Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-Building Susan Rose-Ackerman

State emerging from conflict generally have very weak institutions and an influx of outside funds. These two conditions provide incentives for officials to make corrupt deals for personal gain. Outsiders, brought in to monitor and manage the transition, may become corrupt as well. The conflict itself is likely to have bred a culture of secrecy and impunity where self-dealing is easy to conceal. The end of the conflict may not end encourage the development of transparent and accountable government, especially if those who gained financially from the conflict are in power and seek both to preserve past gains and benefit from the rebuilding effort. Thus, although incentives for corruption exist in all societies, the incidence and scale of corruption may be especially high and especially destructive in post-conflict situations. Corruption is a symptom that state/society relations are dysfunctional, undermining the legitimacy of the state and leading to wasteful public policies. Good policies are unlikely to be chosen or to be carried out effectively without honest institutions. When reform begins, new structures of government and control need to be available quickly or reforms meant to produce good governance and the rule of law can generate into a spiral of violence and corruption as citizens seek to deal with the uncertainty generated by reforms. The rule of law is meant to introduce clarity and certainty into economic, social and political relationships. However, if the rhetoric is not matched by a real improvement along these dimensions, the stage is set for chaos and a new set of corrupt incentives. Peace-building strategies must avoid triggering vicious spirals. An economy that is jumpstarted by giving monopoly powers to a few prominent people may produce a society that is both lacking in competition and unequal. Early stage decisions can lock in the power of a small elite whose vested interests then hold back efforts to increase competition and enhance fairness. Although it may be risky and difficult

to counter corruption in post-conflict peace-building, if the problem is allowed to fester, it can undermine other efforts to create a stable, wellfunctioning state with popular legitimacy. Corupia i post-conflict pcii Susan Rose-Ackerman De stat n curs de dezvoltare de la conflict au, n general, instituiile de foarte slabe i un aflux de fonduri din afara. Aceste dou condiii ofer stimulente pentru funcionarii de a face oferte corupte pentru ctig personal. Strainii, au adus inauntru pentru a monitoriza i de a gestiona tranziia, a putea deveni corupt, de asemenea.Conflictul n sine este posibil s fi crescut o cultur de secrete si impunitii n cazul n care auto-afacerea sa fie uor de a ascunde.Sfritul conflictului, nu se poate termina s ncurajeze dezvoltarea guvernului transparent i responsabil, mai ales dac cei care au ctigat financiar de pe urma conflictului sunt n putere i s ncerce, att pentru a pstra ctigurile anterioare i a beneficia de efortul de reconstrucie. Astfel, dei stimulente pentru corupie exist n toate societile, incidena i amploarea corupiei poate fi extrem de ridicate i mai ales distructiv n situaiile post-conflict. Corupia este un simptom c relaiile de stat / societate sunt disfunctionale, submineaz legitimitatea statului i duce la politici publice risipitoare. Politici bune este puin probabil s fie ales sau care urmeaz s fie efectuate n mod eficient, fr a instituiilor de cinstii. Cnd ncepe reforma, noi structuri de guvernare i de control trebuie s fie disponibile rapid sau reforme menite s produc o bun guvernare si statul de drept poate genera ntr-o spiral violenei i a corupiei ca cetenii s ncerce s se ocupe cu incertitudinea generat de reforme.Statul de drept are menirea de a introduce claritate i certitudine n relaiile economice, sociale i politice. Cu toate acestea, n cazul n care retorica nu este nsoit de o mbuntire real de-a lungul acestor dimensiuni, scena este stabilit pentru haos si un nou set stimulente corupte.

Construire a pcii este o strategii care trebuie sa evite declanarea spirale vicioase. O economie care este abea inceput da puteri de monopol la cteva persoane proeminente poate produce o societate care este att de lipsit de concuren si inegal. Deciziile stadiu incipient poate bloca n puterea unei elite mici ale cror interese sunt irosite apoi meninei din nou eforturile de cretere a concurenei i de a spori corectitudinea. Dei poate fi riscant si dificil de combatere a corupiei in post-conflict , n cazul n care problema permite s se agraveze, se pot submina eforturile pentru a crea o stabil, care funcioneaz bine de stat, cu legitimitate popular.