G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELICIANO MUOZ, alias "Tony", et al.

, accused, MARVIN MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias "Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE MISLANG, defendants-appellants. CRUZ, J.: Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and thus impliedly accepted his sentence. The others have questioned their conviction and insist that they are innocent. The prosecution did not think so, and neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for the appellee would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact even increase the penalty. The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and instant punishment meted out by what appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven persons, most of them bodyguards of the town mayor, went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood without further ado and without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror. The second was forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son. The third, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had his brains blown out. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous criminals they were pronounced to be. Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed. Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate informations, the four who stood trial were found guilty. 1 The other seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of Feliciano Muoz, who did not appeal, has long become final and executory and is now being served. 2 We deal here only with the appeals of the other convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who all ask for a reversal. The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. 3 As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his son Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the rest surrounded the house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was then bathing his horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under his house, he was met by Millora who simply shot him at arm's length with a "long firearm," hitting him in the mouth and killing him as he fell. At that precise time, Muoz, Tayaba and Mislang were standing by Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of them made any move to restrain or dissuade him. 4 After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and knocked him down. Muoz kicked him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while the others looked on in silent approval or at least without objection. They then took the bleeding man with them to look for their third target, Alejandro Bulatao. 5 In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them to her husband. They found him tending to their cows with his son Pedro. Muoz ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie down and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro twice in the head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba and Mislang, along with their companions, merely stood by as the brutal act was committed. Juana watched her husband's death in terror and the 12-year old boy made a desperate run for his life as one of the accused fired at him and missed. 6 The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then vented their violence on Aquilino, whom Muoz again brutally kicked as the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely defenseless. Finally, Muoz ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the head and body. Muoz and Minora then picked up all the empty shells and fled with the rest of their companions, leaving the terrified Juana with the two grisly corpses. 7 The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, 8 Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's sister; Jose Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and Aquilino's brother; Juana Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife; and Pedro Bulatao, 11 their son. Their testimony was corroborated by Dr. Juanita de Vera, 12 who performed the autopsy on the three victims. Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin Minora as the other accused stood by and the mauling of their brother Aquilino before he was dragged away by the group. The trial court especially noted the straightforward account given by Jose, who positively identified Minora as the killer and described the participation of the others, including the savage kicking of his brother by Muoz. 13 Melecia earlier pointed to Mislang as the one who had shot her father but changed her mind later on cross-examination and named Millora as the actual killer. She explained her turn-about by confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange for the sum of P3,000.00 promised by his father although she actually did not receive the money. 14 For her part, Juana related how she was threatened with death unless she accompanied the accused to where her husband was. She narrated in detail how Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how Aquilino was later kicked and then also shot to death, also by Muoz, while the other accused stood by. 15 Her testimony was corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had also thought of killing because he was "talkative" and indeed was shot at when he successfully escaped after his father's murder. 16 The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the killings that it occurred to these witnesses to denounce the accused and suggests that this delay should impugn their credibility. As correctly pointed out by the trial judge, however, these witnesses were naturally deterred from doing so for fear that they would meet the same fate that befell their relatives. These were humble barrio folk whose timidity did not allow them to report their

grievances beyond the barrio officials they knew, more so since the higher authorities appeared to be indifferent and gave no attention, much less encouragement, to their complaints. It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses as painstakingly pointed out by the appellants, 17 but these are minor flaws that do not detract from the essential truthfulness of their accounts of the ruthless killings. 18 The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said witnesses are emphasized by the medical reports 19 of the injuries sustained by the victims, as follows: Mauro Bulatao: 1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip left side around 1 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 1-1/2 cm. in diameter. 2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth. Alejandro Bulatao: 1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye practically lacerated. 2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead practically opened with the brain tissue outside. Aquiline Bulatao: 1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper right jaw bone around 1- 1/2 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 2 cm. in diameter. 2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the left clavicle around 1- 1/2 inches in diameter. The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court correctly rejected as false and unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy group and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out. Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos and their adversaries, Victoriano Bacani said that the latter included Tayaba, Mislang and five others who fled from the scene in a jeep. 20 Graciano Muoz, corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw seven men in a jeep coming from the sound of the gunfire after he had paid Mauro P400.00 to redeem his stolen carabao. 21 Another witness for Millora, Orlando de los Santos, testified to having seen the encounter between the Bulataos and the other group and declared that the former were armed with carbines and Garand rifles. 22 The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared hesitant and suspicious on the stand and did not give the impression that he was telling the truth. 23 Moreover, it took him all of one year to report the alleged shooting encounter, which he also did not mention that same afternoon when he visited Mauro's family to condole with them. 24 It is also not believable that the group would flee because they had no more bullets when their supposed three adversaries were already dead in the field. The alleged redemption made by Muoz was described by the trial court as preposterous, especially since no shred of evidence had been presented to show that Mauro was a cattle rustler, let alone his 16 year old son. 25 As for De los Santos, no firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of the Bulataos, including Mauro, who was found not in the supposed battleground but under his house, as testified to by Dr. De Vera. 26 Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of the killings, having gone there in the evening of June 29, 1972. He claimed he had stayed there overnight with a female companion after drinking beer with Atty. Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos City only between 8 and 9 o'clock the following morning or June 30, 1972.27 The lawyer corroborated him, 28 but he cannot be more credible than Mauro's own children, Jose and Melecia, who positively identified Millora as the person who actually shot their father in the face and killed him instantly. Such a traumatic experience could not have been forgotten by these witnesses who saw their father murdered without warning or mercy nor could their memory of the heartless killer have been easily wiped out from their minds. It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically declared that Millora was with the group that she took to the field where her husband and Aquilino were killed by Muoz. 29 Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both claimed that Mislang having complained of cattle rustlers, a group of policemen, including Tayaba, stayed in the former's house the whole night of June 29, 1972, leaving only at 8 o'clock the following morning of June 30, 1972, after Mislang had served them breakfast.30 Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house was located, is only two kilometers from Balite Sur.31 Moreover, the trial court doubted the testimony given by Sgt. Lomibao, who corroborated them and spoke of having heard the gunfire narrated by Millora's witnesses. The decision noted that Lomibao was mysteriously absent when the police chief and Dr. de Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock that morning to investigate the killings. In fact, it expressed the suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag, who also testified for the accused, might have been among the seven unidentified persons who were with Muoz and the three appellants herein when the Bulataos were murdered. 32

All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses at the trial and assess their credibility. As we said in a previous case: We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility. The written record will not show that nuance of tone or voice, the meaningful contrast between the hesitant pause and the prompt reply, and the expression or color or tilt of face that will affirm the truth or expose the fabrication. All these subtle factors could be considered by the trial judge in weighing the conflicting declarations before him, and we do not find that he has erred. 33 We agree that the three appellants, together with Muoz and their seven other companions, participated in the killings of the three Bulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution. The defenses of the herein appellants should be, as they properly were, rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more convincing and telling evidence submitted by the government. However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation assigned by the court a quo to each of the appellants in each of the three offenses imputed to them. In Criminal Case No. 0176, Millora was found guilty as principal and Muoz and the other two herein appellants only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case Nos. 0177 and 0178, Muoz was found guilty as principal and the herein appellants only as accomplices. 34 In support of this finding, the trial court said that there was no evidence of conspiracy to justify holding each of the accused equally liable for the three murders. We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start, when the eleven men went out to look for the suspected cattle rustlers, there was already an agreement among them to ferret out and punish the Bulataos whom they had condemned beforehand. They knew whom they were looking for. They knew where to look for them. They sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons. When they reached Mauro Bulatao's house, four of them went inside while the rest deployed themselves in strategic positions. When Millora shot Mauro, the appellants and the others stood by with guns at the ready. Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him. Together they dragged Aquilino from the house and the rest watched while Muoz kicked him in the head while helpless on the ground. Together, they took him with them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her husband. The rest stood by with their weapons as Muoz shot Alejandro in the head. No one interceded to stop him from also killing Aquilino. There is no question that the group moved in concert, pursuing a common design previously agreed upon, that made each of them part of a conspiracy. 35 As such, each of them is liable in equal degree with the others for each of the three killings. Each member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of murder is guilty as a co-principal, regardless of who actually pulled the trigger that killed the three victims. It is settled that in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 36 Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by alevosia. There was treachery because every one of the three victims was completely helpless and defenseless when shot and killed by the accused with no risk to themselves. Mauro was completely taken by surprise when he was shot in the face. Alejandro was lying down when he was shot in the head. Aquilino was seated when he was shot in the head and shoulders. None of the three victims had a chance to resist. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution providing as follows: Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the said article but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by the above provision. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as before, where the offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance, with the minimum period, i. e., reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable in all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the original penalty, including death, was thus maintained except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional prohibition. In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in People v. Masangkay 38 and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People v. Atencio 39 divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People v. Intino, 40 as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum. The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question. The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact. A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides

for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 41 At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of much assistance either in the case at bar. Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty, we are still not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional Commission that there was also a requirement to adjust the two remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a necessary consequence of the provision as worded. The following exchange cited by those in favor of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking but not decisive of the question: FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished. MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in computing the degrees. Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the specific situation. FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749). FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain. MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for the penalty for murder. The medium period isreclusion perpetua. The maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will, therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment? FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record, CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 750). So there we have it "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about." Assuming that Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body, we are still not persuaded that it was the intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum period but also the other periods of the original penalty. That is not necessarily inferable from his statement that "the judges will be equal to their task," especially so since he also said and we think with more definiteness-that "all we are saying is that the judges cannot impose the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). We understand this to mean that they were not saying more. The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty. It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another-or strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere did not say enough. The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members 42 at that time still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry. Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.

The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied: "Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a penny?' The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body. Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we impose on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy. It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers would have remained unpunished were it not for the vigilance of certain responsible officials, especially the police and the prosecuting officer, who took up the cudgels for the victims' families. The courage and conscientiousness they displayed are still the most potent weapons against those who, in their arrogance, believe that they can flout the law and frustrate justice because they have the protection of powerful patrons. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty as principals in Criminal Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each of them is sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties ofreclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to the heirs of their victims civil indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 for each of the deceased, or a total indemnity of P90,000.00, with costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-12727 February 29, 1960

MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. GAMES AND AMUSEMENTS BOARD, ET AL., respondents-appellees. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC., petitioner-intervenor-appellant.

BARRERA, J.: This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioner Manila Jockey Club, Inc., in the Court of First Instance Manila (Civil Case No. 31274), in which the Philippine Racing Club, Inc., intervened as party in interest with leave of court, praying that judgment be rendered against respondents Games and Amusements Board (GAB), Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon: (a) Interpreting Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 1502 in such a manner that the 30 Sundays unreserved for charitable institutions and therefore belonging to the private racing clubs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309 continue to pertain to said private entities, and that the 6 additional sweepstakes races authorized under Republic Act No. 1502 should be held on 6 of the 12 Saturdays not reserved for any private entity or particular charitable institution under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, or on any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday and legal holiday; (b) Holding that respondent PCSO does not have the right or power to appropriate or use the race tracks and equipment of petitioner without its consent, nor can respondents compel petitioner to so allow such use of its race tracks and equipment under pain of having its license revoked. Respondents duly filed their respective answers to said petition and the case was heard. After hearing, the court, on July 5, 1957, rendered a decision which, in part, reads: The court does not deem it necessary to rule on the deprivation of property of the petitioner and the intervenor without due process of law, as feared by them, because as they have stated, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is using their premises and equipment under separate contracts of lease voluntarily and willingly entered into by the parties upon payment of a corresponding rental. There is therefore no deprivation of property without due process of law. Wherefore, the court is of the opinion and so holds that once a month on a Sunday not reserved for the Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross and other charitable institutions by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is authorized to hold

one regular sweepstakes draw and races, pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1502, thus reducing the number of Sundays which may be 6dmissib to private entities by the Games and Amusements Board. . . . From this judgment, petitioner and intervenor interposed the present appeal. The issue is the proper placement of the six (6) additional racing days given to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, in virtue of Republic Act No. 1502, approved on June 16, 1956. The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, the basic law on horse racing in the Philippines, as later amended by Republic Act No. 983, are as follows: A. Sundays: (1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society .................. (2) For the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) . (3) For the White Cross, Inc. ............................................. (4) For the Grand Derby Race of the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society ........................................................ Total ................................................................ (5) For private individuals and entities duly licensed by the GAB, other Sundays not reserved under this Act, as may be determined by the GAB ........................................... or 30 for Leap years Total for the year .................... or 53 for leap years. B. Saturdays: (1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society ..... (2) For the White Cross, Inc. ....................................... (3) For private Individuals and entities duly licensed by GAB and as may be determined by it .................................. (4) For races authorized by the President for charitable, relief, or civic purposes other than the particular charitable institutions named above, all other Saturdays not reserved for the latter .................... Total ................................................................ 12 Saturdays 4 Saturdays 24 Saturdays 12 Sundays 6 Sundays 4 Sundays 1 Sunday 23 Sundays

29 Sundays 52 Sundays

12 Saturdays 52 Saturdays

C. Legal Holidays: All, except Thursday and Friday of the Holy Week, July 4th and December 30th, have been reserved for private individuals and entities duly licensed by the GAB. As stated, Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to twelve, but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, the GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six. Appellants protested, contending that the said increased should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable, relief, or civic purposes, or should be assigned to any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday, and legal holiday. Appellants contention cannot be sustained. Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended by Republic Act No. 983, by express terms, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Saturdays for the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO, and 12 Saturdays to the President for other charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These days can not be disposed of by the GAB without authority of law. As to the remaining racing days, the law provides: SEC. 4. Racing days.Private individuals and entities duly licensed by the Commission on Races (now GAB) may hold horse races on Sundays not reserved under this Act, on twenty-four Saturdays as may be determined by the said Commission (GAB), and on legal holidays, except Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, July fourth, commonly known as Independence Day, and December thirtieth, commonly known as Rizal Day. It is clear from the above-quoted provision that appellants have no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except, perhaps, on the holidays), because their holding of races on these days is merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB. When, therefore, Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted increasing by six (6) the sweepstakes draw and races, but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it did, form among the only available racing days unreserved by any law the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and determination by the GAB. It is suggested that the GAB should have chosen any week days or Saturday afternoons. In the first place, week days are out of the question. The law does not authorize the holding of horse races with betting on week days (See Article 198 of the Revised Penal Code). Secondly, sweepstakes races have always

been held on Sundays. Besides, it is not possible to hold them on Saturday afternoons as, it is claimed, a whole day is necessary for the mixing of the sweepstakes balls, the drawing of winning sweepstakes numbers, and the running of the sweepstakes races. Be that as it may, since the law has given certain amount of discretion to the GAB in determining and allocating racing days not specifically reserved, and since the court does not find that a grave abuse of this discretion has been committed, there seems to be no reason, legal or otherwise, to set aside the resolution of the GAB. Furthermore, appellants contend that even granting that the six (6) additional sweepstakes races should be run on Sundays, yet if they are held on a club race day, the GAB should only insert them in the club races and not given the whole day to the PCSO, to the exclusion of appellants. In support of this contention, the following quotation from the debate in the House of Representatives before voting on House Bill No. 5732, which became Republic Act No. 1502, is cited: Mr. ABELEDA. If there are no more amendments, I move that we vote on the measure. Mr. MARCOS. Mr. Speaker, before we proceed to vote on this bill, I want to make it of record that it is the clear intention of the House to increase by two the ten regular and special Sweepstakes races making it all in all, twelve, and that in cases where a sweepstakes race falls in a club race days the Sweepstakes races should be inserted in the club race. Mr. ABELEDA. The gentleman from Ilocos Norte is correct. . . . (t.s.n., Proceedings in House of Representatives, Congress, May 17, 1956; emphasis supplied.) Appellants cite in their briefs a number of authorities sustaining the view that in the interpretation of statutes susceptible of widely differing constructions, legislative debates and explanatory statements by members of the legislature may be resorted to, to throw light on the meaning of the words used in the statutes. Upon the other hand, the appellees, likewise, quote in their briefs other authorities to the effect that statements made by the individual members of the legislature as to the meaning of provisions in the bill subsequently enacted into law, made during the general debate on the bill on the floor of each legislative house, following its presentation by a standing committee, are generally held to be in 7dmissible as an aid in construing the statute. Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other.1 In view of these conflicting authorities, no appreciable reliance can safely be placed on any of them. It is to be noted in the specific case before us, that while Congressmen Marcos and Abeleda were, admittedly, of the view that the additional sweepstakes races may be inserted in the club races, still there is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of Congress were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely devoid of any such indication. This is, therefore, not a case where a doubtful wording is sought to be interpreted; rather, if we adopt appellants theory, we would be supplying something that does not appear in the statute. It is pertinent to observe here that, as pointed out by one of appellants own cited authorities,2 in the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements an internal and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may defeat the former. The following, taken from 59 Corpus Juris 1017, is in the line with this theory: The intention of the legislature to which effect must be given is that expressed in the statute and the courts will not inquire into the motives which influence the legislature, or individual members, in voting for its passage; nor indeed as to the intention of the draftsman, or the legislature, so far as it has been expressed in the act. So, in ascertaining the meaning of a statute the court will not be governed or influenced by the views or opinions of any or all members of the legislature or its legislative committees or any other persons. Upon the other hand, at the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1502 in June, 1956, the long, continuous, and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes draws and races were held on Sundays and during the whole day. With this background, when Congress chose not to specify in express terms how the additional sweepstakes draws and races would be held, it is safe to conclude that it did not intend to disturb the then prevailing situation and practice. On the principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage and practice under the statute, or a course of conduct indicating a particular undertaking of it, will frequently be of great value in determining its real meaning, especially where the usage has been acquired in by all parties concerned and has extended over a long period of time; . . . (59 C. J. 1023). Likewise, the language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize additional sweepstakes draws only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law would not have included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races were specifically authorized, and it would be confusing, inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it has never been done before), the conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club races. Appellants contention that to compel them to permit the PCSO to use their premises and equipment against their will would constitute deprivation of property without due process of law, deserves no serious consideration. As the lower court has found, every time the PCSO uses appellants premises and equipment, they are paid rentals in accordance with the terms of separate contracts of lease existing between them and the PCSO.

The decision appealed from, being in consonance with the above findings and considerations of this Court, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered. --G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, and VICENTE G. ACABAN, respondents-appellees. Sy Santos, Del Rosario and Associates for petitioners-appellants. Tagalo, Gozar and Associates for respondents-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.: The only issue in this petition for certiorari to review the orders dated March 4, 1972 and March 27, 1972, respectively, of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 75138, is whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405. * On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered against the defendants. To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court. In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the instant petition. The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads: Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits. Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court. The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to this case, the position of the petitioners is that the bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforequoted provisions of law. We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same

intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus: Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law. Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for instance, that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by this amendment or by this law? Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or rather, the inquiry is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not? Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor. Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit. Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit. Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary garnishment or attachment of the deposit is not allowed? Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization. Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure as well as the substantive law on the matter is amended? Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect. Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely establishing the liability of an individual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be executed ... in the execution of that judgment, does this bill, or this proposed law, if approved, allow the investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the judgment? Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory. Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is P1,000,000 and the deposit is half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the judgment may be executed? Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that obligation to the Government, but not to determine whether a deposit has been made in evasion of taxes. xxx xxx xxx Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of a sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant? Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to which I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by attachment. Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached? Mr. RAMOS. That is so.

(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3840, July 27, 1955). It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank. WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972, respectively, are hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants. --G.R. No. L-23196 October 31, 1967

LAUREANO OLIVA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS V. LAMADRID and ROSA L. VILLALUZ, defendants-appellees.

CONCEPCION, C.J.: Appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte dismissing the complaint herein. Plaintiff Laureano Oliva was the owner of a parcel of land of about 3,5258 hectares, located in the sitio of Pinagdamhan, barrio of Lalawigan, municipality of Daet, province of Camarines Norte. The property was covered by Homestead Patent No. 18863 and Original Certificate of Title No. 363 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for said province, issued, in his name, on May 8, 1932. On October 2, 1958, he mortgaged the property to the Rural Bank of Daet, Camarines Norte, as security for the payment of a loan in the sum of P250.00. He having subsequently defaulted in the payment of this obligation, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the property sold, by the provincial sheriff, at public auction, to the Bank, as the sole bidder, on February 4, 1961, for the aggregate sum of P188.00, representing P160.00, as unpaid balance of the loan, plus P12.00 as interest, and P16.00 as attorney's fees. The certificate of sale, issued by the sheriff, on February 6, 1961, stated that the property could be redeemed "within . . . two (2) years from and after the date of the sale, or until February 4, 1963." No redemption having been made within said period, the corresponding deed of sale was executed in favor of the Bank, on February 27, 1963, on which date said Original Certificate of Title No. 363 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3968 issued in the name of the Bank. On March 2, 1963, the latter sold the property to Nicolas V. Lamadrid for the sum of P350.00, and, accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3968 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3978 issued to Lamadrid. Prior to May 31, 1963, plaintiff offered to repurchase the property for said sum of P350.00, but the offer was turned down. Hence, on said date, he instituted the present action against Lamadrid and his wife, Rosa L. Villaluz, to compel them to reconvey the property to him, for said sum of P350.00, which he deposited with the Clerk of Court, and to recover damages, attorney's fees and costs. He claimed that, as holder of a free patent and a torrens title, he is entitled to redeem the property within five (5) years from February 4, 1961, the date of the auction sale, pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Upon the other hand, defendants alleged in their answer that the right of redemption expired on February 4, 1963, under the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670, which, they maintain, is controlling. After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered judgment for the defendants. Hence, this appeal, taken by the plaintiff, directly to the Supreme Court, on questions purely of law. The main issue is whether the period of redemption is governed by Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as asserted by the plaintiff, or by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended, as contended by the defendants and held in the decision appealed from, upon the theory that Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 refers only to voluntary conveyances and that the foreclosure sale had been made under Republic Act No. 720. As early as July 30, 19511 it has been settled, however, that Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or free patent. Besides, on February 28, 1963,2this Court explicitly rejected the theory that said provision "refers exclusively to voluntary conveyances and not to involuntary ones," upon the ground that "the law does not distinguish between the two kinds of conveyances." Upon the other hand, Section 5, of Republic Act No. 720, as amended provides: Loans and advances extended by Rural Banks, organized and operated under this Act, shall be primarily for the purpose of meeting the normal credit needs of any small farmer or farm family owning or cultivating, in the aggregate, not more than fifty hectares of land dedicated to agricultural production, as well as the normal credit needs of cooperatives and small merchants. For the purposes of this Act, a small merchant shall be one whose capital investment does not exceed twenty-five thousand pesos. In the granting of loans, the Rural Bank shall give preference to the application of farmers whose cash requirements are small.

Loans may be granted by rural banks on the security of lands without torrens titles where the owner of private property can show five years or more of peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession in the concept of an owner or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already approved, the provisions of any law or regulations to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, That when the corresponding titles are issued the same shall be delivered to the register of deeds of the province where such lands are situated for the annotation of the encumbrance: Provided, further, That in the case of landspending homestead or free patent titles, copies of notices for the presentation of the final proof shall also be furnished the creditor rural bank and, if the borrower applicants fail to present the final proof within thirty (30) days from date of notice, the creditor rural bank may do so for them at their expense: And provided, finally, That the applicant for homestead or free patent has already made improvements on the land and the loan applied for is to be used for further development of the same for other productive economic activities. The foreclosure of mortgages covering loans granted by rural banks shall be exempt from the publication in newspapers now required by law where the total amount of the loan, including interests due and unpaid, does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00). It shall be sufficient publication in such cases if the notices of foreclosure are posted in at least three of the most conspicuous public places in the municipality where the land mortgaged is situated during the period of sixty days immediately preceding the public auction. Proof of publication as required herein shall be accomplished by the foreclosure sale and shall be attached with the records of the case: Provided, That when a land not covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or free patent land is foreclosed, the homesteader or free patent holder, as well as their heirs, shall have the right to redeem the same within two years from the date of foreclosure: Provided, finally, That in case of borrowers who are mere tenants the produce corresponding to their share could be accepted as security. It should be noted that the period of two (2) years granted for the redemption of property foreclosed under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670, refers to lands "not covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or free patent," or to owners of lands "without torrens titles," who can "show five years or more of peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner, or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already approved," or "of lands pending homestead or free patent titles." Plaintiff, however, had, on the land in question, a free patent and a Torrens title, which were issued over 26 years prior to the mortgage constituted in favor of the Bank. Accordingly, there is no conflict between section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended, and the period of two (2) years prescribed in the latter is not applicable to him. Moreover, the legislative history of the bills3 which later became said Republic Act No. 2670, amending Republic, Act No. 720, shows that the original proposal was to give homesteaders or free patent holders a period of ten (10) years within which to redeem their property foreclosed by rural banks; that this proposal was eventually found to be unwise, because its effect would have been to dissuade rural banks from granting loans to homesteaders or free patent holders which were sought to be liberalized said period of redemption being too long, from the viewpoint of said banks; and that, consequently, the proposal was given up, with the specific intent and understanding that homesteaders or holders of free patent would retain the right to redeem within five (5) years from the conveyance of their properties, as provided in the general law, that is to say the Public Land Act, or Commonwealth Act No. 141.4 It is, therefore, our considered view that plaintiff herein has the right to repurchase the property in question within five (5) years from the date of the conveyance or foreclosure sale, or up to February 4, 1966, and that having exercised such right and tendered payment long before the date last mentioned, defendants herein are bound to reconvey said property to him. Although plaintiff had offered to redeem it for the sum of P350.00 paid by Lamadrid and the former has actually deposited this amount in the lower court, as redemption price, plaintiff now alleges that he is bound to pay no more than P188.00, this being the sum for which the property had been foreclosed by the Bank. Independently of the amount due under section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, we cannot entertain this pretense entailing as it does a substantial change of the theory under which plaintiff had litigated in the lower court, which is not permissible on appeal.5 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered declaring that, upon the judicial consignation of the sum of P350.00 by plaintiff herein, the property in litigation had been redeemed by him, and, accordingly, directing the defendants to execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance in his favor, and that, thereafter said sum of P350.00 be turned over by the Clerk of Court to the defendants, with costs against the latter. Said deed of reconveyance shall be executed by the Clerk of the lower court, in the event of failure of the defendants to comply with this decision, within 30 days from the date on which it shall have become final and executory. It is so ordered. --G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974 HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the Municipal Board,respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila." The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed: On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor. When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065. The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment. On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress." Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065. Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065. Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the ViceMayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until further orders from this Court." The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties. Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.

The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution. The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect." Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads: The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof. Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection. 4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary 6 There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President. In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point. The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows: The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all billsauthenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions: Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal." Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its

immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal." Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic. As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement." Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.