Islamic Research Institute for Culture and Thought

International Conference

Quran and Epistemology Conference

Tehran, 2012

The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature From an Arab/Islamic Perspective

Samir Abuzaid

Samir Abuzaid

The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature From an Arab/Islamic Perspective Samir Abuzaid

Abstract
The problem of the disagreement between the mechanistic model and the current advancement of science and philosophy of science is addressed. The author argues that the three basic presuppositions of the mechanistic model (the indivisible atoms, determinism and reduction) are scientifically refuted and hence, there is a need for a new model of nature that restores consistency between our view to nature represented by such a model and our contemporary scientific and philosophical knowledge. The author analyses the concept of the model of nature and deduces its basic principles, and reviews the possible basic principles of such an alternative model. On the basis of his analysis of the epistemological presuppositions of the Arab/Islamic Worldview, as a sociological and not as a religious concept, he introduces his view of the basic principles of the new model that are consistent with such a Worldview and with the scientific proven facts as well as with the contemporary advancements of the field of philosophy of science.

1. Introduction
Today we live in the modern world. The modern world is usually contrasted to the pre-modern periods by its scientific Worldview as opposed to the Religious Worldview. One of the basic marks of such a contrast is that the modern scientific Worldview is based on the 'mechanistic' causal view whereas the Religious one is based on the 'teleological' view. The exemplar of the first one is the Newtonian mechanistic picture of the world, whereas the exemplar of the second is the Aristotelian teleological picture of the world, especially when associated with the Christian religion.

The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature The function of each picture of the world is to present successful explanations to phenomena we experience in our human life; from those related to our earthly objects, such as plants, animals and humans to the phenomena related to the macrocosm with its celestial objects and events. In comparison to the teleological view, the mechanistic view has proved much more successful in explaining such phenomena, to the extent that we gave up completely the teleological view in favor to the mechanistic one. However, the mechanistic view has encountered, since the first third of the twentieth century on, great difficulties that forced scientists and philosophers to defend it in several ways. Such a defense has turned such a picture, as will be explained clearly, from a realistic picture that describes reality in strait forward terms to some form of a metaphysical or theoretical formulation. In addition, such a defense is now bearing heavily on the future. So instead of getting more scientific and practical support, defenders of such view reckon on the metaphysical assumption that future advancement of science will bring with it scientific justification of such a view. The main problems that confronted the mechanistic view, due to the advancement of contemporary science, are on the subatomic, biological and mental levels. This leaves true and complete success of such a view confined to only one level, namely the natural normal level, with the exception of chaotic systems. Till today there is no agreed upon or complete mechanistic explanation of the Quantum phenomena at the subatomic level, the organic and cellular vital phenomena, and the human intentional and consciousness phenomena, in addition to chaotic and self organization systems. Despite contemporary prevalence of the mechanistic view as well as its theoretical metaphysical defending forceful arguments, nevertheless, a wide variety of philosophical views that are either partially or totally in contradiction with such a view has appeared in the recent decades. This has produced a situation of fragmentation or a basic schism in contemporary scientific and philosophical community. Today we have a full range of spectrum of views with respect to explanation of phenomena of the world, all of which are part of contemporary academic scientific and philosophy of science domains. Such a spectrum starts at one extreme by defending what can be termed the orthodox

Samir Abuzaid mechanistic view, through views that present new concepts that aim at saving such a view on behalf of some of its presuppositions, and ends at the other extreme by views that contradict directly such view and present alternative scattered non organized non-mechanistic views.

Three Possible Positions

Within this fragmented picture it is evident that advancement of science, natural and human, is based essentially on the degree of success of the view embraced about the real world. Hence, coming to consensus amongst the scientific and philosophical community is especially important for the future of contemporary science. More important is to achieve consensus about the more fruitful and productive view, whether mechanistic or not. In this respect, we have three possible positions: First, coming to consensus about a new or improved form of the mechanistic view in order to overcome its current problems; Second, rejecting the notion of the World view or World picture altogether, whether mechanistic or not; The third, is to place effort toward constructing a new non -or partially- mechanistic view. In this work, we reject the second option; for we start from the contention that science cannot advance with the absence of an overall consistent view to the world. From another side, much work is currently underway to support both metaphysically and practically the mechanistic view to the world. The only position left is that in which a new scientific view to the world is to be admitted. Such a position is that which we purport to discuss in this study from the point of view of the contemporary Arab/Islamic worldview.

The Arab/Islamic Scientific View

A Worldview is that of a specific person, society or a complex of societies (i.e., a Civilization). In addition, a Worldview can be based either on natural human presuppositions, or on a specific religion. In the later case, such a person, society or a civilization deduces such a Worldview from the strictures, rituals or the central text of such a religion. Within this understanding of the term, the Islamic world, as a group of societies (Arabs, Iranians, Turks, etc), belongs to one civilization that possesses a

The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature specific Worldview, namely the Arab/Islamic civilization. The Worldview of such a Civilization is based essentially on the principles and values of 'Al-Quran', which is the central text of the Islamic religion. Consequently, such a Civilization bears its name from the language that preserves such a text, which is Arabic, and from the religion through which its Worldview is deduced, which is Islam. Here we make essential differentiation between two basic concepts: Religion and Civilization. If we don't make such a differentiation by using one and the same term "the Islamic Worldview" then we will conflate the two meanings of the term: the 'Islamic Worldview' as a religious idealistic concept, and the 'Islamic Worldview', as a sociological-epistemological concept. The first can't be used in the sociological analysis of the society with its cognitive and epistemological principles because of its idealistic nature in which there is no a sociological actor. In the second, the sociological actor is the societies that comprise together the collective civilizational complex. Establishing the essential difference between the two concepts of Religion and Worldview is important in this work. For the scientific view of the Arab/Islamic civilization is not a religious view to the world, rather, it is a civilizational view that is developed and continuously evolves according to the advancement of the local societies of such a civilizational complex as well as in response to the advancement of human thought at large1. With such a general understanding in mind, every Worldview constitutes a specific view to the world in general, and to the basic principles upon which scientific and epistemological knowledge of the world can be constructed, in particular. Here, it should be noted that such principles don't produce an a priori fixed picture of the world. Rather, such a picture, as a scientific one, changes with the change of our human knowledge as well as with the different views introduced in the different societies within the same general civilizational Arab/Islamic complex.

For a recent work that establishes clearly, on the basis of civilizational analysis research program, the basic differentiation between the two concepts see, Salvatore, Armando. 2010, "Repositioning Islamdom The CulturePower Syndrome within a Transcivilizational Ecumene", European Journal of Social Theory V. 13(1), Pp. 99115.

Samir Abuzaid The general beliefs and presuppositions of the Worldview deduced from the Islamic religious view only posit the general limits of our scientific beliefs of the world. Hence, the eliminative materialist view, for example, falls outside the limits of the Arab/Islamic Worldview, whereas the dualist as well as neutral monism can be taken to be within such limits. Therefore, the scientific picture of such a Worldview is not a religious or Islamic scientific view; rather, it represents the scientific view of the contemporary Arab/Islamic societies. As a consequence, such presuppositions will allow us, as will be seen, to participate positively in contemporary endeavors to formulate the contemporary scientific view to the world. On the basis of such understanding of the concept of the Arab/Islamic scientific view to the world we will deal in this work with the problem of the possible or anticipated new model of nature. It should be noted here that, for reasons that will be clear in the following pages, we will use the term 'model of nature' instead of other terms such as World view, World picture, World presuppositions, etc.

2. The Concept of the 'Model of Nature'

Nature is all what we experience as humans: non-living material, living animals as well as other humans. With advancement of science such a concept has included newly discovered entities such as atomic and subatomic elementary particles, on the micro level, as well as planets, stars and galaxies, on the macro level. Human endeavors to explain phenomena related to such entities necessitated two basic moves: classification of such entities into categories, and reducing some categories of such classification to some other more basic category. In this way such a vast and enormous number of different entities are reduced to a small number of basic categories. In addition, the process of explanation necessitated establishing specific form for the relations between such categories. The result is a simplified picture or view to nature. However, we prefer to use the term 'model' to describe such a process for two reasons. First, the term 'view' or 'Worldview' is too wide for the problem we deal with here, whereas the term 'picture' gives an impression of a subjective

The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature position from nature. Second, the term 'model' gives as we shall see an impression of a scientific stance from nature. However, the term 'model' points out to some kind of 'replication' or 'representation' of an original entity or object with some basic difference between the two. Since any object is composed of elements and relations between these elements, the model should reflect the elements of that object and the relations between them. Hence a replica of a specific material object, for example a statue, with difference in size is a 'model', of such a statue; a theoretical description of the elements and relations of a specific system, the solar system for example, is a 'model' of such system, and so on. However, when we speak about a model of nature as a whole, in accordance to this general understanding, human experience along the history has shown that such a model would be extracted through identifying two basic concepts. The first is the concept of reduction in which we reduce all that exists in nature to the elementary entities that comprise together all existence. The second is that the relations between such constituents of reality are mathematical in principle. These elementary entities and the mathematical relations between them 'represent' the real world, and hence, comprise a model of nature. Through such basic constituents and the mathematical relations between them we should be able to explain all the natural phenomena around us. Due to these two basic features of the 'model of nature', any such model is basically linked to the scientific theories about nature, or more precisely to 'laws of nature'. Hence, Stathis Psillos defines the concept of the model in contemporary philosophy of science as follows: Term of art used in understanding how theories represent the world. Though according to a popular view, the semantic view of theories, theories are families of models, there is little agreement as to what models are, how they are related to theories and how they represent whatever they are supposed to represent... According to Cartwright, models are devices employed whenever a mathematical theory is applied to reality. This view has recently been developed into the models-as-mediators programme,

Samir Abuzaid according to which models are autonomous agents that mediate between theory and world.2 Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann introduce the relation between models as theories about the world and the concept of 'Laws of Nature' as follows: What role do general laws play in science if models are what represent what is happening in the world? One possible response is to argue that laws of nature govern entities and processes in a model rather than in the world. Fundamental laws, in this approach, do not state facts about the world but hold true of entities and processes in the model.3 However, in this paper we will take any model of nature as composed of three basic concepts or presuppositions: the final constituents of reality, the 'vertical' relations between the successive levels of nature, and the 'horizontal' relations that realize motion and change within the same level. Keeping in mind such a general view of the concept of 'model of nature', there are several types of 'scientific' models of nature that are introduced along the history of human thought. In general, these views can be classified into: mechanical, teleological, process, organic, and Complex, in addition to the multiple levels view of nature (material/live/mind levels).4 However, two major models have dominated human thought, namely, the Aristotelian teleological model and the mechanistic atomistic model.

The Aristotelian Model

The Aristotelian model of nature is well known in history of philosophy as the exemplar of a teleological model. The basic elements are four, fire, earth, water and air, whereas the basic relation is the final cause. Such a model has dominated humanity since the Greek age till modernity. According to Jonathan
2 3

Psillos, Stathis. 2007, "Philosophy of Science AZ", Edinburgh University Press, P. 153-154

Frigg, Roman and Hartmann, Stephan. 2006, "Scientific Models", in Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), the Philosophy of Science An Encychlopedia, Routledge, p. 748.
4

Stephen C. Pepper mentions six 'metaphors': animism, mysticism, formism, mechanism, organicism, and contextualism that produce different Worldviews or 'World hypothesis', .Koltko-Rivera, Mark E. 2004, "The Psychology of Worldviews", Review of General Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 1, Pp. 9.

The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature Barnes5, Aristotle offers a clear view of the nature of reality. The elements or fundamental stuffs of the sublunary world are four: earth, air, fire, and water. Each element is defined by way of four primary powers or qualities wetness, dryness, coldness, and hotness. The elements have each a natural movement and a natural place. Fire, if left to itself, will move upwards and will find its place at the outermost edges of the universe; earth naturally moves downwards, to the centre of the universe; air and water find their places in between. The elements can act upon and change into one another. Beyond the earth and its atmosphere come the moon, the sun, the planets, and the fixed stars. (Barnes: 98) However, Aristotles main contention is that the physical universe is spatially finite but temporally infinite: it is a vast but bounded sphere which has existed without beginning and will exist without end (Barnes: 100). In such a model, there is a basic difference between the earthly sub-lunar realm and the heaven that is composed of planets and stars. The heavenly bodies, which Aristotle often refers to as the divine bodies, according to Barnes, are made of a special stuff, a fifth element or quintessence; Now it is the function of what is most divine to think and to use its intellect, so that the heavenly bodies, being divine, must therefore be alive and intelligent. Aristotle, according to Barnes, argues for the existence of a changeless source of change an unmoved mover as it is normally called. If there is to be any change in the universe, there must, Aristotle holds, be some original source which imparts change to other things without changing itself. The unmoved mover is outside the universe (Barnes: 102) The core of Aristotles account of explanation is his concept of 'change' and his doctrine of the four causes, a concept that encounters a considerable degree of vagueness. For it is usually presented as four types, 'the material cause', 'the formal cause', 'the efficient cause' and the 'final cause'. However, according to David Cooper, Aristotle's original writing in Greek didn't point out to the term cause as understood in English, rather, for him a 'cause' is what is cited in answer to questions beginning 'On account of what?'. On such a basis,

Barnes, Jonathan. 2000, "Aristotle -A Very Short Introduction", Oxford University Press.

Samir Abuzaid cooper asserts, he is clearly right in that people offer answers of all four kinds 6. However, the central concept that explains change in the Aristotelian model, as well known, is the last kind of the four causes, which is the final cause. For the great majority of thinkers and philosophers such a model constituted a huge obstacle to scientific advancement of humanity. The basic reason for such a position is that it adopts teleology in scientific explanation. With the advent of the mechanical 'causal' explanation, a new era for advancement of science has commenced7.

The Classical Mechanistic Model

Modernity is marked by the appearance of the mechanistic view to nature. Nature, in such an account, is composed of tiny microscopic indivisible atoms that interact continuously according to laws of motion generating everything we experience in nature. It is usually referred to the Newtonian Mechanics as the most complete theoretical form of such a view. Stathis Psillos defines the concept of mechanism as "any arrangement of matter in motion, subject to the laws of mechanics". More specifically, he adds, it was thought that all macroscopic phenomena were the product of the interactions (ultimately, pushings and pullings) of microscopic corpuscles. The latter were fully characterised by their primary qualities".8 However, the mechanistic model of nature has never been introduced in a complete formulation, even in the Newtonian version where the force of gravity violates the principle of direct interaction. Instead, such a model has appeared gradually with different versions. It was first introduced by figures such as Descartes, Gassendi and Boyle in the seventeenth century as opposed to the Aristotelian model in general, and to the teleological explanations, in particular. In this period, the mechanistic view was a part of what is termed the corpuscular theory of matter.

6 7

Cooper, David. 1996, "World Philosophies An Historical Introduction", Blackwell, Pp. 117.

Major critics of Aristotle are Descartes in his 'The World ' (1633) and Francis Bacon in his 'the new Organon' (1620), and Bertrand Russell in his 'A History of Western Philosophy' (1946), among many others.
8

Psillos, Stathis. 2007, "Philosophy of Science AZ", Edinburgh University Press, P. 149

The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature During the period of its early formulation, according to Stephen Gaukroger, Gassendi set out the programme of the mechanistic view in broad terms as follows: There is no effect without a cause; no cause acts without motion; nothing acts on distant things except through itself or an organ or connection or transmission; nothing moves unless it is touched, whether directly or through an organ or through another body.9 Stephen Gaukroger points out that the classical notion of 'Mechanism' existed in many varieties, and that it is difficult to characterize in the abstract. However, he construes in some detail, the ideal-type mechanism as which has the distinctive feature that it reduces all physical processes to the activity of inert corpuscles making up macroscopic objects, where the behaviour of these corpuscles can be described exhaustively in terms of mechanics and geometry, and where they act exclusively by means of efficient causes, which require spatial and temporal contact between the cause and the effect. We can assume, he continues, that the corpuscles contain no empty spaces, that they are spherical, and that they are all of the same order of magnitude. The space in which they move is a continuous, complete, isotropic, three-dimensional container which acts as a reference frame for the location of bodies (Gaukroger: 260). Carl Craver and William Bechtel state that the notion of mechanism has four aspects: (i) a phenomenal aspect, (ii) a componential aspect, (iii) a causal aspect, and (iv) an organizational aspect.10 The phenomenal aspect is related to the appearances of the mechanism. The componential aspect is related to the final constituents of the mechanism. The causal aspect is related to the cause and effect relations between the components of the mechanism. Finally, the organizational aspect is related to the structure of the mechanism. In the case of the mechanistic view to nature as a whole, the phenomenal aspect is the different levels of nature (the micro subatomic level, the normal macro level, the vital and the mental). The componential aspect is the final constituents of matter which was seen in the classical mechanistic view as the
9

Gaukroger, Stephen. 2006, "The Emergence of a Scientific Culture - Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 12101685", Clarendon Press, Oxford, P. 253.
10

Craver, Carl and Bechtel, William. 2006, "Mechanism", in Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), the Philosophy of Science An Encychlopedia, Routledge, p. 469.

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Samir Abuzaid indivisible atoms. The causal aspect is that based on direct contact between the final constituents. And the organizational aspect is represented by the concepts of reduction (the vertical relations) and determinism (horizontal relations). Of special importance in the mechanistic view the two essential relations, determinism and reduction. According to John T. Roberts, the most famous exposition of the doctrine of determinism in the context of modern science is due to Pierre Laplace: We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, would be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the world, provided that its intellect were sufficiently powerful to subject all data to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past would be present to its eyes. 11 However, such a concept has become more complex, especially when related to laws of nature. According to Roberts, it is taken to be of a deterministic theory, where the property of determinism is defined by quantifying over all the physically possible worlds allowed by the theory. Alternatively, he adds, one can define determinism as a property of a set of laws, proceeding as above, but quantifying over all the possible worlds allowed by that set of laws. (Roberts: 200) Similarly, the concept of reduction is no less complicated. Reductionism is the thesis that the results of inquiry in one domain -be they concepts, heuristics, laws, or theories- can be understood or are explained by the conceptual resources of another, more fundamental domain12. According to Michael Silberstein, historically, there are two main construals of the problem of reduction and emergence, ontological and epistemological:

11

Roberts ,John T. 2006, "Determinism", in Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), the Philosophy of Science An Encychlopedia, Routledge, p. 198.
12

Wimsatt, William C. and Sarkar, Sahotra. 2006, "Reductionism", in Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), the Philosophy of Science An Encychlopedia, Routledge, p. 696.

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The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature 1. The ontological construal: is there some robust sense in which everything in the world can be said to be nothing but the fundamental constituents of reality (such as super-strings) or at the very least, determined by those constituents? 2. The epistemological construal: is there some robust sense in which our scientific theories/schemas about the macroscopic features of the world can be reduced to or identified with our scientific theories about the most fundamental features of the world. 13 Yet, according to Silberstein, these two construals are inextricably related. Reductionism is the view that the best understanding of a complex system should be sought at the level of the structure, behavior and laws of its component parts plus their relations. The ontological assumption implicit is that the most fundamental physical level, whatever that turns out to be, is ultimately the real ontology of the world, and anything else that is to keep the status of real must somehow be able to be mapped onto or built out of those elements of the fundamental ontology (Silberstein: 81). Thus, the three basic presuppositions of the classical mechanistic model of nature, namely, the indivisible corpuscular final constituents, determinism, and reduction, by advancement of science turned out to be mere philosophical or theoretical constructs, instead of being true in the real world. As we will see in the next section, this leads to the conclusion that the mechanistic model in its classical or realistic sense has in effect failed.

3. Failure of the Mechanistic Model

Today, in the mainstream scientific community, nobody defends the existence of final indivisible constituents of mater. For, effectively, advancement of science in the twentieth century, especially, the standard model of the subatomic realm, has proved that the atom is composed of an extremely complicated system of elementary particles (Quarks and Gluons). Moreover, nobody can define realistically the nature of such particles, for the standard model itself is not complete yet due to our inability to unify the gravitational
13

Silberstein, Michael. 2002, "Reduction, Emergence and Explanation", in Peter Machamer and Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell, P. 80.

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Samir Abuzaid force with the other three basic forces of nature. Michael Silberstein describes the current situation as follows: The world is not just a set of separately existing localized objects, externally related only by space and time. Something deeper, and more mysterious, knits together the fabric of the world. We have only just come to the moment in the development of physics that we can begin to contemplate what that might be (Silberstein: 97). As a consequence, the mechanical postulate of the interaction between the final corpuscular constituents of matter is rendered to the status of a philosophical speculation instead of being a realistic representation of nature. Similarly, nobody, in the main stream science, defends today determinism as a concept that mirrors reality. For Quantum Mechanics has shown that subatomic particles interact probabilistically. For example John Roberts states clearly that the probabilistic nature of state reduction entails that the standard formulation of quantum mechanics is indeterministic in all of the senses of the term. (Roberts: 204) As a consequence, we can't ascribe determinism to individual particles or systems, but we can define the overall probabilistic outcome of one particle over a sufficient period of time or of sufficiently great number of particles in a specific time. This led to the appearance of the concept of 'probabilistic determinism', an obvious endeavor to save 'philosophically' the concept of determinism. Moreover, the appearance of chaotic and self-organized systems, in which we can't follow the deterministic interactions between the particles, and hence can't predict its outcome in advance, have led to giving up the classical notion of determinism in such systems. To the extent that John Roberts states, [I]t is now known that classical physics is not deterministic, in either the predictability sense or the ontic senseMore generally, many classical systems exhibit the feature known as chaos, which rules out the possibility of predictability (Roberts: 200) . Besides the physical systems, determinism has proved to be not applicable to other non-physical systems, such as organic chemical combinations, living cells, animals, and human beings. This leads to the conclusion that the classical

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The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature notion of determinism is applicable only to extremely limited special cases, which is the idealized mechanical system in the normal scale, such as an idealized group of billiard balls on an idealized flat table. In addition to the above, the concept of reduction, whether in its ontological or epistemological senses, couldn't be Justified in reality. Efforts to reduce the mental level to the biological, as well as the biological to the chemical have not been successful along the course of the last few decades despite the great advancement of scientific technology. On the theoretical side, efforts to reduce human action to laws of physics, have failed due to our inability to explain the phenomena of human intentional states as well as human consciousness. Similarly, biology could not be reduced to the laws of physics. The end result was the appearance of the concept of special sciences, in which there is no privilege to physics as the base of all science 14. This becomes clear in recent works about the problem of reduction. Sahotra Sarkar states that a very common belief among philosophers is that reduction leads to the unity of science.15 However, William Seager, states clearly, It has become clear in the later stages of the century that despite the rich and complex interrelationships that prevail among scientific theories, there is little or no prospect of even roughly fulfilling the dream of the grand unification of all theories into a complete hierarchy of reduction. 16 With the failure of realizing the three pillars of the mechanistic model of nature it becomes clear that such a model, at least in its classical realistic sense, has failed. However, such a view is still prevailing not in a realistic sense but in philosophical sense, even though without a complete formulation as a means of inquiry. This situation is clear in the following statement of Mark B. Couch in a very recent paper,
14

See the famous article by Jerry Fodor,

Fodor, Jerry. 1974, "Special Sciences (or: the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)", Synthese, V. 28 Pp. 97-115.
15

Sarkar, Sahotra. 2008, "Reduction", in Psillos Stathis and Curd Martin (eds.) The Routledg Companion to Philosophy of Science, Pp. 430.
16

Seager, William. 2001, "Supervenience and Determination", in W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell, P. 480.

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Samir Abuzaid The notion of a mechanism has become increasingly important in philosophical analyses of the sciences. Many philosophers now accept that explanations that appeal to mechanisms have a fundamental role to play in scientific practice. The notion of a mechanism, however, still remains inadequately understood. There is unclarity about what precisely makes something count as the mechanism for a capacity, and no agreement about the criteria we should use in making this determination.17 The failure of the mechanistic explanation as a realistic model of nature has, among other reasons, led to the appearance of new concepts that contradict directly the presuppositions of such a model.

The New anti-Mechanical Philosophical Concepts

New concepts in direct contradiction with the basic presuppositions of the classical realistic mechanistic model of nature have appeared gradually during the last decades of the twentieth century. The corpuscular postulate of the final constituents of mater has been contradicted by the appearance of the theory of Quantum mechanics and our inability to define the nature of the subatomic elementary particles, as mentioned above. In addition, the postulate that such corpuscular particles are passive in nature is contradicted by the appearance of the concepts of disposition and powers. For, according to Rom Harr, to attribute a disposition (or power) to a thing or substance is to say that if certain conditions obtain, then that thing or substance will behave in a certain way, or bring about a certain effect that is, that a certain outcome will occur18. The concept of reduction is contradicted by the concepts of emergence and holism. According to Michael Silberstein, Claims involving emergence are now rife in discussions of philosophy of mind, philosophy of physics, various branches of physics itself including quantum mechanics, condensed matter theory, nonlinear dynamical systems theory (especially so-called chaos theory), cognitive neuroscience (including connectionist/neural network modeling and consciousness studies) and so-called complexity studies (Silberstein: 93).
17 18

Couch, Mark B. 2011, "Mechanisms and constitutive relevance", Synthese, V. 183, Pp. 375.

Harr, Rom. 2001 , "Dispositions and Powers", in W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell, Pp. 97 .

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The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature Emergentists, following Justin Garson, generally hold an ontological premise and an epistemological one. The ontological premise is that (i) there are properties (or laws) that obtain of certain complex physical entities that do not obtain of any of the individual parts or lower level constituents of those entities. The epistemological premise is that (ii) the instantiation of those properties cannot be derived from an exhaustive knowledge of the nonrelational properties of the parts, in addition to any laws of composition that obtain among lower-level entities (e.g., additivity, fundamental forces) and statements of definition. Hence emergentism takes its place in contemporary philosophical parlance as a variety of nonreductionist physicalism.19 From another side, the concept of holism, which is in direct contradiction with reductionism, has appeared in the last decades. The term "holism" refers to a variety of positions which have in common a resistance to understanding larger unities as merely the sum of their parts, and an insistence that we cannot explain or understand the parts without treating them as belonging to such larger wholes.20 Therefore, instead of reducing the 'larger unities', such as the mind, the living cell, etc, to the physical level, without a remainder, such unities are understood as wholes that lose its significance if reduced to its constituent parts. Such a situation in which the mechanistic explanation survives alongside other numerous concepts that are in contradiction with it points out to the current fragmented situation of the philosophical community.

4. The Possible New Model of Nature

By now, it should have become evident that the model of nature employed is crucial in advancement of science. We have already seen that for many scholars, the Aristotelian model represented an obstacle for advancement of science. And with the increasing gap between this model and scientific facts it was inevitable to abandon it in favor to the newly admitted mechanistic model. Similarly, today we experience a gap between the mechanistic model of nature and scientific facts as well as new trends in philosophy of science. Such a
19

Garson, Justin. 2006, "Emergence", in Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), the Philosophy of Science An Encychlopedia, Routledge, p. 230
20

Hookway, Christopher. 2001, "Holism", ", in W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell, P. 162 164.

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Samir Abuzaid gap is represented by our inability to explain phenomena related to Quantum Mechanics, our inability to unify the natural and human realms, and by giving up the presuppositions of the mechanistic model, as shown above. Scholars from different orientations, both scientists and philosophers of science, within the mainstream science pointed out clearly to such a situation. In order to show that the question we raise in this paper about the need for a new model of nature is already addressed strongly in literature, we will review recent opinions of three philosophers who belong to the mainstream academic community of science and philosophy of science. The common theme that is shared between such three opinions is that 'modern science' might be wrong headed and that the presuppositions of such a science are in need of radical renovation or even total substitution.

Three Recent Different Views

1- Craig Dilworth and the Metaphysics of Science. Craig Dilworth21 in his 'Metaphysics of Science' tries to avoid the problematic associated with the classical mechanistic model. He makes clear that science is not totally objective, rather, it is based on transcendental beliefs that consist of the most fundamental presuppositions of science. In being transcendental, he asserts, they cannot have been arrived at through the pursuit of science, but must be, in a definite sense, pre-scientific, or metascientific. And they can be revised or abandoned in favour of alternatives (Dilworth: 1-2). On such a basis, he criticizes most of other contributions to the philosophy of science. For, in them, "there is an implicit faith that humankind has been constantly moving forward along the one road to Truth, that road being Science, without consideration being given to the thought that modern science might appear just as wrongheaded in the future as alternative forms of science do now" (Dilworth: 7-8). Dilworth introduces three basic presuppositions or principles of modern science that are taken to be ontological in nature, thus they are to be conceived as
21

Dilworth, Craig. 2006, "the Metaphysics of Science - An Account of Modern Science in terms of Principles, Laws and Theories", 2nd ed., Springer. Dilworth is a professor of philosophy at Uppsala University.

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The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature together delineating an ontological paradigm or ideal (Dilworth: 51). These three principles are: the principle of uniformity of nature, the principle of substance and the principle of causation. A. The Principle of the Uniformity of Nature According to Dilworth, the principle of the uniformity of nature concerns change, and is usually understood to mean that natural change is lawful, or takes place according to rules. It thus implies a deterministic conception of change, though this determinism need not be strict. For example, adds Dilworth, the rules according to which change takes place might on occasion be broken, while the principle still retain its basic validity such a breaking of the rules perhaps constituting a miracle; or it may be that the principle apply only to broad categories of change, setting deterministic limits within which relatively undetermined change can take place as we assume when we grant ourselves and fellow humans free will; or with regard to probabilistic laws. (Dilworth: 53). Here, it is clear that Dilworth relegates the principle of determinism to the status of a more general metaphysical one, to the extent that it accepts probabilistic laws, free will, or even breaking the rules (which means miracle). B. The Principle of Substance In this second principle, Dilworth avoids definition of the final constituents of matter (be it atoms, quarks or otherwise). Moreover, he accepts anti reduction with respect to levels of nature. He implements instead the view that each level 'presupposes' its previous one in the hierarchy. In addition, he admits that the substance can be relativised to a discipline in the sense that the substance of a discipline need only exist perpetually from the point of view of the discipline itself (Dilworth: 56-57). Hence, in this principle there is no a definite final substance, in addition there can be no 'ontological' reduction of the upper level to the lower level. C. The Principle of Causality The principle of causality, according to Dilworth, states that change is caused. For him, the idea of supernatural causes has no place in modern science. But all natural causes need not be conceived of as being physical, and there are important alternatives to be considered, the foremost of which is the idea of a

18

Samir Abuzaid formal cause (Dilworth: 57). This means that Dilworth allows for mental as well as non-natural causation (in order to allow for free will), which represents an apparent depart from the classical understanding of causation. He justifies such a position by stating that "in neither the natural nor the social sciences do we at present have alternatives of equal simplicity, coherence and generality to take their place, and that if we did, we might then ask whether we still had to do with what we today call modern science'". (Dilworth: 61). However, these three presuppositions or principles are presented by Dilworth in order to save the mechanistic model of modern science. The end result is giving up the final constituents postulate, the determinism postulate, and the reduction postulate. Moreover, such a characterization of reality is too general to present an alternative. 2- Henry Stapp and the Mindful Universe. On the basis of the new discoveries of the Quantum World, Henry Stapp, a well known physicist, in his 'Mindful Universe'22, stresses on the failure of the mechanistic model to incorporate the mental phenomena. In his view, the conflating of Nature herself with the impoverished mechanical conception of it invented by scientists during the seventeenth century has derailed the philosophies of science and of mind for more than three centuries, by effectively eliminating the causal link between the psychological and physical aspects of nature that contemporary physics restores. But the now-falsified classical conception of the world still exerts a blinding effect (Stapp: 2). The problem, according to Stapp, is, rather, a conceptual one: the concepts of classical physics that many neurobiologists are committed to using are logically inadequate because, unlike the concepts of quantum physics, they effectively exclude our conscious thoughts (Stapp: 3). In his view, all nature were believed to be completely determined by the physically described properties and laws that acted wholly mechanically at the microscopic scale. But the baffling features of new kinds of data of the Quantum world acquired during the twentieth century caused the physicists who were studying these phenomena, and
22

Stapp, Henry P. 2007, " Mindful Universe - Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer", Springer.

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The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature trying to ascertain the laws that governed them, to turn the whole scientific enterprise upside down (Stapp: 6). The founders of quantum mechanics, according to Stapp, made the revolutionary move of bringing conscious human experiences into basic physical theory in a fundamental way. After two hundred years of neglect, he adds, our thoughts were suddenly thrust into the limelight. This was an astonishing reversal of precedent because the enormous successes of the prior physics were due in large measure to the policy of excluding all mention of idea-like qualities from the formulation of the physical laws (Stapp: 17). The solution in Stapp's view is to embrace a specific interpretation of Quantum mechanics in which human consciousness plays essential role. Therefore, in Stapp's view, the final constituents of matter are continuously engaged with human consciousness as well as its free will, generating what is called the Psychophysical Building Blocks of Reality (Stapp: 96). A situation that produces closing up the gap between the material and the mental. 3- David Peat in From Certainty to Uncertainty David Peat in his "From Certainty to Uncertainty"23 cites the inherent uncertainty that is discovered in the different domains of scientific inquiry. From quantum theory, chaos theory, mathematics, representation, computer science, language, to science of the environment, he discusses in details how our view to the world has been radically changed from a world in which certainty is secured to another in which uncertainty about the world dominates. Quantum Mechanics, again, is the basic source of uncertainty. For, according to Peat, in the quantum world, Quantum chance is not a measure of ignorance but an inherent property. No amount of additional knowledge will ever allow science to predict the instant a particular atom decays because nothing is causing this decay, at least in the familiar sense of something being pushed, pulled, attracted, or repelled. Chance in quantum theory is absolute and irreducible. (Peat: 9). Such a fact has, according to Peat, deep consequences, to the extent that Pauli (one of the founders of QM) spoke of the need for physics to
23

Peat, David F. 2002, "From Certainty to Uncertainty the Story of Science and Ideas in the Twentieth Century", Joseph Henry Press.

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Samir Abuzaid confront the subjective levels of matter and come to terms with irrationality in nature. (Peat: 16) Moreover, according to Peat, uncertainty also exists in another and even more disturbing way, about the very goal of science and philosophy. From the time of the Greeks, he continues, human beings have asked what the world is made of. But then Niles Bohr challenged the ability of science and the human mind to proceed further. He, according to Peat, almost seemed to be suggesting that science as we knew it had finally reached a limit and could go no further as a means of enquiry into the nature of reality. Maybe quantum reality exists only as a concept in our own minds. And thus we are left with a mystery. Maybe there are no foundations to our world. (Peat: 24 - 25) This leads Peat to conclude that, we have to acknowledge that our world is more complex than we ever imagined. And to point out that science has begun to set aside the blinders it has been wearing for the past 200 years to view the world in terms of complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty. If the material world appeared simpler in the past, he states, it was because we were looking at it through the perspective of classical physics. (Peat: 199-200). In this perspective, what will be the future of science, how can we deal with such a situation? The answer is through diversity of scientific views. Peat countenances the way for diversity in scientific practice as follows: Science begins with our relationship to nature. The facts it discovers about the universe are answers to human questions and involve human-designed experiments. The Western scientific approach, for example, places nature in a series of highly artificial situations and demands that answers are given quantitatively in terms of number. As a consequence, Peat concludes, other societies, had they developed a strong science of matter and an associated technology, may have had quite a different relationship to the natural world. In turn, they would have asked other sorts of questions. They may have been more concerned with relationship, wholeness, the position of the human observer, and the role of consciousness in the world. They may have abstracted quantities or qualities different from those of, say, mass and velocity. This is not to say, he comments, that a science created

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The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature by Non Western societies would in some way contradict or deny Western science. Rather it would provide a different framework for knowing the world, through which alternative theories and explanations would be offered (Peat: 208-209). Here, it is clear that Peat, as much as the other two views, is talking about the need for a new view to science that is to replace the oversimplifying mechanistic view to nature. The answer is naturally a new model of nature that can deal with the new world which is characterized by inherent uncertainty, complexity and the positive role of human subjectivity.

Possible Candidates for a New Model

The picture in reality is much more complicated. The aforementioned views are no more than examples of the different views that are introduced in the last few decades in order to overcome the difficulties that confront contemporary modern science with its already failed mechanistic model of nature 24. This means that we are in the middle of a period similar to that between the middle ages and the modern era (between the 14th and the 17th centuries). In such a period dissatisfaction with the Aristotelian model was growing along with the continued endeavors to formulate an alternative model. These efforts have culminated in constructing the mechanistic model which has been successful until the appearance of QM around the first third of the twentieth century. With such a characterization of the current period in mind, the question of the possible alternative model of nature arises strongly. What would the formulation of such an alternative model look like; what are its basic presuppositions that prove consistent with the contemporary proven scientific facts; what would be its vertical relations between levels of nature as well as its horizontal causal relations between its composing elements. There are many proposals that lurk around in contemporary literature, in which different formulations of the presuppositions of a new view to nature are introduced. However, the prospective model of nature that we expect to be a
24

The new views of science cover a wide range of proposals both within mainstream science as well as outside orthodox academic circles. For detailed exposition of such proposals see our, Abuzaid, Samir. 2008, "Science and Conditions of Renaissance the New scientific Conceptions and the Scientific Grounding of the Arabic Renaissance", Madbouli Bookstore, Cairo, Pp. 84 127. (in Arabic)

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Samir Abuzaid real alternative should be: 1) consistent with proven scientific facts; 2) internally consistent. Therefore, the question is not in proposing different views or presuppositions, but it is in the details of the proposed formulation which is supposed to fulfill the above mentioned conditions. It should be noted here that fulfilling the condition of consistency with contemporary proven scientific facts would lead to some sort of continuity with the previous mechanistic model. Hence, our aim should not be to over through the current 'modern mechanistic science', but to perform a sort of upgrade of contemporary science to another phase of advancement toward uncovering mysteries of nature. In the following we will present the possible positions that are introduced in contemporary literature in each of the basic components of the structure of the anticipated new model. The first represents the basic constituents of nature which is supposed to be an alternative to the postulate of the final indivisible 'atoms'. The second represents the vertical inter-levels relations that are supposed to be in place of the postulate of reduction. Finally, the third is the horizontal relation which is supposed to be in place of the concept of the direct contact mechanical causal relations. By reviewing the different positions proposed in literature we can introduce the following brief picture of the possible presuppositions that have the opportunity to fulfill the above mentioned conditions. 1- Postulates of the final constituents of nature. Eliminating the postulate of the solid indivisible entities, as proven to be in contradiction with proven facts of science25, we have the following: The final substance is energy that is not corpuscular, but in some way composes passive matter at the lowest level of the hierarchy of nature. The final substance is energy that composes a double sided or dipole 'matter-mind', (the psychophysical constituents). Different forms of matter at different levels of reality with unknown relation between them (due to the emergent properties). 2- Postulates of the vertical inter-levels relations
25

The concept of nature excludes by definition the existence of the supernatural entities; hence it is not part of our discussion of the elements of the model of 'nature'.

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The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature Eliminating the postulate of reduction as proven to be inconsistent with contemporary scientific facts (the failure of the grand unifying theory), then we have the following: Completely separate levels of nature (radical emergentism). Partial reduction between only two successive levels (supervenience). Holism, in which the upper level affects lower levels (downward causation). 3- Postulates of the horizontal causal relations Eliminating the postulate of determinism as well as non scientific teleology (i.e., that which is not linked to functionalism or human intentionality) as in contradiction with contemporary scientific facts, we have the following: Probabilistic indeterminism Functionalism (for organisms) Dispositions and Powers. Intentionality (which includes teleology for human beings) Chaos, self-organizing systems and fractals indeterministic relations.

The challenge that confronts contemporary scientific community, then, is to construct out of such possible postulates a self consistent model of nature that sheds new light on our scientific inquiry and helps to advance new solutions to current unsolved problems, such as interpretation of QM, the phenomenon of consciousness, and above all construction of a non-reductionist formal system of laws of nature.

5. Epistemological Basis of the Arab/Islamic Worldview

It should be emphasized again, as pointed out above, that the concept of the 'Arab/Islamic Worldview' is a sociological concept that ascribes a specific Worldview to a specific group of societies that belong to one civilizational complex. Such a worldview can develop and evolve with the continual unfold of our understanding of nature as well as with the continual development of such societies. In addition, such a group of societies can have minor differences, within the general framework of such a Worldview, which reflects the particularity and course of intellectual evolution of each of them.

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Samir Abuzaid This should be contrasted to and differentiated from the concept of the 'Islamic Worldview', as noted above. For, the later is a religious concept that does not change with the evolution of the society. And in very general terms, it includes the final and unchanging religious beliefs about the world. Therefore, basic beliefs of the sociological concept (the Arab/Islamic Worldview) are formulated on the basis of those of the Islamic Worldview, such as the existence of God, the hereafter, the reality of God's messengers, the possibility of God's miracles. Whereas, the rest of the beliefs that compose it are based on human experience. Therefore, with respect to the issue of the model of nature, the relation between the social form of such a view and the religious Worldview is twofold. The first is that the religious Worldview imposes basic restriction on the Arab/Islamic (social) view, which is that it can't be a materialistic one, in the sense of the strict determinism discussed above. However, other forms of naturalism that remain silent with respect to the supernatural will be consistent with it. Such condition allows for the naturalistic treatment of the topic without being in contradiction with the religious Worldview, in accordance to our separation/connection methodology discussed elsewhere 26. The second is that the social Arab/Islamic view to nature draws from the religious Worldview as well as its founding text (Al-Quran Al-Kareem) its basic presuppositions through interpretations of the text. Due to the fact that the process of interpretation includes inevitably differences in views of the result of such a process, there would be inevitably differences in the basic presuppositions of such a view form a society to another. However, such differences will be limited and bounded by the more general basic beliefs agreed upon above. Hence, in practice there will be a diversity of views within the general framework of the 'Arab/Islamic Worldview'.

26

The separation/connection method is developed specifically to resolve the problems that arise when we confront the problem of the relation between science and religious issues. But at the same time it has a general form that applies to every problem that encounters a subjective and an objective element. See details of deduction and formulation of such a method in our, Abuzaid, Samir. 2005, "The method of religious renewal in the thought of shaikh Abdoulquaher Aljurjani", in the magazine of the Faculty of Dar el'Oloum, issue no. 36, Pp. 161-212. (in Arabic)

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The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature

Epistemological Presuppositions of the Arab/Islamic View

Within such a general perspective of the relation between the 'Islamic Worldview', 'the Arab/Islamic Worldview' and the problem of the model of nature, we express our own view of the 'scientific' or 'epistemological' presuppositions of such a view. It should be noted that what we present here is no more than a contribution from a specific writer who belongs to the Arabic societies which is part of the collective Arab/Islamic civilizational complex. Consequently, such a view is but a specific view that can be criticized by other non-Arabic views. However, at the same time such a view can be legitimately considered as fully consistent with the final or basic beliefs of the religious 'Islamic Worldview'. Consistency, here, means only that it doesn't contradict in any way such basic beliefs. Keeping in mind such a note, the epistemological presuppositions of the Arabic Worldview are composed of the following principles: 1- Reason is the basic tool of knowledge, and knowledge is in principle possible. 2- Reason is supposed to reply to the question of knowledge, how creation has started, how existence is composed, and of what, and the starting point is observing nature. 3- Scientific knowledge is an ethical and religious act because it leads to knowing God. 4- Scientific knowledge is a religious duty because it makes possible for man to construct ethical communities. 5- There are limits to human knowledge; complete knowledge is for God alone. 6- Science is not completely free, but it is committed to abide to the ethical principles. 7- Humans possess freedom of choice, and are subject to laws of nature. 8- There are universal eternal laws that govern change; those laws represent exposition of God's will. 9- The principle of evolution; evolution is for all existence, evolution here is much wider than, and different from, Darwin's theory. 10- The principle of quantity; knowledge is quantitative.

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Samir Abuzaid 11- The principle of scientific advancement, where such advancement is essentially ethical. 27 Such basic epistemological principles can be grouped into three general presuppositions, namely, limits of knowledge, indeterminism in causal relations and the ethical function of scientific knowledge (Abuzaid, 2009: P. 124). From such basic principles of the Arabic scientific view (which can be easily generalized to the general Arab/Islamic Worldview), it becomes possible to define the basic elements of any possible model of nature that is consistent with, or introduced through, such a view.

Consistent Principles of the Possible Model of Nature

As we have previously mentioned throughout this paper, there are three basic components of any model of nature, namely, the final constituents, the vertical inter-level relations, and the horizontal casual relations between them. Following are our view of such components that could be consistent with the Arab/Islamic view, introduced without detailed analysis. 1- Multiple levels, with different forms of the constituents of reality. Reality is composed of material/energy particulars that can be broken into further parts indefinitely; the only limits for such constituents are those of human knowledge. In addition, material of the different levels has different emergent properties. 2- Symmetric vertical relations between the successive levels of reality. The relation between the different levels of reality is not reductionist; rather there is symmetric as well as formal resemblance between them. 3- Indeterminist as well as teleological forms of horizontal relations The horizontal 'casual' relations within each level are based generally on both the 'mechanical/indeterminist causal' as well as the 'teleological' human relations. However, the form of such relations differs in the different levels. The human level is more teleological (due to intentionality and free will), whereas the
27

Justification and Details of such a view are introduced in our,

Abuzaid, Samir. 2009, "Science and the Arabic Worldview, the Arabic Experience and the Scientific Grounding of Renaissance", Center for Arabic Unity, Beirut, Pp. 107-130. (in Arabic)

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The Epistemological Basis of the New Model of Nature lowest level is more probabilistic causally with dispositions and powers. In between, the biological is based on both types with different meaning depending on the degree of complexity of the organism. As noted before, presenting such formal view of the model of nature is not the important step; rather, what is important is the ability to construct a complete model that proves to be internally consistent as well to be consistent with proven facts of contemporary scientific knowledge. Realizing such constraints requires obviously tremendous amount of work. Hence, this outline represents only a preliminary formulation of a research program that aims at participation of the contemporary Arab/Islamic societies in formulation of the newly anticipated model of nature, and hence to participate in advancement of contemporary human scientific endeavors. Finally, it should now be clear that such a program, albeit that it is based on the Arab/Islamic Worldview, it is not in any meaning an 'Islamic' religious view. For science, despite that different societies with different worldviews participate in its theoretical and practical realization, is nonetheless a human activity. If what we introduce is an 'Islamic' scientific view in the religious sense, then it will be confined to those who belief in Islam, and at the same time it will be isolated from other sciences that are formulated by other non-believers. And this is manifestly an invalid position. What we present here is by all senses of the term a local participation by Arab/Islamic societies in contemporary human endeavors to overcome the current impasse of contemporary modern science.

6. Conclusion
In this paper we introduced the current state of contemporary scientific thought which is marked by an essential schism between two views to nature. The first is supporting the mechanistic view despite the increasing difficulties it encounters both on the theoretical and practical levels in contemporary science. The second introduces in various ways alternative non-mechanistic concepts that purport to settle instead of the mechanistic view. Such a state of division, has led to a situation in which we are unable to present a consistent idea about what are

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Samir Abuzaid the basic constituents of nature, and what are the relations between them. In short, due to such a situation we lack today a consistent model of nature. Due to the importance of having a consistent and realistic model of nature in advancement of science, we discussed in this paper the possibility of introducing an alternative model that fulfills such condition, from the point of view of contemporary Arabic or Arab/Islamic societies. Therefore, we first introduced the conceptual problems that confront the mechanistic view to nature and proved that the mechanistic model, at least in its classical realistic sense, has effectively failed. Afterwards, we presented alternative concepts that are introduced in contemporary philosophy of science that contradicts the mechanistic view, and that represents possible candidates for an alternative view. In order to support such a picture we reviewed three recent views of eminent contemporary philosophers of science as an example of the whole antimechanistic trend. These works present in different forms essential criticism to the mechanistic view and at the same time some alternative positions. In the last section of this paper, we presented the concept of the Arab/Islamic scientific and epistemological view, which is a sociological concept, and not in any means a religious one. Through such a concept we reviewed the basic scientific presuppositions of such a view that makes possible introducing an alternative new model of nature. In order for such basic elements to be transformed into a new model of nature, it should satisfy two basic conditions: internal consistency and consistency with contemporary scientific facts. Through such basic presuppositions we introduced a general framework for a scientific program that aims at participating in advancement of contemporary scientific thought participation in formulation of the new and anticipated model of nature that would replace the already failed mechanistic one.

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