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Aristóteles - Zeller
Aristóteles - Zeller
Aristóteles - Zeller
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AEISTOTLE
AND THE EAELIER PEEIPATETICS
VOL.
I.
Wf
WORKS BY
DR.
:
E.
ZELLER.
History of
PRE-SOCEATIC SCHOOLS
Crown
8vo.
3()5.
Greek
Philosophy from tlie Earliest Period to the time of Socrates. Translated from the German by Sarah F. Allkvxe. 2 vols.
SOCRATES
Translated
AND
from
THE
the
SOCRATIC
0. J.
SCHOOLS.
Rkichel, M.A.
German by
Crown
Translated
A, Goodwin.
Allkyxk and
Crown
8vo. ISs.
STOICS, EPICUREANS,
lated from the
8vo. 155.
AND
0.
J.
SCEPTICS.
Eeichel, M.A.
German by
TransCrown
Crown
8vo.
OUTLINES
OF
THE
HISTORY
OF
GREEK
F.
PHILOSOPHY.
LONGMANS, GREEN,
39 Paternoster
&
CO.
Eow, London
ARISTOTLE
AND
I
!
"
BY
B. F. C.
COSTELLOE,
M.A.
J.
H.
MUIEHEAD,
1
M.A.
'<
\^
I.
CO.
All
rights reserved
311
VI
TO
TEAN8LAT0ES' NOTE
The
following translation embraces Part II. Div. II.
Eduard
Zeller's
work on
ment.'
sanction,
and
time
by
Messrs.
Longmans
as
translations
of
the
Mr. Costelloe
chiefly
notes
up
the
for
Mr. Muirhead
for the
middle
owing
to an accident for
which the
translator
of the text in
viii
TRANSLATORS' NOTE
Zeller's notes
German
text
with a view to condensing the material where this could be done without impairing
believed to
its
value.
The
treatise is
readers which
The student
will find
ample
which
is
and the
so logical and
that
it
has
not been
considered necessary to
CONTENTS
OF
CHAPTER
Year of his
Alexander,
racter, 39.
31.
Flight
from
Athens and
II
death, 33.
Cha-
CHAPTER
Aristotle's writings
A. Consideration of the particular
Works seriatim
The Catalogues,
Letters and poems, 53. Dialogues and earlier writings, 55. Works on Logic, 64. Rhetoric, 72. Metaphysics, Natural Philosophy the Material Universe and Inorganic 75. Nature, 81. Organic Nature, 87. Ethics and Politics, 97. Theory and History of Art, 102.
48.
:
Exoteric, 106.
lit
Scientific, 123.
CHAPTER
Fate of Aristotle's Works, 137.
ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER IV
STANDPOINT, METHOD, AND DIVISIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE
Aristotle
165.
Their Difference, Dialectic, 171. Empiricism, 173. Formalism, 177. Division of his Philosophy: Theoretic, Practical, Poietic, and their subdivisions, 180. Logic, Metaphysics, Physics, Ethics, Theory of Fine Art, 188.
Aristotle's
and Plato,
IGl.
Method:
CHAPTER V
LOGIC
Scope of Logic, 191. Nature and Origin of Knowledge, 194. Development of Knowledge, 196. Problem of the Science of Knowledge, 211.
Universal elements of Thought: the Concept, 212. Essence and Accident, Genus, Differentia, Species, 213. Identity and Difference, kinds of Opposition, 223. The Judgment, 229. Affirmation and Negation, 230. The Quantity of Judgments, 232. Modality, Conversion, 236. The Syllogism, 236. The Figures, 238. 233. Rules and Fallacies of Syllogism, 241. Proof: its problem and conditions, 243. Limits of Proof; Immediate Knowledge, 245. Axioms and Postulates, 248. The Principle of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, 251. Induction, Dialectic or Probable Proof, 252. Defects of Aristotelian Induction, 255. Definition, 265. Classification, 270. Sumvia Genera,
271.
^
.,
CHAPTER VI
INTRODUCTORY
INQUIRIES
TOUCHING
PHYSICS
ARISTOTLe's
META-
The Categories what they are and how they are deduced, 274. The Categories in Detail, 281. Significance of the Theory of
:
the Categories, 288. First Philosophy as the Science of Being its Problem, 290. Its Possibility, 292. Fundamental Questions of Metaphysics, and tlieir treatment by Earlier Philosophers the chief problem of Metaphysics in Aristotle's time and his mode of presenting it, 295. Criticism of previous attempts at its solution: the Pre-Socratics, 297. The Sophists, Socrates, and the Minor Socratic Schools, 312. Plato, 313. The Ideas, 314. The Ideas as Numbers, 319. The Ultimate Principles of Things, the One and the original Material, 321. The value of Aristotle's criticisms on Plato, 326.
:
xi
VII
continued
is
the Actual and the Possible deduction of the opposition of Matter and Form, 340. More accurate account of the opposition the Actual and the Possible, 345. Significance of this doctrine in Aristotle, 351. The Form in its three different aspects as Cause, 355. The operation of the Material Cause Passivity, Natural Necessity, Contingency, 358. Essential significance of Matter, 365. Matter and Form in relation to the principles of Individuality and Substantiality, 368. Relativity of Matter and Form, 378. Motion and the First Cause of Motion, 380. Mover and Moved, 383. Eternity of Motion, 387. Necessity of a Primum Mobile, 389. Its Nature, 393. The operation of God on the World, 402.
: : :
CHAPTER
A. The Idea of Nature
VIII
PHYSICS
Nature as the Cause of Motion, 417. Kinds of Motion, 422. Motion in Space, 423. The Infinite, 427. Space and Time, 432. Further discussion of Motion in Space, 437., Qualitative Change: Opposition to Mechanical Theory, 441.-$Qualitative Variety in Matter, 443. Qualitative Transform atioi?, 450. Mixture of Materials, 456. Final Causes in Nature, 459. The Resistance of Matter to Form, 465. Nature as a Progressive Series of Forms, 466.
CHAPTER IX
PHYSICS
continued
469.
The
Terrestrial
and the
Celestial
Universe the ^ther, 472. The Four Elements, 477. The Unity of the World, 485. The Shape of the Universe, 487. Structure of the Heavens Theory of the Spheres, 489. The Number
:
of the Spheres, 499. Retrogressive Spheres, 501. The circle of the Fixed Stars, 504. The Planetary Spheres, 505. Earth and Heaven, 506. Generation and Destruction in Terrestrial Elements, 508. Meteorology, 512. Inorganic Nature, 516.
Addenda and
Page
74, n. 2.
Co7'rigenda.
No. 78 gives the Rhetoric only
of these may be in great part explained by the supposition that Aristotle did not always write, but dictated his books. 178, n. 2, for Braniss 7'ead Brandis
22.
Zeller
many
188, n.
1, col. 1,
1.
1.
12, for
203, n. 2,
4, insert
1, 1.
11.
199, n. 2
210, n. 2, col.
224, n. col. 1,
18, delete of
11, 12,/o/' a
30, /or
1.
5,
for there
1,
302, n. 3, 335, n. 1,
add a further reference to De Cwlo, i. 10 itiit. col. 2, 11. 18, 21, for equahty read identity col. 2, 1. 3,/or corresponds with read assimilates to
1.
itself
4,/o/- general
1.
1.
346, n. col. 2,
comma
361, n. col. 1,
364,
1.
16,
8.
1875, p. 425),
Toustrik {Ifermes, ix. and suggests that the word 'disturbance' miglit be replaced
17,/or Fr. 13 i^ead Fr. 12
by 'modification.'
390, n. 3, col. 1,
395, n. col.
1,
1. 1.
9,
add that
it
l)e
400, n.
1, col. 2, 1. 11,
omit not
,
404,
1.
1.
33, after
405, n.
1.
word read is thought read intelligible do read are 12, for 18, /or motion read moved
5,
read Form related to them read not only bodies and for bodies and masses magnitudes but everything which possesses them or is related to them 427, n. 8, col. 2, 1. 8,/or masses read magnitudes 428, 1. 28, /or after read beliind 441, n. 2, col. 1, 1. 8,/or forcible read forced 454, 1. 11, /or extension read extrusion 459, n. 5, col. 1, 1. 17, for But read Again 479, n. 1, col. 1, 1. 1, after ought add in the converse case 1. 4, after does add not 481, n. 1, col. 2, 1. 24,/or oppositions read opposites. 497, n. 1, col. 2, 1. 3,/or one who stands ... in front of him read in front of the
16, /or forces
9,
417,
1.
propeller
504, 1.1, /or
who
One
The
510,
1.
2,
AEISTOTLE
AND THE
EAELIBE PEEIPATETIC8
d
The
lives
CHAPTER
As the
itself
existence, so
we
was
at first confined in
narrow
and gained, as
is
Socrates
not only a
pure Athenian
to pass
citizen,
feels
no desire
is also
Plato
an
Athenian, but the love of knowledge takes him to foreign lands and he is connected by many personal
interests with other cities. his scientific training
he spends his youth and a considerable part of his manhood out of Athens, chiefly in the rising Macedonian
kingdom
VOL.
stranger, not
I.
and even when he is in Athens, it is as a bound up with the political life of the
B
ARISTOTLE
city,
ties
from giving
The
birth of Aristotle
Ari-
stotle's life
now extant
v.
are (1)
Diogenes,
;
Brandis, Aristotelia i. 1-188 Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, i. pp. 48-65 Grote's Arist. (1872), i. 1-37,
;
;
copious) (2) DiONYSius of Halicarnassus, Epist. ad Amvumim, 727 sq. (3) 'Apiffr. pios 1. 5, p. Koi (rvyypdixixara avrov, by the
;
and Grant's
1-29.
Ai-ist. (1877) pp. Stahr discusses (p. 5 sqq.) the lost works of ancient writers
which treated of
Aristotle's life.
Anonymus Menagii; (4) another sketcii of his life, known to us in {a) the Bios first three forms printed in the Aldine ed. of Arist.
:
We
Opp.
141)6-1)8
(which
is
there
ascribed to Pldloponus, elsewhere to Ammonias, but belongs to the as neither), here cited Pseudo-Ammoidus (o'^Amm.); (h) the Life published from the Codex Marcianusby Robbe in 1861 cited
,
doubt
differs
widely;
as Vita Marciana (or V. Marc.) (c) the Life cited as the Latin Ammoyiius, preserved in an ancient
;
we can only test each statement by its inherent probability, 2 According to Apollodorus
apvd
the
DioG.
basis
9 of
no
the
doubt on statement
{ibid. 10,
Pseudo-Ammonius
;
itself; (5) 'Htrux'ov MiA7?o-Iou ircpl Tov 'Apia-ToreXovs (6) SUIDAS, sub
All of these, voce 'ApicrroreATis. except (ih), are to be_ found in UuHLE, Arist. Oj)]). i. 1-79. Westermann's appendix to CoVitcs bet's Diogenes, and his Scriptorum (at p. 397) also con-
tain (3)
'Lib.
o-ives (4&)
Ord. 245), before the publication of (4&), ascribed the archetype of (4) to the younger Olym-
sthenes as three years younger than Aristotle, whereas he was born in the same year, or at most in the year before (in the beginning of 01. 99, 1, or end of 01. 98,
4); vide
piodorus
later
a guess which
may be
Stahr
i.
30.
Gellius'
statement (iV.^.xvii. 21, 25) that Aristotle was born in the seventh year after the freeing of Rome
many
flourishing cities,
possession of
all
whose people were no doubt in full Greek culture.^ His father Nicomachus
in 384 B.C., follows from the accounts as to his death above, and would also follow from our information as to his residence at Athens, if the figures are to be taken strictly (cf. p. 6, n. 3,
from the Gauls also agrees, since that event is referred to the year 364 A.U.C., or 390 B.C. So also the V. Marc. p. 3, and the Ammon. Latin, p. 12, assert that he was born under Diotrephes (01. 99, 1) and died sixty-three years old under Philocles. An otherwise
unknown
writer,
EUMELUS
(ap.
DiOG. 6), asserts, on the other hand, that Aristotle lived to be seventy but there is little reason
;
EosE (p. 116) in preferring this account, since his next words, tnuv hKovirov ire\evTT]a'eu, sufficiently show his lack of trustIn fact, as the worthiness. manner of Socrates' death is here transferred to Aristotle, so is his age also possibly by reason of the spurious Apologia ascribed
to follow
;
to
Aristotle
(v.
p.
35,
n.
3,
For if, at seventeen, he to Athens and was with Plato for twenty years, he must have been thirty-seven years old at Plato's death; so that, if we put his exact age at 36^ and bring down Plato's death to the middle of 347 B.C., his birth would still fall in the latter half of 384 B.C. It is, however, also possible that his stay in Athens did not cover the full twenty years ^ So called because most of its cities were colonies of Chalcis in Euboea. Stagira itself was originally colonised from Andros,
infra).
came
parallelism with the Platonic Apologia of Socrates. But apart from the probability of this explanation, Eumelus is completely displaced by the agreement of all the other testimony, including that of so careful a chronologist as ApoUodorus. A reliable tradition as to the age of their founder must have existed How in the Peripatetic School, could all our witnesses, except this one unknown and badlyinformed writer, have come to agree upon a false statement of it when the truth could have been easily ascertained ? ' That he was born in the first half of the Olympiad, or
infra')
and
its
but perhaps (cf. Djonys. w?5 supra) received a later contribution of second founders from Chalcis. In 348 B.C., it was, with thirtyone other cities of that district, sacked by Philip, but was after-
wards on Aristotle's intercession restored (v. p. 24, infra). Vide Stahr, 23, who discusses also the form of the name (^ra-y^ipos^ or ^Tor/^ipa. as a neuter plural). do not know whether Ari-
We
stotle's
his will, ap. DiOG. 14) was spared in the destruction of the town or was subsequently rebuilt. 3 Bernays (Z>iZ. Arint. ii. 55, ' 134) calls Aristotle a half
in
Greek,'
but
Grote
(i.
3)
and
B 2
ARISTOTLE
was the body-surgeon and friend of the Macedonian and it is natural to suppose that the King Amyntas long hereditary in the family must father's profession
^
have influenced the mental character and education of the son, and that this early connection with the Macedonian
Court prepared the way for the employment of Aristotle On neither of these in the same Court at a later time.
points, however,
We
may
Nicomachus took
Grant (p. 2) rightly maintain against him that a Greek family in a Greek colony in which only Greek was spoken, could keep their nationality perfectly pure. Aristotle was not an Athenian,
and
though
philosopliical
whose surroundings and training were so closely similar as those of Schelling and Hegel, or of Baur and Strauss. Vide DiOG. i. (quoting Hermippus), DiONYS., Ps. Amm., V. ^larc, Ammon. Latin., and SuiDAS. The family of Nicomachus,
'
yet be found in him of the fact that his poHtical sense had its training elsewhere but he was as truly a Hellene as Pythagoras,
;
Xenophanes, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Democritus, or the rest. The un-Greek element whicli
'
'
according to these authorities, traced its descent, as did so many medical families, to Asclepius. TzETZES, Cliil. X. 727, xii. 638, gives no ground for doubting The three recensions of the this.
Bernays
boldt
(in Werlie, v.
and
1
W.
von
Hum-
his letter to Wolf, 25) find in Aristotle is doubtless to be connect ed not so much with the place of his birth as with the characteristics of his generation and his individual The full-born bent of mind. Athenian Socrates exhibits traits far more singular and seemingly
of Aristotle's mother,Phaistis, but for Diogenes tells erroneoiTsly us she was a Stagirite by birth, and Dionysius says that she was a descendant of one of the Chalcis. This colonists from connection might account for the mention of a country house and garden at Chalcis in the testaThe stateun-Greek as" compared with his ment (DiOG. 14). own people and time than Ari- ment in Suidas, suh voce NiKdjiiaXos, that a person of that name stotle, and if the typical writings of Aristotle appear un-Greek in had written six books of 'larpiKk comparison with Plato's, still, on and one book of ^vcriKo. refers, the one hand, this is not true of according to our text, not to the his Dialogues, and, on the other father of Aristotle (of. Buhle, 83, hand, equally great divergencies Stahr, 84), but to an ancestor are to be found between men of the same name; though no
5
tell
how
how long
what personal relations resulted from it. knowledge have we as to the early development of his mind, or the circumstances or method of his education.^ The sole piece of information we have as
or
Equally
little
life is
Ammonius ^
in later
life
he was a
child,
and
to
own daughter
^
in marriage.
etc, cf. BUHLE, 1 sq. (lege Tpo((>rjs for (p-fifi-ns) 10 sq. Eobbe. * In his will (Diog. 16) Ari-
He
Administr.
1, vol.
ii.
280 K)
that the Asclepiad families practised their sons eK Traldwv in reading, writing, and avaT/xviv, does not help us much, as (apart from the question whether the information is fully credible) we do not know how old Aristotle was at his father's death. It is
mentions his mother and monument to be erected to her. Pliny (H. Nat. xxxv. 10, 106) mentions a picture of her which Aristotle had painted by Protogenes. There may have been many reasons why his father was not mentioned in the will. ^ Apparently a relative who had emigrated to Stagira, for his son Nicanor is called 2Ta7eipiT77s and oIkCios 'ApicrroTeKovs (Sext.
stotle
orders a
to
be placed
that Aristotle was for three years a pupil of Socrates and that he
doubtful
human
^
or animal
all
p. 89, n.
afterwards accompanied Alexander to India ? (Ps. Amnion, p. 44, 50, 48, V. Marc. 2, 5, Ammon.
Lat.U,12,U).
Aristotle in his will(DiOG. 12) directs that Nicanor is to marry
''
In
ARISTOTLE
but
it
growth.^
His entrance into the Platonic School ^ gives us our earliest reliable data on the subject. In his eighteenth
year Aristotle came to Athens
when she is grown charges him to take care of lier and her brothers, ws KalTraTrjp Sov Koi adeX^os he orders that the portraits of Nicanor, Proxenus, and Nicanor's motlier, which he had projected, should be completed, and that if Nicanor completed his journey successfully (r. infra), a votive offering he had promised should be set up in Stagira. These arrangements prove that Nicanor was adopted by Aristotle, and that Aristotle owed special gratitude to Nicanor's mother as well as to Proxenus, apparently similar to that he owed his own motlier, of whom a similar portrait is ordered. If we assume the truth of the story in the Pseudo-Ammonius it will most naturally explain the whole. Dionysius notes that Nicomachus was dead when
his (laughter
^
circle of
up
lie
Nicanor's death (DioG. 13). This Nicanor is probably the same Nicanor of Htagira whom Alexander sent from Asia to Greece to announce his consent to the return of the exiles at the Olym-
cf the pseudo-Aristotelian Rhet. ad Alex, i, 1421, a, 38, and G ROTE, p. 14). And the vow in Aristotle's will probably relates to a journey to Alexander's headquarters where he had given an account of his mission and been detained on service in Asia. It is probably the same Nicanor who was governor of Cappadocia under Antipater (Arrian ajmd Phot.
;
.
made away
Cod. 92, p. 72, a, 6) and who was with, in B.C. 318, by Cassander, for whom he had done good service on sea and land
to Plato. It might appear that, as Aristotle died at sixty-three, the son of his foster-parents would be too old to marry a daughter not then grown up but this does not follow. If Aristotle was a child at his father's death, and Proxe;
Aristotle
came
(Diodor. xviii. 64 sq. 68, 72, 75). The dates agree exactly with
of Pythias, as see p. 20, n. 3, infra. know nothing of the age at which Aristotle came to Proxenus, nor of the manner or place of his education, for it was probably not at Atarneus see above, p. 5, n. 5. 2 A silly story in Ps. Amm. 44, V. Marc. 2, and Amman. Latin. 11 relates that he was sent by the Delphic Oracle. Apollodor. ap. DioG. 9
what we know
to
whom
^
We
nus a young man, the latter might have left a son twenty or twenty-five years younger than Aristotle, and some ten years younger than Theophrastus (then
at least forty-seven) whom Pythias was to marry in case of
''
irapafiaKiTiv
Se
IlKdrwvi,
KoX
Sia-
for
avr^
Eume-
Koi
SeKa
4twv
avcTTavra.
iTTTO/caiSeKO
ira>v
yevSixevos.
We
have also the chronology of Dion} sius, who places his arrival
in the archonship of Polyzelos (366-7 B.C. 01. 103, 2), while the statement (F. Marc. 3, Ammon. Latin. 12) that he came in the archonship of Nausigenes (01. 103, 1) takes us to the middle of his seventeenth year instead Euseof the completion of it. bius in his ChroniGle knows that he arrived at seventeen, but places the event erroneously in 01. 104, 1. The statement of
he be Eumelus the Peripawhose riepl rris apxaias KcoficfiSias is quoted by a scholiast to iEschines' Timarch. (ed. Bekker, Abk. d. Berl. A had. 1836, Hist.-2}Ml. Kl.230, 39; cf. KosE, Arist. Lihr. Ord. 113), he would belong to the Alexandrine, or possibly even the post-AlexanIn no case, as drine period. above shown, can he merit our As to Epicurus and confidence.
Timffius vide p.
9, n. \, infra.
The
Eumelus (ajjud DiOG. 6) that he was thirty years old when he met Plato is combined by Grote (p.
3 sq.) with the accounts of Epicurus and Timaeus as to his dis-
Vita Maroiana finds it necessary to refute the story that Aristotle came to Plato in his fortieth year. The Latin Ammonius reproduces this in a still more absurd form, to which he adapts other parts of his story for he says that it was thought by many that Aristotle remained forty years with Plato. His translation xl annis immoratus est sub Platone probably means that the text of the
; '
'
archetype was
virh
youth (cf. infra), but without deciding between the two accounts. We have already
solute
UXdroiVi, or
4rpifiv,
&c.
If the latter
be sup-
seen
how
little credit
attaches to
Eumelus' account of Aristotle's age and manner of death (p. 2, n. 2) but the two statements are connected and fall together, for,
;
posed, the mistake might well have arisen by the dropping out of &V in the translator's MS. Plato himself was probably at the moment absent on his
1
second
Sicilian
journey
p.
(vide
as Aristotle
in
composed an elegy
memory of a fellow-student, Eudemus of Cyprus (p. 11, n. 4, infra), who went to Sicily with
Dion in 357 B.C. and was killed there, it follows that Aristotle, if he were thirty when he came to
Athens, would have been born several years before 384. We do
Stahr (p. 43) suggests that the abovementioned statement that he was three years with Socrates and after his death followed Plato (P^. ^ww. 44,50, V. Marc. 2, Ammon.
Zeller, Plato,
32).
Lat. 11, 12, Olympiod. in Gorg. 42) arose from a misunderstanding of this circumstance. The archetype may have contained the
ARISTOTLE
twenty years until the master died.^ It would have been of the greatest value if we could have known in detail something of this long period of preparation,
in which the foundations of his extraordinary learning
and of
been
laid.
important questions as to the movement and history of his mental development in absolute silence, and entertain us instead with all
life
manner
and character.
first
One
he
Another
being
service, afterwards,
Cf
p. 6, n. 3,
:
and Dionysius,
U\dTa}ui.
lit
suj)ra
a-va-radils
Pnz?/^.
Lv. XV.
Ti/A.aiov
2, 1 TTcDs av ris airoSd^aiTO Tov Tavpo/LLCviTov \4yovTos iv Tols IffTopCais, ado^ov Ovpas avrhv larpeiov Kal ras rvxovaas (hiatus) d\p rrjs 7f\iKias /cAeicrat.
Timffius
^
oUv
ry
irepl
iin-
made Plato's acquaintance in his twentieth year perhaps because Plato then returned from Sicily, perhaps because Aristotle had till then been of the school of
Isocrates,
arroXy, veov jxkv ovTa KaracpayeTv avrhv r)]v irarp^av oixriav, eireira 5e iirl rh (TTpareieaOai (Tvveucrdai, KUKUs 8e Trpdrrovra iv rOvrois iirl rh (papfxaKoiroiKuv iAOeiu, eTretra avaTreirrafidj/ov tov IlXdrcovos irepindrov iraffi, irapaXafi^Ty avrhv (leoe, according to Athen. -Trapa^aAcTv
by
Aristocles.^
Greater weight
rhv
irepliraTOv')
cf.
the
passage quoted in similar words, apud Athen. viii. 354, ajjud DiOG. x. 8, and less
closely a2?ud
1
same
^LIAN.
V.
H.
v. 9.
In the
first place, it is
with-
out any reliable authority. Even in antiquity no other testimony than Epicurus and Timseus is known, and except these two, none, as Athenasus expressly remarks, even of Aristotle's bitterest opponents mentioned these Timaeus's reckless slanstories. derousness, however, is well known, and he was embittered against Aristotle by his state-
credible writers who say that Aristotle devoted himself from his eighteenth year to his studies at Athens, but the other story is in itself most improbable. If Aristotle were no more than the (To<pi(Tr)]s dpaavs cv^ep-^s irpoir^T^s that Timaeus calls him, he might
oy\iiixaQ)]s
also.
But when we know that apart from philosophical greatness, he was the foremost man of learning of his time, and was also famous as a writer for his graces of style, we must think it unparalleled and incredible that his
thirst
first
for learning
should have
(not excepting Democritus and Nausiphanes, to whom he was under large obligations) whom he did not attack with calumnies
and depreciatory criticism (cf. DioG. X. 8, 13 Sext. Math. i. 3 sq. CiC. N. D. 1, 33, 93, 26, 73 Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. I. p. 946, n). Statements by such men, betraying as they do a tone of hatred, must be taken with great distrust and their agreement is no
;
property he could hardly have found means to live at Athens. Grote (cf. p. 6, n. 3, supra) does too much honour to Epicurus and Timseus when he treats their testimony as balancing the other. They are probably naked and
baseless
lies,
and therefore we
guarantee, for it is possible that Timseus copied Epicurus, or (as we may better think) that Epicurus copied him. Not only, however, have we against them the consensus of many far more
ought not even to infer from them with Stahr (p. 38 sq.) and
Bemays {Abh.
pMl.
d.
Brest.
i.
GesellscJiaft,
Hist.193), that
probably Aristotle practised medicine in Athens while he was natural studying philosophy.
10
dialectician
ARISTOTLE
accused
Aristotle
of
ingratitude
to
his
master.^
showy
and
set
ancients, re-
Neither Aristocles nor any of the trustworthy witnesses mention medical practice, and the two who do, refer to it in such a way as only to raise suspicion while Aristotle apparently reckons himself among tlie 'laymen,' jUt? rexvlrai, in medicine {Divin. 1,
;
^Elian,
DiOG. 2
a-jrecrrr]
Se
IWdTUPos
t'cuvov aireAaKV. 11.
eri
irepiouTOS' ooare
(prjalu
TLaKa9a'KeplTa7rcti\dpiayevpr]94vTa
TTju fiTfT^pa
iv. 9,
^and
so
tEliAN,
aj).
16;},
'
a. 6).
and Helladius
279,
p. 533,
Phot.
M\
XV.
2,
Aws
Tai
iv
. .
T^
.
avrov
. .
^Lfikicf xpevSe.
(pdcTKWV
TAeUTU>VTL
HAdrojvi /.I?; irapayeveadai. ret re ^L^Kia avTov SiacpOeTpai. Neither His of the charges is important. absence at the time of Plato's death, if that is true, may have had an easy explanation Plato, indeed, is said to have died quite unexpectedly (cf Zellee, Plato, The injury to Plato's p. 35). books, if it means a falsification of the text, is an obvious and absurd calumny. If, as is pos;
.
sible, it refers
Similarly b. Cur. Gr. Aff. v. 4G, p. 77, says Aristotle often attacked Plato while he was yet alive Philop. Anal. Post. 51 a, Soltol. in Arist. 228, p. 16, that he had especially opposed his and master's Ideal Theory Augustine, Civ. Dei. viii. 12, that he had established even then a numerous school. ' This occurrence is related by our sole authority (^LIAN, V. II. iii. 19, cf. iv. 9) in this way that when Plato was over eighty, and his memory was failing, Aristotle on one occasion,
CahI.
Theodohet,
Xenocrates
being
absent and
though it is keen and not always just, is no indication of any personal misunderstanding,
since to Aristotle
it meant only natural and impersonal polemics. Besides Aristocles, Diogenes (ii. also rejects Eubulides' 109) charges as a calumny.
^Ipeusippus ill, had gone with a band of his own pupils and started a debate with Plato, in which he drove the old man into a corner with such rude pertinacity that Plato withdrew himself from the halls of the Academy into his own garden, and it was
11
opposition to his
own
'
by
strangers.'
All these
data,
however,
are
could
not
possibly
first place,^
be
true,
for
chronological
reasons in the
and held
Probably, however.
peats and extends. For Aristides the Latin Ammonius (11) substitutes Aristocles but the Greek Pseudo- Ammonius (p 44 sq.) limits itself to the remark oh yap Ti 0VTOS rod UXdroivos auTCfKoBo/j.'qa'ev avrc^ rh AvKeiou 6
; .
:
XV. 2, 2 ; Tts 5' Uv ireicrdeLT] to7s vtt' 'ApLffTO^cvov rod jxovffiKov Xeyofievois
'Ap., o&s
2
Tivs
viroXa/xfidvovcri.
Cf.
iv
TTj
r^
^(qj
rod HXdrajyos
Kol ry
aTro5r]fA.ia
refuted
iu
yap
irKoLvri
(pT]cr\v
iiravicTTaadai Ka)
avroiKoSo^vovs
fielv
avTCf Tivas
irepiirarov
Phil. p. 81, 125. ^ When Plato returned his last journey Aristotle
was
;
Among
the
euiot
was
Aelian (iv. 9), who in reference no doubt to the words of Aristoxenus, says of Aristotle avTcpKod6fi7}(rev avr^ [Plato] SiaSo also the Vita Marrpifiiiv.
ciana, 3
'Ap.
;
under 24 (cf. p. 2, n. 2, sujjra, and Zeller, Plato, p, 30 sq.) is it (apart from other questions) likely that he could so early head a school against a master who was then at the height of
his
this are (a) Aristotle published several Platonic essays (cf. infra and Zeller, Plato, p. 26). For many reasons (especially perhaps because of their notable departure from the method of teaching laid down by Plato, cf. Zell. Plato, p. 517 sq.) it is unlikely
*
:
(Tx^^Vf'
irpuTOs
crreidrjs
i(rvKo<pdvTif](Te
koX
'Api;
vampov
rfKoAovOrjcrev
re-
f erringto
AEiSTiDES,i>e q^mtuorv. ii. 324 sq. (Dind.), who, however, does not refer to Aristotle by name any more than Aristoxenus, whose account he re-
and third
of
Plato's
Sicilian
12
ARISTOTLE
statement did not
refer
to
that
Aristotle
at
all.^
Elian's story as to driving Plato out of the Academy stands in contradiction with other and older ^ accounts
which show that Plato at that time had long removed his school from the open spaces of the Gymnasium of the
Academia
lieve of a
to his
own
gardens.
But besides,
it
ascribes
man of otherwise noble character except on the most conclusive proofs whereas here we have nothing but the testimony of a gossip-grubber, who is known to
:
repeat without discrimination things that are palpably untrue. Against the suggestion that Aristotle had by
journeys, Aristotle
(/y)
(cf.
infra)
their
genuineness
on
grounds
on the lines of Plato's Plicedo^ and Aristotle was probably still in the Platonic School when he wrote it, wliicli was long after
the third journey, since it is in memory of a friend who died
352 B.C.
Oorg.
16G,
(c)
in
that are solved by our view of their application to the Ciiprian Eudemus and Plato, instead of to the Rhodian Eudemus and Aristotle himself. In the corrupt last line, Bernays {Rh. Mvs. N. F. xxxiii. 232) reads iiowd^. He refers dvSp^s, &c., to Socrates;
xiv. and 895, Bbrgk, Lyr. Gr., p. 504) has preserved some verses of Aristotle's Elegy on Eudemus, which
Supiylement}).
(pi\ir]s
IBpixraro
[Plato]
fiSvos
t)
ivapyws
olKeio)
Index Herculanensis,
6, 5,
re
Aristoxenus
may
have referred
ws
Kal evSaificcu a/to yiverai aurjp. ov vvv S' eoTTt \afie7v obSevl ravra TTOrL
i.
ayados
re
to Heraclides himself; cf. ZelLER, Plato, p. 30, n. As to the Index Hercul. see ibid. p. 553.
2 In DiOG. ill. 5, 41 Zeller, Plato, p. 25, n.
;
cf
55) doubts
13
and been kept at a distance by him,' we could bring many statements which imply that the relation between
had
so
We
may
which negative, not only Elian's story and the other similar tales, but the whole theory that there was before
Buhle, p. 87, sees a proof this in the fact that Plato does not mention Aristotle, to which circumstance even Stahr,
'
of
p.
in
Socratie
dialogues
And
Kovs) and by David (ibid. 20, b, 16), that Aristotle was ashamed to mount the teacher's chair while Plato lived, and that this was the origin of the name ' Peripatetic' There is another theory (Philopon. 2it supra, 35, b, 2,
probably all Plato's works, except the Laws, were written before Aristotle
all.
David,
ibid.
25,
Ammon.
Pseudo-
came
to
Athens at
Ammon. p. 47, V. Marc. 5, Amman. Latin. 14) that the name of Peripatetics belonged
originally to
vi.
27
['Ap.] vTrbXiKa.ToivosToaov'Tov
i]yd(T6r},
when
T^s a7xiJ'oias
vir*
:
ws vovs
ttjs
avTOv irpoaayopeveSiarpifiris ffdai and Ps. Ammo7i. 44, says Plato called Aristotle's house oIkos
avayvdocTTOv
cf. also Zeller, Plato, p. 559. To the same tradition belong the very doubtful story cited in Zeller, Plato, p. 26, n., and the account of the
:
altar dedicated
inscription
with a laudatory by Aristotle to Plato onhis death (Anim. 46, Philopon. i.q.v., Schol. in Amat. 11, b, 29), which arose, no doubt, out of a mistranslation of the Elegy to Eudemus, p. 11, n. 4, mipra. * Such is the idea mentioned by Philopo]ms(w?^ svpra, 11, b, 23 sqq., where in 1. 25, lege ^Apiarore-
over that school after Plato's death, or rather that of Speusippus, Aristotle's followers were called Peripatetics of the Lyceum and the others Peripatetics of the Academy and that, in the end, the one school were called Peripatetics only, and the other Academics. The origin of this theory is doubtless Antiochus, in whose name Varro in CiC. Acad. i. 4, 17 tells an exactly similar story which indicates that the whole is only an invention of that Eclecticism,developed by Antiochus, which denied that there was any essential difference between Plato and Aristotle.
; :
14 Plato's death
ARISTOTLE
any breach between him and his
rest in their antiquity
scholar.
and
credibility,
remained with Plato twenty years, which plainly could not be true if, although he lived for
assert that Aristotle
that
So even in
is
years
contesting the
principles of the
and his own personal relation to him such as plainly shows how little the sentiment of respect and affection
for his great
their
philosophic
accentuated in the
So also we find that he was treated as a Platonist by contemporary opponents ;^ for Cephisodorus
sharpest way.
^
Vide
suina.
p.
6,
n.
3,
and
7,
p.
8,
n.
Ep. ad Amiii.
YlXdrcopi kuI
eTTTtt
i.
p.
738
'4us
(Tvvj]v
5ieTpi;|/e>'
seems to point to charges which his logical polemic against Plato had drawn down upon him, rh 8e KaOEth. N. 1. 4, init.
:
irwv
Koi
rpiaKOvra,
out'
ISiau
ovre
7re-
iiriffKeipacrOaL koI
(TXoAtjs
^
riyovfiepos
irus
\4yeTai,
(plhovs
Kaiirep
jToiriKws aipeaiv.
self
cf.
and the
Ka6'
ov<i
^i^
rh
eJvai
&.v5pas
S'
ti.u
elcrayayelu
ra
eYSr;.
do^eie
Tpo-novs SeiKuvfjiev
kuto.
(jyafiev
on
Xaws
fieKTiov
Koi
5e7u
iirl
eari ra
icaO^
ei'Syj
t^v
viroXrjrpiv
a(aTr]pLa
ye
ttjs
aX7]9eias
Kal ra
(j)i\o-
ras Ideas, and the like, Metaph. i. 9, 990, b, 8, 11, 16, 23, 992, a, 11, 25, c. 8, 989, b, 18; iii. 2, 997, b, 3, c. 6, 1002, b, 14 cf. Alex, and Asclep. on 990, b, 8 and Alex, on 990, b, 16, 991, b, 3, 992, a, 10.
;
V eluai
olKe7a avaipelv,
crdcpovs
aWoos re
aix<po7v
Kal
ovras-
yap ovroiv
^iXoiv ocriov Trpon/jLau cL\-f)deiap. Cf. Zeller, Plato, p. 512; cf. also Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.\. p. 971, as to Aristotle's own view of his duty to a teacher.
^
tV
of
Pr. Ev.
xiv. 6, 8.
16
Ideas.'
Macedonia.^
Again,
it is
years,
and immediately thereafter left the city for several presumably for no other reason than that then
for the first
time the
tie that
time broken.
Finally,
we
that Xenocrates
it is
and
probable
But in view of the known loyalty of Xenocrates and his unbounded reverence for Plato, it is
not to be supposed that he would maintain his relations
visit to
^lian
inde-
pendent a mind as Aristotle's would not give up its own judgment even in face of a Plato; that as time
^
20, n. 3, infra
^AKa5r]iJ.ias
Bop^opov 4u irpoxoais,
p.
obviously alluding to him the cases cited, Zeller, Plato, p. 364, n. ; and notes on 585, and later passages), p.
is
he
(cf.
whereas
in
Speusippus
cases.
is
named
pro-
to
parallel
This
Others have remarked that mentions Xenocrates, and that he avoids his name as if on purpose where
Aristotle almost never
bably indicates not ill-feeling, but rather a desire to avoid the appearance of personal conflict with one who was teaching beside him at Athens.
16
ARISTOTLE
went on he began to doubt the unconditional validity of the Platonic system and to lay the foundations of his
own and that he perhaps even many of the weak points of his
:
uncompromising criticism which we find him using later If a certain difference between the two men had on.^ developed out of such relations, or if Plato had not been
more ready than many others since, to recognise in his scholar the man who was destined to cany forward and to correct his own work, it would be nothing wonderful.
Yet that any such difference actually arose cannot be proved, and cannot even be shown to be very probable ^
while
we have
Aristotle brought on
intentional offence.
any open breach by ingratitude or The same facts make it very imIf he had
own during
so,
done
his
friendly relations
Platonic circle
moment when
On Even in the books Philosophy' {Arist. Fraym. 10, 11. p. 1475), apparently written
before
Plato's
death,
he
had
combated the Ideal openly Theory, and in the same treatise {Fragm. 17, 18) had maintained the eternity of the world.
2 have no right to ascribe to Plato and his circle of friends the later ideas of school-orthodoxy, in any such sense as to
We
suppose that the master could not tolerate the independence of such
a scholar as Aristotle. Besides, not to mention Heraclides and Eudoxus, Speusippus himself dropped the Ideal Theory, ^ The remark of the PseudoAmmonius that Chabrias and Timotheus prevented Aristotle from setting up a new school against Plato is absurd. Who could hinder him, if he chose ? Chabrias, moreover, died in 358 B.C. and Timotheus was banished from Athens for life in the followingyear,beingthenavery oldman.
;
17
his school,
it
follows that
from his eighteenth to his thirty-seventh year, we cannot well over-estimate the influence
of such a relation upon his course of thought. The effect of that education on Aristotle's philosophic system
discloses itself at every point.
The
himself 1 commemorated the moral greatness and lofty principles of the man whom the base have not even the
'
right to praise.'
obviously not prevent Aristotle from turning his attention at the same time to all other sources which might carrry him onward and help to satisfy
his insatiable
thirst for
knowledge.
We may safely
assume that he
did in fact employ his long years of preparation at Athens in busy acquirement of his marvellous learning, and also that he took a keen interest in
researches
in
it
natural
as
always treated
is
of secondary importance.
also possible
he
may
breaking
comioeting school. hear, for instance, that Aristotle taught Ehetoric in opposition to Isocrates ; ^ but we know that the great
up against him
We
>
J. ffT^^-^'/iJrsfoteles,
p. 12 mpra. !\'\P-
'i^>
Aristotle.
enmi
turpe,
siU ait
esse tacere
cum/orere Isocratem
disoipuloi^vm
videret,
nohihtate
...vmtavitrejjentetotamformam jrrope d^sc^pl^nce su<e [which sounds as if Aristotle had even then a school of his own, though
tionem
fucjit
VOL.
sajieJssim^ITeglT^^ "''
I.
18
orator's relations
ARISTOTLE
with Plato were no longer good and he attacked the philosophers.^ We have distinct that indications also which lead us to assign to this same
period the
writer
;
commencement
of Aristotle's activity as a
and the
time
he imitated his master, both in matter and form,^ shows clearly how completely he took on the impress of Plato's
and made the Platonic methods his own. In time, of course, and no doubt even before he left Athens, Aristotle acquired as a writer a more independent position and it is manifest that he had in reality outgrown the
spirit
;
came
visibly to an
lipimm, qui hunc Alexandra filio Again, ihid. doctorem accierit. 19, 62, Arist. Isocratem ipsum
lacessivit,
. . .
and
quis Arist. fuit ? porro Isocrati est adversatvs imIn Tusc. i. 4, 7, Cicero 2)eiu'ms ? assumes that Aristotle attacked Isocrates in his lifetime, which would be possible only in his first
acrio?'
residence at Athens, for when he returned in 335-4 B.C. Isocrates was many years dead. Cf QuiNEoque {Isocrate\ TiL. iii. 1, 14
.
Panath. 17 can hardly refer to Aristotle, because of the dates cf Spengel, Ahh. d. Bayer. Aliad. Cephisodorus, a pupil vi. 470 sq. of Isocrates, wrote a defence of his master against Aristotle, full of bitter abuse; v. Dionys. Be Isocr. c. 18, p. 577; Athen. ii. Aeistocl. 60, d, cf. iii. 122, b ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 24, Nu;
MEN.
xxiii.
ihid. xiv. 6, 8,
Themist. Or.
285,
c.
jam
'scholis
jwnieridianis . seniore Arist. j)r(P^W'^'^^ artem oratoriam coepit, noto qiiidem lllo,
.
with
KpaT7]v, so misplacing the story as of the time of the founding of the Lyceum. Cicero {Offic. i. 1, 4) speaks clearly of contests between Aristotle and Isocrates in his . life {de Arist. et Isocrate quorum uterque suo studio delec.
19
That event opens a new chapter of Aristotle's So long as Plato led the Academy, Aristotle would not leave it. When Speusippus took his place,
Aristotle had nothing to keep
him
first
in
Athens; since
contemplated the
which Athens would naturally have been the fittest place. Therefore he accepted, with Xenocrates, an invitation from Hermias, the lord of Atarneus and Assos,^ who had himself at one time belonged to Plato's school.
friend of both,^
and they
Thereafter Aristotle
was
for his
own
Hermias had
;
power of
it is
had
left
texts perhaps the ^vvayuy^ H^xpSiv seem to belong to the first Athenian period. ' This choice has caused surprise,
5,
who
that Aristotle went to Hermias after Plato's death. The opposite would not follow from the charge cited from Eubulides on p. 10, n. 1, s%qjra, even if that were true. Strabo names
a more orthodox continuation of his teaching. Speusippus was a much older man, was Plato's
nephew, had been brought up by him, had followed him faithfully for a long period of years, and was also the legal heir of Plato's garden near the \.cademy. Besides, we do not Know whether Plato did himself bequeath the succession or not. BoECKH, Hermias,' ^JA. d. Berl. Aliad. 1853, Hist. Phil Kl,
'^
Assosasthe place where Aristotle lived during this period. Cf p. ] 7, n. 2, su2Jra. Aristotle s enemies {ajfud DiOG. 3, Anon. Menag., and Suidas,
.
'A/>.),
was an immoral
IS
but this
impossible;
^
Boeckh, iUd.
187.
sius, etc.,
108.
= 345-4
B.C.,
in
'
p. 133 sq.
3 Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, Apollodor. aj). DiOG.
p.
9,
610,
and
the archonship of Eubulus : see ApoUod. and Dionys. iUd. ' Boeckh, iUd. 142, refuting Strabo, has shown this to be probable, though not certain.
c 2
20
of
ARISTOTLE
Hermias the
pliilosopher married
^
Pythias,
;
who was
his last-
and of
left
According to Aristocles
:
Cf.BOECKH,?Z;<VZ. 140.
HarpocraEtym.
her an
call
evvoiav
eyrj/J-ev
TiON, Suid.
31.,
s.
v.
'Epfxias,
&\X(i}5
fxhu
(Tcocppova
Kal
arvxova-au fievToi ovffav, Tas KaraXafioixTas crvfjicpopas rhv Strabo (^ut supra) a5X(phv avrr\s. says Hermias married her to Aristotle in his lifetime, which is negatived by the Letter, if Aristocl. {ibid. 4, 8) genuine. says tliat Aristotle was accused in his lifetime of having flattered her brother to win Pythias, and
ayaOT]y
Sm
also that Lyco, the Pythagorean, told a foolish story of Aristotle sacrificing to her after her death I>iog. (v. 4) caps as Demeter. the sacrifice this by placing immediately after his marriage. Lucian {Eun. c. 9) talks of sacricf. a like hint ficing to Hermias
;
Diog. (6) says he had a mon(whose inscription he Hermias at cites) erected to Delphi. A contemporary lampoon on this by Theocritus of Chios (a witty rhetorician of the Isocratean school and local leader of ant i- Macedonian politics) is noticed by DiOG. 11, ARISTOCL. at supra, and Plut. DeLxil. 10, p.
ument
603
;cf.
Muller, Hist.Gr.
p. 15, n. 1.
ii.
86,
and supra,
Aristotle
also dedicated
to
Hermias the
in
Suidas,
s. V. 'Ap. 'Ep^i'as, and Hesych. call her his daughter, the untrustworthy Aristippus (apud DiOG. 3) Both are dishis concubine. proved by the fact that Hermias was a eunuch (for the statements of Suid. Hesych. and Anon.
Menag.
cilable
with Demetr.
De Moo.
293). Aristocles ajj. Eus. xv. 2, 8 sq. cites a letter of Aristotle to Antipater, and a book by Apellicon of Teos relating to Hermias and Aristotle, and says that
Pythias
Strabo
was
the
sister
adopted daughter of
(xiii.
and Hermias.
DiOG.
Hist.
V. 1.
ap.
i.
Qr.
589
c,
citing
Macedonian Court ^
old,^
The
him
have no reliable testimony as to the special reasons which led Philip to think of Ariin
Mytilene.'""'
We
stotle.^
entirely
ing her a kraipa; SuiDAS and the Anon. Menag.), yet he must have treated her as his wife, and his will speaks of her with honour, provides for her, and begs his friends iTrifieXcTadai
.
.
ut sujjra. The Schol. in Arist. 28 says Aristotle was at Alexander's Court at Plato's death, but this is obviously wrong.
2 Cf. Geiee, Alexander Aonst. (Halle, 1856).
^
und
fjLuriadevTas
'6ri
ifiov,
kuI
'EpTrvAAiSos,
6.v5pa
Diog.
says fifteen,
which
Kol
iav
jSouATjrat
must be an
(cf.
a date
Stahr,
p. 85).
(DiOG. 13). As to Aristotle's daughter we know from Sext. Math. (i. 258), the Anon. Menag. and Suidas s. v. 'Ap., that after Nicanor she had two husbands, Procles of Sparta, and Metrodorus the physician; by the former she had two sons who were scholars under Theophrastus, by the latter a son, Aristoteles, who was commended (being then probably young) by TheoSoOfi
*
i.
1, 9.
5 Stahr (p. 84, 105, A. 2) is not averse to the view that Aristotle first went back from Mytilene to Athens, but none of our biographers know anything of it. On the contrary, Dionys., ut sn/pra, expressly says he went from Mytilene to Philip. Aristotle in a fragment of a letter
in his
Eloc. 29, 154, ew ^ikv ^A6r]v(av els 'S.to.yeipo ^KBov 5i^ Thv fiaffi\4a rhv fieyav e/c Se '^rayeipwu its 'Ad^,vas
ap.
Demetr. Be
:
says
iyitJ
in battle (Ari2,
stocl. ap.
Eus, XV.
s.
10
DiOG.
29
Suidas
v.
@6i)p.
and
NiKd/x,,
confirmed by the terms of Theophrastus' will, apud DiOG. v. 51). The six books of Ethics and the work on his father's Physics,
ascribed to him by Suidas, therefore very doubtful.
are
' This date is given by ApolLOD. ap. DiOG. 10, and Dionys.
Sm rhv xetyWiij/a rhv fieyav, but this jocular expression, even if the letter is genuine, proves nothing, as it is clearly meant, not as an exact historical statement, but as a rhetorical antithesis between the termini of his journeys, leaving out the intermediate points. * According to a well-known story, Philip had told Aristotle,
22
ARISTOTLE
without information as to the kind of education he gave the young and ambitious prince, and the influence he
to
assume that
before Alexander's birth, that he hoped he would make a great man of him(?r. the letter />. Gell.
is certainly Philip could not have written in these extravagant terms to a young man of
ix. 3),
spurious,
not certain that any are trustworthy. Plutarch \Alex. c. 7 sq.) praises Alexander's thirst for knowledge, his delight in books and learned conversation, and his passion for the poets and
historians of his people.
He
as-
27,
who had
had no
chance
distinguish himself; and, to again, if he had destined him to be his son's instructor from
birth,
he
to
2.
him
109,
would have brought Macedonia before 01. But the prince, who
was deeply interested in science and art, and no doubt well informed of what was going on in
notice of Aristotle after he had become one of the most distinguished of Plato's school, though little weight attaches to Cicero's statement to that effect {De Oral. iii. ;>5, 141). It is also possible tliat tlirough his father, Aristotle had relations with the Macedonian court, and he may himself, as Stahr (p. 33) suggests, have been acquainted in his youth with Philip, who was the youngest son of Amyntas and about his own age. There was a work, or perhaps a section of a larger work, On the Education of Alexander,' by the Macedonian historian
' '
well-known letter (ji. v. ap. Gell. 5, quoting Andronicus, and ap. SiMPL. Fliys. 2 b), in which Alexander chides Aristotle for
XX.
publishing
trines,
and
Athens,
those
not understand them. Plutarch also connects Alexander's fancy for medicine, which he sometimes tried personally on
his
would
friends,
with
Aristotle's
We
Ilepl fiaaiKeias,
and
'Tirhp 'AiroiKwv,
(Alex. 8)
Marsyas (SuiD.
s.
v.
Mapo-.; cf.
says Aristotle revised the text of the 7Zm<^ for Alexander. As fellowpupils of Alexander are named Marsyas (Suid. Mapa.), CalHsthenes (Justin, xii. 6; cf. Plut.
MuLLER,
sq.).
it
morabilia (Geier, iUd. 11 DiOG. vi. 84)o Yet the accounts we have of it are very scanty, and it is
Alex. 65; DiOG. v. 4 Arrian. but vide Geier, Alex. 10 Seript. 192 sq.), and perhaps Cassander (Plut. Alex. 74). At
;
iv.
23
that influence was important and beneficial, even if we had less distinct testimony as to the respect of the great
to the king.^
Alexander
was not only the invincible conqueror, but also a farHe was ambitious seeing ruler, ripe beyond his years. establish the supremacy, not of Grecian arms only, to
but also of the Hellenic culture. He withstood for years the greatest temptations to overweening pride to
man could
still
be exposed.
spirit, in
other world-con-
querors in nobility of
And
who
formed his apt intelligence by scientific training and fortified by sound principles his natural instinct for all
that was great and noble.^
Aristotle himself appears to
have made a kindly use of the influence which his position gave him, for we hear that he interceded with the king for individuals and even for whole cities.^
the same time Alexander
met
iyevovro
Opafifievos
rcKfiripiov.
6 /xevToi
irphs
<pi\o(To(piav
ifiireipvKiDs
ott'
koI
avrcp
crvvT-
apxris
Cv^os
^LIAN.
V.
H.
iv. 19).
but cf. 52. The V. 39, fabulous stories as to Alexander's youth, preserved by the pseudoCallisthenes, may be ignored. 1 'Apto-ToreATj Plut. Alex. 8 eavfidCo^v iv apxfi Koi ayaircou ovx rjTTov, CDS avrhs eAeye, rov irarphs, &s Sr eKer^/oi/ yuej/ ^ajv, 5i^ rovrov Se KoAws C^v, varepov Se vTroTrT6Tepov eax^v [v. infra], ovx ^o'tc iroiricrai Ti KaKbv, aXX' at (^iKo<ppo(Tvvai t5
DiOG.
ovk i^eppvr] rrjs ypvxvs, as his relation to Anaxarchus, Xenocrates, and the Indian phikoX irSdos
viii.
106, d.).
That he did not act in practice on Aristotelian principles (Plut. Virt. Alex. i. 6, p. 329;
exovaai
irphs
DeOYSEN, p. 99, 2 Hellen. i. b, 12 sq.) proves nothing to the contrary. ' Fs. Amm. 46, V. Marc. 4, Jlww. Zif. 13,-^LIAN, F. ^.xii.54.
cf.
StAHE,
d.
GescJi.
24
ARISTOTLE
latter
Of the
had at
we
thank him
must naturally
cannot afterwards have been resumed in any regular way, for in the immediately
following years the precocious prince took a most active
1
So Plut. Alex.
33,
3,
c. 7, cf.
Adv.
1126,
and
Ammon.
47, V. Marc. 4, Ammon. H. Nat. vii. 29, ^LiAN. V. IF. iii. 17,xii. 54, 109, Valer. Max. v. 6, ascribe the re-
monument was erected to in consequence on the Acropolis. The story may be suspected of resting on a spurious letter; yet Diog. (6) also says ^-qdi 5e
that a
him
Sri irpefffi^vovTos avrov irphs ^ikiinroy virhp ^ Kdrivaioov a-xoKapxris iy^vTO ttjs
filois,
storation of Stagira to Alexander. Plutarch, however, seems on the whole better informed, and is confirmed by the expressions of Aristotle and Theophrastus themselves cf. p. 25, n. 2, infra. Plut. {Adv. Col. 32, 9) and Diog-. (4) say that Aristotle also framed laws for the restored city, which is hardly credible. Dion (^r. 47) relates that he had to contend with great difficulties in the restoration, of which he complains in a letter, which may or may not be genuine. His work did not last long, for
;
iv
vtt'
^KKahriixia
St)
a-xo^rjs "EevoKpdTrjs
ikOSpTa
avrhv koI
deaadfievou
kK4(Tdai. irepi-
irarou rhv iu Au/ceioD- This cannot be true as stated, for at Speusippus' death, 339 B.C., Aristotle had long been Alexander's tutor, and at that date there could be Ho question of embassies to Macedonia. Stahr's theory (p. 67, 72) of an embassy in Aristotle's first residence at Athens is untenable.
The story may relate to the two years between the battle of Chgeronea and Philip's murder, when
already influential at the Macedonian Court, might by
Aristotle,
Dion (^ihid.) and Strabo (vii. f r. 35) describe Stagira as uninhabited that it succeeded for the time is
:
47,
and
in
V.
Ma/rc.
and
Ammon.
his intercession have done some service to Athens which Hermippus could describe by some such term as irpea^eveiv. The favour Alexander showed to the Athenians may have been partly due to Aristotle's influence (Plut, Alex.
G.
25
campaigns
though that
circumstance does not exclude the possibility of some continuance of their intellectual pursuits in the intervals
of leisure.^
drawn to the city of his birth. ^ At an earlier period he and his pupil had already left Pella.^ After Alexander ascended the throne, Aristotle must still have remained some time in the north. But with the beginning of the great war with Persia, the reasons that had bound him to Macedonia came to an end, and there was no longer anything to keep him away from that city, which
offered at once the
'*
and the
probably for the different stories as to the length of his tutorship, given by Dionys. as eight years (his whole residence in Macedonia), and by Justin (xii. 7) as five years, which is itself too long. 2 That the last period before his return to Athens was spent in Stagira, where his family house
seum, near Mieza. Stahr (104) takes this to be near Stagira, but Geier (Alexander und AHstot. 33) shows it to be S.W. of
Pella, in
*
Emathia.
The fragment quoted p. 21, n. 5, says it was the Thracian winter that drove him from Stabut this could scarcely be the chief reason. ^ The Ps.^ww^m. 47, says Aristotle was, after Speusippus' death, called to Athens by the Athenians, or, according to V. Marc. 5, by the Platonic school, the leadership of which he took over in common
gira,
was
(cf. p. 3, n, 2),
is
assumed
fragment quoted p. 21, n. 5, the genuineness of which is not beyond doubt. He must have treated Stagira as his home, since in his will (DiOG. 16) he
in the
with Xenocrates
this bio-
orders
offering for Nicomachus to be erected there. His second wife was of Stagira (v. p. 20, n. 3), and Theophrastus owned land in the city (Dioa. v.
52),
the votive
graphy, however, contain at this point a chaos of fables. The Ps. Amnion, says Aristotle taught after this call in the Lyceum, had afterwards to fly to Chalcis, went thence again to Macedonia, accompanied Alexander on his Indian expedition, collected in his travels his 255 forms of government, returned after Alexander's
26
ARISTOTLE
He returned to Athens^
for his
in
Olymp. 111.2
(b.c.
335-4)
left
work
in that city
but
what he accomplished in that short interval borders on Even if we may assume that he had the incredible.
already in great part completed the preparatory work
for his philosophy,
all
his systematic
life.
period of his
The Latin. Ammon. and the Vita Ma^rciana 8) send him with Alexander to
and returning home after the war, and after all this they make him start teaching in the Lyceum, ily to Chalcis and die there,
twenty-three years after Plato,
restored after the destruction of Thebes in the summer of 335, and that Alexander did not start on his march into Asia till the spring of 334, For the other view the calculation of Dionys, {see next note) may be quoted, but it is probable that this is
The
collection
of
polities
is
in
noticed also by Ammon, Categ. 5, b; David, Schol. in An. 24, a, 34 Ps.-PoEPH, ibid. 9, b, 26 Anon.
;
Alexander's campaigns
merely his own deduction from the years given by Apollod. 01. Ill, 2, for the arrival in Athens; 01. 114, 3, for his death; therefore, 01. 114, 2, for the
flight to Chalcis.
2
Dionys. ut supra
iaxo^a-
ad Porpk. apud Rose, Ar. xjseud. 393. To seek any grains of truth in this confusion would be lost
time.
'AAe^duSpov reXevTTjv, iirl K(f)i(roSiapov &PXOPTOS, airdpas eh XaXKiSa v6<r(f reXevTa. As Alexander died June 323, and Aristotle in autumn
(cf. p. 37), this reckoning will be exact if Aristotle came to Athens in the autumn of 335 and left in the autumn of 323. It would also coincide if Aristotle went to Athens in spring 334 and to Chalcis in summer 322, which,
322
Ill, 2, but do not indicate whether Aristotle came in the first or second half of the year, i.e. end of 335 or spring of 334. For the latter it may be argued that the hostility of Athens to Alexander was only terminated 9,nd the Macedonian influence
01.
naming
however,
as
is
is
otherwise unlikely,
at p. 36, n.
1
,
shown
infra.
27
and strenuous labour went on his work as a teacher, since he now began to compete with his great master on a
new
school.
The
open spaces of the Lyceum were the resort that he chose for his hearers.^ He was wont to converse with his
up and down in that gymnasium between the rows of trees and from this custom his
scholars as he walked
;
name
of the
'
Therefore,
so limited, and they were called oi e/c (or ttTrb) rov irepiirdrov (or 01 iK tSov wepiiraTwu, StrABO, xiii. 1, 54), as the other schools were called ol airh rrjs 'A/coStj/uios, or
01 airh TTjs (Troas
iii.
V. 352.
(v.
ap. Diog. 2, etc.; Qi\(^. Acad.S..^, 17; Gell. N. A. XX. 5, 5; Diog. i. 17; Galen. IT. ijJiil. c. 3 Philop. in q. V. Schol. in Ar. ii. b, 23 (cf. in Categ. Schol. 35, a, 41 sq. Ammon. in q. v. Porph. 25, 6 David, in Categ. 23, b, 42 sq., and p.l3,n.3 supra) with David, Schol. in Ar. 20, b, 16; Simpl. in Categ. 1 fin. That this derivation is correct rather than the opposite view of Suidas (s. v.
2
; ;
;
Hermippus
181
Math.
vii.
The acroamatic instrucwhich was intended only for those who were tried and well prepared, occupied the mornlectic.
tion,
ing;
the
exoteric
.
lectures,
to
the nepiTraros of the Lyceum as the meeting-place of the school is proved, first, by the form of the word, which can be derived only from the verb, and also by the fact that the word IleptTroTos in the earliest times was not confined to the Aristotelians (v.
p. 13, n. 3)
;
which the public was admitted, the afternoon (cf Quintil. iii. 1, pomeridianis scholis Ar. 14,
jjroieipere
Qivos,
artem oratoriamccepit).
ew-
though
later it
was
the latter the ^iiKivhs Trepliraros utroque enim tempio'e amhulans disserehat. It is impossible, however, to address a large audience therefore walking
;
28
as
ARISTOTLE
had already happened more or
less
some inquiry
detail.^
through
with
scientific
accuracy of
difficulties
On
wherever these
an alternative method. ^
It is this,
10,
and not
:
is
eTreiS^
iyeuoyro
speaking of Polemo
^Aeye
oi/Se KaQi^cou
irphs
Se eTre-
The continuous lecture on a definite theme is expressed by irphs deaiv Acyeiv a more cursory treatment by iTrix^ipeiu (cf.
:
not
a good
witness, since what he appears to state of Aristotle's later time seems to be taken from a source relating to the earlier period of contest with Isocrates (cf. p. 17, n. 3). It is probable, however, from Aristotle's Rlietorio itself that in the oral philosophic teaching rhetoric was not forgotten, and Gell., ut supra, speaks expressly of rhetorical
Diog. 3
eyv/jLva^e
piKws
the Oeffis being a general topic, not a particular question (cf. CiC. Top. 21, 79, Up. ad Att. ix. 4 QuiNTlL. iii. 5. 5. X. 5. 11 and Feei, Qucest.
eiraffKcou,
;
29
any popular lectures addressed to large audiences, that is referred to in tlie story that he received in the morning a small and select circle only and in the afternoon
everyone
freely.^
At
we must
also
haviug on
many
sides a
common
life.
For friendship
its
by word and
act a tender
and
we hear
Academy, he was wont to gather his scholars about him at common meals and that he introduced a plan of definite regulations for these meetings and for the whole
of their
common
life.^
needed
him by
Macedonian
and
especially
Prot.
150).
In hae Ar.
7wn ad
tenuiter
pMlosnpJiorum
morem
dissenmdi, sed ad copiam rhetorum in utramque partem, ut ornatins et uheritis did posset, Neither says whether exercuit. the earlier or the later school of rhetoric is meant: probably both;
cf.
which may refer, however, to the work mentioned p. 99, n. l,i^r; and Diog. (4) preserves a hint of his arrangement for the internal government of the school by offichanging every ten days. Cf Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. i. 839, n, 1. ^ According to ^lian ( V. H. iv. 19), Philip gave him ample means to pursue his investigacers
tions, ttKovtov dj/ej/Se^, especially
Gell.
ihid.
i^corepiKo,
dice-
rJietoricas meditationes facultatemque argiitiarum cirAli'iimque rerum notitiam illas vero exotericonducehant
bantur, quce
ad
and Gell.
common meals
v6aoi (rvixiroriKoi,
in Natural History Athen. (ix. 398) speaks of Alexander devoting 800 talents to that work ; and Plin. (H. Nat. viii. 16, 44) says Alex, placed under his orders all the hunters, fishers, and fowlers of the kingdom, and all overseers of the royal forests, ponds, and live stock, numbering many thousands. Pliuy'g story,
;
80
ARISTOTLE
stories of the ancient writers
we may
to be, and however wealthy suppose Aristotle himself to have been by fairly
it
may seem
inheritance/
is
which he probably could not have commanded but for such kingly assistance. The deep and wide acquaintance
with the writings of his people which his
disclose to
own works ^
us could
;
and on this head we are expressly was the first who accumulated a great Such works, again, as the Politeiai and the library.^ collection of foreign laws could not be produced without laborious and no doubt costly investigations. The books
possession of books
told that he
on Natural History especially and the kindred treatises presuppose researches such as no one could have brought he had at his disposal or could set more than the resources of a private individual. It was therefore a happy circumstance that the man whose grasp of mind and rare powers of obto completion unless
in action something
however, is disproved (v. BranDis, p. 117 sq., and Humboldt, Xosm, ii. 191, 427) by the fact that with a few exceptions, such as elephants, Aristotle shows no
hampered by poverty.
worthlessness
n. 1
^
of
the
of
p. 9,
and
3.
to
His will proves nothing as earlier years, but apart from the calumnies of his oppo'
his
Besides the extant works, we know of others concerning Khetoric, Poetry, and the History of Philosophy, ^ Strabo, xiii. 1, 54, p. 608 irpwTos wu 'la/xev avvayay^v fiifixia
:
nents, as to his pride and love of display, all we know of his way of life, his choice of residence, his marriage, and the means necessary for his extensive
fiaa-i-
Aeas
fii^Xioe^Kr)s
i.
avuTa^iv.
(iii.
Cf.
Athen.
3, a.
Gell.
81
marked him as the ablest founder of empirical and of systematic learning, should have been so favoured by fortune that the needful equipment for his great calling was not denied him.
science
In the
good relations
were disturbed.^
The
of the
may
many
necessary for
pugnant to the Hellenic traditions and to the self-respect of independent Greeks, and at the harsh and passionate excess into which the young conqueror was betrayed when he was surrounded by flatterers, embittered by personal opposition and made suspicious by treachery .^ There would be no lack of tale-bearers to carry gossip
true and false to the king, for the learned and philosophic
members
game
of their ambitions.
As
friendly, it
also,
seems he was prejudiced against Aristotle"* because of the close relations between the philo-
But the
^
Cf. p. 23, n. 1, su^ra. The exchange of letters which is cited as a proof of their friend-
ship is unreliable, because we do not know how much is genuine. 2 Plutarch (cf. p. 23, n. 2, supra) says Aristotle was dissatisfied with Alexander's whole political idea of the fusion of the Greeks and Orientals,
For examples v. Plut. Alex, c. 52, 53, Areian, iv, 9-11. ^ Cf. Plut. Ihid. 74 (though that is after the death of Callisthenes)
;
;
as
to
;
Antipater,
cf.
32
ARISTOTLE
came through the action
The
philosopher to the
new
way
them
the pointed
in
which he vaunted
his inde-
pendence and drew upon himself the eyes of all the malcontents of the army the importance he assumed to
;
he gave himself accordingly, had long caused the king This made it to look on him with anger and mistrust.
the easier for his enemies to persuade the king of his
placed Alexander's
Callisthenes lost his
life
in
^
the
life
In the heat of his anger the king's suspicions turned against Aristotle^ also, for he had brought up Oallison, Cassancler, was a pupil of Aristotle (PLUT.^te. 74), by the letters of Aristotle to Antipater (Aristocl. ajnid Eus. Pr. Ec. xv. DiOG. 27 Demetr. Eloc. 2, 9 225 Jj^LiAN, V. II. xiv. 1), and
;
;
writers,
and of modern 23, 2 Stahr, Arist. 1. 121 sq. Droysen, Gescfi. Alex. ii. 88 sq. Grote, Hist, of Greece, xii.
Qu.
vi.
; ;
;
290
^
sq., etc.
jj;^
jg
highly improbable he
especially
pater
is named as chief executor in Aristotle's will, (7j;^ DiOG. 11. The false story of his complicity based is in Alexander's death on this circumstance (?;. in-
was an accomplice, though w^e cannot say how far he was to blame for exciting by reckless talk his younger friends,
^ Alex, writes to Antipater (Pltjt. Alex. 55) ol fihv iraldes vTrh T(i/ MaKeSoucou KareAevaOrjaav top Se (ro(pLar7]v [Callisth.] y<i} KoAdaco Kal ruvs iifireij.\pai/Tas avrhv koX tovs inroSexoixfvovs tols TroAeci tovs ifxol iTn^ov\evovTas. Accord:
fro).
6.
p. 1043,
Qu. conv.
i.
6. p.
623
ArriAN,
18 sq.;
10-14
ing to Chares
(ajj.
Plut.
ihid.),
434 d
Tusc.
Theopheast.
10, 21
;
ap.
ClC.
he had at
tirst
intended to try
ill.
Seneca, Not.
33
him
reckless
So
far
princely pupil's
ander meant to kill Aristotle and Antipater is merely a rhetorical exaggeration. * Plut. iUd. Aerian, iv. 10, 1 DiOG. 4 SuiD, KaXKiae.
;
Arrian (vii. 27) and I. Pliny {H. Nat. xxx. 16) mention it, but, like Plutarch, treat it as an invention. Xiphilinus (Ixxvii. 7, p. 1293) says the Emperor Caracalla deprived the Peripatetics in Alexandria of
gonus
vii.
Plutarch says this expressly n. 1, supra), and the story in Diog. 10, that Alexander, to mortify his teacher, took
'
their privileges on account of the alleged guilt of Aristotle. ^ The disproof of the charge (cf.
(of. p. 23,
Stahr, Ar.
SEN,
rests,
i.
136
sq.
and Droy-
contrary, sees in the king's kindness to Xenocrates, a consequence of Aristotle's teaching. Philoponus {a2md Arist. Meteor ol. ed. Ideler, i. 142) cites a reputed letter of Alexander to Aristotle from India, which proves nothing. * The earliest witness to this story is a certain Hagnothemis {apud Vjj^JT.Alex. 77) who is said to have heard it from King Anti-
i. 705 sq,) apart from its moral impossibility, on these grounds \a) Plut. ihid. shows expressly that the suspicion of poisoning first arose six years after Alexander's death, whenit afforded the passionate Olympias a welcome pretext to slake her hatred against Antipater's family, and to excite public opinion against Cassander who was said to have administered the poison (Z>) equal suspicion attaches to the testimony of Antigonus, which must belong to the time when he was at enmity with Cassander, though we do not know whether he made any charge against
Gescfi. d. Hellen.
VOL.
I.
34
ARISTOTLE
For the unexpected news of the sudden death of the dreaded conqueror called out in Athens a wild excitement against the Macedonian rule, which, as soon as the news was fully confirmed, broke into
open war. Athens put herself at the head of all who were willing to fight for the freedom of Greece, and before the Macedonian regent Antipater was fully prepared, he found himself beset by superior forces, which he only succeeded in mastering after a long and risky
From the first this struggle in the Lamian War.^ movement threatened, as was to be expected, the prominent members of the Macedonian party. Aristotle
Aristotle;
Aristotle,
is
(c)
it
is
significant
ander's
service,
and
intrusted
.
whom
no calumny
amiss, such as Epicurus, Tima3us, Demochares, Lyco, etc., know nothing of the charge
with important missions (cf p. 5, the (It) finally, n. 7, supra) rumour of Alexander's poisoning
;
complished by water from the Nonacrian spring i.e. the Styx a proof that we are not dealing with history; {i^ the accounts Arrian and Plutarch give us from the court chronicles as to
the course of Alexander's illness do not in any way suggest poison (/) if Aristotle's motive was the fate of Callisthenes, that could hardly have caused in him a hatred that would lead six years later to murder, nor could he, after so long a time, have had
is refuted by the movement of Alexander's events afterwards. death was the signal for an outbreak in Greece, which in the Lamian war brought Antipater himself to great straits. Anyone acquainted with the politics of the day would clearly foresee such a result. If Antipater were not as much taken by surprise as everyone else was by the king's death, he would have made preparations either to stem or to head the rising. If he had been known as the author of that which the Greeks acclaimed as the beginning of freedom, they would not have begun their revolt by attacking him and if any part in it had been attributed to Aristotle, he would not have had to fly from Athens.
; 1
any fear as to
(_^)
his
own
safety
For
details, see
i.
Droysbn,
sq.
it is
own
Gesoh. d. Hellen.
59
86
but, in any case, ; Alexander and his friendship with Antipater were so well known, his own name was so famous, and his personal enemies, no doubt, so many, that he could not escape attack. The charge brought
his relation as tutor to
against
him
in itself baseless
enough
must
it
But
Aristotle found
the
*
rising
storm.^
He
escaped to
Eu-
According to Aristocl, ajj. Eus. Pr. Ev. XV. 2, 3, Demochares (doubtless Demosthenes' nephew, de quo cf. Cic. Brut. 83, 286: Be
iii.
23, 95 Seneca, De Ira, 2; Plut. Demosth. 30; Vit. Orat. viii. 53, p. 847, and SuiDAS) had alleged that letters of Aristotle's had been found
Orat.
ii.
23,
which were
hostile to Athens;
that he had betrayed Stagira to the Macedonians, and that after the destruction of Olynthus he had betrayed to Philip the richest citizens of that city. As the last two are impossible, the first is probably untrue, as Aristocles himself recognised.
^ The charge was brought by Demophilus on the instigation of the Hierophant Eurymedon,
related
the deification of Hermias, and alleged as proofs the poem noticed (p. 20, n. 3), and the alleged sacrifice (p. 20, n. 1) cf. Athen. xv. 696 a, 697 a;
to
:
may
65) suggests, out of his own fancy, nvh. 56yju.ara rrjs ^i\o(TO(pias avTov & iuSfiKxau cli/ai aaefirj oi
i.
'Aer}va7oi.
both, belonged to that school is not sufficient proof. have still less ground to accuse the Academic school of having any share in it. 3 His remarks that 'he would not give the Athenians a second chance of sinning against philosophy,' and that ' Athens was the
We
D 2
ARISTOTLE
boea,^
where he had a country house, to which he had sometimes retired before,^ and his enemies could only To Theophrastus ^ inflict on him unimportant insults.^
he gave over his teaching work at the Lyceum, as a But it was not given substitute during his absence.
place spoken of by
5'
e'Trl
Homer where
the
what we ad Amm.
Chalcis.
tind in
i.
Dionys. Lp.
that Aristotle
5,
3,
(rvK(f),
in allusion to
having
fled to
iELiAN,
p.
iii.36;
EusTATH.
1573
;
in
H
V.
120,
Ammon.
48
Marc.
last
8;
Amman. Latin.
17, the
not possible to assume (with Stahr, i. 147) an earlier emigration of Aristotle to Chalcis, on the authority of the statement of Heraclides that
Aristotle
them in a letter to Antipater. Favorinus, apud DiOG. 9, says the Homeric hne occurred in a written Apologia,
mentioned placing
was
living
8'
['E-TTiKoupov]
eis
KoAo-
which is known also to the Anoyi. Menaq. and to Athen. xv. 697 a, both of whom doubt its genuine-
For Aristotle's
flight
was
One does not see why ness. Aristotle, once in safetjs should write a useless defence. It was no doubt a rhetorical exercise in imitation of the Socratic Ajwlogia (cf
the fragment given by Athenseus with Plat. ApoL 26 d sq.). 1 Apollodor. ajmd DiOG. 10 is made to say that this was in 01. 114, 3, i.e. in the latter half This is improbof 322 B.C. able, for Strabo (x. 1, 11) and Heraclides ap. DiOG. x. 1 speak as if he lived a considerable time in Chalcis and besides it is more likely that the attack on Aristotle happened in the first uprising against the Macedonian party than that it was begun after Antipater's decisive victories in Thessaly, and that Aristotle fled in good time instead of waiting through the whole of the Lamian war. Probably, therefore, he left Athens late in the summer of 323, and Apollodorus only said
;
only to the danger that threatened him at Athens, which arose only on Alexander's unexpected death; and he cannot therefore have gone to Chalcis before the news reached Athens, Either in the middle of 323. Heraclides or Diogenes must be
due
inexact.
.
The Pseudo-Ammonius
(cf p. 25, n. 5 su^jra) and David lSc?ioL in Ar. 26 b. 26) assign im-
possible dates.
2
Cf.
Strabo,
x.
1,
11,
p.
448.
3 In a fragment of a letter to Antipater probably of this time
(ajj.
^LIAN,
V.
H.
xiv. 1,
cf.
p.
44, n. 4 infra)
mention
e^vTwv
makes
;|/7j^i(r-
(101.
What
ment,
S)V
cKpyprjixai
vvv.
privilege
we do not know.
If it
it
may
37
Aristotle
to
In the
B.c.^,
in the
summer
of 322
he
which he had long suffered.^ two great contemporaries he survived Alexander by less than a year, and predeceased Demosthenes only by a short interval. His
succumbed
So
it
to a disease from
chanced that
of his
body
is
His
last
will is preserved to
and
it is
monument
it
of his
^ Apollod. ap. D10G..IO, V. Marc. 3, Ammon. Latin. 12, and Dion. Mp. ad Amm. i. 5, give
and because
It
was
about the time of Demosthenes' only in JElias Cretensis, p. death (Apollod. ibid.'), but a 507 d) that he threw himself into the Euripus because he could not little earlier (Gell. N. A. xvii. As that date is given discover the causes of his visions, 21, 35). by Plut. (^Dem. 30) as the IGth and the variant of the same in of Pyanepsion 01. 114, 3 = Oct. 14, Justin, cohort. 36, Greg. Naz. Or. iv. 112, or Procop. Be Bello 322, Aristotle must have died between July and Sept. of that year. Goth. iv. 579, that his fruitless 2 That he died by illness is meditations on a vision wore him stated by Apollod. and Dionys. out with worry and fatigue, need ut supra; cf. Gell. xiii. 5, 1. no refutation, though Bayle (art. Aristotle, n. Z) thinks the latter a Censorin. {Bi. Nat. 14, 16) adds fitting end cf Stahr, i. 155. liwiw ferunt naturalem, stomacM 3 Related only by V. Marc. injirmita^tem crebrasque morhidi 4 and Ammon. Latin. 13, and corjyoris offensiones adeo virtute animi diu sustentasse, ut magis with the addition that an altar mirum sit ad annos sexaginia tres was built on his grave and the eumi vitam protulisse, quam ultra council meetings held there and The statement that a festival (^ApiffTOTeKeia) was Tion pertulisse. of Eumelus ap. DiOG. 6 (de quo instituted and a month named after him. The evidence is not V. p. 2, n. 2, p. 6, n. 3 supra) followed by the Anon. Menag. and good but as he was not only the Suidas, that he poisoned himself most illustrious citizen but also with hemlock, or (as Hesych, has the re-founder of Stagira (cf Dio. Or. 47, 224, who says that Aristotle it) that he was condemned to drink hemlock, is probably a con- alone had the fortune to be ttjs fusion with the death of Demo- irarpiSos o'lKKTr^s) the story is not sthenes or of Socrates. It cannot wholly improbable. * Apud DiOG. 11 sq be historic, because the best proevidence is against it, because it bably (cf V. 64) taken, like the wills of Theophrastus, Strato, is contrary to Aristotle's own and Lyco, from Aristo, a noted principles (^^. iV. ii. 11, 1116 a,
;
.
88
faithful
ARISTOTLE
attacliment and careful provision for
slaves.
all
who
Theo-
circ.
200-250
Kelos),
who
place.
(lege will be
mentioned in his
Herm-
ippus {circ. 200-220) cited the same record (v. Athen. xiii. 589 fl.)' which according to V. Ma7'c. 8, and Amnion. Latin. 17
/JLeTO, \_Twv']
Twu avTOv
(rvyypafxfidr(i)v
{Amnion. Latin, 'cum voluminibus suorum tractatuum ;' cf. IIEITZ, Verl. Schr. d. Ar. 34). The external evidence for the the more will is therefore good because it is likely that the wills of Aristotle and his followers would be carefully preserved by the Peripatetic school (for which those of Theoph., Strato, and Lyco were a kind of foundation charter), and because Aristo was himself the immediate successor of Lyco. The document has also all internal signs of genuineness, and the objections which have been urged against it (cf. (tRANT, It is objected 26) prove little. that it mentions neither a house in Athens nor a library, both
;
others quoted, a regular disposition of his whole property. Grant thinks it unlikely that Pythias was not yet marriageable or that Nicomachus was a lad but this Why may not Ariis not so. stotle's wife Pythias, perhaps after the death of older children, have borne him a daughter ten years after their marriage ? or why might Aristotle not have by a second wife, for whose remarriage he provides, a son who would be a lad when his father Besides, we was sixty-three? know from other sources that the
;
education of Nicomachus was taken over by Theophrastus. The naming of Antipater arouses in Grant a suspicion that the
forger inserted
him
is
name
but
it
that Aristotle might appoint him in order to place the carrying out of his directions for the benefit of those depending on him under the protection of his
powerful friend.
that
first
is
And
this is all
is
meant when he
irdvrcav,
named
iwiTpoTTos
whereas
the
carrying
out
of
the business
latter,
which
made
arrangements
peated in the extant will, that being rather a set of directions to friends than, like the three
provisions of the will is left to Theophrastus and the other eViObjection is taken to fieX-nrai. the provisions for four statues of animals which Aristotle is said to have vowed to Zeus Soter and Athene the Preserver, for Nicanor's safety (DiOG. 16), as being an imitation of the Socratic for Asclepios offering votive (Plat. Phcsd. 118, A). This, however, is far-fetched and the point is unimportant. Little as
89
named
and
to
him he
left
Excepting a few
details as to his
we
Most of these
such
those concerning
his
relations
of his later
years."^
What
and
Athene, yet it is quite natural that he should erect a monument of his love for his adopted son in their common home, Stagira (to which the statues were to be sent), in a fashion which accorded with Greek custom. He himself in Etiiics iv, 5 reckons votive monuments and offerings among the forms in which the virtue of
lxya\o'!rpTreia
'
Pausanias (vi. 4, 5) mentions a statue said to be of Aristotle as to others, v. Stahr, i. 161 sq, and as to those exl ant, especially the lifesize sitting statue in the Palazzo
Spada
at
Rome,
v.
Schuster,
shows
itself.
Erhalt. Portr. d. griech. PMlos. Leipz. 1876, p. 16, where they are photographed. The sitting statue has a lean face, earnest and thoughtful, showing the lines of severe mental labour,
and with a
profile.
delicate,
clear-cut
is
xiii.
well
5,
A.
where
must be substituted for Menedemus '). It is quite credible, and not unlike Aristotle. 2 Steabo, xiii. 1, 54, p. 608 Plut. Sulla, c. 26 Athen. i. 3, a, with which cf. DiOG-. v. 52.
;
impresses us with its life-like truth to nature, and the workmanship is so excellent that it may well be an original work dating from the time of Aristotle
It
or his immediate successor. Directions are given in Theophrastus' will (DiOG. v. 51) that
the
Mou(re?oj/
:
DiOGt. 2
calls
him
laxvo-
be finished
and fxiKpSfi/iiaros, and an abusive epigram in the Anthology (iii. 167, Jac), which deserves no weight, (TfxiKphs, (paXaKphs, and
(TKeX^s
nrpoydffTcop.
t5 Uphp
irpSTepov
bably
We
R,
(op.
pronouncing
word rpavXhs
DiOG.
2,
Anon.
T(^ t^PVy which proto be understood of a statue already erected. * Cf. p. 8 sq. 19, n. 4 ; 20, n. 1,2; 33, n. 4 ; 35, n. 1, 5,
is
40
ARISTOTLE
his
by
many enemies^
Nor do
of
little
probability.^
we have
a
give us
shrewdness,
or
jealous
first
and
these
little-minded
The
of
charges
concerns
his
relations
with
the
Macedonian rulers. The second refers to the criticisms he allows himself to make in writing of his But it- cannot be cotemporaries and his forerunners.
proved that he ever sought the favour of Philip and
sujira.
tullian's
Another calumny is TerAr. familiarem suum Jlermiam tiirpiter loco excedere fecit {A2whget. 46), which in the context can only mean he betrayed him, a tale so senseless and wicked
that it required a Tertullian to invent it. The story of Philo of Byblos ap. SuiD. UaKaicp., as to immoral relations with the historian Palffiphatus of Abydos is equally baseless. Themist. Orat. xxiii. 285
>
Macedonian Court and flattered Alexander, and that at his death 75 (or even 300) dishes were found in his house or that
:
he was immoral in relation to Pythias and Herpyllis, and was also enamoured of Theodectes of Phaselis and again that he was so effeminate that he bathed in warm oil (doubtless for medical reasons, cf. DiOG. 16 and p. 37,
:
talks of
stotle's
a (XTparhs
{ap.
:
'6Xos
of Ari-
calumniators.
Aristocl.
so miserly that afterwards or that in his youth he was too fashionable for a philosopher (which, as he was rich and brought
n. 2, supra'),
and
oil
he sold the
Diogenes
are
named
Eubulides, Alexinus, Cephisodorus, Lyco, Theocritus of Chios, Demochares, and Dicsearchus, within a generation of Aristotle. 2 Such as the accusations to be found in Aristocl. and DiOG., ut supra Sum. 'Apirrr. Athen. Plin. ff. A^. viii. 342, xiii. 566 XXXV. 16, 2; ^iLlAN, V. H. iii. Theodoret, Our. Gr. Aff. 19 xii. 51, p. 173; LuciAN, Dial. Mort. 13, 5, and Paras. 36; that Aristotle was a glutton, and for that reason went to the
;
and up at Court, is possible) that he was impudent and sneerIf there were any facts ing.
:
underlying these stories, we may conclude from the character of the narrators that they were in
any case
trivial and we can see in the passages of Lucian and Thcodoret and his quotation from Atticus how Aristotle's own statements as to wealth and pleasure were twisted to support these suspicions. 3 Even Stahr (i. 173 sq) pays too much attention to these
;
charges.
41
to be
follies
and
to
it
was not
as
To impute
it
him
an
offence,
is
to
By
and training he was a Greek. But while all him to the royal house to which he and his father owed so much, no one can say
birth
his personal ties attached
So
satisfied
sweeping changes.
men and
ditions
things,
on which the
government depends.
With
his
practical
acumen he
;
among
At
that day no
Stalir thinks it
flattery
when
Alexander
H.
xii.
ov irphs
irphs
angry with inferiors, and that he stood above all men, which was surely true of the conqueror of the Persian Empire. We cannot tell whether the letter is genuine.
Heitz {Verlor. Schr. d. Arist. 287) suggests that this fragment does not agree with that in Plut.
Arist. 13, p. 472 614, 1581, b) in which Aristotle is made to compare
;
^ffffovs
with Rutgers,
aXXb.
crol
Rose
Tohs
ovSels
and
'[(Tos,
Heitz)
KpeiTTOvas
yivcrai,
if
5e
but
this is genuine
{Tranqu. An.
Aristotle said no more than the truth, and he wrote, according to ^llan, in order to appease
Fragm.
Alexander's wrath against certain persons, for which purpose he tells him that one cannot be
himself with Alexander, but the letter is much the more doubtful of the two.
42
ARISTOTLE
conld be found except in the Macedonian
new foundation
kingdom,
for the
conditions of Greece
armed
rising
against Macedon.^
come
by Philip,
Can and then reorganised as a Macedonian town. we blame him if he accepted that view, and, with a
just appreciation
of the
political
situation,
attached
if
still
find
power
to
if
face
enemy without
to
Can we
its basis
condemn him
he
felt
come
an end, when
was gone ? Can we object if he believed that in his pupil Alexander was fulfilled the condition under which he held that monarchy was natural and just ^ where one man stands
all
others in efficiency as to
he preferred to
of Hellas rather in
man
great
king of Persia,
'
for
cities
13
fin^
had
Plut. Phoc.
23.
pgiit^
iii,
48
been bidding against each other ever since the Peloponnesian War, and hoped that he would give the
Hellenes the only thing they lacked to become the
rulers of the world
political unity ?
As
for the
it
is
colour,
rest
sometimes unfair. But they never take on any personal and it would be impossible to prove that they ever
as sharply,
on any other motive than the desire to make his point and establish it as completely as possible.
discoveries,
on his own
we ought
and remembering
is
this,
we
that remains
pardonable self-appreciation.
Still
less
to pass over
minor matters ^
need we
hoped soon to see philosophy completed.^ If he did, it would have been only the same self-deception of which many other thinkers have been guilty, including some who have not been, as he was, the teachers of mankind
> Polit. vii. 7, 1327 b, 29, reckoning the merits of the Greek race SiJirep iXevOepdv re
:
Tvyxdvop TroXireias. Like the tale told by Valer. Max, viii. 14, 3, as a proof of Aristotle's sitis in capessenda
2
standing of the Rliet. ad Alex. Rhet. Hi. d, 1^10 h, 2). qiq Tusc. iii. 28, 69 Aristoteles veteres philosopjios accnsans qui existimavissent pMlosopMam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos ant stultissimos ant gloriosissia. \ fin. {ci.
:
mos fuisse
paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane ahsolutamfore.
44
for tens
ARISTOTLE
of centuries.
In
fact,
have occurred in an early'work of Aristotle's,^ and to have related not to his own system but to Plato's,
So
will,
far
as
Aristotle's
philosophical
writings,
the
us
and our incomplete accounts of his life afford any picture of his personality, we cannot but Nobility of principles, a just moral honour him.
sense, a
warm and
keen judgment, a susceptibility to all beauty, lively feeling for family life and friendship,
benefactors, affection for
relatives,
gratitude towards
and a
lofty conception of
marriage
far tran-
such
are
we can
see.
They
it
all
carry us back to
reduced
all virtue,
backed as
knowledge
of
men and by
deep
We
are
bound
all
own
life,'^
manner
*
of one-sidedness
(piXo-
him should be
which it is rightly sold, and that several should be referred by Rose (Ar. Ft. No. 1) freed and even started in life, As to the latter, cf. his saying, and Heitz {Ar. Fr. p. 33). 2 As Bywater {Journ. of ap. DiOG. 17, ov rhv rp6irov, dAAa
(ro<pias,
In Philol. vii. G9) also says. Aristotle's extant works he often refers to the need of further investigation. ' As to the former, cf. his will, which provides inter alia that none of those who had
rhv
&vQp(joirov r{X4r)<ra.
Cf his expressions in the Letter to Antipater, ap. ^lian, V. H. xiv. 1 and ap. DiOG. 18. In the former fragment he says as to the withdrawal of former honours {de q. v. p. 36, n. 3,
.
45
human
And
it,
and in
spite
attached to
seems to us
lofty
and honourable,
still
more are
his powers
and
intellectual
achievements altogether
astounding.
Never have
so great a wealth of
know-
and so untiring
with a
scientific thinking,
capable of piercing
into the
all
know-
branches.
That
Stagirite,
But
which
those
qualities
mark the
full
manhood of
science
17
in width and
(/;.
solidity
supra) ovTws
jUTjSev fieKeiv
;
sq)
one who had reviled him behind hishack: airdura fie Kttl jj-affTiyovTco, The few poetic attempts we have show no great gift. On the other hand his wit was noted
the
DeMETR. 29, 233) give proof of it. That it went with a tendency to banter and sauciness of speech (&Kaipos crrwfivXia), as ^lian (V. IT. iii. 19) tells us of him in his youth, is possible, though not proved by the existing testimony, ^ Be quo infra.
letters
46
ARISTOTLE
terminology.
He
and the moral His energies, at all in the same way as Plato does. work is drier, more professional, more closely confined But to the field of cognition than Plato's had been.
of our hearts, weld in one the scientific
man
might,
knowledge then
Even
if
we put
measure the
he obtained from scholars and friends, and perhaps also from trained
still
slaves,^
the range
of his achievements
common standard, that we how one man in a short life especially since we know that
wring from a weakly body the
Aristotle has
had
to
task
it
did.
he was as a
man we know
unhappily too
little,
Of what but we
* Callisthenes of Babylon is said to have sent him information of astronomical observations there (Simpl. Be Coelo, Schol. 503, a, 26, following Porph.), but
the story is suspicious because of the addition that these observations went back 31,000 years,
^
Qf p 37^ ^
2,
and DiOG.
v.
16.
47
foes, or
must demand.
48
ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER
II
Aristotle's writings
K. Consideration
The
both by
extent and
its
manysidedness.
his
The works
over
all
which we
have under
name
extend
branches of philosophy, and they exhibit a vast Yet wealth of wide observation and historical learning. add a great catalogues to these extant works the ancient
number of others, of which only the titles or slight fragments now remain. Two of these catalogues we have
:
21 sqq.), the first in two recensions, that by Diogenes (V. Anonymus Menagii' the other and that called the The first list contains, in in certain Arabic texts.^ Anonymus ^ ^ of which the Diogenes, 146 titles, most
'
: '
'
'
new
ones.
An appendix
many of which,'^ however, are only repetitions or variants Pseudepigrapha. those already entered and ten
of
See both in the Arist. Fraoni. of Rose and Heitz (Ar. 0,Z V. 1463, Berlin ed., iv. b, lsq.,Parised.) According to the earlier
"^
48) he
who
was Hesychius of Miletus, lived about 500. ^ As to the possible grounds Heitz. omission cf oi this Verlor. Schr. Artst. ip. 15
^
by
Rosefroman Ambrosian^S.
3
132. pro-
are 9, ^.e. Nos. 147, 151, lo4, 155, 167, 171, 172, 174, 182, repeating
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
49
Both the sources agree in putting the total number of books at nearly 400.i The author of the first catalogue
cannot be (as Kose imagines
2)
identified with
Andro-
nicus of Khodes, the well-known editor and arranger of Aristotle's works,^ though it is not to be doubted that
that Peripatetic did compile a catalogue of Aristotle's
writings.^
For even
is
if
we could
Andronicus
number
at
1,000 books,^ and the circumstance that the extant index includes Hhe liepl spfirjvsLas, which he rejected/
remains clear that we should look to find in Androthose writings above all that are included in our extant Corpus Aristotelicum, which is derived, speaking broadly, from his own. This is far
it
nicus's edition
from being true of the extant catalogues, for many important parts of the extant Corpus are either altogether absent or at least are not to be traced under
^^' 1^' o^^' \^h ^i H^' 39 and 11 of the main list. DiOG. 34, and the Anon, MENAG. at the beginning of his list. The titles mDiog. (reckoning the Letters as one book for each correspondent named and the UoKiTiiai as a single book) give 375 books those in the Anon, as completed by Rose, 391.
;
^^'
^^'
^^^^h ^id not at all correspond with his own work. A similar catalogue of the writings of Theophrastus is ascribed to him by the Scholia at the end of his Metaphijsics and at the beginning of the seventh book of the ^^6^. ^/
Plants.
^
David,
SgJwI. in At. 24
'
a
'
19.
*
iff
Pt.
in. a, 549,
3 (2nd edition).
1 his IS clear
This is the more remarkable because we gather from Dioa 34 that the catalogue was to include only works recognised as ^e6
^^"*-
V.
Marc. 8
^^ ^' """^
^*'
^^.-
nuine. Bernays(i>mZ.^.^,..l34) therefore supposes that the book was inserted in the cata^^" ^ Andronicus by a later
hand.
^
5'>
'
VOL.
50
their later
ARISTOTLE
names and
^
The conleft
is
verse theory
that the
in Diogenes
was meant to
out of
contain
only those
nega-
contains
it
many important
and that
distinctly claims to
For be a complete review of the philosopher's works.^ it is equally impossible that it can owe similar reasons
its
origin to
'
our
Of the books contained in Corpus AristoteUcum Diogenes' list mentions only the
following: Nos. 141, The Cate(prics; 142, n. kp^t]vdas\ 49, 50, 'AmA. Uporepwu avaXvriKwv
;
important
parts
of
our
bfXTipc^v
102,
t
n.
Cy'wi/,
1)
books
(meaning no doubt the UUtory of AnimaU, he spurious tenth book of which is afterwards, No. 107,
128, called 'Tirep toD ^urj yevvav) 75, UoKitlkvs aKpodMrjxa-viKwv a 23, OlKovofiiKhs a ffiujs 8 books
;^
Corpus. The Anon. Menag. adds the Topics under that name (his No. 52) and the Metaphysics, to which he gives 20 books (if the text is right, de quo infra). The First Analytic is his 134, with 2 books, and the Mhics is 89,
'HOiKctiv k' (lege
dix adds
;
a'-K). His appen148, ^vaiKi] uKpSaais, 17]' 149, IT. y^via^ws koX {lege t] (pOopas 150, IT. /uLeredipcov, S' 155, 156, n. Ccf(}v n. C4^^ la-Topias i'
: ; ; ;
78,
Tex^ns
pr)TopiK^<f
:
/3'
119,
Kiv7]<Tws
(^(vcvv fiopiccv
names,
n. n.
of.
'NiKOfiax^'ioji^-
(pvcreois
(which are a Kivhcr^ois probably parts of the Physics) y' and No. 39, n. (rroix^itav a fi' probably the two (meaning books n. yeve<TQ}s with our book
iii.
Of Bernays, Pial. Ar. 133, and Rose, ut supra cf on the Verlor. opposite side, Heitz,
:
Schr. p. 19.
^
'
2ui/e7pai|/c
5e
Tr&fnrXcKTTa
7)yT)(rdix7]v
fii^Kia
air^p
aKdXovOov
book iv. or Meteor.')', 70, eVeis iinx^ipw<^of TiKoi Ke' (no doubt a recension the ProUems) 36, n. rwv -rroaathe treaXoos XeyojjLevav (doubtless that tise, often cited by Ar. under name, which is now book v. of the
IJe
C(vlo,
;
viroypdxpai
5ia
r^v
irepl
rrdvTas
Xoyovs ravdphs aper^rjj/,' are the introductory words in DiOG. v. 21, but that does not mean that he would exclude the main philosophical treatises. The same is
clear from 34, where Aristotle's power of work is said to be proved
e/c
Metaphysics)', and 38, 'He^Kwi/ (only 5 books). Even assummg that all the suggested correspondences are correct, the list still
roov
*
Trpoyeypafx/x^voou
avyypafx-
fidroov,
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
61
whom
must have been a scholar of the AlexanHermippus ^ and he must either not have had the means or not have taken the trouble to give us more than a list of the manuscripts which were to be found ^ in a library accessible to him,
Its compiler
Otherwise
it
him
would works
which can, as we
I
shall see,
The
first
m the Library of
Of
writings, which
Alexandria.
two Arabic writers of the thirteenth century^ copied from a certain Ptolemy' probably a
^
by Greek
:
writers.^
His
list
cf Zellee, Ph. d. Or. Pt. iii. a. 556, 2nd ed., and Heitz, Verlor. 'Schr. 38.
.
mclifk. 19, At. Pol. xliii,, Nietzsche, Rhein. Mus. xxiv. 181 sq. ' We are not expressly told that this scholar and Peripatetic, who wrote about 200 B.C., catalogued the works of Aristotle but it is hardly to be doubted, seeing that he wrote a biography of Aristotle in at least two books which Diogenes used (cf. DiOG. V. 1, 2, and
a. d.
;
b,
is
1,
Athbn.
xiii.
and
logue.
^
De
One
q.
V.
Rose, Ar.
0pp.,
p. 1469.
49,
n.
4,
supra
(cf.
E 2
52
ARISTOTLE
For while
treatises,
Ptolemy put
Books, their
tlie
total of
Aristotle's
works at 1,000
lists
comprise only
so^e 100
Of the component parts of counting about 550 Books.^ their our extant Corpis only a few are wanting, and
absence
may be
partly accidental.^
Some
others are
(Ibn el Kifti, d. 12-18, aj), Kose, ibid.) says this Ptolemy was an
admirer of Aristotle, who wrote a book, Histories Ar. et Ifortis ejuset Scriptorum Ordo, addressed to Aa^las (or AHlas) the other
:
Catalogue came after Andronicus clear from the mention of is Andronicus at No. 90, and of Of the Apellicon at No. 86.
writers of that name knovirn to Rose (Ar. Lihr. Ord. 45) suggests as the same the Neoplatonist Ptolemasus, named by Jambl. ap. Stob. Eel. i. 904, and by
us.
(Ibn Abi Oseibia, d. 1269, ihid.') also speaks of his Liher ad Galas de vita Ar. et eximiajnetate testament I ejus et indiee scriptorvm ejus notorum. Both copy from him bio<i:rapliical details as well as the Catalogue, but
in prorincia
Rum
'
(i.e.
the
Roman Empire),
and that he was a different person from the author of the AlWhat they say, howmofjest.
exactly with in Ar. 22, a, 10 (after Proclus, cf. 1. 23), says of a Ptolemy who reckoned the
ever,
corresponds
what David,
Scliol.
total of Aristotle's books (as did Andronicus, cf. p. 49, n. 5) at 1,000, avaypacp^v avTwu Troir}adixepos Kol rhv fiiov avrov kol ttjj/ SidOeaiv
:
and with the remark in J'.Marc.S, as to the same, that to his list of Aristotle's works he added his
to
David takes this Ptolemy be Ptolemajus Philadelphus, but this merely proves the ignowill.
rance of David, or the pupil who recorded his lectures; though we know that Ptolemasus Philadelphus himself was a collector of
Proclus In Tim. 7. Another was a contemporary of Longinus, but he is said (by Porph. V. Plot. 20) no scientific to have written works. The most probable identification would be with the Peripatetic Ptolemy, whose attack on a definition of grammar by Dionysius Thrax is quoted by Sext. Math. i. 60, and by the Schol. in Bekker's Aneed. ii. 730, and whose date therefore must lie somewhere between Dionysius and Sextus (70-220 B.C.). An exact reckoning is not possible without going into the variations of the numbering in the different texts. If the 171 Polities were counted separately, they would raise the total to about 720. 2 The most important omissions are the Ethics and the (Economics besides which there are the Rhetoric, ad Alex., the book upon Melissus, &c.; and the
' ;
works (Athen. i. 3, David, and Ammon. Schol. in Ar. 28, a, 13, 43), and was a pupil of
Aristotle's
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
named
Greek
twice over.
63
The
Arabic catalogue
is
proved by the
often
set against
and origin
no
Nothing but a
full
and
review of
all
judgment on their authenticity.^ To begin at the point where the old catalogues end, we may distinguish from the philosophical treatises those writings which dealt with personal matters the Their number is letters, poems, and occasional pieces. relatively small and if we exclude those whose genuine-
n.
'^TTvov
Koi iyp-nySpcreus,
and
IT.
Auetoritate, 1854,
Xp<cfji.dTO}v,theU. KSfffjiov,!!.
Twj/,
apeTuu
ejnffrajjhus, 1863, rejected too summarily all the lost and several
and the
*i'(rto7i'W;U(/c']fj.
But
as No. 40 includes the De Memoria et Somno, so it may be that others of the small scientific tracts are bracketed in the list under
one
*
title
As
to the
by
titles
the
Ar.,
1865), refuting
Val. Rose,
De
Ar.
The writings of the extant books. named in the ancient Catalogues will be cited in this chapter by Kose's numbers (p. 48, n. 1) ; of the Catalogues themselves, that of Diogenes will be cited as D.,that of the Anonymus Menagii as An., and the Ptolemy of the Arabic Ar. Fr. will be texts as Pt. used for the collection of the fragments by Rose in Ar. Oj)p. v. 1463 sq., Berlin ed.; and Fr. Hz.
54
ahistotle
is
ness
is
very
little left.
and perhaps some part of the matter said to be cited from his Letters,'^ may stand. The so-called Apologia of Aristotle,^ and the Orations in praise of Plato and
Alexander,'^
must be
for that of Heitz in Ar. Opp. iv, b, 1 sq. of the Didot edition. " For these, with the notices relating to them, v. BERGHK,Zyr. Gr. 504 sq.,K0SE, Ar. Pseud. 598 sq., Ar. Fr. 621 sq., p. 1583, and
The most imFr. Hz. 333 sq. portant are those above cited
(p. 12, n. 4, p. 20, n.
3),
whose
genuineness we have no reason to doubt. D. 145 mentions %-k7i and iyKciofxia ^ i\ey7a, and An. 138 v/j-povs appear in An. Ajjj). 180.
;
2 The Letters of Aristotle, praised by Demetr. Floe. 230, SiMPL. Categ. 2 7, Scliol. in Ar. 27, a, 43, and others (cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 587, Heitz, Verl. Schr. 285, and Ar. Fr. 604-620, p. 1579, Fr. Hz. 321 sq.) as the high-
An
(v.
^Y.yKdofxiov
quoted by Olympiod.
166
YiXaTuvos is Gorg.
water mark of epistolary style, were collected in eight books by one Artemon, otherwise unknown
Jahrl. f. Philol., Suppl., xiv. 395, and.lr. Fr. 603, Fr. Hz. 319); but it is more than suspicious, since
No. 87). Andronicus is said to have reckoned twenty books (Pt. No. 90, cf. Gell. XX. 5, 10), but perhaps it was only twenty letters, which is the number in An. 144 names letters D. 137. to Philip, letters to the Selybrians, four letters to Alexander Demetr. Eloc. 234, Ps. (cf. Amm. 47), nine to Antipater, and seven to others. The letters of
of Platonic biography. A Panegyric on Alexander aj). Themist. Or. iii. 55 (Ar. Fr. 602, Fr. Hz. 319) is condemned by the Fr. a^). RuTiL. Lupus, De Fig. Sent. i. 18, if that belongs to it, Bernays' theory of another Alexander (Dial. Ar. 156) being very improbable. An 'EyKXTja-ia 'AKe^duSpov is named by An. (No. 193) as spurious. Books n. 'AAe|cij/5pou are ascribed by Eustath. ajj. Dionys. Per. V. 1140, and An. Apjj. 176, to Aristotle through some confusion between his name and Cf. Hbitz, Verl. Schr. Arrian's.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
65
may
include those
questions,
all
essentially distinct in
form from
^
We
make
his
fact
use
of the form
of
dialogue.
It
is
that
those
of Plato
in the
own
hands.'*
^
Of the
the three
known works
books
291,
*
Oyi Fhilosoj^hy^
and Muller,
v.
.
Script,
d.
{de
Alex. pref.
Cf Bernays, Dialoge
Ar.
q. V. Bernays, 21, 148 etc., and Rhe'in. Mus. xvi. 286 sq.. Rose, Ar. Ps. 52 sq., Ar. Fr. 82-
(1863), Heitz, Verl. Schr. 141221, Rose, Ar. Pseud. 23 sq. 2 Cf. Cic. Ad Att. xiii. 19, 4, Basil. Ep. 185 (167) ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 24, Plut. Adv. Col. 14, 4, Dio Chrys. Or. 53, p. 274, Alex. ap. David, SgIioI. in Ar. 24, b,
48, p. 1479,
EijS7]fxos
is
called
and
cf. quotations in Ar. Fr. 41), or nepl \l,vxvs (D. 13, An. 13, Plut. Pio 22), or EvS-nfjLos ^ v.
David, iUd. 24, b, 10 sq., 26, 35; Philop. ihld. 85, b, 41, and De An. E. 2 Peocl. ap. Philop. ^tern. M. 2, 2 (cf. Ar. Er. 10) and In Tim. 338 d;
33,
b,
;
(Plut. Cons, ad Apol. 27, 115, and Simpl. ap. Ar. Fr. learn from Plut. Pio 42). 22, and Cic. Pivin. 1, 25, 53, that it was dedicated to Aristotle's friend, Eudemus, who died in Sicily 352 B.C. (cf.p. lln. 4 supra),
rl/vxvs
p.
We
Ammon.
Cateff. 6,
;
(ap.
Stake,
and
it
Ar. ii. 255) Simpl. Phys. 2, b Priscian, Solut. Prooim. p. 553 b. 3 Basil. Ep. 135 (167) ap. Rose, Ar. Pseud. 24. Ar. Fr. 1474. Heitz, 146.
16).
Of the Fragmients ascribed to it by Rose, more probable places will be indicated infra for Fr. 36, 38, and
48. Aristotle himself seems, in
Pe
Ad Quint. Cic. ut supra. 5 does not refer to Dialogues. ' Aristotelius mos,' in Cic. Ad Earn. i. 9, 23, has a wider sense; and refers to the in ntramque partem disputare,' cf Pe Orat. iii. 21, 80 but see Heitz, 149. * This remarkable Dialoj^ue
*
Fr.
iii.
An.
4, init.
oversight
gives
47, 95,
four
books),
'
Rose, Ar. Ps. 27, Ar. Fr. 1-21, p. 1474, Heitz, Verl. Schr. 179 sq., Fr. Hz. 30 sq., Bywatee, 'Aristotle's Dialogue
Bernays,
66
tice
^
ARISTOTLE
seem to have been the most important.
to the
to be said for the conjecture that they were written in the period
work of
much
when
Aristotle
still
scholars,
independe//- position.^
on Philosophy,' Journ. of
vii.
Philol.
1487,
Bernays,
48,
64 sq.
work was a dialogue {Solut. Proceni. p. 553), and it is confirmed by the statement (Plut.
Adf.
Col. 14, 4, Procl. ap.
Philop.
^m. M. 2, 2; V. Ar. Fr. 10) that Aristotle had in his Dialogues attacked and renounced the IdeHl Theory; of. At. Fr. 11 from the second book n. (piXoa. arguing against the Ideal Numbers. These three books are referred to (besides D.) by Philodem. n. eva-eBdas, col. 22, and following him, by Cic. iV. I>. i. 1 8, H'6. The apparent reference in Arist. P%.s-. ii. 2, 194, a, 35 yap rd ov ej/eKa' etp-qrai 5' (Stx^s eV TOis irepl <piXo(ro<pias) is as Heitz says (^Verl. Schr. 180) Yary susbut on the other hand the reference will not apply either to the Book on the Good (which could not be
;
Rose, Ar. Ps. 87, Heitz, Verl. Schr. 169, Fr. Hz. 19. CiC. Pep. iii. 8, 12, mentions this as a comprehensive work in four books. According to Plut. Sto. rep. 15, 6, it was attacked by Chrysippus ('Ap. Trepi ^iKaioavviis
'
'
auriypd(pooi^)
of
nowhere
called n. (pi\o(T., cf. p. 61, n. 1, infra), nor to Ifetaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, 2, since as Aristotle left
that book unfinished he could not quote it in the Physics. Kose's rejection of the n. (piKoa. is followed by Susemihl, Genet. Fnt. d. plat. Phil. ii. 534 but the arguments are insufficient. D. 1, An. 1, Pt. 3, At. Fr.
;
Carneades mentioned by LacTANT. Fpit. 55 (ap. CiC. Pep. iii.) seem to have been also specially directed to this work. Dpjmetr. Floo. 28 cites a passage from it. We are not told that it was a Dialogue, but that is inferred from its position at the head of D. which begins (Bernays, p. 132) with the Dialogues arranged according to number of books. It is, however, true that in the midst of the Dialogues (as No. 12) the Protrepticus comes in, which probably was not a Dialogue. Neither probably were Nos. 17-19. It is a question, therefore, whether the Anon, has not here preserved the original order so that the Dialogues really include only the first thirteen numbers of An., together with the Sj/mposlon which was misplaced in that list by reason
:
of the textual error(?7.p. 58, n. 1). 2 This is specially true of the Eudemus. All the fragments of
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
whicli are supposed
to
67
by reason of the place assigned them in the catalogues but some of them are only distantly connected with
this dialogue prove that it was built on the lines of the Phcsdo. They have in common not only their subject, the Immortality of the Soul, but also the artistic
in which treated. Like the PJiccdo (60 E), the JEudenms was intro-
duced {Fr. 32) by a revelation in a dream, the direct prototype of which is to be found in the other Dial, relating to the last days of Socrates {Crito, 44 A). As Plato concludes his work (108 D sq.) with an imaginative myth, so the Eudemus had also its mythic ornament (cf. Fr. 40, where the words of Silenus, ^aiixovos
etc., remind us also of 617 D, and Fr. 37, which must be taken in a mystical sense). As the Phcedo (69 c) refers to the doctrines of the Mysteries, so Fr. 30 of the Eudemus recognises the validity of the customary honours to the dead. But the most remarkable resemblance between the two Dialogues is in their philosophical contents. Aristotle in the Eudemus insisted .not only on Immortality, but also on Preexistence and Transmigration, defending in his own way the theory that the soul in its entrance into this life forgot the Ideas {Fr. 34, 35). As the Ph(sdo based the decisive argument for immortality on the relation of the soul to the idea of life (105 c sq.), so the Eudemus also called the soul ein6s n (Fr. 42). As Plato worked up to this argument by a detailed refuiiriirouov,
Rejj. X.
tation of the theory that the soul was the harmony of its body, here also Aristotle followed him (Fr, 41). Exactly on Plato's lines is likewise Fr. 36, where the misery of the soul tied to the body is imaged in a striking comparison ; and even if By water (Journ. of Phil. ii. 60) and Hirzel (Hermes, x. 94) are right in referring this Fr. to the Protrejjticus, still this also seems to have been on the same lines as the Eudemus (cf. p. 60, n. 1, infra). Aristotle took a more independent position against Plato in the books On Philosophy. It is true that the Frs. in which he defends the belief in the gods, the unity of God, and the rational nature of the stars (Fr. 14, 13,
16,
ap.
N.D. Brandis,
Cic.
228, refuting Kose, Ar. Ps. 285), read like Plato, and that Fr. 15 (de q. V. Bern AYS, 110, and Fr. Hz. 37) is evidently modelled on Bep. ii. 380 d. Nevertheless, Aristotle decisively declared himself in this work (Fr. 10, 11, cf. p. 55, n. 6) against the theory of the Ideas and Ideal Numbers, declared the world to be not only, as Plato said, unending, but also beginningless (v. Frs. 17, 18,
with which Bywater, 80, well compares Plut. Tranqu. An. 20, p. 477) and gave in Book T. (v. Bywater's reconstruction thereof from Philop. in Nieom. Isag Cic. Tusc. iii. 28, 69; Procl. in EuCL. p. 28 cf. Ar. Fr. 2-9) a
; ;
58
ARISTOTLE
system,^
the philosophic
authenticity.^
of humanity to culture and philosophy, which, although it connects with Plato by the remark {a}). Thilop.) that the spiritual and divine principle, in
ment
(v.
p.
ever,
much
variation,
and
Blass'
view that certain passages are taken verbally from the n. (piXocr.
is
improbable.
'
rod adiixaros dxAuj/, and by the theory of periodic floods whereby humanity was thrown back into savagery (cf. Plato, Tim. 22 D, Laws, iii. 677 A, 681 e), indicates
clearly an independent view of history which goes beyond Plato not only in relation to tlie eternity of the World {Meteor, i. 14, 352 b, 16; Polit. vii. 9, 1329 b, 25; Metaph. xii. 8, 1074 a, 38; of. Bern AYS, TheopliT. il. d. Frommiglt. 42), but to the process of spiritual develojjinent {Metaph. i. 1, 981 b, 13, and 2, 982 b, 11 sq.). Aristotle's interest in scholarly inquiries appears in the passages of this work on the Magi, on
Orpheus, on the Seven Wise Men, and on the development of philosophy from their time to his own and his critical sense is shown in his discussion of the story of Orpheus in Fr. 9. Taking all this into consideration, the books On Pliilosopliy show, as compared with the Fudemus, a remarkable advance in independence of thought, leading to the suggestion that they were written later, perhaps at the end of Plato's life. Krische (Forsch. i. 265) sought to identify the 3 bks. n. ^i\o<r. with Metaph. i., xi., xii. but this is now untenable (cf. Heitz, 179,
;
and
infra, p. 76 sq.).
It is
more
probable that they were used for various passages of Metaph. i., xii., and for the bk. n. ovpavov
Dialogue is doubted by Muller, Fr. Hist. ii. 185 but it is proved not only by its place in the Catalogues, but also by an express statement in V. Marc. p. 2, and by the form of Fr. 61. It was probably used as a genuine work by Eratosthenes of Aristotle and Apollodorus, but we cannot be sure that their references {Fr. 60 ap. DiOG. viii. 51) may not point to another work, posAristotle, sibly the Politeiai. however, himself refers at the end of Poet. 15 to a discussion in the iKS^do/jLcyoi \6yoL, which it is most natural to apply to the n. iroL-qruv, as in the Rhetoric (which EosE, Ar. Ps. 79, suggests) there is no corresponding passage. The few references we have, which are mostly historical notes, show nothing that throws doubt on the genuineness of the work. Fr. 66 contains statements as to Homer, evidently from a tradition current in los, which (notwithstanding NiTZSCH, Hist. Horn. ii. 87, Muller, ut supra, and Rose, Ar. Ps. 79) do not prove the spuriousness of the book, since they might well have been introduced in the Dial, without being believed by the author.
;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
With
the Dialogues
59
may
be
connected
another
set of writings,
44; cf. Heitz, V.S. 192, who rightly questions the application of Plut. JV. p. Suav. V. 13, 4 to this Dialogue) the n. ttXovtov
;
An. 7; Ar. Fr. 86-89, p. 1491; Ar. Ps. 101; Heitz, V. S. 195, Fr. Hz. 45) probably attacked by the early Epicurean,
(D. 11;
Metrodorus,
in
cf.
if
Philodem. De
col. 22,
AMd,
n. iroXmlas, but
ttXovtov
the
by name,
reckoned
'
as belonging to it Heitz rightly rejects Fr. 88 and the n. evxns (D. 14; An. 9; Ar. Fr. 44-46, Ar. Ps. 67 Fr. Hz. 56 p. 1483 Bernays, 122), to which we possess only one reference that can be identified with certainty, i.e. Fr. 46, which is too closely related to Plat. Rejj. vi. 508 e to permit its rejection, If we could say absolutely that the Dial. IT. evyevelas (D. 15; AN. 11; Pt. 5; Ar. Fr. 82-85, p. 1490; Ar. Ps. 96; Bernays,
;
'^
140; Heitz, V. S. 202; Fr. Hz. which was already questioned by Plut. Arist. 27, is not genuine, it would follow (as Heitz suggests) that the stoiy that Socrates was accused of bigamy misrests upon some in it This, however, understanding. seems hardly probable, because the story in question appears so frequently and so early in the Aristotelian School. As to the genuineness of the Dialogues
55),
60
ARISTOTLE
it
yet distinguished, as
treatises
(at
by
least
in part)
Aristotle's
work.*
named
form an approximate judgment but there do not seem to be decisive grounds for rejecting any
of them.
(Thras.
ibid.
To the same period with the Eudemns belongs also the Pro
Ar. Phet. iii. 14, p. 1415, b, 30). If Cicero used it as a model for
his Ilortensivs (Scrij^t. Hist. Aiig. V. Sal. Gallieni, c. 2), it may still be questioned whether the dialogue form was part of the imi-
trejftims (D.
12
An. 14
Pt.
where
it is
probably transposed
Ar. Ft. 47-50, p. 1483 Fr. llz. According to Teles, circa 46). 250 B.C., it was addressed to the Cyprian prince Themiso, and was
;
known
Crates
to
(t.
and USENEii, Rhcin. Mus. xxviii. 372, suppose it to have been a Dial., and Beenays, IIG, gives no opinion but Heitz, V. S. 196, and HiRZEL, Hermes, x. 61, seem to be right in saying that it was a continuous essay. The reasons
;
are
G(jivo.
(1)
:
that
tip
Teles
says
'A/>.
e/jLi-
irpoTpeTTTiKhv
^ypa^pe irphs
a drama
man,
Tiv\ irpoa"Yp6.(j)iv,
not be written
riva ypd(peip
irpoTpeTTTiKol
:
that we know were essays and not dialogues even the pseudo- Platonic Clitojjhon, which got an unsuitable second
title
aj?.
of
UpoTpcTTTiKhs (Thrasyll.
iii,
DiOG.
60), is
no exception a dialogue,
As Usener, ut sujfra, shows, Cicero also used it for the Somnium Sci^rionls, Rep. vi., and, mediately or immediately, Censorinus, D. Nat. 18, 11. Bywater, lit siipra^ has also shown (but cf. Hirzel) that Jamblicus used it for his own Protreyticus. Of a kindred nature apparently was the TI. TraiSetas (D. 19 AN. 10; Pt. 4; Ar.Fr. 51, p. 1484; Ar. Ps. 72; Heitz, V. S. 307, Fr. Hz. 61). As no fragments are preserved, we cannot tell whether the 11. rjSovTJs (D. 16, cf. 66; An. 15; Pt. 16; Heitz, V. S. 203; Fr. Hz. 59) was a The book dialogue or not. n. fia<n\ias (D. 18; An. 16; Pt. 7 Ar. Fr. 78, 79, probably also 81, p. 1489; Fr. Hz. 59), which was addressed to Alexander, and apparently referred to by Eratosthenes {op. Strabo, i. 4, 9, p. 66), was more probably an essay (v. Heitz, V. S. 204) than a dial. (Rose, Ar. Ps. 93,*' and On the other Beenays, 56). hand, the title *A\4^av5pos ^ vvfp (irepi) airoiKwv [-KtcDj/], if the text
tation.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
the treatise
61
On
the
Good}
It
recorded
from or of
it
its
genuineness.^
be correct, rather suggests a dial. (D. 17 Ar. Fr. 80 Bernays, 56 Fr. Hz. 61. Heitz, V. S. 204, 207,
; ;
suggests
Kal
IT.
TTphs 'AAe|.
virlp airo'iKuv
fiaa-iXeias.
A
vir.
preferable
airoiKwu
a'.
fiaaiXeias a').
Other fragments
which Rose places among the Dials, will be referred to infra. The n. TayaBov consisted,
'
that he was not sure whether Aristotle's reference referred to the n. ray. or to a special work. If so, this makes rather for than against Alexander's knowledge of the n. Tuyddov. Simpl. Be An. 6, b, Philop. Be An. C. 2 (cf. Ar. Fr. p 1477 b, 35), Suid. 'Ayad. p. 35, b, believe that the
words
according to D. 20, of three books An. 20, one book; Pt. 8, five books: Alex, ad Metayli. iv. 2, 1003 b, 36, 1004 b, 34, 1005 a, 2 repeatedly quotes Book II., and the regular form of citation is eV Totj TT. Tay. Apart from the Catalogues, we never hear of this work except in the Aristotelian
notices Commentators, whose are collected and discussed by Brandis, *Perd. Ar. Libr. de IdeisetdeBono,' Gr.-rmn. Phil. ii. Krische, Forsch. i.263 b, 1, 84 Rose, Ar. Ps. 46, Ar. Fr. 22-26, p. 1477, and Heitz, V. S. 209, Fr. Hz. 79. Brandis {ihid.) has shown that none of them except Alexander possessed the work Heitz, p. 203, doubts this itself. even as to Alex., because he in one place (p. 206, 19) distinguishes the eK\oyi] rwv ivavrioov noticed Ar. Metaph. iv. 2, 1004 a, 2 {de q.
;
yofxivois in
they
really
to
Platonic
writings
But
writers
this
second hand.
We
cannot tell whether Aristotle published in his lifetime his notes upon the lectures of Plato, or whether they became public after his death. If the cKAoy^ r.
ivavr., cited by himself, formed part of them, the former would of course be true. It is clear that the book was in use before the end of the third century B.C., and certainly before the time of Andronicus, because of the mention of it in Diog.'s list; cf. p. 48 sq. supra. 2 Referred to by Aristoxenus
infra) from the second book II. rayaQov, and in another place (p. 218, 10, 14) identifies them.
These passages seem, however, only to show that Alexander knew of no e/c\. t. iv. as a separate book, but saw in the second book n. Tay. a discussion to which, as far as the sense went, Aristotle might be referring, so
others, cf. Zeller, Plato, 26. (P7iy.9. 32, b, 104, b, Schol. 334, b, 25, 362, a, 8) mentions, besides Aristotle, Speusippus,
and
Simpl.
tiffius
Xenocrates, Heraclides and Hesas having published the Platonic lectures. 3 This is pro ved, against S USE
d. 2)lat. Pliil.
ad
loo.
62
ARISTOTLE
is
There
the Ideas,^
Metaphysics^^
JExtracts
from some of Plato's writings and the monographs on earlier and cotemporary philosophers^
Tliis work is named in D. and An. 45 (which give it one book only) n. ttjs Ideas or n. Ideas. We have references, however, by Alex. inMetaph. 564, b, 15 to the 1st book n. Idewv, in 573, a, 12 to the 2nd, and in 566,
1
54,
An. 85 Simpl. Be Tov; D. 94 Cwlfl, Schol. 491, b, 37 <rvvoxpiy^ Tifiaiov ypdcpeiv ovk iTTi.rofjL'^v TOV
; ; :
cf. Fr. Hz. 79. aw-n^iwae) ^ n. rcov Ilvdayopeiwv, D. 101 An. 88 no doubt the same as is named 'l^waycoy^ rSov TLvOayopelois
; :
b, 16 to
we may
b, 36).
a, 19,
the 4th (but in the last case well read A for A, with Rose, Ar. Ps. 191, Ar. Fr. 1509,
Syrian, In
3Ietaj)h. 901,
942, b, 21 speaks of a work The eiSwj/ in two books. same is meant in Pt. 14 by the three books De imar/inihus, ntrum existant an own but the Arabic title \fari aiduln'' indicates that their Greek text read not 11. etSaJj/, but n. etSwAcov cf. RoSB, At. Ps.
n.
Tcoj/
UvdayopiKa {ihid. 505, a, 24, 35) UvOayopiKhsl-ov ?] (Theo. Arithm. SJ^tjs n. T7JS HvdayopiKwv 5) (Alex. Metaph. 560, b, 25), and n, TTjs TlvQayopiKris (pi\o(ro<plas
;
185; Ar. Fr. 180-184 p. 1508; Fr. Hz. 86 sq. we have I. 990 b, 8 sq. not only Alexander's statement that this passage refers to the work on Ideas, but it seems to be the natural inference from Aristotle's text itself that ho is re;
V. Pyth. 31). Probably separate title Uphs rohs UvOayopeiovs, D. 97, is only a part of the same work, as D. gives each of them one book only, Simpl. while Alexander and
(Jambl.
the
quote from book 2. The reference in DiOG. viii. 34, cf. 19, probably belongs to this treatise (whether we there read eV r^ ire pi
or tt. Kvdfxwp only, cf. Other notices of the Cobet). work are collected by Rose, Ar. Ps. 193, Ar. Fr. 185-200, p. 1510 find also three Fr. Hz. 68. books n. rrjs ''Apx^reiov [-tou ?1 (piAo(To(pias in D. 92, An. 83, Pt, cf. Ar. Ps. 211, and Fr. Hz. 9 Also Uphs 77, and cf. last note.
Kvaixcav,
ferring to some more detailed discussion of the Ideal Theoiy which is already known to his
We
this,
Kose {Ar. Ps. 186) doubts bat Alexander's own statements (cited in Ar. Fr. 183 Jin., 184 /?<-.) indicate as much. * Ta eK rujv vSfxcov UT^drwvos (D. 21, as 3 Bks., An. 23 as 2). Ta e/c rris iroXirdas a jS' (D. 22. PrOCL. Ar. Fr.^ 176, in Benip. 350 Ta eK Tov Tifiaiov Kal p. 1507). rwv ^Apx^TCLcov (alias Ka\ 'Apxv3
TO,
'AAKfialwvos,
e/c
Ylpo^Xriixara
(?
A-n/JLOKpirov, 7 2) books, D. 124, An. 116 (cf. Ar. Ps. 213, Ar. Fr. 202 p. 1514, Fr. Hz. 77 ;) Uphs rh M\la<Tov, D.
ruv
95, 98,
An. 86 An. 89
lip.
Up.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
so far as these
63
were genuine
must,
however, have
first
residence
collection
of
Platonic Divisions
ascribed
to
him
was no doubt a forgery.^ Far above all these in historic importance stand the works which set out the peculiar system of the Master in Speaking broadly, it is these strict philosophical form. which have survived the first century A.D., and have alone
Z-i]vo}vos,
D. 100
otir treatise
De
Melisso, &c., to which, besides the lost section as to Zeno, another cited at second hand by Philop. Phys. B. 9 as Tip. r))V UapixeviSov dd^av seems to have belonged. know that this work was used by Simplicius (cf Zeller,i.474 sq.).
We
view of the character of our informants it is very possible that tliey presented ^s history what lie had only stated as a Pythagorean tradition. Similarly the meanings of the Pythagorean symbols {Fr. 190 sq.) and the contents of Fr. 188, which Isidor.
ajp.
ttjs STreuo--
Clement.
Strom,
vi.
641
Kal aevoKparovsl^cpLXocrocpias'],
9.3, An. 84. We cannot judge as to the genuineness of several, of which we have the titles only. It is
D.
may
have
left,
among
attributes to Aristotle himself, are merely references to Pythagorean theories. The rest of the passages cited from this book as to the Pythagorean system give no reason to reject it. The apparent contradiction
{ap. Simpl. De Schol. 492, b, 39 sq.) and Coelo ii. 2, 285, b, 25 is quite reconcileable, without following Alexander in assuming a falsa lectio, for which, however, Fr. 195, ap. Simpl. iUd. 492, a, 18, gives some ground. 2 This is named in the existing lists only by Pt. 53, as Divisio Platonis^ (formerly mistranslated \jusjura7idum or tesCoelo,
falsely
systems
written
down
and
passed themselves off under his name. That the latter was the case with the tracts in our Corpses on the Eleatic School is proved in Zeller, Ph. d. Or. i. 465 sq. It is more difficult to decide as to the authenticity of the work on the Pythagoreans. If all the fables (see Zeller, Pli. d. Gr. i. 285) which appear in Ft. 186, were related as historic fact, the book could not be Aristotle's, but in
'
'
tamentum PV). It was, perhaps, the same as the Aristotelian 5mipeVets (v. p. 75, n. 2, infra) else-
where mentioned. A similar work, obviously a later recension of the Pseudo -Aristotelian text
64
ABISTOTLE
knowledge of the Aristotelian philosophy. is no doubt primarily due to that it was in them that that philosophy was
during the years of his teaching at Athens.
is
set it forth
If
we take what
now
extant or otherwise
known
which
first
meets us
the Categories ^^
the book on
used for the account given of Plato by DiOG. iii. 80, is printed by RoSK, Ar. Ps. 677-61)5 (and after him by J^r. Hz. 91), under the title, Aiaipdaeis 'ApiarordAovs, deq. V. ZeIjL., Pk.d. Gr. ii. a. ;)82.
think them the same. Andronicus was probably right {ap. Simpl. nt supra, Schol. 81, a, 27) in identifying the title of To Kph T. tSttccu with the spurious appendix of the so-called Post'
The
title
of this
work by
;
pr;^:idicamcnta
'
and
it
may have
common (and probably correct) account is KaTrjyopiai but we tind it also named as n. rcov KaTTjyopioov, KaTr^yopiai Sewa, n. T civ 5e/ca Karrfyopicov, U. rwv SeKa yevwv, n. Tuu yeycou rod ovtos, KaTTjyopiai ^toi tt. rwv SeKa yeviiccordTccu yevwv, n. rwu KaQoXov \6y(i)i>, Ylph Toou roiriKuu (or tottccu) Waitz, Arist. Org. i. 81, cf. ISIMPL. in Cat. 4, )8, and David, Sahol. in Ar. 80, a, 8. The title Ta irph twv roircav was known to Andronicus according to Simpl. ibid. 95 C, Schol. 81, a, 27, and to Boethius, In Prccd. iv. p. 191 (who obviously got his knowledge irom the same source as Simpl.,
the
:
been invented either, as he supposes, by the writer of that tract, or by some later editor who found the original name, Karrjyopiai, too limited for the treatise as
enlarged by the spurious addition. Aristotle himself refers to his theory of the Categories (Be i. ], 5, An. 402 a, 28, ^410 a, 14, Anal. Pri. i. 37, cf. the quotations, infra, p.
as
189, n. 2, q. v.) to his readers, and he this in other places also, which seems to indicate that he had dealt with it in a
known
assumes
is
a more
Porphyry). Herminus, circa 160 A.D., preferred it to the ordinary name. David, however, (^Schol. 81, b, 25), D. 59, and An. 57 name a book called Ta 7rpi> Twj/ Tt^TTcoj/, besides the Karrjyopiai, which is D. 141, An. 132, Pt. 25 b and do not ajjpear to
i.e.
;
definite reference in Mh. JV. ii. 1 init. to Cateff. c. 8 (cf. TrenDELENB. IRsi. Beitr. i. 174). That in Eth. Eud. i. 8, 1217,
b 27, may possibly refer not to the Categ. but to some work of Eudemus, and those in Top. ix.,
(Soph.
5,
El.-) 4. 22.
as to categories in Toj).
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
which, however,
is itself
65
so brief
lowing Aristotle's example, Eudemus, Theophrastus, and Phanias, wrote not only Analytica,' and works n. ep^rji/etas,' but
'
also Kar-nyoplai
(Ammon.
SoJiol.
Anon.
i.
1827, p. 270, rightly denies this as to Theophrastus, and doubts it as to Eudemus). The references in Simpl. Cat. 106, a, 107, a, sq., Schnl. 89, a, 37, 90, a, 12 do not prove that Strato referred to Ari-
On the other stotle's Categories. hand, the ancient critics never doubted the genuineness of the extant book, although they rejected a second recension {v. Simpl. Catcg. 4 f, Schol. 39, a, 36 Anon. ibid. 33, b, 30 Philop. ibid. 39, a, 19, 142, b, 38 Ammon.
;
; ;
saying that its compiler might be found 'in any master of a peripatetic school of the age following Chrysippus' (p. 207). Their critical positions, however, Prantl are not all tenable. Qibld.) takes exception to the number 10 but in the Toj). i. 9, the same ten Categories are given, and we know from Dexipp. lln Categ. 40, Schol. 48, a, 46) and Simpl. {ibid. 47, b, 40) that Aristotle named these ten in other works also. It is true that Aristotle generally uses a less number but that may only mean either that he here adduces all the ten because his object was logical completeness, or that he counted more Categories at an earlier time than he did later. He never assumed, as will be shown later, a fixed number of them. Again, it is objected that the KaTTjy. speaks of Sevrepai. ova-lat but we find as parallels to this not only irpSbrai ovalai (e.g.
; ; ;
vii. 7, 18, 1032, b, 2, 1038, b, 10), but also rp'nai ovaiai (ibid. vii. 2, 1028, b, 20, 1043, The words of KarTjy. a, 18, 28). cIkStws 29 b, 0. 5, 2,
:
. . .
Metaph.
fiSva
Tct
elfSTj
Koi
to,
y4ur}
Cat. 13, 17, and Boeth. In Freed. 113, all following Adrastus, a noted critic circa 100 A. D.; cf. Fr. Hz. 114). The only doubts suggested are by Schol. 33, a, 28 sq., and these apparently were not derived from Andronicus. The internal characteristics of the book, however, are in many ways open Spengel to criticisms, which {Miinchn. Gel. Anz. 1845, 41 sq.), Rose {Ar. Libr. Ord. 232 sq.), and Prantl {Oesch. d. Logih, i. 90, 5, 204 sq. 243) have used to combat its genuineness, the latter
SevT^pcu ovaiai Xeyovrai, are not to be translated < the term Seur. ova-, is used for genera and species and rightly so,' since it was not commonly so used before Aristotle, but rather, there is reason to treat as a second class of substances only genera and species.' Again, when it is remarked in Karvy. c. 7, 8, a, 31, 39, that, inspeaking, irpSs strictly cludes those things only which not merely stand in a definite relation to some other thing, but have their essence in such a reols rh clvai ravrSv icrri lation
*
VOL.
I.
66
AMISTOTLB
parts
the
and
kinds
of
propositions/
those
on
"' ^^^^^'^ ^^ ^^ t45 irp6s ri irm ex^ need to suspect here any trace
influence, since the exetf appears also in Ae. Toj}. vi. c. 4, 142, a, 29, vii. 3,247, c. 8, 164, b, 4; Phys. a, 2, b, 3, and Mh. ^'. i. 12, 1]01, of
Stoic
Ti
jrpos
TTws
It is trvie, however, b, 13. all the objections cannot easily be set aside. Nevertheless, the
that
treatise bears in general a decisively Aristotelian impress it is closely related to the Tojncs in tone and contents, and the external evidence is heavily in its
;
favour.
is
The
best
conclusion
seems to
whole
the body of the work it is probable also that passages have been left out and others added but much of in this recension the inconsequence of exposition and language may as easily be due simply to the fact that the Categ. were the earliest of the logical writings, and were written probably many years earlier than the Analytics. This book, n. kpjx7]viias, w^as in ancient times rejected as not genuine by Andronicus (so Alex. Anal. pri. 52 a, and Sclwl. in Ar. 161 b, 40; Ammon. De Interpr. Boeth. 6 a, and Schol. 97 b, 13 Anon. iUd. 94 a, ihid. 97 a, 28
;
21
Philop. De An.
13,
4),
to* be explained by the assumption that the genuine body of the work extends to c. 9, 11, b, 7 only, but that what followed has dropped out of the recension
we
possess, and is replaced only by the short note, c. 9, 11, b, 8-14. The so-called 'Postprnadicamenta' (c. 10-15) were suspected as early as Andronicus
followed recently by Gumposch {Log. Schr. d. Ar., Leipz. 1839) and Hose (Ar. Ps. 232;. Brandis (.1/;^. d. Berl. Akad. 263 sq., cf. I)AVID, Schol. in Ar. 24 b, 5) takes it to be an incomplete sketch of the work, to which c.
14 (rejected as early as
Ammonius
;
cf
Ammon.
Unci.
81,
81, a, b, 37),
FMl.
ii.
b, 406).
It is
question whether
k was
graph, at c. 9, 11, b, 8-14, reads exactly as if it came in the place of further discussions which the editor cut out, justifying himself by the remark that there was nothing in them which did not appear in the earlier part. In
201 b Schol. 135 b) has probably been added by a later hand. The external evidence for the work is good enough. Not only do all three lists agree in naming it (D. 152, An. 133, Pt. 2), but we are told that Theophrastus referred to it in his essay IT. KaTacpdcreoos KOL aTTOcpdaeas (BlOG. v. 44; ALEX. A7ial. pri. 124, Scfwl. 183 b, 1 more explicitly, after Alexander, Boeth. iMd. 97, a, 38; Anon. cf. the Schol. in Ar. 94, b, 13 Schol. ap. Waitz, Ar. Org. i. 40,
Interpr.
;
Ammon. De
b, b
16,
@6-
(ppaa-Tos,
etc.;
cf.
Ammon. De
It
seems
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
conclusions and scientific
also
67
that
Eudemus
IT.
Ae'lecos
6, b,
Anon.
24) may have been an imitation of this book (not, as Sclwl. 84, b, 15, wrongly suggests, of the Categories cf the quotation from Ammon. in preceding note). This last suggestion, however, is uncertain, and the notices as to Theophrastus are not absolutely clear, for the texts show that he did not name the n. hpii.t\v. at all. Alexander thought he saw, from the way in which Theophrastus dealt with the subject (thema) in his own book, reason to infer that he had
Ar. 146,
a,
Aristotle in mind but whether he was right in that inference or not, we cannot judge. The Schol. /;. Waitz has nothing to show that the reference there quoted from Theophrastus referred to a passage in this book, and was not
;
rather a general reference to the frequently recurring Aristotelian law of the excluded middle. On the other hand, it is singular that while the n. epfirjv. referred to is never cited or in any of Aristotle's books (cf. BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 102, a, 27), only the First it cites not Analytic (c. 10, 19, b, 31 Anal. 46, 51, 6, 36) and the To2ncs (c. 11, 20, 6, 26: Top. ix. 17, 175, b, 39), but also the n. ypvxvs (c. 1, 16, a, 8), and that for a proposition which neither the ancient opponents of Andronicus nor modern scholars have been able to find in it (cf. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 97, b, 49, whose suggestion, however, is not satisfactory). Its remarks on Khetoric
:
must have been written, if by him. The question, therefore, is not only whether it is by Aristotle or by another, but whether it may not, as Grant suggests (A 7'. 57), have been written out by one of his scholars from oj-al lectures in which the difficulties of beginners would naturally be kept in view. Syllogisms are dealt with by the 'Ava\vTiKa irpdnpa in two books, and scientific method by the'Aj/aA. ricrr^pa, also in two. The fact that D. 49 and An. 46 give nine books to the 'AvaA. irpdr, (though An. 134 repeats the title with two only) points probably only to a different division; but it is also possible that other tracts are included, for the Anon. ScJiol. in Ar. 33, b, 32 (cf. David, ibid. 30,
it
'
b,
4,
142, b, 38,
says that Adrastus knew of forty books of Analytics, of which only the four which are extant were counted genuine. That these are genuine is proved beyond doubt, both by internal evidence,
and Poetry
(c.
4,
17, a, 5)
have
by Aristotle's own references, and by the fact that his earliest pupils wrote works modelled on them (cf p. 65, suj^ra, and BeanDis, Rhein. Mus. Niebuhr and Thus we know Br. i. 267),
.
f2
68
ARISTOTLE
dis-
an
Analytic
(Alex. Top.
70),
(cf.
other references ap. Bonitz, It is Ind. Arist. 102, a, 30 sq). therefore the original title, and has always remained in common use, notwithstanding that Aristotle cites certain passages of the First Analytic with the word iv rois irepl avWoyKr/xov (^Anal.
post.
i.
commentary, quotes from both on numerous points in which they developed or improved Aristotle's
'Aua\.
[ed.
Trpor.
(cf.
3,
or that Alexander {Metaph. 437, 12, 488, 11, 718, 4) and Pt. 28
call
Tlicophr.
Ft.
the
Second
Analytic
(Z><?
;
airo-
Wimmer], p. 177 sq. 229; Eudcm. Fr. [ed. Spengel], p. 144 sq.). For the Second Analytic
the references are less copious but we know of passages Alexanof Theophrastus through der (Anon. Schol. in Ar. 240, b,
;
2, a,
242, aj). EusTRAT. ibid. ibid. 17), through Themist. Philop. 199, b, 46, and through an ibid. 205, a, 46, and through Anon. Schol. ibid. 248, a, 24, of
and
a remark of
Eudemus,
all
of
which seem
Analt/tio.
We
Puis. De Libr. iv, fin., vol. viii. 765 Propr. vol. xix. 41) chooses to substitute, as he says, for the common titles, the names n. (rv\\oyi(TiJ.ov and n. a7ro5ei|ews nor have we any right to name them on internal grounds (with GuMPOSCH, Toy. Ar. 115) n. avKXoyKTixov and Me0o5iKa. Brandis justly remarks {Ue. d. Ar. Ory. 261 sq.; Gr.-rdm. Phil. ii. b, 1, 224, 275) that the First Analytic is far more carefully
SejKTJKrj,
or that Galen
phrastus, not only from the form -n-porepa, of the title of the'Aj/a\. but also from express testimony Hippocr. (r DiOG.v.42; GALEN,
et
PI.
ii.
2,
vol.
v.
213,
and
Nat. i. 26) that he did it write a Second Analytic, and that, as is probable that in the text, he followed Aristotle. himself cites both Aristotle Anah/tics under that name Top. b, 32 viii. *11, 13, 162, a, 11, Ehet.i. SopJi. Fl. 2, 16.5, b, 8;
A LEX.
Qii.
subject
We
ii. 25,
1357, a, 29, b, 24, 12; Metaph. vii. b, 12 init. Fth. N. vi. 3, 1139, b, 26, 32 also Be Tnterpr. 10, 19, b, 25 31 31. Mor. ii. 6, 1201, Mil. Fud. i. 6, 1217, a, 17, ii. 6, 1222, b, 38, c. 10, 1227, a, 10
2,
1356, b, 1403,
;
;
9,
a, 5,
of which, however, the last, and perhaps the third and seventh also, seem to have been worked out long after the others (v. Brandis, Ue. d. Ar. Ory. 255
Gr.-rom. Phil.
its
ii.
b, 330).
The
cita-
name
is
established
by
tions in
Aristotle himself
{Be
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
proof.^
69
of our Organon,'
we have
also the
names of a great
Interj)r. 11, 20, b, 26; Anal. 2>r. i. 11, 24, b. 12; ii. 15, 17, 64, a, Rhet. i. 1, 1355, a, 37, 65, b, 16 28, c. 2, 1356, b, 11, 1358, a, 29
; ;
c.
iii. 18, J419, a, 26, 1403, a, 32 For the art of proof hj 24).
;
term
probabilities Aristotle uses the Dialectic' (jTo/^. init., Rhet. init., etc.), and he refers to the Topics in a similar way as irpay'
fxaTeia
tt.
t^u
StaAe/cTiK^jj/ (^Anal.
It is probable, therefore, that by fte0o5t/cck (Rhet. i. 2, 1356, b, 19) he meant the Topics, which in the opening words announce as their object, fieOoSov vpe7u, etc., and in which viii. 2 i7iit.) (i. 12, 105, a, 16 the relative passage is to be found, rather than, as Heitz (p. 81 sq., Fr. Hz. 117) suggests, a lost work: cf. KOSE, Ar. Libr. Ord. 120; Vahlen,
pri.
i.
Porphyry, appears to regard the as belonging, and the former as not belonging, to the In Hypomnematic writings. D. 81 we even find a second The theory entry of MeOoBiKhv a'. of Spengel (Ahh. d. Miinchn. Aliad. vi. 497) that our text of the Topics contains grave lacunce does not seem to be proved by the passages he quotes (Rhet. i. 2, 1356, b, 10; ii. 25, 1402. a, As to the former, which 34). refers to the Topics only for the
latter
'
'
iv.
13),
is
As
to
apply to Top. viii. 10, 161, a, 9 sq., the words KaOdirep koL iv To7s roTTiKOLs, etc., need not be taken as referring to a particular passage, but may be taken as
Wien.
Aliatl. xxxviii.
99
Bonitz,
Ztschr. Oesterr. Gymn. 1866, It seems, also, that 11, 774. in several MSS. the Topics were
meaning of objections there are in Khetoric, as in Topics, many kinds,' i.e. in oratorical use as opposed to disputation, a remark
'
headed with the title M60o5/co, so that an idea arose that they were distinct works. This idea has been attributed to Dionys. {Ep. I. ad Amm. 6, p. 729, on Rhet. i. 2), but he speaks only of
auaXvTiKi) Ka\ fiedoSiK^ irpayfiareia,
and does not specially include the Topics in the latter. But D. 52
inserts MeeoSiKo. in eight books, and An. 49, the like title in-
that might well be made even if these distinctions were not taken in the earlier book. For similar uses of Sxrirep eV ToTs tottikoTs, etc., cf. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 101 b, 44 sq., 52 sq., and Vahlen, tit supra, 140 (where the phrase in Rhet. ii. 25 is explained as meaning Instances are here used in the same way as in Topics, and those of four kinds,' etc.).
'
cluding seven books, although both know the Topics as well. So Diog. (v. 29) distinguishes to Te TOiriKa Koi fiedodiKoi and Simpl.
;
or
21,
The n. ao^iffTiKoiv iKeyxcou, Alex. Schol. 296, a, 12, 29, and Boeth. in his transla(as
(Cat. 16
a,
Schol 47,
b, 40), after
have it) Soc^to-r. eAeyxoi. Waitz(^r. Org. ii. 528), followed by Bonitz (Bid. Ar. 102, a, 49),
tion
70
ARISTOTLE
of kindred writings
:
number
and
treatises
on Knowledge
Opinion,^
on Definition,^
on
Classification
by
Genera and Species,^ on Opposition and Difference,^ on Particular Kinds of Conceptions,^ on Expression in Speech,^ on Affirmation and Negation,^ on Syllogshows that Aristotle in the De Interpr. c. 11, 20, b, 26, and
Anal.jjri. ii. 17, 65, b, 16, refers to passages of this work (i.e. c. 17, 175, b, 39, c. 30, and c. 5, 167, b, 21), under the name eV
ToTs
ToiriKols
;
No. 60,
'OpiffTiKa,
that he reckons
knowledge of fallacies as part of Dialectic (Soph. El. c. 9 fin., cf. Top. i. 1, 100, b, ch. 11 fin. 23) aiid that c. 34 is the epilogue not only for these but for Topics.' the whole science of
'
' ;
;
four books (cf DiOG. v. 50, for the same title inthelistof Theophrastus' works) 63, on the objects of Definition, two books 63 b, De Contradictione Befinitionum, 63 c, De Arte Definiendi 64, Il/jbs tovs dpKTiJLohs, two books (cf. the same from Theophr., DiOG. v. 45), translated De Tabula Definiendi. As to the collections of defini; ;
tions
^
'
IT.
etSoji/,
An.
28, otherwise
unknown.
11 cf. BRANDTS, (ri:rom. Phil. ii. b, 118) to distinguish the two, in a way, however, which proves, not that the two were not meant to form a whole, but that the treatise on fallacies was composed later than the The lists of rest of the TojAcs.
1359,
b,
^ As to the opposition of concepts there was a book 11, Twv avTiKiLfMevcav, doubtless the same as IT. ^vavriuv (D. 30, An.
32).
Simplicius, in his
(v.
;
comment-
Ar. Fr. 115Fr. Hz. 119), 121, p. 1497, sq. gives us some further informa-
D. and An.
'Zo(p.
do not name the that reading in An. 125 is, as Rose shows, wrong), and yet give the MefloStKa only eight books, whereas Pt. 29, separates them from the Tojnes possibly, however, in (26 b) D. 27, n. ipia-TLKwu two books,
eX. (for
;
tion as to this book and its casuistical discussions. Rose (Ar. Ps. 130) refers it to the age of Theophrastus. Pt. 12 has n. Zia^opas, four books. ^ De Relato (IT. tov irpds rt), six books (Pt. 84).
^
De
Significatione,
is
its
Greek title
and An. 27, n. ipia-riKwu xSyuv two books, are the same as our
'
Itun^
i.e. rpafi/jLariKhv
or -wv.
As
n.
iTTLa-r-fjiJ.'qs,
(TTTjyUwv,
An. Ap2>. 162. The genuineness of the work is doubtful, because it is nowhere else referred to. 2 To this subject refer several
another related title, TI. to Xe^eus, cf infra. Pt. 54, Partitio Conditionmn quce statuuntur in race et ponnntur, four books, may also have been a grammatical
.
treatise.
^
Alex. Metaph.
cites
a,
26,
this
simply as
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
isms,^
71
and
on subjects belonging
Eristics.^
to
the
sphere
of
Topics and
T(f
IT.
Probably,
KaTa(pd(T(i}s
it
probably, how-
books of "Opoi irph rdv r6ir(ov that The the text of D. is wrong. An. gives instead two titles 51,
:
"Opwj/
DiOG.
1
V.
airo<paff^(i}S.
An.
;
Cnatural to refer the "Opoi to book 1, the first half of which (c. 1-11) consists in definitions and their explanation, and the seven Topica to books
fiifiXiov
is
;
52, Toitikcov
Here
it
a'
(D. 48).
-
2-8.
We conjecture,
therefore, in
this category belong in the first place the treatises placed next to the MeOooiKo. in the lists Ta irph rSiu roirav (D. 59, An. 57) "Opoi TTph Tuv roTTiKoiv, 7 books (D. 55) ToTTiKuv irphs tovs '6povs
To
view of the fact that both lists have the number seven, that in
D. also the "Opoi was originally distinct from the Topica, and that his text read "Opoi irph ruv ro:
iriKcav a'
ToiriKccv o'-f'.
D. 65 and
1,
a'
)8'
'Y^irix^ip-nixdruv
three books
B)
D.
tiomtm
Tojnca,
quae
i.e.
in
; '
33
An.
De Defniendo
Topico
;
(i.e.
On
iirix^LpriiJ.aTiKal
/ce';
cf.
alsoTHEON,
Definition in Topics,' Pt. 61); 11. ipwrrja-eus n. IBicau (D. 32) Kol airoKpicrecos (D. 44, An. 44). Brandis, however, believes (ut supra) that these names indicate only particular parts of our Tojnea. He takes Ta irph rwv Tdiruv (elsewhere used for the cf. p. 64, n. 1) to be the Categ. first book, which in fact we know to have been so called by some (Anon. Schol. hi Ar. 252, a, 46) the "Opos tSov tSttcov [as Br. reads Tott. irphs it] to be books 2-8 TOVS opovs, books 6-7 n. ISlmv, book 5 and n. ipcor. k. airoKp. book 8, as to which we learn from Alex. Schol. 292, a, 14, that many named it so, and others again, with a reference to its first words, n, Ta|ecos K. airoKplffecas. These suggestions seem to commend except that it is themselves easier to suppose as to the seven
; ;
;
Progymn.
(Rhet. ed. Sp. il, 69), who ascribes to Aristotle and Theophrastus iroXXh
p.
165
W.
fiifiXia
diffewu iiriypacpdixeua,
de-
scribed by
Alex.
ets toi 254, b, 10, as containing avTiKclfieva St' evdd^wv iinx^ip7](nv. (Uphs dcffiv iirix^ip7v means *to develop the pro and con of a given proposition,' v. Ind. Ar. 282, b, 57, 283, a, 6: Oea-eis therefore are iirix^iprifxariKal themes for dialectic development or dialectical exercises with an introduction to the way of working them out.) The 'ETTtxeip Vara are no doubt identical with the
tV
second book
Philop.
'Tirofivftfi.
72
ARISTOTLE
Next
to the
come the
written
Rhetorical
Works.
at a
Some
of
these
;
were
wards and
long interval.
or
of Aristotelian
alleged Aristotelian
which
ancients
(cf.
Ar. Fr.
.
11 3, p.
1496
amusmata
'
or
'
if
umsmata
1
'
vTro/j.v'fi/j.ara), i.e.
No.
S2, IG
books
and
69, 2 82, b,
books
book.
PtOSE, Ar. Ps. 128; Fr. Hz. 116). It dealt probably (cf Soph. El. 4) with the fallacies Trapa t\\v Xi^iv.
The references in Athen. iv. 173, and xiv. C^r>i to "Ap. ^ Qeocppacrros
iv rots vTroixvi]ixa(n are not to a defined book so named, but are vao^ue and not to be i(1entified.
Cf.
a,
B/iet.
;
i,
init.
c.
2,
Wliat relation
in Pt. (No.
tlic ITporao-eis
named
books,
and No.
say,
we cannot
but
we
also find
two entries in D. (46 and 47), and one in An. (38) of nporacreis a. The 'ETnx^ipr)iuLaTiKo\ xSyoi, cited by Aristotle in the opening of
c' 2.
25 Soj)Jt. El. 34, 184, a, 8. two extant Besides the works, this class includes primarily the Theodectean Ehetoric: i.e. D. 82 and An. 74, T4xvt]s ttjs QeoSeKTOu (rvvaycvy^ [? etVayoj'y^] The exin one or three books. tant Rhetoric alludes (iii. 9 fin.')
1356,
'^
to
an enumeration
eV rols 0eo5e/c-
reiois, wdiicli
Aristotle,
Rliet.
n.
(cf.
first
/XJ/77/A.
work
the
itself
(449,
b,
13
sq.,
;
450,
a,
iii. be spurious, the existence of this book in early times. The compiler of the Rhet. ad Alex. 1. 1421, b, 1 makes Aristo-
30 sq., 450, b, 11 sq. cf. BONITZ, Tnd. Ar. 99, a, 38). Under the head of Topics fall also tlie 'Ej/<TT6.<ris, D. 35, An. 36, Pt. 55, b the YlpoTacT^is ipiariKol 5', D, 47, An. 44 Auceis ipiariKal S', D. 28, An. 29 and Aiaipeo-eis ffocpiariKOLi, S', D. 29, An. 31. As to the
;
tle
speak of rais
vir
;
i/xov
T^xvais
0eo5e/cT7? ypacpeiaais
and
ference also must be anterior to Andronicus. The words leave it doubtful whether the writer meant a Rhetoric dedicated to Theodectes, or one written by Aristotle but published
1 fin.
by Theodectes
I^ater
'
Ae'liv, named by tract Uapa SiMPL. SaJwl. 47, b, 40, was doubted, as he says, even by the
tV
ARISTOTLE'S WitITINGS
of
73
the
history
of
rhetoric/
most im-
or
set
out rhetorical
probable
(of.
0eoSe/cTfjfoi rexvai.
Anon,
15,
Ft. Hz.
10,
125
Quintilian,
ii.
gives this explanation with an ^ut creditum est': Valee. Max. viii. 14, 3 gives it more distinctly) or else they name Theodectes directly as the author (Cic. Orat. 51, 172, 57,
;
the TexJ'r?[s] a' of D. 79, An. 73 probably meant the extant Rhet. ad Alex. In D. 80 the MSS. vary between &X\t] r4xvr} and &XK7\ rexyoov crvuaycoyfi. If the former is right it would mean a second recension of our Rhetoric if the latter, a recension of the
Texvwj/ (Tvvaycoy^
:
in neither case
194
QuiNTiL.iv.
;
2,
63 and later
:
writers ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 141, Ar. Fr. 123 Fr. Hz 124 sq. compare the similar treatment of the title JS'icomachean Etldos by Cicero and others, de quo p. 97 or else they ascribe to Ariinf. stotle and Theodectes the opinions they find in this book (DiONYS. Comp. Verb. 2, p. 8, Be Vi Demos. 48, p. 1101 Quintil. i. Ar. Fr. 126). If it is 4. 18 genuine, which the Fr. at least give no reason to doubt, we should consider it certainly not as a work written Z>y Theodectes
;
; ;
would it imply separate works. Of the special tracts, the TpvWos has been mentioned p. 58, n. 1 supra probably An. Aj)^. 153,
:
n. priTopiKTis is merely a duplicate of it. In the title, n. Ae|ecos a' fi' (D. 87, An. 79, n. Ae|. KaOapas cf on a similar book by Eudemus, p. 698, n. 3) Brandis in the Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 1. 79 detects book 3 of our Rhetoric, whose
:
and published by
first twelve chapters deal with that subject. This is the more probable that D. 78 gives the Rhetoric only two books, although An. 72 has three books. The others, i.e. D. 85, An. 77, n. fieyedovs a' (de quo cf. Rhet. i. 3, 1359, a, 16, ii. 18 sq. 1391, b, 31, 1393, a, 5) D. 88, An. 80, n. (TvjxfiovXias \_-ris] a (v. Ar. Fr. 136, p. 1501, Ar. Ps. 148, Fr. Hz. 126): An. App. 177, n. ^^ropos
;
An. App. 178, Texv-rj were doubtless all spurious, as was also the Murj/novikIv (D. 117, An. 109) which would be dealt with as an aid to
fl
ToKiTiKov
iyKcofiiaariKT),
Rhetoric.
Pt.
68, UapayyeXinaTa
plural
0eo8e/cTm {Rhet.
iii.
9)
so.
For
as the Uapayy. p-nropiKrjs attributed to Theophrastus by DiOG. v. 47, but was in any case not by Aristotle. An exposition of all the
further details v. Rose, Ar. Ps. 135 sq., and Heitz, 85 sq. As to the remaining titles in our lists which relate to Rhetoric,
rhetorical theories (r4xvai) down to Aristotle's own time was given in the T^xvoiv (rwaycoy^ (D. 77, as two books: An. 71, and Pt.
74
ARISTOTLE
examples/ we have only one preserved to us,^ in wliich, however, we possess without doubt the most mature state-
ment of his
Alexander
24, as
yris a!
rhetorical doctrine.
is
The
EJietoric addressed to
now
one book), D. 89, ^waywand D. 80, "AA-Atj t^x^^v avvaywy^ (if tliat is the right reading) seem to be duplicates only. "We hear of it in CiC Be
)8',
x6yov
and ^EyKw^Lov
Invent,
ii.
2,
6,
Be
Orat.
:
ii.
38,
counted as pseudepiThe grapha in An. 190, 194. and apophvarious proverbs thegms quoted from Aristotle (Rose, Ar. Ps. 606 sq.; Fr. Hz. 337 sq.) are collected from difirXovrov, are
an abstract of it seems to be meant by Deraetr. Magn. (jip. DiOG. ii. i04) by the title 'ETrtro^^
1
'EvOvfirjixara prjTopLKO.
a',
D.
84,
An. 7G
and
'Eudv/j.-niJ.dTwu
diaipeffds a
ferent sources. 2 I.e. the three books of the The date of its comlihetorlc. position must be the last residence of Aristotle at Athens; cf. Brandis in Ar. Rhet.' Pkllol. That it has suffered interiv. 8. polations and transpositions {e.g. in book ii. c. 18-26 ought to pre'
written 'Eu6. KOI alpeafcou). To the same class belonged Ax. 127, but I. Uapoifxiwu, as npooi/xicov a' in D. 138. With these should be reckoned the XpeTat a collection of striking remarks, like Plu;
cede
vi.
'
c.
1-17) was
J-Z/A. d.
proved by
Spengel,
483,
iMunclin.Aliad.
followed by
Schr.'
Vahlen,
Z. Krit. Ar.
xxxviii. 92,121.
tarch's Apophthegms, quoted by Stob. Floril. 5, 83, 7, 30, 31 29, 70, 90,43, 140,57, 12, 93, 38, 116, 47, 118, 29. But as a saying of Zeno the Stoic is quoted from it (57, credit 1 2), and as w^e can hardly Aristotle with such a collection of anecdotes, it must either be a forgery or else the work of a
,
book iii. has been qiiestioned bv Sauppe, Bionys. u. Ar., Gott. Rose, Ar. Ps. 137 1863, p. 32 Heitz, p. 85, 89 SCHAARn. SCiiMJDT, Samml.Plat. Schr. 108, whose view has been followed in Zeller, Plato, p. 55. 3 This work was known to
of
;
the
(v.
is
later writer of the same name, like the grammarian mentioned Rose believes aj?. DioG. V. 35. (Ar. Ps. 611) that 'hpiffror^^ovs is a misreading for 'Apiaruvos.
author of our earliest list D. 79, but its authenticity be thought of. not to
SpeNGEL Anaxim.
ix.
it,
(2^07.
Ars
and
last
The same book seems to be what is meant in Stob. (38, 37, 45, 21) by the citation iK rwp koivuv
:
chapters,
'ApiffTOTeXovs
diarpi^wv.
See
its
Fr.
aj).
This suggestion, however, is very questionable cf Rose, Ar. Lib. Ord. 100 Kampe, in the Philol. For, apart ix. 106 sq. 279 sq.
; . ;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Of the writings devoted
philosophic system, the
of Definitions
^
75
first
place
^
is
given to collections
as
and Divisions
regarded
aids
to
of the separation of the part attributed to Anaximenes from the rest, the influence of the school of Aristotle betrays itself throughout, not only in the persistence of a method of didactic definitions
i<V.
Hz. 119),
2,
by M. Mar. i.
and divisions, but also in the tenor of particular passages. Cf., e.g., c. 2 init. (with Rhet. 1. 3) c. 3, 1424, a, 12-19 {Polit. vi. 4, 1318, b, 27-38) c. 5, 1427, a, 30 (^Eth. N. V. 10, 1135, b, 11 sqq., Rhet. i. 13, 1374, b, 6) c. 8, 1428, a, 19 sqq. {Rhet. ii. 25, 1402, b, 12 sqq.) c. 8, 1428, a, 25 {Anal, pr. ii. 27 init.); c. 9 init. (Rhet.i. 2, 1357, b, 28) c. 12 init. (Rhet. ii. 21, 1394, a, 22); and the dis; ; ; ;
1183, b, 20 sq., cf. Eth. N. i. 12, 1101, b, 11, but may have found its way from that source into the Aiaipeoreis also. Aristotle himself names an 'EK\oy^ roov evavTiatv, in Metaph. iv. 2, 1004, a, 1, where, after the remark that all oppositions finally go back to that of the %v or ov and its opposite,
he adds
reOewp'fja-da}
5' tj/jlIv
:
tinction of evOvfx.'niJ.a and yvcafxri in c. 11 sq., though differently put, is of Aristotelian origin (cf Rhet. ii, 21, 1394, a, 26) c. 17 (Rhet. i. c. 28 iriit. 15, 1376, b, 31 sq.) 29 init. (Rhet. iii. 9, 1410, a, 23). D. 64, An. 61, 'Opia/jLol, 13 "Opoi, 10 books, books Pt. 59 was certainly a later work of the School, analogous to the Platonic As to the other Defijiitiones. title. An. bl,''Opu)v ^i^Kiov a', cf. p. 71, n, 2, supra. 2 Besides the ' Platonic Divisions mentioned p. '63, n. 2, the lists name the following of this
.
ravra iv rfj K\oyf} rcov ivauriuv in the parallel passage, xi. 3, 1061. a, 15, it is only ea-Twcrav yap
avrai
33, TTOLVTa Se Kol
1004, b, avaySfieva (paiverai els rh ev Kal rh ttXtjOos elK^ipda} yap t) auaycoy^ r]fuv. To the same refers also x. 3, 1054, a, (TTi 5e Tov fifv uhs, &(nrep 29
:
re^ecopTj/xeVat
cf.
raWa
'
Kal
iu rf)
5iaip4(ri
rwv
ivavri(av
'
class: D. 42, AtotpeVets i{' [An. 41, n. Stotpeo-e&jj/l ; D. 43, An. 42,
AiaiperiKuv a [Kose leg. -Kbv, as in the duphcate title D. 62] Pt. 52 gives the Aiaip^treis (which might extend to any length according to the subjects chosen),
;
from or
identical
(as
ravrh Kal '6ixoiov Kal X(Tov, etc. and the rainhv and '61X010V were themselves given in Metaph. iv. 2, 1003, b, 35, as examples of the e^Sr? rov cvhs treated of in the 'EK\oy^ r. iv. cf. also X. c. 4 ad Jin. But in 3Iet. xii, 7, 1072, b, 2 the words Siaipeais StjAo? refer, not to a T] treatise, but to the division of two kinds of ov 'iveKa given just before. Whether the reference to the 'EKhoy^ r. iv. indicates a separate treatise or a section of the work On the Good,' even Alexander did not know (cf, p. 61, n. 1); but since the subject
5iypd\paiHV, rh
;
76
ARISTOTLE
but none of these Most important, there^
the treatise
On
a torso
genuine
bound up ^ with a number of which is other fragments, some genuine, some spurious, to form
now
arbitrarily
our
on
Metaiihysics.^
wliicli
Probably,
cites
however,
the
Aristotle
the
'Ek:Ao7^
with
rayaOov, Aristotle
is
probable
that
in
a younger contemporary of Andronicus, the title (which never appears before, and is permanent after that date) may safely be
referred to Andronicus himself, collection of Aristotle's writings alone explains it for it means, not as SiMPL. Phys. 1,
view.
whose
;
De Motu Anim. G, 700, b, 8. That Aristotle himself so named it, is probable from Metaj)h. vi. 1,
V.
1020, a, 15, 24, 30, xi. 4, 1001, b, 19; Phys. i. 9, 192. a, 35, ii. 2 fn. De Coelo, i. 8, 277, b, 10 Gen. Corr. 1. 3, 318, a, 0; De An. i. for irpdoTr] (piKoa-ocpia 1, 403, b, 10 we also find (piXoaocpla alone {Metaph. xi. 3, 4, 1001, b, 5, 25), e^oKoyiK)) {Mctapli. vi. 1, 1020, a, 19, xi. 7, 1004, b, 3), t) irepl ra 6e7a (piXocrocpia {Part. An. i. 5, 045, a, 4), ao<pia (JSIetapli. i. 1, 2),
and
fxeOodos
Trepl
rrjs
apxri^
t^^
Trpc^TTjs (Phys. viii. 1, 251, a, 7), as Aristotle's expression for the subject of the book and accordingly the book itself is also spoken of as a-ocpia, (piXocrocp'.a, eeoXoyia (ASCLEP. Schol. in At. 519, b, 19, 31). Cf BONITZ, v. 5, Arist. Metaph. ii. 3 sq. first find the name /xerd TO (pvaiKO. in Nicolaus of Damascus, who (ace. to the Schol. to Theoph. Metaph. p. 323, Brand.) wrote a Gewpia tu>u
;
and theNeoplatonist Herennius (ap. BONITZ, Ar. Metaph. ii. 5) supposed, the Supernatural, but .that which in the order of doctrinal development, and of the works as collected, followed after the books on the Natural Sciences (cf. Alex. Metaph. 127, 21; Asclep. Schol. 519, b, 19). It is named in the lists by An. Ill, An. App. 154, and Ft. 49. The latter has the usual Greek reckoning of thirteen books; the former which has at 111 k', at 154 leaves it uncertain whether the editions referred to were incomplete, the one having only A-K, and the other A-I, or whether K and I are corruptions of N,
t'
;
i.e.
A-'N.
^
The question of the arrangeof our Metaphydcs has been so far established by Bran-
ment
We
dis in
'Ap.
^erd
to.
(l>v<riKd
afterwards
63-87, 541 sq., and by Bonitz {Ar. Met. ii. 3-35), that it is sufficient to earlier for reader refer the theories to the comprehensive account given by Bonitz at p. 30.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
77
{e.g. x. 4,
1056, a, 23, with which cf. v. 10, 1018, a, 25, and x. 6, 1054, b. 34, cf. V. 15, 1021, a. 25) and a discussion reserved in v. 7 ad Jin. for another place is to be found in ix. c. 7. The tract n. tov
;
TToaaxcas,
originally
'
It niust
vii. 13),
by
shown by the citaPhys. and in the and as an aid to the exact use and understanding of philosophic terms and as such it appears in D. 36, and in
is
as
n.
Biffiv.
Between these
connected books there is inserted, in book v., an inquiry into the different meanings of thirty philosophical conceptions
and terms, which stands in no connection with either the preceding or the following book. The Aristotelian authorship of this section is beyond doubt. Aristotle himself quotes it (in
Metaph.
vii.
init.,
x.
,1
cf.
Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, b, 29, Phys. i. 8, 191, b 29), with the words eV rots ircpl rod Trocap^ws or
TT.
Tov
TToa.
Xeyerai (KaffTou.
The
indicates, by the the discussion had already come under the reader's notice. It appears, therefore, that Aristotle actually intended to incorporate our book v. or the contents of it in this part of his work, but never was able to finish the literary connection. As to book xi., the second half (c. 8, 1065, a, 26 sq.), is a compilation from the Physics, obviously not genuine. The first half exactly corresponds in content with
in a
way which
^v, that
word
book v., and that it is an unAristotelian tract which has taken the place of a genuine book with similar contents, is as decisively disproved as that of Rose {Ar. lAhr. Ord. 154) that the book is entirely unworthy of Aristotle. The book is alluded to in other
books
of the
iii.,
iv.,
and
vi.
and
is
therefore either an early sketch argument afterwards expanded in them, or else, as Kose {Ar. Lihr. Ord. 156) supposes, a later abstract of them. A point in favour of the latter view is the objectionable recurrence,
78
ARISTOTLE
the doctrine of changeable substances and their causes only in
seven times, of the particle ye which is otherwise unknown in Aristotle's writing (Eucken, De Ar. Die. Rat. i. 10; Ind. In view, Ar. 147, a, 44 sq.) however, of the arguments from tlie contents of the book themselves adduced in support of the other view by Bonitz (Ar. 3Iet. ii. 15, 451), this peculiarity is not decisive, especially as the general style of the book has Aristotle's
IX7]V,
narrow compass, and in a style condensed often to the point of This, with the fact obscurity.
that in these chapters the formula jJL^TOL ravra [a'C. AeKreovl on occurs twice (i.e. 3 init., and 1070, a. 4) indicates that it was not a book published by Aristotle, but a set of notes intended as a basis
wiiich many for lectures, in points were only hinted at in the the briefest way, with the knowledge that they would be made The plain by oral development. main theme of the lectures consisted of the points which in the second half of book xi. are treated with special care while the more general metaphysical inquiries which were to serve as an introduction or basis for them were only lightly sketched. The matter the lectures dealt with
;
re found elsewhere. [Thus re occurs in Aristotle almost exclusively in the Ethics and Politics (Eucken, 16); 5e 76 almost exclusively in the Physics (ibid. 33),
.
.
in which also jx^vroi, Kairoi, and Toivvu are much commoner than in the other works (ibid. 35, 51) &pa recurs oftencr in the later
:
in the
50):
and among
the ten books of tlie Ethics, there are many variants as between the three last and the sections i.-iv. or v.-vii., which again vary from one another in diction In this first half (ibid. 75 sq.). of book xi. five of the seven cases Besides, of 76 ix)]v occur in c. 2. 76 is so often inserted by the copyists that it is always possible some early scribe is partly reBook xii. appears as sponsible.]
was no doubt intended to be included in the work on the First Philosophy; and c. 6-10
as far as matter is concerned, exactly fitted to be the conclusion of it. C. 1-5, on the nothing hand, include other which is not contained in the The polemic of earlier books. Eose (Ar. Lihr. Ord. 160) against
are,
an independent treatise, which refers to none of the preceding books, but seems to allude to the
in c. 7,
which, as will be seen this book in the next note, is specially well fortified with external evidence has no value as against its
10 (esp. 267, b, 17 sq.) 1073, a, 5, and in c. 8, 1073, a, 32, to Phys. viii. 8 sq., and also to the De Ccelo ii. 3 sq. It is remarkable that while c. 6-10 develop in some detail the views of Aristotle as to the Godhead and other eternal Essences, c. 1-5 on the contrary give us
Phys.
viii.
Aristotelian authorship, but only as to its connection with our The relation of the Metaph. remaining two books to the rest but there is no is not clear; reason to hold with Rose (p, 157) that only xiv. is genuine. Aristotle must have originally meant to include them in the same book, for xiii. 2, 1076, a, 39, refers
ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS
after Aristotle's death.^
79
Of
tlie
other writings
men-
998, a, 7 sq., xiii. 2, 1076, to iii. 2, 997, b, 12 sq., xiii. 10, 1086, b, 14 to iii. 6. 1003, a, 6 sq., and in viii. i. 1062,
iii.
2,
Athon.
a,
39,
where the name is Pasicrates and Asclep. Scliol. 520 a, 6, except that he has erroneously transferred the story from a to A). That it was inserted after the other books were collected is clear, not only from its designa-
22 he contemplates a treatment of Mathematics and the Ideas, which, as appears by xiii. init., was intended to serve as an introduction to Theology (cf, Brandis, 542, 413 a). On the other hand, in xiv. 1, the obvious reference to x. 1 is not noticed, and vii. and viii. are not referred
a,
to at all in
p. 26).
xiii.
and
xiv.
(Bonitz,
^ a|
W'
inconceivable that Aristotle would have repeated a considerable section almost word for word, as is the case with the present text of i. 6, 9, and xiii. But book i., as a whole, 4, 5. must, as well as book iii., which
It is
but from the way in which breaks the connection of the closely consecutive books A and B, for which reason man}^ of the ancients wished to make it a preface to the Physics, or at least to book i. of the MetapU. {Schol.
tion,
it
Syrian {ap. 3) mentions that some critics proposed to reject A. These, like Asclepius, probabl}^ confused it with o if not, Syrian was right in thinking their sug589,
b,
1
sq.)
Schol. 849,
a,
^
'.
cites it (iii. 2, 996, b, 8, cf. i. 2, 982, a, 16, b, 4, and 997, b, 3, cf. i. 6 sq.) be older than book xiii. It seems to me, therefore,
-r,
the most probable conjecture that the argument in i. 9, which is apparently more mature than
that in book xiii., w^as inserted on a second revision of book i., after Aristotle had decided to exclude books xiii. and xiv. from the scope of his main work on Metaphysics. Book ii. (a), a
collection of three small essays, written as an introduction to Physics rather than to Metaphysics (v. c. 3 ScJwl.), is certainly not by Aristotle. The majority of the
gestion laughable. * This seems probable (cf. Zeller, Ahh. d. Berl. Akad. 1877, Hist. Phil. Kl. 145) because of the circumstance that most of the genuine books of our Metajfhysics were in use at the date of the oldest peripatetic books or
fragments which
we
possess,
and
that they seem to have been gathered together in the same series of books with the rest at a very early date. Book i., as above stated, was not only the
for Theophrastus in book of his History of Physics, but has also left clear traces in what we know of Eudemus, and is the source of the point of view taken by the author of the treatise on Melissus, &c. Books iii. (B) and iv. are referred to by Eudemus,
i.
model
Eudemus, Pasicles of Khodes (Schol. ap. J r. Opp. 993, a, 29 the soSchol. in Ar. 589, a. 41 [Bekkek's called Philoponus
;
book
vi.
by Theophrastus; book
80
ARISTOTLE
by Eudemns; book ix. by book xii. by Theophrastus, Eudemus, the writer of the Matjna Moralia, and the
Theophrastus
;
Mriapli., like
book
xii.,
which
Kivhcredos
book
the
rod n. tract cf. TTocraxaJs X^ySfievou, by Strato the following: (1) Metaj>h. 1, J)81, a, 12 sq., Eudem. Fr. 2, Speng. (2) i. 3, 988, b, 20,
fifth,
the
did not in fact belong to the main treatise, are in use as commonly and at as early a date as those parts which did, it must be conjectured that the whole was put together in the period immediately Aristotle's following death. This theory receives remarkable confirmation from the fact that already in the n. C^'wi/
KLV-fjo-ews
(c.
6,
700, b. 8),
which
ihid.
5,
1.
De
i.
(4) Melissa,
i.
986,
Xeno]ih.
belongs undoubtedl}' to the third century B.C., book xii. itself is quoted by the title reserved by
Aristotle for his
21 sq.,
1.
ihid.
main
eV
treatise
irepi
on
rrjs
Metaph.
TrpdoTTjs
i.e.
to7s
(cf.
(piKoaocpias
a,
BONITZ,
;
EUD. Fr. 11, S. 21, 7 (7) Theophr. Fr. 48 (8) i. 6, b, 32, EuD. Fr. 11, S. 22, 7,
44,
i,
6,
47
sq.
the sus-
987,
8p.
(9)
3,
i.
8,
;
989,
a,
30,
Theophr.
Fr. 46
(10) iii. 2, 990, b, 26, iv. 1005, a, 19, EuD. Fr. 4; (11) iii. y, 999, a, 6, Ftli. Fud. i. 8, 1218, a, 1; (12) iv. 2,1009, b, 12, 21, Theophr. Fr. 42; (13) iv. 6, 1011, a, 12, c. 7. 1012, a, 20,
picion thrown on the passage by Krtsche, Forseh. 267, 3. and Heitz, V. S. 182, is groundless). "We may assume, then, with some probability that immediately after Aristotle's death the finished sections of the work on First
Philosophy (i.e. books i., iii., iv., vi.-x.) were bound up with the other sketches and notes of a
in AHst. 90, a, (15) vi. 1, 1026, a, 13-16, Theophr. Fr. 12, 1 (16) vii. 1, 1028, a, 10, 20, EuD. Fr. 5 (17) ix. 9, 1051, b, 24, Theophr. Fr. 12, 25; (18) xii. 7 init., cf. c. 8, 1073, a, 22, DeMotn An. 6, 700, b, 7; (19) xii. 7. 1072, a, 20, Theophr. Fr. 12, 5; (20) xii. 7, 1072, b, 24, c. 9, 1074, b, 21, 33, Etli. Eud. vii. 12, 1245, b, 16, M. Mor. ii. 15, 1213, a, 1 (21) xii. 10, 1075, b, 34, Theophr. Fr. 12, 2; (22) xiii. 1, 1076, a, 28, Eth. Fud. i. 8, 1217, b, 22; (23) xiv. 3, 1090, b, 13, Theophr. Fr. 12, 2. Since, our parts of therefore, the
;
;
12-46
by him (i.e. and xiv.), and that at the same time book v. was inserted between iv. and vi. but that book a, and the second half of xi., were first attached by Andronicus to this work, with which they were not connected either by origin or contents.
like character left
xi. first part, xii., xiii.,
;
Naturally,
taintj'-
we cannot with
by whom the
cerfirst
affirm
redaction was undertaken. But the statement of Alex. (ap. Metaph. 760, b, 11 sq.), that it was Eudemus, deserves all consideration while the different story told by Asclep. (Scliol. in Ar. 519, b, 38 sq.) is open to the
;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
81
largest
first
Aristotle's productions.
We
have
important investigations which Aristotle himself connected together. They deal with the general
and conditions of the material universe, of the earth and the heavenly bodies, of the elements with
basis
their
properties
phenomena.
and relations, and of meteorological These are the Physics, ^ the two conRose, Ar. Ps. 615 Fr. Hz. 347) seem to have formed part. It is referred by Rose to* the hand of Aristocles of Rhodes, a contemporary of Strato but this seems unlikely cf. Heitz, V. S. 294. It cannot, however, have been a genuine work of Aristotle, and itseems tohave contained, not philosophical inquiries as to the Godhead, but collections and probably explanations of myths and
ajj.
; :
:
gravest doubts. Cf. further, p. 155 sqq. Besides the Books on Philosophy (p. 55, n. 5, and 57), on the Good, and on the Ideas (p. 61, n. 1, 62, n. 1), the Uepl evxvs was
'
probably genuine
tin,).
(v. p. 58, n.
1,
The three books n. rvxris (An, Aj)2). 152) and the MayiKhs were not. The latter is named bj' Diog. (i. 1. 8, ii. 45), and was also evidently used by Plin. {H. JV.
XXX. 1, 2) as Aristotle's, but it is reckoned by An. (191) among the Pseudepigrapha,and we know from Suidas ('Aj/Tto-e.) that it was attributed sometimes to the Socratic Antisthenes, sometimes to
the Antisthenes
patetic of
(le^e,
who was a
ci^'ca
Peri-
Ehodes
180 B,c,
religious usages. The n. hpxh^^ from its position in the list of D. 41, seems rather to have been a metaphysical or physical tract than a political one, but we know nothing of it. As to a 'Theology of Aristotle,' which originated in the Neoplatonic
School
us
V.
and
is
preserved
to
in
1479
Fr. Hz.
;
Heitz,
V. S.
morgeid.
117.
2
1877,
it to be a Dialogue. Of the QeoAoyovfieva, which was ascribed to Aristotle by Macrob, (Sat. i. 18), the Theogony mentioned by Schol, Eur. *Rhes. (28), and the reAeral spoken of by Schol. Laur. in Apoll. Rhod. iv. 973 (v. these and other quotations
'
'
294, 8 siders
Rose,
A r.
1,
Ps. 50,
who con-
^vctik}) a.Kp6a<ns in 8 books AN. 148, leg. r( for ii?'), as its own MSS and those of Simpl. Phys. init.. An. 148, Pt. 34, &c., name the treatise. Aristotle him-
(in
self
commonly
<pv(riKb.
calls
only the
first
books
(Phys.
viii.
1,
VOL.
I.
82
ARISTOTLE
On
the
nected works
viii.
3, 253, b, 7, cf. ii. 1, 192, b, 20, viii. 10, 267, b, 20, cf. iii. 4 ; Metaph. i. 3, 983, a, 33, c, 4, 985,
V.
is
with book
vi.,
so closely con-
name
II. kiv}]-
1059,
i.
a,
34,
i.
Metai)li.
5,
xiii. 1,
i.).
Phys.
cf. Phys. ii. 3, 7; 986, b, 30, cf. i%.5. c, 9, 1086, a, 23, cf. The later books he
Adrastus
SiMPL.
16,
2,
i.-v.
a) n.
visually
calls
ix.
ra
8,
Trepl
Kipv.afus
\_(pv<TiKu>v'], as others named the whole, while vi.-viii. bore the title n. Kivriaecos under which
(Metaj)h.
1049, b,
;
36, cf.
i.
Phys.
viii., vi.
Be
Qt'lo
.
5, 7,
272, a, 30, 275, b, 21, cf Phys. vi. 7, 238, a, 20, c, 2. 233, a, 31, viii. 10 Be Co'lo iii. 1, 299, a, 10, cf. Gen. et Phys. vi. 2, 233, b, 15
; ;
shown that
cited
this
v.
was
so in the
earliest period.
When
Theophr.
Corr.
viii.
;
i.
3,
318, a,
c, 6,
3,
cf.
Phys.
445, b, 19, cf, Anal. post. ii. 12,95, Pltys. vi. 1 But in Phys. viii. 5,^ 257, b, 10).
;
Be Sensu
as e/c tuv <pv(riKu>v he may easily have meant not only this whole treatise but and cf others also Qut supra Simpl. 216, a). When Damasus the biographer and follower of
book
a, 34 eV Tols KaOoKov -rrepl (pvaeoos refers to B. vi. 1, 4, MetajjJi. viii. in to B. v. 1 1, and (pvcriKo. Metaph. i. 8, 989, a, 24, xii. 8,
;
Eudemus
t^s
-n-epl
<|)U(rea)S
1073, 32, the phrase to tt. (pva^cas refers not merely to the whole of the Physlca, but also to other
works on Natural Science (cf. BoNiTZ and Schwegler arZZoc). For more general references see
4, Be Ccelo i. 6, 274, a, 21, TOLS irepl ras apx^s, B. iv. 12, vi. 1, Be Ca'lo iii. 4, 303, a, 23,
B,
eV
iii.
Trepl XP^^^ '^"^ KLvr}(rws, and see IND. Arist. 102, b, 18 sqq. D. 90, 45 (115) names a IT. (pvcrecos and a n. Kiv^a^ws, but the former with three books only,and the latter with one (cf. p. 50,n. 1).
b,
SiMPL.(P%s. 190, a, 216, a, 258, and 320, a) says that Aristotle and his kraipoi {i.e. Theophrastus and Eudemus) spoke of the first
5 books
<pv(riKoov
tuv nepl Kivfi' a-ews Tpia, it does not follow that he means vi., vii., viii., and not rather v., vi., viii. (cf. KoSE, Ar. Libr. Ord. 198 Brandis, ii. Indeed book vii. gave b, 782). even ancient critics the impression of a section not properly fitted into the general connection, and Simpl. {Phys. 242, a) tells us that Eudemus passed it over in his revision of the whole work. It need not on that account V e classed as spurious (with Eose, 199), but rather (with Brandis, ii. b, 893 sq.) as a collection of preliminary notes which do not belong to the Treatise on Physics. The text has taken on many in;
as ^vaiKa or n. apxa>v
and No doubt viii. as n. Kiwfjffeus. Porphyry, however, was right (av. SiMPL. 190, a) when he in-
and of books
vii.
terpolations and alterations from a paraphrase, known even in the time of Alexander and Simplicius (y. Simpl. 245, a, b, 253, b, and
cf.
Spengel, Ahh.
d,
MuncUn.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Decay
^
83
and the
Meteorology.'^
them under
sq.),
Akad.
iii.
313
but
the
Ar. Meteorol.
i.
415,
ii.
ii.
199 (nor
original text is to be found in the smaller edition of Bekker and in that of Prantl. The Aristotelian origin of B. vi. c, 9, 10 is rightly
from Cic. N. B.
15,
and Plut.
Plac. v. 20) infer that the n. ovpavov was originally more complete or existed in a recension
different
^
maintained by Brandis
(ii. b, 889) against Weisse. * The n. ovpavov in 4, and the n. 76j/eo-ecos KoL ^dopas in two books. The current division of these books, however, can hardly be derived from Aristotle, for books iii. and iv. of the IT. ovpavov are more nearly connected with the other treatise than are the earlier books. Aristotle recognises both by a short reference to their contents in the beginning of the Meteorol., and by citing
yiKa
Pt. 37, IT. fMeredopcuv 5' ^ /t; TcwpoffKOTTid ; Pt. 76 do. with two
observed,
books only.
Be
.
7 in Meteorol. i. 3 rhv &V(a roirov iv Tols irepl rod iroi^lv Koi Tracxetj/ ^uapiffixevois to the Gen. et Corr. i. 10 (not Metew. iv.) Be Sensu C, 3, 440, b, 3, 12 (eV toTs Trepi jui^ecos) ; to the Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, Be An. ii. 11, 423, b, 29, Be Sensu, c, 4, 441, b, 12 (eV ro7sTrp\ ffToix^icav). A work n. ovpavov is ascribed by SiMF.(Be Ccelo, Schol. in Ar. 468, a, 11, 498, b, 9, 42, 502, a, 43) also to Theophrastus, who is said to have followed the lines of Aristotle's book. With this exception the earliest witnesses to the existence of the work are Xenarchus and Nicolaus of Damascus (t>. Brandis, Gr.rbm. Phil ii. b, 952), but there is no doubt of the authenticity either of these books or of the
Ccelo
irepX
ii.
.
.
,
This work, as above places itself, in its opening chapter, in immediate connection with the works last discussed and its genuineness is beyond doubt. Aristotle himself does not name it (for Be Plant. ii. 2, 822, b, 32 is a spurious book), but he frequently recalls its doctrines; cf. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 102, b, 49. According to Alex. Meteor. 91 and Olympiod. ap. Idelee, Ar. Meteor, i. 137, 222, 286, Theophrastus in his fx.iTap(rioXoyLKa(T)iOG.v. 44) seems to have imitated it. Ideler {iMd. i. vii. sq.) shows that it was known to Aratus, Philochorus, Agathemerus, Polybius, and Posidonius. Eratosthenes, however,
;
ihid.
seems not to have known it cf. i. 462. Of the four books, the last seems from its contents not to have originally belonged
;
to the saijie treatise. Alex. {Meteor. 126, a) and Ammon. (ap. Olympiod. in Idelee, Ar. Meteor, i. 133) prefer to connect it with the IT. yevca-em but it is not adapted to that work either. Since it has all the appearance of being Aristotelian, and is cited by Aristotle (Part. An. ii. 2, 649, a, 33 ; cf. Meteor,
;
o 2
84
ARISTOTLE
743, a, 6 9, 384, a, an 33), it must be taken to be isolated section, which was not contemplated, in this form, when
ii.
Gen. An.
iv. 6,
6,
cf Mcieor.
383, b,
the Meteorology was begun (v. Meteor, i. 1 ad fin.'), but which in the end took the place of the further matter that remained to be dealt with at the end of book iii., which obviously does not itself bring the treatise to a As P.onitz (^Ind. Ar. 1)8, close.
b, 53) notices in criticising Heitz, this book (c. 8, 384, b, 33) cites
apxoov (ibid. 93), IT, KivrjtTcas (D. Pt. 17, 45, 115; An. 102, 1 B the same again as Auscid8 B and tatio 2)^iysica, at No. 84 perhaps also as n. apxvs at D. 41). In what relation the same work stands to the titles: 11. (pva^ws (D. 90 as three books, An. 81, as one); <PvaiKhv a' (D. 91); or n.
; ; ;
(pvaiKwi/ a'
(An. 82) is not clear. An. Ap2J. 170, Ft. 85 n. xP"''ou might also be only an extract including PJ/ys. iv. 10- 14, though it is preferable to think of it as a special treatise by some of the
:
3feteor.
360
SrENGEL,
'
Ueb.
d.
Keihen-
AhUandl.
;
d.
Munelm.
T.RANDIS, Gr.Aliad. V. 150 s(i. rom. Phil. ii. b, 1073, 1076; Rose, Arist. Lihr. Ord. 1J)7).
Tlie doubts alluded to by Olympiod. ihid. i. 131, as to book i. the reasons are unsupported given by Ideler (i. xii. sq.) for holding that two recensions of the Meteor, existed in antiquity
;
Aristotle himself Peripatetics. refers with the words iv ro7s ir. aroix^iuiv in the Be An. ii. 11, 423, b, 28, and the De Sensv, 4, 441, a, 12, to the Gen. et Corr. 2 sqq. Whether in D. 39, ii. An. 35, the title n. (rroix^icov 7' only refers to this work (possibly
in connection
with
50,
n.
De
1
;
(Joelo
iii.
or with 31etror. iv., cf. Fr. Pfz. 156), or whether it means a special collection of several Aristotelian tracts the elements, or relating to
and
iv., cf. p.
The points which he supposed to have been found in another edition of this, are for the most part referable to other works, and where that is
not so (Sen. Qu. Nat. vii. 28, 1 our cf. Meteor, i. 7, 344, b, 18) informant m ay be in error. But it may is possible that these points have come from an edition that later had been expanded by a
;
there was a separate (which could not be considered genuine) must remain an open question. 80, again, as to the book n. tov Trdcrx^i-v ^ ireirovOevat (D. 25) Aristotle in Be An.
whether
treatise
ii. 5,
41 7, a, 1, and in Gen. Anirn. iv. 3, 768, b, 23 refers by the formula, iv to?s it. rod ttoi^Iv koI Trdax^Lv, to Gen. et Corr. i. 7 sq.,
cf
fol-
lowing titles n. apxS>v ^ (pixrews a' (An. 21), iv ro7s rr. tv dpx^" rrjs oAtjs (pvaca^s (ThEMIST. Pe rwv J.n. ii. 71, 76), iv to7s tt.
:
a leference doubted by Trendelenburg (De An. ibid.) and by Heitz (V. S. 80), but which it seems impossible, on comparison of the passages, to reject (cf. with Gen. An. p. 324, a, 30 with De An. 416, b, 35, and sq. 323, a, 10 sq. with De An. 417
; ;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Another
a, 1,
a5v-
varov,
etc.,
and
325,
title
ap.
Ar.
Oj)jj.
ii.
973,
n.
v.
cr-n/uLciuu),
which
suggests
Fr. 11%. Ar. Fr. 237 sq. 1521 157 Ar, Ps. 243 sq. The n. ttoTafMoou (Ps.-Plut. He Fluv. c. 25 ad fin. Heitz, V. S. 297 Fr. Hz. 349) seems to have been a
; ;
separate treatise
it
late compilation.
lier
Of much
ear-
et
Corr.
Trend.
Gesch.
Kategor., 130, supposes) it treated generally of the categories of Action and Passion. With Physics also was connected the tract De qua^stionibus hylicis, Pt. 50, and perhaps also Pt. 75, Be accidentlMis unirersiSy both without doubt spurious. So must be also An. A^jj^. 184, n. KdcTfxov
(according to Rose, either by Theophrastus or of his time) is An. App. 159 Pt. 22, n. ttJs rov 'NciKov avafidaews, de q.v. R0SE,^r. Ps. 239 sq. Ar. Fr, The Fq'. Hz. 211. p. 1520; date
;
treatises
De
H\t.mior%bus
and He
cannot
which cannot have been written by Aristotle, who so decisively combats the idea of a beginning of the world. The book n. kSctixov (which is not even known to our three lists) was
yevea-ecos,
genuine, as they are mentioned nowhere else. As to the n. xpco^oTcoi/, well founded objections have been raised by Prantl (/Ir. ii. d: FarVen, Miinch., 1849, cf. 107, 115, 142, etc.). p. 82 Alex, in Meteor. 98, b, and Olympiod. in Meteor. 36,a(/AlDELER, Ar. Meteor, i. 287 sq.) allege that
be
Aristotle wrote a
book
IT.
x^H-<^^t
written at the earliest 50-1 B.C. of. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. iii. a, 558. The so-called quotation from a
work n. /Ai|ecos, given by Minoides Mynas, in his edition of Gennadius against Pletho {Fr. Hz. 157), belongs perhaps to the Siaipiffeis spoken of p. 75, n. 2. Many of the books we hear of as related to the subject of tbe Meteor.
but neither seems to have known it. So Michael of Ephesus, He Vita et M. 175, b, remarks that Aristotle's n. ^vrav kuI x^^^^ was lost, so that it was necessary Arito rely on Theophrastus. stotle himself alludes in Meteor.
ii.
3,
359, b, 20,
to
some more
extended inquiry into the qualithings relating to the sense of taste and since in tbe late He Sensu, c. iv. ad fin.^ further inquiries on the same subject are projected as part of the work on Plants, it is a question whether we should refer the allusion in Meteor, ii. to a separate book n. xw^Vy and not consider it rather as a later interpolation referring to He Sensu"ties of
;
seem to A work
;
have
n.
been
spurious.
avefiooy
(ACHILL.
Tat. in Ar. c. 33, 158 A; Fr. Hz. 350 Rose, Ar. Ps. 622) was ascribed to Aristotle, probably by a confusion between him and Theophrastus {de q. v. DiOG. v.
42; Alex. Meteor. 101, b, 106, a, etc.) and so with the 'S.-nixila
;
X^i-P-<^vo}v
(D. 112, or
a2).
An.
99,
AMISTOTLE
mechanical,
optical,
mathematical,
tracts.^
and astronomical
nxidiDeAn. ii. 10. Aristotle contemplates at the end of Meteor, iii. a work on Metals, and the commen*^ators mention a jneTaWwv. TT. See fxovofiifiXos SiMPL. PInjs. 1, a; Be Ccelo,
c. 4,
ad Jin.).
The n.
aTSfKov rpafi/j-wu
(Ar. 0pp. ii. 968 sq.), which in our lists is only named by Pt. 10, and never cited by Aristotle himself, was also ascribed with much likelihood to Theophrastus
Phys. a, 1, m. (who, however, on the Meteorologia,\. 135 id., speaks as if he did not know such a
tract)
;
by Simpl. De Ccelo, Schol. in Ar. 510, b,10, and Philop. Gen.et, Corr. 8 b, whereas Philop. ad Gen. et Corr. 37, a, and ad Phijs. ra. 8, treats it simply as by Arialso
Its genuineness is doubted by Rose (Ar.Libr. Ord.Wii). The reference in EuTOC. ad ArcMni. de Circ. Dlmens. prooim,.
stotle.
Olympiod.
in Meteor,
i.
Some, with more reason, attribute the book to Theophrastus (Pollux, Onomast. vii. 90, X. 149; cf. DioG. V.44; Theophr. Alex. Meteor. J)e Lapid. init.
183
id.
;
126,
a,
ii.
161
Id.;
and
sq.,
see
that Meteor,
8,
iv. iii. 7, 378, b, 5 384, b, 34, refers to the n. ^er. (on which see Heitz, p. 68), see
names
lxTi]xo.viKa fiifixia
98, b, 53.
We
aj).
know nothing
fodinis
Aral).
of the
De
metalli
Vers.
(Hadschi
160).
Khalfa,
tract
on the
M7]xaviKa (in D. 123; AN. 114, called iJL-(]xaviKbv [-coi'], but more correctly ap. Pt, 18, Mtjx. t/jo)3A^ftaTa) are certainly not from the hand of Aristotle cf Rose, Ar. Lihr. Ord. 192. D. 114,
;
.
IMagnet (n. ttjs Xidov, D. 125; An. 117; Rose, Ar. Ps. 242; P?'. H. 215) was probably spurious.
^OiTTiKbv
a'
An.
103,
iyi
fiifiXia;
cf.
;
David
Anon.
(Hadschi Kh. loc. clt. 159 see Meyer, Nicol. Damaso. De iilan;
tis,
praef. p. xi.
sq.,
Ord. 181
was certainly
53),
0'j<rlas
so.
a'
MaOf] fiariKhv
(D. 63
An.
n.
TTJs
eV
To7s
ixad7]jxa(nv
Categ Schol. 25, a, 36 Proleg. in Metapli. ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 377, and Fr. IIz. 215 'OTTTi/ca Trpo^A-fjiJ.., V. Marc. p. 2 and p. 8. It is clear from a reference in a Latin translation of Hero's KaTOTTTpiKo. (clrc. 230 B.C.) ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 378 Ar. Fr. 1534 Fr. Hz. 216, and from the Pseud. Ar. Prohlems, xvi. 1 ad fin.., that
; ; ;
(An. Apj?. 160), IT. fiovaSos (D. Ill; An. 100), n. fxcy^dovs (D. 85 An. 77, unless this was a Rhetorical tract; see p. 72, 2
;
name
at an early date,
is not,
it
genuineness
assured, though
is
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
87
Next to the Physics and the related treatises come the numerous and important works dealing with life. Some of these are descriptive, others are inquiries. To the and the former class belong the History of Animals
*
bable that among Aristotle's genuine Problems there were some in Optics The Be Speculo, attributed by Arabic and Christian Middle-Age writers to Aristotle, appears to be only Euclid's KoTOTTTpi/ca (Rose, Ar. Ps. 376). An. 101, report an D. 113 'AarpovofxiKhu and Aristotle himself refers to such a work in 3Ieteor. i. 3, 339, b, 7 (^Stj yhp S)TTTai Sia Tuv acrrpoKoyiKuv deioprjfidrcov riiJuv), ibid. c. 8, 345, b, 1
;
;
titles
Be sideruvi arcanis. sideribus eorwnique arcanis, stellis lahentibus, and Mille verba de astrologia judiciaria. As to the accuracy of the other mathematical and related writ(p.
159-161)
Be Be
we can decide nothing. The attempt of Rose (Ar. Libr. Ord. 192) to prove that none of them does not can be Aristotle's
ings,
(^Kaddnep
Ccelo,
T7JS
irepl
ii.
Se'iKwrai
10,
eV
toTs
irepl
succeed. ' n. TO
IffTopias
i'.
aarpoXoylav
Tctlecos
deoop-fjixatriv),
and De
(Trepl
e/c
291, a, 29
avTcov
etc.
5e
ruv
AeaarpoXoyiav deoipeiTOci} 7eTat yap iKavcos) ; SiMPL. on the De Ccelo, Schol. 497, a, 8, appears to have the same in his mind. The existence of the book is accepted, of modern
scholars, by Bonitz (^Ind. Ar. 104, a, 17 sq.) and Prantl (ad n. ovp. p. 303) ; while Heitz (S. V.
(TI. ^4^v the 155 same is meant by D. 102 and An. 91, n. C^'^Vf nine books, and by Pt. 42). The Arabic writers count ten, fifteen, or nineteen books, and had no doubt expanded the extant text by various added tracts cf. Wenrich, Be Auct. Grcec. Vers. 148. Aristotle quotes it by various names Icropiai [-ta] t. to ^<^a (Part. Anim. iii. 14, 674, b, 16
^(fa iaropla
A2J2J-
An,
17) thinks it probable, though in Fr. Hz. 160 he refuses to decide. Blass {Rliein. Mus. xxx. 504) applies the references to writings by other hands. Ideler (Ar. Metayli. i. 415) assumes a varying recension of the Be Ccelo, which has no probability. It
p.
1
iv, 5,
iv. 8
ad
Gen. An.
IffTopiai
IT.
i.
4, 717, a,
c.
33
i.
20,
;
16, init.)
(Part. Anim. Gen. 660, b, 2 ii. 1, init. c. 17, Anim, i. 3, 716, b, 31 ; Respir. c. 12, 477, a, 6), tu^'iK)] Iffropia (Part.
;
does
not
seem
probable
that
Anim.
iii.
5, Jin.),
iffropia ^vctik^
;
Heitz,
ibid.) Astrological
work
took the form of Problems, since Aristotle repeatedly speaks of Qi<i3pi]ixara. Not to it, but to late interpolated tracts, are the
(Part. Anim. ii. 3, 650, a, 31 Ingr. An. c. 1, Jin.), and simply la-Topiai or Iffropia (Be Resjnr. 1 6, Gen. Anim. i. 11, 719, 478, b, 1 a, 10; ii. 4, 740, a, 23; c. 7, 746, a, 14; iii. 1,750, b, 31; c. 2,753, b, 17 c. ^Jin. c. \Ofn. c. 11 Jin.
; ; ; ;
88
In
ARISTOTLE
Heitz, 224
sq.
;
its contents, however, it is rather a Comparative Anatomy and Physiology than a description of animals. As to the plan of it, cf. J. B. Meyer, Ar. Its genuineness TJiierk. 114 sq. is beyond question, though as to the tenth book, it must be taken to be, not merely with Spengel {Be Ar, Lihro Hist. Anim. Heidelb. 18-12), a retranslation of a Latin translation of a section written by Aristotle to follow book vii., but wholly- spurious with Sci.neider (iv, 262, i. xiii.), Kose {Ar. Lihr. Ord. 171), and Brandis (^Gr.-r'6m. Phil. ii. 6, 1257). Apart from any thing else the un-Aristotelian assumption of a female semen would prove
Clemens, Pcedag. ii. 150, C (cf. Athen. vii. 315, e) seems to refer to the same lost work, and Apollonius {Mirahil. c. 27) mentions it, distinguishing it expressly from the extant Hist. An. (n. Cywj'). Parts of this lost work are probably indicated by the
names
IT.
drjpiwv
c.
Catasterismi,
41,
Buhle,
ii.
88); 'TTrep
Toiv iivOoXoyovfiivwv C^uiv (D. 106; An. 95); uTrep tQv (rvj'OiTwv (cf^^
(D.
DiOG.
V.
44 attributes a
this
of
is
itself.
No doubt
as that
[Trepi]
tliis
book
fiT)
the
same
in
v-n^p
tov
Wimm.
to Alexander's reported assistance for the whole work, cf. p. 29 sq. snjrm and as to the sources used by Aristotle, cf. Rose, Ar. Lihr. Ord. 206 sq. Besides this History of Animals, there were know^n to the ancients various similar works. Athenfeus, for example, uses one work different (as is clear from his own words) from our Jlist.A/i., xmder:
;
As
Dialogue Eudemus,' and Heitz, Fragm. Ar. 217, to the larpiKa. The citations from this and similar works, sometimes under the
'
name
of Aristotle, sometimes of
the names eV t^ it. Zcfwu, iv ro7s IT. Z. (Rose, Ar. Ps. 277, and Heitz, 224, unnecessarily read
ZwiKwv), iv
rq)
ir.
ZcoiKwv,
iv rcf
Z(fCt}v
iiriypa(poiJ.iv(f ZcfiKqi, iv
ry
TT.
tt.
^ {kuI]
at the
cites
IT.
'IxOvCOV, iv
tt.
T^
Z(i}'iKWV
;
^l^Qvuv
but
as v4ixtttov notes of
;
Schweighauser on the passages in question e.g. ii. 63, b iii. 88 c. vii. 281 sq., 286, b and the Index, and see Rose, Ar. Ps 276 sq.: Ar. Fr. Nr. 277 sq.;
; ; ;
Theophrastus, will be found in Rose, Ar. Ps. 276-372; Ar. Fr. 257-334, p. 1525 sq. Fr. Hz. 171 sq. Plin. (^H. Nat. viii. 16, 44) says Aristotle wrote about fifty, and Antigonus (Mlrab. c. 60 IQ6']) says about seventy books on Animals. Of all these it is clear that none but the first nine of our Hist. An. were genuine. The work which Athen. used (which is not Aristotle's style, to judge by the Fr.) seems to have been a compilation from them and other sources, belonging, in view of the passage quoted from Antigonus,to the third century B.C.
;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Anatomical Descriptions.^
the three books O71 the
anthropological
'
89
The
latter class
begin with
Soul^'^
tracts
follow.^
a. 30,
The
Be
further
i.
investi-
The
Interpr.
16, a, 8,
11
Be
ad,
in D. 103, An. 93) are very often cited by Aristotle (of. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 104, a, 4, and Fr. Hz. 160), and it is not possible with Rose {Ar. Lihr. Orel. 188) to explain these references away.
earlier
We
i.
525, a, 8,
ii.
Gen. An.
7,
An. iv.
were furnished with drawings, which were perhaps the principal point of the work. The Schol. on Ingr. An. 178, b (after Simpl. Be Am7/ia), can hardly have cited the work from his own knowledge. Apuleius (Be Mag. c. 36, 40) talks of a work of Aristotle,
n. ^(fwv auaTOfirjs, as universally
Ideler {Ar. Meteor, ii. S60) is not correct in saying that the reverse follows from the end of Meteor, i. 1. The words in the Ingr. An. c. 19 ad fin. which name this book as only projected and the n. ^4^v jxopicoi/ as in existence, are (with Brandis ii. 6, 1078) to be considered as a gloss only. Of its three books the first two seem in a more complete state than the third, Torstrik, in the preface to his edition of 1862, has shown that there are preserved traces of a second recension of book ii., and that confusing repetitions have crept into the present text of book iii.,
known
but it is seldom mentioned elsewhere, and Apuleius himself possibly meant the n. Ctfwv ixopicau. The extract from the work K\oy^ avaro/nuj/, D. 104, An. 94, Apollon. Mirah. c. 39 was certainly not by Aristotle. Heitz {Fr. 171) rightly rejects Rose's opinion {Ar. Ps. 276) that the avaroiJial were one work with the Cv'^Ka. An. 187
;
made before the date of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the same appears to be true of book i. also. Singularly enough
;
D. and An. do not mention the work but Pt. 38 has it whereas D. 73 and An. 68 give eVety
; ;
stotle's
n. 2,
^
the
accounts of
supra.
no human anatomy
iii.
3,
513,
a,
12,
i.
see
'^
cited
by
(BONITZ,
J/Z. Ar. 102, b, 60 sq.), in the Gen. An. ii. 3, v. 1, 7, 736. a, 37, 779, b, 23, 786, b, 25, 288, b, 1, Part. An. iii. 10, 673,
and
90
ARISTOTLE
wide sense, as including
all the anthropological treatises which are introduced by 11. alad. 1 init., The as by a common preface. same explanation will account for the statement in Parf. An. ii. 7, 653, a, 19 that Aristode
y^vea^m (BONITZ, Ind. ArAQ^, a, 8 sq.), De Mcmor. c. 1, inlt.. Be Somno 2, 456, a, 2 (Be 3Iofu Anim. c. Wfin.), and announced as coming in the Meteor, i. B, 841, a, 14. TEENDELENBURG.Z'eylM. 118 (106) sq. (contra EoSE, .4r. <7r^. 219, 226; Brandis, iifc'r.
Gr.-rbm. Phil. ii. b, 2, 1191, 284 BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 99, b, 54, 100, b, 30, 40) believes that the n. alad. is mutilated, and that it is a separated section of it which is preserved as the e/c rov ircpl
;
would speak
Kal
TT.
ev t ro7s
ir.
al<Td'f](rws
oLKovarccv,
is
Ar. Opp.
ii.
800
sq.
It
of the causes and effects of sleep. The subject is to be found only Be Somno, 2, 8, 458, a, 18 sq, and no fitting place for its introduction can be found in our n. alaQ. Probably it did not occur in the
vTTvov
Sicapifffievois
certain that some of the references in later writings cannot be satisfactorily verified in our present text. According to the Gen. An. v. 2, 781, a, 20, and PaH. An. ii. 10, 65G, a, 27, it was
original text either and we are to understand the referetce as indicating by n. al<re. the general, and by IT. v-kvov the particular description of one and the same treatise (in which view re should
;
explained
that the canals of the organs of sense started from the heart but, on the contrary, in the only applicable passage of the extant treatise (c. 2, 438, b, 25) we are told that the organs of smell and sight are seated near the brain, out of which they are formed, but those of taste and touch in the heart. It is not until the Be Vita et M. c. 3, 469, a, 10 that he adds that the heart is the seat of perception for the other senses also (only not cpavepws as and here 1. 22 sq. for these) refers to the passage of the n. alad. just cited (for it is only there, and not in the Part. An. ii. 10, as cited Ind. Ar. 99, b, 5, that the different positions are assigned to the organs of sense). From these fact sit does not follow that a section dealing with this point is omitted in our text, but rather that the words eV to7s tt. alaO. in Gen. An. v, 2 and Part. An. ii. 10 are to be taken in a
;
perhaps be dropped). So finally in Gen. An. v. 7, 786, b, 23, 788, a, 84 there are allusions to investigations as to the voice eV rols These IT. Tpvxvs and ir. al(Tdi}(recos. are to be referred chiefly to Be
ii. 8, and secondarily to c. 1, 487, a, 3 sq., 446, b, 2 sq., and 12 sq. whereas the beginning of c. 4 of
An.
the Be An. itself tells us that it was beyond the plan of that treatise to give any detailed account of
voice and tone, such as we find TI. the extant fragment in
aKovcrrwu.
is
contains no express references to any of his books. In fact its own broad and sketchy methods of exposition show it to be the work
its
Kal
avafjLvfiffeus,
quoted in the Be Motu An. c. 11, ad fin. and by the Commentators. The book of Mnemonics noticed
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
p. 72, n. 2 Jin. supra,
91
has nothing
ing
(3) n. virvov kuI iyprjySpareus cited Be Longit. V., Part. An., Gen. An., Motu An., and announced as in contemplation (Ind. Ar. 103, a, 16 sq) by Be An. iii. 9, 432, b, 11, Be Sensu, c. 1, 436, a, 12 sq. It is freit.
to
do with
Rose, Ar. lAhr. Ord., refers to Hist. An. iii. 3, 513, a, 21), and as the Essay on Life and Death is spoken of
(cf.
who wrongly
KOL virpov
(Gell.
vi.
6,
Alex. Top.
copied
Sensu, 125, b, Michael, in Arist Be Mem. 127, a, Ptol. 4). It is, however, clear from Arist. Bivin. in Somn. c. 2, Jin., that it was in fact bracketed with (4) n. 'TLvvirviav and (5) n. ttJs ro0' "'^irvov fiavTiKTJs. (4) is also in the Be
Somno,
2,
456, a, 27,
announced
as in preparation.
fiidrriTos /cot
An
iii.
10,
and by name Athen. viii. 353, a, Pt. 46, and perhaps also An. App. 141. (7) n. (wtis Kol QavoLTov: to which (8) n.
view so closely related that they form one whole {Be Vita et 31. c. 1
avairvorts, is in Aristotle's
Brandis (1192 sq.) suggests that only the first half of the so-called Parva Naturalia' (Nos. 1-5) was composed immediately after the Be Anima and that the rest of these (which in Ptolemy's catalogue stand at No. 46 sq. divided from the books on Sense, Sleep, and Memory by the books on Zoology) were not written until after the works on the Parts, the Movement, and the Generation of Animals, though projected earlier. And it is true that in the Be Generat. Anim. iv. 10, 777, b, 8, we hear that inquiries into the reason of the varying duration of life are projected, and these are not further dealt with in that work. But on the other hand the Part. An. iii. 6,
' ;
669. a, 4 refers to
Be
Respir.
c.
10, 16, and the same iv. 13, 696, b, 1, and 697, a, 22, to Be Respir.
c.
Be
Respir.
c.
21,
a,
486, b, 21).
tract, n. ve6Tr]Tos
Vita et Morte,
(cf.
of by Aristotle (467, b, 6, 10), to which our editors ascribe the lirst two chapters of the IT. (wijs Koi Oavdrov, but clearly without reason, for it seems more probable either that Aristotle never wrote the tract or that it was lost at a very early date (cf. Beandis, 1191, BoNiTZ, Ind. Ar. 103, a, 26 sq, Heitz, p. 58). Inasmuch
Ar. 103, a, 23, 34, sq., where the other references are more problematical). If Brandis
I7id.
is
right, these
references
must
have been added, as does sometimes happen, to works previously completed. As to the genuineness of the writings already named, it is guaranteed not only by internal evidence, but by the references referred to. Another
as the Be Vita et Morte, c. 3, 468, b, 31 (cf. Be Bespir. c. 7, 473, a, 27) mentions the Essay on the Parts of Animals as already exist-
projected tract,
(las
IT.
(Be Sensu
c.
436, a, 17,
Long.
c.
Respir.
ii.
An.
7,
92
ARISTOTLE
On
on
the Parts of Animals,^
gations
essays
the
Generation
and
Movement
of
653, a, 8), was probably never written (thougli Heitz, p. 58 and Fr.Ar. 169, thinks otherwise). It
is
unknown
to
Alexander,
J)e
Sensu, 94, and therefore it is likely that the Be Sanitate et Morho known by the Arabic writers (lladschi Khalf a />?/ Weneicii, Two books IT. 1 (;0) was a forgery. u\pews (Ax. Aj}p. 173) and one n. hardly (poouT]^ (ihid. 164) could
be
1).
book n. TpofpriK seems to be referred to as existing in the J)e Som/io, c. 3, 456, h, 5 (the reference in Meteor, iv. 3, 381, b, 13 being too uncertain), and it is spoken of as a project in JJe An. ii. 4 Jin., Gen. An. v. 4, 784, b, 2, Pari. An. ii. 3, 650, b, 10, and c. 7, 653, b, 14, and c. 14, 674 a, 20, and iv. 4, 678, a, 19. The reference in Be J/otu An. 10,703, a, 10 (cf. Michael Kphes. ad lac. p. 156, a) is not to a IT. rpocpris, but to the n. TTv^vixaros for the words ris /J-ff oiv 7) actiTTjpia rov
:
Peripatetic cf. further ajj. EOSE, Ar. Lihr. Ord. 167, sq., and Brandis, p. 1 203, who both with Bonitz reject the book. n. C4^^ jxopiuu four books (in An, App. 157, three books) cited in the Be Gen. An.., Infjr. An., Motn An. (cf. Ind. Ar. 1()3, a, 55 sq), and the Be Vita et M. and Be Ilesjrlr. {de q. v. p. 91, supra) but the Be Somno, 3, 457, b, 28 might be referred to Be Sensu, 2,' 438, b, 28, though Be Somno, c. 2, 455, b, 34 may be better paralleled by Part. An. iii. 3, 665, a, 10 sq., than by Be Seinu, 2, 438, b, 25 sq. It is spoken of as projected in Meteor. Hist. An. ii. i. I, 339, a, 7, and
;
'
The
tirst
book
is
(TvjxcpvTov TTvevixaros
e'lprjTai
iv 'aA-
a kind of introduction to the zoological works, including the treatises on the Soul, and the activities and conditions of life, and it cannot well have been originally meant for this place On the order of (cf. 8PENGEL, Aristotle's books on Natural Phi'
to the words rod ifj.(pvrov Trv^vixaros 5ia/j.ouri ; (n. TTj/eu. init.). (So BONITZ, Ind. uir. 100, a, 52 but Rose, Ar. Lihr. Ord. 167 makes them refer to the n. ^(f. KLvr)(T. itself, and Heitz, Fr. Ar. 168 to the n. Tpo(t>ris.) The work is named in Pt. No. 20, where it is wrongly given three books. It dealt with food and other matters in an aphoristic style; and that it is later than Aristotle is clear from the fact that it recognised the distinction of veins and arteries, which was
AoLs clearly relate
Tis
7)
;
Mdnch.
others
AMd.
there
n. ((fup yVae(>}s, five books An. App. 158, three books, Pt. No. 44, five books, ibid. No. 77, the same work in two books the errors are of no signi(in
;
It is often referred to ficance). by Aristotle, but only in the future (cf. Ind. Ar. 108, b, 8 sq.).
unknown
DiOG. omits it but its genuineness is beyond doubt. Book v., however, seems not to belong to it, but to be an appendix to the works on the Parts and Generation of Animals, just as the
;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Animals/ complete
lost
*
93
his
zoological
system.
Later in
books
On Plants}
'
refers
De
'
So
Michael Ephes, on
Vita et M. 175 b, Simplicius Philop. &c. {apud Rose, At. Ps. 261, Heitz, Pt. Ar. 163) say the contrary, but we need not suppose they spoke from personal knowledge of the IT. (pvroov. Quintil. (xii. 11, 22) proves nothing for, and Cic. (Fin. v. 4, 10) nothing against, their genuine-
Be
can hardly be Kiv7](Tcos ^^)<t>p authentic among other reasons, because it cites the n. irvev/xaTos Rose (Ar. (cf. p. 89, n. 3 Jin.). Lihr. Ord. 163 sq.) and Brandis (ii. b, 1, p. 1271, 482) declare it spurious Barthelemy St. Hilaire
; :
What Athen. (xiv. 652 a, 653 d, &c.) cites from them (Ar. Fr. 250-4) may as probably be taken from a false as from a genuine book. The two Aristoness.
telian references
it,
mentioned make
however, overwhelmingly probable that Aristotle did write two books on Plants, which were
94
still
ARISTOTLE
extant
in the time of though they were afterwards displaced by the more elaborate work of Theophrastus (so Heitz, Ar. Fr. 250, and Verl. Sclirift. 61, though Rose, Ar. Ps. 261, thinks the books by Theophrastus were ascribed to Aristotle). According to Anti-
Hermippus,
Goxus
ap.
{Mirahil.
c.
Ar. Fr. 253, Fr. Hz. 223) Callimachus as well as Theophrastus seems to have borrowed from these two books. So did the compiler of the <^vTiKa, as to which Pollux, x. 170 {ap. Ar. Fr. 252, Fr. Hz. 224) could not say whether they belonged to Theophrastus or to Aristotle, but which no doubt, like the ^wi'/ca
we know how conthe earlier Peripatetics adopted the teaching and the very words of Aristotle. On the other hand, the only passage cited verbally from Aristotle's books (Athen. xiv. 652 a, ap. Ar. Fr. 250) is not in those of Theophrastus, so far as we have them and the latter contain no direct reference to any of the Aristotelian writings a circumstance which would be incredible in a work so extensive which touched at so many points the
<pvrS)v
:
for
stantly
The
manner,
Athemeus
and
very passage {Cavs. PI. vi. 4, 1) in which Jessen finds one main proof of his theory points to several later modifications of an Aristotelian doctrine which had arisen in the School after his death. Theophrastus, in contrast with Aristotle's view, speaks of male and female plants (cf. Cans. PI. i. 22, 1, Hist. iii. 9, 2, &c.). But a decisive argument is to be found in the fact that not only does the text of Theophrastus speak of Alexander and his Indian expedition in a way
4, 1, 5, 9, Cans. viii. 4, 5) which would be hardly possible in Aristotle's lifetime, but it also refers to what happened in the time of King Antigonus {Hist. iv. 8, 4) and the Archons Archippus, B.C. 321 or 318 {Hist. iv. 14, 11) and Nicodorus, B.C.
{Hist. iv.
(Pref. to NicoL. Dam. Be Planed. 1841) ascribes them in their original form to Nicolaus of
tis, ii.
Damascus, though possibly they are only an extract from his book,
worked over by a
later hand. Jessen's suggestion (Bhnn. Mvs. 1859, vol. xiv. 88) that Aristotle's genuine work is contained in the work of Theophrastus is in no way supported by the fact that the latter closely agrees with
314 {Cavs. i. 19, 5). It would likewise be clear on a full comparison that the diction and manner of statement in the Theophrastic books makes it impossible to attribute them to Aristotle.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
field of
95
mies,^ the
^
n.
^Avdpd>irov
only
named
in
An.
Aj?jj.
183.
There
are a few items which seem to have belonged to this tract, apud KoSB, Ar. Ps. 379, Ar. Ft. 257264, p. 1525, Fr. Hz. 189 sq. 2 '^vGio'^voiyioviKa. (Bekker, 805), \-Kbv a' in D. 109, but -wa )8' in An extended recenAn. 97]. sion of this work is indicated by numerous references to the physiognomic theories not to be found in our text, which occur in a treatise on Physiognomy writ-
For the little that remains of it, see Rose, Ar. Ps. 384 sq., Ar. Fr. 335-341, p. 1534; Fr. Hz. 216, but on Fr. 362 cf. p. 88, supra. The genuineness of these writings, or at least of some of them, cannot be maintained. That Aristotle held that medical subjects should be treated in a technical way, and not from the point of view of natural science, is evident from his own declaration
which he makes,
p. 9, 1 fin. (cf.
;
ten probably by Apuleius {apud Rose, Anecd. Gr. 61 sq. cf Fr. Hz. 191, and R0SE,^r. Ps. 696 sq.). ^ D. mentions two books of ^larpiKoi the Anon, two books 11. larpiKrjs ibid, APP. 167, seven books n. larpiKTis: Pt. 70 five books of npo^\'f]iJi.aTa larpiKa (from which it appears that the larpiKci. in the list of Diog. were also problems, book i. of our extant Problems being made up of such medical questions and answ<3rs) Vita Marc. p. 2 R, UpofiX-fjixaTa iarpiKo. Pt. 71 IT. SiaiTrjs ibid. ibid. 92, one 74 b, Be Pulsu
; . :
:
Sensu, i. 1, 436, a, 17 Longit. V. 464, b, 32 Pe Pespir. c. 21, Part. An. ii. 7, 653, a, 8), iin. and such an indefinite statement as that of ^lian ( V. H. ix. 22) cannot prove the contrary. As to the composition IT, v6(tov koX vyidas see p. 91 fin. Galen (as Heitz ibid, justly remarks) can have known no composition of Aristotle on medical science, since he never mentions any such, although he quotes the
; ;
Pe
book
a^).
larpiKhs:
Wenrich,
guinis Profusione Co el. Aurel. Celer. Pass. ii. 13, one book Pe Adjutoriis (perhaps a mistake in the name). Galen in Hippocr. Pe Nat. Horn. i. 1, vol. xv. 25 K, knows of an 'larpiK^ cwaywy^ in several books, bearing Aristotle's name, which was nevertheless recognised as being the work of his pupil, Meno; and this is possibly identical with the ^Zwaywy)] in two books named by Diog. 89 (as Wenrich, p. 158, suggests).
philosopher more than six hundred times. An. 189 mentions the TewpyiKa amongst the Pseudepigrapba. Pt. 72, on the other hand, gives 15 (or 10) books Pe Agricultura as genuine, and the statement in Geopon. iii. 3, 4 (Ar. Fr. 255 sq. p. 1525) on the manuring of almond-trees seems to have been taken from this, and not from the treatise on plants. Rose (Ar. Ps. 268 sq. Hz. Fr. 165 sq.) mentions other things which may perhaps have come
*
from
or
this source.
That Aristotle
is
from PoUt.
clear
a, 33, 39.
06
ARISTOTLE
spurious.
The
;
Problems'^
^
but our
described
productions of the
Peripatetic
have existed in
'
many
ol
In the Index
23,
Ptolemy,
No.
Hadsclu Khalfa gives I)e Anl(n. rwv (p(i}Xv6vT(t}v^ malium Cojdura, nee nan de
:
Loois, quihus
delit'jscunt,
'^
deversantur atque
i.
With regard to this treatise the exhaustive article by Prantl Ueb. d. Probl. d. Arist.' among the Ahh. d. Munch.
see
'
^vaiKo.
TTpo^Kri[xara,
and some-
Altad. vi. 341-377; KOSE, Arist. Ar. Ps. 215 Lihr. Ord. 199 sqq. HEITZ, Verl Schr. 103 sqq. s(iq., Fr. At. 191 sqq. ^ Aristotle in seven refers places to the Upo^X-nixara or
;
;
Upo^K-nixariKa (I'EANTL, iUd. 361 Ind. Ar. 103, b, 17 sqq.), sq. but only one of these quotations
;
addition Kar' elSos (Twayui'yris Q arranged in accordance with the matter'). Gellius generally says, Prohlemata (xix. 4), Proh. i^hyslca (xx. ITpo4, (juoting Prohl. xxx. 10) iyKVKXia fiX-n/jLUTa Apul. (JJe Mar/m, c. 51) has Prohlemata; Athen^eus and Apollonius {vid. Indices and Prantl, 390 sq.) althe
:
times with
to a certain extent the and the same extant Problems is true (PR. ibid. 367 sqq.) of the majority of the later references. Prantl, 'iZ/wZ. has abundantly proved this, and he has also shown {Miincli. Gel. Anz. 1858, No. 25) that among the 262 further problems which are given by Bassemaker in vol. iv. of the suits
'
; '
"'
ways npoi8AT7^aTo
(Sat.
vii.
(pvaLKa;
Macrob.
Didot edition of Aristotle, and some of which were at one time erroneously ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf. USENER, Alex. Aphr. ProU., Lib.
iii.,
iv.,
there
is
by
The same is true of those which Rose {Ar. Ps. 666 sqq.) takes from a Latin MS.
Aristotle.
12) Physical qufsstiones. To collections of problems are also referable the titles ^vctikQv Xt]' Kara arcix^lov (D. 120, An. 110 asto the words k. crTotX;the explanation of which in Rose, Ar. Ps. 215, is not clear, they are to be understood of the arrangement of the different books in the alphabetical order of their headings) UpoffX-fi/xaTa (68 or 28 B, Pt. 65) 'ETTLTedea/xevwu irpofiX-nfxdTcvv fi' (D. 121, An. 112); 'EyKVKXiuv fi' (D. 122, An. 113, Upo^X7)iJt.aTa ijKvKX. 4 bks., Pt. 67) Physica Prohle-mata, Adsjiec(Ammon. Latin. tiva Prohl. (D. p. 58); "AraKTu 127, [a]5toTa/CTa)i/ i/8' An. 119). PrcB'
: ;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
97
Turning to Ethics and Politics, we have on the former subject three comprehensive works,' of which,
missa Qiioistionihus (Pt. &&, says the Greek title is hrhimatu hrua'
n.
7]6(iov
ruv QrjTiqfxdTbov o^' (AN. &Q with the additional clause <bs (f)7](riv EijKttipos 6 aKovar^is auTov^ David (ScJiol. in Ar. 24, b, 8) also speaks of 70 books n. (rvfiuiKTcou ^Tirtifidrwu, and the Vita Marc. p. 2, R of ^vaiKo, wpo^X'fjuaTa in 70 books 'E^rjyvfJL^va (or 'E^rtrao-inet/a) Kara y4pos iS' (D. 128, An. 121). With regard to the Upo^X-fifxara ixt]xaviKa,
:
(which seems to be an extract from the same work) Pt. 30 sq. the Great Ethics in two books, the Eudemian Ethics in eight. Aristotle himself quotes {Metaph. i. 1, 981, b, 25, and in six passages of the Politics) the ^QiKd, meaning doubtless the Nicomachean Ethics (cf. BenDiXEN in PMlologus x. 203,
vTroOijKas
;
86, n. 1, and The spurious composition n. TrpofiXrjfidTcov, to which beoTTTiKCL, larpiKa, cf. p.
95, n. 3.
sides D. 51 (and also An. 48, although the irepl is here wanting) Alex. To2}. 34, Schol. in Ar. 258, a, 16, also refers, seems to have contained a theory as to setting and answering problems. See Rose, Ar. Ps. 126, Fraffm. 109, p. 1496, Fr. Hz. 115. On the other hand, book XXX. of our Problems cannot well be meant (as Heitz, 122, believes) by the iyKvKXia, JEth. N. 1, 3, 1096, a, 3. Aristotle seems rather to indicate what he calls
in
Ind. Ar. 103, b, 46 101, b, 19 sqq.). Cic. {FlQi. V. 5, 12) believes that the Lihri de Morihus of Nicomaclras are ascribed to Aristotle, inasmuch as the son would write very much like his father. Diogenes also (viii. 88) quotes Eth. N. X. 2 with the words (^rjcl Se NiKofiaxos 6 'ApicTTOTeXovs. On the other hand Atticus {ajmd Bus, Pr. Ev. XV. 4, 6) gives all three Ethics with their present names as Aristotelian; likewise Simpl.
sq.
;
290
sqq.,
and
and De
CopIo, i. 9, 279, a, 30 Ha eyKVK\La <l>i\o<ro(pi\ixara. Cf BerNAYS, Dial, of Arist. 85, 93 sqq. 171 BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 105, a, 27
;
sqq.
More on this infra. 'UdiKa 'NiKOfidxeia 10 B., 'KOiKa Ev5iiij.ia 7 B., 'HdiKa /xeydha 2 B. Of our catalogues D. 38
^
;
only names 'UdiKwu e' al. S' (although DiOG. elsewhere {Vita, 21) cites the seventh book of the Ethics in connection with Eth. End. vii. 12, 1245, b, 20); An. 39 has 'WdiKuv K {e.g. the Eth. Nic.^ the last book of which is k),
in Cat. 1, C 43, e and Schol. Porphyr. Schol. in Ar. 9, b, 22, who says the Eudemian Ethics were addressed to Eudemus, the MeydXa NiKo/xdxia {31. Mor.) to Nicomachus the father, and the MiKpa NtKOjuaxta (Eth. JV.) to Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle. The same story is told by David, Schol. in A r. 25, a, 40. Eustrat. {in Eth. N. 141, a cf. Arist. Eth. End. vii. 4 init. c. 10, 1242, b, 2) speaks of the Eudemian Ethics as the work of Eudemus, that is to say, he repeats this statement after one of the earlier writers
;
whom
he used
and
VOL.
T.
98
ARISTOTLE
only
however,
one
the
Nicomachean
Ethics
is
of
mass of smaller
an early period, they were employed to fill up the blanks in the Eudemian Eth.; he is inclined to look upon the treatise on pleasure, Nic. vii. 12 sqq., which Aspasius also attributes to
Eudemus
Jin.'),
mian Ethics
(p, 518 sqq.), but without wishing to exclude the possibility of its being a sketch intended by Aristotle for the Nicomachean Eth., and later on replaced by x. 1 sqq. In his Arist. Stud. i. 20 (against which Walter argues in Die Lehre v. d. inald.
sqq.
Schleiermacher (' On the Ethical Works of Aristotle,' for 1817, W. W. Z. Philos. iii. 306 sqq.) gave it as his opinion that, of the three ethical works, the so-called Great Ethics is the and the Nicomachean oldest, Ethics the latest, but the treatise of iSpengel already cited makes the opposite view clear, viz. that
'
Eudem. et Mcom. P)Onn, 1847), and with him also Fritzsche {Arist. Eth. Eud. 1851, Prolegg.
xxxiv.) refer orAj Nic. v. 1-14 to the Nicomachean, and Nic. v. 15, vi., vii., to the Eudemian Ethics. Grant {Ethics of Aristot. i. 49 sqq.) refers the whole of these three books to the Eudemian whilst Bendixen(PMZoZ{7^?/s, x.l99 sqq., 263 sqq.) on the contrary, for reasons worthy of note, defends the Aristotelian origin of the 12-15. including vii. whole, Brandis (6^r.-rom. Phil.ii. b, 1555 sq.), Prantl {D. dianoct. Tvgenden d. A?'. Miinch. 1852, p. 5 sqq.), and in the main also Ueberweg ( Gesch. d. Phil i. 177 sq. 5th ed.),
the genuine work of Aristotle is the Nicomachean Ethics, that the Eudemian Ethics is a supple-
mentary work by Eudemus, and that the Great Ethics is an extract taken directly from the EuBut the position of demian. which are the three books common to the Nicomachean and
iib.
d. niliom.
Eudemian Ethics
Eud.
iv.-vi.)
is
{Nic.
still
v.-vii.,
moot
Ethih, 26 sqq. cf. 15 sqq.) agree with the conclusions of Spengel the last-named with this modi-
Spengel (480 sqq.) bepoint. lieves that they belong originally to the Nicomachean Eth., but
support
which
has
it,
that
ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS
tracts is also
99
genuine.
named/ but probably few of- them were Of the sociological writings only one the
has been submitted to the afterwork of another pen, and has perhaps, in consequence of a mutilation, been supplied from
the
'
and the
title
Eudemian Ethics.
59
the 'EpwTi/cbs mentioned on p. 59), 'EpwTiKa (An. Aj/jf- 181 Pt. 13, 3 B.) and 4 B. of &faeis ipwriKal (D. 71, An. 66 Pt. 56, 1 B.) are mentioned, both of them doubtless equally spurious. An. 162 reckons n. cw^poo-vj/Tjs among the Pseudepigrapha. IT. (t>i\ias a' (D. 24, An. 24, Pt. 25) is supposed not to be a copy from Fth. A', viii. ix., but a special treatise, which can hardly be genuine.
; ;
IT.
j8'
dperrjs
(D. 76, An. 64 Pt. 11, 4 B.) ; n. Tov fieXriovos a' (D. 53, An. 50) ; n, cKOvaiov (-iuv) a' (D. 68, An. 58) IT. rod alperov Kal tov IT. atperov ffvfifiefirjKdTOS a' (D. 58
;
Still less can Aristotle have been the author of Seaeis (piXiKal (D. 72, An. 67). fi' Of the two writings n. ffv/x^idoffeus avSpds Kal yvvaiKds (AN. yl;;^;. 165)
and
Nofxovs (-oi) avSpos Kal ya/xe166), the former is mentioned by other writers several
rrjs (ibid.
Kal (TVfjLfiaivovros,
An.
56).
It is
not probable that Aristotle composed a treatise n. iiridvfxias In the beginning of the Be Sensu, he proposes future researches into the faculty of desire, but we do not hear that they were carried out what we find in Seneca (^De
: ;
(e.g. by Clemens, Olympioand David in the passages given by Rose, Ar. Ps. 180 sq., Ar. Fr. 178 sq., p. 1507). Rose (Be
times
dor.,
Ira,
i.
3. 9, 2, 17, 1, iii. 3,
l)may
more probably have been contained in the writing n. iraQu>v (or -ovs) opyrjs (D. 37, An. 30), the supposed remnants of which Eose (Ar. Is. 109 sqq., Ar. Fr. 94-97, No. 1492) and Heitz {Fr. 151 sq.) have put together. Whether it was a dialogue (Rose) or a treatise (Heitz) cannot with certainty be determined the latter seems the more probable opinion. Its genuineness is, to say the least, undemonstrable,
;
H2
100
ARISTOTLE
^
is
preserved
but though
admirable
contains some
it is
work
unhappily
like the
Metapliysics,
un-
finished.2
genuine.^
(Economics
rest
cannot
be
lost
considered
we have
1
everything
in addition to these two, quotes a third by Chaniaeleon, must liave been indebted for his quotations to various writers, to whom it was known by different names ^anot very probable supposition. What is quoted from it is con-
Aristotle puts this work in the closest connection with the Ethics, by treating the latter as auxiliary to politics (Fth. JV. i. 1, 1094 a, 26 sqq., 1095, a,
c. 13, 1102, a, 5, 12 init.;met. i. 2, 1356, a, He expects from politics realisation of the principles down by Ethics (iUd. x. 10).
2, c. 2 init.
vii.
26).
cerned, partly with historical, partly with physiolo.oical discussions whether dnnikcnness was regarded also from a moral point
;
the
laid
But
(cf.
PolU.
vii.
1,
of the
'kofxoi
(Tva(rtTiKo\
ii.
1323, b, 1, 1261,
for
the circumstance of the Platonic republic beingmentioned in it (Procl. in licvij). 350, Ar. Fr. 177, p. 1507) gives us no hence we cannot indication determine whether Ptose {Ar. Ps. 179) is right in supposing that there was a discussion in it on the arrangement of, and good behaviour at symposia, or Heitz (Ar. Fr. 807), 'in believing that
;
30, iii. 9, 1280, a, 18. c. 12, Even apart from 1282, b, 19). the citation Bhet. i. 8 fin., and the mention of it in the catalogue (D. 75, An. 70), its geniiineness can-
it
the n.
contained a collection of customs relating to them, (TvcTaiTLOov ^ (TVfXTroa-ioov (AN. App. 161) is identical with it not so, however, the three books
the title of which makes us think not so much of questions with regard to meals, as of questicns such as are proposed at a meal, like Plutarch's ^vnTroaiaKa irpoFor the UapayyeXfiaTa ^X-fjfxara.
cf.
p. 72, n. 2 fin.
not be doubted, however seldom it is named by ancient writers (see the remarks of Spengel, Ueb. d. Pohtik d. Arist.,' Ahh. d. Milnclin. AMd. v. 44 infra). 2 For further information, see the section on the political philosophy of Aristotle, ch. xiii., infra. 3 Of the second book (as to the beginning of which see EoSE, Arid. Lihr. Ord. 59 sq.) this has long been admitted, but Gottling {Arist. (Econ. p. vii. xvii.) considers the first to be a section of a genuine Aristotelian writing it seems more probable that it is the work of a later writer based on Polit. i. (See end of ch. xxi., infra.') D. 23, An. 17 name OIkovoJJLIK65 (or -ov) a'. Cf p. 99 supra on another pretended second book.
'
;
.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
except a few fragments.^
1 Thepolitical writings named, besides those quoted, are the following: (1) lioXmlai, a collection of facts with regard to 158 states (D. 145, An. 135, the text of which Bernays, Rh. Mus. vii. 289, with the approval of KosE, Aq'. Ps. 394, has evidently
101
Among them
the loss of
ness of the work, which Rose (^Ar. Lihr. Ord. 56 sq., At. Ps. 395 sq.) disputes, has no weighty arguments against it (as Heitz,
Plut. names
the work /crt'o-ets koI iroAtTetot) not only treated of the constitution, but also of the usages, customs, situation of the towns, the history of their foundation, their local traditions, &c. Pt. 81 gives the number of cities as 171 (or 191, according to the view
of Herbelot, Bibl. Ammon. V. Ar. 48 Ammon. Lat. p. 56,
Seliol.
in Ar. 9, b, 26, and David, ihid. 24, a, 34, say 250, and Philop. ihid. 35, b, 19, about 250, but the increase does not seem to be founded on any later extension of the collection, but merely on clerical mistakes (cf KosE, Ar. Ps. 394). Simpl. ( 6fe^d^. 2, y. SchoL 27, a, 43) seems by the
246 sqq. shows) and even if the external evidence, of which that of TiM^us {a^md Polyb. xii. 5, 11) is the oldest producible, did not utterly exclude Rose's supposition that the work was published and circulated in his name soon after Aristotle's death, nevertheless the internal improbability of that theory would be much strengthened by it. The declarations of David, ihid., and the Schol. to Porphyry's Isagoge (vid. Rose, Ar. Ps. 399, Ar. Fr. 1535) favour the supposition that the different states in the Polities are taken in alphabetical order; and this explains why the Athenians (according to Fr. 378, where, however, the reading is uncertain) are treated in the 1st book, and the Ithacans in the 42nd {Fr. 466). The circumstance that the numerous fragments all contain merely isolated notes, without reference to a
p.
;
uniform complete treatise, will not (as Rose, Ar. Ps. 395
holds) serve as a proof of the spuriousness of the work; but, in conjunction with the fact tliat the Aristotelian writings nowhere refer to the work in question (for even Eth. N. x. 10, 1181, b, 17, refers to the Politics cf Heitz, 231 sq.), it supports the view (Heitz, 233 sq.) that the Polities was not a literary completed whole, but a collection by Aristotle, for his own use, of
;
.
words
existence of spurious Polities; pvn' (158) instead of yvr](Tiais may be the true reading (Heitz, Ar. Fr. 219), though Ideler, Ar. Meteor, i., xii. 40 can hardly be right in substituting ^TTio-ToAats for
iroXireiais').
The
numerous
in MtJLLER, Fragm. Hist. ii. 102 sqq. (cf BoURNOT, in Philolog. iv. 2B6 sqq.) RoSE, Ar. Ps. 402 sqq. Ar. Fr. 34.3-560, p. 1535 sqq.; Fr. Hz. 218 sqq. The genuine;
which he had gathered by personal observation and inquiries, and partly from
facts partly
102
ARISTOTLE
government
in various
simply irreparable.^
Poetics
If this
^
Our
writings.
is
only a fragment
so,
copies would only be circulated after A chapter out of the his death. UoKiTfla 'A6r]vaiu>u may have given rise to the title IT. twu So'Awvos a^ovwv (An. Apj). liO cf. MiJLLER, ibid., 109, 12). A similar collection was (2) the NSfxifia ^ap^apiKu, which are quoted under
be
UoKiTiKhs
cf. p.
^affiXeias
;
and 'TTrep airo'iKcou, p. 60, sub Jin. on n. f)T]Topos ^ -KoKiriKov, p. 72, n. 2, towards the end on n. apxh^t p. 81, n. 1, fin.; on a bunglingforgery of the Middle Ages, Se;
cretnm secretortim
rege
dk/nis),
cf.
(or, Aristotelis
ad Alexandruvi rcffemdemoribus
this title
11
sq;
18G
(yoixljxoiv
fiap^.
(Tvvayuyr])
',
Libr. Ord. 183 sq, Ar. Ps. 583 sq. Since this was written the
from
this title also the designations Nd/xoi a' iS' y' 5' (D. 140),
vofiifxwu 8'
re-
been wrongly
To
(An.
them the
(Atiien.
longed.
i.
vojxiixa
'Pwimaiuv
v6^iixaTvppif]vS:v
probably be-
{apud MuLLER, ibid. 178 sqq.. Rose, Ar. Ps. 537 sqq., Ar. Fr.
561-568, p. 1570, Fr. IIz. 297 sq.), Nos. 562, 563 and 564 can only be attributed to Aristotle under the supposition that he did not give their contents in his own name,
covered. This writing, in our editions, is entitled IT. Trotr/Tt/cTjs. Aristot. himself mentions it in the Politics (viii. 7, 1341, b, 38), as a future work in the Rhetoric (i. II fin. iii. 1, 1404, a, 38, c. 2, 1404, b, 7, 28, 1405, a, 5, c. 18, 1419, b, 5, with which cf p. 74, n. 1), as already existing, with these words eV To7s Trepl nonjTiKrjs, or (1404, b, 28) eV T. TT. TToiriffeoos. The Indices
:
name
TiKTis
TIpayfiaTeias Te;^vrjs
iroit]-
but
as current.
(3)
NTjey)
traditions
somewhere
Ai/cajw/iara
Rifi'er.
'EAAtji/iScov
The
or Aik.
Twv
irdAeoji/
y
(Ammon.
Vocal).
Marc. p. 2, R) seem have dealt with quarrels between the Hellenic states and their settlement they are also
-TrdAewj/ ( V.
to
(D. 83), t4xvvs ttoitit. fi' (An. 75), Re arte iioetica secufidum. disciplifiayn Pythagorcs, Pt. Fr. (this addition is caused by the combination of two different titles: cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 194). Ps.-Alex. Soph. El. Schol. in Ar. 299, b, 44, has eV rqS ir. ttoitjt. likewise Herm. in PTicedr. Ill,
/8'
;
named more
(D. 129, An.
Apu/ids).
j3'
;
briefly
AiKaKo/xara
and AsT,
h t^
tt. it.
SiMPL. Cat.
ir. ir.
-ir.
;
120,
Harpocrat.
e(T IS TTo Kit iKal
ir.
spurious.
The Anon.
the
los,
in libris quos
scripsit.
de
arte poetica
thorities
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
103
much
to the theory
his dissertations
left
on the
poets.^
Nor
is
there
much
of the other
come after chap. 18), which sufis mentioned only in the quotations ficiently prove that we only p' sgiven on p. 58, n. 1, with regard sess Aristotle's work in a mutito the writing IT. ttolt^tcov), the lated and hopelessly corrupt condition. We cannot here inquire more modern only with one except in so far as they copy how its present condition may be more ancient writers, as we must explained (Susemihl, ibid., p. 3 suppose was the case with Am- sq., gives an enumeration of the From ditferent, and in part widely dimonius and Boethius. this alone we might suppose that verging attempts at explanation). the writing in question originally It may be true, as Susemihl had a greater extension than it concludes, that the carelessness now has, but this becomes cert ain of the writing, the caprice of from the references to such the copyists, and the freaks of parts of it as are missing in our accident account for most of the recension, as for instance the mischief but we cannot make discussion on the Catharsis pro- these factors responsible for the mised in Polit. viii. 7, 1341, b, 38, interpolations, except in so far as which would naturally have come they may have rendered possible the introduction of some marin the section on Tragedy, and, as we learn from sure traces, ginal notes into the text. Of the Dialogue n. toivtwu actually did occur there (cf. Bernays, Grundz. d. Abh. d. y we have already spoken on p. Besides this An. 115 gives 58. Arist. lib. d. Wirkung d. Trag.' Abh. d. hist.-jyhil. Ges. in Breslau, KvkXov it. TTOirtrCov, likewise in 160 sqq., 197 sq. SusEMlHL, p. three books. This title may have 12; Vahlen, p. 81 sq. of his arisen, by duplication and coredition, and others) the exam- ruption, from that of the Diaination of Comedy, promised logue, or it may (according to Poet. c. 6 init., and quoted Heitz, 178) designate a work Rhet. i. 11 Jin., of which Bernays distinct from it but the kvkXov {Rh. Mtis. viii. 561 sqq.) has may also have sprung from the
books on Poetry (a third
;
'
'
'
pointed out valuable remnants in Cramer's Anecd. Paris., vol. i. app. (now in Susemihl, p. 208 sq., Vahlen, 76 sq.) and the discussion on Synonyms, which Simpl. men;
(yKvKXiov' (or -iav) which is found in No. 113. Allied to it, it would seem, are n. TpaycpSiwv a' (D. 136, An. 128) and Ku/j-ikoI (Erotian, Uxj?. Voc. Hi2)])ocr. s.
*
v.
'Hpo/c\. v6(Tov).
Miiller
{Hist.
Gr. ii. 82), though not rightly, takes the AidaaKaAiai (D. 137 An. 129 Kose, Ar. Ps. 550 sq.. At. Fr. 575-587, p. 1572 sq. Heitz, 255, Fr. Hz. 302 sq.), seemingly a chronological cat a;
;
;
104
AMIStOTLE
us^
books named to
and among
where
ahiaL seems to indicate the form of treatment which is proper to the airoprifxara or irpo^KriixaTa, viz. that the hia. ri is sought, and 1he reply consists in giving tlie SrWi or the aiTia) ^ATropTj/ndTODV 'O/jltjpiKuu C (L>- 318; An. lOG C;
;
Hist. ii. 188 sqq.) cannot be maintained. More ancient seems to be the book n. fMova-iKrjs, which both DiOG. (116, 132) and An. (104, 124) give us in two places, and which is identical with the musical problems noticed by Labbeus, BiM. nova, 116 (see liRANDis, ii. b, 94) but it is no more genuine than the IT. KaXov (D. 69, An. 63, n. Kd\;
Xovs).
To these belong certain minor, mostly historical works, 'OAvfiinovlKai a' (D. 130, An. 122); Uv'
Heitz, 258 sq,, Fr. Ih. 129; Rose, Ar. Ps. 148 sq., Ar. Fr.
137-175, p. 1501 sq.) or, as the Vita Marc. p. 2. names it, 'O^.
(r]T7]iJ.aTa
;
Qlovikwv eXcyxoi a' (D. 134 and probably also An. 125); Uv9iov7Kai a (D. 131, An. 123, with the
strange
eV
title,
TlvdioviKas
;
fii^Xiov
'M.ivaixfJ-ov iv'iK-qaev)
IlvQiKus
Ylpofi\-r]pi.drwv
'OfXT]pi-
Ptol. 147 1)1 Ammon. V. Ar. 44 Amm. Lat. 54, probably a duplication ot: the aTvop7]ixara) 'A7ropi)iiiaTa 'Haiodou a' (An. App. 14i5)
I
Kuv
;
(An.
A2)2).
a (D. 133), possibly only a different title for the same writing N?/cat Aiovva-iaKoi a (D. 135, An.
126, 'NiKMU Aiou. aa-TiKwv Kcd
vaioiv
cf.
\r)-
a).
'ATTOp,
'Apx'-^o'xou,
EvpiTiSovs,
To these
(Ax. 107)
the
'ATToprnxaTa
Oela
seem
tise
roLs
:
'HAiou fiovs ; (AN. Aj)p. 142), no doubt only one of the Homeric problems. -Of these writings the ones which are more likely to have an Aristotelian origin are the Querie\S on Homer but even these may have had later additions made to them. On the other hand the genuineness of the neVAos (An. 105 An. App. 169 Rose, Ar. Ps. 563 sqq., Ar. Fr. 594-600, p. 1574 sq. Fr. Hz. 309 sqq.; cf. Bergk, Lyr. Gr. 505 sqq. Muller, Fra'gm.
is
Hose, Ar. Ps. 545 sqq., Ar. Fr. 572-574, p. 187; Heitz, 254 sq., Fr. Hz. 300 sq. MiJLLER, J/ist. Gr. ii. 182 sq. Further n. vp7]iJidTcov (Clemens, Strom. i. 308, A, where, however, an Aristotelian work with this title which could not be genuine seems to be designated notes which may have come from the work are given by Muller, ihid.
; :
181
sq.).^
n. QavfjLaaluvaKovaixdTwv
(xii.
quoted by Athen.
oK/i.
d/c. c.
541
cf.
eV davfxaaioLs, perhaps also by AnTIGON. 3Iirabil. c. 25 (cf. av/n. aKova-fx. c. 30), a collection of strange phenomena,' the genuineness of which cannot be admitted. For further information on this
'
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
these also there
is
105
titles
have crept
B.
in.
On
or
known
to us as Aristotelian,
poems
were of two
The
Ari-
stotelicum
scientific form.^
And
are,
almost
as
all
be called genuine
will
be seen, connected
way
that
is
only to
one
hypomnematic
'
notes,
that
is
to
say,
;
made by
work see Westbrmann, Uapa^ol6ypa.<^oi, p, XXV. sqq., and espeRose, Ar. Libr. Ord. 54 Ar. Pseud. 279 sq., who refers the main body of the work, consisting of chaps. 1-114,
cially
sq.,
Schr. 163
Aristotelian
work on this
subject,
We
130-137, 115-129, 138-181, to the middle of the third century, An enlarged treatment of this, or a more extensive specimen of the same sort of work, is perhaps the no/jaSo|o, from the second book of which Plut. {Parall. Gr. et Rom. c. 29, p. 312) quotes something which is not found in our au/x. o-K. UapoLfxiai a' (D. 138; cf. An. 127), a collection of proverbs, the existence of which seems to be proved, inter alia, by Athen. ii. 60 d, although Heitz (Verl.
prove whether the references in Eustath. in Od. N 408 and Synes. Enc. CalvAt. c. 22 (^Ar. Fr. No. 454, No. 2) belong to this or to other works. In addition to these there
cannot
are two titles which are so indefinite that they furnish no safe clue to the contents of the writings to which they correspond: napo)3oA.al(D.126); "Araw:ra (to which irpofix-fi/xara or v-rrofivTjfxara
may
.
be supplied)
ifi'
(D.
127
*
cf p. 96, foot),
The' wonderful stories' are perhaps the only exceptions, but they are not Aristotelian.
106
ARISTOTLE
own use, and therefore not thrown by him into any such literary form and unity None of the as the works designed for publication.^ genuine is of this class,^ but extant works which are several of those which are lost seem to have belonged
Aristotle merely for his
to
it.^
is to
be distinguished a third.
Cicero, Quintilian,
and
Dionysius of Halicarnassus praise Aristotle not only for scientific greatness, but equally for the grace and richness
of
his
exposition
the
'
golden stream of
his
speech.'''
referred to
works designed
irphs viru^vriCTiu
avkfTa^^v 6 (piXocrocpos these writings cannot, however, be taken as iravrri cnrovSris &^ia, and hence we may not draw from tliem any proofs for the Aristotelian doctrine: 6 fiivroi 'AAe|avhpos TO. vTroixvr)/J.ariKa avfXTr^cpvpfidaavov
^liva
(prjalv
our Corpus were intended to serve as the basis for lectures, or were compiled from them, they would not on that account be merely
'
hypomnematical
=*
writings.'
p. 62, n. 4, 5,
mentioned on and perhaps also the whether the Polities (p. 101) riepl TayaQov is also one (as alE.g.,
those
elvai
Kol
fii]
Trphs
eVa
tliis
p. 61, n.
2 fn.'),
(TKoirhv
ava(p4padai,
and
for
very reason the others are distinguished from them as awrayDavid (ScJtol. 24, a, 38) fxariKa.
:
vTro/xur]/j.aTiKa
fjLova
/jl^u
Xiyovrai iu
ois
air e-ypdcpv or av iTTiAoyuu Kal TTJs fcp^irovaris eKSoarecriv airayye\ias. Cf. Heitz, Verl. Schr. 24
TO.
K(pdKaia
Si'xa
TTpooi/jLiuu
Koi
Sq.
2
occur as an instance, cannot have been written down for his own use alone, since Aristotle often quotes them (see above, p. 96), thereby implying that they are known to
his readers. Other instances, such as the Melissus, etc., cannot be
Cic. Toj). 1,3: the works of Aristotle are not only recommended by their contents, sed (licendi quoque incredihili quadarn cum copia turn etiam suariBe Invent, ii. 2, 6 (on the tate. Aristotle has 2u^'o7co77? T^x^uv) left the old orators suaritate et hrevitate dicendi far behind. JJe Orat. i. 11, 49 si item Aristoteles, si Tkeoplirastus, si Carneades eloquentes et in dicendo snares atque ornatifuere. Be Fin. i. 5, 14 (on Epicurus) qicod ista PlaTheophrasti AHstotelis tonis
: :
orationis
ornamenta
neglexerit.
Acad.
ii.
Jiimen
:
orationis
stoteles.
supposed genuine.
Even
if it
be
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
by him
for publication.
107
It is not applicable to
;
any of
now
extant
and of
two Latin writers probably knew but a small part.^ We are driven to suppose, therefore, that it was to other works, lost to us, that they ascribed this kind of excelThe critic who judges of literary form by purely lence.
scientific criteria will find, it is true,
much
to praise in
dis-
He
will
precision
and
compactness of his
and
his
masterly
But of the
which Cicero emphasises, or any graceful movement of a rich and rolling eloquence, he will find even
in the
rough brevity of statement, the involved construction of long sentences, often broken by anacolutha and
parentheses, stand
description.
We
in a style far
more
rich
and
clarlorem putem. Dionys. Be Verb. Cop. 24 of the philosophers, Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle are the best as to style, Be Cens. Vet. Sc7'i2)t. 4: irapa:
books. Of the others, however, Cicero used several of' the writings mentioned on p. 55 sqq., the books on Philosophy, the Eudemus, the Protrepticiis, perhaps also the noAirt/cSs, n. fiacriKclas and n. irXovrov; cf. Fin. ii. 13,
XTjTTTeW
IJ,ilJ.7)(Tiv
5e
rrjs
KoX
'ApifrrorfXr]
els
40
Acad.
ii.
re
irepl
t^v
(pfirtveiav
5eti/oT7jTos
/col
rrjs
aacprfveias
Koi
Tov
Except the Topics and Rhewe have no reason for supposing that any of them knew by personal reading the extant
toric,
125 Birifi. i. 25, 53 Fragm. Hort. aptid Augustine c. Jul. iv. 78 Fin. v. 4, 11 Ad Quint. Fr. iii.
15, 42, 16, 44,
; ;
B.
ii.
Ad
ii.
Att.
28, 2
Off. n. 1.
16, 56
and above,
p. 60,
108
ornate,
ARISTOTLE
and approached
of
far
more
graces
the
Platonic
the
scientific
treatises
is
now contained
our
Corpus}
This difference
to be explained, not
merely by the
but also by the
the same
the
fact
same
ments of
common
in terms
in
And
from his
On
served in
Nos.
allowable.
SedoijLeuoi
there without a purpose, but is meant to distinguish the \6yoi K5eSo(iieVot from certain other
^oyois iKavws.
Koi
Trepl
Pe
TLs
oAAtj Se
Adyovs wcTTrep S' evOvpas (for which Uernays, Pial. d. Ar. 15 sqq, erasing Xoyovs, reads: Sxrircp
euOvvas Se)
SeSco/cuia
Kal
rois iv
yap Tiva avrijv x4yov(n, &c. In the first of these places, Bernays says (ihid. that 'pub13) lished' here means the same as 'already published' (the same explanation of the words is given by KosE, Ar. Ps. 79), yet one
Neither can we translate in such a way as to make ' the writings published by me a mere periphrasis for my writings partly because such a turn of phrase is not found in Aristotle. When he refers, without indicating a particular work, to something that has gone before, he is accustomed to say merely, iv &Wois, eV erepots or irpdrepov. Again the fact that he does not say utt' i/uLov iKSedofievoi shows that the emphasis falls on e/cSeSo^eVoj, as such, and that the
K6yoi.
iKS^SoficuoL
'
'
; '
\6yoi iKSeSo/neuoi are meant as an antithesis to fii) e/cSeSo/ueVot. Only we have no right to assume that things n^ iKdeSofievoi mean things published later. The anti-
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
109
'
and from the perfect iKSeSo/jLeuoi to read such as had already been
*
published at the time of the writing of the Poetics, and so were earlier than that work,' is shown to be impossible by the reflection of Ueberweg on this passage (Ainst. ah. d. BicMTi.^ p. 75) that every author puts himself, in regard to the reader, in the time at which his work will be in the reader's hands. Hence, if the Poetics were to be laid before the whole reading world, i.e. published, just like the x6yoi to which they referred, they would not be designated in contradistinction to the latter, by the predicate e'/cSeSofievoi, since each of them would
be, in relation
authors of the variant X^yoixivois instead of yiyvoix.') of conversations, such as would occur in educated circles, or (as Kose, Ar. Ps. 717, thinks) of expressions of opinion coming from the Platonic school for the evOvuas SeSw/cuta re;
to their reader, equally a \6yos e/cSeSoyueVos, Eose wished to refer the K6yoi e'/cSeS., first to former passages in the Poetics (Ar. Libr. Ord. 130), and later (yl?*. Pseud. 79) to the Rhetoric, but he was subsequently (Ar. Ps. 714) right in withdrawing both, since the discussion for which the Poetics refer to the \6yoi iKSeS. is found neither in the Rhetoric nor in the Poetics (cf. Beenays, ibid. 138): and, even apart from this, the latter could never have been so indicated. Nor can we on the other hand (as KosB, Ar. Ps. 717, maintains) refer the expression to writings on Poetry by the Platonic school, for we clearly must confine it to Aristotelian writings: and in the second passage, De An. i. 4, the \6yoi iv Koivcf yiyvd/xevoi
the soul is the harmony of its bod}^ and cannot mean vague conversations of third persons (cf. also Bernays, ibid., 18 sq.). Neither can one refer them to oral statements made by Aristotle to his pupils (Philop. see following note), partly because Aristotle never elsewhere refers to such statements, and in a treatise which, though perhaps primarily intended as a textbook for his school, yet gives no indication anywhere of being meant only for his personal pupils, he could not well appeal to them partly because the Philosopher had really inserted the criticism referred to in one of his own writings (cf. fol:
lowing note). The latter fact indicates that it is wrong (as SiMPL. does see following note) to refer the \6yoi iv koiv^ yiyv. to the Platonic Phcedo, for which this expression would not be a sufficient indication, nor would
;
it
correspond (cf. Bernays, p. 20) with the manner in which it is in other places mentioned (cf.
Meteorol. ii. 2, 35.5, b, 32). Finally, though Ueberweg ( Gesch d. Phil. 1. 173, 5th ed.) understands by the \6yoi iv k. yiyv.
cannot be understood (as ToRSTmK,Arist. de An. 123 supposes, he being perhaps preceded by the
(extending the explanation of Philoponus) discussions which occurred in actual conversations, or in writings arranged in the
110
to
ARISTOTLE
so refers
was to be found in the T^udemus} We find other and more frequent references of his to the Exoteric Discourses as the place where he had Opinions, howdealt with such and such a subject.^ ever, differ as to the meaning of that name and the
which he
' '
form of dialogues, it seems clear that the latter could not be so named, and that there was here no reason for mentioning the dialogue form of such discussions. From the point of view of grammar, owing to the present tense of
yiyvoixivois (to
Ar. 124,
phrase
cius(in
iyKVKk.
is
'
writings in the
common
strain,' is
De
to
TTJj'
rd^iv
e'l
46, rightly calls attention), they cannot be ex' the speeches subplained as
AHst. 105,
a,
mitted (i.e. which have been submitted) to publication,' for in that case it would have been It can only mean, as yvoiJ.4vois. Bernays translates it in his
Dial. d. Arlst. 20, 'the discourses existing in a state of publication, available for the use of all,' taking the eV Koivif here in the same sense as in the exprestV Koiv^ KaTariOeaOat, iv sions Koiv^ acpicvai (in medio rellnqnere, Metapli. i. 6, 987, b, 14). A similar meaning to that of the A0701 eV KOiv(f yiyvSixevoi seems to be attached to iyKVKXia or 4yKvof which (piko<TO(pi)ixaTa, K\ia mention is made in MJi. 1. 3, 1096,
:
a,
(kuI
'iKavcos
and De
Coelo,
i.
9, 279, a,
30
(/col
yap KaOdirep iv
nus (De An. E, 2) leaves us the choice between it and the &ypavpds robs eraipovs, Simplicius {De An. 14, with it the connects a) Pho'do. 2 All the passages are quote i below.
(poi
avvov(riai
and
x6yoi5 '6ti t6 6e7ov afieTdfiXrjTov hvayKalov ehai, &C.). 'EyKvK\ios can, just as well as 4v Koivip yiyv6/xeuos, mean in medio j^ositvs Bernays' rendering, Dial. d.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
relation
111
of these
'
Exoteric Discourses
'
to
our ex-
tant
Corpus.
always referred
works,
treatises
distinguished
by a
^
less
strict
method of treatment.^
as to details.
But
^
they
differ
among themselves
Cicero
and Strabo
The former, however, terms as popular statements.'' Dialogues,^ is unmistakeably thinking only of the
which we
also find described as
'
exoteric
'
in Plutarch.^
According
to Gellius,
late
the Aristotelian writings are divided into acroamatic and exoteric, oTa ra IcrropiKa koI ra SiaXoyiKo. Koi '6\(os rh /i^ &Kpas
OLKpi^eias
(ppovri^ovra.
dorus, circ. 1367, cf. p. 69, n. 1), the former of whom understands
De An.
ii.
E, 2 {ap.
:
by
^^coreptKol x6'yoi.
the
common
fiara,
261) wv
ra
elai
i^MTepiKo.
koI oi SiaKoyoi
aiTip Sto
about the Fin. V. 5, 12 highest good, Aristotle and Theophrastus have written duo genera lihrorum, ununi jyopulariter
"^ :
yeypa/xfieva.
scriptivni,
quod
i^iorepiKht' ajjjjel-
labant, altei'uvi limatius [d/cpijSe<rr4pci)s, in a more severe style], quod in conimentariis reliquerunt^ but in essentials they both agree.
3
XIII.
1, 54, p.
609
because
the
TheoPeripatetics, after phrastus, had not his works and those of Aristotle, ttAV oxiywv Koi yiiKKTTa ruv i^urepiKuv, they
liappened
^TjSei/
Ad Att. iv. 16, 2 quoin singulis libris [of the discourse on the State] ntor jjrowmiis, ut Aristoteles in lis qua; i^tarepiKovs vocat. In contradistinction to the Dialogues, the strictly scientific works are called (see preceding note) commentarii, continuous expositions, corresponding to the avTOTrpSa-Mira or aKpQariKo, of the Greek interpreCf.
:
nlo/ni
Ixetj/ (f)i\o(To(pe7v
ters (see p. 112, n.l,andll3, n. 2). Adv. Col. 14, 4, p. 1115 Aristotle everywhere attacks the Ideas: iv roTs i}0iKo7s virojULvii/iaaiv
:
irpayfiariKcos
aWh deaeis
2, b:
Tols (pvaiKoTs,
tuv i^ayrepiKuv
112
ARISTOTLE
named
'
exoteric,'
acroatic,'
everyone
the
Alexander,
is
Andronicus/
is
supposed to
'
acroatic
expressly stated
At
a later time
the further
'
acroatic
'
N.
A.
XX.
5:
Aristotle's
lectures and writings were divided into two classes, the e^co'E|wTeTepiKo. and the aKpoariKa. piKacl'icchantuT (pur ad rltetoricas
nicditationcx fdcvltatemqve argvi'larum ciriliuniqve rcrnm, noaKpoariKa. ('onducchant, t'ltiam
shows that the distinction between the \6yoi aKpoariKol and i^wrepiKol must have been known
to the author of the letter.
''
Thus Plut.
S'
Alex.
c.
7:
^oiKe
7]QiKbv
iroXiTiKhv
irapaXafielv
svhtiUorqve ar/'ifahatur quccque ad natura; condisceptaii ones que temp latlones In the d'lalecticas peH'inehant. Lyceum the morning was devoted to the latter, the evening to the former (cf. p. 27, n. 8). Lihrosquoque S2(os, earuni omnium
Xoyou, aXXa Koi ru>v airopp'f}TU}v Koi fiapvTfpwv l^aOvT.] SiSaaKaXioiv, &s ol avSpes ISius aKpoajxar iKas Koi iTTOTTTiKas [as in mysteries] irpoffayopevovTS ovk i^ecpfpov els iroX-
CLEMENS, Strom. not only the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, but all schools have secret doctrines and secret writings Xeyovffi Se
Xovs,fxeTa(Tx^^^V.
575,
covimeoitarios, seorsiim dlvisit, ut alii exoteriei dicerentnr, 2)artim aoroatici. 2 De Suhst. Fao. Nat. vol, iv. 'ApiffroT^Xovs ^ Qeocppaffrov 758 ra p.\v ToTs iroXXois yeypacpOTcav,
rernm
Cf.
Gell.
:
ibid.
Plut.
1.
The wording
TO 8e KOivd T Kal e^wrepiKa On the same theory, in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1, 1421, a, 26 sq., Aristotle is requested by Alexander to observe the strictest secrecy with regard to this work, while Aristotle, on his part, lays a reciprocal duty of silence on Alexan[-ov]
der.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
113
works a form of exposition which must make them uninany but his scholars while at the same time it is said that it was here only that he disclosed his
telligible to
; ^
views in their
the the
'
full logical
connection. ^
On
this theory
exoteric
'
by the fact that they were intended wider public, and that they were therefore put in a more popular form, did not cover the more difficult
'
acroatic,' just
for a
classes
of inquiry,
scientific
and substituted for a severe and method of proof one more accommodated to
general comprehension.^
This idea is expressed in the answer of Aristotle to Alex^
ander (see Gell. ibid.'), when he replies to the reproach of the latter with regard tothe aKpoariKol \6yoi XaQi oZv aurovs Kal e/cSeSo:
TiKws irphs So^au. He instances the Tonnes, the p-nropiKa and the e|wrepiKa. Kal yctp eV iKcivois ifMlcrra
'
fxeuovs Kal
fx)}
CKSeSoiiievovs
|uj/eToi
yap elffi fiSvots ro7s t]/xuv aKoixraaiv. See also Themist. Or. xxvi. 319, A sq., where it is said that Aristotle did not find the same discourses suitable for the masses as for the philosophers, and therefore withdrew the highest secrets of his teaching (the reAeo tepa, the fivffTiKhp) from the former by using obscure language. Simpl. jP%. 2, b, referring to the letters just mentioned, says eV rols
:
But the and the Rhetoric shows that this only refers to the basis of the opinions laid down in these writings, the argument from the universally
acknowledged (the
ej/5o|oi/),
irepl rSov
and
not to the teaching as such. The later writers, as a rule, express themselves in the same sense
thus Simpl. Phys. 164, a: e|&)repiKo. 54 iffTL to koivo. Kal 5t' euSd^wu irepaiySfieva aWa fi^ airoSeiKTiKO. (UTjSe aKpoafxariKa.
As to see follow-
aKpoafiaTiKoh affdcpeiav eTreTTrjSeuo-e, &c. For the same view see Categ. Schol. 27, a, 38, David, Categ. Schol. 22, a, 20 27, a, 18 sq. In
;
the
c.
V. Auct. 26, calls Aristotle SittAoDs, 6.K\os ixhv 6 eKTOffOev (paiv6/xvos &\\05 Se
6 (PToadeu,
-
and cf. Philop. Phys. the other hand David, in Ar. 24, b, 33, changes ScJwh the statement of Alexander (which he quotes in order to rep. 4.
On
fiariKo'is TO,
exoteric
and
esoteric.
Tojj. 52,
TO
aXrjdrj,
iu 5e to7s Sia\oyiKo7s
xf/evSrj.
tA
Alexander remarks,
&A\ois SoKovuTa, TO
3
that Aristotle speaks at one time XoyiKws in order to unfold the truth as such, at another SmAe/c-
Besides the testimony already adduced, the statements found in the Neoplatonic com-
VOL.
I.
114
ARISTOTLE
The theory just mentioned can be traced
as far back
'
not put
its
however,
requires correction in
himself as to the
Exoteric Discourses.'
It is true that
'
in a general sense he
may
describe as
exoteric
'
any
go to establish this point. Thus the so-called Ammon. in Catcg. B,b sqq. (see also Stahr,
AristoteUa, ii. 255 sqq.), who, after some other divisions of the the Aristotelian writings, among syntagmatic ones distinguishes
'
'
avTOTrpocrcoTra
koL aKpoap-ariKO.
and
SiahoyiKa Kal i^wrepLKa. The former are written -rrphs yvrjaiovs b.Kpoaras, the latter irphs t)]V twv TToWwu a}(pf\(iav in the former own his Aristotle expresses
;
that David (24, b, 5) expressly appeals to Animonius (n. epfi-nveias) and to the commentary on theCatef/orics passing under Animonius' name (which, although in form it does not its present come from Ammonius, yet seems to have originated in one written by him), indicates that Ammonius was David's proximate authority
cer-
opinion with a strictly scientific argument, in the latter ra 5oKovvra avTc^, aW' ov 5t' airoSeiKriKwv iirix^LprjixaTiov, Kcd oh oToi re eicriv ot iroWol iTraKo\ov9^7v. Simigreater length, larly, only at David, Schol. 24, a, 20 sqq., who likewise divides the avurayfjiaTLKa
into avToirpSacoTra or aKpoaixartKa and diaXoyiKa h. Koi i^coTepiKO. Acyovrai and considers the former to have been written irphs rovs
iiTLTrjSeLOvs
T-p
tainly made use of earlier writers (and principally Alexander, whom David at 24, b, 33 attacks, and from whom his quotation of the Aristotelian Eudenivs is probably taken, Uke that in Philop. Dc An. E, 2 sq. Ar. Fr. p. 1481,
;
No. 41),
we do not know has been added to On the other their testimony. hand we must trace the statestill
how much
ments
(piKoffocpia,
the
(pi.\o-
St'
avayKacFTiKoov
5ia TTidauMv.
'
the latter
Cf. p. 111, n. 4.
In proof of this statement we cannot attach so much importance to the passage just given from David as Heitz does The fact IVerl. Sehr. 25 sq.).
in Cicero, Strabo, and Ge\\.mB{vide sitpra, p. Ill, n. 2-6, 112, n. 1), to Tyrannic and Andronicus, and the letters mentioned on p. 112, n. 3 etc., prove that the latter was aware of the distinction between exoteric and acroatic writings, and of the suggestion that the last mentioned
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
in liand,^ or
115
always
and
necessarily
denote a distinct
class
of
writings.^
Nevertheless there
it
we
to such a class
and that
Polit.
fxhv
i.
5,
rauTa
6,
Iffus
irrrl (TKe^ews.
;
in the Rejmblio 1264, b, 39 Plato has only imperfectly treated of legislation, ra 5' aK\a ro7s f^ctidev \6yois TreirKrjpwKc rhv KoyovJ The term ' e^codev Koyoi covers in this case writings of the most In like speculative character. manner Eudemus Fr. 6 (Simpl. Phys. 18, b), where instead of the
'
at that time were everywhere in vogue even at social gatherings. That this does not fit other passages will be shown immediately;
in question,
such a rendering is forbidden by the strictly dialectical and genuinely Aristotelian style of the discussions from p. 217, b, 32 to
p. 218, a, 30.
^ Thus, besides the passae'e given in the preceding note from the PhysicSy the Eudemian Eth. ii. 1, 1218, b, 33, introduces the division of possessions into the external and the spiritual with the
e^ei
S' cLTToplav
....
'((Tws
5e ov irphs
rhv \6yov of Aristotle {Phys. i. 2, 6%^* 2* "^'''^ 185, b, 11) we read TovTo airoplau i^urepiKriv.
:
Phys. iv. 10, init. wpwTou Ka\ws ex^' SiaTroprjaaiirepl avrov \_Tov xpovov] Kal 5ta twv i^wrepiKwu \6yoov. The e|ajT. K6yoi here mean the discussion which follows immediately, and which is called exoteric (in the same way as Aristotle, in other places, puts the logical in opposition to the
'^
remark
8e
Kal
the
parallel passage, Eth. N. i. 8, 1098, b, 10, Aristotle says: he wishes to speak about happiness KoL e/c TWV X^yofiivuv ire pi aifTrjs, by which, according to the context, only the prevailing views
concerning meant. It
that the
happiness
can
be
is to these, therefore,
a it does not aim at and adequate notion of time (the ii Icnv b xpoj/os, 218, a,
because
strict
must
Eudemus
only takes into consideration certain preliminary properThe question is not ties of it. but here of exoteric writings Prantl is none the less wrong (Arist. Physih, 501, 32) in maintaining that by the exoteric discourses we are to understand, not only in the present instance but everywhere, only those conversa31), but
;
true especially of 1323, a, 21 vo/j.iaavTus oZv LKavSos TToAAa \4ye(rdai Kol rwv iv To7s i^o^TepLKoTs XSyois irepl rrjs apicrTTjs C^rjs Kal vvv XPVareov avTo7s. That by this lie does not mean mere oral expressions of opinion in the conversations of daily life is clearly
is
This
Pollt. vii.
i,
fol:
tions
116
tlie
ARISTOTLE
writings referred to were of a more popular type
texts
is
i
made probable
;
:
ibid. 32 His avaKvTiKols Aeyofxei/ etc aii(pi(r^-nry](rii:V, from oaa &A\a irpoarhiopi^dixiQa iv Tois point may be stated thus And, on the other the arguments in the i^wrfpiKol avaXvTiKOLS. hand, the vvv xp^fTfov avTois is \6yoi, it will be univei sally recognised that the conditions of adverse to this explanation. That hai)piness include not only exter- is meant to designate what folnal and bodily good things but also lows as something extracted from and pre-eminently spiritual good the exoteric discourses but Arithings although it is true that in stotle would be far more likely to common life we are wont to content use such a formula if he was quotourselves with far too small a pro- ing something from a former work portion of such s])iritual good.' than if he was merely repeating This line of reasoning necessarily in writing what he had already implies that the i^wrepiKol \6yoL orally delivered. This latter, from the nature of the case, he must in qucstion,witli which the current opinion of society is said to be in have had occasion to do as often as a modern university teacher })artial agreement, are not the same as any form of expression does it. The fact, tlien, that he expressly mentions that he is of that current opinion (cf. BerKAYS, Dial. d. Arist. 40). Then, 'making an extract from the e|wTpiKo\ Koyoi,^ points, as in the again, the words irp6s ye fiiav ZiPe Cwlo, ii. 13, 295, a, 2, and aipeffLV ovSels au.(pL(T&r)TT]aeiev point Jlcti'or. iii. 2, 372, b, 10 (where to definite explanations, set down some of the writings which we in writing, not merely existing in the intangible medium of oral possess are quoted with the same conversation. It would be easier Xpr](TT4ov) to an existing written And an Aristotelian writto connect them with oral dis- work. courses of Aristotle himself (as ing must be meant, since that OXCKEN does in Staatd. d. Arid. which follows out of the i^corepWe cannot, however, iKoi \6yoi sounds perfectly Aristoi. 44-59). base this view on the present telian, and forms a whole with what Aristotle gives in his own Keyofiev (together with the Stopi:
'
C6iJiea, Pol. iii. G, 1278, b, 32), since Aristotle not only quotes the writings of others very frequently in this way, but not unfrequently even his own; cf. (/JOAtej/ Se Pol. vii. 13, 1332, a, 8
:
name
Lastly,
(jiiiels
Se
ipov/jLev,
1.
38).
something similar to that which is here quoted x6yoi is found in from the i^wr. some passages of the Ethics (i. 6 sqq. x. 6 sqq.), which Zeller,
although
in his second edition, brought into connection with this quonow concedes tation, yet he cf. to Bernays {ibid. 71 sq. Oncken, ihid. 43, 5; Vahlen, Arist. Aufs. ii. 6) that Aristotle
;
Koi iv To7s
251, a,
iii.
5);
1)
Pe
5'
;
Xoyos
61/
Tols
irepl
Kivrjcews
(iaTLu) Metaph. v. ?>0 fin.; \6yos Mil. vi. 3, Se TOVTOV iv erepois 1139, b, 26; utnrep /cot iv roh
;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
both by the express distinction that
i^oDTepiKol
117
is
drawn between
'
the Ethics, which in the Politics he repeatedly quotes as 7)BiKa, and puts in tlie closest connection
distinction ') of different kinds of dominion, but for the exact limitation of their difference
'
with them
Zeller's
{vid.
ed.).
p.
2nd
of Bernays' the127, n.
2,
ory (73 sqq.), that the first chapter of the seventh book of the Politics strikingly diverges from the usual style of his scientific works, and bears distinct traces of having been extracted from a dialogue
(as Bernays, p. 38 asserts), cannot be inferred from the ^iopi^6/xeda, since this expression designates not only the exact distinction, the carefully- weighed logical antithesis,' but an]/ kind of distinction whatever. If we compare with it the perfectly analogous use of Xeyo/neu, diopi(6fxeda, &c., in the passages given above (p. 115), we shall be prepared to give the same meaning to the Siopi^ofieda here, and when
*
agree with Bernays that by the exoteric discourses in this passage is meant a written work of the philosopher's which is lost to us, and which Aristotle here seems to follow pretty closely, for which very reason he refers to it, and not to the Ethics, though the parallel passages in the latter were closely connected with it in meaning. Less convincing with regard to this, in spite of what Bernays says to the contrary (iii{. 38, 51 sqq.), appears to be Polit. iii. 6, 1278, b, 30 aWa iXT]v Koi rris apxHS tovs
'
'
e|&)-
the passage appears to this interpretation. (And there are certainly some among the lost Aristotelian writings iti which the distinction here
and
n. 1,
S'
n. fiaffiXeias
v.
supra, p. 58,
:
and
60, n.
1). The
4 init.
true of Eth.
eVrl
iroirjais
0/j.ev
vi.
like is erepou
TricTTev-
koI Trpa^is
the oIkqvoixik)], and the ttoMtik)] apxh} ^dSiov 5i6A.etf koI yap 4vto7s
avrwy Kol to7s i^wrepiThe connection here unquestionably allows us to suppose that the words refer to
Se irepl
Ko?s \6yois.
avTuv iroXXaKis. These words, looked at in themselves, might refer not only (as Oncken, ibid.,
suggests) to oral disquisitions, but also (by taking the 5topf^(^/ie0o as the collective we ') to conver'
discussions in Aristotelian writings of a character different from that of the scientific works which we possess, as for instance the Dialogue on the Poets or Gryllos but that it forbids any other supposition Bernays (p. 39, 57 sqq.)
;
sations not connected with the School or even with scientific philosophy. That Aristotle here * refers to the e|a>T. x6yoi, not for the existence' (more correctly
has not made out. If anybody wished to give to the passage, instead of the narrow meaning assumed by Bernays, the broader one, 'this has already been proved
in
my
the
118
ARISTOTLE
words
T^s
:
i\ivxns] Koi
x6yois apKovvTws ^via /col XP'')^'''^^^ avTols. diov TO fihv &\oyou avTrjs For ehai rh 5e \6yov exou. though it is by no means so incredible as Bernays, p. 36, believes, that the distinction be-
indifferent.
If,
on
is
sion by an appeal to Eudemus Bernays, (see preceding note). referring to this, finds it impossible to believe that we are te draw the explanation of such a corner-stone of tlie Peripatetic system as the connection of ttoi-
tween the rational and the irrational in the soul may have made its way from the Platonic school into wider circles (Epicharmus, at a much later period, comes ver}'' near to it with his vovs dpa, &c.), and though it could scarcely be said to be an actual impossibility to interpret the words i^car.
\6yoi as referring to opinions current outside the school, yet the introductory words here too much resemble those given above from Polit. vii. 1, and the Xeyerai apKovvTws ^via Kai vvv XPV^^'''^'^^ avToh liere points too obviously to written discussions, for us to be able to refer this quotation
from the common well educated so, he ought to iind it no less absurd to draw from the Very same source an
7}(Tiy
and
-rrpa^is,
exi)lanation of the centre of gravity of all Ethics, the notion of EvhaL/xovia. And yet we find in Mh. i. 8, init. incontestably
(TKeTTTeou
e/f
8);
irepi
auT^s
Koi
This may not mean that we are to seek the scicnHfie defimtion of happiness in the conversation of the educated but neither would this be affirmed in Eth. vi. 4 init. about that of -rroiriaLS and irpa^is, if we were to understand the f^ccT. x6yoi in this passage of the The appeal to uniXey6fi(va. versal conviction would be to establish a general distinction of
Twv Keyo/xevcov
irepl auTTjy.
mere X^ySfxeva. If it refers an Aristotelian work, this must be one of the lost writings most probably the Eudemus for the quotation does not
to to
'
'
agree with IT. i/^fx^s iii. 9, 432, a, 22 sqq., and this work would not be cited by such a reference, but, as always in other places, by eV Neither in Tols irepl xpvxvs.^ Metaph. xiii. 1, 1076, a, 28 (on the Ideas as such he will only
'
TToiriais
from
irpa^is
:
and
yap
this
is
Aristotle's
way
rep
aXrjde?
i.
we
discern in Eth. i. 13, 1102, a, 26 an intention of appealing to some Aristotelian writings in the
speak aTTAws Koi '6aov v6iiov x-P^v TidpvXXriTai yap rcif iroXXa Kal virh ruv ^ct}TpiKa)V xSyuv") can we understand by the c^mt. x6yoi It oral discussions of others. must mean the work of Arialone stotle himself, since this could dispense him from a fuller criticism of the doctrine of Ideas and that we are to look for such work neither in the philo;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
119
be
sopher's doctrinal discussions nor in his strictly scientific writings is suggested not only by the designation 6|a>T. \6yoi, but also
solution, in the Dialogae on Philosophy, Y.^carepiKhs in Aristotle means (1) that which exists outside,
'^
by the Koi (koL vith r. i^. A.), by which the i^oT. \6yoi are distinguished from other not exoStill more clearly teric \6yoi. does this appear from Eudemus, when the latter, probably remembering this passage, in th. i. 8, 1217, b, 22 says likewise of the Ideas iireaKeTrrai Se Tro\\o7s irepj
:
the
external
ffoes
and
which
former
out,
external.
called
ii.
an
i^MrepiK-i]
apxh (Polit.
10,
\6yois Kol iv
.
roils
Kara
<piXo(ro<piav.
Cf following note. This is indicated by the express statement in the passages quoted in the preceding note, especially from Polit. vii. 1, Eth. i. 13, Metaph. xiii. 1, that certain points have been suflBciently explained even in the exoteric disthat is, inasmuch as we courses should less expect such discusEudemus puts it sions in them. more definitely, by putting the i^wrcpiKol \6yoi (see preceding note, Jin.) in opposition to the Since the \6yoi Karci. <f)i\o<ro(j>lau.
' '
: '
1272, b, 19), or when hand and foot are styled i^wnpiKh fieprj (Gen. An. v. 6, 786, a, 26); to these uses cf the i^carepiKo. ayada, Pol. vii. 1, 1323, a, 25. In the second meaning the expression is used in the combination i^iorepiKoi irpd^eis (Pol. vii. 3, If now, in the 1325, b, 22, 29). phrase i^cor. \6yoi, we propose to give it thefirst meaning, we cannot, by exoteric discourses, in those passages where Aristotelian writings of a particular class or the inquiries contained in them are meant, understand such discourses as lie outside the discussion in which they are referred to as * other discourses' (like the i^wrepiKwrepa CTKer^is and the e^co.
are scientific inquiries, the former can only be popular discourses and, since (as we have seen) writings are meant by them, they can only be popuNow it might inlar writings. deed appear that the criticism of the doctrine of Ideas, to which
latter
;
and
3)
nor
yet (as Bernays thinks in I>ial. d. Ar. 92 sq.) such as do not enter into the essence of a thing, but are external to it (as p. 115, n. 2).
The
latter
suit, partly
Mh. End.
and Metaph. xiii. refer, would of all 1, loc. clt. things have been least suited for popular writings; but we have already seen on p. 76, n. 3, 5G, n. 2 vied, that he opposed this
i.
8,
be a strange way of speaking of popular treatises,' partly because it would not fit those cases in which Aristotle again takes up in later works, as being suitable and adequate, what he had said in
'
doctrine, with
120
inferred either from
selveSj or
ARISTOTLE
tlie
that Aristotle's
There
works also which were adapted to the understanding of the general public.^
As
is
Master did
all
tliat
were made because he published them ^ and the idea that he designedly chose for them a style obscure
and unintelligible
visible
to the lay
mind
is
disproved by the
themselves.
characteristics of the
texts
truth
sider
all
is that,
by the use of a
by methodical
If
it
tions,
be true
many
particular points of
n, 4).
be called exoteric, in this use of the word, in the sense that they were known and in use even outside the Aristotelian school. But it comes to very much the same thing- also if we start (as Zeller prefers to do), with the second meaning of i^corepiKhs, and understand the i^cor. xSyoi to signify such w^orks as were intended for outsiders or for the general public, the same, in fact, as are included in the terms xSyoi K:5eSofxevoi or 4v KOiv^ "yiyvoix^voi.
popular character was implied in the designation, but not directly expressed in the adjective e|coTepiKbs
as such.
When Eudemus
puts the Koyoi e|wT. in opposition to those Kara (piKoaocpiav (see preceding note), we might understand the latter to mean such as were intended to serve for scientific instruction but at the same time there is nothing against the translation both in those intended for the general public and in the scientific trea'
'
tises.'
'
ARISTOTLWS WRITINGS
difficulty,
121
obvious
was only a
their dissemination
more
seem to
works were famous. The sole aim of the second set of texts was scientific investigation for its own sake, and they were therefore distinguished by a
which his exoteric
' '
and a less artistic dress. It seems that of by far the greater part, if not the whole, consisted of those writings which Aristotle wrote before the opening of the Peripatetic School at Athens, and of chiefly while he was still one of the Platonic circle all of which nothing remains but a few fragments.^ On
stricter logic
to
communicate them to
2
'
others.
In this sense', says Prof, Zeller, I had already expressed myself in the second edition, p. 98, as to the probable state of facts with regard to the distinc*
tion between exoteric and esoteric writings. On the other hand, I then believed that, in the Aristotelian passages which men-
tion the i^urepiKol Xoyoi, I could everywhere translate that phrase as meaning such discussions as do not belong to the sphere of the inquiry actually under investigation. (Thus also Schweglee, Gescli. d.griech. Phil. 194.) I have now rejected this opinion, and think that the general meaning of i^airepiKhs, to designate something external, or relating to the external, is mor
122
ARISTOTLE
Aristotelian writings, or in the oral disputations of the school. These, in their view, may be called exoteric, either because they always have to deal with something foreign to the matter (cf. the e|a> and cco) \6yos, Anal. i. 10, 76, b, 24), or because they always treat the subject externally. Grote {Aristotle, 03 sqq.)
{Arist. nnd, die exoter. Reden^ cf. particularly pp. 15, 04), and SUSEMIHL {Philol. Anc. v. 074
sq.),
that only the conversations are designated by the e|coT. x6yoi. Rather nearer to it are Ravaisof non-philosophical circles
SON (JSIetaph. d' Arist. i. 209 sq.) and Thurot (Etudes sur Aristote, 209 sq.), who understand by them
such dialectic discussions (in contradistinction to the strictly scientific), as proceed by arguments TTphs SJ|oj/, occurring either in
agrees with them, except that, besides the Aristotelian Dialogues and some extracts from the acroamatic works, he thinks conversations outside the school are referred to. In like manner (though with the exclusion of conversations outside the school) Ueberweg {Gesch. d. Phil. i. 143, 5th ed.). Oncken {Staatsl. d. Arist. i. 43 sq.) refers the term to oral discussions, allied to the scientific lectures in which the e|a>T. \6yoi are mentioned, but of a different class from them. On the other hand Ritter ( Geseh. d. Pliil. iii. 21 sqq.) holds more closely to the statements of the ancient writers about the two classes of Aristotelian pupils and writings, in assuming (p. 29) that all the strictly scientific works were only written by Aristotle as a help to his lectures and were only published, at a later period, by himself or his pupils, and perhaps at first only for the latter whereas the remaining writings (which are lost to us), were designed for the use of cultured persons and might, together with any corresponding lee tures, be called exoteric. A like position is held, in the main, by Bernays {Dial. d. Arist.), who by the exoteric discourses under;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
123
less
and it may be very true that the matter of the former was advanced than the systematic doctrine of the Master, but it is entirely as we have it from his riper years
;
beside the
mark
reader's eye.
published
'
or 'exoteric' books
which points
In the texts themwhich it is hard to reconcile with the idea that they were really puhlished,
his scholars, as classbooks only. selves there are
many
indications
In the
stance
stands
^
first
place there
is
is
Heitz
sqq.)>
( F(?7'Z.
in substance, prefers to give the expression (with reference to Fhys. iv. 10 init.) the broader meaning, and to make it imply a point of view farther removed from true science. Bonitz (Bid. Arist. 104, b, 44 sqq. ZeitsGhriften fur ostr. Gymn. 18(56, 776 sq.) takes a similar view. Stahr
;
ii. 239 sqq., cf {Aristotelia^ especially 275 sq.), and Brandis (Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 101 sqq.) express themselves less decidedly
philosophical writings, such as the Dialogues, partly a special manner of philosophising the latter broadly identifying the exoteric writings with the popular ones, but abstaining from further definition of them or *' exoteric of the expression discourses." Thomas (De Arist. e|cDT. xSyois') stands quite isolated with his strange whim of looking for Aristotle's exoteric discourses in the greater EtJiics. Space does
;
the
the exoteric writings are meant partly those in which something was treated merely in passing, partly and principally those which did not essentially belong to the systematic connection of
not permit me a more searching examination of these various suppositions the principles on which it would be based are contained in what has been said
;
above. Stahr, ibid., gives all the earlier references Which bear upon the question.' Ritter (iii. 29) and BranDis (ii. b, 113) have already
'
124
cites that other
ARISTOTLE
book
itself:
is
in contemplation only.
These
All four
The
Topics
is
and yet
may
at
any rate they cannot be later than the Analytics, in which these same books are cited as well as the earlier
ones.^
When
which, as
it
we know them,
to a section
which
was
compiled
but
it
ix.
167,
*
b, 21,
is
Cf.
p.
67,
n.
1.
BONITZ
follows
(Itid.
Arist.
passages on which tlie followingexplanation is based, so far as they have not been expressly
cited here. 2 VIT. 8,
jxou opov^
Pliys. i. 8, 191, b, 2 Aristotle remarks, after a discussion on the possibility of comingfTs /xfv d}] rpSiros into existence
:
In
ovTOS, &\\os
5'
OTi ei/Se'xeTai
Svpa/XLV
Tavra
ma,
a,
24
/j.eu
eV
rtVcoj/
Ae-yejj/
Kara t^v
'
Kal TrjV
avWoyiaiv kripois
ii.
aKpifiecn^pov
8' e/c
Anal. Post.
ii.
iuipyeiav tovto 5' iv &Woii SiwpiThis arai St' uKpifi^ias fj.aA\ov. reference is most probably to a passage in the 3Ietaphysic8 (for to refer it to one of the lost
2),
viii.
-rh
5'
eV
apxv
kpcoTwv,
Kar' a.\r}9iav jxlv iv ro7s avaKvriKo7s [Anal. Pr. ii. 16] dprirai, Kara
JiJL),
ho^av 5e vvv Ae/creoj/, ix. 2 (Sq/)h. Trepi jj-hv ovv tu>v 165, b, 8
:
writings is forbidden by the fact that Aristotle is not accustomed in other places to quote these latter, as he cites the dogmatic simple iv writings, -with the In the &\Kois cf p. 108, n. 3).
;
Tots avaXvTiKols
3
e'iprjrai.
ii.
A7ial. Pr.
15,
64, a,
36
6.W(av ipccrrffxaToov ffv\XoyictaffQai ddrepov ^ ws iv to7s TOTTLKols i\4xOv A-ajSeTi') refers to Toj). viii. and Anal. Pr. ii. 17, 65, b, 15 (oTrep ^'ipTjraf. Kcd iv TOty
(e<TTt 5e bi
however, it not only agrees with ix. 6 sqq., but also with V. 7, 1017, a, 35 sqq., i.e. the treatise ITepi rov iroa-axois, The .same is true of. p. 76, n. 3. of Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, b, 29, as compared with Meta^h.
Meta^jh.,
V. 7.
AHISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
tract cited in the
125
Be
Goelo
was written
later
than that
:
work. 2
yet in
The Meteorology
its
refers to the
it
Be Sensu
and
own preamble
Plants,
which
is
spoken of
still
demonstrably later
treatise
as being
unwritten.
The same
on Plants
^(pwv
referred to in an
Us pi
and in a
is
later
one as yet
Parts and
future."^
to come.^
The
;
lost
book on Food
it is
quoted in the
the
De Somno
There
is
in
Generation of Animals,
promised as in the
if
Be Coelo, ii. 2, 284, b, 13 the world had a right and left side, it would also be obliged to have an above and below, a before
(iffirep
eijpTjTai
(pvTwv.
On
on
in
p. 93, n.
and behind
SicoptCTat
irepl
^jl^v
ovv
irepl
rovTWV iv Tols
ras toov ^((xav Kivi](T^is (Jngr. An. 2, 704, b, 18, sqq., ihid. c, 4 sq.) Si^ t^ ttjs
^ucews oXk^Io. ttjs iKeivoov eJuai. - This is proved not only from MeteoTol. i. Ifin. but also because the History of Animals and n, Cv^v jxopioiv are quoted see Ind. Arist. 100, a, 55 sq.
;
quote in many places the History of Animals, De Vita et 31., Fart. An., and Gen. An. ' I. 23, 731, a. 29 a\\h Trepl
:
fxhv
(pvTU)v iv
kripois
fxtv
eTreV/ceTTTat.
III.
fi?i.
eoTTOj
TovTwv
T)ixiv
TiQ^wp'nixivou
5e ircpliv ToTs
3, 783, b, tovtoov (the falling of the leaves in winter) iv &\\ois rh aXriov \KT0v (cf i. Trepl fihv odv (pvTWv, 1, 716, a, 1 avra Kad^ avra x^P^^ eVttrKeTrTe'oj',
On
v.
23
dAAa
Trepi
(De
and
p. 93, n. 1).
Seiisu, 3) 5ib Ttt fxkv Aeyccfxcv, to7s 5' ws virdpxova'i xp7j(rcc/ie0a avrwu.
Still
Trepl
^
more
clearly
3,
iv
must we,
//.
/I.
V.
539,
a,
20:
Cf. p. 92, and on the chronological relation of the writings n. VTTVOV, n. (cpOOV flOploiV, n. ((^WV 7ei/eVecos, see BoNiTZ, Ind. Arist. 103, a, 16 sqq., 55 sqq.
126
texts, ^
ARISTOTLE
making it impossible to say which comes before The tract on the Parts of Animals is cited
it cites
the other.
How
are
we
Are we
so to
these cases as to
if it
later
and
assump-
The
But there
is
a far
n.
^oir^s /cal
0ai/aTou,
together
avatrvoris,
tJ> 8'
An. 5, 700, a, 33 many animals have the front and hind parts near one another, olou
Ingr.
TO.
24,
re jxaKaKia
KoL to
crTpo/jL^wSr}
rovrwv irpdrcpov
iv kr^pois [Part.
684, b, 10 sqq., 34, where is said of the jxaXaKid re Ka\ crTpofxfiwSrf twv oarpaKoSfp-
An.
iv. 9,
the same
ixu>v).
An.
tJjs
iv. 11,
the other hand, Part. 690, b, 14: t] 6' alria ai/Twu (of snakes) ctTToSias
On
tuv
virdpxovai, Sos the XP'^I'^^H-^^"'plainly shows that the reference exposition. is not to a future Still more violent than the changes of text here contested is the resource {Ar. Lihr. Ord. 118 sq.) of giving to efpTjrot, when necessary, the meaning of ^tj^tj(rerat, and of denying the reference to the future in expressions like els iKe7vov rbv Kaiphv
airoKeiadca.
Twv
irporepov
irdvrwv.
Besides the passages given preceding note, this the suggestion seems especially objectionable in De Ccelo, ii. 2 {vid.
*
in
ABISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
simpler explanation,
if it
127
we
them
for a
time only
his oral
among
his
scholars
lectures.
troduced
later
would come in from time to time. If the author was never able to give to such a work any final revision for the purpose of publication, it might well happen that in one place a reference would stand in its originally correct form, as to a future work, though in another passage of the same or an earlier text a note might have been incorporated which spoke of the same work The same theory will explain the as already written. which we have every reason to fact that the Politics consider as a book never finished by Aristotle, and
is
cited
itself
which
^
is
spoken of by the
is
The
fact
Therefore he could
If he
since the
t^
ovpavif, kc.
corresponds with
the
fih odv (line 13). The whole passage from ^lupiarai to eijXoyov
ko7s irepl rovrwv'), the Poetics frequently, vid. supra p. 102, n. 1. ^ VIII. 7, 1341, b, 39: on the ' catharsis pvv fxkv airXois, irdKiv S'
'
iu
rols
irepl
iroirjTiK^s
ipovfi^v
avr^ (line 20), could be dispensed with, and it would all have to be taken as a postvirapx^iv eV
Aristotelian interpolation. Cf. infra, ch. xiii. 2 The Politics i. 8, 1366, a, 21 {StriKpifiwTai yhp iv to7s ttoKlti'
as Bernays {Ahh. d. hist. phil. Ges. in Breslau, p. 139) rightly supposes, probably refers to a lost section of our Poetics, and not to one of the Politics (Heitz, Verl. Schr.
(Ta.<p4(mpov,
which,
100
sq.).
128
ARISTOTLE
,
had published the Rhetoric he could not in it have referred as he did to the unpublished Politics.^ The closing words of the Tojncs ^ seem to indicate that Aristotle's treatises were meant primarily for his
scholars.
indulgence or their thanks for the theory he has unfolded to them,^ referring specially to those
who have
book of one of his hearers. Such a view is negatived both by the wording of the passage,^ and by the fact
that
in later writings
himself'^ in
to another
author.
Such an address would be out of place in a work which was tendered to an unlimited circle of readers by formal publication, but it is entirely natural if the Topics was then issued only to Aristotle's scholars
It is more difficult to explain the strange fact that Hhef. iii. 1, 1404, b, 22 speaks of the actor Theodoras as if he were living- and acting, whilst still Polit. viii.' 17, 1336, b, 27 treats him as one belonging to the jiast.
'
hWas
TrpajfJ-areias
TrapaSocews rju^rjixevas, Aoiirhv hv efrj irdvTwv v/xuv 7) twv i]Kpoa~ jx^voiv epyou rd7s /xku irapaAeAet^/xeyois rrjs iJ.e66Sov
evpr}fMvois
^
avyyvcliiui.'qu
to7s
5'
Some
and
But here the question arises, whether we possess, in the third book of FJu'toric, the work of Aristotle himself, or the work of
a later writer, who, in this passage, which seems to be in the genuine style of Aristotle, may have used one of his earlier works. Cf. p. 72, n. 2. - Soph. El. 33 Aristotle fin. had no predecessor for his theory Se <palvTai ei of demonstration
: ;
v/juv
v/iicov, rf/xiu
and
ri/jLuv
but
included
whom
*
he apologises.
distinguishes among readers the * i^Kpoafievoi from the rest only by striking out the ^ before rwv iiKpoafievcav could we get a simple address to listeners, but the MSS. all have
Which
the
'
it.
^
6ea(Tau.4voisviJUU
ex^tv
t]
/x4do5os
40 sqq.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
as a
129
auxiliary to them.^
memorial of the contents of his lectures or as an That this was true of some of his
books,
also.
The
now forms
the
book of the Metaphysics, could never have been published by Aristotle in its present form as a
fifth
glossary without beginning or end. It can only have been placed in the hands of his scholars simply as an
aid to his
teaching.
Yet he often
refers to
it,
and The
same argument applies to the often-cited anatomical texts, ^ which must have been limited to a narrow circle because of the drawings which were an essential part of
them.
If
it
same must be true of those in which these citations occur for no one could in a published book refer to an unpublished one, or say that a subject not gone into was fully explained in an inaccessible
;
tract.
The
trick of carelessness in style which is so often remarked, the repetitions which surprise us in an exposition otherwise compact, the insertions which upset a
naturally well-ordered
if
never put the finishing touches to the writings in question, and that various matters were at the time of the
As Stahr, iUd.t has supposed. 2 Cf. pp. 76, n. 8, 124, n. 4.
'
About
which
see
p.
89,
n. 1.
VOL.
I.
130
ARISTOTLE
posthumous publication added to the original text either from parallel copies or from the author's notes.^ This
theory becomes extremely probable
when, as in the
books On the
Soid,'^
we
any
is
not Aristotle's.^
The same kind of argument would apply also to the rolitics and Metaphysics^ but as to these we have
independent grounds
unfinished,
for the belief that
they remained
forced on us
for
we
as
a certain book
was a posthumous
it
in such a
way
series
cannot have
life.
it
way
for that
work
is
cited in
many
of the books on
natural philosophy.^
The scope and the modifications of this theory as to the way in which the Aristotelian books were produced,
can only be settled by a detailed examination of the indi'
Cf. p. 89, n. 2.
It
may be
of scholars have been led to adopt, with various particular modifications thus Bitter, iii, 29 (rid. Beansujjra, p. 121, n. 2 mid.) Dis, ii. b, 113 Ueberweg, GescJi. d. Phil. i. 174, eighth ed., SusEMIHL, Arist. Poet. p. 1 sq., BerNAYS, Arist. Politik, 212. It is also probable that Aristotle, instead of writing, usually dictated: which would account for many of the irregularities of style, such as the
; ;
otherwise with the repetitions and disarrangements of the connection in the Etidcs, especially
bks. 5-7. Cf. p. 97, n. 1. ^ As in Bk. vii, of the Physics,
on which Spengel has written in Ahh. d. Milnch. Ahad. iii. 2, 305 sqq. Cf Prantl, Arist. Phys. 337. * Cf p. 76, n. 3, and infra, Ch.
. .
xiii., init.
5
Ar. 102,
Ind.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
vidual
texfcs.
131
But the
exoteric
'
works,
all
from the
fact that,
Aristotle's
pupils,
it
seems
very probable that the whole of our Corpus, so far as it is genuine, consists of books which were produced in connection with the teaching in the Lyceum, were intended at
first
and were
only
made
it may also be assumed, not only from their contents, but also from their express internal correlation that
Aristotle
is
also
them working up in writing what he ha,d way of oral lectures,^ though likely that when they came to be published
in
by third parties explanations were added and whole passages interpolated from Aristotle's papers or his other lectures.^ A few of the texts may have served him
as aids in his teaching, without
of lecturing.4
One
130.
Cf. p. 129
.
and
and the
Dp,
on
to
3
Cf what has been remarked with regard 128 sq. p. the closing words of the
As,
Anima.
*
rod
77).
'lojnos.
been
130,
One is inclined to think the same of the 'Avarofiai. * The twelfth, cf. same note,
at p. 78.
case
132
ARISTOTLE
for a lecture course,
though
That theory
excluded in the
first
place
by the all-pervading
system of cross references, which both in number and in manner go far beyond anything that Aristotle
could have wanted for himself.^
Again
all
it is
negatived
by the
view
fact that,
in spite of
more
if
carefully
have been
own
use.
the author
^
Bk. xii. of the Metapliy&ws has in the first half none at all, and in the second, which is worked out much more fully (since the SeSej/crat, c. 7, 1073, a, 5, relates to c. 6, 1071, b, 20), a single reference (c. 8, 1073, a, 32
Se'Set/crai
S'
(Uth.
^^.
vi.
3,
1139, b,
26,
i.
Metaph.
1,
iv. 5,
1010,
a, 4,
Ehet.
ev
to?s
<j>v(riKo7s
irepl
28 and
It is otherwise in most rovTwv). Still more of the other works. decisive, however, is the form of the references. No one uses for the expressions like himself <|)a/i.ei/ mentioned in p. 115, n. 4, or circumstantial formulas, like ck
ZiciXdixiQa
(Metaph.
iv
vii.
1,
init.),
&
dioipiffafjifv,
oh
SiupiffdiiieOa,
i.
ra
Zi(api(Tp.4va Tjfuv
(Metaph.
7,
2,
4,
985, a, 11,
9,
vi.
4,/w., i. (Rhet. i.
1028, a, 1356, b,
Tjfiiv
1357,
a,
29),
rededopriTai
T6
rrjs
Icrropias
rrjs
irepl
ra ^^a
koX
Trp\
(pavephv
Kal
roov
avaTOjxSsv
v<mpov
yevea-ecos
a, 18),
Xex^'hc^TO'i'
"'
'''oh
(Part. An. iv. 10, 689, like (the Ind. Ar. 97, b, sqq. furnishes examples), or like those quoted on p. 115. 2 To this class belongs the conclusion of the Topics (see p. the vvy 5e Xeyco/xev 128, n. 2)
and the
avruv (Metaph. i. 3, cf. also those sen983, a, 33) tences in which what has been discussed before is summed up, and what is going to be treated is announced (e.g. Metaph. xiii. 9, 1086, a, 18 sqq., Rhet. i. 2, 1356, b, 10 sqq. So2)h. El. c. 33, 183, a, 33 sqq. Meteorol. init.). Oncken (Staatsl. d. Ar., i. 58) cites, from the Nicom. Ethics and
'iKavois
irepl
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Another unlikely theory^
transcripts in
is
133
that
which suggests
which
Aristotle's pupils
had
set
down the
We
But whether they are a mere transcript of these, or a free working-up of the same matter, whether they were designed to repeat as correctly as might be
the words of the master, or to leave us a spiritual re-
a very different
rely
on the suggestion
that
it
the P^Zt^i^s alone, thirty- two passages with such formulas. No one will believe that Aristotle would have had to write down ail such expressions in his lecture-book, like a man beginning- to teach, who is not sure of a single word. Oncken, ibid. 48 sqq. following ScALiGER. O. there remarks (62 sq.) that he thinks he has only made this supposition probable with regard to the Ethics and Politics, but his reasons would hold equally for the majority of our Aristotelian
'
writings.
2
Oncken,' in proof of
appeals,
this,
rightly
besides other passages (p. 59 sq.), to those passages of the Ethics in which an audience is spoken of Eth. i. 5tb rrjy TroAiTt/cTjs 1, 1095, a, 2, 11
:
(Eth. X. 10, 1079, b, 23, 27 vii. 5, 1147, b, 9, are not relevant here and Pol. vii. 1, 1323, b, 39 T4pas yap iariv ipyov crx''^^'^^ ' Tuvra, only means this beinquiry.') another longs to Oncken further proves that, in referring on any point to other works, only such expressions are used as are suited to a person who is sjjealdng, such as dp-qTai, KeKreov, &\\os \6yo5, Sec. but such language was certainly used in referring to writings (like the Problems and the i^corepiKol \6yoi, see above, p. 96, and p. 115, n. 4), and is often so used in our own days. He also refers to the title
; :
;
TToAtTt/c^
;
aKp6a<Tis
{ap.
DiOG.
v.
but since
ovK
ecTTt oIkio5
OLKpoaT^s 6 v4os
. . .
we do
titles
iTfpl [x\v
cLKpoarov
irecppoifiidaOoo
Toa-avra.
Ibid.
c.
2,
1095, b, 4
rhv
134
ARISTOTLE
But on closer inquiry, this argument For it is not here a question of any as commonly arise in the redaction of
statement.^
comes
to nothing.
such defects
and repetitions and the erroneous piecing together of the broken argument. It is more a question of peculiarities of style not restrained by the writer, which are too characteristic and too constant in their character to
allow us to
Such an origin might be thought possible if they appeared in some books and not in others. But as they in fact extend, though in varying
them.^
degrees, through the whole, they can only be ascribed
to Aristotle himself
'
answerable
The very
chief
style
And
this
is
the
ground on which Oncken bases his opinion. The defects of our texts are most easily explained from tlie natural defects of a peripatetic monologue
'
(he says, p. 62), 'hastily copied and badly edited from the note-books of the audience.' 2 With these must be reckoned the formation of the sentences (searchingly inv^estigated by Bonitz, Arist. Stud. ii. 3 sqq.) especially the explanations, often of considerable length, which are parenthetically introduced, and the anacolutha consequent on this the frequent use or absence of certain
in
;
occurring so often in all Aristotelian writings, which are put at one time in simple form, at another (as in De An. i. 1, 403, b, 7 sqq.. Gen. et Corr. ii. 11,337, b, o, and in the passages explained by Bonitz, Arist. Stiid. ii. 16 sq., ibid. 6, 333, b, 30) in a
form, but are not answered. That such unanswered questions could not have occurred in a composition (Oncken, ihid. cannot allow 61), one how many, for instance, are found, only to mention one modern writer, in Lessing Neither can one admit the supposition {ibid. 59), that they were answered, in oral discourse, by the audience or the teacher. They seem to be, both in Aristotle and Lessing, a very natural diversion of an acute and lively Dialectic, which
disjunctive
particles (proofs of
which are
to
in the Ztschr. 1866, 804 sqq.), and similar points. The same is the true view as to the questions
notice of this
work
Mr. Gymn.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
135
is
Aristotle's
^)
own. from
A like conclusion
might allude
we
have seen
for in a lecture a
man
could
two past
courses, but
It
seems
many
cases, as in the
Natural Philo-
Such
would have taxed the attention and memory of the most zealous hearer, and it is difficult to see how
they could have been transcribed so perfectly.^
Yet
We
Eudemus
in their
Analytics followed
the general
followers adopted
and we can bring proof that these word for word several passages of the
extant Meta/pliysics.^
^
Eudemus adopted
the Ethics of
See pp. ]28, 131. Note, in relation to this point, how one and the same composition is frequently ref erred to in the most remote places, and how, on the other hand, the most widely differing texts are cited in the same treatise. Thus the Physics, De Calo, Gen.
'^
et
Corr., Meteor., Be Anima, Be Sensu, Part. An., are quoted in many passages of the Jf6;f<z/7%sics and in the Ethics the books on Generation and Corruptlonin the Meteorology, Metaphysics, Be
;
self
* *
and not
136
Aristotle,
ARISTOTLE
and
still
more the
into his
letters in
These
fashion
in
which
Aristotle's
followers
clung to the
As
it is not a mere tranby another hand, but that on the contrary it bears to be and must have been the work of Aristotle
script
(see p. 128).
If
stotle
it
beyond the
circle
make
also intelligible that they might for a long time, even after his death, have been withheld from general publicity, or that they might even by an unlucky acci-
lost
And,
according to a curious and well-known story, such an accident was said to have occurred, involving, as was
supposed, the
Aristotle.
*
loss
for
Phi/s. v.
2,
226,
b, 14,
and are
a,
These
have
reference
to
^r.-rom. Phil.
ii.
b, 114.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
137
CHAPTEK
III
Strabo and Plutarch say that the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus passed, at the death of the latter, to his heir, Neleus of Scepsis, and that they were
stowed away in a cellar by the heirs of Neleus, discovered only in the early part of the last century B.C.
by Apellico of Teos in a decayed condition, brought by him to Athens and thence by Sulla as spoils of war to Kome, where they were afterwards used and republished by Tyrannio and Andronicus..^
writers
From
this
story the
named argue
that
to
the Peripatetics
who
tell
is
definite evidence,
Ad
and Atticus (Cic. Ad Qu. Fr. ii. 5, His work at Att. iv. 4, 8).
Rome could not, therefore, have extended very far beyond the middle of the century, even though he perhaps lived on into
the last third of it. (He died according to Suid. s. v. ynpaihs, in the third year of an Olympiad the number of which has unbeen miswritten.) fortunately
Rome Rome
he was even at the time of his capture a scholar of renown, that he was instructing in B.C.
67 the sons of Cicero, and had some intercourse with the latter
About Andronicus
Ph.
d. Gr., pt.
iii.
cf.
a,
549, 3,
Zeller, and
above, p. 49, n.
6.
138
ARISTOTLE
if so,
what the nature of the evidence might be.^ found in the tale a welcome explanation of incompleteness and irregularities of the existing the If in truth the case were exactly as Strabo Corpus.^ and Plutarch say, we should not only not wonder at the
and
Later
critics
we should
wider and more hopeless corruption than appears in For if it were true of the most important fact to exist.
'
Our
authorities
for
the
QeocppaffTO,
TOV OVK
u)TpLK(Jou,
XOV(riv
yur/Sej/
oAws
fii^Ala
irKriv oK'fyojv,
TTpay/xaTiicuis
dWa
O^aeis \r}Kvdi(iv'
d(p'
ro7s
5'
vaTepov,
Tuvra
irporiAdfv,
&fmvov
The only thing from Strabo. which the latter does not give is the remark that Andronicus obtained copies of the Aristotelian works through Tyrannio, published them, and wrote the robs
vvu
(pepofjLepovs irivaKas.
(pi\oao(pe1v
Kal apiaroreXi^eiP, to. iroAAo duayKa^eadai. ixfuroi et/cora K^yeiv Sid rh irArjdos rcov
Plut.
may
have added this from what he knew from other sources, or also supposes in Arist. (as Stahr Strabo's historical ii. 23) from work (made use of immediately
afterguards
for an incident Sulla's residence at Athens).
in
But we can only suppose this to have been taken from Andronicus, if we limit the {to7s Peripatetics' 'younger S' va-repov, &c.) to those predecessors of Andronicus who were able to use the editions of Apellico and Tyrannio, and it is very questionable whether anyone could attribute to these
d/xapTLu>u.
We
have no right to suppose (Heitz, Yerl. Schr. 10) a source for his information about Apellico'sdiscoverj'- of books, independent of
men, who are qiiite unknown to us, an improvement of the Peripatetic doctrine, and a closer
insight into
Aristotle,
such
as
Hence our only stable witness for this item is Strabo. But we do not know to whom the latter was indebted for his information; the supposition that it was Andronicus is very unsafe. Strabo, after the statements as to the purchase of the AristoteStrabo.
lian books by Apellico, and as to his faulty editing of them, says avvi^T] Se toIs ck rSov TrepnrdTcov,
:
might with reason be ascribed to Andronicus. As little can we assume Tyrannio or Boethus
Grote ascribes it, Ari54) as Strabo's source of information, since the former
(to
stotle,
i.
whom
would have taken a different view of his own edition, and the latter of the younger Peripatetics. 2 Thus BuHLE, Allff. UncyM. Sect. i. vol. V. 278 sq., and lately Heitz; see next page, n. 2.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
139
century and
more in the
cellar of Scepsis,
till
Apellico found
them
if it
supplied unskilfully
missing portions,
and that
Tyrannio and Andronicus also had no further manuscripts they could collate who then could guarantee
that in any
number
among
Neleus'
MSS., adopted
of his
own
works separated, and other portions blunderingly bound together, or lacunae great and small filled up by the
editor's fancy ?
Modern
Strabo's story
which even
its
That Theophrastus bequeathed his library to Neleus is beyond doubt.^ That the MSS. of
1 After the isolated and disregarded voice of a learned Frenchman, about the beginning of the eighteenth century, had raised doubts as to this narration (see what Stahr fjives in Arist. ii. 163 sq. from the Journal des AS^-aj'ttw^of the year 1717, p. 655 sqq., as to the anonymous composition Les Amhiitcz de la Critique), Brandis (' Ueb. die
gether silence.2
294 sq.). Later scholars have mostly followed them, 2 Heitz, Verl. Schr. d. Ar. 9 sqq., 20, 29 sqq. Grote, Aristotle, i. 50 sqq. Grant, Ethics
; ;
Schicksale
llhein.
d.
arist.
v.
Biicher.'
Mus.
Niebuhr
, ;
and
Brandis, i. 236 sqq 259 sqq. cf. Gr.-rdm. Phil. ii. b, 66 sqq.) was the first to deal with it seriously, Kopp {Rhein. 3fus. iii. 93 sqq.)
of Ar. i. 5 sqq., Aristotle, 3 sqq. Certain errors in Strabo's and Plutarch's representation are indeed admitted by these scholars. but in the main it is said to be correct. It is impossible here to examine in detail the reasons given for this opinion, but the grounds for its rejection are fully dealt with in the text.
Stahr
DiOG. where
Theophrastus' will, apvd v. 52 cf. Athen. i. 3, it is added that Ptolemy Philadelphus bought the whole
^
;
140 Aristotle
ARISTOTLE
and Theophrastus belonging to that library
to
correct enough.
therefore be beyond question that Andronicus' edition of the Aristotelian text-books was
may
And
it
is
also
system and
however, it be maintained that these writings were nowhere to be found outside the Scepsis cellar and were
for the preservation of the text.
If,
unknown
In the
first place,
it
is
philosophers.
concerned themselves with Aristotle, as critics or as Cicero says not a word, though he had
abundant occasion,
for
he lived at
Rome
at the very
intercourse
Alexander,
nothing
who used
or at second
Alexandria, this may easily be an inexact expression, just as the opposite it is inexact, in
tion, iUd., asserts that the rvTwle library of Neleus was taken to
way, when, in v 214, he makes Apellico possess not the works, but the library of Aristotle.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
hand.
'
141
MSS.
of Neleus.^
way
feel
themselves bound
it
by
his
text,^
though
if
On
is
an
as
It
may be
true that
away
time went on from the study of natural philosophy and metaphysics, but this change took place not on the
death of Theophrastus, but at the earliest on the death
of his successor Strato.
So
far
on the contrary, with a one-sided preference to physics, though he by no means neglected logic and metaphysics.
He
frequently
contradicted
Aristotle;
but
because he attacked
expressly.^
cf.
With regard to the first, the account given on p. 66, n.l. as to his doubts about the 'Ep;ur?i/etas n. with respect to the second point, cf. Dexipp. In Arist. Categ. p. 25, Speng. (Schol. in Ar. 42, a, 30) irpSiTov
:
likv
ovK iv Jkiraai rois avriypd^ois rh " 6 \6yos rris oixrias" irp6(TKeiTai, us Koi BorjOhs fjLvr]fio-
pute by means of Sulla's MSS. (or, if he had not access to the latter, at least by means of the copies of Tyrannio, which, according to Plutarch, he used). It seems, therefore, that these MSS. were not the only copies nor even the original ones of the
vivii KoX 'Av8p6uiKos it is not said that he has settled the dis-
works in question. Cf. Beandis, Rhein. Mus. i. 241. 2 Qf SiMPL. Ph]/s. 101, a. ' The proofs will be given,
'
142
ARISTOTLE
The theory that
Athens
is
an end, even
was due
every
correlate
in
way
it
unnatural.
It is
to the parallel
which
Plato.
nevertheless
was
no
loss
for
texts
of
in
?
many
himself of the most important sources of the Peripatetic teaching? Who can think that Eudemus, the most
loyal of the Aristotelian circle, or Strato, the shrewdest
books
or that Demetrius
them
works
or that
Ptolemy Philadelphus bought other books of Aristotle and Theophrastus for his Library of Alexandria, but
omitted to obtain copies of their essential texts ? The story also supposes that the possessors of the
stotle
manuscripts objected to such uses of them that Arikept his writings closely under lock and key, and
:
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
secrecy,
143
and
are
laid it as a
duty on
Ms
heirs.
All this
^
is
We
not
left,
The materials are very scanty for the history of a time whose philosophic literature by an unhappy accident we have almost wholly lost but we can still prove, as
;
to a great part of Aristotle's books, that they were not unknown to the learned men of the two centuries that
by Sulla. Whether Aristotle did or did not him^oii jpuUish his strictly scientific treatises, they were in any case destined to be the text-books of the School,
and to be used by its members. Even those numerous passages in which they refer one to the other offer us a palpable proof that, in the view of the writer, they were
not only to be read by his scholars, but closely studied and compared, and, by consequence, that copies were to be kept and multiplied. That this was done is clear, not only from the notices which
of Athens
we find of particular books, but from certain general considerations also. If it is true that the Peripatetics lost the genuine
Aristotelianism
disappeared,
it
when
the
library
of
Theophrastus
must be because the sources of that teaching were nowhere else to be found. But we hear
not only of Theophrastus but of
imitated Aristotle
^
Eudemus
titles
also,
that he
contents of his books; and how close was the imitation both in wording and in the line of thought, we can see
for ourselves
in the
MUcs
'
Cf.pJ48,n.4,andinthesec-
^^^
144
ARISTOTLE
this,
To do
texts
;
possessed Aristotle's
especially
at a
it is
them
Again,
time when he was not living at Athens.^ beyond doubt that the Alexandrian Library
included a large
number
of Aristotle's works. ^
The
who
place Aristotle
writers of philosophy,
writings
it is not possible that the scientific works of Aristotle can have been left out of account. If the Catalogue of
Diogenes ^ comes from the Alexandrine Library, it is proof positive that they were there but even if that
:
the Catalogue
1
still
Vide supra,
p. 130, n. 3.
Sckr. 13) indeed thinks that if the Aristotelian works had been universally known and published, it would be incomprehensible that Eudemus in his Physics (and
2
Heitz
( Verl.
words
It
of
Aristotle
so
exactly.
if that Eudemus had hesitated to do this with regard to published works, a plagiarism on unpublished ones must have seemed much more unlawful to hira. It is impossible, however, to re-
seems,
however,
occasion to the forgery of such texts (Ammon. Schol. in Arist. David, iUd., 1. 14 28, a, 43 And such SiMPL. Categ. 2, e). accounts as those noticed at p.
;
gard his conduct in this light at all, and he himself probably never so regarded it. His Ethics and Physics were never intended to be anything but elaborations of the Aristotelian works
universally known in the Peripatetic School, adapted to the needs of his own tuition.
64, n. 1 and 67, n. 1, about the two books of the Categories and the forty of the Analytics which Adrastus found in old libraries, must refer especially to the Alexandrian Library. But it is
not
to be supposed
that
the
works, and did not possess the genuine ones, by reference to which the forgeries were proved. * See Stake, ibid. 65 sq. on
this point.
"^
p. 48 sqq.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
it,
146
and earlier than Andronicus, had before him a great part of our extant Corpus Aristotelicum} Its probable author, Hermippus, was acquainted with the works of Theophrastus
(which according to Strabo and Plutarch were buried in Scepsis along with those of Aristotle), as is clear from
his catalogue of them, preserved, apparently,
who
by Dio-
genes.2
That he at
all
events
be inferred from the silence of Diogenes on that subject.^ Another strong evidence of the use of the Aristotelian books in the third century B.C. is to be found in the
Stoic teaching, which in its most systematic exposition by Chrysippus follows both in logic and in physics more closely on the Aristotelian than could be possible
if
indeed,
is,
in
SI*
Cf.thescholionattheendof
fiv^iav
ahrov '6\ws
TreTroLrjrai
originated with Hermippus, is the more probable since that writer is mentioned immediately before in v. 45. 3 For, on the one hand, it is not to be supposed that Hermippus in his copious work on
Aristotle (mentioned on p. 51, n. 2) would not have mentioned this circumstance, if he had been aware of it and, on the other hand, it
;
r;'.
"Epfxiinros
DiOG. (ii. 55) names a book by Hermippus on Theophrastus, of which It probably formed a part,
very improbable that the author to whom Diogenes is indebted for his many quotations from Hermippus would have passed over this information. Diogenes, to whose
is
literary tastes
it
mended
upon
*
itself,
That the
lists in
Diog.
v.
46 sqq.,
it, if
at least in part
and
indirectly,
VOL.
I.
146
ARISTOTLE
If the works of Aristotle were first unearthed
by
Apellico and first fully known through Tyrannio and Andronicus, how could it be said of Oritolaus that he
imitated the old masters of his school Aristotle, that ^ or how of Herillus the Stoic is, and Theophrastus ?
that he based himself upon them,^ or of Pana3tius that he was always quoting them?^ How could we have
How
Antiochus,
have explained the Aristotelian teaching as one with and the Academic, and attempted their complete amalgamation ? ^ or where could oppothorough-going nents such as Stilpo and Hermarchus have found the
^ So again, since material for their attacks on Aristotle ? letter in which AlexAndronicus gives us the alleged
ander complains to Aristotle about the publication of that date his doctrine,"^ it follows that long before of Aristotle, including some of those which writings
'
exoteric,'
must have
in fact
poses
acquaintance
with
Ari-
Ibid.
d.
V. 25,' 73.
;
Ibid iv 28, 79
Gr. pt.
iii.
cf.
Zbll.,
Ph.
a,
503, 3,
2nd
ed.
'
n. 1,
and
112, n.
3.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
exoteric or
147
hypomnematic/ are not here in point, but also of the majority of the scientific treatises themselves.
In the case of the Analytics we show this by the Catalogue of Diogenes and by the notices as to the use made of them by Theophrastus and Eudemus.^ For the Categories and the Uspl spfn^vslas, we have the Catalogue.3 As to the former, Andronicus found in his
the spurious Post-prsedicamenta added to them, and was acquainted with several recensions, having varying titles and different readings.^ It follows, there'
MS.
'
fore,
his
must have been long before day in the hands of transcribers.^ The Tojpics are
^
and
The
letters,
Demetrius (n, kpfi-qv.), probably also by Carneades the ProtrejMcus, which is known even to Crates, Zeno. and Teles (p. 60, n. 1), the Eudemus (p. 56, n. 2), which at any rate Cicero used the discourses on Philosophy
Teles,
;
60, d) was attacked by Cephisodorus; in short (as has been shown at p. 48 s^q.), all the compositions given in the Catalogue of Diogenes, not to mention the spurious but much-used composition n. evyeveias (p. 59, n. 2). The writings on ancient
ii.
philosophers,
sus, &c., are
among which
is in-
which, before him, Philodemus, and also Metrodorus, pupil of Epicurus, made use of the ipu>TiKbs, which, according to Athen. XV. 674, b, Aristoof Ceos knew; the dialogue n.7roti7Tc5j/(p.58, n. 1), which Eratosthenes and Apollodorus seem to have used the '0\vfnriov7Kai, which Eratosthenes (ajmd DiOG. viii. 51), quotes the DidascaUcs, which Didymus quotes in the Scholiasts to Aristoph. J?;. 1379 (cf. Heitz, Verl. ScJir. Z^^); the Uapoi/xlai, on account of which Aristotle (according to Athen.
;
; ;
and on Wealth
(p.
found a2?ud Diog No. 92-101 (see p. 62, n. 2, siwra). 2 See p. 67, n. 1. ^ See pp. 64, n. J, 66, n. 1. * See pp. 64 and 66,-p. 141, n.l.
*
The
the
same
would
follow
from
statement
dronicus followed pretty closely the Categories of Archytas, since the latter at any rate are imitations of the Aristotelian; Simplicius, however, bases what is here said merely on his false supposition of their genuineness.
^
^
Cf. p. 68, n. 1,
and
71, n. 2.
Of
Theophrastus
this
is
L 2
148
his follower Strabo
^
ARISTOTLE
had used them.
The
Rhetoric
is
all likeli-
hood are themselves earlier than Andronicus;^ and the same is true of the Theodectine Rhetoric.^ The worked over by Theophrastus and Physics were
so closely
various
One
of the
scholars of
Eude-
clear
p. 5,
same author In Categ. Schol. 92, b, 20 sq., with Themist. Phys. 54,
b, 55, a,
taph. 342, 30, 373, 2 (705, b, 30, See Simpl. Categ. 719, b, 27). Schol. in Ar. 89, a, 15. infra Toj)., Alex. Cf. (Schol. 281, b, 2). Among Strabo's writings is found apitd DiOG. v.
>
(Schol. 409, b,
a,6,b, 28),
and Brandis,
;
8, 411, Rliein.
KaraKoKovdwu
is
120, b,
where
iii.
it
remarked on Phys.
:
8,
208,
n. 3),
ad Alex, (vide supra, p. 74, which Diogenes (No. 79) knows (cf. p. 72, n. 2) as well as cur Bhetorio (about which see the latter p. 72, n. 2, ad /in.) apud Demetrius, Be Elociitione quotations from our Rhetoric are found here, c. 38, 41 ( Rhet. iii.
; ;
KdKXiov yap, olfiai, rh " e|a) 18 rov i.(TTiws " ovTois aKoveiv, ws 6
b,
Eijd-nixos ivoTiffe
&c.
so 121,
rarov b ev
:
KaO-nye/JiSvos,
ricri
*'
apTiypdcpois']
avrl
rod
dh [sc. "
Koivij
"TrpwTTj. "
EijS-n/xos;
Kal ovro)
ypdcp^i
Kot
128,
Etjhrjixos 5e
;
rov:
TOLS 13,
TrapaKoXovOoov,
1409, a, 1); c. 11, 34 {Rhet. c. 81 iii. 9, 1409, a, 35, b, 16) (Rhet. iii. 11, init.y, to it ihid. c 34 refers, which is earlier than
8,
;
Eudemus
irapwv
;
writes,
the author Archedemus, who was probably the Stoic of that name, circa 140 B.C.
(as shown at p. 72, likewise given in Diogenes, and is named by the Rhetoric ad Alex. * get these facts, apart from other proof, from the exceedingly numerous references to for the Physics in Simplicius Theophrastus, instance, about cf. Simpl. Phys. 141, a and b, and 187, a, 201, b, and the
3
222, b, 18, iv rols E(;5. 201, b eavTov (pvaiKols irapacppd^wv ra rov Eude'Apia-ToreXovs; 216, a:
:
Which
is
n.
2)
We
iircKeiva "
instead
:
of the second eVl raSe; 242, a (beginning of the seventh book) Ei5. /uc'xpi rovSe SArjy (Tx^^^v irpayKe^aXaiois b.Ko\ovQi](Tas^ fiareias
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
149
mus
'
cited from
tlie
on Movement.' It can also be proved that the same work was known to Strabo,^ and Posidonius the Stoic showed
less
no
acquaintance with
it.^
The De
Ccelo
cannot
than
the
is
Hepl
(\>9opas
appears
in the Catalogue of
,
Diogenes,^ and
when the
Meteorology
which
is closely
known
the theory
The
(spurious)
and the Astronomy, are named in the list The Natural History was adapted not in Diogenes. only by Theophrastus,^^ but also by the Alexandrine That it was not writer Aristophanes of Byzantium.*^
Mechanics^
toCto
iv
Trap\dci}v
ws Trepirrhv
/col
'6
iirl
to
T^
re\evTai(f>
;
^i^Xitp Ke<j>d\aia
/iCTTjA^e
279, a:
(r^eS^i'
ye
Ei;5.
Vide supra,
p. S3, n. 1.
irapa<ppd(oi}U
Kal
avrhs to
That
is,
j8'
^ApiarroreXovs
ridricn
koI
;
ravra
(rroix^iwu a'
n.
it
ffwrSfxcos 294, b shows that the first motor must be immovable to which Eudemus adds rh irpwrtas Kivovv Kad' eKdffTTjv Kivqffiv. For
TO
Tfx-fiixaTa
Aristotle
and
^
p. 136,
2.
:
Damasus
about which see p. 50, n. 1 * Vide sujyra, p. 83, n. 1. ^ Simpl. De Ccelo, Schol. in Ar. 517, a, 31. SiMPL. iMd. 486, a, 5. * The former No. 123, the latter 113 vide supra, p. 86, n. 1. *" DiOG. v. 49 names as his
**
2 Cf. Simpl. Phys. 153, a (155, b), 154, b, 168, a, 187, a, sqq., 189, b (cf. Phys. iv. 10), 214, a.
3 In fragment the ajnid Simpl. Phys. 64, b of which
:
'ETriTo/iwi/ 'Apta-TOT6Aovs
n.
Z^Jwi/ r'.
" According to Hierocl. Hippiatr. Prtef. p. 4, this grammarian had written an 'EiriToyu^ of
it,
which Artemidor.
ii.
Oneiroe/y
oit.
14 calls
virofivfifiara
150
ARISTOTLE
the Alexandrine period
is
unknown during
also
shown
which was
much
in use.^
of Living Creatures,'
Ilspl
iTvsvfJLaros?
Movement who used also the spurious treatise As to the Problems,* it is more
than improbable that the working up of that book for the Peripatetic School began later than the time of
Andronicus.
seen,'^
The
Meiarpliyncs
them by Strabo and other Peripatetics. It was prothough some sections of ])ably published by Kudemus
;
it
first
introduced by Andronicus
Philosophy.
Of the
EtJdcs,
it is
obvious that
it
could not
have existed only in Tlieophrastus's MS. so as to be lost with it, for if so it could not have been worked over
either
by Eudemus or
Moralia.
at a later date
Politics, if
by the author of
are to judge
Magna
the
list
The
we
by
his
For the present purpose it is of no importance whether they are mediate or immediate witnesses for the use of Aristotle's work.
^ Upon which see ThemiSTOCLES in De An. 89, b, 91, a Philop. De An. C. 4. Cf. p. 89,
knows
'
this epitome.
l,^rf
Aboutwhichseep.87,n.
n.l, supra,
^ *
fin.
Ar'\stote\\aiVL History of Animals in Antigonus' Mirabilia (c. 16, 22, 27-113, 115) are perhaps taken,
^ ^
1.
p.
100, n.
p. 100, n. 8,
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
which
is also
151
by Philodemus.i It is obvious that before him the author of that book 2 had the Folitics knew it also is indicated by the notices that DicEearchus
cited
of his Tripoliticus.^
is
The use
source Cicero
of
it is
which he used
for his
it
own
works
but
it
must have been accessible to learned persons after the death of Theophrastus. The same is true of the UoXiTStai, for the use of which in the Alexandrine
period
1
we have abundant
Vit. ix. ( Vol Here, ii.) 47, col. 27, 15, where
proofs.^
De
col. 7, 38,
it is
2
citing Cic.
i.
iii.
6.,
Bep.
25
(cf. Polit.
9,
1280,
6, 29, c,
seek in
Eudemus
:
or one of his
Peripatetic contemporaries than In Aristotle see ch. xxi. infra.^ s On which see infra, ch. xix.
is
here,
4,
1184, b,
3.S
sqq., defined as
ivepyna Koi XP^o''^ '^'^^ aperrjs, this has certainly a greater resemblance to Polit. vii. 13, 1332, a, 7 (a passage to which Nickes, Be
Arist.
Polit. Zibr. 87 sq. calls attention) than to Mh. JV. i. 6, X. 6, 7, Und. ii. 1, since happiness is here certainly called ivcpyeia kot' apcT^v (or t^s ap6T77s),but the conjunction of the ivepyeia and
6, 1278, b, 8, 19, i. 2, 1253, a, 2) Rej). i. 26 (Pol. iii. c. 1, 1274, b, 36, c. 6, 1278, b, 8, i. 27 7, 1279, a, 25 sqq.); Rej). (Pol. iii. 9, 1280, a, 11, c. 10, 11, 1281, a, 28 sqq., b, 28, c. 16, 1287, Rej). i. 29 (Pol. iv. a, 8 sqq.) Susemihl (Arist. Pol. 8, 11). xliv. 81) also agrees with this. But since Cicero does not name Aristotle in the Rejntblic, and Leg. iii. 6 only refers to him in very indefinite expressions, he
;
;
seems not to have drawn immediately on Aristotle, and the question arises where did he get this Aristotelian doctrine from ? Susemihl, p. xlv, thinks, from Tyrannic, but we might also pre:
sume Dicaearchus, whom Cicero was fond of using. 6 The oldest witness for this is Timaeus, ajmd PoLYB.xii. 5-11, and the latter author himself.
There is also, besides Diog. (Hermipjms) No.l45,the Scholiast
of Aristophanes, who (according to a good Alexandrine authority)
in his 2nd ed., that in Cicero's political writings many things are
152
ARISTOTLE
is
was
also known to the Alexandrine grammaria,ns placed beyond doubt by recent research.^
We may sum up the case by saying that of the genuine portions of the extant Corpus, there are only the works on the Parts, Genesis, and Movement
Animals, and the minor anthropological tracts, as to which we cannot show either express proof or high probability for the assertion that they were in use after
the disappearance of Theophrastus's library from Athens. Even as to these we have no reason to doubt it only
of
we cannot positively prove it and that, when we remember the fragmentary character of our knowledge of
;
is
and Plutarch that the scientific writings of Aristotle were after the death of Theophrastus all but wholly withdrawn from access is therefore decisively negatived by the facts. A
belief of Strabo
nothing strange.
The
few of these writings may possibly have suffered the fate which they ascribe to the whole. One book or
lost to the School at Athens the library of Theophrastus, and may have been again published by Andronicus from the
another
when they
damaged MSS.
reasons
of Sulla's
all
collection.
But that
this
happened to any or
is for all
antecedently improbable.
quoted the noAiTe?ai very often; see Anst. Ft. ed. Rose, Nos. 352, 355^Sn'^I^'^^'^'^^^'^^^'^l-^^esq., 470 485, 498 sq., 525, 583. Iheir presence in the Alexandrian hbrary is clear from the Catalogue of Diog. (No. 83), and their having been used by Ari-
stophanes
de AHe Trag. Judic. Rel^ from the Introductions and Scholia to Sophocles and Euripides
Susemihl has collected at p. 20 sq., of his edition (following Trendelenburg, Granmiat. Grac.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
153
the long
been copies of the important text-books made during life of Theophrastus. He who cared so well
way, by providing for them gardens and houses and a museum and the means of maintaining it, could never have deprived them of his most precious and most indispensable possession his own and his master's texts if a sufficient substitute for them were not at hand. Any theory, therefore, as to an individual book of our collection, that its text rests solely on a MS. from Apellico's library, ought to rest entirely on the internal evidence of the book itself; for Strabo's and Plutarch's suggestion of a general
for his scholars in every other
it
no support.
be denied that
many
of the
books show signs leading to the conclusion that in their present form other hands than the author's have been at work. We find corruptions of the text, lacunae in
the logical movement, displacement of whole sections,
additions that could be additions which
made only by
context,
are Aristotelian
style, and which yet can hardly be late interpolations.^ Strabo's story, however, does not serve for the explanation of these phenomena, for the reason, among others, that
which
so condensed a
yoi-ies
(p. 64, n. 1), n. epi^nveias (p. 66, n. 1), the Rheto^-ie (p. 72, n. 2), the 3fetaphysies (p. 76, n.
3),
(p. 81,
book of the Meteorology (p. 83, n. 2), the tenth book of the History of Animals (p. 87, n. 1), n. ^vxris (p. 89, n. 2), bk. v. Be Gen. An. (p.92,n. 2),theMJucs (p. 98, n.l), and thePoetics (p. 102, n. 2); and the remarks in ch. xiii. infra upon
the state of the Politics,
154
ARISTOTLE
which we can prove to have been current before ApelWe must explain them really as arising in part lico. from the circumstances under which these treatises
were written and
issued,^ in part
were used
for
and the many accidents to was exposed. which If we pass to the discussion of the time and sequence in which the writings of Aristotle were produced, we
carelessness of transcribers
each transcript
importance than
It is clear that
commenced
probable that he
Mitylene
and Macedonia.
all to
The extant
writings, however,
seem
much
them
belong to the second Athenian period, although preparation may probably have been made for
before.
The proof
not only those books in which they occur, but also all that are later ^ and partly in the common references
: 1
'^
How
means,
explanations and repetitions may find their way into the text, and greater or smaller sections may come to be repeated, is perfectly plain, and is proved on a large scale by the parallel case of the Eudemian Physics and Ethics. 3 See p. 56 sqq. He left Athens in
345-4 and returned in 335-4. Thus Meteor, i. 7, 345, a, 1, mentions a comet which was visible whenNicomachus(01. 109, 4, B.C. 341) was Archon in Athens, its
B.C.
*
course and position being accurately described as from subseThe quent personal inquiry. Politics refer to tlie Holy War as an event in the past (v. 4, 1304, a, 10), and to the expedition of Phalascus to Crete, which took place at its conclusion about 01. 108, 3 (DiODORUS, xvi. 62), with a j/eoxTTi (ii. 10, /m.)> but the same book refers to the assassination of Philip (B.C. 336) in v. 10, 1311, b, 1, without the least indication
of its having been a very recent The Bhetoric in ii. 23, event.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
which even the
earliest of
155
them contain
to
Athens and
If,
then, the
right, it
1399, b, 12,
;
refers
without doubt to past events of the years B.C. 338-336 in iii. 17, 1418, b, 27 it mentions Isocrates' Philippus (B.C. 315) ; of the Rhetoric also Brandis shows {Philologvs, iv. 10 sqq.) that the
son of the indefiniteness of that particle. Just as little does it follow from Anal. Pri. ii. 24, that Thebes was not yet destroyed at that time we might rather gather the contrary, with regard to this work, from Polit.
;
Attic orators quoted in it Poetics who were younger than Demosthenes, could
many
iii.
'
5,
1278,
a, 25.
and in the
Cf.
Brandis,
Gr.-r'6m. Phil.
ii.
b, 116.
We may give
:
here a
departure
from Athens, and the same is true of the numerous works of Theodectes which are used both here and in the Poetics. In Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 1, xii. 8, 1073, b, 17, 32, Eudoxus and the still younger Callippus, and in Eth. N. vii. 14, 11.53, b, 5, x. 2, init., Speusippus and Eudoxus are spoken of as if they were no longer living, Eose (Arist. Lihr. Ord. 212 sqq.) has shown with regard to the History of Animals^ from viii. 9, ii. 5. init., and other passages, that it was only written (or at least completed), some
time after the battle of Arbela,
which the Macedonians saw elephants for the first time, and probably not before the Indian expedition. The fact that even nmch earlier events are introduced with a vvv as inMeteor. iii, 1, 371, a, 30, the burning of the temple of Ephesus (01, 106, 1,
in
instances, besides those already noted. Categ. 4, 2, ttou, oXov iv AvKelcp. a, 1, c, 9 fin. Anal. Pri. ii. 24 Athens and Thebes, as examples of neighbours. Likewise in Phys. iii. 3, 202, b, 13; iMd. iv. 11, 219, b, 20: rh eV AvKcicf) elvai. Meta2)h. V. 5, rh 30, 1015,^ a, 25, 1025, a, 25 irXevffai ety A^yivav, as an example of a commercial journey. Ibid. V. 2i, fi7i. the Athenian festivals Dionysia and Thargelia (Aristotle also uses the Attic months e.g. Hist. An. v. 11, &c. ; but it is not fair to attach any importance to this), R7iet. ii, 7, 1385, a, 28 ^ eV AvKelq) rhv <popfji.hu Sovs. Ibid. in. 2, 1404, b, 22, Polit. vii. 17, 1336, b, 27: the actor Theodorus. Very frequent mention is also made of Athens and the
: : :
:
few further
Athenians (Ind. Ar. 12, b, 34 sqq.). Again the observation on the corona borealis (Meteor, ii. 5,
362, b, 9) suits the latitude of Athens, as Ideler (i. 567), on this passage, shows. 2 P. 108 sqq. especially p. 123 sq. and p. 128 sq.
:
b, 19,
and in Polit. v. 10, 1312, Dion's expedition (01, 105, 4 sq.) proves nothing, by reaB.C. 356),
166
follows that all of
ARISTOTLE
them
raust
head,
is
comprehensive a collection, there is hardly to be found a single notable alteration of teaching or terminology.
All
is
ripe
is
the important writings are woven closely together, not only by express cross reference, but also by their whole
character.
There are no scattered products of the We can only look upon them different periods of a life. as the ordered execution of a work planned when the
author, having
come
had gathered together the philosophic fruit of a lifetime. Even the earlier works which he proposed to connect
with his later writing, he revised on a comprehensive Therefore, for our use of these texts, it is no plan.
great matter whether
a particular book
was written
must be
caused by the use of cross references already noticed.^ As such cases are, after all, only exceptions in the general run of the citations, the value
certain difficulty
is
not so slight as
are, in fact,
which our judgment as to the order of the writings is placed in doubt by the occurrence of references both ways. Of the extant books, so far as they are open to this classification, 2 the logical treatises, excepting the tract on
124 sqq. however, is always the case except with writings the genuineness of which can be
^
Cf. p.
This,
opposed on other grounds. Not only are none of these quoted in the genuine works, and only a single one in a spurious compo-
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Propositions,^
itself natural
167
It is in
may be
considered to come
first.
Aristotle's methodical
development of his system by the formal inquiries which were designed to establish the rules and conditions of
all
scientific thinking.
But
it is
also
made
evident by
his
Of the
be the
cies,
seems to
The
book on Falla:
the treatise
but only very few of them On the other hand, there is not one among the works which we consider as genuine, which does not quote the others, or is not quoted by them, or, at least,
sition,
implied, whilst in most of them examples of all three connections To explain more fully: occur. I. Of the decidedly spurious works (a) the following are neither quoted nor do they quote n. kSct/xov, n. xpco/iicTa>/, others n, aKovarrwv, ^vffioyvwjxoviKii, H. <pvru>y (see p. 93), n. dav/xaaicov aKovfffidTwv, MTJxai/t/ca, n. arofiwu ypafxfji.wv, 'AvffjLoov Oeaeis, H. aepo(pdvovs &C., 'H0tKo fieyd\a, 11. aperwv Koi kukiuv, OiKovo/xiKd, 'PTjToptK); irphs 'A\4^avSpov. (b) n. TTVivfiaros quotes no other, but is quoted in the spurious treatise n. C(f(t}v Kivi\ffi(i}s. (c) On the contrary, the latter itself is never quoted. But it names some other writings as does also the Eiidemian Ethics, supposing that its quotations refer to Aristotelian works. II. Among the remaining
: : ;
the Categories is the only work which quotes no other, and neither is it directly quoted (but cf p.64). The n. ep/LL-nvcias. U. T. Kad' virvov fiauTiKTis and the Rlietoric quote others, but are not quoted n. C'^wj/ yevicreus has many quotations, but is only once cited, as a book planned for the future of the MetajjJiysics only bk, V. is quoted or used (cf pp. 76, n.3, and 79, n.l) in genuine works, bks, i,, xii., and xiii. in spurious ones and the 3Ietaph. itself quotes the Analytics, the Physics, Be Ccelo, and the Ethics.
.
On which
67,
n.
see p. 66, n. 1.
1,
on
in
p.
68,
n.
1,
we have
:
the
Anal. 10 fxaWov
(pavepws
iu
rols
Ka66\ov irepl Kiu-fiffecos 5e7 A;^0^vat TTepl avTwv. Tlie Physics, however, is the earliest of the works on Natural Science. A negative line of proof also is found in the fact that in the Categories, the Analytics, and the Topics, none of the other writings are quoted.
158
ARISTOTLE
Later than the
may
be placed
now forms
the
fifth
book of the
In
It is projected in
is
book of
presup-
cited
or
works posed not only in but also in the majority of the other tracts concerning Natural Philosophy, while it on the other hand neither
ethical
cites
Ccjelo,^
nor presupposes any one of them.^ That the Be the treatise on Growth and Decay, and the
follow
Meteorology,
is
the
Physics
in
in
the order
Meteorology
given,
itself^
very
expressly
stated
the
or the
De Anima came
not settled.
it.^
was begun before the other the De Anima we must tracts which point back to it someis,
With
Seepp. 64,n. l,p. 67,n. l,p. and the treatise of Brandis quoted in the first-cited note, which (p. 256 sqq.), by a comparison of the Anahjtics with the Topics, establishes the earlier date of the latter. For, on the one hand, it is mentioned in the Physics and
68
sq.,
'^
Which we
(Jihein.
*
cannot,
like
Blass
'
Mus. xxx. 498, hypomnemati505), consider a cal writing, not merely because
of the references
made
also.
to
it,
but
on other grounds
Gen. et Corr. {vide supra, p. and, on the 1, p. 124, n. 4) other, it seems in c. 30 fin. to referto^vittZ. Posf.i. 6,75,a,18sqq., 28 sqq. though the latter point
76, n.
; ;
Be
^ Meteor, i. 1, whereon cf. further p. 83, n. 1, Ind. Arist. 98, a, 44 sqq., and the quotation of the tract n. (cfoov iropeias in the De Ccelo, ii. 2, given p.
125.
8 That the completion of the History of Animals should not be put too early is clear from what has been said on p. 154,
is
not certain. 3 Vide supra, p. 81 sqq., Ind. Arlst. 102, a, 53 sqq., 98, a, 27
sqq.
n.4.
ARISTOTLE S WRITINGS
times expressly
contents.
^
159
Some
and
is
the
Genesis
of Animals.^
later
That group of
which followed
tracts
undoubtedly
upon
it.^
On
Mhics and
Politics, inasmuch as it can hardly be supposed that Aristotle would have broken in upon his
different direction.
not
We
must,
nevertheless, decide in favour of the earlier construction of the Natural Philosophy texts, for a thinker
who
was
soul,^
so clearly convinced
as
Aristotle
human
must be supposed
There
to
and
relations.
are, indeed,
very
Immediately
after
the Ethics
102, b, 60 sqq.).
Vide siijyra^ p. 89 sqq. See pp. 89, n. 2, 89, n. 3,87, n. 1 Ind. Arist. 99, b, 30 sqq. * The further question of the relative order of the three writings named has been already
^
3
:
* Thus RoSE, ^lm#. Libr. Ord. 122 sqq. Eth. x. 3, 1174, b, 2. Cf. Phys. vi.-viii.
'^
Eth.
i.
i.
Though
Aristotle
in
Mh.
discussed on p. 91 sq.
26 sqq. refers, not to De An. iii. 9, 432, a, 22 sqq. ii. 3, but to the i^wrepiKol \6yoi, yet ii, 2 init. seems to presuppose
13, 1102, a,
160
ARISTOTLE
Politics}
comes the
ences, the
refer-
Rhetoric should be
the
Poetics
should
be
later
than
Politics
but
This, however,
probably true
or
probability a work which and with which several other fragments, some genuine, some spurious, have been amalgamated since.^
in
all
tlie
we have
the bulk of
ings.
theoretical writ-
But that there are not many more of such traces may perhaps be explained by the fact
that Aristotle did not wish to interfere with the practical aim of an ethical work {Eth. i. 1, 1095, a, 4, ii. 2, mit.) by any discussions which were not indis-
pensable to
1102, a, 23.
1
its
purpose
cf.
i.
13,
See See
p. 100, n. 1.
p.
ch. xiii.
is it
And
go to make improbable that the Ethics, so closely allied with the Politics, should have been written before tlie works on natural science.
correct, it would also
physics, see p. 156, n. 2. Eose's supposition (Arist. Lihr. Ord. 135 sqq. 186 sq.) that the 3Ietaphysics preceded all the writings on natural science, or at any rate the zoological ones, makes the actual condition of that work an inexplicable puzzle. But there is also the fact that the Physics, as well as the Be Ccelo, are quoted in numerous passages of the Metaphysics {Ind. Ar. 101, a, 7 sqq.) as already existing, while the Metaphysics are referred to in Phys.i. 9, 192, a, 35, as merely in the future.
161
CHAPTER IV
THE STANDPOINT, METHOD, AND DIVISIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE
As
with Plato.
earlier
of his
forerunners,
and
it
with
him a
them
eager
method
to preface his
own
is
inquiries with a
He
wont
to let
He
is
But the
is
upon
Aristotle
than
ciple,
it
apparent in the general structure of his system is in the treatment of special points. In prin-
Plato had refuted them all. Aristotle is not under the same necessity to distinguish his position accurately from theirs.^ He does not, at least in any
of the extant writings, devote
any space to such proby which Plato established the claims of philosophy and the true meaning of knowpaideutic efforts as those
Even in Metapli. i. 8 their principles are merelj^ criticised briefly from an Aristotelian point of view, and the Eleatics and
'
Heraclitus, about whom Plato busied himself so much, are passed over altogether,
VOL.
I.
1X32
ahistotle
against
'
]edo-e, as
'
on the
one hand, and the Sophists on the other. Aristotle presupposes throughout that general point of view which
characterised the Socratico-Pl atonic Philosophy of Ideas. His task is to work out, on these general lines, a more
perfect system of knowledge,
principles,
by a more exact definition by a stricter accuracy ot of the leading method, and by an extension and improvement of all
the scientific data? It is true that in his own writings the rare expressions of agreement with his teacher are almost lost sight of by comparison with his keen and
constant polemic
against Platonic
views.^
Yet
in
reality aud in the whole his agreement with Plato is far greater than his divergence,^ and his whole system
it
as a develop-
ment and evolution of that of Plato and as the completion of that very Philosophy of Ideas which Socrates
founded and Plato carried on. In the first place, he agrees
for the
Plato in his general views as to the meaning and office To him, as to Plato, the object of of Philosophy itself.
AVe shall deal later on with this polemic, especially as it was directed against the doctrine of
stotle, as 14, n. 3,
we have shown on
p.
i.
9, xiii., xiv.
not unfrequently includes himself in the first person along with the rest of the Platonic
school.
passages are
But
his
way
is
found in which Aristotle expressly declares his agreement with Plato, Besides the passages noted on
such a relation
the
of treating opposite
p
JV:
12,
i.
and
p.
U,
a,
n. 4, see
;
Eth.
2,
1095,
32
ii. 2,
1104, b,
iii. 4, 429, a, 27; 1265, a, 10. 2 Cf. also the valuable remarks of Strumpell, Gesch. d. Aritheor. Phil. d. Gr. 177.
An
6,
Whilst Plato to that of Plato. puts his own view, even where contradicts the original one it of Socrates, into the mouth of his teacher, Aristotle not unfrequently attacks his teacher the even where they agree main point, and only differ in opinion as to secondary matters.
163
Essence, or,
to speak more accurately, the universal Essence of that which is actual. 2 Philosophy treats solely of the
and basis of things,^ and in fact of their and most universal basis, or, in the last resort, of that which presupposes nothing.'* For the like reasons he ascribes to the philosopher in a certain sense a knowledge of everything, thinking,
causes
highest
all
'
knowledge
knowledge,'
As
which
is
Aoial. Post.
ifMircipias
.
ii.
.
.
19, 100, a, 6
i.
24, 85, b, 13
^K
Kal
5'
Texvvs o-pxh
ihv (xhv irepl yeueaiv, t4xvvs, iav 5e ircpl rh hy, 4Tri(TT^,fXT]s. Metaph. iv. 2, 1004, b, 15 t(? ovTi ^ tv (rri Tivii, IfSto, Kal tovt'
iiriaT'fjiJ.'qs,
:
and Mh. JV. vi. 6 init., x. 10, 1180, b, 15. More infra, in cliapter v.
^
Anal. Post.
5e
i.
init.
iiri.
.
(TraaQai
'6rav
(TKeiv
5t'
oiSfied^
eKaarou
((TtI
irepl
S}v
rov
(pi\o(r6<pov cTrt-
Ibid. 1005, a, 1005, b, 10. 2 Metajyh. iii. 2, 996, b, 14 sqq. rh clSevai 'dKaarov . t6t'
(TK4\^/a(rdai TaXrjdes.
Kal
init.
ixi)
2, c. 3,
IX"".
ol6fi6a
virdpx^tv,
8toi/ uSoi/xeu ri
:
i<TTiv, &c. ; vii. 1, 1028, a, 36 etSeVot tot' oiSfxiQa Ka(TTOv juaAtoTo, orau rl icrriu 6 &v9puiros yvcfj/xev ^ rb
rrvp,
7, 1141, a, 17. a, 28, 982, a, 1, 982, a, 12, 982, b, 2 sqq., 2, vi. init. Cf. Schweglee, 1, Arist. Metaph. iii. 9.
c.
*
Phys.
olSfxeda
rh.
i.
1,
184, a, 12
tJt6
fxaKkov ^ rh iroihv ^ t^ irotrhv ^ rh TToD, &c. c. 6, 1031, b, 20 t^ iiriaratrdai eKacrrov rovr6 iffri rh ri ^u dvai iiriffraffOai, and cf 1. 6 ibid. xiii. 9, 1086, b, 5: the determination of the notion of
;
: .
yhp
%rav
Kol
init.
yivaxrKeiv
cKaffrov,
alria yuMpiaw/nev
ra irpwra
Kal
rhs
apxas
ras
irpcaras
fihy
Xafielv;
iTTiarrtfiTj
:
c.
10,
1086,
;
Ibid. ii. 3 jMetaph. i. 2, 982, b, 9 56? yap ravrriv [that science which is to deserve the name co^to] rwv irpwruu d.px(ii}V Kal alriwv eJvai dwpririK'f]V rSre yhp c. 3 init.
fi^xpi
rwv
(xroixeiwu.
b,
lii.
33
rwv KaQ6\ov
(iBfvai
'Kp(l}r7]v
iii.
(pajxlv
eKacrrov,
oicojmfda
'6rav
r^u
;
airiav
yvwpi^etv
1003, b, 16,
rt ^<rrai
iv. 3,
s
1005, b, 5 sqq.
^u enl irdvrwv
ibid, a, 28, b, 1
Metaph.
i.
2,
982, a, 8, 21,
xi.l,1059,b, 25.
Anal.Post.i.U
iv. 2,
1004, a, 35.
164
ARISTOTLE
'
from Fancy or
is
the contin-
To him, as to Plato, knowgent, so also Aristotle. ledge arises out of wonder, out of the bewilderment of To him, its the common consciousness with itself.^
object
is
exclusively that
which
is
contingent cannot be
but only
an opinion, when we believe that a thing opined. might be otherwise it is knowledge, when we recogSo far nise the impossibility of its being otherwise.
;
from
it is
'
Opinion
'
and
'
Knowledge
'
being
all
the same,
rather true, as Aristotle holds, that it is utterly impossible to know and to opine about the same subject
at the
same
time.^
So,
again,
'
Knowledge
'
cannot
In like manner Aristotle distinguishes 'Knowledge' from mere Experience by the test that the latter gives That,'' while the former gives us in any matter only a Why also ^ which is the very mark that Plato us a used to distinguish Knowledge from True Opinion.'
' '
'
'
'
'
'
'
ala6i,(reus
iariv
itrlffTatrOai.
For
&c.
PA.
2
6^r.,pt.
Anal. Post.
c.
6 pn. tank.
y\\.
15,
vi.
2,
1026, b, 2
Eth.N.Vi. 3, 1139, b, 18, sqq. To this line of thought c. 6 init. belongs the refutation of the principle,thatforeveryonethatistrue which seems true to him, which is dealt with in Meta2)li. iv. 5, 6, much as it is treated in Plato's T^^?Mw. ' Anal. ou5e St' Post. i. 31
:
perception has always to do with individuals (more on this subject rb 5 K^edXov koX iirl infra), alaQdv^ffQai, Sec. iratnu aZvvaTov Even though we could see that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or that in an eclipse of the moon the earth stands between the sun and the moon, yet this would be no knowledge, so long as the universal reasons of these phenomena re-
mained unknown to
*
us.
Metaj?7i.
i.
1,
981, a, 28.
165
man can
reach,
Nevertheless,
it is
the Platonic.
content,
is
To
a term
which includes
it
all
spiritual
and
and
yet,
it
when
very
essence, he
distinguishes
of
it
from
human
off
activity.
strictly
Aristotle,
more
while,
on the other
xii. 7,
:
See Metaph.
i.
2, 982, b,
aficivwv
b,
S'
rj
oi/Sefxia
1072,
fiaWou
r]
'YV<api(ov<ra rivos
irpa-
Kr4ov eKaffrov
is
'
tovto
raya-
6hv iv cKdffrois.
dewpia rh i^Skttov Kal &pi<rTov. In Mli. jV. x. 7 theoria is the most essential ingredient of perfect happiness cf. e.ff. 1117, b, 30: 6t 5^ Oelov 6 vovs
:
24
'
which investigates the highest reasons and causes, since 'the highest *the good' and end are inchided among these.
one
'
Ibid.
1.
ovSeixiav
ws
5t'
XP^'**''
(()afiv
kripav, aAA'
SIxTirep
^vSpwirds
(EvcKa
KotX
4\fv6epos
&
avTOv
ovTO)
Kal
fx.))
&KKov
fidvi)
i)v,
avTTj
fidutf
rhv ^vOpuirov, Kal d /cara TovTOv fiios d7os TTphs rhv avQp(i}Tnvov ov xph Se Kara rovs irapaifiiov vovvras avQp(ainva (ppovelv dudpuirov bvra ovSe 6vr}ra. rbv dvrjrhv, dAA' </)' (iffov ivSex^Tai adavari^eiv Kal iravra iroiilv irphs rh ^v Kark rh KpariCTOv ra>u iv avrcf . . tJ) oIk7ov (pvan Kpariffrov Kal eKaarcp rfj
TTpbs
'
i\vd4pa
Sib
ovcra
roiv
iiriartiixuv
'
yap avT^
avTTJs
ouTrjy eVc/ceV
t(,v
iariv
.
Kal SiKaiws
ovk
avdpwTrlvr]
.
vofjii^ono
oifre
elvai,
7]
KTrjais
oAA.'
t6 diiov (pdovephu
.
. .
ivS^x^Tai
"
5^ 6 Karb. rhv vovv ^los, [xaKiffTa ciircp TOVTO ^vOpwiros ovTos &pa Kal evSai/xoveffTaros C. 1178, b, 28: ey '6<rov 5^ 5to8,
;
reivei
7]
Oewpia, Kal
t]
evZaijxovia.
Xph
vo/xi^eiv
Tnunayrepav
.
r]
. .
Kai6Tpai
yap avay-
Cf.
vii.
xii.,
c.
9,
1179,
15 fin.
infra.
22,
Taurrjy,
166
ARISTOTLE
it
hand, he brings
exclusively an
into
closer
is
relation
with the
is
experimental sciences.
affair
it
His view
that Philosophy
He
dis-
tinguishes from
(Tr/oafts-),
which have their end in that which they produce and which
soul.'
He
distinguishes
also the
creative
effort
(iroirja-Ls)
which
is
itself.^
With
Experience, on the other hand, he connects Philosophy more closely. Plato had banished all dealings with
the sphere of change and becoming out of the realm
of
'Knowledge'
Even
as to
the passage from the former to the latter, he had only the negative doctrine that the contradictions of opinion and fancy ought to lead us to go further and to pass
to the pure treatment of Ideas.
Aristotle, as
we
shall
to
movement
that,
little
the phenomena.
Besides the passage just given, see Eth. N. vi. 2, c. 5, 1140, a, 28, b, 25; x. 8, 1178, b, 20; vi. 1, 1025, b, 18 sqq. xi. 7 pe An. iii. 10, 433, a, 14; and
;
7,
306, a,
6.
The
same
is
Eth. i of Metapli.
993, b, 20.
167
of philosopliic knowledge.
Aristotle
concedes that scientific knowledge kas to do only with the universal essence of things yet he does not stop
;
Philosophy to deduce the Individual from the Universal Science has to begin with (as in a7ro8sfcft9, vide infra).
the Universal, the Indeterminate
to the Determinate.^
;
>
i
but
it
must pass on
think
little
phenomena.^
It
must
not,
therefore,
of
knowledge must
lie.^
It is
like reason
that Aristotle
makes
for scientific
He
takes
fieya
iffriv
'
(ru/ii8e)3T7K(JTO
(rv/x^dWeTai
fXfpos
irpds
rd etSeVai t6 ti
excu/U.ej'
TTuffav
fidXicrr''
[x)]v
airopiav
icrri
5'
iireihav
yap
airoSiSduai /carci
aXX^
T^v
T(i)V
Kttl
(pavrafflav irepl
fj
rwv
avfifiefiriKi'
fiev
ws aXrides rh
aX-qdes Koi
fJ.v
Xeyd/j-evou,
7]
ean
ws ovK
Sxnrep
S>v
yap
iTTKTriif/.'n,
rb
iiriffraa-dai,
Bnrhv,
'
rh
dvvdfxei
SvvafjLLS
rh Se ivepyeia
CDS
iiXr]
t]
fj.U
o'iv
[toC]
rod
ri
KaXKiffra' irdffTjs yap airo^ei^eMS apx^ TO ri icrriv, S)(rre Kaff oaovs rwv bpiffuQv iM^ (TviJL^a'vei ret (TvfiSrjAov on ^cfirjKora yvwpi^nv
. . .
S'
SiaXcKTiKcSs
'dnavTes
3
tp7\vrai
Ka\
Kevus
a,
Kal
wpifffieuov
rdSf ri odcra rovSe rivos. 2 Metaph. i. 9, 992, a, 24 (attacking the doctrine of Ideas)
:
Part. An.
irepl
5,
645,
5:
els
Xoiirhp
elirelv,
rrjs
(coXktjs
(pvffeois
jurjSei/
fi-fire
'
irapaXiirSvras
fx-ffre
SAws 8
roiv
(-nrova-ns
rrjs
ffo<pias irepl
Zvvaixiv
arifxSrepov
rim-
fldKaficv
(irepou
fxevois
T^s alrias '6dv 7] apxh "t^s jueraBe Cop.lo, iii. 7, 306, /3o\^s) &c. riXos Se ry\% ixkv iroif\riKT\s a, 16 iiri(Tr'f]/xr}s rh epyov, tt/s Se (pvffiKrjs rh <l>aiv6(Xvov ael Kvp'ws Kara Be An. i. 1, 402, a, IG oiffQ-nffiv. %oiK 5' oh ix6vov rd ri iari yvwvai XP'ho'^fJ'-OV elvai irpos rh OewpTjorat ras
:
Kara
ffa<ra
tV
Q^opiau
ro7s
(i/xws
Srifxiovpyf}-
<f>vais
aixT}xdvovs
SvvafJLevois
rjSovas
alr'tas
.
irope'xet
ras
yvupi^eiv Kal
hib Set
irepl
<t)vaei (piXo(r6(pois
tV
:
n^
'
Suo-xepaivetj/ iraiSiKoSs
arificorepuiv
r^v
roSv
(TKeypiv
ev iraffi
Be
Ccelo,
airias
Qvcriais
.
rS)v
,
,
(rv/xfie^-nKSrcov
raU
rk
aAAa
Kal avdiraXiy
168
ARISTOTLE
'
the content of
Knowledge,' and of
scientific proof, to
include not only the Necessary, but also the Usual {to o)9 sttI to iroXv).^ He deems it a sign of philosophic
crudity that a
man
should
demand
when
in fact
^^
depends on the nature of the subject matter what amount of exactitude can be attained in each of the
sciences.3
Where
coercive proof
fails
him, he
is
content
Anal. Post. i. 80, iii. 12 Jin. Part. An. iii. 2, 663, b, 27. Metaph. vi. 2, 1027, a, 20, xi. 8, 1064, b, sqq. Eth. N. i. 1, 1094,
b, 19.
example
xiii. 3,
being
1094, b, 11-27, 2, 1104, a, 1, vii. I fin. ix. 1, 1165, a, 12 {Polit. vii. 7 fin. is not in point here). It is chiefly as regards the ethical discussions that Aristotle here denies the claim they liave to a thorough accuracy, because the nature of the subject does not allow of any such result for in judging of men and the issues of human action, much rests on estimates which are correct only in the main and as a rule.' ^ According to Aiial. Post.i. 27, that science is more exact (aKpifiea-Tepa), which besides the Uti settles the diSn that which has to deal with purely scientific questions, not with their application to some given case (v /j.^ nad'
i.
Eth. N.
1098,
1,
c.
7,
a,
26,
ii.
S^ (that according to its notion ture, is earlier, or stands to the first principles
1078, a, 9)
Sffcp
tip irepl
TTpOTfpwp
Ty
\6ycf)
which, or nanearer
cf
.
p.
this
first
(Tri(rTT)fxv
at fioAKTra
tQv
irpdorup
(lai),
is
'
'
'
capable of so much the less according as it descends more and more to the world of sensible things (cf. iUd. 1078, a, 11 sq.) for in the latter noWii r] rod aopiarov (pixris ivvirdpx^i {Metaph. iv.
5, 1010, a, 3; further infra, in ch. vii. sec. 2). Therefore the natural sciences are necessarily less
viTOKiix4vov [d/cpt^Seo-TepaJ
t^s Ka0'
ap/io-
\moKiiix4vov, oiov
viKrjs),
apid/j.r}TiK^
and
of
lastly
that
which
accurate than those which are concerned with what is constant, like the first Philosophy, pure Mathematics, and the doctrine of souls
from a smaller assumptions (e.ff. Arithmetic as compared with Geometry), or in other words the
its results
deduces
number
which De An. i. 1 init. extols cLKpifieia); and those which have the transient as their object are less exact than Astronomy (il/e(of
the
more abstract
iK
Trpoadea-eus,
i.
Metajjh.
taph. 1078, a, 11 sqq.). Kampe (Erkenntnisstheorie d. Ar. 254) says, that in the scale of aKpi^eia
169
up with arguments possible and probable, and more definite decision until a further
analysis can be had.^ It is not, however, the essential problems of philosophy which Aristotle so treats, but always special questions of ethics or natural philosophy,
for
which Plato himself had relaxed the strictness of and put probability in the
The
real difference
between
*
them
insists
is
only
branch of knowledge in Philosophy; whereas Plato on treating everything except the pure Science
Why,
the
man who
thirsts after
spiritual effort
rhv
\6yov,
4av
.
comby dividing
rb
5 ward v
nature takes the but this would been said in the be true of Ethics
ii.
els
and
Politics.
Cf EUCKEN, Meth. d. Arist. Forsch. 125 sq. See further on this subject in the next chapter.
avaydycofjiev.
^
De
CceU,
5,
287,
b,
28
^^^^
^i.
511, b, sq.
.
vii.
519,
sqq. c. 12 init. Gen. An. iii. 10, 7G0, b, 27, where to a discussion
e; Tim. 29, B,sq. and alib. Cf Zeller, PA. d. Gr., Pt. i pp. 490, 516, 536 sq.
c, sqq.; PI. 173,
TO,
TTore
rore
iav
rfj
al<rdT}(Ti
Be Ccelo, \\.\2inU. weipareov \4yeiv t6 (paivdfJLevov, alSovs d|iov dvai vofii^ovTas ri]V Trpodv/jLiav
fia\\ov
ro7s
^
Tuv \6yo}U
iriarevreov, Kal
fiaWoy ^
to
dpdffovs (it
\6yois^
bfioXoyovfieva
leiKviwcrnois
ix.
<paivoixevois.
H. An.
^1 fin. c. 42, 629, a, 22,27. Metapli. xii. 8, 1073, b, 10 sqq. 1074, a, 15. Meteor, i. 79, init. irepl ruv atpauuu rfj alaO-fiaci vofii^ofiev UavoSs aTroSeSer^^"' 'f'^
:
kuI fiiKpas
ei/iropias
ayair^
av ras
U,
c.
5,287, h, 31
P^rt. An. l
5,
644, b, 31.
170
off the
AUISTOTLE
theoretic from the practical activities.^
is
That
distinction
full
but the
note of unity
ment by the
human
'
an indispensable condition precedent of ethical knowledge.^ If it be true that this shutting back of Theory upon itself, this exclusion from the notion of Philosophy of all practical need and
as a moral upbringing is
' '
effort
(as
it
becomes apparent,
for the later
for
example, in the
pare the
way
Man
from practical usefulness, nevertheless we should not overlook the fact that even here Aristotle only followed
in the direction indicated before
'
by Plato
for Plato's
live
for
Philosopher
'
would
also,
if left
to himself,
'theory' alone,
life
of the
Eepublic on compulsion.
with those
the
who
criticise
Philosophy, not from the point of view of an ideal humanly unattainable, but in a way that could be carried out in the actual world,^ or with those who
office of
attack
for distinguishing
between
the ideal of knowledge and the scientific attainment of If such a view of the relation of the ideal to men.'* actuality were in itself and in Aristotle's view well founded, it would only follow that he had sought, as
KiTTEE,<9^s.<Z.PA.iii.50sqq. Besides the passages to be cited infra, on the inquiry into the highest good/ cf Eth. N.
1
x. 10, 1179, b,
20 sqq.
i.
1,
1094,
b,
27 sqq.
*
'
p.
56
sq.
171
Even
this,
however,
is less-*
To
it
is
not entirely
is
not
any individual phenomenal thing, although Aristotle an unactual ideal even so.
He
sees
it
is set
very high
cannot
best
it
be
reached by everyone
that
that
even by the
Yet he
is
never content to
weakness of humanity. Indeed, the whole course of this account must have already shown how complete
is
his
real
this very
point.
out in
In his philosophic method Aristotle likewise follows all essentials the lines which Socrates and Plato
out.
opened
His method
is
highest perfection.
With
it he combines the observational method of the student and even though it be true that he does not of nature
;
among
the
Greeks.
Bv
that advance he
made
as that was
As
i.
2,
7,
1072, b, 24
Eth. N.
b,
2 sqq., x. 1178, b, 25
;
7,
cf.
c.
8,
172
'
ARISTOTLE
'
idea
may
be.^
As
commonly
set out
on
such inquiries
examples
beliefs,
commonly accepted
arguments from uses of words and ways of speech so too is Aristotle wont to find his starting-point for the
definition of such ideas in prevalent opinions, in the
meaning
of words. ^
by means
Aristotle
of a
dialectical
comparison
all
of various
sides.
opinions and
in
But
is
directed with
more
view.
explicit
consciousness to
As
a rule, he
make
for or against
each view
is
and
simply
ii.
1,
notion of
from
173
method of
it
He
by the
all
In his own writings he us a most perfect example of a dialectical inof the subject. If
from
all sides
we
did not
know
it
-
before,
we should
With
To
Aristotle the
most perfect
definition of
an
idea
'
is
On
rd
more
:
definite
later.
aXriov
Be An.
'6ri
fidvov
Set
.
\6yov 5r]Aovv
atViaj/
ctAAa
koI
t^u
\6yoi
re-
t6 neaov, ev airaffi 5e rovro And after quoting some examples eV airaa-i yhp rovrois (pavcpdv icrrip oti to avro iffri rd ri iffri Koi Sia ri iariv, &c. Ihid. c.
Qtir^'hai.
:
ivvirapx^iv
ilaiv
Kal ificpalveadai.
oiov
vvp
rwv
ri
icrri
rpayu}Vi<Tix6s ;
rb taov
erepofi'f]Ki
'
opdoycoviou eJvai, laoirAevpov 6 Sh roiovros opos \6yos rov (rvixirepda[xaros 6 5e Keycav on earlv 6 rerpayuvKTfiSs fx.e(T7]s evpeais, rov Trpdyfiaros Keyei rd aXriov, Anal.
'
3 init. c. 8 init. ibid. i. 31, 88, a, 5 rd Se Ka96\ov rijxiov Sti StjAo? rd atriov. J/i^to^^/i. vi. 1, 1025, b, 17: dia r6 rrjs avrrjs etvai Siavoias r6 re ri lari ZriKov iroielv koX el effriu.
;
:
every inquiry deals vi^ith four points, the STi,the Si6ri, the t lo-rt, the ri iariv. These may, however, be reduced to the two questions el ecrri ixeaov and ri eari^ rb fiecov rb fxeu yap
ii.
1.
sq.
Ibid, vii, 17, 1041, a, 27 (pavepou roiuvv '6ri (rjrel rd aXriov rovro S' ecrrX rb ri i^v elvai, ws eiire7p \oyikcSs h tTr' evioou jxev eari rivos eVe/ca, eV eviuv 5e ri eKipria-e
:
'
irpurov.
elScSfiev
Cf
r)}v
.
.
Anal. Post.
airiav, alriai
ii.
init.:l'rTe\^eeiri(rra<rdaiol6neda'6rau
Se rirfieffov
rapes
ira<rai
avrai
Siot
rov
'
SeiKvvvrai.
174
ARISTOTLE
There-
view
(as
we
ought to
take account not only of the idea and the final cause of a thing, but of the efficient and the material causes
Holding as decisively as we shall see he does that a thing is to be explained by its own causes, he could not well be content with a method which should Idea gives, and look only to the Universal which the neglect the immediate definiteness of the things themalso.
' '
selves. ^
This
is
COS
In this sense Aristotle not unfreqiiently contrasts the logical consideration of a subject {i.e. that which is only concerned with what is universal in its concept), either with the analytical, which enters more deeply into the peculiarity of the given case, (and which he also calls ^k twv K^ijxivwv), or with the pliys'ical research which draws its result not from the concept of a phenomenon merely, but from its concrete conditions. The former, for instance, Anal. Post. i. 21 fn.,
-
Kal
ToiovToi
Tiv4s
ficiv
'
\oyiKws
Khv eK Tcoj/Se So|t6 T(f} rainh rovro avfi^aiv^iv. Gen. An. ii. 8, 747, b, 28 Ae^eoSe XoyiK)}v [oTr^Setltj/] 5ia toGto oti o(T(f KaQoXov jxaXKov TToppccTepw rwv
S' iirKTKOirovcri
:
oiKficov
icrrlv dpx(>}v.
And
after a
proof such as this has been brought forward, he adds (748, a, 7): oinos fxev ovv 6 \6yo5 Kad6\ov Xiav koX Kv6s. ol yap fi^ iK tu>v olKeiuv
apxoov \6yoi Keuoi, Sec. (similarly Zfe An. i. 1, 403, a, 2: 5ia\KTiKot)s Kal Kvws Mh. Micd. i. 8, 1217, b, 21 XoyiKws Kal Kevus). Hence in such cases he much prefers the physical treatment to the logical
;
:
c 23, 84,
19, 30; Metajjh. vii. 4, 1029, b, 12, 1030, a, 25, c. 17, The latter, Phys. iii. 1041, a, 28. 5, 204, b, 4, 10 (cf. a, 34, Metaph. xi. 10, lOGG, b, 21), c. 3, 202, a, 21; De Ccelo, i. 7, 27o, b, 12; Metaph. xii. 1, 10G9, a, 27, xiv. 1, 1087, b, 20 (similarly (pvaiKxs and Kae6\ov, De Cwlo, i." 10 /in. c. 12, But here he takes 283, b, 17). the logical to be so much the more imperfect, the further re-
32, 88, a,
(e.g. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, 316, a, 10: 1^01 5' 6.V ris Kal iK tovtwv, oaov
Siaipepovcriv
ol
Gr. ,-pt.i.
p. 869, 1),
moved
Phys.
it
is
from the
:
metaphysical researches on Ideas (3Ietajjh. xiii. 5 Jin.) he thinks the AoyiKcorepoi \6yoi are the aKpi^4<TTpoi. See further, Waitz, Arist. BONITZ, Arist. Org.ii. 353 sq. Metaph. ii. 187; Ind. Arist. 432, b, concrete 5 seq. Rassow, Arist. de not. def.
; ;
definiteness
viii.
doctr. 19 sq.
175
which has drawn down on him often enough the reproach of an unphilosophic empiricism.^ He was
not only one of the highest speculative thinkers
he
was also one of the most accurate and untiring observers, and one of the most erudite men of learning that the world knows. As in his general theory he conceived
of experience as the condition precedent of thought,
come
his
and of perception as the matter out of which thoughts forth, so in practice he did not fail to provide for
own system
Especially
should
first
any theory of nature he insists that we know the phenomena and then look about
We
find in
him the sureness and accuracy of method which empirical science has in modern times attained. In Aristotle's day it was only in its infancy, and it suffered
from the complete lack of the proper aids to observation
'
We
SCHLEIERMACHER,
Gesch. d. Phil. p. 120, says of Aristotle: * cannot deny that there is a great want of speculative genius,' &c., and on p. 110
that
Aristotle's general
We
and
historical
data,
he contrasts the older Academics with him, as being more speculative' but he sets out with aprinciple, according to which Aristotle must certainly come off badly: Never has one who first went through a great mass of empirical work become a true philosopher.'
'
;
'
Thus
the judgment
which, however, can scarcely be reconciled with his own observations on pp. 184 sqq..
(middle).
d.x\.rist.
Cf.
Eucken, Methode
^c^.
Forsch.Yll
176
ARISTOTLE
often crossed by the speculative and dialectic methods which he took over directly from Platonism.
too
it
would be more
him with
it
too
little
would be far truer to say simply that he carried both methods as far as could be expected of The science of the Greeks began with specuhis day.
much.^
But
any and largely by the efforts of Aristotle himself. Therefore it was natural that the dialectical method of Socrates and Plato, with its logical dissections and connections of ideas, guided by
lation.
The empirical
sort of
development at a
Aristotle
brought
to
it
in theory
It
completion.
and practice, as we have just said, was not to be expected that the
him an
modern centuries
is
the credit
scientific
him even
methods
of
'
made
by Bacon, and, since the above was first wTitten, by Lewes {Aristotle^
91, 97)
and, through
177
them
as
well as he then
That Aristotle's dialectic had to do with a far more extensive range of empirical data than Plato had to deal with is the reason why Aristotle's methods of exposition
are distinguishable at a glance from Plato's by that air of formal logic which they wear. Aristotle does not limit
himself to that unfolding of pure ideas which Plato expected of the philosopher,^ though his own attempts at it were in truth but rare and partial. The ideal processes
are for ever interrupted, in Aristotle, by references to experience, by examinations of ambiguous terms, by criticism of other views. The more extensive is the
matter which he has to bring under the yoke of science is he to see that every step in his far-
reaching investigations should be assured on the one hand by a copious induction, and on the other by a careful observance of the rules of logic. His manner
of presenting his work seems often dry and tedious as compared with Plato's; for the texts we now possess
yield us but rare
for
which
his writings
examples of that richness and charm were praised no less than his
master's.
artistic finish,
make
miss wholly the dramatic life, the the fine mythical presentment which us love the Dialogues.^ But the Corpus Aristo-
We
telicum exhibits the peculiar qualities of a philosophic style in so high a degree that we ought not only
' For fuller information on the methodological principles of Aristotle and their application,see the next chapter and Etjcken,
;
(1872);
cf.
esoecially
pp. 29
Die Methode
sqq. 122 sqq. 152 sqq ^ g^e Zeller's Plato, ^ Cf. p. 106 sq.
passim
d. Arist.
Forschung
j^
VOL.
I.
178
not to call
'
ARISTOTLE
him a bad
'
writer,'
set
him
is
He
accused of
grows more concrete, as in his physics or ethics, this but it will not be regarded as a blemish by falls away those who remember how needful even in Plato's view how much bewilderment this strict logical effort was
;
among
ideas
distinctions
how many fallacies will have in the meanings of words the exact analysis of the syllogism. been avoided by Rather has Aristotle done the world immortal service
in that he established a fixed basis for all scientific
procedure,
and won
to us
for
whose value
If,
we only
to
to
it
remember that
great.
we endeavour
to appreciate, so far as at
we
two things.
call A'ristotelian,
we
shall
the basis he inherited from Socrates and Plato. Yet, on the other hand, there is an element of originality
so notable
and so sustained as to make us stigmatise the notion that Aristotle was a kind of dependent follower of Plato who did nothing but formally work
up and complete
utterly unjust.^
his
master's thought,
as
an error
>
Aristotle adheres not only to the Socratic proposition that Science has to do with the idea of things, but also to the further consequence which takes us into the
is
truly actual
sq.
d. Phil.
see
Kant,
i.
179
m
it,
a thing
is
only
all
its
is actual only in so far as it partakes of that ideal essentiality. Yet, whereas to Plato this Essential Being was a thing existing by
and that
'
else
'
which he relegated to a separate ideal world beyond the world of experience, his follower recognises
itself,
the truth that the Idea, as the essence of things, could** not stand separate from the things themselves. Therefore
common essence of things indwelling in the particular things themselves. In lieu of the negative relation to which the sundering
existing for itself apart, but as a
of ideas and
phenomena had
he posits
mutual dependence. Therefore he calls the senelement the Matter, and the insensible essence the Form. He puts it that it is one and the same Being, I here developed into actuality, there undeveloped and
their
sible
So it comes that, for him, Matter must, by an inner necessity, strive upward to Form, and Form equally must present itself in Matter.
In this transformation of Plato's metaphysic,
to
it is
easy
recognise
is
the
realism
whose aim
is
Just this
and ever recurrent charge against the Ideal Theory, that it leaves the world of phenomena, the things of Becoming and Change, unexplained. For his own part, he finds the very root-definitions of his
his strongest
the secret of
all
genesis and
all
change, whether by
nature or by
art.
N 2
180
ARISTOTLE
Yet
Aristotle, too,
is
Plato. the philosophy of Ideas which he inherited from Matter together, Hard as he tries to bring Form and the last they always remain two principles, of
still
to
which he can neither deduce one from the other, nor Fully as they are worked out both from a third. range of finite things, still the highest through the left outside entity of all is nothing but the pure Spirit,
in man is the world, thinking in itself as the highest from without, and that Reason which enters into him
which never comes into any true unity with the indiviis at dual side of his being. In this way, Aristotle perfection and the ending of the Idealism of once the
Socrates and Plato
:
its
perfection, because
it
is
the
whole most thorough effort to carry it throughout the world of phenorealm of actuality and to explain the but menal things from the standpoint of the Idea
'
'
also its
ending, since in
it
and the possibility of ever holding together the Idea real unity, after we have once Phenomenon in any
basis of the posited, in our definition of the ultimate
world, an original opposition between them, principles If we follow out the development of these
that purpose to in the Aristotelian system, and seek for we are take a general view of the divisions he adopted,
met
in his
writings nor in any trustworthy account of on that point his method, is any satisfactory information if ^e should trust the later Peripatetics to be found.i
own
Kitter,
iii.
57 sqq.
Bkandis,
ii.
b,
130
181
Neo-Platonic commentators,
all
Aristotle
had
philosophy into
Theoretic
office
and
Practical^
of perfecting the
perfecting the
appetitive.
In Theoretic Philosophy,
:
Physics,
fell,
it
said,
into three
Ethics, Economics,
and
Politics.^
Ari-
we
find.
Teichmuliek,
ii.
Arist.
real
ForscJi.
9
v. d.
sqq.
Waltbe,
Die Lehre
sqq.
'
Thus Ammon. in Qu. voc. 7, a, sqq. (who adds the fourfold division of Mathematics
Porpli.
part as ah instrument of Philosophy), practical philosophy into Ethics and Politics, and Politics into the science of ibhe State and the science of the household. Alex. To2y. 17, gives as philosophical sciences, Physics, Ethics, Logic and Metaphysics but as to Logic cf below
:
.
David,
Pkys.
Scliol.
25,
a,
i.
1
e
;
Simpl. Philop.
;
p. 187, n. 2.
2
Pe An.
i.
Anatol. in 462 H.; EUSTRAT. in Mh. N. init. Anon. Schol. in Arist. 9, a, 31. The division into theoretical and practical philosophy had already been given by Alex, i/i Anal. PH. init. and DiOG. v. 28.
.
10, 433, a, 14
6, cf.
9,
Fth.
vi. 2,
;
For further in1333, a, 24. formation see chap. xi. 3 iira^ rh i. 1, 1095, a, 5 r4\os [ttjs TToAtTt/cfjs] iffrlv oh ypSxTis
14,
ML
aWa
10,
irpa^is.
Likewise, ibid. x.
ing
Further, the latter, in part divergfrom the others, divides theoretical philosophy into Phy-
1179, a, 35, ii. 2, init.: iirel oZv 7) irapovaa Trpayfxareia ov d^upias fveKd irrriv Sxrirep at &\\ai (ov yap iV flSw/aev Ti icrriv rj aperi) (TKiirrSluLcOa, ciAA.' /i/' ayaOol yevdficda, ^irel oi/Shv &i/ ^v 6<f>e\os ovttjs), &c.
182
at
ARISTOTLE
an early date in his School a division of Science
,
and practical.^ He himself, however, is accustomed to add a third the poietic science ^ because he distinguishes TroLrjais or production from irpa^Ls or action, both by its source and by its end,
into theoretic
'
and that production has its work to be brought into being, but action has its end in the activity of the
the latter in the
will,^
end
'
Metaph.
opBus
5'
ii.
(a), 1,
"^"^
'''^
993, b,
Koki'lffQai
speaks merely of an
of a
tik}),
<f>i\offO(pia)
eVto-T^yu?;
(not
19
ex**
TT/v (piKocrocpiav iTricniifxtiv ttjs olAtj0eias. dwpT]TiKT]s fifv yap (wherein, however, the whole of philosopliy is here inchided) tcAos dAr,eeia,
synonymous
the latter
with
when
Etli.
End.
5'
i.
signifies not
merely knowledge in
1214,
a,
.
8:
.
ttoWSjv
TO, {x\v
ovtwv
avrSiu <tvuT;'j/et irphs rh yuwvai fx6vov, to. Se Koi TTCpl Ttts KTr}(rcLS Koi irfpl ras
6(t}pr]iJi6.TCt)v
.
'6(Ta /xev
ovv
&C.
2
MetapU.
:
vi
1,
1025,
. .
b,
.
general, but science in the special sense of the term. And since in Metaph. vi. 1 {vid. inf. 183, n. 3) he gives three (pi\o(ro(plai OewpririKal, this undoubtedly supposes that there is a non-theoretical, i.e. a practical or poietic philosophy. But one cannot believe that by
is meant, not that science which treats of irpa^is and iroiTjais (Ethics, Politics, and the science of Art), but the faculty of
18 sq.
71
<Pv(Tik)]
iwiffTTj/xri
the latter
irpaKTiK)]
(pvcriK^
OewprjTtKTj
c. 2,
1026,
b,
(xi.
7)
ovdefxiS.
yap
[so.
and
rixvi)
(WALTER,
iTri(rTT}ixr)
i-mfxeXes
irepl
avrov
Lehre
v. d.
rov
(TvixfiffirjKOTOs]
oiire
irpaKTiK^
'^i\o(TO(pla
oijTc iroiriTiKfj
oUre 60Dpr}TiKf}. The same division of iiriffri^fxr] in Top. vi. 6, 145, a, 15; viii. 1, 157,
10.
c. 2,
and even
iiricrr-finri
cannot have
it
a,
Further
cf.
EtJt.
N.
vi.
1139, a, 27, x. 8, 1718, difference theoretic science in De Coelo, iii. 7, 306, a, 16 Metaph. xii. 9, 1075, a, 1, cf. ix. 2, 1046, b, 2, and Bonitz on this passage. Though Aristotle here
3-5,
20,
tain branches are distinguished as practical and poietic from Physics, Mathematics and Metaphysics, which are the theoretic
sciences, the former must likeAnd wise be really sciences.
left
Metaph.
vi. 1,
1025, b, 22
183
to
The two
coincide,
however,
as opposed
way
another, whereas
Knowledge has
to
do with the
three
than as
are
it
is.^
Aristotle
first
movable and
corjporeal,
second referring
to
which
is
incorporeal
and unmoved
these being
ovvTi
r)
ws eV
.
.
ri\ri.
7]
5e
TrpcoTTj
[sc.
^jA-OfTot^m]
.
Kal irept
ry
irpdr-
(iffre Tp7s
TovTi T) Trpoaipecris. Hence L^th. vi. in the province of 5, 1140, b, 22 art it is better to err voluntarily in that of morals involuntarily. ' erepou S' EtJi. vi. 4 init.
: ; :
hv ejev
fxariKi),
(pvaiK^, deoKoyiK'f].
1,
Simi;
b,
&Wo
'
iroii^iffews
....
lo-Tt
rrjs fxev
yap
t}
iroi-fjcreoos
7^p
i.
aifT^
evirpa^ia
r4\os.
'
Ibid.
vi.
fikv
1 init.
Eth.
47ciffri]p.7]
1096, a, 30, c, 6 init. De Ah.L I, 403, b, 7 sqq. About the name of the first philosophy, cf also p. 76, supra. As to Mathematics as the science of numbers and quantity, and the abstraction peculiar to it, whereby it does not consider a body according to its physical properties, but only from the point of view of magnitude in
larly xii.
.
<pavp6u
....
;
yap
:
viroAafi-
i^dvofxiv, h iiria-rd/Jifda
jx)] ivS^x^ffGai &W<i}s ^x^i-v c. 4 init. rov S' ^vSeXOfiepov &\\cas ^x^i^v ^ffri ri Kal Cf. C. 2, TTOiTfrhv Kal vpaKTou, &c. 1139, a, 2 sqq. Ue 6te/o,iii. 7, 306,
:
space, and, in determining number and quantity, disregards the of that in intrinsic condition which they occur, see Phys. ii. 2, Anal. Pout. i. 10, 193, b, 31 sqq. Anal. 76, b, 3, c. 13, 79 a, 7 Metaph. xi. Pri. i. 41, 49, b, 35
;
p 167, n. 2 Part. An. 640, a, 3 ^ yap apxh to7s fiev [the theorists] rh iv, toIs 5h [the technicists] rh ia-Sixevov. Metaph. vi. 1 (xi. 7) where among other things 1026, a, 13
vid.suj)r.
;
4,
c.
3,
i.
I,
a, 9, xiii. 2, 1077, a,
iii. 2,
'
De An.
71 IJLfv
dW
yhp (pvaiK^
OVK
evia
irepl
ctKiV/jra,
ttjs
Se jxaOtifia/x^v
TiKTis
aKivrjra
ov
in many places, e.g. Metaph. i. 2, 982, a, 26 De Coelo, iii. 1, 299, a, 15, c. 7, 306, a, 26; Be An. i. 1, Cf. Brandis, p. 135 402, b, 16.
;
184
ARISTOTLE
however,
we attempt
to apply the
suggested
we
knowledge
;
because
it
investi-
73 sq., finds in Aristotle, viz, that a sensible subtratum is first denied and afterwards attributed to Mathematics, and that its object is now designated as removed, now as not removed, from what is sensible, is partly solved by the distinction of the purely mathematical from the applied sciences, and partly and chiefly by the remark that Aristotle nowhere says that the object of Mathematics is a x'^P*(TThv, but only that it is considered as such, i.e. by abstracting from its sensible nature in Metaph. xii. 8, 1073, b, 3, moreover, Astronomy according to the common reading is not called 'the truest philosophy,' but the oiKeioTctTTj, the most important of the mathematical sciences for the discussion in hand still Bonitz is right in reading t^s otKeioTctTTjs <pi\o(ro<pia Twv fxadrjuiariKuv iiTi<m}fxS}v.
; ;
:
RiTTER,
gates what is most difficult to be known because the science of the last reasons is the most accurate (o/cpijSeo-TaTr;) and gives the most perfect instruction as to causes because, more than any other, it pursues knowledge for its own sake and because, as the science of principles, and hence
;
also of final ends, it must govern all others. In Top. viii. 1, 157, a, 9, the following is given as an example of a division Uri eVt:
(TTTfiJ.'q iiriffT'fffi'rjs
fieffrepa
efvot
'
Meta2)n.
vi.
1,
1026,
a,
21
(and almost the same in xi. 7, 1064, b, 1), after what is given in the preceding note tV tiihuto.:
TTjj/ [eVio-TT^/xTji/]
Aristotle in Metaph. xii. 9, 1074, b, 29 sq. also supposes that the value of knowledge is proportioned to that of its object. The universal pre-eminence of the theoretical over the practical and poietic sciences does not, however, rest on this, nor on their greater exactness, for some of them (the zoological and psychological sciences) have no superiority over Ethics in either respect but primarily on the fact that knowledge is here an end in itself; cf. Metaph. i. 1, 981, b, 17 sqq. 982, a, I. * Thus Ravaisson (Essai siir
;
(TttjtSv.)
Se Tcoi/ 6((i}pr]TiK(2v. He discusses at length in Metapli. i. 2, why the first philosophy especially deserves the name ao^ta because, as perceiving the most universal, it gives the most comprehensive
:
la Metaphysique d'Aristote, i. 244 sqq.). who wishes to subdivide theoretical philosophy into Theology, Mathematics and Physics, practical philosophy into
and
Ethics, Economics and Politics, poietic philosophy into Poetics, Rhetoric and Dialectics.
185
Of
all
that Arifall
under
poietic science
'
the Poetics
for
he himself rele-
gates the
that
it is
Rhetoric to
Dialectics cannot
Logic. ^
If
we were
to conclude
from this
difficulty that
the
theoretic and
practical
was
preferable to the division into three, we should thereby be cutting ourselves loose from the statements of Aristotle himself.
The one mathematical work to which he gives a reference, and which can with certainty be taken to be genuine the tract on Astronomy belongs,
of Mathematics.
according
'
to
2,
the
classification
:
above
indicated,
;
to
/jJAt^f. i.
1356, a, 25
Sxtt^
TO
ia-Ti
1359, b, 8
Sxt
rris
irepl
TO.
T}^
(iirep
purposes of Politics and since the character of a science depends on its purpose, he includes it in the practical section. Hence, although in itself an artistic science, and designated as such
Aristotle (e.g. MJiet. i. 1354, a, 11 sq. b, 21, J 355, a, 4, 33, b, 11, c. 2, 1356, b, 26 sqq. rhetorical theories are also called rexvai, cf. supra, 72, 2, 73, p. 1), still he does not seem to give Rhetoric an independent place in the system, as Brandis does (ii. b, 147), and still more decidedly Boring (Xnnstl. d. Arist. 78).
;
by
p-qTOpiKT)
avyKurai
re
ava\vTiK7Js
iiri(TT'fiiuLr]s
Koi ttjs
rots
rh
fifv
ijdrj
T?)
Sia\KTiKf)
rh Sh
i.
<ro(pi(niKo'ts
\6yois. ^i^A.
1,
1094,
iro-
b,
[r^v
AitjkV]
oijcras,
oTov
aTpari]yiKT)v,
oiKovofiiKTiv, ^TjropiK'fiV
xP^M-^^V^ ^^
irpaKriKcSv
&c. These expressions seem to have a direct reference to the passage cited from the Mhetorie. Aristotle sees in it an application of Dialectics for the
So in Top. i. 1 init. c. 2, plainly designated as an auxiliary science to philosophy in general, and especially to the theoretical investigations,
'^
it
is
186
Physics.
ARISTOTLE
Of the
others, they are
either
of doubtful
an
'
essential
exposition of his
system.^
second,'
^
The
again,
is
spoken of as the
as
if
there were
no thought of Mathematics standing between it and and Aristotle himself refers First Philosophy the
' :
'
the
Mathematical
Axioms
to
the
'First
Philoso-
phy.'3
As
divide
later
Economics and Politics ^ like the commentators'^ who were misled in that matter by
into Ethics,
He
distinguishes in the
first
the
Politics
from the
Tactics,
writings
cf.
which
:
he desires to
mics, Military
'
and Rhetoric ^
and then in
Politics
'
'
About
Metaph.
p. 86, n. 1, siqna.
^
TTjs (pvffiKr^s
<}>ias.
KoX
iv.
as the three parts of practical science this division must consequently belong to the oldest
;
Peripatetics.
^
3
*
Metaph.
Aristotle in Eth. vi. 9, 1142, a, 9, besides <pp6vr](ns which relates to individual action, certainly names otKoj/o/t^oandTroA.tTeio also: but in 1141, b, 31 he has divided Politics [i.e. the science of the life in society with the exclusion of Ethics) into olKovouia, vonodea-ia, Tro\iTiK^, so that, according to this, Economics forms a part of Politics, Still more definitely Eudemus in Mfi. Eud. i. 13, combines the 8, 1218, b.
icoKitik)] koL olKovo/xiKrj Kol ^p6u7}(ns
302, also agrees. 1094, a, 18 sqq., vi. 9, 1141, b, 23 sqq. " Eth. i. 1, ibid., and 1095, a, 2, i. 2 i7iit. and Jin,., ii. 2, 1105, a, 12, vii. I2i7iit., cf. i. 13, 1102, a, 23. Hhet. i. 2, 3, vid. sujfr. p. 185,
son,
iii.
1,
n. 1.
Eth.i. 1, ]094,b, 2;Ehet.\. Also in the first 1356, a, 25. book of the Politics, Economics, as far as Aristotle has treated the subject, is taken to belong to the; science of the State.
2,
187
remember that
it
in the above
whether we take
for Logic.
to be twofold or threefold,
there
is
no place
The
which
Stoics
is
a point of
that
Logic
for
tion,^
Methodology.''
Nor
much
had worked out his Logic with such must have had some definite place in
his system.^
subdivision,
The only conclusion is that the scheme of which we deduce from the above-quoted
narrow
for
books
built
contain.
A
'^
might be
' Eth. i. 1 1094, b, 7. So also in the lengthy discussion, x. 10. DiOG. V. 28 Alex, in Pri.
;
is
of course beside
Stipra, p. 91 sq.
Anal,
in
init., ScJtol.
No more
trustworthy
(Z(?<7.
is
Ra252,
Top.
41,
m,
Ammon.
ajnid
;
vaisson's statement
ci^.
Waitz,' Arist. Org. i. 44 vied. SiMPL. Categ. 1, ^, Schol. 39, b, and Philop. in Categ. Schol. in Ar. 36, a, 6, 12, 37, b, 46. The same in Anal. Pri. ibid. 143, a, 3. Anon. ibid. 140, a, 45 sqq.
bespeaks of an organ of
264 sq,), that Analytics is no special science, but the form of all science. It is much rather the ^?wwZe</^e of this form, which constitutes a particular branch just as much as Metaphysics, which is the knowledge of the universal grounds of all Being, Marbach, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 247, even thinks that here can be no doubt that the "Mathematics" which forms a part of philosophy is what is now called Logic'
' t
188
ARISTOTLE
otlier
on the
remark, that
all
physical,
Under the
comprehends both
and this alone would prove that he could not here have meant to indicate a scheme for the presentation of his system, in which these two departments are kept so
obviously distinct.
If,
then,
find in his
we are forced to give up the attempt own isolated remarks any key to the plan
which
corresponds with
the
to
of
his
work
as
construction
itself,
work
we have
it,
or taken
up with philosophic
investigations
we
distinguish
among
are
main masses.
These
his
of
Logic,
of Metaphysics, of
fifth
would be the
iidiKrjs
ra 5e
dewpias
o>s
fxaWov
2
iffTiv.
Ka\
liihv
Tuv
yap
irpofi\r}ixa.Tuv
iJ-fprj rp'ia.
at
XoyiKai
<TO(piav
....
Korr^
d/JLoiccs
5e Koi
ra
iro-
jSATj/xaro
....
no importance as
As an instance of logical propositions Toj). ubi auj). mentions the principle, which belongs equally to Methodology or Analytics and to Metaphysics (cf. Metaph. iv. 2, 1004, a, 9 sqq., 1005, a, 2), that opposites fall
under the same science. Again, in the instances given on p. 174, n. 2, giqjra, \oyiKhs at one time stands for logical, at another foi metaphysical inquiries for the] latter also in Eth. Eud. i. 8, 1217,
;
against this, that, in dealing with the difference between knowledge and representation, Aristotle remarks in Anal. Post. i. 33 TO 8e \onrh iroSs Sel SiaveTfxai Jin.
:
iri
iirKTr-fifMrfS
Kal
t4xvvs Kal
b, 16.
189
He
seems to
of
have forgotten to
work from the idea and problem of philosophy as a whole, or to reduce them to any simpler plan of diviOf these five, the section of Logic and Methodosion. logy ought to come first, not only in the time order of
the important texts, ^ but also in the order of exposition
for Aristotle
himself describes
it
as a propaideu-
other inquiries.^
scientific
method, the
'
First Philosophy
must come.
it
belongs in
time to the close of Aristotle's work,^ nevertheless it contains the key to the philosophical understanding of
the Physics and the Ethics and
,
it
is
from
it
we must
obtain
all
we
could take
The very
8(ra
See s?/^m, p. 156 seq. Metaph. iv. 3, 1005, b, 2: 8' iyx^tpovffi rwv \y6uTMV
-TTcpl
Inadmissible,
on
Tivh
rris aX-ndeias,
Si'
tv rp6irov
Sc? a7ro5ex6(r0ot,
aTTaiSevffiav
twv
avaKvTiKoSv tovto Spuffiv 6? yap vepl TovTwv ^Kiu irpocTTKrrafjLevovs, aWk fx^ oLKovovras ClTeTv. It is much the same for the ques-
the other hand, is Prantl's explanation {Gesch. d. Log. i. 137), which refers the tovtodp, not to the words with which it is immediately connected, but to the
d^idixaTa,
tion in hand, whether the rovruv is referred to avoKvTiKcSv, or more correctly to the investigations indicated in the words irepl rrjs from the dX-qOfias &c., since nature of the thing it comes to the same, whether he says, One
'
about which Aristotle has spoken above. As a consequence of this translation, Prantl thinks it monstrous that this passage should be used as a proof of the precedence of tlie
Analytics.
^
Vid. supr. p. 76
sqq.,
and
p. 160, n.
190
ARISTOTLE
of the
'
name
in
First Philosophy
'
the logical
order
it
precedes
other
material
most universal of all presuppositions.^ The Physics follow on after the First Philosophy,' and the
of the
'
Ethics follow
the Physics,
is
pre-
The Rhetoric must be taken The philosophy of Art, on the as belonging to Ethics.^ other hand, forms a section by itself, which is not brought into any definite connection with the rest. We can only treat it, therefore, as an appendix. To a like position we must relegate also Aristotle's occasional
supposed in the former.^
utterances as to Religion
in the true sense,
'
for a
Philosophy of Religion,
Still
Metaph.
vi. 1,
1026, a, 13,
the superlative
this
(pi\o(ro(pia'jvpoTfpa{(f)V(riKrjs, /j.a6r]ixa-
30, Gen. et Corr. i. 318, a, 5. Vid. supQ'a, p. 159. ^ See snj)ra, p. 185, n. 1.
'^
LOGIC
191
CHAPTER V
LOGIC
From
We
must
not,
technique
it,
'
of his philosophic
therefore,
full
In dealing with
he does
and uniform
Of the
first
the Topicshe
single
the
Analytics
it it
of Science,^ partly
aforesaid,
of the
subject.
logical
concerned with
Toj).
i.
1 init.
r/
/xev irp66(Tis
d<|)'
orav
b^ioius
Slxrirep
eVI
^TjTopiKris Koi
Svur)(r6iJ.0a
<rv\\oyi(ff6ai
ircpl
ovtcov Swoifxeuv
t/c
rovro
S' icrrl
rh
twv ivdexofMevuv
"^
iroi^Lv
&
irpo-
K6yov virexofres
aipovfieda.
vircvavTiov.
Cf
c. 2.
C.
f^o^ify 5e
r(\4ws
tV fJi-fOohoy,
'
192
far as
ARISTOTLE
may be
necessary thereto, did he stay to consider
It was not until a later he extended these hints into a
is
He
touches on
fact,
The theory
other
Metaphysics
than to
Logic, because
involved in
its
construction, but
is
the natural division of those real relations, to which the Categories, according to their content, are referred.^
of
'
Analytica
PH.
0.11:6-
'^
that Aristotle
going by an
init.
irpwrov /nkv
7]
(lirc^u
ncpl ri Kal
irepl
analytical method,
rivos ecrrlv
Set|tJ/
crK\pis, '6ti
he proceeds from
KoX
ilTKTT'flfJLVS
aTToBciKTlKrjS.
ii.
propositions, so in like
manner
init.
Trepl fxev
airodei^eoos, ri
he passes from propositions to notions. Both are merely considered as factors in the syllogism. ^ Some other writings on Concepts,
Tavrhv
yap
iffriv.
AnMl.
i.
PH.
i.
1-3.
Anal.
Post.
'^
2, 72, b, 7.
Vid. supr. p. 66, n. 1. Anal. Post. ii. 3 sqq. and cf. especially c. 10. * The little that has to be mentioned with regard to this will be adduced later. The definition of the '6pos in AtmI. Pri. i.
3
supra, seem to have had a purely logical character; but probably not one of them was the work of Aristotle. Aristotle not only calls both the principal logical writings 'Ava\vTiKd (see p. 67, n. 1 ), but
p. 70,
and p.
185,
1,
LOGIC
investigations which
Logic,' Aristotle
193
class
we should
under 'Formal
to
was
chiefly concerned
determine
method of forming ConPlato had added that of Division Aristotle was the discoverer of the theory of Proof This is to him so clearly the one important point, that he
ceptions
;
;
reIt
solves into
it
the whole
science of Methodology.
the later Peripatetics described Logic 2 as an 'instrument' of philosophy,^ and when accordingly the logical writings of Aristotle were
in
when
the end published together under the name of the 'Organon,''' this was in no way contrary to the
'Ava\viv means to reduce a given thing to the parts of which
'
eVl
Th
TrpS>Tov
atriou, t
iv
rij
vp4crei eaxaroi^
composed, or to investigate the conditions through which it is brought about. In this sense
it is
iariv
rhy
elp'r]^4vov
ypafJ-fia.
Aristotle uses auaKvais and avaXiiiv regularly for the reduction of syllogisms to the three
figures, e.g.
^i
riKal,
'^"'K
Anal. Pri.
lo-Xf^Tov
iv
rrj
avahvaei
(Cf.
i.
32
init.
irpuTOv ehai
... Tovs yeyivnix4vovs [(Tv\Xoyi(rfiovs] avakvoifieu ets to irpoeip-q^iva (Tx-fifJ-ara, for which was written
eV tt} yeueaei.
Trendelenburg,
Arist. p. 47 sq.)
(TT-fifXT)
Mem.
Log.
eVt-
The waAvriK}}
immediately before
^ofiev
eipr]fieva crxrinaTa.
ttws
els
8'
audirpo-
TOVS <rv\\oyi(rfjLovs
ra
Cf.
BONITZ,
Ind. Arist. 48, b, 16. And since every investigation consists in tracing out the component parts and conditions of that with which it is concerned, avaXveiv together with Cnre'iv stands for investigate.' Thus Eth. N. iii. 5, 1112, b, 15: {^ovKeverai .... ov8eh irepl tov t4\ovs ) a\\^ OJ/J-evoi reXos ri, irws Kal dia t'ivoov
eo-Ttti
1359,b, 10) designates accordingly the art of scientific inquiry, or the introduction to it, which is scientific method-
(Ilhet.i.4:,
ology
of
scientific inquiry,' i.e. the theory it as in MetapTi. iv. 3, 1005, b, 2. 2 On this designation, proved to have existed since the time of
Cicero, cf. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 514, 27, 535. ^ Vid. supr. p. 187, n. 2.
* This name is not used by any of the Greek commentators
(TKOTTovai.
I.
ecus
tt.v
tKduaiv
VOL.
194
ARISTOTLE
own
'
Master's
being the
The further theory that Logic, as view.^ Organon of philosophy, could not be also a iDcirt of philosophy, 2 he would hardly have approved. In order rightly to comprehend this Science of Method, it will first be necessary for us to go more closely into Aristotle's views concerning the nature and
'
origin
of
Knowledge.
For
it
is
the
conception of
direction
ment of Knowledge in the mind of man must point the way for its systematic development in Science also. All Knowledge relates to the Essence of Things
to
the
Universal
properties
all
with themselves in
Causes of
is
all
that
is
actual.^
is
only to be
known through
till
the sixth century, as applied to the writings it only came to this use later (cf. Waitz, Arist. Org.ii. 293 sq.). On the other hand, the texts are, before that time, called by them opyaviKa, because they refer to the vpyavov (or bpyauiKhv cf. SiMPL. in jxipos^ (piKo(To<pias
; ;
and Ethics it has its own end in itself and its own object, or that it is meant to be a philosophically established presentment of the activity of human thought and nothing else (ibid. p. 138 sq,), is a supposition which can neither be proved from any definite statements of Aristotle, nor from the construction of his logical writings. The ' real-metaphysical side of the Aristotelian logic,'
Philop. in
7,
Cat.
15;
T>A^YlJi, ibid,
6^e5c/i. <Z.Xo^. i. 136, respect unreasonable, when he denounces the schoolmasters of later antiquity,' who, * infected with the folly of the Stoic philosophy,' wished at any price to represent Logic as the tool of knowledge. This is really
Prantl,
this
is in
'
however, need not on this account be disregarded. Even if it is regarded as the Science of Method, it may have its foundations in Metaphysics and even though it precede the latter, yet it may be;
come necessary,
^
"
the position and meaning which Aristotle gives it. The theory that in the same sense as Physics
gypj.^ p. igy, n. 2.
Fi^.s?^^?/-.
pp.163
sq.,
173 sq.
LOGIC
196
This follows in
propositions about
the relation of the individual to the universal, which will meet us hereafter ; for if it is individual existence
alone which can be
called originally actual
'
if
the
'
Ideas
^
'
but only
it
properties
<.
the soul must bear within itself the ground-principle of its knowledge, he is equally positive that it is not
possible to attain
any
real
of experience.
some present knowledge, to which it joins on.^ Out of this axiom there arises the doubt, which had given
the earlier thinkers so
bility of learning
^
^
<-
much
> /
at
all.
For
we
a^ia (pavTaff/id
rh y^p
perception with his metaphysics in I)e ATI. iii. 8,^432, a, 2 iirel dh ouSe irpayfxa ovd4v iffri irapa ra fj-eycdr}, us Sok7, to. afV^TjTa /cexcu:
t:/c^
e'/c
TrpovirapxoixrTjs
ylverai
iari
acpaipea-ei.
yvdjaewsv^hiGh he immediately proceeds to prove as to the diff erent sciences, both as regards syllogistic and inductive proof.
The
30;
3
like in
Metaph.
i.
9,
tions] Kal o<ja tcSu aiaerjTcov e'lets /col Trddv. Kal Sid tovto oijre ix)j aiadavd/xevos ij.7]9(u ovOeu hv ixdQoi ov5e ^uj/etTj orav re ^ewpp, dvdyKT}
Mh.
and
992, b*
' '
vi. 8,
1139, b, 26.
a, 696,
pt.
i.
996,
02
196
ARISTOTLE
of that
knowledge from which which is not in fact true all the rest is to be deduced in which case the said or else we have still to acquire it, knowaxiom does not hold for that which is the highest to all.i It was this difficulty that Plato sought ledge of of Anamnesis 'the latent recolavoid by his doctrine
'
But apart from all the lection of a prior knowledge. against the preother objections wbich he finds to lie
existence of the
unable to reconcile him unhimself with this theory, because it seems to without thinkable that we should have in its a hiowledge ^ not to speak of all the various absurdities Imowing it
soul,'^
Aristotle
is
to
which a
His lead.^ of the Ideas in the soul would obviously by means of solution lies rather in that conception answered so many of the questions of
which he has of metaphysics and natural philosophy in the notion Development 'in the distinction between the groundThe work of potentiality and the completed actuality.
'
soul,
he
its
says,
sense
I
must certainly bear within itself in some knowledge. For if even our Sense Perception
ii.
Anal. Post.
19, 99, b,
20
Toivvv,
on
iyy[vcrdai.
'^
principles
(the
apx^i
.
CL the section
Anal. Post.
i.
vld.lnf.y.
.
tc2j/ 5'
a^eVcov Tr,v
. .
tion of soul
3
and body,
loo.
and
yvucTL-i
of the
'
apxa^ iyyivovrai
-ti
Metapli.
iuovaai XeK-fidaaiv. el /xev 87? exfM^" (Tvix^aivei yap aKpiavras, &TOTrov PcrTpas exovras yvaxreis airo^ei^ews Xaix&avop.ev n^ \avedviv. el de
exovres irporepou,
ttcos
&v yua3pi(oLfiev
.
992, b, 33. if ideas ^ To]}, ii.7, 113, a, 25 were in us they would have also Still Arito move with us, &c. himself would scarcely stotle have laid much stress on this merely dialectical line of attack.
9,
:
LOGIC
is
197
is
not
different
from the
lies in its
nature as such
knowing with an immediate knowledge those highest principles, which are presupposed by all derivative and mediate knowledge as its condition and starting-point/ So far, then, the soul may be de' De An. ii. 5, 417, b, 2 sqq. Aristotle here says that neither
b,
38
^ eV
iirl
ivicov
rj
eTriCT^^Tj
rh
irpayfia;
vArjs
iirl
consciousness nor thought ought to be called a irdcrx^iv and an aWoiaxris, unless we distinguish two kinds of suffering and change r-fju re eVl ras (TrepriTiKas Sia64(reis /xcTafioX^v koI ttjv eVi ras ^i5 Kal rriv (pvffiv. Similarly in iii. 5, 429, b, 22 sqq., iii. 7, 431, a, 6. 2 Be An. ii. 417, b, 18 koX rh KOT ivepyeiav [al(rddve(r0ai] Se
: :
Anal. Post.
.
. ,
eVei Se
airaaa
/iierci,
\6yov
ecrri,
apxSov iTrKxr^ifxri (jl\v ovk Uv e^Tj, eVei S' ovZkv aKT}d4(rrpov eVSe'^erai
ivai
^iTiffri\ixii]s
.
. .
Aeyerai r^ decope7v Siacpepei tov fxlu ra. iroi'QTLKb. ttjs ivepyelas (^oc0ev, rh 6par6v etc. aXriov S' on rS)V KaO' eKaarov fj Kar^
dfiolufs
^ vovv, vovs Uv
ei
eiVj
Se, '6ti
rS}v apxoov
Trap'
iTTicrr'fjiiirjv
ivepyeiau
iffTi rfi
ataQ-ncns,
7}
S'
i'KKrT'fjju.r)
Etll. vi. 6
oijr'
tt,v
ry]s
apxvs rev
eirj
r&v KaBoXov
avT^ orav
ovK
3
ravTa
5'
eV ai/rfj
Trios
CTTio-rij/iiT]
oijre
rex^V
eV
^vxf}. Sih yo7}(Tai fxkv eV ^ovX-qrai, ataddvcaBai S' avrc^' avayKoiou yap virdpalffQifiTov.
ovre
(ppdvrjo'is
....
XeiTr^rai vovv
X^iv rh
at 430, a, 2 (following the passage to be cited presently on p. 199, n. 2), he says 192, 3 Kal avrhs Se [o j/oCs] potjtos iariu SxTirep to. vorjrd. iirl fikv yap Twv &j/ev v\7]s rh avrS iari rh voovv Kal rh voovfxcvov t] yap iirtariifxr] t] Qfii}pr\riK)] Kal rh ovrocs iiriffrrirhv rh avrS ear IV. Ibid. iii. 7 init. rh S' avr6 ear IV t] Kar'' ivepyeiav iin(rrij/j.7]
:
:
De An. iii.
ehai rcov apxa>v. c. 7, 1141, a, 17, b, 2, c. 9, 1142, a, 25 (5 fikv yhp vovs rcov opcov, cov ovk ecrri \6yos.
:
c. 12,
1143, a, 35 (with
;
which
cf.
d.
:
])raM.
6
sqq.)
vovs
aficporepa
Vernunft, etc., 38 rcov iaxdrcov 4ir' Kal yap rcov irpdorcov '6prov
Kal rcov icTxdrcov vovs iari Kal oh X6yos, Kal S fxfv Kara ras aTroSd^eis
rcov aKivfircov '6pcov Kal Trpdorcov, 6 S' ej/ rals TrpaKriKa7s rod i^xdrov Kal iv5exoiJ.4vov etc. (More will be
T^
Trpdyfiari.
198
scribed as the
'
ARISTOTLE
place of the Ideas,'
'
and
it
may be
said
of the faculty of
Thought that
/j.^
it is
said as to the latter, in ch. xi. and xii. infra.') This recognition of principles is an immediate knowledge (&fi^(rov), for the root principles of all argument cannot, in their turn, be proved (cf Anal. Post. i. 2, 3, 72, a, 7, b, 18 sqq. c, 22, 84, a, 30; ii. 9 i7iit.c. 10, 9-4, a, 9 ar\d3fetaj)h. iv. more 4, 1006, a, 6, 1011, a, 13 fully later). But on this very.
elvai
.
Kal
. .
to
fj
ctATjfles
(ixrirep
Kal
rh
\pev5os ;
ovdh rh a\r]des iwl rovruv rh avrh, ovrois ou5e rh clvai, ctW' ecrrt rh fjiev aXrjdh rh 5e \pevSos, rh fxev 6iye7v rd 5' ayvo^tv Kal (pdvai a\r}6hs
.
airarrjdrjvai yap irepl QLyydveiv rd ri iariv ovk iariv dAA.' t) Kara icrnv 'Sirep '6cra Stj avXfiefirjKos
fiT]
' .
account it is always true. For error only consists in a false conjunction of perceptions, and hence arises only in the Proposition by reason of the conjunction of the Predicate with a Subject {Cater/.
4
fioi.
;
ravra ovk aAA' ^ vo^lv ^ fi-ff rh rd Se aKr]dhs rh voeiv avrd Se x|/eGSos OVK iariv, ouS' airdri], According to these aAA' ayvoia.
passages we should understand by the irpordaeis ^jxiffoi, which express the ultimate principles {An.
Post.
i. 2, 23, 33, 72, a, 7, 84, b, 39, 88, b, 36), only those propositions
De Interpr.
iii.
i.
16,
a,
;
12
immediate knowledge, on the other hand, is concerned with pure conceptions relating to no subject distinct from themselves, which we can only know or not know, but as to which we cannot be deceived De An. iii. 6 init. Twv aSiaipTCi}V vSrjcris iv 7] ixkv odu
8,
Dc An.
432, a, 11)
in
which the predicate is already contained in the subject, not those in which it attaches to a
subject different from itself or in other words, only analytical
:
prlo7'i
manner the
{iUd. ii. rod ri iariv
TOvTOis
iv
TTcpl
affirmed as to the existence or non-existence of a aA.770es, a-vvO^ais tls ^Stj vorjixdrwv conception, nor of its connection us v ovTwv and ibid, at the end Lastly, ecTTi 5' 7] fiev (pdcris tI Kara tlvos, with a stated subject. Socrirep t] Kardcpacris, Koi a\7}97]S ^ when the principle of contradic6 St vovs ov iras, aAA.' \|/eu5r?s Traaa tion (in Metaph. iv. 3 sq. 1005, 6 Tov tI iffri Kara rb tI riv lvai, b, 11, 1006, a, 3) is designated aXA' as the fiefiaiordrr] ap^V iraffwv Trepi aKr]9^s, Kal ov rl /cara rivos cocnrep rh dpav tov iBiov aXrjdhs, et %v Sia^tvcrBrivai. aSvvarov, here also 6 &v6pcairo5 rb XcvKhv ^ fiT], ovk only the fundamental principle of all analytical judgments is aXrfdes ael, oiirws ^X^'' '^^'^ &vev eVei Se in question the formal identity v\t]s. 3fetaph. ix. 10 itrX twv rh of every conception with itself. aKriBls ^ t|/6D5os . 1 Be An. iii. 4, 429, a, 27 koL Trpayfxdrwv icrrl rcf ffvyKelffdai ^ eS S^ ol \4yovre5 r^v ^vxh'' elvai TTt^r' iarlv fj ovk etrri SiripTJffdai roTTov etScSv (see on this Zeller's rh ahrjOes XeySfxevov ^ xl/evSos Trepi Sk S^ TO. aaivB^ra rl rh elvai. ^ Plato), irKi\v ^ri oUre SArj aAA'
oh
Se
h ovK Kot t5
effTL
rh Tpevdos
Koi
'
which
i/zeCSos
t(>
nothing
is
'
LOGIC
thinkable.^
199
This contained knowledge, however, can only become actual knowledge in the active exercise of
cognition.
ence,
it
possibility
and a basis
and
so,
according to him,
it is,
forming
activity.^
vor}TiK^,
its
its
own
inherent
71
ovre
cfSr;.
iii.
evreAexeto
8 init.
:
aWh
Svvd/xei
^
rh
De An.
^vxns
TO.
vvv 5e
(TvyKe-
yet learned nothing, but possesses the capacity for learning something, but also when he knows
irepi
TO.
XexOepra
<pa\ai(a(TavTs
\l/vx^
8'
7]
f^Trca/iifv
irdKiv
on
rj
ovra
irdos
iffri irdvra.
rj
'yap al(rdr]Ta
7]
rh ovra rd
vo-qrh, effri
ircos,
.
iirKrrTjTd
5'
aladrjrd.
(Cf
ii.
5/w.
2
7 init.)
:
De An.
airaOes
Nous
;
iii. 4, 429, a, 15 &pa Se? ehai [before the experiences the effect of
the voTjThv, it must be without vdOos cf. BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 72, a, 36 sqq.], Scktikov Se tov eWovs
Koi
SvvdfjLei
elSos]
dAAa
something, but has not at a given moment this knowledge actually present to his mind. It was in the latter sense that Plato conceived of innate knowledge,whereas Aristotle conceived of it under the former analogy. This is the meaning of his comparison of the soul with the book that is not yet written on and it was a misapprehension when this comparison was understood in the sense of the later Sensation-theory of knowledge. (Cf. Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 342
:
ex^i'V, (iiCTT^p
ai(rdr]Td,
sq.;
Trendelenbueg, on
485 sq.)
passage, p.
this Aristotle
vofjTd
6
. .
dpa KaAovuei/os
.
rrjs
^vxvs vovs.
Kal v
5)j
etc. (vid. sujjr. p. 198, n.l). Ihid. b, 30 Swd/iei irds icrri rd vo7]rd 6
:
only wants to illustrate by it the difference between the Svydfiet and ivcpyeia.. He does not here go on to inform us in what way
potential
actual.
knowledge
becomes
vovs,
tt,v
irplv
vofj.
ovTcos
^o'lrep
iv
ypa/x/jLaTeici}
firjOev
inrdpx^i- ^vre-
TOV vov. Here (b, 5) and in 417, a, 21 sqq. a still more accurate distinction is made between two meanings of the
4ir\
ii.
5,
dvvdfjLci
we can
call a
man Swdfiei
But, according to what has gone before (429, a, 15), it is not the alad-nrd but the vo-nrd by whose action the tablet of the VOVS, blank in itself, is written upon, so that we have to deal in fact with a theory far removed from the Sensationphilosophy.
iiTKTT'fjfji.uv
200
ARISTOTLE
Tlirougliout his whole treatment of this question,
we
we cannot
altogether
remove without doing violence to the statements of the Master himself. On the one ha^nd, Aristotle contests the possibility of any innate knowledge, and insists that
truths on which
all
in
the
beginning in germ.^
we gain Of
all
knowledge in so
that the
it
cerned, or
merely to cause
'
205
he immediately explains this phrase by adding (431, b, 28) audyKY] 5' ^ avTa ra e^Sr? ehai. avTO. jxlv yap St] ov oh yap 6 KiQos eV T^ ^vXVi o.KKa t6 eI5os uare rj Ka\ yap ^pvxh oocnrep t] xeip eVrtj/
:
than the thought that the soul is everything inasmuch as it is capable of having the forms (or images) of all things within itself. That it produces them out of itself is not stated. On the contrary, as the power of perception is called eldos alaOrjruu, because it receives into itself the forms of the al(rdr}Td, so the vovs may, in the same sense, be called elSos
t5wv, inasmuch as it is the faculty to receive the insensible forms and rdiros eldwv (p. 198, n. 1) may be taken in the same sense. The
-fj
'
T]
xetp opyavov iariv opyduoop, Ka\ 6 uovs eldos elBwv Kal r, a^aOrjcns
eWos at(T6r]ruu. Since the hand indeed forms and uses the tools, but still can only form them from some given material, this comparison does not carry us further
statement that universals are in the soul itself (in Be An. ii. 5, cited at p. 197,n. 2), occurs in a passage which has no reference to the growth of knowledge in itself, but where Aristotle is endeavouring to illustrate the progress from the power of perception to
'
'
LOGIC
For
It
this
201
innate ideas
would take us back again to the theory of which Aristotle so decidedly rejects.
pure
would be equally wrong, however, to make him a Empiricist, and attribute to him the view that
'
the Universal,
If this were his view, he could not possibly have derived the highest concepts of all the 'prind^ia of all knowledge from that faculty of immediate cognition by which the Ilous is,
all
other forms of
which by an ascent from individuals to universals, cannot be the data of any immediate kind of knowledge, but must be data of that kind of knowledge which is the most entirely mediate of all. Our cognitive
I'or it is plain that concepts
thinking activity .^
at
faculties,
he
take this
way
to arrive
at these
prmdjpia
thoughts in which these prindjoia come for us into consciousness as the mere precipitate of a progressively
refined experience, or the act
to ourselves as only the last of these successive geneactual perception by the relation of eVio-TTj/iTj^to the d^wptlv (p. 417, b, 5 6ecopovv yap ylyverai rh exov tV eTTiffT-fifi-np). Finally, in Anal, Post. ii. 19 (cited at p. 197, n. 4,,9wpro) Aristotle says it is impossible to believe that we should come to the knowledge of the highest principles, without possessing previous knowledge but he looks for that previous knowledge not in any ideas innate in the soul prior to all experience, but simply in the inductive process.
:
As Kampe {ErTienntnisstheorie d. Arist. p. 192) objects, not without reason, though his citation of Metaph. i. 9, 993, a, 7 sqq. is not in point.
'
2 gQ Kampe, ibid. but it is hard to reconcile with this exposition his attempt in the next following pages to reduce that true perception which is, for Aristotle, the basis of all knowledge to some kind of Intuitive Thought, essentially differing both from
;
ad pi.
Onthisseep.l97,n.4,sj^j7m.
202
ralisations
ARISTOTLE
upon a matter given in experience. Each of these generalisations consists in an induction,^ the result of which can only be expressed as a judgment and a conclusion, and which therefore is, like all
judgments, either
distinguished from
false
or true.
But,
on the other
is
by him mediate cognition, and what we attain by it is not judgments but ideas not that which may be either false or true, but that which is always that which we may either have or not have, but true
as to which, if
we have
it,
we cannot be
is
deceived.^
So,
again, as
all
Matter and
is
sensible,
tingency, the
possibility of
all
inseparable from
tion alone
that
is
we can never
which
is
For those ideas which rest entirely on experience can have no higher certainty than that on which they rest. But of the knowledge of the ^rincijpia^ Aristotle holds that it is of all knowledge the most certain,'' and he will allow nothing to rank among the jprincipia except what is necessarily
unconditionally necessary.
true.^
I
i
immediate knowledge
and
that
it
can
all
perception.
But the
itself.
*
spirit of
man
i.
has
not;
Cf. p. 197, n. 4. ^ Cf infra in the second part of eh. vii., and the notes there on these points.
2,
ii.
19,
Anal. Post.
i.
6 init.
LOGIC
which
it
203
them cannot consist in any self-intuition making us conscious of the principia as of a truth already within us.^ It must be something whereby certain thoughts and ideas arise through an action of that which is thought upon the spirit thinking it, in some way analogous to that in
finds
or act of introspection,
which perception
is
arises
And
Aristotle does,
when he
says
is
is
;
to
the perceivable
it
'
or that
it
touches
'
it
relates
In
this
way we
is
for
the
moment
by the
intelligible
and
consistent.
questions remain
wholly unanswered
What
is
this,
which we get the principia of all mediate knowledge and the most universal of all ideas and axioms ? What kind of being belongs to it ? In
intuition of
it
act
upon our
spirit ?
Of what
sort
we
so
attain ?
Do
all
of
view in
;
Be An.
.
iii.
4,
429, a, 15
see p.
3
Metaph. ix. 10, 1051, b, 24 (vid. supr. p. 197, n. 4): inperception of the aavvOera is rh fihv Qvyelv KoX (pdvai aXriQis ... rh 5' ayvoeTv /x^ Qiyyaveiv ; xii. 7, 1072, b, 20: avrhv 5e voe? & vovs [the divine vovs] Karh fji.erd\r)^iv tov vo7\Tov [by taking itself as a vo'r]T6v] voriros yhp yiyveTai Qiyydvuv Kal voccu. Eemembering,
doubtless, the first of these passages, Theophrastus also says in Fr. 12 (Metaj)h.) 25 'If we begin with observation we can, up to a certain point, explain things from their causes: oTav Se eir' avrci ra &Kpa ficTaBaivcD/jLev ovk4ri dvvd/neda, either because these have no causes, or because our
:
eye cannot see in a full light, tc^xo 5' eKeTvo a\T]d4(rTpov &s avr^ r^ v^
^
a\pa/j.4vcf}.''
;
De An.
iii.
6 Jin.
cited
si^r. p. 197, n. 4.
204
ARISTOTLE
(as
does the law of contradiction), or are there also metaphysical ideas which are so given, such as the ideas of
Being, of Cause, of
God ?
of
the
'
Ideas,
except
that,
since
for
Aristotle the
Forms
The
final
we
shall
The
all
'Forms' had
individual
And
none the
less
perception,
logical
are
human thought into an immediate presentment of a supersensible world, and the object,
product of
in that sense, of an intellectual intuition.
by
an
actual
recollection,
and
that
the
accustom
itself to receive
the
light of the
Ideas by
is
So
with
Aristotle
self-evident
that
at
the
LOGIC
farthest possible distance from that
its
ii05
knowledge which is and that consequently our ascent to knowledge can only come by a gradual approximation to that goal, through a progressive deepening of our
goal
;
effects to causes.
Knowledge, which we neither possess as a perfect gift of nature nor derive as a consequence from something higher than itself, must issue out of that which is
lower: that
is,
out of Perception.^
is
The development
is
in
That which
absolutely
first
is
relatively to
us last;
its
than the
and the principle than the deductions which depend upon it, yet individuals and things of sense have more of certainty for us.^ And in like manner we find/
Anal. Post. ii. 19, 100, a, ovr^ 5^ iuvTrdpxovffiv acpoopiffjueVat at e|eis(?i<:^.swy;r. 196, n. 1), out' ott' &XK(jt)v e^eup yivovrai yvuxTTiKocrepooy, aAA' aird alaO'fi
10
vii.
o-ecos.
i. 2, 71, h, 33: It p6iarl Kalyvci}pifjidiTepa5ix(>}s' ou yd,p ravTov trpSTepov rfj (pvaei Koi TTpds Tj/LLas TTpoTepov ou5e Yt-copijxwnpov Kal rjfiiu yuccpifidorepov \4yoi 5e irpos rjfxas (jlIv irpdrepa Kctl
Anal. Post.
S'
Tepa
ttjs yvwpifxwrepa rot iyyvrepov alad-fjcrecvs, ottAws 5e irpdrepa Kol yvctipifidiirepa rcL iroppdirepov ecTTt be iroppuiT(xrw jxev rcL KaOoAov fidXiara, iyyvrdrco 5e rci, KaO' eKacrTa. Phys. i. 1, 184, a, 16 Tre'^uKC Se
:
2, 982, 29 sqq. 1029, b, 4 sqq.; ix. 8, 1050, a, 4 Toj?. vi. 4, 141, b, 3, De An. ii. 2 iniL, iii. 7, 22 init. Eth. i. 2, 1095, b, 2. (Still more forcibly, referring rather, however, to PLATO, Pep. vii. init. than to Aristotle, is it expressed in MetapJi. ii. 1, 993, b, i).) The apparent contradiclion in PIli/s. i. 1 ecTt 5' rjfui/ Trpurou brjka koI (racprj rci avyKexv/iifua
i.
i.
5 fin.
Cf.
Metaph.
a,
23
v. 11, 1018, b,
4,
fxaWov
^jai
'
vcrrepou
rd.
5' e/c
tovtoov yivKal
ai
yvdopi^a
(rroix^^a
6/c
Tuv
yvcopi/xwrdpcav rjfuu
iirl
r]
65o's
Koi
(Tacpea-rfpoov
TCi (xacpeffTcpa
T77 (j)v<Ti
Kal yvwpifjLcaTepa
oi)
ydp
apxcu SiaLpovffi ravra. Sid e/c ruv Ka96\ov iirl to. KaO' eKacrra 5e7 irpo'Uvai. rh ydp '6\ov Kara r7,v aiadficnv yuapi/jLcarepov, rh 5e KaO6Xov '6\ov rl eariv iroWh yap TrepiXafifidvei cos /xepr} rh Ka66\ov, is only a verbal ambiguity. For (as
'
206
ARISTOTLE
than a deduction from the general.^ which actual knowledge is evolved from the rudimentary possibilities of knowledge is this. The first stage is always, as we have remarked, sensible
is
to us
more
clear
The way
in
perception.
The man who is deprived of one of the organs of sense must of necessity also lack all the corresponding knowledge, for the general
can only
rests
upon perception.^
Now
proper objects of perception ^ but inasmuch as a universal, although it may be as yet undistinguished,
is
with universals.^
Or, to
is,
speak more
accurately,
not
properties.
manner
'
of a
this
'
(johs) but a
such
Tkendblenburg on
An.
p. 338,
Arist.
iii.
De
J
fiev
and Eitter,
etc. remark) but the sensihle universal which is here dealt with the as yet_ in-
6 Sia
S'
ovv TrpSrepos Kal yi/copifKarepos Tov fi4crov avKXoyKTixhs, ijfuv ivapy4(TTcpos 6 Slo, rrjs iirayoDyrjs.
an
we
sent to ourselves a body before we clearly distinguish its themIn constituent parts.
selves,
2 De An. iii. 8, 432, a, 4 (vid. supr. p. 195, n. 1). De Sensu, c. 6, 445, b, 16 ouSe vo^'id vovs rh eKrhs
:
18.
18, 81, b, 6
roJv
Kad' '^KUffTov
aXixdrja-is.
The same
ele-
ments are always prior to that which is made up of them Be Metaph. Ccelo, ii. 3, 286, b, 16
;
idea recurs frequently, e.g. An. Post. i. 2 (vid. supr. p. 205, n. 2), c. 31 (vide p. 207, n. 1), Phys. i. 5
Jin.,
^
Be An.
i.
xiii. 2,
1
1076, b, 18,
ii.
c. 3,
Anal. Pr.
MetapTi.
1,
Be An.
LOGIC
;
207
{roLovhs) and although in perception they never come under our intuition in the form of a universal, but always as belonging to this or that thing, and in a
definite individual instance, yet still they are virtually
universals,
thought of the universal can be developed.^ Now the way in which it is developed is this. In sensible perception itself the several sensible properties,
fore also the relative universals,
and there-
is
memory
a general
An. Post.
eariu
31, init.
ouSe
et
5i'
alffd-ffo-eas
iiriffracrdai.
ykp
%(mv 7] aXffdrjiTis rod roiovSe TovSe T IV s [only the rSSe, however, is an individual subKoi
Koifi^
is said in the text will establish the agreement of these passages with the general doctrine of Aristotle, about which Heider
stance
ovdhv (Ttifiaiv^i tSov Koivrj KOTtiyopov^^vciv rdSe ri aWa toiSpSe; Metaph. vii. 13, 1039, a, 1 of which more infrd], aA.A' alaQdveadal ye avayKoiov rJSe rt k(iL tcov Ka\ vvv. rh Se KadSXov /col iirl iraffiv aSvuaTOv atcrOdveaOai. ov yap rc^Se ouSe vvv. ov yap hv ^v KadoXov iirel oZv at fihv O7ro56t|ets . KadShov, ravra 5' ovk ecrriv aladdv:
15 contradict it, as Kampe believes {ErTtenntnissth. d. Ar. It is there said that know85). ledge as Zvvaixis is tov KaddXov
a,
Nor
Kal aopicTOv, t] 5' ivepyeia upifffievrf Koi ODpifffievov rdSe ri odaa, rovS4
ecrdai,
Si'
<f)avephv
'6ri
ouS' iirlaraffdai
alffd^ffeus
a,
100,
KaB''
17:
fKuaTov, ^
aXaQriffis
:
rov
KadoXov
ov
tion,
icrrlv, oJov
avOpdirov, aAA'
i. e.
KaWia
avdpccirov
Percep-
has, it is true, a definite individual Kallias for its immediate object; but what it gives us is the image of a man with these definite properties, and the circumstance of this man's being Kallias has no influence upon the content of our perception. Cf.
All that this states is that the capability of knowing extends to everything that is knowable, but that every actual perception is the perception of a definite object; and whether this object is an individual or a universal conception does not enter into the question. KadSXov here signifies the indefinite,' as to which cf xii. 4, 1070, a, 32 Gen. An. ii. 8, 748, a, 7 Mh. ii. 7, 1107, a, 29.
Tivos.
' ; ;
De An.
iii. 2,
Hence the
ii.
a'ia-dvais
De An.
iii.
further
sqq.;
De An.
3,
ii.
12,
424, a, 21
5.
428,
and Ph7/s. i. 5,
189, a,
What
S{/vafiis
208
ARISTOTLE
fixed
Thus
and science
universal principles of
a scientific
and of these in
is
comprehension
only to be gained by a
in
The
result
may
be put
Plato
which,
from the phenomenal world, on most that was to be seen was a reflection of the idea and not the idea itAristotle's theory of the ascent to knowledge rests self. it, on the contrary, rather upon a striving after the
in his
In other
demand
imme-
on the underlying universal, the relation between the two elements is quite
reflection
and
different.
1
To Plato the
abstraction
Kal
re'xJ'Tj
A7ial. Post. ii. 19, 100, a, 2 iK jxev oZv alcrOrjcreciis jiueTai uuxfxr},
uiO-irep
toIs
avdpcvTTOis
....
yiveTai Se
Texj/77,
k^yofxev,
e'/c
Se ^vi^ix-qs ivoKto)
oTav
e/c
yivo/j.vr)S e/xTreipta.
/xurjixai
fiaTcov fiia
yap ttoWoI
apiOfjiw
fj
ojiioicov inr6\ri\pts.
vTToXriypLV oti
Travrhs 7}peiJ.i,aavTos tov KaOoXov iv T?7 4"^X??' '^^^ ^vhs 7rapaT(i TToAAa, h h.u eV airaaiv ev ivrj (Keivoif rh
T^j/
v6(Tov
cvTh, TfX^VS
apxh
Kal
e7rj(7T'i';|Ui?s,
toIs
TOLo7a-Se
war'
elSo^
tt/j/SI
eu
iku fxev
i.
-Trepi
yevecriv,
Tex^V^j
^^^
a<popL<T97ai,
Kdfxvovcn
. . .
tV
5e Trepl rh ov, eTTicTTTjjUTjs. Metajtli. yiyuerai 5' e/c ttjs 1, 980, b, 28 jUJ/7;|U7js ejximpia tols avQpwirois' at
:
yap rroXXal
ixv9\jxai
v6(rou, crvfTiveyKev, Texvns. In the same passages is also found more to the like purpose. In Phys. vii. 3, 247, b, we have, /c yap TTjy KaTa juepos ifiweipias rrjv KaQoKov Kafjifidvouev TTi(TTi)(xT]v.
LOGIC
is
20d
the
first
thing,
coming to any knowledge of universal essence at all. To mind upon the common essence of the empirical data is the main point, and it is only as an inevitable consequence of this that abstracAristotle the direction of the
tion
like
in.
For a
knowledge derived by sensation against the objectors he shows that, notwithstanding the contradictions and deceptions of the senses, a true perception is still
for
and that the actuality of what we perceive is beyond doubt, although its value is relative in a word,
possible,
:
want of caution
in^
the use
we make
itself
of
it.^
He
never leads
exposed to error.
yap auaipeOeuros aXaQriais mev avaipeirai,
ffai/xa,
Metaph. iv. 5, 6, 1010, b, sqq., where, among other things (1010, b, 30 sqq.), it is stated that although we might say in a certain sense that without a perceiving being there would be no atVflijTck as such, still it is impossible to say that without the ou(rQif](ns the viroKelixei/a & Trotei t^v oh -yap ai<TQr]<Tiv could not exist
Cf.
h)]
r}
alffdTirhv
dcpfxhv,
5e
earrai,
oTov
Kal
yXvKi),
iriKphu
raWa oaa
2
icrrlv alo'drjrd.
To this refer Metaph. iv. 5, 1010, b, 3 sqq., 14 sqq.; xi. 6, 1062, b, 13 sqq. 3 De A71. iii. 3. 427, b, 11: ^
fxeu
yap
dtadrjais
ru>v
5'
ISiwu
del
a\r]97)s
Kal
iraaiv
vtrapx^i-
roTs
eavrrjs iffriv,
C^ois, SiauoeTadai
^pevSais Kal ohSevl
eV5e;;^6Taj
Kal
Kal
eCTt ri koX ercpov Trapa Tr]U % avdyKT] irpOTepov e?j/ai rrjs aladija-ews' rh yap kiuovv rov Kiuovfievov TTporepSu iffri. Likewise Cat. c. 7, 7, b, 36 t^ yhp aiadr]Thu TrpoTepop rrjs alo'O'fja'eccs Sokc? eJvai. rh ixhy yap alcdrjThv dj/aipcdkv ffvuoAA.'
oX(tQt]<tiv,
:
virdpx^i'
:
/J.^
\6yos. Ibid. 428, a, 11 al jxhv [the al(rdi\(reis'\ aXr]9e7s aUl, al 5k (papraaiai yivovrai al ttK^iovs
li^euSeTs.
sqq.
ai/atpelrV aiadrjaiy,
aladr^rhv
r)
5e a^ffdrjcns rh
.
.
.
418, a, 11 1010, b, 7] aiadrjcris ^evS^s rov iSiov iarlv, oAA' t] (pavratria ov ravrhp
ii. 6,
;
Similarly
5,
oh'S
oh
I.
awavaipil
^(^ov
rp
alad-f](rei.
VOL.
210
ARISTOTLE
He
natural to
his
This
is
in
case
little
making any
close inquiry
which a subjective
of our
construction
simply
who
be expected to take
decessors
senses.2
'
ad fin.
-
It
p. 209,
that everything is always being moved, or that one thing is always moved and another never, -nphs airaura yap ravra Ikuvt] fiia Tricrris opw/xep yap evia orh /jlcv Kivo^fxeua
'
as given objectively even those sensible properties which Democritus had already shown to be merely subjective (Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 772, 1. 783, 2). Similarly in Phys. viii. 3, in combating the opinion (of Parmenides), irdvra 7ip/xe7u, he f ollow^s up the striking remark (254, a, 30) that such a view could not explain 5d|a and (pavTaffia as movements of
ore 5' rfpe/j-ovvTa. IMd. 258, a, 33, in opposing the doctrine iravr
r]pfxe7i^,
he
Sciji>,rovTOv ^rjrelu
X6yov
seem to natural.
All such questions as are are in our sound senses, &c., Aristotle considers altogether misleading
the soul (it would have been more exact to say of the changing series of mental images') with the sweeping observation that to investigate such a view is Qn'^^lv x6yov &u fisXTiou exo/Jt-ev ^ Xoyou deTadai, and kukus Kpiveiv rh iriaThv Koi rhfii] TTLffrhu Koi apxhv Koi fx)) apxhv. The same objection holds, in his opinion against the theories
'
TTOLVTccv
elvai
oiiK
yap \6yov a^iovaiv ovtoi \6yov yap (rjTova-iv wv x6yos' airodei^ews yap ecTTt
.
apxn ovK
iv. 6,
airobei^ls i(TTi.
cf.
[Metajjh.
below, p. 247, u, 2). He thinks it a self-evident proposition that we can only decide upon the sensible properas upon the good ties of things ard the evil, the beautiful and the
1011, a, 8 sqq.
LOGIC
211
such,
He
represents to us always, or almost always, with truth the special colour, sound, etc., which it perceives, but
that illusion
first
views, then, as to the nature or origin of knowledge, the arrangement of Aristotle's theory of
scientific
To these
knowledge
his Analytics
corresponds.
for in the
It is
versal Causes
ugly
'
Uni1
therefore, of the
a normal state of the senses and the mind. In this sense Aristotle himself illustrates
in
De An.
rwv
fjLeu
iii.
3,
1010, b, 14. can only trust the deliverance of each sense with regard to its own particular objects, those of sight with regard to colour, &c. wv
:
We
iSiav a\7]di,s
icTTiv
fj
'6ti
\aX(TQi\(mav\
kKacrrt]
iv
rtf
aur^)
<pi](riv
oXiyKTrov exovaa rb xl/evSos. 5evrepov Se rod (TUyU^eySTjKeVot ToCra" Kal ivTuvda ^5i] ivSex^rai 5iai|/eu-
^x^'-^' irepl rh
irepl
yap \VKhu, ov tovto rb K^VKhv, fj &\\o Ti [whether the white thing is, e.g., a cloth or a wall], |/euS6Tat. (So also at the end of
SfcrOai'
OTi
i
fji^v
dXXa
rh
//eu5eTot,
Se
C.
6.)
rpirov
Se
'iSia'
twv
kqivSov
5'
Kal
ovSeTTdoTTOTe fieTifiaAev,
eTTO/ieVcoi/
Toh
TO.
aviJ.^efir}K6(riu,
oh
olov
devi
irepl
virdpx^i
Kivriais
\4y(a
dyK-qs rh icrofxevov
Kal /j-eycOos,
&
(rv/x04fiT]Ke
^'Stj
a'(<T-
a-KaT7]0rivai
Karb.
r^v
Koivh
y\vKv roiovrov. Perception shows us primarily (as has been already said on pp. 206-7) only certain sets of
also
see De Sensu, c. i. 437, a, 8.) Sensu, iv. 442, b, 8 irepi (x(v TovTuv [the Koiva just mentioned] aTTUTUi'Tai, Trepi 5e ruu iSicov ouk airaTuvTai, olov o\pis nepl xP^^o-tos
(About these
De
Ihe subjects to which these qualities belong are not immediately and exclusively determined by perception nor are those other properties which are only inferred from what we perqualities.
;
kjX
Metai^Ti. iv.
ceive.
p 2
212
ARISTOTLE
and of effects from causes, word Bemonstration^ forms the task of Science
:
or in one
for in
all
The premises, however, from which these deducmust start cannot be themselves deduced by Nor are they immediately given the same method. in any innate kind of knowledge. It is only by working upwards from phenomena that we can reach the principles only from particulars that we can that underlie them rise to universals. To do this scientifically is the business of Induction. Demonstration and Induction are accordingly the two component parts of the scientific process, Both, and the essential subjects of Methodology.
Proof.
tive proofs
:
Proof with
and in connection
Proposition, as
It
was and
we have
already ex-
them
separately,
liis
more
it is
Nevertheless,
Syllogism
inasmuch
'
as certain
definite
views as to
presupposed by
Aristotle in his
LOGIC
It
213
to
was the searcli for general concepts which gave philosophy under Socrates that new direction which
Plato
not only
essentials.
but
also
Aristotle
followed
in
all
As
we
find that
Aristotle,
generally
speaking,
But
as
we
shall find
him
of the independent reality of the Universal which we think in the Concept, so also in the matter of the logical handling of concepts he feels it necessary in
connection with this criticism to obtain more accurate and definite conclusions on many points.^ Plato had
required that in conceptual definition attention should
and yet
at the
exalted
all
any further distinction between conceptions of property and substance.^ This distinction
as Ideas, without
we
is
Substance.
He
;
goes on
34 sqq,
and 172
sq.
cf.
Anal. Post.
i.
i.
4, 73, a,
Top.
7,
c.
5,
102, b, 4
c.
Prantl
sqq.),
and the
works,
9
;
init.,
Waitz,
in Categ.
16
Bvfinitione qual. Arist. constituerit, Halle, 1844 Rassow, Arist. de JVotionis Definitione Doctrina, Berl. 1843. * See Zell. P/i. d. Gr. pt. i.
p.
Anal. Post. 71, b, 10. According to these passages everything belongs to any object KaQ^ avro' which is, mediately or immediately, contained in the concept
'
518
sq.
584 sqq. * As to the distinction of the iTvfAfiefi-qKhs from the Kad' avrh
/Ji<?.
and all is /caro which does not follow from the concept. To be a biped belongs to any man ko0' avrh,
of that object;
o-w^iSeiSTj/fbs'
'
214
to
ARISTOTLE
a further subdivision of the latter head
make
by
dis-
A
by
is
to
several
accident, but
common element
some other
more general, then the Universal is a property-concept, and indicates an essential property.^ If it is of the
essence of the things in question, then the Universal
becomes a Genus.
for every
'^
If to the
a biped,
/cara
is
common
distinguishing
b, 11.)
man, as
sucli, is
is
To be educated
(rviJ.^^7}K6s.
to
him
wise Metapli. vii. 13, 1038, Cf. last note but one.
A
'o
(Tv/xfie^r^Khs
(T^^;. ibid.)
ifSsx^Tai virdpx^i-v
1X7]
bTojovv
kv\
of a true of all things which fall under the same conbut what is said k. (tvjxcept ^^7]k6s is only true in particular cases and therefore all universal determinations are Koff avr6. Metaph. v. 9, 1017, b, 35: rh yhp KaQoXov Kad' avra virdpx^^, to. Sh (XvjxBefiriKora ov KaO' avra ctAA' iirl
vTcdpx^i-v.
thin<j^ Ka9'
aJT^
is
^ Such an essential quality Aristotle calls a Kafl' aur^ u7rcpx'oi' a iraOos ko.Q'' avTh, or a (rvfi^iPr]Khs Kad' avrh, understanding- in the last case by a-vfifiefirtKhs (the term being used in a sense diff erent from that discussed
h (rvfi^aiv^i
Metajili. v.
12,
iii,
1,
995, sqq.
rcou
Kad'
^KacTTa
airXcos
Xeyerai.
997, a, 25 iv. 1, iv. b, 5, 2, 1004, vi. 1, 1025, b, 12, vii. 4, 1029, b, 13; Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, b, 11,
b,
18,
25, c.
2,
the (rvfM!3^r)Kds, part of eh. vii., infra. Thus Metapli. vii. 3 in\t. ohaia in common usage means many different things rh ri ijv elvai koX Kol rh KadSXov Koi rh yevos rirapTov rovrcov rh viroKeijuevov. 2 Anal. Post. i. 4, 73, b, 26 Ka96Kov Se Xiyu} % Uv Karh iravrSs
'
:
:
19, c. 4, 73, b, 5, c. 6, 75, a, 18, c. 42 Phi/s. i. 3, 186, b, 18, ii. 2, 193, b, 26, c. 3, 195, b, 13,
7, 75, a,
;
4, 203, b, 33; Be An. 1. 1, 402, b, 16 Bhet. i. 2, 1355, b, 30 Waitz, on Anal. Post. 71, b, 10
iii.
;
Tbendelenburg, Be An.
sq.
;
189
a,
iarrl
T inrdpx'p Koi KaB' avrh ku) fi ahrS. (pavephv &pa on '6cra KaOSkov e|
avdyKrjS
virdpx^f-
twv
povfievov.
iv
tois irpdyfiacnu
:
yope7crdai
ra roiavra X^yiaQo},
airodovvai
Part. All. i. 4, 644, a, 24 ra 5e Kad6\ov KOLvd TO. yap irXeioaiu vTrdpxovra KaOoXov Xeyo/xfV. (Like'
LOGIC
qualities included in the notion of the
215
other marks which are again essential with reference to a certain part of the whole class, and by which such
part
is
made up
of the
specific differences}
21)
specific
a,
differences
rh
viroKeifie-
vov Tous Zia^opous, rh irp&rov ej/virdpxov & Aeyerai eV rtp ri iffri ov 5io0opai XeyouTai at ttoiSttj. , .
Ts (that these
two descriptions
apply to the same meaning of y4uo5 is shown by Bonitz on this passage). Ibid. x. 3, 1054, b, 30
XeyeTUi Se y4vos t &iJ.(pco ravrh Keyovrai Korh. r^v oxxriav ra Sid' rh yap <popa X. 8, 1057, b, 37 roiovTOv y4vos kuXcc, ^ djucpw ev ravrh \4yerai, fiij Kara (Tv^fie^it]Kh5 ixov Sia<popdt'. Top. vii. 2, 153, a, 17 Karriyop^lrai 5' 4v r^ rl iari
;
:
the second to properties, activities and conditions in fact, the avixfi^if]K6ra. To the first belongs the term man,' to the second the term grammar, 'and to the fourth the term Socrates.' But the uncertainty of the whole division immediately appears in the description of the third class, for if there are notions which are predicated both KaB' viroKeifieuov and
'
'
eV
viroKeifievcp
i.e.
which are at
r&
yevri
is
KaX
al
8ia<\>opal.
Every
;
consequently a Ka66kov, but not every Ka96\ov a yevos cf Metaph. iii. 3, 998, b, 17, 999, a, 21, xii. L, 1069, a, 27, &c., with
yivos
i.
once genera and properties (the example Aristotle gives is the concept of science,' which is in the soul as its inroKeifievov, and is also predicated of each of the particular sciences) then the genera and properties cannot be
'
How
9,
992, b, 12,
vii.
13,
1038, b,
was
'
16,
25
sq.
and
Bonitz
on
To the dis299 sqq. between genus and property is also partly referable the statement in Categ. c. 2, 1, a, 20 sqq. c. 5, that everything either
Metapli. tinction
(1) KaB^ vTroKifivov riuhs Xiyerai, 4v vTroKifjLvci} 5e oiidevi eamv, or (2)
iu
inroKeLfxei/ff} pi.iv icrri KaB''
seen also in his treatment of Substance (on which see the first part
of ch. Yii., infra). 1 eV Metajih. x. 7, 1057, b, 7 yhp rov yevovs Kol rS)v Sia<pop(av rh etSr] (for instance, the specific concepts ' black and * white are made up of the generic notion distinguishing Xp^iJ-a and the qualities SiaKpiriKhs and avyKpinKos white is the XP^f^"- StaKpiriKhv^ black is the xpw/ia <rvyKpiriK6v). Set yap rh Top. vi. 3, 140, a, 28 fxev yevos airh ruv dWuv x^piC^*)" [the generic concept distinguishes
: ' '
vnoKeLfie-
vov Se ovSevhs \4yerai, or (3) /ca0' v-noKCilxivov re Xeyerai Kal eV viroKijxivcp iffriv,
or (4) out' iu
inroKeifjLevcp
Of
these divisions, the fourth comprises particular things the first refers to genera and (c. 5,
:
216
finally,
ARISTOTLE
an object
is
whole
is
we have
its
Concept}
The
is
therefore the
(what belongs
every other],
Tivos
6,
to a genus
iv rc^ avTCf yivei. Ibid. vi. 143, b, 8,19. (Further instances of the manner of using Siacpopa are given by Waitz, Arist. Org.
i.
and that they express something substantial {Top. vii. 2, vid. mpr. and yet, looked at in p. 214, n. 4
'
'
themselves, they are not substances but qualities, for they express not a Tt, but a troiSv ri (Top.
iv. 2,
6,
279
a,
other properties he distinguishes them by their being able to be predicated of a subject (kuO' v-koKei/xeuov \4yovTai), but not being in a subject (eV viroKeifxiucf ovk fieri) i.e. they do not subsist in a subject which would exist before themselves, or which might be conceived independently of them, but in one which bj/ them alone is this definite subject (Cat. 5, 3, cf. c. 2, 1, a, 24 sq ); a, 21 sq. they are not accidental but essential determinations (Afetaph. vii. 4, 1029, b, 14, 1030, a, 14 Toj). vi. 6, 144, a, 24 ovZ^'/ia yap SiacpopoL ruu Kara (rvfj.fil3T)Khs viTapx^v'T<>iv eVrl, Kaddirep ovSe rh oh yap iudex^rai r^u Siacpoyevos
DELENBURG,Zrr^t Beitr. z. Phil. i. 56 sqq., and BoNiTZ,on Metaph. v. 14) may be solved in the manner indicated cf. Waitz, ut mpra.
;
Anal.
Vost.
ii.
properties of things are also accidental to other things which fall under the same genus. Ta 5^ Toiavra ATjTrreoj/ [in the determination of concepts] fx^xpi TovTov, eoos Tocravra \r](p6f] irpoorov,
also to other things], airavra 5e /i^ eVi irXiov.
ravTr]u yap avdyKT) ovcriav clvai rod which will be further illustrated below. Ibid. 97, a,
Tvpdyixaros
Many
'
pav vTvdpx^LV Tivl Kai, [xt) virdpx^i-v) they belong to the concept of the which they are subject of affirmed, and hence everything that is implied in them is also true of the species and of the individuals to which they belong ( Cat. c. 5, 3, a, 21 sqq. b, 5). It can hence be said of them, that they
;
get the concept (x6yos of a given object by dividing the genus into its species, and then the species to which our object belongs into its sub-species, and thus proceeding
:
18
we
Trjs
ova-Las)
till
we arrive
at a
group wv ix-qKeTt.
that which
is
ia-rl
8ia(popa, i.e.
(together with the genus) form the substance {Metaph. vii. 12, 1038, b, 19 cf following note)
' '
:
.
indivisible into any farther sets of opposed species, to one or other of which the object in
LOGIC
217
^
;
and the
avQp<}iT(^
special use of
elvai, &CC.,
elj/ot
with a dative
opKr/uSs
(()opcov
e/c
tcov Siais
genus
divided into
continued
ecas
1.
tip
eXdr]
ds rh
rb adiaipdrcf iffrlv elmi, Metaph. x. 1, 1052, b, 16 op ydp iffTt rh aol elvai rh fiovffiKcp ehai, ibid. vii. 4, 1029, b, 14, cf. Ind. Ar. 221, a, 34); and the phrase rh ri ?iv clvai. In the second of these expressions the dative must (according to Trendelenburg, Rh. Mus. 1828, 481
:
15);
and
SCHWEGLER,
Ar.
Metaph.
iv.
entia includes the preceding one the Siirovv includes the (e.g. xnr6irovv), therefore the intermediate terms which fall between
the genus and the lowest specific difference do not need to be repeated in the definition (cf. also Part. An. i. 2 init.). So it follows (Met. ibid. 1038, a, 28) '6ri T\evTaia Sia(popa 7} ovala rod 7]
:
371) be taken possessively, so that avOpuTTCf eJvai is equivalent to elvai rovro 8 iariv avOpdnrc}} = to be that which belongs to man and so rh apdpdoirq) elpai designates the manner of being that is peculiar to man = Man's
' ' ;
'
Being
'
whereas ^vOpwirov
elvai
dpicrfj-os
which, however, we have understand by the rekevTaia 5ia(poph, not only the last specific difference as such, but the specific concept as determined by it, which embraces the higher species and the genus. For the designation of that which is thought of in the concept, Aristotle makes use of various expressions. Besides oiiala
'
in to
and eJSos (of which we shall have more to say in dealing with the Metaphysics), we have to notice
in this connection his
way
of
'
'
'
'
218
ARISTOTLE
itself is
Concept
this
equivalent to 6 ti ^ctti rh civai avTw SrjA&Ji/ K6yos. But to this account must be added the explanation of the force of the peculiar imperfect, which is meant to designate that in things which does not belong to the moment, but which throughout the wliole course of their existence has represented their proper esse, i.e. the essential as distinguished from the contingent and transitory. (Cf.
elvai.
PTiys.
ii.
2,
194, a,
20
In TOV e^Sovs Koi rov tI 'fjv elvai. Phys. ii. 3, 194, b, 26 one of the rb eJSos Kal rh irapdfour causes is Seiyfxa' tovto S' iarlv 6 xSyos 6 TOV ri '^v elvai Koi to. tovtov yht\ this being what Aristotle, in Me:
tapli.
i.
3,
tV ovo'iav
ehai,
Plato,
Tl/eo't.
150,
the Heracliteans maintain ws rh irav Kivqcris ^u Koi &\Xo oi5f v, examples apitd other and SCHWEGLER, ut sKjjra, 373 sq.). Hence rd rl ^v ehai auOpuircf properly means, that which in a man was his proper esse,' the true being of man, that belonging to him which is also called the TrpcoTTj ovffia '(Slos kKacrrco {Metaph. vii. 13, 1038, b, 10;
:
'
all these expressions are constantly interchanged by him. Compare, for example, the Be An. ii. 1, 412, b, 10, where ovcrla t] Kara rhu x6yov is explained by rb ri ^u ehai; Metaph. vi. 1, 1025, b, 28: Th Ti ?iv eivai KoX Thv \6yov vii. 5, rh ri ^v eJuai Koi 6 1 030, b, 26 opi(rix6s (similarly Part. An. i. 1,
; :
'
'
vii. 7, vid.
inf.
vii. 5 fin.')
But
this is simply his Ideal 13eing, that of which we think, when we abstract from what is contingent to the phenomenal man before
Phys. ii. 2,ut supra) 1107, a, 6 KaTo. fieu ova'iav KoX rhv x6yov rhv t'i ^p The ti ^v elvat eJvai XiyovTa. stands to the simple tl <tti. as the particular and definite to the universal and indefinite. Whilst only designates the tI ^v luai form or peculiar being of a ; thing, the question, rl ia-Tiv may be answered by giving either the matter only or that which
()42, a, 25, cf
]'Jt](. ii.
.
6,
tV
'
'
'
vii. 4, 1029, b, 19 ^pa ixT] iuearai X6ya) avrd, AeyoPTL avTO. ovtos 6 X6yos tov tI ijv dvai iKoia-rcf}. So ch. 7, 1032, b, 14 \4yco 5' ovffiav avv vKr]s rb t( Ibid. xii. 9, 107o, a, 1 ?iu elvai. eTrl /iej/ rcou iroiriTiKoiv dvev vXrjs ovaia Koi rh Tt ^v efj/at [sc. rh 7] And ch. 8, 1074, a, irpayixd i(rrC\. 35 rh Se ri -fjv ehai ovk Ix^' vXt]v TO irpuTOV evreXcx^tayap. The t/ ?iu eJvai, therefore, goes with the eldos. Metaxjh. vii. 7, 1032, b, 1 iihos Se K4yu) rh ri ^v eJvai kKaffTOV KoX T^v TTpcaTrjv ovffiav. Ibid. ch. 10, e?5os 5e Ae^w rb ti 1035, b, 32
:
Metaph.
(^
includes both matter and form, or even by giving merely a property; and even when it is answered by giving; the ideal form, the answer need not embrace the whole concept of the thing, but may be confined to the genus, or the specific difference (the proof of this is given by
Arist. Metaph. iv. The ti ?iv eJvai is, 375 sqq.). consequently, a definite species of the ri ia-Ti (hence Pe An. iii. tov tl icTTi Kara rh 6, 430, b, 28
:
ScHWEGLEB,
Tl ?iv elvai
= Being on
*
;
tial side
')
and thus,
LOGIC
Essence.^
219
And this is arrived at by the process of making the Universal of the Genus determinate bymeans of the aggregate of distinguishing marks.^ But
monly happens
may
be
ehai, whereas the other phrase never has the looser sense of the Tt ((TTi, so as to designate merely the matter of the thing or a mere property, or a generic universal without the specific differ-
Top. vii. 5, 154, a, 31 \6yos 6 rh ri ^v clvai (T'nfiaiuwv. Metajy/i. v. 8, 1017, b, 21 rh ri ^v eJvai ov 6 x6yos opifffxhs, Kot TovTO ovtria Aeyeroi kKaffTov. So also vii. 4, 1030, a, 6, cf. a, Ifi, b, 4, and ch. 5, 1030, also Part. An. i. 1, 642, b, 26 a, 25. Hence Aristotle also
94, a,
6pi<x^6s effri
:
n.)
ences. The like relation exists between elvai with the dative and the accusative: rh elvai with
XevKcp elvai designates the idea of
what is white rh XcvKhv elvai, the Cf. property of being white. SCHWEGLER, loo. cit. p. 370 Phys.
:
iii. 5,
Aristotle
for-
mula rh
^v
eJuai.
Stilpo really used it (see Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 223, 3), he probably took it from Aristotle. Again, Antisthenes could hardly have used the mere ri -^v to designate the concept at least, this does not follow from the references in Zell. ibid. p. 252, n. 1. The following writers treat at length of the rl ^v clvai and the allied phrases Trendelenburg (who was the first to examine this subject thoroughly), Rhein. Mus. v. NiebnTir und Brandis, ii. (1828), 457 sqq. Be Anima, 192 sqq., 471 sqq. Hist.
:
Even if Zeller,
designates the concept (in the subjective meaning) by the expressions 6 \6yos 6 dpl^wu r^v ovffiav {Part. An. iv. 5, 678, a, 34), b x6yos 6 tI iffri Xiycov {MetapJi. V. 13, 1020, a, 18) and similar phrases. (AJ70S or \6yos ttjs oixrlaSj in relation to the objective meaning of \6yos, stands for the form or the Being of things e.g. Gen. An. i. 1, 715,
:
:
a, 5,
2,
i.
;
1,
403, b, 2
cf.
ii.
and
in Top.
init.
%cti
eJuai
5'
'6pos
ix.\v
\6yos
;
6 rh tl
^v
a-nfiaivcov.
So ch.
ii.
4,
101
b, 21,
and
i.
oh. 7,103, a, 25
Anal. Post.
; ;
3,
Beitr. i. 34 sqq.; Schwegler, ut supra, 369 sqq. (who cites other authors); Hertling, Mat. n. Form. b. Arist. 47 sq. Anal. Post. ii. 3, 90, b,^30, Spifffihs ixkv yhp rov ri 91, a, 1
:
fcrri
Kol ovaias
opiajxhs
init.
Meta/ph. ch. 13, 1039, a, vii. 5, 1031, a, 8 19 ; viii. 3, 1043, b, 28 ch. 6, 1045, a, 26; Poet, ch.6,1449, b,23. But the same word, in a further sense, signifies either of the two terms of a proposition (subject and predicate), and is therefore the standing expression for the three Anal. terms of the syllogism '6pov Se koAw Pri. i. 1, 24, b, 16 6ts %v SiaXverai tj irpSraais, etc., ch. 4, 25, b, 32, ch. 10, 30, b, 31, ch. 34, 48, a, 2 Anal. Post. i. 10, 76,
:
72, b, 23
10, 97, b, 26
\6yos rov ri
4(rri.
(Thesameibid.
220
ARISTOTLE
the essence of things, according to Aristotle, consists It is therefore only with the only in their form.^
is
For although a
definite relation of
Form
to
Matter does
also to
and therefore
odv (sc. ovcrlai) ovtoo [in the sense of the avvoXov^ K^yovrai, tovtwv
fieu eari (pdopd
'
Kol
yap
yeuecris
ruv 8e \6yov ovk eanv ovtoos ooarc ovSe yap yeveats (ou (pdeipeaOai yap yiyveraL rh olKia elvai aWa rh 5ia tovto 5e koI Tr;Se rrj oi/cta)
'
.
.
which, in
becomes
concept
fxevou),
the substratum
rwu
ovcriSov
rwv
eKacTTtt
eariv, Kal
Tu>v
on
'
vX-qv
rjs
r]
(pvais
whose properties are the matter, and whose form is made up of the distinguishing marks. But the substratum never actually
without properties, nor the matter without form, and therefore neither does the genus exist outside the species, but only in them looked at in itself, it only
exists
;
ToioLVTr]
1X7]
oSffT'
eKaara avrwu.
el ovv H] t' aTrJSei^is avayKaicov Kal 6 opia-jxhs eViKal ovk eVSexerat, arriixoviKbs, Sxnrep ouS' iTtiaT'i]p.7)v ore jxev iiriore S' &yvoiav elvai, aWct ar'i]fj.'t]v So|a rh roLOvr6v iariv {vid. SUpra
p. 163),
bpiafibv,
ovrois
ou5'
airS^ei^iv
ou5'
contains the aniversal presupposition, the possibility of that which exists in reality in the lowest species Metaph. viii. 6, v. 6, lOlfi, a, cf. ch. 2, 1043, a, 19 25 ch. 28, 1024, b, 3 vii. 12, 1038, cf. ch. 3, x. 8, 1058, a, 23 a, 25 1054, b, 27; Phys. ii.S) fin.; Gen. et
;
:
:
5o|a iarl rov evSeXo/Jievov &WUS e~)(^iv, SrjAov (in ovk tt.v ein avroov ovre aTToSei^is. As soon as we perceive it no longer, we
aWa
Corr. i. 7, 324, b, G {Part.AnA. 3, 643, a, 24, does not come inhere). Cf. p. 217, n. 1. More fully treated in the account of Aristotle's Metaphysics, infra, ch. vii.
'
See
eWovs }x6vov ecrrlv, 6 Se x6yos icrrl rod KaOoXov rh yap KvKAcf eluai Kal kvk\os Kal ^vx'^ ^^vai Kal ^vx^ rov 5e (Tvv6Kov ijdr), oJov ravrd kvkXov rovdl, rwv KaOeKacrrd nvos
KaQoKov Koi rod etSous 6 SpiafiSs. So ch. 15 init. by Substance is meant sometimes the A^7os alone, sometimes the K6yos crvv rf} v\t) crvvei'daai fieu \7ilJ,/x4vos (the aivoXov').
:
^ alaOrirov ^ vovrov (X4yw 5e vof]rovs fJi\v oJov rovs /naOrj^ariKou^, alaOrjrohs Se oTov rovs x-^^ovs Koi
|i;AiVous but even the rails former have a vXrj, only it is a iJ\t j/oTjTrj, 1036, a, 9 sqq.), rovrav Se
LOGIC
the Concept of any object,^ yet
sense
itself,
it
221
is
not
this object of
but only
this
which
can be defined. ^
as such
but this applies also to all IndividKnowledge, in fact, aims always at a Universal,'^ and the words of which a definition is made Each concept up are themselves general terms.-^
of sense
^
;
uals in general.
ovK
<reajs
ecTTiv
bpifffjibs
aX\a
e/c
fiera voj]-
alard^crews
5'
yvcapi^ovrai,
ttjs
aireAdduTas [-ra]
eVreAe-
xetas oi) drjAov irSrepov rrore eialv ^ OVK elalv, aA-A' dei Xiyovrai Kal 5' t] yvwpi^ovraL t<S Kad6\ov \6ycf 0A7J ^yvucTTos Kad' auT-fju, ^ As in the concept of the house (Metajjh. vii. 15, see preceding note), the soul, the axe (Be An. i. 403, b, 2 ii. 1, 412, b, II), of the (TifjLhv (MetapJi. vii. 5, &c.), in fact in all concepts of material and natural things. Cf
although the Phys. ii. 9 fin. material causes are subservient to the ideal or final causes, still in explaining natural phenomena we must give both Kacos 5e Koi iu T<j5 \6y(}} iarl rh avayKoiov [i.e. because the physical or material causes belong to the concepts of ihingH']. dpiaa/jLevcp yap Th pyov Tov
:
numberless things cannot be defined without giving their matter, this seems, at first sight, a contradiction. In the passage referred to (lletaph. vii. 10) Aristotle seeks to escape this contradiction by saying that in such cases, not this individual object, formed by the combination of a specific concept .with this definite matter, is defined, but only its form it is not this circle, but the circle, or the ki!>k\^ ehai, not this soul, but the But the soul, the ^vxv elvai. difficulty is, indeed, by no means
;
removed in this way. If, for instance, the soul is the Entelechy of an organic body {Be
' '
irp'uiv,
5'
on
Biaipecris
roiadi
avrr]
the ri ?iv eJuai r^ {Metaph. ibid. 1035, b, 1 6), then a matter constituted in a stated way belongs to the concept of the soul.
An.
ii.
1),
roiwSe
adifxari.
OVK (TTai, et 1X7) e'let odovras oh, 6t fxr] ffLO-qTOiovaOL ovToi povs. eaTL yap Kal eV rev Kdycf evia Cf 3Iefi6pia oos v\r] Tov Xoyov.
.
Metaph.
Vid.
vii. 15,
1039, b, 27,
as at p. 220, n.
* ^
2,
mpra.
p. 163, n. 2.
mpra,
taph.
vii. 10,
1035, a,
1,
b, 14,
and
hand we deny that matter belongs to the concept of a thing, and on the other are obliged to admit that
Metaph. ibid. 1040, a, 8: not only are sensible things incapable of definition, but also ideas rwv yap Kad' eKaarov r] i5ea,
:
us
5'
<pacrl,
Kal x^P^<^''"h-
avayKoiov
5'
ov iroirjaei 6
222
ARISTOTLE
embraces several individuals, or at least can embrace and even if we descend to the lowest species several
;
we
are
still
only.
Within
Between
ra
'
5e
Keifxcva
virapx^i-v
elf
Koiva
Koi
bpi-
iracTLV.
avdyKT] apa
olnv
6,Wa} Tuvra
Tts
(Te
but below this there only remain individuals which are no longer distinguished (see specifically Metaph. x. 9, 1058, a, 34 sqq.
and5?/j!>rtt,p. 216, n.
l),andarein
Loc.
cit.
1.
a sense
'6jxoia
ix7}Qfv
kxXv^iv
juovct}
97, a, 37, b,
Xo^plsjxkv irduTaTvoWoils^'d^a Sc
(which
is
really
the case in the determination of concepts, r/VZ. mpra, p. 21G, n. 1), and lie gives among other answers this (cfT Bon ITZ, on this passage) even though an object at 1. 27
'
:
continue to form a multiplicity, and, in fact, an indefinite multiplicity, and for this reason cannot be the object of science and of the concept 3Ietaph. iii, 4, iriit. (Ire yap jxt] eari ri irapd ra Kad(.Kacfra, rd he KadeKaara direipa, rccv
; :
be the only one in its species, like ihe sun and the moon, still its concept could only contain such things oaa. eV iikXov eVSe'xera/,
olov
8'
direipwv
;
iruis
evBexerai
ii.
Xafielv
iTnarr]/j.r]v
cf
sqq.;
2\)j?.
ii.
A7ial. Post.
i.
idu
erepos
6cc.'
yeurjrai
tolovto^,
Aoyos,
Cwh,
i.
and ibid. c. 19-21, the proof that argument cannot be continued to inlinity either upwards or downwards. In this Aristotle exactly follows Plato see Zell. Ph. d. Gr. Aristotledept.i.p 524,3,587,1. signates singulars by the phrases rd Ka9' eKaara (or k. eKaarov), rh dpLdficv ev{Metaph. iii. 4, 999, b, 34
:
there were only one circle, oiidev fiTTOv dWo eo-rat t^ kvkXo) eluuL koI TwSi T^J kvkXw, koL to jiifu eldos, rh
5"
dSos
eV
rfj
vArj
:
Kal
twu
kuO'
(Kaarov. Ibid, b, 5 there is only one world, but still the ovpav(f ilvai and the r^^Se t^ ovpav^ dvai.
Waitz on
;
are
different things. Metapli. vii. 10 (r?VZ. mpr. p. 220, n. 2) 6 Kityos earl rod KadoXov.
:
two
s^ipra ; see this passage), to rtva, 6 Tts dvQpoiKos, &c. {Categ. ibid. Anal. Post. i. 24, 85, a, 1, 4, b
Categ.
c. 2, 1, b, 6, et
Anal. Post.
5'
\
ii.
iarl
iras
determination of concepts may be continued till all specitic diiferences are exhausted, and the reXkvra'a Siacpopa is reached ;
vii. 13, 1038, b, 33), {Categ. c. 5, 3, b, 10; Metaph. ix. 7, 1049, a, 27 ct supra ; see Waitz on this passage of the Categories^, also rd dro/na (e.g.
34; Metaph.
r6be
ri
Categ.
c. 2, 1,
iii. 1,
b, 6, c. 5, 3, a,
35;
Metaph.
LOGIC
this accidental difference
223
specific differences lie
and the
memFroalso
and Aristotle
calls these
But
name
is
What
and accidental qualities on the other.^ falls under one Concept must be,
so far as
fall
What
topical
does not
under
iii. 3, 999, a, 12, v. 10, 1018, b, 6, vii. 8 fin., x. 8, 9, 1058, a, 17, b, 10, xi. 1, 1059, b, 35) or ra eo-xaro, because in descending from the most universal
Metaph.
5th book, which deals with the treatment of the ^5ia (c. 1) he distinguishes the tdiov Kaff avrh from the Wlov irphs erepov, the oei ^Biov from the ttotc IfStoj/. He himself, however, remarks (129, a, 32) of the Uiov irphs cTepop, and it is true in any case of the irore XSiop, that it belongs to the (rvfxfiefir]K6Ta. On the other hand, he gives as examples of the X5. Kad^ avrh and del essential marks such as C^ov addparop,
^(fop dpr]rhp, rh e'/c ^l/vxvs Kal aca/j-aTos ffvyKei/xepop (128, b, 19, 35, Cf. preceding note, 129, a, 2). ^ Aristotle does not say so in these words, but it is shown by his discussions on the various meanings of ravrhp. In Top. i. 7 (cf. viii. 1, 151, b, 29 152, b, 31) three of these are distinguished yepei ravrhp is what belongs to one genus, elfSet ravrhp what belongs to one species (cf. Metaph. x. 8, 1058, a, 18), and apiQyi.^ ravrhp, Sip opS/nara irXeica rh Se irpay/xa eV. This last kind of identity may be expressed in various ways
.
thej come last (Metaph. xi. 1, Mh. JV. vi. 12, 1143, 1059, b, 26 a, 29, 33 Be An. iii. 10, 433, a,
; ;
451, a, 26). In Toj). i. 4, 101, b, 17, he distinguishes y4vos, Wiov, and and as soon as he (Tvfji.fifir]K6s has divided the Uiov again into opos and iSiou in the narrower sense, he defines the latter, c. 5, 102, a, 17: 'tdiov S' iffrlv f> fx^ StjAo? luLev rh ri ^v eJuai, fiSpq) 5' U7ra/5%et Kal apTiKaTrjyopeTTai rov vpdyfxaros [is related to it ^as an interchangeable concept], otov tSiou avdpduTTov rh ypafifxariKrjs elvai
;
16
De Mem.
c. 2,
Kvpidirara
dp6/j.ari
/mep
opt}}
Kal
trpwrois
'6rap
5e/CTt/cJj/,
2
&c.
{loc. cit.)
rh ravrhp airo^ody,
Xwiricf
Already
he distin-
KaOdirep
lixdriop
Kal
^<^op
guishes the TTore ^ irp65 ri tSiov from the cnrKcos 'loioy, and in the
orap
Toj
224
ARISTOTLE
is
one concept
whicli
different.^
Conconcept presents itself in a different matter.^ highest degree gives us ceptual distinction in the
Contrary
Opposition;
whereas simple
difference pro-
same Genus,
as far
fact, is
Contrary opposition, in
10, 1018, a, 38 sqq. 1024, b, 9.
^
Tpirov S' avOpwTTCf}, tov avjx^^fi7]K6TOs, diov rh KaQ'i]fx^vov ^ Th ixovaiKbv 'S.wKpd.Tei. There is a somewhat different Aridivision in 3Ietaj)h. v. 9.
.
.
.
and
ch. 28,
Hrau
aiTo
stotle
there disting-uishes, first, the Tavra Kara (Tvix^fir]Khs and ravra KaO' aura then the ravrhv
;
See preceding note and p. 222, That the individual differences of things must be based on Matter will be further shown later on, in the second part of
n. 2.
i8ei
and
apidtxS,
both of which
ii.
are afiirmed partly of that which has a Matter, partly of that which has an Essence (fulleratx. 3,1054, a, 32 that is identical in number which both in Matter and in Form As a general explanais one). tion he gives us a formula which to the one is easily reducible cited above v rahr6rr)s eySr-ns irXeiovuiv tov elvaL r) ris icTTLV lirav xp^/'''"' ^^ TrAeiocrtv (as in avro avTcpravTou). Since, however (according to ch. 10, 1018, a, 85), Unity and Being can be used in different senses, the meaning of the ravrhu, '^repov, kc. must vary accordinolv. Meiaph. v. 9^ 1018, a, ^9: erepa 5e Keyerai uv fj to. f^Sr) TTAf/w ^ v vXv ^ o \6yos rrjs
: :
'/)
c. 6, 6, a, 17; Etli.N. 1108, b, 33, as one already in use (bpi^ovTaC) but in Metapli. X. 4 iii'd., he puts it forw^ard in his own name, and he there establishes the proposition that opposites must belong to the same genus, by observing expressly TO. ixkv yap yivn SiacpepovTa ovK e^ei 65hv els &\X7)\a,
tion, Cateff.
8,
dAA.' aTre^ei
{e.g.
a sound and a colour are not opposed to one another, because they cannot at all be compared, they are aavyi.^Ki]TOi). Yet, on the other hand, we read in MetapTi. v. 10, 1018, a, 25 ivavrla
:
>
\yTai
TO.
re
fi^
Svvara
a/xa
t&j
awTw
yvos, Kal
Toou iv
(TTOP
irXilcrTov 5ia((>epoj/Ta
ovaias' /col '6\us avrLKd/nevcas rcf On e!'5et ravTcp Keyerai to eTepou. and yev^i eVepoj/, cf. ibid. x. 8, v.
T^ avT^
(that
yeuei, Kal
Toiv
ra
TrAel-
^ia<p4povTa
deKTiKcfi
the
iv
LOGIC
nothing but specific difference made absolute.^
tradictory opposition,
226
Con-
is
the relation
sciences:
cf.
too.
cit.
1055,
a,
povTa Twv
Kal
Oirh
ttjv
avrV
Suva/xiu,
same
2,
definition of
wv 7] diacpopa /jLeyiaTi] ^ ottAws ^ Kara yevos f/ Kar' elSos. rh 5' ^AAa evayria Xey^rai ra ixkv r(f to. roiavra ex^iv, ra Se TCf Scktiko. iJyai Twv ToiovTcou, &c. (and the like in
X. 4, 1056, a, 35), and Categ. c. 11^7?.. also has: avdyKr] Sk Trdvra T^ ivavria ij iv r^ avrcp yepei
Be
Ccelo,
i.
269, a, 10, 14, and Fhys. i. 6, 189, a, 13) Aristotle deduced the principle that to each thing
and white],
ij
and
[like
unjust],
cites
Sohol.
6;
At. Ft.
n.
117)
from the
treatise
at/riKeifxe-
vwv, about which cf. p. 70, n 4. The more mature and correct siatement is that which is given in Metaph. x. {e.g. good and evil
could not be contraries it they did not fall under the same generic concept, that of moral behaviour) and, in fact, Aristotle himself (at 1055, a, 23 sqq.) resolves the earlier statements by bringing them into line with the idea of the eVaj/T oj/ as there defined. It is only in reference to that definition of the iuavTiov that we can understand
;
there can only be one contrary. Between contraries there may lie an indefinite number of intermediate grades, which are compounded of these contraries (as colours out of light and dark), yuch intermediate grades are not found, however, between every pair of contraries, but only between those pairs of which one or other predicate does not necessarily belong to the subject concerned, and in which there is a gradual transition from one to the other. {Metaph.y..!; Categ. c.lQ, 11, b, 38 sqq., 12, b, 2b sqq. cf. SiMPL. Categ. Schol.inAr.M, a, 15
sqq.,28 sqq.) What Aristotle hadin his mind in this doctrine of the ivavriov is the scale of changes in the natural sciences ; for every
change
v.
is
Aristotle's
226, b, 2, 6, i. 4, 187, a, 31, 188, a, 31 sqq. Ge/i. et Cott. i. 7, 323, b, 29. To the above definition of the el'Sc-t ivavriov
taph. iii. 2, 996, a, 10; iv. 2, 1004, a, 9, 1005, a, 3 ; xi. 3, 1061, a, 18 ; An. Fri. i. 36, 48, b, 5 Ue An. iii. 3, 427, b, 5, et alibi; see BoNiTZ and Schweglbe on Metajjh. iii. 2, loo. ait.), rwv ivavriwu fxia iiTKTT'fifi'n. That is the same science which deals with the same things things which
;
;
corresponds that of the ivavriov Kara rdirov in MeteoT. ii. 6, 363, a, 30, and Phys. v. 3, 226, b, 32. The correct way of formulating oppositions was dealt with in the
p.
treatise n. avriKeifxivuiv {vid. supra 70, n. 4, and Simpl. loc. cit. 83, b, 39 sqq.; At. Ft. 116).
'
The
biatpopa reKeios of
Me-
VOL.
I.
226
ARISTOTLE
to
Yes
and
between which, therefore, no third or middle term can object one lie,' and of which as applied to every given opposition, to This kind of or other must be true.=* put it differently, arises when everything which is not
contained in
a certain concept
i.e.
is
negative expression,'*
where the aggregate of all is divided between two concepts possible determinations by the test of identity with or difference from some
given
determinant.
Between contrary and contradictory opposition Aristotle places that oi frivation and the jiossession,^ though he is not able quite to establish between this and the other two kinds of difference*^
X. 4, 1055, a, 10 sqq., 22 Since this opposition only occurs between abstract concepts and not between concrete things,
tapJi.
sqci.
here: see
^
CaUg.
and
Metcqyh.
x.
tlie
tained
(^('.(j.
and
acppoavvT])
were
" An opofxa or prifxa aopicnov vid. infra, p. 232, n. 2. "^ "'^'' " "E|is and arepT^ais, e.g. ' see;
to
called airXcis iuavria, not the beings to which these concepts apply (such as the (pp6vi/xos and
le
ing
'
and
'
bHnd.'
For what
fol-
tlie icppwv).
SiMPL.
24 sqq.,
'
cf.
B.
Aristotle's
'
standing formula
lows, cf. Trend bLENBUEG, Bist. Beiir. i. 103 sqq. 6 In Metaph. v. 22 Tand, referring to this, X. 4, 1055, b, 3) Aristolle distinguishes three mean-
ings of the
o-repTjo-ts
(1)
fti'
m^ %xV
Khu
fi^
In a jv^wg.^..... ^.. c. judgment the like opposition is called durlcbaffLS (vid. n. 6, &c., infra)
.,ovu.. (pa(nsavTLKt(jeaL.'
(jyvrhu
7re(|)u-
the
^
is
Metaijh.
iv. 7, xi. 6,
1063. b,
cf.
meaning would privation be synonymous with 'negation (for blind' = not-seeing ), and
first
'
' '
19
and
what
we could
/cara
will be 'said presently about contradictory judgment. The kind of opposition is the same there as
Ka\ %i,iv that which are told by Catey. c. 10, 3, b, 20 sqq. (that is to say, by the
o-repyjo-tj/
we
LOGIC
opposition.
237
Notions
author of the Post-proedicamentd) can not be affirmed of them, namely that everything is either one or the other (either * seeing or * blind ') in such a case, therefore, the relation between a-Tepr](Tis and ^is would be reduced to that of a.vTi(pa<ns, In the other two senses of ffripriffis this is not the case, for in them the (TTeprjffis itself, as is admitted in Metajyh.
'
' ;
a middle term
6>^Lv
'6Tav
yap
ijSr)
rv^Khv
ixov
^ri%(rf'.xi.
It is,
how-
be observed that (1) so long as the thing in question is not Tre(f)VKh5 o^piu ex^iv, it is not
ever, to
iv. 12,
a kind
of |ts ; and thus, if we take * privation in this sense, the opposition of the '4^is comes under the definition of the kvavriov. The distinction of the two in the Post-prcedicamenta ( Categ. c. 10, 12, b, 26 sqq.) is founded on the following argument of
SeKTiKhv 6\pea)s either, and therefore the instance adduced is not to the point and (2), on the other hand, there is much that is intermediate between * possession' and 'privation,' for there are all the degrees of partial possession there are not only
;
:
'
seeing
'
things
and
blind
'
things,
which have no middle term between them (as straight and crooked '), one or other must necessarily apply to
those
'
evavria,
'half blind.' A further distinction of the ivavria from the opposites Kara (rreprjaiv Koi e^iv is said to lie in the fact {Categ.c. 10, 13, a, 18), that in the former the transition from one to the other is
but
also
things
'
'
everything capable of the distinction {e.g. every nuniber must be either odd or even ) when, on the other hand, there is a
'
'
mutual (white can become black and black white), but in the latter only one-sided, from possession to privation, and not conversely. But this is likewise incorrect
:
not
only
can
things
middle term between two ivavria, such a conclusion never follows Everything (we cannot say, which is capable of colour must be either white or black ') but
* ;
may
become seeing and the poor rich and even if this is not possible in every actual case, the same is just as true of the ivavria themselves
in the case of
a-Teprja-is
and
e^is,
neither one nor the other of these we cannot say results will arise that to everything capable of the distinction one or other of such opposites must apply,' for there may be some time at which neither of the two will apply to
;
man
neither can every sick get well, nor every black thing become white. For the logical relation of concepts, such a distinction would in any case be of no importance. Lastly, in
;
Metaph.
is
x. 4, 1055, b, 3, 7, 14, it
it
T^
y^p
;
fi-fjiru
irecpvKhs
oxpiv
ovre oxpiv ^X^^ neither can we reckon this class of opposites with those between which there
IXff
oiire TV(p\hv
and the
ivavTi6rr]s
\4yeTai
but
a kind of
xi. 6,
(rrepria-is
1063,
according to
Q2
228
ARISTOTLE
Of all these subjects of a fourth sort of opposition.^ opposition the general proposition holds good, kinds of
that
'
opposites
fall
concepts would form a kind of gradation from the higher to the r>at tliis also can only be lower. said when the concept of arepricns as is not accurately determined soon as this is done, the relation
;
also
;
treated of
Seliol.
;
(Trep-ncris
and
^is
Stmpl.
Ar. Fr. 119. We shall have to discuss hereafter the metaphysical signiin Ar. SG,
b, 41, 87, a, 2
fication of
'
o-TepTjffis
and
its rela-
of crep7]ais
and
e|is
falls either
under
r-ns.
avric^acns or
under havriS:
To the
ean Post. i. 4, 73, b, 21 points yap rh ivavriov t) arepr^ais ^ avri(paais eV rui avrw yevi, olov &pTLOV
Th
IJ.7]
TTepiTThv eV
apidjj.OLS
for, to
be an
must
express a positive concept, and this not merely indirectly, like the avTKpacns from which it is here distinguished. The same is true of passages like Metapli. vii. 7, 1033, a, 7 sqq., where the sick person who is elsewhere the ivavriov of the healthy person is given as his ar^prja-is &s fi^v ibid. xii. 4, 1070, b, 11
tion to the vAt]. Cat. c. 10, 11, b, 17, 24 sqq.; Top. ii. 2, 109, b, 17, c. 8, 113, b, 15, 114, a, 13, V. 6, 135, b, 17; Metaph. x. 4, 1055, a, 38, c. 3, 1054, a, 23. Instances of such relative concepts are (see Cat., loc. cit., and c. 7; Metapli. v. 15): double and half in fact, the manifold and its part, the virepixof and vTrepx6iJ.^vov the active and
the passive the measurable and the measure; the knowable and
;
knowledge. Though in Metaph. v. 10, two further forms of opposition are named, yet Bonitz, on
this passage,
and Waitz,
Ai'ist.
eJSos [airia rcHv crwixdrcov'] rh Q^pixbv Ka\ &\\ov rp6-Kov rh ^pvxphv i) (Tr^p
r](ns,
for cold forms a contrary opposition to w^arm, and if it is an dSos, it cannot be merely a negation and hence, though it is given as a negation with other analogous concepts (e.r/. Be Cede, ii. 3, 286, a, 25), yet Aristotle himself in other passages admits
;
Org. i. 308, have demonstrated that these latter come under the four already given. Conversely, Phys. v. 3, 227, a, 7 only mentions
two
'^
{avriipacis
and
ivavriorris^.
See n. on p. 225, and as to the extension of the above principle to all avriKeifjLeva, cf Metaph. iv. 2,
.
that, in
certain
cases,
it
is
natural property, and not merely a defect (JPart. An. ii. 2, 649, a, 18), and that it has the power of
acting (^Gen.
24),
et Corr.
ii.
Top. 1. 14, 105, b, 83, 9 ii. 2, 109, b, 17, viii. 1, 155, b, The founda30, c. 13, 163, a, 2. tion of this proposition lies mainly in the fact that, of opposites,
1004,
a,
2,
329, b,
Cf.
true
sqq.,
a mere
<rr4p-f](ns.
Trendelenburg,
theor.
Joe.
cit.
107
one cannot be known without This has different the other. causes in different cases in contradictory opposition, it arises from the negative concept Non-A immediately presupposing and containing the positive one A; in correlative concepts it arises
:
Logic
But concepts taken by themselves cannot,
nor
false.
so far,
therewith
truth
The coupling of the Noun or Name- word with the Verb or Time- word, of the Subject with the
Predicate,^ presents us with a
unit
if this
is
of discourse (or
discourse takes
and
if
anything
affirmed or denied
we
get,
thought expressed in
modes of or Judg-
ment ment
(a7r6<j)av(TLS'y
for
which Aristotle
regards the
type.'^
judgis
when
from their mutually presupposing one another; in contrary opposition, and in (rrep-nffis and e'|is
(so far as that applies here) it arises because the knowledge of the opposed specific differences presupposes that of the common
Org.
i.
352). Interrogation
under the concept of Trp6raais, but it is distinguished as irp6ra(ns SiaXeKTiK^ from irp.
put
in that the latter is darcpov fiopiov rrjs avri(pd(Tws, and the former, on the
airodeiKTiK-^,
AT]\pi.s
genus,
Vid. sujjra, p. 202, &c. Interj)r. c. 4, c. 5, 17, a,
'
;
De
17
Metaph.
d.
2
vi.
4;
of.
Zeller, Ph.
Gr. pt.
As
other hand, ip(t)T7}(ns avn^daews. Similar definitions of irpdraa-is will be found in De Interpr. ii. 20, b, 23, and Anal. Post. i. 2, cf. Soph. El. 6, 169, a, 72, a, 8
;
8, 14.
s
llpoTaais
on the expression
cf.
Biese, Phil.
De
Interpr.
c.
1, 16, a,
13, c. 2,
2;
Waitz,
>
10, 19, b, 11 ; Poet. c. 20, ; Rliet. iii. 2, 1404, b, 26. This is also Platonic ; see
3, c.
BONITZ,
1457, a, 10, 14
d.
4,
17, a, 1
a, 16.
c. 5,
Zell. Ph.
^
Gr.
pt.
pp. 557,
De
e/c
Interpr.
icrrip
n. 5, 532, n, 2.
jxkv
airXri
17, a, 20 aird^avais
.
Be
Se
TOVTcov crvyKifi4vT}
fiev
airXri
irepl
oiis
ecr
(poju)]
fi
S^
71
aTrStpavcis
(TTIjxavTiK)]
rod virdpx^^v ri
In Anal. Pr.
Top.
i.
i.
1,
24,
a,
22
fi^ virdpx^i'V,
ol )(_p6voi. diijprjvTai.
10,
104, a,
8 (cf.
Waitz,
S30
signified
ARISTOTLE
by the spoken words,^ regards tliat as conjoined
is
or divided which
it is
between judgments is therefore that of Every affirmation stands affirmative and negative.^ opposed to a negation which forms with it an exclusive
distinction
(contradictory)
opposition
(ai/Ttc^ctcrtp),
in
such wise
them must be
true and no
On
corresponding
rh
fxev r\
On
^opiov
S' auTi(f)d(Toos
Kard
2.
ratu eV rrj ^vxf) Ta0nixdraov, see De Interpr. c. 1, 16, fi, i?, c. 2 init. c. 4, 17, a, 1
as
(rvfxfioAov
Cf. p. 226, n. 1
and
fioph.
El. c. 1, 165, a, 6; De Sensu, c. 1, 437, a, 14 liJict. iii. The events in the 1, 1404, a, 20. soul which words express are, according to these passages, the same in all men their designation in speech, on the other hand, is (like written signs) a matter of convention, and thus differs in different persons. - Metapli. vi. 4., ix. 1 init. ^ De Interi)r. c. 5 init. icTi 5e ^^ TTpuTos \6yos airocpavriKhs
; ;
:
'
oi 5'
&Woi
1,
irdyres
crvvSeafxcfi
;
eh.
Further,
i.
ibid. c. 5, 6
;
24, Anal. Post. i. 25, 86, b, 33. a, 16 The irpoTaais Kara(pariK^ is also
A7ud. Pr.
called KaTTjyopiK^, the airocpaTiKT] Anal. Pr. i. 2, also (TTepriTiKi). c. 4, 26, a, 18, 31, c. 6, 28, a, 20, b, 6, 15, 0.13, 82, b, 1.
*
'
'
De
Inter^r.
c. 6, c. 7,
i.
17, b,
16
Anal. Post.
2,
ris
ovK
^ari
fiera^h
Kad^
avr^v.
Log Id
universal negatives) in the
231
way
of contrary opposition,
case.^
But
in truth
a perfectly clear
from Aristotle.
As he
dis-
He nowhere
it
which by the
stotle
result.
But Arias
true those assertions which assert actuality and since this, in the
;
only
regards
given case, is itself undetermined, no definite proposition can, with When truth, be then affirmed. it is equally possible that something will happen, and that it will not happen, the assertion that it will happen is neither true nor false it only becomes one or other, according as a corresponding or a contradictory
;
according to later terminology, are opposed as subcontraries, are, in A7mI Pr. ii. 8, 59, b, 10, reckoned among the ivavricas avriKcl/jievai. Aristotle, however, re(c. 15 init.) that this is only according to the words, not as to the thing itself.' 2 Vid. supr. p. 229, n. 2. In De Interpr. c. 10, 19, b, 19, a case is certainly before his mind, otolv
'
marks
Cf. Simpl. state of fact arises. Categ. 103, /3 Bas. according to the teaching of the Peripatetic
:
school only the disjunctive proposition is true, * A will either be or not be but which part of this disjunction will be true, and
' ;
rh effri rplrov TrpocrKarrjyoprjrai, as in the proposition ean S'lKaios &v6pci}Tros. This, however, does not relate to the separation of the copula from the predicate, but only to the fact that, in existential propositions (Ttiv &vdp(i}iros, OVK iCTLV S., &c,, the
:
subject
which
false,
&\r)irTOP
lvai
rfj
means which
Hence
,
all
that
ovk
class of assertions
fjS-n
fj-ev
Toia ^ roia. It is from the Megareans that Aristotle took the Aporia subject-matter of the which he discusses in the passage cited: cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.
'
pt.
i.
p. 220, 1.
De
Interpr.
c. 7,
17, b,
20:
cf.
at pp.
The 224-5, about the ivavTioTrjs. particular aflarmative and particular negative propositions which,
affirmatively (Si/catos &.), or negatively (^ov SiKaios &.) ecrrt Sik. ft. means 'there is a just man,' which is different from &v9po}iros SiKaios i(TTi, 'man is just.' Aristotle nowhere says that every proposition, or even that the existential proposition logically considered, consists of three parts and the treatise n, eptirjveias even shows a preference for selecting examples from those existential propositions which fall into two parts only.
;
232
ARtSTOTL^
to
whereas there
to
in fact
no ground
of
doing
so.^
Aristotle
proceeds
consider
the
Quantity
many objects at once and those which relate to one, and then subdividing the former into universals and
to
particulars.
He
judgments universal,
'
and
_Pqj.
individual.''
But
In Anal. Pr. i. 46 init. c. 3, 25, b, 19, he shows that there is a distinction between ^^ eli/ot To51
inasmuch as propositions of the last kind have the form of ailirmative proposi)U7/
/xr)
tovto,
fjL^
eJuai
KevKhu
\fvKhu,
tions but he does not detect the real reason of this either here or in De Interpr. c. 12 (to which
;
the same, whether the subject and predicate be positive or negative concepts. And Aristotle liimself admits (Anal. Pr. i. 3,
25, b,
19,
cf.
c.
13, 32, a,
31),
Beandis,
2
p. 165, refers).
b,
De
and ovx-vyiaivei no but he wants to call the former ouo/j.a adpiarov, and the
pv/ia;
no
and
in
c.
along with the propositions eariv &udpwTros, ovk e. &., &c., he introduces also the corresponding ones concepts
OVK
ovK-&u9p.,
&vdp.,
judgments, which are also called eVI rwv KadoKov airocpaivopTai KadoAov, and particulars, which are also called eV yuepet or Kara /mepos {Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, a, 17,
c.
2,
25,
a,
4,
made up
:
of negative
ovK-&vdpcoiros,
ov-^'iKaios
which
Io-tij/
ruv KaB6\ov
fiev
fffTiu
OVK-&.,
icTTiv
aTTOcpaiuovTai, i.e.
OVK
effriv
ov-SIk.
ovk-
ject is a KadoKov, t
ir^cpvKe
eir\
TrXfiSvcav
Theophrastus called &c. these propositions e/c fxeraB4crws (Ammon. De Interpr. 128, b, 129, a., and Philop. Scliol. in Ar. 121, a), or Kara ixerddeaiv (ALEX.
:
KarTjyopelo'dai,
is
but in the
Analyt. 134,
a.).
affirmed of whole extension, in the other not so. The Analytics, on the other hand, does not mention individual
the
its
LOGIC
he
adds what he
is
233
'indefinite
calls
the
judgments,'
a
and thus
distinction
here
as elsewhere,
which
logical form of thought-connection at all, but solely with the grammatical form of the expression.^
much
of Judgments,
subject
in
connection
He
dis-
and
possibility,^
is
now
in use
for
Apodeictic,
/classification
/
and Problematic
of Assertory,
in
his
Aristotle
degrees
things.
of
certainty,
'
By
possible
'
only what
he does not mean what may perhaps exist, but may exist but does not exist necessarily, and
therefore rriay or
may
not
;
exist
indifferently.^
The
judgments (see following note) and although it is true that they are without meaning for the main object of that treatise, which is the doctrine of the
syllogism, yet we should expect that, if Aristotle at the time he wrote it had already had his attention called to this form of judgment, he would have expressly stated why he passed it
over.
examples which are there given Tuv ivaurioop eJvai r^u avr))V iiri<rT-i]fji.T\v ,
r^v
r]5oui]v
fx)]
eluai
aya66v,
We may infer, if
the com-
dual judgments must have struck himafter he had written Analytics. ^ In the De Interpr. he adds nothing as to indefinite judgments. In Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, a, 16 (cf 0. 2, 25, a, 4, c. 4, 26, b, 3, etc.) he says 'jrp6Ta(ns ^ Kad6\ov ^ eV /xepei fj adi6pi(Tros but the
.
general.
2
Anal. Pr.
'/)
TrpSraa-is 4crTiv
e'l
trOai virdpx^iv.
3
Anal. Pr.
8'
\eyw
234
corollaries
ARISTOTLE
which he deduced from his definitions were partly confuted by critics as old as Theophrastus and Eudemus.^ To what is called the Eelation of Judg'
vov, ov
S'
fxi]
virdpx^i'V-,
;
^Uvarov
uuTOS avayKULOv, reOevTOS ovSev earai bia tout' effrai &pa ro eV1. 28
:
which may equally happen or not happen (Anal. Pr. i. 13, 32, Hence he maintains b, 4 sqq.).
in Anal. Pr.
1.
ovk ayajKoiov Ka \rh fxi) Mefajfh. avayKoiov ivBex^H-^vou. eari Se dwarhu ix. 3, 1047, a, 24
Sexd^ei/oj/
:
Be
Ccelo,
from the
TOVTO, $ iav virdp^r) 7] eVepyeia, ou AeysTUL 6xel^' rr]v Swafiiv, ovOcv Likewise C. 4, eo-Tai dSvvarou. 1047, b, 9, c. 8, 1050, b, 8 TrRaa
:
avTicpdcrecos icrriv
kjl).
elj/at
fxrj
e'ivai
ix.
yap Kara to dvvaadai \eyeTai, ravrdv iari Swarhv rdvavria i.e. what can be healthy
i?lit.
:
'dcra
can also be ill, what can rest can also move, he who can build can
also destroy. Aristotle
'
ably follows, and from the iravrl eVSexeo-0at the ivdex^ffdai /xv^evl and fx)] iravrl (i.e. the possibility in question of the predicate occurring to none, or not to all, for Prantl, Gesch. d. Lof/. i. 267, explains the words wrongly) for since the possible is nothing necessary, the contrary of all that is (merely) possible may happen. And for the same reason
;
'
possibility,'
contrary is preceding note, and Be Interjjr. BoKe7 5e rh avrh c. 12, 21, b, 12 irav dvvaa-daL Kal ehai Ka\ fii] eluai yap rh Svuarhv refiveaOai v) )8a5/(,6ij/
:
'
Aristotle refuses {ihid. c. 17, 36, b, 35) to allow, in possible propositions, the simple conversion of the universal negative judgFor, since the negative ment. judgment, it is possible that no B is A,' according to him, init is cludes the affirmative, possible that every B is A,' so the
' *
Kal
ix)]
^adi(eiv Kal
&c.),
/xt]
riuveaQai.
determining the concept by taking that meaning of ^vva/xis according to which it designates a power of doing or
dvvarov,
simple conversion of the former would include the simple conversion of a universal affirmative
suffering {3retaph. ix. 1, 1046, a, and it 12 init.) V. sqq., i) matters not that this possibility
;
^
of the
contrary is not always equally great, and that the ^vSexoixevov or Svvarhp (for these two expressions are really synonymous) at one time designates
rule,
judgment; and universal affirmative judgments cannot be converted simply. Theophrastus and Eudemus denied these assertions, because they understood by 'possible,' everything that can happen, and lost hold of the state-
ment that it must also at the same time be able not to happen and thus they included some
things necessary in the possible (ALEX. Anal. Pr. 51, b, m, 64, b,
72,
a,
b,
m,
73,
a).
Aristotle
LOGIC
'
235
ments Aristotle pays as little attention as to the Hypothetical and Disjunctive Syllogisms. Only in what he
himself admits {Anal. Pr. i. 3, 25, a, 37; Be Interpr. c. 13, 22, b, 29 cf MetapJi. vs.. 2 init. c. 5, 1048, a, 4, c. 8, 1050, b, 30 sqq.) with regard to the forces of nature (Swti/tety) which only act in one direction, that the necessary also may he called a possible (Sworbj/), and that, allowing this, universal negative possible-propositions can be converted simply, and that we may conclude from necessity to possibility but he also adds that this is not true as to his own concept of the possible. Two further points of
;
.
there was a perfect possiblesyllogism (Alex. loc. cit. 66, b). Both sides are right, according to their concepts of the possible. If we understand by * possible ' everything that can be, including also the necessary, the syllogisms are quite correct and simple ' Every B is A, every C can be B, therefore every C can be A ' No B is A, every C can be B, therefore it is possible that no C is A.' If, on the other hand, we take possible to mean only that of which the contrary is likewise
'
'
'
possible,
which Alexander wrote a work (Alex. Anal. 40, b, 83, a), arose between Aristotle and his pupils upon the question
dispute,
on
about the mood of conclusions in syllogisms, the premisses of which are in different moods. Aristotle says that where one premiss is a possible- and the other an actual -proposition, a perfect syllogism can only be had in the case where the major proposition is a possible-proposition if, however, it is the minor, we get, first of all, an imperfect syllogism, i.e. one in which the conclusion is only obtained by a deductio ad ahsiirdum and not immediately from the given premisses, and secondly, in the case of a negative syllogism (more correctly in all cases), the possibility in the conclusion must be taken in the improper sense (i.e.
:
syllogisms, because in this supposition the minor, every C can be B,' includes the negative proposition, 'every C can be not-B.' And also, as Theophrastus and Eudemus merely adhered to the principle that the modality of the conclusion is conformed to the weaker premiss (ALEX.z&i*^.), they asserted, on the same principle,
is
that
not as confined to that which both can and cannot be) (^Anal. Pr. i. 15). Theophrastus and Eudemus, on the contrary, were of opinion that even in this case
in Arist. 158, b, 18, 159, a, 6), whilst, according to Aristotle (Atial. Pr. i. 9 sqq.) it is apodeictic when the major is so. In this case also, according to the meaning which we attach to the modality of propositions, both assertions may be made. If the propositions 'B must be A,' 'B cannot be A,' are supposed to express that between B and A there is (or is not) not a contingent, but a necessary connection, it follows that between every-
L>36
AntSTOTLB
^
On the the late doctrine of disjunctive judgments. other hand, he is copious in his treatment of the Conversion of Propositions,^ laying
rules,^
but he
This theory
and
it
may
most original
duce the
discovery.''
As he was
the
first
to intro-
name
of the Syllogism
into
the scientific
first to
connections and
all
advances in
upon the
'
syllogistic
'
combination of judgments.
Syllogism
is
different
from
them.'''
Vld.
S7ij}r.
p. 230.
i.
beings, by reason of a necessity of nature, are mortal, the same every kind of is also true of living beings, e.g. of men), as Aristotle, loo. cit. 30, a, 21 sqq. shows quite clearly. If, on the other hand, these propositions are meant to state that we are obliged to think A connected or not connected with B, the proposition, C must (or cannot) be A can only be deduced from proposition 'B must (or the cannot) be A,' when we are obliged to consider C implied in B. If, however, we only know as a fact (assertorially) that C is B, then we only know as a fact, likewise, that C is or is not that which we are obliged to
'
2,
3, cf. c. 13,
c.
17,
36,
b,
15
sqq.
'
ii. 1,
53, a, 3 sqq.
versal negative and particular affirmative judgments, particular conversion (later so-called conversio ])er accidens) of universal affirmative, and no conversion at all of particular negative judgfor the conversio per ments contrapositionem was not as yet
known
*
to him.
c.
Log.
264.
Anal. Pr. 1. 24. b, ^18^ avWoyicrixhs Se ecrri x6yos iv ^ reOevTcav rivwv erepdu ri rwv K6t-
LOGIC
The
2.r/
more than two assumptions, or more accurately two judgments, from which a third is derived, and that therefore no syllogistic conclusion can have more than two premisses, is nowhere expressly proved by Aristotle
volves no
in the beginning of his treatise, though he refers to
later.i
it,
Now
judgments were
ble,
as yet unconnected.^
impossi-
except a mediation be effected between them by another concept connected with both of them.^ Every
syllogism
cepts,
is
must
and in
way
as to bring out
first
^
e|
audyKTjs
avfifiaivei
r^
i.
principle
which
Aristotle
elvai.
(Likewise
'
Tojj.
1,
1,
165,
'
does not state in this form, but which follows immediately from
his definition of Judgment, if we apply it to the case before us.
Ae'7cy Se r^ ravTa eli/ai rh ravra (rvfifiaiveiu, rh Se * 5ia ravra (Tvfxfiaiv^iv rh fiTjdeuhs e^coOev
'
Ajial.
Pr.
i.
Cf Anal. Pr. i. 23, b, 30 but especially 41, a, 2. Anal. Pr. i. G.25,init. Ibid. 42,b,l sqq. on the number of con^
.
sqq.,
*
{Metaph.
rod
v. 2,
1013, b, 20:
virodeaeis
avixTc^pafffxaros')',
JSf.
the
vi.
9=
the conclusion invariably = o-y/tirfpaa-ixa. In Anal. Pr. ii. 1, 53, a, 17 sqq., however, avfnrpa(Tfjt.a stands for the subject of the conelusion.
cepts in whole series of syllogisms, Of the three concepts of a syllogism {opoi, vid. siqyr. p. 219, n.l), that which occurs in both premisses is called (ji4(ros ; that which comprehends the latter is called thehigherorgreaterduei^oj/orTrpoJto/ ^/cpoj/) that which is comprehended by it, the lower or lesser (e\arrou &Kpou oi effxarov), Anal. Pr. i. 4,25,b, 35, 32, 26, a, 21,c.38
;
init.,
ii.
23, 68, b.
238
elusion.
all
ARISTOTLE
But
this result
may come
in three ways.
As
judgments
with a predicate
disjunctive
the connecting of two judgments into a conclusion, or, in other words, the deduction of the conclusion from the
premisses, rests
upon the
concept or middle term to the other two, it follows that the mode of the connecting ('the form of the syllogism') will be determined by the way in which the
middle term
is
Now
there are
either
may
and as predicate to
the lower concept, or as predicate to both, or as subject Aristotle does not take any direct notice of to both.2
a fourth possible case, in which
it is
;
this fourth
arrangement can
Zogik, 103, p. 276
33 sq. or the major concept is called briefly 6.Kpov, and the minor
Tpirov.
Ueberweg's
Anal. Pt. i. 23, 41, a, 13, at the end of the section on the
1
having treated of the necessity and significance of the Middle concept as a connecting-link between Major and Minor, continues
irphs
ovv avdyKiq fxevri Xafielv 5' ivSex^rai Koi rh T tov B (^ yap rh A tov T
:
&iJ.(pcti
KOLvhv, tovto
2 The position of the propositions has, as we know, no influence on the form of the syllogism. The precedence of the major, customary since then, seemed more natural to Aristotle than to us. In laying down a syllogism, he begins not, as we are accustomed to do, with the subject, but with the predicate of the major: A
Karr]yope(TavTas,
(poiv,
&ix(pa}
T^ r
eVrl
TO. etprj/ieVa
(XX'^l^^^'ra,
<pavphv
gri TrduTU (rvWoyKrfihv avdyKT} yiv(r9ai 5ta rovrwv rivhs t&p axV' Cf. 0. 82, 47, a, 40 sqq., fxdrccv.
vwdpx^i Travrl r^ B, B virdpx^t iravrX so that, even in his form of expression, there is a constant descent from the greater to the middle concept, and from that
:
Cf.
Uebbbweg,
LOGIC
239
We
obtain,
then,
three
Figures
(o-'xrjixaTa)
The
is
ignored, and
figures, it is to
and that
in every
i.
570
3
sq.
coincide, for an unproved supposition may be expressed in a categorical proposition, and conversely a hypothetical proposition may be fully demonstrable. The same statement, can, in fact,
Whether
this
is
a failing
d.
or, as
Prantl
{Geseh.
Leg.
i.
295) thinks, an advantage of Aristotelian logic, it is not necessary here to inquire but when that learned writer, as well as Biese (Phil.d.Arist. i. 155), endeavours to find that Aristotelian account of hypothetical syllogisms, which others miss, in the remarks on supposition-syllogisms (avWoyiffixol e'l vTToOccrews) at Anal. Pr. i. 23, 40, b, 25, 41, a, 21 sqq. c. 29,
;
iv
airavTi
[sc.
(rvWoyia-fiq}']
'dpccr eJvai
Set
koI
45, b, 22, c. 44, he confounds two different things. Aristotle means by a * hypothetical syllogism
that which begins with an unproved supposition (cf. Waitz, on Anal. 40, b, 25). We understand by it that of which the major is a hypothetical judg-
rh Ka66kov virapx^^v. The former not further proved, as Aristotle supposes it to be clear from his preceding explanation of the syllogistic tigures. By way of proving the second, he proceeds &pv yap rod Kad6\ov ^ ovk earai (rvWoyia-fihs, ^ oh -rrpos rb Keiimevov, fl rh e| apxvs alriiacrai which will be exiDlained in detail in what follows infra. ' Los. Git. 41. b, 23.
240
ARISTOTLE
its
quality
and
also as to its
syllogistic
They
He
is
well-known moods
but he also
syllogistic process.^
first
He
hgure alone as
perfect,' because,
according to his
'
imperfect
syllogisms,
first.
and require to be completed through the Their demonstrative value rests upon and is
either apagogically or
by conversion.'* These
reductio
employed in the
hypothetical
'
ad
impossibilG^ as well
as
in
'
arguments
generally.'^
1
Loc.
cit.
1.
27.
c.
For the
tirst
1,
the Scholastic designations) the Taoods: Harbara, Darii, Celare/U, Ferio (Anal. Pr. i. 4); for the second: Cesare, Camestres, Fesfor the tino, Baroco (ibid. c. 5) third Darapti, Felapton, Disaviis, Datisi, Bocardo, Fresison
;
:
irpoaSed/xevov
Trpbs
irapa
ra
^l\riix4va
rb ^ai'^i/at t8 ai/07/cotoj', areA^ Se rhv irpoffSe6fxevou ^ ivhs ^ ttXhSvoov, & ^(Tti fi^j/ ai'ayKa7a Sta tSjv viroKei/xevwu opwv oh ^^v
t\'t]irrai
Sia irpordarewv.
It is
not
(c. 6).
necessary here to
;
.
defend Arisqq.
;
Anal. Pr. i. c. 8-23 cf the discussion in n. 1 to p. 234, s?{^rfl^. < See the sections cited, espe=*
stotle's view,
* Ibid. c. 23, 41, a, 21 cf supra, p. 238, n. 1.
.
LOGIC
With
24]
equal fulness does Aristotle set forth rules for the proper treatment of these forms in scientific
first
and the errors to be avoided. He shows in the instance what kind of propositions are more difficult to prove but more easy to confute, and vice
use,
versa}
Next he provides
fitting premisses,
method of
head he treats minutely of the rules and methods which must be observed in
division."*
On
this
Furthermore he discusses
the syllogisms giving true
;
27-29, here also (c. 29) with express application to apagogic and supposition2
lUd. lUd.
c. 26.
c.
the Platonic method is blamed because (contrary to the rule given at p. 216, n. 1) it multiplies unnecessarily the intermediate
introduces the same thing under different genera, gives negative qualities, divides from all kinds of opposite points of view, &c. Cf. Meyer, Arist. Thierliunde, 71 sqq. * See Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i.
divisions,
syllogisms.
he says
we have then
it is a question of the concept of man as a ^^ou Qv^rhv, then, he says, from the propositions All living beings are either mortal or immortal man is a living being,' it would only follow that man is either mortal or immortal that he is a ^^ov 6vT\rhv is a mere postulate. Hence
' ;
:
When
623 sqq.
* ^
''
Log.
cit. c.
32-46.
ii. 1.
Anal. Pr.
Ibid. c. 2 init. (cf. Top. viii. 11 sq., 162, a, 9, b, 18) 4^ aK-nduv fihv ovv ovK ItTTt \pev5os cuWoyicr:
Aristotle says of division, that it is oTov aadey^s [not valid] <rv\\oyi(Tfi6s. Similarly in Anal. Po8t.ii.5. Alsoin Part. An. i. 2 sq.,
ecrrti/
'
aArj^es,
(because false premisses give the ground itself, the 5i6ti, falsely
cf.svjjra,-p.nS,n.2).
Under what
VOL.
I.
242
ARISTOTLE
;
'
endo
the
'
conversion
;
'
of the syllogism
the Redudio
ad
absurdum
syllogisms
which
result
from
the
conversion of premisses into their opposites/ together with the various syllogistic fallacies and the means of
meeting them.^ Lastly he inquires into those kinds of proof which do not arise by demonstration, in the strict
sense of the word,^ and establishes the
method of arguat
this
;
ment
peculiar
is
to
each."^
We
cannot
point
To
kvkK(x)
koX
e|
dW^Awv
Induction, c. 23 example, c. 24 (cf. Anal. Post. i. 1, 71, a, 9 lihet. i. 2, 1356, b, 2, 1357, b, 25, ii. 20); d7ra7W7^ (reduction
of one problem to another more easy to solve), c. 25 objection
;
This consists in the SfLKwadai. conclusion of a syllogism (which, liowever, must of course be shown to be true from other sources) being used in conjunction wath the converse of oiie premiss to prove the other. For the cases
tain
c.
marks
calls
is
'
((TTj/xem),
stotle
27.
the
'
which AriEnthymeme,'
where
this is possible, see loe. cit. Against 'the vicious 5-7. c. in argument, see Anal. circle
'
these
Post.
2
i.
3, 72, b, 25.
loc.cit. c.
8-10.
6 5ia Tov
proved by the minor and the conclusion. PJ.g., we may prove apodictically All animals which have little gall are long-lived man, the horse &c. have little gall, and are therefore long-lived but the inductive proof will go thus
'
;
'
ll-14,cf.ro/;.viii. 2,157, b, 34, c. 12, l(5'^,h,b,2ind Anal. Post. i. 26, where it is remarked that direct proof is of greater scientific value.
*
lived
Man, the horse &c., are longman &c. have little gall therefore animals which have
'
;
little gall
are long-lived.'
This,
Loc.
cit. c.
XV.
The
apxri alrelaOaL), c. 16, cf. 2'ojJ. \ni. 13; the /j-V trapa tovto (rvfi^alveiv
t6
^evSos,
c.
c.
17
the
irpuTov
\pev5os,
18, cf.
Toj).
viii,
10
rules
tion
;
for
disputation
;
from this, c. 19, sq. by too hasty suppositions, c. 21 on proving certain suppositions by the transposition of the
propositions in a syllogism,
c. 22.
deduced on decep-
'
however, only applies when the minor concept (' animals which have little gall ') has an equal extension with the middle concept (' man &c.'), and when the minor proposition (' man &c. have little gall ') can be simply transposed so that in its place 'the animals which have little gall are man &c.' can be put (loc. cit. c. 23). ' See for a fuller discussion of these points, Prantl, p. 299-
LOGIC
follow
243
him
into
these
to
researches,
although
we un-
doubtedly owe
syllogistic
much
them
the
its
care
many-sided
The
syllogistic
Proof,
second Aymkjtics.
is
All proof
It is
is syllogistic,
proof
it
of necessity
and apprehension by means of proof are only possible when something is explained from its original causes.^ Nothing can be the subject of proof except that which is necessary. Proof is a
Proof, therefore,
That which
is
p.)]
eVSe'xeo'^ot tovt''
&A\as ex^"'- Further references in support of this, sujjra,ip. 163, n. 3. ^ Ibid. et roivw 71, b, 19
:
iffrl
rh
iiri(TTa(rdai
otov
edefiev,
iiri-
avdyKr]
(rriiix-QV
/col
koI
t^v airoSeiKTiK^v
airddei^iv
Se
Aeyco
firKXTTifioviKov.
And
yvcopi/JLcorepccv
(TVfj.-Kepa.(TfJLaTos'
koI
Trporepcav
ovtoo
kuI at apxal oIkuui. rov deiKw/nepov. Ibid, line 29 :alfTta re. .delehai
[sc.
yap
8'
(ffrai koL
ovK lo-rat
2
iiri-
deduced]
a'T'fjfirjv.
Log.
2 init.
eTriVro. .
adai Se
5t'
olS/xcd'
iirKrrTJfxr]
airKcos,
avayKa'iov
h.v
e^r;
%v rh irpayfid
on
iKeiuov
rh
iiriTrrjThi/
rh Kara rvjv
a-rroSeiK-
244
ARISTOTLE
included under matters of proof only in a limited sense.^ On the other hand, the contingent cannot be proved
cannot even be
sary truth
is
known
scientifically. ^
And
since neces-
may
be said that
all
proof relates to
and
is
is
istics
founded exclusively upon the essential characterof things, and that the concept of each thing
its
at
once
which any more perfect the the concej^tual form of Proof secures to us concerning nature and the causes of an object, the higher is the kind of knowledge which it warrants and so, other
information,
therefore,
;
things being equal, a universal proof ranks above a particular, a positive proof above a negative, a direct
above an apagogic, one which enables us to know the cause above that w^hich merely instructs us in the fact/
TTpdyfiacriv
.
(pavephu
on
Cf note 3 infra. Metaph. xi. 8, 1065, a, 4: rod ael fxhu yap traaa iiria-TViiJ.'n
airdSei^is.
1
.
ovTos
iariv.
Tccv
cos
iirl
rh
ttoAv,
rh
5e
(Tu/ijSejSTj/f^y
eu
ovSerepc}}
i.
:
tovtccu
Anal. Post.
Si'
4irl
a-vWoyirrixhs ^
^ Karcc (rv/j.$e^T]Khs, rh Se (ru/x^e^rjKSra ovk avayKala. Ibid. eVel 5' e| avdyK7}s at the end xjirapx^i- Tepl eKaarov yeuos oca KaO* avra virdpx^t ^at 77 cKaarov, <pavephv OTi irepl rwv Kad' avra virapx^VTWV
virapx^i:
al
4-iri(rrr}/j.oviKal
awodei^eis Kal
e/c
us
rh iroXv
rwv roiovruv
(rvix^e^f}K6Ta
elclu.
rh
/j-ev
yap
&(rr^
Koi
et fxev
al irporaffeis
avayKoiai,
el 5'
ovk
ovd'
avayKala,
ei
Koi rb
(rvfXTrepa(T/ji.a
avayKoiov,
OVK avdyKt] rh
SiOTt
ffvixiripafffxa
elhivai
eXu],
fx)^
roiovrou.
rh ttoXv, koI rh (Tv/xTrcpaafxa Cf. p 168, n. 1. 2 AimL Post. i. 6, 75, a, 18, cf c. 8, c. 33, &c. vid. c. 30 supra, p. 164, n. 2. 3 Ibid. c. 6 init. ei odv iffrlu airoSeiKTiKT] iinariiniri e| avay7} Kaioiv 6.p')(^uv (& "y^P etTiffrarai ov
ws
iirl
virdpx^iy
del
Kad'
avrh
Sh,
olov
oi
did crrj/xelav
(TvKKoyiaixoi.
Ka& avrh
iirKXr'fjo'erai,
rh Se SiSri eiriaraaOai ecrri rh Sth rov alrlov iirlffracrOai. Si" avrh &pa Set Kal rh jxecrov r^ rpircp koX rh Cf. irpchrov r(p fieacf uTrapxetv. p. 213, n. 5 supra. * Anal. Post. i. 14, c. 24-27.
LOGIC
If
245
we take demonstration
as a whole,
it
is
The same
considerations lead
up from
deeply
ie
way of thinking that nothing can be demonstrated except from its own peculiar
principles,
and that
it
is
from without.
question,
the
object
in
to another
seeing that
concept.^
All demonstration,
Its
it,
Its function is to
universal,
phenomena from
'
unending, or has
it
a necessary limit ?
iii.
1,
irepl
clvai
apid/xr]-
koivwv
iffriu.
:
rh yetafxerpiKbv
apiQixt]-
koI yecofierpias, ovk ecrri apiOfnjriK^v awSSei^ip ((papfiSffai iwl ra toTs fieyeOecri (ru/uySejSTj/cJTa . &(rr^ ^ airhMs avdyKT} rh avrh ehai
. .
tV
Sel^eaiv,
yevos ^
SrjXov
'
iry,
ei
fieWei
rj
airSSei^is
fierafiaiveiv.
e'/c
rh
rovro S' icrrl rh (Tvixirpa(rfjt.a virdpxou yevei rivl KaB'' avr6. %v 5e raa^id/xara' a^idl>iJ.araS^ io'rlv i^uv rpirov rh [sc. oi airodei^eis etVtV]. yeuos rh vTroKeifievov, ov ra irddr} Kul
avdyKt) ra &Kpa Kal ra fi^ffa ilvai. el yap fi-^ Kad' avra, av/x^e^T^KSra
ecrrai.
5ia
.
. .
rovro
5e7^ai
&\Xr)
iiricrr'fjfJ.T)
ra
r)
aW'
f)
'6ffa
&WTj\a
;
aTfdSei^is.
oZv
r}
air6-
&(Tr' elvai
Odrepou
virh
Odrepov
C.
246
ARISTOTLE
from the particular to the general from the subject, beyond which there is nothing of which it can be predicated to continually higher predirise
We
may
and we may, on the other hand, descend from from that predicate which is the most universal point the subject of no other predicate down to the parBut in any case we must arrive eventually ticular.
cates
:
at a point
where
we
could never reach an effectual demonstration or definiThe argument excludes also the third hypothesis, tion.^
that there
may
exist
an
infinite
number
is
of intermediate
definite preinfinite, it
terms between a
dicate.2
definite subject
and a
If the
list
of middle terms
not
follows that there are things of which there cannot be a demonstration or derived knowledge.^ For wherever the
middle terms cease, immediate knowledge must necesTo demonstrate sarily take the place of demonstration.
evGrytliinrj
is
not possible.
If
we attempt
to
it
we
are
either
brought round
again
that progression ad
all
infinitum
bility of
possi-
else to
'
arguing in
circle,'
solid demonstration.'^
9 init.
Ser^at
:
(pavephu
'6ti.
ovK
eariv
return e/cao-Tou apxc^J^, &c. to this later on. ^ For he says at 83, b, 6,84, ra &Treipa ovk eari 5te|eA0eTj/ a, 3 voovvTa. Cf note 4 infra. 2 I old. ch. 19-22. The details of this treatment, in parts not
:
.
We
997, a, 7
irepi
iravruv
that Aristotle
yap aSvparovaTroSei^ivehai' avdyKti yap e/c rivcou elj/at Koi irepi n /col rivdv tV airJSetljj/. * After Aristotle {Anal. Post. 1. 2) has shown that the proof -power of syllogisms is conditional on the scientific knowledge of the premisses, he continues, in ch. 3
:
LOGIC
conclusion, that in the last resort demonstration
start
247
must
from propositions which, by reason of their immediate certainty, neither admit nor stand in need of
proof. 1
'
These 'principles' of
conclude from
this,
all
Many
that
refute
by reference to
a circle
1).
'
his
no knowledge at
all is possible
others, that everything can be proved.' But he confutes both Of the former he assertions.
on the subject
(de
quo
'
V.
swpra, p. 242, n.
says
elvai
ol
/xev
yap
virodefievoi
fx.^
20
eiri-
SXcos
iiriaraaOai,
ovroi
(Is
aX-qQwv
t'
elvai
KoX
ws ovk Uv iTTiffrafxevovs ra vcTTepa 5ta ra TTpSrepa, wv /u.-^ effri it pur a, opdcos \eyovres, aSwarov yap ra 6.ireipa
&iripov a^iovffLV
avdyecrdai,
trpcvruu Kal afieauv Kal yvcopi/JLODrepcav Kal irporepwv Kal airioou rov
(Txmfiepdffiiaros.
dj/airoSei/cTcoj/,
fx))
.
.
.
e/c
irptarwv
8'
otherwise
SeiKTot
76
/xi]
ovcn]s
aiiruv,
oirep
el
(pafflv elvai
rh iiriaTaffOai ix6vov
know
Karb.
we
8e
e'/c
yu.^
etTTi
ra irpwra
elBfuai, ovSe
ra
eiTiffraaBai
uu
airdSei^is
eari
fx^
that what is deduced would not be known if the principles (apxal) are not known, and that if mee/cetya
iariu.
He admits
ex^iv dTrJrjixeXs 5et|fi/ ear IV. C. 3, 72, b, 18 Se <pap.ev ovre iraaav eiriar^ix-qv
(rvfifie^-qKhs,
:
rh
Kal
ov
aXXa
.
Kal
apxhv
^ rovs
'
diate knowledge, by way of proof, is the only knowledge, then there can be no knowledge of opx^> Yet he himself in the same treatise denies this very thing at p. cf. Metaph. iv. 4, 1006, 72, b, 18 tffri yap airaideva'ia rb fi^ a, 6
;
:
Upovs yvwpiQifxev.
n. 6,
Cf supra,ip. 197,
yiyvdoffKeiv, rivcov
Sei^iv Ka\
Set
0jTe7v air6-
rivwv oh Sc?" '6\(as fiev yap airdvroov aSvvarov airdSei^iv ehai. els hreipov yap Uv fiaSiCot, uiffre /i7j5' ovrws elvai d7r(}5ei|t/. As to the second of the above propositions, Aristotle states it at p. 72, b, 16, in other words
the circumstance that a thing is always so is no reason for rejecting proof by causes, for even the eternal may have its causes on which it is conditional see Gen. An. ii. 6, 742, b, 17 sqq.
;
'Apx"^ "PX"^
airoSei^ews, dpx"^
a,
7,^ 14,
C.
10
init. (A.e7cw
apxas ev
eari
eKda-rcp
[x^
on
ev-
trdvruiv
elvai
'
airS^ei^iv
ovhev
KVKXcf}
KwXveiv
yiveffOai
euSexecrdat
yap
11.
r^v
air68ei^iv
Koi
i^
25 sqq.
to
Sex^rai Se7^ai) ii. 19, 99, b, 21, cf. Gen. An. ii. 6, 742, p. 197, n. 4 b, 29 sqq.; Metaph. v. 1, 1013, a, 14, iii. 1, 2, 995, b, 28, 996, b, 27, iv. 3, and also cf, Ind,
;
248
ARISTOTLE
them.^
even a higher certainty than anything deduced from Consequently, the soul must contain a faculty
of im'mediate
knowledge higher and more sure than And, in fact, Aristotle finds in
pure reason
it
the A^os
the
^just
he maintains that
case
it
never deceives
that in every
it
B,
it not^
in
Yet
ledge.
must be admitted that he has neither proved tlie infallibility of any such knowThis immediate certainty, he says, is of two
There are three elements in every process of demonstration that which is proved, the principles
kinds.
:
from which
prove^.
it
is
it
is
The
first
it
is
knowledge,
that
for
the
axioms are
common
to
different
fields
of
also used in a wider sense, see Anal Post. i. 7, 75, a, 41, c. 10, 76, b, 14, and Metaj)h. iii. 2, 997,
a, 5, 12.
AlT7)ixa is
from
virddea-is
in
10, 76, b,
i.
72, a, 25
Again,
contains an affirmation as to the existence or non-existence of an object, it is a virSdeffis if otherwise, a dpicrfiSs. &eais is used in a broader meaning in Anal. Pr. ii. 17, 05, b, 13,
if
64(ns
sqq.
2
247, n.
1.
Vide
supra,
p.
197
sqq.,
and Anal. Post. i. 3, 73, a narrower one in Top. i. (For further 11, 104, b, 19, 35. references see Ind. Ar. 327, b, 18 sqq.) For a^iufia, which is
a.
66, a, 2, in 9
;
7 (as cited supra, p. 245, n. S),andibid. ch. 10, 76, b, 10 TTciffa yap airoBeiKriK^ iiri(rT-fifir] Trepl rpia iarlu, '6<ra re ehai riderai (ravToi S' ecrri rh yevos ov
i.
:
Anal. Post.
Tuv
prjTiK^),
Koi
Ttt
Aeyofieva
Koivb,
LOGIC
249
matter are peculiar to the particular science.* It is only upon postulates which are proper to a particular
department that he allows a binding demonstration to be founded. 2 But these postulates are just as litfcle
capable as the universal axioms of being deduced from
They must be supplied to us by our knowledge of that particular object to which they
a higher law.^
relate.''
They are
of
effTi
experience.^
a^tci/xaTa e|
How
. . .
wv
irpcarcav airodeiKwa-i,
rpia ravTU
2,
et
'6ri
Se (payephu
ovk
Koi 4^
u>u.
Metaph.
e/c
iii,
997, a,
ras kKaa-rov
avdyKT] yhp
irepi Tc Kal
rivuv
t)]v airdSei^iy.
In
ch. 6
*
he gives yhos
Anal. Post.
i.
viroKi[X^vov
tj
iK^tvai airavruv apxal Kal iiriar-iifXT] iKeivcav Kvpia irdvTcov. Cf. ch. 10,
*
irddv, d^Kafiara in
another order.
l,cit. sujyr. p. 245,n.3,andi^i^. c. 10, 76, a, 37: effrt 5' wv xP^^'Tot eV Ta7s airoSeiKTiKOLs iiriffT-fjibLais ra jxkv X^ia
e/cacrrrjs iirKTT-fjfnjs
Anal. Pr.
Sh Kaff
5ih
X^iat
ai
irMtaTai
eKaffrou
/xhu
[^apx^l
roov
yicr/xaiv].
ras
S'
fxev
avKKoapxas rds
irapa-
irepl
i/jLireipias
i(TTl
Sovvai. Aeyco
yi,K)]V
Se oTov rb Xcra
i/xireipiav
32
init.
Uv dcpcKri ras
:
on tcra ra Komd.
S'
yiKris
eViCTirj/xTjs.
auras opxas
varov, and after this has been proved at length he says at the end at yhp apxal dirral, e| wv re
:
Kal irepl
at
'6
iKavus ruv (paivonevcov ovrws eupedrjcrav at affTpoKoyiKol airoSei^eis. So in Hist. An. i. 7 init. we have first to describe the peculiar properties of animals, and then to discuss their causes ovtm yap
:
:
5e
irepl
'iSiat,
olov
apidfihs,
airo-
Kara
odov,
irepl
r^v
fj-eO-
fieyedos.
&udiravTesSeiKvvovaivwillheiound
in the passages cited at p. 247, n. 2. 2 Vid. S2i2)r. p. 245, n. 3 Gen. An. li. 8, 748, a, 7 ovtos fxev ovv d Xoyos KaOoXov xiav Kal Kevus. oi yap fi^ eK roSv olKeicoi/ apxS>u x6yoi Ket/ol, aXXii. BoKovaiv ehai ruu irpayixdroiv OVK ovres. Cf. p. 174, n. 2,
; :
supra.
'
a/v re yap Kal e| wv eJvai Set tt;?/ airSSei^iu, e/c tovtwv yiverai (papepSv. ^ Cf. preceding note, and the remark in Eth. vi. 9, 1142, a, 11 sqq., that young people can make advances in the knowledge of Mathematics, but not in Natural History or the wisdom of life, '6ti ra /xhv [Mathematics] 8i' afai
eKawrov
irepl
Anal, Post.
i.
9,
76, a, 16
pecrecis
icrriv
[is
an
abstract
250
pass,
ARISTOTLE
he does not further inquire. Sense-perception he treats as a simple datum, whose elements he does not
try to analyse.
He
us merely judgments
upon given
certainties.^
materials,
among what
im-
he
calls
immediate
It is therefore
we
are indebted
To enumerate the
various sciences
is
Even
not to be found
S' ai
apxcd e|
iixirei-
It is said in Bt/i.
b,
153,
that
(fiovXevais) is
Ka9' Ka(Tra,
TreVeTrTai
concerned with to
olov
et apros tovto aicrflrjo-ews ws Set yap ravra. Ibid. vi. 9, lli2, a, 23 sqq., Aristotle explains that, contradiction to eiricrTijfjL'n, in
-/)
ferred to an ala-d-nffis in like man(See also the discussion of ner. So in <pp6v7](Tis in ch. xii. infra.) Eth. iii. 12, 1143, b, 5, referring to the same class of propositions tovtwv ovv e;^' Se? he says
:
Now,
although (as
is
(pp6uT)arLS
is,
like
uovs,
;
an im-
mediate knowledge but whilst the latter is concerned with the ecTTi x6yos (the uu ovK '6poLf
'
highest principles,' which in this case are practical principles), is a knowledge toG (pp6v7](ns
eVxctTOu,
01)
OVK
effTiv
iin(Tri]ixT\
the wider signification of consciousness,' still it always means immediate knowledge,' as an distinguished from an iiria-T-fifir]. Kampe {Erhenntnissl. d. Ar. 220 sq.) finds in the above passages, a proof that Book VI. of the Nicomacliean Ethics originally
'
[the sensible properties of things] dAA' o'la al(T6av6fida, on rb iu toTs fxaOr^fioTiKols ecrxaTOv rpiyauov (i.e. the last thing obtained in analysing a figure is a triangle). Here, therefore, the judgment ' This is explained as a is a triangle matter of a1(TQT]ais (and so also in Anal. Post. i. 1, 71, a, 20) and the minor premisses of practical syllogisms, such as * This deed is just,' 'This is useful,' &c., are redAA.' a((rQ7}<ns,
ovx V
''wf i^icou
'
belonged to the Eudemian but Polit. i. 2, shows how unfounded As little does is this conclusion. it follow from Eth. vi. 3, 1139, b, 33 where the et jxkv yap irws iriffrevr), &c., does not mean 'we have knowledge when we have any conviction,' but knowledge consists in a definite Hnd of conviction based on known prin;
'
ciples.'
2
For proof of
this,
see ch.
xii.
infra.
LOGIC
in Aristotle.
all
251
He
unconditional,^ so that
Law
No
one
this principle,
the highest
it
admits of
no demonstration
it
cannot, that
is
to say, be
ing
'
it.^
He has, however,
iv.
carefully
:
Metaph.
3,
1005, b,
'
^ffiaioTdrr} 5'
Siaipevffdrjvai
apx^ iraauv
Tvepl
^v
irpordcr^i
iffrl
aZvvaTov
yvcopLixwrdrh)v
rrjv
yctp
avaryKolov elvai
fj.^
yvwp'iQovffiv
irdvTes^
ical
avvrrddeTOv.
^u yap avayKalov
^vvteuTa
uTrdOeffis.
ivavria 5' 5d|a S6^ri 7} rrjs apTKpda^ws, fpavephv '6ti aSvvaTOv d/xa viroXafifidviiv rhv avrhv elpai Kal /xij eivai rh avrd afxa yap ttv e^o: rds ivavrias 5d|as d 5tei)/ua'/AeVos Trepl roirov.
ra
elcoddra'),
'
Tuv
ovtwv,
tovto
:
ovx
2 Line 19 (xi. 5 mit.) rh yap avrh ufia virapx^iv re Kol fxij virdpX^iv a^vvarov r^ aur^ Koi Kara rh avr6 Kal Hffa SAAo TrpoffStopicraifxed^
'
Ibid. c. 6, 1011, b, 15: eVel 5' aSvvarov t^v avT[<pa<nv dhTjdeveadai a/xa KaTo. rov avrov [for which at line 20 he substitutes afxa Karacpdvai Kal
airo<pdvai aKi]Qu)s], (pavephv
on
tiv,
\oyi-
Se'xeTai
djx(^(t),
r^
auTcfJ
dW'
fj
irij
Kas Svffx^p^tas.
fiefiaioTdrr] tcou
^ ddrepov
jxkv
irij
Odrepov 5e
apx^v. The axiom opposites cannot belong to .>^** the same thing in the same respect, is only a form of this. And the further principle that no one can really ascribe such opposites at once to anything is so closely connected that sometimes the latter is proved from the former, at other times the former from the latter; cf. Anal. Post., ut et Se (j.)) ip54x^rai supra, line 26 a/na vTrdpx^iv rv avrto ravavria
airXcos.
3 In this sense Aristotle in Metajjh. iv. 4 sq. confutes the
that
'
'
'
statement (which, however, he only ascribes to certain of the older schools as being in his view an inference from their tenets Gr. part i. cf. Zellee, Ph. d. 600 sq., 910, 4), that an object can both be and not be the same thing at the same time,' by proving that in every statement the principle of non-contradic;
'
252
sophistical
ARISTOTLE
misuse of
it
to
of
different properties in
becoming and of change, by that detailed exposition of it in which he shows that it is not absolutely impossible that contradictions should be predicated of the same
subject,
By
blished the
Law
of Contradiction, he lays
^
down
that of
an incontestable Axiom. tlie But he does not expressly deduce the one from the
Excluded Middle
as
other.
Though
kind of knowledge brought about by demonstration is doubly conditioned by an immediate and undemonstrable conviction of the mind, yet he is far from repre-
The
starting-point of
all
demonstration
is
undemonstrahle
it is
any other principle as from its cause. Yet it can be shown from the given facts to be the condition which underlies them, and which their existence presuption
i7iit., c.
In c. 5 1007, b, 22, xi. 6 init.), he reduces to the same principle the dictum (de quo V. Zellee, Ph. d. Gr. part i. 982, 1, 988, 2) that that is true for each one which appears so to him ; and to this, amongst other
is
presupposed.
c.
(paivofjLeuov,
the
dictum
Trp6s ri.
would
6 (of.
4,
make
'
everything a
x^"^"'
^
ovliv
cf p. 230, supra.
.
'
'
Metaph. iv. 7 in applying has argument, Aristotle his reasons those adopted here which are borrowed from the con;
every
(paivS/uLeTov
must be a nvl
sideration of Change in Nature, evidently wishing to prove his theory not only as a logical, but also as a metaphysical principle.
LOGIC
poses.
253
So in the place of Demonstration, conies in There are thus two lines of scientific thinking which require to be distinguished the one
Induction.^
:
which leads up to principles, the other which leads down from principles ^ the movement from the universal to the particular, from that which is in itself the more certain to that which is so for us and the reverse
movement from the individual, as that which is best known to us, to the universal, which is in its own nature the more sure. In the former direction goes
syllogism
and
scientific
demonstration
in the latter
goes induction.^
all
And by
to be.
knowledge comes
.
its
' Cf with what follows the references on p. 242, n. 6 supra. The name * iirayta-yh] refers either to the adduciTig of particular instances, from which a universal proposition or concept is abstracted(TRENDELENBUEG,JE'^<^?;^. Log. Arist. 84 Heyder, Vergl. d. arist. und hegel. Dialehtik, p. 212 sq.), or to the introduction to these instances of the person to be instructed (Waitz, Arist. Org. a. 300). In favour of the latter explanation there are certain passages, in which ' iirdyeiv has as its object the person knowing as 2'op. viii. 1, 156, a, 4 iirdyovra ficv airh ruv KadcKaaroy iirl ra KaOSXov, but especially A?ial. Post. i. 1, 71, a, 19 OTi fiev yap irav rpiywvov e^et Sutrti/ opQats "iffas, vpopSei, '6ti 5e rdSe rpiywvSv iffriv, a/na iirayofxevos irplv 8' 'iraxdwa^ ^ iyvcipiffev .
'
:
'
1095, a, 30 i. 491, 2 and see p. 205, n. 2 supra. ^ Besides Induction, Heyder ( Vergl. d. arist. und hegel. Dial. 232 sq.) finds in Aristotle (Phys. i. 1, 184, a, 21 sqq.) indications of another process, by which we should proceed from the universal of sensible perception to the concept, as the more particular and definite just as in induction we go from the particular in perception to the universal of the conBut he himself rightly cept. observes that this is only an induction reversed (though this case is not usually made very
-
cf.
;
2,
d. Gr. pt.
AajSeTv
(TvA\oyi(Tixhv,
rpdirov
fidp
Tiva
tffcos
c. 18,
81, b, 5
prominent by Aristotle). When a universal is brought out as that which is common to many individual cases, it is thereby
254
ARISTOTLE
nature admits of no demonstration must be established have already remarked that this by induction.^
We
undemonstrable element of thought need not necessarily be abstracted from experience, but that Aristotle
rather regards the universal axioms as apprehended by
the
sees
But
as he
activity
of reason
is
only
gradually
developed in the individual under the guidance of experience, so he believes there are no other means of
scientifically verifying its
by a comprehensive induction.^ Many difficulties are For inductive reasoning is founded, involved in this.
separated from the complex in which it presents itself to perand this is all that ception Aristotle has in his mind in the passagecited; cf. p.205sq. mj)ra. Anal. Pri. ii. 23, 68, b, 13 airaura yap TricrTevofxep ^ 5ta cruAAo;
tion of the whole will be gathered from what is said in the text.) Similarly Anal. Post. i. 1 init. Anal. Post. i. 18: fj-auddt/ojuiev ^
iirayooy-^
fj
d7ro5et|ei.
e/c
cctti
5'
t]
tj
'
jxkv a7roSei|is
rcbv KaBoXov,
'
S'
yLa/iiov
?)
Si'
eTraycoyris.
Ibid, at line
;
dSui/a/jlt]
Si'
:
35
Eth.i.
al fxkv
IMd.
OTt
ii.
19, 100, b, 3
TO.
S'
Sf;Aov
S^
7}ixLV
irpccra
^nayuyri OewpovvTai, al S' alffOrjcreL, irpoe'/c &c. vi* 3, 1139, b, 26 yLycocKOfxevcov Se -rraaa diSaaKaXia
; :
' .
iirayayfi
i.
yvupi^nv avayKalov.
rh
.
Top.
12:
etTTi Se
{xey
[e?5os
X6ywv
tj
SiaAe/fTiKwj']
XoyKTfjLos
.
.
e'7ra7w777,
rh Se ci^ASe
airh
to,
7]
fxhv
yap
t]
Si'
671-070)7775,
Sr?
r]
Se
itrayccyr]
(TvAXoyLajLLCf.
/xeu
eiraywyr)
6
tS}v
KadeKaffTou
.
.
.
inl
7)
KaQoKov
Kal
apxv icTi
Kal
e'/c
rod KaQoXov,
tu>u KaQoKov.
Se
(podos
ecTTi 5'
p.\v iiraybiyr)
auWoyL(r/j.us
eiVii'
indav(i)Tf:pou
Kal
aacpearepov
&pa apxal e| wv 6 (rvWoyiafihs, wv iiraywyr) ovK eCTi (TvWoyiafMos (Trendelenbueg, Hist. &pa. Beitr. ii. 366 sq., and Brandis, ii, b, 2, 1443, would like to cut out
Kara
Kal
rrju
aXffQiqffiv
yvoopiixwrepov
To7<i
Aoyiff/jhs
Tovs
Hid.
a,
the last two words, on the gTOund that all unproved knowledge does not rest on induction; but the form of statement is not more universal than in the other parts of this passage, and the explana-
35
'^
^laariKcoTfpou Kal irphs kvTiKoyiKovs ivapyecrrepov. Bhet. 1. 2, 1356, c. 8 init. and cf snpra, p. 205 sq.
;
.
See
p.
S7c2)ra.
3 See also the citation infra (in note 1 on p. 256) from To^f.
i.
2.
LOOIC
as
255
a mutual relation of
and the middle of the syllogism have the same extenIn other words, no cogent induction is possible, unless a predicate can be shown to be common to all the
sion.
it is
to be predicated.
Such an exhaustive acquaintance with every individual It would seem, therefore, that case is impossible.^ every induction is imperfect, and that every assumption which bases itself upon induction must remain uncertain.
To meet
this difficulty,
it
was requisite
for the
to
im-
instance.
down
he
in
the Topics.
The value of
dialectic consists,
says,
it is
an intellectual
discipline,
:
nor that
it
teaches argumentation as a
fine art
it is
inasmuch
as
*
it
knew
ii.
24
fin.
\jh 7rapd5et7ywa] Siacpepei rrjs ivaywyris, '6ti t] fxkv e| aircivTcov ratv aTOjxwv rh uKpou iSeiKuvev wTropx^"'
T^
(UeV^
.,
rh bk
ovK e|
Ihid. c. 23, Set Se voiiv rh T [the 68, b, 27 lowest concept in the inductive syllogism] t^ e| airavrcov rcou yap rj KaB^Kaarov (rvyKeiiJ.evov
airdvrojv
delKvvffiv.
:
'
Even
if
we supposed we
266
AUISTOTLE
It
for as these cannot be deduced by demonstration from anything more certain than themselves, there is
ciples
nothing
left for
probability.^
us but to get at them from the side of Such an attempt must start from the
What
all
the world, or
it,
the
believes, is
it
carries with it a
presumption that
it
rests
upon a
real
experience.^
'
Tojy.
i.
'H
p-ev
rr\s
TTpayfJ-anias,
7]s
fxeOodov
npoQ^ais evpuv,
irpo-
65hu exei. Aristotle (Tojh viii, 11, 162, a, 15) calls the dialectical
a0'
Ttepl
bvi/r](T6fji.eda
avKAoyi^ecrdai.
koL
iravrhs
e|
tov irpoTeQevTOs
6v5o|a)j/,
jX'qQ'kv
fiKr\ixaTos
avroX
8e
Koyov
virexovres
.
.
ipovfxeu
vTvepauTiov.
SiaAeKTLKhs
avWoyicriJLos 6 e 4uS6^ccv
^oimevos
.
. .
avWoyi-
ev5o^a Se ra doKovvra
^)
KacTLV
'/)
rols irAeiaTOis
t)
to7s (ro(pois,
Ka\ rovTOis
TOLS
syllogism iTnxeipr)iJ.a. Thurot, sur Ao'lst. 201 sqq., compares the dili'erent statements of Aristotle on the office and use of Dialectics; but he has laid rather too much stress upon the partial inaccuracy of Aristotle's language. Cf. on the Tojncs also p. <)8, n. 1, supra.
J'Jtudes
2 Birm. in S. c. 1 init.: irepl Se rrjs fiauriKijs rrjs eV ro7s viruois
eudo^oLS.
Ibid.
y]
rpia
irphs
[XP''7(T'i/ios
yv/Jij/ aalai',
irpayfxaTela],
yLuofxeurjs
ovre
Karacppovriaai
irphs
TCLS
.
iin(Tri]jxas,
dwd/xevoi
irphs
ajx(p6repaZiaTTopTi<raipaov ev kKacrrois
Koicrrrjv
fxev
iir Lffr'}]yL7]v
ap^ci^v.
apx(*>v
6/c
tV
irporeQela-av
irpwrai at apx".^ airdvroov elal, Sia 5e Tocv irepi eKacra ivoo^a^v avdyKy]
irepX
t)
rh /nhu yap iroWovs viroXa/xfidveiy e'xeij/ ri (Trj/jLeiwSes rh ivvirvia irapfX^rai iriariv us e^ efiireipias Aey6/xvov, &c. Bth. i. 8 init. vi. 12, 1143, b, 11; Bhet. i. 1, 1355, a, 15 (cf.the beginning of ch. xiv. infra). For the same reason, Mh. vii. 14, 1153, b, 27 appeals to Hesiod ("E, K. T)fx. 763) (pv/JLT] S' oij ri ye irdjxirav air6\\vrai, ^v riva Xaol iroWol and Synes. Calv. Enc. c. 22 (^Ar. Fr. No. 2) quotes as
ireiarOTJuai.
pdSiov
ovre
i)
irdvras
avrcov SieAdelu.
rovro
5'
ifStoj/
Aristotelian
iraXaias
yueVrjs
elcri
'6ri
[sc. at irapoifxiaC]
/xaXiara
(piXocrocpias
ev
rats
iariv
ras
c^eraariKT]
yap oZaa
fj-eddSuu
irphs
airaauiy
Tf
apxo.s
iyKaraXeififxara irepiffwOevra
LOGIC
Such a foundation may appear unstable
;
267
and the
by combining the
different points
of
view which cross one another in popular opinion, and by balancing them one with the other. From this he
got his habit of prefacing his dogmatic dissertation^
with ^kiroplai of enumerating the different sides from which the subject may be touched of testing conclusions by mutual comparison and by established standards
;
and,
finally,
of
raising
difficulties
by
this
testing
process and obtaining a ground for a scientific exposition from their solution.^
These
dialectical
elucida-
way
by clearing up the questions which are in issue;, by grouping the inductive results under a certain number of general aspects, and by making them explain each other and so combining them into an aggrer
gate result.
is
led
on into the
koHL Se^iSrrjra. Cf also Eth. End. 1264, a, 1 i.6mi^., and, as to the belief in the aldiip,De Coelo, 270,h, Id, Metajfh.
hik ffvvrofxiav
Polit.
ii.
5,
vvvai
irepl
ix6.Ki.ffTa jxkv
irdvra
el
ret
evSo^a
fi^,
ravra ra
koX
irddr],
Se
rcb
With
this is connected Aristotle's preference for proverbial sayings and * gnomes,' about which cf p. 104,
.
ihv yhp \in)Tai re ra dvffx^pv koI KaraXeiinirai to. evSo^a, dedeiyfievov Uv elTj
irKitffra
Kvpidorara'
n. 1
(on the
'
Ilapot/xtat).
iii.
iKavws. Cf. De Coelo, i. 10 init. Anal. Post. ii. 3 init., and WaitZ on this passage also Phyg. iv. 10
;
Metaph.
cviroprjffai
Unit.:
Ka\S)s-
effrt Se
init.,
To7s
fiovKofievois rrpoijpt)
yov rh
Sio-TTopTjo-at
yhp
twv
5'
TrpArepov
airopovfxfvuv
JV. vii.
iffrl,
\veip
ayvoovvTas rhu
1
fin.
:
Seff/xSv,
rwv
&\\(i>v,
I.
Meteorol. i.lS init., DeAn.i. 2 init., Zongit.Vit. c. l, ^Qi,h^2lf &c. InTb/;. viii.11,162, a, 17, the airSpriiJ.a is defined as ffvWoyiaixhs 5ia\KTiKhs a.vTKpdffeccs. These Aristotelian Apories served the Scholastics as a model for their disjmtatio jjro et contra.
' '
VOL.
258
ARISTOTLE
which brings us
to philosophic knowledge.^
It is true that neither this theory nor the actual
ments of modern
science.
his procedure in the working from the observed facts of the laws and definitions out of Science, or in the establishment of natural pheno-
Whether we consider
mena
themselves,
we must admit
Of
that
it
shows serious
all
consists in
the
of a given class, of a proposition which expresses as a universal law that which was true of all
these particular cases.^ In truth, Induction consists in inferring such a proposition from all the cases hnown to
us
and in considering the principle on which the inductive method rests, the main point is to inquire how we are justified in concluding from all the cases hiown
;
to us,
a law for
blamed
none
of his successors succeeded in stating it clearly until Stuart Mill wrote his Logic and even he could find no answer but an inadequate and self- contradictory theory.
;
But
it
Aristotle's position
that his theory of Induction does not help us over the real difficulty, which is to ascertain how the correctness
of an inductive proof can be assumed in spite of the fact tbat the range of experiences on which it rests is
not complete.
The
2,
we have
and
Metaph.
iv.
1004, b, 25
lo-Tt 5e
v 5ia\eKriKh
ireipaffTiK^ irepl
p. 255.
&v f]
<pi\oa-o<pla yvoxTTiK-fj.
LOGIC
already indicated, has tried to
fill
259
invention of the
dialectical
'
throughout.
But
it
only for
on which guesses, inferences and fancies have, or at least may have, become mixed up with Even where Aristotle is dealing actual experience. with actual observation, he falls, in many respects, far short of the standard which we are accustomed to set
in
to the scientific observer.
As
to
the conditions of a
own
observations
or
controlling
others,
we have
is
As he
tive
perception,^
so
it
is,
on
this side of
it,
much
to
It
is
true
that he
an extraordinary
have been
partly
now be
by
this
verified
or
^)
Cf. p. 210 and tw/Va, ch. X. For this is not always posis
is
that name,
sible, partly
often
meant
known
to us.
s
260
ARISTOTLE
Most of
;
found to be correct.
these,
of course, are
many
cases among them where careful investigation would be The methods of experiment he did not required.^
altoo-ether neglect.^
'
His
Part. 33 sqq. (cf. Lewes, AHst. 394), that he had made experiments on the development of the embryo in the egg, since he there remarks that we often find in eggs, even on the third day, the heart and the
more odd is
it
that Lewes
An.
iii.
665,
a,
liver as
isolated points.
So in
Gen. An. ii. 6, he makes remarks on the order of appearance of the different parts of the body from which, as even Lewes ( 475) admits, we see that Aristotle studied embryonic development. A statement, long considered fabulous, about the appearance of a placenta in a kind of shark {H. An. vi. 10, 565, b, 1) has been confirmed (by Joh. MuLLER, Ahh. d. Berl. All. 1840, PJiys. math. Kl. 187, cf. Lewes, loc.cit. 205) the same.is the case (cf. Lewes, 206-208) with Aristotle's statements about the embryo of the ink-fish ( Gen. An. iii. 8, 758, a, 21) about fishes which build a nest {H. An. viii. 30, 607, b, 19) about the eyes of
; ;
should complain of Aristotle's failure to mention the freshness of the sea breeze, the play of the waves, &c. This is to blame Aristotle for not having the bad taste to drop from the realism of a zoological description into the style of a feuilleton, or the impertinence to explain to people who had the sea daily before their eyes the things they had
d.
Arist.
163 sqq., gives instances from Meteor, ii. 3, 359, a, 12, 358, b, 34 {H. An. viii. 2,
590, a,
a,
22)
ii.
H. An.
iii.
vi.
30 {Gen. An.
iii.
1,
2, 560, 752, a, 4) ;
2, 413, b, 16; Be H. An. 471, a, 31 vi. 37, 580, b, sqq. (if this was really an experiment, and not rather a chance observation). Then again there are others in-
Be An.
Respir.
troduced with a
Xiyovffiv,
Gen.
An.
later
iv,
1,
765, a, 21 (which is
on disputed by himself),
iii.
1,
425, a,
Hist. An. ii. 17, 508, b, 4 (though in Gen. An. iv. 6, 774, b, 31 the same is stated in his own
and
kind of stag has under the tail {E. An. ii. 15, 506, a, 23, cf. W. Eapp in Mailer's Archiv. f. Anat. 1839, 363 sq.). With regard to his
description of the cephalopods, Lewes remarks ( 340 sq.) that it could only spring from a great familiarity with their forms, and we see in it the unmistakeable traces of personal knowledge.
name).
Some
ments are
kind, that we may well doubt whether Aristotle himself conducted them and, on the whole, he appeals to experiments so seldom that we cannot avoid seeing how little he, or Greek
;
general,
re
LOGIC
To
261
that he
careful to correct
many
attention to
authorities,^
the
untrustworthiness of
lacks adequate
some of
his
and
accepted
myths.''
tion,
Where he
is
he
might be a tendency to close an inquiry too precipitately, he gives us warning that we should first weigh
all
before
we
decide.^
for the
know-
ledge of
all
' Besides the numberless items of information from the History of the Greek States, of Philosophy, of Poetry, and of Khetoric, which the extant works contain, we
4t/rTvx'fjKaiJ.ev.
refer here to what is quoted from the Politics and other lost works; de quo vide p. 101, n. 1; 73,n. 1; 62, n. 5; 58, n. 1; 103, n.l, and 104, n. 1. ^ Thus in the cases named by
may
to us
{loc. cit. 124), Gen. An. 755, b, 7 sqq., 756, a, 2 ch. 6, 756, b, 13 sqq., 757, a, 2 sqq. iv. 1, 765, a, 16 sqq., 21 sqq.; H. An. viii. 24, 605, a, 2 sq. ' As in Hist. An. viii. 28, 606, a, 8, ii. 1. 601, a, 25, where certain statements of Ctesias are called in question as untrustworthy in Gen. An. iii. 5, 756, a, 33, where he says that fishermen frequently overlook the occurrence in question: ovQih yhp avTwv ovOev rrjpel roiovrov rod yvwvai x^P^v. So in Hist. An. ix. 41, 628, b, 8 ; axn6itrri 5' ofjirw
iii. 5,
;
EUCKEN
37, 618, a, 18, 620, b, 23, he appeals to eyewitness. * As in doubting the genuineness of the poems of Orpheus, and the existence of their supposed author; as to which see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. vol. i. 50. ^ Cf. supra, p. 169, n. 1. I)e Ccelo, i. 13, 294, b, 6: dAA' ioiKuffi fJt-^xpi Tivhs ^TjreTv, oAA.' ov fi^xP'' '"'^P ^^ Swarhv ttjs
c.
hand, in
29,
70^ 7jfx7v tovto trivrh irpayfia iroifiadai r^v (ijTTjcrip aWa irphs rhv ravapria \4yovTa' koI yap avrhs iv avr^ (rjre'i fiexpi Tep tiv ov firiKeri %XV avriXeyeiv avrhs avr^ iih 8c7 rhv fieWovra Kahws Qr]r-{]aiiv ivarariKhv flvai Sia ruv oIk^iuv ivarda-coov rep y4vei, rovro 5' iarlv kK rod irdcras ndewprjKevai ras Siaairopias
jra<rt
Tjdcs, /x^
TTphs
'
(popds.
''
Th
(pi\o(ro(j>ias
Si^yv:
vide
supra, p. 169, n. 8.
262
ARISTOTLE
but also an observer of care and common sense. Nevertheless, we find that glaringly incorrect statements are
not rare in Aristotle, and occur sometimes in cases
where, even with the simple methods to which he was
limited, the correction
more commonly do we find that he draws from insufficient and incomplete data conclusions much too rash and sweeping, or that he forces his facts to conform to some general theory which
easy enough.^
still
And
has
inductions he
In his basis. and by basing them on various popular assumptions he leaves them without any sure foundation. He shows himself but little
itself
no adequate
is
experiential
Cf.
EucKEN,
loc.
:
clt.
155
Such cases are that Arigives the male sex more teeth than the female (Hist. An. on the conii. 3, 501, b, 19
sqq. stotle
;
149 sqq., 154 sqq., 315, 332, 347, 350, 352, 386 sq., 398, 400, When, however, it is 411, 486. said that Aristotle in the Part.
jectured cause of this error see Lewes, Arist. 332, A. 19); that the human male has three sutures in the skull, and the
An. iii. 6, 669, a, 19, asserted that only man has a pulsation of the heart (so Lewes, 399, c, where According to this pashe adds sage one might think that Aristotle never held a bird in his
: '
491, b, 2)
that
man
hand
is
has only eight ribs on each side (ibid. I. 15, 493, b, 14) a supposition, as it would seem, universall}^ held at that time, and explained by supposing that it was founded, not on anatomical
observations of human corpses, but on observations of living bodies cf j). 89, n. 1 that the lines in the hand indicate longer or shorter span of life (ibid. 493, b, 32 sq.) that the hinder part of the skull is empty (H. An. i. 8, Part. An. ii. 10, 656, 491, a, 34 b, 12; Gen. An. v. 4, 784, b,
;
. ;
stotle distinguishes, in
De Respir.
or
20, 479,
b,
17,
the
(T<pvyixhs
always going on, heart-beat from the irri^rjcris ttjs Kop5ias = the strong throb of the heart in passion. And even the latter he does not confine to men, for he says in the tract referred to that it sometimes becomes so strong that animals die of it. All that is said in the passage cited is iv avdpa>Trc() re yap (TvfjLfiaivei ix6vov ws elire 7v i.e. the passion-throb occurs almost exclusively in
:
35).
Man.
LOGIC
skilled in the art of analysing the
263
to its causes
its action,
He
has not
mastered
even
the best technical skill of Greece was possible to him methods of establishing and analysing facts, of checking observations and theories, or of applying experi-
ment
to science.
He
expected to attain.
rather would
it
There
is
be strange
were otherwise.
we
note in his
theory and practice, he would not only be far more in advance of his own time than in fact he was he would have belonged to another and much later period of
human thought.
titude, correlation
we
was necessary in
all
ranges of
scientific
collected
and and
be
laws of
and these again continually checked and To this end no genera 1 revised by the facts themselves. disquisitions on methodology, but only scientific work Until the experimental sciences had itself could assist. passed far beyond the position at which they stood in Aristotle's time, it was not possible that either the methodology or the methods of experimental knowledge
of facts,
264
ARISTOTLE
advance beyond the form in which he In the then state of science it was
should really
stated
them.
was not
and with such care. It to be expected that they should also be with
the like care tested, or that his personal observations should be exactly discriminated from information otherwise
received,
latter critically
which we find absurd, were probably taken by Aristotle from others in all good faith, and were not doubted by him, merely because the knowledge of nature which he possessed gave him no reason to think them impossible. When
appraised.
Many
we
are surprised
often
built hypotheses
by the rashness with which the Greeks or theories upon facts whose
think
first sight, we do not stop to utterly they were ignorant of all our aids to accurate observation, and how greatly this poverty of
falsity is
obvious to us at
how
tools
ment.
must have hindered every sort of helpful experiTo fix time without a watch, to compare degrees
of heat without a thermometer, to observe the heavens without a telescope and the weather without a baro-
meter these and the like were the tasks which the natural philosophers of Greece had to set themselves.
no basis for accuracy as to facts, the attend the classification of phenomena, the discovery of natural laws, and the correction of
there
is
Where
difficulties that
hypothesis by experience are so vastly increased, that we cannot wonder if scientific inquiry rises but slowly and
insecurely above the levels of prescientific fancy.
service
The
for
the world in
LOGIC
265
appreciated
we
try to judge
To enter
examine his refutation of the Sophistic fallacies, are equally beyond our present scope. No wider view of
his scientific principles is to be got from them, but only
an application of them to a
Science properly so called.^
place to
field
But
Definition,
the
Topics.'^
all
As
the starting
point of
scientific
cept
which
is
Definition
is
is
strives.
Knowledge
is
the grounds of things, and in the concept this insight summed up. The what is the same as the ' why.'
' '
apprehend the concept of the thing as soon as we apprehend its causes.^ So far, Definition has the same problem as Demonstration. In both we try to discover the means by which the object has been brought to be what it is.'* Nevertheless, they do not, with Aristotle,
entirely coincide.
'
We
In the
first
Brandis, pp. 288-345 gives a sketch of both. 2 Besides the general works
Heyder, Vergl
BialeUih,
p.
247
sqq.,
and
Kampe,
195 sqq.
Erkenntnissth. d. Arist.
De
Kassow,
and
p. 173, n. 2.
*
266
AUlSTOTtn
be de-
not concerned with mere properties but with the substantial essence only.^ The converse not everything that can be defined is no less true
and
is
admits
of demonstration,
as
may
be
seen at
start
once
demonstrations
Indeed,
must
it
from
definitions.^
seems to be
true in general, that the contents of a definition are undemonstrable by syllogisms for demonstration fre:
supposes a knowledge of the essence of the object, while The one points this is precisely what definition seeks.
out that a property belongs as predicate to a certain subject; the other does not concern itself with individual properties, but with the essence
inquires for a
'
itself.
'
The one
'
that^'
what
and
we must
first
know
Here, however,
we must draw
a distinction.
The fact is that a definition cannot be derived through a single syllogism. We cannot take that which is asserted
predicate in the definition of an object and use it as the of a middle term in our major premiss, in order to attach
it
again in the conclusion to the object which was to be defined for if, in such a process, we are dealing with not merely one or other of the properties, but with the whole concept of the object, then it must
: >
Anal
Post.
ii. 3.
8t:
?)
fl
Ibid. 90, b, 18 sqq. (cf. Another supra, p. 246 sqq.)kindred reason is there given
2
ovk
lo-rtv.
*
Anal. Post,
;
.
90,
b,
28
sqq.
*
also.
LOGIC
the one
267
definition,
it
Therefore
follows that,
as we have described,
method of arriving at the idea by means of for the division presupposes the division is no better The same objection also applies to the concept.'* method^ of assuming a definition and proving its for validity a ^posteriori by reference to individuals how can we feel certain that the hypothesis which we assumed, does really express the idea of the object, and not merely a numiber of particular marks ? ^ If, lastly,
;
we endeavoured
'
Vid. sum'a, p. 216 sqq. 2 Anal. Post. ii. 4. As an illustration he uses the definition of the soul as * a self-moving number.' If we wished to establish this by means of the sj'^llog-
ism
* everything that is itself the cause of life is a self-moving number; the soul is itself the cause of life, &c,* this would be
:
^ Anal. Post. ii. c. 7, 92, b, 5, 26 sqq, cf. c. 10 init. i. 1, 71, a, 11; Top. i. 5 init.; Metaph. vii.
;
4,
1030, a, 14.
* ^
insufficient, for
in this
way we
F/<^. sw^^r, p.
could only prove that the soul is a self-moving number, and not that its whole essence, its concept, is contained in this definition. In order to show this, we should
Which one
know
not
also
who) had likewise made, " Anal. Post. ii. c. 6, and Waitz.
268
ARISTOTLE
we should be met with the
never brings us to a
*
what/
but always to a
'
that.'
But although
definition can
neither be obtained
possible to reach
When
and we
experience in the
first
which links them to their subject, we are so establishing by demonstration the essence of the thing
if
;
and
it.
we continue
we
Although
us to find
to
may be
said
and in
may be
essence.^
Loc. cit.
c. 7,
92, a, 37
Indue-
shows that something in general is of such and such a kind, by proving that it is so in all particular instances but this is equivalent to proving merely a
tion
;
&(rT^
airo^ei^eus
ten yvwvai
rh
ti
4<ttiv
ov
ianv
UrieffTivfjovK e(rriv,nottheTiia'Ti.
*
Spia/xhs
eTs
fxhv
\6yos rod rl
'
out the too short hints of Aristotle's statement by reference to the argument cited at p. 216, n. 1 suprUf from A?ial. Post. ii.
to
fill
icmv
airoSel^ews
(rvfjiVfpaffiJ.a
the
13.
*
Anal. Post.
ii.
8 Jin.
ffv\-
Koyifffihs fikv
rov ri
itrriv ov ylverai
fuller explanation of which is given above. That definitions of the latter kind do not suffice, Aristotle tells us in De An. ii. 2 ; vid. supra, p. 173, n. 2..
LOGIC
269
From
to the
tions of Definition
we
method by which in
is
arrived at.
an object
can only be
causes, Defi-
its
must embrace those distinctive characteristics by which the object is actually made to be what it is. It must, by Aristotle's rule, be got at by means of that which is prior and more known; nor must these
principles be such as are prior in our knowledge, but
It
scholars
who
differences:
yL6vov rh
fivai
genus
is
Altai. Post.
fifv
ii.
C.
fffn 8e
rl
ruv
ovK
rl
'4rp6v
aXriov,
irphs
ra
jxiv
Afieffa
Koi
aWcL
flffiv,
iroiriffai.
^ IkWov rpdirov (pavepk preceding note and Anal. Post. ibid. 94, a, 9 6 5e ruv aficffwv dpifffihs diffis iffrl rod rl
QiffOai 5er
Cf.
iffriv avairodeiKTos.
6,1048,
Kiydv,
^TjTeTi/,
a,
ix.
rh rt iffriv for a definition only correct when it explains all the ffvfi^efirjKora (i.e. the ko0* avrh ffv/xficfiriKdra, the essential properties w^. p. 214, n. 3 sw^ra)
elSevai
is
;
rS>v
'6pov
kaOiKaffra
rfj
iiraywy^ h fiovXSfieOa
Kal
dAAo
rh
p.
avdXoyov
253.
ffvvopav;
and above,
To
Induction also belongs the process which is described in De An. i. 1, 402, b, 16: toiKc S' oi/
of an object. On immediate knowledge, cf. p. 246 sqq., 197 sqq. ^ Qf course with the exception of the &/iffa just mentioned, i.e. that which is conditional on no principle other
than
'
itself.
Top.vi.4:;ct^.205,n.2supra.
270
prior
ARISTOTLE
and more certain than
Inversely
its
contents,
and
tlie
we
obtain
the
same
mining
the
characteristics
for
these
simply the
in their
scientific
But
these,
turn,
are
an order of supe-
The genus is narrowed by the then the species so first of the differentiating marks produced is further narrowed by the second, and so on. It is not, therefore, a matter of indifference in what
and
inferiority.
;
order
the
finition.3
definition,
in
fact,
implies
not
mere
the
enumeration
completeness''
of
but also
Bearing this
and the proper sequence of them.^ in mind, it will be found that in the
Loc.cit.\^].,h,2^;cLsvpra,
p. 215, n. 1, 216, n. 1.
2 This follows from the passages cited svpra, p. 173, n. 2, compared with pp. 215, n. 1,244, By reason of this conn. 3.
can occur in the definition; of. p. 217 sqq., Anal. Post. ii. 13, 96,
b, 1 sqq., i. 23, 84, a, 13., Top. 6 and other passages Waitz Categ. 2, a, 20.
;
vi.
on
on
p.
gives
ii.
Anal. Post.
ii.
13. 97, a,
23
and
.
Sta^opot.
s Anal. Post. ii. 13, 96, b, 30; cf 97, a, 23 sqq. * Tci eV Tcj} rl ecrri KarriyopIt ov/xeva, at rov y4vovs Sia<popai.
Se rb KaraffK^vdC^iv '6pou 5i^ ruv Siaipfo-ewu rpi&v Sel aroxaC^freai, fov \afie7u to. Kar-nyopovfxeua 4v
is
is
LOGIC
progressive division
is
271
equally
And
accept
was yet recognised and further worked out by him as a means to their discovery.'^ Supposing, then, that we have defined and surveyed the whole field of the knowledge of concepts on this
method, we shall obtain a system of ideas such as Plato
looked
for,^
Summa
down
Genera through
the lowest
the intermediate
members
scientific
to
species.
And
since
deduction must
introduction
creates
of a
new
cause,
added
cause
a corresponding differentia,
must exactly
corre-
spond with the actual sequence and concatenation of causes. Plato never undertook actually to set forth that
derivation of everything knowable out of unity, which
Aristotle
Post.
25;
i.
the object to be divided; and lastly (to which Plato devoted less attention), that it should not proceed by means of deduced or contingent differences, but by the essential ones. Cf. preceding
note.
^ Two further rules, contained especially in the sixth book of the Topics where he enumerates at length the mistakes made in defining are omitted here,
Like Plato (Zeller, Gr. pt. i. p. 524 sq.). he also considers that the most important thing is that the dishould be continuous, vision should omit no intermediate grade, and should totally exhaust
2, 3.
Ph.
d.
See Zell.
272
ARISTOTLE
to him, are
no more
than are the special postulates of each science.^ They are connected, not by any complete community of
nature, but only
sqq., &c.
Aristotle says, in Metapli. xii. 4, 1070, b, 1 (irapa 7ap t^v ova-iav koL rdtWa TO KaTt)yopovfiiva ovd4u ecrri Koiv6u), that the categories especially can be deduced neither from
one another nor from a higher common genus v. 28, 1024, b, 9 (where the same is said of
:
xi.
9,
1065,
;
Phys.
a, 19,
iii. 1,
200, b, 34
;
De
4,
An.
i.
5, *410, a,
13
Uth. N.
;
i.
1096,
23 sqq,
cf.
TRENDE-
LENBURG, Hist. Beitr. i. 149 sq. The concepts, which one would
be most inclined to consider the Being and highest genera, One,' are no y^vn Metaph. iii. viii. 6, 1045, b, 5 3, 998, b, 22
'
'
X. 2, 1053, b, 21
xi.
1,
;
1059, b,
1070, b. 7 Eth. N. ibid. Anal. Post. ii. 7, 92, b, 14 Top. iv. 1, 121, a, 16, c. 6, 127,
27
sq.
;
xii. 4,
7
is
cf.
It
a,
identity,
arithmetical
iV.
LER on Metaph.
on
p.
iii.
(more
v.
7,
276 infra^. Therefore the principle ' that eventually everything is contained in a single highest concept as in a common
genus,' which Strumpell, Gesch. d. theor. Phil. d. Gr. p. 193, gives as an assertion of Aristotle, is not really Aristotelian. 2 In Metaph. v. 6, 1016, b, 31, four kinds of Unity are distinguished (somewhat different is the other fourfold enumera-
1131, b, 12, 1132, a, 1), but also in qualitative identity, such as similarity (Gen. et Corr. ii. 6, 333, a, 26 sqq.), or in identity of operation (cf. Part. An. i. 5, 645, T^ avdhoyou r^v atn^v %xov b, 9 Svpa/jLiv, ibid. i. 4, 644, b, 11; ii. 6, 652, a, 3), and in fact in all categories (Metaph. xiv. 6, 1093, Besides those in the b, 18). passages just mentioned, other instances are given in Be Part.
:
LOGIC
why
the sciences are not
all
273
is
one,
own
If
peculiar sort of
it
it.^
be true that
is
among
first
the sciences
we
*
find one
which
'
principles
it
the
a science of
.
First Philosophy
we must not
any single
shall find it
expect
principle of being.
On
the contrary,
we
that
we should
inquire into
all
be considered,
This
is
or,
PH.
i.
Tpa
'6ff(ou
/xirj0'
8'
4iri(TT'fifji.r]
icrrlv
6/c
ere'/jay,
and Bhet.
cannot
ciples),
6 fin.
at apxal
eVepot
TO,
e/c
other thing (the highest prinmust be explained by analogy, as, for example, the concepts of Matter, of Form, &c. cf Me;
.
iii.
2,
997, a, 21
-K^pl
oZv rd avr6
Kad' eVri
yivos
T7JS
avfifiefirfKSTa
avrk
QeuIbid.
avTTis [eTTio-T^jwr/s]
avTwv
8o^a>v.
taph, ix. 6 (vid. sup. p. 269, n. 1); xii. 4, 1070, b, 16 sqq,, and Phys. i. 7,191, a, 7. Thisisthe account given by Trendelenbueg in \)Ss,Hist. Beitr. i. 151 sqq. Analogy is of special importance to Aristotle in his study of Natural History; see thereon infra, and cf, Meyer, Arist. Thierkundcy 334 sqq. ' Ayial. Post. i. 28 init. fila 8' iricrr'f)fMr} 4crTlv . 7} iuds y^vovs
' :
.
1003, b, 19: ottovtos Se 2, yevovs Kal aX(TQT](ris jxia hds Kal iiriar-fjixy. Ibid. 1004, a, 3:
iv.
Toaavra
fi^pr}
(f)i\o<ro<plas
. .
.
e<rrlv
ocranrep at oixriai
vdvs y4vr\
TovTois.
^x^^''''^
"^^
The relation between and the concept of the First Philosophy will be examined
this
infra.
VOL.
I.
274
AUISTOTLE
CHAPTER YI
INTRODUCTORY INQUIRIES TOUCHING ARISTOTLE's METAPHYSICS
1
.
The Categories
fall,
All
according to Ari:
stotle,
When,
the
Categories
neither
mean
which would be utterly foreign to his Realism, nor are they merely concerned with logical relations. What they exTrendelenburg, Gesch. Katcgoriecnlehre {Hist. Beitr. i. 1846), pp. 1-195, 209-217; BONITZ on Aristotle's Catego'
to
him merely
C.
init.
ruv
Kara
ix-ql^jxiav
d.
/)
irov
v)
irorh
-fj
/ceTo-^ot
^
i.
H.
(first
published in the SitzvngsheHclit der Wiener Akad., Hist.pMlol. ATZ. 1853, B. X. 591 sqq.); PrANTL, Gesch. d. Log. i. 182 SCHUPPE, Die sqq., 90 sq. arist. Kategorieen. (^Gymn. progr,
;
i)
irdcrx^iv.
To^).
to'ivvv
ravra Se?
iv
oh
eari Se ravra rhu apiOfihu d^Ka, ri ion, iroahv, iroiov, npos ri,
k6s].
irov,
essay
1S66) cf. BrentANO's der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nacli Ar., published in 1862. 2 Categ. c. 2 init. r(hv \eyoKara avfj-irXoK^v jueVwi/ rk juej/ \4y(rai, ra S' &uv av/jLvKoKris.
Gleifvitz,
;
irore,
Keladai,
ex^iu,
iroie7y,
Vo7i
iraax^iv.
^ Aristotle uses various expressions to designate them (cf. Trendelenburg, loc. cit. at p. 6 sqq., and BONITZ, ^vt stipra^ at p. 23 sqq., and in the Ind. AHst.
METAPHYSICS
press
all
is
276
Not
sions of categories
but only those which represent the view under which the Actual
may be treated.
378, a, 5 sqq.).
rh.
7ej/r7
i.
among the
He
tov
(^scilicet,
1,
De An.
402, a, 22), to. irpwra 9, 1034, b, 7), also SjatpcVets {Top. iv. 1, 120, b, 36, 121, a, 6), and irrcixreis (J^Ietaph. xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26, with which cf. Etlh. End. i. 8, 1217, b, 29), t^ Koivh. TTpcora {Anal. Post. ii. 13, 96, b, 20, and Metajfh. vii. 9,
Metaph.
vii.
whereas the predicate, as such, can only occur in the proposition. Hence it is needless to ask the question (over which Schuppb, loc. cit. 21 sq., gives himself unnecessary trouble) in what sense Substance,' which is notapredicate-concept (inde infra, ch. vii. init.), can belong to the scheme of the categories. Any concept becomes a predicate by being asserted of something, and this may occur even with concepts expressing substance (cf Metaph, vii. 3, 1029, a, 23, to /xev yhp
*
.
1034, b, 9)
BONITZ
(with
whom
Beitr. zur Logik, ii. 1 sqq. agrees) rightly explains the last expression by simply transand lating KaTt]yopia * assertion consequently yfvii\ or ax^H-o-To. r. Kar. = the chief genera or fundamental forms of assertion,' = the various senses in which an object
' ; ' '
LUTHE,
&\\a
8e
Trjs ovorias
ii\rjs).
Karriyopenai aVrrj
TTJS
For instance, in
the
proposition, ' this man is Socrates,' Socrates is predicate. From this logical function, which
meaning modes
of assertion,' or Karriyopiai rov 6vros (Pht/s. iii. 1, 200, b, 28 Metajih. iv. 28, 1024, b, 13, ix. 1, 1045, b, 28, xiv. 6, 1 093, b, 19, &c.); the latter phrase implying that every such assertion is concerned with being. The meaning of predicate,' which Karn]yopia often has in other places, and which
;
'
Brentano Qog. cit. 105 sq.) and ScHUPPE give it here, does not
suit the Aristotelian categories, designate the for the latter different senses of the to koto
pmihifxiav
may take on in a 2Jf"oposition, it by no means follows that such an idea, when regarded out of this special relation and with reference solely to the content of the idea itself, is to be regarded as signifying anything dependent, or in the nature of a property or avfjifiifiriKSs. Strumpell is mistaken in saying (Gesch. d tlieor. Phil. h. d. GriecJien, p. 211) that the categories treat of the various ways of predicating or the distinctions to be drawn in the ways of combining concepts, though in other respects he correctly apprehends the merely formal character of the
a substance-concept
categories.
^
avfi-irXoK^v
KeySfxeua,
Mttaph.
V.
7,
1017,
a,
22
T 2
276
AniSTOTLE
categories eitlier tliose concepts whicli are so universal as to be predicable of things of the most different kinds,
and
to have a different
meaning according
to the rela-
tion in
which they are used (such as the concepts of Being and of Unity ^), or any of those more definite expressions which concern the concrete condition of
ouTO 5e dual Xey^Tai offairep ra o-xVt t^s kottjyopias' 6(rax(ii>s yap Xeyerai, roaouTaxcos rb eluai (TTjfxaiyei (cf. Mh. JV. i. 4, 1096, a, 23). Hence the categories are called KaTrjyoplai Tov ovTos (see preceding
Ka6'
ffrj/xaiuei
tity,
and a fourth as to place cf. following note. These two concepts (which
; '
KaTO,
ovTusv,
3,998, b, 22 sqq.; x. 2, 1053, b> 16 sqq. viii. 16, 1045, b, 6, cf. That of which they re- supra, p. 272, n. 1), are no y4v7)y note). present the various meanings is but predicates which may be the tv {Metaj?7i. vi. 2 init. ix. 1, applied to all that is possible. De An. i. 5, 410, a, That they cannot be genera, 1045, b, 32 13 Irt 5t iroWax^s Aey OfjLeuov rov Aristotle proves in Metaph. iii. 3, by observing that a genus can ouTOSf ar}fxa(vi yap rh fxeu rdSe ti, &c.); cf. I7id. Arist. 378, a, 13 never be predicated of the mark Logical relations of con- which stands to it as a specific sqq. cepts, on the other hand (such as difference, but that Being and Unity must be predicable of 'opos, yhos, X^iov, crvfJifiefirjKhs), are not expressed in separate cate- every mark which can be added but run indifferently- to the Sy and the ovaia.^ Both the gories, through them all. In answer to concepts are used in various the question ri ian; for instance, meanings. MetajjJi. v. 7, gives you may get according to cir- four senses of Being,' while ix. 10 (cf. xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26, where cumstances an ovaia, a iroahv, &c. As little are the the Kara (rvfjL^efirjKhs Keydfievov "bv see Top. i. 9. categories concerned with the is omitted) gives three, one of opposition of true and false, these being that /coto to ffxh^-o-'^owhich has reference, not to the rSiv KaT'i)yopiu>v, which suggests nature of things, but to our rela- that a different kind of Being cortion to them {3Ietaj)h. vi. 4, 1027, b, responds to each category, and Being 29). Yet Aristotle sometimes does therefore implies that make, after all, an ontological cannot as such coincide with any The same is application of the categories, as single category. rh %v 4v iravrl when, for example, he deduces true of Unity the different kinds of change y4vi dffri ris (pvffis, Koi ovOevhs from the circumstance that one tovt6 y avrh r] (pixris, rb Iv ( = there is nothing whose essence kind is concerned with things as to their substance, another as to consists in Unity as such '). It their quality, a third as to quan- likewise occurs in all categories,
;
:
'
'
'
'
'
METAPHYSICS
any
object
m^
ethical
properties.*;
and
its
physical or
such as
the
and the
Possible, of
Form and
object, of
The
which it is predicated, no new mark and Aristotle concludes from this, '6ri ravTha-Tjiiiaivei
;
iv. 1,
120, b,
ircos
rh ej/ Ka\ rh Iv (Metaph. x. 2, 1054, a, 9 sqq.), the rh eu koI rb tv ravrhv Koi fiia (pvcris r^ a/coAaA\' ou% ais ovQeiv aW'fjXois
.
. .
26; Pliys. v. 2, 225, b, 13, iii. 1, 201, a, 23; Be An. iii. 2, 426, a, 2 Teendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 135 sqq.), and in this sense it is
;
viii. 4,
1029,
how
the cate-
kvL 2,
\6ycf)
dr}\oi>iJ.va (3Ieta.j)7i.
iv.
1003, b,
22),
3,
gories other than Substance have a substratum, yet it does not itself become a category. Still
1061,
b,
*
15
sq., cf.
vii.
5,
1030,
b,
16).
Upon
Unity,'
cf.
also
'
Metaph.
X. 1 sqq.
ticular * unity treated of), and the references at and see also p. 272, n. 2 supra Heetling, Be Arist. notione unius, Berl. 1864, As to the hv, see particularly Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden. * For this reason such a concept as Movement (or Change) is not put among the categories
; ;
would it be a category if we were to accept the belief of the later Peripatetics (which is not established by Metaph. v. 13, Simpl. Categ. 78, 5, 1020, a, 26 29 Bas.) that it belonged to
less
;
the category of the iroa-hv, or as others preferred (Simpl. ibid. 35, So also, 5, 38) to the irpos ti. when Eudemus (Bth. Bud. 1217, b, 26) gives Motion (in place of Action and Passion) among the categories, it is not Aristotelian. Other Peripatetics, notably Theo-
it is
a physical concept which, through the different categories, receives its further determination as substantial change, qualitative or quantitative change, or movement in space (Phys. v. 1 Jin.,
2 init., ibid. 226, a, 23, iii. 1, 200, b, 32 Gen. et Corr. i. 4, 319, b, 31 Be Ccelo, iv, 3, 310, a, 23 3Ietaph. xii. 2, 1069, b, 9 more about this infra). He allows that, looked at in itself, it may
c.
;
phrastus, said more correctly, that it * runs through many categories (Simpl. ibid. 35, 5, 38 Phys. 94, a). In the same way the G ood is to be found in various categories (Bth. N. 1. 4, 1096, a. 19, 23). ^ None of these concepts is reckoned among the categories or comprised under any one of them. On the contrary, whea Aristotle is the considering various meanings of Being,' he mentions the distinction of Suj/'
'
'
278
ARISTOTLE
is
purpose of 'categories'
They
are
may
In Aristotle's
not real con-
us,
framework into which all real conceptions are to be set, whether they are confined to one division of the framework or extend to several.'
ceptions, but only the
and ivreK^x^la, with the distinction of truth and falsity, as matters to be superadded to the distinctions expressed by the categories (Metajjh. v. 7, 1017, a, 7, 22, 31, 35, vi. 2 init., ix. 10 init.y c. 1, 1045, b, 32, xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26 Be An. i. 1, 402, a, 22, cf. Trendelenburg, Gesch. der Categorise )ileJire, ut supra., p. 157 sqq. BoNlTZ, nt supra, p. 19
<{/AJ
; ;
indifferently {Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 26 Metaph. ix. 10 init. rb Se Kara dvvafiiv Kol iycpyeiavTOvrajv). Aristotle does not tell us why
;
:
they cannot be reckoned among the categories but the reason seems to be that indicated above, viz, that these ideas do not merely
;
racter and the formal differences of that which falls under them, but designate definite real relations of actual being. Thus also Brandis, ii. b, 394 sqq. On the other hand Trendelenburg, ibid. 1G2 sq. explains the absence of Possibility and Actuality from the categories by saying that the latter are ' separated predicates,' whilst
'
'
'
the former is no real predicate.' It seems, however, that precisely the opposite is the case. The categories are not themselves directly taken as predicates, but only as designating the place of certain predicates in the scale whereas the distinction of Possible and Actual is based on real and definite facts, the contrast between the different conditions of development in individual things, and the opposition in the universe as a whole between the corporeal and the spiritual. The one kind of distinction is only an abstract, metaphysical expression of the other. But it is not possible entirely to agree with Bonitz when he says on p. 18, 21, that the categories are only meant to render possible a survey of what is contained in the empirical data,' and hence that * such concepts are excluded as extend beyond the comprehension of empirical data, to any kind of explanation of them.' For the concept of Motion is given by experience just as much as that of Action and Passion, and the concept of Substance is as valuable for explaining the data as that of form and matter, or of
'
'
'
METAPHYSICS
Of the completeness
279
us
how he came
to set
does
it
8, 10, a, 35 sqq. Metaph. v. 20), he refers back with the words KoX ToAAo 5' ws Bi-^prirai irpSrepov. Be An. i. 1, 402, a, 24: irSrepov
by this we are to understand such concepts as designate the common object-matter of a series of experiences, such as are the concepts of weight, extension, thought, &c. For those very
categories which are most frequently and universally applied substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, and passion
trocrhv
SAAt]
ruv
Siaip0ei(Twv
Karffyopicou.
(rTjfxaivei
Ibid.
c. 5,
410, a, 14:
TTocrhv
yap rh fihv rJSe ri xb fie ^ iroihv ^ Kai riva &X\7]v tS>v diaipcdeicrwv Karriyopicov. Anal. PH. i. 37 rh S' vtrdpx^^v rSSe
:
T(^5e
bffaxSis
at
xii.
designate merely formal relations, and hence are adapted to cover and apply to a content of the most diverse character and though this is not so absolutely true of others such as irov, ttotc, or Ke7(r6ai that peculiarity only proves that Aristotle was not able strictly to carry out through them all the point of view with which he started his categoryscheme as a whole. Bkentano himself, at p. 131 sq., admits that the distinction of the categories is not a real distinction.' Prantl, GescJi. d. Log. i. 204 sqq., denies that Aristotle adopted any absolutely fixed number of categories but it is clear, not only from the enumerations given at p. 274, n. 2 and p. 282, n. 3, but also from many other expressions, that he did. Thus we have in Soph. El. c. 22, init. iirelirep
;
1069, a, 20 nrpwrov rh iroihv, elra rh TTOffSv; vi. 2, 1026, a, 36: ra T7JS Karrjyopias, oTov rh o'x^fJ'-o-'TO. jxkv r\, rh Se iroihv, rh 8e iroahv, rh Se iroS, rh Se ttotc, /col elf ri &XXo (rr]fxaivi rhv rpSvov rovrov ; vii. 4, koI yap rh ri iariv 1030, a, 18 eva fiev rp6irov (njiuaivei r^v ovaiav Kai rh r65e ri, &\\ov Se (Kacrrov
7}
Metaph.
ohcria,
elra
rcov Karr^yopovfievuiv,
iroahv, iroihv
;
Kai '6aa
a,
33
'
erepai ^ at avral apxai aroix^la rSov ovffiSiV Kai rSiv irpos ri, Kol Kad^
eKoiarriv 5e roov Karrjyopiuv dfioicus.
Likewise in Meta^yJi.
vii. 9,
1034,
some of the
to
categories,
he refers
at the rest with a mere &\\ai Karriyopiai,^ as to something well known, and in Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, b, 12, a, 21, the impossi-
bility of
an
is
argument
iroiovv,
irdffxov, Sto-
tion that the number of categories is limited to those there named. The completeness of Aristotle's list of categories is also supposed by the proof referred to the end of p. 276, n. 2, that at
280
ARISTOTLE
; ^
so little indication
that
we
there are only three kinds of motion (in the narrower sense),
qualitative, quantitative, and local (Phys. v. 1 sq.), inasmuch
as that theorem is proved by the process of exclusion. Motion,' Aristotle argues, does not occur in the categories of substance, &c. therefore only those three categories remain.' ' Even in the lost writings no
' '
:
presented by the adverbs of place and time; the last four categories are to be looked for in the
verb, for 7roi6?v and irdo-xeii' translate into a general concept the force of the active and passive voices, as K^lffdai renders one side of the intransitive, and ^x^iv the special force of the Greek perfect. But, in the first place, as
way. On the contrary, he does not distinguish the parts of speech on any such method as 2 ToTRENDELENBUEG(in his that which Trendelenburg's dissertation Be Arist. Categoriis theory of the categories would [Berl. 18.'i8] and the Elementa presuppose, for he nowhere exLogioes Arutotelicce, p. 54) be- pressly distinguishes the adverbe, longs the credit of having first he treats the adjective (as priiia) endeavoured to find one. But along with the verb, and in fact even his repeated explanation in the only parts of speech which Hist. Beitr. i. 23 sqq., 194 sq. has he names (apart from the article not persuaded us that he has and conjunction) are the ovona really succeeded in doing so. It and the ^^/io. It is therefore seems rather that the objections not probable that grammatical which RiTTER, iii. 80, and still forms to which, as 'parts of more exhaustively^ Bonitz, loc. speech' he paid no attention, cit. 35 sqq., have brought against should nevertheless have guided his opinion, are well justified. him in distinguishing the classes Trendelenburg (and after him of concepts. And, again, the BlESE, Phil. d. Arist. i. 54 sq.) two series do not in fact correbelieves that in setting out these spond to any such extent as we ten genera Aristotle was proxi- should have expected if Trendemately influenced by gramma- lenburg's supposition were tical distinctions. He suggests correct. For 'quantity' and that oifo-ia corresponds to the quality may just as well be exsubstantive, voahv and voihp to pressed by substantives (e.g. \evthe adjective with irpos corKSrrjs, eep/iorrjs, &c., Categ. c. 8, respond such forms of expres- 9, a, 29) or verbs (AcAeuKwrot,
:
occurred; otherwise the early commentators would have appealed to it. Whereas, on the contrary, Simpl. SchM. in Ar. 79, a, 44, says '6\us ovSaiaov irepl
Tttftcos
such have
demonstration
seems
to
Bonitz, p. 41 sqq., fully proves, Aristotle himself nowhere gives any indication of his having arrived at his categories in this
rrjs
tcov
'^^vSsv
oiiBefiiau
'
'
'
'
METAPHYSICS
by putting together the main points
true that a certain logical
^81
to
be found
We
the
action &c.) as by adjectives and passion as well by substantives (irpa|js, v6lQo^, Sec.) as by time not only by adverbs verbs but also by adjectives (x^iChs,
;
'
'
'
very many subSVTpa7os, &c.) stantives designate no substance {Categ. c. 5, 4, a, 14, 21); and a corresponding for relation
; '
there are two facts first, that Aristotle in speaking of the categories, never indicates such a deduction, and next, that none can be found into which they naturally fit. Even in Brentano's ingenious scheme, this is not the case. If the ten categories had come about in the way he suggests, they would have been enumerated by Aristotle in a corresponding order. Instead of that, the irpos ti, which, according to Brentano, should come last, stands in the middle in every enumeration (see p.274, n. 1 and p. 282, n. 3), andits regular place (the only exception
:
being Phys. v. 1) is immediately after the inherences' After it, again, the affections do not follow (as they should according to Brentano's order), but the
'
TToahv, and formal = ttoiSv) (2) ajfections (iroteTi/ and irdo-xttJ', to which, at one time, Aristotle added
;
(3) external circumstances and irore, and, for a time, K7(r0ai). The question is not, however, whether it is possible to bring the ten categories into some logical scheme (for that
X^"')
;
(iroO
could be done with any series, unless it were merely put together at haphazard), but whether Aristotle aiTived at them by means of a logical deduction. And against any such supposition
categories ex post facto is concerned, Zeller gives on p. 288 infra, that which he prefers, although he does not believe that Aristotle arrived at his list of categories by any method in which he had in his mind beforehand either that or any other logical scheme into which they were to fit.
282
ties:
first
ARISTOTLE
(in the
qualities
which belong to a thing in itself, and then (in the irpos Ti), those which belong to a thing in its relation to
other things.
conditions
of
From
list
sensible
existence
Space
and
Time.
This
And
he ends the
for that,
In
fact,
categories
is
is
not
always
ar-
the same. 2
somewhat
number.
Aristotle himself so
he passes
in
over
the categories
of Possession
and
Situation,
enumeration .3
Vide supra, pp. 246 and 272. Examples will be found in what follows, and also at p. 279, n. 1. The most striking thing
*
'^
^ iroahv ^ Trp6s ^ Trotiraaxov ^ irov ^ ttotc, Htup tv kuO^ cvhs Kar-nyoprjOf}. Ibid, b, 15 ray4vr] rSiv KaT-qyopiwv ir^wepavTai' ^
'6ti
iroibv
ovv
t)
that in Cat. c. 7, contrary to the otherwise constant rule, and even to the order given in c. 4, irp6s precedes iroi6v. No satisfactory reason can be found for this, but it would be rash to conclude anything from it against the genuineness of the work, since a later writer would probably be less
is
^ yap
fcoibv
^ troahv ^
fj
ttoiovu ^ ttoo-xoj'
ova-ia to
ttov
which the
et
r^
koI
irork koI
t^ Trp6s
^
t^
iroieTv
irdarxeiv,
avdyKi)
rpcTs eJvai
Kiv-fjffeis (of.
p. 279, n. 1
to
Aristotle
'
himself,
i.
for
whom
it
MetajjJi. v. 8, 1017, a, 24: Jin.). rwv Karriyopovfievwv to. ficv ri ia-ri crrnxaivei, rh 5e iroihp, tA Se iroahv, to Se iTp6s n, rd Se nov rd Se Trore.
*
22, 83, a, 21
d.
Gr.
pt. 1,
S>(TTf
ri i(TTiv [^KarrjyopelraQ
325.
METAPHYSICS
for a
283
them by the seem to Aristotle natural that he should find a round number of cateBut we cannot well suppose any further congories. nection between his doctrine and the Pythagorean ^
decirnal
Platonists,^
which made
at first
nor
is
the conjecture^
much more
probable, that he
borrowed his categories from the school of Plato.'* It is true that almost all of them appear in Plato's writings ;
^
used as occasion
at a full
enumeration of
Among
*
much
the most
;
p. 12.
3
sqq.
place, there is of the ten categories among the Platonists and it is not likely that information about so notable a point would neither have been transmitted through their writings nor
*
no trace whatever
certainly not Platonic in fact it one chief point of dispute between Aristotle and his master that the latter conceded to ideas of quality the position of substances and made the iroihv an might rather suppose ohaia. (as Ueberweg does in his Logik, 47, at p. 100) that Aristotle was led to his theory of Categories in his recoil against the theory of Ideas, and, in particular, by the reflection that the Ideas only
is
We
the
again, the theory of the categories is so closely connected with the other opinions of Aristotle that it is not likely to have
things under the form of substantiality, whereas things in the actual world exhibit many different forms of existence. But as this explanation
represented
sprung up on other ground. Take, for example, merely the fundamental statements as to the ova' a and its relation to prowhich the whole perties, on in division of the categories These are Aristotle is basec^.
presupposes the distinction of substance from properties, &c., too much importance must not be attached to the theory. 5 See Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 205 sqq.; BONITZ, vt supra, p. 56. Prantl, Oesch. d. Log. i. 78 sqq., and Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 589,
itself
S84
ARISTOTLE
is
important
may
here be
fitly
individual Substance.
is
set out in
parts
a Quantum.^
is
the
Quantum
;
a constant Quantum,
(Oeo-is),
if
is
the quantity
(rd^Ls)
if
without position,
then
is
non-extensive.^
The undivided,
is
or the unity by
is
distinguished,
tinguishing
mark
"*
of quantity, that
measurable and
to a divisible
has a measure.
As Quantitas belongs
:
wv cKarepov f) fKaffrov eV ri Kai r6S ri ir4(pvKv clvai. The eVuirdpxovra, however, are, the constituent parts as distinguished from the logical elements of the concept. Thus, e.ff., in 3fetaj)7i. iii. 1, 995, b, 27, c, 3 init. he inquires whether the yevrj or the iwirdpXovra are the highest principles ;
ibid.
is
viii. 17 Jin. the (ttoix^Iov defined as that ds 6 ^laipelrai [sc. rX] ivvirdpxov [Acc] ws fj\7)v. Similarly in viii. 2, 1043, a, 19, cf. Gen. An. i.21,729,b. 3 wsivirndpXov KoX ixSpiov hv evdvs tov yivofievov (Ttafxaros fiiyvvfifvov rrj vXr}. Ibid. c. 18, 724, a, 24 Ua s 4^ vA-qs
: :
ber and time are also iroah, we must not suppose that these parts are merely material ones and in Metaph. v. 13, the roSe t* must be understood not of individual substance, but in a wider
'
'
sense,
2
as
signifying
anything
numerically distinct
TToahv Ka9' avrh
(apiO/j.^ /).
and Kara
(rv/jL^efij]-
Cat. 6 init.
ibid.
Trendelenburg,
treats
p.
82,
further of discrete and continuous quantities, with special reference to Cat. 6, Phys. v. 3, 227, a, 10 sqq. and Metaph.
loc. cit.
*
Cat.
sqq.
ylyveffdai
rivos
press
the
opposition
of
....
that
Cat. c. 2, 1, a, 24, c, 5, 3, a, 32, &c. (Ind. Arist. 257, a, 39 sqq.) The iroahv is consequently that which is m^de up of parts, like a body, and not of logical elements, like a concept. But since num-
which has and that which has not extension in any general form, but merely by means of examples
(of
the
;
former
line,
body
*
of the latter
X.
1,
time, num1052, b, 15
surface,
ber, word).
Metaph.
METAPHYSICS
285
and substantial whole, so Qaalitas expresses the differences whereby the conceptual whole is divided; for
under Qualitas, in the
stotle
Ari-
As
quality as
sqq.
fall
Cat. c. 6, 4, b, 32. This follows immediately from the above definition ot Troff6v: that which can be divided into parts can also be built up of parts and
;
rwv
Kivovfi^uuv y
Kivov/xeva
To
be measured by them.
Further
the first class belong, among other things, the qualitative distinctions of numbers to the
;
marks of
iroahv (Cat. c. 6, 5, b, 11 sqq.) are that nothing is opposed to it, and that it is what it is and neither more nor less, and that the concept of equality and inequality belongs peculiarly to
it.
'
second, aper^j and KUKia. With regard to the Sia<popd see supra, p. Therefore Quality ex215, n. 1. presses a determination of form, for that is true of the 8ia<t>oph Meta^yh. viii. 2, 1043, a, 19 %oiKe yap 6 fihv Sid rwv Sia<pop(ov \6yos Tov eWovs Kal ttjs ivepyelas elroi, 6
;
:
(devre-
5' /c
tcDj/
fuwapx^VTuv
ttjs
v\r}s
pai
are sometimes also called iroihp, or more correctly irot^ ovffla (Cat. c. 5, 3, b, 13 cf. Metaph. vii. 1, 1039, a, 1); and sometimes the <Tvfxfiefi7fK6Ta are
;
fiaWov.
3
TTotoTTjTos
In Cat. c. 8 the concept of irott^rrjs is not explained except by reference partly to forms of speech and partly to examples. In 3Ieta2)h. v. 14, 1020, b, 13, however, there is an enumeration
of its different meanings thus: (Tx^^^y 5r; KOT& 5vo TpSirovs \4yoir' &v rh iroihv, Koi tovtwv eva rhv
KvpitifTOTov
rj
irpctTT? fitv
yap
.
iroiSTris
.
T^s
ovcrlas
5ia<popd
to Se
10, a, 25, others might occur) are the following (1) 6|s and Bid6<ns, which are distinguished inasmuch as f^is expresses a lasting state, while Siddetris is used sometimes for every state whatsoever, and sometimes for a transitory one (cf. Metajjh. v. 19, 20; BONITZ and Schwegleb on this passage Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 95 sqq. Waitz, Arist. Org. i. 303 sqq.) Instances of e|t$ are eVia-T^/iot and dperai] of mere Siddea-ts^ health and sickness. (2) "Oc*
told,
286
ARISTOTLE
He
mark
unlike. 2
But
^
To the category
;
of Relativity
and in
is
expresses
(i.e.
aSwafilav fl Aeyerat (a class which, however, cannot be strictly distinguished from the e|ejs and Siadea-as see Trendelenburg, ibid. 98 sqq.
;
BURG
Svua/xis
later).
(3) The passive qualities, 7ra07jTt/cai also called irddos in irotdrrjTes, the meaning of iroidrtjs Kaff %v aWoiova-Oai eVSexerai (3fetaj)h. v.
21),
irde-q
Beitr. i. 101 sq.) equally apply to many other things which Aristotle includes under Quality whilst, on the other hand, the impossibility of a constant definition of the categories is seen from the fact that a generic
^irto-TTj/tr;) may (e.g. concept belong to the Trp6s n, when a corresponding specific concept (ypafXfiariK^) belongs to the iroihy
under the category of Trao-xei"), by their duration. Aristotle,ho wever, understands by them not only the qualities which are produced by a irddos (such as white and black colour) but also those which produce a irdeos or an aWoiwais on our senses cf. De An. ii. 5 init. (4) Figure
:
{Cat.
b, 18
c. 8, 11, a,
;
whereas in Metaph. v. 15, 1021, b, 3, larpiKYi is counted under irpds ri, that it may follow
generic concept, iirKTrrjixrj). * That the category of RelaCat. c. 7, precedes tivity, in that of Quality (vide supra) is contrary to the natural relation of both, as is clear, not only in all other enumerations and in the express explanation in Meta2)h. xiv. 1, 1088, a, 22, but indirectly also (in Cat. c. 7 itself) from the fact that the o/xoiov and laov and quantitative (qualitative equality) is in 6, b, 21 counted as irp6s Ti cf. Top. i. 17 Trenits
; ;
tial properties.'
2 Cat. c. 8, n, a, 15; on the other hand (ibid. 10, b, 12, 2G), the eVoj'TJOTTjs and the /xaWov kuI rjTTou ( = ditf erence of degree') do not belong to all quantities. The notion of Similarity, cf Tojj. i. 17
'
. ;
iVetajjh. v. 9, 1018, a,
15, x. 3, 1054, a, 3, and ijifra, p. 287, n. 2. ' For, on the one hand, the re-
delenburg,
5
ibid. p. 117.
c.
Thus
rh vpSs
Cat.
in Cat. c. 8, 10, a, 16, that the concepts of rarity and denseness, roughness and smoothness, designate no quality, but a sit^^-
mark
^(rrt
ri ols
7, 8, a, 31 rh elvai ravrdu
: :
iari
T^
where
METAPHYSICS
the least
reality.'
,2
^
287
of Relativity
this,
In
however, he
others.^
a, 26, c. 8, 146, b, 3.
'
Metaph.
ut
supra
rb Se
dently from the fact that it is measured or thought, and only becomes a relative in so far as that which measures and thinks enters
into relation with it). The like also in Metaph. x. 6, 1056, b, 34, 1057, a, 7. * Another division is found in Top. vi. 4, 125, a, 33 sqq. * The various peculiarities of the Relative which are mentioned in Cat. c. 7 are all found, as is there remarked, only in a part of that class e.g. the ivapndTrjs (6, b, 15, cf. Metaph. x. 6, 1056, b, 35, c. 7, 1057, a, 37, and also
:
Trpos Tt TTc^yTwr
[for
which Alex.
read iraawv] Hikioto. (pvais ris ^ Karriyopiwv iffri, Koi ovffia ruv
2
vcTTepa Tov irotoG Koi iroffov, &c. b, : rh 5e irp6s ri oijTC Svudfiei ovffla
;
oijT ivepydc^.
Mh.
iV.
i.
1096,
yap rovr' ^oikc Koi (TVfjL^efirjKSTi rod ovros. 2 Metaph. v. 15 the irpds ti appears in the following forms
a,
21
Ttapa<pv6j8i
(1) Ka6' apidfjihv Kal apidfiov irdOrj (and in other related forms) to this head belong the ^aov, 'dfioiov^ ravrhv in SO far as these are concerned with relations to a given
; : toutci ficv yap wv /xia t] ovffia, Hixoia 8' S>v rj TroicJrrjs fiia, iffa
Teendelenbukg,
unity
jxaKXov Kal ?ittov, the property of correlatives to be simultaneous ( Cat. 7, b, 15), which is not found in the relative of the second class (the iTria-TrjThu, &c., see note 3,
in Gen. et Corr.
ii.
6,
333, a, 29)
Kal
(2)
KOTtt
Svvafiiv
TTOtrjTi/cV
iradr}riKr]V,
like
the
dep/xavriKhv
supra). But it is a universal mark of every relative, to have a corresponding correlative (rh irphs
avTi(rrp4(povTa KeyeorOai, Cat. 6, b, 27 sqq.), which, in the main,
tallies
and the OepfiavrSv; (3) in the sense which comprises such expressions as fiCTprirhv,
Stoj/orjToV.
iiriffT'nThp,
The
first
two kinds
:
at first (c. 7
1, 200, b, 28. 3fefaph. ibid. 1021, a, 26 In the first two of the cases is called t<^ adduced the trpds oTrep eVrli' &Wov Acyeardai avrd h
with the statement made itiit.) and afterwards repeated (8, a, 33), that the irpos Tt is oaa avrd amp iarlv kr^puv
elyai
Aeyerot ^ oirwaovv
dWws
irphs
iarlv (double is
that
which
dfpfxavTiKdu).
warms
statement differing merely by being less exact. Individual substances {irpwrai oifffiai) cannot be relative but
erepov, the latter
;
Thus in
e'|iJ,
Cat. c. 7, 6, b, 2,
atadrjffiSy
iiri-
has
its
the
Siddeais,
288
ARISTOTLE
categories are dealt with so briefly in
The remaining
Aristotle mentions
the treatise on the Oa/e^ories and, indeed, wherever them ^that an extended account of
of
the cate-
us
how
to
distinguish the different meanings of concepts and the Thus, different corresponding relations of the actual.
in the first place, the original or substance of each thing
is derivative.^ is
that
Among
division is again
ties,
made between
Of the
qualities,
one class belong to things in themselves, and in this case they express sometimes a quantitative and sometimes
a
qualitative
determination
that
is
to
say,
they
^
;
form
Ti,
has gone before. Gen. et Corr. i. 7, treats Action and Passion more at length, but that passage deals with the physical meaning of these terms, and we shall have to mention it later on. "Elts is discussed etymologically in Metaph. v. 15, and in Cat. c. 15 (in the FostproBdicamenta). ^ cf. note 4 on next page.
' As Trendelenburg, p. 103, rightly remarks, the Quale is related to the Form, the Quantum to the Matter vide siq^ra, 284, n. 1 and 4, p. 285, n. 2, cf. p. 219, n. 2. Thus similarity also, which, according to Aristotle, consists in qualitative equahty (see p. 286, n. 3, 287, n. 2), is deanother place, as in fined, equality of Form (Metaph. x. 3, Bfxoia Se ihv /xi] ravt^ 1054, b, 3
;
:
16, 1020, b, 28, 1021, a, 21, are relative concepts; the parts of a whole (^irrtUXiov, K<pa\i}, &c.) are also said to be relative (Cat.
6, b, 36 sqq., cf., however, 24 sqq.). Also Matter (Phys. and if so, why not ii 2 194, b, 8) Form as well ? In the abrupt ending of the
7, 8, a,
; '
genuine Categories, c. 9 (as to which, see the latter part of n. 1 to p. 64, S2ipra) it is merely said of
the category of iroterj/ and Trelo-xetv, that it is susceptible of opposition
As to
METAPHYSICS
289
that
is
With regard
is
to activities, the
that of
silentio.
Finally, as
Where and
;
the
When.
however, both of these ought to have been ranged under the Category of Relation and perhaps it was this kinship which led Aristotle to place them as a
strictness,
In
airXws Svra .... Karh rb elSos ravTo. ^), in Metajjh. iv. 5, 1010, a, 23 sqq. iroa-hv and iroihv are
irapa
r^v
ovffiav
rrjs
viroKeifjLfvov
Xeyerai
elSos,
in MetajjJi. xi. G, 1063, a, 27, TToihv is taken as (pvais d}pi(Tix4uy], TToahv (like Matter, vide infra) as aSpiaros. * All concepts of relation refer to something which is con-
and
irpos
ception
^
this is not without exclear from p. 282, n. 3. * Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, b, 11 TTOfTO yap ravra [iroihu, &c.]
'
That
is
(but what is asserted wa^' viroKeilx4vov is a Gvp.^cfiy}Kbs in the further sense Anal. Post. i. 4, 73, b, 8 Metaph. v. 30 fin. &c) c. Ka\ yap Troffhv Kal 7, 190, a, 34 Koihv Ka\ irphs Tpou Kal Trore /cot wov yivTai vTroKei/jLeuov rivos hia rb ix6vr)v r}ju ovaiav fjLTjOevbs Kar' &\\ou \4yadai viroKei/xevov to 5' ^A.A.o TrdvTa Kara rrjs ovcrias iii. 4, 203, b, 32:' Metaph. vii. 1, 1028, a, 13, Ihid. 1. 32 irdvTMV rj ovffia irpooTOv
:
XP^^V
(cf.
c. 4,
1029, b,
:
Kara rcov ovcriup KaTvyopclrai (about avfi^e^riKhs in this meaning see p. 275 sqq.). Similarly 1. 19, iMd. a, 25, c, 4,
(rv/xfi4fir)Ke
Kol
23, c. 13, 1038, b, 27, ix. 1 i7iit. xi. 1, 1059, a., 29, xiv. 1, 1088, b, 4
vtmpov yap
[ttjs outrtos]
traaai at
73, b, 5.
Ph'i/s.
i.
1,
185, a, 31
aWwv xwp'O'Td^'
iart
Karrtyopiai. Gen. ef Corr. i. 3, 317, b, 8. Hence in all the enumerations ovcria goes first. Cf. also infra, ch. vii. init.
VOL.
I.
*U
290
ARISTOTLE
inquiry, therefore, into Substance, or
An
Being as such,
must
Actual.
2.
Tlie
Fird
As Science in general has for its task the investigation of the grounds of things,^ so the highest Science must be that which refers to the last and most universal
of the grounds of things.
For
most
being com-
It gives us the
knowledge which
universal
is
most
are
It
most
principles
the
furthest
removed from
sense experience.
since
it
principles.
because
it
points
is
instruction
It gives us that
knowledge which
it is
is
to itself, in that
of knowledge.
It gives us that
it
which dominates
establishes that
end to which
is
knowledge
'
serves.^
p.
to
Vide supra,
this
we
may
is
Metapli.
i,
2,
thus
summed up
iiriffrrj/jLTiv
airoLVT^v olv
twv dprm^vwv
TrlirTsi
t)]v
avrrjv
rh (y]Tov-
shown
(981, b, 30)
diroiavovv
jx^vov uvofxa\jTo(pia\-
deTyapravT'nv
/xTripos tojv
twv
sqq.
dewprjTiK'fjv.
Mh.
a,
elvai.
TV. vi. 7.
Metapli.
vi. 1,
X^ipoTex^ov
Oeccp-qTiKoi
1026,
yivos
rSiv
21
t'^v
Ti^fjirdrTiv
[eirio-TT^urj?/]
Set irepl
rh rifxidoTarov
Hence
riva'i
(TT'fip.T],
'6ti
nZv
t)
cro(pla -rrepi
iiri-
aiT'.as
Koi
apxds eariv
Srj\ov.
avTT] 5e
METAPHYSICS
set forth
291
include
actuality, for these ultimate grounds are simply those which explain Being as suchj Other sciences, such as Physics and Mathematics, may limit
themselves to
conception of
which they take no further. The science of the ultimate grounds of things must go through the whole world of things, and must take them back, not to finite principles,
but to their etern^L^auses, and, in the
that which
is
last resort,
to
proceeds
world. 2
'
all
unmoved and incorporeal, from which movement and formation in tho corporeal
is
This science
iv.
1
:
Metaph.
Tiy
^f;
(ttiv
4iri-
t^ yivei
.
irepl o elaiv
?)
(TTXfir]
TOVT(j}
aTToSetKuvovcriu
^ ayayKaidrepov
.
fia\aKu>Tepoy.
el i(TTiu
d^ioius
5e oil'
irpayfiaTevovTai ovSev
kxBoKov irepl tov outos /jup.is avrov ti airorefiotoutou fieyai d(t.'podm rd iirel Se tus apxas (Tvfji^e^riKOi Kal TCLs aKpordras otVias ^7]rov/j.V, SrjXov CDS (pvcredos rivos avTas avajKalov elvai Kad' avT^v. 5ti Kai 7)ijuv TOV ovTos f] hv ras irpdoras uiTias \rjTrTeov. Cf note 2 and
iiricTKotrei
i]
jXT)
i<TTi
Th yevos
ou,
akKa
Trepl
passim. See the previous note, and see also Metaph. vi. i at apxal Kal TO a^TlO ^'TJTCtTOt Ta>V OVTWU,
:
So with Physics and Mathematics, ihe former being concerned with that which is moved and in which the Form is not separated from the Matter, the latter being at the best concerned with that which is abstracted from Matter and Movement, but which does not exist of itself as immaterial and unmoved (cf. p.
it
is
SrjAou 5e
on
f)
oi/ra.
Every science
183, n, 3) el 5e tI ecniv a'ihiov Kal aKLvrjTov Kal x^'P'O't^j/, (pavephv oti decoprjTiKrjs Th yvcovai. ov [xevTOi
:
(pvcnK?is
ye
ovde ixaOrjixaTiKTjs,
aXKa
irpoTepas
a/j.(po7v.
Ti Kal
The object
x'^'Pi'^rh koI
of this science
is
the
aKivTjTa avdyKT} Se irlvTa fxev to. aXTia a'iSia elvai, fiaK'ffTa Se tovto
iroi-i](ra(Tai
\afiovffai
TouTO yap aXTia to7s (pavepols tw Qeiujv. In them, if anywhere, to delov must be sought with them stands or falls the possibility of
;
ARISTOTLE
names Theology/ and its task is to invesand the ultimate grounds thereof, as being ultimate, are necessarily also the most which, universal, and concern, not any part of the actual, but
the whole.
It is true that the possibility of
such a science
is
open to much question. How can one and the same science treat of causes which are of different kinds, and
And, on the
each r/enus
we were
to a special science,
how
is
since in this
it
up among the
its
special
sciences
Again,
is
is
to
draw
into
scope the
principles
at
of scientific
all
procedure,
definite
or
to
any
science,
it
inasmuch
relate.^
as all sciences
make
is
to be a single science, or
all classes
more
of the actual ?
are
more than one, the next question is, all of the same kind or no, and which
If there be only one,
all
them
it
is
then
if there is a First Philosophy nothing else besides natural substances, Physics is the first science ; tl 8' l(ni ris ovala aK'vrjTos,
vid.
c.
mpra.
-
Metaph.
Ibid.
;
iii.
1,
995, b, 4,
init.
^
oTi irpujT-n
'bv
'
fccu
e^rj
ravrrjs
ii,v
b,
26
ct.
METAPHYSICS
objects of knowledge,
293
ot
we may
is
The
first
alternative
to say
it would be then impossible what kind of science had to do with the qualities of Being. The latter seems untenable, because sub-
stances
cannot be
known by
the
same method
of
demonstration as qualities.^
Aristotle
remarking
that not only that which falls under the same conception,
This, he says,
is itself
is
the case
as regards Being. or
is
Substance,
somehow
named Being.
All
in question denote
either that
ties
all
which
is
lead
and circumstances of Substance, and in the end they up to certain elementary pairs of opposites, and
fall
opposites
science."*
For these
diflSculty
all
2,
ov '^ap fi6vov
aWh
-I
25.
Among
the
a-vfifiefirjKOTa ra'is
in 995, 1003, b, 34 sqq. 1004, a, 1(5 sqq. The furtl er Apories of the third book, which are concerned not only with the concept of the First Philosophy but also with its contents, will be mentioned later on.
b,
ivavTiov, Sec.
enumerated
JMd. 1. 19, 1004, a, 24, cf. note and as to the difference between Kad' v and nphs ev, see lUetaph.
%ii. 4,
^
20;
cf. iv. 2,
On
p.
221,
supra,.
* Mttapli. iv. 2 rb Se ov Keyerai fih iroXKaxus. a\ha irpls (v Koi /n av riva (ftvaiv (for which
later
apxhy) kaI
294
ARISTOTLE
must needs resume in itself the content is removed in Aristotle's mind by
in
other sciences,
Being.
As Philosophy
general
has to do
with
many
from
sections of
^
As
in
Being determinate
general, so
science
is
is
distinguished
Being
universal
It
distinguished
sciences.
from
others, in order to
which
appertains to
itself
all Being.^ The objection that Substance must needs be treated in other ways than that
ovx
d/jLwvviuLccs
o-j(rlo.i
25, b, 27 sqq.
oti irddr)
Metaj)h. iv.
2,
1004,
a,
a,
2,
ovaias,
(pOopal
ra
t)
8'
on
oShs
(Is
ovaiau,
7)
-7)
&c.
-
(TTepriaeis ^ TrotOTTjres ^ yevur]TiKa ovaias, r) rSsv irphs T^v ovffiav heyojj.4vuy, ^ tovtuiv Tivhs aiTO(\>a(r(is ovaias Sih Kal to fxT] hv ehai fir] ov (pafj.4v. The consideration of One also belong-s to this science, for the ev and the ov are (ilnd. 1003, b, 22) TavThu Ka\
iroi7]TiKa
ir)
Mctaph.
iv. 2,
1004,
9 sqq.
Since the concepts of the One and the Many, of Identity and
Distinction, &c., relate to one and the same object, therefore one and the same science must deal with them; 1004, b, 5:
eirel
fl
fj
jx'a
(pvais
Tw
aiTiov,
aKO\ov6e7u,
wairep
^'''
apxh
X'jyq}
Kal
aAA' ovx ^^
.
dr}Xovfxva
TO,
8f/Aoi/
ovu
TavTa Kad^ avTd iaTi irddri, aAA' ovx o.pi6inol ^ ypajxfial ^ irvp. drjAou us (Keivris ttjs i'in(TTi,fi'qs Kal
ov
TL eo-Tt yj'Mpiaai Kal to, av/j.fiefi'qKdT
OTI
Kal
ovTO.
jULias
dewprjaai
ovTa.
trpdjTOv
iravTaxov
T]
Se
iTnaTTifiT]
St'
aWa
h,v
^prrjTot Kal
7]
avTo7s. As the mathematical and physical properties of things form a special province, ovrw koI
ovTi p hv ecTTt Tivh "(Sia, Kal toGt' eVrt nepl wv tov (piKoaoipov iTriaKf^aadai Ta\r}dis. Ibid. 1005, a, 8. This is further illustrated in xi. 3, 1061, a, 28 sqq.
ToJ
ovaia,
twv
.
oixriwy
Tos apxo.s Kal tols otV/as 5ih Kal tov exejc Thp (piX6ao(poj/. ouTOS 'Sea ttSr) Oewprjaai fxias iffTiv cVto-Tirj/Arjs Tq5 y4vei to. re e^Sij tuv eldccv. Further, 1004, a, 9 sqq.
.
METAPHYSICS
which proceeds by deducing its
essential attributes
296
would
not trouble Aristotle,^ since the same thing would be true of the fundamental coaceptions of any science whatever.
To
would
much
In
Being in
Methodology
p.
251.
By
Aristotle,
sophy.^
3.
The Fundamental Questions of Metaphysics and their Treatment 'by earlier Philosophers.
Aristotle had left
The forerunners of
problems in the
him a
series of
way
he found
it
necessary to obtain a
new
solution.
The
most important of these, to the answering of which the fundamental ideas of his system are immediately
directed,
1..
First of
how
Is there
beside
'
and above
It is
MetapJt.
1.
vol..
* u 4
296
ARISTOTLE
?
Are the
from matter as a
is
What
is
that
Is
it
which
is
and
there
The first ? was the common view which hnd latel}^ come out, bluntly enough, in the Nominalism of Antisthenes the second was the theory of Plato the third that of Parmenides
;
and of Eucleides
3.
after him^'V^
two
how can we hold these Can the One be at the same time a manifold, including in itself a number of parts Can the Many come together in an and qualities ?
are both given in experience,
tosfether in thougrht ?
actual
unity
answered.
two
ideas
be a delusion,
knowledge.^
The Physicists of the Atomic and Empedoclean schools lijjftited the relation between the Many and the One to that of an external and mechanical The Pythagoreans found in juxtaposition of parts..
number, and Plato, with keener philosophic insight, in his Ideas, a means of combining a multitude of different
'
d.
Gr. pt.
1,
METAPHYSICS
corresponding
itself,
297
in sensible
things
explained
4.
that
How
is,
as to the theory
come
or change ?
Such were the questions that Parmenides and Zeno had asked in doubt, and the Megarians and the Sophists had repeated their questionings. The like
drove Empedocles and Anaxagoras, Leucthings by the combinations and
Plato himself so
difficulties
all
that
was truly
actual.
questions
clearly in view.
^
To the
first
of the diroplai,
Are
there
is
besides
is it
Is the
'
other
'
of one kind, or
of Plato ?
is
The limitation of Being to sensible things contradicted by the series of arguments on which Plato
:
such
iii.
as,
that the
34 sqq. 1060, b,
just mentioned,
Metaph.
1,
2, 997, a,
c. 2,
(xi.
1059, a, 38,
2.
23),
iii. 6, viii,
298
particular things
ABISrOTLE
of sense, passing
and
^
indistinct as
and that
all
the world of sense, as passing, presupposes an eternal as formed, presupas moved, presupposes an unmoved These Platonic assumptions, poses a forming cause.-
however, as
of
^
we
all
manner
difficulties.
question
to be
sought
parts
the
latter
material
be adduced.
For either view plausible arguments may On the one hand there is the analogy of
we name when
we have
to
explain their
character.
On
the other
hand there are the conditions of knowledge, which we attain to by a process of determination through concepts
And as in the assignment of genera and species. between these again there arises immediately the question, whether the highest genera or the lowest species
ought to be treated as the true
'principia.
The former
would be
all
individual existence as
The
latter
iv. 5,
vii. 15, 1039, b, 27; 1009, a, 36, 1010, a, 3, cf. i. G, 987, a, 84; xiii. 9, 1086, a, 37,
Metaph.
v.
Metaph.
iii.
998, b, 14 sqq.
b, 8.
2
^
Ibid.
4,
T^
apx^s
uTroAa^u-
Among the (xi. 1, 1059, b, 34). varied and often intricate forms of Aristotle's dialectic, it is only possible to state here the leading line of reasoning.
METAPHYSICS
On
tlie
299
the
unlimited no knowledge
is
possible,
and since
all
of universals.
lie
The
or
latter is
universal
existing independently,
the Ideal
Theory of Plato.^
particular
An
case
is
contained in the
further inquiry,
of
a
at
different
all
(e.g.
nature.
Those who
as in
accept
universals
stantial,
Number)
the
first
must
affirm
is
proposition
but the
opposite opinion
Metaph.
18
10(50,
iii.
4 init.
c.
6 fn.
init.,
first
llie
Mctaph.
ovv fXT\94v ovOev au
oiffQ-nra,
iii.
4,
999, b, 1
et jxkv
(cf. vii.
sq.), xiii. 6,
xL 2
ian
etr]
irapa
ra KaO^
e/cacrro,
ibid.
TToo-oii'
b,
19.
In the
is
vorjThv
aWa
iravra
called
xo^^TcoTaTr? Kal oj/ayKatoTaTrj similarly in xiii. 10, 1086, a, 10; and we shall find later on, that its importance and difficulty vest not merely on the opposition of Aristotle to Plato, but also on the intrinsic contradiction involved in the foundations of his own system. 2 That this Apory coincides with that adduced on p. 298, in Aristotle himself asserts
Metaph.
iii.
4, c.
6,
1008,
a,
question
,p'n.),
/
'^
(iii.
4,
or rh
yap
apid/j-ff
eu
KaO^KaiTTov K^y^iv
c. 6,
5ia<ppei
1002, b,
300
ARISTOTLE
To the same head belongs the Numbers and Figures are Substances
question whether
bodii3s
themselves as their
and as these bodies presuppose, as their elements, the surface, the line, the point, and unity, it would seem that surface and unity must be as subwhile on the other hand these have stantial as body is
;
to be
and cease
to be, as
is this.
The
jirincipia
as
it
seems, be of
:
accidental.^
:
Individual things,
except in so far as
it
^individual
if
entities, exists
And
finally,
must
be whether both
not.
ot these
it
If
we say Yes,
difference
*
between them.
iii.
Metaph.
1,
4,
1001, a,
c.
xi
2
1059, b, 27,
iii.
2,
1060,
a, 36.
of the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines, ' Ihid. iii. 6, 1002, b, 32 cf. BONITZ and Schwegler on this
5 (cf. xi. 2, 1060, p. 1002, b, 32 viii. 5 \n\t. c. 3, 1043, b, 15). shall meet with further objections to this view in the criticism
Metapli.
passage.
*
b, 12 sqq.,
and on
As Plato supposed, in
full
We
accordance with Aristotle's view, Cf Zeller, P/i. <?. (rr. pt. i. p. 628 sq. 805 sq.
.
METAPHYSICS
301
decide whether the principia of the changeable are themselves changeable or unchangeable. If they be changing, then we must go back to deeper principia,
If they be
it
we have
to explain
how
The
can be
unchangeable,
arises.^
like dif-
Being.
How,
fall
for
example,
is
under wholly different categories, such as those of Substance and Relation, can lead back to principles that are one and the same ? ^
which
stated above
those relating to
the unity of the manifold, and the possibility of change were clearly present to Aristotle's mind, and he sought
in the first principles of his Metaphysics to find a solu-
The combination of the manifold into him chiefly as leading up to the inquiry
differentia can be one in conthough he recognises that the same question may be raised in all cases where things of a different
3
Metaph.
Ibid.
iii.
4,
1000,
answers
{ibid.
bers (^Metaph.
c.
3,
1044,
a,
2,
^11 This question also occurs in Anal. Pod. ii. 6, 1)2, a, 29. In Beliyterpr. c. 5, 17, a, 13, it is
and to the relation between soul and body (c. G, 1045, b, 11 De An. ii. 1, 412, b,
6
init.'),
;
6 sqq.)
but also in
many
cases:
b,
cf.
Mvtaph.
b
viii.
propped, discussed more fully in Metaph. vii. 12, again touched upon in viii. 3, 1043, b, 4 sqq..
12:
KofiToi
avrhs
itdvTu>v,
&c.
302
cases
ARISTOTLE
as will be seen, is in its essence
It is based upon the relation of the possible and the actual of Matter and Form.* The problems of Becoming and Change are of still greater importance If a thing comes to be, for the Aristotelian system.
same.
does
it
arise out of
If a
become something, or nothing ? thino- ceases to be, does Does change mean the becoming of opposite out of The one opposite, or of the same out of the same ? seems to be impossible because nothing can come out
of nothing, nor can anything return to nothing, nor take on it the qualities of its opposite {e.g. warmth the
qualities
of cold).
The other
it is
alternative
is
equally
impossible, because
a definite time
^;imilar case
is
come
the
to be that
which
it
already
is.^
In
all
principles of philosophy.
,
where Cf. Phys. i. 2 Jin Lycophron and others "are blamed for running into difficulties by the inference that one must at the same time be many: lixrirep
re Kal ovK iuSex^fi^vov ravrhv TToAAa eivai, /utj ravTiKeiiieva 5e ev Koi 5vvdfii Koi lo-Ti yap rh
cj/TeAeYeia.
Cf. Phys. i. 6, 189, a, 22, c. 190, b, 30, c. 8 init. iUd. 191, h 10 sqq., Gen. et Corr. \. 3 init. ibid. 317, b, 20 sqq. Metajjh. xii.
Y
'
^^
6,
i.
c.
See Gen et Corr. i. 7; Phys. 189, a, 22, c. 7, 190, b, 29, To Aristotle 8 191, a, 34.
3
but on the other hand. 28) neither can absolute opposites v-jt' a\Ki]\ov yap irda-x^tu ravavria h.UvaTov (Phys. i. 7, 190, b, 33).
;
METAPHYSICS
The contributions which
stotle.^
303
his forerunners
had made
He
philosophies
primarily
it
which made
first
and he further
and
final causes.^
The
by him because
of the difficulties which beset every one of their presuppositions,'' because of their
moving
and because of the superficial way in which they erected an arbitrarily chosen element into
cause,^
the universal
qualities
basis of things, whereas the sensible and changes of bodies are conditioned by the
The same
he agrees with the Ionic school in assigning a material element as the basis.''' To his peculiar doctrine as to
the flux of
all
He
thinks
that
the
is
overlooks the
iii. 5,
See
De
Caelo,
Metaph.
;
of earlier philosophers is here dealt wii h only in so far as it concerns their fundamental doctrines. MetaiJh. i. 8 init. cf. iv. 5, 1009, a, 36, 1010, a, 1. ^ Metaph. i. 7, 988, a, 34 sqq. b, 28, Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 32 sqq., Gen. An. v. 1, 778, b, 7.
'*
988, b, 29 sqq. l/^to^7i. i. 8, 988, b, 26 6^ew. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 24 * Gen. et Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, De Coelo, iii. 5, 304, b, 11, cf. 8
i.
8,
ibid.
i. 3,270, a, 14; Phys. 1.7, 190, a, 13 sqq. iii. 5, 205, a, 4. ' Aristotle, indeed, generally
puts
him along with Thales, Anaximenes, &c. see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 585, 1.
;
304
fact that every
ARISTOTLE
change presupposes a substratum
;
that
under alterations of matter, the form maintains itself that it is not all kinds of change which could go on and that from the changeableness of ad infi,nitvjm
;
earthly things
to the universe as a
of
draw any conclusion as The theory of the unity opposites he dismisses by the argument that Herato
we ought not
whole J
clitus is in conflict
with the
Law
of Contradiction/'^
The
His assumptions as
to
the
by EmpeSphere.'
^
elements
in
'
the
ments
is
which are
remarks
matter
known
to us as
fire,
water,
&c.'^
is
He
not explained
Metaph.
iv.
5,
1010,
d.
a,
15
i.
See Zellee,
sq.,
Pit.
Gr.
600
^
and
483,
i.
1.
989, a, 22-SO; 329, b, 1, c. 7, 334, a, 18, 26, c. 6 init. ihld. i. 1, 3 4, b, 10, 3 5, a, 3, c. 8, 325, b, 16. In De Cwlo, iii. 7 init he
H,
Metaph.
et
Gen.
Corr.
ii.
1,
gives a detailed refutation of the atomistic reduction (by Empedocles) of aWoiooais to eKKpiaris. * The opposites 'warm and cold,' &c., on which Aristotle bases his own theory of the ele-
ments. ^ Gen.
ii.
3,
i.
8,
325, b, 19,
METAPHYSICS
305
at all,' and that in the theory of the pores and effluxes an explanation of the mutual influence of bodies is put forward which would logically lead to absolute
Atomism.^
from
since
first
of motion
'
in the
Empe-
scope
is left,
He
world to be arbitrary and untenable,'^ and the theory of the composition of the soul out of the elements to be beset
with
difficulties of all kinds.^
The
kind.
criticisms on the
Aristotle
plausible basis.
positions,
Atomic theory are of a similar admits that the theory has a very If we start from the Eleatic presupdesire nevertheless to save the ideas
and
if
we
and of movement, then an Atomic theory is the most convenient way of escape. So if we think it an impossibility to suppose bodies to be actually
of the manifold
divisible
cicl
Dc
Part. An.
cf.
viii. 1,
*
1,
640, a, 19
Phys.
Gen.
et
Corr.
d.
i.
8;
i.
252, a,
4.
Zellek, Ph.
3.
3
Gr. part
d.
iii.
6J5,
De
Gr. pt.
8,
i.
iii.
986,
b,
De An.
;
i.
5,
409, b, 23-410,
27
'
Gen.
et
Corr.
ii.
6,
333, b, 2
1)
;
sqq. (cf.
cf.
Metaph. iii. 4, 1000, b, 3. Metaph. iv. 5. 1009, b, 12; Zeller, ihid. 727, 1.
VOL.
306
constituents.^
ARISTOTLE
Aristotle, however, neither admits these
coming of
as a combination of
Rather does he
which
again must be
divisible.^
He
and the interaction of bodies or the passage of the elements into one another or the processes of becoming
and
The theory that the atoms are infinite in change.-^ number and kind is also rejected, because the phenomena can be explained without this hypothesis, since all
differences of quality or of form are reducible to cer-
movement of the elements in nature are also limited by number; and it is Aristotle's view that a limited number of original entities is always to be preferred to
an infinity of them, because the limited is better than the limitless.*'' The assumption of empty space, so far
i. 8, 324, b, 85 316, a, 13 sqq.; cf. Zellbr, Hid. 764 sqq. 2 Gen. et Corr. i. 2, 317, a, 1 But Aristotle expresses sqq. himself more exactly on this point, though without explicit reference to the Atomic theory,
>
Gen. et Corr.
2,
Phijs. vi. 1
De
Ccelo,
iii.
4,
sqq.
c.
303, a, 20.
*
Gen.
c. 9,
sqq.
4,
et Corr. i. 327, a, 14
;
8,
325, b, 34
Coelo,
iii.
De
in Phys.
3
iii.
6 sq.
Gen.
et
Corr.
i.
2,
317, a,
iUd. c. 7, e. 8, 306, 303, a, 24 shall have more a, 22 sqq. to say on this subject later, " Be C(eIo,m. 4, 303, a, 17 sqq. 29 sqq. b, 4 cf. Phi/s. i. 4 Jitt. viii. 6, 259, a, 8.
;
We
;
17 sqq.
METAPHYSICS
from being necessary
the characteristic
^
307
as
to explain
phenomena such
any particular place towards which it would tend, and everything would necessarily move with equal quickness.2 He finds that movement and its different kinds are, in the Atomic Philosophy, simply presupposed, and not deduced from first principles.^ He objects that the
school completely overlooks the
teleology of nature,
and that instead of giving us any principles on which phenomena rest, it refers us to an unsolved necessity,
or to the assertion that in fact things have always been
as they
are.''
which can only here be mentioned in passing against the theory of an infinite number of co-existent worlds ^
;
^
;
doctrine
concerning
the
soul,^
and
his
is
so closely
Empe-
'
iv.
7-9,
cf. c. G.
More
i.
on this
-
later.
^ See Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. 788 sqq., and Gen. An. v. 8 vers.
Be
300,
33 sqq.
b,
ii.
8.
28 sqq. 275, b, 29, 277, a, 13, 294, b. 30, iii. 2, With regard to the
7,
fin.,
where
Aristotle's criticism of
of
Demo-
nature by Democritus,
as to the
I)e Catlo,
i.
see
Zeller,
ibid. 797, 2.
**
c,
Gr. pt.
^
iii.
a, 378.
xii. 6,
2,
Mefaph.
1071, b, 31.
Zeller, ii2U
822.
X 2
308
docles that
objections.
it
ARISTOTLE
is
open
infinite
for the
The
number
also
make all knowledge of things impossible. Again, since the primary differences of kinds of matter are limited in
number,
so
also.
Since
all
bodies have a
magnitude,
their
constituent
and since
all
in each thing, as
Anaxagoras was
kinds of matter.^ Further, if primary matter is to be looked for in the simplest bodies, few of the o^ioiojxepi] could be considered as primary matter. ^ Anaxagoras
recognises the existence of change in things, but the doctrine of the unchangeability of their constituent parts
is
The continuity of bodies is negated by the infinite number of their constituents,"^ in spite of Anaxagoras's weak attack upon the
theory of em.pty
is
space.''
Anaxagoras
was
^
;
Empedocles.'"^
The
original
mingling of
it,
all
kinds of
would be unthinkable
viii.
'
i.
4,
187, b,
Calo^ iii. 4. For a furtlier remark as to tlie infinite in space, see Plujs. iii. 5, 205, b, 1.
I)e
''
infra.
a, 22.
De
De
Ccelo,
iii.
4, 302, b, 14.
;
Gen. et Corr. i. 1 Pkys. 20o, a, 19. Further objections of a similar kind, but not especially directed against Anaxagoras, will be dealt with in
^
Besides the physical objections which are raised against it in Metapk. i. 8, Gen. et Cori\ i.
10,
iii. 4,
327, b,
both of this statement and of the corresponding one (that, at all times, everything is in evey-
META PHYSICS
but
if it
COO
it
would lead
to the
substitution of
matter
'
him and
which Anaxagoras assumed.^ The theory, common to others, of a beginning of movement among
Aristotle freely
to
be
it
still
unsatisfactory,
on the one
mis-
hand,
With regard
little
first
to the Eleatics
they talk
'
different
meanings of unity
limit in
attribute to
unconditional
Melissus).
and predicate, of
185, a,
10,
i.
that it destroys the principle of contradiction. See Zeller, Ph. d. Or. pt. i. 911. Metapli. i. 8, 930, a, 30. 2 Phys. viii. 1, 252, a, 10 sqq. See Zeller, iUd. 887, 4, 893, 2; Be All. i. 2, 404, b, J, 405, a, 13. * Metaph. \. 5, 986, b, 26
'
=*
P/n/ft. i.
2,
3 init.,
;
8,
46.
310
ARISTOTLE
that thing and quality, so that we cannot even Fay between Being as Being is without distinguishing
'
'
we
attribute to
it
as
quality
which
^
latter,
if
there
necessarily be something other than Being, i.e. notThe Eleatics assert the unity of Being and being.
fact
'
'
Being
'
is
only a com'
mon predicate of all things, and Not-being is perfectly thinkable as the negation of some definite kind of being
(e.g.
divisibility of
it
as extended
Becoming,' and therefore in space.^ of things, on the ground that every the multiplicity or process of becoming must start either from Behig
They deny
from Not-being, and both hypotheses are untenable. They overlook a third possibility, which not only
makes Becoming conceivable, but is the sole expresthat sion of any actual process of becoming namely, becomes what it is, nob out of absolute Notanything being, but out of that which is relatively not-being.'' Aristotle holds that Zeno's polemic against move-
ment
as
rests
upon
similar
misconceptions,
inasmuch
he treated space and time not as fixed but as discrete quantities, and argued on the assumption
This is the essential point of the complicated dialectical discussion in Phys. i. 2, 105, a, On the second 20-c. 3 vers. Jin. half of these discussions (c. 3), Plato, Parm. 142, b sq., cf. B sqq.; and see 244, JSt)/jh.
'
Metaj)h.
ift^rf.
i.
iii.
4,
1001, b, 7; cf.
Zeller,
541.
8, cf.
Phys.
Metaph. xiv
Zbller,
''
ibid. p.
i.
562
sq.
sq.
a,
Phys.
3,
187,
3;
cf.
1009, a, 26 sqq. (The point will ch. be treated more in detail On the other hand, viii. infra.) the Eleatic hypothesis is ansvvered in Ge7i. et Corr. i. 8, 325, a, 13 merelj^ by a reference to the opposed facts of experience.
2,
METAPHYSICS
of an infinite
311
number of
actual
subdivisions, whereas in fact they merely include potenStill tially in themselves all possible subdivisions.^ less importance does he attach to the arguments used
is
limitless
and motionis
How
we
can
it
One,'
unless
things,
and to represent even contradictory opposites Here also Aristotle finds as one and the same ? ^ unproved assumptions as to the principles of things, and
an absolute
philosophy.
failure to solve the weightiest questions of
among the Pythawho attempted a philosophy of nature, although goreans, their principles made movement and change, which are They the basis of all natural processes, inconceivable.'*
Neither does he find a sohition
it
to
Yet how can that which is extended in space be derivable from numbers, or how can weight arise out How, in of that which is neither light nor heavy ? ^
number.
fine,
all ?
What
was
'
the centre
^
'
itself
cf.
Zeller,
'^
Phys. i.S
Phys.
i.
init.',
cf.
Zeller,
ihid. 554, 3.
19 sqq. 989, b, 29 sqq. 5 MetajjJi. i. 8, 990, a, 1 2 sqq. iii. 4, 1001, b, 17, xiii. 8, 1083, b, 8 sqq. xiv. 3, 1090, a, 30; De
^
2, 185, b,
i.
Metajjh.
8,
3Ietaph. xiv. 5, 1092, b, 15. Ti e passage refers to Platonics and Pythagoreans together. Other remarks, which refer immediately to Plato and his school, but also apply to the Pythagoreans, need
Metaph.
xiii. 6,
1080. b, IG,
Cailo,
iii. 1
Jin.
Zelleb,
312
ARISTOTLE
Again, where things different in character are explained by one and the same number, are we to distinguish
we
to
deny
we come upon singular The theory of number itself very incompletely worked out,"* and there are numerand
caj)rice.^
marks with
censure.''
earlier schools of
damental reconsideration.
nection there
later schools
no account
they taught was to Aristotle's mind only a mock wisdom, which dealt in the contingent, the unessential,
What
and the
unreal.^
Metajjh.
i.
5,
986, a, 6, 987,
11.
a, 19.
cf. xiv. 6,
1093,
a, 1, 10.
the One, this view is explained (against Plato and the Pythagoreans) in Metaph. iii. 4, 1001, a, 9, 27 cf. X. 2; and it is there especially remarked that the assertion of the substantiality of the One would destroy the plurality of things. As to the &ireipov of. Phys. iii. 5, and also
c. 4,
See Zeller, ihid. 367, 2. 8uch as the Antichthon (Zeller, ihid. 383, 4 \ the harmony of the spheres {De Cwlo, ii. 9), a theory about time {Pliyg.
*
'
'
218, a, 33, cf. Zelle, 406, 3 sq.), and certain views as to the soul (^De An. i. 2, iOi, a, 16, c. 'H Jin. cf. Afial. Post.
iv.
10,
ihid.
ii.
203, a,
1.
METAPHYSICS
to
establish
813
any metaphysical propositions, but to combat the scepticism which brought all manner of truth into question, and to prove the untenable nature of their sophisms.^ The services rendered by Socrates to philosophy are by no means minimised by Aristotle, although at the same time he emphasises the limitation
of Socrates' achievement to the sphere of ethics,
and
any metaphysical
basis.^
Of the
lesser Socratic
and the and the Cynics, in regard to their theory of knowledge and ethics.''
actual,^
The attention which Aristotle pays, however, Plato and the Platonic school is as thoroughgoing
his treatment of the other Socratics is slight.
to
as
His own
He was com-
him
to
Thus
it is
The former in
proving that
destroj^ all
it
5, cf. c. 4, 1007, b, 20, x. 1, 105:^, a, 35, xi. 6 init. ; the latter in the
but also
:
all
treatise
^
on the
fallacies.
Cf.
Zeller,
power one who does not now hear would be deaf one who is not actually building would be
no architect. The former are spoken of in Metaph, v. 29, 1024, b, 32, viii. 3, 1043, b, 23 (cf. Zeller, Hid. 252 sq.), and in Eth. Nic. x. I,
*
1143 Ihat even the Ethics of Socrates are one-sided, is shown by Aristotle in Eth. Nic. iii. 7,
1113, b, 14 sq. sqq. 1117, a, 9, 17 sqq.
=
c.
11, 1116, b, 3
vi.
13,
1114, b,
3 (cf. Zeller, ihid. 220, 1). Aristotle here confutes the Megarian principle, that the merely possible is actual, by
ix.
Metaph.
1 172, a, 27 sqq. Aristotle attacks the exaggerations of the moral doctrine of the Cynics,
Supra, pp.
14,
56
sq.,
162,
&c.
314
in
ARISTOTLE
no
spirit
of jealousy or detraction
that
Aristotle
comes back again and again to discuss the Platonic doctrines, and to set out their defects from all points of
view with untiring patience for such a criticism of his master was unavoidable if he was to defend his own philosophic individuality, and his right to found a new
;
fame of his predecessor and the His main criprestige of the flourishing Academy.
school, against the ticism, leaving out of account incidental objections, is
first,
against the
later
Ideal
'
Theory,
as
such;
secondly,
against the
; '
and, thirdly, Pythagorising statement of the Theory concerning the ultiagainst the principles laid down
mate basis of things. Matter and the One.^ The Ideal Theory of Plato rested upon
tion that
it is
his convic-
without criticism Plato's doctrine as to the mutability of all sensible things (which for Plato was the second
buttress of the
Ideal
must exist for itself as something substantial (beyond phenomena, Aristotle parts company with him. This, therefore, is the central point about which revolves
that
the whole Aristotelian attack on Plato's Metaphysics. For Aristotle holds as to this assumption that it is
'
p.
197 sqq.
Vide supra, pp. 163, 300, &c. Vide supra, p. 300 sqq.
METAPHYSICS
devoid of
all scientific
315
it
leads in its
results to difficulties
soluble,
phenomena,
He
not
is
established
it,
there
be attainable otherwise.
Ideas
is,
thing of which
said to be
the Idea
;
'
for in the
man
same marks are included as in the conception of man in the ordinary sense, there being no difference between the two beyond the addition of the word ideal (to
'
'
avTo).'^
is
man who
But
sqq.
Metapli. i. 9, 990, b, 8 1079, a, 3fefaj)h. iii. 2, 997, b, 5 TToWaxfi S' ext^J'TOjy SuaKoXiav, ovOevhs 7)TT0;/ 6.TOirov rh (pdvai fiku flval Tivas ^vcreis irapa ras eV ry ovpavw, ravTas Se ras avTas (pdyai Tois aladriTols it\t]v Uti to /x^v diSta rd Se (pQaprd ' avrh yap dv*
xiii. 4,
aA\' f] alad-nra ai'Sm. Similarly Metapli. vii. 16, 1040, b, 32: itoiovffiv odu [ras i^eas] ras avrhs toj eJ'Set to7s (pQaproti, aWodi'Qpunrov
Kal
avTo'imrov,
irpoffTiQ^vTts
rots
al<Td-r]Tois
t5 p7j/.ia rh ahrh. Ibid. xiii. 9, 1086, b, 10 cf, Eth. N. 1. 4, 1096, a, 34, Eud. 1. 8, 1218, a,
10.
^
&\Ao
S'
obSev, TrapaTrXi^aiov
TTOLovvrcs
(pdaKoua-iu
TOis
deovs
yuei/
dvai
Metaph.
i.
9 init.
xiii.
4,
dp0pJi}Troeide7s
Se
ovre
1078, b, 32,
316
ARISTOTLE
it is
to
which
(as
belongs.^
This proposition, in
sum-
were waived, the Platonist would only pass out of one difficulty into another. It would appear, for
even
if this
Yet
is
when once
divided
it is
among
must
all
follow that
products of
kinds
;^
and
to
in the
would be true of
them that
it
Thus
inasmuch as
make up
must
under a
and subordinate
a conit
in form
there
must be
many
Substances, and
many
;
real Substances,
Z6^mv Uu
oiiffiav
24, 85, b, 18
cf.
2.
i.
Zeller, Ph.
d.
^^' P^'
^
i-
^^7,
Metaph.
1039, b, 15.
2
Metaph.
i,
9,
1084, a, 27
In the first of these passages we should read oTov rd y^vos, us ylvos, (.i^uv (sc.
5,
1079, b, 34.
irapiUiyixa ^CTai).
*
Metai)h.
i.
9,
991, a, 26.
METAPHYSICS
and these sometimes of opposite kinds.
the Idea
is
^
317
Or
again,
if
to be Substance,
;
it
be a general concept
for it is
many
it
is
Of Ideas of
it
is
of other
like
the
individual,
numerically one,
we subit,
in
which case
it
clearlv cannot
Aristotle considers the assertion that the Ideas contain the essence of things to be inconsistent with the
view that they are at the same time incorporeal. He represents Plato as speaking sometimes of a matteir of
'
the Ideas
'
all
and concep-
cannot exist by
itself separately.^
'
JSIetapli. vii.
c.
13.
1031), a, 3,
b,
from
vii.
Cate(j. c. 2.
c.
14; cf.
'=
8,
1033,
19,
a, 23.
i.
9,
Mctaph.
15, 1040, a,
8-
1085
27.
Top. vi. 6, 143, b, 23. Length in itself must be eithe]* hnXarls or irXdros cxoi/, and then the genus must be at once a species also.
''
Metaph.
vii. 16,
a, 32,
iii. (?,
i.
9,
992, b,
9, xiii.
P^fPlujs.
iv.
1,
209, b, 33
cf
Metaph.
vii. 6,
103!,b, 15
cf.
sq.,
628
sq.
.sqq.
passpge,
ii.
2,
193 b, 35
318
their objects.
ARISTOTLE
There can be no 'Idea of the Good' standing by itself, for the conception of the Good appears under all possible categories, and determines itself differently according to the different circumstances
;
aad as
there are different sciences that deal with the Good, so there are different kinds of good,
in fact, an ascending scale
among which
there
is,
further objection
is
an
Idea is always to be posited in every case where more things than one meet in a common definition, the common essence of the Idea and its phenomenon must
them. 2
Even
'
if
that what
is irporepov
and var^pov
no
common
generic concept,
and therefore
in no idea, but (109G, b, 25 sqq.) only in a rela(Vide supra, p. tion of analogy. 276 sqq.) Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 2, vii. 13, 1039, a, cf. vii. 6, 2, 1031, b, 28. Aristotle expresses this objection here by saying that the doctrine of
'-'
Ideas leads to the rpiros &vdpwTros. Cf. Zell., Plat. Stud. p. 257, and Ph. d. Or. pt. i. p. 623, 5. He finds the parallel of the rp'.ros (which, however, is &i/dpunro5 equally true of the ideas themselves, cf. Sojjh. El,
c.
22, 178, b,
same name.
METAPHYSICS
less
319
still
say that
it
could
byis
no means
appearances.
As
Even the
some kind of copying and The principle of motive power, without which no process of becoming and no explanation of nature is conceivable, is wholly wanting.^ So also is the principle of final Even in regard to the theory of Knowledge, cause.'* the Ideas cannot render us that service which Plato
references to
own
if
then they are not truly the essence of things, and therefore the
to
no sure con-
And
hand, could
we
All
any know-
assumed
creased
? ^
these difficulties
will
if
we
i.
9,
991, a, 12 (xiii.
cf.
Etli.
End,
i.
8,
5,
9, 99 i, a, 20, 992, 1079, b. 24), i. 6, 987, b, 13, viii. 6, 1045, b. 7, xii. 10, 1075, b, 34. 3 Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 8. 19 sqq. b, 3 sqq. (xiii. 5) 992, a, 24 sqq. b, 7, c. 7, 988, b, 3, vii. 8, 1033, b, 26, xii. (], 1071, b, 14, c. 10, 1075, b, 16, 27 Gen. et Corr. ii. 9,
i.
mit.\ 2 Metaph.
28
a,
(xiii. 5,
* Metaph. i. 7, 988, b, 6, c. 9, 992, a, 29 (where, instead of lib, li o should be read). " Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 12 (xiii. 5, 10 r9, b, 15), vii. 6, 1031, a, 30 sqq. cf. Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, a,
32:
ret
'yap
et57?
x'PfTw
r^p^ri-
fffiaTO.
320
ARISTOTLE
between the Ideas and the things of sense the whole The difficulties which would science of Mathematics.
thus arise were set out by Aristotle with a painstaking
may
all
ways of escape
Pythagorising
He
of of
how we are to think to ourselves the causality numbers,' or how they can contribute to the existence He shows how capricious and contrathings.^
asks
is
dictory
objects.^
He
in
character
are
quali-
and numerical determinations, which are quantiremarking that two numbers make up one number, but two Ideas do not make one Idea, and that
among
make up numbers no
quali-
be units qualitatively different if there were Ideal With minute and careful thoroughness,^ Numbers.''
he controverts the various suggestions as to the relations of mathematics to the Ideal Numbers which were
thrown out by Plato and his school and the devices they
resorted, to in order to maintain a conceivable difference
Metapli.
,
i.
9, *.>91,
b, 9,
with
the answer:
if
Cf.
568
^
sq. 854,
pt.
i.
Loc.
2.
9,
991, b, 21 sqq.
992, a,
METAPHYSICS
321
them.^
between the Numbers and the units which compose But in this, as in other branches of the argument, his main point is always that there is a fundamental contradiction between the notion of a unit of
fact of differences of kind.
It is not,
objections to Ideal
also to the
But it is to be noticed that, in Aristotle's view, if once w^e assumed tbe existence of Ideas and Ideal Numbers, the ordinary mathematical numbers would lose their status, for they could only have the same component parts and therefore the same
nature as the Ideal
of
Numbers
be
themselves.^
The
position
ideal they
for qua must go by ideal numbers, and qua mathematical they must go by mathematical number ^ and from the way in which the theory of magnitudes is
;
magnitudes would
equally dubious;
must be
and a
without
line,
solid
all
find
Numbers
and
it
is
impossible to
know
'
the
constituent parts of
all
23,
Mttaph. xiii. 6-8. As in Metaph. xiii. 9, 1085, a, and in xiv. 2, 1090, a, 7 sqq.
3,
1090, a, 25-b, 5, they are used against Speusippns. * Mt'taph. i. 9, 991, b, 27 xiv, 3, 1090, b, 32 sqq.
c. 3,
;
* Mitaph. i. 9, 992, b, 13 xiv. 109O, b, 20. Ihid. i, 9, 992, a, 10 xiii. 9 1085, a, 7, 81.
Gr
pt
VOL.
1.
322
ARISTOTLE
knowledge cannot be derived from any prior knowledge.^ He doubts whether all being can have the same constituent parts,2 or whether out of the combination of the same elements, at one time a number and at another
He remarks that such time a magnitude could arise/^ ascribed to substances, and constituent parts can only be only to those substances which have some admixture of
materiality.''
nor as universal
not as individual, because they would be cognisable and could not be the connot then not as stituents of more things or Ideas than one they would not be of the universal, because in that case
:
nature of
substance.''^
exception to the variance of the Platonic suggestions as to the 'material element,'^ and rejects altogether the
the two
'
and
He
asks
how
the
One can
is
itself,
when no
universal
The notion
;
of unity
^
expresses
xiii. 10,
only a
Mttaph. i. 9, 992, b, 24 against which, indeed, his own distinction of demonstrative and inductive knowledge might be used. 2 This is suggested, without
Metaj)U.
a. 4.
1086, b, 19,
1087,
MetapU. xiv.
1089, b,
1,
1 1
;
1087, b,
cf.
4,
12,
2(>, c. 2,
Zeller,
mention of Plato, in Metaph. xii. 4, 1070, a, 33 sqq. cf. what was adduce'd on pp. 300-301, supra.
;
Gr. pt. i. p. 628, 3. it the remark in Meta/pli. xiv. 3, 1090, b, 13 sqq. is true, that Nature is not lviaoli^lt]s ^airy
T'h. d.
'
Of
3
*
10/w.
ther
cf.
Zeller,
ibid.
p.
Fur851 sq.
'inn.
METAPHYSICS
323
quality or, more exactly, a determination of measure. This, however, presupposes something measured,., and even that is not necessarily anything substantial, but
may
ing as it is one or the other of these, the One will be variously determined, as predicated of one or other of the similar kinds of subjects.^ Whoever seeks to deny this
the One as the only SubEleatics a position which, apart from other objections, would make Number itself impossible.2 Again, if with Plato we are to say that the
'
'
will
be driven to explain
One
is
intolerable difficulties,^ not worse, however, than those which would be raised if, with Speusippus, we attempt to
distinguish the
a special principle
the Great and Little,' this conception indicates nothing but bare qualities, or rather, bare relations and these, indeed, of such a kind as
itself.4
by
As
could least of
all be taken for anything in the nature of substance, since they manifestly require a substratum.
How
can substances, he asks again, consist of that is not substantial, and how can constituent parts be at the same time predicates ? ^ Or if we are to take
which
thisfirst,
second principle to be more closely related to the as not-being is to being, such a theory would be
Plato believed that he could only
of Parmenides by assuming a prin1087, b.
altogether perverse.
escape the
'
monism
X. 2
;
Metaph.
xiv.
1,
36
33,
'
and
sqq., b, 13,
*
xi. 2,
1060, a,
36;
cf.
.wy^?'^, p.
312, n.2,and p. 272,11.2. in. 4, 1001, a, 29. 3Ietaph. xiv. 4, 1091, a, 29,
16, 22
. ,
init.
Metaph.
1,
1
'
'
xiv
Y2
324
ciple of not-being.
ARISTOTLE
This assumption
is
not necessary
Being
itself is
only
^
;
and
it
would
According
Being and
'
'
the manifold
from
of substance only,
^c.,'"^
and not
or of
movement
must the Ideas whose matter it is be likewise moved.'* The main defect of the Platonic view lies in the position that opposition as such
ciple of all things.
still it is
is
the
first
If
all
Ever)' thing
which
it
comes
to
be,
which
?'x
which
this
it
is'
(thont to
hecome.
The nature
of matter in
He had
as the
in
Bad
side of the
question namely, that it is the positive substratum of By this all formative action and of all becoming.-^
MctapJi. xiv. 2, 1088, b, 35 sqq. cf. p. 223, supra. Ihid. 1089, a, 12. ' Ihld. 1. 15, 31 sqq.
1
^
Metaph.
;
xiv.
;
init.
c.
4,
a,
1075,
Zeller,
Ph.
d.
Gr. pt.
i.
p. Gl-1.
'
Ibid.
i.
9,
992, b.
7.
Ml^TAPllYSlCS
.325
matter tends to
its
own
annihilation,
into
Further contradictions arise in the considerations that the Great and Little (as was above remarked
of the
'
existing for
a substance
cannot possibly be
so,
which
is
finally,
we
way
deduced from their ultimate principles, distinct statements are entirely wanting. We ask if they arise by a
mixture, or by a composition, or by a generation, and
is no answer.^ We are nob told how out of the One and the Many could be produced those units of which numbers are composed,'^ or whether number be
there
the
the
first
first ten.^
We
by
its
are not
which
is
duality which,
to
and we are not shown how the duality of the Great and Little can, with the aid of the One, bring forth any numbers which could
^
'
Phys.\.^,Vd2,?i,lQ.;Meta2)h.
P/ti/s. iii. 6,
xiv. 4, 1092, a, 1.
-
sqq.
c. 4,
^
203, a,
Metaph. xiv.
;
sqq.
xiii. 9,
directed against Speusippus. s jfji^ io85, b, 23, c. 8, 1083, b, 3(> sqq. xii. 8, 1073, a, 18. Zeller, ibid. p. 591, 3.
;
7, 1082, a, 20.
][Jetaj)h.
i.
9,
991, b, 31.
326
ARISTOTLE
tlie
not arise by
Tbere are a
sufficient.
These criticisms of the Platonic theory are not all of equal value. Not a few of them, at least in the form
in
upon a misunderstanding of
cannot
Ije
Nevertheless,
it
weak
Among
all
which he uses in
jirst^
that
universal concepts
all
the concepts
and at the most only the genera and species of things, and not the things themselves second^ that the Ideas are
;
phenomena, the coming to be and ceasing to be of things, change and movement, with all the natural
properties of things that rest thereon.^
'
In the direction
Metaph.
Cf.
xiv, 3, 1091, a, 9.
257 sqq.
^
on the importance which he himself attached to this objection cf., for example, Metaph. i. 9,
;
991,
a,
Trivrwv
5t
(xdMara
METAPHYSICS
of Aristotle's polemical energy to these points,
327
we may
recognise in
him the
spirit of the
Natural Philosopher
facts.
His powers
is
superior to
him
in dialectic
But he
is
determined
to give currency to
common
is
cause.
there
wedded
of Nature.
So
far the
time to
turn to his
own answers
&v
ris, ri
nore
(TvfxfidK-
ri
Aerot
rk
e^dr]
to7s
aiSiots
rwv
Kal
al(r9r]Ta>v
^
'
rots
yr/vofi^voLS
and
so ihid. 992,
(f)0ipoixvois
ovT
].
yap
:
KLvrt(Tws
24
oAws Sh
fxlv
avTols;
(pavepcov rd a'iriov
20
t^ 5e \4yeiv
/cat
rovro
Xiyojx^v
e^aKa/j.^v
TrapaSeiyiiiara
e'xetj/
avra
eluai
/iT-
r&Wa
KivoKoy^lv iari
rrjs /iera^oATjs),
kc.
328
ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER
Yir.
CONTINUATION.
Tiue
Tii:<:he
M dn
I/iqairi/
of Metapliysics.
are tlires
discussed.
main questions which now fall to be In so far as the First Philosophy has to do
it
follows
which
is
must precede
in a true
other investigations.
To
this question
is
common
Aristotle, as has
which are expressed by general conceptions. been seeii, was nob content with the
but for that very reason he attributed the more
It
answer
the universal.
was
felt
in the inaccurate
statement of
fundamental error of
Plato's view,
and he
that
it
ception of
the
same
relation
start. The first question for Philosophy, therefore, must be an inquiry into the conception of substance,' which is an inquiry into the relation of
'
Platonism must
the
individual
to
the
universal.
See
p.
METAVIIYSICS
essential actuality
329
individual,
it
to
the
side
of the
had
made
becomes detached
meaning.
which'
To him Form
is
developed into
is
full actuality:
undetermined
univ^ersality,
Matter in opposition
accord-
to
Form.
The
fine,
relation of
Matter to Form
Movement.
first
first
the
concerned.
will
the Ihiiversal.
the universal as
it
is
bination
of
Aristotle
Theory in
from
330
ARISTOTLE
itself.'
the thing
universal
is
many
common,^ or, more accurately, that which belongs to them by reason of their nature, and It follows that all therefore, necessarily and always.^
things
in
of things
subjects.
or,
and not
we
get
the
things
them
is
as
distinct.
For
%v nrapa
ra iroWa
If,
substituted Aristotle's
is
thino- subsistino'
is
Kara ttoWmp.^ bv
not anyIt
itself, it
cannot be Substance.
is
name
of Substance''
iravTaxov
used in various
(pa/ihv
elvai.
ret
Seep.31G,n.l,s?(/;;vi'.
5),
Metaph.
lOSG, b, 2: tovto S' [the iKivriae doctrine of Ideas] fxev 'S.'jOKpa.T'ris 5ia rovs bpicrfJLOvs, ov jxriv ix(*>pio-e ye roov Kad' fKacTTOv Kol TOVTO opdccs iv6i)(Tei> OV ^wp^a'as apev fi\v yap tov Ka96\ou ovk ea-Tiu iTn(TTT]ixt\v \a^e7v, rb Sc- x^P' i(^eiu oiTLO'y tcou crvfx^aivovTUV ^vaX^P^^ "ffJt Tas Ideas iaTiv Cf. c. 4, 1078, b, ao sq. Meta2>h. vii. 13, 1038, b, 11 TO 5e Ka96\ou Koivov tovto yap Aeyerai KaOoKov o TxKeioanv virapx^i-v
xiii.
. .
Ndaph.
V. 9,
KaOoAov 1017,
b,
35
Kampe,
160
'
sq.
Anal. Post. i. 11 init.: eUv oZv eluai /) eV rt irapa to, avdyKT}, u airddei^is TToAAa OVK fCTTar eivai jxivToi %v KaTO, TroXAciv
/jeu
De An.
iii,
-'
34 outco yap \iyo;j.ev to KadeKaaTov rb apidfjiCf} eu, KaOoKouSeTO eirlTovTwv. Be Interj)r. 7, 17, a, 39 Part.
iricpvKiv
;
iii.
4,
9i;9,
b,
644, a 27, and s?/^r. Anal. Post. \. 4, 73, b, 26 KadoAov 5e \4ya) t> kv KaTO. iravTds re vTrdpxv koI KaQ'' abrh Koi rj avTO.
An.
i.
4,
(pavephu
ixpa
oti
oaa Ka96\ov
ciel
e|
avdyKfiS
c.
imdpx^i87, b,
31,
32: rh yhp
and elsewhere translated substance.' It is strange to find this translation attacked (by Strumpell, Gescli.d.theor. cf. (Jr. 213 sq. Phil. h. d. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 555, ground that Aristotle 1) on the nowhere understands by oWio. the unknown, constant, and real substratum of variable attributes.' It cannot, however, be expected that we should cease to use for
here
by
'
'
METAPHYSICS
senses,^
831
but
it
thing
else,
derivative.2
nor can depend upon anything else as a In other words, Substance is that which is
Or
again. Substance
Being
which
These conditions Aristotle all other being is draw^n.'* The universal, as he finds fulfilled only in individuals. proved against Plato, does not subsist for itself. Every
universal, even the genus, has its existence only in the
individuals of which
it
is
predicated.
It
It is
always in
'this
something other
individual alone
than
itself.
denotes not
The
that which
which
is
not borne up by some other, which is what it by reason of itself, and not upon the basis of some
is
fidXiffra
an Aristotelian term the word which the custom of 1,500 years has consecrated to it, simply because Herbart connects the same word with another sense. On the different meanings
1
yap
So/cet
eJmi ohaia rh
.
vvu fxev ovy tvttcp e'lprjrai ri ttot iarlv rj ovala, otl to firj Kaff viroKeifitvov a\Aa Ka0' ov ra &\\a. Cf. Anal.
viroKe'/xeuou
irpxrov
PH.
*
i.
27, 43, a, 25
6.
Longit.
:
V. 3,
of
s^e p. 374 sc[.,ifi/ra. ovcria 84 imiv v Cat. c, 5 KuplooTaTOL T KOI TTpwTccs Koi fidAio'Ta
over' a,
:
465, b,
X^yojXivt],
Tivhs
tIs
viroKeifjLeuov
viroKeifxhcfi
f)
rU
avOpooiros
Cf. further
TreNDEL-
rb hv jVetaj)h. vii. 1 init. \4yTai TToAA-axiis [in the different (pauepov ori. rovrwv categories] irpwrov *ov rb t'l iffTiv, oirep (rr]fxa\vei ra S' &\Aa Aeyerat tt]v oixriav oura t(j5 toD ovtws uvtos ra fxiv
. .
.
.
Hist. Beitr. i. 53 sqq. Aristotle himself elsewhere MetapU.Y. 8, 1017, so defines it. airavra 5e TaOra xiy^Tai b, 13
^
:
ENBURG,
iroaoT-qras
Sec.
. . .
di/ai,
iixrre
ra Se
Tro'oTTjras,
to irpwTcas ov koI ov
t\ ov
itself
ovfflaoTiovKad'vTroKeifxivovA^yeTai,
aWa
ia-ri
1028, b,
cKeTz/o
to.
8'
&KXa
vii. 3,
nothing else than to nothing else; cf. Anal. Post. i. 4, and the remarks which follow] dA\'
[what
is
and applies
vTroK'ixiv6v
'hv
aXXa
Kfyerai,
h.v
eiTj
c.
7,
Se avrh
/UTjKreTt
ovffia
virdpx^i-
See further on
p. 289.
332
otlier
AmSTOTLl^
being.
^
in so far, that
is
to say,
they
set
forth the
;
common
^
essence
of a
certain
number
'
of substances
:
Kai
iii.
G,
eV vTroKnixiva's
foriy
fj.}}
ovaxv
ovy
rjSy
i.
Txy
?;},
tvojotccv
ov(TL-jiy
aSvywoy
calls
HaAcoj/ ri
^IvoLi.
Anal. Post.
4,
a,
Kl.G. 22, 178^ b, 37 (cf. ibid. 179, 8) TO yap dvOp'joiros Kal airav t6
:
b, 5,
where Aristotle
/ca9"
Koiyjy OV To'Se
T7
that o ^u.)/ /ca9' vnoKntxivoj KsyeraL aWov riyos, oToy rh ^a^i(oy erfpjy tl oy ^a^'^ov iau Kal kevKoy, S' ojcr'a, KM oaa ro'Se ri, ojx 7] krepoy ri uyra effrly birsp eVx-V Ta fjLey 5^ /j.^ Ka9^ viroKeia^yov
aWh
Trp6s Tl
77
TTws
(Tr}:j.alyi.
[sc. Aeyi/xej/a]
a9"
ana
Ae'yw,
ra
Ka9'
which supports
said
to be
.
t]
.
eicaoToy
rcoy
yh.p
aWvv
KaTriyopyjixiray o-ji)y X'-^P'-'^t^v, a"jrr] 5e fx6vr] c. 8, 102!), a, 27: TO xaipio-Toj/ Kal to rods ri vndpx^iv
;
5oKu
a,
] [)
fidKia-TaTrj o-jaia
:
c.
1,
lU/JO,
;
rb roSe ri c. 10, 10:')o, b, 28 KaldKov S' ojk ecrriy oiiaia c. 12, lOvJI, a, 27: r] oua'.a hy tl Kal roSe ri arj^uaiyei cos (/)a;.teV; c. 13, 1038, b, 10:
oxxriav kxl
: ;
such a substantial idea. (HektLING, Mat. und Form, 44, 1, has misunderstood this statement.) Cat. c. 5, 2, a, 15 SevTepaL
:
TvpwTT]
ovcria
'ihios
eKxaru)
Te
5);
??
oyx
Tavra re
yfi'T]
.
/cal
.
Ibid.
1.
JU
e/f
TO-'jTjiy
oTov
&y0p(O7ros Kal
6ioopoi'(ri,
(payepoy
on
o-j9fy
tcov
/cat
obQtv
(TrjiiayeL
rctr
KJiyrj
KaTrfyopovixeyaiy roSe ti, dAAa Toi6y5e c. 16, 1040, b, 23 Koiudy fxy}9ev ovar a obSeyl yap uirdpx^i V
; :
further on. Otherwise the expression SevTepa ovala does not occur in Aristotle. As, however, he elsewhere uses
((foy.
TO
And
so
O'jala
aW
irpMTTi ovtria for substance in the primary sense,' and rp'.Tr] ova-la
'
rj
avrfj re Kal
r^ exoyri
:
for
'third
class of substances,'
airrV oj iarly ova'a. Ibid. fin. T<2y KaOoAou Xeyo/JLivwv obdev oixria xii. 5 init. eVei 5' eVri ra t.uv x^'P'
:
i<rrh, TO, 5c
ov
;(OJ/3(rro, ovffiai
eKeTva.
MJETAPHYSICS
substantial character with the
333
substances, so
the
in a higher
applied to them
it is true of them, as of every universal, that they are not a This,' but a Such not substantive, but adjective and that they express,
'
'
The
The
so-called
secondary substance of
Cat. c. 5,2, b, 7sq. Aristotle, indeed, Stems to say the opposite in 3Ietaph Yiil 1, 1042, a, 13: en aWws [(ru^^o/j/et] rd y^uos
only of individual substance has been shown. A second (Cat 5 3,a, 6 sq.,and p. 381, n. 2\?/m)
is t^ fi^ eV J7roet^eVa; ^hai lUit this characteristic belongs also to the class, and not to it alone
fxaXXou Twv ei5<bu [oiaiay eiVat] Kal TO KaddXov t<2v KaBUatrra but
;
but likewise (Cat c 5 8 a 21 &c.) to the specific 'difference. since this is likewise
contained in the conception of the thing to which it applies; ^^i^e (according to Aristotle, *^'^-) only that is eV ^TTo^e.^.V.; which does not belong to the conception of that of which it is predicated, but which is a quality in a substance quite init e.a. in the sentence 'the body is white' KfvKov is eV viroKeifievcp on the other hand, in the sentence man is two-legged,' S.Vow is not 4v VTroKifi4v<f}. A further peculiarity of substance is (Cat c. 5, 3, b, 24) r6 f,r}dh avrals iuavr'ou ehai. And yet Aristotle himself remarks thkt the 'same
:
o/, ^ 'Cat.
c.
o,
2, a,
,
19
sq., b,
,.
^3^1
.
{),
u, D,
o^^f^''l''"t^'^P'l^t
Ti
this
5e
tifv
holds unconditionally:
iirl
SfuTf'pij/ ovaiup cpaiv^rai ojxoMs T(f> (Txif^ari t^s -n-pocTvyopias ToSe ri a-qfiah^iy ov
to;;/
.
.
dependent of
fi'iv
aKrjdfs ye,
o-ij^aij/er
Tt
ov
vTTOKii^Kvov
o5o-7rep
'
aAAa
kuto.
ttoWuu
avdpwTvos
A7eTa: Kal t6 (^ov. Ihe tirst characteristic of suDstance was rd ^^ Kad' v-noK^iti^vov Kiy^fxeai.
That
this
is
true
334
ARISTOTLE
stance.
It denotes
only.
For
it
is
perties of a definite
witli
it,
In contrast
it
is
the
individual
substances alone
which
original
name
is
not without
its difficulties.
it
knowledge
is
ultimate
If
knowledge
the
first
is
the
recognition of
must
relate, in
place,
If
individual substance,
ble.
follows that,
may be made
(^ihid.
1.
:}3)
is
it
sus-
ceptible of no diiference of degree, no greater or less. For while, perhaps, we might say that one is more or less of a man than another, yet we could in no sense say that he is more or less 'two-legged.' If,
'
finally {ihid.
4,
a,
10, b, 3, 17),
(rvfiaiuei.
Cf.
Simpl.
A'at.
2f>,
we
Bas.,
who
Ibid,
explains
iroid
ns
ovaria
by
ttoiJttjs ovcriwSris.
-
tv apid/uLif hv TcSu ivaviiwv ehai hcKTiKov, to Kara t^v eavTrjs ^erajSoAV 6e/CTi/cV rdSv ivavricau
Ka\
See p. 162.
^
*
and
p. 219, n. 1.
4,
MetajJll. vii.
1030, b, 4
holds only of individual substance, since to classes the conceptions of numerical unity and change are inapplica(Ivai,
this
iK^tvo Se (j>avep6u
a-n-Aws Sptar/xos koI
on
6 irpdyruis Ka\
ovcnuv ianv.
n. 1.
METAPHYSICS
in the last resort, all
335
of the individual,
knowledge
is
and that individual things furnish, not only the startingpoint, but the whole essential content and object of
knowledge.
This conclusion,
cisively rejects.
He
is
it
addresses
itself all
This contradicti(m
it
is first,
first-
distinction.
He
says, without
that knowledge
is
is
is
substantial
illustrates
Even
God
is
individual Substance.
The
fact that
:
Substance
and Form run together proves nothing for, as will be seen, there recurs in the working out of the conception of Form the same difficulty which now engages us
with regard to Substance.
Aristotle
himself
,"*
recognised the
full
weight of
the difficulty
'
Pp. 162 sqq., and 220 sqq. siqna. CiAn Anal. Post. \. 24, 85, ihe argument that the a, 20 sq general method proof is better than the particular; and ihid. rd Se ri iari rwy c. 14, 79, a, 28 Kae6\ov eo-TiV. BlE3^,Phil.d.Arist.i. 56 sq.
,
:
first,
'^
1086, b, 33 sq., Anal. Post. i. 31 1)81, a, 7 i. 1, in regard to the second, Cat. c. 5, Metapli. vii. ]0, 3, b, 14 sq. ; 1035, b, 27, c. 16, 1040, b, 21, xii. 5, 1071, a, 2. * Metajjh. in. icrn S' 4 Ifiit.
Metapli.
xiii. 10,
;
83G
ARISTOTLE
^
tliat
Knowledge, considered
is
is
indeterminate and
but that in actual practice, on the contrary, it is always directed to something determinate. This, howThe knowledge of the ever, does not take us very far.
versal,
The
certitude of that
their certitude.
Such knowledge,
known by
otlier
dual as such, but, on the contrary, the individual is On the it only in the form of universality.^
hand,
if
is
original
actuality, then
ought to be precisely,
(put individual,
tlie
knowledge of
the universal ought to depend upon In fact, it would be the individual certainty.
as Aristotle taught,^ the universal
its
and
better
known and
^
exofiep-n reTovTccpaiTop'a Koi TTaawu XaXe-rrcaTaTr] Kal ava'y KaLordrr} deooprjaai, irepl ris 6 Xoyos i(paTr]Ke
See especially
&c.,
svpra.
^ Tc^ huOoXov \6ya}, as Aristotle expresses it, Metapll. vii. 10 (see pp. 220 sqq., svpra). * See p. 205, n. 2, Siqyra. ^ Rassow'S solution (J.m^f)^. de Kotiords Definltione Boctrina, p. 57) is equally unsatisfactory. He appeals to Metapli. vii. 10, 1085, b, 28 (where, moreover, after the words us KadoXov, which stand in opposition to the following KaQ" e/cao-Tov, we have simply
vvv
Toov
i-KiaT-'riixriv
c.
.A';?.:
et
ix\v
ovv
KaOoAov
[viz. ovK
at apx^i,
ravra
(Tvjxfia'vei
ovOeu yap iaovTUL ovaiaL rctiv Koivwv ToSe ti (rrj/iaiVet, aXKa TotoVSe, h 8' ova'ia toI^ ti, as he says before,] et 5e ii)] KaOoAov, aAA.' US ra KaOeKaara, ovk tffovrai im(TTT]Tai
KaOoKov yap
at itn(Trr\yiai
iravruv. CI.
Metaph.
also
xiii.
^\. 2, \OQ>0,h,
vii.
18,
1039,
Metaph.
10
see p. 1G7,
an iliriiu) and c. 4, atd tries to solve the contradiction by remarking that in definition and in science generto supply 1029, b, 19,
ally the individual is regarded
n. 1 supra.
METAPHYSICS
If,
337
genus had than the species, but that, on the contrary, for us the species had more than the genus we should thereby place ourselves in opposition
in itself
conceding
this,
we were
more of the
essential
word,
US as such.
it
not that it appears to only one case which would make possible to escape the difficulty that is, if there were
is
individual Substance
There
is
a principle which, being individual, could be at the same time truly universal, for this could be at the same
time, as substantial, a basis of actuality, and, as uni-
Such a principle seems to be found in the keystone of Aristotle's entire system namely, in his theory of Pure Thought, or of God. To him the Divine, as thinking Essence, is Subject as the End, Mover and Form of the world, it is also a true
versal, a basis of truth.
;
The conception of it has existence in -one Essence, not merely contingently, ^ but by reason of its own nature whereas, in all finite things,
universal.
individual
itself,
number
of individuals.^
to seek
From
this stand-
point
it
would be possible
a solution of the
difficulties
not as individual, but from the universal side of its being. That
]ust the reason why it would require to be otherwise if the individual were the substantial.
IS
Metaph.
Ua
hpiOfK?
ttoAAcDj/,
oiou itvOpdirov,
together clear. As perhaps that of the sun or of the moon see p. 222, n. 2,
;
:ZccKpdT7,s
r-
VOL.
I^
338
ARISTOTLE
ultimate principle, absolute certitude for thought coincides with absolute actuality of being, but that, in all
That
this solution,
how-
would
is
misses
draw the
that
all
He
knowledge consists
of the
universal,
alone.
and that substantiality pertains to individuals h^ven if we were to limit the first of these
its
incompatibility
Aristotle's
view
not that
/'V3
knowledge
are
It
is
directed
to
the universal
because
incapable
is,
of perfectly
knowing the
iii
individual as such.
^pite
of the fact that the individual things of sense are better known to us, the universal must furnish the sole object
of
knowledge in the strict sense, because it is in itself more original and more cognisable because it alone
possesses that immutability which anything that
is
to
afford.^
The
further
degree
of actuality also.
And we
also
find^
AsG. V. HERTLiNGdoes,il[/.^.
h.
terial world.
H^e
it is
the only
Arist. 43, f., remarking- that the form of universality is not in all spheres the indispensable condition of knowledge,
u.
Form
resource
we have
but only where we are dealing with the knowledge of the ma-
METAPHYSICS
of
339
"reality
Matter. But one cannot understand how can belong in a higher degree and a more primary sense to that which is a combination of Form
Form with
to that
which
i.e,
pure Form as
it
is
is
known
in universal concepts,
to the Actual
Possibility.'
which
It
limited by no element of
mere
merely a lacuna*, but a deep contradiction in the philosophy of Aristotle.^ He has set aside the
Platonic attempt to hypostatise the universal concepts,
its
two main
pillars,
the assump-
namely/that
it is
know-
its
object.^
How
was
it
thought without involving contradictions ? We need not expect, threfore, to avoid contradictions in working out the further developments of his
theory,
by which Aristotle sought a solution of the Ideal theory and the doctrines connected therewith had left unanswered.
presents it pure, Since Kittee, iii. 130, called attention to this difficulty it has beeH further discussed by Hey'-^
* Even Heetling fails to make this intelligible, when he goes on to say in the passage just quoted
is
is
worth in things.
sphere of sense is never the whole thing, but is entangled with all that is accidental and that has its source in matter. He thus suggests the question how the thing in which the permanent worth is mixed with the accidental can be anything more substantial than the form which
cf Arist. und liecjel. Dial. 180, 183 sq., and Zeller's first edition, p. 405 sq., which was
;
.
dee
followed by Bonitz, Arist, Metaph. ii. 569. Schwegler' Arist. Metaph. iii. 133. Cf. also
Strumpell,
sq.
3
.
Cf Zeller, Ph.
sq.
Gr. pt.
541
"
^40
AUISTOTLE
Form and Matter:
the Actaal
{I)
and
the Tossihle.
lie
We
to Plato.
In the Ideas
had distinguished
from their sensible appearance. Aristotle refused to think of the former as a universal subsisting for itself Yet he does not wish to abandon outside of things.
the distinction, and the grounds on which he bases it are the same as those of Plato namely, that the nonsensible
object of knowledge,
and
that
it
alone
ances.
different
He
from knowledge,
object of
knowledge must be something other than All that is sensible is passing and sensible things. 'contingent which may be one way or cliangeful it is a may be another. What knowledge requires, on the
;
'
contrary,
itself,
an object as unchangeable and necessary as which can as little change into its opposite as
is
Of
sensible things
it is
a proof;
the
we Form
:
Form, indeed,
all
Becoming
from being something else. Becoming, then, consists in this, that some matter takes on a definite Form. This Form must therefore be posited before each case
1
Metaph.
y'n.
11,
^uev
15 (see p.
of.
il/id.
eVtg-TTj^uT?
ohdevos,
ei
fi-h
ris
chai
^ti
which
eTriffrvfivv-
iariTapara
et?j
ou5'
5,
iv.
ovdh
arravra. yiyvaaKO/xsv.
METAPHYSICS
of
341
Becoming
as tlie
case
such
supposition
it
could
not
be
carried
ad
infinitum^ for if
could,
be true
came to be there was a Form ^ which itself had not come to be. For the same reason there must also be Matter as the correlative of Form. The relation of these two
^
it,
merely as one
Ei5os,/lop</>^,
Ao7os(see
p. 211),
Mttapli. iii. 4, 990, b, 5 fxriv e/f 76 a'i^iov oitOfv lariv, ouSe yeveaif ehai hvvariv avdyKr] yap elvai ri rh yiyuo/nevov Kol c'l ou ylyvcrai Kal tOvtoov rh %cr-)(^arov ayivvriTov etir^p 'iararai re koX Ik
-'
aWa
'
rovTo iv 6.\\cf}. The form, again, could only come from another form, and so on ad inji/iitum, since all coming to be is the embodiment of form in matter. (paycphv &pa oti ovde rd elSos ov yiyvcrai oh^e r6 ri ^j/ Hvai oTi TO fxlu ws dSos ^ o'jffia Keyofievou oi) yiyucrai, rj he aivodos TavTT}V \eyo/j.4t/t] yiyperai, 7) Kara
.
.
fii]
ovros yevfcrdai adiivarov 5' e^Trep r/ v\r] iarl Sioi rh ay4vv7]TOs elvai, iroAu ert /nciWou
.
Kai
on
;
eV Travrl
t^
yevoix4vc()
vAtj
T(
^IKoyov
iKeiuT]
elvci
t^v
ohaiav
[o,7crta
ei
iroTe
yiyverai.
v\t]
as that
which
TOVTO
e<TTai
becomes]
iXT)TC
yap
54
/x-fje
rh jxlv ToSe rh Se ToJe c. 9, 1034, b, 7 oy fi6vov 54 TTcpl rris overtax 6 \6yos Sr]ko7 rh fi^ yiyv(r6ai rh elSos, a\\^ irepl Taurcou Sfio'cos riav irpccrav Kowhs 6
cpeari, Kal
:
ean
iffTai
iKeipT],
el
ovQkv
&c.
It is
rh Trapdirav,
tovto
aSuvaTOU, avayKf] ri ehai Trapi rh avvoXov t)iv jj.op^7]u Ka\ t6 eJdos vii. 8 init. eVei Se inr6 rivSs re yiyverai to yiyvo^ivov Kal e/c
;
not the ball, nor is it the brass, that comes to be, but the brass ball, not TTOihp but iroihp ^v\op
;
xii.
Tiuos
[e.f/.
out of brass]
.
koI h
Trap
wairep . le.r/. a ball] oj^eThviroKeififvov ^01(770^ x^^'^^^'j ojTU)s ovdh TijV acpalpav el fx^] Kara
yiyverai.
.
(ru/u.^e^r)Kcs
\4yco
S'
on
r6v
Xa^Kdv (TTpoyyvXov
t6
arpo-yyvKov v) Trou7v, oAA' eVepdj/
rroielv
icrrlv ov
(T(pa'tpav
imo TiPtjS rod irpcvrov KLvovpTOs h Se, 7] uAt/ els h 54, rh eibos. fis &TTeipop ovp elcTip, el /x^ ixopop xo^Khs yiyperai crrpoyyvKos, dAAa Kal rh crrpoyyvXop ^ 6 _j^aA/cJs
rl Kal
yap yuera^SaAAe:
ri.
vcp'
Kal
ei's
ov
fx\p,
tV
ti,
apdyKT] 54 arripai.
viii. 3,
I hid.
olou rd eidos
1043, b,
1(5, c. r.,
342
ARISTOTLE
all
would remain
Here again
Becoming.^
It
might seem that out of Being nothing it is already and out of Not:
Being nothing
finds
it
also,
for
ex nildln
niliil fit.
Aristotle
by
saj^ing
that
all
which comes
to be
starts
is
in
the process of
Becoming out
and
of that which
/'.s'
That from which anything comes to be cannot be absolutely Not-Being, but at the same time it cannot be that which it is only on its
in a relative sense
not.
way
to become.
that which
it
is
to be in
If, for
example,
but as
educa-
an uneducated
man becomes
In
fact, it is
is
the
that
is,
All Becoming
actuality.
is
a substratum
w^hicli
'
.
whose essence
it is
to be pure possibility,
All
Cf pp. 302, 309 sqq. This relation is tnily developed in P7/?/s.i, G-10, from which
2
the following are extracts c. 7 <pauu yap yipecrOai i^ &K\ov &\\o i^ eTi'pov eVepoj/ ^ ra airkci f^al
: :
the man becomes cul'the uncultured bethe latter, if I comes cultured say 'the ^ncultured man becomes a cultured man ']. toov Se yivofjiif I
'
tured,'
or
'
METAPHYSICS
becomes that whicli
it
343
its
comes to be out of
opposite-
What becomes warm must before have been cold. He who becomes a man of knowledge must before have been
without knowledge.^
Opposites as such, however, canVOV Kal T7JS
5v6, viz.
ivociv d)S
fiopcpTJs
CCTTt
Se Td Se
rh rh
fiev
S'
ej/,
e'lSei
ovx
fikv
yap
yivonevos &v6pQ)Tros ical etrri, rh Se /at? fiovanchv Kol Th d/movcrou ovre airXws
ovT (TvuTiOe/xcvov
fievMV 3e TOvTwv yiyvojxivcav tovto
Tis
Trifi\e\pp,
vTrofxevei.
dicapKT-
i^ airavTuv
rwv
viroK(:7(T6ai
el
Td yivSfxevov,
.
.
Koi
api9/j.y
aXK'
iivai.
ei'Set
ye ovx eV
avdpccircj}
raiirov rd
Koi
TO
/!/
virofjLeuei,
rb
5'
^'TOyUtVei Td fjLev fi^ dvTiKdfievov virofxevei (6 yap dvQpunros virolj.euei) Td fxovcriKdv Se /col t6 djxovaov
ovx
(1) matter as such and (2) the negation of form ((XTeprjffis) as property (<ru/x)8e)8TjK3s) of matter. It is just this distinction, c. 8 goes on, which solves the difficulty previous philosophers felt in dealing with the possibility of becoming which they ended by totally denying oijTe yap to ou y'uecrdai {elvai ')dp ^'Stj) e/c re fi^ tvTos ovheu &v yeveaOai rj/j.e7s Se Kal avToi t^aixfv yiyueaOai fxlv ovSkv cnrXus e'/c fx^ ovTos, '6fi(t3S ixivTOL yiyveaOtti Ik
.
fi^
/c
OUTOS,
olov
KaTCL
(TVlJLfie^V,K6s
'
yap
fx)]
TTjs
ovx vTrofievei. Ibid. 190, a, 81 in the case of all else that becomes the ov(ria is the substratum of the change oti Sh kuI ai ovalai Ka\ ocra aAAa airXws uuTa | vtro:
avTd
it is
thing becomes what not from its negative which in and for itself does not exist
Tai Ti [i.e. a
:
man,
for example,
.
yivoiT'
tiv
(pavepov.
This he goes on
he is uncultured]
ovTOs, &XXos
to prove by the examples of plants, animals, products of art and chemical changes(aAAo/a)0"e<s),and then proceeds &(tt SrjAou e/c twv
:
S'
Xdyeiv
b,
ivfpyeiav.
SvyajLuv et Corr.
Kal
i.
t^j'
15
Tpoirov jxfv
dei.
elp7)ix4vu}V,
OTi
Th
yiv6/j.(uou
dirav
dXXov
i^
Kal iffTl ix4v Ti yiv6[JLevov, eVxi 5e rt & tovto yivQTai, Kal novTO 5itt6v )) yap rb viroKeiat
i<TTl,
(TVvQeTOV
Xcyd/xevou dfxcpoTfpws.
xii.
fxevou
^ Th auTiKeiiueuov. Xeyw Se dj/Ti/ceTff^jtt fxhp Th &/nov(rov, viroKu(r6ai Se Tdv cLvdpwTrov, Kal t)}v fxkv
d(rxvi^o(Tvpr]u
Kal
tt]v
djuopcpiau
t)
tV
Td
CLTa^iav to dvTiKe'iixevov,
i)
tov Se
. . .
XaXKou
Tdv
'
vTTOKeifievou.
844
ATIISTOTLE
not change into their opposites, nor even act upon their
opposites.
ignorance
Becoming
which underlies
as their suljject the changing properties and conditions, and maintains itself in them. Tliis substratum certainly is in a sense the opposite of that
it
which
is
is
to become, but
It
it
is
so not in itself,
but
derivatively.
it
to
receive,
;
and
in
place of
them
it
has their
opposites
to that
tion,
and
is
in so far it
which
to
come out of
its
own
As
Cf. besides
the
above nn.
nomena
eno\igh to assume two principles standingto one another in the relation of opposites, aTropTjtreie yap av tis ttws
it
is
not
7)
7]
iruKvoTrjs
irc(j)vK(v
v)
Ti
t/V TrvKforriTa.
oiroiaovv ivav:
ofjLo'ccs
Sh Ka\ aXXr]
TLOT'os,
kc
eari
/jLu
5ih
rets
doxa?, to-Tt S' dbs Tpe?s. Koi ^ari fxhv ris Xtyoi rh ws ravavr'a, oiou /xovaiKou Kcl rh a^iovaov v) to Oep/jLoi/ Koi Td \i/vxpov T^ I'pjxoafxlvov KaX utt' rh apap/xo(TTOV eari 5' ws ov
-/)
aW'fjAMV
yap
iraffx^^v
ravavria
besides viroK^ifxeuou and \6yos ef-pecial account of (rrepTiais, otherwise only two. A thing-'s opposite is its principle in so far as its matter is infected with areprjcris or the contrar}' of the form it is going to receive something other than its opposite is its principle in so far as the matter in itself is as capable of the one determination as of the other c. 9, 192, a, 1() Plato errs in identifyingthe material simply with the non-existent, uvtos yap rivos Oeiov Kal ayaOov Kal icperod, t6 fxeu ivavriov avTo} (pa/xev dvai,
if
we take
METAPHYSICS
it is
34.5
a presupposition of
itself
cannot ever
same substratum,
ningless basis of
it is
imperishable
This begin-
Becoming ^ is Matter;'^ and so we have Matter alongside of Form as a second term.'' The notion and the relation of these two principles is more accurately determined in the doctrine that Form is the Actual and Matter the Possible."^ Both
TO
'0 irc<puKev i(t>'rTOa.i Koi opdyeaBai avTov tear a t)]v kavrov (pvaiv. TO?s 5e (Tv/x^aivei rd ivairiov ope-
PJnjs. ilnd.
1.
31
Xeyai yap
ou yiperai ti
(xv/xfiefirjKos.
:
yeadai rrjs kavrov (pdopas. Ka'.roi ovT avrh kavTOv oiov re etpieaOai rb fiSos 5la rh fxr] eluat eVSeey, oijTC TO evavTLou. (pOapTiKa yap a\\i]\av TO, ivavria. aAAa toCt' ecTTii/ 7] v\r], uxrirfp au ei S^Av 'dppevos Kai alcrxP^v KaXov (see Phys. iv. 9, p. 825, n. 1, svjrra). 217, a, 22 i(TT\v vArj fi'a rwv ivav:
Kara
4
fill.
to-Ti
Se
/j-aAia-ra
jxkv
Kai Kupiccs rd viroKeifievov yeviaeus Kai (pdopas ScKTiKdi', rpoirou Se tivx Kai
rd
Ta7s
i.
aWais
ytieTajSoAaTs
:
3fetaj>k.
3,
983, a, 29
Cf.
erepxv 5e
i/'Atjj/-
tV
koI
rd
viroKi/j.evov.
*
Ka\
tSov
aWccv
Kol
Toov
(pvffLKccu
iuavTido'eoou,
4k
Svyd/xei
ovtos
t]
ipepyfia ov
[sc.
yiverai,
Ka\
oh
x^^P'f^T'h H-^i'
vXt), T(^ S'
n. As arfprjais constitutes of itself no independent principle, but merely belongs to matter as such, i.e. to matter as still form-
next
Tuv
ivavTiccaeu'v']
fhai
less, it is
krepov.
' See p. 341, n. 2, siqyra. Phys. i.9, 102, a, 28: ^(peaprov KaXdy'ev
form and matter only in a very few passages and with a certain
reservation see P/irs. i. 7 (p. 344, n. 1); Mctoph. xi'i. 2, 106VS b, 32, c. 4, 1070, b, 10, 18, c. 5, 1071, a, (5, 16.
;
eire
yap
eiTe
ol'
iwndpxovros
(pOeipeTai, eis
TOV.
-
To
VTCOKtlfXevOU,
342, n. 2,
and
0'e7i.
10, 328, b,
S'
elSos.
414, a, 1): ix.op<p\ koX ellto^ Tj KoX Xoyoi Kai oiov ivtpyeia Tov SeKTiKov. Ibid. 1. 13 oifTTe Ao'7os Tis av ill] \j] if'i'X'''] ''"^ ^'i^os, ahk" ovx vXt] Kai to liroKe'^uevov.
ii.
:
Be
All.
ii. 1, 412, a, 6 yeios ev ri twv ovtcov t^v ovalav, TttUTTjs 5e t^ fxlv as v\t]v, % KaO' a'.Th juev ovk iari rode rt, eTfpov Se fjLOp(pi]v Kai elSos, Kad' t/Stj Xeyerai ToSe tl Kai Tp'nov t5 e/c Tovrwv. (Tti S' tj jxlv vXt]
^
:
De An.
\(.')0jxv
ddos ivreXex^ia.
;
:
So
414, a, 14 sq. Coi. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, a, 32 ds fxev ovv uAtj ToTs yf.vvr]To7s icrriv c'hiov rh Svva-
10
ARISTOTLE
the
elvai.
distinction
^Ii'tapli.
to,
Ka\
fir]
vii. 7,
1032,
"ifj
a,
20: airaura 8e
rj
yiyv6/j.eva
vXrjV.
(pvcTfi
rexvrj
e^^'
SvvaThv yap Koi eli^ai Koi /x^ elpai iKacTTOv ahruv, rovro S" [that wliicli can be or not })e] i(Tr\v iv viii. e/cao-TO) vXi] c. 15 (/'. sxpra) vK-qu 5e Keyco ^ /xr} 1, 1042, a, 27 rode Ti oZffa eVepye'ct 5uj/a,iiei eVrl ivel 8' T5t ri: c. 2, 1012,' b, 9 ixlu ws viroKeLiaevr] kcu ws uAtj 7]
; ; :
:
S"
eVxij/
rj r;
Ihid.
1.
;
\0V.\,
a,
12
Koi
iufpyeia oAAtj
X'Syos
;
&AXr}s
/u-hv
uArjs
Kal
20
1.
ipepyeias
[^oviTia
rod 27 ^
:
ei'Soy?
r?is
yap ws
iJ.op(pT}
v\7]
iarlu^
c.
)>
r]
5'
:
ws
.
on
(Ufpyeia;
i//'i/.
.
.
rrjv ivepyeiay
rrjs evepyeias
:
of the icTxdrv vXr], he must make the same reply to the question as to the iixri eKaarov, the matter If of these determinate things. the earth cannot be said to be avdpooTTos, neither can it Si/i/a,uet be called according to Afetaph. the viii. 4, 1044, a, 35, b, 1 sq., matter of man'; and what the same passage calls ZwdjueL oIkIu, 1049, b, 8 sq. designates uAtj. On the other hand, irpdoTr) uAtj is So far, theresimpl}" Suj/ct/iei ov. fore, as there remains any distinction beUvcen the two pairs of conceptions, it c ncerns not so much their actual content as the point of view from which we regard it. In the antithesis
'
1045, a, 23 vXr) rh Se rh jx\v Bwdfiei rh Se ijLOpcpf]. Kal ivfrpyeia ix. 8, 1050, a, 15 7/ vk-q earrl Svvdixei, on eA9o( tiv els ru orav Se y ipepyeia ?), rore elSos
c.
G,
of
distin-
iarlu
rh
fieu
guish between different elements, in that of ivepyeia and Swdfiei between different states or con-
'
iv
r(f
eibei
h.
ro ilhos Cvfpyeid iffriv vkri Kal 7] ouala [roov <pQa.prooi'~\ xii. 5, Swa/JLLS ovaa, ojk ivepyeia euepyeia jxtv yap ro 1071, a, 8 1. 18 dvud;ueL Se 7/ vXr] elSos irdurau Sr/ irpwrai apxat t^ iv^p^'^ia Svudixei. irpwrov, ro efSet, Kal aWo
ovcr'a
. , .
Kal
Th6 former ditions of things. refers to the relation of substance to attribute; the latter, to the relation of the earlier to the later condition, of the incom-
'.
<>
But plete to the complete. since the very essence of matter consists in possibility of form in actuality, we can conceive no case in which more than a
grammatical change
in order that we the latter for the And vice sions.
easily
be
multiplied to prove that tJ ^wd,ui OP corresponds precisely to vXr], rd ivepyela ov to elSos. Even the statement (BoNiTZ, Arist. Metapli. ii. 398) that v\-r\ refers raiher to trpwrt], duvdui hv rather to iaxdrt] vArj (see p. 348, n. 1, infra), does not seem correct. If to Ihe question irSre
Svvd/xei
iffrlv
may
verm we may
in
most cases substitute matter and form for the possible and
the actual. The only difficulty that can possibly arise is in the case where we are speaking, not
of two things- related to one another as the possible to the actual, but of one and the same
{Mctaph.
METAPHYSICS
between which
all
347
^
If
we
that a given
object
in
want of a
definite
Form, and
ing
it.
is
If
a product of
become
is
anything, then
we
shall
determination by Form.
nothing,
but
or
can become
the
of
Subject,
all
namely,
thinkable
the
predicates
but
which
all
precisely
on that
account
it
is is
equally
receptive
is
them
all.
In other words,
that which
:
in Possibility
it is
it
8,
19o,
5,
1,
viii. 4, 255, a, 88; Be An. Ge7i. An. ii. 417, a, 21 sq. but even here it 735, a, 9
;
;
seemed to presuppose it, is clear from the statement that nothing to which 'becoming' is inapplicable can be said to have a
also
matter
b,
Metapli.
viii.
5,
1041,
can
always
be
shown that a
and
27:
oa-cou yet^ecris
aWrjXa.
Knv
vX-q.
-
have, logicall}' considered, a wider range than uAtj and clSos (since, while the latter express only a relation of two subjects to one another, the former express also a relation of one subject, to itself), metaphysically there is no distinction between them, That Aristotle's conception of matter and with it the distinctionbetweenmatter and form thus originated in the attempt to explain becoming,' which
' '
fXTa^o\^ els ocra 5' &vev rod jj.Ta^d\eariv /ult], ovk eari tovtcdu Cf. vii. 7 (previous n.)
-1)
Td
Suva/^ei
liu.
A somewhat
different meaning attaches to Swa/xis when it indicates power or facultj'- in the sense of the
apxh /uera^SATjTtK//, whether we speak of a faculty for doing or for suffering, a rational or an
irrational power (cf. Mctajfh. ix. 1-6, v. 12) Aristotle, however,
;
again mixes up both signitica(cf. BoNlTZ on Metaph. 379 sq., and p.. 234, n. 1, sujjra\
tions
348
ARISTOTLE
If conversely
it
we
that
take
is
everj^thing
to completion, if
as
fully
its way we think of the end of its growth attained, we obtain the pure and com-
on
plete
realisation
of
its
conception, to which
is
nothing
formless,
no matter that
still
attaches.
The Form,
its
corresponds with
and Form
is
in
Just as a statue
contained
actual
existence
Form which
Fioni
Zvvau.is
this
it
second
we have
a
cation of
man
4,
is
ra
Karaixyji'ia.
Mctaph.
v.
which
resides,
determinate
power
as in Pent. An. ii. 1, ()4(), ;i, 14 sq., where moist and dry, warm and cold substances, (icn. An. i. 18, 725, b, 14, where certain liquids, 3IeteorA\. 3, 359,
b,
12,
where
5,
salts
and
alkalis,
J)e
fxeis.
Sensii,
fragrant
'
1015, a, 7, c. 24 imt., viii. 6, 1045, b, 17. c. 4, 1044, a, 15, 34, b. 1, ix. 7, 1049, a, 24. Some verbal confusion is caused b}^ the fact that the expression TTpwTT) vkri is applied equally to nuitter which is absolutely, and to matter which is only relativelj', first (to the oAws wpdoTr] and to the Trpds avrd itpurr] v\r}) see Mctaph. v. 4, viii. 4, 1041,
;
a, 18,
23; Phya.
ii.
1,
19.3, a,
28,
and
Cf.
^
cf.
Mdaph.
BONITZ,
'Ej/f'pyeia
b, 10.
or eVrcAexeia
(in
the concrete rh it^epyeia ov, rh eVTcA6;(;eta ov), expressions which properly differ as activity or
act ualisation
differs
from com-
minate form.
material as
,
UpdoTT] uAtj is
the
mentary differences
precedes all elethe ia-xarr} v\r{, e.g of the statue is the stcne or brass; the tVxaTTj v\r\ of
it
;
Cf. in/ia,
META PHYSICS
ceptibilityindeterminate,
capable, indeed, of
849
undeveloped self-existence,
definite reality,
becoming a
but not
yet
made
into one.
By
he means the same being considered as a developed totality or Being which has wrought out all that it
When accordingly he Matter with potential, being, he means to say that the former is the totality of the qualities which the latter does not possess but
contains
into
full
existence.
identifies
Form with
actual.
is
capable of acquiring.^
without form or definite character, being just that which precedes all Becoming and all formation;
TTpcoTT] vXrjj'^ is
the
centre
of
;
indifference to
all
nite qualities
jVetc(j?/i.
8'
7]
i'aTi
yap
irphs
vpayixa
duvdaei. iu
TCf)
fir]
ojtus
Socrirep
\eyo/xeu
oToy
Ti
T(i}y
ix<ivToov jxopcp^u
irplv
7]
v\r} Kzl
\iyo/xV 5e
Svudfxei
Th ap.op(pou exet
flOpCpT]!/,
Xa,3e7v
ITphs
t^v
^v\y
OJTOtS
aVT7]
OVaijiV
kA
Tj
rhv
iirl
fx)]
CLV
Svudrhs
diwpTjcrai.
8'
iii.
7eia.
rfj
SriKou
tcov
KaOeKuara
dAAot
iirayooyrj
^ovAo/xeOa hiyeiv.
^ir}Ti7i/,
A/yoj
/j-iiTi
8' v\7]v
^ KaO^
a\jT))u fxiire tI
jULijOkv
on ws rh TO oiK)ho;xiKhu, Ka\ T'b iyprjyopos irpbs rh K%dv5 )u, ical rh bpiav trphs rh [ivov [xku o\piv Se t^ai', Kal TO cLTroKzKpijXivov iic rrjs uAtjs irphs T7]v vKr\v, kxX to arreip')a(rp.4vov wphs Th auipyaffTOV. tj.vTrjs Se TTJs Siacpopas BaTtpov jxopiov eoTCi} 7} ip^pyeia affixpia-fi^vr], OuTepcfi 5e Th 5uvaT6v c. 8, 1050, a, 21 ^5' vnoKeiPJnjs. i, 7, 191, a, 7
Kt\ Th
avdhoyov crvvopau,
Kj^ofjiovv Trphs
Aeyfrat oTs liipiTTai TO uv; c. 11, 1037, a, jx^Ta txkv yap t^s uAtjs o-jk 27 lanu [A070S], aSpiffTov yap; ix. 7, el 5e' ti ian irpiiTou, 1049, a, 24
:
:
iroahu fir,T
&\\o
t)
ix7]kIti
vivov [of
TovTo
n.
5,
viii.
see p. 315,
:
jueiTj
(pvais iirLCTTrjTi]
Kar avaho-jiav.
supra, iv. 4, 1007, b, 28 Th yap huud/x^i hv Kxl fi^ eVreAsX^ia Th aSpiaTSu iaTi. Phys i. 7 see above, n. 1, and iv. 2, 209, b, 9 passing from this it becomes
;
:
350
ARISTOTLE
it is
we
shall see,
which the
infinite is that
Form, has reached no conclusion or completion.^ And since what is wholly indeterminate cannot be known.
Matter, as such,
that
by analogy by supposing a substratum for things of sense in general which is related to them in much the same way as a special material To Form, on is to the things that are made out of it.'^
is
unknowable.
It is only
of
it,
we
defniiteness,
limitation,
and
.
. .
intelligibility.
Form
'
^f^puxo^J^^v^n'
viro
tov iUous
, .
.
[the
form]
(fat
?}
a-pKr/.trVoi'
cVrt 8e
IQlOVTOlf
V\l]
KO).
TO
1),
oApiffTOU.
Jlr C.rln,
Hot
elj^at
\\\.
S, HO;!,
17: aeiSes
a-iofxpoy
ih jxaKinra yap au
Oh
tnroKdf.ceuoi'
o'utu) dvi'aiTO
pud/J.i((T6ai,
Kaddirsp iv
rw
Tif-uxw
Tthiiov b' o-j5f:i> jlLT] exov t4\os ov yap Kivov TO 8e TfAos 7r^.7s Au'w ffvudiTTnu iarl t^ anauTi Kai oAoi) rd aiTfipou ecTTi yap v) amipoi' Trjs tou /.aytdovs reAe ott]to bvpdixei oAoi', ros uArj kuI eVTeAe^ea 5' ov Kal ov -Trepte'xei
. . .
Uireipoi'
'
Sid Kal
i5os
yap ovk
5e Kal
stands, first of all, the unlimited in space, and in this sense he examines the conception in Phi/s. iii. But finding that in ac4 sq. tuality there is no such infinite space, he finally identifies the un-
vXrj
aroirov
Kal
ahvuaTOv,
to
dyvoxrrov
t6
a6pia-Tou nepiex^ti' tal opi^eiu; c. 7, (pauepov ort oos uAtj to 207, b, i)5
:
limited wilh the aopiarov or uAtj. the notion Cf. ih'ul. c. 6, 207, a, 1 commonly entertained of infinity is wholly false, ov yap ov fxrjSeu e^co, aAA' ou dei ri e|co eVxi, tout'
:
6.irsipou fihv ovv iaTLv iarlu ov kxto, iroahu Xafx^avovcnu aei ri AajSetj/ tffriv l|w. ou Se fxriSeu e^o), tout' iarl TeKciou Koi o\ov(De
aTreipoV
a'lTiov, Kal oti t^ uvai avTta (TTpr]ais, to Se Kad' avTo vwoKeiixei'oy rh ffvuex^^ '^<** aiaOrjTou. iv. 2, see previous note. Phys. iii. 0; see previous note ibid. i. 7, JSIetaph. ix. 6 see p. 349, n. 1, supra, Metapli. vii. 10, 1036, a, 8 ^5' uAtj it-yvaitnos Kad^ avT^v. Cf. also p. 220, n. 2, supra for parallels from Plato, cf. ZklLEii, Ph. d. Gr, pt. i. p. 621, 2.
airetpou
iariv
ywev
'^
METAPHYSICS
351
and Matter, therefore, require nothing further to medi-. ate between them in order to produce a whole, but are
immediately
Matter in
united:
Form
;
is
the
definiteness
of
itself indefinite
itself
Form.
When
the
stand opposed to one another as two separate things, but one and the same thing looked at as Matter is the Potentiality of that of which the Actuality is its
Form.'
But
just as
in
may we
a single substance, so as to imply that one Matter and one Form constitute the fundamental elements which in
various combinations produce the aggregate of things.
Aristotle
recognises, indeed, in
is
the
Divine
Spirit
being which
pure
Form
without Matter.
all
Yet he
Forms,
things, but as
all
other individual
many
substances.
In like manner
Aristotle recognises a fundamental matter, which, while in the elements and generally in all particular kinds of
matter
itself
it
qualities, yet is in
bodies.
'
3retaph.
1045, b, 17
to the question how the elements of a conception or of a number can be one, Aristotle answers that they are related to one another as matter and form (see p. 220, n. 2, sifj}ra): ea-n S' iiairep
e^pTjTat koI tj iffx^rv v^V [ot p. 348, n. l] Kal v ^lopcp^ ravrh kuI eu [So rh fihu Swd/xei to 8e ivepyeia. Bonitz reads, but^ Bekker has ev yap ti ravTo kuI Svvdfxei to eV.] 'iKaaTou ical rb 5vudf.ii Koi rb
:
362
ARISTOTLE
is
matter
never present except in the definite form of Nor can it be otherwise, since
^
is mere Potentiality without any Actuality whatsoever. This original corporeal Matter,
moreover, does not exhaust the conception, and Aristotle goes on to speak also of an incorporeal Matter which he
finds, for
figures.
To
example, in conceptions and in mathematical this belongs whatever, without being itself
cori)oreal, stands to
something
else in the
as corporeal
that not only does each of these conceptions denote a single existence or definite class of things, but they are
used, though undoubtedly obtained in the first instance by abstraction from corporeal things,^ wheresoever a
relation subsists analogous to that
express.^
Thus
in
'
Phys.
iii.
5,
204, b, 82
ovk
vorir-i].
Ibid.
tj
.
c.
10,
Ha-Ti
Ttt
roiovrov
au^a
alffdTjrhv irapa
i/Atj
5'
;^ej/
.
.
alaBr}Tii
vot]tt]
103G, a, 9 iariv rj Se
:
otherwise the four elements must needs resolve themselves into this, which is not the case. Ge7i. et Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, 8. Ibid. 1. 24 Tj^els 5e (pafiev fxhu ehai riva vX-qv
ffToix^la KaXovix^va,
:
j/otjt^
5e
r)
iv
toIs
alcrd-nrois
oTov
Tuv
(ju^fxaTcav
oil
rwv
aladT^Tcov,
aAAa
rd
5,
TavTTiv
yiverai
Ibid,
i,
2,and 345 n.5,,sz/^A Of matter he remarks also in Gen. et Corr. i. 4, 320, a, 2, that we are to understand by it [xdMcna koL Kvpiws rh viroKeifxeuov yeueaeocs Kal (pdopas Sktik6v.
^
Metaph.
Se TTjs
Kal
viii. 6,
1045, a, 33
r]
Metapli.
S'
xii.
ra
5'
oXtio.
lo-Tt
y'Arjs
aia-erjTi),
J ddrov Xoyov rh
;
^uef vo-qr)]
5'
Kal at dpxal
ws,
fj-euvXr)
tan
/cot'
rh
ivepyeid iffrip vii. 11, 1036, b, 35 ^(TTUi yap vXr) ivicov Kal fir] aladr)Ta)V Kal iravTos yap vXt] ris icTTiv t fi-f] iffri ri riv dvai Kal eldos
S'
:
&s
alaQ-qTccv
aoifxdroov
avrh
Kad'^ aiirh
rj
aAAa r65e
t)
tj
eari yap
vX-q
/xhu al(Tdr)r)]
rj
Se
ws fih elSos rh eep/mhu Kal &XXov rpdirov rh \pvxphu rj (rreprjais, vXtj 8e rh Swdfiei ravra irpurou Kad' avro irdvToou Sc ovtcc fifv cltreTv
'
.
METAPHYSICS
353
two elements, Aristotle attributes to the genus the same significance as Matter, while he identifies the
specific
Similarly in the
zoology, in
in physiology, in
psychology, the upper and the lower spheres and elements,^ the soul and the body,^the male and the female,'*
same relation as the Form and the Matter. The same is true, it need hardly be remarked, of Potentiality and Actuality. These also express a definite relation which may subsist between all possible kinds of objects, and which can best be explained by analogy.^ Aristotle
in the
applies
them
in precisely the
Form.
He
show the possibility of several properties belonging to one and the same thing. By them he explains the relation between the passive and the active
to
'^
and in general
ovKiCTTiv, ru> auaXoyov Se, wffirip it ris UTTOL oTi apxa' el(ri rpe7s, rh
d5os Koi
'iKaiTTov
7/
(TTep-nai'i
Kal
t}
vKt].
dAA.'
TovTwv
'^Tipov irepl
eKaarov
:
yeuos iariu;
5'
en c. 5, 1071, a, 3 rpoTTov T(p avdhnyov apxo-ial avToi, olov iucpyeia Kal Sui^a/jLis.
uWou
aWa
/col
&\\(cs.
Gen. et CorrA.'i^,^\%, 335, a, IS. ^ jjg j^,^ [[ |^ 412^ b^ 9 s;q q. 2, 414, a, 13 sq. and often. * Gen. An. i. 2 i/tit., ii. 1,732, a, 3, ii. 4, 738, b, 20, and often. AEetapll. i. 6, 988, a, 5, V. 28, 1024, a, 34.
)]12, a, 12,
ii.
b, H2,
8,
^ ^
Be An.
ili. 5.
;
aiTia Kal <TToix^7a, uxnrep iXexBr], TU)v fir) iu ravT^ yeuei, xP^h"-^"^^^^
y\/6(pwv, ovaiSov, Trocr6Tr]TOS,
irX^v
r^
avihoyop' Kal toov eV tolvt^ y4veL erepa, ovk e^Set, aW' OTi tSov KaO^ (KacTTOv &Wo f} re cr^ vXrj Kal rd Kivrjaav Kal rh eldos Kal t) i/xh, rep KadSxov Se xSycp ravTo..
*
Metapli. ix. 6 seep. 349, n. 1, Sl/pra. Ibid. I04:8,h, 6 Adyerai S' ivepycia ovirdvra dfxoiws, oAA' v) rd avaXoyov, 6>s rovro iv tovtc(> ^ irpbs tovto, rd S' eV TwSe fj irpbs ToSe to, /mev yap ws Kivrjcns irphs Svvafj.iv, ra
:
'
riva v\r]v.
Cf
xii,
5,
See
Be
Be An.
ili. 5.
VOL.
A A
354
ARISTOTLE
It follows that one
understanding.^
second.
The elements,
all
for instance,
material of
own
peculiar
is
Form
as a specific metal.
While the
soul in general
in
is
its
viewed as the Form of the body, yet even own highest and most immaterial part a distinction
made between two elements which are related to one another as Form and Matter.^ Indeed, we shall find that
everything except the
'
other
hand, as we already know,'* Matter never actually presents itself to us except as endowed with Form.
We
less
may therefore
lies at
Form. The
all
first
purely form:
the foundation of
things
but
it is
ultimate
lie all
through which the original Matter has to pass before it becomes the particular Matter with which the Form of the thing immediately unites itself.^ The same holds
true of the hvvafiLs?
*
We
and
320,
ascribe potential
knowledge
b,
n. 2, p. 351, n. 1, p. 301, n. 3
4,
ii.
1,
Y^.^i.%,n.\,e.g.Metaj)?i.\\i\A,\OU, a, 20: yiyvovrai 8e irXdovs v\ai rod ai/rov, orav daripov t] crepa v, oTov tp^ey/na e'/c Xnrapov koX yKvKeos, d rd Kmaphv e'/c Tov y\vK4os, fK Se
32
'
*
a,
29;
x^^^s TCfauaAv^adai
v\-t)v ttjv
elsTrjVTrpdljTriv
x^^Wa,
Cf. p. 352, n. 2.
See
Cf.
p. 352, n. 1, 5?/^r,
and
'
compare
*
p. 348, n. 1.
Be
quoted
33;
the
passages
METAPHYSICS
not only to the
355
is
man
of learning
when he
conceived as
and even
to
man
in general.
But the
we have
to distinguish
which it had at first the by degrees and in the universe at large there are an infinite number of intermediate stages between mere Potentiality or the first Matter, and complete Actualij^y, which is pure Form or God. Now in the phenomenal world, Form presents itself
attains the realisation of that
mere capacity
to be, except
under the aspect of a threefold principle of causality, while Matter contains the ground of all impressibility
in the habit of
of Cause
efficient
the
and the
These,
Gen. An. ii. 1, 735, a, 9: iyyvrfpo) 5e Koi iroppcoTepa) ajrh auTov ivSix^rai elvai Sv/uLcifxei, wcrirep
'
KadevSwv
ovvTos.
2
y^ca/nerpris
tov iyprjyop-
I, 1013, a, 17: iraiTwv ovv KOivhv tcDp" apxoou rh irpurov clyaL odeu ^ ^(Ttiv t) yiyvsrai ^ yiyvaxTKirai tovtuu 5e ai fihu ivvirapxovaai elaiv al 5e eKTOs.
fihi/
MetapJi.Y.
Anal. Post.
i.
2, 72, a, 6
Tojj. iv.
Apxai.
On
the meaning of
1,
121, b, 9.
^
:
/i^e^
et Corr.
i.
7,
Gen. An.
P/ajs. ii. 3, 194, b, 23 eVo ovv rpSnov ainov \4yeTai rb 6| o5 ylverai ivvirapxovTos, olov &\\ov x'^^'^^^ '^ov ai/Spiwros, &c. Se t^ ei5os koi to irapdS eiyfia tovto
v.7,788,a,14;also7*o<?Z^. c. 7,1450, b,27; Waitz, ^7'i,v^. Orr/ i.457 sq., the Ind. Arist. under apxh, and p. 247, n, 2, sujfra. 'Apxv indicates the lirst in every series, and in this sense it is used for all kinds of causes, but more especially of
first
\6yos 6 toD ti ^v eluai koi to, tojtou yeVrj [i.e. the classes above it] ... tTi od^v rj apxh ttjs
v tt^ccttj t) rf/s i]pefir](Tea}s ... eTi ws rh reAos tovto 5' iarl Th ol %v^Ka ( = Metaph. v. 2) 195, a, 15 one class of causes is ws t5 ^| ol olItio., and of these to [lIv ws tI viroKeiixevov, to. Sc &s tJ>
5' 4(tt\v 6
fxeTal^oAris
causes,
i.e.
ducible
from no
AX
356
ARISTOTLE
two
first
mentioned.
is
not different
actualise a
from
its
is to
concept.
sets the
whether the
motion comes from without. Even in the latter case it produces motion, is the conception of the thing which Only man can alike in works of nature and of art.
Only the conception of health can determine In like tbe physician to labour in producing health.^
beget man.
Ti i]v
hai
7]
ueeu
rivos the
end
is
in
the
one
(Trdaeccs
Kol
Kivr,(Tcos
lastly
rh
'i^
Mctapk. i. T(\os Kul rayaOov. ra 5" atria KtyeraL Terpax^s, iilit. wv fi'av jJikv alriav (pa/xlv ehai rrjv irepav ovaiav Koi rh ri i)V eluai Se T7V ^\r]u Kal rh viroKiifxe/xov,
:
.
case to heal the sicl-, and in the other to estal)lish health). Phys. ii. 7, 198, a, 24 eu ipX^rai Se ra rp'a els rh
rpirw
ravrr],
Se oOeu
Se
7]
rerdprTjv
avriKei/JLeuriv
'iveica
aWlav
Kal rayadov. 1044, a, a2, Anal. Pod. ii. 1 1 init., IJe Somno, 2, 455, b, 14, Gen. An. i. 1 init ,\. 1, 778,
rh ov
Ihid.
viii.
4,
ncWaKLS rh fih yap ri Iffri Kal rh ov euKa eV iffri [cf. 198, b, 3], TO S' o9eu 7] Kivqcris irpcvrou rep ct,vdpcctros yap el'Sei ravrh rovrois Cf. i. 7, 190, b, avOpooTTou yevva. l)e An. ii. 4, 415, b, 7: 17 sq. tan Se r] ^vx^ '''^^ (wvros (Tu^iaros
'
b,
7,
and elsewhere
of.
Ind.
alria Kal apX'h- ravra Se iToKKax<>>s Aeyeiai. o/xoiws S' t] ^vxh Kara rovs hiwpi.(Tfxevovs rpoTTOvs rpels alria
Kal
Arist. 22, b, 29. On the different terms used for the four causes, ihid. and Waitz, Arist. Org. ii. 407; on what follows, Hitter, iii. 106 sqq. The further modilications of the doctrine of the four
ili^vX<^v
fully.
(Tcofx-drccv
i|/inj/rj
airia,
causes in Phys. ii. 3, 195, a, 2G sq. (of. Mctapli. V. 2, 101 3, b, 2S), are unimportant, as is also the distinction of the ov eVexo into person and thing, on which cf. Be An. ii. 4, 415, b, 2 rh 5' ov eVewo SiTT^J', rh ii.\v ov rh Se ^. See also
:
5u'AiJ.ei.
xii. 7,
2, 194, a, 35, and Metajjh. 1072, b, 2 (where we must read IcTt yap rivl rh ov 'ducKu Kal
Fhys.
ii.
of these three identified with the So Metaph. viii. 4, 1044, third. taws Se ravra (i.e. eldos and b, 1 Gen. An. 1. rekos) &ix<p(c rd avrd. yap alriat vir6Kivrai init. 1 rerrupes,r6 re ov cVexa w5 reXos,
is
:
ravra
fikv
METAPHYSICS
manner we
shall in the highest cause,
357
the source of
its
Aristotle in his
oZv
'6dev
ii.
movement united in one. Nor does physics distinguish more than two kinds
a'.irep
7)
ios
eV Tt
'
Tp'.rov Se Kol
T]
riraprov
t)
uAtj koL
iikv
'
yap
iffTiv
us
uAtj,
t]
5'
us
ti
1,
is
apxh '^^^ Kit/'fjcrfcos. Ibid. 732, a 3, where the female called the uAtj, the male the
Kivovcra
irpdoTT],
fiopcpT]
5e? 5e Kal
tV
tp'ittjv
ahia
\6yos
c.
virdpx^i
Kol
;
rd
elSos,
and
6,
where, as in i. 1, the formal and the final cause are identified, and only three principles are enumerated: the r4\os or ou eueKu, the apx^ kivtjtlk^ koI
742, a, 28
see p.341,n. l,fin. Meta2)h.\\\.linit.: iravTa to. yiyvofiepa vtt6 re rivos yiyuerai Kal eK tivos Kal ri. Of the ixp' ou it is said f urtlier on Kal ixp^ ov, 7) Kara rh eJSos Xeyo/xevr]
irpoffvTrdpx^i-v.
Metaph.
xii. 3,
(pvcris
7)
yiyvofxevcp]
avT7] 5' eV
and the XP^^'-I-'-^^ ^ Xpvrai rh rekos. Part. An. i. 1, rrjs 641, a, 25 (l)vcrea}s Sixmos Xeyo/jLfuris kuI oijffTjs ttjs ixhv us v\7]s TTJs S' US ouaias [which =
yevvriTtKi]
:
&v9puTros yap &vQpuTTov yeuua, and further, 1032, b, 1 1 ooare (TVjx^aivn. rpSirov riva e| vyidas vyieiuv yiueadai, Kal
aW(f.
tV
7]
ttjs
t]
&vev vXrjs
iarpiKT]
yap
Kal
?5os]
Kal
%<TTIV
aVTt]
Koi
U)S
7]
vyieias
Kal
Xiyu
-fju
S'
Kivovaa Kal ws rh t4Kos. Phi/s. ii. koI iirel t] (pvais 8, 199, a, 30 StTT')/ T) fxku WS uAtJ 7] 5' 0)5 (JiOpip)], reKos 5' avrr] avrr} &j/ etrj r/ ahia -q ou eVe/ca. Jbid. c. 9, 200, a, 14 rh 5' ou eVe/ca iv Tqs \6'Y(f}. Li. 34 rh reAos rh ou cueKa Kal 7/ apxh airh rov opiajxov Kal rov hdyov. The artist's method is nature's also: eVei 71 olKia TOi'i/Se, raSe Set yiyveadai ourws Kal el &vdpci}7ros ToSl, TttSi. Part. An. i. 14: (paiverai 5e 1, 639, b, 7rpd}T7} [aWla^ %v \cyo/jLV 'iveKa Tivos \6yos yap obros. De An. i. T<) eiZo%, eve/ca 1, 403, b, 6 TUivli. Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 5: us [Xfv OAtj tout' iariv aXriov Tols 7ej/7jTO?s, us 5e tJ ov eVe/cei/ fiopcj)^ 7] Kal rh elSos tovtq 5' effrlv 6 \6yos 6 ttjs eKdaTov oucrlas, and previously : dalv ovv [at Tf/s o-pX"^ yeviaeus~\ Ka) rhu
:
ri
elvai.
All.
ii.
4, 740,
b, 28
5e r^xvr] fiopcp^
ruv yivojxivuv
i.
iv
'dXAcf.
7}
Part. An.
1,
610, a, 31
Corr.
ii.
9,
fx.op(p-h
corresponds to Te'xfTj; the art, however, is elsewhere treated as the true efficient cause, the artist only as a secondary cause e.g. Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, a, 34.)
;
Metapli.
Kivovu
di/dpctiirois
xii.
4 fin.
/jihi/
(irel
5e
rh
iv
ro7s
<pv(riKo7s
(read
iv
avOpurccf),
approved
by
duOpuTTOS,
larpiKT]
iffriv.
t^ yivu
at
avral
358
ARISTOTLE
final,^ in
and that of Form or concept. ^ This is the only distinction, therefore, which we must regard as fundamental that between formal, efficient and final causes For though the is merely a secondary subdivision.
;
and
and
it
only in the
separate."*
phenomena of sense that they are found The created universe has several causes
the
is
7,
Again, as the
Form
and
said in
15,
Cicn.
et
Curr.
i.
ii24, b,
it
that as the ov
eVe/ca
is
'
not
K0L'r]TiK6v.
For a fuller discussion on At this point, it will be enough to refer the reader to l^art. An. i. 1. Cf.
p, 642, a, aZrai, r6 0'
the otlier, but in a different sense physical exercise, r.ff., may be the efficient cause of health, health the final cause of exercise. This is the meaning of ttoWolkis
;
in P/u/s.
*
dalv
6.pa
ov
eVewa
Koi
17: rqj Se XP^'^V Trpcrepov [sc. iv4pt^ rqS efSet rh yia Svfdueccs^ ^5e
yap
T]
(pvais
cf,
/maWou
ttjs wAtjs,
with
further the passages quoted in the foregoing note from J*/n/s. ii. 8, and Part. Afi. i. 1.
1,
which
avTh ij/epyovv irpdTfpov [^i.e. every potentiality presupposes a similar actuality], apLdfji^ 5' oj for, as this is explained, the seed indeed precedes the plant which springs
v. is
from it, but this seed itself comes from another plant, so that it is still the plant that produces the
plant.
^5iov
classed along with the necessary and eflicient, yet as Ritter, appealing to Pltys. ii. 9, 200, remarks, the rightly a, 80, moving cause is not here considered by itself, but only as united with matter. Cf. also eV yap rrj vXrj rh Hid. 1. 14 avayKOLOV, rh 5' ov iveKa iv T(p KSyqi. ^ So that, as is remarked Phijs. ii. 3, 195, a, 8, of tw^o things each may be the cause of
:
Ibid. vii. 9, 1034, b, 16 ovaias '6ti avdyKrj Trpovirdpx^tv krepav ova'iav eVreAe^e/a odaav ^ Trote?, oTov Cv^''^ ^* ylyverai Cv*^^5 Gen. Ah. ii. 6, 742, b, 33: apxv 5' iv fikv To7s oLKivfiTois rh ri
rris
.
.
icrriv,
iv
irAeious,
nacrai
^
rhv
avr6v
r,
'
wv
srijjra.
fi'ia
rhv
apiOfihu, (iOev
Kivrjais iariv.
See
p.
318 sq.
METAPHYSICS
is at
359
all
cause of
irddos
is
and nothing is susceptible of such a process but that which is not yet determined
is,
nothing, that
nothing but Matter, which can exhibit every activity and every quality,
in
for the simple
determinable
quality
itself, it has no But though Matter is wholly devoid of any such active and positive force,
or
operative
it
every obstruction
To what
And
so,
that
Form always works with a purpose, it is in Matter we must seek the ground of all phenomena that
and antagonistic
to be explained
to
The
is
by
Though
yet
this
it is
in
no sense
efficient cause,
Though
:
it is
not necessary in
itself, it is
so con-
ditionally
'
Geii. et Corr.
7,
324, b, 4
e^et
to
rh
^cra fxep
p.op<p)]v,
ovv
jxt]
eV vKri
t)]V
Tavra fiev awadT} twv ttoii)oaa S' iv vArj, iraOTjTiKoi. tV fifv yap v\7jt' XeyofjLev S/jLoicas cds (lirelv Tr]v avT^v ilvai twv auTiKeiTiKuiu,
fxevccv diroTcpovovv, cSo-Trep
y4po5
ov.
ibid.
1.
18
t/S'uAtj
:
ri
v\r} iraOrjri-
kSv
ii.
9,
360
ARISTOTLE
duced certain particular materials must be ready to hand.^ For the same reason, the extent to which Nature
'
riato
diaspKTjj.ei'wv
distiiig-iiished
the aXria from tlie avva'nia, the efficient causes (8t' aJv 7171/6x01 Tt) from the indispensable conditions {av^v ww ov
;
yiyuerai)
cf.
JJir.
1.
(512
sqq.
[the necessity imposed by the conception and that of compulsion]. ecTTt S' ev yc to7s exovai yhiffiv 7] rpiTTi. X^yojxiv yap t)]v Tpo(l)))u avayna^ov ti KaT ov5eTpoi/
TovTcav
Toov
rpoircov, dAA.'
adopts this disHis whole view of nature turns on the opposition between design and natural neAristotle tinction.
also
on ovx
cessity, between what is required by the conception or form of a thinii: and what proceeds from
rovro 5' iarlp wa-iTip e| uTrofleVews. Gen. An. i. 4, 717, a, 15 ttuv rj (pvcris 5id rb avayKa7ov Troie? 7) 5id ro 7) fifXnov ii. 6, 748, b, 16: irdpTa
oiou T &vev Tavrrjs eJvai.
: ;
the nature of its material: the former is the 5i' h, the latter the oZ ovK aueu the former is independent and unconditioned, the latter is for a purpose and conditionally necessar}'. To these two there is added a tliird kind oi^ necessit}^ viz. compulsion, which, liowever, does not further concern us here (unon this as distinguished from the necessity of the conce]jtion, cf. P/ti/s. viii. 4,
;
5e ravra, Kaddirep etiro/xev (748, a, 86), Ae/creoj/ y'lveaOai rfj jjlIv e'l
avdyKris, ttj
5'
%VQKd Tivos
iv.
a/xcpOTcpas tcls
e'l
usually we look for the necessity in the nature of the material parts dAA' ofiws ovk dvev yuev rovrcov yeyovev, 01 fxevroi 5 i d ravra
;
Tr\))u
ws
5t'
v\7)v
dfxoius
Se Kal
Pc;,s^.
ii.'u, 94, b,
1015, a, 2(5 sqq.,vi. 2, 1026, b, 27, xi. 8, 1004, b, 88) Cf. Mctaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, rh yap kva-yKOLOv roaauraxoos, 11 TO fx-ev I3:a otl vapa ryjv opjjLrjV, to Se ov OVK civv rh ev, rh Se /x^ eV5eXo/i6j/oy aWws dAA' airAcos. Part. An. i. 1, (i8'.), b, 21: rh 5' e| audyv.
5,
:
87;
Metaph.
aWois iraaiv, eV oaois rh rov eVrij/, ovk dvev fikv rcav avayKalav exovrcov rrjv (pvaiv, ov /xivroL 76 Sid ravra dAA' 1) ws vXtjv e| vTToOecreoos St/ rh avayKa7ov, dAA' ovx ^^ rfXos iv yap rrj v\t) rh avayKa7ov, rh S' ov eveKa iv rqj koyq}. L. 80 (j)avephv S^ on rh avayKa7ov iv ro7s (pv(nKo7s rh ws
iv ro7s
'4vKd
.
.
'
iir)s
ov
iraaiu
virapx^i
aiBiois,
to7s
kuto,
5'
iiKr)
\y6fjLvov
Kal
ai Kivr,a^is
ai
(pvcriu o/noLccs
....
virapx^t 5e t6
ravrr\s.
So/fg? 5e
aTr?\a>s
Pe An.
ncriv
r)
ii. 4:,
416,
-rrvphs
a,
9:
rrfs
fxiv
awAuis
To7s
rd
1
i^
rov
.
<pv(Tis
viro9(aojs Kal to7s iu 76 j/6 ere iraaiv. Jhid. 642, a, 1 etVJv apa Sto aWai avrai, t6 0' ov evKa Kal rd e^ auiyKrjs iroWa yap yiverai on
:
alria
tt/s
.
.
rpocprjs
Kal
av^^<TQ}s hai
fiev
TTcos
av ris aTropr}<Tie TToiau Xeyovffiv avdyK7)v at keyuvres e'l audyKrjs' tuu /idpyap Svo rpdiruv ovSerepov olov re virdpx^iv, rww
'lacos
avdyK-q.
8'
et Corr.
Gen. 7) ^vxriii. 9, 335, b, 24 sq. it is not the matter which is the proit is
;
dinov,
aWafiaWov
and moved
METAPHYSICS
361
can realise lier end the mode and the perfection in which the Form manifests itself are conditioned by the character of these materials that is, by their capacity for receiving and exhibiting the Form Just in proportioD as
and degenerate from their true patterns and the proper we shall have productions which serve no end at all, but are developed incideutpurposes of nature, or perhaps
ally as the result of
sity, in
causative conception heat does not any more of itself effect production than the saw saws of itself. Part. An. iii. 2, G63, b, 22 iras
;
:
8e T7JS
kuto,
tov /coxaSimilarly Aristotle distinguishes {Anal. Post. ii. 11, 94, b, 27) '^v^ko. tivos and e| avdyKtis and enumerates {Metai)h. V, 5) the commoner applications oi kvayKcuov: to that oS &vev ovk eyS^x^rai (fjy, &c. ws avvairiov, to that which is fiiaiou and to that
(pvffis
rhu \6yov
eueKo.
Kexprirai, x4yup.v.
els rh wcpiXifiov tois TrfpiTTcafiaaiu, ov fiijv Sia TOVTO Se? ^rjreTv iravra evcKa TLVOS, aXXd rivcav vvroiv TOiovTcav erepa e'| avdyKTis (rvfi^aivei
which is oLvayKoiov in the proper sense rh airXuvv ( = arrXSos avayKoiov) viz. the /i^ hZex^ijx^pov &\Xws
6X641/.
Eudemus ajmd Sim PL. P/12/s. 63, a, that matter and aim are the two
this
is
Tavra iroXXd. So according to Gen. An. v. 1, 778, a, 30, only that has an end to serve which appears universally in all nature's productions or in certain classes of them ; individual varieties on the other hand have none the eye has an end to serve the fact that it is blue has none ibid,
dia
: ;
:
c.
8 Jin.,
mention
is
made
of
causes of motion. Within the sphere of conditional necessity there is again (Gen. An. ii. 6, 742, a, 19 sq.; where, however, 1. 22, we must read, not ov IVe/ca but with Cod. PS. and Wimmer rovTov u.) a twofold distinction made between that which as efficient cause conditions the
yiveaOai (rv/xfiaivei fx^ VKd TOV aXX' e| avdyKrjs Koi 810, T^u alriav t^i/ KivrjTiK-fji/. According to Metajj/i. viii. 4, 1044, b, 12, the eclipses of the moon appear to serve no end vei 6
;
phenomena oaa
rhv (rtrov ah^-tiar), aXX' e| avdyKr]s rh yap avax^fv \|/yX^')''"* ^^^ ^"^ T^ ^vx&^v vSccp
Zei/s
^TTOJs
ovx
362
ARISTOTLE
shall hereafter
We
and how many phenomena he accounts for by the resistance of Matter to Form. Again the same property of Matter is also the source of all contingency in
Nature.^
first
By
'
the contingent,'
to
Aristotle,
who was
the
carefully
examine
all
this
conception,^ under-
stands in general
that which
is
neither contained
its
is
normal.^
yevifxcvop
viOfQai
of
Whether
also of all
freedom
(rvfj-fiaivei.
Koi ^X
rcf)
airoWvTai 6 alros eV Trj a\(f, ov TOVTov eveica vei ottojs air6\7]Tai, aWarovTO avfi fie fir] Ki^(Phys. ii. individual organs 8, 198, b, 18) of animals are without purpose the bile is a Tripirrufia Kal ovx eueKOL Tivos {Part. An. ibid. 1. 13), the stag has no use for its antlers
; :
choice in man, from which alone contingent effects really spring (to it alone at least these are referred in De Interpr. c. D, 18, b, 81, 19, a, 7), Aristotle does not tell us. In Phys. i. 5, 1 96, b, 17, sq., he expressly excludes frQ^ purpose, as such, from the domain of rixvof
':^vfxfiifir]Khs in the narrower sense, rb airh Tvxfis. ^ As he says himself, Phys. ii. 4. * An. Post. i. 4, 73, a, 34, b, 10 Aristotle calls KaS" aiira, oaa koI virdpx^i^ Te fv rcf tI iffriv oaois Twv cvvirapx^vrcov avrois avra iv Ty Koycp ivvirdpxovcri ry ti iari
'^
:
G6B, a, 6, 664, a, 7). The same is true of all superfluous materials which are unemployed such materials are &xpvo"roi' or even rwv Trapa (pvaiv Ti (Gen. An. i. 18, 725, a, 1, 4) we must therefore decide even in reference to one and the same material whether it serves a purpose or not lymph {lx<^p), eg., which consists partly of half-assimilated and partly of corrupted blood, is in the former aspect a'lfxaros X"P*'' ^^ ^he latter e| avdyKTis (Part. An. ii. 4 Jin.). Necessity of this latter kind, as is indicated in the passage quoted above from PJiys. ii. 8, coincides
{ibid.
iii.
2,
5r]\ovvTi
Si'
Sea 5e
;
firfderepoos
iirdpx^i, (rvfififiTiK6Ta
/iiev
further, t^
avrh virdpxov kKdcTT(f Kad^ fi}] 5i avrd (rv/j.fiefir]K6s. Top. i. 5, 102, b, 4 avfifi^firiKos Se iffriv ... & eySe'xeTat virdpx^iv
avrh, rd 5e
:
6r(f}0vv
evl
;
/col
.
T(f
avTCf
1
,
KoL
[xij
virdpx^iv
fievov
^
cf p. 234, n.
Svi/ardv,
on ivS^x^-
and
p. 218, n. 4,
p. 214, n. 3,
firiKos
with contingency.
AeyeTai
ft
virdpx^i
fji-fv
Ttv*
METAPHYSICS
363
place
by the witness of universal experience,^ and in particular by the fact of the Freedom of the Will.^ But he finds
the true rationale of
finite existence
all
all
from
this
many
The
latter
of
its
perfect accomplishment
'^^
owing
to the inde-
owing
to the
design.^
contingent or accidental
e|
t^ ttoKv.
The
vi.
same
1026
definition is given
b, 31 sqq. (xi. 8).
;
2,
ii.
oXws eariv eV ro7s /j.^ ael ivfpyovai rd Svvarov (hai, koI fx^ d/xoius. Metaph. vi. 2, 1027, a, 13: &(tt
t}
Phys.
uAtj
(XTai
iirl
;
alrla,
fj
iubexofx^vr]
5 init. Be Cwlo, i. 12, 283, a, 32: rh fifv yap avrcfiaTSv icTTi Kal rh aird Tvxv^ Trapa ro ctel Kai rh a>s
iirl
ii.
irapa t5 ws
rh
-ttoXu
&\\u}s, rod
8,
appearance of design in nature be explained by supposing that of her chance productions only
those survive which are fitted to Uve ? No ravra [xhv yap Kal iraura ra (pvaei fj ael ovtu yiverai ^ cos iirl rh troXh, roov 8' airh rvxvs Kal TOV avTO/xdrov ovdev. So Ue
:
(see p. 345, n. 5, svjjra), v. 30, 1025, a, 2i: ovSe S^ aXriov copicrixivov ovdev tov a-i;^)8e)37?/coTos, aWa rh tvx^u, tovto S' aSpiarou. Cf. n. 5 infra. See pp. 3G0 sqq. s^qjra,
(rv/i/SejSTj/cf^Tos
vii. 7
'
An. iv. 10, 778, a, 4: fiovXerai fikv oZv 7} (pvais to7s rovroou [t&v ^.arpoov'] api9/xo7s apidGen.
ras yeueaeis Kal tcls reXfVTas, ovk aKpifio7 5e did re t)]v ttjs i/Arjs anpiffTiav KaldiaTh yiveaQaiiroKXas apX"^> '' "^^^ yevea-eis ras Kara. <pvaiv koX to? <p6opas i/jLTrobi^ovaai noWaKis aKnai rwv irapa (pvaiv ffvfjLirnrrdvToiv elaly. See further p. 341 sqq.
ytieTj/
Ccclo,
'
ii.
8,
289, b, 26.
b, 31,
19, a, 7.
^ Be Interpr. c. 9, 19, a, 9 there must be contingency, '6ri
:
See
u.
3,
sniira.
Phys.
ii.
364
ARISTOTLE
Now,
since these
Contingency,
word,
may
But
activity in
obedience to a purpose
is
or cpnception of an object
realised.^
That which
;
it
is
unessential
and there-
17 rajv Se yivofxivoov to. rov ylyverai, raS' ov eveKo. tov oca re a-nh
: .
called Tiixv, otherwise avTOfxaTou, so that the latter is the wider conception. Both, however, stand
ecpially
Siavo'as
(pv(T(ios.
ii.v
.irpaxdeir]
5r)
Kol
airh
/xlv
oaa anh
TO,
tion
5,
uxTT
7]
aopiara ra ovtus
ysvrjTai,
.
.
tvxV^
atria, Koi
rvxv
rh
a'jTo aXriov
(TvfxfiefirjKhs
oi>pi(Tjj.4i/ov,
yap &j/ T(f hi cru/xfia'T]. It is chance, for instance, if one conies to a place for another purpose and is rewarded in a way he had not
aupiarov
197, a, 20). Akin to this, but unimportant for our present investigation, is the coincidence in time of two
'
thought of
sure
;
or
if
desires to sail to is carried to another or, generally, if from action directed to a definite end
l:ie
one
or if place
;
and
yhrjTai, ov
e|cD
Phys. ii. 6, 197, b, 19). If the action is one of voluntary choice (irpoaipeTou) such a chance (according to the passage just quoted from Phys. ii.) must be
TO
a'lTiov,
the moon. Such a coincidence (which is the purest and simplest case of contingency) Aristotle calls a-vfiTTUfxa, Div'm, jk S. i. 462, b, 26 sqq. 2 See p. 856 sqq. sujjra. Metaph. vi. 2, 1026, b, 18 Sxrirep yap ovSfxaTi jxdvov rh trvfjifiefi7]K6s ion. 5tb nXoLTCov rpSirov Tiva oil KUKois T^v o'o^io'TiKTju irepl rh fir} Ou fra^ev. elal yap ol ruu (rotpiffrdv Xoyoi irepl rh ffvfifiefir]Khs us clveTv (patuerat IJ.d\iara Trdvroov. L. 21 yap rh avfiPcPrjKhs iyyvs ri rov (xi)
^
OVTOS,
METAPHYSICS
fore Aristotle says that the contingent borders
3G6
non-existent.^
While
it is
becomes
'
'
still
clearer
From Matter
Aristotle is
is
apt to
is said to be merely one of material ^ and yet procreation, which depends upon it,^ occupies a most important place in the scheme of the philosopher.'*
;
' Anal. Post. i. 6, 75, a, 18, C. Mctaph. ihid. 1 02G, 30, 33 init. b, 2, 1027, a, 19 (xi. 8). 2 MctajjJt. vii. 5, 1030, b, 21 sex
,
hih
rh avrb
iv. 3,
(Tireptxa
OrjKv
v)
&ppij/
Cf. Uen.
ii.
An.
'
767, b, 8 sqq.,
3,
is
ix,iir\hu\eB,i\\eKaQ' a-jTavTTapxovTa;
and p. 353, n. 4, mj)ra. Be An. ii. 4, 415, a, 2G, and ol her passages. That this is in737, a, 27,
in
but
X. 9 iiiit. it is asked Zia ri yvv)^ avZphs ovk eiSet Sia(p4pi ... ou5e QfQv e?]\u Kal &ppiv 'irepoif t^ ei'Se/, KairoL Kad' avrh tov ((fov
remarked
by Engel,
Ueb.
d.
ical ovx ws Aeukottjs a\X' y Cv^^v, Kal rh 07i\v Ka.1 rh appev vTrdpx^i ; iin(] the answer is that a distinction in
aurrj
7;
Siacpopa
Koi
fieXavia,
kind rests on ivavTioTrjTes iu rcf ^6y(f alone, not on those eV rfj fi^rj. rh Se Sipp^w Kal 6rj\v tov Cv^^
oiKe7a u(u irdOr], aAA' ov
oixTiau,
kot^ r^y
crw/xart.
Bcdeut. d. vKf] Arist., llheiii. 3Ius. N.F. vii. 410. * It is even stated, Gen. An. i. 2, 710, a, 17, b, 8, that the sexual distinction, depending as it does on dilference of function, is /faro rhu Xdyov and is one oh Kara rh rvx^v fiopiou ov5h Kara ttjp rv^ovaav SvvafJLiv.
366
ARISTOTLE
we
sliall
Similarly
which Aristotle always represents as even in their physical nature different in kind from human beings, are yet at the same time to be regarded
lower animals,
as imperfect
formations
it
Matter that
w^e
must
and cor-
from tlie follows This general consideration that all Change and Becoming presupposes a material (sec jj.342,n.2 sq. suj^ra) which, as Suvdufi ov contains the possibility alike of being and not-being ( Gen. et
'
6.K\riXa.
PdWeiv
v\7i
jx^v
Tj
;
ecTTiv
/ur/,
oea vii. 10, 1035, a, 25 ovv (TvviiXriixixiva rh elSos Kal ravra fxku iarlu i/Atj
. .
(pdiiperai
/jt.^
els
ravra
oaa Se
Cor?',
ii.
Metaph.
vii.
7,
and
other passages. Cf. p. 345, n. 5), as Aristotle himself distinctly Cf. MctajJh. vii. 15 (see says. p.' 220, n. 2, supra), ix. 8, 1050,
b,
eCTt
5'
ovdiv Svudfxd
dtSioj/.
[Or as this
4,
203, b,
forms, of immaterial ou5' i<rri 1070, a, 15 yivecris Ka\ (pOopa rovrcav, aAA' dWov rp6irov etal Kal ovk clcrlv olKia re rj dvev vkrjs Kal vyieia Kal irav rh Kara rexvr\v not the form as such, as we must understand
is
said
3,
xii.
-KCKra
diiua/JLLs
aua
iffriv
[the possi-
being invohes the bility of possibility of not being, &c.] Th apa Swarhu (hai ivbex^Tui Koiflvai Kal p.)] eT'at(cf.p. 234, n. 1),
.
only its union with 1. 22, but this or that material has a beginning and end); xii. 1, 1069,
b, 3
2,
:
^8'
10G9, b, 24
:
irdvra
5' i/'At/i/
t})
S'
iv^ex^lJ-^vov
(xri
Hvai
2, init.).
The motion, therefore, of every perishable thing is combined with effort, for only thus is the possibility of the opposite sta*e (the hvva;xis t7]s avr i<bd(Ttci}S, 11. 25,
.30
oaa ^jTajBiAAet. Longit. v. S> p-'h ear IV evavriov Kal oiroi a^vvarov av ei'rj (pdaprjvaL fxr} eariv But we may not infer from this the indestructibility of any material thing: advvarou yap r(p v\t]v
b, 7
TrdfTri fxeu
ex^t 3, 465,
sqq.)
overcome
rh
eudex^Tai,
irau
8'
elvai
27
otrcoj/
aBvuarov ^ depfihu J) evdv rj KevKov Kexo^pKr/xeva etrrai yap ra irdOT} [' for in this case these qualities
Ka\
/nera/SoA./;
its
would
be
independent
exist-
MBTAPHYStCS
said of all badness
ences
'].
367
ovv,
orav
^ rh
possibility of opposites, since its conception has for ever been realised in it and will always continue to be realised. Evil
out beginning can have an end, and nothing that is without end can have had a beginning, since this could only be if it were its nature at one time to be, at another not to be. t&v Se
TOIOVTWV T] aVTT} SvyafjLis ttjs avTKpdcreus Kal rj SXt] alria rov
eluai Kol
'
fi-ff.
tV
ix. 9, 1051, a, 15 ; Aristotle seems, indeed, to assert the very opposite of this avdyK-r) 8e Koi itrl Twv KUKccv rh Te\os Kal iuepyeiav eJvai x^^P^^ '''VS Suua/iiecas t5 70^ Suvduepou ravTO &!J.(pci) ravavTia. Srjkou &pa on ovic eVri rh Ka/cbj/ Trapa to irpdyfiara vaT^pou yap ttj (pvffei rh Kanhv rrjs
:
Metaph.
and imperfection, on the other hand, consist in nothing else than a discrepancy between the concept of a thing and its actual state. While, therefore, on the one hand, the Svud/j-ci hv cannot be itself evil, yet is it, on the other hand, the ultimate cause and condition of it. Accordingly Aristotle himself speaks {Phys. i. 9, 192, a, 15) of
the KaxoTTOihv of the i/Ar;. He it is not evil in itself and in its essence, but only
admits that
'
in a secondary sense, and in so far as, being without form, it lacks also the qualitj^ of goodness
(cf. p. 324, n. 6, and p. 344, n. 1). But it is precisely upon this want and this indeterminateness that
'
Suvd/j.e(i}s.
But
this only
means
minations (see
to
p. 234, n. 1, S7ij)ra)
merely Swdfxei hv we cannot attribute one of two mutually exclusive qualities, such as good and bad, as the Platonists had done in explaining matter as evil (cf. I)k\ i.
is
what
642, 6, 721, 737). Nevertheless, the ultimate cause of evil can only reside in the Swdfifi ov, in other words, in matter and this is indicated by Aristotle himself when, in the passage just quoted, he proceeds ovk &pa ov5' iv To7i e| apxv^ kolI to7s aiSiois oiidiv iariu ovtc Kanhv ovTe a/j.dpTTifia ovT 5i(f)6ap/xfi/ou Kal yap rj
:
the possibility of its turning out bad as well as good depends. Eternal reality excludes evil, since it has either no matter at all, or one which, as perfectly definite and formed, is incapable of opposite determinations while mutability and change, on the other hand, are sure indications of evil and imperfection, (On this subject cf also Eth. JV. vii. 15, 1154, b, 28 fiera^oXi] Se irdvTcov yXvKVTarov, Kara rhv ttoit^t^u, Sia TTov-qpiav rivd. uxrirep yap dvOpcoTros
:
rj
(pixns
Seo/jLeuT]
oi55'
ixera^oXris
iirieiKTis.)
ou
yap
5i(X(p6opa
is
rwv KaKwu
since
7i(f
,
SO we shall find that Aristotle traces all imperfect forms of natural existence to the resistance which the matter offers to the form and by a parity of reasoning he would have been forced to refer the
aK\rj
:
And
368
feet
ARISTOTLE
and imperishable heavenly bodies are no less formed In Matter alone we must seek of a definite material.^ for the cause of change and motion, which result from
an innate striving of Matter after Form.^
finally, is
Matter,
all
those
things at least
and Form.
Aristotle
of the
we could have wished and thereby he bequeathed to his followers in the Middle Ages a rich op:
and man, incorporeal beings free from any taint of Matter, which we must nevertheless regard as being also individual existences.^ Yet when the Form becomes actual in
anv material,
it is
why the
source oE moral evil to the body, which in his general scheme is alone passive and changeable,
had he
vague.
not, as
we
wholly
"' Aristotle himself has not overlooked this objection. He meets it {MctapU. viii. 4,1044, b, eVi Se twv 6) with the remark (pvcriKciy jiifv aiSiwv 5e ovaiuv &\\os
:
On
\6yos. "laws 'yap evia ovk exet vhrjv, (pvaiKoX koX ^1 o-j ToiavTt]i' (as the
'y^vvrirai ovciai)
aXXa
fx6vov
Kara
Similarly xii, 2, 1069, b, 24. The ether, for instance, of which the heavens and the heavenly bodies consist, is said to have no ei'avTiwo-is and therefore to be subject to no It has chano-e in its substance.
T6irov KivoTiv.
angels devised, to the effect that these pure spirits, as specitically different from every other and itself the only member of the species, is therefore at once specifically and numerically single, is nowhere suggested by
each of
Aristotle.
METAPHYSICS
369
Form is never present in it except under certain limiting conditions and with certain definite properties, which are not contained in the Form as such that is, in the pure
The Form
or Concept
is
always a
Universal,' denoting not a thing but a kind,^ of being thought, but not of existing,
and capable
by itself apart from Between the Individuals into which the m^/nce species resolve themselves no difference of kind or Form any longer exists,'* and consequently they must be distinguished from one another by their Matter.^ Aristotle is
things.^
<5
through-
fxeXauia
us
tj
v\t]
yap
6 6.v6p(i}iros,
ov
TTotu
Se
Sia<})opay
i/Atj-
difference]
yap
the form
not something apart from definite material things, aAAa t^ toi6v^( arj/jLaluti, rdde Kal
is
oipifffxivov
etd-r] ^iolv ol ayOpoDnoi Sia tovto, Kairoi '^Tcpai al (TapKes Kal ra ocrra e| uv o5e Kal oSe a^Xa rh avvoKov
ovK
f(TTiv,
aWa
iroiel Kal
yei/va
K tovSc roidvSe.
is itself
the distinctive
:
universaliiy; see pp. 'S3'd,Scc.supra. ^ Phys. ii. 1, 11)3, b, 4 ^ P-op<ph Koi rb eidos, ov xajpitrrbv ou ctAA' ^ Kara rhv \6yov. Metaph. viii. 1, 1042, a, 2G sqq. v. infra, n. G.
;
Seeuotesatpp.216, 221,&c.
supra.
(Uei S' ovx '^repou, on iv T(f Koycp ohK eariu ivavriooais. There are certainly passages in Aristotle in which that which constitutes the difference between individuals of the same species seems to be included in the conception of their clSos thus it cannot be overlooked that the conception, ^.^., of man, which according to the passage just
**
'irepov fxh',
Metapk. vii. 8fi?i. (cf. c. 10, the form unites with the matter, rh 5' airav ^'St? rh
^
1035, b, 27 sqq.)
elSos
Toiovde
Kal oTTols KaXKias Kal ^ooKpdrTis Kal CTepou fihv Sia r^qv v\r]v, ercpa
quoted is an injima species, does nat exclude certain individual differences which have a reference, not to the matter alone, but also to the form of the individual
members
form).
of
it
{e.g.
their bodily
i(Tri
rh fih \6yos rh
fiep iv Tqi
ttSei
ooai evavTi6Tr}T(s
S' i/Arj,
5' cV
t^
VOL.
B B
370
ARISTOTLE
;
out
but
of
it is
no room
for
essence things;
several individual the contrary, the former always resolves itself Metaph. finally into the latter. koli. xii. 5, 1071, a, 27, it is said Tu>v eV Tahrf^ et'Set eVepa [sc. to. fiSej, aW' (TroLxeld eVriv], ovk OTL ruiv KaOcKaarou 6,\\o, Vj re a)] rh elSos v\7} Koi rh Kivr\<Tav Koi Kal 7] e/j.^, r(^ Ka66\ov Se Xdycp While, however, accordravrd.
or Socrates.
:
The only
lies
on
ground of individuality
the matter
v\r]
(veffTi,
in
fore
(1.
is]
T^
18).
of Metapli.
(etrrt 5'
/meu
T]
T]
is true 1042, a, 26
ovaiaTh
.
. .
viroKfi/xevov,
5' 6
^Woos
vXt]
&\\ws
\6yos Koi
an
elSos of his
own
different
from
that of everyone else, still the one does not differ from the other in kind. They will differ from one anot her, therefore, only in so far as they belong to different subjects or in otlier words, in tlieir actual embodiment, not in their characfer apiO/xcf, not e'lSei. Metaph.
:
rdSc ri hv ry \6y(f) rpirov 5e rb iK rovTCov, ov y^vecns fiSvov Ka\ <p6opd i(TTi Koi x'^P^^'''^^ air\u>s), and of the similar statement, Metaph. v. 8 (see p. 3 72, n. 2, i7ifra). The form is a rJSe in so far as it expresses a definite kind of being (man, but it becomes the beast, kc.) form of a definite individual thing in being united with a Considered material. definite
fxopcpr],
XcopjcTToV
icrri.
1, it
said: the name oixria seems fo belong in the first place to the toiovtov 5e vTTOKeiueuov trpwrov Tp6i:ov yueV riva 7] i/'Atj Acyerai, &\^ov Se rp6irQV t] fxopcp)), Tpirov Se Since, then, by rh e/c TovTuv. viroKLiJLvov ov substancc the individual thing as the subject of all its predicates is elsewhere understood (cf pp. 332 sqq., 300, kc), we should naturally refer /xopcpr) here to the form of the individual thing qua individual. But from the further explanation, c. 8, it
'
.
and
as
it is
conclude,
that Phys.
/J-opcph
iv
rep
aiaQ-nrw (1033, b, 5), this ws Mos ^ ovaia AcySixevov, is only the un-
realised form which first makes this definite thing into a thing which is defined in this or that way (T(55e into a roidvSe, 1. 23) in the actual thing, i.e. in the
from the fact 210, b, 29 sq., seems to reckon the eWos as well as the vXt] a constituent element of the thing, that it is the cons-til utive principle of individual This is true rather of being.' the material in which the form Even De is first individualised. An. ii. 1, 412, a, 6 leads to no other conclusion. It is there said Xeyofieu 5^ y4vos 'dv ri rSov tvrwv t)]V ovaiav, ravTijs 5e t5 fieu ws vXr}U, h KaO' avrh fifu ovk ^ari T({5e Tt, eTipov Se ij.op<p^v Kol eJdos, Kad' ^v ^5t7 \4yTai rJSe tj, /col rpirov rh eK rovrcov. The thing is called this definite thing, i.e. a thing of
(Form
If.
Mat.
iv.
3,
'
matter, but vi^hich on the other hand itself stands related to individual things as man is to
this kind, because its material has received this form so the r6^e means here also, not the individual, but the specific peculiarity.
;
Still
less
in such passages as
METAPHYSICS
individual
Metaph.
871
Forms of
1071,
a,
sensible things.^
20 {apxh
Every Individual
xii. 5,
yap rh Kad' eKacTov ruv Kad' sKacrrop &>6pa}Tros yap avOpdoTrov Kad6\ov
'
'Ax'^^ecos, &c.)
itisCasHERTLiNG-
sajs at p. 57), stated 'in plain words that the form, like all first
principles, must be individual.' Peleus, however, is not the mere form of an individual but a real
individual thing, since it gives to the individual its peculiar nature, and is thus distinguished from the essence {rh t\ ^v elvai), which is always, at least in sensible things, a universal. He admit?, however, that these two conceptions, which in certain passages Aristotle undoubtedly recognises as distinct, are as a rule
individual and he has become so by the union of the form man with this particular human body.
;
Moreover,
5,
"(Siou elSos
(Metaph.
xii.
1071, a, 14) refers, not to the individual form of this or that man, but to the form man in general. So also the remark (Be An. i. 3, 407, b, 23) that any soul may not enter any body, since all have their Xhiov eI5os Ka\ fxop<p)]v, must be taken to refer to bodies and souls of different kinds, and to mean that the soul of a man may not wander into the body of a beast. And when Gen. An. iv. 1, 7G6, a, GG sqq. explains the origin of the female sex on the ground that the male principle cannot transform the material into its Xhiov ^Ihos, it is not dealing with the. individual type, but with the form of the male sex. It does not alter the case here that difference of sex according to Metaph. x. 9 (see p. 365, n. 2, stqjra) resides not in the ovaia ( = elSos) of the Cv"^ but only in the i/Ai7 and the craj^a for even although it be true that to Aristotle this diffeience concerns, not the essence of man or animal as such, but only the form of the
:
used interchangeably by h im. It seems more correct to say, on the contrary, that it was Aristotle's conscious intention to identify the two, and to treat the form as well as the essence as a universal.
If in
we
monise with this view, this is an inconsistency which the actual facts of the case forced upon
him. It is not the expression of the view with which he started and which was only afterwards obscured. That the essence of each thing lies in its form is to
hody, yet it is not on that account a mere question of individuality. Hertling (Form ti. Mat. 48 sq.) believes that the form in Aristotle mu.'^t necessarily be an
'
opposite he never stated in express words; it can only be deduced from casual expressions to which we cannot certainly prove that Aristotle himself consciously attached this significance. As a matter of fact the boundary line between the essential marks which constitute the class conception, and the unessential which constitute mere individual difference, is very impalpable. In every attempt to define it and to explain certain differences among th'ngs as class differences, others as individual varieties within the same class,
we
BB
372
ARISTOTLE
is
an Individual.^
'
two terms
ently.^
sible to
'
object of sense
is
and
'
individual
all this,
'
indiffer-
If Matter
the cause of
it is
it is
imposcontri-
suppose that
distinguished from
:
Form only
it
rather
must
own
to
Form.
of multiplicity,
Kahoi
ot /itv
.
o-vfifiaivfi
perienced this difficulty is undeniable but it does not therefore follow that he did not make the attempt, and that he intended from those eihr] which coincide with class conceptions to distinguish a second kind of d^f] which represent, not what is common to the class, but what is peculiar The truth is to the individual. that there is no place in his scheme for such individual forms. For since according to the wellknown view that the form has neither origin nor end (see p. 342 and this must hold also of the form which as ro'Se ri is in an individual existence see preceding note) the individual forms of
:
y
5'
ivavTicos
yap
.
e/c
Trjs
(paiviTai
:
which,
however, Plato did not deny, since it is just because the same material gives only one specimen, that material things constitute a plurality even when there is no distinction of kind between them as Aristotle also holds. ^ Cf. 3Ietaj)7t.. iii. 4 Ceiled p. 342, n. supra) where he says if there were nothing but individual things, there would be nothing but sensible existence xii, 3, ovaiai Se rpfis, 1070, a, 9 fxiv
>';
r^
(paiveadai
ert rpirr]
Se (pvcris (here
=
'
els
V)
Kai
7]
e'^ty
ris
ck
sensible things, if there are such, must be in actual fact separable from the things whose form they are but this in Aristotle's view is wholly inadmissible. 1 mtaph. vii. 11, 1037, a, 1:
;
TovToou,
i.
Kad^
(Kaffra.
De
Ccnlo^
:
9,
227, b,
219, n.)
Form as such
and
is
something
differ-
yap uArj ti's iariu t fi-i] ehai Kol eJSos avTo Ka6' Ibid. xii. 8, avrh aXXa r6Be ti. This only cited p. 339, n. sujjra. has there refers, however, as been already remarked, to the individual rcembers of an injzma
KoX TrauTos
iari ri
-^ju
ent from form in the material if, for instance, there existed only one single circle, tlie circle would still continue to be something different from this circle. The one would be the iUos, the other clhos V rfj vXri /col rHv Ka6'
cKaarov.
eirel
yap
alcr9T]Thv
eV
t^
vKri
sjtecies.
See Plato
2
e.g.
Meta2)h.
1.
6,
988, a,
'Individual reality' and eihos iv rfj v\r) here signify the same thing.
virripx^v.
METAPHYSICS
373
a higher value,
when we
is
Substance,
and
if
we have
the
just
seen,
is
always
universal,
Form, and if
is
therefore
Matter
then
we cannot
and that
of
Matter supplies the ground also of substantial being, it is not pure Form, but the composite result
Form and Matter which alone is Substance. Indeed, since we have defined Substance as the substratum
'
(uTTOKStfisvov)
and have
it
also recognised in
Matter the
substratum of
all
all
Yet
it is
impossible
admit
this.
;
Form alone Matter, on the contrary, is no more than the bare Potentiality of that whereof the Actuality is Form. Not only, therefore, is it impossible that
belongs to
its
Form
there
are
expressly identifies
Form with
Substance.'*
He
to
which
'
it
belongs,^ so that
2 '
*
See pp. 331 sqq. See pp. 300, 333, and notes. See pp. 344 sq. Kg., Motaph. i. 3, 983, a,
iii.
27;
4,
1080,
(eiSos
b,^ 5,
6e
fKaarov
. .
Kal
A7a;
tV
c. 10, 1035, b, 32, c. 1037, a, 29, c. 17, lOil, b, 8 viii. 1, 1042, a, 17, c. 3, 1043, b, 10 sqq.; ix. 8, 1050, a, .5; Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 6 Meteor. iv. 2, 379, b, 2G, c. 12, 390, a, 5; Part. An. i. 1, 641, a, 25; Gen. An. i }, 7li, a, 5. Cf, p. 214, n. * Metajjh. vii. G in answer to
1
1
,
rl ^v ehai),
374
ARISTOTLE
Further, he will not suffer anything else
of the thing.
im-
Substance (ovald)
in the full
is
and
strict sense of
the word.
The question
to a
is
whether we are
to assign
it
Form which
or
In
his Metaphj^sics
in the Form, or in
Whole produced by
would not be known
the Matter, or
in
the composite
the question (1031, a, 15) irorfpou ravriu iariv t) krepov to ri ^u flvai J) (Kaarov ; it is said that the}^ are different only in the cas9 in which a conception belongs to a thing Kara avfifie^riKhs
exist, things
(rwu
5'
tion expresses the essence of the thing itself they are one and the same. Kg. the conception of whiteness is different from the on the other KfvKhs Hudpcoiros hand the hi ehai is not different irom the fu, the ayaOcp dvai from the ayaOhv, nor again (c. 10, 1036, a, 1, of. viii. 3, 1043, b, 2) the kvkKos, fhai from the KvK\cf>
;
ovK ecrrai ^irKTrrifxy}, to OVK carai ovra 1031, b, 3). Tliis holds of all o<Ta fxr) /car' &\\o Xeyerai, aWa Kaff avra Koi irpioTa. rwv 1031, b, 13, cf. 1032, a, 5 trpdoTcov KoL Kad' avra Xeyo/xevwu rh eKaarcf elj/at Kal cKaaToy rb avro Kal eV 4<TTi c. 11, 1037, a, 33 sqq.
fxhv
:
;
'
and
1017, b, 23 (rv/xfidivei Sr; Kara Svo rpoirovs t)]V ovffiav \4ye(rdai, t6 6' vrroKeififVOV
Metapk.
<E<Txo.Tov,
fjir}KTi
Kar^
6,\\ov
hv r65e ri hv Kal [where, however, as X<*>pi<tt6v f? 8CHWEGLER and BONITZ rightly remark upon this passage, we
\4yTai,
Kal h
Xoopiffri^v to
cf. viii. 1
METAPHYSICS
the combination of
both.^
375
his
Bat
answer
is
far
from satisfactory.
He
admits
that Matter
cannot
it
altogether of this
title,
the substratum of
all
amid change.^
Matter
the
is
Nor
is
it
sufficient to
maintain that
Form,
latter
;
being
for
actually,
the
former
only poten-
tially so
TOiovrov Se
how can we
rj
conceive of a Substance
5'
kKaffrov
fiop(ph
Kal
on
eV
t]
vKt] hr\\ov.
rb
f/5os.
'
.
:
irdaais
VII. 3 init. (cf at p. 370) use ' substance in various ways as equivalent to the Ti ^v ehai, tlie KaQoKov, the yevos, By the last, the viroKei/xevov. again, we may understand either the v\rj or the iJ-op<p^ or the comOf posite product of both. these, however, the Ka96\ov, and with it the y4yos (on the relation of which to the k3.66\ov, see p. 213 sq.), are quietly set aside, 13 (cf. p. 333, sujjra) and c. since the fiopcj)^ coincides with the Ti ^v fhai there only remain the three above-mentioned sigCf. 0. 13 nifications of oiia-la. init, viii. 1, 1012, a, 26 sqq.
we may
'
ralsfjerafioXais. Cf.p.344.
7,
:
IMdAx.
1049, a, 34 the substratum of the rode ri is v\r] Kal ovala vKiK-i]', et ovv iarl rh vii. 10, 1035, a, 1 fiev xiXr] rh 5' elSos rh 5' e'/c rovrwv, Kal ovaia tj tc vArj Kal rh elSos Kal rh fK rovrxv. Fhys. i. 9, 192, a, 3 (cf. pp. 342 sqq. and notes)
: :
Tjfxus
/xeu
yap
v\r]u
Kal
ar(pi](Tiv
fieu o'JK
rr}v
5e
areprtaiv
5e
Kad^
rijv
vXrfU,
rr)V
ii.
ffrfpr](riv
oudaficis.
Be An
(see p. 669,
:
n, 6, supra).
ifnd. 0. 2
Be An.
;
369, n.
a,
2
6,
sujjra)
23 sq.
Metapli.
vii.
Metapli, viii. 1, 1012, a, 26 ovaia rh viroKei/jicvov, &W(i)S 6.K\ws 5' b Xoyos jxlv 7] vKt], . rpirov Sc rh ex Kal v fiopcp^, rovruv c. 2 init. cVel 5' r] fi\v ws vTroKeifj-iPT] Kal &S vXrj ovala
*
%ari
5'
7}
Svpdfiei,
\onrhp
fin. ris
7]
:
tV
^s ivcpyciav
ris
5r/
ovcriav
ruv
'
alcrdrirwv
etVetj/
iffriv.
Ibid.
'
Xo^p^fTrhv
SoKfl
Kal rh T(^5e ri virdpx^^v fidAKTra ttj ovala, 8ih rh flSos Kal rh 6^ afifpoLv ovaia hoJ^mv Uv fhai fiaWov rrjs i/Arjs. Cf. further, p. 345 sqq.
<pavfphv
iK rwv elpTJixevoy
Kal ttws
5'
7}
fxkv
yap ws
v\7],
7)
7)
ws
fiop<p^,
r)
'6ri
eVepyeia
Se
rpir7]
CK
Meta^yh.
viii. 1,
1042, a, 32
376
ARISTOTLE
:
which is merely potential that is, an absolute existence which does not yet actually exist ? If we grant that Form
the proper Substance of things, actual existence in the highest sense, and that as such it is opposed not ouly to Matter but also to the composite product of
is
show how
is
Form
in itself
always a Universal, that the Individual is always burdened with Matter, and that Substance is originally individual Substance. In like manner he fails to tell
the essence and substance of things which cannot be conceived apart from a definite material composition 2 or again how Matter devoid. of quality and determination can produce the individual
;
us
doterminateness of particular existences which are not related to each other as so many impressions of a die but are differentiated from one another qualitatively by
definite properties.
Finally,
it
is
why
and extinction should pertain to things that are the joint product of Form and Matter, and 3^et nqt to Form
birth
lutoly great and small) avdyK-q re iKaarov v\r]v eluai rh Sui-duei TOLOvrov, uxrre /col ovaias t^ Se irpos Tt oijTe Svvdaei ovaia ovre
:
ehai fiaWov
rrjs
vKrjS.
r^y
fikv
roivvy e| afi({>o7y ovaiay, \4yco Se r7}V iK re rrjs v\r]s Kal rrjs ixopcprfs, a(per4oy vcrrepa yap Kal 5^ At;,
'
ivepyela.
viii. 3 init. iyiore XavOdv^L trSrepov crrjfialpei rh tvo/xa (TwOfTov ovff'av ^ T^ju ivepy^iav T
'
:
Mctaph.
Kal
T^v
fiop(pr]v,
oTov
t}
oIk'u irdTepuv
rov koivov oti (TKeiraa-fxa e/c \lQwv cJjSI Kei/jLevu>v, ?) TTJs epepyeias Kal rod e^Sovs on arKfiraafia vii. 3, 1029, a, 5: et
(TTlfMelov
irXivOcoy Kal
Tt>
?5os
T?is
vAris
irpoTcpov
Kal
frequently distinguishes between conceptions of pure form and of form inherent in a definite material the standing example of the latter is the (ri/jihy as distinguished from the ko7\ov so also axe, saw, house, statue, and even soul. Cf. Pkys. ii. 1, 194, a, 12, ii. 9 Jin. Be An. i. 1, 403,
2
;
Aristotle
fxaWov
Kal rod ef afKpolv xpSrcpov fffrai line 29 rh eldos xal rh ef a/x^olv ovcrla SS^eiev &j/
iy,
; :
b, 2,
vii.
ii.
1,
412, b, 11.
10, 1035,
a,
Mcfaj)h.
1 sqq. b,
5,
c.
METAPHYSICS
or Matter separately. ^
377
For even if we can suppose that Matter as such had no beginning, it is hard to imagine
that the
Forms
Substance.
we discerned in dealing with the notion of The fact is that Aristotle combiues in his Mefails to
harmonise.
On
to
is
always Universal.
On
the other side he acknowledges that this Universal has no existence apart from the Individual, which he
therefore declares to be the Substance.
He
cannot
explain
how
may
coexist in one
and hence the above-mentioned contraAt one time the Form, at another the Individual which is the product of the union of Form and Matter, appears to be the Actual. Matter causes
philosophy,
dictions arise.
mere Potentiality. It is represented at the same time as indefinite Universality and as the ground of individual determinateness. So the un*
Metaph.
vii.
15 cited at p.
ovaiav Xiyoi^v.
audyKT} Sh Tavrrju
219, n.
viii, 1,
1042, a, 29
TpiToi/ 5e
rb
e/c
^ aidiou dvai ^ (pdapTTjv kvev rod (peeipea-eai Kal y^yovivai &vfv rov yiyueaOai rh elSos ovSeU
. .
TovTwu
[form
:
and matter],
;
oZ
c. 3,
ovSh yej/^a, aWa Troiilrai T(i5e yiyvirai hi r6 ck tovtcou c. 5 init. iirel S' evia &yeu yevicr^ws Kal (pdopas ea-ri Kal ovk
noiel
;
:
Qii^ (Ivai h irapa ravrd ^(Ttlv, d ravd' uK-n ovaia' h i^aip7] ovpTcs rrjv vArju \4yov7iu. et odv rovT alTiov rov ehai Kal oixrias [so BoNiTZJ, TovTO avrijv tiv t)]v
.
.
iariv, olov ai dTiyixal, eKirsp flalu, Kal oAojs to. e^idv Kal al /nopcpal, oh
yap rh XVKhu yiyverai, dWa rh ^v\ov KivKuv. Cf. pp. 341 sqq., and notes there.
878
AUtSTOTLB
we cease to wonder that Aristotle's
among
the
and to a far greater extent among the logicians of the Middle Ages.
also
vital
Form and Matter, Potential and Actual. By means of this distinction he explain show Unity can also be Multiplicity; how the Genus and Differences form one Concept; how the many Individuals constitute one Species how Soul and Body make one Being.^ It is this alone which enables
;
him
to solve the
all
as well as tinction of
others
had stumbled.
of this
problem.
and Potential, they are in a position of essential correlathe notion of the Potential implies the possibility
of
its
becoming Actual
it
that
that
is
Everything
;
is
to
become actual must be potential and conis potential must at some time
actual, since
become
what
is
never to be actual
Aristotle
Nor does
mean
Cf.
pp.219,
5.
n, 2, 351, n. 1,
ii.
and
369, n.
De An.
1,
412,
assertion that a thing is potential only so long as it is actual but he forbids us also to say {ihid. c. 4 init.') '6ti Swarov fiev roU ovk %<rTai 5e, since this could only
;
METAPHYSICS
379
by Potentiality any mere logical or formal but also real Potentiality. Matter is in itself or in its capacity that whereof the Actuality is Fo^^m and consequently
;
Matter of
itself implies
is
provoked by
to
is
itself.^
On
is
Form
ness to Matter
by
it
the
But the
be said of that which by its very nature could not be but this could not be potential, and he therefore denies (as was pointed outatp. 366,n. l)that in things of eternal duration there can be any potentiality without actuality. * Cf. the passage, Phys. 1, 9, quoted p. 344, n. 1. Matter is said by nature icpUaQai. koX
:
from
distinguished compulsion, audyKr] "jrapa t)]v 6pij.^v, and the falling of a stone quoted as an example of the former (similarly Metaph. v. 5, 1015, a 2f3, b, 1, c. 23, 1023, a, 17 sq., xii. 7, 1072, b, 12 cf.
;
Hektling, Mat.
u.
Form,
91).
6p4ya6ai
Kol i(peTov,
tov
deiov
Kal
ayadov
and this is the principle upon which we must explain the movement of the world by God and of the body by the soul.
Cf such expressions as Metaph.
.
Nevertheless we cannot but recognise in the use of these expressions the psychological analogy from which the terminology is borrowed, reminding us as it does of the earlier hylozoism.
2 Aristotle as a rule makes no distinction between these two terms (see Trendelenburg, Be An. 296 sq. SCHWEGLiiR, Arist.
;
xii.
7,
;
1072, b, 3
ibid,
a,
Kivel
:
ws
ipdo-
(icjov
26
rh
hp^Krhv
oi)
Kivovjx^vov.
to is
cjnscious desire, but a natural impulse, and is frequent ly referred to by Aristotle as the cause of the natural movements of bodies. Thus {Phys. ii. 1, 192, b, 18) we are told a work
:
no mere
sq.
b,
35
if
and
he seems to do so in individual
passages, yet is the distinction of each from the other so loosely defined that in different passages the same is assigned to both. Thus motion is usually called the entelecheia of matter, the soul the entelecheia of the body (cf. Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 26, 201, a, 10, 17, 28, 30, b, 4 viii. 1, 251,
;
of art ovdffi'au
fioKrjs efKpvTov,
Spfiiju
e;^et
jx^ra-
1023,
a, 8,
avTov (pvariu and Kara T^fv abrov ipuhv are parallel phrases Anal.
Post.
ii.
11,
94,
b,
37,
where
rijv
a, 9
Be An.
inner necessity,
dvay/crj
Kara
27, b, 5, 9,
380
ARISTOTLE
Motion.^
The
correlation
therefore
of
its
Form and
Causes.
(3) Motion
and
the first
Cause of Motion.
what he meant by
other words,
it
the definition
we have
guoted.
in
is
its
own end
life,
in
happiness, is called energeia, while on the other hand that which is subord inate to an end outside itself and ceases with its attainment, e.ff. building, walking, &c., is called motion. (On these two kinds of activities, ?;. also c. 8, 1050, a, 23 sqq.) Metaph. ix. 8, 1047, a, 30 again seems to appropriate eVreAexeta to the state of completion, eVe'pyeia to the activity directed to its attainment, or to motion (Sok7 yap
iy(pyeia fxtxKiffTa 7} Kiuriais eJpaij, so c. 8, 1050, a, 22. Also Be ii. 5, 417, b, 4, 7, 10, 418, a, 4, ivT^K^x^ia stands for the completed state. (That Metapli. xi, 9, 1065, b, 16, 33, repeatedly uses ivepyeia where Phj/s. iii. 1 has eVreAexeja, is of no importance, on account of the spuriousness of the former passage.) Elsewhere motion is called iv^pyeia areA^s, eV. rod a.T(\ovs, and as such is dis-
thought,
and An.
pression occurs Mcta]-)li. xii. 8, 1074, a, 35, c. 5, 1071, a, 36, as applied to the pure, immaterial form, viz. God. Phys. iii. 3 init. the action of the moving cause is ev4pyia, called the change effected in that which is moved eVreAexeict, a use which seems quite proper, as the latter and not the former is brought to completion by motion yet in the passage that follows eVreAexetais used of both, and in Metaph. ix. 8, 1030, a, 30 sqq. it is said, with reference to the two kinds of activities distinguished above in the case of those whose end is outside of themselves, the energeia is in that which is moved in the case of the others, in that which acts. It is therefore impossible to point to any fixity in the language used to express the distinction between these two terms. Phi/s. iii. 1, 201, a, 10, b, 4: Tov Swdfici ovros ivreX^x^ia ^ 7] roiovTOv, Kivrjais icrriv tj rod Svvarov, y Suvarhv, eVreAcxeto
;
(pavfphv
'6ri
:
Klvrjffls
iariv
c.
2,
a-rrXMs ivtp-
202, b, 7
Kivrjffis
cVreAexeja rod
METAPHYSICS
381
The movement of
which a house can be made, into an actual house. But motion is the entelechy of potential existence only qua potential and
not in any other relation.
for instance, out of
brass,
which a statue
cern it in so far as it is brass for qua brass it remains unaltered and has always had a certain sort of actuality but only in so far as it contains the potentiality of being
made
KivrjTov
into a statue.^
it
f)
kivi]t6u
viii. 1,
25
a, 9
4>a/iej/ Stj
tV
a, 9, sqq. xi. 9,
(and
X^tav Tov
1065, b,
KH/7JT0V p Kiyr)T6y. So Metaph. xi. 9, 1065, 'b, 16, 33 see preceding note. That only this transition and
;
sqq.).
(
Brentano's explanation
t'
by
means
Vun der mannigf. Bedeutung des Seienden nach Arist. p. 68), according to which motion is the actuality which transforms a
potential being into 'this potential being,' or which constitutes or forms a potential as potential,' is without support either in Aiistotle's use of terms or in actual fact. For, in the first place, the entelechy of the ^wdix^i tv is not that by which the Sw. hi> first comes into being ; and, in the
'
meant by the expression entelecheia or energeia is obvious not less from the nature of the case itself than from ihe repeated description of motion as an uncompleted energy or entelechy
(see pp. 383, n. 1, 379, n. 2). The same distinction elsewhere occurs.
Pleasure,
is
e.g., is
said not to be a
second bronze
place, when, e.g., the which is potentially a statue is formed into the statue,
its KLVT](Tis
its
i.e.
becoming
kudpihs,
the attainment, of the end, a result of the completed activity. Eth. N. X. 3, 4, vii. 13, 1153, a, 12. * In this way the previously
bron7e, Aristotle, however, has stated the meaning of his definition unambiguously in the
quoted
definition is
explained.
and
382
is
ARISTOTLE
clear,
be
only applied to
for
tlie
case of
special or
is
particular
movement;
own.
sucli
movement
always
some
sort of its
general notion of
If, on the otlier hand, we take the movement, it may be defined as the
process
by which Potentiality is actualised, the development of ^fatter by Form, since the material (pia material is mere Potentiality which has not yet in any
respect arrived at Actuality.
all
destruction.
is
never assaid,
Aristotle.^
It follows
refuses to regard
as
forms of motion, maintaining that though every motion ^ this distinction is chano-e, all change is not motion
must be accepted
as a relative one
h^
on other occasions^ employs motion and change as synonymous terms. The doctrine, however, of the different
kinds of motion belongs to Physics.
is intermediate between and actual being it is Potentiality struggling into Actuality, and Actuality not yet freed from Poten;
We
potential
tiality
in
other
It
is
distinguished
from mere
by being
sense
an
its strictest
is
by
directed
'
E.g. Pliys.
sqq.
c.
METAPHYSICS
to
383
lias also attained its object thought, for both a process of search and also a mental possession of the object of thought whereas motion ceases in the attainment of the object, and is therefore
an object
is
instance,
only an unaccomplished
effort. *
Hence each
particular
motion
is
opposite
a transition from one state of being into an from that which a thing ceases to be into
it
there
has to become. Where there is no opposite, no change.^ Consequently all motion implies two principles that which moves, and that which is moved, an actual and a potential being.
is also
that which
it it
Motion
eveKa 77 Kiur^ffis, ovk eari ravra ^ ov reXeia ye ov yap reXos, dAA' eKeiuT) evvirdpx^i rh tcAo? Kal
uiv
irpa^is
oPTwv ovT e/s evfpyeiau tan de7i/ai avT^u anXctiS' ovtc yap rd Svvarhv voahv ilvai KiyeTrai | avdjK'qs
otre rh ivepyeia iroahr,
Se' aXriov
5' '6ri
7}
7]
irpa^is
ov yap
owS'
a}xa
fiaBi('ei
Kal
ajxa
fiefidSiKev,
o'lKoSojuLel
Kal
re K'vqcris
areX^s
:
'
&c. ecvpaKe Se Kal opx rh avrh Kal voe? Kal vev67]Kev ri)v /xev ovv roiavrrjv evepyeiav Xeyw, eKeivtiv 5e K^urjaiv. Cf. c. 8, 1050, a, 23 sqq. and p. 379, n. 2, supra; De An. ii. 6, 417, a, 16: Kal yap ecrriv 7] Kivqais evepyeid ris
o''KoB6/j.T]Kv,
areXijs fxevroi
7}
yap
7)
Kivriais
S'
"tiv,
rereXea-fxei/ov
Kiv7](Tis
rh
5e
8e
225, a, 10
a,
Meiaiih. ix.
Twv
1, 224, b. 26 sqq. Metapli. viii. 1, 1042, 32, 2, 1069, a, 13: eU evavrictxreis hy elev ras KaQeKaarov
PItys. V.
;
xii.
rtXos aAAa rcov Trepl rh riXuSy oiov rov icrxvaiueiv r] irrxvaaia, avra Be 'drav laxvaivtj ourws i(TT)piuKivf]aei,fi^ inrdpxovra
ovSep-la
fxera^oXai avdyKT) Si] fierafidXXeiu r^u vX7]V Svva/j.eu7]v &iLL<pco eirel 5e dirrhv rd hv, fieraBdXXei trau eK rov dvyafxei ovros els rd evepyeia ov. Cf. p. 342 sqq.
at
384
ARISTOTLE
the
Potential or Matter
:
Form upon
even in that
which moves
the soul
as
itself
we always
it
we
from
the passive.^ While Becoming, therefore, is impossible without matter or potential being, some Actuality is not
less indispensable as
where an individual has developed itself from mere Potentiality to Actuality, and consequently
Even
in cases
it,
yet another
individual must have come before it in actual existence. The organic individual is produced from seed, but the
Phys. iii.2(p. 38P,,n.l),viii. 257, b,'8 Metapli. ix. 8 esp. 1050, Phy^. vii. 1 a-KCLV b, 8 sqq. xii. 3 v-k6 riVQS avdyKT} Kivovfiivov T()
'
Metaph.
?l
ix. 1,
1010,
a,
28]
aAV
5,
iroitiv
TO
8e
Trdcrx^^^-
Nothing
even in the case of Kive^adai that which apparently is selfmoved, the material which is moved cannot be at the same time the movino: cause, since if a part of it is at rest the w^hole
:
single, therefore, is selfmoved, ctW' avdjKr] dirjpriaOai Td Kivovv iu kKacrrcf irpds rb Kivovfiipov
is
that
oiov
e'lrl
rcJov
ai^'vx^'^
opcoficv,
orav
Kivrj ri
T(V /x\pvx(^i^
avra
ttu
aWa
av/x^aivei
Kive'tcrQai
.
Kal
ravra
:
yepoiTO
(pauephu
;
must
in the
self- moved
be dependent
The true exelse. planation is to be found in the above account, and Phys. iii. 2 (ren et Corr. ii. 9 neither form in itself nor matter in itself explains becoming; ttjs filv yap t^ Tracxf'" ^^^t^ ^aX t^ {/Atjs KiveiffQai, T^ 5e TTOiflv Kol KiveTv
on anylhing
:
257, b, 2 advvarov 5)] rh avrh aiirS kivovv irdvTr] KLv^lv aWh avru ^epoiro yap av oXov Kal (pepoi rrjv ahr^v (popav, ev hv kol aTO,uov tQi ei'Sft, &c., Tt bicapiarai on Kivcirai rd KivrfTov, &c. (see p. '68'^, n. 1). Therefore, we certainly hear nothing in Aristotle of any Identity of Mover and Moved (Biese, Phil. d. Arist. 1. 402, 7, 481)
c. 5,
'
'
'
kripas
p,
Svvd/xews.
See
further,
:U1 sqq. 2 See preceding note and Phys. it is impossible iii. 4, 255, a, 12 that a (Tvux^^ ^al avfx.cpv'ks should be self -moved ^ yap %v Ka\
:
nor does the existence of something which at the same time moves and is moved {Phys. iii. 2, 202, a, 8 and above) in any way prove it, i the above explanations are true.
ffvvfX^^
M^
MBTAPHYSICS
seed
is
38$
meets with a potential being, and no obstruction from without intervenes, then the corresponding motion is net-essarily produced.^ The object in which this process
takes place
it
is
the thing
is
effected is the
therefore, is the
common function of
:
both, though
it
takes
\
'
Metaph.
ix.
oel
e/c TOX)
Svud/jLei
oTav ws UuauTai [under the conditions which limit their activity and pas.
KaKelvas
dvdyKrj,
&vdpcoTros
e'l
/jLOvcriKOv, del
:
ovcTia,
sivity] Tb'/roirjTiKhvKal ThiradTfTLKhv rh fih iroielvTh Se 7ra(rXf t^^ ^Keivas 5' ovk di/dyKrj avTai fxev yap [the irrational] iraa-ai fxia kvhs
irX7i(xia(w(Ti,
'
xpovov aelTrpoXa/ufiduei
TToirjTtKij,
(Ke7vai 5e
to);/
ivaiTiuv^
ivpyeia kripa irph krepas e'tts rrjs Tov dei Kiuovvros vpdiroos. xii. 3, (cited in note to p. 356, supra)
;
xii. 5,
1071, b, 22 sqq.
c.
6,']
072,
.
. .
a, 9
(I
ivepyovv &Wa}S ii. 1, 734, b, '6(Ta. (pvcrei yiverat ^ rex^V vtt^ 21 iuepyeia uvros yiverai eK rod Svpdjiiei roiovrov. Phys. iii. 2 fin. fldos Se del o'taerai ri rh klvovu, ... &
aet
aWo
:
Kal &\\a}s.
Gen. An.
that necessity forced this powder of -choice to be exercised on both alternatives, opposite effects must be produced at one and the same time). For even in the case of the latter, so soon as the choice has been made, the result necessarily follows oiroTepov yap tv
if
:
waTe
6peyr)Tai
T(S
Kvpiws,
tovto
Troirjaei,
OTavwsSvvaTai
irad-nTiKui
icrrai
apxh foi
Kivfi,
orav
TTOS
e'/C TOV hvudjXei UVTOS duOpwrou. Ibid. c. 7 viii. 9, 265, a, 22 Metaph. vii. 7, c. 9 >/*., ix. ^fin., xii. 7, 1072, b, 30 sqq. Be An. ii. 4 init. iii. 7 init. cf. also p. 355-6, mpra. Phys. viii. 4, 255, a, 34 sqq. [Only an apparent exception to
TTOiei
av9pu)irov
(1048, a, 11); but the wall must decide on the one side or the other, if the condition of action is to be present for to produce opposite effects at the same time is impossible, ov ydp
:
ovTOJs e^et
eo-Ti
avTuu
tV
7}
Svuafxii/ ov5'
TOV
d/j-a iroielv
SvuaijLis (1.
22).
Finally,
effect
it
'*
introduced by Metaph. ix. 6, where it is said (1047, b, 35) we must distinguish "between
'his is
irrational
necessarily' produced when the active and passive principles are in the condition ws SvuavTai TToielv koI irdax^iv and the general reasons of this have already been stated at p. 378-9.
is
;
VOL.
I,
C C
386
AMISTOTLJ^
:
moved
operation of the motive principle upon the thing moved them.^ as conditioned by continuous contact between
>
Pliys.
iii.
3,
where
this is
discussed at length. V. 1. 224, b, Kivnais ovk eV t) 4, ihid. 1. 25 Tw ("ihei a\\' eV Tq3 KivovfM^V(f KoX vii. 3: the KLvr^TO} kot' ivfpy^iav. dAAoicDO-ts takes i)lace only in the
:
Here the motion of throwing. of the thrown seems to continue after contact with the thrower But this Aristotle has ceased. cannot admit to be the case. He
therefore
10,
assumes
;
{Phys.
viii.
material thing.
426, a, 2
'
:
De^
r]
An.
tw
iii.
2,
ci 5' i<Triv
Kivriais Koi
ttoiov/col
TTOiTjo-is
KoX rb iraQos iv
r/
2GG, b, 27 sqq., 267, b, 11, De Insomn. cf. iv. 8, 215, a, 14 2, 459, a, 29 sqq.) that along
yap rov
iroirjTiKov
with the thing thrown the thrower moves also the medium through
which
iroirjais
koX
t]
Trddrjais
Traaxo!'''''
o.\?C
ovk iu
p.
rw
it moves {e.g. the air or water) and that the motion of the thing w^hich is moved is com-
-noLodvri.
2
See further
'2,
:
358-9.
Cf. p. 378-y.
municated to it from this, when it has passed from the thrower. But since this motion continues after that of the thrower has
ceased, while (according to his presupposition) the motion of the medium must cease simultaneously with that of the thrower, he adopts the curious solution that the medium can still pro-
)3atJ/ei
5e
tovto
0i|et
iiioff oLfxa
Koi irdcrx^i.
:
b, 24, vii. 2, init. a/xa TCf kivov^^vc}) eVri* Kivovv Xeyw 8e rh d/xa, on ovdfu iffTiv
. .
.
avrSiv ixTa^v- tovto yap Kouhv iirl kivovvt6s iravThs Kivovjxevov koi
eVrii/ which is then shown to be true of all kinds of motion. Ibid. 1 viii. 2, 255, a, 34, c. 1, 251, b, sqq.; Gd)t. et Corr.i. 0, 322, b, 21, Gen. Jn.n. 1, 734, c. y, 327, a, 1 Kive7v re yap n^ cfKTdiKVOu a, 3 dhvpaTov Metajjh. ix. 5. Cf. n. 1 supra, and p. 387, n. 3. That this contact of the moving force with
;
:
duce motion even when it has itself ceased to be moved ohx afxa
:
dWa
Kivwv TraucTjToi Kivwv, kivovv Se eTi iaTiv (267, a, 5;. The law of inertia, according to which motion persists
Kivovfxevov
/xev
d/xa
OTav
that which
moved, is conceived of by Aristotle as not merely a momentary one giving the tirst impulse only, but as lasting during the whole continuance of the
is
until it is met by an opposing force, was not, therefore, known the natural motion to him. of the elements, which carries each of these to its proper place,
How
motion,
is
3 Jin.),
it
METAPHYSICS
Indeed, this appears to
387
him
yV even
of what
is
:
acts only
V through
touching
contact
it
^
its
object
to
the
by
the
however,
to
is
related
^
thinking subject as
Form
Matter
and
in like
manner God,
in
we
I
eternal as
it
is
as
Form and
sents,'*
repreend.-^
and that
had a beginning, the movens and the motum must either have existed before this beginning or not.
For
if it
and
first
so a
must have come into being, movement would have taken place before the motion. If they did exist, we cannot suppose that
rest,
they were at
to move.
since
it
was of
But
if it
moved by anything
'
else at all.
Cf. p. 203, n. 3.
Metaj)7t.. xii.
iii.
...
lOTl, b, 19, 429, b, 22,
(ixTTe
'[
9, 4,
Gefi.et Corr. i.G, 322, h, 21: nothing can affect another without being in contact with it, and in the case of things which at the same time move and are moved, this contact must be mutual (323. a, 20 sqq.); ecrt 5'
ftjs
ainoiTo rod kivtitov, iKeivou Se ouSeV <pafx,hv yap iviore rhp KvirovvTa drrreardai rj/nwy, ctAA' ovk avrol iKduov. That this,
iK^lvo /xev
&</
however, is no more than a play upon words is obvious, See p. 341, n. 2, 345, n. 1.
'
With what follows, cf. SiET&^CK.,Die Lehre d.Ar.v.d.Ewig^ keit d. Welt (^Untersuch z. PJnl. d. GriecJien Halle, 1873, pp 137 189).
^
vov (x^
CC
388
ARISTOTLE
tlie
with
we should
in this
It is
movement
before motion.
motion equally impossible to conceive of of a movement is always conditioned by The cessation movement which puts an end to the first. As
as destructible.
another
in
former argument we were forced to admit a the first, so here we process of change antecedent to Motion is to the last.^ cannot escape one subsequent the world was end; therefore without beginning or
the
perish.'^ never created and it will never although Motion from this point of view is in*\ Yet, its limitathere is another aspect in which it has
finite,
'
tion.
it
follows
principle, Since every motion presupposes a motive motion in general involves that file idea of
first
the assumption of a
moved by anything
else.
of moving causes, should be involved in an infinite series motion, because which could never produce actual us to a first cause and without they would never bring ehai kuI Kivwiv, ^iVep 6 The above account contains on h.v6.yK7] '"' ";'5'^^'^\. With essence of the discussion in XP''^^^ '^"^"^ the pasThat motion must reference apparently to this PJnis viii 1
1
be eternal is also asserted in 3Ictank xii. G, 1071, b. 6: hW' i,Larov KivvTiP ^ -y^viaBai ^ <peapwar ae\'yapf,u. Further, if Time is without beginning and
sage, Metaph. xii. 6 proceeds oi/Se XP^^ov ov ^ap oUvryo -npdr^pov /cal '^ar.pov .Iva^^ fir) ovros xP^^ov. Ka\ v Kiuv<r^s upa ouro, avuexvs
:
iixrirepKaco^popos?)
^ yaprhavrh
end (on this see infra, p. 406, also, since .^c.) motion must be so Time, as we shall find, cannot be conceived of apart from motion.
Cf PJu/s
viii. 1,
K.u^<r.<is
-.dOos.
The same
ianu
b xpovos
li.V^is r's, .r^ep aa xPor'os eVrl., apdyKV Kal KipvcTiP aidiou ehai,^nd after proving the infinity of time
inference follows from the state ment (PJnjs. vi. 6 2o6, b, 32 sqq iMetaph. ix. 8, 1050, b, 3) that every change and process presupposes a previous one In this form viz the question as to the eternity of the world, the present subject will Ch. IX. infra. recur
"^
METAPHYSICS
that,
389
moved produces
is
its
own
motion, since
vi^hat
it is
the
become and hence the same thing cannot at the same time and in the same relation be both moved and moving. We are forced, therefore, to admit a primum mobile. That principle, again, might be either something moved and therefore something The first of these self-moving, or something unmoved.
to
:
moved
cases,
however, resolves
itself into
the
second,
for
must of necessity be different from what it moves. Consequently there must be an Unmoved Substance, which is the cause of all motion.^ Or as this is elsewhere more briefly demonstrated since all motion must start from a motive principle, a motion which has no beginning presupposes a motive principle which is as eternal as the motion itself, and which, as the presupposition of all motion, must be itself unmoved.^ Thus, then, we obtain three elements that which merely is moved and never causes motion, = Matter that which both causes motion and is itself moved, = Nature that which causes motion without itself being moved, = God."* Our previous pages will have shown that this position
'
rrdwra
vii.
1
(jydapToi.
aW'a^vvarov
'
Kivn-
Phys.
viii.
5,
cf
and
criv
v)
agreed that neither efficient nor formal nor even final causes permit of a regresms ad injinitum. Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 4
ii.
(a), 2,
where
it is
^v.
ykp
ael
.
.
n
.
Kivovfxevoy
&irav(TTou
ean
^
Toivvv
koL % kivu.
5, 25G, b, 20 1072, a, 24 (as
;
Phys.
viii.
='
Metaph.
xii.
7,
avajKY]
aKiurjTou.
eJuai
riva
et
a'iSiov
ouaiau
TWf ovTuv,
390
is
ARISTOTLE
not
an isolated one in Aristotle's pliilosophy. Actuality in the highest sense is synonymous with Pure Form devoid of Matter the Absolute Subject which as
perfect
Form
is at
the Universe.^
once the motive force and the end of The gradations of existence, ascending
from the
first
tion in God.
And
this
thesis
actually
God
two prin-
from
reflection
upon
A well-known fragwhat stress he laid upon the witness of ment shows beauty and order in the universe to the existence of Nor are these arguments without their justifiGod.'*
Cf. pp. ?>55, kc, and the passages quoted, pp. 395 sqq., on God as highest form, pure energy and supreme end. Mdaph. xii. (Ttiv ^picrrov del 7, 1072, a, 35 [in every sphere of being] kvaXoyov ro irpwrov. - SiMPL. De Ccelo, 130, ScUol. in At. 487, a, 6 {Ar. Fr. 15):
'
toIs virvois
niaffixovs
yivo^hovs
ras
eV
Tavr'r]s ^vBov-
koX
yap,
<P'n(T\v,
ry
J)
rovrov ev toTs irepl which see Ch. II. snpra) " KaBoKov yap iv oh eo-ri ri
Aeyet 5e
Trepl
yevnrai t] ^vxh, t^tc r^v IlZiov airoKa^ovaa (pixriv irpofxavriv^rai re koI irpoayopevei ra jx^Wovra. roiavTT} Se eVrt Koi ev t^ Kara Thv edvarou xP'C'^^* '^^^ ffwfidTOJv. So Homer represents Patroclus and Hector as prophesying at
^i\o(ro(ptas(as to
death,
e'/c
tovtwv
ovv,
(f)'n(r\v,
vire-
Koi ctptfieXriov, iv rovTois iaTi arov. 67rel ovv iu toTs oiaiu iarlv
uvOpwiroi ehai ri Behv rh KaB' kavrhv [-J)] ^oiKbs rrj ^vxv k^ irdvTuv iirKTrrnxoviK^jTaTOV.
uor^ffav ol
8)/
aWa
&\Ko &X\ov
^
fieXriov, cariv
apa ri
/col
Koi airb
ruv
ficB'
fierewpcov
BeaffdifiXiov
rh
eeloj/."
/xevoi
yap
T]^4pav ^ fxev
ix.
irepiiroXovvra,
20
'Apto-TOre'ATjs 5e ciTrb dvolv dpxaiv evvoiau Bewu eAeye yeyovevai eu to7s dvBpwirois, dir6 re rwv ircpX r^u xpvx^v (Tv/xfiaivSvTuv KOI airb rSiv
:
rev rSiV
iuS/JLiaav
elval
roiavTTjs
curiov.
*
fjLCTedpuiv.
dXX' avh
fihu
rS}v irepl
In the brilliant
14 (prob.
in
TTjv
^vxhf'
<Tv}xfiaiv6vr(i)v 5td
rovs iv
also
from the
11.
(piXo(ro<pias
METAPHYSICS
cation in
his
i391
certain points of
in
an obscure
the divine
human and
The beauty
its parts,
connection of
the
stars,
and
the
whom we
far
shall
Being placed
whom
alone
all
Oonse-
D.
ii. .37,
95,
which
re-
cum autem
turn
terras
nox opacasset,
the beginning, of Plato's picture of the dwellers in si the cave {RejJ. vii. init.") essent, qui sub terra semper habitavissent accepissent
at
:
minds us
'
eorumque
ratos
tum omnium
senescentis et ortus
:
autem fama
et auditione, esse et vim Deorum deinde aliquo tempore, patefactis terrae faucibus, ex illis abditis sedibus evaderein haec loca, quae nos incolimus, atqueexire potuissent cum repente terram et maria coelumque vidissent, nu-
quoddam numen
solem
ejusque
tum
occasus atque inomni feternitate immutabilesque cursus haec cum viderent profecto et esse Deos et haec tanta opera Deorum esse arbitrarentur.' According to CiC. ^V. D. ii. 49, 12.5, Aristotle seems to have pointed to the instinct of animals as a teleological argument for the being of God. ^ For the fuller discussion of
this see infra.
^
892
ARIS7VTLE
upon teleological principles as well as the identification which he elsewhere establishes between the force of nature working to fixed ends and God^ are not a mere
spirit of his
whole system.
The
If,
35 sqq., where God is described as the upiaTov or ov ev^Ku, and as thus the eflicient cause of motion in the world; but especially c. 10, where the question is discussed TTorepxs ex^^ '? "^^^ o\ov (pvais rh ayadup icai Tt &piaTOv, nonpoi'
:
like
Speusippus,
we accept a
we
Kex(^pi-(riJ-^vov Tt KoX
/)
T-V Ta^LV,
v)
aucporepws,
GTpdT^vjjLa. In the case of an array the good resides as well in the general as in the order of the whole in the former, however, in a still more prhiiary sense than in the latter. The universe is com:
destroy the unity of all being (see the passage, Div. I. p. 854, 1); Ttt 5e ovra ov fiovXeraL iroXiTeveadai kukms. " ovk ayadhv ttoXvKoipavii] efs Koipauos Icttco." Cf. xiv. 3, 1090, b, 19, where he is again attacking Speusippus ovk
:
eoiKC S'
6/c
7}
(pvats e7reja-o5iw57]S
oiaa
rwv
(paivofxevooy,
wairep /jlox^VP^
IDared to
an army
ttws,
TCTaKrai
ouTcos
Tvphs
KOlI
OVX
tl.
ex^^ ocare
/jltj
eTvai
Barepw
OoLTepou fXTjOev,
a\K' iari
irphs fiev
yap ev awavra (rvi/reraKrai, except that each creature is more fully subject to this order just in proi^ortion to the nobility of its nature, even as in a household the freeborn are subjected to a stricter discipline than the TOLavTT] yap kKaarov apxT] slaves.
avTOov
("is
7]
(pvais iariu.
Xcyco
5'
oTou
ye rh diaKpiOrjvai ixvdyKr] airaatv i\de7v, Kol aAAo ovras iarlu wu Koivcavel airavra els rh o\ou. All other systems are founded of necessity upon the opposite principle Aristotle's is the only exception, ov ydp iariv ivavriov rS
:
rpaycpSia. We have the same point of view in I&. 16, preserved us only by an unknown to scholiast, where Aristotle says given several apxaK they must be either ordered or disordered. But the latter is impossible, since from disorder no natural order, no K 'ifffxos. could have arisen ei Se Terayjuevai ^ e| kavTUV iraxQil' aav t) virh e^ccOev Tivhs alrlas ; but even in the former case exovcri ri Koivhv rh avvdiTTOv avras KaKelvo rj The comparison of the a.px'horder of the world with that of an army is further developed in Sext. Math. ix. 26 sq., which perhaps follows Aristotle Ilepl
:
<piXo(TO(pias.
See Div. i. p. 143 sq. 786 (Zeller's Plato, Eng. Tr. p. 281
sqq. 485).
T]
<pv(Tis
METAPHYSICS
unity of the world and
its
393
also,
that Aristotle
in his
most important
treatises
motion
is
itself
the condition of
all
change.
The further
being eternal,
it
it
characteristics of the
Supreme Being
Motion must be continuous (crvvsxv^), and so must be one and the same throughout. But such a
is
single motion
single motum.
is as
single and
eternal as motion
absolutely
itself
unmoved;
since
that
which
is
moved, being
it
an unbroken and
is
consequently
of
the
primum
It is
sary
'
and
this unconditional
6,
the law by
)(
Phys.
viii.
259,
a,
13
the
^ In Fr. 15 (preserved to us by Simpl. Do Ccelo, 130, 45, K., Soliol. in Ar. 487, a, 6), from
the
single single
motion
presupposes
cause.
Cf.
a
p.
moving
391, n. 2. On the constancy and unity of motion we shall have more to say in the next chapter. - Phys. viii. 6, 259, b, 22, c. 10, 267, a, 24 sqq.
the treatise n. (l)i\ocro<pias, the immutability of God is proved on the ground that the KpdTicrrov can neither suffer change from anything else nor feel in itself the need of any such change, (It must be granted to BeeNAYS, Dial. d. Arist. 113, and Heitz, Ar. Fragm. p. 37, that
394
whicli the universe
ARISTOTLE
is
held together.^
it
It
is
further
is
is
incorporeal.
Only that
;
that
is
merely potential
is
on by nature
which there
no element of unrealised
is
possibility.^
But
the Potential
necessarily material.
is
A Being that
The the Aristotelian fragment. passage in Plato's Republic, ii. 880, D sqq., as Simpl. remarked, served as the original of it.) The same reason is assigned also in the De Ca-lo, i. 9 (see p. 395, n. fi) for the immutability of God, and in Metaph. xii. 9, 1074, b, 2(), for the doctrine that God must always think the same ex. p. 397, n. 2. thing
;
Twv (pdapruv, eai 5' ovOhv 5vvd/xei aiSiov. This he then goes on to That which is merely prove. potential can both be and not be.
i
T^
1072, b, 7: eVet S' eo-Ti ri kivovv avrh oLKiyriTOU bv, ivepyfia ov, zovto ovk ej/Sexerat
^^
Metaph.
xii.
7,
e'l
avdyKr]S
upa eVrtv vv ' Kal rj avdyKr) KaXoos [i.e. in so far as it is necessary it, is good, since, as is immediately explained, its necessity is neither external nor merely relative, but absolute fir] iv^ex^y-^vov &\\ws,
^ TovTo avrd [relatively to that], 'o \yTai eVSexec^at |U7j elvai [the former, if I say, * it is possible the latter, if I for A not to be say, it is possible for A not to be in this place, or not to be so great, or not to have this quality '] airXais Se rh Kar^ ovcriav [but that whose is absolutely perishable substance can cease to be]. ovOiv &pa Toov a(p0dpT(i}V airXus Swdfiei ovSt ruu e| iorlv hv airKccs
airXus,
'/)
5'
'
'
audyKiqs ovtuiv.
if
3 Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 12 there were a KivtyriKhv which did not realise itself in action there would be no eternal unineVSe'xeTot yap terrupted motion T^ Svvafiiu ^xov fjL^] ivcpyf7v. But this would be equally true, et
:
aW'
airXws
avayKa7ov']
e/c
TotauTTjs
&pa
rj
apxvs
^pTTjrai
ovpavds Kal
-
(pvm^.
After showing that the iuepyeia precedes the Swafxis in all the three respects of hoycfi, Xpov(f and ohcria Aristotle goes on,
Afrtaph.
ix. 8,
r] 5' ovaia avTrjs Sivafiis' ob yap earrai Kivrjcris ai'^ios eV5eX^Tai yap rh Svvdfid ov fxh eluai. Se?
ivepyficreL
'
1050, b, 6 (follow-
quoted at
higher reality than the Siva/xis]. T filv yap aidia trpirepa ry ovcria
dpa elvai apx^v TOiavTr]v rjy rj ovffia ivepyeia. The leading thought of this proof (iuSex^o^Oai ') fJvai ouSev SiO(i)ep6i iv ro2s aiSiois) Aristotle states also Phys. iii. 4, 203, b, 30, and he shows in Metaph. ix. 4 that it is inadmissible to say,
METAPHYSICS
be immaterial and therefore incorporeal.^
incorporeal can be unchangeable
;
395
Only the
subject to
Moreover
is
always
limited.
finite
But the limited cannot possibly produce an inactivity like eternal motion, for its power is just
primum
incorporeal,
indivisible
motionless, passionless,
ovk
etTTot 5e,
immediately follows that we can never say of anything which by its very nature
cease to be, that it will never and consequently cease to be it cannot be of the nature of that which never ceases to be (the a'iSiov).
ca7i
;
from which
^ Plujs. viii. 10, 266, a, 10 sqq. 267, b, 17. Metapli. xii. 1 jitu " Metaph. xii. 7 (see p 394, n.
;
1,
supra)y
i.
c.
8,
1074,
:
a,
35
n.
cf.
De
eanv
279, a, 16
on.
e|&>
Se rov
ovpavov
oijre
SedeiKTai
ovt'
ivSe-xcrai
(pavephv
&pa
on
'
Cf. p.
f),
847
sq.
and Mefaph.
ert
eJua.i
Kevhv oOVe
;(;p(5j/os
e^oodev
'
xii.
ravras
vXtjs.
toIwv
auev ye koI
yap
SeT, et irep
ovT xp^^o^ avra iroie? yqpdcTKeiv. ouS' ecrrlu ovSevhs ovSe/j-ia jxera^oX))
Toov vTTfp
<popav,
aWo
-
T^v
e^coTOTCtf
TTayix4v(av
After what has been said above, this does not require any further proof. All change is a
transition from possibility to actuality, which is only precluded where there is no matter, and therefore no Zwdixei ov. Cf. (besides p. 359 sqq.) the proof in
Phijs. vi. 4, that
aAA' avaXXolwTa Kal airad?) T7]v api(rT7]v exovTU ^w Kal r^u avrapKeaTarr^v SiarcXeT rhv airavra
alwva. After some remarks upon the expression ali^Vy Aristotle proceeds rh rov iravrhs ovpavov riXos KaX rh rhu irdvTa xP^^^v Kal Tryi' aireipiav Trepte'^oy riXos a'lwu
:
everything which
We
ddduaTos Kal
dcTos.
06 ev
dfxavIt,
shall thus find also that the soul is in essence unmoved. 3 PJiys. viii. 6, 259, b, 18. Cf. preceding n. and p. 366, n. 1. * See p. 394, n. 3, and MetapTi. vii. 7, 1032, a, 20, c. 10, 1035, a, 25.
Kal
p'lis,
ro7s
dWois
i^^prrjTai,
S'
is
rarov)
must
be
unchangeable.
396
ARISTOTLE
By
a converse
process,
it
all
primum
mobile and
of
all
that
which
rjv
it
moves are
is
single.^
The cause
motion, or God,
(to rt
Form
or,
in other words, is
Thought.
self-
centred thought
soul has
is free
from materiality,
even the
an essential relation to the body, and in all substances form is involved with matter. Again, perfect activity exists in thought alone. Neither
corporeal
constructive
is
(TroirjTifcr))
nor practical
is
(irpaKTi/cr)) activity
end of both
external to them-
selves, and therefore they require material to work But the Supreme Being has no end beyond with. 2
itself,
because
it is
is
ovT yap
aWo
Kp^lrrSv icrriu o ri
.
[nom.]
KLU-fjaei
oijT
Ix*'
and tliat we must do so is obvious from the fact that the subject of
this explanation is expressly said to be that which is e|w rod ovpavov, the incorvireprrjv i^uTaToo (popav poreal, immovable, all-embracing, the 6e7ov irpwTov Kal aKpSrarov, the cause of all being and life. Metajjh. xii. 8, 1074, a, 31
(pavKov oudev, out' 6//5ees tu>v avTov KaXwp ovSevos iffTLV. (Cf. p. 398, n. 3.) Asto whether this account, indeed, was to be taken as refer-
ring to the primal mover or the primally moved (the outmost sphere) the old commentators according held divided views Alexander to SiMPL. i7i loc, as well as his Peripatetic predecessors, gave the preference to the second, the younger (Neoplatonic) expositors to the first explanation. Alexander's view seems to be supported by the words
:
on
'
el
yap
irXdovs
apiOfj.^
di/dpcoiroi,
rj irepl ^Kaarov apxh, ctW' oca 76 iroWai e^s yap api6/x(f TToWa, vXrjv e^ft rh 5e \6yos Kal 6 avrhs iroWwv ri ^v elvai ovk e^et vKrjv rh irpcoTOP
Se
'
'
'
eVreA-exeto yap.
Cf. p. 400, n. 1. Ccelo, ii. 12, 292, b, 4: T(p S' uis &pia-ra ^xovri oitdeu Set TTpd^ecas eari yap avrh nh ov eVe/co,
'-
Kot
6.iravcrrou
5^
Klvr^triv
Kiuelrai
v\6y(os, unless
we
alter KivelTui
De
however
into KLve7; it is easy, to supply 6 ovpavos "as the subject, even although God is spoken of in what precedes,
Simpl.
'
7]
5e TTpa^is del iaTiv iv Svcrlv, orav Kal ov eVe/co ^ Kol rh rovrov eycKa.
METAPHYSICS
true that in analysing
397
from Actuality
the
from actual
Thought
(Oscopla).
But
no undeveloped
potentiality
finite
and even in the case of man, it is only his nature which renders him incapable of uninter;
rupted thought.
consists of
an activity that cannot alter, since to a perfect being alteration would involve a loss of perfection.2
God, therefore,
is
He
and
vitality
and
is
the source of
What, then, are the contents or subject-matter of this Thought ? All thinking derives its value from the object of thought but the Divine Thought cannot be dependent for its validity on anything beyond itself, nor can it relate to anything except the best. But the best is
;
*
rcp
man
(d avOpunipos vovs 6
twv
arvv-
fxivov, Ti Se
luaWov tov
Troi7u, ri
at isolated moments when it contemplates perfection, not in broken fragments but in its en64tci}]/)
tirety:
t)
avr)) aurijs
ttv
eXr].
koX
tuv
v6t](Tis
"
ihv airauTa
xii.
aloova.
:
avdpcairivwv 5^
ravrri ffvyy^v^cr-
TaTT]
b,
v^aifxoviK(ara.TT].
;
Metaph.
c. 9,
1074,
28 we cannot think of the divine thought either as resting or as in a state of mere potentiality,
for
et
fxr)
vSvffis
[actual
tyvafiis,
9, 1074, b, 2o rh 6ei6TaTov koI ri/xiwraTov voe? Kal oh fxcra^dWei ^is x^^P^^ 7P V fi(Ta^o\}] koI Klu-qais ns ^'Stj t^ tolovtov. Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, 28 (pa/xev Se [5^] rhv dehv ehai ^<^ou
Metaph.
SrjKou roivvv
on
=*
dAAa
iivai
to avvex^s alrcf rris voi](Tu>s. Ihid. 1075, b, 7 (following BoNiTz's text) pure reason is indivisible as is therefore the discursive thought of
:
avuex^^ '^"^ a'iSios virdpx^i t<^ decf rovro yap 6 deos. Be Ccelo, ii. 8, 286, a, 9 deov 5' ivepyeia aOavaffia tovto 5' ia-rl fcw^ atSios.
:
398
ARISTOTLE
itself.^
nothing but
must necessarily be the case with Pure Spirit, thought and its object are identithe cal.^ This unalterable repose of thought upon itself indivisible unity of the thinking subject and the object of
the thought of God, therefore, as
thou"-ht
'
God.'^
less, of course, can affected by any emotion from without. Hence the statement {Etk. N. viii. 0, 1158, b, 35, ] 159, a, 4, or more deli iiitely End. vii. 3, 12, 1238, b, 27, 1214, b, 7, 1245, b, 14, and from this treatise M. Mot: ii. 11, 1208, b, 27), that God does not love but is only loved, and that between Him and man there is too wide a separation to peru\it of mutual
Still
[?],
avTh
eavTO
yivuxTKei
God be
taj)h. xii. 9
7]
^ eTr' iviwu t] rh Trpayfia ; eVt /xev rSiv T\oi7]TiK(iov avev v\7]S 7) ovaia Kal to
iinarr 7)1X7],
.
.
iin(rr7]iJ.ri
avTh
e(TTai,
fiia.
Kal
c.
7]
voriais
iii.
:
tov
4 pn.
voovixivov
-
De An.
7 mit.')
Metapli.
xii.
9,
efre
70^
'
fxridev
j/oeT,
ti
(cf. c. 5
and
eVi /xev
icXTi
Th
(Te/xyhv,
dAA.'
exet wcrn-ep
Kadevdooi'
Kvpiov,
i'lT]
tovtov 5' aAAo ovK av 7] apiarr] ovaia 5ta "yap tov uoelv rh rifiiou
e'lre voel,
. . .
.
ti voel
ri.
.
.
.
Korspov ovv SLa(t)pei ri 7) ovdkv t5 vos7u rh Ka\hu t) rh tvxov ; }) Kal aroirou rh biavoe7aOaL irepl iuicci' (as at p. 397, S/jAoj/ roivvv if further, at 1. 29, n. 2); vovs were the mere power of thinking, SriKov, on aAAo ri Ssv e'lr] rh Ti/XLWTepov ^ 6 vovs, rh voovfxivov KoX yap rh voeiv Kal r] uoTjffis virdp^ei war^ el Kal rh xiipicTTOv voovvti ovk ti.v ei'r; rh (pevarhv tovto, apKTTOu 7) voTjcris avrov &pa voel,
.
.
1075, b, 7: exov v\7]v, &c., see p. 397, n. 1, supra. ^ This view is set forth in the passage immediately following that quoted p. 394, n. 1 5tauMetajjJi.
xii.
9:
adiaipeTov irav
Th
fii]
ycay))
S'
icTTlv
o'ia
[sc.
t^
irpdlncf)
KivovvTi]
7}iJuv.
0VTU3
ixkv
7)
iifuv
TjSoi/^
7] dpiCTTj fiiKphv xpovov yap dei iKelv6 iffTiv yap oBvvaTov. eVel Kal
'
ivepyeia
[so
BONITZ,
'
KpaTiarov, Kal effnv c. 7 (see voi](T(i)s voricris. 7} uSiqais Be A71. iii. 6, 430, b, 24 n. 4). Se rivi fJ-T] ioTiu iiavriov rwv t
tiVep eo-Tt
tJ)
:
following Alexander, rightly instead of t] tjS. iv4py.'] tovtov koI Std toOto [i.e. because not God's activity alone, but activity in general, is pleasant, for in this passage, as often in this book, lucidity is sacrificed to an excessive brevity of style] iypifyopa-is
atcrdTjffis v67)(ns
^iSkttov
t]
^AxiSes Se
l\ vdrjais
tj
Kal
jxviiixai
Sid TauTa.
METAPHYSICS
These
Divine
propositions of
Aristotle
first
.399
concerning the
Spirit
contain
the
attempt to find a
Theism.
as
self-conscious
intelligence
from the principles of a philosophical system instead ox being borrowed from religious notions. And on the
very threshold
solution of
we
which
all
systems of
theistic speculation
how
are
we
God
from
we may
yet preserve
his per-
sonality,
and
vice versa ?
;
Aristotle represents
God
as
self-conscious Spirit
Him
of
body and
Ko.Q''
outV fov
passage
ixaXiara rod /jLakKxra [pure thought has for its object that virhich is absolutely best, and all
Koi
71
the more
the purer it is]. aurhv Sh voe7 6 vovs Kara fxerdAri^piv Tov voTjTov vorirhs yap yiypeTOi Qvyyavtav Koi vouv^ Hxm ravrhv vovs Koi voy]T6v. TO yap SeKTi/cbv
fitly
is quite general, referring neither to the divine nor to the human reason exclusively ; 1. 24, however, continues et ovv ovrcos e5 ex*> ^^ rjfieTs ttotc, o dehs ael,
:
OavfJiaarTSv
'
et
Se
6;^ei
jxaKKov
Se
w5i,
ert koX
'
Qavixaciwrepov.
^a>)/
Tov
uor}Tov
Kal
ttJs
ovcrias
Sicrr'
vovs,
5e' ye virdpx^'^- V y^P vov ivepyeia (o)^, e'/ce?i/os 5e t] ev^pyeia ivipyeia Se t/ KaQ^ oi/tV eKclvov ^corj
iuepyd
{^evepyiiv
[i.e.
Se
e^ajj'.
eKUVo
.,
as
at p. 397, n.
^W<-. x. 8,
vii. 15,
1
3, sujjra.
Further cf
n. 1; iJ/*^.
citedatp. 397,
:
tivity] t SoKe7 6 povs delov e'xetr, Kal 7) dicopia rh t^Sio-tov koI dpicrrov
(and therefore actual knowledge, and not the mere capacity of knowing, is the best and most
blessed state. On this meaning of deupla vid. BONITZ, Tnd. Ar. From 1. 18 328, a, 50 sqq.)
{t)
earai
xa^P* ''75<'V
and
^ecfJ
.
Fulit.
,
vii.
1,
1323, b, 23
t^
tuv
i^coTfpiKcov
ayaQuv aXXa
tc^
ttoios
Si'
Se
vdrjcris
t]
kuO'
aiirijv)
this
tis
ehai
400
ARISTOTLE
That neither
7rpa|ts
and that
:
the
question
ctAAa ras ras i\fvdpiovs ; ai 5e (Tuxppoves ti &z/ (hu ; All these being inconceivable (5ie|lovai Se TTOLVTa (paivoLT^ av to. irepl TUs 7rpa|ets fiiKpa. Koi avd^ia deuv),
,'
avSpelovs
. . .
fj
he concludes
:
t^>
8/j
C^vn,
&ic.
(as at p. 397, n. 1). Be Ccelo ii. 12, 292, a, 22 eoi/re -yap rui p.\v ^picna xouTi viTapx^<-v rh ev &uv irpd^ecos, 5' iyyvrara [the heavenly rcf
not recognise any such limitawhich, moreover, would be wholly inconsistent with his other views (for since, according to the passage quoted p. 394, n. 1 properties must be all God's absolutely necessary, none can belong to Him which He does not require for his perfection and blessedness, and which therefore He could not dispense with without prejudice to these). On the contrary, he says without any reservation {Eth. x. 8 see p. 397. n. 1, S7ij)ra), that neither iroielv nor irpdrreiv can be attributed to God that perfection in action (practical virtue) can only find a place in human intercourse and among beings who are subject to human passions (EiJi. x. 8, 1178, a,9,b,5, vii. 1, 11 45, a, 25); that every action is a means to an end
tion,
;
;
bodies of the outer sphere] Sia Ibid, b, 4, cited oAiyrjs /cat fxias.
p. 39(), n. 3, suj)rd
G,
:
(ren. et Corr.
i.
since every Ttoikiv 323, a, 12 involves a corresponding iracxeiv, we cannot ascribe a -KOifiv to every movens, but only to such as must itself be moved in order
different from itself, and therefore that it cannot be attributed to God, for whom there is no end not yet attained (JDe Coelo, as
quoted above).
Nor
is
it
any
than Trotetv. conception These details are much too explicit to permit the assertion (Beentaxo, Psychol, d. Arht. 247 sq.) that Aristotle desires to deny to Deity only such actions
sive
objection to this view that Aristotle elsewhere {Eth. vii. 15, see p. 398, n. 5 fin. Polit. vii. 3, 1325, b, 28) speaks of God's -rrpa^is, since the word here used in the wider sense in which it occurs in Eth. vi. 2, 5, 1139, b. 3, 1140, b, 6 (where it is said that irpaf^is differs from
;
action universal must be ascribed to God on any view) as result from a felt need, and that therefore, while denying that irpdmiv contributes anything to the blessedness of God, he does not deny that it belongs to Him generally. Aristotle does
(irpdTTiv
' ;
'
having its end in itself, being the t4\os) and includes every form of activity, activity of pure the even thought. No other meaning will suit the words, Eth. vii. 15, oel v and in a similar avT^ irpa^is
TToiriais
in
cvirpa^la
sense Pol., as above, 1. 16 sqq., distinguishes irpd^eis irphs kr^povs, Tas rS}V aTTofiaivSvTav X'*P"' 7'7''oin a word, fxivas Cf Tov wpdrreiv
METAPirVSICS
the limits of an isolated self-contemplation.
irpd^iis
401
But
this
e^coTepiKoij
actions which
called
elsewhere
irpa^is
are
simply
in the narrower sense of the word from tus avT0Te\e7s, Koi ras auTuv eueKa deupias Kal Siavoijaeis, and attributes only the latter to God, in opposing- the view that the practical life is superior to the theoretic (rxo^fj yap tiv d dfhs exoi kuAws koi ttus 6 i^coTcpiKot k6tixos, oTs ovk elalu irpd^eis TTapa ras oiKeias ras avruu. Still less is it a pertinent objection that in using popular language Aristotle ascribes iroieTu to God, as in Be Caelo, i. 4 Jin.
;
out further specification of its nature. But if action does not belong to God, neither can will, for as will (irpoaipeais) is dpxh irpd^ecos and originates in turn in a desire on the one hand and the conception of an end on the other, it always presupposes an
7]eiK)) e^ts
(Mk. vi.
2,
1139, a, 31)
De An. iii. 10, 433, a, 23, is defined as rational desire ; but desire cannot in any sense be
jSouArjo-ts,
(d dehs
Kal
r]
(pvais
oiiShv
fidrrfv
ii.
voiova-iv).
Gen. et
Corr.
10,
ascribed by Aristotle to God nor can we admit the assertion of Brentano, p. 246, that because
336, b, 31
{arvucirK-fjpwcre
rh oXov
ivTcAexv iroiiicras r))v @ehs here means the yeveffiv). which governs divine force nature, whose relation to the first cause of motion is left, as we shall see, wholly undefined nor can we draw any conclusion from this use as to Aristotle's view of God as the absolute supradehs,
;
&
he ascribes to Him 7}hov^, he must also have ascribed to Him something corresponding to desire in us. It is only of sensuous KvTn} and T]^ov^ that Aristotle says {De An. ii. 2, 413, b, 23) that it involves iiridvfiia he expressly adds that he is not here speaking
;
reason, any more than from the frequent use of d^ol as in Eth. X. 8, quoted above, and
viii. 14, 1162, a, 4, x. 9, 1170, a, 24, we may argue that Aristotle was a poly heist. UoieTi/ also in these passages seems to
I
mundane
and ibid. iii. 7, 431, a, declares dpcKriKhv and (()fvKTiKov to be identical with
of
:
Nous
he
10
atae-nriKhv,
and remarks
iii. 9,
10,
iUd.
to be
3Ietaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 12 (to which Beentano appeals, but which is nowhere directly applied to God b}'- Aristotle) to
thtj
432, b, 27, 433, a, 14, cf. Mh. vi. a, 2, 1139, 35, that the vods OeafprfTiKhs (therefore also the divine) does not deal with the (j)VKrhv and ZiwKrhv by which desire is always conditioned. It is evident that those passages in which Aristotle uses the common conceptions of God as generally
p.
narrower sense discussed it bears merely the 182 general signification of creation or production, as in the phrase
;
vovs
iroiTjTiKhs,
and merely
indi-
cates causality
in general with-
VOL.
I.
D D
402
solution
'
ARISTOTLE
is
wholly unsatisfactory.
On
On
in
and
is
deter-
mined
these
as
much by
the variety of
its
objects as
changes
of intellectual states.
Aristotle
by by destroying
conditions
merges the notion of personality in a mere abstraction. The diflficiilties which perplex us when we come to consider the operation of (lod upon the world are not
object of desire for his own sake universe and the desires the whole order of nature (Brext, 247), receive no support whatsoever from Aristotle. Such a conception, on t lie contrary, is wholly irreconcilable with his idea of God, for all desire is an effort after something not yet attained,
'
xii.
10 (see p.
.S91, n. 2.
supra) offers
Aristotle
no support to
is
either.
here inquiring in what way the world contains the good. The only answer which he gives, however, to this question is contained in the words Koi yap iv rij rd^ei
rh fd Kol 6 a-Tparrjyhs, Kal fiaWov ovTOS oi) yap ovros Sia Ti]v rd^iv
'
and
dAA.' iKeivr]
diarovTou
iffriv.
If
we
any such
1
effort is inconceivable.
On
apply this to the idea of God and the world it certainly follows that the perfection of the universe resides in the first place in God as the first cause of motion, and secondly in the universal order that owes its origin to it. On the other hand, t he comparison of the world to an army gives no clue to the method in which the order of the universe proceeds
has expressed
for doubt.
himself
with* a
St. 246 sq.), IJRENT. {Psych, d. that in knowing- Himself, God knows the whole creation as well, nor Schneider's modification of it {Be Caum p'nali AHst. 79 sq. cf. also Kym, Mefaphya. UnterK. 252, 256), to the effect that God knows the intelligible world as the totality of the forms that are contained in his thought, finds
AH
from God (for this was not the question under discussion). As we evidently cannot conclude from it
that
any
justification
in
Aristotle's
God sketches plans, issues commands to his subordinates, &c. (though this way of represepting God's government of the
>vntings.
METAPHYSICS
less
403
weighty.
Aristotle describes
God, as we have
also more and the ground of
While we
belief in
him
Providence which
yet see that he
extends
its
care to individuals,^
we may
'
D d2
404
ARISTOTLE
he recognises,^ in the adaptations of nature, traces of the operation of God, and that he finds in human Reason an
indwelling element of Divinity.^
But if we attempt to bring t*hese convictions into harmony with his theology as above discussed, we are met by many questions to^
which
it is
noi]easy to find
firsl?
an answer.
if
In the
vj
place,
it is
obvious that
God
exercises
thing
else,
He
Here,
however, we
already alluded
exercises a
that
power of attraction over Matter, causing it God moves the world in this to move in its direption. way: the object of desire and the object of thought But these cause motion without moving themselves.
two motive forces are ultimately the same (the absolute object of thought is the absolutely desirable or pure
good)
;
of desire
is
is
apparent beauty,
real
beauty
but
the
set
and not
Thought, therefore,
is
is
starting-point or principle.
in motion
Thought, however,
of thought;
by the object
series
is
of the
1
two
absolutely intelligible,^
ly point out,
and in
Cf. p. 421,
and
S),
p.
4G0 sq.
ii.
I>,
Eth.
b,
ix. 7,
1177, a, IH, b,
;
.SO,
7;]fi
117'.), a,
2G;
:
Gen. An.
27, 7;{7, a, 10
4,
4U8,' b,
29
686, a, 28, 373. kripa (TvaToix'a Kad" ai}ri]v. By this It epa (rufrTOtx'a we are to understand, as the more recent conimentators right^'ij%,
a, 7, iv. 10,
NoTjr^ 56
7}
and as is obvious the series of being and good. The expression refers to tt^e Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine of the universally prevalent antithesis of being and notbeing, perfection and imperfecfrom
1.
3o,
tion,
(fcc,
METAPHYSICS
this
tual.'
40o
as
Being stands
^
'
first,
defined
and communicates motion to the rest.' 2 God, therefore, is the primimi mobile only in so far as He is the absolute end of the world,^ the Governor, as it were, whose will all obey, but who never sets his own hand to the work.^ And He fulfils
that which*
is
moved by
it
by being absolute Form. As Form in general moves Matter by inviting it to pass from
this function
^
sort.''
where
1004, a, 1, ix. 2, 1046, b, 2,xiv. 6, 1093, b, 12, i. 5, 986, a, 28; Phys iii. 2, 20U b, 25, i. 9, 192, a, 14; Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 319, a, 14. Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, a, 26 see BoNiTZ and Schwegler. 2 lUil. 1072, b, 3 Kiv^l 5e <ws ipd>lj.pov, Kivovjxcvov (better Cod.
;
cf.
Metaph.
iv.
2,
if
first
KivrjTiKhv aXriov
'
324, b,
tan
apxh
Se t^ iroirjTiKhv
Trjs Kiwfjcreus)
iroi-ncris
aXriov ws oOcvtj
is
ET
^
Kivov/x4}'Cf>)
5e
raAAa
KiV7.
God
it is
(see
p.
400,
also do the movers of the celestial spheres (to be discussed infra, Ch. IX. in the section on the Spheres) these cause motion, according to Metaph. xii. 8, 1074, a, 23, ws t4Xos ovtrai <popas. * Cf Metajih. xii. 10 init. and
;
.
As
n.
But
quite another
thing to say that according to Aristotle God operates upon the world not directly but indirectly, not by Himself exercising activity upon it, but as perfect being by eliciting its activity by
his
fin.
*
mere existence He is
;
efficient
The
subject,
however,
is
here only treated generally: the question is not whether God moves the world but how He
moves
it,
and
it is
therefore
ir-
relevant
when Brentano,
ibid.
235 sqq., contests the assertion that God 'is not the first operative principle, but only the final cause, of being that according to Aristotle no operation at all belongs to Him. This assertion
' ;
in virtue of his final cause. Nor is it sufficient to discredit this s'atement to adduce passages in which God is described in general as the moving or efficient principle of the world. No one doubts that this
is so.
it
cause being
only
'
'
To prove our view wrong, would be necessary to produce passages in which direct action upon the world is attributed to Him it would be further neces;
406
this
ARISTOTLE
doctrine
system.
the
harmonises admirably with the whole It gives us, in fact, the proper coping-stone of
ultimate
unity of formal,
and
final causes,
and their
moreover,
We
find in
it,
the ultimate principle of union between the Metaphysics and the Physics the point at which the investigations
Unmoved and
issue.
the
Moved meet
to
It
enables Aristotle
trace to absolutely immaterial and unmoved Being the ultimate source of all movement and change, and to
make God
the
central,
controlling
principle
of the
Him
in its machinery
on
the one hand or disturbing the uniformity of natural law bv personal interference with it on the other. It further furnishes him with the means of reconciling the eternity of the world with its dependence upon a divine
supernatural Being.
the motion of the universe be referred to definite acts of Deity, we are forced to assume that the world had a
beginning, since every single act and that which is produced by it has a beginning in time.^ On the other
is
and
definite point,
is
motion to the
it
attraction w^hich
(and Ari-
such a system), can be conceived of stotle's But the with or without beginning. indifferently as
Cosmos
is
sary to show how any such statement can be reconciled with those
Him
it
and
own
1.
is the thought,
with the
Cf. p. 412, n.
METAPHYSICS
407
more important the above doctrine is for Aristotle, the more obviously does it reveal the weak side of his
theory.
The notion
so obscure
if,
Further,
perfection,
as
is
As Theophrastus easily discerned, IV. 12 (3fetajjh.), 8 ei e<pe(ris, S)] SA\cos re Koi rod
'
:
for
his
own
this
it
which
desire is produced
;
apicrrov, /j.era
at/
i7j
i/zuxrjs,
cfirpvx
Tci
PROCLUS,
m
:
Kivovfieva.
Similarly
Tim. 82,
Arist.
dt}
(of.
ScHRADER,
Volunt.
Doctr. Brandenb. 1847, p. 15, A, 42) asks et 70/j Ipa. b Koff/xos, &s (prjcn Kal 'Aptaror4\r]s, rov vov
Kal Kivelrai
irphs
ravrrjv
'
fore justified in denying that Aristotle held this notion in the face of his own plain and re-
peated statements and the interpretations of them in this sense by the most faithful of his disciples all the less as it is hard indeed (as the discussion in Theophrastus, Fr. 12, 5, clearly proves) to say in what other way motion can, on Aristotle's principles, be conceived of as proceeding from the absolutely unmoved. Brentano (as above, 239 sq.) thinks, indeed, that there is nothing so totally in contradiction to the Aristotelian doctrine as the view that ' matter is the efficient principle because it moves of itself to meet God, who is its end.' As little, he says, can 'the end produce anything of itself
;
causes the motion as little can it mean that the end produces it by itself alone, apart from any efficient principle. The fact is that the efficient cause is not here regarded as different from the final. Though we should perhaps in such a case conceive of two independent causes at work, the attractive force and the thing that permits itself to be attracted, Aristotle represents the relationship otherwise. He ascribes to the mover a ^vvaixis iroi-qriK)}, to the motion merely a
(Meta])h. v. 15, 1, 1046, a, 16 sqq.). It is impossible, therefore, for him to attribute to that which owes its motion to something else, any independent efficiency of its own. On the contrary, the efficient and the final cause, as has been shown at p. 356 sq., he conceives of as in essence one.
ZvvafJLis
iradririK^
1021, a,
15,
ix.
without an
efficient
principle.'
But nobody has asserted either the one or the other. When
it
is
said
that
God
the
causes
desire
motion by causing
Their apparent severance under certain circuTustances is only a phenomenon of the sensible world, where form realises itself in matter, and therefore (cf. pp. 368 sq.) in a plurality of individuals. In the intelligible world, however, efficient and final cause are always one and the same, and accordingly it is impossible to speak of an end producing anything apart from a principle
408
ahistotle
motum must be
in contact' with
the
mohile,
it
must be
in
primum
It is true that
he endeavours to
contact
exclude
idea
;
for
'
to juxtaposition in
Moreover, he asserts
"
motum
is
but not
vice versa.
is
contradiction that
to the of efficiency.- Similar action of God Himself is that of the spheral spirits, which produce motion in their respective spheres as being themselves the end of the motion cf p. 405, n. 3. It is still more strange that Brentano
;
.
goes beyond the view which he combats, in saying, p. 240, that according to Mcfaph. xii. 7, 1072. a, 26: 'God moves as known:' for since matter, as he himself adds, cannot know God. it would follow from this that God does not move matter at all. The assertion, however, rests upon a misunderstanding. Aristotle says (cf p. 404) rh opeKrhv Koi rh vorjThv Kive? oi) Kivovmvov vovs Se vnh rov votjtov KipeTrai KJi/e? 8e ws epcufifuov. As
. :
voTjrhv
God moves
onl}^
Nous
(to
which, however, motion can be ascribed only in an improper sense cf. Ch. XI. at the commencement and at the enddnfra); the world, on the other hand. He moves as 4p(i>/jLvov by means of the up^^is which He causes. "VVe, indeerl, should
;
'
METAPHYSICS
of existence in space forced
409
still
upon us
God
its
circumference.
is
For since
taken to be motion
and of the original motions in space none is continuous and uniform except circular motion,^ the operation of the first mover upon the world must consist in the production of circular motion.^ According to Aristotle, this might be effected either
absolutely
from the centre or the circumference of the world, for both of these places are ap;^at, and command the whole movement. He prefers the latter, however, because it
moves faster than the and that which is nearest to the cause of motion ought to move at the quickest rate.'* In defending
is
centre,
he might hope to evade the objection that he places God in a particular locality by his peculiar theory of space, which excluded from the notion everything that lay beyond the limits of the world. It is
this position
'"^
we cannot
is confined to the unvarying exercise of uniform self-contemplation, so, in his relation to the world, He has no other func-
Again
To explain the
'
Phys.
^,
viii.
7,
see p. 421
^^^
Phya.
viii.
6 fin.,
;
c.
Metapli. xii.
6/;^
c.
8,
^ fin. 1073, a,
;
2^
s<l%
P%.
viii. 10,
267, b, 6
279, a, 16 sqq. (see p. supra). Hence the assertion (Sext. Matli. x. 23; HypoUjp. iii. 218) that God is to Aristotle t^ Trtpas rov ohpavov ^ Cf. De Ccelo, i. 9 (cited as above, at p. 395, n. 6) and p. 432, / r
i.
Cwlo,
9,
395,
n.
6,
i?^
n. 5.
410
infinite diversities
ARISTOTLE
and subdivisions of its motion, by simple and uniform activity, would be im-
means of this
possible.
Aristotle himself admits as much with reference to the heavenly bodies; and accordingly he adds to the first mover a number of subordinate but equally
eternal substances,
whose business
it
is
to cause the
The same
provision
must, however, be
of
all
made
to account
for special
motion
As
kinds and for every separate property of things. cannot have produced
exercises one general function in
we
some
its
Only
is
it
will not
do to
equally general in
operation
for
orbit
of the sun and planets, from which Aristotle ^ deduces the phenomena of growth and destruction. The special character of everything must be ascribed
to its
own
particular nature
:
and Form.^
Here a new
and
?
question rises
in finite things
God
Or what
as they
are
we
3Ieta2)h.
xii.
8,
For
-
fuller
explanation
xii.
6,
&K\o
AWcos
/col
dWus.
IX. infra.
mtaph.
1072,
a,
to secure the uniformity of the motion of the world (TreptcJSy 1. 10 is prob. corrupt), Sel -ri aei
/icVetj/
Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, a, see the section of Ch. IX. infra, which deals with the earthly world.
23
;
wo-auTOJs
ivepyovv.
el
5e
METAPHYSICS
the changes of birth
411
What
and
We
cannot suppose
such a
them
to be God's creatures
^
;
to
be, Psych, d. Arist. 198, 234 sqq. BuLLiNGER goes even further,
Erhabenheit uber alien BiMlismus etc. (1878), p. 2 sq. According to his view, Aristotle supposed not only the whole world, but even the material of which it is made, to originate in a divine act of creation. Thus the
JDes Arlst.
'
395, n. 6), and justified in applying " eTs Koipavos ea-Tw " (p. 391, n.
(p. 394, n. 1,
and
to
Him we are
material out of which God creates the world would, according to Aristotle, be nothing else than the power and might eternally actual in God, whereby the world is actualised,' &c. (p. 15).
'
'
It will be sufficiently evident from the account already given in the text that speculations are here attributed to Aristotle which are as foreign to the range of his thought as they are in conflict
with his definite declarations. ^ That God is called irpuTrj dpxh (see p. 403, supra), proves nothing for this may mean, not only that He has produced everythino-, but also that He is the
;
The commander, however, is not therefore the creator of his subordinates. And as little does it follow from Mctaph. ix. 8, 1050, b, 3 (see p. 385, n. 1 supra)\.\\2X the creative activity of God precedes all being in time; for the ael Kivovv irpcoToo^ does not (as Ps. Alex, in loo. certainly thought) refer to God as the first cause of motion in the universe. On the contrary (as is obvious from the explanation upon p. 1049, b, 17 sqq. which the Sxrirep (tirofiei/ recalls), the reference is here to the fact that every individual thing presupposes as the condition of its production another similar already existing thing, and this likewise another, ecuj rov
2).
del KivovvTos irpcoTcos
:
and
order
:
i.e.
dpxh,
come
to the first
member
until we of the
412
ARISTOTLE
it
but
arises with
series
question
tirst
given the
whole
in
Kivovy);
each
and
the
p.
repeated from
1049, b, 26, where (as Phys. viii. 10, 267, a, 1, 3) this is unAridoubtedly its meaning. stotle was precluded from holding any theory of creation by his view of the eternity of the world. Such a theorj^ moreover,
is incompatible, not only with the assertion that to God belongs neither irpdrTtiv nor ttoic'iv (see p. 400, n. 1), but also with the principle ex nihilo niliil ft (P/n/s. i. 4, 187, a, 84, c. 7, 190, a, H;'Gen. An. ii. 1, 733, b, 24; Metaph. iii. 4, 999, b, 6, vii. 7, 1032, a, 13, 20, b, 30, c. 8 init., ix. S, 1049, b, 28, xi. 6, 1062, b,
of every subsequent theism this is impossible. One who conceives of God as the substance of the world, and of finite things as mere manifestations of the divine force immanent in them, may, and even must, in consequence, declare that the one is as eternal as the other. One, on the other hand, who treats God as a personal being outside the
from which we have not the smallest right to make an exception in fa\our of the Deity, as
24),
world, distinguishing other beings from Him as so many independent substances, would involve himself in a palpable contradiction were he to hold that the latter are eternally created by the former. Creation as an act proceeding from a personal will must necessarily be in time, and an individual being in order to produce other beings must necessarily exist before them. For only causcc im7nane7ites\m\e
does. p. 240, indeed, believes that the eternity in time of immaterial substances as little dispenses with the necessity of an efficient principle for them as the eternity of motion dispenses with the necessity of a mover in other words, he endeavours to reconcile the eternity of the world with the theory of its creation by means of the conception of an eternal creative activity in God. But upon the principles of the Aristotelian as
' ;
contemporaneous effects ; causes frariHeuntes always precede their effects : the father precedes the
son, the artist the work of art, the creator the creature. Such a contradiction we should be justified in attributing to Aristotle, only if we could show that he held alike to the eternity of the world and to a creative activity of God. The opposite, however, is the case. Aristotle holds, indeed, quite definitely the doctrine of the eternity of the world, but
of a creative activity in
God we
METAPHYSICS
respect to the
413
Forms of sensible things, and to the order of nature which results from their union with Matter they also are uncreated.^ It is equally impossible upon
Aristotle's
as the result of
showing to explain the adaptations of nature any personal interference on the part of
finally,
God.2
If,
the
ancient
Greek view of
is in
the
open
disagreement with Aristotle's dualistic theism,^ this does not, where the question is one of his scientific
views, justify us in setting aside or explaining
away
his
own
and well-considered statements, on the ground that he has neglected to bring them into harmony with views that were pressed upon him from
definite
another side.
He
thoughts of God, whose selfdevelopment produces alteration in individual things, and the harmony of whose transmutations is guaranteed
Forms
as the
eternal
But,
no
iroiitv
belongs to
As
shown
Such interference is expressly denied of God (see p. :i68, n. 1), nor on the theory that the world is eternal can we
*
we must supply certain important conceptions, and goes on * Indeed, that all existences must be traced back to, referred ultimately to, living thoughts of God, and that these must be treated as the simple substrata
physics,
:
understand when it could have taken place cf. p. 412. Cf. infra, p. 420 sq.
;
xii.
9,
2, supra) If nothing attained by the thought of the divine spirit, wherein consists its
is
meta-
worth?
We
may, moreover,
as-
414
ARISTOTLE
in the first place, this statement can apply only to the Forms as such, and leaves the existence of the eternal
substances
plained.
(the
spheral
spirits,
&c.)
wholly unex-
In the second place, it is untenable even It finds no support in with respect to the Forms. own utterances,^ and in more than one point Aristotle's
it
The
object
definite of Divine Thought, according to Aristotle's than God Himself: not only statement, cannot be other
ex-
forms, which cluded, but even the specific concepts or their internal essence, must remain remote constitute
different from Him, since they are always something stand far below that which alone from Himself, and
and perfect can be matter of his thought viz. divine Aristotle anticipating to the eternal thought of God
:
sumethat
Leibnitz's doctrine of monadsmore or less consciously intended qualito refer the changes in the exties or essence of individual
That dynamic activities which have gone out from God, and therefore also finite being which is animated by these,
and
p.
577
n.
'
istences to the self-development which of the divine thought on Ihey rest, and the obstructions and disturbances in this self-
existences by an anticipation of the conception of a harmonia pra'staMUtn., to the unity and perfection of the ultimate reality, the unconditioned spirit of God,
is their common substratum.' Cf further his p. 578, where the central point of the Aristotethe lian theology is sought for in doctrine that all determination dy in the world is referable to ITamic IcTivities, and these again
which
should seek to return to Him, is bo also quite comprehensible, iJ/^^. iii. a, 113 sq Even J/c%^^. xn. 9 contains nothing to support Brandis s view (cf. also Kym, iMetaph^ Aristotle there Urders. 258). asks how we are to conceive of the thought of the divine spirit if nothing is thought of by him (not: if 'nothing is attained by his thought ') his power of thought must be as worthless as that exif something ercised in sleep
' ;
'
other than Himself is thought of, then is the worth of his thought to be measured by the worthiness But this does not of its object ? mean that the Divine thoughts constitute the essence of things.
METAPHYSICS
415
Conversely, the Forms of things cannot be being.' thoughts of the Deity, since, according to Aristotle, the
Form
is
neither
to
anything.^
Again,
we
find
no analogy
divine thoughts
indeed,
it
is is
the proposition
that there
all
Him
struggle to return to
Him
this striving,
motion, to
it-
by means of the
forces.^
Nor
is
it
it
For supposing
of
immanence
the Deity
would by virtue of his thoughts be inherent in things, and the latter would have in God the permanent ground
of
their
shifting
properties.
v/e
Instead of Aristotle's
at
is it
dualistic theism,
should arrive
system
of
dynamic pantheism.^
impossible to
4y^.5?/;;r.
See
p. 398, n. 1,
sq.,
and
p.
n. 2,
,
and
373
sq.
mpra.
'
and
is
the very
ex-
still
more
41G
AIIISTOTLE
duced that fusion of things diverse and fundamentally distinct which meets us in the spurious book upon the World and still more in Neoplatonism. Aristotle leaves
it
quite uncertain
particular
his
how we
the
From
and individual Forms to the Deity. utterances upon the subject we can only say
that he placed
them
side
by
side,
without explaining
things by the operation of the Deity, or even They are given attempting such an explanation.
factors, just as
Matter
is
It is true not attempt to deduce from Form or Deity. unity of his system, the ovk a'yaBov iroXvtliat the
KotpaviT], is thus
This brings us to the conclusion of the Metaphysics. God being defined as the First Cause of Motion, phi-
Unmoved to
the
Moved or,
in
obvious by-KYM; cf. ibid. p. 242 2i6sq.,256,258sq.,andp.402,n.l, According to Kym, tin. supra. God is said to be, not only the creative conception, but also the material cause of the world, the indwelling purpose and the productive force that is immanent This, however, is a mere in it. assertion, and is not proved to be Aristotle's own opinion by any
detailed investigation into his declarations on the subject. ' Cf THBQPfJB. Fr, X2 (^Me.
taj)7i.),
Kdyov
TrXeiw
i^d-q
rrjs
icpeaeus,
iroia
/col
rivwv,
eVetS^
spheres] Kal
virevapnai
nva
&pi<jTov'] Kal
ov xf^piv acpaves.
e^re
yap ev rh kivovu, dronov rh fxrj irdura r^v out^j/ [sc. <f>opav Kivel-^ elre KaO' eKaarou erepov, a'i (rdat'] dpxoX TrAeioyy,^ SjTTe [?] rh t' avficpupou avrS>v ets tp^^^iv iovrwv
r^v
PhI'sics
417
CHAPTER
PHYSICS
A.
VIII
The Idea of Nature and the most General Conditions of Natural Existence
has to deal, as
corporeal
First Philosophy, according to the view of Aristotle, we have seen, with unmoved and inreality
:
though,
in
treating
of
this
its
proper subject,
we were
some
Natural Philosophy occupied with the aggregate of corporeal existence which is subject to Motion.' All natural substances
;
of natural existence
everything, in
to them.
we
fact, which possesses them or is related Hence the whole domain of corporeal existence belongs to Natural Science.^ But regards form only
ifc
and the
Cf. p. 183, n. 3.
De
Coelo,
i.
init.
7]
Tr^p't
(pvaews
iin(TTi}fir]
ax^^hv
irXdar-n
1, 298, b, 27 eVel 5^ ruv tpia^i ^cyo/nevuv to yueV ea-Tiv ovaiai ra 5' cpya koX irddv rovrwv [by ovaiai,
(paiv^Tai irepi re crcvfiara Kai fiey^eri Kalra rovrwv elvai nddr] kuI 7 as
KLu-nafis,
ba-ai
cTt
Se
irepl
ras apxds,
dcriv
however, he here means both simple and composite bodies] (pavephv on r^v irKeiaTTiP avfifiaivei
Trjs
irepl
rrjs
Toiaxmjs
<picrL
oixrias
(p{)aus
iaropias
iraaai
a-wjuaTa
avveaTciyrwv ra fxeu i(TTi acafxara /col fieyeOr] [as the human body], to 5' exei (rSifia Kal fiey^dos [as man], t^ 5' apxal rwu
fXOi'roiu
Tuv yap
nepl
at
(Tco^uctTwj/
duai
ovaiai
yhp
<pv(TiKal
7)
^ fiera
elaip [as
I.
the soul]
iii.
(rw/xdrcou yiyvourai Kal fieycduiK iVfitajjh. vi. 1, 1025, b, 26 sq. (xi. 7) and elsewhere ; see infra.
=*
wsm.
VOL. vuLi.
Eg'
418
ARISTOTLE
It
it
is
subject to
bodies are
not
indeed,
Mathematics may be
distin-
guished from Physics by the fact that the former deals with immovable, the latter with movable, substances.^
Furthermore, movable existence can only be regarded as natural when it contains within itself the principle
*
'
of
motion
and
between
The
dis-
which
is
drawn between
rational
and
irrational forces,
former
may
act in either of
two opposite directions, the and that the former, therefore, are free,
is
realm of Nature.^
Yet
Form and
:
we are met by
this question
Does the
'
Form
Metapli.
vi.
1,
a,
nepl
iffTiv.
^vxn^
oa-n
^vlas
fJ.^
i.
Qiupriaai
rod
vhr]s
7.
Phyi^. ii. 1, 192, b, 13: ra nev yap ^vaei ovra irdvra (paiverai
""
(pvaiKOv,
avv
1,
Be
Phrjs.
All.
2,
403, b,
:
^xoura iv eawroTs dpxV Ktvficrews kol a-Taaeus, ra /xev Kara rSirov, to.
8e
/car'
FuTt'.An. 11,64:1,
-
ii.
mathematician
av^V(riv Ka\
'
(pQiaiv, to.
5e
KaT
exet
aWoioiaiv
etc.
. .
kX'vk)
8e
koX
dpfi^v
IfxaTiou,
.^ovSefiiav
ifKpvrou,
_
physicist is occupied with the form of bodies, aAA' ovx v (pvaiovSe Kov (rdfiaTos ir4pas '^Kaarou ra (Tu/i/Se/SrjKOTa SewpeT ^ roiovrois
[sc.
Sih
(pvaiKols^
ovai
'
av/jL^efi-nKev.
as he proceeds in the rest of the chapter further to explain. ^ 3IetajjJl. xii. 3, 1070, a, 7 v fih oi r^xv-t] apxh eV &A?^cfi [similarly ix.
/nerafioKris
:
Kal x^p'^C^''
Kiviiaectis
X'"/"'^'^"
.
.
.
7P \V
.
etc.
ixvev
Kiu-ncrews,
oLudpooiros
<rap^
Se Kal
10^^' b' ^] ^ ^^ ^^'^'^ "PX^ ^^ avr^. Metajih- ix, 2 init. c. 5, c. De Interjjr. 8, 1050, a, 30 sqq.
"*
oarovv Ka\
ovKeri.
Cf
C. 13,
22, b, 39.
183, n. 3, sv2)ra.
PHYSICS
or in the Matter ?
419
In support of the second alternative might be asserted that everything requires some material in order to be what it is.^ Yet Aristotle is
it
first alternative.
Form
causes
the material
is
material, so
we wish to determine the gewe must not consider what much as the moving and informing
Nature is the cause of motion and rest in everything which possesses these conditions of being originally
force.''
thing
and not merely in some derivative fashion. A natural is one that has such a motive force within itself.'' But Aristotle does not help us greatly in defining
*
193, a, 9-30. 1, 1014, b, 26. Phys. ii. 1, 193, a, 28 sqq. c. Metaph. as above, 2, 194, a, 12. 1. 35 sqq. Part. An. i. 1, 640, b, 28, 641, a, 29, b, 23 sqq. For a fuller discussion of this point see i/i/ra and p. 357-8. * Part. An. :7 i. 640, b, 28
ii.
Phys.
v.
4:
Jin.
t]
irpdirri
7;
Metapli.
-
V. 4,
\cyoiJ.4v7]
iarlv
rwv
ixovraev apxhv Kiv-fia-ews iv avrols ^ avrd. vi. 1, 1025, b, 19 [xi. 7, 1064, a, 15, 30] ir^pl yap rfji^ roiavrrjv icrrlt/ ovaiav \Ji <pvaiK)f\
:
'^
4v
77
77
apxv
rrjs
Kivi\<Tews
koX
')fa.pKaraT^vp.op(p))v<p'u(TisKvpia}T4pa
641, a, 30: the scientific investigator has to deal with the soul still more than with the body, oarcp /xaWov t] v\r] Si'
rrjs vXiKTJs (l)v(r(as.
fj
dvdira\iv.
Phys.
oUffrfs rrjs
(rrdaeus iv avrfj (or 1. 26: ircpl toiovtov hv ean Swarhv KiveTadai). It is indifferent whether nature is described as the substratum of motion merely, or of rest as well, since, according to Aristotle, rest {^p^fiia, <TTd(ris) belongs as an attribute only to those things to which motion belongs, or at least can belong, and is merely (rreprfais
vwapx^i irpdoruis KaO' avrh /col fiTj Kara avixfie^rtKos. 1. 32: <i)V(ns fifv o5j/ i(TTLTO pr]div (pvcTiv 8e e;^ei oaa ToixvTrjv Hx^t apxW' Metaph.
Phys. iii. 2, 202, a. 3, 226, b, 12, c. 6 iidt., vi. 3, 234, a, 32 c. 8 239, a, 13, viii. 1, 251, a, 2^.
Kivfjo-eus.
2,
E 2
420
ARISTOTLE
^
force
'
with accuracy
On
the
one
side
lie
considers
attributing to
her a
life
and
He
which
In a
except by the
word, he uses expressions that can scarcely be explained analogy of the human soul and the
against this idea as conceived by Plato. Though he remarks that the designs of Nature are not determined by deliberation like those of an artist,^ and though in general we cannot attribute to him any real and intentional personification of Nature, yet
the
analogy re-
mains.^
On
regards
living
beings as individual
life
substances.
to
He
them, and he
never indicates, or sets himself to discover, how this Nor principle is related to the single force of Nature.
does he teach us
causality."^
how Nature
insisting
it
is
When
of divinity, he denies
'
to
merable it will suttice to refer to the discussion of design in nature which follows in the text. As will be shown in its
proper place. ^ By analogy is meant, not identity, but similarity. Cf. with what follows BeanDlS, iii. a. 113 sqq.
' '
'"
^ovov fxercx^i' [^b twv v) yap avOpdiruv ycuos^ tov Oeiov ruv r]/juu yvupificap ^(fOiV ^ fidXiara irdvrcov. man stands iv. 10, 686, a, 27 upright Sia rh rrju (picriv aitrov Kal T^v ovalav eli/at delav epyoi/ 5e tov rh voe7v Kal <ppovilu. deioTOLTOv Eth. N. X. 7, 1177, a, 13 sqq. (cf vovs is the divine in p. 1 65, n. 1) man, and therefore the highest activity is the theoretic.
a, 7
: :
As
in Part.
An.
ii.
10, 656,
PHYSICS
and from
this point of
is
421
as a whole
demonic*
Yet there
are
theology of the Greeks, who recognised and revered an immediate exhibition of divine force in natural phenomena. Nature and God are so used synonymously,^'
and a share
view
as
is
in
divinity
is
conceded to
all
natural
So
far
God
the
first
cause of motion,
all
motions in the
Him
On
if
we
of the
primum movens
to
conclusions
are impossible.
to
sphere
we have
Mover a series still more necessary in order to explain the much greater variety of movements in the realm of nature to assume a train of independent substances endowed with motive power of their own. How the harmony of these movements or their conjunction in an orderly
system
'
is effected, it is
hard to say.
:
:
It
cannot be by the
Dhin. p.
S. c. 2, 463, b, 12
dreams
Etli. N. x. 10, 1179, 4xei rh -irav. rh /xev oduTrjs (ptxrctas [the b, 21 moral disposition] Sid nvas 9ias alrias rois us aK-ndcos evrv.
Saifxovia,
'^
Be
X^*'""'
viroipx^i.
The
dflai
alriai
rj
(pvffis
Gen.
as to
et Corr. ii. 10, 386, b, 27 sqq. (see r\ext chapter, infra). Polit. vii. i,
rovro ^32: edas y'ap ^vvajxius epyop, ^ris Kal t6S avu1326,
a,
Mh. N.
vii. 14,
422
ARISTOTLE
universe; and
it
would be
illegitimate
to
attribute
on the
it
in his writings.^
Consequently
it
or,
we ought to combine these two points of view, and, if so, how we ought to do it. But meantime we may
permit Aristotle further to unfold his view of Nature.
'J'lie
to
that of Motion.
In
we had
therefore
should
analysis of physical
special sense.
supplement our previous conclusions with an motion in its stricter and more
p.
380
sq.
as
the
what
exists potentially.
By
analysing
we
Aristotle distin(J)i\q3V
'
Eth.K.x.
9,
1179,3,22:
troiuv us
fiivovs
ruu
5e
Koi
opOws
trpdrrovras.
(ro(f>(fi
on
yap
fidXicrO^ virdpx^i,
ovk SStjAov.
Tis
ewLU^Kcia rCov auOpunrivoov inrh deuv yivirai, lixmep SoKe7, Kal etVj &j/
60<pi\4(TraTOS
&pa.
is
It is obvious
that
Aristotle
here arguing
;
evXoyov xatp^"'
Kal
ciTj
'""^
ovToi/s
t^ apiffTcp
aya-rraiuTas
ry
6
povs)
Kal
Tovs
389sqq.
lndXiffra
PHYSICS
423
and decrease; qualitative motion, or alteration; and motion in space, or locomotion to which may be added as a fourth kind, birth and destruction.^ Now all these
kinds of movement
third
may
we examine
increase or growth, to
begin with, consists in the addition of fresh material to matter which has already received a certain form the
:
increment
that which
is
it
its
form
in other
a,
stance (birth and destruction) is not admitted to be motion (simicf Simpl. c. 5, 229, a, 30 Phys. 201, b, who extends the statement to the Peripatetic school in general, remarking, however, that Theophrastus, among others, did not keep strictly to elsewhere this use of language)
larly
;
.
Mefapk. viii. 1, 1042, a, 32, xii. 2 mit.,P/iy8.Yiil 7, 260, a, 26, 261, Gen. et a, 32 sqq., vii. 2 init. De An. i. Corr. i. 4, 319, b, 31 Long. v. 3, 465, b, 3, 406, a, 12, .^0; De Ccelo, iv. 3, 310, a, 25. Aristotle here Cat. c. 14 init. three generally distinguishes
; ;
kinds
change {fieTafioXi}) from being to being, from being to not-being, and from
of transition
not-being to being. Tlie first is motion in the stricter sense, the second destruction, the third
orif/ination.
Aristotle treats this also as a form of motion, and uses * motion' as synonymous with ' change.' See p. 382, n.'i,svpTa. Phys.\ii. 2,243, a, 21 (cf. Pe An. i. 3, 406, a, 4) distinguishes two kinds of loco:
that which is selfmotion he then originated and that which is The divides into the kinds mentioned caused by something else.
Motion
in the text
KOTCt Trddos
(Kiuriffis
Kara
fieycdos,
and Kara
roirov,
7,
as he
calls
them Phys.
viii.
260, b,
tion rates
T)
four kinds of fieTafioXi] Kara rh ri (yeveffis Kal (pQopa), -q Kara, rh iroffdv {aij^riais /col (pOiais), Karb. 7] Kara rh iroihu (ctAAotaxrts), 7] rh TToO {(popa). That these are the only categories under which motion caa be thought, is shown Phys. V. 2, where change of sub-
four kinds the StVrjo-Js, third and fourth of which, however, may be resolved into the Cf. viii. 10, 267, b, 9 first two. Pe An. iii. 10, 433, b, 25 sqq. Ingr. An. c. 2, 704, b, 22 i3fot. An. c. 10, 703, a, 19); the
latter
e\^is,
again
is
of
&(ris,
6xV(ris,
statement mRhet.i.
5,
1361, b,
An.
ii.
8,
424
ARISTOTLE
words, such increase is an augmentation of matter, the form remaining constant. Similarly decrease is the diminution of matter without change of form.i
tive
Quantitative alteration, therefore, implies both qualitamovement and locomotion. 2 But the second of
is
these two
for
every transformation
duces
active
it
produced, of an
for (although the not necessarily true) the patient must always be touched by the agent, and contact cannot be effected
converse
without locomotion.''
Even the
tion,
is
last species of
movement
in space.
If
one
were to assume
existence,
an absolute beginning
could
or
not,
end of
such a transmutation
indeed, be called a movement, since in such a case the substratum of the movement would itself
begin
or end.
But
birth
and annihilation
in this absolute
sense
xxiv. 9,936, b, 38. IdeleE,^W#. Meteor, ii. 509. P tae the full discussion in Gen. et Corr. i. 5.
-'
Phys.
lloiuv
viii. 7,
'
tlie
physical sense
IS
synonymous
^
aWoiovv,
aOai.
(TLs
kWoiw-
fi^v
yhp
7]
aWomThv,
pificoTpov
rovro 5' oh ^ Kivr^ais vdOos Kaff Strou iWoLovrai ixdvov. On a further meanin'>* of 7rote?y see in n. 1 to p. 400 * Phys. viii. 7, 260, b, 1 sqq where it is further remarked that all qualitative changes are ultimately resolvable into rarefaction and condensation, which involve change of place. Geoi. et Cm-r. i. 6, 322, b, 21 sqq. c. 9, 327, a,
iriffxovTinrddos -
1, of, p.
^
386.
Kol Tra9r)TiKou
toiovtou.
i. 6, 322, b, 9, 323, a, 17: ov yap ol6v re irav rh Kivovv ttoicTv, finep rh iroiovy o.vTiB'{]<TofXv t^
6om
Gen.
et
et Corr. i. 3, amonoarguments, shows thai matter would in the end be all used up, if destruction were to
Ge7i.
other
PHYSICS
sort,
425
i
being of some
and
Its
is
ends
its
its
existence
beginning
is
the
else.^
end,
aod and
Consethe
sur-
quently,
different
individual object.
vives as a whole, although its qualities alter, but it is generated or destroyed when it, as a whole, begins or
ceases to exist.^ If on the contrary we regard the universe and not the individual, then generation and destruction coincide partly with composition and division, partly with the transmutation of materials.^ Now both of these processes are occasioned by movement in
space.'^
cause
all
Everything that comes into being has its becoming implies a being by which it is
'
'
' '
mean
-^j
a,
^^^' ^' ^'' yeveais ehai irpc^TT] Twv Kiuvcrea,u 5LhTovro,'6Tiyueaeai Set t5 TTpay^ia irpuTov. rh S' >'
S6^i
,,v
T'i 7 hv
^"^',
7]
in the irddv, birth and destruction by change in the viroKeifxevop, whether in respect of its form (\6yos) or its matter c 4, 819
;
fpbs fi^v 6T0V0VV tS>v yivotxh^v ovTws exei, erepou hvayKoTiov wpdT^pdy TiKiv.Tfrdai Twu yiuofi4yu,p ov avTb Kal fi-q yiySfievov, Kal rovrov erepou irpSr^pou. Cf. 38 1-7.
aW
p.
Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 318, a, 23 5ia rh r^v rouSe (pdopav &KKov ^Ivai y4vjaiv. /ca2 r^V rov^^ y^p^triv &A.\ov Hvai (f>dopau diravarov amy'
:
10: kWoiucris /n^u iariv, 'drav rov iwoKeifidvov, alaOr}. rov Hvtos, fierafidWv iu to7s a{>rov TrdO^ffiu .... Uap' S' '6\ov ^erafidWr, fii] hirofx^vovros alaB-nrov rivos oos viroKeifieuov rov avrov y4u<rLS ijSn rh toiovtov, rod 'si
h,
{,Trofx4vovTos
<peopd.
319, a, 20,
P'
3
'
IMd.
Cf.
10,
,^
336, b, 24.
fan yap
i. 2, SU, a, 20: yevetris air\rj Ka\ <bdoph ov (TvyKpmec Kal SiaKpia-^i, Urav
(ren.et Corr.
dW
b 31 where he argues that geis effected by definil e becoming transmuted and determined in certain ways by the agency of efficient forces destruction, on the other hand by the conquest of the passive
sqq.,
neration materials
matter
form.
^
over
the
MeTa^a\A77
determining^
260,
/c
rovS^
els
roSe o\ov.
'AKKoiacris is
produced by change
Cf. P/ii/s.
viii. 7,
b 8
426
ABISTOTLE
Since this, as
produced.
tion,
we saw
Again, if movement must precede all generation.^ movement in space precedes generation, it must of necessity precede growth, change, decrease, tion
;
and destruc-
which has previously been generated.^ Therefore this species of motion is the first in the order of causality, as
well as in the order of time and in the logical order also.^
said, Aristotle
had done.
his
Even purely physical occurrences cannot, in satisfactorily accounted for by this method, seeing that many of them are only to be conceived as modes of qualitative alteration, or the
opinion, be
transmutation of
materials.''
Kol
jjLOLvcoais
dent of these conceptions, and none of them are applicable to the heavens (260, b, 19 sqq. Gen. et
Corr.
ii.
KaO^ &s yivecris Kal (pOopd Aeyerat (XvyKpivofieva Se Kal rccv ovaiSiv.
ZiaKpivSjxeva
lj.eTa^6.A\iv.
^
10
init.).
is
So
also
move-
dvayKH]
Kara
a,
roirov
1
Fliys. ibid.
et Corr.
ii.
261,
sqq.
Gen.
10
init.
- Pkys. ibid, b, 7. It is here further pointed out in proof of the priority of movement in space,'
'
the only one of these conceptions which has to do with the eternal, and is of infinite duration (260, b, 29, 261, a, 27 Aristotle also argues that sqq.). because it is the last in time in rein space
ment
pose them. Without the movement of the heavens, neither o;eneration nor destruction, neither growth nor material change, could take place. Movement itself, on the other hand, is indepen-
spect to individual existences, it must be the first in nature (260, b, 30, 261, a, 13) and he holds that it causes the least change in the nature of the thing moved, and is the motion which the self -moving produces in preference to every other (261, a, 20). Ibid. 260, b, 15 sqq. ^ Seep. 304,n.3,andp.306,n.o.
;
PHYSICS
rise
427
philosophy of a
is
development, and that the importance of Aristotle's natural philosophy consists, to a great extent, in having
first
made
this
notion
it
of development possible
it is
and
consciously given
clear that
and
left
us nothing but a
movement in space
of un-
means to its end all that is corporeal and determined by natural necessity. Next to Motion in Space, and not without direct relation to it, come investigations by which Aristotle further illustrates the idea of motion in his Physics and these include discussions upon the Infinite, Space, Time, the Unity and Continuity of Mot ion, ^ &c. The Infinite ^ had played an important part in pre* See p. 307, n. 4, and cf. p. 359, sq. supra. - He describes those conceptions, indeed, generally, iii. 1, 200, b, 15 sqq. c. 4 init., as belonging to the discussion upon motion, and deals with the first three in bks. iii. and iv. before the section upon the kinds of motion but the way in which he treats
is
thinking
^ The discussion of this conception Aristotle introduces mPhys. iii. 1, 200, b, 15, with the words Zok^I h'' t] Kivr](Tis ^Ivairwv (rw^x^^i rh S' &Treipov SfKpaiverai irpwrov ii/ t&5 (ruvexe?; c. 4 mif. he remarks that natural science deals with masses, motion, and time, each of which is either finite or infinite, On what follows see Zeller, P//. d. Or. pt. i. 186.
:
428
ARISTOTLE
Plato and the Pythagoreans
Aristotelian pliilosophy.
went
to
so far as to
make
:
it
an element of
all
things, and
this
therefore a substance.
Aristotle begins
'
by proving
be impossible
'
infinity
Then he shows
For suplimited by
is
inconceivable.
pose
it
to be a body,
;
body
that which
superficies
or if
it
not
Lastly,
and more
the
especially,
an
infinite
body
It could not
be
composite,
since,
number, an infinite body could not be made up of them unless one of them were infinite in magnitude, and such an element would leave no room for the rest.^
And
to think of
first
it
as
simple
is
equally
impossible.
In the
no
and
its
;
quite impossible
abides,
and
to
which
it
tends
and this law determines the difference in weight between bodies every body without exception must exist
;
there is no definite locality, no distinction of up and down, centre and circumference, before and after, right and left.-^ Moreover, whereas it is manifest that bodies
'
Phys.
n. 2,
-
and
i.
7 init.
*
Be
Ctelo,
iv.
Phys. ibid. 204, b, 22. Ibid. 205, a, 8 to end of chap., 8, 215, a, 8. De Ccelo, i. 6
PHYSICS
either
429
move
straight lines
up and down
movements.
is
The
former
is
movement
is
end.2
because lineal motion has a starting point and Indeed, infinity could not move at all, since it
' '
would take
infinite
ceivable space.^
argument
formless
being shape
we
indeterminable, which
which cannot be limited in such a way as not to leave some portion of it outside."* The infinite first becomes a whole and complete when it is enclosed by means of form. But the world cannot be conceived except as complete and a whole.^ It is therefore impossible that
imt.
sqq.
c. 7,
Aristotle's
firiSev
words
In c. 6, 273, a, 21 sqq., the same conclusion is reached by showing that infinite bodies mui-t be infinitely heavy or light, but
infinitely heavy or an infinitely light body is an impossibility, since it must either exhibit infinite speed or be absolutely immovable. As is shown, at unnecessary length, De Coelo, i. o, 271, b, 2ri sqq. 272, b, 17 sqq. c. 7, 275, b,
'
yap ov
e^cc,
eVrl,
tout'
aireipSv
iariv,
an
where, however, the antithesis is merely verbal, ov jwrjSej/ e|a) meaning that beyond which nothing exists,' ov aei n e|a>, on the other hand, M hat of which a part always remains beyond.'
'
12.
'^
De
Coelo,
i.
6 init.
a,
Also
21
c. 7,
275, b, 15 sqq.
^
IMd.
c.
6, 272,
a, 36.
sqq.
Phy.
vi. 7,
238,
6 see at p. ^^Q,sup. 715, b, 14 ^ Se (pvais ((xvyei rh direipov rh /xev yap &iripov oTeAes, tj 5e (fivais ael ^T/ret rehos The objection {Phys. iii. 4, 203, b, 22 sqq.) that infinite space presupposes also an infinite body, he afterwards sets asidc(iv. 5,212, a,31, b,8, 16 sqq.;
^
Pliys.
iii.
Gen. An.
i.
430
ARISTOTLE
minable magnitude.^
Yet we cannot entirely do without it. Time, and is measured by time, are without beginning or end. Magnitudes are capable of* infinite
motion, which
division,
cf.
number
i.
of
infinite
increase.^
Hence we
see p. 395, n. siqjj'o) by his peculiar definition of space as the boundary between the enclosing- and the enclosed. The boundary of the world itself is, therefore, according to his beyond it iew, not in space there is no space either void or
Ccelo,
9,
'
;
De
fxkv
ovv
1(5
&ireLpou,
(ptxv^pbv
e/c
TdUTOJv.
c.
(5,
206, a,
ibid, b, 24.
:
Phys.
IdTiv
iii.
6,
itiit.
otl
5'
el
fxi]
uireipov
ctTTAis,
iroWa
ahvvaTa (Tv/j-fiaiueL, brjXou. rod re yap xP^^"^ ecTTat tis apx^l Kal Tf AewTT?, kclI ra fxey^dr] ov Smipera
/cat apiO/j-ds ovk earai Aristotle proves in particular: (1) the eternity of time, and with it the eternity of motion which is measured by time. Besides the passages quoted p. 388, n. l,seeP////.viii. 1, 251, b, lOsqq. and cf. 3Ictaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 7. He argues that as every present is the middle point between the past and the future, and every moment is a present, it is wholly impossible to conceive of any moment of time which has not a before and after, and therefore of any which could be a first or a last moment, a beginning or an end of time. (2) He proves the infinite divisibility of
els
ixeyedr],
dneipos.
817, a, 2 sqq., I)e Cceloy iii. 306, b, 22). The assumption of indivisible bodily surfaces or lines is not only incompatible with the fundamental principles of mathematics (Be Ccelo, iii. 1, 298, b, 33 sqq, c. 5, 303, a, 20, c. cf. the treatise n. 7, 306, a, 26
i. 2,
8,
uto/jluv
ypafi/uLwu),
but
it
would
likewise make the most universal of all physical phenomena, viz. motion, impossible, for, magnitude and time being alike indivisible,it is impossible to traverse one part before another. Inrespect, therefore, of each of the indivisible elements and accordingly also of the whole which is constituted by them motion could only be predicated as a thing of the past, never as a thing of the present (Phys. vi. 1, 231, b, 18 sqq. cf c. 2, 233, a, 10 sqq. c. 9, 239, b, 8, 31), and all difference of velocity must also in like manner vanish (ihid. c. 2, 233, b, 15 sqq.)
PHYSICS
431
must conclude tliat the infinite exists in one sense and not in another or in other words, that it has
:
actual
existence.
is is
The
;
divi-
magnitudes in space
indefinite
yet
we
an infinitely small particle. The multiplication of numbers has no limit yet there is no infinitely great number.^ In a word,
therefore argue that there
may not
It is
its
extension
number, on
TO
ever
Tt
. .
become
ov
dAA.'
7,
actual,
Xafifidvciu
&(rr6
rh
direipoy
.
Set
ws roSe
del eV yeveaei fj (pdopa, 207, b, 11 (on the infinity of number) Ibcrre Swdfi^i
&c.
c.
fx4v
iffriv,
ivepyeia
5' oti
'
ctAA.'
dei
virepfidW^i rh Aafi^auSfjievov iravrhs wpifffiivov irk-fiOovs. dAA' ov xcwpttrrhs 6 apidfihs ovros tt)s SixoTOfiias, obSh ij.4pi 7] aireipla yiverai,
dWa
ciffirep
no proof. Phys.
'
iii.
6,
206,
a,
12 sqq.
rh
Keyerai
5^
rh
elj/ot
fxev
It is shown also, Gen. et Xpovov. Corr. i. 2, 316, a, 14 sqq., with respect to infinite divisibility, that ic never can be actually realised in fact and therefore exists only potentially. It is just because it
is
merely
'
4v
Swd/xei.
that
the
6.ireLpov
ecrt 8e
'6ti /j.kv
Infinite
is
reckoned
among
Kar'
iu4pyeiau
ovk
%(Ttiv
'
^ir^ipov,
ftprjrai,
XctA.6irbj/
diaipecei
ypafj-fids
aveXuv
material causes (see p. 350, n. 1, supra). Phys. iii. 7. Time, however, even Aristotle holds to be infinite
'^
in both directions.
432
as
AiasTOTL^
infinity of force.
an
This
is
also,
however,
is
manifested
we may
first pl^ce,
and same
No more
is
can
it
be idenalso
is it
with
the
matter of bodies,
since
this
:
in space
is
nor is
circumit
may
not regard
as
may
exist
and move
Space may more properly be defined as the limit of the surrounding body in respect to that which
it
surrounds.^
The place
is
surrounds
world.
*
'^
it,
and space
in general
by the
limits of the
See notes to p. 395, supra. Phys. iv. 1-4, cf. esp. 211, b, 5 sqq., 209, b, 21 sqq. ^ To irepas rod iripi^xovros adofiaros, or, more accurately, to ToG irepiexouTos irepas aKivrirov
2
It is strange that space should here be called as in c. 4, 212, a, 20 (cf. n. 3, supra) rod ohpavov ri rb
(Txo.Tov KaX aTTTOficvov rod Kivqrov
(xdiixaros irepas T]pfiovv for we are told (v. below and p. 377) that the vault of heaven moves continually in a circle. Aristotle
;
trpwrov.
Cf
De
Coelo,- iv.
3,
310,
b, 7.
'
"iSios tJttos,
iv.
Phys.
irpSjTos
init.,
T6iros Koiv6s.
rdiros 4v
iarlv cKacrrov
Phys.
iv. 5,
(c. 4, 212, a, 18 212, a, 31 sqq., viii. 9, 265, b, 1 sqq.) that just as in the case of a ball which spins round its own axis without otherwise moving- the circumference is as
means, however
sqq.
c.
5,
PHYSICS
Aristotle obtains the notion of
438
Time by a similar Time cannot exist without motion, since it is only by the movement of thoughts that we perceive it.
process.^
Yet
it is
itself is
is
inseparable
in one case
another slower
its
whereas time
is
is
universally
fast.
movement
it.
always equally
It
but
is
different
from
It is the
of motion in respect to
what
the
' '
is earlier
unit of this
number
is
now.'
Time
is
occasioned
now.'
It is this that
makes
now
moment
as
it
we
already
know
the
Aristotle's
them."^
the
distinction
stationary
circular
its
between
In like manner his concep11, of. p. 220, a, T6 5^ 6 xp^vos rep vvv KoX Sfpp7)Tai Kara rh vvv 219, b, 9 Clxrircp 7) Kivncris aei 6.Wi] kol aWrj, Kal 6 xp^^os 6 5' cifia nas xP^vos 6 avros rh yap vvv rh avrh 8 ttot' i)v rh S' elvuL avrcp erepov. Ibid. c 13, init. rh 5e vvv icrri awextia Xpdvov ffwex^i yap rhv xp^fov rhv irape\66vra Kal ea6/j.evov, Kal
iv. c.
as
centre,
(Tvi/X'f)!f
their
the highest heavens move only in a certain respect, and are in space only Kara (Tvfifie^rjKds, and in so far as their ] tarts move and are in space (^Be
so
( 'o'lo,
'
V, 5,
Dis, ii. b, 748, w^rongly suspects). In a like sense it is said (212, a, 18) that the river is stationary, and that only the individual
oKoDS
TTcpas
XP^^*^^
-p
icTTiv
fj
'
Siaipe? Se
ael erepov
Swdfief koI
rh vvv,
.
/xev toiovto,
dh avvSe?, del rb
waves move.
'
Phys.
avr6 ravrd
'ApidfjLQs
Kiwria-ews
Kara
1 1 Jjn.
;
to
Be
eari Se ravrh Kal Kara rj Siaipcais Kal r] V(0(tis, t6 8' elvai ov ravrd. * Cf. p. 428 sqq., and 387, supra. Aristotle, however, here
.
.
VOL.
I.
434
ARISTOTLE
If
Space
is
the enclosed,
Aristotle tries on
fute the widely-received assumption of a vacuum, which, owing mainly to the teaching of the Atomists, had become part of the current Natural Philosophy. The reasons with which they had supported it appear
him inconclusive. Movement does not need to be explained by such an hypothesis, since we can imagine that
to
Condensation
may
be referred to
th-e
exit of
;
air or other
rare-
when passing
into air
into steam)
may
phenomena
The vacuum elements to reach their natural place. would rather put a stop to the possibility of motion.
Since emptiness yields equally on all sides, one cannot imagine anything capable of determining a body to
follow
afford
one direction
It
would
special
it
no distinction of natural
it.
No
On
the
immutable.
3.
Phys.
i.
iv,
12,
221. b.
;
De
iv.
Coelo,
9,
279, b,
p. 895, n. 6,
7,
mpra
sqq. 214, a, 24 s(
c.
8 mit,
c.
PRYSICS
would be equally impossible, on
infinite
tlie
436
hypothesis
for
of
in
vacuity,
to
if
assign bodies
any reason
of the
rest
Nature
Again,
fall
medium through which they are moving, everything would have to fall or rise with infinite rapidity through the infinite rarity
of the void. greater masses
On
fall
if,
ceteris paribus,
because they more easily overcome the withstanding medium, then in the void, where there is no resistance to
Lastly,
how
are
we
to
conceive that an
empty space exists beyond the space occupied by bodies, since, if a body entered that space, there would then be two spaces, an empty and a fall, the one within the other? And what is the use of such a void space, since every body has its own extension ? Besides, by
*
empty space or any space at all beyond the world, one would end in the contradiction of asserting that a body could be where no body can.^ If empty Space is impossible, empty Time, filled with no movement, is equally inconceivable, since Time is
is
nothing but the number of motion.^ Aristotle, in fact, maintains the eternity of motion as having neither be'
Phys.iv.S; ct Be Coph,
iv.
In estimating- the force of these arguments we must, of course, take accoimt of the state of scientific knowledge at the time, and of the presuppositions which were shared by Aristotle and the Atomists alike. See
2.
Kevhv ovSh xP<^j/os eVrlj/ e|o. TOV iO) ovpavov- iv airavTi yap tSttcp SwatoV v-ndp^ai trcDyuo- Keuhu S' (hal
(paaiv
iv
ju^
iwircipx^i
.
(xooixa,
.
nwarhv
de
p. 442, infra.
&fxa
5e
J^^
5rj\ov
P'^\ on
^-
^'
P^'
a,
11
5' iat\ yeviaOai r|co rod ovpavov SeS^iKrai on ovt' ^anv oUr' ivdix^rai yeviaOai (ru:ixa. P/njs. \m. 1. 251, b, 10: t^ irpSrepov Kal varepov irws iffrai xP^vov fx)] ivros; ^ 6 xp^vos fx^
.
-^
ova-qs
Kiv^crecos ;
et
S-fj
ianv
2
FF
430
ARISTOTLE
ginning nor end.^ On this point he suggests the remarkwhether there could be Time without a able question
:
soul ?
is
implicit in motion, but that in reality it cannot be without the soul, because number does not exist without a calculator, and reason is the only calculator.^ But we
should
make
a mistake
if
we sought
to discover in this
remark any
philosophy.
importance in
Time modern
ceeds from Aristotle's not conceiving the ideas of Time and Space in as pure and abstract a sense as is familiar
to us.
Although he does not go so far as Plato, who identified Space with extended substance, and Time
stars,-^
make an
Xpovos
Time
Kiv'cr^ois
ael
Kiuria-'s
Tis, e^Trep
2o
avayKt)
fjL^v
aWa
i.
avdyKfi
9.
elvai
Kal
Kiv^cnv,
direp
xpovos irddos ti
279,
a,
is
Kivfjcreajs.
:
De
8'
Coflo,
of its existence; v. Toesteik in Wi. Miis. xii. 1857, p. 101 sqq.], oiov el evSexerai Kivrjcnv elvai avev Aristotle is not quite \\ivx^sconsistent in his answers to the question, what faculty of the soul it is that perceives time. Accord-
world there
apid/xhs
A II. iii.
Da we must
KLvhae'jos
KiurjaLS
&Uv
Cf. p.
395, n.
'
B,
supra.
a.
10 sqq.
esp.l. 25:
apie/xelu
r)
Se
jUTjSei'
^ux^
suppose That it is the reason, and that the sense of lime is limited In the Be to rational beings. Mem. i. 450, a, 9-23, on the other hand, he assigns it 'to the wpwrou aia-e-nTiKhu, and attributes memory, which involves the perception of
time (ihid. 419, b, 28), to many of the lower animals (ibid, and Hist. An. i. c. 2, 453. a, 7 sqq.
1,
advuaTOU eh'ai XP^^^^ "^^xh^ f^h oijavs, a\\' r) tovto o irore uv iariv 6 xp<^'os [apart from the soul time, as such, cannot exist, but only that which constitutes the essence of time, the reality that
lies
488, b, 25).
3
d.
Gt. Abth.
i.
beneath
it
as the substratum
PHYSIOS
4a7
as universal forms of sense, and the existence in which have seen that he cannot they are manifested.
We
conceive of space without physical locality, higher and lower, gravity and levity.^ He limits existence in space,
in
its
which
itself,
is
surrounded by
another body different from position that there is no space beyond the world, and
that the world as a whole
single parts.^
ia not in space, but only its In the same way the homogeneous parts
space; they are not actually so until separated from the whole.^ It is the same with Time. Time, being the number of motion, presupposes an
potentially in
object
moved on
counting subject.
He
when Time
is called
the
number
of motion,
we must not
understand by the word number that by which one counts, but what is counted.'^ Number, that is, must be taken Far from not in its subjective but its objective sense. considering Time as a mere form of our perception, he
regards
it
rather as something
pertaining to motion,
where
bodies cease,
Time
In the further discussion of Motion which is found in Aristotle's Physics, our attention is chiefly drawn to
the points which bear
more directly upon his doctrine of the primum movens and the structure of the universe. He
P. 428, supra. says, therefore, Phys. iv. the movements of 1, 208, b, 8 simple bodies (fire, earth, &c.)
'
He
show
ov fx6vov
'6ti ea-ri
ri 6 rdiros,
real significance). ^ j^gg p. 429, n. 5, supra. * Phys. iv. 5, 212, b, 4. * PAys. iv. 11, 219, b, 6. * De Ccelo, i. see p. 435, 9
;
n. 3, svf>ra,
and
p. 3&!", n. 6.
438
ARISTOTLE
defines the meaning of coexistence in space, of contact, of intermediate space, of succession, of continuity, S>lc} He distinguishes the different relations in which the unity of motion can be spoken of,^ finding the absolute
that
unity of motion in continuous or unbroken movement is, in such as belongs to one and the same object
same relation at one and the same time.^ He asks what constitutes uniformity of motion and its opposite in what cases two movements, or movement and repose, may be said to be opposed to each other
in the
'^
how
ment has
divisible
continuous
magnitudes are
this
it
ad
infi^dttDn,''
that time
and space in
is
only with
P/ujs^ y.?>:
a^ia
fxev
ovv
Ae-yerat tcwt duai Kara tottoi/, oaa eV epl Tdtrcf iarl irpwrcv, x^p'^s Se
aTreaQai Se wv ra fxera^v oe els irecpvKe Trpwrou acpiKvMai rh fxerafidWou jpe^^s 5e ov fxera Tr}u dpx^u
o(Ta eV ere>(^,
of Bekker's smaller edition. ^ P/ajs. v. 4, 227, b, 21 awAws 5e yum Kyrjais rj rfj ovaia fxia Koi t<2 apiQfx^, the latter is the case when
:
<
a-Kpa'dixa,
t)
/xouoy SuTos
firiShv ixera^v
eVr
. .
not only the thing moved and the kind of its motfon {aWoiwais, (popa, k.c., together with their special varieties) but also the
[join with
.
time
is
a,
20
t-^u
TauT^j]
oil
4(pe^r\s
iariv.
re aTr\S>s
[^k\v'I](T iv~]
.
dvdyKr) koI
et
fX^l^^vov
cessive] t
8e
[immediately suc-
auvexv
fiia.
* ^
*"
^^i^ai
koI
(Tw^xhs,
....
KoX
Ibid, b, 15 sqq.
[continuous], orav ravrh yevrirai %v rh iKarepov irepas ois diTToi/rai. In the <rvvex^s, therefore, there must be unity as well as contact. On acp^ of. Ge/t. et
323, a, 3. v. 4 init. motion is either yiv^i or Met or avKws juia. For other senses in which motion is said to be one,' see ibid. 228, b, 11 sqq. Of. vii. 1, 4, pp. 125, 139,
i.
Fhys.
Ibid.
V. o, 6.
vi. 1 sq.
2, sicjjra.
The
space and time (the pointand the moment) is therefore (as is shown
Corr.
-
6,
Phys.
'
De An. iii. 6, 430, b. 17 sqq.) never found existing actually and independently as a xpto-T^v, but only as contained potentially in the divisible, and not ever known except as a negation.
PHYSICS
finite spaces traversed in a finite
439
spaces are only said to be whereas which the time of motion traversed in the same sense of the establishes the he
to do
infinite
in
is
infinite
indivisibility
bility of
motion nor rest are possible.^ He discusses the divisimotion and of the body moved, ^ remarking that
alteration
every
attains
completion in an indivisible
its
beginning
is
never
capable of being accurately determined/ He shows that it is equally impossible to measure a merely finite space
in infinite time or an infinite space in finite time,
and
any distance
These conclusions
ments against motion,^ and enable him to prove that the indivisible can neither move nor change in any way.'^
Finally,
for
investigating the
movement
by asking^
whether there can be a single movement of infinite duration. After establishing the eternity of motion and
*
'^
Pky.
Ihid.
vi. 2,
c.
233, a, 13 sqq.
3,
:
and again
c. 8,
lasts
m. and Themist. Phys. 55, a, m., that difficulties had already suggested themselves to Theophrastus and Eudemus in connection with this view, ^ Phys. vi. 7 ; of. p. 429, n. 3, supra. Aristotle shows, P%s.viii. 9, 265, b, 10, that his predecessors also treated motion in space as the most primary,
Phys.
vi. 9, cf.
c.
2,
and
233, a, p.^Sll,
440
ARISTOTLE
primum movens^ he
it
the necessity of a
if
^
:
there
is
movement without
in space, for
beginning or end,
must be movement
other,'-^
:
case the
a new movement may begin in another direction, but one and the same cannot continue without a break.
circular motion
If all
move-
ment
in
circular, or mixed,-"* a
endless duration
could.
Movement
points
straight
line
cannot
have
''
movement
has terminal
at
which
it
it
ceases,
and though
may be
infinitely often
repeated,
stitute
one and the same in unbroken sequence, can be without beginning and end.^ It unites the repose of the universe with unceasing motion, since
it
enables
it
to
move
'
Phys.
viii.
'
lUd.
261, a, 31 sqq.
sq. supra.
^
Among mixed
we must
all
Phys.
viii.
tion
**
in
supra.
reckon
;
Generation from not-being to being destruction from being to not-being increase from less to greater decrease from greater to less alteration from one state to another, e.g. from water to steam.
^
;
An
'
not only in itself (see p. 430, n. 2, supra) but also because the world is not infinite, ^ All this is explained at length, Phys. viii. 8, 261, a, 27263. b, 3, 264, a, 7 sqq. c. 9 hdt.
PHYSICS
without changing
sure for
all its
441
^
place as a whole.
is
It is the
mea-
entirely uniform
whereas in rectilinear
this eternal rotation is
movement
rapidity increases in
How
of the
primum movens
"*
Important though movement in space is, as the most primitive kind of change on which all others are dependent, Aristotle cannot agree with the mechanical
theory of physics in merging
one, and iu
Three
Is there a qualitative
?
between
sorts of
matter
Is there a quali-
Is there such a
com-
PItys.
viii.
9,
265, b,
cf.
p. 398, 4.
-
motions
other words, the downward motion of heavy, and the upward motion of
light bodies.
3
of elementary
bodies: in
is the case. Phys. viii. 9, 265, b, 8 sqq. ^ The seventh book of the Physics is passed over in the above account, because it was not originally a part of the work (see p. 8 1, n. 2, svpra). Its contents are as follows. After it has been explained in c. 1 that every movement must have its source in a
the sensible qualities of things; c. 4 inquires in what case two movements are commensurable, and c. 5 finally proves that the same force moves half the mass in t he same time twice as far, in half the time the same distance as the whole likewise that the same mass is moved, by the same force, in the same time, the same distance, in half the time half the distance, while half the mass is moved by half the force the same distance on the other hand, it does not follow that twice the mass is moved by the same force half as far as half the mass, or the same mass by half the force half as far as by the whole force for the force may not perhaps be able to move it at all. The same is true of the other kinds of change.
;
;
442
qualities ?
AltlSTOTLE
The Atomists answered all three of these and Empedocles at least the
questions, Anaxagoras
second and the third, in the negative. Aristotle feels himself obliged to answer all affirmatively, combating the mechanical theory of his predecessors, and seeking
the solution of their difficulties in the peculiar tenets of
That he wholly succeeded in this attempt the natural science of our day will certainly refuse to admit, and will even be frequently inclined, with Bacon,^ to take the part of Democritus against him. Yet-this is just a case in which we have to guard
his
own
system.
man who
occupies one
among
In order to form well as the philosophers of antiquity. an impartial judgment of Aristotle in his contest with the mechanical theory of physics, and to appreciate his own views, we must never forget that we have not here to do wdth the atomistic philosophy of our days, but
with that of Democritus, which differed from
co'lo.
it
Mo
but the scantiest rudiments of the methods and processes of observation which we have to so boundless
He had
to
define the
elementary physical conceptions of an age whose observations did not extend beyond the reach of the naked
eye,
Of
all
our
mathematical,
ences
{Arist.
optical,
ThierTtuiid^,
and
419
sq.) to Aristotle's
method
in test-
Cf. also
sq.,
1220
sq.,
ing heat.
PHYSICS
physical instruments,
lie
443
nomena, the conditions of chemical combination, pressure of air and its effects, the nature of light, heat,
combustion, &c.
in
on which the
based, were
It
physical theories of
modern
if
science are
would have under such circumstances Aristotle had developed views in natural philosophy of which we could have availed ourselves without alterabeen more than a miracle,
tion at the present time.
to
It is the business of a history
show how he explained phenomena consistently with the position of knowledge in his own day.'
None of the ancient systems presents so pure a form of mechanical physics as the atomic, to which the theory of the elements adopted by Plato from Philolaus is
closely allied.
and consider
only original
this view, not
differences of shape
Both deny qualitative variety in matter, and magnitude as the and real distinction. Aristotle opposes
merely because it maintains the existence of infinitely small bodies or superficies, but also because
In both rejudgment, the weaknesses of the Platonic theory are most striking.^ It contradicts
spects, according to his
it
mathematics, because
superficies,
'
it
which brings us
262
sq.
2
assumption
.
Cf. supra, p.
Qf^
270
sq.
444
ARISTOTLE
^
of indivisible lines
magnitudes
into points.^
Again
it
bility of bodies.^*
assumed by Plato do not fill the space within the world, and yet he allows no vacuum.-* Lastly, it is impossible
to
difficulties
form any coherent bodies out of them/'' Nor are the which beset this theory from the point of
less
view of physics
important.
of
surfaces
the specific gravity or levity of the single elements be Fire would have to become heavier and produced?
its
bulk;
much
little
water.^
Again, while
respect to
diffi-
experience
'
Plato, indeed,
cf.
es actually
;
tion
2
IMd.
d.
Ph.
'>
Gr.
ad fin. 868. Ccelo, iii. 1, 299, a, 6, 300, Cf. Gen. et a, 7, c. 7, 306, a, 23. since the Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, 21
pp. 807, 2
IMd.
Zell.
pt.
De
b,
De
irpdoT-r)
uAtj
must read to a-w/bLararwu iTrnrebwv, the gen. iniire^icv being governed by 7rA^06t) cf the corresponding objection to the Pythagoreans, p.
; .
311, n. 5, 6 supra.
Ccelo,
:
305, b, 31, 306, a, 26 primary atoms of the elements cannot be divisible (nor are they according to Plato and
3
iii.
De
7,
'
De
c. 5,
312, b, 20 sqq.
Democritus) seeing that when fire or water is divided, each part is again fire or water whereas the parts of a ball or pyramid
how we are to interpret these objections in the mouth of Aristotle. s De Ccelo, iii. 7, 306, a, 1 sqq. Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 676, 1, 2.
ready been shown
PHYSICS
triangles are left over/
445
it is
and that
as easy to think of
a superimposition of surfaces
as of the
composition
assumed by
fact that the for instance
Plato.^
water
and
earth,
place, how are we to comprehend the and movements of the elements by these hypotheses of Plato? Democritus supposed that fire was formed of globes, on account of its mobility and
In the
last
qualities
disruptive force
Plato thought
it
made
comparative immobility.
are hard to
move
in their
therefore
The Atomic theory of Democritus and Leucippus is treated by him with more respect ^ but he holds that
;
^
Ibid.
sq.
1.
20
cf.
Plato, Tim.
56
D
3 *
which
Casio, iii. 1, 299, b, 23.
c. 8,
Be
Jbid.
306, b,
9.
Ibid. 306, b, 29 sqq., where it is further objected that balls and pyramids are easily moved only in a circle, whereas tire has an upward movement. Again, if corners that give to it is its fire its heat-producing power, all elementary, bodies must likewise produce heat as well as everything that has mathematical i-hape, for they all have corners. Fire changes things which it a pyramid or a seizes into fire
;
into contact into balls or pyramids. Pire separates only dissimilars, whereas it unites similars. Further, if heat be united to a particular shape, so also must cold, ^ Pkoclus at a later date defended it in a separate treatise against his attacks Simpl., Schol. in Ar. 515, a, 4. ^ Cf. the discussion in Gen.et Corr. i. 2, 3 5, b, 30 sqq., the chief sentences of which are cited in
it
; i
comes
Zell. Ph.
Coelo,
iii.
d.
Gr. pt.
i.
771, 4 also,
;
cf.
De
306, a, 6 sqq.
446
it
ARISTOTLE
fiir
also is
may
homo-
geneous quality. In the first place, it is open to all the objections which beset the hypothesis of indivisible
bodies.^
it
is
clear that
we
attribute a distinct
know
;
the reasons
why
not inclined
among
atoms
and
if
developed from another.^ If all the atoms are homogeneous, one does not see how they are separate, and why they do not join when brouglit into contact with
one another.
materials,
If they are
in this circumstance,
ments quoted p. 430. n. 2, all of which are more or less directly Here aimed at the atomists. also, we must continually remind
oiirselves of the state of science
collision.
see
how
end by attribut-
at the time, and of the peculiar character of the theory which When, for Aristotle attacked. instance, he shows that atoms could not coherein a solid body, he is not speaking of the atoms of modern physics, which attract and repel one another, are held in
ing corners and hooks to atoms, by which they may hang on to one another (Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 796, 2, 798, 4), could not but appear to Aristotle, as they Cic. appeared (according to Acad. ii. 38, 121) to his follower
Strato, fantastic and absurd, See p. 445, n. 3, mpra.
^
"
Seep. 331
sq.
4,
ways, but of the atoms of Democritus, which act upon one another only mechanically by pressure or
De
CopIo,
iii.
303, a 24 sqq.
Cf. p. 306, n. 6.
riirsics
tact,
447
which
is
In the same
way
if certain qualities
them
like
warmth,
;
for instance
were
it
is,
however, equally
suppose them
is
endowed with
definite
properties.
Again, there
no reason why there should be only small and invisible atoms and not also large ones.^ Lastly, if
moved by another power, they experience an influence, and their apathy is destroyed if they
the atoms are
:
move themselves,
and
different
is
either inside
from what
moved
"*
in which case
them
they
object.
things.
fire spherical,
Ari-
however, derives his most conclusive argument against the homogeneity of matter from the very phe-
science
is
accustomed to
Democritus,
of gravity.
all
like Aristotle,
bodies mutually
attract each
atmo-
sphere they
caused by
(ren. et
Corr.
i.
8,
326, a,
<
lUd.
326, b,
2.
29 sqq., to which, however, it might be replied that they refuse to unite because they are not liquid but solid bodies.
p.
lUd.
both views alike and on the same grounds. Cf. also Gen. et Corr ^f / ^
j,
8,
326, a, 8.
4t8
ARISTOTLE
air,
vapour, &c.
all
the atoms
fall
fall
downwards
atoms and the pressure by which the lesser are driven upwards. For the same reason, he held that the weight
of composite bodies, supposing their circumference equal,
empty
interstices.^
is
Aristotle demonstrates
:
that this
no above or beneath in infinite space, and consequently no natural tendenc}downwards all bodies must fall with equal rapidity in
hypothesis
false
there
is
On
ancient science.
vacuum
but this
Cf.
sq.,
Zell.
791
sq.
Ph.
d.
Gr.
i.
779
P?iys. iv. 8, 214, b, 28 sqq. JJe Ccelo, iv. 2, 308, a 34-309, a, 18 see p. 428, n. 5, supra.
;
real advance upon the atomic theory, but only as a means of making his own arbitrary assumption of deviations in the atoms comprehensible. Seep. 307, n. 4,
sujjra.
re-
cognised
however, as a
PHYSICS
appears to him so inconceivable that he considers
sufficient
449
it
ground
empty
space.
bodies be composed
must
itself light
and by virtue
or are
it
own nature
disposed to
rise,
downward movement
else.
size,
Although
may
nevertheless a
of earth
sible,^
would necessarily be heavier than a small quantity or water. This, however, he thinks impos-
and he says
it
is
manifest
when we
consider
phenomenon
If gravity
homogeneity in matter.
would be heavier than a small one of denser, and accordingly would move downwards. If, on the contrary, it is said that the more vacuum a body contains the lighter
terial
Cf./*Ays. iv. 8, 216,a, 13: 6pajfi^uyap rh fxei^co f>oirr]V exovra fi fidpovs ^ KovipOTTjTos, icLV ToAAtt d/jLolus
'
ravrov
vKrfV,
Koi
ixi\Q'
airXois
elvai ixt]Q(v
Tjj
Iffx^'i
rh
IffOTaxri
&pa irdvT
eo-rai
oKiycou [small atoms] 5e jx^yaKuv fiapvrepa tlvai. et tovto icrrai, (TvixfiriffiTai iruKhv a4pa koX iro\v irvp vSaros eJuai tovto 5 fiapvrcpa Kal yijs 6\iyris. eVriV aSwarov. Cf. previous D. Ibid. C. 5, 312, b, 20 sqq, (where,
/xiKpa
[in
a vacuum].
-
dAA' ahvvaTov.
:
however, in
ihv
Se Suo,
troiovvTa,
1.
32
we must read
irws eo-rat
[as
to.
/iTa|i/
of rb] 56
twv
Ty
ix^yedci SiacpipouTOi'V
apayKa7oi'
text).
VOL.
I.
G G
450
it is, it
Aristotle
may be answered
that a great mass of deuser and
vacuum than
a small
one of the rarer sort. Finally, if the weight of every body corresponded to the proportion between its bulk and
the empty interstices, ever so great a
lump
of gold or
lead might sink no faster, and ever so great a bulk of fire rise no faster, than the smallest quantity of the same
stuff.
He
concludes that
we
existence of certain bodies heavy or light in themselves, which move respectively towards the centre or the cir-
^ ;
and
when
conceive of them as distinguished from each other the qualities of the matter composing them and not by merely by the figure or magnitude of the elementary
ingredients.^
are the materials of the world different in
Not only
(jnality,
but they are also subject to qualitative transUnless we admit this, we must explain formation.
tlie
apparent transmutation of
matter
either
(with
Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the Atomists) by a simple extrusion of existing materials, or (with Plato) by a
change in the figures of the elements. ^ We have already seen ' how far Aristotle is from agreeing with the latter
On the other hand, solution as maintained by Plato. were we to imagine that one and the same corporeal substance, like wax, assumed first one and then another elementary form, and that this metamorphosis was in
Aristotle here follows Plato's view; see Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 678 sq. Strato, on the ocher hand, returned to that of Democritus
'
b,
Cf.
XX.
308, a, 21 sqq. 309,
iii.
7.
Be
Ciclo,
PHYSICS
451
of these elementary substances would follow,^ and this he finds to be at direct variance with the nature of
corporeity.2
As
to the theory of
Atomists,
it is
stances into which others seem to be transformed existed previously in a state of interminglement with the latter,
Aristotle thinks
Experience shows
us a metamorphosis of materials in which the elementary properties of substances alter. One substance
passes into another, or a third
is
formed of several.
When water
phenomenon is not,
he says, occasioned by a mere alteration in the position and order of the parts, nor has a mere separation or combination of materials taken place, but, while the substance remains the same, certain of its qualities have
changed.^
is
made from
air,
a body
air,
Conversely,
when
air is
all
produced
Be
that
Cu'lo,
iii.
305, b, 28
is
that underlies
the elements
The meaning
we may suppose
the ele-
alike (as was actually done by Philolaus, of. Zell. Ph. d. Gr.
i. 376 sq.). By thus conceiving of the atoms of the elements as
ments formed of atoms of a definite shape earth of cubical, fire of quadrilateral, atoms without adopting Plato's view of the constitution of these bodies, and that the conversion of one element into another may be explained, not as its resolution inlo its primal surfaces and the coiubinatlon of these into a new form, but as a transformation of the material
divisible, however, we should involve ourselves in the difficulty already mentioned, p. 444, n. 3.
^
10 sqq.
l)e Cmlo,
8,
Metapli,
sqq.
452
ARISTOTLE
even bursts
How
it
is
this to be explained
on the hypo-
had previously existed in the water withIf a body grows or dwindles, out change or difference ? it is not merely that new parts are added to it, but all
'
its
formed from
from a cask, but the food passes into a wqw material.^ Moreover, it is clear that the elements themselves come
into existence
and perish
are
fire is
water
atmin.
is
How'
we
to conceive of such
formation
must be
definite points at
Becom-
ing, else
we should be driven
two
directions.
an
infinite pro-
<n*ession in
whether absolutely
seen,'*
we have already
or such
as above, 305, b, view of gravity precludes the admission that the greater weight of water as comC'atlo,
Be
o sqq.
Aristotle's
is
due merely
to its greater density. The atomists of that time could not pos-
atoms emanating froni water in which they had previously been imprisoned. As against such theoriesAristotle'sobjectionsarevalid. Gen. et Corr. i. 9, 327, a, 22. ^ Ibid. ii. 7, 334, a, 18, 26; cf. Be Ca;lo, iii. 7, 305, b, 1. Cf. p.
sibly explain the expansion of fluids into steam as the result of increased repulsion in the atoms at least the atoms of Democritus are certainly incapable of internal
;
457
iii,
sq.
*
Empedocles and Anaxchange. agoras (with whom Aristotle, ibid, 1. 16 sqq., first deals) were obliged
and
PHYSICS
453
why
No more
can
it
Hence
we
For
if
and
Lastly,
how
are
we
to
imagine the
Empedocles and Democritus made bodies enter each other by means But not only can this hypothesis be disof pores.'
'
1
De
CoelOy
iii. 7,
305, a, IG
Be
CopIo,
iii.
6.
This objection is first brought against Anaxagoras in the Pliys. i.4,I87,b, 22 sqq. in2)e 6Wo,iii, 7, 305, b, 20 sqq. it is used against all who explain material change as an extrusion in the latter case with justice, since if steam, for
:
De
Cwlo,
iii.
4,
803, a
24,
where the words viroX^iy^ei yap ael, &c., must mean 'since the larger atoms would fail to obtain
release,' so that in water, for ex-
454
ARISTOTLE
divisible,
and need not be actually divided in order to experience reciprocal influences but it really serves no purpose, for,
;
two bodies cannot affect each other by contact, those parts of them which interpenetrate by means of pores
if
will not
do so
either.^
movement
of the
qualitative
alteration.
Where
the
the former
had
real
assumed
operation
of
His predecessors
re-
and
he extended
it
which he understands
by
The movement, are contained in the correlation of potentiality and actuality. AVhen two things meet, of which one is actually what the other is potentially, then, so far as
'
action
and passion
'
is
*'
and a change
'
is
et Corr. i. 8, 326, b, 6327, a, 7 sqq. Gen. et Corr. i. 6, 323, a, if the 12 movens is likewise partly ntotuni, parti}- i/nmobiJe, this must be true also of the aorent Kid yap rh kivovu iroifTv ri (pacri Koi TO TTOiovv KivcTu. ov fx}ju aWa dia<pfpfi ye Kal Se7 Siopi^eiv ov yap oi6v re irav rh Kivovv toluv,
Gen.
o'tou
28,
C. 9,
oAAa rb kiuuv
Ihicl. c.
rroielt/ ItTTiv.
^
9 init.
ovcri
yevyav Koi iroifiv \a^6vTs Ka\ iricrx^iv, \4yu/xev upxhv t)]V iroWaKis elprj/xevrjv. et yap i(TTi rh /ahv Swd/j-ei rd 5' ivTvwapx^t to7s
roiovrov, 'K4(pvKev ov rfj fiev Trao'xeij', ctAAa irivrr) Ka0' oaov iffrX roiovrov, jfrrou Se Kal fiaWov rj roiovrov fxaWdv iari Kal
\f:X^'a.
5'
rfj
ov
e'lirep
rh
iroiovv
avri.Qi\<Toixev
8'
T(j3
irdarxovri.
rovro
oh
if
Kivr\(ns
vdOos.
aWoiov-
rirrov.
PHYSICS
455
Action and passion, like all movement, the other.^ presuppose on the one hand the distinction of a movens
Where one
it
possible
where both
inevitable.^
depends upon the agent being partly similar and partly opposed to the patient since of things which belong
;
and a colour, for example, neither can produce any change in the other and the same is true of such things as are completely similar, since change is always a passage from one condition into an opposite, and that which does not
stand in any opposition to another thing cannot produce
in
it
an opposite condition.
generically
patient must be
different
;
but specifically
and
so the old
moot point
as to
whether likes
by the law
patient are
"^
and
like itself.^
Hence
p. 386, n. 1,
been already shown, that all motion has its seat in the motum, not in the movens.
'
It has
n. 3, sujjra. Gen. et
'"
CorrAhid.^2^,
^5rj
a,
Sih
nal
eijKoyov
kuI
depixaivuv
Kal
to
Ibid. 327, a, 1 c. 8, 326, b, 1. Longit. Vit. 3, 465, b, 15. Cf. p. 378 sq. iupra. ^ Gen. et tbrr. i. 7, 323, b, 15324, a, 14, with which cf the quotations on p. 340 sqq. * Like all 4vavria. Hee p. 224,
,
oXus to
to irda-xov t6 Te yap iroiovv Kal rb irdaxov cuavria iarl, Kal t] y^veffis Tovvavriov. ctiaT^ avdyKt] to eis irdexov cis rb iroiovv fieTafidw^iv ovroi yap (arai etV Tovvavriou v
yiveais.
456
ARISTOTLE
is
'
the patient
determinate
so far as
it
form
'
is
form,
it
is
inasmuch as
it
must
upon
be capable of receiving
similar in kind.
If the
agent
is also
each other, both must be of the same material, and in this respect belong to the same genus.But this
condition does not universally apply to agents
:
for as
is
without passivity,
material,
and
its
operation
conditioned by
irdOos
on
its
own
it
part.'"^
The
is
reason
why
all
active influence
occasions,
to
subject in
/
to actuality,
e.
to change,
offers
and being
points,
nowhere
force."*
active
must
mixture^
two or more
n. 2,
'^
materials,^' in
which
relation obviously identical with that which he expresses in the passage quoted p. 454, n. 3, under the form of potentiality and actuality. 2 Ihid. 324, b, 6 t^v fiev yap
:
upra. For the above, see Gen. ct Corr. ihid. from 324, a, 15 to the end of the chapter ; and cf. c, 10,
328, a, 17.
*
Gen. et Corr.
i.
us
clireTv
tV
P- 454, n. 8,
a, 6 sqq.
^
i.
supra).
avrijv elvai
ruv
avTiKi(x4vu)V oTrore-
Tlie y4vos stands to the elSos generally in the relation of matter; see p. 219,
According to Gen.
Corr.
10.
PHYSICS
neither the one
is
457
merged
formed which
it
is
In other words,
consists neither
but in
chemical combination.
When
two
preserving
its original
new
material,
wherein
they
remain only potentially, inasmuch as they can be again Such a relation, however, only extracted from it.^
13 sqq. 828, a, 19 sqq., that only the union of substances(xf>'o''"a), not that of qualities or of the form with the matter or of the immaterial efficient cause with its passive object, can be called a mixture (/xi^is). To us this seems superfluous but according to Metajjh. i, 9, 991, a, 14 (cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 890, n. 4, and ibid. i. 881 sqq.) he had some occasion to make this reservation. That the substances, moreover, which are mixed can only be of a material nature is self-evident for the incorporeal
;
:
-Ibid.
S'
328,
a,
10:
(pa/nev
ftirep
Se? fiefiTxOai
n, rb
:
fiix-
Oh ofioio/jLcphs elj/at [or as it is i^ei rov previously expressed avTov \6yov t^ oXcp to fiopiou'] koI Sia-ir^p t)v uSotos t^ ixipos iidwp, On the ovtw kcu rov Kpadevros. dfioio/xepei see the end of Ch. IX. w/m, and cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr.
i.
879, n. 2. ^ ^vvdeais,
a,
{ibid. 328,
is atradis
xiv. 5, 1092, a, 24, 26) from [xi^is In Metaph. vii. 2, or Kpaais. 1042, b, 16 o-uvSeo-ts is further distinguished as the class notion under which Kpaais comes.
As happens in the case of burning {Gen. et Corr. i. 9, 327, b, 10), where it is not a mixture that takes place, but the production of fire and the destruction of wood, or, in other words, the change of wood into fire. The same is true of nutrition, and generally of all cases in
'
As Anaxagoras, the Atomists and, later, Epicurus supposed. ^ iir^. 327, b, 22 eVeU' ^(ttI ret iikv Swdfiei to S' evepyeia ruu uuruv, ivBex^rai ra jxix^^vra elvai
:
ttws
koI
h^}
elvai,
ivepyeia
ixev
13, 328, a,
23
sqq.).
This
is
not a case of
fM^is
but
aWoioiXTis.
yeyovSros e| ^n cKaripov airep fiaav irp\v /xixSvpai koI ovk airo\a)\6Ta .... aw^srai yap t] SvvafMis avruv, just because they and can be again separated sqq. In later usage com1. 31
kripov avruv,
;
458
AltlSTOTLE
occurs
when
^ ;
and when,
in
its qualities
and
lastly
when they
at as
many
Where
other
these conin
each
such
manner that both, while combining, change at the This combination, attended by the same moment.
simultaneous transmutation of the materials combined,
is
mixture.'^
Aristotle
is
mechanical physicists.
is far
He
goes further,
from being
is
satisfied
with that
confined to material
mediate
merely
Dc
tions of
phenomena.
final
causes
plete mixture of
Tvavrr)
fiiJ.7x6aL,
tliis
kind
(^to
rraOrjTiKo.
re
v-rr'
Scnsu, c. 3, 440, b, 11), as distinguished from a mere compound of smallest parts was called rj 5t' o\ov Kpacris. This is the case when their material is of the same kind but their qualities are of an opposite character ibid. 328, a, 19 sqq. cf, p. 454, stfj^ra. 31 ^ Ibid. 328, a, 18 towards the end of the c, where the above is thus expressed mixture takes place iTre'nrep cVrlr evia roiavra ola
"
;
ffra
Ka\
ivSiaipeTa
[according to
ibid.
what
Aristotle
says,
328,
b, these
another]
ravra yap
oijr
i(j)9dp6ai
avdyKri fiefxiyfxfva ovr' %ri ravra ottAws (hai, ohre avvdecriv elvai rijv
fu^iv avruv, otjre irphs r^v atffd'naiv
jiarent mixture]
jxkv h
h.u
iv6pi<TTou iv iradr]TiKdv
Ibid. 328, b, 22
ri
Se
fii^is
eVwcts.
PHYSICS
450
above material necessity, the design of the universe above the physical explanations of nature, theteleological.
Our researches up
If Nature
is
End.
has
its
goal by which
determined.^
End.^
If everything which
movement
^
the
Ari-
stotle
human
action
directed
towards an end.
of
Hence while combating the theory an anima mundi in the form in which it had been
He
any motion at
all.
It
would be
p. 462, n. 2.
^ *
p. 404,
and
p. 396, n. 3. p. 379, n. 1.
sqq.;
;
25 27
inconsistent with its perfect happiness that it should be intermixed with the body of the world and, burdened with the
latter, should have uninterraittently to produce, like an Ixion with his wheel, a motion which
the first place because he cannot regard the soul as in any sense a motum and therefore not even as kavrh Kivovv (see the beginning of Qh.^. infra). He further objects that Plato conceives of the soul of the world as something extended in space. But it would be impossible to suppose that its thought
had no affinity with its nature and which therefore involved exertion. Nor, indeed, is it shown
how
it produces it, Lastly, the soul cannot be opx^ as asserted in the Phcf-drus, if, according to the Tinucus, it comes into exist.
460
refers not only the
ARISTOTLE
movement
of the outermost sphere,
which communicates
moved by them
human
to the
body J
He
nature in general, to a certain extent, from the same point of view in the eternity of motion he recognises
:
tlie
immortal
life
of nature,^
sort
Every
is
vital activity is
we
shall
see,"*
for
follows that
by regarding nature
is
as a living whole,
Cf. p. 373 sq. and see the section in the next cliapter concerning the Spheres. Aristotle is so
'
due, not to
iheprimum movens,
far justified from liis own point of view in treating both the world
as a whole, and its individual parts as animated with life, as he does also Be Ccclo, ii. 12 followed bv Eudemus {Fr. 76 b, Simpl.
Albut to particular motors. though the whole world is thus animated, yet Aristotle refuses to call it with Plato i^fov, because its life springs from no single principle of motion. 2 Plii/s. viii. 1 U6Tepov init.
:
5e
yeyouf irore
Kiv7\(ns
ovk nixra
outus
Kiveladai /xrjShv,
-/)
oijT
iyevero
in the
is
same sense
in
tis
is the relation of the spheral spirits to their spheres. Each of these spirits, however, animates only the sphere which it moves and the jirimum worens only the irpSoTos ovpavos. While the movement of the latter, indeed, extends to all the other spheres, yet in their case it is
same nature
ovaa To7s (pvcrei (XvucaTwcn iraaiv. In these words Aristotle seems to have in mind the passage from
Ileraclitus,
d.
Qr.
3
i.
586, 2.
5' iv yrj
Gen. An.
yiuerai
vSwp
virdpx^iv, iv
S'
vSari irvevfia, iv 5e
something communicated from without like the motion of the driver on a carriage their own proper motion, on the other hand,
;
rovTcp iravrl d^ppidrrira ypvxtKqv, uxrre Tp6-Kov riva irdvra ^/zu^^s flvai
PHYSICS
461
and deducing its movement from the incorporeal forms which govern all material change and shape, Aristotle is driven, as was Plato on similar grounds,' to adopt of God and necessity a teleological theory of nature.^
nature, he says, do nothing without a purpose
;
nature
always
strives, as far as
;
perfection
nothing
;
is
plete in her
of her productions
we may
and
far
art,
its
own purpose
creations
it
is,
least of
them repay
'
as
i.
aTroAeiVet ri TaJv
sqq.
With what follows, cf ElTTee's exhaustive treatment of the whole subject, iii. 213 sqq. 265 sqq. 3 De Ccelo, i. 4 fn. 6 B^hs kuI
'
7}
<pV(TlS
OvSeV
^ICLTTIV
1T010V(TIV.
:
\\.
avayKaiwv ttX^v iv rois irTjpwfxaari KoX rois are\f (Tiu. Gen. et Corr. iv airaaiv del ii. 10, 336, b, 27 rov P^Xriovos opiycadai (pafiev r^v <pi(nv. Be Vita et M. c. 4, 469, r^v tpvcriv dpcofxev iv iraffiv a, 28 cK ra>v Svvarciv iroiovaav rh KciWi(TTov. Gen. A n. ii. 6, 744, b, 36
: :
:
ovQkv
T/ff/r.
TTOif'i
r]
.... ovOfV MS ^Tvx^ TToieT T] <l)vais. 291, b, 13: r) 5e (pvcris ovdev aXdyws ouSe /naTTju Troie?. c. 5, 288, ael Troie? twv eV5ea, 2 17 (f)v(ris
c. 11,
:
(pvffis.
Likewise
739, b,
19.
An.
c. 2, 704, b,
15
v <pv<ns
/c
ouOev
iroieT ixdrtiv
dW'
'
dei
rwv
'S6;^ojueVajj' T77
ovaia
Trepl
eKaarov
XOfiivwv rh fifXTiarop. Pol'it. i. 8, 1256, b, 20: et olv v (pixris jurjfler artAts rroiti firirt fiT^Te IxdTrjv. Part. A/t. i. 1, 639, b, 19: fxaWov 5' icrrl rh ov (veKa Kol
rh Ka?^hv eV rots
Si6-irp ei yivos ^(f>ov rh dpicrrov ^iXriov w5i, ovrus koX ex^t koto (pvffiv. Even in the most insignilicant products of nature we may perceive the effort after perfection cf foil. n. and Eth. N. x. Xffws Se Koi iv ro7s 2, 1173, a, 4
;
.
a, 15 (cf.
14)
ri
(puais eV
uiiShv
rwu
(pav\ois
icrri
ri
(pvaiKhv
dyadov
:
VSxo/A6'a,''
c.
iroiel
:
rh
fieAriarov,
r}
12,
694, a, 15
rrcplep^ov.
(pvais
iii.
iroiii
De An.
(pvcris
9,
432,
b,
21
/x^re
iroid
KpeTrrov fj Kad' outo, h ip'irai rov o'lKflov dyaOov. vii. 14, 1153, b, 38 irdvra ydp <pvaii e^et Tt 0(:'lov. PaH. An. i. 5, 645, a, 15
'
402
ARISTOTLE
he shows,
is Form, but the form of everything is determined by the function for which it is designed.^ All Becoming has its goal, and the terminal point of all motion is also its end or object.'- This pursuit of fixed designs in nature is demonstrated to our experience by the order and coherence of the universe and the regularity with which certain effects are produced by certain It is impossible to ascribe to chance what means.
happens always or even usually.^ He lays especial stress upon the motions of the heavenly bodies, the
birth
of living creatures
human
action, inas-
hib
Se't
/j-rj
otj(Tr]S ^cttl
irepl
Tuiv
ari/JLUTepuv
(cfccv
(iri-
tus bade tlie strnngers welcome to the bakery wliere they found
him, saying
also,
iTp\
tliat
God was
ry)u
tliere
ovTco
Kal
npos
(T]Ti](nv
Se?
jXT)
TCAOS Ti)s KIVT](X(:WS, TOVTO ^(TXO-Tov Ka\ TO ob kvKa. c. S, 199, a, 8 eV oaois Te'Aos eVrt ti, tovtov eveKa KpaTTiTai Th irpoTCpov Kal rh ^(pe^ris, kc. I hid. 1. 30, see p. 350, supra. Part. An. i. 1, 641, b, 23 iravTaxo^ Se \4yoix^v To5e ToCSe ez/EKo, OTTov tiv <paivii]Tai t4Aos ti
:
:
irphs
r)
KLvrjffis
irepaiuei iJ.r]Bephs
(ivTos Tivhs
to
flJ.iro5i(opTOS,
(ixTTe
eJuai
(paucphv
St]
yap
iv
jx)]
rvxovTws aKTC
Ti)s
'
eVe/ca tivos
OTt
b,
Toils
(pv(rOi)s
jxaKiaTa
t)
ov
5'
edTl KaKovjXiv
TL
TOIOVTOV,
Pliys.
7]
t
ii.
Kal
(pvcTLv.
T]
1,
193,
oos
12
(pvais
AeyoyueVrj
y^youe r^hovs
rod
X^pO'V d\r](pev. (Cf. c. 1, in previous n.) Cf also Meteor, iv. VI, BOO, airavTa 5' iar\v wpia/xdva a, 10
1
:
Ka\ov cited
Tw
epyq)
'
ra
/jl^v
yap
dvvd/uLeua
rd avruv epyov aXrjdws ((TtIv Ka<JTa, olov 6 ocpdaXfids [sc. aArjOws 6(p9aXiJ.ds itTTiv^ el opa, Td 8c fi^ Svvdixivov dfiwuvficos, olov 6 redvews
TToteTi/
^ 6 XiOivos.
2
(pvais
apa 415, wff'n-ep yap 6 vovs 'iviKa tov b, 16 TTOte?, Thv avTov TpSirou Kal r] (pvcris. ^ Phys. ii. 8, 198, b, 34, 199, b. 15, 23 Part. Ari. iii. 2, 663, b, Gen. An. i. 19, 727, b, 29, cf 28 Dc Ccelo, ii. 8, 289, b, p. 302, n. 5 26 ovH ecTTiu iv to7s (pvaei Th cos eTvx^v, ou5e tJ) iravTaxov Kal ira(Tiv vndpxov TO otTTo tvxV^'
.
.
init.^
f]
lxnp(pT)
(pxxxLs.
Be
Ail.
ii.
4,
PHYSICS
much, that
is
403
pletion of nature,
If
large,
is more strict, and the regularity more unbroken. Whence, indeed, could the laws which govern the former have sprung except from the latter ?^
final
It
and most important problem of natural science. must direct its attention, not to the individual, but
which the individual subserves not to the But if it is suggested that, in
:
to the whole
aWa
(x^v ovd4u
Kara
Trao-t
Tci^eajs.
;
Part. An.
ii.
i.
b,
12-30
;
De Cwh,
8,
1, 641, 289, b,
;
diro rvxvs koI rod avro/j-drovroiovrov (Tva-TTJvai, eV ^ otto rvxvs Koi ara^ias ou5' driovv (paiveTai. Cf also Zell, Ph. d. Gr. i. 650, 579, 1. PJiys. ii. 9, 200, a, 32 (after
=*
Gen. An. iii. 10, 760, a, 31 25 Metapli. xii. 10, xiv. 3; see p.
391, D. 2, suj)ra.
naWou
5e
tj
rivos
eveKa
\Pavt. An.
7}
i.
1,
641, b, 12:
iravra.
aXriov
yhp rovro
(pv(Tis
J/e/ca
rov
iroie7
iffrXv
7)
rexvr),
ovtws
iv
ahrols
roh
apxh
tal
Kaddirep [as well as] rb depiubu Kal ^pyxpov 4k rod iravros. Slo /xaWov eiKos rov ovpavov yeycurjaOaL virb
roiavr'ns
airias,
et
y4yove,
Kal
fiaWou ^
rd ^ya TO dvrjrd
<j>aiueraL
'
rb yovu rerayovpaviois
r)
eV
5'
ro7s
irepl
V/xas,
rb
ervx^
ra Burira /xaWov.
rbv
S'
Kal yevfffdai,
ovpavov
much as Nature chooses her materials with a view to the thing thpt is to be produced] oAA' ovx avrr] rov reAouy. Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 29 it is not sufficient to give the material causes of a thing. Matter is merely the motmn, the movens in the province both of nature and art is something quite different the Kvpiwrepa alria is the form. Materialistic physics, instead of giving us the real causes, can tell us only of implements of production as if one in answer to the question ' Who saws the wood ? were to reply,
:
'
464
ARISTOTLE
order to pursue definite ends, Nature must be capable of conscious deliberation, Aristotle considers this un-
reasonable
Even
Art,
lie
reflect,
it is
artist unconsciously.^
Moreover,
we already know, forms to Aristotle's the distinction between Art and Nature, that the mind productions of the former have their motive principle
outside themselves, and those of the latter within.^ thus arrive for the first time at the important conception
We
of
immanent
design,
point
so
essential
to
Aristotle's
'The
saw.'
aud
d.
p. 307, n. 4,
ej/e(TTi T^ fVcKa rov, Kal eV (pvaei. Aristotle has here in view the ai't that has become a llxed habit
Gr. pt. i. 7.^8, 1, 3, 81)3, 2, on the neglect of final causes in ancient physics. Part. An. i.
(paivcrai Se irpuTH] 039, b, 14 [sc. alria] %v X^yofifv iveKci tiuos
1,
:
and second nature in the artist. Such art he conceives of, hownot as belonging to the but as inherent in 'Art' itself, seeing that the creative principle resides, not in the artist, but in the artistic conception which operates in him, and w^hich Aristotle therefore identifies with the T^xv-f] itself cf. the passages quoted from Mctaph. vii. 7, Gen. An. ii. 4, Part. An. i. 1, in n. 1, p. 356, and Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, oo-o yap fir) exet r))v avrrjv a, 34
ever,
artist,
; :
\6yos yap ovtos, apxh 8' 6 \6yos ev re ro7s Kara rexvriv ofio'ctis
Kal eV
rols
(pvcrei
avufffr-nKoaiu.
Ibid. c. 5, G4o, a, 30: in the investigation of the animal ovganism tlie question is, not of the
individual parts or the matter, but of the oAtj ixop(f>^, of the a-vvdecris and the oAtj ovaia. Pkt/x.n. 8, 11)9, b, 26: arooUaOaL '4vcKd rov TTOV 5e TO jUTj yivtaOat, iay |U?; Uwari to kivouv
v\r)v,
TTotel
'
cnraOri
ouTa,
iroiovara
oiov
rj
larpiKt]
avTT)
yap
vy'ieiau
ov^fv
-
TTcttrx^* ^''^^
'"''^^
vyia^o/iituou.
missed by Doring, who, in his Kuni^tl. d. Arist. 68, puts a false emphasis on tluiai], Kairoi Kal rj T^xvV ov fiovMveTai Kal yap et ivriv iv r^ ^vXcf 7] vavwqyiKr], Sfxolws h.v
*
See p. 418, n. 3, ,wpra. In this sense Nature, as the internal in living operative principle
things, is also expressly opposed to the human understanding,
cf.
Gen.
(pvcrei
i-noUi
^<n'' ei
iv ry
rix^y
6,
744, b, 21.
PHYSICS
But
465
along with the free operation of form, we have the necessary element of matter
for,
We have alBoth
ready shown (p. 359 sqq.) that Aristotle finds in matter the
precisely that
which does not happen as the fulfiment of some design, but is produced by the way, in consequence of the
operation of intervening causes which are indispensable
to the attainment of a further end.
This characteristic
it
towards
definite
many
yet she
still
endeavours as
make
em-
lost.^
always proceed with the same rigour, but must take into account the disturbances introduced into the
designs of nature by necessity and chance, admitting
exceptions
to
rules,
and feeling
satisfied
when her
1,
(5,
supra. 744, b, 16
SxTirep olKOpSfios
troiTJcrai
xPW'r^v.
He
points
especially to uses to which siiperfluous materials (Trepmwfxara, on which see Gen. An. i. 18, 724, b, 23 sqq.) are put in the formation
iii. 2, 663, b, 31. Cf. also p. 361, n. 1, and Part. An. iv. 5, 679, a, 29, where be says of the juice of the cuttle-fish ri Se (pvais o/'
:
sqq.,
PaQ't.
An.iii.
2,
663, b, 27,
VOL.
I.
HH
4GCj
ARISTOTLE
It is
irregular natural
phenomena
He
regards
them
result
and failure of the Such phenowhich she originally intended.'^ mena arise from form not being completely master over
unfulfilled design, as a mutilation
matter.^
Moreover,
we may
siders it a kind of abortion or failure of the ends of nature when children do not resemble their parents, and especially their father,^ when a good man begets
versa,''
Metapli.
ii.
n. \, 2, supra.
evia
fvcKci
Kara
t^x^V
^^ ^'^
'''"
bpBws
(see his p. 212) that the doctrine of Nature rests according to Aristotle rather on opinion than on science, seems to be due to a mistranslation of Anal. Post. i.
33, 89, a, 5, where t] <pv<ns ri TOiavr-n (i.e. to evBex^l^^^ov KOi
purai
repara
3
eVe/ca tow.
fren.
An.
iv.
4,
770, b, 9
f'ari
ri,
&\Xa}s
ex^Jj',
as
context)
roiavTT]
'
and
is
irapa tpvffiv
iirl
oh iracrav ciAAo
irepl
r^v ws
irapa
ro ttoKv
yap r^v
Nature
is
so also
(i.e. d)8e)8aios).
Gen. ^M.iv. 3,759, b, 10 sqq. Aristotle is here speaking of abortions which want essential parts of the human body as well as
those which have more than the proper number, and applies the above explanation to both t\os yap ru>v fiev Kiu^ffeoov (form-giving
:
it is
it
not gener-
comes from
orav
T]
fx^
Kpari](Tri
r^u Kara
motion) Kvofx4vwv,
KpaTovfxeurjs,
rr\s
5' vKiis
ov
ii\i)U
Kara ro
eTbos ^ixris.
ficvei
S'
to
Kad6\ov
. . .
Cf. previous n.
jjL^
fia\i(TTa
'
rovTO
(TtI (oJov
Cf. TO Te'pas avaTrrjpia rls icrriv. also 767, b, 13: to 5e repas ovk eueKoi rov KoiX avayKa'ov irpos r^v T^v rod T\ovs alriav, aWa Kara
aviiiPefirjKos
^
avayKa7ov.
ii.
* Gen. An. ii. 3, 767, b, .5: h ioiKws ro7s yovevaiv ^'5rj rpoirov rivh. repas iarlv. * Polit. i. 6, 1255,^ b, 1 yap, &(Tirep e| avQpuirov a^iovcri iK dijplwv yiveadai &vdp(t}irov Ka\
:
Phys.
8,
199, b, 1
et
5)/
9r)piov,
ovrw Ka\
e| ayadSov
ayadov
'
PHrSICS
467
does not correspond to that of the soul.' Indeed, he looks on all the female sex as imperfect and mutilated
in comparison with the male, because the informing force of the man was insufficient to overcome the matter
not properly proportioned to the lower ^ they are the imperfect attempts of nature to make men a form of development analogous to that of children." Moreover,
among the animals we may discern a further malformation in the case of single tribes the mole, for instance ^
or, to speak more accurately, we may distinguish between more perfect and less perfect animals such as have blood are more perfect than such as have none the tame than the wild;^ those which possess but one
:
centre of organic
with several.^
life than those which are provided In like manner, vegetables, as compared
e
^
Kac
rcou Sov\a,u,
avf^fialue^
8h
X. on 8ex
on. JU
ID
Animals
^xh ^/u^pa [^ya] rciu ayp'mv ^eAx/o; rV <i>iciv. Aristotle admits, however, himself, Part. An i ;) 643, b, 3, that the division of animals into tame and wild is a false one, as all tame animals are found also in a wild condition,
^\
raAXa^apa
IZ, b.hj, a, 8.
Tou&uepcc^ou.
Cf.
c.
it
the
consists in a
mere capacitv
iv.
Part. Aoi.
5,
682, a
^^'
^^
-t\r''-b
^^^' ^' ^^
indeed, desires to give to such creatures only one central organ, ^^*' ^ei"g enable to do this she '' ^^^^^^ ^ ^i^^ tt^^ several In the Problems (x. 45) the writer goes so far as to say that
HH
4C8
ARISTOTLE
Tliey display design but
developed form
^
;
and they
too, as
we
shall
lowest stage of
development and in
Aristotle
life,
its
most rudi-
mentary
outline.
recognises a degree of
though the
what appears
whole
of
is
to be
inorganic'^
Thus Nature
as a
Form
over Matter
more
perfect development
That which
is
absolutely
since all
temporal origin
is last,
ment out
wliich
of Matter into
first
Form, and
the
tlie
beginning (that
thought)
is
comes
in
order
of
also
It follows that
complex existorganic to
the
inorganic.''
He
first
which he
nature produces wild plants and animals in greater quantity than tame ones, because it is easier to make what is imperfect than what is perfect, and because nature, like art, is only able to create the better after long pracThis, however, is an extice. aggeration of the Aristotelian doctrine of nature's weakness. Cf. Gen. An. iii, 7, 757, b, 19,24. 2 Phys. ii. 8, 199, b, 9 kuI iy
'
:
ra vcrrepa
ToTv
(pvTo7s
^veari rh
cveKo. rov,
supra
and
yeveaei irpSrepa (pvaiv icrrl, koI -rrpwrov rh rfj yevecrei TeKevTa7op rcf /lev olv XP^^V trpoT^pav r^u vXrjv avayKa7ov dvai kol yev<Tiv, rcji Xoyqs 5e t^/j/ kKaarov fxop<pi]v. Metapli. ix. 8, oiraj/ eir' apx^f /SaSi^'ei J 050, a, 7 rh yiyv6fiivov koI t4\os apx^ yap rh ov eucKa, rod reXovs 5' eVewa ?; ycueffis. Seealso-p. 205, n. 2, supra. ^ Part. An. 646, b, 4. Meteor. oel Se, fiaWov iv. 12, 389, b, 29 Srjkop [ti eKa<TTOu} iirl rwv xxrrcpwv koX '6\oos '6(ra olov opyaua K2) fveKd
rfj
. .
tV
tV
PHrsiCi^
469
CHAPTER IX
CONTINUATION
B.
the
Elements
inquiries into
nature to the consideration of the actual constitution of the world, Aristotle comes upon a question which had
occupied a leading place in previous metaphysical discussions
His pre-
which we
beginning in time
some,
such as Anaxagoras,
holding that this world
Plato,
is
world we see
is
only one
among an
is
infinite series of
Aristotle eternal
to
declare
that
our world
begotten.^
itself
rov.
upon him/
Although
d.
in his system
Gr. pt.
'-
it
not
Wehaveaclearerideaof the true nature of man than of flesh, bones, &c., and a better idea of the nature of the latter than of the elements. T^ 7^^ ov fi/Ka ^Kia-Ta ivravda StjAov oirov irMlcTTov t^s uAtjs wo-Trep yap ei ra e(Txo.Ta
i.
The atomic school held the existence of both Anaximander, Anaximenes, Diogenes, and Empast.
Xricpdeiri,
t]
&\\o
Trap'
v)
pedocles placed the series in the On Heraclitus cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 586, 2 ad Jin. 629, 1 ad Jin. .and on Xenophanes,
iind. 498,
^
'^
outV, V
5'
ovaia
ovOh &\\o
Jin.
\6yos, rh 5e nera^v avaKoyov rcf iyyvs ehai '^Kaarou, iirelKalrovruu oTiovu i(TTiv eucKdrov.
'
As he says himself
i.
in the
De
Fr.
Ca-lo,
*
Cic. Acad.
18), quotes
On
the latter
cf.
Zell. Ph.
probably from
470
AklSTOTtS
it,
from
is
produced by
change,"''
however the individual parts may cannot as a whole have had a beginning in
time.
Aristotle, indeed,
nowhere expressly
states this
result in the
to us, although
He contents himself,
in
treatise n.
(\)i\oao<pia<;
(sec p.
sq. Hn])ra), at
TrpuTrjS.
nulla
fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita esse eum undiqueaptuni ut nulla vis tantos queat niotus iiiutationemque moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum cxistere
Similarly we should have to conclude that as a preliminary to the transition from creation to destruction of the world or vice versa a change must take place in the creative force or in the material upon which it works.
If both remain unchanged their mutual relation must also remain unchanged, and therefore also the resultant effect. But
ut hie ornatus uncjuam dilapsus occidat.' (Cf. Plato, Tim. 84, :b, 8o Ps. 68, E, and elsewhere.) Phit-o, uFAcrii. M. ii. 189 {Ar. Fr. 17), where it is declared to be Sfctrr? a0eo'T7js to regard the bparos B^hs as no better than any human product. The See p. 387, supra. latter is even quite compatible with the doctrine of the birth and destruction of the world.
'
On
Phys. viii. 1, 251, a, 20 sqq. where, in opposing the view that motion had ever a beginning, he says had the movens and the mobile existed without producing any motion, the transition from rest to motion could only have been effected by a previous change
^
:
according to Aristotle, God is eternal, and unchangeable matter, on the other hand (setting aside the doctrine of the immutability of the material of which the heavens are made), we know can only suffer change through the operation of the moving cause. If, therefore, the latter is unchangeable, its relation to the matter and the universe which is its product must This is the be unchangeable. argument indicated by Cicero in the passage quoted above,
it
to
PHYSICS
his investigations into the origin of the world,
471
with
and refuting the doctrine The docthat the world has a beginning but no end.^
proving that motion
however,
the
it
is eternal,
trine,
is
For
if
primum movens
unchangeable, the
effect
which
same.
It
as a destructive, force.
follows also
from Aristotle's
stars are
immutability
made.
Not
absolute birth
have
and destruction
novo
it
find
no place in Ari-
had
a
;
beginrjing
consllio
inito
whence
may
be concluded that the creative force must have produced the best from all eternity in virtue of its own unchangeable perfection.
' Aristotle devotes De Cwlo, 10-12, to the proof that the heavens are without beginning and end, confining himself, however, almost exclusively to the attack on the Platonic view, that,
ticular moment ? or why should that which has been from all eternity cease at this particular moment to exist? (283, a, 11) It is its own nature which constitutes a thing without beginning or end, and this in such a case excludes the possibility of not-
i.
they will endure for ever, ihey yet had a beginning in time. His chief argument against it is that beginning and endlessness, end and beginninglessness, are mutually exclusive. That which exists for an endless period can neither begin nor cease to be in either case there must be a time in which it is not (see c, 12, 281, b, 18 sqq. where, however, it is proved in too formal a way). Why, moreover, should that which has not existed for all eternity begin to be at this pjir;
w bile
being the nature of that which has had a beginning and is liable to perish must, on the other hand, include it. The latter, therefore, cannot last for ever any more than the former can begin or end (1. 29 sqq. cf. p. 366, n. \,fn. and the passage quoted, ibid.
; ;
ilt.
from Metaph.
ix.
8).
The
views, on the other hand, of those who hold that the world has both beginning and end are
The atomic view Aristotle considered that he had disposed of by his doctrine of the unity of
the world, while in reference to the view of Heraclitus and Empedocles he contents himself
with remarking
(c.
10,
280, a,
472
stotle's system,
ARISTOTLE
but even such a fundamental change in
as
is
presupposed by
but only of
its
The question any origin of the world in time, actual character and constitution.
is
The universe
the one
is
:
terrestrial,
and
This opposition
at once revealed
by the testimony of our senses and Aristotle can hardly have come to it in any other way. The unalterable nature of the stars
larity of their
movements form,
recognise
to
different
a contrast
to terrestrial corruptibility
we
are forced to
two
essentially
realms,
subject
laws.
seems to him to
its
demonstrate
necessity.
argues, are
capable of
is
movement
But
movement compound
from the
in space
of both.
The
it
first
two,
the
circumference,
versa,
and
If these
certain
are the
tirst
must be
sqq.
Zell.
P/i. d.
Gr.
pt.
ad Jin.) that it attributes to the world a mere change of form and not a veritable birth
i.
629,
and destruction, That it was the observation of this which led Aristotle in
'
the
first
instance to
make
his
PHYSICS
most primitive and ancient bodies.
473
Those, on the movement, must be formed by combination from them, and receive their
contrary, which exhibit a composite
particular
bias
and
also rectilineal,
movement must be
other, the
more
unbroken and
is
contrary
Accordingly there
must
exist
two
the
one origin-
move:
ment.^
it is
Rectilineal
movement has
opposite directions
either
which exhibit
for the
it
must be of opposite
:
they must
which
it
is
it
out contrariety.
does not rise or
fall,
and in
fact it
It is
already laid down (c. 2, 269, a, 10, 14) as the basis of the discussion (see p. 224, n. 3), %v hi ivavrlov, which, when thus universally expressed, is certainly
open
to dispute.
474
its
ARISTOTLE
natural motion.^
is
for circular
motion
change.
His argument for this is that everything that comes into being springs from its opposite, and everything that perishes is resolved into the same ^ all in'-^
crease
and decrease depend upon addition or subtraction of the matter out of which a thing has grown, and therefore that which, being without beginning, possesses no
such matter, cannot increase or decrease
finally,
;
all
bodies,
which
and where
there
is
JW;. c. a, 269, b, lS-270,a, nor can the positioD ySm fx^ yap iv^ex^rai t^v aXKov Kai Irepou
12
;
2,209,
a,
7) be accepted except provisionally as of universal validity. As is shown in the sequel, it is The inapplicable to the aether. position upon which the latter
TUerhinde, 393) in casting a doubt upon Aristotle's clearly expressed meaning, mereIv on the ground of the actual clitliculties that beset the theory,
(Aristot.
-
He
a, 13. b,
avaWoiuTov,
u'iSiou
conclusion rests, (viz. that movement in a circle has no opposite). indeed, endeavours Aristotle, (c. 4) further to establish by
aAA' ayrjparov koL dvaWoiajrov Kal airaOes. Cf. Mctaph. viii. 4, 1014, b, 7, xii. 1, 2, 10G9, a, 30, b, 25. On this point, cf. also p.
'^
341
'
sq.
Be
Cudo,
i.
3, 270, a,
13-35.
be crooked or oblique for if we have two opposite motions on the same or on parallel lines
;
direc-
does
not
make the
shghtest difference whether the lines are straight or circular, Moreover, the courses of the fixed stars and of the planets are actually in opposite directions why may these bodies
;
not,
then,
consist
of
different
PHYSICS
475
This position draws further support from experience. For he contends that if the spaces of the heavens, as well
as the intermediate space
were
full
of air or
fire,
considering the magnitude of the stars and their distance from each other, would be so hugely disproportioned to that of the remaining elements that the latter could not
preserve their equilibrium, but would be swallowed up
by them.
can therefore only be maintained on the hypothesis that is filled with a body different from the
We
all
body
is
superior to
no evidence of the
heaven or
its parts.^
immortal and divine nature. The name a3ther may be traced to the same source, for Aristotle, like Plato,-"'
derives
it
from dsl
dslv^
from the
De
o\)
restless rotation of
treatise tion.
'
^
^
Ovlo,
Se?
b,
i.
3,
270, b, 11.
5ls oAA' ras avras
Such a proportion involves that there is as much air and as much fire as will be produced by the transformation of all water into air and all air into fire on
the basis of the existing quantitative extent of these bodies. 2 3feteor. i. 3, 339, b, 13-340,
a, 18.
airfipdKis
o.<\>iKV7(TQai
U^as
19.
^;uay.
JDc
Ccelo,
270,
339, b, 27,
is
given words, and JMetaph. xii. 8 ad fin. See infra, the section of Ch. I'X. on the Heavens, and Ch. XII. pt. 2.
5
Plato, Crat.
410, b.
476
ARISTOTLE
The conclu-
elementary
1
De
Codo,
i.
i.
3,
Meteor,
3,
389,
d.
that
is
meant by the
and
Be
passages
a, 5.
bu
the name * aether,' cf Zell. Ph. il. Gr. i. 897, 4 ad fin. - Althongh it is called irpurov (TToix^7ou, De Cwlo, iii. 1, 298, b, c. 3, 6; Meteor, i. 1, 338, b, 21 339, b, 1(5, 340, b, II, rh twv 6.(Trp(iiv aToix^lov; Gen. An. iii. it is yet expressly 3, 737, a, 1
;
it
is
otherwise with
Sf
'
(pva-iKol fxiv
(listiiigiiislicd
ri\)ni tlie
ii.
in tlieso ])assages
a'ihioL
oiiic
ovcriai.
'
frrajy
70^ evia
3, l',M\,
e^f
vAr]u,
7)
01;
roia.vTi]v
aWa
/jioi'op
icara r^irui'
kli'-)]t%u.'
Matti-r,
twv
i.
KaXov/neuooi'
3,
(TToix^iwv
340, b, 7 (ef, p. 488, n. 3, infra), erepov a-wfia iTvpos T Kal &cpos and De Orlo, i. 2, 2G9, a, 30: ovaia crco/naTos aWf] irapa tus ivravQa (rvardcrfis diiorepa Kal Trporepa tovtoop airdv;
Meteor,
however, is denied of the heavenly bodies only in the sense in which it belongs to temporal
things.
Aristotle
means that
uAtj
if
we understand by
which
a
thing
is
that
of
made,
Kal
the
vTTOKiifxevou
yepeareus
<p6opas
ruiv
If,
cf. ih'id. c.
;>
(following n.).
therefore,
we understand by
o-ToixeTa
as stand to one another in the relation of opposites, and pass into one another, we cannot reckon the rether among these.
SeKTiKov (as it is defined, Gen. et Corr. i. 4, 320, a, 2), the unseated and eternal has no uAtj in this sense but if w^c take it in the more general sense of the substratum of change, the Swd/xei hv,
;
it has v\ri, inasmuch as it is capable of movement in space. 'I'hat this is all that Aristotle means is obvious from the parallel passages, xii. 2, 1069, b, 24 Trdura 5' v\riv ^X^' '^^'^ fiera^dWei
r
.
. .
'6iTa
jx^ yevP7]Ta
aWa
oh
izoi
viii. 1,
1042, b. 5
terial
substratum
'
(EfiENTANO,
;
Heetling,
'
ex^i/cat
Mat. und Form, 22), that the aather consists of a material which is'no material, of an immaterial
material
'
(Kampe,
Erliennt-
050, b, 20 ouS' e*" Ti KiPOv/j.pop aidiop, ohK effri Kara hvpafiip kipov/j.pop aAA' ^ iroSiP TTot [only in respect of
c.
8,
PHYSICS
mutation,
it
477
are formed the heavenly spheres and stars the god-like in the realm of matter.^
it
is
The
circular
all
respects.
If
movement
is
move-
But, as we have remarked, rectimotion follows two opposite directions, upand down, toward the circumference and toward the centre. That
is rectilineal.
ment
lineal
which tends naturally downwards is heavy that which rises is light. Accordingly the elements exhibit the opposites of heavy and light.^ This opposition cannot,
;
and
qualitative.
The
materials we cannot explain either, with Plato and Democritus, by the mathematical qualities of atoms, or, with
can it be said to move merely Zwdii^i and not ivepyda, inasmuch as it is not yet in the place to which ^it is moving]
rovTov
ffOai']
is
same sense
the the
can
the
i
5'
[l.p.
Tov irSdey
iroi kiucT-
same sense
vK-nv
ov9h KuXvei
:
uwapx^iv.
3,
It
is
Be Ca;lo, i. 9, 278, a, 10 sqq. Aristotle expressly says 6 ovpavhs as a universal conception is different from oSe 6 ovpav6s the
;
339, b, 25 also, similarlv, Be Ca-lo, i. 3, 270, b, 1], 20 ^ wpdrtj ouo-/o tmv acoudruv, rh vpurov
former
latter
less
viii. 4,
is
rfj
flSos
v\r)
Kal
noptp^,
the
Still
fj./xiyfi4vov.
that the celestial globes are incorporeal beings (like the ther, they are frequently called diia (Tcifiara, &c. see Ind. Ar. 742, a, 43-60) ; we cannot, therefore, suppose for a moment that
:
riov irapa yijy Kal irvp Ibid. ii. 1, 284 a, 4 Later philosophers, such as Cicero's Epicurean (iV. De. i, 13 33, cf. Krische, Forseh., 'sOG sqq.) and the pseudo- Justin Cohort, c. 5, 36, identify on this ground God and the tether
(riafia,
'4rep6v
g^e
p.
473
sq.
478
of one and the
ARISTOTLE
same primitive material.
point
We
have
first
But those who deduce the differences of matter from a condensation and rarefaction of some one original element are, besides other arguments, met by
the objection that they do not explain the distinction
They
it
confine
some-
thing merely
relative.'^
sition of rectilineal
Again, since
it
includes
two tendencies, upward and downward, we must in the first place assume two bodies, of which one naturally
sinks, the other rises, the
In the second
we must imagine an
intermediate element, or
rather
Of
these four
fire,
water and
air.
is
devoid of lightness
fire is
devoid of heaviness.
centre,
other bodies
the
'
20
Be
PHYSICS
rises
479
air,
above
all
other bodies.
Water and
on the
Water
;
is
fire,
air heavier
than
fire,
but lighter
sink of
Under no
;
possible circumstances,
fire
them is withdrawn.^
earth
Air and water, on the contrary, when the matter which fills Earth is everywhere heavy; water,
;
air, everywhere except in and water ^ fire, nowhere.^ Therefore of two bodies the one which holds the more air may be heavier
;
weight of wood,
for instance,
We
'
may
more
All
definitely
by
another
process
of
reasoning.^
Properly, indeed, they ought to rise into the higher Aristotle; admits himself. Be Ccelo, iv. 5, H12, b, sqq., that this does happen unless external force be applied,
;
world cannot consist of sether alone, fox it must have an immovable cen're. There must therefore be a body whose nature it is to rest at the centre and move
it, and therefore also one an opposite nature. We thus have earth and fire, which in turn require water and air as
towards
of
'
intermediate elements,
follows, see Gen. The true author of this theory of the elements is said to be Hippocrates (according to Idblbr, ^riz^. J/z-^^or. ii. 389, who appeals to Galen, i>e ^/^w'. sec. Hipiiocr. i. 9, 0pp. ed. Kiihn i. 481 sq.). This, however, is uncertain for several reasons. In the first place, neither of the works here referred to, n. <f>v<nos avOpdoirov and n. aapKuv, can be
et Corn.
ii.
'"
For what
2, 3.
an empty one
3
ibid. c. 4, 311, b, 9.
Aristotle,
in
the
passage
in this
just
referred
to, finds
theory
an
Be
The same
ideas occur, in a somewhat different application, ii. 3, 286, a, 12 sqq. It is there said that the
480
ARISTOTLE
bodies capable of being perceived by the senses are prehensible but all qualities perceptible by the sense of
;
reducible
to
four
warmth,
The
cold,
dryness, moisture.^
attributed to Hippocrates.
205, 241,
have not here to do with these, as they do not indicate a particular kind of action and
We
;
origin, cf.
cxlvii., civ.
KtJHN, Hipyocr. 0pp. I. Littre, (IJuvrea (V 315 sqq. iJSl. i. llippoeraie, A gain, while tlie treatise n, (pvaios
;
avOpwirov
recognises (c,
init.)
Empedocles's four elements and even makes heat and cold, dryness and moisture the constituent elements of every living thing (c. 3), it yet does not bring these
passion the elements, on the other hand, stand to one another in that particular relation of action and passion {ihid. 329, b, 20), which the treatise on birth and destruction chiefly discusses. e^p^ilv Ibid. 329, b, 24 Kol ^vxp^v KoX vyphu Koi ^r]phu to
-'
/j.(u
two positions together as Aristotle does, or deduce each of the four elements from the various
combinations of those four pronor, indeed, perties into pairs does Galen (see supra) claim this for it. The treatise n. aapKwv, on the other hand, refers (at i. 425, k) to the Aristotelian account of the elements, but this merely proves that it is later than Aristotle. That heat and cold, dryness and moisture, were regarded as the elements of things in the medical schools of his time, is corroborated by Plato, St/m. 186, d. The early physicists 187, D. regarded the conflict of heat and cold as the primary principle of
;
iradriTiKa
ra 5e t^ yap iari rh (TvyKplvov to. dfxoyevT] [from which it follows that fire separates heterogeneous elements], x^/vxpou
r^
iToir)TiKa
dvai
K^yerai
'
d^pfxhv
ra T
vyphu 8e rh aopiffrov
evopiarov
ttv,
olKcicp
opcp
^r}phv
5k rh a6pi(Trov
5v(r6pi(rrov 5e.
(Cf.
and
fie$pyfivov
form two
in its of
5e
^-npdv
ireir-nybs
init.
eirel
rerrapa
.
.
SicapiaTai
.
evolution and frequently united with it that of dryness and moisture, without, however, as yet expressly combining these four as the primary properties of things.
S}U ra /j.hv 5vo ironjriKa, X^ioi3V, rd dep/xov Kal rd ^vxp^v, to Se Svo TradriTiKa, rd ^r]p6v Kal rd vyp6v t\
Se
TTiffris
(fiaiuerai
PHYSICS
four properties in pairs,
481
we
two impossible combinations, four that are possible, in which one active and one passive property are always united, and thus four simple bodies or elements are
exhibited
or air;
2
i warm and
cold
dry, or fire warm and moist, and moist, or water; cold and dry, or
;
earth. 3 These are the four sorts of matter of which all composite bodies consist, which are excreted from all.
6epix6rr}s
Kal
^f/vxp^r-ns
opl^ovffai
Kttl crvfi<pvov(rai
Kal ix^rafidXXova-at
ra
ofioyevrj Kal
ra
/j.^
SfioyeyTj, Kal
vypaivovcrai
(TKXripvuovffai
Kal
^rjpaivovtrai
koI
Kal fiaXdrrova-ai,
ra
Kal
Se
|r/pa
Kal
vypa
Spi^S/nej/a
tSAAo ra
Cf.
c. c.
4 init. c. 5, 382, a, 27 sqq. 10, 388, a, 21, c. 11, 389, a, 29. ^ In his descriptioTi of these
stituent parts of any kind (cVuttdpxovra), and thus even the component parts of a conception or a demonstration, as well as the form as constituent part of the thing, but in a more special sense the iwirdpxop us uAtjj/ (BoNiTZ, Ind. Arist. 702, a, 18 sqq-) stands for the ultimate material constituents of bodies themselves, that els % SiaipeTrai ra
ffcafxara effxara,
iKuva 5e
fnjKer'' els
&Wa
3,
efSei
ii. 2, 329, b, 7, 13, 330, a, 30, 33, and Meteor, i. 2, 339, a, 13, he calls the latter (heat, cold,&c.) both arroix^la and apxal, the bodies of which they are attributes, ottAS adifxaTa, Ind. Ariit. 76, b, 15 sqq. Again, they are frequently called (noix^7a with the addition ra KaAovfxcva [Phys. i. 4, 187, a, 26, iii. 5, 304, b, 33. Gen. ct Corr. ii. 1, 328, b, 31, 329, a, 26. Meteor, i. 3, 339, b, 5. Gen. An. ii. 3, 736, b, 29. Metaph. i. 4, 985, a, 34 t^ ws eV
:
1014,
a,
els h
raKKa
(rdfiara
SiaipeTrai,
ev-
virdpxov Svvdfiei fj evepyeia, avrd S' ear IV aSialperov els erepa r^ eXZet (^De 6teZ<>, iii. 3, 303, a, 15). So
Gen.
i.
et
Corr.
ii.
1 init.
;
355, b, 1, iv. 1 init. 3 init. c. 5 init., and innumerable other places. The original oppositions, moreover,
2,
TiKwu)
Be
Coelo,
iii.
^\r}s
elSci
\ey6jLLva
ffTOix^^a'],
Fart. An. ii. 1, 646, a, 13 even ra Ka\ov/j,va vt6 rivoov aroix^^oi., SO that we clearly see that he is merely following in this the usage of others. On the other hand, aroix^lov which in its most general sense indicates con-
YOTi,
I,
II
482
ARISTOTLE
all
are resolved. ^
Their
own
primitive
and indecomposable nature is proved by the fact that though they can, by transmutation, pass into each otlier, they never excrete any other body from themEvery composite body in the terrestrial kingselves. ^ dom contains all of them.^ Yet they are never revealed For example, to our experience in perfect purity.^
elemental
which
as ice
is
is
by an
water.
Elemental
caloric,
or
evaporation;-^
'
flame, on
3.
the contrary,
v.
no constant
ttTi^ls
elcriv,
.
I)e CVelo,
iii.
Metaph.
Oepfior-nros,
3,
see p. 481, n. l,and elsewhere. 2 De OrJo, iii. 3, 302, a, 19 sqq. 3 As is more fully proved,
et Corr.
ii.
ipvxp^rrjros
\l/vxpi^T'nTOS
t]
yci.p
koI
7]
1]
(eais virepfioAai
7]
rwes
/lej/
5h Oep/jLorriros
irii^LS
Gen.
8.
Gen.
ia-Ti
ovK
'^KacTTOV
(I ovv vypov
icrrai
C^(Tis
f/c
^qpov
dep/jLOv.
oUr
e/c
irvpSs.
aWa
IjliktSv
fifu eariv, oi
is
made about
TTUpoeiSfS,
ov TTVp, Kol r-h TCf aepi aepoetSe's Cf. ofJLoiws 8e KOLirl rSov aKXwv. Meteor, ii. 4, 359, b, 32, where,
340, b, 21, c. 4, 341, b, 22; cf. 1. 13: irpwrov (ikv yap vTch r))v iyKvKXiou (popdu itrri
Meteor,
i.
3,
referring to the distinction between wet and dry vapour, which f o-Ti is discussed below, he says S' ovTi rh vyphv &vv tov ^rfpov ofjTC rh |i?pbj/ &vev tov vypov, aWa irdvTa ravra Xeysrai Kara r^v Ibid. ii. 5, 362, a, 9 vTrepoxhv. dry vapours are only produced where moisture is present. Ibid. iv. ACCOXUing uu -I /t^o. XV. i,i^ii, According to Phys. iv. 7, 21 8. O, a 32 air is intermingled with water; whereas, in i^e -Se/is?/, c. 5,
:
:
rh depfxhu Kol ^vphv, t Xeyofifu irvp auwuv/jLou yap rh koivov, &c. What is called fire is a kind of inflammable material (uTre/cKau/io) which,
'
'
like
little
had
with heat in fire identified general (see Zell. Ph. d: Gr. distinction the 588 sq.) i. between fire and the heat of
;
fire
443 a'
*
4, this is
controverted;
cf.
Meyer,
25
TO
Si=
irDp
^(xrlv
virepfioX^
appears in his school (Plato, Aristotle had a special reason for emphasismg this distinction, as is indicated by the above passage from the Meteorology. For it was impossible that between the aerial and the celestial sphere there should
Crat. 413, c). ^, ^^. ^- ~, -V.
.
PHYSICS
material, but a
483
phenomenon occasioned by the transmuand dry substance (air and earth). Again, while each of the elements exhibits two essential properties, one of which in each case is its proper and
tation
of moist
distinctive characteristic
the dryness of
of water, the
fire.2
warmth of Since, finally, each element includes a passive and an active quality,*^ it follows that all act upon and
' '
moisture
by one another, that they mingle and are transformed into one another a process, indeed, which would not otherwise be conceivable.^ Each element
are acted on
may
pass into
all
the
rest,
from
be a region of fire, as he was forced to hold there was, if fire included only visible flame.
'
be the primary quality of water, moisture of air, he yet tells us here Key^rai Se riav (rroix^iuv
:
Meteor,
ii.
2,
355, a, 9
-^
vypov Kal ^T]pov fjLTa^a\\6vTwv yiyvcTai Kal oh rpe^erai [with which that which is improperly called rpotp^, Long. nt. 3, 463, b, 24, Vita et M. c. 5, 470, a, 2, does not conflict] ov yap 7] aWi} olffa Sia/mevei ovOeva xp^vov ws elireTj/. Ibid. c. 3, 357, b, 31 Kaddvep rh tuv peouTcov vBdrcou Kal rb rrjs <p\oyhs
Sia
(Tvi/exovs
:
/tec
yap (p\h^
/j.hv 777, vypov Se ridefieOa 5e vypov awfia tiSwp, ^ripov 5e yijif (iv. 4, 5, 382,
iSialrara ^r}pov
.
. .
iiSup
pevfia.
:
Vita, et
M.
c. 5,
ii.
Gen. et Corr.
aW
[xiv
3,
470, a, 2. 331, a,
passive or material qualities (see p. 480, siqjra), earth and water are held to be the matter of all bodies. Fire, on the other hand, represents in a special sense the element of form {Gen. et Corr. i. 8, 335, a, 9 sqq.), for here, as elsewhere, the containing element stands to the contained in the relation of form to matter
Coelo, iv. 4, 312, a, 11) Similarly, more reality is attributed to heat than to cold, inasmuch as the former is a positive, the latter a negative, attribute ; the one is classed as being, the other as not-being {Gen. et borr i. 3, 318, b, 14).
^rjpov
/xaWov
\l/vxpov,
vSccp
5e
5'
\f/vxpov
^ fjLaWop
{Be
^ vypov, a^p
depuov,
TTvp
vypov jxaWov ^ ^aWov ^ Irjpou. Mtteor. iv. 4, 382, a, 3. In the latter passage Aristotle says, among other things, that earth and water alone are inhabited by living beings (on which vide below), because they alone are uAr; rSov acafiaTuiv. For although cold is held by Aristotle
Se
depjuov
See pp. 479 sq. mjJi^a. Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 329, b, 22, c. 7, and elsewhere see pp.' 450 sq. su2)ra.
^
*
;
484
ARISTOTLE
;
opposite to opposite
all
opposed
to each other just in the same way as their distinctive properties (warmth, cold, dryness, and moisture) are
opposed.
this opposition
is,
the
more
difficult
from one to the other; the less complete, the easier. Therefore, when two elements exhibit respectively a
both their essential properties, the process is difficult than when they have one property in common and conflict only in respect of the In the latter case the alteration of one property other.
conflict of
in one of
them occasions
;
the other
while in the former case we only gain one intermestep by such a change for only the element between the two that are opposed is produced, and diate
requires a second transmutation before the metamorphosis is complete. For instance, by removing the
it
we obtain air but it is only when the humidity common to water and air has been removed If the humidity of water disthat we obtain fire.
cold of water,
;
appears, earth
produced; but in order to generate to earth and water must be fire, the coldness follows that the elements which withdrawn. Hence it
is
common
metamorphosed are wholly opposed to one another are by an indirect process those which are but partially
;
directly.
directly into into air or earth, indirectly into water ; air indirectly into earth; water directly fire or water,
earth directly
into water or
fire,
air.^
4.
Thus
all
the
Gen. et Corr.
ii.
PHYSICS
485
self-
For
if
its
natural place,
it,
and
if its
having
then
all
by
force,
must move
to these
earth
it
mediate spaces.
Hence
is
impossible
that
there
air,
and consequently that there should be another world besides the one in which we live. We cannot suppose that a body is forcibly retained in a locality beyond the world, since such a locality must be
and
sether,
'
Cf.
ZeLL.
ibid.
ii.
pa.
680.
d.
Gr.
i.
619,
'^
and
&aT
tovto koI inGavhv, ws a^vvarov fxri rhu avrhv eJuai irepl iravruiv tovtojv \6yov, Koi ^ia<p4peiv TaxvTrJTi /cot
^paSurriTi rris /aerafioAris eVi irdvraiv re Koi (pOopau clvai Koi yeveffiu, v^iv
av/j-fia'-
b,
29
dei Sia/iieuet. roov avTobv ovffa fiopiwi/ apidix^, ^ r^ efSet Kal T<p iroa-^ rSsv jx^puv, fjL^ra^aWSvToiv dei Kaddirep a^p Kal rh ttSti/jlov vScop Kal rh irvp. ael yap dWo Kal aWo yiverai tovtcov '^Kaarov, rh S' elSos
ovre del ra avra fiepr] dia/xevei, ovre yy^s ovre daXdrrrfs, dAAd fiSvoy 6 Kal yap Ka\ Trepl yrjs iras uyKOS. rh fikv yap ojxoiws Set vTro\afie7u av4px^Tai rh 5e iraKiv ffvyKarafiaivei Kal rovs rSirovs avuficra
rov
rh
TrKi]6ovs
KaOdirep rh
rris
(pKoyhs pev/xa.
fidWei rd t' fTriiroXd^oura Kal to Kariovra iraKiv. Cf. also Tt^hL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 2, 576, 620.
486
ARISTOTLE
;
and
if all
bodies
no body
and consequently no space, since space is is or can be.^ The same conclusion is arrived at also from another side. Several worlds would presuppose several first causes of motion, which would be specifically similar, and consequently
outside
it,
has no matter
But the primum movens and complete in itself. It follows that the world which derives its continuous and eternal motion from the first cause must be so too.^
only different in their matter.
:
it is
single
If,
must manifest
us
this argument would be only conclusive if there were an extra-mundane matter in which this concept could incorporate itself,
answer that
it is
kind, although
we ought
always to distinguish between its concept and the phenomenal manifestation of the same which is present
to our senses.^
now
in
more can there be such in the future, or have been at any past period. This world of ours is one, and single, and complete.'*
existence, no
c.
9,
278, b,
out'
This metaphysical proof, held in prospect Be (Joelo, i. 8, 277, b, 9, is given Metapli. xii. 8, 1074, a, 31 sqq. of. also p. 388 sq., and on matter as the source of multiplicity, p. 368 sq. Be Cwlo, i. 9 cf. p. 222.
^
;
=
nXclovs ovpavol oijT iyevovro ivSex^Tai yev4(r6ai TrAejous aAA.' efs Kal fiovos koI reAeios ovros ovpavSs ianv. lUd. i. 1 fin. particular bodies are infinite in
uffl
number
Toijvo/xa
koI
jx)]
ry
/xh
tj? 5'
'
Ibid. 279,
a,
Sxrr'
ovt vvv
PHYSICS
487
Furthermore, the shape of the universe is determined by the nature of the five simple bodies. Since
circular
motion
is
motion to the
distinction,
rest,
proper to one of them, and rectilinear we obtain in the first place the
touched upon above, between the two chief regions of the world that in which circular motion
and that in which the opposite movements up and down hold sway i.e. that which is full of sether, and In both of that which contains the four elements.
rules,
:
lie
mined by
it
their distance
in spheres
centre.
which are at all points equidistant from the In the middle of the whole lies the earth
solid sphere,^ but in extent a relatively small portion of Its fixture in this locality proceeds partly the world.2
>
in the text, Aristotle proves the rotundity of the earth {De Ccelo, ii. 14, 297, a, 6 sqq.) from the form of its shadow on the moon
during an eclipse, from the different stars visible in the north and the south, and the fact (already touched on 296, b, 18) that falling bodies do not move in parallel lines but only at similar angles towards the earth. With regaid
to the last,
" In proof of this statement Aristotle, Meteor, i. 3, 339, b, 6, 340, a, 6, refers generally to the affrpoKoyiKk 6wp-f]ixara, BeCoslo; as above. 297, b, 30 sqq., he adduces the fact that when we
short distance north south, some of the stars or visible over the horizon seem to change their positions. He_ rtJ"
move even a
there
it
is
doubt whether
had
room
tained by accurate observation and experiment, or whether it was not, an inference from the theory that all bodies which have weight gravitate towards the
(jentre.
488
AklSTOTLJE
its
:
material,^
'^
its
the upper surface of which is the water and the earth are hollow
fire.
Aristotle, however,
last,
remarking that composed partly of moist and partly of dry vapour, the latter produced from earth, the former from water and the moisture of the earth the
:
drier kinds
that
their
presupposes a fixed centre, which Aristotle conceives of as corporeal see p. 480, su^jva. ^ Thus, heavy bodies when thrown upwards in a straight line return to their starting-point
;
DeCcelo,\\. 14,
where Aristotle
opposes the view that the earth moves, both in the form in which it was held by Philolaus (Zell. Ph. (I. Gr. i. 388), and in the form p:iven to it by Hicetas, Ecphantus, Heraclides (ihid. i. 459, ii 1, 8^7 sq.), and attributed also to
Plato (ihid. ii. 1, 682, 2). His chief reason is (296, a, 27, b, 6, 25) that circular motion is contrary to the elemental nature of the earth, in virtue of which its proper motion is rectilinear and toward the centre. For the
{ibid. 296, b, 25 sqq.). Moreover, astronomical phenomena find a satisfactory explanation on the hypothesis that the earth rests (297, a, 2), while on the opposite hypothesis irregularities must result; for instance, the stars could not always rise and
set at the same points (296, a, ;]4 sqq.). The motion referred to in Anal. Post. ii. 1, 89, b, 30, is
' '
the earthquake. * The proof of this, De Coelo, ii. 4, 287, b, 1 sqq., is as follows
same reason all other motions must be denied of it. For since
its
as water always accumulates in the deepest parts, and the nearer the centre the deeper any part is,
w^ater must continue to flow towards the centre until all the deep places are filled up, i.e.
natural motion
is
toward the
centre, and all bodies rest when they arrive at the place toward
which they naturally gravitate, until its surface is at all points motion away from the centre equidistant from the centre. The cannot belong to any part of it proper place for water is the and the whole must be at rest. space occupied by the sea, Meteor. - The rotation of the world ii. 2, 355, a, 35, b, 15, 356, a, 33.
PHYSICS
489
greater gravity, sink downward ; so the former fill the upper, the latter the lower, region of the atmosphere.^
The spherical form of the lower world involves that of the celestial region which surrounds the former and touches it at all points. 2 But considered in themselves,
the heavens could scarcely be supposed to have another shape,^ since the sphere is the first and most perfect
and therefore the one appropriate to the first Moreover, it is only this figure which can revolve within the space which it encloses,^ and external to the heavens there is no space. Lastly, the motion of the heavens, being the measure of all movefigure,
body.
ment, must be the most rapid but the most rapid is that which has the shortest journey, and a circle is the
;
same point
to the
same
point.^
' Meteor, i. 3, 340, b, 19 sqq. 341, a, 2, c. 4, 341, b, 6-22; cf.i. 7, 344, b, 8, c. 8, 345, b, 32 ii. 2, 354, b, 4 sqq.; De Ccelo, ii. 4, a, 30 287, on the difiference be; ;
which are described by the spinning of a smooth body, and of which, therefore, each section
which cuts the axis at right angles forms a circle whose centre is on the line of the axis.
Simplicius gets out of the difficulty by remarking that, while in the case of other shapes there is only one axis that will serve the purpose, in a sphere you may take any you please an explanation with which we may
;
is void (see pp. 432 sq.), it follows that the celestial and the fiery spheres are at all points in contact with one another. ' For what follows see De
which
Coelo,
*
ii.
4.
lUd.
rest content on so trifling a point. ^ Or as Simplicius, in loco, explains it: of all lines which return to the point from which they started, and thus inclose a space, the circle is the shortest just as of all surfaces of equal extent that which is circular, of
all
early
bodies
of
equal
bulk that
viz.
all
those
490
ARISTOTLE
finer
The
its
matter
is,
the more
world
as,
and as the argumust ments by which the spherical shape of heaven is proved
be perfectly adapted to its form,
re(iuire.
Still
we cannot regard
the
matter of the
Nature, in Ari-
process,
aether,
which composes
the
terrestrial
heaven,
approaches
atmosphere.^
heavens, Aristotle
explanation
the argument is a It is obvious that Aristotle accepts the globular form of the earth on the direct evidence of the senses, and merely adds these other proofs as supplementary evidence.
lame one.
Kampe is wrong dAiKpives, Sec. the in supposing that it is air as the matter of the fiery region and not the fether that is
here spoken of. The &v( M^Xf" aeX-f-iurjs does not mean the region below the moon, but the upper regions reaching down as far as the moon, and lying between it and the starry heavens. Moreover,
accfia
>
Unci. 287, b,
iffriu
'6rL /j-ev
olv
acpaipoeidrjs
6 Kocrixos SriXov
(K Tovrwv, Kal on kot' aKpifinav (VTopvos 0VTW5 waTC fxrjdhu /UTjre TTapanKriaiws exftv X^ipoK/j-riTov jxry 6.KK0 ixr]dfv Twv irap^ r]u7u eV
ocpdaAfjiols (paivofifucov,
'drepov a4pos
cannot
no
terres-
trial
or depression in the outer surface of the celestial globe would presuppose a void space outside of it. 3 Meteor, i. 3, 340, b, 6 rh
:
possibh^ mean the air, but, as 10 immediately says, the 1. irpocTOP aroix^^ov kvkKc^ (pepofxevov must not, or the aether. however, conceive of a mixture of elementary substances which cannot extend to the region of circular motion, but merely of of differences in the degree density.
We
(x\v
yhp
&v<i}
Kal
fJ-^XP''
<T^X'i]VT]S
498, a, 45) Plato had thus stated the problem of astronomy rlvwv
:
Tpov eJuai aSoiia <pafxiv irvpds re Kal aepos, ov fxrjv ctAA.' eV avr^ ye rh fxiv KaOapuTipou dvai to 5' tjttuu
inroTeOeKTuv ofiaAccv
Viav Kivrftrecov
Kiur](Tiis
SiarrcoB'p
Kal rerayfie-
ra vepl rhs
TcovtrAavu/fiepwv (paiuSfieya,
PHYSICS
491
move
Twv
fiia
irXaviafievoov
erepas
function consisted in discovering hypotheses which would explain the phenomena as satisfactorily as (on their somewhat hardy assumption) the motion of the stars is explained by the theory of uniform motions. The highest criterion of the truth of a theory is rh adiC^adai ra (paivS/xcva. To take only a few instances cf. the quotations from and about Heraclides, in Zell. Ph. d. Gt. i. 881, 1, and in BoCKH, D. Tiosm. Syst. d. Platon, 134 sqq. Aristotle's statements about Callippus, Metaph. xii. Tp S' 7)\iov Ka\ 8, 1073, b, 35
:
fieu
eTi/o;,
&c.
a(peia6a>
Be
Ka\
Coslo,
5^ Tovrwv
(ilTeTv yikv
tV
f'^i
fiiKpas
ixovras a<popfi6.s, Sec. ; C. 5, the desire to explain 287, b, 28 everything is a mark either of great zeal or great folly. The extent, however, to which the attempt is open to blame depends upon the motive which inspires it, and the strength of a man's conviction of the truth of
:
his views
iroTcpov avdpcairlvus ^
T^} (re\r]V7]s
5vo qiero
acpaipas,
en
;
rrpocrde-
Teas
il
eJpai
ra
(t)aiv6[xeua
ments and Geminus, in Simpl. Phijs. 64, b, and what the latter says of
the old following
astronomers
partly
Sosi-
roTc X"P"' ^x^^v Sfi To7s evpvvv 5e rh <paiv6iJt.Pov (irjreov. Cf. also Part. An. i. 5, 644, b,31, where it is said that the study of the heavens possesses an infinite
TVXXI,
IffKovffi,
Eudemus and
charm,
rdfieda
:
ei
Kal
Kara
.
fiiKphv i<pair-
genes, Pe Coelo, Schol. in Arist. 472, a, 42, 498, a, 43, 499, a, 7, 500, a, 25, 501, b, 28, 502, b, 5 sqq. 503, a, 23, 504, b, 32 sqq. Aristotle adopts the same criterion. He asserts only those positions which are warranted by the facts where the latter are inadequately known, or do not speak with sufficient plainness, he makes no pretence of absolute certainty, but is content with probability. Thus Meta2)h. xii. 8, 1073, b, 38, 1074, a, 14, afterdeclaring(1073, a, 11) that the investigation is not yet concluded, he says avayKoiov Se et /ueAAoi/cri cruvTeddaai iraaai. ra
; :
observation, cf ibid.
Trepl
639, b, 7:
to
Sciicvvovffiv,
ouTco
Se?
Kal
ihv
(pvaiKov
to.
ra ^ya
irepl
KaX
ra
fx^pi]
rh
eKaarov, eveiff ovtco Keyeiv rb 5ia ri Kal ras alrtas, ^ &\\as irus. (That Aristotle would decide for the former method is obvious.) Aristotle himself was a most careful observer of known facts see p. 46, n. 1, supra. ' Aristotle speaks, of course, only of the stars known to the ancients, and visible to the naked eye.
;
492
ARISTOTLE
i.e.
from west to
could
east,
move
in
its
freely in space
around the earth. That these bodies was a thought beyond the
star
and therefore were obliged to imagine at least as many celestial spheres as they saw Aristars differing in their movements and periods.^
sphere,
stotle does
The
stars,
he
is fixed,
phenomenon must be
of the heaven or the
movement
both
Many of the older philosophers held that the stars were carried round by the air or the rotation of the world. Besides
Xenophanes and Heraclitus, who
held that the stars were nebulous masses, this view was shared by Anaxagoras, Democritus, and perhaps even xinaximenes ; Empedocles held that it was true of the planets but not of the fixed
stars,
dawned upon them. seemed, moreover, to be demanded by the nature of the stellar motions themselves, which, if tliey were one and the same every day round the earth, were more naturally explained by a
yet having
It
which were
set
immovably
in the arch of heaven (see Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 226 sq. 500, 622, 715, 799, 898, 3). Anaximander seems to have been the first to start the theory of spheres {Ihid.
206 sq.) which was subsequently adopted by thePythagoreans(ii>/<^. 384, 1, 449) and by Parmenides {iUd. 528). Plato adopted it from the Pj-thagoreans (^ihid. i, 685), and was followed by Eudoxus and Callippus, the leading astronomers of Aristotle's time (see p. 497 sq., infra). It seemed forced upon them by the difficulty they had in conceiving of a free motion of the stars, tlie
idea of universal gravitation not
motion of the whole sphere of the fixed stars than by a number of separate motions. A like hypothesis seemed to afford the best explanation of the movements of the planets, including tlie sun and moon their proper motion being the result of the rotation of their spheres, which takes place, however, in a direction opposite to that of the fixed stars, while their daily course was to be explained on the ground that the rotation of the stellar regions included them also. 2 Be Ccelo, ii. 8. This argument is stated with some fullness, because it shows the important fact that Aristotle already presupposes the existence of different stellar spheres.
single
;
PHYSICS
move independently,
for
493
case
in this
how
could
we
explain the exact correspondence between the rate at which the stars move and that of their spheres ? We
In this case
to
The same may be said about move while their spheres also the rate of the astral moveno
real connection
although there
between the
two.
Hence we
more rapid
It is further seen to
Mere
;
rolling,
how-
would not carry them on their way ^ and the fact that the moon always shows us the same side proves that
they do not spin.
Moreover, their shape
is
the least
adapted to progressive movement, since they are devoid of locomotive organs^'' obviously because nature has not
intended them for any such movement.^
' Tovs fih kvkXovs Kive7adaL To Se &(rTpa ^^uepeTv [i.e. they have no motion of their own within
their
own
spheres, but
koI
is
move
toTs
organs of locomotion, the corresponding shape, viz. rotundity, ^ Moreover, Aristotle adds, it is only the sun which appears
to roll at its rising
with
2
them]
That this
eVSeSe^ueVa
and setting
KvK\oi5
<f>epe(reai,
and
monstrated,iJ*<^.c.ll,bothbythe shape of the moon in its different phases, and by the teleological argument that since nature does nothing in vain she must have given the stars, which require no
optical delusion, * Cf also Zell. Ph. d. Gr i. 681, 1. * In his refutation of the doctrine of the harmony of the spheres (c. 9 /w.), which we
.
494
ARISTOTLE
Now
sphere revolved on
rate.
its
own
many
spheres
Ari-
was bound
since even he never doubted that the heavenly spheres and the matter which composed them performed such
moreover, he was obliged to suppose that the spheres contained within the universal globe, in which there
kind of movement.'
was no vacuum whatever, had no room for any other He went further, and connected
may omit,
Aristotle gives another reason, viz. that infinite confusion would result if the movements of the stars were free.
'
is
said upon the movement of the heavens, p. 489, and on the circular movement of the primeval body, p. 473. It was a universal
presupposition among ancient astronomers, traceable to Plato (seep. 490, n, supra, and the references to Eudoxus and Callippus, p. 500 sq. ivfra), that the movement of the spheres must be perfectly uniform. Aristotle endeavours to establish its truth in the first instance in connection with the irpcoros ovpavhs, the sphere of the fixed stars. In-
Unequal motion presupposes change either in motum or viovens, or both, but this is impossible with regard to the heavens. For it is obvious to
the senses that the parts of the (highest) heavens are uniform in their movements, while with regard to the heavens as a whole the same conclusion is forced upon us when we consider that unequal motion is only possible where force is either added or withdrawn, and that every with-
PHYSICS
his peculiar theory of motion with these views.
495
All
motion depends upon the contact of a mobile with a motive body, and this law must apply to the motion of
the spheres, since one movens in the same matter can
motion ultimately proceeds from an unmoved cause, and every motion which has no beginning from an eternal
cause of movement,^ we must imagine as many eternal and unmoved substances for the production of the
for the
movement of the spheres as there are spheres required phenomena to be accounted for.^ The heavenly
;
there
vdrepov filav ovaiav ^ jr\elovs, Koi irSffas ; and answers, 1073, a, 26: eTrel Se rh Kivovfievov avdyKf] vTTo rivos KivctaQai, Koi rh
c.
stotle 6er4ov
asks,
t)]v
roiavT7)v
Kiuovv aKipTfTOv klvai Ka0' avrh, Koi rijv cuStov Kivricnv inrh d'iTTpicTov
tV
a*'*"''
^<^'
^vhs,
(popau
^v Kiviiv
r^v
ovaiav Koi aKivrfTOu, &KXas (popds oijo'as ras tcov irXaviirav aihiovs avdyKT] Kal tovtoov
. .
.
Kd(TTr}v
tS)v
(popwv
utt'
CLKiviirov
T6 KiuelaOai Kaff avrh Kal aiSiov oixrias. ^ re yap roov dcrpuv (puais d'lSios ovcria ris od<ra, koI t5 kivovv aid tov Kal irporepov rod Kivov/uifvov, Kal rh TTporepov ovcrias ovaiav dvayKoiov
elvai. (pavephv rolvvv 8ri roaavras re ovcrias dvayKaTov elvair-ffv recpvcriv
aiBiovs
Kal
dKivi^rovs
KaB'
avrds
Kal SLvev
fieyedovs.
BeENTANO'S
Cf. p.
way
in
by the unmoved mover, p. 404. 3 After showing the necessity of an eternal incorporeal cause
of motion, Metaph.
xii.
view that these eternal beings were created by God has already been discussed at p. 412, supQ'a.
*
De^ Ccelo,
:
ii,
b, 1 )
aW'
Tifiels
7,
Ari-
avruv
fxdvov
496
ARISTOTLE
as
must be
many
of a
'
souls,' to preside
The
empty
interspace.^
The centre of
this
system
;
is
called
and
and each
is
It
Siavoovfxeda
'
inroXafifidveiu
Kal
(wrjs.
true that avrwv seems to refer to the stars, not to their spheres, and that we are at liberty to picture with Kampe {Eriienntnissth. d. Arist. 39 sq.) each individual star as
It
is
itself
b
5'
moved
Ccdo, ovpavhs
wfra,
vol.
a,
ii.,
init.^.
Be
2,
285,
Kal
b,
29:
;
cfxrpvxos
animated by a
so, for if
spirit
but
the
passage does not compel us to do the spheres are animate the stars which are part of them must share their life and action. Elsewhere, however, Metaph. xii. 8 (see p. 501 sq. ivfra, and cf. previous note), he expressly says that there cannot be more eternal unmoved beings than
there are spheres, and this is only what we should have expected from him, since it is only from the movement of the stars that he infers, in the way indicated in the preceding note, the existence of such beings. Moreover, it is only the spheres, and not the stars, which are said by him to be moved. It is only these, then, that have * souls of their own, or, to speak more strictly, it is only these which
'
cf. Part. An. i. 641, b, 15 sqq. As, however, the mover of the highest sphere lies outside the world and is un-
So 284,
1,
32
world-soul
'
stotle expressly rejects, see p.459, n. 5) is as inapplicable to it in its relation to its sphere as it is to the other spheral spirits in their relation to theirs. ' Aristotle denies that there is
any void (see p 433, sq. supra), and accordingly conceives not
'
'
only of the astral spheres but of the others, even the lowest, as in immediate contact with one another. Meteor. 1. 3, 340, b, 10 sqq. 341, a, 2 sqq. ; Be Coelo,
all
ii.
4,
2
287,
.
a,
5 sqq.
;
Coelo,
i.
6 init.
ii.
4,
287,
a,
8,
and elsewhere,
PHYSICS
spheres, that the terms above
497
and beneath are applied opposite points in the circumference, and consequently that we come to speak of right and left, front and back, in the world. In this case, reckoning from
to
the sphere of the fixed stars, we call the southern half of the globe the upper, reckoning from the planetary sphere, the northern.^
'
its
own
peculiar
See De Cmlo, ii. 2 (cf. Phys. passage just referred to) and the lucid explanation in Bockh, P. liosm. Syst. d. Platon, p. 112 sqq. The differences here spoken of apply only to motion, and therefore properly only to that which
; to (285, a, 23) TO oQiv 7] KiuTjais, the right hand rh d</)' ov, the front to icp' o ri Kiurjais. (Cf. Inyr. An. c. 4, 705, b, 13 sqq.) If we apply this to the world, that is tlie right side of the irpwros ovpavos from which its motion proceeds in other
is
living
and
self -moved
is
motion will be that which carries the point in the periphery which has received the push past one who stands in the line of the axis in front of him in other words, that which proceeds from the right in a forward direction and thence to the left. This, however, will be the case with the motion of the sphere cf the fixed stars only if the head of one standing inside of it be upon the south pole with that of the spheres of the planets
:
which move from west to ea^t, on the other hand, only on the words, the east. This motion opposite supposition. According is conceived of (285, b, 19), as it to Aristotle, therefore, our anwas by Plato (see Zell. Ph. d. tipodes are in the upper hemiGr. i. 684, 1), as proceeding in a sphere, which he also calls circle towards the right, as when (obviously from a different point in a circle of men anything (as, of view than that just indicated) for instance, the cup or the talk the right side of the world we at table, Plato, Symj). 177, d, in the lower hemisphere and on 214, B, c, 222, E, 223, c) is passed the left side. On the other hand, along by each to his neighbour reckoning from the courses of on the right. The irpuros ovpavos the planets, ours is the upper is therefore represented (285, a, and right-hand, theirs the lower 31 sqq.) as standing inside the and left-hand, side. He points circle of the heavens in the line out, indeed, that we cannot proof its axis, touching one of the perly speak of a right and a left poles with its head, the other at all in connection with the with its feet, and as giving the world as a whole (284, b, 6-18
;
ball
at some point upon its equator the push with its right
e7r6i57;
Se rivis elffiv
o'i
(pacriv eivai
Tt 5e|iOj/ Koi
. . .
e^Trep
iravrhs (rd/xari
K K
498
ARISTOTLE
communicated by the presiding incorporeal
but in
all
motion,
being
is
;
uniform, without
and the rapidity of this rotation vary in the several At the same time the spheres are connected spheres.
witli
way
its
how we
are,
under the
el
rwu toiovtmv). Nevertheless, Fhys. iii. 5, 205, b, 33, he sa>'S that the distinctions above and below, before and
dimiv
left, exist ov
dWa
Kol
b,
Jngr. An. 5, TOG, T(f o\cp he finds it natural that motion should proceed from the upper front and right side, t] [dv yap dpxv Tifiiov, rh S' ^I'co rod
avT^
11,
A similar connection oi" the surrounding the inner with spheres Plato had conceived of as existing between the spheres of the planets and of the fixed stars, when in Tim. 36, C, 39, A (cf Fh. d. Gr. i. G83), he represents the axis of the former as inserted in the latter, and accordingly attributes to the planets a spiral the of motion compounded
'
tov uinaOev Kal TO Se^LOU tov dpKTTepOV TljXlWTtpov (t.houiih it might; bo said with equal truth, ws 5jd to tcls
KOLTw Kal rh
irpocrBiv
One motions of both circles. would suppose from Arikt. Metaph. xii. 8, 1073, b, 18, 25,
fSiMPL.
I'.KS,
Be
b,
1
3(1,
that
Eudoxus and
dpx^-s
eV
TovTois
iJvai
TavTO.
nuiwTioa rwv duTLKn/j-ivwi' /.Lopiwu irrtiv). So in BcCdlo, iii. 5, o the question why the heavens move from east to west and not in the contrary direction, he gives the answer that since nature orders everything in the most perfect ])ossible way, and forward motion is superior to backward, the heavens have ret^eivcd that motion which, according to the
t
(pus also conceived of the stars collectively as carried round by (he sphere of the lixed stars, and the planets collectively by a sphere moving in the line of the It is clear, however, ecliptic. from the further explanations of Simplicius and from Aristotle's
( 'alii
from that
the
description of right and left in is to be regarded as a forward one. The allusion, Meteor. ii. 5, 362, a, 32 sqq., to the north pole as the upper, the south pole as the lower, is an unimportant use of ordinary language.
c. 2,
PHYSICS
499
specified circumstances, to determine both the number of the spheres and also the direction and rapidity of
For
this
of Cnidos,
purpose Eudoxus, the famous astronomer who may be regarded as the first founder of
observation,^
a complete theory of the spheres based upon accurate sketched out a system of twenty-seven
spheres, twenty-six of which belong to the planets. Considering the simple nature of its motion, he thought one sphere enough for the heaven of the fixed stars, and in this sphere the whole assemblage of the stars was
fastened.
On
upper planets, and three apiece to the sun and moon, which, in agreement with Plato, he placed lowest in the planetary scale. The first sphere
of each planet was intended to explain
tion
in
it
its
daily revolu-
since
to the
with the heaven of the fixed stars, accomplished every day a rotation from east to
planet.
Aristotle,
concert
same
on
the contrary, extended Plato's doctrine to the relation of all the upper spheres to those that are contamed within them, as is clear from his hypothesis of retrogressive spheres (see iTifra).
(Cf. also De Coelo, ii. 12, 293, a, TToAAa (T^ixara. Kivov(Tiv at irpb 5
:
immediale contact with one anp. 496, n.l,7//;m), each can communicate its motion to the one next below it. This relation need not apply with equal strict
other (see
ness to the elementary spheres as to the heavenly, seeing that they do not, like the latter, consist of
r^s reKfVTa'as
exovcr-qs
Kal^rrjs^
ei/
&crTpov
iv iro\\a?s
ff<pa7pa
yap
crcpaipais
Tf\vra7a
4v5e5efj.4uv
IMd.G.lO.) Hejustiview on the ground that the upper spheres stand to the lower as the form to the matter,
^pTai.
ties this
a body whose nature it is to move in a circle. Aristotle, however, supposes in Meteor i 3, 341, a, 1, ii. 4, 361, a, 30 sqq' that the winds circle round the earth, being carried round by the
rotation of the world, Cf. p. 490, n. 4 si/pra
De
a,
12
Simpl.
Be Coelo,
in
Sohol. in
Ar
498
svpra, p. 451, n. 2
K K 2
500
west.
ARISTOTLE
The second, which was fastened
into
its
it,
revolved
course in the
the
ecliptic.
The
round by the
to explain
surrounding spheres, but differing from them in direction and the period of rotation, were
meant
motion of the
spheres.
star itself.^
stars
first
two apiece
more probable
remarking
of
IDEIJJK on Euilt^xus, Philo.wjfh.Abk.d.Berl. Ahad. 1830, p. 67 i^. For a fuller account oi" tlie
'
Eudoxus
theories of Eudoxus and Callippus, see besides the scanty allusion in Aristotle (^Metaplh. xii. 8, 1073, b, 17; SiMPL. ibid. 498, b, 5-500, a, 15, who depends partly upon the work of Eudoxus n. Taxwj/, partly upon the account of Sosigenes, but has not altogether avoided falling into mistakes, and Theo. Astronom. p. 276 sqq. ed, Martin, in whom, however, his editor (p. 55 sq.) points out serious errors. In explanation, cf.lDELER, ibid. 7osqq.
Krische, ForscJiuiigen, p. 288 sq., are followed by Bonitz, Anst. Metaph. ii. 507 sq., and
w4io
Schwegler,
;
274 sq. PbaNTL, 'Apiar. w. ovp. 303 sqq. 2 According to Simpl. ibid.
498, b, 28, 500,
a, 23,
perhaps only of his pupil Polemarchus) who on the death of the latter betook himself to Aristotle at Athens, Simplicius kjiows of no work by him, but gives some account, taken from Eudemus's History of Astronomy, of the reasons which led him to dissent from Eudoxus. Arist. ibid. 1073, b, 32 SlMPL. ibid. 600, a, 15 sqq.; Theo, ibid. 278 sq. Ideler, Krische, 294 sq. 81 sq. * It is obvious from the passage quoted p.490, n. 4,supra, that he did not attribute complete certainty to it. According to Simpl. 503, a, 3, he even brought forward several objections to it in the Problems. The passage, however, does not occur in this treatise as we have it, which makes it all the more difficult to decide upon its genuineness.
=*
this astro-
PHYSICS
that his
501
own
sphere assigned
superfluous.^
rectification
by Eudoxus and Callippus to each planet At the same time he judges an important
coherence of the heavenly system.
carries
For
if
each sphere
round in
its
course
all
in
it,
assumed spheral system would be altered communication of movement from the spheres of one planet to
result of the
those
of another.
accordingly, inserts
lowest of each planet and the highest of that which comes next beneath, meaning them to obviate the action of the first upon the second. But the premises of the whole theory require that these fresh spheres
should move at the same rate as those which they are destined to neutralise, but in an exactly opposite
direction;
2
as
many
'
marks, 503, a, 38 sqq. (where, however, 1. 41, we must read crwcnroKadiaruffav), a special sphere is not required to explain the daily rotation of the planets from
east to west, since, in consequence of this connection the motion of the spheres of the fixed stars communicates itself to all that are contained in it. 2 For if two concentric spheres, whose axes lie in the same line, and of which the inner
one is fixed to the outer by the poles of its axis, spin round the common axis with relatively equal velocities in the opposite directions, each point of the inner sphere is at each moment precisely in the position in which it would be if both spheres were at rest. The
completely
neutralised one another in their effect upon the inner sphere and all that depends upon it, as Sosigenes, in Simpl. ibid. 500, b, 39, truly explains.
602
ABISTOTLE
^
as the
movements
In other words, the collective motions peculiar to each planet have to be considered none of these may be communicated to another planet,
:
by
its first
neutralised.^
It is only the
moon which
requires no
Aristotle,
adds twenty-two
1(pa7pai
aveXiTTOvaai
(sup-
ply ras
Tpwu
(r<f>aipas,
not
ib.
as
Sosigenes
does, SiMPL,
i.e.
vvpdv(i) Kivfjcreis,
communicate
to
them a motion
of the next above them, and in this way to keep them in the same position
opposite
that
relatively to
the fixed stars as they would ha^e held had the planetary spheres above them produced no effect upon them at all ("ras dv\iTTOvaas Kcd els rh avrh a.iroKaOi(TTa.(Tas rfj Oeaei t^v
irpcirriv
a'(pa7pav
rerayixevov
ihid. 1074, a, 1
sqq
Theophrastus
called these spheres avrava^epov<rai, because they carry those that are beneath them back,
of
retrogressive
spheres.
Ari-
and
less
&va(TrpoL,
are star498, b, 41, where, however, the retrogressive spheres appear to be conall of
some, but
them
(SiMPL
ibid.
has obviously overlooked this. If he had remarked it, he would not have neutralised the action of the primeval spheres of each planet which run parallel with the heaven of fixed stars, but would have abolished them
stotle
starless spheres
altogether.
PHYSICS
Mars, A^enus, Mercury, and the
fifty-five or,
if
503
sun
giving in
all
we add
entities
fifty-six
many
eternal incor-
poreal
unmoved
to
from
whom
spheres proceed.^
not
fail
conceiv^ed,
The progress of observation could show that the theory of spheres, even as thus was inadequate to explain the phenomena
earl}^
accordingly, as
epicycles
'
triumphantly against
it.^
Metaph.
;
Simpl.
;
moved, there can be no motion and therefore no sphere in the heavens which is
is
star.
Sf (XT]Zfxlav oiSv t' eJyai (pophv fx^j (Twreipovcrav Trpos 'darpov <popav^ Ti 5e iraaav ^ixriv koI iraffav ouaiav diradrj Kol Kad' avr^v rov
dpiffTov
Sei
vofxl^eiv,
ravras
&c.],
erepa
[sc.
dirad'^s
dudyKT] rdv dpidfidv elvai rSiv ovaiuv. eire ydp fl<riv eVepot Kivoiev tiv cus reAos
dWa
rovTOV
groundless the traditional reading is obviously meaningless.) Here also we can see that his theory is founded upon observation. In 1. 12 he remarks that if we were to leave the sun and the moon out of our reckoning, the number of the (planetary) spheres would be 47 but the difficulty is so obvious that Sosigenes conjectured this to be a slip for 49 (Simpl. ibid. 502, a, 11 sqq.). Krische, with whom and seemingly also Bonitz Schwegler agree, refers the remark to the eight retrogressive spheres under Mercury and the sun but it is not easy to see Low the (T<pa7pai avfK'movaai belonging to the sun and the moon could have been left out.
;
ibid.
o{i<rai
(popas.
however, in 1. 20, we must clearly read with B< nitz t e'Aos BrbnTANO's objection to this emendation, Psychol, d. Ar. 344 sq., is
Mm.
xii.
604
ARISTOTLE
One
circle of fixed stars,
it,
or the
'
first
heaven,' as
Aristotle called
celestial world.
is
most perfect
object,
accomplishes
it
its
purpose by a
single motion.
In
its
single sphere
carries
Its
an innumotion
is
direction,
it it
from
right to
right.'^
Moving without
it
trouble,
requires
no Atlas
to support
40
:
nor any
sail to
carry
round by
ihid. 500, a,
t^v ayxii'oiav avrov &.G. SiMPL. proceeds, 502, b, 5 sqq., to give the arguments which he brought against Aristotle's theory.
Koofiidcras
1
few motions, the next above that and the next again reach higher attainments, the former by the aid of many, the latter by the
aid of few, motions. Finally the highest heavens a,ttain the highest with one single motion. In answer to the second question, Aristotle remarks that the first sphere far excels the others in
vital
asks
of
De how
Ca'h),
it
ii.
12,
Aristotle
is
that the
number
{voriffai
from the prlmum inovens, but the three middle planets have one motion more than the two above and below
their distance
yap
t^s
C'^^js
koX ttjs
apx^s
eKacTTris
iroW^v inrepox^v
eluai ttjs
7r/?coT7js TTphs
first
sphere contains so many stars while the converse is the case with the others, several spheres being assigned to each star. In reply to the former question (292, a, 22) he says that whereas the Most Perfect needs no action (see p. 396, n. 2, 3, and
p. 397, n. 1), of all
but that the nearer each is to first the more are the bodies which it carries, seeing that the lower spheres are carried round by the upper. Aristotle himself seems, from the way in which he introduces them, 291, b, 24, 292,
a, 14 (cf. p. 169, n. 3, and p. 490, n. 4) to place no great reliance
neath
Him
end by a few actions, another requires many, others still make no effort to attain their end at all, but content themselves with a distant approach to perfection.
upon these explanations. The problem, however, appears to him too important to be altogether passed over. There are questions which he approaches with a species of religious awe, but which nevertheless lie very near
his heart.
-
at
it
all,
nearest to
has
See See
p. 494, n.
supra.
p. 497, n. 1, supra.
PHYSICS
force. ^
605
all
Its
motion embraces
and generates
all
Unbegotten and indestructible, affected by no earthly distress, comprehending in itself all time and space, it rejoices in the most complete existence that has been allowed to any bodily thing. ^ Less
motion.
perfect
is
Instead
we
its
course.
Their
a pure
and uniform
See
p. 459, n. 5.
Coelo,
ii.
iffnv eTs Kcu aiSios [d ttos ovpavhs Aristotle, however, has principally view the itpwros ovpavhs, which, in in i. 9, 278, b, 11, is called by preference simply ovpavSsI dpxhv ovk %-)(^u)v rod fxiv KOI TeAeuT^i/
1 init.
:
:
De
ancients were right when they assigned the heavens, as alone indestructible, to the gods, for it
is
&<pdapTos Kal
irdarjs
ayeyrjTos,
$ti
5'
airaO^s
Oui^Trjs
Sutrx^peias
rb
/xrj56/Ams
irpoaSelffdai
Piaias
iravrhs alcovos,
exw^
Se koI TrepiexoifV
iv avrcp
rhv
&,iripov
xpjyoj'
KuXvovTa Karex^i (t>4p(rdai irefpvKSra avrhv SAAws yap rh roiovrov iiriirovqv, irav
avdyKijs,
SiSirep KaXws e;^et ffv/uLireideiv eavrhv rovs dpxaiovs Kal [xaXiffra irarpiovs TfiJLoiu a\7}d?s eJpai xSyovs, us %<ttiv
ri,
Kal
SiaI. 9,
Kal
The
aWa
KVK\o(popia reAeios
tos areAers Kal rhs ixovtras irepas Kal iravKav, avr^ /Av ovSe/xiav oUt apx^v exovcra otfre reAeuT^j/, aAA' &iTav(Tros ovcra rhu 6,iripov xP'^'^oj/, rciv S' &\\<i)v
Trepte'xet
oZaa
apxv^ t^v Se
passage which follows (quoted p. 395, n. 6), refers partly to the same subject, even although the description contained in it refers primarily to God and not to the heavens. All that was said of the aether, p. 473 sq., is equally applicable to the irpuros ovpavhs, which, according to the account p. 490, n. 3, is formed of the purest aether.
iravKav.
The
606
ARISTOTLE
circle are
is
from the
produced.'
of
these motions
affected
by the
a further proof
Nevertheless,
of the
which
of perfection.-^
As
the aether
elements, so
tlie stars
They form
tlie celestial
Cf
De
ovpavhv KoL
to,
deiSrara robv
(paivo/j.e-
vuv. Metaph. xii. 8, 1074, a, 17 (see p. 503, n. \, supra). The stars are therefore called 0e?o auixaTa,
Metaph.
12,
ibid.
b,
1.
30,
De
Ccelo,
ii.
likewise the heavens, ihid. 3, 286, a, 11. * Part. An. i. 1, 641, b, 18: t6 yovv TeTayfjL^vov /col rh wpiff292,
32;
fi4vov TToAu
fiaWov
Trepi
(pa'v^Tai iv ro79
S'
ovpaulois
'/)
v/xas to
^A\ot'
28
6 yap irepl rjfxas rov aladrjTov Toiros 4u <pdopd Ka\ yeveaei 5iaTeXe7
:
fidvos
&u
'
aAA.'
eiirelp fiopiov
oifdev
icrriv.
ws
By
pirrsics
Aristotle,
like
507
Plato,
animated by rational
fore
and ascribed
^
to
these
There-
he attributes a priceless value to the smallest iota we can boast to have acquired about them. 2 In this view we can trace the consequences of a metaphysic which deduced
ultimately
all
it
motion
is
also
possible to recognise in
a reflection of those
modes of
supplied by the four elements, and in which birth, death, and qualitative change take place, and the world of the heavenly spheres,which consists of astherial matter and which, while exhibit-
doctrine, Metaph. i. 9, 990, b, 34, 991, b, 13, iii. 6, 1002, b, 15, 17, 22, 467.
1 Eth. vi. 7, 1141, a, 34: avOpdirov iroXv OeiSrepa r^v (pvffiv, oTou (pavepdorard ye e| wv 6 Kda/xos
ing
tion
motion
of
Ccelo,
in
space,
admits
any
i.
Be
kind. 2, 269,
Similarly,
a, 30, b,
14
it4^vk4
Tis
oifcria
ffdjxaros
&XXr)
avv(rrriKj/. De Ccelo, i. 2 see preceding note. ^ Part. An. i. 5 init. the beings in the world are either unbegotten and imperishable, or begotten and perishable o-u^/Se;
:
j8T7/ce
5e
irepi
fjiXv
iKeivas
Ti/xlas
xnr-
....
etTTt Tt
irep]
Trapa
i]ij.as
ra
<rd>/xaTa
ra
ikdrrovs
.
rjfuv
Sevpo Kol
fffiivou
Tepov K^xcopie;^o'
rtxrovrq}
rifiicoTepav
a<l>aT7)K
rijv
ipvcTLV
'6<T(firep
;
tuv
ivravQa ir\e7ov c. 8, 276, a, 28 sqq. b, 3, ii. 12, 292, b, 1, where twv &(Trp(av and ipravOa are opposed Meteor, ii. 3, 358, a, 2,5 tout' del yivecrdai Kara, riva rd^iy, us eVSeX^rai fxeT^x^iv ra ivravOa rd^ccos. In ordinary language evravOa and iKe? indicate respectively the upper and the under world (e.ff.
;
:
ire pi Sh rwv <p6apdpx^tv Oewpias rcov (pvToov re koI ^(fuv eviropov/jLfv fxaWou Trphs rijv yvSxriv 5td to avuTpoipQv. ex^' ^' ^ndrepa X'^P^^rwu fih yap el koI Kara i^uKphv
e<paTrT6fie6a,
'6fxa)S
Sia
t^v
rifitorriTa
Trap' Tjfuv
fiiKphu fiSpiov KariSelu iariv i) iroWa erepa Kal fxeydha 5t' aKpifieias Idelv t^ Se 5fd rh fiaWou Kal wXeiu yuwpl^eiv
iflSidv
rvxhv Kal
Plato,
Efij?.
330, D, V. 451, b; AjjoL 40, E, 41, B sq., and elsewhere), in Plato also the sensible and ideal
avrciv Xafxfidvei ri]v rrjs iiriarriiixris uTrepoxV, ^Tt 5e 5ih rh Tr\7\(Tiairepa Tjficou elvai Kal rrjs (pvaeus o'lKeiSrepa
avriKaraXXdrrerai ri
Phrsdr.
ra dela
CoelOy
ii.
(piXocrotplav.
where
he
is
describing
the
Platonic
608
ARISTOTLE
thought which lay at the root of the natural religion of the Greeks, and which stamped themselves in similar
notions upon the philosophy of Plato.^
self,
Aristotle
him-
indeed,
is
perfectly conscious
of this connection
between his theories and the ancient faith of his nation. The relation between the terrestrial world and the celestial spheres gives rise to the motions and change of
earthly things. The laws that govern the earth are necessarily different from those of heaven,^ because of
the difference
of materials,
if
for
no other reason.
forces
them
to
move
in
opposite directions and to exhibit opposite qualities, to act and be acted upon, to pass into and to inter-
another.'' But since everything that moved must be moved by something else, it follows
i.
p.
2,
68G
sq.
svpra,
and
xii.
Metaph.
TrapaSe'So-
Kal ravras ras 5o|oy eKeivuu olou Xei-^ava irepKreaSxrOai fJ-expi- Tov vvv. 7] jiiev ovv irdrpios 5o|a Kal 7] irapa roov Trpurwv iirl
(pOeipoinevcoj/
vaXaicov
(laiv
roaovroy
^
ovroi [the
TTfpie'xet
Ttt
re starry heavens]
'Skrju
Koi
<pv<riu.
Se
6;
Athenaq.
;
Svpplic.
c.
^Stj
irpoarriKrai
irphs
rcou
rroXAuv /cat wphs t)}v els rovs vo/llovs Kal rh (TvjuLcpepov xp^^^i-v avOpunroeL^els re yap rovrovs Kal rwv &\\wv C4'wv o/xoiovs riffl Xeyovai, Kal rovrois erepa aKoXovda Kal
'
Clemens, Strom, v. Euseb. ihid. 5, 1 Chalcid. in Tim. c. 248 and elsewhere; cf. Keische, Forsch.
22, s, 88 p D; 591,
irapaTrAy^o'ia
rois
elpri/meuois
'
wj/
et ris xt^P'Vas avrh Xdfioi fiSvov rh irptorov '6ri deovs wovro ras irpdras
ovaias elvai deicos tiv etprja-dai vojxia-eiev Kal Kara rh eiKhs iroWaKis evp7)fxevf]s eh rh Svvarhu eKdirrr/s
Kal
have distorted this to that the Divine Providence reaches only as far as the moon and does not extend to the earth. How far this representation agrees with the true Aristotelian doctrine may be gathered from what has been already said, at pp. 403,410, and 421.
347,
1)
mean
rex^ns Kal
<piKo(ro<pias Kal-KaXiv
sq.
477
sq. sup.
PHYSICS
an impulse from without.
509
The immediate sources of Their movement occasions the changes of warmth and cold, which in the opinion of Aristotle, are the most generally active forces in the elementary bodies. ^ Although the stars and their spheres are neither warm nor cold,^ yet, by their movement, they generate light and heat in the
these motions are the heavenly bodies.^
nearest to them as, indeed, moving bodies warm and even set fire to surrounding substances by friction. This is partilies
;
swiftly
is
fastened,
it
is
stars,-*
nor yet
Meteor,
5'
2,
339, a,
21
burn, and the lead of arrows and bullets to melt (on this widely spread error of the ancients, cf.
it
(popais,
lixm
irciaav
avrov
rijv
dvua/xiv
oicTTe
Kv^epua<rdai
(xkv
iKilQiv.
lDELEK,.lm^. 3Ieteor. i. 359 sq.); must therefore heat the air that
surrounds them, raina
avTct iKQepfxalverai ^4pffdai,
Kivr]<Tei
....
avTov
rOsv
TTvp
avyy^ur} tovtois ods iv v\r]s eifSet rd>u yiyvofievwu airia xph vofii^eip, rh 8' 0VTU5 aXTiov ws oOev 7] ttjs .
.
.
/xeu ovv 5ia to eV de'pt ts 5id T7ji> TrKrjy^iv rfj ylyverai irvp' tu)V 5e &v(i}
eKaffrou iv
r^
fi^
ff<paipa,
(pip^rai, Sxtt^
Kivifa-ews
del kiuouc. 3,
avra
ixkv
iKirvpovadai,
rov
S'
340,
aepos virh rr]v rov kvkXikov (XdofiaTOs (r(j)a7pau uvros audyKTj (pepofievrts
iKeivrjs
See
It
p.
480, n.
3, sujjra.
ijcdepixaiviaQai,
impossible that they should be, seeing that the jether, of which they consist, admits none of the opposites which constitute the qualities of the elements. Some further reasons against the view that they are of a fiery nature are given, Meteor.
^
is
IxaKurra
Se/xduos.
6 i\ios
nXrjcnd^ouTds re avrov Kal a.vi(Txovros KoX virep tj/jlols uvros yiyverai rj depfidrrjs. That
Sih
S^
i.
fiit.
*
:
DeCoelo, ii. 7, 289, a, 19 the do not consist of fire, t) 5e Ocp/xorrjs ott' avruu koX rh </)cos yiverai 'ttap(K'rpi^oix4vov rod aepos
stars
virh
the sun has this effect is explained, Meteor, i. 3, 341, a, 19, in the course of an exposition which agrees with the passage just quoted, in terms similar to the above. See further Meteor, i. 3, 340, b, 10, i. 7, 344, a, 8. The whole account, however, would suggest many diflaculties even to
TTJs
iKeiuuv
(popas.
Motion
510
so slow of
ARISTOTLE
motion as the moon.
fire
air, to burst and rush violently downward.^ If the motion of the sun were uniformly the same in relation to the earth it would produce a simple and unvarying
effect either of
generation or of destruction.
makes
it
unequal.
sun
is
sometimes nearer and sometimes further from the and the alternation of birth
is
and death
Whether
latter with the remoteness of the sun, the one with the approach of warmer and the other with that of colder
and
!sing-le
cold,
celestial
it
the motion of the whole sphere that produces them? AVe sliould require in tliat case to siipjjose that the sun stands out oi its sphere like a jironioiilorv. Or how does it ;i,ii,ree witli tlie account here given that the lire and air region is separated from the solar sphere by the lunar ? Meteor, i. 8, 341 a, 28. Gen. et Corr. ii. 10 eVel t\ Kara r^v (^opau Kiwqcrls SeSeiKrai OTi aiSios, dvdyKri rovrwu out wu Kal yeveaiv elvai arwexSos >; yap (popa TToi-fj(TL T^v yiveffiv eVSeAexcDs 5ia
is
'
'^
:
when
iuaur ias,
ruiy
tj
rij (popa
tt] auwjULa\tla.-
yap ivavTiwv rauavTia a'lTia. Sio koI oux v irfxarr] (papa alria ^arX YeveVewy koX (pdupas, aAA' r] Kara rhu Xo^ou kvkKov eV rav-rr) yap Kalrh (Tvvf:X^^ ^(Ttl Ka\ rh Kiyi^iodai
Kivriff^is . rris fxhv olv avvtx^*"^ ^ '''^^ oXov (popa alria, rov 54 TrpoaUvai koI airUvai ?/ ^yKKiais avfxfiaivii yap ore fxlv iroppoo yiveo-dai ore S' iyyvs. aviaov 5e tow SLaarr^/jLaTos uvtos auw/xaXos earai
.
5uo
rj
Kiurjais
'
rh irpoadyeiv Kal dirdyeiv rh yevvrjTiKov. But as both birth and death are eternal, <pavepov on fiids fieu ofjo-rjs tt)s (popas ovk eV5eXerot yivea-dai dfjitpw Sia rh evavTia elvai rh yap avrh Kal axravrois ^xov del rd avrd irecpvKe iroie?!/. Siffre iJTOi yeveffis del earai fj (pdopd.
, .
'
iyyvs elvai yevvS., rqi dirievai raitrhv tovto /cai irSppu) yiyecrdai (pOeipei Kal el r^ iroWdKis Trpocrievai yevva, Kal ry iroWdKis direK0e7v (pdelpei raiu yap evavricov rdpavria atria, Cf. Meteor, i. 9, 346, b, 20, ii. 2, 354, b, 26. ^ As is done in the preceding note and in the passages quoted, p. 512, n. 1 , infra.
PHYSICS
derance of one over the other/
same.
still
611
by causing
flying to
the different localities which, if prevented by no controlling influence, they would severally occupy.
The
materials of the world are thus continually conducted in a never-ceasing stream of reciprocal trans-
The endlessness of
this process
communicates
The substances
no right
thus
'
left
the
the life of animals have their natural periods, which are determined by the revolution of the sun and the moon, as we might expect: koX yap 9epix6T'i)Tis Ka\
y\iv\(:is
a'lTiov yap tovtov iarlv rj &A\r]\a uerdfiaa-is el yap eKaarov e/xepev ev rfj avTov x^P'"els
awjxara.
Kal
i]Sr]
/j.^
iJ.erefia\\ei/ viro
Siea-TrjKea-av.
tov
irXrjaioi^,
tcu
H^xpi
(rviJ.iJ.eT plus
rivhs
oZv did T7V <j)opdu did 5e TO ixerafiaAKeiv ovk eVSe'xtTcti ixeveiv ovdeu avrwv iv uvSefiia xw/>a
Terayfxevr].
ras yeveaeis, fxera 5e ravra Tos (pdopds. rovTOov S' exovai rh Tr4pas Koi rrjs apxyjs Koi rijs reAeuT^s at TovTwv Kivr}(reis tS>v aarposv. The changes in the temperature
iroiovari
of the air depend upon the sun and moon those in the water upon air and wind. Whatever is or comes into being in them must adjust itself to their state. (Then follows the passage quoted p.
;
363, n. 4.)
5e rh eJvai
et
Gen.
7
J
:
Corr.
e/c
ii.
aixa 5e StjAoj'
5'
rh
irSppo} TTJs
dpxvs
dcpiarraaOai, rqi
awopovcriu, Sia ri
kKacnov roov
\enrojj.evcf)
rpoircp
(TweirAripoxre
rh
ro3v els t))v olKeiav (pepofievov eV T(^ dneipcf} XP^^V o'' 5tf(rTa(rt rh.
x^pw
'6\ov
6e(is
iroi-fiaas
evreXexv
evSe\.)
512
ARISTOTLE
is
mutation
for as the
at fixed
and equal
intervals,
and
as the
movement
kind of
all
circle,
pheno-
mena produced by
He
first
describes those
fiery circle;
;
and
and
finally
the
those
of
irvvbipoiro to i'ivai
,sujr/'a),
on
circle
way no
hih.
nature]
will
generation,
2'.]
P/i//s. iv.
14, 22;), b,
sqq.
^
ovaias rh yiueadai del Kal tt]u yfvtcriu. Ibid. c. II fin. perishable things complete the circle of their being apie/j.cp not (Uei. Cf. also Zell. Ph. cl. Gr. i. p. 512. Ibid, at 836, b, 9 eV X(T(f Xpovcf Kal 7] (pdopa kol t] yeveais rj Kara (pvaiv. 5ih Kal ol ^pouoi Kal ol
:
'
treatise is
offa
a-v/j.-
Palvei Kara (pvaiv /xhu, araKToripav jxivrOl T7?S TOU TrpwTOv (TTOix^iou
Twv
. . .
aco/uidToov, irepl
rbu ytiTvivvTa
fidXiara tottov t^ cpopa ruv &(npwv, o(Ta T OeirifXiv hv a4pos dvai KOiva TrdBt] Kal vhaTos, en 5e yf/s
ocro
ei'577
fiioi
kKacrruiv apiO/xhu
fx^^c'^
'^'*'
Kol
/ueprj
Kal
irddt]
tSsv
rovTcp Biopi^ovrai iravToif yap iffri rd^Ls Kal TTcis fiios Kal xpovos /j-erpelrai Trpi65cf,Tr\^v ov r^ avrt^ irdures.
fiepcov.
Experience, moreover, is in hardpw/xeu this theory yap (in irpoffiouTOS jxkv rov /;Atoy
and
'
'>
iv.
mony with
yeviffis
6.
icrriv,
tffcf
aTriouTos 5e ^6i<ris,
TOTTos
64(Ti
Kal eV
XP^'^V ^Karepov.
It is
fxera
tovtov
:
[i.e.
true that in many cases death takes place quicker. The reason of this, however, is to be found in the disproportionatenessof the materials. 2 Ibid. 337, a, 1, c, 11, 338, b,
3,
1
and again
Kal &epo5,
''
9 init.
iii.
Ibid.
6,
378, a, 15 sqq.
sqq.
cf. c.
(see p. 484,
IDELER.
PHYSICS
513
which are exhibited within the sphere of the earth. The latter part of his treatise does not seem to have been finished. Aristotle appears, instead of continuing
the work, to have composed the separate essay which now forms the fourth book of the Meteorology and
which
offers a
of animate existence in
we should
chemistry.
and organic
various
In the
first
of
these
sections
phenomena, such as meteors and aerolites,^ together with the Comets and the Galaxy, are explained to be
collected masses of dry
fire
and inflammable vapours set on by the motion of the stars.^ Comets are bodies of
vapour in a state of slow combustion, moving
Similar in kind is the vaporous material being excreted and by the movement of the whole heaven.*
its
this
Milky Way,
inflamed
In the lower portion of the atmosphere are observable all circumstances connected with the formation of the
Under the influence of solar warmth the moisture on the surface of the earth evaporates. The rising mists cool themselves in the higher regions of the air, imparting a portion of their heat to the fiery
clouds.
'
See
.
p. 83, n. 2, sujpra.
i.
were thought
to forecast.
'
3
^{eUor.
On
4, 5.
n. 4, 479, n. 4, 490, n. 3, and 509, n. 4. "J^'i^.c. 6-7, especially .344, a, 16 sqq. and c. 8, 345, b, 32 sqq. In
^
Cf pp. 482,
of the nature of comets which he here gives, Aristotle endeavours (344, b, 18 sqq.) to explain those
meteorological
phenomena
{e.g.
Meteor, i. 396 Ideler points out that Aristotle's account of comets held its ground among the most distinguished astronomers until the time of Newton ^ jj^^ ^ g^ ^^^ 34g^ ^^ g where the attempt is made to explain in detail, on the basis of this supposition, the form and appearance of the Milky Way.
VOL.
I.
L L
514
ARISTOTLE
Then they condense, change from air to water,^ and fall again to earth. In this manner there is formed a stream of air and water, moving up and down in a circle when the sun is near, the column of air, or warm exhalation, rises when it retreats, the stream of water flows downwards.*^ Aristotle makes use of this phenomenon to explain the clouds and
of the upper atmosphere.^
:
snow and hail,"^ and goes on to connect with it the nature and origin of rivers ^ and of the sea." The former are produced in part by the products of the atmosphere and in part by a transmutation The sea, though of vapour into water within the earth.
mists,^ dew, rime, rain,
no
less
world,
is
always yielding a
returns to
it
and
bitter
taste
is
are generated
in other
words, combustion. These vapour, then, carry the result of this combustion aloft with them, which mingles with
the water of the rain and the streams, and being by reason
of
its
it
remains
'
The reason
i.
given,
iMd.
'^
c. 8,
Air, which is a compound moisture and heat, when it cools down, is transformed into moisture and cold, i.e. water see
of
Ihid. at 346, b, 32. Ihid. c. 10-12. J^m?. c. 13, 349,b, 2-c. 14yif/i., where he gives a survey of the most noted rivers and their sources. The matter of c. 14 will
*
p. 484, supra.
3
Ihid.
i.
c. 9.
Ihid.
ii.
c.
1-3.
PHYSICS
behind in the
sea.
515
Dry evaporation
Both are mingled in the lower atmosphere, but the dry exhalations rise aloft and are carried round by the rotation of the upper regions. This excretion of the warmer matter causes the remaining moisture to cool and be condensed into rain
evaporation rain.
and
this refrigeration
warm
the earth in the shape of wind.^ Consequently, the alternations of wind and rain depend upon the fluctuations of
one another.^
terior
of the
may
In the earth
itself stones
damp
Ibid. i. c. 13, 349, a, 12 sqq., 4-6, especially c. 4, where the subject is further developed. Cf also IDELEK, i. 541 sqq. Meteor, i. 3, 341, a, 1 Prohl. xxvi. 26. 2 Upon this oj/TJTrepia-Toats, a
3,
457, b,
2.
ii.
conception which plays a great part in Aristotle's philosophy of nature, as it did in Plato's before, and in the Stoics' after, him, see
also Meteor,
i.
Meteor. ii.T,^. An enumeration of the various hypotheses advanced by the ancients to explain earthquakes is given by Ideler, in loco, 582 sqq. * Ibid. ii. 9, and iii. 1. * These phenomena are dealt with in Meteor, iii., chapters 2-6. ^ Meteor, iii. 6, 7, 378, a, 15
sqq.
12, 348, b, 2
De
516
ARISTOTLE
is
not properly
start.
Taking
regarding
warmth and
and then the
and
moisttire as
in
their
several manifestations.
generation,
substance
^
;
cor-
withdrawn by some external heat, and consequently form and distinctness are destroyed.''
ments of a being
Among phenomena
may be reckoned
Of the two
(pvaiu <p6opa els
iraffa
yap
7]
Kara
ttjj
L. 16
eV
a7i'>\iis
5'
Meteor,
7]
iv.
ol)V
1,
378,
b, 28:
7]
eVrt (pQopa
olKeias Kal
utt'
eKacTTC}}
vyp<^
irpwTOV jxkv
yevecris Kal
Tcoj/
7}
KaOoXov
aTrArj
Kara (pvaiv
6ep/j.6r7]ros
'
aWorpias
depfidrTjros
auTTj 5'
avTiKeijxivr) (pdopa
*
Kara
(pvcriv.
%(TTi 5' 7} olttXti 31 KoX ((>vaiK7] yeueais fxerafioAT] vttS rovTwu roov Swdfieaf, orav e;^a>o'i AoyOV, 6K TTIS VTT0Klfliv7)S vK7]S
Ihid.
1.
earlu 7) rov irepiexoyros. Corruption may also be described as the joint effect of ^pvxp^rTis o'lKeia, and 6ep/j.6r7]s aXXorpia. Moisture, however, is (ace. to 1. 8 sqq.) a
eKaarr) (pvcrei
at
elprjfxevai
avrai
S'
[wAtj] elalu
yewwai
5
Se
Kparovvra
Kparfj,
a.7Ti\iia
rrjs v\7]s.
Ibid. 379, a, 2
orav 5e
/x^
necessary means, all generation being the result of the action of moisture (which is evopiarov see p. 480, n. 2, S2q?ra) upon dryness in obedience to the efficient force of nature destruction begins orai/
; ;
Kara
fxepos
jiieu
fxdoKvffis Kal
ylverai, rij
fidXicTTa
5'
airXfj yepecrei
c^i/zts.
rh opi^fiepov
'<^i^i.s,
ivavTiov
Koivov
irerpis, iriiravffis,
6im]<Ti$
PHYSICS
passive principles moisture
in its nature the
therefore,
517
is
more
easily determinable
moisture,
characteristics of
can exist without the other, but both (and therefore also the two elements, whose fundamental qualities they
are)
must
This comsoft.^
bination produces
Every body, again, which has must be stiff, and all stiffness
Consequently,
own
definite
form
a form of dryness."^
we
and
Homogene-
warmth and
cold/'
as effects of heat,
/xdoXvais,
a7re\|/m, wjucJttjs,
vessel.
c. c.
cold.
*
Ibiff. c. 5 init.
dpxa^ Tcov crw/ictTcoj/ al TradrjTiKal vyphv KoX ^rjp6v iirel 5' eVri rh fxkv vypdv evdpKTTOv, rh Se ^rjpdv Zv(T6pi<TTov [see p. 480, n. 2,su2)ra],
.
.
oixol6i' ri T(f
u\l/Cf)
5-7. 8 init. c. 10, 388, a, 20 sqq. On the nature of homogeneity, cf. Part I, 879, 2. Homogeneous bodies (ofioio/nepri) are defined in general as those composed of one kind of material,
'
Ibid. Ibid.
&\Arj\a irdcrxovcip' rb yap TCf ^vpcfi aXriov rod Spi^eaOai Ka\ 8ia rovTo e| afxcpoTv icnl rh upifffxepou (TWfia. Xey^Tai 5e tS)V
Trphs
vyphv
.
(TToix^lcov
yri,
whether that material be simple and elementary or compound, in the narrower sense as those composed of the latter. Opposed to the homogeneous is the heterogeneous (di/ofJLOiofjLepes), or that which is composed of different held materials mechanically
together, as is the case especially with organic bodies. See, besides the passages referred to above, Meteor, iv. 10, 388, a, 13. c. 12 init. De An. i. 5, 411, a, 16-21, where besides b, 24 sqq cf.
; ,
2, stip.'].
ravra
diravra
ra
upiff/xeva
ivravQa [added because the statement does not apply to aetherial regions] ovk &vev yrjs Kal
(Tca/xara
SSaros.
^
.
dfxoiofjLfp^s
we
have
6fioii5-^s,
which
is
518
ARISTOTLE
and composition/ passing to
In
we
physics which
is
We cannot
therefore here do
o\ov rots
ii.
more than
Part. An.
fMopiois ^/toeiSe's,
655, b, 21, where d/xoioaeprj is explained by (rwwvvfia rois 6\ois TO. fiep-n cf. the Jjid. Arist. under the word. According to Philop. Aristotle distinguished in his
9,
;
between elementary homogeneous and organic bodies. In a quotation from this dialogue occur the words {Ar. Fr. 1482,
Eudeinns
davfia, 10, cf p. 482, supra) fxerpia eVrt rSiv (TTOix^icov 7] v6(T0S
.
Twu bjxoiofxcpwv 7} dcrdeveia Tuv opyaviKuiv rh ai(Txos they are perhaps, however, only inserted by the reporter by way of ex. .
property (koiv^ (pixris Koi of many bodies with whose other properties it is inseparably united (ov x^P^^'^'h)That which gives actuality to this property (J} rovrov ii/fpyeia Tov Sia^avovs p 5ia((>aves 17 ej/reAe'xem rod 5ia(pavov5, 418, b, 9, 419, a, 10) and as it were colour to the transparent object is light, whicli again is caused by fire or
Siva/uiis)
common
planation. Ibid. c. 8-11. Caps. 8 and 9 treat especially of stiffening by heat and cold; of melting by heat and moisture of softening, bending, extending; of breaking, bruising, splitting, &c. caps. 10 and 11 treat of the constituent elements of homogeneous bodies and the properties by which they
; ;
may be known.
^ toiovtov rivhs At the same time he controverts (De An. 418, b, 20; Be Se7mi, c. 6, 446, a, 25 sqq ) the view of Empedocles that light is motion passing from heaven to earth, on the ground of the immense distance at which we see it. Light, to Aristotle, is the effect of motion (see 468 sq. sujjra), but is not jjer se a motion, but rather a definite state which is produced in a body as a whole in consequence of a qualitative change {aXKoiuais) such as freezing (De Sensu, c. 6, It is asserted at 446, b, 27 sqq.) the same time that vision is the defined as
irapovffia
iu rep 5ia(pave7.
PHYSICS
as
it
519
will
be
now
motion which passes from an object to the eye through the trans]parent medium (Be An.
ii.
7,
c.
29,
iii.
;
1,
424, b,
Be
Se7isv, 2,
presence causes light, by absence darkness, is also that which on the border of transparent things produces Colour. For colour resides only on the
its its
by
surface of bodies, and belongs, therefore, only to those which have definite limits as light is said to be ^v aopicrTq} rep SLa(pave7 (Be Sensu, c. 3, 439, a, 26), so colour is defined (ibid. 439, b, 11) as rh rod diacpavovs iv (rdofxari o)pi(riJ.ev(p irepas. White and black correspond on the surface of bodies to light and darkness (439, b, 16), and from these two primary colours come all the others, not merely by the mechanical confusion of their atomic elements, nor by the shining of
:
points of view in the most exhaustive manner, pp. 86-159, as also Baumkee, Arist. Lehre V. d. Siniiesvermoffevi (1S77 ),ip. 21 sqq. S o u n d is said to be motion caused by the concussion of hard bodies and transmitting itself through the medium of the air. It was to describe this idea of the sound-medium that Theophrastus and other Peripatetics invented the word Sirjx", formed upon the analogy of Sta^aj/rjs, just as in like manner they invented Sioa/xos to describe the medium by which smell is transmitted. Phi LOP. Be An. L, 4 cf. ibid. M, 8, o. 10, o. Those notes are
high which make a forcible impression on the ear in a brief time, i.e. quick notes those on the other hand are deep which take a longer time to produce a weak impression, i.e. slow ones (Be An. ii. 8, 419, b, 4-420, b, 5). Bodies which are fastened into others and carried round by them as the stars are, produce no sound
;
one through the other, but also by a real process of mixture, such as is described at p. 420. If they are mixed in simple numerical proportion, we have pure colours if otherwise, impure. Inclusive of black and white, Aristotle enumerates in all seven primary colours (ibid. 439, b, 18 to the end
of the chapter,
also c. 6, 445, b, 20 sqq.,and c. 4, 442, a, 19 sqq. Cf, Be An. ii. 7 init. ibid. 419, a, 1 sqq. Meteor, iii. 4, 378, b, 32 sqq., i. 5, 342, b, 4). The treatise upon colour starts from somewhat different premisses vide Prantl, who treats Aristotle's doctrine of colour from different
; ; ;
Smell
Casio,
ii.
9,
water or
a, 1, b, 4
;
air (e7xuAtos
|7j/j(^t7js,
443,
provisional description of
KttTTi/wSrjs
and
avaBvixiaaiSy
Be
as Sensu,
443, a, 21).
This
is
how they
(Be
;
become objects
Sensu,
;
to the sense
c. 5,
Be An. ii. 6 cf. Baumker, 28 sq.) In the same way Taste is the effect of
the union of dry or earthy material
520
ARISTOTLE
the law discovered by the Pythagoreans which declared that the harmony and discord of sounds depended upon certain numerical relations is considered also to apply, not only to colours, but to tastes (xu^oO- T)e Sensu, 4, 442, a, 19 sqq. c. 7, 448, a, 15. Aristotle compares seven principal tastes to the seven primary colours. Fm'ther investigations into the nature of x*^/"**^ ^^ reserves (Be Sensu, c. 4 fin.^ for the (pv(Tio\oyia irepl rwv (pvTciv. Upon the treatise attributed to him ir. x'"f^^^-> ^ee p. 84, n. 1. The sense of Touch has for its object all those general qualities of bodies (Be An. ii. 11, 422, b, 25, 423, b, 26), which are ultimately resolvable into terms of the elementary oppositions referred to on p. 479, supra, and do not, therefore, call for further
special notice here.
with moisture, which, however, in this case is not that of water and air, as in the case of smell, but of water alone. The object of the
again
sense of taste is x^f^^'X^f^^^ is defined as rh yiyvd^ifivov virh Tov elprjfievov ^-qpov [viz. rod
'
yevaeus ttjs Kara ^vva^iv rrjs ivipy^iav [i.e. ets aWoLcoTLKhv which causes our sense or faculty of taste actually to feel a sensation, 441, b, 19], TOV Tpo<piixov
^rjpov irdOos
As
(Xiiraphv
Spi/J-h and and 6|u) are a mixture of sweet and bitter if these elements are mingled in a
and
aKj-ivphv,
avffTTjphu, (TTpucpvhv
certain proportion we have pleasant tastes otherwise, unpleasant Be An. ii. ones (Be Sensu, c. 4
;
10,
Baumk. 32
sq.).
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