August Dombrow

PL SC 309

29 October 2009
Data Essay 1

Part I
The data presented in the data file, African Coups.dta, suggest two possible causal models: that
coups are a result of failing economies or, contrarily, coups cause economies to fail in SubSaharan Africa. After calculating the regressions in Stata, both showed negative relationships,
that is, an increase in variable x (the independent variable) results in a decrease in variable y
(the dependent variable).
The first regression explored whether a states economic status, as measured by GDP, exerts
any influence over the number of coups later witnessed by examining the relationship between
each countrys mean GDP from 1970-1979 and the total number of coups that country
witnessed from 1980-1989. State produced the following figures and scatterplot:
Number of obs = 44
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------coups80s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------gdp70s | -.0002134
.0002089
-1.02
0.313
-.000635
.0002081
_cons |
3.144844
.733104
4.29
0.000
1.66538
4.624308
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From these results, we can ascertain the formula for the line that best describes the data, which
produces what appears to be a negative relationship:
y(hat) = -.0002134x + 3.144844

This line suggests that for every dollar increase in a countrys GDP, the expected number of
coups diminishes by .0002134. While such a measure appears insignificant, GDPs, as
demonstrated by the chart above, are measured in thousands of dollars, so the impact becomes
much greater in magnitude. However, the 95% confidence interval includes 0, so it remains a
possibility that no relationship exists at all or may even exist in the opposite direction (i.e. more
impoverished economies experience less coups). Ultimately, we cannot conclude that an
impoverished economy causes coups.
The second regression displayed a similar trend, this time attempting to use coups in the 1970s
to explain the state of the economy in the 1980s:
Number of obs = 44
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------gdp80s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------coups70s | -271.2587
124.0853
-2.19
0.034
-521.6729
-20.84447
_cons |
3346.245
402.9516
8.30
0.000
2533.056
4159.434
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Again, we notice that, for every increase in the independent variable (number of coups in the
70s), there is a decline in the dependent variable (mean GDP by country in the 80s), a line
represented by:
y(hat) = -271.2587x + 3346.245
So, for each additional coup observed from 1970 to 1979, that country can expect a $271.26
decrease to GDP. Unlike the previous regression, this new confidence interval lies entirely in
the direction of the given slope, which means that, even though some variation may exist, we
can still expect to see this negative relationship between GDP and coups.

Comparing the two models, the second provides stronger evidence for a causal relationship,
illustrating that the countries, which experience more coups, later have the weakest economies.
This may lead us to conclude that coups are, in fact, responsible for this impoverishment;
however, there may exist some third, unknown variable that is causing both increased coups
and decreased GDP. But, it is not entirely unreasonable to surmise that the political instability
that frequently accompanies a coup may contribute to this decline. If we do accept this premise,
then it has important implications for policy governing the region, demanding that governments
provide a stable political and social environment if they wish to grow their economies.
Part II
To test the historians theory, I looked added another variable whether the country is a former
British colony or not (the dummy variable). The resulting regression shows a positive
relationship between GDP and British colonization, but the confidence interval contains 0, so we
cannot be certain of this relationship. Additionally, this new variable does not alter the original
assessment, so we cannot conclude that British colonization set the stage for economic
impoverishment or repeated coups:
Number of obs = 44
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------gdp80s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------coups70s | -263.9725
125.0634
-2.11
0.041
-516.5432
-11.40181
british |
510.0302
666.0847
0.77
0.448
-835.1551
1855.216
_cons |
3134.947
490.0339
6.40
0.000
2145.304
4124.591
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Looking at the other colonial powers (France, Portugal, and Belgium) in a similar manner yields
similar results. French colonies also enjoy a boost to the economy, thought not as strong as
British, while colonies of Portugal and Belgium showed negative relationships. Again, each
confidence interval contains zero, so none of the relationships are certain:
Number of obs = 44
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------gdp80s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------coups70s | -266.3383
126.5278
-2.10
0.041
-521.8663
-10.81022
french |
201.4574
673.8839
0.30
0.766
-1159.479
1562.394
_cons |
3258.792
501.5422
6.50
0.000
2245.907
4271.677
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Number of obs = 44
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------gdp80s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------coups70s | -267.0491
124.3391
-2.15
0.038
-518.1571
-15.94116
portugeuse |
-1054
1121.64
-0.94
0.353
-3319.197
1211.197
_cons |
3433.836
414.1399
8.29
0.000
2597.463
4270.208
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Number of obs = 44
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------gdp80s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------coups70s | -256.2664
124.505
-2.06
0.046
-507.7095
-4.823389
belgium | -1414.485
1280.973
-1.10
0.276
-4001.462
1172.492
_cons |
3413.384
406.4768
8.40
0.000
2592.488
4234.281
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A comprehensive look at all four dummy variables reveals a slightly different story, as the
confidence interval for the coup70s variable now includes zero. However, none of the dummy
variables are reporting a confidence interval which might help establish a causal relationship. If
any relationship is valid, it is most likely the coups variable which has demonstrated the
strongest relationship throughout the tests:
Number of obs = 44
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------gdp80s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------coups70s | -249.0699
130.3191
-1.91
0.064
-512.8872
14.74746
british |
185.7281
1088.263
0.17
0.865
-2017.345
2388.801
french | -11.59505
1092.859
-0.01
0.992
-2223.972
2200.782
portugeuse | -1095.127
1475.611
-0.74
0.463
-4082.346
1892.092
belgium | -1457.199
1598.907
-0.91
0.368
-4694.018
1779.619
_cons |
3434.509
1074.634
3.20
0.003
1259.027
5609.991
------------------------------------------------------------------------------