Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Labor I Digests
Labor I Digests
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That in all things, God may be glorified. 35. HINOGUIN V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 36. TANCINCO V. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM 37. ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. V. WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 38. ALANO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 39. LAZO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 40. LUZON STEVEDORING CORP. V. WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 41. VDA. DE INGUILLO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 42. MEEZ V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 43. CLEMENTE V. GSIS 44. DABATIAN V. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM 45. VILLONES V. ECC 46. RODRIGUEZ V. ECC 47. RARO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 48. MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. V. NLRC 49. YSMAEL MARITIME CORPORATION V. AVELINO 50. VICENTE V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 51. GSIS V. GSIS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 52. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION V. SANICO 53. PRINCIPE V. PHILIPPINE-SINGAPORE TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. ARTICLE 279 - SECURITY OF TENURE 54. RANCE V. NLRC 55. KIAMCO V. NLRC 56. MAGTULAC V. NLRC ARTICLE 280 KINDS OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR & CASUAL EMPLOYMENT 57. DE LEON V. NLRC 58. A.M. ORETA V. NLRC 59. ECAL V. NLRC 60. MAGANTE V. NLRC 61. BETA ELECTRIC CORPORATION V. NLRC 62. KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION V. DRILON 63. CAPULE V. NLRC PROJECT EMPLOYMENT 64. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION V. NLRC 65. CARTAGENAS V. ROMAGO ELECTRIC COMPANY 66. MARAQUIMOT AND ENERO V. NLRC SEASONAL EMPLOYMENT 67. MERCADO, SR. V. NLRC FIXED PERIOD EMPLOYMENT 68. BRENT SCHOOL V. ZAMORA 69. CIELO V. NLRC ARTICLE 282 - JUST CAUSES FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 70. A.M. ORETA AND COMPANY V. NLRC 71. BUISER V. HON. VICENTE LOEGARDO 72. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY SALES V. OPLE 73. INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION V. NLRC 54 56 57 59 60 61 62 64 65 66 67 69 70 71 72 73 75 77 78 79 80 81 83 84 85 87 89 90 92 93 95 96 97 98 99 101 102 104 105 106 108 109 111 113 114
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That in all things, God may be glorified. 74. MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION V. NLRC 75. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY V. NLRC 76. FILIPRO, INC. V. NLRC 77. GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICES V. NLRC 78. ABBOT LABORATORIES V. NLRC 79. HOMWOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION V. NLRC 80. DOSCH V. NLRC AND NORTHWEST AIRLINES 81. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORP. V. CA 82. CITIBANK V. GATCHALIAN 83. LABOR ET AL. V. NLRC 84. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION V. NLRC 85. EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION V. NLRC 86. ROBUSTA AGRO MARINE PRODUCTS V. GAROMBALEM 87. OFFSHORE INDUSTRIES V. NLRC 86. WENPHIL CORPORATION V. NLRC 89. MANEJA V. NLRC AND MANILA MIDTOWN HOTEL 90. PEPSI COLA BOTTLING CO. V. NLRC 91. DIZON V. NLRC 92. PEPSI COLA BOTTLING CO. V. NL|RC 93. BUSTAMANTE V. NLRC 94. BLTB BUS CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS 95. HELLENIC PHILIPPINE SHIPPING V. NLRC AND E. SIETE 96. VIERNES V. NLRC AND BENGUET ELECTRIC CORPORATION 97. GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION V. NLRC 98. ROQUERO V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES 99. MARANAW HOTEL V. NLRC 100. SUARIO V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND 101. SUNIO V. NLRC 102. UICHICO V. NLRC 103. ASIONICS PHILIPPINES, INC. V. NLRC ARTICLE 283 284: AUTHORIZED CAUSES FOR TERMINATION 104. WILTSHIRE FILE CO. V. NLRC 105. ESCAREAL V. NLRC 106. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION V. NLRC 107. SERRANO V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 108. AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION V. NLRC 109. ASIAN ALCOHOLIC CORPORATION V. NLRC 110. ASIAN ALCOHOLIC CORPORATION V. NLRC 111. LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION V. FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS 113. INDINO V. NLRC 114. CATATISTA V. NLRC 115. NORTH DAVAO MINING CORPORATION V. NLRC 116. REAH CORPORATION V. NLRC 115. SAN FELIPE NERI SCHOOL OF MANDALUYONG, INC. V. NLRC 118. FILIPINAS PORT SERVICES, INC. V. NLRC 119. CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SMC) V. DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR 115 116 117 118 119 120 122 124 125 127 129 130 131 132 133 135 137 139 141 143 146 147 149 151 153 155 156 158 160 162 164 165 166 168 170 171 173 175 177 179 180 182 183 184 185 186
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1. Flores v. Nuestro
FLORES V. NUESTRO 160 SCRA 568 YAP, J. FACTS 1. The petitioner, Herminio Flores and his wife, worked for respondent, Fortunato Nuestro in his funeral parlor since June 1976 as helper-utility man and as bookkeeper and cahier respectively. 2. On October 7, 1980, respondent registered the petitioner spouses with the SSS, as his employee. Thereafter, the spouses received an increase in their respective salaries. 3. On October 30, 1982, Herminio and Nuestro had an altercation, during which the latter physically assaulted the former. 4. Herminio then filed a complaint for physical injuries against Nuestro. 5. As a result of the incident, the Flores family had to leave their quarters at the funeral parlor and seek protection from the Pilar, Bataan Police. 6. Thereafter, petitioners filed illegal dismissal charges against respondent. On the part of the respondent, he denied the existence of employer-employee relationship, and further alleged that petitioners were the ones to voluntarily abandon their work ISSUE Was there an employee-employer relationship in this case? HELD YES. There was an employee-employer relationship. That the respondent registered the petitioners with the Social Security System is proof that they were indeed his employees. The coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employeremployee relationship.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment." None of the above criteria exists in the case at bar. Highly unusual and suspect is the absence of a written contract to specify the performance of a specified piece of work, the nature and extent of the work and the term and duration of the relationship. The records fail to show that a large commercial outfit, such as the San Miguel Corporation, entered into mere oral agreements of employment or labor contracting where the same would involve considerable expenses and dealings with a large number of workers over a long period of time. Despite respondent company's allegations not an iota of evidence was offered to prove the same or its particulars. Such failure makes respondent SMC's stand subject to serious doubts. Uncontroverted is the fact that for an average of seven (7) years, each of the petitioners had worked continuously and exclusively for the respondent company's shipping and warehousing department. Considering the length of time that the petitioners have worked with the respondent company, there is justification to conclude that they were engaged to perform activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the respondent, and the petitioners are, therefore regular employees.
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HELD YES. There is an employer-employee relationship between petitioners and private respondents. The work of private respondents is clearly related to and in the pursuit of the principal activity of the petitioners. The indicia used for determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, all extant in the case at bench, include: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee, (2) the payment of wages, (3)the power of dismissal, and (4)the employers power to control the employee with respect to the result of the work to be done and to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. The last requirement, so herein posed as an issue, refers to the existence of the right to control and not necessarily to the actual exercise of the right. The Court, however, finds the award of separation pay to be unwarranted.. The Labor Arbiter, sustained by the NLRC, concluded that there was neither dismissal nor abandonment. The fact of the matter is that petitioners have repeatedly indicated their willingness to accept the private respondents, but the latter have steadfastly refused the offer. For being without any clear legal basis, the award of separation pay must thus be set aside. There is nothing, however, that prevents petitioners from voluntarily giving private respondents some amounts on ex gratia basis.
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ISSUE Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between TWSI and Mrs. Sevilla.
HELD NO. There is no employer-employee relationship between TWSI and Mrs. Sevilla. There has been no uniform test to determine the existence of an employer-employee relation. In general, The Court has relied in the so-called control test, where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. The records will show that the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private respondent Tourist World Service, Inc., either as to the result to the means used in connection therewith. In the first place, under the contract of lease covering the Tourist Worlds Ermita office, she had bound herself in solidum as and for rental payments. A true employee cannot be made to part with his own money in pursuance of his employers business, or otherwise, assume any liability thereof. In that event, the parties must be bound by some other relation, but certainly not employment. In the second place, when the branch office was opened, the same was run by Mrs. Sevilla payable to TWSI. Thus it cannot be said that she was under the control of TWSI as to the means used. She obviously relied on her own capabilities. It is further admitted that Mrs. Sevilla was not in the companys payroll. For her efforts, she retained 4% in commissions from airline bookings, the remaining 3% going to TWSI. Unlike
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That in all things, God may be glorified. an employee then, who earns a fixed salary usually, Mrs. Sevilla earned compensation in fluctuating amounts depending on her booking successes. The fact that Sevilla had been designated branch manager does not make her, ergo, TWSIs employee. Employment is determined by the right of control test and certain economic parameters. Titles are weak indicators. However, there is no joint venture or partnership between TWSI and Mrs. Sevilla, either. The Court is of the opinion that the relationship of said parties is one that of a principal and an agent. But unlike simple grants of a power of attorney, the agency that the Court hereby declares to be compatible with the intent of the parties cannot be revoked at will. The reason is that it is an agency coupled with an interest. Thus, TWSI is held liable for damages for its unwarranted revocation of the contract of agency.
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Hours of Work
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9. Jardin v. NLRC
JARDIN V. NLRC 326 SCRA 299 QUISUMBING, J. FACTS 1. Petitioners were drivers of respondent Philjama International Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of "Goodman Taxi." Petitioners used to drive private respondent's taxicabs every other day on a 24-hour work schedule under the boundary system. 2. The petitioners earned an average of P400.00 daily from which respondent regularly deducts the amount of P30.00 supposedly for the washing of the taxi units. 3. Believing that the deduction is illegal, petitioners decided to form a labor union to protect their rights and interests. 4. Upon learning about the plan of petitioners, private respondent refused to let petitioners drive their taxicabs when they reported for work on August 6, 1991, and on succeeding days. 5. Petitioners suspected that they were singled out because they were the leaders and active members of the proposed union. Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a complaint against private respondent for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees. 6. The labor arbiter dismissed said complaint for lack of merit. 7. On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the judgment of the labor arbiter. The labor tribunal declared that petitioners are employees of private respondent, and, as such, their dismissal must be for just cause and after due process. 8. Private respondent's second motion for reconsideration was granted and said court ruled that it lacks jurisdiction over the case as petitioners and private respondent have no employer-employee relationship. Expectedly, petitioners sought reconsideration of the labor tribunal's latest decision which was denied. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE Whether or not employer-employee relationship exists between the petitioners and respondent Philjama International, Inc. HELD YES. In the determination the existence of employer-employee relationship, the Supreme Court has applied the following four-fold test: '(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power of control the employees conduct.' Under the control test, an employer-employee relationship exists if the 'employer' has reserved the right to control the 'employee' not only as to the result of the work done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. Otherwise, no such relationship exists. In a number of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that the relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. We explained that in the lease of chattels, the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over the latter. The management of the business is in the owner's hands. The owner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called "boundary" they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the above-stated doctrine to the relationships between bus owner/operator and bus conductor, auto-calesa owner/operator and driver, and recently between taxi owners/operators and taxi drivers. Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly
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That in all things, God may be glorified. employees of private respondent because as taxi drivers they perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. "act of disobedience" does not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal. In instant case, the POEA found that private respondent's actuation which led to his dismissal was the first and only act of disobedience during his service with the petitioner, Furthermore, examination of the circumstances surrounding private respondent's disobedience shows that the repatriated seaman's utterance of "makakasaksak ako" so instilled fear in private respondent that he was deterred from carrying out the order of the captain. Hence, his act could not be rightfully characterized as one motivated by a "wrongful and perverse attitude." Besides, said incident posed no serious or substantial danger to the well-being of his other co-employees or of the general public doing business with petitioner employer, neither did such behavior threaten substantial prejudice to the business of his employer. 2. NO. The Court reiterated that the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.
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12. Pan American World Airways System v. Pan American Employees Association
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS SYSTEM V. PAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 1 SCRA 527 REYES, JBL FACTS 1. Petitioner herein claims that the one hour meal period should not be considered as overtime work, because the evidence showed that complainants could rest completely, and were not in any manner under the control of the company during that period. 2. The court below found, on the contrary, that during the so-called meal period, the mechanics were required to stand by for emergency work; that if they happened not to be available when called, they were reprimanded by the lead man; that as in fact it happened on many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals or told to hurry up eating to perform work during this period. ISSUE Whether or not the 1 hour meal period of the mechanics is considered working time. HELD Yes. The Industrial Courts order for permanent adoption of a straight 8-hour shift including the meal period was but a consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest but was actually a work hour, since for its duration, the laborers had to be on ready call.
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Wages
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HELD YES. Anent the inclusion of allowances, the Court ruled in Santos v. NLRC that in the computation of back wages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of the basis salary of the petitioner but also her transportation and emergency living allowances. Anent the inclusion of commissions, Art 97(f) by itself is explicit that commission is included in the definition of the term wage. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation or construction; there is only room for application. The ambiguity between Art 97(f), which defines the term wage and Article 284 and the CBA, which mention the words pay and salary is more apparent than real. The word salary
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That in all things, God may be glorified. means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains and industry in another mans business. There is eminent authority for holding that the words wages (Middle English: wagen) and salary (Latin: salarium) are essentially synonymous. Both words are interchangeably used and refer to one and the same meaning: a reward or recompense for services performed. Likewise, pay is synonymous with wage and salary. Inasmuch as the three words have the same meaning and commission is included in the definition of wage the logical conclusion is, in the computation of the separation pay of the petitioners, their salary base should also include their earned sales commissions. Granting, for the sake of argument that the commissions were in the form of incentives or encouragement, so that the petitioners would be inspired to put little more industry on the jobs assigned to them, these commissions are still direct remunerations for services rendered which increased the income of Zuellig. Commission is the recompense, compensation, or reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustee, receiver, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit of the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that commissions are part of petitioners wage or salary. The Court takes judicial notice that some salesmen do not receive basic salary but depend on commissions and allowances alone, although an employer-employee relationship exists. If the opposite view is taken that commissions do not form part of salary or wage, the Court will be saying that such salesmen will not be entitled to separation pay, which is absurd. The workingmans welfare should be the primordial concern in interpreting the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. All doubts should be resolved in favor of labor.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. 2. Payment in full by petitioner of the COLA before the execution of the CBA in 1982 and in compliance with Wage Orders Nos. 1 (26 March 1981) to 5 (11 June 1984), should not be construed as constitutive of voluntary employer practice, which cannot now be unilaterally withdrawn by petitioner. To be considered as such, it should have been practiced over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate. Adequate proof is wanting in this respect. The test of long practice has been enunciated in Oceanic Pharmaceutical Employees Union vs. Inciong such that respondent company agreed to continue giving holiday pay knowing fully well that said employees are not covered by the law requiring payment of holiday pay." Absent clear administrative guidelines, petitioner cannot be faulted for erroneous application of the law. Payment may be said to have been made by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a "doubtful or difficult question of law." Since it is a past error that is being corrected, no vested right may be said to have arisen nor any diminution of benefit under Article 100 of the Labor Code may be said to have resulted by virtue of the correction.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. part of regular compensation. In order to determine whether such conditions operated in the instant case, the reopening of the trial for receiving evidence on the point was evidently proper.
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FACTS 1.
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On June 5, 1984, petitioner Manila Banking Corporation (Manilabank) was placed under comptrollership by then Central Bank in view of the bank's financial distress. 4 On May 22, 1987, the Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 505 prohibiting Manilabank from doing business in the Philippines. Feliciano Miranda, Jr. was designated as receiver. He immediately took charge of the bank's assets and liabilities. He likewise terminated the employment of about 343 officers and top managers of the bank. All these officers and top managers, who are private respondents herein, were paid whatever separation and/or retirement benefits were due them. Private respondents filed a complaint against Manilabank and its statutory receiver with. the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) claiming entitlement to the following additional benefits alleged to have accrued from 1984 to their effective dates of termination, viz: (a) Wage increases; (b) Christmas bonuses; (c) Mid-year bonuses; (d) Profit sharing; (e) Car and travel plans; (f) Gasoline allowances; (g) Differentials on accrued leaves, retirement and other bonuses; (h) Longevity pay and loyalty pay; (i) Medical, dental and optical benefits; and (j) Uniform allowances. Such claim to entitlement of the foregoing benefits was based on Manilabank's alleged practice, policy and tradition of awarding said benefits. They contended that the policy has ripened into vested property rights in their favor. On November 14, 1989, Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati rendered his decision ordering Manilabank and its statutory receiver to pay in full all the claims of private respondents amounting to P193,338,212. 33.
ISSUE Whether or not private respondents are entitled to receive bonus despite the financial distress of the company? HELD NO. By definition, a "bonus" is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver which the recipient has no right to demand as a matter of right. It is something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient. The granting of a bonus is basically a management prerogative which cannot be forced upon the employer who may not be obliged to assume the onerous burden of granting bonuses or other benefits aside from the employee's basic salaries or wages, especially so if it is incapable of doing so. Clearly then, a bonus is an amount given ex gratia to an employee by an employer on account of success in business or realization of profits. How then can an employer be made liable to pay additional benefits in the nature of bonuses to its employees when it has been operating on considerable net losses for a given period of time? Records bear out that petitioner Manilabank was already in dire financial straits in the mid-80's. As early as 1984, the Central Bank found that Manilabank had been suffering financial losses. Presumably the problems commenced even before their discovery in 1984. As earlier chronicled, the Central Bank placed petitioner bank under comptrollership in 1984 because of liquidity problems and excessive interbank borrowings. In 1987, it was placed under receivership and was ordered to close operation. In 1988, it was ordered liquidated. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner bank was operating on net losses from the years 1984, 1985 and 1986, thus, resulting to its eventual closure in 1987 and liquidation in 1988. Clearly, there was no success in business or realization of profits to speak of that would warrant the conferment of additional benefits sought by private respondents. No company should be compelled to act liberally and confer upon its employees additional benefits over
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That in all things, God may be glorified. and above those mandated by law when it is plagued by economic difficulties and financial losses. No act of enlightened generosity and self-interest can be exacted from near empty, if not empty, coffers. Consequently, on the ten (10) items awarded to herein private respondents which represent additional benefits, they having already been paid separation and retirement benefits.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. plant. Moreover, CSI had the power to assign its janitors to various clients and to pull out, as it had done in a number of occasions, any of its janitors working at Union Carbide. As to whether CSI is engaged in labor-only contracting or in job contracting, applying the test prescribed by the Labor Code and the implementing rules, the court finds sufficient basis from the records to conclude that CSI is engaged in job contracting. Without regard to the third issue, even if the janitors were, indeed, employees of Union Carbide or that CSI is a labor-only contractor, thus making Union Carbide a direct employer of these janitors, petitioner Rhone-Poulenc, as purchaser of Union Carbide's business is not compelled to absorb these janitors into its workforce. An innocent transferee of a business establishment has no liability to the employees of the transferor to continue employing them.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. bank is liable to Orpiada as if Orpiada had been directly, employed not only by (CESI) but also by the bank. It may well be that the bank may in turn proceed against (CESI) to obtain reimbursement of, or some contribution to, the amounts which the bank will have to pay to Orpiada; but this it is not necessary to determine here.
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Proximate Cause the efficient cause which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere pre-existing condition upon which the effective cause operates and must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an independent cause.
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The concept of work place referred in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. A soldier must go where his company is stationed. Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1 hours from the later by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao and the place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. The soldiers were on an overnight pass. They were not on vacation leave. In this connection, a soldier on active duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. A soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g. going on an approved vacation leave.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. 3. YES. An assault although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an accident within the meaning of the Workmens Compensation Act since the word accident is intended to indicate that the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. c) The signs of consolidation should appear soon (within few hours) and the symptoms to initial chilling and fever should at least be 24 hours after the injury. d) The patient must present one of the following findings a few days of the accident: i. Severe chill and fever ii. Headache and pain, agonizing in character in the side iii. Short, dry, painful cough with blood-tinged expectoration iv. Physical signs of consolidation with fine rales A review of the deceased work activities, as janitor will show that they included the regular use of deleterious substances such as muriatic acid, the fumes from which are inhaled when used in cleaning and clearing of toilet bowls and the unclogging off toilet pipes and plumbing connections. The deceased also performed other varied manual work such as sweeping, scrubbing and mopping school corridors, with the resultant inhalation of a` lot of dust, lifting heavy objects, painting classrooms, preparing seats for pupils during school programs, as well as going to and from his place of work thus exposing him to occasional wetting and chilling from downpours and rains. The combination of all these, coupled with the fact that the decedent was working in Tondo, a depressed area must have lowered his resistance to fight the microbes causative of pneumonia. The risk of contracting the said disease, therefore was increased by his working conditions, thereby satisfying an additional condition for compensability.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. effectivity of the New Labor Code. The governing law in the prosecution of the cause of action which accrued of said cause of action. Since the Workmens Compensation Act was then in full force and effect, then it should govern in the case at bar. It must be pointed out that as early as December 4 to 20, 1972, the deceased was already entitled to disability benefits under Sec. 14 of the Workmens Compensation Act because his illness prevented him from reporting to his work for more than 3 days and under such a situation, his employer was obligated under Sec. 37 to file a notice of illness with the Workmens Compensation Commission and to manifest its intention of whether or not to controvert his right to compensation. Failure to comply with said sections constitutes a renunciation of the employers right to controvert the claim resulting in the waiver of all its non-jurisdictional defenses, such as non-compensability of the claim.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. optional retirement on the basis of his ailment has been approved. Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and still entitled, under good behaviour, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his optional retirement application proves that he was no longer fit to continue his employment. Further, the petitioners physician categorically classified the petitioner under permanent total disability.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. position, to perform tasks and responsibilities of another position so that he may be justified in asking for the benefits and emoluments of the latter position. This reasoning in effect deprives management of its power to determine its specific manpower requirements in any given period of time. The third reason fails to appreciate the legal significance of the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to fix the terms and conditions of employment in compulsory arbitration. Sec. 10 of the Industrial Peace Act provides that if no other solution to the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of employment. The fixing by the Court of the terms and conditions of employment is intended as a solution to the labor dispute which was certified by the President for arbitration. The CIRs power must be exercised with circumspection inasmuch as it interferes with the management prerogative of controlling personnel movements. The only reason why the CIRs approval is necessary before any intended transfer, promotion, demotion or separation may be effected pending a dispute is to stop acts that mar the process of solving the labor problem at hand; to produce the salutary effect of preventing further deterioration of the already deteriorated relationship between the employer and employees. Otherwise, the CIR would not be justified in interfering with what, under normal circumstances, is purely a management prerogative.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. Code that could justify his dismissal. Furthermore, private respondents not only failed to give a valid and justifiable reason to terminate Kiamco, but they also ignored the due process requirement of the law. Due process in termination cases requires the employer to furnish the worker or employee sought to be dismissed with two (2) written notices, i.e., a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and a subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The records show that the second written notice informing petitioner of his actual dismissal was not complied with. When Kiamco returned to work he was bluntly informed by private respondents that he was already terminated due to the expiration of his employment contract. Indeed, the failure of private respondents to comply with the due process requirement further tainted Kiamco's dismissal with irregularity.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. and had it been shown that petitioner's activity was exclusively limited to painting that certain building, respondent company's theory of casual employment would have been worthy of consideration. However, during petitioner's period of employment, the records reveal that the tasks assigned to him included not only painting of company buildings, equipment and tools but also cleaning and oiling machines, even operating a drilling machine, and other odd jobs assigned to him when he had no painting job. A regular employee of respondent company, Emiliano Tanque, Jr., attested in his affidavit that petitioner worked with him as a maintenance man when there was no painting job. It is not tenable to argue that the painting and maintenance work of petitioner are not necessary in respondent's business of manufacturing liquors and wines, just as it cannot be said that only those who are directly involved in the process of producing wines and liquors may be considered as necessary employees. Otherwise, there would have been no need for the regular Maintenance Section of respondent company's Engineering Department, manned by regular employees like Emiliano Tanque, Jr., whom petitioner often worked with.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. twelve (12) months, the contract period is renewable subject to future agreement of the parties. It is clear from the employment contract that the respondent Grulla was hired by the company as a regular employee and not just a mere probationary employee.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. Petitioner has established that since the very inception of his employment in 1980, he was never deployed from project to project of private respondent but had been regularly assigned to perform carpentry work under the supervision of a certain Bernardo Padaon who, since 1964 until his resignation on January 2, 1982 worked for private respondent as the supervisor of its Carpentry Department. This goes to show two things: that petitioner was assigned to perform tasks which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of private respondent; and that said assignments did not end on a project to project basis, although the contrary was made to appear by private respondent through the signing of separate employment contracts allegedly for different projects because it is indeed obvious that petitioner continued to perform the same kind of work throughout his period of employment allegedly considered to have been done on a project to project basis. Although petitioner had only rendered almost two years of service, nevertheless this should not detract from his status of being a regular employee because as correctly stated by the labor arbiter, the determining factor of the status of complainant- petitioner or any worker is the nature of the work performed by the latter and the place where he performed his assignment. Moreover, if petitioner were employed as a "project employee" private respondent should have submitted a report of termination to the nearest public employment office every time his employment is terminated due to completion of each construction project, as required by Policy Instruction No. 20, which provides: Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the company is not required to obtain a clearance from the Secretary of Labor in connection with such termination. What is required of the company is a report to the nearest Public Employment Office for statistical purposes. Throughout the duration of petitioner's employment, there should have been filed as many reports of termination as there were construction projects actually finished if it were true that petitioner Telesforo Magante was only a project worker.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or under the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. The law thus provides for two kinds of regular employees, namely: 1. those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and 2. those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. The individual petitioners herein who have been adjudged to be regular employees fall under the second category. These are the mechanics, electricians, machinists machine shop helpers, warehouse helpers, painters, carpenters, pipefitters and masons. It is not disputed that these workers have been in the employ of KIMBERLY for more than one year at the time of the filing of the Petition for certification election by KILUSAN-OLALIA. Owing to their length of service with the company, these workers became regular employees, by operation of law, one year after they were employed by KIMBERLY through RANK. While the actual regularization of these employees entails the mechanical act of issuing regular appointment papers and compliance with such other operating procedures as may be adopted by the employer, it is more in keeping with the intent and spirit of the law to rule that the status of regular employment attaches to the casual worker on the day immediately after the end of his first year of service. To rule otherwise, and to instead make their regularization dependent on the happening of some contingency or the fulfillment of certain requirements, is to impose a burden on the employee which is not sanctioned by law. That the first stated position is the situation contemplated and sanctioned by law is further enhanced by the absence of a statutory limitation before regular status can be acquired by a casual employee. The law is explicit. As long as the employee has rendered at least one year of service, he becomes a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed. The law does not provide the qualification that the employee must first be issued a regular appointment or must first be formally declared as such before he can acquire a regular status. Obviously, where the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be drawn.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. 2) The tasks performed by the alleged "project employee" are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. However, the length of time during which the employee was continuously re-hired is not controlling, but merely serves as a badge of regular employment. In the instant case, the evidence on record shows that petitioner Enero was employed for a total of two (2) years and engaged in at least eighteen (18) projects, while petitioner Maraguinot was employed for some three (3) years and worked on at least twenty-three (23) projects. Moreover, as petitioners' tasks involved, among other chores, the loading, unloading and arranging of movie equipment in the shooting area as instructed by the cameramen, returning the equipment to the Viva Films warehouse, and assisting in the fixing of the lighting system, it may not be gainsaid that these tasks were vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. As regards the underscored phrase, it has been held that this is ascertained by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Truly, the cessation of construction activities at the end of every project is a foreseeable suspension of work. Of course, no compensation can be demanded from the employer because the stoppage of operations at the end of a project and before the start of a new one is regular and expected by both parties to the labor relations. Similar to the case of regular seasonal employees, the employment relation is not severed by merely being suspended. The employees are, strictly speaking, not separated from services but merely on leave of absence without pay until they are reemployed. Thus we cannot affirm the argument that non-payment of salary or non-inclusion in the payroll and the opportunity to seek other employment denote project employment. While Lao admittedly involved the construction industry, to which Policy Instruction No. 20/Department Order No. 19 regarding work pools specifically applies, there seems to be no impediment to applying the underlying principles to industries other than the construction industry. Neither may it be argued that a substantial distinction exists between the projects undertaken in the construction industry and the motion picture industry. On the contrary, the raison d' etre of both industries concern projects with a foreseeable suspension of work. At this time, we wish to allay any fears that this decision unduly burdens an employer by imposing a duty to re-hire a project employee even after completion of the project for which he was hired. The import of this decision is not to impose a positive and sweeping obligation upon the employer to re-hire project employees. What this decision merely accomplishes is a judicial recognition of the employment status of a project or work pool employee in accordance with what is fait accompli, i.e., the continuous re-hiring by the employer of project or work pool employees who perform tasks necessary or desirable to the employer's usual business or trade. Let it not be said that this decision "coddles" labor, for as Lao has ruled, project or work pool employees who have gained the status of regular employees are subject to the "no work-no pay" principle.
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The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately follows. The proviso is applicable only to the employees who are deemed "casuals" but not to the "project" employees nor the regular employees treated in paragraph one of Art. 280. Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the season. The termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.
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ISSUE Whether or not Alegre was lawfully terminated and that he is entitled to reinstatement. HELD NO. Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable. distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employers' using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head. Article 280 does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period, provided the same is entered into by the parties without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstance vitiating consent. It does not necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities. There is thus nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of the employees duties.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. of employment and his services cannot be terminated except for just and authorized causes enumerated under the Labor Code and under the employment contract. Granting, in gratia argumenti, that respondent is a probationary employee, he cannot, likewise, be removed except for cause during the period of probation. Although a probationary or temporary employee has limited tenure, he still enjoys security of tenure. During his tenure of employment or before his contract expires, he cannot be removed except for cause as provided by law. The alleged ground of unsatisfactory performance relied upon by petitioner for dismissing respondent Grulla is not one of the just causes for dismissal provided in the Labor Code. Neither is it included among the grounds for termination of employment under Article VII of the contract of employment executed by petitioner company and respondent Grulla. Moreover, petitioner has failed to show proof of the particular acts or omissions constituting the unsatisfactory performance of Grulla of his duties, which was allegedly due to his poor physical state after the accident. Contrary to petitioner's claims, records show that the medical certificate issued by the hospital where respondent Grulla was confined as a result of the accident, clearly and positively stated that Grulla was already physically fit for work after he was released from the hospital.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. recognized by the Labor Union in the private respondent company in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. for his union activities and thereby defeat his right to self-organization. But the transfer can be upheld when there is no showing that it is unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee. The case at bench is bereft of any circumstance that would indicate that petitioners decision to transfer private respondent to Urdaneta branch was made with grave abuse of discretion. The reason for her transfer was due to the exigency to uplift the operational efficiency of Urdaneta branch. This was the very same situation the Court faced in Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp. vs. Laplana. In that case, the employee Laplana, was a cashier at the Baguio City branch of PT&T who was directed to transfer tpo the companys branch office at Laoag City. The employee refused the transfer averring that it will involve additional expenses and it will be a big sacrifice for being away from her family which might adversely affect her efficiency. In ruling for the employer, the Court upheld the transfer from one city to another within the country as valid as long as there is no bad faith on the part of the employer. Surely, Cabatbat is in a better position that Laplana. The distance between her new assignment in Urdaneta Pangasinan and her place of residence is only about 30 kilometers while the distance between Baguio and Laoag City is definitely beyond 30 kilometers. Since the Court ruled that the transfer of Laplana from Baguio to Laoag was valid, we see no reason to resolve that the transfer of Cabatbat from San Carlos to Urdaneta is improper, absent any showing of bad faith on the part of the employer. Prtivate respondents refusal to obey the transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order of her employer sanctioned under Article 282 of the Lsbor Code, and therefore, warrants dismissal. The decision of NLRC is nullified and set aside. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is reinstated.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. private respondent, insisting that by petitioners alleged contumacious refusal to obey the transfer, said petitioner was guilty or insubordination. 2. NO. Neither is the other ground alleged by Northwest in dismissing petitioner which is loss of confidence, supported by evidence. The fact that Northwest wanted to promote petitioner to Director of International Sales indicated that Northwest had full confidence in petitioner. The outright dismissal of petitioner from his position as Manager-Philippines of Northwest is much too severe, considering the length of service that petitioner rendered for eleven years. While a managerial employee may be dismissed merely on the ground of loss of confidence, the matter of determining whether the cause for dismissing an employee is justified on ground of loss of confidence, cannot be left entirely to the employer. The charges against petitioner were not fully substantiated, and there can be no valid reason for said loss of confidence. Justice and equity call for petitioners reinstatement The decision of NLRC is reversed and set aside and the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering the petitioners reinstatement to his former position with full back wages, is reinstated.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. company. Hence, respondents 22 years of service would not, by itself, mitigate her negligence, especially in view of the substantial loss incurred by petitioner bank.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. A finding that an employee is illegally dismissed entitles him to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and the payment of back wages. But in this case, the petitioners did not pray for reinstatement. The Labor ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement which is hereby affirmed. If the employee does not desire to be reinstated, the employer shall pay him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. This is only just and practical because the reinstatement of petitioners will no longer be in the best interest of petitioners and Gold City considering the animosity and antagonism that exists between them brought about by the filing of charges of both parties against each other. As a rule, full back wages are computed from the time the employees illegal dismissal until his actual reinstatement, but since in this case, reinstatement is not possible, the back wages must be computed from the time of the petitioners illegal dismissal until the finality of the decision. The decision of NLRC is set aside and the decision of the Labor Arbiter is reinstated.
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ISSUES 1. Whether or not petitioner Wenphil has a just and valid cause to dismiss private respondent Roberto Mallare. 2. Whether or not the due process requirement in the manner of dismissal has been complied with. 3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and with payment of full backwages for 3 years, without qualification, in case he was dismissed for a cause but without due process.
HELD: 1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled with the Labor Arbiter that the dismissal of private respondent Mallare was for a just cause. He was found guilty of grave misconduct and insubordination. This is borne by the sworn statements of witnesses. 2. NO. The aforementioned provision of the Personnel Manual of Wenphil which may effectively deprive its employees of the right to due process is clearly against the law and hence, null and void. The security of tenure of a laborer or employee is enshrined in the Constitution, the Labor Code and other related laws.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. Under Section 1, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, no worker shall be dismissed except for a just and authorized cause provided by the law and after due process. Sections 2, 5, 6, and 7 of the same Rules require that before an employee may dismiss an employee, the latter must be given a written notice stating the particular act or omission constituting the grounds thereof; that the employee may answer the allegations with a reasonable period; that the employer shall afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires; and that it is only then that the employer may dismiss the employee by notifying him of the decision in writing, stating clearly the reasons therefor. The failure of petitioner Wenphil to give private respondent Roberto Mallare the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. 3. NO. The Supreme Court held that said policy must be reexamined. .It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has been shown guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the undeserving, if not the undesirable, remains in the service. Thus, in the present case, where the private respondent, who appears to be of violent temper, caused trouble during office hours and even defied his superiors as they tried to pacify him, should not be rewarded with reemployment and backwages. It may encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the private respondent should be maintained, He has no right to return to his former employer. However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. Petitioner must be imposed a sanction for said failure. Considering the circumstances of the case, petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00The measure of this ward depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer. The petition is granted.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. As to due process, the record shows that no hearing was conducted before the petitioner was dismissed. While she submitted a written explanation, she was not accorded the opportunity to fully defend herself. Consultations or conferences may not be a substitute for an actual hearing. The Labor Arbiter decision was reinstated.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. . The petitioners' contention is untenable. The law is clear on the matter. In fact, when private respondent's lawyer called up Danaquel by phone to inquire categorically if he "had been or was about to be dismissed" Danaquel emphatically answered "No." Then dew days later or on May 25, 1988, the private respondent was handed his termination letter. The employer's action was drastic. Under the circumstances, it cannot be stated that the private respondent was given the opportunity to prepare for his defense. However, to order reinstatement at this juncture would serve no prudent purpose considering the supervening facts and circumstances of the case. Not only is PCPPI a new corporation continuing the business and operations of PCD, there is also no doubt that the relationship between the petitioners and the private respondent has been strained by reason of their respective imputations of bad faith which is quite evident from the vehement and consistent stand of the petitioners in refusing to reinstate the private respondent. Thus, in order to prevent further delay in the execution of the decision to the prejudice of the private respondent and to spare him the agony of having to work anew with the petitioners under an atmosphere of antagonism, and so that the latter do not have to endure the continued services of the private respondent in whom they have lost liking and, at this stage, confidence, the private respondent should be awarded separation pay as an alternative to reinstatement.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. made out by private respondent Consunji for a lawful dismissal: the balance of evidence thus moved to equipoise. But equipoise is not enough; the employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. The burden of proof in effect moved back to and once again rested on respondent Consunji, the employer asserting the existence of a just cause for dismissal. This burden of proof Consunji did not discharge. The failure of Consunji to discharge the onus probandi resting on it, must be taken in conjunction with its conceded failure to conduct an investigation on the project site before serving Dizon his notice of termination. It may be supposed that the carrying out of such an investigation on site before repatriation, would not have been easy. But petitioner was entitled under our law to an investigation where he would be informed of the charges against him and have an opportunity to present his defense or explanation before being dismissed. What is at stake in such a case is not simply a property right but also the employee's means of livelihood. Besides, if an investigation had been conducted, Consunji might well have been convinced by Dizon's explanation.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. acts leveled against private respondent and also informed him that a hearing is set on a specific time and date for him to explain his version. First, for the charge of misbehavior and abuse of authority, there is scant evidence on record which would show that private respondent is guilty thereof. Mere accusations and declarations by certain persons that the latter attempted to bribe or had engaged in fistfight, cannot support a finding that he indeed committed such acts. Unsubstantiated accusation without more is not synonymous with guilt. With respect to the charge of dishonesty and conflict of interest, evidence on record shows that private respondent purchased 2,000 cases of Pepsi products in his personal capacity, aware that the prices thereof (Pepsi products) will increase. However, he made it appear that said products was bought by a certain customer who later executed an affidavit denying such purchase. When the price of Pepsi products increased, private respondent sold as his own the 2000 cases at the adjusted price thereby accruing benefit to himself. In said fictitious sale, he utilized petitioners resources and company time for which the former was duly paid. By making such transaction, he also engaged himself in business competing with his employer and thus comes in conflict of interest against petitioner. He cannot serve himself and petitioner at the same time all at the expense of the latter. It would be unfair to compensate private respondent who does not devote his time and effort to his employer. The primary duty of the employee is to carry out his employers policies. Moreover, the fictitious sale is an act of dishonesty. Route salesman, like private respondent, is a highly individualistic personnel who roam around doing field work of selling softdrinks, deal with customers practically on their own and are entrusted with large amounts of funds and properties of the employer. There is a high degree of trust and confidence repose on them and when that confidence is breach, as in this case, proper disciplinary actions may be taken. The foregoing acts of dishonesty and conflict of interest justifies disciplinary sanctions provided it is commensurate with the gravity of the act. Under the factual milieu of this case a disciplinary sanction less punitive than the harsh penalty of dismissal meted on private respondent would suffice, considering his ten (10) years of service with petitioner and this being the first time he was charged with and investigated for such acts. There is no evidence that he has committed infractions against the company before this incident, otherwise, he would not have been promoted in the first place.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. 1. Those engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and 2. Those who have rendered at least one year of service whether such service is continuous or broken. The law distinguishes between the two (2) kinds of employees to protect the interests of labor, particularly the tenurial interest of the worker who may be denied the rights and benefits due a regular employee by virtue of lopsided agreements with the economically powerful employer who can maneuver to keep an employee on a casual status for as long as convenient. In the case at bar, petitioners were employed at various periods from 1985 to 1989 for the same kind of work they were hired to perform in September 1989. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC agree that petitioners were employees engaged to perform activities necessary in the usual business of the employer. As laborers, harvesters or sprayers in an agricultural establishment which produces high grade bananas, petitioners' tasks are indispensable to the year-round operations of respondent company. This belies the theory of respondent company that the employment of petitioners was terminated due to the expiration of their probationary period in June 1990. If at all significant, the contract for probationary employment was utilized by respondent company as a chicanery to deny petitioners their status as regular employees and to evade paying them the benefits attached to such status. Some of the petitioners were hired as far back as 1985, although the hiring was not continuous. They were hired and re-hired in a span of from two to four years to do the same type of work which conclusively shows the necessity of petitioners' service to the respondent company's business. Petitioners have, therefore, become regular employees after performing activities which are necessary in the usual business of their employer. But, even assuming that the activities of petitioners in respondent company's plantation were not necessary or desirable to its business, the Court affirms the NLRC's finding that all of the petitioners have rendered non-continuous or broken service for more than one (1) year and are consequently considered regular employees. The Court does not sustain NLRCs theory that private respondent should not be made to compensate petitioners for backwages because its termination of their employment was not made in bad faith. The act of hiring and re-hiring the petitioners over a period of time without considering them as regular employees evidences bad faith on the part of private respondent. The subsequent rehiring of petitioners on a probationary status "clearly appears to be a convenient subterfuge on the part of management to prevent petitioners from becoming regular employees. In the case at bar, there is no valid cause for dismissal. The petitioners have not performed any act to warrant termination of their employment. Consequently, petitioners are entitled to their full backwages and other benefits from the time their compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. Private respondent moved to reconsider the Courts (First Division) aforesaid decision on grounds that: (a) Petitioners are not entitled to recover backwages because they were not actually dismissed but their employment was not converted to permanent employment; and (b) assuming that petitioners are entitled to backwages, computation thereof should not start from cessation of work up to actual reinstatement and that salary earned elsewhere (during the period of illegal dismissal) should be deducted from the award of such backwages. The Court En Banc declared that there is no compelling reason to reconsider the decision of the Court (First Division). However, the Court En Banc clarified the computation of backwages due an employee on account of his illegal dismissal from employment The Court declared: The Court deems it appropriate to reconsider the earlier ruling on the computation of backwages as enunciated in the Pines City Educational Center case, by now holding that conformably with the evident legislative intent as expressed in R.A. No. 6715, backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not, as a general rule, be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the
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That in all things, God may be glorified. legality (illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself and family, while full backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee. The clear legislative intent of the amendment in R.A. 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the deduction of earnings elsewhere rule. A closer adherence to R.A. No. 6715 points to full backwages as meaning that i.e,. without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for full backwages to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity and therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. established in an appropriate investigation. Managerial employees, no less than rank-andfile laborers, are entitled to due process. Loss of confidence, which is the usual ground for the removal of the managerial employee, must be established like any other lawful cause. Even if it be assumed that Siete was a managerial employee- an issue which was not earlier raised or resolved- the petitioner has not satisfactorily proved the reason for its supposed loss of confidence in him. It is not true that the vessel would be left unattended if the captain were to be placed under investigation because he would not have a ready replacement. Under Article 627 of the Code of Commerce: The sailing mate, as second chief of the vessel and unless the ship agent does not order otherwise, shall take the place of the captain in case of absence, sickness or death, and shall then assume all his powers, obligations and liabilities. In the instant case, there was even a ready replacement for Siete. Petition is dismissed and the assailed decision is affirmed, with the deduction of $400.90 from respondents total award.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. or (2) if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year. The petitioners fall under the first category. The job of a meter reader is necessary to the business of BENECO since unless the meter reader records the electric consumption of the subscribing public, there could not be a valid basis for billing the customers of BENECO. The fact that the petitioners were allowed to continue working after the expiration of their employment is evidence of the necessity and desirability of their service to BENECOs business. Since petitioners are already regular employees at the time of their illegal dismissal from employment, they are entitled to be reinstated to their former position as regular employees, not merely probationary. Moreover, under Article 279, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Therefore, petitioners backwages should not be limited to one year only. 2. YES. An employer becomes liable to pay indemnity to an employee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to comply with the requirements of due process. The indemnity is in the form of nominal damages intended not to penalize the employer but to vindicate or recognize the employees right of procedural due process which was violated by the employer. Indemnity is not incompatible with the award of backwages since they are awards based on different considerations. Backwages are granted on the grounds of equity to workers for earnings lost due to their illegal dismissal from work. On the other hand, indemnity is meant to vindicate the right of an employee to due process which has been violated by the employer. In the case at bar, BENECO failed to comply with the provisions of Article 283 of the Labor Code which requires an employer to server a notice of dismissal upon the employees sought to be terminated and to the Department of Labor, at least one month before the intended date of termination. Therefore, it was held that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in deleting the award of indemnity.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy. 2. YES. Under Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended: Security of Tenure.-In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." In the case at bar, there was no evidence which clearly showed an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages. The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate is "to restore to a state, condition, position, etc. from which one had been removed" and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole." The Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement ... and to his full backwages . . ." Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. An exception to the rule is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee. In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned. The principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained. Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed. As a system analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the procurement of supplies. In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As has been held before, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for termination, it must rest on some basis which must be convincingly established. An employee may not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. While the Court should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should it dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences. To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally Saldivars alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records. Thus, she was illegally dismissed.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. notice to of the employers decision to dismiss him. Both were given by respondent PAL. 2. NO. Article 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending appeal. The rationale being the law itself laid down a compassionate policy as to vivify and enhance the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working man. The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory for PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of the SC. Technicalities have no room in labor case where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat it. Hence, even if the reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal of the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he has received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. respondents in terminating him On the contrary, the records of this petition show that the private respondent acted in accordance with law before effecting the dismissal. The records also show that there was a prior application with the Ministry of Labor to terminate the petitioner's employment. A copy of said application was furnished to the petitioner. The petitioner, however, did not oppose such application nor did he do anything to preserve his right. Neither can we consider the private respondents' response to the petitioner's query regarding his status as having given him false hopes. The referral to the personnel department was merely a part of the formal procedure undertaken by the bank. Such referral does not show that the bank acted in a wanton or willful manner.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. other. As regards the personal liability of Sunio, he cannot be made jointly and severally liable with petitioner company and CIPI for the payment of backwages of private respondents. He was impleaded in the Complaint in his capacity as General Manager or petitioner corporation. There appears to be no evidence on the record that he acted maliciously or in bad faith in terminating the services of private respondents. His act is therefore within the scope of his authority and was a corporate act. It is basic that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Therefore, petitioner Sunio should not have been made personally answerable for the payment of private respondents back salaries.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. with malice or in bad faith. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners have a direct hand in the illegal dismissal of respondent employees. They were the ones, who as high-ranking officers and directors of Crispa, Inc., signed the Board Resolution retrenching the private respondents on the feigned ground of serious business losses that had no basis apart from an unsigned and unaudited Profit and Loss Statement which, to repeat, had no evidentiary value whatsoever. This is indicative of bad faith on the part of petitioners for which they can be held jointly and severally liable with Crispa, Inc. for all the money claims of the illegally terminated respondent employees in this case.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. Sunio was impleaded in the Complaint in his capacity as General Manager of petitioner corporation. We ruled therein that "there appears to be no evidence on record that he acted maliciously or in bad faith in terminating the services of private respondents. His act, therefore, was within the scope of his authority and was a corporate act." Thus he was not jointly and severally liable. In the instant case, Nothing on record is shown to indicate that Frank Yih has acted in bad faith or with malice in carrying out the retrenchment program of the company. His having been held by the NLRC to be solidarily and personally liable with API is thus legally unjustified.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. If the change was effected to consolidate the functions of the pollution control and safety officer with the duties of the Industrial Engineering Manager, as private respondent postulates, such substitution was done in bad faith for as had already been pointed out, the Industrial Engineering Manager was hardly qualified for the position. If the aim was to generate savings in terms of the salaries that PRC would not be paying the petitioner any more as a result of the streamlining of operations for improved efficiency, such a move could hardly be justified in the face of PRC's hiring of ten (10) fresh graduates for the position of Management Trainee and advertising for vacant positions in the Engineering/Technical Division at around the time of the termination. Besides, there would seem to be no compelling reason to save money by removing such an important position. As shown by their recent financial statements, PRC's yearend net profits had steadily increased from 1987 to 199038 While concededly, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not require that the employer should be suffering financial losses before he can terminate the services of the employee on the ground of redundancy, it does not mean either that a company which is doing well can effect such a dismissal whimsically or capriciously. The fact that a company is suffering from business losses merely provides stronger justification for the termination. In this regard, it could be concluded that the respondent PRC was merely in a hurry to terminate the services of the petitioner as soon as possible in view of the latters impending retirement; it appears that said company was merely trying to avoid paying the retirement benefits the petitioner stood to receive upon reaching the age of 60. PRC acted in bad faith.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. staged by petitioner union was illegal because it was likewise grounded on a violation by respondent company of the CBA, enumerated as an unfair labor Practice under Art. 249 [i] of the Labor Code.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. position is available to Ms. Joaquin. All of these militate against the propriety of reinstating the respondent. I f the respondent had been a laborer, clerk, or other rank and file employee, there would be no problem in ordering her reinstatement with facility. But she was Vice President for Marketing of Asiaworld. An officer in such a key position can work effectively only if she enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management. It should be underscored that the backwages are being awarded on the basis of equity or in the nature of a severance pay. This means that a monetary award is to be paid to the striking employees as an alternative to reinstatement which can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or because of the realities of the situation. We, therefore, affirm the award of backwages with modifications as an alternative to reinstatement.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. 2. payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; 3. good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and 4. fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished. In the case at bar, private respondents failed to proffer any proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner. Absent such proof, the Court has no basis to interfere with the bona fide decision of management to effect more economic and efficient methods of production.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. in extent. 2. The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. There should, in other words, be a certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic recourse with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or otherwise laid-off. Because of the consequential nature of retrenchment, it must, 3. be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses. The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses, i.e., cut other costs than labor costs. Whether or not an employer would imminently suffer serious or substantial losses for economic reasons is essentially a question of fact for the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to determine. In the instant case, the Labor Arbiter found no sufficient and convincing evidence to sustain petitioner's essential contention that it was acting in order to prevent substantial and serious losses.
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That in all things, God may be glorified. was within its rights in closing Hacienda Binanlutan and in terminating the service of petitioners.
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