Military Review

The Professional Honorable John O. Marsh Jr.

Secret.wy

Journal

of the US Armv

Published by
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
VF7LUMELXVNe AUGUST 1987 e N08

of the AmIy

Lieutenant General
Gerald T. Bartlett

Commandant, USACGSC

20NTENTS

2 The Forgotten Forces

by Lieutenant Colonel (P) John M VarIn. US Army

Major General
Gordon R. Sullivan

Deputy Commandant. USACGSC

1%

and Friction: Challenges Command and Control

il%g by Lmsterwm Colone/ Clayton R Newel/,

to

US Army

Military
Review Staff
LIeutenan!CaIonel Ph(ll#p ,Chlldress W Ed!tor m Ch!ef LxeulenantColonel Lynn Havach, Edmr L$eteanl Colore Thomas E Conrad, Managing Edior Mm PatncIa L WtIxm. Secretary
Associate

27 Clausewitz and the Concept of

Command Leadership

by Donald D Ch)pman

40 The Mnact of T&%

by Major Frad E D,erksme!er, US Army

Pmdction

Siafl Ms, Alme M McCart, Produc

tion Eddor; Mr D M G,angreco, Dwgn EoirY Mrs Kay L Sanders. Man.scr!pt!lndex EoItor, Mm Cynthia L Teare. Ma.wcr@Fd)lor(al Ass$stant. Mrs Seth V Hart. Books, Ed!mnal

48

.4Ss!srat
Feature% M< Ph$ll,pR Daws Books Ed, for Media Support Staff: Mr Amos W GaNaway Pmumg Offrcer, M( Cnarles A Martmson IN An and Des!gn, Mm Nancy Sktllln, Contracting Lsiin-American EdMons: Suan8h.American Edmon L!eulenam Colonel F Alhedo Caales, Ch,k?anArmy. SPmIrsh-Ae can Eddor, W Raul Aponte and Mrs A$xa L Dmz, Ecbfors. Mm Margaret M Ewe, Translaloc Mrs WwmnaE Shotde, Ea$tortal Assistant Braz$l!anEdltton Colonel Franms.cos c Pam plona, 8razAan Anmy, Combrned A,ms Cete$
L!aison Of flcerfLfd!tary Review Adwser. Mr

Viewgoint*
50 The .Commarrders Intent
Keen It Short

by Major Russell 54 W Glenn, US Army

Command, Control and the Commanders Intent

by Ma/or Edward J Fd{befl. US

Army

~~e;~~lication
by Major Dawd

of commanders
A. Fesfabend, US Army

69 Getting the Word to Willie and Joe

by Lieutenant US Army Colonel Laurence W Mazzeno,

AlmenspoS Lopes, Eddor. Mr Carlos M Chacon and Mrs Lore C Reza., Translators Ms Belva K Wdson. Eartonal Assfstanl AdminlstraNon: SlaN Serges! (P) Earnesl SteDhe. s., Adrmmstrabve NCO. Mrs E.mce E Overheld Mrs Merrmm L Clark and M,ss Donna rlme 1 DeLorezo, Subsc,ut!on$

83 Summaries 85 Letters 88 News 90 96

the best

from other journals

MR Advisory

Board: Colonel Orde N Butts

Assrstat Depufy Commandant, Cnatrman ColoAmrIs.3?0 I@ Crqhmn W Abram Jr. C4mLnneo

Book Reviews Bulletin Board .

~~~=x$fyg

.servmesstaff school C-310nel Howard OamelJr DeDatiment of Susla!nment .md Reswrcmg Colonel Leonard A Fore, School 10, Protess, onal Devefopmet, Colme! Lou,s D F Frasche Combar Srud)es lnsot.te, colonel Fr& L Reeves, AJMVResewe Adviser Colonel Gmrge K Hastings. AnnY Nabona! G.wd Aanser CoIo nel John R Iandry Cente, for Army Tacbcs Dr Trmothy K Nen]ger, JolI F worm?. Cha,r 01 Mirtiwy Htstow. Colonel Levos I Jeflnes, DIreclor. ate of Academrc Operat!om Colonel Leonard D Holder Jr SChoci of Advanced M,lrt,my S1U,PS Colonel .%chard H Taylor. Depanme.t of JoIn! and Combined Operahons, Colonel FredenCkW !,, ,,. ..,,!,,, s,, T$mmerman Center Ax Amv Leadershw Jr,
Operahons.

!,, ,,0

,s$.0,,84,.,

Sir Wi]]iam Slim said, one of the most valuable qualities of a ~~mmander is ~ flair @r putting himself in the right place at the vital time. Effective command and con trol, or Cl, systems and techniques must aid the commander In this endeavor, C: can mean many different things to different people. The term crops up in discussions on leadership, technology, tactics, communications, Intelligence and battle drills

Despite having devoted spemal Issues to C In November 1981 and November 1985, ,tfzlt~ary Rewew has certainly not exhausted the subject. Nor, ]n most cases, have the orwts found definitive answers to some of the questions raw.ed Therefore, because new equipment, new techn]qes and new lessons learned (or old Iessons relearned) continue to generate thought and discussion on C, .Udltary l?ecltewonce again focuses on C. From the wmtlngs of Clausewitz to the latest In 20th century technological de: velopments, our authors examine ariou~ factors that can affect the ablllty of ~ ~om. bat commander to malnta]n order and to make informed declslons In an Inherently chaotic s]tuatton made even worse by the fog and friction of war. Also, because many theor]sts bel]eve that C, requmes yet another C, for commumcat Ion, this Issue of l.frtt taw Reuzeu, includes articles on command Information and on commumcating tbe commanders intent

In the US Army, most people accept the Idea that an Informed soldler IS a motivated sold]er. Troops perform better when they understand why someone hss asked t hem to do sometbmg. Although little ewdence supports not keeping the troops informed, some methods of ]nform]ng soldlers seem to be more effective than others. Some ana lysts have hailed many of the elaborate informational products of World War H as command (Internal) information triumphs But were those efforts really as effectl~,e as they seemed> The article Gett]ng the Word to W}llle and Joe addresses this ques tion

Vlewpomts looks at commanders Intent. Perhaps never have thev]ews presented ]n this section been so divergent Who should wrote tbe Intent paragraph, what it should Include, when someone should wr]te It, where ]t should appear In the opera tions order and how long It should be are just some of the questions that our authors addressand disagree on Apparently, the Army needs to continue think]ng on and dlscuss)ng th]s subject. No matter bow good C:oreven C may support command decisions Therefore, status oftbecombat support and combat Resmw,e Components Although wlnnlng ble, this art]cle questions whether the combat units to conduct a second batt!e

be, w}nnlng also requires effect]~re Iog]stlcsto The Forgotten Forces exam]nes the current serwce support forces of the Active Army and the first battle of the next war maybe possi LJS Army WIII have the ablllty to susta]n Its

Comments, letters to the editor and articles that support or take exception to the thoughts presented are always welcome at lft[~tary Re~,ww. We encourage you, our readers, to use your journal as a forum for presenting your views Your Ideas may, af. ter all, help our Army deter war or, If necessary, ~vln on the future battlefield Share them

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Mllllmy

f?evlew, FUnStOn H* II, FOII LeWWIWWIII,

KS MCIZ7491O

= =

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annual US i%rqy Operations R@searoh symposium scheduled for 14 and 15 October at Fort We, Virginia. The symposium wUI bring
together rnflitay, am.dexrdc and induatria.1 experts in operation research to exchange information and experiences. Select8d papers and presentations solicited for the symposium will appear in a net of proceedings Send inquiries about the WMPOSiD to Dfrector, US &my Materfel @terns Anafyais Activfty, Am AMXSY DA, Aberdeen Prov?@ Groum% MD 21005 5071, o? calf Glenna IYngfe at ADIU?ON 29S-6576 or cornrnerefd (301) 276-6576 or Kathy Brooke at AUTOVON 29 E3051 or conunen%.f (301) 2753051. halyab? LighW@ will be the theme of the 26th the WE#

DC Anyone Navy Yard in Waahingtm, interested ~ preparing a papa about naval technolo.glcal developments, nfmaf-induatrid relationa, strate&y or other aapecta of naval Mat-my shoufd write to the AMI Conference Coordlnatar, Naval Hisbmfcal Center, Buffdmg 57, Washington Navy Yar& Wa.sM@cm, D C 20374. Seeking %u-wivel Stories Do you have a survival stmry-either military or citih.n-you would like to sham? The US A& For.3e SumiVal School is seeking people who have experienced a aurvival eplaode that the Air Force coufd uoe for training. If you axe lnterestad fn participating m the program, write to 3636 Cf?rvT/DOV, Fahchffd Ah Fome Baae, Waahingtcm 99011-6024, or calf ADTOVON 352-2371/2171 or commemfal (509) 247 2371/2171. Charter Members Scmght An Armrican museum that wfll commemorate the Battle of Normandy in World War 11 is now OfferhIg chart&r memberships The Battfe of Normandy Museum held its gmundbrealdng ceremonies lmt September and w schedtded for completion in June of next year. For more information on the museum and the membemhlpa write to the US Ccnnrnittae for the Battle of Norman@ Museum, Post Office Box 37603, WaafXngtcm, DC 20013.

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The BrazflimkPorh@e8e edition of Military Review has been searching for nearly two years for a translamr to round out its staff We need someone fluent in En@ah and Portuguese capable of translating the ldnds of tits.ry-relatei often technical articles carried in our journal TIME is a 0S-09 career civil service

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of Cadet Coremand-part of the US Arqy H@erve Offlcem Training C-arps (RLYfW) Cadet Cmnrnan drecently moved Porn its tempormy home at Fort Ber$amm Harrfson. Indiana, to Fort Monroe, Virfginia The school k responsible for trafning the men and women who teach BOTC students nationwide. Students at the school include newly assigned ROTC Cadet Cmnmand brfgade and batta.lfon co rnrnamders, as well es .99sk3tant professors of nM1.itary acienoe and senior noncommissioned Officers

fheSchool

A 3d lnlanuy Div)slon M1Otank destroyer southern France ,n August 1944

passes the Wrecked rema,ns o+ a German

convoy near Mon!el, mar after the mason

of

The At]ies conducted hvo mvasmns ut France m 19.!4. AIthough the British pushed fur ex panding the Italian operatwns, LS planners sup ported the Ouerlord landings in Normandy wth subsequent landings on the southwn coast O( France. Initially designated.-!rul the August m wsion of southern France was renamed Dra.goo77 because planners thou~ht the orlgmd name had been compromised. The AIhes used an elaborate deceptmn plan to disguise the objectives of the opemt{on. The Ger mans knew somethmg was up. but thought it would take place in [My. Allied efforts encour aged this behef. Radar countermeasures. multl ple dn,ersions, decoys, airhurne assaults with dummy parachutists and a Iast-mmute change m convoy direction were eftective. Ufide Geiman troops were on alert m Genoa. troops along the French Nviera awoke to massive naval and aenalo \

h{jmhm drnent {m 15 .\ugust 1W. Amphlhu MS awrult and m horw Imimgs placed more tlmn 90,(]()() men ashoje the tist day. By mghtfall 16 August, almust 151.(M)(Imen were m the hem+ hewf. J [S t~sk turce went tirst north to Qip ancf then west to Muntehmar, effectively trapping the ma]or Itt utGwman tortes m the area. This wtion exacted a terrible toll on tht German forces. Al thou$h most of the Gelmans eventually escaped, the Alhes took some 15.()()OGmmm prlwnws, and the fighhng destmywf.or captured about 4.000 vehicles and kdled thousands of horses and uncounted German sutdlers. B~28.krgust, French troops h~d captured Toulon and Narsedles ,mut taken more than 1;,000 ptlsoners. The nmt day. Allled troops started movm~ up the Rhtine valley and hnkwi up w,iththe lSThwd.Almyon l? September.

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.4

-*

The Forgotten Fbrces

Lieutenant Colonei (P) Jobq~,@~ US Army

.

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----

The Stooth-to.tnit mtio rrithijl tbv [ .S mr~tbus bwn o mutter of .i debatr batb ittside ortdwtsidc tbr.4 mt.q tiwsotlI1> titnc. .llwe ban.q for the buck has become n rcr[lqcvq. Tbc .4JWq bm fwmd new si:r of tbe force. wmhut uuits withwt incrc a.vinq the wcwrll 11hervdid thvsc comhot troops WIIIC from. crmt bow &Jeh tbc .-irIII,q support them ? tins tbc ratio pcmtul urn swrt)t,q too far? This nuthw thinks it frrrsand rwims u uwwitz.q fiw tb c frft ((w.

Iogistlc forcw IS that of the theater com HE US Armys thin IIne of lo~tstlc mander> In chief fCINCs) charged with the forces behind Its combat dlvislons has dally re~llty of being prepared to use those been the topic of much discussion but llmloglst~cs force. Ited act]on wlthm the [department of De to f]ght a war General Bernard Roger>, All]ed fense (DOD) for several years Desp,te cun former Supreme Commander, Europe and US Army Chlefof tlnulng protests from the field aver moJor Staff. told the LIS Senate Armed St>rvlces shortfalls In these unglamorous hut crit1c31 (?ommlttee In December 1985 that wedont forces that provide lifeblood to our major have sufficient combat service support tightlng units, the problems persist Our forces to support our forward deployed protracted fa]lure to prov]de these forces forces In Europe. He has reemphasized hl~ stems from three fundamental tl~ws un evaluation several times since, and Nlar]ne clear respons]billty for soivlng the prub(hneral George B. Crist, the commander of Iems, the way we plan and a general I.ick of our rapid response forces for the Lflddle understanding of Iog]stlca. The result has East. echoed been an extended period of now institution hls views in hlarch 1986 test] mon> to ConWess Commanders of other um alized neglect that we cannot quickly fix tled commands and many of the Armys field Unwlll]ngness to admit shortcomings and commanders are concerned about the low to sollc]t broad governmental support for read]ness and Inadequate number of nondivl overcoming them could ha~,e tragic conse smnal Iogpstlc support umts needed ]mmedl quences on the next battlefield If our tanks ately to be~n fighting a war and helicopters ha~,e no ammunltlon, no Former Assistant Secretary of Defense fuel and no spare parts James \$ebb, who until Apr]l 1987 oversaw The most important evaluation of Army

August 1987

* MILITARY REVIEW

J
.

DOD* Reser\,e Components, upon which the Army depends for more than 70 percent of Its Ioglstlc support forces, has slm]lar

Historicoi DOD data sborr [ thel dispt-opor-tioaate growth of combat bat talions aad dicisions siace 1962 as tbe ..hays total maapouer (attire, rewrce and cici[iatt J declined fol~otcirw the Iietnam conflict and reataiaed sigaif icaat[!y below prewar lecels.

~,iews He hassald that plming morecomfmt troops In Europe In the last decade has caused such a force structure dislocation that combat units now do not have sufficient Ioglst]c umts to sustain them In a con\, entlonal \var. lie belleves that our ta]l-to.tooth Imbalance has caused operat]cmal paraly SIS. forced down the throat of the command-

ing general who would be requtred to Iizht a European \var The widespread deflclencles run the gamut from an Inadequate number of sup port units to major $mblerns In manning, equlpp}ng and tralnln~ both active and reserve units These deficiencies result from not plac!ng sufficient prmrlty on the support forcm \ve need most. One {ndlcatlon of where the prlorlty has gone M the marked Increase in combat un]ts during the past quarter century when available manpower was actually shrlnklng Iltstorlcai DOD data show this du+propor tlrmate growth ofcomhat battalions and di vTslons slnre 196? as the Armys total manpoiver(actlve, reserve and clv]l]an )decllned followlng the \letnam cohfllct and re. malned s]gn]ticantly below prewar levels. Currently, we have 367 maneuver battal ions }n theact]ve Army, asmanyas m 1968 at the peak of the \letnam confllct-142 more maneuver battalions than In 1962

MILITARY REVICW * August 1987

fic control, medical support, construction and selected other adrmnlstrative and tech mcal service functions, such as graves reg]s trat]on. decontam]natlon, laundrybath M..,.,wo ser~,lce or c]vl 1affairs support. People sOme MC Rc C$vl mans.,., tlmes refer to them as the Tactical Support 8..8,,., ,000 s, mc. SC, Increment (TSI t of t he Army force structure. 4003 .400 MANEUVER Some Iog]st]c units are also Integral to d]w. sions, but the Armys Iogzst]c force problems are nut ]n divisions . 300 Skept]cs may wmnder, howe~rer, why, If the problems are so serious, more has not 300 r been done to solve them. The reasons have .-/ i, evolved over the past 25 years through a x, MANPOWER 2000 . 200 -... p,.-- complex series of events ranging from con gressional tinkering w]th meaningless tooth-to-tall ratios In the mld-1970s to sup , 000 port force reductions ]nltlated by over-zeal . ,00 ouscnt]cs w!thln the Pentagon who equated combat capab]llty to the number of tanks they could count V1e\ved alone, these events may not raise undue concern But pieced together. they form the dlscomfort jng mosaic facing cINCS when they try to hut we have nearly a quarter of a m!lllon build real{stlc conventional war plans and fewer .oldlers on active duty. try to avoid unnect+sary risk of nuclear es DOfJ manning statlsttcs cunflrm the calation The]r combined effect has been a trend \V1thln a near-constant active end piecemeal dtsmantllng of our techn]cal sup >trength slnct, 1974, act]ve combat units ac tu~lly Increased manmng by about 80,000 port capability, for which no s]ngle person was responsible soldlers. mostly at the expense ufactive sup Today, no single person M yet responsible for correcting }t eltber. port units, wh]ch decreased by nearly Re>ponslblllty for ~upport forces began to .10,000 soldlers The trend doesnt change cloud In the late 1950s when the Army, folmuch by add]ng reser~res According to Imvlng ]t~ experiment ~v]th the pentomic dl Army data, nlneofevery ten soldlers the Ar \,ls]on and presaging z f) OL).wide trend, be my added to Its tactical forces since 1974 gan to rearrange support at dlv}>]on level \vere asst Rned to combat untts The Iog],t]c forces in Jeopardy are nonalong functional Instead of branch Ilnes This change culm]rmted In approval III 1961 d]vl>lonal combat service support ICSSI of the ROAD lKeorganlzatlon objectIves fin ces that provide corps, army and theater Armj D]vu+ton ]concept support They do not Include peacetime base Befare ROAD, units of tbe Techn]cal operatlnns organizations that people someServ]ce~ m a d]vlslon had a clear relation t]mes confuse with the units responsible for sblp with their parent branch They worked In-theater tacttcal supper t in wartime The under technical supervls]on a term loose ~vtirtlmc tactical Ioglst]c units that are In trouble perform the primary functions of ly Interpreted to mean absolute controlof the sen]ar Techn]cal Serwce officer in the supply, maintenance, transport:ltl on, traf

August 1987

MILITARY REVIEW

,.

dlwsion as part of stovepipe organlzat]ons s}de the Technical Serwces. Techmcal Serv under overall control of chiefs of Techn}cal ices could no longer by-pass the General Services In Washington Quartermaster Staff. units, for example, were the responsibility On the rither hand, loss of Technical Serv. of the Quartermaster C,eneral. Ice chzefs removed the primary spokesmen In the new ROAD dlv}slon, Techntcal for Army support forces from semor c]rcles Serwce units lost branch Ident]ty as techni of po!ver In }Vash]ngton No longer dld the cal funct]ons merged. The Army consoli dated quartermaster units,, for example, with maintenance, transportation and oth er units and made them part of new d]v]slon la the aeu ItO.4D ffirisiou, support commands commanded by officers Technical .%wice units lost branch wth no direct affiliation \v]th Technical ideatity ns tech nicrd functions mewed. Services, Th]s reorgan]zatlon was the first The .41-azg consolidated quurfcr= In a ser]es that ruptured hlstorlcal, trad{. master utzits, for example, with amin tlonal assoc!atlon of units and personnel tenancc, tmasportation aad other units from tbelr parent Technical Service. During and made tlzent part of new dicision that same year. DOD created the g]ant support comntaads commaaded b.v agencies: Defense Supply Agency. Defense officers with ao direct affiliation Intelligence Agency. Defense Communlca Tecftnical Set-rices. rcith tlons Agency and so forth. They also al}gned functionally. absorbing selected duties and much manpower from the Technical Serv. senior Quartermaster officer, for example, Ices But the defense gmnt> focused .- as prckvde concepts and doctrine for QuArter they still dkon single-manager, commodi ty management of hardware rather than on nmater Corp* operations and develop and defend needs for manpo\ver. money and integration of hardw, are with personnel. units hu longer was he even In Washin traimng and doctrine gton And no longer dld he or otber Technical In addltlon, the vast majority of empk? Service chiefs have eas} access to the Armv ees of the new defense agencies were clv IlSecretariat and a~ Ians Thus, fam}llar]ty with and under senior declslon-makers tkct]ng the Al mys future standing of Army tactical support units that Ellmlnatlon of Chwf~ of Technical Serv had charactemzed Technical Serwces dlsap. ices and reorganlzatwn along functional peared. And the moves to functlmml]z~ both lines accelert~ted the demise of the Techn] above Army level and wlth]n the Army thus cal Services. completed orphaning of Army left Technical Services with no clear link to support umts and blurred responsibility for their D( )1) support counterparts or, tit the their adequacy Prm,lously, the Technical operating end, wtth the dlwslon Sem,lce chiefs had been responsible for two Then, m 196, came the p]votal dec]slon main tasks. providing branch un{ts to oper toel]mlnate Technical Serwcechlefs as part ate under Interbranch commands and of Army reorganization That dec]slon cul branch staff sections to superv]se tbelroper minated an effort to reduce the power of and at]ons; andcommand]ng directly the brancb to tr]m the fat from Technical Services, support base for the entire Army. such as whose authority and relatweautonomy had schools, base maintenance shops. depots caused Army-wide resentment since \i70rld and procurement organizations. War 11 From the perspective of those out-

MILITARY REVIEW

Augus! 1987

Prepostkxu?d armor at Ka!serslauteco, Germany. REFORGER

/(/, 1971

.5

With Tcchaical Services oat of decisioo atakia.q, no oae had the requisite coazbiaatioa of interest, wlderstaaditt,q aad in ffwace to restrain the headloag rash ia tfte 1970s to fzearg tf2e force to atatcfi Societ con cca tioaal iotprowazents. Sfrort-sightrd de feasc aaaf.qsts inteat oa coaatiw tfll$~s aadpfa.viw lattol?-!i~e zcar .qaazes of attritioa used tfw amorpft ous alass of sapport as fair .qaaw to provide udditioaal ataapoaw spaces for am taak battalions. . . . . . L.

After 1962, the ml~slon focu> \vas gone,. and ti hiatus In responslblllty fur branch units and doctrine occurred. os dlimantltng of the Technical Semvces be~an [n a serrse. technical branches became nearl} irrele. i,a.nt, as units formerly performing hrancll related technical mlsslnns merged Into n~,w units ~v]th out b! anch names Under tbe ntw system, the entire personnel management structure fortechn ical spec{alt les~va. left In a quandary Altbougb clearly infantry and armor officer~ would command Inf;mtry and armor un{ts, for example. wh]eh branch would pl ovide the cummander of a support command or a forward support battallon The Arm} IS still Krapplmg for ways to compensate For tbls d]sruptlon of long estal~Ilshed pattern~ of support brancb missions uctlvltles and fuactlotrs }V]th the pnnclpal loglstlc spokesmen SE Ienced and responslbll]ty for loglst{c units fragmented, the subsequent Increase In combat forces at tbe expense of support became almost Inevltablc. Such a trend appealed to all the major Washlngtoa constltuenc]es. none of whom bad a vested interest In the adequacy of company-size support un&, from the Tecbnlcal Serwces. Army

(hlefsofStaff, selected from the ranks of the combat ~rms and unschooled ]n technical br.inch opm.it iuns, natul allj ivanted more combdt unit+ SO dld pultt] clans, ~vho prefer. red not small lo~]st]c units but large actlve duty comtmt dlvl~lonstbat would stimulate ]OLJ} eronnm![,s and b] in: addlt]onal jobs permunenlli to their dlstrlrts \VIth Techn]ca] ServictLs nut of dec)~lon mah]tlg. no one bad tht, requls]te comb] na tl,]n of ]ntermt, unde].tandlnx and lrlflu ence {o rt,fitrala the headlons rush In tbe 1970s to het]~> the fnrce to match Sowet convent inn~] tnlprovements Short-~]gbted defeaw t+naly~t, Intent on count]ng tanks and playlag Pattan-llke ~var games ofattrl tlon uwd the amol pbnus mass of suppnrt as futr ~amc to provide additional manpower >PJCCS for new tank battalions that Lan chestrlan attrlt]on models told them the Arm} needed to tight In Europe Wnh analy ,Is based more on emotamr th,m fact and wltb troth feet planted firmly In the stratosphere, the Pentagon and (an~essjomtly painted the CINC> Into the corner they nmv occupy, They pushed lo@tc forcw Into the Reserve Components, usjng the gwlse of the Total Force Concepf as a polttlcaliy popular sIO

August 1987

. MILITARY REVIEW

gan to hide lack of total force analysls They wvngs. combat dlv]slons and aircraft carr] ren)o~,ed literally hundreds of loglstlc mls the Army d]d not know the ers. For example, stemsand capabillt]es from active farces. lo~lst]cal effect of adding two new Ilght mAccording to Webb. this mo~,e made the infantry d]vlsions to Its actl~e structure until Army depend on Reserves for logi~tic sup nearly a year after it announced Its declslon port ofay sizable regional confllct Conse the time. the Ioglstms com to add them At quently, support of the Actl>,e Army 1s now, mumties In OSfl and OJCS wewed loglstlcs designed basically to handle only peacetime as deallng with materiel. not forces. Force workloads ~vh]le relylng heavily even ]n structure commultles looked only at corn. peacetime on contractors. civilians and bat force structure and considered Iog]stlc manageable maintenance backlogs furce structure a matter ior Ioglsttclans No F]nally, In the late 1970s and 1980s, budgetary pressures, the Strategic Defense Inltlative and the $30()-ship Navy left the .Vo element in either the office Army unable to achieve lts ambltmus plans of the Sect-etar.y ofl)efense (OSD) or in to rely on Reserves under tbe Total Force the Office of concept and resulted ]n the effective remov tke Joist C/i iefis of Staff ((),Jcs) has clear responsibility for ea al of a large number of support umts from su ring tftat the force by simply not forming needed addi forces zce bui[d are supportable. tional support units. Thlsportlon of the for .4s a resuit,, no one rriti cal[y examines our Io.qistic force gotten forces now exists only on paper needs before making key dicision,v to through a umque accounting mechanism boild air uin.qs, combat dicisioas called COJIPO tthe unresourced compo aad aircraft carriers. nent of the force There the paper tall lan guishes, u Itb neither people nor equipment and with an American publ]c and (ongre>s unaware of the potentl.sl dangers posed by one lvanted to evaluate below. the.llne srrp what be]levers ]n the status quo simply call port forces By the t Ime the effect of thedecl s]on became apparent. It was too late to re an ticceptable Increased risk. It remains verse a politically popular but potentially much easier to Join the steady drumbeat of disastrous choice outdated crit]clsm ahmrt fat In the Armys support tall than to address the problem and Planning suggest that phantom urrlts have placed us, as Wehh says, In danger of havtng a force Sermus flaws In the DOD plannlng sy* tem are the secondary fundamental reason st~ ucture that 1s not e~,en ah sustainable as for persistent problems In Army tact]cal the beans, bullets and bandages that we support forces Theplannlng flaws had their hi~ve In place to support ]t roots m changes that began in 1962. when The question ofjust which oftice IS respon. Robert McNamara. then Secretary of f)e slble for support forces remains unanswer fense, Instituted the complex Plannlng, Pro ed No element in either the OffIce of the gramming and Budgeting System. Instead Secretary of Defense (OSDJ or m the Office of a s]ngle coordinated system, DOD oper of the Joint Ch]efs of Staff ~OJCS] has clear ates three Independent systems: one for responslbihty for ensuring that forces we strategic planning, one for constructlngwar build are supportable As a result. no one plans and one for resource planmng. In the critically examlnw our Iog]st]c force needs ory. the systems mesh. In practlc~.bokvek,er, before makln~ key dec]s]on> to build alr

MILITARY REVIEW

August 1987

they are nearly mutually excluslve and cre Operations called the Joint Planning Sys tem [JOPS) Under that system, CINCS ate serious disconnects because no unifying hu]ld realistic plans based on what the thread integrates different views of the planners. Each plannlng system focuses on OJCS has told them IS available. Only then a different set of problems at a different do they evaluate what they can do w]th ex pected assets and therefore know what they point. The strategic planners m the OJCS use need most. One might expect that their knowledge of todays shortfalls would then the Joint Strategic Planmng System, and they focus about ten years Into the future. become tbe foundation for what DOD buys ]n the future to ehmlnatecapabll]ty deficits. Instead, because of a fear of compromise ,of war plan details, this information I]es fat. Lacking useful OJCS adcice low 1n the Joint Staff. protected by a shop about what needs to be fixed, OSD must worn admm]stratlve regulation known as use an artificial means to establish NfOP39. Llany oK1cers have not even read phmning andprograrrrraing priorities th]sdocument, but they often c]te 1t as an ex for services. This artificial scenario, cuse to avo]d penetrating external analysis knowt as the Defense Guidance IIlns or to a~~old dlvulgmg to OSI) what needs to tratiue Planning Scenario, assumes atz
be fixed extremely important role, because it
The OSD M responsible for operating the then becomes the means by ulzich
third system, the PPBS resource plann]ng (MD and the sercices estiruate require and allocation process But because the only nlen ts and pro.qrarn dollars.
tnformatmn about strategy, forces and prl orlt]es that OSLI rece]ves from the OJCS as a basis for planning M the unreal lstlc, un constrained view of strategy developed by They base their plannlng on a Panglosslan the strategic planners, OSD has no realistic vlslrm of the future unconstrained by reali basin fm-cfeveloplng a menu ofl e~ource allo tyguided hy what they would like to have cation chmces ln an ideal world to protect nat}onal secu Lacking useful OJ(S adv]ce about what rvty, w]th full kno~vl edge that the forces are needs to be fixed, OSD must use an artlficlal unaffo~d able. But they ignore Ioglstlc forces mean+ to establish planning and pmgram in their strategic plann]ng, forgetting that m]ng prlmvtles for services. This artificial Iog}stlcs M the true llm]tat]on on a reallstlc scenario, known as the Defense C,uldance strategy. The OJCS strategic planners con. Illustrative Plannlng Scenario, assumes an centrate instead only on major above-theextremely Important role, because it then Iine forces [divlsmns, w]ngs, earner task becomes the means by which OSD and the fhrce groups) By excluding an evaluatwn of services estimate requirements and pro supportabll]ty of the force, they build flaws gram dollars But the single artificial global Into our strategic planning that resemble scenario and lts related force plann]ng pro management plans to bu]ld a football team jections ten years by focusing only drr the quarterback and re into the future are essen t]a}ly the same used by OJCSstrateglcplan ceivers and lgnorlrrg the offensive hne and ners and are very different from theater blocking back. un]que scenar,os CINCS and OJCS Those who bulid war plans and who know operational planners use to build war plans. best what our most pressing war-fighting Thus, we have no common basis for reconcil needs are, hwvever, use a different system.

August 1987

MILITARYREVIEW

lng dlfferlng estimates of need. By assum Jawbone and. hence, IIttle con~,entional de ing st~pllstlcally and incorrectly that, lf we terrent credlblllty The additional d]v]slons can handle one large war, we are capable of carved Iiam a shrlnk]ng force since 1962 at responding to more than one (or even one) the expense of support units may have re placrxJa hollow lesser included wars, the artltic]al (X5D sce Army wltb a bellow de terrence nario simply adds to plannlng confusion. The prlnc]pal effect ofuslng an umrchlev. Understanding able scenario and set of assumptions ln both A general lack of understanding of logis. strategic and resource plannlng IS that it tics IS also responsible for failure to prowde gives the s,erv]ces latitude to plan and fund the forces the CINCS need. Todays leaders any progr~ms they choose and still remam w]th]n broad OSf) planning and program lessons ln tbe words of Gen. may find some eral Omar Bradley descrlb]ng General ming ~uldel]nes regardless of the real effect George Patton as one who was oddly indif on ]ndl~,ldual CINC theater ~var plans ferent to problems of supply and who, Thus, the Army can add more dlvlsions in though a skilled tactic] an, had Trttle pa stead of support forces and clalm that it M tience and shunted supply brusquely aside getting closer to an unachievable goal. and as too unworthy a deta]l to mer]t hrs atten who could argue against that? tion. The po]nt IS not so much that Patton The operational result is that CINCS now dld not appreciate logistics as ]t is that we have the consequences of 25 years of myopia may need more Bradleys ln our senior ranks ln force building. an Army w}th teeth but no

,.
MILITARY REVIEW

August 19S7

who are wd ling to acknowledge and take dents of warfare should evaluate carefully. Our experiences in the four major conflicts action when needed on details of logw,tlcs of this century. for example. prowde three Most semor ofilcers are neither schooled general lessons. nor experienced ln theater Ioglstlcs. In 1986, for example, of 11 Army four-star genfour conflicts, ~ve underesti First, m all mated ]n peacetime planmng the amount of erals on acti~,e duty, all had served ln dlv] wartime support our forces would need. In World War 1.12 of42 LJS dl~w.ions deployed to Europe had to convert to support func .Wost senior ot7icers are neither t]ons because the War Department had pro schooled nor experienced in theater vided ]nsufflclent suppor$ to keep divisions logistics. In 1986, for example, of 11 in action. In World War 11, the number of Army four-star genera[s on actice dutg, dlwslons planned continually shrank from all had serued in divisions. But oalg 114 ]n 1942to 1001n 1943 t0901n 1944, and one had ever served in a aondiuisional nond]wsmnal combat umts decreased corre logistical unit. spondingly for s]mllar reasons. During the Korean contllct, shortage of support forces, particularly truck compames, again ham pered progress of combat forces Even more sions. But only one had ever ser~,ed ln a non. damag]ng wasourfailure to provldetralned divisional logistical umt, although support US supervisory support personnel conver un]ts make up nearly half of the Armys sant ln Korean and Japanese who could co wartime forces Only five generals had had a log]stlcs assignment of any type, and none ordinate host nat]on assistance , Vietnam reflected the same problems, pamlcularly ln had been assigned to advise the Reserves base development In all four cases, the first that provide most Army support forces key logistic le~son M that we have a consist Wlth the World War 11generation and near ent history of underestimating wartime loly all Korean War senior officers now gone g]stlc needs from active duty. we slmpIy do not have any The second and officers who ha~,e experienced theater logls corollary major lesson IS that, because of a propensity to underesti tlcal operations in an unstable, hostile base mate support needs, \ve ha~~e had inade en>,lrOnment. quate support force structure m existence at The lack ofemphasls on theater Iogistlcs the beglnn]ng of each con flict. Fortu at staff and war co] Ieges reflects this lack of nately, the pace ofprevlcms wars and advan 10g@lcs experience among senior officers tages ofa reasonably secure homeland and Although few Army offhrs WII1 ever be ]n lines of communication allowed time to volked ln tactical maneuvers of comb~t forces, the curriculum ]n these schools deals overcome these deficlencles We will, how. ever, hardly have the luxury of long warmmostly with handling combat forces War UP periods to correct planning m}stakes In games usually note logistic force cOn preparing for future conventional cOnfllct stramts but assume them away so they do Third, tactical support needed ln each not interfere with maneuver 20th century war has progressively tn. Army schools also give Iog]st]cal lessons creased for many reasons. The most appar of history short shrift while tactical lessons ent reason M support of major battles receive a great deal ofatten a ~rastly Increased tlon US h]story prowdes some key lessons workload on log@lc un]ts As forces became more technologically oriented, they needed about the effects of logistics that serious stu ?

10

August 1987

* MILITARV REVIEW

it

Backlogged milltay suppl!es al Pusan. Korea, 9 August 1950

During the Korean conflict, shortage ofsupport forces, particularly true) k companies, again hamperedprogress of combat forces. Ecen more damagin,q was our failure fo prouide tvaiued US supervisory support personnel conversant in Korean and Japanese who could coordinate host nation assistance. Vietnam reflected the same problems, particularly in base derelopntent.

Tra]n]ng an a~,]onlcs mechanic for a Blackmore supply, malntenmrce and transport. hawk helicopter, for example, takes about tlon for weapons and equipment that were 35 weeks In bigger, heavier. more complex and more nu the past, several weeks of tramlng were adequate for young so)d]ers merous and for forces that had to move more with mechanical sklllsalready learned from quickly over greater distances. Ten times as repalr]ng their own cars We now must sup many ~.ehlcles per mari were m theater ln plement these skills !vlth add]t]onal trainVietnam as in Europe 1n World War I We In.g on black boxes and the mysteries of com have transitloned from supporting horses puter technology using hay appropriated from nearby fields And although Army emphas}s on compo to supporting increasln~ly complex tanks nent replacement rather than component and helicopters with gargantuan appetites repair has probably slmpl]fled work for for fuel, ammun]tlon and spare parts. An maintenance personnel In divisions [al hll Abrams tank, for example, consumes ready staffed at three times as much fuel ln European com 100 percent 1, the price for speedier lnltlal return to operation ofweap bat conditmns as an Nf60A 1 Shifting exon systems In forward areas may well be in Istlng large stocks of older equipment to the creased workload 1n rear areaswhere Reserves rather than replacing them has ln Army loglstlc units are weakest. The fix creased the number of tanks and other new forward doctrine, while appeallng to divl. equipment that need support slon commanders because !t pushes work The complexity of supplying and ma]n out of dlwslons, may not be able to prowde talnlrrg the Armys b]g. new high-tech them the respons~ve refills they need In equ~pment means that we need mm-e highly deed, despite recent emphasis on rel]ab]llty skilled soldiers who take longer to tram

MILITARY REVIEW

. .4ugusl 1987

11

Into a h]gher demand on our support units, although the Army has llttle Idea how much, because It accepted the new doctrine without evaluating the Iog]st]c effects. At the same time, defense commitments have expanded mtu areas that w,i11Increase the need for Iogwtlc force structure. In Eu rope. US forces have long counted on signifi cant local support from th.i hlghlydeveloped economy But &fiddle Eastern deserts and tropical zwglons of Central America, for ex ample, have few If any Ioglstlc bases or llnes of communication for potential local sup port L)esp]te how simple these trends and log)stic lessons seem. the majority of the US oflicercorps bas not absorbed them. Our re cent experience In Grenadaa reasonably simple loglstlc taskprovided a small fore taste of what !ve could expect If the Army The complexity of supplyin.q had to provide logistical support on a large and nlaintaininq the .&mys bi.q, nea scale ]n a hostile environment The OJCS lo higk-teck equipment means tf~at zre aced more Izi,qh[.y skilled soldiers uh o glstlc planners d[d not even know about the Grenada operation until after It had begun. fake lortger to train. . . . In the past, Planning also omitted graves registration seueval zeeeks of traiain.q were ade qzfate for young soldiers with nzcchani personnel Teams to order resupply items could not communicate with the continental cal skills already learned from repairing Un]ted States ICONL%) sources of supply tkeir ouvz cars. We nom must supplebec:luse they bad Inadequate cqnmurilca men t these skills. . . f tlons equipment. Ratmns shipped to the is U land to feed US soldlers \vent to feed prls onm-s Fortunately, oursold]ers were able to appropriate enemy trucks and borrow need. and malntalnabll]ty, it could }vell be that ed food. water and fuel the net Ioglstlc workload has st]ll Increased But d]d tve need Grenada to sound a warn and that the rearrangement kms simply ing when studies of Army Iog]stic forces placed the burden on units least capable of over tbe past ten years bad provided in shouldering It, creasingly ornlnous Ind]catlons of inad The Army also must no~v keep a larger equate prwrlty to Ioglstlc forces? The pros number and wider variety of repau parts pects for change are uncerta]n. L)esplte the and components on band and transport fact that many both In them over greater dw,tances [t uses, for exsenior pollcymakers and out of uniform oppose the direction the ample, 20 percent more line Items now than Army has charted, many officers belleve the In 1970. Even AlrLand Battle doctrine sig Army M committed to current structure and nals the need for more Ioglstlc support, be priorities regardless of consequences for the cause it Includes more maneuver over rest oft he force greater d]stances, Tbls Increase translates

12

August 1987

MILITARY REVIEW

Proponents of current Army structure s]ons were inappropriate fm low.intenwty and plans beheve that only combat forces conflict and that any attempt to use them deter, They argue that the Soviets are im would invite m]l]tary disaster. He also said pressed primarily by large numbers ofd!~r] that he would rather ha~,e four more engl slons, and they discount estimates of Soviet neerbattallons than four light divmionsand soph@lcatlon in evaluating our total force that the Army needed combat serwce sup capability, Including our support weaknessurgently than shooters port far more I es. They also seem to discount the poss]blli justification An additional often heard In ty that Sowet awareness of our Iog]stlc defense of the status quo is tliat solutlons weaknesses may be a pr]ncipal reason for will come in the Five-Year Defense Flan suspected Sowet war plans to outflank US through a series of new Inltiatlves IF we forces ]n Germany, get to the rear quickly just wa]t long enough. But soiutlons to sup. and cut off our dlvlslons from their tenuous port problemsif, Indeed. such solutions Ilnes of communication The argument for a large number of div] slons as a deterrent also seems to anticipate OJCS logistic planners did not a short coni,ent]onal war In Europe, where ez~en tiuou~ about the Grenada operatiou extensive Imes of commun]catlon for SLIS. until after it ta]ned combat would, of course, not be nechad be.qau. Planniuq also omitted graces registration persounel. essary. Such reasomng IS both shallow and Teams to order resupply itetus could dangerous It relegates US soldlers to a not communicate u,ith the continental trlpwlre role and inv]tes rellance on early [nited States (CO.VLS) sources of escalation, If we are not golngtoplan on sus supply because they had inadequate tained conventional combat, we do not need conztuunications eqaipmen t. . . . large numbers of trlpwlre dlvlslons Fortunately, Another argument M that the Army, be our soldiers were able to appropriate ett etuy tracks and borrow cause It must prepare for a broad spectrum needed food, u,ater and fuel. of confllct, has designed a balanced force that prowdes some capab]llty against all posslbll]tles. If one measures balance by an equal number of Ilght and heavy forces, that idea may be true. About half of DODS land forces are light and half are hea~y. If, on the other hand, one measures balafrce by our con~,entlonal capability to respond to the greatest threat, the answer may be very dif ferent because Soviet forces are 96 percent heavy. Whlchever view of balance 1s correct, planned Army structure and prlorltles clearly please few CINCS. General Paul F German, former commander of Southern Command, an area ]rrclud]ng Central America, disagrees strongly with current plans. In 1986, he told a gathering at the Brookings Institution that Army Ilght divi

MILITARY REVIEW

August 1987

13

exl>toften appear only ln the last year of Inltlal estimates of saving 30,000 man the plan with other lo;v-prior]ty projects. power spaces may pruve tu ha~,e been very ~uhere they go on hold perpetually as prom opt Imlstlc Unfortunately, It may be too late to re ised future ~undlng falks to materialize The Armys ]nit]atives are not new and may coup the spaces In foiw+ structure plannlng, well be inadequate Knowm In Pentagonese credit appears years ahead for ant]ctpated as risk reduction measures. Army pallla manpower sawngs. Lo:]stlc}ans had hoped tlves for logistic force def]c]enc]es have to reapply manpower savings to allevlate changed little m several years. long-+mdlng mann}ng shortfalls {n e~l>t. Ing support units and to create new un]ts, Some people expect the most v]slble and ho~vever, the Army maj have used these encouraging Improvements to come from log}stlc unit productivity stud]es I LUPSI De manpmver >avings instead for combat umts slgnt, d to reduce requirements and save, that the Army decided In 1983 It needed scarce support manpower by using more mm-e than it needed support un]ts I.tJPS savings may not, therefore, prov]de rellef productl~,e equipment, LUPS changes be gan ln the early 1980s under superv]s]on of expected by field commanders. the Office of the Deputy ChwfofStafffor Lo contnbut{ons As with LLJPS, of US allles glstlcs. One such change was replqcing under host nation support IHNSI arrange ments will continue to help, but by no 5.00t1-gallon fuel tankers with 7,500-gallon stretch of the Imag]natfon WIII solve the Ar tankers. theoretically sa~,lng a driver for every three older vehicles while retuning mys support force dllemrna The Federal ablllty to carry 15,000 gallons of fuel. But Republ N of Germany agreed several years ago to provide eventually about 50.000 re servists to support the Army In Europe ,, . ,Most observers of defense affairs assumed [a 1986, [Geaeral Prtal F. Gorntaa] this number represented a new add]tion to told tt gatheriag at the ftroo.kin.qs Iasti our capabli]tl es. In fact, howvver. some of jatioa t)lat .-it-my light dirisioas lterc the promised support has been In existence inappropriate for low-iat~nsit.v conflict and factored Into US plans for decades Gt, rand that any attempt to ase theta man C1vlllan Support Groups have been a wonld in rite ttt iiitary disaster [and] he key, stable part of Iogistlc support to US uoald rather bare fear more engineer forces since the 1940s The only change In battalions than fear light dicisions. their contribution to our forces IS that the 4 r=. armed forces are now Integrating them as reserves \vlth a wart}me role, rather than as clvllvans the program apparently failed to account for The same s]tuat]on exists In Korea, where Increased fuel consumption as the Army KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the modermzed and to consult field troops over L:n]ted States Army I soldlcrs have helped seas on the practicality of the changes US forces ]n both combat and support roles What seemed log]cal to planners thmklng s]nce the Korean con fflct. And since the about hne haul ori US four-lane highways 1950s, the Korean Service Corps IKSC I has dld not necessarily meet the needs of EurcI performed technical and serwce tasks, par pean Iogritic planners concerned about abdticularly labor-] ntensvejobs requlr]ng less Ity of larger, longer tankers to negot!ate training. But although host nat]ons can narrow German roads off autobahns. As help qu]te a bit, what they can and should LUPS factors In s]mllar field experience,

14

August

1987 * MILITARY REVIEW

contribute has a Ilmlt The sizable host na harbor doubts about relying extensively on tion support contrlbut]on to Ioglstlc opera crlt]cal wart]me support and contractors for tions from the Western European clwlian have not yet seen LOGCAPs potential dem economy and Infrastructure that could as onstrated. sist US div]sions would not llkely be ava]l Another improvement frequently cited by able elsewhere In the world. Army spokesmen as a risk reduction mea Indeed, we may have good reason to ques sure IS the continuing scrub of support re t Ion a DOD POIICYthat presses for Increased rel]aneeon otber nations for log]stlc support and that has encouraged replacement of US [n force structure planning, credit
lo~lst]c structure based solely on expecta appears years afzead foruntiripateff
tions of signed agreements. Logic would munpou,er sacin,qs. Logisticians had seem to be on the sldeofa US policy that first hoped to reapply rnanpozcer sacinqs to defines a mlnlmum level of unilateral US alleviate long-standing ozannin.q short capabdity that we should mainta]n as ]n falls in existing support units and to surance agm nst changing mrcumstances ]n create new units; horcecer, the Army our allumces, then seeks foreign assistance may haue used tftese manporcer when loglstlcsupport maybe feasible and fi satin.qs instead for combat units. nally replaces US force structure only when host nation capab]l}ty has proved Itself ade quate Instead, we do not begin by defining a minimum US capability. quirements. Those who do not understand Ioglstlcs have succeeded for years, based The Army erases need for US Ioglst]c mm-e on emotion structure once a host nation signs an agree than on evidence, In pa]nt ment One cannot help wondering just how ing support forces needs as o~,erstated. By so do]ng. they have won approval for a suc dependent our combat forces really are on cession of studies to re;rerlfy repeatedly other nations for crlt]cal Ioglstic support Wartlmehost nation agreements, according real need to reduce Iog]stlc forces to bona fide hard requlremwrts. Altbou2h stud. to Rogers, w]llpot be a panacea for all of the ]es, historical indicators and test]mony of combat support combat service support US commanders, ho$vever. have consistent units. ly pointed to the conclusion that we simply LOGCAP (Logistics CIVII Augmentation did not have enough support umts for the Program) is another risk reduction ]mtIa Armys divisions, the tactic of contlrrually tlve that the Army began three years ago. studying the problem has been largely suc The program uses contingency contracts cessful Studies with cli,illan groups or corporations to pro delay action long enough to avoid change whi Ie ddferent tssumpt]ons vide wartime capabillt]es, such as tugboat and scenarios, and different Interpretations serwce, that either do not exist In the US of results, create In minds ofcl. force structure or that contractors could pro uncertainty vllian dec]slon vide more qu]ckly or economically Al makers How much are we short? What M the con though LOGCAP does have some potential, dition ofex]stlng Ioglstlc units? The details It may be Ilmlted According to Pentagon are classdled But L% commanders who say sources, the program has accomphshed llt Army Initiatives have not prowded the lo tle and has encountered skepticism among gistic capab]llty they need describe the potential field users who will need man problem as serious Crist said to Senator power to administer the contracts. They

MILITARY REVIEW

August 1987

15

Nunn in 1986 testimony, Overall, there is a 35,000 (man )shortfall for Southwest Asia m reserve units right now. if the shortfall in support for 4.5 of the Armys 28 divw.ions is

change. Appropriate top management in terest could usher In a needed regular, highIevel review of readiness of loglstlc forces, for example. Readiness reviews throughout the Army and DOD, like force planning, tend to focus on div}sions and pay little at tention to the hundreds of nondlvisional Logic would seem to be on supply, maintenance, transportation. medi the side of a US policy that first defines cal, engineer and other Ioglstlc units. More a minimum level ofuailateral LS top-level scrutiny of loglstlc force problems capability that we shouId main fain as insurance against changing circum would also mean that DOD would have to pay closer attent]on and accord higher pri stances in our alliances, then seeks ority to Army Reserves, because they pro. foreign assistance when logistic vlde the bulk of Army wart]me Ioglstic support may be feasible. units Tbe current Army policy of manning and equipp]ng all 28 Army d]vmans at nearly 100 percent, Includlng late deploy that large, other CINCS have good reason to be concerned about supporting the other ers, while reserve logistlc units deploylng well before many of these dlwslons are 111 23.5 div]sions rely}ng upon the Armys for equipped and manned with trained person gotten forces. nel at an average of 80 percent fill, -IS not The time M mpe for change Congress and tlkel:; to provide the responsive support the Packard Commission specifically recog commanders say they now lack nized such longstanding concerns of US Settllng the Issue of responslbdlty for lo commanders when they agreed In 1986 that gihtic forces WIII also promote a greater un the roles of the CINCS and the Chairman of derstanding of Iog]stlcs and eventually the Joint Chiefs of Staff needed stren~hendraw attent]on Ing to force attention to the]r needs The De to solutions to other prob lems [t would ]n all likelihood lead to fur partment of Defense Reorgan]zat]on Act of ther dlscus~lon of tbe Armys need for more 1986 has removed some major organ ]zat ionmoney to solve Its loglst]c force probtems. al Impediments to change, and the locus of But plnpolnt]ng responslblilty and g]vlng power M rightfully shifting from services to the Army more money will not solve Ioglstlc commanders. DOD has a rare opportunity to force problems w]thout one other funda begin solving a fundamental problem of mental change We need to integrate, rather CINCS. than >eparate, the planmng systems de The first and most Important act]on that scribed earl]er and remse them so that they the Secretary of Defense should take lh to can fix flaws Identified In a net assessment make an OSD ass]stant secretary unmw ofourcrr!rent. ratberthan some Ideal future takeably responsible for Ioglstlc forces The capabll]ty This con chairman should likewlse p]npolnt respon approach M entirely sistent with Packard Commission recom slbll]ty at a commensurate level in OJCS. mendations on lNatIonal Security Planning By fixing responsib}llty at semor Ievets, and Budgeting the llkeIlhood of solutions WII1 Increase slg Wltb necessary repairs to our planning mficantly as those ivho are responsible can highl]ght Iogistlc force Issues to deci.won systems, and with responslbilltles clearly ass]gned at sen]or levels for fixing Army lo makers In Washington wltb adequate ]nter glstlc forces, the lack of understanding of lo~ est, authority and influence to cause

16

August 1987 . MILITARY REVIEW

gistical problems that seems so pervasive and intractable wouId eventually be resolved. The multitude of specific actions needed to reverse decades of benign neglect would follow naturally, More studies of the situation will not change the judgment of our CINCS about the support forces that are now their Achilles heel, If DOD does not take advantage of the current opportunity to blend a solution to this long-standing problem into the reor-

ganization now beginning, the problems the CINCS experience due to logistic force shot-t falls could, for the first time, be a principal cause of our soldiers dying. According to General Glenn K. Otis, commander of US Army Europe, daring tells us that we may disregard CSS ]n select cases, but history warns that there is peril in basing combat operations on inadequate CSS. We here in USAREUR believe the warning of history.m %

NOTES
1 General Bernard W %qers Commander r. C,,! US European COW,,, H@.r\ ., Mare the S,,1, Armed Sew,,, Cmwmnw 0 the OrW ,,,,. .0 0,..,$0 M.WW Proce..res 01 the Demrlmenl of 0. I,.. and !,, Co.OreS, ,2 DecernDer,985 2 General George B Crtst USMC Gmmnader ( ChmelUS Central s C De Command Hear,n$beqorelhem.!. ArnwaSew,ces omm,neeon )mrP,, of De,eQ,e A,hor,z.t,o 10,APDroPr\at#o, or F,,.., Year ?987 { D, 2 u,,,,6 CommnO, 11 Marc ?986 6? 7 3 James H Webb Jr M law ComDe!ence Delenw ,ss..s 1 no 61 {28 P.ugbsf198615 4 US D,mrlmet of Oef,n.e F!,e. Year De,e?,e Program ,H#5t.r$c4 memred b, Off>ceolAssstant Se,retaVcl Delen,e ,ComDlroller,,Prog.am an. Budrjet, [We,, g!.. DC 21 J,.? 19831 . . . 6 0,,. !0, O >974from Arm D,w?Y Cel .1 S,.. for Ooemlon. and P,., ,. ,,, ec,,ng Tact,.., SUPPO,ncrement .1 De,,., Plan? g 8, Pr.qramnmg Cateqwe, ,OPPC, 6,,, {,( FY 1987from sane DPPC Or W 1987c,.m D,!..se ManDowerReQ.,remenl Rwor! Febr.wr 1986 7 ,bd 8 Larry C?.r.ey wem warm 01Combat S.mofl W.ak. eSs 4,w Tmm, ,.5 $elm,aq ,937 $8 9 Ib,d 10 Me,,, Gone,.! Sar!!l?mon and Br\qad,erG..era Be Krlle. Arm, 0,<..,,,,... A T,me,o T.,. s$.., Ammo 6.,,,s JO.,., Way ?985 86 ) , Ge.w#Omar N Br.dley A Sold,er , S!oV, Ne. Yo?k Hew HOlad Co 1951, 51 ,2 +@, M Cole ,6 Dorm K C),,, ,, .% A Pe,,m,na? Sh,Oy04All Proache$m me Problem., ComQalS.pw. Ram%Wm. lre Arm, Fo,ce Research nelYsrs A CoVOrat,On Stnmtwe OPeral,onSD .s. %3,1PaJer Paper !,!,, ,962 NO RAC <ORO,SP 180 111 14 13 ,b,d 1!19 ,4 IWO W 2> 15 IB>d x I-3 ,6 ,0!0 xl, ?

,, ,b,,i. ,2 w

..

18 be.tenanl colonelDon Prehol Ofl,ceor lb. Cmnolrwr of the Army basea on rem. or Army $anvmedata czilecl 0. ana co.!.3 nhmon June 1985 ,3 CaP,an Ram, Tra,.,.g O,rw,ora,e .eado.aer, US Arm Tra (g and Do.,,, .? comma, ,!,c.,s,o. 4 November 1986 based o R, Q.t.ea CourseBase L,stw Army 1am .q .?wred Resource Sysem Pro ,ec!ed for FY 87 JIY 1986 20 J m Bdrdene Ot!<ce 01the OeP.tVCh,ef 015!,1! 1., bcq SK, 5.DPIY and Ma,.wnmm D!recl.rate dab er,rac!ed Irom Ann Mas,er Data F!le November 1986 21 t.ic.sel 0.% Gre.m. %wa.t CO.I.50. M,l,t.3PI Lcq?t!c$ F. ,um W.,(W. CT J.ly. Auqw! ,985 2&28 22 us DeDa.me.I or oelen.e SO.*P? tm!tary Power Iwaswwlon DC US Governme.! Pr,n!ngorfsce 198519 23 GeneralPa.>Go, Pre%e!a,on,o E,ecul#e Leaoesh)DSem?ar . . Pr!or!(es ! us 0,,,... Po,,cy Eirook,,g, ,,, ,,,.. 8 a.~,,!,986 24 Frank Sp me, The O.le..e F,W!SOtL.l. me ft.goreparedbv OSD (PA&E, ,nay,l 5 D,cember 1980 law we,e,,d !0039,.ss 25 M.,., EO..ard OL.atre..x.x b.elnq$oA,,<,!mt Secre,aI) or Deleme {Ma.11.we, %!.erve Afla!rs .0 LCWIICS, R.sIwD. the LGQ SI!CS F.,,, Man-h 1984 26 Agree.,! belwee I., US Gove.nmet and the Feoera,%bl,c 01 German, cocernznqho,! ,1,0 wow. ,u.(ng ,,,s>. m W) son Fe,eral ReD.b c 01German, >5APr,l?982 27 Row, .,,, g, 28 Cr s! MPar,g, 29 DefenseWawo.er .ewreme.ts ..Po* FY $987 30 Geerel Ge..O,s a?dVa,O,<P,Robed P 0,,5,011 C5S Cr.ual D, !,,,0 01De,em+.ce . EUI.DQ ., O.!obe, 1986 82-89

l.wutenanr Coiond <PI John M Van., & [he Deputy Assutant D[reclor. Management and (on (ml Army Budget Offics,, Office of the Assmvzr Sr<.ctacv of the A rmv, Fznancial .Managt,mrrd Th. Pmzt.gon, Wash!ngl.n, DC H, rece~wda B S from the US .Mr[ztafy Academy. an .Lf A from .%f ddlehu~ Colle#c, an MBA from Long Island r Unrtwwtv and a ma.!er~ dcgr?e from the llnu u W< of Pnrt~ (Sorbonnel, and he IS a graduate of U5ALGSC He has.erwd r. a L.rlk-l> of mnunmzd and S. ffasszgntnents m Europe, tkc Continental Lfntted S1.1,s. Korea and Vwtnam and .s rm.tst an( ,hwf of staffi Eesourm .%fanage,nentid SUP. port Comnzandl Corps). whzch proctdmi tarttr.llo gt511. ..pporl to US force. m Sou{hern (kmzam /

MILITARY REVIEW

August 1987

17

Challenges to Command and Controi

Lieutenant. Colonel Clayton R. Newell, US Army x

.,4=

..

Command and contro[, or C, is one of fhe premier concepts in to days US Armg. Effectice[y directing friendly forces against an en emy, imposiny the commanders u,ill on the opposing command structure and soinning are the ultimate aims ofa C system. But many factors work against C systems, and the commander must recognize and deal with these challenges before C can assure suc cess on the battletie[d.

suwze~ts that command and contm] IS some -. RMIES strive to be orderly in many ... how above thechaosofbattle Chaos. the an ilitary minds, the picture of a truly tithesis of order, actually predominates in professional unit is tidy ranks and files of kvarand makm the battlefield a place where men and equipment on parade. While there uncertmnty prevails Commanders may see is some truth m this picture. too much em the expression C as a means to provide cer phaslson order may actually be detrimental tainty when making battlefield decmons. to success on the battlefield. Th]s theory IS But there IS no certainty In the chaos of bat especially true as technolo~ becomes more tle This search involved In tbe conduct of war Technologi for certalrrty produces a dy namic tension between what commanders cal Jargon, with Its apparently precl>e would I]ke to do meanings, creates a false sense of orderli and what actually happens on the battlefield. ness when used to descrlhe broad, ]ntangl TWO tictlonal vignettes from JVorld \Var 1 ble concepts. illustrate this In the Iexlcon of the US Army, for examdynaimc tension. In The Soldlci- H[s DaI[.v Lifr Thrrragh the Ages, ple. the widespread use of the expression C I.ante Corporal Verrall finds himself to represent command and control Implles caught ]n the chaos of battle between Brlt an m-derto war that simply does not exist on wh and German Ilnes where there was now the battlefield. C IS a pseudo.mathematical somuchsmoke driftlngover thegrourrdthat expression that, when used as Army Jargon,

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1987

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>

II/t

it was Impossible to know where the enemy Commanders may see the was or where his own lures were. In the mid expression C as a means to provide dle of that storm of death he stood there, certainty when making battlefield wonder]ng in which dlrectlon he should decisions. But there is no certain~ in move. the chaos of battle. This search forcer. In cent rast to Verralls confusion, a newly tainty produces a dynamic tension appointed corps commander In the The Gen between what eral, one Lieutenant General Curzon, as commanders would like to do and what actually happens sures h]mself that there was going to be no on muddl {ng m hIs corps. Everything was go the battlefield. ing to be exact, systematic, perfectto Cur zon the adject]ve systematic Implled a su premely desirable quality. killed thousands of soldiers. Apparently, While Verrall exw,ted m the chaotic reali those searching for the perfect system d]d ty of a storm of death, Curzon sought the not understand or consider that amb]g-wty, comfort of certainty by being systematic. not certainty, is the norm in war. In World War 1. the misguided systematic, Since World even scientific, search for certainty by comWar I, technology has inten s]fled both Verralls storm of death manders and staffs on both s]des needlessly

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19

According to and Curzons desire to be systematic. Mod one source, the earliest ref erence to the fog of war was in 1724, when em weapons systems, detection devices and electronic deception, to name but a few ad Chevalier Folard observed that the coup doeuzl [sic] is a gift of Ood and cannot be ac. vances, make todays battlefield many times more lethal than the one Verrall quired; but if professional knowledge does not perfect it, one only sees things imper fectly and in a fog. Of course, the concept a goes beyond the literal reference to fog. It re In spite of the potential
fers to the fact that commanders simply can confusion surrounding the intro not determine enemy intentions before they duction of yet another new term, the
happen. The fog of war prevents com Armys lexicon needs a way to convey
manders from being certain of exactly what the ambiguity of the battlefield.
is happening to their own units on the bat The expression F, for fog and friction,
tlefield, much less the enemys. The coup provides a useful contrast to
doed translates hteraliy from the French as the well-established C.
a glance or glimpse. As Folard used it, it re fers to the battle-experienced commanders ability to quickly and intuitively under stand complex in the absence of knew. Concurrent developments in com situations munications and computers also make Cur today, perfection of the coup certainty. Even zons goal to be systematic seem more at doeil by constant professional study re tainable. mains virtually the only way a commander The dynamic tension between certainty can hope to penetrate the fog of war. Friction, the second factor in F, ]s a and ambiguity IS as real today as it was in World War I. Success in battle and in war Clausewitzian concept. Friction, Karl von Clausewitz wrote in the early nineteenth will go, as lt has always gone, to the side that century, is the can best cope with the omnipresent ambigu force that makes the appar ently easy so difficult. He elaborated on ity of the battlefield. By its very nature, and this theme by expressing the idea that while in spite of technology, the battlefield will re war M indeed very mam chaotic. It is simply unrealistic to ex si mple, even the simplest task is difticult No matter how systematic pect order in an activity in which the whole tbe preparation for war, this friction will point is for armed opponents to destroy one eventually reduce the effectiveness of the another. best plans of the best armies unless com In spite of the potential confusion sur manders can deal w]th the ambiguity of F rounding the introduction of yet another on the battlefield. new term, the Armys lexicon needs a way to The expressions F and C neatly describe convey the ambiguity of the battlefield. The the perspectives of the fictional soldiers expression Fz, for fog and friction, provides a Verrall and Curzon. F presents the ambigu useful contrast to the well-estabhshed C.. ity of Verralls battlefield, and C represents Fog and friction, two intangibles of war, the systematic method that Curzon, or any have always been present on the battlefield. other commander, uses to search for certain They are, however, relatively new ideas in ty. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) convey tbe hterature of war, considering the three this idea of searching for certainty when thousand and more years man has spent try they define a C~ system as the facilities, ing to elimmate himself from the face of the equipment, communications, procedures, earth.

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It is impossible to know exactly where every person or piece of equipment

will beat any one time, even if all the elements of a complex C system function
perfectiy. Add an opponent who will try very hard to disrupt an already am biguous situation, and P can very quickly overpower the best C system.

and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the mwsions assigned. The JCS definition, however, does not mention that the C system has to function In an unsystematic, ambiguous environment. Even in peacetime, simply mowng men and equipment across the ground produces an ambiguous situation. It w impossible to know exactly where every person or piece of equipment will beat any one time, even if all the elements of a complex C system function perfectly. Add an opponent

who wdl try very hard to disrupt an already ambigrrous situation, and F can very, quick ly overpower the best C system. Success m war demands that the commanders C system be greater than F. The US Armys keystone war-fighting manual, Field Manual (FMI 1005, Operations, speclfles that The ultimate measure of command and control t C) effect tueness is whether the force functzons more effectzuely and more qwekly than the enemy b In simple terms, a commanders C system must overcome F to be effective. A C sys tem, no matter how effective, cannot ellmi-

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21

ing to overcome F and Impose their will on nats F-, nor does the experienced commander the enemy. Simply having a great deal of in expect it tn The experienced commander does, formatlon about the enemy does not guaran however, expert his C syst@m to be effective tee success. In the the enough to allow Ium to copewith the F., a real wew of one authority, mznd thtnks wth tdeas, not u,lth znforma istic exqwctatlon when C expands to become tzon C vzth the adcbt]on of comrmmmatlons, Mod Communications must, therefore, Include ern communication systems help commanders the concept of conveying ideas, as well as in Iubcicatethefriction areas and seetbrough the formation, If commanders are to have any foggy ones. [n fact, tfus (23system is central to hope oft hlnking of ways to defeat their ene the conduct of battle, accorrhng ta a semor NATO commander. mY. SOme years agO, the US Armys Infan try School defined communications as the Returning to the JCS for a definition of process by wblch Ldeas and Information are communications, we learn that It is a meth transmitted from one place to another or od or means ofcont,eymg information of any from one person to another.t kind from one person or place to another, This definition provides a more complete This detimtlon ]s satisfactory as far as It picture of what must happen m an effective goes, but it fails to cope with the F of battle. C system. Remembering that th:&Armys While reformation per se M Important, the doctrinal measurement ofC effectiveness is idea behind the Information actually pro the ability of the friendly force to function wdes the lubrlcant and vision to overcome more quickly than the enemy, commanders F. This distinction between Ideas and Infor must be able to matmn is crucial when commanders aretry react rapidly to unexpected

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situations by deciding what to do based on available information. Commanders simply cannot afford to wait for certainty. They must be able to act even when they h,ave less information than they would like. Incom plete information, like F, is an omnipresent challenge of war. One key to ensure that C is greater than FZ on the battlefield is an ad equate supply of the lubricant and the vi sion inherent in good communications to convey information and ideas rapidly. Ideas, however, must accompany the in formation that passes through the C sys tem. Simply showing a briefing chart, for example, that merely records the number of bridges across a river may not be very help ful to the commander unless it can also con vey the idea of why the bridges are impor tant to the commanders plan. Without com municating tbe idea along with the information, the effort spent moving data Communicating the data or through a C system maybe an exercise in information just to fill in the blanks is futility. An experienced division com the idea is the essential not enoug~ mander has cautioned that an inordinate thing. Unfortunately, increasing amount of staff time is consumed in gather in communications and advances ing and filtering the data that must fill m automatic data processing have the blanks on the charts. encouraged a tendency to dwell on Communicating the data or information how much information or data the C Just to fill in the blanks is not enough; the system can transmit. idea is the essential thing. Unfortunately, increasing advances in communications and automatic data processing have encour become an end aged a tendency to dwell on how much infor in itself. The structure must exist to exchange reformation and, more im mation or data the C3 system can transmit. portantly, ideas. Along with staff time wast In the confusion of battle, one can derive ed in gathering great comfort from the systematic organiza and filtering data, staffs can become wrapped up in maintaining and tion, collection, collation and display of da feeding the C system, rather than using ta. Once displayed for the commander, this available information to generate Ideas information creates the impression of an or needed to conduct tbe battle. Certainly, the derliness that is simply not present on the more information a commander has about battlefield. Some technicians even think the an impending battle or campagn, the bet C system actually requires a steady ter. stream of accurate and reliable operational/ Information cannot, however, be allowed logistical reports. to become an end in itself. Commanders will For a C3system to requtre a steady stream
virtually never have all the information of information implies that the system has

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23

they would like to have. They must be pre One is to increase its information-process ing capacity, the pared to act with decisiveness in an uncer other to design the organi zation, and indeed the task Itself, in such a tain environment. General Oeorge S. Pat way as to enable it to operate on the basis of ton Jr. writes of deman&ng an attack to be less information.t conducted without delay over the objections The Armyscurrent fascination wth tech of ail the generals concerned because his nology tends to focus on the first option, wh]le Patton might have advocated the sec ond. To be successful, commanders must de For a C system to require a
velop the ability to strike a balance between steady stream of information implies
their sixth sense and the necessity for a that the system has become an end
steady stream of information. They must in itself. The structure must exist to
organize their C systems, both people and exchange information and, more impor equipment, so that they can function on less tantly, ideas.. . . Staffs can become
than certain information. wapped up in maintaining and
Planning is a key factor in the ability ofa feeding the C system, rather than
C system to overcome F. Detailed planning using available information before a battle, a campaign or a war can an to generate ideas.. . . ticipate many of the problems presented by ... .. ._ G.,. b< F and provide a better opportunity for the 4 C system to function effectively. No matter how detailed tbe plan, however, F will cer sixth sense told [him] it was vital.] Patton tainly cause it to was proven correct. Attacking without de change once battle begins. The Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth von lay resulted in breaking up an enemy attack Mokke, a successful commander in the 1870 before it started. France-Prussian War, cautioned that no With advances in communications and plan survives contact with the enemy. data processing, the amount of mformatlon Von Moltkes message should remind available to todays commander is rapidly planners, especially prewar or peacetime increasing. Although we may be approach planners, that their plans must accommo ing the time when enough information is date changes once the battlefield situation available to present a certain picture of the differs, as lt certainly will, from what they I battlefield, the commander may not have thought would happen. Although planning the time to wait for the system to analyze can greatly assist the C systems ability to the data before he must act. Too much Infor cope with F, commanders must guard mation can paralyze a force as quickly as too against the danger of becoming so enamored little data if the commander m hesitant to with their plan that they resist changes to it act in ambiguous situations. Because the regardless of the for according to commanders coup doed remams a key in situation, Patton, successful generals make plans to gredient to success in battle, the com tit circumstances, but do not try to create mander must control his C system, not be a circumstances to tit plans. slave to it. Commanders at all levels, once commit In hls classic study of command, historian ted to battle, naturally want to believe their Martin Van Creveld notes that an organiza plan is working tion, when confronted with a task, and hav and are reluctant to accept information contrary to that supposition. ing less information available than is need Objective analysis of available information, ed to perform that task, has two options.

August 1987

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though essential, is frequently difficult. SimpIy assuming that things are going well because of no news to the contrary does not always work. The old adage that no news is good news does not necessarily apply to in formation in war. On the contrary, wrote German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, a successful commander in World War II, whenever things are going well, news usually finds its way back quickly enough. If, on the other hand, the attack gets stuck, a blanket of si lence descends on the front, either because communications have been cut or those con cerned prefer to hang on till they have some thing encouraging to report. Another rea son that it may take longer for reverses on the battlefield to become known to higher Ftexifrility is the word for the
headquarters, a more modern writer notes, abWy of a commander to adapt his plan
is the human failing that no one wants to to what the situation till allow. Flexi pass bad news upward, especially if it re bility, like communications, provides
flects unkindly on him. a sort of lubricant and vision that helps
In light ofthis expected reluctance among overcome P. Combining F and flexi subordinates to pass on bad news, com bility produces the expression F.
manders must actively seek out the situa tion on the battlefield to find out whether their plan needs changing. The commander, through his C system, must be able to re tion of war and tbe flexible attitude that the ceive and transmit both ideas and infornra successful commander must develop to deal with these intangibles. No matter how so tion to evaluate progrese or the lack thereof. phisticated the C system, at times the F How he does it is a combination of personal desires and equipment available, but he may so overwhelm tbe combat forces that operations bog down for no apparent reason. must have some method that allows him to The experienced commander who under monitcir the battle without imposing impos stands the intangibles of war must then be sible requirements for information on his able to develop subordinate commanders. Unrealistic re new ideas based on limited information to porting requirements themselves contrib achieve his objective. This flexibility is Pattons sixth sense or Fo ute to the Fz with which subordinate com lards coup doeud. manders must also contend. Although successful commanders cannot Flexibility is the word for the abdlty of a hope to eliminate commander to adapt his plan to what the sit F, they cab reduce its det rimental influence. Technology continues uation will allow. Flexibility, like commu to develop equipment and techniques that nications, provides a sort of lubricant and vision that helps overcome Fz. Combining F provide commanders access to an everincreasing pool of information to plan and and flexibility produces the expression Fj. F3 conduct their operations. This increase can represents a combination of the fog and fric-

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25

be, however, a mixed blessing, for along ning can establish when and where the fight with the benefits of more information comes should be, once the tight begins, the com the danger that commanders or tbew staffs, mander must be able to contend with F, The in a misguided or even an unguided effort to planning process includes designing a C please the boss, become so enamored with system that will provide the commander the the system that, instead of focusing on the information and Ideas necessary to conduct Ideas it transmits, they make the accumula however, can only assist the the tight. C, tion of information an end in itself. commander. He must prepare himself, be Armies and their commanders exist not fore the fight, to deal with the intangibles of F>, simply to accumulate information, but to fight wars. Clausewitz reminds us that the Designing C systems is relatively simple end for which a soldier m recruited, clothed, compared to understanding F. A lifetime of armed, and trained, the whole object of his study may not be enough for some aspiring sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching N commanders to be successful in battle, but simply that he should fight at the right place ignoring the intangibles of war in the belief and the right time. that technology alone will somehow bring Determining the right place and the right order to the chaos of battle will certainly time is the commanders job. Although planguarantee failure. %

NOTES
1 Pn,ltD Warner l.. .SCM,erl+. Oa#V lJfe Thro@h,. .@, ,New Y,* %s,,nger Pub!t,h,ng ClmPay 1975) ?W? 2 C S Forester TheGenwaIIAnac.l,s The NauIJcal8 A.at,on P.b ,hsinng ComPaoyot.4menca ,9821 207 ,wnohas,, O.WW1> 3 Cbe.rsw Fol.rrl Mo,elle, L%co...$ s.r 1. G.eme 7724 Quoted m Roo, t Deb. He,,,, D,c,oaw of M,lr,aw and N. d 0..,,,.., ,Anao 0,,, n,,m s,.!.s Naval 1.s,1!. 19661.121 1 Ka o C@S,w12 0 War W MOl.e! Howwfl and Peter Paret ,P.ce,o. NJ &nce,on uns.erl,,y ?,,ss ,97s, ,2, 5 US Jot.t Chmefs f Stan lJCSI P.bl,cat%on o 1,D,cmmrr 01wt. T .m. Asscc efed rem, (Wash,ngtm DC 1 Jan.er) 19861 77 6 uSDePWImen!o lttieAnn, Fre16 Manual 10h5 ODer.monS [Wash mqo., Dc May 1986, 22 ,ewhasis O*.., , 7 Ge.eral Glen. K (M5 ana M. I Robe. F D.smI1 Maww t.e C3 P,ecesf,, , Central E.,oD, S<gnal,Novembef <986, t 9 8 Jcs Pm 1 80 9 Thewxe %szah me Cul, 01mhmaon me %wore .r comD.mr5 mtil.e TmeA1701 Th!.hq !New V.* Pantheon Scaks 1586188 1emDm3 10 JoseD. A OYmtead %cesses 01Command lnl!enm Counu.I -1>0 m Se)eC!e6 Readings m Uodern Lea#emh,D,60,8,. g GA US Am, Infatrl Sthml 19711220 ,emmla,$saaaea) ,, Ma, G,. R,card L P., Iaman Command and Cow., n ,,, 2d A,. mored Dwwon M,av R,!,* ,J.,y ,982) 4, 12 M,chaetA Plaiz Tecno,q,ca, Advance, 10,EntmncEu B.ti,el,eld Leaders!w s,gna LNovember198S) 67 [errmh.sts @Jed) 13 Gem., S Pall. J War ASJK,. I,, Bo,!o MA Ho...,. M,ffl,n Co 19471}.0 men,,.,,,>, (c dent h , arratve 0 Pig. 207 and aga ,S aex.rwle 01ho. heear.ed h, Payon cqe 387 ,. M..,. va. cr,.@d c.ov? w.,.w,,,camLIn@e MA +iervardn, .,,s ,y Press 1985) 269 ,5 L! Co! Jac# D I+OSCOU,, o. !+,,,.. .6 ,,. G.,,., s,. Ml, ,ary Rawer, ,March 1987, 72 ,6 Pa. Z@ A s,(gh,,yd,%,,., ers$oof t. <0,,,, m Page ,,6 >7 Er<c. o !.!,s1,, LOS!b ,!00,s ,C~>CagO .,? Regneq Co ,958) 68 ,8 Om,$ead 227 19 Ca.,e.fw 95 ,ern@Ia,850ng.-4)

Lwutenant Colonel Clayton R .Veuwll M the dt.

rrctor, J.mt Operatmns Concepts, Department of
MdItaJY Strategy, Planning and Operations, US Army War College. Ca.lu[e Barrack& Pen nsjlua. ma He recemed a B S from Arizona State Unu,er. stty and N agrmiualeof USA CG.SC Ht has ~erwd as the asststant US Army Trammg and Doctrzne Command system manager for the Xl-Source Analysts System. US Army tntelltgence Center and School, Fort Huachuca. Arfzona, and as a mil. Itaw opemtlons specuz[tsi Ulth the US Army Con. cepts Analyszs Agency, Bethesda, Ma.-y [and Hrs article, Operating m the 21si Cmtuv appeared m the September 1986 Md]tary Rev]ew.

26

August 1987 * MILITARY REVIEW

Clausetitz

dtb

Donald

D. khipman

TIIe topic military lender.ship generates considerable debate, ia both talk andpriat. Hours ( ofaz[[itar.y classroom time, ser 7 eral tie[d maaua!s, many baaks, and namerous journal articles al[ propoutid rarious leadership styles, theories, and maxims. This author beiieres that most of these effarts miss the mark. Hc exatnines leader ship from the perspective of perhaps histarys foremost mititary tlleare ticiaa and Dractitioaer.

?,.-.. .
2*

When an architect szts down with a pen and paper to determine the strength of an abut ment by complwated calculation, the truth of the answer at whwh he arriues w not an ex pression of hw own personality. Fwst he se [ectsthedata with care, then hesubmlts them to a mental process not of his own muention, of whose logic he w not at the moment fully consczous, but whtch he applles for the most part mechanically. It w never llke that Ln war Continual change and the need to re spond to lt compels the commander to carry the whole intellectual apparatus of hls knowledge unthm him. He must always be ready to brvng forth the appropriate decwz on. By total assimilation wzth his mlndand ltfc, the commanders knowledge must be trans formed Into genrrme capabdtty
Clau5ew11z

ECENTLY, military leadership studies have degenerated into the memorization of various management theo ries with heavy doses of communication feedback principles Interwoven with coun sehng techniques. These lessons are then linked to some form of social-psychological model designed to prowde the officer a Ilst of leadership dos and donts. Know your.wb, Be enthusiast, and other such descrip tions characterize most military Ieadershjp lessons. Seldom, If ever, are the concepts of war, danger and uncertainty Included In such presentations. For instance, ]n Stogdllls Handbook of Leadersktp. a com pendium of more than 800 pages, not once M the term war used. Somewhere In the rush to promote zero d fects, to increase managerial efiectlvenes , the mdltary has substituted contempora J . quasi psychology, and business leadership models for the clas slcal combat command models As a result, noted Jeffrey Record, these new mdltary managers are mdoctrlnated with the belief that a science of war exists and that this most complex, uncontrollable and least un

R
.

derstood of all human activities can be man aged given the proper tools and requisite faith in its manageabihty.: !Many believe the Vietnam War defeat was m part the result of an entrepreneurial management ethic that failed to consider the basic elements of combat leadership. Be cause of the vigorous rotation of command responslbilltles, few combat leaders were able to brnld the cohesive mdltary structure necessary to deal with a determined enemy. Desp]te this recent experience, these leader ship lessons have not yet been institutional ized Into the contemporary American miil tary thought process. According to Edward N Luttwak, m four-years, the United States assigned four different mllltary com manders to the El Salvador Mdltary Assist ance Group. AS far as combat leadership IS concerned, noted Luttwak, the managerial techniques of categorizing combat situa tions with schematic diagrams, numerical data and information files count for llttIe in a guerrilla war compared with the mtuitwe feehng fur a country and Its people wh]ch comes from personal experience Unllke many current mllltary officers who are mostly managers in uniform, Karl ~,on Clausewltz \vas a fighter, a leader, anda keen observer of battle Ife fought In the Na poleonic wars and was with General .Nflkhall I Kutuzov during the disastrous RussIan Campaign of 1813. Here Clause. witz recorded firsthand elements of bravery and leadership that, according to experts, even Napoleon could not have described In more lumdter~. Clause}vltz, more than any other clasmcal mil Itary writer, was a philosopher of war who dehneated the significant elements of battle For most of hls life, he was mvoived ]rr some form of warfare. In 1795, at the age of thmteen, he fought m hls first battle. SIX years later he attended the Prussian War College (the Krtegsakademze), where he studied under the tutelage of Gerard von

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=---

tie&llisd+ght at WaIeilo6-t815 . _.q r,.

- -. -.

,:-

Unlike Karl He fought the

many current military oficers who are mostly munagers in uniform,

von Clausewitz was a tighter, a leader, and a keen obserwer of battle.
in the Napoleonic tears and was with General,+ fikhail 1. Kutu~ov during
disastrous Russian Campaign of 1813 . . . . He concluded his battle
experience with Marshal Blucher at Leipzig and Waterloo.

Scharnhorst, the preeminent mllltary scholar of the era. When Napoleon invaded Prussia, Clausewitz fought In the Battle of Auerstadt, where he was captured by the French. Later, during the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, he fought at Borodmo and witnessed the disastrous crossing of the Berezina River. He concluded hls battle experience with Marshal Blucher at Leipzig and Waterloo After the Napoleonic wars, Clausmwtz Joined the Krvegsakadernre and soon became its director During this time, he wrote ex tensively and produced several historical rnanuscrlpts In 1831, after hls death, hls works were pub] whed, and On Mar became a classic Yet, had it not been for the Prussian General Helmuth von Moltke, CIausewltzs works might have faded Into obscurity. With ,Moltkes endorsement, German mdltary Journals published Clausewltzs thoughts and claimed they were significant insights into the nature of war. Even to the

point of plaglarlsm, Moltke used Clausewltz toJustlfy hls own ideas Before World War 1, the German emphasis on Clausewltz prompted the French and the Brltwb to unde~ake their own exam] natlonsofthis phllosopherofwar. His views of boldness were incorporated into a French fighting ethic called elan. In Britazn, CIausew]tz was translated Into English and studied at Sandhurst Yet Clausewitzs im. pact on World War I remained controversial for quite some time Despite Clausewltzs clalm that defense would dominate over of. fense, few World War I generals considered th]s part of the battle equation > Disregard ing new weapon technology, they sent their soldlers in waves against enemy trenches and suffered extremely high casualties. Then with calm, determined elanwhich they said Clausewltz wou~d praise-these same generals continued throwlrrg the]rsol diers against strong enemy fortifications for the rest of the war As a result, after.World War I, B. H Liddell Hart, one oftbe worlds

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foremost contemporary mil]tary scholars, accused the French and the British of using Clausewitz to rationalize their heavy casu alties. According to Liddell Hart, these gen erals became intoxicated with the blood red

Unlike Jomini, who listed battle principles in categories, C[ausezcit2 described war in philosophical terms. Clauseu~itzs theories were listed as considerations rather than ultimatums. Although he wrote aboi# uarious battle conditions, he went beyond these con ditions and related them to psychologi cal and political considerations.

wine of Clausewltzlan growth. While most historians beheve Llddell Harts views were distorted, this criticism was accepted as truth by most All led officers. Consequently, except in Germany, Clausewitz became very unpopular - For Instance, the United States mllltarydld not study Claustnvltz un til 1943. Until recently, most US mllltary profes. slonals preferred Henrl ,Jomlnls works to Clausewltzs UnllkeJomlnlJ~vho Ilsted bat tle principles In categories, Clausewltz de scrjbed war in philosophical terms Clause Wltzs theories were lwted as conslderat!ons rather than ultimatums Although he wrote shout various battle condlt~ons, he went be. yond these condlt!ons and related them to psychological and politlcal considerations Ultimately, Ilke many other classlcal writ ers, Clau>ewltzs On War was so broad In Its scope that It was interpreted In a variety of ways In hpite of Clausewltzs current popular ity, hls command-leadership concepts are seldom cited While hls views on wars na ture and pollt]cal ramifications remain up permost In the study of the profession of

arms, hls insights mto leadership, while very clearly described, are often neglected. Just as he wove politics and war into a philo sophical fabric, Clausewitz described lead ership not in isolation, but in an environ ment of danger, uncertainty and turmod. Unlike ]n current mihtary managerial the ories, war was a significant part of his views and, therefore, a part of his command lead ership considerations. More than any other scholar, C Iausewltz described the essence of military leadership In combat conditions that were essential to a thorough under standing of this topic. ClausewItz was never deluded into de scribing mlhtary leadership m managerial terms Wbi Ie be real Ized the Importance of technology, he was never deceived into beIievlng war was a science and the com mander ivas foremost an engineer. Too of ten, according to Clausewltz, technocrats reduced e~,erythlng to a few mathematical formulas, managerial theories and engi neering equations If only war were this simple, he wrote, battle and campa]gns ivould hardly provide a scientific problem for a schoolboy, iNur did he accept the premise that psychological models would quallfy an officer fol command. These lead ersh iij precepts became part of t he command Ilturgy well after Clausewitz had had hls say Instead, Clausewltz outllned all the fac tors that qu!ckly destroyed leadershlpJudg ment and command responsibility First, he noted that unlike other llfelong events, war was extremely complicated. It was ne]thera science nor an art More than anything else, war wah a human social phenomenon In which maJor Interests clashed and In wh,ch the confllct was resolved through blood sbed Although war appeared simple, In the long run,even the slmple was very com plex Everything from the cannon explosions to the sight of men dying and being mutilated

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Intensified this Leadership environment. Danger, exertion and uncertainty worked together as a psychological fog to disrupt and dlsorlent the commander and his per ceptions. IIOW could a good commander vis uallze his duties without sensing the life threatenlng consequences of combat? Fre quently In hls cognltlve process, a leader made poor leadership decisions in a wave of recklessness or tlmldity Thus, noted Clausewitz, too often when a commander was suffering from thirst, fatigue or prlva tlon, obJectlvlty was iost Accord]ng to Clausewltz, very few com manders could break through the psycho logical fog to ensure their sollders would tight at the right time and In the right place and vnn. This feat required the skills of a mlhtary genius. Clausewitz believed a true mllltarygenius was as rare as another Isaac Clausescitzs concept ofcotn Newton Yet, be demystified this charac nt and leadersh ip u~as embodied in his terization by noting that a genres was not tflougbfs on fhe nature of the tnilifary paranormal or even God-sent, as much as he genius. . . . Because uar u~as so awesome was a product of an advanced society who aad so fall of dattger, exertion, ancer was challenged lrrtellectually and possessed taiaty and chance, Clausewit: claimed avery h]xhly developed mental aptitude thaf only strong aad in~ease iadicid for the profession of arms. uals possessed the strength of rci[l fo Only after exceptional achievement were susfain fh e froops in f?)eir efforf fo the harmonious combinations of the mill defeaf the enettzy. tary geniuss skills obvious. Like Aristotle, Clausewitz viewed the mdltary gemus in terms of balanced traits. Thus, stated Clausewltz, he must possess a proper tern - awesome and so full of danger, exert) on,un certainty and chance, Clausewitz claimed perament and gifts of the mind In comblna. that only strong and Intense Indtvlduals tlon and in wh,ich one or the other may pre possessed the strength of lvlll to sustain the dominate, but none may be in conflict with troops In their effort to defeat the enemy the other It IS the Impact of theebblngofmoral and Consequently, Clausewltzs cOncept Of phys]cal strength, of the ,heart-rending command leadership was embodied In his spectacle of tbe dead and wounded, that the thoughts on the nature of the military ge commander has to withstand first In him nius This gemus possessed two very dis self, and then In all those who, dmectly or In tinct features. The first was the embodi directly. have entrusted hlm wltb their ment of a strong mind, which Clausewitz thoughts and feellngs, hopes and fears As called character. Tbe second feature meach man> strength gives out, as it no long included d]stmct personality traits that he er responds to hls WI]], the Inertia of the said were essential. Because war was so

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whole gradually comes to rest on the com manders wi II alone , Because so much in battle depends on the commanders Judgment, Clausewltz clalmed self-control was a supreme ml Iitary virtue. In times of exceptional stress and vl

Proper military character developed u~hen the officer balanced his intense emotions u,ith self-control act ing os a couuteru,eigh t. . . . IClausewitzl claimed there were four basic types of individuals, each scith different enlotion at characteristics, onl.g one of which u~as suitable for combat comtnand. . . . All in sometoay or another could contribute to aa armys success; how eeer, only the intense type possessed the emotional character to be a great commander. , Lolence, the commander had to keep hls head and act rational 1y under all c~rcumst an ce~. Citing Napoleon and Frederick the Great. Clausewitz noted these great cap tains, although harboring Intense emo tions, possessed well-educated minds that controlled their desires. Without the noble pride of self-control, he continued, com manders were swept aw,ay by their emotions and thus resorted to blind pass]on Only through self-awareness and experience could the commander learn how, to guard against not only psychological fog but also hls own Intense passions. Nearly a hundred years later, Douglas Southall Freeman claimed self-control was Robert E. Lees supreme leadership trait. Reemphasizing Clausewitzs theories, Free man noted that self-control was Lees pri mary criterion for selectlng his command lieutenants. A brilliant officer who lacked self-control simply was not a candidate for

command in Lees Confederate Army Over and over again, stated Freeman, Lee denied command to ofllcersofwhom he said, I can not trust a man to control others who cannot control himself. Consequently, proper m]lltary charac ter de>,eloped when the officer balanced his Intense emotions with self-control acting as a counterweight Yet, Clausewitz noted, not every oflicer possessed the emotional dispo sition to be a successful commander. He claimed there were four basic types of indi viduals, each with different emotional char acteristics, only one of which was suitable for combat command. He called these four types Imperturbable, sensmve, volatile and Intense qAll in some way or another could contribute to an armys success: however, only the Intense type possessed theemotlon al character to be a great commander. Clausew]tz contended that, because the lmperturable type possessed bulldog-llke tendencies, he could be valuable In some designated m]litary mlsslons. Yet, Clause wvtz continued, too often, the Imperturbable type lacked the initiative and vigor to take bold risks; Thus, th]s type would not make a good commander On the other hand, the senwtlve type often leaped Into new tasks with a great deal of wgor and risk taking. Yet, noted Clausewltz, while trifles stirred the sensltlve type to action, major problems tended to overwhelm him. In war, stated Clause$wtz, the sensltlvetypeshow no lack ~fenergy but they were unlikely to achieve anything s]gmficant unless they possess a very po~verful Intellect to provide the need ed stimulus. The volatlle type, Clausewvtzs third cate gory, became Inflamed with passion very quickly and just as suddenly lost this Inten sity. Thus, claimed Clausewltz, the volatile type possessed gun powder emot]ons that quickly lgmted, sparked, flamed and then died out. Too often the volatlle type lost his composure and self-control, and nothing

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Although IClausewitz] debunked hard and fmt war-fighting rules, he nonetheless believed theory was necessary to provide a standard of reference for proper decisions. He conceded that while wars differed in many zvays, often there were similarities in the ends and means. Thus, a commander needed to study war theory to develop his judgmenf and to provide an understandin.q of a battles sa[ieist conditions.

was worse in active service, said Clause. where oecoura. writz. Inamlnor skirmish, type geous act would sufTice, the volatile of significance, could accomplish something stated (Xausewltz, If this type learned to control hls temper, he could become capable of great military feats. Yet, for the most part, claimed CIausewitz, the volatile types were of little value in society as a whole and therefore of little value in war ,1 Ofall the categories, on [y the intense type possessed the character to become a good military commander. This type, stated Clausewitz, had the deeply rooted emotions that would sustain him in times of supreme difficulty In comparison to the volatile type, the intense type displayed a durable passion that was IIkeheat t.a ashowerof sparks Thus, noted Clausewitz, the in tense type was best able to summon the tl tanjc strength lt takes to clear away the

enormous burdens that obstruct actlvlty in war.- Yet, without the counterweight of tn tellect, even the intense type could lose hls self-control and become cmmed away with bhnd passion, Since Clausewltz wewed war as a msg. ndlcent human drama, he realized there existed a wide variety of human emot]ons, good and bad, that were vltai to Ieadersbip. Some of these emotions motivated com manders to great deeds while others obvi. ously detracted from accomplishments. For instance, he noted envy, generosity, pride, humll!ty and wrath often motivated sol diers to courageous acts< Therefore, more likely than not, a great leader would be an Indlv]dual who displayed intense emotions In the same way Gaius Jullus Caesar displayed an intense ambltlon, I~annIbal an in. tense hatred and Frederick the Great an intense desire for glory.:

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Impllclt m his statements on emotional types, Clausewitz indicated good com manders must possess intense emotions that would sustain them in difficult times. They may be Imperturbable, sensitive and volatile at times, but they must never lose

Implicit in his statements on emotional types, Clausescitz indicated good commanders must possess intense emotions that would sustain them in diftkult times. They tttay be intperturable, sensitive and colatile at times, but they must. . . [use] self discipline to control [their] flaming passions.
L.. . . . -. .,., . . . a

self-control. According to Clausewltz, Just as a compass navigated and regulated a ship through rough seas, the intense type used self-discipline to control his flammg pas sions. Only this character type possessed the strength to stand against the many and varied pressures of war and suffering. The commander must trust his Judgment and stand Ilke a rock on which the waves break m vain, concluded C Iauswwtz. - To balance the commanders Intense pas sions and p~owde him the knowledge to deal with uncertainty, danger and suffering, Clausewitz belleved he must be well edu cated. Smde war was not a science, since there were no theories that could match wars reality, and since there were no pre scriptive rules that were directly applicable. Clausewitz belie~,ed a great commander should possess an imaginative and reflec tive intellect. All officers, despite their rank, he noted, ought to study the profession of arms because even junior posmions of command require outstanding Intellectual qual]tles for outstanding achievement. Thus, in addition to balanclng the com

mand3rs passions, the Intellect provided reference points and standards with the ul timate purpose of not telling him how to act but of developing hqudgment. Clausewltz recognized that commanders needed trmning m both practical and intel. Iectual skdls. While many officers appeared rather simple in comparison to scholars, he noted, We should not dmmiss the value of their practical intelligence. Unlike scholars, the officer must understand his weapons and hm soldiers. In particular. he must know the character, the habits, the virtues and the defects of the soldiers he commands, While It was not necessary to know every weapon, he must know how to properly deploy them. This type of knowl edge, commented Clausewitz, cannot be forcibly produced by an apparatus of scien. tlfic formulas and mechanics; it can only be gained through a talent forejudgment and by the application of judgment to the observa tion of man and matter. In add]tlon to practical intelligence, Clausewltz reahzed theoretical knowledge was Important, Although he debunked hard and fast war-f ight]ng rules, he nonetheless! belleved theory was necessary to provide a standard of reference for proper dec]slons. He conceded that ~vhile wars differed in many w,ays, often there were slmllarltles in the ends and means. Thus, a commander needed to study war theory to develop his judgment and to provide an understanding of a batt les sal lent conditions. Other than actual battle experience, military history provided the best test of this theory, accord ing to Clausewitz. In this medium, the com mander should dlstirigulsh between wars ends and means, and dluminate all phases of warfare in a thorough, critical inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books, commented Clausewltz. It will hght his way, ease hls progress, tram his Judgment and help hlm avoid the pitfalls.]

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Yet, the lessons of mllltary history should not be Ilghtly exam}ned, stated Clausewltz, Too often, he noted, ]rresponslble htin dling of history leads to hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus theorizing It was better, he continued, to study a single military event, well documented and analyzed, than to read about a dozen slmllar events that were superficial lydetalled Seldom, )n these studies, were there complete anyvers. From this research. only degrees of proper and im proper application were available }low. ever, Ifhwtoncal exampIes were ~vell docu mented, then the commander could use the historical forum to expla,n hls Ideas, re qulrements, and plans By comparing ab stract theories, mll]tary history provided some evidence of how, a future doctrine might apply Cla,.tsewltz cautioned commanders not only to study historys emp]rlcal ewdence. but also to take note of the psychological ef-

fects Often a great deal was revealed by the development of a new lveapon, yet more qf ten than not, the weapons psychological ef fect ~vas even more significant Sometimes, poorly led w-m]es retreated affer the first engagement while others stood steadfastly through all dangers Because thepsychologIcal Impact was not alwayb con~ldered, Clause$vitz said that one has to have seen the steadfastness of the forces trmned and led by Bonaparte ]n the course of hw, con quests-seen them under fierce and unre lenting fire-to get some sense of what can be accomplished by troops steeled by long experience of danger. in whom proud record ofvlctones has Instilled the noble principle of placlng the highest demands on thems elves As an Idea alone It IS unbeliev able : Above all else, according to Ciausewitz, a thorough studyvf mdltary history aided the commander in making cr]tlcal judgments

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Of all the decisions a commander must make, to Clausewitz, one was paramount. In the beginning of any conflict and before committing soldiers, the commander must determine the true nature of the conflict: The first, the supreme, the most far-reach ing act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make IS to establish by the test the kind of war on which they are embarkin~ neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn It into, something that IS alien to its nature.~ Consequently, the commanders intellec tual development was foremost in Clause witzs concept of leadership. He believed the intellect served two purposes. First, it was necessary to balance intense emotions; sec ond, it aided critical judgment. With a strong intellect, the commander could un tangle confusion in battle, evaluate ends and means and shed light on the true na ture of war. Ultimately, commanders must use theu mtellect and temperament to turn their knowledge into genuine action.> Unllke other professionals allowed large portions of time to make a major decision, commanders must determine the course of action with a moments notice. During an operation, stated Clausewltz, decisions have usually to be made at onc~ there maybe no time to review the situation or even think It through. Therefore, he stated, the excel lent commander was the individual who was permanently armed with the proper knowledge to deal with wars quickemng tempo. This commander must make unhesi tating, sensitive and discriminating deci sions, and then he must possess the courage to ensure these decisions go Into proper action. These leadership qualities Clause wltz called coup doe~l and determi na tion. According to Clausewitz, a com mander who possessed coup doerl had the ability to quickly conduct an embracing sur vey of the salient battlefield conditions. If

superb leadership emerges unscathed from the relentless struggle with the unforeseen, stated Clausewitz, two qualities were indw pensable First an intellect that, even in the dark est hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second the courage to follow this faint light wher ever it may lead. The first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup d oeil; tbe second is determmation. After proper analysls of the military situ ation, the commander must have the physi cal and moral courage to take action, He must possess the proper mind set that will overcome doubt and fear to push forward with the mission. Because war was m the realm of danger, stated Clausewitz, courage was the soldiers first requirement. According to Clausewitz, courage was dif ficult to define. In an engagement, he noted, soldiers displayed three behavior patterns. Inltlally, the soldier wanted to avoid danger and flee. Since thw, was not possible, the sol diers Intense concern for personal survival became apparent In a display of anxiety and fear. Only when the soldlers concern for proper conduct overcame hls desire for sur vival dld courage appear. Clausewltz called courage a noble emotion that often neutral ized fear and countered the soldiers concern for surmval In the face of danger.$ He con sidered It a key element of an armys morale: Physical casualties are not the only loss es Incurred by both sides In the course of en gagement; their moral strength is also shaken, broken, and ruined. In deciding whether or not to continue the engagement It is not enough to consider the loss of men, horses and guns; one also has to weigh the loss of order, courage, confidence, cohesion, and plan.] Clausewitz belleved there was a hierar chy of courageous behaviors, beginning with physical courage, then moral courage, then determination and finally boldness.

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Physical courage often occurred in individ uals who lived in societies in wh]ch life was not held in high esteem&This primitive type of physical courage was an inbred habit and therefore very dependable. In contrast, indi viduals living In modern societies in whmh life was held in high esteem displayed phys ical courage developed out of strong emo tions, such as patriotism and ambltlon. Al though the prlmltlve type of physical cour age was more dependable, often these primitive individuals lacked the boldness to be great leaders. According to Clausewitz, moral courage differed from physical courage. Moral cour age included a willingness to face powerful psychological pressures; make a decision and accept the responsibility for actions Moral courage developed from strong emo tions governed by the intellect CIausewitz claimed the intellect needed to arouse the qua] Ity of courage, which then supports and sustains the commander m action. Yet, he noted, commanders needed both physical and moral courage. When the commander displayed both of these types for long peri ods of time, then he possessed determina tion. Determination was a long-term cour age that overrode the commanders agonies of doubt and perils of hesitation. Between the extremes of foolhardiness and timidity was the capacity for creative

Between the extremes of

foolhardiness an timidity was the
capacity for creatiue % isktaking, based
on successful calculations and deter mined courage, which Clausewitz called boldness.

rlsktaklng, based on successful calcu lations and determined courage, which Clausewltz called boldness. In great bat. ties, boldness was always necessary. As a form of risk taking, Clausewitz considered boldness a noble quallty that allowed a com mander to rise above the engagements menacing danger to prowde the proper lead ership. Boldness, Clausewitz said, was the very metal that gives edge and luster to the sword.. Clausewitz also noted, however, that boldness can degenerate into either timidity or foolhardiness. Of the two, timidity was a thousand times more destructive because it allowed the enemy to take advantage of the commanders loss ofequibbrium.ti On the oth er hand, foolhardiness occurred when the com mander failed to consider the safety of his sol diers, faded to carefully consider tbe meansat hand and allowed his blind passion to control his actions. O&en, stated Clausewitz, foolhar diness occurred when a commander was so far

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from the battle that he allowed his imagina tion to replace reality. Whi Ie many contemporary writers de scribe leadership in the managerial terms of routinization and efficiency, Clausewitzs

In Clausewitzs view, very few in dividuals had an aptitude for military leadership. . . . Leadership aptitude was an exclusice product of neither heredity nor environment. Indeed, claimed Clausewitz, potential leaders must first of all be born with the proper tentper ament, and then they must acquire military ski[ts through rigorous sthdy ofpractical and theoretical knowledge.

apprOach Included all the distinct elements of combat and suffering. More than any oth ermilitary theorist, he viewed leadership In a setting where danger, uncertainty and doubt plagued everyone. Excellent milltary leadership occurred when an Indlvldual, surrounded by doubt and uncertainty, made proper decisions and possessed the courage to ensure his ideas went Into action. In this type ofenvlronment, the difference between a good leader and a poor one was most obvlOUS. The excellent leader had the ability to see through the psychological fog to deter mme the true nature of events, never as suming them to be something they were not or allowlng wishful thinking to obscure hls analysls Clausewltz called this leadership skill coup doet/. A second part of excellent leadership included the courage to turn de cisions Into posit}ve action. For Clausewitz, phys]cal courage, moral courage, determi nation and boldness were all forms of cour age and extremely valuable attrlbutesofex cellent leadership. Thus the bas]c concept of command leadership Included both coup doeil and courage.

classicaI military theories, and courage consistently reap pear as primary attributes of excellent Lead ership. For instance, in his classic, The In /7uence of Seapower Upon HLsfory, Alfred Thayer Mahan claimed Admiral David Far ragut possessed astonishingcoup doedand a daring with which, in unforeseen crisis, he snatched and secured victory.+ Field Mar shal Rommels biographer said the general possessed Flngerspttzengefuhl, an innate sense of what the enemy was about to do. S. L. A. Marshall said leadership was by rough approximation, 60 per cent the ability to anticipate; and 40 per cent. the ability to improvise.h Consequently, good military leadership occurred when an indi vidual properly analyzed a situation and then applled the proper action. This, claimed Clausewitz, was the fundamental essence of good leadership. In Clausewitzs wew, very few individ uals had an aptitude for military leader ship. Because few Indiwduals possessed a highly developed passion for mihtary life, truly great military leaders were rare, Con sequently, this leadership aptitude was an exclusive product of neither heredity nor en vironment. Indeed, claimed Clausewitz, po tential leaders must first of all be born with the proper temperament, and then they must acquire mihtary skdls through rigor ous study of practxal and theoretical knowl edge. Good leadership, therefore, was a product of certain inherent aptitudes, in tense emotions and lifelong study. While the practical aspects of soldiering could be learned on the job, he was adamant in his suggestion that all otlcers must examine the theory of war by extensively studying military history. A highly developed intel lect provided two essential leadership quali ties. Frost, with the study of military history and other subjects, the potential leader ac quired some reference standards to aid his ability to judge situations and then conduct
coup doetl

Throughout

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operations. Second, a highly developed lrrtel lect served as an instrument of self-control to restrain intense emotions that could evolve in to blind passion, recklessness or timidity. From experience and observation, Clause witz said, excellent mllltary leadership in cluded the sort of mind that was inquiring rather than the creat]ve mind, the compre hensive rather than the specialized ap proach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children and the safety and honor of our country. To say a thing was excellent, stated C. S. Lewis, was merely to express ones feeling about a subject. These feelings, he contin-

ued. were nothinc ., more than sensations that individuals were socially conditioned to believe.ti In Clausewitzs case, few mili tary theorists can match hls years of condi tioning m war, his study of military history, and his direct observation of good and poor leadership examples. More than anyone else, he possessed the cr]tical social condi tioning to determine the true nature of ex cellent military leadership. More tharr any one else, he established tbe standards by which all other examples of mditary leader ship should be measured. Thus, Clausewltz ought to be the first authority and primary gmde for preparing current military leader ship development programs. %

NOTES
! Berard M ~,,,.o ,93, Bass S!ogd,i s H.nobr33kof Leadership [N* c
)

Yok Mac

23 ?4

lb>d 139 Peter Pare,

C$a.sewfz

and

,.

S,,!.

{L.,.

OxlOrd U,var,#Q

2 Jeflrey Re53r0 The Fcrlne$ol W,, H,,c,,, s Aor,l 1980 ?9 23 3 Ed..rd N Lttwak ThePen?awn ,0 !., 4 of War ,New York S> r,. 8 %,,,,, ,984) ,9 of Peace a< War ,LoM CaVbr80qe 4 W B G, ,. Ph,low,?hers
Press 5 ,!3?8, h$ClkW 4, Howard CtauWW,12 (New YOrh 0s10 d .,.,,s,[)

P?,,, 1976, ,99 0 25 O..s,. >%, har 1>7

26 27 ,0, ,bfd 7,1
75

Press

,983) 60
on war m M owe, ho..sra and Pew Paret 6 K.ri . . . Clausew,!z 1s!?6, 84 (P,.,. NJ Pr.meton ,ver$,! ,...s 7 S.s(, Hen? 1(00,1 tlarl The GhOS, Of N.WOEO, LOQO. Faber 8 F?.

Oer 7931) 21 8 C!a,eiwu 0. Ww 47 9 U.(t,d S1.31?$ M,lrtaP/.4Cadem ,,m> CJ.. W.,,7 and S,.,,1?,. lWe$l Po,nt NY U S MItav AcaoemYPre.. 19431 10 Cla.se.#Lz on war 178 , , l.,d !.49 ,2 ID>, 1,2 13 IM 10C ,4 Rcha.,d M, Keen. }.,P3c7GIo to 4.s,0,,. ,New Ymi The hbd?r LI brq 1947) 333 0. W., ! 00 15 ClauseW!&
16 17 18 lm ~04 ,D>O ,05 Dou9a% %t-all Freewa !06 Lee 4 Bmgmoh, (Nw Yorti SChr(bP, 5

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 . 42 43 44

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Awec T Ma,, .dd,ess .1 C,,,. u s Nav., w m College The Pm eedgs ,,, ,Decmtw <P,88, ,4 6? 1 ?9 45 Srother,

. A T Mahan Presden! o! lhe

., the U!I.U Stale, Naval !.s!, FOX (New VOr Har!3ers & Pub

Des..

Yong Ram-e,

Tt!e Desefl

s. 193513182 19 Cla.,m.,tz On War 20 1b>O

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19511 1$6 Fre (Goticestm, MA PeInr Suth

46 $ L A ha.,hall $./,. Awm,r <.s,,, ,978, ,08 47 Cla.sew !2 0. w,, ,>2

48 C S k-s 7he 5,,

g E,e\New

York

Ba)laP,ne@mk,

<967). ?0,

DonaldD Chtpman t, therduc.tton.ladt iwrto fh? Commandant. Sqn.dron Offrwr S.hool, Au Unuersq, Maxwell ALrForceBase, Montgommy, Alabamn He IS also a commandm m the US Naual Reserue With a Ph D from Florth State Unmer. ?u,v, he has .wwd 0S an 1IZS1IUC1O, at the Naual Actanom Schools Command, Nalal .4w .51atlon, ppn,a,d., F1.nda, and on the faculty .t Ge.rw. Southwestern College. A.wncus, Geoww

MILITARY REVIEW

August 1987

39

_,. .

.,,

\y-/

The new udcanced dicisiw and corps Iewl cor?zl?lzlrticatiottssJ{s tcm, .Uohile Subscriber Equipment l.lLSfi.I,should siqniticntzt[y ifuprot,e butt[#ie[d command amt control [(). This urticle e.canz ines the ron.qe of C methods currentlq arai[ahle to the corn monder, describes the .11.S.? ,sqstem a]fd anal,qzcs it> effect.s WI(..

( ()!1111011 1 to
for szipe,r[cw

q[

Opel

ot[i117s

{.s the

lltl-c,s,slt~

rommand

and

control

I+eld Manual

1[1(}5.op,,ror,,m,

.?JLY Jn all. encompasmn~ compri,. hensl~e and complete command and control 1C-) system can meet the extensive demands the LIS Army places on It This complex C system must consist of methods that are automated and manual, mechani. cal and human tstlc, direct and Indirect, and permissive and restrlct{~,e The methods are synergistic They must be mutually sup. povtlng and used concurrently because no single method by Itself can guarantee supe-

rior C The US Army demands that Its c, system h,~ndle the followlng tasks. 0 Support the commanders dec]~lon.
mak]ng process on a battlefield character-
ized by nonllnear, rapid-paced operatlon~,
lethal systems, eiectron]c warfare ~d chaos o \lultlply the dynamics of combat power. maneuver, firepower, protect,o and leadership. o Support the AlrLand Battle lmpera tlvm The upcomln~ fielding of the }Iobile Sub scriber F;qurpment {LISEI promlsescIramat m Improvement of all aspects of C-. This new

40

August 1987.

MILITARY REVIEW

communications system for division and corps level will be fielded throughout the US Army by 1994, starting with the 1st Cavalry D]~rlslon m February 1988.

Displte the technological advances made in Information processing and commrrnica tions, the basic methods of C have remained the same th+rougbout the history of warfare and fall into three broad categories: e Organization (Ieadershiplcommand and statT1. COMMAND AND CONTROL . e Processes e Facilities {command posts and com \lewed separately, command and control munications}. have adyrramlcrelationshlp, and the battle Achieving superior C:requires fully mtr= grating these Each of these tield requires a balance of both. Like situa components. tional leadership, commanders must use broad components has methods that kon trlbute to meetmg the demands on the C. command and control methods to respond system. effectively and efflc]ently to the battlefield. The tactical situation, level of threat, trust of subordinates, leadership style of the com Organization mander, Intensity of the battle. condit Ions of Leadership on the battlefield hasanex the unit and the fog and friction of war area panded meaning. Not only must a com few of the parameters commanders use to mander possess Ieadersbip qualities and decide the extent to which they use com abllmes. but also he must per-form specific mand or control or both. actmns to ensure success. Accordlrrg to FM Command IS a dynamic process m which 1005, the most essential element ofcom commanders receive freedom of action to bat power IS compeh?nt and confident leaderuse Inltlative to achieve goals on the battle s/Itp. Leadership provides purpose, dlrec tlon, and motii,atlon in combat. Com field. Commanders intent communicates priorities and dlrectlon. Control, on the othcrlttcal functions to perform manders have ontbebattlefield Field Circular (FCllO1 erhand, imphesconstrained action in which subordlrrates do not have unfettered free 55, Crrrps o17ri Drrlsion Command and Con trol, describes these funct]ons, such as domtooperate Theymust follow dwections knowing the sltuatmn, .mslgmng missions, and mstructlons communicated through making decisions, dlrectlng and synchro specific orders. mzlng forces, allocating means and sustain A good defirritlon of C needs to encompass ing forces. both of these terms and the spectrum of The C system must Support thecom methods avadable. According to one theo mander In accomplishing these tasks. On r]st, C IS the exercise of command, the the battlefield, must be where means of planning and dlrectirrg engage commanders they can best influence the outcome by real ments and battles. Its essence hes m apply locating forces, changing missions or pro ing Ieadershlp, the ability to make concise, vidlngsupport. rapldassessments oftactlcal sltuatlons, deThe C system must be flexl ble enough to allow for the mobility of the cislon making, and supervision of the commanders andto allow them to perform actions resultlng from those decisions. In their critical tasks from anywhere on the practice. It concerns the orgamzatlon. proce battlefield. dures, and techniques that allow the com Commanders must also esta;lish and mander to Implement hx+ will in pursmt of communicate their vision of the battle to hls assigned mmslons.:

MILITARY REVIEW

August 19S7

41

will in purstut of the units objective. The subordinate commanders. According to FM deeislon-making process is a systematic, 1005, it is imperative that the overall ten-step approach used to arrive at and exe commanders intent and concept of opera cute tactical decisions F*M 1015 states tions be understood throughout the force. that It IS the procedures and techmques Commanders need to pass this intent used to find out what M going on, to decide what action to take, to issue InstructIons, and to supervise execution.. This process Commanders hate critical must be efficient, continuous and proactive. functions to perform on the batt[etield The smooth, controlled flow of Information . . . such as knowing the situation, will facilitate the process. assi.gnin.g missions, making decisions, The final result of the decision-makmg directing and synchronizing forces, process IS an operations order Orders, a[locati.n.q means and must be clear and expllcit and as brief as is sustamm.q forces. B consmtent with clarity and should be orig inated and disseminated m time to permit subordinate commanders the max]mum through operations orders and personal con ensures dissemination time. Good C of orders to subordinate uruts as rapidly as ferences with subordinates. FM 1005 also possible recommends that subordinate leaders re ceive their orders face-to-face from their commanders.> Thorough understanding of Facilities Command posts ICPS) support the decl the Intent by subordinate commanders fa slon maker by provldlng the decwlon maker cilitates command and decreases the re quirements for control. a structural framework to facll ltate decmon A commander requires assistance In per. making CPS are the focal point for plan mng, conducting and sustamlng operations forming h]s C respons]blllties, and hls staff on the battlefield. Corps and divis]on nor should play an important part In coordinat mally operate ing the execution of his intent by perform three command posts: ma]n, tactical and rear. The mlsslons ~ary, but mg such critical functions as coordinating each CP must .sur~,lve, operate and plan. Be operations, obtalnmg and providing infor cause CPS are to detec mation, preparing plans and orders, and suh!ghly vulnerable tion, Iocatlon and destruction, they requn-e pervising execution. According to FM 101 specific act]ons to ensure survival. CPS also 5, The Sta ff and Com bat Orders, the staff require organlzatlon, design, and manning secures and furnishes such mformatlon as to allow the commander and the staff to effi may be required by the commander, pre ciently execute the current battle and to pares the details of hls plan, translates hls plan for future operations decision and plan Into order~, and causes Malntainlng C requmes commumcatlons such orders to be transmitted to the troops both vertically Personal An efflclent and well-trained staff is there and bonzontally. visits by commanders, IIalson oftlcers and fore crlt]cal to the control of the battle. messengers or voice or data systems can pro vide methods of exchanging information. Pfocesses This communications system needs to be re The decision-making process accomphsh liable, secure and able to support the quick es the purpose of C, which Is, according to pace of the battlefield. FM 1oI5, to implement thecommanders

42

August 1987 * MILITARY REVIEW

Types of information processed on the bat because it w]ll provide dig dramatic change ital secure communicatlonsto both mobile tlefield include voice, record traffic, data and static users. MSE is the equivalent of an and position location and require various kinds of equipment. Scheduled for fielding advanced telephone system with stationary telephones and mobile radio terminals, as in 1988, SIN CGARS (Single Channel well as facsimile Ground and Amborne Radio System) will re devices and the capability to accommodate data terminals. place the VRC-12 family of radios and WI1l The MSE subsmvber WIII find the new sys pass voice and data. Its frequency-hopping tem more user friendly than the current ability makes it harder to locate and jam. system for several Another communications system under de reasons. Fwst, MSE auto matically connects users to the people they velopment is the Army Automatic Data Dis are calling. Mobile and static users can easi tribution System (ADDS). This system will lyplace phone calls. They simply dial the be capable of passing secure, antljam data phone number using fixed directory num required for the Army Tactical Command bers, and the MSE system automatically and Control System (ATACCS). It will also finds the called party, anywhere on the bat be capable of determining positional and tlefield, and connects the call. Because of nawgatlonal data. this automation, users do not need to know the switchboard system. The system auto matically connects calls and roptes them MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT around damaged or busy systefns using flood search routing. Second, uScrowned and operated MSE will replace the current switch facsimile and data terminals have replaced communications centers and board, multichannel and communications radio teletype and now handle hard copy re center system atdivlsion andc?rps. It isa

.&J
MILITARY REVIEW

August 1987

43

CPS are the focal point for planning, conducting and sustaining operations
on the battlefield. Corps and division normally operate three comrnandposts: main,
tactical and rear. The missions uarp. but each CP must suruice, operate andplan,
so theg require specific actions to elzsare their surviral.

through the system at a data rate up to 9600 cord tra~c messages. Third, selected key baud. users w]ll no longer have to stay at a desk The employment of MSE WIII be different with a telephcm~ now they vull be able to from that of the current dlvw,lon and corps communicate through the entire system commumcatlons systems With hlSE the dl. from their vehvdes. Fourth, the system also wsion signal battallon and the corps signal has such other features as call forwarding, brigade WIII work together to prowde an ln preprogrammed conferencing and corn. tegratedcommunlcatlons network through pressed dlahng. out the battlefield Static and mobile users can have exactly The basic bruldlng blocks of the MSE sys. the same capability. Static users m com tern are the node centers, which are identi mand posts have a telephone (Digital Noncal and interchangeable throughout the secure Vo]ce Terminal [DNVTI) equipped battlefield A with a data port to connect djrectly to a fac corps area with five dlk,l s]ons will have 42 node centers. A dlvlslon simile machine or a data terminal. .Mobde users have a Mobile Subscriber Radiotele w]II have four node centers, signal battal]on and corps signal battalions WIII have four or phone Terminal 1MSRT),whlch they can six node centers. They will make up the grid also use with facsimiles and data terminals. net~vork (backbone system) Node centers This MSRT system M similar to that of consist of a node center switch, Ilne of sight a mobile cellular telephone The dlgltal {LOS) mult)channel systems, down-the-hill facslmlle machine can transmit one page radios, a radio-access unit 1RAL1) and sys of black and white In 15 seconds The tem management facilities. The LOS multldata terminal can transmit messages

44

August

1987.

MILITARY

REVIEW

P.-A .

r--

..

MSE will replace the currefd switchboard, multichannel and

communications center system at division and corps. It is a dramatic change
because it willprovide digital secure communications to both mobile and static
users. MSE is the equivalent of an advanced telephone system with stationary telephones and mobile radio terminals, as rvell as facsimile devices and the capability to accommodate data terminals.

channel systems IInk node centers to other node centers From these backbone nodes, extension . nodes establlsh eommumcations In CPS and headquarters. LOS multichannel systems connect these,extenslon nodes, e]ther large or small, depttnding on optimum subscriber density, to one or more n6de centers. Switchboards at the extension nodes provide service to static users and allow them to enter the total area commurrlcat]ons system. The numerous extension nodes do not need to be near the C Ps they support. For example, down-the-hill radios allow the CP to be up to eight kilometers from the node. hlost headquarters at brigade level and most combat support and combat service support battalions will have small extension nodes; large extension nodes are for larger headquarters

MoblIe user access to the MSE network is through RAUS. Each node center deploys w,lth two RAUS geographically dkmbuted on the battlefield to provide continuous communications to all users on the move in corps and division areas. MSRTS with a range of 15 kdometers are automatically af. fi listed to the nearest RAU as users move around the battlefield. MSE provides numerous phones and MSRTS at corps and division levels. Each division WII1 have 175 MSRTS and 500 DNVT phones, and a corps vail have 800 MSRTS and 3,500 phones. Mareuverbattallons will typically have two hfSRTs that will allow them to connect to the entire communica tions system. One majoi change is that users will now be responsible for, installing, maintaimng and operating their phones, MSRTS, facsimiles and terminals,

MILITARY REVIEW

* Augusl 1987

45

tasks by allolvlng them to obtain timely in put during the planning process, to synchro mze plans and tocommunlcate plans and in tent to subordinates Finally, commanders can communicate the{r Intent more easily because ofsecure, reliable communjcat~ons, and ]ncreased moblllty will allow more per sonal vlslt~ to subnrdlnate commanders Staff functions and the decislm-making process ~v}ll impro~,e significantly under MSE becau>e the flow of ]nformatlon. In and out of headquarters, WV]]be more rellable. II WIII be e~sler to find out what M going on From these backbone uodes. .]nd easier to i~sue InstructIons D~strlbu extension nodes establish cent m uui tIon of orders and plans w]II Improw as they cations in CPS and headquarters. go through the hISE system using facsimile. LOS multichannel systems connect which emphasizes the Informality of Infer. these extension nodes, either large or matlon and permits reliable, direct and small, dependia,g on optimum sah rapid dlssernl nation This rapid dlstrlbu scriber den.sit.q, to one or more node tlon allows subordinate commanders more centers. .Twitch boards at the cxtcnsiou plannlng time LISL v.*II1aptlmize the use nodes prouide sercice to static users oftlme by routine use ofwarnlng order~, ~lt. and atlow them to enter the tota[ area uatlon updates, and antlc]patory planning coat at an ica tious s.qstenl. and pos]tlonlng uf forces iMSE will have a great effect on command po~t. overall CP surv!vabll}ty w]I1 ln creaw hecauke of greater dispersal, qlcker klSE wli 1 impro~re the responsl>wness of and displacement C because, according to FM 1005. the uI a reduced electronic and physical stgnature (Ps WIII become more timate measure of successful command and efficient because LISft aliows for rapid corn. control effectiveness IS whether the force munlcatlon of plan> and orders and for con functions more effectively and more quickly tlnuou> operations than the enemy. Cl% and their s!gnal s!te can Prlmarlly, hlSE WIII Increase the moblll supporting be more dlhpersed under the MSE >ystem ty of commanders because It allows continuCurrently. wire and cable IImltatlons force OUS, rellable, secure communications from CPS and msoctated units Into a small area virtually anywhere on the battlefield Com The MSE down-tbe-hlil radios and MSRTs, manders can be at the decisive points on the however. wtll support a more dispersed arr battietield. such as at the CP, In them vehi angement. Tbe cles or at subordinate CPS dlscussins opera smaller CPS can displace tions. They can lead from any crlticai point more rapidly because signal sites provide communications on the battlefield. MSE w1ll prowde flexi on an area bas!s and are not required to be with or necessarily affill. bility and mobility to commanders without ate w,lth specific units With MSE, CP setup depriving them of the ability to respond to and teardown tlmet are much shorter be. oppOrtunltles or changing cwcumstances cause of fewer wire and cabllng require. with the whole force. MSE M,I1lalso assist ments The reduction of high frequency commanders In accompllsh{ng their crltlcal

46

August

1987

. MILITARY REVIEW

em{tters and overall unit dwpersal reduces MSE trill improce the respou the electronic signature. siceness of Cl because, accordiny to CPS will be more efficient because MSE FM 100-5, the ultimate measure of WIII permit rapid exchange of information. successful conttnand and control effec MSE will also allow CPS, primarily tactical, tiveness is tvhether the force by providing to operate continuously functions more effectively and ntore telephone-llke service to users even while quickly than the enemy. on the move. MSES greatest effect on C- maybe that It can support the type of operations envi sioned in AmLand Battle, Tactical opera MSfi offers a tions may require swift and frequent move magmtude of Increased capa ment, rapid change to the offensive and nonbility over the aged and cumbersome com Ilnear operations. MSE can multlply the munications system curcently in use, espe dynamics of combat power by assisting com cially when fielding IS complete throughout manders to maneuver and concentrate the Army in the next seveti years forces at the critical point. Maneuver umts The full assessment of the effects of MSE WI1l begin with the 1st Ca~,alry DivIslon in can remain highly mobile without losing the summer of iMSE may communications support. MSE helps con 1988 Although need some break-In adjustments, as nor serve tightmgpotential, making it harder to mally occurs wvth new systems and struc find CPS and maneuver units. MSE can tures, MSE should dramatically improve a keep up with operations over the depth of tactical commanders capabilityto meet the the,battlefield and prowde commanders the challenges facing the Army mthe 1990sand flexlbllity and freedom to operate independ beyond % ently thet FM 1005 reqtures.

NOTES

Ma0, stem..

E n..,,

C.mand m,

co.,,., c. tent IJs h,,

4 5 6

,X
,C US

4
21

Demmmnt .+ Che Armv FM301 5 Fm=smna..co.. a,ome

MajorFred E Dzerks?ww-r w m the Cooperam,e Degree Pmgranz, Florid. T.stttute of Technology Center, Red.tonettrwnal, Alabama He recemed a B S from the US MLILtaq Amdemy and L. a grad. uate of USACGSC He has seruedas an armor bat. tahon and a brigade szgnal ofjfcer m the WI Armored Diwmon, F?&ral Rqmbhc of Germanj, as a company comma. deranda battahon S3 m the Ist Infantry Dumon IMechanmd]. Fort Rdey, Kansas, and as an assignment officer at the Mdz. tary Personnel Center, Alexandra. Vrrguua

MILITARY REVIEW

. August 19s7

47

VIEWP OINTS

\
Just what is Commanders Intent? US Army publications offer
several definitions of the concept. Many commanders, instructors,
sotdiers and students have their own interpretation of what the
concept is aad how to apply it. Where shoutd it appear in the opera tions order? How lony or short should it be? Shoutd it describe the
how or just the desired resutt? The three Viewpointspresented
here add to the discussion of commanders intent, attempt to an
J swer some of these questions, and highlight some of the mam points of the debate over this relatively new, but important, sub-

~: On the Commander Intent ~

!; ....

k.

,/ C

APTAIN Greens company moves through surprisingly weak resistance during the counterattack and eas]ly secures Its objective Green hopes all is going as well for the rest of the attacking forces so that they WIII then easily reestablish the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area i m prepara tion for the coming offensive Suddenly he notices enemy vehleles mo~lng r~pldly 10 their rear Grabbing the handset, Green rialls h]s commander, but radio commun]ea tlons are out. \Vhat a target, he thinks do I attack or stand fast on my objective? Several kilometers to the north, I.leuten ant Colonel Grimm also finds the going much easier than he had anticipated. Al though not yet at their objectives, hls com pany commanders should be there shortly. A call coming in from the commander of Company C breaks these pleasant thoughts: a lucrative target is in the battallon sector to

the north ofhls attacking units. Grimm re allzes that he can swing his units north and take advantage of this unexpected opportu nity, but that in so doin~ he would fall to make hls ObjectIves on time. He ponders the sltuatlon do 1 strike north, or is the battal ~on objective the pr~me target? These two scenarios address simple exam ples In ~vhlch the commanders intent could act to guide subordinate unit leaders in the absence of du-ectlon from seniors If Greens and Grimms commanders had properly briefed these subordinates on their respec tive Intents regarding the missions at hand, each umt leader could quickly make a decl slon, confident that ]t would support the ob jectives of the larger force of which they were a part. The commanders intent is receiving a great deal of attention as a means ofdescrib-

50

August

1987

MILITARY

REVIEW

VIEWPOINT

]ng the commanders wsuallzatlon of an op eration and what he expects to achieve as a result of unit execution Paragraph 3a of unit operation orders 10PORD I states the intent of the commander at the level to which the OPORD apphes. The Intent of the commander one level higher IS in paragraph lb Some commanders in the field state their intent during preoperatlon briefs In three to five minute~: others take an hour and expand upon the entire OPORD What M this commanders Intent, and how can a commander effectively communicate It to hls subordinate unit leaders> Current doctrine w,rlters are wrestllng w,]th the definition and best means of cmn. municating the commanders Intent. One Fort Leavenworth text, for example, defines It as the statement of what the h]gher com mander visualizes the battlefield WIII look Ilke as a result of accompllshlnS the mls s{on This IS stated In terms of the status of the enemy and the posture of the unit In other words. the Intent communicates what the result of an operation should be in the minds eye of the commander The Armys manual on terms and syrnbol~, hwvever. de fines the commanders Intent as the com manders vlslon of the battl+how he ex pects to tight and what he expects to accom plish rhe cr!tlcal dlffereace between thew two delinltlons IS scope. The first definition de scribes ~vhat the commander hopes to find after [he battle, the second also tell> how to acble~ t such an objective Both deflnltlons require that th~, commanders lnt~.nt b~ more than a restatement of the mlsston. but the, first. unllke the second. does not lm plngeon the territory covered bv the concept of the operatlan Hoivever. ne]ther ade quately provides the commander a warktibl[, concept forspeclfylng his Intent tn the field. The Importance of the debate ]s ob~,tous The mission statement denotes the what.

when, who and where of an operation. The concept of operation details the how of mis sion accomplishment. The mission state. ment cannot afford the space or the time to

The comaznaders inteat is

vccciriag a great deal ofattcatiaa as o
awaas of describing the cam m rzacters
risaali:a t iali of aa aperat ioa a aft w{t at
he e.vpects to acizirm as a resalt af
aait e.rwwfion. . . . same Voauaffali(ws
ia tlw tic[tt state their iatflat davia,q
prcoperatiaa bricfv ia th ret> ta tire
miaates; othem take an hoar aad c.v paafl apoa the eatiw 01(W).

describe how to act in contingency situa tions such as those Green and Grimm faced. The concept of the operation is a descrip tion of the commanders battle execution; It is the how that denott+the means ofmlssion accomplishment It too cannot cover all pos sible branches and sequels to the operat]on. The commanders Intent spans the gap be tween the broad statement of mwslon and the detslls of the concept It also sets the frame~vork wlthln which the commander structures hls mlss]on statement and con. cept of theoperatlon. The mlsslon statement and concept are both derivatives of the com manders intent, but neither fully achle~,es the scope or depth of that intent. The commanders Intent IS the statement of Ills purpose for Imtlatlng an operation. It IS that to which a subordinate can look for guidance In the absence of orders. In hls few Ilnes or several minutes, the commander must commumcate that which he wants hls leaders to remember ~vhen they face the un expected intent defines the essence of the operation Because It should be utmost ]n the subordinatesmind, It should be broader

MILITARY REVIEW

* August 1987

51

In >cope and more farsighted than the mls slon statement Lyhen ,a suhordlnatc, faces u sltuatlon outside the scope nf the mlsslon. hls superiors Intent should guide hlm In the absence of specific instructions, the sub. ordinate should act In accordance wvth the Intent. knowing that hls actions thereby fit with the master plan Intent does not in ciude guidance on how to conduct an opera tion. for the commander reallzes the lmpos siblilty of Identlfylng every contingency, much iess howto act when confronting each

iiow does the commander communicate this intent to hls leaders ]n a manner that concisely conveys the crlt]cal information~ Envlslonlng the battlefield after the opera tion M dlfflcuit, to communicate such a vL won tasks the most eloquent officer. Rather, the commander must communicate what his umt IS to do m the frame of reference of the big picture HIS statement of intent shouid provide subordinates a framework for anaiyzlng which branches or sequeis to the primary course of action wouid support

52

August 1987

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VIEWPOINT
the commanders objectives. This statement of Intent must be concise, so the subordinate leader can grasp it readily and retain it easi ly in his mind as he moves to mission accom plishment. The commanders intent M a statement of essence: what M the overriding objective for this and related operations? With an understanding of the com manders Intent, both Green and Grimm could act with confidence that they were supporting their commander Each could see thesituatlon at hand, analyze it with re gard to what he knew was his commanders Intent, and act accordingly. Two examples of tbe commanders intent follow. Each makes the overriding objective of the opera tion clear to subordinates wlthput attempt mg to Identify spemfic branches or sequels to the original operation. Intent 1: We w]ll reestablish the FEBA In preparation for the corpss counterattack through our dlvls]on sector, Our Job Ih to es tablish the launching pad for the corpss killing blow; you must secure the key ter rain assi~ed to each of you Intent 2 The diwslon now wrests the lnl tlatlve from the threat forces and puts them to their heels. The primary Objective IS de struction of the enemys ablllty to fight

The contmmzders intent spurts

the gop betzceeu the broad statement
of mission and the detaiis oftlle concept. It also sets the framework uitllin which the contn#and@r strac- tares his mission statpment and concept of the operation. Tbe mission statemeat aad concept are both derira tires of the comntanderrin ten t, bat aeither fally achietws the scape or depth of that intea t.

In the first case, the terrain objectives specltied In the mlsslon statement are ofpri. mary Importance, so Green and C.rlmm know that they must forgo their targets of Opportunity. In the second intent statement, the commander has clearly stated that de struction of tbe enemy M the number one obJectlve, so our leaders know that they should ]mmed]atelyexplolt any Iucratlv.e targets of OppOrtunW. The commander who carefully and conc}sely states hls Intent greatly in creases the odds that hls subordinates will act as be would have them qct when they face the unexpected %

NOTES

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.3

.. . .

.. . ... .

o you want to find out about com quires first deciding what It should be, what Possibly you have manders Intent. it should look like, what it should do, how we had to write one, read one or Interpret one should develop It, who should write it and operations. during the course of tactmal order where lt should go In our operations Like many of us, you may have heen conin corn. format If you are Interested fused about what it should or did say. The you should behang manders Intentand wide variations In the content, the form and on because Im going to attack some sacred the purpose of commanders Intent have cows contributed to this confusion. Should corn. Whet is it? manders intent be and do whatever the Commanders intent has been bouncing commander deems necessary, or does It around for about seven years now We have a specific purpose In our operations or should know what lt E,, yet conslderab]e der format? I belleve commanders Intent has a unique and crltlcal role in the comcontroversy remains. So lets start with some defintt,os. Commanders Intent IS the mand and control of the AirLand Battle. It should provide reformation that comple commanders statement of strategy. Now, thats strategy with a smal 1s not strategy ments but does not repeat or replace infor with a blg S, as Opera mation found elsewhere in the current oper in the Strategy, ations order. It should not continue to be the tmnal Art and Tactics espoused In Field Manual (FM ) 1005, Operations It the is catchall for Important factors of an opera tactical strategy of the commander What tion that the commander or his staff want to repeat or emphasize. Standardizing the role the commander is trying to achieve and the cr]ttcal aspects of and the purpose of commanders Intent re how he hopes to achieve it,

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Commanders intent is not only the com It may take many forms depending on the
manders statement of strategy but also the level it addresses. At the operational level
commanders means of measuring success. (campaign plans), it%ay describe the cap It is the criteria of relevance or the meas ture or destruction of enemy centers of grav urement of effectiveness. It 1s not the mis ity. In low-intensity operations, it may spec sion statement or the concept of operations, for both of these ideas come from com manders mtent, but are distinct from it. Comrnanders irtteut is the
The mission statement includes the critl commauders stcdemeut ofstrcrteg!l.
- cal tasks that the commander deduces will ,1ou~thats strateg~ with a small s not
result in achieving his intent. Can a subor strate.g,y with a big S, as in the Stra dinate commander accomplish the mission tegy, Operational Art aad Tactics and fall the intent? Yes! espoused in Field Mauual (FM) 1007, . For example, perhaps the intent M to pen Operations. /t the tactical strategy is etrate enemy defensive posit]ons, drive deep of the commander. into his rear area and force the commitment of the enemys 2d echelon tank regiment. The commander may receive the mission of .. seizing an assigned objective deep in the en by which forces are.to ac Ify the conditions emys rear that should force the commitor it may define polifical or cept combat, ment of the enemy reserve. If he penetrates pacification goals. At the tactical level, It the enemy defenses and seizes the Objective may state what you are trying to force tbe but does not cause the commitment of the enemy to do or explaln the relevance of the enemys reserve, then he has failed to ac to the result you are try current operation complish the Intent. ing to ach]eve. Finally, it may define some future condition of the battlefield based These criteria of relevance or this meas urement of success should contain the crvtlcal upon your operation and the relationship that condition would have to subsequent op why of the operatmn. This why IS not In the erations. who, what, when, where or even why of the If you have to write the commanders ]n mmslon statement. These crltsma of relevance tent paragraph, should appear clearly In the commanders in dont pick all of these or combine three or four with some new, ones tent paragraph with the relevant and critical that you happen aspects of the how. The why not only per to think of. Pick one: maybe one of these, maybe some tains to the crltlcal tasks outlined in the mis other one. Pick the one that is the most rele sion statement, but also expla]ns the how that vant to the operation. Include just enough IS In the concept of operatmns. Thus, com information so that your subordinates un manders intent explalns both the mwmon derstand your rationale for selectlng the and the concept of operations. critical tasks in the mlsslon statement and your method m the concept of operations What does it look like? Because commanders intent is the crite First of all, the commanders intent para ria of relevance, graph M shortone to three sentences max It does not tell subordlrmtes what to do, but rather how what they do WIII imum (Please dont rewrote the concept of be measured. It ele operations in the first person singular. ) Peo is the quintessential ment ofcomhat ple should be able to read lt quickly, under operations that explains tbe why of both the what and the bow stand It and remember it.

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d,,!)l I(, lSI1,ICI.C ti~tlltJ. laitlatt!t, and llcxl I)il]t} III ~tvlng th(, mea>urc [)1>UCCVSS. ot n It Ii.n)t,tllml It pn~l IclesA >t.nw.c)t purpow t{] c,)mh,]t :Ictl,>ns It give. the relevancy that nlr)tiv,ite~ our subordlnat+ It xfves tht, xenel,il dlr(wtlon th,{{ vrwures that our>uti 01dln,ite> lndcpt.ndent act Ion> IVIII contrlb ut t. t o t hi- mea>uve of .uccess And It p]@ wdw the continuity that WIII ensure mis sion success in the absence of dontrol ivhlle tying together current and future opera tions The Army ha> bounced around. ptcklng one or two of these functions and declaring them to be gospel. Ilowever, commanders Intent IS simply the written exercise of lead ership ah It pertains to the specific tactical operation. It provides purpose, dlrectlon, motli,atlon and contlnu]ty to tactical opera tions It commands suhordlnates ]n the ab >ence of directmn It gives the crlterla of 1elevance that subordinates use to develop new plans when the current plan fails or re quires significant vanatlon (omttl(tn(ilrs
f!tll.1] if)t[,nt
is /10/ The why IS not something that m simply fhc Ctytlltmttfi(vs Stttl(,mtnf Ot.sfrllf(?l.tl nice to know. not something we give to our Imt nlso the (wIIIm711ff(,rs m(wns 0{ subordinates because .,ve have a volunteer )nwwuring success. It is the witvriu ()/ Army and we want to be good guys It is W1lnlltw or the !I)(flsllw!tlultt 1)/ crltlcal It IS more Important than the mw efkcfiwmss. It is nof fh(, mission slon statement In the AlrLand Battle Not sftrtvmcnt w the concept ofop(mtilms, only does It allow subordinate commanders fin. hotJl Of tllesc, itfrus come fi{mt the abdlty to react to changing sltuatlons, conzmmtrters in fent, hut m but also ]t allows other adjacent and sup. disfilrcf tivm it. porting units to Interpret these independent actlonsand make therequlred adjustments Wlthln the context of the commanders in tent, these other unltsthen mod]fy thelrcm time yet allow oursubordlnate commanders respondlng plans vnthout orders Thus, the tbe freedom to achieve aglllty and exercise why synchronizes the force w~thout con Inltlatlve? Commanders intent and the ctm tinuous control cept of operations are the elements of the op Finally. the problem of what the state erations order that should articulate these ment of the commanders Intent +hould do requirements and strike the balance be has n,] cookbook solutlon. no one school tween command and control st)lutlon Because each and e~,ery >ltu~t]on Commanders Intent exerclws command IS unique, e~ch requl~e~ lIS own me.~+ure of and ensures that operations are effective It .U ccc,,, allows subordinate commanders the freeLets look at what the ~tatement of the commanders Intent should dn In relatlon t~~ A)rLand Battle Our operations order has two basic funct)ons command and control. In wmtten form, It exercises command to subordinate leaders by provldlng purpose, dlrectlon, motl~ratlon ahd continuity (the leadership Imperatives plus one ). It also controls by allocating resources and estab Ilshlng a plan for maneuver and support These fu nctlons dlrectl y relate to effect weness and efficiency Commanders intent makes operations effective through the written exercise of command. The rest of the order attempts to make operations efflclent through control. Now we come to tbe blg A1rLand Battle dllemma: How do we synchronize the combat power of our maneuver elements to achieve adequate firepower at thedecislve place and

Hhat
if do? does

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VIEWPOINT

(omrttaridcrs intent e.wmi.ws com mnnft nod ensuws thot opelwtiuns

are f~ffmfiw. It allows sub(mtinftte wmolond(m the ti<wtom to c.wwiw n,qili{y.
initiatitv and tk.vibilit.rl [W girin.q the memwm of smwss, oot tlw nicthod.
It pmcidt,s n sellsc of puvpo.sc to coot hot actions.

+ucm+-th~t is, befc)rc. fve develop thc~ m~s. ..ton tle need to know the rules of the g:lmc, Ix.f,,re me devt,lop tho game plan At this time the commander and staff should ey. PIC+ the meuns h~ uh[ch the unit could nchleve ..ucce s%. a pmce.s~ th,at would dnvt. the selectwn of the approprmte objectives und rnc[hod Development of essential tasks In the mlsslnn statement should not, howev<r. dl. rectl~ fol]otv development of conimxnders Intent Their development should he lnter-

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related and simultaneous: to develop a strategy that will work, we need to know our mandated tasks, and to select the essential tasks, we need to have a sound strategy. What comes first: the chmken or the egg? What we choose as our essential tasks and method of operation should yield the greatest

At the operational Ierel, [the commflarfers iateat paragraph] Iany describe the capture or rtestructioa of ea eat.y cea tens of ,qrflcity. la low iateasit.y operatiolzs, it may specify the coaditioas by which forces are to uccept COOI at, or it am.y define political or b pacification goals. At the taetica[ Iere[, if omy state what you are tr.yiog to force the eaemy to do or e.rplaia the rel ecaace of th e co rrea t operatioa to th c result you are tr,yia.q to acftiere. . --------d

experience and authority to Its development and acceptance. Also, he obviously has the ultimate responsibility for the commanders intent formulation process. Additionally, because no one corrector ideal statement of the commanders intent exists, the one the commander selects or personally develops must depend on the advantages of the poten tial opportunities afforded by the measure ment of success. In Its most effective form, therefore, commanders intent will guide the commander as well as his subordinates.

Where does it belong?

Until recently, we had no guidance on where commanders intent should appear in our operations order. The Army was trying to fi~ure out what the commanders intent was, much less where it should go. It now ap. pears as paragraph 3a in the US Army Com mand and General Staff College Student Text 1003, Battle Book. That Is, it comes after the mlsslon paragraph and before the concept of operations. That arrangement, however, doesnt make sense. If the com manders intent prowdes relevancy for both return on our selected measure of success, the mlsslon statement and the concept of op Thus, the meaaure should chive the plan. erations, then It should either precede both or follow both. liko should write it? If we needed It the commanders intent, so the com the Intent before we devel is oped our mlsslon and concept of operations, mander should write It, right? Wrong! It is why dont we give it to our subordinates be too Important to leave to the commander fore both statements in the orders format? Is alone. I dont mean that the way it sounds. not the commanders intent the touchstone We all know that commanders are not nec for measuring subordinates success? Is it essarily blessed with some divine abihty to not the tactical strategy for developing es see the nature of truth. The analysls of the sential tasks and the concept? If so, then a sltuatlon requires a broad consideration of deductive approach would indicate that the multiple factors. In all but the most simphs commanders intent paragraph should pre tic situations, an analysis by one person cede our current could result in a superficial analysis. Effec mission statement. I suggest we modify that sacrosanct para tive commanders insist on alternatives so graph that has withstood the test of time. that they can choose the best one. Paragraph 2 needs to be split up. The entire The commander must, however, partici para~aph should still be titled mission, but pate in the process of writing the com lt sh~uld consist of two subparagraphs par manders Intent paragraph. He brings both agraph 2a should be Intent, and paraa unique perspective and a higher level of

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graph 2b should be Essential Tasks Be /f conzmanders intent is the sides causing the commanders intent to measure of success for com brd opeiw precede the mission statement so that our tions, I think ice need it before ue do subordinates can more easily understand the plan. When we receice our the mission, this arrangement would also mission ti-om higher headquarters, the serve two other purposes. Making comfirst things we do are a mission analysis manders intent a subparagraph could enand procidin.q information to on r com coura~e commanders to keep it short. Also, mander. I think re musf decerop and because the new format directs that tbe inarticulate c-emmatzders in tea t tent of the next higher commander appear at this stage. v,erbatim in the last subparagraph of paragraph 1, by placing commanders intent as paragraph 2a, we would gain the additional advantage of providing continuity of thought between the higher level comSo there it is: what commanders intent is, manders intent and our intent It would just what It should do, how it should be devel make more sense. oped, who should write it and where ]t Now, what about our new paragraph Zb? should be placed. We would need to modify slightly our curLets take the mystery out of the com rent mission statement, now Essential manders intent by agreeing on what it Tasks,to include only who, what, when and should be, what It should look like, what it where elements. We ought to drop the why should do, how we should develop It, who from subparagraph 2b The intent parashould wr!te It and w,here It should appear. graph covers It with greater relevancy, and Lets gwe It the standardized role and funcIt received oni y lip serv]ce In the prewous tion that it deserves and that our operations order desperately needs, so we can help to mission statement anyway The superficial ensure sufYiclent command, adeqnate con treatment of the why in the mission statement probably caused the emergence of trol and effective communication of the tac tlcal plan % commanders intent to begin v+lth.
NOTES
Norma A Sq Gene..! $.t.naqtmet fin 400,0.<. ,,mme.ood CL %..,.0 ,WUn 1984! Mao? o!th. concepi$ lor$l!aIeg, !orm.,.!,o. a.d,m.leme.ta,oni .r, m.(,h.5,.es.es. ,30a, D,,, .m mm ,.,, ,.! 0,!.1 3., ? Pe$ec DrLw, The Fffe, !v, Lre,...e, F New Y.. a>w, & R..

4..),,,,,

m,nquw cme.aorre,e..wce .ea.red,oroc.5,he Psotfhe..mPa enerq .! 3 Co,o.e HUha *a$Sde Czega 0,0! thea.the% .lF,e(o Mev.9 10@5 00,%,. ., a6, unentonga,,.ommander, ,he7,,nla,q Dm. sm{l!qh~ Forl OrO C81,10!!aPrOD.,, ,he*dl/O,,l,a.,,,h> P\m,,r.

.!fo,.r Ed&ord J Ftl[bertz [S attexdtng [he S,ho,>lo fAdL,anced. %fcl?taq Studws [tSArmy Contmand and Gencrul Staff Collrg~ (USA. cG.9C!. F<IrILcmretzu orllZ. Koa.as Hereceweda .?S fr.m!h? US.%lzlztam Academ?andlsagrad uow ofthc Cotnmand and General Staff Offlcws tourw. LISACGSC He hasserredm nunwmus command and staff assignments m mfantcv unLts, (U (arums powttons m lhe combnt development /ie[d. and as the Brigade .S.?, 9th lnf.nt? Regt mm! Forl Oral, L7a[!fornm

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OCTRINAL fads are mllltary con The crux of the commanders intent de . cepts that people frequently Invoke, bate should be utlllty rather than defini marginally understand and rarely apply Is tion. Each commanders Intent M ultimately commanders Intent one of these fads? A rel hls own Definition disputes are inconse atively obscure term a few years ago, com quential compared to the dearth of Ideas on manders intent now dominates the conver the pract]cal application of this concept in sation of sen]or mll]tary leaders. Doctrinal the command and control of soldlers. The d)scusslons are Incomplete without refer purpose of commanders Intent will ulti ences to commanders Intent. Most slgnlfi mately determine the appropriate concept cantly, doctrine writers are revlsmg the definition. standard m]ss]on order format. reserving Let us consider commanders Intent from an application perspective. We will examine paragraph 3a for a statement of com manders intent, Its purpose (dare we say intent?) m the AlrLand Battle. Through this analysls, we wIII Commanders Intent has clearly wmn our hearts, but what about our minds? The doc derlveand demonstrate a concept detimtion wvth maximum command and control po trinal development process has not kept pace with the enthusiasm for this concept, A tential because commanders Intent is a consensus detinltlon for commanders In valuable doctrinal development thqt de tent is conspicuously absent, DiscussIons of serves more than fad status th,s topic typically degenerate mto impas sioned debate by proponents eager to fill the Commanders Intent and Initiative doctrinal vacuum >vlth their favorite defini attribute We can easily the phenomenal tion success of commanders Intent to its lin-

., . D

--

2A %-da

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cagecommanders intent IS the child of the Ue can easily attribute our Armys most cherished tenet. Initiative. phenomenal For many years, ]nitlatlve was the consola success of commanders intent to its lineage-commanders tion prize in our development race ws-a-vis intent is the child of our A rmy s most the Soviet army. We dismissed significant cherished tenet: initiative. For tngny Improvements In Soviet equipment and doc years, initiatiz,e seas the consolation trine, counterbalancing them with a cult of prize in our dece[opment race c&ti.ri.% The Inltiatlve and Its ablllty to dellver us the Societ army. . . . The emer,yence of from years of fiscal and mental inattention. AirLandBattle doctrine ahzended Tbe emergence of Ai%l,and Battle doctrine this attitude considerable. amended this attitude considerably Al though we place an even hlgherpremlum on !nltlative in an AirLand Battle envmon ment, we now understand that the innate lnltlative of the US soldler is not a panacea e The AirLand battlefield IS fast paced, Undirected ]nltlatlve, In fact, M worse than each force accelerates the rate of battle, hop useless. The National Training Center, Fort ing to collapse the decis]on processes of Its Irwin, Callforma, demonstrates repeatedly OppOnent A platOOn leader may eriterbattle with one task In the company operation or that combat Lnltmtcve contraty to the corn. manders WL[[M rhaos Commanders Intent der, but may accomplish several additional tasks before a battle lull permits resump addresses the need for a synehrwrt~zlng fromeworh that focuses combat znrtzat~t,e on tion of the deliberate planmng process, o The AmLand battlefield M wolent: the su,aportlng the commander why cant the tradltjonal mlsslon order lethallty of modern \veapon systems wreaks ha~,oc on commanders and sta!ls. Company form~t promde th[s synchronizing frame commanders may assume battal]on com work~ The rnlsslon statement explalns the mand wtthout ceremony or debriefings and who, ~vhat, when, where and w,hy of the task under conditions of violent stress at hand. The concept ofoperatlons explalns The violence, the how These tools are time-honored syn pace and depth of the Air. Land battlefield has extended the required chronizing concepts, and excellent ones at synch ronlzat]on range beyond the Immedi. that Their focus, howe~rer, Is the immediate ate commander-subordinate relationship subordlnatr= level In the AlrI. and Battle, The battallon commander can confront such focus IS not enough Synchronlzatlon forces from outside hls brigade sector If be must extend t~vo levels do~vnto the subor has the tactical horizons of the dj~,lslon corn. dinate subelement level. The requirement mander The platoon leader can Arrticjpate forsjncfwon[zation two levels down IS ITNW subsequent tasks his corn. than a convenient rule ofthumblt M a log lf he understands panys role In The ical consequence of the AlrLand Battle envithe battallon operation company commander can assume battalwn ronment command If he the concept of e Tbe A1rLand battlefield IS deep mo understands operation for the brigade. Commanders In. bile, long-range weapon systems extend the tent must extend the synch rontz]ng frame strlk~ng power and agll]ty of both enemy ~vork down to subordinate subelement corn. and friendly forces A battallon commander manders. Tbe must summarize may suddenly confront forces that originat commander the mlsslon and the concept of operations. ed outside hls battal!on sector and even the emphasizing the most Important aspects of sector of hls parent brigade.

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ward of phase Ime (PL) Blue The brigade concept of operations IS to accept battle handover from the dlvislons covering forces in sector and to engage and defeat the first echelon of enemy regiments ~vlth a delay to PL Kentucky Subsequently, a strong area defense WIII defeat second-echelon rego ments forward of PL Blue. By 0800 the commander of 1st Battalion, 72d Infantry, has a dilemma (see fig 1) Al though not engaged, he has IIstened to a frr nous battle on hls adyacent left sector The 2-36 Armor battallon commander reported declslve en~agement by an estimated three reglment force before barrage ]ammlng in Fig. L Ddemma of the commander,
terrupted all communications, As the otJ P 172 Infantry, at 0800
scurlng smoke lifts, the 2-36 Armor M con spicuously absent 1[1s left flank company {now, apparently, the left flank of the bri objective and method. By presenting this gade) reports summary directly to commanders ofsubor observing at least two artil lery batteries firing 4.000 meters west of his dinate subelements, he extends the syn. posltlon The executl~re officer (XO) has chron}zlng effects of the mission and the come for~{ard from the battalion trains area concept of operations down an additional with a report th~t two armored mlnelayers level. are Iaylng mines ~cross the valley floor to his left rear Behind the mlnelaym-s, an ene A Definition my force of estlmatcd company stren~th M From an application perspective. we have dlg~lng Jightlng The 1-72 Infan derived the followlng definition for com posltlons try I)a)son at the pass.)ge potnt reports that manders intent. Commanders Intent )~ the becau~e of Ilght engagement. the cavalry commanders personal verbal and Sraphlc troop In }lIS coverlnS fm cc ariw IS not w]th summary of the unit mmslon and concept of drawlng operation that ewabllshes a description of \Vhat should com the mlsslon objective and method. thus ena the 1-72 Infantry mander do) The blingcommanderstwo echelons below to ex enem} artillery units, the mobile bbstacle detachment and the enemy ercise effective combat Inltlatl>,e in an Air. force arr all attractive tar~ets. but he mus/ Land Battle en~,]ronment. A mlnlmum crl. attack them Immediately for effect]ve tenon of Iegltlmacy for any statenwnt of results The expanded v]ew offered by the commanders Intent M whether a subordi dlvls]on commanders tntent (see fig 2] re nate subelement commander. could make an solves the dilemma. effective declslon based on this guidance The battallon rejects the Idea The following examples Illustrate this re commander of attacking any of these targets because qun-ement. such attacks \vould alert the enemy corn. Example 1. At 0400 the 3d Brigade, 74th mander to our Intent Ions on hls flank, at Infantry Dli,islon (Llechanlzedl occupies tracting reserves or follow-on forces Noting battle poslt}ons north of the Rasmussen that the d}v}slon intends to llmRidge. Its mlsslon IS to defend m sector for commander

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My intent is to strike rapidly through the enemys support structure, minimizing costly force on force attacks. I am accepting risk that the 2d Brigade will be able to successfully delay and defeat a superior force of two successive divisions and intend to deceive the enemy into believing that our reserve has been corcnitted early in the 2d Brigade secto?. Third brigade will retain the Rasmussen Ridge, destroying an anticipated motorized rifle division in that sector. After the Combined Arms Army Commander has committed bis second division in the Duringer Valley, Ist Brigade will p launch a counterattack of at least two battalions abreast, rapidly sweeping through the artillery and logistic structure of the committed enemy regiments and seizing defendable terrain along route A-6.

Ftg

2 74th Mechamzed

Dwiston

Commanders

Intent

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The rioleare, rv[ationship.

required Syachr-ottizatiotl raa,qc beyoad the imatediate

hattlcfieht Im.s es-teaded fhe comazaader-sabordiaate . . . (ommanders iatetzt mast e.rteod the sgachtvnizia,q fiameuork doaw to so bordiaate su bsieat eo t commaadcrs. .

pace aad depth of the Airf.aad

it direct force.on-force attac!i<, he redesig a Ilmlted ,ittack to flx enem.v ,ind 10 cm]rluct nates battle posltlon 11-.1(;as a wt.~ln mls near Elll>dorf Tbe concept fimcw reported for tbl> uperatton IS a tJvo-company attack, slon This act]on protects an additional w[th ,\ (,~mp.lny support lngt)y fite. wh)le B counterattack mute. allowln~ I<t Br!w]de to launch Its counterattack .i~aln.t unpre Cnmpan\ maneuvers to tkw flank The at to~k proceed+ too well-when B Company pared pmlt!on~ at tht, appropriate depth report. th,it It has +wept th(, otlJ~>ctlve, dc~ (enemy artillery supp, ]rt structure, und stmying only two Ivhee led vehicles, the h,it strength [two Imttallon+ sbrcast I Intended tdllon commander call. for th~, orders smup by the dlvls]on comm:{ndtt [{c, then d,, w;* A+ the .i (-ump,~n~ cnmm,lnd track lvehlcle) ,irtlllery and mortar Ii] e nn the ObM;IVJbi C :ipp] tNIches the ta]~ets and repos)t]ons the battallon rtIrally point, a horrific rocket v~]llt,y bl{~nkt,ts the command group The A serve to cover the em,my fhrce at Elllsdntt Company cummanders first gl~nce throu~h Finally. he dlsp~tches couriers [I) advlw a cr:icked vtsinn block confirms bls worst both the hrlgadc and the CI]IIsion ,)F 111, f~.,ir he t, now tbe battdllon commander action The {wmnurnrl net IS al!ve with reports of Example 2. It ha, been a hectic momtng be.ivy ,)ntlt,ink fire from enemy posltlons for 1st Btvgadc At .{ 10tJ() orders gr(Iup near SpI ach Looking at his map overlay, be meeting, the brlsade comnmndel l>~ued a remembers tbe hngade commanders Intent fmgmentatlon order mmvng the axis of the Isee flg 31 brigade counterattack north to Include the The new battallon commander surmises \Verl~an-Drozhelm I oute nmv protected by that the enemy force mvglnally reported at the 3d Br]gade Tbe :1-69 Armnr tmtt~llons Elllsdorf wai exaggerated or has moved to role in this operat]on is IO detach an armor Sprach This force potenta+lly threatens the company to the main effort along that route

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brigade movement to route A-6. An enemy counterattack force, if It exists, WIII obvious ly not be committed to restore the combat outpost at B Companys objective To meet the brigade commanders Intent of fixing th]s force with minimum loss, he elects to cautiously continue the attack to the west and orders B Company to return suppres sive fire on Sparch A Company IS ordered to move to the high ground south of Sprach

Temporary Conceptions \Ve have derived a definition

of com manders Intent that extends the synchrmrl 3-69 Armor will fix the enemy at zatlon of subordinate scrbelement In!t{atlve Ellisdorf with minimum forces and to a depth appropriate for the A]rLand bat cause the enemy to commit its counter tlefield Thlsdefin}tion IS but one of several attack force prematurely. This will allow the remainder of the brigade to current understandings that have evolved sweep undisturbed through the enemy to fill the void of expllclt doctrinal guidance support structure and seize the de for this concept We will review these alter fendable terrain al&g highway A-6. native conceptions (0 complete our argu ment that commanders Intent 1s a synchro Flg 3. Ist Brigade Commanders Intent crlzatlon tool to focus the ]mtltrti~,e ofwcbor dlnate scrbelement commanders. Because these altermr~ive conceptions have sc=rlmrs what, when, where, ~vhy and huw a] e rrltl IIcnltatlons In real-world uppllcat]on, thml matcly all [Crcluslve. There IS ncrth]ng else A long-term viahll]ty IS doubtful. Thel-efore, commander \vhose Intent statement is other we have labeled them temporary, than a personal summarv of the m]sslon and concept ofthv operatlun ha~ not discovered a ( ornmandcrsIatcnt Is rcnksswmc: There new essence. he has discovered that hls are some who ~vould attribute a mystical. staff needs to rewrote the operutmns order undefinable a>pect to commanders Intent, ( an fnlanders It scrme how captures the es Intent Is o TaYJ-(WTIIree such as ,hcntence ,Strrtemenf: Thr average, com sence of what a commander want> to trccom pl]>h au II ]s not the mlsslon and It is not mander coordinates three to five subord lcrtite~, ccrch of the concept of the operation, hut It IS some whom has a >lmllar span of control It IS ]mposilbie to synchronize Indlvlduals strtlggllng with thing else. nine to ttventy-fi~e huborcficrate subelt= thlsdr=finlt]on sense the importance ofcom ments In time and space with bmef wvrd manders Intent but mlsappreclate a v]tal picture, .]lone Therefore, a graphic &ompun component. Its audience A dlwslon corn. ent of the commander+ Intent IS manda manders statement of gommacrders Intent tory. Although tv, o- or three-sentence com ~~nchrOnlz= the mltlatl~e Of hlh battahon manders Intent statements are simple. commanders. It> focus I. not the subordl w,ell-chosen wwrd~ of folks lnes> or pro n,~tc. hrlgades They have hl> ml>~lon state fanity can effectl,el] ccrn~,ey only the ment and concept of the operation Al maod of the commander Such statements thou~h they are not excltlng wmrds-who,

MILITARY REVIEW . Augusl 1987

65

OMalOn PLAN
O 1 Sl!ua!lon
# Frlmdlv [1] s0rJ;8d*r,t Inlm!
2 Mlsslon 3 Execu!lon a Olvl:lon Cmmmder% 1!81 b concept ni op8m10n I ibrba!l,n BriuEdo PLMl
O Sllwlm
; Frimolv ~ [1] Dlvklon
Commmd,rs

Immt
2 Mls%lon
3 ixmtlon , Brlgad8 Cmmmws
In!ml b M,w! d Operalion

Battalion OFLAM 1 S[latlo,

Verbatim Frl,ndl c-(l) 8rnMe T Co.mder% mm! 2 MI881O :

I FE. 4. Verbat!m Transfer of Commanders

Intent in Operatton

I
Plans (OPLANS) w

Exmullon a Bsrrallon Commmws

are not sufficient to focus the inltlatlve of subordinate subelements on the A1rLand battlefield.

Commanders Intent ,Vot How: Any statement

Addresses

Whnt,

that pays 1Ip service totheprmciple of maximum subordinate latitude \s generally safe ]n our Army. But the assertion that commanders Intent does not Include aspects of the method that WIII accomplish the mlsslon cripples the syn chromzatlon potential of this concept. An unambiguous statement of the objectwe M necessary, but not sufflelent To concentrate effectively, subordinate suhelernents must tinderstand not only the!r owm tasks, but also the relationship of those basks to others the concept of the operation. Commanders Intent Is His Vision of

battlethe conclusion The potent}al for time synchronization ofsubordlnate subele ments with such a static statement is v]rtu ally nil. By omlttlng method, this concep tion Implicitly assumes that the objective is Independently achievable by the subordi nate subelemmrts. That ]s not the reallty of the AIrLand battlefield.

(ommanders Intcnf Is Developed by the Sfaffi Same have asserted that the staff may

Hhut the BrrttlefieId

Shonld Look Like:

Th]s view has the advantage of tbe very amblgaous looks like phrase and Is, therefore, relatively popular, as In this example ofa possible commanders Intent statement. At the conclusion of this battle we WII1 have restored the FEBA Iforward edge of the battle areal; enemy forces WIII be 40 percent effective, Isolated and unable to reconstitute. This view lsanotbervermono fcommanders intent asastatement of the objective, devmd of method. Th]s statement restricts Ltself to a static snapshot of a small portion of the

develop the Intent statement, If the corn. mander 1s so Incllned. But the development of an effective commanders lrrtent statement is a challenge that must not be under estimated The mlsslon concept of operations ~tatements encompass the complete scheme of maneuvers. fires, eng]neer sup port, deception, antlclpatlon, msk and so forthoften several pages ofguldance. For warding all this information two levels down to subordinate subelements IS not practical. The effective condensation of the mission and concept of operation toa concise graphic and word form ]s a science that ap proaches art. Thesummaryprocess lnvolws IatentJudgments, priorities and decisions of tremendous consequence to the m]ssmn and tbe unit. only one person can shoulder this responslbllltythe commander Does this mean that. the commander must personally draft It? Yes! This assertion rests uncom

66

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VIEWPOINT

fortably In our Army. The commander has though It cannot rellably dupllcate the ge such a range of responsib] Ilt Ies t hat the per captains, the commanders mus of the great ception that he M a revwwer, not a doer, has Intent concept clearly establishes both a re become an article of faith. Personal respon a framework quirement and ftn,synchronlz siblllt~ for the commanders Intent state ment M a small reversal of this trend and lends great clarity to the commander-staff Althou.yh ttro- or three-sentence communication process. conmanders intent statements are (ommanders latent IS the Frieodlg simple, well-chosen words of folksiness Higher Situation: It has been argued that or profanity ran effecticel,y coace;l only more effective use of the mission order para the mood of the corn mander. Such graph lh {Friendly SItuatlon) would obviate statements are not snflcient to focus the utillty of the commanders intent state the initiative ofsubordinate subele ment. The rigorous exposition of the objec men ts on the.4 irLand battlefield. tives and concept of the higher unit 1s exact ly the synchronization effect sought by com manders Intent. The d!st]nctlon, however, is one of authorship. Can a subordinate umt lng the lnltmtlveofsubordmate ~ubelement d]vine the higher commanders Intent? Not commanders an aspect of command and as effectively as the commander himself. control that ordinary commanders might The commanders intent statement devel. overlook. Commanders Intent Is, therefore, oped at paragraph 3a should be transferred a Iegltlmate and useful addition to our doc verbat lm to paragraph 1b of the next lower trine, headquarters (see fig. 4) The commanders personal mhlvement. the verbatim trans Doctrinal Requirements fer to subordinate aubelernents and the Commanders intent i~ quite adequately addressed In Field Manual (FM) 1005, clear focus on subordinate subelement ]nl. ().rxv atro)~s, the source book for LIS .Arm.v tlative are the distinctive charactertstlcs of commanders Intent that make it a worth doctrine Thv need far flexlbllitv In command and conwhile addltlon to the mission order format. t]ol IS gwwm for the committed maneuver unit Commanders [n tent Is a .VPU Solution: comm.lndm than fhr an?one else lle cannot de. Commanders Intent is nelthernew nor a SOpenal on constant dlrectlon. but must light inde Iutlon Commanders intent is only a tool, a pendently e~en when he cannot commumcate device to complement what the great cap outs]de hlsown zone or wctor lfe must knoy the tains of hwtory have consistently recog commander two levels above Intentmn of the nized to be the essential, hard work of face the concept of operation of hl. him. understand to-face, forward leadership. General George Immediate commander, and know the responsl S Patton Jr.s modus operctndr. for example, bllltwsofthe un!tsonh]s tlanksand m support of was a daily tour of subordinate (corp~l and hM opemtlons If he understmds these things. the committed command~r can conduct his oper subordinate subelement (divlslon) head atmn con fidently, quarters. He personally ensured that com anticipate events, and act free 1} and boldly to accomphsh hls mlsslon wthout manders In his Thwd Army understood (and further orders compiled witht) hls Intent. Our Armys cur This statement clearly describes com rent enthusiasm for commanders Intent M manders intent In Its proper relationshlpto an attempt to inst~tutlonallze the Insight of subordinate subelements and the immedl hlstotvcally successful commanders. Al-

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The effectice coudensatiou of the mission and concept of operation to a concise graphic and word form is a science that approaches art. . . . Only one person caa shoulder tffis responsibility-the rom)n auder. Daes this mean thaf fhe commander musf personally draff if? Yes! . --<

an ovwall picture ofa commanders assumptions or Intent Army doctrine winters must ellminate such amblgulty lfwre are to effectively appiy commanders Intent to the command and control of soldlers \Ve need a clear defini tion of commanders Intent as tbe corn. manders personal verbal and graphic sum mary of the unit mlsslon and concept of operatmns POIICY should mandate the com manders development of hls Intent state ment. Nhsson order procedures should ex pl!cltly describe verbatim thetransfer Of the ate commanders concept of the operation. commanders Intent statement to the subor Other FM 1005 references slmllarly em dinate subelement commanders. phasize the synchronization role of com WIII commanders Intent, tbe cblld prod manders Intent. Such clarlty IS lost, hmv doctrine, mature to become igy ofemerglng ever, In many derivative documents that an appltcahle command and control tool? Implement AlrI. and Battle The detinlt ion> Only Ifcommanders Intent doctrine demon tn FM 100 5- 1, Opc>rotrona[ TeIWIS and strates that cbacactenstlc common to all are typical of the doctrinal amh] Without .$yJnbo/s, tool. utlllty utillty, com gulty surrounding those concept manders Intent Ii Ill be tomorrows m)lltary cliche The commander~ Intent fad has cap Commanders intent-~ omm~ndw+ k I.!on of the battlehow h~, expects to fight and ~th~t tured our attent]on and enthusiasm Iftb)s h~.mp~ct. tu ~ccompllsh I.%,<uI.,s COIZC,,PI (II,I,L. altlcle fac!lltates the transition of com cratwn. J manders Intent from mllltary buznvord to Concept of operation*A &T.lphlc. \k>ril.i!. ur v.mtten >tatemcnt ln hIoad outline thdt gI\w appllmble mncep-such was the Intent

$,??..

~-= --

&

&

68

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99 WI

Getting the word @

( mnmoad iafarmotioa ((I) is fhr [ S .i rmys ia terao[ pablic affairs pra gram aad provides c<)flltrz[(t(icatic))i obout, hctweea aad from a CO)JZ. mander aad the meat hers of his. caaz moact. Tb is concept of infiwm ia.q ffle traaps is as otd as the A raty. (;~ac,ral (;corqc I!as//ia.qtoa adltl WIi~ll~)dlli.~ oftictox to Limprcss apart the miad of

Iicaffa]rsot%cercan benefit from theexperi OMkl AN DERS have always been ences of those ]n\,olved in Cl programs ]n concerned with gett 1ng the word to \\orld War 11 then- troops and the relationship between bow Informed troops are and unit morale bas long been recognized. The normal 1n qumt]ve American lsconstantly Iook]ng fm The birth of formal programs can be answers to the nationat and commun]ty traced ]n part to med]a reports of almost mu. problems that confront h]m and affect h]> well -being, editors t]nous conditions ex]~tmg In the US Army of the 1959 Arrr/y dur]ng 194041 Young men drafted Into an Almanac observed. Th]s urge to be In. formed about events tak]ng place around Army theydld not understand, for purposes hlm becomes stronger when he joln~ the they could not dl~,lne. were simply not com mitted to the service and were ready to leave Army. Formal troop Information programs it on any pretext. The OHIO movement (Over the 11111[n October) among draftees started In World War 11and owe their status recel~,ed wide press coverage, and veteran to Amerlcas chleforgianuer ofv]ctory, US Army Chwf of Staff General George C. Llar reporter H. H. Ralleys ac NCU, Fork ?lmm shall. Convinced that men fought better and count ofcond]tlons in Army camps was con protested less Iftbey understood howtbey sidered so sensttt~,e that his editors chose not to print It: contributed to the countrys defense, Mar they sent }t to the War De partment Instead sballmslsted that commander sat all Ie\els Fortunately, Marshall perceived the, conduct vl~orous Information programs. To problem accurately and belleved the Ameri supplement thelrefforts,he.authorized cre can soldler had a r]ght to know why he \vas ation of var]ous organizations that were beln~ asked to serve. The pollt]cal condi predecessors oftodays internal mfurmatmn tions that had caused Congress to reinstate agencies wlthln the US Army Office ufthe the draft In 1940 were not grasped by most Cb]efofPublic Affairs and other elements of young men beln~ conscnpted. To help them tbe Army staff Tbe goal of command ]nformatlan {Cl) has understand, Marshall cbrected commanders to beg]n a program to expla}n to all soldlers rema]ned constant since World War 11. to the nature of the berltage they were defend provide information to malntaln or Improve ing, and \vhy It soldlers morale and thereby Increase com was necessary that they do ~ the}r part bateffectlveness Ilowever, asanyseniorof titer & sergeant vvho remembers mandato Organizing Troop ry CI classes well knows, methods for pro Information Acfivifies In}tIally, the troop Information program vldlng such Information have cban,ged Iknown by various titles dur]ng the war) s}gnlf] cantlyo~,el. tile years. Nevertheless, a ,vasdes]grred to by provid re\, Iewofthe early development of the pro motlvatesoldlers !ng a mtlon ale gram provtdes several lessons Cl opera for serwce As tbe war pro gressed. the program expanded to include ttons In!Vorld JVarl Imayserveas~ use i not only c]t)zenship training, but also lnfor blueprlnt for todays officers ivhu wlsb o t mat]on about the countr]es ]n which troops draw from the historical record lessons of \vould be stat] oned, pollcles govern]ng their value to the modern force. Therefore, this service and other topics. study provides a history, outlines some Instruction began w]th a series of pre problems of evaluating progmms, and then suggests ways todays commander and pub. pared lectures A special agency was cre-

HismRlcAL

ovERvlEw

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WILLIE AND JOE

,ated under the Adjutant General to superner of the Public Information section of to t Me these indoctrination programs the Mo days Publlc Affairs Ot%ce. After much d]+ rale Branch. Unfortunately, because troops cussion, the task wws Instead assigned to found sessions boring. initial efforts were Osborns branch. seldom successful. Instructors met resist1942, the branchs name ~vas In January ance from men unwllllng to hak,e precon changed to Special Services. A school for ceived Ideas challenged and skeptical about Spectal Services officers was establ Ished in Americasneedtobul]da military force to March 194? at Fort George G Meade, iMary deploy to Europe. Efforts were also ham 1943 the school moved to Iand: In October pered by commanders and polltlclans who Washington and Lee Unlverslty. Lex. balked at havln~ the Army engage in actlvl t]es that might be considered propaganda. To make matters worse, the Morale Imtlally, the troop mformatlon Branch was responsible for more than troop program (known by various Wles lnformat~on. Under the heading morale. the during the war) was designed to moti Army lumped together troop information, vate soldlers by providing a rationale ideological Indoctrination, personal welfare for serwce. As the war progressed, the and recreation actiwtles \lorale officers program expanded to include not onty spent much of each day worry]ng about rec citizenship ,reatl onal facllltles and equipment, reservtrammg, but also reform ationabout the countries in which troops ing little time for in forma tlondutl es. would be stationed, pollcies govermng Further. field commanders gavp the pr their service and other topics. ogram Ikttle support. fIence, when a confer. ence of morale off~cers was held In \Vashlng ton In February 1941, seven months after lngton. Virgmm. Later. schools were estab the branch was created, \Jar Department officials learned that many commands had lished overseas. The emphasis ivas Inltlaily not filled these positions Fe~v field ofticers on recreation actlwtles: e~rentually, bowhad any qualifications In anyofthe areas for e~,er, the curriculum was expanded to in ~vhlch they were responsible, and many had clude Instruction cm troop Information pro grams subjects such as morale and leader. no >dea what the job entailed. Even ~vorse, sblp, ideas as weapons and morale factors many found they were the butt of constant were taught along ;vlth Army newspapers jokes from troops. and films. Officers selected for training The appointment of Frederick H. Osborn. were supposed to have deep conwctlon for a prom]nent clvil]an, as brigadier general the A}lled cause and a background in educa and chief of the Jlorale Branch In August tion, government. Journalism, advertising, 1941 W*JSa slgmficant step forward. Osborn personnel management or a related field c had served as an adviser to both the Army In 1942, Special Services Branch was and the Navy on morale matters. transferred from The Adjutant General to Responding to a report from \Vendell the commander Wdkle, who while touring o~,erseas had no of Army Serwce Forces, During that year and the next, the branch ticed the deplorable state of information made a concerted effort to let the rest of the reaching soldlers there, the Army staff met Army know what it was doing. It achieved todetermlne how to provide these men news recogmtlon largely through its newly cre from home. Initially, the Job was to be Nven ated research section. Under the direction of to the Bureau of Publlc Relations, forerun-

MILITARY REVIEW

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71.

in late 1943. a the eminent social sclentlst Samuel Stouf discussion hour to be held on duty time ~vas and a full-time fer, a group of military and ci~,illwrs con mandated. orientation officer was added to every com ducted systematic surveys to measure sol ba~staffdown to regiment and separate bat dlers attitudes on subjects ranging from taJ1on and at Installations The operations concern for safety ]n the war zone to prefer and plans officer (G3 ) ivas gl~,en staff re ence for footwear. Information prowded by spons}blllty for tbe program

In January 1942,,the branchs name was changed to Special Serwces. The emphasis was initially on recreation actiwhes; eventually, how ever, the curriculum was expanded to
include mstrucllon on troop mforma tlon programs. Sub]ects such as morale
and Ieadershlp, Ideas as weapons and
morale factors were taught along with
Army newspapers and ftlms.
....,. ..-- . . a
. . C-=-=----

Print Media

During the ~var year~, the Army used a viuvety of medm to provide Information fqr soldler~ Responslblllty for managing pro. ductlon ~vas dl~,]ded between the War De., partment and the field commands The most p~omlnent med]um ~vas print. Commanders encouraged the establlsbment of soldier. papers at all levels. ranging from Army \v)de p,)pers and periodicals to mlmeo gmphed edltlons churned out at pint>, de. pofs and combat units Perb.ips the most famous puhllcatlon was .Ttar, or!d Str[p~s f.S&. SI Begun durtng th]s group to commanders In the field made \Vorld \Var I to provide news to the Ameri leaders more aware of soldlers needs and gave Iegltlmacy to the brancbs actlv]tles. can Expedltlonary Force, .$&~S bad died ivhen truops came home In 1919 Rut In ear In 1943, the War Department created the lnfurmatlom and Rducatlon (I&I.;) DIvisIon ly 1942, Llatshall approved It, rebirth on under the Army Service Forces Special the rwwmmendatlon of the commander of L~S f(~rc~>h1*I Brltaln hlarshall remarked Services Branch became a part ofthis agen

th:lt It existed pr!marllv t~)furntsbouroffi cy The new I&E Ehvlslon was charged Jvltb cers and men u lth ne~vs about themselves, conducting research, provldlng advice to tbe]r comrades. ~nd the homes they left be commanders cm morale actlwtms. operating hind A mldlers neivspaper In tbe~e gra~,e tbe vanrms brancb offices making pr]nt and times, hecontlnued, w more than a morale electronic med]a products. des]gnlng proc(, venturi, It w ,a dures fnr 1&E pmxrarns and supwvmng sesymbol nfthc, things wv are f]ghting to pre~erie and spread In this lect!on and tralnlng of officem engaged In threatened ivorld. The ma!or morale services acttvltles [le~un as a 5,000 circulation weekly In br{.:]ktbrough during thl~ period v.as the sep~rtitlon of education and lnformutlon April 1942. S&.$ eventually sem,ed vn-tually t+ et-~ >oldwr in funct Ions from recreation sel I Ices actlvl Europe and the Far East. The tles: l&E officers could now concentrate on paper moved forwzwd wltb the troops. From printing plants established throughout the morale and Information programs war zones, papers The officers still fficed problems of credl moved to the front lines by trucks, Jeeps and m,en runners who dellvered b]llty, hmvever, many commanders refused the news to soldlers In combat. to reco{nlze Orientation programs as a net. Supplementing S&S was Yank maga. essary part of their combat respmrslbtlltles zlne. Twenty -tlvo editions of this tabloid fo Some help came from the J\rar Department

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1987

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cum,d on more Ilterary topics than d]d datly p,tpvIs It achlm,ed a regular readership of 26 million, Staffed by enlisted men. la~[k spo!ieto thesoldler In hisown language; cor respondents often filed their reports from the combat zones. These Army.wide publications ~vere joined In the field by thousands Of lOcals. Di v]slon~, regiments and even battalions usu ally had some form of paper Many clv}lian s~affed support centers had their owm news letters and papers, telllng workers how products they manufactured ~~ere helping the Cfiuse Much material for these local papers was supplled by the Camp Newspaper Service, an arm of the 1&E Division that sent pie. During the war years,
tures. art work, feature material and edito prominent medwm was
the most rial suggestions to more than 2,000 local ed print, Commanders encouraged the
itors. Also promdlng copy was Army Ne\vs estabhshment of soIdler-papers at
Scmvce, operat]ng from New York. ,vhlch all levels, ranging from Army-wide
sent out features, analyses and cOlumns by papers and penod!cals to mimeo well-known Journalists hlore than 80,000 graphed edltlons churned out at posts,
words were cabled around tbe ~vorld dally depots and combat units.
Edltom found assistance readily avadable in G I Ga//cv. a monthly publication aimed at helplng them h~ndle thelrjobs for weekly discussion sessions on subjects One of the more popular publications >uch as The Nlaster Race. (;ermany & Ja among combat soldiers \va.s IVru,.s .Ifap This pan, Lebensraum and \Vhy We Are In series of maps helped soldlers see ho~v the Alaska The I&E Ehvlslon also supervised ~var lvas progressing In various Iocatlons. productmn of booklets for use in G1 fiound By July 1945, weekly,ict[,s Map edltlons to tables (soldler-led discussion groups). taled 10, Includlng one In Spanish for troops In the Caribbean and one !vlth simplified Radio and Film le~ends for troops possessing IImlted llter Productions l&E personnel also turned to electromc acy skills media to reach troops. Army .News Service Other printed materials h~ndled ccntralsupplled broadcast materials to hundreds of Iy were posters and pamphlets on subjects of radio stations that sprung up wherever Army-wide Interest A mmes of pamphlets troops Ivere sent Tbe worldwlde Armed titled !~hat t/7e Soldtcr Thtn/:s was distrib Forces Radio Service Included almost two uted to unit commanders It covered topics hundred stations by the end of the war. Lo such as Some klorale Problems Overseas. cal broadcasts ~vere augmented with mate Leadership & Negro Troops and Some rials from studios In New York, Hollywood Ideas for Increasing Pride in Outfit. A se and San Franc]sco At the height of produc ries of fact sheets titled Army Talk OrZenra tion, 86.000 transcriptions a month were f[on Fact Shwts .ga~e leaders background

The most ambitious morale and mdoctrma shipped overseas. Newscasts on~natmg in tlon mov)e production was the Why We New York covered the days events for serv IOght series. The brainchild ofhlarshali, the memen all over the world. serves was put CI agencies also made great useofthe Sig together by Hollywood pro ducer Frank Capra Brought on active duty as nal Corpss Army Pictorial Serwce. lndoc a major, Capra was tasked to counter German trlnatlon films were constantly produced. propaganda efforts and to motivate American The biweekly A rmy-.Vaty Screen ~faga~lne. soldlers who dld not understand the threat or a movie-format news show covering both the im lications home frant and battle zone, was well re of war overseas. Using cap tured [ootage and prewar German documen ceived. Perhaps even more popular was the taries, Capra produced a clnematlc master GI Movie Weekly, a free 45.minute pro piece, called by gram on subjects of general Interest. At hlarsball the most Important single means of improvmg troop morale un tendanceat these films ran high In the Unit dertaken during the war ed States and overseas.

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August 1987. MILITARY REVIEW

The most ambitious morale and mdoctnnation movie production was the Why We Fight series. The brainchild of Marshall, the series was put . together by Hollywood producer Frank Capra. Brought on active duty as a majo~, Capra was tasked to counter German propaganda efforts and to motivate American soldiers who did not understand the threat or the Imphcations of war overseas.

Special Projects
On occasion, I&E conducted media blltzes to prepare soldiers for special events. Most notable among these campaigns were the one launched before D-day and the one orgamzed to inform soldlers of the War Departments demobilization plan. Both show how people work]ng within the CI network successful Iy assisted commanders m boosting morale and improving combat effectiveness. In the first Instance, the Research Branch collected information about the general attitude of troops preparing to invade Europe With General Dwight D. Eisenhowers approval, a five-week campaign was organized; all media concentrated on subjects soldiers needed to know about before the in-

vasion began. Yank carrwd special articles to hlghllght the ]mpendlng op&-atlon S&S had a special four-page supplement each week. Armed Forces Rad)o offered dramatl zations to prepare troops for their move. Five special pamphlets were prepared In the A rrrzy Talks series to glvejunior officers materialsfor discusslngthe invasion with their troops. The fifth pamphlet was given to ev ery soldier participating in the invasion A simlllar media campaign was used to spread the word about the Armys plan for demob] Ilzation after the war. Staff persrm nel developed radio, motion picture and newsprint materials to carry the iame mes sage to all troops in the Europt%r theater on the same day, helping to reduce the confu sion that inevitably comes when lnforma

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ting the word to the American soldler were extremely busy and extremely prohfic. But Martin Van Crevelds study of combat efficiency during the war suggests that there actually exists evidence showing a negative correlation between troop indoc trination and morale and that a program of troop Indoctrination IS unnecessary In victory and not Ilkely to have much effect }n defeat. Is this possible? Tbe record suggests that most programs were considered successful by those In a posltlon to commit resources for them A more crltlcal look, however, at the general effectiveness of Cl efforts re veals that some of the more hghly touted tlon Isdellvered piecemeal. Capras mowe programs may not have been as effective as Two Down and One To Go was available the senior leadership thought It would be untrue to say that all Cl pro for release; a pamphlet of the same title had grams were falluresorthat the majority had been stockpiled at various locatlons; spemal only marginal Issues of Yank and Army Talk had been pre Impact on morale. On the other hand, evidence gathered from outside positloned in the European theater; and news serwces had sent advance copy to edl official mllltary files indicates that some programs dld not tors for local use. Radio and shortwave an achieve the Impact attrlb utedtothem. Two projects Illustrate thedls nouncements complemented printed cover crepancy quite well the soldler-papers pubage; wrtuallyevery soldlerheardofthe plan Ilshed Army-wide and the Why We Fight on the same day. film series. Both have been described in offi The perceived success of these programs cial sources m Immensely effective. On clOs made hq+h-level commanders realize the im portance of CI to overall success on the bat however, one can see that er exammatlon, success IS relatlve tlefield When the war was over and the lm and that {t was achieved In some Instances at the expense of trarll medlate need to build combat morale no long tlonal mllltary methods ofdo}ng business er existed, troop information remained a permanent part of the postwar Army The News for Soldiers by Soldiers I&Ii Dlvlslon continued to function after hos The orit+nal S&S ~vas started by enllsted tilities ended. In 1946, a War Department men In 1917, and staff reorganization aligaed the I&f2 func when the paper was reborn In 1942, the staff wqs mostly enl]sted. Offi tions under the newly created OffIce of the cers were In chargethaugh. and Inevitably Chief of Information. Many of the programs problems arose born of necessmy or tossed together haphaz over the freedom of S& Sedi tors to challenge command pol]cy or poke ardly had prot,en their worth and have been fun at high-ranking officials Both Yank continued to the present. and S&S had Marshalls per~onal support, but even he was concerne much ]Icense soldler-journal The history of Cl programs In World War 11 suggests that those responsible for get occasionally took

One of the more popular pub lications among combat soldlers was
News Map. This series of maps helped
soldiers see how the war was progres sing m various Iocatlons. By July
1945, weekly News Map edlt{ons totaled
10, including one m Spamsh for troops
in the Caribbean and one with sim plified legends for troops possessing
Iimlted hteracy skills.

EVALUATING c1PROGRAMS

\
Pos[-VE day DamPhle! on demoblltzatlon

!4AR DEPARTMENT PAMPHLET NO. 21-31

On occasion, l&E conducted media blitzes to prepare sold!ers for special events.
Most notable among these campaigns were the one launched before D-day and the
one organized to reform soldters of the War Departments demobilization plan.
Both show how people working wiihin the Cl network successfully assisted com manders m boosting morale and tmprovmg combat effectiveness.

Elsenho\ver shared }fmv,halls V]WVS to. m!l)tary establishment. I&l? personnel ward so)dler papers and generally supported were con~vnced that t roops be}~eved enllsted the enlisted men running papers in the Eum writers and editors but were skeptical when pezin theater, Not al I senior commanders they found officers writing for or running had such sympathy for these pa.per%Gen Because enllsted men were their papers, eral George S Patton Jr. was a pal~wularly entrusted with operations for most of these bostlie cntm-and on more than one occasion publications, a tradition of pride among edi Emenhowr was forced to step in to protect tors was fostered. These uniformedJoura[. them At one pmnt. Eisenhower had to rermnd Ists worked hard to give the America GI commanders that, though a great deal of what he wanted to read A few resmted ef pressure has been brought on me to abol]sh forts to make their papers serve command such things as [BIII] hlauldins cartoons, the needs, but the best among them used their B-Bag etc , he wanted no Interference In opportunities wisely matters ofthls kind. Official documents suggest that editors Those charged \vlth running the paper were, wltb few exceptions, able id write as had to continually balance the desire for they wished .Noted cartoonist BIII Mauldln freedom from censorship with the compet story in hls remimscefices tells a dfferent of ing need to make the papers a part of the the war: I tried to stay completely away

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WILLIE AND JOE

from stuff that hadaneditorial twist.. ability of Why We Fight to Impart specific
The only editorializing you can do in the ar to influence knowledge and attitudes to my 1Sthat which is approved by the army N ward the war and toward soldlenng.
It is possible this concern was shared by oth Their findings were made publlc in a
ers involved in the newspaper business, and scholarly study released In 1949. These re.
at least ]n the eyes of some staff and editors there may have existed a form of prepublica. tion censorship The record suggests that most

Motivating Through Film

programs were considered successful

by those m a posltlon to comm)t re A second program whose value M open to sources for them. A more critical look,
question is the Why We Fight film series however, at the general effectiveness
The core of the Armys orientation course for of Cl efforts reveals that some of the
draftees and an Important tool for morale touted programs may not
more highly bu]lding, the series was in Marshalls est] as effectwe as the
have been te almost universally popular and effec leadership thought.
semor

ii in putting across the message he de % sired. Nlarshall even went so farastosolimt the support of President Franklin I). searchers concluded that the frlms had Roose~,elt, who promoted the project in po on the mens knowledge of marked effects litlcal circles. Their enthubmsm was shared factual materml about the causes of the by Slr Winston Churchill and by senlorrniil effect on their knowledge war and some of tary leaders who spoke fak,orablv of the specific world events. But there had been films.. only Iimlted Impact on oplnlons of a mm-e Capra.lnslsts that the watchword under #eneral nature Nlost tellingly, the films which he worked ~~astbat Truth was to be had no effect on the mens motlvatmn to serve as soldlers, the baws for h]> efforts. That fact not~vlth the ultlmate objective of standlrrg, a hmtorian studying the Impact of the orwntatlon program. The clear impli cation is that, despite the enthusiasm for the first. of the ser]es, Prelude to War, these films at the blghest le~els, scientific found that ltsreal significance Iles In Its re flection of official attitudes and popular evidence ml>es serious concerns about their real success. prejudices regardlns international rela tions. The key question. then. ~. thw Was Why We Fight really effective in mot]vat]ng There can be Americans oldlerstofightbe L r? Testimo no doubt that the I&E Dlvi slons effOrts were conducted with a great
ny from ~tmior leaders and War Department deal of fervor and enthusiasm. it is impm accounts leave nodoubtthatlt~vas Therels tant, thou~h, not to confuse act~t{tv lvlth cf other evidence to consider. though, that hints strongly that theserlesrmy not have a caution K+ offered perceptlk,ely
frc[treness; by the author of the Armys official hi~tory
done that at all. of the Army Serwce Forces: the I&E Divv
I&E Div}s}on socla}sc]ent]sts conducted sions programs lnvolwd an effort to mam several surveys to determme the effects of taln morale and to provide useful informa the films. Through a series of questions and Much of the material produced In
tion. statements designed to probe reactions to furtherance of this ~vork was Imag)nat]ve
these mov]es, researchers investi~ated the

AN

ASSESSMEN

MILITARY REVIEW

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79

groups, enllsted-run papers and other pro inative and marked by excellent cmftsman grams disturbed ship. How effective it was was always uncer many In the chmn of com taln.s mand. Some went so far as to accuse I&E of A military psychiatrwt writing during ficers of being communists; supporters the war observed that the I&E Diwslons ef the claim that information countered with forts had been only partially successful, programs recognized the basically high lev meeting resistance constantly from troops el of ]ntelllgence of the Amerlean soldwr, not conwnced that the United States was ivho wanted to know !vhat Jvas happening really threatened.; Even an officially spon and who ~vas entitled to form hls own opin sored study conducted In 194.5 concluded ion about tbe war and bl> place in It that there existed no significant differences Further, It 1s clear that soldlers were re In attitudes among men who had partlc]pat Medtu used In Information ceptive to the ed In formal orientation programs and those programs: attendance at government-made mu~,les was high, and tbe number of~oldlers who had not One htstorlan has remarked, who read GI newspapers was perhaps even , somewhat cynically, that the programs were more popular at higher headquarters higher Why, then, ~vere some efforts not to than among rank and file. tally successful. and tvby were perceptions Combat commander. were nut enthusla. afthose at blgber Ietelsdifferent from those In the cumbat units? - tlc about programs forced on them by hl~her Part of the ans!ver IIes In the general ten headquarters. One divlslon commander dency of Americans to be cynical of author. Ity AIM), many Americans wbo entered the An officially sponsored study con Army In the 1940s brought with them stron~ prejudices, botb polltlcai and social. ducted m 1945 concluded that there As long ah tbe Army wa~ largely a conscript exwted no slgmflcant differences m at force, resistance to new or different Ideas titqdes among men who had parhclpaied m formal orientation programs and could be expected those who had not, Reviewing }Vorld \Uar 11iniormatlon and . 3 Indoctn natton efforts, one socml sclentmt concluded that efforts to explaln why we fi~ht ~nd to provldt. a conception of a polltl compkuned that l&E had been a constant harassment that hdd Interfered ~vlth nor that of tbe defense of the cal KOJI beyond countly have been more Irrelevant than un mal tralnlng. Compounding the problem. successful and that efforts to develop an l&E personnel were often not ekemplary Ideological concept of the mllltary mission leaders, many were Incompetent or ill have met Ivith IIttle success and have per. trmned. Combat troops frequently refetm,d haps been a source of confusion. LIauldln to I&E personnel ah SISSY and accu,ed put the sltuatlon even more simply: We them of boondoggling Further, many ~oni donut have to he indoctrinated or told there IS m.anders dld not attend Information ses. a ~v,aron over there We know there IS a war slons or take an active part In the program, on because we see It We dont like It n It ts small wonder that, at the Io;vest levels, darned bit, but you dont see many soldlers l&E was viewed with dlsdaln quitting. Fancy propaganda 1151a Ilttle w. In their defense, l&E otlcers were trying prrfluous to protect and promote democratic values In Such observations ~re sobering, espec]alan organization not geared to allow much Iy for those who are today Involved in proIatltude of oplnlon. Soldier discussion

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August 1987 . MILITARY REVIEW

WILLIE AND JOE

? vldlng news to soldlers and \vorking to mot]. vate them to do thelr~obs better. One might SoIdlers were receptwe to the conclude that ]n battle, soldlers need no uth information programs. media used m er motii,ation than that provided by the ene. . . Why, then, were some efforts not my to their front. But to dmmlss the need for totally successful, ? Parl of the answer hes m the genmal Cl simply because soldwrs at the front Ilnes can see the enemy would be naive The tendency of Americans to be cymcal of rights and responslbllltles of mtlzenshlp, authority. Also, many Americans who the duties ofsoldlerlng, the place of combat entered the Army m the 1940s brought w!th them strong preludlces, In world affialrs-all can and should be a part of a soldlers mental baggage, because both polltlcal and social. Ideas do cause men to fight, even If they make up only a small part of the combat equation. The lessons to be learned from troop inforAs a result, CI tends to be appyoprmte. mation efforts In World !Var 11may be sum placed on the back burner by many leaders marized as follows: Often, Cl M done only by publ]c affa]rs staff o The combination of Informatmn serv ers, \vho, Ilke thew World War 11 predeces {ces with other actlvltles clearly detracted sors. are far removed from the front Ilnes. from the effectiveness of CI programs. This For CI to be ful Iy successful. commanders was particularly true where a single officer must take an act]l,e part In unit Information or small staff was requ]red to accomplish programs. d]sparate tasks The Army corrected that e The mlsslon of Cl personnel In World problem in tbe years after tbe \var War 11 was bound up In Ideology, v.b]ch so Unfortunately. wblle the duties that bur ciai scientists have demonstrated IS only a small part ot~vbat causes soldlers to be mot] dened CI personnel In J\orid War 11 have been taken a~vay, todays Cl officers often vated, Yet, those at the highest levels, \vho are genu]nely attached to Ideology, st]il in find themselve> saddled with other, equally onerous jobs that llmlt the time they can sist that promotln~ abstract values 1>the most important m{won of command !nfm devote to the]r pmmary task. Some get matlon. kldny sen]or Iwders want 10 Impart syphoned off mto protocol or spend time edtheir conv]ctlon> to those they lead Wh]le Itlng the paper (though that is still the job of the thought is admirable, implementing It an enlisted soldler or clv]l]an employwl poses two problems sold]ers are not entbu Addltlonally, CI officers 3re often vlct]ms of smstlc about lectures on Ideology, nor are staffing cuts, they recept~ve such messages o Because Cl was a staff function, re to getting from figures }n moved from battlefield act}vltles, people asauthority. Today, too. a exlstsbet\;,een ss.nsigned to it \vere not always the best avail wldewlf Ior Ieoders and young soldiers regarding able, and those ]n combat umts looked \vlth media preferences. SoIdlers are radio TV disdain on them Commanders \vho spoke chsparaglngly of CI added to the problem, and whatever good effect the programs may have had was diluted by such negativism Th]s problem persists today. For many years, Ci \vas a mandatory subject Today. commanders aw charged to conduct Cl as

ewslon works: long talklng head tapes

Todays commander and public affams of that fill the shelves of audiovisual support
ficer must realue that CI is not an append centers attest to this sad fact.
age, a nice-to-have program prowding sol e The purpose of Cl In World War II was
dlers an opportunity to see themselves in to improve morale, which Involved more
the local paper If done correctly, CI can be j than simply providing Information and con as valuable asanytralnlng or maintenance ducting lndoctrlna?ion programs. To be ef weekly schedule. actl~,lty on the SoIdlers fect]ve, CI had to work In consonance ~v{th !vho feel Rood about themselves and what other Army programs That \vas not always they do wvll perform thelrjobs better; effec done well, as a result. the effect lvene.s of CI tive CI programs give soldlers that k]nd of feellng ~ programk suffered

NOTES ,

:,2

,. i.

3.,

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REVIEW

Selective Assassination Answer to the Terrorists

ByDr %cffic Glen St J. Barclay

an
Trade

1987

Defence

Reporter.

February

Concluding that terrorism IS tn fact an act of war and poiltlcally motl\, ated wr)lence pure

.]nd wmple, Dr Glen St, J Barclay iuggests I ihlsartwle for Pac[f[cU cfenc,cR cp,]rtert hat It would therefore be completely appropi-mte for 5e curtty forces engaged 1n dmect action m terrorlat situations to be dmected to take no pr]stmers Barclay, an associate professor of tnternatxon. al relatmns at the Unlverslty cd Queensland, cal15 It b]mply 111 glcaI to treat terrorists as O crlmmala when they are attempting to achieve exactly oppOslte goa15 for exactly opposite rea sons The rule~of crlmlnal law do not perta?n to terrorlAm, he v,mtes, because they treat the ter. rorlst as something other than what he really IS Theauthor states that punt~b)ng peoplcuho lntcnd to become martyr~ an}w,iv makes no wnw And rehabllltatlng thcm through extend. cd fitayi ln prison IS eqwdl} unrc~l~~tlr unk+ tbev could be convinced tbtit thmr \Iew. win-c wnmg Accord%ng to Barclay, It would be dlftl cult to tblnk of an exrrclse less llkel} tube ,UC Ce>aful But thqse problems would not arise. Barclay says, If terrmvsts wwe treated as combatants e. gazed In ack of war Inthlsscenarm, terrorists wearing dmtmctlw and recogmzed uniforms while carry{ng out terrorist actlwtles would he Wanted safeguards under tbe Genc+a Conven tion B.mclay,h owever,l squ]cktopmntoutthe obwous terrorists never wear dlstlnctlve and rc>c[]gnlzeduniforms. Intbat casr, hcwrltes, the rules ofconventlonal warfare would not pertain. Take noprLsoners, lfposs]ble. besavs JJutlf not, make them hostage> and glvethem suspend. ed death sentences tobecmmed out ]n tbe ewmt of any bodv~ attempting to secure their reledse by further terrorist operations The whole purpose of such actmns would be to render terrorism IllogIcal by renderm.g lt coun terproductive, Barclaj writes Such a>trategy would clearly demonstrate that any terrmst actlun would make the sltuatlon worse from tbe

terroristsvlewpomt Therel snovalu:lndolng anyth]ng tosecure somebody s release from CUS. tody Ifanythmgt hat onedoes lsgolng to result mevltably In that persons executmn, he adds A further assumpt Ion, acccmdmg to the author, is that there can be no concessions or negotm tmns w]th terrorists. except on procedreh for thew surrender EJecauseterronsm targets the Innocent, the only logical methods to use against terrorism are those that target tbe gmlty, Barclay writes Barclay also says that terronstsof al! races have always claimed to be soldlers and demand. edtobetreated as such There can benoposslble oby+ctton to taking them at their word. it IS thmr own free cbome to wear a recognizable unlforrn ]f they want to be taken alme, or to disguise them. selves asc]vll !arlslf they want to bekll led The author concludes that what ISln questmn here ISnot moral, t>,but will and logic -ELH.

My Philosophy
By Major Defepce Force Wayne

of Leadership
L. Dandrldge May4une 1986

Jourrra/,

in th{, ~burt e.>:I\. lcw dm .hlp I* ar does wmu 23(1 difk,ret thm~:, for hi,qoj Wa>n<I L f)an di id~i,. \\ ritlng m tbe lIJ\ ,June 1986 cdltion of t hi, Au:trwl tan l)cfint c Frm,, .Imi? nal Among bi. more >trrJ,lng cb,rr.xtrr!z.it ia.of lt,advt>blp

om the iolfowvn~ e I.eadershlp ]>not glwvfyng war o Leadersblp w not doing anything tu get promoted e Leadersblp IScommandmg and managmg e Leadership IS humanmtlc. being assertive. but not aSL~esslve Lhmdridge also says Ieadersh}p ISnot a good ef ficiency report, nor IS lt paper readiness He says It E not forgetting that the past IS our heritage, the present ISour challenge, and tbe future ISour responslblllty Moreover, [eadershlp means no comproms~e of tbe lntegrlty of ones word, deed, or signature. He wmtes that Ieadersh]p IS fa!r, predictable. and consistent and means giving a superior sound professional adv)ce when you know he or

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:hu does not want to hem It It alw can be found in *Igeneral who knows the fr{endly and enem? sltuatwn. the tmmed]ate action for tbe hl -16 I ftle. hls drlvers first name and family, and the Lords Prayer DandrldEe finds a long ll+t of names -sonle common. some unfam]llw that represent lead ership and shows that lt can he good or bad. cen tralized ordecentrallzed. warm or cold. offenblvt, or de fensl\,e, macro or micro, or expcnslve or flee lle sa}s lt can also be baccalaureate. bal. tmced. bwc. and too frequentl} backwatd and batbarlc C)ptImlzlng, mtnlmumg, nlemorlzlng and nle~merlzlng are all traits of leadership say. tbe author It 15 the kind of tbm~ that looks YOU In the eye, klchsyou In the ass. covers your flank. and takes your place on tbe most dangerous mw mon lie ~ays that leadership often makes good grades ln ~chool and bas man\ Important de grees, but hasalsobeen known to flunk math~nd Englmh Leadership can be learned and taught. but not forgotten or bought, sa!s Dandrldge Heconcludestbat leadez~hlpls so In Iovcw]th life that It I. w]llln# to dle to Tnsurc that othet ltves \\ III go onELH.

Four-Star

Management

By Jay*megan /nc , January 1987

Thlslsthestor} of the LISAlr F1]rce T~ctical Alr Command ITA( I. an 01ganlzatlon th.]t J dec ztdeago \vasln a sorrv state. but that. under the leadership of Gtmeral W L Breech. becanwone of the bright stats of tbe defense flrmwnc,n t. ac= cording to Jay F]negan .Ivho\vrltes !ntl]e Janu arylssue Oflnc magazine half of TACs At one pulnt, F1neKan w}>.

planes in a $25 bllllon fleet were not battle readj, md more than 220pldne~ were ~ounded forl:sck ofapzre p.lrtsor nlajntc,ll:illce TACpI lots lacked tbe Ilylng time nece>~a)l to beep thetl SLIIIS sb.irp. .ind m~n\ pilot. nlt,ch.%rllc. andtvchn)cvan> \vt,le dt..c,] tlrl~tl]e Alr F,)lct>)n droves TitC \\asalso suftenng throuxh i peI md of soaring accident rates Then Cr@ech alrlved and changed everythln~ ln sl>andaha If years Todaj. TAL fight ers ale ln fine condltlon. Its p]lots are fully trained. and lts]nstallat ions areln\p.~rkllng condition The number of grounded planes ISdown to only a few and tbe crash rate IS also may down Reenllst

mtmtsaremanng Accord)ngto F1negan, Per haps most remarkable, Crtwch was able to work hl> magic with no more money, no more planes, and no more personnel than were available\\ hen he started Creechs strategy wastoforceabot. toms.up management st}le on an tmgamzatlon that had always been stnctlyt op-down-push mE responslblllty and authwty down Into the tlnlest crevices of blscommand Andsostunnm# was hls execution that the Pentagon has now be gun to apply hls techniques throughout the II S mllltarj Creerh spent time ln the Pentagon during the days of Defense Secretary Robert NlcNamara when the watchwo]d was centralization. Fine gan writes, and he sa\v NcNamara carry out bls a.s)gnment of curbm~ mterserwce rivalry and lrIbtltUtl IIg greater clvlllan controi of the m,ll tary But C1eech also sa~i that commanders ln the field were stripped of thetr autonomy and that decls]on making was jealouslv guarded wlthJ the Pentago n. Ftnegan sa)s Creech took command of TAC long after hlcNamara had departed tbe Pentagon, but cen tralized management vas still entrenched m the mll]tary only It wasnt \vork Ing, FlneSan wr)tes. nut at TAC. anyway [granted, sonledu plicatmn had been ehmln.]ted. along \v]tb some jobs But the cost had been hl~h the American mdltary command had been robbed of much of]ts \,lgor Innovation and 1nlt7atl\,c were dis. coura~ed. and people \vere dehumanized. thought of m mere cwts of productmn, like so many bullets m-roes> kits The new TAC commander launched a crusade to give pwver and authority to the people at the bottom Whattreechd ]dbest,perhaps,a crord. lngto Flnegan, wmtoremmde>en the lowest. level emplo}ees that thin) Jobs were directly tmd ]nto TACscentralmlswon flvlngandfightmg By tbeutrly 1980s. TACbadgone fr(]mthe A]r Forces \vorst command to tt~ best Fme~an sa\s, E\,en t he Pentagon has got the rellgmntbat Creecb ]n.plred Recent PentaRon dlwctl\e> autborlze commander> to abollsh reg ukttlons, .treamlme procedures, and do what ever they think be~t to accomplish the mlsslon Creech still finds, m hls retwement travels, ex ecutlves\$ho vlewdecentrallzatlon and delega tmn as loss of control and abdication of com mand Butbec laImsthatw henheleftTAC. he had more control than hls predecessors because he had created leaders and helpers at alf Ievels Creech says that without that network below you. youre a leader m name only

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SUMMARIES
Creech recogrnzed very early that there was only so much he could do at the top of T.AC He told F1negan, You cant m]cromanag~people resent that. Things are achieved by individuals, by collections of twos and fiyes and twenties, not collections of 115,000 And thats as true In m industryas lt is m the m,htary -ELH. Theauthmth]nks that somehow \vrltlngdown leadership guidelines completes the right of pa.sa~e to the promised land of leadership After searchlngh,s past, ilartmproduces the fol lowvng Ten Commandment. of Lea~ershlp Q Thou shalt dWayS, remember that peOJ)ie are more Important than things o The shalt afiirm rather than C~JOii? e Thou shalt not covet another persons lead ership theory, rather, thou shalt fall ln love with good ~esults e Thou shalt get r]d of the notion of.good and
bad Ieadershlp e Thou shalt never forget that leadership and communication are 1nextrlcably bound tOgether. e Thou shalt communicate by example e Thcm shalt always dlstlngtush between bat. ties and skirmishes Q Thou shalt VEW ank asa responslblllty, not r a prlvdege e Thou shalt be competent and confident enough to take a risk o Thou shalt always reward etblcal behavior Martin says he holds these prmclples before himself as a map and a compass They always remmd hlm that leadership IS rarely an auto matic response to external forces, but rather a hard, reasoned, planned process of thought and action, of personal values applied to organlza tmnal challenges. ELH.

Ten Leadership Commandments By Chaplain (Colonel) Richard K. Marfm,

USA, Retired
M///tary Chap/sins f?eview, Winter 1987

T.loses started it, writes Chaplaln Richard K blart]n In the winter 1987 edition of .W(l[tar? RGLWUI He was the first to requlsl tlon and receive a handbook on leadership Actu ally, klartlnr says. It was not really a book, lt was a talklng paper with ten bullets He says reactmn to the 10 bullets was mixed. but m the end, a funny tblng happenedthe bul lets worked, and hloses accomplished hls m]s. wm Since that ttme, hfartln saj.. everyone In the leadership and management business has felt compelled to duplicate that mountaintop feat and to come up with a set of rules, principle., guidelines, theories, pronouncements, strate gles, directives, musmgs, or ramblmgs ,
Chap/alns

LIC. !. a \ Iolent stru~gle fovcontml ef the WII1of peopl.. ab poJ1tlcal entitles, not a polltlcal socud .tlug~le to tnfluence the conduct of vmlence 1n the form of mllltary action The plnblem we ha\e \>lth I.IC stc,mti from an ermneou> nut]on .ibout the Ymtnam Uar In \\hat IS hy now m apocryphal imvdent. ColuneJ Jlarry G Summers Jr relates meet]ng vnth hls Nnrth Vwtnamew counterpart tn Hanm ]n 197FJ and decl~ring that the Lnlted State. was new+r detbatrd an the battlefield. The North Vietnam (,w colnnels reply. as everyone remembers, wa> that that was true hut also lrreleuant Now, what dld that J]ttJe piece ofmsdom meanthat wm.

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85

n]ng b~ttlefi was 1rrelovant or that we, the US tmlitorv. simply won lrre Ie\,ant battles> There IS a difference, and the difference would seem to be that the side that can structure the military con tllct meanmgftdly lrelevantlyl will wln Wefa]led to do this 1n V1@nam and therefo] e die\\ the erroneous conclusmn that direct m]lt ta] y actmn ~combat agatnst the enemjsm]lltary fwcesh was the least effective \vay of waging thl> type of c,mfllct F~om this expwnence has arisen thenotloll that the social, polltlcal, economlcand psvchologlcal dlmenslons of the struggle are more meaningful We have taken up thew more enlightenedsoclal philosophies lndeahngwlth ]nsttrgency and revolutionary confflct because they seem to provide a more rat]onal bas)s for ~ettln~ at the root causes of the conflict \Vhat we have ovet%oked ISthe ]rratlonal. but perhaps more relevant, dimension of \volence It. self. \vhlch IS the undesirable outcome of the larger struggle We have turned m]lltary art on its head. Instead of mlI~tary operations w}th po Iit ]cal and other consequences, we ]nst ead see po litical and socral operations wtth the ronhe. quence> of llmltmg the level ofvlolence through controlling the enemys ability to conduct mlll tary actlOn The fruits of these 111-concelvc.dnotions m~\ soon appear m Central America We mav won reapa dxaster there becauw ofuurfallurv m un. derstand the mtture of that contllct We ha\t. turned It Into 5ometh1ng tdten to It. uv.n n.tture Our basic philosophy ln Central America 1s tu reduce the level ofconfllct with a mtnlmum pres cmce of combat force.. to train the allws to defend themselves. and to engage In mttlon -support nctlon5 Meha~,ea large number of Reser\e Corn ponent combat support and combat w] \Ice sup. port unlt~ )n the zone Engineer. medwtal. com munlcatlons, aviation and other support troop, aredolnggteat thlngstobo15ter the moralt, of the allles Up to now iN1caragua\ President f)~nwl Ortega has engaged the allw+ ,Hondura\ and El Salvador) and has kept h!+ dlbtancc flo]ll [IS forces. e~cept for occa~lona) tm mt.t attacks of The chlllmg reality of a miijor communht fen.lve dlrccted specifically agatn,t these ei. posed ~lS .uppo?t folces IS not nut of the t calm of po~slbllltv AssumlnR the u>ttal Anlerwan ab horrenceufmllitar? \),)lence. espectallyunantlc lpated \lolent att,lck. Ortega could pull off a Tet Offens]\e-t\ peupwtofour >trateg} in there gmn Hexvould ha\etobe \\tlllng tosufferenor mnuscasualtles. \vould need thcfanatlcal back ing of hls o\\n people, and would have to strike

w.ryeftlcwntlyat many p01nt5.3t once In an o\er all coordinated uffens]te Hlsmllltary +rength and pol]tlcal ~uppmt for .uch an oftvnwve are que$t)onable nt th]> time Ourvulnerablllty toauch an attack andourpo lttlcal urmutahlllt> for coprng with such a het back ln our strateg\, ho\vever. do not w.em to bc m questmn E\,en lfwe \\ere able to reestablish control rapidly and lnfllct terrlbleditmageon the tnem}, there would be the r{sk of polltlcal backIashduetotempotzwv iossolcontrol, a general undefined feeling that something had gone wrong. that Ieadelshtp had chosen the wrong strategy. that lI\,es had been lost [both enetn> and frlendl}l. and that we had engaged m Itm ttonal \lolent con fflct \vlthout purpow othe] than todefend our5el\e*aga)nst destruct10n All ofthls, ofcourw. would bedl\pktyed tothe Amer lcan publ]c on the even]ng news, where It would have the greatest psvcholog]cal ,mpdct LVar M the appllcat ton of wptwol mll]tary force toaccompll >hpolttl calands,>cl;ll goal~ The operatl\e medium of war ISde>tructlve, but pur poseful vmlence In the last several years we have dectded that this ]s not enough. that the m]lttar~ >hould deal \tttbthe enemy on several phtnes at once lVehave c,>meto belle\, ethat we should p,act,ce >wval. polttwal. psycholo~lcal .lnd ecunomic oper.?tlons directly. lnst~.ad of tbrouxh the, medium of \]olent appl]ratmn of milltar> force Thecmwent de flnltlonofLI( svem> toset u~up ps>chologlcally foradtsastrous scenario W]th ]ts amblFuouslv defined relatlonship~ between mllltarj and nonmllltar> actlun andthe lack of obJectl\e mliltarv focus, it permlth ttstnselcct al. most anyratmnalstrzttc~ andtodlsregard the irrational fm-tor of ra\\ primordial vmlence a> thepnnc] pal motl\e underlying an} protracted stru~~le The\ @or \vIll be the side that can ef. tectlveI> structure the mratlonal, the Iosern,ll be the hide that refttsm to abandon seemingly ra tmnal. but lrrelevmt. ideas LTCJohn S Fulton,USA, le!delberg.liermaoy t

On Soviet Logistics
H.?vlng part] clpated In 1980 ]n the prepara tmn of a draft field manual on Soviet Ioglstics. I was partlcuk+rly attuned to the message 1n the Aprd article Soviet Reinforcement m Europe hy Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth L1 Keltner and Graham H. Turblvllle Jr If nothing else IS

86

August 19870 MILITARY REVIEW

Li9_TERS

g~lned from the itrtlcle, the autho? . cloblng po?. * a~raph must be kept firmly in m]ndby CSand al I]ed planners. We cannot affo]d to low ilght of the Sovret ablllt} tomnve,l rmc)ra. f,lrfu] \\ard .x. po~+hle bcfwx=the tracks htt the ground unlf+. the conversion one small cwlectmn
factor for u met! IC ton hs. changed In the L>. few t vears. themaxlmumto\\ed In.idofthr MA Z.537 IS 6.; mctrlc ton.. not 55 I Probdbl} a typo in the ot-l~!n,~l quoted docunwnt, ST- CS.07 -280-741 COLRoger C Staples, WAR, Ret[red,
Santa Barbara. Cahlorn#a

require antlarmm. moblh~ forces The regtmen. t.d c.ivalry squadron lsan outstanding combat utRan]zatlon that can fulf! 11that mletoday Per baph the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment \vIll ba\,can ovDortunltv. tuaddto lts%var D]8ns Let US hope SO
MAJPhAlpO Allure, USA,ArIfngton. Vtrg!n!a

Mixing Heavy and Light

Thv Ile.]vv L];ht opw.itlon s article p]t,. .cntedb\ Colonel. IVllllam W Haltzog ,md John or> I,,(, 1) Hnwald in the API II I.sue of Mrl?tH,( WJ.c.fle.hlngl\ clcmr, pract]cal and conm.c I I fullv am w. \vlth thmr pmposltlon that \\e need more lnfot m.jtlon on the technlqum uf bea\ y light opetatlc>nb Their article ofTer, prag mattc solut]nnhun a subJect mmt authm+dmcu. s onlv tbco]ctlcall~ It WCI.an r\cellmtt revww of technlqum lequlrc,d ofcomrnandc,r> to optlmm? .UCCC+S \v]th J beas\ light mlx CAforces on the battlefield The .cenario. presented b;lhe .iu. thnr. p! m {de the rwcewar! backdrop tgm.%ke tilt. k... ur. meaningful ,md pertinent to ttictl ca I I<,adm> I \tould I <,commc,nd th.lt the al tlcle be re p! Int[,d 111 in/onIr v .ind ..lrm,u m:tganne. and ln P, th<,.tl,, I!Iw(w fk:t,t(c alwbe :lppl0. !t \\uuld
I]{ r.tt<. lw lnclu.ron in thr field circularwx ImIILu. tl. The Imwn. ptewnttd \\ould fit it+ of

Tanks Needed for LIDs

in the. rh.tpte! > c,,!enng ,.t.,tl,m. Tbt. m:tte) ,.11uould bc, c,wclk,nc to] .ln uffio.t >
cIJ., II> an! b~ttal}un or hi+mdc, MG Andrew L Cooley. USA,fort Slew. wt. Georgra

nlct,l\ .PCLCWI ]c:ll com.d tact

More on Lost Island

MfLITARYREVIEW

August f987

87

ON AGAIN, OFF AGAIN

The US kfanne Corps wh,ch late last year ,ssw?d a request for pro poSa15to develop an alr defense vet 510. of Its hght armored veh, cle ILAV)IMR Feb 1987, 103), hascan celled the request because only one defense contractor responded The Marines m!g,nally wanted to purchase 125 a,r aefense .anarns of is LAV25 8x8 wheeled armored uersmwe! tamer, but General E1ec tnc was the only company that re. spo.deo to the request tor pro. posals General Electr,c offered Its
Blazer turrel

Despite cancellation of the re. quest Ior proposals the Marines have reportedly not cancelled there. qu,remenl?or an al! defense veh!cle based on the LAV Chassis The Ma. r!ne Corps st!ll wants to beg, fhe program by the end of th,s year. but IS now expected to relss.e the request tar proposals based on a system less capable and sopiwbcated !han the one Or,g, nally planned M,l,tary
Tecfmology, r 1987

NEW

ZEALAND

PICKS

AIJG the AUG. butdselected the AUGto mamtarn commonahty between ,1s weaoons and those d the Ausval, an army New Zealandsm d.svy ,s reportedly go,ng to share,. the producuon of the AfJGs pur chaspd by Austral,a NO f,rrn delr@ry dstes or overall Coslsweree stablrshc?d for the New Zealand purchase lnfernaoonal
annys De fense Re.@w < 1987

HOVERING

THUNDERBOLT
Sea reals are under way on a full scale, 8.meter. preproductloP ver. S1OPof a mulflpurpose hovercraft Ihatfeaturesamque steew-g sys. tem Nrcknamed the 7hunoer001t the new craft was burlt by Marlne sw,ft L1d of Great Br@. Company 0tt,Cld15 repo[tt?dly are negooat,ng VWmmhtary athor, t,es to evaluate the Cfalt The steering systemcalled re verse d!rect, onal thrust (RDT1al. lows for a 360-dc?gree turm.g rad,us at zero toward arm reverse soeeas Italsoenaoles thecrafimchang ear rec[mn Wlfhout Iosmg !Isaw. cush,on base Because the RDTsystem sup pfms both !#ll and drecoonal drl.e the 7hunoerlIolt reawes no external driv!ng fans Jane s De fencc
Week/y c 1987

The New Zealand army fo!kwwng thelead Oflhe Au5tral, an army has selected the 5 56mrn AuG assault r,. fle pros.ced by Aus!r, as Steyr. Darmler. Pch to replace ,1s FN FAL 762mm weapons New Zealand Se. Iocted the AuG following ew?nswe e.aluatlons of,1 and the Colt M 16A2 Accord,ng to p. DIE.hed reports the New Zealand army found ht!te d,fterence between the M16A2ard

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM LAUNCHED

The Twk,sh Army has launched an ,mmovement program to upgrade the f#reROwer moull,ly andre:lavl,iy O!!IS Md4 self -propelled howlfzer to ensure that the system remains m serwce to the year 2000 and beyond A consorhum of We5t German tom. Dan#es. Workrng mco.pmctron wdh the Turk,sh Army, wdfcarfy out the upgrade Program The ,mprovemen! program w,ll e Increase the combat range 0: the weapon to 24 kilometers wth standard ammun#fmn and30kllome ters wth Special rounds e Ensure useofal[ NATO sland ard armmumt,on e Improve thehowllzer smobtllty 0 Increase standards for reltablf ,ty. a.alla D,hfy, rnalntmnab)llty ad durab,lrty The modermzatlon k,t conwsts of modular elements that allow rnax,. mum.seof extstmg components All of these components are scheduled tor production by Turkmh Industry Tests have been Complefed on a mockup ollheupgraded engme,afld fmng mats are de soon overall, 166 M44 systems are due for up grad,ng NA TOs Sfxteen NaoLms. All R,ghts Reserved

88

Aug@1987

* MILITARY REVIEW

NEWS

LOOKING BACK
A novel way of presenting a much wider fteld of v!ew to a!rcmdl pmm than fhat currently offered by normal head-up d[splays, and at a fractjon of the price, E being developed and tested by MBM Technology of Great Bmaln Called the rear we~ d)splay, or RVD, the new system uses a pair of coherent frber-optic bundles and op. hcs installed m a fbght helmet m such a way thaf the plfot places hls eyes almost m contact wlfh the lens of a msplay located behind h,s head At the same t!me, the prlot mamta!ns a full v!ew ! hot of the aircraft through the use of a small comb,ner glass m front of his eyes W!fh the vlewrng assembly close to fhe PIIOW eyes, bright hght can be suppressed through use of a helmet sun visor The visor, however, does not reduce the d!splay Iummance ano lull-color Imagery provided Accord!g to developers, the RVD offers a wide fwld of wew both vetl. catly and hor!zontaliy The low wew can be used to electromcally gener. ate mstrumentatlon In this way ba. 51C data can be projected on the scene as the plot looks ahead, while 3 glance down could reveal a com plete msbument panel tt ,s also possble to prowde both a clear View ahead and below by means of a sensor or camera Unl,he Conventional d,splays that are prone to glare and Instrument reftectlons, the new RVD can more eas!ly be Shaeldedfrom glare because the sm. @ lens , the system @ t...hmd fhe ~tots head In addtlron to offering an e>tra w,de held ot wew, the RVD does not consume valuable equ[pmerd space m fhe atrcraffs nose Removing the display from m front of the pklot alSO removes a potential source of IWIY during e)ectton The RVD, according to devel opers, is not yet ready to enter pro. ducllon, but one model has been sold to a Ihrmand E being tested on a Lynx helicopter stmulator DeveL opers see the RVD as a useful de .Ise for fixed wing pdots as well as helicopter p,lots The cost of the ba. SIC system ,s est,maled at 25,000 Brmsh pounds Jane .s De fence
Weekly I 1987

SAVE WEIGHT, SPACE FOR AMMO Anewtyueo fammunlflonc onta,n. er that saves substantial wetght and space over the hadmonal wooden case E be,ng manufactured m Aus Iral,a by Hendersons International The container !s reusable and has a standard external Configuration but has mtemal recesses that can be molded to recewe a rwde variety of ammumhon and other Items Calfeo SECAP for sfandard exter. nal conhgratm. Wmmunmon pack. age the new container M construct. ed of a semmgld polyurethane foam material that !s Iw. retardar!t, self. exfmgushmg, and unattrachve to vermm Developers say the conta, n. er,5 of neghg,ble?utr,t, onal value an rmDorta[ Constderat, on for ]ngle operations where vermm are more prevalent The ma!er(al E also resist. ant to mold and fung! .% advantage SECAP has over the sfandard wooden ammun,f son crate ,5 that the new con fa,ner can wrtally be kicked out of heilcoD. ters on resupply m,sstons whereas the wooden Conlamers had to be uloaoea by Iwo men to avo,d dam. age .SECAP containers carrying M26 grenades have been tCSt dropped I(OM hej,copters al alflludes of 30 to 100 meters w,tbo.[sulferl.g damage to the package or ,!s con ienfs The A.str.31!an Army ,s currently havm~ SECAPconlamers manfac. [urCd 10 carry M26 hand grenades. 81 mm mortar rounds Smarex smoke grenades and r1A7 f.zes Developers say some S% ,.ler.al conl,gurat,ons are feasitle lor weap 0.s ammun,t,o. tooa and tom. mvtcahons ano reed, cal eaul P ment - In femal,ondl De fence Re. t 987 v,eti

..

TARGET PRACTICE
The 1,Ooothaerial target produces by me Northrop COrPOcatlOnfor the US Navy recently came Off the Pro ducl,on hne The target, called the BOM.7dC, s!mulates enemy air. craft Crwse m,sskles and anfm,p m,ss,les for US Navy target pract,ce and weapons evaluahon Produced by Northrops Venfura Dtvts!on m Newbu~ Park. Cahforma, the EtOM. 74C m sent aloft through the use of two 2,350 .pound4hcust, ]et.asssted lakeoff rockets

89

MILITARY REVIC;V * August 1987

SOVIET POWER ANOTHETHIRO WORLD Ralan by

Menon 261 ~ages Vale Umversfy Press. New Haven.

%w?t wrltmgs and dlscuswms wlth Soviet scholars. Rajan klerton assesses the forces that the Scmet tlnton ha. available fm m]lltaty ]nterventton m regional Tbtrd World con fllcts Menon also discusses the use of Soviet military power tn Angola. Ethiopia and AfSban L. stan, exam]nm Sov]et defense spending trends. analyze~ the growth and current status of Sovtet power projectmn forces, 3nd describes the evolu tion and usefulness of the Soviet arms transfer program ]n the Third World Xlenon dlmdes Soviet POIICY toward the Third World since World war 11 into three pha~es Phase 1,1945 t. 1953, wasaper].d of Sovlct lnac. tlvlty IMenon wmtes that the prmcl pal SOI let preoccupation In fm%vgn POIICY wa. not wtth re. mote areas but with Jia.tern Europe. The second phase of Soviet POIICY tuward the Tblrd Vvorld,accordlngtothe author, Ia.tcd flom 19.54to 1969 Described as a petvotf of.ict]vism. Sm,]et foretgn policy asp]? atlons became muw global a. tbe Sovtets began a more actlie effort to v.in fntmd. and Influence In the Third Wmld %fmm ~r,teh that the most glaring me.xknm. of Sov]et policy 1n the Third Uotld dttnng th]. phase was 1n mll]tary power For example. the Sovret Vn{on lacked the mean. tu project It> forces by alr and sea into remote Iocat]on. Phase 111began in J970 ..lccordtng to Xlenon. It. mot stnklnc h,ature b:]. been the Increa$. ln~ .,illence of mllltary power in SOI @ conduct 1n [h<. dexeloplng area. The focu. of S,,(!<,t t TJITrd 1,,(,t r UI1<I liu Ii,uld wtIn tiie ch:iptet.. ISon this ph.sw The author dr.im: the:e conclu .wn, fr.m his as.e.sment o \ihll.. the role of Sob let mtlltarl pow<+In the Th]rd World h,~s hecomc more s:]llent .Ince 1970. Sov]~,t conduct ISmarked h! ctiu tlnn and upportunl~m, rat be] than >n creased propenslt\ towmd rt, k t,lk$ng e Wh]lc tbe Sm]et Union IS aware of tbe op. portunltles ottered hy tbe volatlllt} of Thtrd World pollt]cs. ]t undel stands WCIIthe fv.tr. dens and rlsk~ of lnvolkement

CT 1986$2000 Drawvng from

o The focus of %wet mllltttry prlorltle; con tlntte. to be on the Untted States, Europe. China and Japan Neither Soviet doctrine nor procurement su;gests that mterventlon ln tbe Tblrd World bas become a goal of par. amount Importance Chapter footnotes and assorted tables, inter .perwd throughout the book, ptowde I.alttable reference data Tbe umwslon of a selectlve blbll ngraphy detracts somewhat from what IS other. wise a well. wr~ttcm and well-orgamzed book .% tvcl Putwr and ihe TAfrd Worlds hw,torlcal ap proach will .ippettl to the general reader and senou. .tudent of national security James B Money, USA, Refired, Annandaie, Vlrgma COL

THEUNCENSORED WAR: The Media and Welnam

by DamelC Halhn 285 pages OxfordUnwersty Press, N?wYork 1986 S22 50 The Vwtnarn \Var llteraturv WOM+month b, month \Vbat Daniel C li~llln add. tu th,lt xr, N {n~ book Itst ISa I ]gotous look nt muJ\.1 c,,$w,.ict. und pw-ftwm,ince. or at least c?ltaln m.IIm PO! tinrw of 1t Tbls !. a book worth reatflngmu.r rcmflnx for the. e who h,~xt, m.lde up thels mind. about the ptes. Jnd Vletn.im It ma} cbonxe w]rne m,nd,. otat leg+ opt, them UP ., hlt Hallrr]wcoL1ect lncalllnCthvYletn:,tn\Vai nn uncwtxned conflict in tb,]t new. COPVand plc ture~ from combat zone% dld not h8\t, to pit.. did. buw thrott~h a ctm:ors hi]nd~ .J.urnalt.t. mvr, bavcto be ,~ccredtted and agr?eto .ume. en .~blc. coter,ase S~delines to prot~.ct operat]orml sccunty Tbme w,,! ki,d I c~mark:lbl\ well rn tbe eyes of thenl!l ltarvand thcprc, t.lnallbuta\(,ly few instance. tYhet her th]. t. the de f!ntt, vt hook .dmut tht, m,.d,~ .tnd Vtetnam IS quest, i,rl able. hw.iu. e !t deal> cb]etl> wth cowrage tn nt.two! k telcvls, !on ~nd the .Vc,[( l,,?/: TImt,, Tb,..c arc not Incon.equenttal med!a b> ,inj mean., hut the book IS not twall> about uII mt.dla coverage of the confllct Thus, the books title me, reaches It. content But th]. book I. still J tr~ilbrcaker t~rbat H.l lin has to .a} about tclm I>Iort and Vletn,im IS

90

August 1987. MILIITARY REVIEW I

.Iprtiflcant In the m,i{rt, tek.v!smn was not hos t]le m Its coverage Idt.ed, ft \\as ~ene~ally i-e. sptctlul of the milltary s role and performance

The, ttme dt+mted to co~emgc of the war W.ISle.. th.in w? m@lt recall it dozen orw years afterthc end of Amertc,ln $n~,olvement AS the wat dl ag~ed on. thecw. erage became cunfflctlg in ch~racter, as ILillln de.cnhes lt, Ieflect]ng the uncvrta!n polltlc.il dlrectl<~n,, fthexvaradpu,v lnc clt.hrnt at Imme, ln and out of govm nment fht=mnctuwm is fur I]urn the tt-levlwon Io.t the ,$,,r vww held hj m:%n~ Thti: v),++ t. ,nnccuratt~ and .impl]it]c, by .inv mcmwtre The TImP., tuo. was not the perpmual foe ,,:.he mtltt.lt v ur tlw handmwden of the Far Left In. deed, the ?tmc, ,upporti,d Prw,,dwt Lydon f? .Jobn +,]< earlj mmm, t mcnt of .-omhat forcm, wb]k, urging d]plurnatlc nvgot] at ton What 1. no txcable. Htillln suggests, I+ .t .hlft f]om storws buwd un ufflc]al government announcemcnt~ to o more qut.stlon]n~ ottltu de. h.?. cd in part on the dchatc ~bmtt the American commitment In \?lvt nanl We need more studws about the n~tule and chalacterc>f]ourrl,sll.nl In Vlt,trmm. .md ltall~n s .o lidwork i. J nev d(,p.lr[ure point fo] rt.smlcb on th~ p,e.. govtvnmmt r.,laclonihlp ln t]mes of n:+tmnal crt.lh COL Wallace6 Eberhard,LISAR. Rehred. Athens, Georg!a

The weakness of the book. lf It cm be called th.it, M that the book bas no coherent storv lme Reader. wbo seek or need this kind of glue ~obold tht,ir interest wII1 not find It In Newmans book Ifun theotherhand they seek to reflect on thecol or. the complexity and the chaltenge that serwce ln tbe ~rofesslon of arms offers. then this book IS for tbem Tbe t lt [e of the hook. WhutArc (Ac,? cl. lfodc of<. !s reall,. a sbartI attcmtmn-cettwAfter readln~ wba{ one suc&sful profe&onal has to sit}, tbe reader IS left wltb tbe thought that tbe answer I]es ln such concepts as human, t>. hard work and absolute profr.sblonallsm, ~ptced llber atly with a good dose of humor and an unerring fix on se] wce to the natm, mx .c.lf or setfish am. Thi. book }. well v.orth paying tbc $1895
requlted to bav~ !t for imps pro fesbl onal library COLFrederfck W, Timmerman, Jr., USA, CenleriorArmy Leadership, USACGSC

WHAT AREGENERALS ADEOF?by M

Aubrey sidio press

MaIor General

Red Newman USA,+?etlred 314 pages Pre Novato CA 1987 s18 95 I{al Ing been an atld rcatferof Gt,ner,%lAuht eb Red Xewman% columns In Arntv mit~azlnc fm m.]r]> ~eals 1 undcrtrmk the upportuntt) to rcx. VIPW latest book \V/?af.4rt,(;{,r/r?a/$ .llac/t, O/ his wi[b pleasure and affection .Newman consl>t entl~ has bmm a tolce uf t c,amn. a friendly nlen. tor. to ~tl who I ead hl: words Such wmnltb and openness to sbd] e on, ,. tbuuShts 1. J r.)tt, trea .uY,, In .in .w(, in v hlcb pevplc, t]~ to act dud Iouti mntc, Itkr rubutb. pl.un and cohmlL, s.. than the I ICIXI> endowed human I>elngs t hnt thm .Imuld he The strength ufXewman. book 1. th.it lt I. re allI ast.]les of 111,columr]. art:tnged lna natur,~l topical profoesslon that addlesse. first junlot of fice! concw nh. theu field ~rade office! concerns und flnall\ general uf~lcershtp Onl~c.in lead the \Jrwus topics qu]ckly and ertslly. thus incre a.. lngtbechance that ont>mlght ~ct on thep]thy ad vice hrewmzm offers

MILITARY REVIEW

August 1987

91

PASS[NRW!W
CONTEMPORARY TERROFNSMEd,lec by W,! am GutTr,dGe 225 paqes Factson File h$,v York 1986 S16 95

b
-

TIII. ,<,lunlt~,>x.itlllt],,. the t e.pt>n.c+ .%x.11blc to l,b~.1.d denwcr.l IJ cw, tu oppuw the thle.it o! tc,t i,)! l.m .md d].wct~ the 01ganlzatmn .lnd n]vf lmd. UI ,clected fe! I (It I.t LmuLIp, !n \Ve.tt. I n I< IJWPL, he T thl, boc,k b.1-tX\O CI1*lll.011,> .,> th<ltd!., (]>.,~> ch.il.+ctet I.t,c, <,!t,,, t (UI.m Jnd .inotbcr tb<lt ple.vr]t~ lout c<?:<, ]:tc>tIc+ on e\tleml.t h k~mtp> In Fi.ince. Sp.1111. If .11$ .+i:d \\ t.t [;,,rm.tnx Th<,eu,lu.tt<. lc! cu. on iicstw n Europe confine. [Ill. book to the t e~lnl ofthc specMl It. lt ulll jmt tlndw cut Jppcx.tl ,lnl<>ng tlw gtmt,Ial tt,.idel sh]p GOL W]lham OepaloJr USA Isf SPecIal Operalmns Command (A!rborne) Fort Bragg. A
North Camhna

THEARAB MILITARY OPTION3VGewra! SNd E SIZly 329 edges Ame~,cmW e~sl Resealcl SaPF~anc,s:o CA 1986 52600

(;t,m,l .11S~.ld E-SM?l, I 31ch1fc>ct ,It thv SUL,7 (111.LI CI ,],,lng .md c.ipturc]f the B.]] 1.1, llnc,. t. .I h<,t~loft h,, AI.Ib Um Id [nf,,! tunatel.v ! t,>lthe CJUM> ptmce Ill the ll!ddk, Ea,t. the gt>m>ralMI%. mlllt at? of a option J. themll I wlut]on in th], t]ouh led remon This book IS i,lwir
l\ ,ilmcd :t]onxlv.lt not onl\ .It fo.tvt tng FIto-At .%h *UPPO! t. but men mm e

~~ll]ppln~ul]a !)t!-l. t.](,1I])stetla E1.Sb.]zly. avetel an of .I\ W,II: F(WPno po,>lbll!t! fm .1 negot I.lted .cttlement of Arab ISI.K,IIdlttct [WCC>$,,1IOU.>tudc,nts o! the Illddlc Ea$t moj !~ish to puI .ue tbt. htmk fu] thin MAJ R!ChardL StrubeJr USA. Manhattan, Kansas

A TURNINGPOINT INWORLOWAR II 24 August 1944 m Romama by ll,e CeaLSes. c Flom Co?stmtlmu ma M,ha,$E Ionescu ?35 pages Cc uvba UPvers,iy Press Te,\ Ym. 1985 S22 50

Tbc tltlt Jlonv XLIII t~l.r flw cjc,brm~ of m.ln~ mtlltal~ ret]detfi Thl> x~mk LMa WOUPof Hom.sntan hl>torlan. attempt> tu prove that the Ronl,lnl, at] ft,ctlon f>tml the A\Is coalltmn on 24 AuSust 1944 d? tut ned the ttdc, axaln.t Gt,lm,~n~ dw Ing \iorld \Var II This task m not .m e~>! em-.md deiplte thmi best efforts. the ituthms case IS not conLlnclng The Roman Ian defection further crippled Hltlets .puttei ln~ m.ir mach]ne It ha.ttmed the end of the war But a turn. ]ng potnt lt Nas not Thlt buuh Will mtmwt East European htstoI i.]n. LTC RobertR Ivaftv. SA. Foft Bhss, Texas U

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BOOKREVIEWS

conc]se yet in-depth prelude, Following the prelude for each phase addressed are two or three indlvlduaI vignettes that occurred during that time or particular operation Th]s format gives the reader the instght needed to understand each storytellers perspective, yet preserves the color and flavor of each ctmtr]hutors personahty This hook heglns with a sailors eyt.wltne>. m. count of the attack on Pearl Harbor and con. eludes with the USS ,tft.wmzr~scaptain recounting the prepmz+tlon for the .tgnlng of the &urrtmder document on Tokyo Ba} The 30 excerpts cume mostly from naval officers, the major]ty of whom were Na\ al Academy gj-adates v..ho sub. sequently retired a> admirals Howewr. thmr ]anks~t the ttme were a. vmved as thelrpartlcu. kir dut]es Their perspectives range from a Ma. rme lleutenimts mvld recollection of the hkmdy Tulag; .Guadalcanal operation to a rear admi.

ralfi

p}annlng and execution of the capture of T1. nmn Underwater demolition team explo]ts, the plimnlng of.lames 11 Doullttleh rtud on Tokyo,
operation+ ln Manllti Harbor and suhma.

salv3ge

rlne wolfpack patrols are but J few of the other experlence~ chronicled Although this work is predominantly a na~zd history, ]t t. ]nteretit]ng and Important read{g fmall mllltaryprofess] onaf~ Examplesoftbe n novatl on\ and Imtmt Ives spawned by the meces slty of battle are many and potnt to the ,mpor. tance oft he cre~tlve thinker References to staff operatmn. and the lntrlcacles and nuances of the cpmmand ~tructure also serve to make mlpur. tant pwnts still vabd today The Iiheral use of maps and the glosk)ry ofab. brev]atmns coupled with }Iasons stage. sett]gs alleviate the need for the reader to be an accompl]sht.d naval h[storlan to enjoy and benefit from

GLOBALilESOffRCESANO INTERNA. TIONAL CONFLICT Enwronmenlal Fac tors m SIraleg!c Policy and Achon Ed#ted by Arlhw H Wesl#ng 280 paqe, Oxford U1rvels,ty Press New Yozk 19S6 S72 95

THE FUTfJRE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE by George H Quester 334 paqe> Lex mglop BOOM Lex,ng:on MA 198b 52495

FREOERICKTHE

GREAT The Magmfl.

cent Emgma by Ro!md B A$Pt?v 715 Dage$ T,cknor and f,elo~ hew YOIN 1986 S?9 95

Robmt R A:pte} ,> \\<.II hr>(,mnfm h]+ t]$m~ulumc survey of un. tn !It<, SIIaClc, t,+ The c,ncvclopedlc a(]. ltl!lrl. il \\.li t.ll (.. \i,t: pio.icb .c,r~id hlrn well In that buuk. but fail+ hlm badly In th]~ PIe.ent effCII De>p]te t hc gI eat mass of matwnl It presents. Frwf. t dmm not addtooul under.tandmg Th]s book contains ,,) It 1. t/),,(j,,wI .ln irnmt, nw ~mount of dc~t~ll w]th a.tonlshlngl) few footnote., n].lr]~ of them f]om wcond. y ,ourceb Asprev seems determined to u m<,rlook nothing Llnfortunatclv, hc f~llsht,t~iccntJv[]sto[]ls thecx pc,]t MIll look cl.mvhtm, forwell-documented ]nformatron, wblle the MAJ Bruce R Plrnle, USA, ca.u.il reader t. overwhelmed wltb detail.
cOII1\,[

Center of MIhfarv

History,

Washington.

OC

MILITARY

HEVIEW

August

t987

93

this book Masons collection IS recommended to all o~lcers of the armed serv]ces interested m furthering them professional skl 11sand knowl edge through a truly enjoyable medium CPT JeffreyA.Appleget.tJSA. AyersKaseme, Federal Republrc of Germany

Flghtlng the Itahans, It turned out, was one th]ng facing the Germans was somethmg quite different. The book, whmh might be of some m. trlnslc value to officers Interested m the North African war, suggests but does not answer two fundamental questmns How does an army pre. pare Its officers for the unexpected Why does such an army fall In this so completely? OamelJ. Hughes,
Combmed Arms Cen!er Hrsforian,

DILEMMAS OFTHEOESERT AR:A New Look al W the Libyan Campaign 1940-1942 by M!chael Carver 160 Oaaes Indiana Unlversltv Press. Bloommoton IN 1986 $2600
Field Marshal illlchael cam.er wrote this hook to rehabilitate the reDutatlon of General Neil R1tchm, blamed by ma;y for the long series of dm asters suffered by the E~ghth Army before the El Alamem battles The author has at least partml. ly succeeded, although perhaps not qu]te In the manner he had hoped Rather than ramng Rltchw to the presumably higher level of Auchlnleck or to the standards of the Bnt]sh Army (also presumably h~gher In normal cncum stances I, Carver succeeds ~ pul 1. Ing practmally the entree lot far below the rnlnl. mum standards of competence rightfully expect ed of any professional He demonstrates that many of the prmclpals Involved were incompe tent and dewous me, who.e postwar wrttln~fi d]storted the pa~t to enhance their own repwa. tlons at the expense ofothcm Such, ofcorse, 1. the normal pract]ce of the personal memmr. so perhaps there IS IIttle new here after all. Carver makes good, lf Ilm]ted, use of the lfor. matlon that was available to the EJrltlsh through signals mtell]gence Unfortunately, the more he delves mto this, the Inwer must .Ink the readers evaluation of the Eighth Armys performance Indeclslveness, lack ofjudgment and self. serving pettiness compounded the Bntlsh mmmctders already formidable problem> of leading poorly prepared umts agmnst one of the wars fimv,t and boldest tact]nmrs Carver su~~ests, pmhaps un. intentionally, that only against such opponenti could Erwin Rommels reckle.s audacitj ha~.e succeeded time and again If a wgle feature stands out m this dreat~ ac of the British officer count, ]t 15 the !nahllity corp~ to cope with the unexpected. Prepared for set.piece battles and unfamiliar with the de mands of mobile warfare, Brltlsh commanders seem to h~ve been unaware of the challen~e posed by motorwed dlwsmns and In mme cases proved no more capable of adapting to chang d condttlon~ than their French counterpart t

Furt Leaven worth. Kansas

MONW Final Years of the Field Marshal 1944-1976 by Nlgel Hamilton 996 pages McGraw-Hill Book Co New York 19B6 $2995 General Slr Bernard Law Montgomery scarcely needs an Introductmn to the readers of itfllrtary Re,teu As the Allled ground com mander dur]ng the Normandy campaign and wb~eqwt commander of 21st Arm3 Group. Montgomery was the Bnt u,h general most re. spons]ble for victory In \Ve$,ern Europe In 1945 t [ A.font> Ftrml Years nft}w Fwlti Mcrrshal. NI. g~l Hamilton concludes hls superltrtlve blogra fiy of the controversial Brlt]sh commander Hamiltonsresearch alone makes this volumeim Indlhpensable contribution to the hl~torlography of the Ilteratureon World WarH Unfortunately, tbe authors almost exclus>ve rellance on Brltlsh source., prtmarlly Montgomerys own records and Joutnal, does noth{ng to quell the debate sur. rounding the rnents of Montgomerys general. sb]p that most frcquentl} dlv]des along purely natmnalistlc Ilnes Indeed, It is somt.tlmeh dlffi. cult tod!stlngulsh whether.tf,m(y ISa blograph} or an autobiography The Montgomery who emerges fl om thew P+ e~ Isa commander flush with wctory after crushIng the armies of tbc, JYc,hrmacht in Nurmandy during the summer of 1944 Relegatrd to com mand of the Bntlsh and Canadian arm)es by Etwnhowers tt.sumptlon of command of the ~ouncf war in September, Monty chafes unde~ the Supreme Commander, refusal to adopt h{. single thrust strate~y for the lnvaston of tier. many Hamilton and Montgomery feel EIsmr. hewer. decls]on to approve a dual thrust with Montgomery and Bradley ~har,ng equal blll]g ncedlt+} prolonged the war Throughout the hook. buth theituthorand hlssuby?ct remain crlt. Ical of Elwnhowers superwslon of the Sround war, preferring h!ontgomery~ solutmt that h! t,klmtgomeryl +hould have been the overall conr dlnator of the land war

94

August 1987

MI!JITARY REVIEW

BOOKREVIEWS

?.merwan reader. vull resent fiamllton~ por traval of Eisenhower as strictly amateurish and lnctipable of effectively managing a bi+ttle field Bradky fares as poorly Bradleys poor dw posltlon of force. rnvttesdm%tertn tbe Ardennes and only Montgomerys afnllty to organize the chaos of the Bulge pre~,ents total dlslntegratlon nfthe Allwd Front Indeed, Bradle> emerges a> a medtocre commander who 1. frl~htened by %Iotv. m]l~t.ary expmtlse Patton ments only an occasional reference or footnote This I. not tos,iy the book i. wltbout merit On the contrary. Hamilton pie>.ent. an tntele. tmg and vtwd namatitc of tb~ u:*I from the BI Itlsh P,>l.Pectl~e Oneofthebc?c]V. chlefcotylbut,o5 I. the cxamlnatmn of NAT()s fot matlve yt.am, .+.WCIIas Montgomery. IOIFin lt~ mllltary cumm.lnd >tructure Even more fa. c!nat)ng are hlont~omerjs attempt. to ]ntluence the, postwttr Br[tl>h army

In summary, ilam]lton hardly presents an un biased biograpby of b,. subject Yet he does well portraying Montgomery a> a master of tbe set. piece battle, a sk)lled organizer and one of tbe mmt Irisplratlonal commanders of the war American readers enamored wmh Genhower, Bradley and Patton v 11neker understand tbe Impact and tbe Itft Montgomery gave to a be leaguered Br]t]sh natmn accustomed to defeat In the early stages of tbe war hlontgomery gave vwtor? to Rr]taln and tnstll led renewed mfi. dence m the F3rltlsh soldler To have served iwth hlonty In the desert war and northwestern Eu rope became a~ familmra boast as the pr]de asso cmted with serwcc under tbe flamboyant Patton. Montgomery mav hai,e been arrogant, egot]stj cal and contemptuous of Allied generalsblp but wtbout those cbaractm.tm, Monty would not have been kIonty
MAJ (P] Cole C Kingseed. SchoAeldBarracks,
H@Wall

R, 1,,,, WAR WITHOUT MERCY Raceand Power mthe Pacd!cWartJv JOhn W Dotier 399pages Panmeon Boow NewYork 1986 52250 CHINASMILITARY REFORMS, lnternatKmal and Oomeslm Imphcahcms Ed,ted by Charles O loveIoYJr anti Bruce W watson 142 pages Wesw?w Press Boulaer CO 1986
<1 / Q< . ..

TEN YEARS AFTER HELSINKI The Makmgoflhe European Se curdy Regime Ed!ted W Ka:I Moltola 184 pages Wesww Press Boulder CO 1986 S2550 THE MILITARIZATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS bY Ken. net? W Grundy 133 pages lna, ana Ul, verslv Press B,oom,ngton IN 1986 S1895 ENGINEER HISTORICAL STUOIES Number 3Explor!ng Na tufes Sanctuary Capam Wllham Ludlows Report of a Recona!ssance from Carroll, Montana Terrdork, on the Upper MT+ sourlto the Yelfowstone Natronaf Park, and Return Madem the Summer 0tle75by CdP!d,n W#!l,am Lu010$V lntroaucto.by Dr Paul Walxer 1550aaes uSGovernmnf pr<nt,~901t,ce Wash,nglon OC S700 THE SOWETFAR EAST MILITARY EWILOUP.Nuclear Oilem masand Asian Securdy.E olledbyR, cnardH Solomon and M3. sataka Kosaka 301 pages Aubuln HOW pub, sn, n9 CO !fover MA 1986 S2995C10thb0und S1695DaPerbound RULES FOR LEADERSHIP lmprown gUndPerformanc ebyJol W B!afl?S,b than lfltrOdUCllOfl by WaltEIF UmerJr 115pag es kdt,onal Oefense UmversWPress WashmgtO1 OC 1986 BLOCKING THE SPREAO OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. American and European Perspectives Counc,I on ForegnReldt,ons keti York 19B6 S695

MANHUNTOY Peter hlaas 302 pages RanOom House New York ?986 S1795 THE KOREAN WAR. Challenges m Crisis, Credtb!fdy and COIW mand by Burfon I Katdma~ 381 pages Temple Un,vels%ty Press Ph,!adelph,a PA 1986 S3495 BARONVONSTEUBENSRELIOLUTIONARY AR ORILL MAN W UAL A Facs!mde Reprint of the 1794 Edd!on by Fredwc% WII Mm Kmmvon Steubel 1880aoes Oover Publ,cat!ons New Y;rk-1985 S495 8ROTHERS IN ARMS. A Journey From War to Peace by W,ll,am Breves Jr Z87pages AvrerlA KnOPt. NEw WJrk 1986 S1795 THE CIA ANO THE US intelligence SYSTEM by Scot10 BreckuWdQe 364pages Westv,ew Press Boulder CO 1986 S30 00 DICTIONARY OF WARS by George C KOhn 5B6Pages Factson

File hewtorf 1986 S2995 ESSAYS ON STRATEGYNI 135 PaQes Nat,onal Oefense Umver sty Press Washington OC 1986 EUROPEAN SECURITY STUOIES NUMBER 4. Europes Neutral

States. Pa Ifners or Prohteers In Western Securdy? by SlePhen

Kux 45 PdGeS ln5t!tule tOr EuroDe3n OtlenCe &StrateQ,c5tu0 Ies LUndOfl 1986 S800 IILUSTRATEO CATALOG OF CIVIL WAR MIL{TARYGOOOS Un ion Weapons, Insigma, Umform Accessories and Olher EquIP-

mentt)YSCWWr HarOevano Graham. 146pages ca!ons New York S995 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIRO WORLO MILITARY ALIZATION. Sowmgthe Serpents Teeth Edtledby en Katz 329 pages Lexington Books Lex,f1910n S33 00

Oover Publ$ INOUSTRI. James Eve[ MA 19B6

MILITARY REVIEW

August 19B7

95