Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME HyrjeMbi sigurimet dhe teorine mbeshtetese natyra ekonomike dhe funksionet e sigurimit

Sigurimi sht mnyra pr t siguruar mbrojtje kundr humbjevefinanciare q rezultojn nga nj mllojshmri perilesh. Me blerjen epolicave te sigurimit, individt dhe bizneset mund t marrinkompensim pr humbjet pr shkak t aksidenteve rrugore, vjedhje tpasuris, zjarri dhe dmtime t stuhise, shpenzimet mjeksore, dhehumbje t t ardhurave pr shkak t paaftsi e vdekjes. Demshperblimi per humbjet gjenerohet nga fondi i sigurimeve. Sigurimi sht i arsyeshem, kur ngjarjet e sigurimit (rreziqet) shkaktonnevoj t konsid erueshme pr para. Si nj kategori ekonomike nje siguracion paraqet marrdhnieveekonomike, duke prfshir fo rmat dhe metodat e krijimit t fondit tsigurimeve dhe prdorimin e tij n demshperblimi n per ngjarjet esiguruara dhe duke ndihmuar njerzit, kur disa ngjarje ndodhin njetn e tyre. Aleksandrov A. (1998) prshkruan karakteret e meposhtme tkategoris ekonomike te sigu rimit: prania e marrdhnieve rishprndarese; pranin e riskut te siguruar (dhe kriterin e vlersimit t tij); organizimin e komunitetit t sigurimit nga nenshkrues dhesiguruesit; kombinim individuale dhe interesave t sigurimit dhe grupit; prgjegjsi t bashkuar e t gjitha nenshkruesve pr dmin; prhapje e kufizuar e dmit; rishprndarjen e dmtimit n hapsir dhe koh; kthimin e pagesave t sigurimit; vetmjaftueshmeri t veprimtaris s sigurimit. Pr t sqaruar "Sa Sigurim duan individet" Jeffrey M. Perloff (2004) vn dukje se mnyra se si funksionon sigurimi sht se nj person qe kaantipati riskun apo firm i jep para pr kompanin e sigurimit ngjendjen e mir e natyrs, dhe kompania e sigurimeve e transfe ronpara te i siguruar n gjendjen e keqe e natyrs. Transaksionit lejonpersonin qe k a antipati riskun apo firm t zhvendose disa ose t gjitharreziqet drejt kompanin e si gurimit. Faqja 1

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME

Pr shembull, z. X sht person qe ka antipati riskun. Ai dshiron tsiguroje shtpin e tij, e cila sht me vler 80 $ (mij). Ekziston njprobabilitet 25% qe shtpia e tij do t digjet vitin e ardhshm. N qoftse ndodh nj zjarr, shtpia do t jet vler vetm 40 $. Kur nuk ka sigurim, vlera e pritur e shtpis s tij sht (1 / 4 * 40 $) + (3 / 4 * $ 80) = 70 $. Z. X prballet me nj sasi te larte risku. Variaca e vlers s shtpis stij sht (1 / 4 * ($ 40 -$ 70) * ($ 40 -$ 70) + (3 / 4 * ($ 80 - $ 70) * ($ 80 - $ 70)) = 300 $ Devijimi standart eshte : $300 = $17.3 Tani t supozojm se nj kompani sigurimesh ofron nj bast t drejt, ose t sigurim t drejt, nj bast midis nj siguruesi dhe nj tesiguruari n t cilen vlera astit per te siguruarin sht zero. Kompania e sigurimeve ofron z. X te tregtoje $ 1 n gjendjen e mir enatyrs (pa zjarr ) pr $ 3 n gjendjen e keqe e natyrs (zjarri). Kysigurim sht nje bast i drejt pr shkak e vlera e pritshme t ktijsigurimi per z. X sht zero: (1 / 4 * $ 3) + (3 / 4 * (- $ 1) = 0 $

Meqenese z. X sht antipatik ndaj riskut, ai sigurohet plotsisht, dukebler sigurim t m jaftueshem pr t eliminuar rrezikun e tij krejt. Mekt shum sigurimi, ai ka t njjtn sas asurie n dyja raste.

Z. X i paguan kompanise se sigurimeve $ 10 n gjendje t mir tnatyrs dhe merr 30 $ n gje ndje t keqe. N gjendje t mir, ai ka njshtpi me vler 80 $ minus 10 $ qe ai i paguan kom anise sesigurimeve, pr nj pasuri neto prej 70 $. Nse ndodh zjarrit, ai ka njshtpi me vler 40 $ plus nj pages nga kompania e sigurimeve e 30$, pr nj pasuri neto, prsri, 70 . Vlera e pritur e z. X me kete sigurim te drejt eshte $ 70, e njjt mevlern pritur pa sigurim. Varianca qe ai ndesh bie nga $ 300 pa sigurimne $ 0 me sigurim. Z. X sht m mir me sigurim, sepse ai e ka tnjjtn vler te pritur nuk dhe prballet me asnj risk. Jeffrey M. Perloff (2004) prshkruan se kur sigurimi i drejt ofrohe, njerzit antipatike ndaj riskut sigurohen plotsisht. Nse kompanit e Faqja 2

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME sigurimit tarifojne m shum se sa mimi i sigurimit t drejt, individtblejne me pak sigur im. Pr shkak se kompanit e sigurimit nuk ofrojn sigurim t drejt, shumica e njerzve nuk jane te siguruar plotsisht. Nj kompani esigurimi nuk mund t qnd roje ne treg, nse ajo ofron sigurim tdrejt. Me sigurimin e drejt pagesat e pritura t e kompanise sesigurimeve do t jet e barabarta me shumn qe kompania esigurimeve mble dh. Pr shkak se kompania e sigurimeve ka shpenzimeoperative - shpenzimet pr mbajtj en e zyrave, format e printuara, punsimin e agjentve te shitjes, dhe kshtu me radh - nese nje firmsigurimi siguron sig urim t drejt do t humbase para. Primet ekompanive t sigurimit duhet t jet te larta mja ftueshem pr tmbuluar shpenzimet e tyre operative, keshtu qe sigurimit sht mpak se e d rejt pr t siguruarin.

Sa mund t tarifojne kompanite e sigurimit pr sigurimin? Nj kompanimonopoli sigurime sh mund t'i ngarkoje nj shum deri n primin trrezikut qe nj person sht i gatshm t pag t shmangurriskun. Sa m shum antipatik ndaj riskut te jete nje individ, m tepernje k ompani sigurimi monopol ka per te tarifuar. Nse ka shumkompani t sigurimit qe konku rrojn pr tregun, mimi i nj policsigurimi sht m pak se maksimumi qe individt antipati j riskutjan t gatshm t paguajn, por perseri mjaftaftueshmerisht e lartse firma t mbulo e shpenzimet e tyre operuese. N shum vende n zhvillim, sigurimi nuk sht i prhapur dhe shtinteresante pr t hetuar e vazhdueshmerise se sigurimit tepaket te te varfrit. Kshtu, shtja hulumtimi i ksaj t eze sht si mposht: Pse shumica e t varfrve n Shqipri jane te me sigurim te paket ? nxjerje nga libri bundos pershtat : Pr fat t keq jo t gjitha risqet jan t sigurueshme. Q nj risk te jet i sigurueshm duhet t plotesohen disa krkesa. Nga kndvshtrimi i siquruesit pr risqet e sigurueshm krkohet q: -Objektet t jen n sasi dhe cilsi q t lejojn nj prllogaritje te perafrt t probabilitetit t humbjes. Kshtu, n qoft se numri i objekteve sht i vogl, ather siguruesi do t jet subjekt i nj pasigurie t njjt me at t t siguruarit. Gjithashtu, cilsia e objekteve pr t'u siguruar duhet t jet e njjt n menyr q t formulohen statistika ndihmse pr humbjet. - Humbja, duhet t jete aksidentale dhe jo e qellimshme. - Kur ndodh humbja duhet t jet e prcaktuesbme dhe e matshme. -_Objektet e siguruara nuk duhet t jen subjekt i dmtimeve t rreme, pra, t stimuluara. Nqa kndveshtrjmi i t siguruarit, risqet duhet t plotsojn dy kushte: Faqja 3

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME -Humbja potenciale duhet t jet e madhe, aq sa t shkaktoje dem financiar. - Propabilitetii humbjes nuk duhet t jete shume i madh. Nj nga prirjet t siquruarve sht t mos sigurohen ndaj humbje me propabilitet t madh ndodhjeje, sepse kosto e transferimi do t ishte tepr e lart. Sa m e mundshme t jet humbja, aq m e sigurt sht ndodhja e saj. Sa m e sigurt t jet kjo ndodhje, aq m i lart do t jet primi prkats. Mrojtja nga risqet Funksioni kryesor i sigurimeve sht q ato t veprojn si mekanizma pr transferimin e riskut. Por edhe pse e transferojn rrezikun ato nuk mu nd ta shmangin nj plagosje ose nj smundje, kshtu q ato mund ta mbrojn individin nga fatkeqsit e jets. N nj mas t konsiderueshme mund t mbrohet ajo q zoteron personi, kryesisht pasuria edhe kjo nprmjet dmshprblimit. Streset mendore dhe fizike si dhe smundjet mund t paksohen n qoft se individi ka njohurit e nevojshme pr smundjet dhe merr masa parandaluese pr to. Nj pasuri, por edhe nj individ me gjendje shndetsore t keqsuar mund t mbrohen n qoft se personi apo biznesi q prfaqson ai, blejn nj polic sigurimi, q t mbrojn pasurin nga faktort njerzore (vjedhje ose dmtime me dashje), kundrejt aksidenteve (zjarr ose prplasje automjetesh), ndaj stuhis dhe prmbytjeve ose ndaj smundjeve dhe paaftesis pr t punuar. Mundesia pr t psuar nj humbje apo dm material lidhet me rritjen e numrit t incidenteve si dhe me mundsin e ndodhjes s tyre. Rritja e numrit t rreziqeve lidhet me nj numr t madh veorish indlvknrale, mendore, fizike dhe pasurore t personit ose kompanis. Sigurimet mbrojn pasurin materiale duke i dhn zoteruesit t saj burimet pr t zvendsuar humbjen q i sht shkaktuar. Ato mbrojn nj person pr t cilin nevojiten shpenzime pr t'ia kthyer shndetin n gjndjen e tij normale ose pr t siguruar rehatin si invalid. Nga ana tjetr, sigurimet mbrojn edhe personat, t cilt nuk jan n mosh pr t punuar duke u siguruar t ardhura n formn e pensioneve, duke i prfshir punonjesit n skemat e produktit t sigurimeve. Koncepti i mbrojtjes s sigurimeve sht nj marrveshje pr zhdmtim n para ose pr zvndsim pr t mbajtur pasurin e t siguruarit n t njejtat kushte edhe pas ndodhjes s ngjarjes s siguruar. T gjitha pasurit e nj pronari, si: toka, ndrtesat, pajisjet, llogarit bankare, veshjet, aksionet, autoveturat, patentat e produkteve q prodhohe n pr her t par, si dhe vlerat q zotruesi prfiton nga prdorimi i pasuris s tij mund t sigurohen. Ato mund t mbrohen ndaj nj rreziku t veant ose ndaj disa rreziqeve njhersh duke u siguruar kundrejt tij. Pr t'u siguruar e mbrojtur zotruesi do t shpenzoj vetm primin e sigurimit, q duhet t'i paguaj nj shoqrie sigurimi. Kontrata e sigurimit sht nj letr e nnshkruar nga palt, ku prcaktohet rreziku, objekti i siguruar, rrethanat dhe periudha pr t ciln ai sigurohet, personi q e siguron dhe pjesa e rrezikut q ai pergat itet te pranoje. Faqja 4

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME 11.1 Bazat Ligjore Si do t'a theksojm edhe m von veprimtarit siguruese n vendin ton jan kryer edhe prpara vitit 1991 madje edhe prpara vitit 1944. Por n kt kapitull ne do t flasim pr bazat ligjore t sigurimeve pas vitit 1991, vit i cili sht i lidhur me ndarjen e veprimtaris s sigurimeve nga arkat e kursimeve dhe krijimin e shoqris s par siguruese, Instituti i Sigurimeve, q ende vazhdon t jet e vetmja shoqri siguruese me kapital publik. Instituti i Sigurimeve (INSIG-u) u themelua n baz t ligjit Nr. 7461 dat 23. 7. 1991. Por, duke filluar nga qershori i vitit 1999 n baz t ligjit Nr. 8081 date 7.03.1996 "Pr veprimtarit e Sigurimeve dhe Risigurimeve", ai ka adaptuar formn e shoqris anonime shtetrore dhe funksionon n prputhje me dispozitn prkatse t liaiit Nr. 7638 dat 19.11. 1992. "Pr shoqrit treatare". Le t ndalemi pak m hollsisht n ligjin Nr. 8081 dat 7.03. 1996, pasi ky ligj aktualish t prbn aktin ligjor baz mbi t cilin ushtrojn veprimtarin siguruese jo vetm INSIG-u por edhe t gjitha shoqrit e tjera private t sigurimeve t krijuara pas vitit 1998. N kt ligj prcaktohen parimet dhe rregullat e prgjithshme q lidhen me siprmarrjet n fushn e sigurimeve. Mbi bazn e dispozitave t prcaktuara n kt ligj, shoqrit siguruese ushtrojn veprimtarin e si,gurimeve t drejtprdrejta q kan pr objekt prsonat apo jetn e tyre dhe pasurin apo dmet materiale, si edhe veprimtarin q ka pr objekt risigurimet. Fusha e zbatimit t ktij ligji, shtrihet pr siprmarrjet n sigurime dhe risigurime nga shoqrit vnd ase dhe t huaja, t cilat marrin prgjegjsin pr mbulimin e rreziqeve, n baz t kontratave t lidhura prkatsisht me t siguruarin dhe siguruesit. N kt ligj nuk prfshihen veprimtarit e Institutit t Sigurimeve Shoqrore, Institutit t Sigurimit t Kujdesit Shndetsor dhe Shoqrive, Shoqatave dhe enteve t tjera q bjn pjes n nj regjim sigurimesh, ndihmash apo prkrahjeje shoqrore, mbikqyrja e t cilave rregullohet me ligje t posame (neni 3). Sipas ktij ligji, shoqrit siguruese vendase ose t huaja duhet t kufizojn veprimtarin e tyre vetm n veprimtari siguruese dhe risiguruese si dhe n operacionet q rrjedhin drejtprdrejt prej tyre. Nuk lejohet q ato t kryejn veprimtari t tjera t fardo lloji qofshin ato ( neni 5). Gjithashtu, sipas ktij ligji (neni 6) nuk lejohet q e njjta shoqri sigurimesh t kryej sigurime pr jetn dhe pr pronn (jo jetn). Aktualisht vetm INSIG -u i kryen t gjith kto lloje sigurimesh, pasi deri n vitin 1999 ka qn e vetmja shoqri siguruese tek ne, prandaj i sht lejuar q t'i kryej t dy kto lloje veprimtarish (jetn dhe jo jetn). Kompanit e tjera siguruese jan t liensuara dhe kryejn vetm veprimtari siguruese pr pronn, pra, pr jo jetn. N vende t tjera ka edhe shoqri sigurimesh q marrin n sigurim edhe jetn edhe jo jetn. Tarifat e primeve t sigurimit sipas ligjit (neni 12) caktohen nga vet shoqria e sig urimit, me prjashtim t primeve pr sigurimet e detyrueshme t pasuris ose prgjegjsis t cilat rregullohen me ligje t veanta (si sht prgjegjsia ndaj palve t treta pr sigurimin e automjeteve, karton i jeshil pr mjetet q lvizin jasht vendit etj., t cila t caktohen m urdhr t ministrit t Financave). Faqja 5

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Shoqrit e Sigurimeve q merren me sigurimin e mjeteve motorrike krijojn nj organizim, q quhet Byro Motorrike, e cila i prfaqson kto shoqri n tregun e brendshm dhe n vnde e huaja si dhe kontrollon realizimin e detyrimeve q rrjedhin n Ja Konventat Ndrkombtare pr sigurim ndaj palve t treta dhe pr dmet e shkaktuara nga aksidentet automobilistike. Deri n tetor t vitit 2001 detyrat e byros motorrike i ka kryer lnstituti i Sigurimeve INSIG-sh.a. Nga kjo koh sht krijuar dhe funksionon m vete Byroja Shqiptare e Sigurimeve. Shoqrit e Sigurimit e ushtrojn veprimtarin e tyre duke u mbshtetur edhe n mjaft akte t tjera ligjore si sht ligji Nr. 7641 dat 1.12. 1992 "Pr sigurimin e detyrueshm t mbajtsve t mjeteve motorrike pr prgjegjsin ndaj personave t trEt", Kodi Civil i Republiks s Shqipris (kreu XXIII q bn fjal pr Sigurimet), disa dekrete t Kuvendit t Shqipris, Vendirns t Kshillit t Ministrave, udhzime, urdhra dhe rregullore. Nj dokument i rndsishm ligjor q rregullon veprimtarin e INSIGut dhe Shoqrive Siguruese sht dhe Statuti i tyre pr t cilin do t flasim n nj paragraf t veant. Mbi bazn e ktyre ligjeve ushtrojn veprimtarin e tyre, n kushte t njjta t gjitha Shoqrit e Sigurimeve, qofshin kto me kapital publik apo privat ( neni 22 )

"Nga t katr miliard njerz sot n tok, t cilt jetojn me m pak sedy dollar n dit, m million kan akses n sigurim. " Churchill Craig, n Konferencn e Microinsurance n Tetor 2005, Mynih . 1. Te dhena te Tregut Treg Sigurimet Titull: Shum aksidente, pak dme t paguara Shqipria sht ndr vendet me normn m t lart t aksidenteve n Europ, por njkohsisht sht mes atyre vendeve ku paguhen m pak dme pr to Nga Ersuin Shehu

Shqipria sht nj ndr vendet me normn m t lart t aksidenteve dhe t dmtimeve nga aksidentet automobilistike n Europ. N raport me numrin e mjeteve q figurojn zyrtarisht t regjistruara dhe q, sipas Ministris s Transporteve, sht rreth 350 mij, n Shqipri ndodhin 20 aksidente pr do 10 mij mjete. Por realisht norma e aksidenteve sht m e lart, pr arsyen e vetme se numri i mjeteve n qarkullim, sipas statistikave t trthorta t institucioneve, vlersohet t jet rreth 280 mij. Kjo bn q norma e aksidenteve t t rritet n 25 pr 10 mij automjete. Ndrsa sipas shoqrive t sigurimit, vetm 220 mij automjete figurojn t siguruara: e thn ndryshe vetm 220 mij qarkullojn me dokumentacion t rregullt. Po ta ndrtojm raportin mbi kt shifr, n Shqipri ndodhin rreth 32 aksidente n 10 mij automjete t regjistruara. Faqja 6

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Kto shifra jan disa her m t larta n raport me mesataren europiane, q vlersohet rreth 5 aksidente pr 10 mij mjete. Kjo shpeshtsi e lart aksidentesh logjikisht t bn t mendosh se Shqipria duhet t ket nj raport t lart t pagess s dmeve pr aksidentet automobilistike nga shoqrit e sigurimit, kur dihet q sigurimi i makins pr prgjegjsi ndaj palve t treta sht i detyrueshm. Por n t vrtet nuk ndodh kshtu. Duke iu referuar t dhnave m t fundit t Autoritetit t Mbikqyrjes Financiare (AMF), deri n fund t muajit tetor t ktij viti, raporti mes dmeve dhe primeve pr sigurimin e brendshm pr prgjegjsit motorike ndaj palve t tjera (TPL) sht m pak se 19.6%, ndrsa pr vitin 2007 rezultonte vetm 18.7%. Ky raport sht m i ult krahasuar me gjith vendet e rajonit (Tabela 1). Raporti dme - prime n sigurimet motorrike: Shqipri 22.8% Mesatarja BE: 75.8% Ndrsa raporti dme - prime pr sigurimin e prgjegjsis motorike ndaj palve t treta, duke prfshir edhe kartonin jeshil dhe policn kufitare, sht rreth 22.8%. Kto shifra prfaqsojn nj diferenc shum t madhe krahasuar me mesataren e Bashkimit Europian, n raportin dme - prime n sigurimet motorike. Pr vitin 2006, ky raport isht e n nivelin 75.8%, ose 3.3 her m i lart krahasuar me Shqiprin, sipas t dhnave nga AMF-ja. Po t i referohemi norms s kombinuar dme + shpenzime pr dme ndaj primeve, mesatarja europiane sht rreth 97.5%, ndrkoh q deri n vitin 2001 ishte m e lart se 100%. Pr kt tregues t dyt n Shqipri nuk ekzistojn t dhna zyrtare. Grafik, Raporti mesatar dme prime pr vendet e BE (%) TABELA T dhna t krahasuara pr tregun e sigurimeve n disa vende t Rajonit T ardhurat Shqipria (viti2006) ngaprimet esigurimit(milioneuro) 48 Popullsia(milionbanor) 3.14 Dendsia e Sigurimeve(primet prfrym)Euro 15.2 Penetrimi i sigurimeve, % (Primet/PBB) 0.60% Maqedonia 84 2 40.8 1.80% Bullgaria 615 7.4 83 2.90% Rumania 1,600 22 72 2.50% Serbia 520 10.1 45 2.00% Kosova 39 2 19 1.50% Faqja 7

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Kroacia 1,150 4.4 260 3.20% Burimi: Autoritetet e sigurimeve t vendeve prkatse, mediat, t dhnat statistikore pr po pullsin dhe PBB-n t vendeve prkatse

*Pr Serbin, Kosovn, Kroacin dhe Shqiprin, t dhnat jan pr vitin 2009, shtetet e tjer 8 Burimi: Autoritetet e sigurimeve t vendeve prkatse, mediat, t dhnat statistikore pr po pullsin dhe PBB-n t vendeve prkatse

*Pr Serbin, Kosovn, Kroacin dhe Shqiprin, t dhnat jan pr vitin 2007, shtetet e tjer 6 E dini se paguhet edhe jeta? Nj tjetr faktor q i bn potencialisht t kripura dmet nga aksidentet n Shqipri sht numri i lart i viktimave dhe i t dmtuarve n prgjithsi nga aksidentet rrugore. Sipas statistikave zyrtare, n vitin 2009 ndodhn 1254 aksidente me t dmtuar n njerz. Nga kto aksidente, jan dmtuar 1728 persona, nga t cilt 384 kan humbur jetn. N kt shifr prfshihen vetm personat me dmtime t rnda, sepse vetm ata regjistrohen nga policia n rast aksidenti. Mbi 50 aksidente ne dite te ushtaraku paraqiten nga aksidentet automobilistike s ipas shefit te urgjences se traumatologjise zotit Myftar Torba . Ku ka rritje gjate muajve te veres. Ardhja e emigranteve per pushime dhe shtimit te levizjes me makine , zgjatet dita, njerezit shkojne neper plazhe e pishina dhe k eto i bejne dhe pas orarit te punes. Nder shkaqet kryesore sipas tij mbetet dhe perdorimi i pijeve Faqja 8

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME alkolike nga drejtuesit e makinave. Per fat te keq mosha mesatare qe perben pjes en me te madhe te te aksidentuarve eshte 35-40 vje, por nuk mungojne as 18 vjearet dhe me t e vjetrit. Aksidente me makine po behen vertet shqetesues theksoi Myftar Torba. Sipas ktyre shifrave, n Shqipri vdekjet nga aksidentet jan 12 n 100 mij banor. Ndrkoh, n vendet e tjera, prfshi ato t rajonit, kjo shifr sht dy her m e ult. N Maqedoni vdekjet nga aksidentet jan vetm 5 n 100 mij banor, n Greqi 4 n 100 mij banor, ndrsa n Itali 2.7 n 100 mij banor. N vendet e Europs Veriore, si n Angli apo n Suedi, ky raport bie n 1 viktim pr 100 mij banor. Por, a bn numri i madh i t dmtuarve q t paguhen m shum dme nga aksidentet? Sigurisht q jo, shifrat q prmendm m lart flasin qart. Sipas ekspertve t sektorit t sigurimeve, dmi pr nj person t vdekur n aksident shkon mesatarisht 30-35 mij euro. Nse do llogarisnim se vetm pr 50% t t vdekurve n aksidente prgjegjs jan drejtuesit e mjeteve t siguruara, shoqrit e sigurimit do t paguanin n vitin 2009 rret h 5.7 milion euro, ose 700 milion lek: e thn ndryshe 1.5 her vlern e t gjitha dmeve t paguara pr sigurimin e brendshm motorik (TPL) gjat vitit 2009. N Shqipri, ndryshe nga t gjitha vendet e zhvilluara europiane raporti i dmshprblimeve pr humbjet njerzore kundrejt atyre materiale vlersohet 15% me 85% n nj koh q n vendet europiane ky raport sht t paktn 50% me 50%! Kjo e bn edhe m kritike gjendjen: n Shqipri paguhen rreth 600-700 mij euro pr njerzit nga rreth 4 milion euro q paguhen n nj vit pr dmet nga aksidentet automobilistike. Pa llogaritur n kt mes t dmtuarit ose t plagosurit, t cilt, sipas ligjit, do t sillnin gjithashtu shpenzi me shum t mdha n dme pr kompanit e sigurimit. Kjo kategori t dmtuarish shpesh krkon shpenzime m t mdha se ata q vdesin n aksidente, sepse kan nevoj pr ndrhyrje kirurgjikale tepr t kushtueshme, si edhe pr kujdes si invalid pr t gjith jetn. Po pse realisht dmi m i madh, jeta, realisht paguhet pak nga shoqrit e sigurimit? Sipas z.Demir Osmani, ekspert i siguris rrugore dhe kryetar i shoqats s Siguris Rrugore dhe Ambientit, ka dy shkaqe kryesore pse shoqrit e sigurimit nuk paguajn pr personat q dmtohen nga aksidentet. Arsyeja e par sht se shum njerz, pr t mos thn shumica e tyre, nuk e din se n dmet q kompanit e sigurimit duhet t paguajn n rast aksidentesh, prfshihet edhe jeta apo dmtimet fizike. Arsyeja e dyt, sipas z.Osmani, sht edhe m shqetsuese: korrupsioni dhe manipulimet q ndodhin n vlersimin e aksidenteve. Shum shpesh kompanit e sigurimit bjn mos q ekspertiza t nxjerr fajtor viktimat dhe jo prgjegjsit e aksidentit. N kt rast, shtja mbyllet. Z.Osmani thot se problemi i pagess s dmeve pr jetn dhe shndetin sht nj rast tipik q krkon rritjen e informacionit dhe kulturs qytetare pr sigurimet. Shoqata e Siguris Rrugore, ve t tjerave, publikon shpesh edhe broshura pr kt qllim, me financimin e OJF-ve t ndryshme t huaja. Por institucioni q sht i ngarkuar me ligj pr mbrojtjen dhe informimin e konsumatorit n kt sektor, AMF, bn pak pun sensibilizuese. Sa prej jush kan lexuar ose par/dgjuar ndonj mesazh publik nga AMF pr t drejtat apo n prgjithsi pr sjelljen konsumatore n raport me sigurimet? Z.Varuzhan Piranjani, ekspert i tregut dhe ish-drejtor i kompanis s sigurimeve Ins ig, thot se nj arsye e rndsishme sht se marrja e nj dmshprblimi nga nj shoqri sigurimesh krkon shum mund, prpjekje, koh t humbur si edhe n shum raste jo pak para pr t i shkuar shtjes deri n fund. Kt gj e tregojn proceset e shumta gjyqsore Faqja 9

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME q ka ndaj kompanive t sigurimit, por q zor se gjenden n statistikat e sigurimeve apo t ndonj kompanie dhe insitucionit q i mbikqyr ato. I trembur nga kto peripeci, shpesh konsumatori shqiptar merr at ka i japin shoqrit e sigurimeve ose heq dor fare nga krkimi i saj. Aksidentet, shumica drrmuese pr faj t drejtuesve Femrat jane burim aksidentesh automobilistike . Behet fjale per femrat qe drejto jne makinen, pasi shumica e tyre nuk jane ne aftesine e duhur per te qene shofere. K ete e pohon shefi i sherbimit te Traumatologjise, Myftar Torba, i cili theksoi se, ndo nese numri i shofereve femra eshte i vogel ne raport me shoferet meshkuj, ato bejne nej num er te madh aksidentesh. Kjo ndodh ngaqe nuk e kane shkathtesine e meshkujve dhe shpesh perfundojne ne shkaktare te aksidenteve. Vertet femrat po behen problematike ne shkaktimin e ketyre aksidenteve theksoi Torba. 96% e aksidenteve n Shqipri ndodhin pr faj t njerzve. Sipas statistikave t Policis Rrugore dhe Drejtoris s Shrbimeve t Transportit Rrugor, jan gabimet njerzore shkaku kryesor i aksidenteve automobilistike. Ndr prgjegjsit njerzore, t parat jan ato t drejtuesve t mjeteve. Pr faj t drejtuesve t mjeteve ndodhin 70% e totalit t aksidenteve, si pasoj e shkeljes prej tyre t rregullave t qarkullimit rrugor. Gjith nj sipas shifrave zyrtare, 20% e aksidenteve ndodhin pr faj t kmbsorve. Vetm 6% e aksidenteve ndodhin pr shkak t mungess s sinjalistiks apo mirmbajtjes s rrugve. Teknikisht edhe kto prfshihen n aksidente q ndodhin pr shkak t gabimeve njerzore. Vetm 4% e aksidenteve ndodhin pr shkaqe madhore dhe q jan jasht mundsis pr t u parandaluar nga njerzit. Ekspertt thon se jan pikrisht rrugt m t mira ato q shkaktojn numrin m t madh t aksidenteve. Rrugt e asfaltuara mir, me pak kthesa, sjellin edhe numrin m t madh t aksidenteve, ku shembulli tipik sht rruga Fush-Kruj Lezh. Sipas z.Demir Osmani, n kushte t tilla drejtuesit e mjeteve jan m t prirur pr t shkelur rregullat e qarkullimit rrugor, kryesisht duke kaluar kufijt e shpejtsis, apo duke kryer paraka lime t gabuara. Megjithat, z.Osmani thot se kjo nuk i shfajson organet kompetente publike, pasi mungesa e sinjalistiks s plot sht nj nga problemet m t mdha t sistemit rrugor shqiptar. Problemet fillojn q nga vijzimi, mirmbajtja e deri nga vendosja e tabelave rrugore. Ndrsa z.Piranjani v n dukje se n vendet e zhvilluara europiane edhe shoqrit e sigurimeve ndikojn shum n uljen e aksidenteve nprmjet disa mekanizmave t thjesht, t till si rritja e primit t sigurimit deri n dy her n vitin e ardhshm nse kryen ndonj aksident, mospagesa e dmshprblimit, nese nuk je i lidhur me rrip siguri e etj. Mekanizma t till q ndikojn shum n sensibilizimin e opinionit publik, pra, pr pasoj edhe t uljes s rasteve t dmtimeve nga aksidentet automobilistike. Sigurime Pasuria me zjarrin

Titull: T luash

Megjith shtimin e rasteve t zjarrit n biznese dhe apartamente, shqiptart vazhdojn t jen pak t ndrgjegjshm pr nevojn e sigurimit Faqja 10

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Nga Ersuin Shehu Thuhet se me zjarrin e me ujin nuk bhet shaka. Por me sa duket, shqiptart ende nuk jan shum t vetdijshm pr rreziqet q mund t vijn nga forcat e natyrs. Sipas t dhnave zyrtare q raporton Autoriteti i Mbikqyrjes Financiare, vlera e primeve t shkruara bruto pr sigurimin nga zjarri dhe forcat e tjera t natyrs gjat vitit 2009 i shte 517 milion lek, ose 9.36% t totalit. Ndonse n vler absolute tregu shnon nj rritje me 35.6% krahasuar me vitin 2008, n peshn specifike t ktij sigurimi ndaj totalit rri tja sht n nivele shum m modeste, me 0.36% m shum krahasuar me vitin e mparshm. Sipas shoqrive t sigurimit, kta tregues jan m pak se modest, duke marr n konsiderat volumin potencial t ktij tregu. Madje, shoqrit e sigurimit bjn t ditur se pjesa drrmuese e sigurimeve nga zjarri dhe forcat e tjera t natyrs bhet praktikisht n mnyr t detyruar nga bankat, pr bizneset q kan vendosur pronn e tyre si kolateral pr kredit e marra. Shoqrit llogarisin se n Shqipri gjenden efektivisht mbi 300 mij shtpi banimi dhe jan t siguruara afrsisht 17 mij t tilla. Sipas drejtorit t prgjithshm t shoqris Interalbanian, z.Bardhyl Minxhozi, rritja e numrit t apartamenteve dhe t bizneseve kto 10 vitet e fundit ka qen dhe mbetet n ritme shum t larta, ndrsa tendenca e rritjes pr sigurimet nga zjarri dhe rreziqet e tjera t prons mbetet relativisht e ult. Megjithse shum shpesh dgjojm raste t rnies s zjarrit n apartamente dhe biznese, fare pak prej tyre jan t siguruara dhe, 'sht m e keqja, n raste t tilla i krkohet shtetit pr t'u kompensuar pr dmet q ndodhin. Kjo do t thot se kjo shkall e ult e sigurimeve t prons vjen kryesisht pr shkak t mentalitetit negativ dhe mosnjohjes s ktyre shrbimeve. N kushtet e ekonomis s tregut, duhet t paguash vet pr mbrojtjen e pasuris tnde, thot z.Minxhozi. 40 euro pr t siguruar nj apartament Pr sigurimin e pasuris nga zjarri dhe forcat e tjera t natyrs mimet jan n varsi t disa faktorve dhe kompani t ndryshme zbatojn mime t ndryshme. Por sidoqoft, kosto e sigurimit sht modeste n raport me dmet q mund t shkaktohen nga zjarri apo fatkeqsit e tjera natyrore. N procesin e tarifimit t rreziqeve t prons ndikojn disa faktor q lidhen me shkalln e rrezikshmris s llojeve t ndryshme t prones, si p.sh., lloji i materialit t prons. Gjithashtu, mimi sht edhe n varsi t vendit ku ndodhet prona, t vlers n para t saj etj. Pr banesat mimi sht mesatarisht rreth 0.5 euro pr mij, q do t thot q nj apartament me vler 50 mij euro mund t kushtoj rreth 40 euro, prfshir TVSH-n! Pra, afrsisht sa pes karta telefoni, -thot z.Bardhyl Minxhozi. Z.Ogert Shkrepa nga kompania e sigurimeve Sigal thot se mimet po ndikohen shum edhe nga konkurrenca midis kompanive, madje, sipas tij, n disa raste pr kt shkak mimet shkojn n nivele qesharake. Gjithsesi, pavarsisht nga sa m sipr, mimet jan shum t arsyeshme dhe nuk jan kurrsesi nj barr q t justifikoj mossigurimin e prons. Ky sigurim kushton nga 1 euro Faqja 11

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME

deri n 3 euro pr 1 mij euro t siguruara. Tarifa varet edhe nga kushtet e mbrojtjes n ga zjarri, si dhe nga vendndodhja e objektit, thot z.Shkrepa. Viti 2007 shnoi edhe nj rritje t fort t dmeve t paguara nga shoqrit e sigurimit. Pr dmet nga zjarri dhe nga forcat e tjera t natyrs, gjat vitit 2007 shoqrit e sigurimi paguan dme n vlern e 125 milion lekve, ose 318% m shum se n vitin 2006. Sigurimi nga zjarri, tregu i bankave

Sipas shoqrive t sigurimit, numri m i madh i kontratave t sigurimit nga zjarri i tak on individve, ndrsa vlera m e madhe e primeve bizneseve. Por shoqrit nnvizojn se vetm nj pakic e sigurimeve nga zjarri jan realisht vullnetare. Kryesisht jan bankat, q u imponohen klientve q marrin kredi pr ta siguruar pasurin ndaj zjarrit dhe forcave t tjera t natyrs. sht pr t u prmendur fakti se shumica e policave t sigurimit t prons, afrsisht 80% e tyre, jan lshuar pr individ apo firma q e kan t bllokuar pronn si kolateral pr kredin e marr n bank. Pra, sht banka ajo q i detyron individt t sigurojn pronn, n mnyr q kredia t jet e garantuar n rast t ndonj fatkeqsie natyrore apo zjarri, -thot z.Shkrepa nga Sigal. Kontributi i rndsishm i bankave n kt treg theksohet edhe nga drejtori i prgjithshm i Interalbanian. Nj rol t madh n popullarizimin" e sigurimeve nga zjarri po luajn bankat, t cilat sigurimin nga zjarri si rregull e kan si kusht pr dhn ien e kredive. N kt kontekst, edhe individt q marrin kredi pr shtpi, jan t detyruar t sigurojn banesat nga zjarri. Kjo do t ndihmoj n nj t ardhme t afrt pr shtimin e ktij biznesi, -thot z.Minxhozi. Nuk din t blejn dhe nuk dim t shesim?

N analizn e shoqrive t sigurimit, mentaliteti negativ i klientve dhe mungesa e kulturs s sigurimeve vullnetare sht pengesa kryesore pr zhvillimin e tregut t sigurimit nga zjarri dhe fatkeqsit e tjera natyrore, por pa mohuar se faji nuk qndron vetm nga njri krah. Megjithat, kur nj produkt nuk shitet n masn e duhur, faji kryesor sht i shitsit. Kshtu, kompanit e sigurimeve, prve marketingut, kur shesin sht e domosdoshme t jen korrekte, sidomos kur ndodh nj ose disa raste zjarri duke dmshprblyer shpejt dhe me cilsi. Gjat vitit 2007, ne patm dy raste zjarri n magazina n nj dit t vetme dhe i dmshprblyem n rreth 100 mij euro brenda dy-tre javsh. N kt mnyr, krijohet besimi reciprok midis kompanive dhe klientve, thot z. Bardhyl Minxhozi. Ndrsa shoqria Sigal vlerson se pr t nxitur rritjen e ktij tregu nevojiten ndryshime ligjore dhe prfshirjen n skemn e sigurimeve t detyrueshme edhe sigurimet e apartamenteve nga zjarri dhe rreziqet shtes. Sipas z.Shkrepa, shoqria Sigal ka n planet e saj fushata aktive marketingu pr t promovuar produktet e veta n kt fush. Do t punojm nprmjet medias s shkruar dhe vizive, shprndarjes s fletpalosjeve pr ndrgjegjsimin e individve dhe subjekteve pr sigurimin e prons s tyre nga Zjarri dhe Katastrofat Natyrore . Vetm nprmjet sigurimit bhet transferimi i rreziqeve Faqja 12

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME nga individt ose firmat te kompanit e sigurimit. Kjo i lejon t siguruarit t punojn dh e t zhvillojn biznesin e tyre t qet. E vetmja humbje e pakthyeshme pr klientin sht primi i paguar, i cili sht fare e vogl po t krahasohet me shumn e dmit apo me shumn e fondeve rezerv pr t prballuar fatkeqsit. Nga ana tjetr, individt apo biznesment ndihen t lir t investojn kapitalet pa pasur frikn e ndonj dmtimi, sepse edhe po t ndodh kshtu, kompanit e sigurimit do t kthejn do gj n gjendjen e mparshme financiare, thot z.Shkrepa. Ndrsa, sipas z.Minxhozi, Interalbanian pr vitin 2008 synon t rritet m shum n kt pjes t tregut, duke u prqendruar n nj marketing m efektiv, t thjesht dhe t kuptueshm pr rndsin q kan kto lloj sigurimesh pr klientt. sht e domosdoshme q s pari t sqarojme termat mikrofinanciare, mikrosigurim dhe nensigurim. Termi mikrofinanciar i referohet kredive dhe shrbimeve bankare pr t varferit. Ajo u shpike kur Banka Grameen Muhammed Yunus filloi dhnien e kredive te vogla (mikro kredi) t varfrve n Bangladesh n mesin e viteve shtatdhjet. Risit jan, prve shkalles se vogel ishte dhenia e kredise t grupeve qe garantonin pr njri-tjetrin, n vend te krkeses per kolateral. Per m teper kredit kan qen dhe ende u jepen n mnyr tipike grave. Fillimisht ideja e te dyjave, kreditimit t grave dhe t kreditimit pa kolateral i beri ithtart e tij objekt tallje. Por ideja doli e suksesshme pr dy arsye: S pari , n shumicn e vendeve n zhvillim, grat ende kan nj rol varts n shoqri veanrisht n lidhje me shtjet financiare. Si pasoj, duke i dhn mikrokredit pr grat sht par si nj mjet pr arritjen e fuqizimin te grave n shoqri. S dyti, doli se grat e paguajne kredine t tyre ne menyre m t besueshme dhe nuk jane doreleshuar ne shpenzimin e parave (Roth et al., 2007). N vend t ksaj, kredit u investuar n projekte me IRR t lart. Gjat viteve, mikrofinanca ka evoluar pr t'u br nj produkt i pjekur financiar me nj penetrim goxha te larte dhe mbulimin e njerzve t ardhura t ulta n shum vende n zhvillim. Mikrosigurimi, si microkredia, kerkon zvogelim rigoroz produkteve konvencionale financiare, n kt rast sigurimit. Pr fat t keq, "e vogla sht e dryshme" nuk eshte vetm e vrtet pr shkencat natyrore, por edhe pr financen: Me reduktimit t produkteve t sigurimit karakteristika percaktuese ndryshojne. Sfidat dhe veantit qe kjo sjell jan prpunuar ne mijera studime. Nj nga shpresat e mdha mbi mikrosigurimin sht lejimit e qasjes n sigurim pr ata q m par ishin t privuar nga do form formale e zhvendosjes se riskut . Nj individ sht referuar si i nensiguruar n qoft se niveli aktual i sigurimit sht m posht se niveli optimal. Ky i fundit sht prcaktuar si zvogelimi m i lart i mundshm Faqja 13

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME i atyre risqeve financiare personale duke u furnizuar me produkte t sigurimit. Ky prkufizim padyshim varet nga supozimi se primet e policave te sigurimit jan te dre jta.. Si verehet ne tregun e sigurimeve ne Shqiperi perhapja e sigurimit ne prefektura t me te ardhurat me te larta. (bej nje titull me te shkurter permbledhes) Analize e meposhtme bazohet ne analizen e korelacionit midis dy variablave qe vi hen re ne treg , 1) te ardhurat totale te popullsise se prefektures dhe 2) primet total e te paguara ne sigurime sipas prefektures per jeten, jo-jeten dhe ne total. Te dhenat jane marre nga Instat ne menyre te terthorte meqenese nuk ekziston nje informacion mbi te ardhurat per fryme sipas prefekturave. Duke supozuar qe shperndarja e perberjes se familjeve ne Shqiperi nuk eshte e ndryshueshme ndermjet prefekturave mund te behet nje shperndarje e te ardhurave te per fryme ne baze te te dhenave mbi familjet. Nga nje anketim qe eshte kryer nga Instat, eshte bere statistika e shperndarjes se pajisjeve elektroshtepiake neper familje sipas rretheve, nga mund te nxiren te dhena per prefekturat. Ne baze te nje statistike te dyte po nga Instat te kryer ne Shqiper i eshte gjetur sasia e shpenzimeve qe ben nje familje sipas rretheve per pajisje elektroshtepia ke, nga mund te nxiren te dhenat per prefekturat. Po te supozojme qe pajisjet kane te njejten jetegjatesi dhe nevoja per shpenzime per t i zevendesuar eshte kostante ne te gjithe Shqiperine. Gjithashtu supozojme qe shpe nzimet berhen per zevendesim pajisjesh dhe jo per shtimin e tyre. Gjithsesi edhe sikur te behej per shtimin e tyre ky fenomen do te qe nje fenomen qe mund te mendohet se nuk ka ndikim ne analize sepse do te qe shume me i vogel se shpenzimet per zevendesimin e tyre. Prej ketej arrijme ne perfundimin se mund te krijohet nje koeficent nga i cili ne mund te shperndajme te ardhuren per fryme te Shqiperise sipas prefekturave perka tese dhe t a korelojme me te dhenat e Autoritetit te Mbikqyrjes Financiare per gjeograf ine e primeve te sigurimit dhe te marrim nje numer qe shpjegon, sipas rezultatit te ma re nga analiza, ne nje sasi te madhe shperndarjen e primeve sipas prefekturave. Menyra se si funksionon analiza eshte te tille: Nga te dhenat mbi shperndarjen e pajisjeve afatgjata sipas rretheve nxjerim te d henat per secilen prefekuture duke ditur rrethet qe permban secila prefekture dhe popullsi ne perkatese marim nje mesatare te ponderuar me popullsine e secilit rreth per seci len prefekture. Perqindja e marre me lart ponderohet me pas me peshat perkatese qe n e rastin

tone jane cmimet e tregut te pajisjeve elektroshtepiake (supozohet se marrja e c mimeve aktuale nuk ka ndikim ne analize sepse zbatohet parimi kontabel qe thote qe nje pajisje vlen sa vlera e saj e zevendesimit, pra mimi i tregut) duke na dhene nje tabele v lerash qe mund te interpretohet si sasia totale e pajisjeve elektroshtepiake sipas prefekt urave (nje statistike e re qe mund te kete vlera per studime sociale). Vlerat e marra konve rtohen ne te dhenat e vitit 2009 duke bere nje konvertim ne baze te koeficenteve te ndrysh imit te numrit popullsise sipas prefekturave. Vlerat tashme te korektuara kthehen ne vle ren totale te shpenzimit, duke marre per baze perqindjen qe ze shpenzimi per elektroshtepia ke sipas prefekturave. Duke supozuar se e shpenzimet jane te barabarta me te ardhurat meq enese nuk kemi arsye te themi se funksioni i kursimeve eshte i ndryshueshem ndermjet Faqja 14

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME prefekturave. Duke i vendosur shenjen e barazimit tashme kemi nje tabele vlerash (pa njesi) me te cilatat mund te bejme shperndarjen e te ardhurave per fryme te Shqi perise sipas prefekturave. Nga te dhenat makroekonomike keta tregues gjenden kollaj per vitin 2009. Prej ketej mund te ndertojme tabelen e te ardhrave te popullsise sipas pre fekturave. Tashme qe i kemi te gjitha te dhenat mund te analizojme shume thjeshte te dy var iablat nepermjet kovariances se tyre lineare. Nga vlerat e kovariances mund te themi qe mendimi qe blerja e primeve varet nga te ardhurat eshte i drejte sepse me teper se 85 % ( 0.79 ) e te dhenave shpjegohet nga funksioni linear . Pra mund te themi se nje person ndikohet shume nga e ardhura e tij ne vendimet q e lidhen me blerjen e produktet e tregut te sigurimeve. Analiza e Hipotezave te meposhtme statistikore behet mbi bazen e te dhenave te mbledhura nga anketimi ne qytetin e Tiranes. Mendohet qe rezultatet qe dalin pre j saj jane perfaqesuese per gjithe Shqiperine meqenese popullsia e Tiranes eshte nje p opullsi heterogjene e perbere nga shtresa te ndryshme shoqerore dhe me origjine nga shum ica e trevave te Shqiperise. Anketimi eshte kryer ne disa zona te ndryshme te Tiranes gjate nje periudhe nje javore me ane te zgjedhjeve rastesore. Hipotezat e meposhtme jane bere mbi bazen e supozimeve :

shpenzimet e sigurimit te individeve jane te varur nga tardhurat e tyre vjetore, gje qe u vertetua edhe nga Analiza meLart mendimi pozitiv reth sigurimit i individeve eshte n varsi tgjinis s tyre mendimi pozitiv reth sigurimit i individeve eshte n varsi tmoshs s tyre mendimi pozitiv reth sigurimit i individeve eshte n varsi tedukimit t tyre Personi i cili sht i siguruar eshte n varsi t t ardhurave t tyre Pjesmarrja n kt statistike nga qyteti Tiranes prbhej nga 400njerz, 378 prej tyre dhane prgjigje t plot pr pyetjen, dhe 22 prejtyre nuk deshen t prgjigjen. Mosha e te intervi stuarve ishte 18 vjec elart. Numri i pyetjeve ishte i 8 dhe ato ishin t gjitha py etje te hapura. Pyetjeve n kete ankete ishin n lidhje me informacionin e te Faqja 15

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME

intervistuarve si mosha e tij, gjinore, dhe arsimit, mesatarja e tardhurave, mend imin e tyre pr shrbimet e sigurimit. Me ktinformacion do t kemi mundsi pr t gjetur at s t popullsis qedin pr kompanit e sigurimit dhe faktort pse ata jan kundrshrbimeve rimit? Kto jan arsyet prse ne jane zgjedhur ketohipoteza dhe qllimi yn sht pr t msu dokumentet embledhura. Ne kemi analizuar marrdhniet e klientit t shrbimeve t sigurimit n grupin ton t par. Ne konsiderojm se pjesmarrsit sam shum te perfshihen n durat e aplikimit aq m afrrezultatet jane me realitetin. Sikurse Kotler (1997) prsh kruan nteorin e tij sht e mundur pr t marr nj rezultat t mir edhenese numri i pjes m pak se 1% e popullsis ntrsi. Ne krijuam pyetesorin pr t mbledhur informacion. Frekuencat A=GjiniaB = Mosha C = Arsimimi D = t ardhurat mujore t anketuaritE = A jeni i siguruar? F = A keni t ardhura t mjaftueshme pr t qene i siguruar? G = A eshte sigurimi i arsyeshem? H = A besoni n sigurim? Gjinia: mashkull: femr: Mosha: nga 18 deri 25 nga 26 deri 45 nga 46 e lartNiveli i arsimit i aritur: Universitet Shkolla e mesme Te ardhurat mujore: nn 50 000 LEK me teper se 50 000 LEK A perdorni sherbime sigurimeve? Po Jo Nuk ka prgjigje Nse, Jo, a jeni n gjendje t per tepaguar pr shrbimet e sigurimit? Po Jo Nuk ka prgjigje A besoni n Sigurimet? Po Jo Nuk ka prgjigje A mendoni se sigurimi sht i Po Faqja 16

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME arsyeshm? Jo Nuk ka prgjigje Gjinia e t anketuarve Frekuenc a Prqindja Te Vlefsh me mashku ll 248 65,6 femr 130 34,4 Totali 378 100,0 Mosha e t anketuarve Frekuenca Prqindjq Te Vlefshme nn 25 116 30,7 26-45 199 52,6 46-mbi 63 16,7 Totali 378 100,0 Arsimimi Frekuenc a Prqindja Te Vlefsh me i diplomu ar 228 60,3 shkollim te mesme 150 39,7 Totali 378 100,0 Te ardhurat mujore t t intervistuarve Frekuen ca Prqindja Te Vlefsh me nen 50.000

Lek 318 84,1 mbi 50.000 Lek 60 15,9 Totali 378 100,0 A jeni i siguruar? Faqja 17

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Frekuen ca Prqindja Te Vlefsh me Po 23 6,1 Jo 355 93,9 Tota li 378 100,0 A keni t ardhura t mjaftueshme pr t siguruar? Frekuenc Prqind I vlefsh m Po 57 15,1 Jo 321 84,9 Tot al 378 100,0 A sht sigurimi i arsyeshem? Frekuen ca Prqindja Te Vlefsh me Po 132 34,9 Jo 181 47,9 Nuk ka prgjigj e 65 17,2 Totali 378 100,0 A besoni n sigurimet? Frekuen ca Prqindja Po 78 20,6 Jo 226 59,8 Nuk ka prgjigje 74 19,6 Totali 378 100, 0

Ne testuam qndrimin e te siguruave per sigurimin me faktortdemografike (gjinia, mo sha, arsimi) me kriterin e kontrollit te hipotezave me shperndarjen hi-katror X2 (c 2). Programi StatistikorSPSS 14v sht prd orur pr t llogaritur marrdhniet midisvariablave. Faqja 18

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Ho-Proporcioni i t intervistuarve q mendon se sigurimi sht i pavarur nga gjinia. H1-Proporcionin n t anketuarve t cilt mendon se sigurimi sht i varur nga gjinia. Tabela a). Tabela Permbledhese "A sht Sigurimi i arsyeshm? * Gjite e te anketuarve " Te anketuarit mashk ull femr Totali A eshte Po Numri sigurimi iarsyeshem? 87 45 132 % sigurimi tarsyeshem? 65,9% 34,1% 100,0% % anketuarve 35,1% 34,6% 34,9% % Nga Totali 23,0% 11,9% 34,9% Tepric , 4 -, 4 Std. Tepric , 0 -, 1 Tepricat eregulluara , 1 -, 1 Jo Numri 119 62 181 % sigurimi tearsyeshem? 65,7% 34,3% 100,0% % anketuarve 48,0% 47,7% 47,9% % Nga Totali 31,5% 16,4% 47,9% Tepric , 2 -, 2 Std. Tepric , 0 , 0 Nuk ka Tepricat eregulluara Numri , 1 -, 1 prgjigj e 42 23 65 %sigurimit tearsyeshem? 64,6% 35,4% 100,0% % anketuarve 16,9% 17,7% 17,2% % Nga Totali 11,1% 6,1% 17,2% Tepric -, 6 , 6 Std. Tepric -, 1 , 1 Tepricat eregulluara -, 2 , 2 Total Numri 248 130 378 Faqja 19

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME % sigurimit tearsyeshem % anketuarve % Nga Totali 65,6% 34,4% 100,0% 100,0 100,0 100,0% %% 65,6% 34,4% 100,0% Figura 1. A sht e sigurimii arsyeshem? * gjini te anketuarit Bar Chart 120 respondent's male female 100 80 60 Count 40 20 0 Yes No No answer is insurance resonable? Faqja 20

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME

Prova statistikore: Prdorni nj mostr Hi-katror pr t krahasuarshprndarjen e vrejtur nda n nj shprndarje te hipotetizuar.Testi Hikatro sht prdorur pr shkak se prgjigjet jan t klasifikuar n kategori nominale dhe ka vrejtje t mjaftueshme. Tabela b) Hi-katror Rezultatet e provave "A sht e sigurimit tarsyeshme? * Gjini ank etuarve " Statistika Vler shkalle lirije P Hi-katror 0035 2 0983 Rezultatet e testimit jan dhn si vlere tabele Hi-katror me vlere(0,035) dhe shkalln e liris (2) s bashku me vlern P (0,983). Testimi i vleres kritike: Vlera e (c 2) me shkalln e liris (2) sht 13,82 pr a = 0,01 . Vendim: Vlera e llogaritur sht m i vogl se vlera kritike, kshtu qhipoteza zero pranohe t. Kjo do t thot qe neqoftese i anketuarimendon se sigurimi sht i arsyeshem kjo nuk varet nga gjinia e tij. Ho-Proporcioni i t intervistuarve q mendon se sigurimi eshte iarsyeshem sht i pavaru r nga mosha. H1-Proporcioni i t intervistuarve q mendon se sigurimi sht iarsyeshem eshte i varur nga mosha. Tabela b) Permbledhese t sigurimit sht e arsyeshme? * Mosha e tanketuarve mosh t anketuarit Totali nn 25 26-45 46-mbi sigurimisht i arsyeshem? Po Numri 23 89 20 132 % sigurimieshte i arsyeshem? 17,4% 67,4% 15,2% 100,0 % % mosha anketuarve 19,8% 44,7% 31,7% 34,9% % Nga Totali 6,1% 23,5% 5,3% 34,9% Tepric -17,5 19,5 -2,0 Std. Tepric -2,8 2,3 -, 4 Totalet e regulluara -4,1 4,2 -, 6 Faqja 21

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Jo numri 79 83 19 181 % sigurimieshte i arsyeshem 43,6% 45,9% 10,5% 100,0 % % mosha siguruarit 68,1% 41,7% 30,2% 47,9% % Nga Totali 20,9% 22,0% 5,0% 47,9% Tepric 23,5 -12,3 -11,2 Std. Tepric 3,1 -1,3 -2,0 Totalet e regulluara 5,2 -2,5 -3,1 Nuk ka prgjigj e Numri 14 27 24 65 % sigurimieshte i arsyeshem? 21,5% 41,5% 36,9% 100,0 % % mosha anketuarit 12,1% 13,6% 38,1% 17,2% % Nga Totali 3,7% 7,1% 6,3% 17,2% Tepric -5,9 -7,2 13,2 Std. Tepric -1,3 -1,2 4,0 Totalet e regulluara -1,8 -2,0 4,8 Total Numri 116 199 63 378 % sigurimieshte i arsyeshem 30,7% 52,6% 16,7% 100,0 % % mosha anketuarit 100,0 % 100,0 % 100,0 % 100,0 % % Nga Totali 30,7% 52,6% 16,7% 100,0 % Figura b) A sht e sigurimi i arsyeshem? * Mosha e t anketuarve Faqja 22

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Bar Chart 100 80 46-over 26-45 under 25 age of respondent's 60 40 20 0 Yes No No answer is insurance resonable? Count

Prova statistikore: Prdorni nj mostr Hi-katror pr t krahasuarshprndarjen e vrejtur nda nj shprndarje te hipotetizuar.Testi Hikatro sht prdorur pr shkak se prgjigjet jan t klasifikuar n kategori nominale dhe ka vrojtime t mjaftueshme. Tabela c) Rezultatet e provs Hi-katror "A sht Sigurimi i arsyeshm? * Mosha e t anketuarve " Statistika Vler Shkalle lirije P Hi-katror 48147 4 0000 Rezultatet e testimit jan dhn si vlera tabele te shperndarjes Hikatror (c 2) Vlera (48,147) dhe shkalla e liris (4) s bashku me vlernP (0,000). Testi i vlers kritike: Vlera e (c 2) me shkalln e liris (4) sht 18,46 pr a = 0,01 . Vendim: Llogaritja tregon se vlera e llogaritur sht m i madh se savlera kritike, ksh tu q hipoteza zero refuzohet. Nga kjo nekonkludojm se mosha e te anketuarve ka ren desi ne vendimin e tyrene lidhje me sigurimet . Shumica e te anketuarve (67,4%) mosha e te cileve eshte 26-45supozojne se shrbimi i sigurimit sht i domosdoshm n jet. Nemund t konkludojm se kjo pjes e popullsis n ve merrpjes n jetn sociale dhe t biznesit, prandaj mendimi i tyre pr Faqja 23

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME sigurim sht pozitiv. T anketuarit nn moshn 25 kan mendim negativ pr sigurim. Ne mendojm se arsyet jan: Sipas informatave zyrtare nuk ka nj lende mesimore t lidhur me sigurimin n shkolla dhe gjimnaze. Sipas hulumtimit ton, njerezit e pa sigurua jane me teper (93,9%) se njerzit e siguruar (6,1%). Kjo mund t thot se nuk gjenden kushtet e tilla, pr t rinjt, qe t ken mendimin e tyre n shoqri. Ho-Proporcioni i t intervistuarve q mendon se sigurimi eshte i arsyeshem sht i pavarur nga arsimi; H1-Proporcioni i t intervistuarve q mendon se sigurimi eshte i arsyeshem sht i varur nga arsimi; Tabela c) Permbledhese "Eshte Sigurimi i arsyeshm? * Arsimi " Arsimi Total I diplomu ar shkoll n e mesme sigurimisht i arsyeshem? Po numri 116 16 132 % sigurimi eshte iarsyeshem? 87,9% 12,1% 100,0 % % arsimit 50,9% 10,7% 34,9% % Nga Totali 30,7% 4,2% 34,9% Tepric 36,4 -36,4 Std. Tepric 4,1 -5,0 Tepricat e regulluara 8,0 -8,0 Jo numri 76 105 181 % sigurimi eshte iarsyeshem? 42,0% 58,0% 100,0 % % arsimit 33,3% 70,0% 47,9% % Nga Totali 20,1% 27,8% 47,9% Tepric -33,2 33,2 Std. Tepric -3,2 3,9 Tepricat e regulluara -7,0 7,0 Nuk ka prgjigj e numri 36 29 65 % sigurimi eshte iarsyeshem? 55,4% 44,6% 100,0 % % arsimit 15,8% 19,3% 17,2% % Nga Totali 9,5% 7,7% 17,2% Faqja 24

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Tepric -3,2 3,2 Std. Tepric -, 5 , 6 Tepricat e regulluara -, 9 , 9 Total numri 228 150 378 % sigurimi eshte iarsyeshem? 60,3% 39,7% 100,0 % % arsimit 100,0% 100,0 % 100,0 % % Nga Totali 60,3% 39,7% 100,0 % Figura c). A sht e sigurimi i arsyeshem? * Arsimi Bar Chart education 120 graduated high school 100 80 60 40 20 0 Count Yes No No answer is insurance resonable?

Testi statistikor: Prdorim nj mostr te tabeles Hi-katror (c 2) pr tkrahasuar shprndarj en vrejtur me nj shprndarje te hipotetizuar .Shperndarja Hi-katror (c 2) sht prdorur pr shkak se prgjigjetjan t klasifikuar n kat ri nominale, dhe ka vrojtime tmjaftueshme. Tabela d) HI-katror Rezultatet e provs "sht Sigurimi i arsyeshm? * Arsimi " Statika Vler shkalle lirije P Faqja 25

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Hi-katror 67956 2 0000 Rezultatet e testimit jan dhn ne fillim si vlera tabele te Hi-katror (. 2) Vlera (67,956) dhe shkalln e liris (2) s bashku me vlern P (0,000). Vlera kritike e testuar: Vlera e (c 2) me shkalln e liris (2) sht 13,82 pr a =0,01 . Vendim: Vlera e llogaritur sht m e madhe se vlera kritike, kshtu q hipoteza zero refuzohet. Nga kjo ne konkludojm se t anketuarit ndikohen nga arsimi n vendimin e tyre mbi sigurimet. Shumica e t anketuarve (87,9%) me arsim t lart jane t mendimit se shrbimet e sigurimit jan t nevojshme. Ne mendojm se arsyet jan: Shumica e universiteteve kane disa lende t biznesit si lndt e detyruara. Shumica e studentve zakonisht prpiqen t fillojn biznesin e tyre ose jan t angazhuar tashm n biznese t vogla, t mesme ose biznese t medha. Kjo sht arsyeja pse ata jan t interesuar me shum n sistemin ekonomik duke prfshir edhe sistemin e sigurimeve. H0-Pjesa ardhurat H1-Pjesa ardhurat e e e e t anketuarve q sht i siguruar eshte e pavarur nga t mjaftueshme pr qene t jen t siguruar. t anketuarve q sht i siguruar eshte e varur nga t mjaftueshme pr qene t jen t siguruar.

Tabela e) Permbledhese "A jeni i siguruar? * A keni t ardhura t mjaftueshme pr tu siguruar? " A keni t ardhura t mjaftueshme pr tusiguruar? Totali Po Jo jeni tsiguruar? Po numri 22 1 23 numri i pritshem 3,5 19,5 23,0 % A jeni tsiguruar? 95,7% 4,3% 100,0 % % a keni t ardhura t mjaftueshme prte qene isiguruar? 38,6% , 3% 6,1% % Nga Totali 5,8% , 3% 6,1% Tepric 18,5 -18,5 Faqja 26

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Std. Tepric 10,0 -4,2 Teprice eregulluar 11,1 -11,1 Jo numri 35 320 355 numri i pritshem 53,5 301,5 355,0 % a jeni tsiguruar? 9,9% 90,1% 100,0 % % a keni t ardhura t mjaftueshme prte qene isiguruar? 61,4% 99,7% 93,9% % Nga Totali 9,3% 84,7% 93,9% Tepric -18,5 18,5 Std. Tepric -2,5 1,1 tepricat eregulluara -11,1 11,1 Total numri 57 321 378 numri i pritshem 57,0 321,0 378,0 % a jeni tsiguruar? 15,1% 84,9% 100,0 % % a keni t ardhura t mjaftueshme prt qene isiguruar? 100,0% 100,0% 100,0 % % Nga Totali 15,1% 84,9% 100,0 % Figura e). "A jeni i siguruar? * A keni t ardhura t mjaftueshme pr tqene i siguruar? " Faqja 27

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME 400 300 Bar Chart No Yes do you have sufficientincome? 200 100 0 Yes No are you insured? Count Tabela 2,31 Rezultatet e testit Hi-katror "A jeni i siguruar? * A keni tardhura t mjaftueshme pr t qene i siguruar? " Statistik a Vlera shkalle lirije P Hi-katror 124,157 1 0000 Rezultatet e testimit jan dhn ne fillim si vlera tabele te Hi-katror (c 2) Vlera (124,157) dhe shkalln e liris (1) s bashku me vlern P(0,000). Vlera kritike e testar: Vlera e (c 2) me shkalln e liris (1) sht 10,83 pr a =0,01 . Vendim: Vlera e llogaritur sht m i madh se vlera kritike, kshtu qhipoteza zero refuzo het. Kjo do t thot se mosperdorimi i shrbimin tesigurimit nga njerzit varet nga mjaf tueshmeria e te ardhurave te tyrepr tu siguruar. Faqja 28

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Si perfundim nga analiza e anketes se mbledhur ne Tirane me pyetje te pergjithsm e rreth anketuesve dhe mendimit te tyre mbi sigurimet arrijme ne perfundimet e meposhtme , po te marim si baze testimin e hipotezave me shperndarjen Hi-katror me vlera standa rte : Neqoftese personi mendon se sigurimi sht i arsyeshem kjo nukvaret nga gjinia e tij . Mosha e individeve ka rendesi ne vendimin e tyre ne lidhje mesigurimet. Individet ndikohen nga arsimi n vendimin e tyre mbi sigurimet. Mosperdorimi i shrbimin te sigurimit nga njerzit varet ngamjaftueshmeria urave te tyre pr tu siguruar. Meqenese nga Analiza rezultoi se sasia e sigurimeve qe blen nje individ ka aresi te larte nga te ardhurat e tij, do te qe e nevojshme qe te studionim se perse sa e varfer e popullsise ka nje perqasje kaq te vogel ne tregun e sigurimeve. Si shihet e te ardh nje v shtre dhe nga

Grafiket ku jane mbivendosur primet me te ardhurat per secilen prefekture, vereh et qe perve prefektures se Tiranes pjesa tjeter e prefekturave kane nje perqindje shpen zimesh Faqja 29

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME disa here me te vogel per sigurimet. Kjo na on te mendojme se tregu ka nje mosefi cence ne kete pjese te tij. Per te gjetur perse shtresa e varfer e shqiptareve nuk jane te siguruar u ngrite n kater hipoteza , te lidhura dhe me shkaqet qe parashtron shpesh dhe literatura, ne lid hje me shkaqet qe cojne ne moseficence te tregut nga te dy krahet , oferte e kerkese. K rahu i ofertes u medua se nuk kishte eficence per keto tre arye : 1) Kosto me te larta transaksioni per produktet me prime te uleta 2) Zgjedhja e keqe , rriku moral dhe mashtrimi eshte me i larte per personat me te ardhura me te uleta 3) Pamundesi shkallezimi te produkteve te sigurimit per personat e varfer Kurse krahu i kerkeses kishte vec nje arsye te vetme qe e pengonte shtresen me t e ardhura te uleta qe te qasej prane ketij tregu: 4) Mungesa e antipatise ndaj riskut, mungesa e informacionit , racionlitetit dhe moskuptimi i produkteve te sigurimev Mbi bazen e ketyre arsyeve te mesiperme u ndertuan kater hipoteza. We in turn test the hypotheses that the market for microinsurance is impeded by (1) transaction costs, (2) adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud, (3) lack of sc alability, (4) lack of risk aversion, information, understanding and rationality. We reject the first three hypotheses and find that insurers and gru pet e perbashket in cooperation can reduce transaction costs, adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud to levels which make microinsurance feasible. Further we find that the products currently offered by Albanian insurers are commensurately scalable (with the exc eption of health insurance) and offer significant risk reduction potential to low incom e clients, indicating that the products offered are not ill-suited to the clients needs. How ever, we find evidence that, although risk averse, the target population for microinsuran ce products is widely unaware of microinsurance availability, lacks financial liter acy and understanding of basic insurance concepts impeding the demand for microinsurance . Hypothesis 4 can thus not be rejected. Since the 1970s, the academic discourse on uncertainty has gained momentum and b oth imperfect information and its resulting market failures have been included into contemporary microeconomics. Though not widely discussed in academic textbooks u p

until now, uncertainty is the foundation of insurance theory. Two major assumpti ons with respect to the consumers are made in the theory of uncertainty (Mas-Collel et al ., 1995). First, the expected utility theorem is assumed to hold. It states that utility f unctions have the expected utility form (Neumann-Morgenstern utility function), i.e. aggregate utility is equal to the sum of the probability weighted utilities of each possible outcome. Second, individuals are assumed to be risk averse. Due to risk aversion, the individual is willing to trade risk for certainty because it derives additional utility from a certain outcome Faqja 30

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME (Dionne, 2000). More generally, if the price for insurance is fair, i.e. the pre mium equals the expected indemnity payment of the insurance company, the individual prefers the certain outcome over any other outcome with non-zero variance (Schlesinger, 2006 ). In addition, Mossin s theorem (1968) explains that if all preceding assumptions hold, the individual is fully insured. Loewenstein et al. (2001) argue that even if the pr ice is not fair i.e. the insurance company keeps a profit, the individual might still opt f or insurance because of potential non-pecuniary benefits (e.g. peace of mind) from being insu red. Directly hinging on the assumption that insurance policies are fairly priced is the assumption that insurers themselves are risk neutral towards risk or are able to perfectly diversify the risks they are insuring. Roth & Athreye (2005) claim that insuranc e companies are indeed risk neutral towards microinsurance related exposures as th ese are dwarfed by the size of their overall portfolio.9 Further, some risks are by defi nition more diversifiable than others: a very high degree of diversification can be reached for life and accident insurance while polices insulating farmers from draughts or natural dis asters bear a great deal of covariant risk (Churchill et al., 2006). Ne tregun e mikrosigurimit mund te themi se Throughout the academic literature we have reviewed, the simplest definition for microinsurance we came across is insurance for the poor . This is in analogy to microcredit, which is in fact credit for the poor. Similarly, Warren Brown (2001) defines microinsurance as insurance for low-income people. Churchill et a l. (2006) reinforce this point by stating that microinsurance and conventional insu rance are similar except that the former referring to a clearly prescribed target market: low-income people. There is no clear cut-off point between microinsurance and conventional insurance. Microinsurance is primarily directed at people below and at the pover ty line, sometimes also marginally above it. Apart from addressing different people, microinsurance is not substantially different from conventional insurance theory with respect to the major insurance characteristics. The same assumptions are made as outlined above and microinsurance is also affected by asymmetric information and market failures like adverse selection and moral hazard. In addition, due to its small scale layout microinsurance is much more exposed to transaction costs than conventiona l

insurance (Morduch, 2002). Ne baze te punimeve te autoreve te ndyshem dhe hipotezave te meparshme, koncepti i microinsurance is a recent development in the financial industry which has evolv ed less then ten years ago. Due to its short history, the amount of academic literature on the topic is neither abundant nor undisputed. Currently, microinsurance is seen as the nex t step of financial integration of the poor after the microcredit programmes seem to becom e relatively well established. This section provides an overview of the previous r esearch on microinsurance. We thereby focus on the relevant literature that relates to our research question. As such, we analyse the reasoning for underinsurance of the poor. The majority of the literature is case based and analyzes the experiences with microinsurance in different countries. Most of the studies on microinsurance are prepared by a han d full of world wide operating organizations and working groups. Faqja 31

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Four major arguments for underinsurance of the poor can be identified in the lit erature and are discussed subsequently. Correspondingly, we derive four hypotheses, base d on these arguments, on why the poor are underinsured. 1.) Transaction cost The single most important argument for underinsurance of low-income people in th e literature relates to transaction costs. Morduch (2002) acknowledges that transa ction costs are often preventing microinsurance from being provided by commercial insu rance companies. Ahuja et al. (2005) go a step further by stating that this lack of af fordability prevents the potential demand from expressing itself in the market. Microinsuran ce causes higher transaction costs than conventional insurance at almost every stag e of the insurance transaction. Selling insurance to the poor is costly due to the large amount of low premium contracts. Servicing insurance, handling and controlling claims and paying out benefits is equally more costly (McCord, 2002). Transaction costs have to be brought down to make insurance affordable. In order to be able to provide microinsurance on a large scale, the choice of the right distribution channel is crucial (Churchill, 2006). Four different insurance distribution models are outlined in the literature: First, t he insurer can distribute the policies himself. This subsequently is referred to as the direct sales channel. Second, grupet e perbashket can set up insurance schemes on their own accounts; they are most of the time operating under the radar of regulators because the latter don t want the former to take on excessive risks. Third, mutuals can provide insurance as well. They are usually professionally managed, regulated member-owned and offer the advantage o f operating close to the people. Fourth, community-based organizations can offer insurance. They are member-owned, unregulated and by their very nature very clos e to the clients (Roth et al., 2007). For the purpose of our analysis, we discuss the first model and then focus on a combination of both, the first and the second model, the socalled partner-agent model. Discussing the partner-agent model we mendojme se si do te funksiononte nese grupet e perbashketa do te providing close to area-wide covera ge of poor and marginally poor families. Most of the literature focuses on the transaction costs the insurer is faced wit h. This neglects the fact that those insured also incur substantial transaction costs. W e discuss the transaction costs of both parties involved, the insurer as well as the insured.

The central role of transaction costs in microinsurance leads to the derivation of the first hypothesis which is discussed in this paper: Hypothesis 1: Transaction costs are proportionally higher for microinsurance tha n for conventional insurance. 2.) Adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud Adverse selection refers to an ex-ante asymmetric information problem of hidden information. Akerlof (1970) uses the analogy of the markets for used cars to ill ustrate that with uncertainty and information asymmetry the market does not necessarily clear resulting in an inefficient allocation. Adverse selection and moral hazard are b est prevented by designing the insurance policy such that the incentives are aligned already from the outset. Examples include copayment which would render a given policy unattractive for risky insurance takers. If prevention by design is not feasible , the insured Faqja 32

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME as well as the insurance will try to reduce adverse selection by signalling and screening, respectively (Jehle et al., 2001). Moral hazard is a problem of hidden action an d formally is a part of principal-agent theory. It refers to postcontractual actions caused by the principle s inability to observe the agent s actions. Therefore, the principal has t o design an incentive scheme so that the agent takes the appropriate action (Jehle et al. , 2001). Fraud, i.e. deliberately causing damage or claiming damage which has not occurre d is best addressed by monitoring. While moral hazard might occur due to a non-consci ous change in behaviour, fraud always happens deliberately. For simplicity, despite fraud not being a market failure in a strict sense, we treat it as such for the purpose of this section. While these market failures are also prevalent in conventional insurance, they m ight be more important to microinsurance, preventing the microinsurance market from developing. Previous research suggests that for certain kinds of insurance, thes e market failures are indeed detrimental. Whenever, these market failures can not be avoi ded by design, means such as signalling and screening will be employed, leading to tran saction cost. Because these tend to accrue as absolute costs rather than as proportions of the premium, small scale schemes are obviously hit harder. Nevertheless, there are innovative ways around both problems: Group insurance is getting more and more popular and co-payments as well as lapsing periods and first year exclusions are not uncommon (Churchill et al., 2003). Typically damage due to negligent behaviour i s also excluded. According to Herrera et al. (2004), the problem is fairly small in lif e and accident insurance as death claims are easy to verify and the sum assured is not high enough to result into reckless behaviour. Mommens (2006) analyzes the case of cr op insurance. In agriculture, the costs of screening are very high so the insurance is unable to tell a good from a bad farmer before selling insurance (adverse selection). More over, high monitoring costs prevent the insurance from controlling if the farmer still takes care of the field appropriately after taking insurance. In health insurance, adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud are even more detrimental. People might be encouraged to overuse the health system or wait too long to seek medical treatment in the case of critical illness insurance (Churchill et al., 2006). In this study, we want to investigat e the extent to which adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud are responsible for the under insurance of the poor. Consequently the next hypothesis is as follows.

Hypothesis 2: Microinsurance is exposed to severer problems of adverse selection , moral hazard and fraud than is conventional insurance. 3.)Scalability Although not explicitly labelled scalability problem, previous research indicate s that it might not be possible to provide some specific microinsurance policies due to th e inability to scale the premium and benefits to a level that is affordable for po or people. Two conditions have to be fulfilled for microinsurance to be scalable. The premi um needs to be directly related to the benefit and the benefit in turn should be so mehow related to the income of the person (Churchill et al., 2003). The first conditio n is straight forward. If fair pricing is assumed, the condition should hold automatically. Th e second condition, however, is more complicated and depends on the type of insurance. Wh ile life insurance can easily be scaled down to microinsurance levels (benefits depend on Faqja 33

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME income), health insurance is probably the most complicated insurance to scale do wn (benefits are almost not dependent on income as they have to cover a certain sickness) . In the literature, the scalability problem is often treated together with the asymmetric information and transaction cost problems. In this thesis, we want to look at all the three effects separately. The third hypothesis is therefore formulated as follows: Hypothesis 3: Conventional insurance products can not be scaled down to the exte nt necessary for providing microinsurance 4.) Risk aversion, information, understanding and rationality The demand for microinsurance is largely unexplored. Most of the studies are rat her qualitative in nature and not based on representative samples. Previous research gives different reasons for underinsurance of the poor: First, alternative informal ri sk mitigation mechanisms like self-insurance11 and communal insurance are mentioned. It is acknowledged, however, that these mechanisms are inherently unstable and cover o nly small impact events due to idiosyncratic risks (Churchill et al., 2006). Second, lack of information and understanding seems to be a major determinant reducing effective insurance demand (Manje et al., 2002). This includes among other factors mistrus t towards the insurance company due to bad experiences or word of mouth, the inabi lity to distinguish between insurance and saving as well as the expectation to get money back at the end of the policy. Third, ignorance about insurance products and risks in li fe are used to explain the (partial) underinsurance (Roth et al., 2007). We want to add a di scussion on rationality to this point and argue that people might think and act bounded rati onal or even irrational in certain situations which causes demand to fall short of what it could be. Argumentimi per vertetetesine ose jo per secilen hipoteze : 1.) Transaction cost Hypothesis 1: Transaction costs are proportionally higher for microinsurance tha n for conventional insurance In the following we examine whether transaction costs are the reason why insurance products are not offered to the poor. First, the different kinds of transaction costs are defined. Second, we evaluat e whether they are proportionally lower for microinsurance than for conventional insurance in the

direct sales model. Third, the partner-agent model is introduced to show how tra nsaction costs in microinsurance can be brought down as to ultimately reject hypothesis 1 . In the context of microinsurance, transaction costs are incurred by the insurance compa ny as well as the insured individual. Transaction costs of the insurer include (1) edu cating imperfectly informed clients on the merits of taking insurance products to reduc e the financial volatility in their lives, (2) conducting due diligence and screening clients to prevent adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud and finally (3) servicing exis ting insurance contracts e.g. collecting and disbursing money. The clients, too, incu r transaction cost largely due to (4) conducting due diligence on different insura nce products pre-contract, (5) meeting documentation requirements set by the insurer and (6) Faqja 34

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME costs associated with the exchange of money, most notably paying monthly or annu al premiums to the insurer. We in turn discuss the six costs mentioned above and an alyse the extent to which they differ when insurance products are scaled down to match the demand of the poor. This is done for two different microinsurance distribution c hannels: First, we look at transaction costs if the insurance offers insurance directly t o the poor. Second, we analyse the costs in the socalled partner-agent model. 7.1.1 Direct Sales Model (insurance company sells insurance directly to the poor ) Transaction costs for insurance company: (1) Poor clients are on average less financially literate than wealthy ones. Con sequently, the insurance agent needs to spend more time on each client increasing transacti on costs for the insurance company. However, the salary of the insurance agent in the rur al areas is lower, so it is unclear if transaction costs in absolute terms decrease or in crease. However, due to the considerably lower scale of premium and cover transaction co sts make up a larger share of the premium. (2) Pre-contractual screening and due dil igence are the most common forms of transaction costs related to information asymmetrie s. The insurance company largely transfers these costs to the client by imposing specif ic documentation requirements depending on the type of insurance. Nevertheless, it has to bear the cost of collection and processing of these documents. These documents a re collected in the central offices of the insurance companies so the costs of proc essing are probably the same independently of the size of the policy. Hence, transaction co sts are higher as a proportion of premiums. As a consequence, insurance companies might be inclined to shift part of their due diligence for the lower premium policies fro m precontract to post claim (Churchill et al., 2006). This reduces the costs somewhat and we expect transaction costs to be comparable to conventional insurance in relative terms. (3) Generally speaking, the cost of collecting premiums and disbursing money in case of adverse events should be relatively constant and independent of the size of the premiums. However, two cost factors differentiate microinsurance and conventional insuranc e: First, rural clients largely don t have bank accounts so the insurance either needs a loc al presence or has to send an agent to collect and disburse the money. In urban are

as with wealthier clients, all this is done through bank accounts. Second, lower premium products often have lower frequencies of payment reducing transaction costs. For policies with high premiums, the payments are more likely to take place on a monthly basis. Summarizing, transaction costs of premium collection and benefit disbursement ar e likely to be higher for microinsurance in absolute and relative terms. Transaction costs for the client: (4) Rural clients, except for the very credulous ones, conduct their own due dil igence. They incur costs searching for policies, understanding the meaning of the contra ct and evaluating the contract and its implications. It is impossible to estimate if th e costs are higher or lower than for conventional insurance because again two opposite effec ts might be offsetting each other partly (more time spent at lower opportunity cost). How ever, relative transaction costs will be higher for microinsurance compared to convent ional insurance. (5) In addition to the costs outlined above, the documentation requir ements set by the insurer also mean significant transaction costs to the clients. Filling o ut application Faqja 35

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME and claim forms can be done in a few minutes by a literate person experienced in financial matters. For the average rural poor, however, this probably involves s eeking the advice of a trusted person with knowledge in the matter. Again, opportunity cost s have to be weighted with time spent on filling out and receiving the forms. In absolute terms, it is unclear if transaction costs are higher. However, it is reasonable to assume tha t transaction costs of meeting the documentation requirements are substantially hi gher for lower premium policies. (6) Finally the client faces the transaction cost of pay ing the premiums to the insurance company. Most of the clients don t have bank accounts so the client has to bring the money to the local office of the insurance company if th e agent does not come to pick it up. Due to the yearly premium payments, this part of th e clients transaction cost should be small but still higher than in conventional insurance in absolute and relative terms. As shown on a qualitative basis, scaling down insurance poli cies does not automatically mean that transaction cost decreases in proportion. Tabela 1 i llustrates that quite the opposite is true: Transaction costs as a proportion of premium increase, rendering microinsurance less attractive. 7.1.2 Partner Agent Model (insurance company sells insurance to the poor with th e help of grupet e perbashketa intermediary) Transaction costs for insurance company: (1) In the partner-agent model, client education and the entire sales process ar e taken over by the grupeve te perbashketa (Churchill et al., 2006). In return, the insurance pays a commission as percentage of premium to the grupit. Grupi not only has the necess ary grass root staff in place, it also has a lot of experience with the clientele an d regularly organizes educational trainings for the poor to improve their (financial) litera cy. Adding a course module on insurance would be the easiest and most cost efficient way to e ducate the clients. This reduces the transaction costs of the insurance company substan tially and renders the whole sales process more efficient. In this model, we expect the tra nsaction cost of the insurance company to come down well below the costs of conventional insurance. (2) Under the partner-agent model grupet does all pre-contractual due diligence. Grupet has significant advantages in conducting due diligence. The organization has field staff that closely interacts with the people and is there

by able to reduce the information gap between insurance and client. This reduces adverse se lection and moral hazard problems as well as fraud. Apart from reducing the information gap, the field staff can easily collect application and claim forms bundle them and send them back to the insurance company. All of the insurance companies that we met retain thei r post claim due diligence in-house in order to prevent fraud. All in all, the due dili gence and documentation process becomes more efficient and transaction cost of the insuran ce are lower in absolute terms and comparable in relative terms to the conventional ins urance. (3) Grupet e perbashket collects the premiums once a year during the SHG meeting s and transfers the money in bulk to the insurance company. The organization disburses the claimed benefits which the insurance company transfers to its accounts. Disburse ment mostly involves personal interaction of the grass root staff with the claimant b ut most of the time, both live in the same village anyway. As a share of premium, transacti on costs related to collection are smaller in absolute and relative terms and costs of di sbursement Faqja 36

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME are slightly higher in relative terms than for conventional insurance. In sum, r elative transaction costs are likely to be approximately equal . Transaction costs for the client: (4) The partner-agent model reduces transactio n costs related to sales education in at least two ways. First, by screening and selecti ng the most suitable insurance schemes for the poor, grupimi ensures that the women get the cover they need at low cost. Two assumptions have to be fulfilled for this to hold: Cl ients have to have a reasonably similar risk exposure; this seems to be a reasonable assump tion as the group members tend to come from similar backgrounds. Moreover, clients need to trust the grupimet as intermediary to select reasonable products for them. Second, as most grupimeve duhet te kene regular training modules for the educati on on insurance could be added. Transaction costs of the clients are lower because the y have to spend less time on due diligence and get a better product on average. (5) Meetin g the insurer s documentation requirements, the grupimeve field staff can offer experien ce on how to obtain certain documentation. While the insurer could do the same task, grupimeve staff might be more convenient to deal with for the clients as they ar e likely to know and trust the staff already. Problems related to insurance policies can als o be discussed. This reduces transaction costs to the client in absolute terms. In relative term, the costs are probably comparable. ( 6) Transaction costs due to transfer of money are reduced for the clients . As such money can be collected and in some cases even be disbursed during the regular meetings . An insurer would very likely not afford to send one of its agents by each client s do or. We conclude that transaction costs of money transfer are lower in absolute terms an d about equal in relative terms. A summary of the above findings is given in figure 2. As transaction costs diffe r for different insurance types, we want to stress that the table illustrates the exam ple of life insurance. Other insurance types might deviate from this analysis. Figure 2. Transaction cost overview This figure depicts how the transaction costs of microinsurance incurred under d irect sales and partner-agent schemes differ from conventional insurance. The differen ce is shown both in absolute and relative terms (as a percentage of premium). The exam ple illustrated displays the costs for life insurance. Due to many unknowns, the act ual costs can differ from what is shown here depending on the surrounding conditions.

Faqja 37

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME

7.1.3 Summary and contribution In the above section we have examined whether transaction costs are suited to ex plaining why the poor are underinsured. We differentiate between six different sorts of t ransaction cost incurred by insurers and clients alike. In the direct sales model, we have shown that each of these costs declines by less (often by much less) than proportionate to premiums when the policy is scaled down. Consequently, transaction costs make up an ever bigger share of total costs the more an insurance policy is being scaled down. We can n ot quantify the effect due to too many unknowns. This is in line with the findings of Murdoch (2002) and McCord (2002) who state that the increasing share of transact ion costs associated with smaller insurance policies can deter a market for microins urance. This is not the end of the story, however. Our next step is to show how transact ion costs can be brought down significantly when insurers and grupet e perbashketa coopera te by means of the partner-agent model. In discussing the potential for cost reduction of each sort of transaction cost we show qualitatively that by merits of the cooperation model, transaction costs can be brought down sufficiently for insurance to be provided on a smaller scale suited to the needs of the poor. Hence, we reject hypothesis 1 and conclude that transaction costs are not the major reason for underinsurance of the poor . 2.) Adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud Hypothesis 2: Microinsurance is exposed to severer problems of adverse selection , moral hazard and fraud than is conventional insurance As outlined in section 5.2 , we want to investigate if adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud are substantial ly more relevant in microinsurance than in conventional insurance. In this section, we subsequently discuss the different insurance types with respect to market failur es in Faqja 38

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME microinsurance compared to regular insurance. The analysis includes (1) life and accident insurance, enterprise insurance which comprises of (2) dwellings & content, (3) cattle and (4) weather and crop insurance and (5) health insurance. 7.2.1 Life and accident insurance All life insurance policies we came across in Albania (and probably elsewhere) c over death and accidents leading to disability. The implications for adverse selectio n are quite obvious. Clients who feel their risk to have an accident is above average, e.g. construction workers or rickshaw drivers are more likely to take insurance. Also , families much rather pay premiums for older or sick members or generally anyone likely to die soon. This is a problem all life insurers are facing. At least five measures pre venting adverse selection can be identified none of which indicates that for life insura nce market failures are a substantially bigger problem in microinsurance compared to conven tional insurance. First, excluding the elderly is one way to keep the expected premium amounts low for both insurance types. However, typical age thresholds are chosen . As su ch, they are much lower than conventional insurance thresholds due to the lower life expe ctancy of the poor. Second, in order to avoid taking customers already fatally sick, co mmercial insurers often ask clients to undergo a health test before being insured. This p oses too high a cost for most low income customers. To achieve a similar result, rural in surers check whether an illness (probably) already existed once a claim has occurred. P reexisting diseases are explicitly excluded in low income policies. Furthermore, a six month lapsing period can be applied . This is a rather unpopular measure. Third, offering highly competitive rates for additional family members is a very smart move as w ell, as it is highly unlikely that many family members have high risk at the same time . Mc Cord et al. (2005) describe how microinsurance agents learn to avoid high risk groups by avoiding areas like e.g. truck stops due to high HIV infection rates. This effec tively leads to similar results compared to conventional life insurance where rates are deter mined based on job, postal zip code or other demographic features. Moral hazard is les s prevalent in life and accident insurance. It is hard to believe that clients bec ome more risk taking once their lives are covered by a policy. Stories of husbands killing the ir wives to receive the benefits are not unheard of, yet extremely rare, as the covers paid not very

high. Furthermore, a significant survival bonus is often paid. Fraud is not part icularly easy in life and accident insurance because the death of a person is a highly si gnificant event and most probably the whole village knows about it and attends the funeral . In the case of accidents, a police certificate is required in order to prove that the a ccident actually happened. In addition a disability certificate from a doctor is needed. We have not found examples in the literature nor have we heard about cases where fraud i n life and accident insurance was a problem. This holds true for conventional as well a s microinsurance. Hence, small adaptations need to be made to the design of life i nsurance policies in order for the insurance to be provided. However, market failures are not more detrimental in microinsurance compared to conventional insurance. 7.2.2 Dwellings & content insurance Dwellings & content insurance policies are subject to adverse selection, whether for low income or wealthier clients. Some of the adverse selection risk is eliminated by the design of the policy. However, the usage of the premises poses a certain deal of adverse Faqja 39

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME selection as its riskiness can not easily be observed. However, microinsurance p olicies do not differ from conventional insurance in this respect. As for all other insuran ce policies, compulsory by design eliminate adverse selection risk. Due to the difference bet ween personal value and insurable value, moral hazard is not considered a substantial risk in dwellings & content insurance. People do not take the risk of loosing their belo ngings only because the insurance company would replace the building and the contents. The discussion of fraud is different for dwellings & content insurance than for the other insurances that we have seen so far. While nobody is inclined to commit suicide or get sick to reap the insurance benefits, people might very well consider burning dow n their house if the insured value strongly exceeds the value of the house. As such the insurer needs to ascertain that the sum insured does not supersede the actual value of t he premises. This problem also exists in conventional dwellings & content insurance . Moreover, most houses in villages do not have a fixed street with street name, h ouse number and postal zip code and the owners are not registered with local authorit ies with a fixed address. In order to prevent the policy holder claims compensation for say his neighbours house as well as to scrutinize whether the cover suggested by the cli ent is reasonable, the insurer needs to have an agent in place. Doing so, the insurer o vercomes the asymmetric information problem causing both, the incentive and opportunity f or fraud. As described in more detail in on health insurance, the insurer is not entirely insulated from fraud on the agent s behalf. Upfront lump sum payments reduce this kind of risk. Again, there is no reason to assume that the risk of market failures in dwellings & content insurance is substantially differ ent from conventional insurance. 7.2.3 Cattle insurance There is a significant deal of asymmetric information involved in cattle insuran ce. To avoid adverse selection, the insurers require a veterinarian to assess age an d health of every animal so that an adequate premium can be calculated. The main adverse sel ection risk is related to the different kinds of farmers. While some of them might be v ery caring and wary, others care less about their animals. This might affect the life expec tancy of the

cattle significantly. However, this is a problem that exists for both types of i nsurances, microinsurance as well as conventional insurance. The main moral hazard risk rel ates to the farmer caring less due to his herd being insured. While we cannot exclude th is risk completely, we believe it is negligible: Buying new animals is always a hassle f or the farmer because of the transaction costs involved such as travelling to the local market, bargaining for the price and still suffering from asymmetric information on the cow s physical health. Moreover, insurers avoid moral hazard by offering only one year contracts. After each year, the value of the cow needs to be newly assessed (Rot h et al. 2005). Hence, the risk of moral hazard is not substantially different for both i nsurance types. In order to avoid fraud, each animal has an ear tag and in case of death, the claimant has to cut off the tagged ear which is then sent to the insurance compa ny together with a picture of the dead animal. We conclude that cattle insurance is in no respect substantially different for microinsurance compared to conventional insu rance. 7.2.4 Crop and weather insurance Faqja 40

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME Crop insurance is a product offered to small and large land owners. It insures f armers against loss of crops due to flooding, riots and vandalism. There is some advers e selection involved as farmers who believe their harvest is especially prone to b eing destroyed by flooding or riots are more likely to buy such insurance, while the insurer clearly has an information disadvantage (Mommens, 2006). Moral hazard might aris e in case the crops have been damaged already as the insured farmer has little incent ive rescuing as much of it as possible. Fraud can happen under the same circumstance s as described above, i.e. when the agent is corrupt or the field is overvalued. Agai n, adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud risks are fundamentally the same for micro as well as conventional insurance. A newer alternative also referred to as weather insuranc e, acknowledges that bad harvests are almost exclusively the consequence of irregul ar rainfall and pay out compensation to farmers depending on the rain fall measured , regardless of their actual harvest and the effort they exerted. Adverse selectio n is not a problem for this kind of insurance as the insurer presumably has information on the historical rainfall statistics. As claims do not depend on the actual harvest an d obviously farmers can not influence the rain, moral hazard is not a problem at all. By des ign, false claims are not possible. The only perceivable form of fraud is the backdating of contracts. 7.2.5 Health insurance Health insurance providers face a significant risk of adverse selection. Clients who believe their health is at peril or already have a sickness are more likely to t ake health insurance then those perfectly healthy. The mitigating measures are similar as f or life insurance. First, excluding clients as of a certain age threshold, often 55 year s, helps limiting adverse selection. Again, thresholds are lower than for conventional in surance. Second, a six month waiting period is a formidable way to exclude those already ill instead of having low income people pay for a medical check up. Third, family in surance schemes at very competitive rates are offered to circumvent adverse selection. A gain, it is unlikely that all members of the same family suffer from sickness at the same ti me. The most important form of moral hazard in health insurance is excessive usage. The problem is not easily tackled but insurance companies include two covenants for low inco

me clients which makes the provision affordable: First, insurers only cover stays i n hospital in excess of 24 hours. Second, the insurance sets a maximum cover not to be exce eded by any sickness or patient. Both measures are not common in conventional insurance because of being deemed unsocial. Although these covenants do not reduce moral h azard per se, they at least limit the risk of the insurance company. Insurers operatin g low income policies (mostly in rural areas) are much more likely to suffer from frau d. Collusion between nominee and insurance agent may lead to backdating of insuranc e policies. Upfront premium payments effectively prevent this to a certain extent. Collusion between hospitals and clients poses another challenge: Hospitals and doctors hav e no incentive to verify the person getting treatment is actually the insured client and not someone else. Instead, they stand to cash in extra revenues. One solution to thi s problem might be that the insurance company requires licensed hospitals to take a photo of the person treated when being admitted (Garand, 2005). Finally, most clients have ve ry little medical knowledge if any. Hospitals can take advantage of this by billing proced ures which are much more expensive then the procedures actually carried out. Again, t he insurance company is able to control this problem by conducting random interview s with Faqja 41

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME clients who received medical treatment and frequently disguise fraud by doctors (Garand, 2005). While all of these forms of fraud are possible in urban hospitals and wit h wealthier clients, they are a lot less likely. The transaction cost argument implies that for more expensive health insurance policies the cost of monitoring and conducting interv iews constitutes a smaller percentage of total cost. Further, urban clients have pict ured IDs to identify themselves at any time. Hence, market failures should not be substantia lly different for low income policies and conventional insurance. 7.2.6 Summary and contribution We examined the hypothesis that market failures can convincingly explain the deg ree of underinsurance of the poor. Although market failures are prevalent in microinsur ance, they are not particularly more so than in conventional insurance. For some of th e insurance types, insurers change the policy specifications for microinsurance sl ightly to avoid adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud caused by a slightly different s etting compared to conventional insurance (people not having addresses, etc.). After customizing the policies to low income clients, there is no reason to believe th at adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud are more relevant than in conventional insuran ce. 3.) Scalability Hypothesis 3: Conventional insurance products can not be scaled down to the exte nt necessary for providing microinsurance As explained in the literature review, it is argued that scalability of products might be a problem in microinsurance. Insurance is not necessarily scalable to such extent that a product suitable for wealthy clients can be provided to the poor. This point is emphasized as the literature often refers to scalability issues when actually referring to transaction costs related issues. The structure of this section is as follows: First, the co ncept of scalability is defined. Second, the assumptions for the scalability discussion a re provided. Third, for every insurance type it is analysed whether the products are in fact scalable or not. To define scalability, we need to look at both the relation between cover a nd premium as well as the relation between cover and the insured person s income. Two conditions need to be fulfilled for the policy to be scalable: First, as the min imum size of the cover determines the minimum premium, the insurance can only be considered scalable if the insured event or object can be partially insured or the insured

event or object can be divided into reasonably small pieces. Second, the size of the cove r needs to be somehow related to the income of the insured individual and the benefit shoul d be primarily pecuniary (Churchill et al., 2006). The second condition is not straig ht forward but as we will see, scalability is very much dependent on it. Both conditions in dividually are necessary but not sufficient conditions. Consequently, only if both conditio ns are fulfilled, the insurance can be considered scalable. As the below analysis shows , the first condition is fulfilled for all insurance products. The second condition, however , is not fulfilled in the case of health insurance, so this insurance type cannot be cons idered scalable. In order to be able to discuss this, the assumptions of this section n eed to be clearly specified. For that purpose, it is assumed that insurance products are f airly priced and any given person has the same probability of being hit by an adverse event. In addition, transaction costs are disregarded for the purpose of this section. Faqja 42

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME 7.3.1 Life insurance Pure Life Insurance If life insurance is to fully cover the financial costs related to the death of a person, the insurance should cover the value of the residual earnings capacity of the person plus the one time costs incurred for funeral etc. This is the cover needed to make the fa mily of the dead person equally well off from a purely financial perspective. However, there is no reason why a person s expected life earnings should not be partially insurable. As such, there is no minimum cover in life insurance. Disregarding transaction costs, pre mium and cover are proportional. Consequently, the first condition is fulfilled. With reg ard to the second condition, it is obvious that the life insurance cover is clearly depende nt on the income of the person as it is determined by discounting the residual earnings ca pacity. Consequently, both scalability conditions are fulfilled and life insurance is co nsidered to be scalable. Pension insurance Pension insurance has very similar characteristics compared to standard life ins urance. The major difference is that the cover is not paid out in the case of death but rather at retirement in the form of a reverse annuity. This does not change the structure of the insurance substantially, so both conditions are fulfilled and it can be consider ed scalable as well. 7.3.2 Personal accident insurance Personal accident insurance covers not only the death of a person, but also part ial and total permanent disability. Similar to the life insurance, it is meant to cover the residual earnings of the insured in case of death. The case of partial and total permanen t disability is more complicated because it also needs to cover medical and living expenses o f the disabled. Nonetheless, there is no reason why death and disability should not be partially insured. Again, for the same reason as for life insurance, there is a clear rela tion between income and cover: Both the death as well as the disability component are of the insurance are calculated. Life insurance is in fact the insurance type which is most easil y scalable due to its simple premium and payoff structure. on the basis of the expected fut ure earnings of the insured. Consequently, both conditions are fulfilled and the ins

urance is considered scalable. 7.3.3 Enterprise insurance Dwellings & content Dwellings & content insurance covers the domestic enterprise as well as the hous ehold and private belongings of the insured. The premium and cover are determined by t he value of the house and its contents. Dwellings & content insurance is scalable t o a considerable extent. As long as the insured objects are clearly defined, there i s no reason to assume that dwellings & content insurance cannot be broken down to the indivi dual object insurance or even insuring part of an object. From the perspective of the insurance company this becomes only problematic if the object insured is not specified. Bu t again, Faqja 43

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME this is more a problem of contracting than an argument against scalability. With respect to the second condition, the size and value of the house and its contents (and t herefore the amount to be covered) are in most cases be directly depending upon the person s in come, such that the second condition is also fulfilled. Summarizing, dwellings & conte nt insurance is scalable. Cattle insurance Cattle insurance covers the death of a milk animal. Cover and premium are scalab le in the value of the individual cow and the amount of cows to be covered. The minimum premium for covering the death of a cow completely is determined by the minimum value of a milk animal. Theoretically, however, there should be no problem covering th e value of the cow only partially. As a consequence, the first condition is fulfilled. W ith respect to the second condition, it is clear that there is a strong relation between the amount of cows the farmer has and his income. Similar to agricultural insurance, cows are farmer s income generating asset so their value is by definition related to income. There fore, cover and income are related and both conditions are fulfilled. Weather and crop insurance Weather and crop insurance cover the plants and harvest in agriculture. If a dro ught occurs, the farmer gets compensation for the sum insured or the actual damage in curred whichever is smaller. Premium and cover move proportionally and the farmer can a lso insure his field partially. If he opts for the latter, however, the insurance ne eds to make sure that the farmer bears his share of the costs, i.e. if 30% of the field is i nsured and 30% of the harvest gets lost due to drought, the insurance pays 9% of the value of t he field and not the total amount lost. This however is more a question of contracting theory and moral hazard than scalability. As mentioned above, the field can be insured part ly from a scalability perspective. Moreover, the second condition also applies as the inco me of the farmer is likely to be proportional to the size and amount of the fields that he has. The field is the farmer s income generating asset so by definition, income and value o f the asset to be covered are related. Hence, both conditions are fulfilled and crop i nsurance is scalable. 7.3.4 Health insurance The case of health insurance is more complicated than the other insurances for a

couple of reasons. We analyse these reasons by looking at the two scalability condition s previously defined. First, we investigate if health insurance is scalable in cov er and premium. We find that health insurance is scalable in general, but in the very s pecific environment in India, the scalability is severely constrained. Second, we look a t the relation between cover and income of the person as was done for the other polici es as well. First, looking at the relation between cover and premium it is important t o notice that health insurance needs to cover many different sicknesses. Therefore the pr emium is to be understood as a blended average probability of the various sicknesses. Des pite the inherently complicated nature of health insurance compared to other insurance ty pes, one can theoretically imagine that people can insure only a portion of a certain sic kness. This is effectively what happens when insurance companies put caps on the maximum cov er of certain policies. This is not a problem per se, actually quite the opposite: People can at Faqja 44

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME least hedge a certain portion of a potential sickness. It is assumed that this i s still better than having no insurance at all. For the purpose of this argument, we deliberate ly neglect the fact that in most societies it is morally unacceptable to refuse treatment o f e.g. a heart attack on grounds of limited insurance cover. However, when looking at the Alban ian health care system more specifically, it becomes clear that health insurance is indeed more problematic than it seems at first glance: The complication relates to the provision of free healthcare by the Albanian state. As such, health insurance is the only insurance type where people actually have to decide upon taking or rejecting the insurance service after the covered event has occurred. More precisely, they have to choose betwee n a private hospital where treatment is (partly) paid for by the insurance and free treatment in a public hospital. Rejecting the insurance service might sometimes be the wiser choice because for severe diseases heavy co-payments might lead to high indebtedness wh ile it is unclear if the quality difference between the hospitals is worth the money. A second complication arises because health insurance is non-pecuniary as opposed to all other insurances that we have looked at so far: It actually covers a service rather th an paying out a predetermined amount of money. The latter, however, has a certain price an d can be scaled down only to a limited extent. As such, taking the insurance benefit in m ost cases of severe sickness also means incurring heavy co-payments. This leaves the insur ed individual with a decision between public and private treatment with many unknow ns. Consequently, the person might end up taking the public service in case of sever e sickness despite having insurance because of the fear not being able to afford t he remaining part of the expensive private treatment. On the other hand, in the cas e of smaller sicknesses, the quality difference between public and private hospitals might be so small that health insurance is not worth the money. Due to the (partial) subs titutability of the private and public health sectors, the insured service cannot be broken d own to a sufficiently small level without people substituting private for public treatmen t. Consequently, the first condition of scalability in cover and premium is only pa rtially fulfilled: Up to the point of substitution of the services. Second, analysing the relationship between cover and income of the insured also reveals

interesting results: For all the insurances that we have analysed so far, income of the person and cover of the insurance policy are somehow directly related. In health insurance, however, this is not the case. Most of the sicknesses cost the same n o matter if a rich or a poor person gets sick. Consequently, the second condition for scalab ility is not fulfilled. If we assume for the purpose of this argument that from a moral point of view, it is not acceptable that only the rich people get medical treatment we have to acc ept that health insurance is not be self sustainable for rich and poor people without cro ss subsidization. 7.3.5 Summary and contribution In this section we investigate if insurance is scalable to the level required fo r providing microinsurance. We define two major criteria that need to be fulfilled in order to allow for scalability: First, the insured event or object can be partially insured or the insured event or object can be divided into reasonably small pieces. Second, the cover m ust be somehow related to the income of the person. We show that the first and second condition is fulfilled for all types of insurances except health insurance. In t he case of the latter, the first condition is only partially fulfilled due to the substitutabil ity of public and Faqja 45

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME private services. The second condition is not fulfilled because the service that is covered by health insurance has a certain price irrespective of the income of the insure d. Churchill et al. (2006) and Dror et al. (2005) admit that health insurance is th e most complicated insurance type to provide to the poor, they fail to explicitly separ ate the scalability effect from transactions costs and market failures. 4. ) Risk aversion, information, understanding and rationality Hypothesis 4: The client bases for conventional insurance and microinsurance dif fer in either risk aversion, information, understanding or rationality, thus causing ef fective demand to fall short of potential demand. In the previous three sections, we have examined whether transactioncosts, marke t failures as well as the lack of scalability of existingproducts can explain un derinsurance of low-income people to aconsiderable extent. We find that none of the four hypotheses canexplain underinsurance compellingly and rejected each of them exceptfor scalability of health insurance. In this section, we analyse whet herthe apparent state of underinsurance is related to impediments on thedemand s ide. The analysis is structured as follows: After introducingthe concept of pote ntial and effective demand, we discuss threeassumptions which need to hold for p otential and effective demand tobe reasonably similar. These assumptions are the n tested. Weconclude there is evidence that two of these assumptions are notfulf illed and consequently effective stays below potential demand. Hence, we cannot reject hypothesis 4 and find evidence that lack ofinformation, understanding and rationality are major reasons forunderinsurance in Albania. The concept of potential and effective demand is derived from Matul(2005). Poten tialdemand is defined as the demand that would be observed in an efficient market. As opposed to that, effective demand represents thedemand that is actually observed in the market. In accordance with theabove definition, we have identified three assumptions that need to befulfilled for potential demand for microinsurance not to fall short ofeffective demand: Clients (a) are risk av erse (b) are well informedabout the products supplied and understand them and fu rthermore (c) are rational. In the following we analyse one by one whether thesethree assumpti ons are supported by our findings. 7.5.1 Risk aversion Overview Risk aversion is a crucial prerequisite for insurability of individuals for obvi ous reasons. Faqja 46

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME However, we find it hard to prove risk aversion directly. Therefore our line of reasoning in this section is the following: After a short intermezzo on the assumed utilit y function, we show that people demand certain types of insurance explicitly emphasizing tha t it helps them to mitigate the financial risk of the underlying adverse event. Assum ing that people expect the products to be fairly priced, this finding is interpreted as e vidence for risk aversion. Although the evidence is not particularly strong, we believe it i s reasonable to assume that people are risk averse. Intermezzo on utility functions, risk aversion and inter-temporal choice: As outlined above, we assume von Neumann-Morgenstern utilityfunctions. While risk averse individuals necessarily have concave utility functionsthis ca usality unfortunately does not hold the other way around: Concavity of the utility function can have two different reasons: Riskaversion o r inter-temporal preferences. While risk aversion is anecessary condition for in surability of the individual and the proximityof effective and potential demand, inter-temporal preferences solelyindicate that clients might be inclined to sav e in order to smooth theirconsumption and to maximize their utility. As both eff ects cannot bedistinguished we can never be sure if the individual is in fact ri skaverse when observing concave utility functions. Cultural dimension: Informal insurance schemes might be a sign of risk aversion. Severalinformal ins urance mechanisms prevail in society. We have illustrated a couple of informalcopingmec hanisms when discussing the risk reduction potential of theexisting products. Fr iends and relatives seem to be the most importantyet highly imperfect informal i nsurance mechanism. 7.5.2 Information and Understanding Overview we arsyetojme whether the people have sufficient access toinformation and commen surate understanding of insurance productsdhe pastaj weinvestigate if the indivi duals are taking rational decisions. Dealing withthese three points in this sequ ence is compelling as philosophicallyspeaking, information is the necessary cond ition for understanding andunderstanding a concept is the necessary condition fo r taking rationalchoices. We show that the lack of information and understanding is the mainreason for eff ective demand falling short of potential demand. Hence, we cannot rejecthypothesis 4, i .e. there is sufficient evidence for effective demandfalling short of potential demand. Faqja 47

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME (1) The finding that people admit not to have enough information isboth helpful andchallenging at the same time: It anticipates the answer to thehypothesis we a re testing. If the answer reflected the actual situation, the assumption of perfect information and understanding of insurancewould be vio lated and hypothesis 4 could not be rejected, i.e. the lackof information is at least partly responsible for underinsurance inAlbania. However, we want to test if this is true, i.e. if information and insurance are indeed related. As such, given the apparent state ofunderinsurance , more information should ceteris paribus lead to higherlevels of insurance. The line of reasoning to be followed is straightforward: If we find that more infor mation leads to more insurance, we can in turn conclude that the current level of information is insufficient and hence partly explains underinsurance. proxie for the exposure to information are chosen: the level of education of the people. The level of education is assumed to increase financialliteracy a nd leads to a higher ability to gather and process information. If a higher level of education goes along with higher levels ofinsurance, it is likely that the assumption of perfect information andunderstanding is violated. Our analysis from statistika e kryer neTirane tregoi a relationship between educ ation and the likelihood to have insurance. (2) The fact that a substantial people answer not to take insurancebecause of a lack in money is not understandable for us and taken asevidence for a lack of in formation and understanding of insurance. Theargument has two different aspects, information and understanding: First, the absolute amount of premiums of all of the microinsurancesthat we have seen seems more than reasonable compared to theincome that the people have. Second, assuming fair pricing and homogenous risk exposure, theexpected average benefit should be equal to the premiums paid overtime. The argument of insuffici ent income to pay for insurancebecomes therefore void. Rather, the opposite is t rue: While insurancegives the people the opportunity to smooth a certain expecte d lossover a couple of years, not taking insurance eventually leads to asituatio n, where they have to pay a large sum which by far exceedstheir payment capacity . (3) Some of the people may state that they do not take insurancebecause others t ell them not to. From an information perspective, theeffectiveness of word of mo uth is astonishing. Moreover, it isinteresting to see that bad experiences seem to have a much higherimpact and spread faster than good news. This is unfortunat e becausemost of the families do not even try to get information on insuranceand understand what it is about. Hence, there is an inherent bias in Faqja 48

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME information and a lack of understanding for the people who rely on theopinion an d experiences of others. 7.5.3 Rationality Overview In microeconomic as well as conventional insurance theory humans areassumed to b e rational. This implies optimizing their utility given their budgetconstraint. It is, however, widely understood that these are not realistic assumptions. Instead, irrational and bounded rational behaviour (as outlined by Kahneman etal. (1982)) are prevalent. Bounded rational behaviour implies thatindividual s decisions are subject to heuristics and systematic biases. This concept acknowledges that agents experience limits informulating and solving complex problems and in processinginformation (Simon, 1991). In the following we give a number ofexamples of irrational and bounded rational behaviour. Before, we want to stress that bounded rationality and even irrationalbehaviour is nothing specifically associated with developing countriesand as such does not necessarily distinguish agents in developed anddeveloping countries. Bounded ra tionality and irrational behaviour arealso prevalent in our society and certainl y lead to inefficiencies in theinsurance market as well. Part of the reason why the majority ofinsurance policies are enforced by the state in most western soci etiesis probably related to this inefficiency. In the following we argue thatwhi le bounded rational and irrational behaviour are not exclusivelyassociated with developing countries, the effect might be stronger dueto the educational and cul tural background of low income people. Cultural dimension Although bounded rational and irrational behaviour are prevalent indeveloped as well asdeveloping countries, we find evidence that education and cultural background matter substantially. As we have seen, more education including financialliteracy leads to a better ability to gather and process information, ahigher level of underst anding provides the basis for rational decisionmaking. As financial literacy is low in low income people, we can safelyassume that bounded rationality and irrat ional behaviour have a biginfluence and are partly responsible for underinsuranc e. We note that formal insurance is restricted until recently to the biggercities a nd higher income classes. Low income people in rural areas areonly slowly being exposed to formal insurance and this new conceptneeds some time to result in fam iliarity amongst the poor. 7.5.4 Summary and contribution Faqja 49

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME In the analysis of hypothesis 4, we first define risk aversion, information and understanding and rationality as assumptions foreffective demand not to fall short of potential demand. Each of theseassumptions is then tested subsequently. We find evidence for riskaversion, so this assumption is fulfilled . However, the assumption offull information and understanding of insurance is c learly violated. Itcan furthermore be shown that the rationality assumption does nothold either. There are only a few studies that try to evaluate the demand formicroinsurance. The literature is mainly case based and empirical. Matul s (2005) study on microinsurance demand in Georgia is probablythe most compr ehensive study in this respect. To our knowledgenobody has researched the demand of low income people in Albania sofar. Matul shows that insurance knowledge var ies with income andlocation of the person. We find that the correlation with inc ome isrelevant in our sample. The location as approximated by the professionalso crucially determines the knowledge of insurance in our case. Matulstates that h ealth and property insurance are the most well knowntypes of insurance. Overall, Matul finds that individuals are risk aversein general, lack basic information and understanding of microinsuranceproducts which is in line with our findings. Rationality issues are notdiscussed in the empirical literature so far. On our research we have found out followings: 1. Insurance premiums mostly come from obligatory insurance. 3. Annual insurance expenditures of people strongly depend on their annual incom e. 8. Respondents who is educated and whose age is 26-45 assume that the insurance services is necessary and has positive opinion about it. 9. Not using the insurance service by people depends on their sufficient income to be insured. ++++++++++++++++ shto vete We consider followings are the main reasons for undeveloped insurance market in Jizzak region: low level of insurance culture, low level of income, lack of understanding by th e population and legal entities the need in insurance services, Undeveloped economy of country, which doesn t allow the insurance market to develo p as a whole; Lack of brokerage companies to work with insurance agencies; Lack of skilled specialists and prepared insurance managers. Hypotheses Findings Faqja 50

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME H1: Transaction costs are proportionally higher for microinsurance than for conventional insurance Rejected In the partner-agent model, transaction costs for microinsurance are not higher than for conventional insurance when measured as a percentage of premiums H2: Microinsurance is exposed Rejected When customizing policies to to severer the needs of low problems of adverse selection, income clients and cooperating moral hazard with NGOs, and fraud than is conventional adverse selection, moral hazard insurance and fraud are not a bigger problem for microinsurance than for conventional insurance H3: Conventional insurance RejectedWe find full scalability for life, products can not (except foraccident and be scaled down to the extent necessary for health insurance) enterprise insurance. For health insurance providing microinsurance problems with scalability can not be rejected H5: The client bases for Not While low income people in conventional rejected south-east India insurance and microinsurance are found to be risk averse, they differ in either lack risk aversion, information, information and understanding understanding or of insurance rationality, thus causing products and show bounded effective demand to rational and fall short of potential demand irrational behavior. Effective demand falls short of potential demand due to these impediments 9. Conclusion On the basis of the data collected during our assignment in Tamil Nadu, India, this summer we have investigated the reasons forunderinsurance of t he poor in south-east India. In line with thearguments and issues raised in prev ious research we have tested fivehypotheses which are considered relevant: Our a nalysis illustrates that (1) transaction costs, (2) adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud aswell as ( 3) an inherent lack of scalability of insurance products (withthe exception of h ealth insurance) occupy a non-pivotal role inexplaining underinsurance of the po or in south-east India. Moreprecisely, while these factors might be deterring th e emergence ofmicroinsurance theoretically, it is shown that if insurance compan

iesand NGOs cooperate given the special regulatory environment in India, these factors are almost irrelevant. This argument directly hinges on the assumption of a reasonably well developed NGO network withmicrofinance distr ibution infrastructure in place which is shown to be a reasonable assumption. (4) An assessment of the overwhelming Faqja 51

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME amount of microinsurance products available in the market revealsthat the risk r eduction potential of the existing products is high. Noneof the informal risk ma naging mechanisms can hold up with insurancein terms of risk mitigating potentia l. Consequently, underinsurancedoes not seem to be caused by ill-suited supply. (5) We also analyse ifeffective demand of microinsurance falls below potential d emand asdefined by a lack of risk aversion, information, understandingand ration ality. We find evidence that microinsurance clients are in factrisk averse, one of the crucial prerequisites for insurance provision. However, people have very limited knowledge about productspecifications and acce ssibility of insurance and misunderstand basicinsurance concepts and features. F urthermore, the study hints at someirrational and bounded rational behavior that impedes insurancedemand. In summary, the last hypothesis cannot be rejected and effective demand staying far behind potential demand is deemed themost important reason for underinsurance in south-east India. Following recommendations are essential to succeed in the future: To improve partnership with Banks. Banking Association is the main founder of th e Ishonch . The earned resources of the Banking Association contains 1% of all banks annual profit in Uzbekistan (information was taken from the Central bank of Uzbe kistan). Chance should be given to banks as offering them available services. This projec t must be worked out with all commercial banks and Banking Association. To give whole rights to banks in insuring their clients. To make simpler registr ation procedure. It would be convenient for people to insure not leaving banks because their trust to banks. It would help to avoid misunderstanding between them too. Anothe r reason for that is the efficiency and high speed procedure of insurance services . All the documentations, balance sheets, contract forms should be written in Uzbe k language, because most of the youth in Jizzak city have difficulty in speaking & writing Russian. Uzbek is our state language. We realised that specialist-development and training are not seriously considere d by the management. Only good motivated and trained specialists can lead organisation to wards good results. Training function should be developed and its responsibilities sho uld be agreed. To work on complex program how to improve the knowledge of hired insurance agent s and give them opportunity to experience their knowledge in practice. It is much better to organize programs in the company itself, because students who study in colleges and universities are far from practical work. That s why agents will be taught in comp any where they already worked for some time, they will put all their ability and ski lls to develop insurance services and how it works with clients. Ishonch insurance agency needs to be provided with up-to-date computers, Office an d

phone equipments. To provide agents with monthly salary for their work and find some ways to impro ve working conditions. Faqja 52

Version i pare Shqip SIGURIME To organise an insurance marketing research to identify potential opportunities and business directions. Uzbek insurance market is not developed and there is huge p otential to grow. Marketing research among individuals and corporate clients will show th e customer needs and changes/ directions in the market in a new future. Research s hould be conducted by international recognised agency to get comprehensive and detailed r esults. It should form start point for future direction. To develop new services and products for banking sector. New services and produc ts might come from the research mentioned in a point above. To improve Strategic Planning and Control Process. Analysis shows that Strategic planning process has to be improved. There significant rooms for improvement in this area. Short, medium and long term Plans should be developed and agreed by the Bo ard. This should be main document to be followed for top Managers and should be regul arly monitored comparing with actual results. Strategic Plan should be reviewed at le ast once year and corrective parameters should be agreed depending on current market cond itions and available internal resources. Because marked point of marketing for agents s eem to be unreal during their work and investment projects in our region as well. Given information is not correct and it is usually shown just in facts. Only three pro jects out of twenty-nine didn t fall through but the rest twenty six projects were taken away f rom the program in 2006. To identify new geographical expansion opportunities. Ishonch agency has already good geographical presence. But some regions are not covered by insurance agenci es due to several reasons. Agency should conduct own research to identify possible opportunities and if it is possible to make necessary investments. To lobby insurance service reform. Insurance system should be reformed to be abl e to render better services to clients. It should be lobbied by Government. All other insurance companies also should be involved in insurance reform discussions with Governmen t. Statistike e tregut te sigurimeve : Detyre kursi e zhvilluar nga studente te Fakultetit te Shkencave Sociale, dega Pune sociale, viti dyte, lenda Drejtimi i sigurimeve shoqerore , Anketim ne Tirane Qershor 2009 Struktura e buxhetit te familjeve sipas prefekturave Instat per zonat urbane 2000,

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Anekte mbi Cmimet e pajisjeve elekstroshtepikake prane firmes Neptun, Janar 2010 Von Neumann Morgenstern utility theorem, Wikipedia, enciklopedia e lire Faqja 54