PEOPLE VS. CAYAT [68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO.

45987; 5 MAY 1939] Facts: In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians. Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind. The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take. Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law. Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the nonChristian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

Ceniza vs. Comelec Facts: Sometime December 1999, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 5, providing for local elections on January 30, 1980 The law in questions provides that any city existing with an annual regular income derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than 40M at the time of the approval shall be classified as highly urbanized city and all other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located. To implement the law in question, the respondent Comelec enacted Resolution no.1421, which provides the instruction of voting provincial officials from highlyurbanized and component cities. The Resolution provides that registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote in the election of the officials of the province of which the city is a component, if its charter provides, but in voters in highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located. The effect of the law in question results to inconsistencies with other city. Two of which are; City of Cebu is considered as a highly urbanized city and its charter allows that registered voters can elect provincial officials, but pursuant to the law in question, they cannot. Also the City of Mandaue is classified as component city but cannot vote on provincial officials since their charter prohibits them to do so. Thus, a taxpayer suit was instituted by the petitioners led by Ramon Ceniza, assailing the validity of BP51, on which uses the annual income as basis for classification arbitrary and is not germane to the purposes of the law. Issue: Whether or not annual income as basis reasonable and valid distinction. Whether or not BP 51is not germane to the purposes of the law. Held: Yes. It is a substantial distinction and it is with accordance to the purpose of the law. In the issue of its relativity to the purpose of the law, what the law in question seeks to effectuate is the constitutional provision as prescribed in the Principal and State Policies that the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, specially the barrio tonsure their fullest development as selfreliant communities. By enacting BP 51, it defines a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall independent from the provincial government and officials. By virtue of city classification set by BP 51, then cities, with capability of independence and self-reliance will be detached from the supervisory powers of the provincial government. Because the revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic and political unit. Also, it will show whether or not the city has a sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is located. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. Thus, if a city will have an annual income as set which is 40M, then it would be self-reliant to mange itself and the provincial will no longer lend its assistance, thus corollary to their independence, is equal to the loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs specifically in electing provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any jurisdiction and authority over these highly urbanized cities. Rufino Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan Facts:On 1979, by virtue of the PD1486 as amended byPD1606, RA1379 was passed supplemented by another act, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.The petitioner, Rufino Nunez was convicted by thepublic respondent, Sandiganbayan, of Estafa throughfalsification of public and commercial documents.The petitioner filed a motion to quash inconstitutional and jurisdictional grounds but was denied bythe respondent. Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition claiming that PD1486 as amended is violative of his right to equal protection of laws.The petitioner contends that 1) an appeal, as amatter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion, 2) appeal also was shrunk and limited only toquestions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trialevidences and 3) there is only one chance to appealconviction, by certiorari to the SC instead of traditional twochances, CA then SC.He also avers that other Estafa indictess are entitledto appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts andto two appellate courts. Issue: Was the law in question, amending the jurisdictionof Sandiganbayan, violates the right of equal protection? Held: No it is not.The court ruled that the law in question satisfies therequisites laid under the People vs. Vera case, warranting itas a valid and reasonable classification. Base on substantial distinction. Since the institution of the1973 constitution, there isalready an established different procedures for an accused, aprivate citizen or a public official, and it is not necessarily abreach to equal protection of law. Germane to the purposes of the law Sandiganbayan is created to promote a accountableand honest public service since as constitution provides, public office/service is a public trust. Moreover, this specialcourt is created in a purpose of providing remedy to aproblem, which is, dishonesty in public service. 2

INT'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING [333 SCRA 13; G.R. NO. 128845; 1 JUN 2000] Facts: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. Issue: Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause. Held: The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreignhires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. Wherefore, the petition is given due course. The petition is hereby granted in part. The orders of the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10, 1996 and march 19, 1997, are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER v. MISSOURI, 234 U.S. 199 (1914) 234 U.S. 199 INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF MISSOURI, ON THE INFORMATION OF ITS ATTORNEY GENERAL. No. 166. Argued April 29, 1914. Decided June 8, 1914. Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court: Information in the nature of quo warranto, brought in the supreme court of the state, to exclude plaintiff in error from the corporate rights, privileges, and franchises exer- [234 U.S. 199, 203] cised or enjoyed by it under the laws of the state, that they be forfeited, and all or such portion of its property as the court may deem proper be confiscated, or, in lieu thereof, a fine be imposed upon it in 'punishment of the perversion, usurpation, abuse, and misuse of franchises.' The ground of the action is the alleged violation of the statutes of the state passed respectively in 1899 and 1909, and entitled 'Pools, Trusts, and Conspiracies,' and 'Pools, Trusts, and Conspiracies and Discriminations.' The facts alleged in the information are these: Plaintiff in error is a Wisconsin corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of agricultural implements, binders, mowers, etc., and was licensed on the 5th of April, 1892, to do business in Missouri under the name of the Milwaukee Harvester Company, and on September 18, 1902, became licensed to do and engaged in such business in the state. In that year in such business in the state. In that year New Jersey was organized with a capital stock of $120,000,000 for the purpose of effecting a combination of plaintiff in error and certain other companies to restrain competition in the manufacture and sale of such agricultural implements in Missouri, and the New Jersey company has maintained plaintiff in error as its sole selling agent in Missouri. Before the combination the companies combined were competitors of one another and of other corporations, individuals, and partnerships engaged in the same business in the state, and that thereby the people of the state, and particularly the retail dealers and farmers of the state, received the benefit of competition in the purchase and sale of farm implements. The combination was designed and made with a view to lessen, and it tended to lessen, free competition in such implements, and thereby the said corporations entered into and became members of a pool, trust, combination, and agreement. In furtherance thereof, and for the purpose of giving the International Harvester Company of New Jersey a [234 U.S. 199, 204] monopoly of the business of manufacturing and selling agricultural implements in the state, and for the purpose of preventing competition in the sale thereof, plaintiff in error has compelled the retail dealers in each county of the state 4

who desire to handle and sell or act as agent for it to refrain from selling implements manufactured or sold by competing companies or persons. By reason thereof competition in such implements has been restrained, prices controlled, the quantity of such implements has been fixed and limited, and plaintiff in error has been able to secure, and for several years enjoy, from 85 per cent to 90 per cent of the business, all to the great damage and loss of the people of the state, and by reason of its participation in the pool, trust, and combination, and by reason of the acts and things done by it, plaintiff in error has been guilty of an illegal, wilful, and malicious perversion and abuse of its franchises, privileges, and licenses granted to it by the state. The answer of plaintiff in error denied that it had become a party to any combination, or that, in its transactions, there was any purpose to restrain or lessen competition, or that trade had been or was restrained. The case was referred to a special commissioner to take the evidence and report his conclusions. He found, as alleged in the information, that the International Harvester Company of New Jersey was a combination of the properties and businesses of formerly competing harvester companies, and plaintiff in error being one of such companies, and thereafter, by selling the New Jersey company's products in Missouri, had violated the Missouri statutes against pools, trusts, and conspiracies. In exceptions to the report of the special commissioner plaintiff in error urged that the statute of Missouri violated the equality clause and due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, '(1) because said statute arbitrarily discrim- [234 U.S. 199, 205] inates between persons making or selling products and commodities and persons selling labor and service of all kinds: In that each section of said statute applies only to articles of merchandise, and not to labor or services and the like, the prices of which are equally and similarly determined by competition, and may be equally and similarly the subject of combination and conspiracy to the detriment of the public. (2) Because said statute arbitrarily discriminates between the makers and sellers of products and commodities and the purchasers thereof: It prohibits manufacturers and sellers from making contracts or arrangements intended or tending to increase the market price of the articles they make or sell, but does not prohibit purchasers from combining to fix or reduce the market price of the commodities or articles to be purchased by them. (3) Because said statute, as construed by the commissioner, unreasonably and arbitrarily interferes with plaintiff in error's right to make proper and reasonable business contracts, and deprives it of property rights in respect thereto.' These exceptions were urged and argued in the supreme court upon the filing of the commissioner's report. Judgment was entered upon the report, in which it was adjudged that by reason of the violation of the statutes of the state, as charged in the information, plaintiff in error had forfeited the license theretofore granted to it to do business in the state, and it was adjudged that the license be forfeited and canceled and the company ousted from its rights and franchises granted by the state to do business in the state, and a fine of $50,000 was imposed upon it. It was, however, provided that upon payment of the fine on or before the 1st of January, 1912, and immediately ceasing all connection with the International Harvester Company of New Jersey and the corporations and copartnerships with which it had combined, and not continuing and maintaining the unlawful agreement and com- [234 U.S. 199, 206] bination with them to lessen and destroy competition in the sale of the enumerated farm implements, and giving satisfactory evidence thereof to the court, the judgment of ouster should be suspended. The company was given until March 1, 1912, 'to file its proof of willingness' to comply with the judgment. It was also adjudged that upon a subsequent violation of the statute 'the suspension of the writ of ouster shall be removed' by the court 'and absolute ouster be enforced,' and to that end the court retained 'its full and complete jurisdiction over the cause.' 237 Mo. 369, 141 S. W. 672. A motion is made to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff in error in its answer simply denied that it had violated the antitrust laws of the state, and it is contended that by not alleging in its answer that those laws violated the Constitution of the United States, it waived such defense. It is further contended that because the Federal right was not asserted in the answer, the supreme court of the state could not have considered, and did not consider or decide it. Decisions of the supreme court of Missouri are cited to sustain the contentions. The decisions declare the proposition that constitutional questions must be raised at the first opportunity, or, as it is expressed in one of the cases (Brown v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 175 Mo. 185, 74 S. W. 973), 'the protection of the Constitution must be timely and properly invoked in the trial court.' 5

In Dahnke-Walker Mill. Co. v. Blake, 242 Mo. 31, 145 S. W. 438, it is said: 'The rule of this court is that so grave a question [constitutional question] must be lodged at the first opportunity, or it will be deemed to have been waived. If it can be appropriately and naturally raised in the pleadings, and thereby be a question lodged in the record proper, such is the time and place to raise it;' and that it is too late to raise the question after judgment in a motion for new trial. In Hartzler v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. 218 Mo. 562, 117 S. W. 1124, it was held: 'The motion for a new trial was not [234 U.S. 199, 207] the first door for the question to enter, and in our later decisions we have ruled that a question of such gravity must be raised as soon as orderly procedure will allow. This in order that the trial court may be treated fairly, and the question get into the case under correct safeguards, and earmarked as of substance, and not mere color.' It is manifest, we think, that the court only intended to express the condition of appellate review to be that in the trial court constitutional questions should not be reserved until the case had gone to judgment on other issues, and then used to secure a new trial. The principle of the rulings is satisfied in the case at bar. It is, as we have seen, an original proceeding in the supreme court, and upon the report of the commissioner which brought the case to the court for decision of the issues and questions involved in it the Federal questions were made 'under correct safeguards and earmarked as of substance, and not mere color.' It is true the court has not referred to them in its opinion, but we cannot regard its silence as a condemnation of the time or manner at or in which they were raised. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied. The assignments of error necessarily involve a consideration of the statutes. The relevant provisions are contained in 10,301 of the Revised Statutes of the state of 1909, and 8,966 of the Revised Statutes of 1899 Section 10,301 provides that 'all arrangements, contracts, agreements, combinations, or understandings made or entered into between two or more persons, designed or made with a view to lessen, or which tend to lessen, lawful trade, or full and free competition in the importation, transportation, manufacture, or sale' in the state 'of any product, commodity, or article, or thing bought and sold,' and all such arrangements, etc., 'which are designed or made with a view to increase, or which tend to increase, the market price of any product, commodity, or article, or thing, of any class or kind whatsoever, [234 U.S. 199, 208] bought and sold,' are declared to be against public policy, unlawful and void, and those offending 'shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and punished' as provided. Section 8,966 provides that arrangements, etc., such as described in 10,301, having like purpose, and all such arrangements, etc., 'whereby or under the terms of which it is proposed, stipulated, provided, agreed, or understood that any person, association of persons, or corporations doing business in' the state, 'shall deal in, sell, or offer for sale' in the state 'any particular or specific article, product, or commodity, and shall not, during the continuance or existence of any such arrangement , . . . deal in, sell, or offer for sale,' in the state, 'any competing article, product, or commodity,' are declared to be against public policy, unlawful and void; and any person offending 'shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a conspiracy to defraud, and be subject to the penalties' provided. By 10,304 of the Revised Statutes of 1909, it is provided that domestic offending corporations shall forfeit their charters and all or any part of their property as shall be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction, or be fined in lieu of the forfeiture of charters or of property. Foreign offending corporations shall forfeit their right to do business in the state, with forfeiture also of property, or, in lieu thereof, the payment of a fine. In State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co. 218 Mo. 1, 370, 372, 116 S. W. 902, the supreme court held that the anti-trust statutes of the state 'are limited in their scope and operation to persons and corporations dealing in commodities, and do not include combinations of persons engaged in labor pursuits.' And, justifying the statutes against a charge of illegal discrimination, the court further said that 'it must be borne in mind that the differentiation between labor and property is so great that they do not belong to the same [234 U.S. 199, 209] general or natural classification of rights or things, and have never been so recognized by the common law or by legislative enactments.'

Accepting the construction put upon the statute, but contesting its legality as thus construed, plaintiff in error makes three contentions: (1) The statutes, as so construed, unreasonably and arbitrarily limit the right of contract; (2) discriminate between the vendors of commodities and the vendors of labor and services; and (3) between vendors and purchasers of commodities. (1) The specification under this head is that the supreme court found, it is contended, benefit-not injury-to the public had resulted from the alleged combination. Granting that this is not an overstatement of the opinion, the answer is immediate. It is too late in the day to assert against statutes which forbid combinations of competing companies that a particular combination was induced by good intentions and has had some good effect. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 62 , 52 S. L. ed. 681, 684, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 , 57 S. L. ed. 107, 117, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9. The purpose of such statutes is to secure competition and preclude combinations which tend to defeat it. And such is explicitly the purpose and policy of the Missouri statutes; and they have been sustained by the Supreme Court. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which precludes a state from adopting and enforcing such policy. To so decide would be stepping backwards. Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. 199 U.S. 401 , 50 L. ed. 246, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 , 57 L. ed. 164, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66. It is true that the supreme court did not find a definite abuse of its powers by plaintiff in error, but it did find that there was an offending against the statute, a union of able competitors, and a cessation of their competition, and the court said: 'Some of the smaller concerns that were competitors in the market have ceased their struggle for existence and retired from the field.' This is one [234 U.S. 199, 210] of the results which the statute was intended to prevent,-the unequal struggle of individual effort against the power of combination. The preventing of the engrossment of trade is as definitely the object of the law as is price regulation of commodities, its prohibition being against combinations 'made with a view to lessen, or which tend to lessen, lawful trade or full and free competition in the importation, transportation, manufacture, or sale of any commodity, or article, or thing bought or sold.' See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 , 55 L. ed. 619, 34 L.R. A.(N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Cr. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; United States v. American Tobacco Co. 221 U.S. 106 , 55 L. ed. 663, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 , 57 L. ed. 333, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 325, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141. (2) and (3). These contentions may be considered together, both involving a charge of discrimination,-the one because the law does not embrace vendors of labor; the other because it does not cover purchasers of commodities as well as vendors of them. Both, therefore, invoke a consideration of the power of classification which may be exerted in the legislation of the state. And we shall presently see that power has very broad range. A classification is not invalid because of simple inequality. We said in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 , 43 S. L. ed. 909, 913, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609, by Mr. Justice Brewer: 'The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.' Therefore, it may be there is restraint of competition in a combination of laborers and in a combination of purchasers, but that does not demonstrate that legislation which does not include either combination is illegal. Whether it would have been better policy to have made such comprehensive classification it is not our province to decide. In other words, whether a combination of wage earners or purchasers of commodities called for repression by law under the conditions in the state was for the legislature of the state to determine. [234 U.S. 199, 211] In Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. supra, a statute of Iowa was considered which made it unlawful for two or more fire insurance companies doing business in the state, or their officers or agents, to make or enter into combinations or agreements in relation to the rates to be charged for in surance, and certain other matters. The provision was held invalid by the circuit court of the United States for the district of Iowa on the ground of depriving of liberty of contract secured by the 14th Amendment and of the equal protection of the laws. This court reversed the decision, saying, after stating that there was a general statute of Iowa which prohibited combinations to fix the price of any article of merchandise or commodity, or to limit the quantity of the same produced or sold in the state: 'Therefore, the act in question does little, if anything, more than apply and work out the policy of the general law in a particular case.' Again, 'If an evil is specially experienced in a particular branch of business, the Constitution embodies no prohibition of laws confined to the evil, or doctrinaire requirement that they should be couched in all- embracing terms.' And, 'If the legislature of the state of Iowa deems it desirable artificially to prevent, so far as it can, the substitution of combination for competition, this court cannot say that fire insurance may not present so conspicuous an example of what that legislature thinks an evil as to justify special treatment. The 7

imposition of a more specific liability upon life and health insurance companies was held valid in Fidelity Mutual Life Asso. v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308 , 46 L. ed. 922, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662.' Other cases were also cited in illustration. Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. supra, is especially opposite. It contains the elements of the case at bar and a decision upon them. It will be observed that the statute, which it was said declared the general policy of Iowa, was a prohibition against a combination of producers and sellers. There was the same distinction, therefore, be- [234 U.S. 199, 212] tween vendors and purchasers of commodities as in the Missouri statute, and the same omission of prohibition of combinations of vendors of labor and services as in the Missouri law. The distinction and omission were continued when the policy of the state was extended to insurance companies. The law was not condemned because it went no farther, because it did not prohibit the combination of all trades, businesses, and persons. We held that the omission was not for judicial cognizance, and that a court could not say that fire insurance might not present so conspicuous an example of what the legislature might think an evil 'as to justify special treatment.' We might leave the discussion with that and the other cases. They decide that we are helped little in determining the legality of a legislative classification by making broad generalizations, and it is for a broad generalization that plaintiff in error contends,-indeed, a generalization which includes all the activities and occupations of life; and there is an enumeration of wage earners in emphasis of the discrimination in which manufacturers and sellers are singled out from all others. The contention in deceptive, and yet it is earnestly urged in various ways which it would extend this opinion too much to detail. 'In dealing with restraints of trade,' it is said, 'the proper basis of classification is obviously neither in commodities nor services, nor in persons, but in restraints.' A law, to be valid, therefore, is the inflexible deduction, cannot distinguish between ' restraints,' but must apply to all restraints, whatever their degree or effect or purpose; and that because the Missouri statute has not this universal operation it offends against the equality required by the 14th Amendment. This court has decided many times that a legislative classification does not have to possess such comprehensive extent. Classification must be accommodated to the problems of legislation; and we decided in Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Nat. Bank, 207 U. S. [234 U.S. 199, 213] 251, 52 L. ed. 195, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89, that it may depend upon degrees of evil without being arbitrary or unreasonable. We repeated the ruling in Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338 , 52 L. ed. 236, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114, in Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128 , 55 L. ed. 128, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190, in Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 , 56 L. ed. 175, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529, and again in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 418 , 58 S. L. ed. --, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612. In the latter case a distinction was sustained against a charge of discrimination between stock fire insurance companies and farmers' mutual insurance companies insuring farm property. If this power of classification did not exist, to what straits legislation would be brought. We may illustrate by the examples furnished by plaintiff in error. In the enumeration of those who, it is contended, by combination are able to restrain trade, are included, among others, 'persons engaged in domestic service' and 'nurses;' and because these are not embraced in the law, plaintiff in error, it is contended, although a combination of companies uniting the power of $120,000,000, and able thereby to engross 85 per cent or 90 per cent of the trade in agricultural implements, is nevertheless beyond the competency of the legislature to prohibit. As great as the contrast is, a greater one may be made. Under the principle applied a combination of all the great industrial enterprises (and why not railroads as well?) could not be condemned unless the law applied as well to a combination of maidservants or to infants' nurses, whose humble functions preclude effective combination. Such contrasts and the considerations they suggest must be pushed aside by government, and a rigid and universal classification applied, is the contention of plaintiff in error; and to this the contention must come. Admit exceptions, and you admit the power of the legislature to select them. But it may be said the comparison of extremes is forensic, and, it may be, fallacious; that there may be powerful labor combinations as well as powerful industrial combinations, and weak ones of both, and that the law, to be valid, cannot distin- [234 U.S. 199, 214] guish between strong and weak offenders. This may be granted (Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128 , 55 L. ed. 128, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190), but the comparisons are not without value in estimating the contentions of plaintiff in error. The foundation of our decision is, of course, the power of classification which a legislature may exercise, and the cases we have cited, as well as others which may be cited, demonstrate that some latitude must be allowed to the legislative judgment in selecting the 'basis of community.' We have said that it must be palpably arbitrary to authorize a judicial review of it, and that it cannot be disturbed by the courts 'unless they can see clearly that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched.' Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 269 , 48 S. L. ed. 971, 972, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79, 90 , 54 S. L. ed. 673, 677, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 865; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 179 , 54 S. L. ed. 987, 990, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644. 8

The instances of these cases are instructive. In the first there was a difference made between landowners as to liability for permitting certain noxious grasses to go to seed on the lands. In the second, the statute passed on made a difference between businesses in the solicitation of patronage on railroad trains and at depots. In the third, a difference based on the evidence of qualification of physicians was declared valid. clared valid. In Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Commercial Mill. Co. 218 U.S. 406 , 54 L. ed. 1088, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 220, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 59, 21 Ann. Cas. 815, a distinction was made between common carriers in the power to limit liability for negligence. In Engel v. O'Malley, supra, a distinction between bankers was sustained; and in Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 , 55 L. ed. 899, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1129, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 661, deposits in savings banks were distinguished from deposits in other banks in the application of the statute of limitations. Other cases might be cited whose instances illustrate the same principle, in which this court has refused to accept the higher generalizations urged as necessary to the fulfilment of the constitutional guaranty of the equal pro- [234 U.S. 199, 215] tection of the law, and in which we, in effect, held that it is competent for a legislature to determine upon what differences a distinction may be made for the purpose of statutory classification between objects otherwise having resemblances. Such power, of course, cannot be arbitrarily exercised. The distinction made must have reasonable basis. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 , 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 , 44 L. ed. 392, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 , 44 L. ed. 725, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633; Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 , 44 L. ed. 716, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666; Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 , 45 L. ed. 186, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 , 45 L. ed. 102, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43; Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563 , 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453, 466 , 55 S. L. ed. 290, 296, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U.S. 61, 79 , 55 S. L. ed. 369, 377, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U.S. 467 , 55 L. ed. 815, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709; Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 , 56 L. ed. 1229, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 153, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 697; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 269, 270 , 57 S. L. ed. 216, 217, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642 , 58 L. ed. --, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678. And so in the case at bar. Whether the Missouri statute should have set its condemnation on restraints generally, prohibiting combined action for any purpose and to everybody, or confined it as the statute does to manufacturers and vendors of articles, and permitting it to purchasers of such articles; prohibiting it to sellers of commodities and permitting it to sellers of services, was a matter of legislative judgment; and we cannot say that the distinctions made are palpably arbitrary, which we have seen is the condition of judicial review. It is to be remembered that the question presented is of the power of the legislature, not the policy of the exercise of the power. To be able to find fault, therefore, with such policy, is not to establish the invalidity of the law based upon it. It is said that the statute as construed by the supreme court of the state comes within our ruling in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U.S. 540 , 46 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431, but we do not think so. If it did, we should, of course, apply that ruling here. Judgment affirmed. G.R. No. L-31265 November 12, 1929

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMO N. CRUZ, defendant-appellant. This is an appeal taken by Maximo N. Cruz form the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija convicting him of a violation of ordinance No. 4, series of 1928, of the municipality of Cabanatuan, and sentencing him to pay a fine of P200, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the court below in its judgment, to wit: 1. The lower court erred in not declaring the zoning ordinance No. 4 of Cabanatuan of 1928 unconstitutional for being unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, prohibitive of trade and depriving the accused equal protection of the laws. 2. The lower court erred in not declaring unconstitutional the aforesaid ordinance as amended by resolution No. 327 of November 16, 1928. 3. The lower court erred in not declaring the ordinance in question as beyond the power of the municipal council to enact. 4. The lower court erred in trying and condemning the accused without due process of law. 5. The lower court erred in not declaring the machine in question to be out of the zone of machineries. On account of the close connection between the first and second assignments of error in appellant's brief, they will be discussed together. Ordinance No. 4, series of 1928, of the municipality of Cabanatuan, as amended by resolution No. 327 of the council of said municipality, reads as follows: [No. 23] ORDINANCE AMENDING THE ORDINANCE No. 4 By virtue of the authority of section 2243 (letter [n]) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Council of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, enacts: Section 1. Section 2 of the Ordinance No. 4 current series, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 2. Any kind of engines are not allowed to be installed within the limit of the MACHINERY ZONE as it is clearly defined by section 1 of the Ordinance No. 4, above-mentioned: Provided, however, That all kind of engines, machines and apparatus to be used for the establishment, construction and repairs of any potency of "DELCO LIGHTS AND CINEMATOGRAPHS," are hereby allowed." Sec. 2. Any violation of this ordinance will be punished, upon conviction, with a fine not less than P50 nor more than P200, or by imprisonment of not less than 30 nor more than 6 months, with a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of P1 a day. Sec. 3. This ordinance shall take effect upon the approval of the Council, and shall repeal all previous ordinances and resolutions, or part of the same in conflict with the present. Approved with eight affirmative votes on November 16, 1928. The appellant contends that said ordinance, as amended, is unconstitutional, discriminatory, unreasonable and prohibitive, and that it deprives the defendant of his right to equal protection of the laws.

10

It is a matter definitely settled by both Philippine and American cases, and the defendant-appellant so admits, that municipal corporation may, in the exercise of their police power, enact ordinances or regulations on zonification (43 Corpus Juris. 334). Within the powers granted to municipal councils in section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, the municipal council of Cabanatuan was authorized to enact the zonification ordinance with which we are now concerned. 1awphil.net The question to be decided now is whether said ordinance is illegal and unconstitutional. The defendant-appellant contends that said ordinance is illegal because section 2243 (n) of said Revised Administrative Code, only authorizes municipal councils to regulate the installation of, and to provide for the inspection of steam boilers within the municipality, and not motor engines, and that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. Appellant's contention that the municipal council of Cabanatuan is only authorized by section 2243 (n) of the Administrative Code to regulate the installation of steam boilers, and that the engines in question not being steam but motor engines, said municipal council exceeded its powers in regulating their installation, is untenable. Considering the activities of modern life, and the progress of mechanical engineering, said authority must be construed to extend to motor engines, since both kinds of engines are dangerous in their handling and operation, and have the same end, namely, the development of motive power for industrial purposes. As to the contention that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit, it will be seen that the ordinance copied above does not prohibit the installation of motor engines within the municipality of Cabanatuan but only within the zone therein fixed. If the municipal council of Cabanatuan is authorized to establish said zone, it is also authorized to provide what kind of engines may be installed therein. In banning the installation in said zone of all engines not excepted in the ordinance, the municipal council of Cabanatuan did no more than regulate their installation by means of zonification. As to the contention that said ordinance discriminates in favor of Delco motor engines for light and cinematograph purposes as against other motor engines, such discrimination is not unreasonable nor unjust, for there is a great difference between a motor engine for sawing wood, and light and cinematograph machinery: the first is a nuisance due to the noise of its operation; whereas the second actually furnishes diversion and amusement. Such a classification being just and reasonable, the ordinance establishing it does not violate the defendant-appellant's constitutional right to equality before the law. With regard to the question, likewise of constitutional right, whether or not the defendant-appellant has been tried and condemned without due process of law, inasmuch as he had not been given time to prepare his defense after having been arraigned, this question has already been decided in the case of McMicking vs. Schields (238 U. S., 99; 59 Law. ed., 1220, published in 41 Phil., 971). Moreover, it does not appear that the defendant invoked the right granted to him by section 30, General Orders, No. 58, to have at least two days within which to prepare for trial, after arraignment and after he had entered the plea of not guilty. For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That municipal councils are empowered to enact zonification ordinances within their jurisdiction in the exercise of their police power; (2) that within the zones so established, they may determine the kinds of machinery to be installed therein; (3) that the exception of the Delco Light and Cinematograph motor engine from all other motor engines for industrial purposes, is a just and reasonable classification. By virtue whereof, and there being no error in the sentence appealed from, the same is affirmed in too, with cost against the appellant. So ordered.

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People vs. Vera Facts: This case involves Act 4221or the Probation Act, which empowered Provincial Boards to appropriate salaries of probation officers for the maintenance of the probation system in respective provinces, also this act allows the delegation of power to provincial boards to support or not to support the probation system. This case came from the Criminal case of PP vs. Cu Injeng where the respondent judge of CFI Manila (7th branch) heard the application of probation by Mariano Cu Unjieng. In a criminal case against Cu, the trial court under the respondent judge convicted Cu of the crime charged to him. The defendant, Cu, filed a motion for reconsideration, and was later, filed an application for probation, which was later approved by the respondent judge. Hence, an original action for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioners alleging that the respondent judge CGADALEJ placing Cu under probation. The petitioners also questions the constitutionality of the RA4221, contesting that it is violative of equal protection clause provided in the constitution, since it allows inequalities among different provinces. Issue: Does equal protection of law require territorial uniformity? Held: No. While equal protection of law does not require territorial uniformity, however, there is a limit to allowable territorial lack of uniformity. It is clear that under the Act in question, promotes inequality among provinces permits denial of equal protection, by giving an option to provincial boards to either support or not to support the probation system, it may allow arbitrary decision from local bodies to adapt such. The probation system may be beneficial in its implementation in the Philippines, however, if the mode of its implementation may permit unreasonable classification so as to deprive peoples right to equal protection of law, then the law should be annulled, since the court said that there is no difference between law that denies equal protection and law that permits such denial. Subjecting the law in question to the four requisites of reasonable classification, 2 requisites will be wanting. It may be germane to the purpose of the law and that it is not only base on existing condition, however, the element of substantial distinctions, whereas there is a real And not to capricious differences cannot be established and second, since discretion is delegated to provincial boards, it cannot be applied to all of the members of the same class. Act 4221is repugnant to the constitution.

March 5, 1904 G.R. No. 1491 THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. LORENZO ARCEO ET AL., defendants-appellants. The defendants were charged with entering the house of one Alejo Tiongson on the night of February 20, 1903, armed with deadly weapons, against the will of the said Alejo Tiongson. The evidence shows that Alejo Tiongson lived in his house in company with his wife, Alejandra San Andres, and his wife's sister, Marcela San Andres. On the night of the 20th of February, 1903, between 8 and 9 o'clock at night, the accused, one of whom was armed with a gun and the other two each with bolo, entered the house of the said Alejo Tiongson without first obtaining the permission of any person. It appears from the proof that there was a light burning in the house at the time the accused entered, which was immediately put out by one of the accused; that Alejo and his wife had retired for the night; that Marcela was still sitting up sewing; that as soon as Marcela had discovered the accused in the house she awoke Alejo and his wife; that immediately after the accused were in the house, one of them wounded, by means of a bolo, Alejo Tiongson, the owner the house; that the accused to their own use a certain quantity of money; that the accused took and carried away out of the said house toward the fields the said Marcela San Andres and illtreated her. The evidence on the part of the defense tended to prove an alibi. The court below found that this testimony was not to be believed. We find no occasion, from the proof, to change this finding of fact. The court below found that the defendants were each guilty of the crime of entering the house of another, with violence and intimidation, which crime is punishable under subsection 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for the term of three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and also imposed upon each a fine of 271 pesos and costs. In reaching this conclusion the court took into consideration the 12

aggravating circumstance of nighttime and the extenuating circumstance provided for in article 11 of the Penal Code. Article 491 of the Penal Code provides that He who shall enter the residence (dwelling house) of another against the will of the tenant thereof shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,259 pesetas. Subsection 2 provides that If the act shall be executed with violence or intimidation the penalty shall be prision correccional in the medium and maximum grade, and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. Under the facts presented in this case, was the trial court justified in finding that the accused were guilty of the crime of entering the residence of another against his will and with violence or intimidation? We think that it was. We are not of the opinion that the statute relates simply to the method by which one may pass the threshold of the residence of another without his consent. We think it relates also to the conduct, immediately after entrance, of him who enters the house of another without his consent. He who being armed with deadly weapons enters the residence of another in the nighttime, without consent, and immediately commits acts of violence and intimidation, is guilty of entering the house of another with violence and intimidation and is punishable under subsection 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code. (See Viada, vol. 3, p. 303; Gazette of Spain of the 28th of March, 1883; Viada, vol. 6, p. 363; Gazette of Spain of the 19th of May, 1892, p. 165.) The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the house of another without the consent of its owners or occupants. The privacy of the home the place of abode, the place where a man with his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife and children unmolested by anyone, even the king, except in rare cases has always been regarded by civilized nations as one of the most sacred personal rights to which men are entitled. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man the right of absolute protection to the privacy of his home. The king was powerful; he was clothed with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions, the humblest citizen or subject might shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. The poorest and most humble citizen or subject may, in his cottage, no matter how frail or humble it is, bid defiance to all the powers of the state; the wind, the storm and the sunshine alike may enter through its weather-beaten parts, but the king may not enter against its owner's will; none of his forces dare to cross the threshold of even the humblest tenement without its owner's consent. "A man's house is his castle," has become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the earth. His protection therein has become a matter of constitutional protection in England, America, and Spain, as well as in other countries. However, under the police power of the state the authorities may compel entrance to dwelling houses against the will of the owners for sanitary purposes. The government has this right upon grounds of public policy. It has a right to protect the health and lives of all of its people. A man can not insist upon the privacy of his home when a question of the health and life of himself, his family, and that of the community is involved. This private right must be subject to the public welfare. It may be argued that one who enters the dwelling house of another is not liable unless he has been forbidden i.e., the phrase "against the will of the owner" means that there must have been an express prohibition to enter. In other words, if one enters the dwelling house of another without the knowledge of the owner he has not entered against his will. This construction is certainly not tenable, because entrance is forbidden generally under the spirit of the law unless permission to enter is expressly given. To allow this construction would destroy the very spirit of the law. Under the law no one has the right to enter the home of another without the other's express consent. Therefore, to say that one's home is open for the entrance of all who are not expressly forbidden. This is not the rule. The statute must not be given 13

that construction. No one can enter the dwelling house of another, in there Islands, without rendering himself liable under the law, unless he has the express consent of the owner and unless the one seeking entrance comes within some of the exceptions dictated by the law or by a sound public policy. So jealously did the people of England regard this right to enjoy, unmolested, the privacy of their houses, that they might even take the life of the unlawful intruder, if it be nighttime. This was also the sentiment of the Romans expressed by Tully: "Quid enim sanctius quid omni religione munitius, quam domus uniuscu jusque civium." It may be argued that the offense punishable under article 491 of the Penal Code corresponds to the crime of burglary at the common law. It is true that the offense of entering the house of another without the latter's consent and the common-law crime of burglary are both offenses against the habitation of individuals. But these crimes are distinctively different. The punishment for burglary is "to prevent the breaking and entering of a dwelling house of another in the nighttime for the purpose of committing a felony therein," while the object of article 491 is to prevent entrance into the dwelling house of another at any time, either by day or by night, for any purpose, against the will of its owner. In burglary there must have existed an intent to enter for the purpose of committing a felony, while under article 491 of the Penal Code entrance against the will, simply, of the owner is punishable. Under the provisions of the Penal Code entrance in the nighttime can only be regarded as an aggravation of the offense of entering. We are of the opinion, under all the facts in the case, that the extenuating circumstance provided for in article 11 of the Penal Code should not be considered in favor of these defendants. We find that the defendants are guilty of the crime of entering the house of another with violence and intimidation, without the consent of the owner, with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and hereby impose the maximum degree of prision correccional, and the fine provided for in subsection of 2 article 491 of the Penal Code should be imposed. The sentence of the court below is therefore modified, and each of the said defendants is hereby sentenced to be imprisoned for the term of six years of prision correccional, and each to pay a fine of 271 pesos and the costs of this suit or in default thereof to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Valmonte vs. De Villa Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold bloody the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Issue: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures Held: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of 14

petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose right shave been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a securit y measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent rights of testate to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. People vs. Escano, Usana and Lopez[GR 129756-58, 28 January 2000] First Division, Davide Jr. (CJ): 4 concur Facts: On 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de los Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico, were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX). They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride. P03 Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Julian D. Escao, to open the door.P03 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escao, upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were searched for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45 calibre firearm which they seized from Escao. The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escao to open the trunk. Escao readily agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escao to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms. Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escao, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64.Escao and Usana were also charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree 1866. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. In its Decision of 30 May1997, which was promulgated on 17 June 1997, the trial court convicted Escao, Lopez,Usana and Escao. Issue: Whether the search conducted on Escanos car is illegal, and whether the evidence acquired therein would be sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for possession of illegal drugs. Held: The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to free passage without interruption, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The checkpoint therein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as 15

those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the cars doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. Despite the validity of the search, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of RA 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the cars trunk was opened, with the permission of Escao, without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the cars trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao in the latters car before the finding of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized. Lim vs. Felix Facts: The petitioners. Lim et al, was charged of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder of Congressman Espinosa of Masbate among others. Private respondent, Alfane was designated to review the case and was raffled to RTC Makati Br. 56 of the respondent judge, Nemesio Felix. After transmittal of the case, the respondent Judge issued warrant of Arrest against the accused by virtue of the prosecutor's certification in each submitted information recommending the existence of a probable cause. Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable causeexists. Held: Yes. But by itself, it does not bind judges to come out with the warrant of arrest. Issuance of warrants calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer than an offense complained of has been committed and that there is a reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue warrant or order for an arrest. A judge is not required to personally examine the complainants and witnesses, what the constitution mandates in satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either; 1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant and 2. If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Moreover, the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art III also mandates that x x x probable cause should be personally determined by the judge x x. This means that 1. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. 2. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. 3. Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or release. In the case at bar, the only basis of the respondent judge in issuing warrants of arrest is only the certification of the prosecutor, without personally examining the information (which still in Masbate, and wherein the respondent denied the motion for transmittal of such records of the cases in the ground that certification id enough ground for the determination of probable cause and issuance of warrant ).Thus, there is no personal examination conducted by the judge to establish the existence of probable cause, thereby, the respondent committed abuse of discretion. Note: Preliminary investigation for the determination of sufficient ground for filing of information and investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest, distinguished. The former is executive in nature and part of a PROSECUTORS JOB. While the latter aka preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to the JUDGE.

16

LIM, SR. VS JUDGE FELIX GR NOS. 95954-7 (FEBRUARY 19, 1991)GUTTIEREZ, JR., J. Facts: -On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.-An investigation of the incident then followed.-Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr.,Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.-After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989stating therein that: . . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has beenestablished for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., VicenteLim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy. - Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause. - In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation.- It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them. -On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The judge wrote, In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each information -Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix (statement immediately preceding this paragraph, italicized). ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. RULING: The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. RD: As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be necessary documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. Usually, this depends on the circumstances of each case. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion; after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification 17

and investigation report whenever necessary. As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the Lims presented documents of recantations of the witnesses. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause. STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO [20 SCRA 383; L-19550; 19 JUN 1967] Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsProsecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Petitioners contentions are: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law

Respondents-prosecutors contentions (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Issue: 18

Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally. Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally. Held: The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or G.R. No. L-9635 August 26, 1914 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. A. A. ADDISON and PASTOR M. GOMEZ, defendants-appellees. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in favor of the defendants in an action on a bond given in a criminal action to procure the liberty of the accused pending trial. On the 10th of June, 1912, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Ilocos Sur presented a complaint in the justice's court of Vigan, accusing Walter Schultz of the crime of malversation of public funds in violation of the provisions of Act No. 1730. To procure the liberty of the accused pending trial, A. A. Addison and Pastor M. Gomez became his sureties upon a bail bond, the important parts of which are the following: Whereas a complaint has been filed on the 10th of June, 1912, in the court of the justice of the peace of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, P. I., charging Walter Schultz with the offense of `malversation of public funds by a public official,' and he having been admitted to bail in the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) Philippine currency: Now, therefore, we, Pastor Gomez, of Calle Sacristia No. 954, and A. A. Addison, of Calle Globo de Oro, No. 70, jointly and severally, hereby undertake that the above-named Walter Schultz will appear and answer the charge above mentioned in whatever court it may be tried, and will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders 19

and process of the court, and if convicted will appear for judgment and render himself to the execution thereof; or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that we will pay to the United States the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) Philippine currency. The accused having renounced his right to a preliminary investigation before the justice of the peace, being obe over which the latter had no jurisdiction, was sent to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings. On the 7th of October, 1912, the Court of First Instance received a petition signed by A. A. Addison and Pastor M. Gomez, in which, after alleging that they desired to deliver the accused into the custody of the law and to relieve themselves from the obligation imposed by the bond, they prayed that said court issue an order of arrest against said accused for the purpose of his apprehension. the ground upon which they based this application was that the accused had absented himself from the city of Manila, where he had been for some time, and that the bondsmen were unable to ascertain his whereabouts, although they had made diligent search. On the 8th of October the court denied the petition. On the 22d of November the bondsmen again applied to the court for the issuance of an order of arrest against the accused, basing their application upon the same ground as before. In this application they alleged that the accused could not be found, although the Information Division of the Bureau of Constabulary had made diligent search for him. On the 30th of November the court again denied the application. At a session of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur held on the 30th of November, 1912, the trial of the case was set for the 26th of December of the same year. At the opening of the court on said 30th of November the bondsmen applied to the court for a reconsideration of ifs previous orders denying the application of the bondsmen to be relieved from their responsibility and for an order of arrest against the accused, and again prayed that the court issue such order of arrest, alleging as a ground therefor that the peace authorities did not believe that they were authorized to arrest the accused without such order. They further prayed that on the issuance of said order of arrest the bond which they had signed be canceled and that they be relieved from all responsibility thereunder. On the 10th of December the court, acting on the petition of the bondsmen above referred to, ordered the clerk to issue to said bondsmen a certified copy of the bail bond, with an order authorizing said bondsmen to arrest their principal or require his arrest by any policeman or peace officer, but refused to relieve the bondsmen from their obligation under the bond. This order was mailed to the bondsmen on the same day that it was issued. On the 31st of March, 1913, the prosecuting attorney of Ilocos Sur moved the court that the said bondsmen be ordered to present the body of the accused on the 10th day of April, 1913, for trial, with the admonition that if they failed or neglected to do so, the bond would be declared forfeited. This order was served on the sureties on the 7th of April. the accused was not served with a copy for the reason that he could not be found within the Philippine Islands. The cause was called for trial on the 10th of April, 1913, and the body of the accused not having been presented, the judge declared the bond forfeited. The order of forfeiture gave the sureties thirty days within which to present the body of the accused and admonished them that if they did not do so within that time or show cause satisfactory to the court why they did not, judgment would be rendered and entered against them for the amount of the obligation. On the 5th of May, 1913, the bondsmen filed their answer, alleging that they did not appear in Vigan before the Court of First Instance on the 10th of April, as ordered, for the reason that they did not have time to reach that place from Manila after they received notice of the order, and that the reason why they were unable to deliver the body of the accused was that the court had refused to issue the order of arrest which they had three times prayed for, and praying that upon the allegations made they be relieved of responsibility. On the 28th of July, 1913, the prosecuting attorney of Ilocos Sur moved the court that judgment be entered against Pastor M. Gomez and A. A. Addison, sureties for Walter Schultz, for the sum of P2,000, and that the judgment be executed at once. This motion was notified to the bondsmen and their counsel and hearing of the same was set for the 3d of September at 8 o'clock in the morning. On the 19th of August G. E. Campbell, attorney for the bondsmen and for the accused, asked for a postponement of the hearing of the motion until the 3d of November. The hearing was finally

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set for the 26th of December. The bondsmen or the accused not having appeared at the time set, the 26th of December, the court found in their favor, absolving them from all responsibility under the bond. It is against that judgment that this appeal is taken. We are of opinion that the judgment must be reversed. Section 75 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: The sureties of the bail bond may surrender the defendant at any time prior to forfeiture, or he may surrender himself and the bail be thus executed. An order of exoneration may be made by the court upon proof of surrender and after due notice to the promotor fiscal of the proposed issuance of the order. For the purpose of surrendering the defendant the bail may arrest him, or on written authority indorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking may cause him to be arrested by any police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion. As stated by the attorney for the appellees: From the wording of this section it is clear that there are two methods that may be pursued by the bail in order to surrender the accused, . . . they may arrest him themselves or they may cause his arrest thorough certain channels. In order words, the bail may arrest the principal and deliver him to the proper authorities, or they mat cause his arrest to be made to any police officer or other person of suitable age and descrition by indorsing the authority to arrest upon a certified copy of the undertaking and delivering it to such officer or person. These are the only methods, in a general way, by which the sureties may relieve themselves from responsibility relative to the recognizance. The bondsmen did not either of these things. Instead of delivering the principal to the court having jurisdiction over him or to the sheriff thereof or his deputy, or of procuring his arrest by a peace officer authorized by indorsement upon a certified copy of the undertaking, they permitted the accused to escape and then sought to induce the court in which the action against the principal was pending to issue an order of arrest that the principal might be apprehended and they absolved. The court to which the application was presented did not consider itself authorized under the showing was that the principal was at liberty under a bond which had not been revoked or withdrawn in the manner prescribed by law; and that, until the moment of cancellation or revocation of the bail bond in pursuance of law, the accused was entitled to his liberty. The court, therefore, refused to issue the order of arrest. We do not regard this position as altogether tenable. while the contention of the sureties, in their application for the order of the arrest, that they relieved from obligation when the order was issued, cannot be sustained, the Court of First Instance, under the facts presented, should have lent the sureties, in such manner as the law permits, all the aid that it reasonably could in the apprehension of the principal. While the Codes of Criminal Procedure Acts out the methods by which the sureties may release themselves from their obligation, it does not say that the court may not assist them to release themselves; and we think that the court in this case should have assisted them in their endeavor to apprehend and deliver the principal and thereby to relieve themselves from responsibility. We have no doubt about the power of the court, with or without the application of the sureties, to order the arrest of a principal if it is shown or appears that he is attempting or planning his escape or is in hiding for the purpose of defeating the ends of justice. We do not now decide to what court or other official it is necessary for sureties to present their principal in order to be relieved from responsibility under the bond. That question is not before us. the sureties never delivered or attempted to deliver the body of their principal to any court or peace officer. They simply asked the cooperation of certain peace officials for the capture of the principal, whose whereabouts was, at the time, admittedly unknown. When the obligation of bail is assumed, the sureties become in law the jailers of their principal. Their custody of him is the continuance of the original imprisonment, and though they cannot actually confine him, they are subrogated to all 21

the other rights and means which the Government posesses to make their control of him effective. The responsibility assumed by the bail, being purely gratuitous, may be terminated by them at any time, and, to effect this end, they may arrest the principal at pleasure and surrender him into the hands of the law. Even though there were no statute to their effect, the right of the bail to arrest the principal for the purpose of surrendering him is incidental to the engagement, and the issuing of process is not necessary to its exercise. The arrest may be made by the bail, either in person or by agent, in the manner prescribed by statute. they may pursue him; may seize him at any time of the day or night, and may enter his house for the purpose. If resistance be apprehended, they may at all times command the assistance of the peace officers upon complying with the terms of the statue. (Reese vs. U. S., 9 Wall., 13; U. S. vs. Ryder, 110 U. S., 729; State vs. Lingerfelt, 109 N. C., 775; Taylor vs. Taintor, 16 Wall., 366; Bearden vs. State, 89 Ala., 21; Norfolk vs. People, 43 Ill., 9; Kellogg vs. State, 43 Miss., 57; Hughes vs. State, 28 Tex. App., 499; State vs. Rosseau, 39 Tex., 614; State vs. Cunningham, 10 La. Ann., 393; U. S. vs. Keiver, 56 Fed. Rep., 422; Read vs. Case, 4 Conn., 16; s Ternberg vs. State, 42 Ark., 127.) To the sureties the state gives every facility for the apprehension and surrender of the principal and there is, therefore, very little excuse for their failure to protect themselves. while we do not determine whether or not a peace officer has the right to arrest the principal on the request of the sureties if they do not present a certified copy of the bond properly indorsed, there is no evidence that any peace officer had an opportunity to arrest the principal after having received notice to do so from the sureties, or that the refusal of such an officer, if any, had any influence on the result. nor do we hold, either, that a court may not issue an order of arrest for the accused upon the representation of the bondsmen upon the proper showing. We simply say that, upon the facts before us, we are not prepared to hold that the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur erred in refusing to issue the order of arrest under the showing made at least no error was made sufficient to relieve the sureties. It does not appear from the record that the action of the court had any effect on the outcome as it is fairly clear that the sureties permitted the principal to escape before any attempt was made to apprehend him. The judgment absolving the sureties is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, with instructions to enter judgment against the sureties in accordance with this opinion.

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