RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO.

14078; 7 MAR 1919] Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on thisreservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised AdministrativeCode, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of theirliberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement inreservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace andorder of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. Facts: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which statesthat provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincialboard. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive orderNo. 2, which says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of theirliberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law. (2) Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Tobias vs. abalos Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following: (1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. (2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. (3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. (4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section Issue: WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional. Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law." As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994 ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners, vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents. Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.: Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides: As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election. Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit: Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as

expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with. Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit: Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited. The contentions are devoid of merit. Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution: . . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit: Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied). Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand. As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity thereof. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994 As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Art. VI, Sec. 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA 7675 is not unconstitutional. xxx As to the contention that Sec. 49 of RA 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Sec. 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. xxx Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on RA 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. Similarly, petitioners additional argument that the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering, which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamoras constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional. Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995 JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents. G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995 JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.: At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati 1 Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated. We find no merit in the petitions. I Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied) In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and 2 bounds with technical descriptions. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical 3 descriptions. We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes 4 and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.: Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served. Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law. Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar. II Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay. We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the 5 constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction. III Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides: Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections

to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied) They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) 6 reapportionment cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in 7 the title of the bill and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a 9 new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province 10 created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their 11 sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty. Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with 12 section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of 13 Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand 14 (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject." WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
8

G.R. No. 85642 February 12, 1990 EMILIO C. MACIAS, II, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERMINIO G. TEVES, respondents. Lenin R. Victoriano and Victoriano L. Tizon for petitioner. Pablo E. Cabahug for private respondent.

PARAS, J.: Questioned in this petition for certiorari are the orders of the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), dated September 12, 1988 and October 26, 1988 denying petitioner's (then protestee) motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration, respectively. Petitioner contends that respondent COMELEC, through its First Division, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing said questioned orders. Petitioner Emilio Macias II and private respondent Herminio G. Teves both ran for the position of Governor of Negros Oriental during the elections held on January 18, 1988. Petitioner was proclaimed Governor by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. The proclamation was actually held, as found by respondent COMELEC, on January 25, 1988 (p. 82, rollo), although the "Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation" evidencing said proclamation was dated January 24, 1988. (Annex "B-11," p. 30, Rollo) On January 24, 1988, or the day before the proclamation, private respondent filed a "Pre-Proclamation Protest Appeal" with the COMELEC, docketed as SPC Case No. 88-212. On January 26, 1988, or the day after the proclamation, private respondent also filed with respondent Commission a "Petition to Set Aside, Suspend the Effects of or Annul the Proclamation of [the Petitioner] as Governor of Negros Oriental." The COMELEC dismissed the private respondent's aforesaid protest and petition on January 30, 1988 and denied his Motion for Reconsideration on April 26, 1988. On February 4, 1988, the private respondent filed a post-election protest with the COMELEC, docketed as Election Protest Case No. 88-14, and paid the docket fee of P200.00, as charged by the Electoral Adjudication Board. On February 12, 1988, the private respondent filed an "Amended Petition-Protest." The petitioner filed his Motion to Dismiss to the Original Petition and Amended Petition on February 23, 1988 and March 3, 1988, respectively. Thereafter, the parties filed their respective memoranda. On September 12, 1988, the COMELEC issued an Order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss. The COMELEC also denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on October 26, 1988. Hence, this Petition. In a resolution dated February 28, 1989, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file simultaneously their respective memoranda. Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not the election protest was seasonably filed; and (2) Whether or not the failure of herein private respondent to allege in his original petition that it was being filed by a candidate who has duly filed his certificate of candidacy and to pay the correct filing fee of P300.00 at the time of the filing of the original petition are

jurisdictional defects which deprived the COMELEC of jurisdiction over his election protest. (p. 131, Rollo) Petitioner submits that the COMELEC should not have taken cognizance of the private respondent's election protest since the same was filed on February 4, 1988 or eleven (11) days after the petitioner's proclamation on January 24, 1988, Petitioner anchors his first argument on the following: (a) the date typewritten in the "Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation" which is the best evidence is January 24, 1988; and (b) that under Sec. 250 of BP 881, the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, a sworn petition contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official, shall be filed within ten (10) daysafter the proclamation of the results of the election. (Italics ours) Petitioner's submission holds no water. As found by respondent COMELEC, the date of proclamation was January 25, 1988. Undeniably, this issue is factual, and as We have held time and again, "where the issues raised are factual, the same is not reviewable by the Supreme Court on certiorari (Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, 166 SCRA 657). And therefore, the election protest filed on February 4, 1988, which is the tenth (10th day from the date of proclamation, January 25, 1988, was wellwithin the prescribed period. Assuming however that the date of proclamation was January 24, 1988, the filing of the protest on February 4, 1988 was still within the period since Private respondent filed a "PreProclamation Protest Appeal" on January 24, 1988 effectively suspending the running of the period for filing an election protest as provided for in Section 248, Article XX of BP 881: Sec. 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation.The filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceedings. Anent the second issue, petitioner argues that because private respondent failed to allege in his original petition that he "duly filed a certificate of candidacy," respondent COMELEC did not acquire jurisdiction over the election protest. Petitioner's argument is untenable. As correctly held by the COMELEC in the assailed Decision: The Commission, First Division, notes that the above-mentioned legal provision does not require that a protest must state that it is being filed "by a candidate who has duly filed his certificate of candidacy." Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides that a protest must be filed by a candidate who has duly filed his certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, without requiring in said section that this matter must be specifically alleged in the protest. The Commission however notes that the original petition and/or protest filed by petitioner on February 4, 1988, pertinently alleges that the petitioner was a candidate for the position of Governor in the Province of Negros Oriental and was voted upon by the electorate during the election held on January 18, 1988. The Commission rules that this allegation substantially complies with the requirements of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code. Be that as it may, the defect if any in the preliminary allegations of the original protest pertinent to the requirements of Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code was cured when protestant filed his amended protest on February 12, 1988, before an answer could be filed by any protestee. Protestee's answer was filed only on February 23, 1988, as disclosed by the records of this Commission. (pp. 3-4, Order; pp. 84-85, Rollo) Petitioner also contends that because private respondent only paid P200 instead of P300 as required under COMELEC Resolution No. 1996, the Commission should have dismissed the protest. The

COMELEC countered that the "blame however, should not be laid on the protestant for failure to pay in full the P300.00 docket fee on February 4, 1988, when the protest was filed considering that the docket clerk of the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department charged the said amount which protestant duly paid. Injustice will result if the instant protest is dismissed for failure of the protestant to pay the full amount of P300.00 docket fee on February 4, 1988, when he filed the original protest considering that it was not protestant's fault that there was underpayment of the docket fee." (p. 84, Rollo) We agree with the contention of the respondent COMELEC. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 27, 1988 is LIFTED. SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 134163-64. December 13, 2000] MUSLIMIN SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODEL MAARA, respondents. [G.R. No. 141249-50. December 13, 2000] RODEL MAARA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSLIMIN SEMA, respondents. [G.R. No. 141534-35. December 13, 2000] RODEL MAARA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSLIMIN SEMA, respondents. DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: Muslimin Sema and Rodel Maara were two (2) of the eleven (11) candidates for city mayor of Cotabato City during the May 11, 1998 elections. During the canvassing of the election returns from the three hundred sixty-two (362) precincts of Cotabato City by the City Board of Canvassers (CBC), numerous petitions for exclusion of election returns were filed. For his part, Sema objected to thirty (30) election returns from the following precincts, namely: Precinct Nos. 295A/A1, 274A/275A, 46A2, 262A/263A, 218A/219A, 178A, 255A/256A, 158A/158A1, 214A/214A1, 104A/104A1, 154A/154A1, 92A, 212A/212A1, 109A/109A1, 184A1; 175A1, 168A/168A1, 233A/233A1, 209A/209A1, 121A1, 275A, 198A/198A1, 237A/237A1, 176A, 213A1/213A2, 241A, 167A, 180A, 103A, 264A/265A/266A and thereafter, filed a petition for exclusion of such returns with the CBC on the ground that the same contained material defects, were allegedly tampered with or falsified, prepared under duress, threat, coercion, and intimidation, or substituted with fraudulent ones. If the 30 election returns were to be excluded, Sema and Maara would obtain 13,338 and 12,484 votes, respectively. Including the 30 election returns, the votes of Sema and Maara would be 13,713 and 15,442, respectively. On May 22, 1998, the CBC issued an order dismissing one hundred-sixteen (116) petitions for exclusion of election returns including the petitions for exclusion filed by Sema with respect to thirteen (13) of the thirty (30) contested returns he filed. On May 23, 1998, the CBC issued another order dismissing fifty-five (55) petitions for exclusion of election returns including Semas petitions for exclusion with respect to fifteen (15) of the remaining seventeen (17) contested returns. In effect then, only two (2) election returns remained contested. No appeal was taken from these orders. Nonetheless, on May 30, 1998, the CBC issued another order dated May 29, 1998, this time granting Semas petition for exclusion of the thirty (30) election returns. A copy of this order was actually served upon Maara in the morning of May 31, 1998. On May 30, 1998, counsel for Maara, already aware of the existence of the May 29, 1998 order, questioned the illegal proceedings of the CBC saying that it had previously ruled upon the inclusion of twenty-eight (28) of said thirty (30) contested returns. In addition, Maara questioned the composition of the CBC, the legality of its proceedings and the capacity of the board to act fairly and judiciously. The latter did not rule on his objection. Upon the resumption of the canvassing in the evening of May 31, 1998, counsel for Maara again called the CBCs attention to the fact that it had already ruled upon and dismissed the petition for exclusion of Sema in its Orders dated May 22, and 23, 1998, and which orders had already become final and executory because no appeal was taken therefrom. But the CBC ignored the manifestation, explaining that the previous orders did not include Semas objections. Consequently, Maaras counsel manifested his intent to appeal from the May 29, 1998 order of the CBC. On May 31, 1998, Sema and the other winning candidates for the City of Cotabato were proclaimed by the CBC. Notably, said proclamation was based on the canvass of only three hundred thirty-two (332) election returns, thirty (30) returns having been excluded from the total of three hundred sixty-two (362) returns pursuant to the CBCs Order of May 29, 1998. On June 2, 1998, Maara filed his written notice of appeal with the CBC.
*

On June 5, 1998, Maara filed his appeal with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), docketed as SPC No. 98-240, questioning the exclusion of the thirty (30) election returns in the canvass and the proceeding of the CBC in promulgating the May 29, 1998 order which he claimed to be illegal. The appeal was anchored on the following grounds: (1) the CBC exceeded its authority in its ruling of May 29, 1998 excluding from the canvass the 30 election returns, considering that the CBC had already dismissed the petition for exclusion in its orders dated May 22 and 23, 1998; (2) the CBC was illegally constituted when it issued its ruling of May 29, 1998 because it was presided by Casan Macadatu, who had already been replaced by Atty. Lintang Bidol effective May 25, 1998; and (3) the CBCs proclamation of Sema as Mayor of the City of Cotabato was invalid as it was only on May 31, 1998 that the CBC completed the canvassing of 362 election returns and it was in the morning of the same day when the Board was not in session that Maara was furnished with a copy of the CBCs questioned ruling of May 29, 1998; such being the case, it was only at nightfall of May 31, 1998 when the Board held session that Maara was able to manifest his intent to appeal from the said ruling. On June 9, 1998, Maara filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of the proclamation of Sema which was docketed as SPC No. 98-262. Initially, the hearing of Maaras appeal and petition for annulment of proclamation was set on June 19, 1998 before the COMELECen banc. However, the hearing was cancelled and the two (2) cases were referred to the First Division of the COMELEC instead. Said cases were then heard on June 27, 1998 by the First Division of the COMELEC afterwhich they were submitted for resolution. On June 29, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC issued an order which reads as follows: Without prejudice to the issuance at a later time of a formal Resolution in these cases, but based on the pleadings, the evidence adduced by the parties during the hearing on June 27, 1998, and the facts established therein, the effects and consequences of the proclamation for the position of City Mayor per Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation dated May 31, 1998 issued by the City Board of Canvassers of Cotabato City is HEREBY SUSPENDED. Respondent Muslimin Sema is directed to cease and desist from taking his oath of office as City Mayor and/or from discharging the functions of said office. The Clerk of the Commission is directed to furnish a copy of this order to the Hon. Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, and Land Bank of the Philippines, thru its branch at Cotabato City. The Regional Election Director, Atty. Hector Masna shall serve immediately to the parties a copy of this [1] Order. Despite the above order of the COMELEC, Sema assumed the office of the city mayor of Cotabato and commenced to discharge the functions of said office. On July 3, 1998, Sema filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Court to annul the order of the COMELEC dated June 29, 1998 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction directing the COMELEC to desist from enforcing the questioned order. The case was docketed as G.R. Nos. 134163-64. As grounds therefor, Sema alleged that: The pendency of the appeal which was apparently filed out of time and the petition for annulment of proclamation is not a sufficient basis to enjoin petitioner from discharging the functions of the contested office especially where, as here, he had already taken his oath of office and assumed the same in accordance with law.

The evidence submitted by the private respondent before the Comelec proved beyond doubt that his appeal (SPC No. 98-240) was filed out of time and that he failed to comply with the requirements of [2] a pre-proclamation controversy. On July 14, 1998, this Court issued a resolution directing the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the issuance of the order of the COMELEC dated June 29, 1998 in SPC Nos. [3] 98-240 and 98-262. On August 17, 1999, this Court directed the COMELEC to resolve SPC Nos. 98-240 and 98-262 within thirty (30) days from receipt of the resolution and to make a report of the same to the Court within [4] five (5) days from its promulgation. On September 17, 1999, the COMELEC filed a manifestation and motion for extension of time to resolve SPC Nos. 98-240 and 98-262 stating that the Commissioner to whom the cases were raffled to and assigned for writing of the Commissions opinion was out of the country and would be back on October 8, 1999. Consequently, it asked for a period of thirty (30) days from October 8, 1999 or until [5] November 7, 1999 to resolve the said cases. On October 19, 1999, the Court noted the manifestation and granted the motion for extension of time [6] to resolve the said cases. On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC submitted its compliance to the Courts Resolution of August 17, 1999 and attached therewith a copy of the resolution of the First Division of the COMELEC dated [8] October 18, 1999 denying due course to SPC No. 98-240 for having been filed out of time, dismissing SPC No. 98-262 for lack of merit and affirming the proclamation of Sema as mayor of Cotabato City. On November 5, 1999, Maara filed his comment on the COMELECs compliance stating, among other things, that the same is premature since it is only a resolution of the First Division and not a final [9] resolution of the Commission en banc. Consequently, on December 7, 1999 this Court issued a resolution directing the COMELEC en banc to resolve SPC Nos. 98-240 and 98-262 with finality within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the resolution and to forthwith make a report thereon to the Court within five (5) days from the promulgation of the resolution. On January 19, 2000, respondent COMELEC submitted its compliance and reported that it issued a [10] [11] resolution on January 2, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by Maara. On January 24, 2000, Sema filed a manifestation with motion to consider G.R. Nos. 134163-64 closed and terminated. On January 27, 2000, Maara filed a counter-manifestation with motion to resolve the petition in G.R. Nos. 134163-64 on the merits. On February 14, 2000, Sema filed a motion for leave of court to file an incorporated reply to Maaras counter-manifestation. All motions were noted by this Court. Previously, or on January 13, 2000, Maara filed a petition for certiorari captioned petition ex abundanti cautela, docketed as G.R. Nos. 141249-50, questioning the COMELEC Resolutions dated October 18, 1999 and January 2, 2000. He prayed that the proclamation of Sema as mayor of Cotabato City be annulled and that the COMELEC be ordered to canvass the thirty (30) election returns excluded by the CBC. This petition, however, was dismissed by the Court on January 25, 2000 for lack of a verified statement on material dates. An addendum to said petition was noted without action by the Court [12] on February 8, 1999. On February 7, 2000, Maara seasonably filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. [14] 141534-35. Aside from questioning the non-observance of the COMELEC of its own Rules of Procedure, the petition challenges the illegal proclamation of Sema which proceeded from the illegal
[13] [7]

proceedings of the CBC in excluding thirty (30) election returns in the canvassing of votes for mayor in the City of Cotabato when it had earlier ruled for the inclusion of twenty-eight (28) of said returns. It ascribes to the COMELEC the following errors, viz: A WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH JURISDICTION OR SOUND DISCRETION, OR WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF DISCRETION IN ALLOWING ONE AND THE SAME COMMISSIONER AS PONENTE FOR BOTH THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTIONS; B WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH JURISDICTION OR SOUND DISCRETION, OR WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING A COMMISSIONER OF THE SECOND DIVISION TO SIGN AS MEMBER OF THE FIRST DIVISION ON THE CHALLENGED SPLIT RESOLUTION, ANNEX "A" HEREOF, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO VACANCY IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE FIRST DIVISION; C WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT PRIORLY RESOLVING THE CRISES IN QUORUM OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC SO AS TO ACCORD TO PETITIONER THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW; D WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN BYPASSING IN ITS CHALLENGED SPLIT RESOLUTION THE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER IN HIS SPC NO. 98-240 AND SPC NO. 98-262; E WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISTORTING THE MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE, WHICH THE HONORABLE COURT, IN ITS RESOLUTION OF AUGUST 17, 1999, HAS ALREADY ASCERTAINED; F WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH JURISDICTION OR SOUND DISCRETION, OR WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE BOARD IN ITS ILLEGAL PROCLAMATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT MUSLIMEN SEMA AS THE ELECTED MAYOR OF COTABATO CITY WHICH PETITIONER IN SPC NO. 98-240 AND SPC NO. 98-262 CHALLENGED AND QUESTIONED FOR BEING NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. G

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO PETITIONER'S SPC NO. 98-240 AND SPC NO. 98-262, ON THE TECHNICALITY GROUND THAT THE SAME WERE ALLEGEDLY FILED OUT OF TIME, WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED DECISION OF THE [15] HONORABLE COURT. I The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the order of the CBC of Cotabato City dated May 29, 1998 granting Semas 28 petitions for exclusion of the 30 contested election returns is null and void for having been issued after its earlier ruling embodied in its orders of May 22 and 23, 1998 directing the exclusion of the same returns had already become final. It may be recalled that on May 22, 1998, the CBC issued an order dismissing 13 of the 30 petitions for exclusion filed by Sema. On May 23, 1998, the CBC issued another order dismissing 15 of the remaining 17 petitions for exclusion he filed. He did not appeal from these orders within the reglementary period, consequently, the same already became final. However, the CBC issued another order on May 29, 1998, this time granting Semas petitions for exclusion of 30 election returns, among which were the 28 election returns already ordered included for canvass. It was blatantly absurd for the CBC to rationalize that the May 22 and 23, 1998 orders dismissing the petitions for exclusions refer only to candidates Guianis and Leyretanas petitions and not Semas. The wordings of the May 23, 1998 order is plain and unequivocal. It says: all petitions/cases against the hereunder contested precincts are hereby being DISMISSED for lack of merit xxx. If all petitions/cases were dismissed, then, these necessarily included Semas petition. Furthermore, there was nothing in the aforementioned orders which would indicate that the CBC reserved its right to rule on Semas petition at a later time. Neither do the minutes of the board even intimate such a reservation. II Even assuming arguendo that the orders of the CBC of May 22 and 23, 1998 had not become final and executory, we are not persuaded by the COMELECs pronouncement that Maara belatedly filed his appeal from the May 29, 1998 ruling of the CBC on June 5, 1998. According to the COMELEC's First Division in its Resolution dated October 18, 1999: Records show that the ruling which aggrieved appellant was issued on or about 4:00 p.m. of May 30, 1998. Following the instructions of the provisions above-cited, Maara had, until 4:00 p.m. of June 1, 1998 to file his notice of appeal with the Board. As it was, he filed said notice only on June 2, 1998. In this regard alone, appellant had already committed a procedural lapse. He aggravated his errors when he filed his appeal before the Commission on June 5, 1998, a full day beyond the 5-day reglementary period. The law, we have to stress, specifically ruled out any extension of the five-day period. It is most unfortunate that in committing not only one but two fatal lapses, appellant disregarded a procedure which according to COMELEC Resolution No. 2962 is mandatory and shall be strictly observed by the Board of Canvassers. It cost him his appeal because the same had, for all intents and purposes prescribed. The May 30, 1998 ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of Cotabato City, not having been seasonably [16] questioned can no longer be disturbed. It would appear that the May 29, 1998 ruling of the CBC was received by Maara only on May 31, 1998 which was the same date the CBC declared that it had completed the canvassing of 362 returns. It was also in the evening of May 31, 1998 while the CBC was in session that Maara manifested his intent to appeal from said ruling. The appeal was therefore filed with the COMELEC on June 5, 1998 within the [17] period prescribed in Section 20 (e) and (f) of R.A. No. 7166. Further assuming that the reckoning date for appeal was May 30, 1998 and not May 31, 1998, it bears stressing that the petition brought by Maara to the COMELEC on June 5, 1998, docketed as SPC No. 98-240, in effect challenged the composition of the CBC and the legality of its proceedings. If such

be the situation, the proceedings would be governed by Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 8, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit: Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166 reads: SEC. 19. Contested Composition or Proceedings of the Board; Period to Appeal; Decision by the Commission.Parties adversely affected by a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board may appeal the matter to the Commission within three (3) days from a ruling thereon. The Commission shall summarily decide the case within five (5) days from the filing thereof. Section 8, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: SEC. 8. Procedure Before the Board of Canvassers When Composition or Proceedings of Board are Contested. (a) When the composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers are contested, the board of canvassers shall, within twenty-four (24) hours, make a ruling thereon with notice to the contestant who, if adversely affected, may appeal the matter to the Commission within three (3) days after the ruling with proper notice to the board of canvassers. The Commission en banc shall summarily decide the case within five (5) days from the filing thereof. (b) Upon receipt of such appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the case for hearing, with due notice to the parties, by the Commission en banc. (c) During the pendency of the appeal, the board of canvassers shall immediately suspend the canvass until the Commission orders the continuation or resumption thereof. Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the party adversely affected by a ruling of the board must take an appeal within three (3) days from the date of the ruling. In this case, the facts would suggest that the CBC adjourned its proceedings on May 30 and 31, 1998 without making any ruling on Maaras objections to the CBCs proceedings. When Maara filed his appeal in SPC No. 98-240 on June 5, 1998, it cannot be correctly argued that the 3-day period set by law for its submission had expired because the CBC never ruled on his objections to the boards proceedings. The failure or refusal of the CBC to rule on Maaras objections should not prevent his right to elevate the matter to the COMELEC for proper [18] review. On this score, we find persuasive and logical the dissent of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores to the First Divisions ruling, thus: Maara filed the present Appeal on 5 June 1998. Whether it is within the three day period to file, nobody knows, because the Board never issued any ruling from 30 May 1998 when the proceedings of the board was challenged up to the time it adjourned on 31 May 1998. It never made a ruling at all even after that. The boards adjournment without making any written and express ruling thereon means that the Board has not complied with its duty to rule thereon. The absence of any ruling makes it impossible for Maara to file his appeal within the prescribed period because there was no ruling to appeal from in the first place. The absence of compliance of the duty by the board makes it legally unjustifiable for this Commission to dismiss the present appeal because the three-day period within which to appeal must be counted from the time the ruling was made which in the case at bar is absent. Maara has every right to expect a ruling from the Board on its objection over the latters proceedings. Up to this time, however, the Board has not complied with its statutory responsibility to come up with a ruling thereon. The failure of the Board to discharge this obligation should not in any way prejudice Maaras right to elevate the matter to this Commission on appeal. Otherwise, all that a partial board can do to favor a party is to refuse to make a ruling on the latters opponents objections effectively preventing its review by this Commission. (Abella vs. Larrazabal 180 SCRA 509). It is in this light that the instant appeal must be considered seasonably filed. This Commission must assume jurisdiction, [19] entertain the allegations raised and resolve the issues involved in SPC No. 98-240.

It is clear that the CBC acted without authority when it issued its May 29, 1998 ruling. Consequently, the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it rendered the questioned resolution of October 18, 1999 denying due course to SPC No. 98-240 for allegedly having been filed out of time and affirming the proclamation of Sema as Mayor of Cotabato City; and the resolution of January 2, 2000 denying Maaras motion for reconsideration of the October 18, 1999 resolution. Accordingly, the proclamation of Sema is null and void as it was based on an incomplete [20] canvass. An incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation. A proclamation made where the contested returns set aside will affect the result of the election and the [21] board of canvassers proceeded to proclaim without the authority from the COMELEC is null and void. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 141534-35 is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated October 18, 1999 and January 2, 2000 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The COMELEC is ORDERED to direct the City Board of Canvassers of Cotabato City to reconvene within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision for the purpose of completing the canvass of votes and proclaiming the winner. The petition for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 134163-64 is deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED. The status quo order dated July 14, 1998 is hereby ordered LIFTED. SO ORDERED.

SEMA VS. COMELEC The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1 st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because ofMMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any). Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs. HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed

in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province. Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.