UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM & ENERGY STUDIES

COLLAGE OF LEGAL STUDIES

Project On
RUDAL SHAH V/S STATE OF BIHAR AIR 1983 SC 1086

Submitted to:Radhe Shyam Assistant Prof. COLS Prof.

Submitted by:Aman Agrawal 500012437 Sec.:- A

AKNOWLEGEMNT
I owe my sincere thanks to my concerned subject teacher Mr. Radhe Shyam Sir who helped me in selecting the project topic, helped me in successful completion of this project and corrected it at every step. I would also like to thank my friends and respective teacher who help and motivated me during the project completion.

INDEX

1. CASE NOTE ...4

2. JUDGMENT ..4-11

3. INTRODUCTION 0F FALSE IMPRESONMENT ........12 4. WHO IS LIABLE FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT ..12-13 5. INGREDIENTS OF TORT OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT ..13-14 6. REMEDIES .14-16 7. CASE REFERRED .16-19 8. BIBLIOGRAPHY 20

Rudal Shah V. State of Punjab Case Note:

Constitution illegal detention Article 32 of Constitution of India petitioner detained for 15 years in spite of acquittal petition filed under Article 32 whether under Article 32 Supreme Court can pass Order of compensation for infringement of fundamental right of compensation palliative for unlawful act of instrumentalities of State to repair damage done by officers State to pay compensation as interim measure petitioner without prejudice to interim compensation awarded may bring suit for damages against State.

JUDGMENT
1. This Writ Petition discloses a sordid and disturbing state of affairs. Though the petitioner was acquitted by the Court of Sessions, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, on June 3, 1968 he was released from the jail on October 16, 1982, that is to say, more than 14 years after he was acquitted. By this Habeas Corpus petition, the petitioner asks for his release on the ground that his detention in the jail is unlawful. He also asked for certain ancillary reliefs like rehabilitation, reimbursements of expenses which he may incur for medical treatment and compensation for the illegal incarceration. 2. This petition came up before us on November 22, 1982 when we were informed by Shri Goburdhan, counsel for the State of Bihar, that the petitioner was already released from the jail. The relief sought by the petitioner for his release thus became infructuous but despite that, we directed that a Notice to show cause be issued to the State of Bihar regarding prayers 2, 3 and 4 of the petition. By prayer No. 2 the petitioner asks for medical treatment at Government expense, by prayer No. 3 he asks for an ex gratia payment for his rehabilitation,
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while by prayer No. 4 he asks for compensation for his illegal detention in the jail for over 14 years. 3. We expected a prompt response to the Show Cause Notice from the Bihar Government at least at this late stage, but they offered no explanation for over four months. The Writ Petition was listed before us on March 31, 1983 when Shri Goburdhan restated that the petitioner had been already released from the jail. We passed a specific order on that date to the effect that the release of the petitioner cannot be the end of the matter and we called upon the Government of Bihar to submit a written explanation supported by an affidavit as to why the petitioner was kept in the jail for over 14 years after his acquittal. On April 16, 1983, Shri Alakh Deo Singh, Jailor, Muzaffarpur Central Jail, filed an affidavit in pursuance of that order. Shorn of its formal recitals, the affidavit reads thus : a) That the petitioner was received on 25.3.67 from Hazaribagh Central Jail and was being produced regularly before the Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur and on 30.8.68 the learned Judge passed the following order The accused is acquitted but he should be detained in prison till further order of the State Government and I.G. (Prisons), Bihar. (A true copy of the same is attached as Annexure I). b) That accused Rudul Sah was of unsound mind at the time of passing the above order. This information was sent to the Law Department in letter No. 1838 dated 10.5.74 of the Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur through District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur. c) That the Civil Surgeon, Muzaffarpur, reported on 18.2.77 that accused Rudul Sah was normal and this information was communicated to the Law Department on 21.2.77.

d) That the petitioner, Rudul Shah was treated well in accordance with the rules in the Jail Manual, Bihar, during the period of his detention. e) That the petitioner was released on 16.10.82 in compliance with the letter No. 11637 dated 14.10.82 of the Law Department. 4. The Writ Petition came up before us on April 26, 1983 when we adjourned it to the first week of August 1983 since it was not clear either from the affidavit filed by the Jailor or from the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur, which is annexed to the affidavit as Annexure I, as to what was the basis on which it was stated in the affidavit that the petitioner was of unsound mind or the reason why the learned Additional Sessions Judge directed the detention of the petitioner in jail, until further orders of the State Government and the Inspector General of Prisons. 5. The writ petition has come up for hearing once again before us today. If past experience is any guide, no useful purpose is likely to be served by adjourning the petition in the hope that the State authorities will place before us satisfactory material to explain the continued detention of the petitioner in jail after his aquittal. We apprehend that the present state of affairs, in which we are left to guess whether the petitioner was not released from the prison for the benign reason that he was insane, is not likely to improve in the near future. 6. The Jailor's affidavit leaves much to be desired. It narrates with an air of candidness what is notorious, for example, that the petitioner was not released from the jail upon his acquittal and that he was reported to be insane. But it discloses no data on the basis of which he was adjudged insane, the specific measures taken to cure him of that affliction and, what is most important, whether it took 14 years to set right his mental imbalance. No medical opinion is produced in support of the diagnosis that he was insane nor indeed is any jail
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record produced to show what kind of medical treatment was prescribed for and administered to him and for how long. The letter (No. 1838) dated May 10, 1974 which, according to paragraph 3 of the affidavit, was sent to the 1aw Department by the Superintendent of the Central Jail, Muzaffarpur, is not produced before us. There is nothing to show that the petitioner was found insane on the very date of his acquittal. And, if he was insane on the date of acquittal, he could not have been tried at all for the simple reason that an insane person cannot enter upon his defence. Under the CrPC, insane persons have certain statutory rights in regard to the procedure governing their trial. According to paragraph 4 of the affidavit, the Civil Surgeon, Muzaffarpur, reported on February 18, 1977 that the petitioner was normal and that this information was communicated to the Law Department on February 21, 1977. Why was the petitioner not released for over 5 1/2 years thereafter? It was on October 14, 1982 that the Law Department of the Government of Bihar directed that the petitioner should be released. Why was the Law Department so insensitive to justice ? We are inclined to believe that the story of the petitioner's insanity is an afterthought and is exaggerated out of proportion. If indeed he was insane, at least a skeletal medical record could have been produced to show that he was being treated for insanity. In these circumstances, we are driven to the conclusion that, if at all the petitioner was found insane at any point of time, the insanity must have supervened as a consequence of his unlawful detention in jail. A sense of helplessness and frustration can create despondency and persistent despondency can lead to a kind of mental imbalance. 7. The concerned Department of the Government of Bihar, could have afforded to show a little more courtesy to this Court and to display a greater awareness of its responsibilities by asking one of its senior officers to file an affidavit in order to explain the callousness which pervades this case. Instead, the Jailor has been
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made a scapegoat to own up vicariously the dereliction of duty on the part of the higher officers who aught to have known better. This is not an isolated case of its kind and we feel concerned that there is darkness all around in the prison administration of the State of Bihar. The Bhagalpur blindings should have opened the eyes of the Prison Administration of the State. But that bizarre episode has taught no lesson and has failed to evoke any response in the Augean Stables. Perhaps, a Hercules heas to be found who will clean them by diverting two rivers through them, not the holy Ganga though. We hope (and pray) that the higher officials of the State will find time to devote their personal attention to the breakdown of Prison Administration in the State and rectify the grave injustice which is being perpetrated on helpless persons. The High Court of Patna should itself examine this matter and call for statistical data from the Home Department of the Government of Bihar on the question of unlawful detentions in the State Jails. A. tabular statement from each jail should be called for, disclosing how many convicts have been in jail for more than 10 years, 12 years, 14 years and for over 16 years. The High Court will then be in a position to release prisoners who are in unlawful detention in the jails and to ask the State Government to take steps for their rehabilitation by payment of adequate compensation wherever necessary. 8. That takes us to the question as to how the grave injustice which has been perpetrated upon the petitioner can be rectified, in so far as it lies within our power to do in the exercise of our writ jurisdiction under Article 32of the Constitution. That article confers power on the Supreme Court to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
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enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III is "guaranteed", that is to say, the right to move the Supreme Court under Article 32 for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution is itself a fundamental right. 9. It is true that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes of Courts, Civil and Criminal. A money claim has therefore to be agitated in and adjudicated upon in a suit instituted in a court of lowest grade competent to try it. But the important question for our consideration is whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32, this Court can pass an order for the payment of money if such an order is in the nature of compensation consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right. The instant cave is illustrative of such cases. The petitioner was detained illegally in the prison for over fourteen years after his acquittal in a full-dressed trial. He filed a Habeas Corpus petition in this Court for his release from illegal detention. He obtained that relief, our finding being that his detention in the prison after his acquittal was wholly unjustified. He contends that he is entitled to be compensated for his illegal detention and that we ought to pass appropriate order for the payment of compensation in this Habeas Corpus petition itself. 10.We cannot resist this argument. We see no effective answer to it save the stale and sterile objection that the petitioner may, if so advised, file a suit to recover damages from the State Government. Happily, the State's Counsel has not raised that objection. The petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial, in the sense that a civil court may or may not have upheld his claim. But we have no doubt that if the petitioner files a suit to recover damages for his illegal detention, a decree for damages would have to be passed in that suit, though it is not possible to predicate, in the absence of evidence, the precise amount which would be
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decreed in his favour. In these circumstances, the refusal of this Court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lip-service to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated. Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders to release from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violaters in the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some others too well-known to suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner's rights. It may have recourse against those officers. 11.Taking into consideration the great harm done to the petitioner by the Government of Bihar, we are of the opinion that, as an interim measure, the State must pay to the petitioner a further sum of Rs. 30,000 (Rupees thirtythousand) in addition to the sum of Rs. 5,000 (Rupees five thousand) already paid by it. The amount shall be paid within two weeks from today. The Government of Bihar agrees to make the payment though, we must clarify, our order is not based on their consent. 12.This order will not preclude the petitioner from bringing a suit to recover appropriate damages from the state and its erring officials. The order of
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compensation passed by us is, as we said above, in the nature of a palliative. We cannot leave the petitioner penniless until the end of his suit, the many appeals and the execution proceedings. A full-dressed debate on the nice points of fact and law which takes place leisurely in compensation suits will have to await the filing of such a suit by the poor Rudul Sah. The Leviathan will have liberty to raise those points in that suit. Until then, we hope, there will be no more Rudul Sahs in Bihar or elsewhere.

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INTRODUCTION 0F FALSE IMPRESONMENT This project has required consultation to an assorted range of books and websites that are a part of the secondary sources. Some research papers and journals too have been referred to. The various sites referred to include the official sites of Supreme Court of India and Manupatra for research on cases of Indian origin, while the other cases can be traced back to various books referred to thereby. Explanation:1. Introduction : This section briefly high lights the basics of what is false imprisonment and who can be held liable for the tort of false imprisonment. 2. False imprisonment as a Tort : This part has been included to explain the concept of false imprisonment as a tort with the help of various case laws, both Indian and Foreign. 3. Ingredients of false imprisonment : This section focuses on explaining the

elements of false imprisonment as a tort, i.e., of what constitutes the tort of false imprisonment. 4. Remedies : This division seeks to list out the available remedies for the tort of false imprisonment and of when and how they can be availed. 5. Conclusion : This component endeavours to summarise the project as a whole and to give the concluding remarks and opinion about Imprisonment and its Remedies WHO IS LIABLE FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT A person may be liable for false imprisonment not only when he directly arrests or detains the plaintiff, but also when he was active in promoting or causing the arrest or detention . Apart from this liability can be fastened vicariously, or through instrumentality of some officer. Also, if a person gets another arrested by police on a
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the topic, i.e., False

false complaint, he is liable for damages of false imprisonment . In cases where the plaintiff was arrested on a charge of theft on bona fide but wrong information given by a shop detective and here the police officers gave evidence that they had exercised their own judgement in arresting the plaintiff, the shop-owner would not be held liable. The plaintiff is arrested without a warrant and produced before a Magistrate who remands him in custody; his remedies for detention before and after the remand are different. For detention prior to the remand he can sue for trespass for false imprisonment whereas after it he can sue for malicious prosecution. When a wrong person is arrested and imprisoned under a decree to which he is not a party, the person setting the court in motion is not liable for false imprisonment. In case of false imprisonment the burden to prove justification lies on the defendant who made or caused the arrest.

INGREDIENTS OF TORT OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT To ask at the outset if a convicted prisoner enjoys in law residual liberty, as if the extent of any citizens right to liberty were a species of rights in rem or a matter of status, is to ask the wrong question. The action for false imprisonment is maintainable in personam. The various constituents of false imprisonment include: 1. PERIOD OF CONFINEMENT Whatever may be the period of confinement, the tort of false imprisonment arises. But time period is of essence while determining the amount of compensation to be awarded to the injured party. An otherwise lawful detention may become unlawful if the detention is prolonged for an unreasonable period of time. 2. THE INTENTION FACTOR There are very few torts that consider the intension (mens rea) of the defendant, and false imprisonment is one of these i.e., a person is not
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liable for false imprisonment unless his or her act is done for the purpose of imposing a confinement. To reveal the element of intent, the defendant must only intend to accomplish the act that causes the confinement, and need not contend that the confinement was unlawful; as the defendants actual motives are immaterial. Even negligent acts of confinement amount to false imprisonment. 3. KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLAINTIFF There is no requirement that the plaintiff alleging false imprisonment was aware of the restraint on his freedom at the time of his confinement, e.g., the Meering Case discussed earlier. If the person is confined in a room, with one of the entries known to the plaintiff closed, and the room has more than one entry exit door, but the plaintiff has no knowledge about the same, the defendant will still be held liable. Thus, the person confined does not have to be aware of the confinement or be harmed by it as it is actionable per se - Meering v GrahameWhite Aviation Co 4. PLACE OF CONFINEMENT To constitute the wrong, there may be no actual imprisonment in the ordinary sense- i.e. incarceration. Any confinement in the ordinary sense whether be it prison or any place used temporarily for the purpose of confinement constitutes false imprisonment. An unlawful arrest too amounts to false imprisonment.

REMEDIES 1. Action for Damages Damages in false imprisonment are those which flow from the detention. A person injured is entitled to compensatory damages. The damages for false arrest are to be measured only to the time of arraignment or indictment. There is no legal rule for the assessment of the damages and this is entirely left on the court to measure damages. Elements of the injury to the person which are included in the purview of recovery of damages include injury to the person and physical suffering, mental suffering
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and humiliation, loss of time earnings and interruption of businesses, reasonable and necessary expenses incurred, injury to the reputation and generally the deprivation of any right caused by the loss of liberty such as the plaintiffs loss of the family company during the period of arrest. 2. Nominal and Compensatory DamagesThe general rule in personal tort action is that the plaintiff is entitled to recover such a sum that shall be fair and just, in the absence of circumstances justifying an award for exemplary damages. The mere unlawful detention constitutes the basis for the recovery of at least nominal damages, but an award of only nominal damages may be insufficient and flawed where the facts proved indicate a right to greater damages.It has been held now that the person can now be imprisoned without knowing it. In such cases the plaintiff might obtain only nominal damages.Mental suffering including fright, shame and mortification from the indignity and disgrace, consequent upon an illegal detention, is usually considered an injury for which compensation may be made in an action for false arrest or false imprisonment. The fact that no physical injury was inflicted on one complaining of false imprisonment has been said to be no grounds for denying the recovery of reasonable compensation for mental suffering. 3. Punitive, Exemplary and Aggravated Damages If an imprisonment is affected recklessly, oppressively, insultingly and maliciously with a design to oppress and injure, the court may award exemplary or punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded in cases where the defendants conduct is recklessly indifferent to the rights of others or in intentional or wanton violation of those rights, and such damages are awarded to give a deterrent. In some circumstances exemplary damages may be provided as when there is abuse of power by the state. Aggravated damages may be awarded in a proper case as when the imprisonment in itself of a nominal character is offensive or hurt fell to the plaintiffs feelings. Courts have often held that malice will warrant an award for
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exemplary or punitive damages in an action for false imprisonment or false arrest. Punitive or exemplary damages will not be allowed where the false imprisonment was brought about in good faith, without malice in fact or in law and where there is no element of wantonness or oppression. 4. Writ of Habeas Corpus This writ is considered to be a golden remedy by the English Law. The Supreme Court of India and High Court of states issue this writ under article 32 and 226 respectively.Subject to the rules framed by the High Courts, an application for habeas corpus can be made by the person in confinement or by any person on his behalf. The writ of habeas corpus is effective means of immediate release from unlawful detention, whether in prison or private custody. Where an unlawful detention is continuing the plaintiff may seek this writ. This writ is also used in criminal cases of false imprisonment. 5. Self Help A person who is unlawfully detained may use self-help to escape including reasonable force so as to defend him from unlawful arrest. The force used must be proportionate in the circumstances. This is risky course since the power to arrest is likely to depend upon not only in the commission of offence but in the alternative, in a reasonable suspicion thereof. Hence an innocent person who forcibly resists may be liable for battery if the arrester had reasonable grounds for his suspicion.

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Case Referred In India the first case to be brought into light and decided upon by the Supreme Court with respect to false imprisonment was the A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. Union of India that highlighted the seminal significance regarding the interpretation of

fundamental rights and their interplay. The petitioner was detained under the Preventive Detention Act (Act IV of 1950) and he applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus and for his release from detention, on the ground that the said Act contravened the provisions of Arts. 13, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and was consequently ultra vires and that his detention was therefore illegal, and it was held that the Prevention Detention Act, 1950, with the exception of Sec. 14 thereof did not contravene any of the Articles of the Constitution and, the invalidity of Sec. 14 did not affect the validity of the Act as a whole, and the detention of the petitioner was not illegal. In the Hussainara Khatoon(I) v. State of Bihar case, it was held that speedy trial is an integral part of fundamental right of life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21of the constitution. Further it laid down norms for speedy disposal of cases, after analyzing the fact that a large number of men and women had been held behind bars awaiting trial, for longer than periods that they would have to serve if their offence was proved, thereby depriving them of their freedoms. In Mathew Areeparmtil and other v. State of Bihar and other the court ordered that the cases which involve tribal accused concerning imprisonment of more than 7 yrs. should be released on execution of a personal bond. In the case where trial has started accused should be released on bail on execution of a personal bond. In case where no proceedings at all have taken place in regard to the accused within three yrs., from he date of the lodging of FIR, the accused should be released forthwith under S.169 Cr. P.C. if there are cases in which neither charge-sheet have been submitted nor investigation has been
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completed during the last three years, the accused should be released forthwith subject to reinvestigation to the said cases on the fresh facts and they should not be arrested without the permission of the magistrate In D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengalthe petitioners raised important issues concerning the police powers and if monetary compensation should be awarded for established infringement of Fundamental Rights, as under Article 21 and 22 of our constitution. The court held that Custodial violence, including torture and death in the lock ups, strikes a blow at the Rule of Law, which demands that the powers of the executive should not only be derived from law but also that the same should be limited by law. To check the abuse of police power, transparency of action and accountability were the two safeguards laid down by the court. The D.K. Basus case contained 11 path-breaking directives where the court spelt out, in mandatory terms, the rights of an arrestee or a detainee and the manner in which the arresting or detaining authority is expected to behave, including the written record of arrest, informing of arrestees family of his arrest, medical examination on request, among the others. The case also high-lightened the power of arrest and whether monetary compensation should be awarded for established infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 21 & 22. The Court laid down requirements of power of arrest in para 36 of the judgment and declared monetary or pecuniary compensation is an appropriate and indeed an effective and sometime perhaps the only suitable remedy for redressal of the established infringement of the fundamental right to life of a citizen by the public servants and the State is victoriously liable for their acts. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, looked into the Article 32 of the constitution and determined the power and responsibility of the court to intervene and protect prisoners from the torture they are put through by the jail authorities (hands off doctrine). The
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case also drew attention

on the right against solitary confinement, along with the

principle that said required a Prison Manual to be made available to the prisoners, in addition to keeping of grievance boxes in prisons and remedial action on grievances by the Sessions judge. The Supreme Court also recognized the right of the prisoners to be visited by their friends and relatives, and favoured their visits but subject to search and discipline and other security criteria. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to life and liberty includes the right to live with human dignity and therefore a detainee would be entitled to have interviews with family members, friends and lawyers, and as under article 14 and 21, the regulations must be reasonable and non-arbitrary, without severe restrictions. The cased focused on death of a suspect in police custody, and use of third degree measures by police in investigation. In Sebasitian M. Hongray two persons were taken into custody by the Army authority in Manipur, but were not produced in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus and it was held that those persons must have met an unnatural death while in army custody. The Supreme Court directed the Union of India to pay exemplary damages for the action of the army authorities in murdering the two persons.

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Bibliography
1. Manupatra.com 2. http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi 3. http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/dct.htm

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