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A Curious Proof
A Curious Proof
A Curious Proof
is -p(^p . ~^p).
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
For the second half of the proof, we need the HBL conditions:
(i) if p , then p
(ii) (p q) (p q)
(iii) p (p)
These are standardly assumed to hold in the case in which the modal
operator is taken to be provability (Bew).
They also seem to hold for possible truth (^T) and knowability (^K),
given an appropriate interpretation of .
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
In other words, the proof we have just seen
can be used to show:
^-p(^Kp . ~^p)
^-p(Bew(p) . ~^p)
^-p(^Tp . ~^p)
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
The Structural Limits of Knowledge
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
Lets suppose for a moment that the HBL conditions hold for
knowability i.e., lets suppose, for a factive knowledge operator
K, that ^K satisfies:
(i) if p , then ^Kp
(ii) ^K(p q) (^Kp ^Kq)
(iii) ^Kp ^K^Kp
(Notice that (i) is just the knowability principle.)
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
Given this assumption (that the HBL conditions
hold), then by Lbs Theorem [1955], we know:
^K(^Kp p) ^Kp
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
It is worth pausing at this point to note that Gdels second
incompleteness theorem is an immediate consequence of Lbs
Theorem. This is easiest to see when the theorem is expressed as:
(p p) p
for if we express the inconsistency of a theory using
then consistency is representable as:
~
which is equivalent to:
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
In other words, with p = , Lbs Theorem says that the consistency
of the theory is provable only if the theory is inconsistent:
( )
which is of course just the second incompleteness theorem.
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
Similarly, in the case of knowability, if we use the symbol to
represent a contradiction or impossibility perhaps the proposition
expressed by ^-p(^Kp . ~^p) then the knowability of the
possibility of knowing an impossibility is representable as ^K and
the unknowability of the possibility of knowing an impossibility is
representable as ~^K, which is equivalent to ^K .
So, by Lbs Theorem, we have:
^K(^K ) ^K
And this tells us that either it is possible to know an impossibility, or
it is not possible to know that it is not possible to know an
impossibility.
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
So we now know that if the HBL conditions hold for knowability
in particular, if the knowability thesis expressed by condition (i)
holds then either it is possible to know a contradiction (knowledge
is inconsistent), or knowledge is incomplete.
In other words, either the knowability thesis doesnt hold, in which
case there are unknowable truths (knowledge is incomplete), or the
knowability thesis does hold, in which case knowledge is either
inconsistent or incomplete.
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
Those familiar with the family of Fitch-Church knowability paradox
may detect a whiff of the knowability paradox in this result.
The Fitch-Church result is a surprising refutation of the thesis that
all truths are knowable based on three assumptions: (1) knowledge is
factive, (2) knowledge distributes across conjunction, and (3) there is
at least one unknown truth.
It is easy to misinterpret the knowability paradox as a generalization
of Gdels first incompleteness theorem, which demonstrates that,
for any consistent, sufficiently strong theory T in the language of
arithmetic, there are truths unprovable in T. The problem with doing
this is that the Fitch-Church result rests on the existence of an
unknown truth, which is arguably a contingent fact.
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
The proofs we have just completed
free the Fitch-Church result from the
arguably contingent assumption of the
existence of an unknown truth.
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
Discussion
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
We now know, for any modal operator which satisfies the
HBL conditions, that:
^-p(p . ~^p)
and
( )
(i.e., either contradictions are -able, or the fact that
contradictions are not -able is not -able)
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
One way to understand the underlying tension between
consistency and completeness is as a symptom of a
cardinality mismatch.
A cardinality mismatch, that is, between the expressible and
therefore at most denumerably infinite number of -ables and
the non-denumerable number of potenial -ables that is
generated through the iteration of .
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
These thoughts raise a natural question:
What are we taking the
objects of knowledge (or belief) to be?
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
These thoughts raise a natural question:
What are we taking the
objects of knowledge (or belief) to be?
Do the results presuppose any limits on the
objects of knowledge or belief ?
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
These thoughts raise a natural question:
What are we taking the
objects of knowledge (or belief) to be?
Do the results presuppose any limits on the
objects of knowledge or belief ?
The quick answer to this is:
yes, the results presuppose that
the objects of knowledge or belief are expressible.
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
This presupposition enters the proof at
the point at which we diagonalized on the
objects of belief or knowledge.
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
Propositions are (on most accounts) mind-independent extra-
linguistic abstract entities. So how does diagonalization on
propositions work?
Well, briefly and without entering into the fray on propositions, lets
suppose that the objects of knowledge are propositions, and that a
proposition is knowable only if it is expressible. (Propositions which
are ineffable, inexpressible, or otherwise non-assertable and non-
communicable are not knowable, and therefore would not be
suitable candidates for objects of knowledge.)
We know how to diagonalize on sentences and formulae. So in
order to diagonalize on propositions, it suffices to come up with a
systematic method for mapping (via an injective function)
expressible propositions onto sentences.
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
Each proposition may in theory be expressed by many different
in fact, possibly infinitely many different sentences.
In other words, for sentences S
1
and S
2
such that S
1
= S
2 ,
given a
meaning relation M which takes sentences to propositions, it may
be the case that M(S
1
) = M(S
2
).
So we cant rely on an expression function to take propositions to
sentences.
We can, however, rely on an expression relation, Ex, which takes
propositions to equivalence classes of sentences:
Ex(p) = {S| S expresses p}
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
Heres the key: since each equivalence class is a set of sentences,
each of which has finite length, each equivalence class has a well-
ordering and can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the
natural numbers.
In particular, since each member of each equivalence class is a
sentence of finite length, it can be assigned a unique Gdel
number, call it g(S). We can then well-order the members of Ex(p)
by simply using the standard < relation on {g(S) | S e Ex(p)}.
And, once we have the well-ordering of Ex(p), we can uniquely
encode p by using the least element of the well-ordering.
Diagonalization then proceeds as usual (in this particular proof
using Currys paradox rather than the Liar).
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
One final note:
The result we have discussed does not assume that propositions are
the objects of knowledge, but it does assume that it makes sense
to assert that something is known or is knowable so at some level
it does assume that there are objects of knowledge. These
objects, however, are not restricted to potential truth-bearers such
as sentences or propositions. They could, for example, be some
entity or feature of a possible world that is either a truth maker or a
constituent of a truth maker.
In the case of objects viewed as truth makers in the actual world,
the knowledge could be knowledge by direct acquaintance, i.e.,
knowledge that involves an unmediated relation between the
subject and the truth maker.
Introduction - Proof of Possibility of Believing an Impossibility: Part 1, Part 2 - Structural Limits of Knowledge - Discussion
In other words, the result is not restricted to
knowledge that involves characterizing, representing,
or conceptualizing the objects of knowledge. It does,
however, assume that those objects are what I will call
discretely graspable, i.e., either finite or effectively finite
(expressible through a recursively or effectively
enumerable string of symbols, or in principle
observable via deterministic effects).
I am grateful to the participants in the
Yale spring 2008 works in progress seminar for helpful
comments and questions.
heidi.lockwood@yale.edu