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Transformer Failure: Power Control Engineers
Transformer Failure: Power Control Engineers
P.O.Box 87 Mayfield, NSW, 2304 Tel 02 4928 1511 Fax 02 4928 1511 Mob 0425 326 541
info@pceng.com.au
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TRANSFORMER FAILURE
Rev No 0
Description Issued
Originator KB
Checked MS
Date 23/01/09
23/01/09 Page 2 of 18
Table of Contents
1 2
INVESTIGATION OF FAULT AND FAILURE MODE .................................................................. 5 4.1 Fault Current Determination ................................................................................................ 5 Current waveform analysis. .......................................................................................... 5 Voltage Waveform Analysis. ........................................................................................ 5
Analysis of Fault Recording ................................................................................................ 6 Review of Protection Operation........................................................................................... 8 Review of Tap changer Mechanism .................................................................................... 9 Review of Winding Physical Layout..................................................................................... 9 Winding Open Circuit Voltage ........................................................................................... 11 Detailed Failure Mechanism Sequence ............................................................................. 12
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 13 APPENDICES .......................................................................................................................... 14 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Appendix 1 Calculations ................................................................................................. 14 Appendix 2 Photographs of Failed Transformer ............................................................. 15 Appendix 3 Tap Changer Data ....................................................................................... 17 Appendix 4 Notice of Failure .......................................................................................... 18
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1 INTRODUCTION
An industrial site experienced a failure of a 7.5/10MVA 33000V/6600V power transformer. The transformer was sent to a repairer for inspection and repair. This report reviews the findings of the inspection by the repairer and fault data gathered on site.
2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The review of the repairers report and investigation of fault data verify that the transformer failure was due to the failure of a connection to the transition resistor in the transformer tap changer. The failure caused an open circuit in the delta HV winding leading to high voltages, internal arcing and severe damage to the winding. Existing protection schemes operated correctly and without delay but were unable to contain the damage. No change is recommended to these systems. It is possible to install some additional monitoring of the tap changers but direct detection and prediction of this particular fault is difficult to achieve. Additional monitoring should be considered. The recommended solution is early detection of potential problems through regular planned maintenance according to manufacturers recommendations
2.1 Recommendations
Recommendation 1. Highlight this mode of failure and the inspection required to detect it. to maintenance personnel Consider installing additional tap changer monitoring equipment Ensure tap changer maintenance is carried out at recommended number of operations Ensure transition resistor components are replaced as per manufacturers recommendations Carry out additional offline non-intrusive testing of the tap changers at shorter intervals than tap changer maintenance intervals. Testing such as contact resistance is included.
2. 3.
4.
5.
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Available literature indicated that that failure of tap changers is the second most common cause of failure of transformers, second only to insulation deterioration and failure. The type of failure which occurred with this transformer is fairly common and typical of this type of OLTC failure.
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Figure 1 Fault Trace from Power Monitor An analysis of this recording verifies the failure mode of the transformer. Prefault conditions at point A indicate the system operating at a voltage of 25kV(peak) = 17.7kV(rms) line to ground and 100A pk (approx 210A rms total - 3 feeders) At point B the fault is initiated. The fault is not a direct short circuit but develops as evidenced by the recorded initial fault current peak of 650A developing to a steady state peak of 2500A after 2 cycles (Note these are the fault currents seen by 1 of 3 feeders). After one cycle the fault current has increased to a level which causes the voltage to collapse as seen at point C. Points C and D on the recording show a number of spikes on the voltage waveform. These are probably due to instability of the developing arcing fault across the HV Winding-A of the transformer with some arcing to the tank of the transformer. At this stage the fault current reaches its maximum level. Point E which is 3 to 4 cycles from the start of the fault is where the fault has developed to a full phase to phase fault as a result of the interturn failure and arcing across the top of the HV Winding-A. At point F the vacuum circuit breaker feeding the transformer clears the fault. The fault current is cleared and there is indication of a recovery voltage transient. The time from the
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start to the clearing of the fault is approximately 90ms or 4.5 cycles. The transformer differential protection would have initiated a trip signal in 20 to 30ms and the breaker clearing time would be in the order of 60ms. This confirms the correct operation of the protection scheme. The current and voltage levels for the duration of the fault captured in Figure 1 Fault Trace from Power Monitor above are shown in Figure 2 - Transformer Fault Current and Voltage Levels below
7000.0 6000.0
Current (Amps)
5000.0 4000.0 3000.0 2000.0 1000.0 0.0 0 50 100 150 200 250 Amps
Time (ms)
45.00 40.00 35.00 30.00 25.00 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 0 50 100 150 200 250
Voltage (kV)
kV
Time (ms)
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No earth fault was flagged on this relay. This is because the instantaneous operating time t>> of 0.04s is faster than the earth fault definite time of 0.1s.
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These wires connect the contacts to the transition resistor. A failure of one of these wires resulted in the open circuiting of the transformer HV winding during a tap changing operation
Transition Resistor
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 5 below shows an approximate physical representation of the HV winding viewed horizontally as a cross section of half the winding. Each vertical line represents a layer of turns. From photos there are approximately 10 such layers. This layout is not known for certain but is deduced from photos and the nameplate data. Tap changer Open Cct To B To C
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14
A1
15
The tap take-offs are at approximately mid winding (from nameplate diagram). Between tap 3 and offs tap 13 is approx 10% of the winding (based on known tap range of 13%). Each layer is approximately 10% of the winding (since there are 10 layers). This could mean most of the tap take layers). takeoffs are in one layer with tap leads brought out the top of the winding, so possibly passing close to the top of layer 4 (at tap takeoff position 2).
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HV Amps Source
LV Amps Load
HV2
HV1
LV
Voltage Vectors
Voltage Vectors
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5 CONCLUSION
The problem occurs because an open circuit in the tap changer results in high voltages between sections of the HV windings and connection leads to the tap changer. This results in insulation break down in the HV windings. In conclusion, 1. A failure of a connecting lead in the transformer tap changer resulted in an open circuit of the HV Winding-A 2. The open circuit of the HV winding resulted in voltages of at least line voltage (and possibly up to 2x line voltage) between the open circuited sections of the winding, (ie effectively interturn) causing winding insulation failure and flash over of the winding. 3. The initial fault developed in to a full phase to phase fault due to arc fault propagation, saturation of the transformer core and mechanical distortion of the windings. 4. The HV Winding-A and the tap changer were both severely damaged by the fault 5. Circuit breaker protection is not fast enough to limit this damage once this occurs. There appears to be no practical way to monitor during operation the onset of this particular condition. It is recommended that tap changers should be inspected when transformer maintenance is undertaken to ensure that other similar problems do not occur. Manufacturers replacement recommendations should be followed especially for transition resistor components. Possible non intrusive testing or monitoring of main power transformers should also be investigated such as: Tap changer Motor current monitoring Tap change speed of operation (offline test) Tap contact resistance monitoring (offline test)
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0.514
radians
Fault Current Calculation from Voltage Sag Voltage Sag L-N V sag Vb Base voltage L-L Base MVA Source Imped (pu) Base Imped Source Imped (complex) Source Imped Fault Current (complex) Fault Current Conclusion Pb Zsource pu Zb Zsource Zsource Ifault Ifault
16520 33000 292 0.1137+0.6198i 3.73 0.424038698630137+2.31151438356164i 2.35 1268.37525723914-6914.15113840647i 7030 Fault was Line-Line not SLG (SLG FL =3.8kA only)
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