Revolution from within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary Author(s): Patrick H.

O'Neil Source: World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Jul., 1996), pp. 579-603 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053982 Accessed: 16/10/2010 15:02
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REVOLUTION

FROM WITHIN

Institutional Analysis, Transitions from and the Case of Hungary Authoritarianism,

By PATRICKH.O'NEIL*

dramatic collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe poses a THE

number interesting varied across terized of questions concerns how still waiting communism to be answered. collapsed in Eastern One of the most the process are charac and how

transitions the region. The Europe in timing, manner, and central characteristics. Thus, by diversity in Poland there were the early, negotiated and Hungary, developments "revolution" each one of Romania, shaped the and the palace for prospects coup in Bul consolidated

the sudden downfall of regimes in East Germany and Czechoslovakia,

the ambiguous garia. Moreover,

democracy differently. Hungary is especially striking in that within theparty itself over the course of 1988 and 1989 there developed a rural-based political move
ment, the so-called Such reform circles, which

undermining
transition. cialism within among

the ability of the leadership to dictate the course of the

played

an

important

part

in

are differences of the diversity of state so suggestive the region, contradicting of uniformity the appearance structures. these political

This study, an analysis of the dissolution of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munk?sp?rt, or MSZMP),makes the
case how authoritarian rule was first institutional that understanding a a better case is a to in of variations ized in given key understanding transitions. authoritarian Institutional orders determine the context that

not event itself but also the only the transition subsequent shapes dies and what order, that is, how authoritarianism political replaces it. In this study the strong connection between institutional forms and the
* The research for this study was supported in 1992 and 1993 by a Fulbright-Hays Grant from the as well as by a grant from of the U.S. Department of Education, Center for International Education the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX),with funds provided by the U.S. Department is responsible for the views herein expressed. My thanks to An of State. None of these organizations drew K. Milton for his comments on previous versions of this article.

WorldPolitics 48 (July 1996), 579-603

580 WORLD POLITICS trajectory of authoritarian collapse inHungary will serve to illustrate
this argument.

Current
Authoritarian explained Structural

Perspectives
transitions

on Authoritarian

Transitions

in Eastern to either

by reference

tend arguments economic levels of social progress) urbanization, ample, development, out of a nondemocra that are necessary for the creation of democracy tic form of political control. Process take a different arguments ap on the means

are and elsewhere Europe typically or "structural" "process" arguments. to stress the macrolevel conditions (for ex

to a greater extent proach, focusing which actual authoritarian dissolution the interaction to

of elite political figures stable democracy.1 negotiations produce sets of arguments Both stand in opposition turalism litical can be criticized democratization in that are often taken as

and patterns by on takes place and concentrating and the success or failure of such to one another. Struc and po and the

socioeconomic

development

largely axiomatic, moves of how a nation-state from an authoritarian system to a question one is not democratic Process-oriented per given due consideration. can be criticized to the other extreme. for moving spectives, by contrast, Transitions The oft-cited Rule, for example, provides from Authoritarian no framework events and opts instead to document for contextualizing the actions variable analytical Current of political elites and to stress to the exclusion in the transition, components.2 their resourcefulness state and as a society of both key as

to the transitions thus remain study of political approaches Macrolevel structuralist the broad brush unintegrated. approaches paint strokes of state, economy, and society but fail to link these conditions to the of actual political process approaches dynamic change; microlevel the actual transition catalog the environment from which sential detriment One to understanding of both. of bridging phenomena but do not Each connect them while to es to the they emerge. transitions, political framework, excludes the other, and

way

the gap between

process-

structure-based

1 Well-known examples of structural arguments include Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Req uisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Re view 53 (March 1959); notable among process-oriented works is Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. and Lawrence Whitehead, Schmitter, Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore: eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Press, 1986). Johns Hopkins University 2 O'Donnell, Schmitter, andWhitehead (fn. 1).

REVOLUTION

FROM WITHIN:

HUNGARY

581

analyses is to study theway inwhich organized activities become fixed,

social forms. The "new institutionalism," which has en self-replicating a stresses the social science, strong resurgence within joyed impact of on the institutions and formation of social and political rela ordering tions.3 As to what makes this area of study theoretically valuable and how these findings apply to analyses of state socialism and authoritar ian decline approaches sarily reconcilable. However, research. To based market in general, there are characterized several central are no by a simple diversity answers, of views thread a since institutional that are not neces

begin with,

assumptions start from they

of this through much of the individual rejection

of the rational choice, pluralist, or behavioralist analogies as little more approaches. These approaches typically view institutions structures than instrumental created to serve specific utilitarian func "arenas within which driven by more funda tions, behavior, political rest on mental institutional factors, occurs."4 By contrast, perspectives are not the assumption that these organized forms simply transparent constructs but rather are a more and influential aspect of complex human behavior. follow Institutional necessarily arguments from purposive human stress that these design but forms often do not arise instead

through unintended actions and replication or by default. Institutional

to rational expectations conformity of internal and external activity pull tain and define Second, its own institutions, can be dramatically as the organization affected strives by the to main

integrity.5 as their own structures, develop self-replicating and pat characteristics?resources, values, norms, routines, particular are on to individuals terns?which both inside and outside the passed structure. This tends to bestow on institutions power, the independent to create and ac the objectives of individual and collective ability shape tion. tions In contrast can to more atomistic "establish people this point: "Organiza nicely summarizes with their overall patterns of activity, affect along some kinds of group formation and collec encourage Skocpol the very approaches criteria by which to social institu choice, discover their

preferences."6 tional configurations, political culture,

Theda

3 See in particular James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational 78 (September Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 1984); Walter W. Powell in Organizational Analysis and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 4 March and Olsen (fn. 3), 734. 5 Environments: Ritual and Rationality andW. Richard Scott, Organizational (Bev John W. Meyer erly H?ls, Calif.: Sage, 1983). 6 Paul J. DiMaggio andWalter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Powell and DiMaggio (fn. 3), 11.

582

WORLD POLITICS
(but not others)."7 corollary, organizational and patterns time Over "lock in," is central to to

tive political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of
certain issues political an Third, important the formation

understanding
involves to the

institutionalization
of policies environment.

itself. Institutionalization
of behavior these

typically
respond tend to

practices surrounding an harden, part of the organization's becoming inseparable objectives and therefore blurring between means the relationship and ends. As a more difficult. becomes result, dramatic Indeed, when reorganization are confronted with environmen institutionalized highly organizations are more to suppress or tal or internal likely challenges, they ignore these contradictions than to respond with corrective measures.8 This over to a First, implications. of time. Second, long period by attempting as the tension has two systems may persevere suboptimal if the growing obsolescence of an

institution fosters internal or external pressure, the institution is likely

to preserve the status quo regardless, until en in eliminating succeeds the institution Institutional thus appears as a punctuated rather tirely.9 development to our under than a gradual form of change.10 This well corresponds as those in Eastern and revolutions, such standing of transitions Europe respond such time ?situations that arise without a relatively ian system within and bring down warning short period of time. the authoritar

and Misinterpretation Application in Institutional Analysis

The institutional perspective ten years, as many reference state to has gained scholars now great utilize a deal of currency over or it to augment sup Research on the

the past

plant earlier theories of political activity that had stressed individual ac

tion without state, including social constructs. persistent is one clear example socialism, of this.11 In some

the State Back In: Current Research," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich "Bringing Skocpol, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Reuschemeyer, Press, 1985), 21. 8 and Powell (fn. 6), 14-15. DiMaggio 9 to American G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach Pol Foreign Economic eds., The State and American For icy," inG.John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, Economic Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), 224-25. eign10 and Historical Dynam Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions ics," Comparative Politics 16 (January 1984), 240-44. 11 Notable "Introduction: State Structures, Political Processes, and examples include Ellen Comisso, in CMEA States," International Organization 40 (Spring 1986); Ken Jowitt, "Weber, Collective Choice on the Study of Leninist Trotsky and Holmes Regimes," Journal of International Affairs 45 (Summer of State Socialism," in David 1991); Victor Nee and David Stark, "Toward an Institutional Analysis

7 Theda

REVOLUTION ways, search, earlier studies

FROM WITHIN: anticipated organizational

HUNGARY this current wave beginning

583
of re in the

of socialism

as Weberian-influenced

1950s, strongly shaped work on the USSR and Eastern Europe.12

at is winning institutional converts, Nevertheless, analysis although least within science the perspective tends to suffer from weak political nesses in both definition and theoretical power. For one thing, institu as little more tions are often characterized than self-reproducing linked to sunk costs and vested constructs, interests, rather than as ac own tors in their own culture and re right, creating their organizational sources. As Ronald are not notes, "Institutions Jepperson just constraint all institutions and control.13 structures; empower simultaneously

theory,

A second problem lies in overstating institutional effects. While

perspective order standing political a way that exaggerates ables, which leads context-dependent the degree to which One finds institutional

the

a role in under has rightly been accorded some have utilized in and change, the approach as vari the uniqueness of political institutions that political institutions This then are so limits social

to the conclusion as to be

largely noncomparative. institutional effects can be generalized. in institutional of state this particularly analyses of institutional

perspectives to change from earlier attempts place ofWestern orders. But when these systems under the rubric political is overemphasized, the arguments lose the institutional perspective concept stressing character, differenti process symbol emphasizing ideographic this logic, the institu ation, that is, overshadows causality. Following to use Ken Jowitt's tions of state socialism thus become "novel" because, un are "Leninist," but we then fail to well-worn term, they identify the toward an their theoretical character and shift away from a

the introduction ism.14 Certainly, is awelcome ies of state socialism

into stud

derlying dynamics that institutionalized Leninism

generalizable even rejects stitutional

in the first place. A

is consequently lost. Jowitt process of institutionalization in that its use has "in the use of the term "state socialism," As others
the Economic Press,

creased the analytic familiarity of Leninist regimes by denying their in

peculiarity."15 have noted, such advice does not

Stark and Victor Nee, eds., Remaking Stanford University (Stanford, Calif:

Post-Communism tainty in the Transition: 1993). 12 See, for example, Barrington Moore Jr., Terror and Progress, U.S.S.R.: Some Sources of Change and Press, 1954). (Cambridge: Harvard University Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship 13 in Powell and DiMaggio Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," (fn. Jepperson, "Institutions, 3), 146. 14 See in particular Jowitt (fn. 11); and Nee and Stark (fn. 11). 15Jowitt(fn.ll),40.

Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe "Uncer and Valerie Bunce and M?ria Csan?di, inHungary," East European Politics and Societies 7 (Spring 1989);

584

WORLD POLITICS

lend itself to either theory building or generalization. Nor does it en

rich the analytical process by searching where within the social sciences.16 for illuminating concepts else

WITH LESSONS ENRICHINGTHE "NEW"INSTITUTIONALISM

FROM THE "Old" Many litical new institutionalism in the so-called of the shortcomings the fact that our understanding science are aggravated by to the pioneer whose work of institutional on organizational approach analysis, in po of the

intellectual origins of this field is rather limited. Notable for its absence
is any reference Philip ticularly Selznick, the sociologist in the development consistent than with with those

1940s and 1950s paved theway for later studies in the field. This is par
ironic, given that Selznick's is more science arguments currently employed in sociology found itself.17 in the area of organizational Selznick's many contributions Among on the link between one of the most was his important emphasis study, in political

co-optation
actors

(defined as both the informal linkage of a unit to external

of pacification as well as the formal incorporation of

as a means

individuals into the unit itself) and the institutionalization process. Selznick made the case most strongly in his 1949 TVA and the Grass
institutionaliza that one of the key factors Roots, arguing influencing was the to validate to which their ac tion organizations, seeking degree create and/or tivities and/or fill administrative demands, linkages actors external to themselves. so, the or By doing incorporate formally connects itself to the broader environment and, it is hoped, ganization increases How its technical an power organization nor uniform, however; predetermined or ate certain obstacles opportunities, attempt to realize social different and forms as a result. and legitimacy to the external environment responds is neither

social patterns may cre existing and organizational leaders may and degrees of linkage as a result. The

an can and in which the way organization landscape given a difference in the institutionalization does respond makes process. can thus be seen as a basic tactic for Institutionalization organiza its own set of tional survival, though one that over time often generates
and Terry Karl, "The Types of of Jowitt's approach in Philippe C. Schmitter in Peter and Eastern Europe and South and Central America," in Southern Democracy Emerging inEast-Central M. E. Volten, Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy Europe (New York* Institute for East-West Studies, 1992), 43-45. 17 in Powell and DiMaggio Institutional W. Richard (fn. 3), Scott, "Unpacking Arguments," 179-80. 16 See the criticism

WITHIN: HUNGARY REVOLUTION FROM

dangers. While these relations the process will a of co-optation creates a set of environmen

585

tal relations that legitimizes the organization, there is also the risk that
gain the original tween means hand."18 The policy comes As policy and ends will than had been envisioned greater priority that distinctions and consequently objectives be blurred. no Organizations thus become in be "in

fuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at

goal, the primary a result, organization, valued becomes objective. an institution an instrument of a larger longer simply own sake, and for its be self-replication grow increasingly inflexible even as

may

the social environment remains dynamic. This raises the possibility that the institution will be less willing or able to respond to succeeding
waves is the problem One way of dealing with new of co-optation, and linkages building new members. the more deeply institutional However, incorporating of the means-ends ized the organization and the greater the blurring new actors it will be to assimilating resistant the more relationship, of external with to continue challenges. the policy

whose

loyalty to the institution (as opposed to its ostensible goals) is

This is the essence of the struggle within state socialism,

in doubt. dent

described as the battle between the institutional "red"and the indepen

"expert"?terms tional behavior.19 that have become part of the lexicon of organiza

Reinterpreting
State of socialism extreme

State

Socialism

as an Institutional
Europe

Form
is a clear case

in the Soviet Union institutionalization.

and Eastern Stalinism

all a above represented into all aspects of society and of co-optation and penetration process a process of a large nomen that paralleled the formation economy, itself. from loyalty to the organization klatura whose power derived of its in of the party came the subversion With the institutionalization strumental nature: the party came to be venerated and ends. And and truth, to extreme itwas lengths as the revolution as it became and applied in

carnate and the infallible manifestation

of means the complete merging bodiment and judge of knowledge all information. This was carried

of the people's will; it signaled

the em of to even the sole evaluator

18 inAdministration 1957), 17. (Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson, Philip Selznick, Leadership 19 in all societies; in As Alvin Gouldner argues, this is in fact a basic part of political development the long run the intellectual "expert" segment must be "either coopted into the ruling class or itmust The Future of the be subjected to the repressive control of a burgeoning bureaucracy." See Gouldner, Intellectuals and the Rise of theNew Class (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 24.

586
economic a source and scientific of autonomous,

WORLD POLITICS
criteria were feared as since objective relations, noninstitutional this power. Subsequently,

highly With

institutionalized

Soviet form was replicated in Eastern Eu

of the local environment.

rope?irrespective communist leaders

of the nature in Eastern

the death of Stalin and attempts at reform in the Soviet Union,

realized that their domestic in Europe were to the stitutional linkages extremely weak, leaving them vulnerable in Soviet domestic of changes and international Domes impact policy. tic institutional ties now attracted greater attention. By the 1960s many in hopes of co-opting were the "experts" among the intelligentsia and

communist leaders initiated policies of limited political and economic

reform seemed These tellectuals ism and whose most

in thatway building local legitimacy and increasing technical power. It

the intellectuals actions across reignited the region on the road to class power.20 the struggle between red and expert. As raised in

its reformulation to power was

claim

calls for the reorganization of social on new, party leaders, objective grounds, based solely on their loyalty to these very in

stitutions, struck back. The end of Prague Spring in 1968 was only the
intellectuals evident all over the region were example; purged or left the the institutionally from party, leaving loyal in clear control.21 was still Where itwas no longer domestic institutionalization pursued, on increased intellectual ei but instead appealed autonomy predicated ther to narrow and limited technocratic claims with

liberalizing the centralized economy) or to traditional legitimizing

forms, defining by their ruling and justifying predecessors. the party-state the same myths used

(rationalizing

but not

After 1968 the Czechoslovak party returned to a highly centralized

to Soviet strictures rather than by form, legitimized by its conformity environment. the domestic East Germany also soon launched its own offensive the intelligentsia, technocratic reform with against merging

extreme ideological ridigity inwhat has been termed "computer Stalin

ism."22 In Poland, the party tried variously and technical repression with results so disastrous eroded domestic institu rationalization, they

tional linkages and paved the way for the rise of Solidarity and the
party's desperate recourse to martial law. Even in Romania and Bui
20 on the Road to Class Power (New York: Konr?d and Iv?n Szel?nyi, The Intellectuals George Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979). 21 Iv?n Szel?nyi, "The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power," Politics and no. 2 Reflection Critical Society 15, (1986-87). 22 Leslie Holmes, Withering Away 'Real Socialism' or 'Computer "The GDR: of the State? Party and State under Communism Stalinism'?" (London: in Leslie Holmes, 1981). ed., The

Sage,

REVOLUTION

FROM WITHIN:

HUNGARY

587

to liberalization had been modest those steps garia, where begin with, forward were quickly reversed. domestic institutionalization Instead, was "Balkan" institutional such as traditional, forms, sought through as well the development of sultanistic and dynastic party apparatuses, as the resurrection of nationalism and precommunist history, which viewed the party as the expression ofthat national destiny.

Only inHungary did the process of institutionalization continue to

depend blocking segment social upon a liberalized policy as a means of co-opting an society and

the intelligentsia in particular.While

the formation of intellectual reconciliation

this had the intended effect of

important itself. As a re

it also moved of social opposition, into the ranks of the party dissent and the formal

sult of this form of institutionalization?legitimacy

gentsia?the its eventual party both downfall. perpetuated

attempted through

of the intelli incorporation its rule and created the means of

The

of Socialism inHungary: Institutionalization From Stalinism to "Goulash Communism"

To explain why Hungary followed the institutional path that it did, one
must first understand a violent the effect reaction of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, sig

nificant for having totally destroyed organized party power. Following

to the of General repressive policies the party resorted to coercive rule during the R?kosi, Secretary M?ty?s the new general However, years 1956-62. secretary, J?nos K?d?r, even to create a new institutional base for Hungarian socialism tually chose the rebellion, a rather by pursuing policy of reconciliation shorn of members, tered by the revolution, to than continued its heroic myths, force. Shat and much

of its leadership, the chaos within the party gave K?d?r the opportunity
ideolo the structure a new set of administrative incorporate within a to construct of broad co-optation. which gies upon policy was of "goulash this policy communism" From the 1960s onward a number of reformist elsewhere policies unknown typified by a form of institutional in essence K?d?rism gion. represented a whole forms were where array of ad hoc organizational the intractable for, but not replace, compensate for a more decentralized nomic reforms allowed economy, While tines with a greater role for entrepreneurial of the party-state around the edges Soviet and mixed activity. in the re dualism, to created Eco socialist

model.

Simultaneously

the party initiated a rapid liberalization within

the core institutions and practices formed

society in general.

remained intact, new rou an of the political system,

588

WORLD POLITICS

as to social scientists informal process known Hungarian co-optation the "dual" or "second" society.23 also took place, as the A more formal process of party co-optation to the sector. MSZMP its recruitment nonmanual growing expanded sectors but also This focus was not only on the clerical and managerial on the younger intelligentsia. For many views, of these young intellectuals, a mission counter

party membership
neo-Marxist to create Thus, while a modern

took on a highly charged political edge; exposed to

they arrived with a conservative socialist order. in Eastern Europe

and antiestablishment elsewhere

offensive had emerged by the late 1960s, driving intellectuals out of the
in movements, party and sowing the seeds of later opposition Hungary were in place. K?d?r as reforms and co-optative largely kept policies on a rollback could form of one-party rule, whose predicated tempered of institutionalization?of In other words, the process disaster. spell a to an external, environment?involved legitimizing linkages building the sanctity of organiza system of routines and norms that maintained on the for alternative of the tional form, while activity margins allowing were not intended to Reform and co-optation party-state. rectify the shortcomings sate for it. This socialism created had MSZMP. On of state a socialism, but rather were intended to compen

well as the Soviets knew that since 1956 stability inHungary had been

in the situation for many intellectuals contradictory that the current system of the one hand, it became evident clear limits to reform. On the other hand, the Hungarian retained their

party remained at least superficially committed to liberal policies. As

opposed within. As to elsewhere a result, in the region, this group slowly many began intellectuals to

party ties in the hope that change could somehow be effected from or the "party opposition [that] did not identify with the R?kosi K?d?rist model, or the Stalinist or post-Stalinist systems that they had
created. that we is not our system, not our socialism. We joined the party so " this modeV added).24 (emphasis transform in the meantime, while The party leadership, co-opt simultaneously of an intelli the ascendancy took steps to prevent intellectuals, ing 'This could develop as an internal

in Hungary studies have shown that while "new class." Recent gentsia were directed the intelligentsia, the party actively courted they primar into important their ascension offices into state positions, while ily
23 Elem?r Hankiss, East European Alternatives 24 ev! (What a year!) L?szl? Lengyel, Micsoda chap. 3. Konyvkiad?,

(Oxford: Clarendon, (Budapest:

1990),

Sz?pirodalmi

1991), 20.

REVOLUTION

FROM WITHIN:

HUNGARY

589

within the party itselfwas effectively prevented; these remained in the

hands of a poorly educated, aging

and expert between party and statewas a useful way of both pacifying and controlling party intellectuals. At the m?tropole level of Budapest the party intelligentsia found that membership provided opportunities and privileges, even a limited part in political developments if they
carefully. stepped thus macy, were under control These actors, incorporated in the process. into as a necessary the ruling part of socialist legiti structure and brought

leadership.25

This

segregation

of red

Obstacles
Yet this

to Party Power

for the Rural

Intelligentsia

MSZMP segment only part of the represented intelligentsia. itwas an different intellectuals were of Budapest Outside story: entirely to the party far from the center of power and thus of much less concern were fewer, intellectuals leadership. Resources forcing were little access and connections the party for what to remain within to be had. More

the co-optative of the m?tropole served to pacify over, whereas policies the intellectual rural political acted as a conservative bas class, power staffed by older hard-liners of proletarian back tion, overwhelmingly secretaries insulated the party center Conservative county ground. ca interests and threats by means of a peripheral against local/sectoral reer track for talented party cadres. but not necessarily loyal politically the limit to which the county party This position usually represented rotated from county to county rise; they occasionally was not uncommon in this method While upward.26 is that in comparison is notable with other East Eastern Europe, what ern of Hungary's states, the demographics regional cadre in European the 1980s most resembled that of post-1968 Czechoslovakia, closely in the wake of Prague where younger party leaders had been purged secretaries could but almost never Spring?a vanguard These reality inconsistent of reform.27 with Hungary's image as being in the

tenure for party officials long periods of clans where the creation of party fiefdoms, dynastic
25 Ferenc Gazs?, "Cadre Bureaucracy and tember 1992); see also the formerly classified KB Partcadre positions) (Budapest: MSZMP 26 For details on the class origin, age, and

in effect personal

encouraged and famil

the Intelligentsia," Journal of Communist Studies 8 (Sep Statisztikai adatok a k?der?llom?nyr?l (Statistical data on ?s T?megszervezetek 1983), esp. 10,67. Oszt?lya, see Sta tenures of county party secretaries in Hungary,

tisztikai adatok (fn. 25), esp. 48; and Andr?s Ny?ro, Sege'dk?nyv apolitikai bizottsdg tanulm?nyoz?s?hoz (Resource guide to the study of the Politburo) (Budapest: Interart, n.d.). 27 on Communist Data derived from Central Intelligence Agency Party cadre demo publications D.C.: in Eastern Europe. See, for example, Directory graphics ofHungarian Officials (Washington, Central Intelligence Agency, 1987).

590 WORLD POLITICS

ial ties, overlapping and patron-client dom membership, relationships even more inated.28 This was made the fact that whereas egregious by elsewhere ical power in Eastern to enrich central authorities Europe the Hungarian themselves, used commonly polit central party elite was

relatively poorly rewarded with benefits, a reflection of K?d?r's own

seen asceticism.29 Intellectuals, personal naturally by local party cliques as found themselves shut out of these patronage suspicious, typically these re systems. Talented yet not a part of the elite of the m?tropole, tier" intellectuals "second about their gional frequently complained marginal status "Isten h?ta

form policies directed by the m?tropole inHungary were thus able to neutralize much of the power of the intelligentsia in the capital but had
effect of reinforcing friction and en unanticipated center-periphery to this situation, members below. In response of couraging mobilization the this intellectual bound second tier used and the party to cultivate their own informal

m?g?tt"?"behind

the back

of God."30

Re

networks, largely ignored by central party elites.These "solidarygroups,"

by common served values as a commonly were in that they critical interaction, block of partisan organization.31 key building

The Emergence

of the Reform

Circle Movement32

was in a state of By the mid-1980s Hungarian society deep crisis in as awhole. The dicative of the general of socialist economies stagnation economic "miracle" of the past decades began to disintegrate under the pressure
28 Andr?s

of massive

foreign

debt

and new

pressures

for change

from

A. Gergely, Az ?llamp?rt var?zstalan?t?sa of the party-state) (Bu (The disenchantment tan?csi ter?letfejleszt?si szerepe a megyei dapest: TTI, 1992); and L?szl? Bogar, "Amegye p?rtszervek d?ntesi mechanizmusban" (The role of county party organs in the county council's regional develop ment TTI collection, mechanism) 1989). Budapest, (Manuscript, 29 decision-making One journalist has provided a clever in his observation that the further one traveled from example the capital and out from under the gaze of "az Oreg (the old man), meaning K?d?r, the more audacious were party elites and thus the more sumptuous their food: "Nowhere else could one find a more ex kitchen than at the county party committee." L?szl? Hovanyecz, "H?bor?s gyerek" (Chil ceptional dren of wartime), N?pszabads?g, May 15,1993, p. 21. 30 Zsolt Szoboszlai, "V?zlat a vid?ki ?rtelmis?grol" (Outline of the rural intelligentsia), Juss 2/3 (De a cember 1989-January 1990), 103-12; Pal B?nlaky, "A kisv?rosok ?rtelmis?ge 'helyi t?rsadalom' the public life of "local society"), inTibor Husz?r, ed., A koz?let?ben" (The small-town intelligentsia ?vekben (The Hungarian in the 1980s) (Budapest: Kossuth, magyar ?rtelmis?g aW-as intelligentsia 1986). 31 William 111.: Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, 1968), esp. 32-37. Dorsey, 32 two hun The following discussion of the reform circles is based on an analysis of approximately dred unpublished collected by the author, MSZMP archival research, and in reform circle documents terviews with reform circle participants and former Politburo members (Imre Pozsgay, Resz? Nyers, or documents will be cited as in Hungary. and K?roly Gr?sz) Specific interviews appropriate. For an see Patrick O'Neil, "Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Social expanded analysis of this topic, ist Workers' from Socialism" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, Party 'Reform Circles' and the Transition 1994).

REVOLUTION

FROM WITHIN:

HUNGARY

591

Moscow. While
within

during this period K?d?r had tolerated further political

the state, such as in the election process, changes parliamentary those who called too openly for dramatic still organizational change faced serious repercussions. Even with the final ouster of K?d?r and his

replacement by K?roly Gr?sz

unlikely, lenge cated and opposition forces party

in May

1988, dramatic change seemed

remained too weak to chal

themselves

a trun "Reform communists" authority. spoke largely of a limited democratization, sharing of power while maintaining the constitutional of socialism."33 Even under these cir "inviolatability multiparty and Soviet elections were not anticipated until 1995. The

cumstances, domestic The

MSZMP,which had institutionalized a set of limited reforms to balance

international pressure, environment. was incapable of reacting to a changed

to many social tension extended party intellectuals, resulting it is from this position within those at the rural level. And particularly the party but on the margins of power that the catalyst for self-organi zation emerged: the party reform circle. The origins of the reform cir

cles lie inCsongr?d county and its capital, Szeged, long dominated by
of "Pol Pot party leaders (as is testified by its nickname decades of hard-line, often corrupt leadership, county"). by 1988 a series of scandals the county finally undermined leadership, leaving them grasping for the means which their authority could be re by to asserted. One such idea, a consultative body of local intellectuals "advise" the leadership, was proposed. the body never materi Though to discuss the in the attempt continued alized, several of those involved After idea privately. Local intellectuals reformers scattered began to outline different Not but the concept basic could of a political move conservative

ment within the party, a kind of "reform cell" that could link local party
one throughout based group. horizontally on the local level, concentrate similar or groupings only it could into party organizations such an organization its objectives A grassroots at the

also broaden

and foster movement center

elsewhere that could

party platform as a final of power was envisioned this loose group By November sought

in the country. link up with reformers outcome.34 to enter the public

sphere,

33 Author interview with K?roly Gr?sz, G?d?ll?, also transcripts of Central Commit June 2,1993; tee meeting, December of Education MSZMP archival collection 288f 15, 1988, Hungarian Ministry 4/248 o.e. 34 interview with Csongr?d Author and county reform circle members, Szeged, February 9,1993, 20, 1992, and March 23, 1993; J?zsef Lov?szi, "P?rttagok reformk?re Csongr?d Budapest, October reform circle in Csongr?d dated (The party members' document, megy?ben" county) (Unpublished March 28,1989).

592
hoping

WORLD POLITICS
to raise the ranks of its members within the party. On Novem

ber 29,1988, the first declaration of the Csongr?d county reform circle appeared in the local press. Titled "Reform Circles in the Party as
Well!"?a reference the party?the to the rise in "circles" spreading outside political a radical call to action: with declaration opened of

In Eastern Europe, the countries of so-called existing socialism are in deep cri sis.This crisis can only be fought against with radical and complex reforms; the historic task is to liquidate the structure of the Stalinist model. The economy,
politics, various spheres of society?and our own socialist concept as well?we

must irreversibly liberate from the captivity of the bureaucratic mechanism! This will simultaneously require the following: 1.A clear strategy for r?int?gration into the world economy (above all a functioning market and the revival of re jected bourgeois values); 2. Political and ideological reform which will rediscover and support every legitimate value of the socialist movement; 3. The reform of political institutions, such that they will give space to individual and communal
autonomy and regard a multiparty system as a natural state.

The

quarter-page cussed the need

statement for a critical

continued analysis

with

a number

of the past within And

of points: It dis and the role of the to unite it exhorted

party within
outside hard-liners party

it. It called for the development of a dialogue with those

and for reformers to the party sabotage the reform join reforms. circle finally and create others against other

of the party

seeking to members

so as to build some 120

a horizontally based national political movement.35 A subsequent open

meeting people, The That dapest, of the reform circle on December and over 65 signed the founding could timing of the declaration same Secretary Gr?sz day General of the rise of "strident, warning attracted 2,1988, statement.36 not have spoke been to party

less propitious. in Bu activists

counter-revolutionary chaos ... and awhite tenor

bourgeois restoration-seeking, to forces" who sought bring about "anarchy, Struck first by the reactionary terror" to Hungary.

of the Csongr?d reform circle were of the speech, the members in Szeged then further alarmed by the general appearance secretary's two weeks he targeted the re where later at a local party conference, it as factionalist and divisive.37 form circle, branding In response weeks, fearing the Csongr?d a conservative reform circle kept counteroffensive. some a low profile for their reserva However,

35 are reform circles in the party as well!"), D?lmagyarorsz?g, a "Reformk?r?k p?rtban is!" (There November 29,1988, p. 2. 36 a reform circle has been established), reformk?re" (The party members' "Megalakult p?rttagok 3,1988, p. 3. Csongr?dMegye Hirlap, December 37 con "Gr?sz K?roly besz?de amegyei p?rtertekezleten" (K?roly Gr?sz s speech at the county party 12,1988, ference), Csongr?d Megye Hirlap, December pp. 3-4.

REVOLUTION tions were January soon overcome Politburo

FROM WITHIN:

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593

1989

in late rifts at the top. When by increasing at and noted reformer member Imre Pozsgay

tempted to break the political stalemate by declaring that the "counter revolution" of 1956 had in fact been a "popular uprising" against an oligarchic regime, the Csongr?d reform circle publicly backed him
ouster. The reform circle statement received against those calling for his to the existence national press coverage and called attention of an alter native counterorganization in the This was not lost on other party.38 in Hungary. elsewhere party members not to The decision subsequent expel Pozsgay their radical from the party proba

bly had little to do with the protestations of the Csongr?d reform circle.
However, Pozsgay's combined with the implications of public presence, did begin to mobilize other members of the party act,

intelligentsia. By the middle ofMarch reform circles had appeared in Somogy, Hajd?-Bihar, B?cs-Kiskun, Zal?, and B?k?s counties, and by the end of the month they were to be found in Fej?r, Tolna, Szolnok,
and Gy?r-Sopron?that form circles were B?cs-Kiskun?all heavy inHungary. Re is, in over half of the counties in and Zal?, Somogy, strong Csongr?d, particularly counties well known for lower levels of southern

and conservative, often infrastructures, industry, underdeveloped in Budapest local leaders. While intellectuals remained corrupt party the given parameters hesitant and kept within for reform, at the pe was in open revolt. the intelligentsia riphery Despite mirrored cohort plicitly Nor was ates who place.39 socialization, early reform circle declara within the based on their experiences themes, an remained 1956, Hungary party-state system. Despite organizationally on true state. Socialism and Stalinist could only be predicated democracy not vice versa. To that end, the institutional framework for a true multi Reflecting tions focused their on similar
cited inAlfred Reisch, "HSWP Study Re-Evaluates Budapest, January 28,1989, Imre Nagy, and Forty Years of Hungarian History," Radio Free Europe Research Revolution, 5. 24,1989), 39 (A portrait of the reform time/circle/malady), Gy?rgy Ker?nyi, "Reform kor-kor-k?r-k?p" no. 6 (1989). 38 Radio the 1956 (February Jelzb" 1,

the spreading reform circles the same party extent, suggesting amazing a formal as all ex in each case. None leadership, incorporated or vertical eschewed of hierarchy any semblance organization. connections, one another to an Participants membership. to forty years old, university gradu usually thirty-five at the work in party cells or committees held minor positions registered were common there any or delimited

the

lack of direct

themselves

594 party reform democracy must

WORLD be created,

POLITICS both for Hungary and for the

MSZMP. This would include the formation of a horizontally based party

and the convocation of an extraordinary party congress platform a radical of the party (the current timetable did reorganization not allow for such a congress until after the 1990 elections). parliamentary to effect of reform circles grew throughout As the number Hungary during one another the spring of 1989, they began to form connections with on a horizontal structure of the the vertical basis, direcdy challenging a number of reform circles met at a from party party. In April delegates reform nounce in motion conference the formation an in vain that Pozsgay would (where many hoped or a new of a party and set party itself) platform for a meeting of their own. Reform circles frequently on reform and scathing of the political critiques

plans issued manifestos party; these the national

their way into appeared first in local papers and then made continuous attacks increased discord within These press. leaders and cities as well as the rank and file. Reform local party cir also demanded conferences,

the party, demoralizing cles in many counties where But

to oust entrenched bosses. they sought in spite of these rapid successes, the transformation of the re was not so easy. into an organized form circle movement party platform at There were attempts and his supporters, with Pozsgay but linking up the latent hostility of some rural intellectuals toward m?tropole given Rather than surrender their emerging influ elites, little was achieved. ence to a central reform circles chose instead to act au faction, political as reform circles ties to each other, they Even tonomously. developed a unified some As later noted, participants rejected they leadership. viewed sources themselves as a "reform of the party to kill cific institutional origins. anti-institutional strength, formation circle of a single policy. virus," living it from within?a This but off the structure and re spe of its the movement much gave it also hindered coordination and the clear result of their

This dilemma could be clearly seen in lateMay

conference, senting 110 reform where some 440 were circles

at the first reform

in attendance,

repre delegates and by now over 10,000 participants.40 Dele state socialism and reiterated their gates drafted an extensive critique of economic demands for multiparty and the democratic elections, reform, transformation of the party. Press coverage was extensive, and guest
40 For details kratikus 1989, pp. 1,4-5; rope Research on the conference, (With a see Istv?n Tanacs a demo and Eva Ter?nyi, "B?k?s ?tmenettel to democratic socialism), N?pszabads?g, May 22, peaceful transition of HSWP Reform Circles," Radio Free Eu "First National Conference

szocializmusba"

Judith Pataki, (May 30,1989).

REVOLUTION

FROM WITHIN:

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595
was

participants
Committee. to draft

included several members of the Politburo and Central

Despite such visible power, however, the movement

still unable to unify its actions, as the delegates struggled unsuccessfully

a common statement. Jealous platform in nature, no agreement and overly democratic statement single despite hours of debate. of their own could autonomy be reached on a

On the Offensive While

had members change mands, a clear on

and the Party Center

in Retreat

still chaotic, this public show of strength by the reform circles

effect the of the Politburo as inevitable increasingly and Central anxious party Committee leadership. now saw Many political circle de

and began

to retreat

in the face of reform

fewer and fewer allies. Si secretary with leaving the general of this growing forces took advantage multaneously, opposition disarray within the party to organize their ranks against the MSZMP. By early summer numerous civil groups formed nascent political parties, pres the party into roundtable and eventually suring negotiations achieving their demand Importantly, power dra the ne action, removing matically changed to in a broad-based "front" movement, for the opposition cessity unify as seen elsewhere in the region. Stable, competitive, and articulated po in the Hungarian litical organizations thus developed much earlier the incentive for collective transition monic The regimes. was the path of transition on most at the Central session obvious Committee 29, 1989, May a number in of reform circle demands, where members confronted an to the call for party congress extraordinary particular prior parlia au to the elections whose (as opposed conference, mentary planned was much also heard a confidential The assembly lower). report thority on the reform circle national the movement's which outlined meeting, influence developed of the reform circles on the Central Commit growing protestations, strength.41 Over Gr?sz's tee retreated, for October, with delegates the party congress approving to be elected as soon as in a subsequent in possible. Gr?sz complained
41 az MSZMP az MSZMP reformk?r?k 1989 m?jus 20-?n Bizotts?g?nak "Taj?koztat? K?zponti on the for the MSZMP Central Committee rendezett munkatan?cskoz?s?r?r (Information Szegeden meet MSZMP reform circles' May 20,1989, work conference in Szeged), MSZMP Central Committee MSZMP archival collection 288f. 4/263 o.e., of Education ing, May 29, 1989, Hungarian Ministry 125-29.

in 1990. for open parliamentary elections this internal disintegration of communist

process movements

than

elsewhere to

in the region, where still-formidable challenge

counterhege

596
terview yield form By that

WORLD POLITICS
the party was unprepared from the party ranks, of 1989 reform the reform for such a meeting, such as those heard circles were no but had from to

to demands circles.42

the re

the summer to defend

trying to win the tions for the party congress hoped as many as at the of conservatives backing delegates possible, isolating and forcing the transformation of the party.43 In anticipation congress a second reform circle conference was held in Bu of this showdown, to form a united in early but as before attempts dapest September, plat form failed. less over the actual Importantly, delegates struggled content of a statement than over the authority platform implied by such as an anti-institutional to the old order, Created response organization. could not accept the formalization of the movement and the delegates notion of hierarchy that it contained. In the end, the conference ap an of platform "statement reconciliation," proved ambiguous covering various policy issues on reform and democratization. Also formed was central As and-file the party congress, now strategy to dominate the process of congress nomination delegate party one month and election away.44 un

but were

to carry preparing under way, reform circles

in longer engaged it out. With elec

a coordinating council, charged with the daunting task of building a

folded, the reform circles fought hard to field candidates andwin rank
victories in many electoral support. However, despite status within remained constrained their minority the contests, they by came to an end in late When the process party. finally September, for the congress remained unclear. On the surface, delegate prospects 80 gave the reform circles some reason for hope. Over demographics were under had some form of higher education, and were percent fifty, as either white classified collar or intelligentsia. 90 percent had Nearly never taken part in a before.45 In this aspect, at least, party congress they many estimate
42

clearly would

resembled commit

the reform themselves

circle

cohort.

Less

clear was

how

to the reform

over 40 percent

of the same delegates

one circle platform. By came from the ranks of

" a interview with K?roly Gr?sz, 'Tagadom, hogy n?gy ?vtized zs?kutca volt" (I deny that the last four decades were a dead end), Magyar Htrlap, May 31,1989,4^5. 43 Felh?v?s az MSZMP tags?ghoz" (Reform congress! Call to the MSZMP mem "Reformkongresszust! of six reform circles, June 14, 1989); "A Budapesti Re joint document (Unpublished bership) a formkor?nek reform circle statement regarding the (The Budapest ?ll?sfoglal?sa p?rtkongresszusr?T June 12,1989, p. 7. party congress), N?pszabads?g, 44 es tan?c Gy?rgy Kerekes and Zsusza Vars?di, eds., Reformk?r?k reform-alapszervezetek budapesti skoz?sa (The Budapest conference on reform circles and reform cells) (Budapest: Kossuth, n.d. [1989]). 45 1.This was a special party publication disseminated See Kongresszus '89, no. 23 (October 6,1989), to all 1989 until the last day of the congress. delegates from September See the text of a television

REVOLUTION the nomenklatura from Budapest.46 those sympathetic quarter only about

FROM WITHIN:

HUNGARY those

597

and party apparatus, Reform circle estimates to the reform twelve hundred actually were circle

particularly concluded platform

delegated that the number of less than that group a

of the over

one hundred

delegates, reform circle participants.47

made up and within

The Final Party Congress

Under formal these uncertain circumstances

and the End of the mszmp

the party congress opened on Fri

day, October 6.48Delegates

party platforms, as the Reform Alliance. reform

had the option of allying themselves with

that of the reform the first moment circles, now known for the of reckoning

including This was

circles, and a surprising one at that. Of the eight platforms reg in size with which that of the Reform Alliance, istered, none compared some 464 boasted (The next largest group, the neo-Marxist delegates.

Peoples' Democratic Platform, had sixty-eight.) Not only had the Re form Alliance been able to gather the proreform leadership within its ranks (including Pozsgay, Prime Minister Miklos N?meth, and Foreign Minister Gyula Horn), but hundreds more had also flocked to their
in other words, dwarfed all the others.49 alliance, ac as to how many alliance still open to question supporters as to in order to backed the reform circle demands, joining opposed tually the alliance's way, side. Initially events went be on the presumed winning Central Committee voting rights, steering congress proceed blocking ranks. The Yet itwas a lead to the election of that would ings, and having accepted proposal on the basis of a new winner-take-all party leadership plat competing, for the alliance, form lists. This last victory was particularly important over a decisive as a means of winning party conservatives. victory to work of the alliance began the sheer political weight However, it. Fearing that against the party and in forcing
46 L?szl? 4-5. to invitations for the first meeting of the Reform Alliance congress platform, Sep Supplement tember 25,1989. 48 '89: r?vidett, szerkesztett je For details on congress events, see Emil Kimmel, ed., Kongresszus az 1989 oktober 6-9 k?z?tt tartott '89: Shortened, edited kongresszus anyag?b?l (Congress gyz?'k?nyv 1990); Judit Benk?, 6-9,1989, congress) (Budapest: Kossuth, transcripts of the material from October a az MSZMP kon rendhagy? h?rad?s Gy?rgy Kerekes, and J?nos Patk?s, A sz?let?s sz?ps?ges ktnjai, avagy 1989 Okt?ber 6-9 (The beautiful agony of birth, or irregular information concerning the Oc gresszusr?l MSZMP congress) (Budapest: Kossuth, n.d. [1990]). tober 6-9,1989, 49 Benk?, Kerekes, and Patk?s (fn. 48), 20. 47 Bihari, "Amult?t

the alliance political

elt?r?lni"

was

going many

change,

too far in transforming turned to the delegates

the past), Kapu (October 1989),

v?gleg

(To finally break with

598
Peoples' seemed Democratic an

WORLD Platform,

POLITICS "third-road" left-wing, to the radical demands ideology of the al

whose

counterweight acceptable 7 the Peoples' Democratic the course of October Plat liance.50 During in size, with over 40 percent of the new affiliates form nearly doubled from Budapest.51 As the balance their of power shifted, reform circle delegates grew

anxious

that the majority of delegates (including many in the alliance) would

oppose tween be negotiations, primarily over the alliance and the Peoples' Democratic Platform, argued fears on both sides that too much would the future of the party. Despite demands. up in a compromise, the only other radical Platform

be given

an open seemed option state of the uncertain party split?a prospect given dangerous political a basic on the na a full transition. After of negotiations, agreement day a to and put to a vote. ture of the new party was By agreed large major

ity,with only 159 opposed and 39 abstaining, the congress manifesto

was approved on October 8, and a new party, Magyar Szocialista Part?

theHungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)?was finally established. Had the victory sought by the reform circles been achieved? Initially,
that the alliance would be able to instigate a clear imagined over the in the party, winning the showdown delegates, dissolving off party conservatives. Now most dele and hiving MSZMP, congress not in the manner to support reform, the reform gates claimed though a to circles had envisioned. reengineer Compromise, pseudoreform it had been power, in the offing. a set of clear a formal and having a strategies and leadership Lacking the alliance quickly of lost the supporters, large number questionable as an anti-institutional initiative. Having reaction, they lacked emerged to compete in an open tools necessary the organizational political now became uncertain as well, issue of the party leadership forum. The seemed as the mechanism an alliance a single, of election ticket would compromise in fact by closed lists raised the fear that to discuss lose. Platform began representatives soon at list to preserve party unity but were log to withdraw could they from count the congress and found their on? How many of the del

gerheads. The party wavered on the brink of a split. But towhat end? If
alliance own members were party, whose support

50 30, Rudolph Tok?s, "Beyond the Party Congress: Hungary's Hazy Future," New Leader, October 1989, p. 6. 51 Platform were Calculated by the author. Nearly half of the delegates for the Peoples' Democratic Szo from Budapest, as opposed to less than a quarter for the Reform Alliance; L?szl? Vass, "A Magyar cialista Part," in L?szl? Bihari, ed., A tobbp?rtrendszer kialakul?sa magyarorsz?gon (The formation of in Hungary) 1992), 149. democracy (Budapest: Kossuth, multiparty

REVOLUTION

FROM WITHIN:

HUNGARY

599 this not

whose a single conserv

egates, even within

leave

the platform, would follow? And would

of conservatives was and moderates questionable? into a final compromise, composition leadership, whose

the party in the hands to democratization commitment These electoral atives doubts forced list for the new

the alliance

bled by a handful of platform representatives.52On October 9 the new socialist party elected its leadership, with the older centrist politician
Rezs? Nyers made party president. a new, MSZMP had been democratic transformed; avowedly stood in its place. Yet few were happy with either the results or party came about. the method reform circle delegates Among by which they in particular, felt that too much effort had been spent on dis many The

manner of lead accept. This back-door a number of delegates, but to little selection was denounced by ership a closed-list earlier accepted effect. Having format for elections, with now one list had in effect surren the delegates only being forwarded, most of their power, reduced to dered the list assem rubber-stamping and reformers

party alike could

mantling
constructed

the old party, and too little attention paid to what would be

in its Yet the change had been made: the old order place.53 more or less achieved, the re their objective had been overthrown. With form circles lost their motivating force, and their ranks soon dissolved. tions this incomplete transformation the stage was set for open elec in 1990, of one-party rule the renouncement and for many that the confidence seemed to bode well for the MSZP. Nyers expressed With

MSZP expected to lose only half of the MSZMPmembership,

a base of nearly four hundred the membership of all the other parties them with scheduled elections, presidential a for Pozsgay, who victory bring well-known politicians thousand or more, well

leaving
beyond direct

combined.54 Upcoming for November, also seemed certain to one of the most remained popular and in the nation. His victory would help the party

in its bid for political power.

of the party's transforma the shortcomings Soon enough, however, As it became clear to former MSZMP members tion became apparent. no economic that membership security, few found longer guaranteed

that they had any real socialist (or even political) inclinations. By No

52 "Ez a n?v lesz a v?gso" (This name shall be your last), pt. L?szl? K?ri and Maria Zita Petschnig, 9-10. Els? k?zb'ol (October 16,1989), 2, 53 ranks in the reform circles), Erzs?bet Sulyok, "Antipolitikus sorok, reformk?rben" (Antipolitical October 16,1989, p. 1. Szegedi Egyetem, 54 Rezs? Nyers, "Az MSZP v?rja tagjait az MSZMP-b?l es azon kiv?lr?l is" (The MSZP expects mem October bers from both inside and outside the MSZMP), N?pszabads?g, 14,1989, p. 14.

600

WORLD POLITICS

vember only fifteen thousand of themore than seven hundred thousand former MSZMPmembers had joined the MSZP, many from the old ap
with paratus.55 Moreover, forces were free position now the old party monolith clearly gone, op to mobilize the socialist system fully against

and quickly developed strong organizations that could check the feeble
of the MSZP to hold on to power. attempts a litmus test The battle now turned on anticommunism, campaign that the MSZP clearly could not pass. for a presidential Hopes victory were an to dashed when referendum similarly opposition managed eas block the direct election of the presidency, made much something ier by the enervation like any other of the socialists. Having about given up the one major future.

appeal of theMSZMP?to hold the status quo?the MSZP became much

party, making promises an unknown

The first open multiparty elections for parliament were held in March andApril 1990, based on a combination of single-member dis
tricts and county and national lists.56 Far from

the MSZP took fourth place in the elections, netting some half million votes (about 11 percent of the total) and 33 out of 386 total seats. A
the first postcommunist parties formed the MSZP and liberal parties went into opposition. The net, while over. socialist rule was officially coalition of conservative cabi era of

its original

predictions,

A Political

Resurrection

The disastrous results of the 1990 election proved to be a blessing in

disguise. deserted First, many MSZMP cadres who had clung to the new MSZP the party once elections made it clear that the old spoils sys tem had come to an end. Second, to election results gave weight truly the arguments of MSZP reformers that the party had in fact failed to leadership stepped under down, re

the year the party change radically enough; within a purge of more went conservative elements. Nyers

placed by former Foreign Minister Horn.

while between coalition and opposition antagonism parliament, the MSZP took advantage of its outcast position, tak intensified, parties to its moderate and ironically attention ing positions calling political
55 Zoltan D. Barany, "The Hungarian Socialist Party: A Case of Political Miscalculation," Radio Free Europe/Radio pp. 1-2. Liberty Research Report (December 22,1989), 56 For detailed information on the outcome of the elections, see Gy?rgy Szoboszlai, ed., Parlamenti v?laszt?sok 1990 (Parliamentary elections 1990) (Budapest: MTAT?rsadalomtudom?nyi Int?zet, 1990); an analysis of the electoral system can be found in John R. Hibbing and Samuel Patterson, Hungarian "ADemocratic in the Making: The Historic Hungarian of 1990," Elections Legislature Comparative Political Studies 24 (January 1992).

In

REVOLUTION

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601

to the other in contrast and expertise political experience parties.57 tactics paid off far better than anyone expected. As the popular These

ity of the coalition government deteriorated in 1992 and 1993, hurt by

its inconsistent economic policies and authoritarian leanings, public

support began to shift toward the MSZP. A population

increasingly

transition found the party's social mar weary of the costs of economic and technocratic ket ideology?its image of political expertise?more attractive than the liberal of more radical reform. promise opposition's As a consequence victory the May overwhelming led to an elections parliamentary a no one would for the MSZP, that have victory 1994

predicted just one year before. The MSZP won 149 seats in single member districts (as opposed to 1 in 1990) and another 60 on national
and territorial lists, for a total of over 54 percent of the seats in parlia

ment. A subsequent coalition, formed with the liberalAlliance of Free

a two-thirds in Democrats, gave the government majority parliament.58 In this success, a great debt is owed to the reform circles. As one reform in 1990, the reform circles were in fact victori concluded as in their defeat. Although unable to realize their objectives swiftly or as in in the end they were had hoped, instrumental conclusively they so that a democratic about the destruction of the old order sys bringing circle founder ous tem and a modern socialist party could be built in its place.59

Conclusions
Selznick and other scholars have

and Comparisons
argued that link themselves the institutionalization, to the external environ

process by which as a means ment to certain

organizations of stability, has the effect of binding the organization action and influence routines the path that inform collective

are two different success or failure. There of organizational issues at of itself (a question work here: first, the process of institutionalization de forms of institutionalization and second, the comparative degree) on the case (a extreme in of kind). Overall, question pending specific as we can see stitutionalization tends to cause political ossification, across Eastern and struc but the particular norms, routines, Europe, tures involved in the institutionalization process are critical in under

57 in Post-Communist Barnabas Racz, "The Socialist-Left Hungary," Europe-Asia Stud Opposition ies 45, no,4 (1993), 660-63. 58 For details, see Judith Pataki, "Hungary's New Parliament Inaugurated," Radio Free Europe/Radio 7-11. Liberty Research Report (July 22,1994), 59 bukva gy?'zt?nk?" (We came, we saw, we failed ... in J?zsef G?czi, "J?tt?nk, l?ttunk, buktunk... failure were we victorious?), N?pszabads?g, June 23,1990, p. 17.

602

WORLD POLITICS

the construct of institutional of its power and the trajectory standing it can be asserted failure. that transition such as Indeed, modalities,

those outlined by Philippe Schmitter andTerry Karl?imposition

(co

elite dominant), reform (nego ercive, elite dominant), pact (negotiated, mass ascendant), mass ascendant)?can and revolution tiated, (coercive, be much better understood ifwe trace their forms back to the particu order from which they emerged.60 case the process of In the to an external Hungarian linking the party environment took the form of social legitimizing pacification, predi cated on a reformist and the co-optation of intellectuals. ideology lar institutional

When
means unable

this policy was stifled by economic decay, the party lacked the
respond, having new to formulate the means from within, on these its legitimacy alternatives. Yet co-optation staked anti-institutional the MSZMP elements and creating routines and inadvertently could attack greater space

to

provided the party

by which weakening

for political opposition to form.

in Hun earlier, the incremental process of transition meant that no mass movement the lines of in gary along Solidarity in Czechoslovakia, Civic Forum the Union of Democratic Poland, or the Romanian ever in Bulgaria, Forces National Salvation Front arose to state socialism. Rather, the prolonged erosion of the challenge the rise of smaller, more articulated party encouraged political organi zations. able where and comes of political power also meant dispersal to dominate the transition process or elections This in Eastern the new Europe. Power continued that no side was as as else clearly to shift during negotiations As mentioned

between andwithin regime and opposition as theMSZMP disintegrated

out for power. Political organizations political jockeyed came about less that thus emerged institutional "craft through

ing,"which

supposes political authority, than by default, influenced by

context. area of research, the connection investigating and political reconstruction. transitions, Beyond the patterns of reinstitutionalization that follow formation, cohesive in Hungary political parties the slow

in the negotiating changes This points to a second between institutions, the transition moment,

will be influenced by the legacies of the previous order and its failure.61
Taking decay of party again the example more of power that produced subse

quently limited the degree of party fragmentation

60 Schmitter and Karl (fn. 16), 59-61. 61 This last point ismade most clearly by L?szl? Bruszt and David Field in Hungary: to the Politics From the Politics of Confrontation ternational Affairs 45 (Summer 1991), esp. 19 fn. 11.

in parliament,

in

Stark, "Remaking the Political of Competition," Journal of In

REVOLUTION contrast to the eventual

FROM WITHIN:

HUNGARY parties

603 that swept gov

disintegration after 1989:

of mass-based the first democratic elections

into power elsewhere. Hungary

parliamentary ernment held stability power for for the region. The second turned the same six parties spectrum has institutionalized its entire to

thus exhibited amuch higher level of

coalition an occurrence unprecedented in 1994 also re

term, set of national

that the political indicating in the transition process. In a second example the inability of any one side to dominate the to create a transition meant that attempts Hungarian powerfid, direcdy as to other cases in the elected presidency were blocked, region opposed parliament, rather early in particular), where and Bulgaria (Poland, Romania, strong presiden as the actors to institution cies emerged of political expression seeking alize their own power within the state. Instead, Hungary has a president to vex the with more limited, but ambiguous, powers, political enough government that was at times. This undermined ambiguity stands as a legacy of the MSZMPs

strategy in early 1989 to build a strong presidency for itself, an attempt

tional patterns are thus informed Yet institutions by the revolt of the reform circles.62 Organiza now influence reconstruction that the process of political

Chance, can have ments forces

matrix that gave rise to them. by the institutional alone will not dictate the form of political transition. or international and unforeseen domestic individuals, develop a tremendous impact, one that overrides institutional

in a radically different and turns history direction. Keeping these an institutional can our current in mind, approach complement points of the impact of microand macrolevel forces. By form understanding a more theoretical base without the unique aspects of the ing sacrificing we can allow for the broader forces of circumstances under consideration, to merge with the more aspects of time and place. theory inexplicable

62 Patrick O'Neil, parative Perspective,"

"Presidential Power in Post-Communist Europe: The Hungarian 1993). Journal of Communist Studies 9 (September

Case

in Com