Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Persons and Family Relations Cases Slides
Persons and Family Relations Cases Slides
2004 Cases
Psychological Incapacity
FACTS:
Psychological Incapacity
Bigamy
Bigamy
Bigamy
Bigamy
Support
Support
Filiation
Filiation
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Article 148
Article 148
The registration of a property in the name of the paramour who had no income whatsoever at the time of the donation by a husband is tantamount to a donation which is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The paramour then holds the property under a constructive trust under Article 1456 in favor of the conjugal partnership of the husband with the legitimate spouse. h sband ith spo se
Collusion
LESSONS:
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: "If the , defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated." Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the case. This is true even if during the hearing the fiscal p g g participated and p cross-examined the witnesses.
Collusion
Collusion
Parental Authority
Parental Authority
Filiation
Filiation
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
FACTS:
Spouses G owned seven parcels of land which they used as collateral to secure a loan for their poultry project from the DBP. The spouses subsequently entered into an agreement with E for him to pay to the bank the principal and remaining interest balance in in exchange for ownership of such lots. Come maturity time, DBP wrote a letter addressed to the spouses demanding for the payment of their remaining balance, but they did not pay or even respond to the bank. Seven months after, DBP wrote a demand letter coupled with a reminder of the upcoming maturity of their loan. When the bank, despite its efforts, did not receive any response from bank efforts the spouses, it proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the secured parcels of land. Because of this, E filed a complaint claiming for injunction and payment g part of the spouses, they also filed a complaint p , y p of damages. On the p alleging, among others, that they are entitled to compensation for moral damages brought about by the pre-mature foreclosure.
2005 Cases
Custody
Custody
Francisco vs. Master Iron Works & Construction Corp. (451 SCRA 494)
CASE ISSUE: p y g p Property regime of co-ownership. FACTS: J married E on 15 January 1983.On 15 February 1985, E executed an Affidavit of Waiver, claiming that he was waiving any claims he had over the property E, then General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International, International bought 7 500 bags of cement worth 7,500 P768,750.00 from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC). Failing to pay for it, MIWCC filed a complaint against him and RTC rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC. MIWCC The Sheriff issued a Notice of Levy on Execution/Attachment over the two lots mentioned to cover the balance of the amount due.
Francisco vs. Master Iron Works & Construction Corp. (451 SCRA 494)
J filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcels of land; she also filed a complaint against MIWCC and the ; p g Sheriff. She alleged that her husband has no claim over the two lots as evidenced by the Affidavit of Waiver executed by her husband. But before J could present her evidences, she filed an annulment case against E on the ground that the latter is already married, and that their marriage was declared null and void for being bigamous.
LESSONS: In cases of cohabitation not falling in Art. 147 of the Family Code, Art. 148 will apply. In cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, only the properties a qu d by both of the parties through their p op acquired bo o pa oug actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common on proportion to their respective contributions. Art. 256 of the Family code states that the law can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights rights.
G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo (453 SCRA 283)
CASE ISSUES:
Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late M on the g g y property as co-owner is valid as to his undivided share. Whether or not the conjugal partnership (CP) is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late M.
FACTS:
M and D were married on August 1967 without a marriage settlement. They purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City during their marriage, but the Deed of Sale was executed only in favor of M, without the knowledge and consent of D. The loan remained outstanding upon maturity so H instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property. A Certificate of Sale was issued to H as the highest bidder and consolidated the ownership of the property. D instituted a case for the nullity of contracts of sale and other damages in the RTC, which ruled in her favor. So did the CA. G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo (453 SCRA 283)
LESSONS: p j g p Article 105: The Chapter on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to CPG already established before its effectivity, unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws Article 124: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or In otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority or the written di iti b ith t th it th itt consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void It is not only the share of the nonconsenting spouse that is void, but the entire encumbrance or disposition. The burden of proof that the debt redounded to the benefit of the family must be proven by the creditor for the CPG to be liable.
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005
Change of Name In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wong (454 SCRA 155)
CASE ISSUE: pp g Whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 of the Family Code on the basis of convenience for the childs best interest. FACTS: FACTS Spouses X and Y had minor A when they were not married to each other yet. Their subsequent marriage brought about the g legitimation of A. The spouses plan to have his education completed in Singapore and to stay there for good. Since in Singapore people do not carry their middle names, and because their doing so would provoke embarrassment Y, the mother, filed embarrassment, Y mother in the RTC a petition for a change in name and/or correction/cancellation of entry of As name by dropping the mothers surname. The trial court denied the petition. A petition for review on certiorari was filed before the SC. SC denied the petition.
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
Change of Name In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wong (454 SCRA 155)
LESSONS: g g , p p For the grant of a change of name, there must be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. The petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name name. The evidence need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. The court should be mindful of the consequent results in the event of this grant.
Adoption
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia (454 SCRA 541)
CASE ISSUE: g , p p y Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. FACTS: FACTS C filed for the adoption of his minor illegitimate child, S. When the Trial Court granted such, she was proclaimed to be known and registered in the Local Civil Registrar as Stephanie Nathy Catindig C then filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use her biological mothers surname Garcia as her middle name. h G i h iddl Trial Court denied Cs motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use his or her mother s mothers surname as middle name; hence, this petition.
Adoption
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia (454 SCRA 541)
LESSONS: The law is silent on whether or not an adopted child may use his or her mothers surname as middle name. It is equally silent on what an adoptee should and could use as a middle name. It is a settled rule that adoption statutes are to be interpreted liberally in favor of adoption. Moreover, Art 10 of the Civil Code provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation of application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. An adopted child is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter; thus an adopted child should enjoy all the rights of a legitimate child including the use of the mothers surname as the middle name. Art 189(3) of the Family Code and Sec 18, Art V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his or her biological parent. Hence, the use of the mothers surname as middle name will maintain the maternal li t l lineage.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
B was an illegitimate son of A. Upon the latter s death S B s mother, and A latters death, S, Bs mother his guardian ad litem filed for the compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child and for the administration and partition of As estate. M, a legitimate daughter of A, in behalf of herself and her two brothers g who were of unsound mind, contested the recognition of filiation of B and the appointment of S as administrator. While the case for the settlement of the estate and the appointment of administrator was pending in court, B and M executed a compromise agreement wherein the latter recognized the former as the illegitimate son of her deceased father the consideration for which was the amount of Php father, 6,000,000 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims, and the waiver by the siblings of their counterclaims against B. The brothers, represented by their uncle H, assailed the propriety of the appointment of their sister as administrator and questioned the validity of the judgment as their sister was not authorized to enter into the compromise agreement on their behalf.
Marital Consent
Marital Consent
Parental Authority
Parental Authority
Support
Support
Marriage Prohibition
Marriage Prohibition
Family Home
Family Home
Birth Certificate
Birth Certificate
Article 147
Article 147
2006 Cases
Presumption of Marriage
Delgado Vda. de la Rosa vs. Heirs o Marciana e gado da a osa s e s of a c a a Rustia Vda. de Damian (480 SCRA 334)
FACTS: FACTS The case revolves around the determination of the correct heirs to G and J, which depends on whether the two were y validly married or not. Petitioners, the siblings of J and their children, claim that there was no marriage. They claim that there is no record of the contested marriage in the civil registry and present a witness who testifies that while the couple lived together as husband and wife, they were never married. A baptismal certificate which lists J as "Seorita" was also presented. Respondents, on the other hand, present various public documents indicating the two are married, including passports, veteran's claims, and titles.
Presumption of Marriage
Delgado Vda. de la Rosa vs. Heirs o Marciana e gado da a osa s e s of a c a a Rustia Vda. de Damian (480 SCRA 334)
LESSONS:
Rule 131 Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that the 131, presumption "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" is satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence In this case, evidence. case both their cohabitation and reputation give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between G and J. Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. In this case, the public documents indicating the existence of a marriage are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and adequately support the presumption. presumption No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners. G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006
Presumption of Marriage
Delgado Vda. de la Rosa vs. Heirs o Marciana e gado da a osa s e s of a c a a Rustia Vda. de Damian (480 SCRA 334)
LESSONS:
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward jurisdiction legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be they would be living in be, constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
Marriage Contract
FACTS: FACTS O, a court personnel, charged A, her co-worker, for slapping her in the face because of unpaid interest due in a debt. 3 witnesses corroborated the event. Consequently, A denied this and contended that O falsified her Service Record by stating that she was born in 1942. However, Os marriage contract dated 1956 revealed that she was 22 at the time of marriage This showed that she marriage. was actually born in 1934. O denied this and contended that she was in good faith believing she was born in 1942. She contends that she was asked by her father to sign a document without her knowing the contents thereof. d ih h k i h h f Moreover, she alleges that she only finished Grade 2; as a result, only knew how to write her name but not read.
Marriage Contract
LESSONS: A marriage contract is a public document that needs , y no authentication. As such, it cannot be overcome by the testimony of one of the contracting parties. Although a birth certificate is best evidence for date of birth, the evidence present contradicts it in this case. There was absence of birth records in the Office of Municipal Registrar of Carigara, Leyte and in the National Statistics Office. Moreover, evidence from her Personal Data Sheet shows that she was able to finish high school. Moreover, Moreover her signature in the marriage contract was legible and neatly written which contradicts her allegations.
Filiation
FACTS: FACTS R, respondent, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits when her husband, P, a member of SSS and pensioner, p passed away on December 8. 1996. She indicated in her y claim that P had a child with her, J born on October 29, 1991. Her claim was settled. Later, SSS received a letter from L, sister of the deceased, contesting Rs Claim She asserts that R abandoned her R s Claim. brother for more than six years and lived with another man, and that P had no legal children with R, but that she has a child with the other man, D. In support of her statements she produced a birth certificate of a child born h d d bi h ifi f hild b to R and D, who according to the certificate was married on November 1 1990. She also assailed that his brother was incapable of having children.
Filiation
FACTS: FACTS In view of this SSS stopped payment and asked respondents to refund the amount already given to them. , g R and her child, J sought for reconsideration and countered that she did not leave his husband and that J was Ps daughter. As evidence, she produced an authenticated copy of Js birth certificate with Ps signature as the father. SSS asked experts to attest if the signature was indeed Ps Ps and they affirmed. R asserts that J is entitled to the benefits.
Filiation
Filiation
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Custody
Custody
Bigamy / Annulment
April 25 1955 A il 25, 1955: C married A. i dA December 10, 1970: C filed a petition to declare A presumptively dead, which was granted by the CFI of Sorsogon August 8, 1993: C marries T January 30, 1998: C dies; T files with the SSS to claim all the benefits/pension for the deceased Alleged children from the 1st and 3rd wives appear, court battle for the pension and other benefits begin SSC overturns original decision of g g giving p g pension to T; CA reversed this decision; SC upheld the intermediate appellate courts decision
Bigamy / Annulment
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Marriage Prohibition
Marriage Prohibition
Property Relations
Property Relations
Alejandro Estrada vs. So edad Escritor eja d o s ada s Soledad sc o (492 SCRA 1)
FACTS:
Respondent S is a court interpreter in a Regional Trial Court, R d t i ti t t i R i lT i lC t living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child with this live-in arrangement. At the instance of complainant A, respondent was charged with committing disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code. Respondent asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses, and having executed a , g Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct. g g The Court held that benevolent neutrality and accommodation is the spirit underlying the religious clause in the Constitution and that in deciding respondents plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause, it is the compelling state interest test which must be applied. A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006
Alejandro Estrada vs. So edad Escritor eja d o s ada s Soledad sc o (492 SCRA 1)
FACTS: Th Court then remanded the complaint to the Offi of The C t th d d th l i t t th Office f the Court Administrator and ordered the Office of the Solicitor General to intervene, thereafter leaving the Court the task to determine whether the evidence adduced by the State proves its more compelling interest.
Alejandro Estrada vs. So edad Escritor eja d o s ada s Soledad sc o (492 SCRA 1)
LESSONS: The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate g g goal of the state. The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.
A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006
Adoption
Adoption
Support
Support
Support
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Filiation
Filiation
Neglect of Child
Neglect of Child
Neglect of Child
Bigamy
Bigamy
Marriage License
Marriage License
Marriage License
Family Home
Family Home
Family Home
Filiation
Filiation
Filiation
Support
Support
Unjust Enrichment
Unjust Enrichment
Unjust Enrichment
Property Relations
Property Relations
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Legal Separation
Legal Separation
Annulment
Lessons: I order f In d for F Force and I i id i d Intimidation to b grounds f be d for nullity of lli f marriage, such force or intimidation must be sufficient to deprive the offended contract party of his will.
Property Relations
Property Relations
Property Relations
Family Home
Family Home
Property Regime
Lupo Atienza vs. Yolanda De Cas o upo e a s o a da e Castro (508 SCRA 593)
Facts: L h d an intimate relationship with Y, who was an had i ti t l ti hi ith Y h accountant for his two corporations despite being a married man. They started living together in 1983 and had two children y g g but parted ways after the birth of their second child L filed a complaint in the Makati City RTC against Y for the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements under De Castro s name located in Bel Air Castros Bel-Air. L alleged that the property was acquired during his union with Y as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them. L also alleged that the property was acquired by Y using HIS exclusive funds and the title was transferred to Ys name was without his knowledge and consent but he did not object because their relationship was still thriving at the time.
G.R. No. 168698. November 29, 2006
Property Regime
Lupo Atienza vs. Yolanda De Cas o upo e a s o a da e Castro (508 SCRA 593)
Facts, continued: Y denies Ls allegations stating that she acquired the d i L ll ti t ti th t h i d th property using HER exclusive funds. RTC ruled in favor of L ordering partition of the property in equal shares. q Y appealed to the CA maintaining the property was bought with her exclusive funds. The CA ruled in her favor, declaring the property to be exclusively owned by Y. L motion f reconsideration was d i d by the CA and is Ls ti for id ti denied b th di now claiming that Art 144 of the Civil Code should govern the property regime of L and Y, making L a co-owner of the Bel-Air property.
Property Regime
Lupo Atienza vs. Yolanda De Cas o upo e a s o a da e Castro (508 SCRA 593)
Lessons: The SC denied L s petition and affirmed the CAs decision Ls CA s decision. The CA correctly ruled under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code considering that there is a bigamous relationship on the part of L therefore only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is required. L was not able to prove his actual contribution. His contention should be proved by competent evidence and not rely on the weakness of the opponent s defense. opponents Given their relationship began before the Family Code, Art 148 of the Family Code was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Art 144 of the Civil Code which did not provide for property relations th t govern couples living i adultery or t l ti that l li i in d lt concubinage.
G.R. No. 168698. November 29, 2006
Property Relations
Property Relations
CPG
Security Bank and Trust Company vs. y p y Mar Tierra Corporation (508 SCRA 419)
Facts: M Tierra Corporation, through its president, W entered Mar Ti C ti th h it id t t d into a credit line agreement with Security Bank and Trust Company secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents M, L and R who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. Respondent was only able to pay P4,648,000 for the principal loan and P2 729 195 56 of the credit line it P2,729,195.56 received for P9,952,000 because it suffered business reversals and eventually ceased operations in 1984. Petitioner appeals the lifting of the RTC of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses M. h j lh dl f h M
CPG
Security Bank and Trust Company vs. y p y Mar Tierra Corporation (508 SCRA 419)
Lessons: I acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the In ti t t f th th husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership Petitioner has the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses M benefited from the transaction.
CPG
Metropolitan Bank and Trust p Company vs. Tan (509 SCRA 383)
Facts: M t b k applied f an extrajudicial f Metrobank li d for t j di i l foreclosure on four l f parcels of land including one that covered by TCT 53267 which was registered in the name of J who was referred to as married to E E assailed that she never gave her consent or conformity to encumber the title in question
CPG
Metropolitan Bank and Trust p Company vs. Tan (509 SCRA 383)
Lessons: Th phrase married t E i merely descriptive of th civil The h i d to is l d i ti f the i il status of J, and it is not proof that such property was acquired during the marriage The presumption under article 116 of the Family code p p y cannot apply without proof that the acquisition was during the marriage Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts o It is possible that it was acquired while respondent was single, and only registered after marriage o Proof o a qu oo of acquisition is a condition sine qua non for the o o d o o o operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership
Filiation
Filiation
Lessons: L Article 19, also known as the principle of abuse of right, prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens y y g , p himself to liability. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised at the expense of another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not prejudice anyone; there being no intention to harm. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
2007 Cases
Change of Name
FACTS:
Trinidad R.A. Capote fil d a petition f change of name of h ward from T i id d R A C t filed titi for h f f her df Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores as guardian ad litem Minor Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamoso, born on 09 July 1982 (prior to effectivity of the Family Code) and is using the surname of his natural father despite not being recognized by his father Minor now desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother. Giovannis mother might eventually petition for him to join her in the US and his use of the surname Gallamaso may complicate his status as a natural child. It has been found that the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, without any opposition, the trial court granted the petition for change of name Petitioner Republic filed an appeal on the grounds that the court a quo erred in g anting the petition in a s mma proceeding. granting summary p oceeding CA affirmed the decision ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature. SC affirms the decision of both the CA and RTC
Change of Name
Divorce
San Luis vs. San Luis (G R No 133743, 02-07-07) vs (G.R. No. 133743
CASE ISSUE: W/N the divorce decree issued by another foreign country to an alien spouse allows the Filipino spouse to remarry again under Philippine law. FACTS: F, contracted three marriages in his lifetime. His first marriage with V was terminated when the latter died in 1963. After 5 years, he validly married M, which the latter divorced in Hawaii in 1973 He then married S in California USA in 1974 F died 1973. 1974. in 1992, leaving real properties with an estimated amount of P30 M. The deceased left no unpaid debts. S sought for the dissolution of the conjugal assets and Fs estate and she filed letters of administration in Makati RTC. d h fil d l f d i i i i M k i RTC Children of F by the first marriage, challenged the claim of S that she be the administrator of the estate of the deceased. They claim that her marriage to F was void since F was still legally married with M. They also prayed that Par.2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code not be given a retroactive effect. G.R. No. 133743/G.R. No. 134029. February 6, 2007
Divorce
San Luis vs. San Luis (G R No 133743, 02-07-07) vs (G.R. No. 133743
LESSONS:
There is no need to apply Article 26 retroactively because during the time of the marriage between F and S, there was already sufficient jurisprudential basis to validate the marriage particularly Van Dorn vs. Romillo. The Van Dorn case revolved around the marriage of a Filipino g p woman to a foreigner and whether or not a divorce filed by the foreigner freed the Filipino woman from responsibilities to the marriage, particularly as to properties. The Court ruled in that case that as to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino woman, that she should no longer be considered th Fili i th t h h ld l b id d married to the alien spouse and that she be no longer required to perform her marital duties and obligations. Article 26 is in fact only a codification of Van Dorns precedent. Indeed, Indeed when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
Filiation
Filiation
The Supreme Court has held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required In fact any authentic writing is required. fact, treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
END