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Sarkissian@hitech Ir
Sarkissian@hitech Ir
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ﻣﻼﺣﻈﺎﺗﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ
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ﺁﻟﻔﺮﺩ ﺳﺮﻛﻴﺴﻴﺎﻥ
ﻭﺯﺍﺭﺕ ﺻﻨﺎﻳﻊ ﻭ ﻣﻌﺎﺩﻥ ،ﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺻﻨﺎﻳﻊ ﻧﻮﻳﻦ
ﺧﻼﺻﻪ:
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻟﻴﻞ ﻧﻘﺶ ﻛﻠﻴﺪﻱ ﺁﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺄﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻭ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﻛﻤﻚ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺘﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩ ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺲ
ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻱ ﻣﺤﻮﺭ ،ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭﻱ ﺍﺯ ﻛﺸﻮﺭﻫﺎ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ .ﭘﻴﭽﻴﺪﮔﻲ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ
ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻭ ﻭﻳﮋﮔﻲﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮ ﺑﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺁﻥ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﻧﺎﻛﺎﻣﻲ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ
ﺷﻮﺩ .ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﻛﻮﺷﺶ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﺑﺎ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﻋﻮﺍﻣﻞ ﻣﻮﺛﺮ ﺑﺮ ﻋﺮﺿﻪ ﻭ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ
ﻛﺸﻮﺭﻫﺎ ﻭ ﻭﻳﮋﮔﻲﻫﺎﻱ ﺧﺎﺹ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﻣﻼﺣﻈﺎﺗﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ.
ﮐﻠﻴﺪ ﻭﺍﮊﻩﻫﺎ :ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﯼ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎﯼ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ
ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﻋﺮﺿﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ
.١ﻣﻘﺪﻣﻪ:
ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩ ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺲ ٣ﻛﺎﺭﻛﺮﺩﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻬﻤﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ،ﺗﺨﺼﻴﺺ ﻣﺠﺪﺩ ﻣﻨﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﺯ ﺑﺨﺶﻫﺎﻱ ﻗﺪﻳﻤﻲ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺑﻪ
ﺑﺨﺶﻫﺎﻱ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ،ﺗﺴﺮﻳﻊ ﻭﺭﻭﺩ ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻱﻫﺎﻱ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﻭ ﻛﺎﺭﻛﺮﺩ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﺷﯽ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ،٤ﺍﺯ ﺟﻤﻠﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻛﺎﺭﻛﺮﺩﻫﺎﻱ
ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ ) .(Adapted from Rowen&Toyoda, 2002ﻧﺤﻮﺓ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻭ ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺰﻡ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ
ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺸﻜﻼﺕ ﺗﺄﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩﺗﺄﺳﻴﺲ ﻫﺎﻱﺗﻚ ٥ﺭﺍ ﺣﻞ ﻛﻨﺪ .ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺕ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ
ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻧﻮﺁﻭﺭﻱ ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻳﻜﻲ ﻧﻪ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪﻩ ﺗﺄﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺑﻠﻜﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻛﻞ ﺑﺨﺶ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ
ﻧﻈﺮ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ .ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺑﺮ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻣﺜﺒﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺑﺮ ﻣﻮﻓﻘﻴﺖ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪﻩ
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ،ﺗﺄﻛﻴﺪ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪﺍﻧﺪ ).(Adapted from Avnimelech&Teubal, 2002
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ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
ﺩﺭ ﻫﺮ ﻛﺸﻮﺭﻱ ،ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﻧﻘﺸﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ .ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺭﻳﺴﻚ ﺑﺎﻻﻱ
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱﻫﺎ ،ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻧﻬﺎﺩﻱ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭ ﺣﺴﺎﺱ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻭ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺩﻗﺖ ﻛﻨﺪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻳﺶ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ
ﻧﺎﻣﻄﻠﻮﺏ ﺑﺮ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻧﺪﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﺑﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻲ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ،ﺍﻗﺪﺍﻣﺎﺕ ﺣﺴﺎﺏ ﻧﺸﺪﻩ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺭﻳﺴﻚ
ﻣﻀﺎﻋﻒ ﺩﺭ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱﻫﺎ ﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻨﺪ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﻣﺸﺎﺭﻛﺖ ﺑﺨﺶ
ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ،ﺩﺭ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ،ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﻳﻚ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﻭ
ﺧﻮﺩﺍﺗﻜﺎ ﻣﻨﺠﺮﺷﻮﺩ ).(Kenney et al., 2002
ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﻛﻮﺷﺶ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﺑﺎ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎﺕ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﻋﻮﺍﻣﻞ ﻣﺆﺛﺮ ﺑﺮ ﻋﺮﺿﻪ ﻭ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎﻱ
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻭ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﻛﺸﻮﺭﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻨﺘﺨﺐ ،ﻣﻼﺣﻈﺎﺗﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﺍﺛﺮ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ
ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ.
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ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
1
Capital Gain
2
Rigid
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ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
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Contract Law
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Capital Providers
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Financial Intermediaries
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Adverse Selection
ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﺍﻃﻼﻋﺎﺕ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﻣﻄﻠﻊ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺍﺯ ﻋﻘﺪ ﭘﻴﻤﺎﻥ )(Dickson
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Moral Hazard
ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﺍﻃﻼﻋﺎﺕ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﻣﻄﻠﻊ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺍﺯ ﻋﻘﺪ ﭘﻴﻤﺎﻥ )(Dickson
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Limited Partnership
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Agency Theory
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ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
ﺩﺭ ﺷﺮﺍﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺩﻭ ﻧﻮﻉ ﺷﺮﻳﻚ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ .ﺷﺮﻛﺎﻱ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﻲ ١ﺑﻪ ﺳﺎﺯﻣﺎﻥﺩﻫﯽ ،ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﯼ ﻭ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﯽﭘﺮﺩﺍﺯﻧﺪ ﻭ ﺷﺮﮐﺎﯼ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ٢ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺎﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ .ﺷﺮﺍﻛﺖ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻣﺰﻳﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻋﻤﺮ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ،
ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺖ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻭ ﻣﺰﻳﺖ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎﺗﻲ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ).(Megginson, 2001
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﺩﺍﺋﻤﻲ ﻧﻤﻲﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ ﺑﻠﻜﻪ ﺩﺭ ﭘﻲ ﻧﻘﺪ ﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻜﻤﻴﻞ
ﺳﻴﻜﻞ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ ) .(Kenney et al., 2002ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮﺍﻳﻦ ﻋﻤﺮ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺷﻜﻞ ﺣﻘﻮﻗﻲ ﺷﺮﺍﻛﺖ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﻳﻚ
ﻣﺰﻳﺖ ﺍﺳﺖ .ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺷﺮﺍﻛﺖﻫﺎ ،ﺷﺮﻛﺎﻱ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺖ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﻭ ﺷﺮﻛﺎﻱ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺖ ﻧﺎﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ
ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ .ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺖ ﻧﺎﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺷﺮﻛﺎﻱ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺖ ﺍﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﻭﺟﻮﻩ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺮ ﻋﻬﺪﻩ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﺍﺯ ﻟﺤﺎﻅ ﺗﺄﻣﻴﻦ
ﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﺯﻳﺮﺍ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻟﻴﻞ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺖ ﻧﺎﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺧﻮﺩ ،ﺷﺮﻛﺎﻱ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﻲ ﻛﻮﺷﺶ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ
ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ ﻭﺟﻮﻩ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﺑﻬﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﻧﺤﻮ ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺩﻫﻨﺪ .ﺑﺎﻻﺧﺮﻩ ،ﺍﻳﻦ ﺷﺮﺍﻛﺖﻫﺎ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎﺕ ﺑﺮ ﺩﺭﺁﻣﺪ ﭘﺮﺩﺍﺧﺖ ﻧﻤﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﺑﻠﻜﻪ
ﺳﻮﺩ ﻳﺎ ﺯﻳﺎﻥ ﺑﻪ ﺷﺮﻛﺎ ﺑﺮﮔﺸﺘﻪ ﻭ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎﺕ ﻃﺒﻖ ﺍﻇﻬﺎﺭ ﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎﺗﻲ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﺤﺎﺳﺒﻪ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ.
ﻧﻘﺶ ﻋﺮﺿﻪ ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻪ ﺳﻬﺎﻡ (IPO) ٣ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻨﺠﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ IPOﻣﻮﻓﻖ
ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﺩﻫﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺑﺎ ﻛﺴﺐ ﺷﻬﺮﺕ ﺗﺎﻣﻴﻦ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺎ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ ﺑﻬﺘﺮ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺩﻫﻨﺪ
).(Schertler, 2003
ﭘﺲ ﺍﺯ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻋﻮﺍﻣﻞ ﻣﻬﻢ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﺑﺮ ﻋﺮﺿﻪ ﻭ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﺩﺭ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺑﻌﺪﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻃﻮﺭ
ﻣﺨﺘﺼﺮ ﺑﻪ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺟﻨﺒﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻬﻢ ﭘﻴﺪﺍﻳﺶ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﻛﺸﻮﺭﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻨﺘﺨﺐ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ .ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﻪ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺍﺯ
ﺟﻨﺒﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻛﺸﻮﺭﻫﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺩﺭﺱﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ.
ﺑﺎ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﺯ ﺍﺳﺘﻌﺎﺭﻩ ﻗﺮﺍﺭﺩﺍﺩ ) ،(Contractﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﺌﻮﺭﻱ ﺑﻪ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﻋﺎﻣﻠﻴﺖ ) (Agencyﻣﻲﭘﺮﺩﺍﺯﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﻫﻮﻳﺘﻲ )ﺑﻪ ﻧﺎﻡ (Principalﻛﺎﺭﻱ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ
)ﻋﺎﻣﻞ ﻳﺎ (Agentﺗﻔﻴﺾ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ ) .(Vibert, 2000ﺷﺎﻳﺎﻥ ﺫﻛﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻧﺎﻣﻄﻠﻮﺏ ﻭ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺩﻭ ﺟﻨﺒﻪ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺸﻜﻼﺗﻲ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﺭﻭﺍﺑﻄﻲ
ﭘﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻲﺁﻳﻨﺪ.
1
General Partners
2
Limited Partners
3
)Initial Public Offering (IPO
5
ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﺎﻻﺕ ﻣﺘﺤﺪﻩ ﻧﻘﺸﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ.
ﺍﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﭘﻮﻟﻲ ﻭ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ -ﻣﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﺗﻮﺭﻡ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﹰﺎ ﭘﺎﻳﻴﻦ ﻭ ﻣﺤﻴﻂ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻭ ﭘﻮﻟﻲ ﭘﺎﻳﺪﺍﺭ -ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻧﺮﺥ
ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎﺕ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ،ﺍﺟﺎﺯﻩ ﺑﻪ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﻧﺸﺴﺘﮕﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻝ ﺩﺭ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕﻫﺎﻱ ،VC
ﻧﻈﺎﺭﺕ ﺑﺮ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﺳﻬﺎﻡ NASDAQﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺷﻔﺎﻓﻴﺖ ﻭ ﺟﻠﻮﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﺍﺯ ﻛﻼﻩﺑﺮﺩﺍﺭﻱ ﻭ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎﺕ
ﺩﺍﻧﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ،ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺟﻤﻠﻪ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ).(Kenney et al., 2002
ﺩﺭ ﺳﺎﻝ SBA1 ،۱۹۵۴ﺑﻪ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺁﻣﺪ ﺗﺎ ﺗﻮﺍﻧﺎﻳﻲ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﻭ ﻣﻮﻓﻘﻴﺖ ﻛﺴﺐ ﻭﻛﺎﺭﻫﺎﻱ ﻛﻮﭼﻚ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻬﺒﻮﺩ
ﺑﺒﺨﺸﺪ ) (Avnimelech&Teubal, 2002ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺳﺎﻝ ۱۹۵۸ﻣﺼﻮﺑﻪ ] ،SBIC2ﺷﺎﻳﺪ[ ﻣﻬﻤﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﺍﺧﻠﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ
ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ،ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺐ ﺷﺪ ).(Kenney et al., 2002
SBICﻫﺎ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕﻫﺎﻱ VCﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻣﺎﻟﻜﻴﺖ ﻭ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺑﻌﻼﻭﻩ ﻭﺟﻮﻩ
ﺍﺳﺘﻘﺮﺍﺿﻲ ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﺗﻀﻤﻴﻦ SBAﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ )ﺑﻪ ﺷﻜﻞ ﺳﻬﺎﻡ ﻭ ﻗﺮﺽ( ﺩﺭ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻛﻮﭼﻚ ﻭﺍﺟﺪ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ
ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ .ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﻃﻮﺭﻱ ﺳﺎﺯﻣﺎﻥ ﺩﻫﻲ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻤﹰﺎ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻧﻜﻨﺪ ﻳﺎ ﺻﻨﺎﻳﻊ ﺧﺎﺻﻲ ﺭﺍ
ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻫﺪﻑ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﻧﺪﻫﺪ .ﺍﺳﺎﺳﹰﺎ ﻳﻚ "ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕ ﻣﺎﺩﺭ" ٣ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ ﭘﻮﺭﺗﻔﻮﻟﻴﻮ ﻭ ﺗﺼﻤﻴﻤﺎﺕ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺑﻪ
ﻣﺪﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻭﺍﺟﺪ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ﺳﭙﺮﺩﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ .ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻳﻚ ﺷﺮﻳﻚ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻛﺮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﭘﻲ
ﻛﺴﺐ ﺑﺎﺯﺩﻩ ﺍﺯ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ).(SBA, 2002
ﻃﻲ ﺩﻫﻪ ۱۹۵۰ﻭ SBIC ۱۹۶۰ﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﻏﺎﻟﺐ ﺑﻮﺩﻧﺪ .ﺩﺭ ﺳﺎﻝ ۱۹۷۴ﻣﺼﻮﺑﻪ ERISA4ﻛﻪ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﺍﻥ
ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﻧﺸﺴﺘﮕﻲ ﺭﺍ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻝ ﺿﺮﺭﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺣﺘﻤﺎﻟﻲ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺩﺭ ﻛﺎﺭﻫﺎﻱ ﭘﺮ ﺭﻳﺴﻚ ﻣﻲﻛﺮﺩ ،ﺑﻪ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺐ ﺭﺳﻴﺪ.
ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻣﺮ ﻭ ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ ﺭﻛﻮﺩ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﺳﻬﺎﻡ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﺷﺪﻳﺪ ﺗﺄﻣﻴﻦ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻭ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺷﺪ
) .(Avnimelech&Teubal, 2002ﻻﺑﻲ ﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﻓﻌﺎﻝ ﺍﻧﺠﻤﻦ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ (NVCA) ٥ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ
ﺟﺪﻳﺪﻱ ﺍﺯ ﻗﻮﺍﻧﻴﻦ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﻧﺸﺴﺘﮕﻲ ﺷﺪﻩ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻬﺎﻳﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﻧﺸﺴﺘﮕﻲ )ﺳﺎﻝ (۱۹۷۸ﺍﺟﺎﺯﻩ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ
ﺷﺪ ﺩﺭ VCﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ ).(Avnimelech&Teubal, 2002; Kenney et al., 2002
ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺩﻻﻳﻞ ﻓﺮﺍﻳﻨﺪ ﭘﻴﺪﺍﻳﺶ VCﺭﺍ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﺪﻳﻦ ﺗﺮﺗﻴﺐ ﻧﺎﻡ ﺑﺮﺩ ):(Avnimelech&Teubal, 2002
.١ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﺳﻮﺩﻫﻲ ﺻﻨﺎﻳﻊ ﺳﻨﺘﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪ ﺑﺎ ﺑﺎﺯﺩﻩ ﺑﺎﻻﻱ ﺑﺨﺶﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻳﻜﻲ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻧﻴﻤﻪ ﻫﺎﺩﻱﻫﺎ
.٢ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺖ ﺑﺎﻻﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﺳﻬﺎﻡ ﺩﺭ ﺩﻫﻪﻫﺎﻱ ۱۹۷۰ﻭ ۱۹۸۰
1
)Small Business Administration (SBA
2
)Small Business Investment Company (SBIC
3
Fund of Funds
4
)Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA
5
)National Venture Capital Association (NVCA
6
ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
.٣ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮﺍﺕ ﺩﺭ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﻲ )ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻧﺮﺥ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎﺕ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ – ﺍﺯ ۴۹/۵ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺩﺭ ﺳﺎﻝ ۱۹۷۷ﺑﻪ ۲۰
ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺩﺭ ،۱۹۸۱ﺍﺟﺎﺯﻩ ﺩﺍﺩﻥ ﺑﻪ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﻧﺸﺴﺘﮕﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺩﺭ VCﻛﻪ ﻃﺒﻖ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ
ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺕ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺠﺪﻳﺪ ﺣﻴﺎﺕ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﻣﻬﻤﺘﺮ ﺑﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﻗﻮﺍﻧﻴﻦ /ﻣﺤﻴﻂ ﺑﺴﺘﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻴﺎﺯﻫﺎﻱ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ (VC
.٤ﻣﺼﻮﺑﻪ SBID1ﺳﺎﻝ ) ۱۹۸۲ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ (SBIR2ﻛﻪ ﻛﺎﺳﺘﻲ ﺳﻴﺴﺘﻤﻲ ﺩﺭﺑﺎﺭﺓ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻪ ٣ﺭﺍ ﺣﻞ ﻛﺮﺩ.
ﻣﺼﻮﺑﻪﺍﻱ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ SBIRﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﺟﺮﻳﺎﻥ ﺍﻧﺪﺍﺧﺖ ﻭ ﺗﺎﻳﻴﺪﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺠﺪﺩ ﺁﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺳﺎﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﻌﺪ ،ﺁﮊﺍﻧﺲﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺪﺭﺍﻟﻲ
ﺭﺍ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻮﺩﺟﻪ ] R&Dﺑﺮﻭﻥ ﺳﺎﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ[ ﺑﻴﺶ ﺍﺯ ۱۰۰ﻣﻴﻠﻴﻮﻥ ﺩﻻﺭ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻨﺪ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻮﻇﻒ ﻣﻲﻛﺮﺩ ﺩﺭﺻﺪﻱ )۲/۵
ﺩﺭﺻﺪ( ﺍﺯ ﻭﺟﻮﻩ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ SBIRﻛﻨﺎﺭ ﺑﮕﺬﺍﺭﻧﺪ .ﻃﺒﻖ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﺩﻩ ﺁﮊﺍﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺩﭘﺎﺭﺗﻤﺎﻥ ﺩﻭﻟﺘﻲ
ﻣﺸﻤﻮﻝ ﻣﺼﻮﺑﻪ ﻫﺮ ﺳﺎﻝ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎﺕ R&Dﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻧﻴﺎﺯ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻋﻼﻡ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﻭ ﭘﺮﻭﭘﻮﺯﺍﻝ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ.
ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻛﻮﭼﻜﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻣﻮﻓﻖ ﺑﻪ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﮔﺮﻧﺖ ٤ﻣﻲﺷﻮﻧﺪ ﻳﻚ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﺳﻪ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪﺍﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺁﻏﺎﺯ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ
):(Adapted from Lerner, 1999a
-ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ،۱ﺗﺎ ﺳﻘﻒ ۱۰۰,۰۰۰ﺩﻻﺭ ﺣﺪﻭﺩ ۶ﻣﺎﻩ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺍﺭﺯﺵ ﻓﻨﻲ ﻭ ﺍﻣﻜﺎﻥ ﺳﻨﺠﻲ ﻳﻚ ﺍﻳﺪﻩ ﻳﺎ
ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻱ
-ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ،۲ﺗﺎ ۷۵۰,۰۰۰ﺩﻻﺭ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﻭ ﺳﺎﻝ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ .ﻛﺎﺭ R&Dﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻭ ﭘﺘﺎﻧﺴﻴﻞ ﺗﺠﺎﺭﻱ
ﺍﺭﺯﻳﺎﺑﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ .ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﭘﺬﻳﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺷﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ،۱ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ۲ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﻧﺪ.
-ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ،۳ﺍﻧﺘﻘﺎﻝ ﻧﻮﺁﻭﺭﻱﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ۲ﺍﺯ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻩ ﺑﻪ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ .ﻭﺟﻮﻩ SBIRﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ﺭﺍ ﭘﻮﺷﺶ
ﻧﻤﻲﺩﻫﻨﺪ .ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﻛﻮﭼﻚ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺍﺯ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ﻳﺎ ﻛﻤﻚﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻓﺪﺭﺍﻝ ﻏﻴﺮ SBIRﺍﻗﺪﺍﻡ ﺑﻪ
ﺗﺄﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺑﻜﻨﺪ.
ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ ﺯﻣﻴﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪ ﻭ ﻇﻬﻮﺭ ﻫﻤﺰﻣﺎﻥ ﺩﺍﻣﻨﻪ ﮔﺴﺘﺮﺩﻩﺍﻱ ﺍﺯ ﻓﺮﺻﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻳﻜﻲ ﻭ ﺗﺠﺎﺭﻱ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﻃﻲ
ﺩﻫﻪ ۶۰ﻭ ،۷۰ﭘﻴﺪﺍﻳﺶ VCﺗﺎ ﺣﺪ ﺯﻳﺎﺩﻱ ﻓﺮﺍﻳﻨﺪﻱ ﺩﺭﻭﻥﺯﺍ ﺑﻮﺩ .ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ،VCﺻﻨﻌﺘﻲ ﭘﺎﻳﺪﺍﺭ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﺍﻣﺎ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺍﺯ
ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻤﺎﺕ ﻣﺪﺍﻭﻡ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻣﺤﻴﻂ ،ﻛﻤﻚ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ ﺷﻜﺴﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﻭ ﺭﻛﻮﺩﻫﺎﻱ ﻛﻮﺗﺎﻩ ﻣﺪﺕ ﺣﻞ ﺷﻮﻧﺪ
).(Avnimelech&Teubal, 2002
-۲-۳ﺷﻜﻞﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺍﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ:
ﺍﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ ﻣﻮﻓﻖﺗﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﭘﻴﺎﺩﻩﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺖ VCﺑﻪ ﺳﺒﻚ ﺩﺭﻩ ﺳﻴﻠﻴﻜﻮﻥ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﻧﻘﺸﻲ ﻣﻬﻢ ﺩﺭ ﺭﺷﺪ
ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺩﺍﺷﺖ ).(Kenney et al., 2002
1
Small Business Innovation Development
2
)Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR
3
Seed Capital
4
Grant
7
ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
ﻃﺒﻖ ﻳﻚ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﺵ ﺭﺳﻤﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻭﺍﺧﺮ ﺩﻫﻪ ۶۰ ،۱۹۸۰ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﭘﺮﻭﮊﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺄﻳﻴﺪ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺗﻮﺳﻂ OCS ١ﻛﻪ ﺍﺯ ﻟﺤﺎﻅ
ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻳﻜﻲ ﻣﻮﻓﻖ ﺑﻮﺩﻧﺪ ﺩﺭ ﺟﺬﺏ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭﻳﺎﺑﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺷﻜﺴﺖ ﻣﻮﺍﺟﻪ ﺷﺪﻩ ﻭ ﻣﺠﺒﻮﺭ ﺑﻪ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ ﻛﺴﺐ ﻭﻛﺎﺭ ﺧﻮﺩ
ﺷﺪﻧﺪ .ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﻦ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺘﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻋﻠﻲﺭﻏﻢ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﮔﺴﺘﺮﺩﻩ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺍﺯ ،R&Dﻣﻨﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻧﺎﻛﺎﻓﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺄﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻣﺘﻌﺎﻗﺐ
R&Dﻭ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﻴﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺿﻌﻴﻒ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺘﻲ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﻭ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩ ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺲ ﻣﻲﺷﺪ
).(Avnimelech&Teubal, 2003
ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ Inbalﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻛﻮﺷﺶ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﺟﺮﺍﻱ ﻳﻚ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖ ﻫﺪﻓﻤﻨﺪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺑﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺳﺎﻝ ۱۹۹۲ﺷﺮﻭﻉ ﺷﺪ
ﺍﻣﺎ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻗﺒﺎﻝ ﭼﻨﺪﺍﻧﻲ ﻣﻮﺍﺟﻪ ﻧﺸﺪ .ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ،ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ Yozmaﺑﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺳﺎﻝ ۱۹۹۳ﺑﺮﻣﺒﻨﺎﻱ ﺍﺟﺮﺍﻱ ﻭﻳﮋﮔﻲﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺛﺒﺎﺕ
ﺷﺪﻩ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺍﻳﺎﻻﺕ ﻣﺘﺤﺪﻩ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻤﺎﺕ ﻻﺯﻡ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ ،ﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﺷﺪ .ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﺑﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﺎﻱ ۱۰۰ﻣﻴﻠﻴﻮﻥ ﺩﻻﺭ ﻭﺟﻪ
VCﺩﻭﻟﺘﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﺁﺳﺘﺎﻧﻪ ﺑﺤﺮﺍﻧﻲ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ) .ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺩﺭ ۱۰ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕ VCﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ )ﺳﻬﻢ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ
۴۰ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺗﺎ ﺳﻘﻒ ۸ﻣﻴﻠﻴﻮﻥ ﺩﻻﺭ( ﻭ ﺗﺨﺼﻴﺺ ۲۰ﻣﻴﻠﻴﻮﻥ ﺩﻻﺭ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺩﺭ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻫﺎﻱﺗﻚ
ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺩﻭﻟﺘﻲ .(Avnimelech&Teubal, 2003) (Yozma
ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺩﻻﻳﻞ ﻣﻮﻓﻘﻴﺖ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ Yozmaﻭ ﻧﺎﻛﺎﻣﻲ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ Inbalﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻨﺪ ﺍﺯ ):(Avnimelech&Teubal, 2003
Yozma -ﺗﻮﺳﻂ OCSﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﻫﺎﻱﺗﻚ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﻲ ﻛﻪ Inbal
ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﺧﺰﺍﻧﻪﺩﺍﺭﻱ ﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﺷﺪ.
-ﺍﺗﺨﺎﺫ ﺷﻜﻞ ﺳﺎﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻣﺸﺎﺭﻛﺖ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺩﺭ Yozma
-ﺩﻭﺭﺓ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ،ﺷﻔﺎﻓﻴﺖ ﺩﺭ ﻭﺭﻭﺩ ﻭ ﺧﺮﻭﺝ ﺑﻪ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ،Yozmaﻋﺪﻡ ﺩﺧﺎﻟﺖ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺩﺭ
ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ ﺭﻭﺯﻣﺮﻩ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕ ﻭ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﻣﺸﻮﻕﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺎﻻ ﺩﺳﺖ ،ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺷﺪ ﺗﻴﻢﻫﺎﻱ VCﺣﺮﻓﻪﺍﻱ ﺟﺬﺏ
ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ Yozmaﺷﻮﻧﺪ.
-ﺍﻟﺰﺍﻡ ﻣﺸﺎﺭﻛﺖ ﺑﺎ ﻳﻚ ﻧﻬﺎﺩ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺣﺴﻦ ﺷﻬﺮﺕ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ،Yozmaﻣﺸﻮﻗﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ
ﻳﺎﺩﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﺟﻤﻌﻲ ﺑﻮﺩ.
-ﺍﺗﺨﺎﺫ ﻳﻚ ﻓﺮﺍﻳﻨﺪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﻲ ﺑﺎ ﻣﺸﺎﺭﻛﺖ ﺧﺰﺍﻧﻪﺩﺍﺭﻱ ،ﺑﺨﺶ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ﻭ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ
ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ Yozma
ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ Yozmaﺩﺭ ﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﺷﺪ ﻭ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﻓﺮﺍﻳﻨﺪﻱ ﺗﻜﺎﻣﻠﻲ ٢ﻭ ﺷﺎﻧﺲ ﺑﻮﺩ (Avnimelech&Teubal,
) .2002ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ ﺯﻣﻴﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪ ،ﺳﻪ ﻋﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻬﻢ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺩﺭ ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻣﻼﺣﻈﻪ Yozma
ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻨﺪ ﺍﺯ ):(Avnimelech&Teubal, 2003
1
)Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS
ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﺩﺭ ﻭﺯﺍﺭﺕ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ،ﺗﺠﺎﺭﺕ ﻭ ﻛﺎﺭ
2
Evolutionary
8
ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
ﺍﻟﻒ -ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺍﺣﺘﻤﺎﻟﻲ "ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎﻱ ﺑﺮﺁﻭﺭﺩﻩ ﻧﺸﺪﻩ" ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺧﺪﻣﺎﺕ VCﺩﺭ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﻪﺍﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩ
ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺲ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺎ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺖ ﺑﺎﻻ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻨﺪ.
ﺏ -ﻫﻢ ﭘﻮﺷﺎﻧﻲ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻳﺎﺩﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﻭ ﻓﺮﺁﻳﻨﺪﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺠﻤﻌﻲ ١ﺩﺍﺧﻞ ﻛﺸﻮﺭ ﻭ ﺑﻬﺒﻮﺩ ﺷﺎﺧﺺ ) NASDAQﺷﺎﻳﺎﻥ ﺫﻛﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ
ﻃﻲ ۱۹۸۴-۸۸ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻱ ﻣﺤﻮﺭ ﺍﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻠﻲ ۳۰۰ﻣﻴﻠﻴﻮﻥ ﺩﻻﺭ ﺍﺯ NASDAQﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻛﺴﺐ ﻛﺮﺩﻧﺪ ﺩﺭ
ﺣﺎﻟﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻛﻞ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻠﻲ ۵۰۰ﻣﻴﻠﻴﻮﻥ ﺩﻻﺭ ﺍﺯ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﺳﻬﺎﻡ Tel Avivﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻭﺭﺩﻧﺪ(.
ﺝ -ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﻣﻮﻓﻖ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ Yozma
-۳-۳ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻥ:
ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻥ ﭘﻮﻳﺎﺗﺮﻳﻦ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻱ ﻣﺤﻮﺭ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺁﺳﻴﺎ ﺩﺍﺭﺍ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﺎﻻﺕ ﻣﺘﺤﺪﻩ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ
ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻣﻮﻓﻖﺗﺮ ،ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺍﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﺍﺯ ﻟﺤﺎﻅ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ،ﻛﻮﭼﻚﺗﺮ ﺍﺯ ﮊﺍﭘﻦ ،ﻫﻨﮓﻛﻨﮓ ﻭ
ﺣﺘﻲ ﺳﻨﮕﺎﭘﻮﺭ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﺍﻣﺎ ﺍﺯ ﻟﺤﺎﻅ ﺗﻌﺪﺍﺩ Start-upﻭ ﻣﻮﻓﻘﻴﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻥ ﻓﻌﺎﻝﺗﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﻜﺎﻥ
ﺩﺭ ﺁﺳﻴﺎ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ).(Kenney et al., 2002
ﺩﻻﻳﻞ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻣﺮ ﭼﻨﺪ ﻭﺟﻬﻲ ﻭ ﺑﻪ ﻛﺎﺭﺁﻓﺮﻳﻨﻲ ،ﺍﺭﺗﺒﺎﻁ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﺎﻻﺕ ﻣﺘﺤﺪﻩ )ﺧﺼﻮﺻﹰﺎ ﺩﺭﻩ ﺳﻴﻠﻴﻜﻮﻥ( ،ﺗﻤﺮﻛﺰ ﺯﻭﺩ ﻫﻨﮕﺎﻡ ﺑﺮ
ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻴﻚ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻳﻚ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﻛﻠﻴﺪﻱ ،ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪﻩ ﻭ ﺗﺄﻛﻴﺪ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺑﺮﺁﻣﻮﺯﺵ ،ﺍﺭﺗﺒﺎﻁ ﭘﻴﺪﺍ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ.
ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻴﻚ ﺩﺭ ﻫﻢ ﺁﻣﻴﺨﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ .ﺩﻭﺭﺓ ﺩﻫﻪ ۱۹۶۰ﺗﺎ ﺍﻭﺍﻳﻞ ﺩﻫﻪ ۱۹۸۰ﺭﺍ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ
ﺩﻭﺭﻩ ﻳﺎﺩﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﺗﻮﻟﻴﺪ ﻗﻄﻌﻪ ﻭ ﺍﺟﺰﺍ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻣﺤﺼﻮﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻴﻚ ﻧﺎﻣﻴﺪ .ﺑﺎ ﻭﺭﻭﺩ ﻛﺎﻣﭙﻴﻮﺗﺮﻫﺎﻱ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ
ﺍﻛﻮﺳﻴﺴﺘﻤﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺨﺼﺼﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺟﻬﺖﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﺗﻮﻟﻴﺪ ﺍﺟﺰﺍﺀ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻴﻚ ،ﻣﻮﻧﺘﺎﮊﻫﺎ ﻭ ﺣﺘﻲ ﻛﻞ ﻛﺎﻣﭙﻴﻮﺗﺮ ﺗﻜﺎﻣﻞ
ﻳﺎﻓﺖ .ﺁﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻱ ﻛﻪ ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﺗﺨﺼﺺ ﭘﻴﺪﺍ ﻛﺮﺩ ،ﺗﻮﻟﻴﺪ ﻧﻴﻤﻪ ﺭﺳﺎﻧﺎﻫﺎ ﺑﻮﺩ .ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻨﺠﺎ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ
ﺗﺨﺼﺺ ﻭ ﺍﻧﺘﻘﺎﻝ ﺁﻥ ﺑﻪ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ﺑﻮﺩ .ﭘﺲ ﺍﺯ ﻛﻮﺷﺶ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻳﻜﭙﺎﺭﭼﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﭘﻮﺷﺶ ﻃﻴﻒ
ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﺗﺎ ﺗﻮﻟﻴﺪ ،ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻧﻲ ﻋﻘﺐﻧﺸﻴﻨﻲ ﻛﺮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺑﺮ ﺗﻮﻟﻴﺪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﭼﻴﭗ Fabless ٢ﻣﺘﻤﺮﻛﺰ
ﺷﺪﻧﺪ ).(Kenney et al., 2002
ﺩﺭ ﺳﺎﻝ ۱۹۸۳ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻲ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺐ ﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺗﺎ ۲۰ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎﺗﻲ ٣ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻧﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ
ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺣﺪﺍﻗﻞ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﻭ ﺳﺎﻝ ﺣﻔﻆ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ ،ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﻣﻲﻛﺮﺩ .ﺑﺎ ﺗﺠﺪﻳﺪ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺳﺎﻝ ۱۹۹۱ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﺣﻘﻮﻗﻲ )ﺷﺮﻛﺘﻲ( ﻧﻴﺰ
ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎﺗﻲ ۲۰ﺩﺭﺻﺪﻱ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ .ﻣﺸﻮﻕ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ۸۰ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺩﺭﺁﻣﺪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ
ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻣﻌﺎﻓﻴﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺳﺎﻝ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺟﺎﺭﻱ ﺑﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺠﺪﺩ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ،ﺩﺭﺁﻣﺪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﺭﻳﺴﻚﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻣﻲ-
ﺗﻮﺍﻧﺴﺖ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻇﻬﺎﺭ ﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎﺗﻲ ﻛﺴﺮ ﺷﻮﺩ .ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ ،ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﻭﺟﻮﻫﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ VCﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﻲﻛﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ
1
Cumulativeness
2
Chip
3
Tax Deduction
9
ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
ﺻﻮﺭﺗﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ﻫﻢ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﻣﻲﺩﺍﺩﻧﺪ ﻭ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩﻳﺖﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺻﻨﺎﻳﻌﻲ ﻛﻪ
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﭘﺬﻳﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺑﻮﺩ ،ﺭﺍ ﻗﺒﻮﻝ ﻣﻲﻛﺮﺩﻧﺪ ).(Kenney et al., 2002
ﺳﺎﺧﺘﺎﺭ ﺳﺎﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ VCﺩﺭ ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﺎﻻﺕ ﻣﺘﺤﺪﻩ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ .ﻫﻮﻳﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﻳﻚ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﺻﻮﺭﻱ ١ﻣﻲ-
ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱﻫﺎﻱ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ VCﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎﺕ ﺁﻥ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻳﻚ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﻣﺸﺎﻭﺭﻩ ﻣﻲ-
ﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﺻﻮﺭﻱ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﺗﺴﻮﻳﻪ ﻣﺸﺨﺺ ﻧﻤﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﻫﻴﭻ ﻛﺎﺭﻛﻨﺎﻧﻲ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﺍﻣﺎ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻳﻚ ﻫﻴﺌﺖ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻩ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﺎﻧﮕﺮ
ﺳﻬﺎﻡ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻭ ﻳﻚ ﺭﺋﻴﺲ ﻫﻴﺌﺖ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻩ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﻫﻴﺌﺖ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻩ ﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭ ﻧﻬﺎﻳﻲ ﺗﺄﻳﻴﺪ ﺗﻤﺎﻡ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱﻫﺎ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ .ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭﻱ
ﺍﺯ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻧﻲ ﻣﻌﺘﻘﺪﻧﺪ ﺳﺎﺧﺘﺎﺭ ﺷﺮﺍﻛﺖ ]ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ[ ﺍﻳﺎﻻﺕ ﻣﺘﺤﺪﻩ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺳﻴﺴﺘﻢ ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻧﻲ
ﺑﺮﺗﺮﻱ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﺍﻣﺎ ﺗﻤﻬﻴﺪﺍﺕ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺳﺎﺧﺘﺎﺭ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ).(Kenney et al., 2002
ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻌﺎﻳﺐ ﺳﻴﺴﺘﻢ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻨﺪ ﺍﺯ ):(Kenney et al., 2002
-ﻟﺰﻭﻡ ﻣﺸﻮﺭﺕ ﻭ ﻣﻮﺍﻓﻘﺖ ﻫﻴﺌﺖ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻩ ﺑﺎ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱﻫﺎ ﻣﺴﺘﻠﺰﻡ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﺯ ﻭﻗﺖ ﭘﺮﺳﻨﻞ ﺍﺳﺖ.
-ﻋﻤﺮ ﺩﺍﺋﻤﻲ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕ ﺑﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﻌﻨﻲ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻮﻓﻖ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺗﻌﺪﺍﺩ ﺯﻳﺎﺩﻱ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕ ﺗﺤﺖ
ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ.
-ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ ﻋﻤﺮ ﺩﺍﺋﻤﻲ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕﻫﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺷﻮﺩ ﻛﺎﺭﺁﻓﺮﻳﻨﺎﻥ ﻛﻮﺷﺶ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ
ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺴﻮﻳﻪ ﻧﻜﻨﺪ.
-ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺣﺮﻓﻪﺍﻱ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ VCﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﺭﺍ ﻛﻨﺘﺮﻝ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺍﮔﺮ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﺆﺳﻴﺴﻦ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﻧﺒﺎﺷﻨﺪ
ﺟﺒﺮﺍﻥ ﺧﺪﻣﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺣﻘﻮﻕ ﻭ ﭘﺎﺩﺍﺵ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﻂ ﺑﺎ ﻋﻤﻠﻜﺮﺩ ﺍﺟﺎﺯﻩ ﻧﻤﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﺳﻬﻢ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻣﻼﺣﻈﻪﺍﻱ ﺍﺯ
ﺑﺎﺯﺩﻩ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻭﺭﻧﺪ .ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﻘﻞ ﻭ ﺍﻧﺘﻘﺎﻻﺕ ﺑﺎﻻ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ.
1
Paper Corporation
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ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
ﻫﺪﻓﻤﻨﺪ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻟﻴﻞ ﻛﻤﺒﻮﺩ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﻴﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻧﻮﺁﻭﺭﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺨﺶ ﻛﺴﺐ ﻭ ﻛﺎﺭ ﻭ
ﺗﻌﺪﺍﺩ ﻛﻢ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩ ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺲ ﺑﺎ ﺷﻜﺴﺖ ﻣﻮﺍﺟﻪ ﺷﻮﻧﺪ ).(Avnimelech&Teubal, 2002
-ﻧﻘﺶ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭﻫﺎﻱ ﺳﻬﺎﻡ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻳﻚ ﺍﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﮋﻱ ﺧﺮﻭﺝ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﺷﺎﻳﺪ ﺍﻳﻦ
ﺗﺼﻮﺭ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﻛﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭﻫﺎﻱ ﺳﻬﺎﻡ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﺩﺍﺩ .ﻣﺜ ﹰ
ﻼ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ
(Adapted from ﻛﺮﺩ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﻣﺤﻮﺭ ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻱ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﻬﺎﻡ
) .Armour&Cumming,2003ﻫﺮ ﭼﻨﺪ IPOﻳﻚ ﺍﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﮋﻱ ﺧﺮﻭﺝ ﻣﻬﻢ ﻭ ﺑﺎ ﻭﺟﻬﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ VCﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ،ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺩﻗﺖ ﻧﻤﻮﺩ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﺳﻬﺎﻣﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻘﺪﻳﻨﮕﻲ ،ﺷﻔﺎﻓﻴﺖ ﻭ ﻧﻈﺎﺭﺕ ﻧﺪﺍﺷﺘﻪ
ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﻣﻘﺼﻮﺩ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺮﺁﻭﺭﺩﻩ ﻛﻨﺪ ﻭ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺯﺩﻭﺑﻨﺪ ﻭ ﻛﻼﻩﺑﺮﺩﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ .ﺑﻌﻼﻭﻩ،
ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺎ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺖ ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﺳﻬﺎﻡ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ IPOﺷﻮﻧﺪ )ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ
ﺍﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻠﻲ ﺩﺭ NASDAQﻭ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻧﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻫﻨﮓﻛﻨﮓ ﻳﺎ ﺳﻨﮕﺎﭘﻮﺭ(
-ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﻫﻤﻜﺎﺭﻱ ﺑﺎ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ VCﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺣﺴﻦ ﺷﻬﺮﺕ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺍﺯ ﭼﻨﺪﻳﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﻬﻢ
ﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﺍﻳﻦ ﻫﻤﻜﺎﺭﻱﻫﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﻧﻘﺶ ﻣﻬﻤﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻳﺎﺩﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﻧﺒﻮﺩ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ
ﺑﺎ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ،ﺣﺘﻲ ﻧﺒﻮﺩ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺻﻨﺎﻳﻊ ﻫﺎﻱﺗﻚ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﺑﺰﺭﮔﻲ ﺩﺭ ﭘﻴﺪﺍﻳﺶ ﻭ ﺭﺷﺪ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VC
ﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﻧﻘﺶ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻫﻤﻜﺎﺭﻱﻫﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﭘﺨﺶ ﺭﻳﺴﻚ ﺍﺯ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩ
ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺲ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺭﺷﺪ ﺳﺮﻳﻊ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻜﺎﻥﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ،ﺑﺎﺷﺪ (Adapted from Kenney et al.,
).2002
-ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻭﺍﺳﻄﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﻣﺸﻜﻼﺕ "ﻋﺎﻣﻠﻴﺖ" )ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ
ﻧﺎﻣﻄﻮﻟﺐ ﻭ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ( ﻭ ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ ﻧﺤﻮﺓ ﺟﺒﺮﺍﻥ ﺧﺪﻣﺎﺕ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺑﻪ
ﮔﻮﻧﻪﺍﻱ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺧﻄﺎﺏ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﮔﻴﺮﻧﺪ .ﺷﻜﻞ ﺳﺎﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻣﺸﺎﺭﻛﺖ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﻳﻚ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ
)ﺧﺼﻮﺻﹰﺎ ﻃﺒﻖ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﺎﻻﺕ ﻣﺘﺤﺪﻩ( ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ.
-ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎ ﻭ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﺍﺯ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﻭ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﻭ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩ ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺲ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ
ﺯﻣﻴﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﭘﻴﺪﺍﻳﺶ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﻛﻨﺪ .ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺭﺍﺳﺘﺎ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﻪ
ﺩﻭ ﺩﺳﺘﻪ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ ﻛﺮﺩ :ﻛﻮﺷﺶﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻃﻮﺭ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﻛﺎﺭﺁﻓﺮﻳﻦ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺄﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ
]ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ [SBIRﻭ ﺁﻧﻬﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﺑﻴﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ ]ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ [SBIC
) .(Lerner, 1999aﻃﺒﻖ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﻪ ) Lerner(1999bﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ SBIRﻛﻤﻚ
ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﻧﻤﻮﺩﻩ ﺑﻮﺩﻧﺪ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺭﺷﺪ ﻓﺮﻭﺵ ﻭ ﺍﺷﺘﻐﺎﻝ ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺮﻱ ﺑﻮﺩﻧﺪ .ﺍﻳﻦ ﺭﺷﺪ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻘﻲ
ﺑﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺖ VCﺑﺎﻻﻳﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ .ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﮕﻮ ﺩﺭ ﺻﻨﺎﻳﻊ ﻫﺎﻱﺗﻚ ﻣﺸﺨﺺﺗﺮ
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ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
ﺑﻮﺩ .ﺑﻌﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻣﻴﺰﺍﻥ ﺳﻮﺑﺴﻴﺪﺩﻫﻲ ]ﻣﻨﻈﻮﺭ ﻛﻤﻚ ﻣﺎﻟﯽ[ ،ﺑﻬﺒﻮﺩ ﻋﻤﻠﻜﺮﺩ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﻣﺸﺎﻫﺪﻩ ﻧﺸﺪ.
ﺍﻳﻦ ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻣﺮ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﻛﻤﻚ ﺍﺯ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ SBIRﺷﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻮﻋﻲ ﻧﻘﺶ ﺗﺎﻳﻴﺪ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺖ
ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﺗﻠﻘﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﺪ .ﺯﻳﺮﺍ ﭘﺲ ﺍﺯ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﻛﻤﻚ ،ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎ ﺷﺎﻧﺲ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ VCﺩﺍﺷﺘﻨﺪ.
ﻳﻚ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻬﺎﺩﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺠﺮﻱ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﻳﺴﺘﻲ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﻴﺖ ﻭ ﻣﺸﺮﻭﻋﻴﺖ ﺍﺟﺮﺍﻱ
ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻲﺩﺍﺷﺘﻨﺪ ﺗﺎ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﭘﺘﺎﻧﺴﻴﻞ ﺑﺎﻻ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻗﺒﻮﻝ
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﻣﻲﮔﺮﻓﺖ.
-ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻃﻮﺭ ﺁﺷﻜﺎﺭ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻭ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻱ VC
ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﻧﻤﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﺑﺎ ﺍﺣﺘﻤﺎﻝ ﺯﻳﺎﺩ ﺑﺎ ﺷﻜﺴﺖ ﻣﻮﺍﺟﻪ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﻧﺪ ) .(Kenney et al., 2002ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ-
ﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻣﻮﻓﻘﻴﺖﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﺴﺐ ﻛﺮﺩﻧﺪ )ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ SBICﻭ (Yozmaﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎﺗﻲ ﺑﻮﺩﻧﺪ.
-ﺳﻴﻜﻞ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﺪﻳﻦ ﮔﻮﻧﻪ ﺗﺼﻮﺭ ﮐﺮﺩ ):(Etzkowitz, 2003
oﺳﻜﻮﻥ :ﻋﺪﻡ ﺗﻤﺎﻳﻞ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﺑﻪ ﺗﻌﻬﺪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ
١
oﻛﻤﺒﻮﺩ :ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻝ ﺷﻜﻞﮔﻴﺮﻱ ،ﻛﻤﺒﻮﺩ ﻭﺟﻮﻩ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺘﻌﺎﻗﺐ
oﺗﻌﺎﺩﻝ :ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ ﻭ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻣﻨﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻛﺎﻓﻲ
٢
oﻣﺎﺯﺍﺩ :ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻭﺟﻮﻩ ﻭ ﺣﺮﻛﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺳﻮﻱ ﺗﺄﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻣﺮﺍﺣﻞ ﺑﻌﺪﻱ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ
oﺷﻜﺎﻑ :ﻛﻤﺒﻮﺩ ﻭﺟﻮﻩ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺮﺍﺣﻞ ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻪ
ﺯﻳﺎﺩ ﺷﺪﻥ ﻣﻨﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺻﻨﺪﻭﻕﻫﺎ ،ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱﻫﺎ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺮﺍﺣﻞ ﺑﻌﺪﻱ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﻣﻲﻛﺸﺎﻧﺪ ﻭ ﺍﮔﺮ ﻭﺟﻮﻩ
ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺧﻴﻠﻲ ﻛﻢ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ ﺗﻮﺍﻧﺎﻳﻲ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺘﻌﺎﻗﺐ ]ﺩﺭ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻪ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ
ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ ﻭ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﭘﺘﺎﻧﺴﻴﻞ ﺭﺷﺪ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ[ ﺭﺍ ﻧﺨﻮﺍﻫﻨﺪ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ .ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺸﻜﻞ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺍﺯ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺖﻫﺎﻱ VC
ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ،ﺩﻭﻟﺘﻲ ،ﺩﺍﻧﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﻭ ﺩﻭﻟﺘﻲ -ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﻲ ﻣﺮﺍﺣﻞ ﺳﻴﻜﻞ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﻭ ﻣﺮﺍﺣﻞ
ﺷﻜﻞﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺖ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ ،ﺣﻞ ﺷﻮﺩ ).(Etzkowitz, 2003
ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺳﻴﻜﻞ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻭ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻛﻤﺒﻮﺩﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻮﺟﻮﺩ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺭﺍﻫﻨﻤﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ
ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﺗﺨﺎﺫ ﺍﻗﺪﺍﻣﺎﺕ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ.
-ﻳﺎﺩﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﺍﺯ ﻣﮑﺎﻧﻴﺰﻫﺎﻱ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ،ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎ ﺑﺎ ﮐﺎﺳﺘﻲﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻮﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ
) VCﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺗﮑﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻱﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﮐﻪ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﻧﻤﻲﺷﻮﻧﺪ ﻭ ﮐﻤﺒﻮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺘﻌﺎﻗﺐ( ،ﺣﻔﻆ
ﺍﻧﻌﻄﺎﻑ ﭘﺬﻳﺮﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺧﻮﺭﺩ ﺑﺎ ﻣﻨﺎﺑﻊ ﻋﺪﻡ ﺍﻃﻤﻴﻨﺎﻥ )ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺗﮑﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻱ ﻭ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﻣﺤﺼﻮﻝ( ،ﻭ ﺷﻨﺎﺳﺎﻳﻲ
ﻋﻮﺍﻣﻞ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﺭﺯﻳﺎﺑﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﮑﺮﺩ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﮐﻨﻨﺪﻩ ﺗﺎﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ )ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺗﻴﻢ
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Follow-on
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ﻣﻘﺼﻮﺩ ﻣﺮﺍﺣﻞ ﺭﺷﺪ ﻳﮏ ﺷﺮﮐﺖ ﻣﯽﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻣﺜﻼ :ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ،Seedﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ،Start-upﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ Expansion
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ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ -ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ ٢٨ ،ﻭ ٢٩ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ ١٣٨٣ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ ،ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺍﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﮋﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ ﺭﻭﺷﻦ ﻭ ﺗﻤﺎﻳﻞ ﺷﺪﻳﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺟﺬﺏ ﺗﺎﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ( ،ﻣﻮﺍﺭﺩﻱ
ﺍﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﺩﺭ ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﺍﺯ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩ ﺗﺎﺳﻴﺲ ﻭ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ
ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺩﻭﻟﺘﻲ ،ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﻣﺪ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ ).(Lerner, 2002
.۵ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪﮔﻴﺮﻱ:
ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﺷﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺑﻪ ﺷﮑﻞ ﻳﮏ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﻧﻈﺎﺭﻩ ﺷﻮﺩ ﻭ ﻃﺮﻑ ﻋﺮﺿﻪ ﻭ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎﻱ ﺁﻥ،
ﻭﻳﮋﮔﻲﻫﺎﻱ ﺧﺎﺹ ﺁﻥ ﻭ ﭘﻴﺪﺍﻳﺶ ﺁﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺍﺯ ﮐﺸﻮﺭﻫﺎ ﺑﻪ ﻃﻮﺭ ﻣﺨﺘﺼﺮ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺷﺪﻧﺪ .ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﮐﺸﻮﺭﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻮﻓﻖ ﺩﺭ
ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﻓﺮﺻﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ )ﺑﻪ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎﻱ
ﺗﺎﺯﻩ ﺗﺎﺳﻴﺲ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺭﺷﺪ ﺳﺮﻳﻊ( ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ .ﺩﺭ ﺍﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ ﻧﺒﻮﺩ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻳﮏ ﮐﺎﺳﺘﻲ ﺩﺭ
ﺳﻴﺴﺘﻢ ﻣﻠﻲ ﻧﻮﺁﻭﺭﻱ ﺑﻮﺩ ﻭ ﮐﺸﻮﺭ ﺗﺎﻳﻮﺍﻥ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺗﻮﺍﻧﺴﺖ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﻴﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﮑﻤﻴﻞ ﮐﻨﻨﺪﻩ ﻧﻴﺎﺯﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﺭﻩ ﺳﻴﻠﻴﮑﻮﻥ
ﺟﺎﻳﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺧﻮﺷﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻫﺎﻱﺗﮏ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺧﻮﺩ ﭘﻴﺪﺍ ﮐﻨﺪ .ﺑﻪ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻲﺭﺳﺪ ﻧﺒﻮﺩ ﺟﺮﻳﺎﻥ ﻓﺮﺻﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ
ﺑﺎﺯﺩﻩ ﺑﺎﻻ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﺍﺻﻠﻲ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺧﺼﻮﺻﹰﺎ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺮﺍﺣﻞ ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ.
ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ،ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺳﺒﺪﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎ )ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﺍﻗﺪﺍﻣﺎﺗﻲ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﻣﺸﻮﻕ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎﺗﻲ،
ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﮐﺎﺭﺁﻓﺮﻳﻨﻲ ﺗﮑﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻳﮑﻲ ﻭ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺸﺘﺮﮎ ﺩﻭﻟﺘﻲ – ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻲ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ (SBICﻣﺘﺼﻮﺭ ﺷﺪ .ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ
ﻼ ﺩﺭ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻄﻲ ﮐﻪ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩ ﺗﺎﺳﻴﺲ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ
ﻣﺤﺘﻮﺍﻱ ﺳﺒﺪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺘﻲ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﮐﻨﺪ .ﻣﺜ ﹰ
ﭘﺘﺎﻧﺴﻴﻞ ﺭﺷﺪ ﺑﺎﻻ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭ ﮐﻢ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ ،ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ ﮐﺎﺭﺁﻓﺮﻳﻨﻲ ﺗﮑﻨﻮﻟﻮﮊﻳﮑﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺳﺒﺪ
ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺘﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺮﻱ ﺑﺮﺧﻮﺭﺩﺍﺭ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ.
ﺑﻪ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻲﺭﺳﺪ ﺩﻭﻟﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻦ ﺗﻮﺍﻧﻤﻨﺪﻱ ﻭ ﺗﻌﻬﺪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺩﺭ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﻲ ﻣﺮﺍﺣﻞ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺍﺯ ﭘﻴﺪﺍﻳﺶ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ
،VCﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ﭘﻴﺪﺍﻳﺶ ﻭ ﺗﺜﺒﻴﺖ ﺁﻥ ﻧﻘﺸﻲ ﮐﻠﻴﺪﻱ ﻭ ﻳﺎ ﺗﺴﻬﻴﻞ ﮐﻨﻨﺪﻩ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻣﺮ ﻣﺴﺘﻠﺰﻡ ﺍﺗﺨﺎﺩ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎﻱ
ﺻﺤﻴﺢ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺒﺘﻪ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ ﺯﻣﻴﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ.
ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺩﻗﺖ ﻧﻤﻮﺩ ﮐﻪ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺟﻨﺒﻪ ﺗﺎﻣﻴﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻣﻬﻢ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ ﺑﻠﮑﻪ ﮐﻤﮏ ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺘﻲ ﮐﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ
ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺑﺎ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﮐﻨﻨﺪ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﻧﻘﺸﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺰﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﻓﻘﻴﺖ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺯﻩ ﺗﺎﺳﻴﺲ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ.
ﻧﺒﻮﺩ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ VCﻭ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺻﻨﺎﻳﻊ ﻫﺎﻱﺗﮏ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﻳﮑﯽ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺸﮑﻼﺕ ﺍﺻﻠﯽ ﭘﻴﺪﺍﻳﺶ
ﺻﻨﻌﺖ VCﺑﺎﺷﺪ .ﻳﮏ ﺭﺍﻩ ﺣﻞ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺭﺍﺳﺘﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﺯ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻴﺎﺕ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ VCﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ ﻭ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻖ
ﻳﺎﺩﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ.
ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﮔﺬﺍﺭﺍﻥ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻳﮏ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﮐﻪ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﭘﻴﺶﺭﺍﻥﻫﺎﻱ ﻋﺮﺿﻪ ﻭ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎﻱ
ﺧﺎﺹ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ،ﻧﻈﺎﺭﻩ ﮐﻨﻨﺪ .ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻮﺍﻣﻞ ﻣﻮﺛﺮ ﺑﺮ ﻋﺮﺿﻪ ﻭ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎﻱ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ VCﻭ ﺗﻌﻴﻴﻦ ﮐﺎﺳﺘﻲﻫﺎﻱ
ﺍﺣﺘﻤﺎﻟﻲ ﻣﻮﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﻃﺮﻑ ﻋﺮﺿﻪ ﻳﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍﻫﻨﻤﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺖﻫﺎ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ.
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١٣٨٣ ﻣﺮﺩﺍﺩ٢٩ﻭ٢٨ ، ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ- ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﻫﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻠﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ
:ﻣﻨﺎﺑﻊ
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