INTRODUCTION

Purposes, Roadmap, Thesis…

I. BACKGROUND

a. Defining Secrecy

Events such as the attacks upon the World Trade Centre and The Pentagon in the United

States of America in 2001, the London Bombings of 07/07 and the Mumbai attacks in 2008 have

led people all over the world to feel more insecure than ever about their safety and security.

What many people don’t realize, however, is that this threat has been there all along, it is only

through the these acts of terrorism that we have now realized it; prior to events of 2002 we were

largely living in a fool’s paradise. The way in which this was possible is through the secrecy of

those people who did know of the threat. Military and intelligence agencies are potentially the

biggest endorses of secrecy in the world today; for them secrecy is fundamental to the roles they

perform and if classified information were to find itself in the wrong hands, lives could be lost.

However, one of the biggest issues with a concept such as secrecy is its subjective nature. What

does, and does not, constitute secrecy is open to debate and therefore so is the concept of what

information should and should not be disclosed to the public by these agencies.

The Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (1997)

discusses secrecy:

Secrecy is a form of government regulation. Americans are familiar with the tendency to

overregulate in other areas. What is different with secrecy is that the public cannot know

the extend or the content of regulation.1

1
The Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. Senate Document

1
 Secrecy therefore is an extremely complicated area of political science; whilst some

people argue it is a form of government regulation, others that it is compulsory to protecting the

security needs of a nation and others still that it is a means by which basic democratic rights are

undermined.

The whole purpose of intelligence is to give us an information

advantage over our adversaries. Secrecy protects this advantage by

keeping our opponents from knowing what we know. But poorly

designed systems for protecting secrecy can give away any advantage

we gain when they prevent us from using our intelligence effectively.

In order to understand the issues further it is worthwhile taking a look at the justifications

for secrecy given by those who keep the secrets.

b. Justifications for State Secrecy: Theories and Philosophies

In this post I would like to explore the question of government secrets in a

democracy. That is, I will assume some basic democratic ideas about just
governance and set two views about the justification for state secrecy in
contrast. My principle assumptions will be that it is within the just powers of

105-102, 103rd Cong, 1997

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government to keep state secrets for national security purposes and that the
exercise of just powers of government must be "of, by, and for the people."
The views I will discuss are: (1) that the people vest in their elected leaders
the plenary authority to keep secrets from them and (2) that the people
entrust their leaders to keep secrets only in accordance with limited
principles and procedures that the people assent to. I will argue that
although (1) has some democratic principles behind it, it ultimately rests on
an "authoritarian argument," which I define as an argument that calls for the
forfeiture of liberty in exchange for security. Thus, (2) is the model for
democratic justification for secrecy.

Laws like FISA make it much more difficult to infringe on citizen's

rights and keep it legally a secret, though there remained the threat

of illegal secrecy. Now America faces a challenge to the people's

power through their legislators to exercise control over state

secrecy. Using authoritarian arguments, President Bush has

declared that Congress does not have the constitutional power to

impose principles and procedures on his ability to keep secrets. To

the extent that the constitution is ambiguous on this matter (which

it is not, but which even the President's own claim that the authority

is "inherent" rather than explicit admits), it would be an activist

decision by the judiciary branch vesting anti-democratic power in

the executive branch. The judiciary ought to defer to democracy,

following the precedent stating that Presidential power is "at its

lowest ebb" when explicitly limited by Congress. In that case,

however, it is not unimaginable that the President would refuse to

recognize the authority of the Supreme Court in deciding the

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 matter, forcing a American democracy into a constitional crisis.

c. Secret Agencies and Open Societies: A Brief Discussion of the Balance Between

Democratic Ideals and the Need for Secrecy

A 2001 article in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences

describes how, whilst secrecy is a fundamental process of society, “In a democratic society

secrecy and openness reflect conflicting values and social needs and exist in an ever-changing

dynamic tension”2. It is true that matters pertaining to secrecy and democracy appear to be

opposing; democracy as a form of government requires that “citizens have an obligation to

become informed about public issues”3 yet making a decision to keep a secret represents a

violation of these rights. However, as we established in section x.x, secrecy can often be

fundamental to the basic survival of a nation and it can therefore be considered wise that

governments preserve secret information in the interests of public security. As such, the concept

of a secret agency within an open society presents an interesting dichotomy. Loch Johnston in

his novel America’s Secret Power discusses the antithesis of democracy and secret intelligence

agencies but claims that the two can exist side by side providing …

There are two ways that we may keep secrets from ourselves: (a) by giving
someone the authority to keep information from us and (b) by avoiding
information that we don't want to possess. These seemingly correspond to
the two possible democratic justifications for state secrecy mentioned above:
(1) that the people vest in their elected leaders the plenary authority to keep
secrets from them and (2) that the people entrust their leaders to keep
secrets only in accordance with limited principles and procedures that the
people assent to. There's an analogous relationship between (a) and (1) and
between (b) and (2) are intuitive for now, but I will note that there are
2
Marx, G. (n.d.). Censorship and Secrecy, Social and Legal Perspectives. Retrieved
January 14, 2009, from < http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/cenandsec.html>
3
Stanford Lecture. (2004, January 1). What is Democracy?. Retrieved January 14,
2009, from <
http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm>

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important dis-analogies that will come out below.

My argument is that (2) is the proper theory of democratic justification for

state secrecy. I proceed below by basic disjunctive syllogism. That is, I will
try to show that (1) has anti-democratic consequences, leaving only (2). To
be fair, I'll also discuss whether (2) has anti-democratic consequences. I
leave myself open to the charge of false dichotomy, though I can't think of
any alternatives to (1) and (2).

Initially, (1) looks like it is democratic and preserves the principle that the
power to keep a secret is only exercised of, by, and for the people. The
leader in whom the power to keep a secret is vested is, importantly, an
elected leader. Therefore, the people maintain their autonomy over what is
kept secret from them by electing leaders that they trust. This looks just like
the case with the doctor. We know that it is good for us to have national
security secrets kept and vest the authority to do so in leaders that are
trusted by enough of us to get elected.

However, there are significant ways in which the analogy between (a) and (1)
breaks down. We motivated (a) with the example of an oncology patient. In
that case, the patient gives the doctor the narrow authority to keep certain
information about the progress of his cancer from him. The patient has not,
however, authorized the doctor to withhold information that his wife is
cheating on him, nor does the patient believe that the doctor might receive
such information if it were true. In the case that motivated (a) there is a
narrowly defined quantity of information that the patient has authorized the
doctor to withhold and a narrowly defined quantity of information that the
patient might expect the doctor to have. Furthermore, the information that
the doctor is authorized to withhold and the information that the patient
expects he might have are the same. In fact, (a) is just a means to (b). The
patient has not granted the doctor broad or plenary authority to keep
secrets, only narrow authority to withhold specified information.

Indeed, the democratic basis for (1) breaks down as well. Once a leader has
plenary authority to keep secrets, he or she may withhold information that
the public would have wanted to know. That's an awkward counterfactual,
but one that is important to this discussion. On a democratic theory, we
want P to be kept secret only if it is the case that the public would
wish that P had been kept secret had they known that P. The
authority granted in (1) gives a leader both the power to withhold and the
access to information that the public would have wanted to know.

In fact, the arguments that are usually forwarded for secrecy policies of type
(1) are basically anti-democratic. The government is set apart from the
people in the role of protector and the duty of government officials to protect
the people is generally emphasized over their duty to obey the people.
Familiarly, when policies of type (1) are defended the "authority" of leaders is

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emphasized: They know more than us and are more fit to judge than we are
what should and should not be kept secret. Sometimes theocratic
justifications for authority, harkening back to pre-democratic concepts of
government, are even invoked. Kings once claimed divine rights, and now
some democratically elected leaders imply that they should be trusted with
extensive authority based in part on the claim that the were selected by God
and not the people. Finally, the only arguments that can be forwarded for (1)
will violate democratic principles because (1) vests authority in individuals to
isolate decisions about secrecy from public scrutiny. This is an authoritarian
argument which demands liberty--in the form of input into choices about
secrecy--for security. Furthermore, secrecy of type (1) affords power to
undermine the basis for democracy in informed consent of the governed
through the manipulation of information by mechanisms that are hidden
from the public lens.
Does (2) fair any better? Perhaps it will turn out that secrecy and democracy
are in fact anti-thetical. If that is the case and if (as it seems) secrecy is
necessary for security, it could turn out that liberty and security are in
fundamental tension. I do not think that this is the case and I think that the
emphasis on control over principles and procedures in (2) shows how both
liberty and security can be safeguarded by exercise of the just powers of a
democratic government.

Initially, (2) looks good. Type (2) secrecy is like when an individual keeps
information from himself by quarantining himself from a certain type of
information. By having input into the principles whereby information is
classified the people select categories of information to keep from
themselves without examining each piece of information individually and
thus already revealing the secret. This means that there must be procedures
for classification and review that ensure that only secrets that fall into the
democratically selected categories become classified.

However, aren't we thereby just shifting the type (1) authority to the
individuals in charge of executing the procedures? At best, this seems only
to take us from type (1) secrecy to type (1) secrecy with type (1) secret
oversight. Maybe there's some mitigation of the authoritarian problems with
(1), but they don't disappear entirely. This problem is solved through
independence and accountability. In a type (2) secrecy procedure that is
democratic there must be three parties involved: an executor of the secret
activity; a reviewer that ensures the secret activity accords with principles;
and legislators that are public ally accountable, public ally debate rules and
procedures, and independently appoint and evaluate reviewers.

This forms a basis for understanding how the public can democratically keep
secrets from itself. In practice, circumstances may make type (2) secrecy
difficult. For instance, on the physical battlefield I have a hard time seeing
how military commanders can be subject to review of the appropriateness of

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keeping their battle plans secret. These practical demands seem to require
meta-principles guiding the exception to democratic control over secrecy. I
propose: all suspensions of democratic control over secrecy should minimally
be (i) narrowly circumscribed (i.e., very specifically referenced types, like
"battle plans" or "troop movements"), (ii) temporary, (iii) to the greatest
extent possible avoid legal authority to influence democratic decisions or
infringe guaranteed rights, and (iv) subject to revelation and revocation by
individuals accountable to the public.

An instance in US history where abuse of type (1) secrecy lead to

implementation of type (2) principles and procedures by public ally elected
legislators is, of course, the abuses during the civil rights and Vietnam War
eras. Courts had granted the executive branch broad leeway in conducting
foreign intelligence activities, but that leeway was abused to monitor and
subvert domestic dissidents. Thanks to leaks, and to aggressive reporters
some of those abuses were revealed. Congress acted first by investigating
through the Church Commission then by enacting laws like FISA that used
the American system of checks and balances to establish principles and
procedures for the conduct of intelligence operations that might infringe on
American's rights.

But left unchecked, secrecy becomes a tool in the hands of the

political schemer, who will use it to play political games with his
domestic adversary. Beyond this, the great strength of democracy
is its ability to subject political ideas and plans to the test of the
marketplace of ideas where the weak will falter and fail and only
the most able will succeed. Secrecy therefore inevitably makes the
decision-making process a little bit stupider. And sometimes it
makes it profoundly dumb.1

1. Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, vol. 2, ch. 9, sec. 2 (1919).

The Bush Administration’s six year epic of incompetence and
failure on the national security front can be taken as a very
persuasive proof of Weber’s thesis on many fronts.

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And at this point, that fact seems slowly to be sinking in on the
national intelligence establishment itself. Every administration
plays some game with intelligence classifications. But over time
the Bush Administration’s games have gotten successively cruder,
the veil of legitimate purpose successively thinner. The artifice of
claims of “state secrecy” once greeted with deadly earnest, now
draws derisive smiles. And in the end this will not serve the
nation’s interests either, because it increases the risk that
legitimate secrets will be exposed as the illegitimate and politically
motivated claims of secrecy are rejected.

Analysts I have spoken with in the last few weeks are increasingly
nervous about the highly abusive and politically manipulated use
of intelligence classifications. I posted an interview with career
CIA covert operative Valerie Plame on Thursday, in which she
describes how secrecy claims were used to protect political
operatives in the White House whose criminal conduct in
violating security classifications was in question (note the double
play: bogus national security invoked to trump legitimate national
security, a perfect demonstration of the thesis).

But these days you only have to pick up a newspaper to read about
the Bush Administration’s puerile antics with state secrecy claims.
They have been used consistently to block public disclosure of the
memoranda authored by John Yoo and his colleagues (including,
we’re told, Michael Chertoff and Alice Fisher)which reached to
legitimize torture. There is no imaginable basis for the claim of
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secrecy. Indeed, the techniques are well known and circulated,
and the CIA has since uncovered manuals showing that Islamic
militant organizations are training against these techniques. The
audience that the Administration wants to keep in the dark is not
“the enemy.” The enemy already has the information. The
audience that the Administration wants to keep in the dark is the
American public. The objective of this exercise has nothing to do
with national security. It has to do with covering the political
posterior of the Administration, shielding the reputations of
individuals who have rendered reprehensible, and potentially
criminal advice to further the torture scheme. However, soon
enough these memoranda will all be in the public sphere. Four
more were delivered to the Senate Judiciary Committee just in the
last few days. Marty Lederman offers a brilliant post discussing
these issues and the Administration’s penchant for gamesmanship
with secrecy at Balkinization. He picks up on several
developments I had missed.

Equally troubling, perhaps, is the now-selective refusal of the

Administration to share with Congress the documents underlying
the NSA’s terrorism-related surveillance since 2001. In particular,
it is essential that Congress fully understand what legal
representations were made to induce the telecom companies to
violate the law, since the Administration is now insisting that
Congress give such companies retroactive immunity for such
wrongdoing. Immunity would only make sense, after all, if at a
minimum it had been reasonable for the telecoms to rely on the
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Administration’s legal justifications — justifications that were,
recall, so far beyond the pale that Jack Goldsmith immediately
saw them as “a legal mess,” repudiated them, and (along with
dozens of other high-ranking DOJ political appointees)
threatened to resign if the Administration continued to rely on
them. Let’s say, just for example, that the telecoms were told:
“Well, yes, this would violate FISA and other statutes — but the
Commander in Chief has a constitutional authority to disregard
such statutes, and to immunize your violation of them.” Would
reliance on that sort of a legal justification have been reasonable?
Do we really want to immunize companies who were willing to
violate statutes on such a basis? (Of course, it’s possible they were
provided a more credible argument, too — the important point is
that without seeing the underlying documents, Congress can’t
have any idea whether the companies’ conduct was reasonable or
not.)

And since our inboxes are now overflowing with examples of the
arrogant attitude towards secrecy that this reflects, here’s another
one. Michael McConnell started his first two months on the job
with a solid record for candor and accuracy. He avoided political
doublespeak. And then something strange happened. He became
a shameless and irresponsible political propagandist. Maybe
sometime in the future he’ll give us his account of what happened
that caused this transformation. In any event, he’s now been
called twice for false statements to Congress (which is a crime).
And he tends to grease his way into discussions now by telling us
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that open discussion of the matters with which he is charges “will
cost American lives.” In sum, McConnell is playing precisely the
same game that Weber talks about in his magnum opus, and
which he based on specific historical experience–namely how the
Oberste Herresleitung used secrecy to emasculate the
parliament and convert Germany into a military dictatorship in
1917-18.

With that background, it should come as no surprise that

McConnell now plans to keep America in the dark as to the
national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Iranian nuclear programs.
Pam Hess of AP reports:

National Intelligence Director Mike McConnell has reversed the

recent practice of declassifying and releasing summaries of
national intelligence estimates, a top intelligence official said
Friday. Knowing their words may be scrutinized outside the U.S.
government chills analysts’ willingness to provide unvarnished
opinions and information, said David Shedd, a deputy to
McConnell.

He told congressional aides and reporters that McConnell recently

issued a directive making it more difficult to declassify the key
judgments of national intelligence estimates, which are forward-
looking analyses prepared for the White House and Congress that
represent the consensus of the nation’s 16 spy agencies on a single
issue. The analysis comes from various sources including the CIA,
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the military and intelligence agencies inside federal departments.

Now we know that the NIE has been done and gathering dust for
more than three months. We also know that Vice President
Cheney’s office, which promptly leaks NIEs when it finds them
useful, absolutely hates this NIE and has been doing everything it
can think to do to put it off. Why might that be?

Sources close to the NIE tell me that it would work at cross-

purposes with the Administration’s fall roll-out of its new war
effort against Iran. The NIE will apparently conclude that Iran is
diligently pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and that Iran is
pursuing a delivery system. It will also conclude that even on the
fastest possible track it is still a couple of years away from having
anything meaningful. Which means this threat does not become
an acute one until some time after Bush and Cheney leave office.
In other words, it’s an NIE that the Vice President badly wants to
drop somewhere behind a filing cabinet. And the best way to do
that is to declare it’s so super secret that no one can have a copy of
that particular decoder ring.

No decision is more important to a democracy than the

decision whether or not to take the nation to war. Our

Founding Fathers fully appreciated that. That decision

making process is cheapened when the Executive

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 arrogates to himself all the available information, claims a

monopoly on it, and attempts to exclude others from the

process by saying they are not privy to the information he

has. Listen carefully. That gurgling is the sound of a

democracy being strangled.

II. EVOLUTION OF CIA REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Background to the CIA

Following the events of World War II, the government of the United States recognized the

need for an organization that could supply the US Government with intelligence that could be

utilized to protect the nation. The events of Peal Harbor had surprised the US government and

caught them off guard and a new organization was called for that, with presidential supervision,

could “procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide

intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence

material collected by all government agencies”4 (Fay 147). The news of the creation of a new

security agency was initially met with a great deal of resistance from the groups such as the

military and the FBI. However, President Harry Truman, upon the recommendations of a council

of advisors who had reviewed the military and government operations of World War II, persued

his plans to create a security agency and, in January 1946, established the Central Intelligence
4
Fay, John. Encyclopedia of Security Management, Second Edition (Encyclopedia of
Security Management) (Encyclopedia of Security Management). St. Louis:
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007. P.147

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Group.5

The CIA was officially created on the 18th September 1947 through provisions contained

within the National Security Act6, which was endorsed and signed by President Truman. The act

outlined the ways in which departments such as intelligence, security and cryptology, that had

previously been utilized during the war, would be restructured in order to amalgamate military

divisions. As well as outlined the roles and responsibilities of agencies such as the army and the

navy, the act created an air force, a National Security Council that would act as presidential

advisors, and the CIA. The CIA, through the National Security Act, were “charged (…) with

coordinating the nation’s intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating

intelligence affecting national security”7. Since 1947 the direction of the CIA and their function

within the United States Government has changed in many ways, as we will see in sections x-x.

However, despite this, their basic roles have remained as they were originally planned.

The organization and role of the CIA

CIA Research Paper

The Central Intelligence Agency is the President’s independent foreign

intelligence arm, responsible to him through the Director of National
Intelligence and the National Security Council, and accountable to the people
of the United States by interaction with the intelligence oversight
committees of Congress. The CIA has many duties within those boundaries
and performs a variety of functions through many forms of intelligence.
They employ people from all backgrounds of academic study, from linguists
to economists, along with people from varied ethnic backgrounds to work as
specialists. It is a large agency with many responsibilities, but most

5
"The Creation of a Central Intelligence Group." Central Intelligence Agency. 8 May
2007. 17 Jan. 2009 <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v39i5a13p.htm>
6
"National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 235, 80 Cong., 61 Stat. 496
7
History of the CIA. (2007, April 10). Retrieved January 14, 2009, from
<https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-the-cia/index.html>.

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importantly they perform critical work for the President regarding
international intelligence.
The Central Intelligence Agency’s main responsibility is stated in its Vision
statement: “We will provide knowledge and take action to ensure the
national security of the United States and the preservation of American life
and ideals” (www.cia.gov). The CIA’s job is to provide pertinent, timely, and
un-biased foreign intelligence. They also act as an unseen force by
conducting undercover action as ordered by the President in order to
preempt threats or achieve objectives of the United States. The CIA is the
only intelligence organization that is not subject to cabinet prerogative,
making it reliable in it is unbiased in its reports, because it has no political
agenda. There are six main types of intelligence by which the CIA collects
information. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is information gathered by field
operatives through overt and covert techniques (www.cia.gov).
Communications intelligence (COMINT) is acquired from intercepted foreign
communications (www.cia.gov). Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is information
collected from foreign electro-magnetic non-communications transmissions
by other than intended recipients (www.cia.gov). Imagery intelligence
(IMINT) utilizes satellite photography and other imagery (www.cia.gov).
Measurement and Signature intelligence (MASINT) is technically derived
data, being nuclear, acoustic, seismic, optical, radiofrequential, or scientific
in form (www.cia.gov). Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is knowledge attained by
intercepted signals, comprising all COMINT, ELINT, and MASINT, however
transmitted (www.cia.gov). Open sources are also utilized, being public
information such as the internet or news.
The function of the CIA body is to assist the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency in performing his assigned duties, to be discussed later.
It is then essentially an extension of his arm to collect information. This
information is collected on order from top U.S. officials in order to monitor a
situation or concern. Other governmental agencies frequently provide the
CIA with leads or information that it follows up on with its resources. It then
processes intelligence by evaluating and associating what it has received or
discovered, and then distributes the politically unbiased analysis to proper
consumers on a need-to-know basis
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency). Due to the CIA’s
status as independent, they also provide analysis on issues of concern and
work with other intelligence entities to provide all intelligence consumers
with the best information available. The consumers include the President
(who receives the PDB, the President’s Daily Briefing, an entire intelligence
community product), the Director of Intelligence, and many officials who
work in policy relating to foreign topics, including Congress and the State
Department.
An especially important recipient of foreign intelligence is the Department of

15
Defense. During any foreign engagements or activity, the CIA works closely
with DOD intelligence specialists to provide updated and accurate
information to be disseminated down to all the necessary levels. The CIA
also works in conjunction with other agencies and departments in conducting
its foreign operations. Due to its secretive status, there is no formally
distributed information on its field operations, but past operations have given
us a general idea of how things work. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the military, and others
collaborate on many issues and concerns, counterintelligence being an
example.
The CIA has no judicial or law enforcement powers, and is not allowed to
perform domestic intelligence gathering. The CIA is absolutely prohibited
from any internal security functions. In addition, it is imperative to
understand that the CIA has no hand in policy making; it only provides
information and action on specific policies
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency). An excerpt from
the Values statement of the CIA, from www.cia.gov, states: “Our success
depends on our ability to act with total discretion and an ability to protect
sources and methods.” The CIA also states, “We provide objective, unbiased
information and analysis. We stand by one another and behind one another.
Service, sacrifice, flexibility, teamwork, and quiet patriotism are our
hallmarks.” (www.cia.gov). Regardless of public opinion, this is what the CIA
stands for and how they represent themselves.
Understanding where the CIA fits into government function is
important to know so one can be aware of where the agency’s
responsibilities lie. The CIA is separated into four directorates, who carry out
the processes of collecting, analyzing, and giving intelligence to the
intelligence consumers. First, the Directorate of Operations (DO) is the chief
director for clandestine collection of foreign, including HUMINT
(www.cia.gov). Within the U.S., the DO is in charge of collecting intelligence
given voluntarily by people or organizations. Second, the Directorate of
Intelligence (DI) is the analyzer of the collected information (www.cia.gov).
This directorate analyzes all sources of intelligence and formulates reports,
briefings, and papers on foreign intelligence concerns, as directed by the
higher ups. In addition, the DI must make sure to provide timely and
accurate analysis, and to make sure the analysis is relevant to the concerns
that policymakers and consumers have articulated. Third, the Directorate of
Science and Technology (DS&T) applies technological and technical expertise
to critical intelligence problems (www.cia.gov). Applied research and
development and design, development, and operational deployment of
specialized intelligence systems are included in the spectrum of
technological activities in which the DS&T participates. Fourth, the
Directorate of Support (DS) is the foundation critical to the CIA’s mission

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(www.cia.gov). Protection of CIA personnel, information, facilities,
technology, communications, logistics, training, financial management,
medical services, human resources, records management and
declassification, and information technology are all services provided under
the umbrella of the DS. The Director of the CIA (D/CIA) also has several
staffs under his direction who deal with public affairs, protocol, congressional
affairs, legal issues, information management, and internal oversight
(www.cia.gov). The chain of command is direct and clear within these staffs,
all leading to the D/CIA.
The head of the agency is the D/CIA, who is appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The D/CIA manages everything under
him in the CIA. His authority was established by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act, signed by George W. Bush in late 2004
(www.cia.gov). It abolished the former positions of Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) and Deputy DCI, and created the D/CIA. The act also
created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI). This director
oversees and receives reports from all 14 of the U.S. intelligence
organizations. The DNI is then responsible to the President and other top
officials. Congress has intelligence oversight committees who make sure the
CIA is accountable to the American people. As far as structure within the
organization, other than the Directorates, there is not much information
divulged as far as structure. The CIA has operatives that work abroad both
as employees of other organizations, under State Department diplomatic
cover for example, or under nonofficial cover, where the operative lives as a
private citizen without ties to the U.S. government (www.intelligence.gov).
There is nothing divulged about covert operations. The structure of the CIA
is designed to pass analysis on to intelligence consumers, and when
necessary, conduct covert operations.
Due to the CIA being a non-policy making body, it is important to know
what policy entities it deals with. The National Security Council (NSC), which
is chaired by the President, is “…the President’s principal forum for
considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior
national security advisors and cabinet officials.” (www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/)
The D/CIA sits on the council as the intelligence advisor, with several other
important officials, the more important ones being the Vice President, the
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The council determines much of who the CIA focuses on
during their day to day surveillance. It is vital that the intelligence the
council receives is accurate and timely, as the information is not fed through
the DI, but the D/CIA sits directly on council. One can imagine the
heavyweight discussion and policy formulated on this council, so it is
important to recognize how the CIA interacts with this organization.
Additionally, the CIA has much interaction with Congress, or specifically the

17
intelligence oversight committees (www.intelligence.gov). They are who
ensures the CIA is responsive to the people, and pass the bills which enact
policy that the CIA implements. In addition, the CIA is also responsible for
tasks with other agencies as discussed before, which are set forth by
Congress. An example is narcotics. The CIA does intelligence for the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), which is a part of the Justice Department. The
intelligence they attain aids in the apprehension of illegal substances and
perpetrators in the U.S. and abroad (www.dea.gov). The CIA deals daily with
important policy making bodies.
There are three topics which I will focus on for the next paper which the CIA
focuses on, and they are as follows: 1) terrorism, 2) proliferation, and 3)
“hotbeds”. The issue of terrorism is obviously at our forefront, and the CIA
puts many of its resources into watching terrorist activity. Also, proliferation
is a topic that is of much importance. With radical states like Iran and North
Korea working to attain nuclear weapons and with states like Russia who
have them but don’t necessarily have the security to protect them, the
United States has worries about nuclear weapons falling into the wrong, (i.e.
terrorist), hands. This is obviously a topic of much concern in the current
political climate. The third topic I will discuss is “hotbeds”. Since the birth of
the agency, the CIA has been responsible for keeping their eyes peeled in
the world for any flare of activity, any sign of unrest or disorder. Especially
now that the U.S. has taken on the role of hegemon, the CIA is essentially the
eyes and ears of the world’s police force. The CIA is sent ahead to seek out
any intelligence on brewing situations all around the world so the U.S. can
take a proactive approach to the problem, or at least know of it and can plan
to account for any problems that may arise from it. These are three very
important topics that affect and are affected by U.S. policy; therefore the
intelligence that is attained by the CIA is vital to the decisions made by top
U.S. officials.

Bibliography

Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. www.cia.gov 02/26/06

Central Intelligence Agency. Wikipedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency 2/26/06

CIA (United States Central Intelligence Agency). United States Central

Intelligence Agency Forum. http://www.espionageinfo.com/Ch-Co/CIA-United-
States-Central-Intelligence-Agency.html 3/18/06

Drug Enforcement Agency. United States Department of Justice.

www.dea.gov 3/18/06

18
National Security Council. The White House. www.whitehouse.gov 3/18/06

United States Intelligence Community. www.intelligence.gov 3/18/06

U.S. Espionage and Intelligence. Jeffrey Richelson. George Washington

University.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/ie/index.html

2/26/06

Eras of Intelligence Accountability

Johnson Lock, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia, has outlined

five significant phases of intelligence accountability that the CIA have progress through since

their inception in the 1947 National Security Act. He refers to these as the “An Era of Trust

(1947-1974), Era of Uneasy Partnership (1975-1986), an Era of Distrust (1987-1991), an Era of

Partisan Advocacy (1992-2001), and an Era of Ambivalence (2002-)”8. Each of these eras reflect

changes in the extent to which the CIA have been monitored and supervised.

The Era of Trust: 1947- 1974

During the period following the creation of the National Security Act America was at war

with Russia. The Cold War represented a period of heightened conflict and tension in America’s

history and they were involved in a nuclear arms race that threatened devastating consequences if

they were caught unawares in the same way they had been during the attack upon their base in

Pearl Harbor. They needed to ensure that they had sufficient intelligence to protect themselves

8
Lock, Johnson. "The contemporary presidency: presidents, lawmakers, and spies:
intelligence accountability in the United States. (01-DEC-04) Presidential Studies Quarterly."
AccessMyLibrary - News, Research, and Information that Libraries Trust. 1 Dec. 2004. 15 Jan.
2009 <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-18243474_ITM>.

19
and for this they relied heavily upon the CIA who were held in high regard and were permitted a

great deal of flexibility and autonomy in performing their duties: “the intelligence agencies were

permitted almost complete discretion to chart their own courses, free of meaningful scrutiny by

overseers in the congress”.9 Although the CIA were technically required to report their activities

to the White House and gain official approval for any actions they took, the Director of Central

Intelligence was given significant discretionary powers and the reports he did make to the White

House were described as “sketchy, perfunctory, and often unwanted by law makers”10

X. Secrecy and Domestic Abuses: The Era of Uneasy Partnership- 1975-1986

The year of 1975 was an extremely significant year for the CIA and a number of events

occurred that entailed that this year in America’s history was later dubbed The Intelligence Year.

Events started in 1974 with a set of articles that had been written by Seymour Hersch and were

entitled The Family Jewels. The articles, which appeared in the New York Times, had a

significant impact upon the population’s perspectives of the CIA as they contained claims that

members of the CIA had abused their authorities by conducting covert intelligence work within

the United States itself. The fact that the CIA had potentially been spying upon their own

citizens angered the US public who felt that their right to privacy at threat. The controversy did

not stop at the New York Times article. The CIA were also charged with attempting to bring

down a democratically elected Chilean government and suddenly the faith of the government and

the public in the CIA’s operations waived. In response to the allegations that were being made

9
Johnson, Loch K.. America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society. New York: Oxford
University Press, USA, 1991. P. 9.
Tsang, Steve. Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism (Stanford
10

Security Studies). Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2008. P.55

20
the Government passed the Hughes-Ryan Act.11 The act, which was named after the members of

senate who had created it (Harold Hughes and Leo Ryan), mandated that the US President

reported all of the undercover operations of the CIA to congress within a specified time of their

occurrence and acted as a response to accusations that congress had been too lenient and naïve in

the jurisdiction they had given the CIA.

During the Period of Uneasy Partnership and the government investigations of the claims

that the CIA had been spying on US citizens, a number of startling facts were uncovered:

The inquiries uncovered assassination plots against foreign leaders; illegal mail openings,

wiretaps, and international cable interceptions; intelligence files on over a million

American citizens; improper drug experiments and the unlawful sequestering of

prohibited lethal chemical and biological materials; a master spy plan to conduct

surveillance against Vietnam War dissenters in the United States; intelligence infiltration

of a range of groups in American society, from universities to religious and media

organizations; the incitement of violence against African-American groups; and covert

actions abroad aimed not just at autocracies but democratically elected regimes as well.12

These findings, together with a similar backlog of controversial acts performed by the Federal

Beareau of Investigators, rocked nation’s leaders and the need to balance the protection provided

by an intelligence agency with the rights to freedom of the American people became a pressing

issue.

X. X. The Rockefeller Commission

11
Hughes-Ryan Act (Pub. L. No. 93-559; 32, 88 Star. 1804)
12
Johnson, Loch. "Governing in the Absence of Angels:." On the Practice of Intelligence
Accountability in the U.S. Congress . 5 Mar. 2003. 15 Jan. 2009 <
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/ACF852.doc.>

21
 The events of 1975 led to the establishment of the United States President’s Commission

on CIA activities within the United States under President Gerald Ford which was mandated with

investigating the activities of intelligence agencies such as the CIA. The commmison, led by

Nelson Rockefellar, subsequently became known as The Rockefellar Commission.13 The

commission was asked to establish whether or not the domestic activities of the CIA had

exceeded their legal authority. The commission published their final report in June 1975 and

their findings revealed that there were a number of activities that constituted abuses of the CIA’s

authority: “the CIA conducted a mail inception program that involved the US government

opening thousands of letters sent to and from persons living in the United States (…) [and] also

found that the CIA established a Special Operations Group (…) [which] resulted in the collection

of significant information and materials on domestic dissident groups”14. The CIA responded to

these findings by admitting that they had performed such acts but had done so in the interests of

national security. These admissions coupled with the results of the Rockefellar Commission

caused such a stir in the United States that further, more comprehensive investigations were

ordered into the CIA.

X.X Recommendations of The Rockefellar Commission

X.X The Church Committee

The next investigation conducted during the era of uneasy partnership was entitled The

Senate Select Committee to Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities and,
13
"Rockefeller Commission Report." History Matters Home Page. 15 Jan. 2009 <
http://www.history-
matters.com/archive/contents/church/contents_church_reports_rockcomm.htm>
14
Forest, James J.F., Russell D. Howard, and Joanne Moore. Homeland Security and Terrorism
(The Mcgraw-Hill Homeland Security Series). New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005. P.388

22
because it was led by a man named Frank Church, it became known as The Church Committee15.

The hearings commenced in 1975 and ran for over a year. During the hearings a great deal of

information about the CIA’s actions were revealed that were potential threats to existing security

operations and President Gerald Ford personally requested that the inquiries were ceased.

However, despite this, Church proceeded with his investigations and further information about

the couvert actions of the CIA were revealed to the American public. The Church Committee

eventually published over 14 reports that detailed the activities of US intelligence agencies and a

number of further acticities of the CIA emerged these included the fact that the CIA had utilized

the services of journalists and academic professionals as spies, had created products that were

intended to perform mind control functions, had completed drug testing couvertly on

unsuspecting candidates and had formulated a number of conspiracys to assassinate oversears

political figures.16

X.X Recommendations of the Church Committee

X.X The Pike Committee

The Pike Committee, led by Otis Pike of New York, ran parrell to the Church Committee

but differed slightly in its underlying objectives. Whist the Church Committee had concerntrated

on the performance of illegal activities by the CIA, the Pike Committee was concerned with the

financial viability of the CIA and the cost effectiveness of their work. As with the Church

Committee, the Pike Committee faced some resistance from the Ford adminidtration and conflict

15
"Church Committee." History Matters Home Page. 15 Jan. 2009 < http://www.history-
matters.com/archive/contents/contents_church.htm>
16
Benson, Michael, Allan Swenson, and Allen Swenson. The Complete Idiot's Guide to the
CIA. New York: Alpha, 2002 p. 178

23
soon emerged pertaining to the availability of classified materials and a clash emerged that

entailed the final report of Pike’s committee was never officially published due to Congressional

resistance.17

X.X Recommendations of the Pike Committee

The Era of Uneasy Partnership- 1975-1986: A Summary

The various committees and investigations that occurred during the 1970s had a major

impact on the support that the American people gave to agencies such as the CIA and the

existence of an uncontrolled intelligence organization was no longer acceptable: “America's

support for an unbounded intelligence capability would have to compete with another value that

had long invested the rest of the government, namely: liberty--the safeguarding of the people

against the power of their own government, not just foreign governments”18. The outcome of all

this had a major upon the CIA’s reporting requirements and public awareness of their activities.

They were no longer permitted the autonomy that they had previously enjoyed and their

legislative practices were much more closely monitored. Johnson describes this as a

“democratoization” of intelligence. Whilst this provided closer supervision of the activities of

the CIA, which was considered necessary given the nature of some of the allegations that had

been made against them, not everyone was in agreement with the outcome. Critics argued that

through making the agency accountable to the public and the government the very objective for

the existence of the CIA was undermined; America’s ability to protect itself against enemies was

at threat.

The Chile Debacle??

17
"Final Report of the Assassination Records Review Board, Chapter 1." Federation of
American Scientists. 15 Jan. 2009 < http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/arrb98/part03.htm>
18
Johnson, Loch. "Governing in the Absence of Angels:” ibid.

24
Rockeffellar, Church, Pike: Proposed Intelligence/Oversight Reforms “New Oversight”

Intelligence Oversight Act 1980. (Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980,

H.R. Rep. No. 96-1153 (1980)): By the end of the 1970s,

there were eight ``appropriate committees'' of

Congress, four in each Chamber; these included the

Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence,

created in 1976 and 1977, respectively. In 1980,

Congress and the Carter Administration reached an

accommodation to revise the reporting requirements;

each branch received what it sought in a quid pro

quo through the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act

(Public Law 96-450). As the Administration

requested, the number of panel recipients was

reduced from eight to two (i.e., the Intelligence

Committees). For Congress, the new law imposed

additional reporting obligations on the executive,

expanding the scope, volume, and timeliness of

25
information about intelligence activities, including

covert action abroad. The 1980 Act directed the

intelligence agencies to keep the Select Committees

on Intelligence ``fully and currently informed of all

intelligence activities . . . including any significant

anticipated intelligence activity,'' referring to planned

covert operations. Notification was to be in advance,

except when the President determined that ``it is

essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary

circumstances affecting the vital interests of the

United States.'' Even then, he was to report to the so-

called ``gang of eight,'' a bipartisan group of leaders

of the House and Senate and of the Intelligence

Committees; and he was to notify the Select

Committees ``in a timely fashion'' about the covert

operation and the reasons for not notifying them in

advance.

26
The Era of Distrust: 1987- 1981

The trust in the CIA that the law-makers had been trying to establish since the events of

the 1970s came quickly and abruptly to a halt when, once again, the activities of the CIA

appeared in newspaper reports. This time the news appeared in the Beruit magazine Al-shiraa on

November 3rd 1986. On this occasion the accusations involved two other countries; Nicaragua

and Iran. The US government had been, for some years, attempting to depose the government of

Nicaragua. Covert CIA operations had been utilized in this cause and had been engaged in acts

of terrorism

Despite Ronald Reagan’s best efforts to persuade the American public to support the

contra activities, reports detailing some of the activities of the CIA had led many Americans to

be wary of the acts that were being committed in Nicaragua. This was worsened by the

publication of a CIA manual that had been written for the contras and provided advice and

guidance on unethical methods of persuading the citizens of Nicaragua to support the contra19.

Once again congress became concerned about the activities of the CIA and took actions to cease

funding for contra operations. However, Reagan had found other methods of funding the

activities of the CIA and it soon emerged that during this period his administration had been

engaged in the sale of arms to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages. The

proceeds of such sales had gone directly to support CIA contra dealings in South America.

Despite inititially denying that the government had engaged in these activities, Reagan

eventually admitted it was true:

Blanton, Tom. "Electronic Briefing Book: The CIA in Latin America." The George Washington
19

University. 15 Jan. 2009 < http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB27/index.html>

27
 A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart

and my best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is

not “20

Reagan’s admission coupled with the publication of this story in the Beiruit newspaper

seriously undermined the doctrines of the New Oversight. Reagan and his administration had

paid very little attention to the rules and regulations it had established and once again, the

information that had been kept from the American public under the guise of being in the interests

of security seriously damaged the reputation of the CIA and the credibility of their function.

Congress responded to the Iran-Contra scandal through the creation of further restrictions

and laws. The most significant of these was the Intelligence Oversight Act of 199121 which

determined the requirement for “prior, written presidential finding for important covert actions –

not ex post facto oral approval as once given by President Ronal Reagan”22. The regulations

extended beyond the CIA to all government agencies and specified the requirement for Congress

to be involved if any third party or country outside of these agencies became involved in

operations. Whilst these new reporting requirements went a long way towards tightening

intelligence requirements there was gaps left by the omission of a time limit on reporting to

Select Committees on Intelligence. President Bush commented on this saying:

where prior notice is not provided, I anticipate that notice will be provided within a few

days. Any withholding beyond this period will be based upon my assertion of authorities

20
"The American Experience | Reagan | Primary Source Documents: Speech about Iran
Contra." PBS. 4 Mar. 1987. 15 Jan. 2009 <
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reagan/filmmore/reference/primary/irancontra.html>
21
Intelligence Oversight Act Public Law 102-88; 105 Stat. 429.(1991)
22
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri, and Christopher Andrew. Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA. Portland:
Frank Cass, 1997 p. 184

28
 granted this office by the Constitution23

Boland Ammendment

Era of Partisan Advocacy (1992-2001)

This period of time in the history of the CIA deals with the effects of a partisan discord

caused by a change in government and a new Republican President upon congress. The

Intelligence Commitees were beleaguered by political arguments and differences and the actions

and regulations of the CIA became more of a political tool than a well managed government

agency and the Clinton administration were openly accused of neglecting matters of public

safety, “We don’t care about national security,’ said the Clinton people”24

On September 11th 2001 terrorists staged a castrophic attack on America’s World Trade

Centre and The Pentagon killing 2,819 people25 and suddenly the role of the CIA and their ability

to gain intelligence that could protect American citizens was catapulted back into the fore. The

events of 911 were largely blamed on intelligence failures and three major accusations, amongst

many others, emerged. Firstly, given the primary role of the CIA is to enforce national security

and that the terrorist attacks violated that same national security then this could only constitute a

failure on the CIA’s behalf. To put it simply, they did not perform the job for which they had

been assigned:

There was never any doubt that the events of 9/11 represented the kind of surprise attack

that the CIA had been formed to secure against, and hence a catastrophic intelligence

23
"Congressional Record: Intelligence Authorization Act." Federation of American Scientists.
28 June 1991. 15 Jan. 2009 <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1991_cr/s910628-ia.htm>.
24
Goss qtd in Johnson, Loch. "Governing in the Absence of Angels:” ibid
25
"September 11 by Numbers." New York Magazine -- NYC Guide to Restaurants, Fashion, Nightlife, Shopping,
Politics, Movies. 5 Sep. 2002. 15 Jan. 2009 < http://nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm>

29
 failure.26

Secondly, and perhaps even more worryingly, there were also accusations that the CIA

had been in receipt of intelligence related to the attacks but had failed to act in a manner that was

sufficient to prevent them. Finally, there were some schools of thought that actually accused the

CIA of orchestrating the 911 attacks27 in order to provide the US Government with justification

for declaring war upon Afghanistan and Iraq. Whilst we will not engage in discuss pertaining to

the merits of such arguments here, the fact that such rumours emerged show quite clearly the

distrust that many people all over the world, including America itself, have for the CIA

organization.

It wasn’t just the intelligence agencies that were in the firing line for the events of 9/11,

congress too were facing a great deal of accusations and, in response to this after attempting to

form a joint Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the 9/11 Commission was officially created.

X.X The 9/11 Commission

The 9/11 Commission had the express aim of investigating the alleged intelligence failures and

“to prepare a full and complete account of the events surrounding the September 11, 2001

attacks”28. The Commission was officially created on November 27th 2002 by President George

W. Bush, consisted of 5 Democrats and 5 Republicans and was presided over by the Govenor of

Gill, Peter, and Mark Phythian. Intelligence in an Insecure World. University Park, PA: Polity,
26

2006. P. 1119
27
See "9/11 Conspiracy Theory Books Dominate Debate at Frankfurt Book Fair", October 10, 2003, DW-
World.de, "German Sept 11 theory stokes anti-US feeling", Kate Connolly, November 20, 2003,
telegraph.co.uk for examples
"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." National Commission
28

on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 26 Mar. 2003. 15 Jan. 2009 <http://www.9-
11commission.gov/press/pr_2003-03-26.htm>.

30
New Jersey, Thomas Kean. The Commission was in session for over 18 months before the final

report was published on the 22nd July 2004. The final report of the commission was damning to

both the CIA and the FBI and contained evidence that both agencies had failed to act

appropriately upon information that they had that could have prevented the attacks. The report

commented that whilst the attacks “were a shock... they should not have come as a surprise”29.

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission

In response to the findings of the 9/11 commission and the findings of a further

commission, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission30, the Intelligence Reform and

Terrorism Prevention Act of 200431 was put in place. This act necessitated the creation position

of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a new role that had three main functions:

“To serve as head of the Intelligence Community, (…) to act as the principle advisor to

the president, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for

intelligence matters related to national security, [and to] oversee and direct the

implementation program of the National Intelligence Program”32

a. Post September 11th

29
Sorlucco, Jerry. Facing Fascism: The Threat to American Democracy in the 21st Century. -:
Authorhouse, 2006.
30
"Final Report of the WMD Commission." Federation of American Scientists. 26 Mar. 2005.
15 Jan. 2009 < http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf>
31
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458
32
Best, Richard, Alfred Cumming, and Todd Masse. "Director of National Intelligence:
Statutory Authorities." CRS Report for Congress <
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22112.pdf>

31
 i. The 9/11 Commission

1. Reforms Suggested/Reforms Implemented

ii. Post 9/11 Secrecy

1. …

2. FOIA and CIA Disclosures (?)

III. CASE STUDY: THE ROCKEFELLAR COMMISSION

IV. ANALYSIS (11)

a. Critique of Current System

i. Reforms Suggested by Church and Pike Committees

1. Which reforms were adopted?

2. Which proposed reforms were discarded?

ii. Reforms Proposed by the 9/11 Commission

1. Reforms Adopted

2. Reforms Discarded

32
 b. Proposed Solutions

i. Proposed by Bok: Analogizing Nuclear Disarmament and Dismantling of

Government Secrecy

ii. Proposed by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones: Drawing Out Solutions Based on

Historical Patterns in CIA Performance Revealed Through Permutations of

Political Environment, Relationship with the Executive, and Tasks

Proscribed.

“By examining the CIA over time, it is possible to appreciate the danger of adopting

rigid, unchanging criteria by which to judge the Agency’s performance or axiomatic precepts to

explain it.” Expectations, political environment, personality, and tasks proscribed influence CIA

effectiveness. Furthermore, the same combination of factors may give rise to different effects at

different times.33

iii. Proposed by …

V. CONCLUSIONS

a. What worked, what didn’t, why/why not?

33
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The CIA and American Democracy.

33
 b. Alternative Solutions to Presently Employed Reforms?

n conclusion, the process of intelligence reform is just the

beginning, and there will be a
lot of work ahead to make sure the U.S. intelligence and
law enforcement agencies get it right.
More importantly, the U.S. has made strides in developing
a Director of National Intelligence
who is not bound with the CIA, FBI, or any other agency
(Chambliss, 2005). Despite these
efforts, there is still a ways to go in this intelligence
reform and it is very fragile still because if
this new intelligence reform legislation fails to not allow
the intelligence community to “connect
the dots” and provide more “dots to connect” to prevent
further attacks on the U.S. and its
interests, (Chambliss, 2005), then the efforts would have
been for not in attempting to reform the
intelligence community’s policies and practices. Only
time will tell whether or not the U.S.
intelligence community will succeed; however, with
continued improved politics, leadership and
bureaucratic eradication, the U.S. can at least remain
focused on its intelligence reform efforts.
Summary
Intelligence gathering is not an end in itself, but instead,
it is an essential ingredient to
formulating better policy and protection of U.S. interests.
The key is to essentially put all the
information available together and harness it into a form
that is manageable and useful for
everyone (FDCH Congressional Testimony, 2002,

34
Chambliss, 2005). The notion of “data
ownership” has to be eliminated if U.S. intelligence
agencies, i.e. (CIA and FBI) are going to be
effective in obtaining real “all-source” analysis to
facilitate their piece of the investigating in
taking down this threat hanging over America. The key to
this integral process is the ability to
share information with those who has a need for it
because the minute one element of the
intelligence community withholds any information from
rest of the intelligence community, then
“all-source” loses its purpose and meaning (FDCH
Congressional Testimony, 2002, Chambliss,
29

2005). We must erase the “reactionary mindset” and

remain vigilant in recognizing and staying
abreast in addressing challenges in the area of HUMINT
capabilities, improved quality with
congressional oversight with intelligence efforts, well
informed leaders and better decision
making abilities, and finally continued information sharing
and collaboration efforts between
CIA and FBI agencies could at least give the U.S. a
fighting chance in deterring and destroying
the war on terrorism,
In the road ahead regarding interagency communications
and information sharing, both CIA
and FBI must foster the right attitudes and practices that
will filter throughout. In fact, then
former CIA director Tenet and current FBI director, Bob
Mueller were leaning forward in
deepening cooperation, not only at the headquarters, but
35
in the field as well, despite the different
missions and cultures that exists. It is paramount that
both agencies overcome the unfortunate
phenomenon known as “the Wall”- encompassing a
complex system of laws and rules- not to
mention perceived perceptions that impede the flow of
information between the arenas of
intelligence and criminal prosecution, (FDCH
Congressional Testimony, 2002). The “Wall” has
been known to slow down and at times, stop the flow of
information that both CIA and FBI,
simply can not afford to have stop. Fortunately, President
Bush’s continued endorsement behind
the Patriot Act has helped alleviate this challenge. More
importantly, had the U.S. practiced this
earlier, both CIA and FBI could have ultimately prevented
the 9/11 terrorist attacks that has
made a lasting impression on the hearts and minds

of us all

36