Aporia of Forgiveness Page 1 of 10

Aporia of Forgiveness
And bestow not favors that you may receive again with increase,1 Ye have given bread by rule and habit, ye have not opened your hands for the sake of God 2

Although forgiveness is used in public, religious and political terms, its remarkable international proliferation has not escaped the field of prominent literary critics and philosophers. Here, the question of forgiveness, a meaningful or meaningless one, the way of forgiving someone and to whom it can be granted is a very complicated practice. Undoubtedly, there must be conditions for an act, crime or sin to be forgiven. But this issue is more enhanced and diverse when Jacques Derrida sheds his deconstructive idea over it especially that in his case one faces aporia in forgiveness What is emphasized in this essay is to bring together Derridas idea on forgiveness and study the aporia in it and indicate that how such idea of aporia in unconditional forgiving the unforgivable is related to the aporia in themes of responsibility and secret that Derrida discusses in The Gift of Death. In both cases, one encounters impossibility. In forgiveness, impossibility is in its unconditionality and forgiving the unforgivable and in secret and responsibility it is the singularity of having and knowing a secret that brings responsibility and makes one nonconformist to the social ethics and at the same time keeps one in relation with such regulations. In fact, the impossibility, paradox and aporia in the theme of forgiveness itself becomes a secret. A true definition of forgiveness, proposed by Jacques Derrida is the one which is without limitation and measure. In principle, there is no limit to forgiveness, no measure, no moderation, no to what point?3 Despite its limitations, forgiveness can be confined to themes like excuse, regret, amnesty, prescription, etc. But, apart from

Holy Quran, (Sura 74/ Aya 6), http://www.tanzil.info/.

Jalaluddin Rumi, The Mathnavi, ed. Reynold A. Necholson, vol. I Tehran: Tos, 1996, line 3716. The translation is from Reynold Nicholson, The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi, Lahore: Sange-e-Meel Publication, 2004. 3 Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, Trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 27.

Aporia of Forgiveness Page 2 of 10 the possibility or impossibility of it, a true forgiveness, to Derrida, is that which is to be granted to an unforgivable sin.4 Even it goes beyond crimes against humanity since such crimes are often forgivable by the governments and politicians amnesty. It should not be normal, normative, normalizing. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of impossible.5 To Derrida forgiveness, in its origin, belongs to religious heritage which is called Abrahamic. Such heritage connotes Judaism, the Christianities, and the Islams. However, such aspect of forgiveness goes beyond these religions and tends to efface its traditional assumption in the course of globalization, or what Derrida later calls internationalization. A country like Japan, for instance, with no background of such religious heritage, takes the same tradition of Abrahamism and its Prime Minister asked forgiveness of the Korean and the Chinese for past violence. This country does not have any European or biblical origin, thus, forgiveness finds a scene of Christian confession in the glob that has no more need for the Christian church. This notion refers to the idea of sacredness of forgiveness in the memory of Abrahamism of the religion of book and the Jewish and Christian interpretation of neighbour or the fellow man. And such a new form of forgiveness has converted to a globalized manner since the Christian theme of confession finds its way in the political scenes of the whole world. Thus, the process of globalisation of forgiveness proliferates and to Derrida it is a Christian convulsion-conversion-confession which is a process of Christianisation separated from the Christian churches, as mentioned above.6 Thus, the enigmatic concept of forgiveness, as confounded with related themes like excuse, regret, amnesty, prescription, etc., by going beyond its origin, remains heterogeneous and irreducible. That is why, as Derrida at the threshold of his argument on forgiveness emphasizes, studying and measuring of the question of forgiveness is as

Julia Kristeva draws some of Derridas idea in redefinition of forgiveness. She calls his ideas utopian and stresses that forgiveness must be limited to the private sphere of human interaction. The social arena is where criminals must be tried and punished for their actions: see Julia Kristeva and Alison Rice Forgiveness: An Interview, in PMLA, Vol. 117, No. 2, p. 279, URL:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/823274 (Mar., 2002).

5 6

On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 32. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 31.

Aporia of Forgiveness Page 3 of 10 difficult as the measuring the act of forgiveness since there is no limit to forgiveness, no measure, no moderation, no to what point?.7 Here, to Derrida, the most important fact in its political terms is the crime against humanity. No matter what religion the guilty and the victim are, the point is that a crime is committed on humanity and the act of forgiveness is being taken in Abrahamic manner. And again no matter which part of the world this crime has happened. In any case, very briefly speaking, the act of forgiveness ends up in aporia and remains impossible. Here the language of forgiveness is at the service of determined finalities and there will only be reparations and a political reorientation to achieve reconciliation in order to re-establish normality. But, due to its aporatic feature, Derridean forgiveness should not be normal, normative, [and] normalizing. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impossible: as if it interrupted the ordinary course of historical temporality. Here the logic and common sense faces a paradox: primarily, there must be some guilty to forgive which is also common in Abrahamic base, but adversely, to Derrida, this guilty must be an unforgivable one, like a moral sin. In fact forgiving the forgivable sin, venial sin, causes the disappearance of forgiveness. From this comes the aporia that forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable 8 so it announces itself as impossible. Now, one can infer that why Derrida inaugurates his idea with globalization of forgiveness in which countries with no Abrahamic origin, take this tradition for the act of forgiveness. To justify this, it suffices to say that in the previous century there have been so many monstrous crimes that have escaped from the measure of human justice and the only existing way to forgive them is the aporatic way of impossible unconditional forgiving of the unforgivable. With regard to this fact that crimes against humanity have exceeded the human juridical measurement of justice, lets launch the polemical concept of imprescriptiblity of crime compensation for it equal to its level, which was proposed by Vladimir Janklvitch in his text entitled LImprescriptible in 1970. Here he stresses that in a case of forgiving a crime, like Shoah, it is less a question of forgiveness because the

7 8

On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 27-8 On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 32

Aporia of Forgiveness Page 4 of 10 criminals did not ask forgiveness.9 Derrida contests this singularity in the meaning of forgiveness that tends to lay conditions and some exchange for it. The reason is that, here, one must repent and attest to the consciousness of his fault and avoid returning of that evil. From this he induces the unconditionality of forgiveness. Forgiveness would no longer have meaning where crime, more specifically crime against humanity, becomes inexpiable, irreparable, or immeasurable. It only becomes possible from the moment that it appears impossible.10 Forgiveness is more and more complicated, impossible and aporatic, in Derridean term, when the victim is disappeared and a third party intervenes in it and the concept of sovereignty is highlighted. One can consider the case in South Africa when imprisoned Mandela decided to negotiate the procedure of amnesty in order to permit the return of ANC11 and prevent any vengeance in his country. Another example is when French previous prime ministers found it necessary to efface the past crimes and forgive the crimes to find national unity (which, of course, the urgent danger of communism made them to forget the past crimes to bring into the national community all the anticommunists). Both mentioned cases are apart from Derridean theme of forgiveness because, on the one hand, forgiveness should not be used as a means to calm down the world political tensions, and thus, it should never amount to a therapy of reconciliation.12On other hand, such politicians are those who play the third party in the act of forgiveness and through christianizing their political language and finding sovereignty over others try to achieve their political goals. Here, Derrida stresses that if the scene of forgiveness is a personal face-to-face of the criminal and the victim, the intervention of a third party (in order to speak of amnesty, reconciliation, repentance, reparation, etc.) is not certainly a pure act of forgiveness. To emphasize this idea one must be reminded of the Abrahamic tradition of forgiveness in which two singularities are engaged: the guilty and the victim. Forgiveness can be possible only in the presence of the disappeared or dead victim which is of course impossible. So, to Derrida, for a pure and unconditional forgiveness to have its own meaning, must have no meaning, no
9

On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 33 On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 37 11 African National Congress 12 On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 41
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Aporia of Forgiveness Page 5 of 10 finality, even no intelligibility. [Thus,] It is a madness of impossible. Also, it must follow the consequence of this paradox or what to Derrida is nominated as aporia.13 Thus, it remains heterogeneous to the juridico-political, judicial, or penal order. To Derrida intervention of the third party in the act of forgiveness should not lead to the idea of sovereignty because such idea interrupts the real meaning of forgiveness which is non-meaning. One can consider the theological tradition of the right of grace in the West. Such tradition accords to the sovereign, since it is of the order of law while simultaneously inscribes in the laws a power above the laws; right beyond the law.14 The absolute monarch, president or prime minister who takes advantage of this very right of grace to forgive a criminal does a conditional act of forgiveness, primarily because he is a third party in this act and also through this conditional exercise he desires to find sovereignty over the guilty to achieve a particular interest, whether this interest is personal, or for his family, society or his State. Or one can say that such attempt in finalizing forgiveness is not forgiveness but only a political strategy for the process of reconciliation. Derrida clearly and frankly expresses what he dreams of forgiveness when he talks about its purity, a forgiveness to be worthy to name: the one which is neutralized and neutralizes the law, heterogeneous to the juridico-political, judicial, or penal order. He dreams of a forgiveness apart from power, not addressed from top down: unconditional but without sovereignty. Definitely, this is the most difficult and impossible task to do and becomes a thought of madness since it is necessary to dissociate conditionality and sovereignty from act of forgiveness.15 As mentioned above, the paradoxical and impossible aspect of forgiveness leads to its aporia which is unconditional forgiving of the unforgivable which announces itself impossible. Such notion is based on absence, and of course it is the absence of the victim. Thus, through such impossibility forgiveness finds its meaning in its meaninglessness and unintelligibility which is a moment of madness, as Derrida says. This zone of experience remains inaccessible and secret, a secret that Derrida in The Gift of Death calls it

13 14

On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 42-5 On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 46 15 On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 59

Aporia of Forgiveness Page 6 of 10 supplementary seal16; seal because it is a secret and unknowable, and supplementary because the more one speaks about it, one realizes that he hasnt spoken about it. This very paradoxical and impossible aporia and also the moment of madness of Derridean forgiveness can also be seen in his idea on responsibility, the responsibility that is the consequence of knowing a secret. The idea that a responsible decision is taken on the basis of knowledge defines the condition of possibility or impossibility of responsibility. On the one hand it is possible to make a responsible decision since one cannot make a decision without knowledge, science, conscience and reason. On the other hand, it is impossible in that if such responsible decision making is relegated to a knowledge that it follows or deploys, thus, it is no more a responsible decision since it is a technical deployment of a cognitive apparatus, a simple mechanistic deployment of a theorem. This is the aporia of responsibility to Derrida.17 It is also important to know that it stems from the notion of secret. In fact, knowing a secret entails responsibility which is heterogeneous to the social ethics. The origin of this responsibility is from religion: [r]eligion is responsibility or it is nothing at all. The moment of the experience of responsibility brings into being religion and such responsibility and it extracts itself from that form of secrecy called demonic mystery. The reason for this is that such responsibility freely subjects itself to the wholly and infinite other that sees without being seen. 18 In representing that mystery and waking from the demonic mystery and surpassing it, the conscious subject instead of representing that mystery, exchanges one secret for another. This is a particular economy that within the history of truth sacrifices mystery for secrecy. Derrida exemplifies this notion of conversion of mystery to secret with regard to the theme of responsibility and sacrifice in Abraham. By explaining the significance of trembling in knower of the secret Derrida emphasizes that one trembles because of not knowing the secret and what has already made him afraid, that which one neither sees nor foresees and exceeds his knowledge. As Derrida notices, Kierkegaard writes of trembling with reference to Saint Paul who asks his disciples to work toward salvation in fear and
16

Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills, Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 55. 17 The Gift of Death 24 18 The Gift of Death 2-3

Aporia of Forgiveness Page 7 of 10 trembling. Here, one is under the gaze of God who decides for him, the God who is absent, hidden, silent, separate and secret as he orders to obey and he gives no reason for his intentions. Hence, one remains responsible to work and in the meantime can make his own decision. In the case of Abraham, where God orders him the most cruel, impossible, untenable gesture in sacrificing Isaac, He keeps silent about his reasons. Abraham also keeps silent when Isaac asks him where the sacrificial lamb is to be found. By answering that God will provide it, Abraham keeps the secret and at the same time doesnt remain silent. The way Abraham answers and in fact doesnt divulge the secret is a transgression of the ethical order. Of course, in some respects Abraham does speak. He says a lot. But even if he says everything, he needs only keep silent on a single thing for one to conclude that he hasnt spoken. He responds without responding.19 The reason that Abraham doesnt speak of his secret to his family is that he assumes that responsibility might transgress his own singularity at the moment of decision. No other one could make decision in his place in obeying Gods will. But as soon as he speaks and enters into the medium of language, he loses his very singularity and thus he loses his right to decide, as a consequence he is no more responsible. Derrida says that [t]he first effect or first destination of language therefore involves depriving me of, or delivering me from, my singularity. By suspending my absolute singularity in speaking, I renounce at the same time my liberty and my responsibility. Once I speak I am never and no longer myself, alone and unique. It is a very strange contract both paradoxical and terrifying that binds infinite responsibility to silence and secrecy. This is against the common sense that assumes that responsibility is tied to the necessity of accounting for ones words in nonsecret. If absolute responsibility is supposed to remain mine, I cant speak of that. Here the temptation and necessity of ethics in generalizing responsibility through the medium of language is highly important and it makes one to speak in order to justify himself and his decision. By entering into the medium of language, and the thus ethics, ones responsibility converts into irresponsibility. This is the aporia in responsibility that one always risks not managing to accede to the concept of responsibility in the process of forming it. This aporia demands on the one hand an accounting, a general answering-for-oneself with respect to the general and the
19

The Gift of Death 59

Aporia of Forgiveness Page 8 of 10 generality, hence the idea of substitution, and, on the other hand, uniqueness, absolute singularity, hence nonsubstitution, nonrepetition, silence and secrecy.20 Such absolute responsibility, in order to remain singular, remains inconceivable and unthinkable. Of course we must bear in mind that Derrida in his other essay How to Avoid Speaking: Denials goes further on the idea of secret and speaking of that. He inserts that even when one talks about the possibility or impossibility to avoid speaking of secret, it is already too late. To him language has already started without us. Thus, it is necessary to speak of a secret.21 Therefore, the aporia of responsibility becomes irresponsible as it is inevitable to segregate it from language and the generality of ethics. As a consequence it becomes accompanied with impossibility and unthinkability. The very concept of responsibility, just like the concept of secrecy, is bilateral. Abrahams double secret is between him and God on the one hand, and also between the former and his family on the other. He cannot divulge the secret of what the absolute has ordered him to do and tell about it to his family. That is why his secret finds a double side and because of this he transgresses the ethical orders of his society and by keeping this secret from his family he betrays such ethics. 22 But anyway, he knows the secret and he is responsible for that. Thus, the same conception is true for responsibility. Abraham is at the same time the most moral and responsible and the most immoral and irresponsible of men. [A]bsolutely irresponsible because he is absolutely responsible. On the one side, the knower of the secret, here Abraham, is responsible toward his God and he must keep the secret and make his own decision in sacrificing Isaac. He responds absolutely to absolute duty, disinterestedly and without hoping for a reward, without knowing why yet keeping it secret; answering to God and before God On the other side, he is responsible to his family and society but this responsibility toward his family is dissolved in the responsibility toward his God and thus it converts to irresponsibility. The reason is that by answering to his God and being in relation23 to Him Abraham would have no debt or duty to his fellows. He acts as if he is discharged of his duty towards his fellows, human
20 21

The Gift of Death 60-1 Jacques Derrida, How to Avoid Speaking: Denials, in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, Albany: Atate University of New York Press, 1992, p. 99. 22 The Gift of Death 59 23 Of course to Derrida this relation is also without relation because God is absolutely transcendent, hidden and secret, not giving any reason. The Gift of Death 72-3

Aporia of Forgiveness Page 9 of 10 kind and even his son. This paradox is the aporia of responsibility in Derridas deconstructive view of that. It is enhanced when it comes to ethical orders. To fulfill the absolute duty, Abraham transgresses and betrays the ethical duties to which he belongs while he recognizes them. By assuming the absolute responsibility for sacrificing his son he formerly sacrifices ethics. [B]ut in order for there to be a sacrifice, the ethical must retain all its value; the love for his son must remain intact, and the order of human duty must continue to insist on its rights. In short, the essence of absolute responsibility is to be irresponsible towards the ethical orders that one sacrifices while still he recognizes, confirms and reaffirms them.24 We noticed that how forgiveness and the theme of responsibility (as a consequence of secret) share the common feature of meaninglessness, in Derridean point of view, in that in both of them one should not await any reward and put any term and condition. Also both become impossible and encounter aporia since their meaning of meaninglessness make them impossible; in forgiveness this impossibility is in unconditional forgiving of the unforgivable and in responsibility it is the idea of the irresponsible responsibility of knowing a secret.

24

The Gift of Death 66-7

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Works Cited
Derrida, Jacques, How to Avoid Speaking: Denials, in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, Albany: Atate University of New York Press, 1992.
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On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, Trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes, London and New York: Routledge, 1997. _____ The Gift of Death, Trans. David Wills, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. Holy Quran, http://www.tanzil.info/
Kristeva, Julia and Alison Rice, Forgiveness: An Interview, in PMLA, Vol. 117, No. 2, pp. 278-295, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/823274 (Mar., 2002).

Rumi, Jalaluddin, The Mathnavi, ed. Reynold A. Necholson, 6 vols. Tehran: Tos, 1996, line 3716. Nicholson, Reynold, The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi, Lahore: Sange-e-Meel Publication, 2004.