Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Politics (ADI)
Politics (ADI)
1
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Politics – India Deal
Politics – India Deal.........................................................................................................................1
Bush Good – India Deal 1nc (1/2)...................................................................................................5
***Political Process UQ***............................................................................................................7
UQ – Capital Down (1/2).................................................................................................................8
UQ – A2: Bush Cuts Now..............................................................................................................10
UQ – Bush = Lame Duck (1/2)......................................................................................................11
UQ – A2: Bush = Lame Duck (1/3)...............................................................................................14
UQ – Bipartisanship high (1/3)......................................................................................................17
UQ – Partisanship High (1/2)........................................................................................................20
UQ – Partisanship High - A2: Energy Proposal.............................................................................22
***India Deal UQ***....................................................................................................................23
UQ – Will Pass – Congress (1/2)...................................................................................................24
UQ—AT: Overwhelms the Link....................................................................................................26
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—Time (1/2)................................................................................................27
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—India.........................................................................................................29
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—NSG (1/2).................................................................................................30
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—France/Russia/Japan................................................................................32
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—Australia...................................................................................................33
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—China (1/2)...............................................................................................34
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—Pakistan (1/2)...........................................................................................36
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—IAEA........................................................................................................38
UQ – AT: It Will Pass in the Next Administration (1/3)................................................................39
UQ – A2: Congress Not Key.........................................................................................................42
UQ – Won’t Pass – Congress (1/2)................................................................................................43
UQ – Won’t Pass—Democrats.......................................................................................................45
UQ – Won’t Pass—Time (1/3).......................................................................................................46
***Links – General***..................................................................................................................49
Link—Delay..................................................................................................................................50
Link – Normal Means Spends Capital (1/2)..................................................................................51
Link – AT – Our Plan Is Popular....................................................................................................53
Link – Cuts Unpopular – Congress Subsidized.............................................................................54
Link – Cuts Unpopular – Congress (1/4).......................................................................................56
Link – Cuts Unpopular – Ag Lobby (1/5)......................................................................................60
Link – Cuts Unpopular – American Farm Bureau.........................................................................65
Link – Cuts Unpopular – A2: Democrats......................................................................................70
Link – Cuts Unpopular – A2: Food Manufacturers (Grocers).......................................................71
Link – Cuts Popular – Bipartisan Support.....................................................................................72
Link – Cuts Popular – Lobbies – Named Groups (1/2).................................................................73
Link – Cuts Popular – Lobbies – Named Groups (2/2).................................................................74
Link – Cuts Popular – Lobbies (1/2)..............................................................................................75
Link – Cuts Popular – Grocery Coalition/Heritage.......................................................................77
Link – Cuts Popular – Business Lobbies.......................................................................................78
Link – Cuts Popular – Dems..........................................................................................................79
Link – Cuts Popular – Anti-Spending............................................................................................80
Link—Trade Barriers Popular – Lobby.........................................................................................81
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
2
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
***Links – Ethanol***..................................................................................................................82
Link – Ethanol Cuts Popular (1/2).................................................................................................83
Link—Ethanol Cuts Popular – Lobby (1/2)...................................................................................85
Link—Ethanol Cuts Popular – Congress.......................................................................................87
Link – Ethanol Cuts Unpopular – Lobby (1/2)..............................................................................88
Link—Ethanol Cuts Unpopular – Congress..................................................................................90
Link—Ethanol Cuts Unpopular – Public (1/3)..............................................................................91
***Links – Sugar***.....................................................................................................................94
Link—Sugar Cuts Unpopular – Lobby (1/8).................................................................................95
Link—Sugar Cuts Unpopular – Congress...................................................................................104
Link—Sugar Cuts Popular – General..........................................................................................105
Link – Sugar Cuts Popular – A2: Lobby......................................................................................106
Link—Sugar Cuts Popular—Democrats......................................................................................107
***Links – Soy***......................................................................................................................109
Link—Soy Cuts Popular..............................................................................................................110
Link – Soy Cuts Unpopular..........................................................................................................111
Link—Soy Cuts Unpopular—Lobby...........................................................................................112
***Links – Corn***.....................................................................................................................113
Link – Corn/Soy/Cotton/Dairy Cuts Unpopular – Harkin...........................................................114
Link—Corn and Sugar Cuts Unpopular—Lobby .......................................................................115
***Links – Dairy***...................................................................................................................116
Link—Dairy Cuts Unpopular – Lobby (1/2)...............................................................................117
Link—Dairy Cuts Popular—Congress........................................................................................119
***Links – Cotton***..................................................................................................................120
Link – Cotton Cuts Unpopular – Lobby (1/4).............................................................................121
Link—Cotton Cuts Unpopular—Republicans.............................................................................127
Link—Cotton and Rice Cuts Unpopular......................................................................................128
Link—Cotton Cuts Popular—Oxfam..........................................................................................129
***Links – Fish***......................................................................................................................130
Link – Fisheries Cuts Popular – Bipart/Rangel Link Turn (1/2).................................................131
Link – Fisheries Cuts Popular – Oceana Lobby Link Turn.........................................................134
Link – Fisheries Cuts Unpopular – Lobby...................................................................................135
Link – Fisheries Cuts Unpopular – Food Industry Lobby...........................................................137
***Links – Wheat***..................................................................................................................138
Link—Wheat Cuts Unpopular—Lobby.......................................................................................139
***Links – CAFO***..................................................................................................................140
Link—CAFOs Cuts Unpopular—Lobby (1/2)............................................................................141
Link—CAFOs Cuts Popular........................................................................................................143
***Links – Rice***.....................................................................................................................144
Link—Rice Cuts Unpopular—Lobby (1/2).................................................................................145
Link—Rice Cuts Popular.............................................................................................................147
***Links – Misc***....................................................................................................................148
Link – Multilateral CP Popular....................................................................................................149
Link – Bush Supports the Plan.....................................................................................................150
***Internal Links – Political Process***....................................................................................151
Internal Link – Winners Win (1/2)...............................................................................................152
Internal Link – Winners Lose (1/3)..............................................................................................154
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
3
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Internal Link – Plan costs political capital...................................................................................157
Internal Link – Capital is finite....................................................................................................158
Internal Link – Popularity = Agenda (1/2)...................................................................................159
Internal Link – A2: Popularity = Agenda (1/6)............................................................................161
Internal Link – Olive Branch.......................................................................................................167
***Internal Links – Lobbies***..................................................................................................168
Internal Link—Sugar Lobby = Agenda.......................................................................................169
Internal Link—Farm Lobby = Agenda........................................................................................170
***Internal Links – Nuke Deal***..............................................................................................171
Internal Link—Political Capital = Nuke Deal (1/2)....................................................................172
Internal Link—Bush Pushing Nuke Deal....................................................................................174
Internal Link—Political Capital = Nuke Deal.............................................................................175
Internal Link—Democrats Key Nuke Deal.................................................................................176
Internal Link—Republicans Key Nuke Deal...............................................................................177
Internal Link—Bipartisanship Key Nuke Deal............................................................................178
***India Deal Top-Level Aff Stuff***........................................................................................179
AFF UQ: Uniqueness Overwhelms the Link...............................................................................180
AFF UQ: Won’t Pass—Many Reasons........................................................................................181
AFF UQ: Obama Passes India Deal.............................................................................................182
***India Deal – I-P NW Impacts***...........................................................................................183
Impacts – Indo-Pak NW (1/2)......................................................................................................184
Impacts – Indo-Pak NW – A2: Limited.......................................................................................186
***India Nuke Deal Good***.....................................................................................................187
Nuke Deal Good – US/India Relations (1/3)...............................................................................188
Nuke Deal Good – US/India Relations – Impact: Indo-Pak War................................................193
Nuke Deal Good – Indian Economy/Warming............................................................................194
Nuke Deal Good – Indian Economy – India Key to World.........................................................195
Nuke Deal Good – Warming (1/2)...............................................................................................196
Nuke Deal Good – Russia-China Axis.........................................................................................198
Nuke Deal Good – Oil Prices.......................................................................................................199
Nuke Deal Good – US Nuclear Industry.....................................................................................200
Nuke Deal Good – US Econ........................................................................................................201
Nuke Deal Good – AT: Pollution.................................................................................................202
Nuke Deal Good – AT: Accidents (1/2).......................................................................................203
Nuke Deal Good – A2: US-Pakistani Relations – A2: Terror......................................................205
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Prolif Signal...........................................................................................206
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Proliferation – Safeguards .....................................................................207
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Indian Prolif...........................................................................................209
Nuke Deal Good—Proliferation = Slow......................................................................................210
Nuke Deal Good—Proliferation Deters War...............................................................................211
Nuke Deal Good—Proliferation Prevents Escalation..................................................................212
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Taiwan-China Conflict (1/2)..................................................................213
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Taiwan-China Conflict (2/2)..................................................................214
Nuke Deal Good – Warming........................................................................................................215
Nuke Deal Good – Warming – Impact.........................................................................................216
Nuke Deal Good – Warming – India Key (1/2)...........................................................................217
Nuke Deal Good – Warming – Modeling....................................................................................220
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
4
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – Indian Econ (1/3)..........................................................................................221
Nuke Deal Good – Indian Econ – Solves War (1/2)....................................................................224
Nuke Deal Good – Indian Econ – Key to World.........................................................................226
Nuke Deal Good – Terrorism – Deal Solves................................................................................227
Nuke Deal Good – Terrorism – Down.........................................................................................228
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Indo-Pak Relations – Turn.....................................................................229
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Indo-Pak Relations – Down (1/2)..........................................................230
***India Nuke Deal Bad***........................................................................................................232
Nuke Deal Bad – Proliferation (1/2)............................................................................................233
Nuke Deal Bad – Prolif – A2: IAEA Inspections Solve Prolif....................................................235
Nuke Deal Bad – Prolif – A2: Safeguards...................................................................................236
Nuke Deal Bad—Proliferation = Extinction................................................................................237
Nuke Deal Bad—Proliferation Causes War.................................................................................238
Nuke Deal Bad—Nuclear Accidents Bad....................................................................................239
Nuke Deal Bad – Indo-Pakistan War...........................................................................................240
Nuke Deal Bad – Indo-Sino War.................................................................................................241
Nuke Deal Bad – Taiwan-China Conflict (1/2)...........................................................................242
Nuke Deal Bad – Taiwan-China Conflict – Link Ext. ................................................................244
Nuke Deal Bad – Taiwan-China Conflict – Brink.......................................................................246
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Warming – No Solvency...........................................................................247
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Warming – India Not Key (1/2)................................................................248
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Warming – No Solve: Transportation.......................................................250
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Warming – Turn: Nuke Power = Warming (1/2)......................................251
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Warming – Turn: Nuke Power = Warming (2/2)......................................252
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Terrorism..................................................................................................253
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Terrorism – Pakistan Relations.................................................................254
Nuke Deal Bad – Iranian Proliferation........................................................................................255
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: US-India Relations (1/2)...........................................................................256
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: US-India Relations (2/2)...........................................................................257
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: US-India Relations – Resilient.................................................................258
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: US-India Relations – A2: Terrorism (1/2)................................................259
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: US-India Relations – A2: Terrorism (2/2)................................................260
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Oil Prices..................................................................................................261
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Nuke Industry...........................................................................................262
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Indian Econ...............................................................................................263
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Indian Econ – Growth Bad.......................................................................264
Nuke Deal Bad – Democracy......................................................................................................266
Nuke Deal Bad – Regional Instability.........................................................................................267
.....................................................................................................................................................267
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
5
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Bush Good – India Deal 1nc (1/2)
Bush is using all of his remaining capital to pass the Indian nuclear deal – It will succeed
after a fight
India Today 7-21 (Raj Chengappa, India Today, “The Long Last Mile,” 2008, l/n)
India's other concern is that the NSG may not give it "a clean exemption" and
instead foist killer caveats. Given the domestic political opposition, India has
requested the US to ensure that there were no hiccups or embarrassments at the
NSG. It would need all of Bush's dwindling clout to get NSG clearance by September,
just in time to have it listed for ratification by the US Congress before it adjourns.
The deal is unlikely to get the US Congress' seal of approval without some debate.
Many Congressmen are already seething that Bush used his presidential powers to
waive some uncomfortable clauses that the Hyde Act could foist on India.
Benbrook 3 (Charles, Kellogg Foundation Food and Society Networking Conference, April 24,
ww.biotech-info.net/kellogg.pdf)
About a third of the 17 changes discussed above are already on the table and/or progress is
being made toward implementing them. About another third are conceivable, but will
require some sort of national awakening or cataclysmic event to create political pressure
and overcome entrenched political interests. And the last third will simply happen largely as a function
of the other two-thirds. Implementing this sort of plan will not require a significant increase in federal expenditures nor
will the price of food rise. New taxes, fees and penalties, reduced demand for imported foods, and other longer-term cost
reductions will over time improve economic performance and help reduce federal budget deficits. Billions in medical
expenditures, lost wages, and environmental harm will be saved. Public funding for federal agencies and programs is not
the issue or what is holding back these sorts of changes. The problem is a lack of consensus and
clarity on what is wrong with the American food system and what steps are needed to
make things “right”. Overcoming this problem is getting harder, not easier, because of
increasingly successful efforts by entrenched interests to – Set the terms of debate and
“spin” the messages reaching the public. Control the facts accessible to inform the
debate. Muddle science, create gridlock in regulatory agencies and processes, and
confuse the public regarding food safety, diet-health linkages, and farming’s impacts on the
environment. Sidestep the will of the majority in Congress. Progress will depend on
coordinated and systematic changes in federal fiscal, tax, environmental, research,
regulatory and commodity policies. Reforms must establish new “rules of the road” for
private enterprise. State and local government initiatives, and much stronger regulatory
presence and capabilities, will also be needed to – Stimulate innovation and create new
market channels and better performing markets, and Enforce compliance with worker and
food safety rules, water quality laws, and resource conservation requirements. Collectively,
policy reforms must change the factors governing the flow of agricultural and food
system income streams. Income streams set the values of assets and wage structures.
Income streams determine where capital flows, the terms and cost of capital, and drive the
ability to carry out research and development. In general, the bigger the income stream,
the more political capital and clout in play and at stake.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
6
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Bush Good – India Deal 1nc (2/2)
Reversal of the deal would crush relations and US safeguards
Guardian 8 (7-12,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/12/olympicgames2008.humanrights)
George Bush has undoubtedly wasted his political capital, by saying he would be
attending as a sports fan. Just before he did so, a court in Shanghai granted parole to a
Chinese-born US citizen, Jude Shao, who had served half of a 16-year sentence on tax
evasion and fraud charges. His supporters said he had refused to pay a bribe sought by tax
officials. If Washington's pressure can effect the release of a US citizen, what is its
responsibility to Chinese human rights activists like Hu Jia, who got three and a half
years in prison in April for publishing an open letter, "The Real China and the
Olympics"?
More ev…
Lightman 8 (7-20, David, David Lightman was the Hartford Courant's Washington Bureau
Chief for 23 years before joining the McClatchy Washington Bureau,
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/story/610912.html)
The White House wants the American public to think it's on the rebound, scoring
important triumphs in Iraq and North Korea and on domestic spying while taking
tough stands on oil drilling and relief for homeowners. The White House, the experts
and the polls say, however, is wrong. President Bush hasn't begun a comeback. ''All
this is pretty much a lot of noise. He's going out with a whimper,'' said Erwin Hargrove,
presidential scholar at Vanderbilt University and the author of The Effective President.
Adam Warber, professor of political science at Clemson University, had similar thoughts.
''It's very difficult for him now. His public approval is so poor, he doesn't really have a
lot of political capital,'' Warber said. Congress is run by Democrats reluctant to give Bush any domestic victories, and his
approval ratings have remained at or near a dismal 30 percent for about a year. Bush is the nation's fifth lame duck since the 22nd
Amendment limited presidents to two terms, beginning with Harry Truman's successor in 1952. One was Richard Nixon, who resigned
because of Watergate-related scandals 19 months into his second term. The others left office with strong approval ratings. Bill Clinton's
was 59 percent in a July 2000 Gallup poll. Ronald Reagan's number when he left office was 64 percent. Dwight D. Eisenhower hit 59
Bush's achievements, which are fueling the White House
percent approval just before stepping down.
PR machine, flow from his recent tendency to compromise more on national security
issues.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
9
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – Capital Down (2/2)
Don’t be fooled by bush’s recent accomplishments, he still has no political capital
Lightman 8 (7-20, David, David Lightman was the Hartford Courant's Washington Bureau
Chief for 23 years before joining the McClatchy Washington Bureau,
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/story/610912.html)
Bush was upbeat recently as he recalled his recent string of accomplishments. 'People
say, `Aw, man, you're running out of time. Nothing's going to happen,' '' he said. He rattled
off his list and looked ahead. ''What can we get done?'' he asked. ``We can get good
housing legislation done. We can get good energy legislation done. We can get trade bills
done. And there's plenty of time to get action with the United States Congress.'' But
outside the White House, few were as optimistic. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid
dismissed Bush's energy policies, saying, ''Really, the president's done nothing.'' His
call for more drilling, Reid said, ``underlines and underscores that the main
organization he's trying to help are the oil companies.'' Congress needs to approve any
end to the drilling ban, and with Democratic leaders opposed, that's unlikely. There are
more ominous signs for Bush that his power remains diluted. This week, Congress
overrode his veto of Medicare legislation, and in the House of Representatives,
Republicans, who fear a rout in November's elections, put some polite distance
between themselves and the White House.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
10
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – A2: Bush Cuts Now
Bush’s cuts are too modest to cause political fight
Powell 5 (Benjamin, Research Fellow at the Independent Institute and Assistant Professor of
Economics at Suffolk University, PhD in Economics From George Mason University, March 28,
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1477)
President Bush’s modest proposal to reduce farm subsidies will not cause a partisan
fight between Democrats and Republicans, but make no mistake about it: the fight
that does occur will be interest-group politics-as-usual. Unfortunately, absent from that
fight is any consideration of whether farmers should get subsidies at all. Bush has proposed
decreasing the subsidy an individual farmer can receive from $360,000 to $250,000. If
adopted, the proposal would lower federal spending on agriculture by a paltry $587 million
in 2006. Big corporate farms are most affected by the reform. Also, growers of crops
that receive large subsidies, like rice and cotton, will face greater cutbacks than growers
of crops such as corn, wheat, and soybeans, which generally receive smaller subsidies. Not
surprisingly, the debate in Congress pits representatives in cotton- and rice-growing
regions against others.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
11
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – Bush = Lame Duck (1/2)
Bush is a lame duck
Frank 8 (7-9, Thomas He has received a Lannan award and been a guest columnist for The
New York Times, Wall Street Journal,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121556041111937489.html?mod=googlenews_wsj)
Over at the executive branch, strangely, it is the opposite of panic that reigns. Indeed, the
Bush administration seems to have moved up the date for its own extinction.
Outgoing administrations traditionally step on the gas in their final months, rushing
through all manner of new regulations. This time, however, White House Chief of
Staff Josh Bolten has announced that there will be no new regulations at all come
Nov. 1 – that this lame-duck administration will try to achieve a state of Zen-like
lameness surpassing all precedent. But even this quiet bid for nullity is really a strident declaration of the
administration's true loyalties. After all, Bush & Co. have fought the regulators all along, warring against their own
scientists and shooting down their own agencies' work. Earlier this year, for example, they nixed the more restrictive
ozone standards proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency. The coming elections merely give
them an excuse to close up shop early, to sigh, "laissez faire, laissez passer," and
impose a blanket veto on the whole regulatory enterprise. And what of the
conservative legislators themselves? With little hope of a GOP comeback, they see it's
now or never to redeem the equity they have accumulated with the lobby boys.
Twenty-eight House Republicans have announced their retirement since the last go-
round: The retreat has become a rout, the trickle a hemorrhage.
Eggen 8 (7-13, Dan, and Paul Kane, Washington Post staff writers, “Recent Bush victories smell of compromise”,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/12/AR2008071201616.html)
President Bush has racked up a series of significant political victories in recent weeks,
on surveillance reform, war funding and an international agreement on global warming,
but only after engaging in the kind of conciliation with opponents that his administration has
often avoided. With less than seven months left in office, Bush is embracing such compromises in part because he has to.
Faced with persistently low public approval ratings, a Democratic Congress and wavering support among Republicans,
he and his aides have given ground on key issues to accomplish broader legislative
and diplomatic goals, according to administration officials, legislative aides and political
experts. "To get something done or to get what you want or most of what you want,
you've got to compromise," said Nicholas E. Calio, who served as Bush's first legislative
affairs director. "The president and the White House are very focused on getting things
done, and they don't abide the notion that he's a lame duck." Bush's willingness to compromise
remains limited, and he has threatened to veto several key measures winding through Congress, from Medicare payments
to housing reform. Yet any hint of accommodation is notable for a president who has often pursued a confrontational
strategy with Congress -- even when it was in GOP hands -- and who has stood behind an unpopular war and go-it-alone
policies abroad. "There hasn't been wholesale change, but there has been definite movement toward
compromise," said Thomas E. Mann, a congressional scholar at the Brookings Institution. "What you're
seeing is a willingness to bend some when you're getting a broader objective. On other
things, you finesse it." Two weeks ago, for example, Bush signed a $162 billion spending bill for the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan that he hailed as a product of bipartisan cooperation. But the final legislation was far more expensive
than Bush had said he would accept, and it included expanded G.I. Bill college benefits and other provisions that he had
opposed. A new surveillance bill signed into law Thursday also marked a significant victory for Bush, largely because the
White House won legal immunity for telecommunications firms that helped in eavesdropping after the Sept. 11 attacks.
Yet even there, the compromise legislation included reforms that the administration had
initially opposed, including language making clear that the measure is the exclusive
legal authority for government spying. The changes allowed the bill to easily
overcome opposition from Democratic leaders and civil liberties groups. Bush's conciliatory mood
extended to the Group of Eight summit last week in Japan, where the United States for the first time joined the other
major industrialized countries in agreeing to try to halve greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Although environmental
groups said the deal lacked vital specifics, it marked a long journey for a U.S. president who came to office questioning
the science of climate change.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
15
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – A2: Bush = Lame Duck (2/3)
Bush still has the political power to advance policies concerning security such as the India
Deal
Diamond 8 (8-1, Robbie, Diamond has a Masters in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/safe-applauds-bipartisan-energy-
proposal/story.aspx?guid=%7BC3266EAB-C1A9-4FBE-8A1B-
2D6231290490%7D&dist=hppr)
"This bipartisan collection of leaders has put forward a serious vision to end oil as our
primary source of transportation fuel, and to meet our energy needs in the interim,"
General P.X. Kelley (Ret.), 28th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps and co-chairman
of SAFE's Energy Security Leadership Council (ESLC) said. "We worked closely with
members of both parties last year to draft and pass legislation that included the first
improvement in vehicle fuel economy standards in three decades. In recent weeks, we
have worked with the Gang of 10 and their staffs to take the next important steps.
"We share the same goals with this bipartisan group of senators, and though we may
not agree on all of the steps to reach those goals, this proposal includes several key
policy elements that SAFE and the ESLC are advocating," Kelley added. "It leads our
nation toward the long-term transformation to an electrified transportation system
that is no longer dependent on oil. It also details the necessary steps -- including research
and development and environmentally responsible domestic supply -- to support that effort
and meet our current critical energy needs. This is a strong proposal, and SAFE is eager to
continue working with members of the Group of 10 and the entire Congress to refine it and
pass it into law." The proposal includes policies that will put the U.S. on a long-term
course toward dramatically reducing its dependence on oil, primarily by electrification of
the transportation system. It includes several provisions that SAFE is advocating,
including: increasing research and development funding for alternative fuel vehicles
(including batteries); financial support to help U.S. automakers retool factories to produce
these vehicles; consumer tax credits to encourage the purchase of these vehicles;
expanding transmission capacity for power from renewable sources; and others. To fund
these measures and to meet crucial energy needs in the interim, the proposal includes
provisions to lift congressional moratoria to allow environmentally responsible energy
production in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf, as well as a carbon sequestration credit for
use in enhanced oil recovery in existing wells. "There are few more important national
security priorities for the United States than energy security," Kelley continued.
"Time is short. There are very few legislative days remaining in this election year. It is
time for both the House and the Senate to move forward, and this proposal provides a
solid framework with which to do so."
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
20
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – Partisanship High (1/2)
Partisanship is up
Washington Times 8 (7-27, Gary Andres, Special to the Washington Times, Lexis)
The House majority leadership has pulled out all the stops to block votes on measures
aimed at increasing domestic supply. The entire appropriations process has virtually
ground to a halt because of Democratic leadership concerns that Republicans might
offer amendments aimed at expanding energy resources. The majority has canceled
markups in committee and restricted the types of bills the House considers, using its
considerable procedural power to exclude amendments and other legislative ideas
from consideration. All of these efforts are aimed at blocking one thing: congress
working its will. Lawmakers could come together on legislative proposals aimed at
more domestic production, expanding refining capacity and investing in renewable
resources. But these days, the House is more likely to name a post office than pass
energy legislation. It is a pattern that reinforces Americans' worst stereotypes about the
institution. House Republicans feel emboldened by their successes so far. "This is the most
unified and energized I have seen our members all year," a senior Republican leadership
aide told me. The House Democratic leadership is making a common error: failing to
produce legislative achievement by compromising with the minority. In today's
polarized environment on Capitol Hill, party politics is a zero sum game. If
Republicans develop a popular new idea, Democrats bury it. The notion of sharing
political accomplishment is not in the congressional leadership's lexicon. A former
Democratic senator once told me, "Party leadership now approaches legislation like the
Super Bowl; there's only winners and losers." Lawmakers found a model for legislative success earlier this
year with the bipartisan economic stimulus legislation. The economy needed a boost; Congress came together to do what it could. If
Democrats reached out and repeated this pattern several more times - on issues such as energy, for example, voters would take notice.
That would boost congressional popularity and probably solidify the Democratic majority. Democrats are starting to talk more about
domestic production, but it sounds more like a buffer against blame than a bipartisan solution. This week, the House may consider
Democratic legislation to expedite production in the National Petroleum Reserve - an area of Alaska where drilling is already approved -
as well as a plan to force oil companies to "lose" leases they don't use and possibly some other minor measures. Yet all these ideas have
two things in common: Republicans did not dream them up, and they would do little if anything to address our nation's energy problems.
Congressional rules and procedures provide many ways for the minority to frustrate
the majority's ability to pass these superficial measures that would not address our
nation's energy needs. So the default is a stalemate until Democrats decide they are
willing to confront the energy problems and their environmental-interest-group
supporters. The House majority appears either unwilling or unable to do this - leading to
continuing declines in approval. It also means nervous rank-and-file Democrats have a
tough time explaining how their leadership's obsession with scuttling Republican
legislative ideas eases the pain at the pump. Taken together, these actions send a clear
message to voters: Congress is dysfunctional and more interested in accommodating
narrow, private interests or partisan aspirations than coming together to address the
big problems of the day. Circumstances rarely provide lawmakers with a chance to
address the desires of a focused public. Energy policy does just that - giving the
majority a chance to rise above expected patterns of partisanship. Good-faith
compromise could help refill the tanks of public confidence. So far, the House
Democratic leadership is running on empty.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
22
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – Partisanship High - A2: Energy Proposal
Parties are butting heads over the energy issue
Taylor 8 (8-1, Andrew, Associated Press writer, http://www.newsweek.com/id/150233)
Lawmakers sped for the exits Friday as Congress was to begin a five-week recess
after a summer session noteworthy for bitter partisanship and paralysis on the issue
topmost in the minds of many voters: the cost of gasoline. As its last major act, the House passed
by a 409-4 vote its first spending bill, a $72.7 billion measure awarding generous increases to veterans programs and
military base construction projects. More noteworthy however, was what Congress failed to do: pass energy legislation
and other measures aimed at lowering the price of gasoline. Senate Republicans blocked a bill aimed at
curbing speculation in oil markets, while a similar bill and several others by House
Democrats — including a plan to encourage drilling in already available coastal areas and in Alaska — failed to
advance after party leaders brought them to the floor under procedures that required
supermajorities to pass. That procedure blocked Republicans from forcing a vote on
opening new areas to oil drilling. Republicans have been pressing to allow oil exploration in areas that
are currently off limits, including the eastern Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. They have been
relentless in their assault on Democrats over the topic, even though opening the Outer Continental
Shelf to new exploration wouldn't put any oil on the market for a decade or more. Democratic leaders have
been resolute in blocking new offshore exploration, even as oil patch members and moderates in the
party support the idea. It's clear that if a vote were allowed, new offshore drilling plans would be allowed.
The India Deal will pass the IAEA and will make it through Congress before Bush leaves
office
Times of India 7-25 (“NSG Clearance: Menon to Work on German Leadership,” 2008)
Pakistan has indicated that it might ask for a vote hoping to put divisions in the IAEA
to the fore. But analysts here said that IAEA was a UN body so voting on a decision is
not unknown. However, sources here believe the IAEA agreement should not be a
difficult achievement for India . Even the secretary of Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE), Anil Kakodkar, expressed confidence that the safeguards agreement would be
through. The US wants the Indian nuclear agreement to be in the Congress by the end
of the first week of September, Mulford said. This would give the deal a fighting
chance of going through before president George Bush leaves office.
The deal has the support of the majority of congress but it will be tight
Bipartisan support means the deal will pass in the lame duck session
Washington Post 7-23 (“India’s Outstretched Hand-New Delhi Does its Part to Salvage a
Nuclear Pact – Now it’s Congress’ Turn,” 2008)
There isn't much time; under U.S. law, Congress must be in session continuously for 30
days to consider the deal. Before that clock can start, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group must give India a green
light. While those approvals are likely, they won't happen instantaneously. And
because of the long August recess, there may not be more than 30 "legislative days" left
before Congress adjourns on Sept. 26. The deal raises many legitimate questions. But, on
balance, it is in the United States' interest, and Congress should find the time to say yes
-- in a lame-duck session after the November election, if necessary.
The deal will get through the IAEA and NSG and be in Congress in the beginning of
September
Economic Times 7-24 (“India, US put nuclear deal on fast track,” 2008,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/PoliticsNation/India_US_put_deal_on_fast_track/articleshow/3272154.cms)
NEW DELHI: Putting the nuclear deal negotiations on the fast track the US said it was
planning to seek a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the second week of
August and send the nuclear deal to the US Congress by early September. This comes
a day after Mr Manmohan Singh removed the domestic political hurdles to the deal. With
the UPA government surviving the trust vote, both India and the US are now working
furiously to meet these tight deadlines. The main focus on both sides is to win over the
handful of NSG countries which are still uncomfortable about allowing India into the
nuclear mainstream. These countries, including Ireland, New Zealand and Sweden, will
now be the target of diplomatic initiatives by the US and India. The strategy is to call a
NSG meeting immediately after the meeting of IAEA board of governors on August 1.
The US doe not see any problems at the IAEA stage and expects the governors,
including Pakistan, to give the approval. US ambassador David Mulford said the Bush
administration would talk to Pakistan, which has been trying to block India's civilian
nuclear aspirations. He further hoped that Pakistan would "see things in the right light".
But it is the NSG stage that has both US and India concerned. "Our hope is that following
the IAEA meeting, we would like the NSG meeting to take place within a week to 10 days.
We feel that it is important to immediately address whatever concerns there are and if
necessary have a second NSG meeting," said Mr Mulford. The assessment at this stage is
that it will take time to convince all the NSG members to support a waiver for India.
But the US is determined to complete the NSG step in August. "...So we'll have
enough time to be in a position to give the legislation on the very first days of the US
Congress in September," said Mr Mulford.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
28
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—Time (2/2)
The NSG process will be completed in August and the deal will be signed by Congress in
September
Indo-Asian 7-26 (NDTV, “India may wrap up N-deal by September: Sibal,” 2008,
http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20080058805&ch=7/26/2008%206:33:00%20PM)
A couple of days ago, US ambassador David Mulford had said that the US was keen to
convene the meeting of the NSG in the first week of August after the approval of the
India-specific safeguards agreement by the IAEA board at its meeting August 1.,The
NSG process is likely to be completed in August so that the 123 agreement can be
endorsed by the Congress in September before Washington and New Delhi ink the
bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement.
IANS 7-23 (“With vote won, India and US fast-track n-deal diplomacy,” 2008
http://in.news.yahoo.com/43/20080723/812/tnl-with-vote-won-india-and-us-fast-trac_1.html)
New Delhi/Washington, July 23 (IANS) A day after the government won the trust vote, India
and the US Wednesday fast-tracked the nuclear deal, with New Delhi sending emissaries to
key NSG countries and Washington planning an NSG meeting early next month so that the
deal can be wrapped up by September. 'We will like the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group)
meeting to take place within a week or 10 days after the approval (of the India-specific
safeguards pact) by the IAEA board,' US ambassador David C. Mulford told reporters in New
Delhi in a telephonic interaction from Ohio. The 35-member IAEA board of governors is
expected to meet August 1 to approve the safeguards pact that assures India uninterrupted fuel
supplies for the lifetime of its reactors and the right to take corrective action in case of disruption
in foreign-sourced fuel. 'We feel it's important to address their concerns (of NSG countries)
immediately. If it is necessary to have a second meeting of the NSG, we will do so that we
can present it (123 agreement) to the US Congress in early days of September,' he said.
The Economic Times 7-25 (“India, US Put Nuclear Deal on Fast Track,” 2008)
Putting the nuclear deal negotiations on the fast track the US said it was planning to seek
a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the second week of August and send the
nuclear deal to the US Congress by early September. This comes a day after Mr
Manmohan Singh removed the domestic political hurdles to the deal.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
29
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—India
Singh won the no confidence vote—now he can push the deal without opposition
domestically
South China Morning Post 7-26 (Kevin Rafferty, “Singh Savours Victory, For Now,” 2008)
It was hardly the finest hour for Indian democracy, but Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
finally called the bluff of his leftist so-called allies this week and won a vote of
confidence in Parliament after two days of stormy debate and widespread allegations of
bribery and corruption. The way is now clear for Dr Singh to press ahead with plans for
India to come in from the nuclear cold by pursuing the deal struck with President
George W. Bush in 2005. Equally important is the still-open question of whether the
victory will boost Dr Singh's own confidence and inspire him to revive the stalled
economic reform programme. It would be nice to think that the government will seize the
opportunity to put the economy into second gear, but there are still too many contradictions
and too much red tape restraining what is potentially the most exciting country in the
world. The margin of victory in the no-confidence vote in the 541-member lower
house was 19 votes - 275 against 256. But this was a triumph for Dr Singh, given the
widespread predictions of defeat in the vote, defeat for the nuclear deal and an early
election. Both government and opposition pulled out all their resources: jails were opened
to allow six convict MPs to vote, while ambulances delivered others from hospitals, some
of them on stretchers; allegations of vote-buying abounded. Lal Krishna Advani, leader of
the principal opposition Bharatiya Janata Party, claimed the nuclear deal makes India
"subservient" to the US, a rich claim from a party that tried hard for a similar nuclear deal
when it formed the government. Victory means Dr Singh has the authority to press
ahead with the deal, which still needs the backing of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group and then the US congress. Congress
may be tougher than the Indian Parliament. American nuclear experts have vociferously
protested that the deal allows India to drive a coach and horses round the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and offers an appalling example in trying to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. Brazil
and South Africa had to give up their nuclear weapons programmes before being allowed a
deal; India is being allowed to keep its nuclear weapons untouched.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
30
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—NSG (1/2)
The deal will get NSG approval and be placed before Congress by the end of August
Financial Express 7-24 (“US Wants NSG Process to be Over in August,” 2008)
The US wants the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) process to be completed in August so
that the US Congress can endorse the 123 agreement in September before Washington and
New Delhi ink the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement. "We would like the NSG
meeting to take place in a week or 10 days after the IAEA Board's after the approval of the
India -specific safeguards agreement by the IAEA board at its meeting August 1,'' US
ambassador David Mulford told reporters here in a telephonic conversation from
Cleveland. The envoy, who is currently in the US holding consultations with the Bush
administration on India , said the US, is expecting to get a clean' waiver from the
NSG for India by the end of August. "This is a historic moment and countries are
expected to take a political decision on which side of the history they are-whether they
want to engage themselves with India or not,'' Mulford said in response to a question.
According to him, the Bush administration, is working on the time-line, which would
see the NSG clearing a waiver for India by the end of August so that the Indo-US civil
nuclear agreement could be placed before the US Congress by September. "Some
countries might ask for a second meeting of the NSG, which could be held in the later part
of the months. But even then we have enough time to place the deal before the Congress in
time,'' Mulford said.
The NSG is on board for the India Deal Now—its been endorsed by all of the G8 countries
India Today 7-21 (Raj Chengappa, India Today, “The Long Last Mile,” 2008, l/n)
Also the G8 Summit in Toyako, Japan, was an ideal place for Manmohan to canvass
for the deal with not only Bush but other leaders belonging to NSG countries
including China. Judging from the unequivocal endorsement he got from the G8
countries as also from China, indicating that it would not be an obstacle at the NSG,
the gamble was well worth the effort. In his 50-minute meeting with Bush, the prime
minister also got assurances that the US President would go all out to move the deal
through the remaining hoops.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
31
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—NSG (2/2)
The India deal will get approval from the IAEA and NSG—Momentum and Goodwill
Economic Times 7-28 (Nirmala Ganapathy, “Government Hopes Pakistan Won’t Push For IAEA
Vote,” 2008)
Pakistan's attempt to inject delay and dissent into the process cannot torpedo the
nuclear deal. But India does not want the safeguards agreement to be put to vote at the
board of governor's meeting this Friday. An official said that it remains to be seen if
Pakistan pushes for a vote on August 1. Usually, IAEA board of governors takes decisions
based on consensus. But in case a governor pushes for a vote, then the principle of simple
majority is followed. Significantly, the last time a vote took place in the board of governors
was two years ago and that too over Iran and its nuclear programme. New Delhi definitely
does not want a vote as it would send out a wrong message and give India the dubious
distinction of facing a vote in the IAEA after Iran. New Delhi thinks that such a linkage
is completely avoidable. But officials also warned against overestimating the effects
Pakistan's efforts will have on the IAEA board, where there is enough support for the
nuclear deal, or indirectly on the NSG. Prime minister's special envoy Shyam Saran,
who left for Latin America on Sunday, maintained that the NSG countries, including the
keen supporters of the non-proliferation regime, would not be affected by Pakistan's
note, which has warned that the nuclear deal will lead to an arms race between India and
Pakistan and raised non-proliferation concerns. But the government is fairly confident
that the IAEA step will be completed by the end of this week. Significantly, US
ambassador David C Mulford said last week that the US would talk to Pakistan and hoped
that Islamabad would 'see things in the right light'. Pakistan prime minister Yousaf Raza
Gilani is scheduled to meet US president George W Bush on Monday. Meanwhile, Mr
Saran, who had left for Ireland the day the government won the trust vote, said that the
nuclear deal has more support among NSG countries today than a year ago. Without
going into any specific details, Mr Saran, who gave a climate change talk on Saturday in
between diplomatic initiatives in Ireland and Latin America, said, "whatever demarches
we have made with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group today we are confident
of a much more positive sentiment in the group then perhaps would have been the
case about a year ago." Mr Saran, who refused to go into details of whether India had
Ireland's support, maintained that the ongoing diplomatic initiatives were whipping up a
pro- India momentum. "There is tremendous goodwill for India and I, for one, am
confident we should get the kind of waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group," he
added.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
32
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—France/Russia/Japan
France, Japan, and Russia all support passage of the India deal—especially france.
The Australian 7-25 (Bruce Loudon, “Pakistan: Nuke Deal to Spark Arms Race,” 2008)
The NSG bans exports to nuclear weapons states such as India and Pakistan that
have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and do not have full safeguard
agreements allowing the IAEA to inspect their facilities. But the NSG is ready to
consider a waiver for India , in part due to lobbying from Washington. Moving to
block consensus and stall a process that both India and the US are seeking to expedite,
Pakistan warned the deal ``threatens to increase the chances of a nuclear arms race in the
sub-continent''. The agreement, unveiled in 2005, will allow the US to sell nuclear plants
and related technology to India once it has separated its civil and military programs and
accepted a certain level of UN inspections. Islamabad warned the deal was ``likely to set a
precedent for other states which are not members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and have military nuclear programs''. Predominantly Hindu India and Muslim
Pakistan have fought three wars since 1947. Relations have improved considerably since
the start of a peace process in 2004. But progress at the talks has been slow and deep
distrust remains between the two rivals, which developed their nuclear arms in secret.
Pakistan's intervention yesterday came as a battery of New Delhi's top envoys were
fanning out across the world following the Indian Government's spectacular win in a no-
confidence motion in parliament this week brought by opposition parties who were against
the deal. Scores of India 's most senior officials have embarked on urgent missions aimed
at ensuring rapid approval of the so-called safeguards agreement by the board of the IAEA
when it meets in Vienna on August 1, and the ``clean exemption'' agreement that is due to
be rushed through the NSG immediately after that. There is consternation in the Indian
capital that the move by Pakistan -- clearly aimed at appealing to those countries most
concerned about nuclear proliferation, including the likes of Australia, Canada and New
Zealand -- could seriously upset their calculations and cause major problems in trying to
get US congressional approval of the final draft of the deal before President George W.
Bush leaves office. Last night, Washington's ambassador in New Delhi, David Mulford,
said the Bush administration had the ability to ``persuade'' Pakistan to ``co-operate''.
There seems little doubt Islamabad's intervention will be high on the agenda when new
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani arrives in Washington next week to see Mr
Bush . Given the extent to which Pakistan is tied to Washington after receiving $10
billion in aid over the past few years, its scope for independent initiatives is
considered by most analysts to be limited. Indian hopes the Bush administration
would be able to strong-arm Islamabad were boosted by a report in the The New
York Times outlining plans to shift nearly $US230 million ($240million) in aid to
Pakistan from counter-terrorism programs to upgrading Islamabad's ageing F-16
attack planes.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
37
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—Pakistan (2/2)
Pakistan isn’t a problem—overwhelming good will for India and United States influence
Webindia 7-30 (“India hopeful of positive response from IAEA, NSG (Lead),” 2008,
http://news.webindia123.com/news/Articles/World/20080730/1013977.html)
Pakistan has raised several objections to certain clauses in the proposed India-specific
safeguards agreement, but New Delhi is confident that such efforts will not succeed as
there is an overwhelming support and goodwill for India in the IAEA, the official said.
The US has also spoken to the powers-that-be in Islamabad and exhorted them to see
the India-US nuclear deal in the right perspective. The issue figured in discussions
between US President George W. Bush and Pakistan Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani in
Washington.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
38
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – AT: Won’t Pass—IAEA
The deal passed the IAEA
Neither McCain or Obama will spend their political capital—they’d have to completely
redo the deal
The Hindu 8 (K.V. Prasad, “U.S. Congressional clock ticks away; uncertainty over lame duck
session,” http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/15/stories/2008071559781000.htm)
If the deal does not go through this year, it will have to be the call of Senator Barack
Obama or Senator John McCain, when one of them enters the White House in January
2009. The new President will have to make all the required determinations and then
submit them to the new Congress for its consideration. In the opinion of Prof.
Stevenson, the new President was unlikely to spend much political capital on a deal
done by his predecessor until he achieved several of his own promised goals.
Associated Press 7-10 (Foster Klug, “US-India Nuclear Deal Unlikely to be Reached Soon,”
2008, http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hjHnPz7XX0WpdjPiswhHLvaXj0pAD91QROR80)
The next president could take up the accord when he takes over in January. Failure to
secure approval under Bush, however, would leave it to an uncertain fate. Both
leading candidates for president, Democrat Barack Obama and Republican John McCain,
have indicated support for the deal, but it is not clear that either would consider it a
priority as president. The new administration also would be working without many of
the high-level Bush officials who led painstaking talks with India and then persuaded
skeptical U.S. lawmakers to give their approval. Christine Fair, a South Asia specialist
at the RAND Corp. think tank, said "the underbelly of this deal, as Bush envisioned it,
was that, with our help, India was going to become a global power, and that meant
becoming a global nuclear power. I just don't know if McCain or Obama are going to
embrace that."
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
40
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – AT: It Will Pass in the Next Administration (2/3)
India will just go elsewhere for nuclear materials
Associated Press 7-10 (Foster Klug, “US-India Nuclear Deal Unlikely to be Reached Soon,”
2008, http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hjHnPz7XX0WpdjPiswhHLvaXj0pAD91QROR80)
Democratic Rep. Ed Markey of Massachusetts, a leading critic, said the Bush
administration is pressuring the IEAE and NSG for quick approval of the deal. That, he
said, compromises the integrity of the review process of the deal's nonproliferation
implications. If Congress cannot ratify the deal, and the IAEA and NSG approve it,
Markey added in an interview, "nothing would stop India from signing deals with other
international suppliers.
After NSG approval France and Russia would make nuclear sales to India
Rediff News 7-9 (“After NSG ok, India doesn't really need the US,” 2008
http://www.rediff.co.in/news/2008/jul/09ndeal15.htm)
Given this, it seems likely that the US, and not India, may end up the loser. Once armed
with the NSG approval, India can begin nuclear trade with other countries, US
administration officials and congressional aides told the Post. What it means is that
countries like France [Images] and Russian can make nuclear sales to India while
American companies continue to face restrictions since the congressional approval has
not been forthcoming. Sharon Squassoni, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, agrees as much to the Post. 'India doesn't need the US deal at all'
after the NSG's approval, Squassoni told the newspaper. 'It was a fatal flaw in the logic
of US Congress.'
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
41
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – AT: It Will Pass in the Next Administration (3/3)
New Committee makeup would make that impossible
South China Morning Post 7-26 (Kevin Rafferty, “Singh Savours Victory, For Now,” 2008)
Congress may be tougher than the Indian Parliament. American nuclear experts have
vociferously protested that the deal allows India to drive a coach and horses round the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and offers an appalling example in trying to curb Iran's nuclear
ambitions. Brazil and South Africa had to give up their nuclear weapons programmes
before being allowed a deal; India is being allowed to keep its nuclear weapons untouched.
Regardless of its passage in India—the India deal won’t get final approval in Congress
Congress won’t accept the deal—Washington caved too easily on India’s demands
Curtis 8 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at the
Heritage
Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm2002.cfm)
Some congressmen who are adamant about denying India nuclear fuel reprocessing
rights may be reluctant to accept the language of the 123 Agreement, which seeks to
bridge the divide between Washington and New Delhi on this issue. India has
consistently defended its right to reprocess nuclear fuel. The Administration ultimately
accepted Indian demands regarding this right but distinguished between the right
and an entitlement to U.S. assistance in the pursuit of reprocessing activities. India, for
its part, committed to create a dedicated, safeguarded reprocessing facility to ensure that
U.S.-origin nuclear fuel is not diverted to its weapons program.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
45
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – Won’t Pass—Democrats
Growing democratic opposition is threatening the India Deal.
Hindustan Times 7-11 (“US Vows to Uphold Its End of Nuclear Deal,” 2008)
While critics of the deal, including some Democrats accuse the Bush administration of
diluting US non-proliferation policy, those in favour have warned that if Congress fails
to act this year, India can turn to other suppliers and the US nuclear industry could
potentially lose billions of dollars in business. Democrat Edward J. Markey, a senior
member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the founder and co-
chair of the House Bipartisan Task Force on non-proliferation, for one called the
India-IAEA safeguards agreement as "worse than useless; it is a sham." Expressing
shock at what he called "the loopholes" in the agreement, he said: "Safeguards
agreements should ensure a bright red line between civilian and military nuclear
facilities. Instead, this agreement lays out a path for India to unilaterally remove
international safeguards from reactors." Contrary to everything the Bush administration
has claimed about the US-India nuclear deal, if this safeguards agreement is approved,
India will be allowed to make electricity one day and bombs the next," he alleged.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
46
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – Won’t Pass—Time (1/3)
The deal won’t make it through Congress—not enough time
Thai Press Reports 7-24 (“Bush Administration promises full efforts on India Nuclear Deal,”
2008)
Before the U.S. Congress can approve enabling legislation, the agreement must be
cleared by both the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, and the 45-nation
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the NSG, which governs trade in reactors and uranium fuel. At a
news briefing, Acting State Department Spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos said the Bush
administration will work to move the agreement forward but said it remains to be
seen if there is enough time, especially in the U.S. Congress which aims to finish its
session by September 26. “We're going to be communicating to the Hill how important
we believe this measure is for the United States, how important we believe this strategic
partnership will be for India , for us, and for others concerned with security around the
world. We understand that the calendar is tight. We have the situation that we have. But we
do look forward to moving forward with this and will do so as quickly as we can," he said.
Legislative rules require that the India deal must sit before Congress for 30 days of
continuous sessions before a vote, and the 30-day clock can only begin after approval
by both the IAEA and NSG. A key Congressional Democrat, Ed Markey, who chairs
the House Bipartisan Task Force on Non-Proliferation, said earlier this month there is
simply not enough time left and that administration hopes for action are just fiction.
The India deal has broad support but some members from both parties, including Markey,
contend that it undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Democratic leaders have said
they oppose re-convening Congress for a so-called "lame duck" session after the
November election, partly because they anticipate election gains for Democrats and
do not want the current Congress to be prolonged.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
47
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
UQ – Won’t Pass—Time (2/3)
The India Deal’s time has run out—there aren’t enough consecutive days left on Congress’
schedule and there will be no lame duck session.
Kronstadt, 08 (Alan, Expert on South Asian Affairs and a Senior Analyst at the Congressional
Research Service, “Not enough time in US Congress to pass deal: Expert,” July 8,
http://in.rediff.com/news/2008/jul/08inter.htm)
The key here is that, according to our laws, the Congressional calendar in US requires a
continuous 30-day session once the president introduces the bill to Congress. The
calendar is getting a little tough now. Congress is in recess in August.The session of
the 110th Congress, which sat in January 2007, ends this year. The session is slated to
end in late September unless a lame-duck session occurs after the November election.
Congressmen may or may not decide to come back for the lame-duck session,
specially this year, now that we have a presidential election going on too. This is very
disruptive to the Congressional schedule. The entire 435 members of the House (of
Representatives) and one-third of the members of the Senate are running for re-
election. They are compelled to go back to their districts to campaign. Congress is
likely to be not in session for (the remainder of the) year unless they choose to come
back for the lame-duck session. What if President Bush decides to take it up? Then,
there are ways of doing it, right? I am not aware of any steps the president can take to do
away with the 30 days of continuous session that is required. It is part of the law. We have
the Atomic Energy Act, which is relevant here (It deals with the regulation of nuclear
materials and facilities in the US). There is the Hyde Act, which is an enabling act that is
clear about the requirements (that come after the submission by the) president. That's why,
in the last few months we saw State Department officials started referring... to Senator
(Joseph) Biden's statements.As a senior (senator), Senator Biden's words should be taken
as quite credible on the issue. Biden said we need to submit (the nuclear deal) sometime in
June. When the administration started referring to Biden's statements I took it as a sign that
the (Bush) administration itself was seeing the timeline the same way. Subsequent
statements from the (US) ambassador (to India David Mulford) and even from some
Congressmen suggest that the clock has run out. The 30 days' session starts when the
president submits the India-US nuclear co-operation agreement to Congress. To do
that, certain steps at have to be completed at the IAEA and NSG. If the necessary
steps at the IAEA and NSG are completed by, say, the end of July, then do you think
the nuclear deal has a good chance to pass Congress? The way I see it, there are just
not enough days in the Congressional calendar without (including) a lame-duck
session. As I understand a session is planned in September that only leaves whatever
days are left in September and whatever days remain in July. I don't see how they
(could) get 30 continuous days out of that.
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UQ – Won’t Pass—Time (3/3)
Passage of the India deal is impossible—there isn’t enough time.
Washington Post 7-9 (Glenn Kessler, “Congress May Not Pass U.S.-India Nuclear Pact,” 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/08/AR2008070801523.html)
India's civil nuclear agreement with the United States may have cleared a key hurdle
in New Delhi this week, but it appears unlikely to win final approval in the U.S.
Congress this year, raising the possibility that India could begin nuclear trade with other
countries even without the Bush administration's signature deal, according to
administration officials and congressional aides. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
has struggled to keep his coalition government intact over the controversial deal to give
New Delhi access to U.S. nuclear technology for the first time since it conducted a nuclear
test in 1974. This week, he secured an agreement with the Samajwadi Party to back the
deal, giving him enough support to retain his majority even as the Communists bolted over
fears that the pact would infringe on India's sovereignty. But the legislation passed in
2006 -- the so-called Hyde Act -- that gave preliminary approval to the U.S.-India
agreement, requires that Congress be in 30 days of continuous session to consider it.
Congressional aides said that clock can begin to tick only once India clears two more
hurdles -- completing an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency,
and securing approval from the 45 nations that form the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
which governs trade in reactors and uranium. Because of the long August recess, less
than 40 days are left in the session before Congress adjourns on Sept. 26. "At this
point, both [the IAEA and NSG actions] have to take place in the next couple of
weeks" for the deal to be considered by Congress, said Lynne Weil, spokeswoman for
the House Foreign Affairs Committee. But the IAEA Board of Governors is not
expected to take up the matter until August, whereas the NSG may take several
months to reach a consensus. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) has repeatedly
insisted there will be no lame-duck session after the Nov. 4 elections. There would be
little incentive for the Democratic majority to hold a lame-duck session if, as expected,
the Democrats significantly gain seats.President Bush's agreement with India, considered
a key part of his foreign policy legacy, is designed to solidify Washington's relationship
with a fast-emerging economic power. Bush and Singh agreed to the pact in July 2005, but
it has faced repeated delays and opposition in both countries.Now, with the near
impossibility of congressional passage by year-end, officials and experts have begun to
focus on the possibility that other countries -- such as France and Russia -- would rush in
to make nuclear sales to India while U.S. companies still face legal restrictions.
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***Links – General***
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Link—Delay
Bush has to solely focus on the deal—any delay will cause its death
The deal has to get done now—any further delay would cause its collapse
India Today 7-21 (Raj Chengappa, “The Long Last Mile,” 2008, l/n)
The Left's stringent objections and delaying tactics have left both the Indian and the US
governments with little elbow room to consummate the deal during US President
George Bush's tenure which ends in January 2009.Apart from the IAEA Board clearing
the India-specific safeguards agreement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has to
agree to make an exception in its rules that would permit its 45 members to carry out
civilian nuclear trade with India even though it is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). After that the US President will make a determination that
India has fulfilled its part of the deal and send it to the US Congress which will then
have to take an up-or-down vote on it. Only after all these processes are completed to
everyone's satisfaction, will the deal become operationalised and allow India to engage in
nuclear trade with American entities. If Manmohan suddenly seemed in a hurry to push the
deal through, it was because any further delay would mean that India would have to
negotiate with a new President and a new Congress to seal the deal. And there was
every danger that they may not be as responsive or enthusiastic as Bush and the
current legislators are.
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The third dysfunction in interbranch relations is the length of time and the amount of presidential capital
needed to gain approval of a major foreign policy law or treaty. When the president makes a compelling
case that the national security of the United States demands the approval of a particular bill or treaty,
Congress rarely rejects him. This was true for the Panama Canal treaties and the war in the Persian Gulf.
But if the policy is unpopular, the president will almost certainly have to devote a much larger proportion
of his time and political capital to gaining approval for it, and he will have less time for and influence on
other foreign policy issues. Also, if he needs to ask Congress repeatedly to approve an unpopular policy --
such as contra aid -- he will deplete his political capital and is likely eventually to lose the votes, as
Reagan did. The increasing complexity of the world and its growing interdependence with the United
States means that the agenda will grow, the trade-offs between domestic and international interests will
become more delicate, and the role of Congress will increase proportionately. A few difficult issues -- like
the canal treaties or contra aid -- can delay consideration of the entire foreign policy agenda for prolonged
periods. Given a fixed amount of time and a limited number of decision makers, this systemic delay might
be among the most important problems that stem from interbranch politics. The president must be very
conscious of his agenda and very selective in his approach.
Normal means ensures the plan spends finite political capital - policymaking and resource
distribution require extensive use of White House resources
Light, Brookings Center for Public Service director, 99
(Paul C., THE PRESIDENT'S AGENDA, 1999, p. 2. )
The President's domestic agenda also reflects the allocation of resources, which often are fixed and
limited. As a President moves through the term, each agenda choice commits some White House
resources - time, energy, information, expertise, political capital. Each agenda item also commits some
policy options, whether federal funds or bureaucratic energy. The sheer number of participants in the
policy process both inside and outside the White House has increased rapidly over the last two decades;
interest groups and individuals have "discovered" Congress and the Presidency. This growing pressure
has placed greater emphasis on the agenda as a topic of political conflict. Policy-makers increasingly turn
to the agenda for the first battles over the distribution of scarce resources. Given the ever-tightening
policy options, this pressure will not abate in the near future.
Presidential priorities also involve more conflict, both inside the administration and out. And the greater
the conflict, the more time, information, expertise, and energy necessary to settle the disputes. "You'd be
surprised how long it takes to iron out the differences," a Johnson legislative assistant argued.
"Compromise doesn't usually happen overnight. It takes a heft investment of presidential influence and
effort." Once again, welfare reform serves as an example. One highly placed Nixon observer maintained
that "the [Family Assistance] plan could have been announced much sooner if there hadn't been such a
struggle. With Burns and Moynihan at odds, we couldn't move. When one would attack, the other would
counterattack. Sure, the issue was intricate, but it could have been handled much faster without the in-
fighting. As it was, there was a stalemate for three months."
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Link – Normal Means Spends Capital (2/2)
Controversial decisions burn capital
Thomas & Pika, Professors of Political Science, University of Cincinnati and Delaware, 97
(Norman & Joseph, THE POLITICS OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1997, pg. 215
"Political Capital" is the reservoir of popular and congressional support with which newly
elected presidents begin their terms. As they make controversial decisions, they "spend" some of
their capital, which they are seldom able to replenish. They must decide which proposals merit
the expenditure of political capital and in what amounts.
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Utt 7 (Ronald D., Ph.D., is Herbert and Joyce Morgan Senior Research Fellow in the Thomas
A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/research/agriculture/bg2045.cfm, 6/27)
Exactly how many Members of Congress benefit directly from USDA subsidies has not
been fully established, but several studies and articles have uncovered some
information,[2] and the record indicates that some Members and their families
receive substantial financial benefits. Some of these Members have been serving in
Congress for many years, including extensive service on the agriculture committees.
Others have just been elected to Congress and, while they have yet to take a stand on agriculture spending, nonetheless
confront the challenge of a potential conflict of interest. The following examples represent a cross-section of Members of
Congress who have received USDA subsidies between 1995 and 2005. The list is not intended to be definitive, and other
examples will likely come to light, but this sample illustrates the extent to which these potential
conflicts of interest exist and the significant amounts of money that are involved. The
information was compiled by the Environmental Working Group from USDA data.[3] Big
Subsidies in Big Sky Country. Senator R. Jon Tester (D-MT), newly elected in November
2006, and his wife Sharla are equal co-owners of T-bone Farms, Inc., in Big Sandy
Springs, Montana. Between 1995 and 2005, the farm received $232,311 in USDA
subsidies for oats, wheat, barley, and dry peas and assistance for miscellaneous
disasters.[4] Members of the family of Montana's senior Senator, Max Sieben Baucus (D-
MT), own the Sieben Ranch Company in Wolf Creek, Montana. Between 1995 and 2005,
Sieben Ranch (co-owned by six members of the Baucus family) received $230,237 from
the USDA.[5] There are conflicting reports on the Senator's financial ownership interest in
the enterprise, and queries to his office on this matter were not answered. Dennis Rehberg
(R-MT), Montana's lone Representative, and his wife Janice have received USDA
subsidies in the past but nothing in recent years. Senator Gordon H. Smith (R-OR).
Senator Smith and his wife Sharon co-own Smith Frozen Foods in Umatilla, Oregon. The
company received $45,400 in wheat-related subsidies between 1995 and 2005.[6] The
Salazars of Colorado. Senator Ken Salazar (D-CO), elected in November 2004, and his
brother, Representative John T. Salazar (D-CO), also elected in November 2004, sit on
the agriculture committees of their respective legislative bodies. From 1995 through 2005, the
Representative received $161,084 in agricultural subsidies from the U.S. Treasury, and the Senator received $770 in
2002.[7] The Family of Senator Charles Grassley. Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) has extensive
farm interests, as do some members of his immediate family. Listing his home address as Arlington, Virginia,
Grassley received $225,041 in USDA subsidies for corn and soybeans and disaster assistance between 1995 and 2005.[8]
In New Hartford, Iowa, Senator Grassley's son Robin has received $653,833 in subsidy payments, mostly for corn and
soybeans.[9] Patrick Grassley, the Senator's grandson, who also lives in New Hartford, received $5,964 in subsidies in
2005.[10] The Herseths of South Dakota. Representative Stephanie Herseth Sandlin (D-SD), elected in November 2002,
was appointed to a seat on the House Agriculture Committee. While records indicate that she receives no USDA
subsidies, her father and former South Dakota governor, Ralph Lars Herseth, is a major beneficiary of federal farm pro-
grams. Between 1995 and 2005, he received $789,575 in federal farm support for a diversified portfolio of crops and
farm activities.[11] The Brownbacks of Kansas. Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) received $40,403 in farm subsidies
(mostly for conservation) between 1995 and 2005.[12] His father, Glenn Robert Brownback of Parker, Kansas, received
$319,662 over the same period, and his brother, John R. Brownback, also of Parker, received $286,082.[13] Lugar Stock
Farms, Inc. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), who is a senior member of the Senate Agriculture Committee, and his wife
Charlene own just over 12 percent of Lugar Stock Farms in Oxford, Indiana. The other 88 percent is owned by 13 other
family members. Between 1995 and 2005, Lugar Stock Farms, Inc., received $126,555 in USDA subsidies.[14] Many
More, Past and Present. These elected officials are among a number of Senators and Representatives--including
Representative Dennis Hastert (R-IL), Senator Blanche Lincoln (D-AR), and many others no longer in office[15]
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Link – Cuts Unpopular – Congress (1/4)
Cutting subsidies costs Bush political capital w Congress
Sauer 1 (Peter, “The Monarch Versus the Global Empire: The butterfly and human rights,” Orion Magazine Spring)
Between 1994 and 1997, 42,000 small farms in the U.S. disappeared, and suicide rates among American farmers spiked.
However, during this same period, nearly 20,000 newly consolidated large farms were created. The net loss, 22,000 small
farms, meant that when Congress voted for additional farm subsidies through the Market Loss Assistance Program in
1999, it actually increased the payments to large industrial farms. The farm crisis of the mid-nineties, which continues
today, has brought the industrialization of American agriculture yet another leap forward. For decades, the de facto
national farm policy has been to reduce the number of farms, farmers, farm-related jobs, and the farmers’ proportional
share of agricultural profits, and to structure government farm support programs that encourage and reward the growth of
big farms. These are consolidated, capital- and chemical-intensive corporate and factory farms that participate in and
complement the methodologies of the food and fiber industry, which since the early nineties has been dominated by five
or six multinational corporations. In spite of its contradictions and failures, this farm policy,
which costs taxpayers $28 billion in the current year, continues to receive enthusiastic
bipartisan Congressional support. Republicans support it because most of the money
goes to districts that elect Republicans to Congress. Democrats support it because
several farm states—Iowa, Missouri, and Illinois—are important swing states in national
elections. In a December 2000 New York Times article, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman candidly admits,
“Maybe it is time we had some honesty in farm policy.” To put honesty in this policy would mean acknowledging that
this policy exists to serve electoral politics; that the so-called rural economic development program subsidizes the loss of
farms; and that it promotes agriculture’s spiraling dependency on toxins that damage the human and ecological health of
the nation. These are precisely the same effects that agricultural industrialization has had on Mexico and other developing
nations. The agrichemical corporations that support the current U.S. farm policy with campaign contributions to
candidates in farm state elections also are the primary investors in and beneficiaries of the imposition of similar policies
around the globe.
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Link – Cuts Unpopular – Congress (2/4)
Farm Bill proves subsidies have bipartisan support
AP 8 (“Politically popular farm bill gets election-year boost” 5/15)
WASHINGTON (AP) - Rising food costs and the
upcoming election have fueled bipartisan support for
a politically popular $290 billion farm
bill full of extra money for food stamps and farm subsidies,
despite strong opposition from President Bush. The Senate is expected to approve the five-year bill and send it
to Bush on Thursday, one day after the House supported the legislation overwhelmingly. Supporters garnered 318 votes in that chamber,
28 more than needed to override his promised veto. 100 Republicans voted for the bill. Bush has said the legislation is fiscally
irresponsible and pays too much money to wealthy farmers. Agriculture Secretary Ed Schafer reiterated Bush's veto threat Wednesday by
saying it is a "bloated, earmark laden bill." About two-thirds of the bill would pay for nutrition programs such as food stamps and
emergency food aid for the needy. An additional $40 billion is for farm subsidies while almost $30 billion would go to
farmers to idle their land and to other environmental programs.
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Link – Cuts Unpopular – Congress (3/4)
Both House and Senate support for pro-subsidy legislation: agriculture lobbies strong
Riedl 2 (Brian M., Grover M. Hermann Fellow in Federal Budgetary Affairs in the Thomas A.
Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Agriculture/BG1534.cfm)
Organizations representing the farmers of the subsidized crops are responsible for
much of the $69.6 million that agribusinesses have donated to congressional and
presidential candidates since 1999. 7 Several of these organizations were also
represented on the 11-member Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture,
which was established under the Freedom to Farm Act to review its performance and
recommend changes. In January 2001, the commission released a report calling for the
complete abandonment of Freedom to Farm through (1) the extension and expansion of
Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) subsidies that were supposed to be phased out, (2)
the creation of a new "counter-cyclical" farm subsidy program, and (3) the continuation of
policies targeting subsidies to the largest farms and agribusinesses. 8 American Farm
Bureau Federation President Bob Stallman, a commission member, reiterated these policy
prescriptions before the House Agriculture Committee on February 28, 2001 9 and later
called any vote against them a "slap in the face." 10 The Washington, D.C., office of the
American Farm Bureau Federation backed up these calls for increased farm subsidies
with political donations of a steady $4.5 million per year. Similarly, a member of the
National Cotton Council's board of directors, claiming to represent the entire cotton
industry, testified in favor of subsidy increases before the House Agriculture
Committee on July 18, 2001. His suggestion was given added weight by $304,422 in
political donations that the council contributed to federal political candidates since 1999.
11 The unprecedented farm subsidy increases proposed by these agriculture industry
representatives were quickly written into farm legislation, and on October 5, 2001, the
House of Representatives voted overwhelming to pass the most expensive farm bill in
history. The 10-year, $171 billion bill contains virtually the same PFC expansions, new
counter-cyclical farm subsidies, and further tilting of farm subsidies toward the largest
farms that were proposed by the farm lobby. The Senate followed suit by passing an
equally expensive bill with most of the same policy prescriptions. 12
Subsidy cuts unpopular: Agricultural Interests too Strong, control key members of
congress
Riedl 2 (Riedl, Brian. Grover M. Hermann Fellow in Federal Budgetary Affairs in the Thomas
A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Agriculture Lobby
Wins Big in New Farm Bill” 4/9. KK.)
Producers of the five
largest subsidized commodities--wheat, corn, cotton, rice, and
soybeans--have been responsible for much of the nearly $70 million that has been
donated by agricultural interests to federal candidates since 1999. Leaders of organizations
such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, which have also been multimillion-dollar campaign donors, were appointed to federal
commissions where they proposed several new expensive farm programs to Congress. Not surprisingly, nearly all of the
recommendations made by these organizations ended up in the House and Senate bills. The sugar industry donated
$4.3 million to federal political candidates in hopes of retaining federal sugar
supports that triple the price American consumers pay for sugar. One-fourth of these donations came from just one company--Flo-
Sun, Inc., a sugar empire located in Florida and the Dominican Republic and owned by brothers Alfonso (Alfie) and Jose (Pepe) Fanjul.
Although this corporation is scarcely in need and the Fanjuls' sugar fortune has been conservatively estimated to be worth $500 million,
the government's sugar program provides them with approximately $125 million per year in federal benefits. In December 2001, a
Senate amendment that would have saved consumers $1.9 billion per year by eliminating the federal sugar program was defeated by a
vote of 71-25. Likewise, the peanut industry sought assurance that it would not be harmed by the elimination of price supports.
Organizations including the Western Peanut Growers Association and the National Peanut Growers Group donated nearly $250,000 to
candidates for national office and testified before Congress several times in favor of replacing peanut price supports with generous
federal subsidies. Both the House and Senate voted to include $3.5 billion in peanut subsidies over 10 years, thereby shifting the cost of
the peanut program from consumers to taxpayers. Meanwhile, dairy farmers have been defending milk price supports that impose a
"milk tax" costing consumers $2.7 billion per year. Organizations such as the National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF), which told
Congress that these milk tax policies are actually good for consumers, were responsible for much of the $3.3 million that has been
donated by the dairy industry to federal political candidates. While Congress did allow one dairy price support program--the Northeast
Interstate Dairy Compact--to sunset in 2001, the Senate voted to provide a new $2 billion golden parachute payment for dairy farmers
across the country. Many political scientists no doubt would consider agriculture
policy a classic case of special-interest politics. The beneficiaries of farm
subsidies may be few in numbers, but they have dedicated substantial resources
to influencing the debate on farm policy because its outcome will result in massive gains or losses for
them. On the other hand, while the vast majority of Americans are harmed by
subsidy policies, they have not felt a pressing call to action, given that the
effects of subsidies on an individual level are relatively small and are hidden
in food prices and tax bills. Consequently, the more active and impassioned farm
lobby has succeeded in preserving its special-interest subsidies.
The Kiplinger Agriculture Letter 7 (“Farm interests will fare well overall in the 110th
Congress” 1/5, KK)
Farm interests will fare well overall in the 110th Congress. Farmers have friends on key
committees. Sen. Tom Harkin (D -IA) and Rep. Collin Peterson (D-MN) will head
agricultural committees nearly split along party lines. Both panels often will be bipartisan.
Ag interests also have allies on other important congressional panels, including those
with control over the purse strings in both chambers.
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Link – Cuts Unpopular – Ag Lobby (2/5)
The farm lobby empirically succeeds in gutting subsidy reductions
McKenzie 8 (William, Dallas Morning News Writer, “Fresh Thinking dries up” 5/22) KK
The old way of seeing farm bills was more in terms of domestic benefits. Capitol Hill thought mostly about helping
farmers in the Texas Panhandle, on the plains of the Dakotas or across the fields of Kansas. Farmers, after all,
have political clout. There's a new way to see farm policy, however, and it revolves around connecting the
developed world to the developing world. More than ever, ag policies shape everything from how crops grown in Texas
and Kansas affect food prices in Egypt, Haiti and Cambodia. Bush gets the picture. So do some
legislators, like Republican Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana and Democratic Rep. Ron Kind of Wisconsin. They
pushed for a more economically efficient way of farming, including doing away with
subsidies for farmers who make as much as $750,000, after expenses. Unfortunately, the farm lobby
prevailed. David Beckmann, president of the hunger charity Bread for the World, told me that he met only
one legislator who told him he was wrong to lobby for reforming farm payments. The
rest told him he was right but that they couldn't go against the farm lobby.
Agriculture lobby too strong: Dems and GOP won’t cut subsidies
Orden 2 (David, Professor of ag policy @ Virginia tech, “Reform’s stunted crop,” Cato Institute) KK
As this article goes to press, several things are clear about the 2002 farm bill. First, neither recent budget
considerations nor international commitments to wto rules have constrained farm spending levels
or policy instruments, despite markedly changed budget projections and the importance of foreign markets to U.S.
agriculture. That unfortunate outcome is a testament to the continued power of the agricultural
lobby and its advocates in Congress; neither party seems willing to restrain the farm subsidy
juggernaut. Any prospect for reducing the levels of farm support expenditures has been lost
in 2002. The Senate bill spends more in the next five years than the House bill, and the bidding war may not be over. Fiscal
restraint on farm policy will have to wait for another day.
Riedl 2 (Brian M., Grover M. Hermann Fellow in Federal Budgetary Affairs in the Thomas A.
Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Agriculture/BG1534.cfm)
Because the largest agribusinesses are the chief beneficiaries of agriculture policy,
they have both the incentives and resources necessary to invest heavily in maintaining
the current flow of subsidy dollars. Through representative organizations, they have
served on federal commissions, testified before Congress, and donated millions of
dollars to federal political candidates. Not surprisingly, the House and Senate farm bills
include many of the provisions that these groups support, including massive farm
subsidies and price supports.
Plan unpopular: Ag lobbies strong control, wield support on House Agriculture Committee
The plan tanks political capital—the farm lobby has a stranglehold on policy making. This
evidence assumes their turns
Our evidence is comparative: anti-subsidy lobbies don’t have a chance, farm lobby’s
small agenda ensures support for subsidies
have forced an up-or-down vote on eliminating subsidies for farmers earning $250,000
a year. One lobbyist mused that General David Petraeus could learn something from
Pelosi about crushing an insurgency. Pelosi allowed a vote on Kind-Flake--or, as the
farm groups called it, "Kinda-Flakey"--but this time it was crushed, 309 to 117. "I had
two members tell me they felt sorry for Ron, I was stomping him so bad," Peterson said
with a grin. "If I had put down the hammer, I could've taken him under 100." As they
watched the debate, with its predictable tributes to hardworking family farmers, frustrated
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reformers filled out "Farm Bill Bingo" cards with aggie catchphrases like "farmer-
friendly," "dismantling the safety net" and "East Coast media."
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Link – Cuts Unpopular – A2: Democrats
Sanchez 7 (Marcela, syndicated columnist, “Democrats want to reshape trade,” 4/6, Seattle Post-Intelligencer)
Yet it is not very clear that the Democrats are committed to the fundamental aspect of trade that benefits
poorer nations - free and fair access to the U.S. market. The Democratic proposal also lacks any
mention of ending protections for U.S. producers, particularly the multibillion-dollar agricultural subsidies that
have historically obtained congressional passage with broad Democratic support.
Ndayisenga and Kinsey 99 (Fidele and Jean, Agricultural Economics Association of Georgia,
Journal of Agribusiness 17.1, Spring http://www.agecon.uga.edu/~jab/Library/S99-02.pdf)
The results (presented in table 2) indicate that the coefficient on the variable COST, which
represents lobbying expenditures in the input markets, is not statistically different from
zero. This is interpreted to mean that food firms do not spend a significant amount of
their resources to lobby in their input markets and, by implication, do not exercise
significant political influence in agricultural commodity markets. The significance of
the coefficient on the variable REVENUE, which captures lobbying expenditure in
the output market, is statistically significant. The result suggests that the direct
lobbying through food firms' political contributions is primarily directed to their
output market. The variables labeled DP1 through DP23 in table 2 represent firm1-23,
respectively, identified by name in table 1. The coefficients on DP1-LIP23 (table 2)
indicate whether the gross profit (as measured by R, - C,,) for an individual firm is
significantly correlated with its total lobbying expenditures relative to the reference firm.
The reference firm is the last film listed in table 1 (Wilson Food Corporation). The firms
are entered into the estimating equation in the order they appear in table 1. The gross
profits of only five firms are not significantly related to lobbying expenditures relative
to Wilson Food Corporation (firms 1, 2, 6, 10. and 23). Four firms' profits have a
significantly negative relationship between lobbying expenditures and profits (firms
13, 16, 17, and 20). For the remainder of the firms, increased profits are significantly
correlated with greater lobbying expenditures. The last two coefficients in table 2
indicate that lobbying expenditures were less in 1983 and 1985 relative to the reference
year. 1984. Failure to reject the hypothesis that food firms do not lobby in the input
market (an important component of which is the supply of agricultural comn~odities) is
consistent with the view that food firms have rnonopsony power in their input
markets that allows them to negotiate lower prices despite government regulations, or
they can pass through any cost increases to consumers, or both. Whatever the case
may be, the ultimate implication is that the food processing sector had no serious
incentive to act as a countervailing power to the farm lobby in the forming or
reforming of agricultural policy in the early part of the 1980s.
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Link – Cuts Popular – Bipartisan Support
Bipartisan support for subsidy cuts
Environment and Energy Daily 7 (“AGRICULTURE: GOP stages mutiny on farm bill after Dems reveal
offset plan,” Spotlight, Vol 10 No. 9, July 26)
A bipartisan group of House members backing an amendment to scale back farm
payments and increase conservation funding is hopeful the tax fracas might give them
more support for their proposal, which would avoid the tax offsets by decreasing farm
spending. Their proposal includes many of the administration's proposals to scale back
farm subsidies. Rep. Ron Kind (D-Wis.) told the Rules Committee last night that his wide-
ranging amendment to overhaul farm payments would "get ourselves out of this offset
box." Reps. Paul Ryan (R-Wis.), Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.) and Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.) are
cosponsors of the amendment to cut farm subsidies for anyone making more than
$250,000. The proposal would invest more than $3 billion more in conservation programs.
Rules Committee Chairwoman Louise Slaughter (D-N.Y.) said "there is a lot of interest"
in the amendment. In an interview after the markup of the farm bill rule, Kind described
Goodlatte's remarks as a "bombshell" for the committee's bill. He said he is anticipating
more Republican support for his measure, but "there are a lot of moving parts."
No Political Capital Loss: Farm Bill proves little political interest in agriculture.
Pollan 7
(Michael, a contributing writer, is the Knight Professor of journalism at the University of California,
Berkeley. “You are what you grow,” NYT, April 22) KK
Given all this, you would think the farm-bill debate would engage the nation’s political
passions every five years, but that hasn’t been the case. If the quintennial antidrama of
the “farm bill debate” holds true to form this year, a handful of farm-state legislators will
thrash out the mind-numbing details behind closed doors, with virtually nobody else,
either in Congress or in the media, paying much attention. Why? Because most of us
assume that, true to its name, the farm bill is about “farming,” an increasingly quaint
activity that involves no one we know and in which few of us think we have a stake. This
leaves our own representatives free to ignore the farm bill, to treat it as a parochial
piece of legislation affecting a handful of their Midwestern colleagues. Since we aren’t
paying attention, they pay no political price for trading, or even selling, their farm-bill
votes. The fact that the bill is deeply encrusted with incomprehensible jargon and
prehensile programs dating back to the 1930s makes it almost impossible for the average
legislator to understand the bill should he or she try to, much less the average citizen. It’s
doubtful this is an accident.
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Link – Cuts Popular – Lobbies – Named Groups (1/2)
Subsidy cut movement growing: Oxfam, Environmental Defense Fund, CATO and the
WTO support
UPI 1 (12-31)
Both Cato and Reason have done a great deal to legitimize libertarianism as a serious
political perspective that must be considered when formulating policy, says Charles
Murray, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, one of Washington, D.C.'s top
conservative think tanks.
"The Cato Institute [in particular] has established itself as a major voice in
Washington," agrees E.J. Dionne, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Washington,
D.C.
***Links – Ethanol***
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Link – Ethanol Cuts Popular (1/2)
Package food lobby oppose ethanol use
PR Watch 8 (http://www.prwatch.org/node/7590)
Monsanto, Dupont, Archer Daniels Midland and the PR giant Burson-Marsteller are
some of the corporations behind the Alliance for Abundant Food and Energy. No
doubt feel-good ads from this front group will soon fill the airwaves, especially in
Washington DC. The Washington Post reports, "A group of the world's biggest
agribusiness companies announced it will use lobbyists on Capitol Hill and national
ads to build the case for fuels such as ethanol and biodiesel, even as grain prices climb
worldwide. The biofuels industry has blossomed under federal mandates requiring the
United States to increase alternative fuel usage by 2009. The mandates are under attack
from groups who blame the new industry for rising food prices that have sparked riots and
hoarding in several countries. ... The alliance has a budget of several million dollars for
the campaign, but it did not disclose the exact amount."
Lyne 7 (Jack, Exclusive Editor of Interactive Publishing for site Selection Magazine, August 7,
http://www.siteselection.com/ssinsider/incentive/ti0708.htm)
"Elected officials are primarily motivated by the hunt for political capital, including
campaign contributions but, most importantly, votes," says the Cato Institute's Taylor.
"As long as they believe that ethanol subsidies will deliver political capital, they will
vote for ethanol subsidies."
Bush would have to invest significant amounts of political capital to remove ethanol
subsidies—Congress is unwilling to change
Goodell 7 (Jeff, Contributing Editor at Rolling Stone and a Frequent Contributer to the New
York Times Magazine, August 9,
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/15635751/the_ethanol_scam_one_of_americas_bigge
st_political_boondoggles/2)
So why bother? Because the whole point of corn ethanol is not to solve America's energy
crisis, but to generate one of the great political boondoggles of our time. Corn is already
the most subsidized crop in America, raking in a total of $51 billion in federal handouts
between 1995 and 2005 -- twice as much as wheat subsidies and four times as much as
soybeans. Ethanol itself is propped up by hefty subsidies, including a fifty-one-cent-per-
gallon tax allowance for refiners. And a study by the International Institute for Sustainable
Development found that ethanol subsidies amount to as much as $1.38 per gallon -- about
half of ethanol's wholesale market price. Three factors are driving the ethanol hype. The
first is panic: Many energy experts believe that the world's oil supplies have already
peaked or will peak within the next decade. The second is election-year politics. With
the first vote to be held in Iowa, the largest corn-producing state in the nation, former
skeptics like Sens. Hillary Clinton and John McCain now pay tribute to the wonders of
ethanol. Earlier this year, Sen. Barack Obama pleased his agricultural backers in Illinois
by co-authoring legislation to raise production of biofuels to 60 billion gallons by 2030. A
few weeks later, rival Democrat John Edwards, who is staking his campaign on a victory in
the Iowa caucus, upped the ante to 65 billion gallons by 2025. The third factor stoking
the ethanol frenzy is the war in Iraq, which has made energy independence a
universal political slogan. Unlike coal, another heavily subsidized energy source, ethanol
has the added political benefit of elevating the American farmer to national hero. As
former CIA director James Woolsey, an outspoken ethanol evangelist, puts it, "American
farmers, by making the commitment to grow more corn for ethanol, are at the top of the
spear on the war against terrorism." If you love America, how can you not love ethanol?
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Link—Ethanol Cuts Unpopular – Public (2/3)
Ethanol is widely popular—outweighs your turns
Kantor 4 (Andrew, Technology Writer and Former Editor for PC Magazine and Internet World,
February 20, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/andrewkantor/2004-02-20-kantor_x.htm)
Talking about ethanol is good politics, if not good science. Ethanol can, to some extent,
replace gasoline. You've probably heard of gasohol, which is a mixture of gasoline and
ethanol. That's why politicians like to talk about it. Talking ethanol means you're not
talking about energy concepts people don't like to hear about, like nuclear power,
rolling blackouts, or mandatory low-powered electric cars. It means talking about a fuel
that comes from corn, so voters get that warm fuzzy feeling they don't get from
petroleum products. People like ethanol because it comes from the good ol' USA, so
we can reduce our dependence on people who hate us. It's natural — folks have been
making ethanol since, well, since distillation was invented. It doesn't kill property values
like giant windmill farms or nuclear power stations. And because it's a liquid we wouldn't
have to change our whole delivery infrastructure the way we would with hydrogen.
(Nothing against the hydrogen-powered "Freedom Cars" the Bush Administration has put
$1.2 billion toward developing.) Rural people like ethanol because it means more
money, in sales or subsidies, for farmers. Urban people like it because ethanol burns
cleaner than gasoline and nobody likes a smog alert. Politically it's hard to go wrong
promoting an alternative fuel made from American corn. But, as often happens, reality
rears its ugly head.
***Links – Sugar***
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Link—Sugar Cuts Unpopular – Lobby (1/8)
No one will oppose the sugar lobby—they fear not being re-elected
Sugar Lobbies strong: massive congressional support for sugar subsidies, millions in
campaign contributions
Riedl 2 (Brian M., Grover M. Hermann Fellow in Federal Budgetary Affairs in the Thomas A.
Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Agriculture/BG1534.cfm)
Since 1999, $4.3 million has been donated to federal politicians by the sugar industry,
nearly all of which has come from organizations representing farmers who benefit
from these price supports and want to continue them. Among such pro-price support
organizations are the American Sugar Cane League, which has donated $414,898 to
federal candidates since 1999, and American Crystal Sugar, which has donated
$795,235. In December 2001, an amendment offered by Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) to
eliminate the federal sugar program and shift the savings to the food stamp program
was defeated by a vote of 71-25. 15 The largest beneficiary of continued government price-fixing in the sugar
industry, however, will be Florida's Flo-Sun, Inc. Owned by brothers Alfonso (Alfie) and Jose (Pepe) Fanjul, the Flo-Sun sugar empire
includes several sugar mills and 410,000 acres of land in Florida and the Dominican Republic. Despite a fortune conservatively
estimated at $500 million, the Fanjuls receive a huge annual sugar benefit from the federal government: roughly $65 million for their
Florida-grown sugar and an additional $60 million for the Dominican sugar they sell in the United States. 16 Profiting from Congress's
misguided policies, the Fanjuls have purchased a 7,000-acre luxury resort with 14 swimming pools, several mansions, and world-class
golf courses. 17 It
is not unreasonable to assume that Flo-Sun may well have had
substantial influence on the current farm policy debate on Capitol Hill, given that it
has donated $1,136,900 to federal politicians since 1999. Overall, the sugar industry
continues to be a major beneficiary of price-support policies that have cost American
consumers billions of dollars.
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Link—Sugar Cuts Unpopular – Lobby (2/8)
The sugar lobby drowns out political support for the plan
Sugar Lobbies have clout: campaign contributions greater than any food growers
Krauss 7 (Clifford, “Seeing Sugar's Future in Fuel,” New York Times, October 18) KK
The system does not cost taxpayers money directly, a point of pride for the industry. But it
costs consumers money in the form of higher sugar prices. The system has been subjected
to withering criticism for decades, but the sugar lobby has clout on Capitol Hill. Sugar
producers donated $2.7 million in campaign contributions to House and Senate
incumbents in 2006, more than any other group of food growers, according to the Center
for Responsive Politics, a Washington group.
Financial Times 4 (“Sweet deal: The US sugar industry is an affront to free trade” Financial Times, 2/12)
As Mancur Olson, the American economist, pointed out, pressure groups wield political clout in inverse
proportion to their size. There are few more striking demonstrations of that principle than the US sugar lobby, a
small industry that has punched a big hole in the newly concluded US bilateral trade
agreement with Australia. By successfully resisting Australian demands for removal of its elaborate protection, the
industry deprived US negotiators of the bargaining power needed to secure removal of
Australia's restrictions on wheat marketing, broadcasting and other sectors. Those exclusions, along with
niggardly US concessions on beef and dairy imports, belie official efforts to label the deal a "free trade" agreement.
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Link—Sugar Cuts Unpopular – Lobby (4/8)
Swanson 7 (Ian, “Sugar industry pours it on after CAFTA's bitterness,” The Hill, 2/13) KK
U.S. sugar producers, for years one of the most powerful lobbying forces in agriculture, suffered a bruising defeat
in 2005 when Congress approved the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) over their strenuous
objections. CAFTA allowed a limited increase of sugar imports to the U.S. from Central America, but domestic producers saw it as the
beginning of the end for Big Sugar. Less than 18 months later, however, the industry appears
stronger than ever in Washington, with longtime congressional allies in key positions of
power on several House and Senate committees. Most notably, Rep. Collin Peterson (D-Minn.) is the
new chairman of the House Agriculture Committee. Peterson's district covers the Red River Valley, which runs
along the border of North Dakota and Minnesota and includes much of the nation's sugar beet production. Besides Peterson, sugar
supporters include Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad (D-N.D.), Senate Finance
Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.) and Sen. Byron Dorgan (N.D.), a member of the Senate
Democratic leadership. Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) has also always
supported the sugar program, according to Kevin Price, director of government affairs for American Crystal Sugar
Company, American Crystal Sugar Company, which operates five refineries in the Red River Valley. "I'm optimistic we'll get good sugar
provisions in the farm bill," said Rep. Charlie Melancon (D-La.), a former president of the American Sugar Cane League. American
Crystal is one of several groups representing the U.S. sugar industry that stepped up their political activity in the wake of the fight over
CAFTA. The cooperative spent a record sum - more than $1 million - on political contributions to House and Senate campaigns in the
2005-2006 election cycle, according to the PoliticalMoneyLine website. This is almost twice what the company spent during the 2002
cycle and $250,000 more than the total for 2004. About 60 percent of the donations went to Democrats, which reflects a trend in the
sugar industry that is unusual in agriculture. Whereas most agriculture political action committees (PACs) give more to Republicans,
sugar PACs generally have a slight preference for donations to Democrats. Some PACs representing the sugar industry, and particularly
those representing the sugarcane industry in the south, lowered their contributions in the 2005-2006 cycle, but sugar PACs overall
increased their political donations by a total of $250,000. Besides American Crystal, the Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative
nearly doubled its donations to Republican candidates, from $57,375 in the 2003-2004 cycle to $112,500 in the 2005-2006 cycle. Its
spending on Democratic candidates also increased, from $108,500 in 2003-2004 to $156,250 in 2005-2006. Price said the CAFTA fight
played into American Crystal's decision to step up its political activity. "It's not solely a factor of CAFTA, but it's one thing we've
experienced that makes people interested in being politically active," Price said. He added that the group feels better about its position
for the upcoming debate over the farm bill now that Peterson is chairman of the agriculture committee. Sugar's growing
clout was also reflected in the Bush administration's relatively timid proposals for
sugar reform in the farm bill proposals it unveiled two weeks ago, according to some farm-group lobbyists. "We
were pleasantly surprised by the administration's proposal," said Phillip Hayes, a spokesman for the American Sugar Alliance. "These
guys are not dumb. They can read the writing on the wall," Melancon said, referring to the 2006
elections. All in all, he said the proposal did not represent the radical reforms that some in the agriculture community had been
expecting. Susan Smith, a spokeswoman for the National Confectioners Association, said many lawmakers do want to
change the sugar program, but they find that reform is always an uphill climb. She
described the administration's proposals as interesting but not robust enough to amount to an overhaul. Although U.S. sugar producers
receive no subsidies, they are protected by high import tariffs. The government also restricts the amount of domestic sugar that can be
placed on the market in order to keep the U.S. price high. The White House's only new proposal was to eliminate a 2002 farm bill rule
that requires the administration to allow the release of U.S. sugar on the domestic market only when imports hit a certain trigger level.
That rule, backed by sugar interests, tried to ensure that the government kept imports below that threshold. If the rule were triggered,
U.S. farmers could flood the domestic market and drive sugar prices down - in principle leading to the forfeiture of crops and high
bailout costs borne by taxpayers. But that would violate another rule in the 2002 bill that requires the sugar program to impose no direct
costs on taxpayers.
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Link—Sugar Cuts Unpopular—Lobby (5/8)
Cutting subsidies would be massively unpopular—the sugar lobby controls congress
Virata 4 (Gillian, Masters in International Policy and Practice from George Washington
University, International Economic Studies Center,
http://internationalecon.com/virata/The%20Effects%20of%20the%20US%20Sugar.pdf)
Politicians have responded by preserving the sugar price supports and import quotas.
President Bush signed into law the Farm Bill 2002, which not only negated the farm
subsidy reduction of Farm Bill 1996 but also compensated farmers for losses from the first
bill. The new bill will cost U.S. taxpayers $430 million to support the sugar industry
between 2002 and 2011. Flo-Sun will be among the sugar growers that will benefit
from this support. Politicians have also kept sugar out of bilateral free trade
agreements starting with the U.S.-Canada FTA. When the CAFTA (Central American FTA)
negotiations were concluded and the sugar industry learned that it provided for a
slight increase in sugar imports the industry responded by launching a large,
ultimately successful, lobbying effort to keep sugar out of the U.S.-Australia FTA. The
U.S.ñDominican Republic FTA increased the Dominican Republicís quota by 10% over
several years but kept the quota regime intact. The Fanjuls are among the biggest sugar
growers in that country.
Mitchell No Date Given (Donald, Lead Economist in the Development Prospects Group of
The World Bank http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-
1126812419270/10.SugarPolicies.pdf)
The clout of the U.S. sugar industry was recently demonstrated when it opposed and
almost prevented the passage of the Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) because the agreement increased the sugar quotas of these
countries (Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2005). The U.S. sugar industry had earlier
prevented sugar from being included in the Australia–U.S. free trade agreement, even
though sugar is an important export for Australia. The Washington Post reported
(February 9, 2004) that the powerful U.S. sugar lobby and affiliated individuals and
political action committees had donated $20.2 million to both U.S. political parties
since 1990. Pressures for change are building, however, and the opportunity for sugar
policy reform is better now than in several decades.
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Link—Sugar Cuts Unpopular – Congress
Past votes on cutting sugar subsidies prove there’s overwhelming opposition to the plan
Opposition to the sugar subsidies outweighs your link—bipartisan interest groups and
declining power of the sugar lobby
Plan Popular: bipartisan opposition to subsidies: our ev assumes the power of your lobbies
Edwards 7 (Chris, Director of Tax Policy at the CATO Institute, June 25,
www.freetrade.org/node/694)
With all the negative effects of the sugar program, why does it survive? Because Congress
often puts the interests of the favored few ahead of the general public good. In this case,
sugar growers are well-organized and they protect the program by providing large
campaign support to presidents, governors and many members of Congress. But the sugar
lobby is beatable. The Bush administration proposed minor reform to sugar policies
this year, and a bipartisan group of more than 100 House members led by Jeff Flake,
R-Ariz., is demanding fundamental reform. Also, under rules of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, the sugar trade with Mexico will be opened in 2008, which
should add to the pressure for reform. In winning the House last year, Democrats
portrayed themselves as reformers willing to take on special interests for the benefit
of average families. Now they have a chance to prove it by abolishing the sugar
program.
Reaching out to democrats is key to advancing Bush’s Agenda and overcoming a lack of
political capital
The last time that Bush held a post Election Daypress conference, on Nov. 4, 2004,
he said this about his reelection to a second term: “It's like earning capital… Let me
put it to you this way: I earned capital in the campaign , political capital , and now I
intend to spend it.’’ Today, that capital is gone. “ After the 2000 election, I earned some capital,’’ Bush said two years ago, and with his reelection, he maintained: “I've
earned capital in this election and I'm going to spend it for what I told the people I'd spend it on, which is you've heard the agenda: Social Security and tax reform, moving this economy forward, education, fighting and winning the war on terror.’’ After several months of
campaigning in 2005 for Social Security reforms which neither the public nor Congress supported, the president abandoned that bid – although he has hinted at taking another shot at Social Security reform in his remaining two years. Bush also will be hardpressed to secure
unpopularity, a casualty of the
the tax reform he is seeking in his final two years – making his firstterm taxcuts permanent – with the new Democratic majority in the House. And the president’s own
war in Iraq, will make it difficult for him to withstand Democratic challenges about the future course of
war. Watch for the president today to set a new tone, not the unbridled tone of that last postelection press conference. Watch for the president to call for political reconciliation, a time of healing. Without any capital, cooperation is the president’s best course, as today’s
, Bush must fundamentally
Tribune reports: Bush's tough hand By Mark Silva<Washington Bureau< WASHINGTON – President Bush faces fateful new choices. With his party’s loss of the House, experts say
alter the way he approaches Congress for any hope of salvaging his own "aggressive’’
agenda for the remaining two years of his presidency. And with criticism for conduct of the war in Iraq mounting even within his own party, Bush and his embattled secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, are likely to confront searing hearings in a
Democraticcontrolled House intent on exerting new oversight and challenging the course of the war. This much is certain: The rules of the game have changed. "It’s a real time for choice by President Bush,’’ says Norman Ornstein, resident scholar at Washingtonbased
American Enterprise Institute. "It really becomes a question of whether he is really going to become ’a uniter, not a divider,’ in a way that has not occurred for the majority of his presidency… Or drawing a line in the dust.’’ The White House, intent on fulfilling a domestic
agenda that includes perpetuation of tax cuts won during Bush’s first term, is likely to seek some reconciliation – with Bush planning to speak out Wednesday. During a campaignclosing rally, Bush promised: "For the next two and a half years, I’m going to sprint as hard as I
’’ The president could stumble for two years, experts say, if he does not demonstrate
can.
a new willingness to deal with Democrats. The administration already has revealed a determination to prosecute the war as it is, with Vice President Dick Cheney insisting elections
will have little impact: "The president’s made clear what his objective is: It’s victory in Iraq, and it’s full speed ahead.’’ Any course change – including the removal of a defense secretary who has faced calls for resignation from retired generals and the editorial page of the
Army Times – could take some time. "All those people heading to the polls hoping to change the policy in Iraq are going to wake up Wednesday and find out that won’t happen,’’ says Stephen Hess, a Brookings Institution senior scholar. As the focus of politics in
Washington rapidly shifts to the next presidential election, leaders within Bush’s party could help chart a new war strategy as they seek to regain the GOP’s footing for 2008. "Staying the course’’ in Iraq is only likely to intensify the scrutiny of House committees whose new
Democratic leaders have subpoena power to pursue questions they have raised for the past few years. It’s unlikely that any hearings will escalate to the level of impeachment that GOP leaders have warned of with a Democratic takeover, Democratic leaders say, but the White
House, Rumsfeld and others could face unrelenting interrogation. On the war front and home front, Bush’s ability to make any headway during the rest of his term will depend on a willingness to work with Democrats whom he has spent years marginalizing. Some say Bush
could find quick common ground on immigration reform. Not since his first year, when he secured his “No Child Left Behind’’ educational reforms with the assistance of Democrats, has Bush demonstrated the full bipartisan spirit that he pledged campaigning in 2000 –
running as "a uniter, not a divider.’’ His final two years may depend on a revival of that spirit. "When Bush started out, the idea was, ’I am going to strike a balance here,’’’ says Ornstein, suggesting Bush must regain that
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balance for any success from now on. "If he doesn’t move in that direction, it’s going
to be a long and difficult two years.’’
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***Links – Soy***
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Link—Soy Cuts Popular
There is widespread public and lobby backlash against soy—former supporters of the crop
are jumping ship
***Links – Corn***
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Link – Corn/Soy/Cotton/Dairy Cuts Unpopular – Harkin
Harkin is a strong advocate of corn and soy subsidies
Maintaining subsidies to corn, soy, dairy, and cotton is a critical issue to Harkin—its vital
to maintaining his leadership in Congress
Tomson 6 (Bill, Dow Jones Newswire,
http://www.cattlenetwork.com/content.asp?contentid=93566)
In order to create programs to further support ethanol production as well as keep farm subsidies plentiful, there has to be
a federal budget to support them. And concerns are widespread with lawmakers and farmers
that there won’t be nearly as much money budgeted for agricultural spending next
year as the 2007 farm bill is created. Getting a sufficient budget allocation next year,
Peterson predicted in December, will be the “first big hurdle.“ Sen. Tom Harkin, D-
Iowa, who will take over as chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee in January,
addressed the subject recently in a press conference with USDA’s Johanns. Harkin told
reporters he hopes current high farm prices won’t be used as a reason to allocate a
smaller budget next year - something that could hamper farm leaders in Congress as
they write the 2007 farm bill. The U.S. government has paid out billions of dollars in
subsidies to cotton, corn, soybean, milk, peanut and other producers so far during the
2002 farm bill as well as kept domestic sugar prices artificially high by controlling
imports.
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Link—Corn and Sugar Cuts Unpopular—Lobby
No one is willing to oppose the corn lobby on the issue of cutting corn and sugar subsidies
And the Corn Lobby pushing for this product are very
- doing your part to suppress Communism in Latin America!)
powerful. ADM (Supermarket to the World) does not want to see sugar price supports
dropped. The Corn lobby is also pushing for corn-based ethanol for fuel (as a
mandatory requirement! 10%!), even though it takes the equivalent of nearly a gallon of
gasoline to produce a gallon of ethanol (about a 1.1:1 ratio). Sugar, in contrast, generates 4-
5 times as much energy in ethanol than is used in production and is a much more
economically sound "renewable resource" than corn, for fuel purposes. Now this brings us
to the point. If you are a Senator from a Corn State, like Illinois, there is a lot of
pressure on you to vote for sugar subsidies (to benefit the corn lobby). You can do
what is right for the country, or what is right for the special-interest groups in your State
(who donate heavily to your campaign and party). It is a hard choice to make. Most voters
do not have the sophisitication to even understand the issues (how many of you have even
read this far?). You can vote with Big Corn and Joe Voter won't know or care (the
voters are more concerned with the so-called "real issues" like Gay Marriage and Abortion,
which are really nothing more than window dressing). Or you go vote against Big Corn
and end up out of office in 6 years. Mike Gravel tried to do what was right in Alaska, and
he was history in short order. Political survival versus the right thing - it is not an easy
question to anwser.
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***Links – Dairy***
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Link—Dairy Cuts Unpopular – Lobby (1/2)
Funding dairy popular: farm lobby blocks subsidy cuts
Riedl 2 (Brian M., Grover M. Hermann Fellow in Federal Budgetary Affairs in the Thomas A.
Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Agriculture/BG1534.cfm)
The House and Senate farm bills also benefit the dairy industry. Current law is based on
the perception that Midwest dairy farmers produce milk too efficiently, resulting in
milk prices that are considered to be too low. In response to this situation, the federal
government allows states with less efficient dairy farmers to establish local milk cartels to
keep less expensive Midwest milk off the market and sustain artificially high prices for
milk produced in those states. Under this Depression-era program, the further a
participating state is away from Eau Claire, Wisconsin, the higher its milk prices are
increased. Each year, this "milk tax" costs supermarket customers approximately $2.7
million. 22 Much of the $3.3 million donated to federal candidates by the dairy industry
since 1999 has been from dairy farmers who support continuing the current price-fixing
scheme. In testimony before the House Agriculture Committee on April 5, 2001, Jerry
Kozak--CEO of the National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF), which represents a
majority of the nation's 83,000 dairy farmers--declared that the current milk policy, which
raises the price of milk as much as 20 cents per gallon, benefits consumers and should be
continued. 23 The policy prescriptions of the NMPF were buttressed by the $120,500 in
donations it has made to federal candidates since 1999. In a step toward reform, the
Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, which had allowed New England states to set
milk prices even higher than federal regulations permitted, was allowed to sunset in
October 2001. However, this move was countered by a stipulation in the Senate bill,
which awards $2 billion in golden parachute payments to assist dairy farmers who
will lose the benefits of this second tier of price inflation and provides additional aid
to other dairy farmers nationwide. An amendment by Senator Michael Crapo (R-ID)
to delete this funding was strongly opposed by the farm lobby and failed by a vote of
51 to 47. 24 As written, both the House and Senate bills will continue current price-
altering milk policies. Federal policies that increase milk prices appear to be here to
stay, and dairy farmers--especially those far away from Eau Claire, Wisconsin--will
continue to be the beneficiaries.
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Link—Dairy Cuts Unpopular—Lobby (2/2)
The plan causes a political food fight—dairy lobby and bipartisan support for dairy
controls
***Links – Cotton***
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Link – Cotton Cuts Unpopular – Lobby (1/4)
Cotton lobby strong: important coalitions in Congress
IDEAS 7 (http://www.agobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=98521)
The primary lobby for US cotton farmers, the National Cotton Council, did not
appear at the present hearings, but the cotton voice was heard via American Cotton
Shippers Association (ACSA). ACSA’s testimony indicated that the Association saw US
cotton as being increasingly uncompetitive on the international market, ascribed in their
view to the effect of the removal of certain export subsidy provisions (the so called ‘Step 2’ payments which were ruled
WTO incompatible in the Upland Cotton dispute settlement proceedings and discontinued in August 2006). ACSA made
a call for the competitiveness of US cotton to be secured by firstly maintaining the ‘loan rate’ for cotton, and secondly
recalculating it to provide a more favourable return to growers3. The loan rate is essentially the artificially supported floor
price that keeps US cotton acreages in production, which would not occur at world market price levels. Together with this
proposal the cotton shippers express the view that US cotton has a comparative advantage brought about by the following
factors: A superior US cotton classification system; A unique cotton transportation system in the US; Exceptional
cotton promotion schemes overseas; US reliability as a dependable supplier. Granted these are attractive elements.
However in our opinion it is suggested that the major factor identified is the reliability of the US as a dependable
supplier, and that this advantage is a creature borne of a long history of subsidized support and not a naturally occurring
comparative advantage. While it is likely that the voice of the cotton lobby will resonate with
a weighty appeal through the hearings, the voices of moderation are certainly
emerging, as highlighted in this brief. These voices should be encouraged and supported
as the US domestic market for policy (the so-called ‘political economy’) will likely
function in an improved manner with access and voice given to economically sound
approaches to the 2007 Farm Bill debate. To this end the following closing quotation from
David Beckmann’s testimony with which we concur:
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Link – Cotton Cuts Unpopular – Lobby (2/4)
Subsidy cut unpopular: pressure from cotton industry
Afrol News 7 (http://www.afrol.com/articles/26960)
Officials in developing countries and international poverty analysts say the subsidies drive
down prices, making it hard for small farmers in poor countries to compete on international markets. The ruling
could open the door to billions of dollars in trade sanctions against the US by Brazil, another major cotton producing
country, which initially brought the case against the US. The Brazilian government says the US only retained its place as
the world's second-largest cotton grower by paying out US$12.5 billion in government subsidies to its farmers between
August 1999 and July 2003. China is the largest exporter of cotton, while Brazil is fifth. Oxfam America president
Raymond Offenheiser, said the US Congress is still considering a new Farm Bill that would
leave farm subsidies largely unchanged. “This would be most tragic for the millions of people in developing
countries whose livelihoods are threatened on a daily basis because of US agricultural subsidies”, Offenheiser said in a statement.
Officials in Burkina Faso are not overly optimistic about the prospects of their cotton industry in the immediate future. “We hope that at
the US-executive level, officials will feel embarrassed for always being pointed at and that something can be done to implement the
But the problem remains with the US Congress which is under strong pressure
ruling.
from the US cotton industry lobby,” said Seriba Ouattara, Director General at the Ministry of Health.
Powell 5 (Benjamin, Research Fellow at the Independent Institute and Assistant Professor of
Economics at Suffolk University, PhD in Economics From George Mason University, March 28,
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1477)
President Bush’s modest proposal to reduce farm subsidies will not cause a partisan
fight between Democrats and Republicans, but make no mistake about it: the fight
that does occur will be interest-group politics-as-usual. Unfortunately, absent from that
fight is any consideration of whether farmers should get subsidies at all. Bush has proposed
decreasing the subsidy an individual farmer can receive from $360,000 to $250,000. If
adopted, the proposal would lower federal spending on agriculture by a paltry $587 million
in 2006. Big corporate farms are most affected by the reform. Also, growers of crops
that receive large subsidies, like rice and cotton, will face greater cutbacks than growers
of crops such as corn, wheat, and soybeans, which generally receive smaller subsidies. Not
surprisingly, the debate in Congress pits representatives in cotton- and rice-growing
regions against others.
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Link—Cotton Cuts Popular—Oxfam
Oxfam opposes cotton subsidies
***Links – Fish***
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Link – Fisheries Cuts Popular – Bipart/Rangel Link Turn (1/2)
Cutting fisheries subsidies has wide bipartisan support, and Rangel is their leader
OCEANA 7 (The Largest International Ocean Protection and Restoration and Environmental
Advocacy Group, www.oceana.org/fileadmin/oceana/uploads/
Senate_press_release/Media%20Backgrounder%20US%205%203%2007.doc)
In May, a bipartisan group of 13 U.S. Senators, led by Senator Ted Stevens (R-Ala.)
introduced a resolution supporting the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations and
calling for the United States to pursue an international ban on government subsidies
to the fishing sector that are supporting the overfishing of world’s oceans. In March, a
resolution (H.Con.Res.94) on fisheries subsidies was also introduced in the US House
of Representatives by Rep. Madeleine Bordallo (D-Guam), the chairwoman of the
House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Fisheries, Oceans, and Wildlife.
Oceana 8 (http://www.oceana.org/north-america/who-we-are/successes/)
MAY 2007: Cutting Fishing Subsidies -- After campaigning by Oceana, the U.S.
Congress passes resolutions supporting worldwide cuts in harmful fishing subsidies
that lead to overcapacity in fishing fleets and thus to overfishing. Oceana is working
with nations in the current World Trade Organization negotiations to end these harmful
taxpayer handouts.
Oceana lobby strong – they conduct focused and intensive lobbying campaigns
Oceana 8 (http://www.oceana.org/north-america/what-we-do/)
WE ARE INTERESTED IN RESULTS. To achieve real benefits for the oceans, Oceana
conducts focused, strategic campaigns. Each campaign has a specific timeframe and
objective that will make a significant difference to the oceans. Each campaign
combines scientific, legal, policy and advocacy approaches to reach its goal. Saving the
oceans may take decades, but in each of our campaigns we aim to accomplish an
important milestone in that effort within two to five years.
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Link – Fisheries Cuts Unpopular – Lobby
Fishing industry will lobby against subsidy cuts – stronger than the opposition
Anyanova 8 (Ekaterina, Lecturer in the Law of the Sea at the Kant State University of Russia,
PhD Candidate at Hamburg University, Germany,
http://www.jiclt.com/index.php/JICLT/article/viewFile/68/54)
The broad prohibition of subsidies would be difficult to achieve. In general, fisheries
subsidies are supported by the strong lobby of fishing (and even food) industry. Besides,
subsidies promoting the reducing of the fleets’ capacity seem tobe a reasonable measure in this situation. The
position of the “no need” approach seems to be also not very stable, since the
conditionality of the overcapacity, overfishing and fisheries subsidies is more or less
acknowledged. Probably, the traffic light approach would be the chosen path for the legal regulation in this field.
However, the sphere of the prohibited subsidies expects to be one of the most
controversial issues, prolonging the development of WTO disciplines of fisheries subsidies.
Anyanova 8 (Ekaterina, Lecturer in the Law of the Sea at the Kant State University of Russia,
PhD Candidate at Hamburg University, Germany,
http://www.jiclt.com/index.php/JICLT/article/viewFile/68/54)
The subsidizing of the fishing fleet continues. The attempts to reduce it face strong
political opposition especially from the side of the lobbying sectors of the food
industry. The problem with subsidies is that government grants also are able in some cases
to reduce fleets capacity. Environmental subsidies, applied by the EU, Japan, Canada, and
the United States, try to eliminate the harmful results of the overfishing and fleets
overcapacity (e.g. buying back of vessel and fishing permissions, fishermen retraining
programs etc.).
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Link – Fisheries Cuts Unpopular – Food Industry Lobby
Cutting fisheries subsidies will be opposed by the food and fishing industry lobbies
Food industry key to the agenda – powerful lobby plays politics better than anyone
***Links – Wheat***
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Link—Wheat Cuts Unpopular—Lobby
The plan’s massively unpopular—the wheat lobby is devastating
Busicom 6 (http://www.busicom.com.au/data/News_2006.htm)
Democrats hunting AWB bribes: Bad news for the Australian Wheat Board and the
Government: whatever the findings of the Cole Commission into the oil-for-food inquiry,
Wheat Associates (the US wheat lobby in Washington) now has a powerful ally. The
result of the sweeping shift in political power in America means Democrat Senator,
Tom Harkin (from the wheat state of Iowa), will become chairman of the Senate’s
powerful Agriculture Committee. He has been a consistent and vocal critic of AWB’s
bribes to Saddam. He has in the past claimed the White House didn’t want to investigate
AWB because of John Howard’s willingness to send troops to Iraq. The Democrats are
now in charge of committees of the House, and the new House agriculture committee chair
will be Collin Peterson, also from Iowa. [17.11.06]
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***Links – CAFO***
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Link—CAFOs Cuts Unpopular—Lobby (1/2)
The factory farm industry is a juggernaut—they have power at all levels of the government
and will use their influence to switch votes
Last October, it failed again, by five votes. In between the two votes, a major merger
took place that made the meat industry even more powerful on Capitol Hill. Tyson
Foods, the giant poultry company, bought IBP, the No. 1 meat processor, forming a
Goliath in market share and political power. "There was a reason that we lost by five
votes. And I believe the reason was that Tyson Food purchased IBP," says Carol
Tucker Foreman, from the Consumer Federation of America. "Last year, you had a
few senators who represented IBP states who led a fight. This year, you had Tyson
approaching senators from poultry producing states and urging them to vote to limit
USDA's power. The poultry people had never been involved in this issue before."In other
words, when Tyson, the largest poultry producer, bought IBP, the largest beef
producer, the poultry industry suddenly had a reason to oppose legislation that
impacts the level of salmonella in ground beef. Capitol Hill staffers confirmed
Foreman's assertion, saying lobbyists for the National Chicken Council, whose members
account for nearly 95 percent of the chicken sold in the country, were out in force last fall,
lobbying against the legislation."We had several senators who changed their votes.
Senators who'd voted with us in 2000 voted against us in 2001," Tucker Foreman said.
"And guess what? Almost without exception, they were senators with very large
poultry operations." Her contention is that some senators with poultry interests in
their states now had an incentive to vote against legislation they supported in the past.
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Link—CAFOs Cuts Popular
Regulating factory farms is widely popular across the country
***Links – Rice***
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Link—Rice Cuts Unpopular—Lobby (1/2)
The rice lobby is strong—significant campaign contributions
Griswold 6 (Daniel, Director of the CATO Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, Trade
Briefing Paper No. 25, November 16, http://www.freetrade.org/node/539)
A major obstacle to scaling back the rice program is interest-group politics. The rice
program exists not because it serves the national interest but because the special
interests that benefit from it are more organized, concentrated, and motivated, than
the general public that pays for the program. In the 2003-04 election cycle, political
action committees connected to the rice sector contributed $289,300 to influence
elctions for the U.S. house and Sentae, and those same PACs had contributed
$250,076 in the current election cycle through June 30, 2006. The three largest
contributers were the Farmers’ Rice Cooperative, the USA Rice Federation, and Riceland
Foods. Not surprisingly, a significant share of contribution went to members of the
agricultural subcommittees that oversee the rice program.
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Link—Rice Cuts Popular
Jumping off the rice bandwagon would be popular—it shows independence from lobbying
interests
Griswold 6 (Daniel, Director of the CATO Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, Trade
Briefing Paper No. 25, November 16, http://www.freetrade.org/node/539)
The answer is not to restrict campaign donations but to expose the true costs to the
public of the federal rice program. In the wake of various lobbying scandals in
Washington, reforming the rice program and other farm programs offers members of
Congress an opportunity to show that they can serve the broader public interest by
asserting their independence from special-interest lobbying.
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***Links – Misc***
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Link – Multilateral CP Popular
Multilateral CPs shield politics: government able to fend off internal politics
Steenblik 98 (Ronald, Principal Administrator @ Fisheries Division, Directorate for Food,
Agriculture and Fisheries, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/62/1918086.pdf)
However, cutting through the Gordian knot of domestic subsidies is not a politically
feasible option for large democracies with diverse constituencies. Indeed, even those
smaller countries that have undertaken unilateral reforms realise that. That their governments have
been in the vanguard of efforts to establish international rules and mechanisms for disciplining
subsidies is not due simply to an evangelical impulse. It is, along with the promise of economy-
wide reform, part of the quid pro quo expected of them: their domestic industries can more readily
accept what they see as sacrifices if they perceive progress in efforts to open up export markets.
The difficult part is convincing reluctant trading partners that subsidy reform is in their national
interest as well. Why should importers with vulnerable, import-competing industries be willing
even to consider opening up their markets, much less agreeing to international rules restricting their
ability to subsidise? The trade literature offers several explanations, of which no attempt to
summarise them is made here. The classic reason, given for reciprocal trade agreements in general,
is that the net gains from trade are usually large enough that industries that lose out can be
compensated. Multi-sectoral agreements allow such trade-offs among different sectors
and nations to be made. But another important explanation has also been offered, which
perhaps also explains why agreements are sometimes reached involving only one or a few sectors
— namely, they provide a way for governments to credibly distance themselves from
powerful domestic special-interest groups. Thus, by having its hands bound by an
external agreement, a government may be able to fend off internal political pressures
for protection and subsidies.20 Presumably, it would have a stronger incentive to enter into such
an arrangement if at the same time it is trying to control budgetary expenditure generally.
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Link – Bush Supports the Plan
Bush Administration supports cuts
Ornstein 93 (Norman, Phd Political Science University of Michigan, American Enterprise Institute,
ROLL CALL, May 27, 1993. p. Lexis)
Winning comes to those who look like winners. This only sounds redundant or
cliche'-ish. If power is the ability to make people do something they otherwise would not
do, real power is having people do things they otherwise wouldn't do without anybody
making them - when they act in anticipation of what they think somebody would
want them to do. If a president develops a reputation as a winner, somebody who will
pull out victories in Congress even when he is behind, somebody who can say, "Do this!"
and have it done, then Members of Congress will behave accordingly. They will want
to cut their deals with the president early, getting on the winning team when it looks
the best and means the most.
Ornstein 1 (Norman, ROLL CALL, Phd Political Science University of Michigan, p. Lexis)
In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The
reputation for success--the belief by other political actors that even when he looks
down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory--is the most valuable resource a
chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office
occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity
can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning
side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more
often than not.
Ornstein 2 (Norman, Phd Political Science Michigan University, USA TODAY, January 28, 2002, p. 11A)
The fall of 1990 was not a particularly good time for the senior Bush. Remember: “Read
my lips, no new taxes?” And then the 1990 budget agreement with new taxes? The younger
Bush was not real happy about the articles he read slamming his father’s administration.
But what was most striking to me was how he avidly soaked up lessons about his
father’s presidency. At this moment--on the eve of President George W.’s second State of
the Union message, with Congress back for the second session of the 107th Congress, and
with the country focused on the continuing war on terrorism and the continuing recession--
one lesson the president learned from his dad is particularly apt for him, too. That lesson
is as clear now as it was then: Political capital is perishable. You use it or you lose it. It
is a lesson Bush junior has mentioned himself, and one his political advisers, Karl Rove,
refers to often. Bush now has an approval rating in the mid-80s, a bit lower than at his
peak, but still stratospheric. He has erased any serious doubts about his qualifications to
serve, or the legitimacy of his victory. He has as much political capital in the bank as there
is gold in Fort Knox. So what does he use it for? A string of domestic issues are
possibilities, but economic stimulus sits atop the heap. If he uses his political capital
skillfully, he will first help Americans, many of whom are hurting as a result of the
recession, and he will get more political capital back in return.
Winners lose
Andres 2k (Gary et. Al., Deputy assistant to the president for Legislative Affairs for the Bush administration,
Presidential Studies Quarterly, September, p. 553)
Designing a legislative road map to success would be much less daunting if powerful
presidents only had to build winning coalitions. Unfortunately most presidential actions
cause reactions in peculiar places, in the world of trade-offs. Winning in one arena
may cause a major loss in another. Presidents Bush and Clinton, for example, faced
divided party government conditions during most –or in the case of Bush, throughout -their
administrations. Each could have offered legislation aimed at the median legislators’
policy position and bargained or offered other inducements to win simple majority.
Yet, that model was unrealistic because of the trade-offs facing both presidents. The
most obvious example of this is the trade-off between forging majority coalitions and party
building and winning elections.
Business Week 97 (Business Week International Editions; American News: THE PRESIDENCY; Number
3515; Pg. 30, Lexis)
On the surface, Bill Clinton's second term is off to a strong start. The U.S. economy is
chugging along. The President's approval ratings have hit 61%. And Clinton is
dominating the Washington agenda with his drives for a balanced budget and
additional education spending. But as veteran Clinton trackers know all too well, any
period of soaring Clintonismo is likely to be followed by an abrupt downdraft
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Mann 93 (Thomas, Director of Governmental Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and
Co-Director of the AEI-Brookings Renwing Congress Project, “Beyond Gridlock: Prospects for
Governance in the Clinton Years – And After”)
Most representatives and senators do not feel beholden to any president, let alone one
who ran behind them in the last election. I am reminded of advice I received from former
Senator Jacob Javits of New York in his last year of life, when I was perplexed and trying
to figure out a vote that had just taken place in the Senate. I asked him to explain why
certain senators had voted a certain way. And with halting breath he said to me, “You must
always realize that senators vote in a priority order. First, they vote for their states;
second, they vote out of institutional loyalty to the Senate; and, third, if they have not
decided on the basis of either of those, and the president happens to be of their own
party, well maybe they will give him a vote. But the state or the district always comes
first, the institution second, and only then the president.” Another thing to remember is
how important back home is. They used to call Reagan the great lobbyist, but I remember
sitting in the Oval Office as we lobbied not only in 1981, 1982, and 1983, but also in 1987
and 1988, and member after member would say, “Mr. President, I really want to support
your package. The problem is I am not hearing anything from back home.” The key was to
make sure that we explained why things were important to the district, and why the district
really would support what Reagan wanted. The bad news also is that once the president
gets a vote he wants, the immediate instinct of most members is to cast the next vote
to show their independence from the administration. This is especially true when you
have asked them to vote for a big package, in which some provisions did not make
sense for their districts but had to be swallowed as part of the overall package. Then
their answer is, "I need the next vote to show that I am independent of the White
House
Light 99 (Paulette, Goodard Professor of Public Service at New York University, Founding
Director of the Brookings Center for Public Service, “The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy
Choice from Kennedy to Clinton,” p217)
Thus far, we have talked of five rather separate trends which have contributed to a No Win
Presidency in domestic affairs. Together the increased competition and complexity,
declining influence, pervasive surveillance, and change in the available issues have
steadily increased the price of policy. Presidents must now pay more for domestic
programs. Presidents must be more careful about timing, as well as about the selection of "winnable" issues and alternatives.
While the price of policy has risen, the President's resource base has not. Presidents
no longer have the resources to expend on "educating" the public; they no longer
have the time to spend on a full search for new ideas and programs. If anything, the Presi-
dent's resource base has dwindled over the 1970s. The cost of presidential policy has grown, while
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the President's ability to influence outcomes has declined. It is a remarkable no-win
position.
Internal Link—Winners Lose (3/3)
Winners win doesn’t assume the plan—adding new initiatives can only hurt political
capital
Pastor 91 (Robert, Professor of Political Science at Emory University and Director of the Latin
American and Caribbean Program at Emory’s Carter Center, “Congress and US Foreign Policy:
Comparative Advantage or Disadvantage,” The Washington Quarterly, Autumn)
The third dysfunction in interbranch relations is the length of time and the amount of
presidential capital needed to gain approval of a major foreign policy law or treaty. When the
president makes a compelling case that the national security of the United States demands the approval of a particular bill or treaty,
Congress rarely rejects him. This was true for the Panama Canal treaties and the war in the Persian Gulf. But if
the policy is
unpopular, the president will almost certainly have to devote a much larger
proportion of his time and political capital to gaining approval for it, and he will have less
time for and influence on other foreign policy issues. Also, if he needs to ask Congress
repeatedly to approve an unpopular policy -- such as contra aid -- he will deplete his political capital and is
likely eventually to lose the votes, as Reagan did. The increasing complexity of the world and
its growing interdependence with the United States means that the agenda will grow, the trade-offs
between domestic and international interests will become more delicate, and the role of
Congress will increase proportionately. A few difficult issues -- like the canal treaties or contra aid -- can delay
consideration of the entire foreign policy agenda for prolonged periods. Given a fixed amount
of time and a limited number of decision makers, this systemic delay might be among the most important problems that stem from
interbranch politics. The
president must be very conscious of his agenda and very selective in his approach.
Carter filled his agenda with a host of controversial issues at the beginning of his administration.
Although he succeeded in gaining approval of the new Panama Canal treaties and new energy legislation, both issues
were costly, and ironically, his victories left him weaker politically. Reagan learned from Carter's
experience and selected a smaller, more manageable agenda. His victories -- the tax cut and the defense budget --
came more easily in Congress, and he looked stronger as a result.
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Internal Link – Plan costs political capital
Light 99 (Paul C., founding director, Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, The President’s Agenda,
1999, p. 16)
Presidential priorities also involve more conflict, both inside the administration and out.
And the greater the conflict, the more time, information, expertise, and energy
necessary to settle the disputes. “You’d be surprised how long it takes to iron out the
differences,” a Johnson legislative assistant argued. “Compromise doesn’t usually
happen overnight. It takes a hefty investment of presidential influence and effort.”
Once again, welfare reform serves as an example. One highly placed Nixon observer
maintained that “the |Family Assistance| plan could have been announced much sooner if
there hadn’t been such a struggle. With Burns and Moynihan at odds, we couldn’t move.
When one would attack, the other would counterattack. Sure, the issue was intricate, but it
could have been handled much faster without the in-fighting. As it was, there was a
stalemate for three months.”
Light 99 (Paul C., founding director, Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, The President’s Agenda,
1999, p. 2)
The President’s domestic agenda also reflects the allocation of resources, which often
are fixed and limited. As a President moves through the term, each agenda choice
commits some white House resources—time, energy, information, expertise, political
capital. Each agenda item also commits some policy options, whether federal funds or
bureaucratic energy. The sheer number of participants in the policy process both inside and
outside the White House has increased rapidly over the last two decades; interest groups
and individuals have “discovered” Congress and the Presidency. This growing pressure
has placed greater emphasis on the agenda as a topic of political conflict. Policy-
makers increasingly turn to the agenda for the first battles over the distribution of scarce
resources. Given the ever-tightening policy options, this pressure will not abate in the
near future.
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Internal Link – Capital is finite
Political capital is scarce and presidents must use it wisely
Light 99 (Paul C., founding director, Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, The President’s Agenda,
1999, p. 32-33)
Though capital can be refreshed during the term, the pattern remains: capital is
expended with choice, and can be replaced only to a limited extent. Even when there is
a rally-round-the-flag crisis in foreign affairs, it is not clear how long the rise in public
support will remain. Within two months of the 1979 Iran crisis, with hostages still in
Teheran, Carter’s public approval had dropped back from 80 percent to 50 percent. And
scarcely two weeks before the 1980 Democratic national convention, a “dump Carter”
movement gained momentary strength as party leaders sought a nominee who would win
in the November election. Thus, it is difficult to predict just how much capital can be
regenerated through national crisis. Furthermore, does public approval in a rally-round
crisis affect decisions in the domestic arena? Did the hostage crisis help Carter’s domestic
Agenda? Did domestic crisis increase capital? If the trends in public approval over the
past twenty years serve as an indication of declining capital, declarations of war on
energy or poverty create only moderate increases in support that rarely last.
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Internal Link – Popularity = Agenda (1/2)
Presidents use public popularity to gain political capital and get their agenda passed in
congress
Johnson 5 (Spring, Timothy, Jason M Roberts, Timothy R. Johnson received his Ph.D. from Washington,
http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~tjohnson/MyPapers/CongressandPresidency2005.pdf)
For Light, presidents’ strength includes their public approval ratings and their margin
of victory in the most recent election (1999, 32). When these factors increase, presidents
gain political capital and are therefore more likely to garner congressional support
for their domestic agenda in Congress. Light’s analysis comports with other accounts of
how presidents can use their political capital (which they largely accrue from their
popularity) to win battles with Congress. For instance, many scholars argue that
presidents can use their resources to set both the public agenda and the congressional
agenda (Edwards and Wood 1999; Neustadt 1990). More important for our theoretical
argument, several scholars demonstrate that popular presidents are able to win more
often in Congress (Edwards and Wood 1999; Brace and Hinckley 1992).
Wrone 2 (Brandice Canes-, Scott de Marchi, Brandice Canes-Wrone is a Professor of Politics and Public Affairs
at Princeton University with a Phd from Stanford University, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 491-509)
The literature suggests two types of mechanisms by which presidential approval advances
legislative influence; in this section, we outline these mechanisms and argue that they
apply primarily to salient and complex legislation. The first mechanism, described by
Rivers and Rose (1985), argues that congressional members regard presidential
approval as a signal of public preferences on the president’s policy agenda. Members
are assumed to be seeking reelection and therefore interested in enacting policies that
voters desire.6 Since approval is an indication of these policy preferences, members
are more likely to acquiesce to a president’s legislative requests the higher is his
popularity.
Public approval allows the president to change citizen’s policy positions therefore aiding
legislative success
Wrone 2 (Brandice Canes-, Scott de Marchi, Brandice Canes-Wrone is a Professor of Politics and Public Affairs
at Princeton University with a Phd from Stanford University, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 491-509)
In contrast to this first mechanism, which regards approval as a signal of citizens’ policy
positions, the second mechanism involves the effect of approval on a president’s ability to
alter citizens’ positions. Previous studies find that presidents with approval ratings of
at least 50% can change voters’ positions on an issue, for example through
plebiscitary activity, but that less popular presidents cannot do so (Page and Shapiro
1992; Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987).7 In fact, a highly unpopular president can
even turn constituents against a policy by supporting it (Sigelman and Sigelman 1981).8
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Given members’ incentives to vote with constituents’ preferences, this ability to alter
citizens’ preferences should affect a president’s prospects for legislative success.
Internal Link – Popularity = Agenda (2/2)
Public support builds political momentum
Wrone 1 (Brandice Canes-, a Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at Princeton University with a Phd from
Stanford University ,American Journal of Political Science, Vol, 45, No, 2, (Apr,, 2001), pp, 313-329 JSTOR)
Arguably the most consistent finding in research on the plebiscitary activity of presidents
is that they can utilize speechmaking and other rhetorical activities to increase the salience
of issues. Beginning with Schattschneider's (1960, 14) observation that the president
constitutes the "principal instrument" for attracting a national audience to a policy debate, a
range of work has found that presidential speeches increase the public's attention towards
the issues addressed.4 According to research on Congress, this change in public
salience affects legislators' behavior. In particular, members are found to be more
responsive to constituency preferences on salient policies (Hutchings 1998; Kollman
1998). In combination, these various studies suggest that a president should be able to
generate influence through public appeals; specifically, a president should be able to
achieve policy goals by strategically publicizing issues for which he would like
members to become more responsive to voters' policy positions.
Collier 95 (Feb, Kenneth, Terry Sullivan, Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, (Feb., 1995),
pp. 197-209, JSTOR)
The mainstream approach to understanding prestige and influence relies on cal-
culating something like the percentage of times each member supports the admin-
istration's position on "key" votes (Bond and Fleisher 1980, 1984; Bond, Fleisher, and
Northrup 1988; Edwards 1980, 1985, 1989; Ostrum and Simon 1985; Rivers and Rose
1985). In assessing this relationship, call it a linkage with congressional "success,"
analysts have suggested a number of hypotheses. In addition to a general relationship,
for example, Neustadt (1960) and Edwards and Wayne (1990) argued that prestige
operates "mostly in the background" (using the same words). Neustadt (1960, 87)
argued, "Rarely is there any one-to-one relationship between appraisals of popularity
in general and responses to (presidential) wishes in particular." He further suggested
that while it may affect general success, increasing prestige would not necessarily
affect a specific bill. Or it may affect member decisions but only after a "shift of range"
(or major change) occurs (Neustadt 1960, 96). Lastly, Neustadt suggested an
"asymmetry effect": a stronger effect with declining ap- proval than with improving
approval.
Arguing that approval ratings help the president succeed ignores the fundamental politics
of partisan support
Collier 95 (Feb, Kenneth, Terry Sullivan, Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill., The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, (Feb., 1995),
pp. 197-209, JSTOR)
Edwards (1980, 93) also identified a "partisan" effect: since party best suggests support, any general effect ought to work within partisan
confines. First, he found a high correlation between approval among party identifiers and how party repre- sentatives supported the
administration, with one exception. Republicans sup- ported Democratic presidents more than vice versa. Pursuing this relationship in
prestige has
his newest book, Edwards (1989) suggested that partisanship plays a role because it mirrors a predisposition. Hence,
upper and lower bounds: no matter how low the president's standing some members
will support the administration, i.e., those from the administration's party. Similarly,
no matter how high approval, a significant opposition will remain (Edwards 1989,
109). Edwards (1989, 110ff) did find that support among the president's allies falls the
furthest in bad times and rises the least in good times. Conversely, support among the
president's opponents rises the quickest in good times and falls the least in bad times.
Thus, the Neustadt-Edwards et al. tack on prestige suggests four basic effects: a "general" effect, a "shift of range" effect,
an "asymmetry effect," and a "partisan effect." Additionally, the partisan effect has two variants: (1) as a ceiling on sup-
porter responsiveness or a floor under opposition and (2) improving approval un- dermines opposition more than it
bolsters supporters, while declining approval undermines supporters more than bolstering opposition. Bond and
Fleisher's research represents an extensive challenge to these findings. In 1980 and in
1990, they suggested that as approval increases, support increases only among the
president's partisans. Their analysis also suggested that opponents responded
negatively to increased approval. These results challenge the possibility of general and
partisan effects. They reported uniformly low correlations and sta- tistically
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insignificant coefficients. Moreover, Bond and Fleisher (1990, 189) tested for the shift of
range effect, the asymmetry effect, and the partisan effect yielding no empirical support
Internal Link – A2: Popularity = Agenda (2/6)
Approval ratings don’t help presidents succeed in congress
Collier 95 (Feb, Kenneth, Terry Sullivan, Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. , The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, (Feb.,
1995), pp. 197-209, JSTOR)
This research note lends further support to the notion that approval has little ef- fect
on presidential influence. The process data presented here, data capable of ad- dressing both the "conversion" and the
"success" linkages and capable of looking inside the legislative process, presented no significant linkage. What to make of this result?
First, this analysis clearly undermines the original Neustadt/Edwards con- ception of the power of prestige. In all of its forms, the
process data did not find a significant approval effect. Second, this note does not represent the final word. While it contributes to the
standard debate over the power of prestige, its results only address a portion of the larger debate. Others, particularly Ostrom and Simon
(1985) and Rivers and Rose (1985), using more sophisticated empirical modeling techniques, have identified results suggesting a
prestige effect. While both of these analyses rely only on stan- dard data similar to Edwards and Bond and Fleisher (1990) we intend to
apply our process data to these more sophisticated operationalizations. Third, while the analysis presents a more detailed picture of the
process, it deals with only a limited portion of that sequence, comparing the initial and final sup- port. It excludes support developed
before initiating the process (e.g., "anticipated reactions") and the patterns of support that occur in between initiation and voting (what
might be called intermediate support), and it does not address the strategic questions of agenda size and content (see Gleiber and Shull
1992 for a general discussion). That
every administration starts out considerably "in the hole,"
as in- dicated earlier, suggests that anticipated reactions may not make much of a
differ- ence. Almost certainly low initial support taps only the administration's core
supporters leaving the vast majority uncommitted. Elsewhere, similar process evi-
dence has suggested the unlikeliness of anticipated reactions (Sullivan 1991). Mouw
and MacKuen (1992) recently introduced the question of linking prestige with agenda
control and strategic positioning. With a standard spatial framework, they identified
a very weak role for presidential prestige: when the president enjoys high approval,
supporters tend to "go for broke," asking for stronger legislation, 208 Kenneth
Collier and Terry Sullivan while opponents tend to propose bipartisan amendments.
Their findings still orig- inate from members' voting patterns rather than from
process data. And given the lack of strong empirical evidence, though intriguing, their
empirical results as they now stand seem very preliminary.
Collier 95 (Feb, Kenneth, Terry Sullivan, Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, (Feb., 1995),
pp. 197-209, JSTOR)
Often, politicians and analysts have linked presidential influence with prestige. For
example, Wilson (1908) believed the presidency's strength rested on its claim to speak for
the nation. Some scholars have echoed these sentiments (Neustadt 1960; Polsby 1978;
Kernell 1986). While politicians clearly believe that prestige plays a significant role in
leadership, empirical research provides little reassurance. Different researchers have
characterized prestige as an essential determinant of leg- islative success, as a
marginal influence, and as playing no role whatsoever. Though some analyses utilize
different methods, the dispute between findings ultimately derives from one
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operational problem: coalition formation, where approval might affect influence,
occurs behind closed doors leaving little evidence.
Nicholson 2 (Stephen P., Gary M. Segura, Nathan D. Woods, “Presidential Approval and the Mixed Blessing of
Divided Government Source”, Stephen P. Nicholson, co-recipient of the 2006 Emerging Scholar
Award Assistant Professor School of Social Sciences, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 3, (Aug.,
2002), pp. 701-720)
Given the predominance in the last half century of divided government- split party
control of the executive and legislative branches-the resource of large legislative
majorities has been unavailable to presidents. Yet at the same time, divided
government may present an opportunity for presidents to help themselves in the
arena of public opinion. In this environment, citizens encoun- ter greater difficulty trying
to assess blame and credit. Because blame is the more salient consideration (Campbell
et al. 1960; Cover 1986; Mueller 1973), presidents can point to the opposition Congress
as the source of all problems, and divided government could be a president's best
friend when attempting to avoid blame. Furthermore, since citizens perceive
Congress as the most power- ful branch of government (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
1995), it is not a hard sell for presidents to blame Congress. Given this dynamic, we
believe presiden- tial approval ratings may vary systematically with partisan control
of govern- ment. Specifically, we demonstrate in this effort that presidents are likely
to have higher approval during periods of divided government and lower levels
during periods of unified government. If this is the case, we might have identified
something of a paradox. Presi- dents clearly prefer to enjoy higher levels of public
approval, whether for elec- toral prospects, a policy resource, or some other purpose.2
Divided government, we argue, increases presidential approval, but this resource comes
at a high cost-an opposition Congress that is less willing to buy what the president is
selling, thereby lowering the president's legislative success, which is itself an important
determinant of approval. What is the net effect of these contradictory forces? In this effort,
we focus on the question of whether divided government increases a president's approval
ratings, ceteris paribus.
History proves that approval ratings don’t translate into legislative success
Wrone 2 (Brandice Canes-, Scott de Marchi, Brandice Canes-Wrone is a Professor of Politics and Public Affairs
at Princeton University with a Phd from Stanford University, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 491-509)
At the end of the Gulf War a Gallup poll indicated that 89% of Americans approved
of President George H. W. Bush’s job performance, the highest presidential approval
rating ever recorded by the Gallup Organization. Political observers at the time
predicted this popularity would translate into policy influence.1 Washington Post headlines
declared “President Plans to Capitalize on Popularity Gain.”2 Richard Fenno characterized the moment as “the time for
[Bush] to expend some of the popularity he has gained in pursuit of a comparably large cause at home.”3 Bush’s
performance did not live up to this promise, however. For example, although
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presidential aides cited his anti-crime bill as a keystone of his agenda, a majority of
House members voted against the legislation. In fact, Democratic members publicly
opposed the bill within the week that Bush advocated it in a nationally televised
address. Before long, headlines were proclaiming “Bush Squanders Power.”
Wrone 2 (Brandice Canes-, Scott de Marchi, Brandice Canes-Wrone is a Professor of Politics and Public Affairs
at Princeton University with a Phd from Stanford University, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 491-509)
Perhaps the most initially striking result is that the three estimates of
approval generally have the same effect on presidential success. This consistency
indicates that the divergent findings among previous studies do not derive from
variation in the measurement of approval employed. Table 1 does suggest a
potential rationale for the diversity of findings, however, by showing
that the sample of votes analyzed affects the estimated impact of
approval. Consistent with the negligible impact found in recent work, the effect is
insignificant in the control model. Regardless of the measure of popularity employed,
it does not appear to aid presidents when all roll calls are combined.
Wrone 2 (Brandice Canes-, Scott de Marchi, Brandice Canes-Wrone is a Professor of Politics and Public Affairs
at Princeton University with a Phd from Stanford University, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 491-509)
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Other research suggests, however, that a president may not systematically gain
influence through plebiscitary activity. For example, Covington (1987) and Kernell
(1993) argue that a president can impede executive-legislative bargaining by "going
public." They observe that members have less flexibility to modify their positions on
salient issues, preventing policy compromise. In addition, according to Kernell,
members may be unwilling to bargain with a president who offers no explicit reward
for supporting his position and instead goes over their heads to the people.
Internal Link – A2: Popularity = Agenda (5/6)
There is no evidence that public appeal assists presidential success
Wrone 2 (Brandice Canes-, Scott de Marchi, Brandice Canes-Wrone is a Professor of Politics and Public Affairs
at Princeton University with a Phd from Stanford University, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 491-509)
Existing empirical work does not resolve whether in fact presidents gain systematic
influence from public appeals. Isolated cases of policy success have been documented,
but as Tulis (1987, 45) notes, these cases number ‘`a very few" within the literature,
Moreover, prominent failures have also been documented, ranging from President
Clinton's advocacy for nationalized health care.5 The work most suggestive of
systematic influence is Mouw and MacKuen (1992), who show that when presi-
dents Reagan and Eisenhower publicly addressed issues, congressional agenda-setters
took more moderate positions, Mouw and MacKuen do not examine whether this
behavior reflected presidents achieving their policy goals however.
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Internal Link – A2: Popularity = Agenda (6/6)
Public Approval only helps if the public is both concerned and uncertain about the bill
Eggen 8 (7-13, Dan, and Paul Kane, Washington Post staff writers, “Recent Bush victories smell of compromise”,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/12/AR2008071201616.html)
President Bush has racked up a series of significant political victories in recent weeks, on surveillance reform, war funding and
an international agreement on global warming, but only after engaging in the kind of conciliation with opponents that his administration has
often avoided. With less than seven months left in office, Bush is embracing such compromises in part because he has to. Faced with persistently low public approval
ratings, a Democratic Congress and wavering support among Republicans, he
and his aides have given ground on key issues to accomplish
broader legislative and diplomatic goals, according to administration officials, legislative aides and political experts. "To get something done
or to get what you want or most of what you want, you've got to compromise," said Nicholas E. Calio, who served as Bush's first
legislative affairs director. "The president and the White House are very focused on getting things done, and they don't abide the notion that he's a lame duck." Bush's
willingness to compromise remains limited, and he has threatened to veto several key measures winding through Congress, from Medicare payments to housing
reform. Yet any
hint of accommodation is notable for a president who has often pursued a confrontational strategy with Congress -- even when it was
in GOP hands -- and who has stood behind an unpopular war and go-it-alone policies abroad. "There hasn't been wholesale change, but there
has been
definite movement toward compromise," said Thomas E. Mann, a congressional scholar at the Brookings Institution. "What you're seeing is
a willingness to bend some when you're getting a broader objective. On other things, you finesse it." Two weeks ago, for
example, Bush signed a $162 billion spending bill for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that he hailed as a product of bipartisan cooperation. But the final legislation
was far more expensive than Bush had said he would accept, and it included expanded G.I. Bill college benefits and other provisions that he had opposed. A new
surveillance bill signed into law Thursday also marked a significant victory for Bush, largely because the White House won legal immunity for telecommunications
firms that helped in eavesdropping after the Sept. 11 attacks. Yet even there, the compromise legislation included reforms that the administration had initially opposed,
including language making clear that the measure is the exclusive legal authority for government spying. The changes allowed the bill to easily overcome opposition
from Democratic leaders and civil liberties groups. Bush's conciliatory mood extended to the Group of Eight summit last week in Japan, where the United States for
the first time joined the other major industrialized countries in agreeing to try to halve greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Although environmental groups said the
deal lacked vital specifics, it marked a long journey for a U.S. president who came to office questioning the science of climate change.
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Virata 4 (Gillian, Masters in International Policy and Practice from George Washington
University, International Economic Studies Center,
http://internationalecon.com/virata/The%20Effects%20of%20the%20US%20Sugar.pdf)
Sugar growers have continuously lobbied to keep this program.and their benefits.in place.
Since 1990, the sugar industry has given more than $20 million to both Democrat and
Republican politicians in key positions. It is the largest agricultural industry donor to
political campaigns even though it represents just 1% of U.S. farm receipts. Jose and
Alfonso Fanjul, two brothers who own and operate Flo-Sun in Florida (America.s
largest sugar cane growing and refining operation), raised nearly $1 million in soft-
money donations for the 2000 election cycle. For the 2003.2004 election cycle, the sugar
industry made direct donations of $940,000 to candidates for Congress and the presidency.
Adding to the industry.s influence is the fact that Florida produces a quarter of U.S. sugar
and Florida is a key state in presidential elections. Lobbying efforts by the sugar
industry include having thousands of sugar beet farmers and refinery employees send
petitions to the government, having Congressmen flood the administration with
letters, warning agribusiness-related companies (like Caterpillar) that they will lose
business if they support free trade, and rallying other agricultural trade associations
to fight FTAs.
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Internal Link—Farm Lobby = Agenda
The Farm lobby has congress in their pocket—the plan would create significant
congressional opposition
Reuters 7-24 (Sue Plemming, “Rice says will push Congress hard on India deal,” 2008,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080724/pl_nm/india_nuclear_rice_dc_1)
PERTH, Australia (Reuters) - U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on Thursday
the Bush administration would push the U.S. Congress hard to agree to a civilian
nuclear deal with India before President George W. Bush leaves office.
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Internal Link—Political Capital = Nuke Deal
Political Capital is Key to the Deal
Horner 7-14 (Danielle, Nuclear Fuels, “Progress on India deal may be too late for Congress to
act this year,” pg. 9, vol. 33, l/n)
Nevertheless, a congressional staffer said, there is "no chance" that Congress won't
ultimately approve the agreement. After the "whole world" — as represented by the
IAEA and the NSG — has endorsed the idea of renewed nuclear trade with India,
Congress would be seen as "isolating" the US, said the staffer, who has been skeptical of
the agreement. "There is no incentive not to approve it once everything else is done," he
said.
There’s overwhelming bipartisan support for the India deal. Party leaders on both sides
have expressed interest in getting the deal through
Kazi 7 (Reshmi, Mainstream Weakly, “Lame Duck Session: Why US Senate Must Pass Civilian
Nuclear Deal,” April 24, Volume XLIV, No.48, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article43.html)
The Indo-US nuclear deal enjoys overwhelming bipartisan consensus within the
Congress. In July 2006, the Republicans had overwhelmingly voted in favour of the
deal. In the present mid-term polls all major Democratic leaders have ‘publicly’
expressed their support for the Bill. Key Democratic leaders in the Senate like Joseph
Biden, Harry Reid, Bill Frist, Richard Lugar and John Kerry adhere to their earlier
position on the civilian energy deal even after the elections. There is no reason to
believe that these Democrats would prefer to delay or kill the Bill which they
themselves are backing very hard. The general perception that the Democrats are
going to nuke the deal is therefore not correct.
Nabi Fai; Kashmiri American Council 01 (Ghulam; July 8, 2001 (Washington Times)
The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and
distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the
vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed
and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and
Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and
a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United
States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The Director
of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at
the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to
bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing
despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify
an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.
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Impacts – Indo-Pak NW (2/2)
Indo-Pakistani conflict goes nuclear
Deane`2 (John Deane, Chief Political Correspondent, PA News, KASHMIR CONFLICT 'COULD SPIRAL INTO NUCLEAR
WAR', May 27, 2002, Lexis)
The bitter dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir could escalate into a
nuclear confrontation, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw warned today. In a speech at the
German foreign ministry in Berlin Mr Straw, who is en route to a visit to India and
Pakistan, underlined the gravity of the situation. Mr Straw cautioned: "The current
tension, and the build-up of military forces in Kashmir, could all too easily spiral out
of control into a conventional, and then nuclear conflict of a kind we have never seen
before. "We sometimes add the words 'incalculable risks' in such circumstances. But
whilst we cannot be precise, the risks are all too easy to describe. Death, destruction,
disease, economic collapse, affecting not just the immediate war theatre but many
parts of the subcontinent and lasting for years. "So it is imperative that a better way
out of this conflict is found; a way that sees the end of cross-border terrorism and the
support for all forms of terrorism; then a de-escalation of military preparedness; then
a constructive dialogue to resolve this longstanding bilateral argument over this
beautiful but benighted area of Kashmir."
India deal is vital to the bilateral relationship – any rejections afterwards would devastate
relations.
Levi & Ferguson 6 Fellows for Science & Technology @ the Council on Foreign Relations (Michael A. &
Charles D., 6/16, “U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation A Strategy for Moving Forward”
ttp://www.cfr.org/publication/10795/usindia_nuclear_cooperation.html)
Since then, though, the dynamics have shifted. In the immediate aftermath of the U.S.-India deal,
Russia supplied India with uranium for two reactors at Tarapur, partially alleviating near-term
pressures for outside sources of nuclear fuel. More fundamentally, the high-profile announcement
of a U.S.-India nuclear deal has changed the choices available to American policymakers. If
Congress blocks cooperation after the Bush administration has made strong and public
commitments to India, it would damage the bilateral relationship. Rejecting the nuclear deal now
would leave the United States in a substantially worse position than had that deal not been made in
the first place, reinforcing unfortunate Indian perceptions of the United States not only as anti-
Indian but also as an unreliable partner. The U.S. Congress, of course, should not defer passively to
the president, nor should it allow the effect of its actions on U.S.-India relations to trump all
nonproliferation concerns. But the new reality should make it think carefully about its
nonproliferation priorities and about precisely how those intersect with the U.S.-India deal.
Fortunately, a rebalancing of the deal is possible, protecting nonproliferation needs without
sacrificing the U.S.-Indian relationship—as long as the administration and India show a small
amount of flexibility in moving forward.
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Nuke Deal Good – US/India Relations (2/3)
Reversal of deal kills relations
Hindu 7-16-7
('Major US firms ready to lobby for Indo-US nuke deal', “ http://www.thehindu.com/holnus/001200707160325.htm, accessed 7-
16-8)
”This deal is very very important to both countries," Bill Begert, vice-president at Pratt &
Whitney, a unit of United Technologies Co., which hopes to supply engines for the fighter-jet
deal, is quoted as saying. "If this falls apart, it will have real near-term consequences for
everyone in the defence industry." Pakistan presents another foreign-policy wrinkle, the Journal
says, adding any advances in India's nuclear capabilities could further unsettle the government of
President Pervez Musharraf, currently beset by countrywide protests after he cracked down on
the judiciary and pro-Taliban Lal Masjid in Islamabad. Pakistan also had sought similar
consideration from Washington, but was rebuffed. Many US lawmakers, the Journal says, also
have vowed to oppose any deal that loosens restrictions on how India can use US-provided
nuclear fuel. The stakes are high for Bush's embattled foreign policy, it added, stressing that
aides often cite the thawing of relations with India as a key accomplishment of his presidency at
a time of deep frustration in the Middle East and rising tensions with powers such as Russia and
China. The nuclear deal, they say, is key to cementing a partnership between the world's oldest
democracy, the US, and its largest, India, after decades of chillness.
Bush has heavily touted the deal – reversal would collapse reliable relations
Rashid 7 (Harun ur, Former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva. The Daily Star,
Vol. 5, Num. 1118, July 23. http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/07/23/d70723020329.htm)
The Bush administration's priorities are -- combating terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, regional stability, and the challenge posed by China. The list reflects the extent to
which geography shapes politics and alliances. To the Bush administration, India's size,
population, skills, resources, and potential can make a major contribution as a "global
partner" with the US. India hopes that America can encourage President Musharraf to come to
terms with India's geography, and advise him that Pakistan's security lies in cooperation,
not confrontation, with India. The ultimate power relation between US and India, many suggest,
depends on how far and to what extent the US is able to restrain and counsel Pakistan not
to destablise India and, in turn, the region.
Relations are key to preventing Indo-Pak war – they solve the Kashmir issue.
Riedel 6 Senior Fellow @ Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
(Bruce, 12/18, Global Politics, “India and the United States: A New Era,”
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/riedel20061218.htm)
Now that President Bush has built on this foundation, he should use the new strategic
partnership to move beyond crisis management between India and Pakistan to try to help
the two countries resolve the underlying issue that has brought them repeatedly to conflict:
Kashmir. America has avoided dealing with the Kashmir issue for decades, both because
of its complexities and because India opposed outside involvement, preferring to deal
bilaterally with Pakistan. This approach has not worked; the problem has gotten worse and
has repeatedly taken the subcontinent to the brink of disaster. Now is the time for quiet
American diplomacy to exploit our stronger ties with India and our improved relations
with Pakistan since 9/11 to try to resolve the Kashmir quarrel. It is in the self interest of all
three nations to do so. The timing is particularly fortuitous since India and Pakistan have
begun their own bilateral dialogue to improve relations since they were last at the brink of
war in 2003. That dialogue has already produced some modest confidence-building
measures in Kashmir but has not really engaged the underlying issues. Pakistan's President
Pervez Musharraf says he is ready to engage India on Kashmir and has put some
interesting ideas on the table. He should be tested now by both the U.S. and India. Helping
him resolve Kashmir would also help him end Pakistan's long relationship with jihadist
terror groups which have dangerous relationships with al-Qaeda. If Kashmir moved toward
peace, Pakistan could more easily put those groups out of business and isolate al-Qaeda. A
deal should not threaten India's territorial integrity; rather it should focus on improving the
Kashmiri's lives.
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Nuke Deal Good – Indian Economy/Warming
The India deal is key to solving warming and stabilizing the Indian economy—outweighs
the Kyoto Protocol
Victor 6 (David, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/16/opinion/edvictor.php)
If the deal to supply India with nuclear technologies goes through, future generations
may remember it for quite different reasons than the debate over nuclear
proliferation. Nuclear power emits no carbon dioxide, the leading cause of global
warming. And India, like most developing countries, has not been anxious to spend
money to control its emissions of this and other so- called greenhouse gases. India is
embracing nuclear power for other reasons - because it can help the country solve its chronic failure to supply the electricity needed for a
burgeoning economy. But in effect, the deal would marry their interest in power with ours in
protecting the planet. India is growing rapidly. In recent years its economy has swelled at more than 7 percent per year, and
many analysts believe it is poised to grow even faster in the coming decade. The economic growth is feeding a
voracious appetite for electricity that India's bankrupt utilities are unable to satisfy.
Blackouts are commonplace. Farmers, who account for about two-fifths of all the
power consumed, can barely rely on getting power for half of every day. In industrial
zones, the lifeblood of India's vibrant economy, unstable power supplies are such
trouble that the biggest companies usually build their own power plants. So most
analysts expect that the demand for electricity will rise at about 10 percent a year. (For
comparison, U.S. power demand notches up at just 2 percent annually.) Over the past decade, about one third of India's new power
supplies came from natural gas and hydro electricity. Both those sources have been good news for global warming - natural gas is the
least carbon- intensive of all the fossil fuels, and most of India's hydroelectric dams probably emit almost no greenhouse gases.
However, the
bloom is coming off those greenhouse-friendly roses. New supplies of
natural gas cost about twice what Indians are used to paying, and environmental
objections are likely to scupper the government's grand plans for new hydro dams.
That leaves coal - the most carbon-intensive of all fossil fuels. Already more than half
of India's new power supplies come from coal, and that could grow rapidly. Traditionally,
the coal sector was plagued by inefficiencies. State coal mines were notoriously dangerous and inefficient. Coal-fired plants in western
provinces, far from the coal fields and vulnerable to the dysfunctional rail network, often came within days of shutting operations due to
Private and highly efficient coal mines are grabbing growing
lack of coal. All that is changing.
shares of the coal market. Upgrades to the nation's high-tension power grid is making
it feasible to generate electricity with new plants installed right at the coal mines.
These improvements make coal the fuel to beat. So the deal struck with President George W. Bush matters.
At the moment, India has just 3 gigawatts of nuclear plants connected to the grid. Government planners envision that nuclear supply will
grow to 30 GW over the next generation, but that will remain a fantasy without access to advanced nuclear technologies and, especially,
nuclear fuels - such as those offered under the deal with the Bush administration. By
2020, even after discounting for
the government's normal exuberance in its forecasts, a fresh start for nuclear power
could increase nuclear generating capacity nearly ten-fold. By displacing coal, that
would avoid about 130 million tons of carbon dioxide per year (for comparison, the
full range of emission cuts planned by the European Union under the Kyoto Protocol
will total just 200 million tons per year). The effort, if successful, would eclipse the
scheme under the Kyoto Protocol, known as the Clean Development Mechanism, that
was designed to reward developing countries that implement projects to reduce their
emissions of greenhouse gases. The largest 100 of these CDM projects, in total, won't
reduce emissions as much as a successful effort to help India embrace safe nuclear
power.
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Nuke Deal Good – Indian Economy – India Key to World
Strong Indian economy prevents global economic downturn.
A strong Indian economy prevents economic downturns from going global
Victor 6 (David, Director, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Stanford University. Testimony before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, July 18. Online)
Until now, developing countries have adamantly refused to limit their emissions of
greenhouse gases. These countries are wary that the possible high costs of climate change
mitigation will jeopardize their development goals. The result of that opposition is the
CDM—a system that compensates developing countries for the full extra cost of any
policies to control emissions. The CDM was a good idea in principle, but in practice it is
not working well. The scheme has become mired in red tape as countries and investors try
to establish their baseline levels of emissions and the reduction in emissions from each
project. (The difference between the baseline and the reduced level is the key to the CDM
concept—that difference becomes a credit that can be used to offset emission obligations
elsewhere in the world, such as in Europe’s emission trading system). The problems have
encouraged gaming and they have caused CDM investors to focus on activities that are
easy to quantify and which are marginal in nature. Indeed, energy projects account for just
17% of the CDM pipeline. Almost none of the energy projects are of the type that will lead
to fundamental changes in countries’ energy systems.5 If the India nuclear deal is
successful, it will frame a new approach to engaging developing countries in a climate
strategy. This approach would focus on finding game-changing policies that align with
reluctant countries’ interests.6 Rather than involving hundreds of small and marginal
projects, this style of engagement would focus on just a handful of large pivotal actions
involving just a few critical countries. This concept is incidentally at the core of the Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, whose six members, including
India and the U.S., account for half the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. That Partnership
has promise, but it remains young. Success with this nuclear deal could offer a credible
example of practical actions that the Partnership could encourage.
Victor 6 (David, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/16/opinion/edvictor.php)
What is important is that the deal is not just a one- off venture, as the administration's
backers, on the defensive, have suggested. It could frame a new approach to technology
sharing and managing a more proliferation-proof fuel cycle that, in turn, will
multiply the benefits of a cooler climate. Coal-rich China is among the many other
countries that would welcome more nuclear power and whose emissions of carbon
dioxide are growing fast - even faster than India's. Quite accidentally, it seems, the
Bush administration has stumbled on part of an effective strategy to slow global
warming. Now it should marry that clever scheme overseas with an effective plan
here at home.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
197
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – Warming (2/2)
Nuke Deal revives the US nuclear industry
Nuclear power in the US can cause a drastic reduction in fossil fuel usage
Gobarev 00 (Victor, Independent Security Policy Analyst Based in Washington D.C., Previous
Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and George Washington University,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa381.pdf)
The concerns that such a move would invite increased nuclear proliferation do
not seem justified. Rogue countries currently working on acquiring nuclear weapons
will continue to do so independently of U.S. recognition of India’s nuclear
status. Moreover, many states, especially in the Third World, would welcome a
conciliatory move as evidence that the United States wishes to pursue an equitable
foreign and international security policy for all nations, not merely for developed
countries. Britain, France, Russia, and China, the members of the nuclear club, are likely
to follow the U.S. move. Russia and China would be outmaneuvered, since a crucial
foreign policy and international security initiative dealing with India would have passed
from them to America. That move would also deal a heavy blow to those in China,
Russia, and India itself who dream of building the tripartite strategic alliance to
oppose the United States. U.S. recognition of India as a nuclear power would remove
the main obstacle to making America and India friends and de facto strategic partners.
Such an initiative by Washington would likely mean India’s acceptance of U.S. proposals
on nonproliferation of WMD technology and fissile materials. India would join
international talks on ending the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and
would install effective controls for nuclear-related materials. Those measures would reduce
the threat of proliferation from India and begin U.S.-Indian cooperation on
counterproliferation.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
199
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – Oil Prices
The India deal is key to lowering oil prices—crucial to the economy
Motz and Milhollin 6 (Kelly & Gary, research assistant and Director. Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, June 13.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/Seventeen_Myths.htm)
Fact: The deal is primarily about making money. The main effect of the deal will be to
pardon India – to remove it as a violator of international norms. After such a change in
status, there will be no impediment to U.S. arms sales. This is where the real money is, not
in nuclear reactors. U.S. exporters have mentioned selling as much as $1.4 billion worth of
Boeing airliners, hundreds of F-16 or F/A-18 fighter jets, as well as maritime surveillance
planes, advanced radar, helicopters, missile defense and other equipment. The Russian
press has even complained that the nuclear deal is a ploy to squeeze Russia out of the
Indian arms market.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
201
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – US Econ
The India Deal is key to the US Economy and solving Trade Deficits.
Hiserodt, aerospace engineer, 8 (Ed, “Myths About Nuclear Energy”, The New American. April 30, Vol. 23,
Iss. 9; pg. 18, 6 pgs, Proquest)
MYTH: Nuclear plants emit dangerous radiation
TRUTH: Have you ever known anyone killed in a car accident? I have - two uncles, a
roommate, and a girlfriend from college. How about anyone killed from radiation, or
maybe even injured slightly? If you're like me and nearly all other Americans, you can't
name a single person you know who has been injured by radiation.
The fact is, nuclear power plants emit less radiation during normal operation than do
coal-fired power plants. In an article published in 1993 in Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Review, ORNL physicist Alex Gabbard pointed out "that coal-fired power plants
throughout the world are the major sources of radioactive materials released to the
environment." According to Gabbard, radiation from coal combustion "is 100 times
that from nuclear plants." Yet even at that level, radiation from coal is completely
negligible. Nuclear reactors emit much less radiation than coal-fired power plants.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission limits radiation at the plant boundary to 5 millirems
per year. (It seldom gets anywhere near that.) If you were to stand unclothed at the
boundary for 120 years, you would receive as much radiation as a person living on
the Colorado plateau does in one year from natural background radiation.
Moreover, the U.S. capitol building has long been known to emit too much radiation
to be licensed as a nuclear power plant.
Consider too that unlike coal- or oil-fired plants, nuclear power plants do not have
smokestacks spewing pollutants into the atmosphere. In the case of nuclear plants, the
wastes are contained within the plant itself. Often mistaken for smokestacks, some
nuclear power plants, like some coal- or oil-fired plants, have cooling towers that emit
water vapor.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that radiation is all around us every day.
According to the Department of Energy, the average American receives 300 millirems of
radiation each year from natural sources, but that amount is higher in some places. For
instance, in Denver, Colorado, because of the proximity of the Rocky Mountains and
because there is less atmosphere overhead to protect from cosmic rays, residents receive
almost double the national average background radiation. I wonder, does the EPA know
about this? Perhaps Coloradans should be evacuated!
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
203
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – AT: Accidents (1/2)
Nuclear fears unfounded; they’re based on old myths. The benefits outweigh the risks.
Prefer our ev, it’s comparative
Fortune, ’08 (The Case for Nukes, June 9, Vol. 157, Iss. 12; pg. 22. Proquest)
One uncomfortable way to mitigate the energy crisis has been under our nose since the
1950s: nuclear energy. It's one of the cleanest and most efficient alternatives to coal-
and natural-gas-based electricity production, and it's responsible for less than 20% of
domestic electricity production. The most recent numbers (2006) indicate that coal-
based production was the largest contributor, at 48%. Increasingly expensive
petroleum and natural gas account for 22%. All three are replaceable.
It may not be fashionable to suggest that the French know what they're doing with regard
to anything but wine and cheese, but spend some time in Provence and note the remarkably
clean air and cheap electricity, 75% of which is produced by nuclear power plants. Most of
the plants were built after the 1970s oil shocks that sent France's economy into a tailspin
because it was almost completely dependent on foreign oil, as we are now. Nuclear energy
doesn't produce the air pollution that burning coal does, and even waste products are
recyclable, though it hasn't been done thanks to an also potentially shortsighted
Carter-era decision to ban it over fears of nuclear terrorism. Although the ban has
been reversed, the fears still linger. But irrational fear of improbable safety breaches
is responsible for most opposition to nuclear power in this country. The unlikely
culprit? Pop culture. We've seen The China Syndrome, and we worry that nuclear-
reactor employees may be bumbling Homer Simpsons, capable of accidentally
pushing the red button. Chernobyl and Three Mile Island--the former of which killed
36 people and the latter of which killed none--have become so outsized in the
American imagination that our perception of actual risk has been completely
distorted. We're willing to tolerate the health risks and environmental repercussions
of other fuels to avoid the infinitesimally small and comically improbable possibility
of a catastrophic accident that resembles something out of a 1979 Jane Fonda movie,
the likes of which have never happened in the history of nuclear power.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
204
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – AT: Accidents (2/2)
Three Mile Island proves the safety mechs for NP plants, no injury or death occurred
Hiserodt, aerospace engineer, 08 (Ed, “Myths About Nuclear Energy”, The New American. April 30, Vol.
23, Iss. 9; pg. 18, 6 pgs, Proquest)
TRUTH: The great nightmare associated with nuclear energy is the "meltdown."
Anti-nuclear activists love to point to a scenario in which a reactor would lose its
coolant allowing the fuel rods to melt through the reactor vessel, through several feet
of high-strength concrete, and through hundreds of feet of earth till reaching an
aquifer whereupon a steam explosion would ensue. Consequently, they eagerly seized
upon the accident at Three Mile Island as the embodiment of all their fears - or at
least of the fears they wanted the public to have.
The problem was that Three Mile Island was a demonstration of the safety of nuclear
plants. Beginning at 4:00 a.m. on March 28, 1979, a series of mishaps resulted in the
partial meltdown of the reactor core. By 7:45 a.m. that morning, according to the
Smithsonian Institute, "a molten mass of metal and fuel - some twenty tons in all - is
spilling into the bottom of the reactor vessel." Yet that reactor containment vessel worked
as designed and by 9:00 a.m. the danger was past: "The reactor vessel holds firm, and
the molten uranium, immersed in water, now gradually begins to cool," the
Smithsonian Institute says in its timeline of events at the damaged reactor. Perhaps the
final word on Three Mile Island comes from Greenpeace co-founder Patrick Moore. In
October 2006, Moore wrote in Popular Mechanics: "At the time, no one noticed Three
Mile Island was a success story; the concrete containment structure prevented
radiation from escaping into the environment. There was no injury or death among
the public or nuclear workers."
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
205
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – A2: US-Pakistani Relations – A2: Terror
No Pakistani support for WOT
Landay 8 (Jonathan S., ational security and intelligence corresponden. McClatchy Newspapers,
August 1. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/100/story/46178.html)
The Bush administration and its allies are pressing Pakistan to end its support for Afghan
insurgents linked to al Qaida, but Pakistani generals are unlikely to be swayed because
they increasingly see their interests diverging from those of the United States, U.S. and
foreign experts said. The administration sought to ratchet up the pressure last month by
sending top U.S. military and intelligence officials to Pakistan to confront officials there
with intelligence linking Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence to the Taliban and other
militant Islamist groups. When that failed to produce the desired response, U.S. officials
told news organizations about the visit, and then revealed that the intelligence included an
intercepted communication between ISI officers and a pro-Taliban network that carried out
a July 7 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, the Afghan capital. The United States
and Britain privately have demanded that Pakistan move against the Taliban's top
leadership, which they contend is based near Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's Baluchistan
Province, said a State Department official and a senior NATO defense official, who both
requested anonymity because they weren't authorized to speak publicly. Pakistan has been
given "a pretty unequivocal message" to end ISI support for the militants and shake up the
top ranks of the intelligence agency, the senior NATO defense official said. On Friday,
however, Pakistan vehemently rejected the allegations of ISI involvement in the Indian
Embassy blast, which killed 41 and injured 141. U.S. officials and experts said there's little
chance that Pakistan will take any of the actions it's been asked to take.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
206
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Prolif Signal
No serious risk of proliferation snowballing from the India Deal
Carter 6 (Ashton, Poli Sci – Harvard, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/
20060701faessay85403-p0/ashton-b-carter/america-s-new-strategic-partner.html. Accessed on July 29, 2008//grice)
The most serious charge against the deal is that Washington, by recognizing India's de facto nuclear status and effectively
rewarding noncompliance, hurt the integrity of the nonproliferation regime. There is no question that such an abrupt
reversal of U.S. policy was a blow to nonproliferation efforts, but the damage is manageable and will not
affect the most worrisome near-term cases. To begin with, the impact of the Bush-Singh deal
on so-called rogue states is likely to be minimal. It is safe to assume that as North Korea's Kim Jong
Il calculates how far he can go with his nuclear breakout, he hardly worries about the internal
consistency of the NPT regime (much like Saddam Hussein, who eventually stopped paying it any heed).
Pyongyang's governing ideology is not communism so much as a fanatical embrace of autarky and self-
reliance, which seems to include open defiance of international norms such as
nonproliferation. North Korea's tolerance for ostracism by the international community is legendary. Stopping its
nuclear program -- by measures short of war -- would require tough and focused diplomacy, with incentives and
sanctions, in which the NPT would play little part. The India deal's impact on Iran, another country driving
for nuclear power status, will also be modest. Tehran's ongoing cat-and-mouse game with the IAEA, the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany suggests that Iranian leaders have at least a smidgen
of sensitivity to international opinion. India's nuclear recognition may give Tehran a new talking point --
if India gets a free pass, why not Iran? -- but that is about it. Iran's nuclear program, like that of North Korea,
has deep roots in the country's sense of insecurity and its national pride, and these
factors matter far more than the NPT. Besides, because Tehran continues to claim that it seeks only
nuclear power, not nuclear weapons, it would be hard-pressed to point to India as a relevant precedent. The deal's impact
will mostly be felt among two other groups of countries: states that are not rogues but have flirted or continue to flirt with
nuclear status ("the in-betweens") and states that faithfully uphold the rules, whether or not they have nuclear weapons
("the stalwarts"). South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, South Korea, Taiwan, and, more
recently, Libya have all been in-betweens at some point. Although they eventually forwent nuclear weapons for reasons
specific to their own circumstances, all of them were in some way swayed by the fear that they would suffer lasting
international ostracism if they flouted the NPT regime. With India's sweet deal now suggesting that forgiveness comes to
proliferators who wait long enough, some states might be tempted to stray. (Brazil, which is now trying to enrich
uranium, comes to mind.)
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
207
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Proliferation – Safeguards
Safeguards are in place to ensure nuclear materials and tech are not used for weapons
relative strengths and predicting the course of campaigns. Since World War II, technological advance has been even faster, but
short of a ballistic missile defense breakthrough, this has not mattered. It did not disturb the American-Soviet military equilibrium, because
one side’s missiles were not made obsolete by improvements in the other side’s
missiles. In 1906, the British Dreadnought, with the greater range and firepower of its guns, made older battleships obsolete. This does not happen to missiles.
As Bernard Brodie put it, “Weapons that do not have to fight their like do not become useless because of the advent of newer and superior types.” They may have to
survive their like, but that is a much simpler problem to solve. Many wars might have been avoided had their out-
comes been foreseen. “To be sure,” George Simmel wrote, “the most effective presupposition for preventing struggle, the exact knowledge of the
comparative strength of the two parties, is very often only to be obtained by the actual fighting out of the conflict.” Miscalculation causes
wars. One side expects victory at an affordable price, while the other side hopes to avoid defeat. Here the dif-
ferences between conventional and nuclear worlds are fundamental. In the former, states are too often tempted to act on
advantages that are wishfully discerned and narrowly calculated. In 1914, neither Germany nor France
tried very hard to avoid a general war. Both hoped for victory even though they believed the opposing coalitions to be quite evenly matched.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
212
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good—Proliferation Prevents Escalation
Proliferation frees the US from extended deterrence, preventing global escalation
Layne 96 (Christopher, Fellow of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard,
“Minimal Realism in East Asia,” The National Interest, Spring, p72-73)
This is doubly true when the potential aggressor is a nuclear power because, as Charles de
Gaulle reasoned well, rational states will not risk suicide to save their allies. For both
protector and protected, extended nuclear deterrence raises constant and ultimately
insoluble dilemmas of credibility and reassurance. The conditions that contributed to
successful extended nuclear deterrence in Cold War Europe do not exist in post-Cold
War East Asia. Unlike the situation that prevailed in Europe between 1948 and 1990—
which was fundamentally stable and static—East Asia is a volatile region in which all the
major players— Japan, China, Korea, Russia, Vietnam—are candidates to become
involved in large-scale war. There is no clear and inviolable status quo. The lines of
demarcation between spheres of influence are already blurred and may well become
more so as Chinese and Japanese influence expand simultaneously, increasing the number
and unpredictability of regional rivalries. The status of Taiwan, tension along the 38th
Parallel in Korea, conflicting claims to ownership of the Spratly Islands, and the Sino-
Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands are only a few of the flash-points
that could ignite a great power war in East Asia. Washington will clearly exercise far
less control over the policies of East Asian powers than it exercised over Americas
European allies during the Cold War. Hence, the risk of being chain-ganged into a
nuclear conflict are much higher for the United States in post-Cold War East Asia if it
maintains or extends nuclear guarantees to any of the region’s major states. Even more
important, post-Cold War East Asia simply does not have the same degree of strategic
importance to the United States as did Europe during the Cold War. Would the United
States risk a nuclear confrontation to defend Taiwan, the Spratlys, or Senkaku? Knowing
that they would not constitute the same kind of threat to U.S. interests that the Soviet
Union did, future revisionist East Asian powers would probably be more willing to
discount America’s credibility and test its resolve. The presence of American forces in
the region may indeed have the perverse effect of failing to preserve peace while
simultaneously ensuring the United States would be drawn automatically into a future
East Asian war. They could constitute the wrong sort of tripwire, tripping us rather than
deterring them. Notwithstanding current conventional wisdom, the United States should encourage East Asian states—including Japan—to
resolve their own security dilemmas, even if it means acquiring great power, including nuclear, military capabilities. Reconfiguring American security
policies anywhere in the world in ways that, in effect, encourage nuclear proliferation is widely seen as irresponsible and risky. This is not necessarily the
case. Nuclear proliferation and extended deterrence are generally believed to be flip sides of the same coin, in the sense that providing the latter is seen to
discourage the former. Nearly all maximalists are simultaneously proliferation pessimists (believing that any proliferation will have negative security
implications) and extended nuclear deterrence optimists (believing that extended nuclear deterrence “works”). But this formulation comes apart from both
l nuclear powers in the region are unlikely to act irresponsibly and, as
ends in East Asia: Potentia
suggested above, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is of uncertain credibility in post-Cold War
circumstances in which the Soviet Union no longer exists and strains in the U.S.-Japanese
relationship are manifest. Even selective proliferation by stable, non-rogue states
admittedly raises important political, strategic, organizational, and doctrinal issues. But so
does relying on America’s nuclear extended deterrence strategy in changed circumstances.
The need at hand is to weigh the dangers imbedded in an extended deterrence strategy
against those posed by the possibility of nuclear proliferation, and here the Japanese case
provides the most important and sobering illustration.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
213
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Taiwan-China Conflict (1/2)
Weapons sales are largely unnecessary – Indian-Sino conflict is not coming
The Standard 8 (“China-Taiwan clash 'very unlikely,' US Admiral says,” July 18. http://www.thestandard.com.hk/
breaking_news_detail.asp?id=596&icid=2&d_str=20080718)
Tension between China and Taiwan has decreased to the degree that a military conflict is
unlikely and there currently is no need to sell defensive weapons to the island's
government, the top US military commander in Asia said.While the US is "committed to
the defense of Taiwan,'' "there is no pressing, compelling need for, at this moment, arms
sales,'' Admiral Timothy Keating, leader of the US Pacific Command, told a forum
sponsored by the Heritage Foundation research group.Keating acknowledged that the US,
which is required by its Taiwan Relations Act to defend the island if it is attacked, has not
sold it weapons "in relatively recent times,'' according to a transcript of his remarks.
Agence France-Presse 8 (Inquirer.net, “Better Taiwan-China ties good for the region, Ma says,” July 21.
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/view/20080721-149847/Better-Taiwan-China-ties-good-for-the-region-Ma-says)
TAIPEI -- Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou said Monday that improved ties between the
island and China were "good news" for the entire region, as the odds of military conflict
had been greatly reduced.The Strait between Taiwan and China, heavily armed on both
sides, has long been one of the world's most dangerous potential military flashpoints.But
Ma, speaking to a group of Japanese academics, said the situation had changed
dramatically since he took office two months ago."Simply put, cross-Strait ties have
changed from confrontations to peaceful development. Hopefully the two sides will be able
to co-exist peacefully," Ma said, noting that the chance of a military conflict had
lessened."As the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula are the flashpoints (in the region),
eased tensions across the Strait are good news for the people and countries in Northeast
Asia," he said, according to remarks released by his office.
Improved relations reduce risk of conflict – we are safer now than ever
Robb 8 (Andrew, Opposition spokesman on foreign affairs. The Australian, July 28.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24086171-7583,00.html)
India's energy security and needs are the major issue in the relationship between our two
countries. This issue can make Australia a very important partner to India strategically. It is
what India really wants from us. From a climate perspective there is overwhelming merit
in addressing the reality of India's energy needs by supplying the resources for clean
energy, otherwise these resources will simply come from less environmentally friendly
sources. Two thirds of India's emissions come from burning coal, mainly in power stations.
Without a change in the method of base-load power generation, this share of emissions
from coal-fired power stations will increase through to 2030 and beyond. As India grows,
it will rank third behind the US and China in terms of global energy usage and greenhouse
gas emissions. If the existing restrictions on the import of nuclear technology and uranium
for peaceful power sources are removed, as much as 35 per cent of India's total energy
needs could be met by clean nuclear power plants by 2050. This would have a much bigger
impact on global greenhouse gas reductions than any domestic policy Rudd could propose.
Countries using Australian uranium avoid carbon dioxide emissions roughly equivalent to
our entire annual CO2 emissions from all sources. Around the world nuclear power today
reduces global emissions by more than 2 billion tonnes a year.
Scoop Independent News 8 (“United States Supports India's Civil Nuclear Pact,” July 29.
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0807/S00815.htm)
"India … has a tremendously growing demand for energy. It is a country that, if it tries to
meet that demand through carbon-based sources for energy, is going to contribute
dramatically to the continued growth of greenhouse gas emissions," Rice said. "So it's
important for India to find alternative sources." India imports 75 percent of its oil. Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who recently survived a confidence vote in parliament,
has argued that India needs a stronger investment in nuclear energy generation. Australian
Foreign Minister Stephen Smith, who was traveling with Rice, said his government would
give the India initiative every consideration. Australia, which holds 40 percent of the
world's known uranium reserves, is a key member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. "We
will give very careful consideration to the strategic importance of the agreement, both to
India and to the United States. And we're also looking at the arrangement with a positive
and constructive frame of mind," Smith said. "We, of course, want to look very carefully at
the detail and consider that very carefully in the NSG."
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
216
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – Warming – Impact
Global warming causes extinction
was left alive and it took 100 million years for species diversity to return to former
levels. This dramatic new finding is revealed in a book by Bristol University's head of
earth sciences, Michael Benton, which chronicles the geological efforts leading up to the
discovery and its potential implications. Professor Benton said: "The Permian crisis nearly
marked the end of life. It's estimated that fewer than one in 10 species survived.
"Geologists are only now coming to appreciate the severity of this global catastrophe
and to understand how and why so many species died out so quickly." Other climate
experts say they are appalled that a disaster of such magnitude could be repeated
within this century because of human activities. Global warming author Mark Lynas,
who recently travelled around the world witnessing the impact of climate change, said the
findings must be a wake up call for politicians and citizens alike. He said: "This is a global
emergency. "We are heading for disaster and yet the world is on fossil fuel
autopilot.There needs to be an immediate phase-out of coal, oil and gas and a phase in
of clean energy sources. People can no longer ignore this looming catastrophe."
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
217
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – Warming – India Key (1/2)
India and China are leaders in greenhouse emissions yet only China is pathing the way
towards reduced emissions
Victor 6 (David – Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology. July 18.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11123/india_nuclear_deal.html)
Chief among those other reasons is environmental. The fuller use of commercial nuclear
power, if done to exacting standards of safety and protection against proliferation, can play
an important role as part of a larger strategy to slow the growth in emissions of the gases
that cause global warming. That’s because nuclear power emits essentially no carbon
dioxide (CO2), the most prevalent of these so-called “greenhouse gases.” While this
benefit is hardly the chief reason for initiating this deal, with time it will become one of the
main benefits from the arrangement. The nuclear deal probably will lead India to emit
substantially less CO2 than it would if the country were not able to build such a large
commercial nuclear fleet. The annual reductions by the year 2020 alone will be on the
scale of all of the European Union’s efforts to meet its Kyoto Protocol commitments. In
addition, if this arrangement is successful it will offer a model framework for a more
effective way to engage developing countries in the global effort to manage the problem of
climate change. No arrangement to manage climate change can be adequately successful
without these countries’ participation; to date the existing schemes for encouraging these
countries to make an effort have failed; a better approach is urgently needed.
An India-US partnership through the India nuclear deal serves as a credible example for
developing nations to reduce CO2 emissions
Victor 6 (David – Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology. July 18.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11123/india_nuclear_deal.html)
If the India nuclear deal is successful, it will frame a new approach to engaging developing
countries in a climate strategy. This approach would focus on finding game-changing
policies that align with reluctant countries’ interests.[6] Rather than involving hundreds of
small and marginal projects, this style of engagement would focus on just a handful of
large pivotal actions involving just a few critical countries. This concept is incidentally at
the core of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, whose six
members, including India and the U.S., account for half the world’s greenhouse gas
emissions. That Partnership has promise, but it remains young. Success with this nuclear
deal could offer a credible example of practical actions that the Partnership could
encourage.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
221
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – Indian Econ (1/3)
Nuclear power is critical to India’s electricity – Bottlenecks will choke off their growth now
Victor 6 (David – Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology. July 18.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11123/india_nuclear_deal.html)
Evaluating the environmental benefits of this deal requires, first, understanding the basic
factors that affect investment in the Indian electric power market. From the 1970s through
much of the 1990s India’s economy was famous for its low rate of growth; with low
growth came low demand for electricity. A series of economic reforms, initially introduced
in the wake of a financial crisis in 1991 but strengthened over the many years since, has
changed that situation dramatically. India’s economy enjoyed an average annual growth
rate of around 7% from 1994-2004. Most analysts expect growth to be sustained at 8%
over the next few years if not longer. India’s population is young; and an important fraction
is well-educated and increasingly engaged with the world economy. To be sure, the Indian
economy has many deep flaws. India has made no progress in solving the development
problem in the rural areas where most Indians live, and India’s democracy is notorious for
its political gridlock. All that said, there is palpable evidence that India’s economic reforms
have finally taken hold. Higher growth has led directly to higher demand for electricity.
While the exact future needs for power remain uncertain, there is considerable evidence
that electric demand will grow at roughly the same rate as the economy. Some factors will
tend to dampen the growth in demand for power. For example, economic growth is
expected to cause a shift in the Indian economy away from energy-intensive manufacturing
and also engender investments that make the economy more efficient in its use of energy.
But other factors will cause demand for electricity to accelerate. Among them is an
improvement in power quality that is likely to accompany the extensive efforts to reform
India’s electric power system that have been under way for 15 years. While reformers have
found it difficult to make progress, these reforms are beginning to take effect in some parts
of the country. Those effects are evident not only in the improved performance of some of
the country’s power utilities, but also in the rising role for privately owned (and generally
more reliable) power plants. In industry, for example, reliable power is essential; many
companies are taking matters into their own hands and building their own plants. And
where electricity is more reliable, Indians will consume more of it. There are many
projections for total demand for electricity. In Figure 1, I show the International Energy
Agency’s projections, which envision a doubling of power demand from the present to
2020. Barring an economic catastrophe, I would be surprised if demand for electric power
were dramatically lower than these projections. And it is possible that demand could be
higher if India discovered, as China has in recent years, that demand for electricity rises
even faster than economic output. For now, let’s use these projections to illustrate the
stakes.
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Nuke Deal Good – Indian Econ (2/3)
Electricity demand is critical to India’s econ
India Today Group Online 8 (Indo-Asian News Service, July 25. http://www.itgo.in
/index.php?id=7038&option=com_content&task=view§ionid=5&secid=25)
India can boost its nuclear energy production by accessing additional uranium and solve
the crisis perpetually, Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar said on Friday.
"Here is a technology (nuclear) in which we are one of the world leaders and which can
help us close the demand supply gap without the need to acquire external fuel perpetually,
provided we can access some additional uranium to start with over and above what we already have in our country," Kakodkar said at
the 54th annual convocation function of Indian Institute of Technology (IIT)- Kharagpur. He said the path of civil nuclear empowerment
can be achieved with uranium import but "without any compromise on India's strategic programmes in the process". The United
the India-US nuclear deal, after winning
Progressive Alliance (UPA) central government is pushing to operationalise
a crucial trust vote in parliament on Tuesday, that will open the doors of global civil
nuclear commerce with India after a gap of three decades. "Nuclear energy with its several
million-fold higher calorific value and negligible greenhouse gas emissions can make a
paradigm change for the better. Fortunately, the five decades of domestic research and development have brought us to
the level of being a potent technology powerhouse of global recognition in this area. "Today our self-reliant capabilities provide us
sufficient strength to pursue an autonomous path that is best suited for us. "We have realised this capability despite the embargo that has
been around us. There is no issue that we would pursue the three stage domestic programme leading to unleashing of vast energy
"The demand supply gap in electricity would
potential in our thorium resources on high priority," he said.
progressively widen over the next few decades in spite of our best efforts to deploy all
available indigenous energy resources, including nuclear. "Nuclear power plants, while
they produce electricity, also produce nuclear fuel, and in Fast Breeder Reactors they, in
fact, produce more fuel than what they consume. "This would thus enable growth of
electricity generation capacity without the need for additional external fuel," he said.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
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Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – Indian Econ (3/3)
Rise in the Indian economy depends on alternative energy such as nuclear technology
Victor 6 (David – Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology. July 18.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11123/india_nuclear_deal.html)
Until now, nuclear power has been controlled by the central government, mainly for non-
energy purposes (namely weapons), and has not been exposed to commercial
accountability. In addition, India’s domestic uranium reserves are quite meager–the Atomic
Energy Commission estimates that domestic resources could support only 10 GW of
installed nuclear capacity.[2]Thus, not surprisingly, nuclear energy has played only a small
role in the power sector. Whether and how that could change is at stake in this deal.The
India nuclear deal would provide for “full” civil nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and
India. By enabling India to import modern nuclear energy technology, as well as uranium,
a properly regulated deal would in effect alleviate the historical restrictions placed on
civilian Indian nuclear power.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
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Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – Indian Econ – Solves War (1/2)
Economic decline causes India/Pakistan conflict
Schaffer`2 (Director South Asia Program, CSIS and Former U.S. Ambassador, Washington Quarterly 2002)
Mediocre growth will extract a high price in terms of political and foreign policies. Without
reforms, India's economy will sag, leading to competitive subsidization and spiraling fiscal deficits. A more worrisome issue for the United States, however,
this situation could tempt India's government to take an unusually strident line toward
is that
Pakistan and its other neighbors, which, in turn, would increase the risk of some kind of
miscalculation or desperate move by Pakistan. Continues…Particularly striking about the building blocks for the new
Indo-U.S. relationship is how little Pakistan figures in them. Yet, the long-standing dispute between India and Pakistan remains the greatest obstacle to the
the possibility of unintended Indo-Pakistani conflict is still the
role India wants to play in the world, and
single greatest potential danger the United States perceives in South Asia. Leaving Pakistan out of a
discussion of Indo-U.S. ties would be disingenuous, particularly in the aftermath of September 11. India's unresolved problems with Pakistan start with
Kashmir, the subject of conflicting claims by India and Pakistan and the object of two wars between them as well as a continuing insurgency, supported by
Pakistan, in the Indian-held parts of the state. The list of problems between the two countries also includes a group of secondary issues related to Kashmir,
such as the status of the world's most desolate, disputed military installation on the Siachen Glacier in the high Himalayas, as well as a number of other
"normalization" issues, including trade and visa regulations. Since September 11, the level and frequency of violence has increased within Kashmir and
across the "Line of Control" that separates India and Pakistan. Statements coming from both governments provide no encouragement that the leadership of
either country is close to a sustainable formula for resuming talks about the situation. India's most recent initiative for beginning talks with Kashmiri
political leaders also seems to be going nowhere. Even worse, high-profile terrorist incidents, including suicide bombings of the State Assembly building in
Srinagar (capital of the part of Kashmir administered by India) and more recently at the Indian parliament in New Delhi, have raised tensions between India
and Pakistan dramatically. The most likely culprits in both cases are militant organizations that also appear on the U.S. government's list of terrorist
organizations, active in Kashmir but headquartered in Pakistan. U.S. actions since that latest incident have made clear that the freedom of action these
groups have enjoyed in Pakistan is incompatible with the relationship Pakistan is now trying to establish with the United States. The regional military
easily such incidents can provoke a cataclysmic set of
buildup that followed the bombing demonstrates how
reactions and how vulnerable regional peace is to another violent incident. Resolving
these problems will require a high level of Indian and Pakistani leadership. Both countries,
as well as Kashmiri representatives, urgently need to start a process that will eventually
lead to an arrangement that is comfortable for all three parties and that addresses the issue
of the Indo-Pakistani relationship and the problems of governance within Kashmir. Any such process would
be slow and crisis-ridden; finding a solution is a marathon effort, not a quick fix. The obstacles to the success of such an endeavor are daunting. In India,
coalition politics and broad popular resentment against Pakistan make it difficult for a leader to push even in the best of times for a reasonable settlement of
If India's economic performance is mediocre, this task will become more
India's problems with Pakistan.
difficult. For Pakistan, Kashmir has powerful popular appeal. The political compromise required for a settlement
would be very painful, and the strength Pakistan's government has gained by confronting
militant groups over their activities in Afghanistan will not easily carry over to Kashmir.
Without such an effort, however, the likelihood of new and dangerous confrontations over Kashmir is unacceptably high. Despite the new issues that unite
this all-too-familiar one remains at the top of U.S. foreign priorities and
India and the United States,
cries out for a sustained and sophisticated U.S. diplomatic strategy.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
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Nuke Deal Good – Indian Econ – Solves War (2/2)
The government will try to distract the people during an economic decline by toying with
nationalism-This makes conflict with Pakistan more likely
Business Recorder`2k (Global News Wire, WHAT FORCES INDIA, PAKISTAN TO BACK DOWN IN KASHMIR?,
December 27, 2000 Lexis)
Looking at the domestic politics of each side, presumably it's a lot harder for Pakistan to
calm things down on their side of the Kashmir conflict than it is for India. "Well, yes, in
the sense that it may be a lot harder for the government of General Musharraf to rein in the
Islamic militant groups who're doing much of the fighting in Kashmir. But in the end, it
may be equally difficult for India and Pakistan to step back from the brink in
Kashmir, because Kashmir is far more than a territorial dispute; it's intimately
linked to the national identity of both sides - with Pakistan's identity as an Islamic state
and India's identity as a secular state." Speaking of India's identity as a secular state, isn't
that challenged by Prime Minister Vajpayee's statements in support of a campaign to build
a Hindu shrine over the ruins of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, which was destroyed by a
mob of Hindu extremists in 1992? "Yes, but Vajpayee is playing a delicate political
game. And that's taking India into another dangerous phase, where the ruling
Bharatiya Janata party is revealing its hand, trying to exploit Hindu nationalist
sentiments around the Ayodhya issue. Some observers believe that he may be doing this
as something of a distraction for his supporters, trying to create political space for
himself to push through tough economic measures, which he desperately needs to do.
The government is basically bankrupt, and India is facing an economic slowdown.
We're heading back into a terrible mess, but in a democracy as politically fractured as
India's, it's hard to cut government spending. The alternative is privatisation - the
government owns everything from hotels to car factories, and all they've managed to
privatise in recent years was a bakery - but there's strong ideological resistance. That may
be tempting Vajpayee to distract people with the Ayodhya issue.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
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Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – Indian Econ – Key to World
India’s economy is up and critical to the world econ
Boot & Kirkpatrick 8 (Max & Jeane J., Senior Fellow for National Security Studies. Council on Foreign Relations, July/August.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16838/are_we_winning_the_war_on_terror.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F135%2Fterrorism)
On balance, we are doing pretty well. Near strategic defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq. Near
strategic defeat for al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for al Qaeda globally—
and here I’m going to use the word “ideologically”—as a lot of the Islamic world pushes
back on their form of Islam.Thus spoke CIA Director Michael Hayden in an interview with
the Washington Post published on May 30 under the headline, “U.S. Cites Big Gains
Against al Qaeda.”Hayden’s upbeat assessment is shared by a surprising number of
analysts who have written recently about al Qaeda’s decline and possible fall, including
Fareed Zakaria in Newsweek, David Ignatius in the Washington Post, Lawrence Wright in
the New Yorker, Peter Bergen and Paul Cruikshank in the New Republic, former CIA
analyst Marc Sageman in a new book, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st
Century, and Michael Sheehan, a former New York Police Department counterterrorism
chief, in Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism Without Terrorizing Ourselves.There is
much evidence to support their optimistic conclusions—certainly more evidence than there
was to support the previous conventional wisdom, propounded by many of these same
writers not so long ago, that the American-led invasion of Iraq was a great gift to al Qaeda
and that as a result we were losing the global war on terror. (Bergen, for instance,
published an article just last fall entitled, “War of Error: How Osama bin Laden Beat
George W. Bush.”)It turns out that, far from emerging victorious, al Qaeda in Iraq has been
driven out of its erstwhile strongholds in Anbar, Baghdad, and Diyala provinces. Its last
refuge is in the northern city of Mosul, and even there, thanks to a joint Iraqi-American
offensive, attacks were cut in half during the month of May. From Basra to Baghdad, Shiite
terrorists loosely affiliated with Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army are also in retreat, thanks
primarily to the operations of the Iraqi security forces under the direction of Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, al Qaeda has not managed to
mount any major attacks on an American target, much less on the American homeland,
since 9/11. Those attacks that have succeeded have been fairly minor compared with past
al-Qaeda atrocities: a 2004 assault on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, killed
five local employees and no Americans.There is good reason to think that al Qaeda is still
reeling from the blows it suffered in the aftermath of 9/11. As Wright notes, “nearly 80
percent of al Qaeda’s members in Afghanistan were killed in the final months of 2001,”
and since then more have been killed or captured in countries ranging from Yemen and
Pakistan to Spain and Indonesia. In his Washington Post interview, Hayden mentioned that
since the beginning of this year alone, “al Qaeda’s global leadership has lost three senior
officers, including two who succumbed ‘to violence,’ an apparent reference to Predator
strikes that killed terrorist leaders Abu Laith al-Libi and Abu Sulayman al-Jazairi in
Pakistan.” In an effort to avoid a similar fate, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,
the top leaders, have gone into progressively deeper hiding, probably in the rugged tribal
areas of western Pakistan.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
229
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Indo-Pak Relations – Turn
The deal will sustain peace between India & Pakistan.
Indo-Asian News Service, 2006 (7/14, US-India Cooperation a Win-Win for Both,
http://www.icfdc.com/html/newsarchives/military/icfdc_Military_20050714_a.html)
Fourthly, a civil nuclear cooperation between the US and India will facilitate them to
become major allies so as to promote democracy in the region and beyond. Fifthly, if the
US abandons its hidden agenda to scuttle India's gas pipeline project with Iran through
Pakistan and seriously forges nuclear cooperation, it would help sustain peace between
New Delhi and Islamabad.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
230
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Indo-Pak Relations – Down (1/2)
Ongoing violence from both side have brought relations to all time low
Relations are under stress as Pakistan has broken several cease fires
Sengupta 8 (Somini, “Indian Official Sees Sinking Relations With Pakistan,” NYT, Aug 2.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/02/world/asia/02india.html?hp)
The Indian Foreign Secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, said his country’s relationship with
Pakistan had sunk to a new low since 2003, when the two nuclear rivals stepped back from
the brink of war and began peace talks. His unusually blunt public comments come on the
heels of several cease-fire violations on the disputed border of Kashmir and a deadly
bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which India and the United States have blamed
Pakistan’s leading military intelligence agency , the Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI. “If
you ask me to describe the state of the dialogue, it is in a place where it hasn’t been in the
last four years,” Mr. Menon told journalists at the annual summit meeting of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka. “We
face a situation where things have happened in the recent past which were unfortunate and
which, quite frankly, have affected the future of the dialogue.” Pakistan has denied that it
had any hand in the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul last month, which killed 58
people, including four Indians. India accuses Pakistan of three breaches of the 2003 cease-
fire on the so-called Line of Control in Kashmir. After the Kabul blast, Mr. Menon had
described the relationship as “under stress.”
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
231
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Good – A2: Indo-Pak Relations – Down (2/2)
Afghanistan involvement by both countries strain relations but there is hope of
normalization of relations
The India deal reverses global non-proliferation efforts and crumbles the foundation of the NPT
International Herald Tribune 7-25 (Asahi Shimbum, “India-US Nuclear Deal,” 2008)
But this agreement will also bestow the United States' unofficial blessing on India 's
possession of nuclear weapons. India has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), nor the treaty banning nuclear tests. There is no way India should be
treated in the same way as NPT members, which have sincerely met all obligations to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons The NPT members have all agreed that
technological support for the peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be supplied to
nonmembers. Up to now, the United States has also stood by this principle Now the
United States is treating India differently. Explaining the U.S. government's reasons, the
Bush administration said that, for one, India is a democracy. Secondly, India is very
unlikely to sell nuclear technology to other countries. While it is true that India is
strategically important, we should not let any incidents occur that will allow any
crack in the NPT system. The NPT foundations are shaky enough as it is. If India
becomes an exception, Pakistan is sure to demand similar treatment. North Korea
pushed ahead with nuclear testing after claiming it had withdrawn from the NPT.
Iran is pursuing a uranium enrichment program despite U.N. sanctions. The U.S.
move to finalize its nuclear cooperation pact with India puts a damper on
international efforts to stop such actions
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
234
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
India Deal Bad – Proliferation (2/2)
Nuke deal frees India’s domestic uranium reactors that make bombs – thus increasing
India’s nuclear arsenal
Motz and Milhollin 6 (Kelly & Gary, research assistant and Director. Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, June 13.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/Seventeen_Myths.htm)
Fact: Such exports will help India make bombs. India now needs more uranium than it can
produce. This means that India must choose between using its own uranium to make
nuclear power or nuclear weapons. Allowing India to fuel its power reactors with imported
uranium will free India’s domestic production for reactors that make bombs, thus
increasing India’s nuclear arsenal. In addition, without being able to inspect all of India's
reactors, it will be impossible to tell whether a U.S. export supposedly intended for
peaceful purposes has been diverted to bomb making. Nuclear exports are inherently
capable of military as well as civilian applications.
Post India Deal India maintains their stance on issues key to stop proliferation
Motz and Milhollin 6 (Kelly & Gary, research assistant and Director. Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, June 13.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/Seventeen_Myths.htm)
Fact: The deal leaves India far outside the international effort to combat nuclear arms
proliferation. India continues to oppose the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
has pointedly refused to sign it. It has just as pointedly refused to limit its production of
nuclear weapons, or to obligate itself not to test such weapons. It has also refused to stop
making fissile material for such weapons. Nor has India joined Europe and the United
States in condemning Iran’s enrichment of uranium. The deal does not change India's
negative stance on any of these questions; instead, it legitimizes it.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
235
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – Prolif – A2: IAEA Inspections Solve Prolif
The IAEA can’t inspect EIGHT reactors – this is where India will make their bombs
Motz and Milhollin 6 (Kelly & Gary, research assistant and Director. Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, June 13.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/Seventeen_Myths.htm)
Fact: Inspecting these reactors will not limit India’s nuclear weapon production in any
way. The other eight reactors, which will be barred from inspection, will make more
plutonium for weapons than India will ever need. Thus, the offer to inspect the fourteen is
merely symbolic. Among the eight reactors off limits to inspectors will be India’s fast
breeder reactors, which will generate plutonium particularly suited to bomb-making. In
addition, the inspections themselves will waste resources. The International Atomic Energy
Agency has a limited number of inspectors and is already having trouble meeting its
responsibilities. To send inspectors to India on a fool’s errand will mean that they won’t be
going to places like Iran, where something may really be amiss. Unless the Agency’s
budget is increased to meet the new burden in India, the inspections there will produce a
net loss for the world’s non-proliferation effort.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
236
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – Prolif – A2: Safeguards
Safeguards don’t solve – Separating military and civilian facilities will not limit indian
military nuclear development
McGoldrick and Bengelsdorf 5 (Fred and Harold both were career officials who held senior positions in the U.S. Mission to the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Arms Control Association, October 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/OCT-Cover.asp.)
In any event, it is at least questionable whether this pledge to separate civil and military nuclear
facilities is a major concession on the Indians’ part because it is unlikely to limit Indian
production of fissile materials for military purposes. The decision about which facilities to
declare civilian rests with India.
MCGoldrick and Bengelsdorf 5 (Fred and Harold both were career officials who held senior positions in the U.S. Mission to
the International Atomic Energy Agency. Arms Control Association, October 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/OCT-Cover.asp.)
In addition, if India sought the route of a voluntary safeguards agreement, it is not clear whether
the IAEA would actually inspect all the civil nuclear facilities on the Indian eligible list or
whether the IAEA would carry out inspections only if it has the funds available to do so, as is the
case with the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states. Thus, a voluntary safeguards agreement
would be largely symbolic and is unlikely to yield meaningful nonproliferation benefits, such as
halting the production of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
237
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad—Proliferation = Extinction
Proliferation causes nuclear war and extinction
Taylor 1 (Former Nuclear Weapons Designer and Chariman of NOVA, “Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons,”)
Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of
irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world.
Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might
decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear
war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this
type can be constructed. “… a nation in an advanced stage of ‘latent proliferation,’
finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable
nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them.” Limited nuclear wars between
countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear
wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of “latent
proliferation,” finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition
to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen
in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake,
the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008
238
Russell’s Lab Politics-India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad—Proliferation Causes War
Proliferation causes nuclear war
Quester and Utgoff 94 (George and Victor, “No-First-Use and Nonproliferation: Redefining
Extended Deterrence,” Washington Quarterly, Spring, 1994)
The Negative Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation If Americans ask themselves the elementary question of
why they should be opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, an obvious first answer might
now be that such a spread of weapons of mass destruction could lead to U.S. cities being destroyed
and/or U.S. military units or other U.S. assets abroad suffering nuclear attacks. Further,
Americans also care about nuclear proliferation because foreign cities may get destroyed in future
outbreaks of war. Following such proliferation, nuclear attacks on U.S. targets could take place more
"rationally" in the wake of normal military and political conflicts. Crises sometimes lead to "a war nobody
wanted," or to escalations that neither side can control. The risks that such deterrence failures
would involve nuclear use are increased as more countries get nuclear weapons. Such
nuclear attacks on U.S. targets could also take place less "rationally" -- if someone like Idi
Amin or Mu'ammar Qadhafi were to take charge of a country that possesses nuclear weapons. The kinds of
political forces that bombed the World Trade Center in New York, or attacked the entrance to Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters in Virginia, might then use nuclear weapons. Second,
nuclear weapons have always been important, not just for the devastation they inflict, but also
for the political intimidation imposed by the possibility of nuclear devastation. The
spread of nuclear weapons to any sizable number of countries will tend to give each a way of intimidating the
rest of the world, and thus of vetoing the outside world's objections to any of its more obnoxious activities:
"ethnic cleansing," brutal dictatorships, warlord-caused famines, or
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 239
Russell’s Lab Politics – India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad—Nuclear Accidents Bad
This is the biggest impact in the debate—reactor meltdown is equivalent to the detonation a
thousand nuclear weapons
Calidicott 95 (Helen, PHD anti-nuclear advocate who has founded several associations
dedicated to opposing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons proliferation,”
http://www.robertschoch.net/Nuclear%20Energy%20Radiation%20Toxicology%20Human%2
0Chromosomes%20Helen%20Caldicott%20Circular%20Times.htm)
Each 1000-megawatt nuclear reactor contains as much long lived radioactive material
("fall out") as would be produced by one thousand Hiroshima - sized bombs. A
"meltdown" (in which fissioning nuclear fuel overheats and melts, penetrating the steel
and concrete structures that encase it) could release a reactor's radioactive contents into
the atmosphere killing hundreds of thousands of people, depending upon the wind
direction and population density, and contaminating thousands of square miles
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 240
Russell’s Lab Politics – India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – Indo-Pakistan War
India deal causes a new arms race
Nuclear deal increases risk of indo-pak conflict and nuclear chain reaction
India deal causes US-Sino war, India-Pakistan conflict, and nuclear prolif
Topol 5 (Allan, author of bestseller Spy Dance; 2005. The India Gamble; http://www.allantopol.com/essay87.htm. Accessed on July 30,
2008//grice)
This is a new formulation of Europe’s balance of power in the nineteenth century. It may
on balance be the right course of action for the United States, but we should recognize that
President has taken a bold gamble fraught with three potential dangers. The first is that the
United States’ position discouraging nuclear proliferation has been weakened. The spread
of these weapons may be inevitable, but we are hastening it. Other countries will no doubt
expedite their own nuclear development. Second, we may be creating anxieties in Beijing
which will increase the risk of war with China—precisely the result we are hoping to
avoid. It was no coincidence that only four days before the deal with India was announced
a Chinese general threatened the use of nuclear weapons if the U.S. intervenes in any
conflict over Taiwan. Major General Zhu Chenghu was speaking for the Chinese
government when he raised the specter of a Chinese response with nuclear weapons
against the United States. It’s unlikely that the timing was coincidental. Washington leaks
like a sieve. China no doubt had advance warning of the deal Bush was proposing to
Singh. Zhu’s words were a clumsy but dangerous effort to make Bush consider the deal.
The Chinese were wasting their time. This is politics Texas style. We have a president in
Washington who isn’t intimidated by threats. If they had any impact at all, Zhu’s words led
to strengthening of the deal for India. Third, the deal is causing widespread consternation
in Pakistan, which happens to be our most important ally in the Islamic world in the war
against terror. Pakistan also happens to be a bitter foe of India. We made a serious error in
Iraq by not appreciating the danger of animosity between Sunnis and Shiites. Let’s not
make a similar mistake by failing to recognize the deep seated hatred between India and
Pakistan. Again, religious differences are at the core. Hindu India against Muslim Pakistan.
There is no doubt that the Pakistanis will believe those Indian nuclear weapons will be
used against them. Likely fallout from the deal is to send Pakistan rushing off to China to
develop a nuclear arsenal on parity with India’s. The possibility is real that there will one
day be a nuclear collision between India and China with adverse affects throughout the
world.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 242
Russell’s Lab Politics – India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – Taiwan-China Conflict (1/2)
India nuclear deal provides Taiwan justification to weaponize
Strait Times; June 25, 2000 (No one gains in war over Taiwan; lexis) (PDNSS2410)
The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war
between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would
better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on
such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and horror of horrors raise the
possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it
considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking
China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea,
Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east
Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers
elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may
seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may
be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan,
each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a
full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway,
commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War,
the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US
from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and
political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen
Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea truce or a broadened
war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear
weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little
hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The
US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major
American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese
military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first
use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the
military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson
International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided
by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military
leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked
dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that
come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in
such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem
inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything
else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War
was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when
everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese
troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and
North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the
Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not
do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 244
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Nuke Deal Bad – Taiwan-China Conflict – Link Ext.
India deal leads to the nuclearization of Taiwan
Malik 6 (Mohan, Professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. China Brief, Volume 6, Issue 7
(March 29, 2006). http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3670&article_id=2370926)
As in the past, China’s attitude toward the nonproliferation regime will determine its
future. The Chinese might step up nuclear proliferation in India’s neighborhood (Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and perhaps Bangladesh and Burma) to countervail the U.S.-India ties.
Washington may as well forget about securing Beijing’s help to sanction Teheran if India is
to be cut loose with the proposed nuclear deal. Yet before the U.S.-India deal tempts the
hawkish PLA generals to undermine the nonproliferation regime, they should ponder
whether its collapse is in China’s security interests as it might end in the nuclearization of
Japan, Taiwan and even Vietnam.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 245
Russell’s Lab Politics – India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – China – A2: Deal = Containment
India deal does not cause India to counterbalance china
High relations are short lived until Bush sells weapons to Taiwan after the Olympics
Polyglot 8 (loves reading, writing and learning languages. Hates megalomaniacs. “Why India Must Reject the Nuclear Deal” July 26.
http://sufyanism.blogspot.com/2008/07/why-india-must-reject-nuclear-deal.html)
The nuclear deal assumes that nuclear energy is an economic and safe way for producing
electricity for India. Nuclear energy has failed in India and offers no solution for the future.
After 60 years of public funding, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) produces less than
3% of India’s electricity. For comparison, in less than a decade and without state support,
wind energy now accounts for about 5% of India’s electricity capacity.To escape its
failures, the DAE plans to import large nuclear power plants and fuel. The US, France,
Russia and Japan hope to profit from this. This pursuit of nuclear energy comes despite
that fact that the cost of producing nuclear electricity in India is higher than non-nuclear
alternatives and each reactor adds to the risk of a serious nuclear accident and worsens the
problem of radioactive nuclear waste. The DAE’s budget is ten times more than the budget
for development of renewable energy technologies. India must reverse its priorities and
invest more in wind, solar, biomass and micro hydel energy resources.It is misleading to
believe that nuclear energy is a solution to global warming. Firstly, nuclear energy cannot
replace carbon emitting technologies realistically to any significant extent. Secondly, it will
merely trade radioactive externalities for carbon emissions, which have implications not
just for our health but for generations to come for a long-long time.The real energy
challenge facing India is to meet the needs of the majority of Indians who still live in its
villages. India needs an energy policy that works with the rural poor to develop and
provide the small-scale, local, sustainable and affordable energy systems that they need.
Renewable energy resources are better suited to fulfill this need.The India-US nuclear deal
is anti-environment and anti-people.For all these reasons, the Government of India must
withdraw from the India-US nuclear deal and reject strategic partnership with the United
States.
The deal is not a drastic enough change to curb India’s carbon emissions
Ramana 6 (M. V., Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University. May 10.
http://www.npec-web.org/Presentations/20060512-Ramana-Transcript-Q-and-A-2.pdf.)
An attendee asked Ramana about the extent to which increase use of nuclear energy in
India could positively impact the environment. S/he suggested that even if India increases
the use of nuclear energy, India’s reduction of greenhouse gases would be negligible.
Ramana answered that, for Indian nuclear energy to make a dent in global warming, it
would require the use of nuclear energy to increase by several orders of magnitude. When
someone talks up the ways in which nuclear energy can decrease greenhouses gases, you
must ask: What are they assuming? In addition, Ramana noted how Japan, after it
substantially increased its use of nuclear energy, actually experienced a concomitant
increase in carbon emissions.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 248
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Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Warming – India Not Key (1/2)
Even if India is critical, China is 3 times more of a problem for warming
Barbaros 7 (Raif, founder & president of Carsala, a venture funded startup that will
revolutionize how people buy cars. UC Berkley Energy Symposium, May 27.
http://www.raif.com/?p=31)
* China & India will have to be key components of the solution as they are (and will be) a
significant part of the problem. * China adds 50-100 gigawatts of plant capacity every year.
* Beijing alone adds 600 cars/day. And almost none are scrapped. Whereas in the US, for
every 10 cars that go on the road, 9 are scrapped and taken off the road. * Although India is
critical, China has to have the main focus. China is 3X less energy efficient as India.
Parikh and Parikh 2 (Jyoti K. & Kirit Senior Professor and Professor Emeritus respectively.
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, 2002.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/16/1934784.pdf)
India and other developing countries feel strongly that they are not responsible for the
threat of climate change that has been created. Unsustainable consumption patterns of the
rich industrialised nations in the world are responsible for it. Yet, India and other
developing country economies may be highly vulnerable to climate change. India’s food
production would be adversely affected. Sea level rise would displace a large number of
people. The developing countries are particularly vulnerable to the likely increase in the
incidence of extreme events. The impacts of climate change could hinder development and
delay progress in eradicating poverty, potentially aggravating social and environmental
conditions in these countries. An analysis of India’s emissions show that its per capita
emission of carbon is one fourth of the global average. Even the top 10% of urban
population emits well below the global average per capita emission. India, and other
similar types of developing countries, are making significant progress in limiting GHG
emissions through normal policy developments such as those aiming to improve energy
and economic efficiency of the energy and industrial production capacity, as well as energy
development, both conventional and renewable, which target improved environmental
quality and limit human health hazards from air pollution. India’s energy intensity in
industry and transport sector has come down. It has installed 2300 MW of generating
capacity based on various renewables. Deforestation is arrested and the vast potential of
afforestation on wasteland is increasingly utilised. India and many developing countries
have carried out price reforms and removed subsidies. These have resulted in substantial
energy savings and reduction in emissions through greater use efficiency and fuel
substitution.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 249
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Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Warming – India Not Key (2/2)
India contributes only a small fraction of carbon emissions compared to the developed
world
Even with rapid increase of emissions, India will remain below the industrializes countries
Bose & Sterling 1 (Ranjan, Ph.D. Senior Fellow, Centre for Urban Systems and Infrastructure &
Daniel, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Davis. May 1.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/itsdavis/UCD-ITS-REP-01-13/)
Greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries are increasing most rapidly in the
transportation sector. Even people with low incomes are meeting their need for mobility,
and projected income growth over the next two decades suggests that many more will
acquire personal modes of transportation. How this will affect the earth's climate is a great
concern.In Delhi, India, transportation sector greenhouse gas emissions are expected to
soar. There are policy and technology choices that could significantly lower the emissions
growth rate while increasing mobility, improving air quality, reducing traffic congestion,
and lowering transport and energy costs. To realize these benefits, vision, leadership, and
political will must be brought to bear. Delhi has high vehicle ownership rates for the city's
income level, increasing congestion, poor air quality, poor safety conditions, and
insufficient coordination among the responsible government institutions. Travelers in Delhi
desire transportation services, reflected by the increasing numbers of inexpensive but
highly polluting scooters and motorcycles.This report creates two scenarios of greenhouse
gas emissions from Delhi's transportation sector in 2020. It finds:•Greenhouse gas
emissions quadruple in the high-GHG, or business-as-usual, scenario; but only double in
the low scenario.•Transportation policies are readily available that will not only slow
emissions growth, but also significantly improve local environmental, economic, and
social conditions.•Improved technology would maximize the efficiency of automobiles,
buses, and other modes of transportation and could play a key role in reducing emission
increases.•Keeping many travel mode options available – including minicars and new
efficient scooters and motorcycles – will help individuals at various income levels meet
their mobility needs.•The time to act is now. The issues facing Delhi represent
opportunities for improvement, but the longer authorities wait to address transportation
inefficiencies, the more difficult and expensive it will be to produce a positive outcome.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 251
Russell’s Lab Politics – India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Warming – Turn: Nuke Power = Warming (1/2)
Nuclear tech is not enough of an economically viable option for the key developing nations
contributing to mass emissions. Also, nuclear technology does not reduce carbon emissions
– Japan proves
Ramana 5 (M. V., “Nuclear Power in India: Failed Past, Dubious Future,”
The second is that the adoption of nuclear power makes sense as a strategy to lower
aggregate carbon emissions. A good example is Japan, a strongly pro-nuclear energy
country. As Japanese nuclear chemist and winner of the 1997 Right Livelihood Award,
Jinzaburo Takagi showed, from 1965 to 1995 Japan’s nuclear plant capacity went from zero
to over 40,000 MW. During the same period, carbon dioxide emissions went up from about
400 million tonnes to about 1200 million tonnes. In other words, increased use of nuclear
power did not really reduce Japan’s emission levels. The massive expansion of nuclear
energy, then, was not motivated by a desire to reduce emissions. If indeed Japan was
sincere about doing that, it would have adopted very different strategies. There are two
reasons why increased use of nuclear power does not necessarily lower carbon emissions.
First, nuclear energy is best suited only to produce baseload electricity, which only
constitutes a fraction of all sources of carbon emissions. Other sectors of the economy
where carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are emitted, such as transportation,
cannot be operated using electricity from nuclear reactors. This situation is unlikely to
change anytime soon. A second and more fundamental reason is provided by John Byrnes of
the University of Delaware’s Centre for Energy and Environmental Policy, who observes that
nuclear technology is an expensive source of energy and can be economically viable only in
a society that relies on increasing levels of energy use. Nuclear power tends to require and
promote a supply oriented energy policy, and an energy intensive pattern of development,
and thus, in fact, indirectly adds to the problem of global warming.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 252
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Nuclear power causes global warming and radioactive waste at development and storage
stages, net environmental impact negative
Caldicott 4 (Helen, president, Nuclear Policy Research Institute, Baltimore Sun, April
20.http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=680)
The enrichment of uranium fuel for nuclear power uses 93 percent of the refrigerant
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) gas made annually in the United States. The global production of CFC
is banned under the Montreal Protocol because it is a potent destroyer of ozone in the
stratosphere, which protects us from the carcinogenic effects of solar ultraviolet light. The ozone
layer is now so thin that the population in Australia is currently experiencing one of the highest
incidences of skin cancer in the world. CFC compounds are also potent global warming agents
10,000 to 20,000 times more efficient heat trappers than carbon dioxide, which itself is
responsible for 50 percent of the global warming phenomenon. But nuclear power also
contributes significantly to global carbon dioxide production. Huge quantities of fossil fuel are
expended for the "front end" of the nuclear fuel cycle to mine, mill and enrich the uranium fuel
and to construct the massive nuclear reactor buildings and their cooling towers. Uranium
enrichment is a particularly energy intensive process which uses electricity generated from huge
coal-fired plants. Estimates of carbon dioxide production related to nuclear power are available
from DOE for the "front end" of the nuclear fuel cycle, but prospective estimates for the "back
end" of the cycle have yet to be calculated. Tens of thousands of tons of intensely hot radioactive
fuel rods must continuously be cooled for decades in large pools of circulating water and these
rods must then be carefully transported by road and rail and isolated from the environment in
remote storage facilities in the United States. The radioactive reactor building must also be
decommissioned after 40 years of operation, taken apart by remote control and similarly
transported long distances and stored. Fully 95 percent of U.S. high level waste waste that is
intensely radioactive has been generated by nuclear power thus far. This nuclear waste must then
be guarded, protected and isolated from the environment for tens of thousands of years a physical
and scientific impossibility. Biologically dangerous radioactive elements such as strontium 90,
cesium 137 and plutonium will seep and leak into the water tables and become very concentrated
in food chains for the rest of time, inevitably increasing the incidence of childhood cancer,
genetic diseases and congenital malformations for this and future generations Conclusion:
Nuclear power is neither clean, green nor safe. It is the most biologically dangerous method to
boil water to generate steam for the production of electricity. Helen Caldicott, a pediatrican, is
president of the Nuclear Policy Research Institute and author of The New Nuclear Danger,
George Bush's Military Industrial Complex (The New Press). She lives near Sydney, Australia.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 253
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Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Terrorism
WoT failing
Kingsbury 8 (Alex, writes about national and homeland security for U.S. News & World Report.
International Herald Tribune, August 1.
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/iraq/2008/07/30/in-fighting-al-qaeda-bushs-global-war-
on-terrorism-is-off-target.html)
Since 2001, al Qaeda has conducted a greater number of attacks across a larger geographic
area than at any time in its history. "We find it hard to agree that al Qaeda has been
significantly weakened since Sept. 11, 2001," says Seth Jones, coauthor with Martin
Libicki of the report titled "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al
Qaeda."The authors evaluate al Qaeda since 2001 as being both "strong" and
"competent."What's needed, the report suggests, is a "fundamental rethinking of U.S.
strategy" to focus on minimizing overt military action and increasing intelligence
collection and partnerships with law enforcement agencies around the world.
Kingsbury 8 (Alex, writes about national and homeland security for U.S. News & World Report.
International Herald Tribune, August 1.
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/iraq/2008/07/30/in-fighting-al-qaeda-bushs-global-war-
on-terrorism-is-off-target.html)
"In most cases, military force is too blunt of an instrument and ineffective at ending
terrorist groups," says Jones, a well-known Rand expert on Afghanistan who is also an
adjunct political science professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign
Service.For one thing, they point out, a major American military role sets the stage for a
backlash. "The U.S. military can play a critical role in building indigenous capacity but
should generally resist being drawn into combat operations in Muslim countries, where its
presence is likely to increase terrorist recruitment," Jones and Libicki wrote.While the
report's analysis of the history of counterterrorism operations finds that all terror groups
eventually fizzle out, it was less optimistic on the prospects for a speedy endgame.
Religiously motivated groups like al Qaeda have been particularly tenacious, surviving
longer than most groups."The most salient fact about religious terrorist groups is how hard
they are to eliminate," the study says. They were, however, far less successful in achieving
their goals. "All terrorist groups end, but terrorism, like crime, never ends," Jones says.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 254
Russell’s Lab Politics – India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Terrorism – Pakistan Relations
Deal will sever US-Pakistani relations
Hussain 5 (Ljaz, former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. Daily Times, August 2.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_3-8-2005_pg3_2)
Pakistan has its own reasons for being upset with the agreement. First, in its view, the
agreement implicitly recognises India as a nuclear weapons state, the American
protestation to the contrary notwithstanding. This interpretation derives from the statement
in the agreement according to which India would “assume the same responsibilities and
acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology” which could only refer to nuclear weapons states. This development is quite
worrying for Pakistan because out of the three non-parties to the NPT (India, Israel and
Pakistan), it is now the only one denied some sort of recognition as a nuclear weapons
state.
Hussain 5 (Ljaz, former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. Daily Times, August 2.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_3-8-2005_pg3_2)
Will the effort bear fruit? Burns has categorically ruled out the possibility of a similar
concession to Pakistan. Given that this agreement and the 10-year US-India defence pact
signed earlier are meant to project India as a counterweight to China, it does not make
sense to expect that Pakistan will be treated at par with India. However, one needs to keep
in mind that at present Pakistan has, in the words of Condoleezza Rice, “a central position
in the US foreign policy”. For one thing, the US will need Pakistan’s support for quite
some time in the war against terrorism. This gives Pakistan an important card to wangle
concessions from the US in the nuclear field. The present situation may not be much
different from that which obtained following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan when
the US decided to ignore Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
The nuke deal undercuts Pakistan’s position in the region that critical to fight terrorism
Motz and Milhollin 6 (Kelly & Gary, research assistant and Director. Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, June 13.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/Seventeen_Myths.htm)
Fact: The deal undermines America’s ability to fight terrorism. By favoring India over
Pakistan, the deal undercuts the Pakistani government's position at home. At best, the deal
is a blow to General Musharraf’s prestige, and at worst a public humiliation. Without the
aid of General Musharraf, the United States will have a much harder time accomplishing
its goals in Afghanistan and succeeding in its efforts to defeat al Qaeda. There is no benefit
to U.S. security coming from India under the deal that will offset these disadvantages.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 255
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Nuke Deal Bad – Iranian Proliferation
Deal speeds Iranian prolif and loosens resistance worldwide to resisting nuclear materials
trade
Perkovich 5 [George, vice-president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace,
September, 7 2005, http://www.harolddoan.com/modules. php ?
name=News&file=article&sid=5682]
India's capacity and willingness to cooperate with the United States
inbalancingChinesepowerare too uncertain to form the foundation of a strategic
partnership. The United Statesshould base its partnership on the intrinsic value of
augmentingthe political-economic development of democratic India's one billion people.
U.S. accommodation of the Indian government's preoccupation with nuclear power
will not buy lasting Indian partnership.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 258
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Nuke Deal Bad – A2: US-India Relations – Resilient
U.S. India Relations are resilient.
Fernandes and Marks 2 [George and Simon, India’s Defense Minister and Special Correspndent, 2002, News
Hour with Jim Lehrer August 29th]
George Fernandes: Our relations with the United States is based on mutual trust and
transparency, and naturally, we should be together in fighting all common causes. There
may be areas where there differences. On… there could be differences nuances, there
could be differences in some basic issues, there could be disputes on trade-related matters.
There are bound t o be hiccups in relationships, but I don’t think the kind relation
that we have today between the United States and India is something that can be
derailed by anyone. Simon Marks: After decades of talking past one another, the
world’s most powerful democracy is now working closely with the world’s largest.
Economic and geopolitical changes have helped lure the United States and India
closer together. It’s a relationship with even more potential for growth as both sides learn
to trust one another.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 259
Russell’s Lab Politics – India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: US-India Relations – A2: Terrorism (1/2)
Increasing US-India relations because of have a zero-sum trade off with US-Pakistan
relations critical to fighting WOT
Landay 8 (Jonathan S., ational security and intelligence corresponden. McClatchy Newspapers,
August 1. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/100/story/46178.html)
Pakistani generals and other leaders are also infuriated by President Bush's pursuit of a
strategic relationship with India, their foe in three wars, as embodied by a U.S.-Indian
civilian nuclear cooperation pact that won United Nations approval Friday, the U.S.
officials and experts said. "One thing we never understood is that India has always been the
major threat for Pakistan," said former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain,
now the president of the Middle East Institute. Pakistan is alarmed by India's close ties to
Afghan President Hamid Karzai and its growing influence in Afghanistan, where a $750
million Indian aid program includes the construction of a strategic highway that will open
the landlocked country to Indian goods shipped through ports in Iran. Pakistan, which
refuses to allow Indian products through its port of Karachi, has long coveted Afghanistan
as a market, a trade route to central Asia and a rear area for its army in any new conflict
with India. "Pakistan over the last several years has increasingly come to believe that it is
being encircled by India and a U.S.-India-Afghan axis," said Seth Jones, an expert with the
RAND Corp., a policy institute. For these reasons, Pakistan's military leaders may have
decided to scale back their cooperation with the Bush administration's war against
terrorism and boost support for the Taliban and other militant groups.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 260
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Nuke Deal Bad – A2: US-India Relations – A2: Terrorism (2/2)
Even when relations are low, India and Pakistan pledge to work together against terrorism
Ondaatjie & Thomas 8 (Anusha and Cherian, Bloomberg News, Aug 2. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aby30JQv.2T0&refer=home)
India and Pakistan pledged to unite in the fight against , seeking to defuse tensions
between the nuclear-armed neighbors that overshadowed a regional summit on tackling
terrorism, poverty and food security.Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his
Pakistan counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani joined leaders from Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives saying terrorism remained the biggest threat to
progress in the region, hampering efforts to eradicate poverty and spur economic
growth.``We cannot afford to lose the battle against the ideology of hatred, fanaticism and
against all those who seek to destroy our societal fabric,'' Singh said in his speech at the
annual South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation's summit in Colombo. ``We
must fight jointly against this scourge.''Singh and Gilani met for the first time today as
fighting in the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir has flared and amid claims Pakistani
intelligence agents supported a deadly bombing of India's embassy in Kabul last month.
Leaders from the eight nations are scheduled to sign an accord tomorrow to classify
terrorism as a crime for the first time.``The relations between India and Pakistan are tense
so nobody was expecting a very positive outcome of the meeting,'' said Zafar Nawaz
Jaspal, assistant professor of international relations at Quaid-i-Azam University in
Islamabad. ``Both sides realize they cannot afford to derail the peace process and waste the
efforts of past so many years.''Widest MeasuresThe agreement will call on members to
give each other ``the widest possible measure'' of legal assistance in fighting terrorism in
South Asia, home to the most people affected by conflicts, according to the World Bank.
Bombings take a toll in the region with al-Qaeda active in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in
Sri Lanka where the Tamil Tigers have been fighting for an independent homeland for 25
years.``We have a joint responsibility to fight this menace, we need to fight this menace
individually and collectively,'' Gilani said in his speech. ``Pakistan condemns the attack on
the Indian embassy in Kabul though Pakistan has suffered terrorism the most.''
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 261
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Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Oil Prices
The deal would have little to no affect on global oil prices
Graham 6 (July, Thomas, Graham received a LL.B. from Harvard University in 1961 and
an A.B. from Princeton in 1955,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3533)
Sponsors of the deal argue that, with India’s energy needs expected to double in the next
two decades, nuclear energy will help replace the country’s voracious appetite for oil and
coal and feed the country’s growing electrical grid. But, even if the deal passes in the
U.S. Congress, nuclear power will only account for 12.5 percent of India’s electrical
production by 2030, an ambitious and unrealistic target that doubles India’s previous
estimates made before the announcement of the deal. And it’s not as though India’s
thirst for oil will be supplanted by nuclear energy. The Indian economy, like the
United States, uses oil mainly for transportation and manufacturing—sectors where
nuclear energy is not yet applicable. Hype that the agreement could help restrain oil
prices is just that—hype. U.S. President George W. Bush has declared that the deal
will “help the American consumer” by reducing Indian oil consumption and keeping
prices down, but a March Congressional Research Service report on the energy
implications of the deal concluded that “the reduction in India’s oil consumption . . .
would have little or no impact on world oil markets.”
Nuclear tech is not viable for India – too many development problems
Bidwai 7 (Praful-Member of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists against Proliferation (INESAP). Transnational Institute,
31 July http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?act_id=17161)
Finally, the nuclear deal will do little to promote India's energy security. To start with,
nuclear power is a dubious route to security because it is fraught with grave problems of
operational safety, proneness to accidents, routine radioactivity releases and exposure, and
above all, high-level wastes that remain radioactive for centuries. India's nuclear power
plans have always been marked by utopian and constantly missed targets. For instance,
India was projected to generate 43,500 megawatts of nuclear electricity by 2000. Today,
India produces less than 1/10th of that amount in nuclear reactors. However, even if India's
romantic plans fructify, the contribution of atomic energy to total electricity generation will
rise by 2030 to 6 percent, from the current level of 3 percent. That can hardly be a source
of energy security!
Ramana 6 (M. V., Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University. May 10.
http://www.npec-web.org/Presentations/20060512-Ramana-Transcript-Q-and-A-2.pdf.)
An attendee asked whether the US-India nuclear cooperation deal has anything to do with
oil—that is, to what extent can nuclear-generated electricity actually substitute and actually
displace oil usage in India. Ramana answered that the deal has little do with oil. It will be
hard to substitute India’s current level of oil consumption, which is driven by the transport
and certain industrial sectors, with nuclear electricity.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 262
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Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Nuke Industry
The US is unlikely to receive reactor orders from India
Motz and Milhollin 6 (Kelly & Gary, research assistant and Director. Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, June 13.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/Seventeen_Myths.htm)
Fact: It is unlikely that the United States will receive reactor orders from India. India is
building a string of domestic reactors that are cheaper to construct than American imports
would be, and there are easier places to buy imported reactors. Russia already has a
foothold in India's reactor market, and will charge less money and attach fewer conditions
than will U.S. sellers. France and Canada will also enter the competition. The chance that
the United States will defeat these competitors is slim. The precedent is the U.S.
experience with China in the 1980's. At the time when U.S. nuclear cooperation with China
was being debated, American vendors were citing the large number of reactors that China
would probably buy from the United States. After the deal was signed, China bought
exactly no American reactors. Instead, the U.S. agreement increased the competition and
drove down the price for the Chinese buyers. That was good for China, but did nothing for
the United States. The same is likely to happen with India.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 263
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Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Indian Econ
India’s economy isn’t even important in Asia
The neo-liberal economics effect of the India nuclear deal, which favors the interests of
American corporations, is an unjust exploitation of the impoversihed
Polyglot 8 (loves reading, writing and learning languages. Hates megalomaniacs. Information gathered from ASHA Foundation. “Why
India Must Reject the Nuclear Deal” July 26. http://sufyanism.blogspot.com/2008/07/why-india-must-reject-nuclear-deal.html)
The US –India nuclear deal was first announced as part of a larger package of agreements
that included a commitment to “deepen the bilateral economic relationship” between the
US and India, and create in India an enhanced “investment climate” so that “opportunities
for investment will increase.” The US sees India as an increasingly important source of
cheap labour and high profits for its corporations. Some grassroots movements are fighting
to prevent the corporate take over of ground water resources of Indian people by Pepsi-
Coca Cola and they’re prepared to oppose the entry of Wal-Mart into India.Privileging
business interests means pursuing neo-liberal economic policies which favour the interests
of Indian and US corporations. These policies include the creation of Special Economic
Zones and other such measures that come at the cost of the poor. These policies have been
followed for almost twenty years and have failed. In 2006, India was ranked at number 126
among 177 nations according to the United Nations Human Development Index. India
should follow policies that will promote a just and equitable social and economic
development aimed at meeting the needs of India’s poor and disadvantaged.The India-US
nuclear deal is anti-poor.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 264
Russell’s Lab Politics – India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: Indian Econ – Growth Bad
India’s economic growth increases the chances of conflict-Military spending and nationalism
Gulf News`3 (Gulf News, HUSAIN HAQQANI The writer is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Endow-ment for International
Peace in Washington D.C. He served as ambassador to Sri Lanka and as adviser to Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir
Bhutto., GLOOMY OUTLOOK FOR S. ASIA, March 29, 2003)
India's relative economic health could encourage anti-Pakistan hardliners in New
Delhi to try and "spend Pakistan into the ground" - a calculated policy of increasing
the cost of military competition to the point where Pakistan's economy collapses
completely. India is already turning increasingly towards Hindu nationalism, which is
further aggravating ties with Pakistan. Inadequately performing economies in South
Asia also create the risk of India and Pakistan externalising the resentments of their
people. Instead of allowing such frightening prospects manifest themselves as reality, both
need to start looking at ways to minimise the unsettling effects of the global economic
turndown on South Asia's precarious political and social balance.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 265
Russell’s Lab Politics – India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – A2: US-India Relations—Up
India-US relations are rise with hope of closer ties after Bush leaves office
Polyglot 8 (loves reading, writing and learning languages. Hates megalomaniacs. Information gathered from ASHA Foundation. “Why
India Must Reject the Nuclear Deal” July 26. http://sufyanism.blogspot.com/2008/07/why-india-must-reject-nuclear-deal.html)
In July 2005, President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
announced a deal to exempt India from US laws and international rules that for almost
three decades have sought to prevent states from using commercial imports of nuclear
technology and fuel to aid their nuclear weapons ambitions. These rules were created
because India secretly used nuclear materials and technology that it acquired for peaceful
purposes to make a nuclear weapon. The deal is of profound importance since it allows for
India to import nuclear fuel, reactors and other technologies, and will enable India to
expand both its nuclear weapons and nuclear energy programme.The US Congress took a
year and half to discuss and approve the new US policy and change existing US laws to
enable nuclear commerce with India. In India, the government simply told parliament that
it had made a deal with the United States. Subsequently, the US and India have negotiated
a ‘123 agreement,’ a treaty that will cover nuclear cooperation between the two countries.
But while this agreement will have to be approved by the US Congress, India’s parliament
will not be allowed a vote on it.People of India have been denied the right to debate the
nuclear deal and the larger changes in foreign policy and other issues that it involves, and
to express their opinion through their elected representatives. The nuclear agreement
should not be accepted under these circumstances.It is anti-democratic.
Arizona Debate Institute 2008 267
Russell’s Lab Politics – India Deal
Nuke Deal Bad – Regional Instability
An Indo-US nuke deal causes several scenarios of conflict including arms races in the
region – It is anti-peace
Polyglot 8 (loves reading, writing and learning languages. Hates megalomaniacs. Information gathered from ASHA Foundation. “Why
India Must Reject the Nuclear Deal” July 26. http://sufyanism.blogspot.com/2008/07/why-india-must-reject-nuclear-deal.html)
The United States sees the nuclear deal with India as part of a process of building a
strategic relationship between the two countries. The US seeks to use India as a client state
in its new confrontation with a rising China and to achieve other strategic goals, for
example putting pressure on Iran.We believe that India should not compromise its national
sovereignty or its long standing tradition of an independent non-aligned foreign policy. The
India-US strategic partnership and the nuclear deal in particular will escalate the nuclear
arms race between Pakistan and India, and upset the India-Pakistan peace process. It will
also create serious tensions between India and China, instead of helping improve relations.
The deal with the US also threatens India’s relations with Iran, which the US considers to
be a rogue state. The US in particular is opposed to an Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline that
could improve political and economic relations among these three countries and provide
relatively cheap and clean energy to India.The India-US nuclear deal is anti-peace.