DISTRICTCOURT,CITYANDCOUNTYOF DENVER,STATEOFCOLORADO 1437BannockStreet,Room256 Denver,Colorado80202 COLORADOETHICSWATCHCOLORADO COMMONCAUSEDAVIDPALADINO,etal., Plaintiffs, v. SCOTTGESSLER,asSecretaryofStatefortheState ofColorado, Defendant.

COURTUSEONLY CaseNo.:2012CV2133 (consolidatedwith2012CV2153) Courtroom:280

ORDER THISMATTERcomesbeforetheCourtonPlaintiffsconsolidatedComplaints challenginganumberofrulespromulgatedbytheDefendantinhiscapacityasColorados SecretaryofState(SecretaryorDefendant). I.Introduction In2002,thepeopleofthestateofColoradopassedAmendment27,declaring that...theinterestsofthepublicarebestservedbylimitingcampaign contributions,encouragingvoluntarycampaignspendinglimits,providingforfull andtimelydisclosureofcampaigncontributions,independentexpenditures,and fundingofelectioneeringcommunications,andstrongenforcementofcampaign financerequirements. Colo.Const.Art.XXVIII1. InNovember,2011,theSecretaryinstitutedarulemakingprocesstopromulgatenew rulestoadministerandenforceColoradoscampaignfinanceandelectionlaws.Thenewrules becamepermanentlyeffectiveonApril12,2012. Plaintiffsconsistofnumerouspublicinterestgroups,watchdogorganizations,and individuals,allofwhomhaveaninterestinthenewrules.Plaintiffsfiledtwoseparate

complaints,whichwereconsolidatedinthisaction,challengingthefollowingrulesimplemented bytheSecretarypursuanttotherulemakingprocess:1.71.101.121.184.14.26.16.27.2 14and18.1.8.Thepartiesagreethatinlightofsubsequentchangesimplementedbythe Secretary,thechallengestoRules6.16.2and14aremoot.Defendantdoesnotchallenge Plaintiffsstandingtobringthisaction. II.StandardofReview UndertheColoradoAdministrativeProcedureAct,C.R.S.244101,etseq.,a challengedagencyactionmustbeheldunlawfulifthereviewingcourtfinds: thattheagencyactionisarbitraryorcapricious,adenialofstatutoryright, contrarytoconstitutionalright,power,privilege,orimmunity,inexcessof statutoryjurisdiction,authority,purposes,orlimitations,notinaccordwiththe proceduresorprocedurallimitationsofthisarticleorasotherwiserequiredby law,anabuseorclearlyunwarrantedexerciseofdiscretion,baseduponfindings offactthatareclearlyerroneousonthewholerecord,unsupportedbysubstantial evidencewhentherecordisconsideredasawhole,orotherwisecontraryto law.... C.R.S.244106(7).Uponsuchafinding,thecourtmustsetasidetheagencyactionandshall restrainenforcementoftheorderorruleunderreview...andaffordsuchotherreliefasmaybe appropriate.Id. Anadoptedagencyruleispresumedtobevalid,andtheburdentoestablishitsinvalidity restsonthepartychallengingtherule.ColoradoGroundWaterCommnv.EaglePeakFarms, 919P.2d212,217(Colo.1996).Anagencyispresumedtohaveexpertiseinthesubstantive arenainwhichitoperates,andacourtmaygivecertaindeferencetotheagencythatadoptsarule pursuanttoitsauthorizingstatute.TivolinoTellerHousev.Fagan,926P.2d1208,1215(Colo. 1996). Theactuallevelofdeferencevariesbaseduponthecircumstancessurroundingthe enactedrule.Whererulesarebasedonjudgmentalorpredictivefacts,somedeferenceto administrativeexpertiseisappropriate.U.S.WestCommcns,Inc.v.ColoradoPublicUtil. Commn,978P.2d671,675(Colo.1999).Ifaruleseekstoaddressthepreciseissuethatthe legislatureorthepeopleactingpursuanttotheirreservedlegislativepowerasspecifiedin ArticleV,section1oftheColoradoConstitutionhasalreadyaddressed,thecourtswill construethestatuteaccordinglyandaffordnodeferencetotheagencysinterpretation.City ofBoulderv.ColoradoPublicUtil.Commn,996P.2d1270,1277(Colo.2000)(citation omitted). Legalinterpretationsofarule,astatute,oraconstitutionalamendmentarereviewedona denovobasis.Cerbov.ProtectColo.Jobs,Inc.,240P.3d495,500(Colo.App.2010)(citations omitted).Whereanagencymisconstruesormisappliesthelawinexecutinginitsregulatory 2

function,thecourtshavenocausetodefertotheagencysapproach.SeeSclavenitisv.Cherry HillsVillageBd.OfAdjustment&Appeals,751P.2d661,664(Colo.App.1988).Anagency rulemaynotmodifyorcontraveneanexistingstatute,andanyrulethatisinconsistentwithor contrarytoastatuteisvoid.IndependenceInstitutev.Gessler,__F.Supp.3d__,2012WL 1439167at*8(D.Colo.April26,2012)(citingSuetrackUSAv.Indus.ClaimAppealsOffice, 902P.2d854(Colo.App.1995))(bracketsomitted).Likewise,whereanagencyofficial reinterpretsastatuteinawaythatiscontrarytothatofhispredecessor,thenewconstructionis owednodeference.CommonCausev.Meyer,758P.2d153,159(Colo.1988). Inpromulgatingrules,theSecretarycannotredefineatermalreadydefinedinthe Constitutionorstatutesorinsuchawaythatthedefinitionimposesadditionalrestrictionsona statuteorconstitutionalprovision.Sangerv.Dennis,148P.3d404,412(Colo.App.2006).Any rulemustbereasonableandconsistentwithpurposesofArticleXXVIII.Id.at41213.In summary: Whenacourtreviewsanagencysconstructionofthestatutewhichitadministers, itisconfrontedwithtwoquestions.First,always,isthequestionwhether[the legislature]hasdirectlyspokentotheprecisequestionatissue.Iftheintentof [thelegislature]isclear,thatistheendofthematterforthecourt,aswellasthe agency,mustgiveeffecttotheunambiguouslyexpressedintentof[the legislature].If,however,thecourtdetermines[thelegislature]hasnotdirectly addressedtheprecisequestionatissue,thecourtdoesnotsimplyimposeitsown constructiononthestatute,aswouldbenecessaryintheabsenceofan administrativeinterpretation.Rather,ifthestatuteissilentorambiguouswith respecttothespecificissue,thequestionforthecourtiswhethertheagencys answerisbasedonapermissibleconstructionofthestatute....If[the legislature]hasexplicitlyleftagapfortheagencytofill,thereisanexpress delegationofauthoritytotheagencytoelucidateaspecificprovisionofthe statutebyregulation.Suchlegislativeregulationsaregivencontrollingweight unlesstheyarearbitrary,capricious,ormanifestlycontrarytothestatute. Sometimesthelegislativedelegationtoanagencyonaparticularquestionis implicitratherthanexplicit.Insuchacase,acourtmaynotsubstituteitsown constructionofastatutoryprovisionforareasonableinterpretationmadebythe administratorofanagency. Wine&SpiritsWholesalersv.Colo.DeptofRevenue,919P2d894,897(Colo.App.1996) (quotingChevron,U.S.A.,Inc.v.NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,Inc.,467U.S.837,84243 (1984))(emphasisadded). III.Analysis A.Rule1.7,DefinitionofElectioneeringCommunications. ChallengedRule1.7providesasfollows: 3

 Electioneeringcommunicationisanycommunicationthat(1)meetsthe definitionofelectioneeringcommunicationinArticleXXVIII,Section2(7),and (2)isthefunctionalequivalentofexpressadvocacy.Whendeterminingwhethera communicationisthefunctionalequivalentofexpressadvocacy: 1.7.1Acommunicationisthefunctionalequivalentofexpressadvocacyonlyif itissubjecttonoreasonableinterpretationotherthananappealtovoteforor againstaspecificcandidate. 1.7.2Indeterminingwhetheracommunicationisthefunctionalequivalentof expressadvocacy,itshallbejudgedbyitsplainlanguage,notbyanintent andeffecttest,orothercontextualfactors. 1.7.3Acommunicationisnotthefunctionalequivalentofexpressadvocacyif it: (a)Doesnotmentionanyelection,candidacy,politicalparty,opposing candidate,orvotingbythegeneralpublic, (b)Doesnottakeapositiononanycandidate'sorofficeholderscharacter, qualifications,orfitnessforoffice,and (c)Merelyurgesacandidatetotakeapositionwithrespecttoanissueor urgesthepublictoadoptapositionandcontactacandidatewithrespectto anissue. Plaintiffscomplainthatthisnewruleaddsafunctionalequivalencetestthat substantiallynarrowsthedefinitionofelectioneeringcommunicationcontainedinArticle XXVIII2(7),andthereforeimproperlyrestrictstheuniverseofthosewhomustmakethe requireddisclosures.Further,Plaintiffsarguethatthecasesuponwhichtheruleisbased (primarilyF.E.C.v.WisconsinRighttoLife,551U.S.449(2007))wererenderedobsoleteby CitizensUnitedv.F.E.C.,558U.S.__,130S.Ct,876(2010).Inessence,Plaintiffsarguethat CitizensUnitedplacedfew,ifany,FirstAmendmentrestrictionsoncontributiondisclosure requirements,andthatthereforetheapplicationofWisconsinRighttoLifetodisclosure requirementsisunwarranted. However,newRule1.7issimilarinmostrespectstotheruleitreplaces,formerRule9.4. FormerRule9.4stated: PursuanttothedecisionsoftheColoradoCourtofAppealsinthecaseof Harwoodv.SenateMajorityFund,LLC,141P.3d962(2006),andoftheUnited StatesSupremeCourtinthecaseofF.E.C.v.WisconsinRighttoLife,127S.Ct. 2652(2007),acommunicationshallbedeemedanelectioneeringcommunication onlyifitissusceptibletonoreasonableinterpretationotherthanasanappealto votefororagainstaspecificcandidate.Inmakingthisdetermination,(1)there canbenofreerangingintentandeffecttest(2)theregenerallyshouldbeno

discoveryorinquiryintocontextualfactors(3)discussionofissuescannotbe bannedmerelybecausetheissuesmightberelevanttoanelection(4)ina debatablecase,thetieisresolvedinfavorofnotdeemingamattertobean electioneeringcommunication. Thenewruleaddsnosubstantiveadditionaltermsandimposesnoadditionalrestrictions overtheoldrule.WhileitmaybethatCitizensUnitedrendersbothnewandoldrulesobsolete, priorRule9.4wasineffectandunchallengeduntilitwassupersededbyRule1.7. PlaintiffsrelyonInreInterrogatoriesPropoundedbyGovernorRitter,Jr.,Concerning theEffectofCitizensUnitedv.FederalElectionCommn,558U.S.__(2010)onCertain ProvisionsofArticleXXVIIIofTheConstitutionoftheStateofColorado,227P.3d892(2010) (Interrogatories).There,theColoradoSupremeCourtruledthatCitizensUnitedinvalidated ColoradoConstitutionArticleXXVIII3(4)and6(2)thesesectionsmadeitunlawfulfora corporationorlabororganizationtofundelectioneeringcommunications.Plaintiffspointout thatInterrogatoriesleftthedisclosurerequirementsofArticleXXVIIIundisturbed.But Plaintiffsreadtoomuchintothatdecision.TheColoradoSupremeCourtwasnotaskedabout thedisclosurerequirementsofArticleXXVIIIandthereforedidnotrenderadecisionabout corporateoruniondisclosures.Moreover,IagreewithDefendantthatColoradoEthicsWatchv. SenateMajorityFund,269P.3d1248(Colo.2012)reaffirmsWisconsinRighttoLifes applicabilitytotheColoradoConstitutionsdefinitionofElectioneeringCommunication.E.g., ColoradoEthicsWatchv.SenateMajorityFund,269P.3dat125758and1258n.8. Here,itappearsthattheSecretarydidnotmodifyorcontraveneanexistingstatute. IndependenceInstitutev.Gessler,__F.Supp.3d__,2012WL1439167at*8(D.Colo.April 26,2012)Sangerv.Dennis,148P.3d404,412(Colo.App.2006).Further,thechallengedrule issimilartotheruleenactedbyDefendantspredecessor,anditthereforeisentitledtodeference. Ingramv.Cooper,698P.2d1314(Colo.1985).Accordingly,IconcludethattheSecretaryhas actedwithinhisauthorityunderC.R.S.244101inpromulgatingRule1.7. B.Rule1.12,ReportingThresholdforIssueCommittees Amongotherthings,Art.XXVIII2(10)(1)(I)definesanissuecommitteeasagroup thathasamajorpurposeofsupportingoropposinganyballotissueorballotquestion. ChallengedRule1.12.3relatestothephrasemajorpurpose,andstatesasfollows: Forpurposesofdeterminingwhetheranissuecommitteehasamajorpurpose underArticleXXVIII,Section2(10)(a)(I)andsection145103(12)(b)(II)(A), C.R.S.,ademonstratedpatternofconductisestablishedby: (a)Annualexpendituresinsupportoforoppositiontoballotissuesorballotquestions thatexceed30%oftheorganizationstotalspendingduringthesameperiodor

(b)Productionorfundingofwrittenorbroadcastcommunicationsinsupportofor oppositiontoaballotissueorballotquestion,wheretheproductionorfunding comprisesmorethan30%oftheorganizationstotalspendingduringacalendaryear. Plaintiffschallengethisrulearguingthattheadditionofarevenuepercentage requirement(30%)isarbitrary,andthatsuchalimitationisnotprovidedforinC.R.S.145 10312(b)(I)(III)whichalreadydefinesthetermmajorpurposewithoutresortingtoanannual revenuepercentageofanykind.TheDefendantrespondsthatheisprovidingaclear,brightline testthatbringscertaintytothosegroupswhichmayqualifyasissuecommittees. C.R.S.14510312(b)(I)(III)definesmajorpurpose.Plaintiffsarecorrectthatthe statutedoesnotincludeanannualincomepercentageinitsdefinition.Priortotheenactmentof thestatute,twocaseshadalreadyheldthatthetermmajorpurposeasusedinArticleXXVIII wasnotambiguous.Cerbov.ProtectColo.Jobs,Inc.,240P.3d495(Colo.App.2010) IndependenceInstitutev.Coffman,209P.3d1130(Colo.App.2008).Subsequenttothesecases, thelegislaturepassedastatuteessentiallycodifyingtheholdingofthesetwocases.C.R.S.1 45103(12)(b). Theadditional30%requirementaddsarestrictionnotfoundinthestatuteandnot supportedbytherecord.Therevenuerequirementworksfurthermischiefinthatitappearsnot tobeincomeneutral.Inotherwords,issuecommitteeswithverylittleincome,which presumablyspendmostofthatincomeonelectionrelatedmatters,willberequiredtoreport. Butlargecorporationsorwealthyindividualscouldspendsubstantialsumsofmoneyonissues andyetnothavetoreportbecausetheyarespendinglessthan30%oftheirrevenueonthese activities.Certainlythisiscontrarytotheintentoftheelectorate,whichhasexpressedan interestincompellingmoredisclosure,notless.Colo.Const.Art.XXVIII1. Regardlessoftheconsequencesofthe30percentrequirement,itsadditiontothemajor purposedefinitioninappropriatelymodifiesandcontravenesanexistingstatute,C.R.S.145 103(12)(b).IndependenceInstitutev.Gessler,__F.Supp.3d__,2012WL1439167at*8(D. Colo.April26,2012).Moreovertherevenuetestclearlyisatoddswiththeexpressintentofthe legislature,whichhasenactedadefinitionwithoutuseofsuchatest.Forthesereasons,Rule 1.12.3isinvalidasitexceedstheSecretarysdelegatedauthorityunderC.R.S.244103(8)(a). Wine&SpiritsWholesalersv.Colo.DeptofRevenue,919P.2d894,897(Colo.App.1996) Sangerv.Dennis,148P.3d404,412(Colo.App.2006). C.Rule1.18.2,ExpenditureThresholdforPoliticalCommittee ChallengedRule1.18.2definespoliticalcommitteeasfollows: Politicalcommitteeincludesonlyapersonorgroupofpersonsthatsupportor opposethenominationorelectionofoneormorecandidatesasitsmajorpurpose. ForpurposesofthisRule,majorpurposemeans:

(a)Theorganizationspecificallyidentifiessupportingoropposingthenominationof oneormorecandidatesforstateorlocalpublicofficeasaprimaryobjectiveinits organizingdocumentsor (b)Annualexpendituresmadetosupportoropposethenominationorelectionofone ormorecandidatesforstateorlocalpublicofficeareamajorityoftheorganizations totalspendingduringthesameperiod. Plaintiffsobjecttothisrulebecauseitaddsthefurtherlimitationthatamajorityofthe organizationstotalspendingbedirectedtowardssupportingoropposingcandidates.Plaintiffs pointoutthatthisdefinitionradicallynarrowsthedefinitionofpoliticalcommitteesetforthin Art.XXVIII2(12)(a).There,politicalcommitteeisdefinedasanygroupthatspendsor receivesmorethan$200tosupportoropposecandidates.Defendantarguesthattherules majorpurposetestisclearlyrequiredinlightofAllianceforColoradosFamiliesv.Gilbert, 172P.3d964(Colo.App.2007)andColoradoRighttoLifeComm.,Inc.v.Coffman,498F.3d 1137,115455(10thCir.2007).Bothofthesecasesheldthat,asappliedtothepartiesinthose twocases,thepoliticalcommitteetestnowarticulatedinRule1.18.2wasrequiredbyBuckley v.Valeo,424U.S.1(1976). BothAllianceforColoradosFamiliesv.GilbertandColoradoRighttoLifeComm.,Inc. v.CoffmanundeniablyrequiredapplicationoftheBuckleytesttodeterminewhetherthe plaintiffsinthesecasesweresubjecttoregulationaspoliticalcommittees.Nevertheless,the Secretarysproposeddefinitionisclearlycontrarytothepoliticalcommitteedefinitionin AmendmentXXVIII.Courtscannotrewritestatelawstoconform[to]constitutional requirementswheredoingsowouldbeinconsistentwithlegislative,orhere,thestatecitizenrys intent....AllianceforColoradosFamiliesv.Gilbert,172P.3d964,972(Colo.App.2007) (quotingColoradoRighttoLifeComm.,Inc.v.Coffman,498F.3d1137,115455(10thCir. 2007)). BecausetheRule1.18.2slimitationiscontrarytotheintentofArt.XXVIII2(12)(a)as passedbythecitizensofColorado,theSecretarycannotreadthemajorpurposelimitationinto thedefinition.Doingsowouldresultintheadditionofanew,strict,limitationintoSection 2(12)(a).BothAllianceforColoradosFamiliesv.GilbertandColoradoRighttoLifeComm., Inc.v.Coffmanholdthatsuchanarrowingisimpermissible(though,paradoxically,alsorequired topassconstitutionalmusterasappliedinthosecases).ButSection2(12)(a)hasneverbeen declaredfaciallyunconstitutional,sotherestillmaybecircumstanceswhereitcanapplyas written. Ultimately,itcomesdowntothis:CantheSecretaryaddamajorpurposelimitationto Section2(12)(a)tosavetheprovision,orisitamatterforathelegislatureorthecitizens, throughreferendum,tofixit?WhiletheSecretaryspragmatismistoberespected,removinga criticalelementof2(12)(a)byrulegoesbeyondtheSecretaryspowers.Sangerv.Dennis,148 P.3d404(Colo.App.2006)Wine&SpiritsWholesalersv.Colo.DeptofRevenue,919P.2d 894,897(Colo.App.1996).Heassumesasolutionwithoutlegislativeorvoterinput,and

therebyexceedshisdelegatedauthority.C.R.S.244103(8)(a).Forthesereasons,Rule1.18.2 isinvalid. D.Rule1.10and7.2.1,Definitionofpoliticalorganization ChallengedRule7.2.1states: Politicalorganizations.Inthecaseofpoliticalorganizationsasdefinedinsection 145103(14.5),C.R.S.: 7.2.1Forpurposesofsection145108.5,C.R.S.,anentityisconsidereda politicalorganizationonlyif[it]: (a)Hasasitsmajorpurposeinfluencingorattemptingtoinfluenceelections asdefinedinRule1.10and (b)Isexempt,orintendstoseekexemption,fromtaxationbytheInternal RevenueService. (Punctuationintheoriginal.) ChallengedRule1.10states: Influencingorattemptingtoinfluence,forpurposesofpoliticalorganizationsas definedinsection145103(14.5),C.R.S.,meansmakingexpendituresfor communicationsthatexpresslyadvocatetheelectionordefeatofaclearly identifiedcandidateorcandidates. (Punctuationintheoriginal.) Plaintiffsmaintainthatthesetworulesimpermissiblynarrowthedefinitionofpolitical organizationwhichalreadyisdefinedinC.R.S.145103(14.5).Theresult,accordingto Plaintiffs,isthatthatpoliticalorganizationasdefinedbytheserulesbecomesindistinguishable frompoliticalcommitteewhichinturnresultsinaloopholethatallowsorganizationstoavoid reportingatall.TheSecretaryrespondsthatRule7.2.1merelyechoesthedefinitionofSection 527oftheInternalRevenueCode,andthatRule1.10issupportedbyfortyyearsofFirst AmendmentJurisprudence. C.R.S.145103(14.5)definespoliticalorganizationas apoliticalorganizationdefinedinsection527(e)(1)ofthefederalInternal RevenueCodeof1986,asamended,thatisengagedininfluencingorattempting toinfluencetheselection,nomination,electionorappointmentofanyindividual toanystateorlocalpublicofficeinthestateandthatisexempt,orintendstoseek anyexemption,fromtaxationpursuanttosection527oftheinternalrevenue code. 8

 Tothis,theSecretarysruleaddsamajorpurposerequirementandfurthernarrowsthe phraseinfluenceorattemptingtoinfluencetoexpressadvocacy.Thus,underthechallenged rules,anentityisconsideredapoliticalorganizationonlyif[it]...hasasitsmajorpurpose influencingorattemptingtoinfluenceelectionsasdefinedinRule1.10.Rule1.10inturn definesinfluencingorattemptingtoinfluenceasmakingexpendituresforcommunications thatexpresslyadvocatetheelectionordefeatofaclearlyidentifiedcandidateorcandidates. Readincombination,asintended,thetworulesdefineapoliticalorganizationasanentity whichhasasitsmajorpurposemakingexpendituresforcommunicationsthatexpresslyadvocate theelectionordefeatofaclearlyidentifiedcandidateorcandidates. Thus,theSecretarysrulesimproperlynarrowthedefinitionofpoliticalorganization. Underthestatute,itisanorganizationthatisengagedininfluencingelectionsorappointments ofindividualstopublicoffice.UnderRule7.2.1,thisisnarrowedtoorganizationswithamajor purposeininfluencingelections.Rule1.10furthernarrowsthedefinitiontogroupswhich expresslyadvocatefororagainstcandidates.Thesenarrowingruleseffectivelyeliminate distinctionsbetweenpoliticalorganizationandpoliticalcommittee.Politicalcommittees, subjecttoaconstitutionalcontributionreportinglimitof$200,couldswitchtoapolitical organizationandavoidthisrestrictionunderthechallengedrules.Sucharesultiscontraryto thecleartermsofthestatuteandtheintentofthelegislature.SeeLetterfromStateSenator MorganCarrolltoSecretaryofStateScottGessler(Dec.14,2011)(RecordatTab5.11). RemovingorlimitingcriticalelementsofC.R.S.145103(14.5)byrulegoesbeyondthe Secretaryspowers.Sangerv.Dennis,148P.3d404(Colo.App.2006)Wine&Spirits Wholesalersv.Colo.DeptofRevenue,919P.2d894,897(Colo.App.1996).Hethushas exceededhisdelegatedauthorityunderC.R.S.244103(8)(a).Forthesereasons,Rules1.10 and7.2areinvalid. E.18.1.8(a),MajorContributorReportingPenalties ChallengedRule1.18.1providesasfollows: 18.1Requestsforwaiverorreductionofcampaignfinancepenalties 18.1.1Arequestforwaiverorreductionofcampaignfinancepenalties imposedunderArticleXXVIII,Section10(2)muststatethereasonforthe delinquency.Thefilershouldprovideanexplanationthatincludesallrelevant factorsrelatingtothedelinquencyandanymitigatingcircumstances,including measurestakentoavoidfuturedelinquencies.BeforetheSecretaryofState willconsiderarequest,thereportmustbefiled,andarequestincludingthe informationrequiredbythisparagraphmustbesubmitted *** 18.1.8MajorContributorReports

(a)PenaltiesassessedforfailuretotimelyfileaMajorContributorReportunder section145108(2.5),C.R.S.,stopaccruingonthedatethatthecontributionis firstdisclosed,eitherontheMajorContributorReportortheregularlyscheduled ReportofContributionsandExpenditures.Penaltieswillnotaccruebeyondthe dateofthegeneralelection. Plaintiffschallengethisruleclaimingthatitsetsadefinitecutofffortheaccrualoffines forfailuretofilerequiredreports.Plaintiffsmaintainthatcertainwealthyorganizationssimply willdeclinetofileknowingthatthefineforfailingtodosowillbefixedonElectionDay. Defendantmaintainsthathesimplyissettingforthwhatconstitutesgoodcauseforfailingtofile areport. C.R.S.145108(2.5)specifieswhenamajordonorreportmustfiled.C.R.S.145 111.5(c)setsthepenaltyforfailingtodoso:fiftydollarsperdayforeachdaythatareport [requiredtobefiled]isnotfiled.Thereisnolimit,andnocutoffdate.Rule18.1.8abrogates thefiftydollarperdaypenaltyonceacontributorisidentifiedinanyreport,eithertheMajor ContributorReportortheregularlyscheduledReportofContributionandExpenditures.Butthe rulegoestoofarandcutsoffallpenaltiesasofthedateofthegeneralelection. Thissubstantiallydenudesthestatutorypenaltyandraisesthepossibilitythatthose subjecttothepenaltysimplywillnotreportknowingthatthefineamountwillbefixedon ElectionDay.TheSecretarydoesnotaddresstheeffectofthecutoffdateinhisbrief.Stopping accrualofthefineonElectionDayiscontrarytothestatedinterestsofstrongenforcementof campaignfinancerequirementsasstatedinArt.XVIII1.Furthermore,theruleremovesan enforcementelementfromC.R.S.145111.5(c)bysettinganultimatelimitonfinesforlackof reporting.Assuch,thisruleisbeyondtheSecretaryspowersunderSangerv.Dennis,148P.3d 404(Colo.App.2006)Wine&SpiritsWholesalersv.Colo.DeptofRevenue,919P.2d894, 897(Colo.App.1996).HethushasexceededhisdelegatedauthorityunderC.R.S.244 103(8)(a).Forthesereasons,Rule18.1.8isinvalid. F.Rules4.1and15.6 Rules4.1and15.6increasethereportinglimitsforissuecommitteesto$5,000.Both rulescontainadisclaimerindicatingthattheywillnotbeenforcedunlessColoradoCommon Causev.Gessler,No.2011CV4164(DenverDist.Ct.Nov.17,2011)isoverturnedbyahigher court.ColoradoCommonCauseheldthatthe$5,000limitinRule4.1spredecessor,Rule4.27, wasinvalid.TheSecretaryhasindicatedinRules4.1and15.6thattheywillnotbeenforcedin lightofthetrialcourtsrulinginColoradoCommonCause. Underthedoctrineofripeness,aclaimmustberealandimmediate.Withthis requirementinmind,wemustrefusetoconsideruncertainorcontingentfuture mattersthatsupposespeculativeinjurythatmayneveroccur.Wedetermine

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ripenessonthebasisofthesituationatthetimeofreview,notthesituation existingwhenthetrialcourtacted. DevelopmentalPathwaysv.Ritter,178P.3d524,534(Colo.2008)(citationsandinternalquotes omitted).Here,theSecretaryhasexpresslystatedthatRules4.1and15.6willnotbeenforced pendingarulinginColoradoCommonCause.Becausethereisnorealandimmediatethreatof enforcement,IconcludethatPlaintiffsclaimswithrespecttothesetworulesarenotripefor decision. IV.Conclusion Forthereasonssetforthabove,Rule1.7isvalid.Rules1.101.121.187.2and18.1.8 areinvalid.Rules4.1and15.6arenotyetripefordetermination. ENTEREDthis10thdayofAugust,2012. BYTHECOURT:

J.EricElliff DistrictCourtJudge

11