The Accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plants

May 23, 2012 Research Laboratory for Nuclear Reactors, Tokyo Institute of Technology Director, Distingushed Professor Masanori ARITOMI

Contents
1. Accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plants 2. Why Did We Fail to Prevent the Severe Nuclear Accident? 3. Recurrence Prevention of the Core Meltdown Accident 4. Implementation Challenges for Stabilization

1. The Accidents at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plants

1.1 What Really Happened at the Plants?
(1) The power pylons had collapsed by the huge earthquake. -> The loss of external AC sources resulted. he (2) The giant tsunami hit the Fukushima dai-ichi dainuclear power plants (NPPs) about one hour later after the occurrence of the earthquake. - The emergency diesel generators were fully submerged by seawater, as those generators had been installed in the basement of the turbine building. -> The emergency diesel generators had been destroyed.

- The emergency batteries and the switch he /incoming panels were submerged and also damaged. - The heavy oil tanks were damaged and oil he discharged by the giant tsunami. -> The blackout in the plant resulted from he the loss of all external AC sources.

The huge earthquake and the giant tsunami

Outline of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPPs

Summary of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPPs

(3) In the past, the case study on losses of the external AC sources has been executed. - The main causes of the loss of the external AC sources were 1) Thunderbolt struck the electric power substation. 2) Insulation failures of the insulators for highhigh-voltage transmission lines were damaged by brine or salt damage. - In those accidents, the original situation has been restored within seven hours, since the parts and components for repair and maintenance had usually been kept in the substation.

-> The holding time of the backup batteries he was designated at about eight hours. x At Unit 1 of the NPP, since the batteries had also been fully submerged, the recovery task in the central control room had to be executed under the total blackout conditions and remained unclear in darkness.

(4) The seawater intake structure, including the pumps, were placed and installed outdoors and had not been placed in any special protective structure. - The height of the tsunami had been estimated at 5.6 meters, but the real height of the giant tsunami which hit Fukushima DaiDai-ichi nuclear power plant was larger, and reached almost 15 meters. -> Due to this tsunami, the seawater intake structure were damaged and swept away. - The final heat sinks for all of the cooling he systems in the plant are seawater.

(5) All of the power sources and the final heat sink functions had been lost. - According to the information given at that time, it said to be that the steam generated at the reactor core of the Unit 1 was from the cooling by the isolation condenser (IC). x The IC had not performed any function he at that time, because its valve was closed and inactive. -> The core meltdown accident in Unit 1 he occurred in almost three or four hours.

- In the Unit 3, the cooling water had 3, continuously been injected into the reactor core by its reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) and high-pressure core injection system until 2:42 on May 13. x The core meltdown accident occurred, because sufficient countermeasures could not be taken at that time. - In the Unit 2, the cooling water had continuously been injected into the reactor core by its RCIC until 7:30 on May 14. x The core meltdown accident also he occurred, because sufficient countermeasures could not be taken at that time.

In sequence, large amounts of radioactive materials from their buildings had been released into the environment, but almost all o

(6) In the units 1 and 3 of the plant, the hydrogen explosions occurred in their respective building housing reactors 1 and 3. -> Large amounts of radioactive materials from their buildings had been released into the environment. - Almost all of them had fortunately been released into the sea by the west winds blowing at that time. - Fortunately, west wind brought them to the sea in these cases.

Hydrogen explosions at Unit 3

- In the Unit 2, the safety valve for controlling the pressure inside the reactor was opened at around 21:20 hours on March 14, 2011 and the vent valve of the reactor containment was opened at around 12:00 Midnight the next day March 15, when the radioactive plume was produced. - This time, the release of radioactive materials occurred, flowing on the northnorth-northeast winds to and spreading over the Kanto area including Tokyo. - In the Unit 2, the impact noise occurred near the suppression chamber inside the reactor containment vessel at around 6:00 on March 15, 2011.

(7) At the same time, the hydrogen explosion occurred near the spent fuel storage pool in the Unit 4. - In Unit 4, all of the core fuels had been transported from the core into the spent fuel storage pool, in order to replace the shrouds, part of the internal core. -> There had been in existence higher heating here value of spent fuels in the storage pool. - The evaporation of the water of the storage pool became the boil-dry state boiland the so called zircaloy/water reactions in the pool were thought to be the cause of the hydrogen gas generation.

x The hydrogen explosion in Unit 4 was induced by the hydrogen flowing into it through the common stack from the Unit 3. - The gate between the reactor vessel and the spent fuel storage pool was opened by the earthquake ->The spent fuels in the pool had been deemed to be relatively sound and stable.

After the hydrogen explosion in Units 3 and 4

1.2 Other Nuclear Power Plants located on the Pacific side of Eastern Japan

Onagawa Nuclear Power Station # Tohoku Electric Power Co. took into account of earthquakes off the coast of Sanriku (in the Tohoku area during the Meiji and Showa periods), and into further consideration of the Tsunami induced by the Chilean earthquake, and the Jyoukan earthquake, etc. -> The nuclear power plant was located at a height of 10 meters or higher than sea level, and countermeasures had been implemented such as installation of breakwaters for massive tsunami higher than 15 meters.

-> The Onagawa nuclear plant has never experienced damages of any considerable degree. + The wholesomeness of the power pylons for high-voltage lines has been maintained, and the soundness of one system of external electric power source has firmly been maintained. -> The Onagawa nuclear power plant has never experienced damages of any considerable degree.

The Tokai No.2 Nuclear Power Plant # Japan Atomic Power Co. (JAPCO) implemented its own measures for safety after the earthquake at the Niigata coast. - JAPCO changed the height criteria for tsunami by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers to that of Ibaraki prefecture. - The additional electric power supply for emergency diesel generation has been installed on the higher ground. - JAPCO had prepared a structure, including pumps, for its tidal prevention measures for sea water intake, and the construction for a water stop in one system had been completed about a few days previously.

- As for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), one complete system could be maintained. + The cold shutdown of the reactor had been conducted and achieved by the great and enthusiastic efforts of the reactor operators, taking more than two days of a tenuous tightrope situation. - Such a situation was fortunate for the Kanto Area. - If ever a core meltdown accident would have occurred there, more individuals would be affected and exposed by radiation.

Fukushima Dai-Ni Nuclear Power station Dai(Tokyo Electric Power Co.) # The height of the tsunami was lower than that towards Dai-ichi nuclear power plants. Dai- As the Dai-Ni plants was a later-designed Dailaternuclear power plant, the sea water intake system such as pumps, etc. had been installed within the concrete-covered concretestructure. - As for the emergency diesel generation and the emergency core cooling systems, one of those systems could at least be maintained. -> The transition to the cold shutdown of the nuclear reactors in Dai-Ni plants was Daipossible.

The Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station Dai# Since the basic design of the plant was based on U.S. original technologies at that time, we may say it was insufficient and inadequate towards the anticipated flooding from tsunami. - Since the time when the Niigata earthquake occurred, the fire extinguishing system lines have been strengthened and the major seismic isolated building had been constructed; even the No.1 plant were able to handle and support the post accident situation. x The necessary measures in anticipation of flooding from tsunami had not been implemented.

2. Why did we fail to prevent the severe nuclear accident?

2.1 The electric utility deregulation and the disrespectful attitude toward the efforts to enhance safety
(1) Since the Chernobyl accident, research and study to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants were actively developed. - Due to the so-called bubble economy, solabor costs were escalating and the power rate in Japan was the highest in the world. -> In those days, it was strongly insisted that the power rate, mainly targeted for the electric power-intensive export industries, powershould be lowered

-> The age of free competition related to power rate, and the power cost of nuclear power was evaluated and deemed to be the cheapest one. (2) The technology of nuclear power generation had been completed. - For electric utilities, the matters of concern turned to the peace of mind for NPPs and the symbiotic relationship with the site regions instead of enhancement or improvement of the safety. -> The enhancement of nuclear safety had been deemed to be Money Pits.

(3) The Safety of Nuclear Power Generation - Even in the electric utilities, experts in the field of nuclear safety were recognized as the Money Pits and gradually slipped from their organizational positions. - It was getting harder to obtain the research funding in the universities to enhance the safety of light water reactors. - As issues on nuclear power generation were being treated as industry-related industryproblems in the private sector, the government was deemed to bear the responsibility for only its safety problems.

(4) During the period immediately after the accidents of NPPs, the precise and correct information on the accident was not efficiently brought to the Official Residence. - A chain-of-command structure within chain-ofthe government had not been established at that time. - The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) did not work effectively and the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) did not provide the precise directions to the said agency and the proper advices to the government. - The NISA and the NSC did not adequately perform their respective responsibilities.

2.2 Accident management

(1) The accidental occurrence of a core meltdown that is beyond the design base accident may occur due to the long blackout period. - Many Japanese scientists, engineers and technical experts assumed such an accident, but believed that such an accident would never occur in Japan. - It is [the current focus/policy] to confront accidents by using Accident Management - namely a scenario of curbing accidents by making the most effective use of existing equipment and devices - instead of enhancing safety facilities, including equipment.

(2) Nuclear Safety Commission recommended to the government the provision of accident management (AM) for the severe accident in May, 2002 and called on the electric utilities to prepare and facilitate the AM in July of the same year. - The electric utilities submitted to the government in May 2002 the AM reports on each specific NPP. - NSC reviewed the reports from the electric utilities and decided upon those that were appropriate and reasonable. x Since that time, the adequate reconsideration, training and exercises had never been carried out.

(3) The proposed examples of strengthening the safety facilities 1) Core catchers to prevent the occurring recriticality due to the core meltdown, 2) Double reactor containment, 3) Emergency core injection system, dependent upon the natural falling force of gravity which would be able to feed and inject the cooling water into the reactor core, only by leaving the valve open and working for 72 hours, 4) Fire hydrant lines which would be able to inject the coolant by fire engine. - The fire hydrant lines were only adopted.

(4) The pressure in the reactor pressure vessel he is reduced rapidly. - To release steam to the suppression chamber in the reactor containment and to condense it to water. - Since the water in the suppression chamber is usually cooled, the steam produced there can be condensed into water. - As the water in the chamber cannot be cooled, the steam produced there cannot be condensed.

-> The temperature of the water in the chamber will increase and when heated to saturation temperatures, the vent valve of the reactor containment will be opened, then vented and will reduce the level of pressure to be the same one in both the pressure vessel and the containment. - When such a situation arises, radioactive materials such as Co-60 and Nitrogen isotopes would be discharged into the environment together with the steam.

- If the pressure is reduced to the level of 0.3MPa, the injection of cooling water (fresh water or sea water) into the reactor pressure vessel can be executed by way of the fire hydrant line by using a fire engine, etc. - Due to the delayed action, fuel damage and melting, and the core meltdown in the plant had occurred.

- In the reactor pressure vessel, the cladding tubes, channel boxes and cooling water triggered the chemical interaction of so-called zircaloy-water reaction and produced a lot of hydrogen gases. - By venting at the reactor containment, the high levels of radioactive materials had been released together with the steam and hydrogen gases, and the hydrogen explosion was induced by the contact of oxygen and hydrogen gases, which had been produced in the condensation of steam/water vapor.

Thank you for your attention!