1.In your own words, define a foreign policy. Explain exhaustively the different elements of a foreign policy-making/studies.

Among these elements, what do you think is/are the strengths and weaknesses of the Philippine state in dealing with other states? Foreign Policy is the use of political influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in a manner desired by the states concerned: it is an interaction between forces originating outside the countrys borders and those working within them. Foreign policy of a state is concerned with the behaviour of a state towards other states. It refers to the ways in which the central governments of sovereign states relate to each other and to the global system in order to achieve various goals or objectives. Through its foreign policy it endeavours to persuade others in accordance with ones own ends. It is primarily in proportion to its national power that its persuasive power is effective in this regard. However, even a powerful state cannot afford to enjoy a solo flight in this regard. It has to take into account, not only its own objectives and interests, aspirations and problems, but also those of other states. This process involves intricate processes of diplomacy short of war. It is also based on the observations regarding the traditional behaviour of a given state. Moreover, a state while implementing its foreign policy cannot afford to ignore the rules of International law and canons of international morality. The whole essence of this prelude is that the term foreign policy cannot be studied in isolation from the factors that determine it. National interest as one of the elements of foreign policy studies defines as the country's goals and ambitions whether economic, military, or cultural. The concept is an important one in international relations where pursuit of the national interest is the foundation of the realist school. (Byrd,1996).The national interest of a state is multi-faceted. Primary is the state's survival, welfare and security. Also important is the pursuit of wealth and economic growth and power Many states, especially in modern times, regard the preservation of the nation's culture as of great importance. Today, the concept of "the national interest" is often associated with political Realists who wish to differentiate their policies from "idealistic" policies that seek either to inject morality into foreign policy or promote solutions that rely on multilateral institutions which might weaken the independence of the state. The majority of the jurists consider that the "national interest" is incompatible with the "rule of law". Regarding this, Antonino Troianiello of 2000 has said that national interest and a state subject to the rule of law are not absolutely incompatible: While the notion of state reason comes first as a theme of study in political science, it is a very vague concept in law and has never been an object of systematic study. This obvious lack of interest is due to a deliberate epistemological choice - a form of positivism applied to legal science; and as a result legal science affirms its autonomy regarding other social sciences while constituting with exactness its own object - law - in order to describe it. In doing so it implies deterministic causes which have an influence on its descriptive function. This method which puts aside state reason is not without any consequence: the fact that state reason is not taken into

account by legal science is to be integrated within a global rejection of a description of law as presented in political science. Situational Factors While international constraints may have appeared to some to be more severe than those emerging from the domestic political economy, they were often intertwined with domestic initiatives or failures. Dependence on the US in several respects was not simply an imposition of the world system on the Philippines though in part it was that, dating back to 1898 when Dewey sailed, uninvited, into Manila Bay but was also a reflection of the attitudes, actions and inactions of Filipino leaders, which helped transform assymetrical interdependence into dependency. It was fair to say, as some did (Pomeroy, 1977), that that leadership was itself the creature of American colonialism. But after more than 40 years of possession of the apparatus of legal sovereignty, with the bargaining potential which that involves, the colonial heritage does not seem to be a fully adequate explanation of all that has happened. Even the declaration of martial law , which was so convenient for American military and economic interests, and was stamped with US approval, was to a considerable degree a product of raw Filipino ambitions within the framework of intra-elite competition. Even as one recognizes the impositions of the world system, it is not possible to ignore the Philippine political process. Classical dependencia would deny any autonomy to either leadership formation or foreign policy in the Third World. But here it is necessary to assert the semi-autonomy of both, as would appear to be the view even of some writers in the dependency mode (for instance, Sunkel, 1969). Nevertheless, we must reiterate that the scope of autonomy in the Philippines over time has been less than for most other Southeast Asian states. Dependence has both economic and military dimensions. Economic dependence can be quantiifed in the areas of trade, investment, aid, and debt, moving from the oldest form of world-wide economic relationships to the form most recently of major interest. State Action may refer to programs/activities with other states such as political, economic, psychological and military. is an elusive concept but widely used in political science. Power may be defined as the ability to persuade others to do things that they would not do ordinarily unless pressured to do so. Within domestic politics, power is usually based on numbers, wealth, and organizational skills. A small group that is well organized may exercise considerable influence even without large sums of money. In international politics, power depends on both geopolitical factors and idiosyncratic factors. This emphasis on the individual decision maker led to a focus on psychological and cognitive factors as explanatory sources of foreign policy choice. For instance, Jervis asserted that the psychological disposition of a leader, the cognitive limits imposed by the sheer volume of information available to decision makers and the inclination to select policy options that were patently second-best all contributed to imperfect foreign policy outcomes. In addition, other

scholars pointed out that the decision-making process was itself subject to the vagaries of group dynamics, while the constraints imposed by crises introduced further distortions to foreign policy choice. The result was a comprehensive critique of many of the key findings on foreign policy found in the traditional realist perspective. The focus on individual decision makers, despite its insights, was seen by some scholars to be excessively narrow. Even within states, the conflicting outlooks and demands of foreign policy bureaucracies such as the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Defence clearly influence foreign policy decisions in ways that reflect parochial concerns first over considerations of national interest. For Graham Allison and others, an analysis of foreign policy decision making had to start with these bureaucracies and the various factors that caused them to play what was, in their view, the determining role in shaping foreign policy outcomes. This approach to understanding foreign policy therefore emphasises the interplay between leaders, bureaucratic actors, organisational culture and, to an extent, political actors outside of the formal apparatus of the state. Broader than the behaviourists singular focus on the individual decision maker, advocates of the bureaucratic politics approach to Foreign Policy began a process of investigation into sources of influence on foreign policy beyond the state that was to culminate in a radical rethinking of the importance of the state itself in International Relations. State Capacity/Power may define as to the capability of a certain state to have other states agreed with it on a matter at issue. While the previous approaches sought to understand FPA through, respectively, recourse to the structure of the international system and thedecision-making process within states, a third approach introduced a new means of interpreting foreign policy. Pluralists disputed the belief that states formed the only significant actors in international politics and asserted that, at least since the 1970s (if not earlier), increased linkages between a variety of state, sub-state and non-state actors were eroding the traditional primacy of the state in foreign policy. Indeed, the possibility of multinational companies exercising de facto foreign policy through their financial resources or nongovernmental organisations through their ability to mobilise votes was recognised as a central feature of the globalising world. Thus for pluralists, an analysis of the influences upon foreign policy which are derived from domestic and transnational sources and which were not necessarily tied to the state is crucial to understanding foreign policy outcomes. This environment of complex interdependency effectively diminishes the scope of state action in foreign policy making to that of a manager of a diversity of forces inside the domestic sphere, including government, and outside the boundaries of the state. Traditionally, foreign policy makers have assumed that it is the very nature of the international system itself being anarchic, that is without any recognised central authority which compels states to pursue a relentless quest for security and wealth. With states in direct competition with one another to achieve security and wealth needs, co-operation between the mis ultimately tactical and

limited to a series of selective, self-interested alliances. A security dilemma prevails, whereby efforts by one state to increase its sense of security through arms acquisition or other defensive measures merely inspire other states to adopt similar strategies, and ironically perpetuates a general sense of insecurity among all states.

2. Enumerate and explain the different approaches, models and paradigms in foreign policymaking/studies adopted in both the developed (rich) and the underdeveloped (poor) countries. Clarify the major points in their contradictions. Psychologistic approach views foreign policy as a function of impulses and idiosyncrasies of a single leader. According to this view, kings and presidents are the source of foreign policy; war and peace became a matter of personal taste and individual choice. The approaches are strategically employed to interact with other countries. In the recent time, due to the deepening level of globalization and transnational activities, the states will also have to interact with nonstate actors. The aforementioned interaction is evaluated and monitored in attempts to maximize benefits of multilateral international cooperation. Since the national interests are paramount, foreign policies are designed by the government through high-level decision making processes. National interests accomplishment can occur as a result of peaceful cooperation with other nations, or through exploitation. Usually, creating foreign policy is the job of the head of government and the foreign minister (or equivalent). In some countries the legislature also has considerable oversight. Political psychology is essentially concerned with notions of personality and "good" decision making, that is, the analysis and assessment of the quality of decisions taken by the actors in foreign policy. Both foci share a primary concern about individuals rather than governments or regimes. Because studies based on these foci tend to be chronicles-which are certainly informative from a purely historical point of view-the insights we get from this perspective have tended to be more descriptive than analytical. Essentially, the study becomes a narrative, an observation of sequential events. This approach, however, lacks explanatory power. Focusing on an often arbitrary set of idiosyncrasies, it has tended to account for isolated features of states. Jerrold Post (1993), for instance, examined Iraqi foreign policy during the 1990-1991 Gulf War by looking exclusively at the psychological makeup of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Post's view was that the perceptions, calculations, actions, and style of Saddam Hussein were the main influences on the decision to invade Kuwait and what followed. But this analysis errs first and foremost because it uses inaccurate evidence. In his narrative, Post gives an account of Hussein's childhood, which he later offers as determinative in his political career but can cite no authoritative sources. He makes detailed references to founding episodes in Hussein's relationship with his family, without distinguishing governmental propaganda and mythmaking from serious biographical literature.> As Post would have it, "Saddam has been consumed by dreams of glory since his earliest days" (1993: 268). That may very well be, but neither the nexus between Hussein's childhood and contemporary Iraqi policymaking nor the relevance of this link is firmly established. The Great Power Approach views Foreign Policy as a function of East-West conflict. It believes that the Foreign Policies of developing countries are seen as lacking autonomy;

affected by external stimuli; they reacted to initiatives and situations created by external forces. It is a state that is recognized as having the ability to exert its influence on a global scale. Great powers characteristically possess military and economic strength and diplomatic and soft power influence which may cause small powers to consider the opinions of great powers before taking actions of their own. International relations theorists have posited that great power status can be characterized into power capabilities, spatial aspects, and status dimensions. Sometimes the status of great powers is formally recognized in conferences such as the Congress of Vienna or an international structure such as the United Nations Security Council. The term "great power" was first used to represent the most important powers in Europe during the post-Napoleonic era. The "Great Powers" constituted the "Concert of Europe" and claimed the right to joint enforcement of the postwar treaties. The formalization of the division between small powers[8] and great powers came about with the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont in 1814. Since then, the international balance of power has shifted numerous times, most dramatically during World War I and World War II. While some nations are widely considered to be great powers, there is no definitive list of them. (Wikipedia,2002). Other important criteria throughout history are that great powers should have enough influence to be included in discussions of political and diplomatic questions of the day, and have influence on the final outcome and resolution. Historically, when major political questions were addressed, several great powers met to discuss them. Before the era of groups like the United Nations, participants of such meetings were not officially named, but were decided based on their great power status. These were conferences which settled important questions based on major historical events. This might mean deciding the political resolution of various geographical and nationalist claims following a major conflict, or other contexts. Derivative of realist political thinking, the great power approach was dominant during the Cold War and viewed the foreign policy of third world nations as a function of the bipolarity of the international system. The foreign dynamics of these countries, it was argued, could not be but reactive to external political and economic stimuli. The main criticism leveled against this school was that it neglected domestic factors. Other shortcomings were its focus on the East-West conflict rather than on relevant geostrategic interactions, as well as its neglect of internal variables. Moreover, the end of the Cold War and other changes in the international system during the 1990s render the explanatory power of this approach limited, if not obsolete. Reductionist/Model-Builders Approach views the foreign policies of developing nations as determined by the same processes and decisional calculi that shaped the foreign policies of developed countries. The reductionist, or model-building, approach explains the foreign policies of nations through the use of the same factors as those that affect developed nations. The variations in terms of resources and capabilities provide the framework for comparison. Postulating unchanging rational actor behaviors and similar foreign policy rationales, this approach fails in particular to account for institutional specificities and differing behavioral motivations. James Rosenau's (1969) linkage politics, an older foreign policy approach, is an example of this reductionism, which proved problematic when applied to the Arab world. An offshoot of his concept of a "penetrated" political system, linkage politics was defined as the recurrent sequences of behavior that originate on one side of the boundary between the two types of systems and that become linked to phenomena on the other side in the process of unfolding, [or) any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted

to in another. (Rosenau 1969: 45) The concept proved difficult to apply to Arab political systems. Indeed, as Eberhard Kienle (1990: 26-27) points out, the subtype of linkage processes actually depends on a dichotomy between internal and external politics, for no linkage would exist if the two systems were to coincide. But in Arab foreign policies the frontier between the domestic and the external (other Arab states) is razor-thin, pointing to an overarching Arab polity encompassing in various ways the several Arab states. In short, inasmuch as Arab states' foreign policy making processes are largely affected by the notion of the Arab region as a segmentary society, Rosenau's linkage politics concept-as an example of a model-building approach-loses much of its explanatory power. To determine the degree of overlap between internal and external Arab affairs, one need only look today and in the past at Syrian-Lebanese, Egyptian-Libyan, Saudi-Yemenese, Moroccan-Mauritanian, or JordanianPalestinian relations-all characterized by a high level of policy interdependence and multilayered interrelatedness.

3. Enumerate and explain the patterns and variations of the different foreign policies of the Philippines from the first up to the Present Philippine Republic by emphasizing their procedural, substantive and directional components. Since the date of independence, the Philippine Republic has concluded more than seventy treaties and agreements with various nations, has established several diplomatic missions and consular offices, and has participated in many international conferences. Like the present Vice President of the Philippines, the first Vice President, Mr. Elpidio Quirino, was designated to serve concurrently as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. After 1972 President Marcos assumed for himself all power, and the new constitution and the courts were used, often capriciously, to justify his acts. He exercised all executive and legislative powers without a National Assembly until 1978, and even after that he could override the legislature with his own decrees at will. The exercise of his unlimited power to make decrees became increasingly irregular, with secret decrees as well as public ones. Decisions lost legitimacy and became more difficult to implement, Not just foreign policy, but the entire decision-making process was poorly institutionalized. In the constitutionalist era a confidante of the President had noted that the Philippines did not have a truly professional foreign service (Corpuz, 1966: 64). He also pointed out that diplomats did not owe their primary loyalty to the foreign service, or even to the President, but to their Congressional patrons who secured the job. More than a decade later the President himself noted the need to further professionalize the service (Marcos, 1980: 213). However, there had been a shift in 1972 towards a greater role for the Department of Foreign Affairs, and for other bureaucratic agencies involved in the making of foreign economic policy, for instance, the Department of Finance, the Central Bank, the National Economic Development Authority or the Board of Investments. This was a consequence of both the emphasis on an increased role for technocrats (top bureaucrats with high

academic qualifications and no political backers besides the President) and of the absence of a legislature sharing in policy or patronage. Career diplomats felt that their influence had been enhanced in the first few years of martial law; even the First Couple usually accepted their advice on foreign affairs. But by the late 1970s power and wealth had so corrupted the top leaders that decisions were increasingly made on personal whims without rational analysis. The fact that the First Lady more often substituted for Mr Marcos as his illness worsened also helped explain the situation. The policy process lacked institutionalization in both essential respects. In the early decades of post-war Philippines, relations with the United States defined its foreign relations. The special RP-US relations were carried out in the most comprehensive manner realizable, covering political, economic, cultural and security aspects. Domestic realities at the time, specifically the emphasis on post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, meant that United States would play a significant role, since it emerged as the most powerful country following the Second World War. Still, most administrations recognized the importance of developing relations with neighbors that were just emerging from colonization, as well as with other countries where strategic interests could be pursued. Quirino thus kept an open mind about China, following Communist victory over the Nationalists. Marcos forged ties with PRC and Eastern European states in the light of the oil crisis, Communist insurgency, and the need for export markets. The Garcia Presidency affected the countrys international trade through its Filipino First Policy, while the older Macapagal chose to lift exchange and import controls as the country moved towards free markets; neither succeeded in securing stable growth or equitable distribution of wealth. Marcos and Ramos came into office with clear visions of what the Philippine state should be, helping to de-fine the directions of diplomacy. Marcos had his New Society, and tried to get significant aid and investments for this goal, while Ramos employed a comprehensive Economic Diplomacy agenda which was a significant component of his trade liberalization strategy. Corazon Aquino sought to help spread democratic ideals by forging relations with other democratic states. Solidum, writing in 1982, argued that Philippine foreign policy was trans-forming in major ways as a result of altered perceptions of international developments, particularly those affecting Southeast Asia. She asserted that the conduct of Philippine foreign policy was changing from one that was US-centered to one that was largely affected by Asia, signifying a maturity of our Philippine foreign policy. But while relations with our neighbors have indeed significantly improved, experts interviewed for the study indicated that the countrys ears still appear well-positioned nearest to Washington.

Philippine foreign policy in the early 1990s was broadly pro democratic and pro-Western in orientation. Philippine international prestige was at an all-time high when Marcos was overthrown. During the Aquino administration, the Philippines pursued active, nationalist policies aimed at promoting "genuine independence" and economic development. As a charter member of the United Nations, the Philippines participated in all its functional groups, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization; the World Health Organization; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. In addition, the Philippines has been a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Philippines was a founding member of the Asian Development Bank, which is headquartered in Manila. The current president, Aquino III, campaigned and won on a platform of good governance, promising to stamp out corruption perpetuated by the Arroyo government, which itself came to power on the crest of a popular movement against the corrupt and inept former president Estrada. The struggle for clean government remains a challenge, as public office is still seen by many as a stepping stone to the accumulation of private wealth. 4. From the different elements of foreign policy-making studies, what are the major factors common to all states in Southeast Asian region in designing their foreign policy frameworks? Explain substantively your answer. Foreign policy analysts, and even more so foreign policy decision-makers and implementers, have always had to confront the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy choices. There are various ways of explaining this interface between domestic politics and foreign affairs, with some emphasizing the role of interest groups (including lobbies, political parties, and opinion leaders) while others focus on leadership styles and cognitive patterns of primary decision-makers. There are also structural arguments about the nature of the state (strong state vs weak state), as well as a bureaucratic politics model looking at interactions among various subnational actors, particularly in the administrative machinery of the state. While there are indeed different explanations for foreign policy behavior, one can generalize by saying that the influence of domestic politics becomes apparent when foreign policy choices can be better explained causally by the nature or behaviour of the states political institutions, cultures, economic structures, or leadership goals rather than by any other explanation (Fearon, 1998). The liberal tradition in international relations argues that states foreign relations are in important part a function of their internal constitution. Democratic states are seen as more peaceful and more supportive of agendas like human rights. The recent third wave of democratisation in many post-colonial states begs the question as to whether

democratisation really does generate a more liberal foreign policy. Southeast Asia has witnessed this trend in the overthrow of Marcos in the Philippines, Suhartos New Order in Indonesia, military rule in Thailand and the ongoing reform as movement in Malaysia. Where successful, these struggles are often said to have created some of the most liberal states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) whose policies on issues like humanitarian intervention correspondingly differ from their less liberal partners. Indeed, the politico-economic fur ore accompanying the 1997-98Asian financial crisis was seen by some as a democratic moment that could open the door to participatory regionalism. Legislatures are now said to be playing a key role in shifting ASEAN foreign policies from a realist to liberal orientation. these coalitions and the states they are able to direct. One useful approach is historical sociologists analysis of the state as an amalgam of social, political, ideological and economic elements organised in a particular manner not so much a set of functions or a group of actors as an expression of power. Far from ever being autonomous from society, the state is very much of society, its official resum, as Marx put it, reflecting the interests and ideologies of dominant social forces. States do not stand apart from these forces but are constituted and directed by them. The contrast between the two approaches can be illustrated thusly: Southeast Asias dominant social forces are those nurtured by the regions authoritarian, developmentlist states during the Cold War: business classes dependent on past or current state patronage or access for their wealth and social power. Unlike in Western Europe, where the bourgeoisie developed liberal ideology and entered into alliances with peasants and workers to fight the restraints feudalism placed upon them, Southeast Asian bourgeoisies have been the historical beneficiary of authoritarian rule, which has created the political stability conducive to rapid economic growth by violently suppressing the lower orders. Political theorys tendency to generalize Western Europes experience and posit a relationship between capitalism and democracy is thus inapplicable here. Political legitimacy has instead turned on the delivery of development and rising living standards. The social forces calling for a more liberal-interventionist policy are weak enough before they are mediated at the regional level. Second, it reminds us of the dynamic nature of political struggle, which may not end with the institution of mere procedural democracy (which can simply enshrine oligarchic rule) but may move to demands for fuller, participatory democracy. The forces shaping this struggle, moreover, are constantly and dialectically evolving with the regions ongoing socio-economic development. The political contestation currently underway in Thailand and Malaysia are a reminder that although progressive forces face an uphill battle in Southeast Asia, they are battling, nonetheless. That said, although legislators are also using policy to help our respective countries in ensuring that the leaders will not behave like the Burmese junta, and to protect our good parliamentarians who have suffered through abuses by the ruling parties, there are strict limits to what can be achieved at the regional level. Their mobilisation around an

international issue, and the emphasis they place on developing mechanisms of communication and exchange within, among each other rather than on mobilising constituents domestically, both reflects and compounds their weakness on the terrain which matters most in domestic politics. 5. Given the external environment of the Southeast Asian countries, are their foreign policies really independent? Reason out your answer. Yes, because Southeast Asia isa region of diverse states and cultures that involves all the major powers in the Asia-Pacific in a multiplicity of strategic interests. It is thus a fluid arena, offering the potential of different strategic games, options, and uncertain outcomes, but without a significant crisis hotspot such as those in Northeast Asia. In this complex playing field, the key players have adopted strategies and policies departing from the dichotomies that many analysts predicted at the end of the Cold War. China and most Southeast Asian states have avoided committing to a specific strategic path. Instead, maximizing room for maneuver in expectation of changing distributions of power and influence in the region, Beijing has worked hard to dispel any fears of a Chinese threat. The challenge for Washington now is how to cope with such fluidity in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, all Southeast Asian states want to preserve their own autonomy and sovereignty. They hope that by engaging both major powers in different ways, they will be dominated by neither. Southeast Asian states value multilateral engagement because it helps them pursue this strategy. It means they can engage both China and America without ruffling the others feathers, and employ both in resolving thorny security issues like the South China Sea without stoking head-on tensions between them. Southeast Asian states have especially welcomed Americas strategic pivot towards the region because of its multilateral element. Like Australia, Southeast Asian states have benefitted immensely from the existing order. But with the exception of the North Vietnamese, guided by the almost metaphysical force and genius of Ho Chi Minh, the most experienced revolutionary leader in the region and at once the best-trained Communist and most ardent nationalist, the Southeast Asian revolutionary movements soon revealed an increasing ideological factionalism and a lack of cohesive leadership. There were charismatic men, such as the young Aung San in Burma, and highly educated and sophisticated Socialists such as Soetan Sjahrir in Indonesia, but they were passing figures on the historic stage. Except for Ho, there were no Titos, with whom he has often been justifiably compared, and no other Communist figures who had the qualities of leadership and organization of European leaders, even those who were Soviet puppets. The non-Communists, while often better schooled, were even less sure of themselves and of the direction they wanted the nationalist movements to take. It was thus no accident that the pattern of nationalist development was chaotic and violent at the outset, and erratic and frequently stultifying afterward, with the result that brilliant demagogues like

Indonesia's Sukarno, or colorless but crafty generals like Burma's Ne Win, took over their countries and ran their own revolutions, or counterrevolutions, which were autarchic and often became despotic. They can trade with China, and get lifted by the rising tide of its economic boom. They can also free ride on Americas implicit security guarantee, meaning they can get on with the job of development without having to worry about waging costly wars. This model has served the region well for a number of decades. So it is not surprising that across Southeast Asia, governments judge that their interests are best served by the maintenance of this status quo. They know that as small countries, they only have limited power to affect this. But they also know that an actively engaged America is a necessary prerequisite to achieving it. Southeast Asian countries, many of whom were under colonial rule until the middle of the twentieth century, value regional autonomy and their own sovereignty above all else. They believe that binding both major regional powers into both bilateral and ASEAN-led cooperation is an insurance policyinsurance against the possibility that Chinas rise turns out not to be peaceful, that the United States withdraws from the region into isolationism, or that either power can aggressively dominate the region. Southeast Asian states dont want China to be able to dominate the regionnor do they want to put themselves in a position where they are beholden or tied to the United States. They do not want to be dominated by any great power; instead, they tolerate Americas primacy because it has proven to be benign and welcome its pivot because it suits their own interests. Ultimately, Southeast Asian countries would like to preserve the status quo for as long as possible. They hope Americas re-engagement will help them achieve this. Like Australia, Southeast Asian states are facing a future where their biggest economic partner and their major security partner are not the same country, and in fact, may even become hostile to each other. Their strategies for dealing with this may be even more advanced than Australias. Australian National University Professor Hugh White prosperity, America the security provider who guards the peace. made headlines arguing that Canberra should convince the United States to allow But there are big questions about whether the rest of Asiaincluding Southeast Asiawould actually support this. China to play a larger strategic role in the region. What is most remarkable about Southeast Asias American embrace is its striking uniformity. both America and China, all Southeast Asian states welcome Americas renewed engagement in the region because they worry about what the future might look like as Chinas power grows. Southeast Asian states have long used a two-pronged strategy to manage regional security, engaging all major powersbut primarily the United States and Chinabilaterally, and enmeshing them in ASEAN-led multilateral cooperation. Ultimately, this is designed to ensure no one power dominates the region. Americas renewed focus on Southeast Asia is intended to reassure its friends and allies that they should sustain this effort. Southeast Asian statesespecially the larger, more strategically important maritime states welcome Americas pivot, not because it changes the status quo but because it helps preserve it. 6. What is the significance of studying the foreign relations of the Philippines (as exemplified by its different policies) in the course-Philippine studies? Explain exhaustively.

It is an important step in loving the Philippines and courage of the heroes that fought and died for us. Obviously, when we study the history of the Philippines, we will know its entire history as a country and as subject of colonization. We can also know how did the civilization began. We will know also, its struggle for independence, the heroic experiences that the Filipinos had done just to get their own independence against the colonizers who devoured the natural resources, and by studying the Philippine history, we will discover why this country is still suffering poverty in spite of its rich natural resources. We also need to study our history for us to trace up our own identity. Filipino nationalism, which is an important element of foreign policy, showed every sign of intensifying in the early 1990s. Diverse elements in Philippine society have been united in opposition to their common history of foreign subjugation, and this opposition often carried an anti-American undertone. Leftists have long held that Philippine history is a story of failed or betrayed revolutions, with native compradors selling out to foreign invaders. In the post-Marcos years, this thesis received wide acceptance across the political spectrum. The middle class was deeply disillusioned because five successive United States administrations had acquiesced to Marcos's dictatorship, and Filipino conservatives nursed grievances long held by the left. Through studying the foreign relation of the Philippines, we acquire information as to the purpose of Philippine Foreign Policy of the national interest in our dealings with foreign nations, regional organizations and international bodies. This has been done through its three longestablished pillars, namely: 1) promoting national security; 2) enhancing economic diplomacy; and 3) protecting the rights and welfare of Filipinos overseas. In terms of a practical work program, this must mean advancing under these three pillars the national development and good-government objectives of the administration of President Benigno S. Aquino III. Furthermore, in this modern age, Philippine Foreign Policy should be able to draw ideas and inputs from broad sectors of Philippine society. Not only must the Philippine Legislature provide its perspectives to the Executive Branch, but partners can also be embraced in the private sector, civil society, academia, media and the Filipino diaspora abroad. Foreign policies are extremely important to the us. Because we know informations about different countries fully recognized as the most powerful nation on earth and with that power comes definitive sense of responsibility. The main purpose of every countries foreign policy is to survive and stay strong in today's world. It is policy that provides a strong national security, keeps a good economy with other nations, and is a chance to provide influence on the world; but above all this is the desire for international peace. One of the main ways to conduct good foreign policy is that of diplomacy, where nations negotiate and compromise problems they might have in order to get along. By these diplomatic relations, countries can interact with one another and learn to work together for a better understanding of each other's nations. Every president uses diplomacy as part of his foreign policy. We will be examining the last term of the President administration and his perspective of foreign policies .