Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez G.R. No.

139465, October 17, 2000

By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US requested for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of US tax and election laws. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for copies of the US extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied that request. ISSUE: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? HELD: Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may be provisionally arrested pending the submission of the request. Because of this possible consequence, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Thus, the basic due process rights of notice and hearing are indispensable. Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the Constitutional right to procedural due process must override treaty obligations. When there is a conflict between international law obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail.

Bayan vs Zamora Facts: The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes. Cause of Action: Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII. Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty, b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate. ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution? HELD: Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate. The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

United States v. The Libellants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, Her Tackle, Apparel, and Furniture, Together with Her Cargo, and the Africans Mentioned and Described in the Several Libels and Claims
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CONNECTICUT Argued: --- Decided: 1841

The Spanish schooner Amistad, on the 27th day of June, 1839, cleared out from Havana, in Cuba, for Puerto Principe, in the same island, having on board, Captain Ferrer, and Ruiz and Montez, spanish subjects. Captain Ferrer had on board Antonio, a slave; Ruiz had forty-nine negroes; Montez had four negroes, which were claimed by them as slaves, and stated to be their property, in passports or documents, signed by the Governor General of Cuba. In fact, these African negroes had been, a very short time before they were put on board the Amistad, brought into Cuba, by Spanish slave traders, in direct contravention of the treaties between Spain and Great Britain, and in violation of the laws of Spain. On the voyage of the Amistad, the negroes rose, killed the captain, and took possession of the vessel. They spared the lives of Ruiz and Montez, on condition that they would aid in steering the Amistad for the coast of Africa, or to some place where negro slavery was not permitted by the laws of the country. Ruiz and Montez deceived the negroes, who were totally ignorant of navigation, and steered the Amistad for the United States; and she arrived off Long Island, in the state of New York, on the 26th of August, and anchored within half a mile of the shore. Some of the negroes went to shore to procure supplies of water and provisions, and the vessel was then discovered by the United States brig Washington. Lieutenant Gedney, commanding the Washington assisted by his officers and crew, took possession of the Amistad, and of the negroes on shore and in the vessel, brought them into the District of Connecticut, and there libelled the vessel, the cargo, and the negroes for salvage. Libels for salvage were also presented in the District Court of the United States, for the District of Connecticut, by persons who had aided, as they alleged, in capturing the negroes on shore on Long Island, and contributed to the vessel, cargo, and negroes being taken into possession by the brig Washington. Ruiz and Montez filed claims to the negroes as their slaves, and prayed that they, and parts of the cargo of the Amistad, might be delivered to them, or to the representatives of the crown of Spain.The attorney of the District of Connecticut filed an information stating that the Minister of Spain had claimed of the government of the United States that the vessel, cargo, and slaves should be restored, under the provisions of the treaty between the United States and Spain, the same having arrived within the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, under such circumstances as made it the duty of the vessel of the United States, under such circumstances as made it the duty of the United States to cause them to be restored to the true owners thereof. The information asked that the Court would make such order as would enable the United States to comply with the treaty; or, if it should appear that the negroes had been brought from Africa, in violation of the laws of the United States, that the Court would make an order for the removal of the negroes to Africa, according to the laws of the United States. A claim for Antonio was filed by the Spanish consul, on behalf of the representatives of Captain Ferrer, and claims are also filed by merchants of Cuba for parts of the cargo of the vessel, denying salvage, and asserting their right to have the same delivered to them under the treaty. The negores, Antonio excepted, filed an answer denying that they were slaves, or the property of Ruiz, or Montez; and denying the right of the Court under the Constitution and laws of the United States to exercise any jurisdiction over their persons. They asserted that they were native free-born Africans, and ought of right to be free; that they had been, in April 1839, kidnapped in Africa, and had been carried in a vessel engaged in the slave trade from the coast of Africa to Cuba, for the purpose of being sold; and that Ruiz and Montez, knowing these facts, had purchased them, put them on board the Amistad, intending to carry them to be held as slaves for life, to another part of Cuba, and that, on the voyage, they rose on the master, took possession of the vessel, and were intending to proceed to Africa, or to some free state, when they were taken possession of by the United States armed vessel, the Washington. After evidence had been given by the parties, and all the documents of the vessel and cargo, with the alleged passports, and the clearance from Havana had been produced the District Court made a decree, by which all claims to salvage of the negroes were rejected, and salvage amounting to one-third of the vessel and cargo,

was allowed to Lieutenant Gedney, and the officers and crew of the Washington. The claim of the representatives of Captain Ferrer, to Antonio, was allowed: the claims of Ruiz and Montez being included in the claim of the Spanish minister, and of the minister of Spain, to the negroes as slaves, or to have them delivered to the Spanish minister, under the treaty, to be sent to Cuba, were rejected: and the Court decreed that the negroes should be delivered to the President of the United States, to be sent to Africa, pursuant to the act of Congress of 3d March, 1819. From this decree the District Attorney of the United States appealed to the Circuit Court, except so far as the same related to Antonio. The owners of the cargo of the Amistad also appealed from that part of the decree which allowed salvage on their goods. Ruiz or Montez did not appeal, nor did the representatives of the owner of the Amistad. The Circuit Court of Connecticut, by a pro forma decree, affirmed the decree of the District Court, reserving the question of salvage on the merchandise on board the Amistad. The United States appealed from this decree. The decree of the Circuit Court was affirmed; saving that part of the same, which directed the negroes to be delivered to the President of the United States, to be sent to Africa; which was reversed, and the negroes were declared to be free. The sixth article of the treaty with Spain, of 1795, continued in full force, in this particular, by the treaty ratified in 1821, seems to have had principally in view, cases where the property of the subjects of either state, had been taken possession of within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, during war. The eighth article provides for cases where the shipping of the inhabitants of either state are forced, through stress of weather, pursuit of pirates, or enemies, or any other urgent necessity, to seek shelter in the ports of the other. There may well be some doubts entertained whether the case of the Amistad, in its actual circumstances, falls within the purview of this article. The ninth article of the treaty provides, that all ships and merchandise, which shall be rescued out of the hands of any pirates and robbers, on the high seas, which shall be brought into some port of either state, shall be delivered to the officers of the port in order to be taken care of, and "restored entire to the proprietary, as soon as due and sufficient proof shall be made concerning the property thereof." To bring the case of the Amistad within this article, it is essential to establish: First, that the negroes, under all the circumstances, fall within the description of merchandise, in the sense of the treaty. Secondly, That there has been a rescue of them on the high seas, out of the hands of pirates and robbers. Thirdly, That Ruiz and Montez are the true proprietors of the negroes, and have established their title by competent proofs. If those negroes were, at the time, lawfully held as slaves under the laws of Spain, and recognised by those laws as property capable of being bought and sold, no reason is seen why this may not be deemed, within the intent of the treaty, to be included under the denomination of merchandise, and ought, as such, to be restored to the claimants; for upon that point the laws of Spain would seem to furnish the proper rule of interpretation. But, admitting that to be the construction of the treaty, it is clear in the opinion of the Court, that neither of the other essential facts and requisites has been established by proof and the onus probandi of both lies upon the claimants, to give rise to the casus foederis. The negroes were never the lawful slaves of Ruiz, or Montez, or of any other Spanish subject. They are natives of Africa; and were kidnapped there, and wedre unlawfully transported to Cuba, in violation of the laws and treaties of Spain, and of the most solemn edicts and declarations of that government. By the laws, treaties, and edicts of Spain, the African slave trade is utterly abolished; the dealing in that trade is deemed a heinous crime; and the negroes thereby introduced into the dominions of Spain, are declared to be free. There is no pretence to say the negroes of the Amistad are "pirates" and "robbers;" as they were kidnapped Africans, who, by the laws of Spain itself were entitled to their freedom. Although public documents of the government accompanying property found on board of the private ships of a foreign nation, are to be deemed prima facie evidence of the facts which they state, yet they are always open to be impugned for fraud; and whether that fraud be in the original obtaining of those documents, or in the

subsequent fraudulent and illegal use of them, where once it is satisfactorily established, it over-throws all their sanctity, and destroys them as proof. Fraud will vitiate any, even the most solemn transactions; and any asserted title founded upon it, is utterly void. The language of the treaty with Spain of 1795, requires the proprietor "to make due and sufficient proof" of his property; and that proof cannot be deemed either due or sufficient, which is stained with fraud. Nothing is more clear in the laws of nations as an established rule to regulate their rights and duties, and intercourse, than the doctrine that the ship's papers are prima facie evidence of what they state; and that if they are shown to be fraudulent, they are not to be held proof of any valid title whatever.This rule is applied in prize cases; and is just as applicable to the transctions of civil intercourse between nations in times of peace. In the solemn treaties between nations it never can be presumed that either state intends to provide the means of perpetrating or protecting frauds; but all the provisions are to be construed as intended to be applied to bona fide transactions. The seventeenth article of the treaty with Spain which provides for certain passports and certificates as evidence of property on board of the ships of both states, is, in its terms, applicable only to cases where either of the parties is engaged in war. This article required a certain form of passport to be agreed upon by the parties and annexed to the treaty. It never was annexed: and, therefore, in the case of The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheaton, 1, it is held inoperative. Supposing the African negroes on board the Amisted not to be slaves, but kidnapped, and free negroes, the treaty with Spain cannot be obligatory upon them; and the United States are bound to respect their rights, as much as those of Spanish subjects. The conflict of rights between the parties, under such circumstances, becomes positive and inevitable, and must be decided upon the invariable principles of justice and international law. The treaty with Spain never could have been intended to take away the equal rights of all foreigners who should assert their claims to equal justice before the Courts of the United States; or to deprive such foreigners of the protection given to them by other treaties, or by the general laws of nations. There is no ground to assert that the case of the negroes who were on board of the Amistad comes within the provisions of the act of Congress of 1799, or of any other of the prohibitory slave-trade acts. These negroes were never taken from Africa, or brought to the United States in contravention of these acts. When the Amistad arrived she was in possession of the negroes, asserting their freedom; and in no sense could possibly intend to import themselves into the United States as slaves, or for sale as slaves. The carrying of the Amistad and her cargo into Connecticut by Lieutenant Gedney, and the officers and crew of the Washington, was a highly meritorious and useful service to the proprietors of the ship and cargo, and such, as by the general principles of the maritime law, is always deemed a just foundation for salvage. The rate allowed by the Court, (one-third,) does not seem beyond the exercise of a sound discretion, under the very peculiar and embarrassing circumstances of the case.

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively? HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.

Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World TradeOrganization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondentsacting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through thereduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated withexporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflectedin the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused byWTO.Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts andimpair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTOagreement. Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts thegenerally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheresto the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. Bythe doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta suntservanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a meremoral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered asabsolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as whenPhilippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right underthe concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside therealm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislativerestriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remainsas the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for thedevelopment of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if noteconomic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers,make their free choice.Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Govt. of the USA vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002

FACTS:Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether awarrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

Hong Kong v. OlaliaG.R. No. 153675 Facts: TheP h i l i p pi ne s a n d Ho n g K o n g si g ne d a n Ag r e e me n t f o r t h e S ur r e n de r o f A cc us e d a n d Convicted Persons.Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court. Department of Justice(DOJ) received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of privaterespondent Muoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of privaterespondent. The NBI agents arrested and detained him.Muoz filed a petition for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr. holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high flight risk. After Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denyinghis application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge. ISSUE Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing private respondent to bail? HELD No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing private respondent to bail.Accordingly, although the timehonored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that thePhilippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong SpecialAdministrative Region it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, thePhilippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process guaranteed bythe Constitution . More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also byinternational conventions, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights , t o w h i c h t h e Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that acertain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. I n h i s Se pa r a t e Opi ni o n i n Purganan, t h e n Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termedclear and convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him,this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flightrisk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is nota flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether privaterespondent may be granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (United Kingdom v. Albania) ICJ Decision of 9 April 1949 [1949] ICJ Rep. 4

 The Albanian Government hascontended that the sovereignty of Albania was violated because the passage of the British warships on October 22nd, 1946, was not an innocent passage. The reasons advanced in support of this contention may be summed up as follows: The passage was not an ordinary passage, but a political mission; the ships were manoeuvring and sailing in diamond combat formation with soldiers on board; the position of the guns was not consistent with innocent passage; the vessels passed with crews at action stations; the number of the ships and their armament surpassed what was necessary in order to attain their object and showed an intention to intimidate and not merely to pass; the ships had received orders to observe and report upon the coastal defences and this order was carried out. It is shown by the Admiralty telegram of September 21st, cited above, and admitted by the United Kingdom Agent, that the object of sending the warships through the Strait was not only to carry out a passage for purposes of navigation, but also to test Albania's attitude. As mentioned above, the Albanian Government, on May 15th, 1946, tried to impose by means of gunfire its view with regard to the passage. As the exchange of diplomatic notes did not lead to any clarification, the Government of the United Kingdom wanted to ascertain by other means whether the Albanian Government would maintain its illegal attitude and again impose its view by firing at passing ships. The legality of this measure taken-by the Government of the United Kingdom cannot be disputed, provided that it was carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of international law. The "mission" was designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly denied. The Government of the United Kingdom was not bound to abstain from exercising its right of passage, which the Albanian Government had illegally denied. [Pg 30] In view of the firing from the Albanian battery on May 15th, this measure of precaution cannot, in itself, he regarded as unreasonable. But four warships -- two cruisers and two destroyers -- passed in this manner, with crews at action stations, ready to retaliate quickly if fired upon. They passed one after another through this narrow channel, close to the Albanian coast, at a time of political tension in this region. The intention must have been, not only to test Albania's attitude, but at the same time to demonstrate such force that she would abstain from firing again on passing ships. Having regard, however, to all the circumstances of the case, as described above, the Court is unable to characterize these measures taken by the United Kingdom authorities as a violation of Albania's sovereignty. [Pg 31] After the explosions of October 22nd, the United Kingdom Government sent a note to the Albanian Government, in which it announced its intention to sweep the Corfu Channel shortly. The Albanian reply, which was received in London on October 31st, stated that the Albanian Government would not give its consent to this unless the operation in question took place outside Albanian territorial waters. After this exchange of notes, "Operation Retail" took place on November 12th and 13th. Commander Mestre, of the French Navy, was asked to attend as observer, and was present at the sweep on November 13th. The operation was camed out under the protection of an important covering force composed of an aircraft carrier, cruisers and other war vessels. This covering force remained throughout the operation at a certain distance to the west of the Channel, except for the frigate St. Bride's Bay, which was stationed in the Channel south-east of Cape Kiephali. The sweep began in the morning of November 13th, at about 9 o'clock, and ended in the afternoon near nightfall. The area swept was in Albanian territorial waters, and within the limits of the channel previously swept. [Pg 33] But, in fact, the explosions of October 22nd, 1946,in a channel declared safe for navigation, and one which the United Kingdom Government, more than any other government, had reason to consider safe, raised quite a different problem from that of a routine sweep carried out under the orders of the mineclearance organizations. These explosions were suspicious; they raised a question of responsibility. Accordingly, this was the ground on which the United Kingdom Government chose

to establish its main line of defence. According to that Government, the corpora delicti must be secured as quickly as possible, for fear they should be taken away, without leaving traces, by the authors of the minelaying or by the Albanian authorities. This justification took two distinct forms in the United Kingdom Government's arguments. It was presented first as a new and special application of the theory of intervention, by means of which the State intervening would secure possession of evidence in the territory of another State, in order to submit it to an international tribunal and thus facilitate its task. The Court cannot accept such a line of defence. The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself. The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech in reply, has further classified "Operation Retail" among methods of self-protection or self-help. The Court cannot accept this defence either. Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations. The Court recognizes that the Albanian Government's complete failure to carry out its duties after the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, are extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom Government. But to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.
The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America[1] was a 1984 case of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in which the ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua and against the United States and awarded reparations to Nicaragua. The ICJ held that the U.S. had violated international law by supporting the Contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by mining Nicaragua's harbors. The United States refused to participate in the proceedings after the Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The U.S. later blocked enforcement of the judgment by theUnited Nations Security Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation.[2] The Nicaraguan government finally withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 (under the later, postFSLN, government of Violeta Chamorro), following a repeal of the law requiring the country to seek compensation.[3] The Court found in its verdict that the United States was "in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State", "not to intervene in its affairs", "not to violate its sovereignty", "not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce", and "in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956." The Court had 16 final decisions upon which it voted. In Statement 9, the Court stated that the U.S. encouraged human rights violations by the Contras by the manual entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare. However, this did not make such acts attributable to the U.S

Applying customary international law.Case: The Paquete Habana (1900, US) Facts: Two fishing vessels, running in and out of Havana, owned by a Spanishsubject a Cuban birth, were captured by US Naval vessels and claimed as prizes ofwar, as part of a blockade of Cuba in the Spanish American War. Vessels had noweapons onboard, and didnt know of the blockade until they were captured. Therewas no evidence vessels were aiding the enemies, and they made no attempt to runor resist capture. The vessels were then auctioned off by the district court.The owner brought the claim on behalf of himself and the crew (who had 2/3 sharesinterest of the catch), citing a tradition of exempting fishing vessels from beingcaptured as prizes of war. This international custom dates back to a decree issuedby Henry VI, and has been more or less observed by a majority of states since. Issue: Whether the customary doctrine of exempting fishing vessels from beingcaptured as prizes of war should be enforced. Holding: District court order reversed, and the proceeds of the sale of thevessels and its cargo, be restored to claimant, along with damages and costs.Reasoning: Court said that international law is part of our law, and when thereis no treaty or other governing force, we must look at the customs and usages ofcivilized nations. The court looked at many legal

precedents and treatiesestablishing this customary international law, and found that the capture of thevessels was unlawful and without probable cause. Court found no evidence that thevessels or its crew would aid the enemy; it was just a fishing vessel. Court alsonoted that it was the "general policy of the government to conduct the war inaccordance with the principles of international law."Notes First question: Whether or not there is customary international law? When doescustom ripen to law?Factors the court uses (here and in the asylum case) - have to be found the objective requirement - Practice of states States must be acting a certain way to be custom The subjective requirement - opinion juris (reason/psychology) Why are states acting that way? They have to be acting a particular way because they feelcompelled by law - They must show that the practice is coming about because thestate feels compelled by law Like cordiality - you have to prove there's lawbehind it, usually notEvidence to find these factors - What did court use in Havana case in order to find these factors? Objectively Scholarship Treaties of other nations (bilateral treaties) Court also noted the lack of competing principles Proclamations (p. 99) - the members of the country areproclaiming the practice Subjectively by acting in a certain way (abiding by treaty), they are actingthis way because they are compelled by law By looking at the sources of the evidence, court finds sufficient to enforce thecustom