Critical analysis of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

Critical analysis of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

2010G10

Introduction
On July 18, 2005, the joint statement by the President of the United States of America, George W. Bush, and the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, announcing future nuclear technology cooperation between the two countries did sent waves of astonishment and shock through the non-proliferation community. Since its first nuclear weapons test in 1974, India has been outside the global non-proliferation regime: It did not join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has remained under severe trade restrictions India has been isolated and condemned for its nuclear policy. Reaching out to this nuclear pariah has been an unprecedented and widely criticized step taken by the U.S. government. Almost two years later, the so-called U.S.-India Nuclear Deal (USIND) has developed from a mere statement into a real policy instrument that has already passed some remarkable obstacles on its way to full implementation. This includes an agreement on the separation of the Indian nuclear program into a civilian and a military sector and the passing of the necessary law changes in the U.S. Congress both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. Soon, the bilateral accord could be fully working, with all its intended and unintended implications. From the very beginning, the USIND has been heavily criticized as being a serious blow to the global non-proliferation regime in general and to the spirit of the NPT in particular. Frequently, critics have pointed out that the agreement might serve as a dangerous precedent, encouraging other countries to follow the example of India. In rewarding the Indian government for its non-compliance with the NPT, it is argued, the United States government has created an opportunity for everyone else to pursue nuclear weapons and claim the same treatment, explicitly including states such as North Korea or Iran. Has this door really been opened?

The Indian Nuclear Program

The Indian nuclear program and many of its facets have been relatively well documented.2 For the purpose of this paper, it is not necessary to give an elaborated and detailed account of all the developments that have been taking place so far. Nevertheless, a brief chronology will help to understand the broad context of the chain of events leading up to the
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rather surprising announcement of nuclear cooperation between the United States and India in 2005. Less than one year after independence, the Atomic Energy Act created the legal framework for civilian use of nuclear energy in India in April 1948. In 1954, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) was opened, marking the beginning of the nuclear era. In 1963, the United States and India signed a nuclear cooperation agreement. In the following years, the U.S. helped to construct and refuel the reactors Tarapur-1 and Tarapur-2 (Mumbai). In 1968, however, both India and Pakistan refused to sign the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), prompting increasing suspicion in Washington about New Delhis nuclear intentions. Meanwhile, the strategic environment for India had changed dramatically. The country had already fought and won two wars against Pakistan over Kashmir in 1947/48 and 1965. However, Pakistan had become member of the CENTO and was now an ally of the United States. When India assisted East-Pakistans struggle for independence in the war of 1971, the U.S. did send the aircraft-carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal. The ship was armed with nuclear weapons which President Nixon was willing to use if the Soviet Union had entered the conflict.4 This incident showed Indira Gandhi the vulnerability of India. Additionally, India had been humiliated by China in 1962 when it lost a border war. After China successfully tested a nuclear bomb in 1964, India felt threatened from all sides. As a reaction to all these developments, India entered into an alliance with the Soviet Union in August 1971. Furthermore, Indira Gandhi now pushed the nuclear weapons program forward. On May 18, 1974, India exploded a peaceful atomic device (also known under the code name Smiling Buddha) in the desert of Thar near Pokhran. This test de facto propelled India into the rank of a nuclear weapon state although the Indian government emphasized the peaceful nature of the explosion, thereby trying to maintain the official view that no imported nuclear technology or fuel had been employed for military use. Nevertheless, the U.S. initiative to create the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975 was in large part a reaction to the 1974 Pokhran test, which had demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be used to produce nuclear weapons. As a further respond, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 put massive restraints on nuclear exports from the United States. Indira Gandhis successor Morarji Desai, a follower of Mahatma Gandhis teachings, expressed his regrets about the 1974 test, but was unwilling to declare a
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unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons. When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, she restored the nuclear weapons program and even ordered another test in 1983, which was only canceled after political pressure by the U.S. government.6 During much of remainder of the 1980s, the Indian government (and particularly Indira Gandhis son Rajiv who became Prime Minister after the assassination of his mother in 1984) followed a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Still, however, the prospects for nuclear disarmament were dim. A nuclear weapon-free India became increasingly unrealistic. After 1998, it was nothing more than a fantasy. In the early 1990s, Pakistan began to pursue its nuclear weapons program with more determination and at full strength. As early as 1965, then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had declared: If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry. But we will get one of our own.8 From 1990 on, Pakistans Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was determined to make the nuclear weapons program work, even if that meant eating grass for a thousand years. India felt obliged to respond, and in 1995 Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was willing to conduct a nuclear test, which, once again, was prevented by U.S. intervention.9 On May 11, 1998, however, the newly elected Indian government under the leadership of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) finally ordered the test of three nuclear weapons near Pokhran (the test became also known as Pokhran-II). Two days later, two additional tests were conducted. With these tests, India established itself officially as a nuclear weapon state. Later that month, Pakistan did the same. Although India has never signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it has unilaterally followed a voluntary nuclear test moratorium since 1998.

The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

The joint statement from July 18, 2005, may have come as a surprise to many. However, it has to be seen as part of a much larger transformation of relations between the United States and India that pertain to many different areas. The USIND is one aspect of what has been labeled the energy dialogue between Washington and New Delhi. Additionally, there are dialogues concerning strategic and economic issues. Cooperation between the U.S. and India thus trenches far beyond the civilian nuclear sector. This represents a complete makeover of bilateral relations that have long been marked (and marred) by mutual distrust.
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After Indias nuclear tests in 1998, the relationship between the two countries was arguably at a low point. Afterwards, economic sanctions and harsh rhetoric seemed to hinder collaboration, let alone friendship, between Washington and New Delhi for the foreseeable future. That change came about so quickly has been largely attributed to two circumstances: First, the election of new governments in both the Unites States and India, with the election of George W. Bush arguably being the more important one since it opened up the opportunity for a new approach towards India, something that was not so easily possible for the Clinton administration after putting sanctions on India although it has to be acknowledged that it was Clintons visit to India in March 2000 that de-froze bilateral relations and relaxed the tensions. A new and allegedly more moderate partner in India after the Congress Partys return to power in 2004 obviously also helped to justify the new course. Second, the events of September 11, 2001, forced the United States administration to rethink their global strategy and to reach out to South Asia in general and India in particular. In the very first period after the attacks and in the starting phase of the Afghanistan war Pakistan for military reasons obviously played a much larger role for Washington, but the shift towards India in the following years may turn out to be of more importance. A third argument one might add to this could be the growing significance of the Indian diaspora in the United States. The Indian American community not only creates a more favorable public climate towards India but also is very active in all forms of political lobbying and has definitely had its share in the improved relations between the two countries. In January 2004, the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) laid out the perspectives of future U.S.-India cooperation. In a large arrangement, the United States announced among other things their willingness to further high-technology trade and, thereby, to help and support India in areas such as its civilian space program and also its
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civilian nuclear activities. This was a clear signal by a U.S. government now committed to help India become a major world power in the 21st century. In July 2005, the joint statement of President Bush and Prime Minister Singh declared with regard to civil nuclear cooperation despite India not being a member of the NPT: [A]s a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. The agreement basically offers India assistance with its civilian nuclear program in exchange for international inspections. This not only includes technical support but also the possibility to import fissile materials, particularly uranium. Because it is not part of the NPT and consequently also no member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), India has no access to the international uranium market. The deal would help India handling its notorious problem of uranium shortage. As a precondition, however, India would have to open the respective (civil) nuclear facilities involved into possible imports/exports to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With the accord, the United States also de facto recognizes India as a nuclear power a facet that is of more importance to India than one may initially suspect. The deal was further pushed forward on occasion of George W. Bushs visit to India in March 2006 when India agreed to separate its civilian nuclear program from its strategic military nuclear facilities and put the complete civil sector under international safeguards from 2014 on (a more detailed account of the separation plan will be given later, see table 1). The implications of the whole arrangement became clear in a press conference on March 2, 2006, when President Bush defined the new U.S.-India relations: Our relationship has changed dramatically. We now have a strategic partnership. We must lead. Prime Minister Singh added: America is now a partner, friend and well-wisher. There are no limits to Indo-US friendship. With the separation plan, one huge difficulty standing in the way of full implementation of the USIND in India has been overcome. In the U.S., the joint statement of 2005 set in motion massive legislative action in order to make the law changes required to give the pact a legal framework.16 After passing the House of Representatives and the Senate with astonishing ease, President Bush signed into law the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act on December 18, 2006. While the USIND has already gone a long way, it is not implemented yet. Necessary preconditions include a finalization of a nuclear cooperation agreement between Washington and New Delhi and a safeguard agreement
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between India and the IAEA.17 The final version of the deal will have to specify the technical details of the agreement and has to be formally approved by Congress.18 However, the Indian parliament does not need to be consulted, a formal act of approval is not necessary. Given the wide-spread criticism of the USIND by many political actors in India, this fact may turn out to be of significant importance. Additionally, the NSG has not yet allowed for civilian nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and India. However, it is important to note that the NSG does not constitute an international treaty with legally binding regulations. Hence, the United States could conduct the agreement even without the consent of all NSG member states. In all, the remaining hurdles seem to be manageable so that the USIND could soon be fully working.

Critical analysis of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

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Stages of Indo US Nuclear Deal

July18,2005 Joint statement at Washington (intention to enter into nuclear agreement)

July26,2006 Passed Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006

Nov16,2006 Passed 'United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and US Additional Protocol Implementation Act'

Aug13,2007 to July08,2008 Hue and cry in Indian Parliament

July10,2008 Vote of Confidence in Parliament

July22,2008 UPA Government wins trust vote in Lok Sabha

Sep27,2008 U.S. House of Representatives approve the Indo US deal

Oct01,2008 U.S. Senate approves the deal

Oct 8,2008 - President Bush signs legislation to enact the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement . The 123 Agreement between India and US is finally operationalized

Oct10,2008 - Deal is signed by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Washington D C.

Critical analysis of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

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Impact on India
Indias economical growth is 8-10 % a year and it wont be able to keep up without clean nuclear energy. Nuclear energy is a must to become a developed nation. Reliable power resources bring more foreign investments to India. This will bring more and more job opportunities to India. Some of India's largest and most well-respected corporations like Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, National Thermal Power Corporation and Larsen & Toubro eyeing a $100 billion (U.S.) business in this sector over the same time period. According to Hindustan Times, nuclear energy will produce 52,000 MW of electricity in India by 2020.

Sources:
http://www.milligazette.com/dailyupdate/2006/20060303_india_us_nuclear.htm http://www.financialexpress.com/news/highlights-of-indous-nucleardeal/208405/ http://www.citehr.com/11213-nuclear-deal-other-side-view.html http://www.indianofficer.com/forums/7282-123-agreement-indo-us-nucleardeal-full-text.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.-India_Civil_Nuclear_Agreement Adams, Jonathan. International community split over U.S.-India nuclear deal. The Christian Science Monitor. August 21, 2008. http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0820/p99s01-duts.html Bajoria, Jayshree; Pan, Esther. The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal. The Washington Post. September 4, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/09/04/AR2008090401614.html Denyer, Simon. Factbox: U.S.-India Nuclear Deal Business Potential. Reuters. October 2, 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssConsumerGoodsAndRetailNews/idUSSP57 26420081002 India Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Responding to Critics. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. March 2006.