SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

WASHINGTON, DC 20543-0001

August 23, 2012

Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, FL 34481 RE: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems and Cook, et al.
(FLSC No. SCll-1622)
Dear Mr. Gillespie: The above-entitled petition for writ of certiorari was sent by commercial carrier August 20, 2012 and received August 22, 2012. The papers are returned for the following reason(s): The petition is ollt-of-time. The date of the lower court judgment or order denying a timely petition for rehearing was March 12, 2012. Therefore, the petition was due on or before June 11,2012. Rules 13.1,29.2 and 30.1. When the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in a civil case (habeas action included) has expired, the Court no longer has the power to review the petition. The May 22, 2012 order from the Florida Supreme Court does not appear to be a order denying a timely petition for rehearing.

Enclosures

August 20, 2012 Clerk of Court Supreme Court of the United States 1 First Street, NE Washington, DC 20543 Dear Clerk of Court: Enclosed is my original Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, in forma pauperis, with ten copies, for review of the judgment in the Supreme Court of Florida, case number SC 11-1622. Also enclosed is the following: Rule 39 Motion to proceed in forma pauperis with declaration, original and 10 copies.
Rule 29 Proof of Service with declaration, original.
Appendixes A-F to the Petition. (Rule 14.1 (h)(i)(vi))
Motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem.
error On August 13, 2012 I submitted a Rule 13.5 Application to Justice Thomas for the following: Application to Extend Time To File A Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari, with Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem, and Notice of Extraordinary Circumstances; and Appendix. At the time I submitted the Rule 13.5 Application, I believed the 90-day period to file a petition for a writ of certiorari ended August 22, 2012. Since then I learned that the 90-day period ends today, August 20, 2012. I am disabled with physical and mental impairments and was confused. As of this morning, I do not have a response to my Rule 13.5 Application. Therefore today I submitted a petition, because the 90-day period is absolutely mandatory and jurisdictional. The Clerk will not file any petition for a writ of certiorari that is jurisdictionally out of time. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 2101. S. Ct. R. 13.2. My petition today is shorter than planned,just five pages, because that is all I could do without an extension of time. Thank you.

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Enclosures cc: Ryan Christopher Rodems, counsel for Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., et aI., Respondents

No.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_N_EI_L_Je_G_IL_L_ES_P_IE

PETITIONER

(Your Name)
VS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK. PA, at a!. _ RESPONDENT(S)

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

The petitioner asks leave to file the attached petition for a writ of certiorari without prepayment of costs and to proceed in forma pauperis.
Petitioner has previously been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the following court(s):
Florida Supreme Court, SC11-858, SC11-1622; 2dDCA. 2010-5197, 2010-5529, and 2011-2127 HUlsborough County, Florida, 05-CA-7205, sec. 27.52 Fla. Stat., appointed the public defender.

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[ ] Petitioner has not previously been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in any other court. Petitioner's affidavit or declaration in support of this motion is attached hereto.

AFFIDAVIT OR DECLARAllON
IN SUPPORT OF MOllON FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

I, e I ~ ;~ am the petitioner in the above-entitled case. In BUpport of my motion to proceed in forma, pauperis, I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of this case or to give security therefor; and I believe I am entitled to redress.

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1. For both you and your spouse estimate the average amount of money received from each of the following sources during the past 12 months. Adjust any amount that was received weekly, biweekly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually to show the monthly rate. U Be gross amounts, that is, amounts before any deductions for taxes or otherwise.
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2. List your employment history for the past two years, most recent first. (Gross monthly pay is before taxes or other deductions.)
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Gross monthly pay

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4. How much cash do you and your spouse have?

_ Below, state any money you or your spouse have in bank accounts or in any other financial institution.
Type

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6. List the assets, and their values, which you own or your spouse owns. and ordinary household furnishings.

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7. State the persons who rely on you or your spouse for support.
Name

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8. Estimate the average monthly expenses of you and your family: Show separately the amounts paid by your spouse. Adjust any payments that are made weekly, biweekly, quarterly, or annually to show the monthly rate.

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Rent or home-mortgage payment (include lot rented for mobile home) Are real estate taxes included? D Yes (k(~oo Is property insurance included? D Yes urN Utilities (electricity, heating fuel,
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9. Do you expect any major changes to your monthly income or expenses or in your assets or liabilities during the next 12 months? DYes

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If yes, describe on an attached sheet.

10. Have you paid - or will "you be paying - an attorney any money for ,ervices in connection with this case, including the completion of this form? DYes M'No
If yes, how much?
_

If yes, state the attorney's name, address, and telephone number:

11. Have you paid-or will you be paying-anyone other than an attorney (such as a paralegal or a typist) any money for services in connection with this case, including the completion of this
form? DYes

If yes, how much?

If yes, state the person's name, address, and telephone number:

12. Provide any other information that will help explain why you cannot pay the costs of this case.

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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on:

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In the Supreme Court of the United States Petition for Writ of Certiorari Neil J. Gillespie, Petitioner Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 12. Other information to explain why I cannot pay the costs of this case. I am indigent and live from one disability check to the next. I am fifty-six (56) year-old, single, male, no children, disabled with physical and mental impairments. I receive monthly Social Security disability income on a government-issued card. I was homeless from approximately September 2002 through February 2005. In February 2004 I bought a used 1990 Dodge minivan and lived in the van until I moved to Ocala a year later. In February 2005 I moved to 8092 SW 115th Loop, Ocala, Florida 34481, Marion County, to care for my elderly Mother, an unremarried widow with Alzheimers dementia, who died in 2009. This ongoing case has essentially bankrupted me. The expenses have resulted in foregone medical care and the loss of health. I do not have a bank account because I cannot manage one. I do not have a retirement account. My inability to manage funds resulted in two bankruptcies: Chapter 7 bankruptcy, discharged January 7, 1993, case 92-20222, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Chapter 7 bankruptcy, discharged March 5, 2003, case 02-14021-8B7, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Florida. My home is valued at $85,584. The mortgage is $108,056. The home is underwater; negative equity is -$22,532. Delinquent HOA fees are $6,902. The contents of the home is the estate. Reverse Mortgage Solutions gave me notice June 8, 2012 of Notice of Default and Intent to Foreclose, copy attached. Contrary to its letter, RMS did not offer me consumer assistance to resolve the delinquency and avoid foreclose. August 9, 2012, I made a complaint to HUD that regulates reverse mortgages. The home is owned by The Gillespie Family Living Trust. The trust has no assets other than the home. A copy of the trust was filed September 20, 2011 with the District Court along with my Affidavit of Indigency, Case 5:11-cv-00539-WTH-TBS Document 3 Filed 09/20/11 Page 1 of 37 PageID 76. The District Court did not make a determination of indigency, and dismissed the case on other grounds. The District Courts denial of my motion to e-file on the CM/ECF system cost me not less than $1,094.94, and 178.5 hours labor. See Motion to Apply Funds Toward Filing Fees, Case 5:10cv-00503-WTH-TBS Document 70 Filed 07/30/12 Page 1 of 88 PageID 1863 The District Court is holding $50 of my money paid toward unused filing fees. I moved for return of the $50 on August 17, 2012. See Motion For Return of $50, Case 5:11-cv-00539WTH-TBS Document 26 Filed 08/17/12 Page 1 of 3 PageID 267

Case: 12-11028

Date Filed: 5) (5 of 07/06/2012

Page: 1 of 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303 John Ley Clerk of Court For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

July 16, 2012 Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115TH LOOP OCALA, FL 34481 Appeal Number: 12-11028-B Case Style: Estate of Penelope Gillespie, et al v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, F, et al District Court Docket No: 5:11-cv-00539-WTH-TBS Enclosed is your "Response to Order", which should go to the Supreme Court of the United States, and is being returned to you. The procedure for filing a notice of appeal from a decision of a United States Court of Appeals was abolished by statute effective September 25, 1988. Please note that a copy of this court's opinion, the judgment, and any order on rehearing should be attached as an appendix to any petition for writ of certiorari filed in the Supreme Court. See Supreme Court Rule 14.1(i). Sincerely, JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court Reply to: Melanie Gaddis, B Phone #: (404) 335-6187

SPCT-5 NOA to SC rtrnd to prose

Case: 12-11028

Date Filed: 5) (1 of 07/06/2012

Page: 1 of 4

Case: 12-11028

Date Filed: 5) (2 of 07/06/2012

Page: 2 of 4

Case: 12-11028

Date Filed: 5) (3 of 07/06/2012

Page: 3 of 4

Case: 12-11028

Date Filed: 5) (4 of 07/06/2012

Page: 4 of 4

No: _______________________ _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO The Supreme Court of Florida - Case Number SC11-1622 Decided March 12, 2012 - Rehearing Denied May 22, 2012 ____________________ PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Submitted August 20, 2012 by Neil J. Gillespie, Petitioner, pro se, non-lawyer, an adult man disabled with physical and mental impairments. 8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 854-7807 Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Is there a right to mental integrity in civil litigation as a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest, protection from opposing counsel bullying a pro se litigant with abusive phone calls, insulting letters, harassing behavior in the courthouse, and a false affidavit alleging violence? 2. Is an indigent, mentally ill civil contemnor entitled to counsel when facing arrest and incarceration for civil contempt on a writ of bodily attachment? 3. Can a judge dismiss at the civil contempt hearing a public defender appointed to represent an indigent, mentally ill civil contemnor facing arrest on a writ of bodily attachment? 4. What accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a disabled civil litigant entitled during a full deposition conducted while involuntarily confined in a municipal detention facility for reasons other than serving a sentence resulting from conviction for a criminal offense? What ADA accommodations during regular court proceedings can prevent opposing counsel from bullying and harassing a disabled pro se litigant? 5. Can a lawyer representing a disabled client in civil litigation prevent the client from testifying in his own case because opposing counsel harasses with intent to upset the client? 6. Do the rules of attorney disqualification as held in McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995, apply to counsel litigating against a former client in the same or substantially related matter as the prior representation? What duty does counsel have under bar rules to disclose to the court legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing pro se? 7. What is the fiduciary duty of a lawyer to a client, and a former client? Can a lawyer pursue vexatious litigation against a former client, a libel counterclaim over a letter written about a closed bar complaint, in order to obtain sanctions and force a settlement? 8. Can a settlement agreement and release obtained from a disabled and mentally impaired civil litigant during a coercive confinement be rescinded upon prompt notice to the parties? 9. Can a mentally ill attorney, one with health issues, provide effective assistance of counsel when the disabled attorney failed to obey the clients written and verbal instruction not to accept a walk-away settlement agreement, made when the client was unable to give consent? 10. Does a disabled, mentally impaired civil litigant have a right to effective counsel while in coercive custody without disability accommodation to force a settlement in civil litigation? 11. Is a pro se litigant entitled to the same case management as lawyers to avoid discovery sanctions as described in Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REV. 323? Can a pro se litigant be prevented from representing himself, or filing documents? Can a judge prevent a pro se litigant from attending hearings telephonically, while allowing lawyers to appear by phone? Can a pro se use JAWS, Judicial Automated Workflow System, to schedule hearings? 12. How can pro se litigants overcome the lawyer-judge bias described by Prof. Benjamin Barton in his book The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System?

LIST OF PARTIES

[v'All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. [ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI Petitioner pro se Neil J. Gillespie (Gillespie) respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below. I. OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in case no. SC11-1622 appears at Appendix 3 to the petition and is unpublished. The opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal, Florida, in case 2D10-5197 appears at Appendix 1 to the petition and is unpublished. II. JURISDICTION The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. 1257(a). The opinion of The Florida Supreme Court is dated March 12, 2012. A copy of that decision appears at Appendix 3. A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied May 22, 2012, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix 4. The petition for rehearing, and addendum, are included in Appendix D to show what actually happened. Rule 14.1(h)(i). 4 A Rule 13.5 Application for an extension of time to file this petition for a writ of certiorari was submitted August 13, 2012. (Appendix 5). As of this morning there was no response. The Application included a Motion for Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem, gave Notice of Extraordinary Circumstances, and argued for consolidation with two other cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 12-11213-C and 12-11028-B. Gillespie incorrectly stated in his Application that Gillespie believes the time in Florida case no. SC11-

1622 expires August 22, 2012. (Appendix 5, 4). Since then Gillespie learned that the 90-day period ends today, August 20, 2012. Gillespie is disabled with mental impairments and was confused. Gillespie calculated the correct 90-day period with a date calculator he found online. Therefore today Gillespie submitted this petition for a writ of certiorari, because the 90day period is absolutely mandatory and jurisdictional. The Clerk will not file any petition for a writ of certiorari that is jurisdictionally out of time. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 2101. S. Ct. R. 13.2. This petition today is shorter than Gillespie planned, just five pages, because that is all he could do without an extension of time. A petition five pages or less does not require a table of contents or a table of cited authorities. Gillespie will rely on Rule 14.1(h)(i), an Appendix may include (vi) any other material the petitioner believes essential to understand the petition; and Rule 14.1(h) If the material required by this subparagraph is voluminous, it may be presented in a separate volume or volumes with appropriate covers. III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED First Amendment, Pro se speech, pro se right to petition for a governmental redress of grievances on equal footing given by courts to lawyers; Fifth Amendment, protection from abuse of government authority in litigation; Eighth Amendment, prohibition from excessive fines, $11,550 in sanctions; Fourteenth Amendment, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and a right to mental integrity as a liberty interest. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the ADAAA; The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et. seq.; Section 825.101(4), Florida Statutes; Florida Bar Rule 4-8.4(d). Constitutional Challenge to Fla. Statute 57.105, sanctions for pro se, in conflict with Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REV. 323.

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Gillespie is an indigent, fifty-six (56) year-old single man, law abiding, college educated, and a former business owner, disabled with physical and mental impairments. (Appendix C, D). Gillespies litigation against his former lawyers, Barker, Rodems & Cook. PA, is to recover $7,143 stolen during their prior representation of Gillespie. Ryan Christopher Rodems is unethically representing his firm against Gillespie, a former client of the small three-partner firm, contrary to well-established law and ethics rules, see McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. Mr. Rodems strategy has been, since 2006, to inflict severe emotional distress on Gillespie who he knows to be especially vulnerable, through an abuse of power in a position of dominance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted Gillespie leave to amend his motion for disability accommodation, and it was submitted August 6, 2012. (Appendix D). Gillespie argued for a Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest, see Washington Et Al. v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). Gillespie has a record of impairment since birth. Gillespie is also regarded by others as being impaired. The record shows Gillespie has major depression, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), diabetes type II adult onset, traumatic brain injury (TBI), velopharyngeal incompetence (VPI)(a speech disorder), craniofacial disorder, and impaired hearing. Gillespie argued in his motion: 8. The right to bodily integrity and security of person includes mental integrity, that is, freedom from mental and psychological abuse. The right to safely pursue justice is a fundamental civil right that underscores a litigants right not to be subjected to physical, sexual, mental or emotional violence inside or outside the court, either by private attorneys or by judges and people acting on the part of the state. Law already recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. Litigants in civil proceedings must be free from mental or emotional violence, or their Constitutionally protected rights, including due process, are rendered meaningless. Gillespies petition to the Supreme Court of Florida in SC11-1622 (Appendix 6) addressed why the proceedings in the Second District Court of Appeal (2dDCA) should not have

been dismissed, and sought to rescind a Settlement Agreement And General Mutual Release dated June 21, 2011 obtained from Gillespie while he was in coercive custody on a writ of bodily attachment improperly obtained by Mr. Rodems through ex-parte hearings. The public defender was appointed to represent Gillespie June 1, 2011 on civil contempt with threat of incarceration but the judge dismissed the defender and immediately issued an arrest order. (Appendix 7). In this case Gillespie did not hold the keys to his release; Rodems held the keys, and he planned a coercive confinement to force Gillespie to sign a settlement in the state and federal cases. The record shows Gillespie was impaired and could not make a decision to sign the agreement. Counsel Eugene Castagliuolo made the decision to settle because judges have mud on their shoes; but he too was impaired with health issues, and had a conflict with the defender. The state court case commenced August 11, 2005. Gillespie prevailed on Defendants motion to dismiss February 13, 2006, and established a case for fraud and breach of contract. Partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible for the fraud or negligence of another partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965). There is was actual conflict of interest in Mr. Rodems and Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA representing themselves. Mr. Rodems strategically disrupted the tribunal on March 6, 2012 with 2006 a false affidavit to the court about an attack. This was later disproved by a police investigation. Mr. Rodems obtained $11,550 sanctions against Gillespie for a misplaced defense to the counterclaim, and discovery mistakes. Almost the entire case, from 2006 through 2011, was spent by Mr. Rodems securing sanctions and executing on the $11,550 judgment, including garnishment of Gillespies exempt Social Security. In 2007 Gillespie retained out-of-town counsel Robert W. Bauer for the libel counterclaim. Mr. Bauer reinstated Gillespies dismissed claims, but unable to overcome the misconduct of Mr. Rodems, he withdrew. Gillespie filed May

5, 2010 Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Appendix B) with leave of court, precluding Final Summary Judgment September 28, 2010 on the original complaint, where Gillespie was removed from the hearing. (Appendix 8). Gillespie brought his dispute to court for a lawful adjudication, but did not find justice, only a pattern of racketeering activity. (Appendix 9).

v. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Gillespie's experience represents what many, perhaps most, pro se litigants find when they bring a matter to court: A broken system. Gillespie's experience also shows the torture suffered by the disabled in court. Under McPartland Mr. Rodems should have been disqualified April 25, 2006. Rodems' independent professional judgment was materially limited by his own interest and conflict. This case continued to everyone's detriment. Through my website, people across America contact me with similar stories. This is not American Exceptionalism. Law Professor Benjamin H. Barton, author of The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System, says that virtually all American judges are former lawyers, a shared background that results in the lawyerjudge bias. Barton argues that these lawyer-judges instinctively favor the legal profession in their decisions and that this bias has far-reaching and deleterious effects on American law.

VI. CONCLUSION
Please grant this petition for writ of certiorari, together with such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable, and rescind the "Settlement Agreement And General Mutual Release" dated June 21, 2011. (Appendix 4). Respectfully submitted August 20,2012.

,eil J. G~pie, Petiti

er pro se

No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________

Appendix 1

Decision of Second District Court of Appeals, Florida, 2D10-5197

Appendix 2

Decision of State Trial Court, Hillsborough County, Florida, 05-CA-7205

Appendix 3

Decision of The Supreme Court of Florida, SC11-1622

Appendix 4

Order of The Supreme Court of Florida Denying Rehearing, SC11-1622

Appendix 5

Rule 13.5 Application, Extend Time To File, Guardian Ad Litem, etc.

Appendix 6

Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Supreme Court of Florida, SC11-1622

Appendix 7

Public Defender appointed, relieved, order for Gillespies arrest.

Appendix 8

Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, removed from Summary Judgment hearing.

Appendix 9

Motion to Reconsider, RICO, C.A.11, 12-11028-B May-30-2012

No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME B PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________

Appendix B

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, May 5, 2010, with motion. Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, et al., 05-CA-7205 Rule 1.190(a), Fla.R.Civ.P. A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course. Leave of court shall be given freely when justice so requires. A court should not dismiss a complaint without leave to amend unless the privilege of amendment has been abused or it is clear that the complaint cannot be amended to state a cause of action. Trotter v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. 868 So.2d 593. Procedural rule allowing amended pleadings to relate back to the date of the original pleading is to be construed liberally. Rule 1.190(c). Stirman v. Michael Graves 983 So.2d 626.

No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME C PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________ Appendix C Verified Notice of Filing Disability Information of Neil J. Gillespie, May 27, 2011. Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, et al., 05-CA-7205 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.
Under Title II of the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. 12132. "A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. 35.130(7). "Public entity" includes "any State or local government" and "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government ...." 42 U.S.C. 12131(1). Under Title II of the ADA, "[d]isability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. "The phrase physical or mental impairment" includes "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. "The phrase major life activities means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. A "qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. 12131(2).

No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME D PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________ Appendix D Consolidated Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation, August 6, 2012 With Appendixes 1-3, Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, et al., 12-11213-C
The Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest Washington Et Al. v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) Supreme Court of United States, No. 88-599 Argued October 11, 1989 - Decided February 27, 1990 As relevant to Gillespie and this motion: (footnotes omitted) The Court acknowledges that under the Fourteenth Amendment "respondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs," ante, at 221, but then virtually ignores the several dimensions of that liberty. They are both physical and intellectual. Every violation of a person's bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty. The invasion is particularly intrusive if it creates a substantial risk of permanent injury and premature death.[1] Moreover, any such action is degrading if it overrides a competent person's choice to reject a specific form of medical treatment.[2] And when the purpose 238*238 or effect of forced drugging is to alter the will and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense.

"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME E PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________

Appendix E

Consolidated Notice of Pro Se Electronic Case Filing Prohibition by District Court In Support Of: Consolidated Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation, August 6, 2012 Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, et al., 12-11213-C
The Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest

No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME F PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________

Appendix F

Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, Conflict of Interest and ADA denial by Florida Judge Claudia R. Isom, in case 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough Co. In Support Of: Consolidated Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation, August 6, 2012 Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, et al., 12-11213-C
The Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest

No:

--------IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER

VS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS

PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Neil J Gillespie, do swear or declare that on this date, August 20, 2012, as required by Supreme Court Rule 29 I have served the enclosed MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS and PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI on each party to the above proceeding or that party's counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days. The names and addresses of those served are as follows: Ryan Christopher Rodems, Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, 501 E. Kennedy Blvd, Suite 790, Tampa, Florida 33602, Telephone: (813) 489-1001, for the Respondents. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August 20, 2012.

No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________

Appendix 1

Decision of Second District Court of Appeals, Florida, 2D10-5197

Appendix 2

Decision of State Trial Court, Hillsborough County, Florida, 05-CA-7205

Appendix 3

Decision of The Supreme Court of Florida, SC11-1622

Appendix 4

Order of The Supreme Court of Florida Denying Rehearing, SC11-1622

Appendix 5

Rule 13.5 Application, Extend Time To File, Guardian Ad Litem, etc.

Appendix 6

Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Supreme Court of Florida, SC11-1622

Appendix 7

Public Defender appointed, relieved, order for Gillespies arrest.

Appendix 8

Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, removed from Summary Judgment hearing.

Appendix 9

Motion to Reconsider, RICO, C.A.11, 12-11028-B May-30-2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT, POST OFFICE BOX 327, LAKELAND, FL 33802-0327

July 26, 2011

CASE NO.: 2010-5197 L. 1. No. : 05-CA-7205

Neil J. Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P. A. & William J. Cook Appellee / Respondent(s).

Appellant / Petitioner(s),

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

The appellant's motion for leave to submit reply to appellee's response is denied. The appellant's motion to reinstate dismissed appeal is denied. The appellant's motion to amend notice of appeal is denied as moot.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true copy of the original court order.

Served: Neil J. Gillespie pm Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esq. Pat Frank, Clerk

James Birkhold Clerk

Appendix 1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----:1 FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COUNT I THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on Tuesday, September 28,2010, on Defendant Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.'s (BRC) motion for summary judgment as to Count I, alleging breach of contract. 1 A review of the pleadings, admissions, affidavits and other materials as would be admissible in evidence on file shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the following material facts are undisputed: 1. Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie and two other individuals, who are not parties to this Case No.: Division: 05CA7205
C

action, hired Defendant BRC to bring claims against Amscot for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. (Complaint, ~~ 6, 11). 2. Under TILA, an aggrieved individual may claim actual damages or statutory

damages of up to $1,000.00. 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(l), (2). Under 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(3), an aggrieved individual may also make a claim to have his or her attorneys' fees and costs paid by Plaintiff filed a two count complaint, alleging breach of contract against both Defendants in Count I and fraud against both Defendants in Count II. By Orders dated November 28,2007 and July 7, 2008, the Court granted judgment in favor of Defendant Cook on both counts, and in favor of Defendant Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., on the fraud count.
1

Appendix 2

the losing party under, but only if he or she is represented by counsel. Hannon v. Security Nat. Bank, 537 F.2d 327,328-29 (9th Cir. 1976)(denying attorneys' fees under TILA to pro se plaintiff, and holding that "[t]he purpose behind granting attorney's fees is to make a litigant whole and to facilitate private enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act."). 3. Defendant BRC filed a lawsuit under TILA in the United States District Court,

Middle District of Florida, on behalf of Plaintiff and the two other individuals, (Complaint, ~ 9), seeking, among other things, damages and court-awarded attorneys' fees. (Affidavit of William J. Cook, Esquire, ~ 4). After discovery, William J. Cook, Esquire, an attorney employed by Defendant BRC, testified by affidavit that it became clear that none of the plaintiffs had actual damages. (Affidavit of William J. Cook, Esquire, 4.
~

3).

After substantial litigation and discovery, the district court dismissed the TILA

claims, and Defendant BRC filed a notice of appeal. (Complaint, ~ 9); (Affidavit of William J. Cook, Esquire, ~ 7). While the case was on appeal, the parties began settlement negotiations. (Complaint, ~~ 22-23, Exh. 4-6). 5. Under the "Class Representation Contract," which Plaintiff attached to his

Complaint as Exhibit 1,2 Defendant BRC had a duty to investigate and litigate Plaintiffs "potential claims from [his] payday loans with AMSCOT Corporation." After the TILA action

2 Although Plaintiff argues the Class Representation Contract was unsigned, he alleged in the Complaint that "GILLESPIE and the LAW FIRM [defined as Defendant Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.] had a written Representation Contract." (Complaint, ~~ 2,6). Whether the contract was signed is not material because it is undisputed from the pleadings that Plaintiff "acted as if the provisions ofthe contract were in force." Sosa v. Shearform Mfg., 784 So.2d 609, 610 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001 )("Even if parties do not sign a contract, they may be bound by the provisions of the contract, if the evidence supports that they acted as if the provisions of the contract were in force.").

was dismissed, however, Plaintiff expressed a desire to end the litigation and avoid claims against himself, and he directed Defendant BRC orally and in writing to negotiate a settlement of his claims under TILA. (Complaint, Exh. 4 and 5);(Affidavit of William J. Cook, Esquire, ~~ 6

6.

Eventually, Amscot made a settlement offer which Plaintiff accepted.

(Complaint, ~~ 32-35). Amscot agreed to pay Plaintiff and the other two plaintiffs $2,000.00 each, $50,000.00 to Defendant BRC to settle the TILA plaintiffs' claims for court-awarded attorneys' fees and costs, and a general release of all clainls against the TILA plaintiffs. (Complaint, ~~ 34-35 and Exh. 2; (Affidavit of William J. Cook, Esquire, ~~ 6-8 and Exh. 1)). Under the settlement agreement, neither Plaintiff nor the other two individuals had to pay any portion of their $2,000.00 to Defendant BRC for attorneys' fees or costs. (Affidavit of William J. Cook, Esqllire, ~ 11). The Settlement Agreement, wllich Plaintiff, Amscot and Defendant BRC signed, constituted a modification to the Class Representation Contract for which there was consideration, as Defendant BRC took on the task of negotiating a general release, which was not a dllty under the Class Representation Contract, and stated as follows: "Amscot shall pay the Firm the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars and No/I00 ($50,000), in satisfaction of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and costs, as more fully described herein, against Amscot as asserted in the Action." (Affidavit of William J. Cook, Esquire, Exh. 1).

3 Plaintiff s written directive was for Defendant BRC to demand a settlement whereby Amscot would pay $1,000 to him and $10,000 for Plaintiffs and the other plaintiffs' claim for court-awarded attorneys' fees. (Complaint, Exh. 4 and 5). Had Plaintiff and the other plaintiffs in the TILA action not had counsel, there would have been no basis to make a claim for court-awarded attorney's fees. Hannon, 537 F.2d at 328-29(denying attorneys' fees under TILA to pro se plaintift).

7.

Plaintiff also signed a Closing Statement, which included the following statement:

"In signing this closing statement, I acknowledge tllat Amscot Corporation separately paid my attorneys $50,000.00 to compensate my attorneys for their claim against Amscot for court-awarded fees and costs. I also acknowledge that I have received a copy of the fully executed Release and Settlement Agreement dated October 30,2001." (Complaint, Exh. 2)(Emphasis added). In Count I against Defendant BRC, Plaintiff contends that, even though he entered into the Settlement Agreement with Amscot, by which Plaintiff, Amscot and Defendant BRC agreed that Amscot would pay $50,000.00 to Defendant BRC to settle Plaintiffs and the other two plaintiffs' claim for court-awarded attorneys' fees and costs, and even though Plaintiff signed the Closing Statement, which acknowledged that the payment of $50,000.00 was intended to resolve the claims for court-awarded attorneys' fees and costs, and even through Plaintiff did not pay any portion of the $2,000.00 Amscot paid him to Defendant BRC as attorneys' fees, Defendant BRC sl10uld have paid Plaintiff some portion of the $50,000.00 paid to settle the claims for court-awarded attorneys' fees. (Complaint, Iiflif 12-20). Plaintiff claims that the failllre to do so was a breach of his contract with Defendant BRC. Based on the undisputed material facts, and having read and considered the proceedings, heard from counsel and Plaintiff, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, Defendant BRC is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on Count I for several reasons. First, Amscot, not Plaintiff, paid the Plaintiffs attorneys' fees, and Defendant BRC did not take a percentage of the $2,000.00 paid to Plaintiff for his claims for statutory damages. In other words, Defendant BRC did not charge Plaintiff any attorneys' fees. As the Class Representation Contract states,
4

'

"[i]n rare cases, the Defendant(s) may pay all or part of the attorneys' fees." Amscot paid 100% of Plaintiffs and the other two plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, as agreed to by Plaintiff, Amscot and Defendant BRC, and as pernlitted by TILA and the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.8(f)(authorizing a lawyer to accept payment of his or her fees for representation of a client by one other than the client). Defendant BRC did not breach any contract with Plaintiff by accepting the payment of $50,000.00 that Plaintiff directed Amscot to pay to it. Moreover, Defendant BRC could not ethically share with Plaintiff any portion of the attorneys' fees it was paid. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-5.4(a)("A lawyer or law firnl shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer...."); Profl Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Ope 60-33 (1961)(Quoting with approval, HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 182: "The only situations in which a lawyer may properly permit a client to receive and retain fees paid by others on account of his legal services are when such payments are to reimburse the client in whole or in part for the client's legal expenses actually incurred in the specific matter for which they are paid."). The law assumes that parties have made a contract for a lawful purpose. DCA 2004). Finally, Plaintiff is estopped as a matter of law from adopting a contrary position in this litigation to the one he took during settlement negotiations with Amscot, in the Settlement Agreement signed by him, Amscot and Defendant BRC, and in the Closing Statement. "In order to demonstrate the existence of estoppel, a party must establish (1) a representation as to a material fact tllat is contrary to a later-asserted position; (2) reliance upon that representation; and (3) a change in position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel, caused by the representation
5

See,~,

J.R.D. Management Corp. v. Dulin, 883 So. 2d 314, 316-17 (Fla. 4th

.
and reliance." Sun Cruz Casinos, L.L.C. v. City of Hollywood, Fla., 844 So.2d 681, 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). According to the undisputed testimony by Mr. Cook, Defendant BRC relied on the statements Plaintiff made in the Settlement Agreement with Amscot that Amscot was authorized to pay Defendant BRC $50,000.00 for the claim for court-awarded attorneys' fees and costs, as well as in the Closing Statement, and Defendant BRC would not have accepted the money if Plaintiff had not agreed to the terms of settlement. Therefore, as a matter of law, Plaintiff is estopped from changing his position with Arnscot that its payment of $50,000.00 was to settle and resolve Plaintiffs obligation to pay Defendant BRC attorneys' fees and costs. Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Defendant BRC's motion for summary judgment as to Count I is GRANTED; and, IT IS ADJUDGED that Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie, 8092 SW 115th Loop, Ocala, Florida 34481, take nothing by this action and that Defendant Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100, Tampa, Florida 33602, shall go hence without day and recover costs from Plaintiff, the amount of which the Court retains jurisdiction to determine if the parties cannot agree. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers this _ _ day of September, 2010.

OR\G\NAL S\GNEr SEP 2 8 2010

Copies to:
Mr. Neil J. Gillespie, pro se
Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esquire (Counsel for Defendants)

~upreme

((ourt of jflortba

CASE NO.: SC 11-1622

MONDAY, MARCH 12,2012

Lower Tribunal No(s).: 2D10-5197, 05-CA-7205 NEIL J. GILLESPIE vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, ET AL. Respondent(s)

Petitioner(s)

The petitioner has filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Court. To the extent the petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus directed towards the district court, the petition is denied because a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to direct the manner in which a court shall act in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. State ex reI. North St. Lucie River Drainage Dist. v. Kanner, 11 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. 1943); see also Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 415 So. 2d 62,63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (stating that mandamus "is not an appropriate vehicle for review of a merely erroneous decision nor is it proper to mandate the doing (or undoing) of a discretionary act"), approved, 431 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1983). To the extent the petitioner seeks any additional relief, the petition is dismissed as facially insufficient. PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, J1., concur. A True Copy Test:

~rof,@I

Clerk, Supreme Com1 kb Served: NEIL 1. GILLESPIE / RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS HON. PAT FRANK, CLERK HON. JAMES BIRKHOLD, CLERK
Appendix 3

~upreme

((ourt of jfloriba
CASE NO.: SC 11-1622

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2012

Lower Tribunal No(s).: 2D10-5197,05-CA-7205 NEIL J. GILLESPIE vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, ET AL. Respondent(s)

Petitioner(s)

Petitioner's "Motion for Leave to File a Proper Motion for Reconsideration on Single Issue" has been treated as a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Motion for Rehearing, and said motion is hereby denied. Petitioner's Addendum, Request to Toll Time, Amended Certificate of Service" has been treated as a Motion to Toll Time, and said motion is denied. A True Copy Test:

~,f)@1
Clerk Supreme Comt
ab Served: NEIL 1. GILLESPIE RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS HON. PAT FRANK, CLERK HON. JAMES BIRKHOLD, CLERK

Appendix 4

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

NEIL J. GILLESPIE Petitioner, Case No.: SC11-1622 Lower Tribunal No(s).: 2D10-5197, 05-CA-7205

vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, ET AL. Respondents. ________________________________________/ PETITIONERS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A PROPER MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON SINGLE ISSUE 1. Petitioner Gillespie moves for leave to file a proper motion for reconsideration of

this Courts Order of March 12, 2012 on a single issue, to rescind the walk-away settlement agreement attached hereto, further described as Settlement Agreement And General Mutual Release dated June 21, 2011. (Exhibit 1). In support Petitioner states: 2. Defense counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems has unlawfully represented his firm and

law partner in this action, and should have been disqualified as counsel April 25, 2006 during a motion to disqualify counsel before Judge Richard Nielsen, pursuant to the holding of McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. McPartland has been a mandatory authority on disqualification in Tampa since entered June 30, 1995 by Judge Kovachevich. I raised this issue (among others) in Emergency Motion To Disqualify Defendants Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., provided to this Court in the Appendix. (A.9) 3. McPartland v. ISI Investment Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, (US District Court,

MD of Florida, Tampa Division) held as follows:

[1] Under Florida law, attorneys must avoid appearance of professional impropriety, and any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disqualification. [2] To prevail on motion to disqualify counsel, movant must show existence of prior attorney-client relationship and that the matters in pending suit are substantially related to the previous matter or cause of action. [3] In determining whether attorney-client relationship existed, for purposes of disqualification of counsel from later representing opposing party, a long-term or complicated relationship is not required, and court must focus on subjective expectation of client that he is seeking legal advice. [5] For matters in prior representation to be substantially related to present representation for purposes of motion to disqualify counsel, matters need only be akin to present action in way reasonable persons would understand as important to the issues involved. [7] Substantial relationship between instant case in which law firm represented defendant and issues in which firm had previously represented plaintiffs created irrebuttable presumption under Florida law that confidential information was disclosed to firm, requiring disqualification. [8] Disqualification of even one attorney from law firm on basis of prior representation of opposing party necessitates disqualification of firm as a whole, under Florida law. 4. McPartland relied on a Supreme Court of Florida case, State Farm Mut. Auto. Co.

v. K.A.W., 75 So.2d 630, 633 (Fla.1991). Petitioner cited to McPartland seven times in his Emergency Motion To Disqualify Defendants Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. (A.9) as follows: McPartland, paragraph 22, page 13 McPartland, paragraph 23, page 14 McPartland, paragraph 28, page 17 McPartland, paragraph 50, page 29-30 McPartland, paragraph 53, page 31 McPartland, paragraph 56, page 32 McPartland, paragraph 61, page 34 5. Petitioner established, by Order dated January 13, 2006 (A.11.9), a cause of action

for Fraud and Breach of Contract against Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. and William J. Cook. (Petition, beginning at paragraph 51). Partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible for the fraud or negligence of another partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein,

Page - 2

177 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965). There is an actual conflict of interest in Mr. Rodems and Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA representing themselves in this case. 6. The lawsuit Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, et al, 05-CA-007205

Hillsborough County, FL is substantially related to the earlier representation, the Amscot lawsuit, as held in McPartland: [5] For matters in prior representation to be substantially related to present representation for purposes of motion to disqualify counsel, matters need only be akin to present action in way reasonable persons would understand as important to the issues involved. Counsel for Amscot, Charles L. Stutts of Holland & Knight, provided Petitioner a letter to this effect February 13, 2007. Mr. Stutts wrote: (Exhibit 2) The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in 2001 dismissed all claims brought by you, Eugene R. Clement and Gay Ann Blomefield, individually and on behalf of others, against Amscot in connection with its deferred deposit transactions. This former action is, of course, at the heart of your pending action against Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 7. The following is from Petitioners Emergency Motion To Disqualify Defendants

Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. (A.9). 60. A hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Counsel was held April 25, 2006. Mr. Rodems presented the following case law in support of his position. The cases are largely irrelevant to this matter and set of facts. Rodems failed to disclose to the court legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. The hearing was transcribed by Denise L. Bradley, RPR and Notary Public, of Berryhill & Associates, Inc., Court Reporters. The transcript of the hearing was filed with the clerk of the court. Mr. Rodems presented the following case law April 25, 2006: a. Frank, Weinberg & Black vs. Effman, 916 So.2d 971 b. Bochese vs. Town of Ponce Inlet, 267 F. Supp. 2nd 1240 c. In Re: Jet One Center 310-BR, Bankruptcy Reporter, 649 d. Transmark USA v State Department of Insurance, 631 So.2d, 1112-1116 e. Cerillo vs. Highley, 797 So.2d 1288 f. Singer Island Limited vs. Budget Construction Company, 714 So.2d 651

Page - 3

61. Mr. Rodems violated FL Bar Rule 4-3.3(c) when he failed to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, in this instance Gillespie pro se. Rodems failed to disclose McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, or U.S. v. Culp, 934 F.Supp. 394, legal authority directly adverse to the position of his client. McPartland and Culp are just two of a number of cases Rodems failed to disclose, see this motion, and the Table of Cases that accompanies this motion. Counsel has a responsibility to fully inform the court on applicable law whether favorable or adverse to position of client so that the court is better able to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before it. Newberger v. Newberger, 311 So.2d 176. As evidenced by this motion, legal authority directly adverse to the position of Mr. Rodems and BRC was not disclosed to the court by Rodems. 8. Because of the foregoing, Mr. Rodems and Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA should

have been disqualified April 25, 2006. Petitioner had a clear legal right to have his case lawfully adjudicated. In turn the circuit court had an indisputable legal duty to lawfully adjudicate the case. Had the circuit court disqualified Mr. Rodems as required by McPartland this case would have been resolved years ago. But the circuit court did not disqualify Mr. Rodems as required by McPartland. Instead Mr. Rodems prevented the lawful adjudication of this case, made numerous false statements of material fact to the court, failed to cooperate with opposing counsel, and disrupted the tribunal for strategic advantage. As set forth in the Petition, Mr. Rodems made false representations to the court to have an arrest warrant issued for the Petitioner for the purpose of forcing a walk-away settlement agreement in the case, and to force a walk-away settlement agreement in Petitioners federal civil rights and ADA disability lawsuit. WHEREFORE, Petitioner moves for leave to file a proper motion for reconsideration of this Courts Order of March 12, 2012 on a single issue, to rescind the walk-away settlement agreement attached hereto, further described as Settlement Agreement And General Mutual Release dated June 21, 2011. (Exhibit 1). In the

Page - 4

alternative Petitioner moves the Court to rescind the "Settlement Agreement And General Mutual Release" sua sponte as set forth in the Petition, paragraphs 68, 69 and 70, and grant such other and further relief as it deems just and equitable. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED March 19,2012.

r pro se

Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed by U.S. Postal Service first class mail March 19,2012 to the following: Robert E. O'Neill, US Attorney US Attorney's Office 400 N. Tampa St., Suite 3200 Tampa, FL 33602-4798 Ryan C. Rodems, Esquire 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 Robert W. Bauer, Esquire Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A. 2815 NW 13th Street, Suite 200E Gainesville, FL 32609-2865

Page - 5

Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 32

Filed 06/21/11

Page 3 of 4 PagelD 602

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND GENERAL MUTUAL RELEASE

This settlement agreement and general mutual release, executed on Iune 21,2011, by and between Neil J. Gillespie, hereinafter "Party A" and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., its agents and employees, and Chris A. Barker, and William J. Cook, and Ryan Christopher Rodems, hereinafter
''Party B".

WHEREAS disputes and differences have arisen between the parties, as detailed in the pleadings and records filed in the case styled Neil J. Gillespie v. Barker. Rodems & Cook. P .A.. and William J. Cook. Esquire, Case No. 05CA7205, pending in the Circuit Court ofthe Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County, Florida and Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. Florida. et a1., 5: 1O-cv-00503-WTH-DAB, pending in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division; WHEREAS, the parties wish to fully and finally resolve all differences between them from the beginning of time through June 21,2011; WHEREAS, the parties represent that none ofthe claims released herein have been assigned to a third-party; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration ofthe assignment to Party "B" of all claims pending or which could have been brought, based on the allegations of Party "A", against any person or entity, without limitation, in Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. Florida. et aI., 5:1O-cv-00503-WTII-DAB and dismissal with prejudice oftheir claims in the case styled Neil J. Gillespie v. Barker. Rodems & Cook. P.An and William J. Cook. ESQuire, Case No. 05CA7205, and dismissal ofthe appeal, Case No. 2DlO-5197, pending in the Second District Court ofAppeal, with the parties to bear their own attorneys' fees and costs, and the agreement of Party "B" to record a Satisfaction ofJudgment regarding the Final Judgment entered on March 27,2008, in Neil J. Gillespie v. Barker. Rodems & Cook. P.A.. and William J. Cook. Esquire, Case No. OSCA720S: Each party (the releasing party) hereby releases, without limitation, the other party (the released party) from any and all actions, suits, claims, debts, accounts, bills, bonds, attorneys' fees or costs, judgments, or any claims, without limitation, whether in law or equity, and whether known or unknown, which the releasing party now has or ever had resulting from any actions or omissions by the released paqy from the beginning of time through June 21, 2011. This mutual release shall be acknowledged before a notary public and may be signed in counterpart.

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Cpse 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 32

Filed 06/21/11

Page 4 of 4 PagelD 603

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by CHRIS A. BARKER, individually and as officer fo BARKER ODEM COOK, P.A.

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Holland + Kntght

Tel

813 227 8500

Holland & Knight LLP 100 North Tampa Street. Suite 4100 Tampa. FL 33602-3644 www.hklaw.com

Fax 813 229 0134

Charles L. Stutts 8132276466 charles.stutts@hklaw.com

February 13, 2007

VIAFEDEX Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 11S th Loop Ocala, FL 34481 Re: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., et al.; Case No. OS-CA-720S

Dear Mr. Gillespie: Amscot Corporation has asked me to respond to your letter of February 10, 2007 in which you request that Mr. Ian MacKechnie, President of Amscot, agree to his deposition in the above-referenced matter. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in 2001 dismissed all claims brought by you, Eugene R. Clement and Gay Ann Blomefield, individually and on behalf of others, against AnlSCOt in connection with its deferred deposit transactions. This former action is, of course, at the heart of your pending action against Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Mr. MacKechnie views the prior litigation as closed, and neither he nor others at Amscot have any interest in voluntarily submitting to deposition or otherwise participating in the pending matter. Accordingly, Mr. MacKechnie nlust decline your request. Please contact me if you have questions or care to discuss the matter. Sincerely yours, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP

:PI
cc: Ian MacKechnie
Atlanta Bethesda Boston Chicago Fort Lauderdale Jacksonville Los Angeles
Miami New York Northern Virginia Orlando Portland San Francisco
Tallahassee Tampa Washington. D.C. West Palm Beach
Beijing Caracas* Helsinki* Mexico City Tel Aviv* Tokyo *Representative Office

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF FLORIDA

NEIL J. GILLESPIE
Petitioner, Case No.: SCII-1622 Lower Tribunal No(s).: 2D 10-5197, 05-CA-7205

vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, ET AL. Respondents.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/
ADDENDUM, REQUEST TO TOLL TIME, AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE RE: PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A PROPER
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON SINGLE ISSUE
1. Petitioner Gillespie hereby makes an addendum to his motion served March 19, 2012, for

leave to file a proper motion for reconsideration on a single issue, and states: 2. Paragraph 8 of the motion states: "Because of the foregoing, Mr. Rodems and Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA should have been disqualified April 25, 2006. Petitioner had a clear legal right to have his case lawfully adjudicated. In tum the circuit court had an indisputable legal duty to lawfully adjudicate the case. Had the circuit court disqualified Mr. Rodems as required by McPartland this case would have been resolved years ago. But the circuit court did not disqualify Mr. Rodems as required by McPartland. Instead Mr. Rodems prevented the lawful adjudication of this case, made numerous false statements of material fact to the court, failed to cooperate with opposing counsel, and disrupted the tribunal for strategic advantage. As set forth in the Petition, Mr. Rodems made false representations to the court to have an arrest warrant issued for the Petitioner for the purpose of forcing a walk away settlement agreement in the case, and to force a walk-away settlement agreement in Petitioner's federal civil rights and ADA disability lawsuit." 3. Petitioner makes this addendum to the above paragraph 8: a. Mr. Rodems pursued vexatious litigation against Gillespie in the form of a libel counterclaim in the Circuit Court, case 05-CA-007205, Hillsborough County, as further

described in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Volume 8 of the Appendix. (A.8). Petitioner alleged "Abuse of Process" at Count II for a libel counterclaim commenced by Mr. Rodems against the Petitioner, and pursued vexatiously by Mr. Rodems from January 19, 2006 through September 28, 20 I0, whereupon Rodems voluntarily dismissed the counterclaim without prejudice. Petitioner retained counsel to defend the vexatious litigation brought by Mr. Rodems on behalf of Mr. Cook and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. and incurred over $30,000 in legal fees by attorney Robert W. Bauer, a referral from the Florida Bar Lawyer Referral Service for libel. Mr. Bauer then encourage Petitioner to reinstate dismissed claims in the litigation. SEPARATE REOUEST TO TOLL TIME 4. Pursuant to Rule 9.300(d)(lO), Petitioner belatedly requests the Court to toll time. AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 5. Petitioner belatedly served his motion of March 19,2012, for leave to file a proper

motion for reconsideration on a single issue, March 21, 2012 as follows: HON. JAMES BIRKHOLD, Clerk of the Second District Court of Appeal, 1005 E.
Memorial Blvd., P.O. Box 327, Lakeland, FL 33801.
HON. PAT FRANK, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, Thirteenth
Judicial Circuit, P.O. Box 989, Tampa, FL 33601-0989.
HON. JAMES D. ARNOLD, Circuit Court Judge, Hillsborough County, Thirteenth
Judicial Circuit, 800 E. Twiggs Street, Room 514, Tampa, Florida 33602.
HON. MARTHA J. COOK, Circuit Court Judge, Hillsborough County, Thirteenth
Judicial Circuit, 401 N. Jefferson Street, Room 615- Annex, Tampa, Florida 33602. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED March 22, 2012.

Page - 2

Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed by u.S. Postal Service first class mail March 22, 2012 to the following: Robert E. O'Neill, US Attorney US Attorney's Office 400 N. Tampa St., Suite 3200 Tampa, FL 33602-4798 Ryan C. Rodems, Esquire 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 HON. JAMES BIRKHOLD, Clerk of the Second District Court of Appeal, 1005 E. Memorial Blvd., P.O. Box 327, Lakeland, FL 33801. HON. ;PAT FRANK, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, P.O. Box 989, Tampa, FL 33601-0989. HON. JAMES D. ARNOLD, Circuit Court Judge, Hillsborough County, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 800 E. Twiggs Street, Room 514, Tampa, Florida 33602. HON. MARTHA J. COOK, Circuit Court Judge, Hillsborough County, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 401 N. Jefferson Street, Room 615- Annex, Tampa, Florida 33602.
Ro~ert W. Bauer, Esquire Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A. 2815 NW 13th Street, Suite 200E Gainesville, FL 32609-2865

Page - 3

No: _______________________ _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, et al. - RESPONDENTS THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, ET AL. - RESPONDENTS ________________________ Application to Justice Clarence Thomas ____________________ Application to Extend Time To File A Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem Notice of Extraordinary Circumstances ______________________ Orders of The Supreme Court of Florida, Case No. SC11-1622 Orders of The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, 12-11213-C Orders of The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, Case No. 12-11028-B ____________________ Submitted August 13, 2012 by Neil J. Gillespie Petitioner, pro se, non-lawyer 8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 (352) 854-7807 neilgillespie@mfi.net

Appendix 5

I. Application To Justice Clarence Thomas 1. Petitioner pro se, Neil J. Gillespie (Gillespie), makes application to Justice Clarence

Thomas under Rule 13(5) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Gillespie also seeks appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem, gives Notice of extraordinary circumstances, and includes a general request for other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 2. Gillespie is a fifty-six (56) year-old single man, law abiding, college educated, and a

former business owner, disabled with physical and mental impairments. Gillespies litigation against his former lawyers, Barker, Rodems & Cook. PA, is to recover $7,143 stolen during their prior representation of Gillespie. Ryan Christopher Rodems is unethically representing his firm against Gillespie, a former client of the small three-partner firm, contrary to well-established law and ethics rules, see McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. Mr. Rodems strategy has been, since 2006, to inflict severe emotional distress on Gillespie who he knows to be especially vulnerable, through an abuse of power in a position of dominance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted Gillespie leave to amend his motion for disability accommodation, and it was submitted August 6, 2012. (Exhibit 1). Gillespie argues for a Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest, see Washington Et Al. v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). Gillespie has a record of impairment since birth. Gillespie is also regarded by others as being impaired. The record shows Gillespie has major depression, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), diabetes type II adult onset, traumatic brain injury (TBI), velopharyngeal incompetence (VPI)(a speech disorder), craniofacial disorder, and impaired hearing. Gillespie argued in his amended disability motion, Exhibit 1, paragraph 8: 8. The right to bodily integrity and security of person includes mental integrity, that is, freedom from mental and psychological abuse. The right to safely pursue justice is a fundamental civil right that underscores a litigants right not to be subjected to physical, sexual, mental or emotional violence inside or outside the court, either by private

attorneys or by judges and people acting on the part of the state. Law already recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. Litigants in civil proceedings must be free from mental or emotional violence, or their Constitutionally protected rights, including due process, are rendered meaningless. Gillespie is also indigent and his home is in foreclosure. See the Clerks online letter in the U.S. 11th Circuit, case no. 12-11028-B, returning Gillespies Response To Order stating it should go to the Supreme Court of the United States. (Public Communication 07/06/2012). II. Jurisdiction and Judgments Sought to be Reviewed 3. Gillespie seeks review on petition for writ of certiorari of the following: a. Orders of the Supreme Court of Florida, case no. SC11-1622, denied/dismissed March 12, 2012, rehearing denied May 22, 2012. (Exhibit 2). b. Orders of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, case no. 12-11213-C, denied IFP July 16, 2012, dismissed August 7, 2012. (Exhibit 3). c. Orders of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, case no. 12-11028-B, rehearing and IFP denied June 19, 2012, dismissed July 13, 2012. (Exhibit 4). 4. On July 23, 2012 Gillespie contacted the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court about

consolidation of the above cases and an extension of time to file a petition for writ of certiorari, since Gillespie believes the time in Florida case no. SC11-1622 expires August 22, 2012. The Clerk responded July 25, 2012 as follows: (Exhibit 5) In response to your letter of July 23,2012, you may only submit a single petition for a writ of certiorari when two or more judgments are sought to be reviewed to the same lower court. Rule 12.4. This also applies to an application for an extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Gillespie read Rule 12.4 and believes Florida case no. SC11-1622 can have a petition for writ of certiorari; and the two U.S. 11th Circuit cases can have one petition for writ of certiorari. Gillespie seeks direction from the Court on consolidation of the Florida and 11th Circuit cases.

III. Argument 5. Generally related claims and parties are joined or consolidated that rise from one set of

facts or events in the interest of economy. The issues in Florida case no. SC11-1622 are the proximate cause of both 11th Circuit cases. a. The parties in Florida case no. SC11-1622 are Gillespie, Plaintiff and Counter Defendant, and Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, and William J. Cook, Defendants and Counter Plaintiffs. As set forth in the Petition in SC11-1622 (Exhibit 6), in 2005 Gillespie sued Barker, Rodems & Cook to recover $7,143 stolen during their prior representation of Gillespie. Barker, Rodems & Cook counter-sued Gillespie for libel over a letter about a bar complaint. Mr. Rodems conflict made lawful resolution of this case impossible. Mr. Rodems intentionally and strategically disrupted the tribunal on March 6, 2012 with a false affidavit to the court about an attack in chambers. This was later disproved by a police investigation. Mr. Rodems obtained $11,550 sanctions against Gillespie for a misplaced defense to the counterclaim, and discovery mistakes. Almost the entire case, from 2006 through 2011, was spent by Mr. Rodems securing sanctions and executing on the $11,550 judgment, including garnishment of Gillespies exempt Social Security, and later Gillespies arrest on a writ of bodily attachment, a coercive confinement to force a settlement. In 2007 Gillespie retained out-of-town counsel Robert W. Bauer for the libel counterclaim. Mr. Bauer encouraged Gillespie to reinstate his dismissed claims, which he did. But Mr. Bauer was unable to overcome the misconduct of Mr. Rodems, and his false testimony. Although Mr. Bauer charged Gillespie $31,8631 in legal fees, much of it was wasted, such $5,600 in travel time, and Bauer never filed an amended complaint. Mr. Bauer withdrew in 2009 and Gillespie was on his own. After the case was closed and on appeal of a

$12,650 remains unpaid; the rest was paid from Social Security disability benefits or borrowed. 4

final summary judgment (2D10-5197), Mr. Rodems obtained an arrest warrant for Gillespie through a series of ex-parte hearings where Rodems presented more false testimony. b. The case in the 11th Circuit, 12-11213-C, is an appeal of District Court case 5:10-cv503-oc-WTH-TBS, a civil rights and ADA case for denial of accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the misuse and denial of judicial process under the color of law, in Gillespies lawsuit with Barker, Rodems and Cook. The parties include: Plaintiff: Neil J. Gillespie Defendants: Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida Claudia Rickert Isom, Circuit Judge and individually James M. Barton, II, Circuit Judge and individually Martha J. Cook, Circuit Judge and individually David A. Rowland, Court Counsel and individually Gonzalo B. Casares, ADA Coordinator and individually Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Ryan Christopher Rodems The Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A. Robert W. Bauer c. The case in the 11th Circuit, 12-11028-B, is an appeal of District Court case 5:11-cv539-oc-WTH-TBS, for claims by the Estate of Penelope Gillespie and Gillespie on civil RICO related to Gillespies lawsuit with Barker, Rodems and Cook. The parties include: Plaintiffs: Estate of Penelope Gillespie, Neil J. Gillespie Defendants: Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida James M. Barton, II, Circuit Court Judge, and individually The Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A. Robert W. Bauer IV. Notice of Extraordinary Circumstance - Reputation of Mr. Rodems 6. As set forth in the Complaint (Doc. 1) in the District Court case 5:10-cv-503-cv-WTH-

TBS, Mr. Rodems is a bully. (Doc. 1, 20). Mr. Rodems is a well known as a bully in the legal community. A Tampa Police Department report June 5, 2000, case number 00-42020, alleges

Mr. Rodems former partner Mr. Alpert committed battery, Florida Statutes 784.03, upon attorney Arnold Levine by throwing hot coffee on him. At the time Mr. Levine was a 68 year-old senior citizen. The report states: The victim and defendant are both attorneys and were representing their clients in a mediation hearing. The victim alleges that the defendant began yelling, and intentionally threw the contents of a 20 oz. cup of hot coffee which struck him in the chest staining his shirt. A request for prosecution was issued for battery. Mr. Rodems is listed as a witness on the police report and failed to inform Gillespie about the attack during a time that the lawyers represented Gillespie in another matter. (Doc. 1, 22). U.S. District Judge James D. Whittemore repudiated the infamous coffee-throwing incident as speaker for the Florida Bars Continuing Legal Education (CLE) program. (Doc. 1, 21). Mr. Levine also sued Mr. Rodems, a $5 million dollar claim for defamation, Buccaneers Limited Partnership v. Alpert, Barker & Rodems, PA, US District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, case 99-2354-CIVT-23C. Mr. Rodems has a practice of accusing civil litigants of committing crimes, and accused Gillespie of felony extortion for making a complaint to the Florida Bar. Mr. Rodems is a fan of professional wrestling, brings that mentality to the legal profession. While real professional wrestlers may leave the persona behind in their personal life, Mr. Rodems believes boorish behavior is a legitimate part of winning a case. Mr. Rodems lost a case as plaintiffs counsel in WrestleReunion, LLC v. Live Nation, Television Holdings, Inc., U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, Case No. 8:07-cv-2093-T-27, and commenced another trademark misbehavior, writing disparaging letters to litigants, such as his diatribe attacking the credibility of witness Eric Bischoff in the WrestleReunion lawsuit. A copy of the letter is Exhibit 7, and it is also posted online http://www.declarationofindependents.net/doi/pages/corrente910.html. One question in Gillespies petition for writ of certiorari is the role of bullying in litigation.

V. Notice of Extraordinary Circumstance - Threat By Eugene P. Castagliuolo 7. On July 25, 2012 attorney Eugene P. Castagliuolo threatened Gillespie with litigation

over a disclosure about Castagliuolos admission to having mental problems. Mr. Castagliuolo formerly represented Gillespie, see the Florida Supreme Court Petition, SC11-1622. (Exhibit 6). Gillespie reported the threat, which included a threat against Michael Borseth, a court reporter, to Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi August 1, 2012. Gillespies 11 page letter and exhibits are posted on Scribd at http://www.scribd.com/doc/102656505/Letter-to-AG-Pam-BondiEugene-Castagliuolo-August-1-2012. On August 10, 2012, Gillespie received an email response from Samantha Santana of the Florida Attorney General's Office. Ms. Santana wrote in part: It appears that you provided a copy of your complaint about Attorney Eugene Castagliuolo to The Florida Bar, which is the appropriate agency to address this matter. Please follow up with The Bar directly for further assistance. Gillespie took that to mean a formal Bar complaint, which was submitted August 11, 2012. (Exhibit 7). Gillespie Mr. Castagliuolos health issues resulted in the ineffective assistance of counsel at a time when Gillespie was incarcerated. On June 21, 2011 Gillespie voluntarily appeared for a deposition at the Edgecomb Courthouse in Tampa to purge civil contempt and rescind the arrest warrant. It was a trap. This is from Gillespies petition in the Supreme Court of Florida SC11-1622, paragraph 5: (Exhibit 6). 5. At the direction of Judge Arnold I voluntarily appeared June 21, 2011 for a deposition at the Edgecomb Courthouse in Tampa to purge the contempt and rescind the arrest warrant, but that turned out to be a trap to force a walk-away settlement agreement in the lawsuits. Upon my arrival at the courthouse, I was taken into custody and involuntarily confined by two Hillsborough County Sheriffs Deputies, Deputy Randy Olding and Deputy Larry Berg. I was denied accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Federal Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act, 42 U.S.C. 10801 et seq. After being held in custody during the deposition for over four (4) hours without a lunch break, or the usual mid-day meal provided to a prisoner, I became confused and disoriented. The record (A.4.1.125) shows that I was so impaired that I could not make a decision to sign the agreement. My counsel Eugene Castagliuolo (A.7), whom I hired from Craigslist a couple weeks earlier, made

the decision to settle because judges have mud on their shoes. I signed the agreement while confused and in a diminished state. Castagliuolo disobeyed my prior written and verbal instructions not to accept a walk-away settlement agreement. Once I was released from custody and had a meal, I realized the settlement was a mistake and promptly disaffirmed the agreement by written notice to Mr. Rodems, Mr. Castagliuolo and Major James Livingston of the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office. (A.2.1.2-3). Mr. Castagliuolo failed to disclose a conflict with his daughter, attorney Maria E. Castagliuolo who works for the public defender. The public defender was appointed to represent Gillespie June 1, 2011 at the contempt hearing, but Judge Arnold dismissed the public defender and issued a warrant to arrest Gillespie on Mr. Rodems motion for writ of bodily attachment. Maria Castagliuolo was promoted shortly after her father secured a settlement agreement benefiting the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in Gillespies lawsuit. Gillespie spent a week responding to the threat by Mr. Castagliuolo, first in reporting his threat to AG Bondi, and then with a formal Bar complaint. VI. Notice of Extraordinary Circumstance - Reputation of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit 8. Another extraordinary circumstance is the complete imbalance of power between

Gillespie, a private citizen, and the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida. This imbalance of power has inflicted permanent damage on Gillespie, as determined by Dr. Huffer in her letter of October 28, 2010. Even a sitting Florida Circuit Judge, the Hon. Gregory Holder paid a heavy price for speaking out against wrongdoing in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, almost $2 million. As set forth in Gillespies Response to Order to Show Cause (Doc. 58) in District Court case 5:10-cv-503-oc-WTH-TBS: (Page 5) The Thirteenth Circuit is notorious for wrongdoing. The price is high for confronting judicial misconduct. In one example, Circuit Judge Gregory Holder spoke to the media about judicial misconduct, and was a cooperating witness (2001-2002) in a federal criminal investigation of corruption at the Hillsborough County Courthouse. In retaliation the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) pursued two failed inquiries against him, JQC Inquiry Nos. 01-303 and 02-487. Judge Holder spent many years and $1.92 million successfully defending himself. On June 23, 2005, the Hearing Panel of the

JQC voted unanimously to dismiss the charges against Judge Holder. This was the first trial defense verdict against the JQC in almost twenty years. On September 15, 2009 the Supreme Court of Florida, case no. SC03-1171, ordered entry of judgment for Judge Holder for recovery of costs from the JQC in the amount of $70,000 for successfully defending JQC Inquiry No. 02-487. Judge Holders actual expenses were $1,779,691.81 in legal fees, and cost of $140,870.79. Public files in the above JQC cases are online on the Florida Supreme Court website: http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/jqcarchives.shtml According to the public file, Judge Holders life was at risk for reporting judicial misconduct: During 2001 and 2002, Judge Holder cooperated with the FBI in the courthouse corruption investigation. [Bartoszak Tr. pp. 4-5, at App. 3.] Because of Judge Holders cooperation, the investigations targets had motive and resources to seek retribution against him. [Id. at pp. 7-8] Indeed, these targets faced not just loss of position but potential incarceration. [Id.] Detective Bartoszak testified at trial that the courthouse corruption investigation team was concerned that Judge Holders activities were being monitored by targets of the investigation. Judge Holder was advised by federal law enforcement agents to carry a weapon, and he was provided with a secure cell phone to communicate with the authorities. [Bartoszak Tr. pp. 7-8, at App. 3.] Page 7, Gillespies Response to Order to Show Cause (Doc. 58) in District Court case 5:10-cv503-oc-WTH-TBS. VII. Notice of Extraordinary Circumstance - Demands of Related Cases 9. On June 19, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit granted Gillespies

motion to amend his request for disability accommodation. (Exhibit 4). Gillespie has spent much of his time preparing that amended motion. (Exhibit 1). The Clerk posted it online as a Public Communication because it arrived the same day that the Court closed the case. In support of his amended disability motion, Gillespie made a Consolidated Notice of Pro Se Electronic Case Filing Prohibition by District Court, July 27, 2012, that shows e-filing is a reasonable disability accommodation. (Exhibit 9). Only the Notice is provided, without exhibits, in the interest of economy. The Notice is also attached to a Motion to Apply Funds Toward Filing Fees in the District Court, case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS Document 70 Filed 07/30/12 Page 1 of 88 PageID

1863. The Notice shows that electronic filing (e-filing) prohibition in the District Court cost Gillespie not less than $1,094.94, and 178.5 hours labor. This money could have been used to pay filing fees. The time could have been used to make better pleadings. Also in support of Gillespies motion for amended disability accommodation is the Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, on the Conflict of Interest and ADA denial by Florida Judge Claudia R. Isom in case 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough Co., July 30, 2012. (Exhibit 10). Only the Affidavit is provided, without exhibits, in the interest of economy. The full Affidavit with Exhibits is posted on Scribd at http://www.scribd.com/doc/101764386/Affidavit-of-Neil-Gillespie-Conflict-of-Judge-ClaudiaR-Isom-ADA-July-30-2012. All together there are 18 related cases. (Exhibit 12). VIII. Notice of Extraordinary Circumstance - Disability and Home Foreclosure 10. Gillespie is disabled as set forth in his Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation.

(Exhibit 1). Gillespie is indigent and/or insolvent. On June 8, 2012 Gillespie received Notice of Default and Intent to Foreclose on his home. (Exhibit 11). Gillespie is preparing a defense to the Notice because he cannot pay the $108,056.19 demanded by RMS. Gillespie has nowhere else to move and would become homeless if his defense to the foreclosure is not successful. IX. Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem 11. Because of the foregoing, there is an incredible imbalance of power against Gillespie. In

turn Gillespie is a disabled adult and vulnerable. Past representation of Gillespie was either not competent or not zealous because of professional consideration to Mr. Rodems and his firm. When a person involved in a suit cannot adequately represent his or her own interests, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the person's interests. See Francine M. Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 f.3d 642 (2d Cir. 1999). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), the Court can appoint Gillespie a guardian ad litem. It is clear that Gillespie has not been

10

able to completely represent himself in this litigation. Following G-illespie's head injury in 1988 he has not been able to competently manage money, and twice declared bankruptcy. Prior to that time Gillespie was self-sufficient and prosperous. (Exhibit 1). In addition, the record shows Gillespie can become easily confused, and would therefore benefit from either a guardian ad litem, or a schedule setting out deadlines, as well as an extension of tin1e in to file a petition for writ of certiorari in Supreme Court of Florida case SC 11-1622, unless the Court decides to consolidate the Supreme Court of Florida case with the two cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE Gillespie petitions the Court under Rule 13(5) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari, or consolidate the state and federal cases on a new timeline. Gillespie n10ves for appointment of a guardian ad litem, or a schedule setting out deadlines, and includes a general request for other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED August 13,2012.

11

No:

---------IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER

YS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, et al. - RESPONDENTS
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, ET AL. - RESPONDENTS

PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Neil J Gillespie, do swear or declare that on this date, August 13, 2012, as required by Supreme Court Rule 29 I have served the enclosed Application to Extend Tinle To File A Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari, with Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem, and Notice of Extraordinary Circunlstances; and Appendix. on each party to the above proceeding or that party's counsel, by depositing an envelope containing the above docunlent in the U.S. mail addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid. The Appendix is in PDF on CD. The names and addresses of those served are: Ryan Christopher Rodems Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA 501 E. Kennedy Blvd, suite 790 Tampa, Florida 33602 David A. Rowland, Court Counsel Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Of Florida Legal Department 800 E. Twiggs Street, Suite 603 Tampa, Florida 33602

Catherine Barbara Chapman (For Robert W. Bauer, et al)

Guilday, Tucker, Schwartz & Sinlpson, P.A.
1983 Centre Pointe Boulevard, Suite 200
Tallahassee, FL 32308-7823
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

"-.
Executed on August 13,2012.
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No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, et al. - RESPONDENTS THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, ET AL. - RESPONDENTS ________________________

Appendix - Rule 13(5) Application

Exhibit 1 Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation, August 6, 2012, U.S.C.A.11 (Motion only; the Motion and Appendixes 1-3 are posted on Scribd, 251 pages, http://www.scribd.com/doc/102585752/Amended-Disabiliy-Motion-12-11213-C-C-a-11) Orders of the Supreme Court of Florida, case no. SC11-1622 Orders of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, case no. 12-11213-C Orders of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, case no. 12-11028-B Letter of the Clerk of The United States Supreme Court, July 25, 2012 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Supreme Court of Florida, case no. SC11-1622 Mr. Rodems attack on the credibility of witness Eric Bischoff in WrestleReunion Bar Complaint against attorney Eugene P. Castagliuolo, Florida Bar ID: 104360 Consolidated Notice of Pro Se Electronic Case Filing Prohibition by District Court, July 27, 2012 (Notice only; Notice and Exhibits are posted on Scribd: http://www.scribd.com/doc/102594266/Notice-of-CM-ECF-Prohibition-by-the-District-Court) Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, on the Conflict of Interest and ADA denial by Florida Judge Claudia R. Isom in case 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough Co., July 30, 2012. (Affidavit only; Affidavit and Exhibits are posted in Scribd: http://www.scribd.com/doc/101764386/Affidavit-of-Neil-Gillespie-Conflict-ofJudge-Claudia-R-Isom-ADA-July-30-2012) Response to Order, Notice of Default and Intent to Foreclose. List of 18 related cases.

Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6 Exhibit 7 Exhibit 8 Exhibit 9

Exhibit 10

Exhibit 11 Exhibit 12

.RCIMI)

1NOM\SD. fWJ.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

JAN. 09 2012
QSIC,_C01M ft _

NEIL J. GILLESPIE Petitioner, Case No.: SCII-1622 Lower Tribunal No(s).: 2DI0-5197, 05-CA-7205

vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. and WILLIAM 1. COOK, Respondents.
------------------..,;/

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

1.

In compliance with the Fla. R. App. P. 9.100 and leave of this Court,

Petitioner pro se NEIL J. GILLESPIE respectfully submits this petition for a writ of mandamus addressing why the proceedings in the Second District Court of Appeal (2dDCA) should not have been dismissed. 2. In compliance with Rule 9.l00(g) the petition is accompanied by an

Appendix(es) as prescribed by Rule 9.220. The Appendix will be cited as follows: "A.[v].[e].[p]" referring to the Volume number, the Exhibit number, and the Page number only if referringtoa specific page. For multi-page citations, the ending
I

page is provided after adas9. For quotations from a transcript, line numbers will include the word "line" followed by the" line number. Appendix Volume 3 has Parts

Appendix 6

1 through 4 and will be cited A.3.Part[#].[e].[p]. There may be a few unavoidable deviations from this citation plan, and I apologize for any unintended confusion. A list of the Appendixes, 1-16, follows the last page of the petition. 3. In compliance with Rule 9.100(i) the Record is not submitted because the

Court has not so ordered. However the Index and Record was prepared by the Clerk of the lower tribunal and is available. A copy of the Index and Record is provided. (A.1.5). The Clerks Progress Docket is provided. (A.1.6). Also provided is a copy the Clerks Certificate that shows two affidavits are missing from the lower tribunal file. (A.1.4). The affidavits disappeared from the Clerks file while Circuit Judge Martha J. Cook presided over the case. Copies of the missing affidavits are provided. (A.10). The affidavit at A.10.2 shows the Respondents failed to sign a representation agreement with me in a contingent fee case. The affidavit at A.10.3 shows Mr. Rodems unlawfully notarized his own firms garnishment documents. OPENING STATEMENT 4. My name is Neil Gillespie and I am the Petitioner appearing pro se. I am

mentally ill and have other disabilities like type 2 adult onset diabetes, high blood pressure, and communication disorders. (A.3.Part1.2). On June 1, 2011 Judge Arnold issued a politically-motivated warrant to arrest me for the purpose of forcing a walk-away settlement agreement in my civil litigation with Respondents

BRC and Mr. Cook, as well as to force a walk-away settlement agreement in my federal civil rights and ADA lawsuit against the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, et al., for the misuse and denial of judicial process under the color of law, and denial of disability accommodation. Judge Arnold relived the Public Defender appointed to represent me and I had no counsel at the contempt hearing June 1, 2011. In order to rescind the warrant for my arrest, Judge Arnold required I attend a full deposition, instead of a deposition in aid of execution, even though the case was on appeal on a final summary judgment in 2D10-5197. The civil contempt order was also on appeal. Mr. Rodems asked for a deposition in aid of execution in his efforts to collect $11,550 in 57.105 sanctions against me. Those unjust sanctions were on appeal also.1 5. At the direction of Judge Arnold I voluntarily appeared June 21, 2011 for a

deposition at the Edgecomb Courthouse in Tampa to purge the contempt and rescind the arrest warrant, but that turned out to be a trap to force a walk-away

When appeal jurisdiction has been invoked to review a final order or judgment, the appellate court may review the entire case in the lower court, including all issues preserved for review during the trial and pretrial proceedings. Rule 9.110(h) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizes the appellate court to review any ruling or matter occurring before filing of the notice of appeal. An appeal from a final order brings up for review the correctness of all prior orders. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h). The appellate courts are authorized to review all interlocutory rulings and orders of the trial court in plenary appeals from final orders and judgments.

settlement agreement in the lawsuits. Upon my arrival at the courthouse, I was taken into custody and involuntarily confined by two Hillsborough County Sheriffs Deputies, Deputy Randy Olding and Deputy Larry Berg. I was denied accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Federal Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act, 42 U.S.C. 10801 et seq. After being held in custody during the deposition for over four (4) hours without a lunch break, or the usual mid-day meal provided to a prisoner, I became confused and disoriented. The record (A.4.1.125) shows that I was so impaired that I could not make a decision to sign the agreement. My counsel Eugene Castagliuolo (A.7), whom I hired from Craigslist a couple weeks earlier, made the decision to settle because judges have mud on their shoes. I signed the agreement while confused and in a diminished state. Castagliuolo disobeyed my prior written and verbal instructions not to accept a walk-away settlement agreement. Once I was released from custody and had a meal, I realized the settlement was a mistake and promptly disaffirmed the agreement by written notice to Mr. Rodems, Mr. Castagliuolo and Major James Livingston of the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office. (A.2.1.2-3). 6. I am departing from the usual practice of writing in the third person because

that has not worked for me in the past. Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results is the definition of insanity, and I am not insane,

just mentally ill. The lawyers at Respondent Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. know about my disabilities from their prior representation of me and my efforts with Florida Vocational Rehabilitation. (A.14). Messrs. Barker, Rodems and Cook also previously represented me in the Amscot action which is at the heart of my pending action against Barker, Rodems & Cook. (A.8)(A.13)(A.14). That is why this case is so difficult: The Respondents lawyer, Ryan Christopher Rodems, a partner at Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., his exercise of independent professional judgment is materially limited by his own interest and conflict. (A.9). As such, this is not a legitimate legal proceeding, but rather, as Mr. Castagliuolo noted, a pissing contest - one that began in 2005. Mr. Rodems would not cooperate with Mr. Castagliuolo, who in turn emailed me June 14, 2011 at 7:46 p.m.: Based on what I know right now about your case, your debt to this asshole Rodems would be discharged in your Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and he would get NOTHING from you. (A.7.page 4, and exhibit 8) Prior to Mr. Castagliuolos representation, attorney Rober W. Bauer represented me, and stated on the record August 14, 2008 during an Emergency Hearing on a garnishment before the Honorable Marva Crenshaw (Transcript page 16, line 24): " ... Mr. Rodems has, you know, decided to take a full nuclear blast approach instead of us trying to work this out in a professional manner. It is my mistake for sitting back and giving him the opportunity to take this full blast attack."

After charging me over $30,000, Mr. Bauer dropped the case. When I complained to the Florida Bar, Mr. Bauer and Mr. Rodems joined forces and mislead the Bar in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. (A.15). Until Mr. Rodems is disqualified as counsel for the Respondents, this litigation may also meet the colloquial definition of insanity. (A.9). 7. I retained at my own expense Dr. Karin Huffer as my ADA advocate. I

applied February 19, 2010 to the Hillsborough Circuit Court for reasonable accommodation under the ADA, and submitted a disability report by Dr. Huffer. Court Counsel David Rowland denied my ADA request. To my knowledge no medically qualified person has reviewed Dr. Huffers report, which states I have the following mental illness: Depression 296/3,and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 309.81 with chronic and acute symptoms anxiety. (A.3.Part1.2). Dr. Huffer assessed the foregoing in a letter dated October 28, 2010. (Attached). Dr. Huffer wrote in part: As the litigation has proceeded, Mr. Gillespie is routinely denied participatory and testimonial access to the court. He is discriminated against in the most brutal ways possible. He is ridiculed by the opposition, accused of malingering by the Judge and now, with no accommodations approved or in place, Mr. Gillespie is threatened with arrest if he does not succumb to a deposition. This is like threatening to arrest a paraplegic if he does not show

up at a deposition leaving his wheelchair behind. This is precedent setting in my experience. (p1, 2). He [Gillespie] is left with permanent secondary wounds (p2, top). Additionally, Neil Gillespie faces risk to his life and health and exhaustion of the ability to continue to pursue justice with the failure of the ADA Administrative Offices to respond effectively to the request for accommodations per Federal and Florida mandates. (p2, 1). It is against my medical advice for Neil Gillespie to continue the traditional legal path without properly being accommodated. It would be like sending a vulnerable human being into a field of bullies to sort out a legal problem. Because of its significance, a copy of Dr. Huffers letter is attached to this petition. II. PARTIES 8. I am the Petitioner Neil J. Gillespie, and the Appellant in Case No. 2D10-

5197, 2dDCA, which is an appeal (A.1.1) of the following Orders of Circuit Judge Martha J. Cook in Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, et al., Case No. 05-CA7205, Hillsborough County: a. Final Summary Judgment As To Count 1; September 28, 2010 b. Order Adjudging Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie Contempt; September 30, 2010 I am a non-lawyer, disabled, indigent and/or insolvent litigant appearing pro se at this time. I sued the Respondents Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. and William J. Cook for stealing $7,143 from my settlement in the Amscot case. (A.8).

9.

Respondent Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. (BRC) is a Tampa law firm

that formerly represented me in the Amscot case (A.8)(A.9)(A.11)(A.13), a case at the heart of the present case, and also represented me on disability matters. (A.14). BRC is representing itself against me in all courts, by partner Ryan Christopher Rodems, Bar ID No. 947652. (Rodems). On January 19, 2006 Mr. Rodems brought a counterclaim against me on behalf of Respondents for libel. (A.11.14). Mr. Rodems is a named Defendant in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint filed May 5, 2010 with a motion to amend. (A.8). 10. Respondent William J. Cook, Bar ID No. 986194, formerly represented me

in the Amscot case, a case at the heart of the present case (A.8)(A.9)(A.11)(A.13), and also represented me on disability matters. (A.14). (Cook). 11. Respondent 2dDCA is the appellate tribunal in the appeal of the following

Orders of Circuit Judge Martha J. Cook in Case No. 05-CA-7205: (A.1.1) a. Final Summary Judgment As To Count 1; September 28, 2010. b. Order Adjudging Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie Contempt; September 30, 2010. NOTE: There have been six (6) interlocutory actions in the 2dDCA. (A.1.3). 12. Respondent Hillsborough County Circuit Court is the lower tribunal trial court

in Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, et al., Case No. 05-CA-7205. 13. Respondent Circuit Judge James D. Arnold (Judge Arnold) succeeded

Judge Cook and presided in the lower tribual November 18, 2010 to June 21, 2011.

14.

Respondent Circuit Judge Martha J. Cook (Judge Cook) presided May 24,

2010 to November 18, 2010, entered the following Orders on appeal in 2D10-5197: a. Final Summary Judgment As To Count 1; September 28, 2010 (A.1.1) b. Order Adjudging Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie Contempt; September 30, 2010 After I filed a Notice of Appeal in 2D10-5197 on October 22, 2010 Judge Cook entered seven (7) additional orders, including: c. Order To Show Cause Why Plaintiff Should Not Be Prohibited From Appearing Pro Se, entered November 4, 2010, with 20 days to respond. d. Order Prohibiting Plaintiff From Appearing Pro Se, entered November 15, 2010, 14 days prior to the expiration of the time to respond. (with mailing time). NOTE: See APPELLANTS MOTION TO AMEND NOTICE OF APPEAL (A.1.13) for a reason Judge Cook was trying to silence me. The timing of Judge Cooks Order, November 15, 2010, is suspect and coincides with her Order Denying Fourth Motion To Disqualify Trial Judge of even date which showed Judge Cook was insolvent. Judge Cooks Order prohibiting me from appearing pro se was an effort to silence legitimate inquiry into her financial affairs, which showed that Judge Cook was insolvent due to a near-collapse of the family business, Community Bank of Manatee, which was operating under Consent Order, FDIC-09-569b and OFR 0692-FI-10/09. Judge Cooks financial affairs violated the Code of Judicial Canons 2, 3, 5 and 6. Judge Cooks small ($276M)

nonmember FDIC insured bank lost over $10 million dollars in 2009 and 2010. In 2009 the bank sold a controlling interest to a foreign national, who during the review process in Florida, failed to disclose that his past employer, ABN AMRO Bank, faced one of the largest Money Laundering and Trading With The Enemy cases ever brought by the Department of Justice. e. Order Directing Clerk To Close Case, November 15, 2010. f. Sua Sponte Order To Recuse Assigned Judge, November 18, 2010. Judge Cook recused sua sponte November 18, 2010 upon my Verified Emergency Petition for Writ of Prohibition, and Motion for Order of Protection, filed November 18, 2010, 2dDCA Case No. 2D10-5529. Previously Judge Cook denied five (5) motions to disqualify. I will provide copies of the forgoing upon request of the Court. III. BASIS FOR INVOKING JURISDICTION 15. This Court granted jurisdiction August 22, 2011 for me to file a petition for

writ of mandamus addressing why the proceedings in the district court of appeal should not have been dismissed, pursuant to the Courts authority under Article V, section 3(b)(8) of the Florida Constitution. In addition, The Florida Supreme Court possesses discretionary jurisdiction over cases that pass upon a question certified to be of great public importance under Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), and under Article V, section 3(b)(4). One such question may be whether an indigent, disabled, mentally ill, civil contemnor facing incarceration is entitled to counsel at

10

a hearing to issue the arrest warrant. The United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Rogers, U.S. Docket 10-10, 564 U. S. ____ (2011), Argued March 23, 2011 and Decided June 20, 2011, found no automatic right to counsel for indigent civil defendants facing jail time, though it ruled on behalf of a father who served a year in prison for failing to pay child support and was deprived of his 14th Amendment right to due process. The Court found that counsel was not required because in child support hearings the opposing party is not usually represented, and requiring appointed counsel would be unfair to the unrepresented part. In my case the opposing party is my former lawyers, the Respondents BRC and Mr. Cook, who are representing themselves through Mr. Rodems. In my effort to obtain counsel prior to the June 1, 2011 contempt hearing with Judge Arnold, I personally contacted many, if not all of the law firms listed on SCOTUSblog as interested in Turner, and almost obtained counsel. On May 25, 2011 Krista Sterken, an associate of Foley & Lardner LLP, called offering me legal representation. Ms. Sterken was co-counsel with Michael D. Leffel, a partner at Foley & Lardner LLP, who filed an amicus brief in Turner. Mr. Leffel declined the offer May 27, 2011. (A.12). In addition, Court has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 5, Section 15 of the Florida Constitution to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted. In this case there has been considerable misconduct by attorneys. In Gillespie v. Robert W. Bauer, The Florida Bar File No.

11

2011-073(8B), Mr. Bauer and Mr. Rodems joined forces and mislead the Bar in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. (A.15). Mr. Bauer wrote a letter January 4, 2010 to the 13th Circuit JNC recommending Mr. Rodems for judge. (A.15.11). In return Mr. Rodems wrote a letter of support for Mr. Bauer August 13, 2010 in the Bar complaint. (A.15.2). Mr. Castagliuolo failed to disclose a conflict with his daughter, attorney Maria Castagliuolo, who works for the Public Defender appointed to represent me. (A.7.page 4 and exhibit 4). Mr. Castagliuolo also admitted having mental problems. (A.7.page 4 and exhibit 10, page 7-8). IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS Recent Case History 16. Three days before Judge Arnold ordered my arrest, I hand delivered a letter

to the office of Judge Arnold at the courthouse May 27, 2011. (A.3.Part1.1). Dear Judge Arnold: Please find enclosed courtesy copies of the following: 1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, ADA ACCOMODATION REQUEST, and MEMORANDUM OF LAW 2. VERIFIED NOTICE OF FILING DISABILITY INFORMATION OF NEIL J. GILLESPIE Please note that Mr. Rodems mislead you during the hearing about my attempts to resolve this matter. Please read the motion for appoint of counsel, and my letter to Mr. Rodems dated November 8, 2010, copy attached with notice of filing. Mr. Rodems also mislead you about my

12

disability and ADA requests. Please see the notice of filing disability information. I cannot appear at any contempt hearing without counsel. I cannot have unmoderated contact with Mr. Rodems, his partners or employees. I may file an emergency stay with the US Supreme Court. If the hearing is not canceled or I do not obtain counsel I may file chapter 7 bankruptcy which will dispose of defendants' judgment. Thank you for your consideration. Sincerely, Neil J. Gillespie: My letter to Judge Arnold was clear, concise, stated that Mr. Rodems mislead the court, a claim substantiated in the accompanying documents, such as a copy of Plaintiffs Notice of Filing Letters, Mr. Rodems & Gillespie served November 8, 2011. I filed Mr. Rodems letter to me dated October 26, 2010, and my responsive letter dated November 8, 2010. (A.3.Part1.1.1-11). 17. My May 27, 2011 letter to Judge Arnold was also accompanied by

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, ADA ACCOMODATION REQUEST, and MEMORANDUM OF LAW filed in the lower tribunal May 24, 2011, and provided to the 2dDCA July 18, 2011. The motion is provided with this petition. (A.3.Part1.Exhibit 3.1). The memorandum of law is provided with this petition. (A.3.Part1.Exhibit 3.2). Forty-five (45) exhibits

13

to the motion are provided with this petition. (A.3.Part2.Exhibits 1-22) (A.3.Part3.Exhibits 23-45). 18. My May 27, 2011 letter to Judge Arnold was also accompanied by

VERIFIED NOTICE OF FILING DISABILITY INFORMATION OF NEIL J. GILLESPIE filed in the lower tribunal May 27, 2011, and provided to the 2dDCA July 18, 2011. My disability information is provided with this petition. (A.3.Part1.2). In addition, I made a separate, prior ADA accommodation request to the 2dDCA November 18, 2010 addressed to the ADA Coordinator: (A.1.18) Marshal Jacinda Suhr, ADA Coordinator Second District Court of Appeal 1005 E. Memorial Blvd. Lakeland, FL 33801 I hand delivered the following to Marshal Suhr for use in cases 2D10-5197, and a petition for writ of prohibition to remove Judge Cook, 2D10-5529. (A.1.18) 1. Florida State Courts System ADA Title II Accommodation Request Form 2. ADA Assessment and Report, Dr. Karin Huffer, February 17, 2010 3. ADA Accommodation Request of Neil J. Gillespie, February 18, 2010 4. Notice of ADA Request of Neil J. Gillespie, February 19, 2010 5. Transcript, hearing before the Honorable Claudia Isom, February 5, 2007 6. Letter of Dr. Huffer, October 10, 2010, re Neil Gillespie 7. CV of Dr. Karin Huffer As of today the 2dDCA has not responded to my ADA request, at least as far as I can recall at this time.

14

19.

As stated in my letter to Judge Arnold of May 27, 2011, I planned, and later

filed, not one, but two (2) emergency Rule 22 Application to Justice Thomas in the United States Supreme Court. As with all my communication with Judge Arnold, he simply ignored it. Copies were provided to Mr. Rodems and Court Counsel David Rowland, the Clerk, and others. The two Rule 22 Applications, without exhibits, and email and fax notices, accompany this petition. (A.16) 20. My May 27, 2011 letter to Judge Arnold gives notice that I was considering

bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 to discharge the $11,550 final judgment to Respondents on sanctions awarded under 57.105, Florida Statutes. This was also the plan of Mr. Castagliuolo, a bankruptcy specialist, but he failed to do so: Based on what I know right now about your case, your debt to this asshole Rodems would be discharged in your Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and he would get NOTHING from you. June 14, 2011 at 7:46 p.m. (A.7.page 4 & exh 5) 21. On May 3, 2011, I filed an Emergency Petition For Writ of Habeas

Corpus/Prohibition, The Supreme Court of Florida, Case No. SC11-858, to stop an Evidentiary Hearing on the writ of bodily attachment on "Order Adjudging Neil J. Gillespie In Contempt" that was on appeal as part of a Final Summary Judgment final order in case no. 2D10-5197. The Court denied my petition May 18, 2011. Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie - Representation by Eugene P. Castagliuolo 22. My affidavit made January 6, 2012 sets forth the representation of me in this

matter by attorney Eugene P. Castagliuolo, FL Bar ID no. 104360. (A.7).

15

23.

After Judge Arnold ordered me arrested for allegedly failing to appear for a

deposition after the case was closed and on appeal in 2D10-5197, I hired on June 3, 2011 attorney Eugene P. Castagliuolo from an ad on Craigslist to prepare for, and represent me at, the deposition in order to purge the contempt and rescind the arrest warrant. (A.7.page1). (A.2.1.3-4, Exhibit F). Mr. Castagliuolo responded to my ad on Craigslist within about one (1) hour of posting. Mr. Castagliuolos email states that the Castagliuolo Law Group is a debt relief agency helping people to file for bankruptcy relief. (A.7.page 2;Exhibit 2). We signed a $1,000 flat fee agreement. (A.7.page 2;Exhibit 3). I paid Mr. Castagliuolo the full $1,000 flat fee in advance from my monthly disability income that arrived June 3, 2011. Because I am indigent and live hand-to-mouth, I was not able to afford private counsel for the hearing June 1, 2011 where Judge Arnold ordered me arrested. And because of the animosity created by Mr. Rodems conflict representing his firm against me, a former client, no one wanted to represent me, I was persona non grata. (A.3.Part1.Exhibit3.1,page3). Mr. Castagliuolo Failed To Disclose Conflict With Public Defender 24. At the time of hire, Mr. Castagliuolo failed to disclose a conflict with his

daughter, Maria E. Castagliuolo, an attorney with the Public Defender previously appointed to represent me. The Public Defender was hostile to my cause as set forth in my affidavit (A.7.4), Exhibit 4, Notice of Conflict: Eugene P. Castagliuolo,

16

Maria E. Castagliuolo, and The Law Offices of Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender of the 13th Judicial Circuit. Shortly after the walk-away settlement agreement was signed Maria E. Castagliuolo received a job promotion. 25. I first visited the Public Defender May 24, 2011 and spoke with attorney

Moira Freeman about my case, and provided Ms. Freeman a cover letter and copy of Plaintiffs Motion For Appointment of Counsel, ADA Accommodation Request, and Memorandum of Law. (A.7.4). The Public Defender was appointed to represent me May 27, 2011 by Allison Raistrick of Clerks Indigent Screening Unit, and I paid the $50 indigent fee. (A.7.4)(A.2.1.5). 26. I met attorney Anthony Lopez May 27, 2011, the Public Defender supervisor

of Moira Freeman. After a short discussion, Mr. Lopez said he would not recognize the Clerks appointment of the Public Defender to represent me. (A.7.4). 27. Attorney Mike Peacock of the Public Defenders office appeared June 1,

2011 before Judge Arnold on a hearing for me to show cause on contempt with arrest on a writ of bodily attachment. Mr. Peacock filed Office of the Public Defenders Motion For Clarification seeking relief from representing me. The Court granted the motion and I did not have representation. The Court did not allow time for me to find other counsel, and immediately ordered my arrest. A transcript of this June 1, 2011 hearing is provided. (A.3.Part4.6).

17

28.

On July 15, 2011 I requested by email and phone call a conflict check with

the Public Defenders office and its employee attorney Maria E. Castagliuolo and Mr. Castagliuolo. The phone call only revealed that Maria E. Castagliuolo was recently promoted to the felony unit. An email response July 18, 2011 from Julianne M. Holt, the Public Defender, stated: (A.7.page3;Exhibit4) Without further explanation for your request, I do not feel it is appropriate to respond to this request. 29. On July 19, 2011 I received a threatening email from Mr. Castagliuolo.

(A.7.page3;Exhibit4). Mr. Castagliuolos threatening response suggests he has been working as a shill against my interests. Mr. Castagliuolo Failed To Seek ADA Accommodations 30. I have diabetes type II adult onset, and other disabilities, and gave notice of

my disabilities to Mr. Castagliuolo by email June 4, 2011 at 7.50 p.m. with PDF copies of seven (7) ADA documents. (A.7.page 2-3;exhibit 5). Mr. Castagliuolo was aware of my disabilities but failed to seek reasonable accommodations for me during the June 21, 2011 deposition. (A.7.page2-3). Instead, Mr. Castagliuolo told Judge Arnold this June 16, 2011 at a hearing to quash the arrest warrant: 13 MR. CASTAGLIUOLO: Judge, I've known 14 Mr. Gillespie for about, oh, I'm going to say, 15 almost 14 days. Not longer than that. And, it's 16 readily -- readily apparent to me that this 17 gentleman has some problems, which cause him to be 18 contentious, to say the least.

18

(A.3.part 4, exhibit 5, page 3, lines 13-18) 3 And the linchpin of all this, Judge, is that, 4 for the last 21 months, he's been without counsel. 5 So he's been on the internet. He's been left to 6 his own devices and his own -- he's my client and 7 I've had this discussion with him. He's left to 8 his own delusions about the way this process should 9 work. (A.3.part 4, exhibit 5, page 5, lines 3-9) Mr. Rodems Failed To Cooperate with Mr. Castagliuolo 31. Mr. Castagliuolo complained that Mr. Rodems and his staff failed to

cooperate with him. (A.7.page3-4). Rodems would not return phone calls or provide a copy of the writ of bodily attachment. (A.7.14). Mr. Castagliuolo became angry over Rodems failure to cooperate and sent me this message June 14, 2011 at 7:46 p.m. calling Rodems an asshole: As for a new agreement, this is my suggestion. Give me another $1,000.00 on July 1, and I won't take another dime from you. Consider it a flat fee to get you out from under this writ (BUT WITHOUT entering an appearance in this state court case) and/or to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy for you. The only other things you would have to pay for if we go the bankruptcy route(and these are NOT my fees, they are costs) is the filing fee of $299.00, a credit report fee of $30.00, and the credit counseling fee(s) which will be at most $80.00 (sometimes you can find a cheaper vendor). Based on what I know right now about your case, your debt to this asshole Rodems would be discharged in your Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and he would get NOTHING from you. (A.7.page 4;exhibit 8)

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32.

I agreed to bankruptcy and provided Mr. Castagliuolo a copy of

Assignment of Unliquidated Lawsuit Proceeds (A.7.page 4;exhibit 9) prepared in 2008 by attorney Jeffery Shelquist who researched and believed the assignment would survive my filing for bankruptcy, and allow the case to continue for adjudication on its merits. Mr. Castagliuolo did not mention bankruptcy again. I take this to mean that Mr. Castagliuolo did not want me to file bankruptcy if the case would continue as suggested by Mr. Shelquist. Mr. Castagliuolo wanted to end the case for his benefit, to quickly earn his flat fee, and for his daughters benefit at her job with the Public Defender. Mr. Castagliuolos Disabilities - Ineffective Counsel 33. Mr. Castagliuolo failed to disclose that he has mental problems when I

retained him. (A.7.page 4;exhibit 10). This is how Castagliuolo explained his strategy for the heating June 16, 2011 to quash the arrest warrant: The game plan is this: "Judge, I've prevailed upon Mr. Gillespie to appear for a deposition. Due to his health issues and my health issues, I am requesting 60 days to get this done. Will you please vacate/quash the writ, with a specific instruction to law enforcement to rescind the warrant ?" (A.7.page 5;exhibit 12) I believe Mr. Castagliuolos disabilities prevented him from effectively representing me. Mr. Castagliuolo Complained About Flat Fee Agreement - Terminated

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34.

Mr. Castagliuolo complained that he was not earning his usual hourly rate of

$295 per hour under our flat fee agreement. At one point Castagliuolo demanded $5,000 from me. Mr. Castagliuolo became more and more angry, so I terminated him as counsel by email June 9, 2011 at 12.44 p.m. Mr. Rodems was not cooperating with Castagliuolo which added time and difficulty to the case. In response Mr. Castagliuolo launched one of his trademark threats, which often end with some reference to a former role as prosecutor for added intimidation. (A.7.page 5;exhibit 13). Castagliuolo apologized 29 minutes later but refused to make a refund in exchange for canceling our agreement. Since an active arrest warrant was outstanding against me, I had no viable alternatives to hire other counsel, and consented to Castagliuolos later requests for a promise of more money. (A.7.pages 5-6). Mr. Castagliuolo Threatened to Quit Prior to The Deposition 35. Mr. Castagliuolo notified me by email Wednesday, June 15, 2011 at 7:43

p.m. that he would no longer represent me after the hearing June 16, 2011 to vacate the writ of bodily attachment. (A.7.page 6;exhibit 15). Castagliuolo wrote in part: My sole role tomorrow, after which I shall be finished as your lawyer, shall be to do my utmost best to prevail upon the kindness of Judge Arnold to vacate the writ and resultant arrest warrant.Tomorrow, I will be your staunch advocate, but after tomorrow, my role in this matter will be over. Mr. Rodems Threatening Email to Mr. Castagliuolo June 20, 2011

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36.

On the eve of the deposition, Mr. Rodems sent the following threatening

email to Mr. Castagliuolo, Monday, June 20, 2011, 1:22 PM. (A.2.1.10-13) a. Mr. Rodems announced a walk-away settlement, followed by a number of threats if I did not agree to a settlement agreement attached to the email in PDF. I believe this shows the actual purpose of the deposition, to force a settlement. Please advise Gillespie of the following: We will offer a walk-away once again, and for the final time. Gillespie can avoid the deposition and have the writ of bodily attachment dissolved if he settles his case with us. We offer a walk-away, with a release in the form attached. What this means is Gillespie pays us nothing and all of our claims, potential claims, and disputes occurring before tomorrow are fully and finally resolved. You can tell him that If he rejects it, it will never be offered again. b. Mr. Rodems threatened the following if I did not agree to a settlement: And, if he rejects it, here is what tomorrow will look like: Once Gillespie arrives at the courthouse, he will be taken into custody by the HCSO deputies and brought before Judge Arnold. He should make no mistake, from the moment he walks in, Gillespie will be in custody. The writ of bodily attachment is in effect, and must be executed the moment any law enforcement office identifies him. I expect Judge Arnold will advise Gillespie that until the deposition is complete, the writ of bodily attachment will remain in full force and effect. What that would mean is that Gillespie will remain in custody until such time as Judge Arnold announces that the writ is dissolved which will not occur until the deposition is complete. The deputies will be either inside the room or right outside during the deposition. If Gillespie does not bring the documents or he refuses to answer questions, or behaves like he has in past hearings, I will stop the deposition, and advise the deputies that we need to see Judge Arnold. Obviously, Judge

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Arnold is extremely busy, and he is not going to stop his docket or hearings to rule immediately, and so the HCSO deputies will hold Gillespie in custody until we can find time on the Judges calendar to resolve the issues. Gillespie needs to understand that I will not accept any refusals by him to answer my questions, and I will not tolerate any intemperate behavior. He will not threaten to slam me against the wall,2 like he did in the past, he will not yell3 at me or interrupt me, like he has done in the past. The first time he goes off the reservation, like he did when Judge Isom ruled against him4, and like he did at the summary judgment hearing before Judge Cook5, and like he did when he threatened me on the telephone6, I will suspend the deposition, ask the deputies to take him into custody, and contact Judge Arnold. Also, because this is a deposition under oath, I will need to be assured, through questions and answers, that Gillespie is not under the influence of any substances, legal or otherwise, that affect his memory. I want to be certain that if Gillespie gives me an answer that later proves to be false, he cannot claim physical or mental impairment7. This will not be a short deposition. I have no choice but to be as thorough as possible because I will likely not have another opportunity to depose him. He has been spending a lot of money on filing fees8, service f process9,
2

This is typical of Mr. Rodems false and disparaging remarks he has made against Gillespie throughout this litigation. The Tampa Police Department investigated Mr. Rodems accusation, made in a sworn affidavit dated March 6, 2006. Kibry Rainesberger of the TPD concluded that Mr. Rodems was not right and not accurate in representing to the Court a quote Rodems attributed to Gillespie.
3 4 5

Gillespie did not yell at Mr. Rodems

The transcript of the hearing does not reflect Mr. Rodems accusation. The transcript of the hearing does not reflect Mr. Rodems accusation. 6 Gillespie did not threaten Mr. Rodems on the telephone. 7 Gillespie has disabilities that affect his memory. See Verified Notice of Filing Disability Information of Neil J. Gillespie, May 27, 2011.
8

This is a false statement by Rodems. The Courts have waived Gillespies last four filing fees. This is a false statement by Rodems. The last service of process fees Gillespie paid were $20 each ($40 total) in 2005 to serve Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, and Mr. Cook with this lawsuit. Gillespie was unable to pay $160 in fees to serve four (4) subpoenas for the hearing June 1, 2011.
9

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certified letters10, court reporters11, his website12, etc., so I need to find out where this money is coming from13. If Gillespie finds the deposition process exhausting, as he has claimed in the past, and cannot complete it tomorrow, we can go as many days as he requires, but he needs to understand that he will remain in the custody of the HCSO until it is complete14. The settlement offer is open until 5:00 p.m. today. If he accepts15, then you can communicate it by telephone before 5:00 p.m. He can sign the attached tomorrow, but it must be hand-delivered before 10:30 a.m. If it is handdelivered before 10:30 a.m., I will advise the Judge of the settlement, you and he can probably appear by telephone. I Rejected Mr. Rodems Settlement Agreement June 20, 2011 37. I did not accept Mr. Rodems walk-away settlement offer by the 5:00 PM

deadline June 20, 2011. I rejected the offer Monday, June 20, 2011 2:53 PM. (A.2.14-15). I told Mr. Castagliuolo Im not interested in his walk-away offer:

10

The cost of certified mail is $2.85 per letter and is paid from Gillespies monthly Social Security disability payment of $1,741.
11

Court reporters have made payment arrangements, such as allowing Gillespie to postpone payment until arrival of his monthly Social Security disability payment of $1,741.
12

Gillespies website is billed quarterly at $59.97 or about $20 per month, and is paid from his monthly Social Security disability payment of $1,741. On one occasion when Gillespie could not pay the bill, court reporter Susan DeMichelle paid the quarterly website bill of $59.97.
13

Mr. Rodems knows Gillespies financial background from his firms prior representation of Gillespie, from depositions in the AMSCOT and ACE Cash Express lawsuits.
14

This threat to incarcerate Gillespie on an ongoing basis is designed to intimidate him to agree to a settlement.
15

Gillespie responded to, and rejected the offer in writing by email, through Mr. Castagliuolo Monday, June 20, 2011 at 2.53 PM.

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Eugene, Thanks for Rodems email. Now you know why I could not appear unrepresented with him at a deposition. Rodems email is a MILD example of how he has conducted himself in this case. So long as you are by my side I feel confident attending the deposition and getting it behind me. From what I read in the transcript of the June 16th hearing, Judge Arnold is reasonable, even if he doesnt read much about the case beforehand. If problems develop with Mr. Rodems I think Judge Arnold will be able to resolve the issues, so long as you are present to represent me. Im not interested in his walk-away offer. His last walk-away offer was presented in equally dramatic fashion. As I noted before, Mr. Rodems has repeatedly offered a walk-away settlement because if he looses the appeal in 2D10-5197 that could jeopardize his legal career, and that of his partners, who stand accused of fraud and breach of contract against a former client. Today I was in contact with James Birkhold, Clerk of the 2d DCA about a motion to extend the time for my amended initial brief. After Mr. Birkhold explained the procedure, I drafted another motion to extend the time for 14 days, with the brief due July 6th, see attached. Mr. Rodems walk-away agreement mentions the federal lawsuit, Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, et al., 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB, pending in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division. While I voluntarily dismissed him from the case due to some unbelievable antics, the rest of the case is active, and on June 1, 2011 in response to another matter in the case, I noted that Mr. Rodems previously mislead this Court in violation of Rule 11 (b) in pleadings he submitted, and in turn the Court relied upon Mr. Rodems' pleadings as correct and incorporated false or untrue statements in the Court's orders. I sought leave to move for sanctions against Mr. Rodems under Rule 11(C)(2) for making false or untrue statements to this Court in his pleadings. Im waiting on a response.

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Thirdly, Mr. Rodems may have some concern with action by the Florida Bar, where he assisted Mr. Bauer regarding my bar complaint against Bauer. The grievance committee found no probable cause on a 5-0 vote. That decision was so inappropriate that Jim Watson, Chief Branch Discipline Counsel of the Tallahassee Branch, forwarded my concerns to Carl Schwait, the Designated Reviewer. Attached is the email about that, and Im still waiting for a reply. So Mr. Rodems may be feeling some heat. If you are a good negotiator and see my point, you might offer a settlement where Rodems pays me. On a contingent basis you would be entitled to whatever the going percentage is; it may be 45% since this is on appeal. Im as cool as can be under the circumstances. Nothing Rodems has said today is a surprise to me. Thanks again. Neil Gillespie. I Voluntarily Appeared June 21, 2011 For A Deposition - It Was A Trap 38. I voluntarily appeared June 21, 2011 for a deposition at the Edgecomb

Courthouse in Tampa to purge the civil contempt and rescind the arrest warrant. Mr. Castagliuolo arrived separately. I was taken into custody and involuntarily confined by two Hillsborough County Sheriffs Deputies, Deputy Randy Olding and Deputy Larry Berg, for the duration of the deposition. I was not given anything to eat during the time I was involuntarily confined. The deposition went from about 10:30 a.m. through approximately 3:00 p.m. and did not break for lunch. My last meal was at McDonalds, about 20 minutes before arriving at the Twiggs Street

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Garage across from the courthouse at 6:47 a.m. (A.7.page 6) (A.3.Part4.4.1-3) 39. On June 21, 2011 I was talking the following medication: (A.7.pages 6-7). a. Lisinopril 20mg, one a day for high blood pressure. b. Hydrochlorothiazide 25mg, one a day for high blood pressure. c. Metformin 1000 MG, one twice a day for type 2 diabetes. (Note: Metformin was insufficient to control my diabetes, and on September 29, 2011 my doctor prescribed Glipizide, 5 mg, one twice a day, in addition to Metformin). 40. The June 21, 2011 deposition transcript shows at page 118: (A.4.1.118) 21 [GILLESPIE] I need to use the restroom again. 22 MR. CASTAGLIUOLO: Let's take a break. 23 (Recess from 1:41 p.m. to 2:12 p.m.) 41. At 1:41 p.m. I felt the urge to urinate and went to the restroom flanked by

Deputies Olding and Berg. I was unable to urinate. One of the deputies knocked on the door and asked if I was all right. I felt cold and confused and left the restroom without urinating and returned to the deposition room. (A.7.page 7). When I returned from the restroom, Mr. Rodems made a number of threats to me in response to a question from Mr. Castagliuolo to Rodems about how long the deposition would continue and whether I would be incarcerated that night. Ms. Himes, the court reporter, was present while Mr. Rodems threatened me, but she did not report this in the transcript. My recollection of Mr. Rodems threats is memorialized as follows: (A.7.pages 7-8) (A.5.2.8) Mr. Rodems also launched a new round of threats against Gillespie. Mr. Rodems stated that he had accumulated 130 hours of attorneys fees

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responding to Gillespies pleadings that Rodems considered inappropriate. Rodems said he would seek sanctions against Gillespie for 130 hours of attorneys fees. In the past the Court awarded Mr. Rodems $11,550 in sanctions at $350 per hour in attorneys fees for Gillespies discovery errors and a misplaced defense of economic loss to Rodems libel counterclaim (at footnote 26, The libel counterclaim was an abuse of process, which Rodems later dismissed.) Based upon Rodems threat, 130 hours of sanctions would amount to $45,500. Mr. Rodems also threatened something about bringing the Marion County Sheriff to Gillespies home in his effort to collect a judgment for attorneys fees. And Rodems made reference to Gillespie wearing orange pajamas issued by the HCSO. The details of the threats were not clear to Gillespie because he was disoriented and Rodems was yelling at a fast pace. 42. On the day of the deposition I was taking the medication Metformin at the

maximum daily dose, a 1000 MG tablet by mouth twice a day to control diabetes. It was not working well enough, and on September 29, 2011 my doctor prescribed Glipizide, 5 mg, one twice a day, in addition to Metformin. (A.7.pages 6-7). I likely suffered Hypoglycemia or low blood sugar. (A.3Part4.4.2-3). Near the end of my confinement I had to ask Deputy Olding to repeat himself 4-5 times before I understood what he was saying; Deputy Olding spoke clearly, I just could not understand due to confusion. (A.3.Part4.4.2). 43. In those treated for diabetes a diagnosis of hypoglycemia can be made based

on the presence of a low blood sugar alone. However the Court and my jailers failed to monitor my blood sugar. However resolution of the symptoms occurred once I had a meal. In addition to hypoglycemia, I may have been dehydrated, which also causes confusion. I was taking hydrochlorothiazide, a diuretic, 25mg,

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one a day for high blood pressure. Going a long time without food would cause dehydration, along with a loss of sodium, loss of magnesium, and a loss of potassium. There is evidence that I was dehydrated, I was unable to produce urine during the recess from 1:41 p.m. to 2:12 p.m. In addition, I was taking lisinopril, an ACE inhibitor, 20mg, one a day for high blood pressure. The lack of food may have increased the concentration of lisinopril in my body and further lowered my blood pressure to the point of confusion or diminished state. Again, the Court and my jailers failed to monitor my blood pressure. Mr. Rodems Mislead The 2dDCA In APPLELLEES' RESPONSE 44. Mr. Rodems mislead the 2dDCA July 15, 2011 in APPLELLEES'

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MOTION TO REINSTATE DISMISSED APPEAL as follows: (A.1.12.1) On June 21, 2011, Appellant Neil J. Gillespie voluntarily appeared, with his attorney, for a deposition in aid of execution relating to Appellees' Final Judgment entered March 28, 2011. Once again Mr. Rodems lied to the Court in referencing a deposition in aid of execution. This was an improper, full deposition (line 18) insisted upon by Judge Arnold at the hearing June 16, 2011: (A.3.Part 4.exhibit 5.page 15, line 18) 13 THE COURT: And, I -- at this point in time, 14 his coming here is on a voluntary basis. If he 15 comes in on a voluntary basis on Tuesday, he brings 16 the documents, including the trust documents, which 17 I'll review in camera -- okay -- and willing to sit

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18 for a deposition under oath, a full deposition 19 under oath, then I'll take that all into 20 consideration; and, and as far as I'm concerned, if 21 he does produce the documents, he does sit for 22 deposition, at that point in time, I'd be inclined 23 to withdraw any pick-up order. Mr. Rodems Lied to Judge Arnold - Mr. Gillespie receives income from a trust 45. Throughout the litigation Mr. Rodems has lied repeatedly that I receive

income from a trust. This is what Rodems told Judge Arnold June 16, 2011: 6 MR. RODEMS: The various types of things that 7 one would expect in a collection case. 8 Mr. Gillespie receives income from a trust. 9 We wanted to see the trust documents. (A.3.Part4.exhibit 5.page 7, line 8) 21 MR. RODEMS: There is one matter, Judge. And 22 I'm just trying to head off a problem in the past. 23 Mr. Gillespie is trying very hard not to show 24 to me the trust documents, where he gets income. (A.3.Part4.exhibit 5.page 13, lines 23-24) Mr. Castagliuolo tried to set the record straight: 7 MR. CASTAGLIUOLO: I've been told that the 8 only thing in the trust document is the house, 9 which is underwater, and if there were any rumors 10 of income -(A.3.Part4.exhibit 5.page 14, lines 7-10) The Revocable Inter Vivos Trust Agreement made February 10, 1997, known as The Gillespie Family Living Trust Agreement, is provided with this petition, the

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exact same document to which Mr. Rodems affixed Exhibit 4 June 21, 2011. (A.6.4). The trust shows NO IMCOME TO ME OR ANYONE ELSE. The only trust asset, a family homestead where I live at 8092 SW 115th Loop, Ocala, Florida, has recently dropped in market value from $91,057 to $85,564. The balance on the reverse mortgage has increased to $106,313 as of November 30, 2011. The negative equity of the only trust asset was negative -$20,749 as of November 30, 2011. See (A.6.4) for the trust and related documents. My only reason in objecting to producing the trust was to protect the privacy of my sister who is shown in the trust as not repaying a mortgage on the home. Otherwise disclosure of this trust is unlawful for purposes of my debts: 13 Fla. Jur 2d, Creditors' Rights 91, Property held in trust The equitable interest of a defendant as beneficiary of a trust is not subject to garnishment. The Gillespie Family Living Trust has a spendthrift provision. The creditors of the trustee are not entitled to an attachment to subject trust property held by the trustee to the payment of the trustee's debts. Tillman v. Taylor, 99 Fla. 1326, 128 So. 846, Fla. 1930. The remedy is not available even if the debt is chargeable to the trust itself. Johnston v. Smith, 76 Fla. 474, 80 So. 184, Fla. 1918. The equitable interest of a defendant as beneficiary of a trust is not subject to garnishment, at least in the absence of express statutory authorization. McLeod v. Cooper, 88 F.2d 194, C.A.5 1937. As shown on the accompanying notes (A.6.4) the trust was made by my parents and not discussed. The trust favors my brother and sister, not me. I was not originally named a successor trustee, and I was not listed as a vested beneficiary.

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My parents were high school graduates and not sophisticated in matters of trust law. It appears this trust was made either on the advice of a neighbor, or as the result of attending a financial lecture with a free diner. This is speculation; neither me nor my siblings are certain since it was not discussed. Deposition Transcript Shows Gillespie Too Confused To Decide 47. The deposition transcript shows I was unable to make a decision to sign a

settlement agreement, yet Mr. Rodems argued otherwise in APPLELLEES' RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MOTION TO REINSTATE DISMISSED APPEAL submitted July 15, 2011. (A.1.12.2): In fact, in deciding whether to sign it, Appellant stated to his attorney, "I'll defer to your judgment on this." Gillespie's attorney stated, "I've already given you judgment in private, and I'll give it to you on the record. I think this is -- this is an agreement you want to enter into, and I think it is in your best interest." In fact, Mr. Castagliuolo said this to me June 14, 2011 at 7:46 p.m.: Based on what I know right now about your case, your debt to this asshole Rodems would be discharged in your Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and he would get NOTHING from you. (A.7.page 5) 48. APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT REPLY (A.1.14)

shows clear evidence that I lacked capacity to decide for myself, when I told Castagliuolo "I'll defer to your judgment on this." I already told Castagliuolo not to accept a walk-away settlement agreement. I rejected the offer Monday, June 20, 2011 2:53 PM. (A.2.14-15). I told Mr. Castagliuolo Im not interested in his walk-

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away offer. Castagliuolo failed to obey my written instructions. The 2dDCA denied my motion for leave to submit a reply. I Promptly Disaffirmed The Walk-Away Settlement Agreement 49. I was confused and signed a walk-away settlement agreement while in a

diminished state June 21, 2011. Once I was released from custody, left the courthouse, and had a meal, my senses returned and I realized that signing the settlement agreement was a mistake. I promptly gave written notice that I disaffirmed the settlement agreement to Mr. Rodems, Mr. Castagliuolo and HCSO Major Livingston. (A.2.1.page 2;exhibit 2). I notified Castagliuolo the same day and Rodems and Livingston the next day. Walk-Away Settlement Agreement Too Confusing For Castagliuolo 50. It appears Mr. Castagliuolo himself does not understand the terms of the so-

called "walk away" settlement agreement that he recommend I sign June 21, 2011 while confused and in a diminished state. Mr. Castagliuolo refused to discuss the deposition or settlement agreement after June 21, 2011. Instead Castagliuolo demanded that I pay him $1,000 on July 1, 2011. (A.7.page 8). Mr. Castagliuolo threatened me in a letter dated July 1, 2011 with criminal prosecution under section 812.012(6)(b), Florida Statutes, and section 772.11 Florida Statutes (2011). (A.7.page 8;exhibit 17). Castagliuolo wrote:

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YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you have obtained professional services from me by false pretenses, fraud, and/or deception, in violation of Florida Statute 812.012(6)(b), for which you owe me $1,000.00, as you promised and agreed to pay me. Section 772.11 Florida Statutes (2011) permits me to make claim against you for triple the amount of damages sustained by me by my deprivation by you of the sum total of $1,000.00. TRIPLE THE SUM OF $1,000.00 IS $3,000.00. This is my demand that you pay me the sum of $1,000.00 within 30 days after your receipt of this notice. Castagliuolo never discussed with me what the agreement actually meant, and reading it now I still do not understand the agreement, but it seems to dismiss with prejudice all claims pending or which could have been brought, based on the allegations any party against any person or entity, without limitation. That would include the so-called claims by Mr. Castagliuolo, even though he never performed bankruptcy services for me, and disobeyed my instructions not to settle. Pro bono counsel Danialle Riggins of Ocala, referred to me unofficially by NAMI, the National Alliance on Mental Illness, advised that Castagliuolos threat of criminal prosecution was not legitimate and that I did not violate any criminal statutes. In turn I notified Mr. Castagliuolo by certified letter. (A.7.page 9;exhibit 18). This in turn launched a new wave of threats and insults by Mr. Castagliuolo against me. (A.7.pages 9-11;exhibits 19-20). This behavior calls into question Castagliuolos fitness to practice law. LOWER TRIBUNAL, 05-CA-7205 - STATEMENT OF FACTS

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51.

This six and a half year-long lawsuit is to recover $7,143 stolen by my

former lawyers, Respondents BRC and Mr. Cook, from the settlement in earlier litigation, the Amscot lawsuit. I commenced this lawsuit, pro se, August 11, 2005 by filing a Complaint for fraud and breach of contract. (A.11.1). This case boils down to the veracity of a single sentence on the closing statement prepared and signed by Respondents BRC and Mr. Cook as of October 31, 2001, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit 2. (A.11.1.exhibit 2). The sentence states the following: In signing this closing statement, I acknowledge that AMSCOT Corporation separately paid my attorneys $50,000.00 to compensate my attorneys for their claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs. This sentence was later determined false. The closing statement is a fraud. There were no court-awarded fees of $50,000. As a matter of law it was impossible to have court-awarded fees as claimed by Respondents BRC and Mr. Cook because a federal court dismissed those claims with prejudice, as did at least two other federal courts. This is Respondents fraud against me, their client. U.S. District Judge Richard A. Lazzara dismissed the TILA claims with prejudice August 1, 2001 in the underlying case, Clement et al. v AMSCOT, case no. 8:99-cv-2795-T26-EAJ. Judge Lazzara held: After considering the arguments made and all the authorities now before it, the Court finds that count I fails to allege a claim for relief under the TILA. Moreover, any attempt at stating a claim under the TILA would be futile.

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A copy of Judge Lazzaras Order is Exhibit 8 to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint filed May 5, 2010. (A.8.exhibit 2). 52. During the course of litigation Mr. Rodems argued that the claim for

court-awarded fees and costs actually refers to a fee-shifting provision of the federal Truth In Lending Act (TILA). In fact, the $50,000 claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs is a fraud, a deliberate misrepresentation by Mr. Rodems against me. There were no attorneys fees awarded under TILA in this case. There was no possibility of attorneys fees awarded under TILA in this case because of prior court decision, and in other cases known to Mr. Rodems. Therefore, there were no claims to attorneys fees awarded under TILA in this case. Three (3) different federal courts ruled that the transactions complained about predated the TILA rule. (A.8.pages 17-19; exhibits 7-8). This happened in all three (3) separate TILA lawsuits brought by Rodems predecessor firm and acquired by Barker, Rodems & Cook. 53. Robert W Bauer, one of my former lawyers, outlined Mr. Rodems fraud to

Judge Barton October 30, 2007 during a hearing for judgment on the pleadings: 22 [MR. BAUER] Another issue to point out the fact this is for 23 their claim of court-awarded attorney's fees, there 24 was no claim. The claim had already been determined 25 by the court, denied. It didn't exist any more. (Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 39) (A.10.4)

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1 [MR. BAUER] Yes, there was an appeal outstanding, but that 2 doesn't resurrect any claim. The only thing that's 3 going to resurrect a claim is an overruling by the 4 appellate court. A claim no longer exist once it's 5 been denied, even if it's on appeal. So in 6 asserting there existed a claim for attorney's fees 7 is false. It - it's not there. (Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 39) (A.10.4) TILA Claims Not Valid in Payday Express Lawsuit 54. Clement v. Payday Express, Inc. case no.: 8:99-cv-2768-T-23EAJ. On April

6, 2001, United States District Judge Steven D. Merryday issued an Order in the Payday Express lawsuit that dismissed with prejudice the TILA and RICO claims, and dismissed without prejudice the remaining state law claims of usury and FDUTPA. Judge Merryday held that Because TILAs mandatory disclosures were not required of the defendants before October 1, 2000, TILA cannot form a basis for relief of the plaintiffs claims. (A.8.page 18) TILA Claims Not Valid in ACE Cash Express Lawsuit 55. Clement & Gillespie v ACE Cash Express, case no.: 8:00-cv-593-T-26C. On

December 21, 2000 United States District Court Judge James S. Moody, Jr. issued an Order in the ACE lawsuit that dismissed with prejudice Count I, Plaintiffs TILA claims, and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit for Count II, the alleged violation of state usury laws pursuant to sections 687.02, 687.03, and 687.04 Florida Statutes, and Count III alleged violation of the

37

Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.23 Florida Statutes. Judge Moody explained his decision to dismiss with prejudice the TILA claims on page 3, paragraph 3 of the Order. On March 31, 2000, the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB'') promulgated revisions to a regulation that interprets TILA as applying to check-cashing transactions. See 65 Fed. Reg. 17129, 30 (2000), to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226. The revision to the regulation states, however, that the effective date of the new rule is March 24, 2000, but that compliance is "optional" until October 1, 2000. Id. The Court agrees with Defendant that the plain language of the regulation means that compliance was not mandated until October 1, 2000. The transactions at issue in this case occurred prior to the FRB's regulation. Since Plaintiffs' transactions occurred prior to October 1, 2000, TILA is not applicable and cannot form a basis for relief against Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims under TILA are dismissed. (A.8.page 17; exhibit 7). 56. I prevailed on Mr. Rodems motion to dismiss (A.11.2) filed August 29, 2005

where Rodems argued entitlement to $50,000 claim against AMSCOT for courtawarded fees and costs. Judge Neilsen rejected that argument by Order January 13, 2006 (A.11.9), as did three federal judges before. The doctrine of res judicata bars future action on matters that have been "definitively settled by judicial decision. The TILA claims were gone forever.

38

57.

Specifically, this was how I prevailed: Respondents moved to Dismiss and

Strike August 29, 2005. (A.11.2). I responded September 6, 2005. (A.11.3). A hearing on Respondents Motion to Dismiss and Strike was held before Judge Nielson September 26, 2005. (A.11.4). I was granted verbal permission to appear telephonically as I live about 100 miles from the court and Mr. Rodems did not coordinate the time and date of hearing with me. The Court granted me leave to respond in writing after receipt by mail of case law presented by Mr. Rodems. My Rebuttal to Respondents Motion to Dismiss and Strike was served October 7, 2005 (A.11.5) along with case law (A.11.6). Respondents replied to my rebuttal October 10, 2005. (A.11.7). I served a second rebuttal October 31, 2005. (A.11.8). The Court ruled February 13, 2006 for me and held Those portions of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike seeking to dismiss the Complaint are denied. Defendant shall have fifteen days from the date of this order within which to file responsive pleadings. (A.11.9). Mr. Rodems responded with a counterclaim for libel January 19, 2006. (A.11.14). It was an Abuse of Process (A.8.page 48) that Rodems voluntarily withdrew September 28, 2010. 58. I filed Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment April 25, 2006 (A.11.10)

with an affidavit in support. (A.11.11). On May 4, 2005 I served notice of hearing. (A.11.12). The same day Mr. Rodems objected by email. (A.11.13).

39

59.

Because of Mr. Bauers incompetence, or to generate additional fees, he

allowed Mr. Rodems to re-litigate entitlement to $50,000 claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs in a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for summary judgment was also pending. That has been Mr. Rodems strategy throughout, to keep repeating the lie about entitlement to $50,000 claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs. Mr. Rodems Lied In Open Court About A Signed Representation Contract Mr. Rodems lied in open court October 30, 2007 on a hearing for judgment on the pleadings before Judge Barton, with Robert Bauer represented me. 2 MR. RODEMS: Wait just a second. I have a 3 written signed copy of that contract. I'm not the 4 one that filed this lawsuit. Gillespie did. And 5 Gillespie filed an unsigned version of that 6 contract. 24 MR. RODEMS: That is completely incorrect. 25 There is a signed contract. It exists. (Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 20, beginning line 2) (A.10.4) 1 Mr. Gillespie has a copy of it. 2 THE COURT: But not in the pleading and not 3 attached to a pleading. 4 MR. RODEMS: No. But that was Mr. Gillespie's 5 decision not to do that. I don't know why he 6 didn't. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Well, then that was his 8 decision. And maybe he should have, but I can't 9 make a ruling on the pleadings as they should have 10 been filed.

40

11 MR. RODEMS: Exactly. 12 THE COURT: So the pleadings as they exist 13 allege a contract between Cook and the law firm on 14 the one hand and Gillespie on the other hand, and we 15 have an unsigned copy of a written contract between 16 a law firm and Gillespie. (Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 21, beginning line 1) (A.10.4) 8 THE COURT: Right. Is there anything in the 9 complaint that says the plaintiff had a contract 10 with Cook individually? 11 MR. BAUER: Your Honor, no, there is nothing in 12 the complaint. And it was my understanding, and the 13 reason that I felt that it was still appropriate to 14 include Cook is that there was no actual written 15 contract between Barker, Rodems & Cook that was 16 signed. So there was an issue whether or not in the 17 failure to execute a new contract after the 18 termination of the predecessor firm may have opened 19 up Mr. Cook to the liability. 20 I will concede that if there exists a written 21 contract that clearly shows that the issue is only 22 between Barker, Rodems & Cook and Mr. Gillespie that 23 we have only a contract claim for breach of contract 24 against Barker, Rodems & Cook. (Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 22, beginning line 8) (A.10.4) 23 [RODEMS] We are being shaken down by Mr. Gillespie. 24 That's what's happening here. (Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 31, beginning line 23) (A.10.4) 1 MR. BAUER: Your Honor, first of all 2 THE COURT: Let me ask this: And we are still 3 on this original complaint? 4 MR. BAUER: Yes, Your Honor.

41

(Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 33, beginning line 1) (A.10.4) 20 [BAUER] exactly what those findings were. But this really 21 appears to be an attempt to do nothing more than 22 appellate review within the circuit court just 23 simply because counsel has gotten a different judge 24 to be able to argue the same in front of . (Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 34, beginning line 20) (A.10.4) 3 MR. BAUER: Once the negotiations were settled, 4 there was a fraud committed to procure the 5 modification of the agreement. The modification of 6 the agreement would be the settlement. 7 There's actually two different contracts. 8 There was the original contract that was breached, 9 then there was a fraud committed to procure the 10 second agreement, the settlement agreement, in 11 saying this is what is fair and going to be 12 distributed. 13 As far as whether or not he agreed by saying 14 these are the claims, if you read it -it took me 15 several times reading it. I was constantly 16 confused. I can't find awards of attorney's fees. 17 I can't find awards of attorney's fees. And I 18 finally caught their argument that they are saying 19 it was a claim of attorney's fees that -and it 20 says claim of court-awarded -past tense, awarded, 21 not claim for attorney's fees that would be award. 22 There's no future. There's court-awarded. That's a 23 past tense. It's very easy to understand how a 24 layperson would confuse that situation and think 25 that there had been awarded attorney's fees. (Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 38, beginning line 3) (A.10.4) 1 [BAUER] It's paramount within the attorney-client 2 relationship that the attorney is supposed to make 3 sure that the client understands. I believe,

42

4 that -or my client believes that this was an 5 intentional misleading. It was -the facts are 6 sufficient in this to, are alleged, to see that 7 there was a false statement that was made. There 8 were no court-awarded attorney's fees -or we 9 allege that it was a false statement. And that's 10 all we have to do. We've alleged that there's a 11 false statement. And it will be up to a jury to 12 decide whether there was a false statement. (Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 39, beginning line 1) (A.10.4) 20 [RODEMS] But, you know, we believe that if you will 21 carefully consider this matter, you will see that, 22 you know, Mr. Gillespie is basically trying to shake 23 us down. (Transcript, October 30, 2007, page 45, beginning line 20) (A.10.4) Prior Judges 60. Circuit Judge James M. Barton, II (Judge Barton) presided February 13,

2007 to May 24, 2010, and was disqualified for cause, a business relationship involving thousands of dollars paid by Respondent BRC to Regency Reporting Service, Inc. owned by Chere Barton, wife of Judge Barton. Ms. Barton also transcribed my deposition May 14, 2001 in the underlying litigation, Gillespie v. Amscot Corporation, case no: 8:00-CV2795-T-26EAJ. The transcript was stored in a home office of Judge Barton and contained substantial information about my disabilities. The transcript is part of my disability filing. (A.3.Part1.2.page6;exhibit4). Judge Barton failed to provide me accommodation

43

under the ADA, and sanctioned me $11,550 for discovery errors, for discovery already in Respondents possession from their earlier representation of me. Part of the sanction was for and a misplaced defense to Respondents counterclaim, an Abuse of Process without merit that Rodems dismissed September 28, 2010. 61. Respondent Circuit Judge Claudia Rickert Isom (Judge Isom) presided

November 22, 2006 to February 13, 2007, recused sua sponte after denying motion to disqualify. Judge Isom failed to honestly respond during a conflict hearing February 1, 2007. Judge Isom failed to disclose the fact that her husband, attorney Woody Isom, practiced law with the attorney in the underlying case, Jonathan Alpert. Judge Isom also failed to follow her own law review on the subject of discovery sanctions set forth in Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REV. 323, 324 (1998). The law review shows Judge Isom avoids discovery sanctions against lawyers, who elect judges. The record shows that Judge Isom favored discovery sanctions against Gillespie, a disabled, nonlawyer pro se litigant in litigation against his former attorneys who had a conflict. 62. Respondent Circuit Judge Richard A. Nielsen (Judge Nielsen) presided

from August 11, 2005 when the case commenced, to November 22, 2006, recused sua sponte after denying a motion to disqualify. Judge Nielsen found by Order February 13, 2006 that I stated a cause of action against Respondents BRC and Mr. Cook for fraud and breach of contract. While a motion to disqualify Mr. Rodems as

44

counsel was pending, Rodems filed with malice aforethought a false affidavit swearing under oath that I planned an attack in Judge Nielsens chambers, a strategic maneuver to intentionally disrupted the tribunal and gain an unfair advantage in the litigation. Thereafter Judge Nielsen believed Mr. Rodems and acted with bias toward me. In 2010 the Tampa Police Department investigated and determined that Rodems affidavit was not right and not correct. I can provide additional documentation about this matter. IV. RELATED LITIGATION IN U.S. FEDERAL COURT 63. Neil J. Gillespie v. The Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, et al., case no.

5:10-cv-00503-oc, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division, September 28, 2010. Alleges misuse and denial of process under the color of law, and failure to provide disability accommodation. For more about Mr. Rodems efforts to subvert the JNC process, see PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, Docket 58. Upon leave, I will provide more information. 64. The Estate of Penelope M. Gillespie v. The Thirteenth Judicial Circuit,

Florida, et al., case no. 5:11-cv-539-oc, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division, September 16, 2011. Wrongful death complaint. VI. THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 65. The Court should rescind the walk-away settlement agreement so that the

litigation may be considered on its merits. Mr. Rodems and Barker, Rodems &

45

Cook, P.A. must be disqualified from representing themselves. This case must be transferred to another jurisdiction, it simply cannot be fairly heard in Hillsborough County. I also include a general request that the Court grant such other and further relief as it deems just and equitable. VII. ARGUMENT 66. This petition is about the basic requirements of justice, fairness and equality

that we should all expect from our courts. In this case the most basic protections are either missing from of the Florida Constitution or have been violated. Article 1. SECTION 2. Basic rights No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability. Why do Florida Courts allow depravation of rights because of mental disability? I was denied accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Federal Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act, 42 U.S.C. 10801 et seq. After being held in custody during the deposition for over four (4) hours without a lunch break, or the usual mid-day meal provided to a prisoner, I became confused and disoriented and signed a document to get out of custody. In addition to mental illness I have diabetes, high blood pressure, and communication disorders. 67. Mr. Rodems representation of his firm and partner against me has denied

me access to courts, resulted in excessive fines in the form of 57.105 sanctions,

46

and denied my right to due process, a politically-motivated warrant for my arrest without due process. Article 1. SECTION 21. Access to courts.The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay. Article 1. SECTION 17. Excessive punishments Excessive fines Article 1. SECTION 9. Due process.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself. 68. The walk-away settlement agreement must be canceled. Mr. Rodems did not

have the right to settle my claims against the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit, Mr. Bauer, or anyone other than himself and his clients. The agreement is confusing, so confusing that even now I still do not understand the agreement, but it seems to dismiss with prejudice all claims pending or which could have been brought, based on the allegations any party against any person or entity, without limitation. That would include the so-called claims by Mr. Castagliuolo. So my so-called lawyer at the deposition does not understand the agreement either. In 2008 I assigned and transferred to Penelope M. Gillespie, my Mother, for her use and benefit a security interest in all my rights to receive any proceeds in the case. Since the death in 2009 of Ms. Gillespie the security interest was an asset of the estate. Mark Gillespie was the personal representative of the estate June 21, 2011 and he did not agree to the

47

disposition of the estate asset. Relief by way of cancellation may be sought after the death of a party to the instrument by those succeeding to the decedents rights. Peacock v. Du Bois, 90 Fla. 162, 105 So. 321 (1925). 69. To rescind a contract is not merely to terminate it but to abrogate and undo it

from the beginning. Borok v. Holewinshi, 459 So. 2d 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1984). The prime object of rescission is to undo the original transaction and restore the former status of the parties. Walker v. Eris, 886 So. 2d ,414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2004). The power of a court of equity to grant relief by way of cancellation or rescission of contracts or other instruments is well recognized, Hartsfield v. Williams, 145 Fla. 709, 200 So. 220 (1941) 70. Equity may order the rescission or cancellation of an instrument that was

procured by duress. Sheldon v. Wilfore, 136 Fla. 312, 186 So. 508 (1939); Burton v. McMillan, 52 Fla. 469, 42 So. 849 (1907). "Duress" is a condition of mind produced by improper external pressure that destroys the free agency of a party compelled to act in a manner not of his or her own volition. Smith v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 1412 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Duress may include moral compulsion and certain threats, as well as actual violence; when a claim of rescission is based on duress from threats, the question is whether the person was so threatened as to be bereft of the quality of mind essential to making the contract. 3Am. Jur. 2d, Cancellation of Instruments 23. The age, sex, state of health, and

48

knowledge of the complainant may be taken into consideration in determining whether the complainant was actually acting against his or her free will in entering into the contract. Motor Credit Corp. v. Woolverton, 99 So. 2d 286, 72 A.L.R.2d 334 (Fla. 1957); Burton v. McMillan, 52 Fla. 469, 42 So. 849 (1907). The complainant's power of resistance, under all the surrounding circumstances of the transaction, is relevant in ascertaining whether there was duress of sufficient magnitude to authorize the intervention of the equity court by way of rescission. Burton v. McMillan, 52 Fla. 469, 42 So. 849 (1907). In the context of rescission and cancellation, the ground of undue influence is not susceptible of precise definition; Pratt v. Carns, 80 Fla. 243, 85 So. 681 (1920). The character of the transaction, the mental condition of the person whose act is in question, and the relationship of the parties concerned to each other are all elements that may be taken into consideration in applying the rule. Peacock v. Du Bois, 90 Fla. 162, 105 So. 321 (1925); Pratt v. Carns, 80 Fla. 243, 85 So. 681 (1920). Conclusion 71. This inadequate, flawed petition is the best I can do today under the burden

of mental illness and disability. If I had another couple weeks this petition could be improved. It took a long time for me to figure out a strategy. In a whale of a case like this I spent considerable time thinking about how to take the first bite. Just

49

making the appendixes was a significant task. Use of the existing Index and Record would have enhanced this petition significantly. Georgia Judge Dennis Blackmon, in Phillips v. U.S. Bank, Superior Court of Carroll County, Case No. II-CY-00504, wrote "Sometimes, only the courts of law stand to protect the taxpayer. Somewhere, someone has to stand up. Well, sometimes is now, and the place is the Great State of Georgia. The defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby denied." This Court has an opportunity to stand up and protect the citizens of Florida in that black hole of injustice known as the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. I will do everything in my power to assist in that effort. WHEREFORE, I move the Supreme Court of Florida to GRANT my petition for writ of mandamus. I also include a general request that the Court grant such other and further relief as it deems just and equitable. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED January 9, 2012.
"-,

50

List of Appendixes Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 Appendix 5 Appendix 6 Appendix 7 Appendix 8 Appendix 9 Appendix 10 Appendix 11 Appendix 12 Appendix 13 Appendix 14 Appendix 15 Appendix 16 Record in the Second District Court of Appeal Record in the Second District Court of Appeal Record in the Second District Court of Appeal Deposition Transcript, June 21, 2011 Verified Corrections and Amendments, Depo Transcript Gillespie Family Trust, Exhibit 4, Deposition Transcript Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, re Eugene P. Castagliuolo Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, May 5, 2010, LT Emergency Motion to Disqualify Mr. Rodems, BRC, LT Clerks Certificate, Missing Affidavits; Transcript, LT Record, Plaintiff Established Cause of Action, LT Offer/Decline Representation, Foley & Lardner, LLP Plaintiffs Motion Punitive Damages, 768.72, LT Respondents Representation of Petitioner, DVR Gillespie v. Robert W. Bauer, TFB No. 2011-073(8B) Rule 22 Applications, Justice Thomas, U.S. Supreme Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a paper copy of the Petition and an electronic PDF copy of the Petition and Appendixes on CD was mailed by US Postal Service, First Class Mail, January 9, 2012 to: 1. MR. RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, Barker, Rodems & Cook,

P.A., 501 E. Kennedy Blvd, suite 790, Tampa, Florida 33602.

If service is required on allY other party, I ask the Court to advise me and I will serve those parties immediately.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned certifies that this Petition has been prepared in accordance with Rule 9.100(1) and is submitted in Times New Roman, l4-point font.

Gillespie p1 of 2

DR. KARIN HUFFER

Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist #NV0082 ADAAA Titles II and III Specialist Counseling and Forensic Psychology 3236 Mountain Spring Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89146 702-528-9588 www.lvaallc.com

October 28, 2010 To Whom It May Concern: I created the first request for reasonable ADA Accommodations for Neil Gillespie. The document was properly and timely filed. As his ADA advocate, it appeared that his right to accommodations offsetting his functional impairments were in tact and he was being afforded full and equal access to the Court. Ever since this time, Mr. Gillespie has been subjected to ongoing denial of his accommodations and exploitation of his disabilities As the litigation has proceeded, Mr. Gillespie is routinely denied participatory and testimonial access to the court. He is discriminated against in the most brutal ways possible. He is ridiculed by the opposition, accused of malingering by the Judge and now, with no accommodations approved or in place, Mr. Gillespie is threatened with arrest if he does not succumb to a deposition. This is like threatening to arrest a paraplegic if he does not show up at a deposition leaving his wheelchair behind. This is precedent setting in my experience. I intend to ask for DOJ guidance on this matter. While my work is as a disinterested third party in terms of the legal particulars of a case, I am charged with assuring that the client has equal access to the court physically, psychologically, and emotionally. Critical to each case is that the disabled litigant is able to communicate and concentrate on equal footing to present and participate in their cases and protect themselves. Unfortunately, there are cases that, due to the newness of the ADAAA, lack of training of judicial personnel, and entrenched patterns of litigating without being mandated to accommodate the disabled, that persons with disabilities become underserved and are too often ignored or summarily dismissed. Power differential becomes an abusive and oppressive issue between a person with disabilities and the opposition and/or court personnel. The litigant with disabilities progressively cannot overcome the stigma and bureaucratic barriers. Decisions are made by medically unqualified personnel causing them to be reckless in the endangering of the health and well being of the client. This creates a severe justice gap that prevents the ADAAA from being effectively applied. In our adversarial system, the situation can devolve into a war of attrition. For an unrepresented litigant with a disability to have a team of lawyers as adversaries, the demand of litigation exceeds the unrepresented, disabled litigants ability to maintain health while pursuing justice in our courts. Neil Gillespies case is one of those. At this juncture the harm to Neil Gillespies health, economic situation, and general diminishment of him in terms of his legal case cannot be overestimated and this bell

Gillespie p2 of 2 cannot be unrung. He is left with permanent secondary wounds. Additionally, Neil Gillespie faces risk to his life and health and exhaustion of the ability to continue to pursue justice with the failure of the ADA Administrative Offices to respond effectively to the request for accommodations per Federal and Florida mandates. It seems that the ADA Administrative offices that I have appealed to ignore his requests for reasonable accommodations, including a response in writing. It is against my medical advice for Neil Gillespie to continue the traditional legal path without properly being accommodated. It would be like sending a vulnerable human being into a field of bullies to sort out a legal problem. I am accustomed to working nationally with courts of law as a public service. I agree that our courts must adhere to strict rules. However, they must be flexible when it comes to ADAAA Accommodations preserving the mandates of this federal law Under Title II of the ADA. While public entities are not required to create new programs that provide heretofore unprovided services to assist disabled persons. (Townsend v. Quasim (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 511, 518) they are bound under ADAAA as a ministerial/administrative duty to approve any reasonable accommodation even in cases merely regarded as having a disability with no formal diagnosis. The United States Department of Justice Technical Assistance Manual adopted by Florida also provides instructive guidance: "The ADA provides for equality of opportunity, but does not guarantee equality of results. The foundation of many of the specific requirements in the Department's regulations is the principle that individuals with disabilities must be provided an equally effective opportunity to participate in or benefit from a public entity's aids, benefits, and services. (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Title II, Technical Assistance Manual (1993) II-3.3000.) A successful ADA claim does not require excruciating details as to how the plaintiff's capabilities have been affected by the impairment, even at the summary judgment stage. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d. My organization follows these guidelines maintaining a firm, focused and limited stance for equality of participatory and testimonial access. That is what has been denied Neil Gillespie. The record of his ADAAA accommodations requests clearly shows that his welldocumented disabilities are now becoming more stress-related and marked by depression and other serious symptoms that affect what he can do and how he can do it particularly under stress. Purposeful exacerbation of his symptoms and the resulting harm is, without a doubt, a strategy of attrition mixed with incompetence at the ADA Administrative level of these courts. I am prepared to stand by that statement as an observer for more than two years.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
CASE NUMBER: 05-CA-7205 Plaintiff, DIVISION: J VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; WILLIAM 1. COOK Defendants.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---e

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

COMES NOW, the undersigned on behalf of the Office of the Public Defender, to seek clarification of a Clerk's Detennination dated May 27, 2011, attached hereto as Exhibit A, allegedly appointing the Office of the Public Defender on behalf of the plaintiff, Neil Gillespie, in this cause based upon the following: I.

An Application for Criminal Indigent Status and Clerk's Detennination attached

hereto as Exhibit A purports to appoint the Office of the Public Defender to represent the plaintiff in this cause. 2.

It appears from the docket in this cause that Neil Gillespie is the plaintiff in this

cause and that he is before the Court based upon an Order to Show Cause. 3. Section 27.51, Florida Statutes, sets forth the duties of the Public Defender. The

duties of the Public Defender under Section 27.5 I (b)(3), Florida Statutes, provide that the Public

belief that the plaintiff in this cause, Neil Gillespie, is facing an action for criminal contempt.

Appendix 7

WHEREFORE. the undersigned seeks to clarify with the Court the applicability of the Application for Criminal Indigent Status and Clerk's Detennination as evidenced in Exhibit A, attached hereto. I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing motion has been furnished to Neil Gillespie, 8092 SW 115th Loop, Ocala, FL 34481, Ryan C. Rodems, Esq. of Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 400 North AsWey Drive, Suite 2100, Tampa, FL 33602, and to Richard L. Coleman, Esq., P.O. Box 5437, Valdosta, GA 31603, by hand or U.S. mail delivery, this 1st day of June, 2011.

Mi acock Florida Bar # 0303682 Post Office Box 172910 Tampa, Florida 33672-0910 (813) 272-5980 (813) 272-5588 (fax) peacock@pdI3.state.f1.us

Ikm

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA vs. Defendant/Minor Child

t1-e.. \ LQJ I\~'I t

.

CASE NO.

_~_I A~M' SEEKING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER A

/"

APPLICATION FOR CRIMINAL INDIGENT STATUS

. OR I HAVE A PRIVATE ATIORNEY OR AM SELF-REPRESENTED AND SEEK DETERMINATION OF INDIGENCE STATUS FOR COSTS

Notice to Applicant: The provision of a public defenderlcourt appointed lawyer and costs/due process services are not free. AjUdgment and lien may be imposed agains.t all real or personal property you own to pay for legal and other services provided on your behalf or on behalf of the person for whom you are making this application. There is a $50.00 fee fQr each application filed. If the application fee is not paid to the Clerli of the Court within 7 days, it will be added to any oosts that may be assessed against you at the oonclusion of this case. If you are a parent/guardian making this affidavit on behalf of a minor or tax-dependent adult, the information contained in this application must include your income and assets.
1. I have Udependents. (Do not incl!,hildren not living at home and do not include a working spouse or yourself.) . 2. 1have a take home income of $ ~ paid () weekly () bi-weekly ( ) semi-monthly () monthly ( ) yearly (Take home inoome equals salary, wages, bon;;ies, commissions, allowances, overtime, tips and similar payments, minus deductions required by law and other court-ordered support payments) ~ 3. I have other inco.me paid ( ) weekly ( ) bi-WeekJY~semi-mpQ1l1~~thIY ( ) yearly: (Circle "Yes" and fill in the amount if you have this kind of inoome, otherwise circl~o? Social 5ecurilybenefits es $ No Veterans' benefit............................... Yes $,------I(!9i.
Unemployment oompensation................. s $ Child suppor! or other regular support ~..
Union Funds Yes $ . 0 from family members/spouse...... . Yes $ . . Workers oompensation : Yes $ I Rental incOme................................. Yes $ . .Retirement/pensions Yes $ . Dividends or interest.. :............. Yes $ Trusts or gifts Yes $ 0 Other kinds of inoome not on the lis!...... Yes.$

-1-1----

I
0 No'

I h,w ~,,~~~~'~::'~~~~~,"'s'"~

money market accounts Yes $ ~ "Equity in Motor VehiclesIBoatsi ~/"" Other tangible property.................. ~eI ~ ~V ~ No Us! the year/make/model and tag#: I~iJ?~~.~ . r "L~~ Y;cf

~:~~c:~}(~~~~ft~;

""""""

'No' U"

Yes $

~:~... ~to~"""""'~1 :=l =~ ~~~~k~~~i'~~~'i~~d~di~'~~~i~~)'~: ~'~~---~~~'

"Equity means value minus loans. Also Iist:anyexpe~cy In an interest in such property. Ust the address of this property: . '. ~ Address City, State, Zip .." County of Residence Z ---,_

"lgtb-

5. I have atotal amount of liabilities and debts in the amount of ~ 6. I receive: (Circle "Yes" or "No?

I ....' :

lf7; O~ c.~

. ..

'"

W
Ul

TemP9rary Assistance for Needy Families-Cash Assistance :... "Als Poverty-related veterans' benefits.................................................................................................................................................... Yes Supplemental security Inoome (551) :............................ Yes 7. I have been released on bail in the amount of $ ~. Cash _ _ Surety __ Posted by: Self __ Family __ Other

.~
CJ'I"""

A persen who knowingly provides false information to the clerk or the oourt in seeking a determination of indigent status under s. 27.52, F.5., oommits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, F.S., or s. 775.083, F.S. I attest that the information I have provided on this Application is true and accurate to the best of my
knowledge.

Signed this

A7

day of .

Mil!

,2olL
Sig

~ -r',,?/.

./

~.#:

_/"

_ //------..:...

17~G Print Full L al Name Date of Birth S . . /? 1-;'} J / <) A . r"/ Address ' Driver's license or ID numberU -/0C'-bCXJ~~ VII ~ity, State, Zip' Phone l1umber

pIC; ,-

.r.ao.

CLERK'S DETERMINATION

V-;;::ed n the inf rmation 'in this Application, I have determined the applicant to be

=-_V;;:_Th~ P blic Def nder is hereby appointed to the case listed above until relieved by the Court.
M' , . (

~ent

( ) Not Indigent

-D1te

PATFRA'NK--------~----------

... ------ ... -_ ..

Clerk of the Circuit Court This fonn was completed with the assistance of _ _Clerk/Deputy Clerk/Other authorized person

APPLICANTS FOUND NOT INDIGENT MAY"SEEK REVIEW BY ASKING fOR A HEARING TIME, Sign here if you want the judge to review the clerk's decision of not indigent

06/18/10

EXHIBIT "A"

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER.: 05-CA-7205 DIVISION: J

v.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; WILLIAM COOK Defendants.

J.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -/

ORDER RELIEVING THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER OF THE

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FROM REPRESENTATION
OF PLAINTIFF NEIL GILLESPIE

THIS CAUSE having come to be heard on the Motion of the Office of the Public Defender for Clarification and the Court being fully advised in the premises does hereby relieve the Office of the Public Defender of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit from representation of the plaintiff in this cause as there is no lawful basis for the appointment of the Office of the Public Defender to represent the plaintiff in the cause currently before the Court. DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida on this _ _ day of June, 2011.

HONORABLE JAMES D. ARNOLD CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

Copies furnished to:

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Ryan C. Rodems, Barker, Rodems & Cook, 400 North Ashley Dr., Ste. 2100, Tampa, FL 33602 Richard L. Coleman, Esq., P.O. Box 5437, Valdosta, GA 31603 Mike Peacock, Office of the Public Defender /km

ORIGINAL ~!GNED

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CIRCUIT JUDGE

Law Offices of

JULIANNE M. HOLT
Public Defender Thirteenth Judicial Circuit ofFlorida
700 E. Twiggs Street, 5th Floor
Po. Box 172910
Tampa, Florida 33672-0910

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MR NEIL GILLESPIE
8092 SW 11S TH LOOP
OCALA FL 34481

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants. _________________________________/ AFFIDAVIT OF NEIL J. GILLESPIE Neil J. Gillespie, under oath, testifies as follows: 1. My name is Neil J. Gillespie, and I am over eighteen years of age. This affidavit DIVISION: J CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

is given on personal knowledge unless otherwise expressly stated. At all times pertinent I am a disabled adult as defined by, but not limited to, section 825.101(4), Florida Statutes, and as further described in documents in this lawsuit. 2. The Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (Court) has jurisdiction of this lawsuit and

responsibility under federal and state law for compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 3. Plaintiff retained at his own expense Dr. Karin Huffer as his ADA program

designer and advocate. Plaintiff applied to the Court February 19, 2010 for reasonable accommodation under the ADA. An ADA disability report was submitted by Dr. Huffer. Court Counsel David Rowland denied Plaintiffs ADA accommodation request. 4. Attorney Ryan Christopher Rodems is unlawfully representing his firm against

Plaintiff, a former client, on a matter that is the same or substantially similar to the prior Page 1
Appendix 8

representation, specifically their litigation with AMSCOT Corporation. (AMSCOT). Mr. Rodems knows about Plaintiffs disability from his firms other representation of him on disability matters. Mr. Rodems separately commenced a counterclaim against Plaintiff for libel over his letter to AMSCOT about the prior litigation. AMSCOTs attorney Charles L. Stutts of Holland & Knight, LLP wrote Plaintiff February 13, 2007 that This former action is, of course, at the heart of your pending action against Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. A copy of Mr. Stutts letter is attached as Exhibit A. 5. Since March 3, 2006 Mr. Rodems has directed, with malice aforethought, a

course of harassing conduct toward Plaintiff that has aggravated his disability, caused substantial emotional distress, and serves no legitimate purpose, in violation of 784.048, Florida Statutes. Mr. Rodems engaged in other abuse calculated to harm Plaintiff in violation of chapter 825, Florida Statutes, Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation of Elderly Persons and Disabled Adults. Plaintiff was formerly represented by attorney Robert Bauer in this case. Mr. Bauer complained on the record about Mr. Rodems unprofessional behavior: Mr. Rodems has, you know, decided to take a full nuclear blast approach instead of us trying to work this out in a professional manner. It is my mistake for sitting back and giving him the opportunity to take this full blast attack. (Aug-14-08, transcript page 16, line 24). 6. This case was commenced August 11, 2005. There have been five trial court

judges, four appeals to the 2dDCA, and a Petition for Writ of Prohibition. The problems in this case are due to Mr. Rodems unprofessional behavior. Rodems independent professional judgment is materially limited by his own interest and conflict, as further

Page 2

described in Emergency Motion to Disqualify Defendants Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA filed July 9, 2010. 7. Judge Martha Cook presided over this lawsuit from May 24, 2010 through

November 18, 2010. While presiding over this case Judge Cook misused and denied the Plaintiff judicial process under the color of law. Plaintiff moved to disqualify Judge Cook five times, all of which were all denied. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition to remove Judge Cook November 18, 2010, Case No. 2D10-5529, Second District Court of Appeal. Judge Cook recused herself from the case the same day. 8. Because of the forgoing Plaintiff concluded that he could not obtain justice in this

Court and commenced a Federal Civil Rights lawsuit, Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida et. al, Case No. 5:10-cv-503-oc-10-DAB, US District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division. Plaintiff lives in Ocala. The complaint was stamped FILED at 7:47 AM September 28, 2010 by the US District Court Clerk. Plaintiff planned to file the suit weeks earlier by was delayed by his worsening disability. A copy of the Clerk-stamped cover page of the complaint is attached as Exhibit B. Judge Cook is named as a Defendant in the lawsuit in her capacity as a judge and personally. 9. After filing the federal lawsuit described in the preceding paragraph, Plaintiff

drove to the Court in Tampa for a 11:00 AM hearing before Judge Cook for a CourtOrdered Hearing On Defendants Motion For Final Summary Judgment. A second matter heard was a contempt on an alleged violation of the Notice of Case Management Status and Orders on Outstanding Res Judicata Motions entered July 29, 2010. 10. When Plaintiff arrived in Tampa for the hearing before Judge Cook at 11:00 AM

she was unaware of the Federal Civil Rights lawsuit against the Court and herself.

Page 3

Plaintiff had a duty to inform Judge Cook of the lawsuit prior to the hearing, and did so by handing a copy of the complaint to Deputy Henderson prior to the hearing and asked him to give it to the judge in chambers. This was not for service of process, but to inform Judge Cook that she was a defendant in a lawsuit. Rule 3, FRCP, Commencement of Action, a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. 11. Deputy Henderson refused to take the complaint from Plaintiff, and he refused to

hand it to Judge Cook in chambers. As such Plaintiff had no choice but to address the issue in open court as shown in the record. A transcript of the hearing shows the following: (Exhibit C, Transcript, Sep-28-10, pages 1-5; 19) (Transcript, Sep-28-10, Defendants Motion For Final Summary Judgment, Page 3) 16 MR. GILLESPIE: Your Honor, this morning I 17 filed a federal lawsuit against you. I have a 18 complaint here if you would like to read it. I 19 move to disqualify you. 20 THE COURT: Your motion to disqualify 21 based on a federal lawsuit is legally 22 insufficient and is denied. 23 Please continue with your Motion for 24 Summary Judgment. 25 MR. RODEMS: Thank you, Your Honor. (Transcript, Sep-28-10, Defendants Motion For Final Summary Judgment, Page 4) 1 MR. GILLESPIE: I move to disqualify you 2 on the basis that I have a financial 3 relationship with your husband.

Page 4

4 THE COURT: All right. Your motion to 5 disqualify me on that basis is denied. 6 MR. GILLESPIE: I move to disqualify 7 you -8 THE COURT: Sir -9 MR. GILLESPIE: -- on the basis of an 10 affidavit that you made misrepresentations at 11 the last hearing about whether or not I was -12 THE COURT: Sir, file a written motion. 13 I'm not going to allow you to disrupt these 14 proceedings again. The last proceedings you 15 feigned illness. You left this courtroom -16 MR. GILLESPIE: No, I did not feign 17 illness. 18 THE COURT: Sir, if you interrupt me you 19 will be escorted out. 20 MR. GILLESPIE: Well, I'm leaving. 21 THE COURT: This is your last warning, 22 sir. 23 MR. GILLESPIE: I'm leaving. 24 THE COURT: All right, sir. Escort the 25 gentleman out. He's leaving. All right. (Transcript, Sep-28-10, Defendants Motion For Final Summary Judgment, Page 5) 1 Continue with your motion, please. The hearing 2 will continue.

Page 5

3 MR. GILLESPIE: For the record, I'm 4 leaving because I didn't get my ADA 5 accommodation. 6 THE COURT: That's not true, sir. 7 MR. GILLESPIE: I'm leaving the federal 8 lawsuit on this table for you. 9 THE COURT: You must go, sir. It's not 10 proper service. Leave. 11 (THEREUPON, Mr. Gillespie exited the courtroom) 12 THE COURT: Go ahead. 13 MR. RODEMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 12. The transcript of the hearing shows Judge Cook ordered Plaintiff removed prior to

any discussion of Defendants Motion For Final Summary Judgment. Plaintiff was escorted out of the courthouse by the bailiff, Deputy Christopher E. Brown, of the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office (HCSO). The transcript shows Judge Cook cut Plaintiff the first two times he attempted to say Im leaving the federal lawsuit on the table for you (page 4, lines 20 and 23; Page 5 lines 7 and 8). The hearing continued without Plaintiff and he had no representation. 13. Later during the hearing September 28, 2010 Judge Cook announced on the

record that Plaintiff elected to leave the hearing voluntarily: (Transcript, Sep-28-10, Defendants Motion For Final Summary Judgment, Page 19) 6 [THE COURT]...[A]s you know, 7 this is a Motion for an Order of Contempt and 8 Writ of Bodily Attachment. And let the record

Page 6

9 reflect that Mr. Gillespie elected to leave 10 even though he was advised that the hearing 11 would continue in his absence... 14. Judge Cook signed Order Adjudging Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie In Contempt

September 30, 2010. On page 1, footnote 1, Judge Cook wrote Prior to this motion being heard, the Court heard Defendants' motion for summary judgment. During that hearing, Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie voluntarily left the hearing and did not return. (Exhibit D). This statement is false. Judge Cook ordered Plaintiff removed from the courtroom prior to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The rest of the order is equally bogus and is currently on appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal, Case No. 2D10-5197. 15. Major James Livingston, HCSO, is Commander of the Court Operations Division

for the Court. Major Livingston provided Plaintiff a letter dated January 12, 2011 that impeaches Judge Cooks assertion the Plaintiff left the hearing voluntarily September 28, 2010. Major Livingston wrote: Deputy Brown advised that the Judge ordered you to leave after a disruption in the courtroom. He stated that he followed you to the front door as you exited the building without assistance. (Exhibit E). 16. Dr. Huffer assessed the foregoing in a letter dated October 28, 2010. (Exhibit F).

Dr. Huffer wrote in part: As the litigation has proceeded, Mr. Gillespie is routinely denied participatory and testimonial access to the court. He is discriminated against in the most brutal ways possible. He is ridiculed by the opposition, accused of malingering by the Judge and now, with no accommodations approved or in place, Mr. Gillespie is threatened with arrest if he does not succumb to a deposition. This is like

Page 7

threatening to arrest a paraplegic if he does not show up at a deposition leaving his wheelchair behind. This is precedent setting in my experience. I intend to ask for DOJ guidance on this matter." (pI,
~2).

"He [Gillespie] is left with permanent

secondary wounds" (p2, top). "Additionally, Neil Gillespie faces risk to his life and health and exhaustion of the ability to continue to pursue justice with the failure of the ADA Administrative Offices to respond effectively to the request for accommodations per Federal and Florida mandates." (p2,
~I).

"It is against my

medical advice for Neil Gillespie to continue the traditional legal path without properly being accommodated. It would be like sending a vulnerable human being into a field of bullies to sort out a legal problem." (p2, FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. Dated this 25th day of April 2011.
~I).

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF MARION BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority authorized to take oaths and acknowledgments in the State of Florida, personally appeared NEIL J. GILLESPIE, known to me, who, after having first been duly sworn, deposes and says that the above matters contained in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and official seal this 25th day of April 2011.

~~~,t'!if;:" CECIL!A ~OSENBERGER i*:~:*i Comrmsslon DO 781620 ~ ~V Expires June 6, 2012

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Bonded Thru Troy Fain InuInce 100-385-7018

Notary Public State of Florida

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Page 8

Holland + Kntght

Tel

813 227 8500

Holland & Knight LLP 100 North Tampa Street. Suite 4100 Tampa. FL 33602-3644 www.hklaw.com

Fax 813 229 0134

Charles L. Stutts 8132276466 charles.stutts@hklaw.com

February 13, 2007

VIAFEDEX Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 11S th Loop Ocala, FL 34481 Re: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., et al.; Case No. OS-CA-720S

Dear Mr. Gillespie: Amscot Corporation has asked me to respond to your letter of February 10, 2007 in which you request that Mr. Ian MacKechnie, President of Amscot, agree to his deposition in the above-referenced matter. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in 2001 dismissed all claims brought by you, Eugene R. Clement and Gay Ann Blomefield, individually and on behalf of others, against AnlSCOt in connection with its deferred deposit transactions. This former action is, of course, at the heart of your pending action against Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Mr. MacKechnie views the prior litigation as closed, and neither he nor others at Amscot have any interest in voluntarily submitting to deposition or otherwise participating in the pending matter. Accordingly, Mr. MacKechnie nlust decline your request. Please contact me if you have questions or care to discuss the matter. Sincerely yours, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP

:PI
cc: Ian MacKechnie
Atlanta Bethesda Boston Chicago Fort Lauderdale Jacksonville Los Angeles
Miami New York Northern Virginia Orlando Portland San Francisco
Tallahassee Tampa Washington. D.C. West Palm Beach
Beijing Caracas* Helsinki* Mexico City Tel Aviv* Tokyo *Representative Office

Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 1

Filed 09/28/10 Page 1 of 39

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL LAW DIVISION
CASE NO. 05-CA-007205

----------------------------------------x
NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff,

and BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. A Florida Corporation, and WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants.

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BEFORE: THE HONORABLE MARTHA J. COOK

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Hillsborough County Courthouse 800 East Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602

DATE:

September 28, 2010

TIME:

11:04 a.m. - 11:28 a.m.

Robbie E. Darling
Court Reporter

REPORTED BY:

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

CORRECTED TRANSCRIPT

Pages 1 - 26 DEMPSTER, BERRYHILL & ASSOCIATES 1875 NORTH BELCHER ROAD, SUITE 102 CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 33765 (727) 725-9157

ORIGINAL

APPEARANCES

RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, ESQUIRE

Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 Attorney for Defendants
NEIL GILLESPIE Pro Se

1
2

PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: right. Good morning, folks. All

3
4

I believe we're here today on a Motion

for Final Summary Judgment -- or, Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the defendant; is that correct? MR. RODEMS: Yes, Your Honor. There is

5
6 7

8
9

two other matters as well. THE COURT: Well, let's address the one

10

that has been scheduled first, which is the Motion for Summary Judgment. MR. GILLESPIE: THE COURT: Your Honor Folks, you

11
12

13
14

Please be seated.

don't need to stand to argue. Please be seated. MR. GILLESPIE:

Both of you.

15 16 17 18 19

Your Honor, this morning I I have a I

filed a federal lawsuit against you.

complaint here if you would like to read it. move to disqualify you. THE COURT: Your motion to disqualify

20
21
22

based on a federal lawsuit is legally insufficient and is denied. Please continue with your Motion for Summary Judgment. MR. RODEMS: Thank you, Your Honor.

23
24

25

MR. GILLESPIE:

I move to disqualify you

2 3
4 5

on the basis that I have a financial relationship with your husband. THE COURT: All right. Your motion to

disqualify me on that basis is denied. MR. GILLESPIE: you THE COURT: Sir on the basis of an I move to disqualify

6
7

8
9

MR. GILLESPIE:

10
11

affidavit that you made misrepresentations at the last hearing about whether or not I was - THE COURT: Sir, file a written motion.

12

13 14
15

I'm not going to allow you to disrupt these proceedings again. feigned illness. The last proceedings you You left this courtroom No, I did not feign

16
17 18

MR. GILLESPIE: illness. THE COURT:

Sir, if you interrupt me you

19 20
21

will be escorted out. MR. GILLESPIE: THE COURT: sir. MR. GILLESPIE: THE COURT: gentleman out. I'm leaving. Escort the Well, I'm leaving.

This is your last warning,

22
23
24

All right, sir. He's leaving.

25

All right.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Continue with your motion, please. will continue. MR. GILLESPIE:

The hearing

For the record, I'm

leaving because I didn't get my ADA accommodation. THE COURT: That's not true, sir.
I'm leaving the federal

MR. GILLESPIE:

lawsuit on this table for you. THE COURT: proper service. You must go, sir. Leave. It's not

(THEREUPON, Mr. Gillespie exited the courtroom) THE COURT: MR. RODEMS: Go ahead. Thank you, Your Honor.

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

The plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against the two defendants; Barker, Rodems and Cook and Cook. Count One alleged breech of

contract, Count Two alleged fraud. By orders dated November 28th, 2007 and July 7th, 2008 the Court granted judgment in favor of Cook on both counts and for Defendant BRC on the fraud count. The only count

remaining by plaintiff against Defendant BRC is for Breech of Contract against BRC, and we're moving for Summary Judgment. The following facts that are in my motion

19

THE COURT:

This can be mailed, and I

believe you can give this back to counsel. There were only two conformed copies, one for Mr. Gillespie - all right. You can make a record. I did have your As you know,

3
4 5

6
7

motion, it was noticed for today.

this is a Motion for an Order of Contempt and Writ of Bodily Attachment. And let the record

9
10 11 12 13

reflect that Mr. Gillespie elected to leave even though he was advised that the hearing would continue in his absence. You have

noticed him for deposition, you indicate, several times? MR. RODEMS: Yes, Your Honor. Prior to

14
15 16

the order of July 29th, 2010 we noticed Mr. Gillespie twice for deposition, and both times he failed to appear. The second the motion. and this is all reflected in

17 18
19

On the second occasion he did file

20
21

some sort of motion for protection, but he never made any effort to have it heard or anything. So, when the Court entered the order on July 29th, 2010 denying his Motion for Order of Protection the Court was fairly clear that

22
23

24
25

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. Case No.: Division: 05CA7205
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BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - - - - - 1

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ORDER ADJUDGING PLAINTIFF NEIL J. GILLESPIE IN CONTEMPT

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Tuesday, September 28,2010, on Defendants' Motion for an Order of Contempt and Writ of Bodily Attachment, l and the proceedings having been read and considered and counsel having been heard, and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie has wilfully and with contumacious disregard violated the Court's Notice of Case Management Status and Orders on Outstanding Res Judicata Motions entered July 29,2010 by refusing to appear for a duly noticed deposition on September 3,2010. On July 29, 2010, the Court entered the Notice of Case Management Status and Orders on Outstanding Res Judicata Motions, which stated: "The Plaintiffs 'Motion for Order of Protection,' (no date provided in Judge Barton's order) renewed in his 'Motion to Cancel Deposition' (6-16-10) is DENIED. The Plaintiff has repeatedly been the subject of Motions to
1 Prior to this motion being heard, the Court heard Defendants' motion for summary judgment. During that hearing, Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie voluntarily left the hearing and did not return.

Compel by the Defendants during the course of these proceedings, and has ignored Court orders requiring his participation. The Court will not accept these or any further attempts by the Plaintiff to avoid the Defendant's right to discovery in this case and to bring this matter to a close. Non-compliance with the Court's orders is grounds for dismissal of the Plaintiffs remaining count with prejudice." (Notice of Case Management Status and Orders on Outstanding Res Judicata Motions, ~8). The record shows that Plaintiff previously failed to appear for two properly noticed depositions. Defendants served a notice of deposition on October 13,2009, scheduling Plaintiffs deposition on December 15,2009. On June 1,2010, Defendants served another notice of deposition, scheduling Plaintiffs deposition on June 18, 2010. While Plaintiff served "Plaintiffs Motion to Cancel Deposition Duces Tecum June 18,2010 and for an Order of Protection" on June 14, 2010, he did not attempt to have it heard before the deposition, and did not appear at the deposition. 2 After the Court's Order entered July 29, 2010, Defendants served a notice of deposition on August 17,2010, scheduling the deposition for September 3, 2010. Plaintiff did not respond until September 3,2010, asserting that he would not be attending the deposition for three reasons: First, Plaintiff asserted that "[t]he court has not responded to nor provided accommodations requested under the Americans with disabilities Act ...." Second, he asserted that "the Oath of Office for judges in this matter [ ] are not legally sufficient, calling into question rulings in this matter." Finally, Plaintiff again asserted that Defendants' counsel's

2 As stated above, on July 29,2010, this Court entered the Notice of Case Management Status and Orders on Outstanding Res Judicata Motions, denying the Plaintiff's motions for protection from being deposed.

representation of Defendants is "unlawful." Defendants contend that each of these reasons is

either specious or has been expressly rejected by the Court. The Court agrees. Based on these
findings
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie is guilty of contempt of this Court for failing to appear for deposition on September 3,2010 and he will continue to be guilty of contempt unless and until the Plaintiff is deposed in this matter. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall submit to a deposition in Tampa, Florida, within 45 days. Plaintiff is directed to propose to Defendants' counsel, in writing, three dates on which his deposition may be taken on or before November 12,2010. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Plaintiff violates this Order by failing to submit to a deposition on or before November 12,2010, then the Court will enter an Order to Show Cause requiring Plaintiffs appearance before the Court, and the Court will consider appropriate sanctions. The Court retains jurisdiction to impose additional sanctions, as necessary, and to tax attorneys' fees and costs. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers this

day of September, 2010.

~~.&4A Martha J. Cook

Circuit Judge Copies to:

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie, pro se

Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esquire (Counsel for Defendants)

STATE OF FLORIDA ) COUNTY OF HllLSOOP.()UGH) , THIS IS TO C~~TIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT copy OF H+f: OOCUMeNT ON FILE IN MY OF.e;:~E. I!)(!TNEr~ ,,1',' l-gv~AOF:ICIAL :~~ THISo(&'Ndl. CA'fC>f.(!) ....!:t.

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CI.r.~K OF

PAT FRANK UIT COURT

D.C.

David Gee, Sheriff

Jose Docobo, ChiefDeputy
Hillsborough County
Tampa, Florida 33601

Po. Box 3371 Phone (813)247-8000 www.hcso.tampa.jl.us

January 12,2011

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW l1S th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Dear Mr. Gillespie: In response to your letter dated November 13,2010, I made contact with Deputy Christopher E. Brown concerning your request for an explanation regarding why he escorted you out of the courthouse on September 28, 2010 after a hearing with Judge Martha Cook. Deputy Brown advised that the Judge ordered you to leave after a disruption in the courtroom. He stated that he followed you to the front door as you exited the building without assistance. Other than the official records maintained by the Court, I am not aware of any other records related to the hearing before Judge Cook. As we discussed on the telephone today, you expressed some concern over your personal safety while in the courthouse due to a disability and due to a potential threat from opposing counsel. Please let me know the date and time of your next visit to the courthouse and we will take action to help ensure a safe and orderly visit. Please feel free to contact me with any additional questions or concerns. Sincerely,

James P. Livingston, Major

Court Operations Division

Gillespie p1 of 2

DR. KARIN HUFFER

Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist #NV0082 ADAAA Titles II and III Specialist Counseling and Forensic Psychology 3236 Mountain Spring Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89146 702-528-9588 www.lvaallc.com

October 28, 2010 To Whom It May Concern: I created the first request for reasonable ADA Accommodations for Neil Gillespie. The document was properly and timely filed. As his ADA advocate, it appeared that his right to accommodations offsetting his functional impairments were in tact and he was being afforded full and equal access to the Court. Ever since this time, Mr. Gillespie has been subjected to ongoing denial of his accommodations and exploitation of his disabilities As the litigation has proceeded, Mr. Gillespie is routinely denied participatory and testimonial access to the court. He is discriminated against in the most brutal ways possible. He is ridiculed by the opposition, accused of malingering by the Judge and now, with no accommodations approved or in place, Mr. Gillespie is threatened with arrest if he does not succumb to a deposition. This is like threatening to arrest a paraplegic if he does not show up at a deposition leaving his wheelchair behind. This is precedent setting in my experience. I intend to ask for DOJ guidance on this matter. While my work is as a disinterested third party in terms of the legal particulars of a case, I am charged with assuring that the client has equal access to the court physically, psychologically, and emotionally. Critical to each case is that the disabled litigant is able to communicate and concentrate on equal footing to present and participate in their cases and protect themselves. Unfortunately, there are cases that, due to the newness of the ADAAA, lack of training of judicial personnel, and entrenched patterns of litigating without being mandated to accommodate the disabled, that persons with disabilities become underserved and are too often ignored or summarily dismissed. Power differential becomes an abusive and oppressive issue between a person with disabilities and the opposition and/or court personnel. The litigant with disabilities progressively cannot overcome the stigma and bureaucratic barriers. Decisions are made by medically unqualified personnel causing them to be reckless in the endangering of the health and well being of the client. This creates a severe justice gap that prevents the ADAAA from being effectively applied. In our adversarial system, the situation can devolve into a war of attrition. For an unrepresented litigant with a disability to have a team of lawyers as adversaries, the demand of litigation exceeds the unrepresented, disabled litigants ability to maintain health while pursuing justice in our courts. Neil Gillespies case is one of those. At this juncture the harm to Neil Gillespies health, economic situation, and general diminishment of him in terms of his legal case cannot be overestimated and this bell

Gillespie p2 of 2 cannot be unrung. He is left with permanent secondary wounds. Additionally, Neil Gillespie faces risk to his life and health and exhaustion of the ability to continue to pursue justice with the failure of the ADA Administrative Offices to respond effectively to the request for accommodations per Federal and Florida mandates. It seems that the ADA Administrative offices that I have appealed to ignore his requests for reasonable accommodations, including a response in writing. It is against my medical advice for Neil Gillespie to continue the traditional legal path without properly being accommodated. It would be like sending a vulnerable human being into a field of bullies to sort out a legal problem. I am accustomed to working nationally with courts of law as a public service. I agree that our courts must adhere to strict rules. However, they must be flexible when it comes to ADAAA Accommodations preserving the mandates of this federal law Under Title II of the ADA. While public entities are not required to create new programs that provide heretofore unprovided services to assist disabled persons. (Townsend v. Quasim (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 511, 518) they are bound under ADAAA as a ministerial/administrative duty to approve any reasonable accommodation even in cases merely regarded as having a disability with no formal diagnosis. The United States Department of Justice Technical Assistance Manual adopted by Florida also provides instructive guidance: "The ADA provides for equality of opportunity, but does not guarantee equality of results. The foundation of many of the specific requirements in the Department's regulations is the principle that individuals with disabilities must be provided an equally effective opportunity to participate in or benefit from a public entity's aids, benefits, and services. (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Title II, Technical Assistance Manual (1993) II-3.3000.) A successful ADA claim does not require excruciating details as to how the plaintiff's capabilities have been affected by the impairment, even at the summary judgment stage. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d. My organization follows these guidelines maintaining a firm, focused and limited stance for equality of participatory and testimonial access. That is what has been denied Neil Gillespie. The record of his ADAAA accommodations requests clearly shows that his welldocumented disabilities are now becoming more stress-related and marked by depression and other serious symptoms that affect what he can do and how he can do it particularly under stress. Purposeful exacerbation of his symptoms and the resulting harm is, without a doubt, a strategy of attrition mixed with incompetence at the ADA Administrative level of these courts. I am prepared to stand by that statement as an observer for more than two years.

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No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME B PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________

Appendix B

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, May 5, 2010, with motion. Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, et al., 05-CA-7205 Rule 1.190(a), Fla.R.Civ.P. A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course. Leave of court shall be given freely when justice so requires. A court should not dismiss a complaint without leave to amend unless the privilege of amendment has been abused or it is clear that the complaint cannot be amended to state a cause of action. Trotter v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. 868 So.2d 593. Procedural rule allowing amended pleadings to relate back to the date of the original pleading is to be construed liberally. Rule 1.190(c). Stirman v. Michael Graves 983 So.2d 626.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida professional service corporation, WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants. DIVISION: C CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

RICmlViO
MAY 05 2010

CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, Fl

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----'1

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff pro se Neil J. Gillespie moves for leave to submit Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 1. 190(a), Fla.R.Civ.P. A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course. Leave ofcourt shall be given freely when justice so requires. A copy of the amended pleading is attached to this motion. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of May, 2010.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by hand to Ryan Christopher Rodems, attorney, Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., Attorneys for Defendants, 400 North Ashley Drive, Suit 0, pa, I . 33602, this 5th day of May, 2010.

Appendix B

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida professional service corporation, WILLIAM J. COOK, RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, CHRIS A. BARKER, Defendants. _________________________________/ PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiff, NEIL J. GILLESPIE, sues defendants, BARKER, RODEMS, & COOK, P.A., a Florida professional service corporation, and WILLIAM J. COOK, RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, and CHRIS A. BARKER, corporate officers and natural persons, and alleges: Parties 1. 2. Plaintiff, NEIL J. GILLESPIE, resides in Ocala, Marion County, Florida. (Plaintiff). Defendant BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. is a Florida professional service DIVISION: C CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

corporation and law firm with offices located at 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 in the city of Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida, 33602. (BRC). For the purpose of this complaint, BRC is a successor law firm to Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. (Alpert firm), the predecessor law firm.

3.

Defendant CHRIS A. BARKER is licensed attorney, Florida Bar ID no. 885568, a

corporate officer of BRC, and a natural person. (Mr. Barker or Barker). Mr. Barker is added to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). Mr. Barker was a partner of the predecessor Alpert firm. 4. Defendant RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS is a licensed attorney, Florida Bar ID

no. 947652, a corporate officer of BRC, and a natural person. (Mr. Rodems or Rodems). Rodems is added to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). Mr. Rodems was a partner of the predecessor Alpert firm. 5. Defendant WILLIAM J. COOK is a licensed attorney, Florida Bar ID no. 986194,

a corporate officer of BRC, and a natural person. (Mr. Cook or Cook). Mr. Cook was a partner of the predecessor Alpert firm. Jurisdiction and Venue 6. 7. This is an action for damages that exceed $15,000.00. The events complained of occurred in Hillsborough County, Florida. BRC has

offices located in Hillsborough County, Florida. 8. Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems, and Mr. Cook reside in Hillsborough County, Florida. Background 9. The Alpert law firm sought Plaintiff to serve as class-action representative in two

separate lawsuits, one against ACE Cash Express and one against AMSCOT Corporation. The litigation was over so-called payday loans which are delayed deposit check cashing schemes that can result in usurious rates of interest for the consumer. The Alpert firm needed Plaintiff to intervene and save the AMSCOT case from dismissal as its initial plaintiff Eugene Clement was unqualified. Defendants assumed the case after the Alpert

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firm imploded. Defendants later failed to prevail on the merits, and AMSCOT settled for business reasons. In settling AMSCOT, Defendants broke the contingent fee agreement with Plaintiff, lied about a claim to $50,000 in court-awarded fees and costs and wrongfully took over 90% of the total recovery for themselves. The Florida Attorney General intervened in the ACE class-action. Defendants did not prevail on the merits is ACE either. Defendants represented Plaintiff so poorly that he called opposing counsel for help and negotiated his own settlement. The Florida AG did better for its constituencies. The AG obtained $250,000 for the Florida State University School of Law, and $250,000 for the Department of Banking and Finance. The AG also obtained loan forgiveness for many consumers. Defendants finished poorly for their remaining client Eugene Clement, and later split their attorneys fees with him. During the course of representation, Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook conspired to exploit their clients, broke bar rules, and breached their duty to clients. Defendants formed their firm in secret while working for the Alpert firm. The charade went on for months. Co-conspirators Barker, Rodems and Cook secretly arranged to take clients, cases, and employees away from Jonathan Alpert. Once Defendants controlled the AMSCOT case, they stopped representing the interest of Plaintiff. Defendants hijacked the case for their own benefit. They disobeyed Plaintiffs instructions to settle. Plaintiff became a hostage in a case controlled by three bullies with law degrees. After taking 90% of the AMSCOT settlement by fraud, Defendants relied upon the parol evidence rule to enforce their scam. When Plaintiff complained to the Florida Bar, Defendants accused him of extortion. When Plaintiff later alerted AMSCOT,

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Defendants sued him for libel. It was all part of a corrupt business model that also involved other clients of Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA. General Allegations 10. 11. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 9. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA (BRC) is a law firm and Florida professional

service corporation formed August 4, 2000. The firm employs three lawyers, Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems, and Mr. Cook, and various support staff. 12. Prior to the formation of BRC, individual Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems,

and Mr. Cook were employed at Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., a law firm led by Jonathan Louis Alpert, Florida Bar no. 121970. (Alpert firm). 13. BRC and the Alpert firm existed concurrently for a period of about four (4)

months, August 4, 2000 through December 12, 2000. During that time Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems, and Mr. Cook were engaged in a conflict of interest and divided loyalties with their clients, litigation, and law partners, especially Mr. Alpert. 14. In early December 1999 the Alpert firm commenced at least three separate class

action lawsuits with plaintiff Eugene R. Clement. After the Alpert firm imploded all three cases were assumed by Defendants, who failed to prevail on the merits in any case. a. On December 9, 1999 the Alpert firm filed a class action complaint in United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Eugene R. Clement v. AMSCOT Corporation, case no. 99-2795-CIV-T-26C. (AMSCOT). The action was based on payday lending and alleged violation of federal and state laws. Mr. Alpert signed the complaint as lead attorney in the lawsuit. Plaintiff was later sought to intervene to save this action from dismissal because Mr. Clement was unqualified.

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b. On December 6, 1999 the Alpert firm and Mr. Clement commenced a class action complaint in United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Eugene R. Clement v. Payday Express, Inc., case no. 99-2768-CIV-T-23C. (Payday Express). The action was based on payday lending and alleged violation of federal and state laws. Mr. Alpert signed the complaint as lead attorney in the lawsuit. Plaintiff was not involved in this lawsuit, but the outcome of this case is pertinent to Plaintiffs claim that Defendants were not entitled to court-awarded fees and costs. c. On December 6, 1999 the Alpert firm and Mr. Clement commenced a lawsuit state court, Eugene R. Clement v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., case no. 99-09730, Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in Hillsborough County. (ACE). The action was based on payday lending and alleged a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices, sections 501.201 to 501.23 of the Florida Statutes. Plaintiffs lawsuit against ACE would later be consolidated with this case, and the Florida Attorney General would later intervene in this action. 15. The AMSCOT and Payday Express cases each pled three counts, one federal and

two state. Count I alleged violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Count II alleged violation of state usury laws pursuant to sections 687.02, 687.03, and 687.04 Florida Statutes. Count III alleged violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.23 Florida Statutes. A count was later added to the Payday Express case alleging violation of civil RICO under 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) which was later dismissed. 16. The lead plaintiff in the AMSCOT case, Eugene R. Clement, was unqualified to

serve as a class representative and doomed the case from the outset. AMSCOTs lawyer,

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John Anthony, challenged the ability of Mr. Clement to serve as class representative in AMSCOTs Response in Opposition to Clements Motion for Class Certification and Memorandum of Law in Support. Mr. Anthony wrote: It has become unquestionably clear, after taking Clements deposition, that his complete lack of trustworthiness, honesty and credibility make Clement a wholly inadequate class representative. (p.4, 1). First Clement lied under oath numerous time, including making misrepresentations about his criminal background. (p.4, 2). Clement had suffered both a conviction and pre-trial intervention for prostitution within the past two years, the later just nine months prior. (p.4, 2). Clements debt exceeded $450,000.00, and there was some question about Clements sanity. (p.6, 1,2). 17. United States District Judge Richard A. Lazzara commented on Mr. Clements

inability to serve as class representative in an Order of September 20, 2000 compelling Clements testimony: Whether Mr. Clement used money obtained through deferred deposit transactions for the hiring of prostitutes is highly relevant to his ability to adequately serve as class representative. AMSCOTs Motion to Compel Clement to Respond to Certified Question and Related Questions and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof alleged that Clement failed to disclose two Florida-based criminal proceedings relating to his hiring of prostitutes, including one dated October 29, 1999, just two months before the initiation of the AMSCOT lawsuit. In support of the allegations was a criminal report affidavit/notice to appear charging Clement with solicitation of prostitution against section 796.07, Florida Statutes, together with Clements mug shot. Plaintiff Referred to Defendants

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18.

Florida Department of Banking and Finance attorney Susan Sandler referred

Plaintiff to the Alpert firm for payday loans he could no longer pay. Plaintiff owed a total principal balance of $2,186.27 on six payday loans despite having paid $4,081.08 in fees and costs on the loans over a two year period. 19. Plaintiff met Mr. Alpert at his law firm at 100 South Ashley Drive, Tampa,

Florida, December 28, 1999. Mr. Cook was present and requested Plaintiffs records of transactions with AMSCOT Corporation. At that time Plaintiff did not owe AMSCOT any money but did have five other outstanding payday loans to EZ Check Cashing, Check n Go, ACE Cash Express, Check Smart, and America$h. Plaintiff settled pro se with National Cash Advance on December 24, 1999. Company EZ Check Cashing Check n Go ACE AMSCOT National Cash Advance Check Smart America$h Loan amount $450.00 $300.00 $300.00 $100.00 $300.00 $300.00 $300.00 Total interest paid $917.50 $876.25 $1,108.20 $148.47 $884.00 $76.66 $70.00 $4,081.08 Current balance (NSF) $500.00 (later settled pro se) $338.00 $336.94 $ --338.00 (settled pro se) $338.33 $335.00 $2,186.27

Total $2,050.00

Plaintiff listened to what the lawyers said about payday loans and told them he would be in touch if he decided to proceed. Plaintiff Becomes a Client of the Alpert Firm 20. Mach 20, 2000 Plaintiff met Mr. Cook who agreed to investigate his claims

against ACE Cash Express and America$h. Mr. Cook declined to represent Plaintiffs

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claims against EZ Check Cashing1 or Check n Go2. Mr. Cook said Plaintiff may benefit from the AMSCOT case, which was already being litigated. 21. March 21, 2000 Plaintiff signed a Class Representation Contract with Alpert,

Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. to investigate potential claims from transactions with ACE Cash Express and America$h3. Mr. Cook signed the contingent fee agreement for the Alpert firm. (Exhibit 1). 22. April 12, 2000 Mr. Cook called Plaintiff to copy his transactions with ACE Cash

Express. Plaintiff produced his ACE file the next day at the Alpert firm. 23. April 14, 2000 a class action complaint was filed, Neil Gillespie v. ACE Cash

Express, Inc., case no. 8:00-CV-723-T-23B, in United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. (ACE). (Exhibit 1). The ACE lawsuit pled three counts, one federal and two state. Count I alleged violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Count II alleged violation of state usury laws pursuant to sections 687.02, 687.03, and 687.04 Florida Statutes. Count III alleged violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.23 Florida Statutes. Mr. Cook4 signed the complaint for Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. The lawsuit was based on payday lending alleged violation of federal and state laws. The Alpert firm represented Plaintiff on a contingent fee basis. Plaintiff believed the

Gillespie later settled this matter pro se. Gillespie was part of a class that settled claims in Reuter v. Check N Go of Florida, Inc., Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, case no.: 502001CA001164XXOCAI. 3 On May 3, 2000, Mr. Cook wrote Gillespie that he would not represent him in a claim against America$h. 4 On April 30, 2000, Gillespie wrote Mr. Cook about errors in the Complaint, that paragraphs 19 and 20 were incomplete, and that paragraphs 14 and 15 were repeated. Mr. Cook ignored the errors, and Gillespie again wrote Mr. Cook on May 7, 2000, citing his carelessness, lack of proofreading, and unprofessional attitude. All of this is more evidence of Defendants incompetence.
2

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contract he signed with Mr. Cook March 21, 2000 was a contingent fee agreement regulated by The Florida Bar. 24. On or about May 19, 2000, the Florida Attorney General unilaterally served a

subpoena duces tecum upon Ace Cash Express, Inc. 25. On August 1, 2000 Neil Gillespie v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., case no. 8:00-CV-

723-T-23B was consolidated with Eugene R. Clement v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., which was removed to federal court March 27, 2000, case no. 8:00-CV-593-T-26C (former case no. 99-09730, Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in Hillsborough County). Mr. Alpert Attacks Attorney Arnold Levine - Mr. Rodems a Witness 26. A Tampa Police Department report dated June 5, 2000, case number 00-42020,

alleges Mr. Alpert committed battery, Florida Statutes 784.03, upon attorney Arnold Levine by throwing hot coffee on him. At the time Mr. Levine was a 68 year-old senior citizen. The report states: The victim and defendant are both attorneys and were representing their clients in a mediation hearing. The victim alleges that the defendant began yelling, and intentionally threw the contents of a 20 oz. cup of hot coffee which struck him in the chest staining his shirt. A request for prosecution was issued for battery. Mr. Rodems is listed as a witness on the police report and failed to inform Plaintiff that Mr. Alpert attacked attorney Arnold Levine. 27. Mr. Levine previously sued Alpert, Barker & Rodems, PA, a $5 million dollar

claim for defamation, Buccaneers Limited Partnership v. Alpert, Barker & Rodems, PA, US District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, case 99-2354-CIV-T-23C. Mr. Alpert Runs for State Attorney After Suicide of Harry Lee Coe

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28.

On or about July 20, 2000 Mr. Alpert became a candidate for state attorney for

Hillsborough County5. The vacancy was created by the suicide of State Attorney Harry Lee Coe who shot himself July 13, 2000 over gambling debts and related matters. A report on the matter showed Mr. Coe had $5,000 in bad check fees alone. The tragedy shows the serious societal problems created by excessive bank fees. 29. Defendants deceived Plaintiff by their financial support of Mr. Alpert for state

attorney, while concealing his recent criminal behavior. Each made a $500.00 contribution to the Alpert campaign, the maximum allowed under Florida law. Records from the Florida Division of Elections show the following contributions: a. b. c. Chris Barker made a $500.00 contribution on July 21, 2000 Ryan Christopher Rodems made a $500.00 contribution on July 21, 2000 William J. Cook made a $500.00 contribution on July 26, 2000. Political Crusade Against Payday Loans Hurts Lawsuit 30. Mr. Alpert campaigned on his record with payday loan companies. His political

advertisements stated that Jonathan Alpert has spent his life standing up for working people and protecting consumers, and that The Alpert Record has Protected working families by taking on payday loan companies. The paid political advertisement stated that Now, he wants to take that experience and fight to protect us as our State Attorney. He will fight for us - and he knows how to get results! 31. Plaintiff believed in fighting payday loan companies and supported Alperts

campaign with a $25 contribution. Plaintiff mailed his $25 check to Mr. Cook at the Alpert firm together with a letter dated August 23, 2000. Mr. Cook delivered Plaintiffs

Mr. Alpert was defeated and eliminated in the September 5, 2000 primary election.

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check to the Alpert campaign. Plaintiff received a thank you letter from Mr. Alpert dated August 31, 2000. 32. Mr. Alperts political crusade against payday loan companies was detrimental

to the AMSCOT lawsuit, according to AMSCOTs Response in Opposition to Clements Motion for Class Certification and Memorandum of Law in Support. AMSCOTs lawyer John Anthony wrote: Finally, there are some serious questions as to whether Jonathan L. Alpert, Esquire will properly prosecute this class action for the benefit of the class. Specifically, Mr. Alpert is currently running for the position of state attorney and has made it clear that one of his primary platforms is that he will, if elected, pursue criminal action against the payday advance industry. AMSCOT is in the process of obtaining a copy of the transcript from a recent television show wherein Mr. Alpert made his intentions clear. Accordingly, it is likely that Mr. Alpert is running for elected office on this lawsuit, and that, accordingly, his motives in prosecuting the lawsuit may very likely be different than those of the class he is seeking to represent. Defendants Form Law Firm In Secret: Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA 33. On August 2, 2000, Mr. Barker executed Articles of Incorporation for Barker,

Rodems & Cook, P.A, principal place of business at 300 W. Platt Street, Tampa, Florida. Defendants formed their new law firm in secret from Jonathan Alpert, rented office space, and acquired things needed to open a new law office. Defendants later hired-away staff from the Alpert firm, including a receptionist and a legal secretary. Defendants worked on their plans quietly, in secret, to the extent possible. Defendants did not publicly announce the formation of their new law firm until December 6, 2000. (Exhibit 3). Prior to that time, Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that he and Mr. Barker and Mr. Rodems

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formed their own law firm, and asked Plaintiff to keep the information secret from Mr. Alpert. Defendants double-dealing and deception against Mr. Alpert placed Plaintiff in a position of conflict and divided loyalties with the lawyers and law firm representing him. Defendants Pressured Plaintiff to Intervene in the AMSCOT Lawsuit 34. Mr. Cook was under pressure to replace the unqualified Mr. Clement as lead

plaintiff in the AMSCOT lawsuit to prevent its dismissal. Mr. Cook solicited Plaintiff to intervene in the AMSCOT lawsuit to save the litigation. 35. Plaintiff declined to sue AMSCOT a year earlier during his initial meeting with

Mr. Cook on December 28th, 1999. Plaintiff did not owe AMSCOT money. Plaintiffs debt to AMSCOT was paid in full, unlike the other five payday loan companies, whom he owed a total of at least $1,848.27. Plaintiff wanted to concentrate his effort resolving matters with the remaining five payday loan companies. Plaintiffs exposure with AMSCOT was limited to transactions of $100.00 each, and the total fees and costs he paid AMSCOT amounted to just $148.47. 36. Plaintiff explained the circumstances the preceding paragraph to Mr. Cook, but

Cook continued to solicit Plaintiff to sue AMSCOT. When Plaintiff argued to Mr. Cook that his exposure with AMSCOT was limited, Cook responded that Plaintiffs position was selfish. Mr. Cook pressured Plaintiff to sue AMSCOT, based on Plaintiffs political beliefs that payday loan companies were bad, detrimental to people and society, and charged usurious rates of interest disguised as fees and costs. Mr. Cook assured Plaintiff that AMSCOT had, in fact, committed the violations plead in the class-action complaint.

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37.

Mr. Cooks pressure on Plaintiff to sue AMSCOT created a conflict with Plaintiff

because Mr. Cook already represented Plaintiff in the ACE lawsuit. Plaintiff wanted to keep Mr. Cook happy for the benefit of Plaintiffs interest in the ACE lawsuit. 38. Mr. Cook provided Plaintiff pleadings from the AMSCOT lawsuit even though he

was not yet a party. In a letter dated September 25, 2000, Mr. Cook provided Plaintiff an Order he received in the AMSCOT case. Plaintiff felt pressured that Cook provided him pleadings in the AMSCOT lawsuit where he was not a party together with information about the ACE lawsuit. Mr. Cook was linking Plaintiff, AMSCOT and ACE together. Defendants Offer Plaintiff Incentives to Sue AMSCOT Corporation 39. Mr. Cook offered Plaintiff a number of incentives to sue AMSCOT, because

recovery of $148.47 Plaintiff paid in fees to AMSCOT was not compelling. Mr. Cook offered Plaintiff the following incentives to sue AMSCOT: a. Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that he would receive a fee for serving as a class representative, and the amount awarded by the Court to compensate Plaintiff would likely be between $5,000.00 and $10,000.00. Mr. Cook said class representatives in the Tampa Bay Buccaneers lawsuit received $5,000.00 each, and this case was worth more, he said. NOTE: In Reuter v. Check N Go of Florida, Inc., Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, case no.: 502001CA001164XXOCAI, the Final Approval Order And Judgment of May 16, 2008 by Circuit Court Judge Edward A. Garrison approved $25,000 to Donna Reuter as a fair and reasonable Class Representative Award. b. Mr. Cook said Plaintiff would receive statutory damages in addition to the recovery of the $148.47 Plaintiff paid in fees to AMSCOT. The statutory damages under TILA, the federal Truth In Lending Act, are $1,000.00.

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c. Mr. Cook said Plaintiff would likely receive punitive damages under the state law claim of Usury, section 687, Florida Statutes, and actual damages under the state law claim of Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, section 501 Florida Statutes. d. Under the terms of the contingent fee agreement, the above awards and damages and any costs and attorneys fees awarded would become part of the Total Recovery and divided according to the percentages of the contingent fee agreement. e. Mr. Cook said Plaintiff would get special attention as a favorite client of his newly formed law firm. The new firm would be anxious for business which Defendants hoped Plaintiff would provide. Cook said once Defendants were free from the control of Mr. Alpert they would be able to decide themselves what cases to accept and litigate. 40. Plaintiff finally relented to Mr. Cooks pressure and intervened in the AMSCOT

lawsuit, see Motion For Intervention As Plaintiffs And Proposed Class Representatives, submitted November 9, 2000. This occurred while Plaintiff was a client of the Alpert firm a month before Defendants told Mr. Alpert that they formed a new law firm and were taking his clients and lawsuits away from him. Mr. Cook also convinced Ms. Gay Ann Blomefield to sue AMSCOT. Now Mr. Cook had two prospective class representatives to replace the unqualified Mr. Clement. If either Plaintiff or Ms. Blomefield were later disqualified as lead plaintiffs, the AMSCOT lawsuit could proceed with the remaining plaintiff. The US District Court granted the motion for intervention On March 20, 2001. 41. In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 8, 2010, Mr. Rodems wrote: you did not have

actual damages in the AMSCOT case. (page 2, paragraph 8). This is further evidence that Defendants used Plaintiff solely for Defendants own personal benefit and gain.

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42.

Defendants pressure of Plaintiff and offer of incentives to sue AMSCOT was

likely a crime under section 877.01(1), Florida Statutes, Instigation of litigation, and an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff and the other co-plaintiffs. 43. Following the breakup of the Alpert firm, Plaintiff brought new potential claims

to Defendants at BRC, which now represented Plaintiff in the AMSCOT lawsuit and the ACE lawsuit. In a March 22, 2001 letter to Mr. Cook, Plaintiff requested representation in his efforts with the Florida Department of Vocational Rehabilitation. (DVR). Mr. Cook responded March 27, 2001 that we are not in a position to represent you for any claims you may have with Vocational Rehabilitation. 44. In a May 22, 2001letter to Mr. Cook, Plaintiff requested representation in his

effort to obtain job placement services from St. Petersburg Junior College for students with disabilities. Mr. Cook responded May 25, 2001 we are not in the position to pursue litigation with St. Petersburg Junior College. 45. Mr. Cooks assurance to Plaintiff of assistance with other claims was a deception

to induce Plaintiff to sue AMSCOT. Mr. Cook also led Plaintiff to believe that Defendants would assist him in finding employment. Plaintiff provided Defendants his resume, but Defendants did not assist Plaintiff with finding employment. 46. Mr. Cook and Plaintiff signed a Class Representation Contract to sue AMSCOT

November 3, 2000. (Exhibit 2). The Alpert firm represented Plaintiff on a contingent fee basis. Plaintiff believed the contract was a contingent fee agreement regulated by The Florida Bar. 47. Mr. Cook signed the contract on behalf of Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino &

Cook, P.A. even though Mr. Cook knew that he and Mr. Barker and Mr. Rodems already

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formed a new law firm in August, 2000. Defendants were partners in two law firms at the same time, one of which was secret. Mr. Alpert was the senior partner in the firm representing Plaintiff in two lawsuits, AMSCOT and ACE. This placed Plaintiff in a position of conflict and divided loyalties with the lawyers and law firm representing him. 48. Defendants deceit and conflict of interest created by executing the Class

Representation Contract to sue AMSCOT November 3, 2000, knowing they already formed another law firm and did not plan to honor the contract, was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 49. Defendants announced the formation of their new law firm, Barker, Rodems &

Cook, P.A., by letter to Plaintiff dated December 6, 2000. (Exhibit 3). This occurred four (4) months after Mr. Barker filed the Articles of Incorporation for the new law firm. 50. On December 12, 2000 a Joint Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel was

submitted by Mr. Alpert and Mr. Cook, transferring the AMSCOT case from the Alpert firm to BRC as counsel of record. 51. On December 12, 2000 a Joint Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel was

submitted by Mr. Alpert and Mr. Cook, transferring the ACE case from the Alpert firm to BRC as counsel of record. 52. Defendants began representing Plaintiff in the AMSCOT case on a contingent fee

basis December 12, 2000. There is no signed contingent fee agreement between Defendant Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA and Plaintiff in the AMSCOT lawsuit. Defendants did not execute a contingent fee agreement with Plaintiff when it assumed the case December 12, 2000. Plaintiff asked Mr. Cook about the lack of a contingent fee agreement in July, 2001. Mr. Cook responded by letter dated July 23, 2001 (Exhibit 4)

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and provided new attorneys fees contracts for both the AMSCOT (Exhibit 5) and ACE lawsuits, but the parties did not sign either contract. 53. Defendants began representing Plaintiff in the ACE case on a contingent fee basis

December 12, 2000. There is no signed contingent fee agreement between Defendant Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA and Plaintiff in the ACE lawsuit. Defendants did not execute a contingent fee agreement with Plaintiff when it assumed the case December 12, 2000. Plaintiff asked Mr. Cook about the lack of a contingent fee agreement in July, 2001. Mr. Cook responded by letter dated July 23, 2001 (Exhibit 4) and provided new attorneys fees contracts for both the AMSCOT and ACE (Exhibit 6) lawsuits, but the parties did not sign either contract. AMSCOT Counterclaim Against Plaintiff and Ms. Blomefield 54. On or about March 27, 2001, AMSCOT filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff and

Ms. Blomefield. Defendants failed to advise Plaintiff he was subject to a counterclaim. There was no provision in the Alpert firm Class Representation Contract (Exhibit 2) for defending a counterclaim. At the time of the AMSCOT counterclaim there was no contingent fee agreement whatsoever between Defendants and Plaintiff. TILA Claims Not Valid in ACE Lawsuit 55. On December 21, 2000 United States District Court Judge James S. Moody, Jr.

issued an Order in the ACE lawsuit that dismissed with prejudice Count I, Plaintiffs TILA claims, and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit for Count II, the alleged violation of state usury laws pursuant to sections 687.02, 687.03, and 687.04 Florida Statutes, and Count III alleged violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.23 Florida Statutes.

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Judge Moody explained his decision to dismiss with prejudice the TILA claims on page 3, paragraph 3 of the Order. On March 31, 2000, the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB'') promulgated revisions to a regulation that interprets TILA as applying to check-cashing transactions. See 65 Fed. Reg. 17129, 30 (2000), to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226. The revision to the regulation states, however, that the effective date of the new rule is March 24,2000, but that compliance is "optional" until October 1, 2000. Id. The Court agrees with Defendant that the plain language of the regulation means that compliance was not mandated until October 1, 2000. The transactions at issue in this case occurred prior to the FRB's regulation. Since Plaintiffs' transactions occurred prior to October 1, 2000, TILA is not applicable and cannot form a basis for relief against Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims under TILA are dismissed. (Exhibit 7). TILA Claims Not Valid in Payday Express Lawsuit 56. On April 6, 2001, United States District Magistrate Judge Steven D. Merryday

issued an Order in the Payday Express lawsuit that dismissed with prejudice the TILA and RICO claims, and dismissed without prejudice the remaining state law claims of usury and FDUTPA. Judge Merryday held that Because TILAs mandatory disclosures were not required of the defendants before October 1, 2000, TILA cannot form a basis for relief of the plaintiffs claims. (page 4, last paragraph). TILA Claims Not Valid in AMSCOT Lawsuit 57. On August 1, 2001, United States District Judge Richard A. Lazzara issued an

order in the AMSCOT lawsuit denying class certification as moot, dismissed Count I with prejudice, the alleged violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). The Order dismissed Counts II and III without prejudice to bring in state court, and closed the

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file. Count II alleged violation of state usury laws pursuant to sections 687.02, 687.03, and 687.04 Florida Statutes. Count III alleged violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.23 Florida Statutes. (Exhibit 8). 58. Defendants knew ten (10) months before making the closing statement in the

AMSCOT settlement that the AMSCOT lawsuit was not a fee-shifting TILA action. On August 1, 2001 the AMSCOT lawsuit ceased being a fee-shifting TILA action when the TILA claim was dismissed with prejudice. Defendants also knew from the decisions in ACE and Payday Express that TILA could not form a basis for relief in AMSCOT. Florida Attorney General Motion to Intervene in ACE 59. On or about February 9, 2001 the Florida Attorney General moved to intervene in

the ACE lawsuit citing Florida RICO jurisdiction. Roger B. Handberg, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Economic Crimes Division, appeared for the AG. An Order granted the intervention April 3, 2001. The AG filed its 82 page complaint April 12, 2001. $5,000 Improper Payoff Attempt 60. Soon after Judge Lazzaras Order dismissing AMSCOT, John Anthony offered

Mr. Cook a $5,000 consulting fee or non-refundable retainer to refrain from appealing the ruling or filing state law claims or suing AMSCOT in the future. This was in violation of Rule 4-5.6(a). Mr. Cook described this payment as an improper payoff attempt and not an offer to settle. Mr. Cook said that the Florida Bar likely would prohibit such an agreement. Mr. Cook did not report Anthonys Rule 4-5.6(a) violation to the Florida Bar as required by Rule 4-8.3(a). Mr. Cook did not report Mr. Anthonys improper payoff attempt to the Florida Bar as required by Rule 4-8.3(a). Breach of Fiduciary Duty

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61.

Defendants represented Plaintiff as his attorneys. Defendants owed Plaintiff a

fiduciary duty. It is long established that the relationship between an attorney and his client is one of the most important, as well as the most sacred, known to the law. The responsibility of an attorney to place his clients interest ahead of his own in dealings with matters upon which the attorney is employed is at the foundation of our legal system. (Deal v. Migoski, 122 So. 2d 415). It is a fiduciary relationship involving the highest degree of truth and confidence, and an attorney is under a duty, at all times, to represent his client and handle his clients affairs with the utmost degree of honesty, forthrightness, loyalty, and fidelity. (Gerlach v. Donnelly, 98 So. 2d 493). 62. On August 15, 2001 Mr. Cook announced that Defendants would not honor the

AMSCOT contingent fee agreement with Plaintiff. Cook said Plaintiffs damages were limited to $1,000, the fee-shifting provision of TILA. This was false. Defendants did not prevail on any TILA claims. Defendants breached its fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement by failing to put their clients interest ahead of their own in dealings with matters upon which Defendants were employed. 63. Defendants refusal to honor the contingent fee agreement in the AMSCOT

lawsuit was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. Defendants Commit Fraud Against Their Own Clients 64. Defendants conspired to defraud Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement in the

AMSCOT lawsuit using a corrupt business model that relied upon a five part deception. Defendants corrupt business model worked as follows: a. Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff and the other clients.

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b. Defendants fraudulently procured a favorable agreement from Plaintiff and the other clients taking 90 percent of the AMSCOT settlement for their own benefit. c. Defendants relied upon the parol evidence rule to enforce the settlement. b. Defendants further argued that bar rules prohibit them from honoring a contingent fee agreement since that amounts to splitting attorneys fees with a nonlawyer. 65. Defendants fraudulently procured a favorable agreement from Plaintiff in the

AMSCOT settlement with a five part deception: a. Part 1: Defendants created a sticking part argument that blamed its clients for suing AMSCOT. Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that AMSCOT resented him and that was a sticking part to settling because AMSCOT did not want to pay Plaintiff any money. b. Part 2: Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that AMSCOT did not resent Defendants and wanted to pay money to the Defendants to settle the lawsuit. c. Part 3: Defendants falsely claimed entitlement to fee-shifting TILA damages to evade the contingent fee agreement with Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. d. Part 4: Defendants used deceit to induce Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield, and Clement to sign a Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT October 30, 2001. e. Part 5: Defendants used deceit to induce Plaintiff to sign a closing statement November 1, 2001 in order to receive $2,000 promised in the Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT on October 30, 2001. 66. During a meeting with Plaintiff August 15, 2001, Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that

AMSCOT did not want to pay the plaintiffs anything because AMSCOT resented the plaintiffs for suing. Mr. Cook told Plaintiff this was a sticking part or barrier to a

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settlement. Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that AMSCOT did not resent Defendants and wanted to pay money to Defendants to settle the lawsuit. Mr. Cook said that the sticking part was a $1,000 payment to each of three plaintiffs, not a $50,000 payment to Defendants. 67. Defendants sticking part argument was an overt act in furtherance of their

conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 68. Defendants false claim to court-awarded fees and costs was an overt act in

furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 69. During the August 15, 2001 meeting with Plaintiff, Mr. Cook falsely told Plaintiff

that Defendants incurred costs and expenses of $33,000 in the AMSCOT lawsuit. Cook used this amount as a basis to justify his $50,000 demand from AMSCOT. Plaintiff later learned that the actual costs and expenses were only $3,580.67, plus $2,544.79 paid to Mr. Alpert, for total costs and expenses of $6,125.46. These costs and expenses were not itemized on the closing statement as required by bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(5). 70. Defendants false claim that it incurred $33,000 in costs and expenses was an overt

act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 71. Defendants creation of a deceptive closing statement, and failure to itemize costs

and expenses of $6,125.46 as required by bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 72. On August 15, 2001 Mr. Cook wrote that Plaintiff authorized Defendants to

appeal the dismissal of TILA claims, but not file a new lawsuit in State court. Mr. Cook also wrote that Plaintiff authorized Defendants to demand $1,000 to settle his claim plus $50,000 in attorneys fees and costs. (Exhibit 9). Plaintiffs so-called authorization

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was contrary to his interest, induced by false information Defendants provided him as described herein, and was therefore void. 73. Defendants separate negotiation with AMSCOT for its attorneys fees placed

Defendants in a position of conflict with Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. Defendants August 15, 2001 letter is prima facie evidence of breach of fiduciary duty. 74. Defendants separate negotiation with AMSCOT for its attorneys fees, and

Defendants August 15, 2001 letter to Plaintiff were overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. Defendants Hijack The AMSCOT Lawsuit And Hold Plaintiff Hostage 75. On August 16, 2001 Plaintiff instructed Mr. Cook by letter to settle the AMSCOT

lawsuit. (Exhibit 10). Plaintiff believed Defendants no longer represented his interest in the litigation. Plaintiff requested that Defendants provide copies of his settlement instruction letter to Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. Plaintiff provided Defendants the following instructions to settle the AMSCOT litigation: I agree with you that the Defendant will probably not accept your settlement offer. I believe the sticking point is your request for $50,000 in attorneys fees and costs. I do not believe the $1,000 request each for myself, Mr. Clement and Ms. Blomefield is a barrier to settlement. Therefore I suggest you ask for a lesser amount of attorneys fees and costs. Given your lack of success in this matter thus far, I suggest you ask for $10,000 in attorneys fees and costs. I believe this is a more realistic amount. Given how poorly the case has gone up to now, I believe it is in our interest to settle quickly.

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Plaintiff was concerned that Defendants no longer represented his interest, and among other things he would be indebted to AMSCOT for its costs and attorneys fees since Defendants failed to prevail on the TILA claim. 76. Defendants did not obey Plaintiffs August 16, 2001 written instructions

to settle the AMSCOT lawsuit. 77. Defendants did not obey Plaintiffs September 15, 2001 written

instructions to settle his claims the AMSCOT lawsuit. 78. Defendants did not obey Plaintiffs September 21, 2001 instructions to

settle his claims in the AMSCOT lawsuit. 79. Defendants hijacked the AMSCOT lawsuit for their own benefit and held

Plaintiff hostage for Defendants financial gain. 80. On or about July 25, 2005, Plaintiff sent a copy of his August 16, 2001

letter to Defendants instructing them to settle the lawsuit, to Ian Mackechnie, President of AMSCOT with a cover letter. (Exhibit 11). A month later John Anthony responded to Plaintiff and wrote (in part): Amscot is disappointed that your lawyer apparently did not obey your instructions regarding discontinuing litigation you and he knew to be frivolous. (Exhibit 12). 81. Defendants failure to obey Plaintiffs instructions to settle the AMSCOT case,

and hijack of the case for Defendants own benefit, were overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. Defendants Written Evidence of Fraud Against Its Clients 82. In a memorandum dated Monday, August 20, 2001, Mr. Cook wrote the following

to memorialize his conversation with Plaintiff about AMSCOT: (Exhibit 13).

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a. I explained to him that I did not believe that the sticking part was created through the attorneys fees, but rather it was the payment to the clients. b. I told him of my conversation with John Anthony in which he offered to pay this firm $5,000.00 but would not agree to pay our clients anything. I told him I rejected that offer. He asked me why I had not mentioned the settlement offer to him previously. I told him it was not a settlement offer. It was an improper payoff attempt. c. I told him that the $50,000.00 demand was not set in stone and we would consider the $10,000.00 offer that he suggested. 83. Defendants submitted a written offer to AMSCOT August 20, 2001. Mr. Cook

wrote (in part): our clients are willing to accept $1,000.00 each, representing the amount of their individual TILA statutory damages. They would also want any outstanding loans forgiven. In addition, we would accept $50,000.00 to settle this firm's outstanding attorneys' fees and costs. (page 1, paragraph 3) (Exhibit 14). 84. Defendants August 20, 2001 written settlement offer to AMSCOT is prima facie

evidence of Defendants breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff was not restricted to TILA statutory damages in his recovery. TILA damages did not apply. The TILA claims were dismissed with prejudice. Defendants separate demand for $50,000 to settle the firms outstanding attorneys fees and costs was speculative, not supported by actual fees and expenses incurred, and put Defendants interests ahead of Plaintiff. It was evidence of Defendants proprietary interest in the AMSCOT litigation. 85. Defendants negotiated with AMSCOT on behalf of Ms. Blomefield and Mr.

Clement to have any outstanding loans forgiven. Plaintiff did not have outstanding debt or loans to AMSCOT. Defendants did not seek alternative compensation for Plaintiff.

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Defendants further breached their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff by failing to obtain a settlement of equal value for him from AMSCOT. 86. AMSCOT made a counter offer and agreed to pay each plaintiff $1,000, forgive

any outstanding debts (Plaintiff did not have outstanding debts to AMSCOT), and a $10,000 payment to the Defendants, in a letter dated August 24, 2001. 87. AMSCOT then offered to pay the Defendants the sum of $50,000. AMSCOT

offered to pay each plaintiff $2,000. There is no documentation supporting AMSCOTs increased offer. Defendants did not provide a bill to AMSCOT for legal services, nor provided any basis for the $50,000 in attorneys fees and cost. 88. Once AMSCOT agreed to pay Plaintiff and the other clients a monetary

settlement, Defendants created a new deceit to evade the contingent fee agreement. Under the agreement, attorneys fees became part of the Total Recovery. To evade that clause, Defendants represented to Plaintiff that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit awarded $50,000 in attorneys fees and costs to the Defendants, and this precluded recovery under the Representation Contract, citing a whichever is higher provision for court-awarded attorneys fees and costs. Defendants referred to the $50,000 as a claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs. United States Court of Appeals: No Fee-Shifting TILA Costs or Fees 89. Defendants representation in the preceding paragraph was false. The United

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did not award Defendants $50,000 in attorneys fees and costs to the. Defendants did not have a claim to court-awarded fees and costs because Defendants did not prevail on a TILA claim.

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90.

Defendants false claim that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit awarded them $50,000 in attorneys fees and costs is an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 91. Defendants filed a notice of appeal in AMSCOT August 20, 2001 to the United

States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Case No. 01-14761-A. Defendants submitted Appellants Initial Brief October 2, 2001. AMSCOT did not submit a reply brief. 92. AMSCOT settled the lawsuit for business reasons October 30, 2001. Defendants

did not prevail on a TILA claim. The AMSCOT settlement agreement had a No Admission clause. It was expressly understood that the Parties explicitly denied any wrongdoing, liability, or obligation whatsoever to the other party relating to the settlement. 93. Mr. Cook submitted a Joint Stipulation For Dismissal With Prejudice in the

AMSCOT case November 6, 2001 with the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that the parties amicably resolved the matter and moved for dismissal with prejudice with each party bearing its own attorneys fees and costs. (Exhibit 15). This is conclusive evidence that Defendants did not have an award of attorneys fees and costs pursuant to a fee-shifting TILA statute. Likewise Defendants did not have a claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs. 94. On December 7, 2001 the US District Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

ruled that the Joint Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice was construed as a motion to dismiss the appeal with prejudice, with the parties bearing their own costs and attorneys fees. (Exhibit 16). This is conclusive evidence that Defendants did not have an award of

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attorneys fees and costs pursuant to a fee-shifting TILA statute. Likewise Defendants did not have a claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs. FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT 95. On October 30, 2001 Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield

and Mr. Clement to sign a Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT Corporation. (AMSCOT agreement). (Exhibit 17). Paragraph 1 is Settlement with Plaintiffs for $2,000 each. Paragraph 2 is Settlement with Firm, the Defendants, and reads: Amscot shall pay the Firm the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars and No/100 ($50,000), in satisfaction of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and costs, as more fully described herein, against Amscot as asserted in the Action. To induce Plaintiff to sign the AMSCOT agreement: a. Defendants represented to Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement that the $50,000 sum was a claim for court-awarded fees and costs. The representation was a false statement concerning a material fact. The TILA claims were dismissed and there was no claim to court-awarded fees and costs. b. Defendants made the statement knowing that the representation was false. Defendants knew the TILA claims were dismissed and there was no claim to courtawarded fees and costs. c. Defendants intended the representation would induce Plaintiff to act upon it and signed the Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT. d. Plaintiff relied upon Defendants falsehood as true and signed the agreement October 30, 2001 in return for payment of $2,000 from AMSCOT. Plaintiff suffered

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financial loss of $7,143.68 by accepting the sum of $2,000 instead of the sum of $9,143.68 to which Plaintiff was entitled under law and the Representation Contract. 96. Defendants fraud to induce Plaintiff to sign the AMSCOT agreement was an overt

act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 97. Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement did not immediately receive the

$2,000 payment from AMSCOT described in paragraph 1 of the AMSCOT agreement. Payment was held for three days until Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement signed Defendants closing statement on November 1, 2001. FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, Defendants Closing Statement in AMSCOT 98. On November 1, 2001, Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff to sign a closing

statement prepared by Defendants in the AMSCOT lawsuit. (Exhibit 18). Defendants also fraudulently induced Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement to sign similar closing statements. To induce Plaintiff to sign the closing statement: a. Defendants represented to Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement that AMSCOT Corporation separately paid my attorneys $50,000.00 to compensate my attorneys for their claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs. The representation was a false statement concerning a material fact. The TILA claims were dismissed and there was no claim to court-awarded fees and costs. b. Defendants made the statement knowing that the representation was false. Defendants knew the TILA claims were dismissed and there was no claim to courtawarded fees and costs. c. Defendants intended the representation would induce Plaintiff to act upon it and signed the closing statement made by Defendants in the AMSCOT lawsuit.

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d. Plaintiff relied upon Defendants falsehood as true and signed the closing statement November 1, 2001 in return for payment of $2,000 from AMSCOT. Plaintiff suffered financial loss of $7,143.68 by accepting the sum of $2,000 instead of the sum of $9,143.68 to which Plaintiff was entitled under law and the Representation Contract. 99. Defendants fraud to induce Plaintiff to sign the closing statement was an overt act

in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. Defendants AMSCOT Closing Statement Does Not Comply with Florida Bar Rules 100. Defendants closing statement in the AMSCOT lawsuit (Exhibit 18) does not

comply with Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Defendants closing statement fails to: (a) Reflect an itemization of all costs and expenses. Costs and expenses in the AMSCOT lawsuit of $3,580.88 were not itemized as required. (b) Show the amount of fee received by each participating lawyer or law firm. Payment to Jonathan Alpert for the AMSCOT lawsuit of $2,544.79 was not shown. (c) A copy of the closing statement was not executed by all participating lawyers. Jonathan Alpert received payment of $2,544.79 from the AMSCOT settlement but did not execute the closing statement. 101. Defendants preparation and execution of a closing statement in the AMSCOT

lawsuit that does not comply with Rule 4-1.5(f)(5) was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 102. Defendants cannot avoid compliance with Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), The Rules Regulating

The Florida Bar, by claiming AMSCOT paid its attorneys fees and costs. The rule does not alleviate attorneys from compliance under this claimed contingency.

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103.

Defendants closing statement in the AMSCOT lawsuit further violates Rule 4-

1.5(f)(5), The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, by falsely stating Defendants had a $50,000 claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs or that AMSCOT separately paid this claim. Defendants did not have a claim against anyone in the AMSCOT lawsuit for $50,000 in court-awarded fees and costs. Defendants did not prevail on a TILA claim. The fee-shifting TILA claims were dismissed with prejudice by the court. Defendants knew that three separate courts dismissed three separate lawsuits they brought, and each court held that TILA claims were not possible because the law was not retroactive. AMSCOT settled the lawsuit for business reasons October 30, 2001. The AMSCOT settlement agreement had a No Admission clause and it was expressly understood that the Parties explicitly denied any wrongdoing, liability, or obligation whatsoever to the other party in the settlement. Conclusion of the ACE Lawsuit 104. 105. Defendants failed to adequately represent Plaintiff in the ACE lawsuit. On or about May 22, 2002 Plaintiff called opposing counsel, Mr. Paul D. Watson,

was greeted by voice mail, and left a message that was substantially the following: This is Neil Gillespie, my number is 246-5186, I am calling about the ACE case, I had called Bush, Ross and was told you left and that you took the case with you. At this point I am interested in settling the case and am not real satisfied with the current counsel that I have and would like to speak with you more about that. 106. On June 12, 2002 a mediation was held in the ACE lawsuit. The mediator was

Gasper Ficarrotta of Tampa. Opposing counsel Neil A. Sivyer was present and acknowledged Plaintiffs voice mail to Mr. Watson of May 22, 2002. Mr. Sivyer assured

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Plaintiff he would settle his claims in the ACE lawsuit that day regardless of what Defendants did with their other client Mr. Clement. (Ms. Blomefield was not a party in the ACE lawsuit). 107. Roger B. Handberg, Senior Assistant Attorney General, was present and

represented the AG June 12, 2002 at the mediation described in the preceding paragraph. 108. On June 12, 2002 a Stipulation Of The Parties settled the ACE lawsuit for

Plaintiff and Mr. Clement. ACE paid Plaintiff and Clement $5,000 each, with each party bearing their own fees and costs and shall share in the mediation fees. (Exhibit 19). 109. Plaintiff essentially negotiated for himself because Defendants failed to

adequately represent him. Defendants were still Plaintiffs attorney of record. 110. Plaintiff obtained a $2,000 net settlement negotiating on his own behalf.

Defendants obtained a lesser net amount for Mr. Clement while negotiating for him. 111. Defendants prepared a closing statement in the ACE lawsuit dated June 24, 2002.

The closing statement is contrived and shows Plaintiff received a $500 payment from Mr. Clements settlement. The statement also contains the following language: I acknowledge receipt of $500.00 from my Co-Plaintiff, Eugene R. Clement. (Exhibit 20). 112. Defendants closing statement in the ACE lawsuit violates bar rules because there

is no provision for Plaintiff, a non-lawyer, to receive settlement proceeds in a contingent fee case belonging to a co-plaintiff or non-lawyer client. 113. Defendants their split attorneys fees with Mr. Clement. Mr. Cook told Plaintiff

that Defendants paid Mr. Clement an additional $500 from Defendants attorneys fees after the closing statement in the ACE lawsuit was executed to lessen the disparity in

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Clements settlement compared to Plaintiffs settlement. Mr. Cook said Defendants reduced its attorneys fees and paid Mr. Clement the difference. Florida Attorney General Settlement with ACE Cash Express 114. The Florida AG and ACE entered a Settlement Agreement December 30, 2002.

(Exhibit 21). ACE paid a total of $500,000 in settlement and for issuance by the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Finance (DBF) of authorizations, licenses, or other approvals necessary for ACE to continue in business in Florida, and for releases and other stipulations. ACE paid $250,000 to the DBF Regulatory Trust Fund in full satisfaction of all attorney's fees, costs, and other expenses incurred by the DBF in connection with this matter. ACE made a contribution of $250,000 to the Florida State University College of Law in full satisfaction of all attorney's fees, costs and other expenses incurred by the Attorney General in connection with this matter. ACE also agreed to loan forgiveness by an affiliated company, Goleta National Bank for the "Goleta Loan Consumers with an independent audit paid by ACE. Plaintiff Discovers Defendants Fraud in the AMSCOT Settlement 115. On or about May 9, 2003 Defendants disclosed to Plaintiff the actual costs and

expenses incurred in the AMSCOT lawsuit, $6,125.46. (Exhibit 22). Because of the significant discrepancy between the actual amount and the amount that Mr. Cook said were incurred, $33,000, Plaintiff further investigated the settlement. 116. Plaintiff located the Appellate Court file and read that the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted a Motion for Dismissal with the parties bearing their own costs and attorneys fees. This information and the other evidence provided in

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this amended complaint proved the falsity of Defendants assertion that it had a claim to $50,000 in court-awarded fees and costs or an actual award of $50,000 under TILA. 117. As a result of Defendants fraud, Plaintiff was not able to give his Informed

Consent in the AMSCOT lawsuit or settlement. ACAP - Attorney Consumer Assistance Program 118. After Plaintiff found evidence of fraud by Defendants in the AMSCOT lawsuit,

he consulted counsel who in turn referred him to The Florida Bar. On June 12, 2003 Plaintiff spoke with Donald M. Spangler of the Attorney Consumer Assistance Program. (ACAP). Mr. Spangler assigned reference no. 03-18867 to the matter. Upon a review of the facts as Plaintiff described, Mr. Spangler said Plaintiff could make a bar complaint. Mr. Spangler also said Plaintiff could contact Mr. Cook to try and settle the matter. The Florida Bar complaint form specifically states you should attempt to resolve your matter by writing to the subject attorney, before contacting ACAP or filing a complaint. Even if this is unsuccessful, it is important that you do so in order to have documentation of good-faith efforts to resolve your matter. 119. Plaintiff wrote Mr. Cook June 13, 2003 in a good faith effort to resolve the

matter. Plaintiff included a spreadsheet showing how he arrived at the proposed resolution. 120. Mr. Barker responded to Plaintiff by letter of June 19, 2003 on behalf of Mr.

Cook and Defendants. Mr. Barker misquoted Plaintiffs good faith effort to resolve this matter through ACAP and accused Plaintiff of felony extortion. Barker wrote First, you state that if our law firm does not pay you money, then you will file a complaint against Mr. Cook with the Florida Bar and contact our former clients. We consider this threat to

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be extortionate. See 836.05 Fla. Stat. (2000); Carricarte v. State, 384 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 1980); Cooper v. Austin, 750 So.2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Gordon v. Gordon, 625 So.2d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Berger v. Berger, 466 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). COUNT 1 BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 121. 122. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 120. Plaintiff adds this allegation of breach of fiduciary duty in the AMSCOT lawsuit

to the amended complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). 123. 124. At all times pertinent Defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff. An attorney has a personal fiduciary obligation to a client independent of any

employee relationship he may have with his law firm. 125. Defendants actions alleged above constituted a breach of that fiduciary

obligation in that Defendants sought to advance its own interests over the interests of Plaintiff. 126. Plaintiff was damaged in that he did not receive the full value for his claims in the

lawsuit forward by Defendants nor did he receive full value from Defendants services. 127. Defendants actions were the direct cause of Plaintiffs damages. WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment in the amount of his loss of $7,143.68 for beach of fiduciary duty, plus treble punitive damages of $21,431.04, for judgment of $28,574.72 against Defendants, with interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. COUNT 2 - BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-LAW CONTRACT, AMSCOT 128. 129. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 127. At all times pertinent Defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff.

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130.

A representation contract must comply with The Rules Regulating The Florida

Bar. A representation contract that does not comply with The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar is void and unenforceable. 131. Defendants represented Plaintiff in the AMSCOT lawsuit on a contingent fee

basis beginning December 12, 2000. 132. From December 12, 2000 through July 22, 2001, there was no contingent fee

contract whatsoever between Plaintiff and Defendants. 133. Defendants belatedly prepared a written contingent fee agreement in the

AMSCOT lawsuit approximately seven (7) months later on or about July 23, 2001, in violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2). 134. The belatedly prepared written contingent fee agreement in the AMSCOT lawsuit

was not signed by Plaintiff or Defendants in violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2). (Exhibit 5). The agreement remains unsigned today. 135. 136. The Total Recovery in the AMSCOT lawsuit was $56,000. At the time AMSCOT settled there were three plaintiffs. Each plaintiff is entitled

to a one-third share of the $56,000 Total Recovery or $18,666.66 each. 137. Defendants are prohibited from claiming any part of the $56,000 Total Recovery

in the AMSCOT lawsuit as attorneys fees because an unsigned contingent fee agreement is a violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2) and therefore void and unenforceable. 138. 139. Defendants paid Plaintiff $2,000 in the AMSCOT lawsuit. Defendants owe Plaintiff $16,666.66 in the AMSCOT lawsuit. WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment for $16,666.66 against Defendants, together with punitive damages, interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees.

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COUNT 3 - BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT, AMSCOT 140. 141. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 139. Plaintiff alleges an alternative claim for relief under breach of contract in the

AMSCOT lawsuit settlement pursuant to Rule 1.110(g), Fla.R.Civ.P. 142. 143. At all times pertinent Defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff. Defendants represented Plaintiff in the AMSCOT lawsuit on a contingent fee

basis beginning December 12, 2000. 144. From December 12, 2000 through July 22, 2001, there was no contingent fee

contract whatsoever between Plaintiff and Defendants. 145. Defendants belatedly prepared a written contingent fee agreement in the

AMSCOT lawsuit approximately seven (7) months later on or about July 23, 2001, in violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2). 146. The belatedly prepared written contingent fee agreement in the AMSCOT lawsuit

was not signed by any of the parties in violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2). (Exhibit 5). The agreement remains unsigned today. 147. The AMSCOT lawsuit settled on October 30, 2001 for business reasons.

Defendants did not prevail on the merits or appeal in the AMSCOT lawsuit. 148. 149. The Total Recovery in the AMSCOT lawsuit was $56,000. Defendants refused to honor the terms of the contingent fee agreement with

Plaintiff in the settlement of the AMSCOT lawsuit when disbursing his share of the $56,000 Total Recovery. 150. Under the terms of the contingent fee agreement in the AMSCOT lawsuit, and the

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, a lawful accounting is calculated as follows:

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Total Recovery - Costs and Expenses - Lien, Jonathan L. Alpert - 45% Contingent Fee - 2/3 due to the 2 other clients - $2,000 already paid 151.

$56,000 - $3,580.70 - 2,544.70 - $22,443.57 - $18,287.35 - $2,000

$56,000 $52,419.30 $49,874.60 $27,431.03 $9,143.68 $7,143.68

Contrary to law and the contingent fee agreement, Defendants took $50,000 from

the Total Recovery under the guise of court-awarded attorneys fees and costs in the AMSCOT lawsuit. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. Defendants unjust enrichment was $21,431.03 in the AMSCOT lawsuit. Plaintiffs lawful share of the settlement is $9,143.68 in the AMSCOT lawsuit. Defendants paid Plaintiff $2,000.00 in the AMSCOT lawsuit. Defendants owe Plaintiff $7,143.68 in the AMSCOT lawsuit. Defendants actions were the direct cause of the Plaintiffs damages. WHEREFORE plaintiff demands judgment for $7,143.68 against Defendants, together with punitive damages, interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. COUNT 4 - FRAUD, AMSCOT RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT 157. 158. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 156. Plaintiff adds an allegation of Fraud in the Release and Settlement with AMSCOT

to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). 159. Under Florida law, partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible

for the fraud or negligence of another partner when the later acts within the scope of the

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ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965). 160. 161. At all times pertinent Defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff. On October 30, 2001 Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield

and Mr. Clement to sign a Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT Corporation. (AMSCOT agreement). (Exhibit 17). Paragraph 1 is Settlement with Plaintiffs for $2,000 each. Paragraph 2 is Settlement with Firm, the Defendants, and reads: Amscot shall pay the Firm the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars and No/100 ($50,000), in satisfaction of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and costs, as more fully described herein, against Amscot as asserted in the Action. To induce Plaintiff to sign the AMSCOT agreement: a. Defendants represented to Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement that the $50,000 sum was a claim for court-awarded fees and costs. The representation was a false statement concerning a material fact. The TILA claims were dismissed and there was no claim to court-awarded fees and costs. b. Defendants made the statement knowing that the representation was false. Defendants knew the TILA claims were dismissed and there was no claim to courtawarded fees and costs. c. Defendants intended the representation would induce Plaintiff to act upon it and signed the Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT. d. Plaintiff relied upon Defendants falsehood as true and signed the agreement October 30, 2001 in return for payment of $2,000 from AMSCOT. Plaintiff suffered

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financial loss of $7,143.68 by accepting the sum of $2,000 instead of the sum of $9,143.68 to which Plaintiff was entitled under law and the Representation Contract. 162. Defendants actions were the direct cause of the Plaintiffs damages. WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment in the amount of his loss of $7,143.68 for fraud, plus treble punitive damages of $21,431.04, for judgment of $28,574.72 against Defendants, together with interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. COUNT 5 - FRAUD, CLOSING STATEMENT 163. 164. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 162. Under Florida law, partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible

for the fraud or negligence of another partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965). 165. 166. At all times pertinent Defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff. On November 1, 2001, Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff to sign a closing

statement prepared by Defendants in the AMSCOT lawsuit. (Exhibit 18). Defendants also fraudulently induced Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement to sign similar closing statements. To induce Plaintiff to sign the closing statement: a. Defendants represented to Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement that AMSCOT Corporation separately paid my attorneys $50,000.00 to compensate my attorneys for their claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs. The representation was a false statement concerning a material fact. The TILA claims were dismissed and there was no claim to court-awarded fees and costs.

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b. Defendants made the statement knowing that the representation was false. Defendants knew the TILA claims were dismissed and there was no claim to courtawarded fees and costs. c. Defendants intended the representation would induce Plaintiff to act upon it and signed the closing statement made by Defendants in the AMSCOT lawsuit. d. Plaintiff relied upon Defendants falsehood as true and signed the closing statement November 1, 2001 in return for payment of $2,000 from AMSCOT. Plaintiff suffered financial loss of $7,143.68 by accepting the sum of $2,000 instead of the sum of $9,143.68 to which Plaintiff was entitled under law and the Representation Contract. 167. Defendants actions were the direct cause of the Plaintiffs damages. WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment in the amount of his loss of $7,143.68 for fraud, plus treble punitive damages of $21,431.04, for judgment of $28,574.72 against Defendants, together with interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. COUNT 6 - NEGLIGENCE 168. 169. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 167. Plaintiff adds this allegation of negligence in the AMSCOT lawsuit to Plaintiffs

First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). 170. Under Florida law, partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible

for the fraud or negligence of another partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965). 171. Defendants had a duty under law to conform to a certain standard of conduct for

the protection of others, including the Plaintiff.

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172.

As set forth in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Defendants failed to perform

the duty owed Plaintiff. 173. Defendants were the proximate cause of Plaintiffs damages. WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants in the amount of his loss and damages plus punitive damages, together with interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. COUNT 7 - NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 174. 175. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 173. Plaintiff adds this allegation of negligent misrepresentation in the AMSCOT

lawsuit to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). 176. Under Florida law, partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible

for the fraud or negligence of another partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965). 177. Defendants misrepresented to Plaintiff that his damages in the AMSCOT lawsuit

were limited to $1,000 under a fee-shifting provision of the federal Truth In Lending Act (TILA). This was a misrepresentation of a material fact. 178. Defendants either knew of the misrepresentation, made the misrepresentation

without knowledge of its truth or falsity, or should have known the representation was false. 179. Defendants intended to induce Plaintiff to act on the misrepresentation. Plaintiff

lacked Informed Consent, the ability to make an informed choice when he signed the

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Release and Settlement with AMSCOT and Closing Statement because of Defendants deceptions set forth in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. 180. Plaintiff suffered financial loss of $7,143.68 while acting in justifiable reliance

upon the misrepresentation by accepting the sum of $2,000 instead of the sum of $9,143.68 to which Plaintiff was entitled under law and the Representation Contract. WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment in the amount of his loss of $7,143.68 for fraud, plus treble punitive damages of $21,431.04, for judgment of $28,574.72 against Defendants, together with interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. COUNT 8 - UNJUST ENRICHMENT 181. 182. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 180. Plaintiff adds this allegation of unjust enrichment in the AMSCOT lawsuit to

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). 183. Under Florida law, partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible

for the fraud or negligence of another partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965). 184. Plaintiff has conferred a benefit on Defendants, who have knowledge thereof, the

overpayment of $16,666.66 in Count 3, Breach of Implied-In-Law contract. 185. Plaintiff has conferred a benefit on Defendants, who have knowledge thereof, the

overpayment of $7,143.68 in Count 4, Breach of Implied-In-Fact contract. 186. Defendants voluntarily accepted and retained the benefit conferred.

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187.

The circumstances render Defendants retention of the benefit inequitable unless

the Defendant pays to Plaintiff the value of the benefit. 188. 189. Defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff. Plaintiff is entitled to damages as a result of Defendants unjust enrichment,

including the disgorgement of all monies unlawfully accepted by Defendant from Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment for monetary damages against Defendants for unjust enrichment and such other relief this Court deems just and proper, together with punitive damages, interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. COUNT 9 - CIVIL CONSPIRACY 190. 191. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 190. Plaintiff adds this allegation of civil conspiracy in the AMSCOT lawsuit to

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). 192. Named Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook are parties to a civil

conspiracy. 193. Named Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook conspired to do both

lawful and unlawful acts by unlawful means. 194. Named Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook conspired to do the

things complained about in this lawsuit to harm Plaintiff, including Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Breach of Implied-In-Law Contract, Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract, Fraud, Negligence, Negligent Misrepresentation, Unjust Enrichment, Invasion of Privacy and Abuse of Process.

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195.

Named Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook owed a duty to

Plaintiff as his attorneys to protect Plaintiff from harm resulting from Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Breach of Implied-In-Law Contract, Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract, Fraud, Negligence, Negligent Misrepresentation, Unjust Enrichment, Invasion of Privacy, and Abuse of Process. 196. Upon information and belief, Defendants conspired against other clients. An

application submitted by Mr. Rodems showed former clients Rita M. Pesci and Roslyn Vazquez made complaints they were overcharged in contingent fee agreements. 197. Defendants pressure of Plaintiff and offer of incentives to sue AMSCOT was

likely a crime under section 877.01(1), Florida Statutes, Instigation of litigation, and an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff and the other co-plaintiffs. 198. Defendants deceit and conflict of interest created by executing the Class

Representation Contract to sue AMSCOT November 3, 2000, knowing they already formed another law firm and did not plan to honor the contract, was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 199. Defendants refusal to honor the contingent fee agreement in the AMSCOT

lawsuit was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 200. Defendants sticking part argument was an overt act in furtherance of their

conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 201. Defendants false claim to court-awarded fees and costs was an overt act in

furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement.

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202.

Defendants false claim that it incurred $33,000 in costs and expenses was an overt

act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 203. Defendants creation of a deceptive and misleading closing statement, and failure

to itemize costs and expenses of $6,125.46 required by bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 204. Defendants separate negotiation with AMSCOT for its attorneys fees, and

Defendants August 15, 2001 letter to Plaintiff were overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 205. Defendants failure to obey Plaintiffs instructions to settle the AMSCOT case,

and hijack of the case for Defendants own benefit, were overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 206. Defendants false claim that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit awarded them $50,000 in attorneys fees and costs is an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 207. Defendants fraud to induce Plaintiff to sign the AMSCOT agreement was an overt

act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 208. Defendants fraud to induce Plaintiff to sign the closing statement was an overt act

in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. 209. Defendants accusation that Plaintiff committed felony extortion for his good-faith

effort to settle this matter through the Attorney Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP) of The Florida Bar. Mr. Barker accused Plaintiff of criminal extortion for his effort to settle the matter was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff. 210. Defendants conspiracy and their overt acts caused Plaintiff to suffer damages.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment for damages against Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook for civil conspiracy and such other relief this Court deems just and proper together with punitive damages, interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. COUNT 10 - INVASION OF PRIVACY 211. 212. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 210. Plaintiff adds this allegation of invasion of privacy in the AMSCOT lawsuit to

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). 213. Defendants published Plaintiffs privileged medical information during the course

of the AMSCOT lawsuit. Defendants published information about Plaintiffs disability, treatment and rehabilitation. Plaintiffs medical condition was not at issue in the AMSCOT lawsuit. The AMSCOT litigation concerned check cashing, the federal Truth In Lending Act (TILA), Florida state usury law, and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. 214. Defendants published Plaintiffs privileged medical information in response to

AMSCOTs interrogatories to Neil Gillespie. Defendants failed to object to interrogatories about Plaintiffs privileged medical information. 215. Defendants published Plaintiffs privileged medical information during a

deposition with AMSCOT. Plaintiff was deposed May 14, 2001 by John A. Anthony, attorney for AMSCOT Corporation. Approximately twenty pages of the 122 page transcript concerned Plaintiffs disability, treatment and rehabilitation. Defendants failed to object to interrogatories about Plaintiffs privileged medical information. Defendants

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later published the information by ordering and distributing the transcript of the deposition. Defendants allowed co-plaintiff Gay Ann Blomefield to attend Plaintiffs deposition and hear Plaintiffs privileged medical information. 216. Defendants published private facts about Plaintiff that are offensive and are not of

legitimate public concern. Defendants permitted a wrongful intrusion into Plaintiffs private activities, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 217. The Florida Supreme Court has held that public disclosure of private factsthe

dissemination of truthful private information which a reasonable person would find objectionable, is one of four types of wrongful conduct that can be remedied through an action for invasion of privacy. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So.2d 1239, 1252 n. 20 (Fla. 1996). 218. Defendants actions were the direct cause of Plaintiffs damages. WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants for Invasion of Privacy in an amount determined by a jury, together with punitive damages, interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. COUNT 11 - ABUSE OF PROCESS 219 220. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 218. Defendants BRC and Mr. Cook sued Plaintiff January 19, 2006 in a counterclaim

for libel over a July 25, 2005 letter Plaintiff wrote to Ian Mackechnie, President of AMSCOT Corporation. In fact Plaintiffs letter to Mackechnie also included another enclosed letter. The letter to Mackechnie discussed the lawsuit Clement v. Amscot Corporation, Case No. 8:99-ev-2795-T-26C where Defendants represented Plaintiff. The

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second enclosed letter was a copy of Plaintiffs letter to Mr. Cook dated August 16, 2001 written during the course of the AMSCOT lawsuit instructing Mr. Cook to settle the lawsuit. Defendants failed to obey Plaintiffs instruction to settle. The letter (but not enclosure) was attached to Plaintiffs initial complaint as Exhibit 8. The letter and attachment is attached to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint as Exhibit 11. 221. The filing of a counterclaim may constitute issuance of process for the purpose of

an abuse of process action. Peckins v. Kaye, 443 So.2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). 222. On September 7, 2006 attorney David M. Snyder representing Plaintiff notified

Mr. Rodems by letter that Defendant's counterclaim for defamation, while it may have stated a cause of action at the outset, has little chance of ultimate success given the limited distribution and privileged nature of the publication complained of. See e.g. Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984). 223. Upon information and belief, Defendants counterclaim for libel against Plaintiff

is a willful and intentional misuse of process for the collateral purpose of making Plaintiff drop his claims against Defendants and settle this lawsuit on terms dictated by them. Defendants have perverted the process of law for a purpose for which it is not by law intended. Defendants are using their counterclaim as a form of extortion. 234. On at lease six (6) separate occasions Defendants, by and through their counsel

Mr. Rodems, now a Defendant himself, have offered a walk-away settlement: a. September 14, 2006, Mr. Rodems wrote Plaintiffs lawyer Mr. Snyder that We would agree, however, to a walk away. That is, each party dismisses all claims with prejudice, each party to bear his or its own attorneys' fees and costs.

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b. October 5, 2006, Mr. Rodems wrote Plaintiffs lawyer Mr. Snyder and stated: To clarify, our offer to settle is as follows: (1) We will dismiss our claims with prejudice, Gillespie dismisses his with prejudice, and neither side will pay the other any money; and, (2) Gillespie agrees to sign a general release to be prepared by us; and, (3) Gillespie must agree to appear in court to announce the settlement and submit to questioning from me regarding the voluntariness of his settlement; and, (4) Gillespie must agree to hire and pay a court reporter to transcribe the settlement hearing. The offer is open until 5:00 p.m. on Friday, October 6, 2006 and must be accepted in writing received in this office before the deadline by facsimile or hand delivery with your or his signature. c. February 7, 2007 Mr. Rodems contacted Plaintiff directly by letter and wrote (in part): If it is your desire to end this litigation, we are prepared to offer the following settlement terms: We mutually agree to dismiss all claims pending in this action, and to waive any other claims we or you may have, with each party to bear his or its own fees and costs. We will not seek any attorneys' fees or costs from you. A mutual release is enclosed. You are free to consult with an attorney regarding this offer, at your own expense. You are not obligated to accept this offer. d. At various time during 2007 and possibly 2008 Mr. Rodems made similar settlement offers to Plaintiffs former counsel Robert W. Bauer. e. Some time in August or September 2009 Mr. Rodems made a similar settlement offer to attorney Seldon J. Jeff Childers on Plaintiffs behalf. f. January 28, 2010 Mr. Rodems contacted Plaintiff directly by letter with the following offer, a resubmission of a failed email from January 26, 2010:

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However, I would like to once again propose to you an opportunity to settle with Mr. Cook and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. whereby you would pay them no money and they would pay you no money. The offer is as follows: Mr. Cook and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. would dismiss the counterclaims for libel and would issue a satisfaction of judgment for the judgment against you in exchange for your dismissal of your pending claims. 235. In a letter to Plaintiff dated November 19, 2007, Chief Branch Disciplinary

Counsel Susan V. Bloemendaal, The Florida Bar, responded to Plaintiffs allegation that Mr. Rodems improperly filed a counterclaim. Bloemendaal wrote (relevant portion): Concerning you allegation that the claim is frivolous, this is an issue for the trial court in the pending civil case. 236. Defendants actions were the direct cause of Plaintiffs damages. WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants the amount of his loss, his attorneys fees and costs for defending the counterclaim, together with punitive damages, interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. COUNT 12 - Claim for Punitive Damages Pursuant to 768.72 Florida Statutes 237. 238. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 236. Pursuant to section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, Plaintiff amends his complaint to

assert a claim for punitive damages. The rules of civil procedure shall be liberally construed so as to allow the claimant discovery of evidence which appears reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence on the issue of punitive damages.

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239.

Pursuant to section 768.72(2) Florida Statutes, Plaintiff asserts a claim for

punitive damages because Defendants were personally guilty of fraud, intentional misconduct or gross negligence. 240. Pursuant to section 768.72(3) Florida Statutes, Plaintiff asserts a claim for

punitive damages against Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA for the conduct of Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook and states their conduct meets the criteria specified in subsection (2) and the corporation actively and knowingly participated in such conduct; The officers, directors, or managers of the corporation knowingly condoned, ratified, or consented to such conduct; and the corporation engaged in conduct that constituted gross negligence and that contributed to the loss, damages, or injury suffered by the Plaintiff. WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands final judgment on all counts for compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, together with interest, costs, expenses, and attorney's fees, and other remedy the Court deems just and proper.
Demand for Trial by Jury

Pursuant to Rule 1.430(b) of the Fla. R. Civ. P., plaintiff demands trial by jury. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th da~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished by hand to Ryan C. Rodems, attorney for Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 400 North Ashley ive, \ Suite 2100, Tampa, Florida 33602, this 5th day of May

Page - 52

Table of Contents
Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6 Exhibit 7 Exhibit 8 Exhibit 9 Exhibit 10 Exhibit 11 Exhibit 12 Exhibit 13 Exhibit 14 Exhibit 15 Exhibit 16 Exhibit 17 Exhibit 18 Exhibit 19 Exhibit 20 Exhibit 21 Exhibit 22 Class Representation Contract, ACE (Alpert firm) March 21, 2000 Class Representation Contract, AMSCOT (Alpert firm) November 6, 2000 Letter of William J. Cook to Neil Gillespie, December 6, 2000, new firm formed Letter of William J. Cook to Neil Gillespie, July 23, 2001, new fee contracts New fee contract, AMSCOT (BRC), not signed, never executed New fee contract, ACE (BRC), not signed, never executed Order in ACE, TILA claims & case dismissed, US Dist. Judge Moody, Dec-21-2000 Order in AMSCOT, TILA claims & case dismissed, US Dist. Judge Lazzara, Aug-01-2001 Letter of William Cook to Neil Gillespie, August 15, 2001, rejects contingent fee agreement Letter of Neil Gillespie to William J. Cook, August 16, 2001, instructions to settle AMSCOT Letter of Neil Gillespie to Ian Mackechnie, President, AMSCOT, July 25, 2005 Letter of John A. Anthony to Neil Gillespie, August 26, 2005, BRC did not obey instructions Memorandum of William J. Cook, August 20, 2001, $50K improper payoff attempt etc. Letter of William J. Cook to John Anthony, demands $1K for clients, $50K for BRC US Court of Appeals, 11th Cir., Joint Stipulation for Dismissal AMSCOT, Nov-11-2001 US Court of Appeals, 11th Cir., Order, parties bear own fees & costs, AMSCOT, Dec-07-01 Release and Settlement Agreement, AMSCOT, October 30, 2001 Closing Statement, AMSCOT, November 1, 2001 without itemized expenses Stipulation Of The Parties, ACE, June 12, 2002 Closing Statement, ACE, June 24, 2002 with itemized expenses Florida AG and ACE Settlement Agreement December 30, 2002 Letter from William J. Cook, May 9, 2003, itemized expenses in AMSCOT

CLASS REPRESENTATION CONTRACT

I. PURPOSE
IIWe, do hereby retain and employ the law firm of Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Fe rentino & qok, ~., to investigate my potential claim resulting from Mr., "" .so.~ vJ,' /~ C. E ~ A foI\t ri' '''' s'" ' and, if advisable, to pursue necessary litigation on my behalf.
!

~~l ~ (r,' (les f. }{

<<<

IIWe understand that I/we may be one of several plaintiff(s) or part of a class of plaintiff(s) represented by Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A II. COSTS AND EXPENSES IIWe hereby agree to pay for the costs and expenses of the investigation and preparation of my/our claims for damages. Should it be necessary to institute a lawsuit or arbitration proceeding, IIwe agree to pay all costs and expenses associated with any Court or arbitration proceeding. If an appeal of any decision is filed, regardless of the person or party filing such appeal, I agree to pay the costs and expenses associated with initiating or responding to such appeal. IIWe authorize Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A, to advance and pay any costs and expenses it deems appropriate to the handling of my case. IIWe will pay Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A, for the costs and expenses advanced out of the portion of any recovery remaining after attorneys' fees have been subtracted. IIWe will then receive the portion of what remains, which is known as the "net recovery". Thus, the "total recovery" (all monies received or collected, including attorneys' fees, if awarded) less Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A's attorneys' fees and any costs and expenses will equal the "net recovery". IIWe understand that my/our portion of the "net recovery" will be a prorated or per person share which will be proportional to that of all other class members. The amount of money I/we receive will be determined by dividing the "net recovery" (the amount of any recovery remaining after attorneys' fees and expenses have been subtracted) by the number of class members who are determined eligible to receive proceeds from any judgment or settlement. IIWe understand that the Court or other tribunal may approve a different ratio or formula depending upon the circumstances. If there is no recovery. or if the total recovery is not adequate to pay for all of the costs and expenses advanced, I/we understand that Alpert. Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook. P.A. will not seek payment from me for any expenses.

If I/we terminate this contract, then Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A, may seek payment from me/us for any costs and expenses allowed by law.

III. ATTORNEYS' FEES

In almost all cases in America, each party to a lawsuit or arbitration proceeding pays its own attorneys' fees. In rare cases, the Defendant(s) may pay all or part of the attorneys' fees or the Court or arbitration panel may award attorneys' fees based upon a statute or otherwise. l!We agree to pay Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A, an attorneys' fee if it is successful in obtaining any monies or other benefit on my behalf. I!We understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A, will receive the attorneys' fees awarded by a Court or arbitration panel or will receive the applicable percentage of the "total recovery" (all monies received from the Defendant(s) including, but not limited to, money for actual damages, punitive damages, interest, penalties, attorneys' fees and expenses), whichever is higher. The applicable percentages shall be as follows:

33.334% of the "total recovery" prior to the time that an answer

is filed or a demand for appointment of arbitrator(s) is made;
thereafter,
40% of the "total recovery" from the time of the filing of an
answer orthe demand for appointment of arbitrator(s), through
the entry of a judgment;
An additional 5% of the "total recovery" after a Notice of
Appeal is filed by any person or party or if post-judgment relief
or action is required for recovery on the judgment.

B.

C.

In the event that my/our claim is settled on terms of an agreement calling for payment in installments, whether monthly, annually or otherwise, in the future, my/our attorneys' contingent fee percentage shall be calculated on the costs of any structured settlement or, if the cost is unknown, on the present money value of the structured settlement. If both the damages and the attorneys' fees are to be paid out in future installments, this limitation shall not apply. l!We understand that if there is no recovery. "we will not be indebted to Alpert, Barker. Rodems. Ferrentino & Cook. P.A. for any attorneys' fees.

If I/we terminate this contract, then Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino&Cook, P.A., may seek payment from me/us for any attorneys' fees allowed by law. IV. ALPERT, BARKER, RODEMS, FERRENTINO & COOK, P.A. MAY WORK WITH OTHER LAWYERS ON MY CASE l!We understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., in its discretion, may work with other lawyers on my/our case if deemed necessary. If Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., agrees to work with other lawyers on my/our case, I/we understand that the attorneys' fees I/we will have to pay will not increase. Other law firms or lawyers hired by Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., will be paid out of the attorneys' fees agreed to in this contract and, if I/we so desire, I/we will be advised regarding how the attorneys' fees are divided. V. WHAT THIS CONTRACT COVERS

A.

Scope of Representation

At the time of signing this contract, I/we also signed a Statement of Client's Rights as well as an Acknowledgment regarding investigation of my claim. These three documents encompass the entire agreement between me/us and Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. These signed agreements take the place of any prior, oral or written agreements and may only be changed or modified by a separate, written agreement signed and dated by me/us and Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. This contract is to be interpreted in accordance with Florida law. l!We understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., has no duty to re~resent me/us in any matters other than my/our potential claim resulting from E a "'~ Me.r ~CQ.$ ' " ~r", r.>.s~d'il>t'S .

Ac

l!We understand that if Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., determines, at some later date, that my claim should not or cannot be reasonably prosecuted by the Firm, the Firm may notify me in writing of this decision and withdraw as my attorneys. Under such circumstances, I shall be responsible to Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., only for any fees and costs permitted by law.

B.

Documents and Information

I/we authorize the lawyers to utilize my/our documents and/or information in any regulatory, enforcement, or other proceedings of any kind as may be necessary in the lawyers' sole discretion.
APPROVAL OF THIS CONTRACT
The undersigned client(s) has/have, before signing this contract, received and read the Statement of Client's Rights and understands each of the rights set forth therein. The undersigned c1ient(s) has/have signed the Statement and received a signed copy to refer to while being represented by the undersigned attorneys. This contract may be cancelled by written notification to the attorneys at any time within three (3) business days of the date the contract was signed, as shown below, and if cancelled the c1ient(s) shall not be obligated to pay any fees to the attorneys for the work performed during that time. If the attorneys have advanced funds to others in representation of the client(s), the attorneys are entitled to be reimbursed for such amounts as the attorneys have reasonably advanced on behalf of the c1ient(s). l!We have read this contract and any documents specifically referenced herein, and agree to all terms referenced within such documents. DATED:

,A;y. c~

2 II 2.,,0 0

DATED:

,/1/htd? l I 2~ocJ

_~~-=--....::::..~~..::....:..~

of

Alpert, Barker odems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. Post Office Box 3270 Tampa, Florida 33601-3270

813/223-4131

Client

CLASS REPRESENTATION CONTRACT

I. PURPOSE

INVe, do hereby retain and employ the law firm of Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentin & Cook, N ':>t'\.(., t,OAJ> \IV: ~ P.A., to investigate my potential claim resulting from Mi t\j~ s(.O\ and. if advisable, to pursue necessary litigation on my behalf.

Ud

(;{le5f:' ~

+r.,

INVe understand that I/we may be one of several plaintiff(s) or part of a class of plaintiff(s) represented by Alpert, Barker. Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.

II. COSTS AND EXPENSES

INVe hereby agree to pay for the costs and expenses of the investigation and preparation of my/our claims for damages. Should it be necessary to institute a lawsuit or arbitration proceeding, I/we agree to pay all costs and expenses associated with any Court or arbitration proceeding. If an appeal of any decision is filed, regardless of the person or party filing such appeal, I agree to pay the costs and expenses associated with initiating or responding to such appeal. INVe authorize Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., to advance and pay any costs and expenses it deems appropriate to the handling of my case. INVe will pay Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., for the costs and expenses advanced out of the portion of any recovery remaining after attorneys' fees have been subtracted. INVe will then receive the portion of what remains, which is known as the "net recovery". Thus, the "total recovery" (ill! monies received or collected, including attorneys' fees, if awarded) less Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.'s attorneys' fees and any costs and expenses will equal the "net recovery". INVe understand that my/our portion of the "net recovery" will be a prorated or per person share which will be proportional to that of all other class members. The amount of money I/we receive will be determined by dividing the "net recovery" (the amount of any recovery remaining after attorneys' fees and expenses have been subtracted) by the number of class members who are determined eligible to receive proceeds from any judgment or settlement. INVe understand that the Court or other tribunal may approve a different ratio or formula depending upon the circumstances. If there is no recovery, or if the total recovery is not adequate to pay for all of the costs and expenses advanced, I/we understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., will not seek payment from me for any expenses. If IIwe terminate this contract, then Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., may seek payment from me/us for any costs and expenses allowed by law.

III. ATTORNEYS' FEES In almost all cases in America, each party to a lawsuit or arbitration proceeding pays its own attorneys' fees. In rare cases, the Defendant(s) may pay all or part of the attorneys' fees or the Court or arbitration panel may award attorneys' fees based upon a statute or otherwise.
l!We agree to pay Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., an attorneys' fee if it is successful in obtaining any monies or other benefit on my behalf. I!We understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., will receive the attorneys' fees awarded by a Court or arbitration panel or will receive the applicable percentage of the "total recovery" (~monies received from the Defendant(s) including, but not limited to, money for actual damages, punitive damages, interest, penalties, attorneys' fees and expenses), whichever is higher. The applicable percentages shall be as follows:

A.

33.334% of the "total recovery" prior to the time that an answer

is filed or a demand for appointment of arbitrator(s) is made;
thereafter,
40% of the "total recovery" from the time of the filing of an
answer or the demand for appointment of arbitrator(s), th roug h
the entry of a judgment;
An additional 5% of the "total recovery" after a Notice of
Appeal is filed by any person or party or if post-judgment relief
or action is required for recovery on the judgment.

B.

c.

In the event that my/our claim is settled on terms of an agreement calling for payment in installments, whether monthly, annually or otherwise, in the future, my/our attorneys' contingent fee percentage shall be calculated on the costs of any structured settlement or, if the cost is unknown, on the present money value of the structured settlement. If both the damages and the attorneys' fees are to be paid out in future installments, this limitation shall not apply. l!We understand that if there is no recovery, I/we will not be indebted to Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., for any attorneys' fees. If I/we terminate this contract, then Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., may seek payment from me/us for any attorneys' fees allowed by law.

IV. ALPERT, BARKER, RODEMS, FERRENTINO & COOK, P.A. MAY WORK WITH OTHER LAWYERS ON MY CASE l!We understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., in its discretion, may work with other lawyers on my/our case if deemed necessary. If Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., agrees to work with other lawyers on my/our case, I/we understand that the attorneys' fees I/we will have to pay will not increase. Other law firms or lawyers hired by Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., will be paid out of the attorneys' fees agreed to in this contract and, if I/we so desire, I/we will be advised regarding how the attorneys' fees are divided. V. WHAT THIS CONTRACT COVERS

A.

Scope of Representation

At the time of signing this contract, I/we also signed a Statement of Client's Rights as well as an Acknowledgment regarding investigation of my claim. These three documents encompass the entire agreement between me/us and Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. These signed agreements take the place of any prior, oral or written agreements and may only be changed or modified by a separate, written agreement signed and dated by me/us and Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. This contract is to be interpreted in accordance with Florida law. l!We understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., has no duty to represent me/us in ?ny matters 0 her than my/our potential claim resulting from _ _ t"\ -t r C' fi Xl ~ '-, '~lIV \ {l, M S{ 0 . l!We understand that if Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., determines, at some later date, that my claim should not or cannot be reasonably prosecuted by the Firm, the Firm may notify me in writing of this decision and withdraw as my attorneys. Under such circumstances, I shall be responsible to Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., only for any fees and costs permitted by law.

B.

Documents and Information

I/we authorize the lawyers to utilize my/our documents and/or information in any regulatory, enforcement, or other proceedings of any kind as may be necessary in the lawyers' sole discretion.

APPROVAL OF THIS CONTRACT The undersigned c1ient(s) has/have, before signing this contract, received and read the Statement of Client's Rights and understands each of the rights set forth therein. The undersigned client(s) has/have signed the Statement and received a signed copy to refer to while being represented by the undersigned attorneys. This contract may be cancelled by written notification to the attorneys at any time within three (3) business days of the date the contract was signed, as shown below, and if cancelled the client(s) shall not be obligated to pay any fees to the attorneys for the work performed during that time. If the attorneys have advanced funds to others in representation of the client(s), the attorneys are entitled to be reimbursed for such amounts as the attorneys have reasonably advanced on behalf of the c1ient(s). l!We have read this contract and any documents specifically referenced herein, and agree to all terms referenced within such documents. DATED:

I_l_-_~_~_'_2_Cl_~_U_"_ _

Alpert, Bar r, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. Post Office Box 3270 Tampa, Florida 33601-3270 813/223-4131

~"--'----h,L--------- of

Client

ALPERT, BARKER, RODEMS, FERRE~TINO & COOK

PROFESSIO:>:AL ASSOCI' 1'10:>: .HTOR:>:nS AT l'"
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100 SOL HI \SlIl.Y DRI' . Slll !OOO T."IP\. F1.0RIO, JJbO!

.\t..\ILl:-.l(; :a.':>:J.~~3j

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December 6, 2000

Neil J. Gillespie Apartment C-2 1121 Beach Drive NE St. Petersburg, Florida 33701-1434 Re:

Gillespie v. ACE America's Cash Express. Inc.

U.S.D.C., Middle District, Florida, Case NO.8 :OOCY-723- T-23B
Our File No. 00.4813

Dear Neil: I, along with my partners, Chris Barker and Chris Rodems, are pleased to announce the formation of our own law firm. I will be happy to take your case with me if you would like; however, you have the option of deciding whether you wish to remain with our current firm or whether yOLi wish to retain new attorneys to handle your case. Should you wish for me to take your file, please execute the attached Client Consent f0l11l and return it to me as soon as possible. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter and I look forward to hearing from you soon. Sincerely,

t vv 0f7
William J. Cook

/ , Il 1Iz/~

4; /

WJC/mss
Enclosures


BARKER, RODEMS
CHRIS A. BARKER RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS WILLIAM J. COOK

& COOK
Telephone 813/489-1001 Facsimile 813/489.1008

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIAnON
ATIORNEYS AT LAW

300 West Platt Street, Suite 150

Tampa, Florida 33606

July 23,2001

Neil 1. Gillespie Apartment C-2 1121 Beach Drive NE St. Petersburg, Florida 33701-1434

Re:

Eugene R. Clement, et at. v. AMSCOT Corporation

99.2795-Civ-T-26C
Case No. Our File No. 99-4766
Eugene R. Clement v. ACE Cash Express, Inc.
Circuit Court, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit
Consolidated Case No. 99-9730; Division J
Our File No.: 99.4764

Re:

Dear Neil: I am enclosing new attorneys' fees contracts for each of the two cases in which we are representing you. The agreements are simply a formality to confirm that you have a contractual agreement with our new law firm. Please review the agreements carefully and if they meet with your approval, please sign them and return them to me. Thank you for your attention to this. Sincerely,

William 1. Cook WJC/so Enclosures

CLASS REPRESENTATION CONTRACT

I. PURPOSE

I/We, Neil Gillespie ,do hereby retain and employ the law firm of Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., to investigate my potential claim resulting from my payday loans with AMSCOT Corporation and, if advisable, to pursue necessary litigation on my behalf.
I/We understand that I/we may be one of several plaintiff(s) or part of a class of plaintiff(s) represented by Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.

II. COSTS AN 0 EXPENSES

I/We hereby agree to pay for the costs and expenses of the investigation and preparation of my/our claims for damages. Should it be necessary to institute a lawsuit or arbitration proceeding, I/we agree to pay all costs and expenses associated with any Court or arbitration proceeding. If an appeal of any decision is filed, regardless of the person or party filing such appeal, I agree to pay the costs and expenses associated with initiating or responding to such appeal.
I/We authorize Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., to advance and pay any costs and expenses it deems appropriate to the handling of my case. I/We will pay Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., for the costs and expenses advanced out of the portion of any recovery remaining after attorneys' fees have been subtracted. I/We will then receive the portion of what remains, which is known as the "net recovery". Thus, the "total recovery" (all monies received or collected, including attorneys' fees, if awarded) less Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.'s attorneys' fees and any costs and expenses will equal the "net recovery".

IiVVe understand that my/our portion of the ';net recovery" wiii be a prorated or per person share which will be proportional to that of all other class members. The amount of money I/we receive will be determined by dividing the "net recovery" (the amount of any recovery remaining after attorneys' fees and expenses have been subtracted) by the number of class members who are determined eligible to receive proceeds from any judgment or settlement. I/We understand that the Court or other tribunal may approve a different ratio or formula depending upon the circumstances. If there is no recovery. or if the total recovery is not adequate to pay for all of the costs and expenses advanced, l/we understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., will not seek payment from me for any expenses.

If I/we terminate this contract, then Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, may seek payment from me/us for any costs and expenses allowed by law. III. ATTORNEYS' FEES In almost all cases in America, each party to a lawsuit or arbitration proceeding pays its own attorneys' fees. In rare cases, the Defendant(s) may pay all or part of the attorneys' fees or the Court or arbitration panel may award attorneys' fees based upon a statute or otherwise. l!We agree to pay Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, an attorneys' fee if it is successful in obtaining any monies or other benefit on my behalf. !/\fIJe understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, will receive the attorneys' fees awarded by a Court or arbitration panel or will receive the applicable percentage of the "total recovery" (.1l monies received from the Defendant(s) including, but not limited to, money for actual damages, punitive damages, interest, penalties, attorneys' fees and expenses), whichever is higher. The applicable percentages shall be as follows:

33.334% of the "total recovery" prior to the time that an answer is filed or a demand for appointment of arbitrator(s) is made; thereafter, 40% of the "total recovery" from the time of the filing of an
answer or the demand for appointment of arbitrator(s), through
the entry of a judgment;
An additional 5% of the "total recovery" after a Notice of Appeal is filed by any person or party or if post-judgment relief or action is required for recovery on the judgment.

B.

C.

In the event that my/our claim is settled on terms of an agreement calling for payment in instaliments, whether monthiy, annualiy or otherwise, in the future, my/our attorneys' contingent fee percentage shall be calculated on the costs of any structured settlement or, if the cost is unknown, on the present money value of the structured settlement. If both the damages and the attorneys' fees are to be paid out in future installments, this limitation shall not apply. l!We understand that if there is no recovery, I/we will not be indebted to Barker. Rodems & Cook. P.A. for any attorneys' fees.

If I/we terminate this contract, then Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, may seek payment from me/us for any attorneys' fees allowed by law. IV. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. MAY WORK WITH OTHER LAWYERS ON MY CASE ItWe understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, in its discretion, may work with other lawyers on my/our case if deemed necessary. If Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, agrees to work with other lawyers on my/our case, I/we understand that the attorneys' fees I/we will have to pay will not increase. Other law firms or lawyers hired by Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, will be paid out of the attorneys' fees agreed to in this contract and, if I/we so desire, I/we will be advised regarding how the attorneys' fees are divided. V. WHAT THIS CONTRACT COVERS

A.

Scope of Representation

At the time of signing this contract, I/we also signed a Statement of Client's Rights as well as an Acknowledgment regarding investigation of my claim. These three documents encompass the entire agreement between me/us and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A These signed agreements take the place of any prior, oral or written agreements and may only be changed or modified by a separate, written agreement signed and dated by me/us and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A This contract is to be interpreted in accordance with Florida law.

I/We understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, has no duty to represent me/us in any matters other than my/our potential claim resulting from my payday loans with AMSCOT Corporation
ItWe understand that if Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, determines, at some later date, that my claim should not or cannot be reasonably prosecuted by the Firm, the Firm may notify me in writing of this decision and withdraw as my attorneys. Under such circumstances, I shall be responsible to Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, only for any fees and costs permitted by law.

B.

Documents and Information

I/we authorize the lawyers to utilize my/our documents and/or information in any regulatory, enforcement, or other proceedings of any kind as may be necessary in the lawyers' sole discretion.
3

APPROVAL OF THIS CONTRACT

The undersigned client(s) has/have, before signing this contract, received and read the Statement of Client's Rights and understands each of the rights set forth therein. The undersigned client(s) has/have signed the Statement and received a signed copy to refer to while being represented by the undersigned attorneys.

This contract may be cancelled by written notification to the attorneys at any time within three (3) business days of the date the contract was signed, as shown below, and if cancelled the client(s) shall not be obligated to pay any fees to the attorneys for the work performed during that time. If the attorneys have advanced funds to others in representation of the cl ient(s), the attorneys are entitled to be reimbursed for such amounts as the attorneys have reasonably advanced on behalf of the client(s). IlWe have read this contract and any documents specifically referenced herein, and agree to all terms referenced within such documents. DATED: _ DATED: _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ of Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 300 West Platt Street, Suite 150 Tampa, Florida 33606 813/489-1001

Client

Client

CLASS REPRESENTATION CONTRACT I. PURPOSE

I/We, Neil Gillespie ,do hereby retain and employ the law firm of Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, to investigate my potential claim resulting from my payday loans and, if advisable, to pursue necessary litigation on my with ACE Cash Express, Inc. behalf. I/We understand that I/we may be one of several plaintiff(s) or part of a class of plaintiff(s) represented by Bark(~r, Rodems & Cook, P.A
II. COSTS AND EXPENSES

I/We hereby agree to pay for the costs and expenses of the investigation and preparation of my/our claims for damages. Should it be necessary to institute a lawsuit or arbitration proceeding, I/we agree to pay all costs and expenses associated with any Court or arbitration proceeding. If an appeal of any decision is filed, regardless of the person or party filing such appeal, I agree to pay the costs and expenses associated with initiating or responding to such appeal. I/We authorize Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, to advance and pay any costs and expenses it deems appropriate to the handling of my case. I/We will pay Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, for the costs and expenses advanced out of the portion of any recovery remaining after attorneys' fees have been subtracted. I/We will then receive the portion of what remains, which is known as the "net recovery". Thus, the "total recovery" (.l1 monies received or collected, including attorneys' fees, if awarded) less Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A's attorneys' fees and any costs and expenses will equal the "net recovery".

I/We understand that my/our portion of the "net recovery" wi!! be a prorated or per person share which will be proportional to that of all other class members. The amount of money I/we receive will be determined by dividing the "net recovery" (the amount of any recovery remaining after attorneys' fees and expenses have been subtracted) by the number of class members who are determined eligible to receive proceeds from any judgment or settlement. I/We understand that the Court or other tribunal may approve a different ratio or formula depending upon the circumstances.
If there is no recovery, or if the total recovery is not adequate to pay for all of the costs and expenses advanced, IIwe understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, will not seek payment from me for any expenses.


III. ATTORNEYS' FEES

If I/we terminate this contract, then Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., may seek payment from me/us for any costs and expenses allowed by law.

In almost all cases in America, each party to a lawsuit or arbitration proceeding pays its own attorneys' fees. In rare cases, the Defendant(s) may pay all or part of the attorneys' fees or the Court or arbitration panel may award attorneys' fees based upon a statute or otherwise. I/We agree to pay Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., an attorneys' fee if it is successful in obtaining any monies or other benefit on my behalf. I/We understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., will receive the attorneys' fees awarded by a Court or arbitration panel or will receive the applicable percentage of the "total recovery" (.9.11 monies received from the Defendant(s) including, but not limited to, money for actual damages, punitive damages, interest, penalties, attorneys' fees and expenses), whichever is higher. The applicable percentages shall be as follows: A. 33.334% of the "total recovery" prior to the time that an answer
is filed or a demand for appointment of arbitrator(s) is made;
thereafter,
40% of the "total recovery" from the time of the filing of an
answer or the demand for appointment of arbitrator(s), through
the entry of a judgment;
An additional 5% of the "total recovery" after a Notice of Appeal is filed by any person or party or if post-judgment relief or action is required for recovery on the judgment.

B.

C.

In the event that my/our claim is settled on terms of an agreement calling for payment in installments, whether monthly, annually or otherwisd, in the future, my/our attorneys' contingent fee percentage shall be calculated on the costs of any structured settlement or, if the cost is unknown, on the present money value of the structured settlement. If both the damages and the attorneys' fees are to be paid out in future installments, this limitation shall not apply. I/We understand that if there is no recovery, l/we will not be indebted to Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., for any attorneys' fees.

If I/we terminate this contract, then Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., may seek payment from me/us for any attorneys' fees allowed by law. IV. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. MAY WORK WITH OTHER LAWYERS ON MY CASE I/We understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., in its discretion, may work with other lawyers on my/our case if deemed necessary. If Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., agrees to work with other lawyers on my/our case, "we understand that the attorneys' fees "we will have to pay will not increase. Other law firms or lawyers hired by Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., will be paid out of the attorneys' fees agreed to in this contract and, if "we so desire, I/we will be advised regarding how the attorneys' fees are divided. V. WHAT THIS CONTRACT COVERS

A.

Scope of Representation

At the time of signing this contract, "we also signed a Statement of Client's Rights as well as an Acknowledgment regarding investigation of my claim. These three documents encompass the entire agreement between me/us and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. These signed agreements take the place of any prior, oral or written agreements and may only be changed or modified by a separate, written agreement signed and dated by me/us and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. This contract is to be interpreted in accordance with Florida law. I/We understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., has no duty to represent me/us in any matters other than my/our potential claim resulting from my payday loans with ACE Cash Express, Inc.

I/We understand that if Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., determines, at some later date, that my claim should not or cannot be reasonably prosecuted by the Firm, the Firm may notify me in writing of this decision and withdraw as my attorneys. Under such circumstances, I shall be responsible to Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., only for any fees and costs permitted by law. B. Documents and Information

I/we authorize the lawyers to utilize my/our documents and/or information in any regulatory, enforcement, or other proceedings of any kind as may be necessary in the lawyers' sole discretion.
3

APPROVAL OF THIS CONTRACT

The undersigned client(s) has/have, before signing this contract, received and read the Statement of Client's Rights and understands each of the rights set forth therein. The undersigned client(s) has/have signed the Statement and received a signed copy to refer to while being represented by the undersigned attorneys. This contract may be cancelled by written notification to the attorneys at any time within three (3) business days of the date the contract was signed, as shown below, and if cancelled the client(s) shall not be obligated to pay any fees to the attorneys for the work performed during that time. If the attorneys have advanced funds to others in representation of the cI ient( s), the attorneys are entitled to be reimbursed for such amounts as the attorneys have reasonably advanced on behalf of the client(s). I/We have read this contract and any documents specifically referenced herein, and agree to all terms referenced within such documents. DATED: _ DATED: _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ of Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 300 West Platt Street, Suite 150 Tampa, Florida 33606 813/489-1001 Client

Client

Case 8:00-cv-00723-JSM

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
EUGENE R. CLEMENT, GAY ANN BLOMEFIELD, and NEIL GILLESPIE, individually and on behalf ofothers similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

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v.
AMSCOT CORPORATION,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--'1

CASE NO: 8:99-cv-279~r-26iAJ c"

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Defendant.

ORDER Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and supporting memorandum (Dkts. 89 and 92), Amscot's Response in Opposition (Dkt. 101), Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority (Dkt. 93). Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum (Dkt. 114), and all depositions, exhibits, declarations, affidavits, and materials on file. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that the motion should be denied as moot and this case should be dismissed.

This Lawsuit
Defendant Amscot Corporation is a Florida corporation doing business in Hillsborough County, Florida. Defendant operates a check cashing business licensed under Chapter 560 of the Florida Statutes. (Dkt. 14 at pg. 2).

PlaintiffEugene R. Clement is a resident of Hillsborough County, Florida, and was a customer ofDefendant at a Tampa branch. (Dkt. 14 at pgs. 1 and 4). In December 1997, Mr. Clement filled out an application which provided in part in upper case letters: "Chapter 832, Florida Statutes, makes it a crime for any person to knowingly issue a bad check." (Dkt. 14 at pg. 4 and Exh. A). Mr. Clement periodically engaged in "deferred deposit" transactions by providing Defendant one or more non-postdated checks or postdated checks in return for cash. (Dkt. 14 at pg. 4). Mr. Clement also engaged in rollover transactions with Defendant. (Dkt. 14 at pg. 5). Rollover transactions occur approximately two weeks after the initial transaction when persons may pay an additional

10% of the face amount of the check to extend the "deferral period" another two weeks.
(Dkt. 14 at pg. 5). PlaintiffGay Ann Blomefield is a resident of Hillsborough County, Florida, and was a customer of Defendant at a Tampa branch. She periodically engaged in "deferred deposit" transactions by providing Defendant one or more non-postdated or postdated checks in return for cash. (Dkt. 86 at pg. 4). Ms. Blomefield also engaged in rollover transactions with Defendant. (Dkt. 86 at pg. 4). She engaged in a series ofvarious transactions with Defendant for approximately two years before this lawsuit was filed. (Dkt. 86 at pg. 4). Neil Gillespie is a resident of Pinellas County, Florida, and was a customer of Defendant at a St. Petersburg branch. (Dkt. 86 at pg. 5). Mr. Gillespie periodically engaged in "deferred deposit" transactions by providing Defendant one or more non

postdated checks. (Okt. 86 at pg. 5). He engaged in deferred deposit transactions on at least eleven occasions ending in November of 1999. (Okt. 86 at pg. 5). In two complaints the Plaintiffs and Intervenor Plaintiffs sued Defendant for various violations focusing on its failure to disclose certain infonnation in the transactions and its charging usurious interest. Count I seeks reliefunder the Truth-inLending Act (the TILA). Counts II and III assert state law claims for usury and violations ofFlorida's Deceptive and UnfairTrade Practices Act (FDUTPA), respectively.

Procedural Background
On September 8, 2000, this Court denied the motion to dismiss the First Amended

Class Action Complaint, ruling at that time that sufficient facts were alleged to avoid dismissal of the suit. (Okt.45V Neither party directed this Court's attention to 65 Fed. Reg. 17129, in which the Board ofGovemors ofthe Federal Reserve System (Board) published revisions to the official staff commentary to Regulation Z promulgated pursuant to the TILA. The revisions, dated March 31, 2000, addressed short-tenn cash advances known as "payday loans." After considering the arguments made and all the authorities now before it, the Court finds that count I fails to allege a claim for relief

On March 20, 2001, this Court permitted intervention of Plaintiffs Gay Ann Blomefield and Neil Gillespie and denied class certification without prejudice. (Dkt. 85). On March 23,2001, Plaintiffs' counsel filed the Class Action Complaint-in Intervention. (Dkt. 86).

under the TILA.2 Moreover, any attempt at stating a claim under the TILA would be futile. Having reached this conclusion, the motion for class certification is now moot.

Count I: Truth-in-Lending Violations

The Board's RQle
Congress delegated expansive authority to the Board to promulgate regulations to carry out the purpose ofthe TILA.
~ 15 U.S.C.A.

1604(a}; Ford Motor Credit Co. v.

Milhollin.444 U.S. 555, 560, 566 (1980). One ofthe purposes ofthe TILA is "to assure a meaningful disclosure ofcredit tenns so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit tenns available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit." See 15 U.S.C.A. 1604(a). The Board created Regulation Z as a regulation necessary to effectuate the purposes ofthe TILA. See 12 C.F.R. 226 (a) ("This regulation, known as Regulation Z, is issued by [the Board] to implement the [TILA], which is contained in Title I ofthe Consumer Credit Protection Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.}."). Apart from the promulgation of regulations to implement the TILA, the Board may also rely on its staffto issue administrative interpretations in the form ofan official staff commentary. See IS U.S.C.A. 1640(f). As stated by the Board in its March 31, 2000, issuance of a fmal rule addressing payday loans:

As to the remaining two state-law claims for usury and violations ofFlorida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), the Court finds it inappropriate to exercise its pendent jurisdiction.
2

The Board's official stafIcommentary (12 C.F.R. part 226 (Supp. I interprets [Regulation Z], and provides guidance to creditors in applying the regulation to specific transactions. The commentary is a substitute for individual staff interpretations; it is updated periodically to address significant questions. Congress has bestowed such great authoritative weight to the interpretations and applications by the staff ofthe Board, that "it is unrealistic to draw a radical distinction between opinions issued under the imprimatur ofthe Board and those submitted as official staff memoranda." See Ford Motor. 444 U.S. at 566 n.9.

The Court's Role

"[T]he legislative history evinces a decided preference for resolving interpretive issues by unifonn administrative decision, rather than piecemeal through litigation." Ford Motor, 455 U.S. at 568. Thus, courts should not substitute their interpretations of the TILA for that of the Board, "so long as the latter's lawmaking is not irrational."
~

Ford Motor, 455 U.S. at 568. Where the Board and its staffhave effectively clarified an area ofthe law, the courts must accept those opinions construing the TILA and the regulations and consider them dispositive absent "some obvious repugnance to the statute." See Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia. 452 U.S. 205,219 (1981) (citing Ford Motor). Apart from detennining whether the commentary is repugnant to the statute, however, the court's more difficult role, at least in this case, is deciding whether the commentary should be applied retroactively to transactions occurring before the effective date of the commentary. See, ~ McPhillips v. Gold Key Lease. Inc. 38 F.Supp.2d 975

(M.D.Ala. 1999); Wiley v. Earl's Pawn & Jeweky. Inc.. 950 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.Ala. 1997).

"Payday Loan" as an Extension o(Credit

This action involves "payday loans" which, as argued by Plaintiffs and many other plaintiffs in similar cases, requires an examination ofthe term "credit" as that term is defmed by the TILA, Regulation Z, and any official staff commentaries. Credit is defined the same by the TILA and Regulation Z as ''the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment ofdebt or to incur debt and defer its payment." See 15 U.S.C.A.

1602(e); 12 C.F.R. 226.2(a)(14). The official staffcommentary now defines credit to

specifically include payday loans: 2(a)(14) "Credit".

2. Payday loans; deferred presentment. Credit includes a transaction in which a cash advance is made to a consumer in exchange for the consumer's personal check, or in exchange for the consumer's authorization to debit the consumer's deposit account, and where the parties agree either that the check will not be cashed or deposited, or that the consumer's deposit account will not be debited, until a designated future date. This type oftransaction is often referred to as a "payday loan" or "payday advance" or "deferred presentment loan." A fee charged in connection with such a transaction may be a finance charge for purposes of 226.4, regardless of how the fee is characterized under state law. Where the fee charged constitutes a finance charge under 226.4 and the person advancing funds regularly extends consumer credit, that person is a creditor and is required to provide disclosures consistent with the requirements of Regulation Z. See

226.2(a)(17). 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226 (Supp. I). All ofthe transactions in this action occurred before the effective date ofthe official staffcommentary, which is March 24, 2000. See 65 Fed. Reg. 17129. Generally, retroactive application ofadministrative rules is not favored. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). Some courts, however, have held that this general rule disfavoring retroactivity "does not necessarily apply to agency commentaries." See McPhillips, 38 F.Supp.2d at 980 (citing Barlow v. Evans. 992 F.Supp. 1299, 1305 (M.D.Ala. 1997. In any event, the court must give deference to the agency's classification of the commentary as either a clarification Of a change. See McPhillips. 38 F.Supp.2d at 980 (citing Wright v. Director. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 913 F.2d 1566, 1571 (l1'" Cir. 1990. Nevertheless, "unfettered deference to an agency's classification of its revision as a clarification would allow an agency to make substantive changes, with retroactive effect, merely by referring to the new interpretation as a clarification." See McPhillips. 38 F.Supp.2d at 980 (citing ~ v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds. Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1999.

Clarification versus Amendment or Chan~e

To detennine whether the March 2000 official staff revision should have retroactive application to this case, the revision must be examined in view of the past

interpretations by the agency of the particular subject matter of the revision. See McPhillips v. Gold Key Lease, Inc.. 38 F.Supp.2d 975, 980 (M.D.Ala. 1999) ("court should consider whether the revision is consistent with prior interpretations and views expressed by the agency"). In the event there are no prior interpretations ofthe particular transaction, this fact should also be considered,] If a court finds that revisions to the official staffcommentary amount to a substantive change, rather than simply a clarification of existing law, then the commentary is not applied retroactively. See McPhillips, 38 F,Supp.2d at 980 (court found that revisions amounted to substantive change in law even though Board interpreted its revision as a clarification). First, the evolution of the official staffcommentary adding payday loans and deferred presentments to the defmition ofcredit must be examined. Beginning on November S, 1999, the Board published for comment proposed revisions to the official staff commentary to Regulation Z with respect to short-term cash advances or "payday loans." See 64 Fed. Reg. 60368. The November publication noted that the revisions to the commentary would be adopted in fmal form in March 2000 and "to the extent the revisions impose new requirements on creditors, compliance would he optional until

October 1,2000, the effective date/or mandatory compliance." (Emphasis added). This

] Plaintiffs cite Barlow v. Evans, 992 F.Supp. 1299, 1305 (M.D.Ala. 1997), and Wiley v. Earl's Pawn & Jewelty, 950 F.Supp. 1108, 1112 (S.D.Ala. 1997), as court opinions holding that the staff commentary subjecting pawnbrokers to the TILA applied to transactions that preceded the commentary's effective date. These cases involved a different revision. Each new revision should be examined as a whole to determine its applicability to the individual case.

statement makes it clear that any new requirements placed on the creditors will not be enforced through mandatory compliance until six months after the effective date of the rule. The Board addressed in particular the defmition of credit in the November publication in pertinent part as follows: The Board has been asked to clarify whether Upayday loans"-also known as "cash advance loans," "check advance loans," and "post-dated check loans"---eonstitute credit for purposes ofTILA. Typically in such transactions, a short-term cash advance is made to a customer in exchange for the consumer's personal check in the amount ofthe advance, plus a fee; sometimes the advance is made in exchange for the consumer's authorization to debit electronically the consumer's checking account in the amount of the advance, plus a fee. The transaction occurs with knowledge by both parties that the amount advanced is not, or may not be, available from the consumer's checking account at the time ofthe transaction. Thus, the parties agree that the consumer's check will not be cashed or the account electronically debited until a designated future date. On that date, the consumer usually has the option to repay the obligation by allowing the party advancing the funds to cash the check or electronically debit the consumer's checking account, or by providing cash or some other means of payment. The consumer may also have the option to defer repayment beyond the initial period by paying an additional fee. Section 226.2(a)(14) dermes credit as the right to defer the payment of debt or the right to incur debt and defer its payment. In the case of payday loans, this includes the agreement to defer cashing the check or debiting the consumer's account. Comment 2(aX14)-2 would be added to clarify that payday loan transactions constitute credit for purposes ofTILA. Persons that regularly extend payday loans and impose a finance charge are required to provide TILA disclosures to consumers.

64 Fed. Reg. 60368 at 60368-60369 (emphasis added). The commentary employs the word "clarify" two times in the above-referenced section. The first time "clarify" is used in the sense that the commentary will be determining once and for all if (not when) payday loans fall within the definition of credit under the TILA and Regulation Z. The second time "clarifY" appears in the above section, it merely states that the comment will

be added to definitively make payday loans an example of something that constitutes

credit. Having received comments, thereafter on March 31, 2000, the Board published the final revisions to the official staffcommentary to Regulation Z. The effective date of the revised commentary was March 24, 2000, with the proviso that "[c]ompliance is optional until October 1,2000." See 65 Fed. Reg. 17129. The background section of the revised commentary reveals the various comments made regarding the applicability ofthe TILA and Regulation Z to payday loans and provides in pertinent part: In November 1999, the Board published proposed amendments to the commentary (64 FR 60368, November 5, 1999). The Board received more than 50 comment letters. Most of the comments were from financial institutions, other creditors, and their representatives. Comments were also received from state attorneys general, state regulatory agencies, and consumer advocates. The comment letters were focused on the proposed comment concerning payday loans. Most commenters supported the proposal. A few commenters, mostly payday lenders and their representatives, were opposed. As discussed below, the commentary is being adopted substantially as proposed. Some revisions have been made for clarity in response to commenters' suggestions. The

commentary revision concerning payday loans clarifies that when such transactions involve an agreement to defer payment ofa deb~ they are within the definition of credit in TILA and Regulation Z. 65 Fed. Reg. 17129 (emphasis added). The term "clarifies" found in this section appears to mean the same thing as it did in the November publication-that payday loans are now defmed as credit. Under "Commentary Revisions" ofthe March 2000 publication, the commentary expounded upon the comments submitted regarding payday loans as follows: 2(aXI4) Credit. The Board proposed to add comment 2(a)(14)-2 to clarify that transactions commonly known as "payday loans" constitute credit for purposes ofTILA.. . . . Most commenters supported the proposal because they believed that payday loans are credit transactions. A few commenters opposed the proposal. These commenters questioned whether payday loans should be covered under TILA when applicable state law does not treat such transactions as credit. They were concerned that Regulation Z would preempt state law where, for example, the transactions are regulated under check-cashing laws, and they also asserted that providing TILA disclosures would result in unnecessary compliance costs. These commenters also questioned whether disclosure ofthe APR in such transactions provides consumers with useful information. One commenter asserted that the proposed comment's scope was unclear, and believed the comment might be interpreted too broadly, resulting in the application of Regulation Z to noncredit transactions. This commenter also suggested that payday lenders will be unable to determine whether transactions are consumer credit or for an exempt purpose, such as business credit. For the reasons discussed below, comment 2(aX14)-2 is adopted to clarify that payday loans, and similar transactions

where there is an agreement to defer payment of a debt, constitute credit for purposes ofTILA. Some revisions have been made for clarity to address commenters' concerns.

(Emphasis added). Obviously, some issues existed with respect to a state law's effect on the TILA. The tenn "clarify" or "clarifies" in this section ultimately determines that payday loans fall within the defmition of credit. The March 2000 publication specifically addresses the interplay between state laws and the TILA and Regulation Z as follows: TILA, as implemented by Regulation Z, reflects the intent of the Congress to provide consumers with unifonn cost disclosures to promote the infonned use ofcredit and assist consumers in comparison shopping. This purpose is furthered by applying the regulation to transactions, such as payday loans, that fall within the statutory definition of credit, regardless ofhow such transactions are treated or regulated under state law. The fact that some creditors may have to comply with state laws as well as with Regulation Z, and that creditors may bear compliance costs, is not a sufficient basis to disregard TILA's applicability to the covered transactions. Where a creditor is unable to detennine if a transaction is primarily for an exempt purpose, such as business-purpose credit, the creditor is free to make disclosures under TILA, and the fact that disclosures are made would not be controlling on the question ofwhether the transaction was exempt. See Comment 3(a)-1. A few commenters questioned the effect of the proposed comment on state laws that regulate payday loans and similar transactions. Section 226.28 of Regulation Z describes the effect ofTILA on state laws. As a general matter, state laws are preempted ifthey are inconsistent with the act and regulation, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. A state law is inconsistent if it requires or pennits creditors to make disclosures or take actions that contradict the requirements of federal law. A state law may not be deemed

inconsistent if it is more protective of consumers. TILA does not impair a state's authority to regulate or prohibit payday lending activities. Persons that regularly extend payday loans and otherwise meet the definition of creditor (226.2(a)(17 are required, however, to provide disclosures to consumers consistent with the requirements of Regulation z.. . . The Board will review any issues brought to its attention regarding the effect ofTILA and Regulation Z on particular state laws.. . . The Board recognizes in this section that certain states have passed laws sheltering the fees charged for payday loans from characterization as finance charges or interest, such as Florida. The commentary places everyone on notice that the TILA and Regulation Z in essence trump state law characterizations of fees as something other than what the federal laws prescribe. In that vein, the March publication provides: In describing payday loan transactions, the proposed comment referred to the fact that consumers typically must pay a fee. Some commenters questioned whether such fees are finance charges for purposes of Regulation Z. Theses commenters noted that under some state laws, the fees charged for payday loans and similar transactions are not considered interest or finance charges. A fee charged in connection with a payday loan may be a finance charge for purposes ofTILA pursuant to section 226.4 of Regulation Z, regardless of how the fee is characterized for state law purposes. Where the fee charged constitutes a fmance charge under TILA, and the person advancing funds regularly extends consumer credit, that person is a creditor covered by Regulation Z. See 226.2(a)(17). Comment 2(a)(14)-2 has been revised to reflect this guidance. (Emphasis added.) Thus, proponents ofpayday lenders in most instances can no longer rely on the argument that state law preempts the TILA and Regulation Z.

Finally, at the end ofthe revision, the staffattempts to classifY the revision as a clarification rather than a change in the law with respect to payday loans:

Comment 2(a)(14)-2 has been added as an example ofa specific type oftransaction that involves an agreement to defer payment ofa debt. Because sllch a transaction falls within the existing statlltory and reglliatory definition of "credit," the comment does not represent a change in the law. Generally, updates to the Board's staffcommentary are effective upon publication. Consistent with the reqllirements ofsection l05(d) ofTlL4, however, the Board typically provides an implementation period 01six months or longer. Dllring that period, compliance with the pllblished IIpdate is optional so that creditors may adjllSt their docllments to accommodate TlLA's disclosllre reqllirements.
(Emphasis added). While the Board's staffhas stated that the comment "does not represent a change in law,n at the same time it provided creditors an implementation period "so that creditors may adjust their documents to accommodate TILA's disclosure requirements." This allowance seems to admit that the Board's staffwas aware that this particular area had not been made a part ofthe law as it existed at the time ofthe notice for the proposed rule. Indeed, the Board entertained comments and took a position on how to handle the TILA with co-existing state laws for check cashing. This Court is unaware ofany prior interpretations by the staffdefmitively making payday loans part of credit as that term is defmed by the TILA and Regulation Z. This case presents a situation in which no final commentary addressing payday loans existed prior to the fmal March 2000 revision which made payday loans part of credit under the TILA and Regulation Z. There is no question that in Florida the effect ofthe TILA and Regulation Z has been unclear with respect to those properly registered under Chapter

560 of the Florida Statutes. While some federal district court opinions outside ofFlorida have held that payday loans are extensions ofcredit under the TILA and Regulation Z,4 the decisions within Florida have not been unifonn. See Gonzales v. Easy Money. Inc.. No. 5:00-cv-2-0c-l0GRJ (Feb. 22,2001); Clement v. Ace Cash Express. Inc.. No. 8:00 cv-593-T-26C (M.D.Fla. Dec. 21, 2000); Betts v. McKenzie Check Advance of Florida. LLC, No. 8:99-cv-2828-T-30F (M.D.Fla. Dec. 20, 2000). Based on the comments solicited by the Board and the fact that no prior interpretations by the agency had been expressed, the Court fmds that the March 2000 revision effects a substantive change in the law without retroactive application. Because the transactions at issue in this case occurred before compliance with the official staffcommentary was either optional or mandatory, the official staff commentary should not be applied to them. Based on the above reasons and absent any authority from the Eleventh Circuit or United States Supreme Court to the contrary, the Court finds that the official staff commentary at issue should not be given retroactive application in this case. Consequently, count I is dismissed with prejudice.

Counts II and ill: Violations of Florida's Usury Law and FDUTPA

Because the Court has resolved Plaintiffs' federal claims against Defendant, only See Hartke v. Illinois Payday Loans. Inc., 1999 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 14937, *6 (C.D.IlI. Sept. 13, 1999); Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville. TN. Inc. 35 F.Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1999); In re: Brigance. 219 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr.W.D. Tenn. 1998); Hamilton v. York. 987 F.Supp. 953, 957-958 (E.D.Ky. 1997).
4

Plaintiffs' state law claims remain in this action. Title 28, Section 1367 ofthe United States Code provides that the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims where it has dismissed all the underlying federal claims.
~ 28

U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). In making this detennination, the court should consider

factors such as "comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like." See Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (lIth Cir. 1999) (quoting Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. 81 F.3d 249, 257 (1st Cir. 1996. Although this decision is discretionary, see Englehardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998 ), the dismissal ofstate law claims is strongly encouraged where the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial. See Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997). Where the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims, the claims should be dismissed without prejudice so they can be refiled in the appropriate state court. See Crosby, 187 F.3d at 1352. In the interest ofjudicial economy and convenience, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims in this action. Accordingly, it is therefore ordered and adjudged as follows: 1. Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. 89) is denied as

moot.
2. 3. Count I is dismissed with prejudice. Counts II and III are dismissed without prejudice to bringing them in state court.

4.

The Clerk is directed to close this file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on this

-.1 day of August, 2001.

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel ofRecord

F I L E Date Printed: 08/02/2001

COP Y

Notice sent to: John A. Anthony, Esq. Gray, Harris, Robinson, Shackleford, Farrior 501 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 1400 P.O. Box 3324 Tampa, FL 33601 William J. Cook, Esq. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 300 W. Platt St., Suite 150 Tampa, FL 33606 Peter J. Grilli Peter J. Grilli, P.A. 100 S. Ashley Dr., Suite 1300 Tampa, FL 33602

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
ATIORNEYS AT LAW

CHRIS A. BARKER RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS WILLIAM J. COOK

300 West Platt Street, Suite 150

Tampa, Florida 33606

Telephone 813/489.1001 Facsimile 813/489.1008

August 15,2001

Neil 1. Gillespie Apartment C-2 1121 Beach Drive NE St. Petersburg, Florida 33701-1434

Re:

Eugene R. Clement, individually and on behalfofothers similarly situated, AMSCOT Corporation Case No. 99.2795-Civ-T-26C
OUf File No. : 99-4766

Dear Neil: This confirms that you authorized us to appeal the decision in the above-referenced case. We will not be filing a new lawsuit in State court. In addition, you authorized us to demand $1,000.00 to settle your claim plus $50,000.00 in attorneys' fees and costs. Of course, we will keep you updated on the appeal and any settlement negotiations. As we discussed, however, we do not believe that the Defendant will accept our settlement offer.

William 1. Cook
WJC/mss

Neil J. Gillespie
1121 Beach Drive NE, Apt. C-2
St. Petersburg, Florida 33701-1434

Telephone and Fax: (727) 823-2390

VIA FAX AND FIRST CLASS MAIL August 16, 200 I William J. Cook, Attorney at Law Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA 300 West Platt Street, Suite 150 Tampa, Florida 33606

Re:

Eugene R. Clement, individually and on behalfofothers similarly situated, AMSCOT Corporation Case No. 99.2795-Civ-T-26C
Your File No. : 99-4766

Dear Bill, Thank you for your letter dated August 15,2001 relative to the above captioned case. I agree with you that the Defendant will probably not accept your settlement offer. I believe the sticking point is your request for $50,000 in attorney's fees and costs. I do not believe the $1,000 request each for myself, Mr. Clement and Ms. Blomefield is a barrier to settlement. Therefore I suggest you ask for a lesser amount of attorney's fees and costs. Given your lack of success in this matter thus far, I suggest you ask for $10,000 in attorney's fees and costs. I believe this is a more realistic amount. Given how poorly the case has gone up to now, I believe it is in our interest to settle quickly. Thank you for your kind consideration. Sincerely,

4P~~
ell J. Gillespie / cc: Kindly provide a copy of this letter to Mr. Clement and Ms. Blomefield

10

Fax
From: Neil J. Gillespie
1121 Beach Drive NE, Apt C-2 St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Phone/Fax: (727) 823-2390

To: William Cook, Attorney at Law Fax: 813-489-1008

Date: August 16, 2001

Pages: 2 including this page

Re: AMSCOT Corporation

o Urgent

0 Please Reply

0 For Your Review

Comments: see accompanying letter.

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (813) 810-0151 July 25, 2005 Ian Mackechnie, President Amscot Corporation 600 N. Westshore Blvd., 12th Floor Tampa, Florida 33609 RE: Clement, et al. v. Amscot Corporation, Case No. 8:99-ev-2795-T-26C, US District Court, Middle District Florida, Tampa Division; on appeal, Case No. 01-14761-A US Court of Appeals, For the Eleventh Circuit Dear Mr. Mackechnie, I was a plaintiff in the above captioned lawsuit. While this action is settled, I regret becoming involved, and was pressured into it by my lawyer, William Cook. I am sorry for the consequences you suffered. About two years ago I found discrepancies in the case file. This is part of my attempt to uncover the truth. As I see it, you paid $43,000.00 too much to settle this case. Here's why. Prior to my involvement in the above captioned lawsuit, Mr. Cook represented me in a lawsuit against ACE, America's Cash Express, for payday loan roll-over transactions. The lawsuit was joined by Florida Attorney General Robert Butterworth. I still believe the ACE litigation was justified. However, in my view Amscot was not as culpable as ACE, and I initially declined Mr. Cook's solicitation to join the lawsuit. But Mr. Cook said that I was selfish for not suing Amscot, and I relented. During the course of litigation it became apparent to me that Mr. Cook and his associates were incompetent and not truthful. During the settlement negotiations I tried to settle this case for $10,000.00 in legal fees and $1,000.00 to each of the three plaintiffs (see copy of my letter, enclosed). You ultimately paid $56,000.00 to settle, and I believe this was the result of our lawyers' collusion. This is my opinion, and I welcome any supporting evidence. In the alternative, perhaps your lawyer John Anthony was just a very poor negotiator, and you paid $43,000.00 too much to settle the lawsuit. I filed a complaint against William Cook with the Florida Bar (TFB No. 2004 11,734(13C) to no avail. I am available to discuss this further if you wish. Thank you. Sincerely,

:f;~~11

Neil J. Gillespie
1121 Beach Drive NE, Apt. C-2
St. Petersburg, Florida 33701-1434

Telephone and Fax: (727) 823-2390

VIA FAX AND FIRST CLASS MAIL August 16, 200 I William J. Cook, Attorney at Law Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA 300 West Platt Street, Suite 150 Tampa, Florida 33606

Re:

Eugene R. Clement, individually and on behalfofothers similarly situated, AMSCOT Corporation Case No. 99.2795-Civ-T-26C
Your File No. : 99-4766

Dear Bill, Thank you for your letter dated August 15,2001 relative to the above captioned case. I agree with you that the Defendant will probably not accept your settlement offer. I believe the sticking point is your request for $50,000 in attorney's fees and costs. I do not believe the $1,000 request each for myself, Mr. Clement and Ms. Blomefield is a barrier to settlement. Therefore I suggest you ask for a lesser amount of attorney's fees and costs. Given your lack of success in this matter thus far, I suggest you ask for $10,000 in attorney's fees and costs. I believe this is a more realistic amount. Given how poorly the case has gone up to now, I believe it is in our interest to settle quickly. Thank you for your kind consideration. Sincerely,

4P~~
ell J. Gillespie / cc: Kindly provide a copy of this letter to Mr. Clement and Ms. Blomefield

GRAY
ROBINSON

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SUITE

201 N.

FRANKLIN STREET

2200 (33602)
CLERMONT JACKSONVILLE
KEY WEST

POST OFFICE
TAMPA,
TEL

Box 3324

FAX

FL 33601 813-273-5000 813-273-5145

gray-robinson.com

LAKELAND MELBOURNE

813-273-5066
JANTHONY@ORAY-ROBINSON.COM

NAPLES

August 26, 2005

ORLANDO TALLAHASSEE TAMPA

VIA FED EX
Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 11 5th Loop Ocala, FL 34481

Re:

Eugene R. Clement, individually and ou behalf of others similarly situated, vs. Amscot Corporation, a Florida corporation United States District Court, Case No. 99-2795-CIV-T-26C

Dear Mr. Gillespie: I have been asked to respond to your letter to Ian MacKechnie of July 25, 2005. Amscot is disappointed that your lawyer apparently did not obey your instructions regarding discontinuing litigation you and he knew to be frivolous. Amscot is disappointed that you did not admit that the litigation lacked merit when I deposed you. We regret that Amscot was required to expend time, money, and other resources defending frivolous litigation. I assure you that we did our best as lawyers to move the case to the correct conclusion, without making it more expensive for all involved. We are pleased that this matter has been concluded, and consider it to have been a closed controversy for some time now. We hope you will put it all behind you as well.

John A. Anthony JAA/aw cc: Ian MacKechnie

# 708746 vI

12

MEMORANDUM TO FROM DATE RE

File

WJC~
Monday, August 20, 2001 Clement v. AMSCOT

99.4766

I spoke with Neil Gillespie on August 17, 2001. We had a fairly lengthy conversation about the pluses and minuses of going forward with the appeal and the settlement offer. I explained to him that I did not believe that the sticking part was created through the attorneys' fees, but rather it was the payment to the clients. I told him of my conversation with John Anthony in which he offered to pay this firm $5,000.00 but would not agree to pay our clients anything. I told him that I rejected that offer. He asked me why I had not mentioned the settlement offer to him previously~ I told him that it was not a settlement offer. Itwas anJ.mp.rop..~!:2.(~~QfLattempt.At the end of the conversation, when I told him that I would wait until Monday befui:eisent the settlement offer, he told me that that was not necessary. He simply wanted to advise me that he was not necessarily happy with the $50,000.00 settlement demand. I told him that the $50,000.00 demand was not set in stone and we could consider the $10,000.00 offer that he suggested. I told him that it was not likely that we would receive such an offer, however. WJC

WJC/mss

13

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
ATIORNEYS AT LAW
CHRIS A.. BARKER RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS
WILLIAM

300 West Platt Street, Suite 150

Tampa, Florida 33606

J.

COOX:

Telephone 813/489 .. 1001 Facsimile 813/489 .. 1008

August 20, 2001

Anthony, Esquire Gray, Harris, Robinson, Shackleford, Farrior Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601-3324

Jo~ A.

Re:

Eugene R. Clement, individually and on behalfof others similarly situated, AMSCOT Corporation

Case No.
'Our File No. :

99.2795-Civ-T-26C

99-4766

Dear Mr. Anthony:

Tn our recent telephone conversation, you said that your client would be willing to pay this firm some kind of "consulting fee" or '~on-refundableretainer" in the amount of $5,000.00 if our clients were to refrain from appealing Judge Lazarra's recent ruling or refile their state law claims in
state court. You did not offer any money to our clients. That offer is rejected.

We cannot and will not agree to resolve our clients' claims without any consideration going
to our clients.

If your client truly wishes to resolve these claims, our clients are willing to accept $1,000.00 each, representing the amount oftheir individual TILA statutory damages. They would also want any outstanding loans forgiven. In addition, we would accept $50,~00.00 to settle this firm's outstanding attorneys' fees and costs.
I am sure that you realize that our actual fees and costs are far in excess ofthis amoup.t. If our clients were to prevail on appeal, the court undoubtedly would enter summary judgment against your client, thereby entitling us to an award ofour fees and costs. Our motion for class certification likely would also be granted, in that your opposition to our class certification motions focused primarily on the merits of our clients' claims.

14

John A. Anthony, Esquire August 20, 2001

Page 2

We view our chances of success on appeal as good, as at least one district court has already decided the same issue contrary to Judge Lazarra's ruling. Indeed, Judge Lazarra himselfexplicitly recognized in his order that the retroactivity issue was difficult. .This offer is being made on behalf ofthe individual plaintiffs only and not on behalfofany class. Consequently, our clients' agreement to settle on the above-descnoed temis would not affect the claims of any other Amscot customers. This offer shall remain open for thirty (30) days. Thank you for yom attention to this matter. Sincerely,

William J. Cook WJC/so

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASE l-IO . 01-14761~""
~
~

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, GAY ANN BLOME FIELD , and NEIL GILLESPIE, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Appellants, v. AMSCOT CORPORATION, Appellee.

I
I
~

I,'.~

______________,

JOINT STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

The Parties, by and th_ou(Jh tI-leir undersigrled counsel, amicably

A~I)pel1ate

hav~.

flg

resolved

this

matter,

pursuant

to

Federal

Rule
""to:

of th

Procedure 42 (b)

move for dismissal with prejtldice

attorn~s'

each party bearing its own

fees and costs. day of November, 2001.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

BA~KER;

RODEMS & COOK,

P~A4

Gray, Harris, Bobinson, Shackleford, Farrior

WILLIAM J. CO K, ESQUIRE Florida Bar No. 986194

300 West Platt Street
~)uite

150

33606 489-1001 (TEL) 489-1008 (FAX) Z.:\.t to rrle :i5 for Appe 11 ant ~3
(813) (813)

Tampa, Florida

R. FERNANDEZ, ES Florida Bar No. 008 5 501 E. Kennedy Blvd Sllite 1400 Tampa, Florida 33602
(813)
(t~J3)

273-5000
273-5145

(TE"L)
(F~AX)

. ~tt~~~jrneys

for Appellee

15

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant

to Federal

Rule

of Appellate

Procedure

26.1

and

Eleventh Circuit Rule 26.1-1,

counsel for the Appellants certify

that the following persons and entities have an interest in the outcome of this case. Alpert, Jonathan L., Esq. Alpert & Ferrentino, P.A. Amscot Corporation Anthony, John A., Esq. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Barker, Chris A., Esq.
Blomefield, Gay Ann
Clement, Eugene R.
Cook, William J., Esq.
Gillespie, Neil
Gray, Harris, Robinson, Shackleford, Farrior, P.A.
Lazzara, The Honorable Richard A.
United States District Judge, Middle District of Florida
MacKechnie, Ian
Rodems, Ryan Christopher, Esq.

IN TIlE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR TIlE ELEVENTH

CJ:RCUI~:t----.--.

-=:~

--..__

u.s. COURT OF APPEALS

No-.Ol-14161-I\A

riLED

ELEVEN '" GJI~GUIT

OEC 0 7 2001
EUGENE R. CLEMENT,
individually and on behalf of others silnila::-ly TlfOMASK.KI\Iir4 situated, CI [ftK _ pJajlltiff-AEpel!~nt,

GAY ANN BLOMEFIELD, NEIL GILLESPIE,

b'~

91- C~- c?? /9S-: I

~ '-e--~--I-lJ-~"""

Plailltiffs- Illtervenors
Counter-Defendants-A~pellmlts.

versus
AMSCOT

CORPORATION,
A Florida Corporation,

Defendant-Interveno~:-Coul"iter -Clailnarlt:-l\p~elltj=y .
....J
_.~~-----~----~~~--~~-~---~

On Appeal front tIle United States District COUl:t for tIle Middle District of Florida
BEFORE: EDMONDSON and BARKETt, Circuit Judges.
BY THE
COUI~T:

The parties jOillt. stipulation for disI11issal of lIlis appeal

with prejudice, which is construed as a motioIl to distniss this

appeal
wit}1

prejudice, witl"l the parties bearing t.lleir

G~'BD.

0"111

costs

and attorney's fees, is

ATRUE Copy - ATlESTE.D:

CLERK U.S. COURT Of APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

oj,. Ike ~uu:::

;Y Duun CLERK
AlUIITA, GEORQIA

16

RELEASE AND SETTLE!\lENT AGREEMENT

This Release And Settlement Agreement (this "Agreement") is made and entered into this

~ day of October, 2001, by and between Amscot Corporation ("Amscot"),

Eugene R. Clement

("Clement"), Gay Ann Blomefield ("B lomefield"), and Neil Gillespie ("Gillespie"), individually alld on behalf of others similarly situated (collectively, the "Plaintiffs"), and Barker, Rodcl11s & Cook, P.A. (the "Firm") collectively referred to herein as the "Parties," who hereby execute this Agreement and state as follows:
1.

Settlemen t 'VitlI Plain tiffs.

Amscot shall pay each 0 fthe Plainti frs the sum

f' TWll

Thousand Dollars and No/100 ($2,000), in satisfaction of their claims for damages, as more Cully described herein, against Amscot as asserted in the matters styled (i) Euenc R. Clement, et_al. v. Amscot Corporation, Case No, 8:99-cv-2795-T-26C, pending in the United States District ('ourt, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division and (ii) EU!:!ene R. Clement. et ai. v. Amscot

Corporation, Case No. 01-14761-A, pending in the United States Court of Appeals, For the Eleventh Circuit (collectively, referred to as the "Action").

2.

Settlemen t 'Vitll Firm.

Amscot shall pay the Finn the sum of Fifty TlJolisalld

Dollars and Noll 00 ($50,000), in satisfaction of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and costs, as more fully described herein, against Amscot as asserted in the Action. 3.
A~e,

Competence, and Authority. To procure payment of said sum as referenced

in paragraph number one, the Plaintiffs hereby declare that they are each more than eighteen (18) years of age, and are otherwise competent and fully authorized to execute this Agreement. To procure payment ofsaid sum as referenced in paragraph number two, the Firm hereby represents and warrants that it is a corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of Florida. The Finn has the necessary corporate power, authority, and has obtained all

17

necessary consents required to execute, deliver and perfonn the obligations under the provisions of this Agreement. 4. Unknown and llnanticipated DaIIla~es. The Plaintiffs and the Finn hereby agree

that, as a further consideration and inducement [or this Agreemcnt, this Agreement shall apply to all unknown and unanticipated damages resulting from the transactions and OCClllTences alleged or that could have been alleged in the complaint initiating this Action filed by the Plainti ffs.

5.

Amicable Civil Resolution. Without in any way admitting guilt or liability in

connection with the referenced events, by or on behalf of any of the Parties, the Parties have agreed to an amicable civil resolution of all causes of action arising out oflhe transactions and occurrences alleged or that could have been alleged in the complaint initiating this Action filed by the Plaintiffs.

6.

IVlutual Releases.

Upon Plaintiffs' and the Fiml's receipt of the considcration

required pursuant to paragraph numbers one and two (1. and 2.) hereoe this Agrcement shall operate as a general and mutual release by the Plaintiffs and the Fiml against Amscot and by Amscot against the Plaintiffs and the Finn, and all ofboth Amscot's and the Finn's shareholders, directors, officers, employees, and agents of any kind, and all successors and assigns, from any and all liability relating to the transaction outlined generally in paragraph numbers one and two (I.and 2.) herein. This mutual release shall therefore discharge all claims, liens, debts, actions, demands, damages, costs, expenses, actions, and causes of actions, or assertions of any kind whatsoever, both at law and equity, whether knO\vn, unknown, alleged, direct, indirect, disputed, contingent, real, or imagined, that in any way relate to the Action or said transactions relating to the Action.

7.

Release of Liens:

The Plaintiffs and the Firm represent that there are no

outstanding claims, liens or subrogation rights against the released parties resulting from or in any
-2

way related to the damages claimecl in the Action, and all occurrences thereaCter other than 1110:;\..' which will be satisfied by the Plaintiffs and the Firm. 8. Indemnification/Hold Harmless: Plaintiffs ancl the Fiml agree to protect, defend,

indenmify and hold Amscot harmless from and against any ancl all liabilities, damages, claims, demands, costs or expenses, including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees as hereinaftcr set forth resulting from or relating to the Action, including specifically, any lien asserted by the fonner film who represented the Plaintiffs, Alpert, Barker, Rouellls, Ferrcntino & Cook, P.A. IIJkJa Alpert & felTentino, P.A.

9.

Confidentiality.

The consideration for Amscot acceding to the terms of this

Agreement is favorable community relations and the maintenance of good will and favorable reputation of Arnscot. The Parties agree that no disclosure shall be made to any third parly

regarding the transaction generally outlined in paragraph numbers one and two (1. and 2.) !Jerci II, except as required by existing State of Florida statutes, under the laws of the United States 0[' Amelica, or pursuant to a third party subpoena, or in connection with resolution of any olltstanding third-paliy liens. 10.

No Admission.

It is expressly understood that the Pariies explicitly delly allY

wrongdoing, liability, or obligation whatsoever to the other party relating to the transaction set forlh in paragraph numbers one and two (1. and 2.) herein. Because this Agreement is a settlcmenl document, it is agreed by the Parties that this Agreement shall not be filed, introduced into evidence, or otherwise used for any purpose in connection with the transaction set forth generally in paragraph numbers one and 2 (1. and 2.) herein. The provisions hereof are intended to be broader than the provisions offlorida Statutes 90.408 and Federal Rule of Evidence 408.
-3

11. No Interpretation Against the Drafter. The Parties ackJlO\vledge that this Agreement is voluntarily entered into by all of them. All having had the right to counsel ill connection with the negotiation, execution, and drafting hereof, no portion of this Agreement shall be construed against any of the Parties drafter hereof. 12. l\'IodificatioIl. The teffi1S and conditions of this Agreement may not be modified
011

the grounds that its counsel may have been the primary

except in writing signed by the Parties. 13. Florida ContractfHillsborough County Venue. This Agreement is hereby deemed

a Florida contract, executed and perfoffi1ed in Hillsborough County, Florida. This Agreement shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Florida, regardless of whether this Agreement is executed by certain of the parties hereto in other states or counties. jurisdiction and venue in Hillsborough County, Florida. 14. \Vaiver of Jurv Trial. The Parties hereby knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally The Parties consent to

waive the right to a trial by jury in respect of any litigation based hereon, or arising out oC under or in cOllnection with this Agreement, and any agreement contemplated to be executed in conjunction therewith, or in the course of conduct, course of dealing, statements (whether verbal or written), or actions of any of the Parties. The Parties acknowledge that this provision is a material inducement for this Agreement. 15. Third Party Rights: Nothing in this Agreement, whether express or implied, is

intended or should be construed to confer upon, or to grant to, any person, except the Parties and their respective assignees and successors, any claim, right, or remedy under or because of either this Agreement or any provision of it. Conversely, none of the Parties are waiving, releasing, or
-4

otherwise modifying their rights as against any third party except as expressly providcd hcrein. 1G. Execution in Counterparts. This Agreement is binding on, and inures to the bendit of, the respective successors, pennitted assignees, and personal representatives of the Parties. The Parties may execute this Agreement in counterparts. Each executed counterpart will be considered an original, and both of them togetller \vilt constitute the same agreement. This Agrcemcnt will become effective as of its stated effective date when each party has executed a counterpart and delivered it to the other party. IN 'WITNESS \VHEREOF, the Parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the day and year first above written. AlVISCOT CORPORt\TION

By:

Name: Title:

_ _

BAIUillR, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.

By:-..lL-~=-_b_L'_b__n'----'-'--""-----N

ame:~W~:l..(~h. .:-~ /I\_- - -.o. .J,j'_\_c",-o=d...:....k

S.!-~-=(~(-=-e.
...:....h:.!.-f-Y-f-(-ff:...l.<'' ' ' :'C{:...L'1::!-V(!......:e:....c., (

_
_

Title :__

1141 2987/ldw

-5

.L

\) ,)

lftJ 006

assignees, and personul representatives of the Parties. The

16.

Execut.ion ill Counterparts. This Agreement is binding on, and inures to the benefit

0f,

tl1~.~ n:0pccti;< successor~, permitted

?<::.,ti-:-s may e:"ecut( ,his Agreement in counterparts. Each executed counterpart \vill be considered
an original, and boU) of them together will constitute lie same agreement. This Agreement will become eff,=cti ve as of its stated effective date when each party has executed a counterpart and delivered it to the other party. IN \VITNESS WHEREOI", the Parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the day ami year first aboYl.'~ written.

AlVISCOT CORPORATION

Eugene R. Clement

Title:

02E-s: (0.--J\

Gay Ann Blomefield

Neil Gillespie

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.

Bv: . J

.._._.

. _.

Name:

:J4J2987ildw

-5

BARKER, RODEl\'1S & COOK, P.A.

CLOSIN'C STATEMENT

Style of Case: Eugene R. Clement, Gay Ann Blomelleld, and Neil Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corporation. Our File No.: 99.4766

As of: October 31, 2001

ATTORNEYS' FEES & COSTS

PAYMENTS TO CLIENTS EUGENE R. CLEMENT GAY ANN BLOMEFIELD NEIL GILLESPIE

$ 50,000.00

$ 2,000.00

2,000.00 2,000.00

I .

TOTAL

$ 56,000.00

In signing this closing statement, I acknowledge that ANISCOT Corporation separately paid my attomeys $50,000.00 to compensate my attorneys for their claim against AMSCOT for court awarded fees and costs. I also acknowledge that I have received a copy of the fully executed Release and Settlement Agreement dated October 30, 2001.

18


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR lllLLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CMLDMSION
EUGENE R. CLEMENT, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v,

ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., a Texas corporation d/b/a ACE America's Cash Express, Defendant.

Consolidated Case No. 99-9730 Division J Class Representation Jury Trial Demanded

-----------------...,:/
NEIL GILLESPIE, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., a Texas corporation d/b/a ACE America's Cash Express, Defendant.

---------------_---:/

STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES

Pursuant to the Mediation Conference held the 12th day of June, 2002, the parties have agreed to abide by the following:

I.

The Defendant, ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., agrees to pay and the Plaintiffs, EUGENE R. CLEMENT and NEIL GILLESPIE, agree to accept the sum of$5,000.00 each, in full and complete settlement of any and all claims against all defendants that have been brought or could have been brought in the above styled cause. Clement and Gillespie shall execute releases of all defendants. ACE will release Clement and Gillespie. The Defendant, ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., shall forward said sum to the Plaintiff's attorney within thirty (30) days of the date of this Stipulation. Each party shall bear their own fees and costs, and shall share in the mediation fees.

2.

3.

4.

19


5. After receipt of the funds, the Plaintiffs will cause this action and the related appeal in the Second District Court of Appeal to be dismissed, with prejudice. Date ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC.

~:

/'~~
...

',.

---

'

N~

WILLIAM 1. COOK :Attorney for Plaintiffs

'--..

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.

Closing Statement as of June 24,2002

Style of Case: NEIL GILLESPIE, et al. v. ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., a Texas corporation, d/b/a ACE America's Cash Express

Our File No.:

99-4764

CREDITS: SETILEMENT PROCEEDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 5,000.00 PAYMENT FROM EUGENE R. CLEMENT'S SETTLEMENT $ 500.00

DEBITS: ATTORNEYS' FEE (per contract and agreement at mediation on 6/12/02) COSTS (see attached) $ 1,500.00 $ 2,000.00

NET TO CLIENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 2,000.00 I acknowledge receipt of $500.00 from my Co-Plaintiff, Eugene R Clement. As an administrative convenience, I am receiving the amount directly from my attorneys' Trust Account as part of my settlement proceeds. The above closing statement is hereby approved by the undersigned on the above date. NEIL GILLESPIE BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.

By:

buftL

20

Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Ace Cash Express Date Range: 12101/2000 - 06124/2002

Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced
~r"I;
l..lll ( , , , t ) I ~'- t-~3~

.:<:.. . p~~~,.

":

t{

l-I(

I tIl'

-,.),.

' . . ... r

1'1~1.

229 01/08/2001 000049994764 66601/08/2001 000049-994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Postage Photocopies Photocopies Postage Photocopies Facsimiles Legal Research Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Postage Facsimiles Facsimiles Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage 28 2 60 2 64 87 9 23 4 2 4

$3.20 $1.00 . $0.25 $0.34 $0.50 $9.00 $21.86 $5.75 $1.00 $0.68 $1.31 $9.50 $21.75 $2.25 $2.20 $16.00 $0.76 $0.76 $3.50 $13.50 $1.39 $7.00 $0.50 $15.00 $0.50 $2.36

$3.20 $1.00 $0.25 $0.34 $0.50 $9.00 $21.86 $5.75 $1.00 $0.68 $1.31 $9.50 $21.75 $2.25 $2.20 $16.00 $0.76 $0.76 $3.50 $13.50 $1.39 $7.00 $0.50 $15.00 $0.50 $2.36

481 01/10/2001 000049-994764

168 01/11/2001 000049994764 493 01/11/2001 000049994764 47001/31/2001 000049994764 119801/31/2001 000049-994764 961 02108/2001 000049-994764 964 02108/2001 000049-994764 979 02108/2001 000049994764

1071 0211212001 000049994764 1086 0211212001 000049994764 1148 0211212001 000049994764 1154 02113/2001 000049994764
116702113/2001 000049-994764 123502113/2001 000049994764 1177 02114/2001 000049-994764 1529 02127/2001 000049994764 1585 0212712001 000049994764 1589 02127/2001 000049994764 1601 02127/2001 000049994764 1630 02127/2001 000049-994764 163902127/2001 000049994764

1644 02127/2001 000049994764 1647 02127/2001 000049994764

1611 02128/2001 000049994764

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Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Ace Cash Express Date Range: 12101/2000 - 06/24/2002

Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced

161802128/2001 000049-994764 168503/0212001 000049-994764 1694 03/0212001 000049-994764

1711 03/02/2001 000049-994764 1712 03/05/2001 000049-994764 1846 03/08/2001 000049-994764 2019 03/15/2001 000049-994764 213503/19/2001 000049-994764 217903/19/2001 000049-994764 2254 03/31/2001 000049-994764 2292 03/31/2001 000049-994764 2355 03/31/2001 000049-994764 2431 04/18/2001 000049-994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Postage Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Legal Research Photocopies @ .25 per page Legal Research Facsimiles 6 pages on 3/20 and 3/29 Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Clerk of the Court, Middle District of Florida - Miscellaneous expenses

44
124

$11.00 $31.00 $1.65 $0.34 $4.38 $0.25 $66.36

$11.00 $31.00 $1.65 $0.34 $4.38 $0.25 $66.36 $2.50 $1.80 $3.00 $24.50 $5.66 $4.50

10

$2.50 $1.80 $3.00

98

$24.50 $5.66 $4.50

2535 04/28/2001 000049-994764 2546 04/28/2001 000049-994764 2560 04/28/2001 000049-994764 2614 04/28/2001 000049-994764 2665 04/28/2001 000049-994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Postage Facsimiles Facsimiles Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles
Barker. Rodems & Cook. P.A.

4 10 4 545 4

$2.00 $5.00 $2.00 $136.25 $1.00 $1.57 $1.78

$2.00 $5.00 $2.00 $136.25 $1.00 $1.57 $1.78 $3.50 $5.50 $2.78 $8.50 $9.25 $3.50
0612412002 12:19pm

2698 04/2812001 000049-994764 2761 04/2812001 000049-994764

2851 05/01/2001 000049-994764 285305/01/2001 000049-994764

7 11

$3.50 $5.50 $2.78

2840 05/0212001 000049-994764 285805/0212001 000049-994764 2872 05/0212001 000049-994764

3058 05/03/2001 000049-994764
Page: 2

17
37 7

$8.50 $9.25 $3.50

Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Ace Cash Express Date Range: 12101/2000 - 06/24/2002

Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced $0.34 2 163 4 $1.00 $40.75 $2.00 $0.34 $5.43 $120.00 $0.89 $0.68 3 $0.75 $5.91 $1.86 4 48 6 $2.00 $12.00 $3.00 $2.03 $35.01 $21.53 $22.12 3 2 3 2 4 $1.50 $1.00 $1.50 $1.00 $1.00 $0.34 4 $2.00 $0.34 $1.00 $40.75 $2.00 $0.34 $5.43 $120.00 $0.89 $0.68 $0.75 $5.91 $1.86 $2.00 $12.00 $3.00 $2.03 $35.01 $21.53 $22.12 $1.50 $1.00 $1.50 $1.00 $1.00 $0.34 $2.00

2895 05/0412001 000049-994764 306805/07/2001 000049-994764 303005/08/2001 000049-994764 3072 05/08/2001 000049-994764 3088 05/08/2001 000049-994764 310505/08/2001 000049-994764 3064 05/09/2001 000049-994764 3112 05/09/2001 000049-994764 3121 05109/2001 000049-994764 3166 05/09/2001 000049994764
3131 05/10/2001 000049-994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Postage Postage Clerk of the Court, Middle District of Florida - Copy Services Postage Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Legal Research Legal Research Legal Research William J. Cook Miscellaneous charges Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles

3204 05/11/2001 000049-994764 324505/11/2001 000049-994764 3302 05/11/2001 000049-994764 3251 05/14/2001 000049-994764
3181 05/15/2001 000049-994764 3184 05/15/2001 000049-994764

S
S S S S S S S S S

3197 05/15/2001 000049-994764 3217 05115/2001 000049-994764 325605/16/2001 000049-994764 326005/16/2001 000049-994764 3294 05/16/2001 000049-994764 329805/16/2001 000049-994764 33180511612001 000049-994764 3322 05/16/2001 000049994764 3409 05/16/2001 000049994764

S
S

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Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Ace Cash Express Date Range: 1210112000 - 06/24/2002

Code: All Codes Person: All Persons

Respon~lble:

All Responsible

Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced

341905/1812001 000049-994764
3424 05/21/2001 000049-994764 3442 05123/2001 000049-994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Facsimiles Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles Postage Postage Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles Department of Banking and Finance - Copy Services Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Legal Research

$4.00 $0.50

$4.00 $0.50 $1.00 $0.34 $1.00 $1.02 $0.34 $0.68 $1.00 $2.00 $0.50 $1.00 $10.00 $1.65 $1.00 $7.80 $8.00 $3.12 $14.00 $7.50 $0.68 $12.00 $54.75 $0.68 $3.00 $13.88

$1.00 $0.34

346605/23/2001 000049-994764 3527 05/23/2001 000049-994764 3503 05/24/2001 000049-994764 3509 05/24/2001 000049-994764 351905/24/2001 000049-994764
3541 05/24/2001 000049-994764 3558 05/24/2001 000049-994764

$1.00 $1.02 $0.34 $0.68

2 8 2 2 40

$1.00 $2.00 $0.50 $1.00 $10.00 $1.65

3573 05/24/2001 000049-994764 3590 05/24/2001 000049-994764

3581 05/25/2001 000049-994764

3629 05/25/2001 000049-994764 360605/29/2001 000049-994764

4434 06/01/2001 000049-994764

$1.00 $7.80

3751 06/04/2001 000049-994764 3760 06/04/2001 000049-994764 3801 06/04/2001 000049-994764

3844 06/04/2001 000049-994764

32

$8.00 $3.12

56 15

$14.00 $7.50 $0.68

3927 06/06/2001 000049-994764 3861 06/07/2001 000049-994764 4057 06/08/2001 000049-994764

12441 06/08/2001 000049-994764

48 219

$12.00 $54.75 $0.68

406206/11/2001 000049-994764 400506/1212001 000049-994764

12

$3.00 $13.88

Page: 4

Barker, Rodems & Cook. P A.

0612412002 12:19pm

Expense Listing
listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Ace Cash Express Date Range: 12101/2000 - 06/24/2002

Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced

4087 0611212001 000049-994764 4091 06/1212001 000049-994764 410606/1212001 000049994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Facsimiles Facsimiles Postage Facsimiles Facsimiles Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Long Distance Telephone Calls Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Office of the Comptroller Copy Services Postage Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page

2 4

$1.00 $2.00 $0.68

$1.00 $2.00 $0.68 $2.00 $8.00 $1.65 $2.25 $8.00 $0.33 $4.50 $0.50 $0.34 $5.00 $2.46 $22.00 $4.50 $1.00 $1.00 $0.50 $0.50 $173.10 $0.68 $0.34 $2.50 $1.50 $326.50

4141 06/1212001 000049-994764

414406/12/2001 000049-994764 416206/1212001 000049-994764

4 16

$2.00 $8.00 $1.65

4184 06/12/2001 000049994764

418606/1212001 000049-994764 412406/13/2001 000049-994764 4225 06/14/2001 000049-994764 4216 06/15/2001 000049-994764 4259 06/15/2001 000049-994764 4321 06/15/2001 000049-994764 434006/15/2001 000049-994764 4405 06/15/2001 000049-994764 441006/15/2001 000049-994764 441406/18/2001 000049994764

9 32

$2.25 $8.00 $0.33

9 2

$4.50 $0.50 $0.34

20

$5.00 $2.46

S
S S

44 9 2 2

$22.00 $4.50 $1.00 $1.00 $0.50 $0.50 $173.10 $0.68 $0.34

4417 06/19/2001 000049-994764

4422 06/19/2001 000049-994764 4463 06/20/2001 000049-994764 4294 06/21/2001 000049-994764 4384 06/21/2001 000049-994764 438606/21/2001 000049-994764 4465 06/21/2001. 000049994764

S
S S S

S S S
S S

5 6 1306

$2.50 $1.50 $326.50

4484 06/21/2001 000049-994764

4500 06/21/2001 000049-994764

Page: 5

Barl<er. Rodems & Cook. P.A.

0612412002 12:19pm

Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Ace Cash Express Date Range: 12101/2000 - 06/24/2002

Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced

4492 06/25/2001 000049-994764 4514 06/25/2001 000049-994764 4520 06/25/2001 000049-994764 4529 06/25/2001 000049-994764 4541 06/25/2001 000049-994764 4546 06/25/2001 000049-994764 4494 06/26/2001 000049-994764 4733 06/26/2001 000049-994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Postage Facsimiles Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Berryhill & Associates, Inc. - Deposition Fee Berryhill & Associates, Inc. - Deposition Fee Facsimiles William J. Cook - Parking Expense Postage FedEx Shipping Charges Facsimiles Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles William J. Cook - Travel Expense- Hotel/Airline Photocopies @ .25 per page Comptroller, State of Florida - Copy Services Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage

76 77

$19.00 $19.25 $3.12 $0.34

$19.00 $19.25 $3.12 $0.34 $7.50 $3.00 $24.50 $140.00 $50.00 $1.00 $24.00 $0.68 $22.88 $2.00 $0.68 $3.00 $0.50 $1.00 $601.10 $2.00 S59.10 SO.75 SO.68 $1.00 $4.25 $1.14

15 6 98

$7.50 $3.00 $24.50 $140.00 $50.00

4734 06127/2001 000049-994764

474507/0212001 000049-994764 4757 07/03/2001 000049-994764 5231 07/03/2001 000049-994764 5233 07/03/2001 000049-994764 4847 07/05/2001 000049-994764 483607/06/2001 000049-994764 4854 07/06/2001 000049-994764

$1.00 $24.00 $0.68 $22.88

$2.00 $0.68

6 2 2

$3.00 $0.50 $1.00 $601.10

488607/0612001 000049-994764
4861 07/09/2001 000049-994764 4970 07/11/2001 000049-994764 5043 07111/2001 000049-994764 5321 07111/2001 000049-994764 5047 07/1212001 000049-994764 511307/1212001 000049-994764 525907/1212001 000049-994764 529207/17/2001 000049-994764 5304 07/17/2001 000049-994764

$2.00 $59.10

SO.75 $0.68

2 17

$1.00 $4.25 $1.14

Page: 6

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Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Ace Cash Express Date Range: 12101/200006/24/2002

Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced $2.25 $128.28 244 10 40 $61.00 $5.00 $10.00 $9.45 5 7 6 $2.50 $3.50 $3.00 $2.52 110 5 $27.50 $2.50 $0.86 2 $0.50 $20.68 $0.12 51 $12.75 $62.28 35 6 3 $8.75 $3.00 $1.50 $50.00 $2.25 $128.28 $61.00 $5.00 $10.00 $9.45 $2.50 $3.50 $3.00 $2.52 $27.50 $2.50 $0.86 $0.50 $20.68 $0.12 $12.75 $62.28 $8.75 $3.00 $1.50 $50.00 $0.25 $2.50 $0.34 $15.08

5333 07/20/2001 000049-994764 5337 07/20/2001 000049994764 5644 07/25/2001 000049-994764 5620 07/26/2001 000049994764 5658 07/30/2001 000049-994764 5692 07/30/2001 000049-994764 567607/31/2001 000049-994764 571908/01/2001 000049-994764 5723 08/01/2001 000049-994764 5706 08/0212001 000049994764 578608/0212001 000049994764 5738 08/03/2001 000049-994764 6023 08/14/2001 000049994764 6277 08/15/2001 000049-994764 651608/31/2001 000049-994764 6739 09/13/2001 000049-994764 693509/13/2001 000049-994764 6851 09/21/2001 000049-994764 7142 09/27/2001 000049994764 718609/28/2001 000049-994764 7266 10101/2001 000049-994764
7428 10103/2001 000049-994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Legal Research Legal Research Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Department of Banking and Finance Copy Services Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Long Distance Telephone Calls Photocopies @ .25 per page FedEx Shipping Charges Long Distance Telephone Calls Photocopies @ .25 per page Legal Research Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Facsimiles Berryhill & Associates, Inc. - Miscellaneous charges Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Postage FedEx Shipping Charges

7507 10103/2001 000049-994764 7315 10104/2001 000049-994764 7611 10/11/2001 000049-994764 7578 10/15/2001 000049994764

1
5

$0.25 $2.50 $0.34 $15.08

Page: 7

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0612412002 12:19pm

Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, CHent-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Ace Cash Express Date Range: 12101/2000 - 06/24/2002

Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced 2 3

7747 10/1612001 000049-994764 7940 10/24/2001 000049-994764

8399 11/09/2001 000049-994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Facsimiles Facsimiles Postage Facsimiles Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Berryhill & Associates, Inc. - Deposition Fee Clerk of Court, Second District Court of Appeal - Filing Fee Clerk of the Circuit Court, Thirteenth Circuit - Filing Fee Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Legal Research Facsimiles Postage Facsimiles Facsimiles Berryhill & Associates, Inc. - Deposition Fee Berryhill & Associates, Inc. - Deposition Fee Facsimiles Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page

$1.00 $1.50
$3.78

$1.00 $1.50
$3.78

8408 11/09/2001 000049-994764

8411 11/09/2001 000049-994764 8439 11/09/2001 000049-994764 8494 11/09/2001 000049-994764

3 24 90

$1.50 $12.00 $22.50 $168.00 $250.00 $156.00

$1.14

$1.50 $12.00 $22.50 $168.00 $250.00 $156.00

$1.14 $6.25 $4.54

8427 11/13/2001 000049-994764

8428 11/13/2001 000049-994764

8490 11/13/2001 000049-994764 8577 11/13/2001 000049-994764 8468 11/14/2001 000049-994764 8609 11/20/2001 000049-994764 8657 11/27/2001 000049-994764 8697 11/27/2001 000049-994764 9196 1211212001 000049-994764 9067 12/13/2001 000049-994764 9199 12114/2001 000049-994764 9259 12117/2001 000049-994764 9260 1211712001 000049-994764 9473 12117/2001 000049-994764
9326 12118/2001 000049-994764

25

$6.25 $4.54

$0.50 $0.34
2 2

$0.50 $0.34 $1.00 $1.00 $151.00 $126.50 $4.50 $13.50 $308.25 $2.00
$1.36

$1.00 $1.00 $151.00 $126.50

9 27 1233 4

$4.50 $13.50 $308.25 $2.00

$1.36

S S
S

9389 12118/2001 000049-994764 9439 12118/2001 000049-994764 9575 01/0212002 000049-994764 9643 01/0212002 000049-994764

S S S
S

12

$3.00
$2.39

$3.00
$2.39

24

$6.00

$6.00

Page: 8

Barker. Rodems & Cook. P.A.

0612412002 12:19pm

Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Ace Cash Express Date Range: 12101/2000 - 06/24/2002

Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced 6 2 3 $1.50 $1.00 $1.50 $2.85 7 30 3 2 2 $3.50 $7.50 $1.50 $1.00 $1.00 $0.34 $2.04 $2.39 36 56 40 $9.00 $14.00 $20.00 $2.85 $5.59 $1.19 7 $3.50 $0.95 $5.00 29 6 $7.25 $3.00 $3.75 18 5 $9.00 $2.50 $1.50 $1.00 $1.50 $2.85 $3.50 $7.50 $1.50 $1.00 $1.00 $0.34 $2.04 $2.39 $9.00 $14.00 $20.00 $2.85 $5.59 $1.19 $3.50 $0.95 $5.00 $7.25 $3.00 $3.75 $9.00 $2.50

964601/04/2002 000049-994764 9703 01/04/2002 000049-994764 9708 01/07/2002 000049994764 9773 01/10/2002 000049994764
9893 01/10/2002 000049-994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Facsimiles Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Long Distance Telephone Calls Postage Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Postage Legal Research Long Distance Telephone Calls Facsimiles Long Distance Telephone Calls Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Postage Facsimiles Facsimiles

991401/10/2002000049-994764 981001/15/2002000049-994764 981801/16/2002000049-994764 982801/17/2002000049-994764 9837 01/21/2002 000049-994764 9993 01/22/2002 000049-994764 9995 01/2212002 000049-994764 1027901/23/2002000049-994764 1007501/25/2002000049-994764 1012601/25/2002000049-994764 1020501/25/2002000049-994764
10449 0211212002 000049-994764 10467 0211212002 000049-994764

10800 02128/2002 000049994764 1097203/11/2002000049994764 1101603/11/2002000049994764 11042 03/11/2002 000049994764 11179 03/13/2002 000049-994764
11341 03/24/2002 000049-994764

11357 03/24/2002 000049-994764 1145503/29/2002 000049994764

Page: 9

Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.

0612412002 12:19pm

Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Malter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE MaUer: Ace Cash Express Date Range: 12101/2000 - 06/24/2002 Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced

11679 04/0112002 000049-994764 11985 04/15/2002 000049994764 12024 04/15/2002 000049-994764 12229 04/15/2002 000049-994764 1209004/17/2002 000049-994764 12104 04/18/2002 000049-994764 1211404/2212002000049-994764

S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S

Facsimiles Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page IKON Office Solutions - Copy Services Postage Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Gasper J. Ficarrotta - Mediation Fee Facsimiles Facsimiles

$1.00 $0.68

$1.00 $0.68 $1.50 $0.75 $1.50 $8.50 $4.50 $2.50 $2.50 $22.25 $172.32 $29.04 $2.64 $0.50 $4.00 $1.00 $4.50 $4.50 $4.50 $2.50 $344.00 $1.00 $2.00 $4,901.69

3 3 3 17 9 5 5 89

$1.50 $0.75 $1.50 $8.50 $4.50 $2.50 $2.50 $22.25 $172.32 $29.04 $2.64

12122 04/2212002 000049-994764

12125 04/23/2002 000049-994764

12242 04/25/2002 000049-994764

12259 04/25/2002 000049994764

12282 04/25/2002 000049-994764

12287 04/26/2002 000049-994764

12313 04/26/2002 000049-994764

12780 05/15/2002 000049-994764 12790 05/16/2002 000049-994764 12924 05/17/2002 000049-994764 12925 05/20/2002 000049-994764

2 8 2 9 9 9 5

$0.50 $4.00 $1.00 $4.50 $4.50 $4.50 $2.50 $344.00

13218 06/03/2002 000049-994764

13225 06/04/2002 000049-994764 1345906/1212002000049-994764 13371 06/13/2002 000049-994764 1347906/17/2002000049-994764

2 4 Transaction Listing Total:

$1.00 $2.00 $4,901.69

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STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE
AND
OFFICE OF THE AnORNEY GENERAL
IN RE: ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC. d/b/a ACE AMERICA'S CASH EXPRESS,

DBF CASE NO.: 9177-F-9/02

----------------I
SETILEMENT AGREEMENT The Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Finance

("DBF"), the Office of the Attorney General (UAttorney General") and ACE Cash Express, Inc. d/b/a ACE America's Cash Express ("Respondent" or "ACE") agree as follows: 1. JURISDICTION. OBF is charged \vith the administration of Chapter 516, 560,

and 687, Florida Statutes~ and the Attorney General is charged \vith the administration of
~

Chapters 501, 559, 687, 895" and 896, Florida Statutes. This agreement applies to Florida

transactions only.
2. BACKGROUND.

Attorney General

a.

The Attorney General moved to intervene as plaintiff in two civil cases

that were pending against ACE~ contending that ACE had violated Chapters 501, 516, 559,
560~

. 687, 895, and 896, Florida Statutes, in connection with deferred

(~Jenlellt aJld Neil

deposit check cashing services.provided by ACE in Florida prior to ApriL.2000. Those cases are: Eugene I~.

Gille.\pie alld ..~'tate ofFlorida, .

Office qfthe Atlorlley Gellert,l, Depllrtnlent ofLegal Affairs liS. ACE Cash Express. IIIC., Allerilative FinclJlcia/,
IIIC J~'

ofthe Treas11re

(~oast,

Il1e., Raymond

c. Henln1ig, DOllold H. Neusll1dl. Kll)' I). Zilliox, J~()l1l1/d J. Schmitt, and unknowl1
FINAL

21

entities Gnd individuals, (~oll.\oli,ll1'ed (~clse No. 99 09730, in the Circuit Court for

the Thirteenth Judicial District of Florida (the "Clement" case); and Betls v. Ace

Cash Expr~'s, 927 So.2d 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), (the "Betts" case). DBF was
not a named party in either case.

b.

ACE and the other defendants disagreed with the claims made by the

Plaintiffs and the Attorney General in each of those cases.

c. d. The Attorney General's Inotion to intervene in the Betts case was denied. In the Clement case, the individual Plaintiffs' clailns were dismissed with

prejudice, leaving the Attorney General as the sole Plaintiff. The Attorney

General's RICO claims were dislnissed with prejudice and are subject ofa
pending appeal before the Second District Coul1 of AppeaJ of Florida styled ..')tate

ofFlorida, Qffice ofthe AI/oriley General v. Zilliox, Case No. 2002-2340

(consolidated with Case No. 2002-3] 13). All of the claims asserted by the

Attorney General in' the Clement case are to be settled pursuant to this

Agreement, with the Attorney General voluntarily dismissing their claims.

e. ACE 'and the individual defendants have denied and continue to deny that

they engaged in any wrongdoing., and this Agreement shall not constitute any adlnission of any wrongdoing or liability on the part of ACE or any of the individual defendants. f.

The, Attorney General and ACE wish to avoid the time and expense

involved, in further litigation.

FINAL

Department of Banking and Finance g. Goleta National Bank, a national bank located in Goleta, California

("Goleta"), has offered loans to residents of Florida since April 2000. ACE has provided agency services to Goleta related to those loans in Florida. On October 25 and 28, 2002. ACE and Goleta entered into separate consent orders with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States ("OCC"), pursuant to which Goleta agreed, among other things, to generally cease the origination, renewal and rollover of its loans in Florida and ACE agreed, among other things, to generally cease providing services to Goleta related to the origination, renewal and rollover of such Goleta loans, both by no later than December 31, 2002. Goleta, ACE and the OC..c agreed that the loans provided by Goleta and serviced by ACE were made pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 85 and that the interest rate charged by Goleta was permissible under the laws of the United States for national banks located in the State of California. DBF was not a party to the agreement between Goleta, ACE, and the OCC.. h. ACE also offers a bill paying service through which it offers to accept or

receive voluntary utility payments from its Florida customers and, for a fee, electronically transmit the payment to the utility. The DBF has informed ACE that to offer this service, ACE should be licensed as a Funds Transmitter under Part II, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes. ACE disagrees with the position taken by the DBF, but, to avoid the expense and uncertainty of litigation. ACE agreed to file, and has pending with OBF. an application to act as a Funds Transmitter

FINAL

..,

under Part II.. Chapter 560, Florida Statutes. The DBF will issue that license, as well as the license authorizing ACE to act as a Deferred Presentment Provider

under Part IV, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, on or before the effective date ofthis Agreement. Ace agrees that future transactions involving the transmission of
funds will be governed by the provisions of Part II, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes,
and ACE will comply with those provisions in all future transactions.

i.

ACE is licensed with DBF as a Check Casher under Part III, Chapter 560,

Florida Statutes.

Pu roose and Intent

J.

The parties wish to resolve and to release any clailns that were asserted, or

could have been asserted, or could be asserted, because of or arising from the
investigation, litigation, pr regulatory review conducted by the DBV or the

Attorney General.

k.
I.

The DBF agrees that ACE has fully cooperated with it in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that this agreement be implemented promptly,

and without injury or inconvenience to ACE customers. m. It is. the intent of the parties that OBF issue or renew any authorization or
contin~le

license necessary for ACE to

to offer services in Florida, including

9

deferred presentment transactions.. check cashing, bill paying debit card transactions, money orders~ wire transfers and other products that are authorized under Florida law. n. It 'is the intent of the parties that this agreement be implemented without

causing competitive disadvantage to ACE..

FINAL

3.

CONSIDERATION. ACE, the DSF, and the Attorney General agree as follows:
8.

ACE will cease providing agent services to Goleta in connection with the

origination,:'-enewal, or rollover of any Goleta loans in the State of Florida by December 31, 2002. ACE may, howevef, continue to provide services to Goleta related to the servicing and collection of Goleta loans originated, renewed, or rolled overin the State of Florida before January 1,
3(g) below.
2~03,

subject to paragraph

b.

ACE has applied

fOf..

and DBF agrees to issue upon the issuance of the

final order contelnplated by this agreelnent, a license with an effective date of

December 30, 2002, authorizing ACE to act as a Deferred Presentment Provider under Part IV, Chapter
560~

Florida Statutes. ACE agr,ees not to enter into any

deferred presentment trapsactions in Florida unless such deferred presentment transactions are completed in accordance with Part IV-, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes. DBF agrees that ACE may act as a Deferred Presentment Provider under
Part IV, Chapter 560.. Florida Statutes, and as a Funds Transmitter under Part II,

Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, between December 30, 2002 and the issuance of the final' order, provided that all such funds transmission .and .deferred presentment transactions engaged in during this tilne period are otherwise completed in
accordance with Part II, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, and Part IV, Chapter 560,

Florida Statutes. OBF agrees that this is consistent with the public interest and will not constitute a violation of this Agreement or any applicable law, including

but not limited t0

~hapters

501 . 516,559,560,687,895 and 896, Florida

Statutes, or an Rules related to those statutes.

FINAL

c.

ACE represents and warrants that it has obtained the consent of Goleta so

that no Goleta loans entered into before 'the effective date of this Agreement will be extendect (except for the custolners' five-day extension options that are part of

the terms of outstanding loans) or converted, without full payment by the Goleta
loan

customers, to any other type of transaction. Where applicable., ACE agrees

that it will not otler deferred presentlnent services to a Goleta loan customer

unless that customer's Goleta loan is r~paid or cancelled in accordance with paragraph 3(g)-below. DBF agrees that the continued services provided under the Goleta loan prograln authorized by this subp~ragraph and by paragraph 3(a) above are consistent with the public interest and will not constitute a violation of this Agreement or any applicable
law~

including but not lilnited to, Chapters 501,

516.. 559, 560, 687, 8951lnd 896, Florida Statutes., or any Rules related to those
statutes.

d.

DBF agrees to issue to ACE licenses pursuant to Part II, Chapter 560,

Florida Statutes, and Part IV, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, with an effective date of December 30, 2002 upon the issuance of the final order contemplated in this Agreement. ACE and the DSF agree that, until the issuance of the final ord~r contemplated in this. agreement.. ACE will continue to offer its bill paying service in order to avoid injury to those customers who rely on that service. DBF and the Attorney General agree that continuing to offer that service is consistent with the public interest and will not constitute a violation of this Agreement or any applicable law, including but not limited to, Chapters 501 . 516, 559, 560, 687, 895, and 896.. Florida Statutes, or any Rules related to those statutes.

FINAL

e.

DBF acknowledges that no additional in.formation is needed from ACE for

it to issue the Ijcenses contemplated by this Agreement..

f:
ACe agrees to pay a total of $500,000 in settlement and for issuance by

DBF of authorizations, licenses, or other approvals necessary for ACE to continue

in business in Florida, and for the releases in paragraphs 7 and 8 below. Of the $500.000 total settlelnent, ACE has agreed to pay $250,000 to the DBF Regulatory Trust Fund in full satisfaction of all attorney's fees, costs, and other expenses incurred by the DBF in connection with this matter and, ACE has agreed to deliver to the Attorney General, a contribution of$250,000 to the Florida State University College of Law in full satisfaction of all attorney's fees, costs and other expenses incurred by the Attorney General in connection with this matter. These amounts will be p~id by check, and will be delivered to the DBF or the Attorney General upon entry of the Final Order as provided for herein.
g.
ACE represents and warrants that it has obtained the consent of Goleta so

that loans that are delinquent as of October I, 2002. and remain unpaid as of the

effective date of this agreement, from customers who engaged in Goleta loan
transactions commenced or originated before October I, 2002 in Florida

(collectively" the "Goleta Loan Custonlers") need not be repaid,. and the debt owed to Goleta from Goleta Loan Customers will be cancelled. h. If Goleta, either directly or through ACE, its agent,. .has notified a credit-

reporting agency ofa Goleta Loan Customer's delinquent debt to Goleta, then

ACE represents and warrants that it has obtained the consent of Goleta for ACE to
notify the credit agency that the delinquent amount has been cancelled. .

FINAL

I.

In addition to the amount specified in paragraph 3(f) above, ACE will pay

up to $15,000 for an independent audit of the loan cancellations provided in paragraph ~g) above, the credit reporting notifications provided in paragraph 3 (h) above, and verification of compliance with the transition from the Goleta loan product to the state licensed product contemplated in paragraph 3(b) and 3(c) above. DBF will select the independent auditor, after consultation with ACE. The independent auditor selected will be required to report to the DBF within 90 days of the selection.

j.

The entry ofa Final Order by OBF in the form of the Attachment to this

agreement.
k.

Within 10 days after the entry of the final order contemplated herein, the

Attorney General will di~miss with prejudice its lawsuit, Eugene R. Clement alld

Neil Gillespie and State ofFlorida. qffice ofthe Attorney General, Department of Legal Affairs vs. ACE Cash Express, IIlC., Altemative Financial, Inc., JS ofthe . Treasure Coast, blc.,.Raymond C. Hemmig, DOllald H. Neustadt, Kay D. Zil/iox, Ronald J. Schmitt, alld unknown emilies and iJ~dividllals. Consolidated Case No.
9909730, in the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District of Florida, as to

all defendants.

1.

Within 10 days after the entry of the final order contemplated in 30)

above, the Attorney General will dismiss with prejudice its appeal of any orders in the Clement case..litigation. including State ofFlorida, Office ofthe Attorney

General v. Zi//iox, Case No. 2002-2240 and Slale ofFlorida, Office ofthe Attomey Gener,,1 1'. AItematil;e FiflCI/lc:i"t, /flC., Case No. 2002-3113.

FINAL

4.

CONSENT. Without adlnitting or denying any wrongdoing, Respondent

consents to the issuance by the DBF ofa Final Order, in substantially the form of the attached Final Order, which incorp~rates the terms of this Agreelnent. 5. FINAL ORDER. The Final Order incorporating this Agreelnent is issued

pursuant to Subsection 120.57(4),. Florida Statutes, and upon its issuance shall be a final administrative order.

6.

WAIVERS. Respondent knowingly and voluntarily waives:

a.

its right to an adlninistrative hearing provided for by Chapter 120, Florida

Statutes,. to contest the specific agreements included in this Agreement; b.

any requirelnent that the Final Order incorporating this Agreenlent contain

separately stated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Notice of Rights; c. its right to the isslJance ofa Recommended Order by an administrative law

judge froln the Division of Adlninistrative Hearings or froln the DBF;

d.

any and all rights to object to or challenge in any judicial proceeding,

including but not limited to, an appeal pursuant to Section 120.68.. Florida Statutes, any aspect, provision or requirement concerning the content, issuance, procedure or timeliness of the Final Order incorporating this Agreement; and e. any causes of action in law or in equity, which Respondent may have

arising out of the specific matters addressed in this agreement. DBF for itself and the DBF.Released Parties,
ac~epts

this release and waiver by Respondent without

in any way acknowledging or admitting that any such calise of action does or may
exist, and DBF, for ~tself and the DBF Released Parties, expressly denies that any

such right or cause of action does in .fact exist.

FINAL

7.

ATIORNEY GENERAL

R~LEASE.

The Attorney Genera]9 for himselfand

his predecessors. successors and assigns, hereby waives, releases and forever discharges ACE, its predecessors, successors, aniliates, subsidiaries and parent corporations, shareholders, directors, officers, attorneys, employees, agents.. franchisees and assigns, and Goleta, and its predecessors, successors, affiliates, subsidiaries and parent corporations, shareholders, directors, officers, attorneys, employees, agents, franchisees and assigns (collecti,vely, the "ACE Released Parties"), from any and all claims, demands.. causes of action.. suits, debts, dues.. duties, sums of money, accounts, fees, penalties, damages, judglnents'l 'Iiabi-tities and obligations, both contingent and

fixed, known and unknown.. foreseen and unforeseen. anticipated and unanticipated, expected
and unexpected, related to or arising out of Goleta's or ACE's operations in Florida prior to the effective date of this agreement. This release includes.. but is not limited to, any claims related to any loans
made~

renewed, or rolled over.bY Goleta in Florida and any services provided by ACE

or its franchisees related thereto.. any clainls related to any violation of Chapters 501,516,559,
560,687, 772, 895 and 896, Florida ,\'la{lIle:~', any clailns related to check cashing services

provided prior to the effective date of Part IV, Chapter 560, Florida L~'ta/lites, and any claims related to any licensing requirements for the services provided by ACE to its customers in Florida prior to the effective date of this agreement. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, this release also includes all claims asserted or that could have been or could be asserted against the parties named as defendants or that could have been named as defendants in

ElIgel1e R Clen1ell1 alld Neil Gi//eSlJie clIld ,~'taJe (!f Flori,la,

Departn1!11t ofLegal A.ffairs liS.
A(~E (~ash

(~ffice

of the Att()rlley Gel/era!, .

[IIC.,

Ex/Jress.

IIIC.,

A/JerI/alive Financial,

,)5' a/the

rreaS!,re (;oast. IIIC., Raynl011d (~. !-!enlnlig, [Jollald H. Neustadt. Kay [J. Zilliox, ROl1ald J.
~'chn1itt, GIld l1111a,OlVII

entities and iJ,divi,hlllls,

(~ol/.\()lidalc!LI (~"se

No. 99 09730. ACE, for itself

FINAL

10

and on behalf of the ACE Released Parties, accepts this release and waiver by the Attorney General without in any way acknowledging or adlnitting that any such cause of action does or
may exist, and ACE, for it~lf and on behalf of the ACE Released Parties, expressly denies that

any such right or cause of action does in fact exist. Respondent hereby waives~ releases and

forever discharges the Attorney General and his respective employees.. agents, and
representatives (collectively, the Attorney'General Released Parties") from any causes of action'
lL

in law or in equity, which Respondent may have arising out of the specific matters addre~sed in
this agreement. The Attorney General, for themselves and the Attorney General Released Parties, accept this release and waiver by Respondent without in any way acknowledging' or admitting that any such cause of action does or may exist, the Attorney General, for himself and the Attorney General Released Parties, expressly deny that any such right or cause of action does in fact exist. 8. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE RELEASE. The DBF, for

itself and its predecessors, successors and assigns, hereby waives, releases and forever discharges ACE and its predecessors, successors, subsidiaries and parent corporations, shareholders, directors, officers, attorneys, elnployees, agents, franchisees andass-igns, and Goleta, and its predecessors.. successors, affiliates, subsidiaries and parent corporations, shareholders, directors, officers, attorneys.. employees, agents, franchisees and assigns (collectively, the "ACE Released Parties"), froln any and all claims, demands, causes of action,

suits, debts, dues, duties, sums of money, accounts, fees, penalties, damages.. judgments,
liabilities and obligations, both contingent and fixed, known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen, anticipated and un.anticipated, expected and unexpect~d, related to or arising out of the conduct of ACE and/or Goleta in connection with the offering of deferred presentment

FINAL

11

services or loans in Florida~ \vhere such conduct occurred prior to the effective date of this Agreement.. This release includes.. but is not liJnited to, any claims related to any.loans made, renewed, or rolled over by poleta in 'Florida and any services provided by ACE or its franchisees related thereto, any claims related to any violation of Chapters 501, 516, 559, 560,687, 772, 895 and 896, Florida LS'tatllles.. any claims related to check cashing selVices provided prior to the effective date of Part IV, Chapter 560, F/orid(J ." Illlllles, and any claims related to any licensing requirements for the services provided by ACE to its custolners in Florida prior to the effective date of this Agreelnent. ACE, for itself and on behalf of the ACE Released Parties, accept this release and waiver by the Attorney General and the DBF without in any way acknowledging or adtnitting that any such cause of action does or may
exist~

and ACE for itself and on behalf of

9

the ACE Released Parties, expressly denies that any such right or cause of action does in fact
exist.

9.

EXCLUSION. This release does not include any claiIns under Chapter 560,

Florida Statutes, against franchisees of ACE related to deferred presentment transactions

engaged in after the effective date of Part IV.. Chapter 560" Florida Statutes, unless such transactions were under the Goleta loan program.
10. ATTORNEYS' FEES. Each party to this Agreement shalJ be solely
respon~ible

for its separate costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution, defense or negotiation in this matter up to entry of the Final Order incorporating this Agreelnent and the dismissals by the

Attorney General provided for in 3 (k) and 3 (I) above.

11. 12.
EFFECTIVE DATE. The effective date of this agreement is December ~O, 2002. FAILURE TO COMPLY. Nothing in this Agreelnent limits Respondent's right

to contest any finding or determination made by DBF or the Attorney General concerning

FINAL

12

Respondent's alleged failure to comply with any of the terms and provisions ofthis Agreement or of the Final Order incorporating this Agreement. WHEREFORE. in consid~ration of the foregoing. DBF. the Attorney General. and ACE execute this Agreement on the dates indicated below. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE

By:

Qrt"~~
D N SAXON Division Director

Date:

OFFICE 0t) By:

~ ~

TR ~'IT~~ENERAL
Date:

RICHARD DORAN. Attorney General

ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., d/b/a ACE AMERICA'S CASH EXPRESS By: ERIC C. NORRINGTON Vice President STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF _ BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority. personally appeared as
--'-~

Date:

of ACE CASH EXPRESS. TNC.. d/b/a ACE AMERICA'S CASH

EXPRESS, who is personally known to me or who has produced _ _ _ _ _ _--'as identification. and who. after being duly sworn. states that he

has read and understands the contents of this Agreement and voluntarily executed the same on behalfof ACE CASH EXPRESS. INC.. d/b/a ACE AMERICA'S CASH EXPRESS.

FINAL

13

Respondent's alleged failure to comp1y ~itl1 any of the tenns arid provisions of this Agreement
or of the Final Order incorporating this Agreement. WHEREFORE. in considiration of the foregoing, DBF, the Attome}" General, and ACE
1.

execute this Agreement on the dates indicated below.

DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE

By:

Date:

DON SAXON Division Director

OFFICE OF
By:

YG~NERAL

Date:

RICHARD DORAN, Attorney General

ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., d/b/a ACE A RICA'S CASH EXPRESS
By:

Date:

STATE OF FLORlDA

COUNTY OF - - -
BEFORE ME\ the -undersigned authority, personally appeared
as

of ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., dIo/a ACE AMERICA"S CASH

EXPRESS, who is personally known to me or \vho has produced

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ as identification, and who, after being duly sworn, states that he

has read and understands th-e contents ofthis Agreement and voluntarily executed the same on behalf of ACE CASH EXPRE-SS. INC., d/b/a ACE AMERICA'8 CASH EXPRESS.

FINAL

13

SWORN AND SUBSCRI.BED before me this _ _ day of

, 2002.

NOTARY PUBLIC
State of Florida
Print Nalne:
My COlnlnission No.:
My C0111111ission Expires:
(SEAL)

FINAL

14

ACE Cash Express, Inc.

1231 Greenway Drive #600

A"CE
NUMBER

AIoIf",.. "iC<\JIr'",'Ue

Irving, Texas 75038 (972) 550-5000

INVOICE DATE

COMMENT

GROSS

DEDUCTION

AMOUNT PAID

12123/02

12123/02

Settlement

250,000.00

250.000.00

PAYMENT ADVICE
WELLS FARGO BANK

A
PAY

ACE Cash Express, Inc.

1231 Greenway Drive #600 Irving, Texas 75038 (972) 550-5000

CHECK NUMBER

005132
AMOUNT

AC E

DATE

AMf'CA'S GuN UJlfUJe

12/19/02

$**....*'***~50.000.00

Two Hundred Fifty Thousand

00/1 00 dollars**....*****************..*************************'*******....*****..*******'**'*

TO THE ORDER OF

Flordia State University College of Law 425 West Jefferson Street

Tallahassee, FL 32306

.~

liP liP

II

00 5 Ii :I 211

I: ~

~ ~0 ~

? a ? 0 I: .. ? 5 ~

b 3 00 118 118

BARKER, RODEMS
CHRIS A. BARKER RY AN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS WILLIAM J. COOK JEFFREY W. GIBSON

& COOK
Telephone 813/489-1001 Facsimile 813/489-1008

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION ATTORNEYS AT LAW

300 West Platt Street, Suite 150

Talupa, Florida 33606

May 9,2003

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie 301 'v\,Test Platt Street, 1"~0. 155 Tampa, Florida 33606 Dear Neil: Pursuant to your request, I am enclosing a copy of our expenses from the Amscot case. You did not receive one of these when you settled your case because you were not required to pay any expenses out of your settlement. As you know, the Defendant paid our fees and costs separately. Also, our fonner finn advised us that it incurred expenses of$2,544.79. I was good to hear from you. I hope everything is going well. Sincerely,

William J. Cook WJC:SDW Enclosure

22

Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Clement v. Amscot Date Range: 12101/2000 - 05/09/2003 Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced Description Postage Postage Photocopies Photocopies Photocopies Photocopies Facsimiles Postage Photocopies Long Distance Telephone Calls Photocopies Postage Postage Photocopies Postage Photocopies Postage Photocopies Postage Postage Photocopies Photocopies Postage Photocopies Facsimiles Postage 2 33 6 8 2 4 270 8

[R;~ordl

Date

CllentMatter

~I
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

~I
$1.43 $1.43 $0.25 $0.25 $67.50 $2.00 $0.50 $0.68 $1.00 $0.05 $0.50 $0.34 $0.34 $2.00 $0.68 $1.50 $0.34 $0.25 $0.34 $0.34 $8.25 $0.25 $0.34 $0.50 $1.00 $0.34 $1.43 $1.43 $0.25 $0.25 $67.50 $2.00 $0.50 $0.68 $1.00 $0.05 $0.50 $0.34 $0.34 $2.00 $0.68 $1.50 $0.34 $0.25 $0.34 $0.55 $8.25 $0.25 $0.34 $0.50 $1.00 $0.34

223 01108/2001 000049-994766 22601/08/2001 000049-994766

659 01/0812001 000049-994766

660 01/08/2001 000049-994766 663 01/08/2001 000049-994766

680 01/0812001 000049-994766

84 01/10/2001 000049-994766 231 01/10/2001 000049-994766 47901110/2001 000049-994766 177201/10/2001 000049-994766 485 01/11/2001 000049-994766 172 01/11/2001 000049-994766

162 01/1212001 000049-994766 530 01/1212001 000049-994766

15301/16/2001 000049-994766 511 01/16/2001 000049-994766 21901/18/2001 000049-994766 59701/18/2001 000049-994766 304 01/22/2001 000049-994766 31201/22/2001 000049-994766 60601/22/2001 000049-994766 609 01/2212001 000049-994766 31901/23/2001 000049-994766 558 01/23/2001 000049-994766 107 01/26/2001 000049-994766 36301/26/2001 000049-994766

Page: 1

Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.

05109/2003 12:33pm

Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Clement v. Amscot Date Range: 12101/2000 - 05/09/2003 Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced

I';e;;d]

Date

Client-Matter

~
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P Photocopies Postage Photocopies Legal Research Legal Research Legal Research Postage Postage Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles

DescriptIon

--~----

Units

Our Coat
$40.50 $1.18

Client Cost

733 01126/2001 000049-994766 44801/30/2001 000049-994766 69901/30/2001 000049-994766 119901/31/2001 000049-994766 1210 01/31/2001 000049-994766 1212 01/31/2001 000049-994766 657 02/01/2001 000049-994766 834 02/05/2001 000049-994766 849 02105/2001 000049-994766 872 02105/2001 000049-994766 864 02106/2001 000049-994766 899 02106/2001 000049-994766 1062 02107/2001 000049-994766 100402108/2001 000049-994766 117402114/2001 000049-994766 1259 02/14/2001 000049-994766 126702115/2001 000049-994766 1291 02115/2001 000049-994766 1393 0212212001 000049-994766 1464 02122/2001 000049-994766 1680 03/0212001 000049-994766 169903/0212001 000049-994766 1945 03/07/2001 000049-994766 1932 03/1212001 000049-994766 2089 03/1212001 000049-994766 2091 03/1212001 000049-994766

162

$40.50 $1.18 $10.50 $15.72 $7.50 $26.21 $0.34 $0.89 $0.34 $3.50 $1.39 $15.50 $59.60 $1.00 $1.81 $20.00 $0.50 $0.34 $11.00 $2.00 $0.50 $0.34 $1.00 $0.76 $15.00 $1.50

42

$10.50 $15.72 $7.50 $26.21 $0.34 $0.89 $0.34

14

$3.50 $1.39 $15.50 $59.60 $1.00 $1.81

Regency Reporting Service. Inc. - Deposition Fee Facsimiles Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Susan O'Dell - Copy Services Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page

80 2

$20.00 $0.50 $0.34 $11.00

8 2

$2.00 $0.50 $0.34 $1.00 $0.76

60 6

$15.00 $1.50

Page: 2

Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.

05/0912003 12:33pm

Expense Listing

Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Clement v. Amscot Date Range: 12101/2000 - 05/09/2003 Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced - --- -'D;s~rl~tlo~------ - - - - - -. --~T _.

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2247 03/3112001 000049-994766

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$0.43 $5.00 $20.50 $2.75 $1.00 $7.04 $38.75 $468.42 $1.00 $1.50 $2.75 $147.25 $2.72 $0.34 $0.34 $468.42 $3.75 $1.10 $3.00 $4.00 $0.55 $187.10 $11.02 $6.00 $3.75 $0.55

Facsimiles 10 pages on 3/19 and 3/26 Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles 2 pages on 4/01 Chris Barker - Miscellaneous charges Legal Research Lexis IKON Document Services Copy Services Facsimiles Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Postage Postage Miscellaneous expenses Lit. Copys and binders Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Legal Research Legal Research Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage

2297 03/31/2001 000049-994766 2335 03/31/2001 000049-994766 2248 04/04/2001 000049-994766 2450 04/23/2001 000049-994766 2455 04/23/2001 000049-994766 2474 04/24/2001 000049-994766 277804/27/2001 000049-994766
2536 04/28/2001 000049-994766 2595 04/28/2001 000049-994766

2649 04/28/2001 000049-994766

2686 04/28/2001 000049-994766

2755 04/28/2001 000049-994766 2826 05/03/2001 000049-994766

2827 05/03/2001 000049-994766 3055 05/08/2001 000049-994766

3087 05/08/2001 000049-994766 315505/10/2001 000049-994766

3235 05/14/2001 000049-994766 334905/14/2001 000049-994766 318205/15/2001 000049-994766 3185 05/15/2001 000049-994766

3439 OS/22/2001 000049-994766 3585 OS/25/2001 000049-994766

3630 05/25/2001 000049-994766

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Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-MaUer Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Clement v. Amscot Date Range: 12101/2000 - 05/09/2003 Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced
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377905/29/2001 000049-994766 3676 05/31/2001 000049-994766 3714 06/01/2001 000049-994766 3742 06/01/2001 000049-994766 4023 06/1212001 000049-994766 4236 06/14/2001 000049-994766 463406/15/2001 000049-994766 4323 06/18/2001 000049-994766 4342 06/18/2001 000049-994766 4512 06/25/2001 000049-994766 4526 06/25/2001 000049-994766 4563 06/26/2001 000049-994766 4652 06/26/2001 000049-994766 4575 06/27/2001 000049-994766 4655 06/27/2001 000049-994766 4853 07105/2001 000049-994766 4835 07106/2001 000049-994766 4857 07106/2001 000049-994766 4890 07106/2001 000049-994766 4859 07109/2001 000049-994766 4957 07/10/2001 000049-994766 4984 07/10/2001 000049-994766 502807/10/2001 000049-994766 506507/10/2001 000049-994766 5087 07/10/2001 000049-994766
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Expense Listing
listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Clement v. Amscot Date Range: 12101/2000 - 05/09/2003 [ Record Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced Description Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page American Investigations Management Inc. - Deposition Fee Postage Legal Research Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Division of Administrative Hearings - Copy Services Legal Research Legal Research Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles 2 6 82 2 68 20 5 4 46 2 6

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509207/10/2001 000049-994766 5203 07/10/2001 000049-994766 531907/12/2001 000049-994766 5596 07/19/2001 000049-994766 5338 07/20/2001 000049-994766 5392 07/23/2001 000049-994766 5426 07/23/2001 000049-994766 5452 07/24/2001 000049-994766 5502 07/24/2001 000049-994766 5672 07/31/2001 000049-994766 5678 07/31/2001 000049-994766 568907/31/2001 000049-994766 5717 08/01/2001 000049-994766 5856 08/06/2001 000049-994766
5911 08/06/2001 000049-994766

5894 08/08/2001 000049-994766 5962 08/08/2001 000049-994766 612708/09/2001 000049-994766

6057 08/10/2001 000049-994766

5941 08/13/2001 000049-994766 5998 08/14/2001 000049994766

5999 08/14/2001 000049-994766 6087 08/14/2001 000049-994766

6191 08/14/2001 000049-994766 6181 08/15/2001 000049-994766 632708/16/2001 000049-994766

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Expense Listing

Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Clement v. Amscot Date Range: 12101/2000 - 05/09/2003 Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced Description Clerk of the Court, Middle District of Florida - Filing Fee Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Legal Research Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page IKON Document Services - Copy Services Postage FedEx Shipping Charges 78 2 27 3 96 60 18 3 4 2 6 14 4

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61870811712001 000049-994766 623408/17/2001 000049-994766 6289 0811712001 000049-994766 6238 08/20/2001 000049-994766 6479 08/20/2001 000049-994766 6254 08/21/2001 000049-994766 6482 08/21/2001 000049-994766 6393 08/23/2001 000049-994766 6406 08/23/2001 000049-994766 637008/24/2001 000049-994766 6425 08/28/2001 000049-994766 6431 08/28/2001 000049-994766 6463 08/28/2001 000049-994766 6474 08/28/2001 000049-994766 6569 08/29/2001 000049-994766 6531 08/3112001 000049-994766 6540 08/31/2001 000049-994766 6552 08/31/2001 000049-994766 6852 09/21/2001 000049-994766 6989 09/21/2001 000049-994766 709909/24/2001 000049-994766 710309/25/2001 000049-994766 718009/28/2001 000049-994766 7204 10/02/2001 000049-994766 7309 10/0212001 000049-994766 7573 10/0212001 000049-994766

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Expense Listing

Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Clement v. Amscot Date Range: 12101/2000 - 05/09/2003 Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced
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7797 10/0212001 000049-994766 7541 10/10/2001 000049-994766 7571 10/10/2001 000049-994766 7522 10/15/2001 000049-994766
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$55.51 $1.02 6 $1.50 $27.68 $177.29 $0.34 2 6 7 6 6 $0.50 $3.00 $3.50 $3.00 $3.00 $0.57 7 14 $3.50 $3.50 $0.34 $0.25 6 $1.50 $0.34 2 $1.00 $0.34 $1.59 18 23 $4.50 $5.75 $0.57 $7.56 $0.50

Legal Research Legal Research Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Facsimiles Postage Facsimiles Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Facsimiles Postage Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Photocopies @ .25 per page Postage Legal Research Facsimiles

7931 10/23/2001 000049-994766 7948 10/29/2001 000049-994766 7976 10/29/2001 000049-994766 7979 10/29/2001 000049-994766 7946 10/30/2001 000049-994766 7964 10/30/2001 000049-994766 7987 10/30/2001 000049-994766
7992 10/30/2001 000049-994766

7965 10/31/2001 000049-994766 7970 10/31/2001 000049-994766 8021 10/31/2001 000049-994766 8056 11/01/2001 000049-994766 810411/02/2001 000049-994766 8116 11/02/2001 000049-994766 8340 11/06/2001 000049-994766 819511/07/2001 000049-994766 8296 11/07/2001 000049-994766 8351 11/08/2001 000049-994766 8453 11/14/2001 000049-994766 851711/15/2001 000049-994766

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Expense Listing

Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Matter: Clement v. Amscot Date Range: 12101/2000 - 05/09/2003 Code: All Codes Person: All Persons Responsible: All Responsible Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced -=D.:.es=cc:;r.:..llp::..=t::..=lo:.:..:n,-Postage Photocopies @ .25 per page Long Distance Telephone Calls Transaction Listing Total: ,--"",,-

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No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME C PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________ Appendix C Verified Notice of Filing Disability Information of Neil J. Gillespie, May 27, 2011. Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, et al., 05-CA-7205 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.
Under Title II of the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. 12132. "A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. 35.130(7). "Public entity" includes "any State or local government" and "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government ...." 42 U.S.C. 12131(1). Under Title II of the ADA, "[d]isability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. "The phrase physical or mental impairment" includes "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. "The phrase major life activities means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. A "qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. 12131(2).

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants. DIVISION: J CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

\l.\80!\VED

M/1.Y 27 20"
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COU~~i HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, ,-...

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -/
VERIFIED NOTICE OF FILING DISABILITY INFORMATION OF NEIL J. GILLESPIE Plaintiff pro se Neil J. Gillespie ("Gillespie") gives Notice OfFiling Disability Information ofNeil J. Gillespie and states as follows: Introduction 1. Since March 3, 2006, Ryan Christopher Rodems, counsel for the Defendants, has

directed, with malice aforethought, a course of harassing conduct toward Gillespie that has aggravated his disability, caused substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate purpose. This is a violation of section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Stalking), and chapter 825 et seq., Florida Statutes (Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation or Elderly Persons and Disabled Adults). Gillespie is disabled, and Mr. Rodems knows of Gillespie's disability from Defendants' prior representation of him. 2. This six year-long lawsuit is to recover $7,143 stolen l by Barker, Rodems &

Cook, PA and William J. Cook from Gillespie during prior representation. The Defendants also countersued Gillespie for libel. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint

Appendix C

filed May 5, 2010. Mr. Rodems is unethically representing his law firm, the Defendants, against former client Gillespie on matters that are the same or substantially similar to the prior representation. Mr. Rodems independent professional judgment is materially limited by his own interest and conflict. See Emergency Motion to Disqualify Defendants Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA filed July 9, 2010. 3. Mr. Rodems has set a level of animosity in this lawsuit best described by

Gillespies former attorney Robert W. Bauer2 August 14, 2008 during an Emergency Hearing on garnishment before Judge Marva Crenshaw (p16, line 24): 24 Mr. Rodems has, you know, decided to take a full 25 nuclear blast approach instead of us trying to work 1 this out in a professional manner. It is my 2 mistake for sitting back and giving him the 3 opportunity to take this full blast attack.

Mr. Rodems' "full nuclear blast approach" has aggravated Gillespie's disability to the point where Gillespie can no longer represent himself at hearings. Gillespie becomes easily distracted and confused, and can no longer speak coherently enough during a hearing to represent himself. See Plaintiffs Motion For Appointment Of Counsel, ADA Accommodation Request, and Memorandum of Law filed May 24, 2011. 4. Gillespies former lawyer Robert W. Bauer believed Mr. Rodems so volatile that

Bauer prohibited Gillespie from appearing as a witness in his own case. Mr. Bauer sent Gillespie an email July 8, 2008 at 6.05PM stating in part: No - I do not wish for you to attend hearings. I am concerned that you will not be able to properly deal with any of Mr. Rodems comments and you will enflame the
1

And other offenses, see Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, filed May 5, 2010. Gillespie incurred $33,000 in legal fees by Mr. Bauer in this matter.

Page 2

situation. I am sure that he makes them for no better purpose than to anger you. I believe it is best to keep you away from him and not allow him to prod you. You have had a very adversarial relationship with him and it has made it much more difficult to deal with your case. I don't not wish to add to the problems if it can be avoided.: See Plaintiffs Notice of Filing Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie filed September 18, 2010. This is evidence that Gillespie was denied access to court in his own case. Circuit Judge James D. Arnold Is Uninformed About Gillespies Disability 5. During a hearing May 3, 2011 the record shows Judge Arnold is uniformed about

Gillespies disability. (Transcript, p7, line 7). Judge Arnold held the hearing ex parte. Gillespie was not present at the hearing and he was not represented by counsel at the hearing. Opposing counsel Mr. Rodems mislead the court about Gillespies disability. In order to end the ignorance and misrepresentation and about Gillespies disability and request for accommodation under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), he decided to make this information public. Gillespie desires to bring this matter out of the closet and into the public domain for the benefit of future litigants. Perhaps this information will someday help the courts function better. Dr. Karin Huffer is Gillespies ADA Advocate 6. Because of Mr. Rodems unethical and unlawful conduct3 that aggravated his

disability and disrupted the proceedings, Gillespie sought accommodation under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Gillespie retained Dr. Karin Huffer as his ADA advocate at his own expense. Dr. Karen Huffer Legal Victim Assistance Advocates (LVAA)
3

Gillespie was able to work amicably with counsel Traci H. Rollins and David J. DAgata, of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, LLP in another lawsuit, see Gillespie v. HSBC Bank, et al, case no. 5:05-cv-362, US District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division. The HSBC lawsuit was resolved in fifteen (15) months with a good result.

Page 3

http://www.lvaallc.com/ 3236 Mountain Spring Road Las Vegas, NV 89146 Tel. 702.528.9588 Email: legalabuse@gmail.com Dr. Huffer consulted with Gillespie and prepared a medical report of his disability. Gillespie Filed ADA Accommodation Request February 19, 2010 7. Gillespie filed Notice of Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation

Request of Neil J. Gillespie February 19, 2010. The Notice shows Gillespie provided his ADA Request, and ADA Report by Karin Huffer to Gonzalo Casares, ADA Coordinator for the 13th Circuit, with a copy to Judge Barton. The Notice states: The ADA Request and ADA Report are to be kept under ADA Administrative confidential management except for use by the ADA Administrator revealing functional impairments and needed accommodations communicated to the Trier of Fact to implement administration of accommodations. This information is NOT to become part of the adversarial process. Revealing any part of this report may result in a violation of HIPAA and ADAAA Federal Law. 8. Gillespies completed and signed ADA form for the 13th Circuit is attached to his

Notice Of Americans With Disability Act (ADA) Accommodation Request Of Neil J. Gillespie. (Exhibit 1). The ADA form specifies that Mr. Rodems is the problem relative to Gillespies disability, see item 6, Special requests or anticipated problems (specify): I am harassed by Mr. Rodems in violation of Fla. Stat. section 784.048. Mr. Rodems withheld this information from Judge Arnold during the ex parte hearing May 3, 2011. 9. A persons ADA information is confidential and protected from public disclosure

like any other private medical information. Gillespie finds the public disclosure of his private information contained in Dr. Huffers report and his ADA request objectionable just as any reasonable person would find it objectionable. In Gillespies view this is a Page 4

wrongful intrusion into his private life, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Gillespie made the information public to stop the ongoing damage to his case, as well as for the benefit of others who are either in a similar situation, or may encounter one in the future. Just like Brian Sterner, a disabled quadriplegic man, made a public disclosure about being dumped from a wheelchair by the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office, perhaps Gillespies public disclosure can move the court system to improvement for the greater good. Below is a link to the CNN YouTube video about the incident with Brian Sterner. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=huRYZAJ8wzA&feature=player_embedded 10. A copy of Dr. Huffers ADA report is submitted as Exhibit 1. The report is

addressed as follows: Mr. Gonzalo B. Casares Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Coordinator for the 13th Judicial Circuit 800 E. Twiggs Street, Room 604 Tampa, Florida 33602 (813) 272-7040 - (813) 272-6169 email: ada@fliud13.org

11.

A copy of Gillespies ADA Accommodation Request is submitted as Exhibit 2. Gonzalo B. Casares Unqualified As ADA Coordinator

12.

Gonzalo B. Casares serves as the ADA Coordinator for the Thirteenth Judicial

Circuit but there is substantial evidence that he is unqualified for this position in terms of his education, training, experience and authority. Mr. Casares is a building repair and maintenance person with no qualifications to review Gillespies ADA medical report, or authority to grant or implement ADA accommodations based upon the ADA medical report. In an email to Gillespie April 14, 2010, Mr. Casares wrote: (relevant portion)

Page 5

Court Facilities Management is the point of contact for all facilities related issues such as repairs and/or maintenance work. As such, we can determine if an ADA function is at issue in our set of buildings and track requests for accommodations. Your request is not within our means to resolve and was referred to the Legal Department for the appropriate course of action. In an email to Gillespie May 4, 2010, Mr. Casares wrote: (relevant portion) The medical file was never within our departments means to help and was handed over to Legal. 13. In a letter to Gillespie dated July 9, 2010 from David A. Rowland, Counsel to the

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Mr. Rowland denied Gillespies request for accommodation under Title II of the ADA. (Exhibit 3). Upon information and belief, Mr. Rowland is a lawyer, not a medical doctor, and therefore he is unqualified in terms of his education, training, experience and authority to review Gillespies ADA medical report, or grant or implement ADA accommodations based upon the ADA medical report. 14. As of today, Gillespie is unaware of any qualified person who has reviewed the

ADA Report by Dr. Karin Huffer (exhibit 1) and evaluated Gillespies ADA Request (Exhibit 2) as it related to Dr. Huffers report and Title II of the ADA. Defendants Published Gillespies Privileged Medical Information 15. The Defendants published Gillespies privileged medical information during a

deposition with AMSCOT Corporation. (Eugene R. Clement v. AMSCOT Corporation, case no. 99-2795-CIV-T-26C, US District Court, MD Fla., Tampa). Gillespie was deposed May 14, 2001 by John A. Anthony, attorney for AMSCOT. Approximately twenty pages of the 122 page transcript concerned Gillespies disability, treatment and rehabilitation. Defendants failed to object to interrogatories about Gillespies privileged medical information. The transcript is submitted as Exhibit 4. The deposition was transcribed by, and a transcript produced by, Chere J. Barton, the wife of Judge James M.

Page 6

Barton II who presided over this case from February 2007 through May 2010, and who sanctioned Gillespie $11,550 for discovery errors and a misplaced defense to a motion to dismiss. Judge Barton was disqualified May 24, 2010 due to a long-standing business relationship with his wife and the Defendants. 16. I Neil J. Gillespie hereby waive my confidentiality of Exhibits 1 through 4 to this

verified notice, including the ADA report prepared by Dr. Karin Huffer. RESPECTULLY SUBMITTED AND SWORN TO May 27, 2011.

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF MARION BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority authorized to take oaths and acknowledgments in the State of Florida, appeared NEIL J. GILLESPIE, personally known to me, or produced identification, who, after having first been duly sworn, deposes and says that the above matters contained in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and official seal May 27, 2011.

f.i~' Con:unISSIOO DD 781620 ~ ~ Exptres June 6, 2012 Jtl/f".:~" Ilondod ThIu Troy FlIin k8lrInC8 800038S-7018
Certificate of Service

4~~~fit-~ CECIL!A ~OSENBERGER

Notary Public, State of Florida

~~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy ofthe foregoing was provided May 27, 2011 to Ryan C. Rodems, Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, 400 Nort ley Drive, it 100, Tampa, Florida 33602 by CD delivered to the security desk. ~ Neil

Page 7

Gillespie pi of22

3236 Mountain Spring Rei. Las Vegas, NV 89146

Request for Reasonable Accommodations ADAAA Title II

Response from the ADA Access Coordinator Must Be Received within
Ten Days of Receipt of this Report.

This request and report are to be provided to the ADA Access Coordinator: Mr. Gonzalo B. Casares Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Coordinator for the 13lh Judicial Circuit 800 E. Twiggs Street, Room 604 Tampa, Florida 33602 (813) 272-7040 - (813) 272-6169 email: ada@fliud13.org This report is for the administrative purpose of establishing accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title II, to ensure equal access to court proceedings for Neil Gillespie. Accommodations will be needed during any meeting, procedure, hearing, discovery process, and any other court-related activity. In response to the American Bar Association (ABA) Resolution of 2002 and the ADA, Title II, and the ADAAA of 2008 effective as of January 1, 2009, these requests and report are intended to assist the Court to properly accommodate Neil Gillespie. Legal Victim Assistance Advocates (LVAA) has chosen to advocate in this case because it especially addresses the invisible disabilities. LVAA is an organization that advocates for litigants with disabilities under the ADAAA Title II. They help to monitor that accommodations are adhered to, assist in filing grievances and complaints, and generally support litigants with disabilities. I am a managing partner of LVAA. This is a case that clearly represents the unique challenge faced by litigants with disabilities as they seek equal footing in Court under the ADA, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), and ABA Resolution of 2002, all mandating accommodations for those functionally impaired. All requirements for qualification for ADA Accommodations are met and reported herein. When we advocate for a client, the client has undergone a screening process ruling out malingering or any other untoward intent.
This report is to be kept uader ADA Admiaistntive coafideatial maaalemeat except fot ase by tbe ADA Admiaistrator reveaUng Cuactioaal impairmeats aad Deeded accommodatloal commaaieated to tbe Trier oC Fact to implemeat admiaistratioa of accommodatiou. Tbis ia(ormatloa is NOT to become part of tbe advenarial process. Revealial aay part of tbis report may result ia a violatioa of HIPAA aad ADAAA Fedenl
Law.

Gillespie p2 of22

Table ofContents
I. Client

11.

Date
I>i~()sis

III.
IV.

Brief History A. B. Functional Impainnents and Interference with Daily Activities Physiological Impairments - Symptoms

V.

I>SM-IV Multiaxial Assessment (Axes I-V)

A. B. VI.

Defmition of DSM-IV Diagnostic Axes Multiaxial Diagnosis of Client

ADA Accommodations Necessary for Fair Court Proceedings

A.

B.
VII.

Current Trend in Providing Access for All People without Disability Bias ADA Accommodations Specifically Needed by Client

Findings

VIII. Summary and Conclusions IX. Appendix A.

B. C. D.

Citations, Referral Source, and Recommended Supportive Resources Legal Considerations Qualifications ofthe Examiner Documents Reviewed in Preparation of the Report

This report is to be kept UDder ADA Administrative eODtideatial management escept fo! use by tbe ADA Admiaistntor reveall_. functional impairments and Deeded auo od.tiODS communicated to the Trier of Fact to implement ad.inistratioD of accommodations. This informatioD is NOT to beeome part of the advenaria' process. Revealial aay part or this report .ay result io a violatioD of HIPAA and ADAAA Federal Law.

Gillespie p3 of22

I.

Client: Date: Diagnosis:

Neil Gmespie
February 17,2010 Depression, Post Tnumatic: Stress Disorder

II.
ill.

Brief History

Mr. Gillespie suffers from Chronic Depression as diagnosed by Cesar Roo Gamero, M.D. in Ocala, Florida, 2009. Dr. Gamero also concurs with earlier diagnoses as does Karin Huffer, M.S., M.F.T., of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and recognizes that Mr. Gillespie suffers from velopharyngeal incompetence that worsens when he is stressed. This presents a barrier to managing effective communication during litigation. The Social Security Administration found Mr. Gillespie totally disabled in 1994. Mr. Gillespie has been in need of ADA Accommodations since commencement of his legal actions. The fact that he was not protected by the ADA created an inaccurate perception of him to the Court and clearly demonstrates that Mr. Gillespie did not have equal access to the litigation proceedings or due process of law. The Americans with Disabilities Act should have protected Mr. Gillespie when he was first in litigation. With accommodations, he may well have avoided the severe trauma he suffers today.
Litigants with disabilities are wlnerable to victimization in courts from adversaries, who insist on being dominant, take advantage of trust, coerce, terrorize, and exploit the unsuspecting. Litigants, like Mr. Gillespie, are often the most shocked from both physical and non-physical injuries with which they suffer at the hands of unkind lawyers. When they report their symptoms to the court, they are often misunderstood. They are suspected of manipulation, accused of being self-pitying, and treated with impatience exacerbating their conditions. Litigants with PTSD and other disabilities attempt to function in the legal system reporting to the Court that they are suffering. Yet, attorneys or judges rarely guide them to the ADA Administrative office for help when they clearly struggle during litigation. Our society has been slow to recognize the coMection between invisible disabilities, the coercive nature of litigation, and victims' health. (Huffer, 95). Many victims like Mr. Gillespie succumb to injury, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), or other somatization of trauma. What the Court has overlooked is the broadened use of the ADAAA as it applies to the use of ADA-mandated accommodations for invisible disabilities.
T.is report is to be kept under ADA Administntive confidential management except rot use by tbe ADA Admlnistntor revealing foactional Impairments and needed accommodations communicated to tbe Trier of Fact to implement administration or accommodations. This information Is NOT to become part of tbe adversarial process. Revealing any part or tbis report may result in a violation of HIPAA d ADAAA Federal
Law.

Gillespie p4 of 22

IV.

Interference with Major Life Activities: A. Functional Impairments:

Mr. Gillespie is functionally impaired in the areas listed below. It is important to note that Mr. Gillespie's impairments are largely invisible. He may appear to be functional on a superficial level even when he is not. Mr. Gillespie's functioning is the highest when he is in supportive and safe environments. His functioning deteriorates when he is in non-supportive, unsafe, or intimidating environments or when he is under any perceived time pressure or stress. His impairments are dramatically intensified during litigation.

Mr. Gillespie cannot sustain concentration due to depression and symptoms of PTSD in the form of flashbacks, emotionally arousing and exhausting intrusive thoughts triggered by reminders ofthe traumatic events. Mr. Gillespie cannot sustain a communication path if interrupted, distracted, or
threatening body language is used toward him. Such circumstances result in cognitive disorganization, dissociation, and an inability to integrate and process information. Mr. Gillespie cannot sustain a progressive chain of communication under stress due to his congenital speech problem. This communication is critical for litigation.

Mr. Gillespie cannot open mail or address matters pertaining to his legal case without

extreme anxiety. This slows him down when he faces deadlines. He cannot manage large amounts of hard copy documents. He must have the time to scan documents for management purposes.

Mr. Gillespie cannot sleep normally, rest, or recuperate due to Post Trauma Stress

symptoms including nightmares and startle responses (i.e., he jumps when doorbell rings). He has hyperreactivitylhyperarousal and she can't eat or sleep or digest food normally.

Mr. Gillespie is easily hyperaroused on a physiological level, especially when

feeling overwhelmed or under any perceived time constraint or threat. Hyperarousal makes it impossible for him to think clearly and make logical and knowing decisions when under extreme pressure.
Mr. Gillespie is unable to withstand stress without triggering moments of dissociation. He may be unable to consistently remember the words that are spoken in
This report is to be kept uader ADA Admlaistrative eoDfideatial maaagemeat except fof use by the ADA AdmiDistrator reveallDg CuDetloDal impairmeats and Deeded aceommodatioa. commuDieated to tbe Trier of Fact to implemeDt admiaistratioD of accommodatioas. This iDformatioD is NOT to become part of the adversarial process. RevealiDg aDy part of tbis report may result ia a violatioD of HIPAA aDd ADAAA Federal Law.

Gillespie pS of 22
Court and cannot perform verbally to participate in his legal case without assistance and accommodations.

Mr. Gillespie is vulnerable to neuroanatomical effects that can be devastating, i.e. decreased hippocampal volume and hyperadrenia. Hyperadrenia influences all of the major physiological processes in the human body and has a host of physical, emotional, and psychological effects. Physical impairments may be induced when stress is protracted and unrelenting.
B. Physioloaicallmpairmentl - Symptoms:

Often overlooked by judicial penoDDe) are well-establisbed pbysiological cbaDges experienced with PTSD, that seriously impair a penon's ability to fUDction during

litigation without accommodations:

Psychophysiological Effects

Flashbacks;
Startle responses;
Hyper-reactivitylhyper-arousal

Neurohormonal Effects

Fear and extreme anxiety;

Hyper-vigilance, unable to relax or have peace due to intrusive thoughts/emotions;
Stress hormones reduce and down-regulate receptors, causing a feeling of being
numb/exhausted and freezing the ability to process information and respond.

Serotonin-dependent Effects

Depression

Memory Impairment Dissociation; Mr. Gillespie must use energy to fight the natural urge to deny the reality put before him; Traumatic intrusive thoughts threaten to crowd out the issue at hand during legal processes; Increased opioid response; a numbing hormone intended to protect the traumatized from pain must be overcome to deal with the legal issues at hand; It is an exhausting emotional "swim upstream" to stay focused and attentive in the . courtroom, critical data is missed, and nuances escape the person with PTSD.

Tbis report is to be kept under ADA AdlDinistntive coafidential management except roj use by the ADA AdOllulltrator revealiDI fu.ctioaal Impairments and Deeded accommodations eommunieated to tbe Trier of Fact to implemeut admiaistratioD of accommodations. This informatioB is NOT to become part oftbe advenarlal process. RevealiDI any part of this report may result in a viOlatiOD of HIPAA and ADAAA Federal

Law.

Gillespie p6 of 22

Neuroanatomical Effects
Decreased hippocampal volume; the hippocampus can actually shrink if trauma is not relieved; Decreased immune system functioning, which can invite physical illness.

Physical Effects
Chronic and diffuse physical pain; Weight loss or gain; Inflammatory conditions; Digestion problems; Insomnia and nightmares References: (van der Kolk, 94), (van der Kolle &, Fisler, 95), (van der Kolk, Pelcovitz, Roth, McFarlane, Herman, 95), (van der Kolk, Hopper, Osterman, 2001), (Zucker, Spinazzola, van der Kolle, 2006), (Huffer, K. and Parrett, B., 2005), (Courtois et ai, 2009).

V.

DSM-IV Multiaxial Assessment (Axes I-V)

A.

Sample & Definition of DSM-IV Diagnostic Axes:

Accepted Forensic and Psychiatric illustration of diagnostic impression and contributing factors, using Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV Edition (DSM-IV), is presented below. Please see www.psyweb.com for further explanation. Clinical Disorders, most V-Codes, and conditions that need Clinical attention. Axis II: Personality Disorders and Mental Retardation Axis III: General Medical Conditions. Axis IV: Psychosocial and Environmental Problems. Axis V: Global Assessment of Functioning Scale. Axis I:

B.
Axis I Axis II

Multiaxial Diagnosis of Subject Client

Depression 296/3, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 309.81 with chronic and acute symptoms anxiety NA

This report is to be kept aDder ADA AdlDiaistrative confidential maDagemeat except rot use by the ADA AdmiDistrator revealing raactiona) imp8irmeau and Deeded accolDmodations communicated to the Trier of Fact to implement admiaistratioD of auoDimodationl. This iuformation Is NOT to become part oftbe adversarial process. Revealing any part of this report may result iD a violation of HIPAA aDd ADAAA Federal

Law.

Gillespie p7 of22

Axis III Axis IV Axis V

Velopharyngeal incompetence 1 Diabetes Type II Adult Onset Legal Global Assessment of Functioning (OAF) prior 85 OAF with stress from legal system 60 in court

VI.

ADA Accommodations Necessary for Fair Court Proceediols A. Current Trend in Providing Access For All People Without Disability Bias:

American Bar Association and the United States Department of Justice in their Webinar, Grant No. 2004-wr-AX-K078 2009, urge supportive and safe judicial environments. The trend is toward moving to a social rather than a medical model for providing accommodations. The attitude is to generally promote near-normal functioning and a fair court process for all people. Courts are asked to, without special accommodations requested, assure the most-basic of human rights are provided: secwity, respect, dignity, the opportunity to pursue rights in a forum with a fair process, and the freedom from any type of degrading or disrespectful treatment. When special accommodations are requested, the courts are to use their imaginations and accommodate to the greatest extent possible without altering the basic functions of the court. A Florida example is found in Van Bever et al National Center for State Courts, 2002, when an agoraphobic woman's legal activities were held in her home due to her phobia preventing her from functioning out of her home. This attitude is affirmed consistently from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 through the ADA of 1990 and the ADAAA of2008 and Florida 13th Circuit Court ADA Policy Statement.

B.

ADA Accommodations SpecificaBy Needed:

I) During court processes, Mr. Gillespie is likely to become symptomatic creating problems concentrating, thinking, processing information, responding and presenting his case in court. He may request short breaks if that oeeurs. 2) Mr. Gillespie needs flexibility with deadliDes due to cognitive interference symptoms interfering with his ability to sustain attention to the issues at hand. Preparation for court is a greater burden for Mr. Gillespie than for litigants without his functional impairments.

1 Inldequllte velopharyng.a' closure (VPC) .IOWI air to escape through the n088 during the generation of consonants
requiring high 01'11 presIUN. leading to Inlpproprlate n1relon.nee during speech production.

This report is to be kept under ADA Administrative confidential DlaDagement exeept fo'
lise by the ADA AdlDlDlstrator revealiDI faBedoaa) Impairments and needed
aceoDlmodatioD. communicated to the Trier of Fact to impleDleDt administration of
aceolDmod.tions. This informatioD is NOT to become part orthe advenarial process.
Revealing any part of this report may result i. a violatioD of HIPAA aDd ADAAA Federal

Law.

Gillespie p8 of 22
3) Mr. Gillespie needs direetives of the Coart made into written form and enforeed as a Court Order.
4) Mr. Gillepsie needs assistance in the form of ease management for complex litigation per rules of the court that Mr. Gillespie will provide.

6) Mr. Gillespie needs assistanee to halt harassment that exacerbates Mr. Gillespie's disabilities. This is restrieted to bebavion designed to emotionally upset Mr. Gillespie witb DO purpose related to the value of tbe ease.

7) Mr. Gillespie needs a continuanee starting immediately allowing him to gather, organize, prepare and scan documents, and to retain an attorney. 8) Mr. Gillespie has attached a list of rules he needs adhered to, and accommodations that he has separately put together. He will do the from time to time. It appears that he is reasonable in this effort in that his requests are either covered under published rules, procedures, laws, or are reasonable exceptions that fall under the ADAAA Title II. This is Mr. Gillespie's best effort to comply across the board to ensure his due process of law. To the greatest extent possible, I urge the court to cooperate with Mr. Gillespie's separate list citing his needs. .

VII.

Findings:

It is important to Dote that, in addition to physical disabiUdes, Mr. Gillespie sullen from PTSD, a psyehiatrie injury, not a mental iUness. His condition is a Dormal reaction to abnormal circumstances. In fact, there are indications that his Depression is a part of his

Traumatic Stress picture. If Mr. Gillespie did not suffer from traumatic stress, he would not be normal considering his state of affairs. Mr. Gillespie's impairments are severely
disabling aDd without proper care can be debilitating for a lifetime.

Due process rights are compromised when discriminatory practices are allowed. The cruel behavior reported by this litigant needs to come to the attention ofthe Trier ofFset. This is a case that must have ADA protection in order to avoid exploitation.
VIII. Summary aDd CoaelulioBS

Mr. Gillespie must have a response to his Request for Accommodations timely, within ten days. The lack of ADA Accommodations has deprived him of his due process rights to be
accommodated or to file a grievance or an appeal. He has been exploited, ridiculed, and
This report is to be kept under ADA Administrative confidential man8gement except rol use by the ADA Administrator revealing funedoDal impairments and needed accommodations eommaaiateel to the Trier of Fact to implement administratloD of aeeo.modatioas. This informatioD Is NOT to beeome part of the advenarial proeess. Revealing any part of this report Rlay result ID a violation of HIPAA and ADAAA Fedenl

Law.

Gillespie p9 of22 denied his rights to a fair hearing. Recent studies have shown that criticism and ridicule are the closest to physical violence in tcrms of their effect on thc victim. Further, intimidating body language and invasive behaviors insult a different section of the brain destructively. Therefore, if a litigant is assaulted by criticism and ridicule verbally simultaneously with invasive power movesthrough body language and attempts at legally gaining access to private and personal space and belongings, the brain is attacked in two separate sections (Maurio & O'Leary, 2004)(Worldwide Intnatl 2003). The specific psychologically aggressive stance taken by Mr. Gillespie's adversary has turned the Court process into a bully/victim cycle due to the ridicule and exploitation of Mr. Gillespie's functional impairments. Preventing this type of discrimination is precisely what the ADAAA is intended to accomplish fully endorsed by the State of Florida.

~~~~
M.S., M.F.T.

This report is to be kept under ADA Administrative confidential managemcnt except f~ usc by the ADA Administrator revealing functional impairmcnts and needed accommodations communicated to tbe Trier of Fact to implemcnt administration of accommodations. This information is NOT to become part oftbe adversarial process. Revealing any part of this report may result in a violation of HIPAA and ADAAA Federal Law.

Gillespie plOof 22

IX. APPENDIX A. Collateral Documents and Contacts Reviewed.

02116/10 Letter to Mr. Hector F Ruiz, Jr.

United States Department of Justice - emailed

02116/10 Letter from Gonzolo Casares - Basic form letter with generic instructions for submitting ADA Accommodations request. 02109/10 Letter to Gonzalo Casares for directions as to submission of forms and request for accommodations. 02103/10 ADA Title II Guidelines for State of Florida

01-26-10, TRANSCRIPT, Judge Barton, ADA and Case Management

08125108 Letter seeking help from Christopher Nauman, Assistant Court Counsel for Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida asking for assistance to obtain reasonable accommodations for court dates.

09126/06 Letter to Casares B. Gonzolo, ADA Coordinator requesting ADA

Accommodations.

08/11/06 Memorandum sent to Casares B. Gonzolo requesting ADA Accommodations. Spring 2000, Hillsborough County Americans with Disabilities Act Transition Plan regarding commitment to ADA Implementation. 1998 Article by Han. Claudia Rickert 180m Stetson Law Review VoL XXVIII Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 322-326.

B.

Citations, Referral Source and Recommended Supportive Resources

American Bar Association (1980). Code of Professional Responsibility. Retrieved 4 September, 2007, from: http://www.abanet.orglcpr/mme/mcpr.pdf.
Tbis report is to be kept UDder ADA AdmiDistrative confidential maoageDlent except 1M use by the ADA Administrator reveaUDg fa Detionat impairments aod Deeded aeeommodatioDI communicated to the Trier of Fact to implement admiaistratioD of accommodations. This Information is NOT to become part of tbe advenarial process. Revealing any part of tbis report may result ia a violatioD of HIPAA aod ADAAA Federal

Law.

Gillespie p11 of 22
American Bar Association ABA Urges Equal Access to Courts for Individuals with Disabilities MPDLR 26:5 September/October 2002, pp 772-774.
American Bar Association (20078). ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Retrieved 4 September, 2007, from: http://www.abanet.orgljudicialethicsiABA MCJC approved.pdt:

American Bar Association (2007b). Retrieved 7 September 2007 from: htij)://www.abanet.orglpublicedllawday/talkinglchild bestinterest.html.

American Bar Association, Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Victims of Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault t and Stalking in Civil Protection Order Cases. American Bar Association; Chicago, Ill, 2007. American Psychological Association (2002). Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct. Retrieved 4 September, 2007, from hnp://www.apa.orglethicstcode2002.html.
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorderst 41b ed., revised (DSM IV-R) APA, Washington D.C., 1994.
Baker, Claudia, M.S.W., MPH & Alonso, Cessie, LCSW. Forensic Validity of a PTSD

Diagnosis Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for PTSD.

Barak, A., & Buchanan, T. (2004). Internet-based psychological testing and assessment. In R. Kraus, J. Zack & G. Stricker (Eels.), Online counseling: A handbook for mental health professionals (pp. 217-239). San Diego, CA: Elsevier Academic Press.
Barak, A., & English, N. (2002). "Prospects and limitations of psychological testing on the Intemet. tt Journal of Technology in Human Services, 19 (213), 65-89. Bard, Morton, and Dawn Sangrey. BrunnerlMazel, Inc., 1986.
The Crime Victims Book.

New York:
Haworth

Bloom, Sandra L., M.D., Reichert, Michael, Ph.D Maltreatment and Trauma Press. New York, 1998.

Bearing Witness

Bond, Rod and Smith, Peter B. "Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch's (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task". Psychological Bulletin, 1996, Vol. 119,No 1,111-137.

This report is to be kept UDder ADA Administrative confidential management except tbt use by the ADA Administrator revealing fUDctioDa. impairments and Deeded aceolDmodatioDs communicated to the Trier or Fact to implelDent ad.inistratioD of accommodations. TblslDforDlatioD is NOT to becolDe part or the advenarial process. RevealiDlany part oftbis report ..ay result in. violatioD orHIPAA and ADAAA Federal

Law.

Gillespie p12 of22

Bremner JOt Narayan M (1998): "The effects of stress on memory and the hippocampus
throughout the life cycle: Implications for childhood devel,opment and aging. tt Develop
Psychopath 10:871-886.
Brown, James T. "Avoiding Litigation Nemosis: A Practitioner's Guide to Defending
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Claims." The American Journal of Trial Advocacy. Vol.
20, Number 1, Center for Advocacy and Clinical Education, Cumberland School of Law,
Samford University, Birmingham, AL, fall 1996.
Chrousos, G.P.. The Hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis and immune-mediated
inflammation The New England Journal Qf Medicine Volume 332: 1351-1362 No20.
1995.
Courtois, Christine A. and Ford, Julian D. et a1 Treating Complex Traumatic Stress
Disorder The Guilford Press, New York, NY, 2009 p313.
D'Amato, Anthony. The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts. 11
Cardozo Law Review 1313 (1990) (Code A900).
Goleman, Daniel. "Key to Post Traumatic Stress Lies in Brain Chemistry, Scientist
Finds." New York Times, 12 June 1990.
Herman, Judith L. Trauma and Recovery. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
Huffer, Karin, M.S" M.F.T. Overcoming the Devastation of Legal Abuse Syndrome.
Fulkort Press, Las Vegas, NV, 1995 pp 20-26, 69-77.
Huffer, K. and Parrett, B. "Judicial System Inaccessibility for Those With Psychiatric
Injury - Legal Abuse Syndrome as a Psychiatric Injury and Diagnosable Subcategory of
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" Edited subtitle for publishing "Legal Abuse Syndrome:
Fact or Fad" Diogenes The Magazine, Fall Edition, 2005, p. 8-10, 34.
Hurder, Alex J. "ABA Urges Equal Access to Courts for Individuals with Disabilities."
September/October, 2002 26:5 MPDLR.
The International Society for Mental Health Online - hqp:llwww.abuse-recovery-and
rnarriage-counseling.comlarticleslabuse/bodylansuaaehtml
Johnston, Joni, Psy.D. "ShrinkRap Investigating PTSD in Psychological Injury Claims"
LexisONE.

Tbis report is to be kept UDder ADA Administrative confideDtial management except fbI ase by the ADA Administrator revealing fuaetionat impairmeats and needed accommodations communicated to tbe Trier of Fact to implement administration of accommodations. Tbis information is NOT to become part of the advenarial process. RevealiDg any part of this report OIay result il a violation of HIPAA and ADAAA Federal

Law.

Gillespie p13 of 22
Keane, T.M., P.F. Malloy and J.A. Fairbank. "Empirical development of an MMPI

subscale for the assessment of combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder." Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 52, 888-891.
Kinchin, David, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: the invisible injury, 2001 edition, Success Unlimited, UK 2001. Legal Victims Assistance Project Report, 2007, Congressional District Programs SOle3 fraudonthecourt.blogspolcom A reporter for The Oklahoman Newspaper, March 28, 2005 By Sally Allen Anti-News Editor NewsOK.com Maiurio, Ronald D., & O'Leary, Daniel. Psychological Abuse In Domestic Violence Relations. Springer Publishing Company, 2004 p.16. Nadel, L., & Jacobs, W.J. "The Role of the Hippocampus in PTSD, Panic, and Phobia." In Nobumasa Kato, ed. Hippocampus: Functions and Clinical Relevance. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1996.

O'Brien, Dr John T, MRCPsych, British Journal of Psychiatry, The 'glucocorticoid cascade' hypothesis in man: prolonged stress may cause permanent brain damage, Department of Psychiatry and Institute for the Health of the Elderly, University of Newcastle (1997), 170, 199-201.
Peck, M. Scott, M.D. Further Along the Road Less Traveled. Simon and Schuster, NY,

1993. Pert, Candace, Phd. The Molecules of Emotion, New York: Scribner Books, 1999. Reese, James, James Hom, and Christine Dunning. Critical Incidents in Policing. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1991. Sapolsky, R.C. Why zebras don't get ulcers: an updated guide to stress, stress-related diseases, and coping, Robert M Sapolsky, Freeman, 1998, ISBN 0-7167-3210-6. Seaer, , Robert C MD The Body Bears the Burden: Trauma. Dissociation and Disease, The Haworth Medical Press, NY, 2001.

Tbls report is to be kept under ADA Administrative eonfidential management exeept fb) use by tbe ADA Administrator revealiDI funetiona' ImpairmeBts and Deeded aecommodatioDs communicated to tbe Trier or Faet to lmpleDleDt administratioD of -ceolDmodatioDI. This inform.tioD is NOT to become part ortbe advenarial process. ReveallDI aDy part of this report may result ID a violatioD of HIPAA and ADAAA Fedenl

Law.

Gillespie p14 of 22 The European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology (EJWOP), 1996, 5(2), (whole issue devoted to bullying and its effects, including PTSD.) Published by Psychology Press, 27 Church Road, Hove, East Sussex BN3 2FA, UK. Tuttle, David, Cortisol - Keeping a Dangerous Hormone in Check, LE Magazine July

200!.
Selye, Hans. The Stress of Life. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1956. Van der Kolk, Bessel, M.D. Yehuda, Rachel, Ed. The Assessment and Treatment of Complex PTSD Chapter 7, Traumatic Stress, American Psychiatric Press, 200 I. Van der Kol~ Bessel, "In the Eye of the Storm," The Psychotherapy Networker, JanlFeb 2004 pp45, 66. Van der Kolk, Bessel, B.A. & Fisler, R. Dissociation and the Fragmentary Nature of Traumatic Memories: Overview and Exploratory Study. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 8, 1995, 505-525. Van der Ko~ Bessel, Pelcovitz, D., Roth, S., Mandel, F, J.L.., Mc Farlane, A., &, Herman Dissociation, Somatization, and Affect Dysregulation: The Complexity of Adaptation of Trauma. American Journal ofPsychiatry, 1996, pp 83-93. Van dec Kolk, B.A., Hopper, J.W., & Osterman, J.E., Exploring the Nature of Traumatic Memory: Combining Clinical Knowledge with Laboratory Methods. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment, & Trauma, 4, 9-31- 2001. Van der Kolk, Bessel A., Alexander C. McFarlane, and Lars Weisaeth, eds. Traumatic Stress. New York: Guildford, 1996. Zegan, L.S. Handbook of Stress, Theoretical and Clinical Aspects. Ed. Goldberger and Bremitz, New York: Free Press, 1982. Zucker, M., Spinazzola, J., Blaustein, M., & Van der Kolk, B. A, Dissociative Symptomatology in Post Traumatic Stress in Disorders of Extreme Stress. Journal of Psychosomatic Research 60, pp. 83-90, 2006.

Tbis report is to be kept UDder ADA AdmiDistrative cODfide.tial maDagemeDt except rw use by tbe ADA Admiaistrator revealiDg fUDctioaal impairments and Deeded ac:c:ommodatioDs commuaicated to tbe Trier of Fact to implement administratioD of ac:c:ommodatioDS. Tbis iDformatioD is NOT to become part oftbe advenarial process. RevealiDI aay part of tbis report may result in a viol.tiOD of ffiPAA and ADAM Federal

Law.

Gillespie piS of 22
C. Legal References and Considentions

Kenneth Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., SI62818, opinion filed 6111109, see link httpjllcaselaw.lp.findlaw.comldata2lcaliforniastatecases!sI62818,pdf) Nielson v. Colgate-Palmolive, 199 F.3d 642 (2d Cir. 1999) Supreme Court of the United States re: The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama and the Alabama Department of Youth Services v. Patricia Garrett and Milton Ash, Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Cancer Society in Support of Respondents. Question: Do Title I and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., properly invoke Congress' enforcement authority under Section 5 oCthe Fourteenth Amendment? Termessee v Lane httpjllwww.supremecourtus.goy/oral argiunentslargument transcriptsl02 I667.pdf U.S. Department of Justice, Americans with Disabilities Act Handbook, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1211991 Appendix N, pp I-II. Van Bever, Mark Esq. National Center for State Courts, 2002 This project was supported by Grant #1999-DD-BX-0084 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. They advise, "Use your Imagination" in accommodations to provide access. There is no frivolous or unimportant disability. Even inability to interact with others is deemed a major life activity: Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., Nos. 03-9080, 03-9109, 2004 WL 2223217 (2d Cir. Oct. S, 2004).) The ruling is important because "if inability to interact with others is deemed major life activity, it significantly expands when individuals can recover under the ADA," said Duke University law professor Erwin Chemerinsky. Plaintiff Audrey Jacques worked at a Staten Island, New York, electric-guitar factory owned by DiMarzio, Inc. She had suffered what her complaint called "severe and major depressions" for years and in 1991 was diagnosed with chronic bipolar disorder. In 1996, the company fired her after she had numerous confrontations with coworkers, including her immediate supervisor. A jury in the Eastern District of New York found that DiMarzio had fired Jacques because it "perceived" her as being disabled in the major life activity of "interacting with others" and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. DiMarzio appealed, challenging how the judge instructed the jury. The judge had relied on the Ninth Circuit's ruling in McAlindin v. County of San Diego, which described "interacting with others" as "an essential, regular function, like walking and breathing," that easily qualifies under the ADA. (192 E3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999).
Tllis report is to be kept under ADA Admlnistrattve confidential management except -., use by the ADA AdmiDistrator revealinc functional Impairments and needed aceommodations commuDicated to the Trier of Fact to implemeDt admiDistration of accommodations. This information is NOT to become part of the adversarial process. Revealing any part of this report may result ia a violation of HIPAA and ADAAA Federal Law.

Gillespie p 16 of 22 Persons with Disabilities have recourse if they are denied accommodations.
"A plaintiffwho establishes a violation of the ADA, therefore, need not prove an intentional
discrimination in order to obtain damages under section 52 [of the California Civil Code]"
(Kenneth Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 8162818, opinion filed 6/11/09, see link:
hg://casel aw.lp.findlaw.comldata2lcaliforniastatecases/sI62818.pdf)
D.
Qualifications of the ExamiDer/CV

Karin D. Huffer, M.S., M.F.T.

3236 Mountain Spring Road, Las Vegas, NV 89146
Email: legalabuse@gmail.com
http://www.legalabusesyndrome.org
hnp://www.lvaallc.com
Telephone: 702-528-9588

Clinical Experienee
I have over 3S years experience as Marriage Family Therapist, Lie. #0082, researching educating, diagnosing, and treating Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)t Legal Abuse Syndrome (LAS), and a wide vanety of other brain injuries and disorders in both private and public sectors.

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Evaluator lind Expert Witness

My testimony has met Daubert and Frye Standards serving clients in the states of Nevada, California, Michigan, Massachusetts, Alaska, Arizona, Alabama, New York, Texas, Virginia, Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Florida. Clients also reach to the UK, Ireland Australia and Canada.
t

I rarely testify in court because once ADA Accommodations are filed, I provide basic expert information in the form of a report followed by usual discovery after which most cases settle. Case information is kept confidential due to HIPAA and ADA confidentiality as well as the sensitive nature of domestic violence cases. Exposure is limited to the following cases as verification examples: I was accepted as an expert witness and testified in Court in Martinez Family Court Contra Costa County, California, May 1, 2008 for a Pro Se Litigant. I testified in Federal Court in Palm Beach, Florida for a Pro Se Litigant and MiamilDade Court for a Pro Se Litigant. I served as expert witness in San Diego, CA for Stephen Dime~ Attorney, and in San Rafael, California for Attorney William Russell.
Tills report is to be kept UDder ADA Administrative coafideatial managemeat except tb6 use by tlae ADA Administrator revealiDg fUDctional impairments And Deeded aeeommodatioDI comlDuaieated to the Trier of Fact to implement adm,indtratioD of accommodations. This informatioD is NOT to become part of the advenarial process. RevealiDI aay part of tbis report may result ia a violation of HIPAA aDd ADAAA Federal

Law.

Gillespie p17 of 22 I serve as a case consultant to Legal Victim Assistance Project (SOlc3 Public Charity Congressional District Programs and carry out the United States Department of Justice mandate in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibiting discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities, in the Court, 28 C.F.R. 3S.130(a). In order to facilitate compliance with The American Bar Association Resolution of 2002, and the ADA and the ADA Amendments Act, I founded Legal Victim Assistance Advocates, LLC. (LVAA), providing accommodations design and in-court advocacy for litigants with disabilities. LVAA also provides certification training for ADA Advocates and offers counseling, coaching, and leadership toward fair access to litigation for individuals with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II of the ADA of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12131-12134, Civil Rights Division, Disability Rights Section and The ADAAA, 2008.

Licenses and Certifications

Honorary Doctorate Counseling and Forensic Psychology Kings College. Marriage and Family Therapy, Lie. #0082, Nevada State Board of Marriage and Family Therapists, with full privileges to diagnose, treat, and assess clients per DSMIV-V and ICD 9-10 : Certified EMDR Therapist by Eye Movement and Desensitization Institute: Nevada Department of Education, licensed Psychology, Counselor, English, Social Studies, Special Education Title I IDEA and Section 504.

Education

Post-Masters Continuing Education Units in Traumatic Stress (more than 500 units).
M.S. 1972, University ofNevada, Las Vegas, Nevada, Psychology

B.S. 1963, University olldaho, Moscow, Idaho, Psychology

Nurses Training Deaconnes Hospital, Spokane, Washington 1960. Memberships

Clinical Member, AMFT

Nevada Association of Marriage and Family Therapists NAMFT EMDRIA Professional Association of EMDR Therapists Professional Speaker, Instructor, and Consultant with Special Experiences in the Areas of Trauma and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 2009 International Conference on Violence and Trauma, September 2009 presenter and panel member.

Tltls report is to be kept under ADA Administrative confidential maaagement except fbr ase by tbe ADA Administrator revealing functional impairments and needed accommodations communicated to tbe Trier of Fact to implemeat administration of aceommodations. Tbis information is NOT to become part oftbe advenarial process. Revealing any part of this report may result in a violation of HIPAA and ADAAA Federal Law.

Gillespie p18 of 22 2009 2009 2008-2009 Participant in American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence and DOJ-OVW bi-weekly webinar series. Faculty, Annual Battered Mothers Custody Conference, Albany, New York. Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center Continuing Medical Education, Regularly Scheduled Lecturer on PTSD and Legal Abuse Syndrome, granting CMEs for Physician licensure. Participating physicians gained expanded skills in diagnosing PTSD, and awareness of their ethical role as to the ADA, and that chronic extreme stress such as litigation as well as acute traumatic incidences precipitate PTSD. Speaker on protocols for treatment of PTSD and trauma in schools. Designed and conducted research adapting FBI critical-incident debriefing protocols for children with special needs including PTSD. Consultant for U.S. Attorney's Office and FBI in a joint effort establishing "FIRST" (Financial Institution Robbery Support Task Force) to assist victims of bank robberies (both customers and employees). This led to a collaboration with FBI field agents during which I adapted methods from their Critical-Incident Debriefing method and developed a graphic for use with those under extreme stress with Complex PTSD from non-acute traumatic exposure. A broadening of the diagnosis of PTSD in the DSM IV aligned with these findings. I conducted more than 200 presentations for peer review regarding treatment protocols, potential ethics violations, and inadvertent abuses of those with PTSD in our bW'eaucratic and legal systems. These led to the development ofa research instrument used for a decade to survey PTSD in employment, education, and the courts, that provided invaluable feedback. I served as Instructor in the areas of traumatic stress for Chapman College, La Salle University, and University of Las Vegas Nevada Extension Division.
This report is to be kept under ADA Administrative confidential management except fbi use by tbe ADA Administrator revealing functional Impairments and needed accommodations communicated to the Trier of Fact to implement administration of aeeommodations. This informatioD is NOT to become part of the advenarial proeess. Revealing any part of this report may result in violatioD of mPAA and ADAAA Federal Law.

20002005

1995-2000

1983-1992

Gillespie p19 of 22 I was a presenter as part of the "Life Span" speakers program and special seminars at Hospital Corporation of America Montevista Psychiatric Hospital in Las Vegas, Nevada. Diagnosis of PTSD was in the early stages of being determined. I achieved a consensus that PTSD was an anxiety condition, fully compensable by insurance and treatable. 1997-2007 The unique needs of those with PTSD were identified through longitudinal research, HufferlAlexander Longitudinal Research, 2007.

Employment
1983-pres Accommodations Designer for access to Judicial System, schools, jobs, and public services under the Americans with Disabilities Act through LV AA. Private Practice in Marriage and Family Therapy - with emphasis on post-trauma stress.. Clark County School District, Las Vegas, Nevada, Counselorffeacher. Liaison under the Americans with Disabilities Act for Section 504 and the IDEA, Special Education and Alternative Education working with expelled students. I proved that the use of accommodations were critical to fair access to education for students.

1972-pres 1963-2003

Published Works

May 2009 Jan 2009 Training Manual for PTSD in the Courts with Ethics.
BMCC Conference, Albany, New York, Presentation of research findings: "Application of Americans with Disabilities Act to Preventable Public Health Conditions During Litigation." BMCC Conference, Albany, New York, Presentation of research findings: "Survey of Family Court Litigation Participants Measuring Perceived Legal Abuses and Public Health Risk."

Jan 2008

This report is to be kept under ADA Administrative confidential maaagement except fW use by tbe ADA Adm.ialstrator revealing fUBctioaal impairments aad needed accommodations commuaicated to tbe Trier of Fact to implemeat administration of accommodations. Tbis information is NOT to become part oftbe advenarial process. Revealing aay part of tbis report may result in a violatioa of WPAA and ADAAA Federal
Law.

Gillespie p20 of22

Fall 2005

Article, "Judicial System Inaccessibility for Those with Psychiatric Injury - Legal Abuse Syndrome as a Psychiatric Injury and Diagnosable Subcategory of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder." Edited subtitle for publishing "Legal Abuse Syndrome: Fact or Fad" Diogeoes The Magazjne. Fall Edition, national circulation, 2005. Columnist, "The Human Side," for Risk Management Magazine, national circulation. Editor and columnist, "Dear Karin," for biweekly magazine, Nevada Woman. Advice column. Overcoming the Devastation of Legal Abuse Syndrome, 234-page text (self-help/textbook) for preventing and treating PTSDILAS. Seven years of peer review brought the data to the point of publication. In fifth printing, ISBN 0-9641786-0-5. Website - http://www.legalabusesydrome.org Provides guidance, facilitates research, provides outreach to the wounded litigants with PTSD.

1996-1997 1995-2003 1995

1997-2008

Conferences Professional Presentations

(excerpted list with only most-recent presentations provided)

Communicating in Ethically Challenging Situations

Humana Sunrise Hospital Physicians, May 1, 2009.

Child's View of Custody Evaluations And The Law That Helps.

Battered Mothers

Custody Conference (BMCC), Albany, NY, Jan 2009.

ADA Applied to PTSD in Litigation, International Conference on Violence and Trauma

(IVAT), San Diego, CA, Sept. 2008.

PTSD in Courtroom, Battered Mothers Custody Conference (BMCC) Albany, NY, Jan 2008.

Advanced Applied Ethics and Protocols for Psycholegal Trauma, Seattle, W~ May 2007.
Tbis report is to be kept under ADA Administrative confidential management except (M) use by tbe ADA Administrator revealing functional impairments and needed aceommod.tions communicated to tbe Trier of Fact to implement administration of accommodations. Tbls information is NOT to become part of tbe .dvenarial process. Revealing any part of tbis report may result in a violation of HIPAA and ADAAA Federal Law.

Gillespie p21 of 22

Research results, Survey of Family Court Litigation Participants Measuring Perceived

Legal Abuses and Public Health Risk, Presented at "BMee", Jan. 2007, Albany, NY.
Radio, Newspaper, and Television
(excerpted list with only most-recent appearances provided)
Jon Ralston Show, TV Las Vegas, NV, November 12, 2008.

The Justice Hour, May 12, 2008, Lisa Macc;, Boca Raton, FL
Outstanding Women in Politics http://www.thewestchestemews.comIWOMEN IN POLITICS: Westchester
News Spotlight is About Outstanding Womeo in Politics.btml

Couple Victims of 'Legal Abuse'for 1j Years By JANE MUSGRAVE THE PALM BEACH POST Published: Monday, July 28, 2008 at 10:50

p.m.

E.

Documents Reviewed in Preparation of the Report

September 17, 2009 Economic Analysis Spreadsheet by Jeff Childers giving opinion as to nonpecuniary cost of litigation. October 27, 2008 Letter to Robert Bauer Esq. Request for Accommodations regarding Bauer motion to withdraw as counsel. March S, 2007 Amended Request for Accommodations. February 20, 2007 Request for ADA Accommodations with diagnosis medical information. Request is for more time to get an attorney and flexible deadlines while he is without an attorney. October 23, 2006 Order denying ADA accommodations for attorney and granting a continuance. October 04, 2006 Transcript of Hearing before Judge Nielson. Mr. Gillespie too ill to appear and made a telephonic appearance. October 3, 2006 to K. Christopher Nauman, Assistant Court Counsel requesting a continuance as an ADA Accommodation. Copy to Judge Nielson.
Tbis report is to be kept UDder ADA Admiaistntive eoatideDtiat Dl8nagemeot except

rat

use by the ADA Administrator revealing r.Dctioaal impairments aDd Deeded .ceolDmodatioDI eommunieated to the Trier of Fact to iDlplemeDt admiaistratioD of accoDlmodations. This information is NOT to become part of the advenaria. proeess. RevealiDI aDy part of tbls report .8Y result iD a violation of HIPAA aDd ADAAA Federal

Law.

----------

Gillespie p22 of 22

October 3, 2006 Letter to Judge Nielson Request for continuance citing lack of ADA Accommodation as one reason, an attorney to speak for him. September 22, 2006 Request for ADA Accommodations to Judge Nielson Circuit Court Division Ft Tampa, FL responses through Court Counsel then put on Court Record denying appointment ofan attomey. September 12, 2006 Request for ADA Accommodations to Ms. Frank, Clerk of Circuit court 13th Judicial circuit Tampa. FL. Third Attempt - No Response. September 26 2006 to Judge Nielson Request for Accommodation Attorney to speak for disabled litigant.
t

September 29, 2006 Letter from K. Christopher Nauman, Assistant Court Counsel denying accommodation of appointment of attorney. August 20 1988 Medical report re: head injury criminal mugging interfered with cognition for a time.
t

This report is to be kept UDder ADA AdmiDistntive cODfldeDtial maDagemeDt except &1 use by the ADA AdmiDistrator reveallDg funetlooa) impairmeDts aDd needed accommodations eommunlcated to the Trier of Fact to implement administration of accommodations. This information is NOT to become part of tbe adversarial process. Reveall8g any part of tbis report may result iD a violation of HIPAA and ADAAA Federal Law.

APPLICANT (name): Neil J. Gillespie APPLICANT IS: Witness Juror Attorney Person submitting request (name): Neil J. Gillespie APPLICANTS ADDRESS: 8092 SW 115th Loo ocala FL 34481 TELEPHONE NO: (352) 854-7807

Party

D Other

D D D

FOR COURT USE ONL Y

Web (Date OPI received):

Facsimile Written notice

Date ADA Coordinator received:

LOCATION:
STREET ADDRESS: 8092 SW 115th Loop, ocala, FL 34481 MAILING ADDRESS: 8092 SW 115th Loop, ocala, FL 34481
CITY AND ZIP CODE: ocala, FL 34481
E-MAIL ADDRESS:neililleiemfi.net
BRANCH NAME: Orcuit Ovil Court DMSION: C
NAME OF JUDGE: Orcuit Court Jud e James M. Barton II CASE NAME: Gilles ie v. Barker Rodems & P.A. and William J. NAME OF ATTORNEY if a Iicable: none ro se

05-CA-7205

case number:

Applicant requests accommodations under Florida Rules of Cou~ Rule 2.065, as follows:

1. Division of Court:

DCriminial

[{]OVii

DJuvenile

2. Type of proceeding to be covered (specify: hearing, trial): All meetings, procedures, hearings, discovery process, trials, appeals, and any other court-related actiVity. 3. Dates accommodations needed (specify): All dates and times from the commencement of this action until its final conclusion including any appeal. 4. Impairment necessitating accommodations (specifiy): Please see the ADA Assessment and Report prepared by Karin Huffer, MS, MFT 5. Type of accommodations (spec;ify): Please see the ADA Accommodation Request of Neil J. Gillespie submitted February 19, 2010 6. Special requests or antidpated problems (specify): I am harassed by Mr. Rodems in violation of Fla. Stat. section 784.048 7. I request that my identity

D
.

be kept CONADENTIAL

[l] NOT be kept CONADENTIAL

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of ate: February 18, 2010

............................._ ..__._ .._

(lYPE OR PRINT NAME)

~~iLJ~_Gm~!~_

ADMINISTRA71VE OFFICE OF THE COURT USE ONLY

D D D D D D

request for accommodations is GRANTED because the applicant satisfies the requirements of the rule. it does not create an undue burden on the court. it does not fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity. altemate accommodations granted (.s:peo'Ij1:

D D D

the request for accommodations is DENIED because the applicant does not satisfy the requirements of the rule. it creates an undue burden on the court.
it fundamentally alters the nature of the service, program, or activity (.s:peo'Ij1:

ROUTE TO:

Court Facilities Date:

Court Interpreter center _

A R

REQUEST FOR ACCOMMODATIONS BY PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES AND ORDER

IN THE CIRCillT COURT OF THE TmRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCillT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants. DIVISION: C CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -/
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request of Neil J. Gillespie
This ADA accommodation request is made in conjunction with the ADA Assessment and Report provided by Karin Huffer, MS, MFT, on behalf of Mr. Gillespie. Accommodations Requested Under the Following 1. Proceed under the "federal approach" suggested by the Honorable James M. Barton, II 2. Rule 1.200, Fla.R.Civ.P, Pretrial Procedure, Rule 1.200(a) Case Management Conference 3. Rule 1.201, Fla.R.Civ.P, Complex Litigation designation 4. Rule 2.545, Fla.R.Jud.Admin, Case Management by the Court 5. Florida Statutes, section 784.048, Stalking (protection from) 6. Florida Statutes, chapter 837, Perjury (protection from) 7. Law Review by the Honorable Claudia Rickert Isom, Professionalism and

Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REv. 323, 324 (1998). Please use this standard. 8. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971) Supreme Court found pro se pleadings
should be held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys.

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

Introduction Opposing counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems has set a level of animosity in this lawsuit described by plaintiffs former attorney Mr. Robert W. Bauer on the record: " ...Mr. Rodems has, you know, decided to take a full nuclear blast approach instead of us trying to work this out in a professional manner. It is my mistake for sitting back and giving him the opportunity to take this full blast attack." (transcript, August 14, 2008, emergency hearing, the Honorable Marva Crenshaw, p. 16, line 24). Mr. Gillespie therefore requires ADA accommodations that are reasonable considering the "full nuclear blast approach" taken by Mr. Rodems in this lawsuit. Disability Background Social Security determined Mr. Gillespie fully disabled in 1994. The Florida Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) notified Mr. Gillespie by letter December 4, 1997 that "It has been determined that you are not eligible for vocational rehabilitation services because your disability is too severe at this time for rehabilitation services to result in employment." Defendants are aware of Mr. Gillespie's disability from their prior representation of him. Defendants reviewed Mr. Gillespie's appeal ofDVR's determination and related documents on or about March 27, 2001. Since February, 2005, Mr. Gillespie was the primary caregiver to his then 75-year old mother, an unremarried widow. Ms. Gillespie needed full-time care due to Alzheimer's dementia and a heart condition. This put additional stress on Mr. Gillespie's existing disabilities. In 2008 Ms. Gillespie's Alzheimer's became worse. About the same time Mr. Rodems garnished Mr. Gillespie's bank account and attorney trust fund. This led Mr. Gillespie lawyer, Robert W. Bauer, to move to withdrawal from the case October

Page 2 of18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

13, 2008. In February 2009 Mr. Gillespie's brother in Texas agreed to take in their mother so he could have respite, and to attempt to get the case back on track. Ms. Gillespie did not tolerate the move and died from complications of the move September 16, 2009. Non-Pecuniary Cost of Litigation An review of this lawsuit by attorney Seldon J. Childers produced An Economic

Analysis Spreadsheet draft dated September 17, 2009 that states the following:
"Non-Pecuniary Cost of Litigation. Plaintiff is likely suffering from physical and emotional ill effects resulting from the litigation, as described in Legal Abuse Syndrome, the book provided to me by Plaintiff. It is always difficult to put a dollar figure on the non-pecuniary costs of any case, and this case is no different. In attempting to evaluate the physical and emotional costs of going forward with the litigation, I considered both short and long-term effects, and the opportunity cost caused not just by direct time invested in the case but also by loss of energy related to physical and emotional side-effects. My estimate was $100,000, but this figure is subjective and the Plaintiff may wish to adjust this figure upwards or downwards. There is 100% probability these costs will be incurred regardless of the outcome of the litigation." (p.4, '4). The Florida Bar, ACAP - Previous Attempt at Alternative Dispute Resolution Mr. Gillespie tried to resolve his dispute with Defendants without litigation through The Florida Bar Attorney Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP). Mr. Gillespie spoke with Mr. Donald M. Spangler, Director of ACAP June 12,2003. Mr. Spangler assigned reference #03-18867 to the matter. Mr. Spangler suggested to Mr. Gillespie that he contact Mr. Cook to try and settle the matter. The Florida Bar complaint form, Part Four, Attempted Resolution, states that "[Y]ou should attempt to resolve your matter by

Page 3 ofl8

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request of Neil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

writing to the subject attorney, before contacting ACAP or filing a complaint. Even if this is unsuccessful, it is important that you do so in order to have documentation of good faith efforts to resolve your matter." On June 13, 2003 Mr. Gillespie made a good-faith effort and wrote to Mr. Cook to resolve the matter, noting ACAP reference #03-18867. Mr. Gillespie requested $4,523.93 to settle the matter and provided Mr. Cook an explanation for the request along with a fmancial spreadsheet supporting his claim. A few days later Mr. Gillespie received a letter from Mr. Cook's law partner, Christopher A. Barker, on behalf of Mr. Cook. In his letter Mr. Barker accused Gillespie of felony extortion pursuant to 836.05 Fla. Statutes and the holding ofCarricarte v. State, 384 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 1980); Cooper v. Austin, 750 So.2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Gordon v. Gordon, 625 So.2d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Berger v. Berger, 466 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Mr. Rodems has accused Mr. Gillespie of felony extortion in his Answer, Affmnative Defenses and Counterclaim, paragraphs 57 and 67. Inequitable Balance of Power Defendants countersued Mr. Gillespie for libel. Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So.2d 975, recognizes the inequitable balance of power that may exist between an attorney who brings a defamation action and the client who must defend against it. Attorneys schooled in the law have the ability to pursue litigation through their own means and with minimal expense when compared with their former clients. The Court may take notice of the vast inequities between Mr. Gillespie and Defendants. Mr. Gillespie is 53 years-old, limited by disability, and limited in financial resources. He is unemployed and relies on disability benefits of $22,049 a year (2009).

Page 4 of 18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case OS-eA-720S

In contrast Defendants are a law firm with three partners, all in good health, and
all at least 10 years younger than Mr. Gillespie. Mr. Rodems' reported income for 2006 was $237,873. In 2007 Mr. Rodems reported $130,000 income, and in 2008 Mr. Rodems reported $164,272. Assuming the two other law partners have similar income, that amounts to between $390,000 and $713,619 per year to litigate this matter compared to just $22,049 for Mr. Gillespie. In addition, Defendants are lawyers representing themselves and have the ability to pursue litigation through their own means and with minimal expense. Mr. Gillespie must bear the expenses of his lawsuit, and the expenses of defending against Defendants' counterclaim. Mr. Rodems represents Defendants. He is board-certified in civil trial law and has been practicing for 17 years. Mr. Gillespie's legal training consists of2 business law classes (1985) and 3 paralegal classes (1998). Prior ADA Accommodation Requests by Mr. Gillespie On August 11, 2006, Mr. Gillespie sent an email to ada@fljudI3.org: "I am a person with a disability representing myself pro se in circuit civil court. Judge Nielsen is presiding over my case, # 05-CA-7205, Division F. Are you the appropriate contact person for ADA compliance? Thank you. Neil Gillespie"

Mr. Gillespie followed this email with several inarticulate attempts to obtain ADA
accommodations. Those errors were due to Mr. Gillespie's ignorance of law and manifestations of his disability aggravated by Mr. Rodems inappropriate behavior toward him. It was confusing to Mr. Gillespie that he could contemporaneously litigate a matter about his credit card in federal court l without the problems he encountered in state court.

1 Gillespie v. HSBC Bank., et aI, case no. 5:05-cv-362-0c-WTH-GRJ, United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division, the Honorable William Terrell Hodges presiding.

Page 5 of18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

Mr. Gillespie previously submitted two ADA requests directly to the Court: A. February 20, 2007, Plaintiff's Accommodation Request Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) (Exhibit 1); and

B. March 5, 2007, Plaintiff's Amended Accommodation Request Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA) (Exhibit 2).

Mr. Gillespie noted on the record to Judge Isom February 5, 2007, that he was having difficulty during the hearing. MR. GILLESPIE: I'm barely able to get myself here today.
(transcript, February 5, 2007, page 16, line 12)
MR. GILLESPIE: Well, Judge, if it pleases the Court, I'm getting confused here. (transcript, February 5, 2007, page 39, line 7) Judge Isom discussed an ADA accommodation with Mr. Gillespie.
(transcript, February 5, 2007, beginning page 40, line 4)
MR. GILLESPIE: Judge, I'm going to need some time to compose myself. The
other matter that we haven't discussed is how my disability impacts the ability to
represent myself. We haven't gotten into that. I've offered to have a hearing on
that. And this is a problem.
THE COURT: I see that you had talked to Judge Nielsen about whether or not a
civil judge has any ability or funds with which to appoint private counsel. Was
that an ADA issue with him?
MR. GILLESPIE: I raised that issue. And let me just say on the record that I'm not
looking for someone to pay the lawyer. I would be happy if the Court would
appoint someone and I'll pay him.

Page 60f18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request of Neil J.. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

THE COURT: On an hourly basis? Did you go through the Hillsborough County Bar Association's lawyer referral service? Didn't you say you had already tried that avenue? MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, Judge, and I have the results from that... Judge Isom conducted an impromptu ADA assessment of Mr. Gillespie during the February 5, 2007 hearing. (transcript, February 5, 2007, beginning page 45, line 6) MR. GILLESPIE: Right now, Judge, my head is swimming to the point where I'm having a hard time even hearing you. But it sounded all right. THE COURT: What's is the nature of your disability? MR. GILLESPIE: It's depression and post...traumatic stress disorder. THE COURT: Are you under the care of a doctor? MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, Judge. THE COURT: And do you have a disability rating with the Social Security Administration? MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, Judge. In the early '90s, I'm going to say '93 or '94, I was judged disabled by Social Security. And I applied for vocational rehabilitation. And to make a long story short, I guess it was in about '98 or '99 I received a determination from vocational rehabilitation that my disability was so severe that I could not benefit from rehabilitation. I would say in the interim that they had prepared a rehabilitation plan for me and they didn't want to implement it. And that's the reason that they gave for not implementing it. I brought that cause of action to the Barker,

Page 7 of18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

Rodems and Cook law finn and they reviewed that. And apparently they were in agreement with it because they decided not to represent me on that claim. And a copy of their letter denying that is part of my motion for punitive damages. You can read that letter. I think I have it here. (transcript, February 5, 2007, ending page 46, line 9) After taking testimony about Mr. Gillespie's disability, Judge Isom offered to abate the matter for three months so Mr. Gillespie could find counsel, but Mr. Rodems objected. Mr. Gillespie retained attorney Robert W. Bauer a month later. (transcript, February 5, 2007, beginning at page 46, line 10) THE COURT: Okay. But in terms of direction today, do you want to just stop
everything and abate this proceeding for three months so that you can go out and
try to find substitute counselor --you know, I realize there's a counterclaim.
MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: But originally, at least, it was your lawsuit. So if you feel that
you're at a disadvantage because of your lack of counsel, I guess I could abate it
and give you additional time to try to find an attorney.
MR. RODEMS: Your Honor, we would oppose that. And let me tell you why.
(transcript, February 5, 2007, beginning at page 46, line 21)
Mr. Rodems continued with a self serving diatribe and accused Mr. Gillespie of
criminal extortion for trying to resolve this matter through the Florida Bar ACAP Program, and other such. Then Mr. Rodems made this accusation in open court: MR: RODEMS: In any event, at every stage of the proceedings when Mr. Gillespie is about to be held accountable for his actions he cries that he's got a

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Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case OS-eA-720S

disability or he complains about the fact that he can't get a lawyer. The reason he can't get a lawyer is because he's not willing to pay a lawyer by the hour for the services he wants. (transcript, February 5, 2007, page 49, line 12). And Mr. Gillespie responded: MR. GILLESPIE: I am willing to pay an attorney by the hour. I have sent a payment of $350 an hour to an attorney with the promise of a retainer if they would take the case. So Mr. Rodems calling me cheap and all of this name-calling and not willing to pay, that's not true. In fact, I offered Rick Mitzel who said the cost would be $200 an hour, I gladly offered to pay him $200 an hour. He wouldn't take the case. These lawyers don't want to litigate against this firm because they're aware of what this firm does and what they're capable of. (transcript, February 5, 2007, page 50, line 14). Unable to find counsel in the Tampa Bay area, Mr. Gillespie sought an out-of town referral from The Florida Bar Lawyer Referral Service. (LRS). The LRS provided a referral to attorney Robert W. Bauer, 2815 NW 13 th Street, Suite 200E, Gainesville, FL.

Mr. Bauer entered his notice of appearance April 2, 2007 on behalf of Mr. Gillespie. This
was just 56 days after Judge Isom considered allowing three months for Mr. Gillespie to obtain counsel, until Mr. Rodems objected and Judge Isom capitulated. Mr. Gillespie paid

Mr. Bauer $250 per hour for representation. Because of the need to hire an out-of-town
attorney to litigate against Mr. Rodems, Mr. Gillespie occurred an additional cost for counsel to travel from Gainesville that added $5,700 to the cost of representation. Judge Barton was pleased with Mr. Bauer, and stated so on the record:

Page 9 of 18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

THE COURT: "It is a good thing for Mr. Gillespie that he has retained counsel. The way in which Mr. Gillespie's side has been presented today with - with a high degree of professionalism and confidence reflects the wisdom of that decision." (transcript, hearing July 3, 2007, page 21, line 6) But Mr. Rodems knows "nice guys finish last" and behaved accordingly. A year and a half later Mr. Bauer complained on the record, just like Mr. Gillespie before him. Attorney Robert W. Bauer on the record:

" ...Mr. Rodems has, you know, decided to take a full nuclear blast
approach instead of us trying to work this out in a professional manner. It is my mistake for sitting back and giving him the opportunity to take this full blast attack." (transcript, August 14, 2008 emergency hearing, the Honorable Marva Crenshaw, p. 16, line 24). Specific ADA Accommodations Requested ADA Request No.1: Mr. Gillespie requests the Court take action to stop Mr. Rodems' behavior directed toward Mr. Gillespie that is aggravating his disability by causing substantial emotional distress that serves no legitimate purpose. Mr. Rodems behavior violates the following Florida Statutes: A. Violation of Florida Statutes, section 784.048, Stalking Since March 3, 2006, Mr. Rodems has directed, with malice aforethought, a course of harassing conduct toward Mr. Gillespie that has aggravated his disability, caused substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate purpose. This is a violation of Florida Statutes, 784.048. As used in section 784.048(1)(a) "Harass" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress

Page 10 of 18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request of Neil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook., PA, case 05-CA-7205

in such person and serves no legitimate purpose. As used in section 784.048(1)(b) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. (relevant portion). As used in section 784.048(2) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Mr. Rodems has harassed Mr. Gillespie throughout this lawsuit. Mr. Rodems telephoned Mr. Gillespie and threatened to reveal client confidences from prior representation2 and taunted him about his vehicle. Mr. Rodems submitted a perjured pleading to the Court falsely naming Judge Nielsen in an "exact quote" attributed to Mr. Gillespie3 Mr. Rodems has engaged in name-calling by phone and by letter. Mr. Rodems has called Mr. Gillespie "cheap" and a "pro se litigant of dubious distinction',4. Mr. Rodems has written Mr. Gillespie that ''you are a bitter man who has apparently been victimized by your own poor choices in life" and ''you are cheap and not willing to pay the required hourly rates for representation."s Mr. Rodems has set hearings without consulting Gillespie6 . On one occasion Mr. Rodems waited outside chambers to harass Mr. Gillespie following a hearing? Mr. Rodems has accused Mr. Gillespie of felony criminal extortion for trying to resolve this matter through the Florida Bar Attorney Consumer Assistance Program. This list of Mr. Rodems' harassing behavior is representative but not exhaustive.

March 3, 2006 telephone call, Mr. Rodems to Gillespie March 6, 2006, Defendants' Verified Request For BailiffAnd For Sanctions 4 December 13,2006 voice mail by Mr. Rodems to Gillespie s December 13, 2006, letter by Mr. Rodems to Gillespie 6 The most recent was Dec-I 6-09, when Mr. Rodems set a hearing for Jan-19-1 0 for Defendants' Motion for an Order Compelling Plaintiffto respond to the Defendants' Requestfor Production and Attend Deposition 7 Following the hearing of April 25, 2006
2

Page 11 of 18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

B. Violation of Florida Statutes, chapter 837, Perjury On March 6, 2006, Mr. Rodems submitted, with malice aforethought, Defendants'
Verified Request For BailiffAnd For Sanctions, a pleading that falsely placed the

Honorable Richard A. Nielsen into the dispute between the parties, a perjury in violation of 837.02(1) and 837.06. Mr. Rodems' verified pleading was made during an official proceeding as described in 837.011(1), made under oath as described in 837.011(2) and concerned a material matter as described in 837.011(3). A recording of the exchange between Mr. Rodems and Gillespie impeached Rodems' verified pleading submitted March 6, 2006. Calls on Mr. Gillespie's home office business telephone extension (352) 854-7807 are recorded for quality assurance purposes pursuant to the business use exemption of Florida Statutes chapter 934, section 934.02(4)(a)(I) and the holding of Royal Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Life
Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 215 (11th Cir. 1991). In addition Mr. Rodems provided written consent

to Gillespie to record their telephone calls, see Notice OfMr. Rodems' Written Consent
To Record Telephone Conversations With Him, submitted December 29, 2006.

There is evidence on the record that Mr. Rodems' perjury has resulted in prejudice and/or discrimination by the Court: 1). On June 28, 2006, Mr. Gillespie asked the Court for protection from Mr. Rodems, who at a previous hearing waited outside chambers to harass him. This is Mr. Gillespie's request and Judge Nielsen's sarcastic response: MR. GILLESPIE: Thank you, Judge. And, Your Honor, would you ask that Mr. Rodems leave the area. The last time he left, he was taunting me in the hallway and I don't want that to happen today.

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Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

THE COURT: Well, you can stay next to my bailiff until he goes home and then
you can decide what you want to do, sir.
(Transcript, June 28, 2006, page 21, line 20)
2). Mr. Rodems' aforementioned perjury succeeded in causing Judge Isom to fear
an attack from Mr. Gillespie. This is an exchange on February 5, 2007 where
Judge Isom feared that Mr. Gillespie brought an umbrella to chambers to
commence an attack:
THE COURT: When in the courthouse engaging in litigation regarding this case - is that your umbrella right there on that chair?
MR. GILLESPIE: I don't have an umbrella.
THE BAILIFF: That's been here since this morning, Your Honor.
(Transcript, Feb-05-07, page 9, line 12)
3) There is evidence that Judge Isom knowingly denied Mr. Gillespie the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of this Court, specifically mediation services. This is an exchange from a hearing February 1, 2007: THE COURT: And you guys have already gone to mediation and tried to resolve this without litigation? MR. GILLESPIE: No, Your Honor. (transcript, Feb-Ol-07, page 15, line 20) (please note, this is from a hearing Feb 01-07, not the later hearing ofFeb-05-07 which transcript accompanies this report.) In addition Judge Isom denied Mr. Gillespie the benefits set forth in a law review by The Honorable Claudia Rickert Isom, Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REV. 323, 324 (1998), on the issue ofadversarial parties and discovery

Page 13 of 18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request of Neil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

problems when she ruled against Mr. Gillespie's Plaintiffs Motion For Reconsideration

OfDiscovery. (transcript, Feb-05-10, beginning at page 71, line 18)

Finally, it appears that the decision of the Court to forgo its case management obligations imposed by Rule 2.545, Fla.R.Jud.Admin. was due to prejudice and/or discrimination set in motion by Mr. Rodems' false portrayal of Mr. Gillespie to the Court. Mr. Rodems is an Officer ofthe Court with great influence on the Court compared to a pro se litigant and ordinary citizen who appears before the Court with a disability. ADA Request No.2: Mr. Gillespie requests the Court fulfill its case management duties imposed by Rille 2.545, Fla.R.Jud.Admin. This will stop Mr. Rodems from taking advantage of Mr. Gillespie's disabilities which has turned the court process into a bully/victim cycle due to the ridicule and exploitation of Mr. Gillespie's functional impairments. On or about January 30, 2006, Mr. Gillespie requested a case management conference from Mr. Rodems pursuant to Rille 1.200(a), see Plaintiff's Verified Response

to Defendants' Verified Request For BailiffAnd For Sanctions, And To Mr. Rodems' PerJury, And Plaintiff's Motion For An Order OfProtection, submitted March 14, 2006.
Pursuant to Rille 1.201, Fla.R.Civ.P, Mr. Gillespie requests the Court designate this case complex litigation. Pursuant to Rille 1.200(a), Fla.R.Civ.P, Mr. Gillespie requests the Court hold a case management conference. Mr. Gillespie requests the Court limit the number of motions to one per hearing unless otherwise stipillated. Mr. Gillespie requests the Court determine the motions that need a hearing. Some motions dating to 2006 have not been heard. Mr. Gillespie requests the Court set a schedule to hear the motions beginning with the oldest first, unless otherwise stipulated. A partial list of outstanding motions is attached as Exhibit 3.

Page 14 of 18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

In addition, Mr. Gillespie concurs with the Court to take a "federal approach" regarding the litigation. (transcript, Jan-26-10, page 4, line 15; and page 18, line 12). ADA Request No.3: Mr. Gillespie requests the benefit of the services, programs, or activities of the Court described in the Law Review by the Honorable Claudia Rickert Isom, Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETsoNL. REv. 323, 324 (1998). This will allow Mr. Gillespie to litigate his case on a level playing field. Currently the Court is using a ''trip and trap" model with Mr. Gillespie. The Court has allowed Mr. Rodems to take advantage of Mr. Gillespie's disabilities and turned the court process into a bully/victim cycle due to the ridicule and exploitation of Mr. Gillespie's functional impairments. The Court has rewarded Mr. Rodems' harassing behavior with an extreme sanction of$II,550. This is wrong, and contrary to the legitimate use of discoveryJl Pretrial discovery was implemented to simplify the issues in a case, to encourage the settlement of cases, and to avoid costly litigation. (Elkins v. Syken, 672 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1996). In this case the parties know the issues from Defendants' prior representation on the same matter. The rules of discovery are designed to secure the just and speedy determination of every action (In re Estes' Estate, 158 So.2d 794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1963), to promote the ascertainment of truth (Ulrich v. Coast Dental Services, Inc. 739 So.2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1999), and to ensure that judgments are rested on the real merits of causes (National Healthcorp Ltd. Partnership v. Close, 787 So.2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2001), and not upon the skill and maneuvering of counsel. (Zuberbuhler v. Division of Administration, State Dept. ofTransp. 344 So.2d 1304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1977). However in this case the Court has issued a Final Judgment March 27, 2008 in the amount of$II,550 based on the skill and maneuvering of counsel, and counsel's aggravation of Mr. Gillespie's disability. Contemporaneously Defendants

Page 15 of 18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request ofNeil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

have not provided most of their discovery due in the lawsuit. Defendants have not provided any documents responsive to plaintiff's initial request for production served July 7, 2006. A motion to compel was submitted December 14, 2006 and remains unheard.
In conjunction with Judge Isom's law review, Mr. Gillespie requests the benefit of the

services, programs, or activities of the Court described in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971) where the US Supreme Court held that pro se pleadings should be held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys. In the instant case Mr. Gillespie has been held to a higher standard that attorneys because there was no case management as required by Rule 2.545, Fla.R.Jud.Admin and as described in Judge Isom's law review. Nor was Mr. Gillespie given or offered the benefit of the mediation program, which is used in virtually all similar cases in the 13 th Judicial Circuit. ADA Request No.4: Enforce by court order the directives imposed by Judge Isom on February 5, 2007. Judge Isom required Mr. Rodems to address plaintiff as "Mr. Gillespie" when speaking or in any written communication relative to this case, and not use nicknames or first names. Judge Isom also instructed Mr. Rodems to communicate in writing and not make telephone calls to Mr. Gillespie. (transcript, hearing of Feb-05-07, page 7, beginning at line 19). Mr. Rodems has disobeyed Judge Isom's directives a number of times since February 5, 2007. In addition, during the January 26, 2010 hearing, Mr. Gillespie told the Court and Mr. Rodems that he was not to communicate by email. In the past Mr. Rodems was abusive in his email to Mr. Gillespie. Nonetheless, Mr. Rodems emailed Gillespie a few hours after the hearing. So a court order enforcing the directives imposed by Judge Isom must also include a prohibition on Mr. Rodems sending email to Mr. Gillespie.

Page 16 of 18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request of Neil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

ADA Request No.5: Mr. Gillespie requests a 180 day stay in the case to accomplish the following ADA Requests, numbers 6 and 7. On October 1, 2009 the Court granted Mr. Gillespie a 60 day stay to fmd counsel. Due to the death of Mr. Gillespie's mother September 16, 2009, he spent most of that time tending to her affairs and has not had sufficient time to find counsel to replace Mr. Bauer. ADA Request No.6: Mr. Gillespie requests time to scan thousands of pages of documents in this case to electronic PDF format. This case and underlying cause of action covers a ten year period and the files have become unmanageable and confusing relative to Gillespie's disability. Mr. Gillespie is not able to concentrate when handling a large amount of physical files and documents. He is better able to manage the files and documents when they are organized and viewable on his computer. Mr. Gillespie will bear the cost of converting files and documents to PDF. This problem has been ongoing since the beginning of this lawsuit and has resulted in sanctions against Mr. Gillespie. When initially responding to Defendants' discovery requests, Mr. Gillespie invoked Rule 1.340(c), Fla.R.Civ.P, Option to Produce Records. Mr. Gillespie offered to allow Defendants to inspect his files, at a law library if necessary, but Mr. Rodems refused. At that time Gillespie was unaware of the technology that would have allowed him to effectively manage documents relative to his disability. ADA Request No.7: Mr. Gillespie requests time to find and hire counsel to represent him. The Court allowed Mr. Bauer to withdrawal in October 2009 without alternate counsel in place. Mr. Gillespie has not been able to obtain counsel through the usual channels. The Hillsborough County Bar Association was unable to refer a single attorney willing to litigate against Mr. Rodems. The Florida Bar Lawyer Referral Service does not

Page 17 of 18

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request of Neil J. Gillespie Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case 05-CA-7205

make referrals in Hillsborough County. The Court may take notice of the difficulty faced by an ordinary citizen in finding counsel when suing his fonner lawyers who have taken a "full nuclear blast approach" in the litigation. After four years of litigation it takes more than a phone call to hire counsel, it likely requires a sophisticated presentation and compelling arguments to prospective counsel to become involved in the litigation. Mr. Gillespie proposes the following plan: a. Mr. Gillespie has identified an attorney, a partner firm that is uniquely situated to represent him. Mr. Gillespie is currently preparing a presentation to the attorney. b. Mr. Gillespie is developing a web site for this litigation. From it he will search for counsel utilizing, among other things, the Wharton Global Community. Mr. Gillespie is a Wharton alumni. The Wharton alumni network has 85,000. Conclusion Mr. Gillespie believes the Court can ordinarily provide ADA accommodations in a timely and efficient manner. But this case has proved difficult because Mr. Rodems has a conflict litigating against a former client and took a "full nuclear blast attack" approach. Mr. Gillespie apologies to the Court for any past ADA requests that it viewed improper. Those errors were due to Mr. Gillespie's ignorance of law and manifestations of his disability aggravated by Mr. Rodems harassing behavior toward him. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED February 19,2010.

Page 18 of 18

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL 1. GILLESPIE,
Plaintiff, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation, WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants. DIVISION: H CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

-------------~/
PLAINTIFF'S ACCOMODATION REQUEST AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) Plaintiff requests an accommodation under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and states: 1. 2. Plaintiff was determined totally disabled by Social Security in 1994. Defendants are familiar with Plaintiffs disability from their prior

representation of him. Defendants investigated his eligibility to receive services from the Florida Department of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR). DVR determined that Plaintiff was too severely disabled to benefit from services. Defendants concurred, and notified Plaintiff of their decision in a letter to him dated March 27, 2001. (Exhibit A). 3. Plaintiff has the following medical conditions which are disabling and

prevent him from effectively participating in court proceedings, including: a. Depression and related mood disorder. This medical condition prevents Plaintiff from working, meeting deadlines, and concentrating. The inability to concentrate at times affects Plaintiffs ability to hear and comprehend.

EXHIBIT

I 1

Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., case no. OS-CA-720S b. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), makes Plaintiff susceptible to stress, such as the ongoing harassment by Defendants' lawyer, Mr. Rodems. c. Velopharyngeal Incompetence (VPI) is a speech impairment that affects Plaintiffs ability to communicate. d. The medical treatment for depression includes prescription medication that further disables Plaintiffs ability to do the work of this lawsuit, and further prevents him from effectively participating in the proceedings. 4. Prior to the onset of the most disabling aspects Plaintiffs medical

condition(s), he was a productive member of society, a business owner for 12 years, and a graduate of both the University of Pennsylvania and The Evergreen State College.

5.

On March 3, 2006, Ryan Christopher Rodems telephoned Plaintiff at his

home and threatened to use information learned during Defendants prior representation against him in the instant lawsuit. Mr. Rodems' threats were twofold; to intimidate Plaintiff into dropping this lawsuit by threatening to disclose confidential client information, and to inflict emotional distress, to trigger Plaintiffs Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and inflict injury upon Plaintiff for Defendants' advantage in this lawsuit. 6. On March 6, 2006, Mr. Rodems made a false verification the Court about

the March 3, 2006 telephone call. Mr. Rodems submitted Defendants' Verified Request For Bailiff And For Sanctions, and told the Court under oath that Plaintiff threatened acts of violence in Judge Nielsen's chambers. It was a stunt that backfired when a tape recording of the phone call showed that Mr. Rodems lied. Plaintiff notified the Court about Mr. Rodems' perjury in Plaintiffs Motion With Affidavit To Show Cause Why Ryan Christopher Rodems Should not Be Held In Criminal Contempt Of Court and Incorporated Memorandum Of Law submitted January 29, 2007. Page - 2 of4

Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., case no. 05-CA-7205 7. Mr. Rodems' harassing phone call to Plaintiff of March 3, 2006, was a

tort, the Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress. Mr. Rodems' tort injured Plaintiff by aggravating his existing medical condition. From the time of the calIon March 3, 2006, Plaintiff suffered worsening depression for which he was treated by his doctors. a. On May 1, 2006 Plaintiffs doctor prescribed Effexor XR, a serotonin norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (SNRl), to the maximum dosage. b. Plaintiff s worsening depression, and the side affects of the medication, lessened Plaintiffs already diminished ability to represent himself in this lawsuit. c. On October 4,2006 Plaintiff began the process of discontinuing his medication so that he could improve is ability to represent himself in this lawsuit. d. On or about November 18,2006, Plaintiff discontinued the use of anti depression medication, to improve his ability to represent himself in this lawsuit. 8. Mr. Rodems continued to harass Plaintiff during the course of this lawsuit

in the following manner: a. Mr. Rodems lay-in-wait for Plaintiff outside Judge Nielsen's chambers on April 25, 2006, following a hearing, to taunt him and provoke an altercation. b. Mr. Rodems refused to address Plaintiff as "Mr. Gillespie" but used his first name, and disrespectful derivatives, against Plaintiff's expressed wishes. c. Mr. Rodems left insulting, harassing comments on Plaintiff's voice mail during his ranting message of December 13,2006. d. Mr. Rodems wrote Plaintiff a five-page diatribe of insults and ad hominem abusive attacks on December 13, 2006. 9. Plaintiff notified the Court of his inability to obtain counsel in PlaintifFs

Notice ofInability to obtain Counsel submitted February 13,2007.

Page - 3 of4

Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., case no. 05-CA-7205

"

10.

Plaintiff acknowledges that this ADA accommodation request is unusual,

but so are the circumstances, Defendants in this lawsuit are Plaintiffs fonner lawyers, who are using Plaintiff's client confidences against him, while contemporaneously inflicting new injuries upon their former client based on his disability. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests additional time to obtain counsel, a stay in the proceedings for 90 days. Plaintiff also requests accommodation in the fonn of additional time to meet deadlines when needed due to his disability. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 201h day of February, 2007.
..
~_.,-.--

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via US Mail to Ryan C. Rodems, attorney, Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 400 N Ashley Dr., Suite 2100, Tampa, FL 33602, this 20 1h day of February, 2007.
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EXHIBIT

I fJ

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation, WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants. DIVISION: C CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

------------_./
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED ACCOMODATION REQUEST AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) Plaintiff requests an accommodation under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and states: 1. 2. Plaintiff was determined totally disabled by Social Security in 1994. Defendants are familiar with Plaintiff's disability from their prior

representation of him. Defendants investigated his eligibility to receive services from the Florida Department of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR). DVR determined that Plaintiff was too severely disabled to benefit from services. Defendants concurred, and notified Plaintiff of their decision in a letter to him dated March 27,2001. (Exhibit A). Defendants were also informed of Plaintiff's medication for depression by fax dated October 6, 2000, Effexor XR 150mg. (Exhibit B). 3. Plaintiff has the following medical conditions which are disabling and

prevent him from effectively participating in court proceedings, including: a. Depression and related mood disorder. This medical condition prevents

... Plaintiff from working, meeting deadlines, and concentrating. The inability ~to. .~~~!!!_
EXHIBIT

Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., case no. 05-CA-7205 concentrate at times affects Plaintifrs ability to hear and comprehend. The medical treatment for depression includes prescription medication that further disables Plaintifrs ability to do the work of this lawsuit, and further prevents him from effectively participating in the proceedings. b. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), makes Plaintiff susceptible to stress, such as the ongoing harassment by Defendants' lawyer, Mr. Rodems. c. Velopharyngeal Incompetence (VPI) is a speech impainnent that affects Plaintiff's ability to communicate. d. Type 2 diabetes. This was diagnosed in 2006 after Defendants' representation. 4. Prior to the onset of the most disabling aspects Plaintiff's medical

condition(s), he was a productive member of society, a business owner for 12 years, and a graduate of both the University of Pennsylvania and The Evergreen State College. 5. On March 3, 2006, Ryan Christopher Rodems telephoned Plaintiff at his

home and threatened to use information learned during Defendants prior representation against him in the instant lawsuit. Mr. Rodems' threats were twofold; to intimidate Plaintiff into dropping this lawsuit by threatening to disclose confidential client infonnation, and to inflict emotional distress, to trigger Plaintiff's Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and inflict injury upon Plaintiff for Defendants' advantage in this lawsuit. 6. On March 6, 2006, Mr. Rodems made a false verification the Court about

the March 3, 2006 telephone call. Mr. Rodems submitted Defendants' Verified Request For Bailiff And For Sanctions, and told the Court under oath that Plaintiff threatened acts of violence in Judge Nielsen's chambers. It was a stunt that backfired when a tape recording of the phone call showed that Mr. Rodems lied. Plaintiff notified the Court Page - 20f4

Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., case no. 05-CA-7205 about Mr. Rodems' perjury in Plaintiff's Motion With Affidavit To Show Cause Why Ryan Christopher Rodems Should not Be Held In Criminal Contempt Of Court and Incorporated Memorandum Of Law submitted January 29, 2007. 7. Mr. Rodems' harassing phone call to Plaintiff of March 3, 2006, was a

tort, the Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress. Mr. Rodems' tort injured Plaintiff by aggravating his existing medical condition. From the time of the call on March 3, 2006, Plaintiff suffered worsening depression for which he was treated by his doctors. a. On May 1, 2006 Plaintiff's doctor prescribed Effexor XR, a serotonin norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (SNRI), to the maximum dosage. b. Plaintiff's worsening depression, and the side affects of the medication, lessened Plaintiff's already diminished ability to represent himself in this lawsuit. c. On October 4,2006 Plaintiff began the process of discontinuing his medication so that he could improve is ability to represent himself in this lawsuit. d. On or about November 18,2006, Plaintiff discontinued the use of anti depression medication, to improve his ability to represent himself in this lawsuit. 8. Mr. Rodems continued to harass Plaintiff during the course of this lawsuit

in the following manner: a. Mr. Rodems lay-in-wait for Plaintiff outside Judge Nielsen's chambers on April 25, 2006, following a hearing, to taunt him and provoke an altercation. b. Mr. Rodems refused to address Plaintiff as "Mr. Gillespie" but used his first name, and disrespectful derivatives, against Plaintiff's expressed wishes. c. Mr. Rodems left insulting, harassing comments on Plaintiffs voice mail during his ranting message of December 13,2006.

Page - 3 of4

Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., case no. 05-CA-7205 d. Mr. Rodems wrote Plaintiff a five-page diatribe of insults and ad hominem abusive attacks on December 13,2006. 9. Plaintiff notified the Court of his inability to obtain counsel in Plaintiff's

Notice ofInability to obtain Counsel submitted February 13, 2007.

lO. Plaintiff acknowledges that this ADA accommodation request is unusual,

but so are the circumstances. Defendants in this lawsuit are Plaintiff's former lawyers, who are using Plaintiffs client confidences against him, while contemporaneously inflicting new injuries upon their former client based on his disability. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests additional time to obtain counsel, a stay in the proceedings for 90 days. Plaintiff also requests accommodation in the form of additional time to meet deadlines when needed due to his disability. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of March, 2007.

-ro..,.=-'---L--+-~:;;O=-"'--'-~;,r"""

"-'<:::=---_ _

pro se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via US Mail to Ryan C. Rodems, attorney, Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 400 N Ashley Dr., Suite 2100, Tampa, FL 33602, this 5th day of March, 2007.

,----.1. ~/ ..'.....;. . <'-/::~/;'''~'/' f/ . . . "/.~~~.

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Page -4 of4

'

BARI<El{, R()I)EMS ~l CC)()I(

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1\1arch 27, 200 I

Neil J. (jillcspic
!\pllrllHcnt ('-2

1121 lleach [)rive NI~ St. Petcrsbllrt~, l;lor.ida 3370 1-1434

I an) cncl()sillg the 111utcrial you provided to \IS. \Ve have revie\\'cd thCll1 and, unfortunately, a position to represent yOtl i:()r any clainls yOli Inay have. 1>lcase understand that our dcci~ion docs not 111CUIl that your cJainls lack 111Crit, and another attorney Blight \vish to represent you. If you vv'ish I() consult '\vith another attorney, ,ve recolnnlcnd that you do so ilnnlediately as a sLatute or lilllital iOI1~\ ,viII apply to any cluinJs you 111ay have. As you kno\v, a statute of lilllitati()IlS is a legal deadline f()f nling a la,vsuit. 'fhank yOll for the opporlunity to revievv yOllf lllflterials.
\ve are not in

Sincerely,

~~/I(J
(~ook

,1

\VilfitUll J.
\\IJ('/lllSS
I:~nclosllres

EXHIBIT

1--'1

Fax
From: Neil J. Gillespie 1121 Beach Drive NE, Apt C-2 S1. Petersburg, FL 33701 Phone/Fax: (727) 823-2390

To: William J. Cook, Attorney at Law

Fax: (813) 228-9612
Date: October 6, 2000
Pages: just this page
Re: ACE Check Cashing deposition

o Urgent
. ...

o Please Reply

0 For YOMI' Review

__._ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8

Comments:

RE: Current medications

Effexor XR 150 mg (depression)
Levoxy~

0.075 mg (hormone)

J---IJ

EXHIBIT

Partial list of outstanding motions and pleadings Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, case no. 05-CA-7205 By date beginning with the oldest. This list is incomplete due to time constraints, and includes mostly plaintiff's motions and pleadings. 1. 2. March 6, 2006, Defendants' Verified Request For BailiffAnd For Sanctions March 14, 2006, Plaintiffs Verified Response To Defendants' Verified Request For BailiffAnd For Sanctions and Motion For An Order OrProtection April 25, 2006, Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment April 25, 2006, Plaintiffs Motionfor Appointment ofCounsel, Attorney's Fees, and Legal Retainer. December 14, 2006, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendants' Discovery January 18, 2007, Plaintiffs Motionfor Punitive Damages Pursuant to Section 768.72 Florida Statutes January 29, 2007, Plaintiffs Motion With An Affidavit For An Order To Show Cause Why Ryan Christopher Rodems Should Not Be Held In Criminal Court And Incorporated Memorandum ofLaw February 1, 2007, Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Defendants' Discovery February 20, 2007, Plaintiffs Accommodation Request Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) March 5, 2007, Plaintiffs Amended Accommodation Request Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) July 16, 2008, Plaintiffs Motionfor Rehearing (submitted by Mr. Bauer) August 14,2008, Plaintiffs Claim ofExemption and Requestfor Hearing (Submitted by Mr. Bauer) December 15, 2009, Plaintiff's Motion to Hold Ryan Christopher Rodems in Civil Contempt ofCourt, (Violated Stay Order of October 1, 2009) January 5, 2010, Plaintiffs Motionfor an Order ofProtections Against Ryan Christopher Rodems (with request to Disqualify Mr. Rodems as Counsel for Defendants) January 26,2010, Plaintiffs Motion For ReliefFrom Order Adjudging Contempt February 16, 2010, Objection To Notice For Trial February 18, 2010, Plaintiffs Motion For Order Or Protection, premise ins ctiiliolllin
~

3. 4.

5. 6.

7.

8. 9. 10.

11. 12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17.

EXHIBIT

13

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

LEGAL DEPARTMENT

DAVID

A.

ROWLAND

GENERAL COUNSEL

July 9,2010

Neil 1. Gillespie 8092 SW IIS lh Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

Via E-Mail: neilgillespic(Ct:mli.Jlct

Re: ADA Accommodation Request Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, Case No.: 05-CA-007205, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, General Civil Division

Dear Mr. Gillespie: This is a response to your July 6, 2010 ADA request for accommodation directed to Gonzalo Casares, the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit ADA Coordinator. You request the same ADA accommodations previously submitted on February 19, 2010. Your February 19,2010 ADA request was a request for the court to take the following case management actions: 1. Stop Mr. Rodems' behavior directed toward you that is aggravating your post traumatic stress syndrome. 2. Fulfill case management duties imposed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.545 and designate the above-referenced case as complex litigation under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.201. 3. Offer services, programs, or activities described in Judge Isom's law review article - Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 323, 324 (1998) - so the court can "intensively" manage the case.

800 EAST TWIGGS

STREET

SUITE

603

TAMPA, FLORIDA

33602

PHONE:

(813) 272-6843

WEB:

www.fIjud13.org

Neil 1. Gillespie July 9,2010 Page 2

4. Enforce Judge Isom's directives imposed on February 5, 2007 which require both parties to only address each other by surname when communicating about this case and require parties to communicate in writing instead of telephone calls. 5. Allow a l80-day stay so you can scan thousands of documents in this case to PDF and find and hire replacement counsel. As ADA Coordinator, Mr. Casares can assist in providing necessary auxiliary aids and services and any necessary facility-related accommodations. But neither Mr. Casares, nor any other court employee, can administratively grant, as an ADA accommodation, requests that relate to the internal management of a pending case. All of your case management requests - that opposing counsel's behavior be modified, that the court fulfill its duties under Rule 2.545, that the above-referenced case be designated as complex, that your case be "intensively" managed as suggested by Judge Isom's law review article, that Judge Isom's previous directive regarding communication between parties be enforced, that your case be stayed - must be submitted by written motion to the presiding judge of the case. The presiding judge may consider your disability, along with other relevant factors, in ruling upon your motion.

Sincerely,

ilfJ~
David A. Rowland cc: The Honorable Martha J. Cook Ryan C. Rodems, Counsel for Defendant Gonzalo Casares, ADA Coordinator for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et aL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

Condenselt! TM
INDEX OF EXHIBITS

AMSCOT
Page 3
Page

Defendant's Exhibit No.1 for Identification (AMSCOT Payday Advance Deferred Deposit
Application)

(
\

4 --------------------------------X
5 EUGENE R. CLEMENT, GAY ANN BLOMEFIELD and NEIL GILLESPIE, individually and on behalf ot : : :

5
6

Defendant's Exhibit No.2 for Identification (Notice of Serving Answers and Objections to
AMSCOT's First Set of Interrogatories to Neil Gillespie)

15

6
7

others similarly s1 tuated,

Plaintiffs,
VS.

7
Case No.: 8: OO-CV 2795-T-26EAJ

Defendant's Exhibit No.3 tor Identification (Summons and Notice of Trlal ot

Adversary proceeding)

79

8
9
10
1~

AMSCOT CORPORATION, a Florida

9
10

Defendant's Exhibit NO.4 for Identification

(Bankruptcy Filing)

80

corporation,
Defendant.

:
: 11
12

--------------------------------X
DEPOSITION OF: NEIL J. GILLESPIE TAKEN:

Defendant's Exhibit No.5 for Identification

(Handwritten List of payday Advances)

12 13 14 15 16 17 DATE: 18 TIME: 19 REPORTED BY: 20 10:15 a.m. May 14, 2001 PLACE:

13

Pursuant to Notice by Counsel for Defendant Barker, Rodems " cook, P.A. 300 West Platt Street Suite 150 Tampa, Florida

14 15 16
17

18 19

Chere J. Barton Notary Public State of Florida at Large

20

21
22 23 24 25 REGENCY REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 201 East Kennedy Boulevard Sui te 950 Tampa, Florida 33602 (813) 222-8978

21
22 23 24 25

Page 2 1 2 3 APPEARANCES: WILLIAM J. COOK, ESQUIRE Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 300 West Platt Street Sui te 150 Tampa, Florida 33606

Page 4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8

4
5

Appeared for Plaintiffs

9
10

JOHN A. ANTHONY, ESQUIRE Gray, Harris, Robinson, Shackleford, Farrior 501 East Kennedy Boulevard Suite 1400 Tampa, Florida 33602

The deposition, upon oral examination, of NEIL J. GILLESPIE, taken pursuant to notice by counsel for Defendant, at the offices of Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 300 West Platt Street, Suite 150, Tampa, Florida, on May 14,2001, beginning at 10:15 a.m., before Chere 1. Barton, Notary Public, State of Florida at Large. Thereupon,
NEIL J. GILLESPIE,

Appeared tor Defendant

11
12 ALSO PRESENr: 13
14

Gay Ann Blometield

9 having been duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, 10 and nothing but the truth, was examined and deposed as 11 follows: 12 EXAMmATION
13 BY MR. ANTIIONY:

15 16
I N DE

x
Page

17 18 EXAMINATION BY MR. ANTHONY 19 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 20 21 124

22
23 24 25

14 Q What is your name? 15 A Neil, middle initial J, last name Gillespie. 16 Q Mr. Gillespie, how is it that you heard about 17 AMSCOT? 18 A I believe it was a listing in the Yellow Pages. 19 Q A listing for what? 20 A I don It recall. 21 Q Do you know what services you needed from them? 22 A A so-called payday loan. 23 Q Is that what you were looking up in the Yellow 24 Pages? 25 A I don 't recall.

Page 1 - Page 4

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

1
2

CondenseIt! 1M
Page 5
1
2

AMSCOT
Page 7

Q At the point in which you were looking up AMSCOT in the Yellow Pages, what companies were you doing payday
A I believe at that time I may have been doing

Q (By Mr. Anthony) Sure.

TIlis looks like the application, AMSCOT'S application. Q Do you see your signature anywhere on that document or your handwriting? A Well, as I -- there appears to be two handwritings here. Some ofit's mine. Where it says last name, that looks like my handwriting. Where it says first name, that's not my handWriting nor is it the correct spelling of my first name. With regard to my signature, it appears that my signature is on the back of the document. Q Okay. Why don't you put an X where your signature is, in this blue pen here, and then date it. A Date it what date? Q With today's date so that we can know that you're authenticating the signature. Did you read that document before you signed it, or do you remember? A I don't recall. I may have glanced through it. The print is pretty small. Q Can you read it? A I can now. I have bifocals. I didn't have them at the time that I -- back in '98. Q Do you think in 1998 you couldn't have read it? Is that what you're saying?
A

3 advance business with?

3
4

5 business with ACE. 6 Q Who else? EZ Check Cashing in Clearwater? 7 A Well, yes. There were a nwnber of companies. 8 You asked about the specific names. If I could refer to 9 those notes, I can maybe answer that better. 10 Q Let me ask you: What did you do to prepare for 11 your deposition today? 12 A To prepare for the deposition I went through the 13 case fIle and some other notes. 14 Q Your case file or your fInn's case file? 15 A My own fIle. 16 Q And do you have the materials with you today that 17 you went through? 18 A No. 19 Q Where are they? 20 A At my house. 21 Q Have you given a copy of those docwnents to 22 AMSCOT in response to our request for production? 23 A Yes. 24 Q You have? 25 A Yes.

6
7

8
9
10
11

12

13
14

15 16 17 18 19 20
21

22 23
24

25

Page 6
1
2 3
4

Page 8
1

Q Okay. Can you identify that document?

Excuse me. Let me see that fIrst. MR. ANTHONY: Sure. MR. COOK: Let me just add for the record we asked for copies of documents relating to Mr. Gillespie's and Ms. BlomefIeld's transactions. We were provided with a copy of the front page of that document but not with the reverse side. MR. ANTHONY: I'm surprised of that. That would be an error on our part, if that's what happened. Approximately two days after we got the request for production, we had prepared the response and filed it of record with the verification page; and we do not have our documents of this witness. I don't know what happened. MR. COOK: Well, somebody didn't copy the back, obviously. MR. ANTHONY: I mean, we don't have any documents from this witness in response to our request for production. MR. COOK: And when was that? MR. ANTHONY: I don't know. That's the last thing I learned from Ms. Fernandez as I was walking out the door. A Are you ready for a response?
MR. COOK:

A I'mjust saying it's small pril'it, very small Q But you don't recall one way or another whether

2 print. 3 5
4 you read that?

5
6 7

A No. Q As best you can recall, does the infomlation

7 relating to your address, social security nwnber, et

8
9 10 11

8 cetera, look accurate? A The social security number is accurate, yes. TIle 9 10 address, accurate, yes. Like I previously pointed out, my
11 fIrst name is not spelled correctly nor is that my

12 13
14

12 handwriting.

13 15 16 17 18 19 20
21
22

Q Right. Now, there was a period of time -- well,

history. Where did you graduate from college? A I graduated from the University of Pennsylvania with an associate's degree and from the Evergreen State College with a bachelor's degree. Q And what sort of business education did you have in college? A I studied management and marketing was my areas of concentration. Q In connection with management and marketing, did you review anything about contract documents or a basic business law class?

14 let's go back and fInd out a little bit about your

15 16
17

18 19 20
21
22

23
24

23
24

25

25

Page 5 - Page 8

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

Condenselt! 'I'M
Page 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

AMSCOT

A I had business law, yes. I didn't have 1 2 commercia1law, no. Q Do you have any other legal education as of 3 4 today, fonnallegal education? A I took some paralegal courses at St. Petersburg 5 6 Jr. College. Yes. Q Have you ever worked as a paralegal? 7 A No. 8 Q Now, you've taken some psychology classes? 9 10 A Yes.
Q Have you ever been occupied in the psychology
11 12 field?
13 A No.
14 Q Have you ever been treated for depression?
A Yes.
15 Q How recently?
16 A I'm under current treatment for depression.
17 Q I'm sorry?
18 19 A Currently.
20 Q Who is your physician?
21 A That would be Dr. Figueroa.
22 Q And where is he located?
23 A St. Petersburg.
24 Q And how long have you been with Dr. Figueroa?
25 A The last couple of years.

Page 11 tell me the first time that you saw a psychiatric doctor or a psychologist or a counselor. A That would have been in 1985. Q 1985? A Yes. Q And who is that? A That would have been Dr. Wainwright. Q Dr. Wainwright? A Yes. Q How do you spell his name? A Actually it's a her. I don't recall exactly how it's spelled. I think it's spelled like it sounds,
W-a-i-n -- Wainwright.
Q And is that when you were in Philadelphia?
A Yes, it is.
Q And where was her office?
A Her office was on Walnut Street, about the 2300
block of Walnut Street.
Q And is that when you were at Temple University?
A I'm sorry? Temple University?
Q Did you first see Dr. Wainwright while you were
at Temple University or - A I don't know what you mean by Temple -- when I
was at Temple University.
Q Did you ever take any classes at Temple
Page 12 University? A I took one non credit class at Temple. Q Okay. A Is that what you're referring to? Q Yeah. Was that when you were at Wharton? A Well, it was in 1985. Q What were you doing in 1985? A I had a company I was running. The reason for my visit, I was undergoing quite a bit of craniofacial reconstructive surgery, and I consulted Dr. Wainwright in
conjunction with that.
Q What is that? What does craniofacial mean?
A Having to do with the head and face.
Q You were having surgery on your head and face?
A Yes.
Q And what did that result from? What was the need
for that?
A That was to correct a birth defect.
Q And what sort of a birth defect?
A A cleft lip and palate.
Q So not as a result of any accident or trauma?
A No.
Q So that surgery was causing you emotional
problems, and that's why you visited her?
A The procedures, yes. There was a number of

Page 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11

Q For two years? A The last couple of years. I would have to review

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

my file if you want an exact date. Q That would be helpful. Prior to your help with Dr. Figueroa, were you with some other doctor with respect to any psychological or psychiatric problems or issues? A I did meet with a psychologist for several sessions. Yes. Q And what was that person's name? A I don't remember exactly, but I think it was something like Kessler or Keller. It was a female doctor, a psychologist. Q And where was she located? A In Clearwater. Q Do you remember the years that you went to her? A That was in '97. Q Anybody else in that field? Any other physician or counselor? A For that period of time are you talking about? I'm not sure - Q I'm talking about for any period of time, from the day you were born until now. Tell me about your psychiatric history. I was trying to do it from most recent going backwards; but if that's a problem for you,

Page 9 - Page 12

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11

CondenseIt! TM

AMSCOT

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Page 13 Page 15 interrelated procedures. 1 A About a year. 2 Q What were the procedures that were causing you Q Your responses to some interrogatories -- and if difficulty emotionally? 3 you want to take a look at them, I'm going to be referring 4 to them. There's a stamp from my office that the exhibit A It was undergoing periodontal treatment, endodontic treatment, the number of surgeries, scheduling 5 tag is in front of. And at this juncture I won't ask you to refer to them. It was stressful. 6 Q How many surgeries were there? 7 any specific sessions, but I will have your prior written A Well, there were two while I was in Philadelphia 8 testimony in the fOn1l of these interrogatories with you so and one in Miami. 9 that you can check them if you want to. You seemed to work Q What were the years of the ones in Philadelphia? 10 in labor pools and temp agencies when you arrived here in A You know, I have a record of my medical history, 11 Florida, is that true, during the first couple of years? and rather than sit here and guess about dates, I'd rather 12 A Let me tum to that page. 13 refer to that. Q I'm on page 8. MR. COOK: You need to answer the questions to 14 A At the bottom of page 7 you'll see that I was 15 employed at Wal-Mart in the SUlmner of 1993.
the best of your recollection. MR. ANTHONY: You know, there's not - so long as 16 Q I got you.
you're giving me the best of your recollection, that 17 A That was when I had initially -. about the time I
will be fine. We're going to check it out later on 18 initially came here.
19 Q I got you. And what caused you to move to
anyway. A What was the question again? 20 Florida?
21 Q (By Mr. Anthony) When were your initial A My family was living here.
22 surgeries that were craniofacial?
Q What members of your family?
A In the '80s.
23 A Mother, father and sister.
Q TIle beginning of the' 80s before your counseling
24 Q You had an auto dealership for several months in
sessions with Dr. Wainwright or afterwards?
25 1976 named Gillespie Motors. Is that true?
Page 14 Page 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 A Yes, it is.

A They were in conjunction with. 1 2 Q And how long did you see her? A About two years. 3 4 Q And then you moved to Miami? A No. 5 Q That's just where you went for additional 6 7 surgery? A Yes. 8 Q Who was your doctor in Pennsylvania for your 9 10 surgery, your lead physician?
A I really need to refer to my notes on that.
11 12 Q Okay. When did you move to Florida?
13 A In 1993.
14
Q And continuously prior to that time, you were in 15 Pennsylvania? A For the most part, yes. 16 Q What sort of occupation did you have while you 17 18 were in Pennsylvania? A From what dates? 19 20 Q Immediately prior to your leaving. 21 A Leaving in 1992? 22 Q Uh-huh. A Immediately prior to that, I was essentially 23 24 unemployed. Q How long was it that you were unemployed? 25

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Q What were the circumstances of the closing of that company? A The circumstances? Could you explain what you mean by that? Q It says the company closed. What happened? Did it file Chapter 7? A No. TIle business wasn't making a profit, and I closed the company. Q Did you borrow money to start that company? A Yes. Q Who did you borrow that money from? A Family members, and I used some savings. Q How much money did you borrow from family members? A I don't recall. Q Was it more or less than a hundred thousand? A Much less. I think the whole investment in the company might have been $10,000. Q So this was a small used car lot or something? A Yes. Uh-huh. Q Did you use fonus such as purchase contracts or lease contracts or financing agreements when you were with Gillespie Motors? A Well, everything was a cash sale; so whatever

Page 13 - Page 16

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et aL
1 receipts we had were to reflect a cash sale. 2 Q You had cash sales of used cars?

CondenseIt! 1M
Page 17
1

AMSCOT

2
3
4

3
4

A Yes.

6 7

8
9
10

11 12
13'

14
15

16 17

18
19 20 21 22 23
24

25

Q During the time it was open, how many of these cash sales did you handle personally? A Maybe ten. Q Was that all the sales that occurred, or were there others that your employees handled? A I believe that was everything. Q Were the automobiles promptly refinanced with a financing company even though they were cash to you? A There was no financing involved. Q They were all just cash-and-move-on deals? A Yes. Q Then you went to Pic-A-Car Auto Sales in Langhorne? A Yes. Q What were the circumstances of your departure from Pic-A-Car? A I left for a better job with Longshore Auto Sales. Q With Longshore Auto sales? A Yes. Q I'm sorry. I don't see Longshore Auto Sales here -- oh, I'm sorry. Longshore Auto Sales, sales

6 7 8
9
10

11

12 13 14
15

16 17

18
19 20 21 22 23
24

25

Page 19 Q Is Kar Kingdom still operating? A No, it isn't. Q How did it come to pass that it's no longer operating? A I closed the company when I sold the real estate in 1988. Q How much did the real estate sell for? A One million, nine hundred thousand dollars. Q Okay. And of that, how much of that was financed? A The mortgage at that time was approximately one million, five hundred thousand. Q Were all payments current - A Yes. Q -- when that occurred? A Yes. Q Did you make a profit then when the company was closed? A Did I make a profit? Is that what you asked? Q Was there a cachet of money left over when the business was closed? A From the real estate transaction, are you asking? Q Maybe I phrased it poorly. Did you close the business at tile same time that you sold the real estate? Page 20
A

2
3

5
6
7

8
9 10

11

12 13 14
15

16 17

18
19 20 21 22 23
24

25

Page 18 manager. So you left on good tenns with Pic-A-Car? 1 2 A Yes. 3 Q And who was your contact person there? A At Pic-A-Car? 4 5 Q Yeah. 6 A Leon Picarello. 7 Q And that was a used car lot? 8 A Yes. Q Now, the next used car lot was Longshore Auto 9 10 Sales? A Yes. 11 Q And what were your reasons for relocating from 12 13 there? A For leaving Longshore Auto Sales? 14 15 Q Yes. 16 A I went to start my own company. Q Did you leave on good tenns with Mr. Shennan? 17 18 A I think he was sorry to see me go and have another competitor, but outside of that - 19 20 Q Did you go to another competitor, or did you 21 start your own company? A I started my own company. I became a competitor 22 23 of his. 24 Q And that's Kar Kingdom? 25 A Yes.

Yes.

Q Did the entity that sold the business -- I'm

sorry, that purchased the business also purchase the real estate? A The entity purchased the real estate but did not purchase the business. Q So the business completely discontinued at that point? It didn't carry over in some other name? A No. Q What is the name of the purchaser? A 'TIle purchaser was Gary Book of McAfferty Ford, but they bought it under a real estate name that I think was Red Garage. Q When the Kar Kingdom was sold, was there a quantity of savings that you had left over or a profit that you had, a nest egg, if you will? A Well, there was capital gains on the real estate. Is that what you're asking? Q No. But I appreciate your observation. Were there net proceeds left over? Did you have a profit from operating that business when the property was sold and the business was wound up? A I don't understand tile question. Q Do you know what a nest egg is? A Not in legal terms, no.

Page 17 - Page 20

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

1

Condenselt! TM
1

AMSCOT
Page 23

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Page 21 Q I'm not asking you a legal tenn. Do you know what a nest egg is? Do you have any idea what - A My understanding of a nest egg is something that people save for retirement. Q Did you have money left over when the property was sold? After you paid all the closing costs, after you paid your capital gains, did you have money left over to either start a new business or to save for a rainy day? A Yes. Q How much was that? A I don't recall. Q Was it more or less than a hundred thousand dollars? A I don't recall. It was probably more. Q Were you in business with any other members of your family at that time? A No, but they did work for me. Q Who in your family worked for you? A My father and my sister. Q Your father and sister worked for you? A Yes. Q What was your father's position? A He was an office manager. Q Had he previously been in the automobile business? Page 22
A No.

Q Global BUSIness Services?

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A I filed a personal bankruptcy in '92, and I

believe Global was listed as one of my assets.
Q So the corporation never sought bankruptcy
protection, or did it?
A No, I don't believe so. I think it went just as
I stated to you.
Q In your bankruptcy case, was that filed in
Pennsylvania?
A Yes.
Q Did any of your creditors allege that there was
any fraud in connection with your bankruptcy filing or any
other claims?
A There was a claim from Wanamaker Department
Store. Yes.
Q And what did they allege?
A I don't have the specifics here, but I know that
it was ultimately dismissed.
Q Did they allege you running Up your credit
without any reasonable expectation that you could repay it?
A Like I said, I don't have that document in front
of me. It's been quite a number of years. All I remember
is that it was dismissed.
Q Do you know why it was dismissed?
A It was without merit.
Page 24 Q TIlat's why it was dismissed? A Yes. Q So you remember that part? Are you currently taking any medication for your emotional situation? A I am taking medication. Yes. Q And what's the medication that you're taking now? A I'm taking Effexor and Levoxyl. Q Do either of those go by any other name that you know of? A No. Q Who are those prescribed by, Dr. Figueroa? A Yes.
Q Let's go back to Dr. Figueroa. We've talked
about Dr. Wainwright and Dr. Figueroa. Any other counselors, psychologists, psychiatrists that you're seeing in between Wainwright and Figueroa? A Before I can answer that question, I would have to go through my records and sit down and think about the past, if you want something accurate. Q So basically you can't recall any other helpers of that kind that you've consulted other than the first one and the current one? A Well, I did mention Dr. Kassos, I believe. Q No, you didn't. Who is Dr. Kassos?

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Q What did Global Business Services primarily do? A It was a consultant and acted to get other businesses started. Q What sort of consulting work did they do, like business consulting? A Yes. Q And what was the typical sort of customer or client that Global had? A At that time we had -- I had an interest in trying to get other car lots started in Philadelphia and the purchase of conunercial real estate. Q So was your clientele primarily prospective car lot purchasers? A Yes. You could say that. Q And what customers did you have? Can you name one or two customers that you had? A The corporate name was Automotive Specialists, and they did business on -- their first fellow was Joe's Auto Sales, and I believe the second fellow was Dorsey's Auto Sales. Q So those are your clients? You had two? A Essentially, yes. Q That company filed for bankruptcy corporately? A What company?

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EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

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A No. I think if you look through the records,

you'll- He testified Dr. Kessler or Keller - MR. ANTHONY: Oh, I heard Kassos just now. Is that - MR. COOK: TIle sall1e person? THE DEPONENT: Yes. A This is exactly why I would rather be able to go through the records so that if I called the doctor Keller and it's really Kassos, you know, you don't get apoplectic. Q 1'111 sure I don't seein apoplectic right now. MR. COOK: Neil, just do the best you can. Okay? Q (By Mr. Anthony) What was it that brought you to Dr. Figueroa? A Well, Dr. Figueroa is ll1Y prnnary care physician. Q Okay. I thought he was a psychiatric or psychological doctor. Ain I wrong on that? A I didn't testify that he was that. He's my prill1ary care physician. Q So you're not seeing a doctor for psychiatric, psychological or e1110tional counseling? A Dr. Figueroa is treating Ine for depression. Yes. Q Even though he's your prnnary care -- he's a general practitioner who is doing that?
MR. COOK:

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Page 27 Who helped prepare it, not type it up? I'm sorry about that. A I prepared it lnyself. Q Your lnove to Portland, Oregon, why did you go there? A I went there to undergo Inedica1 treatInent for speech. Q As a result of YOllr sllrgery? A As a result of pharyngeal incolnpetence. Q What does that mean in the vernacular? A That's a speech disorder. Q So that's independent frOITI YOllr surgery and the things that required YOllr surgery? A I don't understand what YOlI're asking about surgery. Q You said you had a cleft lip or palate? A And palate. Q And palate. A It relates to a - Q A cleft palate? A Yes. Q And so you went to school for that? A I went to school? I don't understand. Q Where did you go to get that corrected, to get your speech disorder corrected?
Q

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I believe so.

A Are we talking about Portland, Oregon? Q I'ln asking you where you went. It's IUy

Q And he's the gentleman who has prescribed these

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medications? A Yes. Q What was it that led you to think you needed lnedications of that kind? A That was his detennination. Q Are you depressed? A Yes. Q For how long has that been? A I would say since in the lnid-' 90s. Q When you lost your business? A No. III the mid-'90s, about '95 or '96. Q What happened? A At that point I Inoved to the west coast and went to school out there and wasn't able to really establish myself there and caIne back to Florida. Q How long were you in St. Petersburg with your family before you Inoved out to the west coast? A About a year. Q Where did you lnove on the west coast? A Eventually I Inoved to Portland, Oregon. Q Who helped type up that chronology that you're looking at? A Who helped type it up?

3 understanding that you went sOlnewhere to Portland -- in

4 Portland, Maine or Portland, Oregon?

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A Portland, Oregon.

Q And were you einployed there?

A No.

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Q Did your speech situation nnprove?

A I underwent treatlnent and received a speech

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Q And you continue to use that speech prosthesis effectively through the present date? A Yes. Q Did you stay out there in Portland, Oregon? At SOlne point you Inoved. Right? A Yes. I Inoved to Oly111pia, Washington. Q And what did you do out there? A I C0111pleted a bachelor's degree at the Evergreen State College. Q And were you einployed while you were going to school? A Essentially, no. I did froll1 tUlle to till1e teach English as a second language to a fellow I 111et in Portland, and I Inay have done S011le odd painting jobs here and there; but essentially I was not ell1ployed.

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1 A Exposed to repeated stresses. Q What stresses? Like bankruptcy? A No. No. Q Employment?

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1 Q What did you do to support yourself -- or how did 2 you support yourself, rather? 3 A In 1993, I believe, the Social Security Bureau 4 detenmned I was disabled, and I've been receiving 5 disability benefits since that time. 6 Q How much are your benefits? 7 A They're currently $1,394 a month. 8 Q What sort of disability were you found to have in 9 order to trigger these benefits? Was it depression, or did 10 it relate to your cleft lip and palate or what? 11 A As I recall, in '93, the initial application was 12 relative to speech -- a speech disability. 13 Q And have you continued to have that speech 14 disability? 15 A It's -- yes, although it is Imtigated with a 16 speech prosthesis. 17 Q When was the last time you were checked to 18 detenl1ine whether or not you had a speech disability? 19 A TIlat would have been at the last detenl1ination, 20 and that was in '95, '96. 21 Q Here, five years later, what is it about your 22 speech that you find to be disabling? I mean, I understand 23 everyword you're saying. What is the problem? 24 A If you're understanding me, I guess there's no 25 problem from that standpoint.

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5 A No. I would say they would have to do with the 6 birth defect. Yes. 7 Q What birth defect, the one that's already fixed? 8 A The cleft lip and palate. Yes. 9 Q TIlat's causing you stress now? 10 A No. It caused me stress growing up. I was 11 physically attacked by students in school from a young age, 12 and that sort of thing. 13 Q Did that make you upset? 14 A Yes. 15 Q And that's continued right up until the present 16 day? 17 A Yes. 18 Q And that's one of the reasons that you're 19 depressed? 20 A I think the depression is -- has many different 21 or several different origins. 22 Q Have you ever tried to take your own life? 23 A No. 24 Q Do you recall ever saying that you would consider 25 that under oath?

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Q Is there some other reason why you're disabled

2 and on disability? 3 A Yes. 4 Q What? 5 A That I really don't know how to answer because 6 they don't release that infonl1ation, or I haven't been told 7 of what it is. 8 Q Who is the "they" who doesn't release infonnation 9 as to why you're drawing a social security check now? 10 A Social Security. 11 Q How old are you? 12 A 45. 13 Q Other than your depression and the things that 14 we've talked about, your oral/facial or cranial surgery, is 15 there anything else that's an impediment to your working? 16 A 1've been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress 17 disorder. 18 Q What does posttraumatic stress disorder mean? 19 THE DEPONENT: Is that calling for a medical - 20 MR. COOK: Just answer to the best of your - 21 Q (By Mr. Anthony) I know you're not a doctor, and 22 I know you're not a lawyer. I'm just asking you to tell me 23 what you think it means. 24 A Yes. It's a stress-related illness. 25 Q What do you think caused it?

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Page 32 I've considered it. Yes. Q When is the most recent time you've made that consideration? A I think about it from time to time. Q Even now with your medication? A Pardon? Q Even now with your medication? A Yes. Q And you're not seeing anyone other than Dr. Figueroa over that? A That's correct. Q Tell me what went wrong when you were in California in the mid-'90s that made -- I don't want to paraphrase your prior words but - A I wasn't in California in the mid-'90s. Q I'm sorry. Good point. In Washington. The west coast. Washington and Oregon? A In Washington in the mid-'90s, '95, '96, insufficient resources, financial, insufficient family support for my endeavors. Q What did your parents or family do that wasn't- to not support you? A They weren't interested in the idea of continuing education. Q They weren't?
A

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1 A No. Q What was the reason that they -- by the way, was 2 3 this your nl01n or your dad or both of theln? 4 A I would say both. Q What's your dad's na111e? 5 6 A Con1elius. 7 Q Con1elius Gillespie? A Yes. 8 Q Is he still alive? 9 10 A I believe so. 11 Q In Pennsylvania? Levittown? Where does he live? 12 A Orlando. 13 Q Oh, he's in Orlando? And your InOln is still 14 alive? 15 A I believe so. 16 Q And where does she live? 17 A Orlando. 18 Q What's her nall1e? 19 A Penelope. 20 Q How about your sister? Was she supportive? 21 A No. 22 Q Where does she live now? 23 A I don't know. 24 Q What's her nanle? 25 A Elizabeth.

Page 35 1 detennine whether or not you could get their lnoney? 2 A Again, I would really want to refer to lny notes 3 about that, but it's lny recollection that it was the 4 craniofacial disorder and related psychosocial issues. 5 Q You have a trelnendolls vocabulary and 6 psychosocial -- is that froln your psychology courses or 7 sOlnething? What does that lnean? 8 A What does psychosociallnean? 9 Q Yeah. 10 A My understanding is that it's psychology as it 11 relates to social settings. 12 Q What are your problelns in social settings, 13 problelns with other people? 14 A Well, I get along good with other people. 15 Q Then what are your problelns? 16 A stress. 17 Q Well, does being with people in social settings 18 cause you stress? 19 A SOlne people. 20 Q How about in professional settings? 21 A Yes, it can. 22 Q Has that ilnpaired your ability to get or retain 23 jobs? 24 A Yes. 25 Q Would you say that's more the cause of your lack Page 36
1 of elnploylnent or your inability to COll1111unicate

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Q Do you know the state that she lives in?

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The last I heard she was living with my parents. Q Is she lnarried? Does she go by another nalne? A She was lnarried, and I believe she's divorced. Q Does she still have the saIne nalne, Gillespie, now? A I don't know what nalne she's using. Q What nalne did she have when she was lnarried? A Bowerly (phonetic). Q How do you spell that? A I'ln not sure. Q Bowerly? A Yes. Q So at that point your falnily stopped paying for yOllf education? A My falnily wasn't paying for lny education. Q They weren't being elnotionally supportive? A No. Q They weren't being financially supportive? A They weren't paying for lny education. That was being paid through a vocational rehabilitation prograln. Q What was the vocational rehabilitation prograln the reslllt of? Did you apply for it? A Yes. Q And what were the criteria that they looked at to
A

2 physiologically? A I'ln not sure I understand that question. 3 4 Q Are you e111ployed now? A Yes. I do part-till1e work. 5 Q How Inany hours a week? 6 A Between eight and fifteen. 7 Q What are you doing? 8 A I'ln working as a -- for a banquet COlnpany, yes, 9 10 catering cOlnpany. 11 Q Doing what? 12 A Serving food to people at catered events. 13 Q And why are you not -- is that s0111ething you can 14 do without jeopardizing your govenllnental benefits? 15 A Yes, it is. 16 Q And is there S0111e reason why you can't do that 40 17 hours a week? What do you think the ll1ain reason is? 1'111 18 sorry. Let's strike that COl1lpound question. 19 Is there any reason that you could not do that 20 full titne? 21 A I really have no interest in it. Also the stress 22 involved would be too lnuch. 23 Q TIle stress involved in serving food? 24 A Yes. 25 Q Forty hours a week?

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1 editor of yours. Is that a fair sUlmnation?

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Q Do you have Inanagelnent responsibilities, or are
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A I have no managelnent responsibilities.
Q What does your job physically consist of?
A Preparing and setting tables for catered events.
Q That's pretty much all you do?
A Yes.
Q Have you ever given your deposition before? Do
you remember that? A Yes, I have. Q How Inany tiInes have you given your deposition before? A I don't know. Q More than five? A Yes. Q What's the first tilne that you gave your deposition? A I don't recall. Q Have you been involved in a lot of litigation? A I don't know what you Inean by "a lot." Q Do yOll relnelnber being involved in any litigation when you were in Pennsylvania? A Yes. Q What case or cases?
A

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A I'ln sorry. Could you repeat that?

Q Is it a fair sUllunation that the acadel11ic dean for
your school declined to publish a letter to the editor that
you had written?
A No.
Q Telllne again - A The acadetllic dean was not in charge of publishing
letters in the school newspaper. That was not his duties.
Q Mr. Cushing was the acadelnic dean?
A He was an acadelnic dean, one of several. Yes.
Q Why did you sue hitn?
A Because he was the one that essentially called Ine
a liar to the editor of the paper.
Q Who was the editor of the paper?
A I'd have to go back through Iny notes to get all
that infonllation.
Q What was the letter about?
A It was about the sununer school, the way SUIIDller
school was run.
Q What was the alleged falsehood?
AI-Ie wouldn't say what the falsehood was.
Q And so the basis of your cOlnplaint was that he
said that the letter was false, so you sued hUll -- or the
letter had false allegations in it, so you sued hun?

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A Well, there was a bankruptcy proceeding that you
Q You're reading on page ten. Right?

A And that caused the editor of the paper not to

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6 renlelnber, all of theln slnall claitns actions.
Q Did you bring that case against Mr. Cushing
7 8 that's referenced on your interrogatory?
9 A Yes.
10 Q Why did you do that? 11 A I had written a letter to the editor of the 12 school newspaper which was critical of Mr. Cushing and SOlne 13 of the school's policies. And he had told Ine -- the editor 14 of the paper or the editor's representative -- that Iny 15 letter was false, but he declined to say what was false 16 about it and prohibited the publication thereof. 17 Q What was the school newspaper -- for what school? 18 A TIle Evergreen State College. 19 Q So what was Mr. Cushing's position? 20 A His position was that he thought the letter was 21 inaccurate but that he wouldn't give any responses. 22 Q What was his job title? 23 A He was an acade111ic dean. 24 Q So the acadelnic dean for the school paper for the 25 school you attended declined to publish a letter to the

Q What sort of daluages were you looking for? You

5 prepared the cOlllplaint, right, yourself? A Yes. 6 Q And you handled the case yourself? 7 A Yes. 8 Q What were you looking for financially? When we 9
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A The c0111plaint was asking for $100,000.

Q Plus punitive dalllages?

A I don't recall.

Q Now, how did the case resolve itself? How did it

A Each side filed for a sillmnary judg111ent; and Illy

15 conclude?

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A No. Q Now, there was a lawsuit the next year in
A Yes.

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2 A That was where the cab company had breached its 3 contract with me over a smoking issue. I had prohibited 4 cigarette smoking in the cab, and the company at that point 5 took the car; and it was in violation of the contract. 6 Q Were you a cab driver at the time? 7 A Yes. 8 Q And so you wanted a no-smoking cab, and they said 9 that people could smoke in it? 10 A Essentially, yes. 11 Q So you sued them? 12 A Yes. 13 Q And what were you asking for financially or 14 otherwise? 15 A I think $600. 16 Q What was the resolution of that case? 17 A I received $370, I believe. Again, I would have 18 to refer to my notes to get the exact amount, but the judge 19 ruled that the company had breached its contract. The 20 judgment was awarded to me. 21 Q Now, your employment with the U.S. Department of 22 Commerce was for the census? 23 A Yes. 24 Q Did you walk house to house doing the census or 25 did you look at data or what? What were your job

1 A I haven't had any contact with them for a number 2 of years. 3 Q Even your parents, your mom and dad? 4 A That's correct. 5 Q When is the last time you talked to your mom? 6 A Maybe '97. 7 Q Do you realize it's the day after Mother's Day? 8 A Yes. 9 MR. ANTHONY: Can I take a break? 10 MR. COOK: Sure. 11 (There was a break in the proceedings.) 12 Q (By Mr. Anthony) Do you have any other sources 13 of actual potential income besides your social security 14 checks and your payments for the catering business? 15 A No. 16 Q How much do you make in your catering business? 17 A Last year my income was $5,000 for all the 18 different places I worked for. 19 Q How many hours would you say you worked all last 20 year? 21 A I don't know. 22 Q Thus far in this year have you worked about as 23 much as you did last year? 24 A I would have to go over the figures, but it's 25 about the same.

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A I was walking house to house. Q And what did you do when you got to each house? A I knocked on the door and attempted to get people to complete the census foml that they had failed to send into the govemment. Q How many people did you talk to total? A None. Q You never talked to anybody? A No. Q You walked from house to house, but you never talked to anybody? A There was no one home. Q At every house you went to? A I think I worked a half a day at that job. When it became apparent that no one was home at these jobs I - and for other reasons, I stopped doing it. Q What were the other reasons? Did you find it stressful? A It was stressful. Yes. Q Okay. How much income do you receive from your family by way of support now? A Nothing. Q How long has it been since you received anything from them?

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A Yes. Q Do you have a lot left over at the end of the month? A No. Q How much would you say you have left over? A I don't seem to have anything left over. Q Are you on the edge of bankruptcy, or are you able to carry on the - A I've thought about bankruptcy, but I'm doing the best I can to avoid that. Q What are your total outstanding obligations on a monthly basis? Let's start with rent. A Rent is $400. Q How about food? A I don't know what that is offhand. Q Have you ever tried to figure out a budget in this manner? A Yes, but I haven't allotted for food. No. Q How about for automobile related expenses? A My car payment is $128. Q When is that due to expire? When will you have the car paid off? A The balance on the car is $3,500.

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Q Other expenses?
A A

Telephone.

Q How Inuch?

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$75 or $80. Q Long distance calls on that? A Not too many. Q Is that a Inobile phone? A No. Q What other expenses out there? A Electric. Q How Inuch? A I think my last electric bill was about $90. Q Ninety? A Yes. Q What else? A I have a nmnber of credit card paytnents. Q Tell me about all your credit card debt outstanding. A I don't think I can reIneInber it all. Q Is it Inore or less than $5,000 at this time? A More. Q Is it more or less than $10,000 at this tiIne? A More. Q Do you know if it's Inore than $15,000? A If you go to page 16 of the answers - Page 46
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A -- you'll see a listing of 111Y debts. Q Have you added theln all up at this tilne? And I

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Page 47 increase or not? A My current Target balance is about $550, and the lilnit is $600. Q How about Amoco? Any change there? A Yes. That balance is close to $1,300. Also they have increased that aInount of credit. Q To what? A About $1,400. Q Capital One VISA. Is that pretty Inuch the saIne? A Yeah. Actually, it's less than that. I've closed that account. Q So you've paid off the 495? A Yes. No. I haven't paid it off. It's sOlnewhat less than that. Q How would you close the account? What do you Inean? You just told theln that - A You call up the credit card COInpany and you say I'd like to close my account, and they close the account. Q And then you just pay theln the balance later on? A Yes. Q J.C. Penney. Any difference .with that account? A Could I interrupt you one Ininute? Q Sure. A Because you said sOlnething about adding these up. The question that you asked is list all debts that Page 48

1 Gillespie has incurred in the past three years in excess of 2 $300. So there's S0111e debts that were incurred prior to
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3 three years ago. Those aren't listed here. Q Right. I asked you for S0111e question -- I asked exa111ple, MacDill Federal Credit Union, what's your balance 5 you S0111e questions in written fonn in those 6 interrogatories. Obviously, we're not here to read there now? 7 questions and answers. I know that you have been reading A MacDill Federal Credit Union for the car loan is, 8 heavily on your interrogatories, but I'ln just saying if you like I just said, $3,500. 9 want to refer to that; and if we can find quick ways to Q Oh, I see. Okay. Maybe we can add these up. 10 answer Iny questions today by having you look at the111, then And Sears, your balance is - 11 we can 1110ve along. A It's a little bit less than that. SOlne of 12 But what the question I'ln asking you is, and I these- 13 wanted to know: What are your outstanding debts at this Q Staples is all maxed out? 14 titne? You took it upon yourself to say, if you want to A Pardon? 15 tum to page 16 it starts with a list of IllY debts, and now Q Staples, you're Inaxed out? 16 we're just trying to go through and efficiently add up all A Staples, it's about $910. 17 your debts. Do you see what I 111ean? Q Okay. Target? Maxed out? 18 A What I'ITI saying is that by doing that you're not A I o\ve theln about $550. 19 going to Inaybe get the accurate answer because I believe Q So you're over your limit? 20 I'nl saying I have to refer to Iny notes if you want an A No. My linlit increases -- this doculnent was 21 accurate answer. prepared- 22 Q Is what you've told 111e so far inaccurate as of Q When did it increase? 23 today's date? A It increased subsequent to the preparation of 24 A Everything I told you has been accurate. this doculnent. 25 Q Okay. Well, then, let's keep going. Q So you've used that? Have you used the whole

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Page 49 J.C. Penney. Do you still owe J.C. Penney Il1oney? A Yes. Q And how Illuch? A TI1at alnount, the lunit, $2,000. Q Have you been cut off by J.C. Penney? A No. Well, let 11le ask you, what do you Inean by "cut off"? Q Do you get past due notices? A No. TIle account is current. Q Aspire VISA. Have your balances changed as of today or your authorized alnount? A Yes. I've closed that account. Q Does that Inean you paid it off? A No. 1'111 paying it off. TIle balance is about $1,850 at this point -- $1,850. Q Did you close that, or did they tenninate it? A I closed it. Q What 111ade you close it? A 1'111 in the process of consolidating SOlne of the
higher interest credit cards.
Q I-Iow are you consolidating it, with another card?
A With a lower interest rate credit card.
Q What's the credit card you're using now to
consolidate these? A A MacDill Gold VISA. Page 50
Q And is that on this list or - A No, it isn't. Q Tell me what your balance is on the MacDill Gold
VISA.

A Yes. Q And what was the balance on that? A About $950. This Direct Merchants Bank Titaniuln

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5 MasterCard, has been closed and paid off. 6 Q How about the Direct Merchants Bank Gold 7 MasterCard? 8 A That's not been paid off. 9 Q What's the balance there? 10 A TIlat balance is about $2,850. 11 Q What about Providian VISA? What's the status of 12 that account now? 13 A Providian VISA has increased Iny credit line to 14 $1,650. 15 Q And what's the 8l110unt outstanding right now? 16 A The a11lount on that is about $1,500. 17 Q How about Dillard's? What's the Il1axilnuIl1 allowed 18 balance on that? 19 A Dillard's has increased Iny credit lillut to $700. 20 I believe lowe thenl $650. 21 Q And Aspire, did we already do that one? 22 A Yes. 23 Q Sallie Mae, your student loans weren't 24 dischargeable, were they? 25 A I'ln sorry. I don't understand.

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I

Q At the bottom of page 17.

A Yes.

A I think it's around $2,900 at this tune.

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Q What's your Inaxulluln authorized indebtedness? A I think it's $3,700. Q And how long has that been out there? A 111at was opened a week or two ago. Q And what have you done with the proceeds that you borrowed on that account? A I've paid off outstanding debt. Q Have you paid it off or just 11lade interest pay11lents on existing debt? A I've paid it off. Q What debt have you paid off? A If you 1l10ve down to where it says Next Card VISA, that account is closed and paid off in full. Q Okay. So that's $680 less? A Yes. Q What about the other $2,000? A 111ere is a Capital One account that's not on this list because it was incurred prior to three years. That's been retired. Q And so you paid that with the credit card

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Q Those have been around since the bankruptcy case?

A No.

Q TIley arose after the bankruptcy case?

A That was incurred in 1998.

Q And what school were you attending at the tilne?

A TIle St. Petersburg Jr. College.

Q And was that your law classes? A Paralegal studies. Yes.

Q Tell111e what your curriculuIl1 was there. What
classes did you take?
A I took an introduction to law for paralegals. I
took a civil litigation class. Q Did you ever hear about class action litigation in that class? A Yes. Q What did you hear about it? A I don't know if I can recall everything I've heard about it. Q Who was your teacher? A FroIl1 which class? Q 11le class where you heard about class action litigation. A That would have been Susan Denlers.

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Page 53 Is she still a professor there, or do you know?

A I believe she is. Yes.
Q Have you talked to her about this case?
A No.
Q When was the last tiIne you talked to her?
A The last day of class.
Q When was that?
A Actllally, it Inay have been after that because I
got a letter of recolmnendation froln her, but it was in
1998.
Q What was the letter of recommendation for?
A I was applying for a paralegal scholarship.
Q FrOln what source?
A One of the paralegal associations, local
paralegal associations.
Q Did you get it?
A No.
Q How Inuch is your student loan with Sallie Mae?
A It's about $9,800, $9,900.
Q What's your Inonthly payment for that? A The loan is currently in forebearance. Q What does that Inean to you? A It Ineans it's in forebearance until -- for one year, and then I'll resume Inaking paylnents on it. Q Is that pretty much when yOll call and tell theln Page 54

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Page 55 of school on this? A I've Inade a nUInber of paYInents. Q More or less than a year's worth of paylnents? A Again, I'd have to consult the record to find out how Inany paylnents I've Inade.
Q Have you gotten any bills for costs frOln this law
finn?
A Have I gotten any bills for costs froln what law
finn?
Q I'ln sorry. Froln YOllr law firm in this case,
Mr. Cook's law finn?
A Bills? Not that I'ln aware of. No.
Q Like invoices for copying costs - A No. /
Q -- transcripts? No? Do you have a means of
paying anything like that if you're asked?
A I would have to talk that over with Iny counsel.
Q Does your counsel know what your finances are
better than you do? Have they helped you in financial
analysis?
A No.
Q What other obligations do you have out there
besides the ones we've already talked about, Inonthly
recurring credit type obligations?
A Well, as I indicated, I wOlud have to check my
Page 56

1 that you're broke, and so they give you a year to get it 2 together? 3
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Q Are there other substantial obligations out 3 there? I-Iow about furniture rental? Do you have furniture 4 rental? could be one reason. Yes. 5 A I don't have any rented furniture. No. Q Do you write the111 SOlne sort of a letter 6 Q Cable TV? explaining to theIn your situation in order to get that 7 A I don't pay for any cable 1V. forebearance? 8 Q You don't pay for cable 'IV? A No. My understanding, it's granted rather easily 9 A No. if you just request it. 10 Q Do you have cable TV?
Q All you have to do is ask for it, and then they 11 A It's provided by the landlord. It's part of the
give it to you?
12 rent.
A I believe that they provide you with a fonn, and
Q Do you have insurance, like life insurance or
you check off that you want a forebearance. Yes. 13 Q Do you have those docu111ents? 14 anything?
A I have car insurance, and I have renter's
A Do I have the docu111ents? 15 Q Yeah. Like a copy of your forebearance 16 insurance.
Q How l1luch does that run you respectively?
application or whatever it is? 17 A I believe the car insurance is about $700 a year,
A It Inay be in l1ly file. Yes. 18 Q About when did you ask for that forebearance? 19 and the renter's insurance is about $150 a year.
Q Do you have any assets in your house that are
A I would have to consult with the doculnent to give 20 an accurate date. 21 worth Inore than $250?
A More than $250? Not that I can think of.
Q Was it this year or last year? 22 Q Mr. Gillespie, you sued the Florida Departlnent of
A Again, to give an accurate date, I would have to 23 consult with the doCUlllent. 24 Labor and E111ployl1lent Security. What was that all about?
A I didn't sue the Depart111ent of Labor Industry.
Q How lllany paylnents have you Inade since you got out 25 A If you're having financial difficulties, that

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Q On page ten of your interrogatory responses it says Neil 1. Gillespie versus Florida DepartInent of Labor and Ell1ploylllent Security. Gillespie appears pro see A Yes. That's not a lawsuit. That's an aillninistrative hearing. Q Oh, 1'111 sorry. What was that for? A 111at was relative to a vocational rehabilitation plan. Q What was your perceived problell1 that led to your initiating that? A Well, the State of Florida had prepared a vocational rehabilitation. plan for Ine and then refused to iInplement it. Essentially that was it. Q And what did that rehabilitation plan involve? A What did it involve? Q Yeah. What did it require? A 111e State had done an evaluation of Ine and detennined that I was suited to be a -- go to ll1edical school and becolne a doctor. Q And do you have a copy of that report around? A I have it in Iny file. Yes. Q And who did that evaluation on you? Was there sOlnebody in charge of the evaluation? A Yes. Q What was that person's nall1e? Do you reIllelllber?

Q And what specifically did the plan provide then?

A As I just told you, it provides for training as a

3 Inedical doctor or -- and it gave SOl1le alternatives also. Q Who is going to pay for your llledical training? 5 A I believe this is a federally funded prograln. 6 Q So the federal government was going to pay for 7 your medical school? 8 A It would be the Division of Vocational 9 Rehabilitation. 10 Q I got you. 11 No~, Florida Elections COlmnission vs. Tholllpson. 12 What involvelnent did you have in that case? 13 A I filed a sworn cOInplaint alleging a violation of 14 the election law. 15 Q Now, you're not listed on the style of that 16 cOInplaint? 17 A That's correct. 18 Q I-Iow was it that you filed a cOlllplaint? Were you 19 one of the cOInplainants? Were you one of the plaintiffs? 20 A I believe a citizen has a right to file a sworn 21 cOInplaint with the Elections COllunission. 22 Q And you did that to correct what wrong? 23 A He had paid a contribution in violation. 24 Q And what was the violation that you perceived? 25 A Initially it was too much l1loney contributed by

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1 A 1'111 trying to reIneInber. Yes. It was Iny

Page 60
1 the lawyer or law fiml to a judge before WhOll1 the lawyer or 2 law finl1 regularly hears cases.

2 counselor froll1 1994.

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Q Wainwright?
A No. My vocational rehabilitation counselor, an

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Q Okay. Who is the judge that you say got the

A Andrews. Q Judge Andrews? What was his first nall1e? A Michael. Q What's his Iniddle nmne? A I don't recall. Q Judge Michael Andrews. Is he in Pinellas County? A Yes. Q And who was the lawyer who contributed to his caInpaign? A 1110111pson. Q What's his first naIue? A I don't recall. He is the senior. His son is also with the finn. Q What's the nalne of the firIn? A Tholnpson, Goodis & Tholnpson. Q And where are they based? A They're in St. Petersburg. Q How was it you callle to find out about this perceived problelll? A I had questioned one of Illy professors at the junior college about why SOl1le lawyers could carry on in

4 Inoney?

5 elnployee of the State. I can't recall his nalne right now. 6 Q And was that person a doctor? A I don't know what their qualifications were. 7 8 Q Now, this was brought in 1998. Correct? 9 A Yes. 10 Q And that was at a tUlle, was it not, when you had 11 already been depressed for a couple of years. Correct? 12 A Yes. 13 Q And you wanted to have the State of Florida 14 s0111ehow proceed to teach you to becoll1e a doctor. Is that 15 pretty llluch what you wanted? 16 A I wanted thell1 to fulfill their obligation that 17 they had lllade for thelllseives. 18 Q And that was what? 19 A Well, it's contained in the vocational 20 rehabilitation plan. I would note that the plan also gives 21 altenlatives and that those weren't llllplelnented either. 22 Q W11at did you want theln to do? When we pull Case 23 No. 98-3444, what are we going to find that you wanted thelll 24 to do? 25 A To linplell1ent the plan.

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court and seem immune to both the law and COllDnon decency; and the judge told me it's simply because these lawyers pay off the judges in the fonn of election contributions, and they don't want to do anything to the lawyer that would upset that flow of cash to their campaign. Q Was that the - A So what I did at that point was I went down to the campaign records for the judge, and then I found that the contribution exceeded the amount set by the statute. Q And was this the professor or the judge who explained that theory? A 111e professor was a judge. Q And what was that professor judge's name? THE DEPONENT: Do I need to disclose that? MR. COOK: Sure. You testified to it. A It was more than one judge. I had another judge that essentially confIm1ed that. 111at was - Q Tell me the judge's - A I can't remember his name offhand. Q Was it one of your professors? A Yes. Q At St. Pete Ir. College? A Yes. I've got it in the records. I can get that to you. Q 111ey were both male professors?

1 COlllillission took the action. But what it turned out was

2 that the $509 amount was only the tip of the iceberg. It 3 wasn't a cash contribution; it was an in-kind contribution 4 that was actually, according to my calculations, valued at 5 over $1,000. 6 Q And what was that? 7 A An in-kind contribution. 8 Q I know that it was in-kind, but what were they 9 giving? Sausages? Napkins? 10 A Essentially they were running the judge's 11 re-election campaign, printing up his flyers, mailing them 12 and all that sort of thing. 13 Q So it was printing and mailing that they were 14 doing? 15 A 111e complaint has a complete listing of 16 everything. 17 Q And as best you recall that was printing and 18 mailing? 19 MR. COOK: I don't think that's what he testified 20 to. 21 A It was also postage. It's all contained in the 22 complaint. 23 Q (By Mr. Anthony) And you drafted that all by 24 yourself? 25 A I filed the complaint, yes, by myself.

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A Yes. Q And you can't remember who they are now? A The second one was Judge Demers. Q Judge Debers?

Q Who drafted it?

A I don't know what you mean by drafting.

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A Demers.
Q Demers. Do you remember Judge Demers' first name? A Not offhand. No. Q And do you know whether that person is still a judge? A They're the chief judge now. Q And that's exactly how it was described to you? A I don't know if that was exactly how it was described; but, yes, that's the essence of it. Q And what was your understanding as to the statutory limit on the contribution to this judge? A It was a $500 statutory limit. Q And how much had this lawyer contributed? A $509. Q And so you sued - A Well, first of all, it wasn't a lawsuit. Q It has a case number. A It's a complaint. Q It's an administrative complaint? A I didn't file any lawsuit. The Elections

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3 Q Who wrote it? 4 A I filled out a complaint application. 5 Q I got you. And you filled it out yourself? 6 A Yes. 7 Q You just can 't remember the name of the first 8 judge professor who told you how things worked? 9 A Right now I'm really stressed, and that's 10 preventing me from remembering. 11 Q 111is is stressing you? 12 A Yes. 13 Q Do you find this to be something that you want to 14 stop for a while? 15 A We can go on. 16 Q How did that case resolve itself? 17 A Well, the Elections COllli11ission found that they 18 had violated the law, the letter of the law; but they 19 deemed that the violation was something they weren't going 20 to pursue. 21 When it was brought to their attention, there was 22 more involved in it than just a $9 overage. 111ey didn't 23 want to pursue the case any further. 24 Q So when you filed this complaint, were you aware 25 that it was just a $509 overage?

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Page 65 Yes. Q And have you appealed that already? A That was appealed. Yes. Q Who handled the appeal? A I did. Q Did any lawyer help you? A No. Q And has it been resolved yet? A No. The Second District Court of Appeal didn't seem to have much interest in the matter, and the advice that I got from an agent of the FBI was to bring it to the attention of the governor. I've done that. Q Have you brought it to the attention of the governor? A Yes. Q Which one? A Governor Bush. Q When did you do that? A I'd have to refer to my records if you want an exact date. Q Have you heard back from Governor Bush? A I would say that we're in communications on that. Q What does that mean? Did he call you? A One of his people called me on his behalf. Q Who was that?
A

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Page 67 Q Were you unsatisfied with that result?

A Well, when the judge let the lawyer misbehave in
court I was concerned about that. Yes.
Q Who was the lawyer Who misbehaved in court and
got away with it, in your opinion?
A Thompson.
Q Did you file a Bar grievance against Thompson?
A No. I did write to the chief judge at the time,
Susan Schaeffer.
Q Did you get a letter back?
A No.
Q What did he do in court that made you so upset?
A He CaIne up and sat down on the table in front of
me. When I was called to read some documents, I would say
that he was under a court order to produce documents, which
he did not do. This made me have to read them in court on
the day as opposed to being able to see them ahead of
time. When I stepped up to read the documents, he blocked
my view, made snide remarks, then he threatened me.
Q How did he threaten you?
A He said that I know your name, and if you ever go
to apply to the Florida Bar I will see that you are
prevented from becoming a member.
Q Do you want to be a member of the Florida Bar?
A I had thought about it at one time. Yes.
Page 68
Q What law schools have you applied to? A Pardon? Q What law schools have you applied to? A I haven't applied to any. Q Have you applied to medical schools? A No. Q Is there a transcript of this badinage of these events in that courtroom? A No. Q Was this the older or the younger 1110mpson? A Older. Q Now, here is Florida Elections Conunission vs. Andrews, 98-163. Is that pretty much the same thing but where it's the judge - A Yes. Q -- as opposed to the lawyer? Is that also on appeal still? A 111at status is the SaIne as 111Ompson. Q Who is Goodis? A Goodis is the partner in Thompson, Goodis & Thompson. Q Okay. I see your third case is Florida Election Conmlission vs. Goodis, 99-169. What was that all about? A 111at was his duplicity in the above two cases. Q What sort of duplicity was he engaged in?

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1 A Again, I'd have to refer to my notes. It was a 1

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Q What did they say?

A That they appreciated my work on this matter. Q Were they following up with it? A Like I say, we're in the process of writing back

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7 and forth. Yes.

Q So Governor Bush's office has written you letters

A Governor Bush himself. Q Has written you letters about this case? A Yes. Q What do they say? A We're sorting out how it's going to be handled. Initially he didn't know if he had jurisdiction or not, and I think that that's what we have to detennine, whether he has jurisdiction to employ a special prosecutor. Q Has he opined on whether he has jurisdiction to do that? A I believe at this point he doesn't believe he has jurisdiction, but the FBI believes that he does have jurisdiction. Q Why did you check this particular judge's contributions? Had you been in a case with him previously? A Yes. This was the case with the taxi cab.

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A He was actually the one running the campaign. He

2 had fonDed the re-election cOllliDittee for the judge and in 3 doing so violated the Florida Election Statutes.

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Q Why did he violate Florida Election Statutes?

A Well, my complaint is nine pages. I'm not even 6 going to attempt to go into the details on this one without

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7 getting the complaint in front of me.

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Q Is this not fresh in your mind?

9 A No, actually, it isn't because I filed that 10 complaint -- or they received my complaint on July 1st, 11 '99; so it's going on two years ago. 12 Q You have a lot of litigation going on, don't you? 13 A I have a few things here and there. 14 Q Do you do all this by yourself? I mean, with the 15 exception of this check cashing loan litigation, do you do 16 all of this yourself? 17 A Some of it is; some of it isn't. 18 Q Of all the things on this schedule, page ten and 19 eleven, what ones have you had lawyers representing you? 20 A Well, Gillespie vs. Bell Savings Bank, that was 21 represented by an attorney, Charles Boohar. 22 Q What one is that on? Oh, at the bottom? 23 A Yes. 24 Q Where is Charles located? 25 A I haven't had contact with him for ten years.

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Page 71 Who painted the $20,000 painting? A Ed C. Wyeth. Q It was your painting? A Yes. Q Do you have any Wyeths now? A No. Q When is this? A That was in the '80s. Q Gillespie vs. Rolls Royce Motors. Did you have a Rolls Royce at one time? A Yes. Q And you sued over the warranty? A That's correct. Q How did that get resolved? A The judge awarded me a finding, and they appealed. I don't know that we followed that appeal up. Q Did you ever recover on your auto warranty? A No. Q Did you use a lawyer for that? A Charles Boohar. Q Gillespie Kar Kingdom, Inc. vs. London Motors. What was that about? A That was a breach of contract. London Motors produced an automobile that I was a dealer for. They failed to comply with the tenns of the contract.
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1 The last I knew he was in the suburbs of Philadelphia. 2 1 2

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Q How did that resolve itself?
A I was represented by Charles Boohar, and then

Q What did you sue Bell for?

A That was a contract dispute.

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3 Mr. Boohar at that point was working for a law finn, which
4 I don't remember the name of -- but he left the finD. And

Q About a note, a promissory note or something?

A After I paid their mortgage of 1.1 million

6 dollars, they wanted to impose roughly a $33,000 prepayment

7 penalty. Our contention was that we had the option of

5 the case stayed with the fonner law finn. I don't think 6 they had any interest in the case and essentially let it
7 die.

8 substituting the collateral under some sort of a tax swap. 9 Q How did that get resolved? 10 A It wasn't resolved. Bell went broke. I think 11 they were taken over by Resolution Trust Corporation, but 12 I'm not sure. And in any event, that lawsuit was listed as 13 an asset in my 1992 lawsuit -- bankruptcy. I'm sorry. 14 Q Gillespie vs. Freedman Auction? 15 A I was represented by counsel on that, Charles 16 Boohar. 17 Q What were these paintings and money? What's this 18 all about? 19 A I had consigned paintings to the auction, and 20 there was some delay in getting the payment for them. 21 Q How much at issue? 22 A There were a couple of things involving 23 Freedman. I don't recall what this one was. One painting 24 was about $20,000, and there were some other ones that were 25 for lesser amounts.

Q You sued British Airways pro se. What does pro 8 9 se mean to you? A For himself. 10 Q How did that case get resolved? 11 A I sued them over smoke coming from the smoking 12 13 section into the non smoking section. Q This is when you were a passenger on the Concord? 14 A Yes. The claim was barred by the Geneva 15 16 Convention. That's my understanding. 17 Q Where did you sue them? France? A It was in Philadelphia. 18 Q Did they bring any lawsuit against you for 19 20 attorney's fees or a claim for attorney's fees or costs? A No. 21 Q Did they show up with a lawyer? 22 23 A I believe they had counsel, yes. Q You didn't know about that there's smoking on the 24 25 Concord before then, before you got on it?

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A There was a smoking and a non smoking section. I

2 was seated in the non smoking section, and smoke from the 3 smoking section left the smoking section and went into the 4 non smoking section where I was sitting. 5 Q What year was this that you brought this claim? 6 A I think that was '88 -- 1988 or 1989. 7 Q How much money were you asking for? 8 A I don't recall. 9 Q What was Bixby Enterprises vs. Gillespie about? 10 A lllat was a complaint for unlawful detainer. 11 Q What does that mean? 12 A They were suing to have me evicted from the 13 apartment. Essentially I rented an apartment in a 14 two-story building. The apartment beneath me they had let 15 a business move into, and it was causing noise, smoke, etc. 16 It was disturbing me. They weren't going to do anything 17 about it. And they eventually settled with me and let me 18 move out of the apartment and returned my deposit. 19 Q What did you allege by way of your counterclaim? 20 A That prior to moving into the apartment I 21 explained to the leasing agent that I wanted a quiet 22 apartment where I wouldn't have a lot of disturbances. 23 Q Is that to keep you relaxed and not stressed? 24 A Yes. 25 Q At this point you were already depressed from

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Q Were you a domestic companion of hers at the

A No.

3 time? 5

Q I don't understand this. She alleged domestic

6 violence? 7 A Repeat violence. 8 Q Repeat violence. 9 A ll1e case had no merit whatsoever. 10 Q Did she employ a lawyer for that? 11 A No. 12 Q Were you just taking a picture, and she filed a 13 lawsuit? 14 A That's correct. Actually, not a lawsuit. She 15 went down and complained to the court, and they filed the 16 suit on her behalf. 17 Q And what was her complaint all about, that you 18 were taking a picture of her? 19 A That I was taking a picture of her building so 20 that I could uncover her security and break in there and 21 steal all her money or something like that. 22 Q Have you investigated any other judges the way 23 you've investigated Judge Andrews? 24 A Yes. 25 Q Tell me the ones you've investigated.

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1 stress? 2 A Yes. Q At this point your family and you were already on A Yes. Q You were already having financial troubles? A Yes.

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1 A I would have to get my list. Actually, the 2 infonnation is in the -- that's part of the complaint. One 3 of the judges I looked into his file, he was adamant that 4 he wasn't going to take these campaign contributions and 5 the inference being that he wasn't for sale. So I thought 6 that was good evidence supporting my case. 7 Q Any other judges you've investigated? 8 A I think that's it. 9 Q Any other lawsuits not on this list either 10 because they occurred afterwards or because they were just 11 onlitted? 12 A No. I think that's it other than AMSCOT, which 13 we're here for and Ace. 14 Q And EZ Check Cashing is also - 15 A Yes. 16 Q -- suing you and you're countersuing them. 17 Right? 18 A Yes. That's on here, page ten. 19 Q How was it that you first heard about payday 20 deferred deposit transactions? 21 A In some marketing media. 22 Q Let me stop before I go into all that. Who is 23 Mark Kamleiter? 24 A Mark Kamleiter is an attorney. 25 Q What's he ever done for you?

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Q How many months did you get to stay there without

A I paid for all the time I was there. Q So why did they want to remove you? A Because I stopped paying the rent.

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A Once they filed the complaint for unlawful

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Q What's Linda Sue Coley vs. Gillespie all about?

A Linda Sue Coley is an employee of EZ Check

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20 Caslling. Outside of that, and even at the time, I didn't 21 know who she was. I'd never met her anywhere else before. I was taking a photograph of this business for 22 23 use in a lawsuit, and Ms. Coley went to the police or to 24 the court and alleged domestic violence or repeat 25 violence. The case was thrown out, and she was fined $50

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A I filed an administrative action. Q And that's what led to the administrative action
A Yes.

attorney/client privilege? I don't want to do that.

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6 privilege. Q (By Mr. Anthony) Is there any case pending in 8 which he's represented you? 9 A No. 10 Q Was there fonnerly any case pending in which he 11 represented you? 12 THE DEPONENT: If I answer that, is that going to 13 violate attorney/client privilege? 14 MR. COOK: What was the question again? 15 MR. ANTHONY: Was there fonnerly any case pending 16 in which Mr. Kamleiter represented the witness? 17 MR. COOK: You can tell him if he represented you 18 in a case. 19 A A filed case? 20 Q (By Mr. Anthony) Filed or threatened case. 21 A He was, you know, as this says, my vocational 22 rehabilitation lawyer. 23 Q Was there a case threatened against you in 24 connection with vocational rehabilitation issues? 25 A No. We were making the threats.
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Q But you brought it -

A Yes.

Q -- regardless? Going back to the deferred

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point here?
MR. ANTHONY: I'm a hungry boy. I was just thinking about that. (There was a break in the proceedings for lunch.) Q (By Mr. Anthony) We had briefly talked about your bankruptcy prior to the break. And if you could take a look at Exhibit 3, what is that? A TI1is appears to be a copy of a Summons and Notice of Trial in an adversary proceeding. Q What's an adversary proceeding? A An adversary proceeding is -- in this case it's a complaint to detennine dischargeability of debt pursuant to Title 11, USC 523.

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Q And who did you make the threats to? A Vocational rehabilitation.

Q And do you recognize that document?

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MR. COOK: I think he testified about all this already, his vocational rehabilitation - MR. ANTHONY: Oh, this is because you weren't going to be -- they weren't going to go through and -

4 governmental entity of some kind?

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your medical deal? A They weren't going to do anything that they had said. I would add, just to supplement this, that the vocational rehabilitation plan also called for medical services and so forth and so on. It wasn't strictly a vocational rehabilitation by way of education or career. It also included medical restoration. Q (By Mr. Anthony) How was that resolved, that latter part that you mentioned? A I'm not sure I understand what you're asking. Q Did they cover some of that medical restoration or any - A Florida? Q Yeah. A Nothing. Q And following the threats, did you bring litigation?

5 account with them without any chance of being able to repay 6 it. Right? 7 A Yes. I think that's what they allege here. 8 Q And finally they didn't pursue it anymore, and 9 you got your discharge. Right? 10 A No, that's not true. They were unable to prove 11 any of this, and this was eventually dismissed. 12 Q Did you counterclaim or something against them? 13 A No. I vaguely remember answering some 14 interrogatories and going through different steps, and 15 ultimately they weren't able to prove their allegations. 16 Q And Exhibit No.4, tell me if you recognize 17 that- 18 MR. COOK: Let me see - 19 MR. ANTHONY: I'm sorry about that. 20 Q (By Mr. Anthony) That's a composite exhibit, I 21 will represent to you, is your initial bankruptcy filing in 22 your bankruptcy case. Do you recognize that document as 23 your initial bankruptcy filings in your bankruptcy case in 24 1992? 25 A Yes.

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Q Do you see your signatures anywhere on those?

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A Let me look. I have the second page. It looks 5 like I signed it twice. 6 Q Do you remember checking out those filings to 7 make sure that they were true and correct before you signed 8 them? 9 A Which filing was that? 10 Q That whole composite exhibit. 11 A What was the question again? 12 Q Do you remember looking that document, as filled 13 out, over before signing it to make sure everything was 14 correct? 15 A I don't really have any independent recollection 16 of it. No. I see now that it's signed, and it looks like 17 my signature. 18 Q Do you have any reason to believe at this time 19 that any infonnation on there was false when you signed 20 it? Did you sign it on December 21 of 1999 - I'm sorry, 21 1991? 22 A No. 23 Q You don't think that's when you signed it? 24 A December 31st. 25 Q Oh, I'm sorry.

2 at the time of filing these is something other than 3 245,000? 4 A I don't really recall. That sounds about right. 5 Q And what property would that be? 6 A That was probably the home I was living in. 7 Q And do you have any reason to believe that the 8 value of personal property in your possession, ownership or 9 control as of the time of your Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing 10 was something other than $4,775 as indicated in Colwnn B? 11 A No. I'm relying on that figure. I would have to 12 go with that. 13 Q And then the total is 245,000 and 4,775 would 14 then be $249,775. Correct? 15 A If that's what it says. Yes. 16 Q Well, I'm not asking you - I don't want to just 17 read off -- do you have any reason to believe that this 18 bottom nWllber is wrong then, the one that has some typing 19 irregularities on it? 20 A That could be a 2 or a 3. I don't know. 21 Q So it wouldn't add up if it were three, would it? 22 A Unless somebody made a math error. 23 Q Do you want to look at the backup sheets and 24 detennine whether or not there's been a math error? We 25 have all day long. I have no problem with that. Take as

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A 1991. Q Do you have any reason to believe that any information on those documents was inaccurate when you signed it? You can take a minute to look over it. A No. I believe it was all accurate. Yes. Q And in particular the page that is a summary of schedules, about three pages - the third page back, the one- A I will say that it looks like somebody has monkeyed with the docwllent a little bit. Everywhere where it says 31, it looks like it could be a 21. And here I see at the bottom of the asset column it looks like it's been typed over. I don't remember the original having those mistakes. It may have, but I don't remember it like that. Q Is there a mistake on it? Do you think that that nwnberisinaccurate? A I don't know. Q Were the numbers on page three, sunullary of schedules -- were the numbers in - THE DEPONENT: See this here? I don't remember that being that way. MR. ANTHONY: He's looking at the total liabilities, the second large column moving from left to right. Q (By Mr. Anthony) Do you have any reason to

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A What do you want me to add up now? Q I'd like you to be able to detenlline for me whether or not the SUllll11ary of schedules was accurate as of the date that you signed. A If this is a representation of the actual bankruptcy then, yes, it was. Q And that's what it appears to be to you. Correct? A It appears to be that. Yes. Q With your signature? A Except that I don't remember these figures being messed up like that. Q Well, put a circle around every figure that you consider to be wrong. A I didn't say wrong; I said messed up. Q How do you mean messed up? Do you mean the typing is messed up? A Well, you can't see whether that's a 2 or a 3. The 9 is double struck, and the 77 5 looks like in bold print, and it's not all the way through, finished at the bottom. I just don't remember it being that way. Q You don't remember messy typing? A I don't remember what I just described to you. Q But, Mr. Gillespie, isn't it true that the sum of

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Page 85 the two numbers at the top of the page where the numbers are not messed up adds up to exactly what that is? A I believe so. Yes. Q And we just went through that exercise. Do you want to check the balance, your Schedule A for real property and the Schedule B for personal property on those two to make sure that they add up? In other words, here's -- it seems that you remember quite well the summary of schedules. Is that correct? A 11le sununary of schedules? Q It's this third page because you don't have the recollection that that was like that? A I just remember the law finn that did this, and I don't remember them doing something like that; but that's just my recollection. Q When we look at Schedule A for real property, 245,000, single family residence. Is that your house in Sewell, New Jersey? A Yes. Q 245,000? A Yes. Vb-huh. Q Non secured totaling 195,000, and a second mortgage of 32,000? A Yes. Q Does that make sense? Page 86
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Page 87 Q So you had a total of $667,000 plus in debt when you filed? A That's correct. Q And you were bringing in 150 a month -- $150 a month? A That's what it says. Yes. Q Is that true? Was it true when you signed it? A Yes. Q And that was before you were on disability? A Yes. Vb-huh. Q And I'm sorry, just for my memory, which is a bit cloudy, I guess, what year did you go on disability? A The disability was determined in 1993. Q I got you. Now, when you first heard about deferred deposit transactions, do you recall the first company that you went with? A Yes. Check 'n Go. Q Check 'n Go? Where were they located? A They were south St. Pete, 54th Avenue South, I believe. Q And who did you deal with there? A I dealt with their personnel. Q What were their names? A I don't have their names. Q You don't have any recollection as to first Page 88

Yes. illl-huh.

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3 second. Then when we go to page three, that's the same 245

4 on page 3 under the assets column, the top assets colwlln,

5 as this Schedule A, 245 right here, that real property. 6 Right? 7 A Yes. illl-huh. 8 Q And then you see personal property under line B, 9 4,775. And then you have your Schedule B, also personal 10 property, carries over two pages, the total at the bottom, 11 $4,775, the sum of all those properties. Correct? 12 A Yes. Vb-huh. 13 Q Did you have any other properties besides those 14 listed on Schedule A, Schedule B, real and personal 15 properties as of that time? 16 A No. 17 Q You know the difference between real and personal 18 property, don't you? 19 A Real property, real estate; personal property - 20 yes. Vb-huh. 21 Q And at that time did you have $428,000 worth of 22 secured debt? 23 A Yes. 24 Q And you had $239,000 worth of unsecured debt? 25 A 11lat's what it says. Yes.

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Q Are they written down anywhere by you? A I don't know. Q Were there any other Check 'n Go locations that you did business with? A I don't think so. No. Q And about what time period was this that you began working with Check 'n Go? A Check 'n Go, I believe it was August 21st of '97. Q How are you so able to remember that specific day? 11lat's my birthday, and I can't remember what happened that day. A Well, the date is memorialized in my interrogatories that I answered for you. Q So from your reviewing the interrogatories? A Yes. Q Have you had a chance to take a look at the backup checks that would have been correspondent to these deals? A I've looked at them. Yes. Q When did you most recently look at them? A It's been a while. I don't recall when. Q More or less than a month? A I would say, for the most part, it's been more

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A I don't know. Have I? I may have. As far as I Q When you take money from one business or firm or

Q What do you have in front of you? You have a

2 know, it's a conunon tenn.

4 person, that's the rob; and then to pay Paul is another

3 yellow lined piece of paper. What's that? 4 A Would you like to look at it? 5 Q Yeah. Sure. 6 A It's a compilation of the different start dates 7 that I compiled from my answers to the interrogatories. 8 Q When did you prepare this? 9 A During my lunch break. 10 Q And what documents did you use to prepare this? 11 A I used solely the documents marked as Exhibit 2. 12 Q Now, all of these transactions with Check 'n Go, 13 EZ, ACE, National, AMSCOT, Check Smart and Americash - 14 A Oh, are you taking my paper from me? 15 Q I took it from you to put a tab - 16 A You're taking my paper and putting it in an 17 exhibit? 18 Q Yes. 19 A Why are you doing that? 20 Q Because it's an important piece of infonnation 21 now. 22 A Really? 23 Q Yeah. MR. COOK: Can I just ask you to allow him to 24 look at that if you're going to - 25

5 business or finn or person. Right? 6

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pocket and putting it in the other. MR. ANTHONY: Well, he said rob Peter to pay Paul. He said it before. Q (By Mr. Anthony) Who are you robbing in that? A It's a figure of speech. No one was robbed. Q Let me ask you a question. Of the seven entities, the ftrst one, Check 'n Go, that's the one that we were talking about first? A Yes. Q Have you bounced any checks to them? A Yes. Q And when did they bounce? A I don't know what day they bounced. Q Why don't you take a look at page 15 of your outline? A Of the responses? Q Yeah. Of your interrogatory responses. A Yes. Okay.

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2 3 4 5 6 MR. ANTHONY: Oh, absolutely. MR. COOK: - ask him questions about - MR. ANTHONY: Absolutely. MR. COOK: - the dates? MR. ANTHONY: It's there on the table. MR. COOK: TIlat's the only reason he did that is since you asked him a question prior to our leaving, and he wanted to make sure he gave you accurate answers. MR. ANTHONY: He's got it. Q (By Mr. Anthony) Now, all of those stopped in November or December of '99. What caused them to stop? A What caused what to stop? Q Your relationship with those seven deferred deposit outfits. A I was no longer able to carry on the, quote, unquote, robbing Peter to pay Paul. Q What does "robbing Peter to pay Paul" mean to you? Who are you robbing in that tenn? A Myself. Q How are you robbing yourself? A I'm taking money out of one pocket and putting it in the other. Q You've used the term robbing Peter to pay Paul elsewhere, haven't you?

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1 Q For Check 'n Go, it says here that checks 2 numbered 1365 and 1366 dated December 3rd, 1999, one for 3 $138 and one for $200, both bounced and haven't been paid. 4 Right? 5 A That's correct. Q When those were written, were you aware that you 6 7 weren't going to be able to cover them except for unless 8 you got another deferred deposit transaction somewhere 9 else? 10 A What was that question again? 11 Q On December 3rd -- I'm sorry. When these two 12 checks were written, the Check 'n Go checks, were you aware 13 that you weren't going to be able to cover them? 14 A No. 15 Q What new or different thing made it such that you 16 couldn't cover them? 17 A Well, like I say, I reached the point where I 18 couldn't continue with this financial treadmill, and I 19 actually sought to get a loan from my bank at the time - 20 SouthTrust, was it -- yeah, SouthTrust, up until the very 21 end. And they denied the loan, and I wasn't able to 22 continue with the financial treadmill. 23 Q Now, did you submit a loan application to 24 SouthTrust? 25 A A loan application? I believe so. Yes.

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Q And did you have a financial statement with that, or no? A I don't think it was that involved. Q Do you remember the loan officer's name? A Not off the top of my head. No. Q What branch? A It was the branch at 4100 4th Street North in St. Petersburg. Q And was that submitted about this time period, or was it prior to that? A It was submitted at this time, and I explained to the manager or whoever was there that I was involved with these loan sharks like AMSCOT and that I was also in touch with the state officials about that and - Q What state officials were you in contact with? A TIle Department of Banking. Q Who did you talk with there? A I have the woman's name in my notes, but I don't recall it offhand. Actually, that may have been later, but in the general sense. And because of these loan sharks, I just wasn't able to continue this financial treadmill paying these exorbitant interest rates. Q So that's what you told SouthTrust to get a loan, that your interest rates were exorbitant and so you needed a new loan?

1 A The office was on First Avenue North, I believe. 2 I think it was First Avenue North around 37th Street. Is 3 that the office? 4 Q And then what happened? 5 A Well, I walked up to a window, the customer 6 service window, and told them I wanted to get a -- cash a 7 check or get a payday advance andwrite out a check. I 8 think the amounts were generally $111 or $117. 9 And they would take the check from me and give me 10 back about $100 in cash. And they would, you know, go 11 through, I guess, whatever office procedures they had 12 there. 13 Q What were the procedures, as best you know? 14 A I don't know what their procedures were. 15 Q What procedures did you undergo? 16 A I just explained them to you. 17 Q Did you sign anything? 18 A I signed the check, and I may have signed the 19 receipt. 20 Q Was there some time in all of your transactions 21 with AMSCOT where on the same day that a check was due to 22 be -- strike that. 23 What do you understand your options to have been 24 for dealing with the check you had given to AMSCOT on the 25 date that was the date of the check?

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Q Now, as a matter of routine, wasn't there a break 5 in between the time period that you received an advance on 6 a deferred deposit check and the time the check actually 7 went in for collection at AMSCOT? Wasn't there always a 8 break of at least a few days? 9 A I'm not sure what you're asking me. Are you 10 speaking about the checks at AMSCOT?

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A Well, the date of the check, I believe, was the date that I was in the office. What were my options? Options for what? Q Did you have an option to let the check go in for collection? MR. COOK: I'm going to object on the grounds of vague -- I mean, you asked him about the date of the check. He testified that the day of the check is the day that he went in to take out the loan. And you asked him what his options were. Do you mean what happened at the end of the two weeks? MR. ANTIIONY: I'd say at the end of the teml. Q (By Mr. Anthony) What was your understanding as to what would happen with the check when you tendered it over? A At the end of the teml? I believed it would be deposited. Q Okay. Is that what happened in your deals at

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Page 97 Q Buy the check back for cash? A Yes. Q Did you ever redeem a check before it went in for collection before it was deposited? A TIlat may have happened once. It may have happened. Q TIle majority of the times, what happened? A It was deposited. Q Was there any time when AMSCOT somehow collected from you more than the face amount of the check for a check cashing transaction? A More than the face amount? Q Yes. A I believe they collected the face amount. Q Was there any time when you understood that AMSCOT would collect less than the face amount of the check? A No. Q At the outset, you knew they were going to collect the face amount of the check. Correct? A At the outset I knew they were going to collect the face amount of the check. Q And you knew that on the first transaction you had with AMSCOT. Correct? A Yes. Page 98
Q Did the alleged problems that you told your

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cover another finn's deferred deposit checks? A It was keeping the financial treadmill going. Yes. Q So that's really all that had been happening for a year is that you were covering deferred deposit transaction advances with the most recent deferred deposit transaction advance? A Yes. Q And were all of these by the time you started with AMSCOT -- and you can use that yellow lined paper, Exhibit 5, to help you if you want -- how many different deferred deposit companies had checks up in the air with you? A At what point? Q Your first deal with AMSCOT, the date of your

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9 AMSCOT, which was on July 23rd, '98, and then you're asking 10 me about something that happened with my banker in December 11 of '99. Is that what you're asking? 12 Q I'm asking: Did you not appreciate what the 13 charge was going to be for cashing a check on the very 14 first time you did one of these transactions? 15 A I knew that the check was -- you know, I'm 16 referring here to this document, which I believe is 17 accurate -- $113.89, and I received $100 cash. 18 20 21 22 23 25 Q Did that seem exorbitant to you at the time on 19 the first transaction?

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first deal with AMSCOT. A I don't know how many were up in the air at that point. Q Who did you deal with at AMSCOT? Do you remember anyone's name? A No. Q Do you remember anyone's appearance? A I remember it was either a guy or a gal behind the counter. Q Either a guy or a gal doesn't narrow it down too much. Do you remember what the person, man or woman, looked like? A Oh, they were just typical folks. Q Tall? Short? A Well, they were inside a bullet proof enclosure. I didn't know how tall they were, what the floor level in there was. Q Never really got a good look at them? A I got a good look at them but nothing memorable. Q Now, you've had an opportunity to study your transactions with AMSCOT. In fact, you're open to the page in your interrogatories that sUlmnarizes that transaction. Right? A I believe this docUlnent was prepared by AMSCOT. Q Right. Can you read it?

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Q And it's the one that says towards the back, the 3 last page of Exhibit D, it says deferred deposits by 4 custolner, AMSCOT, Neil Gillespie. Right? 5 A What did you say, B? 6 Q It's the last page before Exhibit B - 7 A Oh, before Exhibit B? 8 Q Right. 9 A Yes. Uh-huh. 10 Q Have you had an opportunity to pull out and take 11 a look at your checks evidenced by those check nUlnbers in 12 the left-hand colUlnn? 13 A The left-hand colulnn? Yes, I have looked at 14 those checks or reproductions of theln. 15 Q When did you 1110St recently look at theln? 16 A Well, in conj unction with this lawsuit I looked 17 at the111. 18 Q When? Today? 19 A TIle answer 1'111 thinking of ll1ay violate 20 attoTIley/client privilege, so I don't want to do that. 21 Q 1'111 just asking if you looked at them. 22 A And I answered yes. 23 Q Did you look at theln today? 24 A No. 25 Q Did you look at theln yesterday?
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Page 104 Q Check nUlnber - the check llull1ber colull1n is a left-hand colulnn, sir. A Okay. Q Check out your left. 1372, 1343, 1310 - do you see that colUll1n? A I would call that the first of 111any colu111ns. Q Okay. Well, it's left-hand l110ving right. A If you had two colulnns I would call one left and one right. If I have one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine colU1mls, I would call this colull1n one. Q Okay. A I would call that colull1n nine. Q Then let's do it your way. Colulnn one. A Yes. Q I-Iave you or have you not had an opportunity to see the checks that bear these nUlnbers since you received this printout froln AMSCOT? A I'ln just, I think, looking at this for the first tilne. Q You are? Why don't you peel back two pages. Is that your signature on that? Is that your signature under oath on that doculnent? Do you see that signature on the top page? A Yes. Q Did you sign that docull1ent before or after that

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EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et ale

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1 issued. Do you see that? 2 A Yes. Uh-huh.

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page was attached? A I'ln sorry. I was lnistaken. Yes. Yes. Now I recognize this doculnent. Yes, I signed that. And accordingly, these are aCClrrate figures then. Q So these are all the checks that you've had an opportunity to review prior to cOlnpleting the interrogatories. Correct? A Yes. Q Okay. And then as to the top transaction, check nUInber 1372 - A Yes. Q - what is YOllr understanding based llpon that data of the alnount of the check at issue? A My understanding of the alnount is $117. Q That's the face value of the check? A Face value of the check. Q And as to the alnount that was advanced to you in cash on the date that you tendered the check, how Inuch would yOll have received? A I believe $100. Q Okay. And what is your understanding of - A But it Inight have been $100.30. Yes. And, actually, it was quite confusing, but - Q What was confllsing abollt it to you? A Well, what the 30 cents was. Page 106
Q Got you. Now, what is the date that you would

Q And the Salne date that check nU11lber 1372 was

4 deposited and cleared, you wrote three other checks, one

5 for EZ, one for Check 'n Go, and one for Check 'n Go. Do

6 you relnel1lber that? A Yes. 8 Q When you wrote these three checks, total alnount, 9 $838, correct - 10 A Yes. 11 Q -- was SOl1le of the 11loney - 12 A I lllean, I said yes. I haven't added theln up, 13 but- 14 Q Well, add the1ll up. 15 A You wrote three checks. 16 MR. COOK: It's correct. 17 A I'm being told that it's correct. 18 Q (By Mr. Anthony) You wrote those three checks, 19 and you got S011le cash, and then you went over and paid off 20 AMSCOT. Is that what happened, or was it deposited? 21 A I don't recall what I did with those funds other 22 than to, you know, pay household expenses. 23 Q Is it your testiulony that you were unaware on 24 Decelllber 3rd, 1999 that EZ and Check 'n Go were going to 25 bounce $838 worth of checks if on the Sallle day you were
7

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have tendered the check to AMSCOT? A TIlat would have been on the transaction date or the check date. Q Novelnber 15th of '99? A Yes. Q And that's the sa11le as the check date. Correct? A Yes. Q And then there's a deposit date? A Yes. Q Is that the next colulnn over? A Yes. Q And that would have been 12/3 of '99. Correct? A Yes. Q Do you know whether that check 1372 ever cleared? A Yes, it did. Q It cleared? A Yes. Q Now, do you want to take a look at page 15, and if you take a look at your answer to nUlnber 9, it's list the dates -- the interrogatory, list the date and check alnount for any occurrence in which Gillespie ever tendered a check that was subsequently canceled or returned for insufficient funds, taking care to nal1le the banking institution, the bank's address, and to Wh011l the check was

2 go in for $117? Were you just not aware that that was

3 going to happen?
4 A Was I not aware of what?

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Q That you were going to becolne overdrawn?

A Yes, I was aware that that would happen. Q You were aware that Check 'n Go and
EZ were

both

8 going to get a total of three NSF checks?

A Yes, if my bank loan hadn't gone through. Yes. Q If your what hadn't gone through? A The bank loan I discussed with you.
Q Well, you knew by DeceIllber 3rd of 1999 that you A No. Q Really? That's your testiInony?

13 weren't going to get a bank loan. Right?

A That's my testinlony.
Q And there's nothing you could know or look at

18 that would change your testiInony about this key issue 19 today?
20

A I don't think so. Q All right. When you wrote your three checks for
EZ

21 22
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and Check 'n Go on DeceInber 3rd, check nmnber 1359, 1365

A Let ll1e just COITect you. I didn't write thetll on

23 and 1366 - 25 that date.

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EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

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Q Oh, that's when they were submitted?

A Well, you just said I wrote them on that date,
and that's not correct.
Q Oh, they were deposited on that date? Is that
the date that they were deposited or the day that they
bounced?
A No. I'm sorry. I think that was the date that
they were written. Yes. My apologies. Although, let me
just check here. Yeah.
The check wasn't written -- for example, the EZ Check Cashing of Clearwater, $500, the check was not written on the 12th; it was written on November the 5th. The check was dated - MR. COOK: Do you mean the 3rd? THE DEPONENT: November the 5111. Q (By Mr. Anthony) So it was a month? They held it for a month? A Approximately a month. Yes. And that check was dated the 12th of December. And I assume they deposited it 111en or shortly thereafter. And what was your question now about Check 'n Go? Do you have a question about Check And Go? Q Check 'n Go, when were those checks written? A I believe the date of the transaction was the 11th of November of '99.
Page 110 Why don't you tell him what you're looking at for the record. A And for the record, I'm looking at the attachment, Check 'n Go printout sheet to my answers to the interrogatories. And the check, according to this, was dated on 12/3/99. Q So it's your testimony that you were not aware that these three checks would bounce when they were written? MR. COOK: Asked and answered. You can go ahead and answer it again. A I answered that already. Q (By Mr. Anthony) Now, if you go back to the AMSCOT page again, Exhibit A - A Yes. Q -- the second transaction going down the page, check number 1343 - A Yes. Q -- transaction date, 10/18. Again, it's $117. You would have gotten $100 and maybe 30 cents or so? A Yes. Q And that would have been sent in for deposit on 11/4 of '99? A 111at's what it says here. Yes. Q Do you know whether or not that cleared?
MR. COOK:

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11

Page 111 A I believe all my checks to AMSCOT cleared if they

were deposited.
Q Now, do you have any separate recollection of
this second to the last transaction at AMSCOT?
A Check number l349? Q Yeah. No. 1343. A 1343? Q Second to the last transaction. A Not sitting here now. I have no independent recollection of it.
Q Do you have any independent recollection of any
of these transactions other than as you've already
testified?
A I probably remember going in the store for the
first time and the impressions I had, and after that they
were -- it was all pretty much the same.
Q Did you ever do any transaction -- on the first
time, did you go in for a deferred deposit service, or did
you go in for something else?
A I believe it was for a deferred deposit.
Q Have you ever had your taxes done at an AMSCOT
location?
A No.
Q Have you ever done a same day check cashing
transaction at an AMSCOT location?
Page 112 A No. Q Do you know whether or not AMSCOT charges more for deferred deposit transactions than it does for regular check cashing transactions where you get money, and the check goes in on the same day? A I don't know what their same day services are, if any. Q Do you recall ever asking or inquiring about that? A No. Q Would you have any need for that service? A No. Q Based upon the data that you have on this one page printout and whatever follow-up analysis you've done regarding your checks, do you know whether or not you've ever had more than one deferred deposit transaction outstanding at the same time? A Are you asking if I had other transactions outstanding at the same time I had AMSCOT transactions outstanding? Q No. I'm asking just your relationship with AMSCOT. Have you ever had more than one deferred deposit AMSCOT transaction outstanding at the same time? A For example, two or more AMSCOT checks out at once? Page 109 - Page 112

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EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

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Q Correct.
A No.

2 3

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Q And hasn't there always been at least a couple of

4 days occurring between the date that one check has gone in
5 for deposit or collection and the date that you do another

6 transaction?
7 A I would believe so. Yes. 8 Q What is your understanding of what a roll-over is 9 in this industry? 10 A Well, a roll-over is -- in a strict sense, I 11 believe, is paying the interest that's due and leaving the 12 check with the company, the check cashing company, or 13 perhaps writing a new check inunediately and just paying the 14 interest; although these companies all do things a little 15 bit differently, and there's many variations on that. 16 Q Do you understand that you've ever engaged in a 17 roll-over transaction with AMSCOT? 18 A I don't believe the complaint even alleges that. 19 Q I'mjust asking you. I don't care about the 20 complaint. So is it your testimony that you've never done 21 a roll-over with AMSCOT? 22 A Not in that strict sense, no. 23 Q How about in a loose sense? 24 A Well, one could say that using the proceeds of 25 one pocket to pay the other pocket could be a fonn of

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relationship with one of these seven companies? A A contractual duty? Q Yeah, that got you started having to borrow money from one of them? A I'm not sure I understand that question. Q Well, did you have a separate obligation like a promissory note or a rent to own arrangement or some other obligation to any of these companies, a pawn relationship, you needed to get something unpawned? Did you have any other obligation to anyone of these companies other than that you walked in from the street because you wanted money for a check? A Not to these companies directly, but - Q To who? Who is the cause? Who is at fault? MR. COOK: Excuse me. I think he'd probably prefer to finish his question -- or finish his answer. MR. ANTHONY: Sorry. A I would say that there was -- I had a need for money at one point for some expensive dental work, and that was how I initially got into this. Q So you had to pay your dentist, so you did deferred deposit deals? A Yes. Q Now, having said all of that, isn't it true that

Page 114
1 roll-over. 2

Page 116
1 there is a several day period of time that elapses between 2 the closing of one deferred deposit transaction with AMSCOT 3 and the pick up of another on every one of those 4 transactions with AMSCOT. Correct? 5 A I believe so. Yes. 6 Q Did you tell the AMSCOT people that you were 7 working with on these transactions that you were covering 8 the checks as they're deposited with proceeds from other 9 finn's deferred deposit transactions? 10 A No. 11 Q Why not? 12 A TI1ey didn't ask that. 13 Q Do you think they would have given you the 14 ability to keep doing those deals if they knew that you had 15 checks with seven different finns? 16 MR. COOK: Objection. That calls for 17 speculation. 18 MR. ANTHONY: Does that call for speculation? 19 MR. COOK: If you can answer the question, you 20 can answer it. 21 A I believe that they would have. Yes. Q (By Mr. Anthony) You think they would have if 22 23 they knew that you had checks all over six different other 24 outfits? 25 A Yes.

Q Have you ever used the proceeds of an AMSCOT

3 check cashing transaction to payoff or redeem a check on

4 another check cashing transaction? 5 A Yes. It was part of keeping the financial

6 treadmill going. 7 Q Of the checks that are on that schedule, point to 8 the one check that paid off another check in your loose 9 sense of the term. l O A Yes. I would say that because I didn't go to 11 AMSCOT until almost a year into this, that that's what - 12 all of them were being used for that. 13 Q You mean all of the payments that you received 14 from AMSCOT on deferred deposit transactions you used to 15 make payments to other finns? 16 A I used them to keep that financial treadmill 17 going. Yes. 18 Q Who put you on that treadmill? Did somebody 19 force you to go to one of these companies? 20 A No. I was not forced to go to a company. 21 Q Was there some other obligation that you had to 22 one of these companies that got you started engaging in 23 these transactions? 24 A I'm sorry. What was that question again? 25 Q Did you have some separate contractual duty or

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1 at his house in Orlando in Inaybe 1997. references when you started your AMSCOT relationship? 2 Q TIlat's the last tinle you spoke with hiln? 3 A Yes. A Credit references? Q Db-huh. Q And he was a personal reference for you in July 4 A No. 50f'98? 6 A Yes. Q Who is Bill Hindlnan? A Those are personal references. 7 Q Were you pennanently elnployed in July of '98? Q Those are personal. I'ln sorry. Who is Jalnes A I'ln sorry? What was the question? 8 Hill? 9 Q Were you pennanently elnployed in July of '98? A Jalnes Hill was my landlord and friend. 10 A Pennanently employed in July of '98? I don't 11 believe so. Q Is he still your landlord and friend? A He's stilllny friend; he's not my landlord 12 Q Was there a Inethod to your covering the AMSCOT anymore. 13 check and allowing the other three checks to bounce, or was 14 that just luck of the draw for the check cashing finns? Q Where did you rent froln hun? 15 A In other words, you want to know why AMSCOT's A At 1121 Beach Drive Northeast. 16 check cleared and the others didn't? Q What was your rent back then? A My rent then -- I want to say it was 360 a Inonth, 17 Q Correct. 18 A I believe that was a bank error. and then I thil1k it went up to 380 a Inonth. Q AMSCOT's check cleared is a bank error? Q What prompted you to Inove froln that location? 19 20 A Yes. A I haven't Inoved froIn that location. I still live 21 Q Have you been deposed before in connection with there. Q How COlne he's not your landlord now? It's sold? 22 any litigation involving deferred deposit transactions? 23 A Yes. A Because he retired, and SOlneone else bought the 24 Q Who has deposed you? property. 25 A Well, I've been disposed - deposed by ACE. Q Who is that?

Q Did you have to basically give out credit

Page 118
1 A My new landlord goes by the nalne of Metcab. Q Metcab? 2 A Yes. M-e-t-c-a-b, Inc. -- no, not inc. - LL, 3 4 lilnited liability, LLC. Q Who is Bill Hinmnan? 5 A Bill Hinmllan is a friend of lnine. 6 Q And do you have any business together? 7 8 A No. 9 Q What does he do for a living? 10 A He's retired. II Q Where does he live? 12 A He lives at 432 Beach Drive Northeast. 13 Q TIle saIne place you used to live? 14 A No. I never lived there. 15 Q Is that right near by or sonlething? 16 A I live at 1121 Beach Drive; he lives at 432 Beach 17 Drive. 18 Q It's another unit? 19 A No. It's several blocks down the street. 20 Q Have you ever had any business dealings with hinl? 21 A No. 22 Q Who is John Gillespie? 23 A That's Iny uncle. 24 Q I-Iow frequently do you conul1unicate with hiln? 25 A I last spoke with hinl, I think, when I was over 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8
Q Do you relnenlber the na111e of the lawyer? A Paul Watson.

Page 120

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

MR. ANTIIONY: Is that right? MR. COOK: Uh-huh. Q (By Mr. Anthony) How many tilnes by Mr. Watson? A Once. Q Who else? A I was deposed by EZ Check Cashing. Q Who did the deposition? Do you know? A Ronald Collier. Q I-Iow nlany tilnes? A Once. Q Anyone else? A I believe that's everything. Q Do you still have an account with First of Alnerica? A No. Q Were any checks drawn on First of Anlerica used in your AMSCOT relationship? A No. Q How about with any of the other six finns you used? A Well, just so you're aware, First of Alnerica \vas acquired by SouthTrust. Q I got you.

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EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

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1
RE: EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.
vs. AMSCOT Corporation

AMSCOT
Page 123

A So the one account flowed through to the other,

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7

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and that happened in, I believe, January of '98; so that

was prior to my transaction with AMSCOT. It may not have
been prior to transactions with other companies.
Q Have you ever met any other AMSCOT deferred
deposit customers?
A AMSCOT deferred deposit customers? I've met Ann
today. Yes.
Q Have you met her prior to today? A No. And I met Eugene Clement. Q When did you meet him? A I met him on the day of the deposition with Paul Watson.
Q Your deposition with Paul Watson?
A And his. Yes. We were both deposed.
Yes. Uh-huh.
Q When was that?
A Whenever the date of that deposition was.
Q What did you have occasion to talk about without
your counsel present?
A I don't think we spoke about much of anything.
Q Have you talked to him any time since?
A He was in the office the other day when I was
here, and I saw him on television once.
Q What was he doing on TV?

2
3
4 5 ERRATA SHEET

I, NEIL J. GILLESPIE, have read the foregoing 6 deposition given by me on May 14,2001, in Tampa, Florida. 7 Corrections should be made as follows:
8 PAGE: LINE: ERROR/AMENDMENT AND REASON THEREFORE:

9
10
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12
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15

16 17
18

19

20 as given by me in the foregoing, signed this 21 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2001.

Subject to these corrections, my testimony reads day of

22 23
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I

NEIL J. GILLESPIE
Page 124 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

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A He was with Mr. Alpert, the lawyer representing him in an insurance matter on a show with Kathy Fountain. Q What sort of an insurance matter? A I don't know. I don't recall. Q He was on TV. Was he in a class action matter that Mr. Alpert was covering? A I don't recall. Q What did Ms. Blomefield and you have the opportUnity to talk about outside of counsel's presence today? A Just chit chat. Q All right. MR. ANTHONY: I don 't have any further questions. MR. COOK: We don't have any further questions - any questions, and we would like to read. ******** (Thereupon, the deposition was concluded at 3:15 p.m.)

2 STATE OF FLORIDA :
COUN1Y OF HILLSBOROUGH:
4 I, CHERE 1. BARTON, a Notary Public in and for
the State of Florida at Large, certify that I was
5 authorized to and did stenographically report the foregoing
proceedings; and that the transcript is a true record of
6 the testimony given by the witness.

7 I further certify that I am not a relative,

employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am
8 I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or
counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially
9 interested in the action.

10 11
12 13 14 IS STATE OF FLORIDA: COUN1Y OF HILLSBOROUGH: Dated this 28th day of May, 2001.

16
I, the undersigned authority, certify that NEIL 17 1. GILLESPIE personally appeared before me and was duly
sworn.

18
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 28th day 19 of May, 2001. 20 21 22 23 24 Notary Pubhc State of Florida at Large My commission No.: My commission expires:

23
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EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

-$
$1,000 [1] $1,300 [1] $1,394 [1] $1,400 [1] $1,500 [1] $1,650 [1] $1,850 [2] 49:15 $10,000 [2] 45:22 $100 [4]95:10 105:20 110:20 $100,000 [1] $100.30 [1] $111 [1) 95:8 $113.89 [1] $117 [4]95:8 108:2 110:19 $128 [1] 44:22 $138 [1) 92:3 $15,000 [1] $150 [2]56:19 $2,000 [2] 50:21 $2,850 [1) $2,900 [11 $20,000 [2] 71:1 $200 [1] 92:3 $239,000 [1] $249,775 [1] $250 [2]56:21 $3,500 [2] 46:8 $3,700 [1] $300 [1] 48:2 $33,000 [1] $370[1]41:17 $4,775 [2] 86:11 $400 [1]44:15 $428,000 [1] $5,000 [2] 45:20 $50 [1] 74:25 $500 [2]62:17 $509 [3] 62:19 64:25 $550 [2]46:18 $600[2]41:15 $650 [1] 51:20 $667,000 [1] $680 [1]50:19 $700 [2]51:19 $75 [1] 45:4 $80 [1] 45:4 $838 [2]107:9 $9 [1] 64:22 63:5 47:5 29:7 47:8 51:16 51:14 49:15 16:19 98:17 40:11 105:22 98:17 105:14 $9,800 [1] $9,900 [1] $90 [1] 45:12 $910 [1]46:16 $950 [1]51:4 53:19 53:19

CondenseIt! TM
14 [3] 1:17 123:6 1400 [1]2:8 15 [3] 3:4 106:19 150 [4] 1:16 4:4 87:4 15th [1] 106:5 16 [2] 45:25 17 [1] 52:1 195,000 [1] 1976[1]15:25 1985 [4] 11:3 12:6 12:7 1988 [2]19:6 1989 [1] 73:6 1991 [2]81:21 1992 [3]14:21 80:24 1993 [4]14:13 29:3 87:13 1994 [1] 58:2 1997 [1]119:1 1998 [4]7:24 53:10 58:8 1999 [4]81:20 107:24 108:12 1st [1] 69:10 4:5 37th [1] 380 [1] 3:15 [1] 3rd [6] 107:24 109:14 95:2 117:18 122:19 92:2 92:11 108:12 108:22

$1,000 - against AMSCOT

90:3 academic [61 38:23 38:24 39:3 39:8 39:10 39:11 12:21 accident [1] according [31 63:4 103:4 110:5 accordingly [1]105:4 47:11 account [15] 47:15 47:18 47:18 49:12 47:21 49:9 50:11 50:18 50:22 51:12 80:5 51:1 120: 15 121 :1 accuracy [2] 103:9 103:24 accurate [14] 8:8 24:20 8:10 8:9 48:19 48:21 48:24 54:21 54:23 82:5 98:17 84:4 90:8 105:4 Ace [4] 5:5 76:13 89:13 119:25 120:24 acquired [1] acted [1] 22:3 52:15 action [8] 52:23 63:1 79:1 122:5 124:8 79:2 124:9 38:6 actions [1] actual [2] 43:13 84:6 adamant [1] 76:3 46:9 add [8] 6:4 48:16 78:11 83:21 107:14 84:2 85:7 added [2] 46:3 107:12 47:24 adding [1) additional [1] 14:6 address [3] 8:7 106:25 8:10 adds [1] 85:2 administrative [4] 62:24 79:1 57:5 79:2 advance [5] 3:3 94:5 95:7 5:3 99:]7 105:17 advanced [1] advances [3] 3:11 99:16 99:8 adversary [4] 3:8 79:21 79:22 79:23 advice [1] 65:10 afterwards [2] 13:25 76:10 13:20 again [14] 39:7 41:17 35:2 66:1 54:23 55:4 77:14 81:11 92:10 110:11 110:14 110:19 114:24 against [6] 38:7 40:19 67:7 72:19

91:21 2:3

-,
'80s [3] 71:8 '88 [1] '90s [5] 32:13 '92 [1] '93 [1] '95 [3] 32:18 '96 [3] 32:18 '97 [3] 88:10 '98 [7] 119:5 119:10 '99 [7] 98:11 109:25 'n [17] 88:5 89:12 92:12 107:24 109:21 13:23 73:6 26:11 32:15 23:2 29:11 26:13 26:13 10:17 7:23 119:7 121:2 69:11 106:5 110:23 87:17 88:9 91:14 107:5 108:7 109:23 13:24

-4
48:15 85:22 11:4 73:6 82:1 70:13 15:15 5 [2] 501 [1] 523 [1] 54th [1] 5th [2] 4 [3] 2:18 3:9 80:16 4,775[2] 83:13 86:9 40 [1] 36:16 4100 [1] 93:7 432 [2] 118: 12 118:16 45 [1] 30:12 495 [1] 47:12 4th [1] 93:7

26:13 32:18

29:20 29:20 43:6 98:9 119:9 90:12 106:13 87:18 88:10 92:1 107:5 108:22 110:4

-5
3:10 99:21 2:8 79:25 87:19 109:12 109:15

45:24 87:4 49:4 51:10 50:5 70:24

52:6 92:2

-6
6 [1] 3:2

-2
2 [4] 3:4 83:20 84:19 89:11 4:5 2001 [6]1:17 123:6 123:21 124:10 124:19 201 [1] 1:23 21 [2] 81:20 82:11 21st [1] 88:10 222-8978 [1] 1:25 2300 [1]11:17 23rd [1] 98:9 245 [2] 86:3 86:5 245,000 [4] 83:3 83:13 85:17 85:20 2795-T-26EAJ[I] 1:8 28th [2] 124:10 124:18

-7
7 [3] 15:14 83:9 775 [1] 84:20 79 [1] 3:7 16:7

86:24 83:14 56:22 44:25 50:7 70:6 83:10

-0
001372 [1] 102:21

-1
1 [1] 3:2 1.1 [1) 70:5 10/18 [1] 1079 [1]102:6 10:15 [2] 4:5 11 [1] 79:25 11/4 [1] 110:23 1121 [2]117:15 11th [1] 109:25 12/3 [1] 106:13 12/3/99 [1] 124 [1] 2:19 12th [2] 109:12 1310[1]104:4 1343 [4]104:4 111 :6 111 :7 1349 [1]111:5 1359 [1]108:22 1365 [2] 92:2 1366 [2] 92:2 1372 [7]102:4 102:24 104:4 106: 15 107:3

-815:13 8 [1] 80 [1] 3:9 813 [1) 1:25 8:00-CV[I]

110:19 1:18

1:8

-9
84:20 9 [2] 950[1) ]:24 98-163 [1] 98-3444 [1] 99-169 [1] 106:20 68:13 58:23 68:23

86:2] 43:17

118:16

109:11 63:2 47:2 47:3 87:1 56:18

110:6 109:19 110:17

-3
3:7 3 [5] 83:20 84:19 30 [2] 105:25 300 [3] 1:15 4:4 31 [1] 82:11 31st[l] 81:24 32,000 [1] 33602 [2] 2:9 33606 [1] 360 [1] 117:17 79:19 86:4 110:20 2:3

-A
a.m[2] 1:18 ability [2] 116:14 able [13] 25:8 44:10 67:17 80:15 84:3 90:16 92:7 92:21 93:21 above [1] absolutely [2] 4:5 35:22 26:16 80:5 88:11 92:13 68:24 90:1

107:25

108:22 108:23 102:17 105:10

85:23 1:24 2:4

Index Paae 1

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et a1.

77:23 80:12 age [I] 31 :11 agencies [1] agent [2] 73:21 ago [3] 48:3 69:11 agree [1]91:6 agreements [I] ahead [2] 110:11 au [2] 99:22 Airways [I] al [I] 123:1 alive [2] 33:9 allegations [2] 80:15 allege [5] 23:16 23:19 80:7 alleged [4] 74:24 75:5 alleges [I] alleging [I] allotted [I] allow [I] allowed [I] allowing [I] almost [2] 114:11 along [2] 48:11 Alpert [2] 122:6 alternatives [2] 59:3 always [2] 113:3 America [3] 120:18 120:23 Americash [I] Amoco [I] amount [20] 47:6 49:4 51:15 51:16 63:2 97:10 97:14 97:16 97:22 102:25 105:14 105:17 107:8 amounts [2] 95:8 ample [I] AMSCOT[61] 4:17 3:3 5:22 76:12 93:13 94:7 94:12 94:21 95:21 95:24 97:16 97:9 98:4 98:9 99:6 99:1 99:25 100:1 100:21 100:24 103:3 104:17 107:20 108:1 110:14 111:1 111:4 111 :21 111:25 112:2 112:19 112:22 112:23 112:24 113:17 113:21 114:2 114:11 114:14 116:2 116:4 116:6 117:2 119:12 120:19 121:3 121 :5 121:7 123:1 AMSCOT's [4] 3:5 7:2 119:15 119:19 analysis [2] 55:20 112:14 Andrews [5] 60:5 60:10 68:13 60:6 75:23 Ann [3] 1:4 2:12 121:7 answer [15] 5:9 13:14 24:18 30:5 30:20 48:10 48:19 48:21 77:12 101:19 106:20 110:11 115:17 116:19 116:20 answered [4] 88:15 101 :22 110:10 110:12 answering [I] 80:13 answers [6] 3:5 45:25 48:7 89:7 110:4 90:9 Anthony [41] 2:6 4:13 6:3 2:18 6:22 6:18 6:9 13:16 13:21 7:1 25:14 30:21 25:4 43:12 63:23 43:9 77:7 77:15 77:20 78:7 78:16 79:14 79:17 80:19 80:20 82:22 82:25 90:1 90:10 90:3 90:5 91 :11 90:11 91:9 94:13 94:16 96:12 96:13 107:18 109:16 110: 13 115:18 116:18 116:22 120:3 120:5 122:13 anyone's [2] 100:5 100:7 13:19 anyway [I] apartment [1] 73:13 73:13 73:14 73:18 73:20 73:22 74:16 109:8 apologies [1] apoplectic [2] 25:10 25:11 apparent [2] 42:16 98:3 65:4 appeal [4] 68:17 71:16 65:9 65:2 appealed [3] 71:16 65:3 appearance [I] 100:7 APPEARANCES [I] 2:1 2:5 appeared [3] 124:17 2:10 application [8] 3:3

CondenseIt! 1M
7:2 7:3 29:11 54:17 64:4 92:23 92:25 applied [4] 68:1 68:3 68:4 68:5 apply [2] 34:23 67:22 53:12 applying [I] appreciate [2] 20:19 98:12 appreciated [I] 66:4 areas [I] 8:21 arose [1] 52:5 arrangement [1] 115:7 arrived [I] 15:10 Aspire [2] 49:10 51:21 assessed [I] 40:19 asset [2] 70: 13 82:12 assets [4] 23:3 56:20 86:4 86:4 associate's [I] 8:17 associations [2] 53:14 53:15 109:19 assume [I] attached [I] 105:1 attachment [I] 110:4 31:11 attacked [I] attempt [I] 69:6 attempted [1] 42:4 38:25 attended [1] 52:7 attending [I] 64:21 attention [3] 65:12 65:13 69:21 attorney [4] 76:24 124:7 124:8 attorney's [3] 40:19 72:20 72:20 attorney/client [4] 77:2 77:13 77:5 101 :20 auction [2] 70:14 70:19 88:10 August [1] authenticating [I] 7:17 124:16 authority [I] authorized [3] 49:11 124:5 50:6 auto [11] 15:24 17:15 17:20 17:22 17:24 18:14 17:25 18:9 22:20 22:21 71:17 automobile [3] 21:24 44:21 71:24 automobiles [I] 17:10 Automotive [I] 22:18 87:19 Avenue [3] 95:2 95:1 44:12 avoid [I] 41:20 awarded [2] 71:15 aware [10] 64:24 92:6 108:2 108:4 108:7 110:7 away [I] 67:5 55:12 92:12 108:6 120:23

age - breach AMSCOT

]:5 behalf [3] 65:24 75:16 behind [1] 100:8 believes [1] 66:21 Bell [3] 69:20 70:2 70:10 beneath [I] 73:14 benefits [4] 29:5 29:6 29:9 36:14 best [8] 8:6 13:15 13:17 25:12 30:20 44:12 63:17 95:13 better [3] 5:9 17:20 55:19 between [8] 24:17 86:17 94:5 36:7 94:15 94:16 113:4 116:1 bifocals [1] 7:22 bill [4] 45:12 117:6 118:5 118:6 bills [3] 55:6 55:8 55:12 birth [4] 12:18 12:19 31:6 31:7 birthday [I] 88:12 bit [6] 8:14 12:9 46:11 82:10 87:11 113:15 Bixby [I] 73:9 block [1] 11:18 blocked [I] 67:18 blocks [I] 118:19 Blomefield [3] 1:5 2:12 122:8 Blomefield's [I] 6:6 blue [I] 7:14 bold [I] 84:20 Boohar[5] 69:21 70:16 71:20 72:2 72:3 Book [1] 20:11 born [I] 10:23 borrow [4] 16:10 16:12 16:14 115:3 borrowed [I] 50:11 bottom [1] 15:14 52:1 69:22 82:12 83:18 84:22 86:10 bought [2] 20:12 117:23 Boulevard [2] 1:23 2:8 91:19 bounce [4] 107:25 110:8 119:13 bounced [4] 91:17 109:6 91:20 92:3 Bowerly[2] 34:9 34:12 boy [I] 79:14 branch [2] 93:6 93:7 breach [I] 71:23

15:10 65:11 50:9

-B
83:10 85:6 B [9] 86:2 86:8 86:9 86:14 101:5 101:6 101:7 bachelor's [2] 8:18 28:18 backup [2] 83:23 88:19 backwards [1] 10:25 badinage [I] 68:7 balance [13] 44:25 46:5 46:10 47:2 47:5 47:19 49:14 51:3 51:9 50:3 51:10 51:18 85:5 balances [I] 49:10 bank [9] 51:4 51 :6 69:20 92:19 108:9 108:11 108:13 119:18 119:19 bank's [I] 106:25 98:10 banker [I] banking [2] 93:16 106:24 bankruptcy [20] 22:24 23:2 3:9 23:8 23:12 23:4 44:9 31:2 38:1 52:5 44:11 52:3 70:13 79:18 80:21 80:22 80:23 80:23 84:7 83:9 banquet [I] 36:9 67:22 Bar [3] 67:7 67:24 Barker [3] 1:15 2:2 4:3 72:15 barred [I] Barton [3] 1: 19 124:4 4:5 based [4] 60:20 102:25 105:12 112:13 basic [I] 8:24 basis [2] 39:23 44:14 117:15 Beach [4] 118:12 118: 16 118:16 bear [I] 104:16 became [2] 18:22 42:16 57:19 become [3] 58:14 108:5 becoming [I] 67:23 began [1] 88:9 beginning [2] 4:5 13:24 102:21 begins [I]

16:23 67:17 100:2 72:8 33:14 39:25 23:11 73:19 39:21 98:1 113:18 59:13 44:20 89:24 51:17 119:13 99:7 35:14 122:1 58:21 94:7 120:16 89:13 47:4 41:18 49:11 61:9 97:12 97:20 105:13 106:22 70:25 40:2 1:9 5:1 89:13 94:10 94:23 96:19 97:24 98:23 99:20 100:4 101 :4 106:2

Index Page 2

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

breached [2]
41:19 41:2 43:9 79:12 89:9 94:15 79:17 38:7 78:24 87:4 72:8 54:1 25:14 65:13 44:18 73:14 100:15 29:3 65:21 66:8 5:3 8:25 19:21 20:3 20:21 21:15 22:6 26:12 43:16 79:10 91:5 22:4 96:25 45:17 49:22 50:25 49:20 cards [1] care [5] 25:16 25:20 25:24 106:24 113:19 career [1] 78:14 carries [1] 86:10 44:10 carry [4]20:8 60:25 90:16 cars [1] 17:2 case [39] 1:8 5:13 5:14 23:8 5:14 40:7 37:25 38:7 40:14 41:16 52:3 52:5 53:3 55:10 58:22 59:12 62:22 64:16 64:23 66:11 66:24 66:25 68:22 72:6 72:11 72:5 76:6 74:25 75:9 77:10 77:15 77:7 77:18 77:19 77:20 77:23 79:23 80:22 80:23 37:25 cases [3] 68:24 60:2 cash [13] 16:25 17:1 17:11 17:2 17:5 95:6 63:3 61:5 98:17 95:10 97:1 105:18 107:19 cash-and-move-on [1] 17:13 cashing [15] 5:6 69:15 74:20 76:14 79:10 97:11 98:13 109:11 111:24 112:4 113:12 114:3 114:4 119:14 120:8 36:12 catered [2] 37:6 36:10 catering [3] 43:14 43:16 caused [6] 15:19 30:25 31:10 40:1 90:12 90:13 12:23 causing [5] 31:9 73:15 13:2 98:7 41:22 census [3] 41:24 42:5 cents [2] 105:25 110:20 CERTIFICATE [2] 124:1 2:19 124:4 certify [3] 124:7 124:16 8:8 cetera [1] 80:5 chance [2] 88:18 47:4 change [2] 108:18 49:10 changed [1] 16:7 Chapter [2] 83:9 39:8 charge [3] 57:23 98:13 47:17 49:23 49:21 50:17

Condenselt! 1M
charges [1] Charles [5]
69:24 70:15 72:2 chat [1] 122:11 check [113] 13:18 15:9 54:13 55:25 69:15 74:19 79:10 85:5 87:18 88:5 88:10 89:12 91:]4 92:1 94:6 94:6 94:21 95:7 95:18 95:9 95:24 95:25 96:4 96:8 96:14 96:21 96:24 96:25 97:3 97:10 97:17 97:20 98:13 98:15 102:4 102:6 102:23 102:23 104:1 103:1 104:4 105:9 105:15 105:16 106:2 106:4 106:15 106:21 106:25 107:3 107:5 107:24 108:7 108:22 109:9 109:10 109:11 109:13 109:21 109:21 110:4 110:5 111:5 111 :24 112:5 113:4 113:12 113:13 114:3 114:4 114:8 115:12 119:14 119:16 120:8 checked [1] 112:2 69:21 71:20

breached - connected AMSCOT

citizen [1] civil [1] 52:14 claim [4]
72:15 72:20 59:20 23:14 73:5 80:4 23:13 8:25 52:15 52:23 122:5 9:9 52:12 106:15 110:25 119:19 103:19 5:6 27:16 31:8 1:4 22:9 22:13 22:22 47:5 47:18 16:6 19:18 49:12 51:5 16:2 87:12 26:19 74:18 70:8 97:16 97:9 94:7 96:5 8:15 9:6 52:8 120:10 82:12 86:4 101:13 104:1 104:10 106:11 103:25 104:10 72:12 41:22 9:2

card [8] 45:16

commission [8]59:11
59:21 63:1 68:12 68:23 124:24 committee [1] common [2] 91:2 36:1 65:22 118:24 77:4 64:17 124:23 69:2 61:1

break [11]
43:11 79:16 94:4 94:16 75:20 79:18 94:8

briefly [1] bring [4]

72:19 bringing [1] British [1] broke [2] 70:10 brought [6] 64:21 58:8 73:5 79:7 budget [1] building [2] 75:19 bullet [1] Bureau [1] Bush [3]65:17 66:10 Bush's [1] business [33] 8:19 5:5 16:8 9:1 19:25 20:2 20:6 20:7 20:22 21:8 21:25 22:2 22:19 23:1 43:14 38:4 73:15 74:22 91:3 88:6 118:7 118:20 businesses [1] Buy [1] 97:1 buying [1] 65:11

5:6 30:9 66:23 76:14 87:17 88:9 89:13 92:12 94:17 95:7 95:21 96:1 96:8 96:21 97:1 97:10 97:22 101:11 102:17 102:25 104:1 105:13 105:18 106:7 106:23 107:5 108:1 108:22 109:11 109:18 109:23 110:17 112:4 113:12 114:3 114:8 119:13 119:19 29:17 81:6 43:14 92:1 94:10 99:22 103:2 103:7 103:13 104:16 107:8 107:25 109:23 112: 15 116:8 119:13 1:19 67:8

claiming [1] claims [2]

38:6

class [10]
52:14 52:22 53:6 classes [4] 11:25 52:9 cleared [1] 106:17 107:4 111:1 119:16 clearly [1] Clearwater [3] 10:15 109:11 cleft [5] 12:20 27:20 29:10 Clement [3] 121:10 123:1 client [1] clientele [1] clients [1] close [1]19:24 47:15 47:18 49:16 49:18 closed [10] 16:9 19:5 47:11 19:21 49:17 50:18 closing [3] 116:2 21:6 cloudy [1] coast [4]26:15 32:17 26:21 Coley [3] 74:19 74:23 collateral [1] collect [3] 97:20 97:21 collected [2] 97:14 collection [6] 94:17 94:18 113:5 97:4 college [9] 8:18 8:20 28:19 38:18 60:25 61:22 Collier [1] column [16] 82:23 83:10 101:12 86:4 103:21 103:23 104:2 104:5 104:12 104:13 columns [4] 104:6 104:8 coming [1] Commerce [1] commercial [2] 22:12 12:2 52:16 52:23

communicate [2] communications [2] companies [11] 5:2

5:7 99:22 113:14 114:19 114:22 115:1 115:8 115:10 115:13 171:4 companion [1] 75:2 company [24] 12:8 16:9 16:3 16:6 16:10 16:19 17:11 18:22 18:16 18:21 19:5 19:17 22:24 22:25 36:9 36:10 41 :2 41:4 41:19 47:17 87:16 113:12 113:12 114:20 competitor [3] 18:19 18:20 18:22 compilation [1] 89:6 compiled [1] 89:7 complainants [1] 59:19 complained [1] 75:15 complaint [26] 39:23 40:5 40:10 40:11 59:13 59:16 59:18 59:21 62:23 62:24 63:15 63:22 63:25 64:4 64:24 69:5 69:7 69:10 69:10 73:10 74:15 75:17 79:24 113:18 76:2 113:20 complete [3] 42:5 56:1 63:15 completed [1] 28:18 completely [1] 20:7 completing [1] 105:6 comply [1] 71:25 composite [2] 80:20 8UO compound [1] 36:18 concentration [1] 8:22 concerned [1] 67:3 conclude [1] 40:15 concluded [1] 122:18 72:14 Concord [2] 72:25 confirmed [1] 61:17 confusing [2] 105:23 105:24 conjunction [3]12:11 14:1 101 :16 connected [1] 124:8

-C
C[l]

71:2 41:6 41:2 41 :8 56:6 56:10 19:20

checking [1] checks [41]

88:19 91:17 92:12 92:12 99:10 99:11 101 :11 101:14 103:5 103:6 103:10 103:12 103:15 103:20 105:5 107:4 107:15 107: 18 108:8 108:21 110:8 111:1 112:24 114:7 116: 15 116:23 120:18 Chere [3] 124:4 4:5 chief [2] 62: 11 chit [1] 122: 11 chronology [1] cigarette [1] circle [1]

cab [6] 40:25

41:4 66:25

cable [4]
56:7 56:8

cachet [1] calculations [1]

63:4 32:15

California [2] 32:13 calls [2] 45:5 campaign [6]

61:8 76:4 canceled [1] 61:5 69:1 116: 16 60:13 63:]] 106:23 20:17 50:22 18:7 22:13 44:24 56:15

capital [4]
21 :7 18:9 41:5 44:25 56:18 47:9 22:11 44:22 46:7

caT[12] 16:20

26:23 41:4 84:14 circumstances [3] 17:18 16:4 16:2

Index Page 3

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

connection [4] 8:23 23:12 77:24 119:21 consider [2] 31:24 84:15 consideration [I] 32:3 considered [I] 32:1 consigned [I] 70:19 consist [1] 37:5 consolidate [1] 49:24 consolidating [2] 49:19 49:21 consult [3] 54:20 54:24 55:4 consultant [I] 22:3 consulted [2] 12:10 24:22 consulting [2] 22:5 22:6 contact [4] 18:3 43:1 69:25 93:15 contained [2] 58:19 63:21 contention [I] 70:7 continue [5] 28:11 92:18 92:22 93:21 99:4 continued [2] 29:13 31:15 continuing [I] 32:23 continuously [I] 14:14 contract [7] 8:24 41:3 41 :5 41:19 70:3 71 :23 71:25 contracts [2] 16:22 16:23 contractual [2] 114:25 115:2 contributed [3] 59:25 60:12 62:18 contribution [6] 59:23 61:9 62:16 63:3 63:3 63:7 contributions [3] 61:3 66:24 76:4 control [I] 83:9 Convention [I] 72:16 Cook [37] 1:15 2:2 4:3 2:2 6:2 6:4 6:16 6:21 13:14 25:3 25:12 30:20 25:6 43:10 61:15 63:19 77:14 77:17 77:3 79:12 80:18 78:5 90:4 89:24 90:2 91:7 96:6 90:6 107:16 109:14 110:1 110:10 115:15 116:16 116: 19 120:4 122:15 Cook's [I] 55:11 copIes [4] 6:5 103:7 103:9 103:12 copy [6] 5:21 6:7 54:16 57:20 6:16 79:20 copymg[l] 55:13 Cornelius [2] 33:6 33:7 corporate [I] 22:18 corporately [1] 22:24 corporation [5] 1:9 23:4 1:9 70:11 123:1 correct [31] 7:9 12:18 32:11 43:4 58:11 59:17 58:8 59:22 71:13 75:14 81:14 83:14 81:7 84:9 85:9 86:11 87:3 92:5 97:20 97:24 105:7 106:7 106:13 107:9 107:16 107:17 108:24 109:3 113:1 116:4 119:17 27:24 corrected [2] 27:25 corrections [2] 123:7 123:19 correctly [I] 8:11 correspondent [1] 88:19 costs [6]21:6 55:6 55:13 72:20 55:8 75:1 1:14 counsel [9] 4:2 55:17 55:18 70:15 72:23 121 :20 124:7 124:8 counsel's [I] 122:9 counseling [2] 13:24 25:22 counselor [4] 10:19 11:2 58:2 58:4 counselors [1] 24:16 counter [I] 100:9 counterclaim [2] 73:19 80:12 countersuing [I] 76:16 40:23 County [4] 60:10 124:2 124:15 couple [6] 9:25 15: 11 58:11 10:2 70:22 113:3 9:5 courses [2] 35:6 court [Il] 1:1 67:3 65:9 61:1 67:12 67:15 67:4 67:16 74:24 75:1 75:15 courtroom [I] 68:8 cover [5] 78:19 92:7 92:13 92:16 99:11 74:13 covering [5] 99:15 116:7 119:12 122:6 cranial [I] 30:14

Condenselt! 1M
craniofacial [4]12:9 12:12 13:22 35:4 credit [17] 12:2 23:19 45:16 45:17 46:5 46:7 47:6 47:17 49:20 49:22 49:23 50:25 51:13 51:19 55:24 117:1 117:3 creditors [1] 23:11 34:25 criteria [1] critical [I] 38:12 current [5] 9:17 19:13 24:23 47:2 49:9 curriculum [I] 52:11 Cushing [3] 38:7 38:12 39:10 Cushing's [1] 38:19 customer [3] 22:8 95:5 101:4 customers [4] 22:16 22:17 121 :6 121:7 cut [2] 49:5 49:7 39:11 Debers [I] 62:4 debt[8] 45:17 50:12 50:14 50:16 79:24 86:22 86:24 87:1 debts [6] 46:2 47:25 48:2 48:13 48:15 48:17 December [10] 81:20 81:24 90:12 92:2 92:11 98:10 107:24 108:12 108:22 109:19 decency [I] 61 :1 declined [6] 38:15 38:25 39:4 40:3 40:17 94:2 deemed [I] 64:19 defect [4] 12:18 12:19 31:6 31:7 Defendant [4] 1:10 4:3 1:14 2:10 Defendant's [5] 3:2 3:7 3:4 3:9 3:10 deferred [25] 3:3 87:15 76:20 79:9 90:14 92:8 94:6 99:10 99:11 99:15 99:16 99:22 101:3 111:18 III :20 112:3 112: 16 112:22 114: 14 115:23 116:2 116:9 119:22 121:5 121:7 degree [3] 8:17 8:18 28:18 delay [I] 70:20 Demers [4] 52:25 62:5 62:6 62:3 Demers' [I] 62:6 92:21 denied [I] 115:20 dental [I] 115:22 dentist [I] Department [6] 23:14 41 :21 56:23 56:25 57:2 93:16 17:18 departure [I] DEPONENT [7] 25:7 30:19 61:14 77:12 82:20 77:1 109:15 4:10 deposed [6] 119:21 119:24 119:25 120:8 121: 15 deposit [28] 3:3 73:18 76:20 79:10 87:15 90:15 92:8 99:10 99:11 94:6 99:15 99:16 99:22 106:9 110:22 111:18 111:20 112:3 112:16 112:22 113:5 114: 14 115:23 116:2 116:9 119:22 121:6 121:7 deposited [12] 94:20 94:21 96:17 97:4 97:8 107:4 107:20 109:4 109:5 109:19

connection - disorder AMSCOT

III :2 116:8 deposition [13] 1:12 4:1 5:11 5:12 37:9 37:12 37:18 120:9 121:12 121:14 121:18 122:18 123:6 deposits [1] 101:3 depressed [4] 26:8 31:19 58:11 73:25 depression [6] 9:14 9:17 25:23 29:9 30:13 31:20 described [3] 62:12 62:14 84:24 descriptions [I] 42:1 details [1] 69:6 detainer [2] 73:10 74:16 determination [2] 29:19 26:7 determine [6] 29:18 35:1 66:16 79:24 83:24 84:3 determined [3] 29:4 57:18 87:13 diagnosed [I] 30:16 die [1] 72:7 difference [2] 47:21 86:17 different [10] 31:20 43:18 31:21 38:5 92:15 80:14 89:6 99:21 116:15 116:23 differently [1] 113: 15 difficulties [I] 54:3 difficulty [2] 13:3 98:7 Dillard's [2] 51:17 51:19 Direct [2] 51:4 51:6 directly [I] 115:13 disability [9] 29:5 29:12 29:14 29:8 29:18 30:2 87:9 87:12 87:13 29:4 disabled [2] 30:1 disabling [I] 29:22 discharge [1] 80:9 dischargeability [I] 79:24 dischargeable [I] 51:24 disclose [I] 61:14 discontinued [I] 20:7 discussed [I] 108: 11 dismissed [5] 23:18 23:23 23:24 24:1 80:11 disorder [5] 27:11 27:25 30:17 30:18 35:4

-D
D [2]
dad [2] dad's [I] damages [2] 40:12 data [6] 41 :25 103:9 103:11 112:13 date [37]1 :17 7:15 7:15 28:12 10:3 54:21 54:23 84:5 88:14 95:25 96:1 99:25 96:7 106:1 106:3 106:7 106:9 107:3 108:25 109:4 109:5 109:24 110:19 113:5 121:18 dated [5] 109:13 109:19 124:10 dates [5]13:12 89:6 90:4 days [3] 6: 11 113:4 deal [5] 78:9 99:25 100:1 dealef[l] dealership [I] dealing [I] dealings [11 deals [5]17: 13 96:18 115:23 dealt [I] 87:22 dean [6] 38:23 39:3 39:8 2:16 33:3 101:3 43:3 33:5 40:4 103:1 105:13 7:14 7:16 48:23 65:20 95:25 96:2 105:18 106:4 106:21 109:2 109:7 113:4 92:2 110:6 14:19 106:21 94:8 87:21 100:4 71:24 15:24 95:24 118:20 88:20 116: 14 38:24 39:10

Index Page 4

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

disposed [1] 119:25 dispute [3] 70:3 103:9 103:11 distance [1] 45:5 District [3] 1:1 1:1 65:9 disturbances [1) 73:22 disturbing [1] 73:16 Division [2] 1:2 59:8 divorced [1] 34:4 doctor [12] 10:6 10:12 11:1 14:9 25:9 25:18 25:21 30:21 57:19 58:6 58:14 59:3 document [22] 6:1 6:8 7:5 7:12 23:21 46:20 7:17 46:24 54:20 54:24 80:1 80:22 81:12 82:10 98:16 100:24 103:3 103:21 103:22 104:22 104:25 105:3 documents [13] 5:21 6:14 6:18 6:5 8:24 54:14 54:15 67:14 67:15 67:18 82:3 89:10 89:11 doesn't [3] 30:8 66:20 100:10 dollars [3] 19:8 21:13 70:6 74:24 domestic [3] 75:2 75:5 28:24 done [10] 50:10 57:17 65:12 76:25 102:11 111 :21 111:24 112:14 113:20 door [2] 6:24 42:4 Dorsey's [1] 22:20 84:20 double [1] 24:19 down [9] 50:17 61:7 67:13 75:]5 88:3 100:10 110:16 118: 19 DT[19] 9:21 9:24 11:8 10:5 11 :7 11 :21 12:10 13:25 24:12 24:14 24:15 24:15 24:24 24:25 25:3 25:15 25:16 25:23 32:10 drafted [2] 63:23 64:1 64:2 drafting [1] draw [1] 119:14 30:9 drawing [1] drawn [1] 120:18 Drive [4] 117:15 118:12 118:16 118: 17 driveT[l] 41:6 due [4] 44:23 49:8 95:21 113:11 124:17 duly[2] 4:9 duplicity [2] 68:25 during [4] 17:4 89:9 duties [1] duty [2] 114:25 68:24 15:11 98:3 39:9 115:2

CondenseIt! TM
endodontic [1] 13:5 ends [1] 44:2 engaged [2] 68:25 113:16 114:22 engaging [1] English [1] 28:23 Enterprises [1] 73:9 entities [1) 91 :14 20:2 entity [3] 20:5 78:4 ERRATA [1] 123:4 error [5] 6:10 83:22 83:24 119:18 119:19 ERROR/AMENDMENT 123:8 [1] ESQUIRE [2] 2:2 2:6 62:14 essence [1] essentially [11] 14:23 22:23 28:22 28:25 39:13 41:10 57:13 61:17 63:10 72:6 73:13 establish [1) 26:16 19:5 estate [10] 19:22 19:25 19:7 20:5 20:12 20:4 20:18 22:12 86:19 123:1 et [2] 8:7 etc [1] 73:15 1:4 Eugene [3] 121 :10 123:1 evaluation [3] 57:17 57:22 57:23 70:12 event [1] 36:12 events [3] 68:8 37:6 eventually [3] 26:22 73:17 80:11 Evergreen [3] 8:17 28:18 38:18 Everywhere [1] 82:10 73:12 evicted [1] 76:6 evidence [1] evidenced [2] 101:11 102:3 10:3 exact [3] 41:18 65:20 10:11 exactly [6] 62:12 11:11 25:8 62:13 85:2 examination [3] 4:12 4:1 2:18 examined [1] 4:10 46:5 example [3] 109:10 112:24 exceeded [1] 61:9 84:12 except [2] 92:7 exception [1] 69:15 48:1 excess [1] 6:2 Excuse [2] 115:15 exercise [1] exhibit [17] 3:7 3:4 3:10 15:4 80:16 80:20 89:11 89:17 101:3 101:6 110:14 EXHIBITS [1] existing [1] exorbitant [5] 93:24 98:6 98:23 expectation [1] expenses [5] 44:21 45:1 107:22 expensive [1] expIre [1] expires [1) explain [3] 40:2 102:2 explained [4] 73:21 93:11 explaining [1] Exposed [1] EZ [10] 5:6 76:14 89:13 107:24 108:7 109:10 120:8 85:4 3:2 3:9 79:19 81:10 99:21 101:7 3:1 50:14 93:22 98:18 23:20 44:1 45:9 115:20 44:23 124:24 16:4 61:11 95:16 54:6 31 :1 74:19 107:5 108:22

disposed - first AMSCOT

fellow [3] 22:20 28:23 female [2] 66:2 Fernandez [1] few [2] 69:13 field [2] 9:12 fifteen [1] Figueroa [11] 9:24 10:5 24:14 24:15 25:15 25:16 32:10 figure [4] 83:11 84:14 figures [3] 84:12 105:4 file [13] 5:13 5:14 5:15 16:7 54:18 57:21 59:20 67:7 76:3 filed [17] 22:24 23:2 40:16 59:13 63:25 64:24 74:15 75:12 77:19 77:20 87:2 filing [6] 23:12 80:21 83:2 83:9 filings [2] 81:6 filled [3] 81:12 64:5 finally [1] financed [1] finances [1] financial [12] 54:3 55:19 92:18 92:22 93:21 99:4 114:5 114: 16 financially [4] 40:9 41:13 financing [3] 17:11 17:12 finding [1] fine [2] 13:18 fined [1]74:25 finish [2] 115:16 finished [1] firm [16] 46:4 55:9 55:10 60:1 60:2 60:18 72:3 72:5 85:13 91:5 99:10 firm's [3] 99:11 116:9 firms [4] 116: 15 119:14 first [44] 3:5 7:8 7:10 22:19 10:12 6:23 94:8 10:18 36:7 9:21 24:12 24:17 25:23 44:18 91:12 43:24 5:14 10:3 56:1 62:25 6:12 23:8 59:18 69:9 75:15 79:1 3:9 81:9 80:23 64:4 80:8 19:10 55:18 32:19 74:6 93:1 99:12 34:19 124:8 16:23 71:15 103:8 115:16 84:21 55:7 55:11 60:17 72:4 91:3 5:14 114:15 120:21 6:2 8:11

-E
E [1] 2:16 easily [1] 54:8 East [2] 1:23 2:8 Ed [1] 71:2 edge [1] 44:9 editor [7] 38:11 39:4 38:13 39:1 39:14 39:15 40:1 editor's [1] 38:14 education [8] 8:19 32:24 9:4 9:3 34:15 34:16 34:20 78:14 effectively [1] 28:12 Effexor[l] 24:8 efficiently [1] 48:16 egg [4] 20:16 20:24 21:2 21:3 104:10 eight [2] 36:7 eitheT[6] 21:8 58:21 76:9 24:9 100:8 100:10 elapses [1] 116:1 59:14 election [5] 68:22 69:3 61 :3 69:4 Elections [5] 59:11 59:21 62:25 64:17 68:12 45:10 electric [2] 45:12 eleven [1] 69:19 Elizabeth [11 33:25 elsewhere [1] 90:25 emotional [3] 12:23 25:22 24:5 emotionally [2] 13:3 34:17 66:17 employ [2] 75:10 employed [8] 15:15 28:20 28:25 28:6 119:7 119:9 36:4 119:10 employee [4] 58:5 74:19 124:7 124:8 employees [1] 17:8 employment [5] 41:21 36:1 31:4 56:24 57:3 enclosure [1] 100:15 end [6] 40:10 44:4 92:21 96:11 96:12 96:16 endeavors [1] 32:20

-F
face [10] 12:13 97:10 97:12 97:16 97:20 105:15 105:16 fact [1] 100:21 failed [2] 71:25 faiT[2] 39:1 false [5] 38:15 39:24 39:25 falsehood [2] 39:22 falsified [1] family [14] 15:22 16:13 21:16 21:18 32:19 32:21 34:16 42:22 85:17 faT[4] 38:5 48:22 91:1 Farrior [1] father [3] 21:19 21:20 father's [1] fault [1] 115:14 FBI [2] 65:11 federal [3] 59:6 46:7 federally [1] fees [3] 40:19 72:20 12:14 97:14 97:22

42:5 39:3 38:15 81:19 39:21 103:13 15:21 16:14 26:19 34:14 74:3 43:22 2:7 15:23 21:22 66:21 46:5 59:5 72:20

Index Page 5

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

11:21 24:22 60:15 64:7 87:14 91:14 95:2 98:8 99:6 102:3 103: 19 111:15 120: 18 five [4] 19:12 37:15 104:9 fixed [1]31:7 flooT[1] 100:16 11:1 22:19 60:6 62:21 79:10 87:25 95:1 98:3 98:19 100:1 102:17 104:18 120:15 15:11 37:17 62:6 76:19 87:15 9]:15 97:23 98:14 99:25 102:6 104:6 III :17 120:23 29:21

Condenselt! 1M
70:14 118:24

five - issued AMSCOT

118:5 10:24 118:6 8:15 42:13 83:6 102:14 36:6 43:19 5:20 42:2 42:ll 56:20 107:22 16:17 21:12 79:14 13:11 111:11

Freedman [2]
70:23

govemmental [2]
36:14 65:14 66:8 78:4 65:17 66:10 65:12 65:21 8:15 8:16 40:18

Florida [30]
1:9 1:24 4:4 15:11 56:23 58:13 67:24 69:3 123:6 124:15 flow [1] 1:16 2:4 4:6 15:20 57:2 59:11 68:12 69:4 124:2 124:23 61:5 flowed [1] flyers [1] folks [1]100:13 follow-up [1] followed [1]

1:1 1:20 2:9 14:12 26:17 57:11 67:22 68:22 78:21 124:4

117:10 117:11 117:12 118:6 front [6] 6:7 15:5 23:21 67:13 69:7 89:2 fulfill [1] 58:16 full [2] 36:20 50:18 funded [1] 59:5 106:24 funds [2] 107:21 furniture [3] 56:3 56:3 56:5

frequently [1] fresh [1] 69:8 friend [4]

govemOr[6] graduate [1] graduated [1] granted [2]

54:8

history [3] home [3]

42:16 102:15

INDEX [1] indicated [2]

83:10

3:1 55:25

horizontal [2] hours [4]

36:17 36:25

individually [1]
1:5

industry [3]
113:9 inference [1] 79:10 30:6 76:2 89:20

56:25 76:5

Gray [1] 2:7 gnevance [1] grounds [1] growing [1] guess [5]
29:24 96:25 87:12 100:8

house [12]
67:7 96:6 31:10 13:12 95:11 100:10 41:24 42:3 42:14 119:1 household [1] 4]:24 42:2 42:11 85:17

information [9] 8:6

30:8 39:17 81:19 82:3 102:16 4:15 initial [5] 29:11 80:21 13:21 80:23 initiating [l] 57:10 inquiring [1] 112:8 inside [1] 100:15 institution [1] 106:25 insufficient [3] 32:19 32:19 106:24 insurance [8] 56:13 56:13 56:15 56:16 56:18 56:19 122:2 122:3 interest [12] 22:10 49:20 49:22 36:21 50:13 65:10 72:6 93:22 93:24 98:7 ll3:11 113:14 interested [2] 32:23 124:9 interrelated [1] 13:1

hundred [4]
19:8 19:12

guy [2]

-G
gains [2]
21:7 20:17 100:10 20:13 2:12 25:25 95:8 72:15 26:2 1:5 4:2 4:16 33:7 48:1 57:3 71:9 74:18 106:22 123:25

hungry [1] -1

-H
half[l] 42:15 hand [1] 124:18 handle [1] handled [4]
40:7 7:5 8:12 7:7 65:4 7:8

gal [2] 100:8 Garage [1] Gary [1] 20:11 Gay [2] 1:4 general [2]
93:20

17:5 17:8 66:14 7:9

iceberg [1] 63:2 idea [2] 21:2 32:23 Identification [5]

3:4 3:10 identify [1] 3:2 3:9 3:7 6:1

handwriting [4] handwritings [1] Handwritten [1]

3:11

121 :1 63:11 112:14 71:16 66:5 4:11

generally [1] Geneva [1] gentleman [1] Gillespie [29]

1:12 4:8 15:25 34:5 56:23 69:20 71:21 84:25 118:22 124:17 3:6 4:15 16:24 40:25 57:2 70:14 73:9 101:4 123:5

illness [1] 30:24 immediately [3]

14:20 14:23 113:13

following [2]
78:24

follows [2]
123:7

food [5]
37:3

36:12 36:23 44:16 44:20 force [1] 114:19 114:20 forced [1] Ford [1] 20:ll

hang [1] 86:2 happening [1] Harris [1] he'd[l] 115:15 head [3] 12:13
93:5

99:14 2:7 12:14 52:18 4:16 52:20 76:19 57:5 48:8 65:6 26:23 55:19 24:21 10:4 98:20

immune [1] 61:1 impaired [1] 35:22 impediment [1] 30:15 implement [2] 57:13
58:25

interrogatories [12]
3:5 48:6 88:15 100:22 38:8 106:21 15:2 48:8 88:16 105:7 57:1 15:8 80:14 89:7 110:5 91:24

implemented [1]
58:21

heaT[2] 52:15 heard [8]

25:4 52:23 87:14 34:2 65:21

forebearance [6]
53:21 54:13 53:23 54:16

foregoing [3]
123:20 124:5 form[6] 15:8 54:12 48:5 113:25 formal [1] formed [1] former [1]

54:7 54:19 123:5 42:5 61 :3 9:4 69:2 72:5 77:10 16:22 78:13 36:25 29:8 122:2 72:17 23:12

formerly [2]
77:15

forms [1] forth [2] 66:7 Forty [1] found [3]

61:8 64:17

Fountain [1] fOUT[I] 104:9 France [1] fraud [1]

6:6 5:21 37:12 40:2 37:9 95:24 ll6:13 123:6 123:20 124:6 giving [2] 13:17 63:9 7:19 glanced [1] 22:2 Global [4] 23:1 23:3 22:9 goes [2] 112:5 118:1 Gold [3] 49:25 50:3 51:6 gone [4] 98:22 108:9 108:10 113:4 good [7] 18:1 18:17 32:16 35:14 76:6 100:18 100:19 Goodis [5] 60:19 68:19 68:20 68:20 68:23 govemment [2] 42:6 59:6

Gillespie's [1] given [9]

important [1] 89:20 impose [1] 70:6 impressions [1] Ill: 15 improve [1] 28:8 in-kind [3] 63:3
63:8 inability [1] 63:7

interrogatory [4]
47:22 interrupt [1] introduction [1] 52:13

hearing[l] hears [1] 60:2 heavily [1] held[l] 109:16 help [3] 10:5
99:21

inaccurate [4] inc [4]

82:3 1:23 118:3 118:3 included [1] 48:22

36:1 38:21 82:16 71:21 78:15 42:21

investigated [4]
75:22 76:7 75:23 75:25 16:18 55:13 57:14 17:12 37:20 93:3

helped [4]
27:1 helpers [1] helpful [1] hers [1] 75:2 high [4] 98:20 99:1 99:3 26:25

income [3]
43:13 27:9 43:17

investment [1] invoices [1] involve [2]

57:15

incompetence [1] increase [2]

47:1 46:22

involved [8]
36:22 37:22 93:12 59:12 36:23 64:22

46:23 51:19 higheT[l] 49:20 46:20 Hill [2] 117:9 117:10 incurred [4] 48:1 HILLSBOROUGH 48:2 50:23 52:6 [2] 124:2 124:1 indebtedness [1] himself [3] 40:2 50:6 66:10 72:10 independent [4] Hindman [3] 117:6 27:12 81:15 111:9 51:13 increases [1] 47:6

increased [4]

involvement [1] involving [2]

119:22 83:19 70:22

irregularities [1] issue [5] 41:3

96:24 70:21 105:13 108:18 issued [1] 107:1

Index Page 6

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

issues [3] 35:4 77:24 itself [3]40: 14 72:1 10:7 64:16 Kennedy [2] 2:8 Kessler [2] 25:3 key [1] 108:18 kind [3] 24:22 78:4 Kingdom [4] 19:1 20:14 knew [8] 97:19 97:21 98:15 108:12 116:23 knocked [1]
~L-

Condenselt! 1M
1:23 10:12 ]4:21 18:14 113:11 led [3] 26:5 79:2 left [15] 17:20 19:20 20:15 21:5 21:7 44:7 44:8 73:3 82:23 104:8 left-hand [7] 101:13 103:21 103:25 104:2 legal [4] 9:3 20:25 21: 1 Leon [1]18:6 less [12] 16: 17 21:12 45:20 46:11 47:10 50:19 55:3 97:16 lesser [1] letter [13] 38: 15 38:20 39:4 39:18 39:25 53:9 54:5 64:18 letters [3] 66:11 66:8 level [1] 100:16 Levittown [1] Levoxyl [1] liabilities [1] liability [1] liaT[l] 39:14 life [2] 31:22 limit [7] 46:19 49:4 47:3 62:16 62:17 limited [1] Linda [2] 74:19 line [3] 51 :13 123:8 lined [2]89:3 12:20 lip [4] 29:10 31:8 list [10] 3:11 48:15 50:1 76:1 56:1 106:20 106:21 listed [5] 48:3 59:15 86:14 listing [41 4:19 46:2 litigation [9] 37:22 52:14 52:24 69:12 78:25 119:22 live [7] 33:11 33:22 117:20 118:13 118:16 lived [1] 118:14 lives [3] 34:1 118:16 90:7 57:9 18: 1 20:20 44:4 72:4 104:4 101:12 103:23 104:7 9:4 living [4] 34:2 83:6 LL[l] 118:3 LLC [1] 118:4 loan [18]4:22 53:18 53:21 92:19 92:21 92:25 93:4 93:20 93:23 96:9 108:9 108:13 loans [1] local [1] 53:14 located [4] 10:14 69:24 location L4] 111:25 117:19 locations [1] London [2] 71:23 longer [2] 90:16 Longshore [6] 17:22 17:24 18:9 18:14 look [25]8:8 25:1 40:10 48:10 79:19 82:4 83:23 88:18 88:22 89:25 91 :21 100:19 101:11 101 :23 101 :25 106:20 108:17 looked [7] 76:3 88:21 101:13 101:16 looking [10] 26:24 5:1 81:12 40:9 104:18 110:2 looks [8] 7:8 81:4 82:9 82:11 84:20 loose [2]113:23 losing [1] lost [1] 26:12 lots [1] 22:11 lower [1] luck [1] 119:14 lunch [3] 79:16 89:9 15:21 118:9

issues - memorable AMSCOT

man [1] 100:11 management [4] 8:23 37:2 8:21 37:4 manager [3] 18:1 21:23 93:12 manner [1] 44:19 Mark [2] 76:23 76:24 marked [1] 89:11 marketing [3] 8:21 8:23 76:21 married [3] 34:3 34:4 34:8 MasterCard [2] 51 :5 51:7 materials [1] 5:16 math [2] 83:22 83:24 matter [6] 65:10 122:2 66:4 94:4 122:3 122:5 maxed[3] 46:13 46:15 46:17 maximum [2] 50:6 51:17 4:4 may [18] 1: 17 7:19 28:24 5:4 54:18 82:14 53:8 93:19 95:18 91:1 97:5 101:19 97:5 121:3 123:6 124:10 124:19 McAfferty [1] 20:11 mean [34] 6:18 11:23 12:12 16:5 27:10 29:22 30:18 37:21 35:8 35:7 47:16 48:17 49:6 49:13 53:22 64:2 65:23 69:14 72:9 73:11 84:17 84:17 90:18 94:19 96:7 96:10 102:12 102:13 102:16 102:18 103:5 107:12 109:14 114:13 means [3] 30:23 53:23 55:15 media [1] 76:21 medical [12] 13: 11 27:6 30:19 57:18 59:4 59:3 59:7 78:9 78:12 68:5 78:15 78:19 medication [5] 24:4 32:5 24:7 24:6 32:7 medications [2] 26:3 26:6 44:2 meet [3] 10:8 121:11 member [2] 67:23 67:24 members [4] 15:22 16:13 16:15 21:15 memorable [1] 100:19

-1J [12] 1:12 1:19 2:2 4:1 4:5 4:8 4:15 57:2 123:5 123:25 124:4 124:17 J.C[4] 47:21 49:1 49:1 49:5 James [2] 117:8 117:10 January [1] 121 :2 jeopardizing [1] 36:14 Jersey [1] 85:18 job [5] 17:20 37:5 38:22 41 :25 42:15 jobs [3] 28:24 35:23 42:16 Joe's [1]22:19 John [2] 2:6 118:22 JT[3] 52:8 9:6 61:22 41 :18 judge [24] 60:6 60:1 60:3 60:10 61:2 61:8 61:10 61:12 61:16 61:16 62:3 62:4 62:6 62:10 62:11 67:2 62:16 64:8 68:14 69:2 67:8 71: 15 75:23 61:13 judge's [4] 61:18 63:10 66:23 61:3 judges [4] 76:7 75:22 76:3 40:16 judgment [4] 40:17 40:17 41:20 July [6] 69: 10 98:9 119:4 119:7 119:9 119:10 15:6 juncture [1] 60:25 JUDlOT[l] jurisdiction [5] 66:15 66:17 66:18 66:21 66:22

26:6 18:24 71:21 70:1 97:23 116: 14 42:4

46:7 69:15 92:23 93:13 93:25 108:11 51:23 9:22 87:18 111:22 117:20 88:5 71:21 19:3 17:20 17:25 15:3 41:25 81:4 85:16 89:4 100:18 101:15 106:19 34:25 100:12 101 :21 4:23 40:4 82:22 110:3 7:2 81:16 82:12 114:8 40:19

-KKamleiter [4] 76:24 77:16 Kar[4] 18:24 20:14 71:21 Kassos [4] 24:25 25:4 Kathy[lj keep [4] 48:25 114:16 116:14 keeping [2] 114:5 Keller [3] 25:3 25:9 76:23 79:5 19:1 24:24 25:10 122:2 73:23 99:12 10:12

labor [4]15:10 56:25 57:2 lack [1] 35:25 landlord [6] 117:10 117:11 117:22 118:1 Langhorne [1] language [1] large [5] 1:20 82:23 124:4 last [28] 4:15 9:25 7:7 29:17 29:19 43:17 43:5 43:23 45:12 54:22 53:6 88:1 101:3 102:5 102:7 102:18 III :4 118:25 119:2 latter [1] law [20] 8:25 9:2 52:9 55:8 55:6 55:11 59:14 61 :1 60:2 64:18 68:1 72:3 72:5 lawsuit [11] 62:21 57:4 70:12 70:13 74:23 75:13 101:16 lawsuits [2] 76:9 lawyer [16] 60:1 60:1 62:18 61 :4 67:4 67:2 71:19 72:22 77:22 120:1 lawyers [3] 61:2 69:19 lead [1] 14:10 learned [1] lease [1] 16:23 leasing [1] least [2] 94:8 leave [1] 18:17 leaving [51

56:24

16:18 45:22 47:14 88:24 70:25 38:11 38:25 39:24 53: 11 67:10 39:9

56:11 117:12 17:16 28:23 4:6 124:23 6:22 10:2 34:2 43:19 53:5 70:1 101:6 102:9 III :8 78:17 9:1 52:13 55:10 60:1 64:18 68:3 85:13 40:22 62:25 72:19 75:14 38:5 30:22 60:12 65:6 68:16 75:10 122:1 60:25

33:11 24:8 82:23 118:4 56:13 46:20 51:19 118:4 74:18 86:8 99:20 27:16 47:25 50:23 76:9 23:3 70:12 4:18 63:15 37:20 52:15 69:15 33:16 118: 11

49:22 79:12

-M
M -e-t-c-a-b [1] MacDill [4] 49:25 46:7 Mac [2] 51:23 mailing [3] 63:13 63:18 main [1] 36: 17 Maine [1] majority [1] male [1] 61:25 118:3 46:5 50:3 53:18 63:11

6:23 73:21 113:3 14:20

118: 12

28:4 97:7

Index Page 7

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

memorialized [1] 88:14 memory [2] 80:3 87:1] mention [1] 24:24 mentioned [1] 78:17 Merchants [2] 51:4 51:6 merit [2] 23:25 75:9 messed [5] 84:13 84:16 84:17 84:18 85:2 messy [1] 84:23 met [7] 28:23 74:21 121:5 121:7 121:9 121:10 121:12 Metcab [2] 118: I 118:2 method [1] 119:12 Miami [2] 13:9 14:4 Michael [2] 60:7 60:10 mid [5] 26:11 26:13 32:13 32:15 32:18 middle [3] 1: 1 4:15 60:8 might [2] 16:19 105:22 million [3] 19:8 19:12 70:5 mind [1]69:8 mine [2]7:7 118:6 47:22 minute [2] 82:4 misbehave [1] 67:2 misbehaved [1] 67:4 mistake [1] 82:15 105:2 mistaken [1] 82:14 mistakes [1] 29:15 mitigated [1] mobile [1] 45:7 33:13 mom [4] 33:3 43:3 43:5 money [21] 16:10 16:12 16:14 19:20 35:1 21:5 21:7 49:1 59:25 60:4 75:21 70:17 73:7 99:4 90:22 91:3 107:11 112:4 115:3 115:11 115:20 monkeyed [1] 82:10 month [11] 29:7 87:5 44:5 87:4 109:16 88:24 89:1 109:17 109:18 117:17 117:18 44:14 monthly [3] 53:20 55:23 15:24 months [2] 74:8 mortgage [3] 19:11 85:23 70:5 most [8] 10:24 32:2 88:22 96:20 99:16 mostly[l] Mother [1] Mother's [1] Motors [5] 16:24 71:9 71:23 move [9] 15:19 26:21 48:11 50:17 73:18 117:19 moved [8] 26:15 26:19 28:15 28:16 117:20 moving [3] 82:23 104:7 MS[4] 6:6 74:23 122:8 14:16 88:25 101:15 38:5 15:23 43:7 15:25 71:21 14:12 27:4 73:15 14:4 26:22 74:16 73:20 6:23

CondenseIt! TM
118:1 newspaper [3] 38:]2 38:17 39:9 next [4] 18:9 40:22 50:17 106:11 nine [4] 19:8 69:5 104:10 104:12 Ninety [1] 45:13 no-smoking [1]41:8 noise [1] 73:15 non [6] 12:2 72:13 73:1 73:4 73:2 85:22 None [1] 42:8 lUI nOT[4] 7:9 124:7 124:8 North [3] 93:7 95:1 95:2 Northeast [2] 117:15 118:12 Notary [4] 1:20 4:6 124:4 124:22 note [4] 58:20 70:4 70:4 115:7 notes [9] 5:9 14:11 35:2 5:13 39:16 41:18 48:20 66:1 93:18 nothing [5] 4:10 42:23 78:23 100:19 108:17 notice [5] 1:13 4:2 3:5 3:7 79:20 notices [1] 49:8 November [5] 90:12 106:5 109:12 109:15 109:25 now [57]7:22 8:13 10:23 18:9 9:9 25:11 24:7 25:4 31:9 32:5 30:9 32:7 33:22 34:6 40:14 40:22 36:4 41:21 42:22 44:1 46:6 48:15 49:23 51:12 51:15 58:5 59:11 59:15 58:8 62:11 64:9 62:2 81:16 68:12 71:5 84:2 87:14 89:12 89:21 90:11 92:23 94:4 94:12 94:15 94:18 100:20 102:2 103:16 105:2 106:1 106:19 109:20 110:13 III :3 111:9 115:25 117:22 NSF [1] 108:8 number [23] 5:7 12:25 8:7 8:9 13:5 23:22 43:1 62:22 45:16 55:2 82:16 83:18 102:4 102:17 102:23 104:1 104:1 105:10 106:20 107:3 108:22 110:17 111:5 numbered [1] numbers [7] 82:18 82:19 85:1 101:11 92:2 46:4 85:1 104:16

memorialized - owe AMSCOT

61:20 62:3 65:16 65:24 67:25 69:1 69:22 70:23 69:6 70:23 71:10 76:2 82:8 83:18 86:2 90:22 91:3 91:7 91:12 91:14 91:14 92:2 92:3 98:14 99:10 101:2 102:11 102:19 104:8 104:9 104:9 104:10 104:13 107:4 107:5 107:5 112:13 112:16 112:22 113:4 113:24 113:25 114:8 114:19 114:22 115:1 115:4 115:10 115:20 116:2 116:3 121 :1 ones [5] 13:10 55:23 69:19 70:24 75:25 open [2] 17:4 100:21 opened [1] 50:9 operating [3] 19:1 20:21 19:4 opined [1] 66:18 opinion [1] 67:5 opportunity [8]100:20 101:10 103:6 103:17 103:20 104:15 105:6 122:9 opposed [2] 67:17 68:16 option [2] 70:7 96:4 options [4] 95:23 96:10 96:3 96:2 oral[l] 4:1 oral/facial [1] 30:14 order [3]29:9 54:6 67:15 ordinary [1] 94:22 Oregon [7] 26:22 28:1 28:4 27:4 28:14 32:17 28:5 original [1] 82:13 origins [1] 31:21 Orlando [4] 33:12 33:13 33:17 119:1 otherwise [I] 41 :14 outfits [2] 90:15 116:24 outline [1] 91:22 outs [1] 74:4 outset [2] 97:19 97:21 outside [3] 18:19 74:20 122:9 outstanding [9]44:13 45:18 48:13 50:12 51:15 112:17 112:19 112:20 112:23 overage [2] 64:22 64:25 overdrawn [11 108:5 owe [3] 46:18 49:1 51:20

-0
oath [2] 31 :25 object [1] Objection [1] Objections [1] obligation [5] 114:21 115:6 115:10 obligations [4] 55:22 55:24 observation [1] obviously [2] 48:6 occasion [1] occupation [1] occupied [1] occurred [3] 19:15 76:10 occurrence [1] occurring[l] odd [1] 28:24 off [21] 44:24 47:13 49:5 49:13 49:14 50:13 50:15 50:18 51:5 54:13 61:3 93:5 107:19 114:8 offered [1] offhand [4] 61:19 62:8 office [12] 11:17 15:4 94:24 66:8 95:1 95:3 121 :23 96:2 officer [1] officer's [1] offices [1] official [1] officials [2] 93:15 old [1] 30:11 older[2168:10 Olympia [I] omitted [1] once [6] 74:15 112:25 120:6 121:24 one [78] 8:3 13:9 19:8 22:17 23:3 24:23 31:7 39:11 39:13 42:16 47:9 50:22 51:21 53:23 54:4 59:19 60:24 104:22 96:6 116:16 3:5 58:16 115:8 44:13 56:2 20:19 6:17 121:19 14:17 9:11 17:7 106:22 113:4 47:12 49:7 50:12 50:16 51:8 83:17 114:3 99:2 44:17 93:19 11:16 21:23 94:25 95:11 98:2 93:4 4:3 124:18 93:14

-N
N[l] 2:16 name [40] 4:15 7:8 7:10 8:11 11:10 20:8 20:12 22:16 24:9 33:5 33:24 34:3 34:7 34:8 60:6 58:5 60:15 60:18 61:19 62:7 67:21 72:4 93:18 93:4 106:24 118:1 named [1] names [5] 87:23 87:24 88:1 Napkins [1] narrow [1] National [1] near [1] 118: 15 necessarily [1] need [7] 12:16 14:11 61:14 112:11 115:19 needed [5] 93:24 26:5 115:9 Neil [12]1:5 4:1 3:6 25:12 4:15 101:4 123:5 124:16 nest [4] 20:16 21 :2 21:3 net [I] 20:20 never [7] 42:9 42:11 100:18 113:20 new [6] 21:8 92:15 93:25 4:14 7:9 10:10 20:10 22:18 33:18 34:5 57:25 60:8 61:13 64:7 78:3 100:5 120:1 15:25 5:8 88:1 63:9 100:10 89:13 91:6 13:14 84:1 4:21 99:4 1:12 4:8 57:2 123:25 20:24

68:11 28:16 76:11 97:5 120:12 12:2 19:11 24:22 31:18 42:13 47:22 53:14 59:19 61 :16

23:4 74:21 118:14 85:18 113:13

Index Page 8

EUGENE R. CLEMENT,
own [7] 5:15 18:21 18:22 103:1 115:7 ownership [1] 18:16 31:22 83:8

et al.

CondcnseIt! TM
personnel [1] 87:22 Pete [2] 61 :22 87:19 Petef[4] 90:17 90:18 90:24 91 :9 Petersburg [6] 9:5 9:23 26:18 52:8 60:21 93:8 pharyngeal [1] 27:9 Philadelphia [6] 11: 14 13:8 13:10 72:18 22:11 70:1 phone [1] 45:7 phonetic [1] 34:9 photograph [1] 74:22 phrased [1] 19:24 physically [2] 31: 11 37:5 physician [5] 9:20 10:18 14:10 25:16 25:20 physiologically [1] 36:2 Pic-A-Car[4] 17:15 17:19 18: 1 18:4 18:6 Picarello [1] pick [1] 116:3 75:12 picture [3] 75:18 75:19 89:20 piece [2]89:3 40:23 Pinellas [2] 60:10 1:15 place [3] 98:24 118:13 43:18 places [3] 98:22 98:25 1:7 plaintiffs [3] 2:5 59:19 plan [8] 57:8 57:12 57:14 58:20 58:20 78:12 58:25 59:1 Platt[3] 1:15 2:3 4:4 plus[2] 40:12 87:1 90:22 pocket [4] 113:25 113:25 91:8 point [20] 5:1 26:15 28:15 20:8 32:16 34:14 41 :4 66:20 49:15 61 :7 73:25 74:3 72:3 79:13 92:17 99:9 99:24 100:3 114:7 115:20 8:10 pointed [1] 74:23 police [1] 38:13 policies [1] 15:10 pools [1] 19:24 poorly [1] 26:22 Portland [9] 28:1 28:3 27:4 28:5 28:4 28:4 28:14 28:23 21:22 position [3] 38:19 38:20 possession [2] 83:1 83:8 possible [1] 96:22 postage [1] 63:21 posttraumatic [2] 30:16 30:18 potential [1] 43:13 practitioner [1] 25:25 prefer [1] 115:16 preparation [1] 46:23 prepare [5] 5:10 27:1 89:8 5:12 89:10 6:12 prepared [7] 27:3 40:5 46:21 100:24 103:3 57:11 Preparing [1] 37:6 prepayment [1] 70:6 prescribed [2] 24:12 26:2 122:9 presence [1] present [4] 2:12 28:12 31:15 121 :20 7:20 pretty [7] 53:25 37:7 47:9 58:15 68:13 111:16 prevented [1] 67:23 preventing [1] 64:10 94:14 previous [1] previously [4] 8:10 21:24 66:24 98:2 22:2 primarily [2] 22:13 pnmary[3] 25:16 25:20 25:24 print [4] 7:20 8:1 84:21 8:2 printing [3] 63:11 63:13 63:17 104: 17 printout [3] 110:4 112:14 77:2 privilege [4] 77:13 101 :20 77:6 pro [3] 57:3 72:8 72:8 10:25 problem [6] 29:23 29:25 57:9 60:23 83:25 10:7 problems [6] 12:24 35:12 35:13 35:15 98:1 procedure [1] 94:23 procedures [7] 12:25 13:2 95:11 13:1 95:13 95:14 95:15 58:14 proceed [1] proceeding [5] 3:8 79:21 79:22 38:1 79:23 proceedings [3]43:11 79:16 124:5 20:20 proceeds [5] 50:10 113:24 114:2 116:8

own - publication AMSCOT

process [2] 49:19 66:6 produce [1] 67:15 71:24 produced [1] production [3] 5:22 6:12 6:20 professional [1] 35:20 professor [5] 53:1 61:10 61 :12 61:13 64:8 professors [3] 60:24 61:20 61:25 profit [5] 16:8 19:17 19:19 20:15 20:20 program [3] 34:21 34:22 59:5 prohibited [2] 38:16 41 :3 promissory [2] 70:4 115:7 prompted [1] 117:19 17:10 promptly [1] 100:15 proof [1] properties [3] 86:11 86:13 86:15 20:21 property [15] 83:1 21:5 83:5 83:8 85:6 85:6 85:16 86:5 86:8 86:10 86:18 86:19 86:19 117:24 prosecutor [1] 66:17 prospective [1] 22:13 prosthesis [3] 28:10 28:11 29:16 protection [1] 23:5 prove [2] 80:10 80:15 provide [2] 54:12 59:1 provided [2] 6:7 56:11 provides [1] 59:2 Providian [2] 51:11 51:13 psychiatric [5] 10:7 10:24 11:1 25:17 25:21 psychiatrists [1] 24:16 psychological [3] 25:18 25:22 10:6 psychologist [3] 10:13 11 :2 10:8 psychologists [1] 24:16 psychology [4] 9:9 9:11 35:6 35:10 psychosocial [3] 35:4 35:6 35:8 Public [4] 1:20 4:6 124:4 124:22 publication [1] 38:16

-p
P.A[3] 1:15 4:3 p.m[l] 122:19 page [33] 3:1 6:7 15:12 15:13 38:3 45:25 52:1 57:1 76:18 81:4 82:7 82:18 85:11 86:3 91 :21 100:21 101 :6 104:23 106:19 110:14 112:14 123:8 pages [7] 4:24 5:2 82:7 86:10 paid [23]21:6 34:21 44:24 47:13 49:13 50:13 50:15 50:18 50:25 59:23 51:8 74:10 74:13 92:3 107:19 painted [1] painting [4] 70:23 71:1 paintings [2] 70:19 palate [7] 27:16 27:17 27:20 29:10 paper [9] 38:24 39:14 40:1 89:3 89:16 99:20 paralegal [6] 52:10 9:7 53:14 53:15 paralegals [1] paraphrase [1] Pardon [3] 46:14 68:2 parents [3] 43:3 34:2 part [9] 6:10 24:3 56:11 78:17 88:25 114:5 part-time [1] particular [2] 82:6 parties [1] parties' [1] partner [1] party [1]40:20 pass [1] 19:3 passenger [1] 2:2

2:17 6:13 15:14 48:15 69:18 82:6 85:1 86:4 101:3 105:1 110:16 4:18 69:5 104:20 21:7 47:12 50:12 50:16 51 :5 70:5 74:16 114:8 71:1 28:24 71 :3 70:17 12:20 27:18 31:8 38:14 39:15 89:14 9:5 53:12 52:13 32:14 32:6 32:21 14:16 76:2 96:20 36:5 66:23 124:7 124:8 68:20

72:14

past [3] 24:20 48:1 49:8 patronized [1] 79:11 Paul [8] 90:17 90:18 91 :10 90:24 91 :4 120:2 121:12 121:14 pawn [1] 115:8 pay [15] 47:19 56:7 56:8 59:6 59:4 61 :2 90:17 90:18 91 :9 90:24 91:4 107:22 113:25 114:3 115:22 3:3 payday [6] 4:22 5:2 3:11 76:19 95:7 paying [10] 34:14 34:16 34:20 49:14 74:12 55:16 74:9 93:22 113:11 113: 13 44:22 payment [4] 53:20 70:20 108:1 payments [11] 19:13 43:14 45:16 50:14 53:24 54:25 55:2 114: 13 55:5 55:3 114:15 payroll [1] 99:8 peel [1] 104:20 pen [1] 7:14 penalty[l] 70:7 pending [3] 77:7 77:10 77:15 Penelope [1] 33:19 47:21 Penney [4] 49:5 49:1 49:1 Pennsylvania [7] 14:15 14:9 8:16 33:11 14:18 23:9 37:23 21:4 people [11] 35:13 35:14 35:17 35:19 36:12 41:9 42:4 42:7 65:24 116:6 perceived [3] 57:9 59:24 60:23 113:13 perhaps [1] 8:13 period [7] 10:20 10:22 88:8 116: 1 93:9 94:5 periodontal [1] 13:4 permanently [3] 119:7 119:9 119:10 18:3 person [7] 62:9 25:6 58:6 91:4 91 :5 100:11 person's [2] 10:10 57:25 23:2 personal [12] 86:2 85:6 83:8 86:14 86:9 86:8 86:17 86:19 117:7 117:8 119:4 personally [2] 17:5 124:17

Index Page 9

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et ale

publish [3]
39:4 40:2 39:8 101:10 40:12 16:22 22:12 20:3 20:10 22:14 96:24 1:13 64:20 38:25 19:22 20:5 22:12 85:16 86:17 19:25 20:12 83:1 86:5 86:19 20:3 20:17 85:5 86:14 86:19 43:7 14:11 30:5 64:9 83:4 100:18 15:3

CondenseIt! 1M
referring [3]
98:16 12:4 80:5

publish - schedules AMSCOT

repeat [4]
74:24 75:7 39:2 75:8 31:1 57:20 103:20 105:6 103:7 88:16 8:13 25:11 28:15 31:15 48:4 38:3 40:5 51:15 58:5 59:20 64:9 76:17 80:6 80:9 82:24 83:4 86:5 91:5 86:6 92:4 100:23 100:25 101:4 101:8 102:9 102:19 102:22 104:7 104:9 108:13 108:21 118: 15 120:3 122:12 rob [2] 91:4 91:9 robbed [1] 91:12 robbing [6] 90:17 90:18 90:19 90:21 90:24 91 :11 Robinson [1] 2:7 1:15 Rodems [3] 2:2 4:3 roII-over [5] 113:8 113:10 113:17 113:21 114:1 Rolls [2] 71:9 71:10 Ronald [1] 120:10 roughly [1] 70:6 94:4 routine [1] Royce [2] 71:9 71:10 ruled [1] 41:19 run [2] 39:20 56:17 running [4] 12:8 23:19 63:10 69:1 103:6

publishing [1] pull [2] 58:22 punitive [1] purchase [4]

20:3 20:5 20:6

realize [1] really [14]

25:10 35:2 80:2 89:22 108:15 26:16 36:21 81:15 99:14

purchased [2] purchaser [2]

20:11

purchasers [1] purposes [1] pursuant [3]

4:2 64:23 79:24

pursue [3] put [4]

80:8 84:14 7:13 89:15 114: 18 putting [3] 89:16 90:22 91:8

-Q
qualifications [1]
58:7

quantity [1] questioned [1] questions [8]

48:5 90:2 122:16

20:15 60:24 13:14 48:7 48:10 122:14 122:15 48:9 23:22 90:16

quick [1] quiet [1] 73:21 quite [4] 12:9

85:8 105:23

12:8 36:16 30:1 33:2 36:17 36:19 54:4 82:25 81:18 82:2 83:17 90:6 83:7 103:8 103:11 123:8 reasonable [1] 23:20 18:12 reasons [4] 31:18 42:17 42:18 95:19 receipt [1] 17:1 receipts [1] 42:21 receive [1] received [11] 28:9 41:17 42:24 69:10 98:17 103:10 94:5 103:22 104:16 105:19 114:13 receiving [1] 29:4 10:25 recent [3] 32:2 99:16 9:16 recently [3] 88:22 101:15 recognize [4] 80:1 80:16 80:22 105:3

reason [16]

refinanced [1] 17:10 reflect [1] 17:1 refreshed [1] 80:3 refused [1] 57:12 regard [1] 7:11 regarding [1] 112:15 regardless [1] 79:9 REGENCY [1] 1:23 112:3 regular [1] regularly [1] 60:2 rehabilitation [14]
34:21 57:12 58:20 77:24 78:12 34:22 57:14 59:9 78:2 78:14 57:7 58:4 77:22 78:6 29:10 35:4 27:19 6:5

repeated [1] report [2]

124:5 1:19

reviewed [1] reviewing [1] right [34]

REPORTED [1] reporter [3]

94:14 1:23 124:1 2:19

REPORTING [1] represent [2]

80:21 84:6 79:5

representation [1] representative [1]

38:14

relate [1] related [2]

44:21

represented [7]
70:15 77:11 69:19 101:14 72:2 77:16 122:1

69:21 77:8 77:17

relates [2]
35:11

representing [2] reproductions [1] request [4]

6:11 6:19 5:22 54:9 57:16 27:13 85:17 41:16 40:14 65:8 71 :14

relating [2]
8:7 112:21 117:2

relationship [6] 90: 14

115:8 115:1 120:19 29:12 relative [4] 124:7 124:8 57:7 73:23 relaxed [1] release [2] 30:6 30:8 relocating [1] 18:12 83:11 relying [2] 103:3 67:19 remarks [1] remember [39] 7:18 10:16 23:22 10:11 37:10 37:22 24:3 45:19 57:25 38:6 61:19 62:2 58:1 72:4 64:7 62:6 81:12 80:13 81:6 82:13 82:14 82:20 84:12 84:22 84:23 85:13 84:24 85:8 85:14 88:11 88:12 100:4 100:7 93:4 100:8 100:11 107:6 111:14 120:1

require [1] required [1] residence [1] resolution [2]

70:11

resolve [3]
64:16 70:9 72:11 72:1 70:10 78:16

recollection [10]
13:15 13:17 81:15 85:12 III :3 87:25 111:11 53:9 12:10 53:11 35:3 85:15 111:10

resolved [6]

q'uote [2]
98:6

-R R[2] 1:4 rainy [1] 21:8 ran [1] 80:4 rate [1] 49:22 rates [3] 93:22
98:7

recommendation [2]
123:1

resources [1] 32:19 respect [1] 10:6 respectively [1]

56:17

-s
sale [3]
76:5 17:5 17:21 17:25 18:14 53:18 16:25 17:1 17:2 17:15 17:24 18:10 22:21 51:23

reconstructive [1] record [7]

93:24 13:12 29:2 6:13 110:2 25:1 61:23 13:11 110:3 25:9 65:19 6:4 55:4 124:5 24:19 61:8 71 :17 55:24 96:21 114:3 96:21 5:8 15:6 48:9 66:1 119:4 38:8 117:2

response [4]
6:12 38:21 91:24 37:2 78:19 6:19 57:1

responses [5]

5:22 6:25 15:2 91:23

sales [13]
17:7 17:22 17:25 22:20

rather [5]
13:12 54:8 25:8

records [6] recover [1] recurring [1] Red [1] 20:13 redeem [4]
96:23 97:3

responsibilities [2]
37:4 78:15 12:16 27:9 53:24 35:22 50:24 21:4 73:18 77:3 6:8 8:24 103:2

Sallie [2] sat [1] 67:13 Sausages [1] SaVe[2] 21:4 savings [3]
20:15 69:20

restoration [2] result [6]

12:21 34:23 27:8 67:1

RE[I] 123:1 re-election [2]

69:2

63:11

remembering [1]
64:10

63:9 21:8 16:13 121 :24 7:8 57:2 83:15 92:1 110:24 67:9 69:18 85:16 86:9 114:7 82:7

reached [1] read [15] 7:17

7:24 67:14 80:3 94:14 123:5 48:7

92:17 7:21 8:4 48:6 67:16 67:18 83:17 94:13 100:25 122:16 38:3 123:19 6:25 19:7

remove [1] rent [10] 44:14

56:12 74:9 74:13 115:7 117:16 117:17

redeemable [1] refer [10]

13:13 35:2 48:20 14:11 41:18 65:19

74:11 44:15 74:12 117:14 56:3 56:5 56:15 23:20

resume [1] retain [1] retired [3]

117:23 118:10

saw [2] 11 :1 says [14] 7:7

16:6 77:21 86:25 101:2 50:17 82:11 87:6 101:3

rental [2]
56:4

reading [2] reads [1] ready [1] rcal [17] 19:5

reference [1] referenced [2]

103:21

rented [2]
73:13

retirement [1] returned [2]

106:23

renter's [2]
56:19

references [3]
117:3 117:7

repay [2]

reveal [1] reverse [1] review [7]

10:2 103:1

Schaeffer [1] schedule [10]

85:5 86:2 86:14 85:6 86:5 86:14

schedules [5]

Index Page 10

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

82:19 85:10
,.

CondenseIt! TM
29:3 35:11 43:13 sold [7] 19:5 20:2 20:14 117:22 21:6 solely [2] 103:3 someone [1] somewhat [1] 8:9 30:10 35:17 30:9 35:12 ]9:25 20:21 89:11 46:16 16:]0 18:21 21:8 89:6 102:7 started [8] 22:4 22:11 99:19 114:22 117:2 Starting [1] starts [1] state [16] 4:6 8:17 34:1 38:18 57:17 58:5 93:14 93:15 124:4 124:15 statement [1] STATES [1] status [2] 68:18 statute [1] Statutes [2] 69:4 statutory [2] 62:17 stay [2] 28:14 stayed [2] 74:17 steal [1] 75:21 46:15

scheduling - sworn AMSCOT

student [2]
18:16 44:14 102:9 18:22 99:7 115:3 102:16 48:15 1:20 28:19 57:11 58:13 124:2 124:23 93:1 1:1 51:11 61:9 69:3 62:16 74:8 72:5 53:]8 51:23 31:11 8:21 52:10 100:20 123:19 92:23 93:9

84:4

85:9 13:5 53:12 26:16 28:21 38:17 38:25 39:19 55:1 38:13 68:1 72:8

scheduling (I] scholarship (I] school [18]

27:23 38:12 38:24 39:9 52:7 59:7 school's [1] 27:22 3]:11 38:17 39:4 39:20 57:19

schools [3]
68:3

se [3]
72:9

68:5 57:3

seal [1] 124:18 Sears [1] seated [1] second [11]

28:23 81:4 86:3 111:8 72:13 73:3

46:10 73:2 22:20 62:3 65:9 82:23 85:22 110:16 III :4 72:13 73:2 73:4 85:22 8:7 30:9 56:24 7:4 15:14 46:2 67:17 80:3 81:16 84:19 104:16 24:16 44:8 98:18

section [7]
73:1 73:3 secured [2] 86:22

security [9]
8:9 30:10 57:3 see [25] 11:21 17:24 46:9 67:22 80:18 82:11 86:8 104:22 25:21 61 :1 sell [1] 29:3 43:13 75:20 6:2 14:2 18:18 48:17 68:22 81:1 82:20 104:5 107:1 32:9

seeing [3] seem [5] 25:11

65:10 19:7 send [1] 42:5 senior [1] sense [6] 93:20 113:10 113:23 114:9 sent [1] 110:22

60:16 85:25 113:22

separate [3]
114:25 115:6

111:3

1:23 111:18 112: 11 4:21 services [5] 22:2 23:1 78:13 112:6 serving [4] 3:5 36:12 36:23 37:3 10:9 sessions [3] 13:25 15:7 61 :9 set [3] 3:5 102:16 95:6

service [4]

37:6 35:11 35:12 35:17 35:20 settled [1] 73:17 seven [5] 90:14 104:10 115:1 91:13 116: 15 several [6] 10:8 15:24 31:21 39:11 118: 19 116:1 Sewell [1] 85:18 Shackleford [1] 2:7 sharks [2] 93:13 93:20 sheet [2]110:4 123:4 sheets [1] 83:23 Sherman [1] 18:17 Short [1] 100:14 shortly [1] 109:20 show [2]72:22 122:2 40:16 side [3] 6:8 40:18 sign [3] 81:20 95:17 104:25 signature [11] 7:4 7:14 7:12 7:11 81:2 81:17 7:17 84:11 104:21 104:21 104:22 signatures [1] 81 :1 signed [13] 7:18 81:7 81:16 81:5 81:19 81:23 82:4 87:7 95:18 84:5 95:18 105:3 123:20 signing [1] 81:13 similarly [1] 1:6 simply [1] 61:2 85:17 single [1] 15:23 sister [4] 21:19 21:20 33:20 sit [2] 13:12 24:19 73:4 sitting [3] III :9 88:2 situated [1] 1:6 24:5 situation [3] 54:6 28:8 six [3] 104:9 116:23 120:21 small [5] 7:20 16:20 8:1 8:1 38:6 Smart [1] 89:13 41:9 smoke [4] 72:12 73:2 73:15 smoking [11] 41 :3 41 :4 72:12 72:13 72:24 73:1 73:1 73:3 73:2 73:3 73:4 snide [1] 67:19 so-called [1] 4:22 8:7 social [9]

setting [1] settings [4]

start [8]

117:23 47:13 somewhere [3] 28:3 92:8 98:21 son [1] 60:16 sorry [25] 9:18 11:20 17:24 17:25 27:1 18:18 20:3 32:16 36:18 39:2 51:25 55:10 57:6 70:13 80:19 81:20 81:25 87:11 92:11 105:2 109:7 114:24 115:18 117:8 119:8 SOrt[13] 8:19 12:19 22:8 14:17 22:5 31:12 40:4 29:8 54:5 63:12 68:25 122:3 70:8 66:14 sorting [1] 23:4 sought [2] 92:19 11:12 sounds [2] 83:4 53:13 source [1] 43:12 sources [1] south [2] 87:19 87:19 SouthTrust [6] 92:20 92:20 92:24 93:23 120:24 98:2 speaking [1] 94:10 special [1] 66:17 Specialists [1] 22:18 specific [3] 5:8 15:7 88:11 specifically [1] 59: 1 23:17 specifics [1] speculation [2] 116:17 116:18 speech [13] 27:7 27:11 27:25 28:8 29:12 28:11 28:9 29:12 29:13 29:16 29:18 29:22 91:12 spell (2] 11:1 0 34:10 8:11 spelled [3] 11 :12 11:12 spelling [1] 7:10 118:25 spoke [3] 119:2 121:21 9:23 St [8] 9:5 60:21 26:18 52:8 61 :22 87:19 93:8 stamp [1] 15:4 standpoint (I] 29:25 46:13 Staples [3]

students [1] studied [1] studies [1] study [1] style [1] 59:15 Subject [1] submit [1] submitted [3]
93:11 109:1

subsequent [1] 46:23 subsequently [1]

106:23

substantial [1] 56:2 substituting [1]70:8 suburbs [1] 70:1 such [2] 16:22 92:15 sue [6] 39:12 56:25
70:2 72:17 74:19 sued [8] 39:24 41 :11 56:23 71:12 72:8 suing [2] 76:16 suit [1] 75:16 Suite [5]1:16 2:3 2:8 suited [1] sum [2] 84:25 74:18 39:25 62:20 72:12 73:12

stenographically [1]
124:5

stepped [1] steps [1]80:14 still [12] 19:1

33:13 34:5 62:9 53:1 117:11 117:12 120:15 stop [4] 64:14 90:12 90:13

67:18 33:9 49:1 68:17 117:20 76:22 34:14 90:11 111:14 1:15 11 :17 95:2 30:16 31:10 36:21

stopped [4]
74:12 store [2] 23:15 42:17

street [9]
4:4 2:3 11:18 93:7 115:11 118:19

stress [9]
30:18 35:16 36:23 30:24 31:9 35:18 74:1

stress-related [1] stressed [2]

73:23 64:9 31 :1 13:6 64:11 113:22 78:13 36:18 84:20

stresses [2]
31 :2

stressful [3]
42:20 stressing [1] strict [2] 113: 10 strictly [1] strike [2] 95:22 struck [1] 42:19

1:24 4:4 57:18 86:11 summarizes [1] 100:22 summary [8] 40:16 40:17 40:17 82:6 85:8 84: 18 84:4 85:10 summation [2] 39:1 39:3 summer [3] 15:15 39:19 39:19 Summons [2] 3:7 79:20 supplement [1] 78:11 29:1 support [5] 29:2 32:20 32:22 42:22 supporting [1] 76:6 supportive [3] 33:20 34:17 34:19 surgeries [3] 13:5 13:22 13:7 surgery [10] 12:10 12:14 12:23 14:7 27:12 14:10 27:8 27:13 27:15 30:14 surprised [1] 6:9 52:25 Susan [2] 67:9 swap [1] 70:8 sworn [4] 4:9 59:13 59:20 124:17

-TIndex Page 11

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

CondenseIt! 1M
transactions [19] 6:6 76:20 87:15 89:12 95:20 98:14 100:21 111:12 112:3 112:4 112:18 112:19 114:14 114:23 116:4 116:7 116:9 119:22 121:4 transcript [2] 68:7 124:5 transcripts [I] 55:15 trauma [1] 12:21 treadmill [8] 92:18 92:22 93:21 99:5 99:12 114:6 114: 16 114:18 treated [I] 9:14 treating [I] 25:23 treatment [5] 9:17 13:4 13:5 27:6 28:9 tremendous [1] 35:5 Trial [2] 3:7 79:21 tried [2] 31 :22 44:18 trigger [I] 29:9 troubles [1] 74:6 true [9] 15:11 15:25 84:25 80:10 81:7 115:25 87:7 87:7 124:5 70:11 Trust [I] truth [3] 4:9 4:9 4:10 10:24 trying [4] 22:11 48:16 58:1 turn [2] 15:12 48:15 turned [I] 63:1 TV [6] 56:6 56:7 56:10 121:25 56:8 122:5 81:5 twice [1] two [19] 6: 11 7:6 14:3 10:1 13:8 22:17 22:22 50:9 68:24 69:11 85:1 86:10 92:11 85:7 104:8 104:9 96:11 104:20 112:24 two-story [1] 73:14 type [4] 26:23 26:25 55:24 27:1 82:13 typed [I] typical [2] 22:8 100:13 83:18 typing [3] 84:18 84:23 uncover [1] 75:20 under [8] 9:17 20:12 31:25 67:15 70:8 86:4 86:8 104:21 undergo [2] 27:6 95:15 undergoing [2] 12:9 13:4 undersigned [l} 124:16 understand [12] 20:23 27:14 27:23 29:22 51:25 75:5 36:3 78:18 95:23 98:5 113:16 115:5 understood [I] 97:15 underwent [l} 28:9 unemployed [2] 14:24 14:25 Union [2] 46:5 46:7 unit [I] 118: 18 UNITED [1] 1: 1 University [6] 8:16 11:19 11:20 11 :22 11:24 12:1 unlawful [2] 73:10 74:15 83:22 unless [2] 92:7 unpawned [I] 115:9 90:17 unquote [I] unsatisfied [I] 67:1 unsecured [I] 86:24 up [39] 4:23 5:1 20:22 23:19 26:23 31:10 26:25 27:1 46:9 31:15 46:3 47:17 47:25 48:16 67:13 63:11 66:5 67:18 71:16 72:22 83:21 84:2 80:4 84:13 84:16 84:17 84:18 85:2 85:2 92:20 94:22 85:7 99:22 100:2 95:5 107:12 107:14 116:3 117:18 31:13 upset (3] 67:12 61 :5 USC [I] 79:25 used [16] 16:13 18:7 16:20 17:2 46:25 46:25 18:9 89:11 90:24 114:2 114:12 114:14 114:16 118: 13 120: 18 120:22 using [3] 34:7 49:23 113:24

tab [I] 89:15 table [2] 67:13 90:5

tables [I] 37:6 tag [I] 15:5 taking [13] 24:4 24:6 24:7 24:8 74:22 75:12 75:18 75:19 89:14 89:16 90:22 91:7 106:24 tall [2] 100:14 100:16
Tampa [7] 1:2 1:24 2:4 1:16 2:9 4:4 123:6 Target [2] 46:17 47:2 tax [I] 70:8 taxes [1]111 :21 taxi [I] 66:25
teach [2]28:22 58:14 teacher[l} 52:21 Telephone [I] 45:2
television [l} 121 :24 temp [I] 15:10
11 :19
Temple [7] 11:20 11 :22 11:23 11 :24 11:25 12:2 ten [6] 17:6 38:3 57:1 69:18 69:25 76:18 tendered [4] 96:14 105:18 106:2 106:22 term [7] 21:1 90:19
90:24 91:2 96:12 96:16 114:9 terminate [1] 49:16 terms [4] 18:1 18:17 20:25 71:25 testified [8] 25:3 61:15 63:19 78:5 91:7 98:2 96:8 111:13 testify [I] 25:19 testimony [9] 15:8
107:23 108:15 108:16 108:18 110:7 113:20 123:19 124:6 themselves [2] 58:17
98:3 theory [1] 61: 11 thereafter [1] 109:20 THEREFORE [I] 123:8 thereof [I] 38:16 Thereupon [2] 4:7 122:18 thinking [2] 79:15 101:19 third [31 68:22 82:7 85:11 Thompson [10] 59: 11 60:14 60:19 60:19 67:6 67:7 68:10 68:18 68:20 68:21 thought [5] 25:17 38:20 44:11 67:25
76:5
thousand [4] 16:17
19:8 19:12 21:12 threaten [l} 67:20 threatened [3] 67:19 77:20 77:23 threats [3] 77:25 78:1 78:24
three [16] 48:1 50:23 82:7 48:3 82:18 83:21 86:3 104:9 107:4 107:8 107:15 107:18 108:8 108:21 110:8 119:13 through [18] 5:12 24:19 5:17 7:19 28:12
25:1 25:9 34:21 39:16 48:16 80:14 84:21 78:8 85:4 95:11 108:9 108:10 121 :1
thrown [1] 74:25 times [4] 37:12
120:5 120:11
97:7 63:2 tip [I] Titanium [I] 51:4 title [2] 38:22 79:25 today [12] 5:11 9:4 48:10 5:16 101:18 49:11 88:2 101:23 108:19 121:8 121:9 122:10
today's [2] 7:16 48:23 54:2 together [2] 118:7 too [5] 36:22 45:6 100:10 59:25 99:3 12:2 took[8] 9:5 48:14 52:13 41:5 89:15 52:14 63:1 86:4 top [7] 85:1 102:11 102:19
93:5 104:23 105:9 44:13 total [8] 42:7 82:22 83:13 86:10 107:8 108:8
87:1 85:22 totaling [I] touch [I] 93:13 towards [I] 101:2 training [2] 59:2 59:4 transaction [38]19:22 94:23 97:11 92:8 98:8 97:23 98:3 99:6 98:19 99:2 99:16 99:17 100:22 102:3 102:5 102:6 102:8 102:10 102: 17 102:18 102:20 105:9 106:3 109:24 110:16 110: 19 III :4 III :8 111:17 111:25 112: 16 112:23 113:6 113:17 114:3 114:4 116:2 121:3

tab - west AMSCOT

valued [1] 63:4 variations [I] 113:15 verification [1] 6:13 103:24 verify [I] vernacular [I] 27:10 40:25 versus [2] 57:2 view [I] 67:19 violate [4] 69:4 77:13 101:19 77:1 64:18 violated [2] 69:3 violation [5] 41:5 59:13 59:23 59:24 64:19 74:24 violence [5] 74:25 75:6 75:7 75:8 47:9 VISA [7] 49:10 49:25 50:4 50:17 51:11 51:13 visit [l} 12:9 12:24 visited [I] vocabulary [I] 35:5 vocational [13] 34:21 57:12 34:22 57:7 58:4 58:19 59:8 77:21 77:24 78:2 78:12 78:14 78:6 void [I] 77:5 59:11 vs [11] 1:8 68:12 68:23 69:20 71:21 70:14 71:9 74:18 123:1 73:9

-w
W-a-i-n[l] 11:13 Wainwright [9] 11:7 11: 13 11:21 11 :8 12:10 13:25 24:15 24:17 58:3 Wal-Mart[l] 15:15 walk [I] 41 :24 42:11 walked [3] 115:11 95:5 6:23 walking [2] 42:2 11:17 Walnut [2] 11:18 Wanamaker [2] 23:14 80:4 warranty [2] 71:12 71:17 Washington [4]28:16 32:16 32:17 32:18 120:2 Watson [4] 120:5 121:13 121:14 ways [I] 48:9 36:17 week [4] 36:6 36:25 50:9 weeks [1] 96:11 2:3 west [7] 1:15 4:4 26:15 26:19 26:21 32:16

-U
D.S[I] 41:21 ultimately [3] 74:13 80:15 unable [I] unaware [1] uncle [1] 23:18 80:10 107:23 118:23

-v
vague [I] vaguely [I] value [4] 83:8 105:15 96:7 80:13 83:1 105:16

Index Page 12

..
(

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, et al.

Wharton [1] whatsoCvCT[I] whoIC[6] 16:18 46:25 81:10 102:14 WILLIAM [1] window [2] 95:6 without [7] 23:25 36:14 74:8 80:5 witness [5] 6:19 77:16 124:18 woman [1] woman's[l] word [2] 29:23 words [3] 85:7 119:15 worked [8] 21:18 21:20 43:18 43:19 64:8 WOrth[5J 56:21 86:21 107:25 wound [1] write [4] 54:5 95:7 108:24 writing [3] 99:10 113: 13 written [15] 38:11 39:5 66:11 66:8 92:12 92:6 J09:1O 109:12 109:23 110:9 wrong [6] 32:12 59:22 84:15 84:16 wrote [7] 107:4 107:8 107:18 108:21 Wyeth[l] WyethS[I] 12:5 75:9 4:9 74:14 2:2 95:5 23:20 69:6 121:19 6:14 124:6 100:11 93:18 96:23 32:14 9:7 42:15 43:22 55:3 86:24 20:22 67:8 66:6 15:7 48:5 88:3 109:8 109:12 25:18 83:18 64:3 107:15 109:2 71:2 71 :5 ycllow[6] 4:23 5:2 89:3 99:20 Yep [1] 46:1 ycsterday [IJ yet [1] 65:8 young [1] younger[IJ yourself [10] 29:2 40:5 48:14 63:24 69:14 69:16 4:18 40:25

Condenselt! 1M

Wharton - yourself AMSCOT

101 :25 31: 11 68:10 29:1 40:7 64:5 90:21

-xX[4J 2:16 1:4 7:13 1:11

-y
yeaf[I8] 15:1 40:22 43:17 43:22 43:23 54:1 54:22 56:18 56:19 87:12 99:7 114:11 year's [1] years [16] 10:2 10:1 13:10 14:3 23:22 29:21 48:1 48:3 58:11 69:11 26:20 43:20 53:24 54:22 73:5 99:15 55:3 9:25 10:16 15: 11 43:2 50:23 69:25

Index Page 13

No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME D PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________ Appendix D Consolidated Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation, August 6, 2012 With Appendixes 1-3, Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, et al., 12-11213-C
The Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest Washington Et Al. v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) Supreme Court of United States, No. 88-599 Argued October 11, 1989 - Decided February 27, 1990 As relevant to Gillespie and this motion: (footnotes omitted) The Court acknowledges that under the Fourteenth Amendment "respondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs," ante, at 221, but then virtually ignores the several dimensions of that liberty. They are both physical and intellectual. Every violation of a person's bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty. The invasion is particularly intrusive if it creates a substantial risk of permanent injury and premature death.[1] Moreover, any such action is degrading if it overrides a competent person's choice to reject a specific form of medical treatment.[2] And when the purpose 238*238 or effect of forced drugging is to alter the will and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense.

"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303 John Ley Clerk of Court For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

August 07, 2012 Sheryl L. Loesch United States District Court 207 NW 2ND ST OCALA, FL 34475 Appeal Number: 12-11213-C Case Style: Neil Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, F, et al District Court Docket No: 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS The enclosed copy of the Clerk's Entry of Dismissal for failure to prosecute in the above referenced appeal is issued as the mandate of this court. See 11th Cir. R. 41-4. Sincerely, JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court Reply to: Walter Pollard, C Phone #: (404) 335-6186 Enclosure(s)

DIS-2 Letter and Entry of Dismissal

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ______________ No. 12-11213-C ______________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE, lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll versus THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, GONZALO B. CASARES, ADA Coordinator, and Individually, DAVID A. ROWLAND, Court Counsel, and individually, JUDGE CLAUDIA RICKERT ISOM, Circuit Court Judge, and individually, JUDGE JAMES M. BARTON, II, Circuit Court Judge, and individually, et al., llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. et al., llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll lllDefendants. llDefendants - Appellees, lllPlaintiff - Appellant

__________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida __________________________________________

ENTRY OF DISMISSAL: Pursuant to the 11th Cir.R.42-1(b), this appeal is DISMISSED for want of prosecution because the appellant Neil J. Gillespie has failed to pay the filing and docketing fees to the district court within the time fixed by the rules, effective August 07, 2012. JOHN LEY Clerk of Court of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by: Walter Pollard, C, Deputy Clerk

FOR THE COURT - BY DIRECTION

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303 John Ley Clerk of Court For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

August 09, 2012 Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115TH LOOP OCALA, FL 34481 Appeal Number: 12-11213-C Case Style: Neil Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, F, et al District Court Docket No: 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS I am returning to you unfiled the papers which you have submitted. This case is closed. Sincerely, JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court Reply to: Walter Pollard, C Phone #: (404) 335-6186

PRO-3 Letter Returning Papers Unfiled

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303 John Ley Clerk of Court For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

August 09, 2012 Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115TH LOOP OCALA, FL 34481 Appeal Number: 12-11213-C Case Style: Neil Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, F, et al District Court Docket No: 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS I am returning to you unfiled the papers which you have submitted. Your appendices to your motion for accomodation are returned unfiled because these cases are closed. Sincerely, JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court Reply to: Walter Pollard/aw, C Phone #: (404) 335-6186

PRO-3 Letter Returning Papers Unfiled

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, ESTATE OF PENELOPE GILLESPIE, CASE NO.: 12-11213-C Appellants/Plaintiffs, vs. THIRTEENTH JUDICAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, et al. Respondents/Defendants. _______________________________/ APPENDIX - 1 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED MOTION FOR DISABILITY ACCOMMODATION WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - APPOINT GUARDIAN AD LITEM Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6 Exhibit 7 Exhibit 8 Exhibit 9 Exhibit 10 Exhibit 11 The ADA does not apply to the Federal Judiciary Social and Psychological Implications of Dento-Facial Disfigurement; Macgregor Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, panic attack July 12, 2010, Judge Martha Cook Plaintiff's Amended Accommodation Request, ADA, March 5, 2007 Medical History of Neil J. Gillespie Exhibits 6.1-6.17, Doctor letters and medical evaluations of Neil J. Gillespie Velopharyngeal inadequacy - Wikipedia Psychosocial Implications of Congenital Craniofacial Disorders; Gillespie Psychotherapy for Persons with Craniofacial Deformities; Bennett-Stanton Deficits in short-term memory in adult survivors of childhood abuse; Bremner Hahnemann University Hospital ER, Aug-20-1988, Gillespie head trauma/TBI CASE NO.: 12-11028-B

The ADA Does Not Apply to the Federal Judiciary The ADA does not apply to the federal judiciary, a fact not known to Gillespie until he was informed April 10, 2012 by Chris Wolpert, Chief Deputy of Operations, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Mr. Wolpert emailed Gillespie in response to his query, and wrote in part, "My understanding is that the Americans With Disabilities Act does not apply to the Federal Judiciary." Mr. Wolpert appears correct. A review of Title II shows the ADA only applies to a state or local government: Title 42 - Chapter 126 - Subchapter II - Part A - 12131 As used in this subchapter: (1) Public entity The term "public entity" means (A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 24102 (4) [1] of title 49). Prior to that time the following judicial officers and court personnel in the U.S. Eleventh Circuit led Gillespie to believe that the ADA applied to the federal judiciary. a. On March 16, 2012 Gillespie received a phone call at 1:43 p.m. about the ADA from Brenda McConnel, a Supervisor in the Eleventh Circuit. Ms. McConnel was responding to Gillespies call about the ADA initially directed to case handler Walter Pollard. Ms. McConnel advised Gillespie to file a motion and provide supporting documentation for his ADA accommodation request, but did not inform Gillespie that the ADA did not apply to the federal judiciary. Gillespie served a motion for accommodation under the ADA in this Court April 7, 2012. Gillespie also made the following ADA requests and/or inquiries in the Eleventh Circuit:

Page - 1

b. James Leanheart, Court Operations Supervisor, U.S. District Court, M.D. of Florida, Ocala Division, prior to, and during the litigation. c. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk, U.S. District Court, M.D. of Florida, by letter dated April 5, 2012. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit 8 to Consolidated Notice of Pro Se Electronic Case Filing Prohibition by District Court, submitted July 27, 2012. d. The Hon. Anne C. Conway, Chief District Judge, U.S. District Court, M.D. of Florida, by copy of the letter to District Clerk Loesch . Gillespie also wrote to Chief Judge Conway March 22, 2012 about the Courts failure to disqualify Mr. Rodems as counsel. Gillespies March 22nd letter is an exhibit to a Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend the Judgment in District Court case no. 5:10-cv-503-oc (Doc. 60). e. Blair Patton, Supervisor, N.D. of Florida, by telephone April 3, 2012. None of the above judicial officers or court employees informed Gillespie that ADA did not apply to the federal judiciary. Chief Judge Conway responded by letter April 25, 2012 and wrote I am in receipt of your correspondence dated March 22, 2012. Since this case is not assigned to me there is nothing I can do to assist you. A copy of the letter is attached. District Clerk Loesch has not responded to Gillespies concerns. This conduct in the Eleventh Circuit is inconsistent with the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Page - 2

United States District Court

Middle District of Florida
George C. Young Courthouse and Federal Building
401 West Central Boulevard, Suite 6750
Orlando, FL 32801-0675

Anne C. Conway Chief Judge

407-835-4270

April 25, 2012 Mr. Neil J. Gillespie

8092 SW 115 th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481

Re:

Gillespie v. The Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, et al.

Case No. 5:10-cv-503-0c-10TBS

Dear Mr. Gillespie, I am in receipt of your correspondence dated March 22,2012. Since this case is not assigned to me there is nothing I can do to assist you. Sil1cerely,

./

{l~/1

nne C. Conway

SOCTAI..

}.:,l)

r:':"CEGLC;}ICAL !::HICA'l'IC:S OF DENTO-:'lLCIAL DI3i'IGURSmri'l' *

Frances C. One of the of all the

t:~inC'3

r'~~-lcV'et;or

**

that has al'flays str'Jck me as ironic is the fact that, the field of physical disability and rehabilitation, in our society .'lith fncial deviations, Le., is
seldo~

co~cercs wit~in

tte large D::'ouP 0::: D:::-scns

. s f'i '!'l~~er.:ent

included.

In this

res~ect

they

are the mar?inal or When I

ceg~~

fcr~ot~en

peonle. on the psycholobical and sociological aspects

my

r~3earch

of facial c.eformity some twenty years ago, in searching the literature I was surprised to discover of physical disability no
~ention
t~at,

in all the studies of the psychological aspects problecs of

adjust~ent,

~~U

etc., there was practically

1

of the face.

In 1953 a

co~pilation

by Parker and others

h~~dicap

of the

social-psychological research on contained but

t~o

adjust~ents

to physical

and illness

references on facial deformities, and these were listed in A subsequent survey by Wright 2

the subject index under the rubric "cosr:!etic. 1l

in 1960 included five references to studies involving iacial disfigurement. Even today, by
corn~arison

with other types of disabilities, attention

mi~l.

given to the facially disfigured is

In campaigns for the handicapped

*Presented at conference "Psychological and Ecological Implications of

~occlusion

and Dento-Facial DisfigJreffient and Its Impact on the

Well-Being of the Individual," National Institutes of Health,

Bethesda, Md., November 17, 1969.

*t-Research Scientist, InsU tute of Reconstructive Plestic Surgery,

New York University
~edica1

Center,

~ev

York, N.Y.

v, I . %

-2
ci ther to raise fund8 or to cnccurn::;c their" employT:;cnt, the focus is on amputees, p,'lr::lplesics, so on th~

blind, the deaf, those wi th cereb::al 'palzy, and '1'11e victims

persons with sorce f\L'1ctional or organic impairment.

~ay

of such disaLilitics

even be seen or interviewed on television, but Even at most national and

never a person with a facial dis[iguYe'T:ent.

international conferences on disability or rehabilitation, facial disfigure ment as a oatego=y is omitted. Disability has been defined as any condition which prevents one from performing the
no~al

activities of caily living.

Yet the insbility of the

facially disfigured to lead nor:I:al lives tends to be over"looked because they are
oster~ibly

able-bodied, can work, and can physically accomplish

the basic routines of daily living. The more I pursued my investigation of patients whose faoes were marred, repulsive to look at, or
~r-ose ~alfo~tions

though less severe

were stimuli for jokes or ridicule, the sion of this large group.
As

~ore

paradoxical I fO\L'1d the omis

I interviewed and follofted patients in need

of plastic surgery, prosthetic devices, and orthodontic work, it became abundantly clear that defects of the face can be one .)f the most tragic handicaps a person can have. It is quite true that
u~ess

there is some

functional problem, the physical ability of the facially disfigured is not impaired. His handicap is social and psychological.

It is not within the scope of this paper to go into the social and psychological significance of the face end its role in human relations. This has been treated elsewhere. 3 ,4 It is enough to say that the role of the face in our interactions with others is the crux of the problem for anyone whose face deviates from the norm. Coupled with our cultural

...3
cmp1":!l.sis on cxternul the
problcl~:-;
nt':>~nrance,

physical nttrnctiver.css, Hnd conforr:lity,

of the facially handic;:lpped lie squarely in the area of mental

health. One might supcose t::lat the psychic distress caused by disfigurellient is in direct
pro~ortion

to its severity.

But this is not the cuse.

cond~cted

In an at New

interdisciplinary stud7 of facially disfibJred Fatients

York Univer.sity College of Z.:edicine (1949-1952), we found that, for those whose
defor~ities so~rces

evoked ridicule, bordered on caricature, stimulated jokes, of

a~usement,

and were great.

the psychological

i~~ect

was exceeaingly

In fact we found that many patients ....ith such deviations were in

shu~e,

worse psychological

had more behavioral disoraers, and were more the kinds of deformities that were distressing

maladjusted than those

~ith

to look at or tended to elicit strong emotional reactions such as pity or revulsion. This is not to say that our gTossly disfigured patients were well adjusted. But we did find that they complained less bitterly than the Wnile

mildly disfigured and vere more passive -- or perhaps more resigned.

many variables are involved in determining adjustment to facial deformity, one important factor seems to be the consistency of responses which can be expected from others. Our investigation showed that the "grossly disfigured

individual feels that he can almost always count on a negative response wherever he goes. It may be surprise, pity, curiosity, or repulsion, but Since he expects a

seldom, if ever, is it one of immediate approval.

negative response, he is usually prepared and has developed overt or covert techniques of coping with situations. of deformitie5 which are not so
On

the other hand, there are types conspicuous, such as a missing

i~~ediately

-4
ear or a Clalforma tiol'! ... !~ich time but not the next.
sU~Ges

ts a

oS tcreot~r,e.

rrhese may be no ticed one

In certain si tua tion~ a particular type 'of deformi ty

0

rnn;y be lauehed at or evcke an tipa thetic feelir:[,3; ur:der may be erratic

co~plctely

ther concH tions it

ignored or not even noticed.

w~th

In general, the responses are such deformities appear to be

~~d

unpredictable, and individuals

held in a hair-trigger and precariol,s position: They are never quite certain what will happen. They alternate
bet~een

feelings of relief and tension, and Predictability and con important factors which

adjustment to their situation is made difficult. sistency of

res~onse,

then, may be one of the

~ost

permit the grossly deformed to adjust, whereas unpredictability and incon

. S1S t ency
o~

~ response seem t re1n!orce f l ' ~ 0 ee 1ngs

defor7~ties

f anx1e t y. ,,3 ( pp. 86-87) .

Persons with dento-facial category. or a

seem to fall in this latter

The Ferson with buck teeth ("Bugs Bunny syndrome"), for instance, chin is less apt to be
vie~ed

recedi~g

with compassion than as a target

for teasing, nich.-names, or caricature; for, as Aris totle said, "The thing at which we laugh is a defect or ugliness suffering or injury.
~hich

is not great enough to cause

Thus, for exanple, a ridiculous face is an ugly or

mar~ed."

misshapen face, but one on which suffering has not

Yet for the

victim derisive laughter is one of the most potent and destructive instru ments men can use, and the shame, anger, and distress it can generate is immeasurable. These reactions to derisive laughter apnear to be universal.

The Hopi Indians, well aware of its effect, could and did deliberately drive
an offender in the
co~~unity

to insanity by the simple

punisr~ent

of laugh

lng at bim. We do not

~~d

will not know, I suppose, how many lives and

~alocclusion

persor~lities

of those vith noticeable

and dento-facial

disfig~rement

have

-5

however,

haV0

some knO'tdedge of persons who have reported and spd:en of their

connec~ion. ~lrs.

particular problems in this

Roosevelt, whom I knew well,

reported in her wri tines her feelin[;3 about being what she called an "ugly duckli::lg." She had a miserably unhappy childhood and young adulthood, and

had to st:~~ITle long and valiantly before she at last succeeded (overtly at least) in overcodng her feelings of inferiority and shyness. (I have often

wondered whether she would have become the great person she was had she not had this visible handicap.) During her years as First Lady caricatures of Although so late in

her we=e legion -- always with larce protruding teeth. her

lifeti~e, ~d

she finally had relief from this.

She was in an automobile Following

accident

lost, as I recall, three or four of her front teeth.

\L~abashed

dental restoration she told me with

delight what a fortunate

accident it had been, because at last she had straight front teeth. Even in the absence of stereotyping, .there are two other handicapping aspects associated with dento-facial deformity. area in and around the mouth is both emotionally nected with one's self-image. In the first place, the
charE~d

and strongly con

As an instrument of speech and eating, as

well as a mirror of emotions, it also has unique soci.3.1 and psychological implications and symbolic meaning.

Any abnormality in this area. therefore,

is not only highly visible and obtrusive but -- as research has shown tends to evoke a type of aversion which is both esthetic and sexual. A second handicapping factor has to do with the degree to which such defects interfere with the flow of social interaction. The man without an

arm can partially hide its absence in a sleeve; a cripple in a wheelchair

-6
ca:1 attend a di nne r \.. i tr.ou t r;enera ti nc uneo:1incss. said for
tho~e

Eu t the same cannot be

with f&.cial defects.

irreg~larity
t~e

Because in normal interaction the eyes

attend the face, any for the afflicted and

can be distracting and produce uneasiness

non-afflicted alike.
h~ve

As social scientists

pointed out, sFontaneous interaction requires But spontaneity

certain skills and rules on the part of both participants. is inhibited by the relle of "not noticing."

Not to notice dento-facial

')\"S: )
irregulari tics is especially difficult, for, as Goffma...'1 points-ou-t, liThe closer the defect is to the communication
eauip~ent

upon which the listener

must focus his attention. the smaller the defect needs to be to throw the listener off balance. These defects tend to shut off the afflicted individual

from the stream of daily contacts, transforning him into a faulty interactant, either in his eyes or in the eyes of others. 1I5

References

1. Barker, R.G., Wright, B.A., Meyerson, L., and Gorrick, M.R.: Adjustment
to Physical Phvsiaue ar.d
Handi~an

and Illness: A Survey of the Social Psychology of Bulletin 55, rev., Social Science Research

Disa~ilitv.

Council, New York, 1953.

2. Wright, B.A.: Physical Disability: A PsycholoRical Annroach, Harper and Eros., New York, 1960.

3.

~cgregor,

F.C., Abel, T.M., Bryt, A., Lauer, E., and Weissmann, S.: and Plastic
Sur~rr:

Facial

Defo~ities

A Psychosocial SrJdy,

Charles C

Tho~as.

Springfield, Ill., 1953.

-7 4. Goffrr:un, E.:
2n(;0Imt"n~:

'1.\:0 Sl;.dj ,,:-; in tr.t> S0cioloe:v of In t~r~ction,

Bobbs-~e~rill

Co.,

In1i~~apolis,

1963.

5. Goffman, E.: Alienation from interaction, IIuJT:2.n Relations, X: 52, 1957.

Paid Notice: Deaths MACGREGOR, FRANCES COOKE - The New York Times

Page 1 of 1

May 12, 2002

Paid Notice: Deaths MACGREGOR, FRANCES COOKE

MACGREGOR-Frances Cooke. With apologies for the delay to her friends and colleagues, it is with regret that we advise that Frances Cooke Macgregor, an expert on the psychological effects of facial deformities, died on Christmas Eve (2001) at her retirement home in Carmel, California. She was 95 and died of congestive heart failure. She was a renowned social scientist whose research and writing on the social and psychological significance of facial differences was the first acknowledgement of disfigurement as a disability. Her publications document 40 years of research. Mrs. Macgregor was born in Portland, Oregon, but grew up in San Rafael, California and earned a bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California at Berkeley in 1927. She moved to Massachusetts several years later and in 1933 married the late Gordon Macgregor, an anthropologist for the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. They later divorced. While they were married, the Macgregors visited Indian reservations around the country. A professional photographer at the time, Mrs. Macgregor took pictures that captured daily life on the reservations. Those photographs, published in 1941 in a book entitled, ''Twentieth Century Indians'', helped prompt Congress to devote more money to Indian reservations. Other pictures Mrs. Macgregor took over the course of a year in the small Massachusetts town of Hingham, were also published in 1941 in a book called, ''This Is America'', with text written by her friend, former first lady Eleanor Roosevelt. In the 1940's, Mrs. Macgregor moved to New York City and did graduate work in anthropology at Columbia University under Dr. Margaret Mead. Mrs. Macgregor obtained her master's degree in sociology at the University of Missouri in 1947. Her work on facial disfigurement began during World War II while photographing patients at the Ellis Fischel Cancer State Hospital in Columbia, Missouri. Shortly after the war, she met plastic surgeon Dr. John Marquis Converse, who helped repair the shattered and burned faces of French and English pilots. His specialty coincided with her interest in social and psychological ramifications of facial disfigurement. Dr. Converse accepted her suggestion to conduct an exploratory study of his patients. At that time, the existing literature on physical disabilities was limited almost entirely to functional impairments: the loss of a leg, blindness, deafness and so on, and the problems of physical rehabilitation. As for those whose faces happen to deviate from the norm, there was and is, a special irony with which they must contend. Their problems have their roots in the inextricable relationship of the face to the person and its role in human relations. Moreover, it is a situation made even worse in a society whose frenetic efforts to look young and beautiful makes looking different a social stigma-a stigma that has the potential for social and psychological death. Her work led to the World Health Organization adding facial disfigurement to its list of disabilities. In 1951 The Society for the Rehabilitation of the Facially Disfigured was established. Now known as The National Foundation for Facial Reconstruction, the Foundation helps fund the work of the Institute of Reconstructive Plastic Surgery at New York University Medical Center. Mrs. Macgregor remained in close touch with Dr. Joseph G. McCarthy, who became Director of the Institute following the death of Dr. Converse in 1981. The innovative streak in Macgregor drew the attention of the Russell Sage Foundation where she did a threeyear study at the New York Hospital, Cornell University School of Nursing in order to introduce social science into the education of nurses. She published a textbook, ''Social Science in Nursing; Applications for the Improvement of Patient Care'' (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1960). She became a full professor teaching at Cornell University Medical and Nursing School from 1954 to 1968 then rejoined the Institute of Reconstructive Plastic Surgery at NYU Medical Center. In 1991, Macgregor moved from New York City to Carmel, California. She continued her consultancies adding legal clients as well as medical colleagues and patients. Magregor's last research efforts focused on iatrogenic illness. Years before it was frontpage news in the New York Times (Sunday, December 19, 1999), she wanted her philanthropic funds to go to studying medical errors caused by physicians and other health professionals. On the same page as the continuation of The New York Times article of December 19, 1999, ''Breaking Down Medicine's Culture of Silence'', the Institute of Medicine estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year as a result of medical errors. Macgregor had already contributed to studies by the Institute of Medicine and also the Harvard Medical School in her name through the aegis of The Commonwealth Fund. She has left her estate to The Commonwealth Fund who will administer the Frances Cooke Macgregor Awards for further study of iatrogenic illness. At a private ceremony on January 4, 2002, Frances Cooke Macgregor was buried at the family burial plot beside her father, mother, brother and nephew at the Mt. Tamalpais Cemetery in San Rafael, California.
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8/30/2009

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs. DIVISION: G CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

-------------_/
AFFIDAVIT OF NEIL J. GILLESPIE

Neil J. Gillespie, under oath, testifies as follows: 1. My name is Neil J. Gillespie, and I am over eighteen years of age. This

affidavit is given on personal knowledge unless otherwise expressly stated. 2. 3. Circuit Judge Martha J. Cook is presiding over this lawsuit. I made a request for accommodation to the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) to Gonzalo B. Casares, the (ADA) Coordinator. On Friday July 9, 2010 Court Counsel David A. Rowland sent me a letter by email that denied my ADA accommodation request. Mr. Rowland denied my request less than one business day prior to a hearing I was scheduled to attend. 4. On Monday July 12,2010 I attended a hearing at 10:30 AM before Judge

Cook in this lawsuit. While attending the hearing I suffered a panic attack. I informed Judge Cook that I was ill and needed medical attention. Judge Cook excused me. This is exactly what Judge Cook said:

Page 1 of3

6 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gillespie, you're 7 excused. Thank you.

(Transcript, July 12,2010, page 6, beginning at line 6)

5. Deputies of the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office saw I was in distress

and offered assistance. Tampa Fire Rescue was called. Corporal Gibson was by my side and walked me to the lobby of courthouse where I waited for the paramedics. 6. Tampa Fire Rescue arrived and I received medical attention at 10:42 AM

by EMT Paramedic Robert Ladue and EMT Paramedic Dale Kelley. Later I obtained a report of the call, incident number 100035129. The narrative section states "found 54yom sitting in courthouse" with "tight throat secondary to stress from court appearance". The impressions section states "abdominal pain/problems". The nature of call at scene section states "Resp problem". A copy of the report is attached to this affidavit as "Exhibit A." 7. Because the Court denied my ADA accommodation I appeared at the

hearing without one and became ill and was excused by Judge Cook, who continued the hearing without me, thereby denying me by reason of my disability to be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity in violation of law. 8. I received a document from Judge Cook dated July 29,2010 "Notice Of

Case Management Status and Orders On Outstanding Res Judicata Motions" and "Notice Of Court-Ordered Hearing On Defendants' For Final Summary Judgment". A certified copy of the document is attached to this affidavit as "Exhibit B". The document begins with a false account of my panic attack and medical treatment on July 12,2010. Judge Cook wrote: "[t]he Plaintiff voluntarily left the hearing prior to its conclusion.. .loudly

Page 2 of3

gasping and shouting he was ill and had to be excused." At footnote 2 Judge Cook wrote: "Mr. Gillespie refused medical care from emergency personnel when called by bailiffs and left the courthouse immediately after learning that the conference was completed." 8. Upon information and belief, Judge Martha J. Cook knowingly and

willfully, with malice aforethought, falsified a record in violation of chapter 839, Florida Statutes, section 839.13(1) if any judge shall falsify any record or any paper filed in any judicial proceeding in any court of this state, or conceal any issue, or falsify any document filed in any court or falsify any minutes or any proceedings whatever of or belonging to any public office within this state the person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. Dated this 27th day of September 2010.

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF MARION BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority authorized to take oaths and acknowledgments in the State of Florida, appeared NEIL J. GILLESPIE, personally known to me, or provided identification, who, after having first been duly sworn, deposes and says that the above matters contained in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and official seal this 27th day of September 2010.

f,.:

~~

.; Expires June 6, 2012

~ Commission DO 781620

CECIUA ROSENBERGER
80ndId TtIU TIGf FIil . . . . . . . .701.

Notary Public State of Florida

C~~

Page 3 of3

Page #1
Incident Number: 100035 129; Incident Date: 7/1212010; Patient: Gillespie. Neil
Printed By: MOLINA. LAURA Admin Asst (000) on 712712010 7:49:45 AM

TAMPA FIRE RESCUE (EMSID: 2911; FDID: 03072) 808 Zack St. Tampa, FL 33602 (813) 274-7005 x

TAMPA FIRE RESCUE Incident Date: 07/12/2010 Incident Number: 100035129 Patient 1 of 1 RESCUE 1 shift: B GILLESPIE, NEIL 54 YEAR OLD, MALE PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: Depression, Diabetic, Hypertension ALLERGIES: None ; MEDICATIONS: unknown pt doesnt know names; ASSESSMENT: 10:42 Patient Conscious. NO External Hemorrhage Noted; Mucous Membrane Normal Central Body Color Normal Extremities Normal WITHIN NORMAL LIMITS (Airway, Breathing Quality, Accessory Muscle use, chest Rise, Radial pulse, Skin Temp, Skin Moisture, skin Turgor, cap Refill, Pupil size and Reaction) ALS Assessment Done to rule out NOC at Dispatch. SECONDARY ASSESSMENT - INJURY: CHEST - No Injury:. Left breath sounds are clear to auscultation. Right breath sounds are clear to auscultation. Breath sounds are equal. Heart sounds: Normal. NARRATIVE: R1 found 54yom sitting in courthouse. pt a&ox3, skin w&d, pt cc tight throat secondary to stress from court appearance pt states, lungs clear bi-lat, sa02 100%, pt blood sugar 179mg/dl, vitals as shown in flow sheet section, monitor shows sinus rhythm w/ no ectopy noted, pt denies being in any pn, secondary found no acute findings, advise pt multo times to be transported to hospital pt refuses transport and states he would rather go to his Dr. pt signed refusal and advise to call back if any issues occur w/ full understanding. TREATMENT: 10:42 pulse:120 Regular and Rapid Resp:16 Respiratory Effort:Normal BP:148/96 Rhythm:NSR Sa02:100% (on Room Air) Blood Sugar:179 Ectopy:NO GCS:4 spontaneous; 5 oriented; 6 obeys = 15 Responsiveness:Alert painseverity:O 10:42 Sao2, successful, 1 attempt, LADUE, ROBERT EMT-Paramedic (PMD514678) (unchanged) (100 room air) 10:43 Blood Glucose, KELLEY, DALE EMT-paramedic (PMD49960) (unchanged) (179mg/dl) ECG 4 Lead, successful, 1 attempt, ENGINE 1 (unchanged) (nsr 10:44 w/ no ectopy) 10:48 pulse:110 Not Assessed Resp:16 Respiratory Effort: Normal BP:153/86 Rhythm:NSR sa02:100% (on Room Air) Ectopy:NO GCS:4 spontaneous; 5 oriented; 6 obeys = 15 Responsiveness:Alert painseverity:O No Venous Access No Medications Done IMPRESSION: primary Impression: Other secondary Impression: Unknown Impressions: Abdominal pain / problems Other

INCIDENT INFORMATION: Incident location: 0000800 TWIGGS ST E Tampa, Hillsborough, FL 33602

IJL

'EXHIBIT

Page ##2
Incident Number: 100035129; Incident Dale: 7/12n.O 1O~ Patient: Gillespie, Neil
Printed By: MOLINA. LAURA Admin Asst (000) on 7127/20107:49:45 AM

TAMPA FIRE RESCUE (EMSID: 2911; FDID: 03072) 808 Zack St.
Tampa, FL 33602

(813) 274-7005 x

Nature of call as dispatched: chest pain Nature of call at scene: Resp Problem (Anatomic Location: Not Known) (organ system: Not Known) (primary symptom: None) (Other symptom: Not Known ) (condition code: other)
Type

Disposition: Non-Transport Evaluation only of exposure on this run: None 07/12/2010 10:36:35 Call Received 10:37:24 10:38:50 10:39:51 10:40:00 10:40:00 10:56:31 Dispatched Depart Arrive location patient Contact Assume Patient Care Available

07/12/2010 07/12/2010 07/12/2010 07/12/2010 07/12/2010 07/12/2010

Response to scene: Lights and sirens Lead Crew Member: LADUE, ROBERT EMT-paramedic (PMD514678) Crew Member 2: KELLEY, DALE EMT-paramedic (PMD49960) ASSISTING:

ENGINE 1,

PATIENT:
GILLESPIE, NEIL

OOB: 03/19/1956

54 YEARS OLD.

white, Male, 285 lbs 8092 sw 11Sth lOOp ocala, FL 34481

SSN#: 160-52-5117

BILLING INFORMATION:
work Related: NO
Next of Kin Name:, () SSN: NFIRS:

Address:

City:

State:

Z; p:

Phone:

Exposure #: 000 Incident Type: 321 EMS call, excluding vehicle accident with injury Action Taken: 32 provide basic life support
(BLS)

None property Use: 599 Business office

RESPONDING UNITS: suppression [Apparatus:l personnel:4] EMS [A~paratus:1 personnel:2] other [Apparatus:O personnel:OJ Includes no mutual aid resources. Human Factors Involved: other Factors Involved: Impression: 00 other Census Tract:
N N

None None condition of patient: 2 Remained Same

Page 113 Incident Number: 100035 129; Incident Date: 7/1212010; Patient: Gillespie, Neil Printed By: MOLINA, LAURA Admin ASSl (000) on 7127120107:49:45 AM

TAMPA FIRE RESCUE (EMSID: 2911; FOlD: 03072) 808 Zack 51. Tampa, FL 33602 (813) 274-7005 x

SIGNATURES: signed By: LADUE, ROBERT EMT-paramedic (PMD514678) Last Modified By: MILLER, LILAH Admin Asst. (000) on 7/23/2010 1:46:04 PM ***** Addendum / Data correction Added by: MILLER, LILAH Admin Asst. (000) on 7/23/2010 1:46:07 PM ***** (-) : 141000 124(+): Last Modified By: MILLER, LILAH Admin Asst. (000) on 7/23/2010 1:46:04 125(+): PM ..

..

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL LAW DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, and BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.,
A Florida Corporation, and
WILLIAM J. COOK,
Defendants. ------------_---.:/

Case No: Division:

05-CA-007205 G

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NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT STATUS and ORDERS ON OUTSTANDING RES JUDICATA MOTIONS THIS CAUSE came before the Court for case management on July 12, 2010. Both parties
appeared for the hearing; however, the Plaintiff voluntarily left the hearing prior to its conclusion, stating his objection to the case management conference, demanding status of ADA claims already addressed by the court administration, objecting to the physical presence of opposing counsel, objecting to this Court presiding in this matter due to his "notice of filing" of a purported lawsuit against the 13 th Judicial Circuit,l and finally loudly gasping and shouting he was ill and had to be excused. 2 Prior to the Plaintiff s voluntary departure, the parties were asked by the Court for a status update on this case and to list for the Court those petitions and motions presently outstanding. Subsequent to the hearing, the Court reviewed the 11 volumes, paying specific attention to Court orders that substantively disposed issues. In so doing, it was clear that certain of Plaintiff's re-filed motions are res judicata - matters that have been "definitively settled by judicial decision.,,3 Having considered these re-filed motions, the Court hereby

ORDERS AND ADJUDGES:

lRegarding the Plaintiffs "noticed" lawsuit against the 13 th Judicial Circuit, it is well-established law that the
Plaintiff's filing does not present legally sufficient grounds for this Court's disqualification or recusal from this case.
See Dowdy v. Sa/fi, 455 So.2d 604 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1984), 5-H Corforation v. Padovana, 708 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1997),
May v. South Florida Water Management, 866 So.2d 205 (Fla. 4 t DCA 2004) and Bay Bank & Trust v. Lewis, 634
So.2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). This objection was addressed in the Court's July 27, 2010 denial of disqualification.
2 Mr. Gillespie refused medical care from emergency personnel when called by bailiffs and left the courthouse
immediately after learning that the conference was completed.
th 3 Black's Law Dictionary, 7 Edition.

EXHIBIT
Page 1 of 7

1-8

1. Plaintiff's "Motions to Strike CMC" (6-14-10) were DENIED prior to the July 12, 2010 hearing. 2. Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing (7-16-08) is DENIED. The judge to whom this rehearing

motion was directed removed himself from the case and the subsequent judge has, in .her discretion under Rule 2.330, denied reconsideration of the orders of proceeding judges (see order dated June 22, 2010). 3. Plaintiff's "Amended Motion to Disqualify Counsel" (no date provided in Judge Barton's order) and "Emergency Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Counsel" (7-9-10) are each

DENIED. The Plaintiff's original attempt to disqualify Defendants' counsel was first denied,
with prejudice, on May 12, 2006. When a Court dismisses a motion "with prejudice" that means that the motion in question is "finally disposed ... and bars any future action on that claim.,,4 Additionally, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, these motions must be denied. 4. Plaintiff's "Motion to Declare Complex Litigation" (5-3-10) "Motion to Disclose Conflict" (5-5-10). and "Motion to Disclose Ex Parte Communication" (5-5-10) were each addressed and

DENIED in the July 16, 2010 order denying disqualification of Judge Cook, the Plaintiffs
motion for which referenced these matters. 5. Plaintiff's "Motion for Leave to Amend," citing ADA (4-1-10), "Motion for Leave to

Amend" (5-5-10), "Motion to Consider Prior ADA Accommodation," (5-3-10), and "Motion to Stay Pending ADA" (6-14-10) are each DENIED. Even if ADA applied in the fashion which
the Plaintiff sought to employ it, a stay would be unnecessary as that is the point of the protection - to allow a "person with a disability who needs an accommodation to access court facilities or participate in a court proceeding.,,5 Court administration has informed the Plaintiff that the nature of his ADA requests, thus far, involve "the internal management of pending cases,,6 - in other

Black's Law Dictionary, 7 th Edition.

th 5 13 Judicial Circuit Website, accessed July 22, 2010:
http://www .flj ud 13.org/dotnetnuke/BusinessOperations/CourtFacilitiesSecurity/ADAAccommodations.aspx
6 See July 9, 2010 letter from administration, as copied to all parties.

Page 2 of7

words, Plaintiff s issues are the subject of "case management." Moreover, excepting Count 1, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim against Defendant law firm, all of the Plaintiff's pleadings and answers have been disposed and amendment is thereby impossible. See Order Granting Motion

for Sanctions (7-20-07), Order Granting In Part Defendants' Motion for Judgment on Pleadings (11-28-07), Final Judgment (3-27-08), Order Determining Amount of Sanctions
(3-27-08), Order Granting and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Judgment on

Pleadings (7-7-08), Final Judgment as to Defendant Cook (7-7-08), Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Writ of Garnishment (7-24-08), and the Order from Second District Court of Appeals (2D08-2224), opinion and mandate. See also Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.100(a).7 6. Plaintiff's "Motions for Reconsideration" (6-18-10 and 6-23-10) were duplicative and

DENIED by this Court's discretion on June 23, 2010.

Plaintiff's "Motion for

Reconsideration" (6-28-10) filed after entry of that denial is DENIED, as it is duplicative of the
prior two motions, and is disposed by res judicata. 7. Plaintiff's "Motion Dissolve Writ" (5-3-10) is DENIED as lacking legal basis. The Defendants are entitled to this Writ by a final judgment and a judgment granting motion for sanctions; moreover, the Second District Court of appeal has affirmed and issued a "mandate," which means this Court has no option but to enforce the judgment. 8. The Plaintiff's "Motion for Order of Protection," (no date provided in Judge Barton's order) renewed in his "Motion to Cancel Deposition" (6-16-10) is DENIED. The Plaintiff has

repeatedly been the subject of Motions to Compel by the Defendants during the course of these proceedings, and has ignored Court orders requiring his participation. The Court will not accept these or any further attempts by the Plaintiff to avoid the Defendant's right to discovery in this

7 "There shall be a complaint or ... petition, and an answer to it; an answer to a counterclaim ... an answer to a cross claim [if applicable]; a third party complaint [and answer, if applicable] ... no other pleading shall be allowed."

Page 3 of7

case and to bring this matter to a close. Non-compliance with the Court's orders is grounds for dismissal of the Plaintiff s remaining count with prejudice. 9. Each of the Plaintiff's "Motions to Disqualify" against the undersigned have been DENIED by separate order of the Court, the most recent of which was entered July 27, 2010. 10. The Court RESERVES JURISDICTION to consider the following motions:

Plaintiff's "Motions to Compel Discovery" (12-14-06,2/1/07,4-1-10, and 6-23-10) Plaintiff's "Claim for Exemption" (8-14-08 and 5-3-10) Plaintiff's "Motion for Contempt" (no date provided in Judge Barton's order) Plaintiff's "Motion for Order to Show Cause and Contempt" (no date provided in Judge Barton's order) e. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanction" (4-28-10) f. Defendant's "Motion for Proceedings Supplementary for Execution" (no date provided by Defendants) g. Defendant's "Motion for Examination Pursuant to Section 56.29(2)" (no date provided by Defendants) h. Defendants' "Motion for an Order to Show Cause as to Why Plaintiff Should Not Be Prohibited from Henceforth Appearing Pro Se," received July 27, 2010.
a. b. c. d. 11. These motions shall not be set for hearing until the Court has first ruled on the Defendant's outstanding motion for Final Summary Judgment. 12. The Court GRANTS the Defendant's request to set a mandatory hearing upon their outstanding

"Motion for Final Sumnlary Judgment," served upon the Plaintiff January 23, 2007. 8 Both the
Defendants and the Plaintiff are ORDERED TO APPEAR on September 28, 2010 at

11:00a.m. The hearing shall be for no more than 30 minutes. The hearing will be held at 800 E.
Twiggs Street, Hearing Room 511, Tampa, Florida, 33602. The Court shall not grant any

continuance, or any motion for reconsideration or rehearing of this order setting hearing.
13. The Court will allow the Plaintiff to appear telephonically, but it is his responsibility to file a timely written motion no later than September 21, 2010 and for him to provide, at his own expense, for the services of a notary on his end of the phone, since it may be necessary to swear

Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.080, the question of whether or not a receiving party facilitates acceptance of papers (i.e. refuses to accept certified mail and/or federal express deliveries) is irrelevant; the question is the "good faith" of the party who is attempting to produce the document, which can be proven up by delivery receipts and/or any other evidence of legitimate attempt at service. In addition, "the certificate [of service] shall be taken as prima facie proof of such service in compliance with these rules." Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.080(t).
8

Page 4 of7

him in for testimony.

Should the Plaintiff fail to arrange telephonic appearance, then his in

person appearance is mandatory. Should the Plaintiff voluntarily forfeit his appearance by failing to attend, call in, or not participate in good faith (including failure to provide the required notary), then the hearing shall proceed in his absence and the Court may consider sanctions for his non appearance. 14. At this mandatory hearing the parties must also be prepared to discuss the effect of the "Order

Adjudging Contempt" entered by Judge Barton on July 7, 2008. This order found that the
Plaintiff had ability to comply with the "Final Judgment" entered on March 27, 2008 and that the Plaintiff violated the terms of that order by failing to complete Form 1.977 Fact Information Sheet. The Plaintiff was ordered to complete the sheet and to serve a copy to the Defendant no later than July 11, 2008. If the Plaintiff did not timely submit Form 1.977, as ordered, then pursuant to the "Order Adjudging Contempt," "the Court shall dismiss" with prejudice, the Plaintiff's last remaining claim (i.e. Count 1, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim against Defendant law firm). Because this dismissal sanction may render hearing on the Defendant's

"Motion for Final Summary Judgment" to be moot, the parties are ORDERED to provide
proof to this Court that this prior contempt sanction has been addressed. 15. A separate notice of hearing on the motion for summary judgment accompanies this order. Copies will be sent to the parties at the address provided to the Clerk of Court.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida, on July

m,

2010.

~)~t~ Martha J. Cook

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

Page 5 of7

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL LAW DIVISION

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NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, and BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., A Florida Corporation, and WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants.
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NOTICE OF COURT-ORDERED HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TO: Neil J. Gillespie, pro se (Plaintiff) 8092 SW 115 th Loop Ocala, FL 34481 Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esq. (for Defendants) 400 North Ashley Drive, Ste. 2100 Tampa, ~ 33602

YOU ARE NOTIFIED that a hearing on the Defendants' Motion for Final Summary Judgment, filed and served upon the Plaintiff since January 23, 2007, has been ORDERED by the Court (see "Notice of Case Management Status and Orders on Outstanding Res Judicata Motions," entered July 29, 2010).
At this mandatory hearing the parties must be prepared to address the ORDER ADJUDGING CONTEMPT entered by Judge Barton on July 7, 2008, as instructed by this Court's prior order. Both the Defendants and the Plaintiff are ORDERED TO APPEAR before: JUDGE: The Honorable Martha J. Cook PLACE: 800 E. Twiggs Street, Hearing Room 511, Tampa,Florida, 33602. TIME: ll:00a.m. DURATION: 45 minutes DATE: September 28,2010 Should either party fail to attend or to participate in good faith as described in the "Notice of Case Management Status and Orders on Outstanding Res Judicata Motions," then the hearing shall proceed on the merits without that party. All parties will be required to abide by the Rules of Civil Procedure and follow appropriate courtroom decorum. A copy of this notice has been furnished to the parties on the date of this NOTICE.

Page 6 of7

The parties are further advised that failure to appear or to comport with either the "Notice of Case Management Status and Orders on Outstanding Res Judicata Motions" or this "Notice of Court-Ordered Hearing on Defendants' Motion for Final Summary Judgment" may constitute contempt of court, which could result in the imposition of sanctions, including without limitation fine, incarceration or dismissal of the action with prejudice.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida, on July 29, 2010.

/hLLLU/U. Martha J. Cook

if' ~

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

If you are a person with a disability who needs any accommodation in order to participate in this proceeding, you are entitled, at no cost to you, to the provision of certain assistance. Please contact the Administrative Office of the Courts, Attention: ADA Coordinator, 800 E. Twiggs Street, Tampa, FL 33602, Phone: 813-272-6513, Hearing Impaired: 1-800-955-8771, Voice impaired: 1-800-955-8770, e mail: ADA @fljudI3.org. at least seven (7) days before your scheduled court appearance. If you are hearing or voice impaired, call 711.

Page 7 of7

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR IDLLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
Plaintiff, vs.. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P .A., a Florida corporation, WILLIAM 1. COOK, Defendants. DMSION:C CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

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Plaintiff requests an accommodation under the Americans With DisabilitierAct (ADA) and states: 1. 2. Plaintiff was detennined totally disabled by Social Security in 1994. Defendants are familiar with Plaintiff's disability from their prior

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representation of him. Defendants investigated his eligibility to receive services from the Florida Department of Vocational Rehabilitation (bVR). DVR detennined that Plaintiff was too severely disabled to benefit from services. Defendants concurred, and notified Plaintiff of their decision in a letter to him dated March 27, 2001. (Exhibit A). Defendants were also infonned of Plaintiff's medication for depression by fax dated October 6, 2000, Effexor XR 150mg. (Exhibit B). 3. Plaintiff has the following medical conditions which are disabling and

prevent him from effectively participating in court proceedings, including: a. Depression and related mood disorder. This medical condition prevents Plaintiff from working, meeting deadlines, and concentrating. The inability to

C . j.69

Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, }- .A., case no. 05-CA-7205 concentrate at times affects Plaintiff's ability to hear and comprehend. The medical treatment for depression includes prescription medication that further disables Plaintiffs ability to do the work of this lawsuit, and further prevents him from effectively participating in the proceedings. b. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), makes Plaintiff susceptible to stress, such as the ongoing harassment by Defendants' lawyer, Mr. Rodems. c. Velopharyngeal Incompetence (VPI) is a speech impairment that affects Plaintiffs ability to communicate. d. Type 2 diabetes. This was diagnosed in 2006 after Defendants' representation. 4. Prior to the onset of the most disabling aspects Plaintiff's medical

condition(s), he was a productive member of society, a business owner for 12 years, and a graduate of both the University of Pennsylvania and The Evergreen State College. 5. On March 3,2006, Ryan Christopher Rodems telephoned Plaintiff at his

home and threatened to use infonnation learned during Defendants prior representation against him in the instant lawsuit. Mr. Rodems' threats were twofold; to intimidate Plaintiff into dropping this lawsuit by threatening to disclose confidential client information, and to inflict emotional distress, to trigger Plaintiff's Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and inflict injury upon Plaintiff for Defendants' advantage in this lawsuit. 6.
On March 6, 2006, Mr. Rodems made a false verification the Court about

the March 3, 2006 telephone call. Mr. Rodems submitted Defendants' Verified Request For Bailiff And For Sanctions, and told the Court under oath that Plaintiffthreatened acts of violence in Judge Nielsen's chambers. It was a stunt that backfired when a tape recording of the phone call showed that Mr. Rodems lied. Plaintiffnotified the Court Page - 2 of4

1.70

Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, f:A., case no. 05-CA-7205 about Mr. Rodems' perjury in Plaintiffs Motion With Affidavit To Show Cause Why Ryan Christopher Rodems Should not Be Held In Criminal Contempt Of Court and incorPorated Memorandum Of Law submitted January 29,2007. 7. Mr. Rodems' harassing phone call to Plaintiff of March 3, 2006, was a

tort, the Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress. Mr. Rodems' tort injured Plaintiff by aggravating his existing medical condition. From the time of the calion March 3, 2006, Plaintiff suffered worsening depression for which he was treated by his doctors. a. On May 1, 2006 Plaintiffs doctor prescribed Effexor XR, a serotonin norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (SNRl), to the maximum dosage. b. Plaintiffs worsening depression, and the side affects of the medication; lessened Plaintiffs already diminished ability to represent himself in this lawsuit. c. On October 4,2006 Plaintiff began the process of discontinuing his medication so that he could improve is ability to represent himself in this lawsuit. d. On or about November 18, 2006, Plaintiff discontinued the use of anti depression medication, to improve his ability to represent himself in this lawsuit. 8. Mr. Rodems continued to harass Plaintiff during the course of this lawsuit

in the following manner:

a Mr. Rodems lay-in-wait for Plaintiff outside Judge Nielsen's chambers

on April 25, 2006, following a hearing, to taunt him and provoke an altercation. b. Mr. Rodems refused to address Plaintiff as "Mr. Gillespie" but used his first name, and disrespectful derivatives, against Plaintiffs expressed wishes. c. Mr. Rodems left insulting, harassing comments on Plaintiffs voice mail during his ranting message of December 13,2006.

Page - 3 of4

Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, r.A., case no. 05-CA-7205 d. Mr. Rodems wrote Plaintiff a five-page diatribe of insults and ad hominem abusive attacks on December 13, 2006. 9. Plaintiff notified the Court ofhis inability to obtain counsel in Plaintiff's

Notice ofInability to obtain Counsel submitted February 13, 2007. 10. Plaintiff acknowledges that this ADA accommodation request is unusual,

b:ut so are the circumstances. Defendants in this lawsuit are Plaintiff's fonner lawyers, who are using Plaintiff's client confidences against him, while contemporaneously inflicting new injuries upon their former client based on his disability. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests additional time to obtain counsel, a stay in the proceedings for 90 days. Plaintiff also requests accommodation in the form of additional time to meet deadlines when needed due to his disability. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of March, ,2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via US Mail to Ryan .C. Radems, attorney, Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 400 N Ashley Dr., Suite 2100, Tampa, FL 33602, this 5th day of March, 2007.

Page - 4 of4

172

BARI<ER, RODEMS & COOK

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
ATIORNEYS AT LAW

CHRIS -A. BARKER RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS WILLIAM]. COOK

300 West Platt Street, Suite 150

Tampa, Florida 33606

Te lep hOlle 813/489 .. 1001 Facsimile 813/489 .. 1008

March 27,2001

Neil J. Gillespie Apartlnent C-2 ] 121 Beach Drive NE St. Petersburg, Florida 33701-1434

Re:
Dear Neil:

Vocntiollal Rellabilitntion

I am enclosing the material yOll provided to us. We 11ave reviewed tIlem and, llnfortllnately, we are not in a positiol1 to represent you for allY clainls yOll may have. Please understatld tllat our decision does not 111ean tllat your claims lack nlerit, and another attorney might wisll to represent you. If you wisll to consult witll another attorney, we recolnlnend that you do so immediately as a statute of lilllitations will apply to any claims you Inay have. As you know, a statute of linlitations is a legal deadline for filing a lawsllit. Tllanl( you. for the opportunity to review your Inaterials.
Sincerely,

\Villialn J. Cool{
WJC/rnss
Enclosures

1.73
'EXHIBIT'

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Fax
From: Neil J. Gillespie
1121 Beach Drive NE, Apt C-2 St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Phone/Fax: (727) 823-2390

To: William J. Cook, Attorney at Law

Fax: (813) 228-9612

Date: October 6, 2000

Pages: just this page
Re: ACE Check Cashing deposition

o Urgent

o Please Reply

o For Your Review

Comments:
RE: Current medications Effexor XR 150 mg (depression) Levoxyl 0.075 mg (hormone)
STATE OFFLOFlIOA ) COUNTY OF HiLLSBOROUGH) THIS IS TOCERTIfV THAT THE FOREGOING IS ATRUE AND CORHfiCT cot'1 Of Tf DOCUMENT ON FILE IN MY OFFICE. WITNESS MY ~ ANO Of!FICIAL SEAL THIS 31.v1"" DAYOF ,to T 201 0
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Neil J. Gillespie, medical history (partial) 8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

August 6, 2012

DOB: March 19, 1956, Philadelphia, PA, Thomas Jefferson Hospital. Congenital disorder: unilateral cleft lip (L), cleft palate, eustachian tube defect (L), retracted eardrum (L). Medical Conditions Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with PTSD related panic attack in response to stimuli associated with a serve stressor Anxiety disorder due to medical condition Dysthymic disorder (chronic depression) Depression Cleft palate with unilateral cleft lip (L) Facial disfigurement, scaring Velopharyngeal Incompetence (VPI) Voice disorder, hypernasality Retracted eardrum (L) Eustachian tube defect Hearing loss Diabetes (mellitus) NOS, Type 2 diabetes, adult onset Brain trauma, head injury from a mugging (1988) Prosthesis Speech bulb obturator. In September 2001 my palatopharyngeal musculature had changed where I could no longer insert the obturator in my mouth. Omni ADV hearing aid, serial no. 36-95-300004 (no longer functional) Medical history 1. Craniofacial surgery, age three months, Misericordia Hospital, Philadelphia, Dr. Duncan, 18th & Walnut Streets, Philadelphia. 2. Palate surgery, age two years, Thomas Jefferson Hospital, Philadelphia, Dr. Duncan. This is my earliest memory, the hospital stay. ICD-9-CM Code 309.81

293.89 300.4 296.3 749.21 709.2 528.9 784.43 384.28 381.89 389.90 250.00 310.20

Page - 1

3. Speech therapy, age eight years, Easter Seals Center, Levittown, PA. 4. Orthodontic treatment, 1968-1974, Temple University Dental Clinic, Philadelphia. Fitted with a removable retainer with a prosthetic left lateral incisor. NOTE: Additional reconstructive surgery was scheduled at Temple University Medical Center, including bone graft and pharyngeal flap procedures, but was canceled due to denial of insurance coverage based on a preexisting condition clause of my private insurance policy. That was in 1974 when I was 18-years old and graduating high school. The insurance policy was bought from a local insurance agency, paid for with money earned cutting lawns. After reconstructive surgery was canceled, my life took another path. I did not follow my contemporaries to college, but worked as a steel mill laborer at the U.S. Steel Fairless Works. Following a layoff a year later I worked in the restaurant business, and later in the car business. Eleven years later in 1985 I was able to reschedule the bone graft surgery. The pharyngeal flap surgery was delayed until 1990. I also entered the Wharton Evening School in 1985. Bullying. Like many children afflicted with a congenital craniofacial disorder, I experienced disability-based bullying, and physical assault. Disability-based bullying caused me severe depression and anxiety from my earliest days. I became an Eagle Scout December 3, 1971. The Boy Scouts allowed me a modicum of normalcy and chance for success in an otherwise physically and psychologically abusive school environment. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Adult Treatment Time-line Beginning at age 29 I continued rehabilitation with better insurance (Blue Cross), and income from my car business. I estimate that from 1985 forward I spent at least $100,000 out of my pocket for treatment and rehabilitation of my congenital craniofacial disorders. This list is representative and does not include every treatment or provider. There are too many treatments and providers to list, and many records are long gone. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 5. July 22, 1985 Consultation with Joseph Kusiak, MD, Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, American Oncologic Hospital, Central & Shelmire Avenues, Philadelphia, PA 19111. Examination; proposed surgical plan and medical team. 6. 1985-1987 Dr. Sharon Wainright MD, Psychiatrist, 22nd & Walnut Street, Philadelphia. I was a private-pay client in ongoing weekly or biweekly visits for general anxiety, and anxiety related to medical treatment. After Dr. Wainright left private practice I saw other therapists, including Dr. Harriet Wells, as a private-pay outpatient client at the Institute of the Pennsylvania Hospital in Philadelphia. The challenge for mental health providers is shown in a paper by Bennett and Stanton: Psychotherapy for Persons with Craniofacial Deformities: Can We Treat without Theory?

Page - 2

(Cleft Palate-Craniofacial Journal, July 1993, Vol. 30 No.4) 7. August 1, 1985 Marilyn A. Cohen, BA, speech pathologist, The Cleft Palate Program, Childrens Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP), 34th and Civic Center Blvd., Philadelphia, PA 19104. Speech evaluation (re-evaluation March 30, 1989). 8. August 12, 1985 Harvey M. Rosen, MD, DMD, Reconstructive Surgery, Pennsylvania Hospital, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Surgery scheduled; bone graft and rhinoplasty. 9. March 10, 1986 Rosario F. Mayro, DMD, DDS, 1830 Rittenhouse Square, Philadelphia, PA 19103. Pre-surgical orthodontic alignment. Ongoing treatment. Referral for periodontal surgery. 10. April 22, 1986 Mark B. Snyder, DMD, periodontist, 220 South 16th Street, Suite 900, Philadelphia, PA 19102. Periodontal surgery. Ongoing treatment. 11. August 12, 1986 Reconstructive surgery (bone transplant), Dr. Rosen, Pennsylvania Hospital. Closure of oral-nasal fistula; bone graft to alveolus of nasal floor; septoplasty. Bone graft donor site, left hip. 12. December 15, 1986 Reconstructive rhinoplasty, Dr. Rosen, Pennsylvania Hospital. Developed breathing obstruction following surgery. 13. July 6, 1987 Peter Randall, MD, Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, 3400 Spruce St., Philadelphia, PA 19104. Consultation, obstructed breathing. (no consensus). 14. April 20, 1988 Dennis G. Sanfacon, DMD, 1829 JFK Blvd., Philadelphia, PA 19103. Completed prosthodontic treatment (five unit bridge), stabilized surgical site. Was supposed to last 20 years; failed Feb-17-2005 (17+ yrs.). Barry Korn, DDS, endodontic treatment. 15. Aug-20-88 Head trauma, street mugging, lost consciousness, taken by police car to Hanemann University Hospital ER, see report. Sutures to close laceration to right outer eye, severe head pain. Suffered traumatic brain injury, loss of cognitive and motor functions for several weeks, difficulty speaking and forming sentences. Within several months I thought I recovered from this brain injury, but now that assessment appears incorrect. This injury diminished my business ability, and I have not held substantial employment since. Today I do not have a bank account because I cannot manage one. I went from self-sufficiency to total disability in 1994. My inability to manage funds resulted in two bankruptcy proceedings and homelessness. The bankruptcies are: Chapter 7 bankruptcy, discharged January 7, 1993, case 92-20222, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Chapter 7 bankruptcy, discharged March 5, 2003, case 02-14021-8B7, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Florida.

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I have been indigent and/or insolvent since I first filed bankruptcy December 31, 1991. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Florida 16. May 26, 1989 Consultation, D. Ralph Millard, Jr., MD, FACS, 1444 NW 14th Avenue, Miami, FL 33125. Surgery scheduled, obstructed breathing and velopharyngeal incompetence. 17. December 14, 1990 Surgery, Dr. Millard, Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, FL. Cleft rhinoplasty with submucous resection, pharyngeal flap. Resolved breathing issue somewhat; pharyngeal flap failed a few weeks later. 18. December 19, 1990 Consultation, Felipe Martinez, MD, FACS, 1350 SW 57th Avenue, Suite 210, Miami, FL 33144. Developed ear infection following surgery. 19. May 5, 1993 Consultation, Mutas B. Habal, MD, FRCSC, FACS, and Jane Scheuerle, Tampa Bay Craniofacial Center, 801 W. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd., Tampa, FL 33603. Diagnosis: velopharyngeal incompetence. Recommendation: surgery to re-graft alveolus of nasal floor with bone from skull, and to perform another pharyngeal flap procedure (declined, poor risk/benefit analysis after consulting with Dr. Wainright). 20. June 1, 1993 Consultation, Pamela Kynkor, MS, CCC, Speech-Language pathologist, Beth Ingram and Associates, Inc., 3450 E. Fletcher Ave., Tampa, FL 33617, Speech evaluation. 21. June 4, 1993 Consultation, Noreen P. Frans, MS, CCC-A, (dispensing clinical audiologist), Better Hearing Services, 2312 West Waters Avenue, Tampa, FL 33604, (813) 935-3446. Some hearing loss, no recommendation for intervention. 22. August 23, 2003, Social Security determined that I was totally disabled. Social Security found that I became disabled under their rules on January 17, 1992. On August 1, 2012 Social Security wrote that there was no need to review my case. However I would like to work if I could find suitable employment. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Oregon 23. May 26, 1994 Robert W. Blakeley, Ph.D., speech pathologist, Oregon Health Sciences University, CDRC, Portland, OR 97207. Diagnosis: velopharyngeal incompetence. Recommendation: speech obturator (reduction program), then surgical intervention. Peter Lax, DMD, fitted a temporary obturator during twelve appointments from May 26, 1994 through April 11, 1995. (good result) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Washington 24. January 22, 1995 David R. Zielke, DDS, MS, Suite A-103, Allenmore Medical Center, 19th & South Union, Tacoma, WA 98405. Endodontic treatment, tooth 18, supports speech obturator.

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25. March 22, 1995 Susan Porter, MA, clinical audiologist, Hearing Healthcare Center, Inc., 3525 Ensign Road NE, Olympia, WA 98506, (360) 491-9733. Hearing evaluation with test results showing a significant conductive hearing loss in the left ear. DVR. 26. March 26, 1995 Herbert C. Thomas, MD, MS, Pacific Northwest Otolaryngology, 4540 Sandpoint Way NE, #320, Seattle, WA 98105, (206) 527-5366 (examiner, Susan A. Wilcox, MACCC-A). Medical evaluation and clearance for a hearing aid. DVR. 27. August 17, 1995 Barry L. Kimmel, MSCCC-A, Hearing Healthcare Center, Inc., 3525 Ensign Road NE, Olympia, WA 98506, (360) 491-9733. Provided hearing aid, Omni half shell with K-amp, left. DVR. 28. November 11, 1995 Eric F. Pinczower, MD, Assistant Professor, Department of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery, University of Washington Medical Center, Seattle, WA 98195, (206) 548-4022. Velopharyngeal incompetence/pharyngeal flap surgical consultation. 29. November 15, 1995 Jeffrey E. Rubenstein, DMD, MS, Director, Maxillofacial Prosthetic Clinic, University of Washington Medical Center, D683 Health Sciences Building, Seattle, WA 98195, (206) 685-2344. Velopharyngeal incompetence/obturator consultation and maintenance. 30. November 21, 1995 Craig S. Murakami, MD, Assistant Professor, Department of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery, University of Washington Medical Center, Seattle, WA 98195, (206) 548-4022. Pharyngeal flap surgery consultation. 31. November 21, 1995 Kathryn M. Yorkston, Ph.D., Speech/Language Pathologist, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, (206) 543-3134. Velopharyngeal incompetence consultation. 32. December 18, 1995 Jeffrey E. Rubenstein, DMD, MS, obturator reduction procedure. 33. February 28, 1996 Dean Wiese, MD, 410 Black Hills Lane, #C, Olympia, WA 98502. Primary care physician. Consultation for otitis media/serous (recurring ear infection) 34. March 19, 1996 Allen D. Hillel, MD, Associate Professor, Department of OtolaryngologyHead and Neck Surgery, U of Washington Medical Center, Seattle, WA 98195, (206) 548-4022. Speech-hearing clinic, fiber-optic nasendoscope, Dr. Yorkston. 35. March 19, 1996 Jeffrey E. Rubenstein, DMD, MS, obturator reduction procedure. 36. August 22, 1996 Jeffrey E. Rubenstein, DMD, MS, obturator reduction procedure. 37. August 29, 1996 R. Dean Russell, MD FRCS[C], (ear, nose, throat, head and neck) 403 Black Hills Lane SW, Suite F, Olympia, WA 98502, (360) 357-6314, 1-800-270-6314. Consultation, ear fluid build-up, ear tube procedure. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Florida

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38. November 12, 1996 William N. Williams, Ph.D., (Speech-Language Pathologist) Director and Professor, Craniofacial Center, University of Florida Shands, Room D8-30, Dental Sciences Building, Gainesville, FL 32610 (352) 846-0801. Consultation, velopharyngeal incompetence, obturator reduction plan, surgical options. 39. November 12, 1996 Glenn E. Turner, DMD, MSD, Associate Professor of Prosthodontics, Director, Maxillofacial Prosthetics, University of Florida Shands, College of Dentistry, Gainesville, FL 32610 (352) 392-4294. Consultation, velopharyngeal incompetence, obturator reduction plan, surgical options. 40. November 21, 1996 Dr. Nixon, Endodontic Specialists, 3201 SW 34th Ave., Ocala, FL 34474. Endodontic treatment, tooth number three. (supports speech prosthesis). 41. November 25, 1996 William N. Williams, Ph.D. Videofluorographic evaluation, University of Florida Shands, College of Dentistry, Department of Oral Biology. 42. February 4, 1997 nasendoscopic assessment, Drs. Williams and Turner, Shands. 43. February 4, 1997 M. Brent Seagle, MD, University of Florida Shands Clinic at Park Avenue, 1015 NW 56th Terrace, Gainesville, FL 32605, 1-800-749-7424, (352) 395-6810, consultation, velopharyngeal incompetence, surgical options; palatal extension or pharyngeal flap. 44. February 6, 1997 David J. Zaner, DMD, 2825 SE 17th Street, Ocala, FL 34471. Periodontal surgery (crown lengthening), tooth 18. (supports speech prosthesis). 45. February 27, 1997 Glenn E. Turner, DMD, MSD, Associate Professor of Prosthodontics, Director, Maxillofacial Prosthetics. Completed prosthetic restoration of tooth number three. (supports speech prosthesis). 46. March 25, 1997 Stephen H. Dunn, DDS, 9401 SW SR 200, Suite 101, Ocala, FL 34481, (352) 873-2000. Prosthetic restoration of tooth 18. (supports speech prosthesis). 47. May 9, 1997 Bayfront Medical Center (ER), 701 Sixth Street South, St. Petersburg, FL. Experienced sudden hearing loss (L), accompanied by bleeding in ear & mouth. 48. May 14, 1997 Alan M. Gall, MD (otolaryngologist), 2299 Ninth Avenue N, Suite 3B, St. Petersburg, FL 33713, (813) 321-3344. Follow-up consultation, removed ear tube. 49. May 23, 1997 Dr. Gall, follow-up appointment. Noted improvement. Scheduled hearing test in July to measure hearing loss. (not completed). 50. August 22, 1997 contacted J. Douglas Bremner, MD, Assistant Professor of Diagnostic Radiology & Psychiatry, Yale University School of Medicine; and Dr. Dorothy Lewis, Dissociative Disorders Clinic, New York University Medical Center, following their appearance on the ABC Evening News, Health Report, August 18, 1997, the segment Growing up damaged, by John McKenzie, ABC News. I wrote in part to Drs. Bremner and Lewis:

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Thank you for your recent appearance on the ABC News Health Report with John McKenzie entitled "Growing up damaged." I am interested in additional information about the subject, including diagnostic recommendations. My interest is personal. Born with a craniofacial disorder affecting both speech and appearance, I was subjected to severe psychological abuse, both familial and societal. At age 41 I am currently disabled with "mental health issues," but I do not believe an accurate diagnosis has been made in my case. Dr. Bremner responded September 12, 1997 with an offer, one that later did not materialize: Thank you for your interest in our research program on victims of childhood abuse and the brain. If you or anyone else is interested, you can stay for free in our research unit and obtain financial compensation which more than offsets travel expenses, as well as a comprehensive diagnostic and biological assessment, including brain imaging. You can call 203 737 5791 for information. Dr. Lewis responded September 4, 1997 and wrote: Thank you for your letter of August 22,1997. Unfortunately I do not know of someone in your area who specializes in the complications of craniofacial disorders. I am sorry I cannot be of more help. 51. December 4, 1997, the Florida Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) notified me by letter that I am too severely disabled to benefit from vocational rehabilitation: During our meeting we thoroughly reviewed and discussed your evaluation reports. It has been determined that you are not eligible for vocational rehabilitation services because your disability is too severe at this time for rehabilitation services to result in. employment. This decision was reached 12/4/1997. Previously DVR on May 29, 1994 prepared for me an Individual Written Rehabilitation Plan (IWRP) after a long evaluation process. The DVR plan had three objectives: Objective 1: Neil will be able to speak for up to 8 hours without rest or complaint of pain and deterioration of vocal quality. Objective 2: Neil will develop a marketable skill as a general practitioner. Objective 3: Neil will obtain employment as a general practitioner. (medical doctor, MD) I also received DVR services in Olympia, Washington, in 1995, one year of education at The Evergreen State College, and a hearing aid.

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52. March 21, 2001, Mr. Rodems law partner, William Cook of Barker, Rodems & Cook reviewed my case with DVR, DLES case no: 98-066-DVR, and wrote me March 21, 2001: We have reviewed them [DVR claims] and, unfortunately, we are not in a position to represent you for any claims you may have. Please understand that our decision does not mean that your claims lack merit, and another attorney might well to represent you. Mr. Cook previously represented to me that he would represent me with DVR, as set forth in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, 05-CA-7205, paragraph 43. 53. December 31, 1997 John A. Ferullo, DDS, 1 Progress Plaza, #1340, St. Petersburg, FL 33701-4353. (813) 822-8101. Initial visit, pending prosthetic restoration of tooth no. 19. (supports speech prosthesis). 54. February 20, 1998 David D. Whitaker, DMD, 111 2nd Ave. NE, Suite 1102, St. Petersburg, FL 33701, (813) 895-7519. Endodontic treatment, tooth no. 19. (supports speech prosthesis). 55. September 4, 1998 Selina Kassels, Ph.D, Licensed Psychologist (PY0005229), Florida Center For Cognitive Therapy, Inc., 2745 State Road 580, Suite 103, Clearwater, FL 33761. Consultation for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Dysthymic disorder (chronic depression), Anxiety disorder due to medical condition, etc. 56. 1999-2005, Dr. G. Anthony Figueroa, MD, 1201 5th Ave. N., Suite 300, St. Petersburg, FL 33705, telephone: (727) 895-4500. Dr. Figueroa was my primary care, from January 1999 through June 2005. Dr. Figueroa offered me a part-time job in his office, on the business side, however the office manager, Julie, refused to cooperate, and the job fell through. Julie was later replaced. Dr. Figueroa encouraged me to reestablish contact with my family, which I did, ending a nine year break. Dr. Figueroa treated me for depression at various times with with Effexor, Wellbutrin, fluvoxamine, paroxetine, lexapro, and cymbalta. When I was homeless Dr. Figueroa generously offered to pay a deposit on an apartment for me, but I declined. August 10, 1999 Spoke with Dr. Figueroa that my obturator causes pain in mouth, and I fear being unable to wear the appliance in the future, and deterioration of the appliance. December 18, 2002, low speed car crash, became very tired (pre-diabetic) and passed out while driving. This occurred while I was driving as an independent contractor document courier, but there was no income after expenses, and the total loss of my car ended that employment, and left me homeless, since I was living in my car and motel rooms. 57. September 2001 (temporarily homeless) Unable to wear speech prosthesis. Speculate that the palatopharyngeal musculature changed to where I could no longer insert the obturator in my mouth, and I could not wear it anymore. Marked deterioration in speech. 58. September 6, 2000 through June 30, 2005 Robert S. Pastorius DDS, 3864 Fifth Ave. N., Saint Petersburg, Florida 33713. Numerous procedures, fillings and extractions. Feb-17-05, extracted #11, removed five unit bridge made in Philadelphia (14. April 20, 1988 Dr. Sanfacon)

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installed flipper. June 30, 2005 Dr. Pastorius said I was not enthusiastic enough and he was hesitant to proceed with further treatment. Referral from Dr. Figueroa. 59. May 15, 2001 Randall T Hedrick, DDS, 4957 38th Avenue N, Suite E, Saint Petersburg, FL 33710 tooth 30, endodontics (root canal). 60. September 2002 - February 2005, I was homeless during this period in Tampa, Florida. I left my apartment in Brandon Florida over harassment from neighbors, wayward young people who made life intolerable, from verbal harassment to leaving dog feces on my doorstep. One time they set off an explosive device at my door and I reported that to the Hillsborough Sheriff. After leaving the apartment I lived in motels if I could afford a room. Sometimes I slept outside if the weather was good. Sometimes I lived in my storage unit at Shurgard in Tampa, where I put my furniture. I met another homeless man there, James Worley, we became friends, and we have remained in contact. (James step-father killed his mother when James was about 14 years old, and he has been adrift since). For a week or so I lived at a Salvation Army shelter in Tampa. In February 2004 I bought a 1990 Dodge minivan for $600 and converted it to a living space. I lived in the van until I moved to Ocala in February 2005. I still own and drive the van, and may live in it again. The mortgage holder on the family home where I currently live notified me that it will soon begin foreclosure. 61. April 4 2002 David M. Pedley, DMD, Oral Surgery, 3810 Fifth Ave. N, St. Petersburg, Florida 33713, remove root (apicoectomy) of tooth no. 12. 62. April 1, 2005, Gregory G. Langston, DMD, MSD, Periodontics & Implant Dentistry 8487 Fourth Street North, St. Petersburg, Florida 33702, gingival biopsy, evaluate for dental implants. 63. March 3, 2006 beginning on this date an attorney by the name of Ryan Christopher Rodems has directed, with malice aforethought, a course of harassing and bulling conduct toward me that has aggravated my disability, caused substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate purpose. On March 3, 2006 Rodems called me at home and started an argument over my motion to disqualify him. Rodems ridiculed my speech, and said you cant talk like a lawyer. Rodems also threatened to use his knowledge that I spent a $2,000 car rebate on dental work against me. There was nothing wrong with this, and Rodems was trying to upset me. Rodems then made a false affidavit about the call to the ciurt, and accused me of threatening to attack him in Judge Neilsens chambers. The matter was investigated by Kirby Rainesburger of the Tampa Police Department, who found I did nothing wrong. Mr Rainesburger also said Rodems was not right and not correct for representing to the court as an exact quote language that clearly was not an exact quote. Mr. Rodems has intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on me which has affected every aspect of my life and the life of my family. I have sought medical treatment for depression and other injury caused by this severe emotional distress.

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I believe Mr. Rodems has an earlier edition of this medical history document from his law firms prior representation of me. Mr. Rodems knew that I considered taking my own life, from his law firms prior representation of me. Therefore Mr. Rodems knew I was severely impaired. This is from the transcript of my deposition May 14, 2001 in the Amscot lawsuit when Mr. Rodems firm and partner represented me. This transcript is in the court file in Hillsborough Co., Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, case 05-CA-7205, see Exhibit 4, Verified Notice of Filing Disability Information of Neil J. Gillespie filed May 27, 2011. From the deposition of Neil Gillespie by John Anthony representing Amscot Corporation: From pages 31-32 22 Q Have you ever tried to take your own life? 23 A No. 24 Q Do you recall ever saying that you would consider 25 that under oath? 1 A I've considered it. Yes. 2 Q When is the most recent time you've made that 3 consideration? 4 A I think about it from time to time. 5 Q Even now with your medication? 6 A Pardon? 7 Q Even now with your medication? 8 A Yes. Surely Mr. Rodems reviewed this transcript in representing his law firm and law partner. 64. May 16, 2006 to February 26, 2008 consultation with Dr. William N. Williams, Ph.D., (Speech-Language Pathologist) Director and Professor, Craniofacial Center, University of Florida Shands, Gainesville, FL, for velopharyngeal incompetence, my speech prosthesis (obturator) no longer fits, I cannot wear it any longer. Glenn E. Turner, DMD, MSD, Director, Maxillofacial Prosthetics tried to make a new obturator, he failed; then another failed attempt by Dr. Fong Wong, BSD, DDS, MSD, Assistant Professor, Department of Prosthodontics. At the beginning of treatment I was unable to insert my old obturator in my mouth due to a gag reflex. Dr. Turner said this would be a problem in making a new obturator. Dr. Turner said there was no physical reason for my gag reflex or choking sensation. He said my gag reflex was caused by a psychological issue. He said this would complicate and delay the construction of a new obturator. After almost two years of effort, neither he nor Dr. Wong were able to make me an obturator. Dr. Turner offered the name of Dr. Kelly at the Moffitt cancer center in Tampa. Due to the choking issue and travel distance I declined to pursue another speech prosthesis. 65. March 2006 to October 2007, Dr. Michael Rowley MD, West Marion Family Medicine, 4600 SW 46th Court, Ocala, Florida 34474, primary care, closed practice to become hospitalist. Treated me for diabetes; depression and PTSD, with Effexor XR, propranolol

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August 25, 2007 West Marion Hospital ER, severe back pain following the death of a pet at UF College of Veterinary Medicine under awful conditions. (Aug-13-07). This incident of pain continued though October 1, 2007. Treated by Dr. Rowley. 66. September 16, 2009, untimely death of my Mother, proximate cause of this lawsuit. This has caused me significant emotional distress. Mr. Rodems has ridiculed my reference to this fact, including statements to Colleen Jenkins of the St. Petersburg Times, in a story January 22, 2010, Client-turned-adversary accuses Tampa law firm of conflict in judicial bid. Online at this URL: http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/client-turned-adversary-accuses-tampa-law-firm-ofconflict-in-judicial-bid/1067460 67. November 2009, Dr. Karin Huffer, 3236 Mountain Spring Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89146, Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA accommodation advocate and designer. February 17, 2010, Dr. Huffer prepared my ADA Assessment and Report (ADA Report) for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, submitted February 19, 2010 to Mr. Gonzalo B. Casares, ADA Coordinator, in Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, 05-CA-7205. DSM-IV Multiaxial Assessment (Axes I-V) Axis I: Axis II: Axis III: Axis IV: Axis V: Depression 296/3, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 309.81 with chronic and acute symptoms anxiety. N/A Velopharyngeal incompetence, Diabetes Type II Adult Onset Legal Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) prior 85 GAF with stress from legal system 60 in court

Dr. Huffers report shows the following: (These are selected passages, see the full report) Brief History: Mr. Gillespie suffers from Chronic Depression as diagnosed by Cesar R. Gamero, M.D. in Ocala, Florida, 2009. Dr. Gamero also concurs with earlier diagnoses as does Karin Huffer, M.S., M.F.T., of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and recognizes that Mr. Gillespie suffers from velopharyngeal incompetence that worsens when he is stressed. This presents a barrier to managing effective communication during litigation. The Social Security Administration found Mr. Gillespie totally disabled in 1994. Mr. Gillespie has been in need of ADA Accommodations since commencement of his legal actions. The fact that he was not protected by the ADA created an inaccurate perception of him to the Court and clearly demonstrates that Mr. Gillespie did not have equal access to the litigation proceedings or due process of law. The Americans with Disabilities Act should have protected Mr. Gillespie when he was first in litigation. With accommodations, he may well have avoided the severe trauma he suffers today.

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IV. Interference with Major Life Activities: A. Functional Impairments: Mr. Gillespie is functionally impaired in the areas listed below. It is important to note that Mr. Gillespie's impairments are largely invisible. He may appear to be functional on a superficial level even when he is not. Mr. Gillespie's functioning is the highest when he is in supportive and safe environments. His functioning deteriorates when he is in non-supportive, unsafe, or intimidating environments or when he is under any perceived time pressure or stress. His impairments are dramatically intensified during litigation. Mr. Gillespie cannot sustain concentration due to depression and symptoms of PTSD in the form of flashbacks, emotionally arousing and exhausting intrusive thoughts triggered by reminders of the traumatic events. Mr. Gillespie cannot sustain a communication path if interrupted, distracted, or threatening body language is used toward him. Such circumstances result in cognitive disorganization, dissociation, and an inability to integrate and process information. Mr. Gillespie cannot sustain a progressive chain of communication under stress due to his congenital speech problem. This communication is critical for litigation. Mr. Gillespie cannot open mail or address matters pertaining to his legal case without extreme anxiety. This slows him down when he faces deadlines. He cannot manage large amounts of hard copy documents. He must have the time to scan documents for management purposes. Mr. Gillespie cannot sleep normally, rest, or recuperate due to Post Trauma Stress symptoms including nightmares and startle responses (i.e., he jumps when doorbell rings). He has hyperreactivity/hyperarousal and she can't eat or sleep or digest food normally. Mr. Gillespie is easily hyperaroused on a physiological level, especially when feeling overwhelmed or under any perceived time constraint or threat. Hyperarousal makes it impossible for him to think clearly and make logical and knowing decisions when under extreme pressure. Mr. Gillespie is unable to withstand stress without triggering moments of dissociation. He may be unable to consistently remember the words that are spoken in Court and cannot perform verbally to participate in his legal case without assistance and accommodations. Mr. Gillespie is vulnerable to neuroanatomical effects that can be devastating, i.e. decreased hippocampal volume and hyperadrenia. Hyperadrenia influences all of the major physiological processes in the human body and has a host of physical, emotional, and psychological effects. Physical impairments may be induced when stress is protracted and unrelenting. B. Physiological impairment - Symptoms:

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Often overlooked by judicial personnel are well-established physiological changes experienced with PTSD, that seriously impair a persons ability to function during litigation without accommodations: Psychophysiological Effects Flashbacks; Startle responses; Hyper-reactivity/hyper-arousal Neurohormonal Effects Fear and extreme anxiety; Hyper-vigilance, unable to relax or have peace due to intrusive thoughts/emotions; Stress hormones reduce and down-regulate receptors, causing a feeling of being numb/exhausted and freezing the ability to process information and respond. Serotonin-dependent Effects, Depression Memory Impairment, Dissociation; Mr. Gillespie must use energy to fight the natural urge to deny the reality put before him; Traumatic intrusive thoughts threaten to crowd out the issue at hand during legal processes; Increased opioid response; a numbing hormone intended to protect the traumatized from pain must be overcome to deal with the legal issues at hand; It is an exhausting emotional "swim upstream" to stay focused and attentive in the . courtroom, critical data is missed, and nuances escape the person with PTSD. February 19, 2010, I submitted my ADA accommodation request (ADA Request) with a Notice, and the Courts ADA form in Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, 05-CA-7205. October 28, 2010, Dr. Huffer wrote a letter documenting the abuses in my case. Dr. Huffer is the author of Overcoming the Devastation of Legal Abuse Syndrome, and a founder of Equal Access Advocates (EAA), and Legal Victim Assistance Advocates (LVAA). Due to my indigence and/or insolvency, I can no longer afford Dr. Huffers services. Dr. Huffer however remains a part of my support system. 68. July 12, 2010 I had a panic attack during a hearing before Judge Martha J. Cook at the George E. Edgecomb Courthouse, 800 E. Twiggs Street, Tampa, Florida. Judge Cook refused to follow the directives of Court Counsel David Rowland on ADA accommodations. Mr. Rowland wrote to me July 9, 2010 and said the ADA coordinator could not moderate Mr. Rodems bullying behavior toward me. Coincidentally on July 9, 2010 I submitted an emergency motion to disqualify Mr. Rodems, and handed it to Judge Cook at the start of the hearing on July 12, 2010, but she refused to consider the motion and I suffered a panic attack. I felt a sudden onset of intense panic and terror. My symptoms included choking, palpitations, sweating, shortness of breath, chest pain, nausea, abdominal distress, feelings of unreality, feeling dizzy, unsteady, and feeling lightheaded. I felt an urge to escape danger.

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When Deputies of the Hillsborough County Sheriff Office (HCSO) saw I was in distress they offered assistance. I believe HCSO Corporal Gibson was present, along with HSCO Deputy Henderson and perhaps others. Tampa Fire Rescue was called. Corporal Gibson stayed by my side and walked with me to the lobby of courthouse while I waited for the paramedics. Tampa Fire Rescue responded, and an assessment was done at 10:42 a.m. by lead crew member Robert Ladue, EMT Paramedic (PMD 514678) and crew member 2 Dale Kelley, EMT Paramedic (PMD 49960). Later I obtained a report, incident number 100035129, which stated in the narrative section found 54yom sitting in courthouse with tight throat secondary to stress from court appearance and advise pt mult. times to be transported to hospital and pt refuses transport and states he would rather go to his Dr. pt signed refusal. The impressions section noted abdominal pain/problems. The nature of call at scene section noted Resp problem. After the panic attack I drove home and spoke with Dr. Karin Huffer by telephone at 3:03 p.m. and told her about the panic attack. At 3:36 p.m. I responded to an email for legal representation from attorney Pedro Bajo in Tampa. This is what I responded: Mr. Bajo, Would you consider just evaluating my motion to disqualify Mr. Rodems, with no representation? Thank you. Neil Gillespie 69. July 2008 to present, Dr. Cesar R. Gamero, MD, 9401 SW Highway 200. Building 2000, Suite 2004, Ocala, FL 34481. Dr. Gamero is a primary care doctor who treats me for diabetes, anxiety, depression, and all other medical issues. We tried Sertaline for depression and Clonazepam for anxiety but the side effects were to severe. Also Mirtazapine for depression, and Pristiq. Tried Aricept (leftover Alzheimers meds). Also Nuvigil to improve wakefulness and concentration. For diabetes and high blood pressure, lisinopril, metformin hydrochlorothiazide. Nuvigil works to focus my attention and temporarily overcome depression, but the side affects are significant and include severe headache, insomnia, sweating, dry mouth, constipation, dizziness, altered sense of being, and mood changes such as increased agitation, irritability and exaggerated sense of well-being. I also found Nuvigil not reliable. Sometimes it worked, but other times it incapacitated me. Nuvigil is also relatively expensive. My last prescription for 15 50mg tablets cost about $80. Samples of Nuvigil are available from Cephalon, the manufacturer, and from Dr. Gamero, but the sample size is 150mg. That strength, 150mg, incapacitated me and led to extreme headaches. Attempts to cut the 150mg tablet into a smaller size may result in an uneven dose, and reduced effectiveness, according to the pharmacist. Nuvigil is the replacement for Provigil, which patent has expired. The U.S. military provides Provigil to military pilots on long missions to keep them awake. Provigil has other off-label uses. Generic Provigil is also relatively expensive; Walmart quoted me $588.68 for thirty (30) 100mg tablets on July 18, 2012. This was a $398.78 savings off the $987.46 full price. This cost is prohibitive for me.

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Current health issues From a mental health perspective, I become easily confused and distracted. This is especially true when I leave home. When my lawsuit began in 2005, I had the ability go to the law library and do research for about one hour. Now when I go to the law library I am overwhelmed by the environment and cannot do anything, other than to hand the librarian a list of cases I found in outdated books at home and return in a week or so to pick up the copies. In 2011 while returning in my vehicle from the appeals court in Lakeland, I became completely lost for many hours. I can no longer follow directions on a map. To compensate for this deficit I obtained a GPS device, and take it with me on trips outside Ocala, so I can find my way home. Short term memory deficit. I am unable to read more than a few words at a time and type them on the computer. This makes legal work very time consuming. I believe short term memory deficit causes a hearing problem in court. Lack of concentration. When doing things I often become confused and unable to concentrate. I overwhelmed and depressed. At that point I stop and rest, or switch to another task. I become distracted with other tasks, likely an avoidance issue. It takes me a long time to do things. Switching between tasks works to a point. Other times switching tasks leads to more and more uncompleted tasks, when I forget to finish an earlier task. Hand-eye coordination deficit. My ability to do ordinary tasks is declining. My mind thinks of the task, but my hands and body do not respond like they used to. Many years ago I worked parttime as a banquet server, but I became too slow was unable to continue. I was not able to set tables or serve food quick enough, and my stamina declined. Assembling documents in my lawsuit has become difficult. I am only able to do so with computer-assisted technology. Forgetfulness. I have become very forgetful. This is a problem while cooking food. When I go to heat a can of soup on the stove, I soon forget about it, until I smell the food burning. This has resulted in the destruction of several pots and pans. Now I must set the timer anytime I cook. I compensate for forgetfulness by making lists, and leaving items in plain sight in the same place, so the location is burned in my memory. This results in a home that looks very disorganized to the casual observer, but it helps me go on. Diabetes. I become very tired when my blood sugar is too high. My doctor said his ideal blood sugar level is 110. Records show my blood sugar level May 25, 2011 at 8:41 p.m. reached 245. This was a week before a civil contempt hearing June 1, 2011 before Hillsborough Judge James Arnold. Through a series of ex-parte hearings, Mr. Rodems presented false testimony and obtained a warrant to arrest me on a writ of bodily attachment. Velopharyngeal Incompetence (VPI). Because I can no longer wear my speech prostheses, I cannot speak very long. The assessment of Dr. Jane Scheuerle, Tampa Bay Craniofacial Center, of June 2, 1993 helps explain this issue.

Page - 15

Social life. I live alone in a small two-bedroom retirement home with my pet bunny. My social life is limited to an occasional Thursday morning breakfast at a local restaurant with retired men who live on my street in Oak Run, a retirement community. The Thursday morning breakfast is a weekly event, but attending weekly is too stressful, so I go about once a month. I do not like eating in restaurants, I find the environment overwhelming. I also have a telephone relationship with a woman in Miami that began in late 2008. We have never met in person. She is retired and cares for both her elderly parents who are in their mideighties and very ill. Otherwise I stay at home and work on my case. Hearing deficit. This appears related to short term memory deficit. Telephone recording. My short-term memory is poor. My ability to accurately take notes is severely reduced. Even my concentration during a conversation is impaired. So recording a call allows me to listen to the caller a second or third time for a better understanding of the issues. This is in addition to another issue I mentioned, that opposing counsel once misrepresented the contents of a call to the court. When I was caring for my Mother, who had Alzheimers and other ailments, recording calls from the doctor allowed me to accurately understand the call and follow the doctors orders. That is how I got started recording calls. Sometimes the recording program inadvertently records my screams as I sit at my desk, cursing this lawsuit and legal system. Website as a coping mechanism. In my ADA accommodation request made February 19, 2010 in Hillsborough Co. lawsuit, I described how I would create a website to help find counsel. While I did not find counsel, people I meet with stories of legal injustice, and we support each other. Combinations of disabilities. A study by the World Health Organisation shows depression is more damaging to everyday health than chronic diseases such as angina, arthritis, asthma and diabetes. Researchers found if people are ill with other conditions, depression makes them worse. Somnath Chatterji of the World Health Organisation led the study. The most disabling combination was diabetes and depression, the researchers said. "If you live for one year with diabetes and depression together you are living the equivalent of 60 percent of full health," Chatterji said in a telephone interview. News of this study was reported by Reuters on September 7, 2007. The study is reported in the Lancet Medical Journal, Vol. 370 No. 9590 pp 851-858. On February 19, 2010 I made requests under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), including this one. ADA Request No.6: Mr. Gillespie requests time to scan thousands of pages of documents in this case to electronic PDF format. This case and underlying cause of action covers a ten year period and the files have become unmanageable and confusing relative to Gillespie's disability. Mr. Gillespie is not able to concentrate when handling a large amount of physical files and documents. He is better able to manage the files and documents when they are organized and viewable on his computer. Mr. Gillespie will bear the cost of converting files and documents to PDF.

Page - 16

AMERICAN ONCOLOGIC HOSPITAL

6.1
GILLESPIE, Neil

#74123

415-13

Rev. ]-8]

PROGRESS REPORT
Notll prairllss of caslI. complications. chanilll In dlaposls
condition on dlscharill. Instructions to patlllnt

CHART COpy

7/22/85

The patient is a 29 year old white male referred by Dr. Carver who is status post left unilateral 'Class IV lip and palate repair at approximately age two years old. He is unclear about the details of the degree of his defects, the surgical procedures, who performed this, or exactly where it was done. Apparently, after the initial bout of surgeries to repair the lip and hard and soft palate, he had no further surgical intervention. He had no ongoing follow-up for this problem. At approximately age 13 to 14 years old, he underwent orthodontic treatment at Temple University Hospital's Dental School and this ultimately resulted in the placement of a retainer with a prosthetic left lateral incisor. He has worn this since that time. He notices drainage of food into the left nasal floor. His left and right nostrils are opened, although the left is somewhat stuffy and occluded. His main concerns upon presentation are related to the persistent cleft in the left alveolus, the draining fistula, and the possibility of foregoing the need fOD a prosthetic device. In addition, however, it is obvious on confronting the patient that he has a moderate amount of nasal deformity, flattening of the left side in the premaxillary region, and lip distortion, particularly at the vermilion. In addition, the patient has a significantly hypernasal speech pattern with ~bvious velopharyngeal incompetence. On physical examination beginning externally, the patient has a slightly large nose with a small dorsal hump. The size of the nose is slightly larger than proportional to his face, although not exaggeratedly so. The right alar dome is full. The left alar cartilage is posteriorly and laterally displaced and somewhat hypoplastic compared to the left side. The left alar base is also laterally displaced. The nostril sill is flattened, and there is an obvious fistula between the distal nasal floor and the oral cavity. The left columella, likewise, is somewhat hypoplastic and twisted. The upper lip scar is well healed and appears to be a LeMesurier or Tennison-Randall type repair. The upper lip tubercle is preserved, but the vermilion border is somewhat irregular. Length appears, however, to be satisfactory. There is a-lateral orbicularis bulge of the left upper lip. Internally, there is a wide cleft of the left alveolar ridge at the level of the lateral incisor with a fistula into the nasal floor. This runs posteriorly and nearly to the end of the secondary palate. The soft palate has a linear scar. it is very short, and there is lateral movement but no central movement of note. continued ...

GILLESPIE, Neil Page Two . 7/22/85 My impression and recommendation to the patient generated three specific areas of interest. One relates to the scar revision of his upper nose and the relationships of his nasal tip, nose, and secondary deformities in this area. The second area of interest in importance is the alveolar cleft with the naso-oral fistula. The third area is the palate with obvious velopharyngeal incompetence and a foreshort and scarred palate. My initial recommendations will be that the patient undergo orthodontic evaluation. I will arrange for him to see Dr. Rosario Mayro for evaluation as well as x-rays to assess his occlusal relationships. It also should be noted that he, in general, had a fairly satisfactory occlusal relationship.with some lateral collapse and crossbite on the minor segment on the left and evaluate his adequacy as a candidate for bone graftin~which I think he would qualify. Subsequent to this, I will have him see Dr. Harvey Rosen concerning the actual surgical procedure and also he will be seen by Miss Marilyn Cohen, a speech pathologist with special interest in patients having cleft lip and palate for an evaluation concerning feasibility of posteropharyngeal flap in a patient of this age group. Concerning the external revisions, this can be accomplished concerning the upper lip, possibly at the same time as the fistula closure with orlllcularis redirection, a revision of the nostril sill and the lateral alar base, and also possibly tip rhinoplasty or this can be accomplished at a later date with a formal rhinoplasty in concert with other procedures. In addition, the vermilion border should be repaired. This can be done by Z-plasty technique. The patient, therefore, will be seen by the consultants and a general plan with timing'for surgery, etc., will be made. We will arrange to make these arrangements and follow-up with the patient. No letter.

ep s1ak, M.D. econstructive Surgery JK:bsm T--8/1/85 D--7/23/85

The Nl!!,i.\la~~ Hospital I Founded 1751

PENNSYLVANIA HOS- TTAL

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DEPARTMENT FOR SICK AND INJURED EIGHTH AND.SPKUCF; STREETS P.ADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19107 . PHONE (215) 829-5643

6.2
August 12, 1985
',.,

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HARVEY M, ROSEN. M,D, D,M,D, Head, Se,lion of Plastic Surgery H, ROBERT CATHCART, President

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Joseph Kusiak, M.D. American Oncologic Hospital Central " Shelmire Avenues ,.', ~~~l~~elphia, Pennsylvania 19111

".
Neil Gille.pie

RE:
Dear Joei"" ,

This lllorning your patient, t-lr. Neil Gillespie, was seen in consultation regarding his secondary cleft lip and palate deformi ties. His major concern at this point in time is the edentulous space in the region of the left lateral incisor which necessitates wearing a removable appliance. This area has never been bone grafted. On physical examination there is the obvious stigmatA of an unilateral left sided cleft lip and palate. Examination of the lip reveals poor aligrunent of the vermilion border. There is lack of muscle continui'ty high in the lip. Nasal examination shows a deviated septum with the body of the septum in the left nasal airway and the caudal end pre senting in the right nasal airway. There is a fla~~Q,~lar base. Tho alar sill i~ recessed. There is a slumping of the left alar rim. Tht:: right lower lateral cartilage is hypertrophied compared to the left lower lateral cartilage. Intraoral examination reveals an edentulous space in the region of the left li1teral incisor. There is an obvious oronasal fistula. There i~ a slight posterior cross bite in the lett posterior segment. There is marked velopharyngeal escape. I exp~a1nwd to Mr. Gillespie that in order for nim to have a iix~d bridge appliance made 60 thathhe could be rid of his removable ap pliance, an alveolar bone graft would be necGssary. Whether or not the posterior cro86bite should be corrected prior to this time is up to Dr. Mayro. At the &~e time that the bone graft is per formed lip revision could be done as well. At a secondary procedure a posterior pharyngeal flap And naaal reviaion could be performed.

and The Institute. III North 49th Street I Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19139 I Telephone (215) 471.2000

---_ __ __
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Joa.ph Kuaiak, M.D.

Auguat 12, 1985 I looK forward to 41a

Thank you for referring K% G11leQpie. cuas~9 him with you. Sest revarda.

Sincerely youre,

Harvey M. Rosen, M.D., D.M.D. cel

1iHa/e~

Rosie Mayro, D.M.D., 1830 Rittenhouse Square, Phila., PA 19103 Ma. Marilyn Cohen, Facial Reconstruction Center, Children'. Hoapital, Philadelphia, PA 19104

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11155

THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF PHILADELPHIA

THE CLEFT PALATE PROGRAM
34th and Civic Center Boulevard
Philadelphia. Pa 19104
(215) 596-9120

6.3

Don LaRossa. M. D., Director

September 12, 1985

Joseph Kusiak, M.D. American Oncologic Hospital Dept. of Plastic Surgery Dept. of Surgery
Central and Shelmire Ave.
Philadelphia, PA 19111 RE: Dear Joe: Thank you for referring Neil Gillespie for a speech evaluation. I had the opportunity of evaluating this gentleman on August 1, 1985. ~e had a history of a unilateral cleft lip and palate repaired some 1me in early childhood. He is presently wearing a dental shell which l ' l s obturating to some degree an anterior parallel fistula. He has had a short course of speech therapy during his early school years. Mr. Gillespie's speech is characterized by hypernasality with nasal escape. Hi~ hypernasality is accentuated when he removes his palatal appliance but I do not feel that the fistula is the prime cause ~f the hypernasality or the nasal excape. Occlusion of his naris with the appliance in place greatly improves the overall quality of his speech and generally eliminates the hypernasality. His articulation is well within the normal range. On direct physical examination, he appears to'have a deep oral pharynx' with a short but mobile soft palate. He has an active gag reflex,with fairly good lateral wall motion. I would suspect that he would do - fairly well with a posterior pharyng~al flap ~ut given his age the . prognosis is guarded. I discussed this recommendation with Mr. Gillespie and also informed him that there is the possibility even with the posterior pharyngeal flap that there may not be an improvement in his speech and that he could possiply require speech therapy following the flap. I do not feel he would benefit from a course of speech therapy at this point in time as this appears to be an anatomic defect.
>.' :

Neil Gillespie B.D. 3/19/56

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PlASTIC SURGERY: Peter Randall, M.D., Don LaRossa, M.D., Linton Whitaker, M. D., Ralph Hamilton, M. D., R:Barrett Noone, M.D.,). Brian Murphy, , ,:" Arthur Brown, M.D. SPEECH PATHOLOGY: Marilyn Cohen, B.A., Marilyn Bernhard, M.A.; DENTIST."" Rosario Mayro, D.M.D., 'Imes Schweipi; D.D.S.; QTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY: William Potsic, M.D., Steven Handler, M.D., Ralph Wetmore, M.D.; AUDIOLOGY: Richard Winchester, Ph.D.; PEDIATRICS: Patrick Pasquariello, M.D.; SOCIAL WORK: Susan Freimark, A.C.S.W.

M.D~.

(2)

RE: Neil Gillespie

If you would like further confirmation of the problem, I would recommend proceeding with nasal pharyngoscopy rather than lateral static x-rays. Thank you for allowing m~ to participate in Mr. Gillespie's care. With best regards, Sincerely yours,

Marilyn A. Cohen Speech Pathologist

MAC/med
cc: Harvey Rosen, M.D. Rosie Mayro, M. D. t..""

6.4

Rosario Felizardo Marro, D.M.D.

Practice Limited to Orthodontin

Harch 31, 1986

Dr. Harvey Rosen

Pennsylvania ~ospital
Suite 309
700 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA., 19106
Re: Neil Gillesoie

Dear Harvey: Mr. Neil Gillespie has began orthodontic treatment

in preparation for bone grafting. I anticipate that
he will be ready for surgery in the month of August,
1986. ~tr. Gillespie will be in touch with you shor~y
to set up a definite date Please do not hesitate to call me if you have any questions.
i

Best regards, Sincerely yours,

,~
Rosario F. r:layro, D.J.LD.
RFi'1:er
cc: Dr. Joseph Kusiak

1830 Rittenhouse Square, I-A, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

215-735-5211 ,: ....

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6.5

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APRIL

22) 986

1850 RITTENHOUSE SQUARE PHILADELPHIA) PA 19103

ROSARIO

F.

MAYRO) D.M.D.

RE: NEIL GILLESPIE

DEAR ROSIE: AT YOUR KIND SUGGESTION I EXAMINED YOUR PATTFNT" NEIL GILLESPIE" TODAY TO EVALUATE THE EXTENT OF GINGIVAL RECESSION AND PLAN CORRECTIVE SURGICAL PROCEDURES. THIS THRITY-YEAR OLD MAN IS IN GOOD GENERAL HEALTH. HE IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING ORTHODONTIC TREATMENT IN YOUR OFFICE AND A MAXILLARY BONE GRAFT IS SCHEDULED LATE NEXT SUMMER WITH DR. ROSEN. THE PATIENT HAS SEVERE GINr.IVAL RECESSION IN THE LOWER ARCH EXTENDING FROM THE LOWER LEFT FJ RST PREMOLAR TO THE LOWER RIGifT FIRST PRfMOI_AR. THERE IS ALSO SEVERE CERVICAL EROSION WHICH APPEARS TO BE SECONDARY TO OVERZEALOUS TOOTHBRUSHING. IN THE UPPER ARCH THERE IS RECESSION AND MUCOSAL MARGINAL TISSUE ON THE CANINES AND RIGHT LATERAL INCISOR. THERE IS ALSO A HIGH MAXILLARY FRENUM BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INCISORS. THE PATIENT HAS MINOR COMPLAINTS OF SENSITIVITY WITH EXTREMES OF HOT AND COLD IN AREAS OF RECESSION.

As WE DISCUSSED" I WILL BE PROCEEDING WITH CORRECTIVE MUCOGINGiVAl PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO ST~BILIZE THF. DENTOGINGIVAL JUNCTION AND PREVENT FURTHER RECESSION DURING ORTHODONTIC TREATMENT. IN AR E A 5 WHERE SENSIVITITY IS A PROBLEM OR THERE ARE COSMETIC CONCERNS" THE PROCEDURES WILL BE DESIGNED TO OBTAIN COVERAGE OF EXPOSED ROOT SURFACES.

DR. ROSARIO MAYRO APRIL 22J 1986 PAGE Two

I SEE NO PROBLEM WITH CONTINUED TOOTH MOVEMENT IN THE UPPER ARCH. I WOULDJ HOWEVERJ DEFE~ ACTIVE ORTHODONTIC TREATMENT IN THE LOWER ARCH UNTIL AFTER I HAVE COMPLETED THE MUCOGINGIVAL SURGERY.
I LOOK FORWARD TO COLLABORATI NG WITH YOU IN THE TREATMENT OF TH IS VERY CHALLENG ING CASE. I WILL KEEP YOU POSTED ON Mi<. GILLESP I E S PROGRESS.
I

SINCERJ~Y,/,
MARK

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SNYDERJ D.M.D.

MBS:MEB CC: HARVEY ROSENJ

D.M.D.J

M.D.

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PeriodontICS and Ora/Diagnosis

6.6
_. ---_.. _._----

MARK BSNYDER, DMD, PC

220-sc5JTH SIXTEENTH STREET SUITE 900

PHII.ADELPI /lA, PLNN5YIVANIA
(21': ':>46 O/?9
I(JIOY

JULY

3" 1986

ROSARIO F. MAYRO" D.M.D. RITTENHOUSE SQUARE PHILADELPHIA" PA 19103

1850

RE:

NEIL GILLESPIE

DEAR ROSIE:

I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT I HAVE COMPLETED PERIODONTAL SURGERY ON YOUR PATIENT NEIL GILLESPIE. A BAND OF KERATINIZED GINGIVAL TISSUE WAS PLACED FROM THE LOWER LEFT SECOND PREMOLAR EXTENDING ACROSS THE ANTERIOR REGION TO THE LOWER RIGHT SECOND PREMOLAR. IN THE UPPER ARCH THE MUCOSAL MARGINS ON THE ANTERIOR TEETH WERE ALSO REPLACED BY KERATINIZED GINGIVA. NEIL TOLERATED THE PROCEDURES ~XTREMELY WELL AND HEALING HAS BEEN UNEVENTFUL. INCIDENTIALLY" THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN HIS PLAQUE CONTROL. I HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT NEIL BE SEEN ON AN ONGOING BASIS FOR PERIODONTAL HEALTH MAINTENANCE APPROXIMATELY EVERY FOUR TO SIX WEEKS DURING THE ORTHODONTIC PHASE OF HIS TREATMENT. I WILL EE SEeING HIM AGAIN SHORTLY BEFORE HIS SURGERY WITH HARVEY ROSEN. HIS PERIODONTIUM IS CURRENTLY HEALTHY ENOUGH TO WITHSTAND THE RIGORS OF ANY ANTICIPATED TOOTH MOVEMENT.
THANK YOU FOR REFERRING THIS MOST CHALLENGING CASE TO ME FOR TREATMENT. IF I CAN BE OF ANY FURTHER ASS ISTANCE" PLEASE DON 'T HESITATE TO CALL.
i

CC:

HARVEY ROSEN" D.M.D." M.D.

JUL 0,,1986

.._._ ...._,

I ...

.~NSYLVANIA HOSPJ~ ~L
. N.tion's Fint HOIpit.11 FoundN 1751

DEPARTMENT FOR SICK AND INJURED EIGHTH AND SPRUCE STREETS ....ADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19106

6.7
May 18, 1987

/
HARVEY M. ROSEN. M.D. D.M.D He.d. Section of PI..tic Suraery Suite 3H. 301 South Eiahth Street H. ROBERT CATHCART, Pruidenl

~EPHONE (215) 829-5643

Pete~ Randall, M.D.

University of Pennsylvania Hospital
Four Silverstein
3400 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

RE: Dear Peter:

Neil Gillespie

I have asked Mr. Neil Gillespie to see you in consultation regarding a secondary cleft nasal deformity. Mr. Gillespie had been referred to me by Joseph Kusiak for a bone grafting procedure to his residual alveolar cleft. When first seen by me he had a very large nasal pal atal fistula with a significant alveolar defect. In addition, he had a rather severe cleft nasal deformity with a large amount of velopharyn geal insufficiency. A pharyngeal flap was discussed, but he declined this and wanted to concentrate on the bone grafting of his alveolar cleft as well as some secondary nasal surgery. He was operated upon last spring, at which time he underwent bone grafting of his rather ,..-extensive alveolar cleft and, at the same time, repositioning of the nasal septum and nasal' spine in the midline. He did wel~ followinq ~ these procedures, and approximately six months later he underwent a rhinoplasty procedure involving further work on his septum with only minimal resection, reduction of a dorsal nasal hump, and reduc tion of his left alar flaring. As a Desult of the last mentioned maneuver, he has developed some blockage of the left nasal airway due to excessive buckling of the lower lateral cartilage. It is-significant to note that prior to his nasal surgery he denied having anY}di,fficul ties wi t~ nas';ll br 7athing.. For thi~ reason. no extensi.Y,~.~~9r:kwa~~~ne to the r~ght ~nfer~or turb~nate, wh~ch is s~.'.~~;J~ ".t'IY'hypertrop~~ed, and the nasal septum was not more ~~--.e:i.el~'~rese'6ted. .' .
',' '., ~'i'r,:~~;'f:::'.'" .

I would appreciate your thouqhts on his residual problem. If you think further significant improvement can be obtained, and if he is agreeable, please do not hesitate to proceed with any surgery that you think advisable. .. Thank you in advance for seeinq Mr. Gillespie. Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Harvey M. Rosen, M.D., D.M.D. hrnr/eg

.nd The Institute. 111 North 49th Street I Phil.delphi., Pennsylv.ni. 19139 I Telephone (215) 4712000
, ,,-:t:. I )f~
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HOSPITAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 4TH FLeOR - SILVERSTEIN PAVILION

JONATHAN E. RHOADS, M.D. CLETUS W. SCHWEGMAN, M.D. BROOKE ROBERTS, M.D. PETER RANDALL, M.D. JULIUS A. MACKIE, M.D. L. HENRY EDMUNDS, JR., M.D. LEONARD D. MILLER, M.D. CLYDE F. BARKER, M.D. RALPH HAMILTON, M.D. HENRY D. BERKOWITZ, M.D. HAZEL I. HOLST, M.D. LINTON A. WHITAKER, M.D. ERNEST F. ROSATO, M.D. LEONARD J. PERLOFF, M.D. JAMES L. MULLEN, M.D.
3400 SPRUCE STREET PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19104 (215) 662-2000

6.8

June 17, 1987

DON LA ROSSA, M.D.

RICHARD N. EDIE, M.D.
LARRY W. STEPHENSON, M.D.
JOHN L. ROM BEAU, M.D.
GORDON P. BUZBY, M.D.
ALI NAJI, M.D.
W. CLARK HARGROVE, III, M.D.
V. PAUL ADDONIZIO, M.D.
CLIFFORD W. DEVENEY, M.D.
KAREN E. DEVENEY, M.D.
IRA J. FOX, M.D.
JOHN M. DALY, M.D.
MICHAEL H. TOROSIAN, M.D.
scon P. BARTLEn, M.D.

Harvey M. Rosen, M.D., D.M.D.

Suite 3H
301 S. Eighth Street
Phi1ade1phLa, PA 19106
RE: Dear Harvey: Thank you so much for your letter concerning Mr. Neil Gillespie. This certainly sounds like an interesting and rather difficult situation. I would be very pleased to see him. I will certainly keep you in touch with any plans, and do appreciate so much information. Thanks again. Neil Gillespie

Peter Randall, M.D. PR:spd cc:

~Mr. Neil Gillespie
~oseph

Kusiak, M.D.

FOUNDED 1855

6.9
THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF PHILADELPHIA THE CLEFT LIP AND PALATE PROGRAM
34th and Civic Center Boulevard
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(215) 596-9120
Don LaRossa, M.D., Director
Pam Onyx, Coordinator

March 30, 1989

Don LaRossa, M.D. HUP RE: Neil Gillespie DOB: 3/19/56 Dear Don: I had the opportunity of reevaluating Neil Gillespie on March 30, 1989. The speech evaluation is essentially unchanged since his last evaluation in 1985. Mr. Gillespie's speech is characterized by hypernasality with consistent nasal escape. On direct physical examination the palate appears to be short and slightly immobile. Articulation is within the normal range. I would recommend nasoendoscopy to confirm velopharyngeal incompetence and to evaluate the degree of lateral wall motion. Mr. Gillespie was counseled regarding the options for correction of his hypernasal voice quality, includ ing the use of dental prosthetics and posterior pharyngeal flap. I also ex plained to Mr. Gillespie that the prognosis after placing a posterior pharyn geal flap are somewhat guarded in an adult and that he may continue to have some persistent hypernasality requiring additional speech therapy. I believe Mr. Gillespie is interested in proceeding with a nasoendoscopy and will be contacting you after he receives notification from your office. Thank you for the opportunity of participating in this patient's care. Sincerely yours,
, / ' ,/-'

Marilyn E. Cohen Speech Pathologist MEC:sam cc: Mr. Neil Gillespie

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PLASTIC SURGERY: Peter Randall, M.D., Don LaRossa, M.D., linton Whitaker, M.D., Ralph Hamilton, M.D., Harvey M. Rosen, M.D., Joseph F. Kusiak, M.D., R. Barrett Noone, M.D., ). Brien Murphy, M.D. SPEECH PATHOLOGY: Marilyn Cohen, B.A., Marilyn Bernhard, M.Ed. DENTISTRY: Rosario F. Mayro, D.M.D., Dennis G. Sanfacon, D.M.D., Barry S. Kayne, D.D.S., Stanley Horwitz, D.D.S., Howard M. Rosenberg, D.D.S. OTORHININOLARYGOLOGY: William Potsic, M.D., Steven Handler, M.D., Ralph Wetmore, M.D., AUDIOLOGY: Dan F. Konkle, Ph.D. PEDIATRICS: Patrick Pasquariello, M.D. SOCIAL WORK: David ). Beele, M.S.W., A.C.S.W. Lawrence W. C. Tom, M.D. GROWTH/ANTHROPOLOGY: Nancy Minugh-Purvis, Ph.D. GENETICS: Elaine H. Zackai, M.D., Donna M. McDonald, M.s. PATIENT EDUCATION: Pamela H. Onyx, B.A. NURSING: Kelly Gould, R.N.

li. 'Ralph Millard, Jr., M.D., F.A.C.S.

thony

Wolfe, M.D., F.A.C.S.

Walter R. Mullin, M.D., F.A.C.S.

December 3, 1990

6.10

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie

23 Sweetgum Road Levittown, PA 19056 Dear Mr. Gillespie: Arrangements have been made for your admission to Jackson Memorial Hospital, East Tower, on Thursday, December 13th, 1990 between the hours of 12:00 and 2:00 p.m., for surgery the following day. Please be prepared to pay the hospital a deposit of $4400 toward payment of your final bill. However, they may accept insurance forms in lieu of payment. Please let us know at once if you prefer to be admitted on the morning of surgery, as we would have to arrange for your lab work to be done prior to the day of surgery. Also, we've arranged for Dr. Millard and his Resident, Dr. LaTourette, to see you in our office on Wednesday, December 12th at 10:00 a.m. for medical workup. Please send us your insurance forms with "insured section" completed and signed. This will help expedite the processing of your claim. Be sure to find out and let us know if your insurance company requires pre certification for planned surgery. Contact Marisol in our office as soon as possible regarding this matter. Kindly confirm these arrangements upon receipt of this letter. If we do not hear from you by December 12th, we will assume that you are unable to go ahead at this time and we will find it necessary to remove you from the schedule until we hear from you again. Enclosed is a list of special instructions which should help answer some of your questions. If we can be of further assistance, please feel free to call upon us.

~urs.
Chris Montoto Secretary to Dr. Millard

D. Ralph Millard, Jr., M.D., F.A.C.S.

'The Plastic Surgery Centre

6.11

Anthony Wolfe, .M.D., F.A.C.S. Walter R. Mullin, M.D., F.A.C.S.

Plutic and Re.:onsl:ruc:tivc Surgery Tel. (305) 325144.

1444 N.W. 14th Avenue
Miami. Florida 33125

December 6, 1990

Christy Barcelona Pennsylvania Blue Shield Pre-authorization Request P. O. Box 890041 Camp ~ill, PA 1708900041
TO WHO-I IT HAY CONCERi'J

Re: Neil Gillespie ID: D5ll5395 Group: 20l63C

The above natmed patient was seen in consultation by D. Ralph Hillard, Jr., M.D. on May 26, 1989 at which time reconstructive. surgery was scheduled. The patient \Vas born with a tmilateral cleft of the lip and palate including nasal distortion lvith difficulty breat~~g and nasal escape, secondary to tIle cleft. TIle proposed surgical procedure lvill be cleft rhinoplasty lvith submucous resection, possible pharyngeal flap and cleft lip correction, procedure codes: 30520, 40720 and 42226. Dr. Hillard's fee for these procedures lvill be approximately $3,900.00. Dr. ~lillard feels very strongly that this surgery is functional i."1 nature. We will greatly appreciate receiving pre-authorization for this surgical procedure. We will also appreciate your expeditious attention to this request as Hr. Gillespie's surgery is scheduled for Dece.'nber 14, 1990.

S)7Z:t:~r:L

Marisol Pardo, Insurance Secretary

~1P/a

JUN 29 1993
MUTAZ B. HABAL., M.D., F.R.C.S.C., FAC.S. PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTNE SURGERY
801 W. Dr. ".rtin L ICing, Jr. BIwI.

6.12
Telephone: 813/231HH09 FacsOnBe: 813/.238-1119

Tampa, FL 33603-3301

May 5, 1993

RE:

NEIL GILLESPIE

To Whom It May Concern: Neil Gillespie is a pleasant 37 year old white male patient seen 'today for the first time at the Tampa Bay Craniofacial Center. He brings with him today an organized synopsis of the multiple operative procedures that he has undergone, initially in Philadelphia and the last in Miami. The patient presents with velopharyngeal incompetency and is leaking air both posteriorly and interiorly. The palate is short and does not appear to have much activity. Prior to preparing Mr. Gillespie for a surgical procedure, I would like to do a complete visualization of his problem to see if the pharyngeal flap needs to be removed and enough time allowed for the tethered flap to adjust, or if a complete flap with two small posts on each side is appropriate in order to allow him to communicate and be understood despite his hypernasal speech which at the present time cannot be comprehended. These operative procedures will be discussed with the patient following the visualization procedure which has been scheduled at st. Joseph's Hospital on 6/1/93 and again in consultation with Dr. Scheuerle. I will see him prior to the procedure on 5/26/93 at 1:45 p.m. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate 'to com municate with us.

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Mutaz B. Habal, M.D.
(dictated but not read)

Sincerely,

MBH/bbd/5-8

6.13
June 2, 1993 Robert E. Williams, Ed.D. certified Rehabilitation Counselor Department of Labor and Employment Security Divisional of vocational Rehabilitation 11213 B North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612
Department of Communication Sciences and Disorders College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, BEH 255 Tampa, Florida 33620-8100 (813) 974-2006 FAX (813) 974-2668

Re.: Neil J. Gillespie Dear Dr.

Willia~s,

Thank you for your letter of inquiry concerning Mr. Neil Gillespie's health and employment status and potential. Each of your five questions concerning Mr. Gillespie's diagnosis and treatment plan is listed and addressed below. 1. What is Mr. Gillespie's disability (ies) and what is the level of severity? -.,. Mr. Gillespie has sustained the surgical results of mUltiple treatments for a congenital cleft lip and palate. While he is facially intact, he retains several incomplete elements of the sequelae of this congenital dysmorphology. Because of the oro-nasal fistula and velar limits, Mr. Gillespie is utilizing extreme measures to make his speech intelligible. He is applying undue stress to the laryngeal and pharyngeal musculature a control the normal air stream. Because of his extra effort in striving to meet the demands of society, he is at risk for damaging his larynx. Also, the unnatural openings between the nose and mouth invite incidence of infection and irritation to sensitive tissues that were never meant to associate in this way. Exchange of food stuffs and secretions between the two cavities must be stopped to promote complete healing and maximal function. 2. What is Mr. Gillespie's functional level? What physical limitations (e.g., speaking, hearing, communicating, etc.) are imposed by the disabilities? Because of his present oro-facial-pharyngeal status, Mr. Gillespie is not advised to use his full voice in long-term verbalization. That is, prior to closure of the fistulae, and correction of the palate, he would be ill advised to lecture, or undertake pUblic speaking. He can communicate intelligibly on a one-to-one basis and as such he displays an astute mind with considerable .~ experience with interpersonal communication. This level of communication is possible due to Mr. Gillespie's conscientious and accurate speech articulation. When he attempts to use a stronger (louder) voice, the increased

'<\MPA

ST. PETERSBURG

SARASOTA

FORT MYERS

LAKELAND

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FlORIOA IS

m AFFIRMATIVE ACTION I EOUAL OPPORTUNITY INSTITUTION

air pressure increases the hypernasal resonance and thereby decreases the effectiveness of his speech. He looses intelligibility and fatigues rapidly. Because I have no objective data on his hearing status, I can only be suspicious that it is currently within normal range, but also that he has sustained the effects of early, untreated middle ear effusions that usually result in conductive hearing loss during infancy. effort was seen yesterday at the Tampa Bay Craniofacial Center for assessment of the current status of his congenital orofacial cleft condition. Mr Gillespie is experiencing severe speech expression problems due to inadequate intra-oral and oronasal structures. Although he has had several surgeries in an earnest attempt to resolve this problem, none of the procedures have completed the treatment he requires in order to produce clear verbal communication .. 3. What is the probable future course of the disability (ies)? If untreated, Mr. Gillespie rjsks irritation and abuse with abrasion to the laryngeal tfssues, continued irritation to the upper airway and mutual irritation and possible infection to the oral and nasal mucosa due to the uncontrolled exchange of cavity contents during every day living activities. 4. Are there any work environments that must be avoided? If untreated, Mr. Gillespie must work in settings that provide minimal irritants to the nasal, oral and pharyngeal mucosa. He must avoid excessive drying of those tissues and the linings of the larynx. He must not shout, use his speaking voice in excess, or be exposed to excessive or continual loud noise because of both the hearing factor and the need to override the noise with use of a loud voice. 5. will treatment ease, alleviate, or remove the disability (ies)? If so, what treatment is recommended? Treatments are available to alleviate the current problems and remaining dysmorphologies that underlie the problems cited above. However, the exact mode of treatment requires an objective examination of Mr. Gillespie's intra-oral, oro-nasal, and oro-pharyngeal structures. The approach that has been suggested by the Craniofacial Team at the Tampa Bay Craniofacial Center includes the following steps. A. - out patient hospitalization for nasendoscopy to determine the present cause of immobility in the soft tissue of the soft palate and to visualize the extent of the nasopharyngeal gap. If the last surgical result has modified over time, it mqy be desirable to surgically

modify the present condition by severing any tethering tissue that is limiting palatal function. Prior or sUbsequent to the hospital experience, a complete aUdiological assessment would be helpful to rule out any middle ear dysmorphologies connected with the congenital problem. . B. - Clini9al observation indicates that following this careful, objective examination, Mr. Gillespie will need surgical correction of (a) the anterior oronasal fistula; (b) bone graft to complete the maxillary alveolar arch; and (c) 'secondary palatoplasty to form a pharyngeal flap to reduce the hypernasality. [Please note that the order in which these are listed assure that the separation of cavities, the continuation of the airway and the skeletal support of soft tissue modification will prevent any' future deterioration of these same tissues.] ,. ".,' , . c.' :.-Following surgeries to correct all the current interfering dysmorphologies, Mr. Gillespie will need to '.' have sixmontlls of speech therapy to 'assure' that he no .'c longer over-activates his larynx and' learns to utilize ;. fully 'th.e're-confiqilred oral and oro";;pharyngeal ,," : structures. ' " ," ' . ,;':::;Due to his current physical disability Mr. Gillespie is ':experiencing rejection in job applications . It is the opinion of the Craniofacial Team that correction of the 'identified sequelae of the congenital dysmorphology, this young may will be able to find employment in any current or emerging job site that requires his type of skills. He is competent in matters of business, and has a keen interest in dealing with people~ He may seek employment in human service areas, personnel management, or counseling whether in business or in some specialized area., of human communication. As a student at the University of South Florida and a promising contributor to our community, this young man needs support to pursue . appropriate treatment for the remaining dysmorphologies of his mouth, throat and face. ' . Please let me know if I can be of further assistance . to you in your efforts to provide the needed assistance to Mr Gillespie.

~/i6

fLe~:l~y~,~'t.G-<A.,c...'l/t.."',

euerle, CCC-SLP
Professor
co-Director, Tampa Bay Craniofacial Center

OREGON I-IEALTI-I SCIENCES UNIVERSIlY

CIIII..I) I)EVELOPMENT & REHAUIfJTA'Il0N CENTER 1'.0. Box 57/i~ Portland, Oregon 97207-0574

6.14

Services for G1., ildre1l u,itb Special J/eallb Needs l}1lfl..ersity AjJUfated Plugrllll1

June I, 1994

To Whom It May Concern: RE: Neil Gillespie

This 38 year old I1lan has a repaired unilateral cleft lip and palate. His primary surgery was
done in Pennsylvania and he had SOITIe secondary work including a pharyngeal flap for
speech, in Florida.
Since speech treatlnent for serious hypernasality has been unsuccessful up to this point, the
patient came to Ine for consultation about a speech plan.
Examination shows objectionable hypernasality with moderate nasal emission of air which
markedly weakens all 16 air pressure phonemes. Use of the fiber-optic nasendoscope on May
26th verified that the pharyngeal flap, done three years ago (for speech), has pulled loose.
The treatment plan is to utilize a telnporary speech prosthesis (for circa two years) to
markedly obturate all sounds froln entering the nasal cavity. After normal oral resonance is
obtained and Inaintained for about four to five ITIonths, an obturator reduction program would
begin whereby the throat and palate 111usculature would be "challenged" by slowly making the
obturator sl11aller, in stages. At the end of approximately two years, it is expected that oral
nasal resonance anti oral air pressure would be close to normal limits and that pharyngeal and
palate 111usculalurc \vould have inlproved considerably. This is expected to nlake the patient's
velopharyngeal systenl nluch Inore anlenabie to a surgical procedure to substitute for the
speech prosthesis \vithout c0l11promising the patient's nasal airway.
Respectfully sublnitted,

Robert W. Blakeley, Ph.D.

Professor of Speech Pathology,
Director, Craniofacial Disorders Progralll

blak/b:gille~pi.

6.15
Craniofacial Center Health Science Center
PO Box 100424 Gainesville, FL 32610-0424 Telephone: (352) 846-0801 Fax: (352) 846-1539 e-mail: Wiliiams@dentaLufLedu

Clinic Report: Videofluoroscopic assessment of the velopharyngeal port during function for speech

Re: Dental No.: Medical No.:

Neil Gillespie 18-80-41 10-44-032

This forty year old white male was seen on November 25, 1996 for a videofluoroscopic assessment of his velopharyngeal port during function for speech. Mr. Gillespie is currently wearing a speech bulb obturator, and his speech resonance frequently alternates between hyponasality and hypernasality. The purpose oftoday's filming was to determine the size, configuration and placement of the bulb in the nasal pharynx to determine if alteration of these factors can improve his overall resonance quality. The nasal pharyngeal structures were coated with a thin barium sulfate solution to aid in defining soft tissue contrast. Records were obtained in the lateral and frontal (A-P) planes with and without the speech bulb obturator. Detailed analysis of the film revealed the following conditions: 1. Without the obturator the soft palate is mobile, demonstrating a movement pattern appropriate to the several speech samples Jared produced. Although there is good velar mobility, contact with the posterior pharyngeal wall is not achieved. That is!, a consistent gap of 10 - 12 mm exists between the elevated velum and the posterior pharyngeal wall during speech. 2. The depth of the nasopharynx, as measured along the palatal plane from the posterior nasal spine to the posterior pharyngeal wall is 25 mm. This compares to the norm of 24 mm 2 mm/SD revealing Mr. Gillespie's nasopharyngeal depth to be well within normal limits for his age. 3. The configuration of the posterior pharyngeal wall is nearly vertical above and below the palatal plane, a pattern well within normal limits. 4. An A-P view revealed symmetrical mesial movement of the lateral pharyngeal walls approximately 25 - 50% of the distance from rest to midline.

Neil Gillespie Fluoroscopic assessment of VP Function for Speech November 25, 1996

In summary, Mr. Gillespie presents with a speech pattern characterized by near normal resonance but which frequently alternates between hyponasality and hypernasality. He is currently wearing a speech bulb obturator and today's assessment revealed placement and configuration to be near optimal.' Without the obturator, Mr. Gillespie's speech is significantly hypernasal and although the velum elevates appropriately there remains a consistent gap of 10 - 12 mm during speech. In order to further define whether any improvement can be made to the speech bulb obturator or if a secondary surgical technique might be a viable consideration, a nasendoscopic assessment should be conducted. If I can be of any further assistance in the interpretation of this film please call me at (352)

8:;~~
W. N. Williams, Ph.D.
Speech-language Pathologist
cc:
Mr. Neil Gillespie
1121 Beach Drive, N.E.
Apt. C-2
81. Petersburg, FL 33701-1434 Mr. Glenn Turner P.O. Box 100435 JHMHC Dr. Brent Seagle P.O.Box 100286 JHMHC

Medical, Dental, Center Records

Yale University

]. Douglas Bremner, M.D. Departments of Diagnostic Radiology and Psychiatry School ofMedicine Diagnostic Imaging Yale-New Haven Hospital 20 York Street New Haven, Connecticut 06504

6.16

~~~
8/14/97

Yale Psychiatric Institute POB 208038, Yale Station New Haven, CT 06520 (203)737-5787 FAX7857855 email, j.bremner@yale.edu

Thank you for your interest in our research program on victims of childhood abuse al1d the brain. If you or anyone else is interested, you can stay for free in our research unit and obtain financial compensation which more than offsets travel expenses, as well as a comprehensive diagnostic and biological assessment, including brain imaging. You can call 203 737 5791 for information. Also look at our web site at http://info.med.yale.edu/psych/org/ypi/traumaltauhome.htm Thanks again.

~~mner, M.D.

~~

Assistant Professor of Diagnostic Radiology & Psychiatry

Yale University School of Medicine;
Research Physician, YaieNA PET Center,
VA Connecticut Healthcare System;
Director, Trauma Assessment Unit,
Yale Psychiatric Institute

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ABC Evening News, Health Report, August 18, 1997. Peter Jennings introduces,
Growing up damaged - by John McKenzie, ABC News - (JM)
JM - It is a time of adventure, a time of discovery. It's long been known that what children see, and hear, and feel, can have a powerful impact on their development. But only now are scientists beginning to understand just how powerful

Dr. Dorothy Lewis, New York University: We realize that the consequences actually can affect the brain's anatomy, the structure of the brain itself: and then it can affect the way in which the child adapts for the rest ofhis life.
JM - At Yale University scientists are conducting pioneering research on the effects of child abuse;

Dr. Douglas Bremner, Yale University: Being physically injured, having broken bones, bruises, trips to the hospital, having objects thrown at them, sexually assaulted by relatives.
JM - Researchers discovered that kind of abuse produces physical changes in the brain, including one area called the left Hippocampus. Researchers found the abuse results in the Hippocampus actually shrinking, and by as much as 20 percent. For victims the affects can be profound.

Dr. Douglas Bremner, Yale University: They have behavioral problems, they have increased aggression, they can't form lasting relationships, they have trouble keeping jobs, they intrusive memories and night mares that make it almost impossible for them to lead a normal life.
JM - Scientists believe that repeated abuse causes stress in the child, and the production of stress hormones. Too much of these hormones can damage, even kill nerve cells in the brain. And scientists are discovering the abuse need not be physical. Researchers affiliated with Harvard University tested people who had been subjected as children to severe psychological abuse, subjected to repeated screaming, and yelling, and harsh critical language. The results were startling. Guxtaposed brain scan images appear) This is a scan of a health brain, and this from someone who was verbally abused as a child. Although subtle, you can actually see a difference. Right here in the pathway linking the left and right hemispheres ofthe brain. In the abused, the area is smaller, narrower; that can lead to hyperactivity and impulsive behavior. And the effects appear lasting. Researchers find these brain abnormalities in adults well into their forties and fifties.

Dr. Dorothy Lewis, New York University: And its something that we don't know ifwe can reverse.
JM - Revealing evidence that a child's brain may be much more vulnerable than ever imagined. John McKenzie, ABC News, New Haven, Connecticut. (end).

August 22, 1997 Dr. Douglas Bremner PET Center 950 Campbell Avenue, lISA West Haven, CT 06516 Dear Dr. Bremner, Thank you for your recent appearance on the ABC News Health Report with John McKenzie entitled "Growing up damaged." I am interested in additional information about the subject, including diagnostic recommendations. My interest is personal. Born with a craniofacial disorder affecting both speech and appearance, I was subjected to severe psychological abuse, both familial and societal. At age 41 I am currently disabled with "mental health issues," but I do not believe an accurate diagnosis has been made in my case. Having earned a BA in psychology, my understanding of brain development suggested the possibilities reported by the ABC News Health Report. However I have not been able to locate a practitioner knowledgeable about this condition, or willing to perform a bran scan. Your suggestions are appreciated. Thank you again for your consideration. Sincerely,

@[?))1
Neil J. Gillespie 1121 Beach Drive NE, apt. C-2 St. Petersburg, FL 33701 (813) 823-2390

September 17, 1997 J. Douglas Bremner, MD Assistant Professor ofDiagnostic Radiology & Psychiatry Yale University School ofMedicine; Research Physician, YaleNA PET Center, VA Connecticut Healthcare System; Director, Trauma Assessment Unit, Yale Psychiatric Institute POB 208038, Yale Station New Haven, CT 06520 Dear Dr. Bremner,

Thank you for your letter and accompanying information about Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Pursuant to your offer of a comprehensive diagnostic and biological assessment, including brain imaging, I would like to schedule an appointment.
Last Friday I spoke briefly with Susan Insell at the number you provided (203-737 5791). Ms. Insell was unable to offer any definitive information. Kindly advise when this appointment could be scheduled.

Thank you again for your consideration and patience.

Sincerely,

(Q)[?JW
Neil J. Gillespie 1121 Beach Drive NE, apt. C-2 St. Petersburg, FL 33701 (813) 823-2390

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550 First Avenue, ~~~I~Y~o~1514 Cable Address: NYUMEDIC Department of Psychiatry
(212) 263

6.17

6208

September 4. 1997

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie 1121 Beach Drive NE, Apt. C-2 St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Dear Mr. Gillespie: Thank you for your letter of August 22,1997. Unfortunately I do not know of someone in your area who specializes in the complications of craniofacial disorders. I am sorry I cannot be of more help. Sincerely.

Dorothy 0 now Lewis. M.D. Professor DOL/vh

ABC Evening News, Health Report, August 18, 1997. Peter Jennings introduces,
Growing up damaged - by John McKenzie, ABC News - (JM)
JM - It is a time of adventure, a time of discovery. It's long been known that what children see, and hear, and feel, can have a powerful impact on their development. But only now are scientists beginning to understand just how powerful

Dr. Dorothy Lewis, New York University: We realize that the consequences actually can affect the brain's anatomy, the structure of the brain itself: and then it can affect the way in which the child adapts for the rest ofhis life.
JM - At Yale University scientists are conducting pioneering research on the effects of child abuse;

Dr. Douglas Bremner, Yale University: Being physically injured, having broken bones, bruises, trips to the hospital, having objects thrown at them, sexually assaulted by relatives.
JM - Researchers discovered that kind of abuse produces physical changes in the brain, including one area called the left Hippocampus. Researchers found the abuse results in the Hippocampus actually shrinking, and by as much as 20 percent. For victims the affects can be profound.

Dr. Douglas Bremner, Yale University: They have behavioral problems, they have increased aggression, they can't form lasting relationships, they have trouble keeping jobs, they intrusive memories and night mares that make it almost impossible for them to lead a normal life.
JM - Scientists believe that repeated abuse causes stress in the child, and the production of stress hormones. Too much of these hormones can damage, even kill nerve cells in the brain. And scientists are discovering the abuse need not be physical. Researchers affiliated with Harvard University tested people who had been subjected as children to severe psychological abuse, subjected to repeated screaming, and yelling, and harsh critical language. The results were startling. Guxtaposed brain scan images appear) This is a scan of a health brain, and this from someone who was verbally abused as a child. Although subtle, you can actually see a difference. Right here in the pathway linking the left and right hemispheres ofthe brain. In the abused, the area is smaller, narrower; that can lead to hyperactivity and impulsive behavior. And the effects appear lasting. Researchers find these brain abnormalities in adults well into their forties and fifties.

Dr. Dorothy Lewis, New York University: And its something that we don't know ifwe can reverse.
JM - Revealing evidence that a child's brain may be much more vulnerable than ever imagined. John McKenzie, ABC News, New Haven, Connecticut. (end).

August 22, 1997 Dr. Dorothy Lewis Dissociative Disorders Clinic New York University Medical Center 540 1st Avenue New York, NY 10016 (212) 263-6208 Dear Dr. Lewis, Thank you for your recent appearance on the ABC News Health Report with John McKenzie entitled "Growing up damaged." I am interested in additional information about the subject, including diagnostic recommendations. My interest is personal. Born with a craniofacial disorder affecting both speech and appearance, I was subjected to severe psychological abuse, both familial and societal. At age 41 I am currently disabled with "mental health issues," but I do not believe an accurate diagnosis has been made in my case. Having earned a BA in psychology, my understanding ofbrain development suggested the possibilities reported by the ABC News Health Report. However I have not been able to locate a practitioner knowledgeable about this condition, or willing to perform a bran scan. Your suggestions are appreciated. Thank you again for your consideration. Sincerely,

Neil J. Gillespie 1121 Beach Drive NE, apt. C-2 St. Petersburg, FL 33701 (813) 823-2390

(Q)~W

Velopharyngeal inadequacy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Velopharyngeal_incompetence

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

(Redirected from Velopharyngeal incompetence) Velopharyngeal inadequacy (VPI) is a malfunction of a velopharyngeal mechanism. The velopharyngeal mechanism is responsible for directing the transmission of sound energy and air pressure in both the oral cavity and the nasal cavity. When this mechanism is impaired in some way, the valve does not fully close, and a condition known as 'velopharyngeal inadequacy' can develop. VPI can either be congenital or acquired later in life.

Velopharyngeal inadequacy
Classification and external resources ICD-9 528.9 (http://www.icd9data.com /getICD9Code.ashx?icd9=528.9) eMedicine ent/596 (http://www.emedicine.com /ent/topic596.htm) MeSH D014681 (http://www.nlm.nih.gov /cgi/mesh/2011/MB_cgi?field=uid& term=D014681)

1 Terminology 2 Relationship to cleft palate 3 Classification 4 Causes 5 Treatment 6 References 7 External links

Different terms can be used to describe this phenomenon in addition to velopharyngeal inadequacy. These terms and definitions are as follows: Velopharyngeal insufficiency: The inability of the velopharyngeal sphincter to sufficiently separate the nasal cavity from the oral cavity during speech. Velopharyngeal incompetency: When the soft palate and the lateral/posterior pharyngeal walls fail to separate the oral cavity from the nasal cavity during speech. Although the definitions are similar, the etiologies correlated with each term differ slightly; however, in the field of medical professionals these terms are typically used interchangeably. Velopharyngeal inadequacy is the generic term most often used to describe the functionality of the velopharyngeal valve.

A cleft palate is one of the most common causes of VPI. Cleft palate is an anatomical abnormality that occurs in utero and is present at birth. This malformation can affect the lip, the lip and palate, or the palate only. A cleft palate can affect the mobility of the velopharyngeal valve, thereby resulting in VPI.

7
1 of 3

7/29/2012 8:08 AM

Velopharyngeal inadequacy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Velopharyngeal_incompetence

The most frequent types of cleft palates are overt, submucous, and occult submucous.

While cleft is the most common cause of VPI, other significant etiologies exist. These other causes are outlined in the chart below:

VPI flow chart compiled from the following sources: Johns, Rohrich & Awada, 2003 and Peterson-Falzone, Karnell, Hardin-Jones,& Trost-Cardamone, 2005

A common method to treat Velopharyngeal insufficiency is pharyngeal flap surgery, where tissue from the back of the mouth is used to close part of the gap. Other ways of treating velopharyngeal insufficiency is by placing a posterior nasopharyngeal wall implant (commonly cartilage or collagen) or type of soft palate lengthening procedure (i.e. VY palatoplasty).

Conley SF, Gosain AK, Marks SM, Larson DL (1997). "Identification and assessment of velopharyngeal inadequacy". Am J Otolaryngol 18 (1): 3846. DOI:10.1016/S0196-0709(97)90047-8 (http://dx.doi.org /10.1016%2FS0196-0709%2897%2990047-8) . PMID 9006676 (//www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed /9006676) . Johns DF, Rohrich RJ, Awada M (2003). "Velopharyngeal incompetence: a guide for clinical evaluation". Plast. Reconstr. Surg. 112 (7): 18907; quiz 1898,1982. DOI:10.1097/01.PRS.0000091245.32905.D5

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Velopharyngeal inadequacy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Velopharyngeal_incompetence

(http://dx.doi.org/10.1097%2F01.PRS.0000091245.32905.D5) . PMID 14663236 (//www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14663236) . McWilliams, Betty Jane; Peterson-Falzone, Sally J.; Hardin-Jones, Mary A.; Karnell, Michael P. (2001). Cleft palate speech. St. Louis: Mosby. ISBN 0-8151-3153-4. Hardin-Jones, Mary A.; Peterson-Falzone, Sally J.; Judith Trost-Cardamone; Karnell, Michael P. (2005). The Clinician's Guide to Treating Cleft Palate Speech. St. Louis: Mosby-Year Book. ISBN 0-323-02526-9. Willging JP (1999). "Velopharyngeal insufficiency". Int. J. Pediatr. Otorhinolaryngol. 49 Suppl 1: S3079. DOI:10.1016/S0165-5876(99)00182-2 (http://dx.doi.org /10.1016%2FS0165-5876%2899%2900182-2) . PMID 10577827 (//www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed /10577827) .

Several Examples of Velopharyngeal Inadequacy (http://www.FauquierENT.net/voicenasal.htm) Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Velopharyngeal_inadequacy&oldid=496889991" Categories: Congenital disorders This page was last modified on 10 June 2012 at 11:56. Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply. See Terms of use for details. Wikipedia is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.

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The Evergreen State College Olympia, Washington

Psychosocial Implications of Congenital Craniofacial Disorders Lifespan Developmental Psychology

Jerry Shulenbarger, Ph.D, faculty
Winter quarter, 1995

"I just wanna be normal Doctor, give me that old fashioned normality"
--Actress Uma Thurman as Sissy Hankshaw pleading to Dr. Dreyfus in the film "Even Cowgirls get the Blues"

Submitted by Neil J. Gillespie

Dedication

To Dr. Robert W. Blakeley Professor of Speech Pathology Director, Craniofacial Disorders Program Oregon Health Sciences University Child Development & Rehabilitation Center

Thank you

Your effort and treatment on my behalf have given me the voice to make this oral presentation

Table of Contents

Page 1

Introduction

Page 2

Birth

Page 6

Freud

Page 7

Hi story

Page 9

Teasing

Page 12

Speech

Page 15

Bibliography

Final Page

Reasearch Outline

Introduction

My interest in the subject of the psychosocial implications of congenital craniofacial anomalies is personal. palate. I am afflicted with a unilateral cleft lip and I welcome the opportunity to write and speak on the The

subject to promote further public understanding.

process also provides me with greater self-awareness. This report will focus on persons with congenital anomalies as opposed to acquired disfigurement. Acquired

craniofacial disfigurement results from accidents, fires and illness. The psychosocial implications for each group vary

and I will note them throughout the report. My presentation will include photographs of persons with various examples of craniofacial disorders. Unlike

other disabilities, facial disfigurement is to a large extent visual, and a picture really is worth a thousand words. I will begin this paper with the story of a young mother and the birth of her son. I'll also discuss Freudian

implications, historical background, the subject of teasing and speech concerns. In America, about 4 million babies are born each year. Between the 7th and 8th week of gestation, the nasomedial process completes the fusing of the philtrum of the lip. This fails to occur in about 1 of every 700 live births, resulting in about 5,700 new cleft cases per year.

Page-l

Birth, the beginning of mother-child relationship

I would like to begin this project by considering the thoughts of a young mother, Rita Brzozowski, and her reaction to the birth of her son, Adam. Rita's story

appeared in the May/June 1992 issue of AboutFace, a craniofacial support group newsletter. Rita begins,

"For most people, having their first child is an exciting event. There are the usual

concerns about what could go wrong, but a normal, healthy baby is expected. When our

first child, Adam, was born this was not the case. It started with a discernible hush in "Just a hare lip", Not able to see the

the delivery room.

replied my obstetrician. baby's face,

I tried to recall anything I

knew about this condition ... When I saw him, my heart sank. This was not the perfect baby

I had envisioned - the one with the rosy checks, delicate lips and upturned nose. This baby's face was disfigured ... As I held my newborn son, all I could see was this defect ... I felt I was in a dream and held someone else's child." Later Rita would say, blow. "My ego had suffered a major

I did not feel pride in showing my baby to others.

Even a trip to the pediatrician was a challenge to my pride

Page-2

and vanity.

In the waiting room I would keep Adam's face

hidden over my shoulder." My information indicates that Rita's experience is not unusual. Brantley and Clifford (1979b) found that mothers

of children with cleft lip and/or palate reported significantly greater negative recollections of the postnatal period than mothers of normal children. Other reactions have been more negative, including abandonment of the child. This is particularly true in Russia (Blakeley), All of this

Korea and to a lesser extent, China (Li).

information points to an important fact: The interaction between mother and child is a critical factor in determining the psychological adjustment of these children. A recent study entitled The Role of Maternal Factors in the Adaptation of Children with Craniofacial Disfigurement was completed at Harvard Medical School and Children's Hospital, Boston, MA (Campis, DeMaso, Twente, 1993) and reported in The Cleft Palate-Craniofacial Journal (January 1995). This study hypothesized that maternal adjustment,

perceptions, and social support would better predict child adaptation to craniofacial disfigurement than medical severity. Of the 77 children (ages 6-12) in the study, 33

had cleft lip and/or palate, the other 44 had a more severe deformity. The study found that maternal adjustment and

maternal perceptions of the mother-child relationship were more potent predictors of children's emotional adjustment than either medical severity or maternal social support. This study also reported that the degree of facial

Page-3

disfigurement had no relationship to child or maternal perceptions, but that having a comorbid severe medical condition was related to greater behavior problems in children. This study cited nine prior studies which

indicated that children with craniofacial disfigurement have difficulties in psychological adjustment and two studies to the contrary. The study also cited other conflicting The major limitation

information in almost every category.

of this study was that the evaluation of child adjustment relied on parent report. Also, with a predominance of upper

SES families in this study, caution is the word regarding generalization of findings. Another study I found was done at the University of Washington School of Medicine in Seattle, entitled "Psychological Functioning of Children with Craniofacial Anomalies and Their Mothers: Follow-up from Late Infancy to School Entry" (Speltz, Morton, Goodell, Clarren, 1992). In

this study, 23 mothers and their 5- to 7-year old children with craniofacial anomalies (CFA) who were assessed in an earlier study (Speltz, et al., 1990) were followed. the small sample size and high rate of control-group attrition, this study is important because longitudinal research on the psychological development of CFA children and adolescents is almost nonexistent. The results of this Despite

study indicated that a (1) a sizable minority (18%) of the children with CFA had clinically significant behavior problem scores; (2) individual differences of CFA children

were predicted by observational measures of earlier mother

Page-4

infant interaction; (3) mothers of CFA children with visible defects reported less favorable social support than mothers of CFA children without visible defects. One interesting aspect of this survey was that the potential predictor variables used were based on observational measures of mother-infant play and teaching interactions. These measures are infrequently used in CFA

psychological research despite their widespread application in other areas of developmental psychology. Also, mothers

of CFA children reported higher levels of emotional distress and greater marital conflict than controls, as reported on standardized questionnaires. In the Child Behavior

Checklist (CBCL) portion of this study, girls with CFA had mean scores above the 85th percentile for their normative group, but boys with CFA had mean scores very near their normative average. In addition 18% of the CFA children had

CBCL scores above the 95th percentile, indicating the need for clinic-referral for psychiatric problems (compare with non-CFA children at considerably less than 5%). The researchers suggested that the mother's child-directed orientation during play with her infant or toddler may predict maternal behavior problem reports up to 4 years later; higher levels of child-directed play skill were associated with lower subsequent CBCL scores. As we have seen from the foregoing information, there are early psychological implications for persons with congenital craniofacial anomalies. Juxtaposed with acquired

disfigurement in later life, these implications are unique.

Page-5

Freudian Considerations From a Freudian psychosexual developmental perspective, cleft lip and palate offers some interesting considerations. These considerations involve the first psychosexual stage, the Oral Stage. "According to the theory, from birth to age one, the mouth, tongue, and gums are the focus of pleasurable sensations in the baby's body, and feeding is the most stimulating activity." (Berger, 1994) Feeding an infant with cleft lip and palate presents a challenging set of physical circumstances. "Children with a

cleft palate cannot create sufficient negative pressure to suck milk, which is expressed from the nipple between the upper and lower gum pads, because of the absence of a palatal seal" (Berkowitz, 1994). One mother described each

feeding of her cleft palate infant as a "nightmare" (AboutFace January/February 1993). In addition to feeding problems, surgery of the lip, palate and gums of an infant presents an opportunity for pain and trauma. Presurgical orthopedic alignment

procedures as well as postsurgical concerns are another source of possible interference with oral stage development. In addition postsurgical feedings are sometimes especially difficult. I feel that the above issues place an afflicted infant "at risk" for possible oral stage fixation. This is not a

concern with craniofacial disfigurement acquired later in life.

Page-6

Historical Perspective Dr. Benjamin M. Spock, in his latest book A Better World For Our Children, provides a poignant example of the negative attitudes confronting persons with congenital deformities. On page 21 of his book, Dr. Spock relates a

story told by his mother and the impact the remarks made on him. "She taught us that sinful thoughts were as harmful as

deeds, and to touch ourselves "down there" was not just sinful but might cause birth defects in our children. After

four years of medical school and four residencies, I thought I had long outgrown such teachings, but I recall when our first child was born I returned from the hospital's nursery to my wife's room to exclaim happily, and ten toes!" Attorney Allen Fagin spoke at the 1992 NFFR Conference on facial disfigurement and noted that until recently a number of major American cities had "ugly laws" that imposed fines on "unsightly" people who were seen in public places. An example was the Chicago municipal code which, until 1974, fined persons who appeared in public who were "diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed, so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object". In addition, I found examples dating from Medieval England. One example dating from the late eleventh or "Mike has ten fingers

twelfth century is the first evidence for both cleft lip and palate in British archaeology. "Despite the inability to

breast-feed, and the possible social stigma, the individual had survived into adulthood" (CPJ).

Page-7

Another example is found in documentary evidence from sixteenth century Kent. The document, with an illustration This document is interesting

of the child, is dated 1568. for two reasons.

While descriptive of the facial cleft, the

document clearly repudiates the child's mother for being unmarried. The headline of the document proclaims "The

forme and shape of a monstrous child", and describes the cleft lip as "the mouth slitted on the right side, like a Libardes [lizard's] mouth, terrible to beholde". The

document also proclaims "A warnying to England", describes the mother, one Marget Mere as, " ... being unmaryed, played The

the naughty packe, and was gotten with childe ... "

document suggest that this deformed child should be a warning to those indulging in a sinful life, and thus move them to repentance.

Page-8

"Teasing" I'd like to begin this section with a brief quote from the book "Beauty is the Beast, Appearance-Impared Children in America", by Ann Hill Beuf. "On Monday, March 1, 1988,

an American sixth-grade student walked into his elementary school classroom and shot himself. He did this because his Clearly

classmates had teased him about being overweight".

the time has come to address the problem of "teasing". The first step in confronting the issue of "teasing" is to give this activity a more appropriate name: Verbal Assault, based on disability or appearance. In a sense, it is easy to understand why children verbally assault those who look different. As Dr. McCurdy

states in his book "The Complete Guide to Cosmetic Surgery", "Young children are extremely perceptive of differences in appearance, and, as they are relatively uninhibited in their social interactions, such differences are freely pointed out" . Sociologist Macgregor notes that derisive laughter is also a potent and destructive force. She writes "These The

reactions to derisive laughter appear to be universal. Hopi Indians, well aware of its effect, could and did

deliberately drive an offender in the community to insanity by the simple punishment of laughing at him". Two other groups of unlikely offenders are health care providers and teachers. "When a child is born with impaired

appearance, many hospital staff members employ the term F.L.K. ("funny looking kid") to describe the infant to one "Use of the "F.L.K." term constitutes an Page-9

another (Beuf).

act of objectification.

So does any use of language that

refers to the child by his or her disorder such as "the cleft palate in room 320" (Beuf). "That is, by focusing on

the master-status of "person-with-impai red-appearance " and thus ignoring the traits possessed by the child as an individual, the stigmatizer manages to reduce the victim to the position of a thing rather than a person" (Beuf). Trivialization was used by some doctors to remind the children of people who were worse off than they were, with comments such as, "You're lucky you don't have cancer."

Surely doctors do not set out to wound the feelings of their young patients, but they have been taught in medical school to judge the seriousness of a medical problem in terms of its life-threatening nature. In a New York Times story on physical disfigurement, author Jill Krementz said that while many of the disfigured children she interviewed received support from their peers, a few were teased mercilessly or even attacked by schoolmates because of how they look. "The only children

who had a really painful time from their peers were the ones who had facial disfigurements," Ms. Krementz said, adding that children who are missing limbs or have other disabilities are more likely to receive comments on how well they are doing. Krementz's observations have been noted by Macgregor who states; " ... there are two other handicapping aspects associated with dento-facial deformity. In the

Page-IO

first place, the area in and around the mouth is both emotionally charged and strongly connected with one's self-image. As an instrument of speech

and eating, as well as a mirror of emotions, it also has unique social and psychological implications and symbolic meaning. Any

abnormality in this area, therefore, is not only highly visible and obtrusive but - as research has shown - tends to evoke a type of aversion which is both esthetic and sexual.

Teachers are another source of problems for afflicted children (The Providence Sunday Journal). Examples cited by

Beuf include a teacher ridiculing a student who lost a contact lense and another who's home-room teacher didn't see the harm of a student being called "Dumbo ears" because of protruding ears. Legislation such as the American's with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the recently passed Washington State bill # 5474 on Disability Discrimination should be utilized to prevent the abuses cited in this section. Parents must be willing to fight for their child,

Beuf emphasized, "and why they don't is sometimes a mystery" .

Page-II

Speech

Speech is a mirror of the soul; as a man speaks, so is he. Publilius Syrus, circa 42 B.C.

Speech is a concern that separates cleft palate from some other craniofacial disorders. The psychological

implications of speech present challenges to the afflicted individual from infancy through adulthood. Cleft palate children are at risk for language development problems. A screening device to address this The "Parent

issue was the subject of a recent study.

Questionnaire for Screening Early Language Development in Children with Cleft Palate" is the title of the paper. Thirty subjects, 16 to 30 months of age received the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory: Toddler (CDI:Toddler). A control group was also tested. Both

groups received a speech language screening.

Results

indicated that the CDI:Toddler was a valid screener of language development. The cleft group demonstrated evidence of delays in expressive language development. The cleft group had a mean

vocabulary of 177 words, compared with 288 words for the control group. sentences. The cleft group used shorter, less complex

Intelligibility was poorer in the cleft group.

Within the cleft group, hypernasality ratings of moderate and severe were associated with expressive language delays.

Page-12

Adult cleft palate populations are also at risk for impaired speech concerns, when related to employment, as demonstrated by two studies. "From a psychological

standpoint Neiman and Duncan emphasized the importance of speech. This study revealed that speech was the single

factor that adversely affected the selection of prestigious jobs even in the presence of a facial disfigurement. It

would appear that speech should be given top priority." (Lehman, Jr., MD, 1993) I spoke with Dr. Lehman about this study, where photos of persons with both unilateral and bilateral cleft lip and palate were shown to a personnel manager. Also presented

were tape recorded voices, both normal and hypernasal speech. The hypernasal speech was much less likely to be

viewed as having the communication skills needed in the marketplace. Another study was conducted by Dr. Jane Scheuerle at the Tampa Bay Craniofacial Center. In this test adult cleft

palate subjects voices were tape recorded, both preoperative and postoperative. The recorded voices were presented to a

panel of three business persons for evaluation as employees. The results favored the postoperative voices unanimously. Adult speech issues were also noted at the First International Symposium for Long Term Treatment in Cleft Lip and Palate at the University of Bern, Switzerland. "When an adult does not speak correctly, those around him notice it immediately, and speculate whether or not the affected person is of normal intelligence. For this reason, we feel

Page-13

that correct speech has many important consequences." (J. Weissen, 1979) "From the beginning our team considered

speech evaluation and speech therapy as most important, because receptive speech, i.e. that which one hears, is dependent on the entire environment (i.e. 360 degrees) as opposed to the operative cosmetic result which is only visual, i.e. maximal field of 180 degrees." (Weissen

& M. Bettex, 1979)

Goffman's view of craniofacial handicapping conditions expressed the subject especially well. "The closer the

defect is to the communication equipment upon which the listener must focus his attention, the smaller the defect needs to be to throw the listener off balance. These

defects tend to shut off the afflicted individual from the stream of daily contacts, transforming him into a faulty interactant, either in his eyes or in the eyes of others". Sigmund Freud was an individual who suffered acquired speech impairment. for palatal cancer. In April, 1923, Freud underwent surgery More operations followed in the fall He had

and Freud was compelled to wear a prosthesis.

trouble speaking and was rarely free of discomfort (Gay).

Page-14

Bibliography 1. Robert W. Blakeley, Ph.D., Professor of Speech Pathology, Director, Craniofacial Disorders Program, Oregon Health Sciences University, CDRC, Portland, OR Personal communication and photographs. 2. The Cleft Palate-Craniofacial Journal (CPJ), January 1995, Volume 32, number 1, American Cleft Palate-Craniofacial Association (ACPA). "The Role of Maternal Factors in the Adaptation of Children with Craniofacial Disfigurement" by Leslie Campis, Ph.D., David Ray DeMaso, M.D., and Allison White Twente, Ph.D.

3.

CPJ, January 1995, Volume 32, number 1, ACPA,

"Parent

Questionnaire for Screening Early Language Development in Children with Cleft Palate" 1993, Nancy Scherer, Ph.D and Linda L. D'Antonio, Ph.D.

4.

CPJ, November 1994, Volume 31, Number 6, ACPA,

"Medieval

Example of Cleft Lip and Palate from St. Gregory's Priory, Canterbury", by Trevor Anderson, M.A.

5.

CPJ, September 1993, Volume 30, Number 5, ACPA, "Psychological Functioning of Children with Craniofacial Anomalies and Their Mothers: Follow-Up from Late Infancy to School Entry" by Matthew L. Speltz, Ph.D., Kathi Morton, Ph.D., Elizabeth W. Goodell, Ph.D., Sterling K. Clarren, M.D.

Page-IS

6.

Dr. Benjamin M. Spock,

"A Better World For Our Children"

National Book Network, 1994

7.

National Foundation For Facial Reconstruction (NFFR), Conference Proceedings of 11/18/92, "Special Faces: Understanding Facial Disfigurement."

8.

AboutFace newsletter, May/June 1992, Vol. 6, No.3, Rita Brzozowski, "A Mother's First Lesson", cover story.

9.

Weissen, J., Speech Therapist, Department of Pediatric Surgery, Inselspital, CH-3010 Berne. Proceedings of the

First International Symposium, Long Term Treatment in Cleft Lip and Palate, August, 1979, University of Bern, Switzerland.

10

Jim Lehman, Jr., MD, AboutFace Newsletter, March/April, 1993, "Ask a Professional" column and personal communication.

11

Ningyi Li, MD, DDS, Professor and Chairman, Department of Stomatology, Qingdao University Medical College and Hospital, Qingdao, Shandong, The Peoples Republic of China. Personal communication.

12

The Complete Guide to Cosmetic Facial Surgery, John A. McCurdy, Jr., MD FACS, 1981, Frederick Fell Publishers, Inc.

Page-16

13.

Ann Hill Beuf,

"Beauty is the Beast; Appearance

Impaired Children in America", 1990, University of Pennsylvania Press.

14.

Kathleen Stassen Berger,

liThe Developing Person Through

the Life Span", third edition, 1994, Worth Publishers

15.

Samual Berkowitz, DDS, MS, FICD,

liThe Cleft Palate

Story", 1994, Quintessence Publishing Co., Inc.

16.

The New York Times, Thursday, October I, 1992, "Parent

& Child" by Lawrence Kutner.

17.

Frances Cooke Macgregor, M.A., Social and Psychological Implications of Dento-Facial Disfigurement, 1969

18.

The Providence Sunday Journal, October 7, 1990, by Rosemary Jones of the Allentown Morning Call.

19.

Thurston County Works in Progess, November 1994, Legislative Report Card, Disability bill

20.

Cleft Palate and Cleft Lip: A Team Approach to Clinical Management and Rehabilitation of the Patient. 1979, W.B. Saunders Company

21.

Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis

Page-17

1966, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., Peter Gay, intra.

22.

Dr. Jane Scheuer1e, Co-Director, Tampa Bay Craniofacial Center, Tampa, Florida, personal communication 1993.

23.

Goffman, E., Alienation from interaction, Human Relations, 1957.

Page-18

Dr. Blakeley is a pioneer in the use of speech obturators to correct velopharyngeal incompetence, the hypernasal speech associated with cleft palate.

April, 1994 Multnomah Athletic Club, Portland, Oregon right: Dr. Robert W. Blakeley, Ph.D, Speech Pathologist left: Neil Gillespie, age 38

My speech obturator made at Oregon Health Sciences University (OHSU) under the direction of Dr. Blakeley.

OREGON I-IEALTI-I SCIENCES UNIVERSIlY

CIIII..I) I)EVELOPMENT & REHAUIfJTA'Il0N CENTER 1'.0. Box 57/i~ Portland, Oregon 97207-0574

Services for G1., ildre1l u,itb Special J/eallb Needs l}1lfl..ersity AjJUfated Plugrllll1

June I, 1994

To Whom It May Concern: RE: Neil Gillespie

This 38 year old I1lan has a repaired unilateral cleft lip and palate. His primary surgery was
done in Pennsylvania and he had SOITIe secondary work including a pharyngeal flap for
speech, in Florida.
Since speech treatlnent for serious hypernasality has been unsuccessful up to this point, the
patient came to Ine for consultation about a speech plan.
Examination shows objectionable hypernasality with moderate nasal emission of air which
markedly weakens all 16 air pressure phonemes. Use of the fiber-optic nasendoscope on May
26th verified that the pharyngeal flap, done three years ago (for speech), has pulled loose.
The treatment plan is to utilize a telnporary speech prosthesis (for circa two years) to
markedly obturate all sounds froln entering the nasal cavity. After normal oral resonance is
obtained and Inaintained for about four to five ITIonths, an obturator reduction program would
begin whereby the throat and palate 111usculature would be "challenged" by slowly making the
obturator sl11aller, in stages. At the end of approximately two years, it is expected that oral
nasal resonance anti oral air pressure would be close to normal limits and that pharyngeal and
palate 111usculalurc \vould have inlproved considerably. This is expected to nlake the patient's
velopharyngeal systenl nluch Inore anlenabie to a surgical procedure to substitute for the
speech prosthesis \vithout c0l11promising the patient's nasal airway.
Respectfully sublnitted,

Robert W. Blakeley, Ph.D.

Professor of Speech Pathology,
Director, Craniofacial Disorders Progralll

blak/b:gille~pi.

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These images were found online and added August 3, 2012 under fair use for illustrative purposes.

The Evergreen State College Olympia, Washington

Freuds Oral Psychosexual Theory and Craniofacial Disorders

FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY Alan Nasser, Ph.D, faculty Winter quarter 1995

Submitted by Neil J. Gillespie

This paper considers Freud's oral psychosexual theory and persons with a craniofacial disorder. Information is presented in four sections, followed by my conclusion. 1. Infantile Sexuality The Freudian oral psychosexual stage begins at birth. "The mouth, tongue, and gums are the focus of pleasurable sensations in the baby's body, and feeding is the most stimulating activity" (Berger). Freud notes that the "[M]ost striking feature of this sexual activity is that the instinct is not directed towards other people, but obtains satisfaction from the subject's own body. It is auto-erotic..." (Freud, Three Essays). Freud goes on to say that, "It was the child's first and most vital activity, his sucking at his mother's breast, or at substitutes for it, that must have familiarized him with this pleasure. The child's lips in our view, behave like an erotogenic zone, and no doubt stimulation by the warm flow of milk is the cause of the pleasurable sensation" (Freud, Three Essays). So, Freud asserts an oral erotogenic zone and suggests that the flow of warm milk causes a pleasurable sensation in this zone. His theory states that, "The sexual aim of the infantile instinct consists in obtaining satisfaction by means of an appropriate stimulation of the erotogenic zone which has been selected in one way or another" (Freud, Three Essays). 2. Craniofacial Disorder For this paper I use the craniofacial disorder cleft lip and palate. The etiology of this congenital disorder occurs between the 7th and 8th week of gestation, with a fusion failure during the nasomedial process (Patten). The resulting disorder presents an oralnasal fistula, often with premaxilla protrusion. In layman's terms this means that the afflicted individual, internally, has a hole in the palate, or roof of the mouth, resulting in an unnatural opening between the mouth and nose. Externally, the afflicted individual
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has a facial deformity, where the openings of mouth and nose are conjoined. Sometimes the upper gum line protrudes from this opening (premaxilla protrusion). The afflicted individual almost always experiences feeding problems and surgical trauma. 3. Clinical Observations. Feeding an infant with a cleft presents a challenging set of circumstances. Dr. Berkowitz notes that Children with a cleft palate cannot create sufficient negative pressure to suck milk, which is expressed from the nipple between the upper and lower gum pads, because of the absence of a palatal seal (Berkowitz). In addition to feeding problems, surgery of the lip, palate, and gums of an infant causes pain and trauma. Reconstructive procedures may include pre-surgical orthopedic alignment of the premaxilla (infant wears a facial orthopedic device), arm restraints (to prevent the baby from removing the device), cleft lip and palate closure, and construction of a pharyngeal flap (for speech improvement). Post-surgical trauma includes pain, swelling, sutures, additional feeding problems, and wearing arm restraints. 4. Non-clinical observations One mother described each feeding of her cleft afflicted infant as a nightmare (AboutFace). Another mother relates the experience with her afflicted baby saying, Few individuals would try the challenge of feeding him, risking his choking and vomiting on every drop (AboutFace). These experiences are in stark contrast to Freuds observation of a normal infant. Freud states, No one who has seen a baby sinking back satiated from the breast and falling asleep with flushed cheeks and a blissful smile can escape the reflection that this picture persists as a prototype of the expression of sexual satisfaction in later life (Freud, Three Essays).

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Conclusion Freud states the following about oral stage developmental fixation: Every external or internal factor that hinders or postpones the attainment of the normal sexual aim will evidently lend support to the tendency to linger over the preparatory activities and to turn them into new sexual aims that can take the place of the normal one. (Freud, Three Essays). If so, it follows that the clinical and non-clinical observations cited in this paper point to the possibility of fixation to the oral psychosexual stage of development. Examples of behavior indicating oral psychosexual stage fixation include smoking, drinking, eating disorders, and a proclivity to speaking. Thus I conclude that a cleft lip and palate puts an afflicted individual at risk for oral fixation. Concerning the legitimacy of the theory, Fisher and Greenberg state in their book Freud Scientifically Reappraised: Testing the Theories and Therapy, that Freudian oral psychosexual developmental theory is a valid psychological phenomenon. (Fisher and Greenberg). Bibliography 1. Kathleen Stassen Berger, The Developing Person Through the Life Span, third edition, 1994, Worth Publishers. 2. 3. Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Basic books. Samual Berkowitz, DDS, MS, FICD, The Cleft Palate Story, 1994, Quintessence Publishing Co., Inc. 4. AboutFace, craniofacial support group newsletter, January/February 1993 and May/June 1992. 5. 6. B.M. Patten, Human Embryology, third edition, 1968, McGraw-Hill Book Company. Seymour Fisher and Roger Greenberg, Freud Scientifically Reappraised: Testing the Theories and Therapy, first edition, 1996, Wiley-Interscience Publishers.

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Psychotherapy for Persons with Craniofacial Deformities: Can We Treat without Theory?
M. ELIZABETH BENNETT, PH.D. MARY L. STANTON, B.S.
In recent yrs, Incr..slng number. of experts hev. recomm.nded tMt psychological support be avall.ble for cle" children .nd their ,.rent Fe. cle" ,...1. c.nt.... howev.r offer comprehensive psychologlCIII ..rvlees. This paper pr.sent. lOme conceptual tactor. which may contribute to the piluclty of psychological treatment. available to cleft children and their famlll... Shortcoming. In current concepts of emotional dy.functlon In cleft chlldr.n are dl.cussed, and the effect. of conceptu81 confusion on options for psychother.py ar. outlined. Suggted directions In p.ychotherapy r....rch tor clen children are discussed.
KEY WORDS:

clfJfting, emotional dysfunction, psychotherapy

improved over the past 5 years, this seems unlikely be cause of the low priority of mental health services in most publicly funded agencies. How is it that psychological services are so difficult to come by in a population which has consistently been iden tified as needing psychological care? At least two factors may contribute to this, including (I) the relatively low priority of psychological services in public assistance pro grams mentioned previously, and (2) the inherent difficul ties of providing weekly psychological interventions to center populations which may be diverse economically, geographically. and culturally.

Numerous studies have documented psychosocial prob lems associated with cleft lip and palate. Children with clefts have been reported to have lower self-concepts than normals (Broder and Strauss, 1989), lower self-esteem than nonnals, impaired peer relationships, and increased dependency on adults (Pil1emer and Cook, (989). In addi tion, poor body image (Strauss et aI., 1988) and poor academic performance have been noted in children with clefts (Richman el a1.. 1988). Teachers have also reponed that cleft children more frequently display conduct disor ders when compared with their normal peers (Richman. 1976). Information from surveys of the parents of cleft children suggests that cleft children master developmental tasks more slowly and resist separation from parents more strongly (Benson et aI., 1991). Given this list of psychological problems and familial distress associated with clefting, it is not surprising that numerous authors have suggested that psychological treat.. ment should be available to children with clefts and their families (Heller et al., 1981; Arndt et aI., 1987; Bjomsson and Agustsdottir, 1987; Pertschuk and Whitaker. 1987, 1988; Broder and Strauss, 1989). Such recommendations are so common that cleft palate centers were surveyed (Broder and Richman, (987) to determine what psycho logical services were available to children receiving treat ment at cleft palate centers. The results of the Broder and Richman survey were discouraging. Few centers reported offering psychological treatment for cleft children. Less than SOli, of centers offered mental health screening interviews, and fewer still offered short tenn therapy (21%). In 1987, only 13% pro vided long.. term psychological support for children with clefts or their families. Although these figures may have
Dr. Bennett and Ms. Slanton are affiliated with the University of Pittsburah. School of Dental Mcdic:inc. Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania. Submitted November 1992; Accepted January 1993. Reprint requests: M. Elizabeth Bennett. Ph.D., Department of Rehav
ion1 Science. University of Piltlburgh School of Dental Medicine,
Pittsburah. PA IS261.

The Problem of Psycbotherapy

While either factor just mentioned may be partially re sponsible for the generally low level of psychological services available to cleft children and their families, we believe there may be a more obvious and troublesome root to the lack of psychological services. Having determined that psychological services are a necessary adjunct to cleft treatment, few investigators have defined which psycho logical treatments are suitable for cleft children. We could locate no controlled studies that differentially evaluated the efficacy of psychotherapy for cleft children or their families. As Strupp (1978) notes in his studies of psychotherapy outcome, it is not enough to demonstrate that psychother apy is effective in a general sense. Because the major issue of psychotherapy is behavior change, researchers must define what is to be changed and how change can be brought about. In the area of facial deformities, we are largely unable to answer these questions. What does a cleft child (or adult) want to change? What should the aim of psychotherapy be for a cleft child? What are the chief emotional problems of indiv iduals with faci aI deformities?

Emotional Dysfunction in Cleft PersoDs

A review of the literature provides few answers to the first question, "What does a cleft child or adult want to

Bennett and Stanton, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND FACIAL DEFORMITIES 407

change?" Although we found numerous studies which de scribed emotional problems in cleft children, many lacked appropriate control groups. Thus. it is impossible to draw firm conclusions from these studies because equivalent, noocleft children drawn from the same sorts of popula tions may experience emotional problems as well. An examination of those studies which did employ adequate or methodologically appropriate empirical techniques suggest that questions remain regarding what, if any, emo tional problems typically accompany a diagnosis of clefl Ii p/palate. For example, Richman ( 1983) reported that cleft adoles cents did not show significantly more personality or ad justment problems than did nonnal controls. In addition. this report noted no significant differences in self-per ceived academic functioning and social satisfaction in cleft persons compared with their noncleft peers. Simi larly, Bjomsson and Agustsdottir (1981) concluded that cleft individuals were relatively well adjusted socially and achieved educational levels similar to those of normal controls. Most imponant, these researchers noted that their cleft subjects did not believe that their cra.niofacial defect had significantly influenced their lives. In contrast, Heller et aI., (1981) reported that a signifi cant number of cleft patienls report continuing dissatis faction with appearance, hearing, speech. and teeth. Simi larly, Kapp-Simon (1985) reported that cleft patients had poorer self-concepts than normal controls. With regards to achievement motivation, Peter and Chinsky (1975) re poned that cleft subjects had significantly lower educa tional aspirations when compared with their normal peers. Additionally. McWilliams and Paradise (1973) reported that fewer cleft subjects were married during adulthood when compared to their normal peers. Clearly, there are inconsistencies in the data regarding emOlionaVsocial dysfunction and clefts. While some re ports seem to indicate that clefting has relatively insignifi cant effects on emotional functioning, other data provide strong evidence to the contrary. Such contradictions have not gone unnoticed in the literature, leading at least one author (Tobiasen, 1984) to suggest that consistent, mean ingful answers to questions about emotional dysfunction and clefting cannot be answered without sufficient theo retical specificity. Even if we accept that there are emo lional problems which occur more frequently in cleft children than in normal children. Strupp's second ques tion, "how change can be brought about" cannot be ad dressed without theory. How Can Change be Brought About? This question must be answered in the context of theory; a theory of how dysfunction develops and how it can be changed. Although broad theories of personality may be of use in generating general answers about human emo tional dysfunction, they may be considerably less useful in providing specific answers for the facially deformed.

For example, both psychodynamic and social learning theorists would postulate that emotional distress arises in part from repeated, painful, developmental experiences. However, such broad hypotheses tell us little about the nature of those experiences for facially deformed persons. It is understandable that researchers have sought a model more specific to the experiences of cleft palate children to answer questions relevant to the development and treat ment of emotional dysfunction in cleft children. The most popular notion of emotional dysfunction in cleft children has been that of 'reflected appraisals" or 'lhe "looking glass selr' (see Shrauger and Schoeneman. 1979, for a review). From this lheoretical viewpoint, cleft chil dren are at a developmental disadvantage emotionally be cause they incorporate a negative societal view of facial deformity into the self-concept. Researchers into cleft palate issues have noted support for this concept of emo tional development in the extensive literature on physical attractiveness. This large and frequently cited literalure suggests that 'there are far-reaching social benefits to be ing physically attractive, and severe negative social conse quences for those who are physically unattractive (see Berscheid, 1980; Dian. 1981,1986; Adams, 1984; Patzer, ' 1985; Alley and Hildebrandt. 1988 for reviews). To sum marize, researchers have discovered that physically unat tractive people of all ages are perceived less positively by observers of all ages than attractive people. Assuming that faces with deformities are inherently unattractive, some researchers have suggested that negative reactions from observers are partly responsible for the emotional distress noted in cleft children (Tobiasen. 1984). The appeal of this concept of emotional dysfunction is clear. Not only does the idea of reflected appraisals con form to common sense notions of emotional development (e.g., "children learn what they live"), but in the case of cleft children. the concept is supported by a literature that delineates society's negative views of physically unattrac tive children. It should not be surprising therefore, that this particular view of dysfunction has been frequently cited in the cleft literature (see Clifford, 1973; Glass and Starr, 1979: Edwards and Watson, 1980; Tobiasen. 1984) as a useful theory of emotional dysfunction in cleft chil dren and adults. Although intuitively pleasing, such an explanation is problematic for several reasons. Researchers have re cently begun to question the benefits of physical attrac tiveness. Often referred to as the "what is beautiful is good phenomenon, the benefits of physical attractiveness have been noted as some of the most replicable and robust findings in the social science literature. However, a recent meta-analysis of the physical attractiveness literature (Bagly et at, 1991) found major limitations in such con el usions. The results of their meta-analysis suggest that beauty serves as a strong cue for suppositions of social ease. but has little effect on perceptions of intelligence, honesty, virtue, helpfulness. potency, or general emo
6

408 Cleft Pal.re-Craniofacial Journal. July 1993, Vol. 30 No.4

tional adjustment. Other investigators have noted in stances in which beauty may be a handicap, especially in inferences about vanity, and self-centeredness (Cash and Janda, 1984). Additional doubts concerning the applicability of the physical-attractiveness literature have recently arisen. Several authors, both in the psychological (Zuckerman et aI., 1991) and dental literatures (Pertschuk and Whitaker, 1987) have cautioned against oversimplified interpreta tions of the ubeauty is good" phenomenon. These authors have noted that a myriad of factors contribute to impres sion fonnation, including vocal attractiveness. nonverbal gesturing, mannerisms, and social skills. Others have noted that frontal photographs, typically employed in physical attractiveness research, are not representative of real-life interaction. as three-quarter a"d profile views are also captured in day to day interactions (Shaw et ai., 1985). While some research has moved to impression re search using video images and field research, these studies are rare (e.g., Reis et at., 1980, used standardized diaries to study naturalistic interactions). Not surprisingly,the results of field-based versus lab-based physical attractive ness studies have produced less clear results concerning the benefits of beauty For example. Reis et al. (1982) found that moderately attractive college women had more dates and more same-sex socializing than did very attrac tive college women. Another problem with the "reflected appraisals" concept of emotional development is the implicit equation be tween perceptions of physical unattractiveness and physi cal deformity. Both Reis and Hodgins (in press) and Pertschuk and Whitaker (1987) caution against applying the literature on physical attractiveness to craniofacial populations. They propose that unattractive individuals, even very unattractive individuals, may have profoundly different social experiences from the facially deformed. Reis and Hodgins cite the social science literature devoted to physical stigmata as an alternate source for theory con cerning social development in cleft populations (e.g., Katz. 1981). Katz postulates that the experience of a stig matized individual is marked by societal ambivalence. That is~ there are strong cultural traditions which dictate help and sympathy for the handicapped, but such tradi tions coexist with societal avoidance and discomfort with handicapped persons. Reis and Hodgins postulate that the experience of ambivalence (strong positive reactions and strong negative reactions) should be markedly different from that of the generalized ncgativity thought to accom pany physical unattractiveness. As additional support for a distinction between the effects of unattractiveness and stigmata, they note the societal distinction between stigma and unattractiveness; there is a Cleft-Palate Craniofacial Association but no association for "homely individuals or parents of homely babies" (p.21). Finally, the distinction between unat.tractiveness and cra niofacial defect has profound con seq Jences for concepts
4

of the development of self-esteem in cleft children. While the prevailing theory of reflected appraisals clearly pre dicts lower self-esteem in cleft children. recent work sug gests that members of some stigmatized groups may actually use their stigmatized status for self-esteem en hancement (Crocker and Major, 1989; Hillman, 1992). Briefly, Crocker and Major outline an attributionbased model whereby the stigmatized individual may attribute negative feedback to factors associated with their stigma (e.g., he doesn't like me because I have a scar above my lip) rather than to factors more closely aligned with the self (e.g., he doesn't like me because I'm an unacceptable person). In so doing, these theorists note, stigmatized peo ple can and do protect their self-esteem. This effect has been noted clinically in facially deformed populations, but has not been studied explicitly (see Baker and Smith, 1939; Macgregor, 1979). The applicability of this model to the cleft population warrants further study. While some studies suggest that self-esteem is lower in cleft children (Broder & Strauss, 1989), Brantley & Clifford (1919) found higher self-esteem in cleft teens than in normal teens.

Providing Treatment in the Absence of Theory

At first glance, differing theoretical models concerning emotional development of cleft chi Idren may appear re moved from the day to day concerns of the psychologist interested in psychotherapy for cleft patients. A closer examination reveals that different models of emotional development may lead to divergent clinical treatments. For example, if facial deformity can be considered as equivalent to extreme unattractiveness, a clinician might assume that any cleft child is regarded with unifonn nega tivity, a victim of cultural prejudices against unattractive persons. Therapy might consist of social skills training to overcome initial negative reactions from peers and teach ers. In contrast, if facial deformity is conceptualized in line with Katz's (1981) ambivalence model, a therapist would make an entirely different set of assumptions about the cleft patient's social experience. Assuming that the cleft child is met with extremely positive reactions in some instances (e.g. teachers more likely to provide help, parents inviting the child to birthday parties) but ex tremely negative reactions in other instances (e.g., peers avoiding interaction, being chosen last for teams)" therapy that is focused on coping with inconsistent social experi ences might be most appropriate. Similarly, a therapist assuming low self-esteem in cleft clients might focus on interventions aimed at enhancing self-esteem. If a therapist accepts Crocker and Major's (1989) attribution-based model, however, a therapy aimed at making accurate and adaptive attributions for social feedback would be warranted. In addition, if a therapist assumes rhat the stigma serves to protect the self-esteem, additional psychotherapeutic support might be necessary

Bennen and Stanton. PSYCHOTHERAPY AND FACIAL DEFORMITIES 409

for patients undergoing surgical interventions aimed at cosmetic improvements. In other words, patients who re ceive noticeable cosmetic benefits through surgery (i.e. the stigma becomes less visible) may be less able to pro teet their self-esteem by using their facial stigma. Thus psychotherapy aimed at helping patients make other attri butions for interpersonal events may be useful. Shortcomings in current concepts of emotional dysfunc tion in cleft populations leave the clinician with litlle empirical guidance for psychological treatment. Not only are we unsure about which treatments are most appropri ate, we have little data that compare different treatments for cleft clients. In the absence of theory. clinicians follow general principles of psychotherapy (e.g., acceptance, em pathy warmth, skills training) on a case-by-case basis. Evidence from the limited literature on psychotherapy for physically handicapping conditions suggests that few em pirical data are available in Ihose areas either (e.g., Ser voss, 1983; Hoxter, 1986; lureidini, 1988). II is not suggested that therapists currently providing psychological treatments to cleft patients are offering in effective treatments, or even that a specific theory of psy chological dysfunction is necessary to help a given cleft patient or family. Studies of the outcome of psychother apy strongly suggest that on the whole, psychotherapy is effective in reducing emotional distress for a wide range of clients and emotional problems (Garfield and Bergin, 1984). A skilled clinician will also conduct a thorough assessment of a client's social environment regardless of population-based data. However. in order to develop pro grams specifically for cleft patients, especially programs designed to teach effective coping early in social develop ment. a more specific plan is needed. How can research contribute to the development of specifie treatments for cleft children who are experiencing emotional dis~s? How can research contribute to the development of primary prevention interventions that might offset the effects of facial defonnity? In the course of our research. we have fonnul ated 'Ihe following suggestions:
I

vey studies and impression studies are useful, but the information they offer is limited. Mental health interven tions for cleft children can only be developed when we understand what makes a cleft child's social environment different from that of a normal child. We cannot expect to treat psychological distress effectively if we cannot define how the distress manifests itself in day to day functioning. There are well-validated means for measuring social inter action in an ongoing fashion which have been used in studies of smoking cessation, weight control. and inti macy (see Reis, 1983. for a review). The application of similar assessment techniques to cleft populations may be feasible. 3. Studies which focus on individual differences and risk factors in cleft populations should be encouraged. As we noted earlier. there are no clear answers regarding the association between clefting and emotional distress. Iden tification of mediating and moderating factors will enable us to predict which cleft children are at risk for emotional problems. For example, it may be that there are important parental variables which will predict which cleft children will experience emotional problems. Studies of individual differences in cleft children. such as different coping styles, may also be useful in understanding which cleft children will experience emotional dysfunction. If such variables prove to be important. we may be able to learn, and eventually teach how some cleft children cope effec tively with their facial differences. 4. Research concerning the mutability of attitudes to wards physical deformity will enable therapists and com munity leaders to launch programs intended to change societal attitudes towards physical stigmata. If we accept the premise that in some fashion, emotional problems associated with elefting stem from negative societal views, a logical research question is whether such atti tudes are changeable. With the advent of popular televi sion characters with visible (e.g., obesity) and invisible (e.g., homosexuality) stigmata. we may be able to study the extent to which societal treatment of stigmatized per sons can change. A focus on any of the above areas will bring valuable information to those interested in developing and refining mental health interventions for cleft children and adults. As mental health interventions are developed, controlled studies can be launched, and better matches can be made between clients, 'therapists, and interventions. Although there is much to be learned about the psychological treat ment of cleft individuals, we believe that there is much to be gained through the study of psychological problems associated with clefting. When social scientists have em pirically demonstrated psychological treatment needs for cleft patients in conjunction with replicable, specific treat ment plans, we believe that funding for mental health services will be substantially easier to secure.

I. Cleft palate centers and organizations should encour age and promote cross-fertilization between social scien tists outside the cleft area and scientists working primarily in cleft palate. Researchers who focus on other stigmatiz ing conditions (e.g., obesity) and scientists who develop and refine theories of stigma (e.g., Katz, 1981; Jones et al. 1984) are rarely cited in the cleft literature. The infor mation and insights they have to offer should become integrated with infonnation specific to eleCting. Some at tempts have been made to incorporate study of other stig matizing conditions (e.g. Harper and Richman, 1978; Brantley and Clifford, 1979). and further work in this tradition should be encouraged. 2. Longitudinal field studies of cleft children in their social environment should become a funding priority. Sur
9

410 Clefl Palate-Craniofacial Journal, JUly 1993, Vol. 30 No.4

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SHRAUGI!R

or

PSYCHIATRY RESEARCH
Psychiatry Research 59 (1995) 97-107

Deficits in short-term memory in adult survivors of childhood abuse

J. Douglas Bremner*a,b,c, Penny Randalla,b,c, Tammy M. Scottc,d, Sandi Capellib,c,

Richard Delaneyb,d, Gregory McCarthyb,d,e, Dennis S. Chameya,b,c

of Psychiatry. Yale Uni~ersity School of Medicine. West Ha~~n. CT 06516. USA
bWest Ha~en VA Medical Center. West Ha~~n. CT06516. USA
CNatiolUl1 Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. West Ha~en VA Medical Center (/51). West Ha~en. CT 06516. USA
dDepartment of Psychology. Yale Uni~ersity School of Medicine. West Ha~en. CT 06516. USA
cDepartment of NftUosurgery. Yale Uni~ersity School of Medicine. West Htnen. CT 06516. USA

D~partment

Received 6 March 1995; revision received 31 July 1995; accepted 8 August 1995

Abstract Exposure to stress has been associated with alterations in memory function, and we have previously shown deficits in short-term verbal memory in patients with a history of exposure to the stress of combat and 'the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Few studies of any kind have focused on adult survivors of childhood physical and sexual abuse. The purpose of this study was to investigate short-term memory function in adult survivors of childhood abuse. Adult survivors of severe childhood physical and sexual abuse (n 21), as defined by specific criteria derived from the Early Trauma Inventory (ETI), who were presenting for psychiatric treatment were compared with healthy subjects (n 20) matched for several variables including age, alcohol abuse, and years of education. All subjects were assessed with the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS) Logical (verbal memory) and Figural (visual memory) components, the Verbal and Visual Selective Reminding Tests (SRT), and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R). Adult survivors of childhood abuse had significantly lower scores on the WMS Logical component for immediate and delayed recall in comparison to normal subjects, with no difference in visual memory, as measured by 'the WMS or the SRT, or IQ, as measured by the WAIS-R. Deficits in verbal memory, as measured by the WMS, were associated with the severity of abuse, as measured by a composite score on the ETI. Our findings suggest that childhood physical and sexual abuse is associated with long-term deficits in verbal short-term memory. These findings of specific deficits in verbal (and not visual) memory, with no change in IQ, are similar to the pattern of deficits that we have previously found in patients with combat-related PTSD.

.
t

Keywords: Physical abuse; Sexual abuse; Memory; Intelligence; Trauma; Posttraumatic stress disorder; Neuro
psychology

Corresponding author, West Haven VAMC (116a), 950 Campbell Ave., West Haven,

cr 06516, USA.

0165-1781195/$09.50 1995 Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved SSDI OI65-1781(95)02800-C

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1. Introduction
Childhood physical and sexual abuse is a prob lem of enormous magnitude. Rates of sexual abuse have been estimated from community samples to be from 110/0 to 620/0 in women (Russell, 1983; Finkelhor and Hotaling, 1984; Kercher and McShane, 1984; Wyatt, 1985) and from 3% to 39% in men (Finkelhor and Hotaling, 1984; Kercher and McShane, 1984). Childhood abuse has been associated with a range of adverse psychiatric out comes, including depression (Briere et aI., 1988; Swett et aI., 1990), anxiety (Briere et aI., 1988; Swett et aI., 1990), dissociation (Putnam et aI., 1986; Chu and Dill, 1990; Ross et aI., 1991), post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Greenwald and Leitenberg, 1990), borderline personality disorder (Herman et aI., 1989; Ogata et aI., 1990), alcohol and substance abuse (Ladwig and Anderson, 1989; Brown and Anderson, 1991), and other psychiatric disorders (Green, 1978; Herman, 1981; Carmen et aI., 1984; Bryer et aI., 1987; Bulik et aI., 1989; Hall et aI., 1989; Palmer et aI., 1990). In spite of this, few studies have examined the long-term conse quences of exposure to childhood abuse. Considerable evidence supports a relationship between stress and alterations in memory (review ed in Charney et aI., 1993; Bremner et aI., 1995a). Studies in animals suggest that exposure to stress results in deficits in short-term memory (Drugan et aI., 1984). High levels of glucocorticoids released during stress have been shown to cause damage to neurons in the hippocampus (Sapolsky et aI., 1988, 1990; Uno et aI., 1989), a brain structure that plays an important role in learning and memory (Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991). Neurotransmitters and neuropeptides released during stress also have the potential to result in an overconsolidation of memory traces, which may explain the existence of intrusive memories in patients with PTSD (Pit man, 1989; Pitman et aI., 1993; Bremner et aI., 1995a). Studies of war veterans suggest an associa tion between the extreme stress of combat and al terations in memory function, including the forgetting of names or other pieces of important personal information. Five percent of soldiers in a major campaign in World War II had no memory for events which had just occurred immediately

after they had participated as combatants (Torrie, 1944). Other studies in combat veterans and prisoners of war from World War II and the Viet nam war have documented amnesia and other dis turbances of memory (Archibald and Tuddenham, 1965; Thygesen et aI., 1970; Eitinger, 1980; Gold stein et aI., 1987; Bremner et al., 1992, 1993b). Em pirical studies of short-term memory have shown deficits in short-term memory, as measured by the Logical component of the Wechsler Memory Scale, in prisoners of war in comparison to combat veterans without a history of containment during the Korean war (Sutker et aI., 1988, 1991). We have previously reported deficits in short-term ver bal memory, as measured by the Logical compo nent of the Wechsler Memory Scale and the Verbal Selective Reminding Test, with no change in IQ, in Vietnam combat veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in comparison to control subjects (Bremner' et al., 1993a). We have also found a decrease in volume of the right hippocam pus in Vietnam combat veterans with PTSD in comparison to matched control subjects. Deficits in verbal short-term memory, as measured by the Wechsler Memory Scale, were associated with decreased right hippocampal volume in these pa tients (Bremner et aI., 1995b). Other studies in Vietnam combat veterans have shown deficits in new learning and memory using different neuro psychological tests than the Wechsler Memory Scale (Uddo et al., 1993; Yehuda et aI., 1995). Studies in children have sho~ a relationship be tween markers of abuse and deficits in the arith metic subscale of the IQ test (Lewis et aI., 1979). The purpose of this study was to compare memory function in adult survivors of childhood physical and sexual abuse with that in healthy matched controls. Based on our previous findings in Vietnam combat veterans with PTSD, we hypothesized that adult survivors of abuse would have deficits in verbal (but not visual) memory, with no change in IQ, in comparison to matched controls.
2. Methods 2.1. Subjects The patient group consisted of 21 adult sur vivors of childhood physical and sexual abuse. Pa

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tients were recruited from the inpatient and outpatient treatment units of the West Haven VA Medical Center over a 12-month period. A long period of recruitment was necessary to identify patients with a severe history of abuse, based on the criteria outlined below. All new admissions to these units were briefly screened for a history of abuse, and referrals were made for the study, following which a more complete evaluation was performed to determine eligibility. All but one of the patients who were identified in this manner, who met inclusion criteria for the study, and who were eligible for study entry consented to partici pate. Patients were included if they had a history of severe childhood physical and/or sexual abuse, as determined by the Early Trauma Inventory (ETI), and an Axis I psychiatric disorder on the basis of a semistructured interview, the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia Lifetime version (SADS-L; Endicott and Spitzer, 1978). Patients were excluded if they had a history of exposure to combat trauma, a diagnosis of schizophrenia or current alcohol or substance abuse based on the SADS-L, a history of trauma tic brain injury or neurological disorder, current use of benzodiazepine medication, or a history of loss of consciousness for > 10 min. Some of the patients were being treated with antidepressant medication at the time of the study. The comparison group (n 20) comprised physically healthy men and women of nonprofes sional occupations who were matched with the pa tients for age, sex, race, handedness, height, weight, years of education, years of parental education, and years of alcohol abuse. Subjects with a history of traumatic brain injury, men ingitis, neurological disorder, current alcohol abuse by DSM-III-R criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1987), physical illness, psychiatric disorder, or history of loss of con sciousness for > 10 min were excluded from the study. There were no differences between patients and comparison subjects in any of the demographic variables that were measured in this study. Pa tients were similar to controls in age (patients: mean 39.7, SD 7.1; controls: mean 36.7, SD = 10.0; t 1.1, dj= 39, P 0.28), race (pa

tients: 18/21 [860/0] white, 1/21 [5%] black, 2/21 [100A] Hispanic; controls: 14/20 [700/0] white, 4/20 [200/0] black, 1/20 [5A.] Hispanic, 1/20 [5%] other; x2 3.61, dj 3; P = 0.31), sex (patients: 15/21 [71A] males and 6/21 [290/0] females; controls: 16/20 [8oo/0] males and 4/20 [2OU/o] females (x 2 0.41, dj= 1, P = 0.52), handedness (pa tients: 18/21 [86%] right-handed and 3/21 [14A] non-right-handed; controls: 19/20 [95%] right handed and 1/20 [5%] non-right-handed; x2 = 1.34; dj= 1; P 0.50), years of education (patients: mean 13.5, SO = 2.1; controls: mean = 14.0, SO = 3.0; t = 0.59, dj= 39, P = 0.55), and years of alcohol abuse (patients: mean 10.9, SO 9.4; controls: mean 6.6, SO = 10.2; I 1.39, dj= 39, P 0.17). Patients were evaluated with the SADS-L for comorbid psychiatric diagnoses. SADS-L data were not available (or three patients. All patients in the study met criteria for current PTSD related to their early trauma. Many patients also had diagnoses of affective disorders. Five out of 18 (28A) patients evaluated with the SADS-L met cri teria for current and 16/18 (890/0) for lifetime major depression. In addition, 1/18 (6%) patients met cri teria for current and 2/18 (110/0) for lifetime dysthymia, while none met criteria for either cur rent or lifetime bipolar disorder or bipolar dis order not otherwise specified. There were a number of patients with comorbid anxiety dis order diagnoses. Seven out of 18 (390/0) met criteria for current and lifetime panic disorder with agoraphobia, and 2/18 (110/0) for current and 5/18 (28%) for lifetime panic disorder without agoraphobia, 2/18 (110/0) had a history of current and lifetime diagnoses of agoraphobia without a history of panic disorder, 3/18 (170/0) current and 4/18 (22%) lifetime social phobia, 2/18 (110/0) cur rent and 3/18 (17%) lifetime generalized anxiety disorder, 1/25 (4%) current and lifetime simple phobia, and none with current or lifetime obsessive-compulsive disorder. No patients had current or lifetime diagnoses of schizophrenia. Other diagnoses included current bulimia in one patient (60/0) and lifetime bulimia in two patients (110/0), and current anorexia in no patients and lifetime anorexia in one patient (60/0). No patients had current or lifetime psychosis not otherwise

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specified, somatization disorder, somatic pain dis order, undifferentiated somatization disorder, or hypochondriasis. Consistent with previous reports, comorbid lifetime diagnoses for alcohol and substance abuse disorders were increased in our group of early trauma patients. Fourteen out of 18 patients (780/0) met criteria for alcohol dependence and 1/18 (60/0) for alcohol abuse, 3/18 (17%) for sedative/hyp noticlanxiolytic dependence and 1/18 (60/0) for abuse, 9/18 (500/0) for cannabis dependence and 2/18 (11~) for cannabis abuse, 7/18 (390/0) for stim ulant dependence and 2/18 (110/0) for stimulant abuse, 5/18 (28%) for opiate dependence and none for opiate abuse, 10/18 (56%) for cocaine depen dence and none for cocaine abuse, 1/18 (60/0) for hallucinogenlPCP dependence and 2/18 (110/0) for abuse, and 4/18 (220/0) for polydrug dependence and none for abuse.

2.2. Assessment of childhood abuse

Research in the area of childhood abuse has been limited by the lack of a comprehensive instru ment with demonstrated reliability and validity (Briere and Runtz, 1988). The current study used the Early Trauma Inventory (ETI), which was developed as part of a parallel project for the assessment of childhood physical, sexual, and emotional abuse. The ETI was developed by a multidisciplinary team including one of the authors of the current study (Kriegler et aI., 1993) in collaboration with colleagues from the National Center for PTSD, based on clinical experience, a review of available existing instruments, and a sur vey of the clinical literature on childhood abuse (Finkelhor, 1979, 1986; Lewis et aI., 1979; Her man, 1981; Herman et aI., 1986; Russell, 1986; Briere and Runtz, 1987; Wyatt, 1885). The ETI assesses the frequency of abuse experiences at dif ferent developmental periods/academic epochs (preschool, elementary school/junior high school, and high school), the age of the individual when the abuse began and when it stopped, the perpetrator(s) of the abuse, the emotional impact of the abuse on the individual immediately after the event and across the life span, and the effect of the abuse on social and occupational functioning as assessed with a 7-point dual-valenced (positive

and negative impact) bipolar rating. In cases where individuals reported abuse that occurred from before age 4, and indicated that they believed it had occurred since birth, abuse was scored as hav ing occurred since birth. Immediate and long-term sequelae for the events, such as medical health seeking and change in custody status, are assessed at the conclusion of the interview. Interrater reli ability and validity studies of the ETI are currently being performed and will be reported in a future publication. The ETI was administered by a clini cal psychiatrist trained in the use of the ETI by one of the authors of the instrument. The Clinical psy chiatrist was unaware of the information obtained from neuropsychological testing. Asessments of abuse in this study were based on self-report. Although considerable variation exists with regard to the definition of childhood abuse (Kinsey et aI., 1953; Finkelhor and Hotaling, 1984; Wyatt, 1985; Briere "and Runtz, 1988), there are no empirical bases to justify the use of specific cri teria. One approach is to identify subjects with a history of very severe abuse, for whom there is no question from their report that they have been ex posed to childhood abuse. We have developed spe cific criteria for severe abuse based on the ETI interview to identify subjects with severe abuse. Severe abuse was defined as a history of exposure to physical abuse (being hit with an object, burn ed, or locked in a closet, or suffering penetrative sexual abuse) that had occurred once a month or more for at least a year and that had extremely negative effects on the individual when the event occurred as well as.on current emotional, social, or occupational functioning. Histories of abuse were obtained in this study by self-report. It might be argued that patients do not accurately report their abuse. One should con sider, however, other methods of validating the history of abuse. Obtaining history from family and friends has its own problems, as these in dividuals may have been involved in the abuse or be in active denial that abuse could have occurred. Limiting study to individuals for whom there are court records of abuse would represent a biased sample, as our clinical impression is that the ma jority of abused individuals do not enter the legal system. One might also argue that deficits in

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59 (/995) 97-/07

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memory in these patients could result in deficient memory for episodes of abuse. These memory deficits, however, involve short-term new learning (not recall of long-term storage). We hypothesize that memory deficits are the result of abuse expo sure; therefore, there would be no reason to expect that memory for the abuse itself would be im paired. It is also our clinical impression that memory traces for these events are often very strong (in circumstances where amnesia does not exist). Patients in this study, as would be expected from the selection criteria, had experienced high levels of physical and sexual abuse. All of the patients experienced some form of physical and emotional abuse, while 19/21 (900/0) experienced some form of sexual abuse. As can be seen in Table 1, patients endorsed experiencing a wide range of abuse ex periences in the different abuse domains (physical, emotional, and sexual abuse). Abuse experiences in the different domains were related to each other; that is, there were significant correlations between severity of physical and emotional abuse (r = 0.50, df = 20, P < 0.05), sexual and emotional abuse (r 0.47, df= 20, P < 0.05), and physical and sexual abuse (r = 0.60, df= 20, P = 0.004). These abuse experiences had a very negative effect on the patients' current lives. For example, 16/21 (760/0) of patients reported that physical abuse had an ex tremely negative effect on them emotionally, 14/21 (68%) an extremely negative effect on work perfor mance, and 16/21 (760/0) on family life at the cur rent time. Onset of the abuse occurred from infancy for physical abuse in 16/21 (76%) patients, emotional abuse in 16/21 (760/0), and sexual abuse in 3/21 (140/0) (or 6/21 [29%] before the age of 5 years). Fourteen out of 21 (68AJ) patients reported that the primary perpetrator of their physical abuse was a male primary caretaker (e.g., father), 6/21 (290/0) a female primary caretaker (e.g., moth er), and 1/21 (50/0) a female child family member. For emotional abuse, 12/21 (570/0) reported that the primary perpetrator was a male primary caretaker and 9/21 (430/0) a female primary caretaker; for sexual abuse, 3/21 (140/0) reported that the primary perpetrator was a male primary caretaker, 1/21 (50/0) a female primary caretaker, 2/21 (10010) a male known adult family member,

Table I Frequency of exposure to traumatic events as assessed by the early trauma inventory (ETI) Abuse
N

Percent
(o/u)

Physical abuse
Spanked with a hand Slapped in the face Burned with hot water/cigarette Punched or kicked Hit with objects Choked Pushed or shoved Tied upllocked in closet 19121 18121

8/21
16121 20121 15121 17121

9/21

91 86 38 76 95 71 81 43 76 81 38 62 81 67 67 24 52 38 38

SeXIIQI abuse
Exposed to inappropriate comments about sexlbody pans Exposed to someone flashing Someone watched you dressing Forced/coerced to watch sexual acts Touched in private pans made you uncomfonable Someone rubbed their genitals against you Forcedlcoerced to touch another penon's private pans Had genital sex against your will Had oral sex on someone against your will Someone performed oral sex on you against your will Someone had anal sex on you against your will 16121 17121 8121

13121
17121

14/21 14121
5121

11121 8/21
8121

Emotional abuse
Often put down or ridiculed Often ignored/made to feel you didn't count Often told you were no good Often shouted at or yelled at Most of the time treated in cold or uncaring way Parents controlled your life Parents fail to undentand your needs Parents expected you to act older

19/21 18/21 18/21 21121

19121 19121

91 86 86 100 91 91 100 67

21121 14121

1/21 (50/0) a male child family member, 9/21 (430/0) a known adult male, 3/21 (140/0) a known adult fe male, and 2/21 (100/0) did not experience sexual abuse.

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The ETI was also used to develop an index of se verity of abuse exposure so that the relationship between severity of childhood abuse and memory function could be examined. Childhood abuse se verity indexes were developed for each of the subscales of the ETI (physical, emotional, and sex ual) by multiplying the total number of items en dorsed as having occurred times the total number of years during which the event occurred, times the frequency with which the event occurred when it was occurring most frequently (based on an in teger from 1 to 6, with 6 being the most frequent, definitions available upon request). The three subscales were also summed to give a total abuse severity index.

2.3. Assessment of alcohol abuse The Addiction Severity Index (ASI) interview was used to assess lifetime alcohol abuse. The ASI evaluates the total number of years of alcohol abuse over the individual's lifetime (i.e., drinking to the point of intoxication, three or more drinks per day, on a regular basis, three or more days in a week) (McClellan et aI., 1985). Early trauma pa tients with a history of alcohol abuse were match ed on a case-by-case basis with controls with a history of alcohol abuse on the basis of the ASI in terview. 2.4. Neuropsychological testing of memory and intelligence All subjects were administered a battery of neuropsychological tests as described below. (1) Four subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R) were administered, including Arithmetic, Vocabulary, Picture Arrangement, and Block Design, to estimate an intellectual level for each subject. (2) Two subtests of the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS) were administered accord ing to the Russell revision (Russell, 1975). The subtests include Logical Memory, the free recall of two story narratives, which is felt to represent a test of verbal memory, and Figural Memory, which is felt to represent visual memory, involving the reproduction of designs following a 100s pre sentation. For both the WMS subtests, immediate and delayed reproduction were tested, and a per cent retention score was computed (delayed

recalVimmediate recall x 1(0). (3) The Verbal Se lective Reminding Test (VeSRT; Buschke and Fuld, 1974; Hannay and Levin, 1985) is a measure of verbal learning in which a list of 12 words is presented for immediate recall. On subsequent tri als, only the words not recalled on the prior trial are presented. The task is complete after two con secutive perfect recall trials or 12 presentations. (4) The Visual Selective Reminding Procedure (ViSRT; Buschke and Fuld, 1974; Hannay and Levin, 1985) is a task modeled on the verbal selec tive reminding in which 12 designs are presented one at a time for 3 s each, followed by an oppor tunity for the subject to draw all from memory. Each design that is not accurately reproduced on a given trial is shown again until perfect recall is attained or 12 trials are reached. Five indices of learning and memory are obtained from each of the selective reminding tasks: Total Recall, Long term Retrieval, Long-term Storage, List Learning (Consistent Long-term Retrieval), and Delayed Recall.

2.5. Data analysis A series of t tests were performed between patients and controls for each of the subcom ponents of the WMS, SRT, and WAIS-R. Two tailed nonpaired tests of significance were used throughout. Pearson's product-moment correla tions were performed between scores on neuro psychological testing and abuse severity scores. The Bonferroni correction was applied to adjust for multiple comparisons. Significance was defined as P < 0.05.
3. Results

Adult survivors of abuse had deficits in verbal short-term recall, as measured by decreased scores on the Logical component of the WMS for imme diate recall and delayed recall, but not..percent re tention. Adult survivors of abuse also had deficits in verbal recall, as measured by the VeSRT (Table 2). After adjustment for multiple comparison with the Bonferroni correction, only the WMS Logical immediate and delayed recall tests differed significantly between patients and controls (P < 0.(03). Adult survivors of abuse did not have

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103

Table 2 Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS) and Selective Reminding Test (SRT) scores in early trauma patients and normal subjects Early trauma patients (n 21)

Normal subjects
(n= 20)

Mean
WMS Logical Memory Immediate recall Delayed recall Retention (%.) WMS Figural Memory Immediate recall Delayed recall Retention (o/u) Verbal SRT Recall Long-term storage Long-term retrieval Continuous long-term retrieval Delayed recall VisuDl SRT Recall Long-term storage Long-term retrieval Continuous long-term retrieval Delayed recall
.p

SO 3.3 5.6 24.1

Mean 2Q.8 17.8 84.7

SO 6.5 6.1 11.9 3.71 3.98 1.58 0.0007 0.0003 0.12

13.6 10.5 75.0

10.2 10.1 96.4

2.9 3.2 6.9

10.9 9.3 82.9

3.4 4.2 20.8

0.66 0.73 2.96

0.51 0.47 0.007

102.6 92.4 83.8 58.7 8.0

19.1 18.5 29.1 32.5 3.5

115.6 111.5 101.5 83.8 10.0

14.4 16.6 21.6 32.4 2.2

2.47 2.64 '2.21 2.48 2.24

0.019 0.013 0.033 0.018 0.03

126.3 124.4 121.1 111.5 11.3

16.6 21.4 23.4 30.2 1.0

126.3 125.1 123.9 120.4 11.1

30.7 30.8 30.9 31.5 2.7

0.004 0.08 0.32 0.92 0.44

0.99 0.93 0.75 0.36 0.66

< 0.05 after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (df= 39 for all comparisons).

deficits in visual short-term memory as measured by the WMS figural component or the ViSRT. In fact, there appeared to be a tendency (which was not significant after correction for multiple com parisons) for the patients to have higher scores on the WMS visual memory task than did the controls (Table 2). There were no significant IQ differences be tween adult survivors of severe childhood physical and sexual abuse and controls. Specifically, there were no differences in WAIS-R scores between PTSD patients (n 21) and controls (n 20) for verbal IQ (patients: mean 101.0, SO 17.5; controls: mean 103.0, SO 17.6; t 0.34, dj= 39, P 0.73), performance IQ (patients: mean 100.5, SO 18.4; controls: mean 107.8, SD 19.5; t 1.21, dj= 39, P 0.23), or full scale IQ (patients: mean 101.0, SO 16.5; con trols: mean 106.7, SO 19.1; t 1.01, df= 39,

= = = = = = =

= =

= =

P = 0.32). Although there were no statistically sig nificant differences, there was a tendency for the abused patients to have slightly lower IQ. The magnitude of difference was not nearly so large as for memory. We elected not to compare memory scores between the two groups with covariation for IQ, because deficits in memory could cause slight decreases in IQ (Le., memory function likely contributes to some of the variance in IQ). Severity of abuse was related to deficits in verbal short-term memory in the PTSO patient group. Overall severity of abuse, as measured by the summed abuse severity score (sum of physical, sex ual, and emotional abuse severity scores, calculated from the ETI as described above), was significantly correlated with deficits in short-term verbal recall, as measured by the WMS Logical im mediate recall subcomponent (r -0.46, df 20, P 0.035). In addition, severity of sexual abuse

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when considered alone was correlated with deficits in verbal short-term memory, as measured by the WMS Logical immediate recall subcomponent (r -0.48, df = 20, P = 0.026). Although there were no statistically significant differences in IQ between early trauma patients and comparison subjects, it is of interest to note that there were some relationships between IQ and abuse in this study. Overall severity of abuse, as measured by the summed abuse severity score, was associated with decreased performance IQ (r = -0.45, df= 20, P 0.039) and full-scale IQ (r = -0.44, df 20, P 0.045). Severity of physical abuse was associated with decreased performance IQ (r -O.SO~ df 20, P 0.022).

= =

= =

4. Discussion
Adult survivors of childhood physical and sex ual abuse had deficits in verbal short-term recall, as measured by the WMS Logical component, as well as immediate and delayed recall, with no dif ference in IQ in comparison to matched control subjects. There were no differences in visual memory between adult survivors of childhood abuse and control subjects. Overall severity of abuse was related to degree of memory impairment in the early trauma patients. Stress at different stages of development appears to have similar effects on verbal short-term memory. In our previously reported group of pa tients with contbat-related PTSD, exposure to trauma in most patients occurred at about the age of 20, while in the current group of survivors of childhood abuse, traumatic exposure often oc curred as early as before the age of 5 years. There is a similar pattern of specific deficits in verbal memory, with no significant change in IQ, in both adult survivors of abuse and patients with combat related PTSD. The left hippocampus is felt to be involved in verbal memory to a relatively greater degree than the right, while the right hippocampus is involved in visual memory to a greater degree. Thus, left hippocampal dysfunction might explain our findings. These- findings add to the growing literature in support of a relationship between stress and al terations in memory. A number of preclinical stud ies suggest that stress is associated with deficits in

memory. For example, animals exposed to the stress of electric footshock develop deficits in short-term memory as manifested by deficits in maze escape behaviors (Drugan et aI., 1984). High levels of glucocorticoids associated with stress result in damage to neurons of the hippocampus (Sapolsky et aI., 1988, 1990; Uno et aI., 1989), a brain structure that plays an important role in learning and memory, with associated deficits in memory (Luine et aI., 1994). Stress also appears to result in overconsolidation of memory, which may be related to neurotransmitters and neuropeptides released during stress that facilitate the laying down of memory traces (Pitman, 1989; Pitman et aI., 1993; Bremner et aI., 1995a). There was a relationship between overall level of abuse exposure measured with the ETI and deficits in short-term verbal memory in the patients in this study. The relationship suggests that deficits in short-term memory are clinically meaningful and relate to exposure to the stressor of abuse itself in stead of to other factors such as psychiatric patient status. In addition, the current findings are a par tial validation of the ability of the ETI to measure abuse-related phenomena. Early trauma patients also showed a relationship between IQ and level of trauma exposure, where lower IQ was associated with increased levels of abuse. This relationship between trauma exposure and IQ was not seen in our combat-related PTSD sample. Previous stud ies in children with a history of severe abuse have found a relationship between the arithmetic subscale of the IQ test and markers of abuse (Lewis et aI., 1979). Trauma at early stages of de velopment may have an effect on IQ that is not seen in patients exposed to traumatic stress at later periods of development. Alternatively, since IQ is remarkably stable throughout the lifetime, and ap pears to have a heritable component, one might consider that families in which there is lower IQ may be associated with situations of abuse. Therefore, low IQ may be a risk factor, rather than an outcome, for exposure to abuse. Although our patients did not have significantly lower IQ scores than comparison subjects, it can be seen from the data that with a much larger number of subjects, it might be possible to demonstrate lower IQ in the patients in comparison to the normal subjects. One might argue that our findings of deficits in

J.D. BremMr et al./ Psychiatry Research 59 (1995) 97-107

105

verbal memory in patients with early trauma related PTSD are attributable to an impairment in concentration. Decreased concentration is a symp tom of PTSD. However, emerging findings from other groups using the continuous performance test (CPT) in the evaluation of concentration in PTSD patients have revealed no difference be tween patients and controls in concentration. In addition, a general concentration impairment would not be expected to result in a specific deficit in verbal memory function, but rather a general effect on both visual and verbal memory. Findings of deficits in short-term verbal memory have implications for the clinical treat ment of individuals with a history of severe childhood abuse. These patients may have difficul ties with learning that impair academic perfor mance (P. Saigh, personal communication, February 1, 1995). There is a tendency to direct patients who are disabled by psychiatric disorders toward rehabilitation programs. These programs often involve a return to the university to learn new job skills. Patients with a history of severe abuse may have deficits in new learning and memory that make academic goals difficult to at tain. Rehabilitation that involves, for example, training in job skills that do not require a large amount of memorization may be indicated. In ad dition, early treatment interventions may prevent the long-term impairments in memory function, and hence academic performance, that appear to be associated with exposure to high levels of stress as occurs with childhood abuse (Saigh, 1989). Studies such as the current one that demonstrate long-term impairment in academic performance, which appears to be associated with childhood abuse, underscore the magnitude of childhood abuse as a major public health problem.

PTSD Grant. The authors also thank Dudley Blake, Ph.D. (formerly of the VA Medical Center site of the National Center for PTSD in Menlo Park, Calif., and now in Boise, Idaho), and Paula Schnurr, Ph.D. (White River Junction site of the National Center for PTSD), for useful discussions, as well as their contribution and those of other in dividuals to the Early Trauma Inventory (ETI) project, which involved the collaboration of in vestigators from the four sites of the National Center for PTSD (White River Junction, Vt.; West Haven, Conn.; Boston, Mass.; Menlo Park, Calif.). We also thank Carolyn Mazure, Ph.D., for expert collaboration in instrument development methodology in the ETI project.

References
American Psychiatric Association. (1987) DSM-III-R: Diag nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 3rd rev. edn. American Psychiatric Press, Washington, DC. Archibald, H.C. and Tuddenham, R.D. (1965) Persistent stress reaction after combat. Arch Gen Psychiatry 12, 475-481. Bremner, J.D., Krystal, J.H., Southwick, S.M. and Charney, D.S. (1995a) Functional neuroanatomical correlates of the effects of stress on memory. J Trauma Stress, in press. Bremner, J.D., Randall, P.R., Scott, T.M., Bronen, R.A., Delaney, R.C., Seibyl, J.P., Southwick, S.M., McCanhy, G., Charney, D.S. and Innis, R.B. (I995b) MRI-based mea surement of hippocampal volume in posttraumatic stress disorder. Am J Psychiatry 152, 973-981. Bremner, J.D. Scott, T.M., Delaney, R.C., Southwick, S.M., Mason. J.W. Johnson, D.R., Innis, R.B., McCanhy, G. and Charney, D.S. (1993a) Deficits in shon-term memory in post-traumatic stress disorder. Am J Psychiatry 150, 1015-1019. Bremner. J.D. Southwick, S.M., Brett, E., Fontana, A., Rosenheck, R. and Charney, D.S. (1992) Dissociation and posttraumatic stress disorder in Vietnam combat veterans. Am J Psychiatry 149, 328-333. Bremner, J.D., Steinberg. M., Southwick. S.M., Johnson, D.R. and Charney, D.S. (1993b) Use of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders for systemat ic assessment of dissociative symptoms in posttraumatic stress disorder. Am J Psychiatry 150, 1011-1014. Briere, J., Evans, D., Runtz, M. and Wall, T. (1988) Symp tomatology in men who were molested as children: a com parison study. Am J Orthopsychiatry 58, 457-461. Briere, J. and Runtz, M. (1987) Post-sexual abuse trauma: data and implications for clinical practice. Journal of Interper sonal Violence 2, 367-379. Briere, J. and Runtz, M. (1988) Symptomatology associated with childhood sexual victimization in a nonclinical adult sample. Child Abwe Neg/12. 51-59. Brown, G.R. and Anderson, B. (1991) Psychiatric morbidity in

Acknowledgments
The authors thank Valinda Ouelette, R.N., for assistance in administration of testing and Beverly Homer for assistance in research administration and data management. This project was supported by a Veterans Administration Research Fellow ship in Biological Psychiatry and a Veterans Administration Career Development Award to Dr. Bremner, as well as the National Center for

106

J.D.

Br~mner

et al. / Psychiatry Research 59 (1995) 97-107

adult inpatients with childhood histories of sexual and physical abuse. Am J Psychiatry 148, 55-61. Bryer, J.B., Nelson, B.A., Miller, J.B. and Krol, P.A. (1987) Childhood sexual abuse and physical abuse as factors in adult psychiatric illness. Am J Psychiatry 144, 1426-1430. Bulik, C.M., Sullivan, P.F. and Rony, M. (1989). Childhood sexual abuse in women with bulimia. J Clin Psychiatry SO, 460-464. Buschke, H. and Fuld, P.A. (1974) Evaluating storage, reten tion, and retrieval in disordered memory and learning. NftHology 24, 1019-1025. Cannen, E., Rieker, P.P. and Mills, T. (1984) Victims of vio lence and psychiatric illness. Am J Psychiatry 141,378-383. Charney, D.S., Deutch, A.Y., Krystal, J.H., Southwick, S.M. and Davis, M. (1993) Psychobiologic mechanisms of post traumatic stress disorder. Arch Gen Psychiatry 50,294-299. Chu, J.A. and Dill, D.L. (1990) Dissociative symptoms in rela tion to childhood physical and sexual abuse. Am J Psychiatry 147, 887-892. Drugan, R.C., Ryan, S.M., Minor, T.R. and Maier, S.F. (1984) Librium prevents the analgesia and shuttlebox escape defi cit typically observed following inescapable shock. Phar macol Biochem BehDv 21, 749-75. Endicott, J. and Spitzer, R.L. (1978) A diagnostic interview: the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia. Arch G~n Psychiatry 35, 837-844. Eitinger, L. (1980) The concentration camp syndrome and its late sequelae. In: Dinsdale, J.E. (Ed.), Survivors, Victims, . and Perpetrators: Essays on the Na:i Holocaust. Hemi sphere, Washington, DC. Finkelhor, D. (1979) SeXUQlly Victimized Children. Free Press, New York. Finkelhor, D. (1986) A Sourcebook Dn Child Sexual Abuse. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA. Finkelhor, D. and Hotaling, G. (1984) Sexual abuse in the na tional incidence study of child abuse and neglect. Child Abuse Negl 8, 22-32. Goldstein, G., van Kammen, W. and Shelly, C. (1987) Sur vivors of imprisonment in the Pacific theater during World War II. Am J Psychiatry 144, 1210-1213. Green, A.H. (1978) Self-destructive behavior in battered chil dren. Am J Psychiatry 135, 579-582. Greenwald, E. and Leitenberg. H. (1990) Posttraumatic stress disorder in a nonclinical and nonstudent sample of adult women sexually abused as children. Journal of1nterpersonal Violence 5, 217-228. Hall. R.C., Tice, L., Beresford. T.P. Wolley, B. and Hall. A.K. (1989) Sexual abuse in patients with anorexia nervosa and bulimia. Psychosomatics 30. 73-79. Hannay, H.J. and Levin, H.S. (1985) Selective Reminding Test: an examination of the equivalence of four forms. J Clin Exp NeuropsychoI7.251-263. Hennan, J.L. (1981) Father-Daughter Incest. Harvard Univer sity Press, Cambridge, MA. Herman, J.L., Perry. J.C. and van der Kolk, B.A. (1989) Childhood trauma in borderline personality disorder. Am J Psychiatry 146, 490-495.

Herman, J. L., Russell, D. and Trocki, K. (1986) Long-term ef fects of incestuous abuse in childhood. Am J Psychiatry 143, 1293-1296. Kercher, G. and McShane, M. (1984) The prevalence of child sexual abuse victimization in an adult sample of Texas residents. Child Abuse Negl 8, 495-502. Kinsey, A.C., Pomeroy, W.B., Manin, C.E. and Gebhard, P.H. (1953) SeXUQI BehDvior in the Human Female. W.B. Saunders, Philadelphia. Kriegler, J., Blake, D., Schnurr, P., Bremner, J.D., Zaidi, L.Y. and Krinsley, K. (1992) Early Trauma Interview. Un published interview. Ladwig, G.B. and Anderson, M.D. (1989) Substance abuse in women: relationship between chemical dependency in women and past repons of physical and sexual abuse. Int J Addict 24, 739-754. Lewis, D.O., Shanok, S.S., Pinkus, J.H. and Glaser, G.H. (1979) Violent juvenile delinquents: psychiatric, neurological, psychological, and abuse factors. J Am Acad Child Psychiatry 18, 307-312. Luine, V., ViUages-, M., Maninex, C. and McEwen, B.S. (1994) Repeated stress causes reversible impairments of spatial memory performance. Brain Res 639, 167-170. McClellan, A.T., Luborsky, A., Cacciola, J., Griffith, J., Evans, F.,. Bar, H.l. and O'Brien, C.P. (1985) New data from the addiction severity index: reliability and validity in three centers. J Nerv Ment Dis 73, 412-423. Ogata, S.N., Silk, K.R., Goodrich, S., Lohr, N.E., Westen, D. and Hill, E. M. (1990) Childhood sexual and physical abuse in adult patients with borderline personality disorder. Am J Psychiatry 147, 1008-1013. Palmer, R.L., Oppenheimer, R., Dignon, A., Chaloner, D.A. and Howells, K. (1990) Childhood sexual experiences with adults reponed by women' with eating disorders: an extend ed series. Br J Psychiatry 156, 699-703. Pitman, R.K. (1989) Posttraumatic stress disorder, hormones, and memory. (Editorial) Bioi Psychiatry 26, 221-223. Pitman, R.K., Orr, S.P. and Lasko, N.B. (1993) Effects of in tranasal vasopressin and oxytocin on physiologic respond ing during personal combat imagery in Vietnam veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder. Psychiatry Res 48. 107-117. Putnam, F.W., Guroff. J.J., Silberman. E.K., Barban. L. and Post, R.M. (1986) The clinical phenomenology of multiple personality disorder: a review of 100 recent cases. J Clin Psychiatry 47, 285-293. Ross, C.A. Miller, S.D., Bjornson. L. Reagor. P. Fraser, G.A. and Anderson. G. (1991) Abuse histories in 102 cases of multiple personality disorder. Can J Psychiatry 36. 97-101. Russell, D. (1986) The Secret Trauma: Incest in the Lives of Girls and Women. Basic Books, New York. Russell. D.E.H. (1983) The incidence and prevalence of in trafamilial and extrafamilial sexual abuse of female child ren. Child Abuse Negl7. 133-146. Russell. E. (1975) A multiple scoring method for the assessment of complex memory functions. J Consult Clin PsychoI 43,

800-809.

J.D. Bremner et al. / Psychiatry Research 59 (1995) 97-107

107

Saigh, P.A. (1989) The use of in vitro flooding in the treatment of traumatized adolescents. J Behav Dev Pediatr 10. 17-21. Sapolsky, R.M., Packan, D.R. and Vale, W.W. (1988) Gluco corticoid toxicity in the hippocampus: in vitro demonstra tion. Brain Res 453, 367-371. Sapolsky, R.M., Uno, H., Rebert, C.S. and Finch. C.E. (1m) Hippocampal damage associated with prolonged glucocor ticoid exposure in primates. J Neurosc; 10, 2897-2902. Squire, L.R. and Zola-Morgan, S. (1991) The medial temporal lobe memory system. Science 253, 1380-1386. Sutker, P.B., Allain, A.N. and Motsinger. P.A. (1988) Min nesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)-derived psychopathology subtypes among former prisoners of war (POWs): replication and extension. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment 10. 129-140. Sutker, P.B., Winstead, O.K., Galina, Z.H. and Allain. A.N. ( 1991) Cognitive deficits and psychopathology among former prisoners of war and combat veterans of the Korean conflict. Am J Psychiatry 148, 67-70. Swett, C., Jr., Surrey, J. and Cohen, C. (1990) Sexual and phys ical abuse histories and psychiatric symptoms among male psychiatric patients. Am J Psychiatry 147. 632-636.

Thygesen, P., Hermann, K. and Willanger, R. (1970) Concen tration camp survivors in Denmark: persecution, disease, compensation. Dan Med Bull 17,65-108. Torrie, A. (1944) Psychosomatic casualties in the Middle East. Lancet 29, 139-143. Uddo, M., Vasterling, J.T., Brailey, K. and Sutker, P.B. (1993) Memory and attention in posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment IS, 43-52. Uno, H., Tarara, R., Else, J.G., Suleman, M.A. and Sapolsky, R.M. (1989) Hippocampal damage associated with pro longed and fatal stress in primates. J Neurosci 9, 1705-1711. Wyatt, G.E. (1985) The sexual abuse of Afro-American and white-American women in childhood. Child Abuse Negl9, 507-519. Yehuda, R., Keefe, R.S.E., Harvey, P.O., Levengood, R.A., Gerber, O.K., Geni, J. and Siever, L.J. (1995) Learning and memory in combat veterans with posttraumatic stress dis order. Am J Psychiatry 152, 137-139.

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PHILA

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19101

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CORNELIUS GILLESPIE
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, ESTATE OF PENELOPE GILLESPIE, CASE NO.: 12-11213-C Appellants/Plaintiffs, vs. THIRTEENTH JUDICAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, et al. Respondents/Defendants. _______________________________/ APPENDIX - 2 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED MOTION FOR DISABILITY ACCOMMODATION WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - APPOINT GUARDIAN AD LITEM Exhibit 12 Exhibit 13 Exhibit 14 Exhibit 15 Exhibit 16 Exhibit 17 Exhibit 18 Exhibit 19 Exhibit 20 Exhibit 21 Exhibit 22 FDLE, NO Florida criminal history for Neil J. Gillespie HCSO, NO criminal history for Neil J. Gillespie Gillespie certified as Eagle Scout, December 3, 1971 University of Pennsylvania, Wharton Evening School, ABA, Dec-23, 1988 The Evergreen State College, BA, December 16, 1995 Letter from Terry D. Silver, CPA, December 13, 2001, Re: Neil Gillespie News stories of Gillespies business, Bucks County Courier Times Mr. Rodems law firms representation of Gillespie, DVR Gillespie letter to Mr. Cook, Barker, Rodems & Cook, Re: Hate Speech Letter of Dr. Karin Huffer, Re: Neil Gillespie and the ADA Gillespies Nov-11-06 letter to Judge Neilsen, ADA; Mr. Naumans response CASE NO.: 12-11028-B

FDLE Criminal History Information on the Internet

Page 1 of 1

Step 5 of 5

Your Search Results

Your Search Criteria
First Middle Last Date of Birth Age Race Sex SSN

Name Maiden/ Alias

Neil

Joseph

Gillespie

03191956 -

W -

M -

160525117 -

FDLE found NO Florida criminal history based on the information provided. No criminal record check was conducted for other states or for the FBI.This record (or statement that there is not a record) is based on a request from a member of the public.This customer used the FDLE internet system to search for the Florida record. FDLE is providing this to respond to the customer's request. Help understanding these results

* Name Aliases/Also Known As DOB SSN Sex Race Height Weight Eye Hair

Print

Home

Email Results to:

neilgillespie@mfi.net

New Search

12
https://www2.fdle.state.fl.us/cchinet/CCHCandidates.aspx 9/12/2010

SANCHEZ. BARBARA

From: Sent: To: Subject:

LINDSEY, HOWARD Wednesday, August 31, 2011 1:56 PM SANCHEZ, BARBARA RE: PRR - Neil Gillespie

Ms. Sanchez, I have spent approximately 45 minutes searching diligently to locate any record of arrest or otherwise for Mr. Gillespie. At this time I am unable to find any paper record or video of this individual and my search covered June 20, 2011 thru June 22, 2011. Please let me know if I can be of any other assistance. Corporal Howard Lindsey #5243 Operations Corporal HCSO DDS (Orient Road) (813)247-8311 hlindsey@hcso.tampa.fl.us -----Original Message---- From: SANCHEZ, BARBARA Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2011 1:03 PM To: LINDSEY, HOWARD Cc: ADLER, EDWINIA Subject: FW: PRR - Neil Gillespie Good Afternoon Cpl: Please review the email below and attachments. Please research to assure if there are any records in your areas. Please provide me with the records and completed cost sheet (as soon as possible please) . Barbara Sanchez, Records Custodian Records Section Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office Post Office Box 3371 Tampa, FL 33601 Office (813) 247-8153 Fax (813) 247-8295 Email: bsanchez@hcso.tampa.fl.us

This agency is a public entity and is subject to Chapter 119 of the Florida Statute concerning public records. Email messages are covered under such laws and thus subject to disclosure.

-----Original Message---- From: SANCHEZ, BARBARA Sent: Monday, August 29, 2011 9:51 AM To: LIVINGSTON, JAMES P Cc: OLIVER, SARAH; ADLER, EDWINIA Subject: PRR - Neil Gillespie Good Morning: Attached is a public records request from Neil Gillespie. Please review the attachment and provide the record from your area. Additionally, please complete the attached cost
1

13

sheet and return with the records. SUSPENSE: 9/2/11

I have included additional information regarding previous communications.

Barbara Sanchez, Records custodian Records Section Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office Post Office Box 3371 Tampa, FL 33601 Office (813) 247-8153 Fax (813) 247-8295 Email: bsanchez@hcso.tampa.fl.us

This agency is a public entity and is subject to Chapter 119 of the Florida Statute concerning public records. Email messages are covered under such laws and thus subject to disclosure.

-----Original Message---- From: SOCRECADMK@hcso.tampa.fl.us [mailto:SOCRECADMK@hcso.tampa.fl.us] Sent: Monday, August 29, 2011 10:16 AM To: SANCHEZ, BARBARA Subject: Message from KMBT 600

NEIL
TROOP
124-

GILLESPIE LEVITTOWN PENNSYLVANIA

HAVING SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE REQUIREMENTS IS HEREBY CERTIFIED AS AN

EAGLE SCOUT

BY THE

BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA

DATE

DECEMBER 3 1971

777

(Jl..Lr~
HONORARY PRESIDENT

~~
PRESIDENT

~
CHI Ef SCOUT EXECUTIVE

~~-~~~~1k~
~:'A!'~~Lo~~~-o/~r~ ~.-. /Yj-C;~~+~.~~~~~

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qj~

14

V N' .1 V E R S I T A S
PENNSYLVANIENSIS

OMN I BVS HAS LITTERAS LECTVJtIS SAL'/TEM DICIT

,urn. academiis antiquus m.os sit scientiis litterisve '. humanioribus excultos titulo ius-to condecorare nos igitur auc-tpri-tate Curatorum nobis com.m.issa

NEIL JOSEPH GILLESPIE

ob studia a Professoribus approbata. ad gt'adum

ASSOCIATE IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

admisimus eique omnia iura honores privilegia. ad hunc

gradum pertinentia. Ubenter con.cessimus

Cuius rei testimonio nOtnina nostta die mensis
Decembris XX\\\ Anno Salutis MCMLXXXVll\ et Vniversitatis
conditae CCXL1X PhUadelphiae subscnpsimus

HIe GRADVS CONLATVS EST CVM LAVDE

s~
M ... A..unP1~
Sigilli Custos
{::::)

p R. ~ E 5

~u11

DECANVS

e.

15

THE EVERGREEN STATE COLLEGE

In recognition of completion
of the course of study approved by the faculty

)Veil joseph (jillespie

is awarded the degree

BACHELOR OF ARTS

with all its honors, privileges and obligations, Conferred at Olympia,

Washington, the Sixteenth day of December,
Nineteen hundred and Ninety-Five.

16

YAMPOLSKY, MANDELOFF, SILVER

&

COMPANY, P.C.

Certified Public Accountants

1420 WALNUT STREET. SUITE PHILADELPHIA. PA 19102 200
TELEPHONE FAX

(215)5454800 (215) 985-1161

December 13, 1991

To whom it may concern: I have been requested to set forth a history of my relationship with Mr. Neil Gillespie, which is as follows: 1) I have known Neil since 1978 when I became his accountant. Neil was an automobile sales person. At that time,

2)

Several years after I began performing Neil's personal income tax work, he began his own used automobile business which was incorporated under the name of Kar Kingdom, Inc. The Company operated from a rental location for approximately two years, at which time Neil purchased a car lot in Langhorne, Pennsylvania to further the growth of the business. Under Neil's,direction, Kar Kingdom, Inc. continued to grow from one year to the next, realizing sales approaching $2,000,000 per year and employing approximately seven individuals. Kar Kingdom, Inc. operated successfully through mid 1988, at which time the lot was sold due to a down turn in the automobile business in Langhorne. During 1989 and 1990, Neil was instrumental in the formation of two Companies, Automotive Specialists, Inc. and Global Business Services, Inc. Neil lent his professional expertise to Automotive Specialists, Inc. while he offered professional business consulting services through his Company, Global Business Services, Inc. Neil maintained his personal residences in Philadelphia ~rom 1984 through 1989, most of this period residing at the John Wanamaker House. While Neil's business interests have suffered due to the ongoing current recession, our office continues to consider Neil as a quality client and a friend.

3)

4)

5)

6)

17

Page 2
Neil Gillespie December 13, 1991

We would be happy to provide any other information required regarding Neil Gillespie if requested.

Sincerely,

Terry D. Silver

TDS/kw/Gillespie

,Ill

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By Joe C1allnl
Courier Times Stat( Writer

un. Phlo}

One-room Edgehlll school near Oxford Valley Mall

. . . built in 1894 and saId 14st month

p-f

~ :! '>
'C

Middletown businessmen buy Wstoricschoolhouse

The structure was recently purchas~d by two township business men atter a car wash firm hacked out of a deal to buy it. And one oflhe ways the two are considering using the properly Is as a used car lot. Nell Gillespie. owner of Kar Kingdom. aod Daniel Day. a realtor paid $87,500 for the.tormer school, located at the Intersecllon of Routes I and 213 and next to the Joshua Tree 'restaurant. That is the same amount bid by National Pride at a public aucllon laslyear.
Nallonal Pride, which had hoped to build a car wash on the site, was unable to complete the sale because of high Interest rates and a Ilght loan market. . Gillespie and Day made settlement on tbe property Jan. 20 but have not decided what to do with it. "We arc considering sa ving the building and keeping it In the style It's In," Oay.sald. One-room schoolhouse Although thp. structure was converted to a sjx~Toom house years ago. ft is one of the last one-room schoolhouses In Lower Bucks County. The sale of the house prompted township officials to see if they could .save the building. Barbara Russell, chairwoman of the township's Historical Pres ervallon Commission, had urged township supervisors to do what they could to save the bUilding and the township convinced Nallonal Pride to withdraw a permit to demolish the building while alternallves were considered. . Before a fin'al decision could be made, however, National Pride decided not to go through with the purchase and the bulldln~ became the property of Day and Gillespie, who were unsuccessful bidders at the public aucllon. "We bought It as an Investment," Gillespie said. Day said one of the possible uses of the building Is as an office, but he said he and his partner have not reached a final decision yet. .
Used car 101 . On Jan. 23 Gillespie wrote to Middletown building Inspector E. Max Einenker to say h.e hoped to use the property for the sale of used

.
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The site of the historic Edgchlll School In Middletown Township will not become I car wash, but a u~cd car lot mil!ht be in its futurC'.

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Courier Times photo bv Art Gentile!

Neil Gillespie, president of Kar Kingdom in Middletow~ Township, displ.ays the Lo'itdon Roadster.

.,

~ ew
.::.~Kar Kingdom,

roadster has' 408 imag~

' .. !

Middletown dealer offers spiffy sports car

~ByDave Chandler . Courier Times Business Editor

..=

cars.

Elnenkel responded four days later. however. that the zoning or- . dinance affecting the property "specifically prohibits any use which in volves, 8S its matn usc, 8 direct servJce to the general public. II The two would then need to apply for a zoning variance and Day said he and Gillespie still are considering what use they can make of the building and the property.

... .... t2:ca.a'" 1I -1-... -c O

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18

a Middletown Township business, has be come the exclusive area auto ~mobile dealer for the London :-fu}adster, an Americanmade convertible that looks like a .'British sports car of the 1940s.
:::';':,'''A lot of new cars today all
; JOl;)k alike," said Neil J. Gilles
;'pie. president of Kar Kingdom,
.which is located at Lincoln
~Highway and Route 213: .,
;':"':':.;4But no one is going to con
,:rase this car... he continued.
;' '''It's an original. ;.':;~:The London Roadster is Kar
::l.I;1pgdom's first line of new
,Cllrs. Gillespie said. Up until
now. the dealership only sold

used cars. The top-of-the-Iine London Roadster model sells for $16, 985, Gillespie explained. "It really is a fun kind of car," he said. The car is manufactured by London Motors Corp. of Dear born, Mich. "The company has been in .business for 19 years." Gilles pic said. "Up until now, the 'company sold directly to the public through ads in the Wall .Street Journal and the New York Times, . ' . .,: "But now, they decided to in crease their market sharc hy establishing dealers." . Gillespie, a Levittown native and a graduate of Bishop Egan Hil!h School, said hc found out

about the London Roadster in an advertisement in the W.all Street Journal. "I called about getting a dealership," he said. "I flew out to Detroit and liked it. It's very similar to the early MGs (a British sports car) of the late 1940s and early 1950s. ".It's a very high-quality car. It's 78-percent hand made. ,," . The London Roadster has a l.8-liter, 4-cylinder' engine. 'It has rack an~ pinion steering, disc brakes iii the front and drum brakes in the rear, an in dependent fou'r-wheel s'uspen-' sian, and a non-rust, fiberglllss body on a steel frame. . A customer interested in buying a London Roadster must know how to drive a car

with manual transmission. . "It's modeled after the line. of real sports cars, and they didn't come with an automatic shiH," Gillespie said. ': . Kar Kingdom was started in 1980. Gillespie said. Its office building is located in the for mer Edge Hill School building: which was built in 1894 and used as a school until the 1940s.. ,i , "I After that. the building was used as a residence up 'until thl! time Kar Kingdom bought i.t.~:; In order to display thc' Lo!!: don Roadster, GlIlespiebui!(.l! showroom adjoining Kar Kin'g dam's office building. The. deal, ership also recently built a ser: vice center to handle' all of its

cars.

. ..

.;:' ~'.\

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA NEIL J. GILLESPIE Petitioner, Case No.: SC11-1622 Lower Tribunal No(s).: 2D10-5197 05-CA-7205

vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. and William J. Cook, Respondents. ________________________________________/ PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS APPENDIX, VOLUME 14 Respondents Representation of Petitioner in Florida Vocational Rehabilitation Exhibit 1 2001, 03-22-01, Letter, Gillespie to Mr. Cook, Barker, Rodems &

Cook, Florida Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR), DLES CASE NO: 98-066-DVR Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6 Exhibit 7 Second Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing, 06-07-98 Third Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing, 07-02-98 Petitioners Motion for Final Summary Order, 10-02-98 Petitioners Notice of Withdrawal Of Request for Hearing, 11-09-98 Order Dismissing and Closing the File, Final Order, 11-12-98 2001, 03-27-01, Mr. Cook, Barker, Rodems & Cook, to Gillespie, re DVR

19

Neil J. Gillespie
1121 Beach Drive NE, Apt. C-2
Saint Petersburg, Florida 33701-1434

Telephone and fax: (727) 823-2390

May 21,2001 William J. Cook, Attorney at Law Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA 300 West Platt Street, Suite 150 Tampa, Florida 33606 Dear Bill, Thank you for letting me know about the Copernic Internet search tool. This search tool is similar to the ForeFront Direct product with which I was involved. While using Copernic recently I came across some information illustrating the negative attitudes some people have toward persons born with cleft palate. Given the number of disability questions raised by John Anthony during my recent deposition, I thought you might find this data informative. Enclosed is the printout of the web page. Sincerely,

Neil J. Gillespie enclosure

20

Guess What?!!

Page 1 of2

Guess What?!!
[ Follow Ups ] [Post Folowup ] [Tel Us Your Cleft Stories ]
Posted byHushG.. RecktIMm on December 12,19100 at 18:59:37:

In Reply to: anyone born with deft pallet and bare lip. ITom the UK? posted by Donna on February 03, 19100 at 05:10:45:
I hate people with hare-lips. I think you all are disgusting and should be killed at birth.

God has punsished your parents for their sins.

Follow Ups:

Re: Guess Wbat'!!J V 10:02:294/11/101 (0) Re: Guess Wbat1!, You're jackass, that's what" Frank 23:36:17 12/17/100 (0)

Post a Followup Name:

E-Mail:

Subject: IRe: Guess What?1! Comments: I hate people with hare-lips. I think you all : are disgusting and should be killed at birth. : God has punsished your parents for their sins.

..:.J

rtiOnal Link URL:

http://www.cleft.net/storieslmessages/971.html

5/7/01

Guess What?!!

Page 2 of2

Link Title:

Optional Image URL:

Submit FplJow Up

I Reset I

[ Follow Ups ] [Post FoUowup ] [Tell Us Your Cleft Stories ]

http://www.cleft.net/storieslmessages/971.html

5/7/01

Gillespie p1 of 2

DR. KARIN HUFFER

Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist #NV0082 ADAAA Titles II and III Specialist Counseling and Forensic Psychology 3236 Mountain Spring Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89146 702-528-9588 www.lvaallc.com

October 28, 2010 To Whom It May Concern: I created the first request for reasonable ADA Accommodations for Neil Gillespie. The document was properly and timely filed. As his ADA advocate, it appeared that his right to accommodations offsetting his functional impairments were in tact and he was being afforded full and equal access to the Court. Ever since this time, Mr. Gillespie has been subjected to ongoing denial of his accommodations and exploitation of his disabilities As the litigation has proceeded, Mr. Gillespie is routinely denied participatory and testimonial access to the court. He is discriminated against in the most brutal ways possible. He is ridiculed by the opposition, accused of malingering by the Judge and now, with no accommodations approved or in place, Mr. Gillespie is threatened with arrest if he does not succumb to a deposition. This is like threatening to arrest a paraplegic if he does not show up at a deposition leaving his wheelchair behind. This is precedent setting in my experience. I intend to ask for DOJ guidance on this matter. While my work is as a disinterested third party in terms of the legal particulars of a case, I am charged with assuring that the client has equal access to the court physically, psychologically, and emotionally. Critical to each case is that the disabled litigant is able to communicate and concentrate on equal footing to present and participate in their cases and protect themselves. Unfortunately, there are cases that, due to the newness of the ADAAA, lack of training of judicial personnel, and entrenched patterns of litigating without being mandated to accommodate the disabled, that persons with disabilities become underserved and are too often ignored or summarily dismissed. Power differential becomes an abusive and oppressive issue between a person with disabilities and the opposition and/or court personnel. The litigant with disabilities progressively cannot overcome the stigma and bureaucratic barriers. Decisions are made by medically unqualified personnel causing them to be reckless in the endangering of the health and well being of the client. This creates a severe justice gap that prevents the ADAAA from being effectively applied. In our adversarial system, the situation can devolve into a war of attrition. For an unrepresented litigant with a disability to have a team of lawyers as adversaries, the demand of litigation exceeds the unrepresented, disabled litigants ability to maintain health while pursuing justice in our courts. Neil Gillespies case is one of those. At this juncture the harm to Neil Gillespies health, economic situation, and general diminishment of him in terms of his legal case cannot be overestimated and this bell

21

Gillespie p2 of 2 cannot be unrung. He is left with permanent secondary wounds. Additionally, Neil Gillespie faces risk to his life and health and exhaustion of the ability to continue to pursue justice with the failure of the ADA Administrative Offices to respond effectively to the request for accommodations per Federal and Florida mandates. It seems that the ADA Administrative offices that I have appealed to ignore his requests for reasonable accommodations, including a response in writing. It is against my medical advice for Neil Gillespie to continue the traditional legal path without properly being accommodated. It would be like sending a vulnerable human being into a field of bullies to sort out a legal problem. I am accustomed to working nationally with courts of law as a public service. I agree that our courts must adhere to strict rules. However, they must be flexible when it comes to ADAAA Accommodations preserving the mandates of this federal law Under Title II of the ADA. While public entities are not required to create new programs that provide heretofore unprovided services to assist disabled persons. (Townsend v. Quasim (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 511, 518) they are bound under ADAAA as a ministerial/administrative duty to approve any reasonable accommodation even in cases merely regarded as having a disability with no formal diagnosis. The United States Department of Justice Technical Assistance Manual adopted by Florida also provides instructive guidance: "The ADA provides for equality of opportunity, but does not guarantee equality of results. The foundation of many of the specific requirements in the Department's regulations is the principle that individuals with disabilities must be provided an equally effective opportunity to participate in or benefit from a public entity's aids, benefits, and services. (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Title II, Technical Assistance Manual (1993) II-3.3000.) A successful ADA claim does not require excruciating details as to how the plaintiff's capabilities have been affected by the impairment, even at the summary judgment stage. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d. My organization follows these guidelines maintaining a firm, focused and limited stance for equality of participatory and testimonial access. That is what has been denied Neil Gillespie. The record of his ADAAA accommodations requests clearly shows that his welldocumented disabilities are now becoming more stress-related and marked by depression and other serious symptoms that affect what he can do and how he can do it particularly under stress. Purposeful exacerbation of his symptoms and the resulting harm is, without a doubt, a strategy of attrition mixed with incompetence at the ADA Administrative level of these courts. I am prepared to stand by that statement as an observer for more than two years.

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115 th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 502-8409

Septerrlber 26, 2006 The Honorable Richard A. Nielsen Circuit Court Judge Circuit Civil, Division F 800 E. Twiggs Street, Room 524 Tampa, Florida 33602

RE: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodation Request Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., and William J. Cook Case number: 2005-CA-7205, Division F
Dear Judge Nielsen, In reply to the telephone message from your judicial assistant Myra Gomez, I am disabled and being treated for depression and anxiety, which limits my ability to participate in court proceedings and meet deadlines. I request that you provide an acconunodation for my disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), specifically the appointment of counsel to represent me in this lawsuit and counterclaim. Thank you.

cc: Ryan Christopher Rodems, Attorney for Defendants

22.1

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

LEGAL DEPARTMENT

DAVID

A.

ROWLAND

COURT COUNSEL

September 29,2006 Neil 1. Gillespie 8092 SW 115 th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

RE:

Gillespie v. Barke.r. Rod~ms & Cook, P.A., and William J. Cook, Case No.: 05-CA 007205, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court, General Civil Division

Dear Mr. Gillespie: Judge Richard A. Nielsen forwarded to me your letter dated September 26, 2006, for response. Please be advised the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit is aware of the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and makes every effort to ensure persons with disabilities are given accommodations in order to provide equality of opportunity and full participation before any court of this circuit. In your letter to Judge Nielsen you indicate that you are being treated for depression and anxiety and are therefore requesting the appointment of counsel to represent you with your pending civil lawsuit as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. While depression and anxiety are conditions that mayor may not be considered impairments under the ADA, depending on whether these conditions result from a documented physiological or mental disorder, your specific request for the appointment of counsel to represent you in a civil lawsuit is not a reasonable or appropriate accommodation under the ADA. I can assure you the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit will fully comply with the requirements of the ADA and will provide any appropriate accommodations that may be necessary to allow you equality of opportunity and full participation in your case before Judge Nielsen. However, any further requests for ADA accommodations should be directed to the attention of Gonzalo B. Casares, ADA coordinator for the 13th Judicial Circuit, 800 E. Twiggs St., Tampa, Florida, 33602. Mr. Casares may also be contacted by telephone at 813-272-6513, and selecting option 2.

Sincerely,

X.~~
K. Christopher Nauman Assistant Court Counsel

cc: The Honorable Richard A. Nielsen

419 PIERCE

STREET

ROOM

214 E

TAMPA, FLORIDA

33602-4022

PHONE

(813) 272-6843

FAX

(813) 272-5522

22.2

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, ESTATE OF PENELOPE GILLESPIE, CASE NO.: 12-11213-C Appellants/Plaintiffs, vs. THIRTEENTH JUDICAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, et al. Respondents/Defendants. _______________________________/ APPENDIX - 3 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED MOTION FOR DISABILITY ACCOMMODATION WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - APPOINT GUARDIAN AD LITEM CASE NO.: 12-11028-B

Exhibit 23 Exhibit 24 Exhibit 25 Exhibit 26

13th Circuit Counsel David Rowland to Gillespie, Re: ADA July 9, 2010 Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, Re: Judge Cook and Rodems disqualification Mr. Rodems Motion for Order Determining ADA Disability for Gillespie Order by Hon. Wm. Terrell Hodges, Gillespie established a cause of action in Gillespie v. HSBC Bank, Case 5:05-cv-00362-WTH-GRJ Document 32 09/25/06

Page 1 of 1

Neil Gillespie
From: To: Cc: Sent: Attach: Subject: "Rowland, Dave" <ROWLANDA@fljud13.org> <neilgillespie@mfi.net> "Casares, Gonzalo" <CASAREGB@fljud13.org>; <rodems@barkerrodemsandcook.com> Friday, July 09, 2010 3:28 PM Response to Neil Gillespie ADA Request.pdf Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, Case No: 05-CA-007205, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, General Civil Division

Attached is a response to your July 6, 2010 ADA request for accommodation.

David A. Rowland
GeneralCounsel, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit 800 East Twiggs Street, Suite 603 Tampa, Florida 33602 Telephone: (813) 272-5905 rowlanda@fljud13.org

23.1
8/6/2012

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL

OF

THE COURTS

C IRCUIT OF FLORIDA
GENERAL COUNSEL

LEGAL DEPARTMENT

D AVID A. RO WLAND

July 9, 2010

Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115`h Loop Ocala, Florida. 34481

Via E-Mail: lleilhillesJ^ie r mli.net

Re:

ADA Accommodation Request Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, Case No.: 05-CA-007205, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, General Civil Division

Dear Mr. Gillespie:

This is a response to your July 6, 2010 ADA request for accommodation directed to Gonzalo Casares, the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit ADA Coordinator. You request the same ADA accommodations previously submitted on February 19, 2010. Your February 19, 2010 ADA request was a request for the court to take the following case management actions: 1. Stop Mr. Rodems' behavior directed toward you that is aggravating your post traumatic stress syndrome. 2. Fulfill case management duties imposed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.545 and designate the above-referenced case as complex litigation under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.201. 3. Offer services, programs , or activities described in Judge Isom 's law review article - Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 323, 324 (1998) - so the court can "intensively" manage the case.

800 EAST Twmos

STREET

SurrE 603 TAMPA.

FLORIDA

33602

PHONE:

(873) 273-6843 WEB: wwwfljudl3.org

Neil J. Gillespie July 9, 2010 Page 2

4. Enforce Judge Isom's directives imposed on February 5, 2007 which require both parties to only address each other by surname when communicating about this case and require parties to communicate in writing instead of telephone calls. 5. Allow a 180-day stay so you can scan thousands of documents in this case to PDF and find and hire replacement counsel. As ADA Coordinator, Mr. Casares can assist in providing necessary auxiliary aids and services and any necessary facility-related accommodations. But neither Mr. Casares, nor any other court employee, can administratively grant, as an ADA accommodation, requests that relate to the internal management of a pending case. All of your case management requests - that opposing counsel's behavior be modified, that the court fulfill its duties under Rule 2.545, that the above-referenced case be designated as complex, that your case be "intensively" managed as suggested by Judge Isom's law review article, that Judge Isom's previous directive regarding communication between parties be enforced, that your case be stayed - must be submitted by written motion to the presiding judge of the case. The presiding judge may consider your disability, along with other relevant factors, in ruling upon your motion.

Sincerely,

cc:

The Honorable Martha J. Cook Ryan C. Rodems, Counsel for Defendant Gonzalo Casares, ADA Coordinator for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

LEGAL DEPARTMENT

DAVID

A.

ROWLAND

GENERAL COUNSEL

July 9,2010

Neil 1. Gillespie 8092 SW IIS lh Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

Via E-Mail: neilgillespic(Ct:mli.Jlct

Re: ADA Accommodation Request Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, Case No.: 05-CA-007205, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, General Civil Division

Dear Mr. Gillespie: This is a response to your July 6, 2010 ADA request for accommodation directed to Gonzalo Casares, the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit ADA Coordinator. You request the same ADA accommodations previously submitted on February 19, 2010. Your February 19,2010 ADA request was a request for the court to take the following case management actions: 1. Stop Mr. Rodems' behavior directed toward you that is aggravating your post traumatic stress syndrome. 2. Fulfill case management duties imposed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.545 and designate the above-referenced case as complex litigation under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.201. 3. Offer services, programs, or activities described in Judge Isom's law review article - Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 323, 324 (1998) - so the court can "intensively" manage the case.

800 EAST TWIGGS

STREET

SUITE

603

TAMPA, FLORIDA

33602

PHONE:

(813) 272-6843

WEB:

www.fIjud13.org

23.2

Neil 1. Gillespie July 9,2010 Page 2

4. Enforce Judge Isom's directives imposed on February 5, 2007 which require both parties to only address each other by surname when communicating about this case and require parties to communicate in writing instead of telephone calls. 5. Allow a l80-day stay so you can scan thousands of documents in this case to PDF and find and hire replacement counsel. As ADA Coordinator, Mr. Casares can assist in providing necessary auxiliary aids and services and any necessary facility-related accommodations. But neither Mr. Casares, nor any other court employee, can administratively grant, as an ADA accommodation, requests that relate to the internal management of a pending case. All of your case management requests - that opposing counsel's behavior be modified, that the court fulfill its duties under Rule 2.545, that the above-referenced case be designated as complex, that your case be "intensively" managed as suggested by Judge Isom's law review article, that Judge Isom's previous directive regarding communication between parties be enforced, that your case be stayed - must be submitted by written motion to the presiding judge of the case. The presiding judge may consider your disability, along with other relevant factors, in ruling upon your motion.

Sincerely,

ilfJ~
David A. Rowland cc: The Honorable Martha J. Cook Ryan C. Rodems, Counsel for Defendant Gonzalo Casares, ADA Coordinator for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

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ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS

13TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

LEGAL DEPARTMENT

o12H1621()396

800 EAST TwIGGS ST., SUITE 603

TAMPA, FLORIDA 33602

...
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US POSTAGE

Neil J. Gillespie
BOQ2 SW 115th Leop
Ocala, Florida 34481

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J~ COOK, Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/ DIVISION: G CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

AFFIDAVIT OF NEIL J. GILLESPIE

Neil J. Gillespie, under oath, testifies as follows:

1. My name is Neil J. Gillespie, and I am over eighteen years of age. This

affidavit is given on personal knowledge unless otherwise expressly stated. 2. 3. Circuit Judge Martha J. Cook is presiding over this lawsuit. I am suing my former lawyers in this lawsuit. On information and belief,

Ryan Christopher Rodems is unlawfully representing Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA and William J. Cook against me. 4. Plaintiffs Motion To Disqualify Counsel was heard April 25, 2006 by

Judge Nielsen. On May 12, 2006 Judge Nielsen signed Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion To Disqualify Counsel. The Order holds that "The motion to disqualify is denied with prejudice, except as to the basis that counsel may be a witness, and on that basis, the motion is denied without prejudice." A certified copy of the Order is attached to this affidavit as "Exhibit A". There has been no Order on adjudication as to the basis that

Page 1 of4

24

counsel may be a witness. The question of disqualification on the counterclaim has not been heard at all. 5. Under Florida law the question is not whether Mr. Rodems may be a

witness but whether he "ought" to be a witness. Proper test for disqualification of counsel is whether counsel "ought" to appear as a witness.[l] Matter of Doughty, 51 B.R. 36. Disqualification is required when counsel "ought" to appear as a witness. [3] Florida Realty Inc. v. General Development Corp., 459 F.Supp. 781. On information and belief Mr. Rodems ought to be a witness. 6. On July 9, 2010 I filed Emergency Motion to Disqualify Defendants'

Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA. The motion properly raises the issue in paragraph 4. The motion properly considered de novo the question of disqualification on the counterclaim. The motion also shows misconduct by Mr. Rodems at the April 25, 2006 hearing sufficient to overturn the Order of May 12, 2006. 7. On July 22, 2010 Judge Cook issued "Order Denying Plaintiffs

Emergency Motion to Disqualify Defendants' Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA". A certified copy of the Order is attached to this affidavit as "Exhibit B". In her Order, Judge Cook wrote "This is the third time that the Plaintiff has motioned to disqualify Defendant's counsel, despite having been informed in an order issued May 12,2006 that this issue had been DENIED WITH PREJUDICE." This statement by Judge Cook is false. The Order issued May 12, 2006 clearly states that "[e]xcept as to the basis that counsel may be a witness, and on that basis, the motion is denied without prejudice."

Page 2 of4

8.

Judge Cook also wrote, "The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to never accept

another pleading from the Plaintiff that indicates an attempt to disqualify Defendants' counsel, as this matter has been DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE." 9. Upon information and belief, Judge Martha J. Cook knowingly and

willfully, with malice aforethought, falsified a record in violation of chapter 839, Florida Statlltes, section 839.13(1) if any judge shall falsify any record or any paper filed in any judicial proceeding in any court of this state, or conceal any issue, or falsify any document filed in any court the person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. 10. Upon information and belief, Judge Martha J. Cook knowingly and

willfully, with malice aforethought, engaged in official misconduct to harm Neil Gillespie and benefit Ryan Christopher Rodems and his clients, by falsifying an official record or official document as described in this affidavit, to deny Gillespie due process, in violation of the Misuse of Public Office statute, chapter 838 Florida Statutes, section 838.022 Official misconduct. (1) It is unlawful for a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for any person or to cause harm to another, to: (a) Falsify, or cause another person to falsify, any official record or official document; (3) Any person who violates this section commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 11. Upon information and belief, Judge Martha J. Cook knowingly and

willfully, with malice aforethought, made a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant, Pat Frank, Clerk of the Circuit Court, in the performance of her official duty, in violation of the perjury statute, chapter 837 Florida Statutes, section

Page 3 of4

837.06 False official statements. Whoever knowingly makes a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his or her official duty shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. Dated this 27th day of September 2010.

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF MARION BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority authorized to take oaths and acknowledgments in the State of Florida, appeared NEIL J. GILLESPIE, personally known to me, or produced identification, who, after having first been duly sworn, deposes and says that the above matters contained in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and official seal this 27th day of September 2010.

it1 Commission 00 781620 Exptres June 6, 2012

CECIUA ROSENBERGER

BondId l1w T~ Fain InuInoe. . . .701.

Notary Public State of Florida

~~

Page 4 of4

3ft

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. Case No.: Division: 05CA7205
F

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants.

-------------

Motion to Disqualify Counsel, and the proceedings having been read and considered, and counsel and Mr. Gillespie having been heard, and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED: The motion to disqualify is denied with prejudice, except as to the basis that counsel may be a witness, aJ.1d on that basis, the motion is denied without prejudice. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, this

lZ"'Afday of May, 2006.

Richard A. Nielsen Circuit Judge Copies to: Neil J. Gillespie, pro se Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esquire

EXHIBIT

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL LAW DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, and
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.,
A Florida Corporation, and
WILLIAM J. COOK,
Defendants. -----------_-----:/

Case No: Division:

05-CA-007205
G

(,;.,)

..

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS & BARKER RODEMS & COOK, P.A. TillS CAUSE came before the Court upon the Plaintiffs motion, filed July 9, 2010. This is the third time that the Plaintiff has motioned to disqualify Defendant's counsel, despite having been informed in an order issued May 12, 2006 that this issue had been DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. "With

prejudice" that means that the motion in question is "finally disposed ... and bars any future action on that claim."1 Moreover, because of the doctrine of res judicata 2 this motion must be DENIED. The Plaintiff is again noticed (as he has been in two previous Court orders) that repeat filings attempting to revisit the same issue can be found to rise to the level of a sanctionable offense. 3 The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to never accept another pleading from the Plaintiff that indicates an attempt to disqualify Defendants' counsel, as this matter has been DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida, on July ~~

20 1~OUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH)
STATE OF FLORJOA

' ~:'s~'~ WITNOEASy-'SOMF'LXuaND AND.oFFlCiAL SEAL

THIS IS TO CERTIFY Tf-'.AT THE FO~EGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COpy OF THE DOCUMENT ON FILE IN

~
.
/ Martha

:~~.\J.to~111 ~r.~d
\"" ....

. .""",\\\

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,~ J~C u..A/ ___

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f~>-~""~':/~i

III:~~'" .~... ..~>f!

"CLE'

'~OFCjRCUIT
than.

PAT FRANK

J. Cook CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

-- -..

Black's Law Dictionary, 7

D.C.

Matters that have been "definitively settl

by judicial decision." Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition.

Lanier v. State of Florida, 982 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2008).

EXHIBIT
Page 1 of 2

Copies Furnished To:

Neil J. Gillespie, pro se (Plaintiff)
8092 SW 115 th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esq. (for Defendants)
400 North Ashley Drive, Ste. 2100
Tampa, FL 33602

Page 2 of 2

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TIDRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR IDLLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation, Defendant. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--:1 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER DETERMINING PLAINTIFF'S
ENTITLEMENT TO REASONABLE MODIFICATIONS UNDER TITLE II
OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Defendant Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., moves the Court for an Order scheduling an evidentiary hearing to determine PlaintiffNeil J. Gillespie's entitlement, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), to reasonable modifications to the rules or procedures for litigating this action, and as grounds therefor would state: 1. On December 29,2009, Plaintiff sent a letter to the presiding Judge's Judicial

Case No.: Division:

05CA7205 C

Assistant complaining that Defendant's counsel had not cleared the hearing date on January 19, 2010 with him. In the December 29, 2009 letter, Plaintiff requested that the Court cancel the hearing on January 19,2010, and also stated: Please be advised there are five important outstanding motions that need a hearing ... In the interest of economy please schedule my five motions together with anything Mr. Rodems wishes to set. I will need two hours for my five motions. (Exhibit "1")(Emphasis added). Subsequently, the Court entered an Order canceling the January 19,2010 hearing and scheduled all pending motions for a one hour hearing on January 26, 2010. 2. At the January 26, 2010 hearing, however, Plaintiff delivered a letter to Judge

25

Barton in open court, which stated in pertinent part he had disabilities and required "accommodations." In direct contrast to his prior request that the Court schedule all five of his pending motions for hearing on the same date over a period of two hours, Plaintiff stated: Some of the accommodations requested are a limit on the number of motions considered in a single hearing. This Courts December 30, 2009 Order setting "all pending motion" [sic] is not acceptable. First a determination should be made of the pending motions, then a reasonable schedule must be set to hear them. (Exhibit "2"). 3. At the hearing on January 26, 2010, after hearing the Plaintiffs assertions that he

was disabled, the Court began an inquiry into this matter, but Plaintiff requested additional time to submit information to the Court. The Court granted the request and did not hear any oftIle motions. On February 4, 2010, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Court stating "Regarding the ADA accommodation information requested by the Court at the hearing January 26, 2010, I plan to submit the information to the Court by Tuesday, February 9, 2010." (Exhibit "3"). On February 9, 2010, he sent another letter to the Court stating "The ADA accommodation information requested by the Court at the hearing January 26,2010 is taking longer to prepare than originally planned. I am sorry to report that it is not ready today as promised. It will be a couple more days, hopefully by Friday, February 12." (Exhibit "4"). 4. To bring this issue to resolution, Defendant requests that the Court schedule an

evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs claim that he requires "accommodations" under Title II of the ADA. 1

1 Under Title II ofthe ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. 12132. "A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices,

5.

To be covered under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must have a "disability,"2 and

even then, Plaintiffis entitled to "reasonable modifications3" only if he is a "qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. 12132. Stated in plainer terms, if Plaintiff is not a "qualified individual with a disability," then he is not protected by Title II of the ADA. 6. Plaintiff bears the burden of proof (a) that he has a "disability"; and (b) that his

"disability" requires "reasonable modifications." Compare Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997)("To prove a public program or service violates Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a "qualified individual with a disability"; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public

or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. 35.130(7). "Public entity" includes "any State or local government" and "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government ...." 42 U.S.C. 12131(1).
2 Under Title II of the ADA, "[d]isability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. "The phrase physical or mental impairment" includes "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. "The phrase major life activities means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. A "qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. 12131(2).

If Plaintiff has a "disability," then the "reasonable modifications" he may request are those necessary for him to meet "the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. 12131(2).
3

entity's services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion. denial of benefits. or discrimination was by reason of his disability. See 42 U.S.C. 12132 (emphasis added)."). 7. As for the specific factual and legal issues to be resolved at the evidentiary

hearing, Defendants request that the Court schedule an evidentiary hearing to determine: a. b. Whether Plaintiff has a "disability," as defmed by Title II of the ADA; If Plaintiff has such a "disability," then what specific "modifications" he is

requesting to the Court's "rules, policies, or practices ... for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by" the Court. 42 U.S.C. 12131(2); and, c. whether the requested "modifications would fundamentally alter the nature

of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. 35.130(7). 8. Additionally, because Plaintiff is pro se, the Defendants request that the Court

advise Plaintiff that the Florida Evidence Code shall govern the evidentiary hearing. WHEREFORE, Defendant moves the Court to schedule an evidentiary hearing to determine PlaintiffNeil J. Gillespie's entitlement to reasonable modifications under the ADA. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of February, 2010.

~ODEMS'ESQUIRE
Florida Bar No. 947652 Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 Telephone: 813/489-1001 Facsimile: 813/489-1008 Attorneys fur Defundant 4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by

u.s. Mail to Mr. Neil J. Gillespie, 8092 SW 115th Loop, Ocala, Florida
February, 2010.

34481, this 12th day

12-30-2009 03:34

NEIL GILLESPIE

PAGE2

8092 SW 1151h Loop Ocala. l<'Iorida 34481 Telephone: (352) 854-7807

Neil .J. Gillespie

December 29,2009
VIA FAX: (813) 276 2725

Ms. Linda Greno, Judicial Assistant The Hono~le James M. Barton, II Circuit Court Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Circuit Court., Division C 800 E. Twiggs Street, Room 512 Tampa. Florida 33602
RE: Gillespie Vo Rarker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., and Willjam J. Cook, case no.: 05CA7205, Division C Dcar Ms. Greno:

This faxed letter is a follow-up to my voice message to you earlier today.

I am requesting the court cancel a hearing set for Tuesday, January 19, 2009, at 4:00 PM set by attorney Ryan Christopher Rodems because Mr. Rodems set the hearing without
consulting with me about the date and time of the hearing. Please be advised there are five important outstanding motions that need a hearing, one dating to 2006: (in a.~cending order, oldest to newest, by date)
1.

December 14,2006, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendants' Discovery February 1,2007, Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Defendants' Discovery

2.
3.

July 16,2008. Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing. This motion is Mr. Bauer's, and js necessitated beealL'ie Mr. Rodems misrepresented to Judge Barton that there was a signed written fee llbTfeement between plaintiff Neil Gillespie and defendant Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA. For the record, let me state that there is NO signed written fee agreement between myself and Barker, Rodems & Cook. No sueh agreement wa.~ signed, none exists, and Mr. Rodems has not produced one. The lack of a signed written fee agreement between the parties is also a violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2).

12-30-2009 03:34

NEIL GILLESPIE

PAGE3

Ms. Linda Greno, Judicial Assistant The Honorable James M. Barton, Jl

Page- 2

December 29, 2009

4. August 14,2008. Plaintiffs Claim of Exemption and Request for Hearing. This motion was also filed by Mr. Bauer and mu.~t be held to detennine plaintiff's exemptions.

5. December 15,2009, Plaintiff's Motion hold Mr. Rodems in Contempt for violating Judge Rarton'5 ruling of October 1, 2009. Judge Barton ruled that the case was stayed and the parties were prohibited from doing anything of record for 60 days. Nonetheless on October 13, 2009 Mr. Rodems filed of record an amended notice of duces .tecum during the stay period. Please advise the undersigned when the above motions can he set for hearing. In the interest of fa.imes~, please cancel Mr. Rodems' improperly scheduled motion set for January 19,2009. In the interest ofeconomy please schedule my five motions together with anything Mr. Rodems wishes to set. 1 win need two hours for my five motions. Thank you fllr your kind consideration. Sincerely,

enclosure: Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing, July 16, 2008

AU calls on my home l\ffice bu."iine~~ telephone extension are recorded for quality o.~urallce Jlurpor.e.'l pUNlUllnt to the business usc exemption or Florida Statllres chapter 934, specifically section 934.02(4)(a)( 1) and the holding of Rc>yal Health Care Servs. JfIe. \I. Jefferson-Pi/ol Lift Ins. Cf)., 924 fo.2d 215 (11th elr. 1991).

8092 SW IISth Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

Neil J. Gillespie

January 26, 20I0 VIA HAND DELIVERY The Honomble James M. Barton, II Circuit Court Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Circuit Court, Division C 800 E. Twiggs Street, Room 512 Tampa, Florida 33602

RE: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., and William J. Cook, case no.: 05-CA-7205, Division C
Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution claims to provide access to the courts to every person for redress of any injury, but for an ordinary citizen justice is often not administered fairfy and is frequently denied or delayed - Neil Gillespie

Dear Judge Barton:

I apologize for the late timing ofthis letter, but yesterday I became aware of Rule 2.540

Florida Rules ofJudicial Administration, Notices to Persons with Disabilities: All notices of court proceedings to be held in a public facility, and all process compelling appearance at such proceedings, shall include the following: "Ifyou are a person with a disability who needs any accommodation in order to participate in this proceeding, you are entitled, at no cost to you, to the provision of certain assistance. Please contact [identifY applicable court personnel by name, address, and telephone number] within 2 working days ofyour receipt ofthis [describe notice]; if you are hearing or voice impaired, call 71 I." Yesterday I tried to clarifY this issue with Court Administrator Mr. Bridenback and left a message for his assistant Tracy at (813) 272-5368, but no one called back. In addition to the Rule 2.540 notice, I have a question about how and where to submit my ADA Assessment and Report. I retained author and health professional Ms. Karin Huffer, MS, MFT as my Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodations Designer and Advocate. Some ofthe accommodations requested are a limit on the number of motions considered in a single hearing. This Courts December 30, 2009 Order setting "all pending

The Honorable James M. Barton, IT

Page-2 January 26,2010

motion" is not acceptable. First a determination should be made ofthe pending motions, then a reasonable schedule must be set to hear them. The Court's Order setting today's hearing does not comply with Rule 2.540. Because the George E. Edgecomb Courthouse, 800 East Twiggs Street, Tampa is a public facility, I believe any notice for a hearing there is subject to Rule 2.540. Also, none of Mr. Rodems' notices for hearings in the courthouse have contained a Rule 2.540 disclosures throughout this litigation. In all fairness, neither did any of my notices, but I am just an ordinary citizen and pro se litigant. (Note: the Court's web site cites Rule 2.065). More importantly, while reading Rule 2.540, I noticed Rule 2.545, Case Management. For whatever reason none ofthe judges assigned to this case have iinplemented any case management in over four years. In addition, Rule 1.200 provides for Pretrial Procedure and a Case Management Conference. In the past I asked Court Counsel about this and did not receive a response. One ofmy letters to Court Counsel is enclosed. The problem is so bad in this case that I believe it should have been designated Complex Litigation under Rule 1.201, Fla.R.Civ.P because A "complex action" is one that is likely to involve complicated legal or case management issues and that may require extensive judicial management to expedite the action, keep costs reasonable, or promote judicial efficiency. But the conclusive evidence ofofficial wrongdoing in this case is from a law review by The Honorable Claudia Rickert Isom titled Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REv. 323,324 (1998). In it, Judge Rickert described the issue ofadversarial parties and discovery problems, which she calls "cutting up". This is what Judge Isom wrote: "When this litigious attitude begins to restrict the trial court's ability to effectively bring cases to resolution, the judge must get involved to assist the process." So apparently extreme measures such as $11,550 sanctions are not the next step in the process. It is outrageous that Judge 180m would ignore her own law review in my case that was before her Court on February 5, 2007. Clearly the 13th Judicial Circuit is prejudiced against me as either a pro se litigant or a person with disabilities, or both. Because of this newly discovered evidence I believe a motion for reliefunder Rule 1.540, Fla.R.Civ.P is appropriate to overturn this Court's Order Determining Amount of Sanctions, and Final Judgment of March 21, 2008. This sanction ofattorney's fees is even more outnlgeous given the fact that plaintiff's motion to compel defendants discovery has not been heard and is pending since December 14, 2006. How can this Court award $11,550 against me when defendants are guilty ofthe same offense? I commenced two lawsuits pro se in August 2005 (one being the instant case) because I could not find or afford counsel to represent him. One lawsuit in federal court involved a credit card dispute, Gillespie v. HSBC Bank et ai, case no. 5:05-cv-362-0c-WTH-GRJ, US District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division. The HSBC lawsuit was resolved a year later with a good result for the parties. Plaintiffwas able to work amicably with the counsel for HSBC Bank, Traci H. Rollins and David J. D'Agata, counsel with Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, LLP and the entire case was concluded in 15 months.

The Honorable James M. Barton, n

Page-3

January 26,2010

August 17~ 2005, Complaint filed, Gillespie v HSBC Bank, et al September 25, 2006, Order establishing a cause ofaction (US District Judge William Terrell Hodges) October 23, 2006, Settlement Agreement and Release November 17, 2006, civil judgment entered dismissing case Apart from these proceedings I am a law abiding, engaged citizen. I am a former business owner and graduate ofThe Wharton School (Evening Division), University of Pennsylvani~and The Evergreen State College. Since 1994 I have been disabled, a condition that affects me ability to represent himselfwhen confronted by a hostile lawyer like Mr. Rodems who knows ofmy disability from his firm's prior representation. In addition, Mr. Rodems sued plaintifffor libel over a letter about a closed bar complaint. Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So.2d 975, recognizes the inequitable balance ofpower that may exist between an attomey who brings a defamation action and the client who must defend against it Attorneys schooled in the law have the ability to pursue litigation through their own means and with minimal expense when compared with their fonner clients. And there is more newly discovered evidence. Mr. Rodems~ application to the 13th Circuit JNC lists two other clients who complained to the Florida Bar that he charged an inappropriate fee in a contingency case, Rita Pesci and Roslyn Vazquez. This shows that Mr. Rodems and his law firm utilize a cormpt business model that works as follows:. A. Usurp the clientts fiduciary interest. B. Procure a signed agreement from the client by any means, including fraud. c. Rely upon the parol evidence rule to enforce the settlement Because Mr. Rodems failed to provide this infonnation in discovery, it was not available for my defense on March 20, 2008 for the sanction hearing to determine attorneys fees.. And the discovery that Mr. Rodems was actively seeking appointment to the bench on March 20, 2008 was a conflict and explains' his obsession with the status ofjudges both at the hearing and during the course ofthis litigation. The Commentary to Judicial Canon 2A states a judge must expect to be the subject ofconstant public scmtiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
In addition to relief from judgment it is time for Plaintiff's FirSt Amended Complaint, which will include a count ofBreach o"fFiduciary Duty~ which is appropriate given the facts and can be added under Rule 1.190(c), FIa.R.Civ.P and the relation back doctrine. Breach of Fiduciary Duty was first argued in this case in 2005, October 7,.2005, see Plaintiff's Rebuttal To Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Strike.

Mr. Rodems testified at the March 20, 2008 hearing on the attomey's fees that "I am board-certified in civil trial law and I've been practicing law since 1992.." (transcript, page 14, line 23). Mr. Rodems also testified that "rve been trying cases for the last 16 years." (transcript, page 15, line 4). On cross examination, Mr. Bauer asked: "How m~y 57.105

The Honorable James M. Barton, n

Page-4 January 26, 2010

actions have you been involved in?" (transcript, page 15, line 18). Mr. Rodems testified: "I filed I believe two in this case and I may have filed one or two other ones in my career but I couldn't be sure exactly.n (transcript, page 15, line 20). Since the March 20,2008 hearing, Mr. Rodems has filed two additional section 57.105 motions in this lawsuit. On July 31, 2008, Mr. Rodems submitted his third section 57.105 motion in this lawsuit, because I did not withdrawn my Complaint For Breach ofContract and Fraud. Mr. Rodems submitted his fourth section 57.105 motion in this case; also on July 31, 2008, because I did not withdrawal my motion for rehearing, which was necessitated when Mr. Rodems lied to the Court at the October 31, 2007 hearing about the existence ofa signed contingent fee agreement - there is no signed contract with Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA and Mr. Rodems falsely told the court otherwise. Furthermore, Mr. Rodems threatened to file another section 5'7.105 motion against Mr. Bauer in April, 2007, and again in May, 2007, regarding appellant's. reinstatement ofhis claims voluntarily dismissed, which the 2DCA upheld in 2D07-4530. So far in this lawsuit Mr. Rodems has filed four (4) section 57. lOS motions and threatened another - while in the balance ofhis sixteen (16) year career Mr. Rodems testified that he may have filed one or two other ones but he couldn't be sure exactly. It is clear that Mr. Rodems is misusing the section 57.105 motion as a weapon in his "foll Duelear blast approaeh" because he has a conDitt of interest in this la~suit and should have been disqualified as counsel upon apoeUant's motion, Plaintiffs Motio"

to Disqlltl.lifv Counsel, submitted February 4, 2006.

As for Judge Nielsen's Order ofMay 12,2006, the Order states "The motion to disqualifY is denied with prejudice, except as to the basis that counsel may be a witness, and. on that basis, the motion is denied without prejudice." As for Mr. Rodems being a witness, the nature ofthis case is that he is essentially a perpetual witness. The transcripts show that

his representation is essentially ongoing testimony about factual matters. Mr. Rodems should be disqualified, it is long overdue. Finally a letter written by Mr. Rodems surfaced relative to a lawsuit disclosed on his JNC application, Wrest/eReunion. LLC v. Live NatioT4 Television Holdings, Inc.,. United States District Court, Middle District ofFlorida, Case No. 8:07-cv-2093-T-27, trial August 31 September 10, 2009. Mr. Rodems lost the case and then wrote a letter attacking the .credibility of Eric BischotI: .a witnesses. The letter is enclosed and may also be found online at: www.declarationofindependents.netldoilpageslcorrente91O.html
Mr. Rodems' letter calls into question his mental well-being. After the jUlY spoke and the case was over Mr. Rodems wrote the following; "It is odd that Eric Bischoff: whose well documented incompetence caused the demise ofWCW, should have any comment on the

outcome ofthe WrestIeReunion, LLC lawsuit.. The expert report Bischoffsubmitted in this case bordered on illiteracy, and Bischoffwas not even called to testify by Clear ChannellLive Nation because Bischoffperjured himself in a deposition in late-July 2009

The Honorable James M. Barton, n

Page - 5
January 26,2010

before running out and refusing to answer any more questions regarding his serious problems with alcohol and sexual deviancy at the Gold Club while the head ofWCW.." Mr.. Rodems also wrote, '~To even sit in the room and question him. was one ofthe most distasteful ~gs I've ever had to do in 17 years ofpracticing law. In fact, we understand that Bischoffwas afraid to even come to Tampa and testify because he would have to answer questions under oath for a third time about his embarrassing past" Mr. Rodems continued his attack on the witness writing, "The sad state ofprofessional wrestling today is directly attributable to this snake oil salesman, whose previous career highlights include selling.meat out ofthe back of a truck, before he filed bankruptcy and had his car repossessed. Today, after running WCW into the ground, Bischoff.peddles schlock like ftGirls Gone Wildtt and reality shows featuring B-listers."

In conclusion, my fonner lawyer, the congenial Robert W. Bauer, complained about Mr. Rodems in open court: " ... Mr~ Rodems has, you know, decided to take a full nuclear blast approach instead of us trying to work this out in a professional manner. It is my mistake
for sitting back and giving him the opportunity to take this full blast attack. (transcript, Aug-14-08 hearing before Judge Crenshaw, p. 16, line 24).

Thank you for your kind consideration.

cc: Mr. David A. Rowland, Court Counsel (letter only)

Mr. Mike Bridenback, Court Administrator in the 13th Judicial Circuit (letter only)
Mr. Gonzalo B. Casares, ADA Coordinator for the 13 th Judicial Circuit (letter only)
Mr.. Ryan Christopher Rodems

~-0S-201e

e5:3e

NEIL GILLESPIE

PAGE1

8092 SW l1S lh Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

Neil J. Gillespie

February 4, 2010 VIA FAX: (813) 276- 2725

The Honorable James M. Rarton, II Circuit Court Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Circuit Court, Division C 800 E. 'l'wiggs Street, Room 512 Tampa, Florida 33602
RE: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.) and Wi1liam J. Cook, casc no.: 05-CA-7205. Division C Dear Judge Barton: Regarding the ADA accommodation infonnation requested by the Court at the hearing January 26,2010,1 plan to submit the information to the Court by Tuesday, February 9,

2010. Thank you.

cc: Mr. Ryan Christopher Rodems

-....;

02-10-2010 04:39

NEIL GILLESPIE

PAGE2

Neil .J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115th Loop

Ocala, Florida 34481

February 9,2010

VIA FAX: (813) 276- 2725

lbe Honorable James M. Barton, IT Circuit Cowt Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Circuit Court. Division C 800 He Twiggs Street, Room 512 Tampa, Florida 33602

R.E: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., and William J. Cook,
case no.: 05-CA-7205, Division C

Dear Judge Barton: The ADA accommodation information requested by the Court at the hearing January 26, 20 lOis taking longer to prepare tban originally planned. I am sony to report tbat it is not ready today a.q promised. It will be a couple more days, hopefully by Friday, February 12.
"Ibis is still a question about wbere to submit my ADA assessment and report. Enclosed is a copy of my email to Mr. Gonzalo B. Casares, ADA Coordinator for the 13 th Judicial

Circuit. Some of the confusion stems from the fragmented cowt system. Apparently there is an ADA Coordinator for Hillsborough County, Ms. Sandra Sroka, and an ADA Coordinator tor the Clerk ofthe Circuit Court, Ms. Lynn Ryder. My previous calls to Court Administrator Mr. Bridenback, his assistant Tracy WelJs at (813) 272-5368, have not been returned.
.!bank you for the Court's patience and understanding.

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

CHRIS A. BARKER RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS WILLIAM ]. COOK

400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100

Tampa, Florida 33602

Telephone 813/489-1001 Facsimile 813/489-1008

February 12,2010

VIA HAND DELIVERY

The Honorable James M. Barton, II Circuit Court Judge Circuit Civil, Division "C" 800 E. Twiggs Street, Room 512 Tampa, Florida 33602

Re:

Neil J. Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.,

a Florida Corporation; and William J. Cook
Case No.: 05-CA-7205; Division "C"

Dear Judge Barton: As you will recall, a hearing was scheduled on all pending motions on January 26, 2010, and during that hearing Plaintiff claimed he was disabled and entitled to "accommodations" under the Americans with Disabilities Act. He asserted that he would provide certain information to the Court, but has yet to do so. The motions scheduled for hearing included motions to compel Plaintiff's attendance at a deposition in aid of execution and to compel complete responses to discovery, as my clients obtained a Final Judgment on March 27, 2008 against Plaintiff due to his violation of section 57.105, Florida Statutes and various discovery violations. Clearly, Plaintiff's claim of disability has delayed my clients from moving forward and collecting on the Final Judgment protecting their rights. Therefore, I have filed "Defendant's Motion for an Order Determining Plaintiffs Entitlement to Reasonable Modifications under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act." In it, I have requested that the Court schedule an evidentiary hearing on this matter. Pursuant to your direction at the hearing on January 26, 2010, I am requesting that this motion be set for an evidentiary hearing as soon as possible. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.

Re, ectfullY'uhmi

Christopher Rodems RCR/so Enclosure cc: Neil 1. Gillespie (wi encl)

Case 5:05-cv-00362-WTH-GRJ Document 32

Filed 09/25/06 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OCALA DIVISION NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, -vsHSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation; HSBC BANK NEVADA,N.A., a National Bank formerly known as Household Bank (SB), N.A.; RISK MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendants. ______________________________________ ORDER The Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed suit against the Defendants alleging violations of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1640(e) and 1692k,1 the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and Florida law, with respect to various charges and fees assessed against the Plaintiffs credit card account. (Doc. 22). The case is before the Court for consideration of Defendants HSBC North America Holdings, Inc.s and HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A.s motions to dismiss, (Docs. 4, 29), to which the Plaintiff has filed a response Case No. 5:05-cv-362-Oc-10GRJ

Although the Plaintiff lists the Consumer Credit Protection Act in the first paragraph of his First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 22), he does not allege any claims under the Act, or otherwise mention the Act. Therefore, the Court will not further address the Consumer Credit Protection Act in this Order.

26

Case 5:05-cv-00362-WTH-GRJ Document 32

Filed 09/25/06 Page 2 of 22

in opposition (Doc. 5). Upon review of the Amended Complaint and the record in this case, the Court finds that the motions to dismiss are due to be granted in part and denied in part. Factual Background The following facts are alleged in the Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Doc. 22) and are taken as true for the purposes of the motion to dismiss. The Plaintiff, Neil J. Gillespie, is a resident of Ocala, Florida. On February 27, 2003, Gillespie opened a MasterCard credit card account, issued by Defendant HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., f/k/a Household Bank (SB), N.A. (HSBC Nevada). Defendant HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. (HSBC North America) is the parent company of HSBC Nevada. At the time Gillespie opened the account, HSBC Nevada charged him a $59.00 annual fee. The initial credit line for the credit card was $300.00. Gillespie maintained his credit card account in good standing and received credit line increases to $400,00, then $500,00, and again to $600.00 over the next year. In mid-2004, Gillespie decided to close his credit card account and pay off any remaining balance. By letter dated June 9, 2004, HSBC Nevada notified Gillespie that his account had been closed. Due to the busy 2004 Hurricane season, Gillespie chose to reinstate his credit card account in order to pay for hurricane related expenses. A $29.00 reinstatement fee posted to Gillespies account on September 6, 2004. On or about September 2, 2004, Gillespie requested, by telephone, an increase in his credit line. In a letter dated September 6, 2004, HSBC Nevada agreed to increase his

Case 5:05-cv-00362-WTH-GRJ Document 32

Filed 09/25/06 Page 3 of 22

credit limit to $800.00, provided that Gillespie pay in advance a $50.00 automated credit line increase fee. HSBC Nevada told Gillespie that the $50.00 fee would later be credited back to his account, and that he should make his check for the fee payable to ACLI. Gillespie mailed a $50.00 money order payable to ACLI to HSBC Nevada on September 7, 2004. Gillespie contends that HSBC Nevada never credited the $50.00 automated credit line increase fee back to his account. Instead, HSBC Nevada charged Gillespies credit card account a $50.00 credit line increase finance charge on September 9, 2004, then reversed the fee the same day. According to Gillespie, these two transactions cancelled each other out, and did not take into account the $50.00 fee he had already paid and was promised would be credited to his account. Gillespie contends that HSBC Nevadas actions constitute a slight-of-hand theft.2 While his account remained open, and throughout the entire dispute process, HSBC Nevada continued to mail Gillespie monthly account statements, each providing a 24-hour automated account information telephone number. On September 11, 2004, Gillespie left Florida in order to avoid Hurricane Ivan, and traveled to Ooltewah, Tennessee. During this trip, Gillespie used his credit card for various travel-related expenses. He relied upon HSBC Nevadas 24-hour automated account information telephone number to ensure that his credit card balance remained within the credit limit.

See Amended Complaint, (Doc. 22), 22.

3

Case 5:05-cv-00362-WTH-GRJ Document 32

Filed 09/25/06 Page 4 of 22

Gillespie contends that the automated account information telephone number provided him with incorrect balance information, such that he unknowingly exceeded his credit limit and was penalized with various overlimit fees. His September 20, 2004 credit card statement showed an overlimit balance of $161.62, the majority of which was attributable to various bank fees.3 If Gillespie had received accurate information

concerning his account balance, and if he had received a credit on his account for the $50.00 automated credit line increase fee, Gillespie argues that he would not have exceeded his credit limit. On November 13, 2004, Gillespie notified HSBC Nevada in writing that he was closing his account. In his letter, Gillespie agreed to pay all legitimate charges, including those for purchases, cash advances, cash advance fees, and lawful interest. He objected, however, to paying any overlimit fees and late fees resulting from the allegedly inaccurate account balance information provided by HSBC Nevadas automatic telephone service. Gillespie also requested an updated account statement within 30 days. By letter dated November 29, 2004, HSBC stated that Gillespies new account balance was $1,121.27 and demanded immediate payment of $355. Gillespie did not pay this amount, and returned the letter with various comments to the Chief Operating Officer of HSBC Bank USA, N.A.

See Doc. 22, exhibit 2.

4

Case 5:05-cv-00362-WTH-GRJ Document 32

Filed 09/25/06 Page 5 of 22

On December 6, 2004, HSBC Nevada sent Gillespie a Delinquent Account Notice demanding payment of his account balance, which had reached $1,150.27. Gillespie telephoned HSBC Nevada on December 20, 2004 to dispute the balance. HSBC Nevada again contacted Gillespie by letter dated December 31, 2004. This letter notified Gillespie that his account had been canceled effective October 7, 2004. However, HSBC Nevada continued to charge Gillespie the $59.00 annual fee on March 20, 2005, and charged a $29.00 late fee and $29.00 overlimit fee every month. On or about December 31, 2004, HSBC Nevada placed Gillespies account for collection with Defendant Risk Management Alternatives, Inc. (RMA), a collection agency with its headquarters in Duluth, Georgia. RMA contacted Gillespie by letter dated January 3, 2005, notifying Gillespie that it was HSBC Nevadas debt collector on this account, and demanding payment in the amount of $1,174.74. That same day, Gillespie received a telephone call from a Roger Harrison at RMA offering to settle the entire dispute for $900.00. Gillespie immediately agreed to the settlement, and agreed to send an initial payment of $135.00 by January 25, 2005, with payment of the remaining $765.00 balance in February 2005. Gillespie sent the $135.00 payment on January 15, 2005, ten days ahead of schedule. He spoke with a Holly Reynolds at RMA, who confirmed the terms of the settlement and provided Gillespie with RMAs receive code to accept the payment. Despite this settlement agreement, and Gillespies initial payment, RMA continued to call Gillespie another 21 times throughout the month of January, 2005.
5

Case 5:05-cv-00362-WTH-GRJ Document 32

Filed 09/25/06 Page 6 of 22

On January 24, 2005, RMA called Gillespie and informed him that RMA would no longer accept the settlement agreement and demanded payment of $1,089.27. RMA called Gillespie again on January 25, 2005, demanded the same payment, and threatened to call Gillespies family if he did not pay the entire $1,089.27 immediately. RMA also claimed to have contacted Gillespies uncle, which was not true, as Gillespies uncle had passed away a short time before. Gillespie eventually changed his telephone number to an unpublished number to avoid any further contact with RMA. On January 20, 2005, HSBC Nevada provided Gillespie with an account statement listing a payment of $135.00, and demanding a payment of the remaining balance of $1,089.79. The statement did not mention the settlement with RMA. HSBC Nevada also charged Gillespie another $29.00 overlimit fee and assessed a $21.05 finance charge. On January 31, 2005, Gillespie wrote to Martin Glynn, President and Chief Executive Officer of HSBC Bank USA, one of HSBC Nevadas parent companies. In the letter, Gillespie discussed the alleged harassment and threats from RMA, including the fact that RMA broke its settlement agreement with Gillespie. He also stated that any further settlement offers must be made in writing. Jory Berdan of Household Bank Credit Card Services responded to Gillespie by letter dated February 24, 2005, acknowledging RMAs breach and offering to settle Gillespies account. The terms of the new settlement offer are not mentioned in the Amended Complaint, although Gillespie states that they were contradicted by later HSBC Nevada correspondence.

Case 5:05-cv-00362-WTH-GRJ Document 32

Filed 09/25/06 Page 7 of 22

To date, it does not appear that Gillespie has made any further payments on his account. HSBC Nevada has continued to assess late fees, overlimit fees, annual fees and interest on the credit card account. As of July 20, 2005, the outstanding balance had reached $1,675.21. Procedural History Gillespie initiated this action on August 17, 2005 (Doc. 1). In his original Complaint, Gillespie alleged three claims against HSBC Nevada: (1) a state law claim for fraud, based on the alleged slight-of-hand theft over Gillespies $50.00 automated credit line increase fee; (2) a claim that HSBC Nevada violated various provisions of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. (TILA), by failing to disclose in advance the various fees and finance charges it assessed against Gillespie, and by failing to provide Gillespie with accurate account balance information; and (3) a state law claim alleging violations of Floridas usury laws. Gillespie also asserted a claim against RMA, alleging that RMAs collection activities violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, et seq. He seeks as relief compensatory damages, punitive damages, statutory damages, interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. On October 17, 2005, HSBC North America and HSBC Nevada filed a joint motion to dismiss all claims against them. (Doc. 4). Gillespie filed a response in opposition on November 4, 2005 (Doc. 5). Before the Court could consider the motion, Gillespie sought and obtained leave to file an Amended Complaint (Docs. 8, 12). The Amended Complaint

Case 5:05-cv-00362-WTH-GRJ Document 32

Filed 09/25/06 Page 8 of 22

is identical in all respects to the original Complaint, with one exception. Gillespie has added a common law claim of negligence against HSBC Nevada, apparently based on HSBC Nevadas alleged hiring of RMA to act as its debt collector. Neither the original or the Amended Complaint allege any claims against HSBC North America. In granting Gillespie leave to file his Amended Complaint, the Court also provided that HSBC North Americas and HSBC Nevadas motion to dismiss (Doc. 4) would apply to the Amended Complaint, and granted leave to file another motion to dismiss focused solely on the new negligence claim. (Doc. 12). HSBC North America and HSBC Nevada did so on April 5, 2006. (Doc. 29). Gillespie has never responded to this second motion to dismiss and the time for responding has elapsed. On July 7, 2005, approximately six (6) weeks prior to Gillespie filing this suit, RMA filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 101-1330. On September 6, 2005, RMA filed a Notice of Pendency of Bankruptcy Case and Automatic Stay of Proceedings with this Court. (Doc. 2). As such, all claims against RMA are stayed pending notice that the automatic stay in the bankruptcy proceeding has been lifted. Motion to Dismiss Standard of Review In passing on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is mindful that [d]ismissal of a claim on the basis of barebones pleadings is a precarious disposition with a high mortality rate. Int'l Erectors, Inc. v. Wilhoit Steel Erectors Rental Serv. 400 F.2d

Case 5:05-cv-00362-WTH-GRJ Document 32

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465, 471 (5th Cir. 1968). Thus, if a complaint shows that the Plaintiff is entitled to any relief that the Court can grant, regardless of whether it asks for the proper relief, it is sufficiently plead. Dotschay v. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1957). As the Supreme Court declared in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See also Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. The Plimsoll Club, 451 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1971). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. Instead, all that is required is that the claimant set forth a short and plain statement of the claim sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Id. However, while notice pleading may not require that the pleader allege a specific fact to cover each element of a claim, it is still necessary that a complaint contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Roe v. Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). In addition, when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court is limited to a review of the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint itself, as well as any attached and/or incorporated documents which are central to the plaintiffs claim. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997). Review of such incorporated documents will not convert a
9

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motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id., see also Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 n. 2 (11th Cir.1999). However, the Court will not consider factual arguments made in motions or other papers, or other evidence not attached or incorporated by the face of the complaint itself. Discussion I. Claims Against HSBC North America Defendant HSBC North America seeks to be dismissed from this case because Gillespie has not alleged any claims against it. It appears from the face of Gillespies Amended Complaint that HSBC North America is a separate and distinct entity from HSBC Nevada.4 It is also clear from the Amended Complaint that Gillespie has not made any allegations against HSBC North America other than to aver that it is the parent company of HSBC Nevada. Thus, it would appear that dismissal of HSBC North America is appropriate. Normally, a parent corporation is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998). Gillespie, however, argues in his opposition that HSBC North America should remain in this case because it is the head of the hydra. See Doc. 5, p. 3. While not entirely clear, it appears that Gillespie is arguing that HSBC North America, in its role as parent of HSBC Nevada, either exercised some sort of control over the actions of HSBC Nevada in this case, or should be held vicariously

See Doc. 22, 4.

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liable for the actions of HSBC Nevada.5 However, Gillespie has made no such allegations in his Amended Complaint. Indeed, none of the five claims even mention HSBC North America. Given the complete absence of any allegations or claims in the Amended Complaint against HSBC North America, the Court concludes that dismissal without prejudice of HSBC North America is appropriate. II. Claims Against HSBC Nevada A. Fraud Claim

HSBC Nevada seeks dismissal of each of Gillespies claims against it.6 The first claim against HSBC Nevada is a state law claim for fraud. HSBC Nevada asserts that dismissal is appropriate because Gillespie has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and because Gillespie has not alleged his fraud claim with the sufficient level of particularity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(a). To allege a claim of common law fraud in Florida, Gillespie must allege: (1) a false statement concerning a material fact; (2) knowledge by the person making the statement that the representation is false; (3) the intent by the person making the statement that the
There are three ways in which a parent can be held liable for the acts of its subsidiaries: (1) an alter ego theory to pierce the corporate veil; (2) vicarious liability based on general agency principles; or (3) direct liability where the parent directly participated in the wrong complained of. See In re Managed Care Litigation, 298 F. Supp.2d 1259, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2003). Gillespie has not alleged any facts in his Amended Complaint to support any of these theories. In his original complaint, Gillespie asks the Court to mail a copy of the complaint to United States Senator Richard Shelby and John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency. (Doc. 1). In its first motion to dismiss, HSBC Nevada asks the Court to strike this request on the grounds that it is impertinent and scandalous. Gillespie has omitted this request in his Amended Complaint, therefore it is no longer a part of this case, and HSBC Nevadas request is denied as moot.
11
6 5

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representation will induce another to act on it; and (4) reliance on the representation to the injury of the other party. Knight v. E.F. Hutton and Co., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (citing Lance v. Wade, 457 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 1984)). See also Romo v. Amedex Ins. Co., 930 So.2d 643, 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Hillcrest Pacific Corp. v. Yamamura, 727 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). HSBC Nevada contends that Gillespie has not sufficiently alleged either a false statement of a material fact, nor any injury attributable to his reliance on HSBC Nevadas statements. The Court disagrees. Gillespies fraud claim centers on the representations made by HSBC Nevada concerning his $50.00 automated credit line increase. Gillespie alleges that HSBC Nevada told him that if he made that payment in advance, it would be later credited back to his account and he would receive a credit limit increase. In other words, he would receive a refund of his $50.00 payment. According to the Amended Complaint, while Gillespie did receive the credit limit increase,7 he never received a refund of the $50.00. Instead, HSBC Nevada charged his credit card account an additional $50.00 fee, and reversed that charge. Simply put, HSBC Nevada double charged Gillespie for the credit line increase, and only credited him back for one of the charges. The partial copy of Gillespies September 20, 2004 account statement further demonstrates this fact.8 The fact that HSBC Nevada did not credit Gillespie as it stated it would, thereby resulting in a loss

See Doc. 22, 18.a., 21, and exhibit 2. Id., exhibit 2.

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of the $50.00 and additional charges to Gillespies account, establishes both a false statement of a material fact and a resulting injury.9 The Court further finds that Gillespie has satisfied the heightened pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). He has stated with particularity all of the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud in this case. More specifically, Gillespie has identified the precise statements he alleges are false or misleading, including the time place and identity of speaker; how he was mislead by those statements; and what HSBC Nevada obtained as a consequence of the alleged fraud, i.e., the additional $50.00 as well as other subsequent charges and fees. Although Gillespies fraud claim could have been read as HSBC Nevada contends - that the $50.00 promised credit was really just a reversal charge - if a complaint shows that the Plaintiff is entitled to any relief that the Court can grant, regardless of whether it asks for the proper relief, it is sufficiently plead. Dotschay v. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1957). Gillespies fraud claim may go forward as alleged. B. Truth in Lending Act Claim

Gillespie also alleges that HSBC Nevada violated numerous provisions of the TILA throughout the existence of his credit card account, including after his account was closed.

The Court seriously questions whether Gillespie will be able to establish that the other overlimit fees, late fees, and finance charges are a direct result of this allegedly false statement. However, that is a discussion for another time, and at the very least, Gillespie has sufficiently alleged damages in the amount of the $50.00 automated credit line increase fee which permit this claim to go forward.
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For example, Gillespie contends that HSBC Nevada did not comply with the TILAs disclosure requirements when it solicited him over the telephone to open his credit card account in February 2003.10 He also contends that HSBC Nevada violated the TILAs disclosure requirements in September 20, 2004 when it did not refund his $50.00 automated credit line increase fee, and as a result of not crediting his account for this amount, did not provide him with the correct account balance, total amount of credits to his account, the correct finance charge, and did not correctly identify and credit other charges.11 Gillespie alleges that HSBC Nevada violated these same disclosure

requirements in each subsequent monthly statement.12 Gillespie also challenges HSBC Nevadas 24-hour automated account information telephone line, stating that it provided him false and inaccurate account balance information, and failed to disclose that reliance on such information would result in finance charges and overlimit fees.13 He also contends that HSBC Nevada failed to identify that his $135.00 payment on January 15, 2005 was made as part of a settlement agreement, and failed to include any of the terms and conditions of his February 24, 2005 settlement

10

See Doc. 22, 58-59; 15 U.S.C. 1637(c)(2). See Doc. 22, 60-61; 15 U.S.C. 1637(b)(3), (4), (7), and (8). See Doc. 22, 70. See Doc. 22, 62; 15 U.S.C. 1637(a).
14

11

12

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agreement in any of his future account statements.14 Finally, Gillespie asserts that HSBC violated the TILA when it failed to disclose that he would be charged annual fees, overlimit fees, and late fees on a closed account in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1637(a), (c) and (d).15 Taking the allegations set forth in Gillespies Amended Complaint as true, which the Court must at the motion to dismiss stage, and refraining for passing on the merits, it appears that the majority of Gillespies TILA claims are properly alleged, and provide a clear and plain statement sufficient to place HSBC Nevada on notice of the allegations against it. Indeed, HSBC Nevada does not challenge many of Gillespies assertions.

Rather, HSBC Nevada limits its challenges to Gillespies claims concerning the September 20, 2004 account statement. According to HSBC Nevada, the portion of Gillespies September 20, 2004 account statement which is attached to his Amended Complaint directly contradicts his allegations that HSBC Nevada did not credit back the $50.00 automated credit line increase fee on his September 20, 2004 account statement,16 and did not disclose the correct amount of credits and charges on that same statement.17

14

See Doc. 22, 67, 70. Id., 63-66

15

15 U.S.C. 1666c provides that all payments received from an obligor under an open ended consumer credit plan by the creditor shall be posted promptly to the obligors account. HSBC Nevada also seeks to use the September 20, 2004 account statement to disprove Gillespies contentions that HSBC Nevada did not disclose it would charge overlimit and late fees on closed or cancelled accounts. However, that statement was created while Gillespies credit card account was open and active. Therefore it does not establish any disclosures with respect to closed or cancelled accounts.
15
17

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Because the Court has already found that, from the face of Gillespies Amended Complaint and incorporated documents, Gillespie has sufficiently alleged that HSBC Nevada did not credit his account for that $50.00 fee as promised, the Court is satisfied at this stage in the litigation that Gillespie has also sufficiently alleged that HSBC Nevada improperly failed to disclose its credit of the $50.00 automated credit line increase fee and did not provide the correct balance, credits and charges on the September 20, 2004 account statement.18 Accordingly, Gillespies TILA claim may go forward as alleged. C. Usury Claim

The third claim HSBC Nevada challenges is Gillespies assertion that HSBC Nevada violated Floridas usury law, Fla. Stat. 687.01, et seq. HSBC Nevada contends that this

claim should be dismissed both because Gillespie has not pleaded any of the elements necessary to establish a claim of usury, and because Florida law does not apply to Gillespies credit card account. The Court agrees. Under Floridas usury law, it is considered usurious and unlawful to charge a rate of interest in excess of 18% for any loan, money advance, line of credit, or other obligation

HSBC Nevada argues that if this claim is not dismissed with prejudice, the Court should order Gillespie to provide a complete copy of his September 20, 2004 account statement. The Court will deny this request. The portion of the statement provided with the Amended Complaint supports all of Gillespies allegations such that dismissal is not appropriate. Moreover, if HSBC Nevada believes that this is an incomplete document and that other portions of the document are necessary at this point in the litigation, it could have easily attached them to its own motion to dismiss. Gillespie is correct, HSBC Nevada, as the lender in this case, has just as much access to Gillespies account statements as Gillespie does. HSBC Nevada has not demonstrated that it will suffer any undue hardship by producing the complete account statement, and the Court doubts that it could, given that it readily submitted Gillespies Cardholder Agreement.
16

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where the principal balance is $500,000 or less. See Fla. Stat. 687.03(1). A creditor who willfully violates Floridas usury law is liable to the borrower for double the amount of interest collected. See Fla. Stat. 687.04; Jersey Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper, 639 So.2d 664, 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Although Gillespie cites to the correct Florida statutes, he does not explain how his credit card account with HSBC Nevada violates this law. Gillespie alleges that HSBC Nevada charged him a nominal interest rate of 18.9%, an annual percentage rate of 22.9%, and periodic interest rates as high as 224%.19 Not only does Gillespie fail to explain how he arrived at these interest rates, but the partial copy of his account statement which he attached to his Amended Complaint directly contradicts his allegations.20 That statement lists a finance charge of $10.72 on a balance of $494.85. Simple math shows that the nominal interest rate charged is well under 18%. Even if Gillespie is correct that all of his late fees, cash advance fees, and overlimit fees also constitute interest, the nominal interest rate would still only amount to approximately 13.9%.21 Given the contradictions between Gillespies account statement and the

allegations in his Amended Complaint, the Court cannot say that he has properly alleged a claim of usury.22
19

Doc. 22, 91. Id., exhibit 2.

20

The September 20, 2004 statement listed miscellaneous finance charges of $58.26, as well as the monthly finance charge of $10.72.
22

21

In his opposition papers, Gillespie contends that his March 20, 2003 account statement (continued...)
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Even if Gillespie had established that HSBC Nevada exceeded Floridas 18% interest rate cap, this claim fails for a more basic reason. Gillespies Cardholder

Agreement with HSBC Nevada clearly states that it is governed by Nevada law.23 Specifically, the Agreement states that Gillespies credit card account will be governed by federal law and the laws of the state of Nevada, whether or not you live in Nevada and whether or not your Account is used outside Nevada.24 Under Nevada law, [p]arties may agree for the payment of any rate of interest on money due or to become due on any contract, for the compounding of interest if they choose, and for any other charges or fees, so long as the interest rates, fees and other terms are reduced to writing. NV Stat. 99.050. See also, Mapes v. Palo Alto Town and Country Village, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 508 (D. Nev. 1984). Because Gillespie has not alleged any violations of Nevada law, nor

(...continued) demonstrates how he calculated his interest rates. See Doc. 5, p. 6. This is a factual argument, inappropriate for consideration at the motion to dismiss stage. Moreover, Gillespie has not included any allegations concerning this statement in his Amended Complaint, nor attached it to his Amended Complaint, so that the Court cannot consider this statement incorporated into his pleadings. The Court also does not see anywhere on the partial copy of the September 20, 2004 statement an annual percentage rate of 0.00%, as Gillespie claims. HSBC Nevada has attached a copy of the Cardholder Agreement to its motion to dismiss. See Doc. 4, exhibit A. Gillespie refers to his credit card contract with HSBC Nevada throughout his Amended Complaint, and many of the issues he references, such as interest charges, the effect of closing an account, and other fees and charges, are directly related to the Cardholder Agreement. It is therefore clear that the Cardholder Agreement has been incorporated into the Amended Complaint, and may be considered by the Court without transforming the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997).
24 23

22

Doc. 4, exhibit A, p. 4.
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alleged that the Cardholder Agreements choice of law provision somehow does not apply to this case, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Gillespies Florida usury claim will be dismissed without prejudice.25 D. Negligence Claim

Gillespies final claim against HSBC Nevada is a common law claim for negligence under Florida law. From the very brief allegations asserted, it appears that Gillespie is arguing that HSBC Nevada was negligent in hiring RMA to act as its debt collector with respect to Gillespies credit card account, apparently because RMA is now in Chapter 11 bankruptcy and cannot be sued.26 To bring such a claim, Gillespie could pursue either a negligent hiring theory, or a common law negligence theory. Gillespies barebones claim does not specify the legal theory upon which it is predicated. However, under either theory, Gillespie has failed to allege a claim upon which relief can be granted. To allege a prima facie claim of negligent hiring, Gillespie must assert that: (1) the employer was required to make an appropriate investigation of the employee and failed to do so; (2) an appropriate investigation would have revealed the unsuitability of the employee for the particular duty to be performed or for employment in general; and (3) it was unreasonable for the
Gillespie argues, without any legal support, that because he did not sign the Cardholder Agreement, it is void under the statute of frauds. Doc. 5, p. 7. Such a bald conclusory statement cannot save this claim from dismissal. In addition, it is unclear from the Cardholder Agreement whether a signature is required for the Agreement to be enforceable. It is also unknown whether Gillespie signed any papers consenting to this Cardholder Agreement at the time he opened his credit account. These unresolved questions are all factual disputes, which cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss.
26 25

Doc. 22, 96; Doc. 5, p. 8.

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employer to hire the employee in light of the information he knew or should have known. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 362 (Fla. 2002) (citing Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)). Gillespies Amended Complaint does not allege any of these elements. In fact, he does not even establish or allege that RMA was HSBC Nevadas employee.27 To the extent Gillespie is instead proceeding under a simple common law claim of negligence, this claim also fails. To allege a prima facie case of negligence, Gillespie must aver that: (1) HSBC Nevada owed a legal duty to Gillespie; (2) HSBC Nevada breached that duty; (3) the breach legally caused an injury to Gillespie; and (4) damages resulted from the injury. See Pinchinat v. Graco Childrens Prods., 390 F. Supp.2d 1141 (M.D. Fla. 2005). Again, Gillespie has not alleged any of these elements, and has not responded to any of HSBC Nevadas arguments challenging this negligence claim. Because Gillespie has not alleged any of the elements necessary for either a prima facie claim for negligent hiring or for common law negligence, his claim must be dismissed. And while the Court has great doubts Gillespie could ever succeed on such a claim, the Court will provide him with one more opportunity to properly allege this claim. E. Punitive Damages and Attorneys Fees

HSBC Nevada also requests to have Gillespies claim for punitive damages in his state law fraud claim stricken because it is based on conclusory allegations in the absence
27

The Court seriously doubts Gillespie could establish such a relationship in any event.
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of a reasonable basis in fact to support a claim for fraud. See Doc. 4, p. 9 (citing Porter v. Ogden, 241 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th Cir. 2001). Because the Court has determined that Gillespie has sufficiently alleged a claim for common law fraud, his request for punitive damages may also go forward. Gillespie has also included in his requests for relief under each of his claims a request for attorneys fees and costs. HSBC Nevada has moved to have Gillespies request for attorneys fees stricken, arguing that a pro se litigant is not entitled to attorneys fees. The Court agrees. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991); Ray v. U.S. Dept. Of Justice, 87 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 1996); Celeste v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1992). The fact that Gillespie may have some paralegal experience or training is of no relevance. Accordingly, any requests on behalf of Gillespie for attorneys fees shall be stricken, and Gillespie is instructed not to include any such requests if he chooses to file a second amended complaint. Conclusion Accordingly, upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that: (1) Defendants HSBC North America Holdings Inc.s, and HSBC Bank Nevada,

N.A.s motion to dismiss (Doc. 4) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. All claims against Defendant HSBC North America Holdings Inc., to the extent any are alleged in the Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Doc. 22), are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Count IV of the Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint against Defendant

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HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Plaintiff may not recover attorneys fees while proceeding pro se, and therefore all references to attorneys fees are STRICKEN, and the Plaintiff may not assert any claims for attorneys fees in any future pleadings. In all other respects the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) is DENIED. (2) Defendants HSBC North America Holdings Inc.s, and HSBC Bank Nevada,

N.A.s motion to dismiss negligence count (Doc. 29) is GRANTED. Count V of the First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (3) All claims against Defendant Risk Management Alternatives, Inc. are hereby

stayed pending notice that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 362 has been lifted. (4) The Plaintiff shall have twenty (20) days from the date of this Order to file a

second amended complaint correcting the deficiencies discussed in this Order. Failure to submit an amended complaint within this time period will result in the dismissal with prejudice of the above-listed claims. IT IS SO ORDERED. DONE and ORDERED at Ocala, Florida this 25th day of September, 2006.

Copies to:

Counsel of Record Neil J. Gillespie, pro se

22

No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME E PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________

Appendix E

Consolidated Notice of Pro Se Electronic Case Filing Prohibition by District Court In Support Of: Consolidated Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation, August 6, 2012 Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, et al., 12-11213-C
The Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest

TATES COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPEAL NO.: 12-11213-C AppeIlants/Plaintiffs, vs. THIRTEENTH JUDICAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, et al. Respondents/Defendants. - - - - - - - - - - - - -/ CONSOLIDATED NOTICE OF PRO SE
ELECTRONIC CASE FILING PROHIBITION BY DISTRICT COURT

In support ofDisability Accommodation and IFP Fee Waiver

APPEAL NO.: 12-11028-B

1.

Appellants, NEIL J. GILLESPIE ("Gillespie") and ESTATE OF PENELOPE

GILLESPIE, give notice of electronic filing (e-filing) prohibition in the District Court, which cost Gillespie not less than $1,094.94, and 178.5 hours labor. The District Court requires pro se litigants to file paper documents with the Court, and does not permit pro se e-flling without authorization, but there is no procedure for obtaining authorization. This practice by the District Court is unconstitutional as set forth in this notice. 2. This Court dismissed Gillespie's appeal no. 12-11028-B on July 13, 2012 for

failure to pay filing and docketing fees. The extra cost of paper filing to Gillespie is not less than $1,094.94. This money could have been used to pay the fees. Gillespie is indigent and/or insolvent. This Court gave Gillespie notice July 16, 2012 in appeal no. 12-11213-C that pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-1 (b) it will dismiss the appeal

Appendix E

unless he pays $455 to the District Court. Gillespie is indigent and/or insolvent and cannot pay the fee. The extra cost of paper filing to Gillespie of not less than $1,094.94 represents money that could have been used to pay the fees. 3. The additional time required of a pro se litigant for paper-only filing is a burden.

This burden is especially onerous to the disabled. Gillespie is disabled. Gillespie spent not less than 178.5 hours filing paper documents. The time saved by e-filing would have allowed Gillespie to make better pleadings. This extra time burden is unconstitutional. PACER and CM/ECF 4. Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) is an electronic public

access service that allows users to obtain case and docket information from federal appellate, district and bankruptcy courts, and the PACER Case Locator via the Internet. PACER is provided by the federal Judiciary in keeping with its commitment to providing public access to court information via a centralized service. See http://www.pacer.gov/ 5. The Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system is the Federal

Judiciary's comprehensive case management system for all bankruptcy, district and appellate courts. CM/ECF allows courts to accept filings and provide access to filed documents over the Internet. See http://www.pacer.gov/cmecf/ (Exhibit 1). CM/ECF keeps out-of-pocket expenses low, gives concurrent access to case files by multiple parties, and offers expanded search and reporting capabilities. The system also offers the ability to: immediately update dockets and make them available to users, file pleadings electronically with the court, and download documents and print them directly from the court system. See http://www.pacer.gov/cmecf/ (Exhibit 1)

CM/ECF Policy in the U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida 6. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida filed a

CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Order, No. 6:07-MC-0027-ORL-19, by Chief Judge Patricia C. Fawsett, signed February 28, 2007. (Exhibit 2). The Order states that electronic filing is mandatory: I(A) EFFECTIVE DATE Electronic filing is mandatory, unless otherwise permitted by these administrative procedures, by a general order of the Court, or by authorization of the Judge;. All documents filed in Civil and Criminal cases in this District on or after July 12, 2004, no matter when a case was originally filed, shall be filed electronically. The Courts CM/ECF Order requires pro se to file in paper format unless authorized to file electronically, but provides no information on how to obtain such authorization: III(C) PRO SE FILER Unless authorized to file electronically, a pro se filer shall file any pleading and other paper in paper format. The Clerk will scan and file these papers electronically and will also maintain a paper file of such documents. If authorized by the assigned Judge, a party proceeding pro se may file electronically. If authorized to file electronically, the pro se filer must follow these procedures. 7. The Middle Districts CM/ECF Order is discriminatory on its face to pro se filers,

and contrary to PACERs mandate - Public Access to Court Electronic Records. The Courts Order violates the Constitutionally protected rights of pro se filers as follows: First Amendment, Pro se free speech, pro se right to petition for a governmental redress of grievances, in the customary manner; Fifth Amendment, depravation of liberty to pro se filers to file electronically; Eighth Amendment, prohibition from excessive fines; the excessive cost to pro se filers to make, transport, and mail or serve by courier paper filings to the Court;

Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the Constitution does not prohibit pro se electronic filing, so that right is retained by the people; Fourteenth Amendment, the due process clause, and the equal protection clause. 8. Gillespie submitted October 1, 2010 Plaintiffs Motion to File Electronically in

Gillespie v. The Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, et al., case no. 5:10-cv-503-ocWTH-DAB, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division. (Doc. 6) (Exhibit 3). The motion was brief, at the suggestion of personnel in the Clerks office: Pursuant to local Rule 1.0t(a) Plaintiff pro se Gillespie moves to file documents electronically in this lawsuit. The Courts CM/ECF Order, described above in paragraph 6, and attached as Exhibit 2, does not provide further instruction on obtaining pro se e-filing authorization. 9. U.S. Magistrate Judge David A. Barker Denied by Order (Doc. 17) October 24,

2010, Gillespies motion to e-file. (Exhibit 4). The Court held: Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion To File Electronically (Doc. No. 6). Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, seeks leave to file documents electronically in this action. Pro se litigants, however, are generally not permitted access to the Courts Case Management and Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system unless extenuating circumstances exist. Because Plaintiff has failed to state any reason why he needs access to the CM/ECF system, Plaintiffs Motion To File Electronically (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED. The Courts Order does not give Gillespie leave to amend his motion, or show cause of extenuating circumstances, or any other reason to e-file. However it should be obvious that a pro se litigant would want to e-file for the same reasons that attorneys e-file: CM/ECF keeps out-of-pocket expenses low, gives concurrent access to case files by multiple parties, and offers expanded search and reporting capabilities. The system also offers the ability to: immediately update dockets and make them available to users, file pleadings electronically with the court, and download documents and print them directly from the court system.

$811.48 Additional Cost of Paper Filing in Case No. 5:10-cv-503-oc-WTH-DAB 130.5 Additional Hours Time Spent Filing Paper in Case No. 5:10-cv-503-oc-WTH-DAB 10. a. Gillespie estimates that he incurred not less than $811.48 in additional expenses

in case no. 5:10-cv-503 because the Court denied his motion to e-file. Gillespie resides 13.9 miles from the Court, according to Google Maps. (Exhibit 5). A round trip is 27.8 miles. To file paper documents with the Court, Gillespie must either hand deliver the documents to the Court, or drive to the post office and mail the documents, or hire a courier service to deliver the documents to the Court. Each of these options are costly and time consuming, but hand delivery appears to be the most efficient. b. Gillespie believes he made not less than 31 round trips in his vehicle to file paper documents, which amounts to not less than 861.8 miles. At least 9 trips were made in 2010, at least seventeen 17 trips made in 2011, and at least 5 trips in 2012. c. Gillespie estimates his mileage cost for filing paper documents at $461.48. The standard business mileage rate set by the Internal Revenue Service in 2010 was 50 cents per mile; in 2011 the rate was 55.5 cents per mile; in 2012 the rate is 55.5 cents per mile. 2010: 9 trips x 27.8 miles each = 250.20 miles x $0.50 = $125.10 2011: 17 trips x 27.8 miles each = 472.60 miles x $0.55 = $259.93 2012: 5 trips x 27.8 miles each = 139 miles x $0.55 = $76.45 Total mileage costs: $461.48 d. Gillespie estimates his postage cost at $150 for filing and serving paper documents by mail. While relatively few paper documents were mailed to the court, there was postage to serve copies to the parties, as well as to mail Rule 4(d) waivers of service.

e. Gillespie estimates his paper and printing cost at $200 for filing and serving paper documents by mail, for paper, envelopes, ink, toner, and drum cartridges, etc. Total for postage and supplies: $350.00 Total costs to file paper in case no. 5:10-cv-503-oc-WTH-DAB: $811.48 11. Gillespie spent at least 46.5 hours driving to the Court to file paper documents.

Google maps estimates about 28 minutes to drive from Gillespies residence to the Court. (Exhibit 5). A round trip is 56 minutes. Additional time is needed to park, walk to the Court building, pass through security, ride the elevator to the third floor, and file paper documents with a deputy clerk. The entire process takes about 1.5 hours. Gillespie made not less than 31 trips to the Court, and expended about 46.5 hours - over a weeks work. (31 trips x 1.5 hours = 46.5 hours). In addition, for items filed in paper, approximately two hours average additional time is needed to print and assemble paper documents for hand delivery to the Court, and more time to prepare documents for mailing to the Court, or to serve paper documents by mail on parties. (42 filings x 2 hours = 84 hours). Gillespie believes that two hours is a conservative estimate of the time needed to physically assemble, and prepare for hand delivery or mailing, paper documents to the court. Simple filings take less time, and larger paper filings take much longer to prepare. Total time to file paper in case no. 5:10-cv-503-oc-WTH-DAB: 130.5 hours. (46.5 + 84). $283.46 Additional Cost of Paper Filing in Case No. 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS 48 Additional Hours of Time Spent Filing Paper in Case No. 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS

12.

a. Gillespie estimates that he incurred not less than $283.46 in additional expenses

in case no. 5:11-cv-539 because he was not authorized to e-file. Gillespie estimates his mileage cost for filing paper documents at $183.46: 2011: 6 trips x 27.8 miles each = 166.8 miles x $0.55 = $91.74 2012: 6 trips x 27.8 miles each = 166.8 miles x $0.55 = $91.74 Total mileage costs: $183.48. b. Gillespie estimates his postage cost at $25 for serving paper documents by mail. While no paper documents were mailed to the court in this case, there was postage to serve copies on the parties, and to mail Rule 4(d) waivers of service to parties. c. Gillespie estimates his paper and printing cost at $75 for filing and serving paper documents, for paper, envelopes, ink, toner, and drum cartridges, etc. Total for postage and supplies: $100. Total costs to file paper in case no. 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS: $283.48. 13. Gillespie spent not less than 18 hours driving to the Court to file paper

documents. As described in paragraph 11, the entire process takes about 1.5 hours. Gillespie made not less than 12 trips to the Court. (12 trips x 1.5 hours = 18 hours). For items filed in paper, approximately two hours average additional time is needed to print and assemble paper documents for hand delivery to the Court, and more time to prepare documents for service by mail to parties. (15 filings x 2 hours = 30 hours). Total time to file paper in case no. 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS: 48 hours. (18 + 30). Combined Totals for Additional Costs and Time 14. Combined totals calculated as follows:

Total costs to file paper in case no. 5:10-cv-503-oc-WTH-DAB: $811.48. Total costs to file paper in case no. 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS: $283.48. Combined total costs to file paper in both cases: $1,094.96. Total time to file paper in case no. 5:10-cv-503-oc-WTH-DAB: 130.5 hours. Total time to file paper in case no. 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS: 48 hours. Combined time to file paper in both cases: 178.50 hours. Seven (7) Hour Time Advantage with Electronic Case Filing in District Court 15. There is a seven (7) hour time advantage to e-filing within the same time zone.

The Ocala Clerks offices closes at 4:00 p.m., with after-hours drop off until 5:00 p.m. Those authorized to e-file have until midnight. FRCP, Rule 6. Computing and Extending Time; Time for Motion Papers Rule 6(a)(4) Last Day Defined. Unless a different time is set by a statute, local rule, or court order, the last day ends: (A) for electronic filing, at midnight in the court's time zone; and (B) for filing by other means, when the clerk's office is scheduled to close. E-Filing as a Disability Accommodation 16. Gillespies motion to e-file is a reasonable disability accommodation request. a. Gillespies disability request submitted to the District Court September 28, 2010 in case no. 5:10-cv-503, and resubmitted publicly in Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespies Notice of Filing Verified Notice of Filing Disability Information of Neil J. Gillespie (Doc. 36) , Exhibit 2, page 17, states as follows: ADA Request No.6: Mr. Gillespie requests time to scan thousands of pages of documents in this case to electronic PDF format. This case and underlying cause of action covers a ten year period and the files have become unmanageable and confusing relative to Gillespie's disability. Mr. Gillespie is not able to concentrate when handling a large amount of physical files and documents. He is better able to manage the files and documents when they are organized and viewable on his

computer. Mr. Gillespie will bear the cost of converting files and documents to PDF. (Doc. 36, Page 47 of 62 Page ID 803). Gillespies disability notice to the Court (Doc. 36) shows Depression, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Diabetes Type II Adult Onset, Traumatic Brain Injury, and Velopharyngeal Incompetence. b. The notice shows that Since March 3, 2006, Ryan Christopher Rodems, counsel for the Defendants, has directed, with malice aforethought, a course of harassing conduct toward Gillespie that has aggravated his disability, caused substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate purposeGillespie is disabled, and Mr. Rodems knows of Gillespie's disability from Defendants' prior representation of him. (Doc. 36, Page 1 of 62 Page ID 757). The notice shows in paragraph 3 a statement on the record by Gillespies former attorney Robert W. Bauer about Mr. Rodems: 3. Mr. Rodems has set a level of animosity in this lawsuit best described by Gillespies former attorney Robert W. Bauer August 14, 2008 during an Emergency Hearing on garnishment before Judge Marva Crenshaw (p16, line 24): 24 Mr. Rodems has, you know, decided to take a full 25 nuclear blast approach instead of us trying to work 1 this out in a professional manner. It is my 2 mistake for sitting back and giving him the 3 opportunity to take this full blast attack. Mr. Rodems' "full nuclear blast approach" has aggravated Gillespie's disability to the point where Gillespie can no longer represent himself at hearings. Gillespie becomes easily distracted and confused, and can no longer speak coherently enough during a hearing to represent himself. See Plaintiffs Motion For Appointment Of Counsel, ADA Accommodation Request, and Memorandum of Law filed May 24, 2011. (Doc. 36, Page 2 of 62 Page ID 758)

c. The Complaint (Doc. 1) shows Florida attorney Seldon J. Childers estimated on September 17, 2009 the non-pecuniary cost of this litigation to Gillespie at $100,000 for physical and emotional ill effects resulting from the litigation. (Doc. 1, 135, page 39). d. A study by the World Health Organisation shows depression is more damaging to everyday health than chronic diseases such as angina, arthritis, asthma and diabetes. Researchers found if people are ill with other conditions, depression makes them worse. Somnath Chatterji of the World Health Organisation led the study. The most disabling combination was diabetes and depression, the researchers said. "If you live for one year with diabetes and depression together you are living the equivalent of 60 percent of full health," Chatterji said in a telephone interview. News of this study was reported by Reuters on September 7, 2007. (Exhibit 6). The study is reported in the Lancet Medical Journal, Vol. 370 No. 9590 pp 851-858. (Exhibit 7). e. Gillespies ability to perform the kinds of tasks need in this lawsuit, such as reading and handling documents, has declined further since ADA Request No. 6 was initially submitted to the state court in February 2010. Gillespies concentration and short-term memory have declined, and he becomes confused when handling numbers of physical files and documents. He able to manage PDF files and documents when they are organized and viewable on his computer. The computer screen helps Gillespie maintain his concentration. When he looks away from the computer screen to perform manual tasks, such as looking in a file drawer for a pleading, he often forgets the purpose of the task. As such, authorization to e-file is a reasonable disability accommodation.

District Clerk Failed to Comply With CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Order 17. As set forth in Gillespies letter to District Clerk Sheryl L. Loesch dated April 5,

2012 (Exhibit 8), the Clerk failed to file on PACER Exhibits 1-15 to Gillespies Complaint (Doc. 1) in case no. 5:10-cv-503-oc-WTH-DAB. Gillespie provided paper copies to the Clerk for e-filing as required by CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Order, No. 6:07-MC-0027-ORL-19: (Exhibit 3) III(C) PRO SE FILER Unless authorized to file electronically, a pro se filer shall file any pleading and other paper in paper format. The Clerk will scan and file these papers electronically and will also maintain a paper file of such documents. However the Clerk failed to comply with the Order which required the Clerk to scan and file these papers electronically. Gillespie notified the District Clerk Loesch of multiple failures by the Clerk, but has not received any response to his letter. (Exhibit 8). Had Gillespie been authorized to e-file, he could have corrected these mistakes by the Clerk: THE CLERK FAILED TO PUT VITAL DOCUMENTS ON CM/ECF AND PACER 2. The Clerk failed to put vital documents I filed in this case on the Case Management and Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system to view on PACER. One such document is Doc. 2, Exhibits 1-15 to the Complaint (Doc. 1) filed September 28, 2010 when I personally commenced the case in the Ocala Division and hand-delivered the complaint and exhibits to a deputy clerk. Doc. 2, Exhibit 4 is my Emergency Motion To Disqualify Defendants Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Baker, Rodems & Cook, PA submitted July 9, 2010 in the state court action; in this Court the motion is Doc. 2, Exhibit 4 to the Complaint (Doc. 1), but not viewable on PACER. This negatively affected my case because Magistrate Judge David Baker, who is located in Orlando, could not view the document located in Ocala when he made rulings in the case. The document was only viewable in person in Ocala, or by request to send the physical file to Orlando. There is no evidence that the physical file was sent to Orlando.

I brought this issue to the attention of Chief Judge Anne Conway by letter dated March 22, 2012, see Doc. 68, Motion To Amend The Judgment, the letter is attached as an exhibit to the motion, and contains 33 pages; a three page letter to Chief Judge Conway and 30 pages of enclosures. PRE-LITIGATION COMMUNICATION WITH JAMES LEANHEART 3. Prior to personally filing this pro se case, I wrote August 30, 2010 to James Leanheart, Court Operations Supervisor, about filing documents on the CM/ECF system and PACER. This is the operative language from paragraph five of the accompanying letter: (Exhibit 2) Myclaimsinvolve documents in the state court record from the Circuit Civil Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit, includingan amended complaint (150 pages), and an emergency motion to disqualify counsel (190 pages). What is the procedure for including or incorporating these numerous and sometimes large documents into mycivil rights complaint? Mr. Leanheart did not respond in writing, but we spoke by phone September 10, 2010. Following Mr. Leanhearts instructions, I filed all the documents in paper September 28, 2010. I personally filed the case September 28, 2010 and personally handed the paper documents to a deputy clerk. But the Clerk did not put any of the exhibits on the CM/ECF system and/or PACER, not the amended complaint (Exhibit 3), not the emergency motion to disqualify counsel (Exhibit 4), none of the 15 exhibits were put on PACER. I complained to the deputy clerks in Ocala more than once to no avail. I complained in person a number of times and the error was not corrected. I live in Ocala and almost always hand deliver my documents to a deputy clerk in order to save the cost of postage or courier service as I am indigent. My letter dated August 30, 2010 to Mr. Leanheart states I planned to file a pro se lawsuit in two weeks or so, but I was delayed until September 28, 2010 due to mental illness and other disabilities, see Doc. 36 for my notice of filing disability information. INCORRECT DATE/TIME STAMP ON COMPLAINT BY CLERK 8. The Clerks date/time stamp shows the Complaint (Doc. 1) was filed 2010 SEP 28 AM 7:47 which time is incorrect. The Court does not open until 8:30 AM, and I filed the Complaint myself in person by handing the Complaint directly to a deputy clerk about 8:47 AM.

INCORRECT PLAINITFF ADDRESS BY CLERK OF COURT 9. The Clerk used an incorrect mailing address for me, necessitating a corrective motion, see Plaintiffs Motion to Correct Mailing Address, filed October 5, 2010. (Doc. 9). My correct address is listed on the complaint and every document filed in this case. My address has not changed since 2005. The motion states as follows: Plaintiff pro se Gillespie moves Court to correct his mailing address: 1. The Court is sending Plaintiff Gillespie's mail to the wrong address. Please use the correct address, listed on the complaint: 8092 SW I15th Loop, Ocala, Florida 34481. INCORRECT PLAINITFF PHONE NUMBER BY CLERK OF COURT 10. The Clerk used an incorrect telephone number for me, necessitating a corrective motion, see Plaintiffs Motion to Correct Phone Number, filed October 13, 2010. (Doc. 15). My correct phone number is listed on the complaint and every document filed in this case. My home phone number has not changed since 2005. The motion states as follows: Plaintiff pro se Gillespie moves the Court to correct his phone number and states: 1. The PACER docket shows an incorrect phone number for Plaintiff pro se Gillespie. The correct phone number is listed on the complaint: (352) 854-7807. Gillespie believes the Clerks failure to comply with the Courts CM/ECF Order and scan and file electronically his paper documents is a violation of due process. Other U.S. District Courts Offer Online Pro Se E-filing Registration and Instruction 18. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California offers

online e-filing registration instructions for pro se litigants, found at this URL: http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ECF/proseregistration 1. A computer, the internet, and email on a daily basis so you can e-file your documents and receive notifications from the Court.

2. A scanner to scan documents that are only in paper format (like exhibits). 3. A printer/copier because each documents that you e-file will also need to be sent to the judge in hard copy (the judges copy is called the chambers copy). 4. A word-processing program to create your documents. 5. A .pdf reader and a .pdf writer, which enables you to convert word processing documents into .pdf format. Only .pdf documents are accepted for e-filing. Adobe Acrobat is the most common program used. The reader (Adobe Acrobat Reader) is free, but the writer is not. Some word processing programs come with a .pdf writer already installed. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California offers an online pro se ECF Registration form in active PDF format. Gillespie PACER Account In Good Standing Since 1999 19. Gillespie has maintained a PACER account in good standing since December 22,

1999, thereby demonstrating his ability to competently handle the account. (Exhibit 9). Gillespie meets the technical requirements for e-filing set forth by the U.S. District Court for the N.D. of California shown in paragraph 17, and on the Courts website. Cost to File Paper Documents in the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 20. Gillespie incurred time and costs filing paper documents in this Court. The

Eleventh Circuit, located in Atlanta, Georgia, is 376 miles from Gillespies home in Ocala, Florida, according to Google Maps. A round trip is 752 miles. This distance requires Gillespie to submit paper documents to this Court by mail or by courier at considerable expense. There is also a time delay in serving documents by mail or courier, as compared to filing documents personally by hand delivery to the Court.

CONCLUSION 21. The District Court's denial of Gillespie's motion to e-file denied him equal rights

with all the other parties in this case, all of whom could e-file pleadings and documents from the comfort of their office or home at little or no extra expense. For the reasons set forth in this notice, Gillespie was wrongfully denied authorization to e-file in the u.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, contrary to the First, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and suffered damages of not less than $1,094.94, and sustained the loss of not less than 178.5 hours of labor. This time and money could have been better spent on G-illespie's actions in the U.S. District Court, and the payment of fees in this Appellate Court, as well as expenses in his state court actions, and was a significant factor in the negative outcomes of those actions, thereby creating new additional Constitutional and other grounds for redress. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED July 27, 2012..

Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was provided July 27, 2012 by email onlytoCatherineBarbaraChapman(catherine@guildaylaw.com).Guilday. Tucker, Schwartz & Simpson, P.A. 1983 Centre Pointe Bo vard, Suite 200. Tallahassee, FL 32308-7823, counsel for Robert W. uer, et .

(-----

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, ESTATE OF PENELOPE GILLESPIE, APPEAL NO.: 12-11213-C Appellants/Plaintiffs, vs. THIRTEENTH JUDICAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, et al. Respondents/Defendants. _______________________________/ APPENDIX CONSOLIDATED NOTICE OF PRO SE ELECTRONIC CASE FILING PROHIBITION BY DISTRICT COURT In support of Disability Accommodation and IFP Fee Waiver APPEAL NO.: 12-11028-B

Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6 Exhibit 7 Exhibit 8 Exhibit 9

Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) information CM/ECF Administrative Procedures Order, No. 6:07-MC-0027-ORL-19 Plaintiffs Motion to File Electronically, Case 5:10-cv-00503 (Doc. 6) Order, Denied - Plaintiffs Motion to File Electronically (Doc. 17) Google Maps, mileage and driving time to District Court, Ocala Division Reuters: Depression more damaging than some chronic illnesses Lancet Medical Journal, Vol. 370 No. 9590 pp 851-858, WHO study Letter to District Clerk Sheryl L. Loesch, April 5, 2012 PACER welcome letter to Gillespie, December 22, 1999 (Redacted)

Public Access to Court Electronic Records

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HOME REGISTER FIND A CASE E-FILE QUICK LINKS HELP CONTACT US Login RSS

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The Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system is the Federal Judiciary's comprehensive case management system for all bankruptcy, district and appellate courts. CM/ECF allows courts to accept filings and provide access to filed documents over the Internet. CM/ECF keeps out-of-pocket expenses low, gives concurrent access to case files by multiple parties, and offers expanded search and reporting capabilities. The system also offers the ability to: immediately update dockets and make them available to users, file pleadings electronically with the court, and download documents and print them directly from the court system. If you already have a filer account and are looking for a link to file, check our Court Links page.

Contact Us | Privacy | Policies and Procedures | About Us This site is maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER Service Center. The purpose of this site is to provide information about locating and filing cases in U.S. federal courts.

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FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

2007FES 28

M110: 12
fLL-[

Miscellaneous

Case i~Bt(;

lb!~4'~R&~~~7-0
;- L

'i

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In Re: Administrative Procedures for Electronic Filing in Civil and Criminal Cases / Upon Consideration, effective March 15,2007, Administrative Procedures I(A), I(B)(36), I(D)(1), II(A)(1)(a), II(A)(I)(c), II(A)(7), II(I)(6), III(C), IV(A)(1), and IV(B) shall be amended1 as follows: I(A) EFFECTIVE DATE Electronic filing is mandatory, unless otherwise permitted by these administrative procedures, by a general order of the Court, or by authorization of the Judge;. All documents filed in Civil and Criminal cases in this District on or after July 12, 2004, no matter when a case was originally filed, shall be filed electronically. I(B)(3-6) OFFICIAL RECORD
,., :J.

PIO Sc file!. A patty plOcccding plO 5Cmay file clcettonieally if autllolized by tk a5signcd Judgc. If authoIizcd, the pro 5Cparty 1l1U5t folloV\> the5e plOccdule5. Al50 5ee Paldf;!aph III C ofthe5c ploccdu1(~5.

473.

Social Securitv Case: A Social Security case is governed by paragraph III D of these procedures. Sealed Document: A document filed under seal will be maintained in paper format and will not be filed electronically unless the assigned Judge orders the document unsealed. Also see paragraphs III A and B of these procedures. Original Transcript: The original transcript of an official court proceeding in the Middle District of Florida when filed by the official court reporter or a contract court reporter of the Court shall be filed in paper format.

5:4.

6:5.

lRedlined language is new. A line is drawn through language to be stricken from the present version of the Administrative Procedures.

I(D)(l) LOGIN AND PASSWORD Attorneys Admitted to Practice in this Court: Upon a proper request, the Clerk shall assign one login and password to each attorney admitted to practice and in good standing in the Middle District or specially admitted pursuant to Local Rule 2.02(a)ft). To request a login and password from the Clerk, an attorney must complete and return to the Clerk an "Electronic Filing Registration Form." The form appears on the Court's web site at www.f1md.uscourts.gOV,is available in the clerk's office, and is attached to this policy. The Clerk will serve the attorney's login and password on the attorney using the attorney's e-mail address or by first-class mail unless the attorney arranges receipt by other means agreeable to the Clerk. The assigned login and password enable the attorney to retrieve and file a document electronically and to receive a notice of electronic filing. II(A)(l)(a) FILING Electronic filing is mandatory. Any document in a case shall be filed electronically except as otherwise provided by these procedures or by court order. II(A)(l)(c) FILING A document which exceeds tvvofive megabytes must be filed in components each of which must not exceed twerfive megabytes. II(A)(7) FILING If filing a document requires leave of Court (e.g., an amended complaint, reply brief, etc.), the filer shall attach the proposed document to the motion as an exhibit (except as provided in Local Rule 3.01(d)). If the Court grants the motion, the filer may file the document electronically.
11(1)(6) PRIVACY PROTECTION

Waiver of Protection of Identifiers: A party waives the protection as to the party's own information to the extent that the party files such information not under seal and without redaction. The Clerk will not review each filing for redaction. III(C) PRO SE FILER Unless authorized to file electronically, a pro se filer shall file any pleading and other paper in paper format. The Clerk will scan and file these papers electronically and will also maintain a paper file of such documents. If authorized by the assigned Judge, a party proceeding pro se may file electronically. If authorized to file electronically, the pro se filer must follow these procedures.

IV(A)(l) EXHIBIT ATTACHED TO DOCUMENT Size Limitation: Except as otherwise provided in these procedures, a filer shall electronically image, i.e., "scan," a paper exhibit filed as an attachment to a document that is less than twt)'five megabytes and submit the exhibit as a .pdf file. IV(B) VOLUMINOUS EXHIBIT If the exhibit attached to any particular document is twt)'five megabytes or more, the document and exhibit must be filed according to the following procedure:

1.

Index: A filer must prepare an exhibit index and file the index as an attachment to the main document. Separate Attachment: Each separate exhibit must be filed as a separate attachment to the main document. Size Limitation: If an exhibit exceeds twt)'five megabytes, that exhibit must be separated into components of twt)'five megabytes or less, and each component of the exhibit must be filed as a separate attachment to the main document.

2.

3.

DONE AND ORDERED this

of

,2007.

Patricia C. Fawsett Chief United States Distri t Judge

Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 6

Filed 10/01/10 Page 1 of 1

Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 17

Filed 10/14/10 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, -vsTHIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, et al., Defendants. ______________________________________ Case No. 5:10-cv-503-Oc-10DAB

ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion To File Electronically (Doc. No. 6). Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, seeks leave to file documents electronically in this action. Pro se litigants, however, are generally not permitted access to the Courts Case Management and Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system unless extenuating circumstances exist. Because Plaintiff has failed to state any reason why he needs access to the CM/ECF system, Plaintiffs Motion To File Electronically (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED. Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Orlando, Florida on October 14, 2010.

David A. Baker
DAVID A. BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Copies furnished to: Pro Se Plaintiff Counsel of Record

8092 SW 115th Loop, Ocala, FL 34481 to 207 NW 2nd St, Ocala, FL 344...

http://maps.google.com/maps?f=d&source=s_d&saddr=8092+Southwest...

Directions to 207 NW 2nd St, Ocala, FL 34475 13.9 mi about 28 mins

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8092 SW 115th Loop, Ocala, FL 34481 to 207 NW 2nd St, Ocala, FL 344...

http://maps.google.com/maps?f=d&source=s_d&saddr=8092+Southwest...

8092 SW 115th Loop, Ocala, FL 34481

1. Head west on SW 115th Loop Restricted usage road 2. At the traffic circle, take the 1st exit onto SW 81st Ave Restricted usage road 3. Turn left onto 115th St Rd Restricted usage road About 50 secs 4. Continue onto SW 110th St Restricted usage road About 4 mins 5. Turn right onto Florida 200 About 19 mins 6. Turn left onto S Pine Ave About 3 mins 7. Turn right onto NW 2nd St Destination will be on the left go 79 ft total 79 ft go 0.2 mi total 0.2 mi go 0.2 mi total 0.4 mi go 1.2 mi total 1.5 mi go 11.6 mi total 13.1 mi go 0.6 mi total 13.8 mi go 410 ft total 13.9 mi

207 NW 2nd St, Ocala, FL 34475

These directions are for planning purposes only. You may find that construction projects, traffic, weather, or other events may cause conditions to differ from the map results, and you should plan your route accordingly. You must obey all signs or notices regarding your route. Map data 2012 Google Directions weren't right? Please find your route on maps.google.com and click "Report a problem" at the bottom left.

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By Michael Kahn LONDON (Reuters) - Depression is more damaging to everyday health than chronic diseases such as angina, arthritis, asthma and diabetes, researchers said on Friday. And if people are ill with other conditions, depression makes them worse, the researchers found. "We report the largest population-based worldwide study to our knowledge that explores the effect of depression in comparison with four other chronic diseases on health state," the researchers wrote in the Lancet medical journal. Somnath Chatterji of the World Health Organisation, who led the study, said researchers calculated the impact of different conditions by asking people questions about their capacities to function in everyday situations -- such as moving around, seeing things at a distance and remembering information. The researchers assigned a number between 0 and 100 reflecting a person's relative health score. "Our main findings show that depression impairs health state to a substantially greater degree than the other diseases," the researchers wrote. The team used World Health Organisation data collected from 60 countries and more than 240,000 people to show on average between 9 percent and 23 percent had depression in addition to one or more of four other chronic diseases -- asthma, angina, arthritis and diabetes. The most disabling combination was diabetes and depression, the researchers said. "If you live for one year with diabetes and depression together you are living the equivalent of 60 percent of full health," Chatterji said in a telephone interview. The findings show the need to provide better treatment for depression because it has such a big impact on people with chronic illnesses, Chatterji added. "What tends to happen is a health provider doesn't look for anything else but the chronic illness," he said. "What we are saying is, these people will also be depressed and if you don't manage the depression you can't improve a person's health because depression is actually worsening it."

Fri, Sep 7 2007

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Depression, chronic diseases, and decrements in health: results from the World Health Surveys
Saba Moussavi, Somnath Chatterji, Emese Verdes, Ajay Tandon, Vikram Patel, Bedirhan Ustun

Summary
Background Depression is an important public-health problem, and one of the leading causes of disease burden worldwide. Depression is often comorbid with other chronic diseases and can worsen their associated health outcomes. Few studies have explored the eect of depression, alone or as a comorbidity, on overall health status. Methods The WHO World Health Survey (WHS) studied adults aged 18 years and older to obtain data for health, health-related outcomes, and their determinants. Prevalence of depression in respondents based on ICD-10 criteria was estimated. Prevalence values for four chronic physical diseasesangina, arthritis, asthma, and diabeteswere also estimated using algorithms derived via a Diagnostic Item Probability Study. Mean health scores were constructed using factor analysis and compared across dierent disease states and demographic variables. The relation of these disease states to mean health scores was determined through regression modelling. Findings Observations were available for 245 404 participants from 60 countries in all regions of the world. Overall, 1-year prevalence for ICD-10 depressive episode alone was 32% (95% CI 3035); for angina 45% (4348); for arthritis 41% (3843); for asthma 33% (2936); and for diabetes 20% (1822). An average of between 93% and 230% of participants with one or more chronic physical disease had comorbid depression. This result was signicantly higher than the likelihood of having depression in the absence of a chronic physical disease (p<00001). After adjustment for socioeconomic factors and health conditions, depression had the largest eect on worsening mean health scores compared with the other chronic conditions. Consistently across countries and dierent demographic characteristics, respondents with depression comorbid with one or more chronic diseases had the worst health scores of all the disease states. Interpretation Depression produces the greatest decrement in health compared with the chronic diseases angina, arthritis, asthma, and diabetes. The comorbid state of depression incrementally worsens health compared with depression alone, with any of the chronic diseases alone, and with any combination of chronic diseases without depression. These results indicate the urgency of addressing depression as a public-health priority to reduce disease burden and disability, and to improve the overall health of populations.
Lancet 2007; 370: 85158 See Comment page 808 See Perspectives page 821 Department of Measurement and Health Information Systems, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland (S Moussavi MPH, S Chatterji MD, E Verdes PhD, B Ustun MD); Economics and Research Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines (A Tandon PhD); and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK (Vikram Patel PhD) Full list of collaborators at end of the paper Correspondence to: Dr Somnath Chatterji, Department of Measurement and Health Information Systems, World Health Organization, Geneva 27, Switzerland chatterjis@who.int

Introduction
Depression is an important global public-health issue, both because of the relatively high lifetime prevalence ranging from 2% to 15% and because it is associated with substantial disability.1,2 Rated as the fourth leading cause of disease burden in 2000, depression accounted for 44% of total disability adjusted life years (DALYs).3 It is also responsible for the greatest proportion of disease burden attributable to non-fatal health outcomes, accounting for almost 12% of total years lived with disability worldwide.1 Without treatment, depression has the tendency to assume a chronic course, be recurrent, and over time to be associated with increasing disability.4,5 The comorbidity of depression with chronic physical diseases such as arthritis and diabetes is well recognised in developed countries.69 Several studies have shown that there is an increased risk of having major depression in people with one or more chronic diseases.7,10,11 The degree to which these comorbid states exist at the global level has not been shown. With a growing elderly population, and the associated increase in prevalence of chronic medical conditions, a concomitant rise in the
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prevalence of depression is to be expected. In fact, projections indicate that after heart disease, depression is expected to become the second leading cause of disease burden by the year 2020.12 The increasing prevalence of chronic physical diseases and depression leads to the question of how these disorders compare in terms of their eect on overall individual health. The presence of self-reported chronic physical diseases such as angina, arthritis, asthma, and diabetes has been associated with reduced health-related quality of life scores.1319 Lower health status has been reported in depressed patients than in those without depression, and this state is unequally distributed across population groups.7,13,2022 Eects of depressive episodes have also been studied with regard to loss in productivity and poor health-related quality of life.13,21,2326 Despite this evidence, depression, like other mental disorders, is often not deemed to be on a par with other chronic physical health conditions in terms of its eect on overall health.27,28 This view is perhaps one of the underlying reasons behind the lack of parity between mental and physical disorders in terms of access to health care.6,2932 To our knowledge, there has been no worldwide

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comparison of depression with other chronic diseases and their eect, either individually or comorbid, on health. We analysed data from the WHO World Health Survey (WHS) to address the following questions: how does the decrement in health state associated with depression compare with the decrement associated with other common chronic physical conditions; and what is the added eect on decrements in health of suering from depression, over and above a chronic physical condition?33

Methods
Sample
Countries from the WHS were selected to represent all regions of the world, with 26 countries from the European region, 15 from the African region, six from the Americas, four from the eastern Mediterranean region, ve from the southeast Asia region, and four from the western Pacic region, giving a total of 60 countries. The countries included in the survey programme represent those countries that were willing and able to participate in the survey. Countries with samples that were nationally representative, probabilistically selected, and which had sampling weights information available, were used in the analysis for this paper. To adjust for the population distribution as represented by the UN Statistical Division and for non-response, post-stratication corrections were made to the sampling weights

Procedures
All respondents used in the analysis were interviewed with the standardised WHS survey, which included questions on sociodemographic and economic factors, a series of questions on health status, and questions related to whether the individual had ever been diagnosed with depression, asthma, arthritis, angina, and diabetes, whether the person had ever received or was currently on treatment for these conditions, and, with the exception of diabetes, a series of symptom questions related to each condition. All surveys were implemented as face-to-face interviews with the exception of Luxembourg and Israel, which were implemented as telephone interviews. All questionnaires were translated and back-translated using a standard WHO protocol. The quality of translations was independently veried by bilingual experts before eld implementation. Informed consent was obtained from all respondents and the study was cleared by the ethics review committees at each site. The health state measure presented in this analysis was developed by WHO based on its framework for measuring health. WHO assesses an individuals state of health as a vector of capacities in multiple domains.34 For measurement in surveys, this information needs to be reduced to a parsimonious set of domains that are clearly dened and measured with reliable self-report questions. After an extensive review of existing survey questionnaires, none were deemed able to match the exact ideas or have
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the information needed to measure the distribution of health in the general population. Hence, a new measure was developed where the valuation could be estimatedie, the relative disability weight assigned to dierent patterns of the health states, thus allowing for cross-country comparability. The measure was based on 18 health-related questions, where the responses were recorded on a ve point scale ranging from no diculty or problem to extreme diculty/inability. Two of the questions assessed general health: one asking overall self-reported health, and the other asking how much diculty the respondent had in working or doing household activities during the past 30 days. These two items were analysed individually. The remaining 16 questions were grouped into the following eight health domains: vision, mobility, self care, cognition, interpersonal activities, pain and discomfort, sleep and energy, and aect. These domains are included in many commonly used health outcome measures such as the Short Form 36 (SF36), the Health Utilities Index Mark 3 (HUI 3), and the Euroqol 5D.3537 The health measure had been extensively tested as part of a similar survey done between 2000 and 2001, the Multi-Country Survey Study.38 The internal consistency of the health measure as assessed using Cronbachs alpha was 091. The test-retest reliability of individual items, measured by the weighted Kappa, ranged from 048062. Missing data for individual items ranged from 13% to 58%. Construct validity was also assessed, and respondents who were older or had a chronic condition reported worse health, whereas respondents with higher socioeconomic status and countries with higher life expectancies on average reported better health.38 A composite health status score was derived from the 16 self-reported health questions. Since the item responses were based on a ve-point ordered categorical scale, a factor analysis using polychoric correlations was done to take into account the covariance structure of the responses to individual questions. The choice of a one factor solution was justied by the high eigenvalue of the rst factor (879, 74% as a cumulative percentage of the variance explained) and the high communalities of the original variables (between 043 and 069). We used the principal component method for factor extraction and the regression scoring method to obtain the factor scores. The factor score was transformed to a 0100 scale, with 0 indicating worst health and 100 indicating best health. To validate the use of symptom questions for diagnosing chronic diseases, WHO implemented in 2003 a diagnostic item probability study in seven countries. Patients were selected from clinics if they were positive for any of the specic disease conditions based on a gold standard diagnostic test, and these patients were considered to be true positives for that particular condition. The patients were then traced back to their homes and asked, for all
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disease conditions, the same symptomatic questions as respondents from the WHS. Additionally, a sample of respondents matched by sex, age, and country of origin was drawn from the WHS if they had negative responses to all the self-reported diagnosis questions for depression, asthma, arthritis, angina, and diabetes. These respondents were considered to be the true negatives for the study. The individual response rates, calculated as the ratio of completed interviews in selected respondents in the sample, excluding ineligible respondents from the denominator, ranged from 63% in Israel to 99% in the Philippines (detailed response rates available on request). The diagnosis of depression was based on the International Classication of Diseases tenth revision (ICD-10) diagnostic criteria for research for depressive episodes,39 and was derived from an algorithm that took into account respondents reporting symptoms of depression during the past 12 months. The individual questions used to assess these symptoms were based on the World Mental Health Survey version of the Composite International Diagnostic Interview.40 The diagnosis for angina was based on the algorithm derived from the Rose questionnaire.41 For asthma and arthritis, the sensitivity and specicity of all potential combinations of answers to these symptomatic questions were checked based on responses from the diagnostic item probability study. The combination of answers that produced the best result based on the Receiver Operator Characteristic analysis was used to apply a diagnosis for each respondent in all 60 countries of the WHS sample. Respondents were regarded as positive for diabetes if they reported ever being diagnosed with diabetes. Questions about diabetes were asked in only 46 of the countries that implemented the long version of the questionnaire. All diagnoses of these chronic physical diseases applied to the past 12 months from the date of interview. For most of the analysis, respondents were grouped on the basis of their disease status into one of the following: respondents having none of the aforementioned health conditions, respondents having any of the single conditions alone, respondents having any of the chronic physical diseases alone in conjunction with depression, respondents having two or more comorbidities without depression, and respondents having two or more comorbidities with depression.

Analysis
The prevalence of each chronic physical disease was estimated, rst aloneie, without any of the other conditions presentthen comorbid with depression but without any additional conditions present, and then two or more comorbid conditions with or without depression. The prevalence of depression in respondents who had any one of the conditions was also estimated. All these estimates were calculated using post-stratied
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probability weights. To make valid comparisons across countries, age and sex standardisations were done using WHOs World Standard Population for age and the UN Statistical Division for sex ratio.42,43 The mean of the health score was calculated using probability weights for the entire sample after stratication by sex, age, education, and income quintile, as well as respondents disease status. To test the statistical dierence of health scores between each pair of disease groups, a one-way analysis of variance using a Schee test was done to adjust for multiple comparisons. Linear regression analysis was used on the pooled dataset of 46 countries to model the relation between respondents health state and whether they had depression, a chronic physical disease, or a combination thereof, after controlling for country of origin, sex, age, education, marital status, occupational status, income level, and any interaction between sex with the other demographic variables. To establish whether cultural dierences in countries aected the relation between disease state and overall health state, interaction terms between marital status, education, and income quintile with the country variable were included in the model. Responses to some health domains such as sleep and aect are likely to be inuenced by whether the respondent is clinically depressed, which could lead to spurious conclusions about the decrements in health associated with depression. To test for this possibility, we did two further analyses. The rst analysis explored the association of disease states with each of the two questions of health measure which assess overall health and do not include any symptoms of depression. Second, we used a recursive regression technique to model the eect of depression when the dependent variable, the health score, contained only two domainsmobility and vision. Then, progressively, other domains were added to estimate the health score. The eect of depression on each successive health score was assessed at each marginal addition of a domain by evaluating changes in the regression coecient. This regression analysis was repeated until all eight health domains were included and their coecients for depression compared. Minimum dierences in the coecient for each successive regression would corroborate the eects of depression on decrements in health as genuine and not the result of a systematic reporting bias. All analysis was coded and done using STATA version 9.2.

Role of the funding source

This study was funded by WHO. The sponsor of the study had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. The corresponding author had full access to all the data in the study and had nal responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
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Results
The prevalence for depression alone, each chronic disease alone, depression with each chronic physical disease, and having multiple chronic conditions with or without depression for 60 countries was estimated with CIs (results not shown, available on request). At the worldwide level, the prevalence for having any one condition alone did not exceed 50%. The prevalence of having diabetes alone had the lowest overall prevalence of 20% (1822). However, since diabetes prevalence was based on self-report, the role of reporting bias that possibly underestimates the true prevalence cannot be ruled out. Depression alone had the next lowest overall prevalence at 32% (3035). Asthma alone had an overall prevalence of 33% (2936), prevalence of arthritis alone was 41% (3843), and angina alone 45% (4348). There were variations across countries, but the range of dierences in prevalence of any one condition did not exceed eight percentage points. A signicant percentage of respondents with any one of the chronic physical conditions also had depression. For respondents with diabetes, at a worldwide level, 93% (73113) also had depression, 107% (91123) with arthritis also had depression, 150% (129172) with angina, and respondents with asthma had the highest prevalence of depression at 181% (159203). For the 71% (6676) of respondents who had comorbidity of two or more chronic physical conditions, nearly a quarter (23%) also had depression in addition to their existing comorbid conditions. Thus, the prevalence of depression in respondents with chronic diseases is signicantly higher than in respondents without chronic diseases (32%, p<00001). The gure shows the mean health score and the 95% CIs for each disease. Respondents without any of

100 906 90 803 Mean health score (0100) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 796 793 789 729 671 718 658 654 585 561

Figure: Global mean health by disease status Data from WHS 2003.

the chronic diseases or depression had the highest health score, 906ie, reported having the best health. Respondents with asthma, angina, arthritis, or diabetes alone, had mean health scores of 803, 796, 793, and 789, respectively, which were signicantly dierent from having no disease but not from each other. Respondents with depression had the lowest health score among all the chronic disease conditions, 729 (p<00001). Respondents who had depression comorbid with another chronic condition had much lower mean health scores than respondents who had the chronic condition alone (p<001). For respondents who had two or more chronic conditions excluding depression, their mean health score was 718, lower than any of the disease conditions alone but higher than any disease state comorbid with depression. The lowest overall mean health score was for respondents with two or more chronic conditions comorbid with depression (561). These results show that comorbid depression is signicantly associated with lower health states in respondents with chronic conditions in comparison to having chronic conditions, including multiple chronic conditions, without depression (p<00001). We examined mean health scores by disease state in more detail by looking across sociodemographic variables (results not shown). The patterns are consistent, and for depression alone the mean health score is lower than for other chronic conditions alone, across all socioeconomic variables. For all comorbid depression, the mean health score is lower across all socioeconomic variables than for any of the chronic conditions alone or for depression alone. Thus, having depression comorbid with another chronic physical disease lowers health status substantially, irrespective of a respondents age, sex, and other demographic variables. The coecients of a regression model in the table summarises the relation between overall health and the dierent disease states and the sociodemographic determinants of sex, age, education, employment status, income quintile, and marital status. We also controlled for country of residence, interaction of country with education, martial status and income quintile, and interaction of sex with education, employment status, and income quintile (results not shown). The results from the model indicate that lower coecient values are associated with lower health scores. Results of the model show that being older is indicative of decreased health status, as is having less education, having lower income, and being unemployed. Women had a lower overall health score, and the decrements in health were greater for women who were unemployed, less educated, or widowed as indicated by the signicant coecients for the interaction terms of sex with these demographic variables (results not shown). There does not seem to be a signicant dierence in health status between being married and
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Independent variables Sex (reference category=men) Women Age group (reference category=1519 year olds) 3044 4559 6069 7079 80+ Marital status (reference category=married) Never married Cohabitating Separated, divorced, or widowed Education (reference category=no school) Less than primary Primary completed Secondary completed Greater than secondary Employment status (reference=unemployed) Currently employed Income quintiles (reference category=lowest quintile) Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Disease status (reference=no health conditions) Depression alone Angina alone Arthritis alone Asthma alone Diabetes Depression+angina Depression+arthritis Depression+asthma Depression+diabetes More than one chronic condition without depression Depression with more than one chronic condition Total number of respondents

Coecients (standard error)

203 (007)* 220 (009)* 558 (011)* 978 (014)* 1530 (018)* 2219 (027)* 002 (01) 020 (019) 193 (011)* 088 (012)* 177 (012)* 220 (013)* 269 (014)* 177 (008)* 077 (010)* 118 (011)* 173 (011)* 241 (012)* 1389 (020)* 668 (017)* 592 (016)* 654 (015)* 353 (026)* 2047 (042)* 1677 (046)* 1944 (039)* 2343 (086)* 1197 (016)* 2438 (031)* 142 755

Coecients for country and sociodemographic interactions not shown. *p<001.

Table: Regression results for overall health

never having been married or cohabitating. However, being separated, divorced, or widowed is associated with lower health scores. Overall, disease status has a greater association with reported health scores than do sociodemographic characteristics. Controlling for all other factors, having depression is associated with the lowest health scores, either alone or comorbid with other chronic diseases (p<00001). The coecient values from the model show that the comorbid state of depression with
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diabetes causes even greater decrements in health than the addition of the two conditions separately. This nding is suggestive of an interactive eect between depression and diabetes that causes an extra negative eect on health beyond the simple addition of each of the two conditions. Having more than two chronic diseases without depression (coecient 1197), although associated with a lower health score than having any one chronic disease, has much less of a negative association with health than does having depression alone (coecient 1389), or depression comorbid with one of the chronic diseases (coecients range from 1677 to 2343). Respondents with two or more chronic diseases in addition to having depression had the lowest health scores of all the disease groups (coecient 2438). Interacting sociodemographic variables with the country variable did not show statistically signicant change the coecients of depression and comorbid depression in the model, which suggests that cultural dierences across countries and their interaction with sociodemographic characteristics does not aect the inuence of depression on overall health. To rule out the eects of depression on some of the health domains included in the health measure, we compared the mean scores by disease status for the two general questions on overall self-rated health and diculties with work and activities (results not shown). Although the scores for the diculties with work question were higher than the overall health question, the pattern across disease states for both questions was quite similar to the pattern seen for the overall mean health score. Respondents who reported no chronic conditions had the highest scores, respondents with depression alone or comorbid with another condition had the lowest scores overall. Even respondents with two or more chronic conditions but no depression scored higher than any respondent with depression alone or comorbid with another condition. We also did a recursive regression as described in the methods section (results not shown). The coecient for depression in the model with the least-related of the health domains, vision and mobility, had a value of 99. Adding a third domain, pain, the coecient for depression rose slightly to 136. With each successive addition of a health domain, the coecient does not exceed 139. The addition of more domainseven those that are likely to be most responsive to the presence of depression such as sleep or energy and aectdid not have an appreciable addition on the average eect of depression on health status. The coecient remains fairly stable irrespective of the composition of domains that underlie the computation of the health score. These analyses show that our ndings are unlikely to indicate a bias due to inclusion of items in the overall health status score that are related to depression.
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Discussion
The worldwide prevalence of depression, asthma, angina, arthritis, and diabetes based on data collected in the World Health Surveys, and used in the analysis presented here, are similar to the data reported by WHOs Global Burden of Disease study.44 The data show that comorbidity between chronic physical conditions and depression is common, and that people with chronic diseases are signicantly more likely to suer from depression than those without (p<0.0001). Our data indicate that depression is associated with a decrement in health that is signicantly greater than those associated with the other chronic diseases in this study. Though depression has previously been shown to be associated with disability and declines in health-related quality of life, this is the largest scale study to our knowledge that shows this decline using direct comparisons across physical conditions in multiple countries with a common measurement strategy. Furthermore, we have also shown that depression comorbid with other chronic diseases produced signicantly greater decrements in health than from one or more chronic diseases, and that this additive eect is substantially amplied in the case of depression comorbid with diabetes. These associations remained evident after adjustment for sociodemographic, country of origin, and economic factors. Our ndings are consistent with earlier studies that have shown a high degree of association between depression and disability.45 There are, however, few studies that have compared the eect of depression with other chronic diseases. One reason for our ndings could be that depression is associated specically with decrements in mental domains of health, which were included in the composite health score we computed for our analyses. However, in the recursive regression analysis, we showed that adding each health domain serially does not alter the substantive results, since the size of the depression regression coecient is barely changed. This nding conrms that the measure is not biased towards depression. Another reason for our ndings might be that depression is associated with a negative assessment of functioning in all domains and therefore what one is measuring is merely a negative frame of mind that leads to reporting biases. An illustration of such a response bias is shown in the study by Owsely and colleagues,46 who assessed the eect of depression in elderly individuals on their response to a vision questionnaire. After controlling for demographics, general health, and vision, depression was found to be associated with reduced scores on the questionnaire, suggesting negative reporting as a function of being depressed rather than actual vision ability. To address this bias, the WHS also included vignettes in the survey whereby each respondent was presented with a set of brief descriptions of individuals in a xed level of health for a particular domain. Five vignettes per domain were presented ranging, for example, from quadriplegia at one
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extreme of mobility, to a marathon runner at the other extreme. Respondents were asked how they would rate their diculty in that particular domain if they were the person described in each of the vignettes. The examination of these rating patterns show that respondents with and without depression showed the same pattern of rating, even though they diered in self-report of their own experiences in each domain. This nding suggests that depressed respondents were not reporting things more negatively for the same level of health, and further supports the absence of biased reporting due to depression (results not shown). Our vignette method was possibly not suciently sensitive in detecting systematic reporting biases: though we do not believe this to be the case, this possibility needs to be investigated in future studies. Additionally, the reporting of depressive symptoms or diagnosis could vary between countries because of cultural dierences in reporting such symptoms. If respondents in some countries underreported their depressive symptoms, leading to an underestimate of the prevalence of depression in these countries, and if this was associated with denial of health problems, it would in fact narrow the dierence in the reported decrements in health between those with and without depression. Our results show this situation was not the case, that even after controlling for country eects, the decrements in health due to depression, both in pure and comorbid states, continue to remain signicant. So if underestimating of depression prevalence is occurring, it actually strengthens the ndings that depression increases decrements in health. Thus, these reporting biases, if they exist, do not detract from our substantive ndings. The WHS was a cross-sectional study and did not include questions on onset and duration of illness, uctuations in course and details of health-care use such as number and timing of contacts with health-care services, the reasons for contact, and the outcome following contact. Hence, we cannot establish what burden depression, and its comorbidity with other chronic diseases, places on the health system, how depression can modify the course of these disorders, and whether treatment of depression when present with these chronic physical diseases would alter their course. For the estimation of prevalence, the algorithms for the chronic physical conditions were based on a small validation study in a few countries that used negatives drawn from respondents in the WHS who self-reported no chronic diseases. Since these conditions are known to have an average prevalence in the general population of around 5%, the likelihood of these true negative respondents having any one of the above diagnoses is low. Both depression and angina were based on validated algorithms, but the algorithms of asthma and arthritis could benet from a more comprehensive validation study, since the presence of some false negative respondents cannot be ruled out. The algorithms might
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need to be modied if larger validation studies are done in more countries and if the true negatives were also identied on a gold standard test. Diabetes was based on self-report, and the role of reporting bias on the prevalence presented in our study is noted. However, we do not think that the possibility of a small misclassication bias would substantially alter the core message of this study that being sad is bad for ones health. In conclusion, we report the largest population-based worldwide study to our knowledge that explores the eect of depression in comparison with four other chronic diseases on health state. Our main ndings show that depression impairs health state to a substantially greater degree than the other diseases. A signicant percentage of respondents have depression in addition to their existing chronic physical conditions, a group that is often unrecognised and untreated.29,47,48 This nding is of special importance, considering the presence of depression and its treatment is clearly related to the outcome of these chronic diseases.7,4850 Comorbidity with depression signicantly worsens the health state of people with chronic diseases. The need for timely diagnosis and treatment of depressive disorders to reduce the burden on public health is imperative. In many primary care settings, patients presenting with multiple disorders that include depression often dont get diagnosed, and if they do, often treatment is focused towards the other chronic diseases.6 Depression can be treated in primary care or community settings with locally available cost-eective interventions.3,51 On the basis of our results, addressing the further exacerbation of disability due to depression needs to be a priority of health systems worldwide. Primary care providers must be taught not to ignore the presence of depression when patients present with a chronic physical condition, in view of the marked eect that it has on an individuals health. This goal can be accomplished in part by sending a message which, in addition to reducing the stigma surrounding mental illness, can alert providers and the public at large that depression is a disease at least on a par with physical chronic diseases in damaging health.
Contributors SM, SC, and TBU contributed to the design of the study. SM, SC, EV, AT, and VP contributed to the analyses. All authors were involved in the development of the manuscript and approved the nal version. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank or the World Health Organization. Conict of interest statement We declare that we have no conict of interest. Acknowledgments AFROBlaise Sondo (Burkina Faso), Djona Avocksouma (Chad), Sitti Djaouharia Chihabiddine (Comores), Georges Moyen (Congo, Brazzaville), M Seka Monney Firmin (Cote DIvoire), Makonnen Asefa (Ethiopia), Richard Biritwum (Ghana), Fredrick Otieno (Kenya), Sidon Konyani (Malawi), Mamadou Bassry Ballo (Mali), Maye Mint Haidy (Mauritania), P Burhoo (Mauritius), M Zauana (Namibia), Babacar Drame (Senegal), Zaid Kimmie (South Africa), Isabel Thembi Zwane (Swaziland), Musonda Lemba (Zambia), Julita Maradzika (Zimbabwe)

AMRO/PAHOClia Landmann Szwarcwald (Brazil), Maritza Molina Achcar (Dominican Republic), Fernando Sacoto (Ecuador), Tim Farrell (Guatemala), G Olaiz Fernndez (Mexico), M W Torres Numbay (Paraguay), Jorge Agulla (Uruguay). EMROMustapha Azelmat (Morocco), Ashfaq Ahmed (Pakistan), Nourredine Achour (Tunisia), Gohar Wajid (United Arab Emirates), Christine Kotarakos (INRA-ECO EU surveys), Aida Pilav (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Marijan Erceg (Croatia), Vlasta Mazankova (Czech Republic), Andrus Saar (Estonia), Roman R.Shakarishvili (Georgia), Jozsef Vitrai (Hungary), Bruce Rosen (Israel), Maksut Karimovich Kulzhanov (Kazakhstan), Ineta Pirkitna (Latvia), Jorun Ramm (Norway), Tamara Maximomva (Russian Federation), Maria Letkovicova (Slovakia), Tit Albreht (Slovenia), Rosa Mataix (Spain), Adnan Kisa (Turkey), Volodimir Olexandrovich Kolodenko (Ukraine) SEAROP Arokiasamy (India), Kyi Soe (Myanmar), Sanjoy Nandy (Nepal), Thushara Fernando (Sri Lanka) WPRORussell Blamey (Australia), Keqin Rao (China), Buongnong Boupha (Laos Peoples Democratic Republic), Maimunah A Hamid (Malaysia), Laurie Ramiro (Philippines), Duong Huy Lieu (Vietnam). References 1 Ustun TB, Chatterji S. Global burden of depressive disorders and future projections. In: Dawson A, Tylee A, eds. Depression: social and economic timebomb. London: BMJ Books, 2001. 2 Ustun TB, AyusoMateos JL, Chatterji S, Mathers C, Murray CJ. Global burden of depressive disorders in the year 2000. Br J Psychiatry 2004; 184: 38692. 3 Hyman S, Chisolm D, Kessler R, Patel V, Whiteford H. Mental Disorders. In: Jamison DT, Mosley WH, Bobadilla JL, Measham AR, eds. Disease control priorities in developing countries, 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University Press; 2006. 4 Solomon DA, Keller MB, Leon AC, et al. Multiple recurrences of major depressive disorder. Am J Psychiatry 2000; 157: 22933. 5 Andrews G. Should depression be managed as a chronic disease? BMJ 2001; 322: 41921. 6 Cassano P, Fava M. Depression and public health: an overview. J Psychosom Res 2002; 53: 84957. 7 Noel PH, Williams JW Jr, Unutzer J, et al. Depression and comorbid illness in elderly primary care patients: impact on multiple domains of health status and well-being. Ann Fam Med 2004; 2: 55562. 8 Cassileth BR, Lusk EJ, Strouse TB, et al. Psychosocial status in chronic illness. A comparative analysis of six diagnostic groups. N Engl J Med 1984; 311: 50611. 9 Chapman DP, Perry GS, Strine TW. The vital link between chronic disease and depressive disorders. Prev Chronic Dis 2005; 2: A14. 10 Katon W, Schulberg H. Epidemiology of depression in primary care. Gen Hosp Psychiatry 1992; 14: 23747. 11 Harpole LH, Williams JW Jr, Olsen MK, et al. Improving depression outcomes in older adults with comorbid medical illness. Gen Hosp Psychiatry 2005; 27: 412. 12 Summary: the global burden of disease. Boston: Harvard School of Public Health, 1996. 13 Strine TW, Chapman DP, Kobau R, Balluz L, Mokdad AH. Depression, anxiety, and physical impairments and quality of life in the US noninstitutionalized population. Psychiatr Serv 2004; 55: 140813. 14 Ciechanowski PS, Katon WJ, Russo JE. Depression and diabetes: impact of depressive symptoms on adherence, function, and costs. Arch Intern Med 2000; 160: 327885. 15 Alonso J, Ferrer M, Gandek B, et al. Healthrelated quality of life associated with chronic conditions in eight countries: results from the International Quality of Life Assessment (IQOLA) Project. Qual Life Res 2004; 13: 28398. 16 Bayliss EA, Ellis JL, Steiner JF. Subjective assessments of comorbidity correlate with quality of life health outcomes: initial validation of a comorbidity assessment instrument. Health Qual Life Outcomes 2005; 3: 51. 17 Fortin M, Lapointe L, Hudon C, Vanasse A, Ntetu AL, Maltais D. Multimorbidity and quality of life in primary care: a systematic review. Health Qual Life Outcomes 2004; 2: 51. 18 Fortin M, Bravo G, Hudon C, et al. Relationship between multimorbidity and health-related quality of life of patients in primary care. Qual Life Res 2006; 15: 8391.

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VIA USPS CERTIFIED MAIL, RRR Article No.: 7010 1670 0001 9008 0291 Ms. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida 401 West Central Boulevard, Suite 1200 Orlando, Florida 32801-0120

April 5, 2012

RE: Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, FL, et al, Case No.: 5:10-cv-00503-Oc-10TBS Dear Ms. Loesch: This letter concerns a number of apparent failures by the Clerk in the above captioned case. In addition, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida does not appear to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act. (ADA). Some issues beyond the Clerks authority are presented in this letter for context. My experience in this case would cause a reasonable person to question the fairness and impartiality of this Clerk and Court. See Plaintiffs Response to Order to Show Cause (Doc. 58). As set forth in the Complaint (Doc. 1), this lawsuit is about the misuse and denial of judicial process under the color of law in the Florida state court action Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, et al, case no. 05-CA-007205, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida. The state court denied me the right to lawfully adjudicate my case due to the conflict of interest of attorney Ryan Christopher Rodems who unlawfully represented his firm, Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, against me, a former client, on the same matter as the prior representation, the Amscot lawsuit. This District Court has continued the misuse and denial of judicial process under the color of law when it failed, among other things, to disqualify Mr. Rodems in this action pursuant to the holding of McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. (Doc. 20). McPartland has been a mandatory authority on disqualification in the Middle District of Florida since entered June 30, 1995 by Judge Kovachevich. The state court action turned into a personal vendetta for Mr. Rodems on January 19, 2006 when he commenced a vexatious libel counterclaim against me, which continued through September 28, 2010 whereupon Rodems voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. Since March 3, 2006 Mr. Rodems directed, with malice aforethought, a course of harassing conduct toward me that has aggravated my disability, caused substantial emotional distress and served no legitimate purpose. (Doc. 36). Mr. Rodems unprofessional conduct is apparent in his letter to me dated December 13, 2006, copy enclosed. (Exhibit 1). For example: I recognize that you are a bitter man who apparently has been victimized by your own poor choices in life. You also claim to have mental or psychological problems, of which I have never seen documentation. However, your behavior in this case has been so abnormal that I would not disagree with your assertions of mental problems. (P1, 3)

Ms. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida

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So, in addition to your case's lack of merit, you are cheap and not willing to pay the required hourly rates for representation. (P3, 2). Mr. Rodems prevented the lawful adjudication of both the state and federal cases through his repeated violation of FL Bar Rule 4-3.3 Candor Toward The Tribunal. (Exhibit 1). Mr. Rodems made numerous false statements of material fact to the tribunal, failed to cooperate with opposing counsel, and disrupted the tribunal for strategic advantage. Mr. Rodems failed to disclose to the court legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. (Exhibit 1). As set forth in my Petition (SC11-1622) to the Florida Supreme Court (Doc. 62), Mr. Rodems made false statements to the tribunal to have an arrest warrant issued for me for the purpose of forcing a walk-away settlement agreement in the state court case, and to force a walk-away settlement agreement in this Court for my federal civil rights and ADA disability lawsuit. CASE MANAGEMENT 1. Pursuant to Local Rule 3.05, the Clerk designated this action as a Track Two Case September 30, 2010 for case management purposes. Upon information and belief, this case is a Track Three Case pursuant to Local Rule 3.05, complex litigation as set forth in Plaintiffs Response To Order To Show Cause (Doc. 58); see paragraph six (6) below, and paragraph twenty-two (22), which is too large to cite here. 6. For case management purposes under Local Rule 3.05, Plaintiff believes this action is a complex litigation case due to the nature of the allegations against a Florida Circuit Court, three circuit court judges, court counsel, the ADA coordinator, the law firm that gives rise to the action, and the attorney and firm hired to represent, and later betrayed, the plaintiff. The Plaintiff, an indigent, disabled, unrepresented, nonlawyer, appearing pro se, alleges misuse and denial of judicial process under the color of law, violation of his Civil Rights, and the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Counsel of record Ryan Christopher Rodems, a one-time defendant himself in this case, made the action impossibly complex by intentionally misleading this Court with false and untrue statements in his pleadings, in violation of Rule 11(b), FRCP. THE CLERK FAILED TO PUT VITAL DOCUMENTS ON CM/ECF AND PACER 2. The Clerk failed to put vital documents I filed in this case on the Case Management and Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system to view on PACER. One such document is Doc. 2, Exhibits 1-15 to the Complaint (Doc. 1) filed September 28, 2010 when I personally commenced the case in the Ocala Division and hand-delivered the complaint and exhibits to a deputy clerk. Doc. 2, Exhibit 4 is my Emergency Motion To Disqualify Defendants Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Baker, Rodems & Cook, PA submitted July 9, 2010 in the state court action; in this Court the motion is Doc. 2, Exhibit 4 to the Complaint (Doc. 1), but not viewable on PACER. This negatively affected my case because Magistrate Judge David Baker, who is

Ms. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida

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located in Orlando, could not view the document located in Ocala when he made rulings in the case. The document was only viewable in person in Ocala, or by request to send the physical file to Orlando. There is no evidence that the physical file was sent to Orlando. I brought this issue to the attention of Chief Judge Anne Conway by letter dated March 22, 2012, see Doc. 68, Motion To Amend The Judgment, the letter is attached as an exhibit to the motion, and contains 33 pages; a three page letter to Chief Judge Conway and 30 pages of enclosures. PRE-LITIGATION COMMUNICATION WITH JAMES LEANHEART 3. Prior to personally filing this pro se case, I wrote August 30, 2010 to James Leanheart, Court Operations Supervisor, about filing documents on the CM/ECF system and PACER. This is the operative language from paragraph five of the accompanying letter: (Exhibit 2) Myclaimsinvolve documents in the state court record from the Circuit Civil Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit, includingan amended complaint (150 pages), and an emergency motion to disqualify counsel (190 pages). What is the procedure for including or incorporating these numerous and sometimes large documents into mycivil rights complaint? Mr. Leanheart did not respond in writing, but we spoke by phone September 10, 2010. Following Mr. Leanhearts instructions, I filed all the documents in paper September 28, 2010. I personally filed the case September 28, 2010 and personally handed the paper documents to a deputy clerk. But the Clerk did not put any of the exhibits on the CM/ECF system and/or PACER, not the amended complaint (Exhibit 3), not the emergency motion to disqualify counsel (Exhibit 4), none of the 15 exhibits were put on PACER. I complained to the deputy clerks in Ocala more than once to no avail. I complained in person a number of times and the error was not corrected. I live in Ocala and almost always hand deliver my documents to a deputy clerk in order to save the cost of postage or courier service as I am indigent. My letter dated August 30, 2010 to Mr. Leanheart states I planned to file a pro se lawsuit in two weeks or so, but I was delayed until September 28, 2010 due to mental illness and other disabilities, see Doc. 36 for my notice of filing disability information. NO ADA ACCOMMODATION IN THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 4. I provided the Court a comprehensive ADA file on the morning of September 28, 2010 when I personally filed the lawsuit. I believe Mr. Leanheart was present along with a number of deputy clerks and perhaps other court personnel. I was assured that the judge in the case would consider my ADA accommodation request and medical report by Dr. Karin Huffer. I was told there was nothing else to do. It appears that the Middle District of Florida does not have an ADA coordinator, and does not provide an ADA form to make an accommodation request as is the practice in state court.

Ms. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida

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Furthermore, the website of the Middle District of Florida does not mention the ADA or how to request a disability accommodation. Among other things, I need to e-file, see below. My state court ADA file requested designation as complex litigation, case management by the court, protection from harassment (psychological torture) and perjury, and to follow the holding of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971), where the U.S. Supreme Court found pro se pleadings should be held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys. And I requested intensive case management of the kind advocated for by the Hon. Claudia Rickert Isom, in her law review Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REV. 323, 324 (1998). Judge Isom is also a defendant in this case. When a litigants health is at risk, an opinion decided March 27, 2012 by Judge Richard Posner of the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Chicago) in a civil rights suit brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 suggested appointment of counsel because withholding nutritious food would violate the Eighth Amendment. This is what happened in my state court action June 21, 2011, see Doc. 33, Doc. 39, Doc. 47, Doc. 61, Doc. 62. In related case 5:11-cv-00539, see First Amended Complaint, Doc. 15, paragraph 16: 16. Gillespie is an individual with mental illness as defined by 42 U.S.C. Chapter 114 The Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 10802(4)(A) and (B)(i)(III). Gillespie was involuntarily confined in a municipal detention facility for reasons other than serving a sentence resulting from conviction for a criminal offense. Gillespies involuntary confinement was in the George E. Edgecomb Courthouse, 800 E. Twiggs Street, Tampa, Florida. On June 1, 2011 Judge Arnold issued a politically motivated warrant to arrest Gillespie for the purpose of harming Gillespie by abuse as defined 10802(1) and neglect as defined by 10802(5) to force a walk-away settlement agreement in the state action, and to force a walk-away settlement agreement in the federal action, Gillespies civil rights and ADA lawsuit against the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, et al., for the misuse and denial of judicial process under the color of law, and denial of disability accommodation. Gillespie was involuntary confined by two (2) fully armed deputies of the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office, and involuntarily held during an improper full deposition, post final summary judgment, an open-ended deposition without time limit, with no lunch break, and no meals usually given to an inmate, until Gillespie suffered injury and agreed to sign a walk-away settlement agreement. Gillespie was so impaired when he signed the agreement that the record shows he was unable to make the settlement decision himself. A copy of the opinion decided March 27, 2012 by Judge Richard Posner of the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals accompanies this letter. (Exhibit 3). The American Bar Association Journal Law News Now reported this story March 28, 2012. (Exhibit 4). PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE MEDICAL INFORMATION 5. It does not appear that Magistrate Judge David Baker, located in Orlando, could read my ADA accommodation request and medical report located in Ocala when he made rulings in the

Ms. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida

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case. Due to Mr. Rodems repeated misrepresentation of my disability, I waived confidentiality and filed my private medical information on the public record, see Doc. 36. I found the public disclosure of my private medical information objectionable, revealing mental illness and other disabilities contained in Dr. Huffers report and my ADA request, just as any reasonable person would find it objectionable, and a wrongful intrusion into my private life. Still, the Court has failed to consider my ADA disability information. TORTURE - ACT OF INFLICTING SEVERE PAIN PHYSICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL 6. As set forth in Doc. 36 (Notice of filing disability and ADA information), Since March 3, 2006, Ryan Christopher Rodems, counsel for the Defendants, has directed, with malice aforethought, a course of harassing conduct toward Gillespie that has aggravated his disability, caused substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate purpose. Another word for Mr. Rodems behavior is torture: Torture is the act of inflicting severe pain (whether physical or psychological) as a means of punishment, revenge, forcing information or a confession, or simply as an act of cruelty. - Wikipedia. (Exhibit 5) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torture The Psychology of Torture: Torture, whether physical or psychological or both, depends on complicated interpersonal relationships between those who torture, those tortured, bystanders and others. Torture also involves deeply personal processes in those tortured, in those who torture and in others. These interacting psychological relationships, processes and dynamics form the basis for the psychology of torture. - Wikipedia (Exhibit 6) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychology_of_torture I alleged torture in this federal action, see Doc. 22, notice of voluntary dismissal. Because the Court would not disqualify Mr. Rodems, I had to dismiss my claims or endure further torture, which I could not bear. The Court raised the issue of extraordinary circumstances (Doc. 21) and I replied in Doc. 22 beginning on page three (3). Paragraph 12 states: Judge Cook is knowingly and willfully harming Gillespie through a confusion technique. Judge Cook is doing this to help Mr. Rodems and Barker, Rodems & Cook prevail over Gillespie in the lawsuit over which she presides. Judge Cook knowingly introduced false information into the court record and other such as a coercive technique used to induce psychological confusion and regression in Gillespie by bringing a superior outside force to bear on his will to resist or to provoke a reaction in Gillespie. The CIA a manual on torture techniques, the KUBARK manual, calls this the Alice in Wonderland or confusion technique. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KUBARK#CIA_manuals

Ms. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida

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A copy of Dr. Huffers letter is attached to Doc. 22 as exhibit A. Dr. Huffer wrote: As the litigation has proceeded, Mr. Gillespie is routinely denied participatory and testimonial access to the court. He is discriminated against in the most brutal ways possible. He is ridiculed by the opposition, accused of malingering by the Judge and now, with no accommodations approved or in place, Mr. Gillespie is threatened with arrest if he does not succumb to a deposition. This is like threatening to arrest a paraplegic if he does not show up at a deposition leaving his wheelchair behind. This is precedent setting in my experience. I intend to ask for DOJ guidance on this matter. (Dr. Huffer, October 28, 2010, paragraph 2) The United Nations (UN) Committee against Torture (CAT) prohibits torture, and torture is prohibited under international law and the domestic laws of most countries in the 21st century, however the United States did not agree to join the UN ban on torture, and the United States claims it's citizens have the U.S. Constitution to protect them. Therefore it is appropriate to seek redress for torture in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. MOTION TO FILE ELECTRONICALLY DENIED 7. My motion to file electronically (Doc. 6) was denied (Doc. 17) October 17, 2010 by Magistrate Judge Baker. I have maintained a PACER account in good standing since 1999. My notion to file electronically can also be considered a reasonable accommodation request under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). My request submitted to this Court September 28, 2010, and again in Doc. 36, see Exhibit 2, page 17, states as follows: ADA Request No.6: Mr. Gillespie requests time to scan thousands of pages of documents in this case to electronic PDF format. This case and underlying cause of action covers a ten year period and the files have become unmanageable and confusing relative to Gillespie's disability. Mr. Gillespie is not able to concentrate when handling a large amount of physical files and documents. He is better able to manage the files and documents when they are organized and viewable on his computer. Mr. Gillespie will bear the cost of converting files and documents to PDF. The failure to file electrically prevented me from being on an equal footing with the other parties in this case who could e-file documents from the comfort of their office or home without the time and expense of mailing, hiring a courier service, or serving the documents in person. The technology to file documents electronically is fairly simple and cost effective. I have a website with documents in this case online at the following URLs: http://yousue.org/litigation/ http://yousue.org/turner-v-rogers/

Ms. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida http://yousue.org/ryan-christopher-rodems/ http://yousue.org/bar-complaint-of-robert-w-bauer/ http://yousue.org/circuit-court-judge-martha-j-cook/ http://yousue.org/13th-judicial-circuit-hillsborough-co-florida/

Page - 7 April 5, 2012

My emergency motion to disqualify counsel described above is also filed free on Scribd at http://www.scribd.com/doc/55960451/ Still, the document I personally filed in paper format September 28, 2010 in the Ocala Division has not been put on the Courts CM/ECF system to view on PACER. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California offers online e-filing registration instructions for pro se litigants, found at this URL: http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/pages/871 I meet the following technical requirements set forth by the Northern District of California: 1. A computer, the internet, and email on a daily basis so you can e-file your documents and receive notifications from the Court. 2. A scanner to scan documents that are only in paper format (like exhibits).

3. A printer/copier because each documents that you e-file will also need to be sent to the judge in hard copy (the judges copy is called the chambers copy). 4. A word-processing program to create your documents.

5. A .pdf reader and a .pdf writer, which enables you to convert word processing documents into .pdf format. Only .pdf documents are accepted for e-filing. Adobe Acrobat is the most common program used. The reader (Adobe Acrobat Reader) is free, but the writer is not. Some word processing programs come with a .pdf writer already installed. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California offers an online pro se ECF Registration form in active PDF format. INCORRECT DATE/TIME STAMP ON COMPLAINT BY CLERK 8. The Clerks date/time stamp shows the Complaint (Doc. 1) was filed 2010 SEP 28 AM 7:47 which time is incorrect. The Court does not open until 8:30 AM, and I filed the Complaint myself in person by handing the Complaint directly to a deputy clerk about 8:47 AM.

Ms. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida

Page - 8 April 5, 2012

INCORRECT PLAINITFF ADDRESS BY CLERK OF COURT 9. The Clerk used an incorrect mailing address for me, necessitating a corrective motion, see Plaintiffs Motion to Correct Mailing Address, filed October 5, 2010. (Doc. 9). My correct address is listed on the complaint and every document filed in this case. My address has not changed since 2005. The motion states as follows: Plaintiff pro se Gillespie moves Court to correct his mailing address: 1. The Court is sending Plaintiff Gillespie's mail to the wrong address. Please use the correct address, listed on the complaint: 8092 SW I15th Loop, Ocala, Florida 34481. INCORRECT PLAINITFF PHONE NUMBER BY CLERK OF COURT 10. The Clerk used an incorrect telephone number for me, necessitating a corrective motion, see Plaintiffs Motion to Correct Phone Number, filed October 13, 2010. (Doc. 15). My correct phone number is listed on the complaint and every document filed in this case. My home phone number has not changed since 2005. The motion states as follows: Plaintiff pro se Gillespie moves the Court to correct his phone number and states: 1. The PACER docket shows an incorrect phone number for Plaintiff pro se Gillespie. The correct phone number is listed on the complaint: (352) 854-7807. FAILURE OF MR. RODEMS TO COMPLY - RULE 7.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 11. Mr. Rodems failed to comply with the Rule 7.1. Disclosure Statement and the Court did not take any corrective action. Mr. Rodems represented Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, which is a Florida profit corporation according to the Florida Division of Corporations. (Exhibit 8). Rule 7.1(a) states A nongovernmental corporate party must file 2 copies of a disclosure statement that: (1) identifies any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation owning 10% or more of its stock; or (2) states that there is no such corporation. (b) Time to File; Supplemental Filing. A party must: (1) file the disclosure statement with its first appearance, pleading, petition, motion, response, or other request addressed to the court; and (2) promptly file a supplemental statement if any required information changes. Upon information and belief, Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA is a nongovernmental corporate party under Rule 7.1(a) and Mr. Rodems had a duty to comply with Rule 7.1(b) and file the disclosure statement with his first appearance September 29, 2010. Mr. Rodems failed to do so. Had Mr. Rodems complied with Rule 7.1, the Court may have been better informed on the issue of my

Ms. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida

Page - 9 April 5, 2012

motion to disqualify Mr. Rodems as counsel. (Doc. 8). I believe Mr. Rodems failure to comply with Rule 7.1(b) was intended to mislead the Court. FAILURE OF THE CLERK TO OFFER PRO SE SERVICES 12. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida does not appear to offer pro se services as compared to other federal District Courts. This is a denial of equal protection under the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. For example: The United States District Court for the Northern District of California offers pro se litigants a Pro Se Handbook, also known as a Handbook for Litigants Without a Lawyer, which can be downloaded online or available free of charge from the Clerk's Office. This is a link to Representing Yourself in Federal Court: A Handbook for Pro Se Litigants http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/prosehandbk In addition to a pro se handbook, at the above link the District Court for the Northern District of California offers the following services to pro se litigants: Official Court Forms in active PDF format. The link shows eleven (11) different forms. http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/civillitpackets Civil Litigation Packets, at the above URL, collections of forms in active PDF for the following: Complaint packet Motion packet Opposition (to motion) packet Initial Disclosures packet Motion for Permission for Electronic Case Filing and Proposed Order Tips for Pro Se Filers: http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/prosetips The United States District Court for the Northern District of California has a comprehensive directory of all Article III judges and Magistrate Judges with photos and biographies, found online at this link http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/judges 28 USC 455 - LETTER TO CHIEF JUDGE ANNE CONWAY 13. My letter to Chief Judge Conway (Doc. 68) made a request under the federal Freedom of Information Act, or other applicable law, pursuant to 28 USC 455, for the biography and/or personnel file of Magistrate Judge David A. Baker. As of today I do not have a reply. Subsequently I found some of this information myself with a Google search. It appears that Magistrate Judge Baker was formerly a partner in the law firm of Foley & Lardner, LLP. It

Ms. Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida

Page - 10 April 5, 2012

appears that the tenure of Attorney David A. Baker at Foley & Lardner included time in the firms offices in Wisconsin and Orlando. On May 25, 2011 Krista J. Sterken, Esq., an associate of Foley & Lardner LLP, Wisconsin, telephoned me at 11:55 a.m. offering legal representation in this matter. (Doc. 49). Ms. Sterkens offer of pro bono legal representation was only contingent upon a conflict search. On May 27, 2011 Michael D. Leffel, Esq., a partner at Foley & Lardner LLP, notified me that Foley & Lardner could not represent me. (Doc. 49). Neither Ms. Sterken nor Mr. Leffel informed me of a conflict as a result their conflict search. Therefore I concluded that the decision not to represent me involved another issue. Given the forgoing, a reasonable person could conclude that Judge Baker may have had some role in the decision by Foley & Lardner not to represent me. CONCLUSION Given the above, my experience in this case would cause a reasonable person to question the fairness and impartiality of this Clerk and this Court. Thank you for your consideration. Sincerely,

Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 854-7808 Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net Enclosures CC: Honorable Anne C. Conway, Chief United States District Judge Hon. William Terrell Hodges, Ocala Division Hon. David A. Baker, Orlando Division Robert E. O'Neill, US Attorney, US Attorney's Office, 400 N. Tampa St., Suite 3200, Tampa, FL 33602-4798 (For the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, et. al) Catherine B. Chapman, Guilday, Tucker, Schwartz & Simpson, P.A., 1983 Centre Pointe, Boulevard, Suite 200, Tallahassee, FL 32308-7823 (For Robert W. Bauer, et. al) Ryan C. Rodems, 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100, Tampa, Florida 33602

VIOLATION OF BAR RULE 4-3.3 BY RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS Ryan Christopher Rodems, counsel for Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. and William J. Cook, prevented the lawful adjudication of both the state and federal cases primarily through his repeated violation of FL Bar Rule 4-3.3 Candor Toward The Tribunal. Mr. Rodems violated the requirements of FL Bar Rule 4-3.3 in his response to the Court (Doc. 12) to the motion to disqualify (Doc. 8) as follows: 1. Mr. Rodems failed to disclose to the Court the actual interest of himself, his law partners, and his law firm Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. in the Amscot litigation, as set forth in the Certificate of Interested Person in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Eugene R. Clement, Gay Ann Blomefield, and Neil Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corporation, Case No. 01-14761-AA. (copy provided) 2. Mr. Rodems failed to disclose to the Court a letter by Amscots lawyer, Charles Stutts of Holland & Knight, LLP, that described the relationship between the Amscot lawsuit and the state court case Neil J. Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. and William J. Cook, 05-CA-007205, Hillsborough Circuit Court. Mr. Stutts wrote February 13, 2007 that This former action [Amscot] is, of course, at the heart of your pending action against Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.. (copy provided). 3. Mr. Rodems failed to disclose to the Court his letter dated December 13, 2006 to Neil J. Gillespie that set forth his prejudice in this matter, including: (copy provided) I recognize that you are a bitter man who apparently has been victimized by your own poor choices in life. You also claim to have mental or psychological problems, of which I have never seen documentation. However, your behavior in this case has been so abnormal that I would not disagree with your assertions of mental problems. (P1, 3) So, in addition to your case's lack of merit, you are cheap and not willing to pay the required hourly rates for representation. (P3, 2). 4. Mr. Rodems failed to disclose to the Court his actual conflict, established by Order of Circuit Court Judge Richard Nielsen dated January 13, 2006, that found a cause of action for Fraud and Breach of Contract against Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. and William J. Cook in the state court action 05-CA-007205. (copy provided). Partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible for the fraud or negligence of another partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965).

Page 1 of 2

5. Mr. Rodems failed to disclose to the Court legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client, McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. In McPartland v. ISI Investment Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, (US District Court, MD of Florida, Tampa Division) the court held that [1] Under Florida law, attorneys must avoid appearance of professional impropriety, and any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disqualification. [2] To prevail on motion to disqualify counsel, movant must show existence of prior attorney-client relationship and that the matters in pending suit are substantially related to the previous matter or cause of action. [3] In determining whether attorney-client relationship existed, for purposes of disqualification of counsel from later representing opposing party, a long-term or complicated relationship is not required, and court must focus on subjective expectation of client that he is seeking legal advice. [5] For matters in prior representation to be substantially related to present representation for purposes of motion to disqualify counsel, matters need only be akin to present action in way reasonable persons would understand as important to the issues involved. [7] Substantial relationship between instant case in which law firm represented defendant and issues in which firm had previously represented plaintiffs created irrebuttable presumption under Florida law that confidential information was disclosed to firm, requiring disqualification. [8] Disqualification of even one attorney from law firm on basis of prior representation of opposing party necessitates disqualification of firm as a whole, under Florida law.

Page 2 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASE l-IO . 01-14761~""
~
~

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, GAY ANN BLOME FIELD , and NEIL GILLESPIE, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Appellants, v. AMSCOT CORPORATION, Appellee.

I
I
~

I,'.~

______________,

JOINT STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

The Parties, by and th_ou(Jh tI-leir undersigrled counsel, amicably

A~I)pel1ate

hav~.

flg

resolved

this

matter,

pursuant

to

Federal

Rule
""to:

of th

Procedure 42 (b)

move for dismissal with prejtldice

attorn~s'

each party bearing its own

fees and costs. day of November, 2001.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

BA~KER;

RODEMS & COOK,

P~A4

Gray, Harris, Bobinson, Shackleford, Farrior

WILLIAM J. CO K, ESQUIRE Florida Bar No. 986194

300 West Platt Street
~)uite

150

33606 489-1001 (TEL) 489-1008 (FAX) Z.:\.t to rrle :i5 for Appe 11 ant ~3
(813) (813)

Tampa, Florida

R. FERNANDEZ, ES Florida Bar No. 008 5 501 E. Kennedy Blvd Sllite 1400 Tampa, Florida 33602
(813)
(t~J3)

273-5000
273-5145

(TE"L)
(F~AX)

. ~tt~~~jrneys

for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant

to Federal

Rule

of Appellate

Procedure

26.1

and

Eleventh Circuit Rule 26.1-1,

counsel for the Appellants certify

that the following persons and entities have an interest in the outcome of this case. Alpert, Jonathan L., Esq. Alpert & Ferrentino, P.A. Amscot Corporation Anthony, John A., Esq. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Barker, Chris A., Esq.
Blomefield, Gay Ann
Clement, Eugene R.
Cook, William J., Esq.
Gillespie, Neil
Gray, Harris, Robinson, Shackleford, Farrior, P.A.
Lazzara, The Honorable Richard A.
United States District Judge, Middle District of Florida
MacKechnie, Ian
Rodems, Ryan Christopher, Esq.

Case 8:99-cv-02795-RAL Document 121

Filed 12/10/01 Page 1 of 1 PageID 1363

US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289 (404) 335-6100

Closed
Docket #: 01-14761-AA Short Style: Eugene R. Clement v. Amscot Corporation Docket Date: 08/23/2001 Lead Case: Agency: Nature of Suit: Other: Statutory Actions Misc. Type: Clerk: Dixon, Eleanor Clerk Phone: (404) 335-6172

District Information
Docket #: 99-02795-CV-T-26 Judge: Richard A. Lazzara Dkt Date: 12/08/1999 District: Florida-Middle NOA Date: 08/20/2001 Office: MFL-Tampa Secondary Case Information Docket #: Judge: Dkt Date: / /

Case Relationships
Docket # Short Style Relation Status Pending Motions No Pending Motions

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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289 (404) 335-6100

01-14761-AA Eugene R. Clement v. Amscot Corporation EUGENE R. CLEMENT, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant, GAY ANN BLOMEFIELD, NEIL GILLESPIE,

Plaintiffs-Intervenors Counter-Defendants Appellants,

versus

AMSCOT CORPORATION, A Florida Corporation,

2 of 5

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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

Defendant-Intervenor Counter-Claimant Appellee. United States Court OF Appeals FOR the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289 (404) 335-6100

Appellant Eugene R. Clement Address Not On File Record Excerpts filed on 10/03/2001 Fees: Paid on 08/20/2001

Gay Ann Blomefield Address Not On File No Briefing Information Found. Fees: Paid on 08/20/2001

Neil Gillespie Address Not On File Appellant Brief Filed filed on 10/03/2001 Fees: Paid on 08/20/2001

Appellant Attorney William John Cook Barker, Rodems & Cook P.A. 400 N ASHLEY DR STE 2100 TAMPA, FL 33602-4350 (813) 489-1001 Fax: (813) 489-1008 wcook@barkerrodemsandcook.com No Briefing Information Found. William John Cook Barker, Rodems & Cook P.A. 400 N ASHLEY DR STE 2100 TAMPA, FL 33602-4350 (813) 489-1001 Fax: (813) 489-1008 wcook@barkerrodemsandcook.com No Briefing Information Found. William John Cook Barker, Rodems & Cook P.A. 400 N ASHLEY DR STE 2100 TAMPA, FL 33602-4350 (813) 489-1001 Fax: (813) 489-1008 wcook@barkerrodemsandcook.com No Briefing Information Found. Appellee Attorney Person Not Found No Briefing Information Found.

Appellee Amscot Corporation Address Not On File

3 of 5

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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

John A. Anthony GrayRobinson, P.A. 201 N FRANKLIN ST STE 2200 TAMPA, FL 33602-5822 (813) 273-5066 Fax: (813) 221-4113 janthony@gray-robinson.com No Briefing Information Found. Initial Service Lara R. Fernandez 101 E KENNEDY BLVD STE 2700 TAMPA, FL 33602-5150 (813) 227-7404 Fax: (813) 229-6553 lfernandez@trenam.com

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303-2289 (404) 335-6100

File Date

Entry

08/20/2001 Fee Status: Paid (08/20/01) for Eugene R. Clement 08/20/2001 Fee Status: Paid (08/20/01) for Gay Ann Blomefield 08/20/2001 Fee Status: Paid (08/20/01) for Neil Gillespie DKT7CIV (Docketing 7) issued. cc: Loesch, Sheryl L. cc: Cook, William J. cc: Anthony, John A. 08/24/2001 Briefing Notice Issued 08/24/2001 09/04/2001 Appearance Form Submitted: William J. Cook 09/04/2001 Transcript Order Form: Appellants- No transcript required 09/04/2001 Civil Appeal Statement Form- Appellants 09/05/2001 Probable Jurisdiction Noted

Party Eugene R. Clement Gay Ann Blomefield Neil Gillespie

Pending No No No No No

William John No Cook No No No

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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

http://pacer.ca11.uscourts.gov/CHMSDKTP.FWX

09/07/2001 Appearance Form Submitted: John A. Anthony 09/28/2001 Certificate of Readiness Appellant's Brief Filed: Appellants-Clement, Eugene R., Blomefield, 10/03/2001 Gay Ann, and Gillespie, Neil (Atty: William J. Cook) Record Excerpts: Appellant-Clement, Eugene R. (Atty: William J. 10/03/2001 Cook) 11/09/2001 Joint Stipulation to Dismiss Appeal with Prejudice The parties joint stipulation for dismissal of this appeal with prejudice, which is construed as a motion to dismiss this appeal with prejudice, 12/07/2001 with the parties bearing their own costs and attorney fees, is GRANTED(JLE/RB).j DIS-4 (Dismissal 4 Letter) issued. cc: Cook, William J. cc: Anthony, 12/07/2001 John A. To: Loesch, Sheryl L. 12/07/2001 CASE CLOSED

John A. Anthony Neil Gillespie Eugene R. Clement

No No No No No No

No No

PACER Service Center

Transaction Receipt
04/05/2012 14:12:01 PACER Login: Description: Billable Pages: ng0053 docket sheet 4 Client Code: Case Number: Cost: njg 01-14761-AA 0.40

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Holland + Kntght

Tel

813 227 8500

Holland & Knight LLP 100 North Tampa Street. Suite 4100 Tampa. FL 33602-3644 www.hklaw.com

Fax 813 229 0134

Charles L. Stutts 8132276466 charles.stutts@hklaw.com

February 13, 2007

VIAFEDEX Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 11S th Loop Ocala, FL 34481 Re: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., et al.; Case No. OS-CA-720S

Dear Mr. Gillespie: Amscot Corporation has asked me to respond to your letter of February 10, 2007 in which you request that Mr. Ian MacKechnie, President of Amscot, agree to his deposition in the above-referenced matter. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in 2001 dismissed all claims brought by you, Eugene R. Clement and Gay Ann Blomefield, individually and on behalf of others, against AnlSCOt in connection with its deferred deposit transactions. This former action is, of course, at the heart of your pending action against Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Mr. MacKechnie views the prior litigation as closed, and neither he nor others at Amscot have any interest in voluntarily submitting to deposition or otherwise participating in the pending matter. Accordingly, Mr. MacKechnie nlust decline your request. Please contact me if you have questions or care to discuss the matter. Sincerely yours, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP

:PI
cc: Ian MacKechnie
Atlanta Bethesda Boston Chicago Fort Lauderdale Jacksonville Los Angeles
Miami New York Northern Virginia Orlando Portland San Francisco
Tallahassee Tampa Washington. D.C. West Palm Beach
Beijing Caracas* Helsinki* Mexico City Tel Aviv* Tokyo *Representative Office

BARKER, RODEMS
CHRIS A. BARKER RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS WILLIAM ]. COOK

& COOK
Telephone 813/489~lOOl Facsimile 813/489~l008

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100

Tampa, Florida 33602

December 13, 2006

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115 th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Dear Neil: As you know, I called you on Decen1ber 12, 2006 to schedule hearings before Judge Isom on February 7,2007. You did not answer, so I left you a voice mail. Later that afternoon, you sent a letter to me by facsimile. In it, you claim to be unavailable February 7 and that you "hope to have representation within 30 days." You have made that assertion for several months now, without retaining counsel, and I cannot delay this proceeding any further on your unfulfilled promises of retaining counsel. You also state in your letter that I have "threatened the lawyers that were helping" you, which is completely unfounded. I will address that issue below. Judge Isom has all day on February 5, 2007 open, and we could resolve all pending motions, except for your motion for summary judgment, on that date. I left you a voice mail on this today. As has Judge Nielsen, I have endured for several months now disparaging remarks from you, false allegations, attacks on my credibility and otherwise boorish behavior. I have not responded to much of it because I recognize that you are a bitter man who apparently has been victimized by your own poor choices in life. You also claim to have mental or psychological problems, of which I have never seen documentation. However, your behavior in this case has been so abnormal that I would not disagree with your assertions of mental problems. I have maintained courtesy in every meeting with you, including a warm sentiment following a hearing -- only to be accused after that of "taunting" you. I intend to continue treating you with the same dignity and respect as I would opposing counsel in any other case; however, I have First Amendment rights, too. I am not obligated to accept your false statements, disparaging remarks, attacks on my credibility and the other tactics you have used in this case. I want to ensure that you understand my position, and so I find it necessary now to write to correct the record.

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie December 13,2006 Page 2

As for your claims that I "threatened the lawyers" that is simply false. I forwarded bye-mail portions of your October 18,2006 to Ms. Jenkins, Ms. Buchholz and Mr. Snyder, and stated "Neil Gillespie has filed a letter with Judge Richard Nielsen, and has attributed comments to the three of you. As an officer of the Court, I believe I have a duty to advise you of this. Please review pages 8-10 of the attached letter. Should any of you desire the complete document, with attachments, please advise." I have received no reply. In fact, the first confirmation that my letter had been received by these three attorneys was your December 12 facsimile letter. Let me explain why I sent the portions of the letter to them. Your tactic of naming these three lawyers as people you had spoken to, and then attributing statements to them anonymously and en masse is very damaging to them professionally. I sent the portions of the October 18, 2006 letter to them so that they could review it and do whatever they felt necessary. I also sent it to them because I questioned the veracity of your letter. I considered four possibilities about the statements you attributed to them anonymously: First, you may be lying. Second, you may be taking some or all of the statements out of context. Third, you may be paraphrasing and changing the meaning of the actual statements. Fourth, one or all of these attorneys may have never said anything to you, but were being used by you to endorse statements that you would later use to attempt to recuse Judge Nielsen. I also disagree that my actions have harmed your ability to hire counsel. The primary problem is that your case is weak. You are essentially claiming in this action that our law firm breached its contract with you by not paying you a portion of the attorneys' fees earned in the Amscot case. Every attorney knows -- or should know -- that the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar and the caselaw prohibit splitting attorneys' fees with a nonlawyer. It is also clear by reviewing the Closing Statement and your letters to us that you knew that Amscot was paying all of your attorneys' fees and that you would not have to pay any portion of your settlement for attorneys' fees and costs. In this case, you received 100% of your settlement, not 60%, and Amscot paid all of your attorneys' fees and costs. No one has ever rendered an opinion that your case has any merit. You misunderstood the meaning of a denial of a motion to dismiss. It is not a comment on the merits. In fact, the Court is required to accept all of your allegations as true. That requirement disappears after the motion to dismiss is resolved. Now, you are required to prove your specious allegations. Any rational attorney looking at this situation would not take this case on a contingency fee basis and would instead require you to pay them by the hour. You, apparently, from your comments to me and in court filings, are unwilling to pay an attorney fairly for the work that would need to be done. In fact, you even moved the Court to have an

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie December 13, 2006 Page 3

attorney appointed for you at the government's expense. Of course, there is no provision under the ADA for appointment of counsel, but the fact that you believe the government should foot the bill for you to file baseless lawsuits is entirely consistent with your actions in this case and past cases. So, in addition to your case's lack of merit, you are cheap and not willing to pay the required hourly rates for representation. Yet, you have had no problem paying filing fees for this baseless lawsuit, the court reporters to transcribe hearings and our telephone calls, and for the frivolous appeal of the discovery order. Another major problem, I gather, in hiring attorneys is your extortion of your former attorneys by threatening to file a Florida Bar complaint if they do not split portions of their earned fees with you. In fact, you have filed three grievances against Bill Cook in connection with this matter -- all of which were dismissed, meaning your allegations were unfounded. Rhetorically, why would an attorney wish to represent you given your past actions against other attorneys? Additionally, any reasonable attorney would find your conduct in this case to be reprehensible. 1. You have routinely violated the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, only to claim that pro se litigants are entitled to special treatment. At every hearing, I recall Judge Nielsen had to advise you to follow the procedural rules and protocol. As I have pointed out with citations of authority, the law in Florida is clear: You are expected to follow the rules of procedure, and you are not entitled to special treatment. When I have cited the law to you, you have told me not to do so. You threatened to "slam me up against the wall." After that, I had to request a bailiff to attend the hearings. You claimed I "taunted" you when, after a hearing, I wished you well. You have recorded a telephone conversation without my permission. I assume your research skills have led you to the statutes and caselaw on recording telephone conversation without permission. In fact, you only filed a portion of the transcript of our very first telephone conversation and we both know why: You never told me you were recording it. You represented to the Court that I "threatened" you, and the comment on which you based it was my comment to you that your libeling of my clients was unnecessary, and that act would cause you to have to pay. Which, it will. You have accused me of perjury.

2.

3.

4.

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie December 13,2006 Page 4

5.

You have filed defenses to the counterclaim that are nonsensical, and yet you claimed to be well-qualified to represent yourself when I moved for sanctions and asked the Court to require you to hire counsel. You took a contradictory position and moved to have an attorney appointed for you because you were not qualified or able to represent yourself, citing your disability, without proof, and a federal law that does not even address the appointment of counsel in a civil action. In one hearing, when Judge Nielsen asked you for authority, you replied with words to the effect that you have no training in the law. You have portrayed yourself as the victim when it suits you and the able advocate when it suits you. You failed to respond to discovery, forcing me to file a motion to compel, which was granted. You refused to comply with that Order, filed a frivolous appeal, which was dismissed, and then petitioned for writ of certiorari, which was also dismissed. When I filed a motion for an Order to Show Cause on the discovery Order, you claimed to be pursuing coverage of the counterclaim by an insurance company. You asked for a continuance of the hearing on that basis. We contacted the insurer's claims adjuster and negotiated a very favorable settlement for you of the counterclaim, and when you found out, you withdrew the claim, thereby preventing the counterclaim from being resolved. Facing an imminent hearing on your contumacious disregard for the Court's July 24, 2006 discovery Order after your appeal of it was denied, you decided to "judge shop" and attacked Judge Nielsen to force him to recuse himself. In doing so, you cited unrelated, irrelevant issu~s and atternpted to bait him with disparaging and caustic remarks, even though he was polite and respectful towards you at all times, allowed you to submit additional argument when you came to the first hearing unprepared, and gave you additional time to find an attorney when we were scheduled to hear on October 4, 2006 your defiance of the July 24, 2006 discovery Order. No good deed goes unpunished, right? You succeeded in having Judge Nielsen step down. There is no effective process for challenging his recusal or having a Court rule on the motive of your motion to disqualify him, but if you were an attorney, the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar would require me to file a grievance and you would likely have faced severe sanctions.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie December 13, 2006 Page 5

Neil, we offered to settle with you without pursuing our right to attorneys' fees and costs, as ordered by Judge Nielsen in tIle July 24, 2006 Order. You rejected it. We offered to settle the counterclaim with your insurer. You withdrew the insurance claim. You are spending a lot of money on filing fees, court reporter fees, and gasoline to hand-deliver motions and whatnot. It appears you want your day in court, so to speak. Judge Isom has all day on February 5, 2007 open. I urge you to agree to set the hearings on that date. We can then move forward and bring this case to resolution.
I hope this clarifies my position on matters, and I look forward to working with you.

RCR/so

-Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 Gillespie - 05.5422

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P'TNEY BOWES

: 02 1P .01.: 0002570237 DEC 13 2006 r:: MAILED FROM ZIP CODE 33606

$ 000.63

Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115 lh Loop Ocala Florida 34481

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TIllRTEENTH JUDICIAL CmCUIT OF

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY,
CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
PLAINTIFF,

vs.
DIVISION" F " BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida Corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK, DEFENDANTS.

--------------_-----:/
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKE TIDS CAUSE came on for hearing on September 26,2005, upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike, and counsel for the parties being present and having made arguments and the court having considered the Plaintiffs Rebuttal to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Rebuttal to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike and the Plaintiff's Second Rebuttal to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike, and the court being advised fully in the premises, it is thereupon, ADJUDGED as follows: 1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike is granted in part and denied in part. 2. Those portions of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike seeking to dismiss the Complaint are denied. Defendant shall have fifteen days from the date of this order within which to file responsive pleadings.

or,

36

//1

3. Those portions of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike seeking to strike portions of the Complaint is granted in the following particulars: a. Paragraphs 47, 48, 49 and 50 of the Complaint are stricken. b. Exhibit 8 to the Complaint is stricken. c. All references to or demands for punitive damages are stricken or failure to comply with 768.72 of the Florida Statutes.
ORDERED in Chambers, at Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida, this

day of

JAN 13 2006

, 2o_.
RICHARD A. NIELSEN CIRCUIT JUDGE

Copies furnished to: Ryan C. Rodems, Esquire 300 West Platt Street, Suite 150 Tampa, Florida 33606 Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115 th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

or'
f _

37

August 30, 2010

Mr. James Leanheart, Court Operations Supervisor United States District Court, MD of Florida, Ocala Division Golden-Collum Memorial Federal Building & US Courthouse 207 NW Second Street, Room 337 Ocala, Florida 34475-6666
Dear Mr. Learmeart:
In a two weeks or so I plan to file an Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) lawsuit in your court. This will be a pro se action since I cannot find counsel to represent me. The complaint may also allege other civil rights and constitutional claims, or other claims. In August 2005 I filed a pro se action in your court, Gillespie v. HSBC Bank et al, Case No. 5:05-CV-362-0C-WTH-GRJ. The proceedings were efficient and well managed.

Pursuant to local Rule 1.01(a) the Court may prescribe by administrative order procedures for electronic filing and related matters in civil and criminal cases. This is a request to file documents electronically if you believe this would be beneficial. I live in Oak. Run which is about 15 miles from the Court. It is not overly burdensome to mail or hand deliver documents to the Court. I have had a PACER account in good standing since 1999. Since this is an ADA lawsuit there are documents with my personal HIPAA protected medical information for the Court to consider, and perhaps attach to the complaint. Pursuant to local Rule 1.09 I may want to file under seal my personal HIPAA protected medical information, but that presents a dilemma when the complaint refers to this information, and to have it under seal may diminish my ADA claims. Any procedural guidance (not legal advice) you can provide would be appreciated. My ADA claims (and possibly other claims) involve documents in the state court record from the Circuit Civil Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit, including ADA accommodation requests, an ADA disability report prepared by my ADA advocate and designer, Dr. Karin Huffer, various Orders, motions, an amended complaint (150 pages), and an emergency motion to disqualify counsel (190 pages). What is the procedure for including or incorporating these numerous and sometimes large documents into my ADA and/or civil rights complaint? Thank you for your consideration.

11 . i e ie 8092 S 115th L op Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 854-7807 email: neilgillespie@mfi.net VIA US Certified Mail, RRR, Article No. 70100780 0000 8981 6504

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8/31/2010

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-2811 T ERRANCE P RUDE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D AVID A. C LARKE, JR., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 2:10-cv-00167-JPSJ.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.

S UBMITTED M ARCH 7, 2012D ECIDED M ARCH 27, 2012

Before P OSNER, W OOD , and T INDER, Circuit Judges. P OSNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff in this prisoners civil rights suit brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 complains that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by personnel of the Milwaukee County Jail. (He has a second, less substantial claim that we discuss at the end of the opinion.) He appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the four defendants, who are the Sheriff

No. 11-2811

of Milwaukee County, two County Inspectors who work at the jail, and a guard. The plaintiff is serving time in a Wisconsin state prison, but was transferred to the county jail on several occasions to enable him to attend court proceedings relating to a postconviction petition that he had filed. On the second and third stays, which lasted a week and 10 days respectively, the jail fed him only nutriloaf, pursuant to a new policy the jail had adopted of making nutriloaf the exclusive diet of prisoners who had been in segregation in prison at the time of their transfer to the jail, even if their behavior in the jail was exemplary. Nutriloaf (also spelled nutraloaf) is a badtasting food given to prisoners as a form of punishment (it is colloquially known as prison loaf or disciplinary loaf). See, e.g., Jeff Ruby, Dining Critic Tries Nutraloaf, the Prison Food for Misbehaving Inmates, Chicago Magazine, Sept. 2010, www.chicagomag.com/ChicagoMagazine/September-2010/Dining-Critic-Tries-Nutraloafthe-Prison-Food-for-Misbehaving-Inmates; Arin Greenwood, Taste-Testing Nutraloaf: The Prison Loaf That Just Might Be Unconstitutionally Bad, Slate, June 24, 2008, www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ politics/jurisprudence/2008/06/tastetesting_nutraloaf.html; Matthew Purdy, Our Towns: Whats Worse Than Solitary Confinement? Just Taste This, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 2002, www.nytimes.com/2002/08/04/nyregion/our-townsw h a t -s-w orse-th an -so lit a ry -c o n fin e m e n t -ju s t -t a st e this.html (all visited March 15, 2012).

No. 11-2811

On his third stay, after two days on the nutriloaf diet, the plaintiff began vomiting his meals and experiencing stomach pains and constipation. (He had vomited during the second stay as well.) He stopped eating nutriloaf and subsisted for the eight remaining days of his stay on bread and water (its unclear how he obtained the bread). He had weighed 168 pounds before his second and third stays at the jail, had lost either 5 or 6 pounds during the second stay, had not regained them, and by the end of the third stay was down to 154 pounds: he had lost 8.3 percent of his weight as a result of the two stays (and he had not been overweight at 168). A guard sent him to the infirmary after one of the vomiting incidents during his third stay, and the nurses there gave him antacids and a stool softener and one of them told him his weight loss was alarming. Upon his return to state prison he continued experiencing painful defecation and bloody stools, and he was diagnosed with an anal fissure that the defendants have not denied had developed while he was in the county jail. The defendants response to his suit has been contumacious, and we are surprised that the district judge did not impose sanctions. The defendants ignored the plaintiffs discovery demands, ignored the judges order that they comply with those demands, and continued their defiance even after the judge threatened to impose sanctions. But the judge failed to carry through on his threat, so the threat proved empty. The only evidence the defendants submitted in support of their motion for summary judgment was a

No. 11-2811

preposterous affidavit from a sheriffs officer who is also an assistant chief of a suburban Wisconsin fire department. The affidavit states only, so far as bears on the appeal, that Nutraloaf has been determined to be a nutritious substance for regular meals. The defendants made no effort to qualify him as an expert witness. As a lay witness, he was not authorized to offer hearsay evidence (has been determined to be . . . nutritious). No evidence was presented concerning the recipe for or ingredients of the nutriloaf that was served at the county jail during the plaintiffs sojourns there. Nutriloaf isnt a proprietary food like Hostess Twinkies but, like meatloaf or beef stew, a term for a composite food the recipe of which can vary from institution to institution, or even from day to day within an institution; nutriloaf could meet requirements for calories and protein one day yet be poisonous the next if, for example, made from leftovers that had spoiled. The recipe was among the items of information that the plaintiff sought in discovery and that the defendants refused to produce. Even an affidavit from an expert stating after a detailed chemical analysis that nutriloaf meets all dietary requirements would be worthless unless the expert knew and stated that nutriloaf invariably was made the same way in the institution. The assistant fire chiefs affidavit says no such thingand he was not an expert. In addition to stonewalling the plaintiff and the district judge, the defendants failed to file a brief in this

No. 11-2811

court and failed to respond to our order to show cause why they hadnt filed a brief. They seem to think that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over a county jail. Deliberate withholding of nutritious food or substitution of tainted or otherwise sickening food, with the effect of causing substantial weight loss, vomiting, stomach pains, and maybe an anal fissure (which is no fun at all, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anal_fissure (visited March 15, 2012)), or other severe hardship, would violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2011); Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2001); Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 1998). Not that all nutriloaf is unhealthful, though all is reputed to have an unpleasant taste. But we do not know the recipe for the nutriloaf that was served the plaintiff, or whether the ingredients were tainted or otherwise unhealthful, because of the defendants failure to comply with the plaintiffs discovery demands. The defendants decided to defy rather than to defend. The uncontradicted evidence is that other prisoners in the jail also vomited after eating the nutriloaf, and this suggests that it was indeed inedible. The only possible justification for the district courts rejection of the plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim, at this early stage of the litigation, is that he may not have sued the right defendants, since he can prevail against a defendant only by proving that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his health. The guard who sent him to the infirmary knew he had vomited, but

No. 11-2811

the guard sent him for medical attention and there is no suggestion that he was responsible for the composition of the nutriloaf or had any reason to suspect its ill effects until the plaintiff got sick. The nurses may have realized that the plaintiff would suffer seriously if he werent given a different diet, and maybe they should have done something other than just treat his symptoms, but they are not defendants. We dont know the precise role that any of the four defendantsthe sheriff, who runs the jail, the two inspectors, and the jail guard (whether he was the guard who sent the plaintiff to the infirmary or some other guard is another thing we dont know)played in making the plaintiff sick. He filed a grievance with the jail, although after his last sojourn there, when he was back in state prison with its adequate diet. The grievance states that the defendant inspectors had authorized the nutriloaf for the prisoners in the part of the jail in which the plaintiff was housed and that theyd done this pursuant to policy established by the defendant sheriff. Complaints filed by unrepresented prisoners are supposed to be construed liberally. E.g., McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2010). There are intimations in the record that jail officialswho may have included one or more of the named defendantswere aware of the plaintiffs plight, and it is apparent that nothing was done to replace the nutriloaf diet that was sickening him, though he was able somehow to obtain bread. The

No. 11-2811

record contains statements that he had tried to solve this problem by speaking with a [correctional officer], that after a second incident of vomiting he told officers again, that he was taken to the clinical office to be seen by a nurse (presumably guards took him there), that other inmates were vomiting their nutriloaf meals (which must have been observed by correctional officers), and that he had written the sheriff informing him about their vomiting. Adult vomiting other than because of illness or drunkenness is rarehealthy, sober adults do not vomit a meal just because it doesnt taste goodand if the plaintiff is being truthful there was a veritable epidemic of vomiting during his stay. A risk can be so obvious that a jury may reasonably infer actual knowledge on the part of the defendants. Hall v. Bennett, 379 F.3d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 2004); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842-43 (1994). The defendants have submitted no contrary evidence, once the inadmissible affidavit from the assistant fire chief is ruled out. It is a possible though certainly not an inevitable inference from the record (and from the defendants contumacy) that jail officials were aware that the nutriloaf being fed the prisoners when the plaintiff was there was sickening him yet decided to do nothing about it. That would be deliberate indifference to a serious health problem and thus state an Eighth Amendment claim. The dismissal of the suit was premature. Since the plaintiff has departed from the county jail and the case involves medical issues, we suggest that the district court request a lawyer to assist him in litigating his

No. 11-2811

claim. The court should also consider imposing sanctions on the defendants. The plaintiffs other claim is that the defendant jail guard offered him a sandwich (and not of nutriloaf, either) if he would spy on other prisoners, and that he had refused. Bribing prisoners in a nonfederal jail to inform on other prisoners does not violate any federal law of which were aware. The failure to give the plaintiff the sandwich could not be thought cruel and unusual punishment for his refusing to take the bribe, for it made him no worse off than he would have been had no bribe been offeredstuck with a nutriloaf diet. The second claim adds nothing to the first, so we affirm its rejection. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We order the defendants to show cause within 14 days of the date of this order why they should not be sanctioned for contumacious conduct in this court. If they ignore this order to show cause like the last one, they will find themselves in deep trouble.

3-27-12

For One Prisoner, Nutriloaf Diet May Violate Eighth Amendment, Posner ...

http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/for_one_prisoner_nutriloaf_die...

Constitutional Law

For One Prisoner, Nutriloaf Diet May Violate Eighth Amendment, Posner Opinion Says
Posted Mar 28, 2012 6:25 AM CDT By Debra Cassens Weiss A federal appeals court has reinstated a lawsuit filed by a prisoner who claimed the nutriloaf he ate in the Milwaukee County Jail was cruel and unusual punishment. The opinion (PDF) by Judge Richard Posner of the Chicago-based 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals suggested appointment of counsel for the inmate, Terrance Prude, who vomited and suffered an anal fissure after eating nutriloaf at the jail during a stay to attend court proceedings. Jail officials gave Prude bread and water as a substitute, and his weight dropped from 168 to 154 after two stays at the facility. Other inmates at the jail also vomited after eating nutriloaf. Withholding nutritious food or substituting sickening food, causing substantial weight loss, vomiting and maybe an anal fissure would violate the Eighth Amendment, Posner said. He cited Wikipedia for the proposition that such a fissure is no fun at all. The defendants, including Sheriff David Clarke Jr., did not disclose the nutriloaf recipe in response to discovery demands. No evidence was presented concerning the recipe for or ingredients of the nutriloaf that was served at the county jail during the plaintiffs sojourns there, Posner wrote. Nutriloaf isnt a proprietary food like Hostess Twinkies but, like meatloaf or beef stew, a term for a composite food the recipe of which can vary from institution to institution, or even from day to day within an institution; nutriloaf could meet requirements for calories and protein one day yet be poisonous the next if, for example, made from leftovers that had spoiled. Posner said the defendants ignored discovery demands and the trial judges order that they comply. The defendants also failed to file an appellate brief and failed to respond to an order to show cause whey they didnt do so. They seem to think that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over a county jail, Posner said. The appeals court issued an order to show cause why the defendants should not be sanctioned for contumacious conduct and warned they will find themselves in deep trouble if they fail to comply. The case is Prude v. Clarke. Hat tip to How Appealing. Copyright 2012 American Bar Association. All rights reserved.

4
1 of 1

3/31/2012 6:30 PM

Torture - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torture

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Torture is the act of inflicting severe pain (whether physical or psychological) as a means of punishment, revenge, forcing information or a confession, or simply as an act of cruelty. Throughout history, torture has taken on a wide variety of forms, and has often been used as a method of political re-education, interrogation, punishment, and coercion. In addition to statesponsored torture, individuals or groups may be motivated to inflict torture on others for similar reasons to those of a state; however, the motive for torture can also be for the sadistic gratification of the torturer. Torture is prohibited under international law and the domestic laws of most countries in the 21st century. It is considered to be a violation of human rights, and is declared to be unacceptable by Article 5 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Signatories of the Third Geneva Convention and Fourth Geneva Convention officially agree not to torture prisoners in armed conflicts. Torture is also prohibited by the United Nations Convention Against Torture, which has been ratified by 147 countries.[1]

A variety of torture instruments including, at right, the iron maiden of Nuremberg.

National and international legal prohibitions on torture derive from a consensus that torture and similar ill-treatment are immoral, as well as impractical.[2] Despite these international conventions, organizations that monitor abuses of human rights (e.g. Amnesty International, the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims) report widespread use condoned by states in many regions of the world.[3] Amnesty International estimates that at least 81 world governments currently practice torture, some of them openly.[4]

1 Definitions 2 History 2.1 Antiquity 2.2 Middle Ages 2.3 Early modern period 2.4 Recent times 2.5 Historical methods of execution and capital punishment 2.6 Etymology 3 Religious prohibitions 3.1 Roman Catholic Church 4 Laws against torture 4.1 United Nations Convention Against Torture 4.1.1 Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture 4.2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 4.3 Geneva Conventions

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4/5/2012 2:25 PM

Psychology of torture - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychology_of_torture

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Torture, whether physical or psychological or both, depends on complicated interpersonal relationships between those who torture, those tortured, bystanders and others. Torture also involves deeply personal processes in those tortured, in those who torture and in others. These interacting psychological relationships, processes and dynamics form the basis for the psychology of torture.

1 The torture process to the torturer 1.1 Motivation to torture 2 See also 3 References 4 Further reading 5 External links

Motivation to torture
Research over the past 50 years, starting with the Milgram experiment, suggests that under the right circumstances and with the appropriate encouragement and setting, most people can be encouraged to actively torture others.[1] John Conroy: When torture takes place, people believe they are on the high moral ground, that the nation is under threat and they are the front line protecting the nation, and people will be grateful for what they are doing.[2] Confidence in the efficacy of torture is based upon the behaviorist theory of human behavior.[3] Stages of torture mentality include: Reluctant or peripheral participation Official encouragement: As the Stanford prison experiment and Milgram experiment show, many people will follow the direction of an authority figure (such as a superior officer) in an official setting (especially if presented as mandatory), even if they have personal uncertainty. The main motivations for this appear to be fear of loss of status or respect, and the desire to be seen as a "good citizen" or "good subordinate". Peer encouragement: to accept torture as necessary, acceptable or deserved, or to comply from a wish to not reject peer group beliefs. Dehumanization: seeing victims as objects of curiosity and experimentation, where pain becomes just another test to see how it affects the victim. Disinhibition: socio-cultural and situational pressures may cause torturers to undergo a lessening of moral inhibitions and as a result act in ways not normally countenanced by law, custom and conscience.

1 of 2

4/4/2012 8:45 PM

U.S. Army and CIA interrogation manuals - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KUBARK

After this 1992 investigation, the Department of Defense discontinued the use of the manuals, directed their recovery to the extent practicable, and destroyed the copies in the field. U.S. Southern Command advised governments in Latin America that the manuals contained passages that did not represent U.S. government policy, and pursued recovery of the manuals from the governments and some individual students.[10] Notably, David Addington and Dick Cheney retained personal copies of the training manuals.[11] Soon after The army created FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation manual. This was used by the U.S. Army until 2007.

7
The first manual, "KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation," dated July 1963, is the source of much of the material in the second manual. KUBARK was a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency cryptonym for the CIA itself.[13] The cryptonym KUBARK appears in the title of a 1963 CIA document KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation which describes interrogation techniques, including, among other things, "coercive counterintelligence interrogation of resistant sources". This is the oldest manual, and promotes the use of abusive techniques, as exemplified by two references to the use of electric shock.[13] Techniques discussed in School of the Americas training manuals, 1987-1991:
[12][5][1]

Motivation by fear Payment of bounties for enemy dead False imprisonment Use of truth serum Torture Execution Extortion Kidnapping and arresting a targets family members

The second manual, "Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual - 1983," was used in at least seven U.S. training courses conducted in Latin American countries, including Honduras, between 1982 and 1987. According to a declassified 1989 report prepared for the Senate intelligence committee, the 1983 manual was developed from notes of a CIA interrogation course in Honduras.[4]

Both manuals deal exclusively with interrogation.[14][15] Both manuals have an entire chapter devoted to "coercive techniques." These manuals recommend arresting suspects early in the morning by surprise, blindfolding them, and stripping them naked. Suspects should be held incommunicado and should be deprived of any kind of normal routine in eating and sleeping. Interrogation rooms should be windowless, soundproof, dark and without toilets. The manuals advise that torture techniques can backfire and that the threat of pain is often more effective than pain itself. The manuals describe coercive techniques to be used "to induce psychological regression in the subject by bringing a superior outside force to bear on his will to resist." These techniques include prolonged constraint, prolonged exertion, extremes of heat, cold, or moisture, deprivation of food or sleep, disrupting routines, solitary confinement, threats of pain, deprivation of sensory stimuli, hypnosis, and use of drugs or placebos.[5][16] Between 1984 and 1985, after congressional committees began questioning training techniques being used by the CIA in Latin America, the 1983 manual went through substantial revision. In 1985 a page advising against using coercive techniques was inserted at the front of Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual. Handwritten changes were also introduced haphazardly into the text. For example, "While we do not stress the use of coercive techniques, we do want to make you aware of them and the proper way to use them," has been altered to, "While we deplore the use of coercive techniques, we do want to make you aware of them so that you may avoid them." (p. A-2) But the entire chapter on coercive techniques is still provided with some items
2 of 6

4/4/2012 8:51 PM

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Filing Information
Document Number P00000075354 FEI/EIN Number Date Filed State Status 593672653 08/04/2000 FL ACTIVE

Principal Address
501 EAST KENNEDY BOULEVARD, STE. 790 TAMPA FL 33602 US Changed 07/07/2011

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501 EAST KENNEDY BOULEVARD, STE. 790 TAMPA FL 33602 US Changed 07/07/2011

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BARKER, CHRIS A 501 EAST KENNEDY BOULEVARD SUITE 790 TAMPA FL 33602 US Address Changed: 01/06/2012

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Name & Address Title P BARKER, CHRIS A 501 EAST KENNEDY BOULEVARD, SUITE 790 TAMPA FL 33602 US Title VP RODEMS, RYAN C 501 EAST KENNEDY BOULEVARD, SUITE 790 TAMPA FL 33602 US Title ST

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www.sunbiz.org - Department of State

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COOK, WILLIAM J 501 EAST KENNEDY BOULEVARD, SUITE 790 TAMPA FL 33602 US

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No: _______________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER VS. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS ________________________ APPENDIX VOLUME F PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ______________________

Appendix F

Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, Conflict of Interest and ADA denial by Florida Judge Claudia R. Isom, in case 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough Co. In Support Of: Consolidated Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation, August 6, 2012 Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, et al., 12-11213-C
The Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest

July 30, 2012

Appeal Nos. 12-11213-C and 12-11028-B Dear Mr. Ley: Earlier today I filed in the District Court a Motion To Apply Funds Toward Filing Fees, in support of IFP fee waiver. A copy was mailed today to the Circuit Court by first class mail. A second courtesy copy is enclosed here. I believe the ruling on this motion affects all pro se filers who are denied e-filing. Please find enclosed for filing Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, with Appendix, Conflict of Interest and ADA denial by Florida Judge Claudia R. Isom in case 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough Co., submitted in support of Consolidated Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation. On July 27, 2012 I wrote you that my Consolidated Amended Motionfor Disability Accommodation would be submitted today, but it has been delayed due to disability and declining health. I plan to submit my disability request by Friday August 3, 2012. I regret any
inconvenienc;.~

caused to the Court by my delay.

Thank you for your consideration. SinCer!,

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eil J. ille ie 092 SW 5th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Enclosures

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Appendix F

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, ESTATE OF PENELOPE GILLESPIE, CASE NO.: 12-11213-C Appellants/Plaintiffs, vs. THIRTEENTH JUDICAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, et al. Respondents/Defendants. __________________________________/ Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie Conflict of Interest and ADA denial by Florida Judge Claudia R. Isom in case 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough Co. Submitted in Support of Motion for Disability Accommodation Neil J. Gillespie, under oath, testifies as follows: 1. My name is Neil J. Gillespie, and I am over eighteen years of age. This affidavit CASE NO.: 12-11028-B

is given on personal knowledge unless otherwise expressly stated. 2. I am disabled as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42

U.S.C. 12101 et seq., the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et. seq., and 825.101(4), Florida Statutes. 3. I filed May 27, 2011 Verified Notice of Filing Disability Information of Neil J.

Gillespie in Hillsborough Circuit Court that shows I have Depression, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Diabetes Type II Adult Onset, Traumatic Brain Injury, and Velopharyngeal Incompetence. I also have impaired hearing, especially under stress. 4. I was a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit against AMSCOT Corporation (Amscot).

Jonathan Alpert filed the Amscot lawsuit December 9, 1999 as partner of the firm Alpert,

Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. Substitute counsel Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. (BRC) and William J. Cook (Cook) represented me beginning December 12, 2000. The Amscot lawsuit was dismissed August 1, 2001. BRC and Cook appealed. 5. I was an appellant in the appeal, Eugene R. Clement, Gay Ann Blomefield, and

Neil Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corporation, No. 01-14761-AA, U.S. Eleventh Circuit. Amscot settled for business reasons before the appeal was decided. The Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement (Exhibit 1) attached to the Joint Stipulation For Dismissal With Prejudice shows persons relevant to this Affidavit: Alpert, Jonathan L., Esq. Amscot Corporation Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Barker, Chris A., Esq. Cook, William J., Esq. Gillespie, Neil MacKechnie, Ian Rodems, Ryan Christopher, Esq. This stipulation was not provided to me by my former lawyers. I obtained it from the Court in April 2006 with a records request. (Exhibit 1). 6. An Order filed December 7, 2001 granted dismissal of appeal no. 01-14761-AA

with prejudice, with the parties bearing their own costs and attorneys fees. (Exhibit 2). 7. BRC and Cook defrauded me of $6,224.78, my share of the settlement in Amscot.

Cook lied to me about a claim of $50,000 in court-awarded fees and costs shown on the closing statement. (Exhibit 3). There was no such award. The $50,000 was actually part of the total settlement, subject to either an unsigned contingent fee agreement, or Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(f) on contingent fees. The amount stolen by BRC and Cook was later found to be $7,143.68. I filed a complaint with the Florida Bar against Cook for violation of ethics rules. The Florida Bar failed to properly adjudicate my complaint.

8.

On August 11, 2005 I sued, pro se, BRC and Cook to recover $6,224.78. The case

was caption was Neil J. Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. and William J. Cook, Case No. 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough County, Florida. BRC partner Ryan Christopher Rodems defended his firm BRC and law partner Cook. 9. On January 13, 2006 Judge Richard A. Nielsen found by Order that I established

a cause of action for fraud and breach of contract against BRC and Cook. (Exhibit 4). On information and belief, partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible for the fraud or negligence of another partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965). There was an actual conflict of interest in Mr. Rodems and Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA representing themselves in this case. 10. On January 19, 2006, BRC and Cook countersued me for Libel over a letter I

wrote to Ian MacKechnie, president of Amscot, about the prior litigation. 11. On February 4, 2006 I moved to disqualify Mr. Rodems and BRC as counsel. On

information and belief, disqualification was required by the holding of McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. McPartland has been a mandatory authority on disqualification in Tampa since entered June 30, 1995 by Judge Kovachevich, U.S. District Court, M.D. of Florida, Tampa Division: [1] Under Florida law, attorneys must avoid appearance of professional impropriety, and any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disqualification. [2] To prevail on motion to disqualify counsel, movant must show existence of prior attorney-client relationship and that the matters in pending suit are substantially related to the previous matter or cause of action. [3] In determining whether attorney-client relationship existed, for purposes of disqualification of counsel from later representing opposing party, a long-term or complicated relationship is not required, and court must focus on subjective expectation of client that he is seeking legal advice. [5] For matters in prior representation to be substantially related

to present representation for purposes of motion to disqualify counsel, matters need only be akin to present action in way reasonable persons would understand as important to the issues involved. [7] Substantial relationship between instant case in which law firm represented defendant and issues in which firm had previously represented plaintiffs created irrebuttable presumption under Florida law that confidential information was disclosed to firm, requiring disqualification. [8] Disqualification of even one attorney from law firm on basis of prior representation of opposing party necessitates disqualification of firm as a whole, under Florida law. McPartland cites State Farm Mut. Auto. Co. v. K.A.W., 75 So.2d 630, 633 (Fla.1991), a Florida Supreme Court case. In 2006 I did not know about the McPartland case. I found McPartland and other similar cases in 2010. 12. On March 3, 2006 Mr. Rodems called me at home about the motion to disqualify

him and an argument ensued. During the phone call Mr. Rodems ridiculed my speech, and threatened me. Rodems said you will pay for writing a letter to Ian MacKechnie, president of Amscot. All calls on home office business telephone extension (352) 8547807 are recorded for quality assurance purposes pursuant to the business use exemption of Florida Statutes, chapter 934, section 934.02(4)(a)(1) and the holding of Royal Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 215 (11th Cir. 1991). 13. On March 6, 2006 Mr. Rodems intentionally disrupted the tribunal with a sworn

affidavit under the penalty of perjury that falsely placed the name of the Judge Nielsen in Defendants Verified Request For Bailiff And For Sanctions. Mr. Rodems falsely named Judge Nielsen in an exact quote attributed to me. Upon information and belief, it was a strategic maneuver to gain an unfair advantage. 14. A voice recording of the call impeached Mr. Rodems sworn affidavit. Kirby

Rainsberger, Legal Advisor to the Tampa Police Department, investigated the matter and wrote February 22, 2010 that Mr. Rodems was not right and not accurate in representing

to the Court as an exact quote language that clearly was not an exact quote. The investigation did not show any wrongdoing by me. 15. Beginning on March 3, 2006, Mr. Rodems has directed, with malice aforethought,

a course of harassing conduct toward me that aggravated my disabilities, caused substantial emotional distress and served legitimate purpose. 16. On March 20, 2006 I requested from Mr. Rodems pursuant to Bar Rule 4-

1.5(f)(5) settlement documents at the heart of the lawsuit. The documents were in dispute as to their existence or whether the documents were signed. (Exhibit 5). 17. On March 27, 2006 Mr. Rodems sent me a hostile email in response to my Bar

Rule 4-1.5(f)(5) request, with his typical false reference to threats of physical violence. (Exhibit 6). Mr. Rodems wrote: I am in receipt of your letter dated March 20, 2006. Each of the items requested have been previously sent to you, and you have attached most of them to your initial complaint filed with the Florida Bar. Given your threats of physical violence against me during our last telephone conversation, and given that you have copies of these documents, your letter appears to be an effort to harass us. Therefore, I contacted the Florida Bar to seek advice on how to respond. I was advised that because the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar do not address abuse of the rules by former clients, the most practical response would be to send the documents to you again. They are attached in pdf format. In the event you make this request again, I have fulfilled my obligations. If this format is not to your liking, you may come to our office any business day between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. to inspect the documents; however, we request 24 hour notice so that we may arrange to have security present. 18. On April 25, 2006 my motion to disqualify Mr. Rodems as counsel was heard.

Judge Richard Nielsen failed to disqualify Mr. Rodems as required by McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. At the time I was not aware of McPartland. Upon information and belief, Mr. Rodems violated FL Bar Rule 4-3.3(c) when he failed to disclose McPartland to Judge Nielsen:

61. Mr. Rodems violated FL Bar Rule 4-3.3(c) when he failed to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, in this instance Gillespie pro se. Rodems failed to disclose McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, or U.S. v. Culp, 934 F.Supp. 394, legal authority directly adverse to the position of his client. McPartland and Culp are just two of a number of cases Rodems failed to disclose, see this motion, and the Table of Cases that accompanies this motion. Counsel has a responsibility to fully inform the court on applicable law whether favorable or adverse to position of client so that the court is better able to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before it. Newberger v. Newberger, 311 So.2d 176. As evidenced by this motion, legal authority directly adverse to the position of Mr. Rodems and BRC was not disclosed to the court by Rodems. Paragraph 61, Emergency Motion To Disqualify Defendants Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. July 9, 2010, also Exhibit 10 to the Complaint in U.S. District Court, M.D. Fla., case no. 5:10-cv-503-oc. 19. On April 25, 2006 I filed Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment. It was set

for a hearing before Judge Nielsen August 1, 2006, at 3:45 p.m. Mr. Rodems objected by email the same day. I canceled the hearing with the intention of resetting the hearing, and hiring counsel to argue the motion. My motion for summary judgment was never heard. 20. On April 25, 2006 Mr. Rodems waited outside Judge Nielsens chambers to taunt

me following a hearing. At the next hearing June 28, 2006 I requested protection from the Court to prevent a reoccurrence. Judge Nielsen did not provide the requested protection: (Transcript, June 28, 2006, page 21, beginning at line 20) MR. GILLESPIE: Thank you, Judge. And, Your Honor, would you ask that Mr. Rodems leave the area. The last time he left, he was taunting me in the hallway and I dont want that to happen today. THE COURT: Well, you can stay next to my bailiff until he goes home and then you can decide what you want to do, sir. 21. Initially I had a good working relationship with Judge Nielsen and his judicial

assistant Myra Gomez. After Rodems stunt Judge Nielsen did not manage the

case lawfully, favored Defendants in rulings, responded to me sarcastically, and sanctioned me for failing to comply with Mr. Rodems discovery requests, even though I complied with the discovery requests to the best of my ability. I moved to disqualify Judge Nielsen, which he denied, but recused himself sua sponte November 22, 2006. 22. Upon information and believe, the right to bodily integrity and security of person

includes mental integrity, that is, freedom from mental and psychological abuse. The right to safely pursue justice is a fundamental civil right that underscores a litigants right not to be subjected to physical, sexual, mental or emotional violence inside or outside the court, either by private attorneys or by judges and people acting on the part of the state. The intentional infliction of emotional distress is a tort. Litigants in civil proceedings must be free from mental or emotional violence, which may be a form of torture, or their Constitutionally protected rights, including due process, are rendered meaningless. 23. 24. My case was reassigned to Judge Claudia R. Isom November 22, 2006. On December 3, 2006 I read a notice on Judge Isoms web page that advised that

the judge had a number of relatives practicing law and If you feel there might be a conflict in your case based on the above information, please raise the issue so it can be resolved prior to me presiding over any matters concerning your case. One relative listed was husband A. Woodson Woody Isom, Jr.. (Exhibit 7).

25.

On December 15, 2006 I submitted Plaintiffs Motion For Disclosure of Conflict,

and moved for disclosure of conflict with the Court or the Court's relatives, or any other conflict of interest in this case. My motion noted the following possible conflicts: Plaintiff learned that Defendant William J. Cook apparently paid $100.00 by check to Woody Isom on or about July 2, 2002. (3, page 2)

Jonathan Alpert paid $150.00 by check to Woody Isom on or about August 22, 2002, and $100.00 by check to The Honorable Claudia R. Isom on or about May 1, 2002. (4, page 2) My motion informed Judge Isom of the significance of Jonathan Alpert to this case: Defendants are Mr. Alpert's protges and former law partners, and the contract that forms the basis of this lawsuit was entered into on November 3, 2000, between Plaintiff and the law firm Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. (4, page 2) On January 5, 2007 I served Plaintiffs Amended Motion for Disclosure of Conflict. 26. On December 12, 2006 I submitted Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration,

Discovery, to reconsider a July 24, 2006 Order by Judge Richard Nielsen for discovery sanctions against me. 27. On December 12, 2006 I submitted Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration,

Disqualify Counsel, to reconsider Judge Nielsen's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Mr. Rodems and BRC) entered May 12, 2006. 28. On December 12th and December 13, 2006 Mr. Rodems left voice mail messages

on my cell phone. (Exhibit 8.4). Rodems called me cheap and other such: (Transcript, December 13, 2006, page 6, beginning at line 24) 24 I would also point out that the problem that 25 you t re having in retaining counsel is probably more (Transcript, December 13, 2006, page 7, beginning at line 1) 1 likely related to the fact that you are cheap and 2 you don't want to pay the attorneys what they're 3 usual hours rates are for litigation like this, 19. ..And then on top of all 20. that you always fall back on your medical 21. condition, which I have never seen any 22. documentation of, that you always allude to that in 23. your Court fillings. And quite frankly, you play 24. the victim when it suits you and you play the

25. advocate when it suits you 29. On December 13, 2006 Mr. Rodems sent me a five page letter of insults,

including ridicule of mental illness: (Exhibit 8.3) I recognize that you are a bitter man who apparently has been victimized by your own poor choices in life. You also claim to have mental or psychological problems, of which I have never seen documentation. However, your behavior in this case has been so abnormal that I would not disagree with your assertions of mental problems. (P1, 3) So, in addition to your case's lack of merit, you are cheap and not willing to pay the required hourly rates for representation. (P3, 2). 30. On December 27, 2006 I responded to Mr. Rodems letter. (Exhibit 7.1). Dear Mr. Rodems, This is in response to your ranting phone message of December 13, 2006, and your subsequent five page diatribe of even date. It appears you have lost perspective in this matter. Both contacts are evidence supporting your disqualification as counsel. As for the substance of your communications, your wild accusations and theories are little more than self-serving fantasies. I consider both to be outside the bounds of acceptable behavior by an attorney and an officer of the court. I have referred them to the attention of the Court for appropriate action. Your name calling, that I am a pro se litigant of dubious distinction, cheap, and other such, is harassment. Be advised that I received your telephone message while at the oral surgery clinic at Shands Hospital in Gainesville, and was so upset that I had to cancel my appointment and leave. Mr. Rodems, you may benefit from the following: Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. is a non-profit corporation formed in 1986 in response to the Florida Supreme Court's mandate that a program be created to identify and offer assistance to bar members who suffer from substance abuse, mental health, or other disorders which negatively affect their lives and careers (Bar Rule 2-9.11). Mr. Rodems, your perjury before the Court, which led to the recusal of Judge Nielsen, is evidence of a problem with you. Likewise with your ongoing harassment of me. I urge you to seek help from Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc., or a provider of your choice.

Kindly stop sending me ad hominem abusive messages and letters. This type of communication from you is not welcome. Stop harassing me and govern yourself accordingly. 31. On December 27, 2006 I wrote to Judge Isom about Mr. Rodems harassment of

me. (Exhibit 8). I provided Judge Isom a transcript of Rodems ranting phone message of December 13, 2006. I provided Judge Isom a copy of Rodems five page diatribe to me of December 13, 2006. (Exhibit 8.3). Dear Judge Isom, Enclosed you will find the transcript I promised of Mr. Rodems' ranting telephone message of December 13, 2006, along with a copy of his subsequent five page diatribe of even date. In my view Mr. Rodems' behavior, his name calling, ongoing harassment, and his refusal to address me as "Mr. Gillespie", all is evidence that he should be disqualified as counsel. Mr. Rodems has lost perspective in this matter, as demonstrated by his perjury before the Court that led to the recusal of Judge Nielsen. Also enclosed is a copy of my letter responding to Mr. Rodems' five page diatribe of wild accusations, theories, and self-serving fantasies. I hope Mr. Rodems contacts the Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc., suggested in my letter. Apparently Mr. Rodems has been missing work, as evidenced from his calling me from home during normal business hours. (See enclosed transcript, page 4, beginning line 15). As stated before, I am concerned for his well-being and mine. I also requested that Mr. Rodems stop sending me ad hominem abusive messages and letters. 32. On February 2, 2007 I submitted Plaintiffs Motion For An Order To Compel

Ryan Christopher Rodems To Stop Harassing Behavior. (Exhibit 9). 33. On February 1, 2007 Judge Isom presided over a hearing Plaintiffs Amended

Motion for Disclosure of Conflict. The hearing was recorded and transcribed by Mary Elizabeth Blazer and is part of the record. Judge Isom denied the existence of any conflict. The transcript shows that Judge Isom failed to disclose the fact that husband Woody Isom and Jonathan Alpert were previously law partners and shareholders at the

10

law firm Fowler White in Tampa. Mr. Rodems failed to disclose that Woody Isom and Jonathan Alpert were previously law partners and shareholders at Fowler White. 34. Upon information and belief, Judge Isom engaged in deception and dishonesty

prejudicial to the administration of justice February 1, 2007 when she lied by omission and failed to disclose that Woody Isom and Jonathan Alpert were previously law partners and shareholders at Fowler White: a. A judge has a duty to disclose information that the litigants or their counsel might consider pertinent to the issue of disqualification. A judge's obligation to disclose relevant information is broader than the duty to disqualify. Stevens v. Americana Healthcare Corp. of Naples, 919 So.2d 713, Fla. App. 2 Dist., 2006. b. In Florida the relationship to a party or attorney is computed by using the common law rule rather than the civil law rule. In computing affinity husband and wife are considered as one person and the relatives of one spouse by consanguinity are related to the other by affinity in the same degree. State v. Wall, 41 Fla. 463. c. Recusal is appropriate where one of the parties or their counsel had dealings with a relative of the court, or whenever a modicum of reason suggests that a judge's prejudice may bar a party from having his or her day in court. The function of the trial court on motion to recuse the trial judge is limited to a determination of the legal sufficiency of an affidavit, without reference to its truth and veracity. McQueen v. Roye, 785 So.2d 512, Fla. App. 3 Dist., 2000. d. Canon 3E(1) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct provides a judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The Commentary to 3E(1) states that under this rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific rules in Section 3E(1) apply. The question whether disqualification of a judge is required focuses on those matters from which a litigant may reasonably question a judge's impartiality rather than the judge's perception of his ability to act fairly and impartially. e. In Garcia v. Manning, 717 So.2d 59, the Court held that it is the ethical responsibility of all judges to know the law and to faithfully follow it. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 3.

11

35.

In 2010 I learned that Woody Isom practiced law with Jonathan Alpert. While

researching accusations in one of Rodems harassing letters to me, I found an affidavit signed by Jonathan Alpert in Alperts divorce case that stated in 3c: (Exhibit 10). I contributed to Judge Sierra's opponent, my former law partner Woody Isom, in last fall's election and supported him, which fact has now been specifically called to Judge Sierra's attention in "summaries" prepared by Elizabeth Alpert's counsel; 36. On March 23, 2010 Woody Isom confirmed in an email to me that he practiced

law with Jonathan Alpert. (Exhibit 11). Woody Isom wrote: He and I were shareholders at Fowler White for a period of time prior to my leaving the firm in Jan. 1985. 37. On February 5, 2007 Judge Isom presided over a hearing in the case. a. The hearing was recorded and transcribed by Denise L. Bradley, and is part of the record. Judge Isom considered the following matters: Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Disqualify Counsel Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Discovery (Sanctions) Plaintiff's Motion To Dismiss and Strike Counterclaim The Americans with Disabilities Act (ABA) On February 6, 2007 Mr. Rodems sent me a letter with two proposed Orders. (Exhibit 20) Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration - Discovery (Sanctions) Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion To Dismiss and Strike Counterclaim Neither Order was signed by Judge Isom, and neither Order was entered into the record. These motions were not considered by any successor judge. b. Judge Isom did not rule on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Disqualify Counsel. The Court considered the disqualification of Mr. Rodems as shown in the transcript, from page 22 through 40, which is presented as Exhibit 21, but then Mr. Rodems objected, as shown on pages 36-37 of the transcript, February 5, 2007: 12 13 MR. RODEMS: You know, I object at this point, Your Honor, because this is what we were getting into

12

14 15 16 17 18 19 25 1 2

earlier. This is a telephone conversation that he didn't get my consent to record. And Florida statutes say that that conversation is illegal and cannot be considered for any purposes by the court in any hearing, except for a hearing prosecuting Mr. Gillespie for illegally recording the conversation. THE COURT: Okay. So we're going to not address the motion for reconsideration and the motion to disqualify today.

(Note: Kirby Rainsberger, Legal Advisor to the Tampa Police Department, investigated this matter and wrote February 22, 2010 that Mr. Rodems was not right and not accurate in representing to the Court as an exact quote language that clearly was not an exact quote. The investigation did not show any wrongdoing by me.) c. Judge Isom denied reconsideration of an Order on discovery sanctions. Upon information and belief, Judge Isom failed to follow her own law essay on discovery sanctions, Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REV. 323. (Exhibit 12). Judge Isoms essay describes a racket or scheme where the Court favors intensive case management for lawyers to avoid costly sanctions, because Florida judges are elected and need the financial support of lawyers. Judge Isom acknowledged that lawyers behave badly in court, and this bad behavior - which Judge Isom calls cutting up - is intended to churn more fees for themselves. Judge Isom refused to provide me the same kind of intensive case management to avoid sanctions. Judge Isom denied me the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of the court, specifically mediation services: (Transcript, February 01, 2007, page 15, line 20) THE COURT: And you guys have already gone to mediation and tried to resolve this without litigation? MR. GILLESPIE: No, Your Honor. Judge Isom did not offer me mediation. Judge Isom let the sanction Order stand. Upon information and belief the sanction Order is contrary to the law on discovery:

13

Pretrial discovery was implemented to simplify the issues in a case, to encourage the settlement of cases, and to avoid costly litigation. Elkins v. Syken, 672 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1996). The rules of discovery are designed to secure the just and speedy determination every action (In re Estes Estate, 158 So.2d 794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1963), to promote the ascertainment of truth (Ulrich v. Coast Dental Services, Inc. 739 So.2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1999), and to ensure that judgments are rested on the real merits of causes (National Healthcorp Ltd. Partnership v. Close, 787 So.2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2001), and not upon the skill and maneuvering of counsel. (Zuberbuhler v. Division of Administration, State Dept. of Transp. 344 So.2d 1304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1977). The sanction Order was later used by Judge James M. Barton to penalize me with a $11,550 sanction. Mr. Rodems used this sanction to extort a settlement from me. d. Judge Isom denied my motion to dismiss Mr. Rodems counterclaim for libel against me. The counterclaim was a vexatious lawsuit over a letter I wrote to Ian MacKechnie of Amscot Corporation, both of whom are interested parties on the Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement (Exhibit 1). My letter complained about the Amscot lawsuit and the prior representation by BRC and Cook. Upon information and belief, Judge Isom should have, but did not, disqualify Rodems and BRC as counsel under the holding of McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. Mr. Rodems pursued vexatious litigation against me that began January 19, 2006 and continued through September 28, 2010, whereupon Rodems voluntarily dismissed the counterclaim without prejudice. I retained counsel to defend against the vexatious lawsuit and incurred over $33,000 in legal fees by attorney Robert W. Bauer, a referral from the Florida Bar Lawyer Referral Service for libel. e. Judge Isom conducted an ADA assessment of me during the February 5,

2007 hearing. This matter is more fully described in Verified Notice of Filing Disability Information of Neil J. Gillespie, submitted May 27, 2011 in Hillsborough County. (And

14

later filed in U.S. District Court, M.D. Fla., Ocala, case no. 5:10-cv-503-oc (Doc. 36), and case no. 5:11-cv-539-oc (Doc 15, Appendix 2). (Transcript, February 5, 2007, page 45, beginning at line 6) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. GILLESPIE: Right now, Judge, my head is swimming to the point where I'm having a hard time even hearing you. But it sounded all right. THE COURT: What's is the nature of your disability? MR. GILLESPIE: It's depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. THE COURT: Are you under the care of a doctor? MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, Judge. THE COURT: And do you have a disability rating with the Social Security Administration? MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, Judge. In the early '90s, I'm going to say '93 or '94, I was judged disabled by Social Security. And I applied for vocational rehabilitation. And to make a long story short, I guess it was in about '98 or '99 I received a determination from vocational rehabilitation that my disability was so severe that I could not benefit from rehabilitation. I would say in the interim that they had prepared

(Transcript, February 5, 2007, page 46, beginning at line 1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a rehabilitation plan for me and they didn't want to implement it. And that's the reason that they gave for not implementing it. I brought that cause of action to the Barker, Rodems and Cook law firm and they reviewed that. And apparently they were in agreement with it because they decided not to represent me on that claim. And a copy of their letter denying that is part of my motion for punitive damages. You can read that letter. I think I have it here.

After taking testimony about my disability, Judge Isom offered to abate the matter for three months so I could find counsel, but Mr. Rodems objected. I retained attorney Robert W. Bauer one month later.

15

(Transcript, February 5, 2007, page 46, beginning at line 10) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. But in terms of direction today, do you want to just stop everything and abate this proceeding for three months so that you can go out and try to find substitute counsel or --you know, I realize there's a counterclaim. MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, Judge. THE COURT: But originally, at least, it was your lawsuit. So if you feel that you're at a disadvantage because of your lack of counsel, I guess I could abate it and give you additional time to try to find an attorney. MR. RODEMS: Your Honor, we would oppose that. And let me tell you why.

Mr. Rodems continued with a self serving diatribe and accused me of criminal extortion for trying to resolve this matter through the Florida Bar ACAP Program, and other such. Then Mr. Rodems made this accusation in open court: (Transcript, February 5, 2007, page 49, beginning at line 12). 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 [MR: RODEMS:] In any event, at every stage of the proceedings when Mr. Gillespie is about to be held accountable for his actions he cries that he's got a disability or he complains about the fact that he can't get a lawyer. The reason he can't get a lawyer is because he's not willing to pay a lawyer by the hour for the services he wants.

And I responded: (Transcript, February 5, 2007, page 50, beginning at line 14). 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 MR. GILLESPIE: I am willing to pay an attorney by the hour. I have sent a payment of $350 an hour to an attorney with the promise of a retainer if they would take the case. So Mr. Rodems calling me cheap and all of this name-calling and not willing to pay, that's not true. In fact, I offered Rick Mitzel who said the cost would be $200 an hour, I gladly offered to pay him $200 an hour. He wouldn't take the case. These lawyers don't want to litigate against this firm because they're aware of what this firm does and what they're capable of.

16

38.

Judge Isom went against her initial judgment February 5, 2007 and refused to

abate the proceeding after Mr. Rodems complained. I was not able to continue the lengthy hearing due to disability. I was too confused: (Transcript, February 5, 2007, page 45, beginning at line 6) 6 7 8 39. MR. GILLESPIE: Right now, Judge, my head is swimming to the point where I'm having a hard time even hearing you.

Upon information and belief, Judge Isom misused and denied me judicial

process under the color of law. Two days later on February 7, 2007 I gave notice of voluntary dismissal (Exhibit 13) and submitted a motion for an order of voluntary dismissal. (Exhibit 14). Mr. Rodems did not voluntarily dismiss his counterclaim. If Rodems did so, that would have ended the case February 7, 2007. 40. On February 26, 2007 The Lawyer Referral Service of The Florida Bar provided

me a referral to Robert W. Bauer of Gainesville (Florida Bar ID: 11058) for Libel & Slander. (Exhibit 15). I was not able to find counsel in Tampa. After reviewing my case, Mr. Bauer told me the jury would love to punish a slimy attorney. (Transcript, March 29, 2007, page 28, line 9). Mr. Bauer encouraged me to reinstate my claims. 41. Mr. Bauer reinstated my voluntarily-dismissed claims in Hillsborough County.

Mr. Rodems appealed the decision to the Second District Court of Appeal (2dDCA), Case No. 2D07-4530. The 2dDCA denied Mr. Rodems Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and held as follows: (Exhibit 22). PER CURIAM. Denied. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(2); Rogers v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 575 So. 2d 214, 215-16 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding that when counterclaim is pending, plaintiff cannot unilaterally dismiss complaint without order of court).

17

42.

Upon information and belief, Mr. Rodems sent threatening email to Mr. Bauer in

May 2007. Mr. Rodems objected to Mr. Bauers leave to amend, threatened Bauer with sanctions under 57.105, Fla. Stat., and reiterated his usual laundry list of alleged bad acts against me, which had no bearing on the matter at hand. (Exhibit 16). Rodems wrote: I am serving the 57.105 motion today...we object to the motion for leave to amend because there is no such thing as a "counter-counter complaint", and you are flat wrong on the motion to withdraw the dismissal. Have you even looked at Rule 1.100(a)? I assume you are aware of the line of cases that hold that a mislabeled pleading or motion is not a nullity. We'll send you a 57.105 motion, and you can decide how to proceed. Given Gillespie's bizarre and inappropriate behavior in this case (asking for a court appointed attorney under the ADA, pleading, among other inappropriate defenses, the economic loss rule to our defamation claims, moving twice to DQ the trial judges, appealing a discovery order, writing inflammatory and false statements about a judge in a letter to the court, threatening to slam me against the wall, and telling an insurance company not to indemnify him in the counterclaims), I am surprised you would rely on any portions of the pleadings Gillespie filed. This example is representative of Mr. Rodems boorish behavior. 43. On August 14, 2008, Mr. Bauer made this statement during an Emergency

Hearing on garnishment before Judge Marva Crenshaw (page 16, beginning at line 24): 24 25 1 2 3 Mr. Rodems has, you know, decided to take a full nuclear blast approach instead of us trying to work this out in a professional manner. It is my mistake for sitting back and giving him the opportunity to take this full blast attack.

Mr. Rodems' "full nuclear blast approach" has aggravated my disability to the point where I can no longer represent my at hearings. I become easily distracted and confused, and can no longer speak coherently enough during a hearing to represent himself. See Plaintiffs Motion For Appointment Of Counsel, ADA Accommodation Request, and Memorandum of Law filed May 24, 2011.

18

44.

Mr. Bauer prohibited me from appearing as a witness in my own case. Mr. Bauer

sent me this email July 8, 2008 at 6.05PM stating in part: No - I do not wish for you to attend hearings. I am concerned that you will not be able to properly deal with any of Mr. Rodems comments and you will enflame the situation. I am sure that he makes them for no better purpose than to anger you. I believe it is best to keep you away from him and not allow him to prod you. You have had a very adversarial relationship with him and it has made it much more difficult to deal with your case. I don't not wish to add to the problems if it can be avoided. See Plaintiffs Notice of Filing Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie filed September 18, 2010, Exhibit 10 to the Complaint in U.S. District Court, M.D. Fla., case no. 5:10-cv-503-oc. I was denied access to court in my own case due to Rodems conflict and misconduct. 45. Mr. Bauer moved to withdrawal October 13, 2008; it was granted October 1,

2009. Mr. Bauer charged me $31,863 in legal fees. $12,650 remains unpaid. 46. Upon information and belief, Mr. Rodems and his staff refused to cooperate with

Eugene P. Castagliuolo (Florida Bar ID 104360) who represented me in June 2011. Mr. Rodems refused to cooperate with or provide Mr. Castagliuolo a copy of a writ of bodily attachment. In his email to me June 10, 2011 Castagliuolo stated in part Last but not least, Rodems' useless assistant put me into his voicemail, where I left a professional but unhappy message. (Exhibit 17). On June 14, 2011 Mr. Castagliuolo called Rodems an asshole in an email to me. (Exhibit 18). Castagliuolo wrote (in part): Based on what I know right now about your case, your debt to this asshole Rodems would be discharged in your Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and he would get NOTHING from you. This example is representative of Mr. Rodems boorish behavior with Mr. Castagliuolo. 47. There are now fifteen (15) additional related cases in this matter due to Judge

Isoms dishonesty and denial of justice. (Exhibit 19). Judge Isom was dishonest when she

19

failed to disclose a conflil;t with husband Woody Isom and Mr. Alpert. Judge Isom denied me justice under t~1e color of law when she failed to disqualify Mr. Rodems and BRC as counsel as required by McPartland. Judge Isom denied me justice under the color of law when she failed to provide intensive case management as she advocated in her law review, Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, and when she failed to abate the hearing February 5, 2006 until Mr. Bauer could be retained. The cost of Judge Isom's dishonesty and denial ofjustice has been enormous to me, all the lawyers, and the court system. FURTHER AFF]ANT SAYETH NAUGHT. Dated this 30th day of July 2012.

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF MARION BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority authorized to take oaths and acknowledgments in the State of Florida, appeared NEIL J. GILLESPIE, personally known to me or provided identification who, after having first been duly sworn, deposes and says that the above matters contained in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and official seal this 30th day of July 2012.

i:
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I~W' CECIUA ROSENBERGER ..:~~ ~ Cormission # EE 191610

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Bonded Thru na, Flirt...... 800-315-7019

Expires m6, 2016

Notary Public, State of Florida

~~

Certificate of Service
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was provided July 30, 2012 by

email onlytoCatherineBarbaraChapman(catherine@guildaylaw.com).Guilday. Tucker, Schwartz & Simpson, P.A. 1983 Centre Pointe Boulevard, Suite 200.

20

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, ESTATE OF PENELOPE GILLESPIE, CASE NO.: 12-11213-C Appellants/Plaintiffs, vs. THIRTEENTH JUDICAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, et al. Respondents/Defendants. __________________________________/ APPENDIX To the Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie Conflict of Interest and ADA denial by Florida Judge Claudia R. Isom in case 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough Co. Submitted in Support of Motion for Disability Accommodation Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6 Exhibit 7 Exhibit 8 Exhibit 9 Exhibit 10 Exhibit 11 Certificate of Interested Persons, Appeal 01-14761-AA, C.A.11, Nov-06-2011 Final Order, Appeal 01-14761-AA, C.A.11, December 7, 2001 Closing Statement, Amscot - BRC and Cook, November 1, 2001 Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Strike, January 13, 2006 Gillespie letter to Mr. Rodems, Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), March 20, 2006 Email of Mr. Rodems to Gillespie, threats of physical violence, Mar-27-2006 Website Notice About Conflict, Judge Claudia R. Isom, December 6, 2006 Gillespie letter to Judge Isom, Re: Harassment by Mr. Rodems, Dec-27-2006 Gillespies Motion for an Order to Stop Rodems Harassment, Deb-02-2007 Affidavit of Jonathan Alpert, Sep-11-2003, Re: law partner Woody Isom Email of Woody Isom to Gillespie, March 23, 2010, Re: law partner J. Alpert CASE NO.: 12-11028-B

Exhibit 12 Exhibit 13 Exhibit 14 Exhibit 15 Exhibit 16 Exhibit 17 Exhibit 18 Exhibit 19 Exhibit 20 Exhibit 21 Exhibit 22

Judge Isom, Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REV. 323 Plaintiff's Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, 05-CA-7205, February 7, 2007 Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Voluntary Dismissal, February 7, 2007 The Florida Bar LRS referral to Robert W. Bauer, February 26, 2007 Threatening Email of Mr. Rodems to Robert W. Bauer, May 3, 2007 Email of Eugene P. Castagliuolo to Gillespie, June 10, 2011, Re: Rodems Email of Eugene P. Castagliuolo to Gillespie, June 14, 2011, Re: Rodems 18 Cases Related to Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, 05-CA-007205 Mr. Rodems cover letter and proposed Orders for Judge Isom, February 6, 2007 Transcript, Hearing before Judge Isom, February 5, 2007, pages 1-3 and 11-40 Order, Second District Court of Appeal, Case No. 2D07-4530

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASE l-IO . 01-14761~""
~
~

EUGENE R. CLEMENT, GAY ANN BLOME FIELD , and NEIL GILLESPIE, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Appellants, v. AMSCOT CORPORATION, Appellee.

I
I
~

I,'.~

______________,

JOINT STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

The Parties, by and th_ou(Jh tI-leir undersigrled counsel, amicably

A~I)pel1ate

hav~.

flg

resolved

this

matter,

pursuant

to

Federal

Rule
""to:

of th

Procedure 42 (b)

move for dismissal with prejtldice

attorn~s'

each party bearing its own

fees and costs. day of November, 2001.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

BA~KER;

RODEMS & COOK,

P~A4

Gray, Harris, Bobinson, Shackleford, Farrior

WILLIAM J. CO K, ESQUIRE Florida Bar No. 986194

300 West Platt Street
~)uite

150

33606 489-1001 (TEL) 489-1008 (FAX) Z.:\.t to rrle :i5 for Appe 11 ant ~3
(813) (813)

Tampa, Florida

R. FERNANDEZ, ES Florida Bar No. 008 5 501 E. Kennedy Blvd Sllite 1400 Tampa, Florida 33602
(813)
(t~J3)

273-5000
273-5145

(TE"L)
(F~AX)

. ~tt~~~jrneys

for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant

to Federal

Rule

of Appellate

Procedure

26.1

and

Eleventh Circuit Rule 26.1-1,

counsel for the Appellants certify

that the following persons and entities have an interest in the outcome of this case. Alpert, Jonathan L., Esq. Alpert & Ferrentino, P.A. Amscot Corporation Anthony, John A., Esq. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Barker, Chris A., Esq.
Blomefield, Gay Ann
Clement, Eugene R.
Cook, William J., Esq.
Gillespie, Neil
Gray, Harris, Robinson, Shackleford, Farrior, P.A.
Lazzara, The Honorable Richard A.
United States District Judge, Middle District of Florida
MacKechnie, Ian
Rodems, Ryan Christopher, Esq.

rO\..)\:\1 ~OF APp/ .

Cj'

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tP"

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 854-7807

REC .IVED
CLERK

..,.

' { \

:::;'

APR 0 4 2006
/'

March 30, 2006 Daniel Richardson, Deputy Clerk United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 56 Forsyth Street, NW Atlanta, GA 30303-2289 Telephone: (404) 335-6100 RE: Clement V. Amscot Corporation, Appeal No. 01-14761-AA
$45.00 Retrieval Fee Enclosed
Dear Mr. Richardson, Enclosed is payment of $45.00 to Clerk of the Court to retrieve the above captioned case for copying, as we discussed by telephone on March 29,2006, Upon retrieval of the file, kindly call me with the total number of pages so that I can send you the 50 cents per page for the cost of copying. Thank you.

~ak~
enclosure

S?~p~.

'~A0182

.'

(Rev. 1lU89)

".

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ORIGI~
RECEIPT FclllvMENT
for the

040171

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

- UNITED STATED COURT OF APPEAL:S

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

I, "

'" '" ~ '" o

ACCOUNT AMOUNT

~.
GENERAL AND SPECIAL FUND 13' ! I 0869PL PLRA Filing Fees 086900 Docketing Fees 322340 Sales of Publications & Opinions 322350 Copy Fees 322360 Miscellaneous Fees (Includes Certifi tion Fee) 510000 Fees for Judicial ervices

0869PL 086900 322340 322350 322360 510000

$

,,' "

~.

-0

~I~ Mail
Rail

TOTAL

All checks, money orders, drafts, etc. are accepted subject to collection. Full credit will not be given until the negotiable i t has een ac . cia' itution on which it was drawn.

..

ATLANTP<.GA 303

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT OFFICE OF THE CLERK 56 FORSYTH STREET. N.W.

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US POSTAGE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALlY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300

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Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115 tho Loop Ocala, FL. 34481

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Case 8:99-cv-02795-RAL Document 121

Filed 12/10/01 Page 1 of 1 PageID 1363

BARKER, RODEl\'1S & COOK, P.A.

CLOSIN'C STATEMENT

Style of Case: Eugene R. Clement, Gay Ann Blomelleld, and Neil Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corporation. Our File No.: 99.4766

As of: October 31, 2001

ATTORNEYS' FEES & COSTS

PAYMENTS TO CLIENTS EUGENE R. CLEMENT GAY ANN BLOMEFIELD NEIL GILLESPIE

$ 50,000.00

$ 2,000.00

2,000.00 2,000.00

I .

TOTAL

$ 56,000.00

In signing this closing statement, I acknowledge that ANISCOT Corporation separately paid my attomeys $50,000.00 to compensate my attorneys for their claim against AMSCOT for court awarded fees and costs. I also acknowledge that I have received a copy of the fully executed Release and Settlement Agreement dated October 30, 2001.

I .... ....) , i
'-'

-,

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TIllRTEENTH JUDICIAL CmCUIT OF

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY,
CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
PLAINTIFF,

vs.
DIVISION" F " BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida Corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK, DEFENDANTS.

--------------_-----:/
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKE TIDS CAUSE came on for hearing on September 26,2005, upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike, and counsel for the parties being present and having made arguments and the court having considered the Plaintiffs Rebuttal to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Rebuttal to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike and the Plaintiff's Second Rebuttal to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike, and the court being advised fully in the premises, it is thereupon, ADJUDGED as follows: 1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike is granted in part and denied in part. 2. Those portions of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike seeking to dismiss the Complaint are denied. Defendant shall have fifteen days from the date of this order within which to file responsive pleadings.

4
or,

36

//1

3. Those portions of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike seeking to strike portions of the Complaint is granted in the following particulars: a. Paragraphs 47, 48, 49 and 50 of the Complaint are stricken. b. Exhibit 8 to the Complaint is stricken. c. All references to or demands for punitive damages are stricken or failure to comply with 768.72 of the Florida Statutes.
ORDERED in Chambers, at Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida, this

day of

JAN 13 2006

, 2o_.
RICHARD A. NIELSEN CIRCUIT JUDGE

Copies furnished to: Ryan C. Rodems, Esquire 300 West Platt Street, Suite 150 Tampa, Florida 33606 Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115 th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

or'
f _

37

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115 111 Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 854-7807

VIA US CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT ARTICLE NO.: 7005257000004274 1994 March 20, 2006 Ryan Christopher Rodems, Attorney at Law Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 Dear Mr. Resems, This request is made pursuant to Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Kindly provide the following: 1. A copy of the executed closing statement of October 31, 2001, reflecting an itemization of all costs and expenses in the Amscot litigation, together with the amount of fee received by each participating lawyer or law firm; and 2. A copy ofthe executed contingent fee contract in the Amscot case. This includes the executed Statement of Client's Rights as well as an Acknowledgment regarding the investigation of my claim. These three documents encompass the entire agreement between me and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. (See Class Representation Contract, page 3). Rule 4-1.5(f)(5) requires that each participating lawyer shall retain a copy of the written fee contract and closing statement for 6 years after execution of the closing statement. Any contingent fee contract and closing statement shall be available for inspection at reasonable times by the client, by any other person upon judicial order, or by the appropriate disciplinary agency. This is a request for a copy of the documents in lieu of an inspection. In the alternative I will make an inspection. Please indicate how you wish to proceed. You may contact me by email atNeiIGillespie@PeoplePC.com. Sincerely,

Neil J. Gilt{spie

~/Z'h?~k.

Page 1 ofl
,
~~C_.ciiiio_m

From: To: Sent: Attach: Subject:

"Chris Rodems" <rodems@barkerrodemsandcook.com> <NeiIGillespie@PeoplePC.com> Monday, March 27, 2006 6:05 PM Docs responsive to NJG letter of 3-20-6.pdf Your document request - March 20, 2006

Dear Neil: I am in receipt of your letter dated March 20, 2006. Each of the items requested have been previously sent to you, and you have attached most of them to your initial complaint filed with the Florida Bar. Given your threats of physical violence against me during our last telephone conversation, and given that you have copies of these documents, your letter appears to be an effort to harass us. Therefore, I contacted the Florida Bar to seek advice on how to respond. I was advised that because the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar do not address abuse of the rules by former clients, the most practical response would be to send the documents to you again. They are attached in pdf format. In the event you make this request again, I have fulfilled my obligations. If this format is not to your liking, you may come to our office any business day between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. to inspect the documents; however, we request 24 hour notice so that we may arrange to have security present. Sincerely,

Ryan Christopher Rodems Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 813/489-1001 E-mail: rodems@barkerrodemsandcook.com NOTICE: This message (including attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, is intended to be confidential, and is also protected by the attorney client privilege or other privilege. It is not intended for review or use by third parties or unintended recipients. If you are not the intended recipient, you are requested to delete the data and destroy any physical copies. Any retention, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.

6
3/28/2006

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit - The Honorable Claudia R. 1som - Notice of Conflict

l'age

or

General CiVil, Division H 800 E. TWiggs St., Room 513 Tampa, Florida 33602 (813) 272-6972

NOTICE FROM THE COURT

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT JUDGE ISOM
HAS THE FOLLOWING RELATIVES PRACTICING LAW
OR INVOLVED IN LITIGATION SUPPORT SERVICES
IN THE TAMPA BAY AREA
Husband, A. Woodson (Woody) Isom, a sole practitioner.

Brother, Dale J.. Rickert, who is a shareholder in the Law Firm of Dale J. Rickert. Sister-in-Law, Janice Matson Rickert, who is an associate with the Law Firm of Fowler, White, Boggs, Banker, P.A., in the "Health Care Litigation Group". f you feel the . t be a conflict in your case based on the abm information, ease raise the issue 0 it can be resolved prior to n (; residing over any matters concerning your case. Thank you,
Claudia Rickert Isom
Circuit Judge

Home

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http://www.fljud13.org/judgeisom_notice.htm12/3/2006

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 11S th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

Telephone: (352) 502-8409

December 27,2006 The Honorable Claudia R. Isom Circuit Court Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Circuit Court, Division H 800 E. Twiggs Street, Room 513 Tampa, Florida 33602 RE: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., case no.: 2005 CA 7205, Division H Dear Judge Isom, Enclosed you will find the transcript I promised of Mr. Rodenls' ranting telephone message of December 13, 2006, along with a copy of his subsequent five page diatribe of even date. In my view Mr. Rodems' behavior, his name calling, ongoing harassment, and his refusal to address me as "Mr. Gillespie", all is evidence that he should be disqualified as counsel. Mr. Rodems has lost perspective in this matter, as demonstrated by his perjury before the Court that led to the recusal of Judge Nielsen. Also enclosed is a copy of my letter responding to Mr. Rodems' five page diatribe of wild accusations, theories, and self-serving fantasies. I hope Mr. Rodems contacts the Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc., suggested in my letter. Apparently Mr. Rodenls has been missing work, as evidenced from his calling me from home during normal business hOllrs. (See enclosed transcript, page 4, beginning line 15). As stated before, I anl concerned for his well-being and mine. I also requested that Mr. Rodems stop sending me ad hominem abusive messages and letters. Thank you.

Enclosures cc: Ryan Christopher Rodems, Attorney for Defendants

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115 th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 502-8409

December 27, 2006 Ryan Christopher Rodems, Attorney at Law Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 RE: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., case no.: 05-CA-7205, Div. H Dear Mr. Rodems, This is in response to your ranting phone message of December 13, 2006, and your subsequent five page diatribe of even date. It appears you have lost perspective in this matter. Both contacts are evidence supporting your disqualification as counsel. As for the substance of your communications, your wild accusations and theories are little more than self-serving fantasies. I consider both to be outside the bounds of acceptable behavior by an attorney and an officer of the court. I have referred them to the attention of the Court for appropriate action. Your name calling, that I am a "pro se litigant of dubious distinction", "cheap", and other such, is harassment. Be advised that I received your telephone message while at the oral surgery clinic at Shands Hospital in Gainesville, and was so upset that I had to cancel my appointment and leave. Mr. Rodems, you may benefit from the following: Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. is a non-profit corporation formed in 1986 in response to the Florida Supreme Court's mandate that a program be created to identify and offer assistance to bar members who suffer from substance abuse, mental health, or other disorders which negatively affect their lives and careers (Bar Rule 2-9.11). FLA is independent of The Florida Bar, although it does receive funding from that organization. Paramount to FLA is the protection of confidentiality for those attorneys who contact FLA for help. Confidentiality in voluntary cases is protected by a written contract with The Florida Bar which guarantees the confidentiality of FLA records, as well as by Bar Rule 3-7.1(i), Chap. 397.482-486, F.S., and other state and federal regulations. Judges, attorneys, law students, and support personnel who seek the assistance of FLA need not worry that FLA will report them to the Bar, the Board of Bar Examiners, or their

8.1

Ryan Christopher Rodems, Attorney at Law Gillespie v. Barker, case no. 05-CA-7205, Div. H

Page - 2 Decenlber 27, 2006

employer. Information is shared with these entities only if the participating individual signs a waiver of confidentiality. FLA's primary purpose is to assist the impaired attorney in his or her recovery. (The preceding paragraph is from the Florida Bar's web site). Mr. Rodems, your perjury before the Court, which led to the recusal of Judge Nielsen, is evidence of a problem with you. Likewise with your ongoing harassment of me. I urge you to seek help from Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc., or a provider of your choice. Kindly stop sending me ad hominem abusive messages and letters. This type of communication from you is not welcome. Stop harassing me and govern yourself accordingly.

/)/./ '// ~
Sincerely,

-'-.

{ ~l J. Gillere

-~ ~

P:~p'
. / /'

{&?

/'"\.

/ /.

?//

Enclosure: Transcript of Mr. Rodems' telephone message, December 13, 2006 cc: The Honorable Claudia R. Isom, w/enclosures Transcript of Mr. Rodems' telephone message, December 13, 2006 Copy of Mr. Rodems' five page letter dated December 13, 2006

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115 lh Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 502-8409 US CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT
Article No. 7005 3110 0003 7395 1887
December 22, 2006 Ryan Christopher Rodems, Attorney at Law
Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.
400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100
Tampa, Florida 33602

RE: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., case no.: 05-CA-7205, Div. H
Dear Mr. Rodems, Kindly take notice that we are not on a first name basis, and I request that you address me as "Mr. Gillespie". I have made this request to you several times, in writing, and still you refuse to comply. I address you as "Mr. Rodems", so I do not understand the problem. Mature adults in civilized society do this as a matter of course, so again, I do not understand your difficulty. Let me remind you that I am ten years your senior, which only reinforces the social protocol that you address me as "Mr. Gillespie". As for your immature, childish remark left on my voice mail, your statement that because the greeting on my voice mail says "Hi,this is Neil, leave a message and I'll get back to you", that you somehow construe this as giving you permission to use my first name, this is further evidence that you are unfit to serve as counsel in this lawsuit. It also calls into question your mental fitness to be a lawyer, in my view. (Exhibit A). I am providing a copy of this letter to the Court, and I am including it in the record. At trial, with you on the witness stand, I will question you about this matter, to give the Court and the jury some idea about how unprofessional you are, and to provide a glimpse into the nightmare of being your client at Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Please address me as "Mr. Gillespie" at all times and govern yourself accordingly.
~/

Sincer: y,

/ ell J. GIlIe.spiel"
t. //

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cc: The Honorable Claudia R. Isom

enclosure, page 5, transcript ofMr. Rodems' phone message of Dec-13-06

8.2

BARKER, RODEMS
CHRIS A. BARKER RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS WILLIAM J. COOK

& COOK
Telephone 813/4891001 Facsimile 813/4891008

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100

Tampa, Florida 33602

December 13, 2006

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115 th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Dear Neil: As you know, I called you on Decelnber 12, 2006 to schedule hearings before Judge Isoln on February 7,2007. You did not answer, so I left you a voice Inail. Later that afternoon, you sent a letter to Ine by facsilnile. In it, you clailn to be unavailable Febluary 7 and that you "hope to have representation within 30 days." You have Illade that assertion for several months now, without retaining counsel, and I cannot delay this proceeding any further on your unfulfilled prolnises of retaining counsel. You also state in your letter that I have "threatened the lawyers that were helping" you, which is completely unfounded. I will address that issue below. Judge ISOI11 has all day on February 5, 2007 open, and we could resolve all pending motions, excel)t for your ITIotion for sUlnmary judgtnent, on that date. I left you a voice mail on this today. As has Judge Nielsen, I have endured for severallnonths now disparaging remarks from you, false allegations, attacks on my credibility and otherwise boorish behavior. I have not responded to Illuch of it because I recognize that you are a bitter lnan Wll0 apparently has been victilnized by your own poor choices in life. You also claim to have ITIental or psychological problelns, of which I have never seen documentation. However, your behavior in this case has been so abnonnal that I would not disagree with your assertions of Inental problems. I have lnaintained courtesy in every tneeting with you, including a wann senti111ent following a hearing -- only to be accused after that of "taunting" you. I intend to continue treating you with the saIne dignity and respect as I would opposing counsel in any other case; however, I have First AInendInent rights, too. I aln not obligated to accept your false statelnents, disparaging relnarks, attacks on IUy credibility and the other tactics you have used in this case. I want to ensure that you understand IUy position, and so I find it necessary now to write to COlTect the record.

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Mr. Neil J. Gillespie December 13,2006 Page 2

As for your claims that I "threatened the lawyers" that is simply false. I forwarded bye-mail portions of your October 18, 2006 to Ms. Jenkins, Ms. Buchholz and Mr. Snyder, and stated "Neil Gillespie has filed a letter with Judge Richard Nielsen, and has attributed comments to the three of you. As an officer of the Court, I believe I have a duty to advise you of this. Please review pages 8-10 of the attached letter. Should any of you desire the complete document, with attachments, please advise." I have received no reply. In fact, the first confirmation that my letter had been received by these three attorneys was your December 12 facsimile letter. Let me explain why I sent the portions of the letter to them. Your tactic of naming these three lawyers as people you had spoken to, and then attributing statements to them anonymously and en masse is very damaging to them professionally. I sent the portions of the October 18, 2006 letter to them so that they could review it and do whatever they felt necessary. I also sent it to them because I questioned the veracity of your letter. I considered four possibilities about the statements you attributed to them anonymously: First, you may be lying. Second, you may be taking some or all of the statements out of context. Third, you may be paraphrasing and changing the meaning of the actual statements. Fourth, one or all of these attorneys may have never said anything to you, but were being used by you to endorse statements that you would later use to attempt to recuse Judge Nielsen. I also disagree that my actions have hanned your ability to hire counsel. The primary problem is that your case is weak. You are essentially claiming in this action that our law finn breached its contract with you by not paying you a portion of the attomeys' fees earned in the Amscot case. Every attorney knows -- or should know -- that the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar and the caselaw prohibit splitting attorneys' fees with a nonlawyer.
It is also clear by reviewing the Closing Statement and your letters to us that you knew that Amscot was paying all of your attorneys' fees and that you would not have to pay any pOliion of your settlement for attorneys' fees and costs. In this case, you received 100% of your settlement, not 60%, and Amscot paid all of your attorneys' fees and costs.

No one has ever rendered an opinion that your case has any merit. You misunderstood the meaning of a denial of a motion to dismiss. It is not a comment on the merits. In fact, the Court is required to accept all of your allegations as true. That requirement disappears after the motion to dismiss is resolved. Now, you are required to prove your specious allegations. Any rational attomey looking at this situation would not take this case on a contingency fee basis and would instead require you to pay them by the hour. You, apparently, from your comments to me and in court filings, are unwilling to pay an attomey fairly for the work that would need to be done. In fact, you even moved the Court to have an

Mr. Neil J. G'illespie Decclnbcr 13, 2006 Page 3

attorl1ey appointed for you at the government's expense. Of course, there is no provision under the ADA for appointlnent of counsel, but the fact tl1at you believe the government should foot the bill for you to file baseless lawsuits is entirely consistent with your actions in this case and past cases. So, in addition to your case's lack of merit, you are cheap and not willing to pay the required hourly rates for representation. Yet, you have had no problem paying filing fees for this baseless lawsuit, the court reporters to transcribe hearings and our telephone calls, and for the frivolous appeal of the discovery order. Another lnajor probleln, I gather, in hiring attorneys is your extortion of your fonner attorneys by threatening to file a Florida Bar complaint if they do not split portions of their earned fees with you. In fact, you have filed three grievances against Bill Cook in connection with this lnatter -- all of which were dislnissed, meaning your allegations were unfounded. Rhetorically, why would an attorney wish to represent you given your past actions against other attorneys? Additionally, any reasonable attorney would find your conduct in this case to be reprehensible. 1. You have routinely violated tIle Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, only to clailll that pro se litigants are entitled to special treatlnent. At every hearing, I recall Judge Nielsen had to advise you to follow the procedural rules and protocol. As I have pointed out with citations of authority, the law in Florida is clear: You are expected to follow the rules of procedure, and you are not entitled to special treatment. When I have cited tIle law to you, you have told lne not to do so. You threatened to "slaIn lne up against the wall." After that, I had to request a bailiff to attend the hearings. You claimed I "taunted" you when, after a hearing, I wished you well. You have recorded a telephone conversation without lny pennission. I aSSUlne your research skills have led you to the statutes and caselaw 011 recording telephone conversation without pennission. In fact, you only filed a portion of the transcript of our very first telephone conversation and we both know why: You never told lne you were recording it. You represented to the Cou11 tllat I "threatened" you, and the COlnlnent on which you based it was lny COffilnent to you that your libeling of lny clients was unnecessary, and that act would cause you to have to pay. Which, it will. You have accused lne of perjury.

2.

3.

4.

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie Decetnber 13, 2006 Page 4

5.

You have filed defenses to the counterclailTI that are nonsensical, and yet you claimed to be well-qualified to represent yourself when I moved for sanctions and asked the Court to require you to hire counsel. You took a contradictory position and moved to have an attorney appointed for you because you were not qualified or able to represent yourself, citing your disability, without proof, and a federal law that does not even address the appointlnent of counsel in a civil action. In one hearing, when Judge Nielsen asked you for authority, you replied with words to the effect tllat you have no training in the law. You have portrayed yourself as the victim wIlen it suits you and the able advocate when it suits you. You failed to respond to discovery, forcing me to file a motion to cOInpel, which was granted. You refused to cOInply with that Order, filed a frivolous appeal, which was dismissed, and then petitioned for writ of certiorari, which was also disInissed. WIlen I filed a motion for an Order to Show Cause on the discovery Order, you claimed to be pursuing coverage of the counterclaim by an insurance COInpany. You asked for a continuance of the hearing on that basis. We contacted the insurer's claims adjuster and negotiated a very favorable settlement for you of tIle counterclaim, and when you found out, you withdrew the claim, thereby preventing the counterclaim from being resolved. Facing an imIninent hearing on your contumacious disregard for the Court's July 24, 2006 discovery Order after your appeal of it was denied, you decided to "judge shop" and attacked Judge Nielsen to force him to recuse himself. In doing so, you cited unrelated, irrelevant issues and atteInpted to bait hinl witll disparagi11g and caustic relnarks, even though he was polite and respectful towards you at all tilnes, allowed you to sublnit additional argulnent when you caIne to the first hearing unprepared, and gave you additional tilne to find an attorney when we were scheduled to hear on October 4, 2006 your defiance of the July 24, 2006 discovery Order. No good deed goes unpunished, rigllt? You succeeded in having Judge Nielsen step down. There is no effective process for challenging his recusal or having a Court rule on the motive of your Inotioll to disqualify hiIn, but if you were an attorney, the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar would require Ine to file a bJTievance alld you would likely have faced severe sanctions.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie Decell1ber 13, 2006 Page 5

Neil, we offered to settle with you without pursuing our right to attorneys' fees and costs, as ordered by Judge Nielsen in the July 24,2006 Order. You rejected it. We offered to settle the coullterclailTI with your insurer. You withdrew the insurance claim. You are spending a lot of 1110ney on filing fees, court reporter fees, and gasoline to hand-deliver motions and whatnot. It appears you want your day in court, so to speak. Judge Isom has all day on February 5,2007 open. I urge you to a!:,Tfee to set the hearings on that date. We can then tTIove forward and bring this case to resolution.
I hope tl1is clarifies lIlY position oIllnatters, and I look forward to workillg with )lOU.

RCRIso

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN THE STATE OF FlORIDA, IN AND FOR HILLSB)OC)UGH COUNTY

GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff,

Case No. 05-7205

-vs
D.ivision: "H n BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P .A.

A Florida Corporation,
WILLIAM J. COOK,

-----------------------------/
TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE RECORDING

Defendants.

RECEIVED AT:
DATE & TIME:

As Indicated Below

December 12 & 13, 2006

TRANSCRIBED BY: Michael J. Borseth

Court Reporte.r

Notary Public

(ORIGINAL

(COpy

Court Reporter/Legal Transcription

(813) 598-2703

Hichael J. Borseth

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APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
NBIL J. GU,TaSPD 8092 SW 115t.h Loop

Ocala, Florida 34481 (352) 854-7807

For the Defendants:

RYAN CllRIftOPBBR
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IQ)BMS I UQUmB .Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.

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400 North Ashley Drive Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 (813) 489-1001

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* * * * * *
message -

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- this

AUTOMATED ANSWERING MACHING:

MR. RC>OEMS:

Hi Neil, it's Chris Rodems.

It's

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Tuesday, February 7th at about 10:10 in the morning.

I have called JUdge 1som' s chambers this

morning to find some hearing time for the motions

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that we're covering and they have offered

Februa.ry 7, 2007, at 10 a .m. for two hours. If

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you're available that day we can start with the two

motions for reconsideration or rehearing that you

filed. And then depending on her rUling go into And

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the motions that a.re pending that we filed.

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that would be the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and Strike

Counterclai~

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-- Counterclatm, dated

Fe.bruary 8th, 2006 - actually, that's your motion,

that hasn't been finished.

As you reca.ll, JUdge Nielsen started hearing

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it on Apri.l 25th, 2006, and made rUlings on

portions of it but did not finish it.

So we would

need to discuss with JUdge Isom whether she 'wishes to adopt his partial rUlings or hear the thing from
the begi.nning.

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In the event that she wishes to

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hear it from the beginning we should be ready to argue it from the beginning_

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Defendant '5 Motion - Amended Motion for Sanction.s

The other two motions that we have pending are

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pursuant to Section 57.105 that was filed on

Ma.y 3rd, 2006.
And then Defendant t s Motion for

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Order to Show Cause why parties should not be held

in contempt of Court, which was dated August 25th

of 2006.

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So if you're available on February 7th, for

two hours beginning at ten a.m., we can hear all of

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those motions.

The office number is 813-489-1001.

And if you could call me back as soon as possible

and let me know, I p.romised the Judge's judicial

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assistant, Joyce, that I would call her back

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probably today one way or the other. So I look forward to hea.ring from you.
out of the office now.

I m

If you have caller 10 t.his

is actually my home phone I'm call.ing you from and

I will be here for a little bit longer this

morning. But if you could call me back at the

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office and leave me a message, 813-489-1001.

And I

look .forward to hearing from you.

Bye-bye.
AUTOMA.TED ANSWERING MA.CHING:

Thank you Neil.

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To replay this

message press 1.

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message sender's call press 8.

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(Whereupon, the above message was
concluded. )

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* * * * *
MR. RODEMS:

* * *

* * * * * *
It s

Hi Neil, it's Chris Rodems.

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about ten

clock on Wednesday, December 13th and

I'm following up from your fax yesterday.

By the

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way, you're greeting says; hi, this is Neil, leave

me a message and I 1 11 get back to you. what I'm doing.
Judge 180m does have February 5th ava.ilable

So that's

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all day.

So we can cover all of the motions at

I understand you're not available on

that time.

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Fe.bruary 7th, so let me know of your availabi.lity

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on February 5th.
What I cannot do is wait to schedule hearing.s

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on your claims that you're going to hire counsel.

You have been saying this since October, and you
have done nothing.
You had plenty of time to hire

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counsel.

I know that you have talked to a numbe.r

of counsel, because you say so every time you file a court pleading.
I

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also disagree with your fax in that it says

I

that I threatened lawyers that were helping you.

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ha:ve not even spoken to any of the lawyers about

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your case ever.

What I did do is I sent to those

three lawyers that you claimed made al.l of these

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disparaging and despicable conments about Judge Nielsen, I sent them a copy of the letter that you
filed in the court file in which you att.ributed

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anonj1InOus statements to the three of them.

Because

as an Officer of the Court and as a Member of the Bar, I do think that they are entitled to know when
someone is out there spreading statements

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attributed to them to the Judges, to be very

damaging on somebody' s career to have someone I.ike

you, a pro se litigant of dubious distinction,

spreading claims that these attorneys have made

disparaging conments about the Judge. they were entitled to know.
that letter.

I thought

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That's why I sent them

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Obviously, if any of the three of them feel

they need to correct your statements or deny attribute - the statements you attribute to them,

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they're free to do that.

discussions with them and
I sent to them.

But I have had no

I

do have the E-Mail that

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And your cla.im that I threatened

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them is just another fabrication on your part.

I

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would also point out that the problem that

you t re having in retaining counsel is probab.ly more

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likely related to the fact that you are cheap and

you don't want to pay the attorneys what they're

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usual hours rates are for litigat.ion like this, or

the fact that your history of filing Bar grieva.nces

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against attorneys is well known.

That you threatened to file three against Bill

Cook in this case, all three of which were denied

out of hand.

And you also filed claims against a And I suspect that

Judge in Pinellas County.

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you're probably drafting a complaint against me

right now as we speak for, you know, my zealous

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represent.ation of my clients, which I know you dontt agree with. They also are aware of the statements that you
have made aga.inst Judge Nielsen, obviously, since
this is a public record now your .lette.rs that you

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filed in October and the motion that you filed to

disqua.lify him.

And quite frankly, the letters are

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so bizarre and. filled with ju.st despicable allegations unrelated to the case, that I suspect that they don't want to have anything to do with
you because they question your veracity and your

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credibility.

I certainly do.

But I think that

that more than likely explains the reasons that youtre not retaining counsel, not the fact that I

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sent them a one-line letter that said; here's the

letter that Bill Gillespie filed, you probably should take a look at it, as an Officer of the

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Court, of course. So there has 'been no effective threatening of

anybody.

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I 1 ve never threatened you at any time.

You keep saying this in all of your Court filings. But what you keep referring back to is my statement
to you that because of your defamation of my
clients that you will pay. And Ultimately, in the

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end, I believe that that will be the case.

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believe that you will have to pay because yo'u

canno't just go around and defame people without
expecting to be held accountable for that.

And

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that' s all that we have ever tried to do is a.sk you

to honor the agreement that you made and to act

decently.

And in.stead, what we always seem to

receive fram you are grievances, complaints,

scandalous allegations.
And then on top of all

that you alway.s fall back on your medical

condition, which I have never seen any documentation of, that you always allude to that in
your Court filing.s.

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And quite frankly, you play

the victim when it suits you and you play the

advocate when it suits you and you try to double

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deal against people all the time.

Your mi.sdea.lings

and your mult.iple lawsuits over the years certainly

support that.
If you would care to ta.lk about any of this I

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would be more than happy to talk to you about it. We will have a chance to inquire about all of this when we get to take your deposition.
AUTOMATED ANSWERING MACHING:
But I _.

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,.. ....... - . ,v

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF

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HILLSBOROUGH

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If Michael J. Borseth, Court Reporter

for the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for
Hillsborough County, 00 HEREBY CERTIEY, that I was authorized to and did transcribe a tape/CD recording of

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...~~ ........

the proceedings and evidence in the above-styled cause,

as stated in the caption hereto, and that the foregoing

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pages constitute an accurate transcription of the tape

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recording of said proceedings and evidence, to the best of my ability.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I tlave hereunto set my hand

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in the City of Tampa, County of Hillsborough, State of Florida, this 17 December 2006. MICHAEL J. BORSETH, Court Reporter

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants.
--------------

CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

DIVISION: H

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO COMPEL RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS TO STOP HARASSING BEHAVIOR Plaintiff pro se, Neil J. Gillespie, moves the Court for an Order compelling Ryan Christopher Rodems to stop his ongoing harassing behavior directed at him, and as grounds therefor would state: 1. Ryan Christopher Rodems made a false verification against Plaintiff in

Defendants Verified Request For Bailiff and for Sanctions submitted March 6, 2006. It was a stunt that backfired when a tape recording proved Mr. Rodems lied under oath to gain an advantage over Plaintiff. Mr. Rodems' perjury led to the recusal of the Honorable Richard A. Nielsen and embarrassed the Court. While these stunts may be commonplace for lawyers of Mr. Rodems' ilk, they are very upsetting to normal people. Currently there is a motion before the Court to show cause why Mr. Rodems should not be held in criminal contempt for perjury. 2. In an ongoing effort to annoy, offend, and harass Plaintiff, Mr. Rodems

refuses to address him by his surname, "Mr. Gillespie", and instead calls Plaintiff by his

Page - 1 of3

first name "Neil" or "Neily". Plaintiff requested Mr. Rodems not to do this, by certified letter dated December 22, 2006, but Rodems persists. (Exhibit 1). If Mr. Rodems invokes "Neily" as a term of love and endearment, Plaintiff states he is not interested in man-love, and considers Mr. Rodems' overture an unwanted sexual advance. 3. Mr. Rodems has engaged in name-calling directed at Plaintiff, specifically

calling Plaintiff "cheap". Plaintiff views this as an ethnic insult derogatory to his Scots Irish heritage. In a five-page diatribe dated December, 13, 2006, Mr. Rodems wrote that " ...you are cheap and not willing to pay the required hourly rate for representation." (Rodems' letter, Dec-13-06, p.3, ~1). Mr. Rodems is insinuating that Plaintiff wants a lawyer "Scot-free". In a ranting telephone message of even date, Mr. Rodems again called Plaintiff "cheap". This is what Mr. Rodems said: "I would also point out that the problem that you're having in retaining counsel is probably more likely related to the fact that you are cheap and you don't want to pay the attorneys what they're usual hours rates are for litigation like this ... ". And again in his letter of December 13,2006, Mr. Rodems made a very broad, damming statem_ent: "You, apparently, from your comments to me and in court filings, are unwilling to pay an attorney fairly for the work that would need to be done. In fact, you even moved the Court to have an attorney appointed for you at the government's expense. Of course, there is no provision under the ADA for appointment of counsel, but the fact that you believe the government should foot the bill for you to file baseless lawsuits is entirely consistent with your actions in this case and past cases." (Rodems' letter, Dec-13-06, p.2, ~7). Again, Mr. Rodems is making an ethic slur against Plaintiff's Scots-Irish background. In the instant case, Mr. Rodems will be liable for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 768.79 Florida Statutes when Plaintiff prevails.

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4.

In addition to ethnic slurs, Mr. Rodems has engaged in name-calling

throughout this litigation, including this from his five-page diatribe: " ... 1 recognize that you are a bitter man who apparently has been victimized by your own poor choices in life." (Rodems' letter, l)ec-13-06, p.1,
~3).

Mr. Rodems appears to be projecting his own

fears, like his poor choice when he decided to lie to Judge Nielsen in his false, perjurious verification of March 6, 2006. Mr. Rodems also called Plaintiff a "pro se litigant of dubious distinction". (Rodems' phone message, Dec-13-06, p.6, line 12). In fact, Mr. Rodems is only jealous because Plaintiff recently prevailed as a pro se litigant against HSBC Bank in federal court (Gillespie v. HSBC, 5:05-cv-362-0c-10GRJ), and has been able to move the instant case along despite his dirty tricks, name-calling, and harassment. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court enter an Order requiring Mr. Rodems to address him as "Mr. Gillespie", to stop engaging in ethic slurs, and cease and desist all ad hominem abusive messages and letters. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of February, 2007.

':---h //
.,/.-:7 /' /,//
~4

()7. ~.{/ k~.

~C'l'

_ ________

e . GilleSpie, Plaint . 8692 SW t15 th Loop' Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 502-8409 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished by fax and US mail to Ryan Christopher Rodems, Attorney, Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100, Tampa, Florida 33602, this 2 nd day of February, 2007.
~~

":~~. /h J. Gill pe
.., /

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/ ,.

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Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115 Loop Ocala., Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 502-8409 lJS CERrrIF'IED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT Article No. 7005 3110 0003 7395 1887 l)ecember 22, 2006
I~yan Christopher Rodems, Attorlley at Law 13arker, "Rodems & Cook, P.A. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 rratnpa, f'lorida 33602
th

RE: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., case no.: 05-CA-7205, Div. H
[)ear Mr. Rodems, Kindly take notice tllat we are not on a first name basis, and I request that you address l1le as lOlOMr. Gillespie"". I have made this request to you several times, in writing, and still you refuse to comply. I address you as "Mr. Rodems", so I do not understalld the problem. Mature adults in civilized society do this as a matter of course, so again, I do not lltlderstand yo"ur difficulty. Let me remind you that I atn ten years YOllr senior, which only reinforces the social protocol that you address me as "Mr. Gillespie". As for your immature, childisll remark left on lny voice mail, your statement tllat because tlle greeting on my voice mail says "Hi, this is Neil, leave a message and I'll get back to YOll", that you somehow construe this as giving you permission to use IllY first natTIe, this is further evidence that you are unfit to serve as counsel in tllis lawsuit. It also calls into question your mental fitness to be a lawyer, in my view. (Exhibit A). I al11 providing a copy of this letter to the Court, and I am including it ill the record. At trial, with you on the witness stand, I will questioll you about tllis lnatter, to give tIle C:ou11 and the jury some idea about how ul1professional you are, and to provide a glinlpse itltO tIle nightmare of being your client at Barker, Rodems & Cool<, P.A. l>lease address me as "Mr. Gillespie" at all times and govern yourself accordingly.
Sincerely.,

~\f
Neil J. Gillespie cc: 'fhe l~lonorable Claudia R. Isom enclosure., page 5, transcript of Mr. Rodems' phone n1essage ofDec-13-06

EXHIBIT

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR IDLLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA FAMILY LAW DIVISION

IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF JONATHAN ALPERT,

Former Husband ELIZABETH ALPERT, Former Wife.

---------------,/
STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH ) )ss.: )

Case No.: 29-2001-DR-4977-C

RECeIVED

SEP 11 2003
.CLERK OF CIRCUITCOURT

AFFIDAVIT Before me the undersigned authority personally appeared Jonathan L. Alpert, personally known to me, who upon being duly sworn deposed upon oath as follows: 1. My name is Jonathan L. Alpert and I am a party in that lawsuit styled Alpert v. Alpert, Case No. 29-2001-DR-4977-C. 2. I make the following statements in this Affidavit of my own personal knowledge.

3. I have reasonable and well-founded fear that I will not receive a fair trial in Hillsborough County, Circuit Court, Division C, where the above-captioned suit is pending on account ofthe prejudice Judge Monica Sierra ofthat Court has against me for the following facts and reasons: a. Judge Sierra has refused for over five months to set a hearing on my Motion to Stay Pending Appeal, and has instead set for hearing all pending motions on September 11, 2003 for two hours, including some ten (10) Motions for Contempt of Court that have been filed against me due to Judge Sierra's refusal to set an earlier hearing; Judge Sierra has shown by her sua sponte ruling, not raised by counsel, refusing to complete the record on appeal, that she is even intent on denying me my appellate rights. In fact, both lawyers have agreed that not only did Judge Sierra have the jurisdiction to rule on the Motion, which she decided

b.

10

on her own without any suggestion of counsel that she did not, but that her ruling was erroneous. c.
I contributed to Judge Sierra's opponent, my former law partner Woody 1som, in last fall's election and supported him, which fact has now been specifically called to Judge Sierra's attention in "summaries" prepared by Elizabeth Alpert's counsel;

d.

In the conduct of these proceedings, the method and timing thereof, Judge
Sierra has shown bias or prejudice so that I can not get a fair trial in front of Judge Sierra because she is detennined to prevent me from timely exercising my appellate rights and also from receiving a fair trial as ten (10) contempt motions and Motion To Stay Pending Appeal and Motion For Temporary Reduction In Alimony can not possibly be heard in conjunction with one another, particularly in the two hours which Judge Sierra has scheduled for it.

e.

I believe that Judge Sierra is biased against me as she has shown by her facial expressions, demeanor, and conduct ofthe proceedings that the such bias and prejudice against me exists I belive that Judge Sierra prepared her April contempt order against me before my lawyer had even filed a response, even though Judge Sierra gave my lawyer permission to file a response. Judge Sierra at the hearing on September 11, 2003, further demonstrated and evinced her bias and prejudice by her facial expressions, demeanor, and conduct and the cumulative effect of her prejudicial conduct only became sufficiently manifest so as to warrant disqualification under Florida Statute Section 38.10 at that time.

f.

Further affiant sayeth not.

Subscribed and sworn to before me thO ll-..JJayof Alpert who is personally known to me.

,2003 by Jonathan L.

Notary Public

Page 1 of 1

Neil Gillespie
From: "Woody Isom" <AWoodsonIsomJr@merlinlawgroup.com> To: <neilgillespie@mfi.net> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 4:35 PM Subject: Re: Jonathan Alpert He and I were shareholders at Fowler White for a period of time prior to my leaving the firm in Jan. 1985.

A. Woodson Isom, Jr. Attorney Merlin Law Group, P.A. 777 S. Harbour Island Blvd. Suite 950 Tampa, FL 33602 Tel: (813) 229-1000 Fax: (813) 229-3692 Web: www.merlinlawgroup.com

PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE The information contained in this e-mail and any attachments may be legally privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the transmittal to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this e-mail is strictly prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender and permanently delete the e-mail and any attachment immediately. You should not retain, copy or use this e-mail or any attachment for any purpose, nor disclose all or any part of the content to any person. Thank you.

From: Neil Gillespie <neilgillespie@mfi.net> To: Woody Isom Sent: Tue Mar 23 16:15:25 2010 Subject: Jonathan Alpert Mr. Isom, While researching a disability issue claimed by Jonathan Alpert, I found his affidavit of September 11, 2003 naming you as his former law partner (paragraph "c"). Is that true, where you a law partner with Mr. Alpert? A PDF of the affidavit is attached. If I dont hear from you I will assume the affidavit is correct and that you were in fact a law partner of Mr. Alpert. Thank you. Neil Gillespie

11
4/16/2012

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR IDLLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA FAMILY LAW DIVISION

IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF JONATHAN ALPERT,

Former Husband ELIZABETH ALPERT, Former Wife.

---------------,/
STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH ) )ss.: )

Case No.: 29-2001-DR-4977-C

RECeIVED

SEP 11 2003
.CLERK OF CIRCUITCOURT

AFFIDAVIT Before me the undersigned authority personally appeared Jonathan L. Alpert, personally known to me, who upon being duly sworn deposed upon oath as follows: 1. My name is Jonathan L. Alpert and I am a party in that lawsuit styled Alpert v. Alpert, Case No. 29-2001-DR-4977-C. 2. I make the following statements in this Affidavit of my own personal knowledge.

3. I have reasonable and well-founded fear that I will not receive a fair trial in Hillsborough County, Circuit Court, Division C, where the above-captioned suit is pending on account ofthe prejudice Judge Monica Sierra ofthat Court has against me for the following facts and reasons: a. Judge Sierra has refused for over five months to set a hearing on my Motion to Stay Pending Appeal, and has instead set for hearing all pending motions on September 11, 2003 for two hours, including some ten (10) Motions for Contempt of Court that have been filed against me due to Judge Sierra's refusal to set an earlier hearing; Judge Sierra has shown by her sua sponte ruling, not raised by counsel, refusing to complete the record on appeal, that she is even intent on denying me my appellate rights. In fact, both lawyers have agreed that not only did Judge Sierra have the jurisdiction to rule on the Motion, which she decided

b.

on her own without any suggestion of counsel that she did not, but that her ruling was erroneous. c.
I contributed to Judge Sierra's opponent, my former law partner Woody 1som, in last fall's election and supported him, which fact has now been specifically called to Judge Sierra's attention in "summaries" prepared by Elizabeth Alpert's counsel;

d.

In the conduct of these proceedings, the method and timing thereof, Judge
Sierra has shown bias or prejudice so that I can not get a fair trial in front of Judge Sierra because she is detennined to prevent me from timely exercising my appellate rights and also from receiving a fair trial as ten (10) contempt motions and Motion To Stay Pending Appeal and Motion For Temporary Reduction In Alimony can not possibly be heard in conjunction with one another, particularly in the two hours which Judge Sierra has scheduled for it.

e.

I believe that Judge Sierra is biased against me as she has shown by her facial expressions, demeanor, and conduct ofthe proceedings that the such bias and prejudice against me exists I belive that Judge Sierra prepared her April contempt order against me before my lawyer had even filed a response, even though Judge Sierra gave my lawyer permission to file a response. Judge Sierra at the hearing on September 11, 2003, further demonstrated and evinced her bias and prejudice by her facial expressions, demeanor, and conduct and the cumulative effect of her prejudicial conduct only became sufficiently manifest so as to warrant disqualification under Florida Statute Section 38.10 at that time.

f.

Further affiant sayeth not.

Subscribed and sworn to before me thO ll-..JJayof Alpert who is personally known to me.

,2003 by Jonathan L.

Notary Public

Page 2 of 4

28 STETLR 323 28 Stetson L. Rev. 323

Page 1

Stetson Law Review Fall, 1998 Essay *323 PROFESSIONALISM AND LITIGATION ETHICS Hon. Claudia Rickert Isom [FNa1] Copyright (c) 1998 by Hon. Claudia Rickert Isom My first assignment as a newly elected circuit judge was to the family law division. Although I considered myself to be an experienced trial attorney, I was somewhat naive about my role as a judge presiding over discovery issues. I assumed that the attorneys assigned to my division would know the rules of procedure and the local rules of courtesy. I also assumed that, being knowledgeable, they would comply in good faith with these provisions. I soon learned that attorneys who were entirely pleasant and sociable creatures when I was counted among their numbers, assumed a much different role when advocating for litigants. For example, take Harvey M. (not his real name). Harvey and I had bantered for years, having many common interests. Perhaps this familiarity gave rise to, while not contempt, a certain lackadaisical attitude about complying with case management and pretrial orders. Harvey challenged me to establish my judicial prerogative and assist him in achieving goals not of his own making. A common assumption regarding family law is that clients receive the quality of legal representation that they deserve. However, my time in the family law division has convinced me that this is not necessarily true. Often times, a case that has wallowed along, seemingly hung up in endless depositions and discovery problems, becomes instantly capable of resolution by bringing all parties together in the context of a pretrial conference. Apparently, some attorneys feel that cutting up is a large part of what their clients expect them to do. When this litigious attitude begins to restrict the trial court's ability to effectively bring cases to resolution, the judge must get involved to assist the process. Recently, the Florida Conference of Circuit Court Judges conducted an educational seminar designed to guide circuit judges in appropriately responding to unprofessional and unethical behavior. [FN1] Various scenarios were presented on video, after which the *324 judges voted on what they felt would be the appropriate court response. A surprising number of judges voted to impose sanctions or report unethical behavior to the Florida Bar Grievance Section. However, the most common response was to do nothing or to privately counsel the offending attorney. A common theme at meetings of the Florida Bar Standing Committee on Professionalism is that, while attorneys can aspire to greater professionalism, the courts can be a bully pulpit to encourage professional behavior. Perhaps the perceived backlash of cracking down on unprofessional behavior is unrealistic for Florida's circuit judges who are elected officials. However, that perception shapes the judicial response, even when responding theoretically at a seminar.

2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

12
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Page 3 of 4

28 STETLR 323 28 Stetson L. Rev. 323

Page 2

The Joint Committee of the Trial Lawyers Section of the Florida Bar and the Conferences of Circuit and County Court Judges' 1998 Handbook on Discovery Practice admonishes trial judges to fully appreciate their broad powers to end discovery abuses and the 1998 Handbook reassuringly states that the appellate courts will sustain the trial court's authority if it is exercised in a procedurally correct manner. [FN2] Once again, this rallying cry ignores the reality of our situation. As a new judge, the lessons urged by bar leadership have been a matter of trial and error (pun intended). Harvey quickly established his reputation, not as a fellow member of my legal community, but as a problematic litigator whose behavior had to be controlled and modified by court order for the legal process to smoothly progress. For example, hearing time was made available to address discovery issues, very specific orders were entered regarding who was to do what, when, and how, verbal commitments were elicited on the record about document production and interrogatory responses, in an attempt to avoid additional hearings. Cases involving Harvey were, by necessity, intensely case managed. Resentment, of course, is a by-product of such intensive case management. Attorneys may perceive that the court is trying to prevent them from earning additional attorney fees by streamlining the process. However, clients rarely complain once they realize that the underlying purpose is to bring the case to timely resolution. In Harvey's case, extreme tools--reporting Harvey to the Florida*325 Bar, striking responses, striking witnesses, imposing financial sanctions, and conducting contempt hearings-- were never implicated. What did happen was that Harvey trained me to be a better judge by showing me how, in a nonconfrontational manner, I could effectively case manage Harvey and similar counsel without having to take off the gloves. Fortunately, not every litigator requires the case management skills of a Harvey situation. Most attorneys are well-intentioned, have a legitimate interest in pursuing discovery efficiently, and do not seek to unnecessarily delay the resolution of a case. What a relief it is to have a case with opposing counsel who are both of this school of thought. New attorneys, or attorneys who are appearing in front of a judge for the first time, must remember that their reputation is primarily built on the judge's personal experiences with them. No bench book exists with a list of which attorneys are trustworthy professionals and which are not. Instead, the individual judge keeps a mental catalog of experiences. For example, does this attorney routinely generate complaints from opposing counsel in other cases about not clearing depositions with their office? Is this attorney often the subject of motions to compel? Can this attorney be trusted when he tells you that the responses to interrogatories are in the mail? Once a negative reputation has been established with the court, an attorney's job will be much more challenging in establishing credibility with the court. And certainly, with so many issues up to the court's discretion, an attorney's reputation as trustworthy and ethical is of utmost importance. And, what about Harvey? Do his clients suffer? Of course they do. But, with effective case management and an experienced judiciary, the damage and delay caused by the Harveys of this world can be minimized while still allowing clients the freedom to choose their own counsel.

[FNa1]. Circuit Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Tampa, Florida, 1991-Present; B.S.Ed., University of Iowa, 1972; J.D., Florida State University, 1975; Vice-Chair and member, Florida Bar Standing Committee on Professionalism; Assistant State Attorney, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 1979-1982; District VI Legal Counsel, Florida

2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&prft=HTMLE&fn=_top&mt=31... 5/20/2010

Page 4 of 4

28 STETLR 323 28 Stetson L. Rev. 323

Page 3

Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 1984-1986; Shareholder, Isom, Pingel and Isom-Rickert, P.A., 1986-1990. [FN1]. See ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING OF FLORIDA CONFERENCE OF CIRCUIT JUDGES: PROFESSIONALISM PROBLEM SOLVING (1998). [FN2]. See JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE TRIAL LAWYERS SECTION OF THE FLORIDA BAR AND CONFERENCE OF CIRCUIT AND COUNTY JUDGES 1998 HANDBOOK 8-9 (1998). 28 Stetson L. Rev. 323 END OF DOCUMENT

2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&prft=HTMLE&fn=_top&mt=31... 5/20/2010

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plailltiff: CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

vs.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants.
--------------

DIVISION: H

PLAINITFF'S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

TO: Ryan Cllristopher RodelTIs YOU ARE NOTIFED that plaintitfpro se dismisses this action without prejlldice pursuant to Rule 1.420(a). Defendants' counterclaim can remain for adjudicatioll. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of February, 2007.
th

~ il J. Gill~Spie~ ~Plaintlf{ pro'-se r8092 SW {15 th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 502-8409
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing 11as been furnished by fax alld

US mail to Ryan CI1fistopher Rodems, Attorney, Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100, Tan1pa, Florida 33602, this 7 day of Febrllary, 2007.
th

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J. Gill~ie'

13

IN THE CIRCIJIT COIJRT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants.
/
BARKER~

CASE. NO.: 05-CA-7205

DIVISION: H

PLAINITFF'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

Plaintiff pro se moves the Court for an Order of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice pursuant to Rule 1.420(a)(2). Defendants' counterclaim can remain for adjudication. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of February, 2007.
th

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eil J. Gi)lespi I, Plaintijf'pro se 092 SW IIS th Loop / Ocala, Florida 34481 Telephone: (352) 502-8409 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished by US mail to Ryan Christopher Rodems, Attorney, Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 400 North Ashley

Drive, Suite 2100, Tampa, Florida 33602, this 7 day ~~ 2007.

th

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C.' /' ~ I ~~/t:.':/
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14

The Florida Bar's Online Lawyer Referral Service

Page 1 of2

o
-. Lawyer Referral Service

o
You have been referred to:
Robert W. Bauer
2815 NW 13th St Ste 200E Gainesville FL 32609-2865 PH: (352) 3755960

PrintZlble Version

Referral Confirmation PLEASE PRINT AND BRING THIS CONFIRMATION FORM WITH YOU TO THE LAWYER'S OFFICE. sf 7. c~ 7

/ll1~Mj

:::------

3?~fH

FOR THE FOLLOWING AREAS OF LAW: Ubel & Slander

THE LAWYERS ON THE FLORIDA BAR LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE A HALF HOUR OFFICE CONSULTATION FOR NO MORE THAN $25.00. PLEASE CALL THE LAWYER'S OFFICE TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT. THE LAWYER WILL NOT CONTACT YOU. PLEASE REMEMBER TO INFORM THE OFFICE THAT YOU WERE REFERRED BY THE FLORIDA BAR LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE.

TO HELP YOU PREPARE FOR YOUR CONSULTATION, PLEASE CONSIDER READING THE FOLLOWING FLORIDA BAR CONSUMER PAMPHLETS:

YOU ARE UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO HIRE THE LAWYER. THE LAWYER IS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO TAKE YOUR CASE. YOU MUST CONTACT THE REFERRED LAWYER BEFORE MAKING ANOTHER REFERRAL REQUEST.

Your lawyer was selected based on the information provided below: You requested a lawyer who is licensed in: Florida and willing to work in, but not located in a specfic county What county: Marion We have several attonery panels, please select the panel you need: Regular What area of law do you need an attonery for? Libel & Slander Do you have a special language requirement? Must the attorney be willing to make a Jail call? No Personal Information: Nell Gillespie 8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala FL 34481 35218547807

15
2/26/2007

http://www.floridabar.org/DIVPGM/LROnline.nsf/All/CVJTYADWFN6TFL3 ?OpenDocwnent

Robert W. Bauer
From:
Sent: To: Subject:

Ryan C. Rodems [rodems@barkerrodemsandcook.com]

Thursday, May 03, 2007 10: 19 AM

rwb@bauerlegal.com
RE: Gillespie hearings

Robert: So that there is no misunderstanding, we do not agree to any delays in compliance with the July 24, 2006 discovery order. Ht'~ha-s"'been"Errit-ered~t:ha-l<letigedbefo::trt.neseco'rid'-:-I5l:A:ahcl again before Judge Isom. We will notice our hearings on one of the agreed dates, and notice will be sent ASAP. Rule 1.170 addresses Sincerely,

counterclaims.~am serving

the 57.105 motion today.

Ryan Christopher Rodems

Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.
400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100
Tampa, Florida 33602
813/489-1001
E-mail: rodems@barkerrodemsandcook.com
NOTICE: This message (including attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, is intended to be confidential, and is also protected by the attorney-client privilege or other privilege. It is not intended for review or use by third parties or unintended recipients. If you are not the intended recipient, you are requested to delete the data and destroy any physical copies. Any retention, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.

-----Original Message---- From: Robert W. Bauer [mailto:rwb@bauerlegal.com] Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2007 10:11 AM To: Ryan C. Rodems Cc: 'Neil Gillespie' Subject: RE: Gillespie hearings I'm sorry if there has been some confusion, but I believed I had responded to your inquiry about discovery. When we first spoke I advised over the phone that I fully intended to comply with the discovery demands as required by the court. You informed me that I would be afforded whatever time I needed to get up to speed in the case. If you have a deadline for discovery I would be happy to comply with that. However, it seems reasonable to first deal with the outstanding motions so that it can be determined if discover is required at
all.

I did responded in my email that I would contact you Tuesday. I apologize that I was not able to do so until Wednesday morning. I did not think it would be a problem. However, I felt that the courtesy email copy of the memorandum clearly complied with your request for clarification as to our position on the future of the case. If you have any further questions please feel free to call. I am available for any of the 7/3, will be set aside. 7/5 or 7/16 dates at 9:30. Please advise how much time

I have read rule 1.100(a) and you will note that the wording of it does not even allow for a counter-claim - actually by implication it bars a counterclaim. It only allows for an answer to a counterclaim - but not the counterclaim itself. However, clearly
1

16

is a strange pleading. In the interest of cooperation I will be happy to rename the counter-counter claim just a counter claim if that would satisfy your concerns.

counterclaims are allowed.

admit that a

counter-countercla~m

You will note that I attempted to make that point in my memorandum.

As a professional courtesy I would appreciate if you would clearly spell out your reasons as to why you believe I have erred in my motion prior to you filing for 57.105 sanctions. Such threats are not conducive to this case moving forward in a collegial and professional manner. As to the 57.105 issue itself - I am available when there is no colorable cases and reasoning to support it. I have not misquoted their holdings. I frivolous lawsuit. sure that you are aware that such sanctions are only argument at all. My motion states an argument with have carefully reviewed the cases to insure that I believe this greatly surpasses the bar for a

thank you in advance for your thoughtful attention to this matter.

Respectfully Robert W. Bauer, Esq. -----Original Message---- From: Ryan C. Rodems [mailto:rodems@barkerrodemsandcook.com] Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2007 8:59 AM To: Robert W. Bauer Subject: Gillespie hearings Robert:

We are still awaiting to hear from you on when we can set our hearings. Based on your earlier e-mail, I expected to hear from you by Tuesday. I did receive the transmittal of the memorandum/motion yesterday.
I think you need to reconsider the memorandum/motion. We object to the motion for leave to amend because there is no such thing as a "counter-counter complaint", and you are flat wrong on the motion to withdraw the dismissal. Have you even looked at Rule 1.100(a)? I assume you are awarf of the line of cases that hold that a mislabeled pleading or motion is not a nullity. VWe'll send you a 57.105 motion, and you can decide how to proceed. Given Gillespie's bizarre and inappropriate behavior in this case (asking for a court appointed attorney under the ADA, pleading, among other inappropriate defenses, the econom.ic loss rule to our defamation claims, moving twice to DQ the trial judges, appealing a discovery order, writing inflammatory and false statements about a judge in a letter to the court, threatening to slam me against the wall, and telling an insurance company not to indemnify him in the counterclaims), I am surprised you would rely on any portions of the pleadings Gillespie filed. I also again urge you to address the discovery issue. This is at least the third time I have raised it with you, and you have not responded. Gillespie has not answered the discovery Judge Nielsen ordered compelled almost a year ago. Although you have not moved to DQ the trial judges twice -- Gillespie was responsible for that and you did not improvidently appeal the discovery order -- also Gillespie's doing -- you took the case as is. You are now responsible for complying with the court's order. Sincerely,

Ryan Christopher Rodems Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 813/489-1001 E-mail: rodems@barkerrodemsandcook.com NOTICE: This message (including attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communication

Page 1 of 6

Neil Gillespie
From: To: Sent: Subject: "Eugene P. Castagliuolo, Esq." <attorneyepc@yahoo.com> "Neil Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net> Friday, June 10, 2011 3:43 PM Re: communication

when I try to click on the HCSO's link, I get the following message:

Sorry, our systems are too busy to service your request.

Similarly, when I telephoned them my call went into a "black hole" and was never picked up in the Warrants Unit. Last but not least, Rodems' useless assistant put me into his voicemail, where I left a professional but unhappy message. Try to come up with some more money (preferably $1,000 but at least $750). Then, next week, I will file a motion to vacate the writ. I will call the clerk on Monday, and if the file is available for me to view, then I will attempt to get down there on Monday or Tuesday to view the file myself. The good news is that the HCSO seems to be so overwhelmed that they are most probably placing all civil warrants on the back burner. So you have my game plan, now try to borrow some money and stay home this weekend. Eugene

www.CastagliuoloLawGroup.com

www.FilingBankruptcyInTampa.com

Eugene P. Castagliuolo, Esquire

CASTAGLIUOLO LAW GROUP, P. A.
2451 McMullen Booth Road, Clearwater, Florida 33759

(727) 712-3333
Castagliuolo Law Group is a debt relief agency helping people to file for bankruptcy relief under United States Code (11 USC 101-1330).

CONFIDENTIALITY: This e-mail message (and any associated files) from Castagliuolo Law Group, P. A. is for the sole use of the intended recipient or recipients and may contain confidential and privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure, distribution, or other dissemination of this e-mail message and/or the information contained therein is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail message, please contact the sender by reply email or by telephone at (727) 712-3333 and destroy all copies of the original message.

--- On Fri, 6/10/11, Neil Gillespie <neilgillespie@mfi.net> wrote: From: Neil Gillespie <neilgillespie@mfi.net> Subject: Re: communication To: "Eugene P. Castagliuolo, Esq." <attorneyepc@yahoo.com>

17
9/9/2011

Page 1 of2

Neil Gillespie
From: To: Sent: Subject: "Eugene P. Castagliuolo, Esq." <attorneyepc@yahoo.com>
"Neil Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfionet>
Tuesday, June 14, 2011 7:46 PM
Re: your call earlier

~vi,h

"love made m}' ]JetlCe

the

lO/"ti. 1111

55 .vears-olll hut.feellike 85.

//11 lIt

the ellll (~f'the line."

Sorry it's taken me longer than I thought to get back to you. This kind of talk isn't good Neil. You're not at the end of the line until you're at the end of the line. And I don't see you being any closer to the end than I am.
As for a new agreement, this is my suggestion. Give me another $1,000.00 on July 1, and I won't take another dime from you. Consider it a flat fee to get you out from under this writ (BUT WITHOUT entering an appearance in this state court case) and/or to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy for you. The only other things you would have to pay for if we go the bankruptcy route(and these are NOT my fees, they are costs) is the filing fee of $299.00, a credit report fee of $30.00, and the credit counseling fee(s) which will be at most $80.00 (sometimes you can find a cheaper vendor). Based on what I know right now about your case, your debt to this asshole Rodems would be discharged in your Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and he would get NOTHING from you.

Take care, I'll be asleep in an hour, but I will be calling Judge Arnold's chambers first thing tomorrow.

www.CastaqliuoloLawGroup.com

www,Fi/inaSankruptcvlnTampa.com

Eugene P. Castagliuolo, Esquire

CASTAGLIUOLO LAW GROUP, P. A.
2451 McMullen Booth Road, Clearwater, Florida 33759

(727) 712-3333
Castagliuolo Law Group is a debt relief agency helping people to file for bankruptcy relief under United States Code (11 USC 101-1330).

CONFIDENTIALITY: This e-mail message(andanyassociatedfiles)fromCastagliuoloLawGroup.P A. is for the sole use of the intended recipient or recipients and may contain confidential and privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure: distribution, or other dissemination of this e-mail message and/or the information contained therein is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail message, please contact the sender by reply email or by telephone at (727) 712-3333 and destroy all copies of the original message.

--- On Tue, 6/14/11, Neil Gillespie <neilgillespie@]mfinet> wrote:

From: Neil Gillespie <neilgillespie@mfi.net> Subject: your call earlier To: "Eugene P. Castagliuolo, Esq." <attomeyepc@yahoo.com> Date: Tuesday, June 14, 2011, 3:58 PM

18
7/19/2011

18 Cases Related to Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, 05-CA-007205

1. Case No. 05-CA-7205, Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., Hillsborough County, Florida (Mr. Bauer appeared for Gillespie April 2, 2007 through October 1, 2009) Case No. 05-CA-7205, Vexatious libel counterclaim, BRC v. Gillespie, January 19, 2006 September 28, 2010, (Mr. Bauer appeared for Gillespie April 2, 2007 - October 1, 2009)

2.

Cases in the Second District Court of Appeal, Florida

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Case No. 06-3803: Gillespie v. BRC, discovery related appeal (Gillespie pro se) (closed) Case No. 07-4530: BRC v. Gillespie, voluntary dismissal (Mr. Bauer for Gillespie) (closed) Case No. 08-2224: Gillespie v. BRC, 57.105 sanctions (Mr. Bauer for Gillespie) (closed) Case No. 10-5197: Gillespie v. BRC, appeal final summary judgment (Gillespie pro se) (closed) Case No. 10-5529: Gillespie v. BRC, prohibition, remove Judge Cook (Gillespie pro se) (closed) Case No. 11-2127: Gillespie v. BRC, prohibition/venue, Judge Arnold (Gillespie pro se) (closed)

Cases in the Supreme Court of Florida

9. 10. Case No. SC11-858: Gillespie v. BRC, habeas corpus, prohibition (Gillespie pro se) (closed) Case No. SC11-1622: Gillespie v. BRC, mandamus, other relief (Gillespie pro se) (closed)

Cases in the U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division
11. Case No. 10-cv-00503: Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Fla., Civil Rights/ADA (Gillespie pro se) (closed, appeal) Case No. 11-cv00539: Estate/Gillespie v. Thirteenth Jud. Cir., FL., Civil Rights, ADA (Gillespie pro se) (closed, appeal)

12.

Cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

13. Case No. 12-11028-B: Estate/Gillespie v. Thirteenth Jud. Cir., FL., Civil Rights, ADA (Gillespie pro se) (closed) Case No. 12-11213-C: Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Fla., Civil Rights, ADA (Gillespie pro se) (active)

14.

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Cases in the Supreme Court of the United States

15. Rule 22 Application to Justice Thomas May 31, 2011, not docketed/considered. (Gillespie pro se) Emergency Petition for Stay or Injunction, re: Supreme Court of Florida SC11-858 Rule 22 Application to Justice Thomas June 11, 2011, not docketed/considered. (Gillespie pro se) Emergency Petition for Stay or Injunction, re: Supreme Court of Florida SC11-858

16.

Original Litigation
17. Case No. 01-14761-AA, Eugene R. Clement, Gay Ann Blomefield, and Neil Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corporation, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed August 20, 2001 Case No. 99-2795-CIV-T-26C, Eugene R. Clement v. AMSCOT Corporation, class action complaint in United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, filed December 9, 1999

18.

Related links on The Justice Network

http://yousue.org/litigation/ http://yousue.org/the-florida-bar/ http://yousue.org/13th-judicial-circuit-hillsborough-co-florida/ http://yousue.org/bar-complaint-of-robert-w-bauer/ http://yousue.org/turner-v-rogers/ http://www.yousue.org/jnc-judicial-nominating-commission/ http://www.yousue.org/jqc-judicial-qualifications-commission/ http://www.yousue.org/circuit-court-judge-martha-j-cook/ http://yousue.org/ryan-christopher-rodems/

BARKER, RODEMS
CHRIS A. BARKER RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS WILLIAM J. COOK

& COOK
Telephone B13/4B9~ 100 1 Facsimile B13/4B9~ 100B

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100

Tampa, Florida 33602

February 6, 2007

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie 8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

Dear Mr. Gillespie: Following Judge Isom's rulings of February 5, 2007 on your motion to reconsider discovery and your motion to dismiss the counterclaims, enclosed please find two proposed orders. I will transmit these orders to the Judge on Monday, February 12, 2007. If you have any objections, please feel free to write to me. Sincerely,

Ryan Christopher Rodems Enclosures RCR/so

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. Case No.: Division: 05CA7205 H

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -I
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - DISCOVERY
THIS CAUSE having come on to be heard on Monday, February 5, 2007 on "Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration - Discovery," and the proceedings having been read and considered, counsel and Plaintiff having been heard, and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED that "Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration - Discovery" is DENIED. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, this _ _ day of February, 2007.

Claudia R. Isom Circuit Judge copies to: Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esquire Neil J. Gillespie, pro se

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, vs. Case No.: Division: 05CA7205
H

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK, Defendants.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -I
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKE COUNTERCLAIM
THIS CAUSE having come on to be heard on Monday, February 5,2007 on Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss and Strike Counterclaim, and the proceedings having been read and considered, counsel and Plaintiff having been heard, and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss and Strike Counterclaim is DENIED. Plaintiff shall have twenty days from the date that this Order is signed within which to answer the counterclaims. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, this _ _ day of February, 2007.

Claudia R. Isom Circuit Judge copies to: Ryan CI1fistopher Rodems, Esquire Neil J. Gillespie, pro se

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY CIVIL DIVISION

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NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, Case No.: -vsDivision: H BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., A Florida Corporation Defendant. 05-7205

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-----------------------------/

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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 13
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BEFORE:
15 HONORABLE CLAUDIA R. Circuit Judge ISOM

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TAKEN AT:

In Chambers Hillsborough County Courthouse Tampa, Florida February 5, 2007 Commencing at 1:30 p.m. Denise L. Bradley, RPR Notary Public

DATE & TIME: REPORTED BY:

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[ORIGINALI
STENOGRAPHICALLY RECORDED COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION Berryhill & Associates, Inc.

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APPEARANCES:

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On behalf of the Plaintiff:

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NEIL J. GILLESPIE (Pro se litigant) 8092 115th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

On behalf of the Defendant:

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RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, ESQUIRE Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602

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Berryhill & Associates,

Inc.

PRO C E E DIN G S THE COURT: All right. On the record. Would

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everybody please introduce themselves for the record, starting with our court reporter. THE REPORTER: My name is Denise Bradley with

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Berryhill Court Reporters. THE COURT: Okay. And for plaintiff. I'm

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MR. GILLESPIE: appearing pro se. THE COURT: MR. RODEMS:

My name is Neil Gillespie.

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Okay.

And for defense.

Ryan Christopher Rodems here on P.A. and

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behalf of defendants Barker, Rodems and Cook, William J. Cook. THE COURT: Okay.

And we've got several things.

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The first thing is plaintiff's motion for order of protection. Is that still pending? That's not

something we addressed the other day? MR. GILLESPIE: The first thing, in the most

recent order in the most recent scheduling was an order to show cause why Mr. Rodems should not be held in contempt of court. THE COURT: Okay. But before we get into that,

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MR. GILLESPIE: Judge - THE COURT:

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Well, no,

I'm just looking at the

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sanctions, you can do that in this division.

You don't

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have to have a separate cause of action filed within criminal court. MR. GILLESPIE: And, Judge, if I were an attorney

and knew what I was doing I would do that, but that's

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the problem here.

I'm not an attorney.

And I'm not

sure of the procedure.

And I don't want to miss

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dotting an "I" and having this thing not be taken seriously. That's why I felt that it was important to

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be represented by an attorney and that's what I'm trying to do. THE COURT: Okay. Well, since I have several

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things scheduled for today, we're going to pass on the order to show cause and move on to your motion for reconsideration of Judge Nielsen's denial of your motion to disqualify Mr. Rodems from representing I guess himself, his law firm and Mr. Cook, correct? MR. RODEMS: THE COURT: MR. RODEMS: law firm. Actually, Judge - All of those entities? I only represent Mr. Cook and the is that

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I'm not a party to these proceedings. Oh, you only represent the law firm

THE COURT: and Mr. Cook.

Is Mr. Cook still with your firm? Yes, ma'am.

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MR. RODEMS:

Berryhill & Associates,

Inc.

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THE COURT: MR. RODEMS: THE COURT:

Okay. He's my law partner. Okay. So, all right, on your motion

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for reconsideration, why should this Court reconsider or rehear the motion to disqualify counsel? MR. GILLESPIE: Judge, defense counsel has a the plaintiff.

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direct conflict of interest with me,

And this lawsuit turns on a contract which is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 1. The contract -- there's

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some history to the contract because it was signed under the previous law firm, Alpert, Barker, Rodems and

Cook.

And then it became Barker, Rodems & Cook and

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they took the assignment of the contract. They never signed a new contract and there's a whole matter about that. But with regard to -- there

is a contract that forms the basis of this dispute. And that contract was drafted by the defendants. now they're trying to disavow that same contract. that's prohibited by the rules. And And I

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As a matter of fact,

brought the Florida Statutes Annotated and they discuss that. And that's under Rule 4-1.9, conflict of

interest-former client. It says here, thus, a lawyer cannot properly seek to rescind on behalf of the new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client.

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And that's what they're doing here.

They drafted

a contract on my behalf and now they're seeking to rescind that contract on behalf of their new client, which is themselves and Mr. Cook. Also, going into the scope of the matter, when a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction -- and the specific transaction is this contract -- subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interest is clearly prohibited. So at one point they represented my interest directly on the specific contract. a materially adverse position. according to Rule 4-1.9. THE COURT: Okay. So they represented you in a Now they're taking

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And this is prohibited

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legal transaction where you had a written employment agreement with them, is that correct? MR. GILLESPIE: THE COURT: the employment? Yes, Judge. So what was the scope of

All right.

What were they supposed to do for you? Well, the contract was a

MR. GILLESPIE:

contingent fee agreement. THE COURT: Okay. But what was the scope? What

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were they supposed to do for you under this contingent fee agreement? MR. GILLESPIE: Under the contingent fee

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agreement they were representing the interest - it was a lawsuit against the Amscot Corporation. But this

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representation contract primarily dealt with the relationship between myself and the lawyers and how any proceeds were going to be divided. THE COURT: All right. So ultimately did they

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settle your lawsuit or did you go to trial? MR. GILLESPIE: THE COURT: There was a settlement, Judge. And did

There's a settlement, okay.

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you sign a release and a closing statement? MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, and they were subsequently

found to be fraudulent. THE COURT: Okay. So is your law firm holding

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settlement proceeds that have not been distributed? MR. RODEMS: THE COURT: No, Your Honor. Okay. So did your law firm undertake

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representation of Mr. Gillespie after Mr. Alpert had to retire from practicing law? MR. RODEMS: No. Actually what happened, if I

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can give you just a brief history, me, Chris Walker and Bill Cook left the law firm that was then known as Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Farantino and Cook in 2000. Jonathan,

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When we left and started our new firm, Mr. Alpert,

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and all of us agreed that we would contact

our clients and see which ones wanted to stay with

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Mr. Alpert's remaining firm, which was going to be renamed Alpert and Farantino, and which ones wanted to join Barker, Rodems and Cook. Mr. Gillespie elected to

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go with Barker, Rodems and Cook. Then the case proceeded to settlement if I recall correctly. And Mr. Gillespie signed the closing

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statement and a release and received all of his money. THE COURT: MR. RODEMS: THE COURT: And the money was disbursed? Yes. So is this lawsuit then a legal

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malpractice action? MR. RODEMS: No. He's claiming that he went back

and looked at it agaln and figured out a different way that he thinks he should have been paid instead of what he agreed to in the closing statement and what he agreed to in the release and what he directed us to do. MR. GILLESPIE: THE COURT: I would object to that.

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So this is then a contract action. It's a contract action.

MR. GILLESPIE: MR. RODEMS:

He's alleging that we breached our That's what he's alleging.

contingency fee contract.

The previous lawsuit against Arnscot involved the Truth in Lending Act, the federal statute dealing with requirements with lenders. THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. GILLESPIE: THE COURT:

Your Honor

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So in terms of this lawsuit then your So did Judge

firm would be witnesses in the case. Nielsen - MR. RODEMS: Judge. THE COURT:

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Oh, yeah, he considered all of that,

Did he consider the fact that you

guys would be witnesses in the case? MR. GILLESPIE: MR. RODEMS: If it please the Court, Your Honor. Judge. We had a

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May I finish,

hearing in front of Judge Nielsen.

And I attached the

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transcript of that hearing to a letter and sent that to you. Everything that Mr. Gillespie has just

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represented to you was fully addressed in front of Judge Nielsen. MR. GILLESPIE: MR. RODEMS: It was not.

We went through the 4-1.9 argument.

We went through the fact that Mr. Gillespie said I might be a witness. We went through all of that. And

after having heard all of that, his motion to disqualify.

Judge Nielsen denied

And that's why I filed the

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transcript because this motion for reconsideration is nothing more than him trying to get a second bite at the apple after all of the repugnant things he said about Judge Nielsen in his motion to disqualify.

Berryhill & Associates,

Inc.

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MR. GILLESPIE: before Judge Nielsen. about the judge. MR. RODEMS: file MR. GILLESPIE: Court,

I object to that.

This man lied

I didn't say anything repugnant

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Well, there's letters in the court

Your Honor, if it pleases the

I can help the Court understand what Mr. Rodems

is trying -- how he's trying to mislead the Court now. THE COURT: No. I just want to know in terms of

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your motion for reconsideration what's new or different or additional case law. MR. GILLESPIE: THE COURT: What's different here -

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Why should it be reconsidered.

What's different here, Judge,
We

MR. GILLESPIE: turns on

and you have put your hand right on it.

are talking about the contract between myself and the defendant. That is the issue in hand.

What Judge Nielsen did -- and it was a very sleight of hand accompanied by the defendants here. They turned it into -- this was not the same matter because it was a matter of truth in lending law. And I

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don't know whether that was intentional by him or he was just misled by Mr. Rodems. not a truth in lending claim. the representation contract. The issue at hand is The matter at hand is

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Really there are two parallel issues running in the representation, the prior representation. That was

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their representation of me on truth in lending and their representation of me between the law firm and myself. And that's what we're talking about. That was

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not considered last time.

What was considered last

time was whether the truth in lending claim was the issue. And it clearly wasn't. Okay. All right.

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THE COURT:

MR. GILLESPIE: if you look at it. Judge,

And I think the record shows that I'm looking for the transcript,

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that was provided by Mr. Rodems. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Looking at that that

transcript on page ten talks about timeliness,

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under the motion to disqualify I guess they're saying that you filed the motion six to eight months after the litigation began. MR. GILLESPIE: Actually, the first speaking We don't

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motion I made was to have him disqualified. have a transcript of that hearing. accurate.

So that's not

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That was back in September. Did you sign the closing statement on

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THE COURT:

behalf of the law firm? MR. RODEMS: THE COURT: No, Mr. Cook did, Your Honor. Mr. Cook did?

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MR. RODEMS: THE COURT:

Yes. Did you attend the mediation or

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settlement conference or anything regarding this case? MR. RODEMS: Your Honor, I didn't have anything

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to do with the Amscot case at all other than the typical normal things that partners would say to each other in the hallway or at lunch. litigation. I didn't handle the

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I don't recall having any participation in I certainly didn't attend any

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the case at all.

mediations or involve myself in the settlement or the releases or any of the strategy decisions, that. MR. GILLESPIE: Judge, whether or not he was There's an imputed nothing like

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directly involved is immaterial. disqualification. MR. RODEMS: Judge,

if you'll look on page ten we

Ceri~~o

also talked about the case of which is at 797 So.2d 1288. THE COURT: Okay.

vs.

High~ey

Let's go off the record.

want to just review this transcript. MR. RODEMS: Okay. Your Honor, if we have just a

moment may I be excused? 23 24 25 THE COURT: MR. RODEMS: THE COURT: Yes. I just need a moment. Yes.

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J.

(Pause in the proceedings.) THE COURT: Okay, back on the record. I've now I

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had an opportunity to refresh my recollection. believe we used this same transcript earlier in relationship to the hearing. review it again.

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I've now had a chance to

So you feel that in terms of your motion for reconsideration that there was additional information that was not presented to Judge Nielsen that would be important to this decision? MR. GILLESPIE: Well, Judge, if you look at page

five of the transcript, this is where Judge Nielsen is questioning. The Court: I had. This begins on page five, line seven.

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Well, see then there was one clarification

And you actually just read the portion of it.

He made reference to the same or a substantially similar matter to the present controversy. what I'm referring to. I answer: And he asks

Amscot Corporation. Yes, it was

And this is where it gets tricky.

the Amscot lawsuit, but it wasn't the truth in lending portion of the Amscot lawsuit. It was the contingent

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fee contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. And if you go down further the judge asked: the action was brought in federal court? And I responded: Yes, Judge. And

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And he asked again:

Is this the matter that

you're referring to that's substantially similar? And I answer: Yes.

And then Mr. Rodems responds to that further down the page on page six. on line 14: And Mr. Rodems states beginning

The matter that defendants represented Mr.

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Gillespie on was a Truth in Lending Act claim filed in the federal court involving the issues of the Rule
4-1.9.

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And Mr. Rodems goes on at the bottom of page six beginning on line 23, So the case that Mr. Gillespie alleges is substantially the same or similar involved a claim by Mr. Gillespie against Arnscot, a corporation, involving alleged violations of Mr. Gillespie's rights under the Truth in Lending Act. This lawsuit involves

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different parties, different facts and different legal issues. And this is where this matter turns very subtly because what Mr. Rodems said there was correct. that's not what this current lawsuit is about. But We're

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not questioning the Truth in Lending Act or what Arnscot did. We're questioning the contract that is between And it's the same parties, And that is

,..,,..,

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myself and the defendants.

the same facts and the same legal issues.

where Judge Nielsen either missed this or didn't

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consider it properly. My motion for reconsideration beginning on page three discusses the fine points of all of this with references. THE COURT: as witness? Where is the section about a lawyer

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Because I know it talks in there about

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you're permitted to be a witness if you're being sued or you're suing your former clients. might be MR. RODEMS: There is a provision of the Rules Seems like that

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Regulating the Florida Bar that authorizes an attorney - THE COURT: Right. So it seems like that would

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be relevant to this discussion because in this case, if I understand correctly, the plaintiff is suing his former law firm. MR. GILLESPIE: Judge, In my motion for

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reconsideration I don't raise that issue of them being a witness, of them being an advocate. THE COURT: I'm just saying that if you look at

4-3.7, a lawyer as witness, it talks about the scenario where a lawyer may be an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness where the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered In the case. And by extrapolation it

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would seem that that's of assistance in determining whether or not Judge Nielsen made a correct decision. MR. GILLESPIE: Well, that notwithstanding, it

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says when a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests is clearly prohibited. In other words, the defendants are

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prohibited from representing themselves. However, they could testify about this if they were represented by another counsel. represent themselves on this. testimony. But they can't

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So, yes, they can give

They just can't give testimony while

they're representing themselves on this matter. And it also talks about if the lawyer's own conduct in the transaction is in serious question which it is -- it may be difficult or impossible for a lawyer to give the client detached advice. what we have here. And that's

It also goes on to say a suit

charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. If the pleases the Court, I can give you West's Florida Statutes annotated which I'm reading from. Would you care to look at this, THE COURT: Judge.

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I have it in the law library across

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the hall.

And in point of fact,

I recently reviewed it

in connection with a different case where there had been a motion to disqualify counsel. Based upon my review of Rule 4-1.7, 4-1.8, 4-1.9, 4-3.7,

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4-1.10, and this later one I was talking about,

I don't hear anything new in your argument today that Judge Nielsen overlooked or failed to address whenever he ruled on your motion previously. MR. GILLESPIE: motion to go through. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Please continue. Well, I still have more of this

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MR. GILLESPIE:

So is what you're saying, Judge,

that you considered that he was correct in that point of law? THE COURT: I'm just saying looking at the

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transcript it looks like in terms of new information I'm looking to see what's changed. ruling in the supreme court? Is there a recent

Is there something that

was not argued at that time or case law that was materially relevant to the case that was not available to counsel at the time that Judge Nielsen ruled upon the motion? You know, in terms of a motion for

reconsideration I'm looking for some information that would have been overlooked by him or perhaps misinterpreted by him which would seem to be the thrust

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of your arguments thus far. MR. GILLESPIE: Well, one thing that he did not

consider, an attorney can be disqualified if he is opposing a former client from whom he received confidential information. here. And that's what we have And Mr.

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Judge Nielsen did not consider that.

Rodems has already threatened to use some of that confidential information against me. And if you turn

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to page five of the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration there's -- this is taken from the transcript of a conversation. MR. RODEMS: You know, I object at this point,

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Your Honor, because this is what we were getting into earlier. This is a telephone conversation that he And Florida statutes

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didn't get my consent to record.

say that that conversation is illegal and cannot be considered for any purposes by the court in any hearing, except for a hearing prosecuting Mr. Gillespie

for illegally recording the conversation. MR. GILLESPIE: Well, that's not true. And

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that's set forth in my motion for an order to show cause with sufficient case law why that recording was true. And this is -- I'm going to reiterate my request

that I be represented by an attorney because now he is threatening me in open court with a criminal

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prosecution. All things go back to this, Judge, which is why

we shouldn't have even begun this hearing today because he is going to object and threaten me with criminal prosecution. And I need to have an attorney. Now I I've taken

have made accommodations to have that done.

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steps today to have an advertisement placed in the st. Petersburg Times and a paper here in Tampa that is familiar with this representation, Loafing, the Creative

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has done an article about me and Mr. Cook and

his representation of me. And I really think that because of Mr. Rodems' propensity to keep threatening me with criminal acts and criminal violations that I need to have an attorney. THE COURT: I gave you the opportunity early on Now we're just So is it

to strike your order to show cause.

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talking about the motion for reconsideration.

necessary to reference the transcript of that telephone call in order to argue your motion for reconsideration? MR. GILLESPIE: I don't know how to answer that

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from a legal standpoint because I am not an attorney. And I want an attorney because you just heard him

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threaten me with a criminal prosecution. THE COURT: Okay. So we're going to not address

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the mDtion for reconsideration and the motion to disqualify today. What about the motion for

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reconsideration for the discovery motion? MR. GILLESPIE: THE COURT: Well, Judge -

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Do you need to reference that

transcript for the motion for reconsideration of the discovery motion? MR. GILLESPIE: Judge, we can go on with this, What you're saying is

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but it's part of this motion.

that I have -- I'm being prohibited from excluding part of this motion. effective. THE COURT: I'm just saying, I'm responding to And I don't see how it can be

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your statement that you don't want to present anything today without the benefit of legal counsel because of your concern for the comment made by counsel about the use of that transcript of a telephone call. Is there

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<anything today that you can consider that doesn't have to do with the transcript of that telephone call? MR. GILLESPIE: Not really, Judge, because it all

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boils down to his dishonesty.

And if we would have a

transcript of our conversations from the first time I met them there wouldn't be a lawsuit here. don't and that's the problem. This one instance that we do have just a fleeting But we

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glimpse into what went on behind closed doors -- this man is a liar. And it's in black and white. And of Of

course he doesn't want it to come into the hearing. course not. THE COURT: All right. Do you have any motions

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that we can consider today that don't reference - MR. GILLESPIE: Court, Well, Judge, if it pleases the I have a specific

I'm getting confused here.

reference here where he threatened to use a specific piece of prior knowledge. that's not even necessary. But the law states that The rules state that just

the existence of prior representation there is a presumption that privileged information was disclosed. And Judge Nielsen didn't consider that. And that's an I have it

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important part of this motion to disqualify. here. I'm trying to find it.

There is a presumption. Judge? That

Are you familiar with that, THE COURT: Yes,

I'm very familiar with it.

was the basis -- you know,

I was referencing a recent

motion that was brought to disqualify trial counsel. And that was the basis for that ruling. That's the one

that I reviewed all of the annotations and publications you brought with you today referencing that situation. MR. GILLESPIE: Well, Judge Nielsen did not

consider whether confidential information was

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disclosed.

And the rule -- I can't find it here right

now -- but the rule states that it's presumed that it happened and that that's a basis for disqualification. Judge, myself. I'm going to need some time to compose

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The other matter that we haven't discussed is

how my disability impacts the ability to represent myself. We haven't gotten into that. I've offered to

have a hearing on that. THE COURT:

And this is a problem.

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I see that you had talked to Judge

Nielsen about whether or not a civil judge has any ability or funds with which to appoint private counsel. Was that an ADA issue with him?
MR. GILLESPIE: I raised that issue. And let me

just say on the record that I'm not looking for someone to pay the lawyer. I would be happy if the Court would

appoint someone and I'll pay him.

THE COURT: On an hourly basis? Did you go

through the Hillsborough County Bar Association's lawyer referral service? already tried that avenue? MR. GILLESPIE: results from that. that earlier today.
THE COURT: What do you mean? The only Yes, Judge, and I have the And Mr. Rodems had discussion on Didn't you say you had

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discussion I remember you mentioning that you had not

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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK, Petitioners,
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COpy
FYI Only
Case No. 2D07-4530

v.
NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Respondent.

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Opinion filed February 8, 2008. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; James M. Barton, II, JUdge. Ryan Christopher Rodems of Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioners. Robert W. Bauer, Gainesville, for Respondent.

No Aetion Necessary

PER CURIAM. Denied. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(2); Rogers v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 575 So. 2d 214, 215-16 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding that when counterclaim is pending, plaintiff cannot unilaterally dismiss complaint without order of court).

WALLACE and LaROSE, JJ., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., SENIOR JUDGE, Concur.

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