DEPOSITORY

f}p^. i>^A^O(.
TACTICS

STRATEGY AND

OF

WORLD COMMUNISM

THE COMMUNIST BATTLE PLAN

HEARING
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTEATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FOUPvTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO

S. Res.
APRIL

58

28, 1955

PART

13

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

UNITED STATES
59886

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON 1955

:

:^r^"r

Boston Fub:

^j-y

Cuperintendent of Documents

OCT 13

1955

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

HARLEY
OLIN
D.

M. KILGORE, West Virginia, Chairman

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi ESTES KEFADVER, Tennessee

JOHNSTON,
Soutli Carolina

ALEXANDER WILEY,

Wisconsin

THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Je., Missouri JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arlsansas

PRICE DANIEL, Texas JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming

WILLIAM LANGER, Nortli Dakota WILLIAM B. JENNER, Indiana ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois HERMAN WELKER, Idaho JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Secueitt Act and Other Internal Security Laws

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana JOHNSTON, South Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas HERMAN WELKER, Idaho THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JE., Missouri JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland PRICE DANIEL, Texas
OLIN
D.
J. G.

SouRWiNE, Chief Counsel

Richard Arexs and Alva C. Carpenter, Associate Counsel Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
II

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

THURSDAY, APRIL
28,

1955

United States Senate, Subcommittee To lN\Ti:sTiGATE the Administration of the Internal Security Act AND other Internal Security Laws or the C031MITTEE ON THE Judiciary,
Washingto?i, D. G. 30 a. m., in room 135, The subcommittee met, pursuant Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.
to call, at 10
:

Present Senators Jenner and Hennings. Also present: Richard Arens, associate counsel; Frank Schroeder and Edward Duily, professional staff members. Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order. I would like the reporter to note that there is only one Senator in attendance at this subcommittee hearing, but a waiver is on file that one Senator can properly and legally conduct the hearing. General, will you be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony that you are about to give to this task force of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the United States Senate will be the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? General Howley. I do.
:

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. FRANK

record ?

L.

HOWLEY

Senator Jenner. General, will you give your full name for the

General Howley. My name is Frank Leo Howley. Senator Jenner. And where do you reside ? General Howley. I reside, sir my home is in Madison, N. J.

And
are

my
in

work

is

vice chancellor of

New York

York. Senator Jenner. You may proceed, Mr. Arens, with the questioning of General Howley. Mr. Arens. General, for the purpose of this record will you give us just a brief resume of your professional background and the experience you have had, with particular reference to the experience you have had and the studies you have made concerning the strategy and
tactics of the Avorldwide

New

University.

My

offices

General Howley. Yes,

Communist conspiracy?
sir.

and

My introduction to this worldwide conspiracy took place in Europe,

really started at the end of the

World War.

had been

in

com-

1301

1302

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

of civil affairs in Cherbourg, France, and then in Paris. Then became what was popnhirly known as military governor of Berlin. "We observed the actions of international communism almost from the beginning in Cherbourg. I had landed somewhere along D-4 or I would like to say that in I will not dwell very long on France. 5 Paris, particularly, where I had the position that would correspond it was called chief of civil affairs, because to military governor France was a liberated country rather than one that was conquered

mand
I

the various steps that took place there for the conquest and control of the French Government. I don't know whether you would like me to make rather long explanations or short ones. After Paris I was chosen by General Eisenhow^er's headquarters to be in charge of the American unit which was to go to Berlin when Berlin had been captured. I would be the commander of the American part of the military government team which would control Berlin. It had been planned that Berlin was to be divided into first 3 and then 4 parts, and that there would be a sort of military governor for each of the areas, then we commanders would coordinate and cooperate in order to control the German city. I was there 4i/2 years, and witnessed and did my best to implement the various American policies which were never sharply defined, but which can be classified as first appeasement that has become quite a nasty word but it was a real effort on our part to win over the Soviets by means of friendship and concessions. And that failed

we observed

miserably. Our second effort was what is generally known as coexistence today. It is a sort of good-neighbor policy, or "You run your part of Germany or your part of the -world ancl we will run ours, and we will tiy
to get along." That led directly to the Soviets not only running their part of Germany but attemi^ting to seize our part. xVnd that resulted in Avhat is known as the hunger blockade of Berlin and the airlift which enabled us to continue there. The third policy is that which was popularly known as containment, simply because an article was written by a man who later became Ambassador to Russia, George Kennan. He wrote an article

which described a type of containment which simply means that we recognized that these people were aggressive and we were strong enough, and where they struck us we w^ould strike back so that they couldn't conquer us and they wouldn't continue to gain control over additional parts of the world and additional peoples. When I left and returned to the United States I gave a series of lectures, and wrote. When Korea struck us, I didn't think there was any use of continuing to talk, so I went to New York University as vice chancellor, and have been there ever since, concentrating on helping to educate as many as 60,000 students in 1 year. have 14 colleges. More than 60 percent of the boys and girls there are working their way entirely through. Some of the graduates have done great things for the world, including Dr. Salk, wlio worked out this vaccine wdiich is a blessing to all of us who have kids. He Mas graduated from our medical college. However, because of the problems, and because I had such an introduction, and because tragically I had been right since 1945 I say

We

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COIVIMUNISM

1303

"tragically" because I wish it were otherwise because I have been pretty much right, and these things that I have prophesied did come true, I have continued my interest in this international conspiracy and have planned at least every year or two on contributing to public thinking in the areas. Therefore I have kept up by way of friends who were placed all over the world, really, ranging from my friend jSIajor General Hind, who is deputy commander fighting the ]\Iau ]\Iau in Kenya Colony, friends in Indochina, and elsewhere, and I have read and studied, and I managed to travel and go to these places every so often. I just got back was to Formosa and Hong Kong. last trip Previously I had been down to Guatemala before the revolution there. I have been to Casablanca and Morocco, Africa, and, of course, have kept in pretty close touch with what is going on in Berlin, Germany,

My

France, and so forth.

Mr. Arens. May I suggest. General, if it is agreeable with the chairman, that we discuss in resume form each of these areas on the basis of your background and experience and information, so that 3'^ou can apprise the subcommittee of your judgment on the strategy of the Soviet in each of these areas, and give your recommendations as to any counterstrategy which our Government should follow. First of all, with reference to Berlin and Germany, if you please, General. On the basis of your experience there as military governor of Berlin, did you reach any conclusions as to whether or not the Soviets could be trusted, whether they can be objects of negotiation or conference ? General Howlet. The Soviet Government, as distinguished from the Eussian people, cannot be trusted in anything. They are dedicated
to the use of any means at their disposal to attain their ends. They will sometimes tell the truth, if it happens to serve their ends, but they will tell lies just as readily. There is no compromising with the Kremlin, if you want to have a sort of quick name for the government that now controls Russia, the Soviet Government of the Kremlin there is no compromising with them. have found no way of turning them away from their mission of destroying all of those things which we think are important in life, the concepts of God, freedom of the individual, emphasis upon a man's having various rights, and so forth, all of these things which we take for granted in the United States, they are

We

against.

had a government which is completely bad, you look hard enough, you can find something good about Mussolini, though I would have trouble doing it. And I suppose somebody could find something good about Hitler, although I wouldn't be able to do it. But I don't believe anybody who is honest can find anything good about the Government of the Soviet Union, Mr. Arens. How potent is the Soviet conspiracy as a threat to the world, in your judgment; an overall appraisal ? General Howley. The threat is very great. It is a world plan. It took us quite a while to reach the point where we would recognize that a Communist move in Guatemala had a relation to the Kremlin and a relation to Mao Tse-tung on the Communist mainland in the government of China. I think we accept that now.
as

As near

we have
mean,

ever

theirs is

it.

if

1304

STKATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

lines

run directly out of the Kremlin; they are all working and they all follow the same detail, even as to how they murder innocent people or how they murder prisoners. There were many of the Korean civilians who were killed and thrown in pits; there were many of our soldiers who were taken in Korea on these death marches. And even the knot that was used to tie them was the same knot which the Communists used in Paris in 1945, or 1944-45, to murder people and throw them in the Seine. You see, the hard core of the resistance movement in France was Communist, the free forces of the interior. There was a hard core there of dedicated Communists, and they fought very effectively when the signal was out to fight effectively against the Germans there. But when Paris was liberated and France was liberated, the normal people who were in the resistance movement went back to work. One of them, named Pierre Fisson he went with me as interpreter to Berlin he wrote a story of it, Voyage to the Horizons. Most of these people went back into normal life, but the hard core of the Communists went on to step No. 2. On this point of similar techniques, we found in one part of the Seine the bodies of, I think it was 27 persons who had been murdered and shot in the back of the head. We found that out of the 20 mayors of the little townhalls, around 20 of the arrondissement boroughs, 18 of the mayors were known Communists let's assume that the others were, too. They were holding mock courts and trying people; they gave them very fine phrases, "collaborators" and "menace to the people" and so on. But they were carrying on a great injustice and actually extorting money and murdering people. And, as I say, even the technique of how they were tied you see, they studied the same books published by
together,

The

the Kremlin.

Mr. Arens. What are the objectives of the Soviets, first of all in Berlin and Germany ? General Howley. The objective there as elsewhere is complete control of the world. You can say it is economic control and political control and military control and control of your very soul, though they don't think you have a soul. But it is absolute dictatorship carried to an extreme we have never known before. Mr. Arens. What are the objectives of the Soviets in calling for a
United Germany?
General Howlet. Any conference you see, you must first start off by recognizing that the Soviet Union is making war against us for complete, overall control of the world, but it is more comprehensive than past wars. Mr. Arens. In other words, you think the Soviets are at war with
us

now ?

General Howlet. Oh, yes. And, of course, all these things I am implying are outlined in the writings of Lenin and Stalin. Stalin, while he was making statements you see, all this is written up and planned, and if we look at it we see that their intention^ and their planning has been continuous. Lenin, particularly about 1909, wrote some very effective explanations of his plan, much better than Hitler in Mein Kampf, indicating what he was going to do.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

1305

to understand what the Soviet Union intends to do I just can't understand that, you have to be rather blind not to under-

For US not
it.

stand

There

is

no compromising with them, and they are abso-

lutely sure that they are going to conquer.

You see, I have had thousands of hours of negotiations with them, and I have gone out with them on a friendly basis I have gone wildpig hunting with the Russian Communists and others, and have seen them drinking great quantities of vodka, and listened to their singing, all through these various phases for 4i/^ years in Berlin. I always asked them various questions to find out what sort of made them tick. I said to General Kotikikov one time he was the commander genI said, "Look, let's get these darn streetcars running eral in Berlin and stop talking about the class problem." The streetcars were not running. I said, "The class struggle will go on forever." And I mentioned these class struggles which we have under encouraging conditions in the United States with poor immigrant boys, Italians or Irish or Negroes, they move on up through a process of land of fighting

their

way

on.

He said, "I don't to see the end of it."

They
That
is

I said,

"We won't live to see the end of the class struggle."

know about
you. General Howley, but I will live

are sure of conquering us. one of their great weaknesses in battle. They have no plan, providing they don't succeed. Of course, we should make use of that knowledge we should make them adjust themselves to us rather than letting them carry on the plan that they have to follow. They have to follow plans whether it is in diplomacy or in the battlefield, because their system of education or their system of government can't train low-level men to think. Wliere they have a plan to take a hill, it has to be a very simple plan. In America, with the type of men we have, we have many a corporal that is as smart as one of their generals, because he has thought as a free man and has grown up with the ability to make
;

decisions.

Therefore, for us to adopt the mass methods of a crude army is to waste the greatest asset we have. And so it is with diplomacy. For us to adopt this crude, brutal, artless policy, which is pushed on the world by the Kremlin, is a tragedy for the whole world. It ends up with our talking all the time about these barbarians instead of, let us say, about French
subjects.

I in

am getting a little off the subject, I am afraid.

is

Mr. Arens. "WTiat

your appraisal of the objective of the Soviet

Germany in calling for a united Germany ? General Howlet. I am sorry I didn't answer

You
the

see,

war

that originally. a conference is part of their technique. It is one part of they are fighting against us. It is made up of economic

warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, and if necessary, military or forced warfare, which they emphasize in any part of the world at any time, depending on which method the Kremlin thinks
will

work best. So it will take

different

example, in Morocco,

now

forms in areas of the I might different the mission world. For economic say that
is

1306

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

the purpose of economic warfare is to destroy the economy of a country, you see, and make the people desperate, make them poor, make them suffer, make them want change. The purpose of psychological warfare, where they use it, is to confuse their opponents so that they are like a bird I saw one time watching a snake it couldn't move I kicked the snake away I assume it was hypnotized and so the opponent is confused, they don't know, and, of course, that helps. That is the purpose of the psychological warfare. The j)urpose of political warfare is to get control of the government, as they did in Czechoslovakia. The military is used as one of the instruments it is simply an extension of the other. Now, we separate those parts, but they don't. It is all one; they combine them. They are all doing the same thing. I am giving this background because it has a bearing on why they call a conference. You see, in Morocco they are in phase one, which And so when they light is to destroy the economy of the country. cork fires, as they did when I was there, they call them the terrorists, the line goes back to the Kremlin through Tunisia and Egypt the terrorists light cork fires. Cork is one of the big exports of the area, only phosphates and wheat are ahead of it. But if you light a fire on the dock, a ship won't take the cork out, because cork can revive and burn up the ship. So there is a lot of cork that has nowhere to go. Wlien you perpetrate a number of murders, which are even politically trivial, the tourist trade stops. All of this is a series of economic things combined with the psychoabout the French and logical, where they get the natives to talk colonialism, whereas in many instances colonialism bears a resemblance to our point 4 program, whether it is good or bad, you have to say this is bad colonialism or this is good colonialism, whether it is good or bad, you have to say so. All these things are working in different places one way or the Together with the groups which the other, but always together. the Communists set up cells. jiolitical people are indoctrinating, With every bit of ground taken in China by Mao Tse-tung, goes back-

ing by political organizations. But it is all one. But why do they go to a conference? The conference is a device for getting their way. For us a conference is a place where j^ou go and iron out differences. To them a conference is a very powerful weapon against reasonable people. So anticipate real trouble when a conference is called. You could do it this way. Let's assume that here we are and here the Soviets are. I will include in the Soviets all of these Communist leaders, whether they have the eyes of the man from China or whether they have the features of the man from Africa, or the features of the man from Central America, their principles are the same. Here they are. They go to a conference. They know where they are going. They are moving along in their effort to gain control of the world. And they never change from that purpose, and haven't for many years. They never stop. "VYlien they go to a conference they will all talk in the hope that they will get a concession that will advance them, you see. They never go back, even though Lenin did describe a process for going backward; I think he called it, "1 step back, 2 forward."

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

1307

They never
always.

stop while they confer.

They

are

moving forward

go to a conference sometimes we don't know where we are going anyway our policy isn't set. That is understandable, because we Americans don't want anything. We are not hungry; we don't need more food or automobiles; we have got them. We don't want anybody's land. So we start out with not being very positive. But they know what they want when they go to a conference. Let's assume that we are going on here with a certain policy. We stop, for fear and as one of mj^ critics used the expression about me, he said that my periodic statements "tended to tear asunder the delicate fab-

When we

ric of international negotiations," or

some such nonsense.

nothing delicate in dealing with the Soviets. You can't insult them. So we stop and they continue on. conference was called, and we Let's take Dienbienphu last fall. agreed a conference with these people with a hideous philosophy, these enemies of everything good, these seekers of control of a great nation of good people and they have been more cruel to the Russian people than anybody else we agreed to a conference at Geneva. So we stopped. In the meantime there was fighting at Dienbienphu. They were going right ahead. And while we stopped they stepped up their artillery fire, and so on and so forth, to make this lowland posi-

There

is

tion at Dienbienphu completely untenable.

allies and some help. of our people, "Let's do nothing to upset the negotiations." So, while we did nothing to upset the negotiations, they captured Dienbienphu, gave the French a tremendous blow to their prestige, killed a lot of people fighting for their government, and advanced their cause of

To show you how

completely they stopped us, the French called for

But you heard the statement coming from our

a jump. says he wants to have a conference I think it is an insult to start with that this man is willing to recognize us. He has turned it around. started off by saying that we won't recognize his government it isn't the real government it doesn't represent the

communism by quite So if Chou En-lai

We

when the Communist Chou En-lai said, "Now we are down and talk to you." It is an insult to start with.

Chinese people at

all.

Yet apparently some people were delighted

willing to
sit

You

can be

sure he has got something up his sleeve. Either he is not willing to make an attack or can't make an attack, or they are planning something and want us to stop or want us to talk. That is a rather long-winded answer. are glad to have your response. Mr. Arexs. General, in the light of your background and experience as a student of world communism, how late is it on the Soviet timetable for

We

world domination? General Howley. I don't believe anybody knows.

You never know completely the other fellow's intention or his timetable. The aggressor always, however, has the advantage with a timetable, because, just from the military point of view, that is an asset. And I want to emphasize again that is only a part of their war against us. On the military, if you are planning an aggressive act, you can say, "We will be completely ready for it, we can have these planes in production, we can have these tanks in production, we can have that satellite
59886 55pt.
13 2

1308

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

government softened," and so forth, and we will be ready on a certain date. But I don't know what that date is. The only thing is, I am sure they have one. And so we have to judge it from our point of view when will we be ready. Well, the United States, as long as we have the sort of philosophy which we do and God willing, we will always be able to have it as long as we have the luxury of such a time philosophy, we will have no plans for aggression. And, therefore, we always compromise by putting plans into production or putting in plans something new, based on what the other fellow will do. Mr. Arens. Can we solve this thing around the conference table? General Howley. I will give you a time element. Here is the time element which I consider vital today. Of course, the mission of everybody is to put an end to wars as such. We are quite willing to fight It is this element of their psychological and governmental wars. f oice that we can't take. We had an opportunity to end all war for theforeseeable future in 1945^8. We could have used forces in keeping with principles already agreed on. United Nations' principles and others we could have forced a termination of wholesale aggression
:

if our efforts to force the Soviet Union to live up to agreements had resulted in war, it would have been a very simple war. And it probably would not have resulted in war. If we had been strong and insisted on some plan such as Baruch's plan, including these safeguards of inspection, we could, I believe, have compelled the Soviet Union, whether they wanted it or not, to accept limitations which would have protected us against attacks which may come im

at least.

And

opportunity, partially because, I think, we to believe the best of them partially because we lacked determination, and partially because we were unwilling to suffer a little bit, and we would rather postpone some of these strong unpleasant things in the hope that they would solve themselves. Now, the time is running out. There isn't any question of the Kremlin's willingness to use any weapon which will attain their ends. As one Russian general said to me I said, "What was the sense, in the commune of 1870 in Paris, of the Communists running around and putting chorus girls on the Notre Dame altar and pulling down the old statue at the Place Vendome and destroying things ?" Then he said "Sometimes you must destroy everything to rebuild it properly." And therefore Communists and that includes Mao Tsetung will not hesitate to destroy everything, if they cannot control
the future.
are
lost that

We

good people, and we wanted

it.

To get back to our time element, right now they are not in a position to use force to attain their ends, because they know we will fight^ and because we do have superiority. It isn't a matter of 5 days of fighting. The United States has superiority of everything except have superiority of philosophy, I believe, of superiority of evil. arms, of planes, of missiles, of planning, of the thinking power of the individual, and of all these factors that enter into modern warfare. But the Soviet Union, up until they obtained the means of making the hydrogen bomb or the atomic bomb on a big scale, did not have

We

means of offsetting all our superiorities. They knew that they could not fight us in tlie old-fasliioned way. They could not use
the

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMIVIUNISM

1309

force against the United States based on the type of fighting used in the last war, because no nation in the \Yorld, except the United States, could fight that kind of a war, wdiich requires a tremendous steel output, over a hundred million tons a year, tremendous ingenuity of women who can go in plants and put gadgets together, and all of these things that the United States has and in which we are vastly superior. Now, for the first time in the history of the world, there are two very dangerous weapons in existence by which a handful of evil men can destro}' a whole nation of good, powerful men. And of course the two weapons one of them is one you would think of, that is, the gi-eat bombs, the hydrogen l^omb particularly. Enough of them with the means of delivering them to the American cities can para-

it

lyze us, can very well, if we wait long enough, destroy us and make impossible for us to really retaliate if we accept the first punch. It is entirely possible, although that is an area where nobody is

certain.

The second great element

now^
is

that makes world dictatorship possible

one you wouldn't usually think of, communications. It is possible now for the first time in the history of the world for one man to impose his will on all the people of the world, technically it is posOf sible, by means of television, radio, the press, and so forth. course, at this point here are many parts of the world, in Africa, and so forth, where they don't have a radio and they don't have these things that can influence your mind and sway you. But the mechanical means exist today for the Kremlin not only to quickly get control of areas, but by a process of indoctrination and twisting of minds to timi the populations of the world so the world doesn't know
right from wrong and which way is up or down. And that is a second great threat. I will dwell more on that. all have that communications The answer to it, of course, is the thing that we have in threat. America and we try to develop in colleges. It is a critical sense, that an individual should insist on being an individual and ask, "Wlio " says so ? Is it true ? Mr. Arens. ^\^iat distinction do the Soviets make between the cold war and the hot war ? General Howlet. There isn't any distinction at all. They are just popular words. They don't even make a distinction between the effort to destroy the economy of a country by starting a strike movement, for instance, and ruining one small plant it is all part of one

We

plan to them. Terms such as "hot war" and "cold war" I doubt if the Russian people ever heard of the terms but they are terms that grow out of our desire to work out names for things they don't mean anything it is all part of one great plan. Mr. Arens. General, may we proceed with an analysis and appraisal of the Communist penetration and threat in specific areas of the world in which you have made a special study ? I would suggest that you pick the area of the world that you would like to discuss first and go

ahead,

if

you

please, sir.

General Howlet. I would like to start with Guatemala because that threat is terminated and it is a rather encouraging situation.

1310
There

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

is

an awfully good lesson there which we ouijht to remember. is that we should not be fooled into thinking that the people of any country are behind the Communist government.

The

lesson

when I was in Guatemala before the revolution, you judged by what was in the newspapers or what you heard over the radio, or what you saw on streamers all over the city, and what you heard these Communists say, and these Communist-led "setups" if you listened to them, all the people were in back of this wonderful thing, and they were speaking for the people. The fact was that when this government was challenged in the way in which it was challenged, by force and it was a government which was maintained by force when the government was challenged by force, there was practically nobody in back of the Communist government. On the physical side of the war you could literally say that there were only a handful that had taken control. The army was in the barracks. And you wouldn't be exaggerating You might say one if you said that 3 men in 3 hired planes did it. of the chaps did it. They did drop bombs on those ammunition dumps and 1 was hit and about 180 killed. At that time the President he called himself President, though he had really seized that control be called on the army to rally and repel this little force that was sitting down there in the jungle. The army said "No." Then he called on the trade unions. The trade unions were not really trade unions; they were set up by Communists and controlled by Communists. So he called on the trade unions, and I think that nobody but 2 or 3 Communist leaders responded. He called on the people to rise up and defend their government. But they knew that they weren't defending their government, and they weren't going to waste any time in defending these ComI say that because
if

munists.

And so the President ran and hid in the cellar of an embassy where, according to South American custom, he was safe. He is now a citizen of Switzerland. Mr. Arens. That, then, was not the usual Communist conspiracy? General Howley. Yes. Let's not be fooled or confused by these Communists. Any man with a printing plant and someone to help him can cover the city with placards. Let's not be confused by that.
That
ity.

Phase 1 is that of destroying authorObviously, you must get authority destroyed or you can't get things stirred up so that you can seize control because anyone in his right mind would not vote the Communists into control of anything. Their system is very poor it is brutal it is slave labor and they still can't produce goods. They make you give up God and golf and you still can't get shoes. Wlien they go into Morocco obviously it is not ready for anybody's troops to go in there their object is to destroy the authority. If the authority is the French Government, destroy that. If the government is a political party, discredit that, as they tried to do in Berlin. If the authority is the church, destroy that. Get it out; it doesn't matter what church it is. If religion is a form of holding people together, destroy it. In Morocco and north Africa there is much to be said as to the good work that has been done there by the French. Much of their
; ; ;

is the first lesson. I have mentioned Morocco.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

1311

colonialism has been really quite magnificent. But if you read some writers who have gone over there one in particular who capitalized upon his position to indicate objectively and then produced a pamphlet if you read those you would think there was a dreadful situation there, and that it is all due to the French Government. Mr. Aeens. May I suggest that we proceed to your appraisal of the situation in the Far East with particular reference to Formosa and

going to come, if you assume a war becomes inevitable, an awful one, the longer we wait, because we are teaching everybody how to shoot each other now. And I would rather, years ago and even now I would rather force issues and get rid of this constant threat of war, even if it meant fighting. But we always go into these wars and fight a war to end wars, and then quit and come home and let a few enemies stir it all up again. Well, my recent visit to Formosa and Hong Kong Mr. Arens. "When was that, by the way ? General Howley. I believe I have been back about 6 weeks. It was at the turn of the year. I was gone about a total of 6 weeks. In think of the Orient and I refuse to get myself all involved in not being able to talk because somebody objects to calling him an oriental it has been my observation that the only people who object to an English word which is well meant are enemies, so they say, "You can't use the word 'oriental'^ that means you don't understand the oriental people." Most of that is bunk. In the first place, when you say it in Chinese it doesn't even sound the way it does in English. In dealing with the orientals, we are all ignorant. And that has caused us to be misled by a small number of people who claim to be experts. Now, whether these experts misled us because they are ignorant or because they are in the pay of the Soviet Union I wouldn't attempt to pass judgment. I don't know. I can't tell what goes on in a man's mind or why he is doing something. But we have been grossly misinformed. And because the Orient has been so far away from us and there have been so few schoolteachers and kids and professors and others from our universities going back and forth and businessmen from the Middle West going out there, we haven't known. We haven't had the feeling which people get from the way we now travel in Europe. It would help us a great deal in dealing with the Orient in the future if we had more of our people going out there. Wlien I was graduated from college I saved some money and I went to France. I went to the Sorbonne and studied there, and in
If a

Eed China? General Howley. Yes. There is a similarity out there, of course, to many other spots in the world. There is a similarity to Germany. They are working around the world now, and dividing it.
war
is

it

will certainly be

Germany. Today I would recommend that many of our students go to the Orient for their postgraduate work. I recommended that to my oldest boy, who is a freshman in New York University now.
are prone to misjudge the Orient because there haven't been enough people who know what the country looks like out there, because it is a very big country and there are a lot of people.

We

1312

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

Most of the information that I started off with, particularly about the government of Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist Government, the legitimate government of China mostly the information I started with, I found to be false. The type of thing I had heard was that they had an old man's army, kind of limping around out on Formosa, and if we were counting on them to do any fighting in support of anything it was a mistake. That is completely false. I -went out on maneuvers with them. I had a little camera, and I took many pictures but my finger covered the camera and they didn't come out so But I made a point of taking a great number of pictures of well. this kind of army. The average age of the army is 28, which is not an old army at all. I don't know how it works out that they have got an old man's army. That army is dedicated to going back and liberating China. And that army is a young man's army, and they are being taught, and learn-

ing very fast, how to fight western style, which is in a cooperative manner, using modern weapons rather than the primitive style that is still used by Mao Tse-tung. Wlien you have an army trained in western style, numbers don't mean very much. So to say, "This little army won't have a chance against this vast army of 2% million." Well, how many millions have we got in our Army? You can write anything on a piece of paper. But in the final analysis the number you can put on a battlefield is how many you can arm properly and train properly and transport
properly.

And Mao

Tse-tung's announcement that he has this

doesn't rpean anything.

Nor do numbers mean anything against

2%

million
a

well-equipped and organized force. So the force on Formosa is much better than I had expected. Just incidentally, the average age of 28 is quite young. Where you really need young fellows is in flying jets. Yet the average age of our jet aces in Korea was just over 28, around 29. And the average age of all our flyers there, including jets and the rest of them, was,
I think, 33.

And this chap that set the record from California to New York was 35 years old. So let's not go overboard on the fallacy that this army on Formosa is an old man's army. Another fallacy was that this was a corrupt government of Chiang Kai-shek, that the government was bad. I don't know what they did on the mainland. I do know why they didn't put into effect reforms, and it makes sense to me. China started having reforms to modernize the country a bit and still not lose their wonderful traditions and their wonderful family life with Sun Yat-sen. Chiang Kai-shek was one of his followers. When the group that the Soviets are behind, the group represented by Mao Tse-tung's Communists, attempted to seize
control, they couldn't get control of this revolution.
;

Mind

you, the

Communists have never produced a general revolution like a Cuckoo bird they would rather move in on something, as they moved in on the Russian Revolution, which started off as a people's revolution, and seized control. Mao Tse-tung's group tried to get control in China, and they fought what is now the Nationalist government for years. Then the Japanese occupied China all during the war years.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

1313

SO how could reforms be put into effect ? On the island of Formosa there is a modern renaissance of a real China, a renaissance which is bringing about needed modernizations without the sacrificing of the

principles which make the Chinese people great. Even in the matter of the redistribution of land in Formosa of those tenant farmers in the past, over 40 percent of them are now owners of their own land. The land was made available both from the state-owned land which had been held by the Japanese when they were there because the Japanese were in control of Formosa, you know, for 50 years those lands were distributed, and certain big Yet the men who owned the biggest estates were also distributed. estates were given genuine compensation, which is the difference between distributing land under a system of justice and distributing land under a Communist system. Senator Jenner. Let the record show that Senator Hennings is now in attendance. Senator Hennixgs. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to come and hear the general long before this, but I had another meeting. General Howlet. Senator, I had indicated that it was all part of the same conspiracy, and our problem was pretty much the same in And it is quite possible that the solutions may come all these areas. all at one time. But the observations in Formosa and the observations in Hong Kong, they fit right in with those observations which you. Senator, and others have seen in Germany, in Berlin. Mr. Arens. Will Chiang Kai-shek fight to the death to defend

Formosa ?
General Ho^vlet. "Well, he doesn't even think in terms of defense. Neither do I. I have very little respect for defense. You can't even get a girl that way, you have to take the offensive if you want to fellow with a drugstore never thinks in terms of holding marry her. what business he has, he thinks in terms of getting more. defense policy would destroy American spirit if vou. really carried There are nations that think in terms of tlie status quo, or it out. as things are. But America never has. So I can't think of the Orient or of anywhere else in terms of defending things; it is almost

impossible.

In modern warfare you can't defend, except as a very temporary measure you always lose. It is impossible to have a perfect defense if the other fellow has a very good offense. So Chiang Kai-shek is with us on that. He never thinks in terms Formosa is easy to defend as an island. of defending Formosa. There are a hundred miles of rough water between it and the mainland. Assuming that we want to help and gain control of the situation either by way of the water or by way of the air, Formosa couldn't
;

possibly be taken.

There isn't any point in talking about Formosa or whether we can defend Formosa. Mr. Arens, Do you have any observation to make with reference to any lessons which we should learn from the situation in Korea in trying to formulate a policy of this Govermnent to meet the worldwide

Communist threat ? we get all of these lessons, General Howlet. Yes, sir. The lessons and then we seem to go off and forget them. That is a disappointing

1314

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

thing to SO many of us. All of the lessons that were learned were learned in Berlin. I wrote my first book, Berlin Command, and I have written others, about it. Senator Hennings. General Hand and others in Berlin told me that is one of the best books that has ever been written on the subject, your
book.

General Howley. Even their techniques at the conference table, even the smile techniques are the same. I noticed in the paper today, and I have great confidence in these newspaper reif it is accurate ports. I know a lot of these press chaps, and they have been doing an awful good job for the American people that Zhukov wrote Eisenhower along the line of "We are soldier boys; let's release this kid and let him go back to his parents" they often did that with me in Berlin. That has no significance that is off to the side. Wliether Zhukov likes Eisenhower personally has no bearing on the It would with us. If you make a friend of an English gensubject. eral or statesman and then you go to the conference table the next day, he may do what his government orders, even if he doesn't like it, but he will let you know that it isn't personal. The Soviet representative has no freedom of choice at all, and whether he likes you or not doesn't matter. Actually the Soviets I dealt with all liked me I am sure of it from what they said, but that wouldn't hinder them from killing me the next day if it entered into their plans. I have been out in the evening with them and have had a grand time drinking vodka and they drink until they break the glasses on the wall and the next day at the conference table there would be no

difference at all the same old line. And those representatives who begin to soften a little bit and not hate us, they get removed from contact. That was the case of those who contacted me who were a little bit inclined to think that maybe we didn't have horns ; they were immediately yanked out and taken out of contact and reindoctrinated. Mr. Arens. General, on the basis of your background and extensive experience, what overall strategy and technique do you recommend for the Government of the United States to use in meeting the worldwide Communist threat ? General Howley. Assuming that we are all agreed that this threat does exist and there will always be a small percentage that you can't change for one reason or another, and there are even people who live in a cave somewhere, so we will never have 100 percent of the American people agree on things I think all of our leaders and all of our thinking people, after all these murders and deaths and all of these lies have been perpetrated, I think today, the vast majority of Americans recognize this whole Communist system for what it is, that tliis international conspiracy is bad, and it is very bad for us. And I think that the people recognize that there is no real compromise with them. There may be little temporary things, but there is no real settling of this problem. There are two ways, therefore, that you can operate. One is to take positive action to see that these Communist governments are destroyed. That doesn't mean rolling the drum necessarily, one, two, But certainly one, two across some place for military liberation. there is a pattern of thought that you must I don't know what word

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMIVIUNISM

1315

if you want, but that isn't a you use, you can call it liberation, maybe, and plan everything to good wordbut we must take positive steps see that these Communist governments fall, whether it is in Guatemala or somewhere else. And they fall with surprising ease. Now, the other way is the way call it what you want, you can call or "let's it delay or postponement or coexistence or "let's do nothing" do anything to avoid dying" of course, even though we are all gomg to die I can tell you a good story about a Buddhist's comment on He said, "You people talk about the hereafter but run your that. He said, "I am a Buddhist affairs as if there weren't any hereafter." I know little about the hereafterbut there are three phases birth, Each has a place. You believe in the concept of life, and death. but you don't allow it to control what you do in life." afterlife, Anyhow you have two general plans of action as I see it. One is

coexistence,"^ defense, decline.

And the other is positive actions in order to destroy these governments which are dedicated to our destruc-

tion.

In 1945 or 1946 I came to the conclusion that we must see these governments fall, and we must use everything, we must use moral means, psychological warfare, economic blockade, and even the risk of war because there will never be a war with any Communist government unless that Communist government wants a war anyhow. In the case of the present Government of Russia, they fought a major war with the Japanese on that Hill 286 in Manchuria. I talked with the Russian general who commanded the troops. They used their artillery, troops, and everything for a major fight; they didn't declare war, so if there was a mere killing of hundreds of Communists, if it did not suit the Communist purpose, they would do nothing about it. In one sense it is very easy to deal with Communist governments, because they will not do emotional things. The British Empire was built on emotion. And I do hope that we never lose our emotions, because there are so many things tied up with them. A cold, rational, bleak world, I have very little use for. I agree with the Greeks that

mind should be the servant of the heart. But they will only use war as an instrument when it suits them. Therefore, if they have a schedule and it suits them, and we do something, they might fight, or they might even without excuse. They might just fight if it suited them to fight. But our action would have little to do with it, because if they wanted a fight they would simply produce an incident, or they would get stooges to give them the
the
excuses.

They have used, since the end of the last World War, a very good knowledge of the way we think. And they have had some of our top people advise them on how we think. They have used a threat of war as a means of getting concessions. If they can get us to say that
nothing matters but peace if they can get us to that point of view, they have got the world. Of course, this is mere nonsense. There are a lot of things that are a lot more important than peace. If you accepted that there would be no struggle and no progress in any direction. For that they have threatened. And in the early days at conferences they always had the god of war standing back of the Russian representative. There was always that threat, whether it
;

was Europe or somewhere

else.

If

we

didn't give

them the

conces-

1316
sions, if

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

we

didn't

sit

down and

negotiate, there

would be war.

We

thought that giving in was better than war, you see, because that is the way we think anything is better than war. If they can get us convinced that peace is all that matters, they have got what they want. So they have always threatened us. Senator Hennings. Right at that point may I inquire, you don't think that is the way we as a people generally think, do you ? General Howley. No. Senator Hennings. We don't think anything is better than war? Do you think we as a people, I say, the generality, the majority of the American people, take the loss of our freedom, take slavery, totalitarian government, all of the things that are inherent in communism we don't prefer that to war, do we ? General Howley. No, sir. And of course we fought one of theSenator Hennings. I understood you to say that is the way we are thinking now. General Howley. It was rephrased. Senator, and I didn't quite follow no, of course. We fought really one of the most awful wars of
;

history over slavery to free the colored man in the Civil War. Senator Hennings. They didn't call it that they called it the war to save the Union, that was the rallying force Mr. Lincoln used so He wanted to stay away from the war to free the successfully.
;

slaves.

General How^ley. I concede your point. But that was a point they used in getting the boys to march out and fight each other. That was one factor, but another factor was certainly economic in the Civil War. So if you took all the factors, including the right of the state to determine its own destiny, they Avere things that w^ere more valuable I agree with to the people at the time of the Civil War than peace. you now, and I apologize if I picked out just one part of our incentives. That just comes out of my grandfather's side of that particular struggle, that was his motivating force, though there were many different
ones.

Therefore we have two patterns. One in favor of holding on while keeping strong so that we do not precipitate a war. In favor of that there are a lot of things in favor of it. The Soviet will is the fact have trouble with their system. They do have a very poor system. They promise the people if they give up all these things like their church, and all of their old customs, they will get more material goods. Of course, it sounds like the Devil tempting Christ, and of course it is, it is a promise of material things if you give up the spiritual. One of their great tragedies is that wherever the Soviets are in control, they produce less goods. I don't want to get into the psychology of why that is, but it is a fact that they go through the various stages that lead directly to slavery. And then they become unpopular. I could tell you stories of my visit to Poland cluring the blockade, when I saw these poor people running from one truck to another; they were going to their second 8-hour day. Marx said an 8-hour day, but that doesn't mean a 40-hour week. They were running to their second 8-hour day. Even then, they were producing less goods. Wlien production lags, they put in regulations forcing the people to work harder. They tried to have heroes to set records, and finally

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

they force them into slave labor.

1317

many goods

Mao Tse-tung. On the other

Even then, they can't produce as as free countries. On this side of holding on, of staying strong and staying on the defensive, is the fact that communism is a very poor system. And wherever it is, the people hate it. I won't break down by causes the hate in China, but there is real hate there against this government of

hand, there is a terrible, dreadful risk to this American delaying policy. The dreadful risk is that the Soviet Union will confuse us and destroy our moral fabric because we permit certain things to go on, and then we can't teach our kids the right things. Then, too, there is the fact that the Russians are obtaining these mass means of destruction and the means of delivering them. We will reach a day when we do not have our present superiority or, we may have superiorities, but they won't count, because an aggressor can offset those by his evil, and he has enough bombs and things of that

sort to

harm us.

eral Kotikikov, who said, "Sometimes you have to destroy everything in order to rebuild properly." have, therefore, a period of grace during which we have supehave enormous bombs which can riority in retaliatory power. have the means of delivering them. destroy the Soviet Union. And their defenses are not particularly good. They therefore would not dare today to attack our major cities for any reason, because they couldn't succeed, and we would succeed in winning against these

Therefore, that is the risk. All of us who believe, "Let us go on ; let us keep trying; let us do anything to avoid trouble," they have something on their side. But the risk is dreadful. I have never been able to take that risk. Those who think more or less in their own ways along this same idea probably have some of these same considerations. Some day it might be 2, 3, or 5 years when the Soviets have these massive means of what we call retaliation or destruction, when they are in a position to attack us first, and our allies, and really destroy great chunks of the world, if they can't control the world any other way, they will use that force. And they will not worry about it any more than my friend. Gen-

We

We We

people.

These people are dialetic materialists; they don't do things emotionally, therefore, while we have superiority they will not attack our

major cities. Meanwhile we have an opportunity on the positive side. We can hold our superiority of mass retaliation in order to guarantee to the civilized world that these barbarians will not attack our women and children in our cities, for the same reason that Hitler didn't use poison gas because he would have lost. We had more poison gas than he had, and we were ready. Therefore poison gas was not used, and other methods of fighting were. We can use tactical weapons, we can use these small weapons which are suitable for the battlefield, atomic weapons fired from cannon just as you fire high explosives, small atomic weapons that can be dropped by planes which are a tremendous force but which can be limited to the battlefield so that only those who want to fight will get hurt. We can, I believe, start the fall of the Soviet conspiracy, and we can start it right across the Formosan Straits at an appropriate time.

1318

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

and psychological weapons against them now, even at the risk of the Soviets emphasising war against us, This government of Mao Tse-tung is a weak government. The people on the mainland now see that they have nothing to hope for from this government. I can spell out in detail why, but we haven't
time to do
it.

We should use economic, political,

They have, for example, seen what happened when they were promised the land. They were promised the land, but now they don't have the land, and they are under worse slavery now than they ever were under war lords. They have found, for example, that all of the products of their land must be turned over to the state, and they get a receipt for them they can't even get food to eat. That receipt must go in the local Communist-controlled bank. So they can save so much money in the bank, but they can't take out a bit of it unless the head of the local Communist government says it is for a worthy
;

cause.

So now all they are doing is working for the government, and under much more cruel conditions than under the war lords.
Mr. Arens. What policy must be pursued by our Government in Formosa and in the Far East, in your judgment ? General Howley. We should use our massive retaliatory material to protect our cities and our allies against the Soviets attempting to attack our cities with weapons and they can't do so now, although how long this superiority of ours will exist I don't know. But it does
exist

now.

the Soviets are using force we can use force against them. can supply to our allies I don't see supplying ground troops to our powerful allies on the flank of China I don't see supplying ground troops to the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek; he has plenty of ground troops. In this great fight around the world each country should contribute its share, and what they have most of is what they ought to contribute. Our speciality isn't troops our specialty is young men and women who can do triclcy things with radar, and gadgets, aiq^lanes, big guns, and things like that. Some countries have infantry, and that should be their contribution to the common fight. Senator Jenner. What do you think about negotiation at this time? General Howley. Negotiation only confuses us. That fits into the Soviet pattern of psychological warfare that confuses us. Senator. Any time we sit down to negotiate with them we have not only confused our allies but we have confused the American people. How can the mother or uncle or cousin or friend who has a relative in a dungeon out there which the Soviets are holding how can they understand a friendly letter between the enemy and us, or a conference where we sit down and talk with these people ? How can I teach my kids what is right or wrong if we don't make a distinction? And, in the final analysis, whether we recognize a government or not should not be based on Stimson's Nine Points as to whether they meet their obligations, for example. Recognition should be a matter of principle. You cannot keep such things secret. You cannot have one moral in Timbuktu and another in north Africa, or someplace else. There are too many newspapermen around. You can't employ Machiavellian tactics of deceit today without destroying your own people.

Where

We

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

1319

Therefore our national policy, I think, has to be based on principle, and certainly a principle is that you do not sit down with a murderer and discuss business or anything else with him. Senator Jenner. "N^liat do you think about severance of diplomatic

Would that help in the psychoWould it encourage the people who are in slavery, logical attack? the fact that this great Nation would no longer recognize a country like that and just have nothing to do with it ? General Howlet. I think so. I think so, for the sake of our own
relations with Russia at this time?

people, Senator. One of the great dangers we are having today is that these compromises, these negotiations, with men who are strictly are in danger of national bad men, is confusing our own people. And once the Nation arrives at a point where the incynicism. dividual says, "Wliat is in it for me? Wliy should I go out and and the flag becomes a rag you don't have a fight for that rag?" great nation. And it is the one thing that can't be rebuilt.

We

The Egyptians lost something about 2,000 years ago, and it isn't nice to say, but their chances of coming back and amounting to sometliing are very slim now. And some of our friends, people we In other words, the love, they are suffering from national cynicism. the fellow doing what he wants for what he gets out emphasis upon of it when you have that emphasis then you don't have a great nation. I think these negotiations and these conferences and these exchanges over champagne glasses do great harm to the American people. forget these people who were killed in forget what it is all about. that the same people, in the case of Korea by outKorea. forget right aggression, caused the death of over 30,000 Americans, and oyer 125,000 casualties, and so forth. So, before we even talk of recognition or continuing recognition, we must do what we did in Germany, in the case of Korea. must submit a list of those men who are criminals, who break agreements not just the Geneva Agreement; they didn't sign it but they have broken every principle of decency they have murdered people; they have killed prisoners; they did that and other things, and we know their names. should have a list of them. Always before we negotiate or talk any business with this present Chinese Communist Government, they should have to meet a lot of terms. One, I think they should have to contribute, with their Russian backers, to the rehabilitation of South Korea. Senator Jenner. Damages, in other words ? General Howley. Damages. The same thing that we demanded in Germany. If we sit down and negotiate with these people and forget what they have done, we forget the American principle that, if crime isn't punished, there will be more crime. should take account of the war crimes just as we did at the end of our last war with Germany. Senator Hennings. know, of course, they will never pay any

We

We

We

We

We

We

We

damages. General Howley. They have never paid any damages, and they have never given anything back, but we can keep the record straight, and when the day comes, they can be punished.

1320
]Mi\

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

Arens.

the substitution of a

observations to make with respect to new leader for Malenkov ? General Howley. No, sir. Those things are insignificant. It is One gangster shoots another and gains all part of the same thing. control. They are still against us. And I think that is quite important, because one will differ a little from the other. One fellow

Do you have any

understands, for example, that if you smile at an American, you can do most anything to him. You can call him a bad name, and if you smile at him, you can get away with it. He understands that if you get rough with us, anything can happen. Stalin got to the point where he didn't care he was rough, and as a result we reacted and built up a powerful force against him. Whether it is Marshal Zhukov, or Marshal Sokolofsky I call him "Wise Guy" Sokolofsky because I sat in on conferences where he but he was got these tremendous concessions from the United States a great one for holding champagne glasses and talking nice and I had some of our own representatives, I wouldn't like to identify them, say that he is not a Communist. Guess where he is now? He is on the Central Committee of the Communist Party. That man has been in the party since the revolution. And for anybody to be misled, because he drinks a couple of cocktails and smiles, into thinking that he isn't a part of this vicious, corrupt system, is a great mistake. The same applies to Zhukov. So my advice is not to be misled by what these fellows say.
;

We

know what they

are.

Mr. Arens. I have Senator Jenner. Senator Hennings? Senator Hennings. General, don't you think that most of these
speculations that, if there is a change, this fellow, or that, or the other fellow, will have his friend taken out and shot or sent to Siberia or otherwise liquidated, that doesn't make any difference, does it? General Howley. To us? Senator Hennings. We hear so much speculation. Now, we have good old Malenkov we have good old Beria, and we speculate, "They are going to be friendly. They like us." That is just nonsense, isn't it, just naive hope? General Howley. Yes; that is just nonsense. It is based on our belief, our whole code of civilization and education and ethics, that you as an individual are really more important than even an Army
;

Let's judge them by their actions. no further questions.

order.

recognize that even in the Army, where you must have absolute If there is an order against an officer's code of ethics, discipline. religion, or behavior, he can say, "No, I can't execute that order."

We

And some
Commies.
This
is

of the German generals did obey orders, and they hung for it. of these things are important, because the individual is even more important than the elected officials. But not with the

Some

The individual must obey orders in everyhave personal reservations. Senator Hennings. He wouldn't exist as an instrumentality of the Soviet state if he wasn't thoroughly committed to the doctrine of world usurpation of power world domination ? General Howley. That is right. Senator Hennings. And the Marxist thesis ?
thing.

He

one pattern.
can't

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

1321

General Howley. Yes. That is an easy way to judge and a correct one. If he is in authority, he is dedicated to our destruction. If he is a peasant in the Urals, he would probably like to love the American must distinguish between people the Russian people are great. the Russian people and the people who dominate them. small percentage belong to the Communist Senator Hennings. I understand. 'Wliat is that percentage ? Party, General Howley. I don't believe that the percentage means very

We

much.
Senator Hennings. I don't either. But you hear people using 5 or 10 million rather loosely. I don't know how they arrive at such a don't know, do we ? figure. General Howley. I would think that in the Communist regime you could probably number the real Communists certainly not in the millions or in the hundreds of thousands. Many of the others have no choice in the matter. They have no choice. But we don't have to consider them. They have a very small, intensive minority. When you hear the Soviets talk, they talk about their October revolution. It was not a revolution. The number of men who seized control in their revolution, in a real old-fashioned coup d'etat you could probably number 80 men who did it they have

We

never been elected in a real election they have simply taken control. Senator Hennings. General, as one member of this committee, I am most indebted to you for your very enlightening and interesting testimony today. General Howley. Thank you, sir. Senator Jenner. General, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you. I think your testimony has been very beneficial and very helpful and very intelligible because it comes from firsthand expe;

rience.

(Wliereupon, at 11 55
:

a.

m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

INDEX
Note. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index. Page Africa 1303, 1306, 1310, 1318

America American Baruch plan

Beria Berlin

1313, 1319 1317, 1320, 1321

command
1302, 1303, 1304, 1305,

Berlin British Empire

Casablanca
Central America

Cherbourg Chiang Kai-shek China Chinese Nationalist Government

China,

1312, 1313, 1303, 1306, 1312, 1313, 1317, 1312, 1318,

Red
of

Chou
Civil

En-lai

war Communist Party, Central Committee

Czechoslovakia

Dienbienphu Egypt Eisenhower Far East

Fisson, Pierre

1306, 1302, 1314, 1311, 1303, 1311, 1312, 1313,

Formosa Young Man's Army Easy to defend Chances on mainland Formosan Straits
France French French Government Geneva Geneva agreement

1313, 1303, 1304, 1306,

1308 1320 1314 1313 1315 1303 1306 1302 1318 1318 1319 1311 1307 1316 1320 1306 1307 1319 1320 1318 1304 1318 1312 1318 1318 1317 1311 1307 1310
1.307

German generals Germans Germany

Germany, United Greeks Guatemala
Failure of revolution Hand, General Hind, General
Hitler

1302, 1304, 1311, 1313,

1.303, 1.309, 1310,

1,303,

Hong Kong
Howley, Brig. Gen. Frank
Japanese Kennan, George Kenya Colony Kotikikov, General
L.,

1303, 1311,

biography
1312, 1313,

1319 1320 1304 1319 1304 1315 1315 1312 1314 1303 1304 1313 1301 1315
1,302 1,303

1305, 1317
I

rr

INDEX
Page
1302, 1304, 1312, 1313, 1319 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1308 1304, 1306

Korea Kremlin
Lenin

Malenkov Manchuria

Mao Tse-tung Marx Mau Mau Mein Kampf

Morocco
Mussolini

New York University Notre Dame

October Revolution Orient Paris Poland Russian Revolution Seine
Siberia

South America South Korea

Soviet Psychological Warfare Soviet Can't be trusted Objective

1320 1315 1303, 1306, 1308, 1312, 1317, 1318 1316,1320 1303 1304 1303, 1305, 1306, 1310 1303 1301, 1302, 1311 1308 1321 1311 1302, 1304, 1308 1316 1312 1304 1320 1310 1319 1318
1303 1804 1304, 1314 1304 1305 1306
1307 1309 1314, 1316 1303 1304, 1305, 1308, 1311, 1317 1304, 1306, 1307, 1318, 1321
1305,

Techniques same everyvi^here

No

plans for failure

Phases of total war Conference as a weapon Weaknesses Use of communications Defense against
Soviet Government Soviet Union Soviets Stalin Stimson's nine points Sun Yat-sen

World War Zhukov

Tunisia United Nations United States United States Policies Urals Voyage to the Horizon
II

1304 1318 1312 1306 1308 1305, 1308, 1309, 1314 1302 1321 1304 1315 1314, 1320

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY

3 9999 05445 2246