Capital & Class-1983-Rüdig-117-56

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Capitalism and nuclear power: A reassessment

Wolfgang Rdig Capital & Class 1983 7: 117 DOI: 10.1177/030981688302000106 The online version of this article can be found at: http://cnc.sagepub.com/content/7/2/117
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Wolfgang Rudig
Capitalism and nuclear power: A, reassessment

traditionally been welcomed by marxist authors as a pinnacle of technical progress and a foundation for the socialist land of plenty .' The only political influence considered was the possible inhibiting influence of capitalism on the pace of technological progress, due to either its misuse for military purposes or the basic anarchy of capitalist production . Martin Spence's recent paper `Nuclear Capital' (Capital and Class 16) distinguishes itself well from such rather antiquated views . In his argument for abandoning nuclear technology as part of a strategy of socialist transformation, Spence attempts to establish that capitalist influence on techological development is far more substantial than mere ìnhibition' . Spence's article may play an important role in putting nuclear energy on the agenda of socialist politics, a process which, in comparison with other countries, is long overdue in Britain . In my view, `Nuclear Capital' falls, however, far short of a comprehensive analysis of the issue : several central hypotheses do not survive empirical test and many important questions have been dealt with inadequately or not at all . Nevertheless, the article does provide a good basis for further discussion and theoretical development . This is the framework of this paper : starting from a critique of `Nuclear Capital', I will try to proceed and suggest alternative asssessments of the nuclear issue . Martin Spence's divided his article into two major sections .
NUCLEAR POWER HAS
Nuclear power is not a technology of the kind which, harmful under capitalism, can be made benign by socialism. It is a dead-end technology that should be rejected altogether . The state however is deeply implicated in its development, marxism is compromised by acceptance of superindustrialism and the trade union movement is largely pro-nuclear. The new green movements will be endangered by seeking incorporation into a traditional socialist programme .
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CAPITAL & CLASS 118 In the first part, he argues that nuclear power is a technology primarily chosen and promoted by multinationals, designed to secure their increasing power . He further argues that nuclear power is a `specifically capitalist technology', which should be totally rejected . In the second part, Spence argues for an integration of a non-nuclear energy programme into an Alternative Economic Strategy, looks at the class base of the anti-nuclear protest, and proposes a coalition of old and new social movements . I will broadly follow this structure and present my theses in three sections : Firstly, I will challenge the view that multinationals are the prime protagonists of nuclear power . I will argue instead that the state should be the central focus of analysis and I will try to formulate some hypotheses on its role in nuclear developments . Secondly, the concept of a `specifically capitalist technology' will be examined . I will consider different possible interpretations and suggest an alternative approach . Thirdly, I will reassess the social base of anti-nuclear movements and evaluate the possibilities of a coalition of òld' and `new' social movements .
The development of nuclear technology
Martin Spence quite rightly points out that the development of nuclear power was a highly complex process and cannot be put down to one simple principle . , However, to reach some kind of satisfactory understanding of this development, one has to look at the history of nuclear energy in different countries in greater detail . I will compare the us, West Germany, France and Britain in this respect, and come to rather different conclusions about the political dynamics behind nuclear power . USA The industrial use of nuclear power received its first major impetus in the so-called `Manhattan Project', an all out effort by the us in co-operation with Canada and Britain to construct an atomic bomb . This project must be regarded as an historically unique concentration of scientific, industrial and financial resources for the construction of a technical device . By the time the project was transferred to the United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) in 1946, it comprised 37 installations in 19 us states and Canada, had about 37,800 members of staff and represented a war-investment of 2,200 million dollars .' In the light of these figures, it seems fair to conclude that the preconditions for further industrial development of nuclear power would never have been created in such a short time without the coincidence of essential insights of atomic physics and the second World War .'
NUCLEAR POWER The industrial generation of nuclear electricity in its present form is thus unthinkable without this initial impetus . In the us, private companies participated in nuclear development from the very early stages . Despite the total control exercised by various state bodies and the absolute secrecy of atomic projects until 1954, private industry was given a major role through a special contract system . Certain research and development projects were carried out by these firms with the cost and a fixed profit covered by state funds . Also the administration of installations, laboratories and so forth was carried out by private firms under this system, which became the dominant feature of US nuclear R & D policy 4 . Until 1954, us nuclear policy was almost totally determined by military considerations . For the firms involved, this had on the one hand the disadvantage of not being able to make use of their experience in the market, but, on the other hand, they were guaranteed sole access to nuclear development and hence had no fear of competition from other companies . From the beginning, Westinghouse and General Electric (GE) were the main contractors, and both companies became the main suppliers of nuclear installations in the following years 5 . By 1954, it had become clear that the aim of the policy of total secrecy - avoiding the international spread of nuclear weapons, particularly to the Soviet Union - had not been reached . Westinghouse and GE were worried about losing out to European suppliers on the world market . The switch of policy in 1954 reflected this changed situation . Firstly, it was geared to creating favourable conditions for the profitable exploitation of nuclear technology at home and to securing the dominance of US technology on the world market . The us Atoms for Peace programme offered the supply of nuclear power stations, assurances on the supply of fuel and financial help . By 1955, more than two dozen countries had entered co-operation contracts with the us'. Secondly, Àtoms for Peace' was an attempt to limit nuclear weapons proliferation by other means : the free offer of nuclear technology was supposed to discourage countries from embarking on their own nuclear projects and thus acquiring nuclear weapons capability at the same time . Under the terms of the US programme, the whole nuclear fuel cycle remained in American hands' . The ensuing development in the us' at first seems to confirm the thesis that private companies took the main initiative . Westinghouse and GE were eager to capitalise on their experience . They were not interested in experimenting with further reactor technologies, but rather in conquering the market as soon as possible with the reactor designs originally developed for military purposes . The chief example is here, the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) which was originally chosen as the power source
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for submarines . Westinghouse was closely involved in the development of the PWR and won most contracts for submarine reactors in the 1950s . Building on this experience, they concentrated totally on marketing the PWR . GE had developed several designs which were less successful and finally chose to concentrate on the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) design . In the middle of the 1950s euphoria spread among the nuclear-industrial complex . The us home market was, however, not very promising . Electricity utilities in the us were small and could hardly afford to invest massively in a new technology with an uncertain future, particularly at a time when conventional power stations were clearly more economic . The us reactor industry thus first concentrated on the European market . Three reactors were sold with the help of both us and European public funds . But the advent of cheap oil at the beginning of the 1960s dashed early hopes of a great commercial breakthrough on a world scale . A turning point was reached in 1963 when a us utility bought a nuclear power station without direct state subventions . This led to a wave of reactor orders by us utilities, inundating the main suppliers Westinghouse and GE with contracts they could hardly carry out . Up to the end of 1967, 75 nuclear power stations with a capacity of more than 45,000 MW had been ordered' . What was responsible for this boom at a time of plentiful and cheap oil supplies? A major factor was that reactor suppliers sold at prices far under production cost in the expectation of handsome profits once the company had established itself in the market . A RANDCorporation study assesses the financial losses of GE and Westinghouse for the first 13 reactors built under the turnkeysystem at between 875 and 1,000 million dollars, i .e . 73 to 78 million dollars apiece" . Despite these artificially low prices, nuclear power was still hardly competitive with conventional energy sources . The central economic justification was the cost calculations of the reactor suppliers, which predicted enormous èconomies of scale', but these were not founded in any concrete experience with nuclear plants" . Why did the private electricity utilities nevertheless go nuclear without any substantial state subsidies forthcoming? The following factors might be most relevant . First, utility decision makers were characterised by an ideology of technological progress . Nuclear power, seen as the latest technical advance, thus had to be welcomed. Even if the cost calculations of the reactor suppliers were not totally accepted, there was the widespread belief that nuclear power was the power source of the future, and that the utilities' prestige and economic standing would be enhanced if this step was taken earlier rather than later . 12 Second, the 1963 èconomic breakthrough' created a
NUCLEAR POWER `bandwagon effect' : without any major change in the political and economic conditions, utilities started ordering reactors to avoid `being left behind' ." The third factor was the fear that the utility industry might be nationalised if it were to reject nuclear power. Once it was seemingly established that nuclear power was the energy source of the not too distant future, utilities went nuclear to avoid the creation of `massive atomic TVAS' . 14 (The Tennessee Valley Authority, the only big US utility in public ownership, was created in 1933 to manage the gigantic hydroelectric projects .) By the beginning of the 1970s, it became clear however, that the cost calculations put forward by the reactor industry were hopelessly wrong . Capital costs soared, due to longer construction times, design complexity, higher safety measures and attempts to increase plant performance ." The nuclear industry was `saved', however, by the oil price increases in the early 1970s . Without this it is possible that the rather costly experience with nuclear power in the 1960s might have led to the halt of construction, at least temporarily . 'S Such a halt was not far away anyway : the main effect of the 1973/74 oil price crisis was to depress consumption, making predictions of future demand much more insecure than in the 1950s and 1960s . At the same time interest rates increased, discouraging investment in capital intensive projects . Anti-nuclear protest delayed nuclear construction through litigation . The private utilities, deciding on purely economic grounds, could thus no longer take the risk of ordering nuclear stations" . With no further demand increases forthcoming, it proved more economic actively to invest in energy conservation than in expanding supply installations ." One other major reason for this decline of nuclear power in the us can be found in the behaviour of the federal administration . Despite the critical state of the US nuclear industry, there was no government programme which comprehensively secured its future ." On the contrary, government policy systematically undermined the nuclear industry's economic standing . President Carter's non-proliferation policy robbed Westinghouse and GE of any chances to play the dominant role in the world reactor market (to the benefit of the Canadian, German and French industries) . The accident at Three Mile Island made the Us home market even more insecure . 19Even the present administration does not seem to be prepared to intervene in the electricity industry to secure an ordering programme for nuclear reactors . The American nuclear industry might press for such intervention, but it has obviously been thoroughly unsuccessful, leaving the whole nuclear option in limbo .
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West Germany
The pattern of development in the major European countries has been different, in varying degrees, from the us experience . Most similar to the us has been the development in West Germany . 20 Here, nuclear activities had been forbidden by the allied powers until 1955, although some clandestine research activities had been going on . The main initiative came from private industry which, in the nuclear euphoria of the 1950s, wanted to get involved in what was supposed to be a major future industry . The German government, following its ideology of free market economics, left it largely to a working group of industrial interests to work out a first nuclear programme in 1957 . The supply industry had failed, however to consult the electricity utilities . German utilities act as private companies, although most of their shares are held by various local and regional public bodies . From an economic point of view, they were not interested at all in nuclear power at first . While the big industrial companies from many sectors (electrical engineering, steel, chemicals and other manufacturing) aimed to build up an independent German nuclear industry with its own reactor line to conquer world markets, the utilities' interest was confined to the future price of electricity . The German government was not in a position to provide the funds necessary for the development of an independent German reactor line, being prohibited from making military use of nuclear power . There was also no intervention in the decision-making process of the utilities which decided in favour of the us-built Light Water reactors . German industry thus had to abandon all other reactor lines and two main companies remained, building the PWR and the BWR under licences from Westinghouse and GE . By 1969, both companies merged to form the Kraftwerk Union (KWU) which is now a 100% subsidiary of Siemens . Reactor construction reached a peak in the early 1970s, before dropping off from about 1975 onwards . As in the us, one reason for this was the influence of the anti-nuclear protest movement, which succeeded in delaying construction through court action, site occupations and other protest activities . On the other hand, unlike the us situation, the utilities remained totally committed to the nuclear option . One reason for this might be that conventional energy sources, such as German coal, are more expensive than in the us . The economic standing of nuclear stations thus remains more favourable . The utilities' pricing policy also seems freer and this greatly improves their manoeuvrability in investment planning. The German federal government and most state (Lander)
NUCLEAR POWER governments retain a strong commitment to the nuclear option . In marked difference to the us, the government has gone to extremes to create conditions favourable to a continued nuclear option in Germany . At home, strenuous efforts have been made to contain the impact of anti-nuclear opposition . The fragmented structure of the German political system has made this very difficult, but no single nuclear power plant has yet been stopped finally . From the point of view of the utilities the big delays in nuclear construction have not been detrimental to their economic standing . On the contrary, electricity demand has risen far slower than their capacity, and there is thus no urgent need to add even more nuclear capacity . The main pressure has been on the Kwu which in the early 1970s gravely miscalculated the demand for nuclear stations and built up what turned out to be a massive overcapacity in production facilities . The German government has, however, always closely identified itself with the interests of the KWU . Export contracts to Brazil and Argentina have been won after the close involvement of senior government officials who also covered the financial risk of the transaction . Attempts to stop the implementation of these export contracts by the Carter administration were rejected . All in all, nuclear power has received comprehensive backing by the state in Germany and this must be seen as one major reason for its survival .
France 21 France from the start followed a different development strategy . Private industry was never allowed to play any dominant role in French nuclear politics . Until 1969, the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) largely determined the course of development . The first years after World War II saw the French trying to build up a scientific and technical infrastructure under the directorship of Frederic Joliot-Curie, a member of the French Communist Party . Joliot-Curie was dismissed in 1950 and an ensuing re-organisation of the CEA brought the nuclear sector under control of the central administration in close co-operation with the military . These circles promoted the idea of a French atomic bomb project and succeeded in guiding the CEA's research and development strategy into a direction best suited to these ends . Successive governments of the Fourth Republic gave no positive backing to the project and, at one point, it was explicitly rejected . However, the CEA continued its work, with the help of interested military circles and a few Gaullist politicians, until the atomic bomb project was officially sanctioned in 1958. 22 Programmes for the `peaceful' use of nuclear energy were first of marginal importance and the first reactor construction proDownloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012
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CAPITAL & CLASS grammes in the late 1950s were rather small compared with the UK . The CEA promoted a gas-graphite reactor which had been developed from the plutonium production technology of the bomb project . The only French electricity utility, Electricite de France (EDF), preferred the us light water reactor, however. After long organisational conflicts the EDF won in 1969 and the CEA's influence was curtailed by a comprehensive re-organisation of the industry . The main protagonist behind the French nuclear programme is certainly the EDF together with relevant sections of the central administration, although the nuclear construction industry also pressed for the LWR to boost its export chances . Nuclear power fitted the EDF development strategy which was first based on a policy of `tout petrole' (all oil) . In an attempt to reduce energy cost by any means, France had opened itself totally to cheap oil imports and neglected indigenous, uneconomic resources such as coal . Already in the late 1960s, EDF had identified nuclear power as a supplement to and later a substitute for oil, to ensure continuing sources of plentiful and cheap energy . In a long term development programme backed by the Paris administration, both politically and with generous financial support, the EDF set out a massive electrification programme based on nuclear power . From the state's point of view, such a policy first increases the strategic energy independence of France (with large uranium resources under French control in Niger) and at the same time, provides the basis for a burgeoning nuclear industry with excellent chances on the world market . EDF gave all contracts to the company Framatome which emerged as monopoly nuclear supplier, forming a stable alliance between the Paris administration, the state utility EDF, and the private monopoly nuclear company Framatome . This nuclear complex remained relatively immune from the political and economic pressures against nuclear power, the French administrative system not allowing protestors any significant influence . The build up of a centralised, supply-oriented electricity industry, with a monopoly structure and access to financial resources at preferential rates through the state, is not as dependent as, for example, the small private US utilities, on short-term market fluctuations . Under the new Socialist government, the EDF's nuclear programme is seen as an integral part of a gigantic new industrialisation programme initiated by the state, although the economic recession and decreasing energy demands are now forcing the utilities to curtail their ambitious programme for financial reasons . Whether Framatome remains `private' as part of the Creusot-Loire complex or is nationalised is irrelevant in determining the degree of nuclear activity in France .
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Britain In Britain23 , nuclear policy-making was at first quite similar to the French pattern . Nuclear technology was developed in the framework of a nuclear weapons programme . A state agency, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), was in charge of nuclear power from 1954 onwards, private industry playing a minor role . The reactor line adopted was, as in the French case, a gas-graphite (magnox) type . But Britain did not make the transformation seen in France in the late 1960s . Firstly, while the French did not succeed in developing their gas-graphite technology further, the British designed the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) to replace the outdated Magnox design . The UKAEA which, like the CEA in France, pushed its own technology thereby had a better case to argue against the LWR . Secondly, the French utility commanded a greater independence than the British Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) . The EDF succeeded in keeping the first reactor programme in the 1950s relatively small . They even managed to order a US LWR in a French/Belgian joint enterprise, thus gaining experience with that type from the early 1960s onwards . In Britain, the CEGB was much more under the sway of the UKAEA which commanded unequivocal government support . The CEGB was not even consulted on the first nuclear construction programme . When, in 1964, the decision was made for the AGR, the CEGB seems to have been subject to heavy pressure from UKAEA and government . It did not command the technical expertise with alternative reactor lines to counteract the UKAEA's claims effectively . At the time of the third major decision, in 1974, the CEGB had voiced its strong interest in a major nuclear programme according to the French pattern . But again its case was dismissed. Electricity demand had fallen far behind that expected in the 1960s . The demand the AGR programme was to meet never materialized, and thus the tremendous delay in AGR construction did not have any adverse impact on the availability of electricity . Furthermore, major oil and gas reserves had been detected in the North Sea. At the time of the oil crisis Britain was thus relatively well off in terms of energy security, and did not need any major nuclear programme . 2' There was, however, a broad political consensus to keep the nuclear option open . The later decisions to go ahead with the construction of two further AGRS in Torness and Heysham and to build a first PWR at Sizewell must be seen in this context . Both cases would hardly be defensible on purely economic grounds, but seem intended to preserve the industrial capabilities of British industry to build nuclear power stations, thus enhancing long-term energy security . What was the impact of industry on this process? There
NUCLEAR POWER are several important differences in the structure of the industry and the nuclear market which must be noted . Firstly, Britain did not use the `contract system', employed in the us in the early stages of nuclear development, presumably because Britain simply did not have large enough companies to perform such a task 21 . Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, British industry was highly fragmented and feeble . In the us the large market for nuclear reactors allowed four major companies to establish themselves in the market (Westinghouse, GE, Combustion Engineering, and Babcock & Wilcox) . The British market was far smaller and export contracts were not forthcoming in sufficient numbers . The decision to spread the AGR orders among the three consortia existing at that time was therefore more than unwise, particularly as none of them had been involved in AGR development and had no experience whatsoever with the technology at prototype or demonstration levels 26 . Britain thus experienced a continuing uncertainty over the choice of reactor line which put private industry in a difficult position . In the US and Germany, it had been left totally up to the utilities to make that choice, although the LWR success has to a large extent been predetermined by Westinghouse and GE's interest . With France finally deciding to adopt LWR technology in 1969, none of the three countries experienced any insecurity over reactor choice in the 1970s . The predominating role the UKAEA was allowed to play is the prime reason for this insecurity which still prevails in Britain . In the us and Germany there had never been any organisation of the power of the AEA, and in France, the CEA had been deposed from its previous position . In all these countries a relatively stable and workable alliance between vendors and consumers had been established, either as a result of market forces or from determined and consistent state planning . Had Britain been in a more difficult energy situation the government might have been forced to a more definite interventionist policy, along the French pattern . Instead, there was never any re-organisation which could have removed the UKAEA from its position, given the CEGB a comprehensive long-term development programme and selected one nuclear supplier able to deliver the goods .
The rationale of nuclear energy
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What is thus the current situation of the nuclear industry world wide? Firstly, there is increasing evidence that nuclear power is still ùneconomic' from the point of view of both vendors and consumers . Some sectors of the nuclear business seem to be making profits, for example in uranium mining and fuel fabriDownloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012
CAPITAL & CLASS 128 cation . But, even here, I would argue that such profits are the result of direct or indirect government intervention . The price of uranium, for example, is not only indirectly dependent on state action through the demand created by nuclear programmes, but has in the past also been directly manipulated . An international uranium cartel was set up in 1975 with the participation of several governments leading to major increases in uranium prices . It reflected a common interest in increasing price incentives which would foster investment and thus secure future uranium supplies" . The nuclear industry has made tremendous losses . The electricity supply industry, where it is organised as private capital, is not prepared to order any further nuclear stations at present . Existing overcapacities, stagnating electricity demand and the unavailability of any reasonably secure forecasts of future development, make the extension of supply installations in general a high risk option . 28 From the point of view of the multinationals, I would argue, the nuclear sector on the whole does not seem to be a very attractive investment . Companies such as Westinghouse and KWU might be prepared to foot the bill for their idle capacities in the hope that the situation will change and that in the end they will be able to get a return on previous investment . Others, such as General Electric, might prefer to leave the market . There are certainly no new companies with new capital forthcoming in reactor construction, enrichment or reprocessing. The situation of the American industry looks particularly bad as their potential export markets are lost to the French, German, and Canadian industries . Framatome and KwU started building MRS under licence from Westinghouse, but both companies developed their own design and the licensing agreements have run out . Westinghouse is therefore not dominating the world market, as Spence suggests" . The French have perhaps the best chance of coming out on top because they have a relatively secure order book for the home market, allowing them to mass-produce one standard design . Furthermore, they are offering complete fuel cycle facilities from enrichment to reprocessing, provided they are able to sort out the remaining technical problems . The French industry is only able to do this because nuclear power is pursued in France as a long-term programme with comprehensive state backing . No industry will survive for very long without a secure home market, the world market being in any case very depressed with Third World countries' debts mounting and their economies declining . All in all therefore, there is very little sign of multinationals pushing forward with nuclear energy to stabilise their power . Instead, the state continues to play a major role . Nuclear energy appears to be viable only in countries where the nuclear-industrial Downloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012
NUCLEAR POWER complex is sufficiently entrenched in the state apparatus . All major actors of nuclear policy-making have to be involved in an integrated policy-making structure : government agencies, electricity utilities and reactor and fuel cycle industries . Of particular importance are the utilities . To finance a major project in the current situation they have to be either very healthy financially (W . Germany), or have preferential access to financial resources via the state (France) . Without active state support, the nuclear industry's situation would be very difficult . What is the rationale behind the state's action in the nuclear field? I earlier identified 'energy security' as the main reason . State actions in all four countries can be understood in these terms . But it is also useful to discuss nuclear power on the more abstract level of theories of the capitalist state . This allows us to understand the broader significance of state nuclear energy policies . The capitalist state has the general task of creating the formal and material preconditions which guarantee continued production and accumulation . On the one hand, the state is dependent on successful accumulation through the tax system : on the other hand it has to win legitimacy for its actions . 30 The creation of favourable conditions for capital accumulation can take various forms . The state can, for example, try to promote R & D with the aim of developing new products . The case of nuclear power can be partly interpreted in this way and indeed most historical studies of nuclear power have tried to identify the best conditions for the development of a successful nuclear technology . The most sophisticated analysis comes to the conclusion that the state should take a major role in the development phase, should then leave the major initiative in the demonstration phase to vendors (reactor industry) and consumers (utilities), and finally leave it to both vendors and consumers to determine the final result in the dissemination phase . 31 Analysed within this framework, the state's promotion of nuclear technology would appear to be a failure, considering its still insecure economic standing after about forty years of development . The technology's inherent problems of high complexity, continued unpredictability and tremendous capital cost would have rendered nuclear power obsolete as a commodity sold on a free market . However, one might argue that the state also has to provide the general infrastructure for successful capital accumulation . Nuclear energy must be seen in this context . Particularly after the oil price crisis of 1973/74, the central motivation of governments in holding on to nuclear power policies appears to have been their aim of long-term energy security . Different states and governments might have different
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CAPITAL & CLASS 130 views over how to promote energy security. One basic feature, seemingly followed by all nuclear countries, is a strategy to keep the national nuclear industry afloat, either by home orders for nuclear reactors despite any immediate economic need for such installations, or generous subsidisation of the export of installations . Assessments of the role of nuclear energy in energy security policy differ widely, once one surpasses this level of maintaining the nuclear-industrial complex as such . The us does not seem to see any necessity to intervene more strongly to secure new reactor orders . In Britain there is the almost unique situation of a conservative government promoting nuclear energy in a bid to curb the importance of the coal sector and thus reduce the threat that might be posed by striking miners. To what extent, however, is the capitalist state able to fulfil its functions? One set of theories tries to show how the imperatives of private accumulation lead an àctive' technology policy to fail systematically . Thus they try to argue that technology policy does not contribute to the creation of stable economic growth in capitalist economies . 32 This approach makes a number of assumptions which might be questioned. First, the rationality of the process of state intervention in technology policy as such is assumed. But how, one may ask, does the state `know' what to research, which technology to promote, what to do to keep the `system' functioning? Hirsch and others simply assumed that nuclear energy as such was a rational object of state intervention and that the problem was how to develop and disseminate it in the fastest and most efficient way . A critique of this approach to technological development leads to two theses on nuclear power which might be worth further investigation . The first thesis is that in the absence of market conditions and a virtual monopoly of expertise by the professionals of the nuclear-industrial complex, the state is in no position to evaluate its nuclear policy independently . This means that one might conceptualise the rationale of nuclear politics in terms of the organisational selfinterest of the nuclear industrial sector rather than in the energy security requirements of the capitalist system per se . The second thesis is that the reasons why nuclear energy became an issue of public protest cannot be found in the failure of the state to develop nuclear energy technology quickly and efficiently enough, but rather in the safety questions raised by the technology . This is a new concern which has to be integrated into the theory of the state . Aspects of Claus Offe's theory can perhaps provide an analysis of these issues . Offe distinguishes between crises as a result of developments in the economic system and crises resulting from state intervention to solve economic crises . Crises of the
NUCLEAR POWER latter kind would manifest themselves in new problems . For example, urban renewal would lead to social disintegration and more expensive rents ; the expansion of the educational system would lead to a deterioration of the conditions of learning and teaching ; the construction of new streets, industries, power stations would lead to increased environmental deterioration . These new problems resulting from state intervention would also create new political conflicts : `The contradictory experience that increasingly sectors of concrete living conditions are determined by politicaladministrative institutions, but are nevertheless politically not controllable, creates a structural legitimation problem .' 33 Offe thus expected that the capitalist state would increasingly be confronted with protest activity generated by its own actions . This 'legitimation crisis' would, in Offe's view, only be solved by new interventions which would go beyond the previous limits and intervene in the nature of capitalist production itself . Offe's prediction did not come true . In many areas where such legitimation crises were expected, they did not materialise . Nevertheless, the rise of the environmental and anti-nuclear movements can be interpreted as a result of a legitimation crisis . This interpretation of the nuclear power conflict as a `crisis of state intervention' has important implications for the analysis of anti-nuclear resistance and its political status . But first it is necessary to have a closer look at nuclear power as a `specifically capitalist technology' . Offe dealt very superficially with the nature of environmental problems themselves . How is it that state intervention has led to a deterioration of the environment? What exactly makes nuclear technology a safety hazard? And what exactly is a `specifically capitalist technology', if there is such a thing at all? 131
Martin Spence at the beginning of his article takes the `case against nuclear power' as read . But he hardly makes any substantial reference at all to the arguments for and against nuclear energy . Spence bases his rejection of nuclear power exclusively on an analysis of the conditions of production in nuclear installations . Nuclear technology as a capital intensive technology provides few jobs, which, besides, are highly alienated . Nuclear workers are required to undertake highly dangerous work . They are so highly regimented that democratisation of the industry is out of the question . There is low level, personal resistance against this control, which in turn endangers not only the workers themselves, but also the entire population . Finally, the imDownloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012
Nuclear power as `specifically capitalist technology'
CAPITAL & CLASS 132 possibility of comprehensive strike action is claimed because of the safety risks involved would interfere with the workers' right to strike, organise, and defend themselves" . These arguments are relatively familiar and well documented elsewhere . Roy Lewis' study of nuclear power and trade union rights in Britain demonstrates that there should be some concern from the trade union side 35 . Dave Elliott's study of energy and employment36 , though heavily criticised 37 , raises this previously neglected issue well and should provide a basis for further studies on the employment impact of different energy technologies . But have these questions been the centre of concern over nuclear energy? In my view the central question, without which there would be no public controversy and mass protest about nuclear power, concerns the safety of installations, from nuclear power stations to reprocessing plants, waste disposal and a possible plutonium economy . Other questions, such as nuclear power's political implications, derive from this concern . While it is reasonable to argue that the safety of nuclear workers should be part of the issue and that anti-nuclear groups should address this problem, we should also note the fact that nuclear workers themselves seem rather oblivious to such arguments . Concern over the safety of nuclear workers has certainly not made nuclear power the major political issue it is now . In my view the major question to be asked is how does the alleged character of nuclear power as `capitalist technology' relate to the safety of nuclear power? Spence addresses this question in a way I found unsatisfactory . To formulate my criticism more clearly, I would like to distinguish between three different approaches to dealing with the safety of nuclear power .
'Use-abuse' approach
The traditional view taken by 'marxist' authors is that technology can be used in different ways, and that its use depends on the `relations of production' . According to this approach, nuclear power is only unsafe where its use is guided by the profit motive . Private utility companies, so the argument goes, want to make as much profit as possible and thus do not invest sufficiently in safety devices . However, if the electricity industry is submitted to public control, and sufficient money is made available to make the plant safe, then there is nothing to worry about ." This argument can be extended to whole reactor lines . One might well argue that the us light water reactor is an inherently unsafe construction because Westinghouse and GE, driven by the profit motive, wanted to capitalise on their experience as soon as possible . They did not therefore develop the
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LWR any further or look at other, possibly safer, designs . Thus, the import of LWR technology should be opposed . This 'use-abuse' approach to nuclear technology is primarily taken by orthodox communist parties . The German Communist Party, for example, is against nuclear power only as long as it is run by the German private utilities and the nuclear industry is not nationalised ." The French communists opposed the adoption of the LWR in 1%9 but are now very pro-nuclear . The Communist Party of Great Britain is also opposed to the LWR, but not to the British AGR . The Communist Party of Luxembourg rejected the import of a German-built LWR and suggested an import from the USSR The 'use-abuse approach' might regard certain technical devices as `specifically capitalist' but does seem to imply that all technological systems somehow can be controlled and put to use . It thus shares the traditional philosophy of unqualified technological optimism .
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The `labour process' approach

This approach emphasises the function of political control which can be exercised through technology . The analysis of capitalist labour processes, inspired by Braverman, 4' alleges that the increasing centralisation of production and increased division of labour does not lead only to economic advantage . Such technical developments also tend to isolate the individual worker, to decrease her or his independence in the production process, to enhance her or his alienation from work and, at the same time, to decrease the chances of political disruption . 42 This approach has been applied to the case of nuclear power in various ways . Early sociological works, for example, expected that automation would be greatly enhanced by the ubiquitous availability of electricity cheaply produced by nuclear stations . 43 More compelling is perhaps the view taken by the BSSRS Politics of Energy Group and Levidov 44 . They reject the , use-abuse' approach because it understands the risks of a technology only as technical imperfections which could be ironed out by technical solutions . Such action would, however, only lead to an ever higher control of the labour process without decreasing the risk involved . They argue instead that the risk of nuclear power can be explained in terms of the political deficiencies of the organisation of the labour process : ` . . . risk is inherent in the continual struggle between workers and managers for control over the labour process . . however exceptional the risks of nuclear power, the risks exist for rather unexceptional reasons, namely the historical
CAPITAL & CLASS 134 tendency of all capitalist technology to subordinate living labour.'45 According to Levidov, it is exactly the attempt to reduce workers' possibilities to make `mistakes' which leads to a greater division of labour and atomisation of workers, which in turn aggravates worker helplessness and contributes significantly to `mishaps' occurring . 46 Spence takes a similar view, representing task fragmentation and subsequent workers' negligence as a form of protest as the main reasons for nuclear power's hazards . "I The important question to be asked here is whether such politically deficient organisation of the labour process can be changed . If the labour process in a nuclear installation could be submitted to workers' control, then, according to these views, nuclear power might be made safe . Such a position would, however, only be a new form of the 'use-abuse' approach . Both views allege that it is only a question of putting right the political conditions under which technologies are used to make them safe . An alternative view might regard the organisation of the labour process as built into the technology itself . There might be technologies which one might not be able to submit to political control . Such technologies thus might be seen as `specifically capitalist' in the sense that they could not be used in a socialist society . This is obviously the view taken by Spence. The central problem with the `labour process approach', is, in my view, the alleged causal relationship between the organisation of the labour process and the general hazards of the technology . While Spence names some cases where such a relation might exist, there is also the more general implication that if no worker, for whatever reason, made a mistake nuclear power would be safe . There does not appear to exist convincing evidence from previous nuclear accidents, near-accidents and the everyday running of installations that the essence of the safety problem derives from workers' behaviour determined by the organisation of the labour process . In what way, for example, do the hazards of nuclear waste disposal depend on labour process variables? More evidence would also be needed to support the view that further `technological progress' could not eliminate many hazards without leading to further alienation of work . In summary, the labour process approach has the basic flaw that it tries to locate the issue of nuclear energy exclusively in the production sector and attempts to explain it with traditional concepts of labour/capital conflict .
The Ùllrich' approach

In two seminal works of 1977 and 1979, Otto Ullrich has provided an innovativeNORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012 political analysis of technology and Downloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV
NUCLEAR POWER power ." Ullrich is particularly critical of the traditional marxist , use-abuse' approach . Nuclear energy is, in his view, a technology which cannot be stripped of its disadvantages by using it in another form . Such 'cul-de-sac' technologies should be abolished in a socialist society . What are the exact reasons for the development of such `cul-de-sac' technologies and how are they identified? The central concept of Ullrich's analysis is 'Grofle Industrie' (Big Industry), as described by Marx in the thirteenth chapter of Capital . Big Industry is characterised by its size, a high degree of division of labour and specialisation, hierarchical structure, centralisation and other elements . Human progress has, in Ullrich's view, been equated with the progress of Big Industry which has led to the present industrial system . This development has, however, reached a new stage : the impact of the industrial system cannot be totally taken account of any more . Big Industry has unintentional, incalculable impacts on both the biological and the social system . Ullrich proposes a re-assessment of `Big Industry' as such . Marxist analyses have recognised the influence of the relations of production on the use and speed of technological change . However, the development of Big Industry as a given technological path has never been questioned . The `productive forces' have thus been seen as independent from the `relations of production' per se . Ullrich challenges this view . The relations of production have had a far stronger and more thorough influence on the productive forces than such a position allows for, to the extent that some technologies are shaped in their very nature by the relations of production . Ullrich goes even further in arguing that capitalist relations of production have determined not only individual technologies but the whole technological development which enabled the build-up of Big Industry as such . This intrinsic reflection of the productive forces by capitalist relations of production did not have to be imposed on the productive forces . Ullrich states that a 'tendential structural affinity' exists between capital and science and technology . Science and technology follow the same principles as Big Industry : both require the delegation of labour to atomised subjects ; both scientific and industrial production consists of many, particularised steps ; both scientific and technological professionals and individual capitals follow narrow aims with a unifying rationality eventually emerging only through an ìnvisible hand', if at all . While Ullrich seems tempted to reject Big Industry and industrialisation as such, he does formulate criteria to assess technologies individually . His main criterion is the 'calculability'
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of their impact . If its effects are incalculable this provides, in his view, enough reason for a socialist society to reject a technology . His alternative is the creation of a new technological system of small-scale, calculable technologies . Ullrich's work has been criticised by various authors . For Kapferer there is a contradiction between the thesis of a `structural affinity' between capital and science and the proposal of an alternative technology : the total rejection of the industrialisation process would be the only possible solution ."' Ullrich does not want to go as far as postulating categorically an irresolvable contradiction between industrialism and socialism, but he does not exclude that possibility either . To return to nuclear energy, it is thus seen as one example of a recent development of industrialism leading to an increased incalculability of its impacts . Nuclear energy might here be the symbol, or the actual first threshold, of a transition to a new phase of industrialism . This concept enables us to root the issue of nuclear energy firmly in the wider environmental and social impact of technological development, outside the narrow framework of labour/ capital conflicts in the production sector . To define the term `cul-de-sac technology' more comprehensively, one might introduce the terms `productive' and `destructive' forces'" . A given technological development could have certain destructive effects, which might be part of its intrinsic structure and not of a certain form of using it . A cul-de-sac technology would be one whose intrinsic destructive effects of either manifest/calculable or latent/non-calculable kind surpass its productive effects . Nuclear energy is a technology of potentially high and uncalculable destructive effects and could thus be classiffied as cul-de-sac technology . $' What, however, is the real importance of nuclear power for `capitalism'? The fact that nuclear power is an ìntrinsically' capitalist technology does not necessarily imply that, in turn, nuclear power is a necessary prerequisite for the survival of capitalism . Indeed, it is even possible to argue that nuclear power, while in one sense unthinkable outside a capitalist form of development, has always remained an alien element . It would not survive under strict market conditions, since it requires a steady flow of subsidies, and it has created severe legitimation problems . Lovins and others have argued all along that nuclear power results from a failure to submit the energy sector to the free market . Lovins seems to desire a return to an ideal capitalist market economy with many individual capitals" . Others have correspondingly argued that only state intervention has created the severe environmental problems of today which would disDownloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012
NUCLEAR POWER appear or be reduced with a return to a market economy ." Severe doubt, however, has to be voiced about whether the social system Lovins and others are proposing would be free of the problems of previous market economies . Inded, Lovins' view seems entirely ahistorical and neglects the basic social forces which had led to state intervention and Big Industry in the first place . Even if one accepts that state interventionism is a necessary stage of capitalist development, there is no reason to believe that all forms of state intervention are rational or indeed necessary . As has been shown, nuclear power has been promoted by a nuclearindustrial complex which, from the start, had close clientele links to the state . In countries such as Britain, France and Germany, this nuclear-industrial complex was able to remain in a commanding position and systematically to exclude possible alternative policies which could threaten its further expansion . The state and the `business community' largely accepted the nuclear complex's view of nuclear power as the only source of security, although both had no real way of evaluating the rationality of nuclear development . Once the nuclear sector's position has been entrenched in this way, it commands a significant amount of power . In the US, this entrenchment process has never taken place . Nuclear power remained a predominantly private business between private supply companies and private utilities . However, there must be severe doubt about whether this situation will continue if the us energy situation becomes markedly more difficult, or if the entire us nuclear industry were about to collapse . There is nevertheless no reason to believe that capitalism would break down should nuclear power become unavailable . That would be to severely underestimate the dynamics and resources of the system . 54 There is no reason why other centralised technologies could not be developed to fill its place which, at the same time, have a far more calculable impact, i .e . are not cul-desac technologies . The large scale use of solar energy, for example, is also accepted by the otherwise pro-nuclear HASA world energy study as a possible future source of unlimited energy supplies ." In this sense, nuclear power does not appear to be a necessary precondition for the continued existence of `capitalism' . Nuclear power might be replaceable by another, more beneficial energy technology, but the point is that there are a great number of other technologies, in other areas, whose social and environmental impacts are absolutely incalculable . Thus, not only nuclear technology, but the system that produces such technologies, is at issue here . In the end one has also, in my view, to face the fact that the further expansion of industrialism in its
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CAPITAL & CLASS 138 present form as Big Industry has totally incalculable impacts : acid rain, the destruction of tropical rain forests, the Coz problem, the uncontrolled release of masses of chemicals into the environment and so forth . Many of these dangers have not received much public attention or led to widespread protest . Nuclear power has served as symbol for all these concerns, as properly analysed by Wolf Hafele, a chief proponent of nuclear development: Ìf properly interpreted and understood, the public concern about nuclear power is not unfounded, but that concern is not a simple function of a peculiarity of nuclear power . It is, rather, the general condition where the magnitude of human enterprises becomes comparable with the magnitude of the widest detrerminants of our normal existence . Nuclear power turns out to be a forerunner, a pathfinder, of that .'" The combination of Ullrich's and Offe's approaches, together with some ideas of Martin Janicke, lead in my view to a more comprehensive assessment of capitalism and nuclear power . The dynamics of the `system' might thus be described briefly as follows . The capitalist economy develops in a fundamentally contradictory way through cycles and crises . Technologies develop determined by the basic rationality of accumulation, in line with the principles of Big Industry . The increase in state functions in response to economic crises puts the state under higher legitimation pressure, making governments' fortunes dependent on their economic achievements . The capitalist state, in its own interest, becomes the most energetic promoter of `growth' . The state starts supporting and undertaking R&D . The development of Big Industry is associated with further specialisation and professionalisation of society, leading to a number of professional sectors . These sectors gain a significant amount of independence as the evaluation of their actual and potential development is largely controlled by themselves . The state increasingly depends on these sectors to fulfil its functions . 'Solutions' to problems caused by capital accumulation and state intervention are developed in ways which do not challenge the basic features of the system which serve the self-interest of the professional sector and even increase economic growth . The health sector can be seen as one outstanding example, others are crime, environment and energy . The `solutions' offered do not deal with the problem directly but rather try to compensate for it, or repair the damage . Thus policies such as the prevention of disease and crime or energy conservation are neglected . With further advancing industrialisation, the problemsolving capacities of this professional sector may become more
NUCLEAR POWER limited at the same time as the production of `problems' increases . The further promotion of industrialisation in general, and certain cul-de-sac technologies in particular, thus leads to incalculable ecological and social effects . To keep the system going more industrialisation will have to take place, requiring `faustian bargains' 58 of which nuclear power is only one . The `green' movement of today is a sign that not everybody is resigned to this development . 139
Industrialism as a social system has created powerful ideologies to legitimate its development . Resistance to industrialism has historically taken many forms . In the early stages of the industrial revolution the working population, driven from the land by enclosure and suffering from the appalling conditions in the new industrial towns, often had the desire to go back to the country and work the land independently . 59 Another source of resistance to industrial development in Brtain has been the landed gentry, whose protest in the late 19th century led to the establishment of the alkali inspectorate, still the backbone of British pollution control . 10 The Luddite movement, alternative land communities and the socialism of William Morris are other examples of antiindustrialist stances . Such movements have long been discredited by 'marxist' authors as obsolete and reactionary . But with hindsight, some of their aims merit far more serious consideration . 61 All these early forms of resistance were carried out by people who had not yet been absorbed in industrialism or who were in positions marginal to or outside production and industry . The working classes soon lost their `back to the country' desires, although the rambling movements of the late 19th and early twentieth century in the north-west of England clearly demonstrate their basic dissatisfaction with the environmental conditions of industrial towns . 62 There was certainly resistance in some sectors against reorganisations of the labour process but they largely remained marginal and did not anywhere approach the destruction of that process . 69 This must be seen as one major dilemma of the labour process approach : it comprehensively explains how labour becomes more and more fragmented, workers atomised, its chances of political disruption minimised, and so forth . But it shows hardly any way out of it in the form of successful protest or resistance . Labour process theoreticians might hope that the experience of being subjected to political control through the labour process might create an incentive to resist . But the theory itself would perfectly explain why such action is not forthcoming . The very process of control removes the preconditions necessary for such resistance to be expressed .
Forms and social bases of resistance
CAPITAL & CLASS 140 Looking at the modem stages of industrialism, it should not surprise us that resistance again forms in social sectors marginal to the production sector . In the US, France and Germany the farming populations around prospective nuclear sites, who feared the further industrialisation of their area, the destruction of their economic base and way of living, took up the struggle with stiff local resistance . It was the forceful suppression of such action by police forces in France and Germany which made nuclear power a political issue there and led to a significant involvement by the left . In Britain, local resistance has not been forthcoming to the same extent, simply because the number of new nuclear power installations in the 1970s was very limited . Only at Torness and later at Luxulyan did significant local opposition arise, but in both cases an escalation of the conflict was avoided by the authorities ." Apart from the rural population directly confronted with nuclear installations, anti-nuclear protest is mainly carried out by sections of the population outside the production sector. As surveys of members of environmental groups have shown, the majority of them come from the non-productive service sectors such as education, the arts and health . 65This is, however, not only a characteristic of the environmental movement but also of the other main movements outside the trade union movement . The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, for example, recruited its members from exactly the same social base ."' Another group outside the direct control of industrialism are the unemployed . They might be expected to protest about purely economic issues rather than environmental issues, or, more likely, fall into passive agony interrupted by occasional destructive action . The German àlternative' movement, however, has succeeded in involving unemployed people in alternative projects of various kinds . The unemployed seem to have played a major role in struggles for the maintenance of cheap housing . They have thus become part of the `green' movement fighting a whole range of issues ." The àlternative' and `green' movements thus have their social bases where the social control of ìndustrialism' is weakest . In my view, they cannot be characterised as `new working class' as Spence suggests . He does not make the vital distinction between , new workers' in the `productive' state sector, who obviously have internalised the values of 'super-industrialism' and those outside the `productive' sector who have chosen to avoid direct subordination to its stringent rules, 68 or whose relative freedom from such subordination has allowed them to perceive and act on the `destructive' impacts of 'super-industrialism .' The new, alternative technologies will not be developed
NUCLEAR POWER and disseminated as àdditions to the technological store' but only after new resources are set free by terminating technologies and their organisational support . In short, a new form of Luddism is required '69 which is geared to dismantling the results of previous `socialist' state-interventionist policy . Previously, socialist theory has recognised a need to dismantle complete industrial sectors only in the case of the military-industrial complex understood as an àbuse' of technology . Such an understanding is too narrow and has to be extended to other sectors of a `peaceful' nature with similar destructive potentials . If resistance to cul-de-sac technologies should become part of a socialist strategy, then the view of `nationalised industries' has to change dramatically . If, as Offe quite rightly suggests, it is `state interventionism' which at least in some countries is the prime protagonist of 'super-industrialism', then some creations of this interventionist policy will have to be dismantled . Considering the social base of the `green' movement, what are the chances that they will be politically successful? Spence . has suggested that `these new workers . . are vital to capitalist development . ' 10 This is, in my view, a misjudgement . As analyzed above, the new movement only emerged as a result of certain social sectors not being directly subordinated to the laws of equivalent exchange . At the same time, they are in a marginal position as regards capitalist development, and therefore do not pose a significant threat of disruption . Furthermore, significant parts of the àlternative' movement are directly dependent on the welfare state . There can be no illusion that the so-called 'alternative economy' is viable on its own : it depends, firstly, on direct state subsidies in the form of grants ; secondly, on indirect subsidies in form of social-security payments ; and thirdly, on the economic well-being of the `non-productive service sector' which provides the large majority of its consumers ." This situation obviously puts the `green' movements in a rather difficult position . On their own, they are unlikely to be able to reach the fundamental transformation of society they deem to be necessary . Martin Spence's central point is that there should be a coalition between the new and the old social movements ; the green and the trade union movements . Such a demand is not new but is nevertheless of undiminished topicality . In Britain, Dave Eliott and SERA are veteran campaigners for such action." In France the CFDT has been successfully involved in environmental and anti-nuclear struggles . In Germany such views have also been put forward frequently and a special group Aktionskreis Leben (Action Group Live) was set up to promote trade union discussion on the nuclear power issue . How successful have these attempts been so far? In Germany the unions have taken and
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CAPITAL & CLASS 142 maintained a thoroughly pro-nuclear attitude . The Àktionskreis Leben' did not succeed in stimulating major intra-union discussion on nuclear power and employment . Their work was seriously hampered by the very hierarchical internal union structure, given the German Federation of Labour leadership's firm control of union policy ." The Federation went as far as to support a mass pro-nuclear rally in Dortmund in 1977 in response to previous anti-nuclear demonstrations in Brokdorf . Particularly noteworthy is the German government's success in winning the support of the coal miners for its policy . The Social Democrats adopted a policy of `first coal, then nuclear' . The SPD was only prepared to accept further nuclear expansion if additional energy demand could not be met by coal . The Social Democratic/Liberal government of Northrhine-Westfalia, where the main German coal resources are situated, declared a temporary ban on nuclear stations to protect the interests of the coal industry . Thus both the coal miners and the whole trade union movement were assured that nuclear expansion would not be carried out at the expense of existing energy sectors, and this made them loyal supporters of the government's general pro-nuclear stance . The trade unions were also the main force inside the SPD supporting the party leadership in their conflict with the party's left wing demands for a halt to nuclear development" . In France, the communist union CGT and the moderate socialist union FO are both staunch supporters of nuclear power . But the predominantly socialist union CFDT has voiced strong criticism of the nuclear programme . The CFDT favours nuclear energy in principle, but is critical of the size and the implementation of the programme . The CFDT have even participated in a common front with ecologists on several occasions . In 1979, a joint petition with Friends of the Earth and other groups was signed demanding a nuclear moratorium"' . Why is it that such a close association between the CFDT and the ecologists is possible in France? First one has to note the CFDT'S ideological background : it is a 'left-socialist' union with strong `syndicalist' tendencies favouring a 'socialisme autogestionnaire', i .e . a socialist society with self determination for all factories and social and political units . It is opposed to the traditional French centralism and has been strongly influenced by the ideas of May 1%8 76 . Secondly, the French ecologist movement has very strong counter-cultural and left-wing tendencies . The French Friends of the Earth, for example, understand themselves as `socialists' in the broadest sense and demand fundamental social changes" . Thus, to the CFDT in France than they are to any union in Britain the environmentalists are ideologically far closer . The German environmental movement may be rather leftist, too, but there is
NUCLEAR POWER no trade union partner like the CFDT available to it . Thirdly, health and safety problems have led to a series of industrial conflicts . Besides many white collar workers in the public sector the CFDT also organises many employees of the nuclear industry . Appalling safety conditions at the La Hague reprocessing plant did much to raise the issue . Strikes were held in La Hague, and also at a number of nuclear power stations, when it was planned to start operating these plants despite cracks detected in the pressure vessel . These actions were partly undertaken jointly with the CGT . 78 In the case of the CFDT, involvement in the nuclear industry has not, as in other countries, enlisted their unequivocal support of nuclear power . Their concrete experience of the nuclear industry has led the CFDT to scepticism and a critique of the pace and content of the French nuclear programme . Nuclear power as such is nevertheless not rejected . However, the nuclear issue seems to be pushed only by a limited number of union leaders with the rank and file largely uninterested . According to Lucas, Most CFDT members are just `fed up' with the issue, 7 B and anti-nuclear activists have expressed their disillusionment with the total lack of involvement of the CFDT membership in anti-nuclear actions ." In Britain, the trade union movement is far more fragmented than in France and Germany ; less hierarchical than in Germany and organised primarily according to crafts and economic sectors rather than by ideology as in France . SERA has been quite successful in bringing discussions on energy and employment into the unions, and quite a number of them have passed critical motions at their conferences . The TUC since its first statement on nuclear power in 1955 has, however, never waned in its support for the nuclear industry . The TUC's energy policy making body, the Fuel and Power Industries Committee, has quite often been more 'pro-nuclear' than the government of the day . In 1977, the TUC Committee objected to the Labour Government's call for a public inquiry to look into Windscale . The TUC's estimates of future energy demand have also been higher than Department of Energy's figures . 81 In 1980, Congress passed a motion demanding more nuclear generation capacity than even the Conservative government was planning to build . The most important issue about nuclear energy in union politics has been the question of the reactor choice . The majority . of unions have traditionally been hostile to the LWR and in favour of the British AGR though the TUC is now less firm on this position . In 1974, it rejected the LWR in favour of the British Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHwR) . But by 1978, the TUC Fuel and Power Industries' Committee had dropped its
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CAPITAL & CLASS 144 opposition to a PWR, a position confirmed in July 1979 shortly after the Conservative government had taken office . Most British unions, however, appear to be opposed to the PWR . Looking at the unions which have adopted a general anti-nuclear stance, one can identify quite clearly the predominance of unions representing the `non-productive service sector' . The main exception is the coal miners' union . This is in marked contrast to the German situation . The leaked cabinet minutes of December make it quite clear that nuclear power is seen in a favourable light because of its detrimental effects on the miners' power . Taking over from SERA, the Anti-Nuclear Campaign (ANC) decided to make the trade union campaign its main political action . Since its foundation in 1979, there have not been many successes . With the exception of the NUM, no other major union seems to have been won for the anti-nuclear cause . It also appears that the involvement of the anti-nuclear unions in movement activities are rather limited . Except for passing motions at conferences and sending a delegate to the odd meeting, there does not seem to have been any significant input into the anti-nuclear movement from the trade union side . It is doubtful whether the Sizewell Inquiry will bring a change . The ANC opted to form a broad-based anti-PWR campaign based on the unions, and succeeded in involving unions which would be inclined to accept an AGR, such as the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) . That such a strategy could create problems became apparent at the Anti-Sizewell Rally in November 1982 when a TGWU representative felt compelled to distance himself from the general anti-nuclear (rather than anti-PWR) tone of the rally . Looking at a number of other countries, there is evidence that unions can under certain conditions, take a very active stance . In a country with no nuclear industry and a long-standing anti-nuclear activist as Vice-Chairman of the biggest individual trade union, one might expect the chances of the trade union movement committing itself to an anti-nuclear stance to be high . This happened in Ireland, where John Carroll and his Irish Transport & General Workers Union (IT&GWU) started a major initiative to oppose plans for a first nuclear power station at Carnsore Point ." Other experiences in Australia and Canada suggest that unions can play a major role in disrupting the nuclear industry . Canadian longshoremen repeatedly refused to handle nuclear material to, or from, Argentina where Canada has just finished constructing a CANDU nuclear power station . The campaign `No Candu for Argentina' did, however, only oppose nuclear cooperation with Argentina on human rights grounds." In Australia trade unions played a major role in the camDownloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012
NUCLEAR POWER paign against uranium mining . Starting in May 1976 with a one day strike by the Australian Railway Union, there have been a number of actions by trade unions to stop mining development . From 1979 to 1981, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) imposed a ban on any uranium shipment . While this union action in close co-operation with environmental groups constituted a major threat to the Australian uranium mining industry, the campaign suffered a major set-back when the ban was lifted in 1981 . This occurred in the context of fierce inter-union disputes between mining workers opposing the ban and transport workers and dockers providing the back-bone of the anti-nuclear action on both environmental and political grounds ." To, assess the possible role of trade unions in an antinuclear campaign, the following factors have to be taken into account . Unions will more likely become active in this field if the existing nuclear industry in the country is small ; the union members themselves are either economically threatened by, or are not dependent on nuclear development ; if the cause is limited, to say, opposition on human rights grounds or against a particular reactor line ; and if the ideological stance of the union is noncommunist, grass roots based, left-socialist . Under certain conditions and for limited purposes, successful co-operation between the anti-nuclear and trade union movements could thus be expected . Nevertheless, a number of features central to the trade union movement make it, in my view, highly unlikely that in their present form they will play a dominant role in the social transformations considered necessary to stop 'cul-de-sac technologies' and `super-industrialism' . First of all, it is the task of trade unions to defend the interests of their members . Once certain industries have developed, trade union activity will try to secure the continued existence of that sector as source of employment for its members . Thus, trade unions play a highly conservative role in the sense that they contribute to cementing existing industrial structures. It thus cannot be expected that anti-nuclear positions will gain any major support from trade unions significantly involved in the nuclear sector . Secondly, the trade union movement in the main accepts the fundamental logic of industrialism . Looking at the trade unions with a critical attitude to nuclear power, they are predominantly located outside the mainstream production sectors, in much the same way as the other social bases of anti-nuclear protest" . Thirdly, there are tremendous difficulties in capitalising on the support given by trade unions to the anti-nuclear movement . That support seems to have consisted mainly in passing motions at conferences . In most countries, there does not seem to have been any significant
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CAPITAL & CLASS 146 involvement of trade unionists in anti-nuclear activities as such . The only tangible effect might come from influencing Labour Party policy and getting an anti-nuclear motion passed at congress . But that, in itself, would far from guarantee a change in Labour Party policy, and even less the policy of a Labour government . Furthermore, there is no prospect of any strike action forthcoming on this issue which could off-set the weak bargaining power of the anti-nuclear movement . Fourthly, the only effective trade union resistance to new industrial development has taken the form of protecting an established economic sector challenged by new developments . There is a long-standing British tradition in that area which may have contributed significantly to the fact that Britain is perhaps further away than other countries in material terms, although not ideologically, from a 'super-industrial' society . Also in the nuclear case, Britain is perhaps the only country where such resistance has become of major importance in the form of the mine workers' stance . Resistance would be expected from the mine workers more than from any other sectors of the trade union movement as the Conservative government has obviously conceived its nuclear programme with the miners in mind in an attempt to deprive them both of their economic and political standing . The miners are one, relatively homogenous group with a tradition of radical action unlike the disparate nature of the other trade unions concerned. Nevertheless, strike action seems to be highly unlikely for the time being . The union might objectively be better off in the long run arranging a deal on the lines of their German counterparts . Their resistance is also only geared against one particular 'cul-de-sac technology', and they are generally in favour of other forms of 'super-industrialism' . There seems to be relatively little concern for the environmental effects of coal development and use (eg Belvoir, acid rain) . In Britain the anti-nuclear movement is certainly on a sticky wicket : it has not received the same public attention as on the continent ; there have been far fewer local conflicts ; and in general fewer opportunities to raise the issue of nuclear power politically . But even numerically strong movements such as those in France and Germany have not achieved any significant involvement of trade unionists in antinuclear activities as such . On the whole, therefore, I share Alain Touraine's assessment that, at present, the trade union movement will not be the movement through which the `green' forces could hope to reach their major aims ." This state of the working class movement must not be seen, however, as its own fault or responsibility . Instead, it is in itself an expression of the power of industrialism, tying the worker at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, maintaining an to the machine, forming and 2012 Downloaded from cnc.sagepub.com
NUCLEAR POWER ideology, and in many cases, turning to open job blackmail in playing off environmental against employment issues ." Martin Spence is far from uncritical of the structures and predominant pro-nuclear attitudes of British trade unions . He is advocating alliances of the anti-nuclear movement with those unions and unofficial elements of the trade union movement sympathetic to the anti-nuclear movement . I also consider this to be highly desirable and fruitful . But I feel that Spence overemphasises the contribution of such a strategy for the anti-nuclear movement . I am afraid that the movement could lose part of its identity and strength if it concentrates too much on winning over the labour movement at the present time . Spence misjudges the role of the French Socialists and the German Social-Democrats on nuclear energy ." Both parties fudged the issue thoroughly, and in both countries the anti-nuclear movement has been left only with feelings of resentment and disillusionment . The German `Greens' and their recent success in the election are the direct result of the Social-Democrats being unable to accommodate the movement's demands . I do not see any reason why a British Labour government should not handle the British anti-nuclear movement in much the same way, particularly as the British movement is far weaker than its continental counterparts . It would be equally dangerous, in my view, if the antinuclear movement were to confine itself to following the path of changing, short-term coalitions on single issues . The ANC is perhaps a sad example of how an organisation originally founded to spearhead a new forceful movement degenerates into just one of many pressure groups . Although I am only too well aware of other factors which have contributed to this decline, (the rise of CND, for example), I wonder whether the almost exclusive concentration on one particular approach - trade union work - has not been counterproductive . There could have been other approaches which would have allowed it to remain a fairly broad based body ; perhaps focusing, more on local and regional antinuclear activities and developing into a national mouthpiece of them . Once an independent `green' movement has constituted itself one might think of 'red/green alliances' to carry out common policies . But the possibility of any political impact would greatly be reduced if the movement gets co-opted too early in its development . The emphasis, in my view, should therefore lie on building the movement's identity and independence . There can, however, be no illusions about the strength of even a fully independent movement . It must be careful not to overstretch its resources . There is no immediate alternative recipe to overcome this weakness . The only lesson which seems appropriate is cautiousDownloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012
147
CAPITAL & CLASS 148 ness . Radical transformations, which on one hand seem necessary, could on the other hand seriously damage or even destroy the movement as such . Serious social crises would most certainly lead to the imposition of authoritarian measures leaving the movement no channels of political activity . The movement has not got the power to physically prevent-the installation of nuclear power stations with direct action, as the experiences of the numerically far stronger French and German movements have shown . An electoral strategy could bear fruits as in Germany, but such successes do not seem likely in Britain for the time being . The movement has not many resources to create the opportunities for itself, it has to take what comes along and make the best out of it .
Conclusions
Nuclear power is a 'cul-de-sac technology' promoted by a nuclear-industrial complex entrenched in energy policy-making and dependent on state support . Such support is forthcoming where, in the state's perception, the further promotion of nuclear power is necessary to secure the national long-term energy security politically . At the same time, capitalism is unlikely to be totally dependent on nuclear power for its further survival, and might indeed be better off without it . As a cul-de-sac technology, nuclear power has been determined in its very nature by capitalist relations of production which cannot be off-set by other forms of using the technology under different political conditions . As such, nuclear power is, however, only a symbol of a new phase of capitalist development to a super-industrial society which involves the incalculability of environmental and social impacts of individual technologies as well as super-industrialism as a whole to the extent that major destructive forces might be set free . The anti-nuclear and environmental movements have to be seen as central opposition movements to this development, having the objective function of emancipatory social movements whatever their own actual understanding of their role . The òld' social movements are primarily oblivious to or actively supportive of superindustrialism', although some important opposition, either in form of opposition to individual technologies challenging established industries (NUM) or as part of a more general consideration of social progress (CFDT) can be observed . What are the consequences of this analysis for the relation of new and old social movements? The differences between trade union movements and the ecological movements cannot be overlooked . I would follow Touraine in identifying the anti-nuclear movement as Downloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012 a potential
NUCLEAR POWER 149
Photomontage : Peter Kennard
new social movement reflecting a new political cleavage . While Touraine et al identify `technocratic power' as the adversary of this movement and the transfer to `post-industrial society' as its aim . 90 I would prefer to substitute `super industrialism' for the former and ècological socialism' for the latter. More important is, however, the analytical point of taking the `green movement' seriously as an independent movement in its own right which cannot readily be subsumed under the labour movement . In view of the above discussion of nuclear technology and environmental problems, it would in my view be totally wrong to demand from the environmental movement a closer involvement with the labour movement in its present form if that implied renouncing central arguments and concerns . This seems to have
CAPITAL & CLASS 150 been the dominant approach taken by leftist critiques of the ecologists," and Spence partly stands in that tradition . In his view, the anti-nuclear movement displays many reactionary, romanticist facets . One cannot deny that some of the ideological constructs used to explain environmental problems might be characterised in these terms, but these criticisms do not apply to the basic aims of the movement or the social function they are playing . The ecologists are an ideologically very mixed group of people, ranging from eco-fascists to, say, eco-communists, but their objective function in social development has to be the central evaluative concept . In this context, there is in my view no point in criticising the ideological shortcomings of environmentalism from the seemingly high position of marxist insights . Much of this has been generated by the failure to create a political mobilisation of significant numbers of people with such insights . This has seen marxists trying to convert all movements springing up without having quite the `right' consciousness . It would, however, be far more significant if ecological problems were taken seriously, even if that entailed a total revision of standard marxist concepts . Instead, ecological problems are re-formulated so as not to upset familiar concepts of analysis . The overwhelming prominence of the production sector in marxist analysis, for example, leads Spence and others to the attempts to derive environmental problems from traditional capital-labour conflicts at the workplace . Such an interpretation, as I have tried to show, is not adequate . It furthermore cements the existing political division of labour with, say, the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science almost exclusively concerned with environmental hazards at the workplace, and other mainstream environmental organisations exclusively concerned with environmental hazards everywhere else but the workplace . To remove that division, both sides have to take the problems concerned seriously . Spence's argument for an incorporation of an anti-nuclear programme into a general socialist programme does not suffice, if socialism still remains a synonym for Big Industry and 'super- industrialism .'
Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments and help I have received from a wide range of people including the editorial committee of CAPITAL & CLASS . I am particularly grateful to Martin Spence for his comradely counter-critique of an earlier draft of this paper, and to Sonia Liff for her careful editing of the text . Downloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012
NUCLEAR POWER 1 For example, E .H .S . Burhop, `The peaceful applications of atomic energy', The Marxist Quarterly, Vol 1, No . 2, April 1954, pp.8293 . 2 Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold, The atomic bomb, London etc . : Butterworths 1979 . 3 Friedrich Munzinger, Atomkraft: Der Bau ortsfester and
beweglicher Atomantriebe and seine wirtschaftlichen and technischen
Notes and references
151
Probleme, 3rd ed ., Berlin etc : Springer 1%0, pp .259-260 . 4 Harold Orlans, Contracting for atoms : A study of public policy
issues posed by the Atomic Energy Commission's contracting for research, development and managerial services, Washington, DC : Brookings
Institution 1967 . 5 Ulrich Rodel,
Forschungsprioritaten and gesellschaftliche Entwicklung: Studie uber die Determinanten der Forschung and Technologiepolitik in den USA, Frankfurt/Main : Suhrkamp 1972, pp . 147,
169-170 . 6 Irvin C . Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, Light Water: How the nuclear dream dissolved, New York : Basic Books 1978, pp . 19-20 . 7 Harald Glatz, `Zum Durchsetzungsprozefi von Kerntechnologien', Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenshaft, Vol . 9, No . 1, 1980, pp .81-91 . 8 On the nuclear development in the us, see in particular Wendy Allen, Nuclear reactors for generating electricity : us Development from 1946 to 1963, Santa Monica Ca : RAND Corporation 1977 ; Frank G Dawson, Nuclear Power: Development and management of a technology, Seattle, Wa . : University of Washington Press 1976 ; Philip Mullenbach, Civilian nuclear power: Economic issues and policy formation, New York : Twentieth Century Fund 1963 ; Lee C Nehrt, International marketing of nuclear power plants, Bloomington Ind . : Indiana University Press 1966 ; Robert Perry et al., Development and commercialization of the light water reactor, 1946-1976, Santa Monica, Ca : RAND Corporation 1977 ; Harold Orlans, op. cit. (ref. 4) ; Irwin C Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, op . cit. (ref 6) . 9 Irwin C Bupp and Jean Claude Derian, op . cit (ref. 6), p .40 . 10 Robert Perry et .al., op . cit . (ref.8), p .35 11 This point is well made by Irwin C Bupp, and Jean-Claude Derian op .cit., (ref 6) . 12 Op . cit., pp .74-75 . 13 Op .cit., p .50 ; Peter deLeon, Development and diffusion of the nuclear power reactor: A comparative analysis, Cambridge, Ma . : Ballinger 1979, p .217 . 14 Irwin C Bupp, and Jean-Claude Derian, op.cit., (ref 6), pp .7475 ; Robert Perry et al ., op.cit. (ref 8), p.80 . 15 Robert Perry et al ., op. cit. (ref 8), p .46 . 16 Man Lonnroth, and William Walker, The viability of the civil nuclear industry, New York/London : Rockefeller Foundation/Royal Institute of International Affairs 1979 . 17 William Walker, Ùtilities and energy conservation : Implications of recent developments in utility policy in the United States', in : Facing the Energy Future: does Britain need new energy
CAPITAL & CLASS 152 institutions? London : Royal Institute of Public Administration 1981, pp .61-69. 18 Barry R . Weingast, `Congress, regulation, and the decline of nuclear power', Public Policy, Vol . 28, No . 2, Spring 1980, pp .231-255 . 20 On the German nuclear development, see Helga Bufe and Jurgen Grumbach, Staat and Atomindustrie : Kernenergiepolitik in derBRD, Cologne : Pahl Rugenstein 1979 ; Christian Deubner, `The expansion of West German capital and the founding of Euratom', International Organization, Vol 33, No.2, Spring 1979, pp .203-228 ; Otto Keck, Policymaking in a nuclear program : the case of the West German fast breeder reactor, Lexington, Ma : Lexington D .C . Heath & Co . 1981 ; Herbert Kitschelt, Kernenergiepolitik : Arena eines gesellschaftlichen Konfliku, Frankfurt/New York : Campus 1980 ; Lutz Mez, Àtompolitik- Der unaufhaltsame Aufstieg zur Atommacht?' in : Hans-Karl Rupp (ed .), Die andere Bundesrepublik : Geschichte and Perspektiven, Marburg/Lahn :/Guttandin & Hoppe 1980, pp . 195-222 . 21 On the French nuclear development, see Bertrand Goldschmidt, The atomic adventure : its political and technical aspects, Oxford etc. : Pergamon Press 1964 ; Bertrand Goldschmidt, La complexe atomique : Histoire politique de 1'energie nucleaire, Paris : Fayard 1980 ; Dominique Saumon, and Louis Puiseux, Àctors and decisions in French energy policy', in : Leon N Lindberg (ed .), The energy syndrome, Lexington, Ma . : Lexington Books, D .C . Heath & Co . 1977, pp .119172 . ; N . J . D . Lucas, Energy in France: Planning, politics and policy, London : Europa Publications 1979 ; Laurence Scheinman, Atomic energy policy in France under the Fourth Republic, Princeton, N .1 ., : Princetown University Press 1965 . See the excellent study by Laurence Scheinman, op .cit (ref.21) 22 On the British nuclear development, see C . M . Buckley and R . 23 Day, `Nuclear reactor development in Britain', in : Keith Pavitt (ed), Technical innovation and British economic performance, London and Basingstoke : Macmillan 1980, pp .252-266; Duncan Burn, The political economy of nuclear energy, London : Institute of Economic Affairs 1967 ; Duncan Burn, Nuclear power and the energy crisis: Politics and the atomic industry, London and Basingstoke : Macmillan 1978 ; Margaret Gowing (assisted by Lorna Arnold), Independence and deterrence: Britain and atomic energy 1945-1952, 2 vols ., London and Basingstoke : Macmillan 1974; Roger Williams, The nuclear power decisions: British policies 1953-78, London : Croom Helm 1980 . 24 J .H . Cheshire et al ., Ènergy policy in Britain : A case study of adaption and change in a policy system', in Leon N . Lindberg (ed .), The energy syndrome, Lexington, Ma . Lexington Books, D .C . Heath & Co . 1977, pp .33-62 . Philip Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall, Manchester : 25 Manchester University Press 1980, p . 125 . Downloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012 Howard J . Rush, Gordon MacKerron, and John Surrey, `The 26
NUCLEAR POWER advanced gas-cooled reactor : A case study in reactor choice', Energy Policy, Vol . 5, No . 2, June 1977, pp . 95-105 . 27 Marian Radetzki, Uranium : A strategic source of energy, London : Croom Helm 1981 . 28 Man Lonnroth, and William Walker, op . cit . (ref. 16) . 29 . Martin Spence, `Nuclear capital', Capital and Class, No . 16, Spring 1982, pp . 5-40 (here : p .20) . 30 Claus Offe, Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates, Frankfurt/Main : Suhrkamp 1972 ; Claus Offe, "Crises of crisis management" : Elements of a political crisis theory', International Journal of Politics, Vol . 6, No . 3, 1976, pp . 29-67 . James O'Connor, The fiscal crisis of the state, New York : St . Martin's Press 1973 ; Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation crisis, London : Heinemann 1976 . 31 Peter de Leon, op. cit. (ref. 13), p . 229 . 32 See, for example, Joachim Hirsch, Wissenschaftlich-technischer 153
Fortschritt and politisches System : Organisation and Grundlagen administrativer Wissenschaftsforderung in der BRD, Frankfurt/Main :
Surhkamp 1970 ; Joachim Hirsch, Staatsapparat und Reproduktion des Kapitals, Frankfurt/ Main : Surhkamp 1974 ; Ulrich Rodel, op. cit . (ref. 5) . 33 Claus Offe, op .cit . (ref. 30), pp . 124-125 (my translation). 34 Martin Spence, op . cit . (ref. 29), pp . 12-14 . 35 Roy Lewis, `Nuclear power and employment rights', Industrial Law Journal, Vol . 7, No . 1, March 1978, pp . 1-15 ; see also Dave Elliott et al, The politics of nuclear power, London : Pluto Press 1978 . 36 David Elliott, Energy options and employment, London : Centre for Alternative Industrial and Technological Systems, North East London Polytechnic 1979 . 37 David Pearce, Employment and energy futures in the ux ;An analysis of the GAITS scenario, Aberdeen : Department of Political Economy, University of Aberdeen 1979 . This point of view is put forward, for example, by Helga Bufe, 38 and Jurgen Grumbach, op .cit. ref.20 . For a presentation and thorough critique of this view, see 39 Stefan Lob, 'Atomenergie - Zur Struktur eines gesellschaftlichen Konflikts', in Heinz Hulsmann, and Robert Tschiedel (eds .), Kernenergie und wissenschaftliche Verantwortung, Kronberg/Ts . : Athenaum 1977, pp . 123-154 . 40 Lutz Mez, and Wolfgang Rudig, Energiediskussion in Europa :
Berichie and Dokumente uber die Haltung der Regierungen und Parteien in der Europdischen Gemeinschaft zur Kernenergie, Villingen : Neckar Verlag
1979 . 41
of work
Harry Braverman, Labor and monopoly capital : The degradation in the twentieth century, New York : Monthly Review Press 1974 .
For analyses in this vein, see Harley Shaiken, 'Neue 42 Technologien and Organisation der Arbeit', Leviathan, Vol . 8, No . 2, August 1980, pp . 190-211 ; CSE Microelectronics Group, Microelectronics: Capitalist technology and the working class, London : CSE Books 1980.
CAPITAL & CLASS See, for example, Feliks Gross, `Some social consequences of 43 atomic discovery', American Sociological Review, Vol . 15, No . 1, February 1950, pp . 43-50 . 44 BSSRS Politics of Energy Group, Nuclear power - The rigged debate, London : British Society for Social Responsibility in Science 1981 ; Les Levidov, `Review of "The Nuclear State" (by Robert Jungk)', Head and Hand, No . 4, Spring 1980 . Les Levidov, `Controlling nuclear technology' in : Gari Donn (ed), Missiles, Reactors and Civil Liberties : Against the Nuclear State, Glasgow, Scottish Council for Civil Liberties, not dated, pp . 34-37 . 45 BSSRS Politics of Energy Group, op . cit. (ref . 44), pp . 23 . 46 Les Levidov, op . cit. `Review of "The Nuclear State"' (ref. 44) . 47 Martin Spence, op . cit . (ref. 29), p.12 . 48 Otto Ullrich, Technik and Herrschaft vom Hand-werk zur verdinglichten Blockstruktur industrieller Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/Main : Suhrkamp 1977 ;Otto Ullrich, Weltniveau : In der Sackgasse des Industriesystems, West Berlin : Rotbuch Verlag 1979 . Norbert Kapferer, `Small is beatuiful - eine ortlose Utopie? 49 Leviathan, Vol . 6, No . 2, July 1978, pp . 314-323 . Hassenpflug has pointed out, that `science and technology' are 50 according to Marx not synonymous with `productive forces' . Science and technology can have both `productive' and `destructive' effects . See Dieter Hassenpflug, 'Marxismus and Industriekritik : Otto Ullrichs "Weltniveau" and der marx' sche Begriff der Industriekritik', PROKLA 40 (Vol . 10, No. 3), 1980, pp . 114-130 . Stefan Lob, op . cit. (ref. 39), p . 135 ; 51 Lutz Mez, 'Der atom-industrielle Komplex', in : Hans-Christian Buchholtz, Lutz Mez, and Thomas von Zabern, Widerstand gegen Atomkraftwerke, Wuppertal : Peter Hammer Verlag 1978, pp . 11-25 : Erich Kitzmuller, 'Wachstum der Produktiv- oder Destruktivkrafte?' in Lutz Mez, and Manfred Wilke (eds), Der Atomfilz: Gewerkschaften and Atomkraft, West Berlin : Olle & Wolter 1977, S . 77-91 . Amory B . Lovins, Soft energy paths : Towards a durable peace, 52 Harmondsworth : Penguin 1977 . Volmar Lauber, Ècology politics and liberal democracy', 53 Government and Opposition, Vol . 13, No . 2, Spring 1978, pp . 199-217 . 54 Thies Gleiss, and Winfried Wolf, Der Atomverein nach Harrisburg, Frankfurt/Main : isr Verlag 1980, p . 93 . Wolfgang Sassin, Ènergy', Scientific American, Vol . 243, No . 55 3, September 1980, pp . 107-117 . Wolf Hafele, 'Hypotheticality and the new challenges : The 56 pathfinder role of nuclear energy', Minerva, Vol . 12, 1974, pp . 303-322 (here : p .317) ; Cp . also Alvin M . Weinberg, `Science and trans-science', Minerva, Vol . 10, 1972, pp . 209-222 . 57 Martin Janicke, Wie das Industriesystem von seinen Mif3sstaiiden
profitiert, Kosten and Nutzen technokratischer Symptombekampfung : Sicherheit, Opladen : Unnweltschutz, Gesundheitswesen, innere
Westdeutscher Verlag 1979 .
NUCLEAR POWER 58 Alwin M . Weinberg, `Social institutions and nuclear energy', in : John Francis, and Paul Albrecht (eds .) Facing up to nuclear power, Edinburgh : St . Andrew Press 1976, pp . 21-39 . 59 E .P . Thompson, The making of the English working class, Harmondsworth : Penguin 1968, pp . 253-256 . Maurice Frankel, The alkali inspectorate : The control of 60 industrial air pollution, London : Social Audit 1974 . 61 Raymond Williams, The Country and the City, London : Chatto & Windus 1973 . 62 See Howard Hill, Freedom to roam : The struggle for access to Britain's moors and mountains, Ashbourne, Derbyshire : Moorland Publishing Company 1980 ; Paul Salveson, Will you come o' Sunday mornin? The 1896 battle for Winter Hill, Bolton : Red Rose Publishing 1982 . Craig R . Littler, The development of the labour process in 63 comparative perspective : A comparative study of the transformation of work organization in Britain, Japan and USA, London : Heinemann Educational Books 1982 . 64 Wolfgang Rudig, `Public protest against nuclear energy : Some international comparisons' Unpublished paper, Department of Liberal Studies in Science, Manchester University 1982 . 65 Stephen Cotgrove, Catastrophe or cornucopia : The environment, politics and the future, Chichester etc : Wiley 1982, pp. 18-20 . 66 Frank Parkin, Middle class radicalism: The British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1968 . 67 Joseph Huber, Wer Boll das alles aifdern : Die Alternativen der Alternativbewegung, West Berlin : Rotbuch Verlag 1980 . 68 Andrew Duff, and Stephen Cotgrove, `Social values and the choice of careers in industry', Journal of Occupational Psychology, Vol . 55, 1982, pp . 97-107 . 69 Langdon Winner, Autonomous technology: Technics-out-ofcontrol as a theme in political thought, Cambridge, Ma ./London : MIT Press 1977, pp . 329-331 . 70 Martin Spence, op . cit . (ref. 29), p . 36 . 71 Joseph Huber, op . cit . (ref . 67) . Dave Eliott et al ., op. cit . (ref. 35) . 72 Manfred Wilke, Die Funktionare, Munich : Piper 1980 . 73 Lutz Mez, and Manfred Wilke, (eds) . Der Atomfilz : 74 Gewerkschaften and Atomkraft, West Berlin: Olle & Wolter 1977 ; Jorg Hallerbach (ed), Die eigentliche Kernspaltung: Gewerkschafren an Burgerinitiativen im Streit um die Atomkraft, Darmstadt/Neuwied : Luchterhand 1978 ; Herbert Kitschelt, op.cit. (ref. 20) . Tony Chafer, `The anti-nuclear movement and the rise of 75 political ecology', in : Philip G . Cerny (ed .), Social movements and protest in France, London : Francis Pinter 1982, pp . 202-220 . 76 Christel Hartmann et al., 'Grundstrukturen gewerkschaftliche Politik in Frankreich', in : Werner Olle (ed .), Einfuhrung in die internationale Gewerkschaftspolitik, Vol. 2, West Berlin : Olle & Wolter 1978, pp . 8-48 . 77 Claude-Marie Vadrot, L'icologie, histoire d'une subversion,
1551
CAPITAL & CLASS Paris : Syros 1978, pp . 184-192. . 78 J S Eisenhammer, `The French Communist Party, the General Confederation of Labour, and the nuclear debate', West European Politics, Vol . 4, No . 3, October 1981, pp . 252-266 . 79 N .J .D Lucas, op cit . (ref. 21) p . 173 . Alain Touraine et . al., Anti-nuclear protest : The opposition to 80 nuclear energy in France, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press/Paris : Maison des Sciences de l'Homme 1983 . 81 Colin Sweet and Anna Coote, Ènergy : Frank Chapple's fantasy', New Statesman, Vol . 102, No . 2644, 20th November, 1981, pp . 6-8 . Wolfgang Rudig, British political parties and trade unions on 82 nuclear power: A documentation of motions and resolutions, West Berlin : Institut fur Zukunftsforschung 1980 (mimeo) ; David Elliott, Trade union policy and nuclear power (Technology Policy Group Occasional Paper No . 3), Milton Keynes : Technology Policy Group, Open University 1981 . 83 John F . Carroll and Petra K . Kelly, (eds) Nuclear Ireland? Dublin : Brindley Dollard, 1980 ; Lothar Meyer and Petra Kelly, `Trades Unions and Nuclear Power : Ireland-Germany-Australia', New Ecologist, No . 3, May/June 1978, pp . 95-97 . Thijs de la Court, Deborah Pick and Daniel Nordquist, The 84 nuclear fix: A guide to nuclear activities in the third world, Amsterdam : World Information Service on Energy (WISE) 1982, p .27 . 85 Joseph Camilleri, `Nuclear controversy in Australia : The uranium campaign', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol . 35, No . 4, April 1979, pp . 40-44 . Lothar Meyer and Petra Kelly, op . cit ., (ref. 83) ; Financial Times, 9th December, 1981 . 86 Cp . Michael Pollak, `Die westeuropaischen Gewerkschaften im Spannungsfeld technologiepolitischer Entscheidungen : Das Beispiel der Auseinandersetzung urn die Atomenergie', Journal fur Sozialforschung, Vol . 21, No . 2, 1981, pp . 123-140 . 87 Alain Touraine et al., op .cit . (ref. 80) . 88 Richard Kazs and Richard L . Grossman, Fear at work : Job blackmail, labor and the environment, New York : The Pilgrim Press 1982 . 89 Martin Spence, op. cit. (ref . 29), p . 19. 90 Alain Touraine et al., op cit . (ref. 80) . 91 Critiques of the us anti-nuclear movement (and responses to them) cover similar ground as the debates reported by Alain Touraine et al . for France and often touch on a similar note as Spence, s . Jeff Pector, `The nuclear power industry and the anti-nuclear movement', Socialist Review, No . 42, November/December 1978, pp. 9-35 ; Marcy Darnovsky, À strategy for the anti-nuclear movement : Response to Pector', Socialist Review, No . 49, 1979, 119-127 ; Stephen Vogel, `The limits of protest ; A critique of the anti-nuclear movement', Socialist Review, No . 54, November-December 1980, pp . 125-134 ; Liv Smith, `Labor and the no-nukes movement', Socialist Review, No . Downloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at1980, pp . 135-149 . 54, November/December UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012

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Capitalism and nuclear power: A reassessment

>> Version of Record - Jan 1, 1983 What is This?

Capitalism and nuclear power: A, reassessment

The development of nuclear technology

CAPITAL & CLASS

CAPITAL & CLASS

NUCLEAR POWER 125

Nuclear power as `specifically capitalist technology'

NUCLEAR POWER 133

The `labour process' approach

The `Ullrich' approach

CAPITAL & CLASS 36

Forms and social bases of resistance

NUCLEAR POWER 149

Photomontage : Peter Kennard

Notes and references

Institution 1967 . 5 Ulrich Rodel,

Westdeutscher Verlag 1979 .

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Capital & Class http://cnc.sagepub.

Capitalism and nuclear power: A reassessment

>> Version of Record - Jan 1, 1983 What is This?

Capitalism and nuclear power: A, reassessment

The development of nuclear technology

CAPITAL & CLASS

CAPITAL & CLASS

NUCLEAR POWER 125

Nuclear power as `specifically capitalist technology'

NUCLEAR POWER 133

The `labour process' approach

The `Ullrich' approach

CAPITAL & CLASS 36

Forms and social bases of resistance

NUCLEAR POWER 149

Photomontage : Peter Kennard

Notes and references

Institution 1967 . 5 Ulrich Rodel,

Westdeutscher Verlag 1979 .

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Capital & Class-1983-Rüdig-117-56

Capital & Class-1983-Rüdig-117-56