Rambus, Inc.'S Motion To Strike (1) Portions of The Second Supplemental Mcalexander Expert Report and (2) Supplemental Section 282 Notices

Case 5:05-cv-00334-RMW Document 3107 Filed 01/13/2009 Page 1 of 15
1 Gregory P. Stone (SBN 078329) Rollin A. Ransom (SBN 196126)

Andrea Weiss Jeffries (SBN 183408) SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
2 Fred A. Rowley, Jr. (SBN 192298) 555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4000
MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP Los Angeles, California 90013-1010
3 355 South Grand Avenue, 35th Floor Telephone: (213) 896-6000
Los Angeles, California 90071-1560 Facsimile: (213) 896-6600
4 Telephone: (213) 683-9100 Email: rransom@sidley.com
Facsimile: (213) 687-3702
5 Email: gregory.stone@mto.com Pierre J. Hubert (Pro Hac Vice)
Email: andrea.jeffries@mto.com Craig N. Tolliver (Pro Hac Vice)
6 Email: fred.rowley@mto.com McKOOL SMITH PC
300 West 6th Street, Suite 1700
7 Peter A. Detre (SBN 182619) Austin, Texas 78701
Rosemarie T. Ring (SBN 220769) Telephone: (512) 692-8700
8 Jennifer L. Polse (SBN 219202) Facsimile: (512) 692-8744
MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP Email: phubert@mckoolsmith.com
9 560 Mission Street, 27th Floor Email: ctolliver@mckoolsmith.com
San Francisco, California 94105
10 Telephone: (415) 512-4000
Facsimile: (415) 512-4077
11 Email: peter.detre@mto.com
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION • ATTORNEYS
Email: rose.ring@mto.com
12 Email: jen.polse@mto.com
13 Attorneys for RAMBUS INC.

MCKOOL SMITH
DALLAS, TEXAS
14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN JOSE DIVISION
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16
RAMBUS INC., ) Case No. C 05-00334 RMW
17 )
Plaintiff, ) RAMBUS, INC.’S MOTION TO
18 vs. STRIKE (1) PORTIONS OF THE
) SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
19 HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., et al., ) MCALEXANDER EXPERT REPORT
) AND (2) SUPPLEMENTAL SECTION
20 Defendants. ) 282 NOTICES
)
21 ) Judge: Hon. Ronald M. Whyte
) Date: January 20, 2009
22 Time: 9:00 a.m.
) Courtroom: 6, 4th Floor
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Rambus’s Motion to Strike Portions of the Second Supplemental
McAlexander Expert Report and Supplemental Section 282 Notices
Case Nos. 05-00334, 05-002298, and 06-00244
1 RAMBUS INC., ) Case No. C 05-002298 RMW

)
2 Plaintiff, )
)
3 v. )
4 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., )
)
5 et al., )
)
6 Defendants. )
)
7
RAMBUS INC., ) Case No. C 06-00244 RMW
8 )
Plaintiff, )
9 )
vs. )
10 )
MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., et al.,
)
11
Defendants. )
12 )
MCKOOL SMITH
DALLAS, TEXAS
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Case Nos. 05-00334, 05-002298, and 06-00244
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 I. Statement of Relevant Facts.................................................................................................2
3 II. ARGUMENT.......................................................................................................................5
4 A. The Court Should Strike the Bowater “Programmable

Latency” and “Autoprecharge” Opinions ................................................................6
5
B. The Court Should Strike the Integration-Trend Opinions .......................................6
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C. The Court Should Strike the Opinions Related to the
7 Morgan (CVAX) Deposition ...................................................................................8
8 D. The Court Should Strike the Opinions Related to the

Horowitz and Fu References....................................................................................9
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E. The Court Should Strike the Opinions Related to the
10 Moussouris Article...................................................................................................9
11 F. The Court Should Strike the Manufacturers’ Supplemental

282 Notices ..............................................................................................................9

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III. Conclusion .........................................................................................................................10
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Case Nos. 05-00334, 05-002298, and 06-00244
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
CASES
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ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc.,
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159 F.3d 534 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................10
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Computer Acceleration Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
6 481 F. Supp. 2d 620 (E.D. Tex. 2007).....................................................................................10
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Case Nos. 05-00334, 05-002298, and 06-00244
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Having met-and-conferred with the Manufacturers in an unsuccessful attempt to have the
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Manufacturers voluntarily withdraw improper portions of an expert report and untimely section
3
282 notice as to certain items, Rambus files this Motion to Strike (1) portions of the December
4
30th Second Supplemental Expert Report of Joseph McAlexander (“Second Supplemental
5
Report”)1 and (2) the related Manufacturers’ Supplemental Section 282 Notices.2 Although the
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Court allowed the Manufacturers to serve a supplemental expert report of Mr. McAlexander
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limited to responding to any new opinions disclosed by Rambus in its December 23 letter, the
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Manufacturers served the twenty-one page Second Supplemental Report from Mr. McAlexander
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containing opinions not justified by the “memory device” issue and which Mr. McAlexander
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should have disclosed earlier. For example, Mr. McAlexander labels sections of his Second
11
Supplemental Report as discussing “Auto Precharge” and “Programmable Latency,” opinions

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clearly not justified by the Court’s allowance of a supplemental report regarding “memory
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MCKOOL SMITH
device.” As an additional example, integration has been an issue for Mr. McAlexander
DALLAS, TEXAS
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throughout this case regardless of the “memory device” construction due to claims reciting
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preambles such as “integrated circuit device.” Yet, Mr. McAlexander improperly attempts to
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revisit the issue of an integration trend to bolster his previous opinions. Furthermore, the
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opinions Mr. Murphy intends to present at trial using the Court’s clarified construction identified
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in Rambus’s December 23rd letter are not new opinions. The Court’s clarified construction is
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only being used as further support for the positions expressed in Mr. Murphy’s earlier expert
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report. Therefore, Mr. McAlexander should have disclosed all of his opinions and relevant
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references in his earlier report. Rambus also moves to strike the Manufacturers’ Supplemental
22
Section 282 Notices, which are untimely under the statute and contain three new alleged prior art
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references that should have been disclosed earlier. The Manufacturers’ overreaching with Mr.
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1
25 The Manufacturers served a “first” supplemental invalidity expert report from Mr.
McAlexander on December 23rd. That report is not the subject of this Motion to Strike.
26
2
27 All exhibits referenced herein are attached to the Declaration of Ramzi Khazen. The Second
Supplemental Report is attached as Ex. A.
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1
Rambus Motion to Strike Portions of Supplemental
McAlexander Expert Report and Section 282 Notices
Case Nos. 05-00334, 05-002298, and 06-00244
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McAlexander’s Second Supplemental Report and with Supplemental Section 282 Notices
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prejudices Rambus on the eve of trial. Accordingly, Rambus requests that this Court strike (1)
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the offending portions of the Second Supplemental Report and (2) the Manufacturers’
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Supplemental Section 282 Notices.
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I. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
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1. On July 10, 2008, this Court construed the term “memory device” to mean “a
7
device in which information can be stored and retrieved electronically.” (Claim Construction
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Order, Docket No. 1392 at 34 in 244 Case.)
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2. On August 22, 2008, the Manufacturers served their “Final Invalidity
10
Contentions,” which totaled more than 5,000 pages and referred to 322 references. The
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Manufacturers disclosed a total of 328 references throughout the various iterations of their
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invalidity contentions. (See Rambus’s Motion to Strike Portions of the McAlexander Expert
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Report, Docket No. 1458 at 2, 7-8 in 244 Case.)
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3. On September 15, 2008, the Manufacturers served the Expert Report of Mr.
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McAlexander regarding validity (“McAlexander Expert Report” or “Original Report”).3 The
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body of the McAlexander Expert Report is 179 pages. The Report contains Attachments A-Q,
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which total 530 pages. It also contains Exhibits 1-135, which add another 5,838 pages—making
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the entire Report over 6,500 pages. In his report, Mr. McAlexander opines on numerous alleged
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prior art references and concludes that Rambus’s patents are invalid. (See Rambus’s Motion to
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Strike Portions of the McAlexander Expert Report, Docket No. 1458 at 3 in 244 Case.)
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4. This Court issued its Order Clarifying the Court’s Construction of “Memory
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Device” on November 21, 2008. (See Docket No. 1381 in 298 Case.) The Court construed the
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term “memory device” as follows: “[A] component of a memory subsystem in which
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information can be stored and retrieved electronically. It is smaller in physical size than that of a
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prior art memory board and has low power dissipation so it can be closely spaced to other
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Mr. McAlexander’s original expert report is attached to Rambus’s Motion to Strike Portions of
27 the McAlexander Expert Report, Docket No. 1458 in 244 Case, as Ex. A.
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components of the memory subsystem such as a processing device.” (Id.) The Court noted that
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“memory device” does not include a microprocessor or controller. (Id. at 3-4.)
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5. During the hearing on December 19, the Court recognized that expert opinions
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could properly be supplemented to account for the Court’s clarification of the term “memory
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device.”4 Importantly, however, the Court indicated (and the Manufacturers agreed) that Mr.
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McAlexander could only supplement his original Report if the supplementation was in specific
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response to any new position disclosed by Rambus’s expert. (See Ex. B, Dec. 19, 2008 Tr.
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13:16-21 (“MR. POWERS: So we’ll be happy to supplement Mr. McAlexander’s report. THE
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COURT: Yes. MR. POWERS: In response to whatever we get from them. THE COURT:
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Right.”) (emphases added); see also id. at 14:17-22 (“MR. DETRE: So it’s not clear to us that
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Mr. McAlexander should be entitled to supplement his entire report. THE COURT: He can only
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supplement to the extent that you’re taking some refined or new position.” (emphasis added).)
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6. On December 23, 2008, Rambus informed the Court and the Manufacturers of the
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ways in which Mr. Murphy’s testimony may be affected by the Court’s refinement of its
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“memory device” construction in addition to Mr. Murphy responding to any opinion from Mr.
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McAlexander in view of the Manufacturers’ burden of proof. (See Ex. C.) In particular,
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Rambus disclosed that Mr. Murphy may testify that the Court’s revised claim construction made
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it even clearer that prior art memory boards and processing devices (e.g., memory controllers)
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were excluded from the category of “memory devices.” Rambus explained further:
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During the December 10 hearing, the Court correctly noted its revised construction of “memory
device” should only serve to eliminate prior art references: “THE COURT: I guess the question
26 that I had is why is what I did, which is basically a refinement . . . . I mean, it seems to me on
infringement it wouldn’t really affect much, if anything, and on validity it might eliminate some
27 prior art reference but that’s all I can think of.” (Ex. D, Tr. 130:11-17.)
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(Id. at 2.)
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7. In response to this single paragraph, on December 30, 2008, the Manufacturers
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served the twenty-one page Second Supplemental Report.
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8. Mr. McAlexander’s Second Supplemental Report contains opinions that Mr.
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McAlexander could and should have disclosed earlier and that have no bearing on the “memory
17
device” issue, including:
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• Opinions relating to “auto precharge.” (See, e.g., Second Supplemental Report, p.
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18 (section entitled “5.5.2. Bowater Renders Auto Precharge Obvious”).)
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• Opinions relating to “programmable read latency.” (See, e.g., Second
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Supplemental Report, p. 17 (section entitled “5.5.1 Bowater Renders
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Programmable Latency Obvious”).)
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• Opinions relating to an alleged integration-trend, given that, regardless of the
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construction of “memory device,” claims with more narrow preambles than
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“memory device” (e.g., ‘916 patent claim 28 reciting “synchronous
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semiconductor memory device”) have been at issue all along in this litigation.
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(See, e.g., Second Supplemental Report, ¶¶ 15, 17, 19-22, 25, 38, 40-41, 44, 46
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(Mr. McAlexander attempting to bolster original integration opinions).)
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• Opinions relating to the Horowitz and Fu alleged references that Mr.
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McAlexander should have presented earlier when opining on the existence of an
5
integration trend. (See, e.g., Second Supplemental Report, ¶¶ 5, 21-22.)
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• Opinions relating to the Morgan (CVAX) deposition, a deposition that was
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presented by Hynix in the Hynix I trial as part of Hynix’s unsuccessful invalidity
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defense. (See, e.g., Second Supplemental Report, ¶¶ 5, 39-41.)
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• Opinions relating to alleged integration in a Moussouris article, an article that Mr.
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McAlexander discussed in his earlier report. (See, e.g., Second Supplemental
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Report, ¶¶ 23-31.)
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9. On December 30th and 31st, after the Section 282 deadline passed, the
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Manufacturers attempted to supplement their Section 282 Notices with the Horowitz, Fu, and
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Patterson references. (See Exs. E-H.)
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16 10. On January 8 and 12, 2009, Mr. Peter Detre on behalf of Rambus met-and-
17 conferred with Mr. Ted Brown on behalf of the Manufacturers, but the Manufacturers refused to
18 withdraw any portions of the Second Supplement Report of the Supplemental Section 282
19 Notices.
20 II. ARGUMENT
21 Mr. McAlexander’s Second Supplemental Report contains opinions that have no bearing
22 on the “memory device” issue and, therefore, could and should have been disclosed earlier. The
23 Court should strike the new references and opinions, at a minimum, which are not justified by
24 Rambus’s December 23 letter or the Court’s “memory device” clarification. The Court should
25 also strike the Manufacturers’ untimely Supplemental Section 282 Notices.
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Case Nos. 05-00334, 05-002298, and 06-00244
1 A. The Court Should Strike the Bowater “Programmable

Latency” and “Autoprecharge” Opinions
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Paragraphs 42-54 of Mr. McAlexander’s Second Supplemental Report relate to
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“programmable latency” and “autoprecharge,” not “memory device.” The Manufacturers even
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boldly label sections of the report as relating to “programmable latency” and “autoprecharge,”
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rather than with anything having to do with the clarified “memory device” term. Paragraphs in
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the “autoprecharge” section, for example, refer to details of “open[ing] a row of data,”
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“precharg[ing] sense amplifiers,” “page mode,” and “timing of the precharge information.” (See
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generally Second Supplemental Report, ¶¶ 42-54.) These are in no way related to the Court’s
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clarification of “memory device.” In fact, the only discussion in the Second Supplemental
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Report even remotely related to the Court’s refined construction of “memory device” is a
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reference to Mr. Murphy’s intent to testify that the Bowater memory controller, either alone or in
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combination with separate memory chips, is not a memory device. Mr. McAlexander makes no
MCKOOL SMITH
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other attempt to address the Court’s construction or how the memory controller in Bowater could
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meet the Court’s construction of a “memory device.” The Court should therefore strike ¶¶ 42-54
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of the Second Supplemental Report.
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B. The Court Should Strike the Integration-Trend Opinions
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Mr. McAlexander uses a good portion of his Second Supplemental Report to improperly
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bolster his previously disclosed obviousness opinions on the existence of an integration trend.
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(See, e.g., Second Supplemental Report, ¶¶ 15, 17, 19-22, 25, 38, 40-41, 44, 46.) Integration,
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however, has been an issue for Mr. McAlexander throughout this case, regardless of the
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construction of “memory device.”
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Throughout this case, Rambus has asserted claims with preambles narrower than
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“memory device.” For example, elected claim 28 of the ‘916 patent recites a “synchronous
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semiconductor memory device,” as opposed to a “memory device.” Moreover, elected claims 4
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of the ‘446 patent and 36 of the ‘020 patent recite an “integrated circuit device,” which has been
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construed to require a single chip under the Court’s original and current construction. Thus, Mr.
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McAlexander had every reason to include opinions regarding integration in his original invalidity
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report in order to make his argument that it would have been obvious in the context of those
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claims to integrate the sort of controller functionality purportedly disclosed in some of his
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alleged prior art references onto a DRAM. And, indeed, Mr. McAlexander did include a lengthy
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section on integration in his original report and cannot dispute this fact. (See generally Original
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Report ¶¶ 159-166 (“the trend has been to manufacture chips that included more circuits and
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incorporated more functions”; “other technical articles also reflect that the integration trend was
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sustained”) In his Original Report, Mr. McAlexander even cited specific references such as
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“Future of DRAMS” (¶ 159), Sawada (¶¶ 160, 162), Yuen (¶¶ 160, 164), Gelsinger (¶ 160) and
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Patterson (¶ 160), and Hikada (¶ 166) as purported examples of an integration trend.
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Yet in his Supplemental Report, Mr. McAlexander now seeks to improperly bolster his
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earlier opinions and to cite new references for the same proposition to which he previously
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opined. See, e.g., Supplemental Expert Report ¶¶ 15 (“integration of controller logic with
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memory arrays (e.g. on a single chip) was well-known”); 17 (“there was a trend towards
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integrating on-chip logic”); 19 (“trend toward integration”); 20 (“market forces, which strongly
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favored the trend toward increasing integration”); 21 (Mr. McAlexander improperly citing
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Horowitz as “an example of the trend towards increasing the level of integration” where could
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have disclosed Horowitz in his Original Report); 22 (Mr. McAlexander improperly citing Fu as
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“another example of this trend” where he could have disclosed Fu in his Original Report).
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The Manufacturers conveniently attempt to downplay that they should have disclosed all
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of the bases for their integration opinions earlier (for example in the context of claims relating to
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“integrated circuit device”) by failing to tie any of Mr. McAlexander’s supplemental opinions on
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anticipation or obviousness to any particular claims. Indeed, Mr. McAlexander never applies
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any opinions to any particular claims in his Supplemental Report, despite the Manufacturers’
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burden of proof on invalidity.
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Mr. McAlexander should have disclosed his integration-trend opinions and more general
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integration opinions in his earlier report. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i) (“The [expert’s]
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report must contain . . . a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the
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basis and reasons for them.”). Accordingly, the Court should strike such opinions from Mr.
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McAlexander’s Second Supplemental Report. In particular, Second Supplemental Report ¶¶ 15,
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17, 19-22, 25, 38, 40-41, 44, 46 improperly bolster Mr. Alexander’s original integration opinions
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and improperly introduce new alleged references to support integration opinions. They should
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therefore be struck.
7 C. The Court Should Strike the Opinions
Related to the Morgan (CVAX) Deposition
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In his Second Supplemental Report, Mr. McAlexander attempts to rely upon, for the first
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time, a 2004 deposition of David Morgan relating to the alleged CVAX reference. Mr.
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McAlexander cites the Morgan deposition and opines that it would have been obvious “to have
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integrated the programmable timing control feature disclosed in CVAX[.]” (Second
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Supplemental Report, ¶¶ 39-41). Mr. McAlexander, however, does not give any excuse for not
MCKOOL SMITH
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disclosing his reliance on the Morgan deposition earlier.
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Regardless of the construction of “memory device,” Mr. McAlexander should have cited
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the Morgan deposition earlier. As discussed above, integration has been an issue for Mr.
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McAlexander throughout this case. Furthermore, Mr. McAlexander previously claimed to be
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familiar with Hynix’s presentation from the Hynix I trial. In that trial, Hynix unsuccessfully
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relied upon the Morgan deposition with respect to claims with narrower preambles than
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“memory device,” including claim 28 of the ‘916 patent (“synchronous semiconductor memory
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device”) and claim 36 of the ‘020 patent (“integrated circuit device”)—claims that are at issue
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again in the instant case. It is clear that Mr. McAlexander should have disclosed his reliance on
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the Morgan (CVAX) deposition earlier. The Court should therefore strike Mr. McAlexander’s
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citations to the Morgan deposition from the Second Supplemental Report. (See Second
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Supplemental Report, ¶¶ 5, 39-41.)
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Case Nos. 05-00334, 05-002298, and 06-00244
1 D. The Court Should Strike the Opinions

Related to the Horowitz and Fu References
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Mr. McAlexander cites two references for the first time in his Second Supplemental
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Report. First, Mr. McAlexander cites an alleged 1987 article by Mark Horowitz entitled “MIPS-
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X: A 20-MIPS Peak, 32-bit Microprocessor with On-Chip Cache.” (Second Supplemental
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Report, ¶ 5.) Second, Mr. McAlexander cites an alleged 1989 article from Beatrice Fu entitled
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“Performance and Microarchitecture of the i486 Processor.” (Second Supplemental Report, ¶ 5.)
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Mr. McAlexander cites the Horowitz reference as “[a]n example of the trend toward
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increasing the level of integration in the semiconductor industry[.]” (Second Supplemental
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Report, ¶ 21.) Similarly, Mr. McAlexander cites the Fu reference in an attempt to bolster his
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opinion on the integration trend. (Id. at ¶ 22 (citing Fu to bolster the argument that “[p]rior to
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1989, the industry began integrating processors and coprocessors together onto a single
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semiconductor chip”).)
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Again, as discussed above, integration has been an issue for Mr. McAlexander
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throughout this case. Mr. McAlexander should have disclosed in his original invalidity report
15
any documents supporting his opinion regarding an integration trend, and the Court should strike
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Mr. McAlexander’s Second Supplemental Report as to the Horowitz and Fu references.
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E. The Court Should Strike the Opinions Related to the Moussouris Article
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Mr. McAlexander presents a three-page discussion of the Moussouris article and opinions
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relating to integration and an integration-trend. (Second Supplemental Report, ¶¶ 23-31). Mr.
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McAlexander notes, however, that he cited the Moussouris article in his original Report. (Id. at ¶
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23.) As explained already, integration has been an issue for Mr. McAlexander throughout this
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case. Mr. McAlexander should have disclosed in his original invalidity report all of the details
23
regarding the Moussouris article that he now attempts to include for the first time in his Second
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Supplemental Report.
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F. The Court Should Strike the Manufacturers’ Supplemental 282 Notices
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On December 30th and 31st, after the section 282 deadline had passed, the Manufacturers
27
attempted to supplement their Section 282 Notices with the Horowitz and Fu references
28
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Case Nos. 05-00334, 05-002298, and 06-00244
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discussed supra, and the Patterson reference. (See Exs. E-H.) The Patterson reference was cited
2
by Mr. McAlexander in his original Report (see, supra, p. 8), so there is no excuse for not timely
3
disclosing it in the original Section 282 Notices. The Manufacturers have no excuse for not
4
providing these references according to the statutory deadline. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (mandating
5
disclosure of all prior art references “at least thirty days before the trial”). Therefore, the Court
6
should strike the Manufacturers’ Supplemental 282 Notices. See ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159
7
F.3d 534, 551 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The purpose of § 282, like that of the Federal Rules, is to
8
prevent unfair and prejudicial surprise, not to facilitate last-minute production of evidence.”);
9
Computer Acceleration Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 481 F. Supp. 2d 620, 683 (E.D. Tex. 2007)
10
(“Failure to comply with the very specific notice requirements of Section 282 is grounds for
11
prohibiting introduction of evidence of the prior art.”) (citing Ferguson Beauregard/Logic
12
Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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III. CONCLUSION5
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On the eve of trial, the Manufacturers used what should have been a narrowly tailored
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Second Supplemental Report to spring new invalidity references and opinions on Rambus.
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Nothing in the Court’s revised construction of “memory device” or Rambus’s December 23
17
letter justified these new disclosures. Accordingly, Rambus respectfully requests that this Court
18
strike the offending portions of Mr. McAlexander’s Second Supplemental Report and the
19
Supplemental Section 282 Notices.
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Mr. McAlexander appears to make a point to refer to “Mr. Detre’s” December 23 letter to the
Court. As a precaution, Rambus additionally moves to strike from the Second Supplemental
25 Report the references to “Mr. Detre’s” letter, given that the jury could be confused if Mr.
McAlexander opines as to a letter from Rambus’s attorney conveying Mr. Murphy’s opinions.
26 Rambus simply used the December 23 letter as a vehicle to convey Mr. Murphy’s opinions and
to tee up any report from Mr. McAlexander. (The burden of proving invalidity is on the
27 Manufacturers, of course, and not Rambus.)
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Case Nos. 05-00334, 05-002298, and 06-00244
1 Dated: January 13, 2009 Respectfully submitted,
2 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
3 MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
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/s/ Pierre J. Hubert
6 Pierre J. Hubert
Attorneys for Rambus Inc.
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Austin 48077v3
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Case Nos. 05-00334, 05-002298, and 06-00244

Rambus, Inc.'S Motion To Strike (1) Portions of The Second Supplemental Mcalexander Expert Report and (2) Supplemental Section 282 Notices

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Case 5:05-cv-00334-RMW Document 3107 Filed 01/13/2009 Page 1 of 15

1 Gregory P. Stone (SBN 078329) Rollin A. Ransom (SBN 196126)

13 Attorneys for RAMBUS INC.

14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

1 RAMBUS INC., ) Case No. C 05-002298 RMW

2 I. Statement of Relevant Facts.................................................................................................2

4 A. The Court Should Strike the Bowater “Programmable

8 D. The Court Should Strike the Opinions Related to the

11 F. The Court Should Strike the Manufacturers’ Supplemental

282 Notices ..............................................................................................................9

Supplemental Report as discussing “Auto Precharge” and “Programmable Latency,” opinions

25 also strike the Manufacturers’ untimely Supplemental Section 282 Notices.

1 A. The Court Should Strike the Bowater “Programmable

1 D. The Court Should Strike the Opinions

1 Dated: January 13, 2009 Respectfully submitted,

2 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP

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