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Aristotle and The Earlier Peripatetics 1
Aristotle and The Earlier Peripatetics 1
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i-
HENRY W. SAGE
1891
DATE DUE
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book
is in
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text.
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AEISTOTLE
AND THE EARLIEB PEEIPATETICS
VOL.
I.
WORKS BY
DR.
:
E.
ZELLER.
History of
PEE-SOCEATIC SCHOOLS
Crown
8vo. 30.
Greek
Philosophy from the Earliest Period to the time of Socrates. Translated from the German by Sarah F. Alleyne. 2 vols.
SOCEATES
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the
SOCEATIC
O. J.
SCHOOLS.
Reichel, M.A.
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Translated Goodwin.
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STOICS, EPICUBEANS,
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German by
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OUTLINES
OP
THE
HISTOEY
OF
GEEEK
F.
PHILOSOPHY.
German by Sarah Alleyne and Evelyn Abbott. Crown 8vo. 10*. Gd.
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LONGMANS, GEEEN,
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'
ARISTOTLE
AND
BY
B. F. C.
COSTELLOE,
AND
M.A.
J.
H.
MUIEHEAD,
M.A.
I.
CO.
VV
,,,!,'..U'
AH
rights reserved
s..
AA>y7/
//
TO
TBANSLATOBS' NOTE.
The
following translation embraces Part II. Div. II.
Bduard
Zeller's
work on
ment.'
sanction,
and
time
by
Messrs.
Longmans
as
translations
of
the
Mr. Costelloe
and
for
notes
up
to
and
Mr. Muirhead
for the
middle
owing
to
an accident
for
which the
them occur
Tiii
TRANSLATORS' NOTE
Zeller's notes
German
text
its
value.
The
treatise
is
readers which
is
The student
which
is
in fact
and the
so logical and
that
it
has
CONTENTS
OP
CHAPTER
Year of his
Return to
Alexander,
racter, 39.
Athens, teaching and research, 25. Coolness of 31. Flight from Athens and death, 33. Cha-
CHAPTER
II
aeistotle's writings
A. Consideration of the particular
Works seriatim
The Catalogues,
Letters and poems, 53. Dialogues and earlier Rhetoric, 72. Metaphysics, writings, 55. Works on Logic, 64. Natural Philosophy the Material Universe and Inorganic 75. Ethics and Politics, 97. Nature, 81. Organic Nature, 87. Theory and History of Art, 102.
48.
:
Exoteric, 106.
III
Scientific, 123.
CHAPTER
Fate of Aristotle's Works, 137.
ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER IV
STANDPOINT, METHOD, AND DIVISIONS OP THE PHILOSOPHY OP ARISTOTLE
Aristotle
165.
and Plato,
Aristotle's
161.
Their Difference,
Formalism, 177.
tical, Poietic,
and
Empiricism, 173. Dialectic, 171. Division of his Philosophy Theoretic, Practheir subdivisions, 180. Logic, Metaphysics,
Method:
CHAPTER V
LOGIC
Scope of Logic, 191. Nature and Origin of Knowledge, 194. Development of Knowledge, 196. Problem of the Science of Knowledge, 211.
Universal elements of Thought the Concept, 212. Essence and Accident, Genus, Differentia, SpeciesT2l3r" Identity and Difference, kinds of Opposition, 223. The Judgment, 229. Affirmation and Negation, 230. The Quantity of Judgments, 232. Modality, Conversion, 236. The Syllogism, 236. The Figures, 238. 233. Rules and Fallacies of Syllogism, 241. Proof its problem and conditions, 243. Limits of Proof Immediate Knowledge, 245. Axioms and Postulates, 248. The Principle of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, 251. Induction, Dialectic or Probable Proof, 252. Defects of Aristotelian InducDefinition, 265. Classification, 270. tion, 255. Summa Genera,
: : ;
271.
CHAPTER VI
INTRODUCTORY
INQUIRIES TOUCHING PHYSICS
ARISTOTLE'S
META-
The Categories what they are and how they The Categories in Detail, 281. Significance
: :
the Categories, 288. First Philosophy as the Science of Being its Problem, 290. Its Possibility, 292. Fundamental Questions of Metaphysics, and their treatment by Earlier Philosophers the chief problem of Metaphysics in Aristotle's time and his mode of presenting it, 295. Criticism of previous attempts at its solution the Pre-Socratics, 297. The Sophists, Socrates, and the Minor Socratic Schools, 312. Plato 313^ The Ideas, 314. The Ideas as Numbers, 319. The Ultimate Principles of Things, the One and the original Material 321. The value of Aristotle's criticisms on Plato, 326.
: :
AEISTOTLE
AND THE
EAELIEE PEEIPATETICS
CHAPTER
I
The
and circumstances of the three great philosophers of Athens show a certain analogy to the character
lives
of their work. As the Attic philosophy began by searching the inner nature of man and went on from this beginning to extend itself over the whole field of
and scope
existence, so
we
was at
first
to pass
citizen, but a citizen who feels no desire beyond the borders of his city. Plato is also an Athenian, but the love of knowledge takes him to
pure Athenian
foreign lands
and he
is
connected by
many
personal
Aristotle owes to
his sphere of
and
he spends his youth and a considerable part of his manhood out of Athens, chiefly in the rising Macedonian
kingdom
VOL.
stranger, not
I.
is
as a
of the
ARISTOTLE
city,
ties
from giving
and impartial
1
The
birth of Aristotle
of Ari-
extant are (1) Diogenes, v. 1-35 (far the most copious) (2) Diontsius of Halicarnassus, JBpist. ad Ammreum, 727 sq. (3) 'Apurr. pios i. 5, p. teal (TvyypdfifiaTa (wtov, by the Anonymns Mfenagii (4) another sketch of his life, known to us in (a) the Bios first three forms printed in the Aldine ed. of Arist. 'Opp. 1496-98 (which is there ascribed to Philoponus, elsewhere to Ammonius, but belongs to as the neither), here cited Pseudo- Ammonius (ox Amm.); (i) the Life published from the Codex
stotle's life
;
now
Aristotelia i. 1-188; BrANDIS, Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, i. pp. 48-65 Grote's Arist. (1872), i. 1-37, and Grant's Arist. (1877) pp. 1-29. Stahr discusses (p. 5 sqq.) the lost works of ancient writers
;
which treated
of Aristotle's life.
We
and
Marcianusby Robbein 1861, cited as Vita Marciana (or V. Mare.) (e) the Life cited as the Latin, Ammonius, 'preserved in an ancient
;
which approaches translation, closely to the Vita Marciana than to the Pseudo- Amnwni%s
more
(5) 'Havxlov WLiKritriov irepi tov 'ApiaroreXovs (6) SUIDAS, sub All of these, voce 'ApurroTeKris. except (46), are to be found in Buhlb, Arist. Opp. i. 1-79. Westermann's appendix to CoVitce bet's Diogenes, and his Seriptorum (at p. 397) also contain (3) and (4a) Robbe, op. cit. gives (4i) and (4c). ROSE {Arist. Lib. Ord. 245), before the publication of (ib), ascribed the archetype of (4) to the younger Olymitself
; ; ;
According to Apollodorus Diog. 9 no doubt on the basis of the statement (ibid. 10, Dionys. and Ammon.) which may be accepted as the safest fixed point as to the date of Aristotle's life, that he died in the archonship of Philocles (01. 114, 3), about sixty-three
2
apiid
years old (erwv rpi&v irov Kal I^Koira, or more exactly, as in Dionys., rpia Trpbs roTs e^Koyra
t7)). Dionysius agrees, but erroneously talks of Demosthenes as three years younger than Aristotle, whereas he was born in the same year, or at most in the year before (in the beginning of 01. 99, 1, or end of 01. 98,
fridxras
4); vide
Stahe
i.
30:
Gellius'
statement (JV. A. xvii. 21, 25) that Aristotle was born in the seventh year after the freeing of Rome
384. 1
many
possession of
all
whose people were no doubt in full Greek culture. 3 His father Nicomachus
in 384 B.C., follows from the accounts as to his death above, and would also follow from our information as to his residence at Athens, if the figures are to be taken strictly (cf p. 6, n. 3,
.
from the Gauls also agrees, since that event is referred to the year
390 B.C. Soalsothe and the Ammon. Latin, p. 12, assert that he was born under Diotrephes (01. 99, 1) and died sixty-three years old under Philocles. An otherwise
364A.TJ.C., or
V,
Mare.
p. 3,
unknown
writer,
Eumblus
(ap.
at Plato's death; so that, if we put his exact age at 36 and in prefer- bring down Plato's death to the to follow Rose (p. 116) ring this account, since his next middle of 347 B.C., his birth words, irihv ax6vnov ereXiinnaev, would still fall in the latter half of 384 B.C. It is, however, also sufficiently show his lack of trustIn fact, as the possible that his stay in Athens worthiness. manner of Socrates' death is here did not cover the full twenty years. 2 transferred to Aristotle, so is his So called because most of age also ; possibly by reason of its cities were colonies of Chalcis the spurious Apologia ascribed in Eubcea. Stagira itself was originally colonised from Andros, to Aristotle (v. p. 35, n. 3, infra) and its parallelism with butperhaps (cf. DiONTS.wi supra) the Platonic Apologia of Socrates. received a later contribution of But apart from the probability second founders from Chalcis. of this explanation, Eumelus is In 348 B.C., it was, with thirtycompletely displaced by the one other cities of that district, agreement of all the other testi- sacked by Philip, but was aftermony, including that of so careful wards on Aristotle's intercession a chronologist as Apollodorus. restored (v. p. 24, infra). Vide A reliable tradition as to the age Stahr, 23, who discusses also of theirfoundermusthave existed the form of the name (2rdyeipos, in the Peripatetic School. How or 'Srdyetpa as a neuter plural). could all our witnesses, except We do not know whether Arithis one unknown and badly- stotle's family house (mentioned informed writer, have come to in his will, ap. Diog. 14) was agree upon a false statement of spared in the destruction of the town or was subsequently rebuilt. it when the truth could have been 3 Bernays (Dial. Arist. ii. 65, easily ascertained 1 1 That he was born in the 134) calls Aristotle a 'half Greek,' but Grote (i. 3) and first half of the Olympiad, or
;
Diog. 6), asserts, on the other hand, that Aristotle lived to be seventy but there is little reason
For if, at seventeen, he came to Athens and was with Plato for twenty years, he must have been thirty-seven years old
infra).
* 2
ARISTOTLE
was the body-surgeon and friend of the Macedonian King Amyntas and it is natural to suppose that the father's profession long hereditary in the family must
' ;
have influenced the mental character and education of the son, and that this early connection with the Macedonian
Court prepared the way for the employment of Aristotle
in the same Court at a later time.
points, however,
On
neither of these
We
may
also
Grant (p. 2) rightly maintain against him that a Greek family in a Greek colony in which only Greek was spoken, could keep
their nationality perfectly pure. Aristotle was not an Athenian, and though Athens was his philosophical home, traces can yet be found in him of the fact that his political sense had its training elsewhere ; but he was as truly a Hellene as Pythagoras,
whose surroundings and training were so closely similar as those of Schelling and Hegel, or of Baur and Strauss. Vide DiOG. i. (quoting Herm1
ippus),
Dionys., JPs. Amm., V. Mare., Ammon. Latin., and Suidas. The family of Nicomachus, according to these authorities, traced its descent, as did so many medical families, to Asclepius.
gives
this.
The
The three recensions of the Pseudo-Ammonius repeat this same statement as to the family
of Aristotle's mother.Phaistis, but erroneously ; for Diogenes tells us she was a Stagirite by birth, and Dionysius says that she was a descendant of one of the colonists from Chalcis. This connection might account for the mention of a country house and garden at Chalcis in the testa-
boldt
(in his letter to Wolf, WerTte, v. 125) find in Aristotle is doubtless to be connected not so much with the place of his birth as with the characteristics of his generation and his individual The full-born bent of mind. Athenian Socrates exhibits traits far more singular and seemingly
Ari-
ment (Diog. 14). The statement in Suidas, sub voce Ni<i,uaxos, that a person of that
name
had written six books of 'IaTpi/c& and one book of $u<n/ra refers,
according to our text, not to the
father of Aristotle (cf Buhle, 83, Stahb, 34), but to an ancestor of the same name; though no
.
5
tell
we cannot
resulted
how
it.
how long
relations
or
what personal
from
ment
method of his
education. 2
The
we have
as
Ammonius 3
in later
life
he was a
child,
and
to
own daughter
7
;
in marriage.
etc.,
cf
BUHLE,
10
for
</>4tJs)
4
sq.
Robbb.
He
have
In his will (Diog. 16) Aristotle mentions his mother and orders a monument to be erected to her. Pliny (H. Nat. xxxv. 10, 106) mentions a picture of her which Aristotle had painted by Protogenes. There may have been manyreasons why his father was not mentioned in the will. 5 Apparently a relative who had emigrated to Stagira, for his son Nicanor is called Srayetpirris and oixetos 'Api<TTor4\ovs (Skxt.
to
be placed
credible) we do not know how old Aristotle was at his father's death. It is
mation
is fully
that Aristotle was for three years a pupil of Socrates and that he afterwards accompanied Alexander to India 1 (Ps. Amnion, p.
44, 50, 48, V. Marc. 2, 6, Ammon. Lot. 11, 12, 14). 7 Aristotle in his will(DioG. 12) directs that Nicanor is to marry
doubtful
human
or animal
ARISTOTLE
but
it
growth. 1
2 our His entrance into the Platonic School gives us eighteenth In his earliest reliable data on the subject.
year Aristotle came to Athens when she is grown up he charges him to take care of her and her brothers, as ko! irar^p
his daughter
;
circle of
av
koX aSeK(t>6s
portraits
and Nicanor's mother, which he return of the exiles at the Olymhad projected, should be com- pian games of 324 b.c.(Dinaech. pleted, and that if Nicanor Adv. BemosU. 81, 103, Diodob.
completed his journey successfully (v. infra), a votive offering he had promised should be set up in Stagira. These arrangements prove that Nicanor was adopted by Aristotle, and that
Aristotle owed special gratitude to Nicanor's mother as well as to Proxenus, apparently similar to that he owed his own mother, of whom a similar portrait is ordered. If we assume the truth of the story in the Pseudo-Ammonius it will most naturally ex-
of Nicanor, Proxenus,
Nicanor of Stagira whom Alexander sent from Asia to Greece the to announce his consent to
Geotb,
And the vow in probably relates to a journey to Alexander's headquarters where he had given an account of his mission and been detained on service in Asia. It is probably the same Nicanor who was governor of Cappadocia under Antipater (Arrian apud Phot.
p. 14). Aristotle's will
Clod. 92, p. 72, a,
made away
plain the whole. Dionysius notes that Nicomachus was dead when
Aristotle
came
to
Plato.
It
whom he had done good service on sea and land (Diodob. xviii. 64' sq. 68, 72, 75). The dates agree exactly with
Cassander, for
of Pythias, as see p. 20, n. 3, infra. 1 know nothing of the age at which Aristotle came to Proxenus, nor of the manner or place of his education, for it was probably not at Atarneus to
might appear
what we know
whom
We
grown up but this does not follow. If Aristotle was a child at his father's death, and Proxenus a young man, the latter might have left a son twenty or twenty-five years younger than Aristotle, and some ten years
;
see above, p.
2
5, n. 5.
A silly
story in Ps.
Amm. 44,
Latin. 11
Ammon.
op.
younger than Theophrastus (then at least forty-seven) whom Pythias was to marry in case of
Delphic Oracle.
3
Apollodob.
Se
irapa$o.\tiv
IIAtiTwyi,
5ia-
which he continued
to belong for
4rav
of the statements of Dionysius (p. 728) that he came to Athens in his eighteenth year, of Diogenes
6, that he came eirra:ai5eKeT775, and of the three recensions of the Ammonius Life that he came
not know, moreover, when Eumelus lived, or from whom he got his information. If, as is possible, he be Eumelus the Peripatetic,
eirTaKaiSeica
gtuv yevdfievos.
We
whose Ilepl tjjj apxaia*; quoted by a scholiast to ^Eschines' 'fmarch. (ed. Bekker, AbA. d. Berl. Aliad. 1836, Bist.-pHl. AX 230, 39; cf. Rose, Arist. Libr. Ord. 113), he would
Ku/j-cpStas is
have also the chronology of Dionj sins, who places his arrival
in the archonship of Polyzelos (366-7 B.c. 01. 103, 2), while the statement (V. Marc. 3, Ammon. Latin. 12) that he came in the archonship of Nausigenes (01. 103, 1) takes us to the middle of his seventeenth year instead of the completion of it. Eusebius in his Clvronicle knows that he arrived at seventeen, but places the event erroneously in 01. 104, 1. The statement of
above shown, can he merit our confidence. As to Epicurus and Timseus vide p. 9, n. 1, infra. The
Vita Mavaiana finds it necessary to refute the story that Aristotle came to Plato in his fortieth year.
The Latin Ammonius reproduces this in a still more absurd form, to which he adapts other parts of his story for he says that it was thought by many that Ari;
3 sq.) with the accoun * of Epicurus and Timteus as co his dissolute youth (of. mfra), but without deciding between the two accounts. We have already
Bumelus (apud Diog. 6) that he was thirty years old wher he met Plato is combined by irote (p.
stotle remained forty years with Plato. His translation xl annis immoratus est sub Platone probably means that the text of the archetype was /i/ %ti\ ye-yovbs 1\v inrb TlXdruvi, or p! erav &v ivBlerpi&ev, &c. If the latter be sup' '
seen
how
little credit
attaches to
posed, the mistake might well have arisen by the dropping out
in the translator's MS. Plato himself was probably at the moment absent on his
Eumelus' account of Aristotle's age and manner of death (p. 2, n. 2) but the two, statements are connected and fall together, for,
;
of
&>v
1
second
Sicilian
journey
p.
(vide
Zbllbb, Plato,
memory of a fellow-student, Eudemus of Cyprus (p. 11, n. 4, infra), who went to Sicily with
in
B.C. and was killed there, it follows that Aristotle, if he were thirty when he came to
Stahr (p. 43) suggests that the abovementioned statement that he was
32).
Dion in 357
We do
three years with Socrates and after hisdeath followed Plato(Ps. Amm. 44, 50, V. Mare. 2, Ammon. Lat. 11, 12, Olympiod. in Oorg. 42) arose from a misunderstanding of this circumstance. The archetype may have contained the
"
ARISTOTLE
1
It
would have
if
we
could have
known
in detail something of this long period of preparation, in which the foundations of his extraordinary learning
and of his distinctive philosophical system must have been laid. Unhappily our informants pass over all the important questions as to the movement and history of his mental development in absolute silence, and entertain us instead with all
life
manner of
he
first
and character. /One of these writers had heard that 2 Another earned his bread as a quack-doctor.
his distress
went
ut
or as in &tj &koo\
2
Amm.,
Toirip
abvsarai
Ev. xv.
iv
a8<Sjou
tb,s
Sipas Tvxo&<ras
K\e!<rat.
ttjs riKixtas
The same is more fully cited from Timseus by Poltb. xii. 7, and
Suidas, sub
s
oUv
Tfl
Isoerates.
Kaddnep $t\o\v 'Eir/zcoupoj ec ray hrenfieviukTuv iiri<rroAp, v4ov /ihv hvra Ko.Tcupa.yeiv avrbv t))v narpQav oiaiav, lireiTa Se <hr! rb OTparevetrtlai avvzSiaQai, kokSs 5e icpdrrorr* iv roirois rb <papfiaKowoihe~iv ixeeiv, eirtira avairewrapiivov toS n\iravos vepiwdrav irao-i, Tapa\a$ilv avrbv ( according to Athen. vapa$a\e7v
re,
irepl
by
Aristocles. 1
Greater weight
of.
same
credible writers who say that Aristotle devoted himself from his eighteenth year to his studies at Athens, but the other story is in itself most improbable. If Aristotle were no more than the ffotpiffr^s Bpaabs eu^ep^s irpoirerfys that Timaeus calls him, he might
oi^i/iaflfc also.
But when we know that apart from philosophical greatness, he was the foremost man of learning of his time, and was also famous as a writer for his graces of style, we must think it unparalleled and incredible that his
thirst for learning should have first arisen at thirty after a wasted
Diodor.
rus
v. 1).
So also of Epicu-
we know that there was hardly one of his philosophic predecessors or contemporaries (not excepting Democritus and Nausiphanes, to whom he. was
under large obligations) whom he did not attack with calumnies
and depreciatory criticism (cf. Diog. x. 8, 13 Sext. Math. i. 3 sq. ClC. JST. B. 1, 33, 93, 26, 73 Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. I. p. 946, n). Statements by such men, betraying as they do a tone of hatred, must be taken with great distrust and their agreement is no
; ; ;
;
youth, and that he could then have achieved attainments hardly credible as the work of a long lifetime. All we know of Aristotle from his writings or otherwise impresses us with a sense of personal superiority incompatible with these tales of his youth not to speak of the argument that if he had squandered his property he could hardly have found means to live at Athens. Grote (cf p. 6, n. 3, supra) does too much honour to Epicurus and
.
Timseus when he treats their testimony as balancing the other. They are probably naked and
baseless lies,
and therefore we
guarantee, for it is possible that Timseus copied Epicurus, or (as we may better think) that Epicurus copied him. Not only, however, have we against them the consensus of many far more
ought not even to infer from them with Stahr (p. 38 sq.) and Bernays (Aoh. d. Brest. Hist.phil. GeseMschaft, i. probably Aristotle
193), that
practised
10
ARISTOTLE
accused Aristotle of ingratitude to his Others accuse him of annoying Plato by his
dialectician
master. 1
showy
manner, and
his jeering.
Others relate that even in Plato's lifetime he attacked his doctrines and set up a school of his own in oppo-
and even that on one occasion he took advantage of the absence of Xeuocrates to drive
sition to the Platonic, 3
Neither Aristocles nor any of the trustworthy witnesses mention medical practice, and the two who do, refer to it in such a way as only to raise suspicion while Aristotle apparently reckons himself among the 'laymen,' i^ Texrirai, in medicine (Divin. 1,
;
DlOG. 2
airsffTii
6h TlXdruvos
i'ceivov
%ri Trepi6vTOS-
Hare
<pri(rli>
tV
463, a. 6).
1
iv. 9,
and Helladius
279,
p. 533,
cup.
Phot.
Cod.
p. 77,
b.
Similarly
XV. 2, 3
tgu
. .
avrov
.
.
/3t/3Aiaj yj/ei/Se.
(pduriccov
jit})
TMaruvL
fiifSKia
irapayeviffBat
reXevravTi rd re
avTov Sicupdelpai. Neither His of the charges is important. absence at the time of Plato's death, if that is true, may have had an easy explanation ; Plato, indeed, is said to have died quite unexpectedly (cf Zellbb, Plato, The injury to Plato's p. 35). books, if it means a falsification of the text, is an obvious and
.
absurd calumny.
Oar. Gr. Aff. v. 46, says Aristotle often attacked Plato while he was yet alive Philop. Anal. Post. 54 a, ScJwl. in Arist. 228, p. 16, that he had especially opposed his and master's Ideal Theory ; Augustine, Civ. Dei. viii. 12, that he had established even then a numerous school. 1 This occurrence is related by our sole authority (J5lian, V. H. iii. 19, cf. iv. 9) in this way that when Plato was over eighty, and his memory was failing, Aristotle on one occasion,
:
Theodoret,
see,
though it is keen and not always just, is no indication of any personal misunderstanding, since to Aristotle it meant only natural and impersonal polemics. Besides Aristocles, Diogenes (ii.
also rejects 109) Eubulides' charges as a calumny.
Xenocrates Speusippus
being
ill,
band
of his started a debate with Plato, in which he drove the old man into a corner with such rude pertinacity that Plato withdrew himself from thehalls of the Academy into his own garden, and it was
; :
11
opposition to his
own 'by
strangers.'
All these
data,
however,
could
not
possibly
first
be
true,
for
chronological
reasons in the
we
possess
Probably, however,
XV. 2, 2
for'
rls
8*
av
-TreitrQeiij
toTs
fievois
iv tqJ
tt)
f3(cp
rov n\dravos
Kal rrj
airoZ'npi.ia
peats and extends. For Aristides the Latin Ammonius (11) substitutes Aristocles but the Greek Pseudo- Ammonius (p. 44 sq.) limits itself to the remark: ov yap en uvtos rod JlXaWtavos aVTCpKob'6[ii](rev avrip rb AvKewv & 'Ap., &s tlvgs inroXafi^dvovcrt. 2 Cf Stahr, i. 46 sqq., not refuted by Heemann, Plat.
;
.
iv
yap
ir\tii/7i
<pi)fflv
iiravlffTaa'Gat Kal
fietv
avTw rivas
irepliraTov
avroiKoSoevovs
irepl
When
last
his
Tavra
Among
the
ivioi
was
Aelian (iv. 9), who in reference no doubt to the words of Aristoxenus, says of Aristotle ayrtpKob'Sfjt.'rio'ev dbr$ [Plato] 5iaSo also the Vita Marrpifiiiv. ovk apa. avTtpKoS6fi7j(rev ciana, 3
;
under 24 (cf. p. 2, n. 2, swpra, and Zbllbe, Plato, p. 30 sq.) is it (apart from other questions) likely that he could so early head a school against a master who was then at the height of
his
this are (a) Aristotle published several Platonic essays (cf. infra and Zbllbe, Plato, p. 26). For many reasons (especially perhaps because of their notable departure
:
'Ap.
(TxoX^v
&>s
'Api(n61-evos
Kal
'Apt;
TCpwTOS
ffTeiBTjs
i(TVKO<p(ivTT]0'
Strrepov rjKoKoiOtjo'ev
re-
324 sq. (Dind.), who, however, does not refer to Aristotle by name any more than Aristoxenus, whose account he re-
12
ARISTOTLE
statement did not
refer
that
to
Aristotle
at
all.
Academy
accounts
which show that Plato at that time had long removed his school from the open spaces of the Gymnasium of the
Academia
lieve of a
to his
own
gardens.
But besides,
it
ascribes
to Aristotle a
man of otherwise
:
known
to
journeys. (b~) The Eudemus of Aristotle (cf. infra) was written on the lines of Plato's Phcedo, and Aristotle was probably still in the Platonic School when he wrote it, which was long after the third journey, since it is in memory of a friend who -died 352 v B.c. (o) Olympiodorus (in Gorg. 166, in JAHN'S Jahro. xiv. and Supplements, 395, Bebgk, Lyr. Or., p. 504) has preserved some verses of Aristotle's
In the corrupt last line, Bernays (Rh. Mus. N. F. xxxiii. 232) reads /uowa|.
to Socrates;
but this seems unlikely. 1 Aristocles (ut supra) says expressly that Aristoxenus always spoke well of Aristotle, against which testimony, founded on a knowledge of his book, the hint
to the contrary in Suidas 'Api<rro|. is of no weight. The word irepfirctTos
eA(W
eucre/UeVs
K\eivbv
(piK'tys
KeKpairlTjs
SdtreSov
ffeiivqs
1
l8p6ffaTO
fitofi6y
[Plato]
ivapyws
otKeltp re @lq> Kal fie96$oi<ri \6ycov,
as
ayaOos
re
Kal
evSaifiuy
a^ia
was used of other schools besides Aristotle's ; cf. Epicurus, cited p. 8, n. 3, supra, and the Index Merculanensis, 6, 5, where it is used of Speusippus, and 7,9, of Heraclides. The rivets of Aristoxenus may have referred to Heraclides himself; cf. Zbller, Plato,
2
p. 30, n.
As to the
5,
ibid. p. 553.
iii.
41
cf.
i.
55) doubts
Zbllbe, Plato,
p. 25, n.
13
and been kept at a distance by him, we could bring many statements which imply that the relation between the two philosophers was of an entirely different kind. 2
had
so
We
may
which in any case are insufficiently attested, and we need take no notice of sundry other stories, whose inaccuracy
is
apparent. 3
which negative, not only ^Elian's story and the other similar tales, but the whole theory that there was before
1
\ovs~)
of
this in the fact that Plato does not mention Aristotle, to which circumstance even Stahr,
p.
mount the
And Socratie dialogues 1 probably all Plato's works, except the Lams, were written bein
fore Aristotle
all.
2
teacher's chair while Plato lived, and that this was the origin of the name Peripatetic' There is another theory (Philopon. vt swpra, 35, b, 2,
'
David,
ibid.
ibid.
b,
24, a,
6,
Ammon.
came
to Athens at
Philoponus, Aetern.Mundi
fiydffQri, ats
ayxwoias 7 HiaTpipTJs vn
aOat
:
vovs ttjs
ai/Tov irpoffayoptve-
Ps. Ammon. 44, says PlatocalledAristotle's house olnos cf also Zellbe, avayvdiffrov To the same Plato, p. 659. tradition belong the very doubtful story cited in Zblleb, Plato, p. 26, n., and the account of the altar dedicated with a laudatory inscription by Aristotle to Plato
and
the Platonic school; that when Aristotle and Xenocrates took over that school after Plato's death, or rather that of Speusippus, Aristotle's followers were called Peripatetics of the Lyceum and the others Peripatetics of the Academy ; and that, in the end, the one school were called Peripatetics only, and the other Academics. The origin of this theory is doubtless Antiochus, in whose name Varro in ClC.
onhis death (Amm. 46,PHILOPON. i.q.v., Sclwl. in Arid. 11, b, 29), which arose, no doubt, out of a mistranslation of the Elegy to
Acad.
similar story
Eudemus, p. 11, n. 4, supra. 8 Such is the idea mentioned by Philoponus {lit svpra, 11, b, 23 sqq., where in 1. 25, lege 'ApuTTore-
17 tells an exactly which indicates that the whole is only an invention of that Eclecticism.developed by Antiochus, which denied that there was any essential difference between Plato and Aristotle.
i.
4,
14
ARISTOTLE
any breach between him and
his scholar.
Plato's death
remained with Plato twenty years, which plainly could not be true if, although he lived for that time in Athens, he had separated himself from
assert that Aristotle
2 time he founded no school of his own. So even in later years and in passages where he
is
and he uses language as to the founder of that school and his own personal relation to him such as plainly shows how little the sentiment of respect and affection 4 for his great master had failed in his mind, even where
their
philosophic
in the
sharpest way.
Platonist
1
Cephisodorus
Vide p.
n.
3,
and
7, p.
p.
8,
n. 1, supra.
'
Up. ad
ItttA
Amm.
Kal
i.
733:
had drawn
Eth. N. i. 6kov fiekrtov
Siairopyircu
down
4,
upon him,
.
trvvriv
TlKdruvt nal
7tyoifij/os
iruv
init.
rb Se
ica6-
ttrcos tiriffietyairBai
Kal
(TxoA^y
3
iras
A-e-yerai,
Kaiirep
itoltik&s a'ipeffiv.
ywop.hi\s
ilffayayetv
5iA
rb
<pl\ovs
8<S|eie
ko.1
ra
eiSri. elj/ai
&vSpas 5' av
iirl
cf.
effrt
7
Ka&
lead
oiis Tp6novs Stiicvvfiw Stl ra etSri Kara t^v inr6\Tityiv %v elyal <pap,ev toj ISeas, and
i.
Xous
f&i\Tiov
Sew
the
like, Metapli.
9,
990, b, 8,
11, 16, 23, 992, a, 11, 25, c. 8, 989, b, 18; iii. 2, 997, b, 3, c. 6, 1002,
Kal rci olKeia avatpeiv, &K\(as re Kal (pi\o<r6<povs ovras- ap.<t>o?y yap ivroiv $l\oiv iaiov irpoTip,av aA^fleiay.
ttjs
(ruTTjplq
ye
a\Tjdetas
tV
b,
14;
cf.
992, a, 10.
of
Zellek, Plato, p. 512; cf. also ZeiAee, Ph. d. Gr.i. p. 971, as to Aristotle's own view of his duty to a teacher. a Numbn. apud Bus. Pr. Er.
Cf.
xiv. 6, 8.
15
Ideas,'
Macedonia. 1
Again,
it is
and immediately thereafter left the city for several years, presumably for no other reason than that then
for the first
time the
tie
that
time broken.
Finally,
we
that Xenocrates
it is
and
probable
But in view of the known loyalty of Xenocrates and his unbounded reverence for Plato, it is
not to be supposed that he would maintain his relations
visit to
indeits
pendent a mind as
Aristotle's
20, n. 3, infra
'A/caSryiefas
2
obviously alluding to him the cases cited, Zbllbk, Plato, p. 364, n. and notes on
he
is
(cf
p.
585,
and
later
pasi
is
p.
whereas
in
Speusippus
named
to
parallel cases. This probably indicates not ill-feeling, but rather a desire to avoid the appearance of personal conflict
with
beside
one
who
was
teaching
. .
him
at Athens...
16
ARISTOTLE
went on he began to doubt the unconditional validity of the Platonic system and to lay the foundations, of his own and that he perhaps even in these days laid bare many of the weak points of his teacher with the same
:
uncompromising criticism which we find him using later on. If a certain difference between the two men had developed out of such relations, or if Plato had not been
1
more ready than many others since, to recognise in his scholar the man who was destined to carry forward and
to correct his
wonderful.
Yet that any such difference actually arose cannot be proved, and cannot even be shown to be very probable 2
:
while
we
Aristotle brought on
intentional offence.
any open breach by ingratitude or The same facts make it very imIf he had
own during
so,
done
his
friendly relations
exactly at the
left
moment when
the
1 On Even in the books Philosophy' (Arist. Fragm. 10, 11. p. 1475), apparently written before Plato's death, he had combated the Ideal openly Theory, and in the same treatise (Fragm. 17, 18) had maintained the. eternity of the world. 2 We have no right to ascribe to Plato and his circle of friends the later ideas of school-orthodoxy, in any such sense as to suppose that the master could not tolerate the independence of such
a scholar as Aristotle. Besides, not to mention Heraclides and Eudoxus, Speusippus himself dropped the Ideal Theory, s The remark of the PseudoAmmonius that Chabrias and Timotheus prevented Aristotle from setting up a new school
against Plato is absurd. Who could hinder him, if he chose ? Chabrias, moreover, died in 358
B.C.; and Timotheus was banished from Athens for life in the f ollowingyear,beingthenaveryoldman.
;:
17
follows that
influence
of such a relation
upon his course of thought. The effect of that education on Aristotle's philosophic system disThe grateful scholar has closes itself at every point. himself commemorated the moral greatness and lofty
1
principles of the
right to praise.'
obviously not prevent Aristotle from turning his attention at the same time to
carrry
thirst for
We
may
assume that he
Athens in busy acquirement of his marvellous learning, and also that he took a keen interest in researches in natural philosophy, though Plato always treated
it
as
of secondary importance.
It
is
also possible
he was
still
member
of Plato's
he
may
breaking
up against him
as the leader of a
competing school.
We
1
in opposition to Isocrates
supra. 2 Steabo (xiii. 1, 57, p. 610) says of Hermias that he heard at Athens both Plato and Aristotle, 3 ClC. Be Orat. iii. 35, 141
Cicero seems to be without exact information] versumque quendamPhiloetetce paullo secus disoit.IUe enim turpe sibi ait esse taeere, cum barbaros: He autem, cum Isoeratem pateretwr dicere. Ita Aristoteles, cumflorere Isoeratem nobiUtate discipulorum videret, ornavit et illustravit doctrmam mutavit repente totamformam illam omiiem, rerwmque cogniprope discipl&nee sum [which tionem cum orationis exercitasounds as if Aristotle had even tione conjunxit. Neque vera hoc then a school of his own, though fugit sapientissimum regem PMlp. 12
. .
VOL.
I.
; :
18
ARISTOTLE
were no longer good and
We
have distinct
same
commencement of Aristotle's activity as a and the fact that in the writings of this time he imitated his master, both in matter and form, 2 shows
period the
writer
;
how completely he took on the impress of Plato's In time, spirit and made the Platonic methods his own.
clearly
left
Athens, Ari-
and
tion
it is
came
visibly to
lippwm, qui Tiwnc Alescwndro filio doctorem accierit. AgaiD, ibid. 19, 62, ArUst. Isocratem ipsum
lacessivit,
.
and
cf.
aerior Arist. fuit ? quis porro Isocrati est adversatns impensius ? In Tuso. i. 4, 7, Cicero assumes that Aristotle attacked Isocrates in his lifetime, which would be possible only in his first residence at Athens, for when he returned in 335-4 B.C. Isocrates was many years dead. Cf QtriNtil. iii. 1, 14 Eoque {Isocrate']
. .
. :
Bayer. Altad. vi. 470 sq. Cephisodorus, a pupil of Isocrates, wrote a defence of his master against Aristotle, full of bitter abuse v. Dionts. Be Isocr. c. 18, p. 577; Athen. ii. 60, d, cf. iii. 122, b Aeistocl. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 24, Nitd.
; ;
Spbngbl, Abh.
men,
ibid. xiv. 6, 8,
c.
Themist. Or.
xxiii. 285,
jam
seniore . . . pomeridianis Arist. prcecipere artem oratoriam ccejrit, noto qnidem illo, ut traditwr, versa ex Philocteta
schoiis
frequenter urns: altrxpbv aiair^v '\aaKfi.Ti\v [!C] 4av\4yeiv. Diog. (3) with less probability, reads aevoKpdrriv, so misplacing the story as of the time of the founding of the Lyceum. Cicero (Qffic. i. 1, 4) speaks clearly of contests between
Aristotle and Isocrates in his life (de Arist. et Isocrate . quorum uterque suo studio deleetatus contemsit alterum), and Isocrates himself, Ep. v. ad Alex. 3,
.
not prevent Aristotle from doing opponents in the Ehetoric he quotes examples from no one so readily as Isocrates, and twice quotes Cephisodorus (Mhet. iii. 10, 1411, a, 5, 23). Cf. as to the whole subject Stahe, i. 68 sq., ii. 285 sq.
justice to his
1
Spergel,
'Isokr.
und
Pla-
ton,'
Abh. d. Munch. Altad. vii. 731, and Zelleb, PA. <;.(? i 416
ii.
459, n.
z
See for proof infra. Of the Aristotelian writings known to us the greater part of the Dialogues and some of the rhetorical
19
life.
That event opens a new chapter of Aristotle's So long as Plato led the Academy, Aristotle would not leave it. When Speusippus took his place, 1 Aristotle had nothing to keep him in Athens; since he does not seem to have at first contemplated the foundation of a philosophical school of his own, for which Athens would naturally have been the fittest Therefore he accepted, with Xenocrates, an inplace. vitation from Hermias,the lord of Atarneus and Assos, 2
who had himself at one time belonged to Plato's school. 3 The prince was the intimate friend of both, 4 and they
remained three years with him. 5
Thereafter Aristotle
went
to Mytilene. 6
was
for his
own
safety,
it is
had
left
Diohys. Ep. ad
Amm.
i.
5,
who
Speusippus was teaching. a much older man, was Plato's nephew, had been brought up by him, had followed him faithfully for a long period of years, and was also the legal heir of Plato's garden near the Vcademy. Besides, we do not snow whether Plato did himself bequeath the succession or not. 2 Boeckh, Hermias,' Abh. d.
'
that Aristotle went to Hermias after Plato's death. The opposite would not follow from the charge cited from Eubulides on p. 10, n. 1 supra, even if that were tree. Strabo names Assosasthe place where Aristotle lived during this period. * Cf. p. 17, n. 2, supra. Ari,
stotle's
Anon.
'Ap.),
.'.',
was an immoral
is
impossible;
5
BoBCKH,
ibid.
137.
p.
9,
610,
and
c 2
20
ARISTOTLE
*
Pythias,
2
who was
his last-
and of
left
(see
niece.
Cf.BOECKH.iM.HO. HAKPOCRAtion, Suid. s. v. 'Epinlas, Mym. M., and Phot. Lex., call her an adopted daughter.
ayaitiiv
oZaav,
arvxivtrav fiiVTOi
aSe\<pbv oiriis.
Strabo
(lit
says
Hermias married
supra) her to
ument
Aristotle in his lifetime, which is negatived by the Letter, if genuine. Aristocl. {ibid, i, 8) says that Aristotle was accused in his lifetime of having nattered her brother to win Pythias, and also that Lyco, the Pythagorean, told a foolish story of Aristotle sacrificing to her after her death Diog. (v. 4) caps as Demeter. the sacrifice this by placing immediately after his marriage. Lucian (Eun, e. 9) talks of sacrificing to Hermias ; cf. a like hint in Athbn. xv. 697 a. 2 The Anon. Menag., Suidas,
s.
Diog. (6) says he had a mon(whose inscription he cites) erected to Hermias at A contemporary lamDelphi. poon on this by Theocritus of Chios (a witty rhetorician of the Isocratean school and local leader
3
of
anti-Macedonian politics)
is
v. 'Ap. 'Epiitas,
and Hesych.
call
noticed by DiOG. 11, Aeistocl. utsupra,&aA Plut. Be Exit. 10, p. 603; cf. Mulleb, Hist. Gr. ii. 86, and supra, p. 15, u. 1. Aristotle also dedicated to Hermias the poem preserved in Diog. 7, and Athen. xv. 695. As to Pythias, the will directs that, as she wished, her remains should be laid beside his own as no other burial-place is named, she was probably first buried at Athens, and died, there;
her his daughter, the untrustworthy Aristippus (apud Diog. 3) his concubine. Both are disproved by the fact that Hermias was a eunuch (for the statements of Suid. Hesych. and Anon.
before Aristotle's death, since the Pythias who was then not marriageable was her daughter (cf. Abistocl.,
long
Suidas and
'
Menag.
cilable with Demetr. He Moo. 293). Aeistoclbs ap. Bus. xv. 2, 8 sq. cites a letter of Aristotle to Antipater, and a book by Apellicon of Teos relating to Hermias and Aristotle, and says that
the Anon. Menag.). After her death Aristotle 'married' (eyrin*) a certain Herpyllis of Stagira, who bore him a son Nicomachus
(Aeistocl. cf. Diog. U); and though their union was apparently irregular (v. Timseus ap, Schol. in Hes. "E. k. 'H. v. 375 Diog. v. 1. ap. Mullee, Fragm
Eist.
Or.
i.
211
Athen.
xiii
589
c,
citing
21
1
young Alexander,
him in Mytilene. 5
stotle. 6
ing her a eralpa; SuiDAS and the Anon. Menag.), yet he must have treated her as his wife, and his will speaks of her with honour, provides for her, and begs his friends eiryif Aeitrflai
. . .
ut swpra. The Schol. in Arist. 23 b, 47, says Aristotle was at Alexander's Court at Plato's death, but this is obviously wrong.
2 Cf. Geiee, Alexander Arist. (Halle, 1856).
a
und
fiVtjfrOevTas
e/iou,
tca,l
'EpirvWidos,
Diog.
says fifteen,
which
Hti airovSoda irepl ifie 4y4p*ro, ruv re &\\atv ko.) i&v $ov\r\Tai avSpa
Xafifidveiv,
ottcos
p.j]
must be an
(DlOG. 13). As to Aridaughter we know from Sext. Math. (i. 258), the Anon. Menag. and Suidas s. v. 'Ap., that after Nicanor she had two husBo0y
stotle's
avaicp
Tifiuv
lodorus cannot be wrong in such a date (cf. Stahb, p. 85). 4 Plttt. Alex. c. v. ; Quintil.
i.
bands, Procles of Sparta, and Metrpdorus the physician; by the former she had two sons who
Stahr (p. 84, 105, A. 2) is not averse to the view that Aristotle first went back from Mytilene to Athens, but none of our biographers know anything of it. On the contrary, Dionys., ut
swpra,
expressly says he went from Mytilene to Philip. Aristotle in a fragment of a letter
ap.
1, 9. 5
Demetb. He
:
says
yeipa 1\hBov SiA rbv Pam\ia rhv jxiyav e Be 'Srrayeipav tls 'ASiivas Sta rbv %6t/xya rbv fieyav, but
this jocular expression,
even
if
v.
29
Suidas
s.
v.
0e<%>.
and
the letter
is
Nimijit.,
confirmed by Theophrastus' will, apud DlOG. v. 51). The six books of Ethics and the work on his father's Physios, ascribed to him by Suidas, are therefore very doubtful. 1 This date is given by Apollod. ap. DlOG. 10, and Dionys.
the terms of
thing, as it is clearly meant, not as an exact historical statement, but as a rhetorical antithesis between the termini of his journeys, leaving out the intermediate points. * According to a well-known story, Philip had told Aristotle,
22
ARISTOTLE
without information as to the kind of education he gave the young and ambitious prince, and the influence he
to
assume that
before Alexander's birth, that he hoped he would make a great man of him (v. the letter ap. Gell. ix. 3), but the letter is certainly spurious, for Philip could not have written in these extravagant terms to a young man of
27,
not certain that any are trustPlutarch {Alex. c. 7 worthy. sq.) praises Alexander's thirst for knowledge, his delight in books and learned conversation,
_
who had
had no chance
to distinguish himself; and, again, if he had destined him to be his son's instructor from
birth,
he
to
2.
him
109,
would have brought Macedonia before 01. But the prince, who
his passion for the poets and historians of his people. He assumes that he was instructed by Aristotle, not only in ethics and politics, but in the deeper secrets of his system, basing this on the well-known letter (q. v. op. Gell.
and
was deeply interested in science and art, and no doubt well informed of what was going on in
xx. 5, quoting Andronicus, and a/p. Simpl. Phys. 2 b), in which Alexander chides Aristotle for publishing his acroamatic doctrines, and Aristotle replies that
may have taken notice of Aristotle after he had become one of the most distinguished of Plato's school, though little weight attaches to Cicero's statement to that effect (JDe Orat. iii. 35, 141). It is also possible that through his father, Aristotle had relations with the MaceAthens,
those
not understand them. Plutarch also connects Alexander's fancy for medicine, which he sometimes tried personally on
would
friends, with Aristotle's teaching. These are, however, more or less probable guesses,
his
may him-
as Stahr (p. 33) suggests, have been acquainted in his youth with Philip, who was the
letters turn
on the theory of an acroamatic and esoteric teaching confined to a few, as to the in-
youngest son of Amyntas and correctness of which p.p. 112, mf. about his own age. We hear of two books which There was a work, or per- Aristotle addressed to his pupil, haps a section of a larger work, Tlepl PairiKelas, and Tnep 'Awolxav, On the Education of Alexander,' d.q.v. p. 60, n. 1 vnf. Plut. {Alex. 8) by the Macedonian historian says Aristotle revised the text of Marsyas (Suid. s. v. Maps.; cf. the Iliad for Alexander. As fellowMuller, Script. Alex. M. 40, and pupils of Alexander are named Geieb, Alex. Hist. Script. 320 Marsyas (Suid. Mapcr.), Callisq.). Onesicritus had treated of sthenes (Justin, xii. 6; cf. Plut. it also in a chapter of his MeAlex. 55 Diog. v. 4 Arbian. morabilia (Geier, ibid. 77; Dios. iv. 10 but vide Geier, Alex. vi. 84). Yet the accounts we have Script. 192 sq.), and perhaps of it are very scanty, and it is Cassander (Plut. Alex. 74). At
1 '
; ; ;
23
we
had
less distinct
Alexander
was not only the invincible conqueror, but also a farseeing ruler, ripe beyond his years. He was ambitious
to establish the supremacy, not of Grecian
arms only,
He
withstood for
which any man could be exposed. errors, he still stands far above
querors in nobility of
spirit, in
other world-con-
And
who
and
all
scientific training
that
we hear
met
17),
6 fieyroi vpbs
ical
<piAo<ro<plav
p.ire<pvKd>s
o-vvre-
and probably
also Theophrastus
(d. q. vide JElian. V. H. iv. 19). The I)iog. v. 39, but cf. 52. fabulous stories as to Alexander's
Bpan/ievos air' apxvs airy ?Aos nal ir69os ovk 4eppvrj rijs tyv^s,
youth, preserved by the pseudoCallisthenes, may be ignored. 1 Plut. Alex. 8 'hpuxToreXit Si 9avfid(a>v eV opxp *"' ayairav ovx ^ttov, lis airbs e\eye, rod irarpbs, is Sj' Ik&i/ov pMv 2>v, Sitt rovrov Be Ka\s fi/, So-rcpov Sh {nroirTorepop " eo'xei' [. infra], ovx & a re irotrjffal ti icaicbv, o.W' at $i\o<ppo<r<!ivai to tr<po5pbv iiceivo nal arepicTucbv ovk exovo-ai wpbs airbv &K\oTpiori\ros
:
as his relation to Anaxarchus, Xenocrates, and the Indian philosophers Dandamis and Kalanus showed (notwithstanding Themist. Or. viii. 106, D.). 2 That he did not act in practioe
cf. StAHE, p. 99, 2 ; DBOYSEN, Gesch. d. Hellen. i. b, 12 sq.) proves nothing to the contrary. s Ps. Amm. 46, V. Mare, 4,
Amm.lat.\S,MLIA.'S,V.H.^..5i.
24
ARISTOTLE
latter
Of the
had at
we
thank him
So Plut. Alex.
33,
3,
o. 7,
cf Adv.
.
that a
monument was
erected to
1126, and Dio. Cheysost. Or. 2 fin, Or. 47, 224 K. On the other hand, DlOG. 4, Ps.
Col.
p.
Amman.
47, V.
109, ^lian. V. If. iii. 17, xii. 54, Valbr. Max. v. 6, ascribe the re-
in consequence on the Acropolis. The story may be suspected of resting on a spurious letter; yet DlOG. (6) also says <t>ri<rl Be KaVEp/uinros iv rois plots, '6ti vpefffieioVTOs adroit irphs ^iKtwjrov inrep 'ASnvalav <rxo\<fy>xi s iyevero rrjs
him
storation of Stagira to Alexander. Plutarch, however, seems on the whole better informed, and is confirmed by the expressions of Aristotle and Theophrastus themselves cf p. 26, n. 2, infra. Plut. {Adv. Col. 32, 9) and Diog. (4) say that Aristotle also framed laws for the restored city, which is hardly credible. Dion ( Or. 47) relates that he had to contend with great difficulties intherestoration, of which he complains in a letter, which may or may not be genuine. His work did not last long, for
;
.
iv
'AKo5rj|iict
S)i
(rxoMjs
ko.1
HevoKpdTW
Beaad/ievov
irepl-
i\9ivra
avrbv
This cannot be true as stated, for at Speusippus' death, 339 B.C., Aristotle had long been Alexander's tutor, and at that date there could be no question of embassies to Macedonia. Stahr's theory (p. 67, 72)
iraTov tov iv AvKeicp.
of an embassy in Aristotle's first residence at Athens is untenable. The story may relate to the two years between the battle of Cha>
ronea and Philip's murder, when Aristotle, already influential at the Macedonian Court, might by
his intercession have done some service to Athens which Hermip-
Amman.
represents Ari-
pus could describe by some such term as Trpetr$e4etv. The favour Alexander showed to the Athenians may have been partly due to
Aristotle's influence (Pltjt. Alex. c. 13, 16, 28, 60).
4 01. 110.1, = 340 B.c.theyearof Philip's campaign against Byzan-
V.
Latm. (13) refer to the service that Aristotle did the Athenians in his letter to Philip, and add
25
though that
circumstance does not exclude the possibility of some continuance of their intellectual pursuits in the intervals
of leisure. 1
Aristotle seems at this time to have with-
drawn
At an
3
earlier period
he
left Pella.
After Alexander
still
have remained
But with the beginning of the great war with Persia, the reasons that had bound him to Macedonia came to an end, and there was no longer anything to keep him away from that city, which offered at once the most congenial residence 4 and the
some time in the north.
best field for his teaching work. 5
During this period Aristotle might or might not be called Alexander's tutor; which accounts
1
probably for the different stories as to the length of his tutorship, given by Dionys. as eight years
(his whole residence in Macedonia), and by Justin (xii. 7) as five years, which is itself too long. 2 That the last period before his return to Athens was spent in Stagira, where his family house
aeum, near Mieza. Stahr (104) takes this to be near Stagira, but Geier (Alexander unci Aristot. 33) shows it to be S.W. of
Pella, in
4
Emathia.
The fragment quoted p. 21, n. 5, says it was the Thracian winter that drove him from Stagira,
was
(cf. p. 3, n. 2),
is
assumed
in the fragment quoted p. 21, n. 5, the genuineness of which is not beyond doubt. He must have treated Stagira as his home, since in his will (Diog. 16) he orders the votive offering for Nicomaohus to be erected there. His second wife was of Stagira
and Theophrastus owned land in the city (Diog. v. 52), with which he shows himself
(v. p. 20, n. 3),
to be well acquainted.
Cf Hist.
.
Plant,
3
iii.
11, 1
iv. 16, 3.
5 The Ps. Amman. 47, says Aristotle was, after Speusippus' death, called to Athens by the Athenians, or, according to V. Marc. 5, by the Platonic school, the leadership of which he took over in common with Xenocrates (cf. p. 13, n. 3). The three recensions of this biography, however, contain at this point a chaos of fables. The Ps. Ammon. says Aristotle taught Lyceum, had after this call in the afterwards to fly to Chalcis, went thence again to Macedonia, accompanied Alexander on his Indian expedition, collected in his
Plut. (Alex,
ARISTOTLE
He returned to Athens'
for his
work in that city what he accomplished in that short interval borders on the incredible. Even if we may assume that he had already in great part completed the preparatory work
for his philosophy, and that the researches in natural philosophy and the historical collections which supplied
Olymp. 111.2 (B.C. 335-4) The time thus left 2 was but twelve years, but
in
all
his systematic
life.
death to his native town, and died there twenty-three years after Plato. The iMtin. Amnion. (14, 17) and the Vita Marciana (5, 8) send him with Alexander to Persia collecting his 255 polities,
and returning home after the war, and after all this they make him start teaching in the Lyceum, fly to Chalcis and die there,
twenty- three j'ears after Plato.
The collection of polities in Alexander's campaigns is noticed also by Ammon. Categ. 5, b; David, Schol. An. 24, a, 34 Ps.-Poeph. ibid. 9, b, 26 Anon. ad Porph. apud Rose, Ar. pseud. 393. To seek any grains of truth in this confusion would be lost
restored after the destruction of Thebes in the summer of 335, and that Alexander did not start on his march iuto Asia till the spring of 334. For the other view the calculation of Dionys. (see next note) may be quoted, but it is probable that this is merely his own deduction from the years given by Apollod. 01. Ill, 2, for the arrival in Athens 01. 114, 3, for his death therefore, 01. 114, 2, for the flight to Chalcis.
;
Dionts. ut supra
Be
TpuTKa.iSeKi.Ttf,
itrxA\aStiSeica
fcv iv Au/cefp
xptvov 4rav
tQ
fieTa
t^v
time.
1 Apollod. apud Diog. 10, andDlONYS.^tf sup., both agree in naming 01. Ill, 2, but do not indicate whether Aristotle came in the first or second half of the year, i.e. end of 335 or spring of For the latter it may be 334. argued thatthe hostility of Athens to Alexander was only terminated and the Macedonian influence
'A\el&vSpov Te\evr})v, eirl Ke<pi<roSt&pov &pxovtos, &ir4p as e ' s Xa\Ki'5a v6tT(f TfAeuT. As Alexander died
June 323,andAristotle in autumn (cf. p. 37), this reckoning will be exact if Aristotle came to Athens in the autumn of 335 and left in the autumn of 323. It would also coincide if Aristotle went to Athens in spring 334 and to Chalcis in summer 322, which,
322
however,
as
is
is
otherwise unlikely.
at p. 36, u.
1
,
shown
infra.
;,
27
as a writer at last
and strenuous labour went on his work as a teacher, since he now began to compete with his great master on a
new
school.
The
open spaces of the Lyceum were the resort that he chose for his hearers. He was wont to converse with his scholars as he walked up and down in that gymnasium between the rows- of trees; and from this custom his
1
name
Peripatetics.'
Therefore,
It
a"
gymnasium con-
nected with a temple of Apollo Lykeios, and lay in one of the suburbs (cf. HabpoceaTiON.and Schol. in Aristoph. Pac.
Sum
v. 352.
ap. Diog. 2, Cic. Acad. i. 4, 17; Gell. N. A. xx. 5, 5 ; Diog. i. 17 j Galen. H. phil. c. 3 ; Philop. in q. v. Schol. in Ar. ii. b, 23 (cf. in Categ. Schol. 35, a, 41 sq.
etc.;
Hebmippus
so limited, and they were called 4k (or cwrb) rod irepnrdrov (or oi ix TUVTepnrdTwji, STEABO, xiii. 1,54), as the other schools were called ol avb ttjs 'A/caS^ias, or oi curb ttjs aroas (v. SEXT. Pyrrh. iii. 181 ; Math. vii. 331, 369
ol
Ammon.
in
q.
v.
Porph. 25, 6
;
Aristotle gave two kinds of instruction the exoteric and the acroamatic. The former related to Rhetoric, and the latter to
'
'
Philosophia remotior ( = Metaphysics) with Physics and DiaSchol. in Ar. 20, b, 16; Simpl. lectic. The acroamatic instrucin Categ. 1 fin. That this deriva- tion, which was intended only tion is correct rather than the for those who were tried and opposite view of Suidas (s. v. well prepared, occupied the morn'Ap. and Sai/cparijs) and Hesych., ing; the exoteric lectures, to which derives the name from which the public was admitted the Tlspiiraros of the Lyceum as the afternoon (cf Qtjintil. iii. 1, the meeting-place of the school 14, pomeridianis scholis Ar. is proved, first, by the form of prascipere artem oratoriam ccepit). the word, which can be derived The former was called the Iwonly from the verb, and also by Qivbs, the latter the $et\ivbs irepithe fact that the word UeplTaros ira-ror utroque enim tempore amIt is imposin the earliest times was not bulant disserebat. confined to the Aristotelians (v. sible, however, to address a large therefore though later it was audience walking p. 13, n. 3)
. :
28
as
ARISTOTLE
had already happened more or less with Plato, the had to give place to that
with
scientific
accuracy of detail. 1
difficulties
On
wherever these
as
an alternative method. 2 In addition to his philosophical teaching he appears also to have revived his
earlier school of Ehetoric, 3 in connection
with which
It is this,
and not
is
doubtless
8e
more
iireiBty
ir\eiovs
coriy4vovTO
Diog. iv. 10, speaking of Polemo aK\a fiSiv oiie Ka0t(iov t?A.6ye vpbs
t&s 0reis,
xefyx-i.
ipaal, irepiirar&v Be
eire-
The continuous lecture on a definite theme is expressed by irpbs Beam \4yeiv a more cursory treatment by eVixefpeu/ (cf
;
not
a good
witness, since what he appears to state of Aristotle's later time seems to be taken from a source relating to the earlier period of contest with Isocrates (cf. p. 17, n. 3). It is probable, however,
from
Aristotle's RJietoric
the oral philosophic teaching rhetoric was not forgotten, and Gbll., ut supra, speaks expressly of rhetorical teaching in the Lyceum.
itself that in
pucas
W*
4
1
Diog. 3
k1 jrpij
Hatv
<rvv-
Hpa a! p^rafleVis being a general topic, not a particular question (cf. Cic. Top 21 79 Ep.ad Att. ix.4; QuintiZ. iii'. 5- 5.x. 5.11; andFEBl, luegt
roi-s Moflijrij
(Wkb,/, the
29
mornalso
At
a
we must
having on
many sides
common
life.
For friendship
its
by word and
act a tender
we hear
Academy, he was wont to gather his scholars about him at common meals and that he introduced a plan of definite regulations for these meetings and for the whole
of their
common
life.
needed
him by the favour of the two Macedonian rulers, and especially by the princely generosity of Alexander. 3
Prat.
150).
In hac Ar.
philosnphorwm
disserendi, sed
morem
tenuiter
rheto-
ad copiam
in utramique partem, ut ornatius et vfoerius diei posset, exercmt. Neither says whether the earlier or the later school of rhetoric is meant: probably both; cf. Gbll. ibid, ifarepuA diceoantur, quad ad rhetoricas rneditationes faeultatemque argutiarum civiliumque rerwm notitiam illas vero exotericonduceoa/nt cos auditimies exereitiumque di. .
.
rum
which may refer, however, to the work mentioned p. 99, n. l,infra; and Diog. (4) preserves a hint of his arrangement for the internal government of the school by officers changing every ten days. Cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. i. 839, n. 1. According to J5lian ( V. R. iv. 19), Philip gave him ample means to pursue his investigations, irKomov avevSerj, especially
and Gell.
Hid.
2 Athen. (i. 3, v. 186 b, cf. 186 e) says he wrote for their
common meals
v6u.oi
o-v/nroriKol,
in Natural History Athen. (ix. 398) speaks of Alexander devoting 800 talents to that work and Plin. (H. Nat. viii. 16, 44) says Alex, placed under his orders all the hunters, fishers, and fowlers of the kingdom, and all overseers of the royal forests, ponds, and live stock, numbering many thousands. Pliny's story,
;
30
ARISTOTLE
However exaggerated the stories of the ancient writers on this subject may seem to be, and however wealthy we may fairly suppose Aristotle himself to have been by
inheritance, yit is yet clear that the vast scope of his
which he probably could not have commanded but for such kingly assistance./ The deep and wide acquaintance
with the writings of his people which his own works 2 disclose to us could hardly be possible without the
possession of books
;
and on
first
Politeiai
and the
be produced without
laborious and
no doubt costly investigations. The books on Natural History especially and the kindred treatises
presuppose researches such as no one could have brought to completion unless he had at his disposal or could set
in action something
more than the resources of a private It was therefore a happy circumstance that individual. the man whose grasp of mind and rare powers of obhowever, is disproved (. BeanDIS, p. 117 sq., and Humboldt, Kosm. ii. 191, 427) by the fact that with a few exceptions, such as elephants, Aristotle shows no knowledge of things which would be discovered in Alexander's expedition.
studies, implies that
he was not
hampered by poverty.
worthlessness
n. 1
2
and
3.
'
His will proves nothing as his earlier years, but apart from the calumnies of his opponents, as to his pride and love al display, all we know of his way of life, his choice of residence, his marriage, and the means necessary for his extensive
1
Besides the extant works, we know of others concerning Rhetoric, Poetry, and the History of Philosophy,
3
to
Steabo,
xiii.
1, 54.
p 608
Ar/rWa, Raci-
Aeas
j8i/3a.io0^kjj s
Athbn. i.
3, a.
31
marked him
In the
good relations
between him
philosopher
The
of the
may
many
necessary for
pugnant to the Hellenic traditions and to the self-respect of independent Greeks, and at the harsh and passionate excess into which the young conqueror was betrayed when he was surrounded by flatterers, embittered by personal opposition and made suspicious by treachery. 2 There would be no lack of tale-bearers to carry gossip true and false to the king, for the learned and philosophic members of his Court were plotting in their personal jealousies 3 to oust each other, and even the courtiers and
generals doubtless sought to use the scientific proclivities
of the prince as points in the
game
of their ambitions.
As
friendly, it
also,
But the
3
severest
blow to the
Cf. p. 23,
exchange of cited as a proof of their friendship is unreliable, because we do not know how much is genuine
2
c.
For examples v. Putt. Alex. 62, 53, Arrian, iv 9-11. 4 Cf. Plut. ibid. 74 (though
;
Plutarch (cf. p. 23, n. 2, supra) says Aristotle was dissatisfied with Alexander's whole political idea of the fusion of the Greeks and Orientals,
that is after the death of Callisthenes) as to Antipater, cf. Pltjt. Alex. 39, 49; Arrian, vii. 12 Curt. x. 31 Diodor. xvii
;
118.
5
This friendship
is
proved
;;
32
ARISTOTLE
came through the action
philosopher to the
the bitter and reckless tone of his diatribes against them ; the pointed way in which he vaunted his inde-
pendence and drew upon himself the eyes of all the malcontents of the army the importance he assumed to
;
himself as Alexander's historian, and the arrogant airs he gave himself accordingly, had long caused the king
to look
mistrust.
This
made
it
king of
his
placed Alexander's
life
2
in
the
Oallisthenes lost his life with the conspirators, though he was doubtless innocent of their treacherous design. In the heat of his anger the king's suspicions turned
I
up
Oalli-
son, Cassander, was a pupil of Aristotle (Plut. lex. 74), by the letters of Aristotle to Antipater (Aristocl. apud Bus. Pr. Mo. xv. 2, 9 ; Diog. 27 ; Demetr. Mac.
writers,
and of modern 23, 2 Stahr, Arist. i. 121 sq. Droysen, Gesch. Alex. ii. 88 sq. Grote, Hist, of Greece, xii.
Qu.
vi.
; ;
290
2
sq., etc.
225
JElian,
V.
H.
xiv. 1),
and
by the fact that Antipater is named as chief executor in Aristotle's will, apud Diog. 11. The false story of his complicity
especially
in Alexander's death is on this circumstance
fra).
1 As to Oallisthenes, PLUT. Alex. 53-55 Sto. rep.
;
It is highly improbable he was. an accomplice, though we cannot say how far he was to blame for exciting by reckless
based
(v.
in-
of
fi-kv
iraTSes
see
20,
;
6. p.
i.
6. p.
623
AREIAN,
18 sq.
; ;
10-14
CURT.
viii.
Chares apud Athen. x. 434 d Theophrast. ap. ClC. Two. iii. 10, 21 Seneca, Nat.
;
imb tSiv MaKcSovuiv KaTe\eA<r6ri<rav top 8e o-o^kttV [Callisth.] iy&> KoKaaui KaX tuuj iitirifi^avTas aurbv na\ tovs viroSexo/ifvovs tois ir6\ctri toJs 6>ol iviPovKeiovras. According to Chares (op. Plut. ibid.), he had at first intended to try Oallisthenes in Aristotle's pres-
33
reckless
A story to
the
effect,
So
far
princely pupil's
I. Arrian (vii. 27) and Pliny (H. Nat. xxx. 16) mention it, but, like Plutarch, treat it as an invention. Xiphilinus (lxxvii. 7, p. 1293) says the Emperor Caracalla deprived the Peripatetics in Alexandria of
gonus
Diog.
2
;
ibid.;
Valbe. Max.
vii.
3
Plutarch says this expressly n. 1, xwpra), and the story in Diog. 10, that Alexander, to mortify his teacher, took
(cf. p. 23,
their privileges on account of the alleged guilt of Aristotle. 5 The disproof of the charge (cf.
Stahe, Ar. i. 136 sq. and Dboysbn, Geteh. d. Betten. i. 705 sq,) rests, apart from its moral impossibility, on these grounds
(a) Plut. ibid, shows expressly that the suspicion of poisoning first arose six years after Alexander's death, whenit afforded the passionate Olympias a welcome pretext to slake her hatred against Antipater's family, and to excite public opinion against Cassander who was said to have administered the poison; (&) equal suspicion attaches to the testimony of Antigonus, which must belong to the time when he was at enmity with Cassander, though we do not know whether he made any charge against
Philopof Aristotle's teaching. onus (apv,d Aeist. Meteorol. ed. Ideler, i. 142) cites a reputed letter of Alexander to Aristotle from India, which proves nothing. 4 The earliest witness to this story is a certain Hagnothemis (apud Pi.UT.AUa;. 77) who is said to have heard it from King Anti-
VOL.
I.
34
ARISTOTLE
For the unexpected news of the sudden death of the dreaded conqueror called out in Athens a wild excitement against the Macedonian rule, which, as
soon as the news was fully confirmed, broke into open war. Athens put herself at the head of all who were willing to fight for the freedom of Greece, and before the Macedonian regent Antipater was fully prepared, he found himself beset by superior forces, which
after a long
and risky
first
Lamian War. 1
From
the
this
movement threatened, as was to be expected, the prominent members of the Macedonian party. Aristotle
Aristotle;
Aristotle,
is
(c)
it
is
significant
ander's
service,
and
intrusted
with important missions (cf. p. 5, ii. supra) (A) finally, the 7, rumour of Alexander's poisoning is refuted by the movement of events afterwards. Alexander's death was the signal for an outbreak in Greece, which in the Lamian war brought Antipater himself to great straits. Anyone acquainted with the politics
;
complished by water from the Nonacrian spring i.e. the Styx a proof that we are not dealing with history (c) the accounts Arrian and Plutarch give us from the court chronicles as to
the course of Alexander's illness do not in any way suggest poison (/) if Aristotle's motive was the fate of Callisthenes, that could hardly have caused in him a hatred that would lead six years later to murder, nor could he, after so long a time, have had
of the day would clearly foresee such a result. If Antipater were not as much taken by surprise as everyone else was by the king's death, he would have made preparations either to stem or to head the rising. If he had been known as the author of that which the Greeks acclaimed as the beginning of freedom, they would not have begun their revolt by attacking him; and if any part in it had been attributed to Aristotle, he would not have had to fly from Athens.
1
any fear as to his own safety; (g) it is probable that Aristotle's own adopted son was in Alex-
For
details, see
i.
Dboysbn,
sq.
Qesoh. d. Hellen.
69
35
but, in
any
case,
and
against
him
in itself baseless
enough
must
it
geance. 2
But
Aristotle found
the
1
rising
storm. 3
He
escaped to
Chalcis
in
Eu-
According to Aristocl. op. Ens. Pr. Ev. xv. 2, 3, Demochares (doubtless Demosthenes' nephew, de quo of. ClC. Brut. 83, 286: De Orat. ii. 23, 95 Seneca, De Ira, iii. 23, 2; Plut. Demosth. 30;
;
Tit.
X Orat.
viii.
53, p. 847,
and
Suidas) had alleged that letters of Aristotle's had been found which were hostile to Athens; that he had betrayed Stagira to the Macedonians, and that after the destruction of Olynthus he had betrayed to Philip the richest citizens of that city. As the last two are impossible, the first is probably untrue, as Aristocles
himself recognised. 2 The charge was brought by Demophilus on the instigation of the Hierophant Eurymedon, related to the deification of Hermias, and alleged as proofs the poem noticed (p. 20, n. 3), and the alleged sacrifice (p. 20, n. 1) cf. Athen. xv. 696 a, 697 a;
:
may
is
not
still
sufficient
less
We
i.
65) suggests, out of his own fancy, rtvh Sdyftara rrjs tpiXotroipias avrov & 4j/6fiiirav elvai aaeftri oi 'AOjjvawH. The weakness of the charge proves that it was only
it.
His remarks that 'he would not give the Athenians a second chance of sinning against philosophy,' and that Athens was the
'
D 2
3ft
ARISTOTLE
where he had a country house, to which he had sometimes retired before, 2 and his enemies could only 4 inflict on him unimportant insults. 3 To Theophrastus he gave over his teaching work at the Lyceum, as a
boea, 1
But
it
place spoken of by Homer where what we find in DlONYS. JBp. 8yx v w ^7r ^yx v V yvp^<rKi o'vkov ad Amm. i. 5, that Aristotle 5' rl <rvKif, in allusion to the died in 01. 114, 3, having fled to It is not possible to sycophants, are quoted by Diog. 9 Chalcis. MhlAS, iii. 36 ORIGEN.Mi supra; assume (with StAhe, i. 147) an EUSTATH. in Odyss. H 120, earlier emigration of Aristotle to Chalcis, on the authority of the V. Mare. p. 1573 AMMON. p. 48 statement of Heraclides that 8; Amnion. Latm. 17, the last mentioned placing them in a Aristotle was living in Chalcis when Epicurus came to Athens, letter to Antipater. Eavorinus, apud Diog. 9, says the Homeric TeKevrlfffavros 5' 'A\edvBpov fiCTeASeiv ['EirOcoupoi'] eh KoAoline occurred in a written Apologia, which is known also to the Anon. (puva. For Aristotle's flight was Menag. and to Athbn. xv. 697 a, due only to the danger that both of whom doubt its genuine- threatened him at Athens, which ness. One does not see why arose only on Alexander's unAristotle, once in safety, should expected death and he cannot write a useless defence. It was no therefore have gone to Chalcis doubt a rhetorical exercise in imi- before the news reached Athens, tation of theSocratic^?fo#ia(cf. in the middle of 323. Either the fragment given by Athenajus Heraclides or Diogenes must be inexact. The Pseudo-Ammonins with Plat. Apol. 26 D sq.). Apollodor. apud Diog. 10 is (cf p. 25, n. 5 supra) and David made to say that this was in (Sehol. in Ar. 26 b. 26) assign im01. 114, 3, i.e. in the latter half possible dates. 2 of 322 B.C. This is improbCf. Strabo, x. 1, 11, p. able, for Strabo (x. 1, 11) and 448. 8 Heraclides up. Diog. x. 1 speak In a fragment of a letter to as if he lived a considerable time Antipater probably of this time in Chalcis and besides it is more (op. ^Jlian, V. M. xiv. 1, cf. p. likely that the attack on Aristotle 44, n. 4 infra) Aristotle makes happened in the first uprising mention rwv iv Ae\<po?s \firi<pi(ragainst the Macedonian party Bevrwv fioL teal &v atpTJ prtfxat vvv. than that it was begun after What this was whether a monuAntipater's decisive victories in ment, proedria, or other honorary Thessaly, and that Aristotle fled privilegewe do not know. If it j in good time instead of waiting was given him by Athens, it may through the whole of the Lamian be connected with the services war. Probably, therefore, he left noticed p. 24, n. 3, supra. 1 Athens late in the summer of Diog. v. 36 and following 323, and Apollodorus only said lines, SxriD. s. v. 0e<j<fy>.
'
37
Aristotle
to
In the
in the
summer
of 322 B.C. 1 , he
succumbed to a disease from which he had long suffered. 2 So it chanced that of his two great contemporaries he survived Alexander by less than a year, and predeceased Demosthenes only by a short interval. His body is said to have been taken to Stagira. 3 His last
will is preserved to us, 4
and
it is
monument
it
of his
1 Apollod. ap. Diog. 10, V. Mwre. 3, Amman. Latin. 12, and Dion. Hip. ad Amm. i. 6, give 01. 114, 3 as the year. It was about the time of Demosthenes' death (Apollod. ioid.~), but a little earlier (Gell. JV. A. xvii.
21, 35).
As that date
is
given
by Plut.
{Bern. 30) as the 10th of Pyanepsion 01. 114, 3 = Oct. 14, 322, Aristotle must have died between July and Sept. of that year.
2 That he died by illness is stated by Apollod. and Dionys.
ut supra;
of.
Gell.
xiii.
1
5,
1.
6)
adds
1166 b, 11), does not fit the circumstances, for in Eubcea he was in no danger. The tale (found only in ^Ilias Ceetensis, p. 507 D) that he threw himself into the Euripus because he could not discover the causes of his visions, and the variant of the same in Justin, cohort. 36, Greg. Naz. Or. iv. 112, or ProCOP. De Bello Oath. iv. 579, that his fruitless meditations on a vision wore him out with worry and fatigue, need no refutation, though Bayle (art. Aristotle, n. Z) thinks the latter a
12, v. 15 init., ix. 4,
and because
lame ferwnt natwalem stomachi infirmitatem crebrasque morbidi corporis offensiones adeo vi/rtute animi din sustentasse, ut magis mirwn sit ad annos setcagmta tres eum vitam protulisse, quam ultra
fitting
end cf Stahr, i. 155. 3 Related only by V. Marc. and Amman. Latin. 13, and
;
.
with the addition that an altar built on his grave and the council meetings held there and that a festival ('Api<n-OTe\eia) was
was
3 supra) fol-
lowed by the Anon. Menag. and Suidas, that he poisoned himself with hemlock, or (as Hesych. has it) that he was condemned to
drink hemlock, is probably a confusion with the death of Demosthenes or of Socrates. It cannot be historic, because the best evidence is against it, because it is contrary to Aristotle's own principles (Mh. N. ii. 11, 1116 a,
and a month named The evidence is not good but as he was not only the
instituted after him.
;
most
Or. 47, 224, who says that Aristotle alone had the fortune to be ttjs TrarplSos oikktt^s) the story is not
wholly improbable. 4 Apud DIOG. 11 sq; probably (cf. v. 64) taken, like the wills of Theophrastus, Strato, and Lyco, from Aristo, a noted
88
faithful
ARISTOTLE
all
attachment and careful provision for connected with him, including his slaves-. were
Peripatetic mire. 200-250 (lege 'Apiarwv S KeTos), who will be mentioned in his place. Hermippus (evrc. 200-220) cited the
who
Theo-
same
589
record
e.),
(v.
Athbn.
xiii.
others quoted, a regular disposition of his whole property. Grant thinks it unlikely that Pythias was not yet marriageable or that Nicomachus was a lad ; but this Why may not Ariis not so. stotle's wife Pythias, perhaps after the death of older children,
of Aristotle's writings, de q. infra. V. Mare, says Aristotle left a SLaOrjKTj . . . $) <j>4perai irapd re 'AvBpoviiccp
KaX Xlrokefialtp
ftercfc
[twi']
triva.K[uv]
ruy avrov
trvyypafifidTwv
have borne him a daughter ten years after their marriage ? or why might Aristotle not have by a second wife, for whose remarriage he provides, a son who would be a lad when his 'father
(Amman. Latvn. 'cum voluminibus suorum tractatuum;' cf. Hbitz, Verl. Sehr. d. Ar. 34). The external evidence for the will is therefore good the more because it is likely that the wills
;
was sixty-three
know from
education
of
Nicomachus was
Aristotle and his followers carefully preserved by the Peripatetic school (for which those of Theoph., Strato, and Lyco were a kind of foundation charter), and because Aristo was himself the immediate successor of Lyco. The document has also all internal signs of genuineness, and the objections which have
of
would be
(cf
Gkant,
taken over by Theophrastus. The naming of Antipater arouses in Grant a suspicion that the forger inserted him as a historic name; but it is clearly natural that Aristotle might appoint him in order to place the carrying out of his directions for the benefit of those depending on him under the protection of his powerful friend. And this is all that is meant when he is named first in the honorary position of iwlrpovos thLvtuv, whereas the
carrying
26) prove little. It is objected that it mentions neither a house in Athens nor a library, both of which Aristotle possessed. A never forger, however, would have omitted the latter, which was the thing of chief interest for the school but it is very possible that Aristotle had already
;
out of the business provisions of the will is left to Theophrastus and the other c?mObjection is taken to the provisions for four statues of animals which Aristotle is said to have vowed to Zeus Soter and Athene the Preserver, for
/ieXijrai.
arrangements about it, which did not require to be repeated in the extant will, that being rather a set of directions to friends than, like the three
made
Nicanor's safety (Diog. 16), as being an imitation of the. Socratic votive offering for Asclepios (Plat. Phatd. 118, a). This, however, is far-fetched and the point is unimportant. Little as
; '
39
named
and
to
him he
left
Excepting a few
details as to his
we
Most of these
such
those
concerning his
relations
What
is
it
quite
Pausanias
natural that he should erect a monument of his love for his adopted son in their common home, Stagira (to which the statues were to be sent), in a fashion which accorded with Greek custom. He himself in Ethics iv. 5 reckons votive monu-
Spada
at
Bome,
v.
Schustek,
ments and offerings among the forms in which the virtue of fieyaKtyjrpejreia shows itself. 1 The pretty story as to the way in which he expressed his choice is well known (Gell. N. A. xiii. 5, where Eudemus must be substituted for Mene'
'
Mrhalt. Portr. d. griech. Philos. Leipz. 1876, p. 16, where they are photographed. The sitting statue has a lean face, earnest and thoughtful, showing the lines of severe mental labour,
and with a
profile.
delicate,
clear-cut
Stbabo,
.
xiii. 1, 54, p.
608
Pltjt. Sulla, c. 26; Athen. i. 3, a, with which cf Diog. v. 52. 3 Diog. 2 calls him i<rxvo-
impresses us with its life-like truth to nature, and the workmanship is so excellent that it may well be an original work dating from the time of Aristotle his immediate or successor. Directions are given in Theophrastus' will (Diog. v. 51) that the Movffc'iov begun by him should
It
be finished
remj
tV
'Apiaro-
and pucp6/ina.To? x and an abusive epigram in the Anthology (iii. 167, Jac.), which deserves no weight, apuKpbs, <pa\aicpbs, and
fftceXfys
irpoyiarap.
We
pronouncing
E, to
ANON.
rehovs lk6vcl Tedrjvai els rb Upbv KaXrhXoiirk kvaS-t\pura Sea irpSrepov farijpxev iv t$ lep$, which probably is to be understood of a statue already erected. 4 Cf. p. 8 sq. ; 19, n. 4 ; 20, n. 1, 2; 33, n. 4; 35, n. 1, 5,
40
ARISTOTLE
his
by
many enemies
Nor do
of
'
little
probability. 2
we have
a
give us
shrewdness,
3
or
jealous
first
and
these
little-minded
The
of
charges
concerns
his
relations
with
the
Macedonian rulers. The second refers to the criticisms he allows himself to make in writing of his But it cannot be cotemporaries and his forerunners.
proved that he ever sought the favour of Philip and
supra.
tullian's
Macedonian Court and flattered Alexander, and that at his death 75 (or even 300) dishes were found in his house or that
:
he was immoral in relation to Pythias and Herpyllis, and was also enamoured of Theodectes of Phaselis and again that he was so effeminate that he bathed in warm oil (doubtless for medical reasons, cf. Diog. 16 and p. 37, n. 2, swpra), and so miserly that he sold the oil afterwards: or that in his youth he was too
:
named Epicurus, Timasus, Eubulides, Alexinus, Cephisodorus, Lyco, Theocritus of Chios, Demochares, and Dicsearchus, within a generation of Aristotle. 2 Such as the accusations to be found in Aristocl. and Diog., ut supra SUID. 'Apurr. Athbn. viii. 312, xiii. 566 Plin. H. N. xxxv. 16, 2; iELlAN, V. H. iii. Thbodoebt, Cur. Gr. Aff. 19 Lxjcian, Dial. xii. 51, p. 173 Mort. 13, 5, and Paras. 36 ; that Aristotle was a glutton, and for that reason went to the
are
: ;
fashionable for a philosopher (which, as hewasrich and brought up at Court, is possible) : and that he was impudent and sneering. If there were any facts underlying these stories, we may conclude from the character of the narrators that they were in any case trivial ; and we can see in the passages of Lucian and
Thcodoret and his quotation from Atticus how Aristotle's own statements as to wealth and pleasure were twisted to support these
suspicions.
3
Even Stahr
(i.
attention
41 to be
follies
and
to
it
was not
To impute
it
him
as an offence,
is to
By
and training he was a Greek. But while all him to the royal house to which he and his father owed so much, no one can say
birth
So
satisfied
sweeping changes.
men and
ditions
things,
on which the
government depends. With his practical acumen he could not put his trust in the Platonic ideal of a State
;
among
At
that day no
Stabr thinks
flattery
when
Alexander
611, apud jElian, V. H. xii. 54) b Svfi.bs icdl 77 opyii ov irpbs iaovs (1. Viaaovs with Rutgers,
angry with inferiors, and that he stood above all men, which was surely true of the conqueror of the Persian Empire. We cannot tell whether the letter is genuine.
Heitz ( Verier. SoJir. d. Arist. 287) suggests that this fragment does not agree with that in Plut.
Rose
robs
and
Heitz)
aMu:
trot
irpbs
Kpeirrovas
ylverai,
if this is
5e
genuine Aristotle said no more than the truth, and he wrote, according to yElian, in order to appease
oiiSels Xaos,
but
(Tramgu. An. 13, p. 472 Arist. Fragm. 614, 1581, b) in which Aristotle is made to compare
;
Alexander's wrath against certain persons, for which purpose he tells him that one cannot be
himself with Alexander, but the letter is much the more doubtful of the two.
42
ARISTOTLE
could be found except in the Macedonian
new foundation
kingdom,
for the
once to maintain their independence against the foreigner and to reform their inner life. The whole course of history so far had proved this so conclusively, that even
a Phocion was forced to say, in the
unless the moral
conditions of Greece
against Macedon. 1
come
who was a
citizen
Can and then reorganised as a Macedonian town. we blame him if he accepted that view, and, with a
just appreciation
if
still
find
and decay within, and the the enemy without? Can we loss of power to face condemn him if he felt that the old independence of the Greek cities must come to an end, when its basis
salvation from the dissension
Can we
was
that
the
condition
under which
he
held
monarchy was natural and just 2 where one man stands out so clearly beyond all others in efficiency as to make their equality with him impossible ? Can we complain
if
man than
in those of the
'
great
king of Persia,
'
for
cities
13
fin.
had
Plut.
PJioc. 23.
Polit.
iii.
43
the Pelo-
political unity ?
As
for the
it
is
and it would be impossible to prove that they ever on any other motive than the desire to make his point as sharply, and establish it as completely as possible.
colour,
discoveries,
on his own
we ought
and remembering
is
this,
we
that remains
pardonable self-appreciation.
Still
less
to pass over
minor matters 2
need we
hoped soon to see philosophy completed. 3 If he did, it would have been only the same self-deception of which many other thinkers have been guilty, including some
mankind
1 Polit. vii. 7, 1327 b, 29, reckoning the merits of the Greek race SiSirep ZhfiQepiv te SiareKei KaX PeXrurra wo\iTv6/i.evov ku\ Swdfizvov &px elv infa" "" /uas Tvyx& vov mXmias. 2 Like the tale told by Valer. Max. viii. 14, 3, as a proof of capessenda Aristotle's sitis
:
'
standing of the RJiet. ad Alex. c. \fin. (cf. Bhet.iii. 9,1410b, 2). 3 CiC. Tusc. iii. 28, 69 Aristoteles veteres philosophos accusams
:
J"* existimavissent pMlosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos out stultissimos aut glariosissi-
mos fuisse
laude,
which
is
plainly an idle
paueis annis magna aoeessio facta esset, brevi tempore pMlosophiam plane absohita/mfore.
44
for tens
ARISTOTLE
of centuries.
remark seems to have occurred in an early work of Aristotle's, and to have related not to his own system but to Plato s, which professed to open out a prospect of an early comIn
fact,
the"
pletion of
all science. 2
So
will,
far
as
Aristotle's
philosophical
writings,
the
and our incomplete accounts of his life afford us any picture of his personality, we cannot but honour him. Nobility of principles, a just moral sense, a keen judgment, a susceptibility to all beauty, a warm and lively feeling for family life and friendship,
gratitude towards
benefactors, affection for
relatives,
and a
lofty conception of
such
are
we can
see.
They
all
carry us back to
reduced
all virtue, backed as it was in him by a wide knowledge of men and by deep reflection. We are bound to suppose that the principles he asserts in his
own
life,
manner
1
personally served
him should be
which it is rightly sold, and that several should be referred by Rose (Ar, Fr. No. 1) freed and even started in life, and Heitz (Ar. Fr. p. 33). As to the latter, cf. his saying, 2 As Bywater (Jowrn. of ap. DlOG. 17, ov -rbv rp6irov, &A\&
atxpias,
Philol. vii. 69) also says. In Aristotle's extant works he often refers to the need of further investigation. 3 As to the former, cf. his will, which provides inter alia that none of those who had
-rbv
Letter to Antipater, ap. JElian, V. H. xiv. 1 and ap. Diog. 18. In the former fragment he says as to the withdrawal of former honours (de a. v. p. 36, u. 3,
45
human
And
it,
we know
it,
and in
spite
of any
weaknesses which
may have
attached to
still
more are
his powers
and
intellectual
achievements altogether
astounding.
scientific thinking,
with a
all
know-
ledge,
all its
branches.
That
Stagirite,
But
which
those
qualities
mark the
full
manhood of science
firire
fnoi
in width and
{op.
solidity
oliras
%x a i " s
17
sq)
aip6Spa fieAeiy xmep av-rmv ufa* M- 01 in the latter, as to p.ri$ev /teKeiv one who had reviled him behind hish&ck.'.airdvTa^.eKalfiao'TtyoiTu.
;
Demete. 29, 233) give proof of it. That it went with a tendency to banter and sauciness of speech C&tcaipos <ttw/iv\id), as iElian ( V. H. iii. 19) tells us of him in his youth, is possible, though not proved by the existing testimony, 2 De quo infra.
letters
46
ARISTOTLE
of research, *in purity of scientific method, in ripeness of judgment, in wary discrimination, in his compact brevity and inimitable keenness of statement, and in
the definite use and comprehensive development of a scientific terminology. He cannot inspire us, lay hold
and the moral His energies, at all in the same way as Plato does. work is drier, more professional, more closely confined But to the field of cognition than Plato's had been.
of our hearts, weld in one the scientific
man
might,
For thousands of years he showed philosophy her way. For the Greeks he inaugurated the age of learning. In every field of knowledge then
open to him he enriched the sciences by original investigations, and advanced them by new conceptions.
Even
if
we put
measure the
common standard, that we man in a short life especially since we know that
wring from a weakly body the
Aristotle has
had
to
task
it
did.
he was as a
man we know
unhappily too
little,
Of what but we
1 Callisthenes of Babylon is said to have sent him information of astronomical observations there (Simpl. De Ccelo, Schol. 503, a, 26, following Porph.), but
the story is suspicious because of the addition that these observations went back 31,000 years,
2
Cf. p. 37, n. 2,
and DlOG.
v.
16.
47
or
which
his
must demand.
'
48
ARISTOTLE
OHAPTBE
II
aeistotle's writings
A.
The
both by
extent and
its
manysidedness.
his
The works
over
all
which we
branches
have under
of
name extend
and they exhibit a vast wealth of wide observation and historical learning. Yet to these extant works the ancient catalogues add a great
philosophy,
number of others, of which only the titles or slight fragments now remain. Two of these catalogues we have the first in two recensions, that by Diogenes (V. 21 sqq.), and that called the Anonymus Menagii the other in certain Arabic texts. The first list contains, in Diogenes, 146 titles, most 2 of which the Anonymus 3 has preserved, leaving out 4 a few 5 and adding seven or
: '
'
'
eight
new
ones.
An appendix
adds forty-seven
titles
many
of those
1
already entered
both
in
and
who
ten
Pseudepigrapha.
See
v.
the
Arist.
iv.
b,
48) he was Hesychius of Miletus, lived about 500. 4 As to the possible grounds of this omission cf. Heitz, Verlm: Sclir. Arist. p. 15.
5 6
Rose from an Ambrosian MS. 132. 3 According to Rose's probable conjecture {Ar. JAbr, Ord.
are
9, i.e. Nos. 147, 151, 154, 155, 167, 171, 172, 174, 182, repeating
ARISTOTLE'S WRlflNOS
49
Both the sources agree in putting the total number of books at nearly 400. The author of the first catalogue cannot be (as Rose imagines 2) identified with Andronicus of Rhodes, the well-known editor and arranger of Aristotle's works, 3 though it is not to be doubted that
*
For even
is said
if
we
Andronicus
number
at
index includes
it
the Tlspl
spfirjvsias,
which he
all
rejected, 7
nicus's edition
writings above
This
is
far
many
important parts of the extant Corpus are either altogether absent or at least are not to be traced under
Nos. 106, 7, 111, 91, 98, 16, 18, and 11 of the main list. 1 Diog. 34, and the Anon, Menag. at the beginning of his The titles in Diog. (reckoning list. the Letters as one book for each correspondent named and the Uo\iTelai as a single book) give 375 books ; those in the Anon, as completed by Rose, 391.
3.9
2
3
which did not at all correspond with his own work. A similar catalogue of the writings of Theophrastus is ascribed to him by the Scholia at the end of his Metaphysics and at the beginning of the seventh book of the Hist, of
Plants.
5
David,
19.
6 This is the more remarkable because we gather from Diog. 34 that the catalogue was to include only works recognised as gemiine. Bernays (Dial.d. Ar. 134) supposes that the therefore book was inserted in the catalogue of Andronicus by a later hand. 7 Alex, in Anal. Pri. 52.
Cf Zelleb, Ph. d. Gr. Pt. iii. a, 549, 3 (2nd edition). 4 This is clear from the abovementioned passage of Plut. {Sulla, 26) from the V. Marc. 8 (cf. p. 37, n. 4, supra) and David, Schol. in Ar. 24, a, 19. It is not credible that Andronicus merely adopted the catalogue of Hermippus (v. Heitz, Ar. Fr. 12)
VOL.
I.
50
their later
ARISTOTLE
name3 and
2
verse theory
that the
in
nega-
contains
it
many important
For
and that
distinctly claims to
it
can owe
Aristotelicvm Diogenes' list mentions only the following: Nos. HI, The Cate-
our
gories
H2,
;
II.
ipfi-rivelas
;
49,
Tlporeptay
avakvTiKuv
102,
I
50, 'AyaA.
bafipaiv
n.
&W,
9 books
(meaning no doubt the History of Animals, he spurious tenth book of which is afterwards, No. 107,
called "tirip rov /j.^ ytvv^v) 123, MTJX a v LK & v a' 75, TloKvriKTjs cucpod(Tfws 8 books 23, OlKovofwcbs a' 119, 78, Texvris /57)to/>ik5js a' ; UoniTiKuy a' and probably also the Topics, under two different
; j ; :
parts of our Corpus. The Anon. Menag. adds the Topics under that name (his No. 52) and the Metaphysics, to which he gives 20 books (if the text is right, de quo infra). The First Analytic is his 134, with 2 books, and the Ethics is 39, "UBiKav k' (lege a'-*'). His appendix adds 148, *ucn/ri) uitpSaais, of (lege i\ 149, n. yevetreus zeal (pBopas 150, n. /teretSptoj/, 5' 155,
: ; ; ;
omits important
n.
(tf,av
Kivfiirems
&W
174,
2
io-Topias
156,
II.
n.
jW
yeviaws
(also 3 books)
Also Nos. 90, n. tpio-ems a' 'ff /, and 45 (115), (which are a' Kiv4itreus n. probably parts of the Physics) and No. 39, n. oroixeiW a' &' y' probably the two (meaning books n. yevetreus with our book
names,
cf.
infra.
II. t)BikSiv
tiiKoimxeiaiv.
side,
Heitz,
tie
Verlnr.
Sclir. p. 19.
Svpfypaif/e
o7rep
-ird/iirKeiirTa
riyrjffd/iriv
f}iP\ia.
atc6\ovBov
iii.
Be
;
Ccelo,
or
book
iv.
viroyp&tpcu
Slit
tV
irep!
irdvras
Meteor.') rixs'PV a 70, tikoX K (no doubt a recension of the Problems) ; 36, n. tUv iroo-aetreis
(doubtless the treaoften cited by Ar. under that name, which is now book v. of the and 38, "HBikHv Metaphysics) Even assuming (only 5 books). that all the suggested correspondences are correct, the list still
X&s
Aeyo/j.4vui>
tise,
\6yovs ravSpbs aper-liv,' are the introductory words in Diog. v. 21, but that does not mean that he' would exclude the main philosophical treatises. The same is
clear from 34, where Aristotle's power of work is said to be proved
in
twv
4
irpoyeypaij.ij.4vuy
<rvyypa/j.-
fj-druv,
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
61
whom
must have been a scholar of the Alexandrine period, most probably Hermippus 2 and he must either not have had the means or not have taken the trouble to give us more than a list of the manuscripts
Its compiler
which were to be found 3 in a library accessible to him, presumably that of Alexandria. Otherwise it would be impossible for him to have omitted important works which can, as we shall see, be clearly proved to have been in use during the two centuries preceding the date
of Andronicus. 4
The
first
is
writings, which two Arabic writers of the thirteenth century 5 copied from a certain Ptolemy' probably a
'
by Greek
cf
.
writers. 6
His
list
556,
Zelleb, Ph. d. 0r. Pt. iii. a. 2nd ed., and Heitz, Verlor.
1
Schr. 38.
So Heitz, i&
i.
sq.,
followed
by Geote,
ii.
48,
Susemihl, Ar.
181 sg.
s
$
and
Peripatetic,
;
Wearenotexpresslytoldthat
this scholar
who
wrote about 200 B.C., catalogued the works of Aristotle but it is hardly to be doubted, seeing that he wrote a biography of Aristotle in at least two books which Diogenes used (cf. DlOG. v. 1, 2, and Athen. xiii. 589, xv. 696), and that his 'Amypcup}) tuv @eo(f>pd<rrov
/3ij8A(aismentionedintheScholia cited, p. 49, n. 4, gnpra (cf
works of Aristotle which are not in his list (Brandis, ibid. Heitz, 17), but this only proves that these references were taken from other sources than those from which he got the Catacites
logue.
5
De
q.
v.
ROSE, Ar.
Opp.,
p. 1469.
6
52
ARISTOTLE
For while
total of
Aristotle's
works at 1,000
of
may
be partly accidental. 2
Some
others are
Strata (Diog.v. 58). Thefactthat the Ptolemy who compiled the admirer of Aristotle, who wrote Catalogue came after Andronicus a book, Histories Ar. et Mortis is clear from the mention of ejusetScriptorum Ordo, addressed Andronicus at No. 90, and of Of the to Aalas (or A'tlas) the other Apellicon at No. 86. (Ibn Abi Oseibia, d. 1269, ibid.) writers of that name known to also speaks of his IAber ad us, Rose (Ar. TAbr. Ord. 45) sugGalas de vita Ar. et exvmiapie- gests as the same the Neoplatotate testamenti ejus et itidice nist Ptolemeeus, named by Jambl. scriptorum ejus notorum. Both ap. Stob. Eel. i. 904, and by copy from him biographical de- Proclus In Tim. 7. Another was a contemporary of Longinus, but tails as well as the Catalogue, but seem to know no more of him he is said (by Poeph. V. Plot. 20) than that he lived provmeia to have written no scientific Mum (i.e. the Roman Empire), works. The most probable idenand that he was a different per- tification would be with the Perison from the author of the Al- patetic Ptolemy, whose attack magest. What they say, how- on a definition of grammar by Dionysius Thrax is quoted by ever, corresponds exactly with David, Sehol. in Ar. 22, a, Sbxt. Math. i. 60, and by the what 10 (after Proclus, cf. 1. 23), says Sehol. in Bbkker's Anecd. ii. 730, of a Ptolemy who reckoned the and whose date therefore must total of Aristotle's books (as did lie somewhere between Dionysius Andronicus, cf. p. 49, n. 5) at and Sextus (70-220 B.C.). An exact reckoning is not 1,000, avaypcupfyv avruy TOtTitrdfievos possible without going into the Kal tov friov aiirov ical rty Siddeffiv and with the remarkin V. Mara. 8, variations of the numbering in as to the same, that to his list of the different texts. If the 171 Po-
(Ibn el Kifti, d. 1248, op. Rose, ibid.) says this Ptolemy was an
'
'
Aristotle's
will.
to be Ptolemaaus Philadelphus, but this merely proves the ignorance of David, or the pupil who recorded his lectures though we know that Ptolemseus Philadelphus himself was .a collector of Aristotle's works (Athbjj. i. 3, David, and Ammon. Sehol. in Ar. 28, a, 13, 43), and was a pupil of
;
lities were counted separately, they would raise the total to about 720. 2 / The most important omissions are the Ethics and the
(Economies besides which there are the Rhetoric, ad Alex., the book upon Melissus, &c.; and the tracts n. anovarcov, n. avcmvoris n. ivvTwlwv, n. /lavrucrjs Trjs iy TOIS SwVOiS, n. I/6CJT7JTOS Kal fiipiDS,
;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Lined twice over.
is
53
The
is
reek titles,
t
such a character
for the
d origin
offer
no
Nothing but a
full
and
handed down
to us
but
new of
igment on To begin
i
their authenticity. 1
at the point
may
distinguish from
ase writings
ters,
the
is
Their number
atively small
and
if
we exclude those whose genuineAuctoritate, 1854, and Ar. Pseudepigraphies, 1863, rejected too summarily all the lost and several Thewritings of the extant books. named in the ancient Catalogues will be cited in this chapter by Rose's numbers (p. 48, n. 1) j of the Catalogues themselves, that of Diogenes will be cited as D.,that of the Anonymus Menagii as An., and the Ptolemy of the Arabic Ar. Fr. will be texts as Pt. used for the collection of the fragments by Eose in Ar. Opp. v. 1463.sq., Berlin ed.; and Fr. Wc.
and n.
aperav K0.K1S1V, n. Bavfuuriav aKovandand the tovGioyvtepucli. But , ^o. 40 includes the lie Memoria, Sommo, so it may be that others the small scientific tracts bracketed in the list under
II.
the
K&afuiv,
XI.
title
1
and number.
to the works known only titles or fragments, cf. the roughinquiry of Heitz ( Fe?'Z<w. rift. d. Ar., 1865), refuting whose learned essays, . Bose,
As
Ar.
Liirorum
Ordine
et
54
ARISTOTLE
is
ness
very
little left.
doubtful or which are certainly forged, there is few poems and poetic fragments,
and perhaps some part of the matter said to be cited from his Letters? may stand. The so-called Apologia of Aristotle, 3 and the Orations in praise of Plato and Alexander, 4 must be rhetorical inventions of later date.
for that of Heitz in Ar. Opp.
1 sq. of
iv. b,
the Didot edition. 1 For these, with the notices relating to them, v. Berghk, Zyr. Gr. 604 sq.,Kosn, Ar. Pseud. 598 sq., Ar. Fr. 621 sq., p. 1583, and The most imFr. Hz. 333 sq. portant are those above cited
(p. 12, n. 4, p. 20, n.
3),
any are genuine, since some are certainly not. Not only Eose {Ar.
Ps. 585, Ar. IAor. Ord. 113) but also Heitz (Verl. Sohr. 280, Fr. Hz. 321) considers all the letters That the six now exforged. tant {ap. Stahr, Ar. ii. 169, and Fr. Hz. 329) are so is
whose
genuineness we have no reason to doubt. D. 146 mentions ?7T7)and 4\tyeia, and An. 138 iyicdifua, ?j vfivous appear in An. App. 180.
;
2 The Letters of Aristotle, praised by Demetr. Eloe. 230, Simpl. Categ. 2 y, Sohol. in Ar. 27, a, 43, and others (of. Rose, Ar. Ps. 587, Heitz, Verl. Sohr. 286, and Ar. Fr. 604-620, p. 1579, Fr. Hz. 321 sq.) as the high-
and Heitz holds that they could not even have been in Artemon's collection. 3 Cf. p. 35, n. 3, supra; Ar. Fr. 601, p. 1578 Fr. Hz. 320.
clear,
;
An
(v.
'EyKti/itov
U\a,Tii>vos
is
water mark of epistolary style, were collected in eight books by one Artemon, otherwise unknown
(v. Demetr. Moo. 223, Sohol. in Ar. 24, a, 26,
319)
Jahro. f. Philol., Suppl., and Ar. Fr. 603, Fr. Hz. but it is more than suspi-
87).. Andronicus is said to have reckoned twenty books (Pt. No. 90, cf. Gell. xx. 5, 10), but perhaps it was only twenty letters, which is the number in An.
No.
no one used what would have been the best source of Platonic biography. A. Panegyric on Alexander ap. Themist. Or. iii. 56 {Ar. Fr. 602, Fr. Hz.
cious, since
319)
ap.
i.
is
condemned by the
Fr.
137. D. 144 names letters to Philip, letters to the Selybrians, four letters to Alexander (cf. Demetr. Moc. 234, Ps. Arum. 47), nine to Antipater, and seven to others. The letters of
v. Simpl. Phys. 120), mentionedbyPHlLOP. Be An. K. 2, are not in D. All
18, if that belongs to it, Bernays' theory of another Alexander {Dial. Ar. 156) being very improbable. An "Eyic\ri(ria 'AXeJaVSpov is named by An. (No. 193) as spurious. Books n.'AA.e|di/8pou are ascribed by Eustath. ap. Dionys. Per. v. 1140, and An. App. 176, to Aristotle through some confusion between his name and
Arrian's.
Cf.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
55
may
include those
questions,
all
essentially distinct in
form from
l
We
those
make
his
fact
of
dialogue.
It
is
that
Dialogues
differed from
of Plato
in the
.
own
hands. 4
5
Of the
the three
books On Jusetc.,
and Mullek,
.
Script,
rer.
Alex. pref. v. Cf Bernays, Bialoge d. Ar. (1863), Heitz, Verl. Sohr. 141221, Rose, Ar. Pseud. 23 sq.
2
sq.,
Cf. Cic.
Ad
Att.
xiii. 19, 4,
Basil. Ep. 135 (167) ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 24, Plut. Adv. Col. 14, 4,
ap.
33, David, ibid. 24, b, 10 sq., 26, b, 35; Philop. ibid. 35, b, 41,
ROSE, Ar. Ps. 52 sq., Ar. Fr. 3243, p. 1479, Fr. Hz. 47) is called EiiBiiuos (Themist. De An. 197, and cf. quotations in Ar. Fr. 41), or 'ncpl tyu X rjs (D. 13, An. 13, Plut. Dio 22), or Ei/STj/tos % w. jfivxv' (Plut. Cons, ad Apol. 27, p. 115, and Simpl. ap. Ar. Fr. We learn from Plut. Dio 42).
and Be An. E. 2 PBOCL. ap. Philop. JEtem. M. 2, 2 (of. Ar. Fr. 10) and In Tim. 338 d; Ammon. Categ. 6, b (ap. Stahe, Ar. ii. 255) Simpl. Phys. 2, b
; ;
and Cic. Divin. 1, 25, 53, it was dedicated to Aristotle's friend, Eudemus, who died in
22,
that
Peiscian, Solut. Proasm. p. 553 b. s Basil. Ep. 135 (167) ap. Rose, Ar. Pseud. 24. Ar. Fr. 1474. Heitz, 146.
was probably written soon (Keische, Forsch. i. 16). Of the Fragments ascribed to it by Rose, more probable places will be indicated infra for Fr. 36, 38, and
it
and
after
De
Ad Quint. Cic. ut supra. Fr. iii. 5 does not refer to Dialogues. Aristotelius mos,' in Cic. AdFani.i. 9, 23, has a wider sense;
4
'
An.
i.
4, in/it.
to refer to a discus-
and refers to the in utramque partem disputare,' cf De Orat. iii. 21, 80 but see Heitz, 149.
'
.
sionin the Eudemus, cf. Ar.Fr. 41. 6 D. 3, An. 3 (who by oversight gives four books), Beenays, 47, 95, Rose, Ar. Ps. 27, Ar. Fr. 1-21, p. 1474, Heitz, Verl. Sohr. 179 sq., Fr. Hz. 30 sq.,
This remarkable
Dialogue
Bywatee,
'Aristotle's
Dialogue
56
tice
l
ARISTOTLE
seem to have been the most important.
to the
of Plato, that there is much to be said for the conjecture that they were written in the period when Aristotle still belonged to the circle of Plato s
work
and had not yet fully passed over to his later independer.'. position. 2 There are certain other works
scholars,
on Philosophy,'
vii.
64
sq.
71-77,
p.
1487,
Bebnays,
48,
(Solut.
is
con-
(Pl.tit.
PHILOP.
Rose, Ar. Ps. 87, Heitz, Verl. Schr. 169, Fr. Hz. 19. CiC. Pep. as a iii. 8, 12, mentions this ' work in four comprehensive books. According to Plut. Sio.
'
Mt. it. 2, 2; v. Ar. Fr. 10) that Aristotle had in his Dialogues attacked and renounced the Ideal Theory cf Ar. Fr. 11 from the second book n. <pi\o<r. arguing against the Ideal Numbers. These three books are referred to (besides D.) by PHILODEM. n. uo-j8ear, col. 22, and following him, by CiC. N. D. The apparent reference i. 13, 33. in Aeist. Phys. ii. 2, 194, , 35 (Si^as yb.p rd ov eveica etprirai 5' ev tois irepl (piKocotptas) is as Heitz says (Verl. Schr. 180) very sus;
.
rep.
15, 6,
it
was attacked by
Chrysippus
avTir/pi.^a>v)
nowhere but on
the other hand the reference will not apply either to the Book on the Good (which could not be
called n. (pAoir., cf. p. 61, n. 1, infra), nor to Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, 2, since as Aristotle left
that book unfinished he could not quote it in the Physios. Eose's rejection of the n. tpiKoa. is followed by Susemihl, Genet. Mnt. d. plat. Phil. ii. 534 but the arguments are insufficient. 1 D. 1, An. 1, Pt. 3, Ar. Fr.
;
and the attacks of Carneades mentioned by Lactant. Mpit. 55 {ap. Cic. Rep. iii.) seem to have been also specially directed to this work. Demetk. Floe. 28 cites a passage from it. We are not told that it was a Dialogue, but that is inferred from its position at the head of D. which begins (Bernays, p. 132) with the Dialogues arranged according to number of books. It is, however, true that in the midst of the Dialogues (as No. 12) the Protreptieus comes in, which probably was not a Dialogue. Neither probably were Nos. 17-19. It is a question, therefore, whether the Anon, has not here preserved the original order so that the Dialogues really include only the first thirteen numbers of An., together with the SympoisUm which was misplaced in that list by reason of the textual error(w.p. 58, n. 1). 2 This is specially true of the All the fragments of
:
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
57
which are supposed to have been dialogues, mainly by reason of the place assigned them in the catalogues but some of them are only distantly connected with
this dialogue prove that it was built on the lines of the Phcedo. They have in common not only their subject, the Immortality of the Soul, but also the artistic
tation of the theory that the soul was the harmony of its body, here also Aristotle followed him (Fr. 41). Exactly on Plato's lines is likewise Fr. 36, where the misery of the soul tied to the body is imaged in a striking compari-
son and even if Bywater (Jown. of Phil. ii. 60) and Hirzel (Hermes, x. 94) are right in referring this Fr. to the Protrepticus,
;
still this also seems to have been on the same lines as the
Eudemus had
also its mythic ornament (cf. Fr. 40, where the words of Silenus, ha.ip.ovos iimrovov, etc., remind us also of Sep. x. 617 D, and Fr. 37, which must be taken in a mystical
(cf. p. 60, n. 1, infra). Aristotle took a more independent position against Plato in the books On Philosophy. It is true that the Frs. in which he defends the belief in the gods, the unity of God, and the rational nature of the stars (Fr. 14, 13,
Eudemus
As the Plicedo (69 c) sense). refers to the doctrines of the Mysteries, so Fr. 30 of the Eudemus recognises the validity of the customary honours to the
dead. But the most remarkable resemblance between the two Dialogues is in their philosophiAristotle in the cal contents. Eudemus insisted not only on Immortality, but also on Preexistence
ap.
N.D. Brandts,
Cic.
ii.
ii.
228, refuting EosB, Ar. Ps. 285), read like Plato, and that Fr. 15 (de g. v. Beenays, 110, and Fr.
Hz. 37) is evidently modelled on Nevertheless, Mep. ii. 380 D. Aristotle decisively declared himself in this
work (Fr.
p. 55, n. 6) against
the theory of
and Transmigration,
own way
soul in
the
its
entrance into this life forgot the Ideas (Fr. 34, 35). As the Plicedo based the decisive argument for immortality on the relation of the soul to the idea of life (105 c sq.), so the Eudemus also called the soul *TS6s ti (Fr. 42). As Plato worked up to this argument by a detailed refu-
the Ideas and Ideal Numbers, declared the world to be not only, as Plato said, unending, but also beginningless (v. Frs. 17, 18, with which Bywateb, 80, well compares Pltjt. Trcmqu. An. 20, p. 477) and gave in Book I. (v. Bywater's reconstruction thereof from PHILOP. in Nicom. Isag Cic. Tusc. iii. 28, 69 Peocl. in Etjcl. p. 28 cf. Ar. Fr. 2-9) a general theory of the develop;
;
58
ARISTOTLE
ment of humanity to culture and philosophy, which, although it connects with Plato by the remark (ap. Philop.) that the spiritual and divine principle, in
of its own light, appears to us dark Sicfc rfyj/ iTriKetfjt.4vT]v rov trtb/iaTos ax^iv, and by the theory of periodic floods whereby humanity was thrown back into
spite
Blass, BJiein. Mus. xxx. 1875, There must be, how481). ever, much variation, and Blass' view that certain passages are taken verbally from the n. $i\oa.
(v.
p.
is
improbable.
1
To
this
class
beloDg the
2,
AN.
2,
savagery (cf. Plato, Tim. 22 D, Laws, iii. 677 A, 681 e), indicates clearly an independent view of history which goes beyond Plato not only in relation to the eternity of the world (Meteor, i. 14, 352 b, 16; Polit. vii. 9, 1329 b, 25; Metaph. xii. 8, 1074 a, 38; cf. Bernays, Tkeophr. ii. A. FrbmmigJt. 42), but to the process of spiritual development (Metaph. i. 1, 981 b, 13, and 2,982 b, 11 sq.).
Aristotle's interest in
Pt. 6; BERNAYS, 10 sq., 60, 139; Rose, Ar. Ps. 77; Ar. Fr. 5969, p. 1485; Heitz, V.S. 174 sq. Fr. Hz. 23). That this work was a
;
Orpheus, on the Seven Wise Men, and on the development of philosophy from their time to his own
his critical sense is shown in his discussion of the story of Orpheus in Fr. 9. Taking all this into consideration, the books On Philosophy show, as compared
and
Dialogue is doubted by Mtjller, Fr. Hist. ii. 185 but it is proved not only by its place in the Catalogues, but also by an express statement in V. Marc. p. 2, and by the form of Fr. 61. It was probably used as a genuine work of Aristotle by Eratosthenes and Apollodorus, but we cannot be sure that their references (Fr. 60 ap. Diog. viii. 51) may not point to another work, possibly the Politeiai. Aristotle, however, himself refers at the end of Poet. 15 to a discussion in the ^/cSeSo/ieVoi \6yoi, which it is most natural to apply to the n. iroi7jTDv, as in the Rhetoric (which Bosb, Ar. Ps. 79, suggests) there is no corresponding pas;
the Midemus, a remarkable advance in independence of thought, leading to the suggestion that they were written later, perhaps at the end .of Plato's life. Krische (Forsch. i. 265) sought to identify the 3 bks. n. </>iAo<r. with Metaph. i., xi., xii. but this is now untenable (cf. Hbitz, 179,
with
sage. Thefewreferenceswehave, which are mostly historical notes, show nothing that throws doubt on the genuineness of the work.
Homer, evidently from a tradition current in Ios, which (notwithstanding Nitzsch, Hist. Mom. ii. 87, Mulleb, lit supra, and
Bosb, Ar. Ps. 79) do not prove spuriousness of the book, since they might well have been introduced in the Dial, without being believed by the author.
the
and
infra, p. 76 sq.).
It is
more
probable that they were used for various passages of Metaph. i., xii., and for the bk. n. oipavov
; ;
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
With
the Dialogues
69
may be connected
another
set of writings,
For thetitlen.iroiijTSy wefindalso (.PV.65, 66, 69 ci Spengel,.A&A. d. Miinehn. Akad. ii. 213 Ritteb, Ar. Poet. x. Hbitz, V. S. 175)
;
; ;
that of n.
it is
?roi7jTiK7Js, which, unless a mere confusion, indicates that the work was not purely historical, but contained discussions on the Art of Poetry as well as information about the poets. After the Dialogues, which made
44; cf. Heitz, V.S. 192, who rightly questions the application of Plut. ]V. P. Sum. V. 13, 4 to this Dialogue) ; the n. tiXovtov (D. 11; An. 7; Ar. Fr. 86-89, p. 1491; Ar. Ps. 101; Heitz, V. S. 195, Fr. Hz. 45) probably attacked by the early Epicurean,
Metrodorus,
in
col. 22,
if
several books, there follows in the lists the TloKiTutbs, which consisted, according to D. 4, of 2 books, according to An. 4, of one {Fr. 70, p. 1487 ; Rose, Ar. Ps. 80; BEBNATS, 153; Heitz, V.S. 189, Fr. Hz. 41) and thereafter the following, in one book each n. ^jTopurijs TpiTiAos (D. 5, An. 5 ; the addition of y' is obviously a false reading, though PT. 2 b, ay. IBN ABI OSEIBIA has De Arte Rituri iii.' Cf. Ar.
; ; if) '
Philodem. De
be (as seems probable cf. Spengel, Abh. d. Miinclm. AJiad. v. 449, and Heitz, I.e.') not n. iroAireias, but n. ttXo&tov the Dial, is nowhere quoted by name, and of the fragments reckoned
Fr. 57
sq. p.
1485;
Rose, Ar.
Ps. 76; Beenays,62, 157; Heitz, Hz. 41); the V.S. 189, Fr. NfyLvdos (D. 6, An. 6 ; Rose, Ar. Fr. 53, p. 1484, Ar. Ps. 73; Bebnays, 84; Heitz, V.S. 190, Fr. Hz. 42), doubtless the same as the fiid\oyos Koplvdios, of which Themist. Or. 33, p. 356 speaks the 2o<J>rT3)s (D. 7 ; An. 8 ; PT. 2 Ar. Fr. 54-56, p. 1484 ; Ar. Ps. 75 Fr. Hz. 42), of which nothing
;
as belonging to it Heitz rightly rejects Fr. 88 ; and the n. evxvs (D. 14; An. 9; Ar. Fr. 44-46, Ar. Ps. 67 ; Fr. Hz. 55 p. 1483 Beenays, 122), to which we possess only one reference that can be identified with certainty, i.e. Fr. 46, which is too closely related to Plat. Sep. vi. 508 e to permit its rejection. 2 If we could say absolutely that the Dial. n. eiiyeveias (D. 15 AN. 11; Pt. 5; Ar. Fr. 82-85, p. 1490; Ar. Ps. 96; Beknays,
;
remains except a few remarks on Empedocles, Zeno, and Protagoras the MevQevos (D. 8, An. 10), of which there are no fragments the 'EpaTi/cbs (D. 9 An. 12; Ar. Fr. 90-93, p. 1492; Ar. Ps. 105; Heitz, V.S. 191, Fr. Hz. 43); the 2v/i.Tr6<rtov (D. 10; An. 19, where avKKoyiafi&v is a
; ;
140; Heitz, V. S. 202; Fr. Hz. which was already questioned by Plut. Arist. 27, is not genuine, it would follow (as Heitz suggests) that the story that Socrates was accused of bigamy in it rests upon some misunderstanding. This, however, seems hardly probable, because the story in question appears so frequently and so early in the Aristotelian School. As to the genuineness of the Dialogues
55),
60 yet distinguished, as
treatises
(at
ARISTOTLE
it
by
least
in part)
ascribable
same period of
also
Aristotle's
work.
belong
named in
are very
few as to 'which we can form an approximate judgment but there do not seem to be decisive grounds for rejecting any
of them.
1
a couple of conversational remarks, which may therefore as properly be called irpoTpeirTiitbs as Menexemis with its longer concould be versational preface
called
(iriT<i.<pios
(Thras.
ibid.
Eudemiis belongs also the Pro(D. 12 An. 14 Pt. 1 where it is probably transposed with the n. <pi\oir. and is theretrejrticus
Ak. Rhet. iii. 14, p. 1415, b, 30). If Cicero used it as a model for his Hortensivs {Script. Hist. Avg.
V.
Sal
Gallieni,
c. 2), it
may
still
As Dsener, ut supra, shows, Cicero also used it for the Somnium Scipionis, Bep. vi., Cyprian prince Themiso, and was and, mediately or immediately, known to Zeno and to his teacher Censorinus, D. Nat. 18, 11. ByCrates (v. Stob. Floril. 95, 21). water, ut supra, has also shown BosE,J.r.Ps.68(with a,fortasse), (but cf. Hirzel) that Jamblicus Bywater, Journ. of PHI. ii. 55, used it for his own Protrepticus. and Usener, Rhein. Mus. xxviii. Of a kindred nature apparently 372, suppose it to have been a was the n. lrcuStlas (D. 19 AN. Dial., and Bebnays, 116, gives 10; Pt. 4; Ar.Fr. 51, p. 1484; no opinion but Heitz, V. S. 196, Ar. Ps. 72; Heitz, V. S. 307, and Hibzel, Hermes, x. 61, seem Fr. Hz. 61). As no fragments to be right in saying that it was are preserved, we cannot tell a continuous essay. The reasons whether the n. TiSovrjs (D. 16, cf. are (I) that Teles says 'kp. 66; An. 15; Pt. 16; Heitz, TrpoTpeimKbv hv eypatye irpbs epl- V. S. 203; Fr. Hz. 59) was a ouva and although a Dial, like dialogue or not. The book a drama may be dedicated to a n. 0curi\eias (D. 18; An. 16; man, tiv\ itpoayp&ipeiv, yet it can- Pt. 7 Ar. Fr. 78, 79, probably not be written to anyone, irpis also 81, p. 1489 Fr. Hz. 59), Tiva ypd<peip (2) that all other which was addressed to AlexantrpoTpem-MoX that we know were der, and apparently referred to by essays and not dialogues even Eratosthenes {ap. Strabo, i. 4, the pseudo- Platonic Clitophon, 9, p. 66), was more probably an which got an unsuitable second essay (. Heitz, V. S. 204) than title of UpoTpeirrmhs (Thrasyll. a dial. (Bose, Ar. Ps. 93,*and ap. Diog. iii. 60), is no exception Bernays, 56). On the other to this, for it is not a dialogue, hand, the title 'A\4av5pos ^ iirip but a speech introduced only by (irepl) hirolnuv [-kiSk], if the text
;
fore said to have three books. Ar. Fr. 47-50, p. 1483 Fr. Hz. According to Teles, circa 46). 250 B.C., it was addressed to the
;; ;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
the treatise
61
On
the Good. 1
It
recorded
from or of
it
its
genuineness. 3
be correct, rather suggests a dial. (D. 17; Ar. Fr. 80 Beenays, 56 Fr. Ht. 61. HBITZ, V. S. 204, 207,
;
suggests
Kal
it.
irpbs 'AAe.
inrep hiro'iKutv
iSao-iAe/os a').
Other fragments
that he was not sure whether Aristotle's reference referred to the n. ray. or to a special work. If so, this makes rather for than against Alexander's knowledge of the n. rayaBov. SlMPL. De An. 6, b, Philop. De An. C. 2 (cf. Ar. Fr. p. 1477 b, 35), Suid. 'AyaB. p. 35, b, believe that the
The
words
iv. 2, 1003 1004 b, 34, 1005 a, 2 repeatedly quotes Book ii., and the regular form of citation is iv rots it. ray. Apart from the Catalogues, we never hear of this work except in the Aristotelian notices Commentators, whose
Alex, ad Metaph.
yopevois in Ah. De An. i. 2, 404, b, 18, refer to this work, whereas they really refer to Platonic
b, 36,
writings
But
(cf. Zeller, II. a. 636, 4). this proves only that these
writers
this
knew the
second hand.
are collected and discussed by Beandis, ' Perd. Ar. Libr. de Ideis et de Bono, Gr.-rdm. Phil. ii. KRISCHE, Forseh. i.263 b, 1, 84 ROSE, Ar. Ps. 46, Ar. Fr. 22-26, p. 1477, and Heitz, V. S. 209,
' ;
work was a Dial, is refuted by Heitz, V. S. 217. We cannot tell whether Aristotle published in his lifetime his notes upon the lectures of Plato, or whether they became public after his death. If the iiiKoy^ t.
havr., cited by himself, formed part of them, the former would of course be true. It is clear that the book was in use before the end of the third century B.C., and certainly before the time of Andronicus, because of the mention of it in Diog.'s list; cf. p. 48 sq. supra. 2 Referred to by Aristoxenus
others, cf. Zeller, Plato, 26. 32, b, 104, b, Schol. 334, b, 25, 362, a, 8) mentions, Aristotle, besides Speusippus,
distinguishes
the eK\oyi) twv ivavrUov noticed Ar. Metaph. iv. 2, 1004 a, 2 (de q. infra) from the second book n. rayaBov, and in another place (p. 218, 10, 14) identifies them. These passages seem, however, only to show that Alexander knew of no in\. r. iv. as a separate book, but saw in the second book n. -ray. a discussion to which, as far as the sense went,
Aristotle
and
Simpl. (Phys.
Xenocrates, Heraclides and Hesas having published the Platonic lectures. 3 This is proved, against Susktiasus
d. plat. Phil.
might be
referring, so
ad
loe.
62
ARISTOTLE
is
There
which Aristotle apparently refers to in the The Metaphysics, 2 and which Alexander possessed. 3 4 Extracts from some of Plato's writings and the monothe Ideas,
graphs on earlier
1
This work is named in D. and An. 45 (which give it one book only) n. rrjs iSe'as or
54,
tov; D. 94 ; An. 85 ; SlMPL. Be Cwlo, Schol. 491, b, 37 aivatyiv if btvn\ikp toS Ti/iatov ypdfpeiv oIk
n.
ideas.
We
have references,
however, by Aojex.. in Metaph. 564, b, 15 to the 1st book IT. iSeav, in 573, a, 12 to the 2nd, and in 566, b, 16 to the 4th (but in the last case we may well read A for A, with ROSE, Ar. Ps. 191, Ar. Fr. 1509, b, 36). Sybian, In Metaph. 901, a, 19, 942, b, 21 speaks of a work n. t&ii eiSSj/ in two books. The same is meant in Pt. 14 by the three books Be vmaginibus, utrwm, exist ant am mom; but the Arabic
title 'fori 0^%!/^ indicates that their Greek text read not n. e ISav,
MrTjJWe) cf. Fr. Hz. 79. 6 n. rav TlvBayopeluv, D. 101 An. 88 no doubt the same as is named SiwryaiTi r&v TlvBayopelois apefficdvTav by SlMPL. Be Casio, Sohol. 492, a, 26 and b, 41 sq.
; :
TlvSayopma (ibid. 505, a, 24, 35) ; TlvBayopiKbs[-ov ?] (Theo. Arithm. Stf^Tjs 5) ; n. ttjs TlvBayopiK&v
TlvBayoptKTJs
(Jambl. V. Pyth. 31). Probably the separate title Tlpbs robs Tlv8ayopetovs, D. 97, is only a part
of the same work, as D. gives each of them one book only,
but n. elS<i\uv cf Rose, Ar. Ps. 185; Ar. Fr. 180-184 p. 1508; Fr. Hz. 86 sq. 2 we have I. 990 b, 8 sq.; not only Alexander's statement that this passage refers to the work on Ideas, but it seems to be the natural inference from Aristotle's text itself that he is re;
.
while Alexander and Simpl. quote from book 2. The reference in Diog. viii. 34, cf. 19, probably belongs to this treatise (whether we there read Iv T<p irepl
Kv6.fi.av, or tt. Koi.fi.uiv only, cf. Cobet). Other notices of the work are collected by Rose, Ar. Ps. 193, Ar. Fr. 185-200, p. 1510 ; Fr. Hz. 68. find also three books n. rrjs 'ApxvTttov [-tou?1 tpt\offo(plas in D. 92, An. 83, Pt. 9 ; cf. Ar. Ps. 211, and Fr. Hz. 77, and cf. last note. Also Tlpbs
ferring to some more detailed discussion of the Ideal Theory which is already known to his
We
Rose (Ar. Ps. 186) doubts bat Alexander's own statements (cited in Ar. Fr. 183 fin., 18ifin.~) indicate as much. 4 To 2k t&v v6fitev TlKdravos (D. 21, as 3 Bks., An. 3 as 2). Ta 2k rrjs iroKiTfias a' &' (D. 22. PEOCL. Ar. Fr. 176, in- Hemp. 350 To 4k toS Tip.aiov ko.1 p. 1507). ruv 'Apxvreiwv (alias ko! 'Apxis
this,
to 'AhKfialwvos, D. 96, An. 87; UpoPK^i/iaTa c tS>v AijfxoKpWov, 7 (? 2) books, D. 124, An. 116 (cf. Ar. Ps. 213, Ar. Fr. 202 p. 1514, Fr. Hz. 77 ;) Upbs ra MeAltrvov, D. 95, An. 86; Tip. t& Fopyiov, D. 98, An. 89 Tip. rk Bevotpdvovs, l-Kpdrovs in MSS.] D. 99 Tip. tA
; ;
ARISTOTLE'S
so far as these
WMTIN6S
'
63
were genuine
must,
however, have
first
residence
collection of Platonic Divisions ascribed to him was no doubt a forgery. 2 Par above all these in historic importance stand the works which set out the peculiar system of the Master in
strict philosophical form.
Speaking broadly,
first
it is
these
We
view of the character of our informants it is very possible that they presented as history what he had only stated as a Pythagorean tradition. Similarly the meanings of the Pythagorean symbols {Fr. 190 sq.) and the contents of Fr. 188, which Isidor.
op. Clement. Strom, vi. 641 falsely attributes to Aristotle himself, are merely references to Pythagorean theories. The rest of the passages cited from this book as to the Pythagorean system give no reason to reject it. The apparent contradiction between Fr. 200 (ap. Simpl. De Casio, Schol. 492, b, 39 sq.) and
Ilepl rrjs
%mva-
D. 93, An. 84. We cannot judge as to the genuineness of several, of which we have the titles only. It is not impossible that Aristotle may have left, 'among his papers, extracts and criticisms on various systems written philosophic down in the course of his studies, and that recensions of these were
1
Ab. De
Ccelo
ii.
2, 285, b,
25
is
falsa
passed themselves name. That the latter was the case with the tracts in our Corpus on the Eleatic School is proved in Zelleb, Ph. d. Gr. i. 465 sq. It is more difficult to decide as to the authenticity of the work on the Pythagoreans. If all the fables (see Zelleb, Ph. d. Gr. i. 285) which appear in Fr. 186, were related as historic fact, the book could not be Aristotle's, but in
off
under his
lowing Alexander in assuming a lectio, for which, however, Fr. 195, ap. Simpl. ibid. 492, a, gives some ground. 18,
This is named in the existonly by Pt. 53, as Divisio Platonis' (formerly mistranslated jvsjwamdwm' or 'testamentmn PI. '). It was, perhaps, the same as the Aristotelian Siai2
ing
lists
'
'
pecreis {v.
where
64
ARISTOTLE
knowledge of the Aristotelian philosophy. is no doubt primarily due to the fact that it was in them that that philosophy was first expounded in the systematic maturity in which he
first-hand
set it forth
If
we take what
now
extant or otherwise
first
known
meets us
the Categories, 1
the book on
used for the account given of Plato by Diog. iii. 80, is printed by EOSB, Ar. Ps. 677-695 (and after him by Fr. Hz. 91), under
the title, Amipe<re 'Apurrorehovs, deq. v. ZBlAj.,Ph.d. Gr. ii. a. 382. 1 The title of this work by the common (and probably correct) account is Karrryopfai but we find it also named as n. tuv
; :
think them the same. Andronicus was probably right (ap. Simpl. ut supra, Schol. 81, a, 27) in identifying the title of TA irpb t. t6tto>v with the spurious appendix of the so-called PostprEedicamenta and it may have been invented either, as he supposes, by the writer of that tract,
' ' ;
or
Karrjyopiuv,
KaTTjyopiai
twv
5e/ca Karriyopittiv,
Tl.
n. n. ruv 5eKa
Select,
yevtov,
Ktvniyoplcu ijrot
Waitz,
the original name, Kcmryopi'ai, too limited for the treatise as enlarged by the spurious addition. Aristotle himself refers to his theory of the Categories (De An. i. 1, 5, 402 a, 23, 410 a, 14, Anal. Pri. i. 37, cf. the quotations, infra, p. 189, n. 2, q. r.) as known to his readers, and he assumes this in other places also, which seems to indicate
that he had dealt with it in a published work. There is a more definite reference in Eth. N. ii.
1 init. to Categ. c. 8 (cf. TrenDELBNB. Hist. Beitr. i. 174). That in Eth. Eud. i. 8, 1217, b 27, may possibly refer not to the Categ. but to some work of Budemus, and those in Top ix
dinary name.
{Schol.
81,
b,
David, however,
25), D.
59,
and
(Soph. El.)
5,
4. 22.
-2,
as to categories in Top.
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
which, however, is itself so brief and undeveloped that it presupposes an early and better account. Simpl. (Categ. 4 (, Sclwl. 30, b,
36) and David (Sclwl. 30, a, 24) say that Aristotle had also referred to this work in another place not now extant under the title of Karriyopiai or Ae'na Kot. We are told also that, fol-
65
saying that
peripatetic
lowing Aristotle's example, Eudemus, Theophrastus, and Phanias, wrote not only Analytica,' and works 'II. epfiiipstas,' but
'
also Karriyopiai (AMMON. Scltol. 28, a, 40, and in q. v. Porph. 15 m, David, Schol. 19, a, 34, 30, a, 5, Anon. ibid. 32, b, 32, 94, b, 14 but Brandis in the Rhein. Mus. i. 1827, p. 270, rightly denies this as
;
to Theophrastus, and doubts it as to Eudemus). The references in Simpl. Cat. 106, a, 107, a, sq., Schol. 89, a, 37, 90, a, 12 do not prove that Strato referred to Aristotle's Categories.
school of the age following Chrysippus (p. 207). Their critical positions, however, are not all tenable. Prantl (ibid.) takes exception to the number 10 but in the Top. i. 9, the same ten Categories are given, and we know from Dexipp. (In Categ. 40, Schol. 48, a, 46) and Simpl. (ibid. 47, b, 40) that Aristotle named these ten in other works also. It is true that Aristotle generally uses a less number but that may only mean either that he here adduces all the ten because his object was logical completeness, or that he counted more Categories at an earlier time than he did later. He never assumed, as will be
' ;
shown
them.
later,
a fixed number of
On
the other
hand, the ancient critics never doubted the genuineness of the extant book, although they rejected a second recension (v. Simpl. Categ. 4 & Sclwl. 39, a, 36 Anon. ibid. 33, b, 30 Philop.
; ;
Again, it is objected that the K0T177. speaks of Sevrepat ovalai but we find as parallels to this not only irpurai oia-lai (e.g.
;
vii. 7, 13, 1032, b, 2, 1038, b, 10), but also rpirai ovtriai (ibid. vii. 2, 1028, b, 20, 1043, a, 18, 28). The words of Karny. c. b, 29: cikoWus 5, 2,
. . .
Metaph.
AMMON.
Cat. 13, 17, and Boeth. In Prced. 113, all following Adrastus,"' a noted critic circa 100 A. D. ; cf Fr. 114). The only doubts suggested are by Schol. 33, a, 28 sq., and these apparently were not derived from Andronicus. The internal characteristics of the book, however, are in many ways open Spengel to criticisms, which (Miinchn. Gel. Ana. 1845, 41 sq.), Rose (Ar. Libr. Ord. 232 sq.), and Prantl (Gesch. d. Logik, i. 90, 5, 204 sq. 243) have used to
.
m.
ra ysvn Sevrepat ohatai \eyovrai, are not to be translated ' the term SetSr. ova. is used for genera and species and rightly so,' since it was not commonly so used before Aristotle, but rather, there is reason to treat as a second class of substances only genera and species.' Again, when it is remarked in
p.6va
. . .
Tcfc
etSri
Kal
'
Karriy.
strictly
c.
7,
8,
a,
combat
vot,
its
r.
speaking, rrp6s ti includes those things only which not merely stand in a definite relation to some other thing, but have their essence in such a relation oh rb elvat ravr6v io"Tt
66
ARISTOTLE
parts
the
and
kinds
of
propositions,
those
on
the body of the work it is probable also that passages have of Stoic influence, since the been left out and others added wp6s tI iras ix av "appears also in this recension but much_ of in Ae. Top. vi. c. 4, 142, a, 29, the inconsequence of exposition Phys. vii. 3, 247, and language may as easily be c. 8, 164, b, 4 due simply to the fact that the a, 2, b, 3, and Mth. N. i. 12, 1101, It is true, however, that Categ. were the earliest of the b, 13. logical writings, and were written all the objections cannot easily be set aside. Nevertheless, the probably many years earlier than treatise bears in general a de- the Analytics. 1 This book, n. hppriveias, was cisively Aristotelian impress it is closely related to the Topics in in ancient times rejected as not tone and contents, and the ex- genuine by Andronicus (so Alex. ternal evidence is heavily in its Anal. pri. 52 a, and SeJtol. in Ar. The best conclusion 161b, 40 Ammon. Be Interpr. favour. seems to be, not that the whole 6 a, and Schol. 97 b, 13 Bobth. ibid. 97 a, 28 Anon. ibid. 94 a, is spurious, but that the seemingly un- Aristotelian elements are 21 Philop. Be An. A 13, B 4), to be explained by the assump- followed recently by Gumposch tion that the genuine body of {Log. Schr. d. Ar., Leipz. 1839) the work extends to c. 9, 11, b, and Eose {Ar. Ps. 232;. Brandis 7 only, but that what followed (Abh. d. Berl. Altad. 263 sq., cf. has dropped out of the recension David, Sclwl. in Ar. 24 b, 5) we possess, and is replaced only takes it to be an incomplete by the short note, c. 9, 11, b, sketch of the work, to which c.
there is no T<j! irp6s ri ttcds %x* lv need to suspect here any trace
; ;
;
8-14.
The
so-called
'Postprse-
14 (rejected as early as
Ammonius
; ;
dicamenta' (c. 10-16) were suspected as early as Andronicus (Simpl. ut supra, Schol. 81, a, Ammon. ibid. 81, b, 37), 27 and. Brandis has now proved they are added by another hand (' U. d. Reihenfolge d. Bucher d. Ar. Org.,' Abh. d. Berl. Altad. Hist,
;
and passed over by Porphyry cf Ammon. Be Interpr. 201 b Sclwl. 135 b) has probably been added by a later hand. The external evidence for the work is good enough. Not only do all three lists agree in naming it (D.
152, An. 133, Pt. 2), but we are told that Theophrastus referred to it in his essay n. icaT=#a<rews
ko! &,iro<pdo-etes(J)IOG. v. 44
;
Kl. 1833, 267, and Gr.-rom. It is another Phil. ii. b, 406). question whether it was compiled from Aristotelian fragments, as he The concluding parasuggests. graph, at o. 9, 11, b, 8-14, reads exactly as if it came in the place of further discussions which the editor cut out, justifying himself by the remark that there was nothing in them which did not appear in the earlier part. In
pltil.
ALEX.
Sclwl. in Ar. 94, b, 13 cf. the Schol. op. Waitz, Ar. Org. i. 40, who, on Be Interpr. 17, b, 16,
;
remarks
<ppa<rTos,
e6-
etc.;
a,
1
cf.
Ammon. Be
It
Interpr. 73,
22, b).
seems
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
conclusions and scientific method in general,
also
1
67
on the
that
Eudemus
n.
Ae'feois
(Alex. Anal, pri. 6, b, Top. 38, Metaph. 63, 15; Anon. Schol. in Ar. 146, a, 24) may have been an imitation of this book (not, as Scliol. 84, b, 15, wrongly sugof. the quotation from Ammon. in preceding note). This last suggestion, however, is uncertain, and the notices as to Theophrastus are not absolutely clear, for the texts show that he did not name the n. kfjx.tfv. at all. Alexander thought he saw, from the way in which Theophrastus dealt with the subject (thema) in his own book, reason to infer that he had Aristotle in mind; but whether he was right in that inference or
;
if
by
not, we cannot judge. The Schol. ap. Waitz has nothing to show
that the reference there quoted from Theophrastus referred to a passage in this book, and was not rather a general reference to the frequently recurring Aristotelian law of the excluded middle. On the other hand, it is singular that while the n. epiitjv. referred to is never cited or
in any of Aristotle's books (cf Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 102, a, 27),
it
him. The question, therefore, is not only whether it is by Aristotle or by another, but whether it may not, as Grant suggests (Ar. 57), have been written out by one of his scholars from oral lectures in which the difficulties of beginners would naturally be kept in view. Syllogisms are dealt with by the 'AvaKvriKct irpdrepa in two books, and scientific method by the'AvaA. Bffrepa, also in two. The fact that D. 49 and An. 46 give nine books to the 'Avah. irp6r. (though An. 134 repeats the title with two only) points probably only to a different division; but it is also possible that other tracts are included, for the Anon. Selwl. in Ar. 33, b, 32 (cf. David, ibid. 30,
1
cites
6,
not
(c.
only
the
:
Mrst
Anal.
'Juries
Analytic
46, 51,
(c.
10, 19, b, 31
36)
6,
and the
26
:
11,
1,
20,
16, a,
Top. ix.
17,
II: rjivxrjs
proposition
ancient opponents of Andronicus nor modern scholars have been able to find in it (cf. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 97, b, 49, whose suggestion, however, is not satisfactory). Its remarks on Rhetoric and Poetry (c. 4, 17, a, 5) have
Simpl. Categ. 4 says that Adrastus knew of forty books of Analytics, of which only the four which are extant were counted genuine. That these are genuine is proved beyond doubt, both by internal evidence,
ibid.
39,
a, 19,
pupils wrote works modelled on them (cf. p. 65, swpra, and Bkandis, Mhein.
Be.
i.
267),
F2
; ;
68
ARISTOTLE
1
proof by probability,
of
and on
fallacies
and their
dis-
an
Analytic
(Alex. Top.
70),
(cf. other references ap. Bonitz, Ind. Arist. 102, a, 30 sq). It is therefore the original title, and has always remained in common use, notwithstanding that Aristotle cites certain passages of the First Analytic with the word iv tois Trep! avWoyuriiov (Anal,
commentary, quotes from both on numerous points in which they developed or improved Aristotle's
'AvaK.
[ed.
irp6r.
(cf.
post.
i. 3, 11, 73, a, 14, 77, a, 33), or that Alexander (Metaph. 437, 12, 488, 1), 718, 4) and Pt. 28
Tlwophr.
Fr.
call
the
Second
vol. viii.
Analytic
765
;
oiro-
Wimmer], p. 177 sq. 229; Eudem. Fr. [ed. Spengel], p. 144 sq.). For the Second Anathe references are less copious but we know of passages of Theophrastus through Alexander (Anon. Schol. in Ar. 240, b,
lytic
;
SeiKTiK^i,
iv. Jin.,
or that Galen
(De Puis.
De
Libr.
Propr.
vol.
substitute,
2,
and
ap.
Eustrat.
ibid.
242,
the names n. and n. oiroSeffeaij nor have we any right to name them on internal grounds (with
titles,
common
<rv\\oyitr/iov
17), through Themist. ibid. 199, b, 46, and through Philop. ibid. 205, a, 46, and through an
a,
Anon. Schol. ibid. 248, a, 24, of a, remark of Eudemus, all of which seem to refer to the Second Analytic. We know as to Theophrastus, not only from the form
of the title of the'AyoA. irpifa-epa, but also from express testimony (v. Diog. v.42; Galen, Hippocr. et PI. ii. 2, vol. v. 213, and Alex. Qu. Nat. i. 26) that he did write a Second Analytic, and it is probable that in that, as in
n. o-vX\oy urp-ov and MefloSwcJ. Brandis justly remarks (Ue. d. Ar. Org. 261 sq.; Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 1, 224, 275) that the First Analytic is far more carefully
subject
the text, he followed Aristotle. himself cites both Aristotle Analytics under that name Top.
:
We
11, 13, 162, a, 11, b, 32 Soph. El. 2, 165, b, 8 Bhet. i. 2, 1356, b, 9, 1357, a, 29, b, 24, Metaph. vii. ii. 25, 1403, a, 5, 12 12 init. Eth. N. vi. 3, 1139, b, 26, 32 also De Interpr. 10, 19, b, 31 M. Mm: ii. 6, 1201, b, 25 Eth. Eud. i. 6, 1217, a, 17, ii. 6, 1222. b, 38, c. 10, 1227, a, 10;
viii.
;
;
have the Topiea in eight books, of which, however, the last, and perhaps the third and seventh also, seem to have been worked out long after the others (v
BRANDIS,
Ue.
d.
ii.
Gr.-rom. Phil.
its
The
name
is
tions in
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
proof. 1
69
of our Organon,
we have
also the
names of a great
Interpr. 11, 20, b, 26; Anal. pr. i. 11, 24, b. 12 ; ii. 15, 17, 64, a, Rliet. i. 1, 1355, a, 37, 65, b, 16 28, c. 2, 1356, b, 11, 1358, a, 29 ii. 22, 1396, b, 4, c. 23, 1398, a, 28, 1399, a, 6, c. 25, 1402, a, 36, c. 26, 1403, a, 32 ; iii. 18, 1419, a, For the art of proof by 24). probabilities Aristotle uses the ' term Dialectic (Top. init., Rliet. init., etc.), and he refers to the Topics in a similar way as irpayfiareia ir. t^v SiaAe/cri/c^y (Anal, pri. i. 30, 46, a, 30). It is probable, therefore, that by ^e6o5i/c4 i. 2, 1356, b, 19) he meant (Rliet. the Tojnos, which in the opening
; ; '
Porphyry, appears to regard the as belonging, and the former as not belonging, to the
latter
'
Hypomnematic
'
writings.
In
D. 81 we even find a second entry of Me0o$uc&i> a'. The theory of Spengel (Abli. d. Mimchn. A/tad. vi. 497) that our text of the Topics contains grave lacunce does not seem to be proved by the passages he quotes (Rliet. i. 2, 1356, b, 10; ii. 25, 1402, a, As to the former, which 34). refers to the Topics only for the
peBoSov
(i. 12, 105, a, 16 viii. 2 init.) the relative passage is to be found, rather than, as Heitz (p. 81 sq., Fr. Hz. 117) suggests, a lost work; cf. ROSE, Vahlbn, Ar. Zibr. Ord. 120 Wien. Altad, xxxviii. 99 Bonitz,
; ;
difference between o'vWoyur/ibs andeira7<7^ (cf. BrANDIS, Ue. d. Rhet. Ar.' ap. PMlologus, iv. 13), it is satisfied by Top. i. 1, 12. As to the second, which does not apply to Top. viii. 10, 161, a, 9 sq., the words xaBdTrep /cal iv
'
etc., need not be taken as referring to a particular passage, but may be taken as
toij roviKois,
Ztschr. Oesterr. Gymn. 1866, It seems, also, that 11, 774. in several MSS. the Topics were
headed with the title MedoSi/ccfc, so that an idea arose that they were distinct works. This
ideahasbeenattributedto Dionys.
(Up. I.
meaning of objections there are in Rhetoric, as in Topics, many kinds,' i.e. in oratorical use as opposed to disputation, a remark that might well be made even if these distinctions were not taken in the earlier book. For similar USeS Of &1TKep iv 10LS TOTTIKOIS,
'
ad Amm.
2),
6,
p. 729,
on
Mhet.
i.
and does not specially include the Topics in the latter. But D. 52
inserts McfloSi/ca in eight books, and An. 49, the like title in-
Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 101 b, 52 sq., and Vahlen, ut supra, 140 (where the phrase in Rliet. ii. 25 is explained as meaning Instances are here used in the same way as in Topics, and those of four kmds,' etc.). 1 The II. ffotpiffTiKuv iX&yx&v,
etc., cf.
44
sq.,
'
cluding seven books, although both know the Topics as well. So Diog. (v. 29) distinguishes t<x
tc roirtxa koX /ledoSixd and Simpl. (Cat. 16 a, Schol. 47, b, 40), after
;
Alex. Schol. 296, a, 12, and Boeth. in his translation have it) 3o</>iot. e\eyxoi. Waitz (Ar. Org. ii. 528), followed by Bonitz (Ind. Ar. 102, a, 49),
or
(as
21, 29,
70.
ARISTOTLE
:
treatises
2
on Knowledge
byon Definition, on 3 Genera and Species, on Opposition and Difference, 4 on Particular Kinds of Conceptions, 5 on Expression
Classification
in Speech, 6 on Affirmation
shows that Aristotle in the De Interpr. c. 11, 20, b, 26, and
Anal.pri. ii. 17, 65, b, 16, refers to passages of this work (i.e.
c.
and Negation, 7 on SyllogNo. 60, 'OpurruA, four books (cf DiOG. v. 50, for the same title in the list of Theophrastus' works) 63, on the objects of Definition, two books 63 b, De Contradiciione Definitionum 63 c, De Arte Definiendi 64, Upbs robs bpiap.obs, two books (cf. the same from Theophr., Diog. v. 45), translated De Tabula Definiendi. As to the collections of definititles in Pt.: i.e.
. ;
and
c. 5,
167, b, 21), under the name toTs TowiKois ; that he reckons knowledge of fallacies as part of 'Dialectic' (Soph. El. c. 9 fin., cf. Top. i. 1, 100, b, ch. 11 fin.
; ;
23) and that c. 34 is the epilogue not only for these but for Topics.' the whole science of Again, however, Aristotle seems cf. Rket. i. 3, (in c. 2, 165 b, 8 1359, b, 11 cf. Beandis, Gr.ram. Phil. ii. b, 148) to distinguish the two, in a way, however, which proves, not that the two were not meant to form a whole, but that the treatise on fallacies was composed later than the
' ; ;
tions
3
and
n.
eiSSiv,
4 As to the opposition of concepts there was a book TI. t&v avTixe ijLivmv, doubtless the
D. and An.
2o</>.
?A.
is,
125
The lists of do not name the (for that reading in An. as Kose shows, wrong),
MefloSiita
as n. ei/avrlwv (D. 30, An. Simplicius, in his commentary on the Categ. (v. Ar. Fr. 115121, p. 1497, sq. Fr. Hz. 119), gives us some further information as to this book and its casuistical discussions. Rose (Ar. Ps. 130) refers it to the age of Theophrastus. Pt. 12 has n.
32).
;
same
only
Sicupopas,
5
four books.
eight books, whereas Pt. 29, separates them from the Tojiios possibly, however, in (26 b) D. 27, n. ipiffTLKav two books, and An. 27, n. IpitTTLKwv \6yuv two books, are the same as our
;
Itelato (n. rod np6s ti), six books (Pt. 84). 8 De Significations, Pt. 78
its
De
Itun'
i.e.
rpafipaTiKov or -uv.
As
to
n.
it!\.a-ri[)x.i\s,
An. App. 162. The genuineness of the work is doubtful, because it is nowhere else referred to.
2
related title, n. Xe'lewr, cf infra. Pt. 54, Partitio Conditionum qnce statuuntur in voce et ponuntur, four books, may also have been a grammatical
.
another
treatise.
'
Alex. Metaph.
cites
a,
26,
this
simply as 4y
; : ;
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
ns, 1
>pics
71
and
and
it.
KaTtup&ffeas
it
probably, howidentical,
3r,
mding, or possibly
irk
books of "Opoi irpb rap rdirwv that the text of D. is wrong. The An. gives instead two titles 51, "Opuv 0i$\'ov a'; 52, ToiriMJv ('.
:
Here
"Opoi to
SvWoy L<ru.uv a' (D. 5'6, An. 'ZvWoyiGTiKbv KaXopot (D. 57 55 -kuv ftpuv") ^vWoyifffiol ;D.48). 2 To this category belong in 3 first place the treatises placed xt to the MeBooiica in the lists irpb r>v roirav (D. 59, AN. 57)
1
);
r.
natural to refer the 1, the first half of which (c. 1-11) consists in definitions and their explanation, and the seven Topica to books
it is
book
2- 8.
We conjecture,
therefore, in
>ol
.
irpb ruv roiriKtov, 7 books 55) Toitikwv vpbs Tobs Spovs /3' (D. 60, An. 59, PT. 62 as
;
ree
num
>
pica,
Upbs
'6povs tokucwi/)
(i.e.
'
view of the fact that both lists have the number seven, that in D. also the "Opoi was originally distinct from the Topica, and that his text read "Opoi irpb tuv toiriKwv a' TottikZv a/-'. D. 65 and An. 62 name also 'Eirixeipip-oTo;!' a' j8' (Pt. 55, 39, B, 83, 1, B) D. 33 An. 33, 'Yiro/iLvfifiaTa 4irtx^ipv Hutmo., 3 B D. 70, An. 65, QeVeu
:
:
Defniendo Topioo
!
On
ignition in Topics,' Pt. 01); iSlav (D. 32) n. ipar^aeas airoKpiffews (D. 44, AN. 44). andis, however, believes (ut
'.
Progymn.
vra) that these names indicate particular parts of our ly He takes Ta irpb rav pica. rav (elsewhere used for the cf p. 64, n. 1) to be the teg. it book, which in fact we know have been so called by some NON. Schol. in Ar. 252, a, 46) ; "Opos rav -riirav [as Br. reads Toir. irpbs to be books 2-8 n. iSiay, )s upovs, books 6-7
;
.
(Rhet. ed. Hp. II, 69), who ascribes to Aristotle and Theophrastus itoXhh f$i[$\ia fleVewv iirtypa(p6tJ.eva, described by Alex. Top. lfi, Schol. eij to 254, b, 10, as containing
p.
165
W.
tV
gvt uceifiwa. Si eV5oo>i' imxtipytTiv. (Upbs Biatv iirixeipetv means 'to develop the pro and con of a given proposition,' v. Ind. Ar.
283, a, 6: fleVeir are therefore themes for dialectic development or dialectical exercises with an introduction to the way of work282,
b,
57,
&rixeip?)j[iTi/ca!
ok 5 and n. iptar. k. -atroKp. ak 8, as to which we learn from .EX. Schol. 292, a, 14, that many
;
med
it
so,
th a reference to its
T<iea>s
k.
words,
airoKpicreus.
These
jgestions seem to commend imselves except that it is iier to suppose as to the seven
:
of which is quoted by Philof. Schol. 227, a, 46, and the "Tiro/ii/V iiriX*'P- vrfth that which is cited simply as "Tirop-v^ixaTaby DEXIPP. Cat. 40, Schol. 48, a, 4, andSlMPL. Schol. 47, b, 39 following Por-
; ;
72
ARISTOTLE
ancient of these tracts were in reality productions of the Peripatetic school at dates subsequent to Aristotle s
death.
Next
come the
Ehetorical
Works.
Some
of
these
;
were written
interval.
alleged Aristotelian
ifumsmata ( = iiro/iviiiJ.aTa), i.e. No. 69, 2 books and 82, b, 1 book. 82, 16 books The references in Athen. iv. 173, and xiv. 654 to 'Ap. 7) @e6<ppairros
1
amusmata
'
or
'
'
ancients (cf. Ar. Fr. 11 3, p. 1496 ; Pose, At: Ps. 128; Fr. Hz. 116). It dealt probably (cf Soph. El. 4) with the fallacies impb. tV \i\ai. An. 196 names among the Pseud.
rots
{mofivfifiatri
vague and
fied.
= 33[?23] 80 = 31 [? 7] books) bear to the 0e<ms iinxwe cannot say, but we also find
(No. 79
not
and No.
epigrapha a work Tlep\ /ie66Sov. Cf. Rhet. i, 1 init. c. 2, 1356, a, 25 Soph. El. 34, 184, a, 8. 2 two extant Besides the works, this class includes primarily the Theodectean Rhetoric i.e. D. 82 and An. 74, Texvys rijs
1
;
two entries in I). (46 and 47), and one in An. (38) of YiporAaeis a'. The 'Emxe'pww"10 ' *.&yoi, cited by Aristotle in the opening of
c.
2.
@eo84ktou trvvaywyfy [? eifTayuy^f] in one or three books. The extant Rhetoric alludes (iii. 9 fin.)
but chapter of the work itself (449, b, 13 sq., 450, a, 30 sq., 450, b, 11 sq. cf. Bonjtz, Ind. An: 99, a, 38). Under the head of Topics fall also the 'Ev(rrdffeis, D. 35, An. 36, PT. 55, b the TlpOTtLlTflS ipllTTMul $', D. 47, An. 44 Auo-eis ipurrncal 5', D. 28,. An. 29 and Auxipetreis iro<p httmuI, 5', D. 29, An. 31. As to the
work
the
n. (cf
/nvn/i. is
.
not a separate
97, a, p. 241),
Them.
an enumeration iv tois Oeo&e/twhich must mean a work of and proves, even if Rhet. iii. be spurious, the existence of this book in early times.
to
refois,
Aristotle,
first
The compiler
Alex.
tle
1.
speak of Tais
OeoScVri; ypatpelffais
and
this re-
ference also must be at least anterior to Andronicus. The words leave it doubtful whether the writer meant a Rhetoric dedicated to Theodectes, or one written by Aristotle butpublished
1 fin.
by Theodectes
in his
A tract
Tiapb.
tV
xQiv,
named by
own name.
Later classical writers several times attribute to the name 'Bhetoric of Theodectes' the
. :
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
of
73
the
history
of
rhetoric, 1
or
set
out rhetorical
probable
Fr. Hz.
15,
atter meaning, in itself most im(cf. EoSeKTiKal rexvai, ANON, in Ar. Fr. 125, p. 1499,
125
Quintilian,
ii.
this explanagives tion with an 'ut creditum est': Valer. Max. viii. 11, 3 gives it more distinctly) ; or else they name Theodectes directly as the author (ClC. Orat. 51, 172, 57, 194 QuiNTIL.iv. 2, 63 and later writers ap. Kobe, Ar. Ps. 141,
10,
;
:
Ar. Fr. 123 Fr. Hz, 124 sq. com. pare the similar treatment of the title Kicomachean Ethics by Cicero and dthers, de quo p. 97 or else they ascribe to Ariinf. stotle and Theodectes the opinions they find in this book (Dionys. Comp. Verb. 2, p. 8, De Vi Bevws. 48, p. 1101 Quintil. Ar. Fr. 126). If it is i. 4. 18 genuine, which the Fr. at least give no reason to doubt, we should consider it certainly not as a work written by Theodectes and published by Aristotle after his death, but as a work of Aristotle dedicated to Theodectes, in which view, since that orator did not survive the date of Alexander's Eastern expedition, and had become known to Alexander through Aristotle (Plut. Alex. 17 fin.), it would have been composed during the years of Aristotle's residence in Macedonia. The name Tc'xkh (in the Rliet. ad Alex.; cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 139) seems to indicate that it had more than one book, though the
; ; ; ; ;
the Te'X v|[i] o' of D. 79, An. 73 probably meant the extant Rliet. ad Alex. In D. 80 the MSS. vary between KAAjj texvi) and &AA77 Te%vwp trvvayaryj]. If the former is right it Would mean a second recension of our Rhetoric if the latter, a recension of the Tex""'' awaywyi) in neither case would it imply separate works. Of the special tracts, the Tpiwos has been mentioned p. 58, n. 1, supra probably An. App. 153, n. j|Topiiri)$ is merely a duplicate of it. In the title, n. Ae'lews a' j8' (D. 87, An. 79, n. \i\. Ka.6a.pZs cf on a similar book by Eudemus, p. 698, n. 3) Brandis in the Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 1. 79 detects book 3 of our Rlietoric, whose first twelve chapters deal with that subject. This is the more probable that D. 78 gives the Rhetoric only two books, although An. 72 has three books. The others, i.e. D. 85, An. 77, n. fLeye8ovs a' (de quo cf. Rliet. i.
: : :
3,
1359, a, 16, ii. 18 sq. 1391, b, o, S); D. 88, An. 80, n. (rv/ifiovMas [-^j] a (v. Ar. Fr. 136, p. 1501, Ar. Ps. 148, Fr. Hz. 126) AN. App. 177, n. p^Topas % iroKiTucov An. App. 178, Texvi;
31, 1393,
:
^yK&j/uiam-i/ci),
were doubtless
all
spurious, as was also the Mirr\p.ovucbv (D. 117, An. 109) which would be dealt with as an aid to Rhetoric. Pt. 68, Tlapayye\fiaTa seems to be the same as the Tlaoayy. fniropiKris attributed to
eoBeKTera (Rliet. iii. 9) would not necessarily do so. For further details v. Rose, Ar. Ps. 135 sq., and Heitz, 85 sq. As to the remaining titles in our lists which relate to Rhetoric,
plural
Theophrastus by Diog. v. 47, but was in any case not by Aristotle. An exposition of all the
1
rhetorical theories (rexvai) down to Aristotle's own time was given in the Texvuv avvaywy^j (D. 77, as two books An. 71, and Pt.
:
74
ARISTOTLE
1
we have only one preserved to us, 2 in which, however, we possess without doubt the most mature statement of his rhetorical doctrine. The Rhetoric addressed to Alexander is now universally admitted to be spurious. 3
examples,
24, as
yrjs a'
one book), D.
/8',
89, J.vvayu-
'Eykcifiiov
\6yov
and
'Eyicd/uov
and D.
80,
"AWq -r(xv^ v
avmywfti (if that is the right reading) seem to be duplicates only. We hear of it in CiC. Be
Invent,
ii.
2,
6,
Be
Orat.
:
ii.
38,
The same work or an abstract of it seems to be meant by Demetr. Magn. (ap. DlOG. ii. 104) by the title 'Eirnofiii
1
'EvSv/i^/iara pnrropuA
a',
D.
An. 88, miswritten 'EvB. KaX aipicrewv). To the same class belonged An. 127,
;
'Evevfn.ni/jATcov
tAovtov, are counted as pseudepiThe grapha in An. 190, 194. various proverbs and apophthegms quoted from Aristotle (Rose, Ar. Ps. 606 sq. Fr. Hz. 337 sq.) are collected from different sources. 2 I.e. the three books of the Rhetoric. The date of its composition must be the last residence of Aristotle at Athens; cf Erandis in ' Ar. Ehet.' Philol. iv. 8. That it has suffered interpolations and transpositions (e.g. in book ii. c. 18-26 ought to pre; .
Upooifilav a'; but I. Uapoifiiaiv, as in D. 138. With these should be reckoned the Xpeitu a collection
of striking remarks, like Plutarch's Apophthegms, quoted by Stob. Floril. 5, 83,7,30, 31,29,70, 90,43, 140,57, 12, 93, 38, 116, 47, 118,29. But as a saying of Zeno the Stoic is quoted from it (57, 1 2), and as we can hardly credit Aristotle with such a collection of anecdotes, it must either be a forgery or else the work of later writer of the same name,
1-17) was proved by d. Miinchn. A/tad. vi. 483, followed by Vahlen, Z. Krit. Ar. Schr.' Wien. Altad. xxxviii. 92, 121. The genuineness of book iii. has been questioned by Sauppe, Bionys. u. Ar., Gott. 1863, p. 32 Rose, Ar. Ps. 137 n. Heitz, p. 85, 89 SCHAAEschmidt, Samml.Plat. Schr.108, whose view has been followed in
cede
c.
Spengel, Abh.
'
author of our earliest list D. 79, but its authenticity not to be thought of.
(ivvay.
SPENGEL Anaxim.
ix.
it,
Ars
(Ar. Ps. 611) that 'ApicrroTeAovs a misreading for 'Aplcrravos. The same book seems to be what
:
and
last
is meant in Stob. (38, 37, 45, 21) by the citation 4k r&v koivuv 'ApurroreKovs SiaTpifSZv. See its Fr. ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 611, and Hz. 335, The two orations, Fr,
chapters, to Aristotle's contemporary An aximenes of Lampsacus. This suggestion, however, is very questionable ; cf Rose, Ar. Bib. Ord. 100 Kampe, in the Philol.
. ;
ix.
106
sq,
279
sq.
For, apart
ARISTOTLE'S TfiRITINGS
Of the
75
place
2
is
given to collections
as aids
to
of Definitions
from the
'
and Divisions
regarded
arbitrariness of the seems more probable) with the separation of the part attributed Platonic Amipre, it cannot be to Anaximenes from the rest, the genuine. The quotation in Alex. influence of the school of AriTop. 126, Schol. 274, a, 42, from stotle betrays itself throughout, Aristotle, iv t$ twv ayaBav 5icnot only in the persistence of a pV (Ar. Fr.'lW, p. 1496 Fr. method of didactic definitions Hz. 119), is satisfied by M. Mor. i. and divisions, but also in the 2, 1183, b, 20 sq., cf. Eth. N. i. 12, tenor of particular passages. Cf., 1101, b, 11, but may have found its way from that source into the e.g., c. 2 init. (with Rhet. 1. 3) AiaipeVejs also. Aristotle himself c. 3, 1424, a, 12-19 (Polit. vi. 4, 1318, b, 27-38); c. 5, 1427, a, 30 names an 'Eic\oyfy rwv ivavrluv, in (Mh. N. v. 10, 1135, b, 11 sqq., Metapli. iv. 2, 1004, a, 1, where, Rhet. i. 13, 1374, b, 6) c. 8, 1428, after the remark that all oppositions finally go back to that a, 19 sqq. {Rhet. ii. 25, 1402, b, 12 sqq.) c. 8, 1428, a, 25 (Anal, of the %v or tv and its oppopr. ii. 27 init.) ; c. 9 init. (Rhet. site, he adds reBeup'fitrBai 5' $\\uv ravra iv t?? iK\oyrj Ttev ivavriwv i. 2, 1357, b, 28) c. 12 init. (Rhet. and the dis- in the parallel passage, xi. 3, ii. 21, 1394, a, 22) tinction of ivBifiri/ui and yvija\ in 1061. a, 15, it is only ia-rwoav yh.p dUrai TeOeupTjfievai cf. 1004, b, c. 11 sq., though differently put, 33, iravra 8e Hal raWa avaydfieva is of Aristotelian origin (cf Rhet. (paiverm els t& %v Kal rb tr\rj9os' ii. 21, 1394, a, 26) ; c. 17 (Rhet. i. el\Ji<pdQ) y&p 7] bvaywyi] 7}/j.7v. To 15, 1376, b, 31 sq.); c. 28 init. 29 init. (Rhet. iii. 9, 1410, a, 23). the same refers also x. 3, 1054, a, 1 ecrri 8e rod fiev ivbs, &<rirep 'Opioyiol, 13 29 D. 64, An. 61, Ka\ iv Trj Slaipeffei ruv ivavrluv "Opoi, 16 books, books Pt. 59 certainly a later work of the Sieypdipa/iev, rb rairb Kal i/iOiov was School, analogous to the Platonic Kal Xaov, etc. and the tout!)!/ and As to the other ouoiov were themselves given in Definitiones. Metapli. iv. 2, 1003, b, 35, as title, An. 51,Opa>v faPKtov a', cf. examples of the effin toC tvbs p. 71, n. 2, supra. 2 Besides the ' Platonic Divi- treated of in the 'EicKoyli t. iv. cf. also x. c. 4 ad fin. sions ' mentioned p. 63, n. 2, the But in Met. xii, 7, 1072, b, 2 the words lists name the following of this
; ; ;
:
D. 42, Ataipiffets i(' [AN. class D. 43, An. 42, 41, n. Siaipeireuv] AiaiptriKwv a' [Eose leg. -nbv, as
: ;
in the duplicate title D. 62] ; Pt. 52 gives the AiaipeVeis (which might extend to any length according to the subjects chosen), 26 books. Whether the work was different from or identical (as
refer, not to a but to the division of two kinds of o5 evena given just before. Whether the reference
t]
dialpetris BtjKoi
treatise,
the work 'On the Good,' even Alexander did not know (cf. p. 61, n. 1); but since the subject
76
ARISTOTLE
but none of these Most important, there1
the treatise
is
On
a torso
bound up with a number of other fragments, some genuine, some spurious, to form
which
now
arbitrarily
our
on
Metaphysics. 3
Probably,
which Aristotle cites the seems to have been dealt with in the second book n.
'EK\oy)i
rayafloO,
it
a younger contemporary of Andronicus, the title (which never appears before, and is permanent
after that date) may safely be referred to Andronicus himself, whose collection of Aristotle's writings alone explains it for it means, not as Simpl. Phyt. 1,
;
is
probable
that
in
Aristotle
view.
This is the name by which the work was originally cited v. Be Motv, Anim. 6, 700, b, 8. That Aristotle himself so named it, is probable from Metaph. vi. 1,
1
ii.
5)
1026, a, 15, 24, 30, xi. 4, 1061, b, 19 Phys. i. 9, 192. a, 35, ii. 2 fin. Be Ccelo, i. 8, 277, b, 10; Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 318, , 6; Be An. i. for irpini\ QiXoaofy'm 1, 403, b, 16 we also find tpi\o<ro<pia alone (Metaph. xi. 3, 4, 1061, b/5, 25), 0o\oyiKii (Metaph. vi. 1, 1026, a, 19, xi. 7, 1064, b, 3), t\ irsp! tci 0Ela <ptAo<ro<pla (Part. An. i. 5, 645, a, 4), <ro<pla (Metaph. i. 1, 2),
; ; ;
and
fi46oSos
irepl
rijs
apxv*
ttjs
supposed, the Supernatural, but that which in the order of doctrinal development, and of the works as collected, followed after the books on the Natural Sciences (cf. Alex. Metaph. 127, 21 Asclep. Schol. 519, b, 19). It is named in the lists by An. Ill, An. App. 154, and Pt. 49. The latter has the usual Greek reckoning of thirteen books; the former has at 111 k', at 154 '; which leaves it uncertain whether the
;
irpdwqs (Phys. viii. 1, 251, a, 7), as Aristotle's expression for the subject of the book and accordingly the book itself is also
;
editions referred to were incomplete, the one having only A-K, and the other A-I, or whether K and 1 are corruptions of N,
i.e.
spoken of as aotpia, </>i\oo-ocp?a, 8eo\oyla (ASCLEP. Sehol. in Ar. 519, b, 19, 31). Cf. Bonitz, v. 5, Arist. Metaph. ii. 3 sq.
2
A_N.
3
The question of the arrangement of our Metaphysics has been so far established' by Brandis in ' Ar. Met.', Abh. d. Berl. Altad. 1834, Hist. Phil. Kl. p. 63-87, Or.-rom. Phil ii. b. 1,
We
rcb
first
/icTct
<pv<fiKa
Damascus,
541
ii.
sq.,
t&
(putriird
afterwards
3-35), that it is sufficient to refer the reader for earlier theories to the comprehensive account given by Bonitz at p. 30.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
77
(e.g. x. 4,
1056, a, 23, with which cf. v. 10, 1018, a, 25, and x. 6, 1054, b. 34, cf. v. 15, 1021, a. 25) and a discussion reserved in v. 7 ad fin. for another place is to be found in ix. c. 7. The tract n. tov
;
mitted to final revision. Book x. seems to have been intended for a somewhat further advanced
section of the same inquiry (cf. x. 2 init. with iii. 4, 1001, a, 4 sq., and x. 2, 1053, b, 16 with vii. 13), but as it is not brought by Aristotle into any express connection with book ix., it has almost the appearance of a separate treatise. Between these connected books there is inserted, in book v., an inquiry into the different meanings of thirty philosophical conceptions and terms, which stands in no connection with either the preceding or the following book. The Aristotelian authorship of this Arisection is beyond doubt. himself quotes it (in stotle
cf. Metaph. vii. 1 init., x. 1 Gev. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, b, 29, Phys. i. 8, 191, b 29), with the words iv rois irepl rod irotrax&s or
;
noaaxm, however, cannot have originally formed part of the work On the First Philosophy.' It must have been written much earlier as is shown by the citations in the Phys. and in tbe Gen. et Corr. and as an aid to the exact use and understanding of philosophic terms and as such it appears in D. 36, and in An. 37 with the special addition
'
ir.
tov
iroff.
AeyeTcu eKatrrov.
The
Key. ^ rav Kark irp6aNevertheless, Ar. Met. vi. 2 init., alludes unmistakably tov. 7, 1017, a, 7, 22 sq., 31, in the a\\' 4vel tS ov cmKas words \sy6fievov \eyerat TroWax&s, wv %v /ih fy to Kmh. (Tu^jSe/STj/cis, etc., in a way which indicates, by the word fy, that the discussion had already come under the reader's notice. It appears, therefore, that Aristotle actually intended to incorporate our book v. or the contents of it in this part of his work, but never was able to finish the literary connection. As to book xi., the second half (c. 8, 1065, a, 26 sq.), is a compilation from the Physies, obviously not genuine. The first half exactly corresponds in content with
n.
t. ttoct.
Seo-iv.
books
iii.,
iv.,
and
vi.
and
is
therefore either an early sketch of the argument afterwards expanded in them, or else, as Rose (Ar. Lib?: Ord. 156) supposes, a later abstract of them. A point in favour of the latter view is the objectionable recurrence,
78
ARISTOTLE
the doctrine of changeable substances and their causes only in narrow compass, and in a style condensed often to the point of obscurity. This, with the fact that in these chapters the formula pera. Tama. \sc. \eKreov~\ Sti occurs twice (i.e. 3 init., and 1070, a. 4) indicates that it was not a book published by Aristotle, but a set of notes intended as a basis
for lectures, in which many points were only hinted at in the the briefest way, with the knowledge that they would be made plain by oral development. The main theme of the lectures consisted of the points which in the second half of book xi. are treated with special care ; while the more general metaphysical inquiries which were to serve as an introduction or basis for them were only lightly sketched. The matter the lectures dealt with
Be Ar.
Bin. Rat.
a,
Ar. 147,
re found elsewhere. [Thus re occurs in Aristotle almost exclusively in the Ethics and Politics (Eucken, 16) Be 7e almost exclusively in the Physics (ibid. 33), in which also fievroi, KaWoi, and rolvw are much commoner than in the other works (ibid. 35, 51) &pa recurs oftener in the later books of the Metaph. than in the and among earlier (ibid. 50) the ten books of the Ethics, there are many variants as between the three last and the sections i.-iv. or v.-vii., which again vary from one another in diction (ibid. 75 sq.). In this first half of book xi. five of the seven cases of ye fiifv occur in c. 2. Besides, 7e is so often inserted by the copyists that it is always possible some early scribe is partly reBook xii. appears as sponsible.-]
.
.
was no doubt intended to be included in the work on the First Philosophy; and c. 6-10
as far as matter is concerned, exactly fitted to be the conclusion of it. C. 1-5, on the other hand, include nothing which is not contained in the earlier books. The polemic of Kose (Ar. Libr. Ord. 160) against this bookwhich, as will be seen in the next note, is specially well fortified with external evidence has no value as against its Aristotelian authorship, but only as to its connection with our Metaph. The relation of the remaining two books to the rest is not clear; but there is no
are,
an independent treatise, which refers to none of the preceding books, but seems to allude to the
Phys. viii. 10 (esp. 267, b, 17 sq.) in c. 7, 1073, a, 5, and in c. 8, 1073, a, 32, to Phys. viii. 8 sq., and also to the Be Ccelo ii. 3 sq.
is remarkable that while c. 6-10 develop in some detail the views of Aristotle as to the God-
It
reason to hold with Rose (p. 157) that only xiv. is genuine. Aristotle
must have
originally
meant
to include them in the same book, for xiii. 2, 1076, a, 39, refers
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
after Aristotle's death. 1
79
to
b,
iii.
2,
39,
22 he contemplates a treatof Mathematics and the Ideas, which, as appears by xiii. init., was intended to serve as an introduction to Theology (cf. Bbandis, 542, 413 a). On the other hand, in xiv. 1, the obvious reference to x. 1 is not noticed, and vii. and viii. are not referred to at all in xiii. and xiv. (Bonitz, It is inconceivable that p. 26). Aristotle would have repeated a considerable section almost word for word, as is the case with the present text of i. 6, 9, and xiii. But book i., as a whole, 4, 5. must, as well as book iii., which
a,
ment
Aiwn. Urbin.~\ in the Introd. to u, where the name is Pasicrates and Asclep. Sclwl. 520 a, 6, except that he has erroneously transferred the story from a to A). That it was inserted after the other books were collected is clear, not only from its designation, but from the way in which
;
it
closely consecutive books and B, for which reason many of the ancients wished to make it a preface to the Physics, or at least to book i. of the Metaph. (Schol. b, 1 sq.) 589, SYRIAN (ap. Schol. 849, a, 3) mentions that some critics proposed to reject A. These, like Asclepius, probably confused it with o if not, Syrian was right in thinking their sug:
cites it
cf.
i.
(iii.
2, 996, b, 8, cf.
4,
i.
2,
gestion laughable.
1 This seems probable (cf. Zellbk, Abh. d. Berl. Altad.
982, a, 16, b,
xiii.
and 997,
b, 3,
the most probable conjecture that the argument in i. 9, which is apparently more mature than that in book xiii., was inserted
on a second revision of book i., after Aristotle had decided to exclude books xiii. and xiv. from the scope of his main work on Book ii. (a), a Metaphysics.
collection of three small essays, written as an introduction to Physics rather than to Metaphysics (v. c. 3 Schol.), is certainly not by The majority of the Aristotle.
1877, Hist. Phil. Kl. 145) because of the circumstance that most of the genuine books of our Metaphysics were in use at the date of the oldest peripatetic books or fragments which we possess, and that they seem to have been gathered together in the same series of books with the rest at a very early date. Book i., as
above stated, was not only the for Theophrastus in book i. of his History of Physics, but has also left clear traces in what
model
Eudemus, Pasicles of Rhodes (Schol. ap. A r. Opp. 993, a, 29 Schol. in Ar. 589, a. 41 the so[Bekkeh's Philoponus called
; ;
we know of Eudemus, and is the source of the point of view taken by the author of the treatise on Melissus, &c. Books iii. (B) and
iv.
are referred to by
Eudemus,
; ;
. ;
80
ARISTOTLE
Theophrastus
Kiviiceins
book
the
.
toS tract n. Ttoffa%ws \y6/i.ei>ov, by Strato cf the following: (1) Metaph. 1, 981, a, 12 sq., Eudbm. Fr. 2, Speng. (2) i. 3, 983, b, 20,
fifth,
the
Metaph., like book xii., which did not in fact belong to the main treatise, are in use as commonly and at as early a date as those parts which did, it must be conjectured that the whole was put together in the period immediately following Aristotle's death. This theory receives remarkable confirmation from the fact that already in the n.
&W
which
Theophr. Fr. 40; (3) ibid. 1. 30, Eud. Fr. 117 (4) i. 5, 986,
;
b,
Melisso, Xenoph. 468, 484; (5) ibid. 1. 21 sq., THEOPHR. Fr. 45 (6) ibid,. 1. 27, Theophr. Fr. 43, 44, Eud. Fr. 11, S. 21, 7 (7) i, 6, Theophr. Fr. 48 (8) i. 6, 987, b, 32, Eud. Fr. 11, S. 22, 7, Sp. (9) i. 8, 989, a, 30, Theophr. Fr. 46 (10) iii. 2, 996, b, 26, iv. 3, 1005, a, 19, Eud. Fr. 4; (11) iii. 3, 999, a, 6, Eth. Eud. i. 8, 1218, a, 1 ; (12) iv. 2, 1009, b, 12, 21, Theophr. Fr. 42; (13) iv. 6, 1011, a, 12, c. 7, 1012, a, 20, Theophr. Fr. 12, 26 (14) v. 11, Strato apud Simpl. Categ. Schol. in Arist. 90, a, 12-46 ; (i5) vi. 1, 1026, a, 13-16, Theophr. Fr. 12, 1; (16) vii. .1, 1028, a, 10, 20, Eud. Fr. 5 (17) ix. 9, 1051, b,
18
Be
belongs undoubtedly to the third century B.C., book xii. itself is quoted by the title reserved by
Aristotle for his
etc.,
see vol.
i.
Metaph.
irpi&Tlls
i.e.
(piKo<TO(pias
BONITZ,
Tad. Ar. 100, a, 47 sq. the suspicion thrown on the passage by Krische, Forseh. 267, 3. and Heitz, V. 8. 182, is groundless). We may assume, then, with some probabilitythatimmediatelyafter Aristotle's death the finished sections of the work on First Philosophy (i.e. books i., iii., iv.,
were bound up with the other sketches and notes of a like character left by him (i.e.
vi.-x.)
xi. first part, xii., xiii., and xiv.), and that at the same time book v. was inserted between iv. and vi. but that book , and the second half of xi., were first attached by
24,
xii.
Theophr. Fr.
7
init., cf. c.
6,
12,
25; (18)
a,
8,
1073,
22,
BeMotn An.
xii. 7.
700, b, 7; (19)
1072,
a, 20,
Theophr. Fr.
1072, b, 24, c. 1074, b, 21, 33, Eth. Eud. vii. 12, 1245, b, 16, M. Mor. ii. 15, 1213, a, 1 (21) xii. 10, 1075, b, 34, Theophr. Fr. 12, 2; (22) xiii. 1, 1076, a, 28, Eth. End. i. 8, 1217, b, 22; (23) xiv. 3, 1090, b, 13, Theophr. Fr. 12, 2. Since, our therefore, the parts of
xii.
12,5; (20)
7,
9,
ARISTOTLE'S rflilTINOS
81
largest
first
Aristotle's productions.
We
have
They deal with the general and conditions of the material universe, of the earth and the heavenly bodies, of the elements with their properties and relations, and of meteorological These are the Physics, 2 the two conphenomena.
connected together.
basis
gravest doubts. Cf. further, p. 155 sqq. 1 Besides the Books on Philosophy (p. 55, n. 5, and 57), on the Good, and on the Ideas (p. 61, n. 1, 62, n. 1), the nepi fix^ 5 was
ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 615 Fr. Hz. 347) seem to have formed part. It is referred by Rose to the hand of Aristocles of Rhodes, a contemporary of Strato ; but this seems unlikely : cf Heitz, V. S. 294. It cannot, however, have been a genuine work of Aristotle, anditseems to have contained, not philosophical inquiries as to the Godhead.but collections and probably explanations of myths and religious usages. The n. apxvs, from its position in the list of 1). 41, seems rather to have been a metaphysical or physical tract than a political one, but we know nothing of it. As to a ' Theology of Aristotle,' which originated in the Neoplatonic preserved to School and is us in an Arabic translation,
;
.
probably genuine
fin.).
(v. p. 58, n.
1,
The three books n. rixts (An. App. 152) and the Nayixhs were not. The latter is named by Diog. (i. 1. 8, ii. 45), and was also evidently used by Plin. (H. iV. xxx. 1, 2) as Aristotle's, but it is reckoned by An. (191) among the Pseudepigrapha,and we know from Suidas('AvTi<rfl.) that it was attributed sometimes to the Socratic Antisthenes, sometimes to the Antisthenes who was a Peripatetic of Ehodes circa 180 B.C. (lege, by Bernhardy's happy conjecture, 'PoS/m for this book, vide Ar.
'V6$tei>i).
On
Fr
27-30, p.
v.
Dieteeci,
AH.
d.
D.
1,
Heitz, V. S. Fr. Hz. 66 294, 8; Rose, Ar. Ps. 50, who considers it to be a Dialogue. Of the eo\oyo6/j.ya, which was ascribed to Aristotle by Macrob. (Sat. i. 18), the Theogony mentioned by Schol. Eur. Rhes. (28), and the TeXeral spoken of by Schol. Laur. in Apoll. Rhod. iv. 973 (v. these and other quotations
1479
;
morgenl.
117.
2
Gesellsch.
1877,
(in
AN. 148,
,
for
wj'),
as its
'
'
and those of Simpl. Phys. init., An. 148, Pt. 34, &c, name the treatise. Aristotle himself
own MSS
commonly
(pvaLKo.
viii.
1,
calls
only the
first
books
(Phys.
VOL.
I.
82
ARISTOTLE
On
the
nected works
viii.
Heavens and On
Growth and
3, 253, b, 7, cf. ii. 1, 192, b, 20, viii. 10, 267, b, 20, cf. iii. 4 Metaph. i. 3, 983, a, 33, c, 4, 985, a, 12, k;, 7, 988, a, 22, o, 10, xi. 1, 1059, a, 34, cf. Phys. ii. 3, 7; Metaph. i. 5, 986, b, 30, cf. Phys. i. 2 ; xiii. 1, c, 9, 1086, a, 23, cf. The later books he Phys. i.). usually calls rtt irep! Kivfitreas
;
cluded book v. with book vi., with which it is so closely connected, under the name IT. Kivfi<reas. For though in the time of Adrastus (op. Simpl. 16, 2, a) many may have named i.-v. n. apx&v [$v<jikwv~\, as others named the whole, while vi.-viii. bore the
title n. Kiv-hatws under which Andronicus (Simpl. 216, a) also cited them, yet it cannot be shown that this was so in the earliest period. When Theophr. cited book v. as 4k tuv <pv<riKcov he may easily have meant not only this whole treatise but others also (vi supra and cf Simpl. 216, a). When Damasus the biographer and follower of Eudemus (ap. Simpl. 216, a, where it is impossible to read Bamascius the Neoplatonist) speaks of 4k ttjs trepl <pv(rews TrpayiiaTfias Tfjr 'Ap. tuv irepi Kivii:
272, a, 30, 275, b, 21, cf Phys. vi. 7, 238, a, 20, c, 2. 233, a, 31, viii. 10 ; Be Ccelo iii. 1, 299, a, 10, cf. Phys. vi. 2, 233, b, 15 Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 318, a, 3, cf. Phys. viii. ite Sensu c, 6, 445, b, 19, cf.
.
Phys.
n,
vi. 1
refers to B. vi.
1,
Metaph.
B. v.
a,
viii.
;
and
<pva-iK&
i.
to
989,
in
Metaph.
8,
24, xii. 8,
1073, 32, the phrase to it. (p iaews refers not merely to the whole of the Phyiioa, but also to other
<reais rpia, it
he means
vi.,
works on Natural Science (cf. Bonitz and SCHWEBLERasiZZoc). For more general references see
274, a, 21, v rots Trepl tos apx&s, B. iv. 12, vi. 1, Be Ccelo iii. 4, 303, a, 23, irep! xp6vov ko! Kivi\treu>s, and see Ind. ARIST. 102, b, 18 sqq.
rather v., vi., viii. (cf. Rosb, Ar. Libr. Orel. 198 ; Brandis, ii.
782). Indeed book vii. gave even ancient critics the impression of a section not properly
b,
B,
iii.
4,
Be
Ccelo
i.
6,
tells
D.
90,
45
(115)
names a n.
(pvcreas and a n. Kiy^ireus, but the former with three books only.and the latter with one (cf p. 50, n. 1). Simpl. {Phys. 190, a, 216, a, 258,
.
b,
and 320, a) says that Aristotle and his eraipoi (i.e. Theophrastus and Eudemus) spoke of the first
5 books as ^vtrixk or n. apxu>v <pv<ri/ci' and of books vii. and No doubt viii. as n. Kw4]<retes, Porphyry, however, was right (ap. Simpl. 190, a) when he in-
us that Eudemus passed it over in his revision of the whole work. It need not on that account \ e classed as spurious (with Rose, 199), but rather (with Brandis, ii. b, 893 sq.) as a collection of preliminary notes which do not belong to the Treatise on Physics. The text has taken on many interpolations and alterations from a paraphrase, known even in the time of Alexander and Simplicius (v. Simpl, 245, a, b, 253, b, and
cf.
Spengel, Aoh.
d.
Munchn.
ARISTOTLE'S fFRlTINGS
Decay
'
83
as
them under
Altad. Hi. 313 sq.), but the original text is to be found in the smaller edition of Bekker and in that of Prantl. The Aristotelian origin of B. vi. c, 9, 10 is rightly
Ar. Meteorol.
i.
415,
ii.
ii.
199 (nor
from Cic.
JV.
B.
15,
and Pldt.
Plae. v. 20) infer that the n. oipavoi was originally more complete or existed in a recension
different
''
maintained by Brandis
against Weisse. 1 The n. oipavoi in
n.
yevetrews
/col
(ii.
b,
889)
4,
rpSopas
ytica
Pt. 37, n. fucrtiipuv S' % /iE; TfapoffKoirid ; Pt. 76 do. with two
books. The current division of these books, however, can hardly be derived from Aristotle, for books iii. and iv. of the n. oipavov are more nearly connected with the other treatise than are the earlier books. Aristotle recognises both by a short reference to their contents in the beginning of the Meteorol., and by citing Be Ceelo ii. 7 in Meteorol. i. 3 wepl tov &va> tottov iv . rots irepl rod irotelv leal Traa-^iv Siaipiafiivois to the Gen. et Corr. i. 10 (not Meteor, iv.) Be Sensu c, 3, 440, b, 3, 12 (iv to'is irepi to the 6en. et Corr. ii. juif ems)
. . . ; ;
books only.
observed,
This work, as above places itself, in its opening chapter, in immediate connection with the works last discussed and its genuineness is beyond doubt. Aristotle himself does not, name it (for Be Plant. ii. 2, 822, b, 32 is a spurious book), but he frequently recalls its doctrines; cf. Bonitz, lnd. Ar. 102, b, 49. According to Alex. Meteor. 91 and Olympiod. ap. Ideler, Ar. Meteor, i. 137, 222, 286, Theophrastus in his
;
fiiTap(rioXoyiKa(T>lOG.v.
44)seems
to have imitated
2,
Be An.
aroix^uiv).
A work
IT.
ovpavov is
ascribed by Slit.P.(Be Ccelo, Schol. in Ar. 468, a, 11, 498, b, 9, 42, 502, a, 43) also to Theophrastus, who is said to have followed the lines of Aristotle's book. With this exception the earliest witnesses to the existence of the work are Xenarchus and Nicolaus
of
Ideler (ibid, i. vii. sq.) shows that it was known to Aratus, Philochorus, Agathemerus, Polybius, and Posidonius. Eratosthenes, however, seems not to have known it cf. Hid. i. 462. Of the four books,
it.
;
the last seems from its contents not to have originally belonged to the same treatise. Alex.
(Meteor. 126, a) and Ammon. (ap. Olympiod. in Ideler, Ar. Meteor, i. 133) prefer to connect it with the IT. yevio-eus ; but it is not adapted to that work either. SiEce it has all the appearance of being Aristotelian, and is cited by Aristotle (Part. An. ii. 2, 649, a, 33 ; cf. Meteor.
Damascus
ii.
(v.
rom. Phil.
b, 952),
no doubt of the authenticity either of these books or of the n. yevio-tas. From StOB. Eel. i.
486, 536
we
cannot, with
Idblee
84
ARISTOTLE
Gen. An.
iv. 6,
cf Meteor,
33), it
383, b,
must be
6,
the Meteorology was begun (v. Meteor, i. 1 ad fin.), but which in the end took the place of the further matter that remained to be dealt with at the end of book iii., which obviously does not itself bring the treatise to a close. As Bonitz (Ind. Ar. 98, b, 53) notices in criticising Heitz,
apx&v (ibid. 93), n. Kiv^atus (D. An. 102, I B; Pt. 17, 45, 115 8 B the same again as Auscultatio physica, at No. 34 and perhaps also as n. apxys at D. 41). In what relation the same work
; ; ;
book (c. 8, 384, b, 33) cites Meteor, iii. 677, 378, a, 15 (cf. on this subject Idelee.iJmZ. ii. 347this
360
Spengel,
'
Ueb.
d.
Reihen-
Abhandl. d. Miinohn. 150 sq. Brandis, Gr.rom. Phil. ii. b, 1073, 1076; Rose, Arist. Libr. Ord. 197). The doubts alluded to by Olymd. Arist.,'
Akad.
v.
piod. ibid. i. 131, as to book i. are unsupported the reasons given by Ideler (i. xii. sq.) for holding that two recensions of the Meteor, existed in antiquity are not convincing. The points which he supposed to have been found in another edition of this, are for the most part referable to
;
stands to the titles n. (pi<rtu>s (D. 90 as three books, An. 81, as one) bvaucbv a! (D. 91) or n. (pvffiK&v a' (An. 82) is not clear. An. App. 170, Pt. 85 n. xptvov might also be only an extract including Phys. iv. 10-14, though it is preferable to think of it as a special treatise by some of the Peripatetics. Aristotle himself refers with the words iv ro?s it. (rTOLx^vv in the De An. ii. 11, 423, b, 28, and the De Sensu, 4, 441, a, 12, to the Gen. et Corr. ii. 2 sqq. Whether in D. 39, An. 35, the title n. otoixeW y' only refers to this work (possibly in connection with De Cosh iii. and iv., cf. p. 50, u. 1 or with Meteor, iv., cf. X*r. Hz. 156), or whether it means a special collec: ; ; :
tion of several Aristotelian tracts relating to the elements, or whether there was a separate treatise (which could not be con-
other works, and where that is not so (Sen. Qu. Nat. vii. 28, 1 of. Meteor, i. 7, 344, b, 18) our
;
informant may be
is
in error.
But it
must remain an open question. So, again, as to the book n. tov irdirxfiv % ireTrovBjvcu (D. 25) Aristotle in De An. ii. 5, 417, a, 1, and in Gen. Anim. iv. 3, 768, b, 23 refers by the
sidered genuine)
:
may
have come from an edition that had been expanded by a later cf hand or largely added to Bkandis, p. 1075. The Physios have the following titles n. apx&v % (pitrem a' (An. 21), iv rols ir. toiv hpx&v Tjjs 8Aijs <pv<rea>s (Themist. De An. ii. 71, 76), iv rols ir. tuv
; 1
:
formula, iv to?s it. tov iroteTv Kai irdtrxeiv, to Gen. et Corr. i. 7 sq.. a reference doubted by Trende-
lenburg (De An. ibid.) and by Heitz (V. S. 80), but which it seems impossible, on comparison of the passages, to reject (cf. with Gen. An. p. 324, u, 30
sq.
;
with
De An.
;
416, b, 35,
and
323, a, 10 sq.
with
De An. 417
ARISTOTLE' 8 WRITINGS
aother class of writings, less directly akin, are the
1,
ctSiJ-
27jjua<ra[(]
title'
xeifu&vwi/,
or in the
ov,
etc.,
and
325,
(Tvfj.-
Keywpev, etc.).
It
jgests itself, therefore, either apply the title in Diog. this section only or to the tole of book i. If, however, a parate treatise is meant, then seems more likely that it was alogous to the Gen. et Corr. that (as Trend. Gesch. Kategor., 130, supposes) it lated generally of the eateries of Action and Passion. ith Physics also was connected 3 tract De qucestionibus JiyUcis, 50, and perhaps also Pt. 75, aecidentibus wniversis, both thout doubt spurious. So must also An. App. 184, n. Kiapov
Ar. Opp. ii. 973, n. tryfietav), for the Fr. of which v. Fr. Hz. Ar. Fr. 237 sq. 1521 157 Ar. Ps. 243 sq. The n. irova.ji.av (Ps.-Plut. De Fluv. c. 25 ad fin. Heitz, V. S. 297 Fr. Hz. 349) seems to have been a
ap.
;
;
late compilation.
lier
Of much
ear-
'.
'eaeas,
which
cannot
have
en written by Aristotle, who decisively combats the idea a beginning of the world. e bopk n. k6o-/iov (which is not 2n known to our three lists) was itten at the earliest 50-1 B.O.t Zeller, Ph. d. Or. iii. a, 558. e so-called quotation from a irk n. ^i|eais, given by Minoides Aristotle's n. <puy ko! x v *- v ?nas, in his edition of Gennawas lost, so that it was necessary Ariis against Pletho (Fr. Hz. 157), to rely on Theophrastus. longs perhaps to the Siatpia-eis stotle himself alludes in Meteor. 2. Many ii. 3, 359, b, 20, to some more jken of p. 75, n. the books we hear of as re- extended inquiry into the quali;ed to the subject of the Meteor. ties of things relating to the im to have been spurious, sense of taste and since in the work n. kvijiav (Achill. late De Sensu, c. iv. ad fin., further inquiries on the same sub.T. in Ar. c. 33, 158 A; Fr. 350 ROSE, Ar. Ps. 622) was ject are projected as part of the jribed to Aristotle, probably work on Plants, it is a question a confusion between him and whether we should refer the eophrastus (de q. v. Diog. v. allusion in Meteor, ii. to a sepaAlex. Meteor. 101, b, 106, a, rate book n. x uM'" ,'i ar) d eg* and so with the 2i)M e ' a consider it rather as a later in;.) i/itbvav (D. 1 12, or ap. An. 99, terpolation referring to De Sensu'
;
(according to Rose, either by Theophrastus or of his time) is An. App. 159 Pt. 22, n. ttjs tow NefAou &i/aj8ci<re<tts, de q.v. ROSE, Ar. Ps.239 sq.; Ar. Fr. The Fr. Hz. 211. p. 1520; treatises De Humoribits and De Siecitate, ap. Pt. 73, 74, cannot be genuine, as they are mentioned nowhere else. As to the n. xp/4oto)j', well founded objections have been raised by Prantl (Ar. ii. di Farben, Munch., 1849, cf. 107, 115, 142, etc.). p. 82 Alex, in Meteor. 98, b, and Olympiod. in Meteor. 36,a(ap.lDELER, Ar. Meteor, i. 287 sq.) allege that Aristotle wrote a book n. x v P''', but neither seems to have known it. So Michael of Ephesus, De Vita et M. 1 75, b, remarks that
;
date
;.
8(3
ARISTOTLE
mechanical,
optical,
mathematical,
tracts. 1
and astronomical
c. 4,
and Be An.
ii.
10.
Aristotle
ad fin.').
The
n. ar&iiuv Tpap.piS>v
contemplates at the end of Meteor, iii. a work on Metals, and the commentators mention a f>Lov6(3iP\os t. fiETtlWtov. See Simpl. Phys. 1, a; Be Cceln, Schol. in Ar. 468, b, 25 Damaso.
;
{Ar. Opp. ii. 968 sq.), which in our lists is only named by Pt. 10, and never cited by Aristotle himself, was also ascribed with
likelihood to Theophrastus by Simpl. Be Ccelo, Schol. in Ar. 510, b,10, and Philop. Oen.et Corr. 8 b, whereas Philop. ad Gen. et Corr. 37, a, and ad Phys.
much
Be Ccelo, ibid.
454,
a,
22; Philop.
Phys. a, 1, m. (who, however, on the Meteorologia,i. 135 id., speaks as if he did not know such a tract) Olympiod. in Meteor, i. 133 id. Some, with more reason, attribute the book to Theophrastus (Pollux, Onomast. vii. 99,
;
m.
8,
treats it simply as
Its
by
Ari-
x. 149; cf.
Be
126,
a,
ii.
161
Ps.
Id.;
and
sq.,
see
261 sq. Ar. Fr. 242 sq. S. 1523; Fr. Hz. 161). Against the idea that Meteor, iii. 7, 378, b, 5 iv.
Arist.
;
;
Rose,
254
The reference in Eutoc. ad Archim. de Cire. Bimens. praam. does not mean that Aristotle wrote a book on squaring the circle the allusion is merely to Soph. El. 11, 174, b, 14 or Phys. i. Without further 2, 185, a, 16. explanation Simpl. (Categ. 1
;
kuI
384, b, 34, refers to the n. i^t. (on which see Heitz, p. 68), see
8,
98, b, 53.
We
but the extant Mrixavwa (in D. 123; AN. 114, called firixavutbv [-], but more
metalli "correctly ap. Pt. 18, Mrix. irpofodinis (Hadschi Khalfa, ap. fl\ll)x.a.Ta) are certainly not from Wenrich, Be Auct. Gr. Ve<s. the hand of Aristotle cf. Rose, Arab. 160). The tract on the Ar. Libr. Ord. 192. D. 114. Magnet (n. ttjs \i6ov, D. 125; 'O-xTitibv a! [-&v, se. irpofiArif/.dTaiv'] AN. 103, 'OwTuca. Pi$\ta; cf. An. 117 ; Rose, Ar. Ps. 242 Fr. H. 215) was probably spuri- David in Categ Schol. 25, a, 36 ous. That Be lapidibus, which Anon. Proleg. in Metaph. ap. was much used by the Arabs Rose, Ar. Ps. 377, andi<V. Hz. 215 (Hadschi Kh. loo. eit. 159; see 'Otttiko, TrpoHKiiii.., V. Marc. p. 2 and Meyeb, Nicol. Bamasc. Be plan- p. 8. It is clear from a reference Rose, Ar. Libr. in a Latin translation of Hero's tis, praef. p. xi. Ord. 181 sq., Ar. Ps. 255 sq.), KaToirTpiKa, (circ. 230 B.C.) ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 378 Ar. Fr. 1534 was certainly so. 1 MaBiHMTiKhv a' (D. 63 AN. Fr. Hz. 216, and from the Pseud. 53), n. rijs iv to"j p.a8r)p.a,<riv Ar. Problems, xvi. 1 ad fin., that such a book had currency under o-iaias (An. App. 160), n. p.ovdSos (D. Ill; AN. 100), n. /leyttovs Aristotle's name at an early date, (D. 85 An. 77, unless this was Its genuineness is not, however, a Rhetorical tract; see p. 72, 2 assured, though it is very pro;
know nothing
of the
Be
mm
ARISTOTLE'S \RITINGS
Next
to the Physics
87
treatises
come
life.
Some of these
To the
and the
to be referred which are mentioned by Hadschi Khalfa (p. 159-161) De siderum arcanis, De sideribus eorumque areanis, De stellis labentibus, and Mille
titles
:
de astrologia jiidiciaria. to the accuracy of the other mathematical and related writings, we can decide nothing. The attempt of Rose (Ar. Libr. Ord. 192) to prove that none of them
verba
As
can
be
Aristotle's
Tti
does
(II.
;
not
(naddirep
SgIkvutcu
iv
rots
irepl
succeed. 1 n.
$a latopla
(ywv
aavpohoylav dewpiiiiatnv), and De Ccelo, ii. 10, 291, a, 29 (irep! li > rris rd^ews abruv etc. e/c twv irepl cunpaXoylav Sevpelrrdai Aeyerai yip Uavms) ; SlMPL. on the De Ccelo, Schol. 497, a, 8, appears to have the same in his mind. The existence of the book is accepted, of modern scholars, by Bonitz (Ind. Ar. 104, a, 17 sq.) and Prantl (ad n. obp. p. 303) ; while Heitz (S. V. p. 117) thinks it probable, though in Fr. Hz. 160 he refuses to decide. Blass (Rhein. Mtts. xxx 504) applies the references to writings by other hands. Ideler (Ar. Metaph. i. 415) assumes a varying recension of the De Ccelo,
la-ropias i', An. App. 155 the same is meant by D. 102 and An. 91, n. ftW, nine books, and by Pt. 42). The Arabic writers
count ten,
books,
fifteen,
or nineteen
ex-
panded
extant
text
by
various added tracts ; cf. Wenrich, De Auet. Grcec. Vers. 148. Aristotle quotes it by various names itTTopiat [_-ia] ir. ra $a (Part. Anim. iii. 14, 674, b, 16 ;
:
iv. 5,
680,
a,
1
;
iv. 8
ad
Jin.
iv.
;
10, 689, a, 18
iv.
13, 696, b, 14
Gen. An.
IffTopiai
ii.
7r.
i.
4, 717, a,
c.
33
i.
20,
;
16, init.)
twc
$W (Part. Anim.
;
1, init. c.
i.
Anim. Anim.
3,
12, 477, a,
iii.
5, Jin.),
iVropfd
ij>v<rwi)
;
(Part. Anim. ii. 3, 650, a, 31 Ingr. An. c. 1, Jin.), and simply iffropiai or iirropla (De Respir. 1 6, 478, b, 1 ; Gen. Anim. i. 11, 719, ii. 4, 740, a, 23 a, 10 c. 7, 746, iii. 1, 750, b, 31 ; c. 2, 753, a, 14 b, 17 c. S.A'ra. ; c. 10/ra. c. 11 Jin.
; ; ;
;
88
In
ARISTOTLE
Hbitz, 224
sq.
;
Clemens, Ptedag. ii. 150, C (cf. and Physiology than a descrip- Athen. vii. 315, e) seems to tion of animals. As to the plan refer to the same lost work, and of it, cf. J. B. Meyeb, Ar. Apollonius (Mirabil. c. 27) menThierk. Ill sq. Its genuineness is beyond question, though as to the tenth book, it must be taken
to be, not
Hist. Anim. Heidelb. 1842), a retranslation of a Latin translation of a section written by Aristotle to follow book vii., but wholly spurious with Schneider (iv. 262, i. xiii.), Eose (Ar. Libr. Ord. 171), and Brandis (Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. 6,
tions it, distinguishing it expressly from the extant Hist. An. (n. &W). Parts of this lost work are probably indicated by the names: n. Bripiuv (EeATOSTH. Catasterismi, c. 41, and therefrom the Scholion in GebmanICUS, Aratea Phcenom. v. 427, Arat. ed. Buhle, ii. 88) ; "Tirep
riov [Av8o\oyovfj.4vav (paiv
(D. 106;
An. 95); imep rwv ffwderaiv t av (D. 105; AN. 92); n. twv <pwKiv6vToiv (Ptol. 23,
lin").
1257). Apart from anything else un-Aristotelian assumption of a female semen would prove this of itself. No doubt this book is the same as- that in D. 107, An. 90, fmcp [Trepl] toO As to Alexander's reliAl yevvlfv. ported assistance for the whole work, cf. p. 29 sq. mpra ; and as to the sources used by Aristotle, cf ROSE, Ar. Libr. Ord. 206 sq Besides this History of Animals, there were known to the ancients various similar works. Athenseus, for example, uses one work different (as is clear from his own words) from our Hist.. An., under the names iv t<j> tt. Z<jW, iv rots tt. Z. (Rose, Ar. Ps. 277, and Heitz, 224, unnecessarily read
'fari
tufu-
the
44 attributes a treatise of that name, doubtless the same, to Theophrastus, from which come the Fragm. 176-178, Wimm. apud Athen. ii. 63 c. iii. 105 d; vii. 314, b. To it also refers the notice in Pltjt. Qu. Conn. 8, 9, 3, which Rose, Ar. Fr. 38, refers to the Dialogue ' Eudemus,' and Heitz, Fragm. Ar. 217, to the larpiKa.
v.
Diog.
The citations from this and similar works, sometimes under the name of Aristotle, sometimes of Theophrastus, will be found in
Rose, Ar. Ps. 276-372; Ar. Fr. 257-334, p. 1525 sq. Fr. Hz. 171 sq. PLIN. (H. Nat. viii. 16, 44) says Aristotle wrote about fifty, and Antigonus (Mlrab. c. 60 [66]) says about seventy books on Animals. Of all these it is clear that none but the first nine of our Hist. An. were genuine. The work which Athen. used (which is not Aristotle's style, to judge by the Fr.') seems to have been a compilation from them
;
ZojlKBJI'),
iv
T$
TT.
Zlp'iK&V,
iv T<p
Ztfitov
iTrtypatyofiivep ZtpiKqi, iv
ty
r$
it.
'IxSiuv, iv tip ir. Ztpixuv Hal 'IxBiuv, iv T<f ir. 'Ij8iW ; but
[al]
at the -same time he curiously our Hist. An. v. ? as Tiifanov notes of tt. (jfuv jioptav (see the
cites
Schweighauser on the passages in question e.g. ii. 63, b iii. 88 c. vii. 281 sq., 286, b; and the Index, and see Rose, Ar. Ps. 276 sq.; Ar. Fr. Nr. 277 sq.;
; ;
and other
ARISTOTLE'S pRITINGS
Anatomical Descriptions. 1
the three books
anthropological
89
The
latter class
begin with
On
the Soul, 2
follow. 3
tracts
The
Be
further
i.
investi-
1 The 'Avaro/ial (seven books, in D. 103, An. 93) are very often cited by Aristotle (cf. Bostitz, Ind. Ar. 104, a, 4, and Fr. Hz. 160), and it is not possible with Rose {Ar. Mir. Ord. 188) to explain these references away. know from H. An. i. 17, 497, a, 31, iv. 1, 525, a, 8, vi. 11, 566, a, 15 Gen. An. ii. 7, 746, a, 14 Part. An. iv. 5, 680, a, 1 and BeRespir, 16, 478, a, 35, that the 'Avaro/iai
; ;
a, 30,
Interpr.
16, a, 8,
Be
We
were furnished with drawings, which were perhaps the principal point of the work. The Schol. on Ingr. An. 178, b (after Simpl. Be Anima), can hardly have cited the work from his own knowledge. Apuleius {Be Mag. c. 3fi, 40) talks of a work of Aristotle,
n. (ipuv
avarofirjs,
it is
as universally
known; but
seldom men-
&W
104,
fioplav.
the work
39
iK\oy)j avaropuv, D. An. 94, Apollon. Mvrab. c. was certainly not by Ari-
Heitz {Fr. 171) rightly rejects Rose's opinion {Ar. Ps. 276) that the avarofial were one work with the ^Si'/ca. An. 187 gives an avaTofii) avBpdyrov among the Psendepigr. Aristotle did
stotle.
D. and An. do not mention the work but Pt. 38 has it whereas D. 73 and An. 68 give reis it. ti/vxhs a'. The Eudemus ought also to be reckoned with Aristotle's psychology the see accounts of it at pp. 55, n. 4, 56,
; ; :
ju.
2,
3
supra.
no human anatomy
iii.
The n. ifivxvs is often cited Aristotle in the lesser treatises presently to be mentioned (BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 102, b, 60 sq.), and in the Gen. An. ii. 3, v. 1, 7, 736, a, 37, 779, b, 23, 786, b, 25, 288, b, 1, Part. An. iii. 10, 673,
by
To this class belong the following extant treatises, which all relate to the Koivh (rd^aros Kai $vxris ipya. {Be An. iii. 10, 433, 20): (1) n. aiV0Vs ical <ua8-r\tuv. Its proper name probably was n. ala-S^creus only (cf. Idelee, Ar. Meteor, i. 650, ii. 358) and it is cited by Aristotle in the n. (. fwpiav and the n. f.
;
90
ARISTOTLE
wide sense, as including
Be Memor.
c.
I,
init.,
Be Somno 2, 456, a, 2 {Be Motu Anim. c. 11 Jin.), and announced as coming in the Meteor, i. 3, 341, a, 14. TBENDELENBURG.Xte An.
118 (106) sq. (contra Rose, Jr. i&r. 0?yZ. 219, 226; Beandis, Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 2, 1191, 284 BONITZ, Tnd. Ar. 99, b, 54, 100, b, 30, 40) believes that the n. aiaB. is mutilated, and that it is a separated section of it which is preserved as the 4k tov irepl aKovarav, Ar. Opp. ii. 800 sq. It is certain that some of the references in later writings cannot be satisfactorily verified in our present text. According to the Gen. An. v. 2, 781, a, 20, and Part. An. ii. 10, 656, a, 27, it was explained iv rots irepl aiaBiiaeas that the canals of the organs of sense started from the heart; but, on the contrary, in the only applicable passage of the extant treatise (c. 2, 438, b, 25) we are told that the organs of smell and sight are seated near the brain, .out of which they are formed, but those of taste and touch in Ihe heart. It is not until the Be Vita et M. c. 3, 469, a, 10 that he adds that the heart is the seat of perception for the other senses also (only not ipavepas as for these); and here 1. 22 sq. refers to the passage of the n. aiVfl. just cited (for it is only there, and not in the Part. An. ii. 10, as cited Tnd. Ar. 99, b, 5, that the different positions are assigned to the organs of sense). From these factsit does not follow that a section dealing with this point is omitted in our text, but rather that the words iv rots ir, alaB. in Gen. An. v. 2 and Part. An. ii. 10 are to be taken in a
;
preface. The will account for the statement in Part. At. ii. 7, 653, a, 19 that Aristorle would speak %v re rots ir. al<T&f}<retvs Kal tt. virvov diwpurfAEi'ots of the causes and effects of sleep. The subject is to be found only Be Somno, 2, 3, 458, a, 13 sq, and no fitting place for its introduction can be found in our n. aiVfl. Probably it did not occur in the original text either and we are to understand the referet.ce as indicating by n. alo-0. the general, and by n. Stti/ov the particular description of one and the same treatise (in which view re should
as
;
perhaps be dropped). So finally in Gen. An. v. 7, 786, b, 23, 788, a, 34 there are allusions to investigations as to the voice in rots it. tyvxfis and 7r. aia8i)aeu>s. These are to be referred chiefly to Be An. ii. 8, and secondarily to c. 1, 437,a,3sq.,446,b,2sq.,andl2sq., whereas the beginning of c. 4 of the Be An. itself tells us that it was beyond the plan of that treatise to give any detailed account of voice and tone, such as we find in the extant fragment n. attovvrSiv. The last-named work is never cited by Aristotle, and
contains no express references to any of his"books. In fact its own broad and sketchy methods of exposition show it to be the work
its
Kal
avap.vl\aeus,
quoted in the Be Motu An. c. 11, ad fin. and by the Commentators. The book of Mnemonics ncticed
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
p. 72, n. 2 fin: supra,
91
has nothing
ing
to do with
(3) II. Hvvov Kal i-ypTiy6ptreas cited De Longit. V., Part. An., Gen. An., Motu An., and announced as in contemplation ( Ind. Ar. 103, a, 16 sq) by De An. iii. 9, 432, b, 11, De Sensu, o. 1, 436, a, 12 sq. It is freit.
Rose, Ar. IAlr. Ord., refers to Hist. An. iii.. 3, 513, a, 21), and as the Essay on Life and Death is spoken of
(cf.
who wrongly
Kal Birxou
(Gbll.
vi.
6,
Alex. Top.
279, Schol 296, b, 1, copied Suid. lurf/py, Alex. De Sensu, 125, b, Michael, in Arist De Mem. 127, a, Ptol. 4). It is, however, clear from Arist. Divin. in Somn. c. 2, fin., that it was in fact bracketed with (4) n. 'Ekuitviuiv and (5) n. rrjs kuB' "Tti/ov. fiavTtKrjs. (4) is also in the De Somnn, 2, 456, a, 27, announced as in preparation. (6) n. naxpo/HtdTTjTOS Kal Ppaxvf3i6TT]Tos, cited,
An
iii.
10,
673, a, 30, and by name Athen. viii. 353, a, Pt. 46, and perhaps also An. App. 141. (7) n. ai?jr Kal davdrov to which (8) n. avairvoijs, is in Aristotle's view so closely related that they form
:
Brandis (1192 sq.) suggests that only the first half of the so-called Parva Naturalia' (Nos. 1-5) was composed immediately after the De Anirna; and that the rest of these (which in Ptolemy's catalogue stand at No. 46 sq. divided from the books on Sense, Sleep, and Memory by the books on Zoology) were not written until after the works on the Parts, the Movement, and the Generation of Animals, though projected earlier. And it is true that in the De Generat. Anim. iv. 10, 777, b, 8, we hear that inquiries into the reason of the varying duration of life are projected, and these are not further dealt with in that work. But on the other hand the Part. An. iii. 6,
'
669. a, 4 refers to
10, 16,
De
Respir.
c.
b,
o.
et
M.
c.
and the same iv. 13, 696, 1, and 697, a, 22, to De Respir. 10, 13; and Gen. An. v. 2, 781,
De
Respir.
c.
21,
a, 20,
There was a third 486, b, 21). tract n. vi&Trrros Kal yiipais, spoken of by Aristotle (467, b, 6, 10), to which our editors ascribe the first two chapters of the n. fays Kal Bavdrov, but clearly without reason, for it seems more probable either that Aristotle never wrote the tract or that it was lost at a very early date (cf. Brandis, 1191, Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 103, a,
,
(cf.
26
sq,
Heitz,
p. 68).
Inasmuch
as the De Vita et Morte, c. 3, 468, b, 31 (cf. De Respir. c. 7, 473, a, 27) mentions the Essay on the Parts of Animals as already exist-
where the other references are more problematical). If Brandis is right, these references must have been added, as does sometimes happen, to works previously completed. As to the genuineness of the writings already named, it is guaranteed not only by internal evidence, but by the references referred to. Another projected tract, n. v6aov Kal Kleins (De Sensu c. 1, 436, a, 17,
Long.
c.
Respir.
ii.
An.
7,
92
ARISTOTLE
On
on
the Parts of
gations
essays
the
Generation
653, a, 8), was probably never written (though Heitz, p. 58 and Fr.Ar. 169, thinks otherwise). It
is
unknown
to
Alexander, De
Sensu, 94, and therefore it is likely that the De Sanitate et Morbo known by the Arabic writers
(Hadschi Khalfa apud Wenrich, 1 60) was a forgery. Two books IT. oi^ea? (AN. App. 173) and one n. (pwpijs (ibid. 164) could hardly be genuine (cf. p. 86, n. 1). book n. Tpa</>7).v seems to be re-
ferred to as existing in the Be Somno, c. 3, 456, b, 5 (the reference in Meteor, iv. 3, 381, b, 13 being too uncertain), and it is spoken of as a project in De An. ii. 4 fin., Gen. An. v. 4, 784, b, 2, Part. An. ii. 3, 650, b, 10, and c. 7, 653, b, 14, and c. 14, 674 a, 20,
and
a,
iv.
4,
678, a,
19.
The
re-
ference in
10 (cf
words
r)
iraiTrtpla
tov &\-
the words
tIstjtov ^fupfcov irj/eifiaTos Sia/xovf) (n. irvev. init.). (So Bonitz, Ink. Ar. 100, a, 52 but ROSE, Ar. Libr. Ord. 167 makes them refer to the
;
Peripatetic cf. further op. Rose, Ar. Libr. Ord. 167, sq., and Brandis, p. 1203, who both with Bonitz reject the book. 1 n. $wv fiopluv four books (in An. App. 157, three books) cited in the De Gen. An., Ingr. An., Motu An. (cf. Ind. Ar. 103, a, 55 sq), and the De Vita et M. and De Respir. (de a. r. p. 91, supra) but the De Somno, 3, 457, b, 28 might be referred to De Sensu, 2, 438, b, 28, though De Somno, c. 2, 455, b, 34 may be better paralleled by Part. An. iii. 3, 665, a, 10 sq., than by De Sensu, 2, 438, b, 25 sq. It is spoken of as projected in Meteor. i. 1, 339, a, 7, and Mist. An. ii. The first book is 17, 507, a, 25. a, kind of introduction to the zoological works, including the treatises on the Soul, and the activities and conditions of life, and it cannot well have been originally meant for this place (cf. Spengel, ' On the order of Aristotle's books on Natural Philosophy,' Abh. d. Munch. Altad. iv. 159, and the, others there
:
cited).
2
(in
&W
work
where
is it
named
is
in Pt. No.
20,
Pt. No. 44, five books, ibid. No. 77, the same work in two books the errors are of no signi;
wrongly given three books. It dealt with food and other matters in an aphoristic style; and that it is later than Aristotle is clear from the fact that it
recognised the distinction of veins and arteries, which was unknown to him (cf. Ind. Ar. 109, b, 22, sq.). In any case it is
ficance).
It is often referred to
future
but only in the Ind. Ar. 103, b, 8 sq.). Dioo. omits it but its genuineness is beyond doubt. Book v., however, seems not to belong to it, but to be an appendix to the works on the Parts and Generation of Animals, just as the
Aristotle,
(cf.
;
by
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Animals, 1 complete his zoological system.
date, but earlier in their place in his teaching,
lost
'
93
Later in
were the
this
books On Plants?
'
are to the Be For summaries of the Anima. contents of the Part. An. and the Generat. Anim. see Meter, Arist. Thierlt. 128 sq., and Lewes, Ar. c. 16 sq. The tract Be Coitn (Hadschi Khalfa, ap. Wenrich, for it p. 159) was spurious cannot be referred, as Wenrich refers it, to the title n. /n.ieas in Be Sensu, c. 3 (cf. p. 83, n. 1, supra). As to the book n. rov fii) yevvifv, v. p. 88, supra. 1 n. (tfnv iropeias, cited by that name in Part. An. iv. 11, 690, b, 15 and 692, a, 17, as the n. iropeias al Kivftfrews tuv fypotv in Part. An. iv. 13, 696, a, 12, and as IT. t5>v i$W Kiv^ffews in the Be Ccelo, ii. 2, 284, b, 13, cf. Ingr. An. c. 4, 5, c. 2, 704, b, 18; yet it itself cites (c. 5, 706, b, 2) the Part. An. iv. 9, 684, a, 14, 34, According as an earlier work. to its concluding words in c. 19 (which, as already suggested at p. 89, n. 2, may be spurious) it is later than the n. 4""' popiav, to which also its introductory words seem to refer back and yet it is frequently cited in that work, and at its close (Part. An. 697, b, 29) there is no hint of an essay on Movement as still to come. Probably it was, in fact, composed while the larger work was in progress. The tract n.
Parva Naturalia,
(Psych. d'Arist. 237) accepts it as genuine. Of the Indices, An. App. No. 156, and Pt. No. 41, have the n. (4 UV mviiaeas, and Pt. No. 45, n. fqW iropeias. 2 n. <pvr5>v 0' (D. 108, AN. 96, Pt. 48). Promised by Aristotle in Meteor, i. 1, 339, a, 7, Be Sensu c. 4, 442, b, 25, Long. Vitce, 6, 467, b, 4, Be Vita 2, 468, a, 31, Part. An. ii. 10, 656, a, 3, Gen.
An.
i.
1,
716,
a, 1, v. 3,
783, b, 20,
and cited in H. An. v. 1, 539, a, 20, Gen. An. i. 23, 731, a, 29 (in the last, it is wrong to change
the perfect tense into the future in the words of citation). Though both these references must have been inserted after the books were complete, it is possible that Aristotle may have inserted them. Alex. p. 183, on Be Sensu, I.e., remarks that a book on Plants by Theophrastus was extant, but none by Ari-
So Michael Bphbs. on Vita et M. 175 b, Simplicius Philop. &c. (apod Rosa, Ar. Ps. 261, Hbitz, Fr. Ar. 163) say the contrary, but we need not suppose they spoke from personal knowledge of the n. tpvruv.
stotle.
Be
hardly be authentic among other reasons, because it cites the II. Tn/ei/iaros Rose (Ar. (cf. p. 89, n. 3 Jin.). Zibr. Ord. 163 sq.) and Brandis (ii. b, 1, p. 1271, 482) declare it spurious Barthelemy St. Hilaire
((pay
xiviiatas
;
can
Quintil. (xii. 11, 22) proves nothing for, and Cic. {Fin. v. 4, 10) nothing against, their genuineWhat Athen. (xiv. 652 a, ness. 653 d, &c.) cites from them (Ar. Fr. 250-4) may as probably be taken from a false as from a genuine book. The two Aristo'
telian references
it,
mentioned make
however, overwhelmingly probable that Aristotle did write two books on Plants, which were
94
still
ARISTOTLE
extant
Hermippus,
elaborate
(so
Verl.
says, or in his n.
we know how
earlier
con-
Peripatetics
Schrift. 61, though Rose, Ar. Ps. 261, thinks the books by Theophrastus were ascribed to Aristotle). According to Antigonus (Mirabil. c. 169, cf. 129, ap. At. Fr. 253, Fr. Hz. 223) Callimachus as well as Theophrastus seems to have borrowed
So did
the compiler of the *utikcL, as to which Pollux, x. 170 (ap. Ar. Fr. 252, Fr. Hz. 224) could not say
adopted the teaching and the On very words of Aristotle. the other hand, the only passage cited verbally from Aristotle's books (Athbn. xiv. 652 a, ap. Ar. Fr. 250) is not in those of Theophrastus, so far as we have them and the latter contain no direct reference to any of the Aristotelian writings a circumstance which would be incredible in a work so extensive which touched at so many points the
;
whether they belonged to Theophrastus or to Aristotle, but which no doubt, like the fauKefc mentioned at p. 88, supra, were compiled by a later disciple for
lexicographical purposes.
The
very passage (Cwus. PI. vi. 4, 1) in which Jessen finds one main proof of his theory points to several later modifications of an
Aristotelian doctrine which had arisen in the School after his death. Theophrastus, in contrast with Aristotle's view, speaks of male and female plants (cf. Cans. PI. i. 22, 1, Hist. iii. 9, 2, &c). But a decisive argument is to be found in the fact that not only does the text of Theophrastus speak of Alexander and his Indian expedition in a way (Hist. iv. 4, 1, 5, 9, Cans. viii. 4, 5) which would be hardly possible in Aristotle's lifetime, but it also refers to what happened in the time of King Antigonus (Hist. iv. 8, 4) and the Archons
In like
manner,
books
Athenseus
and
Eose and Hbitz, and they sometimes distinguish between the phrases used by Aristotle and by Theo(cf.
ibid.')
;
phrastrfs (Ar. Fr. 254, Fr. The two extant Hz. 225). books n. <pvT&v are emphatically un-Aristotelian. In the older
Latin text they have passed already through the hands of two or three translators. Meyer
(Pref. to Nicol. Dam. Be Planus, ii. ed. 1841) ascribes them in their original form to Nicolaus of Damascus, though possibly they are only an extract from his book, worked over by a later hand. Jessen's suggestion (Rlirin. Mns. 1859, vol. xiv. 88) that Aristotle's genuine work is contained in the work of Theophrastus is in no way support ed by the fact that the latter closely agrees with
Archippus, B.C. 321 or 318 (Hist. iv. 14, 11) and Nicodorus, B.C. 314 (Caus. i. 19, 5). It would likewise be clear on a full comparison that the diction and manner of statement in the Theophrastic books makes it impossible to
stotle,
attribute
them
to Ari-
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
field of
2
1
05
Huntit,
n.
For the
little
that remains of
named
see Eose, Ar. Ps. 384 sq., Ar. Fr. 335-341, p. 1534; Fr. Hz. 216,
have belonged to this tract, apnd Eose, Ar. Ps. 379, Ar. Fr. 257264, p. 1525, Fr. Hz. 189 sq. 2 ivauyyvufLovmh (Bekker, 805), l-Kbv a' in D. 109, but -ki ;8' in An. 97]. An extended recension of this work is indicated by numerous references to the physiognomic theories not to be found in our text, which occur in a treatise on Physiognomy writ-
ten probably by Apuleius (apud Eose, Anecd. G-r. 61 sq. cf Fr. Hz. 1 91, and EoSE.^r. Ps. 696 sq.). 3 D. mentions two books of 'larpiicd the ANON, two books n. laTpiicrjs ibid. App. 167, seven books n. larpiK^s Pt. 70 five
;
. :
:
books of Tlpo&K-fifiaTa laTpiK&.(from which it appears that the iarpiKii. in the list of Diog. were also problems, book i. of our extant Problems being made up of such medical questions and answers) Vita Mare. p. 2 E, ripo/SA^/ion-a
iarpiKh
:
Pt. 71 n. Siafnjr
:
ibid.
one Hadschi Khalfa ap. Weneich, p. 159, Be Sanguinis Profusione Coel. Atjeel. Celer. Pass. ii. 13, one book Be Adjutoriis (perhaps a mistake in the name). Galen in Hippocb. Be Nat. Horn. i. 1, vol. xv. 25 K, knows of an 'larpiidi avvayay^ in
74
b,
ibid.
Be Pulsu
:
92,
book
larpucbs
several books, bearing Aristotle's name, which was nevertheless recognised as being the work of his pupil; Meno and this is possibly identical with the Swayayi) in two books named by Diog. 89 (as Wenkich, p. 158, suggests).
;
but on Fr. 362 cf. p. 88, supra. The genuineness of these writings, or at least of some of them, cannot be maintained. That Aristotle held that medical subjects should be treated in a technical way, and not from the point of \iew of natural science, is evident from his own declaration which he makes, p. 9, 1 Jim. (cf. Be Sensu, i. 1. 436, a, 17 Longit. V. 464, b, 32 Be Respir. c. 21 Part. An. ii. 7, 653, a, 8), fin. and such an indefinite statement as that of .Mian ( V. H. ix. 22) cannot prove the contrary. As to the composition n. v/taav a! vyieias see p. 91 Jin. Galen (as Heitz ibid, justly remarks) can have known no composition of Aristotle on medical science, since he never mentions any such, although he quotes the philosopher more than six hundred times. 4 An. 189 mentions the Teu>pyiK& amongst the Pseudepigrapha. Pt. 72, on the other hand, gives 15 (or 10) books Be Agricultwa as genuine, and the statement in Geopon. iii. 3, 4 (Ar. Fr. 255 sq. p. 1525) on the manuring of almond-trees seems to have been taken from this, and not from the treatise on plants Eose (Ar. Ps. 268 sq. Hz. Fr. 165 sq.) mentions other things which may perhaps have come
; ; ;
from
or
this source.
That Aristotle
from
96
ARISTOTLE
The Problems*
3
but our
described
productions of the
Peripatetic
haye existed in
1
many
No.
In the Index of Ptolemy, 23, Hadschi Khalfa gives (n. tv tyw\ev6vT(iov) De Ani:
maliwm
nee
deUtescunt,
2
i.
With regard to
this treatise
the exhaustive article by Prantl 'Ueb. d. Probl. d. Arist.' among the Abh. d. Miineh. Altad. vi. 341-377; Eose, Arist. Ar. Ps. 215 XA.br. Ord. 199 sqq. Hbitz, Verl. Sehr. 103 sqq. sqq., Fr. Ar. 194 sqq. 3 Aristotle refers in seven places to the Xlpoff^/nara or n/>oj8\7j/mTuc& (Prantl, ibid. 364 Ind. Ar. 103, b, 17 sqq.), sq. but only one of these quotations suits to a certain exte"nt the and the same extant Problems is true (PR. ibid. 367 sqq.) of the majority of the later references. 4 Prantl, i bid. has abundantly proved this, and he has also shown {Miineh. Gel. Anz. 1858, No. 25) that among the 262 further problems which are given by Bussemaker in vol. iv. of the
see
; ; ; ' ;
'
$u<nKct
irpofiKii/mTa,
and some-
addition kot' elSos o-vvayuyTJs ('arranged in accordance with the matter'). Gellius generally says, Problemata (xix. 4), Prob. physiea (xx. 4, quoting Probl. xxx. 10) IIpoM/iara 4yKvK\ia Apul. {De Magia, c. 51) has Prdblwnata Athenseus and Apollonius (yid. Indices and Prantl, 390 sq.) al:
times with
the
ways TIpo(i\Ti)j.a.Ta (pvffiKd; Macrob. {Sat. vii. 12) Physiea qtuestiones. To collections of problems are
also referable the titles Qvainav Kt\' Karli, vToixeiov (D. 120, An. 110 as to the words k. o-Toix-.the
:
Didot edition of Aristotle, and some of which were at one time erroneously ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf. Usener, Alex. Aphr. Probl., Lib.
Hi.,
iv., is
there
explanation of which in Eose, Ar. Ps. 215, is not clear, they are to be understood of the arrangement of the different books in the alphabetical order of their headings) npo/SA^aro (68 or 28 B, Pt. 65) 'EmTeflea/usj/wj/ irpoP\7lndTa>v ff (D. 121, AN. 112) 'EyicvKKiav ff (D. 122, An. 113, UpoMfiata iyitiKK. 4 bks., Pt. 67) Physiea Problemata, Adspee;
;
by
The same is true of those which Eose {Ar. Ps. 666 sqq.) takes from a Latin MS.
Aristotle.
tiva
p.
Probl.
(Ammon.
iff
Latin.
(D.
127^ Prce-
58);
'Atuktu
[ajtiia-rdicTuv iff
An. 119).
ARISTOTLE'S T^RITINGS
Turning to Ethics and
missa Qutestionibus (Pt. 66, says the Greek title is oroipiatu orua'
97
Politics,
we have on
the
174
grarva,'
ypcupii,
i.e.
Tlpo$\rifidTii>v
;
irpo-
u7rofl^Kos
or Xlpoavaypatp4\)
oj8'
:
ISvjUjcJk-
twv
naipos & ojcovffT^is aurou) ; David (Schol. in Ar. 24, b, 8) also speaks of 70 books n. ffv/iuixTav Ct T W^-
ruv,
p. 2,
R of
(Metaph. i. 1, 981, b, 25, and in six passages of the Polities') the fifli/cai, meaning doubtless the
<bvaiKh irpfl|3\4uaTa
''E^riyrj/ieva
n 70 books
(or 'EI^TOCjueyo) Kara yens iS' (D. 128, An. 121). With regard to the Hpo$\iifiaTa /nixaviica, 07rTcct, iot(m/&, cf. p. 86, ii. 1, and
and
The spurious composi95, n. 3. tion n. wpofi\rifidTwv, to which besides D. 51 (and also AN. 48, although the irtpi is here wanting) Alex. Top. 34, Sahol. in Ar. 258, a, 16, also refers, seems to have contained a theory as to setting and answering problems. See Rose, Ar. Ps. 126, Fragm. 109, p. 1496, Fr. Hz. 115. On the other hand, book xxx. of our Problems cannot well be meant (as Heitz, 122, believes) by the iyKvKXta, Eth. N. 1, Aristotle seems 3, 1096, a, 3. rather to indicate what he calls in other places i^arepticol \6yoi, and Be Cwlo, i. 9, 279, a, 30 Ti eynvxKta ttuXoffotpiifiaTa. Cf. BerNAYS, Dial, of Arist. 85, 93 sqq. 171 ; Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 105, a, 27 More on this infra. sqq.
1
(Fin. v. Libri de Morions of Nicomaehus are ascribed to Aristotle, inasmuch as the son would write very much like his father. Diogenes also (viii. 88) quotes Eth. <pi)<rl Si N. x. 2 with the words NiKoV a X 01 ^ 'ApurrorcAovs. On the other hand Atticus (apud Etjs. Pr. Ev. xv. 4, 6) gives all three Ethics with their present names as Aristotelian; likewise Simpl. in Oat. 1, 43, and Schol. Porphyr. Schol. in Ar. 9, b, 22, who says the Eudemian Ethics were addressed to Eudemus, the MeydAa Nuco/idxia (M. Mor.) to Nicomaehus the father, and the Mi/cpa NtKondx'a (Eth. JV.) to Nicomaehus, the son of Aristotle. The
:
'
lad. Ar. 103, b. 46 101, b, 19 sqq.). Cic, 5, 12) believes that the
same story
is
told
;
by David,
'HBuci,
'HfliKo
2 B. only names 'HBixav <? at. S' (although Diog. elsewhere (Vita, 21) cites the seventh book of the Ethics in connection with Eth. An. End. vii. 12, 1245, b, 20) 39 has 'KBikuv k (e.g. the Eth. Nic, the last book of which is ),
;
;
Schol. in Ar. 25, a, 40. Eustbat. (in Eth. N. 141, a cf. Arist. Eth. End. vii. 4 init. c. 10, 1242, b, 2) speaks of the Eudemian Ethics as the work of Eudemus, that is to say, he repeats this statement after one of the earlier writers whom he used (cf p. 72, b), and
.
VOL.
I.
ARISTOTLE
however,
only
one
the
Nicomachean
that, after the corresponding sections of the Budemian Bth. were lost at an early period, they were employed to fill up the blanks in the Eudemian Eth.; he is inclined to look upon the treatise
'
(see preceding note, a fragment of the Eudemian Ethics (p. 518 sqq.), but without wishing to exclude the possibility of its being a sketch intended by Aristotle for the
Eudemus
Nicomachean Eth., and later on replaced by x. 1 sqq. In his A rist. Stud. i. 20 (against which Walter argues in Die Lehre v. d. pralct.
Vernunft, 88 sqq.) Nic. vi. 13 is also attributed to Eudemus. On
sqq.
Schleiermacher (' On the Ethical Works of Aristotle,' for 1817, W. W. Z. Philos. iii. 306 sqq.) gave it as his opinion that, of the three ethical works, the so-called Great Ethics is the and the Nicomachean oldest, Ethics the latest, but the treatise of Spengel already cited makes the opposite view clear, viz. that the genuine work of Aristotle is the Nicomachean Ethics, that the Eudemian Ethics is a supple1
mentary work by Eudemus, and is an extract taken directly from the EuBut the position of demian. which are the three books common to the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (Nic. v.-vii., End. iv.-vi.) is still a moot
that the Great Ethics
Spengel (480 sqq.) bepoint. lieves that they belong originally to the Nicomachean Eth., but
the Nicomachean, and Nic v. 15, vi., vii., to the Eudemian Ethics. Grant (Mhics of Aristot. i. 49 sqq.) refers the whole of these three books to the Eudemian whilst Bendixen (Philologus, x. 1 99 sqq., 263 sqq.) on the contrary, for reasons worthy of note, defends the Aristotelian origin of the whole, including vii. 12-15. Brandis (Gr.-rbm. Phil.ii. b, 1655 sq.), Prantl (D. dianoet. Tugenden d. Ar. Munch. 1852, p. 5 sqq.), and in the main also Ueberweg ( Gesch. d. Phil. i. 177 sq. 5th ed.), and Rassow (Forsch. iib. d. nihom. Ethik, 26 sqq. cf. 15 sqq.) agree with the conclusions of Spengel; the last-named with this modification, which has much to support it, that Nic. v.-vii.,
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
tracts is also
S9
named,
genuine.
Of the
the
has been submitted to the afterwork of another pen, and has perhaps, in consequence of a
mutilation, been supplied from the Eudemian Ethics. 1 Such are (besides the Dialogues mentioned on p. 56, n. 1, 59 sq., n. ZiKaioaivt)s, 'EpuTiicbs, IT. ir\ouTou, n. evyevelas and IT. the small TlSovfis), the following composition, still extant, n. aperSsv Kal kukiHv (Arist. Opp. 1249-1251), which is the work of a half -Academic, half -Peripatetic Eclectic, hardly earlier than the first century before Christ Upo. Ttiireis ir. apETijs (D. 34, AN. 342) n. apeTTJs (An. App. 163); n. Si/caiW j8' (D. 76, AN. 64 Pt. 11, 4 B.) ; n. toS /SeAiwos a' (D. 53, An. 50) ; n. eKovffiov (-iuy) a' (D. 68, An. 58) n*. tov aiperov Kal rov <rvp,^e^-HK&TOS a! (D. 58 IT. alperov
:
and the
title
the 'Epanxhs mentioned on p. 59), 'EpaTMa (An. App. 181 ; Pt. 13, 3 B.) and 4 B. of BeVeis iparMal (D. 71, AN. 66 Pt. 56, 1 B.) are mentioned, both of them doubtless equally spurious. An. 162 reckons IT. trutppoffiy^s among the Pseudepigrapha. n. (pihias a' (D. 24, AN. 24, PT. 25) is supposed not to be a copy from Eth.
;
N.
viii. ix.,
which
Still
but a special treatise, can hardly be genuine. less can Aristotle have
been the author of eVeis ipihiKal P (D. 72, An. 67). Of the
two writings n.
Kal
avitfiit&<r*ois
auSpds
yvvaiKds
(AN.
App.
and
165) yape-
Kal ffvufiaivovros,
AN.
56).
It is
not probable that Aristotle composed a treatise n. imBvplas In the beginning of the De Sensw, he proposes future researches into the faculty of desire, but we do not hear that they were carried out what we find in Seneca (De
;
Ira,
i.
3. 9, 2, 17, 1, iii. 3,
l)may
irofleDj'
An. 30), the supposed remnants of which Eose (Ar. Ps. 109 sqq., Ar. Fr. 94-97, No. 1492) and Heitz (Fr. 151 sq.) have put together. Whether it was a dialogue (Rose) or a treatise (Heitz) cannot with the certainty be determined latter seems the more probable
;
opinion.
Its
genuineness'
is,
to
say the
least,
undemonstrable,
rrjs (ibid. 166), the former is mentioned by other writers several times (e.g. by Clemens, Olympiodor., and David in the passages given by Rose, Ar. Ps. 180 sq., Ar. Fr. 178 sq., p. 1507). Rose (De Ar. Libr. Orel. 60 sqq.) has pointed out two Latin translations of these N(i/uoi (or the writing n. <rvp.l3uio;, if both are not merely different titles of the same book) which profess to be the second book of the Economics see Ar. Pseud. 644 sqq. Fr. Hz. 153 sqq. PLUTARCH, Athbn^ius, and others quote from a writing IT. fizBris, perhaps a dialogue cf Rose, Ar. Ps. 116 sqq., Ar. Fr. 98-106, p. 1493 sq.; Fr. Hz. 64 sq. It was certainly not genuine ; it may have been identical with the writing of the same name by Theophrastus (Heitz, %bxd.~), only in that case Athenseus, who,
: ;
H2
100
ARISTOTLE
l
is
preserved
but though
admirable
contains some
it is
work
unhappily
like the
Metaphysics, un-
finished. 2
genuine. 3
be
lost
considered
everything
in addition to these two, quotes a third by Chameleon, must have been indebted for his quotations to various writers, to whom it was known by different names anot very probable supposition. What is quoted from it is concerned, partly with historical, partly with physiological discussions whether drunkenness was regarded also from a moral point of view we do not know. Nor do we know any more as to the contents of the Ntf/uoi ffvaaniKoi (in the MSS., of D. 139, NiS/ios owtotik&s, of An. 130 H6fuav avc-ratiKaiv a', for the circumstance of the
1 Aristotle puts this work in the closest connection with the Ethics, by treating the latter as auxiliary to politics (Eth. N. i. 1, 1094 a, 26 sqq., 1095, a,
2, c.
2 init.
c.
12 init.;Rhet. i. 2, 1356, a, 26). He expects from politics the realisation of the principles laid down by Ethics (ibid. x. 10). But he does not mean both to be merely two parts of one composition (cf. Polit. vii. 1, 1323, b, 39, c. 13, 1332, a, 7, 21, ii. 1, 1261, a, 30, Hi. 9, 1280, a, 18. c. 12, 1282, b, 19). Even apart from
Platonic republic beingmentioned in it (Procl. in Remp. 350, Ar. Fr. 177, p. 1507) gives us no indication ; hence we cannot determine whether Rose (Ar. Ps. 179) is right in supposing that there was a discussion in it on the arrangement of, and good behaviour at symposia, or Heitz (Ar. Fr. 307), in believing that
the citation Rliet. i. 8 fin., and the mention of it in the catalogue (D. 75, An. 70), its genuineness cannot be doubted, however seldom it is named by ancient writers (see the remarks of Spengbl,
'
Ahh.
Miinchn. AJiad. v. 44 infra). 2 For further information, see the section on the political philod.
contained a collection of the customs relating to them. (TUfl-KOffldtV (An. IT. ffVfffflTltoV App. 161) is identical with it; not so, however, the three books
it
if)
sophy of Aristotle, ch. xiii.,m/ra. 3 Of the second book (as to the beginning of which see Eose, Arist. Zibr. Ord. 59 sq.) this has long been admitted, but Gottling
(Arist. (Eoim. p. vii. xvii.) considers the first to be a section of a genuine Aristotelian writing
;
the title of which makes us think not so much of questions with regard to meals, as of questions such as are proposed at a meal,
like Plutarch's 'SvimoaiaKa irpofS^/iara. For the Uapay-yd^/iara cf p. 72, n. 2 fin.
.
seems more probable that it is the work of a later writer based on Polit. i. (See end of ch. xxi., infra,.') D. 23, An. 17 name OiWo/wc&s (or -ov) a'. Cf p. 99 supra on another pretended second book.
it
.
;: .
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
except a few fragments. 1
1 Thepolitioal writings named, besides those quoted, are the following: (1) UoXn-eicu, a collection of facts with regard to 158 states (D. 145, An. 135, the text of which Beenays, S,h. Mus. vii. 289, with the approval of Rose, Ar. Ps. 394, has evidently
101
Among them
the loss of
ness of the work, which Rose (Ar. Libr. Ord. 56 sq , Ar. Ps.
sq.) disputes, has no weighty arguments against it (as Heitz, p. 246 sqq. shows) and even if the external evidence, of which that of TiMiEUS (apud Polyb.
395
improved), which, according to the fragments and the statements of Cic. Fin. v. 4, 11, and Piatt. JV. P. Su. V. 10, 4 (who names the work Kriireis Kal Tro\neiai) not only treated of the constitution, but also of the usages, customs, situation of the towns, the history of their foundation, their local traditions, &c. Pt. 81 gives the number of cities as 171 (or 191, according to the view
11) is the oldest producdid not utterly exclude Rose's supposition that the work was published and circulated in his name soon after Aristotle's death, nevertheless the internal improbability of that theory would be much strengthened by it.
xii. 5,
ible,
The declarations of David, ibid., and the Schol. to Porphyry's Itagoge (md. Rose, Ar. Ps. 399, Ar. Fr. 1535) favour the supposition that the different states in the Polities are taken in alphabetical order; and this explains why the Athenians (according to Fr. 378, where, however, the reading is uncertain) are treated in the 1st book, and. the Ithacans in the 42nd (7'V. 466). The circumstance that the numerous fragments all contain merely isolated notes, without reference to a
in Ar. 9, b, 26, and David, ibid. 24, a, 34, say 250, and Philop. ibid. 35, b, 19, about 250, but the increase does not seem to be founded on any later extension of the collection, but merely on clerical mistakes (cf Rose, Ar. Ps. 394). Simpl. ( Categ. 2,7. Sohol. 27, a, 43) seems by the
words
the existence of spurious Polities ; pvy! (158) instead of yvr\aicus may be the true reading (Heitz, Ar. Fr. 219), though Ideleb, Ar. Meteor, i., xii. 40 can hardly be right in subreicus to point to
uniform complete treatise, will not (as Rose, Ar. Ps. 395 holds) serve as a proof of the spuriousness of the work; but, in conjunction with the fact that the Aristotelian writings nowhere
refer to the work in question (for even Eth. N. x. 10, 1181,b, 17, refers to the Politics ; cf. Heitz,
stituting irioTO\cusfor iroAireiois). The numerous fragments of the large collection are found in MOller, Fragm. Hist. ii. 102 sqq. (cf Bouenot, in Philolog. iv. 266 sqq.) ; Rose, Ar. Ps. 402 sqq. Ar. Fr. 343-560, p. 1535 sqq.; Fr. Hz. 218 sqq. The genuine.
231 sq.), it supports the view (Heitz, 233 sq.) that the Polities was not a literary completed whole, but a collection by
Aristotle, for his
own
use,
of
which he had gathered partly by personal observation and inquiries, and partly from
facts
102
ARISTOTLE
government in various
but not even so
57;
simply irreparable.
Poetics
If this
2
Our
writings.
is
only a fragment
so,
be
copies after
UohiTMbs
cf. p.
on n.
fiaaiteias
his death. chapter out of the IIoAiTcfo 'ABrivaiaivmay have given rise to the title n. tav ~S,i\avos h\6vav (An. App. 140 cf MtJLleb, ibid., 109, 12). A similar collection was (2) the Niijiti/no j8apj8aputeb, which are quoted under
p. 81, n. 1, fin.
this title
11
186
Qapfl.
avvaywy'if);
from
this title also the designaa' j8' y' 8' (D. 140), (An. 131), seem to have
towards the end on n. apxns, on a bungling forgery of the Middle Ages, Seeretum secretorum (or, Aristotelis ad Alexwndrwm regem demoribiis rege dignis), cf. Geiee, Arist. und Alex. 234 sq; ROSE, Arist. Libr. Ord. 183 sq, Ar. Ps. 583 sq. 1 Since this was written the Athenian TIoAireia has been re; ;
tions No>oi
vo/ilfuev 5'
covered.
2
To
(An.
them the
vd/u/m "Prnpalar
App. 185) and the rd/iiyua Tupp7j'i' (Athen. i. 23, d) probably belonged. Among the few fragments (apnd Muller, ibid. 178 sqq., Rose, Ar. Ps. 537 sqq., Ar. Fr.
561-568, p. 1570, Fr. Hz. 297 sq.), Nos. 562, 563 and 564 can onlybe attributed to Aristotle under the supposition that he did not give their contents in his own name,
n. itomjtiktjS' Aristot. himself mentions it in the Politics (viii. 7, 1341, b, 38), as a future work in the Rhetoric (i. 11 fin.,
is entitled
;
iii. 1,
1404, a, 38, o. 2, 1404, b, 7. 28, 1405, a, 5, c. 18, 1419, b, 5, with which cf p. 74, n. 1), as al.
name
Upayfiarelas rexvtjs
ttoit]-
but
traditions somewhere as current. The AiKaitfyioTa (3) tav tt6\cuv (Ammon. Biffer. Voeab., Nfjes) or Aik. 'SWrivlSmv ir6\eav (V. Marc. p. 2, R) seem dealt with quarrels to have between the Hellenic states and their settlement ; they are also named more briefly Aikoi^bto (D. 129, An. 120, Harpocbat.
(D. 83), rexvys rroair. /3' (An. 75), Be arte poetica secundum discipUnam Pythagorce, Pt. Fr. (this addition is caused by the combination of two different titles: cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 194). Ps.-Alex. Soph. Ml. Schol. in Ar. 299, b, 44, has iv r$ ir. itoiijt. likewise Herm. in Phcedr. Ill,
tlktjs 0'
;
and AST,
iv
t$
w.
it.
:
SlMPL. Cat.
it.
ir.
The Anon.
the
los,
name n".
in Hbris quos
scripsit.
de
arte poetica
thorities
; ;
ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS
103
much
to the theory
his dissertations
left
on the poets.
Nor
ia
is
there
much
of the other
which
suf-
men-
come
tioned only in the quotations given on p. 68, n. 1, with regard to the writing n. ttohitSc), the more modern only with one; except in so far as they copy more ancient writers, as we must suppose was the case with Am-
monius and
this alone
Boetbius.
From
suppose that the writing in question originally had a greater extension than it now has, but this becomes certain from the references to such parts of it as are missing in our recension, as for instance the discussion on the Catharsis pro-
we might
mised in Polit. viii. 7, 1341, b, 38, which would naturally have come in the section on Tragedy, and, as we learn from sure traces,
actually
Bebnays,
Arist.
iib.
d.
Wirkung
;
A oh. d. hitt.-phil.
160 sqq., 197 sq. SUSEMIHL, p. 12; Vahlen, p. 81 sq. of his edition, and others) the examination of Comedy, promised Poet. c. 6 init., and quoted Rhet. i. 11 fin., of which Bernays (-BA. Mug. viii. 561 sqq.) has pointed out valuable remnants in Cramer's Anecd. Paris., vol. i. app. (now in Susemihl, p. 208 sq., Vahlen, 76 sq.) and the discussion on
;
;
only possess Aristotle's work in a mutilated and hopelessly corrupt condition. We cannot here inquire how its present condition may be explained (Stjsemihl, Hid., p. 3 sq., gives an enumeration of the different, and in part widely diverging attempts at explanation). It may be true, as Susemihl concludes, that the carelessness of the writing, the caprice of the copyists, and the freaks of accident account for most of the mischief; but we cannot make these factors responsible for the interpolations, except in so far as they may have rendered possible the introduction of some marginal notes into the text. Of the Dialogue n. xovrpSiv / we have already spoken on p. 58. Besides this An. 115 gives Kvk\ov ir. TronjTuv, likewise in three books. This title may have arisen, by duplication and corruption, from that of the Dialogue, or it may (according to Heitz, 178) designate a work distinct from it but the xixKov may also have sprung from the
ficiently
1
: ' '
prove that
we
Synonyms, which Simpl. mentions, Categ. Schol. 43, a, 13, 27. In other places also our text
iyiciK\wi> (or -lav) which is found in No. 113. Allied to it, it would seem, are n. TpayifSiuv a' (D. 136, An. 128) and Ku/ukoI (Beotian, Exp. Voe. Mippocr. s.
'
'
v. 'HpoKA. v&aov).
Miiller (JUist.
Gr. ii. 82), though not rightly, takes the AiSao-KctAfai (D. 137 An. 129 EOSE, Ar. Ps. 550 sq., Ar. Fr. 575-587, p. 1572 sq. Heitz, 255, Fr. Hz. 302 ,sq.)i seemingly a chronological cat a;
104
ARISTOTLE
which dealt with subjects outside and among of the Aristotelian system
us,
;
'
books named to
the main lines
logue based on the existing inscriptions of the tragedies performed in Athens as a part of the book on tragedies. Further, a series of writings relating named, which took to poets is Airopinxdthe form of problems rav TtoiTiTtKav a' (An. App. 145)
'
(ibid. 146, where seems to indicate the form of treatment which is proper to
Atrial
afalai
-Troir/TiKoi
Hist. ii. 188 sqq.) cannot be maintained. More ancient seems to be the book n. /wucriKTJs, which both DlOG. (116, 132) and An. (104, 124) give us in two places, and which is identical with the musical problems noticed by Labbeus, Bibl. nova, 116 (see Beandis, ii. b, 94) but it is no than the n. more genuine Ka\ov (D. 69, AN. 63, n. KoA;
the OKop-fj^iara or 7rpoj8A.^uaTa, viz. that the Sio: t is sought, and the reply consists in giving the Si6n or the atria) 'AiropTifidTaij/ 'OfiT]pucuv C (D. 118; AN. 106 f; HEITZ, 258 sq., Fr. Hz. 129; Rose, At. Ps. 148 sq., Ar. Fr. 137-175, p. 1501 sq.) or, as the Vita Mara. p. 2. names it, '0,u.
;
Aous).
To these belongcertain minor, mostly historical works, 'OAu/wnoy?/cai a' (D. 130, AN. 122); IluQiovikwv e\eyxoi a' (D. 134 and probably also An. 125) UvBiovmai a! (D. 131, AN. 123, with the
1
;
strange
4v
title,
TlvBiovlicas
fiiPKlov TlvBucbs
yHvaixi^ov
Miaiffev)
fyriinarra
npojSArj/idra!/
'O/nipi-
kuv i (An.
91
;
App. 147
Ptol.
;
Ammon.
54,
Lat.
'Airop^iurra
App.
143)
a.' (D. 133), possibly only a different title for the same writing Ni/cai Aioi/uffioKol a' (D. 135, An. 126, Nikuv Aiov. aariKuv KttX \7jvniuv a'). About these writings cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 545 sqq., Ar.
'Apxi^X
"'
Evpiwltiovs,
Xotpl\ov
the
To these
(AN. 107)
The treaalso to belong. Ei Se ttotc "Ofiripos imiritrev tos 'HKlov /Sour; (AN. App. 142), is no doubt only one of the Homseem
tise
:
Of these writings eric problems. the ones which are more likely
to have
are'
an
Aristotelian
origin
;
Fr. 572-574, p. 187 HEITZ, 254 sq., Fr. Hz. 300 sq. Mblijee, Hist. Gr. ii. 182 sq. Further n. eipn/idrav (CLEMENS, Strom. i. 308, A, where, however, an Aristotelian work with this title which could not be genuine seems to be designated notes which may have come from the work are given by MtJller, ibid.
;
the Queries on Homer but even these may have had later additions made to them. On the other hand the genuineness of the rieVAoj (AN. 105 An. App. 169 ROSE, Ar. Ps. 563 sqq., Ar. Fr. 594-600, p. 1574 sq.; Fr. Hz. 309 sqq.; cf. BERGK, Lyr. Gr. 505 sqq. MftLLEB, Fragm.
;
181 sq.).
II. Oau/.iaalaivi.Kova/j.dra'V
quoted by Athen.
(xii.
541
cf.
Oou/i. d. c. 96) and, with the title iv Bavfiua-lois, perhaps also by An-
TIGON. Mirabil.
aKova-fi. c.
c.
25
(cf. av/i.
a 'collection of strange phenomena,' the genuineness of which cannot be admitted. For further information on this
30),
ARISTOTLE'S TfMITINGS
;hese also there
is
105
titles
B.
3n a general survey
)r
known
to us as Aristotelian,
ipart
from the
dnds.
The
letters and poems were of two different component parts of our Corpus Ari-
itotelicum
scientific
form. 1
And
almost
as
all
36
called
genuine
are,
will
be seen, connected
by express references in a way that is only to by the theory that they were addressed to me circle of readers as the connected and mutually extogether
be explained
It is quite different in
hypomnematic
work see
10%6-ypatpoi, p.
'
notes,
Tlapa-
to
say,
;
made by
WESTBKMANN,
Sckr. 163
Aristotelian
work on this
in Eustath.
subject,
Ar. Pseud. 279 sq., who refers the main body of the
sq.,
We
N
c.
references
the Od.
vork, consisting of chaps. 1-114, 130-137, 115-129, 138-181, to :he middle of the third century, in enlarged treatment of this, or i more extensive specimen of the iame sort of work, is perhaps the Iaprf8o|a, from the second book of vhich Plut. (Parall. Gr. et Rom.
29, p. 312) quotes something is not found in our @avfi. Ilapoiplcu a' (D. 138; cf. An. i/c.
:.
vhich
l27),
454, No. 2) other works. these there are two titles which are so indefinite that they furnish no safe clue to the contents of the writings to which they correspond: Tlapaflo\a\(T>. 126); "Atob:to (to which irpofiKi)imTa or Airo/ivfifiara may be supplied) i/3' (D.
Enc. Calvit.
a collection of proverbs, the ixistence of which seems to be jroved, inter aUa, by Athen. ii. d, although Heitz ( Verl. 10
127
'
cf p. 96, foot),
.
The wonderful
'
stories
'
are
::
106
ARISTOTLE
own use, and therefore not thrown by him into any such literary form and unity None of the as the works designed for publication.
Aristotle merely for his
1
is
which are lost seem to have belonged to it. From these two classes of works, however, there is to be distinguished a third. Cicero, Quintilian, and
Dionysius of Halicarnassus praise Aristotle not only for
scientific greatness,
but equally
ness of
speech.'
1
his
4
exposition
'the
and rich-
Ar. 24,
irpbs inr6p.vr\ffiv
fi4.fTa.vov
avvera^ev 6 tpi\6tTorpos these writings cannot, however, be taken as iravTip (/itovStjs &ia,
hypomnematical
3
writings.'
E.g.,
those
and hence we may not draw from them any proofs for the Aristotelian doctrine d /xivToi *A\c{avSpos tc\ (nro/iviffiaTiKa, 0-vp.irerpvpfieva (pTjfflv elvai Kal /xfy irpbs eVo ttKmbv avatpepeaBai, and for this very reason the others are distinguished from them as <rwraypaTina. David (Schol. 24, a, 38)
:
p. 62, n. 4, 5,
Polities (p.
TJepl
rayaSov
is also
one (as
2
al-
p. 61, u.
_/?.),
oh
fidva
KerpA\aia aireypdrprjo'av Bixo. Trpooifilaiv Kal 4irt\6ywv Kal tt)s TcpeKob<ri\s iKBdceffiv airayyeret
*
\las.
Cf.
Hbitz,
Verl. Sohr.
24
sq.
4 Cic. Top. 1, 3 the works of Aristotle are not only recommended by their contents, sed dicendi quoque incredibili quadarn, cum oopia turn, etiam suaritate. Be Invent, ii. 2, 6 (on the Swaywyi) Te^i/ai/) Aristotle has left the old orators suaritate et ireritate dicendi far behind. He Orat. i. 11, 49 si item AHstoteles, si Theoplirastus, si Carneades eloqventes et in dicendo svares
: : : . . .
atque ornatifuere. Be Fin. i. 5, 14 (on Epicurus) quod ista Piatonis Aristotelis Theophrasti
:
orationis
Acad.
ii.
orationis
stoteles.
supposed genuine.
Even
if it
be
quid Aristotelem ?
Quem
dubito
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
by
107
Mm for publication.
now
It is not applicable to
;
any of
1
extant
and of
two Latin writers probably knew but a small part. We are driven to suppose, therefore, that it was to other works, lost to us, that they ascribed this kind of excellence. The critic who judges of literary form by purely
scientific criteria will find, it is true,
much
to praise in
dis-
He will
precision
and
compactness of his
and
his
masterly
ment
in the
rough brevity of statement, the involved construction of long sentences, often broken by anacolutha and
parentheses, stand in plain contradiction to Cicero's
description.
We
ourselves,
in a style far
more
rich
and
phers, Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle are the best as to style, Be Cent. Vet. Script, 4: irapa.\riwr4ov Se /col 'Apia-Tor&ri eis Himaiv ttjs te irepl kppiivtiav
books. Of the others, however, Cicero used several of the writings mentioned on p. 55 sqq., the books on Philosophy, the Ihidemus, the Protreptieus, perhaps also the noAmitSs, n. fiacri\elas and IT. irKoirov; cf. Fin. ii. 13,
40
tV
Seii(T7)Toj
Kal
ttjs
iriupiivelas
Kal
; Acad. ii. 38, 119 iV". 15, 42, 16, 44, 37, 95, 49, Bixin. i. 26, 53 Fragm.
; ;
B.
ii.
;
tov
Except the Topics and Rliewe have no reason for supposing that any of them knew
toric,
125 Hort. apud Augustine c. Jul. iv. 78 Fin. v. 4, 11 Ad Quint. Fr. iii.
;
;
Ad Att.
ii.
xii.
:
Off. n. 1.
16, 56
and above,
p. 60,
108
ornate,
ARISTOTLE
and approached
of
treatises
is
far
more
graces
the
scientific
now
contained
in
our
Corpus. 1
This difference
by the
fact that
but also by the they were not intended to serve the same
for
the
same
ments of his doctrine, published by him, or then in common use, in terms which seem to imply that a
portion of his writings
(including these writings
in
which the references in question occur) were not in the same sense given to the public. 3 And from his
1
On this point
see
what
is
pre-
Nos. 12-14, 17 sq., 32, 36, 40, 48, 49, 71, 72 of the
served in
allowable.
SeBo.ueVoi
Fragments (Academy edition) from the Eudemus, ProtrepUeus, n. $i\oao<pias, n. Slkcuoitiij'tis, and
above, p. 56, n.
2
2.
shall discuss* this immediatelj'. 3 Poet. 15, 1454, b, 17: tfpyrat Se irepl avrStv v rots eKfiedo/xevoLs Xdyois Uavtis. De An. i. 4 init. Kal &\\t] 5e Tts B6a TrapaStSorai
wepl ipvxijs,
tridavij fiey
We
voWois
\6yovs Smrep 5' evBivas (for which Bernays, Dial. d. Ar. 16 sqq, Soirep erasing \6yovs, reads:
evBivas Se) SiSwKvla
Kal
Tois iv
yap riva avrijv \4yovffi, Sec. In the first of these places, Bernays that 'pubsays (ibid. 13) lished' here means the same as 'already published' (the same explanation of the words is given by Rose, Ar. Ps. 79), yet one
there without a purpose, but is meant to distinguish the \6yoi iVSeSo/iEVoi from certain other \6yoi. Neither can we translate efcSeSo/ieVot in such a way as to make ' the writings published by me a mere periphrasis f or my writings ; partly because such a turn of phrase is not found in Aristotle. When he refers, without indicating a particular work, to something that has gone before, he is accustomed to say merely, tv &\\ois, iv erepou or Tp6repov. Again the fact that he does not say Sir' 4 pod ekScSo/icVoi shows that the emphasis falls on eKSeSo/teyoi, as such, and that the \6yoi tKfcSo/ievoi are meant as an antithesis to /jl^i iictietio/ievoi. Only we have no right to assume that things fiii iKSeSo/ievoi mean things published later. The anti' ' '
'
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
109
110
to
ARISTOTLE
refers
1
was to be found in the JEudemus. We find other and more frequent references of his to the Exoteric Discourses as the place where he had dealt with such and such a subject. 2 Opinions, how'
'
which he so
form of dialogues, it seems clear that the latter could not be so named, and that there was here no reason for mentioning the dialogue form of such discussions. Prom the point of view of grammar, owing to the present tense of
yiyvopevois (to
phrase
cius(in
iyKvKh.
is
writings in the common not so appropriate. The so explained by SimpliCasio, Schol. 487, a, 3:
Be
Arist. 105, a, 46, rightly calls attention), they cannot be explained as: 'the speeches sub-
We
b,
mitted (i.e. which have been submitted) to publication,' for in that case it would have been It can only mean, as yevof/.4vots. Bernays translates it in his
Dial. d. Arist. 29, 'the discourses existing in a state of publication, available for the use of all,' taking the iv koivQ here in the same sense as in the exprestV Koivtp KaTaTlde&dai, 4v sions koivu atpitvai (in medio relinquere, Metapk. i. 6, 987, b, 11). A similar meaning to that of the \6yoi iv Kowif yiyvi^voi seems to be attached to 4yKvK\ta or 4ynvKhm (pAoaocp^fuvra, of which mention is made in Ft h. i. 3, 1096, a, 2 (leal trepl fiev to6tuv S.\is' iKavws yap Kal ev rots 4yKvK\iots
:
and De
Casio,
i.
9, 279, a,
Tct 0eia
30 (ko! yap
KaSd-irep
iv
36 sqq., and.Fr. 15, 1476, b, 21, that the matter for which Aristotle refers to the iyxitcKia, was actually treated in two of his Dialogues. Cf. Bernays, ibid. 84 sqq., 93 sq., 110 sqq. 1 It is shown by the passages quoted in Eose, Ar. Fr. 41, p. 1481 sq., and Heitz, Ar. Fr. 73, p. 51, from Philoponus, Simplicius, Themistius, and Olympiodorus (the common source for whom may have been Alexander), that Arist. in the Budemvs, after following the Phiedo, devoted a searching examination to the theory that the soul is the harmony of its body, the principal heads of which examination are given by them. Hence the passages in question must refer to this dialogue, although Philoponus (De An. E, 2) leaves us the choice between it and the Hypa<pot
rols iyKUK\iois
tpiAotroijyfifiaa'i irepl
ffvvovalta
irpds toiis
eralpous,
TroWiiKis
irpo<palveTat tols
and
a)
2
\6yois can,
St i t4
avayicaiov
Simplicius connects
(De
it
An. with
14,
the
Plicedo.
yiyv6/j.evos,
just
mean
below.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
relation
111
of these
'
Exoteric Discourses' to
our ex-
tant
Corpus.
always referred
works,
treatises
distinguished
by a
3
less
strict
method of treatment.
as to details.
But
2
they
differ
among themselves
Cicero
and Strabo
is
The
'
former, however,
Dialogues, 5
in Plutarch. 6
which we
exoteric
'
According
late
the Aristotelian writings are divided into acroamatic and exoteric, oTu t& lo-roptKa Kal to. 5ia\oyiKa Kal f\us ra /xy anpas
anpifleias
(ppovrtfrvTa.
PHILOP.
dorus, cite. 1367, cf. p. 69, n. 1), the former of whom understands by f|o)TpiKo! \6yoi the common opinion, the latter, oral instruction.
2
:
Be An.
ii.
261)
tb O-ureptKa
elffi
fj.ara, 3>v
avyyp6.fiKal oi StdXoyot . . .
airfp Sia
Uti
oil
irpbs
Fin. v. 5, 12 about the ytypap.iJ.iva. 5 highest good, Aristotle and TheoCf. Ad Att. iv. 16, 2 quophrastus have written duo ge- niam in singulis libris [of the nera, librorum, unwm populcwiter discourse on the State] utor scriptum, quod iuntptKbv a/ppel- proasmiis, ut Aristoteles iis labant, alterwm Umatius [a/cpi^- quce i^arepMoiis voeat. In contraoTEpws, in a more severe style], distinction to the Dialogues, the quod in commentariis reliquerunt,' strictly scientific works are called but in essentials they both (see preceding note ) cominentarii, agree. continuous expositions, corre3 XIII. 1, 54, p. 609 because sponding to the avToirp6<ranra or the Peripatetics, after Theo- oKpooTi/ca of the Greek interprephrastus, had not his works and ters (see p. 112, n. l,and 113, n. 2). Adv. those of Aristotle, irX^v 6\lyav Col. 14, 4, p. 1115 Kal fi<i\i<rTa rav iwTepiK&v, they Aristotle everywhere attacks the happened p.Tib'ev <=X el1' <piXoa o<pe'iv Ideas: iv rots rjOiKofc foro/ii^uaow irpay/iaTtKus [going deeply into (synonymous with Cicero's comthe subject, scientific] a\\A, (teVeis mentevrii see preceding note), iv
\7]Kvd(eiv.
4
TOIS tpVfflKOLS,
2,
Sia
TtJOV
il-WTGptKWy
b:
tiia\6yuy
' :
112
ARISTOTLE
named
'exoteric,'
to Metaphysics, Physics,
and
the
acroatic,'
'
Alexander,
is
supposed to
'
acroatic
is
expressly stated
mind
it
of the
At a
later
acroatic
'
shows that the distinction between the \6yoi axpoariKol and llareptKol must have been known
to the author of the letter.
4
Thus Plut.
8'
%oiKe
tlBixbv
Kal
ok/jootiko eonducebant, autem. voeabantur in qiiibus phiUsophia remotior gubtiliorque agitabatwr quaque ad natures eondisceptaiionesqw templatitmes dialectioas pertinebant. In the Lyceum the morning was devoted to the latter, the evening to the former (cf. p. 27, n. 3). Librosquoque mos, earum omnium rerwm oommentarios, seorsum divisit, ut alii exoterini dicerentm;
titia/m
\6yov, a\\a Kal ray aTro^^rtav Kal Papvrtpwv [fiaSvr.'] SiSaaKa\i&v, as oi avb"pcs ISlus aKpoa/iariKos Kal iiroirTiKas [as in mysteries] irpoaayopevovres ovk e(<pcpov els woA\obs,)MTaffxtiv. Clemens, Strom. v. 575, A: not only the Pytha-
goreans and the Platonists, but all schools have secret doctrines
and
Kal
oi
\4yovn
fnhv
St
eVwre-
ptxh. slvai
\_-0V~\
t&v
<rvyypa/i./idTav abraiv
partim
2
acroatici. De Subst. Fac. Nat. vol. iv. 'ApiOTOTehavs % eo<ppd<rrov 758 rh fi^v rots -jroWots yeypatpdruv,
Cf.
;
Gell.
:
ibid.
Plut.
TO 8f KOtvi. Tf Kal 6|TpiKO the same theory, in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1, 1421, a, 26 sq., Aristotle is requested by Alexander to observe the strictest secrecy with regard to this work, while
On
Alex. 7
vide supra, p. 22, n. 1. The wording ouk bpBm iirolriaas iK$ohs robs aKpoarmovs T&v \6ywy,
Aristotle,
der,
reci-
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
113
works a form of exposition which must make them unintelligible to any but his scholars while at the same time it is said that it was here only that he disclosed his
; '
views in their
the the
'
full logical
connection. 2
On
this theory
by the fact that they were intended for a wider public, and that they were therefore put in a more popular form, did not cover the more difficult classes of inquiry, and substituted for a severe and scientific method of proof one more accommodated to
'
general comprehension. 3
1 This idea is expressed in the answer of Aristotle to Alex-
He
ibid.'),
when he
Kal
yap 4v tKelvots
replies to the reproach of the latter with regard totheaKpoanKol \6yoi XgQl oiv ainovs Kal iKtieBofievous Kal fify 4KSe5ofievovs l-vverol
:
Kal 7rcpl
tSc
But the
'
example of the Topics and the MAetoric shows that this only
refers to the basis of the opinions laid down in these writings, the
yap elffi fi6vots rots rifiav aKoiffaffiv. See also Themist. Or. xxvi. 319, A sq., where it is said that Aristotle did not find the same discourses suitable for the masses as for the philosophers, and therefore withdrew the highest secrets of his teaching (the re'Aea Upa, the fivvTitcbv) from the former by using obscure language. Simpl. Phys. 2, b, referring to the letters just mentioned, says ty toTs
:
argument from the universally acknowledged (the ft/$o|oi/), and not to the teaching as such. The later writers, as a rule, express themselves in the same sense
thus Simpl. Pkys. 164, a: lfo>Tepuca Se ioTi ra xou/a Kal Si'
4v56av irepaiv6fiPa aAAa
SeiKTLKa
fitjSh
[xt]
airo-
aKpoafmriicd.
cf.
As to
see follow-
anpoafiaTMois iurdtpeiav ^reT^Sevtre, &c. For the same view see Categ. Schol. 27, a, 38, David, Categ. Schol. 22, a,, 20 ; 27, a, 18 sq. In
and
Philop. Phys.
On
the
statement of Alexander (which he quotes in order to refute it) into 8ti iv fiiv roh ixpoato BoKovyra a&T$ \eyei Kal
:
aWos aWos 54
fiariKois
6 IvToaBev, exoteric
2
and
esoteric.
Alexander remarks, Top. 52, that Aristotle speaks at one time \oyiKus in order to unfold the
truth as such, at another 5mAc-
to to i^cuSt}. Besides the testimony already adduced, the statements found in the Neoplatonic comoAtjOtj,
ra
iv Si toij SiaKoyucoh
aWois
3
tioicovirra,
VOL.
I.
114
ARISTOTLE
The theory just mentioned can be traced
as far back
; '
not put
its
however,
in
if it requires correction
one point or another, by the utterances of Aristotle himself as to the Exoteric Discourses.' It is true that
'
in a general sense he
may
describe as
'
exoteric
'
any
mentators
aiiTOirp6ff(i)ira
nal aKpoaparticb.
and
8ia\oyiKh kuI i |aiTfpiica. The former are written irpbs yvi\aiovs aKpoaras, the latter irpbs riiv tusv isoKKaiv ntyiXtiav; in the former Aristotle expresses his own
opinion with a strictly scientific argument, in the latter rcfc SoKovvra aoT<, aKK' ov St' airoSetKriKay irixeipyp>6Taij/ Kal oh olol re elo'tv ol iroWol iiraicoKovdeiv. Similarly, only at greater length, David, Schol. 24, a, 20 sqq., who likewise divides the trvprayp-aTindi
l
into avTowpdo'ctnra or a/cpOajuccn/cct and SiaXoyuch, & koX ^atrepiKa Aeyovrtu and considers the former to have been written itpbs robs
iriT7]deiovs
that David (24, b, 5) expressly appeals to Ammonius (n. epA"7" veias) and to the commentary on the Categories passing under Ammonius' name (which, although in not its present form it does come from Ammonius, yet seems to have originated in one written by him), indicates that Ammonius was David's proximate authority and though he (Ammonius) certainly made use of earlier writers (and principally Alexander, whom David at 24, b, 33 attacks, and from whom his quotation of the Aristotelian Evdemus is probably taken, like that in Philop. De An. 'E, 2 sq.; Ar. Fr. p. 3481, No. 41), still we do not know how much has been added to their testimony. On the other hand we must trace the state-
ments
in
Cicero,
Strabo,
and
rf
tptKotroQlq,
the
<1>l\o-
Si'
dronicus, and the letters mentioned on p. 112, n. 3 etc., prove that the latter was aware of the
distinction between exoteric and acroatic writings, and of the suggestion that the last mentioned
avayicaffTLK&v
Sik iriBavav.
1
the latter
In
attach so much importance to the passage just given from David as Heitz does The fact (Verl. Selir. 25 sq.).
we cannot
ARISTOTLE'S ^WRITINGS
in hand, 1 or
115
always
and
necessarily
denote a distinct
4
;
class
of
writings. 3
Nevertheless there
it
we
to such a class
and that
Polit.
fikv
i.
5,
raura
6,
%o~<as
i<rrl aictyeus.
;
1264, b, 39 ' in the Republic Tlato has only imperfectly treated of legislation, to. 8' &\\a rots e^udev \Ayois ireir\4ipa)K* rbv \6yov.' The term ' QaiSev \6yoi covers in this case writings of the most In like speculative character. manner Eudemus Fr. 6 (Simpl. Phys. 18, b), where instead of the fyet 8' awoplav .... Xtras 8e ov tcpbs rbv \6yav of Aristotle (Phys. i. 2, 185, b, 11) we read %% el s * " T ^ tovto awopiav eturepucftv. 2 Phys. iv. 10, iait. irpHrov
' :
:
at that time were everywhere in vogue even at social gatherings. That this does not fit other passages will be shown immediately
such a rendering is forbidden by the strictly dialectical and genuinely Aristotelian style of the discussions from p. 217, b, 32 to
p. 218, a, 30.
8 Thus, besides the passage given in the preceding note from the Physios, the Eudemian Eth. ii. 1, 1218, b, 33, introduces the division of possessions into the external and the spiritual with the
remark
Kuddirep
Simpov^eBa Kai
8e
koKws %x el
In the
:
[rov xp6vov] Kal Sta. rav 4aiTepiKwv \6yav. The co>t. \6yoi here mean the discussion which fok
parallel passage, Eth. N. i. 8, 1098, b, 10, Aristotle says he wishes to speak about happiness
KoX
is
Ik to>v
called exoteric (in the same way as Aristotle, in other places, puts the logical in opposition to the physical, vid. infra, p. 174, u. 2), because it does not aim at a strict and adequate notion of time (the rl itrriv 6 xP^ yos '^^< a > 31), but only takes into consider-
to the cononly the prevailing views concerning happiness can be meant. It is to these, therefore, that the efoiT. \6yoi of Eudemus
text,
by which, according
must
4
also refer.
This
is
i.
Polit. vii.
tcls
1323,
ation certain preliminary properThe question is not ties of it. but here of exoteric writings Prantl is none the less wrong (Arist. PhysiJi, 601, 32) in maintaining that by the exoteric discourses we are to understand, not only in the present instance, but everywhere, only those conversations on interesting subjects which
;
olv InavSis icoWa \4yetr8ai rcal tuv iv Tois el-<aTcpiKo7s K6yois irepl T?js apitrT7)s (aijs Ka.1 vvv XPVThat by this he ffreov avrois. does not mean mere oral expressions of opinion in the conversations of daily life is clearly
fol:
116
ARISTOTLE
texts
is
made probable
;
:
etc.
: '
His
point may be stated thus from the arguments in the i^urfpucol \6yot, it will be universally recognised that the conditions of happiness include not only external and bodily good things butalso and pre-eminently spiritual good things although it is true that in common life we are wont to content ourselves with far too small a proportion of such spiritual good.' This line of reasoning necessarily implies that the ^{airepi/col \6yoi in question, with which the current opinion of society is said to be in partial agreement, are not the same as any form of expression of that current opinion (cf. Bernats, Dial. d. Arist. 40). Then, again, the words irp6s ye \dav 81aipecriv ofcSels cLpQitrfiiyr'fio'eicv point
:
:
ibid. 32 Xiyoptv 6Vo &\\a jrpotrSiopi(6^8a iv rois &va\vTucois. And, on the other hand, the vvv xPV^tcov airois is adverse to this explanation. That is meant to designate what follows as something extracted from the exoteric discourses but Arib.vaXvriKois
;
more likely to use such a formula if he was quotingsomething from a former work than if he was merely repeating in writing what he had already orally delivered. This latter, from the nature/ of the case, he must have had occasion to do as often as a modern university teacher does it. The fact, then, that he expressly mentions that he is making an extract from the 4wstotle
would be
far
'
reptKol
\6yoi,' points,
ii.
Be
Ccelo,
13,
to definite explanations, set down in writing, not merely existing in the intangible medium of oral conversation. It would be easier to connect them with oral discourses of Aristotle himself (as Oncken does in Staatsl. d. Arist. cannot, however, i. 44-59). base this view on the present \eyoiuv (together with the SiopiC6i^e a , Pol. iii. 6, 1278, b, 32), since Aristotle not only quotes the writings of others very frequently in this way, but not unfrequently even his own ; cf. Pol. vii. 13, 1332, a, 8 tpa/itv Si
We
Meteor, iii. 2, some of the writings which we possess are quoted with the same Xprtariov) to an existing written work. And an Aristotelian writing must be meant, since that which follows out of the i^artpmoixiyoi sounds perfectly Aristotelian,
and forms
(Tjjteij
a.
whole with
what
own
38).
name
koI iv tois
fjfliKoTs
Phys.
7,
viii. 1,
251, a,
iii.
9
8'
{Phys.
;
1)
Be
Lastly, although something similar to that which is here quoted from the i^ur. \6yoi is found in some passages of the Ethics (i. 6 sqq. x. 6 sqq.), which Zeller, in his second edition, brought into connection with this quo-
Casio,
i.
275, b, 21
\6yos
iv
rois
irepl
Kivfitreais
1139,
b,
26;
tbairep
ml
iv
rois
71 sq. cf. Oncken, ibid. 43, 5; Vahlen, Arist. Aufs. ii. 6) that Aristotle would not by the designation
;
he
now
concedes
(ibid.
: ;
' ;
ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS
both by the express distinction that
O-urepiKol \6yoL
117
is
drawn between
'
have mentioned
the Mhics, which in the Politics he repeatedly quotes as r)6iKa, and puts in the closest connection
with them
Zeller's
2nd
ory (73 sqq.), that the first chapter of the seventh book of the Politic! strikingly diverges from the usual
style of his scientific works, and bears distinct traces of having
distinction ') of different kinds of dominion, but for the exact limitation of their difference (as Bernays, p. 38 asserts), cannot be inferred from the $iopt(6lieBa, since this expression designates not only the exact distinction, the ' carefully- weighed logical antithesis,' but any kind of distinction whatever. If we compare with it the perfectly analogous use of \4yo/i.ev, Siopif<fytE()a, &c, in the passages given
'
and when
ourselves,
we have persuaded
repticol,
fit
from otherpassages, that Aristotle names certain writings \6yoi 4uthe passage appears to this interpretation. (And there are certainly some among the lost Aristotelian writings in which the distinction here
cTepov
7TKTTeiJ-
Kal
irpafcis
to be Polit.
6,
aAAa
fityv
Kal
rrjs
the oUovofitKi), and the toAitikj) apxh] f)4^ l0v SteAeTi/ Kal yap 4v rots
ainuv Kal rots ifcatTepiThe connection here unquestionably allows us to suppose that the words refer to
5e irepl
koTs \6yois.
airiiv woWdicis. These words, looked at in themselves, might refer not only (as Onckbn, ibid.,
suggests) to
oral
'
disquisitions,
discussions in Aristotelian writings of a character different from that of the scientific works which we possess, as for instance the Dialogue on the Poets or Gryllos but that it forbids any other supposition Bernays (p. 39, 57 sqq.) has not made out. If anybody wished to give to the passage, instead of the narrow meaning assumed by Bernays, the broader one, 'this has already been proved in roy other writings,' neither the
: '
118
ARISTOTLE
words
:
Aeyerai Be
trepl
avT%s [sc.
would be analogous
avrois.
etvai
oTov rh fiev
&\oyov
airijs
to
Be
it
\6yov
is
%X 0V
^ or
rjo-is
and
:
irpSf u,
so as Bernays, p. 36, bebelieves, that the distinction tween the rational and the irrational in the soul may have made its way from the Platonic school into wider circles (Epicharmus, at a much later period, comes very near to it with his vovs ipa, &c), and though it could scarcely be said' to be an actual impossibility to interpret the words e'lar. \6ym as referring to opinions current outside the school, yet the introductory words here too much resemble those given above from
though
by no means
incredible
conversation of well educated persons but if so, he ought to find it no less absurd to draw from the very same source an explanation of the centre of gravity of all Ethics, the notion of EiSaiixovta. And yet we find in Mh. i. 8, init. incontestably
ffKe-KTeov Bfy
e/c
1,
and the
Kal
Xeye-rai
eVm
vvv xpi\GTeav
outoij here points too obviously to written discussions, for us to be able to refer this quotation to mere \ey6/ieva. If it refers to an Aristotelian work, this must be one of the lost writ-
irep\
aiiTTJs
Kal
ings
most
;
rwv Xeyofievcov irepl avrrfs. This may not mean that we are to seek the scientific definition of happiness in the conversation of the educated but neither would this be affirmed in ffih. vi. i init. about that of iroirjirii and irp3|u, if we were to understand the c<ot. \6yot in this passage of the \ey6ji.eva. The appeal to universal conviction would be to establish a general distinction of
'
; '
for the quotation does not agree with n. tyvxvs i. 9, 432, a, 22 sqq., and this work would not be cited by such a reference, but, as always in other places, by ev rois irepl Neither in tyvxys.' Metaph. xiii. 1, 1076, a, 28 (on the Ideas as such he will only speak cmAus Kal 'iaov vi/wv x&pw TeBpiW-qrai yap -ra iroWb. Kal iirb
'
mus
Troli\(ns
from
irpSJis
:
and
ya-p
this is
iKriOel
discussions
of others.
It
Aristotle's
8).
way
rip
must mean the work of Arisince this alone could dispense him from a fuller criticism of the doctrine of Ideas and that we are to look for such work neither in the philostotle himself,
jr&VTa ffvvqSeL
i.
rh vir&pxovra (Mth.
discern in Bth. i. 13, 1102, a, 26 an intention of appealing to some Aristotelian writings in the
we
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
exoteric and the scientific treatises, 1
t are
119
losophy.
2
:
E|o>TepiK&s in
Aristotlemeans
lation ^|a>T. \6yoi, but also the koX (/cal vich t. ef. ^.), vhich the e|wt. h&yot are dis-
(1) that
the
exists outside, external and (2) that which goes out, refers to the
;
which
from other not exoStill more clearly appear from Eudemus, 3 this :n the latter, probably remem;uished
a \6yoi.
external.
former
called
ii.
an
e{ajT6/)c^
a-pxh (Polit.
10,
ng
tv Tp6lTOlS KCfX
jis
iv TOLS 4(IITeptlCO?S
following note. This is indicated by the exis statement in the passages ted in the preceding note, icially from Polit. vii. 1, Eth. !, Metaph. xiii. 1, that certain
1
have been sufficiently exned even in the exoteric disrses that is, inasmuch as we
its
' :
'
such discusit
.
in them.
Eudemus puts
1272, b, 19), or when hand and foot are styled i^ureptKa pipri (Gen. An. v. 6, 786, a, 26); to these uses cf. the e|eoTepi/& ayaBa, Pol. vii. 1, 1323, a, 25. In the second meaning the expression is used in the combination QurepucaX irpd^is (Pol. vii. 3, 1325, b, 22, 29). If now, in the phrase e'loii-. \iyoi, we propose to give it ihefirst meaning, we cannot, by exoteric discourses, in those passages where Aristotelian writings of a particular class or the inquiries contained in them are meant, understand such discourses as lie outside the discussion in which they are referred to as ' other discourses (like the
'
KOTck <f>i\o(ro(plav.
Since the
inquiries,
er
are
;
scientific
popuin-
yet (as Bernays thinks in Dial. d. sq.) such as do not enter into the essence of a thing, but are external to it (as p. 115, n. 2).
Ar. 92
writings.
Now
it
might
The
suit,
latter
and Metaph. xiii. would of all igs have been least suited for alar writings but we have ady seen on p. 76, n. 3, 56, ! med. that he opposed this
.
Eud.
i.
8,
oo.
tit.
refer,
;rine,
with
partly because this would be a strange way of speaking of popular treatises,' partly because it would not fit those cases in which Aristotle again takes up in later works, as being suitable and adequate, what he had said in the i^areptKol \6yoi (as in the passages of the Polities, Ethias,
'
120
ARISTOTLE
There may have been, and in fact there appear to have been, other works also which
Dialogues alone were meant.
As to
is
scientific work for publication at all by the contemporary record of the complaints that were made because he published them 2 and the idea that he designedly chose for them a style obscure and unintelligible to the lay mind is disproved by the The visible characteristics of the texts themselves. truth is that, except in cases where we ought to consider them as mere sets of notes for his own use, he takes all manner of trouble to aid the reader, by the use of a strictly devised scientific terminology, by clear definitions, by explanations and illustrations, by methodical processes of thought, and by warnings against possible
If
it
be true
many
particular points of
p. 115,
be called exoteric, in this use of the word, in the sense that they were known and in use even outside the Aristotelian school, But it comes to very much the same thing also if we start (as Zeller prefers to do), with the second meaning of i^arepmbs, and understand the Qur. \iyoi to signify such works as were intended for outsiders or for the general public, the same, in fact, as are included in the terms \4yoi &K$tiv kowQ yiyv6)ievoi. Sofievoi or That such writings were of amore
popular character was implied in the designation, but not directly expressed in the adjective i^urepixhs
as such.
When Eudemus
puts the \6yoi i^ar. in opposition to those kot& <pi\oo-o<piav (see preceding note), we might
understand the., latter to mean such as were intended to serve for scientific instruction but at the same time there is nothing against the translation both in those intended for the general
' ' j '
ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS
difficulty,
121
obvious
was only a
their dissemination
more
seem to
which his exoteric works were famous. The sole aim of the second set of texts was scientific investigation for its own sake, and they were therefore distinguished by a
'
and a less artistic dress. It seems that of the former class by far the greater part, if not the whole, consisted of those writings which Aristotle wrote before the opening of the Peripatetic School at Athens, and chiefly while he was still one of the Platonic circle of
stricter logic
'
all
On
communicate them to
2
'
others.
In this
myself in the
p. 98, as to
second edition,
the probable state of facts with regard to the distinction between exoteric and esoteric writings. On the other hand, I then believed that, in the Aristotelian passages which men-
tion the 4%u>Tepucol \6yot, I could everywhere translate that phrase as meaning such discussions as do not belong to the sphere of the inquiry actually under investigation. (Thus also Schwegleb, Gesch. d.griech. Phil. 194.) I have now rejected this opinion, and think that the general meaning of Qarepticbs, to designate something external, or relating to the external, is more
122
ARISTOTLE
may have been
exoteric
'
a great difference in
'
'
and the
acroatic
'
texts,
appropriate. It follows that even in the combination i^arepiKol \6yot this expression will apply not only to such discussions as lie outside a specified subject (as p. 115, n. 1), or are concerned only with what is external to it (p. 115, n. 2), but also to such as are current outside a particular circle (p. 115, n. 3), or such as. are intended for outsiders (p. 115, n. 4). According as we begin from this or that passage in
Aristotelian writings, or in the oral disputations of the school. These, in their view, may be called exoteric, either because they always have to deal with something foreign to the matter (cf. the |o> and %aa \6yos, Anal. i. 10, 76, b, 24), or because they always treat the subject externally. Gkote (Aristotle, 63 sqq.) agrees with them, except that, besides the Aristotelian Dialogues and some extracts from
and extend the meaning of the expression in that particular passage to all the other cases, we get this or that rendering of the 4a>r. \6yoi. This is the explanation of the fact that even now there are the most diverse opinions on the matter. Of these, the farthest removed from the explanation which has prevailed since the .time of Andronicus, which understands by this expression a particular class of Aristotelian writings, is the supposition of Madvig (Exc. vii.
Aristotle,
the acroamatic works, he thinks conversations outside the school are referred to. In like manner (though with the exclusion of conversations outside the school)
(ffeseh. d. Phil. i. 143, 5th ed.). Oncken (Staatsl. d. Arist. i. 43 sq.) refers the term to oral discussions, allied to the scientific lectures in which the 4^ut. \6yoi are mentioned, but of a different class from them. On the other hand Bitter ( Gesch. d. Phil. iii. 21 sqq.) holds more closely to the statements of the ancient writers about the two classes of Aristotelian pupils and writings, in assuming (p. 29)
Ueberweg
(Arist.
501, 32), Spbngbl (' Arist. Studien,' Abh. d. bayr. Aliad. x. 181 sq.), Forchhamm'er (Arist. und die exoter. Reden, cf. particularly pp. 15, 64), and
that
all
the
strictly
scientific
v. 674 that only the conversations of non-philosophical circles are designated by the Qan. \6yoi. Bather nearer to it are Bavais-
works were only 'written by Aristotle as a help to his lectures and were only published, at a
later period, by himself or his pupils, and perhaps at first only for the latter ; whereas the re-
son (Metaph. d' Arist. i. 209 sq.) and Thttrot (Etudes sw Aristote, 209 sq.), who understand by them
such dialectic discussions (in contradistinction to the strictly scientific), as proceed by arguments irpbs 561-a.v, occurring either in
maining writings (which are lost to us), were designed for the use of cultured persons and might, together with any corresponding lee
tures,
position
Bbrnats
who
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
123
and it may be very true that the matter of the former was
less
advanced than the systematic doctrine of the Master, as we have it from his riper years ; but it is entirely beside the mark to suggest that he sought in either the
one case or the other to conceal his opinions or to with-
reader's eye.
published
'
or 'exoteric' books
which points to the conclusion that the extant, closely reasoned writings of Aristotle were written primarily for
his scholars, as classbooks only.
selves there are
many
indications
which
it is
hard to
reconcile with the idea that they were really published, in the full sense of the word, during Aristotle's lifetime.
In the
first
place there
is
is
Heitz
sqq.),
in substance, prefers to give the expression (with reference to Phys. iv. 10 init.') the broader meaning, and to make it imply a point of view farther removed from true science. Bonitz (Ind.
Arist. 104, b, 44 sqq.
;
discourses."
Zeitsehrif-
ten fur ostr. Gyrnn. 1866, 776 sq.) takes a similar view. Stahe (AristoteHa, ii. 239 sqq., cf especially.275 sq.), and Brandis (Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 101 sqq.) express themselves less decidedly the former believing that by the exoteric writings are meant partly those in which something was treated merely in passing, partly and principally those which did not essentially belong to the systematic connection of
^ot. \6yois) stands quite isolated with his strange whim of looking
for Aristotle's exoteric discourses in the greater Ethics. Space does
not permit me a more searching examination of these various suppositions the principles on which it would be based are contained in what has been said
;
above. Stahe, Hid., gives all the earlier references which bear upon the question.' ' Ritter (iii. 29) and Brandis (ii. b, 113) have already
124
cites that other
ARISTOTLE
book
itself: or that
an
earlier treatise
These
All four
The
Topics
is
and yet
may
at
belong to a
but
later
which these same books are cited as well as the earlier ones. 3 "When the Physics refers us back to discussions which, as we know them, exist only in the Metaphysics, it might be said that the reference is to a section which existed as a separate treatise before the Metaphysics was
compiled
4
;
but
it
b, 21,
{Ind. Arist. 102 sq.) passages on which the explanation is based, they have not been
cited here. 2 VII. 3, 153,
fxhv bpov~\
follows is also closely connected. 4 In Phys. i. 8, 191, b, 2 Aristotle remarks, after a discussion on the possibility of coming into existence its fiiv 8^ rp&nos
:
oiros,
a,
&Wos
'
8'
SYi
24
rtvav irvWoyurii.
ivliix* Taina,
KeyGiv Kara t}jv Svpap.iv Kal t^v ivepyetav tovto 8' iv &W013 St&piffrai
Si
cucptfieias
&Kpi$4irrepov
Anal. Post.
reference
is
13), viii. 11, 162, a, 11: ipavephv 5' eK t5>v ava\vrtKuv (Anal. Pr. ii. t!> 8' iv 2), viii. 13, 162, b, 32
:
[Anal. Pr. ii. 16] rfpjjToi, Kara S6av 8e vvv Xenriov, ix. 2 (Soph. EL), 165, b, 8 irspl pitv oZv rav airoHeiKT iku>v [sc. tTv\\oyio /xwv~\ iv Tots ava\vrtKOis tlprrrai.
:
,
Anal. Pr.
Si'
ii.
15, 64, a,
36
a\\(OV ipUTItftdTWV trv\XoytaaaOai Bdrepov f) iis iv rots TOTTiicois iAexBri \afif7v) refers to
(!<TTl Sh
b,
Top. viii. and Anal. Pr. ii. 17, 65, 15 (Sirep dfpirrai Kal fV tojj
passage in the Metaphysics (for to refer it to one of the lost writings is forbidden by the fact that Aristotle is not accustomed in other places to quote these latter, as he cites the dogmatic writings, with the simple iv &K\ois cf p. 108, n. 3). In the Metaph., however, it not only agrees with ix. 6 sqq., but also with v. 7, 1017, a, 35 sqq., i.e. the treatise Utpl toC voaaxus, cf. p. 76, n. 3. The same is true of Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, b, as compared with Metaph. 29,
; .
v. 7.
: :
ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS
tract cited in the
'
125
work. 2
yet in
Be Ccelo was written later than that The Meteorology refers to the Be Sensu 3 and its own preamble it described itself as the close
which the works on Animals and Plants were to be taken The Natural History quotes the book on Plants, up. which is spoken of in texts that are demonstrably later
4 as being still unwritten.
The same
treatise
on Plants
is
referred to in an
Hepl mcov
book on Pood is quoted in the in the later works on the Parts and Be Somno Generation of Animals, it is promised as in the future. 7
lost
6
;
6 to come.
The
There
is
Be
Ccelo,
ii.
2,
284, b,
13
tbffirep
the world had a right and left side, it would also be obliged to have an above and below, a before and behind SubpiOTai piv oZv irepl roiruv iv rois trepl rks twv (po>v
if
;
pvrav.
shown
on
p. 93, n.
1, is
first
promised
Kivfiacts (Ingr. An. 2, 704, b, 18, sqq., ibid, c, 4 sq.) Sm -rb rrjs tptiffeas oiKeta rqs ineiva>v elvat.
-
in works which, on their part quote in many places the History of Animals, Be Vita et M., Part.
This
is
i.
Meteorol.
juev
fyvrusv
the History of Animals and n. %4 av p-optuv are quoted see Iml. Arist. 100, a, 55 sq.
3
the other hand v. 3, 783, b, aK\k irepi piv Toirav (the falling of the leaves in winter)
On
23
III.
2 fin.
<rra
Si
irepl
1, 716, a, 1
aiirb. /cofl'
roirwv
irepl
yp-tv reBeojpijfievov
iv rots
aira
x a P^ s
iirio-KtTTeov,
r&s aitrdy&ets SetKvvfiivots (Be Sensu, 3) Sil -rck phi hiyiopev, rots 5' &s inrapxovfft xprjtrtefieQa aiiruv. Still more clearly must we, in Meteor, ii. 3, 359, b, 21, refer the etpr/Tai iv a\Aois to Be Sensu, 4. * H. An. v. 1, 539, a, 20
and
6
p. 93, n. 1).
irepl
7
Cf p. 92, and on the chronological relation of the writings n. Sirvov, n. (c$av fioptuv, H. (tpav yeviaeas, see Bonitz, Ind. Arist. 103, a, 16 sqq., 55 sqq.
126
texts, 1
ARISTOTLE
making it impossible to say which comes before The tract on the Parts of Animals is cited
it cites
itself. 2
the other.
How
are
we to
Are we
so to
these cases as to
it
and
assump-
The
But there
is
a far
rb
B'
Kivr)aeu>s
3
706, a, 33: many animals have the front and hind parts near one another, oTov
5,
Thus Top. vii. 3, 153, a, where two lines would have to be thrown out in order to remove the reference, and Meteorol. iii. 2 fin. (p. 125, n. 3), where
24,
An.
re
iv. 9,
the same
/col
trTpon$<iSri
rmv
berpax.ob'ip-
the other hand, Part, An. iv. 11, 690, b, 14 r) B' atria airoStas airav (of snakes) rrjs
/itiv).
:
On
&s fnrdpxov(ri, xpTitrd/xeBa plainly shows that the reference is not to a future exposition, Still more violent than the changes of text here contested is the resource (Ar. Libr. Ord. 118 sq.) of giving to elprjrat, when necessary, the meaning of j>i)Bt)aerat,
the
ray
and
of
denying
the
ftW
rrjs
irepl
(c. 8,
fnivots.
rwv
irpSrepov
irdvrav.
eVeVKeirrai
koixjj
irepl
in the preceding note, this suggestion seems especially objectionable in De Ccclo, ii. 2 (vid.
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
simpler explanation,
if it
127
we
them
for a
time only
among
his
lectures.
troduced
later
and in connection with his oral In such manuscripts addenda would be inand among them references to works written
scholars
would come in from time to time. If the author was never able to give to such a work any final revision for the purpose of publication, it might well happen that in one place a reference would stand in its originally correct form, as to a future work,
though in another
which we
consider as
is
cited
itself
is
spoken of by the
is
Politics in
The
fact
Therefore he could
Politics,
and yet If he
since the
ei
Kal tif ovpavcp, &c. (line 18) corresponds with the BuipioTai
jj.\v
/tois Trepl tovtuv), the Poetics frequently, vid. swjrra p. 102, n. 1. 3 VIII. 7, 1341, b, 39 on the catharsis vvr \i\v imAus, ir&Kiv &'
: ' '
sage from SiiipuTTcu to fi\oyov ivipxiiv iv o.vt$ (line 20), could be dispensed with, and it would all have to be taken as a postAristotelian interpolation. ' Cf. infra, ch. xiii. 2 The Politics i. 8, 1366,
rois
vepl
7roiijTi/rijj
ipoifitv
,,
as Bernays (Abh. d. hist. phil. Ges. in Breslaxi,^. 139) rightly supposes, probably refers to a lost section of our Poetics, and not to one of the Politics (Heitz, Verl. Schr.
<ra<peo-Tepov,
which,
21
{StTjKpi^coTat
yhp iv to?s
iroKirt-
100
sq.).
'
128
ARISTOTLE
had published the Rhetoric, he could not in it have referred as he did to the unpublished Politics? The closing words of the Topics 2 seem to indicate that Aristotle's treatises were meant primarily for his scholars. Addressing his readers, he bespeaks their indulgence or their thanks for the theory he has unfolded to them, 3 referring specially to those
who have
Such a view is negatived both by the wording of the passage, 4 and by the fact
that in later writings he often refers to the Topics
own
or to another
Such an address would be out of place in a work which was tendered to an unlimited circle of readers by formal publication, but it is entirely natural if the Topics was then issued only to Aristotle's scholars
author.
1 It is more difficult to explain the strange fact that RJtet. iii. 1, 1404, b, 22 speaks of the actor Theodoras as if he were acting, whilst still living and Polit. viii. 17, 1336, b, 27 treats him as one belonging to the past. But here the question arises, whether we possess, in the third book of Rhetoric, the work of Aristotle himself, or the work of a later writer, who, in this passage, which seems to be in the genuine style of Aristotle, may have used one of his earlier works. Cf. p. 72, n. 2. 1 Soph. Ml. 33 fin.: Aristotle had no predecessor for his theory of demonstration ei 5c (palvsTai SeaerajueVou ipTtv . *x<=u> V /ue'floBos
; . .
tKavas irapa ras &\\as Tpayfiarelas t&s 4k irapaSiatus 7)ftijjUEi/as, Xotirbv hv tin t&vtwv i/iZv t) ruv Vpoafiei/an %pyov tois piv TrapaAeAeijitjiiEvois rrjs p.e86$ov cniyyv^riu ro!s S' evpri/ieiidis iroMV X e "' X^P' V 3 Some MSS. read, instead of
-
6/uv and vp-iiv, fi/iiv and ruiuv ; but Aristotle could not possibly have
included
whom
4
he apologises,
distinguishes among readers the ' iiKpoap.4vot from the rest ; only by striking out the tj before tuv fiKpoa/ihav could we get a simple address to listeners, but the MSS. all have
Which
the
it.
a,
40 sqq.
ARISTOTLE'S WMITINGS
as a
129
auxiliary to them. 1
That
this
the
fifth book of the Metaphysics, could never have been published by Aristotle in its present form as a It can only have glossary without beginning or end.
been placed in the hands of his scholars simply as an Yet he often refers to it, and aid to his teaching.
that even in texts earlier than the Metaphysics. 2
The same argument applies to the often-cited anatomical texts, 3 which must have been limited to a narrow circle because of the drawings which were an essential part of
them.
If
it
same must be true of those in which these citations occur for no one could in a published book refer to an unpublished one, or say that a subject not gone into was fully explained in an inaccessible
;
tract.
The
which
is
so often re-
marked, the repetitions which surprise us in an exposition otherwise compact, the insertions which upset a
naturally well-ordered
if
As
has
sup-
About
which
see
p.
89,
posed.
2
n. 1.
VOL.
130
ARISTOTLE
posthumous publication added to the original text either from parallel copies or from the author's notes. 1 This theory becomes extremely probable when, as in the books On the Soul, 2 we find throughout considerable sections clear traces of a double recension, without any
reason to say that either recension
is
not Aristotle's. 3
The same kind of argument would apply also to the Tolitics and Metaphysics, but as to these we have
independent grounds
unfinished,
they remained
If this be
so,
forced on us
for
we
as
which
way
follow
it
life.
we could apply it with high probability to nothing more than the Be Anima, would take us a long way for that work is cited in many of the books on
;
natural philosophy. 8
the
The scope and the modifications of this theory as to way in which the Aristotelian books were produced,
A supposition which anumber
:
Cf. p. 89, n. 2.
It
may be
of scholars have been led to adopt, with various particular modifioations thus Kitteb, iii. 29 {rid. Beansupra, p. 121, n. 2 mid.) Dis, ii. b, 113 ; Uebekweg, Qeseh. d. Phil. i. 174, eighth ed., Susemihl, Arist. Poet. p. 1 sq., BeeNAYS, Arist. Politik, 212. It is also probable that Aristotle, instead of writing, usually dictated: which would account for many of the irregularities of style, such as the
;
otherwise with the repetitions and disarrangements of the connection in the Ethics, especially
bks. 5-7. Cf. p. 97, n. 1. 3 As in Bk. vii. of the Physics,
Ar. 102,
Ind.
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
vidual texts.
131
But the
exoteric
'
works,
all
from the
fact that,
Aristotle's
seems
it
intended at
made
it
generally accessible
may
also be
but also from their express internal correlation that Aristotle is in them working up in writing what he had
already given his pupils by
it is
way
also likely that when they came to be published by third parties explanations were added and whole
of lecturing. 4
1
and the De
Anima.
* Like the composition riepl rod iroaax&s (cf p. 76, n. 3, at p. One is inclined to think 77). the same of the 'Avaro/ial. 5 The twelfth, ef. same note,
.
on
to
3
the
As,
of
regard the
Topics.
said
on
seems to
at p. 78.
K2
132
ARISTOTLE
for a lecture course,
though
excluded in the
first
place
manner go
far
beyond
Aristotle
Again
all
negatived
by the
view
fact that,
in spite of
more
if
have been
works are from a literary point of worked up than they would they were merely sketches for the lecturer's
carefully
own
use.
the author
1
Bk. xii. of the Metaphysics has in the first half none at all, and in the second, which is worked out much more fully (since the SiSeucrai, c. 7, 1073, a, 5, relates to c. 6, 1071, b, 20), a single reference (c. 8, 1073, a, 32
SeBeiKTai
8'
Metaph.
vii.
16 and
Hiairep
supra),
i\iyop.ev 26,
i.
ficnrep
\4yop.ev,
vi.
(Mh. N.
3,
1139, b,
Metaph.
1,
iv
rols
(pvaucols
irepl
init., xiii. 2,
8i6iA<J/ie0a
roirav). It is otherwise in most Still more of the other works. decisive, however, is the form of the references. No one uses for expressions like himself the </>ajueK mentioned in p. 115, n. 4, or formulas, like k circumstantial re ttjs lo-Toplas ttjs vzpl t& ($a
Kal tuv avaropav al vffTcpov \ex9ii(rerai iv toIs irepl yev4<reas {Part. An. iv. 10, 689,
<pavepbv
a, 18),
{Metaph.
init.),
7, 2,
4), Sr)\ov
{Rhet.
1028, a, 1356, b,
fip.1v
1357,
a,
29),
redetipiiTai
and the
97, b, sqq. furnishes examples), or like those quoted on p. 115. 2 To this class belongs the conclusion of the Topics (see p. the vvv Si \iyap.Ev 128, n. 2)
;
avTuv {Metaph. i. 3, 983, a, 33) cf. also those sentences in which what has been discussed before is summed up, and what is going to be treated is announced (e.g. Metaph. xiii. 9, 1086, a, 18 sqq., Rhet. i. 2, 1356, b, 10 sqq. Soph. El. c. 33, 183, a, 33 sqq. Meteorol. init,).
ikclvus
irep!
; ; ;
Onckbn
cites,
{Staatsl. d. Ar.,
i.
58)
ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS
Another unlikely theory
transcripts in
1
133
is
that
which suggests
which
Aristotle's pupils
had
set
down the
We
But whether they are a mere transcript of these, or a free working-up of the same matter, whether they were designed to repeat as correctly as might be
the words of the master, or to leave us a spiritual re-
a very different
that
it
The note-theory may rely on the suggestion would explain the carelessness of the methods of
irepl
the Politics alone, thirty-two passages with such formulas. No one will believe that Aristotle would have had to write down ail such expressions in his lecture-book,
like a
man beginning
not sure
ibid.
who
word.
1
is
of
to teach, a single
ruf irohiriKwv aKOV(r6fjLspov. 10, 1079, b, 23, 27 vii. 5, 1147, b, 9, are not relevant here and Pol. vii. 1, 1323, b, 39 erepas yap sffrty tpyov (rxo^vs ruvra, only means this belongs to another inquiry.')
.
(Mh.
x.
'
48 sqq. following Scaligbr. 0. there remarks (62 sq.) that he thinks he has only made this supposition probable with regard to the Ethics and Politics, but his reasons would hold equally for the majority of our Aristotelian
writings.
2
Oncken,
Oncken further proves that, in referring on any point to other works, only such expressions are used as are suited to a person who is speaking, such as elptirai, \skt4ov, aAAo? \6yos, Sec. but such language was certainly used in referring to writings (like the
;
4uTfpiicol \6yoi,
Oncken, in proof of
this,
appeals, besides other passages (p. 59 sq.), to those passages of the Ethics in which an audience is spoken of Etk. i. Sib ttjs ttoXituctjs ], 1095, a, 2, 11 ovk effri oiKeios o/cpoar^s <5 veos . irepl fiep aKpoarov . . Tre<ppoifjLid<r6ti) Toaavra. Ibid. c. 2, 1095, b, 4 iib Be? roh %Qs<fiv ^)x^ at KaAaJ? rbv
rightly
see above, p. 96, and p. 115, n. 4), and is often so used in our own days. He also refers to the title
7TO\itik5(
;
a.Kpoa<Tts
(ap.
DlOG.
v.
but since
we do not know with whom these titles originate, not much can be
inferred from them.
'
134
ARISTOTLE
statement. 1
But on closer inquiry, this argument comes to nothing. For it is not here a question of anysuch defects as commonly arise in the redaction of
well-ordered lectures badly reported, through omissions
and the erroneous piecing together of It is more a question of peculithe broken argument. arities of style not restrained by the writer, which are
and
repetitions
allow us to
Such an origin might be thought possible if they appeared in some books and not in others. But as they in fact extend, though in varying
answerable for them. 2
degrees, through the whole, they can only be ascribed to Aristotle himself.
1
The very
chief
style
And
this
is
the
ground on which Oncken bases opinion. The defects of his our texts are most easily explained from the natural defects of a peripatetic monologue
'
(he says, p. 62), 'hastily copied and badly edited from the note-books of the audience.' 2 be With these must reckoned the formation of the invessentences (searchingly tigated by Bonitz, Arist. Stud. ii. 3 sqq.) especially the explanations, often of considerable length, which are parenthetically introduced, and the anacolutha consequent on this the frequent use or absence of certain particles (proofs of which are to
in
;
occurring so often in all Aristotelian writings, which are put at one time in simple form, at another (as in Be An. i. 1, 403, b, 7 sqq., Gen. et Corr. ii. 11, 337, b, 5, and in the passages explained by Bonitz, Arist. Stud. ii. 16 sq., ibid. 6, 333, b, 30) in a
disjunctive form,
work in the Ztsckr. Gymn. 1866, 804 sqq.), and similar points. The same is
notice of this
but are not answered. That such unanswered questions could not have occurred in a composition (Oncken, ibid. cannot allow 61), one how many, for instance, are found, only to mention one modern writer, in Lessing Neither can one admit the supposition {ibid. 59), that they were answered, in oral discourse, by the audience or the teacher. They seem to be, both in Aristotle and Lessing, a very natural diversion of an acute and lively Dialectic, which
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
135
is
Aristotle's
own.
A like conclusion
for in a lecture a
man
could
courses, but
It
seems
Natural Philo-
Such
would have taxed the attention and memory of the most zealous hearer, and it is difficult to see how
they could have been transcribed so perfectly. 3
rest.
Yet
We
Eudemus
in their
the general
followers adopted
and we can bring proof that these word for word several passages of the
extant Metaphysics. 6
1
Eudemus adopted
the ^Ethics of
See pp. 128, 131. Note, in relation to this how one and the same composition is frequently ref erred to in the most remote plaoes, and how, on the other hand, the most widely differing texts arecitedinthesametreatise. Thus the Physics, Be Ccelo, Gen.
2
point,
et Corr., Meteor.,
Be Anima, Be
Sensu, Part. An., are quoted in many passages of the Metaphysics and in the Mhics the books on Generation, and Corruptionm the Metaphysics, Meteorology, Be
;
Anima, Be Sensu, Part. An., Gen. An. the Metaphysics quote the Analytics, Physics, Be Ccelo, Ethics, the eicKoyii rwv havrluv in the Bhetoric,th.e Topics, Analytics, Politics, Poetics, and the eoBe/creia are quoted. a The notion of formal dictation can hardly be suggested, but if it were, it would imply that our Aristotelian writings were the work of Aristotle him;
;.
self
*
5
136
Aristotle,
ARISTOTLE
and
still
more the
into his
letters in
These
fashion
in which Aristotle's
followers
As
it is not a mere tranby another hand, but that on the contrary it bears to be and must have been the work of Aristotle
script
(see p. 128).
it be true that the philosophical works of Arihad not yet passed at his death beyond the circle of his personal hearers, this circumstance would make it also intelligible that they might for a long time, even after his death, have been withheld from general publicity, or that they might even by an unlucky acci-
If
stotle
And,
These
have
reference
to
b, 114.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
137
CHAPTER
III
Strabo and Plutarch say that the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus passed, at the death of the latter, to his heir, Neleus of Scepsis, and that they were
stowed away in a cellar by the heirs of Neleus, discovered only in the early part of the last century
B.C.
by
by
him to Athens and thence by Sulla as spoils of war to Rome, where they were afterwards used and republished From this story the by Tyrannio and Andronicus. writers named argue that to the Peripatetics who
1
but also his true philosophical system was unknown, but they do not
tell
is
definite evidence,
(Cic.
The date of
this edition
must
have fallen somewhere about the middle of the last century B.C. For as Tyrannio was in B.C. 71 taken prisoner in Amisus and released by Muraena (cf. Zellbr, Ph. d. 6fr., pt. iii. a, 560, 1), he could hardly have settled in
before Lucullus' return to know that (66 B.C.). he was even at the time of his capture a scholar of renown, that he was instructing in B.C. 57 the sons of Cicero, and had some intercourse with the latter
Rome Rome
We
Fr. ii. 6, His work at Rome could not, therefore, have extended very far beyond the middle of the century, even though he perhaps lived on into the last third of it. (He died according to Suid. s. . yripcubs, in the third year of an Olympiad the number of which has unfortunately been miswritten.) About Andronicus cf. Zellbk, Ph. d. Gr., pt. iii. a, 549, 3, and
and Atticus
Ad Qu.
Ad Att.
iv. 4, 8).
above, p. 49, u.
6.
138
ABISTOTLE
if so,
what the nature of the evidence might be. 1 Later critics found in the tale a welcome explanation of the incompleteness and irregularities of the existing Corpus? If in truth the case were exactly as Strabo and Plutarch say, we should not only not wonder at the
and
existing defects, but
far
we should rather have expected a wider and more hopeless corruption than appears in fact to exist. For if it were true of the most important
1
Our
authorities
for
the
@e6<ppa<r-
rov
ovk *x ovfflv SAws tq: fii&\la irAV ohlyav, nal ftdKuTTa ray ^|torspiK&v, fiTjdev e^ety tpiAotrotpeiv
TrpayixaTMws oK\b
rots
1
fleVeis KTl/cvSlfciv
o^>'
liffrepov,
oS
tcc
fiiflKia
The only thing from Strabo. which the latter does not give is the remark that Andronicus obtained copies of the Aristotelian works through Tyrannio, published them, and wrote the to&f
vvv tpepofiwovs irivanas.
Plut.
cwayKdetr$ai fievroi t& iroAAo einSra Keyeiy 5(i rb irKTJdos tuv a/iaprmv. But we can only sup-
may
younger
have added this from what he knew from other sources, or also
ii.
5'
iarepov,
Stahr supposes in Arist. 23) from Strabo's historical work (made use of immediately afterwards for an incident in Sulla's residence at Athens). We have no right to suppose (Heitz, Verl. Sclir. 10) a source for his information about Apellico's discovery of books, independent of Strabo. Hence our only stable witness for this item is Strabo. But we do not know to whom the latter was indebted for his information; the supposition that it was Andronicus is very unsafe. Strabo, after the statements as to the purchase of the Aristote(as
lian books by Apellico, and as to his faulty editing of them, says trvWjBq Sh toij 4k tZv irepmaTtov,
:
Andronicus. As little can we assume Tyrannio or Boethus (to whom Grote ascribes it, Aristotle, i. 64) as Strabo's source of information, since the former would have taken a different view of his own edition, and the latter of the younger Peripatetics. 2 Thus Btjhle, Allg. lihcyhl. Sect. i. vol. v. 278 sq., and lately Heitz; see next page, n. 2.
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
139
works that the only source of our extant text was to be found in these MSS., which rotted for a century and
more in the
cellar of Scepsis,
till
Apellico found
them
if it
and that
who then could guarantee number of cases there would not have been foreign matter, found among Neleus' MSS., adopted into Aristotle's text, or connected parts of his own works separated, and other portions blunderingly bound together, or lacunas great and small filled up by the
scripts they could collate
that in any
editor's fancy ?
Modern
Strabo's story
which even
2
its
gether silence.
library to Neleus is
1
After the isolated and disregarded voice of a learned Frenchman, about the beginning of the eighteenth century, had raised doubts as to this narration (see what Stahr gives in Arist. ii. 163 sq. from the Journal den Scavans of the year 1717, p. 655
sqq., as to the anonymous composition Les Amcnitez de la Critique), Brandis (' Ueb. die Schicksale d. arist. Bucher.'
cularity (A rist.otelia, ii. 1-166, of. 294 sq.). Later scholars have mostly followed them, 2 Hkitz, Verl. Schr. d. Ar.
50 sqq.
Rhein.
Mus.
v.
Niebuhr and
;
Brandis, i. 236 sqq, 259 sqq. cf. Or.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 66 sqq.) was the first to deal with it seriously,
Kopp
finally
{Rliein.
Mm.
iii.
93 sqq.)
of At. i. 5 sqq., Aristotle, 3 sqq. Certain errors in Strabo's and. Plutarch's representation are indeed admitted by these scholars, but in the main it is said to be correct. It is impossible here to examine in detail the reasons given for this opinion, but the grounds for its rejection are fully dealt with in the text. 3 Theophrastus' will, aqrud
Stahb
Diog. where
v.
52
cf.
Athbn.
i.
3,
140
ARISTOTLE
Aristotle and Theophrastus belonging to that library passed to the heirs of Neleus and were by them hidden
in a canal or cellar to
and were afterwards found by Apellico in a desperate All the facts condition, there is no need to doubt. 1 which Strabo relates as to the matter may therefore be
correct enough.
And
it is
also
Andronicus' edition of the Aristotelian text-books was of epoch-making importance both for the study of the
system and
ever,
it
If,
howwere
be
maintained that
these
writings
nowhere
and were
unknown
In the
first place,
it
is
critics
or as
abundant occasion,
he lived at
Eome
at the very
intercourse
Alexander,
who used
first
or at second
Alexandria, this may easily be an inexact expression, just as it is inexact, in the opposite
library of Neleus
was taken
to
way, when, in v 214, he makes Apellico possess not the works, but the library of Aristotle.
"
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
hand.
141
MSS.
of Neleus. 1
way
feel
themselves bound
it
by
his
text, 2
though
if
On
is
an
as
It
may be
true that
away
time went on from the study of natural philosophy and metaphysics, but this change took place not on the
death of Theophrastus, but at the earliest on the death
of his successor Strato.
So
far
on the contrary, with a one-sided preference to physics, though he by no means neglected logic and metaphysics.
He
frequently
contradicted Aristotle
but
because he attacked
expressly. 3
1 With regard to the first, the account given on p. 66, n. 1. as to his doubts about the n. 'Ep/wjxefas with respect to the second point, cf. Dexipp. In Arist. Categ. p. 25, Speng. lrpa-rov (Sehol. in Ar. 42, a, 30) ouk hi Siraffi rots ami/liv ypd<pois rb " S Sf \6yos t5js oicrias
cf.
pute by means of Sulla's MSS. (or, if he had not access to the latter, at least by means of the copies of Tyrannio, which, according to Plutarch, he used). It seems, therefore, that these MSS. were not the only copies nor even the original ones of the
Borjflir /ivrifio-
vciei
teal
'kvSpiviKos
Shein.
2 3
Mm.
i.
241.
it
is
not
Cf.
Simpl.
Phys. 101,
will
a.
The proofs
be given,
142
ARISTOTLE
came at once The theory that
Athens
is
an end, even
was due
every
in
way
unnatural.
It is
much movement
at
more reasonable to
in the
for
Academy,
texts
which
Plato.
nevertheless
was
no
loss
of
in
?
many
had ever been willing and able to possess himself of the most important sources of the Peripatetic teaching ? Who can think that Eudemus, the most
loyal of the Aristotelian circle, or Strato, the shrewdest
books
them
or that
?
Ptolemy Philadelphus bought other books of Aristotle and Theophrastus for his Library of Alexandria, but
omitted to obtain copies of their essential texts
The
that Ari-
in part, in the following pages. They will also be found in the section on Strato, infra, Ch. xx., and notes thereon.
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
secrecy,
143
and
are
laid it as a
duty on his
heirs.
All this
is
We
not
left,
The materials
whose philosophic literature by an unhappy accident we have almost wholly lost but we can still prove, as to a great part of Aristotle's books, that they were not unknown to the learned men of the two centuries that elapsed between Theophrastus' death and the occupation of Athens by Sulla. Whether Aristotle did or did not
;
and
to be used
by
its
members.
and compared, and, by consequence, that copies were to That this was done is clear, not only from the notices which we find of particular
be kept and multiplied.
books, but from certain general considerations also.
If
it is
Aristotelianism
disappeared,
it
when
the
library
of
Theophrastus
must be because the sources of that teaching were nowhere else to be found. But we hear
not only of Theophrastus but of
imitated Aristotle
l
Eudemus
titles
also, that
he
how
close
and
tion on
144
ARISTOTLE
this,
To do
texts
;
possessed Aristotle's
he used was not living at Athens. 2 them at a time when he Again, it is beyond doubt that the Alexandrian Library The included a large number of Aristotle's works. 3
especially
1 as a reliable story tells us,
who
place Aristotle
among
chiefly in
writings
it
is
works of Aristotle
If the Catalogue of
it
out of account.
Diogenes
is
but even
if
that
still
p. 136, n. 3. {Verl. Sclir. 13) indeed thinks that if the Aristotelian works had been universally known and published, it
2
Vide supra,
Heitz
Eudemus
in his Physics (and Ethics) should have imitated the words of Aristotle so exactly. however, that if It seems, Eudemus had hesitated to do this with regard to published works, a plagiarism on unpublished ones must have seemed much more unlawful to him. It is impossible, however, to regard his conduct in this light at all, and he himself probably never so regarded it. His Ethics and Physics were never intended to be anything but elaborations of the Aristotelian works universally known in the Peripatetic School, adapted to the
texts
(Ammon.
;
Scliol.
in
Arist.
not
works, and did not possess the genuine ones, by reference to which the forgeries were proved. 4 See Stahe, ibid. 65 sq. on
this point.
5
p.
48 sqq.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
it,
145
earlier
who
and
than
probable author,
Herm-
ippus, was acquainted with the works of Theophrastus (which according to Strabo and Plutarch were buried in Scepsis along with those of Aristotle), as is clear from
his catalogue of them, preserved, apparently,
by Dio-
genes. 2
That he
at all events
disappearance of the Aristotelian be inferred from the silence of Diogenes on that subject. 3
B.C. is to
be found in the
most systematic exposition by Chrysippus follows both in logic and in physics more closely on the Aristotelian than could be possible if the Aristotelian text-books were unknown. There is, indeed, some express evidence that Chrysippus had in
fact these texts in view. 4
1
Cf. p. 50, n.
1.
originated with
Hermippus,
since
is
the more
probable
that
writer is mentioned immediately before in v. 45. s For, on the one hand, it is not to be supposed that Hermippus in his copious work on
on p. 51, n.2) would not have mentioned this circumstance, if he had been aware of it; and, on the other hand, it
Aristotle (mentioned
is
to
Sp6viKos
Se
irepl
(purSr io-Toplas,
Diog. (ii. 55) names a book by Hermippus on Theophrastus, of whioh it probably formed a part, That the lists in Diog. v. 16 sqq., at least in part and indirectly,
hismanyquotationsfromHermippus would have passed over this information. Diogenes, to whose literary tastes it must have recommended itself, would have seized upon it, if he found it, * For even if we were not
VOL.
I.
146
ARISTOTLE
If the works of Aristotle were
first
unearthed by
Apellico and
first fully
Andronicus,
how
could
Aristotle, that
and Theophrastus
or
how
he was always quoting them ? 3 How could we have mention of the constant tendency of Posidonius towards
Aristotle ?
4
How
Antiochus,
Academic, and
attempted
?
5
their
complete
and
thorough-going amalgamation
letter in
ander complains to Aristotle about the publication of it follows that long before that date
exoteric,'
'
must have
us,
in fact
we can
our-
many
of the lost
works, which,
being
inclined to attach much importance to the polemic against one of the discourses mentioned on p. 56, n. 1, yet the expression in Plut. Sto. Hep. 24, p. 1045, sup-
Ibid. iii. a, 514, 2. Fuller particulars, ibid, 535 sqq. Stilpo wrote, according to Diog. ii. 120, an 'Apt(rTOT?\ns,
* "
poses
1
acquaintance
CiC. Fin. v.
with
Ari-
Ibid. Ibid.
v. 25, 73.
iv. 28,
iii.
x. 25) vpbs From the expression of Colotes apud Plut. Adv. Col. 14, 1, p. 1115, we can, how'ApitrraTehTiv.
Hermarchus
(ibid.
79
cf.
Zbll.,
Ph.
d. Gfr. pt.
a, 503, 3,
2nd
edi
n. 1,
and 112, n.
3.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
147
In the case of the Analytics we show this by the Catalogue of Diogenes and by the notices as to the use
made
them by Theophrastus and Eudemus. 2 For the Categories and the Tispl epprjvsias, we have the Cataof
logue. 3
As
MS.
Post-praadicamenta added to them, and was acquainted with several recensions, having varying titles and different readings. 4 It follows, therefore, that the Categories must have been long before 5 The Topics are his day in the hands of transcribers. 6 in the Catalogue of Diogenes, and Theophrastus 7 and
the spurious
1
The
letters,
;
p. 54, n. 2.
consideration
Teles,
by
Chrysippus,
;
Demetrius (n. ip/iriv.'), prothe bably also by Carneades Protreptieus, which is known even
to Crates, Zeno,
n. 1),
and Teles
(p. 60,
the Mademus (p. 56, n. 2), which at any rate Cicero used the discourses on Philosophy
(p. 55, n. 6) and on Wealth (p. 58, n. 1 end), which, before him, Philodemus, and also Metrodorus, pupil of Epicurus, made use of ; the tywrticbs, which, according to Athbn. xv. 674, b,
60, d) was attacked by Cephisodorus; in short (as has been shown at p. 48 sqq.), all the compositions given in the Catalogue of Diogenes, not to mention the spurious but much-used composition n. eiiyevelas (p. 59, n. 2). The writings on ancient philosophers, among which is included our extant tract on Melissus, &c, are found apud Diog. No. 92-101 (see p. 62, n. 2, supra).
ii.
2 3
4
a
The same
the
would
follow
from
statement
Aristo of Ceos
which Eratosthenes and Apollodorus seem the 'OAu/iirioyiKai, to have used which Eratosthenes (apud Diog.
n.iron;T(i5v(p.58, n. 1),
;
viii. 51),
quotes
the lHdasdalics,
dronicus followed pretty closely the Categories of Archytas, since the latter at any rate are imitations of the Aristotelian; Simplicius, however, bases what is here said merely on his false supposition of their genuineness.
8 7
Cf. p. 68, n. 1,
and Of Theophrastus
71, n. 2.
this
is
148
his follower Strabo
ARISTOTLE
'
The Rhetoric
is
in all likeli-
hood are themselves earlier than Andronicus 2 and the same is true of the Theodectine Rhetoric. 3 The Physics were worked over by Theophrastus and Eudemus, and the latter followed the text so closely
that he a
is
various
reading. 4
One
of the
scholars of
Eude-
clear
p. 5,
taph. 342, 30, 373, 2 (705, b, 30, 719, b, 27). See Simpl. Categ.
Schol. in, Ar. 89, a, 15. 1 Cf. Alex. Top., infra (Sohol. 281, b, 2). Among Strabo's
same author In Categ. Sohol. 92, 20 sq., with Themist. Phys. 54, b, 55, a, b {Sohol. 409, b, 8, 411, a, 6, b, 28), and Beandis, Rhein. Mus. i. 282 thereon about Eub,
;
writings
59,
is
v.
a
is
KaraKoKovSav;
b,
:
ad Alex, (vide svpra, p. 74, which Diogenes (No. 79) knows (cf. p. 72, n. 2) as well as cur Rhetoric (about which see the latter p. 72, n. 2, ad fin.) apud Demetrius, De Elocutione
n. 3),
;
120, b, where it remarked on Phys. ill. 8, 208, 18 KaWiov y&p, olfiai, to " e|aj
&(TTea>s " oifrats
ctKot/etv,
rov
&o.
"
;
us b
EtiftTjfios iv(yfj(TG
t&tov
KaBityefiivos,
so 121,
%v riat
8e [sc.
kvTiypdtpois~]
ltp&Tl\.
avrl
tov
"
koivt)
"
quotations from our Rhetoric are ESStjmoi 128, b EiSBn/ios Se roifound here, c. 38, 41 ( Rket. iii. tois irapaKoXovBuv, &c. 178, b Eudemus writes, in Phy*. iv. 8, 1409, a, 1); c. 11, 34 (Rhet. iii. 9, 1409, a, 35, b, 16); c. 81 13, 222, b, 18, not Tlapav but ESS. (Rhet. iii. 11, i/nit.'); to it ibid. iraptiv 201, b ev toij c 34 refers, which is earlier than kavrov (pvaiKols irapcuppdfav t& tov the author Archedemus, who was 'ApiirTOTi\ovs 216, a: Eudeprobably the Stoic of that name, mus immediately connects with what is found in Aristotle at the circa 140 B.C. 3 Which (as shown at p. 72, end of the fifth book, the beginning of the sixth n. 2) is likewise given in Dio223, in Aristotle an genes, and is named by the Rlw- a rASe repeated in a different context toric ad Alex. 4 We get these facts, apart (Phys. vi. 3, 234, a, 1) gives an from other proof, from the ex- ambiguity in expression, and so ceedingly numerous references to Eudemus puts " hreiceim " instead the Physios in Simplicius; for of the second iirl rdSe; 242, a Theophrastus, (beginning of the seventh book) instance, about ESS. /i^xpt rovSe 8a.t)j <rx*Sbv wpaycf. Simpl. Phys. 141, a and b, and 187, a, 201, b, and the /laTeias Ke<pa\alois aKoXouBfoas,
; :
; : ; :
ARISTOTLE'S VigtITINQS
149
mus
'
'
on Movement.' It can also be proved that the same work was known to Strabo, 2 and Posidonius the Stoic showed no less acquaintance with it. 3 The Be Goalo cannot than Andronicus except Theophrastus. 4
when
its
continuation
the
is
liepl
koX
$6ppas
appears
in the Catalogue of
is closely
Diogenes, 5 and
to have
when
known
been used by many writers of that period. 6 Posidonius, for example, appropriated from it the theory
its
account of the
(spurious)
and the Astronomy, are in the list in Diogenes. 9 The Natural History was adapted not only by Theophrastus, 10 but also by the Alexandrine writer Aristophanes of Byzantium. 11 That it was not
Mechanics,
roSro irape\6&>v &s irtpirrby
hi
4ir\
The named
rh.
retevraiip Pi$\li/i Ke<j>d\aia HCTTJ\8e; 279, a: koi 8 ?e ES5. Trapatppafaii (rx^Sbv xal avrbs -rb.
That
n.
it;
'ApurrtniKavs
Tl6r)ai
ko!
;
toCto
294,
b
first
the
motor must be immovable to which Eudemus adds t!> irparus Kaiauv Kaff kK&ar-ov Kim\aai. For
further details see ch. xix. infra,
(rroixeiuv a'
and
1
p. 136,
n 2. Damasus vide
:
Cf
SIMPL.
' Simpl. Be Ccelo, Scliol. in Ar. 517, a, 31. 8 Simpl. ibid. 486, a, 5. 9 The former No. 123, the latter 113 vide supra, p. 86, n. 1. 10 Dioe. v. 49 names as his
:
'E^iTO/iSp 'ApurToriXovs
n".
ZaW
s-'.
(155, b), 154, b, 168, a, 187, a, sqq., 189, b (cf. Phys. iv. 10), 214, a.
3 In the fragment apud SlMPL. Phys. 64, b of which
:
" According
to
Hieeocl.
Hippiatr. Prof. p. 4, this grammarian had written an 'Eto^ of it, which Aetbmidor. Onevrocrit. ii. 14 calls {nro/uiifutra eij
150
ARISTOTLE
period is also shown by the Catalogue of Diogenes (No. 102), and by the existence of a popular compilation from it which was
much
in use. 1
2
phrastus,
of Living Creatures,'
TLepl
Trvev/jLaros. 3
The Metaphysics was used, as we have by Theophrastus and Eudemus, but after them by Strabo and other Peripatetics. It was probably published by Eudemus though some sections of it do seem to have been first introduced by Andronicus
seen, 5 not only
;
Philosophy.
Of the
Ethics, it
is
obvious that
it
could not
lost
by Eudemus or at a later date by the author of Magna Moralia. The Politics, if we are to judge by the list of Diogenes, was to be found in the Library of Alexandria, 6 along with the first book of our Economics,
either
(see Schneider in edition i. xix.). Demetrius also, Be Elocut. 97, 157 (cf. M. An. ii. 1, 497, b, 28 ; ix. 2. 32, 610, a, 27,619, a, 16), or perhaps the earlier writer used by him,
'Api<rTOT4\r)v
his
For the present purpose it is of no importance whether they are mediate or immediate witnesses for the use of Aristotle's work.
z Upon which see Themistocles in Be An. 89, b, 91, a Philop. Be An. C. 4. Cf. p. 89
;
knows
1
this epitome.
Aboutwhichseep.87,n. l,ad
n. 1,
3 *
supra,
Cf. p. 89, n. 2 ad fin. As to which cf. p. 96.
fin.
the
also
the
Aristotelian History of Animals in Antigonus' Miraiilia (c. 16, 22, 27-113, 115) are perhaps taken,
1.
p.
100, n. 1
p. 100, n. 3.
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
which
is also
151
by Philodemus. 1 It is obvious that the author of that book 2 had the Politics before him that Dicsearohus knew it also is indicated by the notices
cited
The use of it in the Magna Moralia 4 is not so well proven, and we cannot tell to what source Cicero owed the parts of it which he used for his
of his Trvpoliticus?
own
death
political
works
but
it
is
it
Theophrastus.
The same
proofs. 6
is
true
of
the
we have abundant
Tit. ix. ( Vol. Here, ii.) 47, col. 27, 15, where
Be
col. 7, 38,
it is 2
citing Cic.
i.
iii.
6.,
ascribed to Theophrastus. Whom we have rather to seek in Eudemus or one of his Peripatetic contemporaries than
in Aristotle
s
:
Rep.
6,
25
(cf.
9,
1280,
On which
ail fin.
' i.
Although happiness
has certainly a greater resemblance to Polit. vii. 13, 1332, a, 7 (a passage to which Nickbs, De
Arigt. Polit. Libr. 87 sq. calls attention) than to Eth. N. i. 6, x. 6, 7, End. ii. 1, since happiness is here certainly called ivepyeia kot' iperV (or Trjs &peT?s),but the conjunction of the ivipytia and
wanting. Then the spoken of in Eiid. 1219, a, 12 sqq. 23, Me. i. 9. 1098, b, 31, and thus it is quite possible that only these passages were in the mind of the author of the Great Ethics. 5 Zelleb had already proved in his 2nd ed., that in Cicero's
Xpflff's
is
Xpijcis is also
political writings
29, c, 6, 1278, b, 8, 19, i. 2, 1253, a, 2) Rep. i. 26 {Pol. iii. 1, 1274, b, 36, c. 6, 1278, b, 8, c. Rep. i. 27 7, 1279, a, 25 sqq.) {Pol. iii. 9, 1280, a, 11, c. 10, 11, sqq., b, 28, c. 16, 1287, 1281, a, 28 a, 8 sqq.) Rep. i. 29 {Pol. Iv. Susemihl {Arist. Pol. 8, 11). xliv. 81) also agrees with this. But since Cicero does not name Aristotle in the Republic, and Leg. iii. 6 only refers to him in very indefinite expressions, he seems not to have drawn imme r diately on Aristotle, and the question arises where did he get this Aristotelian doctrine from ? Susemihl, p. xlv, thinks, from Tyrannio, but we might also presume Dicsearchus, whom Cicero was fond of using. 6 The oldest witness for this is Timasus, apud PoLTB.xii. 5-11, and the latter author himself. There is also, besides Diog. (Serww^?M)No.l45,the Scholiast of Aristophanes, who (according to a good Alexandrine authority)
; ; ; :
152
ARISTOTLE
also
was
known
to
the
Alexandrine grammarians
is
the case by saying that of the genuine portions of the extant Corpus, there are only
We
may sum up
the works
and
Movement of
tracts, as to
Even as to these we have no reason to doubt it only we cannot positively prove it and that, when we remember the fragmentary character of our knowledge ot
;
is
and Plutarch that the scientific writings of Aristotle were after the death of Theophrastus all but wholly withdrawn from
nothing strange.
The
belief of Strabo
by the
facts.
A
or
may
One book
another
lost to the
School at Athens
when they
Theophrastus, and
may
this
damaged MSS.
reasons
of Sulla's- collection.
all
But that
happened to any or
is for all
antecedently improbable.
quotedthenoAiTeraiveryoftenjsee Arid. Fr. ed. Rose, Nos. 362, 355358, 370, 373, 407, 420 sq.. 426 sq., 470, 485, 498 sq., 525, 533. Their presence in the Alexandrian library is clear from the Catalogue of Diog. (No. 83), and their having been used by Ari1
stophanes
Susemihl has collected at p. 20 sq., of his edition (following Trendelenburg, Grammat. Grtze. de Arte Trag. Judic. Eel.") from the Introductions and Scholia to Sophocles and Euripides,
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
153
of Theophrastus.
He who
cared so well
them gardens and houses and a museum and the means it, could never have deprived them of his most precious and most indispensable possession his own and his master's texts if a sufficient substitute for them were not at hand. Any theory, therefore, as to an individual book of our collection, that its text rests solely on a MS. from Apellico's library, ought to rest, entirely on the internal evidence of the book itself for Strabo's and Plutarch's suggestion of a general disappearance of the texts could give it no support.
of maintaining
It is not, however, to
be denied that
many
of the
We
made only by
are Aristotelian
other context,
which
in so condensed a
late interpolations. 1
style,
and
Strabo's
among
others, that
(p. 66, n. 1), the Rhetoric (p. 72, n. 2), the Metaphysics (p. 76, n. (p. 81, n.
book of the Meteorology (p. 83, n.2),thetenthbookof theSistory of Animals (p. 87, n. 1), n. if/vxys (p. 89, n. 2), bk. v. Be Gen. An. (p.92,n. 2),theMhics (p. 98, n.l), and thePoeties (p. 102, n. 2); and theremarks inch. xiii.mfra upon
the state of the Polities,
154
ARISTOTLE
to
must explain them really as arising in part from the circumstances under which these treatises were written and issued, in part from the way they were used for teaching purposes, 2 in part from the carelessness of transcribers and the many accidents to which each transcript was exposed. If we pass to the discussion of the time and sequence
We
we
this
is
of far less
importance than
It is clear that
commenced
probable that he
and Macedonia.
all
The extant
writings, however,
seem
for
much
them
preparation
before.
The proof
which control
all
Cf. p. 108 sqq. easily, by this means, explanations and repetitions may find their way into the text, and
2
How
greater or smaller sections may come to be repeated, is perfectly plain, and is proved on a large scale by the parallel case of the Eudemian Physics and Ethics. 3 See p. 56 sqq. He left Athens in B.C. 345-4 and returned in 335-4. 4 Thus Meteor, i. 7, 345, a, 1,
vis4,
b, 1,
ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
which even the
earliest of
155
them contain
to
1
Athens and
If,
then, the
it
without doubt to past events of the years B.C. 338-336 in iii. 17, 1418, b, 27 it mentions Isocrates' Philippus (B.C. 345); of the Rhetoric also Brandis shows (PMUlogui, iv. 10 sqq.) that the many Attic orators quoted in it and in the Poetics who were younger than Demosthenes, could by no means belong to a time prior to Aristotle's first departure from Athens, and the same is true of the numerous works of Theodectes which are used both here and in the Poetics. In Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 1, xii. 8, 1073, b, 17, 32, Eudoxus and the still younger Callippus, and in Mh. N. vii. 14, 1153, b, 5, x. 2, init., Speusippus and Eudoxus are spoken of as if they were no longer living. Bose (Arist. IAbr. Ord. 212 sqq.) has shown with regard to the History of Animals,
son of the indefiniteness of that particle. Just as little does it follow from Anal. Pri. ii. 24, that Thebes was not yet destroyed at that time we might rather gather the contrary, with regard to this work, from Polit.
;
iii.
'
5,
1278, a, 25.
Cf.
Bbandis,
6fr.-rom. Phil.
ii.
b, 116.
We may give
:
here a
instances, besides those already noted. Categ. 4, 2, iroD, oTov iv Avueitp. a, 1, c, 9 fin.
few further
Anal. PH. ii. 24 Athens and Thebes, as examples of neighbours. Likewise in Phys. iii. 3,
:
202, b, 13; ibid. iv. 11, 219, b, 20: rb iv Avxeliji elvai. Metaph. v. 5, rb 30, 1015, a, 25, 1025, a, 25 TtXtvaai sis Atytvav, as an example of a commercial journey. Ibid.
:
from viii. 9, ii. 5. init., and other passages, that it was only written (or at least completed), some time after the battle of Arbela, in which the Macedonians saw elephants for the first time, and probably not before the Indian expedition. The fact that even much earlier events are introduced with a vvv as inMeteor. iii. 1,371, a, 30, the burning of the temple of Ephesus (01. 106, 1, B.C. 356), and in Polit. v. 10, 1312, b, 19, Dion's expedition (01. 105, 4 sq.) proves nothing, by rea-
the Athenian festivals Thargelia (Aristotle also uses the Attic months e.g. Hist. An. v. 11, &c. but it is not fair to attach any importance to this). Rivet, ii. 7, 1385, a, 28 S iv AvKeltp rbv <j>op/ibv Sois. Ibid. iii. 2, 1404, b, 22, PoUt. vii. 17, 1336, b, 27 the actor Theodorus. Very frequent mention is also made of Athens and the Athenians (Ind. Ar. 12, b, 34 Again the observation on sqq.). the corona borealis (Meteor, ii, 5. 362, b, 9) suits the latitude of Athens, as Ideler (i. 567), on this passage, shows, 2 P. 108 sqq. especially p. 123 sq. and p. 138 sq.
v. 24, fin.
:
Dionysia
and
156
ARISTOTLE
them must have been composed during
Equally decisive, on this
hardly to be found
head,
is
There are no scattered products of the different periods of a life. We can only look upon them
character. as the ordered execution of a
author, having
come
had gathered together the philosophic fruit of a lifetime. Even the earlier works which he proposed to connect with his later writing, he revised on a comprehensive plan. Therefore, for our use of these texts, it is no
great matter whether a particular book was written
must be
As such cases
is
only
not so slight as
fact,
Of the extant
classification, 2
1
124 sqq. however, is always the case except with writings the genuineness of which can be
Cf. p.
2
This,
ARISTOTLE'S WAITINGS
Propositions, 1
itself natural
167
It is in
may be
considered to come
with.
first.
and accords
Aristotle's methodical
were designed to establish the rules and conditions of But it is also made evident by all scientific thinking. his own citations that the Logic did precede the Natural
Philosophy, the Metaphysics, the Ethics and Rhetoric. 2
Of the
be the
cies,
seems to
The
book on Falla:
the treatise
sition,
On
not
the
one other hand, there is among the works which we congenuine, which does sider as not quote the others, or is not
by them, or, at lease, implied, whilst in most of them examples of all three connections To explain more fully occur. Of the decidedly spurious I. works (a) the following are neither quoted nor do they quote others n. k6<thov, n. xp^^rav, n. axovcrruVf $vffioyvu>p.ovtKa, n. <pvrHv (see p. 93), n. 6av/u.aalu>v
quoted
: :
the Categories is the only work which quotes no other, and neither is it directly quoted (but cf p.64). The n. ipumveias. XI. t. a0' iiirvov /laj/TiKTJs and the Rhetoric quote others, but are not quoted n. <;W yevttreus has many quotations, but is only once cited, as a book planned for the future of the Metaphysics only bk. v. is quoted or used (cf. pp. 76, n.3, and 79, n.l) in genuine works,
.
i., xii., and xiii. in spurious ones and the Metaph. itself quotes the Analytics, the Physics, De Ccelo, and the Ethics.
bks.
aKovtTfia.Ttoi', MT7xafiKa, II. ar6fitov ypapjiuv, 'Avefiuv Qeeeis, XI. Uevo(pavovs &c, 'H0ia fieyti\a, IT.
On which
67,
n.
see p. 66, n.
1,
1.
on
in
p.
68,
n.
1,
hperuv
'PTjropiKij
teal
kclkimv,
OtKOvofiuca.,
we have
:
the
wpbs 'AKe^avSpov. (b) n. Tireu/iOTos quotes no other, but is quoted in the spurious treatise (c) On the n. ftiaii' Kivijaeus. contrary, the latter itself is never
quoted. But it names some other writings as does also the Eudemicm Ethics, supposing that its quotations refer to Aristotelian works. II. Among the remaining
;
Anal. 10 fiaWov 8e tpavepus v rots Ka66\ov irepl Kwf]ffeus Sei Ae^fl^pcu irepl avrav. The Physics, however, is the earliest of the works on Natural Science. negative line of proof also is found in the fact that in the Categories, the Analytics, and the Topics, none of the other writings are quoted.
158
ARISTOTLE
1
may be
placed
now forms
the
fifth
book of the
next.
Metaphysics?
In
It is
projected in
is
book of
Metaphysics
or presup-
Meteorology,
is
the
or the
Be Anima came
not settled.
work, extensive as
some-
68
sq.,
De
76, n. 1, p. 124, n. 4); and, on the other, it seems in c. 30 fin. to referto^.?iaZ.i3osi.i.6,75,a,18sqq., 28 sqq. though the latter point
;
cannot, like (Rhein. Mus. xxx. 498, 506), consider a ' hypomnematical writing, not merely because of the references made to it, but on other grounds also, 5 Meteor, i. 1, whereon cf. further p. 83, n. 1, Ind. Arist. 98, a, 44 sqq., and the quotation of the tract n. (tfiav iroptlas in the Be Ccelo, ii. 2, given p.
Which we
Blass
'
126.
6 That the completion of the History of Animals should not be put too early is clear from what has been said on p. 154,
is
not certain. 9 Vide supra, p. 81 sqq., Ind. Arist. 102, a, 53 sqq., 98, a, 27
sqq.
n, 4.
ARISTOTLE S WAITINGS
times expressly
contents.
'
159
Some
the
Genesis
2 of Animals.
That group of
which followed
it
tracts
is
treatises
it is
upon
it.
On
different direction. 4
We must,
who
nevertheless, decide in favour of the earlier construction of the Natural Philosophy texts, for a thinker
was
soul, 7
so clearly convinced
as Aristotle
human
must be supposed
There
and
relations.
very
Immediately
5
the Ethics.
1 Thus n. alcrBfaeais, n. iiirvov, n. iwirvluv, n. avaTvorjs (Ind.Ar. 102, b, 60 sqq.). 2 Vide supra, p. 89 sqq. 3 See pp. 89, n. 2, 89, n. 3,87, Ind. Arist. 99, b, 30 sqq. n. 1 4 The further question of the relative order of the three writings named has been already discussed on p. 91 sq.
:
122 sqq.
"
Mh.
x.
3,
1174, b,
2.
CI
a, 23.
Mh.
to
ii.
De An.
3,
iii.
9, 432, a,
22 sqq.
yet ii. 2
160
ARISTOTLE
Politics. 1
comes the
ences, the
refer-
Rhetoric should be
the
Poetics
should
be later than
but
probability a work which and with which several other fragments, some genuine, some spurious, have been amalgamated since. 3
in
all
we have
ings.
many more of such traces may perhaps be explained by the fact that Aristotle did not wish to interfere with the practical aim
of an ethical work (Eth. i. 1, 1096, a, i, ii. 2, init.) by any discussions which were not indispensable to its purpose cf. i. 13, 1102, a, 23. 1 See p. 100, ii. 1. 2 See p. 127 swpra, and infra, ch. xiii. And if this supposition is correct, it would also go to make it improbable that the Ethics, so closely allied with the Politics,
;
3 Cf. p. 76 sqq., and with regard to citations of the Metaphysics, see p. 156, n. 2. Eose's supposition (Arist. Libr. Ord. 135 sqq. 186 sq.) that the Metaphysics preceded all the writings on natural science, or at any rate the zoological ones, makes the actual condition of that work an inexplicable puzzle. But there is also the fact that the Physics, as well as the Be Casio, are quoted in numerous passages of the Metaphysics (Ind. Ar. 101, a, 7 sqq.) as already existing, while the Metaphysics are referred to
161
CHAPTER IV
.
As
Yet he made a comprehensive use of the well. He was tetter versed than any of the earlier teachers in the theories and writings of his forerunners, and it is with him a favourite method to preface his own inquiries with a retrospect of earlier opinions. He is wont to let them
with Plato.
earlier
philosophies as
He
is
eager
But the
upon
Aristotle is
apparent
m the
than
ciple,
it is
In prinis
Aristotle
not
He
by which Plato
established
the claims of philosophy and the true meaning of know1 Even in Metapli. i. 8 their principles are merely criticised briefly from an Aristotelian point of view, and the Eleatics and
Heraclitus, about whom Plato busied himself so much, are passed over altogether,
VOL.
I.
102
ledge, as against
'
ARISTOTLE
the ordinary consciousness
'
on the
Aristotle
His task
of the
is
to
work
out,
own
writings
the rare expressions of agreement with his teacher are almost lost sight of by comparison with his keen and
constant polemic
reality
far
Yet in and in the whole his agreement with Plato is greater than his divergence, 2 and his whole system
against Platonic
views. 1
it
as a develop-
com-
In the
first place,
he agrees
for
To him,
' shall deal later on with this polemic, especially as it was directed against the doctrine of
We
stotle, as
we have shown on
p.
&c.
found inwh,ich Aristotle expressly declares his agreement with Plato, Besides the passages noted on p. 12, and p. f4, n. 4, see Eth. IV. i. 2, 1095, a, 32*; ii. 2, 1104, b, 11 ; De An. iii. 4, 429, a, 27 Polit. ii. 6, 1265, a, 10. 2 Cf. also the valuable remarks of Steumpbll, Gfesck. d. Aritheor. Phil. d. Qr. 177.
not unfrequently includes himself in the first person along with the rest of the Platonic school. But his way of treating such a relation is the opposite to that of Plato. Whilst Plato puts his own view, even where it contradicts the original one of Socrates, into the mouth of his teacher, Aristotle not unfrequently attacks his teacher even where they agree in the main point, and only differ in opinion as to secondary matters.
14, n. 3,
;;
163
Essence, or,
more
which
causes
is
actual. 2
Philosophy treats
solely
of
the
and basis of things, 3 and in fact of their highest and most universal basis, or, in the last resort, of that which presupposes nothing. 4 For the like reasons he ascribes to the philosopher in a certain sense a knowledge of everything, thinking, of course, of the point of unity where all knowledge converges. 5 As Plato had distinguished knowledge,' as the cognition of that which is Eternal and Necessary,
'
1
Anal. Post.
{/nreipias
.
ii.
. .
19, 100, a, 6
etc
5"
rexvris
fyxb
and
.,ii. 19, 100; a, 6, i. 24, 86,b, 13 Etlh. N. vi. 6 mit., x. 10, 1180,
b, 15.
3
jiiep irepl
yevefftv,
More infra,
Anal. Post.
Be
r-f p t' t
5i'
i.
in chapter v.
2
y
init.
Ivi. .
.
t 1004, b, 15 ovrt p ov IfffTi riva ISia, Kal tout' itrrl irepl >v rod <pt\otr6<pov &ri(TKt^airOai t&\ti04s. Ibid. 1005, a, 2, c. 3, 1005, b, 10. 2 Metaph. iii. 2, 996, b, 14 TdV rb eiSevai (Kaarov sqq.
Metaph.
iv. 2,
:
aratrQai,
oi6fieB
atrial/
eKaffrov
iarrip
oVcw
(tkzlv
olupeBa yiypjt. ,
.
%p rb irpayfid
pdex*<r6ai
Kal
fify
tout'
a\\ws
ii.
eX"mit.
c.
Hid. c.
11
Mh.
i.
Metaph.
2,
ol6fie6a
1028, a, 36 ei'Serai %Kaarov /xdhiffTa, '6rav ri iffrtv 6 avQpwnos yj/$fiev ^ rb lTVp, JLiSMoP fl rb TTOlbv % TO TTOffbf t) tottou.&c. ; c. 6,1031, b, 20: to iiriffraffBai eKaffrop rovr6 iffri rb ri fy that iiriffratrdai, and cf. 1. 6 ibid. xiii. 9, 1086, b, 5 the determination of the notion of the thing is indispensable, &pev oiitt eartv fiev yap rov naOSXov brurHiinp XojSeTv; c. 10, 1086, 33 7] hritrT'fi/j.T] rap Ka66\ov b, KaddKov at eTTLtrriifiat iii. 6 Jin. Trivrup; iii. 4, 999, b, 26: rb
iariv, &o.
vii. 1,
:
t<Jt' oldfieOa
982, a, 12, 982, b, 2 sqq., vi. init. Cf. Schwbglbk, 1, Arist. Metaph. iii. 9.
*
Phys.
tci
i.
1,
184, a, 12
toVs
yap
oVgw
Kal
oldpeBa
yivdxrKsiv
eKaffrop,
tA irpwra apxas ras irpiiras Kal fifXP 1 Tav croixeiwv.. Ibid. ii. 3 init. Metaph. i. 2, 982, b, 9: 8 yap rairiiv [that science which is to deserve the name <rotpia~] run itpdorwv apx&v Kal atriuv that deupijrwliv c. 3 init. Tore yap
atria ypwpiffdtfiep
ras
eiSevat
irpcbrijv
iii.
(pafihv
sKaarov,
olw/itOa
airiav
/*/)
ri serai
iv. 3,
s
1005, b, 5 sqq.
%p
iirt
xi. 1,
Metaph.
i.
2, 982, a,
8, 21,
iv. 2,
1004, a, 35.
'
164
ARISTOTLE
'
from Fancy or
is
the contin-
To him,
as to Plato,
knowits
common
is
consciousness with
itself.
To him,
object
exclusively that
which
is
might be otherwise
from
it is
'
it is
So
far
Opinion
'
and
'
Knowledge
'
being
all
the same,
utterly
it is
impossible to
at the
know and
same time. 2
So,
again,
'
consist in Perception,
us only of individual
In like manner Aristotle distinguishes Knowledge from mere Experience by the test that the latter gives That,' while the former gives us in any matter only a us a Why also 4 which is the very mark that Plato used to distinguish Knowledge from True Opinion.'
' '
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
MetapJi.
yap rb
&c.
oiVfl^o-eois
%<rnv
hrlaTaadai.
For
Ph.
Anal. Post.
c.
1026, b, 2 Eth.2V.vi. 3, 1139, b, 18, sqq. To this line of thought c. 6 init. belongs the refutation of the principle, that for everyone that istrue which seems true to him, which is dealt with in Metaph.iv. 6, 6,much asitistreated in Plato's Theatetus. Anal. oi8e Si' Post. i. 31
vii.
6 fin. taph.
8, init. c.
30 sqq.
2,
Me-
15,
vi.
perception has always to do with individuals (more on this subject rb Se KaB6\ov ko\ eVl infra), tramv iSvvarov alaSiveaSai, &c. Even though we could see that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or that in an eclipse of the moon the earth stands between the sun and the moon, yet this would be no knowledge, so long as the universal reasons of these phenomena re-
mained unknown
*
Metaph.
i.
1,
' '
165
man can
reach,
Nevertheless,
it is
the Platonic.
content,
is
To
a term
which includes
it
all
spiritual
and
and
yet,
it
when
very
distinguishes
of
it
human
off
activity.
strictly
more
while, on
the other
ovS^'ia xii. 7, 1072, Qewpia to t)Sigtov Kal &piaTov. In Eth. JV.x.7:' theoria is the most essential ingredient of perfect happiness cf e.g. ei Si) Btiov 6 vovs 1117, b, 30 Kal 6 Kara irpbs rbv &v6panrov, tovtov liilos detos irpbs rbv avftpdnrivov $iov oi xph *e Kara tous irapatvovvras avBp&inva (ppoveiv HvBpamov
afiilviav
5'
7)
;
b,
24
Hid.
1.
'
24
SrjAov
oiv,
us
Si'
fivra
oiiSe
BvTjra
rbv
dyryrbv,
aAV
ovSefiiav
aiirrtv
^ryrovuev
cfpeKa
xp iap
tpauev
fii)
*<P
offov
eTepav, aAA'
Saffieep &vBpa>ir6s
eKsvBepos
aiirov
Kal
&\Aov
ix6vi]
$sv,
eAevBepa
aiirr)
p.6vt\
KpdriiTTOv
iirurrnfiuv
yap
Kal SiKalws
vopLiotTO
avrrjs
r)
Kal t$ avSjoVtoV iorw Ikooti)) Qpdnrtp Si) d Kara rbv vovv fiios, efatp touto ixdKicna &v8punros ovtos &pa Kal evSat/j.oveffraTos c. $>' Scrov Si) Sia8, 1178, b, 28
; :
elvai,
&AAr)v
relvei
r)
deovpla, Kal
r)
evSaiuovla.
Xph
vopifav
ftev
TtuuTtpav
.
Kaidrepai
olv
15 fin.
infra,
166
ARISTOTLE
it
hand, he brings
into
closer
is
relation
with the
is
experimental sciences.
tinguishes from
His view
that Philosophy
He
dis-
soul.'
He
distinguishes
is
also the
creative
effort
Qiroin^a-is)
itself.
With
more
of
'
closely.
all
dealings with
Knowledge
'
into that of
'
Opinion.'
Even
as to
to pass
shall
we
to Experience
more
positive
The
latter,
movement
that,
little
the phenomena.
1
Besides
the
Be
Ccelo,
is
iii.
7,
306,
a, 16.
The
given, see Eth. N. vi. 2, o. 5, 1140, a, 28, b, 25; x. 8, 1178, b, 20 vi. 1, 1025, b, 18 sqq. xi. 7 De An. iii. 10, 433, a, 14 and
; ; ;
repeated by Eudemus Eth. i 5 fin., and by the author of Metaph. ii. 1, 993, b, 20.
same
167
of philosophic knowledge.
Aristotle
but
it
must pass on
little
phenomena. 2
It
must
think
of
knowledge must
lie.
It is
like reason
that Aristotle
makes
for
scientific
thought
1
than Plato's.
irpds
He
takes
fieya
'
Metaph.
. . .
rb Be
iraffav
rfyv eirurr'fjfA'qv
l fxev
<Tv/j.fie@riK6Ta
<rvfifSd\Aerai
fiipos
ex ruv Kex^vruVj
fiev
iireiBav
r%v
<pavrao~iav wepl
fy
us a\j)Bes rb \ey6fievov, <m 5' us ovk aKrjBes yap iirio'T-ijfj.T}, 4} faffirep Kal rb iirla'rao'Bat, Btrrbv, Sv rb fiev Bvvdfiei rb Be ivepyeia f} Svva/Ais oiiv us $Ky\ [rov] fiev kclQ6\ov ouaa leal adpitrros rod KaB6\ov Kal aopforov early, r\ 5'
' '
ruv
irdvruv
olffias
KdWiffra' "PX^ ro T
irda"r}s
'
yap
airoBei^ews
Haovs
Gvfi-
ruv
Sptff/xuv
trvfi^aivei
. . .
ra
f&e$tlK6ra yvupi^eiv
ivepyeia
upiauevri
Kal
upifffievov
SyAov *6rt BtdkeKTMus epy\vrai .Kal Kevus Siiravres. Cf. c. 5, 409, b, 11 sq. 3 Part. An. i. 5, 646, a, 5
Aotirbv
eliretv,
irepl
rrjs
foiKrjs
(pvcrevs
els
fi7}Bev
irapa\tir6vras
tuu-
&repov
fievots
'
rrjs
curias
'66ev
0o\f}*) &c.
a,
Be
Kara
trotra
Byifitovpyfi-
Qiktis
reAos tie rijs fiev irot7jrtKT}s rb Zpyov^ rrjs Be tpvaracTJs rb <paiv6fxevov ael Kvp'us Kara rfyv aX<r&nfftv. Be An. i. 1, 402, a, 16 eotKe B' ov fiSvov r6 ri io~ri yvuvai Xpfl&ifiov elvai irpos rb Beapijffai r&s
16
irapexet
Be7
rots
iwurr'fifiTfs
yvwplfetv Kal
fii6
fify
<pi\ocr6<pots
irepl
rav
'
Ctywv
iirt-
ffKetyiv
iv train
y&p ro?s
<f>vfftKois
Be
Ceelo,
air (as
ruv
.
. .
ffvfif3e^7}K6ruv
Ovciais
aWk
168
ARISTOTLE
to ttoXv). 1
He deems
should
it
a sign of philosophic
logical
crudity that a
man
in fact
depends on the nature of the subject matter what amount of exactitude can be attained in each of the
sciences. 3
1
Where
i.
is
content
The
Anal. Post.
iii.
30,
12 fin.
Part. An.
2, 663, b, 27.
Me-
(Metaph.
taph. vi. 2, 1027, a, 20, xi. 8, Eth. N. i. 1, 1094, 1064, b, sqq. b,19. 1 Mil. N. i. 1, 1094, b, 11-27, o. 7, 1098, a, 26, ii. 2, 1104, a, 1, vii. 1 fin. ix. 1, 1166, a, 12 (Polit. vii. 7 fin. is not in point here). It is chiefly as regards the ethical discussions that Aristotle here denies the claim they have to a thorough accuracy, because the nature of the subject does not allow of any such result ; for in judging of men and the issues of human action, much rests on estimates which are correct only 'in the main ' and ' as a rule.' 3 According to Anal. Post. i. 27, that science is more exact (cucpt/Sarrcpa), which besides the 8ti
settles the Si6ti
;
1078, a, 9) Utp 5% to, repl t$ \6ytp (that which, according to its notion or nature, is earlier, or stands nearer to the first principles ; cf. p. 330 sqq.) Kal bntKovtrrspuv roaTtpo-ripwv
ofay puXXov ^x l
first
TOKptjSes.
From
philosophy, according to is capable of the greatest accuracy (cf Metaph. i. iucpifjeo-TaTai Si twv 2, 982, a, 25
Aristotle,
.
:
itrtffTijfjiwv at /idKitTra iuv irpanuy eW), and that every other science
is
to deal with purely scientific questions, not with their application to some given case (y /iii ku9'
xnToK.tip.4vov
capable of so much the less according as it descends more and more to the world of sensible things (cf. ibid. 1078, a, 11 sq.); for in the latter 7roAA.^ t\ tov aopiotov (piffis ivvirdpx*i {Metaph. iv. further infra, in 5, 1010, a, 3 ch. vii. sec. 2). Therefore the na;
inroKei/icvov, olov
vtKrjs),
opifyHjTUt))
apjxo-
and
deduces
accurate than those which are con-' cerned with what is constant, like the first Philosophy, pure Mathematics, and the doctrine of souls
(of which
Be An.
i.
1 init. extols
number
assumptions
(e.g.
the
aicpi$eut);
more abstract
(f\
i 1\o.tt&v<v rijs
have the transient as their object are less exact than Astronomy( Metaph. 1078, a, 11 sqq.). Kampe (ErJtenntnisstheorie d. Ar. 254) says, that in the scale of knpipeut,
THE PHILOSOPHY
''to
<QF
ARISTOTLE
169
to postpone a
more
but
them
is
practical needs. 2
Why,
the
man who
thirsts after
com-
spiritual effort
rhv
\6yov,
iav
by dividing
nature takes the but this would been said in the be true of Ethics
-
avayiyu^v.
further on
d. Arist. Forsch.
this
and
1
Politics.
b, 28 5, 287, Gen. An. iii. 10, 760, b, 27, where to a discussion on the reproduction of bees he adds the remark ov /ifyv dAyirTai ye T(fc ffvpflaiiiovTa mavm, a\\' iav 7T0T6 rSre tj? aitrBijcrei \7i<j)6jj, fxaWov .rav \6yuv Triffrevriov, teal
Be
CoeU,
ii.
sqq.
c.
12 init.
next chapter. 2 Rep. vi. 511, B, sq. vii. 519, C, sqq.; PI. 173, B; Timi. 29, B,sq. and alio. Cf . Zbllee, Ph. d. Gr., Pt. i pp. 490, 516, 536 sq. ' lie Coelo, ii. 1 2 init. weipareov
:
atav
voiii^ovras
rfy'
irpoBvfiiav
rots
ix.
37 fin, c. 42, 629, a, 22,27. Meta/ph. xii. 8, 1073, b, 10 sqq. 1074, a, 15. Meteor, i. 79, init. irepX tv lupavav tjj aiaBiicru vofii^opev iKav&s 07rpSeSeij(8ni Kara
koI fiucpas
einropias
o7a7r
neyttrras ?xM 6 " avopias. Cf. ibid. 292, a, 14, c. 5, 287, b, 31 Part. An. i. 5, 644, b, 31.
irepl S>v rets
170
off the
ARISTOTLE
theoretic from the practical activities. 1
;
That
but the
note of unity
is
ment by
practical activity as
human life, he also represents the an indispensable element therein, as a moral upbringing is an indispensable condition
completion of the true
precedent of ethical knowledge. 2
If
it
be true that
this shutting
back of Theory upon itself, this exclusion all practical need and
'
'
(as
it
becomes apparent,
for the later
for
example, in the
pare the
way
Man
by Plato
for Plato's
live
'Philosopher' would
'
also,
if left to himself,
for
theory
'
alone,
life
of the
Republic on compulsion.
with those
the
office
who
criticise Aristotle
because he conceived
ideal
way
that
could
who
for distinguishing
scientific
between
attainment of
men. 4
actuality
were in
it
founded,
'
itself and in Aristotle's view well would only follow that he had sought, as
x. 10, 1179, b, b,
HlTTi<iR,0es.d. iVt.iii.SOsqq. Besides the passages to be cited mfra, on the inquiry into the highest good,' of. Etl. K.
2
'
1,
1094,
p.
56 sq.
171
Even
this,
however,
is less
To
it
is
not entirely
not
even
so.
Aristotle
He
sees
it
very high
cannot
best
it
be
reached by
everyone
that
that
even by the
Yet he
is
never content to
weakness of humanity.
this account
is
his
real
point.
In
out in
his philosophic
all essentials
method
is
opened
out.
His method
With
he combines the observational method of the student of nature and even though it be true that he does not
;
among
the
Greeks.
By
that advance he
made good
was
As
7,
c.
8,
172
'
ARISTOTLE
each thing they dealt with, and set this kind
all
idea'-' -of
may
be.
As
commonly
set out
on
examples
wont
meaning of words. 2
by means
of a
dialectical
comparison
all sides.
But
is
in Aristotle
directed with
more
view.
explicit
consciousness to
As
a rule,
make
for or against
each view
is
and
simply
10 sq. the notions of Nature, Motion, Space and Time are investigated in De An. i. 1 sqq., ii. 1 sq. the notion of the Soul in Mil. N. ii. 4 s<j. the notion of Virtue; in
ii.
1,
I,
iv.
1 sqq. iv.
notion of
the probable arguments deduced from it, had with Aristotle as a foundation for induction,
173
method of
it
He
by the theory of the syllogism which he invented and by all the related logical inquiries. In his own writings he has left us a most perfect example of a dialectical investigation carried through with keen and strict fidelity from all sides of the subject. If we did not know it
before,
we should
With
To
Aristotle the
most perfect
definition of
an
idea
1
is
On
more
:
definite
later.
Se An.
rd Sri
fxovov
vvv
Kdyoi
re-
after quoting some mraai yap rovrots (pavep6v iffriv '6ri rd avr6 effrt rd ri eon Kal Sid, ri eariv, &c. Ibid, u. 3 init. c. 8 init. ibid. i. 31, 88, a, 6 rd 8e tca96hov rifitov Sri StjAoI rd
(lyreirai.
And
:
examples
ev
rdv
'ipwv
tUr'.v
olov
ri
ian
dtrtov.
fiih
Metwph.
vi. 1,
r pay uyiirfids ; rd tffov erepo/i'fjKet bp8oy&viov ejvat WdrrXevpov * d 5e rotovros '6pos \6yos rov (rv/j-Trepdcfiaros
'
rd
1026, b, 17: rd re
etrriv.
ri
fie
Keyav
Hri
iffrlv
1041, a, 27 (pavepdv roivvv Sri CfTet rd a'inov rovro 8' effrl rd ri %v elvai, &s eiirelv \oyi-
Ibid.
kws
b
. .
eir'
.
eviotv
fiev
eo-ri
rivos
ii.
every inquiry Post. ii. 1. sq. deals with four points, the in, the
:
evexa,
eV
fie
evluv
Se
ri eKivt)<re
irpurov.
init.: eirel
eificSfiev
11
fiidri,
the
ei
ian, the ri
effriv.
These may, however, be reduced to the two questions :.el eari fietrov
airiav,
rapes
iraffai
and
ri itrri.rb /xeffov
rd
fiev
yap
Seixyvvrai.
:'
174
ARISTOTLE
There-
view
(as
we
ought to
take account not only of the idea and the final cause of
a thing, but of the efficient and the material causes
shall see he does by its own causes, he could not well be content with a method which should look only to the Universal which the Idea gives, and
also.
Holding as decisively
is
as
we
that a thing
to be explained
'
'
This
is
its
In this sense Aristotle not ovroi Kal unfrequently contrasts the logical \oyiKas 5"
consideration of a subject (i.e. that which is only concerned with what is universal in its concept), either with the analytical, which enters more deeply into the peculiarity of the given case, (and which he also calls 4k tuv KfijueViw), or with the physical research which draws its result not from the concept of a phenomenon merely, but from its concrete, conditions. The former, for instance, Anal. Post, i. 21 fin., c 23, 84, a, 7,cf. c. 24, 86, a, 22, c, 32, 88, a, 19,30; Metaph. vii. 4,
1029, b, 12, 1030, a, 25, c. 17, The latter, Phys. iii. 1041, a, 28. 5, 204, b, 4, 10 (cf. a, 34, Metaph. xi. 10, 1066, b, 21), c. 3, 202, a, 21 Be Ccelo, i. 7, 275, b, 12; Metaph. xii. 1, 1069, a, 27, xiv. 1, 1087, b, 20 (similarly <I>vo-ikws and
j
TOtovrol
&rHT7co7roG<ri
Ttpes
elo~iv
xhv 4k raj/Se 5>eie rep rainb tovto cvpfiaivzu'. Gen. An. ii. 8, 747, b, 28 AeV" 5e \oyiK^v [air6Beiiv~\ 5ta tovto oti bcrrp KaQoKov p.aA\ou iroppcitrepu tuv
:
And
after
proof suchas this has been brought forward, he adds (748, a, 7): ovros
fiev
oZv 6
oi
Kv6s.
apxZv \6yoi
Be An.
21
:
i.
403,
a,
(similarly 2: SiaAe/ci-imSs
such cases he much prefers the physical treatment to the logical (e.g. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, 316, a, 10 Koi 5' b\v tis Kal 4k tovtihv, Scroti
Staip4povcriif
ot
<pvo~iK&s Kal
KoyiK&s
metaphysical researches on Ideas {Metaph. xiii. 5 fin.) he thinks the Ka6i\ov, De Casio, i. 10 fin. c. 12, Xoymdirtpoi \6yoi are the aKptfieBut here he takes o-Tepoi. See further, Waitz, Arist. 283, b, 17). the logical to be so much the Org. ii. 353 sq. BONITZ, Arist. more imperfect, the further re- Metaph. ii. 187; Ind. Arist. 432, b, moved it is from the concrete 5seq.; Rassow, Arist. de not. def. definiteness of the object. Cf. doctr. 19 sq. Phys. viii. 8, 264, a, 7 ots fikv oZv
; :
176
reproach of an unphilosophic
which has drawn down on him often enough the empiricism. He was
1
he was also one of the most accurate and untiring observers, and one of the most erudite men of learning that the world knows. As in his general theory he conceived
not only one of the highest speculative thinkers
of experience as the condition precedent of thought,
which thoughts
substructure of experiential
Especially
should
first
any theory of nature he insists that we know the phenomena and then look about
We
him the sureness and accuracy of method which empirical science has in modern times attained. In Aristotle's day it was only in its infancy, and it suffered
find in
from the complete lack of the proper aids to observation and of the support of a developed mathematics. We
1
Thus
'
Schlbiermachbb,
p.
Gesch. d. Phil.
Aristotle:
120, says of
We
that
Aristotle's general
a great want of specula&c, and on p. 110 he contrasts the older Academics with him, as being more speculative '; but he sets out with a principle, according to which Aristotle must certainly come off badly 'Never has one who first went through a great mass of empirical work become a true philosopher.'
there
is
bent made him ' more suited for the collective comprehension of
empirical
tive genius,'
and
historical
data,
'
i.
1,
639, b,
Thus
also
S tbumpell,
Theoret.
7 sqq., 640, a, 14.; Hist. An. i. 7, 491, a, 9 sq. ; Meteor, iii. 2, 371, b, 21 Anal. Pr. i. 30, 46, a, 17 sqq. Aristotle appeals here (as in Part. An. 639, b, 7) especially to the progress of astronomy about which see infra, ch. ix. (middle). Cf. Eugken, Methode
;
sq.
176
ARISTOTLE
by the
and
too often
crossed
speculative
dialectic
methods which he took over directly from Platonism. Indeed, so far as natural science goes, it would be more
just to charge
little
would be far truer to say simply that he carried both methods as far as could be expected of The science of the Greeks began with specuhis day. The empirical sciences only attained to any lation. much.
1
But
sort of
Therefore it was natural method of Socrates and Plato, with its logical dissections and connections of ideas, guided by current opinions and the indications of language, should take precedence of any strict empirical rules. Aristotle stood in a close relation to the dialectical movement, and brought it in theory and practice, as we have just said, It was not to be expected that the to completion. art of empirical investigation should find in him an equally complete exponent, and therefore an accurate discrimination between the two methods was as yet far That could only come after the fuller development off. of the empirical sciences and the direct investigation of the theory of knowledge, which the modern centuries
is
the credit
due to Aristotle that his wide and direct scientific instinct led him even so soon to turn to the methods of
This charge has been made by Bacon, and, since the above was first written, by Lewes ( Arv1
61 sqq.
stotle,
91, 97)
and, through
177
them
had
as
well as he then
That
with
is
Aristotle's dialectic
to do with a far
more
the reason
of exposition
by that
air
partial.
hand by a copious
by a His manner of presenting his work seems often dry and tedious as compared with Plato's; for the texts we now possess
careful observance of the rules of logic.
and charm
than his
life,
less
master's.
We
dramatic
the
artistic finish,
make us
style
Aristo-
in
so high
Aristotle
Die Methode
d. Arist.
ForscTitmg
VOL.
I.
178
ARISTOTLE
him a bad
' '
not to call
writer,'
'
him
is
He
accused of
away
but
it
by
those
was how much bewilderment must have been cured by keen distinctions how many fallacies will have in the meanings of words been avoided by the exact analysis of the syllogism.
among
procedure,
and won for thought thereby a security whose value to us we only overlook because we have grown too used to it to remember that it is great.
If,
again,
we endeavour
to appreciate, so far as at
this point
we
we can
call Aristotelian,
we
shall
two things. On the one hand, no one can overlook the basis he inherited from Socrates and Plato. Yet, on the other hand, there is an element of originality so notable and so sustained as to make us stigmatise
the notion that Aristotle was a kind of dependent
follower of Plato
who
his
work
up and complete
utterly unjust. 2
an error
truly actual
d. Phil.
see
Kant,
i.
179
all
else is
'
actual
'
only in so far as
it
Yet, whereas to
Essential Being
'
which he relegated to a separate ideal world beyond the world of experience, his follower recognises
There-
common
essence of
In
led
mutual dependence.
Form.
He
puts
it
that
it is
So
it
comes
that, for
him,
Matter must, by an inner necessity, strive upward to Form, and Form equally must present itself in Matter.
In
to
recognise
is
whose aim
is his
Just this
phenomena,
For
he finds the very root-definitions of his metaphysic in his treatment of those processes wherein
part,
own
is
the secret of
all
genesis and
all
change, whether by
.nature or
by
art.
n 2
180
ARISTOTLE
Yet
Aristotle, too,
is
Hard
still
as he tries to bring
together,
which he can neither deduce one from the other, nor both from a third. Fully as they are worked out through the range of finite things, still the highest
entity of
all is
as
the highest in
man
is
him from
without, and
which never comes into any true unity with the individual side of his being. In this way, Aristotle is at once the perfection and the ending of the Idealism of its perfection, because it is the Socrates and Plato
:
most thorough
effort to carry it
menal things from the standpoint of the Idea but comes to light the impossibility of ever holding together the Idea and the Phenomenon in any real unity, after we have once
' '
we
we
are
met at once with the unfortunate difficulty that, neither in his own writings nor in any trustworthy account of
his method, is to be found. 1
1
any
If
satisfactory information
on that point
we should
:
Cf. for
what follows
Eitxeb,
57 sqq.
Erandis,
ii.
b,
130
THE PHILOSOPHY
and the
divided
4)F
ARISTOTLE
Aristotle
181
Neo-Platonic commentators,
all
had
philosophy into
Theoretic
office
and
Practical,
of perfecting the
perfecting the
appetitive.
In Theoretic Philosophy,
:
Physics,
fell,
it
Ari-
He
we
find,
TEICHMULIEE,
ii.
Arlst.
Forsch.
sqq.
9
v.
sqq.
WALTBE,
Bie Lelire
1
Thus Ammon. in Qu. voo. Porpli. 7, a, sqq. (who adds the fourfold division of Mathematics
into Geometry, Astronomy, Music, and Arithmetic), and after him
as an instrument of Philosophy), practical philosophy into Ethics and Politics, and Politics into the science of the State and the science of tha household. Alex. Top. 17, gives as philosophical sciences, Physics, Ethics, Logic and Metaphysics but as to Logic cf. below
real part
:
David,
Schol. 25, a, 1 ; Simpl. Phys. init. Categ. i. e Phxlop. Schol. in Ar. 36, a, 6, Phys. init.
;
p. 187, n. 2.
2
Be An.
;
iii.
9,
432, b, 26,
c.
Anatol. in Fabric. Bill. iii. 462 H. Eustbat. in Eth. 2V. init. Anon. Schol. in Arist. 9, a, 31. The division into theoretical and practical philosophy had already been given by Alex, in Anal. Pri. init. and DlOG. v. 28.
;
14 Eth. vi. 2, 1139, a, 6, cf. i. 13 vers. fin. ; Polit. vii. 14, 1333, a, 24. For further information see chap. xi. Eth. i. 1, 1095, a, 5 : iireiti, to reAos [rrjs iro\iTiKrjs~\ iffrlv ov yvSaffis aAAa irpiil-is. Likewise, ibid. x. 10, 1179, a, 35, ii. 2, imit.: iirel
10, 433, a,
Further, the latter, in part divergfrom the others, divides theoretical philosophy into Physics and Logic (which, however, he does not consider so much a
oZv
i]
ing
y&p
tV elSafiev ri iffrtv t\ hper^ ffKnr6~ jiicfla, i\\' iv' i.yoBo\ ycvd/ieSa, &rel oiS^c %y fy 8(pe\os bAtjjj), &c.
182
at
ARISTOTLE
an early date in his School, a division of Science into theoretic and practical. He himself, however, is
1
the
2 'poietic science'
iroir^ais or
its
production from
its
by
source and by
end,
end
Metaph.
opticas 8'
19
t^\v tpi\ocrocpiav
rys aKi)yap (wherein, however, the whole of philosophy is here included) tsAoj ahrficm, irpaKTMTJs 8' fyyov. Eth. JEud. i.
Beias. QeupTjTiKTJs /*ev
1,
is
synonymous
8: voWav 8' Sotw ... to flip avruv ffvvTeivei trpos to yvavai fi6vov, ra 8e Kol Trepl ras Kr-fjcreis KaX irepl ras irpd^eis tov irpdyfiaros. 'dcra /lev oZv
1214,
a,
with enwr^jiMj when the -latter signifies not merely knowledge in general, but science in the special
sense of the term.
BeapTifiircoy
And
since in
%X L
&C.
2
$fooo~ocpiav
ixovov
decopriTiK'fiJ',
Metaph,
:
vi.
1,
1025,
.
b,
.
.
18 sq.
i)
(pvirucii
ivuni\i>.i\
Sr/Kov fin oSre irpuKTUeli iariv oifre 7ron}Tiicff .... ibffTe el iracra Stdyota
t)
Metaph. vi. 1 (vid. inf. 183, n. 3) he gives three <pi\otro<plai BeapTjrikoX, this undoubtedly supposes that there is a non-theoretical, i.e. a practical or poietic philosophy. But one cannot believe that by the latter is meant, not that science which treats of jrpSJis and
7roi7((ns (Ethics, Politics, and the science of Art), but the faculty of
irpaKTHcii
itohjtik))
f)
BewpifTiK^,
eXrj
;
r)
<puaiK7]
BecopTjrucfj
tls av
:
c. 2,
1026, b, 4 (xi. 7)
iirto'T'tjfiTri
oASe/ii? yc\p
iirL/j.Kks
irepl
avrov
[so.
tow
(T/ti/3ej37jK(iTos]
oi/re
Trpa/crucp
otfre iroiriTiK^
same
a,
ofae QewpyTiKr}. The ^moT^/iij in division of Top. vi. 6, 145, a, 15; viii. 1, 157,
10.
c. 2,
the irpS|ij and iroMjffi j itself, namely <j>p6vn]cns and tX"1 (Walter, Lehre v. d. prakt. Venn. 540 sq.). QiKotrocpla never has this meaning, and even &ri<rrij/u7) cannot have it in this context. So again since certain branches are distinguished
as practical and poietic from Physics, Mathematics and Metaphysics, which are the theoretic
sciences, the former must likewise be really sciences. And
Further
cf.
Mth.
JV. vi.
1139, a, 27, x. 8, 1718, b, 20, and on the difference between poietic and theoretic science in Be Ccelo, iii. 7, 306, a, 16 ; Metaph. xii. 9, 1075, a, 1, cf. is. 2, 1046, b, 2, and Bonitz on this passage. Though Aristotle here
3-5,
left
Metaph.
vi. 1,
1025, b, 22
183
The two
coincide,
however,
as
opposed to
way
Knowledge has to do with the determination of that which cannot be any otherwise
another, whereas
than as
are
it
is.
Aristotle
three
first
incorporeal
and unmoved
these being
fiev
t)
yap
b" has, as iv $K7). 7) Be irp&rTi [sc. t/uAotro^a] Kal irepl affre rpets Xapiffra Kal aKlyTjra
Xapurra
AW
tovtl
7]
Trpoaipetris.
:
Hence Eth.
vi.
av elev
juoTi/ci),
tyiKoffotp'-ai
(pvtriKTi,
deupTjrlKal, /A067J-
in the province of 5, 1 1 40, b, 22 art it is better to err voluntarily ; in that of morals involuntarily. ertpov S' JStll. vi. 4 init. eVrl iro'ni<rts Kal npal-is ; c. 5, 1140, &\Ao rb yevos irpd^eas Kal b, 3
1 : :
6fo\oyiKt).
Simi;
iroiijffeas
....
TTJSfiey
yap
trov^ffeas
erepov rb TeAos, rrjs 5e wpdl-ews ovk av eXl) earl yap aiirTf 7} eimpa^ia r4\os. Ibid. i. 1 init. 2 Eth,. vi. 1139, b, 18: 3, eirtffr'fjfnj fiey oZv ri iffrtv 2vrev8ev
'
(pavtpov
J3<iv opev,
....
>
irtivTes
yap
'
inroKafi'
5'
h iTritrrdfieBa
-
fii]
ivBexetrBai
aWas
<=x eiv
init.
rov
eVBe-
XO/J-eyov
SAAws *x elv
* ffTl
Ti
Ka^
c. 2,
1096, a, 30, c, 6 init. De An. i. 1, 403, b, 7 sqq. About the name of the first philosophy, cf also p. 76, mipra. As to Mathematics as the science of numbers and quantity, and the abstraction peculiar to it, whereby it does not consider a body according to its physical properties, but only from tbe point of view of magnitude in space, and, in determining number and quantity, disregards the intrinsic condition of that in which they occur, see Phys. ii. 2, Anal. Post. i. 10, 193, b, 31 sqq.
larly xii.
1,
. ;
&c.
;
Of.
76, b,
3,
c.
13,
79
;
a",
1139, a, 2 sqq. Be Gcelo, iii. 7, 306, a vid.svpr. p 167, n. 2 Part. An. t\ yap hpxh ro7s ptv i. 1, 640, a, 3 [the theorists] rb tv, rots 5c [the technicists] rb io-6/i.evov. 1 Metaph. vi. 1 (xi. 7) where among other things 1026, a, 13 tj fiev yap (pvaiKT) nepl ax^ptcra fiev a\\' oi/K 4k(h)to, ttjs 8e fiaSTi^atiktjs ivia irepl aKivTira pev oli
: :
:
Pri.
4,
c.
i.
41, 49, b, 35
3,
1061,
a, 9, xiii. 2, 1077, a, 9 to c.
iii.
1036, 3 Jin.,
;
2,
Be An.
ibid..
996, a, 29
184
ARISTOTLE
also Theology,
he names
all
If,
and
knowledge. 1
however,
we attempt
to apply the
suggested
we
Rittbk,
73
and that
its
object is
signated as removed,
now now as
de-
not
is
partly solved by the distinction of the purely mathematical from the applied sciences, and partly and chiefly by the remark that Aristotle nowhere says that the object of Mathematics is a x m P'mbv, but only that it is considered as such i.e by abstracting from its sensible nature in Metaph. xii. 8, 1073, b, 3, moreover, Astronomy according to the common reading is not called ' the truest philosophy,' but the oi/ccioT^Tr), the most important of the mathematical sciences for the discussion in hand ; still Bonitz is right in reading rrjs oifte iotcJttjs cpiAo,
.
because it investigates what.is most difficult to be known because the science of the last reasons is the most accurate {hcpi^atiri)) and gives the most perfect instruction as to causes; because, more than any other, it pursues knowledge for its own sake and because, as the science of principles, and hence
knowledge
;
also of final ends, it must govern In Top. viii. 1, 157, a, all others. 9, the following is given as an example of a division Sti eiri:
Metaph. vi. 1, 1026, a, 21 (and almost the same in xi. 7, 1064, b, 1), after what is given in the preceding note ri)V ri/ituTd1 :
% Tip cucpiPearipa clvai fj t$ fieKrdvaiv. Aristotle in Metaph. xii. 9, 1074, b, 29 sq. also supposes that the value of knowledge is proportioned to that of its object. The universal pre-eminence of the theoretical over the practical and poietic sciences does not, however, rest on this, nor on their greater exactness, for some of them (the zoological and psychono sulogical sciences) have periority over Ethics in either respect but primarily on the fact that knowledge is here an end in
(rrfoil ivurriuais fie\Tlaiv
;
ri\v [eVio'T^iMjj']
Sei irepl
rb rtfiitb(For, as is said
itself; cf.
2
Metaph.
I.
i.
1,
981, b,
17 sqq. 982, a,
la
in 1064, b, 5 fteKrtav Kal x^P eiedtrrTj Keyerat Kara rb atKeTov eViat fikv oZv deapTyrtKal twv (TTTfTtfr'.)
"
aWuv
Se
hrum\}uBV alpeT&repat,
BeupTiriK&v.
o$tti
t&v
He
discusses
at length in Metaph. i. 2, why the first philosophy especially deserves the name eofyta because, as perceiving the most universal, it gives the most comprehensive
:
Thus Ravaisson (Essai sur Metaphysique d'Aristote, i. 244 sqq.), who wishes to subdivide theoretical philosophy into Theology, Mathematics and Physics, practical philosophy into
and
Ethics, Economics and Politics, poietic philosophy into Poetics, Rhetoric and Dialectics.
185
Of
all
that Arifall
stotle wrote,
under
poietic science
is
the Poetics
for
he himself rele1
that
it is
Dialectics cannot
Logic. 2
If
we were
theoretic and
we
practical
was
should thereby
of Mathematics.
he gives
taken to
The one mathematical work to which a reference, and which can with certainty be be genuine the tract on Astronomy belongs,
25
according
1
to
2,
the
.,
classification
:
above
indicated,
;
to
Ithet.
i.
1356,
&are
<rv/i.fiatyei
tV faroputfiv
otoy irapa-
%v SIkcu6v
icrn irpo&ayopeieiv ttoXitik^v. c. 3, 1359, b, 8: Sirep yelp zeal Tipi-npov eipijmjres rvyx&vo/iev o\ijfl imar,
Sri
rijr
ri
priTopiiCTi
aiyKenai ply
iiruTT'lifnis
iic
re
lunAvrucrjs
IjBri
xal ttjs
purposes of Politics and since the character of a science depends on its purpose, he includes it in the practical section. Hence, although in itself an artistic science, and designated as such by Aristotle (e.g. Rhet. i. 1354, a, 11 sq. b, 21, 1355, a, 4, 33, b, 11, rhetorical c. 2, 1356, b, 26 sqq.
;
irtp!
t& tA piy
:
eWl
-rots
rii
SioXeKTucp
rcb
i.
8c
1,
1094,
to-
b, 2
rav
tivvdfiewv
mb
to.vti\v
[tV
theories are also called rexvai, cf. supra, p. 72, 2, 73, 1), still he does not seem to give Rhetoric an independent place in the system, as Brandis does (ii.
b, 147),
A<tikV]
oSiras,
oTov
arpaTiiyuciiv,
and
still
more decidedly
2,
xp^M 6'"')' Se toiJt7|S to \onra1s ray irpaKTUcuv tiriarrmav, &c. These expressions seem to have a direct reference to the passage cited from the Rhetoric. Aristotle sees in it an
o'ikovoixmtiv, (iriTopixiiv
plainly designated as an auxiliary science to philosophy in general, and especially to the theoretical investigations,
is
186
ARISTOTLE
Of the
others, they are
Physics.
either
of doubtful
any refer-
system. 1
'
an essential part of the connected exposition of his The Physics, again, is spoken of as the second,' 2 not the third, philosophy as if there were
it
and
First Philosophy
Mathematical
3
and Axioms to
:
'
Aristotle
himself refers
Philoso-
the
'First
As regards
divide
later
it
into Ethics,
5
Economics and
Politics
like the
commentators
6
who were
He
Politics
from the
Tactics,
writings
cf.
which
:
he 'desires to
mics, Military
'
and Khetoric 8
and then
in
Politics
1
'
About
Metaph.
p. 86, n. 1, supra.
2
tj)s (pvffiicrjs
<plas.
3
4
(col
as the three parts of practical science this division must consequently belong to the oldest
;
Peripatetics.
5
Metaph.
besides (pp6vq<Tis which reindividual action, certainly names oiKoi/o/tla and mKneia, also: but in 1141, b, 31 he has divided Politics {i.e. the science of the life in society with the exelusion of Ethics) into oiWoufa, vojxoBeala.iroXiTM^, so that, according to this, Economics forms a part of Politics. Still more definitely Eudemus in Eth. Eud. i. b. 13, combines the 8, 121&,
a, 9,
lates to
302, also agrees. 1094, a, 18 sqq., vi. 9, 1141, b, 23 sqq. ' Eth. i. 1, ibid., and 1095, a, 2, i. 2 init. and fin., ii. 2, 1105,
iii.
son,
1,
i.
13,
U02,a,
23. Rhet. n. 1.
2,
i.
2, 3, vid.
supr. p. 185,
8 Eth. i. 1, 1094, b, 2 ; Rhet. i. 1356, a, 25. Also in the first book of the Politics, Economics, as far as Aristotle has treated the subject, is taken to belong to the science of the State.
leal (pp6l'-l]tTLS
187
to be twofold or threefold,
there
is
The
which
Stoics
is
a point of
that
Logic
for
tion,
Methodology. 4
Nor
much
his system. 5
must have had some definite place in The only conclusion is that the scheme of
subdivision,
A different
, ;
1 Eth. i. 1 1094, b, 7. So also in the lengthy disenssion, x. 10. - Diog. v. 28 Alex, in PH. Anal, init., Schol. 141, a, 19, b, 25, in Top. 41, m, Ammon. apud Waitz, Arist. Org. i. 44 medf; Simpl. Categ. 1, , Seliol. 39, b, and Philop. in Categ. Sekol. in
Ar. 36, a, 6, 12, 37, b, 46. The same in Anal. Pri. ibid. 143, a, 3. Anon. ibid. 140, a, 45 sqq. David, in Categ. Seliol. 25, a, 1, where there are also further
fragmentary subdivisions of Logic and the logical writings. ' That in Top. i. l&fin., and viii. 14, 163, b, 9, he speaks of logical readiness as an organ of
even thinks that here can be no doubt that the "Mathematics" which forms a part of philosophy
' t
is
what
is
now
called Logic'
188
ARISTOTLE
all
physical,
Under the
comprehends both
and this alone would prove that he could not here have meant to indicate a scheme for the presentation of his system, in which these two departments are kept so
obviously distinct.
If,
then,
find in his
we are forced to give up the attempt own isolated remarks any key to the plan
corresponds with
the
to
of
his
work which
as
construction
itself,
work
we have
it,
we
distinguish
among
are
main masses.
These
his
investigations
of
Logic,
of Metaphysics, of
A fifth
<pv<rutT\s
would be the
iiBiKTJs
Top.
i.
14, 104, b, 19
?<m
S'
to piv
/jtaWov
,
riSe
Bewpias
&s
iced
lt,ev
rfartp 7repiAa/3eiV
twv
irpoTaVeaii'
iffriv.
rav
vpo$KrjfiilTav
fiepij rpia.
at
Koyucal
....
dfioius 8k koI
to
iro-
....
Tphs
juev
It is of no importance as Sdfay. against this, that, in dealing with the difference between knowledge and representation, Aristotle remarks in Anal.Post. i. 33 to Sf Aonra iras S Suzveffuu fin.
2 As an instance of logical j*opei{ions Top. ubi gup. mentionsthe principle, which belongs equally to Methodology or Analytics and to Metaphysics (cf. MetapJi. iv. 2, 1004, a, 9 sqq., 1005, a, 2), that opposites fall
under the same science. Again, in the instances given on p. 174, n. 2, supra, \oyucbs at one time stands for logical, at another for metaphysical inquiries for the latter also in Eth. Mud. i. 8, 1217,
;
KaX
TepOTS
/col
<ppovi\aeus
(col <ro(plas
b, 16.
189
He
seems to
work from the idea and problem of philosophy as a whole, or to reduce them to any simpler plan of division. Of these five, the section of Logic and Methodology ought to come first, not only in the time order of
the important texts, 1 but also in the order of exposition
a propaideu-
scientific
method, the
'
First Philosophy
must come.
it
belongs in
it
from
such
as the
Four Causes, of Form and Matter, of the different senses of Being, of Substance and Accident, of the Mover and the Moved, &c. The very
See supra, p. 156 seq. Metaph. iv. 3, 1005, b, 2: iaa 8' iyxeipovffi rap \ey6vrav
1
lytios,'
ctA.ijfleas, Si'
tv
rp6mv
tuv
Set aTroSexeoSai,
irep!
airatSeva-iav
to discuss.' Inadmissible, on the other hand, is Prantl's explanation (Geseh. d. Log. i. 137), which refers the rofrrav, not to the words with which it is immediately connected, but to the
much the same for the question in hand, whether the roirav is referred to i.vdK\rriKwv, or more correctly to the investigations indioated in the words irtpl ttjs dKi)8eias &c, since from the nature of the thing it comes to
the same, whether he says, One must be acquainted with Ana'
about which Aristotle has spoken above. As a consequence of this translation, Prantl thinks it monstrous that this passage should be used as a proof of the precedence of the
o|ii4/4oto,
Analytics.
3
Vid. mi/pr. p. 76
sqq.,
and
p. 160, n.
190
ARISTOTLE
of the
'
name
in
First Philosophy
'
the logical
order
it
precedes
other
material
of
all
presuppositions.
The
pre-
is
The Rhetoric must be taken The philosophy of Art, on the other hand, forms a section by itself, which is not brought into any definite connection with the rest. We can only treat it, therefore, as an appendix. To a like position we must relegate also Aristotle's occasional
supposed in the former.
2
as belonging to Ethics. 3
utterances as to Religion
in the true sense,
1
for a
Philosophy of Religion,
Still
the superlative
this
QiKoiroQlais
30,
Gen. et Corr.
2
3
(pt\ocro(pia.irpoTepa(<pvcriic'rjs, naOi}p.a-
Metaph.
Yid. supra,
LOGICS
191
CHAPTER V
LOGIC
Feom
We
must
not,
an independent
investigations.
of Methodology, as the
technique
it,
of his philosophic
therefore, he does
full
In dealing with
and uniform
Of the
first
the Topicshe
from single
Topics
the
Analytics
follows partly
the analogy
of the
subject.
Of the two
Analytics,
first is
the logical
concerned with
Top.
i.
1 init.
ri
pkv
irp68trts
a(p'
orav
6fj.oiais
*'
&<nrep
4irl
ttjs
rwv roi-
$s
<rv?^\oyie<r8ai
irepl
4k
uipovfieBa.
of both
192
far as
ARISTOTLE
may be
necessary thereto, did he stay to consider
It
was not
until a later
he extended these hints into a separate treatise in the Hspl sp/irivstas. In the same way, it is from the consideration of the Syllogism that he is
led to the logical treatment of Notions.
He
touches on
fact,
up as incidental The theory of the Categories, on the other hand, belongs more to Metaphysics than to
of Notions as a whole are only taken
it is
Logic, because
involved in
its
construction, but
is
the natural division of those real relations, to which the Categories, according to their content, are referred. 5
that Aristotle
init.
irpaTov
ph
going by an
analytical method,
tIvos
Beiiv
im\v
t\
axtyis,
in
ircpl owrd-
he proceeds from
ko! IrurHiiais
irtpl
airoSeucTurijs.
ii.
cHroBefJews, rt t<= ixdrepdv iffri /cal irtSs 7toi, ipavepbv, o/ia 8e zeal
irepl lieurHiiiai! &.iro5eucTucrjs
propositions, so in like manner he passes from propositions to notions. Both are merely considered as factors in the syllo-
gism.
other writings on Conwhich were mentioned on p. 70, supra, seem to have had a purely logical character but probably not one of them was
cepts,
;
-rairbv
Some
ydp iimy.
1
Anal
i.
Pri.
i.
1-3.
Anal.
Post.
2
2, 72, b, 7.
Vid. swpr. p. 66, n. 1. 3 Anal. Post. ii. 3 sqq. and cf especially c. 10. * The little that has to be mentioned with regard to this will be adduced later. The definition of the Spoiin Anal. Pri. i. 1, 24, b, 16 alone shows (Spov Si ko\w ts tv SiaAuercu r] Trp6raxns)
the work of Aristotle, 6 Aristotle not only calls both the principal logical writings 'kvaKmuci (see p. 67, n. 1 ), but
(vid. supr. p. 189, n. 2, andp. 185, n. 1) he uses the same designa-
which they
LOGIC
investigations which
Logic,' Aristotle
193
we
was
chiefly concerned
determine
Aristotle
was the discoverer of the theory of Proof. This is to him so clearly the one important point, that he resolves into
it
It
when
Logic 2 as an
'
instrument
of philosophy, 3 and
when
name
of the
Organon,' 4 this
1
the
4v
TO
TrpUTOV
t&TlOV, &
T#
j8ou-
y&p
composed, or to investigate
Kevdfievos eoiKe
fyre'iir
koX avaXvety
&ffirep
top
elptipivov
!
rpiiroy
8'
Sid-
ypa/j./xa. <pa
verai
t\ fjLev
^T^ffis oh
(ftrrio'is,
and Aristotle uses hvi\vais hvaAveiv regularly for the reduction of syllogisms to the three
32 imit. figures, e.g. Anal. PH. el . ... tovs yeyeyrijievovs \ffvKhoyuri.
5e j3ov\v(Tls iraffa
Kal
to
eo'xaTov
4v
ttj
avaK&ffei
irpuTov elvai
Arist.ip.
iy tj? yeviaet.
(Cf.
Trendelenburg,
Mem.
Log.
pobs] kyaXioi^ev els ret jrpoetpTifjLeva (rxh^ara, for which was written immediately before irms &' avdt-ofiev robs trvWoyifffiobs els rcfc irpoOf. BONITZ, etprififva irx^M aT0
:
47 sq.) The owoAutik)) iirio-riivn \llhet.iA, 1359,b, 10) designates accordingly the art of scientific inquiry, or the introduction
to
'
Ind. Arist. 48, b, 16. And since every investigation consists in tracing out the component parts and conditions of that with which it is concerned, i.va\ieiv together with (qrelv stands for
'
ology
which is scientific methodand similarly to; avahvTMb. means. that which deals with
it,
; '
scientific inquiry,'
i.e.
the theory
of
investigate.'
:
Thus Mh. N.
iii.
1112, b, 15 (Povheierai .... rod t4\ovs ') oA\& ovSels irepl Befxevoi reKos ti, ttus koI Sick t'ivwv ecus iW e\6atrtv %<rra.i tricoirovai. . .
5,
.
as in MetagA. iv. 3, 1005, b, 2. 2 On this designation, proved to have existed since the time of Cicero, cf. Phantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 514, 27, 535. 3 Vid. supr. p. 187, n. 2.
it
:
This
name
is
not used by
VOL.
I.
194
ARISTOTLE
own
'
Master's
being the
The further theory that Logic, as Organon of philosophy, could not be also a part of philosophy, 2 he would hardly have approved. In order rightly to comprehend this Science of Method, it will first be necessary for us to go more closely into Aristotle's views concerning the nature and For it is the conception of origin of Knowledge. Knowledge which determines the aim and the direction and the natural developof the procedure of Science ment of Knowledge in the mind of man must point
view. 1
'
the
way
the
development in Science
also.
it
Universal
properties
all
with themselves in
Causes of
is
all
that
is
actual. 3
is
only to be
known through
the sixth century, as applied to the writings; it only came to this use later (cf. WAiTZ,Arist. Org. ii. 293 sq.). On the other hand, the texts are, before that time, called by them opyavuch, because they refer to the ipyavov (or bpyavmhv cf. Simpl. in ficpos) <pi?u>(ro<pias
till
;
and Ethics it has its own end in itself and its own object, or that it is meant to be a philosor
phically established presentment of the activity of human thought
else (ibid. p. 138 a supposition which can neither be proved from any definite statements of Aristotle, nor from the construction of his logical
sq.), is
and nothing
this respect unreasonable, the schoolmasters of later antiquity,' who, 'infected with the folly of the Stoic philosophy,' wished at any
is in
when he denounces
writings. The ' real-metaphysical side of the Aristotelian logic,' however, need not on this account be disregarded. Even if it is regarded as the Science of Method,
price to represent Logic as the tool of knowledge. This is really the position and. meaning which Aristotle gives it. Thetheorythat in the same sense as Physics
may have its foundations in Metaphysics and even though it precede the latter, yet it may become necessary, in the end, to reduce it to metaphysical principles.
it
;
2
s
Vid.supr. pp.163
sq.,
173 sq.
LOGIC
;he Individuals, the
195
through their
This follows in
which meet us hereafter ; for if it is individual existence alone which can be called originally actual if the
the relation of the individual to the universal,
will
'
Ideas
'
'
but only
'
properties
it
same
knowledge.
the soul
For while he unhesitatingly admits that must bear within itself the ground-principle
he
is
of its knowledge,
it
is
not
possible to attain
of experience.
any
real
some present knowledge, to which it joins on. 2 Out of this axiom there arises the doubt, which had given
bhe earlier thinkers so
bility of
1
much
all.
learning at
For
apa
we
yhp
Aristotle himself points out this connection of his doctrine of perception with his metaphysics eVel Se in Be An. iii. 8, 432, a, 2 ivSe irpay/j.a oiBiv tti wapa, Ttfc
:
zt Becopetv
ret
iim
iteye'flij,
us
Sokei,
rh
oiVflr)Ttt
Kex<o-
2 Anal. Post. i. init -rrao-a SiSaaKaXia Kai ira<ra piBritris SmvoriTi/ri; in TrpovirapxoAeris ylvertu
voi\ri.
rr6v
fcions]
ia-ri
i<pcupi<rei
to!
icdBri.
tSv
a\.aB-i\Tuv
e|E
yvdaeus which he immediately proceeds to proye as to the diff erent sciences, both as regards syllogistic and inductive proof. The like in Metaph. i. 9, 992 b 30; Eth. vi. 3, 1139, b, 26. 3 See Zell., Ph. d. Qr. pt. i.
996,
fiiBoi
and
pt.
ii.
a, 696.
3&5e vveiy
'
o 3
196
ARISTOTLE
must already be possessed of that knowledge from which which is not in fact true all the rest is to be deduced or else we have still to acquire it, in which case the said axiom does not hold for that which is the highest know-
ledge of
all.
It
was
sought to
the latent recolAnamnesis But apart from all the of a prior knowledge.
lie
unable to reconcile
it
we should have
in us a "knowledge without
all
knowing
to
it
3
;
not to speak of
which a closer analysis of the notion of the existence of the Ideas in the soul would obviously lead. 4 His
solution lies rather
in that
so
conception
by means
of
many
of the questions of
Development
'
soul,
work of potentiality and the completed actuality. The he says, must certainly bear within itself in some
its
sense
1
knowledge.
ii.
Anal. Post.
19, 99, b,
ex* lv Wv t, o#t'
ayvooSvt ko!
iyytvrtBai.
2
/iriSe/ilav
%x ovaiv H<"
(the
5'
apxal
yvafftv
8ia7rop^(Teiei'
tion of soul
init.
s
and body,
Anal. Post.
i.
loo.
and
ideas
yvaais of the apxaY] iyyivovrai ivovaai \e\4i8a<Tiv. ei p.h Si) ix ^" av/ifialvei yap axptavras, aWoirov fetrrepas %x ovras yvtbaets &7ro5e|eur
'
Metaph.
4
9,
ii.
Top.
if
XavB&veiv.
Sh
Kafifiivofiev
n$)
were in us they would have also to move with us, &c. Still Aristotle himself would scarcely have laid much stress on this merely dialectical line of attack,
yytfoeus
afi&vurov yap
(pavepbv
LOGIC
is
197
to be regarded, not as a passive reception of things given 5 but rather as an activity for which such recepis
tion
is
not
different
from the
lies in its
nature as such
its
condition and
soul
iviav
may be
r\
derb &pev
b, 38
r)
eV
iirio-r^fiT}
7rpayfj.a; evlfiep
rap
TroirjriKoap
VKys
iirl
t)
ovffta Koi
rb rl
6
5e
4
rap deapyriKap
leal
v\
%p elpai, \6yos r6
:
akAoicoo-Ls,
we
distinguish
irpayfia
eirel
p6t]ffts.
fiera^o^p Kal rh\p iirl ras ee teal rr)p <pvo~ip. Similarly in iii. 5, 429, b, 22 sqq., iii. 7, 431, a, 5. 2 Be An.\\. 417, b, 18: Kal rb
StaOecreLs
kclt'
ii. 19, 100, b, 8 ovSep ivurr^fii^s anpi$4ffrepov &\\o yepos t) vovs, at 5'
Anal. Post.
. . , .
Se
fierk
\6yov
e'er!,
eftj,
rap apx&v
,
Uv
evipyeiav
[atffBdveffBat]
5e
tt)s
rod
fj.lv
ra
irotyrtKa
ruv apxoop
irap'
4pepyetas ea>0epj rb 6par6v etc. atriop 5* fri rap Ka$ eKacrov i) /cot'
ivepyeiav
sffTL rfj
ai/Tcp
aXo 87]0'ts,
,
r\
S'
iiriar'hfj.r)
rap Kad6\ov
'
ravra
8*
eV ai/rfj iras
iir'
out' av
ejpat
4irio rr)fir}
rfij
oftre
riypri
^XVauTy
$ t0 voijaai fxep
otfre <f>p6v7]0'ts
....
Sip
helirsrai povp
rmv apx&Prap
opaiv,
C. 7,
1141, a, 17,
:
ovk
iir
b, 2, c. 9, 1142, a,
25
ovk
ph
yap
cf.
X* tv T0
oXq*&i\t6v,
povs
cffri
\6yos.
3 Be An.iM. at 430, a, 2 (following the passage to be cited presently on p. 199, n. 2), he says
c. 12,
1143, a, 35 (with
;
which
192, 3
iffriv affirep
ra
porjrd.
4irl
fxhv
yap
Teendelenbubg, Histor. Beitr. ii. 375 sqq. Walter, Bie Lehre v. d. praM. Vernimft, etc., 38 6 povs rap kaxdrtap eV sqq.)
:
rap
&Vv $A7}s rb avr6 effrt rb voovp koll rb poo^/xevov * y yap iirio'r'fifj.7) r) deupjiTtfc^} leal rb oUra's hrio'Tijrbp rb avr6 eartp. Ibid. iii. 7 i/nit. : rb 5* avr6 larip 7} /car' ipepyetap iiriffr'fifn}
teal yap rap irp&rap b'prov rap eVx^TWj/ povs eo'ri Kai ov \6yos, Kal 6 fitp Kara ras airoSf (Jew rap atcivfyrav b'pap Kal wpd>rup 6 5'
afMf>6rpa'
Kal
r$
irpdyixari.
Metap/i.
xii. 7,
1074,
ipdexofiepov
etc.
(More will be
: ;: :
198
scribed as the
'
ARISTOTLE
place of the Ideas,'
it is
'
and
it
may
be said
is
l-ir)
thai
Kal
a\7i8es
Si<nrep
Kal rb
oitde
...
rb
fiey
oiSe
Kal
/J.ri
rb
elvai,
earl rb rd
$'
ayvoetv
Biyydveiv airarriBTJvai yap Ttepl rd rl iariv ovk eariv a\K' 7) Kara Siro 8^ eariv Swep av\Pt^7)K6s
. . .
ravra ovk
voelv
7) fit)
'
fully later).
this very account it is always true. For error only consists in a false conjunction of perceptions, andhence arises only in the Proposition by reason of the conjunction of the
But on
eariv aTvarr)8r]vai
.
aAV
7)
rd Se a\7i6es rb voeiv avrd rb Se tyevSos ovk %ariv, oi/S* cnrdrTi, iU' ayvoia. According to these
. .
Predicate with a Subject (Oateg. 4 fin. Be Interpr. i. 16, a, 12 Be An. iii. 8, 432, a, 11) immediate knowledge, on the other hand, is concerned with pure conceptions relating to no subject distinct from themselves, which we can only know or not know, but as to which we cannot be deceived Be An. iii. 6 init.
; ; ;
passages we should understand by the Trpordaeis ti.p.eo'oi, which express the ultimate principles (An.
Post.
i. 2, 23, 33, 72, a, 7, 84, b, 39, 88, b, 36), only those propositions
in which the predicate is already contained in the subject, not those in which it attaches to a subject different from itself or in other words, only analytical u. priori judgments. In like
:
manner the
(ibid.
ii.
Spia/ibs
rav ap-eaav
7]
odv ray aSiaiperav ySTtffis ev roinois irepl a ovk eari rb tyevSos v ots Se kal rb tyevSos Kal rb
fiev
'
nothing
r)Sri
voTtpArtcv
&s ev ivTuiv
tffri 8'
7) 7]
and
ibid, at
rl
p.ev (pdais
&o"jrep
tyevBr)s Traffa
a\V
rov ri
a\rt6ris,
tbtrirtp
is affirmed as to the existence or non-existence of a conception, nor of its connection with a stated subject. Lastly, when the principle of contradiction (in MetapJi. iv. 3 sq. 1005, b, 11, 1006, a, 3) is designated as the fSefSatordrT) apxv Traaav irepl
t)v SiatyevffQTivai
ahTjdes
ilKris.
ael t
otirats
ey^et
8Va ayev
eircl
Metaph.
.
ix.
10
8e
^7rl
rb
a\ri6es
7)
tyevBos
rSov
7)
irpay/idrwy
Siripr\aBai
. .
iarl
.
r$
ffvyKe'iffOai
iarlv 7) ovk eari rb a\ri$es \ey6fieyoy 7) tyevSos wepl Be Si) ra affivBera rt rb eTyai %
tt6t'
. .
. .
aSdvarov, here a\so only the fundamental principle of all analytical judgments is in question the formal identity of every conception with itself. Be jlw.'iii. 4, 429, a, 27 Kal eli S^j ot Keyovres rty tyvx^v eivai t6tiov eiStbv (see on this ZELLETt'S
1
:
Pdato),
7tK7)v
&\V
LOGIC
thinkable. 1
199
way
of a
it is,
possibility
and a basis
and
so,
according to him,
forming
activity. 2
votjtik)],
its
its
own
inherent
t\
ofoe
effiri.
eereAe^ei^
8 init.
:
aWa
dvvdfizt rh.
1
De An.
iii.
vvv 8e
yet learned nothing, but possesses the capacity for learning something, but also when he knows something, but -has not at a
given
moment
this
knowledge
TFurrr)fj.ri ficv
8
2
at(r8ri<ris
iii.
t&
aiaOriTd.
h fin.
init.')
:
Be An.
cnroBes
Nous
;
iii. 4, 429, a, 15 &pa Sei elvcu [before the experiences the effect of
actually present to his mind. It was in the latter sense that Plato conceived of innate knowledge,whereas Aristotle conceived of it under the former analogy. This is the meaning of his comparison of the soul with the book that is not yet written on and it
:
the voyrbv,
.
it
must be without
wdeos cf Bohitz, Ind. Ar. 72, a, 36 sqq.], Scktikov Se toC efliouj leal Svvdfiei toiovtov [sc. diov rb
elSos']
the sense of
a\\&
&(rirep
fl)]
%X eiv
>
rb
6
. .
rh
to.
sq.;
Tbendelenbukg, on
485 sq.)
aiffBijr^,
oStoj
.
.
voryrd
passage, p.
this Aristotle
T7js
ovQiv iffrtv evepyettp kclL ed Sij rav uvtcuv irplv voziv etc. (vid. supr. p. 198, n. 1). Ibid.
tyvxiis vovs.
.
.
only wants to illustrate by it the difference between the Swdpai and ivepyeiq. He does not here go on to inform us in what way
potential
actual.
b, 30
vovs,
ttv
Svvd/iei irds
tan to
vaifrh 6
irplv
knowledge
becomes
vorj.
ojItws
Sxrirep
zv
ypafipareltp
fijjBev
(b,
5)
is
5, 417, a,
21 sqq. a
still
and in more
accurate
Svvd/iei
:
distinction
made
But, according to what has gone before (429, a, 15), it is not the aiV9i)T& but the voriri, by whose action the tablet of the vovs, blank in itself, is written upon, so that we have to deal in fact with a theory far removed from the Sensationphilosophy.
200
ARISTOTLE
Throughout his whole treatment of
this question,
we
can of course indicate, but which we cannot altogether remove without doing violence to the statements of the
Master himself.
On
On
the other
in
the beginning
in germ. 3
we gain Of
all
knowledge in
it
merely to cause
1
to be
sq.
* *
205
Cf. pp. 196, n. 1, 197, n. 2, 198, n. 1, and 199, n. 1. 4 There is no necessity to in-
terpret in that sense the passages given above. On the contrary, when he says in Be An. iii. 8 {supra, p. 199, n. 1) that ' the soul is in a certain sense everything,' he immediately explains this phrase by adding (431, b, 28):
av&yKri
b"
if
avra
BJ)
i)
ra
e5t7 elvai.
everything inasmuch as it is capable of having the forms (or images) of all things within itself. That it produces them out of itself is not stated. Onthecontrary, as the power of perception is called cTSos aiaBi)Tuv, because it receives into itself the forms of the uaBifrA, so the vovs may, in the same sense, be called elSos eitiuv, inasmuch as it is the faculty to receive the insensible forms
;
oS ov yap 6 KlBos Sore f) Tjj tyvxy , a\\a r6 elSos tyvxh &<rirep t\ x^P tariv Ka! yap r\ X e V ipyayif iffTiv opydvuv, ko! S vovs eTSoj eiSSv nal r, a)f<rflj)tris elBos aiVflTpw. Since the hand indeed forms and uses the tools,
aira
fiev
yap
and
may
be taken in the same sense. The statement that universals are in the soul itself (m'De An. ii. 5,
cited at p. 197, n. 2), occurs in a passage which has no reference to the growth of knowledge in itself, but where Aristotle is endeavouring to illustrate the progress from the power of perception to
but still can only form them from some given material, this comparison does
LOGIC
For
It this
201
would take us back again to the theory of innate ideas which Aristotle so decidedly rejects.
1
pure
would be equally wrong, however, to make him a Empiricist, and attribute to him the view that the Universal, without any limitation, comes to the soul from the external world.' 2 If this were his view, he
'
knowledge from that faculty of immediate cognition by which the Nous is, according to him, distinguished from all other forms of thinking activity. 3 For it is plain that concepts which
of
all
the
prinavpia
of
all
by an ascent from individuals to any immediate kind of knowledge, but must be data of that kind of knowledge which is the most entirely mediate of all. Our cognitive faculties, he asserts, do, in fact, take this way to arrive
at
universals, cannot be the data of
at these principia;
to ourselves as only the last of these successive geneactual perception by the relation of iviffriiiiii to the Beape7i> (p. 417, b, 5 Oeupovv yh.p ylyverat rb %x ov v\v tiri.arljii.iiv}. Finally, in Anal, Post. ii. 19 (cited at p. 197,n. 4, supro) Aristotle says it is impossible to believe that we should come to the knowledge of the highest principles.without possessing previous knowledge but he looks for that previous knowledge not in any ideas innate in the soul prior to all experience, but simply in the inductive process.
: ;
' As Kampb (Erltenntnisstheorie d. Arist. p. 192) objects, no * without reason, though his citation of MetapA. i. 9, 993, a, 7 sqq. is not in point.
2 So Kampe, ibid. but it is hard to reconcile with this exposition his attempt in the next following pages to reduce that true perception which is, for Aristotle, the basis of all knowledge to some kind of Intuitive Thought, essentially differing both from
;
ad fin.
202
ralisations
ARISTOTLE
upon a matter given in experience.
Each
which can only be expressed as a judgment and a conclusion, and which therefore is, like all judgments, either false or true. But, on the other hand, the activity of the Nous in knowledge is by him distinguished from all mediate cognition, and what we attain by it is not judgments but ideas not that which may be either false or true, but that which is always true that which we may either have or not have, but
result of
as to which, if
we have
it,
we cannot be
is
deceived. 2
So,
again,
Matter and
is
sensible,
and
is
and not-being,
which
is
that
we can never
unconditionally necessary.
entirely on
rest
But
of the knowledge
it
is
of
all
know-
is
necessarily
knowledge
that
it
and
can
all
perception.
But the
itself.
*
spirit of
man
i.
has nob
by
2,
2
3
ii.
Cf infra in the second part of ch. vii., and the notes there
Anal. Post.
i.
6 init.
on these
points.
;;
LOGIC
which
it
203
them cannot consist in any self-intuition making us conscious of the principia as of a truth already within us. It must be something whereby certain thoughts and ideas arise through an action of that which is thought upon the spirit thinking it, in some way analogous to that in
finds
or act of introspection,
which perception
is
arises
And
Aristotle does,
when he
says
is
is
to
the perceivable
it
'
or that
it
touches
'
it
or that as
relates
In
this
way we
get
a theory which
is
for the
moment
by the
intelligible
and consistent.
questions remain
wholly unanswered
What
is
this,
which we get the principia of all mediate knowledge and the most universal of all ideas and axioms ? What kind of being belongs to it ? In what way does it act upon our spirit ? Of what sort
intuition of
we
so
attain ?
Do
all
of
his
Be An.
.
iii.
4,
429, a, 15
see p.
3
Metaph. ix. 10, 1051, b, 24 (vid. supr. p. 197,n.4): inperception of the aavvBera is to /lev Btyelv Kal <pdvai a\y8h ... to 5' ayvoetv pii diyyavav ; xii. 7, 1072, b, 20: axnhv Be roe! 6 vovs [the
divine vovs] /caret iierA\iityiv rov [by taking itself as a vot\t&v~\ vaifrbs yap ylyverai Qiyyixav koL vouv. Remembering,
voi\tov
doubtless, the first of these passages, Theophrastus also says in Fr, 12 (Metaph. ) 25 'If we begin with observation we can, up to a certain point, explain things from their causes '6to.v Be eV aira t &Kpa peTaBaivw/iLfv ovker cWcipetta, either because these Have no causes, or because our eye cannot see in a full light, T&x a 8' ixeTvo aAijflecrrepoi' as aurijj Tcji v$ t\ 6eapla 6iy6vTi koX olov a.^a^^.eva. * Be An. iii. 6 fin. cited
: : , ;
wpr.
p. 197, n. 4.
204
ARISTOTLE
(as
does the law of contradiction), or are there also metaphysical ideas which are so given, such as the ideas of
Being, of Cause, of
God?
but
it
the
Ideas,
except
that,
since
for
The
final
we
shall
ideas.
The
all
Forms
had
for
him, as the
'
Ideas
'
had
for Plato, a
And
none the
less
perception,
logical
removed from experience and immediate metamorphosed in the end from a product of human thought into an immediate
are
by
an
actual
recollection,
and
that
the
accustom
itself to receive
the
light of the
Ideas by
is
So
with
Aristotle
self-evident
that
at
the
; '
LOGIC
205
knowledge which
to
is
goal
know-
gift
must
is
which
is
that
out of Perception. 1
The development
is
in
That which
absolutely
first
is
relatively to
us last;
its
and the principle than the deductions which depend upon it, yet individuals and things of sense have more of certainty for us. 2 And in like manner we find
1
Anal
cnr'
Post.
ii.
19, 100,
a,
i.
5 fin.
Of.
Metaph.
i.
2,
982,
10
a,
23
v. 11, 1018, b,
a,
29 sqq.
oSt'
&Wuv
yvuHrTiKoyripuv,
<rws.
Anal. Post. i. 2, 71, b, 33 np6repa 8' itrrl Kal yvtopifiaWepa $ix&s ov ydp Taiirdv irp6Tepov rii <pvtrei koL irfxis Ti/ias wporepov oJ5e yva
pifu&repov
Kal
tj/juv
yi/cupifj.(tirepov
\4ya> Se irpbs iifias fiev irpoWepa Kal yvwptfit&repa rd 4yy6repov tt)s aitrBijo'eas, aTr\$s 5e irpdrepa Kal
yvwpifitjorepa
1029, b, 4 sqq. ; ix. 8, 4 ; Top. vi. 4, 141, b, 3, De An. ii, 2 init., iii. 7, 22 init. ; Eth. i. 2, 1095, b, 2. (Still more forcibly, referring rather, however, to Plato, Hep. vii. init. than to Aristotle, is it expressed in Metaph. ii. 1, 993, b, The apparent contradiction 9.) etrrf 5' Tj^iiv irpuin Phys. i. 1
vii.
4,
1050,
;
roj/Srjha Kal
ffatpri
rd trvyKexvfieifa
4k rovrtov yivai
fxaWof
erai
Sffrepoy
5'
ra
iroppcbrepov
'
ecri
yvdspiixa
ra trT0i%e7a Kal
iyyvrdru 5e ra Kab" eKatrra. Phys. i. 1, 184, a, 16 ite^ukc Be 4k r&v yvapifiareptay 7]fuv tj 68ds Kal ffatpeffrepav iirl r& (ratpeffrepa ov ydp rfj <piffei Kal yvaptn&repa ralnd tiimv re yvcipifia koI wir\as
ffra,
:
'
apxal Biaipovn ravra. Sid 4k tuv Kad6\ov iirl ra ko6' e/cacTTa 5el irpoUvm. rb ydp S\ov Kara tV atffQ^ffiv yj/apifit&Tepoi/, rb 5e ica.66\ov b'Xov t/ 4o~tiv troWh yap irepthauPdvei us pepy rb Kad6\ov, is only a verbal ambiguity. For (as
'
'
206
ARISTOTLE
us more clear than a deduction from the general. 1 The way in which actual knowledge is evolved from the rudimentary possibilities of knowledge is this. The first stage is always, as we have remarked, sensible perception. Without this we can have no actual thought. 2 The man who is deprived of One of the organs of sense must of necessity also lack all the corresponding knowis to
upon perception. 3
it
Now
proper objects
of perception
but
inasmuch as a
universal, although
is is
may be
as yet undistinguished,
with universals. 5
Or, to
speak more accurately, what the senses perceive is, not the individual substance of the particular as such, but These again are rerather certain of its properties. lated to the particular substance after the manner of a
universal, for they are not a
'
this
'
(roSs) but a
'
such
TRENDELENBURG on
An.
etc. p. 338,
Arist.
iii.
De
105,
p.kv
<5
and Bitter,
it is
Sib tov
piaov <rvK\oyurfihs,
ri/uv
remark)
not the
logical,
but the sensible universal which is here dealt with the as yet indefinite presentation of as when, for instance,
an
we
seDt to ourselves a body before we clearly distinguish its themIn constituent parts.
'
evapyeffTepos 6 Sia rf/j iirayayrjs. 2 De An, iii. 8, 432, a,,l(yid. s-wpv. p. 195, n. 1). De Sensn, c. 6, 445, b, 16 oiSi voeid vavs to inrbs
:
$'
fiii
(aer
3 4
aicr8ji<reas ivra.
i. i.
18.
18, 81, b, 6
tuv
selves,
ele-
a%<rdn<ns.
xiii. 2,
3, 286, b, 16 ; Metaph. 1076, b, 18, c. 3, 1078, a, 9. Anal. Pr. ii. 2d fin. <f>ti<rei
ii.
:
i. 2 (md. supr. p. 205, n. 2), 31 (vide p. 207, n. 1), Phys. i. 6 fin., De An. iii. 5, 417, b, 22 27
Post.
c.
Metaph.
5
i.
1,
DeAn.
iii.
1.
LOGIC
(roiovBs)
;
207
universals,
Now
the
way
in
which
it is
developed
is this.
In sensible per-
ception itself the several sensible properties, and therefore also the relative universals,
An. Post.
t\
i.
31,
im.it.
ouSe
ei
yap
Kal eariv
at<r8ri<ris
tov t oiovtie
Kal /at) TovBe t vos [only the TtJSe, however, is an individual substance ovUev (Tfifiaivei raty KOtvrj
:
is said in the text will establish the agreement of these passages with the general doctrine of Aristotle, about which Heider
KaTi\yopovy.ev<av TtJSe ti
too
much
difficulty.
Nor
of
does Metaph.
which more
eo~6at
infra],
U'
alo-edv-
ye avayKoiov T<J5e ri teal irov Kal vvv. to Be ko96\ov Kal ri iratnv aZ&varov alff&dveffQai. ov yap r6Se ovde vvv. oil yap av ?jv Kad6\ov
.
. .
1087, a, 15 sqq. contradict it, as Kampe believes (JSrkenntnissth. d. Ar. It is there said that know85). ledge as Svvap.ts is tov Ka86\ov
xiii. 10,
Kal aopitrTov,
7]
5'
hepyeta
fopifffievyj
iirel
oZv
5'
at
fiev
aTrofieil-eLS
naQokov, ravra
eoSai,
Si'
Qavepbv
a,
'6rt
aiaB^veais
twrw.
So in
ii.
9,
to Kad' eKaffrov, i\ 8' alffdntris rod Ka96\ov effrlv, otov avGpdnrov, aAA' ov KaWia avBp&irov i. e. Perception, has, it is true, a definite individual Kallias for its immediate object; but what it gives us is the image of a man with these definite properties, and the circumstance of this man's being Kallias has no influence upon the content of our perception. Cf. further Be- An. ii. 12, 424, a, 21 sqq.;andPft$'s.i.5,189,a,5. What
100,
/*/
:
17: altrddverai
twos. All that this states is that the capability of knowing extends to everything that is knowable, but that every actual perception is the perception of a definite object; and whether this object is an individual or a universal conception does not enter into the question. Ka66\ov here signifies "the indefinite,' as to which cf. xii. 4, 1070, a, 32 Gen. An. ii. 8, 748, a, 7 Mh. ii. 7, 1107, a, 29.
; ;
Be An.
iii. 2,
Hence the
ii.
oftrejjo-ij
Be An.
is
iii.
3,
428, a, SlWjUtS
9 init,,
called a
0~{>p.<pVTOS KpiTlK-f].
208
ARISTOTLE
fixed
Thus
and science
'
universal principles of
and of these in
is
a scientific comprehension
in
The
result
may be put
Plato
which, in his
was a
self.
it,
reflection
on
upon a
In other
demand
imme-
on the underlying universal, still the relation between the two elements is quite To Plato the abstraction from the given different.
and
reflection
1 Anal. Post. ii. 19, 100, a, 2 Ik p-ev oZv altr<U]aea>s ylverai u.vf\p.ri, Siffirep \eyofiev, k Be fivfiuris tto\-
ko!
t&x v V
Sict
rrjs
i/nrctpias rots
\dicis
al
ywof>.evT\s Ifarsipla.
fivrj/mi
.... yiverai Be Tex^i), Srav e ttoWuv ttjs efnretplas eWorjp&T<nv fiia koS6\ov yivi)rai irepl ruv
avSpiitrois
t$
apiB^iZ
dpolaiv
{nr6Kri\f/ts.
rb
S'
iraprbs %)pep.iiffaVTOS y Ta/>& t& iroAAi, iy rij t|wx#> T v & av eV atraaiv ev ivij itcetvots t&
% tov Kad6\ov
e^ireipfas
vir6\Tf^iv 8ti
KaWta
av-rb,
iirurrJyiris,
lav per
i.
irepl
y4ve<rw, Te'x^s,
eiritrr-fj/J/qs.
:
^"
toBI trwf)veyKe Ka\ ^ojKpdret Kal KaQeKacrrov oStoj iroWois, ifj.iretpias Iffrly rb 5' 8Vi vaai roh roio7aSe kot' eTBos %v ifpopurBeiirt, ndfivovai Trjvdl
t^v
v6ffov
tV
Be irepl rb hv,
1,
Meta/ph.
8'
j/6trov,
(rvvfiveyKey,
980, b, 28
yiyverai
-rots
eV rrjs
p,vf]p.its ip.ireipta
avSpa^rois' al
yap iroAAal p-vrj/iai toB ainov irp&yfiaros fitas ifnreipias 8ivap.iv 4iroTe\ov<nv
. . . .
the same passages is more to the like purpose. In Phys. vii. 3, 247, b, we have, ex yap -rrjs KUTei p.4po$ i/j.ireipias tt)v
Ka$6\ou AafijSwouev
im<rTf)p.riv.
airofSalvei 8'
iiriffTf)/jLri
LOGIC
is
209
the
first
thing,
coming to any knowledge of universal essence at all. To Aristotle the direction of the mind upon the common essence of the empirical data is the main point, and it is only as an inevitable consequence of this that abstraction
like
in.
For a
knowledge derived by sensation against the objectors for he shows that, notwithstanding the contradictions and deceptions of the senses, a true perception is still
possible,
and that the actuality of what we perceive is beyond doubt, although its value is relative in a word,
:
'
are due
it.
2
He
never leads
in our imaginations
and our
first
exposed to
error. 3
Metaph. iv. 5, 6, 1010, b, where, among other things (1010, b, 30 sqq.), it is stated that although we might say in a certain sense that without a perceiving being there would be no alaBiyrh. as such, still it is impossible to say that without the atadriais the viroKeifieva a iroie? rriv ov yap alaBrfaiv could not exist
Cf.
sqq.,
Sri
7}
yap avaipeBevros ata8t\ai.s ukv avaipeirat, aurfhubi Se %arai, oTov aSpa, Sepiibv, y\vnb, iriKpbv ol r&Wa oaa early aXaBiyri..
2 To this refer Metaph. iv. 5, 1010, b, 3 sqq., 14 sqq. ; xi. 6, 1062, b, 13 sqq. 3 De An. iii. 3. 427, b, 11 r)
:
fiev
yap
ataBrjais
r&v
ISlaiy
txel
oArjfl^s
Kal
Ttaaiv
inrdp^i
roTs
a\\'
erepov irapa ri)v aXa&riaiv, b avdyKTj irpdrepoy elvai rr)s aiaB^aeas' rb yap Ktyovy tov
rt Kal
tan
Likewise
\6yos. Ibid. 428, a, 11 at jxiv [the aladi)aeis\ a\7]Be?s alel, at 5 tpavraaiai yivovrai at irXeiovs
tyevSels.
Cat.
c. 7, 7, b,
36
rb yap aiaBrirbv
rb
fiey
avaipeiT^vaiff0rjo'ty)
418, a, 11 1010, b, 2 ovS 7) aia&rjais tyevSris tov iZlov early, aAA.' 7) (pavraaia ov ravrbv
ii. 6,
Similarly
sqq.
:
5,
aiaByyrbv
ov
I.
avvavaipei
$ov
tj? aiafrfjasi.
VOL.
: '
210
ARISTOTLE
He
shows in
fact that
simple-minded confidence in
is
natural to
his
This
is
in
case
little
making any
close inquiry
which a subjective
of our
construction
simply
upon us whereby they while, on the other impress their images upon the soul
;
'
who
and the naturalist who required so wide a be expected to take sufficient account of the attacks which some of his predecessors had made upon the trustworthiness of the senses. 2 Of course he does not seek to deny the delubasis of empirical facts, could hardly
See the account of Aristotle's theory of sensation, i/nfira, ch. x.
1
ad fin.
1
It
p. 209,
n. 1,
how Aristotle, in
Cat. 7, treats
that everything is always being moved, or that one thing is always moved and another never, irpbs airavra yap ravra tKavi) fila irla-ris dpufiev yap <=via 6re fiev Kivoifieva
ire b" Tipe/iovvTa. Tbid. 253, a, 33, in opposing the doctrine iravr' 4ipefj.eti>, he says, tovtov fareTv \6yov
a<p4vras t^v
<tti Siavoias,
dtffdTjfftv,
as given objectively even those sensible properties which Democritus had already shown to be merely subjective (Zbll. Ph. d. Gr. i. 772, 1. 783, 2). Similarly in Phyg. viii. 3, in combating the opinion (of Parmenides), itavra %>E/ieiK, he follows up the striking
appuffria ris
remark (254, a, 30) that such a view could not explain B<S|a
and
<pavrao-la
as
movements
of
the soul (it would have been more exact to say of the changing series of mental images ') with the sweeping observation that to investigate such a view is CnTsw \6yov &v PeXriov exofiev ty \6yov SiiirBai, and nanus Kplveiv rb marbv koI rhfi.ii tho-tov xa\ apxh" K <d "PxMv. The same objectionholds.in his opinion against the theories
'
All such questions as are are in our sound senses, &c, Aristotle considers altogether misleading irdvTwv yap \6yoy aj-iovffiv oZtol e?j/cu \6yov yap fyirovaiv 3>v ovk etrri \6yos' airobei^eais yap apxn ovk cwr<S8ei/y eon. (Metajjh. iv. 6, 1011, a, 8 sqq. cf. below, p. 247, n. 2). He thinks it a self -evident proposition that we can only decide upon the sensible properties of things as upon the good aDd the evil, the beautiful and the
natural.
LOGIC
211
He
etc.,
which
it
perceives, but
and
in the discriminating
of that which
that which
is
is
To these
scientific
knowledge
his Analytics
corresponds.
for in the
It is
Uni-
versal Causes
ugly
therefore, of the
in a normal state of the senses and the mind. 1 In this sense Aristotle himself illustrates his principle in De An. iii. 3, 428, b, 18 y rf<rflijcns rwv fiev idiwv a\TiBiis itrnv ^ Sri bxiyirxrov %x ov & a T0 tyevfios. 5eurepov 5e rod trv/jL&ePTiKeval ravra' Kal ivravda ^Stj evSexerai B(ai|/eii'6ri fJ.hy Seffdai' yap AevKov, ov tpeuSerat, et 5e rovro rb Aevftbv, % &X\o ri [whether the white thing is, e.g., a cloth or a wall], xj/evSerai. (8o also at the end of
:
1010, b, 14. can only trust the deliverance of each sense with regard to its own particular objects, those of sight with regard to colour, &c. y
:
We
[aiVfl^trewp]
eKdtrrri
ev
ry avr$
<pyj<rtj/
'
Xp6v<p
afia
irepl
rh avro avbeirore
Kal
oiira
aAA' ovV
ov%
otirois
ir&Bos TifLcpKr^rTjo-ev,
aAAa
irepl
rh
c.
6.)
rp'nov 5e tSjv
rols
koivwv Kal
oTs
S'
eirofievaiv
(rvfjL^e^rjKdinv,
6evet
irepl
e|,
av-
virdp^et
Kivniais
to
ISia*
Xeyta
otov
Kal peyeBos,
o-v/i/SefiriKe
ffii)
early
Bi\aa>.
airaTTiOrivai
also
koivb. see Sensu, c. i. 137, a, 8.) iv. 442, b, 8 De Sensu, irepl jiiv roiruv [the Kowa just mentioned] airarSivrai, irepl Se rav ISlwi/ ovk
tV
:
alff-
yXvKv roiovrov. Perception shows us primarily (as has been already said on pp. 206-7) only certain sets of
dyxris rb eGo'ii.evQV
De
Snfarwvrai, otov b\j/is irepl xp&}i.aros kjI h.K.0^1 nepl \f/6<pay. Metapli. iv.
those other properties which are only inferred from what we perceive.
p 2
212
ARISTOTLE
and of effects from causes, word Demonstration, forms the task of Science :
all
or in one
for in
The premises, however, from which these deducmust start cannot be themselves deduced by the same method. Nor are they immediately given in any innate kind of knowledge. It is only by working upwards from phenomena that we can reach the principles only from particulars that we can that underlie them rise to universals. To do this scientifically is the business of Induction. Demonstration and Induction are accordingly the two component parts of the scientific process, Both, and the essential subjects of Methodology.
Proof.
tive proofs
:
Proof with
and in connection
Judgment and the Proposition, as It was not till a later period of his work (as we have already explained) that he went on to treat them separately, and
being the component parts of the Syllogism.
even then this part of his Logic remained distinctly
undeveloped.
applies
still
more
it is
Nevertheless,
and
lastly to the
Syllogism
inasmuch
1
as certain definite
views
as
to
' ;
LOGIC
It
213
new
direction
also
Aristotle
followed
As
we
find that
Aristotle,
generally
speaking,
takes
for
granted the
But
as
we
shall find
him
we
he
feels it necessary in
and
definite conclusions
on many
points. 2
Plato had
and yet
at the
exalted
all
as Ideas, without
is
Substance.
He goes on
4, 73, a,
and 172
Log.
i.
sq.
cf.
Anal. Post.
i.
i.
34 sqq.
v.
Top.
7, c.
5, 102, b,
init., c.
Metaph.
Peantl
sqq.),
210
9
;
18, 1002, a,
5, b,
24
16
;
cf. Ktjhn, De Notionis Lefinitione qual. Arist. constittierit, Halle, 1844 ; Kassow, Arist. de Notionis Definitione Loctrina, Berl. 1843.
works,
Waitz,
in Categ.
Anal. Post. 71, b, 10. According to these passages everything belongs to any object
'
xa8' ai-rh
which
p.
3 See Zbll. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 518 sq. 4 Ibid. 584 sqq. 5 As to the distinction of the <ru/ij3ej8i7Kbs from the /cofl' avrb
and all is Kara. which does not follow from the concept. To be a biped belongs to any man Kaff huto,
of that object;
irvfiPePriicbs'
'
; ;
214
to
ARISTOTLE
a further subdivision of the latter head by dis-
make
A
by
is
to
several
accident, but
common element
some other
more general, then the Universal is a property-concept, and indicates an essentia] property. 3 If it is of the
essence of the things in question, then the Universal
becomes a Genus?
for every
If to the
common
.
distinguishing
To be educated
o-u^ej3?jK(is.
to
him
/ca-rtk
wise Metaph. vii. 13, 1038, b, 11.) Cf last note but one.
s Such an essential quality Aristotle calls a KaB' airb iirdpxov, a tt&Bos KaB' airb, or a <ri//Aj8ej87jKbs KaB' avrb, understanding in the
avpfiefSriKhs
is
thing
things
avp.-
last
case
by
<ru/ij3eflij/cbs
(the
which
cept
;
fall
but what
;
said
all
k.
cases
and therefore
univer:
term being used in a sense different from that discussed above) broadly that t trvpflaivti rivl, i.e, a quality cf. Metaph. v.
;
sal determinations are naff avr6. Metaph. v. 9, 1017, b, 35 ra yap Ka86\ov KaB' aira iirdpxei, ra Si
trU|Uj3ei8ijK<$Ta
ov
KaB' avrb.
a\V
itrl
ruv KaB' eKatrra anrK&s \iyeraL. Cf note 2, below. For more about the <rvp.lefinKbs, see the second
.
1017, a, 12, iii. 1, 995, b, 18, 25, c.2, 997, a, 25 sqq. iv. 1, iv. 2, 1004, b, 5, vi. 1, 1025, b, 12, vii. 4, 1029, b, 13 Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, b, 11,
fin.
c.
30
7,
part of ch.
1
vii.,
infra.
vii.
19, c. 4, 73, b, 5, c. 6, 75, a, 18, c. 7, 75, a, 42 ; Phys. i. 3, 186, b, 18, ii. 2, 193, b, 26, c. 3, 195, b, 13,
4, 203, b, 33; De An. i. 1, 402, b, 16 Rhet. i. 2, 1355, b, 30 Waitz, on Anal. Post. 71, b, 10
iii.
;
Thus Metaph.
:
3 init.
ov-
in common usage means many different things rb ri fy eTvai Kal Kal rb Ka86\ov Ka! rb yivos . reraprov rohriav rb inroKeifievov. 2 Anal. Post. i. 4, 73, b, 26 KaB6\ov Si Aeya> b av Kara Travr6s re vTdpxy ' KaB' aiirb Ka) % avr6. ipavepbv &pa Sri Haa KaB6\ov ej avdyKys virdpxet rots irpdypaaiv
(r(a
.
a,
cirri
riav
r$
eVSei
iv
r$
ri
poifievov.
iv
rip
Part. An. i. 4, 644, a, 24 ra Si KaB6\ov Koivd ra yap ir\eloinv \)Trapxovra KaB6\ov Xeyoptv. (Like:
ra roiavra \ey4ffBa>, Hffa (broSoiW ipurvBevra rl iirri rb irpoKelpievov (e.g. in a man r( iffri ; $ov). Metaph. v. 28,
yypeTffBat
hpiidrrei
LOGIC
215
other marks which are again essential with reference to a certain part of the whole class, and by which such
part
is
then
we
made up
of the
specific differences.
If,
1024, a, 36 sqq., where, among different meanings of yhos, the following are given -rb viroiceliievov reus SiiMpopais, rb irpwrov ivwoipxoy ft \4yerat 4v r$ rl itrrt
:
T6j (that these two descriptions apply to the same meaning of y4vos is shown by Bonitz on this
\yOVTM Kara
(popa
;
1057, b, 37 rb yap toiovtov yevos Ka\a*, $ a^tpw %v ravrb Aeyerai, /x-^ Kara ffvfi^e^tjKbs ixov Sia<popdi'. Top. vii. 2, 153, a, 17 : KaTTiyopelrai 5' iv rq rt 4ari
X.
8,
t&
yevt)
is
koI
al
diatpopal.
Every
;
consequently a ko06\ov, but not every Ka66\ov a yevos cf. MetapA. iii. 3, 998, b, 17, 999, a,
yivos
21
i.
,
differences specific a, 21) 3, the second to properties, activities and conditions in fact, the <riyij3ei87)K<(Ta. To the first belongs the term man,' to the second the term 'grammar, 'and to the fourth the term Socrates.' But the uncertainty of the whole division immediately appears in the description of the third class, for if there are notions which are predicated both ko8' umjKei/ieVou and iv moKetfiivif i.e. which are at once genera and properties (the example Aristotle gives is the concept of science,' which is in the soul as its viroKeiftevov, and is also predicated, of each of the particular sciences) then the genera and properties cannot be
'
'
'
xii.
L,
1069,
;
a,
27,
13,
&c, with
1038, b,
How
9, 992, b,
12, vii.
and Bonitz on 25 sq. To the disMetaph. 299 sqq. tinction between genus and property is also partly referable the statement in Categ. c. 2, 1, a, 20 sqq. c. 5, that everything either (1) Kaff viroKeifieyov nvbs \4ytrai,
16,
iv imoKeifiivip Si ovSevi 4<rriv, or (2) iv vTT0KGif/.evcp p.4v iffrt tcaff inrOKeLftevov 5e ovSevbs \4yeratj or (3) /ea0'
v-noKlfi4vou re Aeyerai leal 4v inrOKei/j.evtp
the boundary between a genus and a property' will be seen also in his treatment of Substance (on which see the first part
'
was
'
'
of ch. Yii.,infra).
Metaph. x. 7, 1057, b, 7 4k rod yevovs Kal tuv Staxpopcbv ra ftSri (for instance, the specific concepts black and white are made up of the generic notion Xpufia and the distinguishing
1
:
yctp
'
'
'
'
icrriv,
itrrlv
qualities SiaKpnucbs and avynpiTikos white is the xP<*>f- a SicwcpiTiK&z/, black is the xPH- a <rvyKpiTtii6v).
:
these divisions, the fourth comprises particular things the first refers to genera and (c. 5,
Of
fiiv
Top. vi. 3, 140, a, 28 Be. yap rb y4vos airb rav &K\cov \uplfeiv [the generic concept distinguishes
:
216
finally,
ARISTOTLE
an object
is
its
whole
is
we have
its
Concept. 1
The
what belongs
Ibid, vi.
(Further instances
of the manner of usirig $ia<popa are given by Waitz, Arist. Org. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 192, a, i. 279 These distinguishing marks 23.) of species, Aristotle calls Suupopb tiSoirotbs {Top. vi. 6, 143, b, 7 ; From Eth. x. 3, 1174, b, 5). other properties he distinguishes them by their being able to be predicated of a subject {tcaO' imo;
substantial {Top. vii. 2, vid. supr. p. 214, n. 4 ; and yet, looked at in themselves, they are not substances but qualities, for they express not a ti, but a itoiiv -n {Top. iv. 2, 122, b, 16, c. 6,128, a, 26, vi. 6, 144, a, 18,21 ; Phys.Y. 2, 226, a, 27; Metaph.v.Umit.). Theapparent contradiction between Aristotle's different statements on the subject (broughtoutby TrenDELENBUBG,.awrf. Beitr. z. Phil. i.
'
KeifAtvov \eyovrat),
in a subject {ev
eiVi)
i.e.
ovk
they do not subsist in a subject which would exist before themselves, or which might be conceived independently of them, but in one which by them alone
is this definite a,
subject {Cat.
5, 3,
56 sqq., and Bonitz, on Metaph. v. 14) may be solved in the manner indicated cf "Waitz, ut supra. 1 Anal. Post. ii. 13, 96, a, 24. Many properties of things are also accidental to. other things which fall under the same genus. Ta 8)) roiavra \T)irr4ov [in the determination of concepts] jue'xpi
;
.
cf. u. 2, 1, a,
24
sq.)i
vi. 6,
TOffavra \7j(p6y irpwrov, hr\ irXtiov vwdp^ei [is accidental also to other things], airavra Si jiii; eitI irX46v. ravrriv yap avdyicT} ovffiav elvai rov
etes
a>v e/caiTToe jxev
tovtov,
yap Statpopa twv Kara trvfi^e^TjKbs inrapx&Twv itrrl, KaOdirep o5e rb ob yap ivBex^rai tV diacpoytvos pav imApx^v ""v'L tal ft)} vTrapx^'v) they belong to the concept of the which they are subject of affirmed, and hence everything that is implied in them is also true of the species and of the individuals to which they belong ( Cat. It can c. 5, 3, -a, 21 sqq. b, 5). hence be said of them, that they the genus) form (together with the substance {Metaph. vii. 12, 1038, b, 19: cf.. following note)
' ;
irpdyfiaros
illustrated below.
18
Tijs
by
Ibid. 97, a, get the concept {\6yos ova-las) of a given object dividing the genus into its
we
and then the species to which our object belongs into its sub-species, and thus proceeding till we arrive at a group Sv/aiiciri eVrl SiaQopa, i.e. that which is indivisible into any farther sets
species,
'
'
; ;
LOGIC
217
and the
theory, cf. Bonitz, Arist. Metaph. ii. 346, 1). So also Metaph. vii. 12, 1037, b, 29 ovBlv yap Urep6v iffriv iv t$ hpiafxw, -kKt)v r6 re yevos teat ai irpcorov \ey6^ieyov Siacpopai (or as it stands 1038, a,
:
divided into
is
its species,
the latter
and
els
this
continued
'dais
ttv
%KBi)
ra
special use of thai with a dative annexed (for instance, rb avSpdmip eti/aL, &c., rb eyl eTvcu rb adicuptrcp icrrlv etvai, Metaphrx.. 1, 1052, b, ov ydp itrri rb trol elvat rb 16 fj.ov<TM<S iiva.i, ibid. vii. 4, 1029, b, 14, cf. Ind. Ar. 221, a, 34) ; and the phrase rb ri t]v efyai. In the second of these expressions the dative must (according to Trendelenburg, Bh. Mus. 1828, 481
:
a.8id$opa.(ibid.
1.
15);
and
since in
Schwegler,
Ar.
Metaph.
iv.
this series every subsequent differentia includes the preceding one the Siirow includes the (e.g. fattntavv), therefore the intermediate terms which fall between
371) be taken possessively, so that avBpcbiry efrai is equivalent to elvai rovro '6 kanv avQptinrcp = to be that which belongs to man and so rb avBp&irip ehai the genus and the lowest specific designates the manner of being difference do not need to be re- that is peculiar to man = Man's peated in the definition (cf also Being whereas avBpamov ehtu Part. An. i. 2 vnxt.'). So it fol- only signifies the condition of lows {Met. ibid. 1038, a, 28) 'in one who is a man, or the actual hiatpopa. r) ovffia rod T\ reKevraia participation in human nature. Trp6.yp.aros Ztrrai koX 6 6pur/j,6s in For the proof of this explanation which, however, we have to such passages as the following understand by the reAevrala 8m- will serve rb eivai avrip 'drzpov, <popb.. not only the last specific rb rjv rots ^Stri rb elvai eo-rtv difference as such, but the specific, (Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 221, a, 42, 54 concept as determined by it, sq., Arist. Stud. iv. 377). The which embraces the higher spe- fact that the article is never put cies and the genns. before the dative (for Aristotle 1 For the designation of that does not say rb r$ avBpdnrif which is thought of in the con- efoai) does not stand in the way cept, Aristotjle makes use of for the rip in this case after rb various expressions. Besides ovaia would be very awkward as a,
'
'
'
'
and eVSos (of which we shall have more to say in dealing with the
Metaphysics), we have to notice in this connection his way of marking out the idea which a word expresses by placing a Sn-ep before it, as Sirep %v, or iirep %v (JPhys. 3, 186, a, 32 sqq.), for ' Being, as such,' or ' One, as such' (cf. Bonitz, Ind. Arist. 533, b, 36 sqq.); and also his
:
matter of diction and moreover this very omission of the article makes it clearer that in the
;
are dealing with which belongs to man as such. The ri i)v that is also, as a rule, construed with the
a.v9paW<p eivai
'
we
that
being
'
dative of the object (t& ri i)p thai ixdcrrcp, &c. ; cf Ind. Ar. 764, a, 60 sq.) ; for it is (as Alex, says, in Schol. 256, b, 14 on Top. 24 m.)
.
: : ;
'
218
ARISTOTLE
itself is
6 ri
Concept
aii-ip
this
equivalent to
SriAusv
Xbyos.
peculiar imperfect, which is meant to designate that in things which does not belong to the moment,
but which throughout the whole course of their existence has represented their proper esse, i.e. the essential as distinguished from the contingent and transitory.
$v eivai.* Pliys. ii. 2,, 194, a, 20: rov etSovs Kal rod rl %v eivai. In Phys. ii. 3, 194, b, 26 one of the four causes is rb elSos Kal rb irapiSeiypa' rovro 5' effrlv 6 \6yos & rod ri %v eivai Kal rb. rovrov yevri this being what Aristotle, in Metaph. i. 3, 983, a, 27, calls tV obalav
:
(Cf.
Plato,
Theait.
156,
and other examples apud Schwegleb, ut supra, 373 sq.). Hence rb rl %v eivai avBprfma
that which in a man was his proper esse,' the true being of man, that belonging to him which is also called the irpari) ovffia UStos eKdffra (Metaph. vii. 13, 1038, b, 10; properly means,
'
' '
vii. 7, vid. inf. vii. 5 fin.) But this is simply his Ideal Being, that of which we think, when we abstract from what is contingent to the phenomenal man before
;
Metaph.
ev
Kal rb rl 1\v eivai, but immediately afterwards rbv \6yov also. In fact, all these expressions are constantly-interchanged by him. Compare, for example, the De An. ii. 1, 412, b, 10, where ob<rla t\ Kara rbv \6yov is explained by rb ri ?iv eiviu Metaph. vi. 1, 1025, b, 28 rb ri $v eivai Ka\ rbv \6yov vii. 5, rb ri fy eivai Kal 6 1 030, b, 26 &picii6s (similarly Part. An. i. 1, 642, a, 25, cf Phys. ii. 2,ut supra) Eth. ii. 6, 1107, a, 6 Kara /xev r)]v ovalav Kal rbv \6yov rbv ri j)v eivai Xeyovra. The ri fy eivai stands to the simple ri eari as the particular and definite to the universal and indefinite. Whilst ri 9jv eivai only designates the form or peculiar being of a ; thing, the question, ri iirriv may be answered by giving either the matter only or that which includes both matter and form, or even by giving merely a property; and even when it is answered by giving the ideal form, the answer need not embrace the whole concept of the thing, but may be confined to the genus, or the specific difference (the proof of this is given by
;
:
'
'
'
Schwegleb,
'
375 sqq.). The ri fy thai is, consequently, a definite species of the ri io-ri (hence De An. iii. rov ri 4ari (caret -rb 6, 430, b, 28 ri %v ehai = Being on its essential side ') and thus, as very corn:
'
LOGIC
Essence. 1
219
And this is arrived at by the process of making the Universal of the Genus determinate bymeans of the aggregate of distinguishing marks. 2 But
in Aristotle, the used in the narrower meaning of the ri %v that, whereas the other phrase never has the looser sense of the ri e'ori, so as to designate merely the matter of the thing or a mere property, or generic universal without the specific differences. The like relation exists
latter
monly happens
may be
between e?voi with the dative and the accusative rb elvcu with
:
XevK$ thai designates the idea of what is white rb \evicbv elvai, the Cf. property of being white. SCHWBGLER, loc. cit. p. 370 Phys.
:
iii. 5,
Aristotle
for-
mula
rb ri v elvai. Even if Stilpo really used it (see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 223, 3), he pro-
bably took it from Aristotle. Again, Antisthenes could hardly have used the mere ri %v to designate the concept at least, this does not follow from the references in Zell. ibid. p. 252, n. 1. The following writers treat at length of the r[ %v elvai and the allied phrases TRENDELENBURG (who was the first to examine this subject thoroughly), Bhein. Mus. v. Niebuhr und Brandis, ii. (1828), 457 sqq.; De Anima, 192 sqq., 471 sqq. Hist. Beitr. i. 34 sqq.; Schwegler, at supra, 369 sqq. (who cites other authors); Hertling, Mat. u. Form. b. Arist. 47 sq. Anal. Post. ii. 3, 90, b, 30, bpiay,bs fikv yhp rov ri 91, a, 1
:
Top. vii. 5,154,a, 31: \6yos b rb ri fy elvat Metwph. v. 8, 1017, b, arinaivuv. 21 rb ri fy elvai o5 b \6yos opurfibs, Kat rovro oi/ffla \4yerat eiedtrrov. So also vii. 4, 1030, a, 6, cf. a, 10, b, 4, and ch. 5, 1030, b, 26; also Part. An. i. 1, 642, a, 25. Hence Aristotle also designates the concept (in the subjective meaning) by the exS \6yos b bplfav pressions ovcrtav (Part. An. iv. 5, 678, a, 34), b \6yos b ri i<rri hsytov (Metaph. v. 13, 1020, a, 18) and similar phrases. (A6yos or \6yos rrjs ovfflas, in relation to the objective meaning of \6yos, stands for the form or the Being of things e. g. Gen. An. i. 1, 71 6, a, 5, 8 ; Be An. i. 1, 403, b, 2 ii. and cf preced2, 414, a, 9, &c. ing note.) By the nature of the case Spos is synonymous with bpurpbs, e.g. in Top. i. 5 init. iari 5* Spos fihv \6yos b rb ri ?jv eivai
94, a, 11.)
bpuTfios earl
: :
tV
ffTlfiaivav.
So ch.
;
4,
ch. 7,103, a, 25 Anal Post. i. 3, 72, b, 23 ii. 10, 97, b, 26 Metaph. vii. 5, 1031, a, 8 ch. 13, 1039, a, 19 viii. 3, 1043, b, 28 ch. 6, 1045,
: ; ; ;
26; Poet. ch.6,1449,b,23. But the same word, in a further sense, signifies either of the two terms of a proposition (subject and predicate), and is therefore the standing expression for the three terms of the syllogism ; Anal. ipov Se Ka\a Pri. i. 1, 24, b, 16
a,
:
tffri
KaX
oi/trias
fiev
oZv
dia\6ercu rj Trp6ratrts, etc., ch. 4, 25, b, 32, ch. 10, 30, b, 31, ch. 34, 48, a, 2 Anal Post. i. 10, 76,
els ov
;
6piff/j.bs
\6yos rov ri
4<rri.
220
ARISTOTLE
It
is
is
For although a definite relation of Form to Matter does belong to the peculiar Essence and therefore also to
between these two elements, bydesignating the genus as the matter and the specific difference and as the form of the concept by this he explains how in the concept the two are one. The genus is that, in other words,
;
odv (sc. ovariai) ouVw [in the sense of the avvo\ov~\ \4yovrai, toutcui/
[lev
eWi
(pOopa.
Kai
yap
yeveffts
effTiv ouVcos
Sore
(oi
oiiSe
yap
.
yeveffis elvai
oiiciq
.
a\\a to
which, in
twv
ovo'twv
ruv
alffQtjTuv
tuv
Ka0'
the substratum
specific
(viroxei-
eKaffra o&d' iptfffibs o1jt' airootL^is ~ 4ittiv, Srt %x ovo lv v\t\v $s t} (pliais
roia&rri &ffr
i
whose properties are the matter, and whose form is made up of the distinguishing marks. But the substratum never actually
without properties, nor the matter without form, and therefore neither does the genus exist outside the species, but only in them looked at in itself, it only contains the aniyersal presupposition, the possibility of that
exists
;
eVSe^effflai
Kai thai
Kafl'
Kai
fi-fj
'
Sib
<p8apra irdvra ra
el
o5y % t' a7rd'5ei|is rwv avayKaitav Kai 6 &pio~p.bs eina'TTjp.oviKbs, Kai ovk ev$ex* Tal > ficirep ou8' &triar4\p.i\v ore /xhv eViariip.7iv ore b" ayvoiav elvai, aAAa 8o'|a to toioutoV eariv (vid. supra
p. 163), OUTftJS ouS' airSSet^Ly ou8' dpifffibv, 8<J|a eVrl tow eVSe-
e/caora avr&v.
aWa
exists in reality in the lowest species ; Metaph. viii. 6, cf ch. 2, 1043, a, 19 : v. 6, 1016, a, 25 ch. 28, 1024, b, 3 vii. 12, 1038, a, 25 x. 8, 1058, a, 23 cf. ch. 3,
.
which
&\\as %X elv 87)\oi/ Sti ovk av eftj ahr&v ofrre cHro'5ei|ts. As soon as we perceive it no longer, we do not know whether it is now the same as we think it to be. (Cf Top. v. 3, 131, b, 21 Anal. PH.
Xofievov
>
1054, b, 27; Phys.ii.9fm.; Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, b, 6 (Part. An. i. 3, 643, a, 24, does not come inhere). 1 Cf. p. 217, n. 1. More fully treated in the account of Aristotle's Metaphysics, infra, ch. vii.
p. 219, n. 1, and Metaph. vii. 11, 1036, b, 28 to5 yap
2
ii.
And in ch. 10, 21, 67, a, 39.) 1035, b, 34 rov \6yov fiepri ra rov
:
See
p6vov cffrlv, 6 Be \6yos iarl tou koS6\ov to yap kvkXcji elvai Kai kuk\os Kai i//uxp *!"" ^al ^vxh ravTa tou Se <rvv6\ou tfSii, olov kvkKov touSI, tGiv KaBeKaard twos
eltiovs
' if)
a'urBrirov
jiieu
fy
j/oijtou (A.e'7<D
8e
j/ojj-
koB6\ov Kai rov eiSovs d dpifffiSs. So ch. 15 init. by Substance is meant sometimes the \6yos alone, sometimes the \6yos abv rfi S\ri trvveiXitlifihios (the aivo\ov). oVai p.iv
:
tovs
tous yuaflrj/xaTiKous, ataBtiTovs Se otov tovs x a ^- K vs Kai tovs |u\iVous but even the
oTov
it is
Saij
LOGIC
the Concept of any object, 1 yet
sense
itself,
it is
221
not
this object
of
but only
2
this determinate
'
mode of sensible
can be defined.
made
up
(T<c5
are
themselves
6piff/j.bs
general
voi\-
terms. 5
Bach
concept
ovk eoriv
ff
aWa
e/c
perk
alad-iivews
X^ias ou dTJhoi/ ir6rep6v iroTe elfflv ovk elo'lv, oU' del Kiyovrai Kal t) 8' i] yvaiptfavrat t$ Ka86\ov \6ytp %\-q &yviaaros Kaff avri\v. 1 As in the concept of the house {Metaph. vii. 16, see preceding note), the soul, the axe (Be An. i. 403, b, 2 ii. 1, 412, b, 11), of the tri/ibv (Metaph. vii. 5, &c), in fact in all concepts of material and natural things. Cf Phys. ii. 9 fin. : although the
' :
material causes are subservient to the ideal or final causes, still in explaining natural phenomena we must give both teas Be Kal eV rQ \6ya earl rb avaynatop [i.e. because the physical or material causes belong to the concepts of things]. SpitrafjL^vip yaprb epyoy tov
;
numberless things cannot be defined without giving their matter, this seems, at first sight, a contradiction. In the passage referred to (Metaph. vii. 10) Aristotle seeks to escape this contradiction by saying that in such cases, not this individual object, formed by the combination of a specific concept with this definite matter, is defined, but only its form it is not this circle, but the circle, or the k{ik\w elvai, not this soul, but the soul, the tyvxfi ehai. But the difficulty is, indeed, by no means removed in this way. If, for instance, the soul is the ' Entelechy of an organic body (Be An. ii. 1), the vl 9jv elvai tQ roupSe aipaTi (Metaph. ibid. 1035,
; '
b,
16),
then
matter consti-
irpUiv,
8'
'6ti
Siaipeots
roiaSi
a&TT}
ovk effTcu, et pvl) eei ob'dvTas TOiovaSi oZtoi 8' ot>, ei fify o~tb*7]pods, tan yap Kal eV rtfi \6yu IVia l+opia us ii\r] tov \6yov. Cf. Me'
taph.
vii. 10,
1035, a,
1, b,
14,
and
hand we deny that matter belongs to the concept of a thing, and on the other are obliged to admit that
5 Metaph. ibid. 1040, a, 8: not only are sensible things incapable of definition, but also ideas t&v yap jtafl' eKaffTov t\ i8e'a, ws 0cc(j), Kal xtu/wrtj. ava.yit.alov 8' e| oyofidrav elvai rby X6yov ovo/xa
:
S'
ov
iroffiffGi
: ;
222
ARISTOTLE
and even
we
are
still
only.
Within
Between
iraffiv.
Ta Se nd/ieva xotva avdyKT} apa inrt&pxew Kal a\\(p ravTa ' otnv e rts <re dpieirrcu.
ffatro,
$ov
ejoe?
\o~xvbv % Xeu/civ %
inrdp^ei.
Tep6f Tt S Kal
1
aWcp
:
but below this there only remain individuals which are no longer distinguished (see specifically Metaph. x. 9, 1058, a, 34 sqq. and supra, p. 216, n. 1), and are in a sense i/xoia {Anal. Post. ii. 13,
these, however, 97, a, 37, b, 7) continue to form a multiplicity, and, in fact, an indefinite multiplicity, and for this reason cannot be the object of science and of the concept Metaph. iii. 4, init. efrre yap tan ti irapa ra KaBe/caffTa, Ta Se KaflertaaTa a-Keipa, Ttav
;
roirtf
virapx*i-v
(which
is
really
the case in the determination of concepts, vid. supra, p. 216, n. 1), and he gives among other answers this (cf Bonitz, on this passage) at 1. 27 :" even though an object be the only one in its species, like the sun and the moon, still its concept could only contain such things '6(ja eir' aWov epSe'xeTa*,
.
^
;
5'
aireipwy
irws
cf.
ivBex^rai
ii.
\afie?v
oTov
eav
Srjkov
on
i.
\6yos,
Ccelo,
Zrepos yevr)TaL toiovtos, %\ios ecrroi Kotvbs apa o Similarly, in De ice' supposing 9, 278, a, 8
:
there were only one circle, oiidev rirrov &K\o ^txrai rb KincAqi elvai Kal T<55e rep Kt5/cA.i5, Kal rb /xej/ eitios, rb
8'
eldos
Ty
tUKti
:
Kal
tuv
Had'
eicaarov.
eivai
Ibid, b, 5
still
2 Metaph. vii. 10 (vid. supr. p. 220, n. 2) & \6yos Icrrl rov Ka66\ov. Anal Post. ii. 13, 97, b, 26 a! 8' iaT\ The van ipos KaS6\uv. determination of concepts may
:
994, b, 20 sqq.; Tap. ii. 2, 109, b, 14; Anal. Post. i. 24, 86, a, 3 sqq. and ibid. c. 19-21, the proof that argument cannot be continued to infinity either upwards or downwards. In this Aristotle exactly follows Plato see Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 524, 3, 587, 1. Aristotle designates singulars by the phrases to. xad' eKoiTTa (or k. eKou-rov), -rb apidw %v(Metaph. iii. 4,999,b, 34; Categ. c. 2, 1, b, 6, et supra see Waitz on this passage), to Tiva, 6 tIs avBpanros, &c. (Categ. ibid. Anal. Post. i. 24, 85, a, 1, 4, b
iTrurrfifiriv
2,
be
continued
till
all
specific
vii. 13, 1038, b, 33), (Categ. c. 5, 3, b, 10; Metaph. ix. 7, 1049, a, 27 et supra see Waitz on this passage of the Categories'), also to Sto/uo (e.g. Categ. c. 2, 1, b, 6, c. 5, 3, a, 35
;
34
Metaph.
ti
TcJSe
Metaph. iii.
1,
LOGIC
this accidental difference
223
specific differences lie
and the
mem-
But
name
is
also
and accidental qualities on the other. 2 What falls under one Concept must be,
3
so far as
fall
What
topical
(c. 1)
does not
under
that the lowest species, which do not divide into sub-species the atiidipopa, mi. supra, p. 216, are given the same name n. 1 but in that case, whenever this meaning does net appear from the context itself, he uses, not merely t& bWofia, but bWop.a etSrf and similar expressions (cf.
iii. 3, 999, a, 12, v. 10, 1018, b, 6, vii. 8 fin., x. 8, 9, 1058, a, 17, b, 10, xi. 1, 1059, b, 35) or to. taxura, because in descending from the most universal
Metaph.
5th book, which deals with the treatment of the tSm he distinguishes the IStov avTo from the IStov irpbs Kttff erepov, the ael tSiov from the irore IStov. He himself, however, remarks (129, a, 32) of the tSiov Trpbs h-epov, and it is true in any case of the irorh Xh'iov, that it belongs to the o vp.$e$riK6Ta. On the other hand, he gives as examples of the IS. ko.9' aino and del essential marks such as ($oy oS6.vo.tov,
,
they come last {Metaph. xi. 1, 1059, b, 26 MA. TV. vi.-12, 1143, Be An. iii. 10, 433, a, a, 29, 33
; ;
tpav Qviyrbv, to 4k ilivxws Kal a"t&/j.atos 0-vyicelp.evov (128, b, 19, 35, 129, a, 2). Cf. preceding note. 3 Aristotle does not say so in
16
Be Mem.
i
c. 2,
i.
In Top.
;
distinguishes
451,
(Ti//ij8eJ8ijK(!s and as soon as he has divided the itiiov again into '6pos and iSwv in the narrower sense, he defines the latter, c. 5, 102, a, 17: iSwv b" etrrlv b StjAoi p.iv ri tI %v ehat, fi6vcp 8' virdpxet Kal avriKaTTjyopeiTai rod
irp6.tiia.Tos
[is
related to it as
olov
an interchangeable concept],
SeKTticdv, &c.
these words, but it is shown by his discussions on the various meanings of tomtov. In Top. i. 7 (cf. viii. 1, 151, b, 29 152, b, 31) three of these are distinguished yhei TavTbv is what belongs to one genus, efSei Tavrbv what belongs to one species (of. Metaph. x. 8, 1058, a, 18), and apiBp.^ Tavrbv, S>v ovdfiaTa irXeito Tb 8e trpayfrn IV. This last kind of identity may be expressed in various ways Kvpiwrara fiev Kal irpdrtos flrav
;
6v6fiaTL
$i
'6ptp
Already (loo. eit.) he distinguishes the 7T0T6 % irp6s Tl ib~iov from the anXus IZlov, and in the
2
Kaddnep
orav
T(p
lp,aTLov
224
ARISTOTLE
is different.
1
one concept
which
there
is
no
difference
in the
highest
degree
Contrary
Opposition;
whereas simple
difference pro-
Contrary opposition, in
8'
rpirov
Hrav
airb
tov
cryjUjSejSsj/ccVos,
otov rb
KaBiifievov
^ rb
fiovtrixby 'ZcuKparei.
There
is
a somewhat different
Arifirst,
the toutci Kara trvfifeliriitbs and ravTa ttofl' aura; then the rairbv
10, 1018, a, 38 sqq. and ch. 28, 1024, b, 9. 2 See preceding note and p 222, n. 2. That the individual differences of things must be based on Matter will be further shown later on, in the second part of
.
both of which are affirmed partly of that which has a Matter, partly of that which has an Essence (fulleratx. 3,1054, a, 32 that is identical in number which both in Matter and in Form is one). As a general explanation he gives us a formula which is easily reducible to the one tj ravrSTTis &p6ttjs cited above rls iariv fj ir\ei6vu>v rod elvai ^ Srav xprJTtu &s irKeloinv (as in avrb avT$TavT6v). Since, however (according to ch. 10, 1018, a, 35), Unity and Being can be used in different senses, the meaning of the -rairbv, erepov, &c. must vary accordingly. 1 Metapli. v. 9, 1018, a, 9: T6/3o Sh \iyerai Ssv % ra efSij d \6yos rijs irAffej S\T) f/ ri
e?5ei
and
apt.Bi.u2,
Aristotle states this definition, Categ. c. 6, 6, a, 17; Eth.N. ii. 8, 1108, b, 33, as one already in use (6piovTui) ; but in Metapli. x. 4 init., he puts it forward in
his own name, and he there establishes the proposition that
opposites must belong to the same genus, by observing expressly: rb. fi.lv yap yevei b~ia(pipovra oiic ex el *W e '* KAAjjAa, aAA' a7re'x irhiov Kal a<ruyiij8A7jTa
(e.g. a sound and a colour are not opposed to one another, because they cannot at all be compared, they are ao-i/j.^Knira'). Vet, on the other hand, we read in Metaph. v. 10, 1018, a, 25 havria \4yerai rd re /*)) tivvara S/ja t avr Trapilvai rlav StatpepSvratv Kara,
:
if)
ydvos, Kal
oialas'
rav
arov
and
SeKriKcp
(that
LOGIC
nothing but specific difference made absolute.
tradictory opposition,
1
225
Con-
is
the relation
accidental to one and the same Sacrutov is confirmed by Metaph. x. 4, 1055, a, 29; De Somn. No. 1, 453, b, 27), Ka\ ra ir\eiaTov dia<pepovra twv into tV ai/r^v Hvvapw, Kal uv 7] Staipopa fieyi(TTTj 1j air\ws 7) Kara yivos kb.t zlSos. ret 5' ah\a ra [lev t$ tqi ivavTia. KeyzTat TOiauro 6X eiy Ta ^* T ScktikA tivai rav Towvriev, &c. (and the like in x. 4, 1055, a, 35), and Gateg. c.
7 ?}
to
11 fin. also has avnyin\ Se irdvra ivavrla r) iv T$ auTtp yevei thai [like black and white], j) iv rols ivavriots yiveo-iv [like just aii-a yivq etvai and unjust],
: if)
Schol.
vuv,
84,
a,
6;
Ar.
n.
Jb'r.
117)
4.
from the
treatise
avruteini-
about which
cf. p. 70,
other predicate does not necessabelong to the subject concerned, and in which there is a gradual transition from one to the
rily
sqq.) resolves the earlier statements by bringing them into line with the idea of the iva.v-r.ov as there defined. It is only in reference to that definition of the ivavriov that we can understand
Aristotle's important
other. {Metaph. x. 7; Categ. c. 10, 11, b, 38 sqq., 12, b, 25 sqq. cf. Simpl. Categ. ScliM.inAr.9ii, a, 15 sqq.,28sqq.) What Aristotle had in his mind in this doctrine of the ivavriov is the scale of changes in the natural sciences ; for every change is a transition from one condition to the opposite ; Phys.
axiom {Me;
iv. 2,
3,
1061,
;
226, b, 2, 6, l. 4, 187, a, 31, 188, a, 31 sqq. Gen. et Cvrr. i. 7, 323, b, 29.To the above definition of the eldei ivavriov corresponds that of the ivavriov Kara rdirov in Meteor, ii. 6, 363,
.-.
3,
c. 5,
18
An. PH.
iii. 3,
i.
36, 48, b, 5
a, 30,
De An.
t'uov fiia
427, b, 5, et alibi;
and Schweglee on
2, loo. cit.),
and Phys. v. 3, 226, b, 32. The correct way of formulating oppositions was dealt with in the
treatise n. avriKsifj.4vtov {vid. supra
p. 70, n. 4, and Simpl. loe. cit. 83, b, 39 sqq.; Ar. Pr. 116).
1
tuv ivavis the same science which deals with the same things: things which
ima-Tiijiii.
That
The
Siatpopa riKeios of
Me-
VOL.
I.
*Q
226
ARISTOTLE
Yes
and
between which, therefore, no third or middle term can 2 lie, and of which as applied to every given object one
or other must be true. 3
put
it
differently, arises
is
not
contained in
a certain concept
i.e.
negative expression, 4
possible determinations
is
with or difference from some Between contrary and contradictory opposition Aristotle places that of privation and possession, 5 though he is not able quite to establish the difference 6 between this and the other two kinds of
by the
test of identity
given determinant.
4, 1055, a, 10 sqq., 22 Since this opposition only occurs between abstract concepts and not between concrete things, the tract n. avTiKEi/ueVaji/ maintained that only the concepts
taph. x.
sqq.
see Categ. c. 10, 12, b, 10. Categ. u. 10, 11, b, 16 sqq., 13, a, 37 sqq. ; and Metajih. x. 1057, a, 33. 4 An 6vofia or pvf-ta aopiarov vid. infra, p. 232, n. 2.
:
here
3
(e.g. <j>p6v7iffis
and
atppoaivri)
were
ing
5
'
"E| and
orepjjiris, e.g.
'
seefol-
to be called air\as ivavria, not the beings to which these concepts apply (such as the <pp6vinos and the &(ppuv). Simpl. loc. cit. 83, b, 24 sqq., of. Plato, Phcedo, 103 B.
1
and
'
blind.'
For what
Aristotle's
'
standing formula
In a judgment opposition is called ayTi<j>atris (vid. n. 6, &c, infra) and in Phys. v. 3, 227, a, 8 and Metaph. iv. 7 init., v. 10 init., the opposition of concepts is included under the same word.
<pacris turiKEiffflai.'
lows, cf. Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 103 sqq. 6 In Metapli. v. 22 ("and, referring to this, x. 4, 1055, b, 3) Aristotle distinguishes three meanings of the or4pT\<ris : (1) ftj/jui) %xv ti twc netpuKiruv e^eo-flat, K^ v f*h aiirb 9jv iretyvicbs ^x elv > ov <pvrbv
the
like
6fipJ,TUv4(TTeprjiTSai\4yerai.
ire<pvicbs
Metaph.
Phys.
iv. 7, xi. 6,
1063, b,
cf.
Only in the meaning would privation be synonymous with 'negation (for blind = not-seeing ), and
nil
%xV-
first
'
'
'
'
'
19
loc. cit.,
and
what
we could
we
will be said presently about contradictory judgment. The kind of opposition is the same there as
Kal ejii/ that which are told by Categ. c. 10, 13, b, 20 sqq. (that is to say, by the
/caret arepiiffiv
'
LOGIC
opposition.
227
Notions
to the point ; and (2), on the other hand, there is much that is intermediate between ' possession and ' privation,' for there iv. 12, 1019, b, 3 sqq., expresses something positive, and is a kind are all the degrees of partial there are not only of 6u ; and thus, if we take possession ' privation in this sense, the ' seeing ' things and ' blind opposition of the eis comes things, but also things 'half under the definition of the ivav- blind.' A further distinction of tIov. The distinction of the two the havr'ia from the opposites in the Post-pnedieamenta ( Categ. Kara aripiiinv ko.1 'Qui is said to lie in the fact (Categ. c. 10, 13, a, c. 10, 12, b, 26 sqq.) is founded on the following argument of 18), that in the former the transthose ivavrla, which have no ition from one to the other is middle term between them (as mutual (white can become black ' straight and ' crooked '), one or and black white), but in the other must necessarily apply to latter only one-sided, from poseverything capable of the dis- session to privation, and not continction (e.g. ' every number must versely. But this is likewise inbe either odd or even ) when, correct: not only can things on the other hand, there is a which see become blind or the middle term between two ivwria, rich poor, but blind things may such a conclusion never follows become seeing and the poor rich (we cannot say, ' Everything and even if this is not possible which is capable of colour must in every actual case, the same is be either white or black ') ; but just as true of the ivavrla themin the case of orep?j<ns and e, selves ; neither can every sick neither one nor the other of these man get well, nor every black results will arise ; we cannot say thing become white. For the that ' to everything capable of the logical relation of concepts, such distinction one or other of such a distinction would in any case opposites must apply,' for there be of no importance. Lastly, in may be some time at which Metosph- x. i, 1055, b, 3, 7, 14, it neither of the two will apply to is said that the <rr4p7i<ris is a kind rb yap fi-fjira iretpvicbs tytv of avr'ifyaais, namely the avHipcuris it ^X etJ/ &Te rv<p\bv oihe otytv %x ov iv r 5e/cn/c, and the ivavTi6r7js Keyercu but neither can we a kind of aripi\ais (thus also in reckon this class of opposites xi. 6, 1063, b, 17); so that, with those between which there according to this, these three
'
author of the Post-pradietmenta) can not be affirmed of them, namely that everything is either one or the other (either ' seeing or * blind ') in such a case, therefore, the relation between ore'pTj(Tis and efis would be reduced to that of avritpcuris. In the other two senses of ffTeprjffis this is not the case, for in them the trTeprjo-is itself, as is admitted in Metaph.
' '
;
a middle term
jj
Brav yap
It is,
<J8jj
Tre(pvicbs
S\fiiv
t%ov p7i%trf.-M.
how-
be observed that (1) so long as the thing in question is not ire<pvKbs Sifw %X nv> i* ^ s n t
ever, to
SeicTiicbv Styeus either, and therefore the instance adduced is not
'
'
'
'
Q2
228
ARISTOTLE
Of
all
these
opposites
fall
concepts would form a kind of gradation from the higher to the But this also can only be lower. said when the concept of ariptitris as is not accurately determined soon as this is done, the relation
;
treated of
SlMPL. Sehol. Ar. 86, b, 41, 87, a, 2 ; Ar. Fr. 119. We shall have to discuss hereafter the metaphysical signi-
aripi\ais
and
e|ir
of ariprtais
.
and
e|is
falls either
under
ttjs.
avrltpatris
or under ivavri6-
To the
i.
Post.
4, 73, b,
yap rb ivavrlov
tpaais iv
r$
rb
/j.7)
irzpirrbv iv apLBfjiois
for, to
be an
ivavrlov,
the
arepritrts
must
express a positive concept, and this not merely indirectly, like the avricpcurts from which it is here distinguished. The same is true of passages like Metaph. vii. 7, 1033, a, 7 sqq., where the sick person who is elsewhere the ivavrlov of the healthy person is given as his aript\ais ; as /ih ibid. xii. 4, 1070, b, 11
fication of aripi\ais and its relation to the S\y. 1 Cat. u. 10, 11, b, 17, 24 sqq.; Top. ii. 2, 109, b, 17, c. 8, 113, b, 15, 114, a, 13, v. 6, 135, b, 17 Metaph. x. 4, 1055, a, 38, c. 3, 1054, a, 23. Instances of such relative concepts are (see Cat., he. eit-, and c. 7 ; Metaph. v. 15): double and half in fact, the manifold and its part, the {mtpexov and iwepfx^fif '">v the active and the passive ; the measurable and
elSos [alrla
knowledge. Though in Metaph. v. 10, two further forms of opposition are named, yet Bonitz, on this passage, and Waitz, Arut. Org. i. 308, have demonstrated that these latter come under the
four already given. Conversely, Phys. v. 3, 227, a, 7 only mentions
koI
ijo-is,
two
2
(avr'upcuns
cannot be merely a negation and hence, though it is given as a negation with other analogous concepts (e.g. Be Coolo,
an
it
See n. on p. 225, and as to the extension of the above principle to all avruceifieva,cf. Metaph.iv. 2,
1004,
ii.
286, a, 25), yet Aristotle himself in other passages admits that, in certain cases, it is a natural property, and not merely a defect (Part. An. ii. 2, 649, a, 18), and that it has the power of acting (Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 329, b, 24), which cannot possibly be true of a mere aripyais. Cf
ii.
3,
a, 9 Top. i. 14, 105, b, 33, 109, b, 17, viii. 1, 155, b, 30, c. 13, 163, a, 2. The foundation of this proposition lies mainly in the fact that, of opposites,
;
2,
eit.
107
Phil
27
sq.
one cannot be known without the other. This has different causes in different cases in contradictory opposition, it arises from the negative concept Non-A immediately presupposing and containing the positive one A; in correlative concepts it arises
:
Logic
229
so far,
Definite
expression, and
and falsehood
sition. 1
The coupling
of the
Noun
unit
if this
is
or
Name-word
of discourse (or
3
;
and
discourse takes
if
anything
affirmed or denied
we
get,
as
modes of or Judg-
ment ment
(aTTotftava-isf
for
which Aristotle
regards the
judgis
when
from their mutually presupposing one another; in contrary opposition, and in trrepijiris and e|is
(so far as that applies here) it arises because the knowledge of the opposed specific differences presupposes that of the common
352). Interrogation
under the concept of irpiraais, but it is distinguished as irp6Tairis SiaAe/cTi/cJ) from vp.
put
in that the latter is darepov popiov rrjs ai/ri<p&<reus, and the former, on the other hand, ipim\ais avTupaaews. Similar definitions of irpdroo-u will he found in De Interpr. ii. 20, b, 23, and Anal. Post. i. 2, 72, a, 8 ; cf. Soph. Ml. 6, 169, a,
cwroSeucrari),
\i)-fyis
genus.
Vid. supra, p. 202, &c. ; De c. 4, c. 5, 17, a, 17; Metaph. vi. 4 cf. Zellbb, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i p. 527, 5; p. 528, 1.
1
Interpr.
As to foo,im and p~r)iw. (the latter of which, however, includes both copula and predicate), see
8, 14.
5
Tlp6Ta<ns
on the expression
De
Interpr.
c.
1, 16, a,
;
13, c. 2,
c.
3, c.
10, 19, b, 11
;
Poet.
20,
Bhet. iii. 2, 1404, This is also Platonic see b, 26. Zbll. Ph. d. Gr. pt. 1, pp. 557,
1457, a, 10, 14
;
d. Arist. i. 128, Arist. Org. i. 368 Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 651, a, 33 sqq, De Interpr. c. 4, 17, a, 1 Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, a, 16.
cf.
Biesb, Phil.
2;
Waitz,
'
r) r)
De
Interpr.
4<rriv
c. 5,
17, a,
.
20
. .
n. 5, 532, n. 2.
fihv airAr)
tie
anrdtyavais
.
. .
De Interpr. c. 4 ; and Rhet., %t supra. 4 Such as wish, request, &c. In Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, a, 22 ; Top. i. 10, 104, a, 8 (cf. Waitz,
3
ik tovtuv
/iii>
trvyKei.ii.ivri
i<m
<puv)i
r)
8c
/ii)
ri
cm\rj
irepl
air6<pav<ris
<nj/iu'Turi)
tov iirdpxeiv rt
tnrdpx*"', &s
oi xjpfooi. Sijj/jtjktoi.
; :
230
signified
ARISTOTLE
1
by the spoken words, regards that as conjoined or divided which is so conjoined or divided in actuality 2 The most fundamental it is false in the opposite case. distinction between judgments is therefore that of Every affirmation stands affirmative and negative. 3 opposed to a negation which forms with it an exclusive
(contradictory)
opposition
(avTi<f>aa is),
in
such wise
third
is possible.
On
corresponding
rh
/^ev t!
fi6piov 5'
&.i/TL<piiffeii)S
Kara twos
2.
Cf. p. 226, n. 1
and
a,
3,
c.
init.
c.
4,
17,
a,
Soph. Ml. c. 1, 165, a, 6; Be Sensu, c. 1, 437, a, 14 ; Rhet. iii. The events in the 1, 1404, a, 20. soul which words express are, according to these passages, the same in all men their designation in speech, on the other hand, is (like written signs) a matter of convention, and thus differs in different persons.
;
2 3
Metaph.
e<rri Interpr. c. 6 init. 8e els irpwros \6yos airoipavTiKbs Kard(paais elra air6(pa.<ns oi 5' &\Koi irdvres <rvv$ecr(iiji ets. Further, Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, ibid. c. 5, 6 Anal. Post. i. 25, 86, b, 33. a, 16
' ; ;
Be
The
16
Anal. Post.
i.
2, 72,
aTv6<pav(Tis 8e hvTitp&oetes
a, 11 imorepQV-
ovv fi6piov. avrltpaffis 5e ayri8ta~is %gti fierat> Kafl' out^c lis ovk
found in such disjunctive propositions as refer to a future result which is contingent or depends on free will. As is here remarked, we can assert nothing at all about them beforehand, neither that they will happen, nor that they will not happen; of them {Gen. et Corr. ii. 11, 337, b, 3) only 8ti ;ue'A\<=i, but not 8ti <prai, is true for the latter excludes the possibility of the event being otherwise. Hence of them only the disjunctive proposition is true, that they will either happen or will not happen.' Of the two categorical propositions, ' they will happen and ' they will not happen,' neither is true of them. The latter assertion is remarkable, for we should rather say, that one of the two assertions is true, but we only find out
is
; ' '
'' :
LOGIC
universal negatives) in the
231
way
of contrary opposition,
1
which does not exclude a third possible case. But in truth we must not expect a perfectly clear exposition of these relations from Aristotle. As he
to distinguish the
Copula expressly
dis-
He
nowhere
it
which by the
stotle
result.
But Arias
'
true those assertions which assert actuality ; and since this, in the
only
regards
given case, is itself undetermined, no definite proposition can, with When truth, be then affirmed. it is equally possible that something will happen, and that it will not happen, the assertion
that it will happen is neither true nor false; it only tecimies one or other, according as a corresponding or a contradictory state of fact arises. Cf. Simpl. Catey. 103, Bas. : according to the teaching of the Peripatetic school only the disjunctive proposition is true, ' A will either but which part of be or not be this disjunction will be true, and
' ;
marks
'
(c. 15 in.it.) that this is only according to the words, not as to the thing itself.' 2 Vid. supr. p. 229, n. 2. In Be Interpr. c. 10, 19, b, 19, a case is certainly before his mind, faav
which
false,
&\t)Trrov
elvcu
tj?
Hence
ijSi)
all that
p.iv
class of assertions,
oix
8e
a\ij6rj
fi
QcvSt}
%ffrai
subject-matter of the ' Aporia which he discusses in the passage cf Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. cited
:
.
pt.
cf.
i.
1
p. 220, 1.
Be
Interpr.
c. 7,
17, b,
20
pp.
224-5, about the 4vavri6riis. The particular affirmative and particular negative propositions which,
to eiTTi rpirov 7rpacrKaTT}yop7Jrai as in the proposition eori Slisaios &v6pairos. This, however, does not relate to the separation of the copula from the predicate, but only to the fact that, in existential propositions tatai &v8pa)iros, ovk eartv &., &c, the subject can be expanded by means of an added adjective, which itself may be put either affirmatively (Si'/caios &.), or negatively (oil SiKaios .) iari Six. 5. means 'there is a just man,' which is different from &vdpaitos SIkmos iari, 'man is just.' Aristotle nowhere says that every proposition, or even that the existential proposition logically considered, consists of three parts and the treatise n. cpnyveias even shows a preference for selecting examples from those existential propositions which fall into two parts only.
J
: :
232
ARtSTOTLE
the predicate
to
in fact
no ground
of
doing
so.
Aristotle
proceeds
to
consider
the
Quantity
relate
many objects at once and those which relate to one, and then subdividing the former into universals and
particulars.
He
judgments universal,
1
and
individual. 4
But
In Anal. Pr. i. 46 init. o. 3, shows that there is between f/.ii elrai toSI
fnj
inasmuch as propositions of the last kind have the form of affirmative propositions ; but he does not detect the
pii \eviebv,
rovro,
piti
etvcu
KevKor
For that in which consists the form of the judgment the definite conjunction of the subject with the predicate remains the same, whether the subject and predicate be positive or nega-
tive
concepts.
And
Aristotle
i.
3,
real reason of this either here or in De Interpr. c. 12 (to which Beandis, p. 165, refers).
31), 4vS4-
De
and ovx-iryuxivei no but he wants to call the former ttvo/m a6piarov, and the
no
iivofta,
pri/ia;
Xeroi fj.T]Sevl virdpx eiv 'so'tlv ovk ayadbv, have a o~XTJpui KaratpaTiKov. 4 Still, this is only the case in De Interpr. c. 7. Universal judgments, which are also called
eirl
tSiv
KaQ6\ov
awotpaivoj/Tcu
and
in
c.
along with the propositions &v0pairos, ovk e. &., &c, he introduces also the corresponding ones made up of negative ia-riv ovK-&vBponros, concepts
tarw
(Anal. Pr.
25, a,
i,
i.
1,
24, a, 17,
c.
2,
10, 20,
fiey
&c), are
which
rS)V
KaQ6\ov
fi^j
koB6\ov Se
ir\ei6vuv
ovk
effTiv ovk-&.,
Kfrrui
ov-Siicaios
airocpali/oi/rat, i.e.
OVK tffTIV OU-SlK. OVKTheophrastus called &c. these propositions iic p.*TaBiotws (Ammon. De Interpr. 128, b, 129, a., and Philop. Sehol. in Ar. 121, a), or Kara. lierdSeo-tv (Alex.
OVK-&l/8p.,
ject is a kb.86Kov,
xe<pvKe KaTT]yop7o'6ai,
&vBp.,
Analyt. 134,
a.).
but in the one the predicate is affirmed of the subject in its whole extension, in the other not so. The Analytics, on the other hand, does not mention individual
LOGIC
he
adds what he
is
%
'indefinite
233
calls
the
judgments,'
and thus
here
as elsewhere,
distinction which really has nothing to do with the logical form of thought-connection at all, but solely
with the grammatical form of the expression. 1 Aristotle also devotes much attention to the Modality
of Judgments,
subject in
He
dis-
and
possibility,
is
now
in use
for
Apodeictic,
classification
and
Problematic
of Assertory,
in
his
Aristotle
degrees
of
certainty,
'
By
but
possible
'
may perha/ps
exist,
only what
therefore
may may
and
may
not
;
exist
indifferently. 3
The
judgments (see following note) and although it is true that they are without meaning for the
examples which are there given tw ivavriuv eivtu t^v avTT\i> iinatfarpi, t^v ydoviiv p)i ehai ayaB6v,
We may infer, if
the com-
dual judgments must have struck hiraafterhehaAvrnttenAnalytics. 1 In the Be Interpr. he adds nothing as to indefinite judgments. In Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, a, 16 (cf. c. 2, 25, a, 4, c. 4, 26, b, 3, etc.) he says irpiraois. % ko.B&\ov % iv pepei % aSiSpurros but the
:
belong, logically considered, to the class of universal propositions; others which might be adduced, such as iariv &vffpuiiros Sticaios, are particular. Aristotle himself makes no further use in the Analytics of the Trpordaeis aSiSpurrot. Theophrastus designated under this name the particular negative (Alex. Analyt. 21, b), or perhaps as Ammon. De Interpr. 73, a, states, particular propositions in
general.
z
irpSrao-ls
ej i.vi.jK.^s
3
aBat tm&px* lv
\4ya>
Anal. Pi:
i.
5' eVSe'xetrflai
234
corollaries
ARISTOTLE
which he deduced from
his definitions were by critics as old as Theophrastus and To what is called the Eelation of Judg'
partly confuted
Eudemus. 1
inrdpxeiv, ovSev
;
etrrai
bla tout*
irfiij
ativvarov
1.
28
iffrai
&pa rb
which may equally happen or not happen (Anal. Pr. i. 13, 32, Hence he maintains b, 4 sqq.).
in Anal. Pr.
i.
13, 32,
a,,
29
(cf.
Metaph. avayKaiov 4vSex6/isvov. itrri Se Swarbv ix. 3, 1047, a, 24 rovro, iav virdpl-ri 77 ivepyeia, ov bvvap.iv, oiidhv Keyerat ex elJ/ T carat aSivarov. Likewise c. 4, 1047, b, 9, C. 8, 1050, b, 8 ira<rct
:
12, 282, a, 4), that from the 4vS4x^o-8ai ^PX elv tne ivSixeirBai fi$i xmipx^-v also invari-
Be
Ccelo,
i.
avTupdurecbs 4criv
Kill EiVctl
ably follows, and from the iravrl 4v84x*<r8ai the 4v84xe<r8ai finSevl and pJi iravrl (i.e. the possibility in question of the predicate occurring to none, or not to all,
Swarbv
9 init. \4yerat, ravrdv iffrt Swarbv ravavrla: i.e. what can be healthy can also be ill, what can rest can also move, he who can build can also destroy. 1 a Aristotle says that in ' possibility,' the possibility of the contrary is also contained (see preceding note, and Be Interpr. Sokc7 5e rb avrb c. 12, 21, b, 12
:
Kal elvai Kal pAi elvai ; ix. '6ffa yap Kara rb dvvacrOai
Peantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 267, explains the words wrongly) for since the possible is nothing necessary, the contrary of all that is (merely) possible may
for
;
happen.
fi^]
elvai
fy
'
irav
yap rb Swarbv
Kal
[ify
r4fj.ve(r8ai
fify
fiaSlfciv
f$a8ietv Kal
r4uveo~9aL
Aristotle refuses (ibid. c. 17, 36, b, 35) to allow, in possible propositions, the simple conversion of the universal negative judgment. For, since the negative judgment, ' it is possible that no B is A,' according to him, includes the affirmative, ' it is possible that every B is A,' so the simple conversion of the former
Swariv, Sec), determining the concept by taking that meaning of Siva/us according to which it designates a power of doing or suffering (Metaph. ix. 1, 1046, a,
9
sqq.,
v.
would include the simple conversion of a universal affirmative judgment; and universal affirmative judgments cannot be converted simply. Theophrastus and Eudemus denied these assertions,
12
init.)
and
it
matters not that this possibility of the contrary is not always equally great, and that the 4v8e%6nevov or Swarbv (for these two expressions are really synonymous) at one time designates something which happens as a rule, though not without excepanother something tions, at
because
they understood by everything that can happen, and losthold of the statement that it must also at the same time be able not to happen and thus they included some things necessary in the possible (ALEX. Anal. Pr. 51, b, m, 64, b,
'possible,'
72,
a,
b,
m,
73,
a).
Aristotle
LOGIC
merits
'
235
Hypo-
thetical
Only in what he
himself admits {Anal. Pr. i. 3, 25, a, 37; De Interpr. c. 13, 22, b, 29 of. Metapli. ix. 2 init. c. 5, 1048, a, 4, c. 8, 1050, b, 30 sqq.) with regard to the forces of nature (Swi/jeis) which only act in one direction, that the necessary also may be called a possible (Swot!)!'), and that, allowing this, universal negative possible-propositions can be converted simply, and that we may conclude from necessity to possibility but he also adds that this is not true as to Ms own concept of the possible. Two further points of
;
there was a perfect possiblesyllogism (Alex. loo. cit. 56, b). Both sides are right, according to their concepts of the possible. If we understand by ' possible everything that can be, including also the necessary, the syllogisms are quite correct and simple ' Every B is A, every C can be B, therefore every G can be A'; ' No B is A, every C can be B, therefore it is possible that no C is A,' If, on the other hand, we take possible to mean only that of which the contrary is likewise
' ' '
possible,
Alexander wrote a work (Alex. Anal. 40, b, 83, a), arose between Aristotle and his pupils upon the question about the mood of conclusions in
dispute,
on
which
syllogisms, the premisses of which are in different moods. Aristotle says that where one premiss is a possible- and the other an actual-proposition, a perfect syllogism can only be had in the case where the major proposition is a possible-proposition
syllogisms, because in this supposition the minor, every C can be B,' includes the negative proposition, every C can be not-B.' And also, as Theophrastus and Budemns merely adhered to the principle that the modality of the conclusion is conformed to
'
the minor, we an imperfect syllogism, i.e. one in which the conclusion is only obtained by a deduetio ad aiswdum and not immediately from the given premisses, and secondly, in the case of a negative syllogism (more correctly in all cases), the possibility in the conclusion must be taken in the improper sense (i.e. not as confined to that which both can and cannot be) (Anal. Pr. i. 15). Theophrastus and Eudemus, on the contrary, were of opinion that even in this case
if,
however,
it is
the weaker premiss (Alex, i bid.'), they asserted, on the same principle, that when one premiss is assertorial and the other conclusion is apodeictic, \the 4ymliiilio (Alex. ibid. 40, a, 42,
b,
get, first
of
all,
Schol.
in Arist. 158, b, 18, 159, a, 6), whilst, according to Aristotle (Anal. Pr. i. 9 sqq.) it is apodeictic when the major is so. In this case also, according to the meaning which we attach to the
modality
of propositions, both assertions may be made. If the propositions 'B must be A,' ' B cannot be A,' are supposed to
express that between B and A there is (or is not) not a contingent, but a necessary connection, it follows that between every-
L>36
ARISTOTLE
'
On
the
other hand, he
3
is
but he treats
it solely
and
it
may
most
original discovery. 4
As he was the
first to
to introscientific
all
remark that
connections and
all
upon the
'
syllogistic
'
combination of judgments.
Syllogism
is
different
from them. 6
thing contained in B and A, by the same necessity, there is,, or is not, a connection (if all living beings, by reason of a necessity of nature, are mortal, the same is also true of every kind of living beings, e.g. of men), as Aristotle, loo. tit. 30, a, 21 sqq. shows quite clearly. If, on the other hand, these propositions
are meant to state that we are obliged to think A connected or not connected with B, the proposition, ' C must (or cannot) be A can only be deduced from the proposition ' B must (or cannot) be A,' when we are obliged to consider C implied in B. If, however, we only know as a fact (assertorially) that C is B, then we only know as a fact, likewise, that C is or is not that which we are obliged to
'
'
32,
i.
2, 3, cf. c. 13,
c.
17,
36,
b,
15
sqq.
3
53, a, 3 sqq.
Simple conversion of universal negative and particular affirmative judgments, particular conversion (later so-called conrersio per aecidens) of universal affirmative, and no conversion at all of particular negative judgments for the nonversio per oontrapontionem was not as yet known to him. 4 As he himself says, Soph. M. c. 34, 183, b, 34, 184, b, 1.
Cf.
i.
Pbantl,
Gescli.
d.
Log.
6
264.
Anal. Pr. i. 24. b, 18 o-vWoyi&fibs 8e eori \6yos iv Ts84vTQ)V TLVWV fETp6v Tl TUV KCl-
; :
LOGIC
The
237
more than two assumptions; or more accurately two judgments, from which a third is derived, and that therefore no syllogistic conclusion can have more than two premisses, is nowhere expressly proved by Aristotle
volves no
in the beginning of his treatise, though he refers to
later. 1
it
Now
judgments were
ble,
as yet unconnected. 2
impossi-_
them by
Every
no more and no less, 4 and of these the intermediate connected in the one premiss with the first and in
way
as to bring out
first
2
avdyfcrjs
trvfifiaivet
Tip
A principle
which
Aristotle
(Likewise Top. i. 1, 100, a, 25, cf. Soph. El. c. 1, 165, \eyco 8e T<p toGto eivai rb a, 1.) bta ravra avfi^aivetv. rb 5e ' Sia
tclvtcl eivtu.
l '
does not state in this form, but which follows immediately from
his definition of Judgment, if we apply it to the case before us. s Cf. Anal. Pr. i. 23, b, 30 sqq., but especially 41, a, 2.
TauTcc
rb [LTjSevbs ea>0ej/ crvfjifiaiveiv opov irpoffSely irpbs rb yev4(T0ai rb avayndiov. 1 Anal. Pr. i. 25, 42, a, 32. As regards terminology, the premisses are generally called irpoi-io-cu (Metaph. v. 2, 1013, b, 20
'
Anal. Pr. i. c.25,init. Ibid. 42, b, 1 sqq. on the number of concepts in whole series of syllogisms.
viroBeireis
tov
ffvfjLTrepda'fj.a.Tos')
the
minor proposition
in Eth.
]V. vi.
Of the three concepts of a syllogism (<fpo(, vid. supr. p. 219, n.l), that which occurs in both premisses is called fietros that which comprehends the latter is called
;
the conclusion invariably = m/j.In Anal. Pr. ii. 1, 53, Trepan-fia. (Tvimipaafia a, 17 sqq., however, stands for the subject of the conclusion.
the higher or greater (/ueifoi' or irputov &xpov') that which is comprehended by it, the lower or lesser (eKarrov Sxpov or iaxmov), Anal. Pr. i. 4,25,b, 35, 32, 26,a, 21,c. 38 init., and Anal. Pr. ii. 23, 68, b.
;
238
elusion.
all
ARISTOTLE
But this result may come in three ways. As judgments consist in the connecting of a subject with a predicate (for Aristotle leaves hypothetical and
disjunctive
premisses, rests
upon the
follows
mode
is
way
in
which the
there are
either
middle term
Now
may
it is
we need not
Uebeeweg's
sqq.
2
Anal. Pr. i. 23, 41, a, 13, at the end of the section on the
1
having treated of the necessity and significance of the Middle concept as a connecting-link between Major and Minor, continues
irpbs
:
el
olv avdyxri
Koivbv,
ph ri
8'
\afie7v
&/j,<poi
tovto
v84x*rai
The position of the propositions has, as we know, no influence on the form of the syllogism, The precedence of the major, customary since then, seemed more natural to Aristotle than to us. In laying down a syllogism, he begins not, as we are accustomed to do, with the subject, but with the predicate of the major A
:
ko.1
vTrdpxciiravTl
t$ B, B
iirdpx^i iravTl
<rx^/iTo, tpavepbv
Sii
fifcav.
so that, even in his form of expression, there is a constant descent from the greater to the middle concept, and from that to the lesser. Cf. UEBEEWE8, loc. tit. p. 276.
:
t# r
'
LOGIC
239
We
obtain,
then,
three
Figures
2
(0-%77/xaTa)
The
ignored, and
figures, it is to
coincide, for an unproved supposition may be expressed in a categorical proposition, and conversely a hypothetical proposition may be fully demonstrable.
i.
570
s
sq.
fact,
Whether
a failing
as Prantl (Geseh. d. Leg. i. 295) thinks, an advantage of Aristotelian logic, it is not necessary hereto inquire but when that learned writer, as well as Biese
or,
;
(Phil. d. Arist. i. 155), endeavours to find that Aristotelian account of hypothetical syllogisms, which others miss, in the remarks on supposition-syllogisms (avWoyttT/iol ej uiroOeVeow) at Anal. Pr. i. 23, 40, b, 25, 41, a, 21 sqq. c. 29, 45, b, 22, c. 44, he corjfounds two different things. Aristotle means by a ' hypothetical syllogism
eV
amvri
[sc.
ffv\Xoyitrfi.$~\
Bel
KaTTjyopiicSv rtva
twv
to Kaddhov virdpxeu/. The former is not further proved, as Aristotle supposes it to be clear from his preceding explanation of the
syllogistic
figures.
By way
of
that which begins with an unproved supposition (cf. Waitz, on Anal. 40, b, 25). We understand by it that of which the major is a hypothetical judgment. And the two classes do not by any means necessarily
proving the second, he proceeds &vev ykp rod ko.66\ov % ovk earrai
avWoy ic fibs, fj ov wpbs to Keifievov, % to it, hpxos aiT^ffeTai which will be explained in detail in what follows infra. 3 Loo. cit. 41. b, 23.
'
240
ARISTOTLE
its
quality
and
also as to its
syllogistic
They
He
is
well-known moods
but he also
must
syllogistic process. 3
first
He
figure alone as
Both the others yield imperfect and require to be completed through the first. Their demonstrative value rests upon and is proved by the fact that they can be reduced to the
syllogistic sequence.
'
syllogisms,
firsb figure,
These
employed in the
hypothetical
'
reductio
ad
impossibile, as well as
in
'
arguments
generally. 5
1
Loc.
cit.
1.
27.
7, 29, a,
30, b, 1 sqq.,
c.
23, cf. 0.
For the
first figure
(to use
1, 24, b,
22
(rvMoyuriibi/
irpo<r8e<fyiEcov
rbv
irapb.
firiSzvbs
Tct
&\\ov
Cclare/it,
Ferio {Anal. Pr. i. 4); for the second: Cesare, Oamestres, Fesfor the bino, Baroco (ibid. c. 5) third Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Fresison
; :
irpbs
5m
twv
inroKifi4voitt
8pav
pd)v
flAriTrrai
5m
irpoTd<reu>v.
It is not
(c. 6).
3
necessary here to
i.
defend Ari;
Anal. Pr.
c.
8-23
cf the
.
stotle's view.
cf.
discussion in n. 1 to p. 234, swpra. 4 See the sections cited, especiallyc. ifin.,o. 5fin.,c. 6Jin.,u.
LOGIC
241
With
use,
and the errors to be avoided. He shows in the first instance what kind of propositions are more difficult to prove but more easy to confute, and vice
versa. 1
Next he provides
fitting premisses,
method of
On
this
must be observed in
Furthermore he discusses
the syllogisms giving true
7
;
Ibid. Ibid.
o.
26.
o.
27-29,
here also
syllogisms.
3
To seek
to define concepts
by means of continuous divisions, he says (c. 31), is of no use we have then to suppose the chief point that is to be proved. When it is a question of the concept of man as a (tpov Bvnrbv, then, he says, from the proposi;
the Platonic method is blamed because (contrary to the rule given at p. 216, n. 1) it multiplies unnecessarily the intermediate divisions, introduces the same thing under different genera, gives negative qualities, divides from all kinds of opposite points
of view, &c. Cf. Mbyeb, Arist. Thierltunde, 71 sqq. * See Zell. Ph. d. Or. pt. i. 523 sqq. 5 Loc. cit. c. 32-46. 6 Anal. Pr. ii. 1. ' Ibid. t. 2 init. (cf. Top. viii. 11 sq., 162, a, 9, b, 13) e| aKyBiiv niv oiv ovk %gti tf^SSos crvWoyitraa0a.i, ex tyevti&v S' ianv aAyBes, irAV ov 5i6ti &W' '6ti tov ykp Sio'ti ovk etrrtv e/c tyevBav trvWoyMTfids (because false premisses give the
:
' All living beings tions are either mortal or immortal ; man is a living being,' it would only follow that man is either mortal or immortal: that he is a ij3oc Bvnrbv is a mere postulate. Hence Aristotle says of division, that aa6eir))s [not valid] it is oTov Similarly in Anal, <rvK\oyi<rii6s.
Post.ii.5. AlsoinPort.jl.i.2sq.,
VOL.
I.
; ;
242
ARISTOTLE
;
'
endo
the
'
conversion
3
;
'
of the syllogism
the Eeduotio
ad
absurdum
syllogisms
which
fallacies
result
from
the
meeting them. 5
method of arguat
c.
ment
peculiar to
is
each. 7
We
6
cannot
Induction,
(cf.
i.
this
23
;
point
1,
possible in the different figures, is discussed in c. 2-4. 1 KvK\a< Ka\ | ahXijKav Ti) SetKvvffSai. This consists in the conclusion of a syllogism (which, however, must of course be shown to be true from other sources)
conditions this
example,
71, a,
c.
24
;
Anal. Post.
2,
;
i.
1356, b, 2, 1357, b, airajay 1)) (reduction 25, ii. 20) of one problem to another more easy to solve), c. 25 ; objection
9
JfUiet.
(tvarairis), u.
26
the syllogism
being used in conjunction with the converse of one premiss to prove the other. For the cases where this is possible, see loc. cit. Against the vicious c. 5-7. circle in argument, see Anal.
'
'
from the probable (eucbs) or certain marks (oTj/iteTa), which AriEnthymeme,' stotle calls the c. 27. The most important of these is Induction,' which we
' '
Post.
2
i.
3, 72, b,
25.
proved by the minor and the conclusion. E.g., we may prove apodictically All animals which have little gall are long-lived man, the horse &c. have little gall, and are therefore long-lived but the inductive proof will go thus
'
'
Man, the horse &c.,- are longlived man &c. have little gall therefore animals which have
' ;
little gall
are long-lived.'
This,
dpXP
13 t6
;
Top.
viii.
the
[ify
tyevbos,
c.
17
the
TrpwTov
however, only applies when the minor concept (' animals which have little gall ') has an equal extension with the middle concept (' manic.'), and when the minor
gall')
(' man &c. have little can be simply transposed, so that in its place the animals which have little gall are man &c.' can be put (loc. cit. c. 23). ' See for a fuller discussion of these points, Peantl, p. 299-
iJzeOSoj,
18, cf.
rules
for
Top. disputation
;
viii.
10;
proposition
tion
;
from this, c. 19, sq. by too hasty suppositions, c. 21 on proving certain suppositions by the transposition of the
propositions in a syllogism,
c. 22.
deduced on decep-
'
LOGIC
follow
243
him into these researches, although we undoubtedly owe much to them in the application of the
syllogistic
the care
its
many-sided
The syllogistic system forms the foundation upon which Aristotle built the theory of Scientific Proof,
which he
set out in the
second Analytics.
All proof
It is
is syllogistic,
is proof.
phenomenon
is
it
of necessity
and apprehension by means of proof are only possible when something is explained from its original causes. 3 Nothing can be the subject
Proof, therefore, of proof except that which
is
necessary.
Proof
is
a
is
That which
aWta icrl, /tal p)i evSexeo-Bai tout' S\Xs exeiv. Further references in support of this, mipra,T>. 163, n. 3. 3 Ibid. 71, b, 19 el toIvw
:
ment, he adds
yap
5
<ttch Kal
brlaraaBai olov ede/iev, av&yici) Kal airoSeiKTM^v eViffT4ip.i\v QaKrtB&VT'etvaiKalTrptbTav Kal apeouv [about this below] Kal yvwplv.tiiTepwv Kal TtpoTepwv tov irvfj.-nepdffp.aTOS' ovtu yap taovrai al at apxal olxeuu tov SeMvv/j.ivov. Ibid, line 29 afrid re . . Set elvai
iffrl
rb
tV
ovk
2
ecToi
ov yap
c.
Trovi\aei
eitt-
ffTf]fJi7]V.
Loc.
tit.
2 init.
oltbfieOa
Mo-to.
.
aWiav
that from which a proof is tin t6t eiriffTafieda deduced] tiTav t!}V aWiav eiSufiey. * Ibid. 8' c. 4 vn.it. e ire! j aSivarov &\\ids ex e v ol iarlv e^io-TTJfiTj air\&s. avayKaiov av etri
[sc.
.
.
'
'
244
ARISTOTLE
1
On
cannot even be
sary truth
is
known scientifically. 2
And
since neces-
may be
and
is
and that the concept of each thing and goal. 3 The purer and the information, therefore, which any more perfect form of Proof secures to us concerning the conceptual nature and the causes of an object, the higher is the kind of knowledge which it warrants and so, other
istics
is at
once
starting-point
know
the
4
fact.
'in
a7ro8eiKTiK5)
5'
wpdy/iao'tv
cpavephv
ejf-ij
e'/c
ex eIX/ curibei^w
roiovrtov rwtov av
6 airoSeiKTiicbs
Of. note 3 infra. 1 Metaph. xi. 8, 1065, a, 4: toD ccel erio-Wj/iij flip yhp itaaa Svros i) a>s eirl rb iro\b, rb Se
T)
airav yap % ojiras imdpx^t % Kara <rv/ifSefii]icbs, ra 5e <m/Kj3e/37)KoVa ovk kvayKaia. Ibid. at the end eVel 8' av&yicris vir&px*i irepl eKaarov yivos Sera Ka9'
frvWoyifffids
'
roirav iariv. Anal. Post. i. 30 ttSs yap trvWoyur/ibs t) St' avayxalvv % Bia ruv &>s eiri rb iroKb irpordffewv
cri/^/3i-/37)it!)y
iv
ovSereptp
aira virdpxei Kal p tKairrov, (pavepbv tin ireol rav Kad' auTck inrapx^yrav ai hnari]novma\ airo5e|eiy al eVc ratv roiovrwv sltrlv. ra fikv yap
o-i//t/3e/97)KoVa
Kal
ei /uey
at irpordaeis
avayKalai,
ei S'
ovk
ovb"
ai/ay/caia,
SoV
p})
ovk hvdyKi) rb
810V1
o-ipirepacriUL
ei
eiiivai
efrf,
us
iirl
rb
TTo\i),
ko! to irviimipaaiia
inrdpxe',
ael
ftia
/cafl'
rotovrov.
2
Cf.
p 168,
i.
n. 1/
ol
a"t]fielcov
Altai. Post.
;
6,
75, a, 18,
30 of. c. 8, c. 33, &c. ; via", tupra, p. 164, n. 2. 3 Ibid. c. 6 init. : ei olv larlv aToSeiKrw)) emor^u?) e^ hiayi)
c.
airb ob mff airb eVio-T^<reTai, oiiSe Sufn. rb Be 810V1 ivio-raadai eori to Sio rov alriov iiriarao-Bai. Si' avrb Upa Sei Kal rb /neffov r$ rpirm ko! rb
irpurop
l
rb yap
Kaiiay
apx&v
(o
y&p
eirio'rarai
ov
r$
fifffcp
virdpyeiv.
Cf.
p. 213, u. 6 supra.
Anal. Post.
i.
14, c. 24-27.
LOGIC
If
246
we take demonstration
as a whole,
it
is
The same
considerations lead
up from
is deeply-
and that
it is
from without.
question,
the
object
in
to another
seeing that
concept. 2
All demonstration,
Its
problem consists in determining, not only the properties which attach to any object by virtue of the conception
of
it.
it,
Its function is to
universal,
phenomena from
'
Is this process of
mediation
unending, or has
it
a necessary limit
1,
200,
b,
24
vo'Tepa yap
ttjs trepl
2
ri
irep\
tuv
itilcitv
Qeapia
ehai
api8^.t]r
tuv koivwv iariv. ovk Anal. Post. i. 7 init. apa iffrtv e &\\ov yevovs fierd^avra
:
ovk
etrri tt\v
to rots fieyeBecn
&ffr'
t)
iru/A#6j3ijK<$Ta
rb yewp,erpiKbv apidfiTjrpia ydp iffrt ra ev reus airoTLK7J. Se/|e(rw, %v fiey rb airoSetKvifjLepoy rb ffvfiirepafffia ' tovto 5' io-rl rb imdpxov yevei rivl ko0* ain6. ev Se
8e7ai, o'foy
ret
yevos
8t}\ov
7T7/,
el
fieWei
8'
f)
air65etis
fieraflatveip.
'
&Wats
8tl aUvvarov,
aj-ubpara' aicfytaTa
S' effrlv 4\
&v
rplrov rb yevos rb inroKelfievov, ov to irddr} ical -ret Kaff avrb o'vp^e^rjKdra Stj\o7 t) e wv p.ev oZv tj a7r<Jc\-7r65eiis.
4k yap rov avrov yevovs avdyKTj ra a/cpa koX to fieo'a elvai. el yap fi)j Kaff avra, ffvfi^e^t\K6ra $ia tovto effrai. ovk effTi
. . .
5e?|ai
&\\rj
aA\' $flV
r)
Sera
e1vg,i
o&tws *x et
"npbs
L'4.6
ARISTOTLE
from the particular to the general from the subject, beyond which there is nothing of which it can be predicated to continually higher predirise
We
may
and we may, on the other hand, descend from the most universal point from that predicate which is the subject of no other predicate down to the particular. But in any case we must arrive eventually at a point where this progression ceases, otherwise we could never reach an effectual demonstration or definition. The argument excludes also the third hypothesis,
cates
:
that there
may
exist an infinite
number
is
of intermediate
If the
list
of middle terms
not
infinite, it
middle terms cease, immediate knowledge must necessarily take the place of demonstration.
To demonstrate
it
everything
either
is
not possible.
If
we attempt
we
are
brought round
infinitum
bility of
knowledge and Proof, or else to arguing in a circle,' which is equally incapable of producing a solid demonstration. 4 There remains, therefore, but one
:
9 init.
5e?|ai
<j>avepfo>
oIk tffTiv U' 3) ix t&v eKaarov apx&v, &c. return to this later on. 1 For he says at 83, b, 6,84, a, 3 ret &TTipa ovk %<sti 5iee^8eic voovvra. Cf note 4 vnfra. 2 Ibid. ch. 19-22. The details of this treatment, in parts not very clear, cannot well be repeated here. have already seen at p. 222, n, 2, that Aristotle
We
supposes a limit to the number of concepts above as well as below. 3 Ch. 22, 84, a, 30; andsoJ/etapli.
iii.
2,
997, a, 7
irepl
Trdvrav
We
yap aSivarov ht6Sei^o' ehai- ai/dyicri yap %k tiviov elvtu leal irepi ti Ktti -rwav tV air<JSet{w. 4 After Aristotle {Anal. Post. i. 2) has shown that the proof -power of syllogisms is conditional on the scientific knowledge of the premisses, he continues, in ch. 3
:
LOGIC
conclusion, that iu the last resort demonstration
start
247
must
their
by
reason
of
These
'
principles
this,
'
of
all
Many
conclude from
that
refute
of
'
no knowledge at
all is possible
earlier exposition
others, that everything can be proved.' But he confutes both assertions. Of the former he
reasoning in a circle
swpra, p. 242, n.
c.
(de
quo
1
v.
1).
Anal. Post.
e
2, 71, b,
20
eiri-
says
elvat
ol
fiev
yap
inroQefievoi
fii]
avdyKTj
(TT'fifji.Tiv
S\ws
eiricTaffBai,
ovrol
Slo.
eis
ovic
elvai
Kal
fciretpov
a^iovffiy
avdyeadat us
effri irp&ra,
av eirurra/xevovs rh vffrepa
irp6repa,
3>v
fffi
ret
airlcov
rod
b'
opOws
e/c
Trpdrav
\4yovres, oZvvarov yap ra aireipa SieAdeiv. eX Te Xaravrai Kal eifflv apxal, ravras ayv&orovs elvai cwrofieli-eu's
otherwise
SetKroi
avair6-
ye
fit]
otfaTjs
avrccv,
'direp
rb eiriaraaQai \l6vov ei eari ret irpSna eiSevai, oiibe ra k rovrccv elvai eTr'iGraaQai cmKws ouSe KvpUos, aA.\' e inroOtceus, ei eKelva ionv. He admits that
ipatrlv elvai
Se
/J.}}
av
airdBeigis
etrri
^tj
Kara
Se
a-VfJL/SeBTJKOS,
rb
exeiv
air6-
Seitfv eariv.
(pafiev
c. 3, 72, b,
18
fouls
otire
iraffav
eiriffrf]fit]v
what is deduced would not be lmown if the principles (a/>xl) are not known, and that if mediate knowledge, by way of proof,
the only knowledge, then there can be no knowledge of apxal. Yet he himself in the same treatise denies this very thing at p.
is
airoSeiKriK^jV
elvai,
a\\a
. .
rf\v
.
rwv
apeaiav avair68eiKrov.
Il6vov
etTLO'r'fiflTjv
e'TTLtrr-fi/J.Tls
aWa
ov Kal apjtfiv
Kal
elvai rivd
<j>afj.ev,
$ robs
cf. MetapJi. iv. 4, 1006, ; effri yap cnraiSevo-ia rb /x^ 6 yiyv&GKeiv, rivuv Be? rjre?v atr6Sei^iv Kal rivwv ov Se?" SXtcs fiev yap avavrtov ab'o'varov air68eitv eis aveipov yap av /SotSffoi, elvai
72, b, 18
:
a,
On the other hand, the circumstance that a thing is always so is no reason for rejecting proof by causes, for even the eternal may have its causes on which it is conditional see Gen. An. ii. 6, 742, b, 17 sqq.
210, n.2fin.
;
ware
[17]$'
ffvKKoyiffriKal, a.
a/ieaoi,
c.
irporaffeis
to the second of the above propositions, Aristotle states it at p. 72, b, 16, in other words w&vrw elvai a7ro5atf ovBev KwAveiv ej/8ex_e<r6at yap kvkXoi
'
yevet raiiras, as 6rt effrt /.lt] evSeX erai Se7ai) ii. 19, 99, b, 21, cf. p. 197, n. i ; Gen. An. ii. 6, 742,
b,
a,
yiveffBat
and then at
r^jv
air68ei^iv
Kal
1-
29 sqq.; Metaph.
v.
1,
1013,
14, Hi. 1, 2, 995, b, 28, 996, b, 27, iv. 3, and also cf. Ind,
248
ARISTOTLE
them. 1
any mediate cognition. And, in fact, Aristotle finds in the Nous the pure reason just such a faculty; and
he maintains that
case
it
it
never deceives
itself,
that in every
it
Yet
ledge.
it
must be admitted that he has neither proved knowThis immediate certainty, he says, is of two
There are three elements in every process of
:
kinds.
demonstration
that which
is
from which
proved.
it is
The
first
it
knowledge,
that the
for
of
also used in a wider sense, see Anal. Post. i. 7, 75, a, 41, c. 10,
76, b, 14, and Metaph. iii. 2, 997, a, 5, 12. Airy/ia. is distinguished
from
'
Air69e<ns
in Anal. Post.
i.
i.
10, 76, b,
2,
72, a, 25
dsais
sqq.
2
247, n.
1.
Vide
supra,
p.
197
sqq.,
7 (as cited supra, p.245,n.3),andiZ><2. ch.10, 76, b, 10: iriwa yhp a7roSeiKTiK^ iwi"rtj|inj irepl rpta iarlv, 8<ra re eTxai tWetoi (toutc! S' ^<tti t\i yevos ov twj/ koS? avra vadriniTuv 4<rrl fletoi.
Anal. Post.
p?jTi/ri|),
*al
t&
Aey6/ieya
koiv&
LOGIC
matter are peculiar to the particular science. 1
It
249
is
be founded. 2
a higher law. 3
just as
little
They must be supplied to us by our knowledge of that particular object to which they
relate. 4
They are
of
experience. 5
How
.
. .
a^twfiara e uv irpurcav airoSeiKvvo'i, real rpirov ra irddt] rpla ravrd eo'rt, irepl S re Selitvvo'i real a SelKvvfft
av. Metaph. iii. 2, 997, a, avajKi] jap ere rtvav eXvat teal 8 wept tl real rtvav rijv dir6Set%tv. In
real e'|
:
ch. 6
iraflij,
1
he gives yevos
inroKe('fkevov 3
rovro, tpavepbv real fin ovk %ari rds eKdffrov iSias apxas a7ro8e7ar eaovrai yap [for there would be] ereeiVai dirdvrav dpxal real e iri(rrT)iL7i r) eKeivav Kvpla irdvrav. Gf. ch. 10,
>
a^Liijxara in another order. Anal. Post. i. 7, Bit. sv/pr. p. 245, n. 3, and Hid. c. 10, 76, a, 37
:
Anal. Pr.
Se Kaff
Sib
i.
30, 46, a, 17
,
iStat
ecrt 8' S)v xpavrai ev rats airoSetKTiKais eirtffrijfiais to fiev IfSia eKdffrrjS iirttrrij/xiis to Se KOtvd iSta fiev olov ypapfifyv elvat rotavSl real rb evdb, notvd Se otov rb Xcra
.
.
at
ir\ettrrat
[dpxal
rets
rav
yttTfiuv].
irepl
fiev
trvWoapxas rds
ytK7}V
ytlcijs
ep/ireiplav
rr)s ao'TpoAo-
airb Iffav
c.
av
atpeKrt tin
:
32
init.
rds
8'
eirtffTr)firis.
KycpdivTav
yap
dirdvrav elvat rav ffvWoytfffiav dS6yaToi/, and after this has been proved at length he says at the end at yap ap%al Strral, e| av Te at fjtev oZv e av Koival, real irepl 8 at Se irepl & XStat, olov api8p.bs, peyeBos. More about the diroSemrutal opxol or the reoiva! 8<j{ai i diravres SeiKviovtrtv will be found av in the passages citedatp. 247, n. 2. 2 Vid. supr. p. 245, n. 3 Gen. An.ii. 8, 748, a, 7 oBtos /Jtev oiv 6 \6yos Ka06\av \iav real nevis. ol
: " ; :
atrTpoAo7treal a-jroSei^ets.
i.
So in Hist. An.
first
7 init.
we have
to describe, the peculiar properties of animals, and then to discuss their causes oSrw yap
:
koto
olSov,
irepl
earl irot^trBat ttiv fi48iirapxov'o'ris tt)s Itnoplas ttjs ereaiTToy irepl Srv re yap real
tpvtrtv
yap
fi.)]
ere
ruv
otKeiav
apxav \6yot
icevol,
pdrav ovk
supra.
3
Cf. p. 174, n. 2,
i.
e| &v elvat Set ri\v air6Setl-iv, in rovrav ylverat (pavepdv. 5 Cf preceding note, and the remark in Mil. vi. 9, 1142, a, 11 that young people can make sqq., advances in the knowledge of Mathematics, but not in Natural History or the wisdom of life, '6rt rd jiev [Mathematics] 8' cupai.
Anal, Post.
9,
76, a, 16
pecreds
eertv
[is
an
abstract
250
pass,
ARISTOTLE
he does not further inquire.
Sense-perception he
treats as a simple
try to analyse.
He
us merely judgments
upon given
certainties. 1
materials,
among what
im-
he
calls
immediate
It is therefore
and
sufficient
account of the
are indebted
him,
2
we
To enumerate the
various sciences
Even a
not to be found
b" at
opx a '
^1
^ur-
b,
(/SouAeuffir) is
concerned with ra
oXov ei
5>s
&pros tovto aitr^cews jkp ravra. Ibid. vi. 9, 1142, a, 23 sqq., Aristotle explains that, in contradiction to hrurHuai, <pp6vr]iTts is, like vovs, an immediate knowledge; but whilst
Ka6' eKotTTa,
7re7re7prai
/)
ferred to an olo-flrjo-is in like manner. (See also the discussion of So in <pp6vi)tris in ch. xii. m/ra.) Eth. iii. 12, 1143, b, 5, referring to the same class of propositions roirav oiv ex c "' '*' he says
:
Set
a1a@7i<nv, avrt)
8' icrrl
vovs.
Now,
indicated in c. 9 fin.) ato-Britrts is here to be taken as in Polit. i. 2, 1253, a, 17, in the wider signification of conis
'
although (as
means
the latter is concerned with the '6poi, &v ovk 6o"Ti h6yos (the highest principles,' which in this case are practical principles), <pp6vr]tiis is a knowledge roS iffxdrov, ov ouic %gtiv ima'T^py ta' alffBriais, ovx h t&v iilav [the sensible properties of things]
'
an
immediate knowledge,' as distinguished from an &ri<r-r4/MIKampe (Erhenntninl. d. Ar. 220 sq.) finds in the above passages, a proof that Book VI. of the Nieoinaehean Ethics originally belonged to the Eudemian but
' ;
Polit.
is it
i.
2,
ah\'
o'ia cu<rOcu/6[ie0a,
on
to ev rots
Htrxmov rpiyuvov (i.e. the last thing obtained in analysing a figure is a triangle). Here, therefore, the judgment This is is explained as a a triangle matter of ala-Byo-is (and so also in Anal. Post. i. 1, 71, a, 20) and the minor premisses of practical syllogisms, such as 'This deed is just,' 'This is useful,' Sec, are re[j.a&T)iAaTiKO?s
'
'
As little does follow from Eth. vi. 3, 1139, b, 33 where the el iiiv ydp iras mo-revr), &c, does not mean 'we
this conclusion.
have knowledge when we have any conviction,' but knowledge consists in a definite Itind of conviction based on known prin'
ciples.'
2
For proof of
this,
see ch.
xii,
infra.
LOGIC
in Aristotle.
all
251
He
principles is the
unconditional, 1 so that
Law
of Contradiction.
No
one
many may
the highest
of
all,
it
admits of
cannot, that
It
is
is
to say,
against objections of
ing
1
it.
He has, however,
iv.
any
Metaph.
3,
1005, b,
'
fStjiaioT&TT} 5'
apxh
netful/ vepl
%v
irpordo-ei
4<tt\
Ta
iltaQora),
t\
SimpevffdTJvai atibvarov
tt)V
yvwpifiwrdelvai
t)]v
B6l-a
B<f|?)
ttjs
avri$do ea>s,
,
tc
yap
ct.va.yKa.iOV
fiij
(pavepbv
'6ti
otivvo/rov
o.jj.0.
imoKo.iJ.fid-
yvapi^ovatv
avrd
Ibid.
djxa
ap.a
yhp av %x 0L
^vavTias
to'utov.
%v yap avayKatov %x eLV rov Atiovv 1-wUvTa TOiV &VTWV, TOVTO Ol%
uirdOeffts.
2
86%as 6
u.
8t6i|/!/(r/ieyos
irepl
6,
1011, b, 15:
&rel S'
Line 19
alia,
to yap
inrdpxetv re Kal n^l inrdpX^tv aSuvarov t< auT$ Kal Kara to , ai)T6 Kal #<ra aAAa 7^poo'Stopiff a^e0 av, iaTta wpoo'diaipio'fj.eva irpbs \oyiaiirb
,
line
5rt
Kas 5vu~xep*ias. atfnj Si] iraffav 4ffTi ^efiatoTdrt] tuv apx&v. The axiom that opposites cannot belong to the same thing in the same respect, is only a form of this. And the further principle that no one can really ascribe such opposites at once to anything is so closely
' ' '
airo<pdvai dXijdus], (pavepbv ovSe Tai/a"ra ap.a virdpx*w ivSe^eTat t$ auTtp . d\\* $ iri] aft<t>w, % daTepov [lev irrj Bdrepov Se
vai Kal
aTr\5)S.
3 In this sense Aristotle in Metaph. iv. i sq. confutes the statement (which, however, he only ascribes to certain of the older schools as being in his view
'
connected that sometimes the latter is proved from the former, at other times the former from the latter; of. Anal. Post., ut Sh /a)i ivSex^Tai supra, line 26
:
an inference from their tenets Zei/leb, Ph. d. Gr. part i. 600 sq., 910, 4), that an object can both be and not be the same thing at the same time,' by
;
cf.
'
afia
inrd^x tv
T$
avT'3 Tavavria
252
ARISTOTLE
it
to
of
becoming and of change, by that detailed exposition of it in which he shows that it is not absolutely impossible that contradictions should be predicated of the same
subject,
By
the
blished the
Law
of Contradiction, he lays
z
down
that of
.
an incontestable Axiom 3 But he does not expressly deduce the one from the
Excluded Middle
as
other.
Though
from repre-
The
incapable of being deduced from any other principle as from its cause. Yet it can be shown from the given facts to be the condition which underlies them, and which their existence presup-
undemonsfrable
it is
tion
In c. 5 1007, b, 22, xi. 6 init.'), he reduces to the same principle the dictum (de quo v. ZELLEB, PA. d. Or. part i. 982, 1, 988, 2) that ' that is true for each one which appears so to him and to this, amongst other
is
presupposed.
c.
<j>aiv6iisvov,
init., c.
6 (cf.
4,
make
'
'
tiv\
the dictum would everything a vp6s ti, See preceding note, 2 OuSe /teralii avriQAveas cvSex eTC" e^"" oS' cf p. 230, supra. 3 Metaph. iv. 7 in applying his argument, Aristotle has adopted here those reasons which are borrowed from the consideration of Change in Nature, evidently wishing to prove his theory not only as a logical, but also as a metaphysical principle.
; . ;
LOGIC
poses.
253
Induction. 1
So in the place of Demonstration, comes in There are thus two lines of scientific
:
the one
which leads up to
principles,
2
down from
principles
the
versal to the particular, from that which is in itself the more certain to that which is so for us and the reverse movement from the individual, as that which is best
known
which
is
in its
own
and
scientific
in the latter
goes induction. 3
all
And by
be.
knowledge comes to
1 Of. with what follows the references on p. 242, n. 6 supra. The name ' inayaiyh refers either to the adducing of particular instances, from which a universal proposition or concept is abstracted (Tkbndelbnbueg,^otj. Log. Arist. 84 Hbydee, Vergl.
'
:
d.
p.
arist.
und
hegel.
Dialelctilt,
Mth. N. i. 2, 1095, a, 30; Zellbe, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 491, 2 and see p. 205, u. 2 supra. 3 Besides Induction, Hey/der
cf.
;
212 sq.), or to the introduction to these instances of the person to be instructed (Waitz, Arist. Org. ii. 300). In favour of the latter explanation there are cer' tain passages, in which ' iirdyeiv has as its object the person knowing as Top. viii. 1, 156,
;
( Vergl. d. arist.
und
hegel. Dial.
232
i.
(Phys.
4 entbyovTa fiky curb rStv Kadixaarov eV! to ko.06\ov, but especially Anal. Post. i. 1, 71, , 19 Sti fiev y&p irav Tpiywvoy %%ei Svtrlv
a,
: :
opdats
rpiyavdv
eyvcbpLirev
co'tip,
. . .
oifia
ivayofievos
should proceed from the universal of sensible perception to the concept, as the more particular and definite just as in induction we go from the particular in perception to the universal of the conBut he himself rightly cept. observes that this is only an induction reversed (though this case is not usually made very
irpiv 8'
Vax^Tjvai ^
18, 81, b, 5
<Vax"')" 8*
prominent by Aristotle). When a universal is brought out as that which is common to many individual cases, it is thereby
254
ARISTOTLE
by induction.
sarily
We
But
as
he
that this
activity
of reason
is
only gradually
means of
by a comprehensive induction. 3 Many difficulties are involved in this. For inductive reasoning is founded,
separated from the complex in which it presents itself to perception and this is all that Aristotle has in his mind in the passage cited; cf. p.205sq. supra. 1 Anal. Pri. ii. 23, 68, b, 13 atravra yap mffreiofiev ^ Sici; trvWo; :
tion of the whole will be gathered from what is said in the text.) Similarly Anal. Post. i. 1 init. Anal. Post. i. 18: /navBdvofi.ev ?) iirayaiyfj % airo8e/ei. eirri 8' r/ lih cWSeiJir 4k tuv Ka86\ov, ^ 8'
iTrayuyi] 4k
tirayayrjs.
7w /caret fxspos
Hid.
Sri
ii.
'
&8tWfi^j
ytcrfiov
;
4irayay! ris. Ibid, at line 35 vid. supr. p. 206, n. 1 Eth. i. twv apx&v 8' at fiev 7, 1098, b, 3
%
Si'
;
:
rov 8e ra KaOoAou
8t}\ov
Si]
Bettiprjffai
Si'
:
19, 100, b, 3
yfuv
ra
irpSna
eirayayrj deaipovi/rcu, at
8' cu(T0^crei,
:
&c.
.
vi".
3,
1139, b, 26
4k irpo-
Sm\KTiKwy] ^07107^), rb Se
.
eruA-
7}
fieu
yap
t)
8t*
ffv\\oyi(rjx$.
/j.kv
irayay7Js t 7t 8e 8^ iirayuy)]
tlfflv
frpXy
4tm
iral
tov KaBSKov, d 8e
igri
ko!
8'
ri
fiey ewayaiyii
trvK\oyurfj.bs 4k
tuv Ka96\ou.
'
iriBavdmpop
aatyimepov
Ka\
&pa apxal 4 %>v 6 ffv\Aoyiff/j.bs, &v ovk zffri (fv\\oyifffi6s eiraywyij &pa. (Tbendelbnbueg, Hist.
Beitr. ii. 366 sq., and Beandis, ii. b, 2, 1443, would like to cut out the last two words, on the ground
Kara
tV
at<rBi\(nv
yvmpifubTepov
8e <rv\-
\0yur11bs
Toils
Hid.
a,
35
2
PiaiTTiK&Tipov Kal irpbs avri\oyiKobs tvapyitrrtpov. c. 8 init. ; Rliet. i. 2, 1366, and cf supra, p. 205 sq.
.
that all unproved knowledge does not rest on induction; but the
See
p.
supra.
3 See also the citation infra (in note 1 on p. 256) from Top.
i.
form of statement
is
not more
universal than in the other parts of this passage, and the explana-
2.
LOGIC
as
255
minor premiss.
It
and the middle of the syllogism have the same extenIn other words, no cogent induction is possible, unless a predicate can be shown to be common to all the
sion.
it is
to be predicated. 2
*j~
case
Such an exhaustive acquaintance with every individual 3 It would seem, therefore, that is impossible.
every induction
is
upon induction must remain unthis difficulty, it was requisite to introduce an abbreviation of the inductive method, and to find something which would make up for the imwhich bases
certain.
itself
To meet
instance.
down
in
The value of
dialectic consists,
he says,
discipline,
:
it is
an intellectual
it is
inasmuch
as
1
it
knew
ii.
24
fin.
[t!> TrapdSeiy/xa]
Siaipepei ttjs
era-
. ,
rb
tik
ova i
c.
cnrdprav
68, b,
ieitcvuffiv.
:
Ibid.
23,
-rb
<?
airavrav
rS>v
ffvyicelfievov
yap
Even
if
we supposed we
256
ARISTOTLE
It
ciples
for as these
probability. 1
them from the side of Such an attempt must start from the
us but to get at
What
all
the world, or
it,
believes, is
it
carries with it a
presumption that
it
rests
upon a
real
experience/
1
Top.
i.
'H
(lev
irp60e<ns
evpelv,
tt)s
irpayn-areias,
fiedoSov
6$bv 6X6i. Aristotle {Top. viii. 11, 162, a, 15) calls the dialectical
a$'
^s
Svyijo'dpeda.
(Tv\Aoyle<r8ai
irpo-
Kepi iravrbs
{iK-flfiaTOS
tov irpoTedevTOs
ei/S6ui/,
teal
avTol
5e
\6yov
vvexoVTes
.
. .
filldev
epovfiey
incei/avrlov.
5ia\eKTLicbs
syllogism 4irixelpr))x.a. Thtjbot, Etudes sur Arist. 201 sqq., compares the different statements of Aristotle on the office and use of Dialectics but he has laid rather
;
eVSofa Se tu Sokovvto.
iraaiv
fj
i) rots ffotpois, tois irKelffTois
iraatv
t)
tois irheifTTois
i)
Kai Toirots
tois
juc\rra
i.
yi/aiplfiots
:
evS6^ois. Ibid.
IVti
Si) irpbs
Kal Tpla
irpbs
stress upon the partial inaccuracy of Aristotle's language. Cf. on the Topics also p. 68, n. 1, supra. 2 Divin. in S. c. 1 init. irepl
too
much
[xpiio-ipos
tcls
.
Tf
irpayfxaTela\
o&re
KaTa(ppovrjo~ai
kutcl
irpbs
(pihoffotptav
en-icTT^uas
Se
tc\s
'6ti
kcltcX
tpLXoffOLpiav
Tri(rTJ}[ias,
Swdfievoi
irpbs
afiLpdTepaSiairopTjffaLpcJov ey eKcicrTOLs
KaToipd/ieBa. t&A.tj0s
rcal
rb tyevSos.
ct i Se irpbs tcl irpuTa tuv irepl ixdo-Tiiv eiri<rTi)p.Tiv apx&v. eK p.ev yap tuv otKeiuy tup KaTa T'hv irpoTedeto'ai/ ewLo'T'fifj.iiv apx&v
aSivarov
eliretv ti irepl ai/Tav, ineiSi]
rb /J.iv yhp iroWobs inroXapfidveLv Ta eviirvia irap*X exerai iricrTiv us e e/xireipias \ey6/j.evov, Sec. Eth. i. 8 init. vi. 12, 1143, b, 11; Rhet. i. 1, 1355, a, 15 (cf. the beginning of ch.xiv. infra). For the same reason, Eth. vii. 14, 1153, b, 27 appeals to Hesiod ("E. k. j,(i. 763) ^>V) 8' o t( ye
ireirrBrjvai.
aire
t)
irdvTas
ei "
T1 o"r)fi-eiuSes
irdp.irav
air6\\vrai,
. . .
H\v
two.
Aool
irpwTal at apxal airdvTUV tuv irepl eKa<rTa ivS6(,uv avdyicr) irepl avruv SieKBelv. tovto 5' ISlov
eial, Sla.
Se
toWo!
c.
Aristotelian
ira\aias
elo-i
oVi [sc. al
irapoi/ilai.']
^ iUa\io*Ta
OLKetov. Trjs
SiaheKTiicris
<pi\offotpias
iv
Tats
emiv
tcls
e'eTa<rTiKr)
yap
o5<ra
irpbs
hirarruv
tuv
fj.ed6Suv
apx&s
LOGIC
257
and the
by combining the
different points
of
other.
From
this
he
with 'AnropLai
which the subject may be touched of testing conclusions, by mutual comparison and by established standards;
and,
finally,
of
raising
difficulties
by
this
testing
process and obtaining a ground for a scientific exposition from their solution. 1
tions prepare the
These
dialectical
elucida-
way
by clearing up the questions which are in issue, by grouping the inductive results under a certain number of general aspects, and by making them explain
each
other and so
Kal Be^iSrijTa.
;
5, 1264, a, 1
Eth. End.
i.6imi.,and,as to the belief in the ai8)ip,De Cwlo,270,b, 19, Metaph. xii. 8,and.M<seo?\339,b,27. With this is connected Aristotle's preference for proverbial sayings and
'
n. 1 (on
1
cf. p.
104,
Se
Metaph.
eiiropTJ(rai
iii.
1 init.
eon
p&Kurra iiiv irdvTa ret ey5o{a ravra t& vd6i), ei 5e /lb, rk ir\e<<rra KaX Kvpu&Taraear y&p Kinrai re t& Sva-x^pv al KaraKeiwnrai r& hSo^a, deStiypevov %v &i\ tnai>as, Cf. De Ccelo, i. 10 into. Anal. Post. ii. 3 init., and Waitz on this passage also Phys. iv. 10 init.,Meteorol. i. 13 init., DeAn.i.
vvvcu
irepl
;
rots
f}ovKop.4yots irpoSp-
70U rb
Sia-Kopfitrat
Ka\ws' % yhp
iffrepov eliiropla \iats riiv irpfaipov airopovfieiftav 4trr\, \{ieiv 8"' ouk %otiv
ayvoovvras rbv
:
Sen-fidv,
&c.
Eth.
N. vii. 1 fin. Scl 8', &mep iirl tuv &h\uv, TiBevTas Tek tpaivofiefa
2 init., Longit. Vit. c. 1, 464, b, 21, &c. InTop. viii. 11, 162, a, 17, the anip^fia is denned as <rv\Aoyi<r/ibs StaXeKTiKos hvrKpdtreais. These Aristotelian ' Apories ' served the Scholastics as a model for their disputatio pro et contra.
VOL.
I.
258
ARISTOTLE
which brings us
to philosophic knowledge.
ments
working
mena
themselves,
consists in
the
of a given
class,
which
In truth, Induction consists in inferring such a proposition from all the cases known to us ; and in considering the principle on which the inductive method rests, the main point is to inquire how we are justified in concluding from all the cases known
to us,
a law for
blamed
none
until
Stuart Mill wrote his Logic ; and even he could find no answer but an inadequate and self-contradictory theory. But it was an inevitable result of Aristotle's position
that his theory of Induction does not help us over the
real difficulty,
which
is
to ascertain
how
the correctness
of an inductive proof can be assumed in spite of the fact that the range of experiences on which it rests is
not complete.
.
The
2,
we have
and
'
Metaph.
Be
71
fffTi
p. 255.
Sv r)
<pi\o<rof(a yviaiTTMi).
LOGIC
already indicated, has tried to
fill
259
invention of the
'
throughout.
But it cannot make up for a satisfactory and methodical comparison of observed facts, if only for
on which guesses, inferences and fancies may have, become mixed up with
is,
in
have, or at least
actual experience.
Even where
falls,
Aristotle
is
dealing
in
many
respects, far
own
observations
or
by
others,
we have
is
As he
tive
too
little
perception, 1
so
it
It
is
is, on this side of it, much to true that he has brought together,
an extraordinary volume of statements of fact, the overwhelming majority of which (so far as they can now be verified 2) have been
Cf p. 210 and infra, ch. x. For this is not always possible, partly because it is often uncertain which animal is meant
1
.
by
this or that name, partly because not all the animals mentioned by Aristotle are sufficiently
known
to us.
s
260
ARISTOTLE
Most of
;
found to be correct.
cases
these,
of course, are
many among them where careful investigation would be required. The methods of experiment he did not
patent enough to any observer
altogether neglect. 2
*
His
33 sqq. (of. Lewes, Arist. 394), that he had made experiments on the development of the embryo in the egg, since he there remarks that we often find in eggs, even on the third day, the heart and the So in liver as isolated points. Gen. An. ii. 6, he makes remarks on the order of appearance of the different parts of the body from which, as even Lewes ( 475) admits, we see that Aristotle studied
4, 665, a,
;
An.
more odd is it that Lewes should complain of Aristotle's failure to mention the freshness of the sea breeze, the play of the waves, &c. This is to blame Aristotle for not having the bad taste to drop from the realism of a zoological description into the style of a feuilleton, or the impertinence to explain to people who had the sea daily before their eyes the things they had
All the
d.
AHst.
embryonic development. A statement, long considered fabulous, about the appearance of a placenta in a kind of shark (H. An. vi. 10, 565, b, 1) has been confirmed (by Joh. Muller, Abh. d. Berl. Ah.
Phys. math. XI. 187, cf. Lewes, he. eit. 205) the same.is the case (cf. Lewes, 206-208) with Aristotle's statements about the embryo of the ink-fish (Gen. An. iii. 8, 758, a, 21) about fishes which build a nest (H. An. viii. 30, 607, b, 19) about the eyes of the mole (Be An. iii. 1, 425, a, 10, H. An. i. 9, 491, b, 28 sqq.), and about a gland which a certain kind of stag has under the tail
1840,
; j
;
163 sqq., gives instances from Meteor, ii. 3, 359, a, 12, 358, b, 34 (77. An. viii. 2, 590, a, 22) H. An. vi. 2, 560, a, 30 (Gen. An. iii. 1, 752, a, 4) Be An. ii. 2, 413, b, 16; Be Bespir. iii. 471, a, 31 H. An.
; ;
vi.
was
in-
An.
later
iv.
1,
765, a,
Gen. 21 (which is
ii. 15, 506, a, 23, cf. W. in Mutter's Arehw. f. Anat. 1839, 363 sq.). With regard to his description of the cephalopods, Lewes remarks ( 340 sq.) that it could only spring from a great familiarity with their forms, and we see in it the unmistakeable traces of personal knowledge.
(77.
An.
Bapp
on disputed by himself), and Hist. An. ii. 17, 508, b, 4 (though in Gen. An. iv. 6, 774, b, 31 the same is stated in his own name). Some of these experiments are of such a questionable kind, that we may well doubt whether Aristotle himself conducted them and, on the whole, he appeals to experiments so seldom that we cannot avoid seeing how little he, or Greek
;
science
in
general,
recognised
their value.
; ; ;
LOGIC
261
1 high admiration by their extent and their accuracy. To received accounts he so far takes a critical attitude
that he
is careful
to correct
many
attention to the
authorities, 3
uhtrustworthiness of
some of
his
and to attack even universally accepted myths. 4 Where he lacks adequate means of observa5 where there tion, he is willing to reserve his judgment
might be a tendency to close an inquiry too precipitately, he gives us warning that we should first weigh all the objections suggested by the matter in hand before we decide. 6 In a word, he shows himself not only an untiring inquirer whose thirst 7 for the knowledge of
all
1 Besides the numberless items of information from the History of the Greek States, of Philosophy, of Poetry, and of Rhetoric, which the extant works contain, we may refer here to what is quoted to us from the Politics and other
ivrerv'x'fiKafiey.
lost n. 1
;
62, n. 5
p. 101, 58, n. 1
37, 618, a, 18, 620, b, 23, he appeals to eyewitness. 4 As in doubting the genuineness of the poems of Orpheus, and the existence of their supposed author; as to which see
c.
hand, in
29,
and 104, n. 1. 2 Thus in the cases named by Eccken (loc. cit. 124), Gen. An.
103, n. 755, b, 7 sqq., 756, a, 2 ch. 6,756, b, 13 sqq., 757, a, 2 sqq. iv. 1, 765, a, 16 sqq., 21 sqq. H. An. viii. 24, 605, a, 2 sq. 3 As in Hist. An. viii. 28, 606, a, 8, ii. 1. 501, a, 25, where certain statements of Ctesias are called in question as untrustworthy ; in Gen. An. iii. 5, 756,
iii. 5,
.
d. Gr. vol. i. 50. Cf. svpra, p. 169, n. 1, " Tie Ccelo, i. 13, 294, b, 6: a\?C iolicaffi fiexP 1 r ivbs C7^ T ' ,/ i aAA' oil fi^xpt 7rep ov Svvarbv rrjs iratrt yap rj/xTy tovto avva-jroptas
5
'
Zblleb, Ph.
t}jv tfynjoiv
to irpayfia iroieioBal rbv T&vavrla \eyovra Ka\ yap avrbs iv avry foret fi*XP l 7reP ^ v ^ /wjkcti %XV avTiKeyeur aprbs ainQ bib Set rbv
T]6es,
fify
trpbs
ctAAefc trpbi
'
where he says that fisherfrequently overlook the occurrence in question: ouflels yap avT&v ovdkv Ttjpei toiovtov tov yvuvai x^P lv So in Hist. An. ix. 41, 628, b, 8 : avrtmrn 5' otfirai
a, 33,
t$
yevet, tovto 5*
men
tov trdoas
(popds.
7
Tb
tptKoffotpias
vide
supra, p. 169, n. 3.
262
ARISTOTLE
common
sense.
Never-
we
more commonly do we find that he draws from insufficient and incomplete data conclusions much too rash and sweeping, or that he forces his facts to conform to some general theory which
easy enough. 1
And
still
has
itself
no adequate
is
experiential
inductions he
on various popular assumptions he leaves them without any sure foundation. He shows himself but little
1
Cf.
Bucken,
Iqb.
:
cit.
155
Such cases are that Aristotle gives the male sex more teeth than the female (Hist. An. ii. 3, 501, b, 19; on the consqq.
jectured cause of this error see Lewes, Arist. 332, A. 19); that the human male has three sutures in the skull, and the
491, b, 2)
that
man
149 sqq., 154 sqq., 315, 332, 347, 350, 352, 386 sq., 398, 400, When, however, it is 411, 486. said that Aristotle in the Part. An. iii. 6, 669, a, 19, asserted that only man has a pulsation of the heart (so Lewes, 399, c, where he adds 'According to this passage one might think that Aristotle never held a bird in his hand ; ' and Eucken, 155, 2), this is an inaccurate accusation. Aristotle distinguishes, in De Retpir. 20, 479, b, 17, the ffQvypibs or heart-beat always going on,
:
from the
TrTiBrjffts ttjs
Kap8las=the
the skull is empty (H~. Am. i. 8, 491, a, 34 Part. An. ii. 10, 656, b, 12 Gen. An. v. 4, 784, b, 35). Further examples in Lewes,
; ;
strong throb of the heart in passion. And even the latter he does not confine to men, for he says in the tract referred to that it sometimes becomes so strong that animals die of it. All that is said in the passage cited is iv avBpdirif re ykp av/ifialvet ix6vov &s elvefv i.e. the passion-throb occurs almost exclusively in
:
Man.
LOGIC
skilled in the art of analysing the
263
to its causes
its action,
He
has not
mastered
even
was possible to him the best methods of establishing and analysing facts, of checktechnical skill of Greece
ing observations and theories, or of applying experiment to science. He does not, in a word, come up to
the standard to which in our day a student of nature
is
expected to attain.
There
is
nothing strange in
it
this';
were otherwise.
we
note in his
advance of his
in fact he was
he would
of
much
later period
human thought.
titude, correlation
we
was necessary in
all
ranges of
scientific
manner of experiments made, that the laws of particular classes of phenomena should be
collected
all
and and
be
and these again continually checked and by the facts themselves. To this end no general disquisitions on methodology, but only scientific work
could
assist.
itself
either
the
264
ARISTOTLE
them.
In the then
state
of
science it
was
It
care.
was not
latter critically
Many
we
find
When
we
are surprised
often built
falsity is
by the rashness with which the Greeks hypotheses or theories upon facts whose
first sight,
obvious to us at
we do not
stop to
think
how
how
must have hindered every sort of helpful experiment. To fix time without a watch, to compare degrees
of heat without a thermometer, to observe the heavens
meter
these
there
and the
is
like
Where
no
difficulties that
cannot wonder
if scientific
The
for the
world in
LOGIC
265
appreciated
we
To
examine his refutation of the Sophistic fallacies, are No wider view of equally beyond our present scope. got from them, but only his scientific principles is to be
an application of them to a
Science properly so called.
1
field
beyond the
limits of
But
Definition,
which we find partly in the second Analytics, partly in the Topics? As the Concept forms the starting
point of
all
scientific
research,
so
cept
which
is
Definition
is
is
strives.
Knowledge
up.
summed
The what
'
'
is
'
why.'
We
apprehend
what
it is.
entirely coincide.
1
In the
first
place,
it
is
clear that
Hbydbb,
Dialeldih,
a sketch of both.
Besides the general works on Aristotelian Logic, see Kuhn,
2
Kampb,
195 sqq.
3
De
and
p. 173, n. 2.
4
Hone
(cf.
supra; p. 212, n. 2)
266
ARISTOTLE
r
c
a:
always universal
and
is
The convei
can be defin
seen at
on
frc
no
less true
admits
of demonstration,
may be
Indeed,
it
seems to
i
undemonstrable by syllogisms
this is precisely
for
demonstration
wh
poii
what
definition seeks.
The one
certs
The
'
what 4 a in order to specify what anything is, we must first kn that it is. 5 Here, however, we must draw a distinctii The fact is that a definition cannot be derived throug
inquires for a
'
that,'
single syllogism.
is
assen
as the predic
be defined
for
if,
in such a process,
we
are deali
1
it
Anal. Post.
ii. 3.
8ti
t)
oiiK
imiv.
*
Anal. Post.
;
kindred reason
also.
is
there
given
sqq.
5
Ibid.
o. 7,
92, b, 4.
LOGIC
follow that both major and minor premisses
alike definitions
267
would be
the
definition,
real definition,
method of arriving at the idea by means of for the division presupposes the division is no better concept. 4 The same objection also applies to the method 5 of assuming a definition and proving its validity a posteriori by reference to individuals for how can we feel certain that the hypothesis which we assumed, does really express the idea of the object, and not merely a number of particular marks ? 6 If, lastly,
; ;
we endeavoured
1
Vid. svmra, p. 216 sqq. Anal. Post. ii. 4. As an he uses the definition soul as a self-moving of the number.' If we wished to estab2
illustration
'
lish this
by means
of the syllog-
itself
the cause of
;
life,'
&c.
ism
' everything that is itself : the cause of life is a self-moving number; the soul is itself the cause of life, &c,' this would be insufficient, for in this way we could only -prove that the soul is a self-moving number, and not that its whole essence, its concept, is contained in this definition. In order to show this, we should
3 Anal. Post. ii. c. 7, 92, b, 5, 26 sqq. cf. c. 10 writ. i. 1, 71, a, 11; Top.i. 5 wit.; Metaph. vii.
1030, a, 14. * Vid. supra, p. 241, n. 3. 5 Which one of the philosophers of that time (we know not who) had likewise made, " Anal. Post. ii. c. 6, and also
4,
Waitz.
268
ARISTOTLE
we
should be met with the
*
never brings us to a
what,'
but always to a
'
that.'
neither be obtained
possible to reach
it
When
and we
experience in the
first
taught us that
conception
begin to search
which links them to their subject, we are so establishing by demonstration the essence of the thing 2 and
if
we
is
defined
it.
in
we
Although
us to find
to
8
may be
be said
and
may
essence.
Loc. cit.
c. 7,
92, a, 37
Indue-
by proving that it is
\oyur/M>v nal Si' Smotieii-eais Siar' &vev airotiei^eas e<n-i yvavat rh rl itxriv oZ 4(ttiv alriov &\\o, oirr' e eviv &ir<iBei{ir avrov.
Ibid.
c.
ttrrtv
&pa
/ibs
dpifffibs
els
\6yos rod rt
<rv\\oyt<r-
tov rl ioTi,
irr6<rei
tie
rrjs
Suupepwv tov t(
:
Anal, Post.
ii.
8 fin.
<rv\-
the explanation of which is given above. That definitions of the latter kind do not suffice, Aristotle tells us in Be An. ii. 2 viol, supra, p. 173, n. 2.
itrriv airotiei^eus o-ujuirepaoyta
fuller
LOGIC
269
Prom
to the
tions of Definition
we
method by which
is
arrived
at.
can only be
by the indication of its causes, Defimust embrace those distinctive characteristics by -which the object is actually made to be what it is. It must, by Aristotle's rule, be got at by means of that nor must these which is prior and more known
;
known
in themselves.
It
scholars
who
differences
8e
8'
for the
genus
is
Anal. Post.
fiev
ii.
c.
%(Ttl
fiivov rb ti
etvat
irpbs
ccttl
ruv
t[
erepSv
ret
fjiev
n
teal
yvatvcu xpijfftfwv
oXriov,
tSjv
ovk %artv.
icrri
eitrif,
Stffre dri\oy
Sri koI
ruv
afiecra
koI
c.pj(a.l
a Kai
elvai
ri 4crriv into-
6e<r6at 5eT
iroifjffai.
Anal. Post.
aiiecrwv dpifffibs
icrrtv avcar6Seucros..
Metaph.
ix.
1048, a. 35 : S^Aox 8' rl ruv KaBeieacrra ry iimyuyjj t ^ov\o/j.e8a Aeyeiv, teal ov Set vavrbs '6pov &M<i leal rb 0W1A070C (jrirtlv, To avvopiyv; and above, p. 253. Induction also belongs the process which is described in De An. i. 1, 402,' b, 16: tome S' ov
6,
rb decapTJtrai ras alrias ruv avfi^e^t\K6ruv ra?9 ovffiais . hWa koX avdiraXiv ra crv^e$7]ic6ra cruufidAAtrat peya fitpos irphs rb eiSevcu rb ri ecrriv for a definition is only correct when it explains all the ffvfi$e$nK6ra (i.e. the Ka8' aiirb crvfifleflriKcWa, the essential properties vid. p. 214, n. 3 supra) of an object. On immediate knowledge, cf. p. 246 sqq., 197 sqq.
. . : ;
2 Of course with the exception of the- &/ietra just mentioned, i.e. that which is con : ditional on no principle other
than
3
itself.
Tflp.vi.4;cf.p.20S,n.2jrapra.
270
prior
ARISTOTLE
and more certain tban
Inversely
its
contents,
and the
mark
for
if
we
obtain the
same
result:
mining
in
characteristics
its essential
by which the object is conditioned nature, it must include the genus and
for
the differentiae,
these
are
simply the
scientific
But
these,
and
is
inferiority.
The genus
;
is
narrowed by the
so on.
produced
It is not, Jbherefore,
definition,
in
fact,
implies
not
mere
the
enumeration
completeness
5
of
and
sequence of
them. 6
will
cf.
p. 217 sqq., Anal. Post. ii. 13, 96, b, 1 sqq., i. 23, 84, a, 13., Top. vi.
sages cited supra, p. 173, n. 2, compared with pp. 215, n. 1,244, n. 3. By reason of this cor.nection Topics vi. 5 sq., immediately after the remarks on the
irpfatpa
Kid
Waitz on
yvupin&rtpa,
gives
has been already remarked on p. 246; that the number of intermediate grades must be a limited one. Cf also Anal. Post.
'
It
ii.
Anal. Post.
ii.
13, 97, a, 23
and
'
Statpopai.
ii.
cf.
rod Aa/3eu>
rt
ra KariiyopoAueira
Ka\
cv
ri
Ti
if
r$
Karriyop-
r$
rl
iari,
radra
Tcijot
vp&rov ^
Trdvra.
Stiirepov,
koI St*
Taura
LOGIC
progressive division
is
271
proper to the upward process towards the universal. And thus Plato's method, though Aristotle could not
accept
it
was yet recognised and further worked out by him as a means to their discovery. 2 Supposing, then, that we have defined and surveyed the whole field of the knowledge of concepts on this
method, we shall obtain a system of ideas such as Plato looked for, 3 carrying us in an unbroken line from the
Summa
down
Genera through
the lowest
all
the intermediate
members
scientific
to
species.
And
since
specific difference in
introduction
creates
of a
new
and every
it
added
cause
a corresponding differentia,
must exactly
corre-
spond with the actual sequence and concatenation of causes. Plato never undertook actually to set forth that
derivation of everything knowable out of unity, which
Aristotle
Pott.
ii.
13,
vi. 5,
96,
b,
15-97, b,
25
i.
Top.
3.
2,
the object to be divided; and lastly (to which Plato devoted less attention), that it should not proceed by means of deduced or contingent differences, but by the essential ones. Cf. preceding
note.
2 Two further rules, contained especially in the sixth book of the Topic) wherehe enumerates at length the mistakes made in denning are omitted here,
Gr. pt. i. p. 524 sq.), he also considers that the most important thing is that the dishould be continuous, vision should omit no intermediate grade, and should totally exhaust
Ph.
d.
See Zell.
272
ARISTOTLE
The highest
no more
They are connected, not by any complete community of nature, but only by a kind of analogy, 2 and the reason
1
Anal. Post. i. 32, 88, a, 31 vid. supra p. 246. sqq. Aristotle says, in Metaph. xii. 4, 1070, b, 1 {irapa yap t)\v ovtrlav Kal TaAAa refc Karyyopovfieva ovBev %trri koiv&v), that the categories especially can be deduced neither from one another nor from a higher common genus: v. 28, 1024, b, 9 (where the same is said of Form and Matter) xi. 9, 1065, b, 8 Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 34 De An. i. 6, 410, a, 13 Mh. N. i. 4, 1096, a, 19, 23 sqq. of. TRENDELENBURG, Hist. Beitr. i. 149 sq. The concepts, which one would be most inclined to consider the highest genera, Being and One,' are no ydvri Metaph. iii. viii. 6, 1045, b, 5 3, 998, b, 22
sqq., &c.
;
;
tion in Metaph. x. 1, in which the unity of analogy does not occur) the unity of number, of species, of genus, and of analogy. Each of these unities includes in it the subsequent unities (i.e. that which in number is one is also one in species, &c.) but not Hence the unity of vive versa. Analogy can occur even in those things which belong to no
: ;
'
'
'
xi. 1, 1059, b, 1070, b. 7 Eth. JST. ibid. ; Anal. Post. ii. 7, 92, b, 14 Top. iv. 1, 121, a, 16, c. 6, 127, a, 26 sqq. Cf. Trendelenburg,
x. 2, 1053, b,
21
27
sq.
xii. 4,
(cf. Part. An. i. 26 t& ficv yap ex avat to Kotvbv Kar avahoylav, ra Se It Kara yevos, Ta Sh /car' elSos). occurs in everything Sera % us fiAAo vpbs SAAo. It consists in identity of relation (io-oVjs \6yav~), and hence supposes at least four members {Eth. N. v. 6, 1131, a, Its formula is &s touto iv 31). tovtu % irpbs touto, to*8' ev T<8e ^ irpds TiiSe {Metaph. ix. 6, 1048, b,
5, 645, b,
:
common genus
7
is
cf.
It
identity,
arithmetical
on
p.
276
infra').
'
principle
b, 9
to avd\oyoi>
ibid.
i.
tV
4,
abri]v
%x ov
644, b, 11 ii. 6, 652, a, 3), and in fact in all categories {Metaph. xiv. 6, 1093, b, 18). Besi8es those in the passages just mentioned, other instances are given in De Part.
5vvaii.iv,
LOGIC
why
the sciences are not
all
273
own
If
peculiar sort of
it
it.
be true that
is
among
first
the sciences
we
'
find one
which
'
a science of
principles
it
the
First Philosophy
we must not
any single
shall find it
expect
principle of being.
On
the contrary,
we
that
we should
inquire into
all
be considered,
This
is
or,
8'
imffT^liri
tffr\v
irepas,
at
apxal
etc
cannot be deduced from any other thing (the highest principles), must be explained by analogy, as, for example, the concepts
of Matter, of T?orm, &c. cf Metaph. ix. 6 (vid. sup. p. 269, n. 1); xii. 4, 1070, b, 16 sqq., and Phys. This is the account i. 7, 1 91 a, 7. given by Trendelenburg in his Hist, lieitr. i. 151 sqq. ' Analogy ' is of special importance to Aristotle in his study of Natural History; see thereon infra, and Arist. Thierhunde, cf. Meter, 334 sqq. 1 Anal. Post. i. 28 init. p-la ft eiriar'tjfjir] effrlv t) lv6s yevovs
; . , : . . .
pA\& erepai
iii. 2,
997, a, 21 : irep* oSv t<J oAtA yevos Ta ffvp.^^i\K6ra Kafl' avrb. T7js airTJs [eirior^iH/s] 4<ttI Seapijffai in tup auTwy douv. Ibid. iv. 2, 1003, b, 19: amuros Se yh'ovs koX dtffdrjffis p.la evds leal
imtrrtinii-
Hid.
fitpr]
. . ,
1004,
a,
roffavra
<pt\offotpias
scrip
*>
'd&anrep at ovtrlai
imdpx il 7&P
v
'
The
this
Philosophy
infra.
VOL.
I.
274
ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER VI
INTRODUCTORY INQUIRIES TOUCHING ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS
1.
The Categories
fall,
All
according to Ari-
stotle,
When,
These highest concepts the Categories 3 neither mean to him merely subjective forms of thought, which
would be utterly foreign to his Realism, nor are they merely concerned with logical relations. What they ex1 Trendelenburg, Gesch. Kategorieenlelwe (Hist. Beitr. i. 1846), pp. 1-196, 209-217; BONITZ on Aristotle's Categories, Aristotel. Stud. vi. H. (first published in the Sitvungsberieht der Wiener Afiad., Hist.plaXol. Kl. 1853, B. X. 591 sqq.); PrANTL, Gesch. d. Log. i. 182 SCHUPPE, Die 90 sq. sqq., arist. Kategorieen. (_Gymn. progr. Gleimitz, 1866) cf BRENTANO's Von der mannigfachen essay
d.
i init. rav Kara /wjSf/ti'ai (rufwrAoV ktyo^ivwv %kootov ^to ovaiav ffrifnaivet % iroabv % troibv 7
C.
:
irpis ti
?)
irov
%
t)
ex 6 "' %
9
iv
init.
:
Troituv
pera
itute
StopttraaOai
ray 4vtjtcov
al
Karriyopiwv
o-vfifleflm
oh imipxovaiv
^Tjfleicrai tc't
IWi
5e
touto tov
<
apidiibi
SeVo, tI 4a v;,
ttoS,
iro<rbi>, tcoiov,
Seienderi nach Ar., published in 1862. 2 Categ. o.2 init.'.ruv TieyokotA avfutXoK^v liivav t& /tec
Bedeutung
des
mire, Kuaiai, ix* lv vda-x^v. * Aristotle uses various ex pressions to designate them (cf
vp6s ti voith
hiyerai,
t&
8'
Su
o-u/inAo/rijj.
METAPHYSICS
1 press is rather the different forms of the Actual.
275
Not
sions of categories
may be treated.
378, a, 5 sqq.)rcb.
among the
He
toS
them
cf.
yhr\
i.
(scilicet,
1,
Svtos,
Be An.
Metaph.
402, a, 22), toi irpara 9, 1034, b, 7), also Staipeffets (Top. iv. 1, 120, b, 36, 121, a, 6), and irrdaeis (Metaph. xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26, with which cf. Eth. Hud. i. 8, 1217, b, 29), rh noma irpara (Anal. Post. ii. 13,
vii.
whereas the predicate, as such, can only occur in the proposition. Hence it is needless to ask the
question (over which Schuppb, loc. cit. 21 sq., gives himself unnecessary trouble) in what sense Substance,' which is notapredicate-concept (vide infra, ch. vii. init.), can belong to the scheme of the categories. Any concept becomes a predicate by being asserted of something, and this may occur even with concepts expressing substance (cf Metaph. vii. 3, 1029, a, 23, t& fih yip
'
.
96, b, 20,
1034, b, 9)
(with whom Luthk, heitr. zur Logik, ii. 1 sqq. agrees) rightly explains the last expression by simply translating Karriyopla =
' '
BONITZ
&K\a
the
ttjs ovffias
K<m}yopeiTai a^rrj
Se t5)s
Stojs).
For instance, in
assertion '
and
-
consequently yht\ or <rxfiitma T Kin-. = the chief genera or fundamental forms of assertion,' = the
'
proposition, ' this man is Socrates,' Socrates is predicate. From this logical function, which
shorter Kari\yoplai = the various modes of assertion,' or Karnyoptat toC Svtos (Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 28 ; Metaph. iv. 28, 1024, b, 13, ix. 1, 1045, b, 28, xiv. 6, 1093,b, 19, las.); the latter phrase implying that every such assertion is concerned with being. The meaning of ' predicate,' which Karriyopla often has in other places, and which BBENTANO (loc. cit. 105 sq.) and Schuppb give it here, does not
suit the Aristotelian categories, for the latter designate the different senses of the ra Kara
/itlSe/iiav
may take on in a proposition, it by no means follows that such an idea, when regarded out of this special relation and with reference solely to the content of the idea itself, is to be regarded as signifying anything dependent, or in the nature of a property or <rv/j.flefiT)K6s. Stbumpell is mistaken in saying (Gesch. d- them: Phil. o. d. Griechen, p. 211) that the categories treat of the various ways of predicating or the distinctions to be drawn in the ways of combining concepts, though in other respects he correctly apprehends the merely formal character of the
a substance-concept
categories.
1
ffu/iTrXo/cV
\ey6iieva,
Metaph.
v.
7,
1017, a, 22
t 2
278
ARISTOTLE
and
to have a different
Being and of Unity '), or any of those more definiti expressions which concern the concrete condition o
Kaff aitra
ffrifiatvet
8e elvai \eyereu
ticrairep
t&
ffX^lliaTa
T ^ s kottj-
yoptas'
avrax&s fb eivai ai)jxaivi (cf. Eth. N. i. 4, 1096, a, 23). Hence the categories are called KoTrjyopiai tov Svtos (see preceding That of which they renote).
present the various meanings is the %v (MetapA. vi. 2 init. ix. 1, Be An. i. 5, 410, a, 1045, b, 32 .13 en Be iroWax&s \eyofi4vov tov Sj/TOSf 0-Tjfj.atvei yhp to fihi/ T<J5e ti, &c); cf. Ind. Arist. 378, a, 13 Logical relations of consqq. cepts, on the other hand (such as opos, yevos, fStov, (ru/AjSe^/cbs), are not expressed in separate cate; :
and a fourth as to place cf following note. 1 These two concepts (whicl Karh it&vtwv fidKurTa \4yerat rui ovrwv, according to Metaph. iii 3, 998, b, 22 sqq. x. 2, 1053, b 16 sqq. viii. 16, 1045, b, 6, cf swpra, p. 272, n. 1), are no yiw\ but predicates which may b( applied to all that is possible
tity,
;
;
iii. 3,
but run indifferentlygories, through them all. In answer to the question tI 1<tti; for instance, you may get according to circumstances an oi<rla, a ttoo-ov, &c. As little are the see Top. i. 9. categories concerned with the
false,
to the
nature of things, but to our relation to them (Mtstaph. vi. 4, 1027, b, 29). Yet Aristotle sometimes does make, after all, an ontological application of the categories, as when, for example, he deduces the different kinds of change
by observing that a genus car never be predicated of the marl which stands to it as a specify difference, but that Being anc Unity must be predicable oJ every mark which can be addec to tnefcyand the ovtria.' Both the concepts are used in various meanings. Metaph. v. 7, gives four senses of Being,' while ix, 10 (cf. xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26, where the Kark <rvfi0efSr)Kbs Keyd/ievov ot is omitted) gives three, one oi these being that kotA to o-xJifiarc t&v KarqyopiSiv, which suggests that a different kind of Being corresponds to each category, and therefore implies that Being cannot as such coincide with any
'
'
'
ns
(pva-is,
icul
oiBevhs
tovt& y airb T) (piffis, to ex ( = ' there is nothing whose essence consists in Unity as such '). It likewise occurs in all categories,
METAPHYSICS
any
object
277
1
and its physical or ethical properties. Equally does he exclude from the number of categories those general metaphysical conceptions which serve to explain concrete peculiarities and processes, such as the conceptions of the Actual and the Possible, of Form and Matter, and of the four kinds of Cause. 2 The
but adds to the concept of the
which it is predicated, no new mark ; and Aristotle concludes from this, 8ti tout!* muiaivti
object, of
t!> %v Kal rh iv (Metaph. x. 2, 1054, a, 9 sqq.), the -rb %v Kal rb %v rairrbv Kal fiia tptiffis tQ clko\a\\' ob% s ovdetv a\\4}\ois kvl \6y<f SriXoipwa (Metaph. iv. 2, 1003, b, 22), and that both have the same extension (airio-rpitpei, xi. 3, 1061, a, 15 sq., cf. vii. 5, 1030, b, 10, c. 16, 1040, b, 16). Upon ' Unity,' cf. also Metaph. x. 1 sqq. (where in paris ticular ' unity of measure treated of), and the references at and see also p. 272, n. 2 supra Heetling, Be Arist. notione warns, Berl. 1864. As to the iv, see particularly Brentano, Vnn der mannigfaehen Bedeutimg des Seienden. 1 For (his reason such a concept as Movement (or Change) is not put among the categories it is rather, according to Aristotle, a physical concept which, through the different categories, receives its further determination as substantial change, qualitative or quantitative change, or movement in space (Phys. v. 1 fin., c. 2 init., ibid, 226, a, 23, iii. 1, 200, b, 32 Gen. et Corr. i. 4, 319, b, 31 ; Be Ccelo, iv, 3, 310, a, 23 Metaph. xii. 2, 1069, b, 9 ; more about this infra). He allows that, looked at in itself, it may
iv. 1,
120, b,
1,
a,
irus
2
i.
135 sqq.), and in this sense it is even used in MetajiJi. viii. 4, 1029, b, 22, to illustrate how the categories other than Substance have a substratum, yet it does not Still itself become a category. less would it be a category if we were to accept the belief of the later Peripatetics (which is not
established by Metaph. v. 13, SlMPL. Categ. 78, 5, 1020, a, 26 29 Bas.) that it belonged to the category of the iroabv, or as others preferred (Simpl. ibid. 35, S, 38) to the irp6s n. So also, when Eudemus (Eth. Mud. 1217, b, 26) gives Motion (in place of Action and Passion) among the categories, it is not Aristotelian Other Peripatetics, notably Theophrastus, said more correctly, that it ' runs through many categories ' (Simpl. ibid. 35, 5, 38 ;
;
'
Phys. 94, a). In the same way 'the Good' is to be found in various categories (JSth. N. i. 4,
1096,
2
a. 19,
23).
278
ARISTOTLE
is
purpose of 'categories'
They
are
may
In Aristotle's
real
all
conceptions are to be
set,
init.,
22, 31, 35, vi. 2 init., ix. 10 c. 1, 1045, b, 32, xiv. 2,' 1089, a, 26 ; Be An. i. 1, 402, a, 22,
7,
indifferently (Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 26 ; Metapli. ix. 10 init. rh Sh Karit Svvafiiv ical iyepyetav Toirav). Aristotle does not tell us why
:
they cannot be reckoned among the categories but the reason seems to be that indicated above, viz. that these ideas do not merely
;
of substance, quality, &c, to the formal character and the formal differences of that which falls under them, but designate definite real relations of actual being.
1
Thus
also
Brandis,
ii.
b,
394 sqq.
ibid. 162 sq. explains the absence of 'Possibility and Actuality ' from the categories by saying that the latter are * separated predicates,' whilst
delenburg,
the former is no real predicate.' It seems, however, that precisely the opposite is the case. The categories are not themselves directly taken as predicates, but only as designating the place of certain predicates in the scale j whereas the distinction of Possible and Actual is based on real and definite facts, the contrast between the different conditions of development in individual things, and the opposition in the universe as a whole between the corporeal and the spiritual. The one kind of distinction is only an abstract, metaphysical expression of the other. But it is not possible entirely to agree with Bonitz when he says on p. 18, 21, that the categories are only meant to render possible a survey of what is contained in the empirical data,' and hence that ' such concepts are excluded as extend beyond the comprehension of empirical data, to any kind of explanation of them.' For the concept of Motion is given by experience just as much as that of Action and Passion, and the concept of Substance is as valuable for ' explaining the data as that of form and matter, or of
' '
METAPHYSICS
Of the completeness of
this
279
is'
framework, Aristotle
how he came
to set
dees
it
8,
10, a,
he
ical
Brentano (fie. cit. p. 82 sq.)> that the categories are 'real concepts,' if by this we are to understand such concepts as designate the common object-matter of a series of experiences, such as are the concepts of weight, extension, thought, &c. For those very
categories which are most frequently and universally applied substance, quantity, quality, reaction, and passionlation,
refers rS,\\a
SiTJprjrai
lrpirepor.
De An.
Kai
ris
i.
1,
r6Se ri Kal
ovcria
irotbv
fj
iroffbv
&\\t]
ruv
fi^v
StaipeBeiffuv
Koriiyopiav.
ffij/iaivei
Ibid.
4}
c. 5,
yap to
irotbv
iroffbv
$}
Kai riva
StatpeOeiffuv
Kariyyoptuv.
PH.
T$5e
i.
.
37
.
dffax&s
oitffla,
01
Strfpijvrai.
:
designate merelyformal relations, and hence are adapted to cover and apply to a content of the most diverse character and though this is not so absolutely true of others such as ttoE, irore or Kei<r8ai that peculiarity only proves that Aristotle was not able strictly to carry out through them all the point of view with which he started his categoryscheme as a whole. Bkentano himself, at p. 131 sq., admits that the distinction of the categories is not a real distinction.' 1 Peantl, Gech. d. Log. i. 204 sqq., denies that Aristotle adopted any absolutely fixed number of categories; but it is clear, not only from the enumerations given at p. 274, n. 2 and p. 282, n. 3, but also from many other expressions, that he did. Thus we have in Soph. ffl. c. 22, wit. ivehrep %X0HSV to yevi] ruv Karijyopiuv namely, the ten enumerated in
;
1069, a, 20 irpurov e?ro rb irotbv, etrd. rb 7j nooiv; vi. 2, 1026, a, 36: ra trx'hpwB' T ? s Karriyoplas, otoy rb fthv rl, rb 8e irotbv, rb Be voffbu, rb
Metaph. xii.
rb Be irore, Kal e rt &K\o rbv rp6irov rovrov vii. 4, 1030, a, 18: al yap rb rl itrrtv
Be irov,
ffijfiaivet
j
eva /iev rp6irov ffrifiaivei rfyv ovaiav Kal rb r6Se ti, &\\ov Be eKaffrov ruv Kariiyopovfievuv, iroffbv, irotbv Kal Sera &\\a rotavra ; xii. 4, 1070,
a,
33
it is
a question
of, irdVepon
erepat %
at
'
-.
ruv ohatuv Kal ruv irpis rt, Kal Kuff eK&ffrnv Be ruv Kariyyoptuv ifioius. Likewise in Metaph. vii. 9, 1034, b, 9, xiv. 2, 1089, a, 7; Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 26, after mentioning some of the categories, he refers to the rest with a mere eu aAAat Karrryopiai,' as to something well known, and in Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, b, 12, a, 21, the impossibility of an infinitely extended argument is proved by the asser'
iroiovVy
irdffxov, Sta-
tion that the number of categories is limited to those there named. The completeness of Aristotle's list of categories is also supposed by the proof referred to at the end of p. 276, n. 2, that
280
ARISTOTLE
1
so little indication
that
we
and quantitative, qualitative, local (Pkys. v. 1 sq.), inasmuch as that theorem is proved hy the process of exclusion. ' Motion,' Aristotle argues, ' does not occur in the categories of substance,
&c. . therefore only those three categories remain.' 1 Even in the lost writings no such demonstration seems to have occurred; otherwise the early commentators would have appealed to it. Whereas, on the contrary, Simpl. ScJiol. in Ar. 79, a, 44, says 'A\us oiSa/iov irepl Tjjs *Tcews tuv yevuv ovSefilay
:
sion as those referred to in Categ. c. 7 ; ir5 and wore are represented by the adverbs of place and time; the last four categories are to be looked for in the verb, for iroieiv and Traax* 1 * translate into a general concept the force of the active and passive voices, as ttuodcu renders one side of the intransitive, and ex e "/ * ne special force of the Greek perBut, in the first place, as fect. Bonitz, p. 41 sqq., fully proves, Aristotle himself nowhere gives any indication of his having arrived at his categories in this way. On the contrary, he does not distinguish the parts of speech on any such method as
not persuaded us that he has It really succeeded in doing so. seems rather that the objections
still
loo.
his
which Trendelenburg's that theory of the categories would presuppose, for he nowhere expressly distinguishes the adverbs, he treats the adjective (as prjua) along with the verb, and in fact the only parts of speech which he names (apart from the article and conjunction) are the uvofia and the /5il,ua. It is therefore not probable that grammatical forms to which, as parts of speech' he paid no attention, should nevertheless have guided him in distinguishing the classes of concepts. And, again, the two series do not in .fact correspond to any such extent as we should have expected if Trendelenburg's supposition were correct. For 'quantity' and quality may just as well be expressed by substantives (e.g. Kev'
'
'
'
'
Kiriris,
Bepfiirns,
&c,
Categ.
c.
8,
9,
a,
METAPHYSICS
281
reduced to supposing that he obtained them empirically, by putting together the main points of view from which
the data of experience can be practically treated.
true that a certain logical
It is
progress
is
to
be found
among them.
Thing.
&c.) as by and passion
tives
; '
We
the
Next
there are two facts first, that Aristotle in speaking of the categories, never indicates such a deduction, and next, that none
:
can be found into which they naturally fit. Even in Brentano's ingenious scheme, this is
not the case.
gories
'
'
'
in the
way he
found. Beentano,
loe.
cit.
p.
148 sqq., also seeks to defend the Aristotelian categories against the charge of having no scientific derivation and suggests another He believes that in scheme. arranging them Aristotle first dis'substance' from tinguished among the and, accidents,' latter, distinguished the absolute from the relative and that he went on to divide the former
'
;
they would have been enumerated by Aristotle in. a corresponding order. Instead of that, the itp6s ti, which, according to Brentano, should come last, stands in the middle in every enumeration (see
p.274, n. 1 and p. 282, n.3),andits regular place (the only exception
into (1) inherences (material = itoabv, and formal = ttoi6v) ; (2) affections (iroieTv and irdaxeu/, to which, at one time, Aristotle added ?X>') ; (3) external circumstances (iroS and iroi-e, and, for a time, xeiaBai). The question is not, however, whether it is possible to bring the ten categories into some logical scheme (for that
being Phys. v. 1) is immediately after the 'inherences.' After it, again, .the affections do not follow (as they should according to Brentano's order), but the
' '
could be done with any series, unless it were merely put together at haphazard), but whether Aristotle arrived at them by means of a logical deduction. And against any such supposition
external circumstances' Nor is the distinction of inherences and affections itself Aristotelian. So far as a logical disposition of the categories ex post facto is concerned, Zbllbe gives on p. 288 infra, that which he prefers, although he does not believe that Aristotle arrived at his list of categories by any method in which he had in his mind beforehand either that or any other logical scheme into which they were to fit.
'
282
ties
:
ARISTOTLE
first
(in the
qualities
and then
(in
the irpos
to
its delation
other things.
conditions
From
list
of
sensible
existence
Space,
and
Time..
And
he ends the
for that,
In
fact,
is
not always
ar-
the same. 2
is
somewhat
number.
Aristotle himself so
he passes
and
Situation, in
enumeration. 3
Vide supra, pp. 246 and 272. Examples will be found in what follows, and also at p. 279, n. 1. The most striking thing
1
is that in contrary to the otherwise constant rule, and even to the order given in c. 4, irp6s ti posed as aviifiefi^To. has been precedes ttoi6v. No satisfactory already mentioned). Phys. v. 1 reason can be found for this, but fin. ei oZv ai Karrjyopiat Si^o^i/rai oixria ku) ttoi6ttiti al t irov koX it would be rash to conclude anything from it against the genuine- t$ trork not t$ Trpds ti Kal r$ iroan ness of the work, since a later koX t$ irote7v ft irdtrxew, avdymt writer would probably be less rptis ilvai Kii/^o-eis (cf p. 279, u. 1 likely to permit a divergence fin.). Metaph. v. 8, 1017, , 24 from the order given than would tSui KaTtiyopou/iivoiv t& fiiv t\ lari Aristotle himself, for whom it aimalvei, rk Se irotbv, t& Si iroabv, was not firmly established. Tct Se rp6s ti, t& Sh vov t& SJ itot4. 5 * See Zkll. Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, a, 21 Ph. d. Gr. pt. lj Sore ^ Iv Ty tI iffTiv \Kwnfyoptircu] 325,
np6s ti tj iroi% ttote, Srav ev naff evbs KarrtyopriSp. Ibid, b, 15 rhyivi] rav Karrtyopiuv Tten4pavTar yi.p irotbv % iroabv ti 'irp6s ti 1) ^ noiovv % iriaxov 1) irov % iroTe (the oltria to which the latter are opfj
8ti iroibv
fj
tj
iroabv
fi
ovy
irdirxov
irov
METAPHYSIQS
for a
283
decimal
1
them by the
seem to Aristotle Platonists, find a round number of catenatural that he should But we cannot well suppose any further congories. nection between his doctrine and the Pythagorean a
at first
which made
nor
iS
the conjecture 3
much more
probable, that
he
borrowed his categories from the school of Plato.4 It is true that almost all of them appear in' Plato's writings;
5
used as occasion
Among
1
much
the most
ZELLER,
857 sqq.
in
As Petersen supposed
PMlos.
p. 12.
s
Chrygipp. Fundamenta,
sqq.
place, there is of the ten categories among the Platonists and it is not likely that information about so notable a. point would neither have been transmitted through their writings nor
*
no trace whatever
certainly not Platonic ; in fact it one chief point of dispute between Aristotle and his master that the latter conceded to ideas of quality the position of substances and made the iroibv an oh<ria. might rather suppose (as Ueberweg does in his Logik, 47, atp. 100) that Aristotle was led to his theory of Categories in his recoil against the theory of Ideas, and, in particular, by
is
We
the reflection that the Ideas only represented things under the
ries
and through them to us. And again, the theory of the categois so closely connected with the other opinions of Aristotle that it is not likely to have sprung up on other ground.
form of substantiality, whereas things in the actual world exhibit many different forms of existence. But as this explanation
presupposes the distinction of substance from properties, &c, too much importance must not be attached to the theory.
itself
5
Take, for example, merely the fundamental statements as to the oitr'a and its relation to properties, on which the whole division of the categories in Aristotle is based. These are
See
Trendelenburg,
Hist.
Beitr.
i.
supra, p. 56. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 73 sqq., and Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 589.
284
ARISTOTLE
is
important
may
here be
fitly-
individual Substance.
is
set out in
parts
a Quantum.
is
Quantum
2
;
a quantity
if
is
the quantity
they are in a definite position (dsais), extensive ; if they are only in an order
position,
(rdgis) without
then
it
is
non-extensive. 3
by means of which quantity This is the disis distinguished, is the measure of it. tinguishing mark of quantity, that it is measurable and
The undivided,
or the unity
has a measure. 4
As
EKaTepop
fl
eKaffTov %v Tt
leal
The
4vvtt-
dpxovra, however, are, the constituent parts as distinguished from the logical elements of the concept. Thus, e. g., in Metaph. iii. 1, 9i)5, b, 27, c, 3 init. he inquires whether the yevq or the ivvirdpXovra are the highest principles ibid. viii. 17 fin. the aroix^ov
is
sense,
as
signifying
anything
numerically distinct (api0/x<j; %v). 2 Metaph. v. 13 (where also irotrbv naff avrb and koto <rvfi$ef3nk6s is spoken of). Cat. 6 init.
Trendelenburg,
treats
ibid.
p.
82.
defined as that els t> Staipe7rai [sc. t1] ivvwdpxov [Ace] us Batji/. Similarly in viii. 2, 1043, a, 19, cf. Gen. An. i. 21,729,b. 3 ushwrdp:
further of
discrete
and
continuous quantities, with special reference to Cat. 6, Phys. v. 3, 227, a, 10 sqq. and Metaph.
loc. cit.
3
Xv kcl\
c. 18,
Tbid.
724, a, 24
S<ra Sis
VKi)s
e/c
sqq.
press
the
opposition
of
that
tivos
ivvirdpxovTos
c. 2, 1, a,
....
c,
etrriv.
Cat.
24,
5, 3, , 32, a,
&c.
39 sqq.)
The iroabv is consequently that which is made up of parts, like a body! and not of logical elements, like a concept. But since num-
which has and that which has not extension in any general form, but merely by means of examples (of the former line, surface, body of the latter time, num-
ber, word).
*
Metaph.
x.
1,
1052, b, 15
METAPHYSICS
285
and substantial whole, so Qualitas expresses the differences whereby the conceptual whole is divided; for under Qualitas, in the stricter sense of the word, Ari1
stotle
As the two
chief divisions
which express an essential distinction, and those which express a movement or Elsewhere he names four determinations of activity. 2
of qualities, he notes those
quality as
fall
sqq. ; Cat. c. 6, 4, b, 32. This follows immediately from the above definition of m<r6v: that which can be divided into parts can also be built up of parts and
KaX at
be measured by them.
Further
the first class belong, among other things, the qualitative distinctions of numbers to the
;
marks of
ttoabv ( Cat. c. 6, 5, b,
11 sqq.) are that nothing is opposed to it, and that it is what it is and neither more nor less, and that the concept of equality and inequality belongs peculiarly to
it.
1
second, ape-r^ and Kaicla. With regard to the Sia<popa see supra, p. Therefore Quality ex215, n. 1. presses a determination of form, for that is true of the $ia<popa Metaph. viii. 2, 1043, a, 19 eoi/ce yap d fiev Sia r&v fiiafpopwv \6yos tov eXSovs Kai ttjs evepyetas elvat, o
:
(Scire-
5' e/c
tuv ipvirapx^fTQiy
Cat.
rfjs
ii\7]s
are sometimes also called Troibv, or more correctly woi& oia-la {Cat. c. 5, 3, b, 13 ; cf. Metaph. vii. 1, 1039, a, 1); and sometimes the (Tu/ijScflrjKiiTo are
poi
fiaAAov.
comprised under the same term (Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, a, 36). 2 In Cat. c. 8 the concept of 71WT7JS is not explained except by reference partly to forms of speech and partly to examples. In Metaph. v. 14, 1020, b, 13, however, there is an enumeration of its different meanings thus: ffxtdbv 5fy KaTa Svo Tp6irovs Keyotr' av rb iroibv, Kai tovtwv eVa rbv KvpLfbraTov irpdrij /*ej/ yap ttol6t7JS t\ TTJs ouatas diacpopa ... t^ 8c
The four rfSij c. 8. (besides which, we are told, 10, a, 25, others might occur) are the following (1) cfis and BuLOeo-is, which are distinguished inasmuch ascfis expresses a lasting state, while StdBecis is used sometimes for every state whatsoever, and sometimes for a transitory one (cf. Metaph. v. 19,
3
ttohjttjtos
Bonitz and SCHWEGLEB on this passage Trendelenbueg, Hist. Beitr. i. 95 sqq. WAITZ, Arist. Org. i. 303 sqq.)
20;
;
Instances of
and
aperat;
health
and
286
ARISTOTLE
He
mark
unlike. 2
But
*
To the category
5
of Relativity
and
in
which
'
expresses
(i.e.
Kciotfcu),
burg
would
Trendelenburg,
ibid.
98
sqq.
More about the Sivafiis later). (3)Thepassivequalities, irafljjTUcal also called wdBos in the meaning of ttoUttis naff %v aWoiovtrdai ivtiexETcu (Metaph. v. 21), and distinguished from the irdflij (which fall under the category of irciffx"!'), by theirduration. Aristotle.however, understands by them not only the qualities which are produced by a iriios (such as white and black colour) but also those which produce a iriios or an aWolwais on our senses cf. De An. ii. 5 init. (4) Figure
toi(Jti)t6j,
:
Beitr. i. 101 sq.) equally apply to many other things which Aristotle includes under Quality whilst, on the other hand, the impossibility of a constant definition of the categories is seen from the fact that a generic
concept (e.g. Imtrr4iiiai) may belong to the irp6s ri, when a corresponding specific concept (7pa/i/uoTi/c5>) belongs to the iroibv (Cat. c. 8, 11, a, 20 Top. iv. 124, b, 18 whereas in Metaph. v. 15, 1021, b, 3, iarpuri; is counted under irp6s ti, that it may follow
;
;
its
and movements
tial properties.'
2
15 on the other hand (ibid. 10, b, 12, 26), the tvavTiirqs and the puWov al
Cat.
c. 8, 11, a,
;
?ttw ( = difference of degree') do not belong to all quantities. The notion of Similarity, cf Top. i. 17 Metaph. v. 9, 1018, a, 15, x. 3,
'
.
in Cat. c. 7, precedes that of Quality (vide supra) is contrary to the natural relation of both, as is clear, not only in all other enumerations and in the express explanation in Metaph. xiv. 1, 1088, a, 22, but indirectly also (in Cat. c. 7 itself) from the fact that the 8/j.oiov and laov (qualitative and quantitative equality) is in 6, b, 21 counted as Ttp&s ti cf. Top. i. 17 Trentivity,
;
1054, a, 3, and infra, p. 287, n. 2. 3 For, on the one hand, the remark in Cat. c. 8, 10, a, 16, that the concepts of rarity and denseness, roughness and smoothness, designate no quality, but a situ-
a,
irp6s ti ols
rh
etvai
'
31 ravrdv
:
*x flv
where
; :
METAPHYSICS
the least
reality.'
'
287
In
however, he
is
in
others. 6
dently from the fact that it is measured or thought, and only becomes a relative in so far as that which measures and thinks enters
into relation with it). The like also in Metaph. x. 6, 1056, b, 34, 1057, a, 7. 4 Another division is found in Top. vi. 4, 125, a, 33 sqq. 5 The various peculiarities of the Relative which are mentioned in Cat. c. 7 are all found, as is there remarked, only in a part of that qlass : e.g. the ivavridrris
(6, b, 15, cf. Metaph. x. 6, 1056, b, 35, c. 7, 1057, a, 37, and also
read
oiivia
iraativ]
twv
vtrripa tov tvoiov real irotrov, &c. b, 2 : rbSf irp6s ti oStc Swa^ei oitria
o<he ivepyeiq.
a,
Mh. N. i.
; 1
1096,
eoi/ee
21
irapatpv6JSi
yap tout
Avtos.
:
(1) ko.9' apiSpbv Kal apiBpov iratb) (and in other related forms) ; to
this head belong the
laov, fytoiov,
Trendelenburg, 123
fiaWov Kal
?ittoi/,
cerned with relations to a given unity: touto i&v yap &v fila y ovffia, Hfioia 5' wv y ttoi6tt}s fila, tffa Be &v rb voabv %v (the latter also in Gen. et Corr. ii. 6, 333, a, 29) (2) Kara Siva/xiD iroijjTi/dji' nal iraBriTiK^v, like the BtppavTutbv and the 9epiuair6v; (3) in the sense which comprises such expressions as
SiavoriTou.
'
correlatives to be simultaneous ( Cat. 7, b, 16), which is not found in the relative of the second class (the eVurrijTfcv, &c, see note 3, supra). But it is a universal mark of every relative, to have a corresponding correlative (jb vpbs avruPrpiipovTa \4yka0ai, Cat. 6, b, 27 sqq.), which, in the main,
tallies
/asTprirbv, ^Tiuffifrbv,
first
The
two kinds
at first
1, 200, b, 28. 1021, a, 26 In the first two of the cases adduced the irp6s ti is called tQ otrep icttIv aXKov \4yeo-6ai alrd b iarlv (double is rnii<reos 5nr\d<Tiov
with the statement made (c. 7 i?titj and afterwards repeated (8, a, 33), that the irp6s
aura airep o~rlv erepuv \4yerat ^ dnwarovp &\\us vpbs erzpov, the latter statement differing merely by being less exact. Individual substances (irpeTcu
ti is Sera
cfoai
obo-iat)
that
it is
which
Tiji
warms
itpis
Bep/iavTov
cannot be relative
but
Seppavrucdv').
&\\o
amd
\4yea8ai
generic concepts (Seirepai over/at) may be. Cat. 8, a, 13 sqq. Thus in Cat. c. 7, 6, b, 2, the if, Sidflecrts, alaSr/aa, eVt-
288
ARISTOTLE
categories are dealt with so briefly in
The remaining
them
and,
indeed, wherever
of
of
the cate-
indicates to us
how
to
Thus,
that
in the
first place,
distinguished from
all
derivative. 2
Among
division
ties,
is again made between the qualities, the activiand the external circumstances. Of the qualities,
one
and in
say,
this
a qualitative
determination
that
is
to
they
3
Tf,
has gone before. Gen. et Corr. i. 7, treats Action and Passion more at length, but that passage deals with the physical meaning of these
terms, and we shall have to mention it later on. "E|is is discussed
and
dicainenta). 103, rightly remarks, the Quale is related to the Form, the Quantum to the Matter vide supra, 284, n. 1 and 4, p. 285, n. 2, cf. p. 219, n. 2. Thus similarity also, which, according to Aristotle, consist* in qualitative eqaairfcy (see p. 286, n. 3, 287, n. 2), is defined, in another place, as equality of Form (Metapk/x. 3, 1054, b, 3 tfytom 5e ihv /tjj toutA
;
:
36 sqq., cf., however, 8, a, 24 sqq.). Also Matter (Phys. ii. 2, 194, b, 8) and if so, why not Form as well 1 1 In the abrupt ending of the
c. 7,
6, b,
genuine Categories, c. 9 (as to which, see the latter part of n. 1 to p. 64, j2ys) it is merely said of
the category of ttokIv and iriax^v, that it is susceptible of opposition
As to
METAPHYSffS
289
that
is
With regard
most far-reaching opposition is that of on the other hand, the categories of Possession and Situation, as has been already remarked, 2 have only a precarious rank, and are afterwards
to activities, the
sil&rdio:
Finally, as
Where and
;
the
When.
it
In
strictness,
and perhaps
was
this kinship
ivra .... Kara rb eiSos roira $), in Metaph. iv. 5, 1010, a, 23 sqq. iroohv and iroibv are transposed with iroahv and eiSos, and in Metaph. xi. 6, 1063, a, 27,
air\as
Troihv is
irapa
rr)v ovffiav
rrjs
'
irdi/ra
yap koO'
AeyeTOt
viroKeifievov
ovfflas
taken as
fpvcris
&pi(rp.4vri,
irotrbv
(like
(but what is asserted /cafl' viroKiip-evov is a <rvp.fiel37iKbs in the farther sense Anal. Post. i. 4, 73, b, 8 Metaph. v. 30 fin. &c) c. Kal yap irotrbv Kal 7, 190. a, 34
:
yivtral
virOKetfievov
pjtvi\v t))v
ovaiav
/x-qOevhs hot'
8'
rb aKKou
irpds
That this
is
\eyeff6aL 'inroKetfievov rb. aWa. T&'Ta Kara ttjs ovfflas iii. 4, 203, b, 32. Metaph. vii. 1, 1028, a, 13, irdvroiv r) ovffla irptoTOv ibid. 1. 32
;
:
is clear from p. 282, n. 3. Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, b, 11 Ttdvra yap ravra \irotbv, &c] (TVfi04^T]Ke Kal Kara rwv oiftriajv KaTfiyopeircu (about cnifi^PriKbs in this meaning see p. 275 sqq.).
ception
4
XP^ v f
( cr
c. 4,
1029, b,
23, c. 13, 1038, b, 27, ix. 1 init. xi. 1, 1059, a, 29, xiv. 1, 1088, b, 4:
iSffrepov
yap
Similarly
73, b, 5.
oi/dev
1.
Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 317, b, 8. Hence in all the enumerations oiirla goes first. Cf also
Karriyopiai.
.
VOL.
*U
290
ARISTOTLE
inquiry, therefore, into Substance, or
An
Being as such,
As Science
For
most
It gives us the
knowledge which
universal
is
most
are
difficult to attain, as
principles
the
furthest
removed from
knowledge,
sense experience.
since
it
principles.
because
it
points
knowledge which
it is
is
to itself, in that
of knowledge.
It gives us that
it
which dominates
establishes that
end to which
is to
knowledge
1
serves. 2
p.
Vide
this
we
wpm, may
Metapli.
i.
2,
Mctaph. i. 1, where, with reference to prevailing news as to wisdom, it is shown (981, b, 30) that b [lev lEfiireipos tuv dwotavovi/
4x^"Tar (dMtojow elvai So/cei <70i/>e$rcpos, i Se rexvirris rwv ipnreipwv, Xeiporexvov 8k &pxiTeKTo>,jit 5e
Bewprirucal
(982, b, 7) e^ airdpTuv obv tS>v eiprifieuwu eVi t^v aurV cTrtaTJiprii' viitrn rb titovnevov ivojm [ao<pia\ Selyap tairi\v
thus
summed up
twv
sqq.
-npcinwv
apx&v
Cf.
vi. 7.
BeapTyrucliv.
iii.
Mh.
eTrai.
N.
1026,
yevos
twv
ir(H7)TUCuv
t]
piaWov.
eVi-
Hence
Til/a?
ao<pla irtpl
miv
t&v &KX(ev
oBttj Be
aril/ill, SijXoc.
tw
METAPHYSICS
set forth
291
include
actuality,
for these
Other
themselves to
which they take no further. The science of the ultimate grounds of things must go through the whole world of
things,
to finite principles,
last resort, to
proceeds
world.
1
all
unmoved and incorporeal, from which movement and formation in tho corporeal
is
This science
:
eoTix eViMetaph. iv. 1 % Bewpet tA ov jj iv Kal to Toiru imo$x'"na Ka "' auT 6. airqV effTlv ovtiefiiq rwv eV fiepet \eyoirH;/iij tis
elatv
<)
airoSetKvvQvffiv
% avayKaidTepov
.
fieva)VT}avT'ij'
ouSefilayap twv&Wojv
HaKaKt&Tepov. , dfiolus 5e oi/b" , el iGTiv ty \vi\ effTt to yevos irepl o Trpayfj.aTevovTai ovSey Xeyovffi Sta
iinaKOTrit kiB&\ou trepl tou Autos ti a.Trorefj.6yf Ov, JiAAa fiipos avrov
fieval
irepl
.
to
it
t6 tc ti
tovtoo
.
Be'jipovat
rd
o-vufie&ljK&s
5t)\ov
as
eirel
avaynaiov elvai koB* avri\v. , . , Sib Ka\ t\iuv tov &vtos rj ov tos irparas CI. note 2 and ulrias Krivreov. supra, eh. iv. pattim. 2 See the previous note, and at apxal see also Metaph. vi. 1 : Kal to afria f>)TeiTOi tZv Svtuv, Si\Xov Se Sti y ovra. Every science has to do wi". h certain principles aWa iroffoi avrai and causes.
[iarpuch, ^oflrj^oTDfJj, &c] irepl 'iv ti Kal yivos ti Trepiypaif/d/ievai irepl
So with Physics and Mathematics, the former being concerned with that which is moved and in which the Form is not separated from the Matter, the latter being at the best concerned with that which is abstracted from Matter and Movement, but which does not exist of itself as immaterial and unmoved (cF. p.
lo-rt SrjKov iroielv Kal el eortv.
is
183, n. 3)
OecoprjTtKrjs
<pujri/c7jy
el
okIvi\tov Kal
x ca P t0 rov
to yvavai
. . .
tpavepbv
.
on
o\t
fiej/Tot
ye
ovSe
fiaB7]fj.aTiKjjs,
aWa
irporepas afupolv.
'
The object
tovtov irpaytiareiovTai,
irepl
o\V
ofcx*
of this science is the x a, P"r 'r ^ ko.1 avdyKri Se iravTa fiev to aKtvtjTa
Svtos airAwi oASe $ iv, oASe too tI iat*vmSiva klr/ov iroiowraia\\' 4k Tdyrov at pev aiaB4\<rei
Troi4)aaaai
outVMAok,
oi 8' uirdfleow
tolto touto yap aXTta toIs tpavepols tu% In them, if anywhere, to Qeitav: Belov must be sought with them stands or falls the possibility of
alfTto atSta elvai, fidAio-TX Se
;
v 2
292
Aristotle also
ARISTOTLE
names Theology, and its task is to invesand the ultimate grounds thereof, being ultimate, are necessarily also the most
1
which, as
universal,
actual, but
the whole.
It is true that the possibility of
a science is
How
collectively together ?
how
is
since in this
it
is
up among the
its
special
sciences ?
to
draw into
or
of scientific
all
procedure,
to
any
of
definite science,
inasmuch
relate. 3
as all sciences
make use
them and
it
is
to be a single science, or
all
more
are
more than one, the next question is, all of the same kind or no, and which
them
it
is
then
the First Philosophy. If there be only one, would seem that that one must include all
ov-ra. rj lv.
'
a First Philosophy if there is nothing else besides natural substances, Physic3 is the first seience ; ei 5' tori tis ovtrla okVtjtos,
:
Metaph. Metaph.
loo. cit.
etalib.
md.
2
supra.
2
iii. 1,
995,
b, 4, c.
init.
s
ircp!
/cai
elrj
IMd.
o. 1,
995, b,
6, c. 2,
996,
ch.v.jmssim.
METAPHYSICS
objects of knowledge,
2P3
ot
Finally
we may
is
The
first
alternative
to say
it would be then impossible what kind of science had to do with the qualities The latter seems untenable, because subof Being. stances cannot be known by the same method of
demonstration as qualities. 2
Aristotle
remarking
is
the case
as regards Being. or
is
Substance,
somehow
named Being!
which is Substantial, or else qualities, activiand circumstances of Substance, and in the end they
lead
up
and
opposites
For these
all
ov yap fi6vov
25. Among the o-vfj.$efSii]K6'ra rais ovalcus must be counted also the
o/Motov,
enumerated in 995,
ko8' %v
lii. 4,
*
1003, b, 34 sqq. 16 sqq. The furtl er Apories of the third book, which are concerned not only with the concept of the First Philosophy but also with its contents, will be mentioned later on.
20;
cf. iv. 2,
1004,
a,
On
p.
221,
'ov
supra.
s
Metaph.
fiiv
ri
8c
\eyerai
%v Kal later
woWaxas,
aWa
irphs
p
:
which
ipxty) Kal
294
ARISTOTLE
other sciences,
is
removed in
in
Aristotle's
mind by
with
Being.
As Philosophy
general
has to do
many
from
sections of
As
in
Being determinate
general, so
science
is
is
distinguished
Being
It
It abstracts
others, in order to
from which
appertains to
itself
The objection that Substance must needs be treated in other ways than that
Being. 2
.
ovx Sfiwvvfiws
0'jffto.i
uvto. \4ytTai,
25, b, 27 sqq.
1
Metaph.
Metaph.
iv.
iv. 2,
2,
1004,
a,
a,
2,
ovoias,
<pdopal
to
fi
8'
on
&c.
2
ffrepiifreis
ff
itoi6ttjtgs
ty
?)
1004,
9 sqq.
iroifjTiKa
yevvi\TiKa ovo'ias,
tS>v
wpbs
T^jvoi/fflav
Keyofi4vwv,tiTovTwv
Sib Kal
Since the concepts of the One and the Many, of Identity and
Distinction, &c, relate to one and the same object, therefore one and the same science must deal with them; 1004, b, 5:
fi %v Kal tov Svtos iv touto Kad' ouTd eon irddr), aKK' obx fl apiSfiol fj ypafijial J) irvp, fl
to
thai
fj.T)"ov<pa.ixiv.
The consid-
eration of One also belongs to this science, for the %v and the "ov are (ibid. 1003, b, 22) ralrbv Kal
fi'a
ipvois
t$
aXriov,
aKo\ov9e7v,
wffwep
apxh \6yw
'oti
Kal
S7j\ov/j.eva
Kal
ovja.
Svtz iravraxov
Tct
7)
irpwrov
fiias
BecopTjaai
SfiKov ws lKtivi\s T7Js eiricTT^JMJS ko! t'i iaTi yvwp'.aai Kal t4 o-Ujiij8e;8i;icoV
a\\a
fiprtfrai Kal Si o A.e'7oi/Tai. ei ovv tout' 4o"tIv t\ ovffla, twv ovaiwv av Scot ras apxas Kal rets aiTias
auToir. As the mathematical and physical properties of things form a special province, oBtco Kal
to!
uvti
$ ov
<tti
Tiva ISia,
Kal
TaVT'
a, 8.
iffTt irepl
wv tov tptAoaotpov
eX etv
T0V
fiSwv.
Sib Kal tov dewpqaai fiias iffrtv t$ yevei to. tc efSy twv Farther, 1004, a, 9 sqq.
<pi\6ffo<pov.
.
.
eVio-KctycwrOai tcUt)0j.
This
in xi. 3,
METAPHYSICS
295
which proceeds by deducing its essential attributes would not trouble Aristotle, since the same thing would be true of the fundamental conceptions of any science what1
ever.
First Philosophy
would
much
In
Being in
to
Methodology
251.
By
Aristotle,
sophy. 2
3.
Tlie
their
Philosophers.
The forerunners of
he found
it
him a
series of
for
which
new
solution.
The
most important of
fundamental ideas
First of
of
his
:
system
immediately
how
are
we
assumed
Or
is there,
beside
and
It is
' '
above
that,
something
uncorporeal,
as
VOL.
i.
U4
296
ARISTOTLE
Anaxagoras, the Megarians and Plato said ? Are the ultimate grounds of things of the nature of matter
only, or is form to be distinguished
from matter as a
is
What
is
that
Is
it
which
is
and in the
there
first
The
was the common view which had lately come out, bluntly enough, in the Nominalism of Antisthenes the second was the theory of Plato the third that of Parmenides
; ;
and of Eucleides
3.
after him.
how can we hold these Can the One be at the same time a manifold, including in itself a number of parts and qualities ? Can the Many come together in an
are both given in experience,
actual
unity ?
answered.
two
Parmenides and Zeno had denied that the ideas could be reconciled, and had therefore
be a delusion,
while
the
oi
Atomic and Bmpedoclean schools limited the relation between the Many and the One to that of an external and mechanical juxtaposition of parts. The Pythagoreans found in number* and Plato, with keener philosophic insight, in his Ideas, a means of combining a multitude of different
Physicists
knowledge. 1
The
of
the
d.
Or. pt.
1,
METAPHY^CS
corresponding
itself,
297
things
explained
4.
that
How
is,
as to the theory
How
can anything
come
or change ?
and Zeno had asked in doubt, and the Megarians and The like the Sophists had repeated their questionings.
difficulties
Plato himself so
all
that
was truly
actual.
questions
clearly in view.
'
To the
first
of the diropiai
Are
there
is
besides
is it
other
'
of one kind; or
The limitation of Being to sensible things is contradicted by the series of arguments on which Plato had already based his Ideal Theory such as, that the
of Plato ?
: 1 With the exception of those just mentioned, which are concerned with the office of the First Philosophy in general.
MetapA.
1,
iii.
iii.
2, 997, a,
c. 2,
(xi.
1059, a, 38,
6, viii. 2.
34 sqq. 1060, b,
23),
298
particular things
ARISTOTLE
of sense, passing
and
;
'
indistinct as
they
are,
and that
all
as formed, presup-
however, as
3
we
manner
of difficulties.
question
The problem returns in the form of the whether the ultimate grounds of things are
latter
parts
the
material
minations. 4
be adduced.
For either view plausible arguments may On the one hand there is the analogy of
we name when
we have
to
On
the other
hand there are the conditions of knowledge, which we attain to by a process of determination through concepts in the assignment of genera and species. And as between these again there arises immediately the question, whether the highest genera or the lowest species ought to be treated as the true princvpia. The former would be universal, including all individual existence as an ultimate principle should do. The latter would be determinate conceptions, and out of such only could the
individual in its peculiarity of character be obtained. 5
vii. 15, 1039, b, 27; 1009, a, 36, 1010, a, 3, of. i. 987, a, 34; xiii. 9, 1086, a, 37,
2 3
1
Metaph.
b, 21).
4 a
iv. 5, 6,
v.
b, 8.
tA
7i/7j
crToixeia Ka!
apxas viroKan-
fidvetv
4<ttIi>
998, b, 14 sqq. (xi. 1, 1059, b, 34). Among the varied and often intricate forms of Aristotle's dialectic, it is only possible to state here the leading line of reasoning.
iii.
Metwph.
METAPHYSICS
On
the like considerations rests the other
1
299
difficulty, to
which Aristotle rightly gives special prominence the question whether it is only individual things that are actual, or
unlimited no knowledge
is
possible,
and since
all
of universals.
lie
The
or
latter is
which
universal
existing
independently,
the Ideal
Theory of Plato. 3
particular
An
case
is
of
a different nature.
at' all (e.g.
universals
stantial,
Number)
the
first
as in
must
affirm
is
proposition
but the
opposite opinion
One
as substance
Metajj/i.
iii.
4 init.
o.
6 fin.
(cf. vii.
13
init.,
first
ibid.
1060, b,
19.
In the
is
' /xiv Metapli. iii. 4, 999, b, 1 odv f*.T]dev otl irapa ra icad' eKaora, obdev ttv eirj vot\tov bXKb. tt6.vto.
:
called the
irao'5>'xoA7ro)T(iTr)/fald>'a7KaioToTij
similarly in xiii. 10, 1086, a, 10; and we shall find later on, that its importance and difficulty rest not merely on the opposition of Aristotle to Plato, but also on the intrinsic contradiction involved in the foundations of his own system. 2 That this Apory coincides with that adduced on p. 298, Aristotle himself asserts in
<uV07jTa, and hence he here again adduces the reasons, which were there mentioned. 3 Mebaph. iii. 4, c. 6, 1003, a, Only another 5, cf. p. 161, 4. expression for the above is the
question
fin.),
(iii.
4,
whether the
j/
:
%v or apiBnQ
to
30).
300
ARISTOTLE
To the same head belongs the Numbers and Figures are Substances
1
question whether
For as the qualities of bodies are mere predicates from which we distinguish the bodies themselves as their
and as these bodies presuppose, as their elements, the surface, the line, the point, and unity, it would seem that surface and unity must be as substantial as body is while on the other hand these have
substrata,
;
to be
and cease
to be, as
as
it
seems, be of
:
accidental. 3
:
Individual things,
except in so far as
it
And
finally,
must
be whether both
not.
ot these
it
If
we
say Yes,
difference
1
between them.
iii.
Hfetaph.
1,
4,
1001,
c.
a,
xi
2
1059, b, 27,
iii.
2,
1060,
Ibid.
iii.
6,
a, 36.
passage.
* As Plato supposed, in full accordance with Aristotle's view, Cf Zhller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 628 sq. 805 sq.
.
b,
12 sqq., and on
6 init.
c. 3,
viii.
32
We
'
METAPHYSICS
decide
301
whether the
priTicipid
changing, then
to deeper principia,
If they be
it
how
can be
The
like dif-
Being.
How,
fall
for
example,
is
which
those of Substance
above those
relating to
unity, concerns
The combination of the manifold into him chiefly as leading up to the inquiry
the differentia can be one in conthough he recognises that the same question may be raised in all cases where things of a different
1 Metaph. iii. 4, 1000, a, 5 sqq. (xi. 2, 1060, a, 27). i xii. 4. Aristotle Ibid. answers (ibid. 1070, b, 17) that the final grounds of things are only analogically the same for
all.
3 This question also occurs in Anal. Post. ii. 6, 92, a, 29. In
Interpr. u. 5, 17, , 13, it is proposed, discussed more fully in Metaph. vii. 12, again touched upon in viii. 3, 1043, b, 4 sqq.,
Be
302
ARISTOTLE
be seen,
is in its essence one and the upon the 'relation of the possible and the actual of Matter and Form. The problems of Becoming and Change are of still greater importance
cases, as will
same.
It is based
If a thing
comes
?
to be,
does
it
arise out of
If a
become something, or nothing ? Does change mean the becoming of opposite out of opposite, or of the same out of the same ? The one
thing ceases to be, does
seems to be impossible
take on
come out
the qualities of
of cold).
opposite
(e.g.
warmth the
qualities
The other
it is
impossible, because
a definite time
alternative
come
the
to be that
which
it
already
is.
analogous problem whether those things which act upon each other are likes or opposites. 3
similar case
is
In
all
principles of philosophy.
this question coincides with the other, as to Change, since that
Cf. Phys. i. 2 fin, where Lycophron and others are blamed for running into difficulties by the inference that one must at the same time be many: Sxnrep
which acts rnirrr-nnTnli will! * that which suffers Sxrr' avaynrfb. rb irda-xoi' fh rb iroiovi/fierafidWeiv
:
'iv
re Kal
8e
ical
ilvai,
p.^
ravTiKelfieya
Kal
yap ivT\ex^f2
rb
tv
Swdfiei
CI
Phys.
c.
i.
6,
189, a, 22, c.
et Corr. i. 7, 324, a 9). P Hence it is true that, on the one hand, things which are not opposed cannot act upon one another: o'jk i<rTi]<ri yap SUi)X
tjjs
((fen.
7,
190, b, 30,
Qiotm
;
'6<ra
See Gen.
et Corr.
c.
6,
189, a, 22,
c.
191, a, 34.
METAPHYSICS
*
303
his forerunners
had made
He
philosophies
primarily
it
which made
first
impossible for
them
and he further
and
final causes. 3
The
by him because
of the difficulties
moving
cause, 5
and because
basis
way
in
.arbitrarily
The same
basis. 7
To
He
is
overlooks the
ill. 5,
'
See
Be
Casio,
Metaph.
5,
1009, a, 36, 1010, a, 1. 3 Metaphj. i. 7, 988, a, 34 sqq. b, 28, Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 32 sqq., Gen. An. v. 1, 778, b, 7.
988, b, 29 sqq. 5 Metaph. i. 8, 988, b, 26 ; Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 24 Gen. et Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, Be Coelo, iii. 5, 304, b, 11, cf. 8 ibid. i. 3, 270, a, .14; Pfoys. i. 7, 190, a, 13 sqq. iii. 5, 205, a, 4. 7 Aristotle, indeed, generally
i.
8,
puts
Thales,
304
fact that every
ARISTOTLE
;
change presupposes a substratum that under alterations of matter, the form maintains itself that it is not all kinds of change which could go on
and that from the changeableness of to draw any conclusion as The theory of the unity to the universe as a whole. of opposites he dismisses by the argument that Heraad
infinitum,
;
earthly things
we ought not
1
clitus is in conflict
with the
Law
of Contradiction. 2
The
His assumptions as to
the
by EmpeSphere.'
3
in
'
the
ments
is
which are
remarks
matter known to us as
fire,
water, &c. 5
is
He
not explained
d.
Gr.
i.
600
3
and
483,
i.
I.
989, a, 22-30 329, b, 1, c. 7, 334, a, 18, 26, c. 6 mit. ibid, i. 1, 314, b, 10, 3i5, a, 3, c. 8, 325,
Metaph.
8,
Gen. et Corr.
ii.
1,
gives a detailed refutation of the atomistic reduction (by Bmpbdoclbs) of aWaiutris to Sicicpurts. * The opposites ' warm and cold,' &c, on which Aristotle bases his own theory of the ele-
ments. s Gen.
ii.
b, 16.
In
De
Caelo,
iii.
7 init
he
3,
i.
8,
325, b, 19,
; :
METAPHYSICS
at
all,
1
305
and that in the theory of the pores and effluxes an explanation of the mutual influence of bodies is put forward which would logically lead to absolute Atomism. 2 The two 'causes of motion' in the Empedoclean system he considers not to be properly deduced
from
since
first
no laws of their
scope
is left,
and Hate not and he remarks that since working are laid down, an inordinate
also divides,
He
world to be arbitrary and untenable, 5 and the theory of the composition of the soul out of the elements to be beset
with
difficulties
of
all
kinds. 6
that the philosophy of Empedocles would lead in the end to a sensationalism whioh would
The
kind.
criticisms
Aristotle
plausible basis.
positions,
we
start
and
if
we
theory
is
think
it
way
divisible
lie
Be
a 19.
,
Part. An.
cf.
viii. 1,
5
i.
1,
640, , 19
Phys.
Gen.
et
Corr.
i.
8;
252,
i.
a, 4.
viii.
Zellee,
3.
3
Pit. d.
Phys.
1,251, b, 28 sqq.
;
Be
d.
iii.
Gr. pt.
8,
i.
iii.
Metaph.
98fi,
Be An.
;
i.
5,
409, b, 23-410,
b,
27
'
Gen.
I.
et
Corr.
ii.
6,
sqq. (cf.
Zellee,
ibid.
333, b, 2 703, 1)
;
cf.
VOL.
306
constituents. 1
ARISTOTLE
Aristotle, however, neither admits these
coming of
Rather does he
which
He
and the interaction of bodies or the passage of the elements into one another or the processes of becoming and change. 5 The theory that the atoms are infinite in number and kind is also rejected, because the pheno-
mena can be
all
movement of the elements in nature are also limited by number; and it is Aristotle's view that a limited number of original entities is always to be preferred to
an
infinity of
is
better than
the limitless. 6
space, so far
i. 8, 324, b, 35 316, a, 13 sqq.; cf. Zbllkb, Hid. 764 sqq. 2 Gen. et Corr. i. 2, 317, a, 1 But Aristotle expresses sqq. himself more exactly on this point, though without explicit reference to the Atomic theory, in Phys. iii. 6 sq. 3 Gen. et Corr. i. 2, 317, a, 17 sqq.
1
Gen. et Corr.
2,
Phys.
vi.
Be
Coilo,
iii.
4,
sqq.
c.
303, a, 20.
5
Gen.
c. 9,
sqq.
4,
8,
325, b, 34
Coelo,
iii.
Be
ibid. c. 7, c. 8, 306, 303, a, 24 a, 22 sqq. shall have more to say on this subject later, 6 Be CmJo, iii. 4, 303, a, 17 sqq. 29 sqq. b, 4 cf. Phys. i. 4 Jin. viii. 6, 259, a, 8.
We
;
METAPHYSICS
30?
as
'
to explain
phenomena such
vacuum nothing could have any particular place towards which it would tend, and everything would necessarily move with equal quickness. 2 He finds that movement and its different kinds
ferences of weight, for in a
are, in the
principles. 3
He
teleology of nature,
and that instead of giving us any principles on which phenomena rest, it refers us to an unsolved necessity,
or to the assertion that
as they are. 4
.in
fact things
which can only here be mentioned in passing against the theory of an infinite number of co-existent worlds s
;
doctrine
concerning
the
soul, 7
and
his
is
so closely
Bmpe-
Phyg.
iv.
7-9, of.
c. 6.
on this
2
later.
iv. 8,
4 See Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. 788 sqq., and Gen. An. v. 8 vers.
Phyg.
Ccelo,
i.
214, b, 28 sqq.
iii.
fin.,
Be
33 sqq.
300, b,
ii.
2,
8.
theory of
6
;
where Aristotle's criticism of the mechanical explanation of nature by Democritus, is very similar to Plato's criticism in the Phcedo of that proposed by
Anaxagoras.
5
Be
Casio, iv. 2,
Be
Ccelo,
i.
see
Zellee,
ibid. 797, 2.
"
'
u.
a, 378.
xii. 6,
1071, b, 31.
x 2
308
docles that
objections.
it
ARISTOTLE
is
open
infinite
for the
most part
to the
same
is
The
number
also
mistaken inasmuch as
it
would
make
all
Again, since
number, so must be the primary bodies also. Since all bodies have a natural magnitude, their constituent
paris (the so-called
size
;
6fj.oiofj.sprf)
cannot be of indefinite
logically obliged to
and since
all
in each thing, as
Anaxagoras was
Further,
if
kinds of matter. 1
primary matter
is
to be
6fioio/j.spi)
Anaxagoras
is
recognises the existence of change in things, but the doctrine of the unchangeability of their constituent parts
The continuity of is negated by the infinite number of their constibodies tuents, 3 in spite of Anaxagoras's weak attack upon the .theory of empty space. 4 Aristotle finds that Anaxagoras
inconsistent with that admission.
is
was
6
;
Empedocles. 5
The
original
mingling of
it,
all
kinds of
would be unthinkable
De
the latter part o ch. viii. infra. ' Phys. iv. 6, 213, a, 22. 5 De Cwlo, iv. 2, 309, a, 19. " Besides the physical objections which are raised against' it in Metaph. i. 8, Gen. et Con: i.
10, 327, b,
both of this statement and of the corresponding one (that, at all times, everything is in eve y-
METAPHYSICS
but
if it
00
were-
more
'
correctly stated
it
would lead
to the
substitution of
and withto
The
theory,
common
him and
others, of a
to
be
it
still
unsatisfactory,
on the one
it mis--
hand,
With regard
little
first
to the Eleatics
point
they talk
different
meanings of unity
limit in
attribute to
unconditional
Melissus).
2,
185, a,
ii.
10,
i.
and De
Cailo,
13,
21)4,
3 init., a, 21
;
on the other hand Parmenides is always treated with respect. 5 Metaph. i. 5, 986, b, 10 sqq.
P/ii/s.
iii.
i. 2, 184, b,.25; De Cwl, 298, b, 14; Gen. et dorr. i. cf. Sext. Math, x, 325, a, 17
1,
8,
46,
310
ARISTOTLE
Being
is
'
we
attribute to
it
as quality
which
being. 1
latter,
if
there
not-
The
'
Being
'
is
'
mon predicate
(e.g.
of
all
things,
and Not-being
perfectly
divisibility of
it
as extended
They deny
must
start either
from Being or
are untenable.
They overlook a third possibility, which not. only makes Becoming conceivable, but is the sole expression of any actual process of becoming namely, that anything becomes what it is, nob out of absolute Notbeing, but out of that which is relatively not-being. 4
ment
rests
upon
similar
misconceptions,
moveinasmuch
as he treated space
discrete
quantities,
1 This is the essential point of the complicated dialectical discussion in Phys. i. 2, 105, a, 20-c. 3 vers. fin. On the second half of these discussions (c. 3),
Metaph.
iii.
4,
1001, b, 7; cf.
Zeller,
4
ibid. 541
2,
cf.
Plato, Parm.
244,
Soph.
2
B
i.
sq.,
see
cf.
Zblleb, Zbller,
ibid. p.
3,
562
Phys.
187,
3;
ibid,
563 sq.
be treated more in detail in ch. viii. ivfm.) On the other hand, the Eleatic hypothesis is answejed in Gen. et Corr. i. 8, 325, a, 13 merely by a reference to' the opposed facts of experience.
METAPHYSICS
311
number
of actual
in themselves
all
possible subdivisions. 1
Still
is
limitless
and motionis
How
we
can
it
One,'
unless
Here
among
the Pytha-
the basis of
all
to
Yet how can that which is extended in space be derivable from numbers, or how can weight arise out of that which is neither light nor heavy ? 6 How, in
number.
fine,
all ?
What
was
'
the centre
'
itself portions
of the limitless
?7
Phjs. Phys.
Phys.
vi. 9, c. 2,
233, a, 21
of.
Zbhee,
2
1
ibid.
645 sqq.
i.
3 init.; cf.
2, 185, b,
i.
Zelleh,
ibid. 554, 3.
19 sqq. 989, b, 29 sqq. 5 Metaph. i. 8, 990, a, 12 sqq. iii. 4, 1001, b, 17, xiii. 8, 1083, b, 8 sqq. xiv. 3, 1090, a, 30; Be Cash, iii. 1 fin.
i. 4
Afetaph.
8,
Metajjh. xiv. 5, 1092, b, 15. Tl e passage refers to Platonics and Pythagoreans together. Other remarks, which refer immediately to Plato and his school, but also apply to the Pythagoreans, need
312
AltISTOTL$
by one and the same number, are we to distinguish between different classes of numbers by reason of the differences of the things they signify, or are we to deny
the variety of these things by reason of the likeness of
we come upon singular The theory of number itself very incompletely worked out, 4 and there are numerand
caprice. 3
damental reconsideration.
nection there
is
no account
What
mock
Metaph.
i.
5, 986, a, 6,
987,
11.
a, 19.
6,
With regard
the One, this view is explained (against Plato and the Pythagoreans) in Metaph. iii. 4, 1001, a, 9, 27 cf. x. 2; and it is there especially remarked that the assertion of the substantiality of the One would destroy the plurality of things. As to the &.iretpov cf. Phys. iii. 5, and also
c. 4,
See Zeller, ibid. 367, 2. Such as the Antichthon (Zeller, ibid. 383, 4\ the harmony of the spheres (JJe Cwlo, ii. 9), a theory about time {Phys.
a
'
'
iv.
10, 218, a, 33, cf. Zelleu, ibid. 406, 3 sq.), and certain
views as to the soul {Be An. i. 2. 401, a, 16, u. 3, fin. cf. Anal. Post.
ii.
203, a,
1.
METAPHYSICS
313
to
any metaphysical propositions, but to combat the scepticism which brought all manner of
establish
although at
of Socrates'
The services rendered by Socrates by no means minimised by Aristotle, the same time he emphasises the limitation achievement to the sphere of ethics, and
basis. 2
any metaphysical
Of the
lesser Socratic
and the
The
as thoroughgoing as
His own
He was com-
him
'
to
Thus
it is
IQ07, b, 20, x. 1, lOo.'i, a, 35, xi. 6 init. ; the latter in the treatise on the fallacies. 2 Cf the passages cited, Zelleb, ibid, at pp. 94, 2, and lhat even the Ethics of 1143
5, cf. o. 4,
.
proving that it would not only destroy all motion and change,
but also
:
or
power one who does not now hear would be deaf one who is not actually building would be
;
Socrates are one-sided, is shown by Aristotle in Eth. Nic. iii. 7, 1113, b, 14 sq. c. 11, 1116, b, 3
sqq. 1117, a, 17 sqq.
s
no architect. * The former are spoken of in Metaph. v. 29, 1024, b, 32, viii. 3,
1043,
!>52
1
b,
23
(cf.
Zellbe,
ibid..
9, vi.
13,
1114, b,
and
ix. 3 (cf. Zelleb, Aristotle here conf utes the Megarian principle, that the merely possible is actual, by
Metaph,
the exaggerations of the moral doctrine of the Cynics, i Supra, pp. 14, 56 sq., 162,
&c.
314
in no spirit
ARISTOTLE
of jealousy or detraction that
Aristotle
comes back again and again to discuss the Platonic doctrines, and to set out their defects from all points of
view with untiring patience; for such a criticism of his master was unavoidable if he was to defend his own
philosophic individuality, and his right to found a
school, against the
new
fame of
his predecessor
Academy.
first,
Ideal
'
Theory,
as
such;
secondly,
ulti-
mate basis of things, Matter and the One. The Ideal Theory of Plato rested upon
tion that
it is
his convic-
buttress of the
Ideal
is
must exist for itself as something substantial beyond phenomena, Aristotle parts company with him. This, therefore, is the central point about which revolves
that
this
2
3
assumption that
it is
Of.
p.
197 sqq.
METAPHYSICS
devoid of
all scientific
315
it
leads in its
results to difficulties
soluble,
phenomena,
makes them
He
not
is
established
it,
there
be attainable otherwise.
Ideas
is,
thing of which
is
said to be
the Idea
; '
for in the
man
(to
In
nothing more
to explain things
is
man who
But
iroWaxv
s'
1x6'''-'
Sv(TKo\lav,
ovBevbs ?ittov &tottov rb tpdvat fiev eival Ttvas (pfoeis irapa ras eV tm
oupavu>,
yap eKeivoi ovdev &\\o ino'ovv, % avBpdirovs aibiovs, oS6' ovroi to tlSii a.x\' % aitrdirra aiSia. Similarly Metapli. vii. 16, 1040, b, 32: ttoiovo'li' oZv [ras ideas] txs avras t$ eXSei tois (pdapro'is, a :jTodv8punrov
Kal
aiirdiinrov,
(pdi/aL
irpocrrtdevrts
to?s
Tins
aiSia.
alffBijTo'is
in
to.
fiev
to 5i (pBaprd abrb yap av8p<m6v <paaw that xa\ "ttttov /cal vyieioc, &K\o S' oiifiiv, itapaitXfoiov iroiouiTes rots Seoiis /lev ehai
ipdaKovaiv A.v6punroei5e7s
Si
rb pf/^ta rb avrb. Ibid. xiii. 9, 1086, b, 10 of. Eth. N. i. 4, 1096, a, 34, End. i.. 8, 1218, a,
aicrdTjTo7s
10.
3
Metaph.
i.
9 init.
xiii.
4,
oute
1078, b, 32.
31G
ARISTOTLE
be separate from that whereof it is the Substance, nor Genus from that to which (as forming part of the
essence)
it
belongs. 1
This proposition, in
were waived, the Platonist would only pass out of one difficulty into another. It would appear, for
even
if this
and the Platonic school Yet accordingly ascribed Ideas only to natural things.
;
divided
when once it is admitted that the Universal Essence is among individual things, it must follow that
artificial
products of
all
kinds; 2 and
Thus
inasmuch as
it
must
under a
and subordinate
must be several Ideas; 4 or again, the various general marks which together make up a concept must be themselves so many Substances, and it would follow that one Idea would be made out of many
in form
Ideas, or one Substance out of
1 Metaph. i. 9, 991, b, 1: Z&ifnv &c aSiVaiw, elvcu x a p's T obo-lav koI ot i\ oio-ia; xiii. 9, 1085, a, 23, cf . vii. 6, 1031, a, 31, c. 14, 1039, b, 15. 2 Metaph. i. 9, 990, b, 11 sqq. 22, 991, b, 6, xiii. 4, 1079, a, 19, c. 8, 1084, a, 27 ; Anal. Post. i.
there
many
1
real Substances,
24, 85, b,
Gl'. pt>
3
i.
cf.
2.
i.
Zeller, Ph.
991, a, 29,
d.
587,
Metaph.
9,
xiii.
1079, b, 34.
vapAteiyiia
*
e'ffTcu).
i.
Metaph.
9,
991, a, 26.
METAPHYSICS
and these sometimes of opposite kinds.
the Idea
is
1
317
Or
again, if
to be Substance,
2
it
be a general concept
individuals. 3
for it is
many
other
it is
among
of which
Of Ideas
it
of
is
the Idea,
like
the
numerically one,
we subit,
in
which case
it clearly
Aristotle considers the assertion that the Ideas contain the essence of things to be inconsistent with the view that they are at the same time incorporeal. He
'
matter of
the Ideas
'
),
all
process of becoming belongs to the essence and conception of them, in which case the conception of
them
cannot exist
by
itself separately. 8
Similarly, he argues
Metaph.
vii.
13,
103!), a, 3,
p. 215, svpra,
5
from Categ.
vii.
c. 2.
14; cf. c. 8, 1033, b, 19, i. 9, 991, a, 29, xiii. 9, 1085 a, 23. Metaph. xiii. 9, 108G, a, 32, vii. 16, 1040, a, 26 sqq. cf. iii. 6,
c.
'
Metaph.
15, 1040, a,
8-
27.
' Top. vi. 6, 143, b, 23. Length in itself must be either airfares or irhdros Ix ", and then thagenus must be at once a species also.
' Phys. iv. 1, 209, b, 33; cf Zell. ibid. 556 sq., 628 sq. "
i.
P,
992, b,
9, xiii.
Metaph.
vii. 6,
103l,b,15 ;cf.
passage,
Pfffs.
ii.
2,
193 b, 35 qq.
i
'
318
their objects.
ARISTOTLE
There can be no
'
standing by
itself, for
under
all
possible categories,
and determines
itself dif;
aad as
among which
which of
there
is,
fact
itself ex1
further objection
is
an
the
Idea
is
common
its
definition,
common
them. 2
phenomenon must
Even
1
if
Eth. N. i. 4 (Eud. i. 8) of. preceding notes. As to the principle that what is Trp6repov and vtrrepon cannot be reduced to a common generic concept, see Polit. iii. 1, (Zell., i bid, 571 1 275, a, 34 sqq. On the same principle in sq.). Eth. Nie. he. ait. Aristotle remarks in criticising the 'Idea of the Good,' that the upholders of the doctrine of Ideas themselves say that there is no Idea of that which stands in the relation of Before and After; but this is actually the case with the Good, for it is found in all the categories: e.g., a substantial good is the Divinity and Reason, a qualitative good is Virtue, a quantitive good is Measure, a relative good is the Useful, &c. Thus, these different Goods stand
;
no
common
generic concept,
and therefore in no
9,
991,
a,
2,
vii.
13,1039, a, cf. vii. 6, 2, 1031, b, 28. Aristotle expresses this objection here by sayingthat the doctrine of Ideas leads to the rplros ii/Spawos. Cf. Zell., Plat. Stud. p. 257, and
Ph. d. Gr.pt. i. p. 623, 5. He finds the parallel of the rp'ros &vBpanros (which, however, is
'
equally true of the ideas themselves, cf. Soph. El,, c. 22, 178, b, 36) in the change of the universal into an individual of the
same name.
METAPHYSICS
would
still
could by
is
no means
fulfil
appearances.
As
Even the
some kind of copying and The principle of motive power, without which no process of becoming and no explanation of nature is conceivable, 3 is wholly wanting. So also is the principle of final Even in regard to the theory of Knowledge, cause. 4
references to
own
service
which Plato
if
then they are not truly the essence of things, and there-
to
no sure con-
hand, could
we
arrive,
And
assumed
creased
if
we
Numbers, and
335, b, 7 sqq. 1217, b, 23.
4
so interposing
Eth. End.
Metaph.
i.
9,
991, a, 12 (xiii.
of.
8,
5, init.). 9, 991, a, 20, 992, 1079, b. 24), i. 6, 987, b, 13, viii. 6, 1045, b. 7, xii. 10, 1075, b, 34. 3 Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 8. 19 sqq. b, 3 sqq. (xiii. 5) 992, a, 24 sqq. b, 7, O. 7, 988, b, 3, vii. 8, 1033, b, 26, xii. 6, 1071, b, 14, u. 10, 1075, b, 16, 27 Gen. et Curr. ii. 9,
i.
Metaph.
a,
28
(xiii. 5,
Metaph.
i.
9, 991, a,
vii. 6,
i.
12
(xiii.
a,
5,
10 79, b, 15),
-ret
1031,
22,
30
83, a,
32:
yap
etSri
x^pera-
reperl:
opivrA.
320
ARISTOTLE
between the Ideas and the things of sense the whole The difficulties which would science of Mathematics.
thus arise were set out by Aristotle with a painstaking
may
ways of escape
Pythagorising
He
of
of numbers, or
how we are to think to ourselves the causality how they can contribute to the existence He shows how capricious and contrathings. 2
asks
is
3
dictory
objects.
He
in
character
between conceptual determinations, which are qualitative, and numerical determinations, which are quantiremarking that two numbers make up one number, but two Ideas do not make one Idea, and that among the numbers which make up numbers no qualitative,
there
were Ideal
Numbers. 4
careful thoroughness, 5
Metaph.
:
i.
9,
991, b,
9,
with
apii/iois
2
nyiv
(tiiroiceifi.ciiziv).
things are likewise numbers, one does not see of what use the ideal numbers are to them; if, on the other hand, things are
if
the answer
xiv. 6 init., ibid. 1093, b, 21 cf. c. 2, 1090, a, 7 sqq 3 Loo. cit. from 1092, b, 29; cf the commentaries on this passage
*
Metaph.
only arranged according to number, the same would be true of the ideas of them, which would not be numbers, but \6~)Oi iv
Cf.
Zbll. Ph.
867
i.
d.
Gr. pt.
i.
p.
568
5
sq. 854,
sq. 884.
9,
Loc.
2.
cit.
991, b, 21 sqq.
992, a,
METAPHYSICS
321
But
is
a funda-
It is not,
also to the
But it is to be noticed that, in Aristotle's view, if once we assumed the existence of Ideas and Ideal Numbers, the ordinary mathematical numbers would lose their status, for they could only have the same component parts and therefore the same nature as the Ideal Numbers themselves. 3 The position of magnitudes would be equally dubious for qud ideal they must go by ideal numbers, and qud mathematical they must go by mathematical number 4 and
;
is
must be
and a
without
line,
solid without
or else
all
which Plato and the Platonists had sought to find the ultimate basis and constituents of their Numbers
in
asserts that
it
is
impossible to
know
1
the
constituent parts of
all
'
23,
3,
c. 3,
3
5,
* Mctaph. i. 9, 992, b, 13 ; xiv. 1C90, b, 20. 5 Ibid, i, 9, 992, a, 10 xiii. 9, 1085, a, 7, 31.
;
against Speusippns.
9,
Cf.
Zelleb,PA.
d, Gr. pi.
i.
991, b, 27
xiv,
628
sq., 805.
3,
1090, b,
32 sqq.
I.
VOL.
322
ARISTOTLE
1
knowledge cannot be derived from any prior knowledge. He doubts whether all being can have the same constituent parts, 2 or
whether out of the combination of the same elements, at one time a number and at another time a magnitude could arise. 3 He remarks that such constituent parts can only be ascribed to substances, and only to those substances which have some admixture of
materiality. 4
He
:
nor as universal
more things or Ideas than one not as would not be of the nature of substance. 5 In another connection, he takes
stituents of
;
and
He
itself,
The notion
;
of unity
only a
1 Metwph. i. 9, 992, b, 24 against which, indeed, his own distinction of demonstrative and inductive knowledge might be used. 2 This is suggested, without mention of Plato,in Metapli. xii. 4, 1070, a, 33 sqq. cf. what was adduced on pp. 300-301, supra. 3 Metapli. iii. 4, 1001, b, 17 sqq. 4 Ibid. i. 9, 992, b, 18 xiv. 2
; ;
5 Metajih. xiii. 10, 1086, b, 19, 1087, a. 4. 6 Metapli. xiv. 1, 1087, b, 4, 12,26, c. 2,1089,b,ll; cIZellee, Ph.. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 628, 3. '
Of
it
init.
METAPHYSICS
quality
323
or,
more
and
even that
is
may
also be a
the
One
'
will
be
'
as the only
Subapart
position which,
Number
itself
im-
Again,
if
One
is
which would be raised if, with Speusippus, we attempt to distinguish the One from the Good as a special principle
by
itself.
4
As
for
'
Little,' this
concep-
tion
indicates
bare relations
could least of
and
all
kind as
How
which
can substances, he asks again, consist of that is not substantial, and how can constituent parts
?
5
Or
if
we
are to take
more
as not-being
is
would be
altogether perverse.
escape the
monism
x. 2
;
by assuming a princ.
Metaph.
xiv. 1, 1087, b.
33,
and
xi. 2,
1060, a,
36;
of.
supra, p. 31 2, n. 2, add p. 272, n. 2. 2 Metaph. iii. 4, 1001, a, 29. 3 Metaph. xiv. i, 1091, a, 29,
Metaph.
a,
i.
9,
992, b,
xiv
1,
1088,
15 sqq.
Y2
324
ciple of not-being.
ARISTOTLE
This assumption
is
not necessary
Being
itself is
only
'
and
it
would
According
Being and
'
'
the manifold
from
of substance only,
and not
movement
'
must the Tdeas whose matter it is be likewise moved. 4 The main defect of the Platonic view lies in the position that opposition as such is the first and original principle of all things. If all does arise out of an opposition, still it is not out of mere opposition as such, which is
negation, but out of relative opposition out of the sub-
comes
comes,-
out
of which
it'
and
it
this
matter
is
which
which
this
is
about
to
become.
The nature
of matter in
He had
as the
in
Bad
namely, that
it is
becoming. 5
Metaph.
xiv.
;
By
1
this
c.
sqq.
3 3
'
cf. p.
Metapli. xiv. 2, 1088, b, 35 223, supra. Jbid. 1089, a, 12. Ibid. 1. 15, 31 sqq. Ibid. i. 9, 992, b. 7.
init.
4,
1091, b, 30 sqq. xii. 10, 1075, a, 32 sqq.; Phijs i. 9, cf. Zbllee, Ph. d. Or. pt. i. p. 614.
METAPHYSICS
325
matter tends to
its
own
annihilation,
into
of the
'
and Little (as was above remarked Unlimited of the Pythagoreans) must be a thing
'
existing for
itself,
a substance
which
is
we
be
We
ask
if
they arise by a
out of the
no answer. 3
the
We
how
One and
Many
the the
first first
There is no deductiqn of uneven number or of any of the rest except ten. 6 We are not shown from whence those which
is
made up
7
:
the indefinite
is
duality which,
by
its
to
and we are not shown how the duality of the Great and Little can, with the aid of the One, bring forth any numbers which could
generate the remaining units
1
Phys.i.
9,
xiv. 4, 1092, a, 1.
sqq.
204, a, 8-34, cf. c. 4, 203, a, 1 sqq. xiv. 5, 1092, a, 21 sqq. xiii. R, 1085, b, 4 sqq.; cf. c. 7, 1082, a, 20.
'*
Phys.
iii. 5,
directed against Speusippus. 5 Ibid. 1085, b, 23, c. 8, 1083, xii. 8, 1073, a, 18. b, 36 sqq.
;
Zbllbk,
'
Netapli.
i.
326
ARISTOTLE
1
There are a
sufficient.
all
Not
upon a misunderstanding
of Plato. 2
Nevertheless,
it
first,
that
universal concepts
all
the concepts
and
at the most only the genera and species of things, and not the things themselves second, that the Ideas are
;
phenomena, the coming to be and ceasing to be of change and movement, with all the natural
properties of things that rest thereon. 3
Metapli. xiv. 3, 1091, a, 9. Cf. Zbllhr, Platon. Stud, 257 sqq. 3 Aristotle frequently insists
"
1
In the direction
METAPHYSICS
of Aristotle's polemical energy to these points,
-
827
we may
recognise in him the spirit of the Natural Philosopher reaching out towards clear definitions of the actual
facts.
His powers
is
him
in dialectic
But he
is
determined
only as verify
phenomena, or take them back to To the logical Idealism of Plato their common cause. there is wedded in Aristotle the Eealism of the student
into unity a series of
of Nature.
So
far the
av
tis,
ti'
ttotc CUjUjSaA-
'
ri
A.Tai
ra
cISti
-t)
tols
allots
rwv
Kal
t
yap
a,
altrdriTav
rots
yiyvofi4yois
(pBeipopevois
ofae yap Kivt 0b>s oijre fieTafiuKrjs ouSejums 4(mv atrta auToIs; and at 1. 20: rb Se \eyety
aiira.
24
ffoiplas
wepl
/iev
twv
tyavepoiv rd alrtov
tovto
Keyofiev
eXaKafJLey
(ouSev
i)
yap
KapaSeiy/jLara
eivat
Kal jUT-
trepl tt)s
airlas '66iu
apxh
c^eic avTuv
T&Wa
Kei/oKoyeiv iarri
tt)s fieTa/3o\v)s'),
&c.
328
ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER
VII.
CONTINUATION.
There
are three
fall
to be
discussed.
follows
which is the inquiry into the conception of Substance, must precede all other investigations. To this question Plato in his Ideal Theory had answered that that which in a true and original sense is actual was to be sought
for only in the
classes,
common
which are expressed by general conceptions. Aristotle, as has been seen, was not content with the answer but for that very reason he attributed the more
:
was
and he felt that it was from the true consame relation that any revision of Platonism must start. The first question for PhilcrPlato's view,
ception of
the
of
'
substance,'
which
is
universal.
way
as to
throw
See
p.
METAPHYSICS
essential actuality
329
individual,
it
to
tbe
side
of the
had
made
becomes detached
To him Form
full actuality
is
:
developed into
undetermined universality,
which
this
is
way
to
Form.
The
fine,
relation of
accord-
y-i
Form, in
is
;
essentially related
Matter,
and
Matter to Form
Movement.
first
first
'/T
motor constitute the third pair of concepts with which Metaphysics is concerned. In the following pages Aristotle's theory will be set forth under these
the
Jhree
heads.
(1)
f.^UH
T"
P*0
the Universal.
the universal as
it is
ascribed Being, in
only.
It was
and original sense, to that by a limitation of this Being, by a combination of Being with Not-Being, that individual
its fullest
These, therefore, had, outside and above them, as something other than themselves, the
universal
essences,
Aristotle
Theory in
from
330
ARISTOTLE
itself.
1
the thing
universal
is
many
things
in
to
which belongs
common, 2 or, more accurately, that them by reason of their nature, and
and always. 3
It follows that all
therefore, necessarily
of things
subjects.
or,
and not
Even when a number of these properties are combined to make the conception of a genus, we get
thereby something which belongs to
all
the
things
them
is
as
distinct.
For
voXXa
If,
substituted Aristotle's
is
ttoWwv.*
not anyIt
thing subsisting by
is
itself, it
cannot be Substance.
6
name
of Substance
wavTaxov
is
used in various
elvai.
ret
Metaph.
v. 9,
yap
/jt,kv
2w/cpanjs
5m
tovs
dpifffzobs,
oil
'
fifyv
eX^/Htre ye
twv
a0' etcaffTov
oil
Ka96\ov Kaff aiira inrdpxei. See also BONITZ, Ind. Arist. 356, b, 4 sqq. Kampe, Erkeimtnissth. d. Aritt.
160
'
sq.
Anal. Post.i. 11
otv
elyat
oiiK
'/)
init.
eiSr)
\afietv, to Sk X aP~ leiv oXtiov Gvn$aiv6vT03v hvaX^piv irepl ras ideas eGTiv Cf. C. 4, 1073, b, 30 sq. 2 Metaph. vii. 13, 1038, b, 11 to 8e Ka96\ov icoivSv tovto yap Aeyerai Ka96\ov o irXeioo'lv inrdpxelv iritpiiKtv iii. 4, 909, b, 34 ovtu yap Xt'yoy.ev to Ka9eicaffTOv to api8fA$ %v, Ka66\ov Se to iirl tovtwv. De Interpr. 7, 17, a, 89 Part. An. i. 4, 644, a 27, and supra. 3 Anal. Post. i. 4, 73, b, 26 Ka86\ov 5e Keyw o av Kara iravT6s Te iirdpxy al Ko8' avrb Kal $ ouni, (pavepbv apa oti oaa aalhjAov ^| aviyKris vrdpxei tois Ttp6.yji.aaai c. 31, 87, b, 32: rb yap ae\ /col
effTtv
p-ey
ev
ti
el
Trapa
to.
tw
TvoWa
ecrrai
"
avdynri,
an65ei^LS
elvai p.ivTOi ev
KaTa iroAAwf
JJe All.
iii.
here
by
'
(by Strtjmpell, Gesch.d.theor. Phil. b. d. Gr. 213 sq. cf. Zbllee, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 555, 1) on the ground that Aristotle nowhere understands by -oi<rm the unknown, constant, and real substratum of variableattributes.' It cannot, however, be expected that we should cease to use for
; '
METAPHYSICS
senses, 1 but
it
831
thing
else,
derivative. 2
is
that which
is
Or
again, Substance
Being in
its original is
which
he
other being
drawn. 4
The
universal, as
itself.
Every
predicated.
It
It is always in
'
itself.
denotes not
this
The
which
is
is
by reason of
/idKio-ra
yap
fioite?
viroKe!/j.evov
irparov
ovv Timip
ol<rta,
elprirat
on
rb
fiii
ko.9'
iiroiceifitvov
aAAa
xaff ov
i.
PH.
465, b,
6.
:
Cat.
c.
ovffia 5e
gittiv
t\
tIj "irnos.
Cf. further
TBENDBL-
i Metaph. vii. 1 ifiit. rb ov Xeyerai iroWaxws [in the different categories] (pavepbv '6ti rovroiv irpSnov ov rb ti i(TTiv, enrep (ryfjLalvei tb 5' SAAa Aeyerat t^iv ovffiav opTtt tb tou outbs ovtos to fnkv
. .
. . .
Hist. Beitr. i. 53 sqq. Aristotle himself elsewhere so defines it. Metapli. \. 8, 1017, atravra Se ravra Ae^etoi b, 13
3
:
ENBUEB,
iroir<$T7jTas
. .
efj/ai,
Tot
Si tto'otijtbj,
Sore rb irp&rws bv ical ov &c. r\ %v [what is nothing else than itself and applies to nothing
else; cf. Anal. Post. i. 4, and the remarks which follow] aAA'
ov<rlab TiovKa8'&woKeifi.4i>ov\4yeTai,
aAAa
eVti
/caret,
1028, b,
ko8'
iKttvo Sk avrb
Bid Ttpwrov irep\
/cmjke'ti
kot' SaAou.
fiiopiffTtov
roirov
anXais t\ ovtriu av etri o. 7, 1030, a, 22 Ti ri Ictiv airXus ttj oualq birdpxei. See further on p. 289.
ov
;
:
; '
332
ARISTOTLE
being. 1
other
in so far, that
is
to say,
common
2
essence
of a
certain
number
1
of substances
c. 5, 2, a,
Oat.
34
to. 5'
tiAAa
wavTuv
:
airia
ravra
\4yerai
ovy
i.
6,
1003, a, 8
T(J5e
r)
eV VKQKElfJ.4va'.S
koivQv
ToiSvfie,
ti
aWa
Soph.
[i$i
ovtruy
8'
txv
rtp-jirtav
dWwv
Ti
elj/ai.
Anal. Post.
4,
where Aristotle calls k9' a'no that t fi)) leaf inroKSLfiivov \4yerat &K\ov Tivhs, oTov to PaV^ov e 4rep6v TiOv j8a5'by earl koX Ksvkov, ovtr'.a, Kal oo~a t6Ss ti, ojx 5 7} erep6v ti uyra cVtIi/ owep itrriv
73, b, 5,
22, 178, b, 37 (al.ibid. 179, ri yap &v0pu>iros Ka\ airav rd Kotvbv ov tcSSe ti, a\\b, toi:Ji/8e ti
El.
a,
c.
8)
Ta
[sc.
fiev
Sri
fi$i
a9'
{nroKeifizvov
KeySpGva]
Kal?'
a'jra
Keyw, Ta
oe
Ka0' vTroKEitieyov
0*uuj9e#7jk JTa.
r)
.
obtria
fj.hv
:
Kal
yz.p
to Ka9'
twit
aWwv
KaTrjyop-qfjtdTwv
o j$ev
^woio'toz',
3, 1029, a, 27: t6 T(S5e ti vwdpxeu/ Soke? p.d\LffTa t|) ovaia c. 4, 1030, t)]v ovtriav /cat t^ tiJSe ti a, 1 9 KaWAou S' ouk c. 10, 1035, b, 28 iajui ovtria; c. 12, 1037, a, 27:
8e ,udVij; c.
to
xtopiffTtiv Kal
r)
&s <panh;
Trpwrri
13,
1038,
eKiffTtp
b,
t)
10:
o'jx
tojj/ toiovtwv ti (This holds even of the sensible qualities of things see p. 206, supra.) Gen. An. iv. 3, 767, b, 33: to Ka9iKatrTov tovto yap r) ovtria. All other categories indicate mere accisubdents (o-v/ifiefiriKiTa') of stance cf p. 289 supra. Aristotle finds it therefore quite natural {Metaph. vii. 16, 1040, b, 26 sq.) that the ideas should be made into a ^aipim-oV if they iire taken for substances. The error of the doctrine of ideas consisted only in regarding the universal as such a substantial idea. (Hertling, Mat. und Form, 44, 1, has misunderstood this statement.) 2 Cat c. 5, 2, a, 15: Seirepai 5c ovtriat \iyovTai cV oTs ttb'ttru/ at
t)
irp6s ti
r)
ttc3s* t)
o-t)y.ati>ei.
ovtria
'iStos
Tavrd T
yivi\
.
. .
Ka\
olov
Qetapovai
oti
tpavepdv
'6tl
o? j9gv
t&v
kjii/t)
to
(yon.
And
so
KaQ&Xov vtrapxo'vTtav
obQlv
c.
trruxa'vti
twv
ti,
:
KaT7\yopovp.4vG>v
T(J5e
aWa
ToidvSe
fj.7]6*i/
16, 1040, b,
'
ovff
a
j)
obtievl
Otherwise the expression Seute'^o ovo-ia does not occur in Aristotle. As, however, he elsewhere uses irp'im) ovo-ia for substance in the primary sense,' and tp'.tt) ovo-ia
'
oi/trla
a\y
for
t&v Ka66Aov
xii.
5 init.
x a 'P-
METAPHYSICS
substantial character with, the
333
they approach to individual substances, so that the species deserves to be called substantial in a higher
degree than the genus.'
ception applied to them
According to the
strict con-
is
true of them, as of
'
This,' but a
'
Such
'
adjective
individual
sub-
stances only. 4
The
1 Cat. c. 5,2,b, 7sq. Aristotle, indeed, stems to say the opposite in JUetaph. viii. ], 1042, a, 13:
only of individual substance has been shown. A second [Cat. 5, 3, a, 6 sq., and p. 331 u. 2, supra) &\Aus [<ru/j8afr'6i] -ri yevos is to fx^i i/ uTroKiifievtp e7vai. But en paWov rSav eifiup \ov<riav eipat] this characteristic belongs also Kal to KaB6\ov twv KaSiKaffTa but to the class, and not to it alone, but likewise [Cat. c. 5, 3, a, lie does not intend to express his own view in these words cf. 21 &c.) to the specific differBonitz and Schwbglek ence, since this is likewise vii. 13 contained in the conception of in loco. 2 Cat. c. 5, 2, a, 19 sq., b, the thing to which it applies 15-21. while (according to Aristotle, 3 See n 1 on last page. Cat. c. ibid.) only that is v vtroKeifiGt/tp which does not belong to the 5, 3, b, 10 traaa Se ovtria So/cet T(>5e Of. irpwTat ovtrtcu ti ffTifiziveu/. conception of that of which it lirl this holds unconditionally is predicated, but which is a 5e twv SeuTe'pri/ ovtriatv (paiverai quality in a substance quite independent of it e.g. in the jttev dfioicas T o*x^M aTl T ^ s npoffov sentence the body is white,' Tiyopias To5e ti ffiyLalveiv AevKov is eV viro/ceijUeVgj ; on the fi},v a\7j0ds ye, dAAa /j.aX\ov iroi6v oit yap hv irrri to" other hand, in the sentence ti arifj.aivt inrotceifjLtvov tlxrirep tj irpiT?; olkticc, man is two-legged,' Siiroup is not iv xnroKiiiicvif. A further aXha. Kara iroWuv o avBpotiros \eyerai Kal to i$ov. peculiarity of substance is [Cat. 4 The first characteristic of c. 5, 3, b, 24) t<) fir)$fv avTtus substance was rd jiir) /caff irnoicei- ivawr'av elj/ai. And yet Aristotle That this is true himself remarks that the same fiii'au \4yetrSai.
,
; ;
'
'
331
ARISTOTLE
it
stance.
It denotes substance
on the side of
its qualities
only.
For
it
it
is
In contrast
with
it,
is
the
individual
name
is
of substance, in
its
original
not without
its difficulties.
it
all
knowledge
is
ultimate
object of knowledge.
it is
is
the
recognition of reality, 3
to real Being,
this substance
ia
must
relate, in
the
first place,
which
is
If
individual substance,
ble.
follows that,
may be made if {ibid. 1. 33) it be said that substance is susceptible of no difference of degree, no greater or less. For while, perhaps, we might say that one is more or less of a man than another, yet we could in no sense say that he is
' '
which we
'
shall
have again to
18
:
refer.
Cat.
u. 5, 3, b,
(after the
p.
333)
more
or less
'
two-legged.'
a,
If,
yip rtva
iroia
ov<riav
2fi,
finally (ibid.
4,
10, b, 3, 17),
oTj/Wyei.
Cf
Simpl. Kat.
we
Bas.,
''
who
See
Ibid.
explains
ovaiiohiis.
ovrrla
by hWttjs
3
4
p. 162.
;iu^( p.
airTdls Sparfibs al
rb ri fy
cTvcu rSiv
oyfiav iariv,
Hee also
p. 219,
iul.
METAPHYSICS
335
knowledge is of the individual, and that individual things furnish, not only the startingpoint, but the whole essential content- and object of
knowledge.
This conclusion,
cisively rejects.
He
is
when
it
it
addresses
itself all
This contradiction
it
is first, first.
distinction.
He
says, without
that knowledge
is
individual es-
is
substantial
illustrates
Even
God
is
individual Substance.
The
fact that
:
Substance
and Form run together proves nothing for, as will be seen, there recurs in the working out of the conception of Form the same difficulty which now engages us
with regard to Substance.
Aristotle
himself
recognised the
full
weight of
way
first,
Cf.
1086, b, 33 sq., i. 1, 7; Anal. Post, i, 31 in regard to the second, Cat. c. 5, Metaph. vii. 10, 3, b, 14 sq.
981, a,
;
Metaph.
5,
xii.
Metaph.
in.
Unit.: ion
$'
336
ARISTOTLE
'
in posse, is indeterminate
versal,
and
is
directed to
tlie
uniit is
how-
their certitude.
Such knowledge,
therefore, as Aristotle
is
known by
actuality,
it
On
the
original
then
it
ought to be precisely,
qua, individual,
it for its truth and would be the individual and not, certainty. 4 which should be in as Aristotle taught, the universal 6 its own nature the better known, and the more certain.
In
fact, it
'"1 T tovtuv airop'a Kal itaaasv ^XO/" E XaAeirwT<rr) a! avayKaiordrri Betepriaat, irep! tjs & \6yos i$ittTi\Ke
supra.
vvv
tuiv
elr
b"
aireipuv
;
irais
eVSe'xeToi \afie1v
:
T$naB6\av \iy<?, as Aristotle it, Metaph. vii. 10 (see pp. 220 sqq., svpra). * See p. 205, ii. 2, supra,
expresses
5
hrurrfinriv
c.
6 Jin.
y-tv
ubv
Rassow's solution
(Aristot.
KaBiKov
ai apxa-i,
toSto
<rvfi$a'vet
ovBiv yap
p.
57)
ti ariiiatyei,
says before,]
trrriTal
ovaia t6Ss ti, ci Si ju); ku66\ov, a.\\' ra naBeicaora, ovk iaovrai 4inb"
akxa as he
He
KaBoKov *yap
at lirio-Trj/iaL
irdvruy.
Cf Metaph.
.
xi. 2, lOfiO, b,
19,
;i,
'
xiii.
10,
also
xiii.
vii.
13,
1039,
14.
Metaph.
10
see p. 167,
n. 1 supra.
METAPHYSICS
If,
337
conceding
this,
we were
genus had
we should thereby
who
it
continually
word,
is
individual Substance
not that
appears to
us as such.
it
There
is
make
that
is, if
there were
be at the same
to be
To him the Divine, as thinking Essence, is Subject as the End, Mover and Form of the world, it is also a true universal. The conception of it has existence in one individual Essence, not merely contingently, 2 but by reason of its own nature whereas, in all finite things,
;
itself,
in a
it
number
of individuals. 3
From
this stand-
point
would be possible to seek a solution of the difficulties suggested, by saying that in God^ as the
sujtra.
together clear. 2 As perhaps that of the sun or of the moon see p. 222, u. 2,
;
1074, a, 33 [everything of which several examples are contained in the same class] SKrjv ?x E1 yty \6yos ical 6 airbs iroWwv, olov avSpdnrov, Zantpdriis Se eh rb Si rl 9jv ehai ovk fya S\r/v rb irp&Toi/, iv-rtXi^eia yap.
xii. 10,
'6<ra
Metaph.
apcB^Si
voWu
"
&
VOL.
I.
* z
338
ARISTOTLE
That
this solution,
all Aristotle's
how
pre
misses
draw the
that
all
universal,
alone.
Even
its
incompatibilit;
Aristotle's viev
is
directed
to
the universa
spit
known
more
sole objec
it is
in
itsel
and more cognisable because it alom possesses that immutability which anything that is fa be the object of knowledge must afford. 2 The furthe
conclusion
is
degree of actuality
also.
And we
also
find
AsG. v. HEKTLlNGdoes,.MaZ.
b.
terial world.
Here
it is
the onl
Arist. 43, 1, remarking that the form of universality is not in all spheres the indispensable condition of knowledge,
n.
Form
resource
we have
but only where we are dealing with the knowledge of the ma-
METAPHYSICS
of
339
Form with
Matter.
a combination of
to that
Form
which
i.e.
known
in universal concepts,
to the Actual
Possibility.
which
It
is
limited by no element of
mere
He
its
two main
pillars,
namely, that
it is
know-
How
was_
it
need not expect, threfore, to avoid contradictions in working out the further developments of his
theory,
We
theory
unanswered.
presents it pure, 2 Since Rittee, iii. 1 30, called attention to this difficulty it has been further discussed by Hey-DER cf Arist. nnd liegel. Dial. 180, 183 sq,, and Zeller's first
;
.
EvenHBKTLiNGfailstomake
object of knowof permanent worth in things. This in the sphere of sense is never the whole thing, but is entangled with all that is accidental and that has its source in matter. He thus suggests the question how the thing in which the permanent worth is mixed with the accidental can be anything more substantial than the form which
is is
edition,
p.
405
sq.,
which was
followed
Metaph.
Arist. ii. 569. Schweglee, Arist. Metapli. iii. 133. Cf. also Stbumpell, Gesch. d. Phil. 251
sq.
3
by
Bonitz,
Cf.
Zellee, Ph.
d.
Gr. pt.
541 sq.
340
ARISTOTLE
Form and
Matter: the Actual and the Possible.
(i)
We nmst now go back to Plato. In the Ideas he had distinguished the non-sensible essence of things from their sensible appearance. Aristotle refused to
think of the former as a universal subsisting for itself
outside of things.
to
abandon
it
same
alone
as those of Plato
namely, that
the non-
that
it
ances.
different
He
from knowledge,
knowledge must be something other than sensible things. All that is sensible is passing and
object of
changeful
it is
a contingent which
' '
may
itself,
be another.
is
contrary,
an object as unchangeable and necessary as which can as little change into its opposite as
knowledge can into ignorance. Of sensible things we can have neither a concept nor a proof; it is the Form alone with which knowledge has to do. Form, indeed,
1
is
also
all
Becoming
something
comes
to be
else.
This
1
Form must
Metaj?h. vii. 11, 15 (see p. 220, supra), with which cf. ibid. iii 4, 999, b, 1 el fiev oiv jUt)0eV io-Tt irapix, to ko.B' 'ixaaTa, ovB\v hv
:
obBevhs,
el pi)
tis efaai
vXaBtimv hri<rrli/t.riy. en ouB' UStov oiBiv ovS' a.Kivi)-rot/ iv. 5, 1010, a, 25 KaTct t!> e?5os Ae^ei
8'
;
:
tV
eii)
vonirhv
aAAi irivra
oiV8i)Ta
Ka.1
airavrx
yiyvatrico/iLei/,
METAPHYSICS
of
341
Becoming
as the
supposing that in any particular case the Form could itself originate in the process of Becoming, yet in any
case
such a supposition
it
could
not
be
carried
ad
infinitum, for if
could,
be true
there was a
Form
which
itself
to be.
For the same reason there must also be Matter as The relation of these two the correlative of Form. should not be defined, as Plato defined it, merely as one
\6yos(see p. 219, supra), ovaia (infra, p. 275), that, (see p. 217, u, 1, rh t\ t\v supra). 2 Mttaph. iii. 4, 999, b, 5 a\Ka jxt\v it ye at&tov ov&ep iffTtv, ovSe yeveatv eli at BvvaT^v avdyicr} yap elvat Tt rb ytyv6ftevov Kal e ou yiyverai Kal Tdfaav rb eaxo-Tov ayepvTjTou etirep 'iffTarai Te Kal 4k uvtos yeveffdat aSvvarov fify en 5' etirep i] ifA.^ iffrl Sid rb
1
El$os,/J.op<pt,
n.
'
tovto iv &\\tf>. The form, again, could only come from another form, and so on ad infinitum, since all coming to be is the embodiment of form in matter, tpavepbv Spa ort ouSe t6 elfios ov yiyperat ou5e rd ri r)p elvat St i rb fiv ws eldos t) ovata
.
.
yevo^iivtp
v\t\
ayevvf]TOS
elvat,
Tro\b
in
fiaXKov
o
elXoyov
iKeivri
elvat
t\v obclav
[oy<r(a
el
irore
yiyveTat.
v\rj
effTcu
which
tovto
IffTat
becomes]
fxi\Te
fjLTj
yiypeffBat
rb
eiSos,
aAAA
irepl
eKeivy,
ei
It is
Tb
irapairav.
tovto irapa Tb
elSos
;
avvo\ov
vii.
tV
:
fJ>op<p}]V teal
the brass, that comes to be, but the brass ball, not irotbv but irotbv %vKov
ball,
is it
xii.
not the
nor
iirel 8e vtt6 tivSs tc 8 init. teal e/c yiyveTat t6 yiyv6p.evov ko! b tlvos {e.g. out of brass] &airep yiyveTat {e.ff. it ball]
.
3 inst.
oijTe
Traj/
yap
twos
Kal ets
eldos.
Tt.
ov }iev
7}
ojbeTbviroKeifievov iroteTibv
o'li-rws oiiSe
x^^dv,
fify
kivovvtos
els
t 5e,
ii\r)
'
t$}v
.
.
crtpalpup el
.
o-u/Afie{$7}fe6s
\eyto
S*
on
Kara t6v
ov
XoKk6v CTpoyyvXov
ffTpoyyvkov r) ttouTv, aAA' erepdy
Trotelv etrrl^
t6
tt\v
Tt,
fftyaTpav
oZv elo'iv, el fir] fx6vov o xa^itbs yiyveTat GTpoyyvXos, Kal Tb GTpoyyvXop t) 6 x^k6s aAXa avdyKT} 8eo~Tr)vat. Ilid.\070, a, 15,
atretpov
viii. 3,
ohv t6
elSas
1043, b, 16,
c. 5,
1044, b, 22.
3-12
ARISTOTLE
all
would remain
Here
Becoming.
It
could come to
might seem that out of Being nothing and out of Notbe, since it is already
:
Being nothing
that
all
also,
fit.
Aristotle
by saying
which comes to be
starts
in the process of
Becoming out of that which is only in a relative sense and in a relative sense is not. That from which anything comes to be cannot be absolutely Not-Being, but at the same time it cannot be that which it is only on its
way
to become.
that which
it is
to be in
If, for
example,
an uneducated
so out of
truly out
tion.
man becomes an educated man, he does the condition of a man not educated, but as of the condition of a man capable of educafact, it is
In
the uneducated
man the
All
Becoming
is
actuality.
All
Kiyovres f) ffvyKetueva [the former, if I say ' the man becomes cultured,' or 'the uncultured becomes cultured ; the latter, if I say the uncultured man becomes a cultured man ']. tc Be yivoji' '
: ,
METAPHYSICS
becomes that which
it
343
comes to be out of its oppositeWhat becomes warm must before have been cold. He who becomes a man of knowledge must before have been
without knowledge. 1
Opposites as such, however, canTd
evwv &s ra ajrA.ii Xeyopev ylveadai, rk fiev virofievov Keyofxev yiveffOat, b /j.hv yap rb 5' ovx vtrofievov.
&udpwiros virofievei fiov<rtKbs yiv6f*eV0S avdpWTTOS Kal flOTl, T& 5e flty
fiova ntbv ai rb a.fJ.ovo'ov otfre air\a>s
ZffTl 5e
e^Set 5e
jxivtav
ovre ffvvriQifievov virofj.4vet. Sioipiff5e to6to>v e airdvTivv twv ytyvofievav tovto 0~ti \afiew 4dv
tis Ka\
aAA.'
eTri/3\e'^j;,
&ffirzp \4yofxev,
fin
tovto
etSei
el
Kal
aptdfirp
'4v
.
.
io~Tiv ev,
.
(1) matter as such and the negation of form {o-t4pUffis} as property (o-yjUjSejSTj/cds) of matter. It is just this distinction, c. 8 goes on, which solves the difficulty previous philosophers felt in dealing with the possibility of becoming which they ended by totally denying: oi/re yhp t6 hv yiveffQai (eTvcu ^hp
(2)
lvtos ouSei/ tiv yevSk Kal avToi <pafieu yiyvecrdai fikv ovlitv air\S>s k /J.ty tvTOSy ojliws fx4vToi ytyv0~6ai Ik
fyZri)
etc
.
O'j yap tovtov rd avdp&TCtp koX to dfxovaw etvai. ical t6 fiev viro/x4vt, Tb 8' ovx vTrofttvei t6 ftev fj.fy afTi/eefytevov vvofidvei (o yap a\v6pwiros inro-
76 ovx
Te
fjdj
ecrQcu
T}fie?s
"
jU$j
&VTOS,
ov,
o!ov
Kara
<n//^j3e077/e<Js
t6 S/toutroy ovx virofievei. Ibid. 190, a, 31 in the case of all else that becomes the oiiffla is the substratum of the change fin 8e teal ai ovcriat koI oo~a aAAa airXas oura e* vkofxevei)
t6
fiovffiitdv 5e icaX
4k yap ttjs
a?5Td
/at)
o~Tepj}o~ea)$, S 4o~ti
ko0'
[i.e. a thing becomes what not from its negative which in and for itself does not exist
rai tl
it is
y4voiT
av tfiavepdv. This
hegoeson
to prove by the examples of plants, animals, products of art and chemical changes(aAAo/<u(T6is),and
uncultured] ... els fxkv 5tj Tp6iros ovtos, &\\os 5' oti eVSe'xeTai tovto. \4yeiv KOTa tt)v SvvafAtv Kal tt^v 4v4pyeiav. Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 317,
Tpoixov fi4v Tivii (k jit) &vto> b, 15 airXas ytveTat, Tpoirov 5e &\\ov 4 ovtos dei. t<5 yap Svvdfiet av 4vtzAe^ei'tj 5e ^u^ %v dvdyKt] irpovTrdpx^iv \ey6fievov d/j.<pOTpus. Cf. Metaph. xii. 2 (an exposition in complete agreement with that of the Physics) ; ibid. c. 4, 1070, b, 1 1 18, c. 5, 1071, b, 8,iv. 5, 1009, a, 30 and p. 341, u. 2, supra. 1 See infra, and Pliys. ii. 5, 205, a, 6.
:
then proceeds
etpnfievtov,
Sore
SfjAoy 4k tSjv
oti
rb yiv6^vov airav
ael
avTLKe7adj.i fihu
tJ>
&fiovo~ov, vttokgl/j.ev
7)
Kal
ti\v
afioptpiav
dvTtKe{/j.evov }
\itiov
t)
tA
oti
viroKtfxevou.
<pavep6v olv
t/c
yiyvtTanrav
tc tov
viroKtfA,4-
344
ARISTOTLE
Cold does not become warmth
;
not change into their opposites, nor even act ijpon their
opposites.
:
ignorance
Becoming
itself in
them.
This
which
is
it
is
to become, but
is
derivatively.
it
which
to receive,
;
and
in
place of
them
it
has their
opposites
to that
tion,
and in so
is to
which
come out of
its
own
As
andp. 323
:
We
we
ulio'ais oh
koI
;
aWii
diroiaovv
hav:
rUrqs, &c
c. 7, 190, b, 29 Svo Aekt-cW eivai ras as rpe7s. koI ear i piv apx&s, *vn. &s Tavavr'a, ofoi' et tis \tyoi rb /lovtrucbv kc\ t!i aiiovaov !) t<5 Btpfidy
Sib
imi
/ikv <bs
8'
/col
utt'
-ravavjla
besides iiroKet/xepov and \6yos take especial account of arepritris, otherwise only two. A thing's opposite is its principle in so far as its matter is infected with crre/j^tr/s or the contrary of the form it is going to receive something other than its opposite is its principle in so far as the matter in itself is as capable of the one determination as of the other c. 9, 192, a, 1(> Plato errs in identifyingthe material simply with the non-existent. Svtos -yap tivos Oeiav ical ayaQov teal iiperou, rd /liv ivavriov a ! JT$ <pa/xev clvat,
; ; :
METAPHYSICS
it is
345
this substratum
;
a presupposition of
itself have
all
Becoming,
cannot ever
had a commencement
imperishable
2
and since
same substratum,
ningless basis of
it is
This begin-
Becoming
is
Matter;
and so we
is
The notion and the relation of these two principles more accurately determined in the doctrine that Form is the Actual and Matter the Possible. 5 Both
to"
5e & vltyvKev
i(b'i(r8at
Kal bpeye-
Phys. ibid.
to"
1.
31
Xeyw yap
kavrov <p{xriv. to?? 5e tfvfif&aivGi t6 evavriov opeyeo'dat tt)s eavrov (pdopas. KaWot ovre aitrb eavrov 6l6v re i<pleo~9ai rh elSos Bla, rb fify elvai ei/Sees,
<r9au
avrov Kara
r)\v
Kara
(rvftfiefiyKos. Gen. ei Covr. i. tffri 8e vKtj fiaAiara fxh 4 fin. Kal Kvpius rd vtroKeifievov yev4o~ews
:
oijre
Tt)
ivavriov.
tydapriKa
AAtx
yap
toCt'
nvx
rxAAijAfe-p
ra ivavrla.
eo~rw 7] uAtj, faffirep dv el 8rj\v dppevos Kal alffxpov na\ov (see Phys. iv. 9, p. 325, n. 1, supra). 217, a, 22 io~rlv vKtj \x!\a r&v ivavTiwy, Qepfiov Kal tyvxpov Kal rav &\\oov rtav tpvatKuv evavridiffewv, Kal k Swdfjiei ovros evepyela ov yiverai, Kal oh xajpiffrfy fiev [sc.
:
[alr'av Qafxev elvaC] v\tju ical t6 vTroKeifievov. Cf. foregoing mi. 4 Cf. the foregoing and the
n. As artp^ffts constitutes of itself no independent principle, but merely belongs to matter as such, i.e. to matter as still form-
tV
next
rwv
1
iyavrioiffeav]
f)
less, it is
fZTCpJV.
i.
See p. 341, n. 2, supra. Phys. 192, a, 28: a<p6aprov Kal ayev> vt]TOP avdyKTi avrfyv elvai. etre yap iyiyvero, vir6Ktadai t( Sei irpwrov, etre rd e| ol> ipvirdpxovTOs . .
9,
.
form and matter only in a very few passages and with a certain
reservation see PIn;s. i. 7 (p. 344, n.l); Metaph. xii. 2, 1069, b, 32, u. 4, 1070, b, 10, 18, c. 5, 1071, a, 6, 16. 3 De An. ii. 1, 412, a, 6 At*) ofj.ev yevos %v rt rmv ovr<av rty ovfftav, ratiT7}S 8e ro fev as ii\T]V t b Kad* aWo (xtv ovk ecTi rAtie ti,
;
:
rpOeiperat, els
rovro
hfp't^erai ?tr^;o-
rov.
-
T6
VTTOKti/XevOV,
2,
342, n.
and Gen.
et Con: i. 10, 328, b, 1 ddrcpw fiev Scktikov Qdrepov 5' elSos. Be An. ii. 2, 414, a, 9: fioptyfy Kal
Sji/
el56s rt Kal \6yos Kal olov evipyeta 3>ffre rod Sgktikov. Ibid. 1. 13 \6yos tis av eit\ \j\ i^ux^] Ka * e *8oy, to inroKeltieyov. aAA' oi>x vKt] Kal
:
Keyerai r6de ri ical rpirov to eari S' f) fiev vKtj 4k rovrwv. Bvva/xis, rb S' dBos evreKexeia. So c. 2, 414, a, 14 sq. Gen. et Covr. ii. 9, 335, a, 32 us- fiev odv S\t) rols yevvtirois so~tw a'faiov to fivva;
:
346
ARISTOTLE
the
elvai.
:
distinction
Metapk.
to.
^
a,
of the effxdrr)
he must make
vii. 7,
1032,
20
airavra Se
'
$ <pvaei 1} t4x.vti ex t yap Kal elvai Kal fj.% elvai e/catTTOv avruv, tovto 5 [that which can be or not be] eVtIv iv iKourrai 8\r) c. 15 (r. supra) viii. 8A.r)x 5e Xeya % p.)] 1, 10=12, a, 27
yiyvdfjieva
vKrjv.
fivvarhv
the same reply to the question as to the SAi) eKdarov, the matter If of these determinate things. the earth cannot be said to be fivvdpei dvdpanros, neither can it
4,
1044, a, 35, b,
' ;
1 sq.,
'
the
Tii5e Ti ovffa
;
ivepyeia fiwdpei itTrl r6fie t; iirel 8' u. 2, 1042,' b, 9 fiev aiy vTroKeifievf} Kal <*js 8A17 7J oifffia &fj.o\oyetTai, aftnj 5' eotIv t)
:
and what the matter of man same passage calls fiwdfiei oiKia,
b, 8 sq. designates 8*7). the other hand, Trpuiry) Satj is simply fiwdfiei ov. So far, therefore, as there remains any distinction between the two pairs of conceptions, it c ncerns not so much their actual content as the point of view from which we regard it. In the antithesis
1049,
On
Svvi.iJ.ii.
\6yos';
[ovffia
1.
;
20
1.
too
:
elfious
Kal tqs
iihri
ivepyeias
27
7]
p.ev
yap &s
fioptp^j
eVtIp]
;
t\
5'
;
ws
.
bWt
ivepyeia
Kal
eI
C.
3 init.
.
.
r)]V ivepyeiav
t^v
fiopffiv
;
rrjs ivepyeias
:
1045, a, 23 rb fie fioptpfy, Kal rb fiev fiwdfiei rb fie ivepyeia ix. 8, 1050, a, 15 v v\v effrl fivvdnei, on e\6oi av els rd
c.
6,
rb
p.ev il\ri
elfios
'
orav 5e
elSei
7' ivepyeia. y,
;
iv
r$
.
itrriv
elfios
b,
2,
rdre 27 r\
:
ovtr'a
. .
Kal
rh
ivepyeia io'riv
xii. 5,
r\
ivepyeia
fJ.ev
1071,
elfios
.
a,
. .
evepyeia
5e
t)
yap rd
;
of form and matter we distinguish between different elements, in that of Ivepyeia and fivvdfiet between different states or conditions of things. The former refers to the relation of substance the latter, to the to attribute relation of the earlier to the later condition, of the incomBut plete to the complete. since the very essence of matter
;
fivvdfjiei
vKtj
1.
18
Kal
aAAo
fiuvdfj.ei.
consists in possibility of form in actuality, we can conceive no case in which more than a
grammatical change
in order that we the latter for the
to
r6 evepyeia ov to elfios. (Bccnitz, Arist. Metapk. ii. 398) that 8Atj refers raiher to irptbrt), fivvd/iei iv rather to io-xdr-i) 8atj (see
necessary substitute former expressions. And vice versa we may in most cases substitute matter and form for the possible and
is
may
earlv
ix.
eitaarov ; Aristotle
{Metapk.
7) replies
by means
the actual. The only difficulty that can possibly arise is in 1 he case where we are speaking, not of two things related to one another ns the possible to the actual, but of one and the same
METAPHYSICS
347
1
between which,
all
If
we
object
in
want of a
definite
Form, and
ing
it.
is
If
we
which
is
a product of Becoming
that
is
to say, if
we think
to
become
is
anything, then
we
shall
determination by Form.
nothing,
but
or
can become
everything
the
Subject,
all
namely,
thinkable
the
predicates
but
which
of
all
precisely
on that
account
it
is
is
equally receptive
that which is
:
them
all.
In other words,
in Possibility
it is
it passes from possibility to actuality, cf. Phys. ii. 3, 195, b, 3, viii. 4, 255, a, 33 ; De An. 21 sq. ii. 5, 417, a, Gen. An. ii. 1, 735, a, 9 ; bat even here it
thing as
seemed to presuppose it, is clear also from the statement that nothing to which becoming is inapplicable can be said to have a matter Metaj)h. viii. 5, 1044,
'
'
always be shown that a. thing is Bvvdpet only in so far as it has the ifAr; in itself. Although,
can
b,
S\rj eVrli/
itt'
otruj/ -ysveffis
&\\ri\a.
Aew
8Aij.
l
<e{ttiv
/*$/,
Cf. vii.
range than BA.rj and elSoj (since, while the latter express only a relation of two subjects to one another, the former express also a relation of one subject to itself), metaphysically there is no distinction between them. That Aristotle's conception of matter and with it the clistinction between matter and form thus originated in the attempt
1
different
Bivafiis
apx^l
irrational
power
;
(cf.
Metapli. ix.
1-6, v. 12)
tions
(cf.
again mixes
379
sq.,
Bonitz on Metwph.
supra\
to
explain
'
becoming,' which
and
348
ARISTOTLE
If conversely
it
we
that
everything
merely
to completion,
as
fully
its way we think of the end of its growth attained, we obtain the pure and com-
on
if
which nothing
no matter that
is
still
The Form,
its
corresponds with
and Form
is
in
Just as a statue
contained
actual
existence
Form which
From
Sivajiis
this
it
second meaning of
Aristotle's appli-
man
4,
is
to Kara/ifo"*-
Metaj/Ji. v.
we have
a
cation of
which
resides,
as in Pait. An. ii. ], 646, a, 14 sq., where moist and dry, warm and cold substances,
where
3,
359,
12,
where
salts
and
alkalis,
De tiensu, 5, 444, a, 1, where fragrant scents are called SuvoThis pure matter, which, however (see infra), is never present as such, Aristotle calls -wpdnri v\y. Its opposite in this sense is uAij
1
1015, a, 7, c. 24 hut., viii. 6, 1045, b, 17, c. 4, 1044, a, 15, 34, b, 1, ix. 7, 1049, a, 24. Some verbal confusion is caused by the fact that the expression TrptiSTT) u'Ai) is applied equally to matter which is absolutely, and to matter which is only relativelj', first (to the oAws Ttp&rq and to the irp&s avTd irpi&rti SA77) ; see Metapli. v. 4, viii. 4, 1044, a, 18, 23; Pliys. ii. 1, 193, a, 28, and cf. Metajj/i. \. 4, 1014, b, 26. Cf. Bonitz, Irul. Arist., 786,
b, 10.
2
'Evepyeia
or fVreAe'xe'a
(in
ecrx^rrj
(ffiios,
o*Kia
e/caffTOu),
or
the matter which unites itself, immediately, without requiring further preparation, with a determinate form. riptijTi) 8Atj is the material as it precedes all elementary differences the icrxarri Ba->), eg, of the statue is the stone or brass; the tVxaTrj iiAri of
;
the concrete rb ivepyeiq ov, rb ej/TcAEx*'? "i"), expressions which properly differ as activity or
actualisation differs from completeness or actuality, but which are commonly used by Aristolle without distinction. Cf. infia,
p.
379
sq.
METAPHYSICS
.349
indeterminate,
into one.
undeveloped self-existence,
definite reality,
capable, indeed, of
becoming a
but not
yet
made
By
all
that
it
contains
identifies
into
existence.
actual,
When
accordingly he
Form with
means to say that the former is the totality of the qualities which the latter does not possess but
being, he
is
capable of acquiring.
#A.?7,
2
wpmrr)
j
is
ust that
which precedes
of
;
Becoming and
all
formation
the
centre
and
defi-
nite qualities
none of the
'
qualities that
:
make
&>i
the
irpbs
Form
of things. 3
Metapk.
8'
rj
eari
TTpayfjia
oovtip.ei.
yap
irpbs KX'wt\y
rav ^x^vruy
8Xr] Kal
Xlyop.zv 5e
Suydpei
oXoy
rijv
kv rtp \\iXy 'EpfiTJv Kal 4v Tjj oXrf 7\u. <reiav, on afpaipede'i} ay, Kal
!
Biapovvra, rb 8' hep.yiia. SijXoy S' iirl ray Ka9iKaffra rrt iiraywyfi % f$ovA6uc0a Xtyetv, kuI oj 5e7 irayrbs opoy forely, aXXa Kal rb avdXoyov ffuvopav, on &is rb o:K7$o/j.ovv irpbs rb olKiSo;xiKbv, Kal rb iypriyopbs' irpbs rb KadevS >v, ical rb dpav irpbs rb p.iov pXv tyiv Se iX "* Ka^ T0 atrOKeKpifievov 4k rrjs iXt]v, kA rb airetpv\i)s irpbs yaap.ivov irpbs rb avepyarrrov. rxiiSuupopas Bdrepoy p.6ptov this 8e rrjs eoTto T) ivzpyeta a<pMpta'p.4vri, Qarmpw Se rb Suyardy c. 8, 1050, a, 21 ; Phyi. i. 7, 191, a, 7 ^8' &itokipiii) (fuiffis tVi<TTj)T)j /car' ava\oyiay.
liria ri\p.ovx kx\
p.)\
rbv
ay bvvarbs p
8tup?i<rai.
rb ttpoptpov e^ei irply XafStiv rijv ojtws atfrij irpbs ovalzv fj.op<p))v, i=x et Ka^ T0 ro8e rt Kal rb uv. Ibid, iii. 1, 201, a, 29. 2 See p. 348, n. I, tu/,ra 3 Metaph vii 3, J 029, a, 20: A^ya; 8' v\i\v % Ka6' avr}jy p.f}re rl pA\rs iroaby fl^re tiXXo fi7]0iv Xeyerai oh fcpuTTai rb ov c. 11, 1037, a, 27 fizra p.ev yap rrjs vXtjs ojk forty [Adyos], aoptrrrov ydp; ix. 7,
;
:
tV
24 ci 8e ri icrri irpa,rov, Kar &X\ou Aeyerat 4k*1vivov [of such and such a nature],
104'.), a,
:
o puiKert
rovroTrpc&Tiiv'Xii
n.
l,see p. 315, 1007, b, 28 rb yap Bvvd/ati ov Kal fify iyreXs' X e l t T ^ a6p -o'r6v icri. Pltys. i. 7 see above, n. 1, and iv. 2, 209, b, 9 passing from this it becomes
;
viii.
5,
supra,
t
iv.
4,
350
ARISTOTLE
it is
we
shall se<
which the
infinite is th
An Form, has reached no conclusion or completion. since what is wholly indeterminate cannot be knowi Matter, as such, is unknowable. It is only by analog
1
that
conception of
it,
substratum
lated to
is
by supposing which is re
as a special materij
it.
2
made out
and
.
. .
of
To Form,
we
definiteness,
rod
.
limitation,
[the
5e
Fori
irtpiexop-evov
virb
effiovs
.
.
form]
Kal wpicrp-eyov
ecm
:
toiovtov i] vKtj Kal rh aipitnov. Be Cwlo, iii. 8, 306, b, 17 aeiSh Kal izpopfoy 5e? to viroKel/xevov eiyai fxaMfTTa yap av o'vtu Svvano
p'vdp.i^ffv'ai,
KaddirEp iv
t$
Tip.a'w
TtKeiov S' obSev ex ov tcAoj t6 Se tzKos /repay ov yap Xipi Kivcp (ruj/dirTetv earl Tip airavrt K o\cp to farsipov itrri yap r Hirtipoy rfjs tov fieycQovs TeXe ottos li\ri Kal to hvvap.ii o\o eVTeAe^e'a 5' oii Kal ov trepiex
. . . . . .
>
yeypairraL, rb 7rae5e;ey.
aKXct 7repte'xeTat,
ixyvoxTTOv
fj
rj
&TTipov
'
Sid
k
o\
hreipov Aristotle understands, first of all, the unlimited in space, and in this sense he examines the conception in Phys. iii. 4 sq. But finding that in actuality there is no such infinite space, he finally identifies the unlimited with the a.6piaTov or \i\ri. the notion Cf. ibid. c. 6, 207, a, 1 commonly entertained o infinity is wholly false, ov yb.p o5 p.nSev efw, oAA' ou ae: Tt &> etrrl, tout' izTreLpov [lev oZv OTmpdV lanv . &<tt\v ov Kara troabv Kafx^6.vovffiv aei ri Xafieiv %<niv e|w. oil Se fj.7]ti*i/ e|w, tout' 6o*ti t\ioi/ Kal oXov(De
1 : . .
By
airetpoy
. . .
eiSos
yap
Se
Kal
e^ei
tj
Shrj
&Toirov
aSiivaTOv,
rd
bvyvwo'TOV
a6piaTov TCpUx* lv Ka^ bp'ifcw, c. 207, b, 35: (pavepby 'oti us S\tj iireipdv iaTiy alriov, Kal Sti juej/ elvai avTu o-Tepyo'ts, rb Se ko outo inroKtlpevov to* (rui/e^es K alo-6r)T6v. iv. 2, see previous not 2 Phys. iii. 6 see previoi note ibid. i. 7, AfetapA. ix. 6 ; si p. 349, n. 1, supra, Metaph. vii. 1 1036, a, 8 tj 8' iiXri &yvw(TTOs kd atijiy. Cf. also p. 220, n. 2, tupn for parallels from Plato, cf Z k: leu, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 621, 2.
; ; : .
Cash,
ii.
4,
286, b,
19,
repeated)
METAPHYSICS
351
and Matter, therefore, require nothing further to mediate between them in order to produce a whole, but are
immediately
Matter in
directly
tl
united
Form
;
is
the
definiteness
of
itself indefinite
,
itself
When
the
is
is its
Form.
their
But
just as
in
mutual relation as two heterogeneous substances, so neither may we regard either of them in any case as a single substance, so as to imply that one Matter and
one
Form
the
Divine Spirit a
Matter.
all
being which
pure
Form without
Yet he
Forms,
things, but as
all
many
substances.
manner
matter
itself
it
qualities, yet is in
bodies.
' Metaph. viii. 6, 1045, b, 17: to the question how the elements of a conception or of a number can be one, Aristotle answers that they are related to one another as matter and form (see
elfpijTai koX % io-xarn KAtj [of. p. 348, n. 1] ho! t\ /j.op<p$i ralnb a! ev rb ixiv Svv&jiei rb 8e ivepyelq. [So Bonitz reads, but Bbkkeb has rairb nal $vv&p.ei rb ex.] %v ydp ti
:
emurTov
p. 220, n. 2, swjjra)
eari
8' liairtp
a!
rb
852
ARISTOTLE
is
matter
Nor can
is
it
be otherwise, since
figures.
To
being
itself
used, though undoubtedly obtained in the first instance by abstraction from corporeal things, 3 wheresoever a relation subsists analogous to that which they originally express. 4 Thus in analysing conceptions into their
Pliys. iii. 5, 204, b, 32 oJk Toiovroy (Tafia aiffBrjTbv irapa to <jTo<xe?a KaKoiueva, otherwise
:
voirrt).
Ibid.
r)
.
o.
10,
%ffTt
V\t]
8'
pxkv
.
.
aiadrirr)
vorirr)
1036, a, 9 eariv t) Sk
r)
vorirri
Sh
firi
eV
toTs
the four elements must needs resolve themselves into this, which is not the case. Gen. et Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, 8. Ibid. 1. 24
Ttiaiis
aitrBnrois
indpxovoa
j?
aiVfrjTo',
olov
s
the
Ss (pafiiv
li'ev
elval
rwa
iKi\v
aiaBtfrav,
aAAa
raiTTjv ov xa>/"OT jji/, a\\' ae! ,uei-' ivavTubatus. r)s ytverai to 41;
Ka\oip,ei/a aToix*ia.
Ibid.
i.
5,
320, b, 12 sq.
2
Metaph.
viii. 6,
1046, a, 33
Se tt)s S\r)S t) fiXv voifTr] r) aiV0r)T^, Kal aelrov \6yov -rb p.evS\n
eon
8'
rb
b,
8'
ivepyita
:
ianv
yap
vii. 11,
35
lEffTat
ii\tj
ala6r\TUV Kal iravrbs yap SAt; tIs 4<ttiv b fir] ia-ri tI fy efoai Kal elSos avrb Ka9' ainb aAAa r6Se ti . .
.
Metaph. xii. 4 to 8' ofrio Kal at apxal &A\a aWaiv co-tip as, 8' as av Ka66\ov %ffri \4yy tis Kal kot' ava\oyiav, touto irdvTwv olov Xaas ruv alo-QriTav cafidrav as p.ev elSos rb Bepfibv Kal &\\ov
. .
.
60-Ti
yap
r)
S\ri
r)
fiev aloSrir^
r)
8e
irdv
rav 8e oSru
METAPHYSICS
two elements, Aristotle attributes
to the
353
genus
tlie
same
he
identifies
the
specific
Form.
Similarly in the
scheme of the universe, in physiology, in zoology, in psychology, the upper and the lower spheres and elements, 2 the soul and the body, 3 the male and the female, 4
the Active and the Passive Reason, 5 stand to one another
same relation as the Form and the Matter. The same is true, it need hardly be remarked, of Potentiality and Actuality. These also express a definite relation which may subsist between all possible kinds of objects, and which can best be explained by analogy. 6 Aristotle applies them in precisely the same way as Matter and Form. He uses them, for instance, to elucidate the connection between the genus and the specific differences, and in general to show the possibility of several properties belonging to one and the same thing. 7 By them he explains the relation between the passive and the active
in the
ovk %vtw, tQ av&Xoyov Se, uerirep et Tts eiicot otl apxai ettri Tpus, t5 elSos teal t\ (TTepycris Kaif]fi\n. aXX'
e/catrTov
312, a, 12,
b, 32,
3 ii. 8,
Gen.
335,
et Curr.
a, 18.
i.
3,
318,
c.
De An.
ii. 1,
tovtuv ertpov
;
irspl
e/eaoTop
:
2,
414, a, 13 sq.
*
and
412, b, 9 sq often.
yivos iarlv
5'
c.
5,
t<jj
1071,
ko.)
a, 3
ti
aXXov rpiirov
avaXnyov apx<"
Svvafiis.
i. 2 init., ii. 1, 732, 738, b, 20, and often. Metaph. i. 6, 988, a, 5, v. 28, 1024, a, 34.
Gen. An.
4,
a, 3,
ii.
De An.
iii. 5.
;
ofria al o-Toixeia,
Sxrirep
i\4x9ri,
twv
firi
iv
ravT$
Kal
yevei, xpufiaruv,
r$
aviXoyov
ficaffTOV
KiVTfffav
tup
$J
ip TttvTtp yipet
'6ti
tup
teal
ft
Ka0'
&XXo
re
(r}j
SXti
t6
ifiet
t$
6 MetapJi. ix. 6 seep, 349, n. 1, supra. Ibid. 1048, b, 6 Keyerai 8* ivcpyelq ov irA.VTa 6/j.otus, aXX' ft t6 ap&Xoyop, us tovto ip tovtu ft irpbs tovto, t6 8' ev T$8e ft wp6s TtJSe to, fiep yap us Kipriffis irpbs Bvpafitp, rcii S' us ovffia trp6s Ttva {JAtjv. Cf xii, 5, 1071, a, 3, cited p. 352, n. 4.
: .
'
De An.
iii. 5.
De
VOL.
A A
'
354
ARISTOTLE
1
understanding.
may be viewed
Form:
second.
as Potentiality in the
The elements,
all
for instance,
material of
Matter; the brass which supplies the material for a statue has
its
as a specific metal.
While the
is viewed as the Form of the body, yet even own highest and most immaterial part a distinction is made between two elements which are related to one another as Form and Matter. 2 Indeed, we shall find that
soul in general
in
its
'
hand, as
we
We may therefore
less
The
all
first
purely form:
the foundation of
things
but
it is
lie all
through which the original Matter has to pass before it becomes the particular Matter with which the Form of The same holds the thing immediately unites itself. 6
true of the SvvafAis. 7
1
We
a, 23, p.
ascribe potential
p.348, n.
a,
l,e.ff.
knowledge
4,
3/etaph.
viii. 6,
1045,
Mctaph.viii.
1044,
b, 16.
219,
and
329,
toS
Cf Gen. et Curr. ii. Phys. iii. 1, 201, He An. p. 375 sq., 440. Cf p. 352, n. 2.
.
1, a,
a,
32
29;
Stov Saripov t) erepa fj, olov <pKeyfm 4k AiTrapoE ol yKvKcos, el t6 Xarapbv 4k too y\uKeos, 4k Si 5 t$ ava\ie<r8cu els tIjv Tpiirqv x
SXv tV x ^"
'
1, 1.
supra,
and
Be
quoted
a,
33;
Cf.
the
passages
METAPHYSICS
not only to the
355
is
conceived as
not actually engaged in scientific activity, but also to the learner, and even to
man
in general.
But the
we have
to distinguish
mere capacity
to be, except
first
the
the' uni-
number of intermediate
first
Matler,
and complete Actuality, which is pure Form or God. Now in the phenomenal world, Form presents itself
under the aspect of a threefold principle of causality,
while Matter contains the ground of
all
impressibility
in the habit of enumerating four kinds material, the conceptual or formal, the
final. 3
of Cause
efficient
1
the
and the
These,
Metaph.
/jtev
however, on closer
a,
9:
a'jrb
v. 1, 1013, a, 17: iraaZv oZv KOtvbv tuiv apx^v rb irp&Toy elvat '68ev f) eOTiv ^ yiyverai fj
'
yiyvtixTKiTai
tovtwv
tie
al
/xev
ovvtos.
On the meaning of Apxai. this expression see Metaph. v. 1, with the comments of SCHWEGLBKandBONITZ, and also xi.lfia., Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, a, 27, Phys. i. 5, 188, a, 27, viii. 1 fin., Gen. An. V. 7, 788, a, 14; also Poet. 0. 7,1450, b,27; Waitz, Arist. Org i.457 sq., the Ind. Arist. under apxb, and p. 247, n, 2, svpra. 'Apxh indicates the iirst in every series, and in this sense it is used for all kinds of causes, but more especially of first causes, i.e. such as are deCf. ducible from no higher.
2
evuirdpxovaal elaw al tie kt6s. Anal. Post. i. 2, 72, a, 6 Top. iv. 1, 121, b, 9. 3 Phys. ii. 3, 194, b, 23 eva juep, oZv rpSirov aXriov \eyerai rb e| ol yii/eral ri evviripxovTos, olov x a ^ K '> s T0 " avtipiivTos, &c. aWov tie rb ettos Kal rb irapitieiyfia tovto ti' iarlv d \6yos 6 rov ri i/v ehai Kal ra toiitou ylvi\ [i.e. the classes oBev ri apxh ttjs above it] ...
; :
irpiuTjj % rrjs ^pe^aeas rb re\os tovto 5' iorl ... t6 ov evexa (= Metaph. v. 2); 195, a, 15 one class of causes is as rb i ov afr-m, and of these ri. p.ev as rb xnroKeipevov, ra 5c us t6
neTaf3o\rjs v
en
dts
AA
856
ARISTOTLE
two
first
mentioned.
is
not different
actualise a
from
its
is to
concept.
sets the
its soul,
or whether the
it
Even
art. Only man can Only the conception of health can determine tbe physician to labour in producing health. In like
alike in
beget man.
ri i)v elvui;
o9ev
r)
nv6s
the
end
is
in
the
one
(Trdfreus Kal Kivi)o-ews ; lastly rb re\os KaX raya86v. Metaph. i. 3 rb. 8' aXrta Xeyerai rerpax<*>s, init. ! ay fi av fiev airiav (pa/lv elyai ri]V outrlay Kal rb ri y)v elvai irepav 5e ry\v v\t\v Kal rb inroKeifie/jiov,
: .
.
rptrrjv 5e o'9ey
rerdprrji/
ravrri,
7)
8e
avriKeifievrjy
rb oZ eveKa Kal raya$6v. Ibid, viii. 4, 1044, a, 32, Anal. Post. ii. 11 init., De Somno, 2, 455,
case to heal the sicli, and in the other to establish health"). 1 Phys. ii. 7, 198, a, 24 %v %PX*rai 8e tb rpia eis rb lreWaKis rb fiiy yap ri iffrt Kal rb ov iv&Ka 'iv eVti [cf. 198, b, 3], rb 8' '68ey t\ kivthtis irpurov t$ eXSei ravrb rovrois ' afdpunros yap &pBpanrov yivya. Cf. i. 7, 190, b, 17 sq. I)e An. ii. 4, 415, b, 7 etrri 8e r) tyvx^l T v C VT0S o-up.aros
:
Gen. An. i. 1 init v. 1, 778, b, 7, and elsewhere cf. 2nd. Arist. 22, b, 29. On the different terms used for the four causes, i bid. and Waitz, Arist. Org. ii.
b, 14,
,
;
alria Kal apx'h- ravra 8e TroWax&s \4yerat. 6/jlo'iojs 5' ?; tyuxb Kara
robs
atria
Kal
'
StajpLCfievous
rpoirous
r)
rpets
Kal
yap oBev
aufiirav
kIvtjo-is airri,
7)
ou eVe/ca, Kal us
i]
ovffia
rav
efi\f/ix<ov
\\/v\firi
atria,
iii.
1G6 sqq. The further modifications of the doctrine of the four causes in Phys. ii. 3, 195, a, 26 sq. (cf. Metaph. v. 2, 1013, b, 2S), are unimportant, as is also the distinction of the ou eVe/cn into person and thing, on which cf De An. ii. 4, 415, b, 2 rb 8' ov eVe/ca Strrbv, rb flee ou rb Se <f>. See also Phys. ii. 2, 194, a, 35, and Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, 2 (where we must read SVti yap rivl rb 08 cVekci koI
. :
of these three
'
is identified with the So Metaph. viii. 4, 1044, Xoas Se ravra (i.e. eTSos and b, 1 te'Aoj) &/A(pu> rd avrd. Gen. An. i. 1 init. vn&Kilvrai yap atrial
third.
touto
pilv
'
METAPHYSICS
manner we
shall in the highest cause,
357
the source of
movement united
in one.
Nor does
re Kal irpuTois
v\rj,
t\
fiev
ydp
Set
IffTiv
us
8'
us
Hid.
p.op<pt)
Se
732, a 3, where the female is called the fiAjj, the male the atria Kivovtra TrpuTT], $ 6 \6yos virdpx^i ical t6 elSos, and c. 6, 742, a, 28 ; where, as in i. 1 the formal and the final cause are identified, and only three principles are enumerated the reKos or ou eVe/co, the apxTi kivt\tikti Kal ycvirrrriKri and the XP^'M " $ Xpyrai to reAos. Part. A%. i. 1, ttjs <pv<reus Six as 641, a, 25
1,
, : :
Trpoo-vTrdpx"v.
p.341,n.
iraVra
itp'
v(p'
I, fin.
ov
oS,
r)
<pu<ris
yiyvopievw]
afari 8' iy
ffio"Te
ffvfiPaivei
Tpdnov time e|
ylveo-Qat,
vyieias
tt\v
i(TTl
tt}v
vyWiav
Kal
ovffTjs ttjs fiev us us ohatas [which = e75os] Kal ecmv avTT] Kal us tj tcivovtra Kal its to t4\os. Phys. ii. 8, 199, a, 30: Kal eire! i) Qitris Zitt^i 7] flSV US l/ATf 7) 8' us p.op<pri, t4\os 8' aiirri aoVij av efof t)
\eyop.4vris
ttjs
Kal
exovaav tS\7jy
Kal
7)
7)
yap
taTpiKf)
TTJS
8'
u'Atjj
8'
OlKoHopLlKT}
tt}s
tj\tis
t8 ?5os
ti
i)v
{ryieias
Kal
oiKias-
\4yu
ovffiav
avev
to
civat.
:
atTia
a,
t]
:
14
L. 34
(fit Gen. An. ii. 4, 740, b, 28 Se t4xvt\ fiop(f>7j tuv yivop.ivuv if a\tep. Part. An. i. 1, 6i0, a, 31: & &vev 7) Se t^xvti Kdyos tov tpyov
7)
apxh
airb
The
also
:
artist's
rov dpiffpov Kal tov \6yov. method is nature's eVel 7) oiKia roi^Se, TaSe
. .
so in Gen. et 335, b, 33, 35, p-oprpi) corresponds to Te'x"i; the art, however, is elsewhere treated as the true efficient cause, the
ttjs
Sxtis
ii.
io-Tlv;
Corr.
9,
8e? yiyvetrBai
oSJtus
Kal
et
artist only as a
e.g.
ivBpuTros
i.
toSI, rail.
Part.
</>afreTat
An.
Se
1,
639,
'
TrpuTT]
secondary cause Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, a, 34.) eVe! 8e to Metaph. xii. 4 fin.
:
eVeKa
eVeKa
Ktvovv
4y
[lev
toIs
fyvffiKots
rivos
i.
De An.
1,
6:
t<!
elSos,
ruvSi.
:
Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, us fikv HKtj tout' 4o~tlv oXtlov b, 5 rots ysv7iT0?s f us Se rd ov eVeKep popipT) Kal to elSos t) tovto 8'
eo"Tlc 6
eV
to eJSos
to ivavTlov, Tp&Trov Tiva Tpia aXrta av eftj, uSl 8e TeVTapa vyUia ydp nus 7) ImpiKT), Kal oltttas
7)
\6yos o
ttjs
elSos
7]
oikoSojuik'/j,
;
and previously
apxal
elo-lv
ouV
Kal
[at
ivipuirov 7ecj'a
UtTptKTi
io-riv.
c.
ysveo'eus']
rbv
358
ARISTOTLE
final,! in
o r coneept. 2
This
is
which w2 must regard as fundamental that between formal, efficient and final causes For though the is merely a secondary subdivision.
therefore,
only in the
separate. 4
phenomena of sense that, they are found The created universe has several causes
the
is
Again, as the
Form
and
it is
1
not
iroitiTiKdj/.
At this point, it will be enough to refer the reader to Part. An. i. 1. Cf. eifflv &pa Svo atrial p. 642, a, 1 aZrai, r6 & oZ eVeva Kal rb 1aviyxris. The opposition is indicated in 1. 17 in the words apxh
this, see pp. 349, &c. supra.
:
1 :
the other, but in a different sense physical exercise, e.g., may be the efficient cause of health, health the final cause of exercise. This is the meaning of iroWaKts in Phys. ii. 7 (p. 356, n. 1).
;
Cf.
T<f>
17
rQ
elbzi
[i.e.
rb every
with which cf. further the passages quoted in the foregoing note from Phys. ii. 8, and Part. An. i. 1. - For although in Gen. An. v. 1, 778, a, 34, the moving cause is classed along with the necessary and efficient, yet as Ritteb, appealing to Phys. ii. 9, 200, rightly a, remarks, the 30, moving cause is not here considered by itself, but only as united with matter. Cf. also ihid. 1. 14 iv yap rij V\rj rb
yap
rj
tpvffis
fiaWov
ryjs #Atjs,
potentiality presupposes a similar actuality], apiBuy 5' oti for, as this is explained, the seed indeed precedes the plant which springs
from it, but this seed itself comes from another plant, so that it is
still
plant.
XZiov
oucr/os
8ti
Trpovirtipxeur
erepav
fy
overlay
avdyxri ivre-
Xe^efqt ovffav
irotei,
oXov op, el
ylyverai
5
ffiov.
ii.
Gen. An.
''
6, 742, b,
33:
fyxb
iariv,
7rSffot
avayKaiov, rb 5' oZ 4veKa Iv rtp \6ytp. 3 So that, as is remarked Phys. ii. 3, 195, , 8, of two things each may be the cause of
irXelovs,
aAAoi'
utv
Kal
/xia
ob
rbv
avr6v
r,
rbv
apiB/xbv, '66ev
Klvrjirls iirriv.
See
p.
METAPHYSICS
is
359
and the
cause of
susceptible of
:
determinable
in
activity
and every
itself,
it
quality,
has no But though Matter is quality or operative force. wholly devoid of any such active and positive force,
taken in
it
every obstruction
by Form.
To what,
And
so,
that
Form always works with a purpose, it is in Matter we must seek the ground of all phenomena that
and antagonistic
to be explained
to
The
is
by
Though
yet
this
it is
in
no sense
efficient cause,
Though
:
it is
not necessary in
itself, it is
so con-
ditionally
1
Gen., et Corr.
7,
iffa fiev
odv
jtt^
4v
0A.7?
to TrA.ax* iv
5e KLvelu
Ka ' T0
KiviTirBai,
to
/cat Troietv
eTepas Suj/a/iews.
jUop^Vj touto fniv cWaflij tojj/ toitjTutuf, iaa 8' iv v\tj, TraBniTiicd. liiv yctp t/AJ! Kiyoptv dfioiws us eltreiv tV avr^v elvcu t&v avTixei-
tV
fievav Sirorepovovy, Scrircp yevos oV. ibid. 1. 18: riS'Vkri fj Stoj iraflrjrittiv ii. 9, 335, b, 29 t5j s fihyltp vAiis
; :
How exclusively passivity was limited by Aristotle to Matter, appears especially in his anthropology.
immediately.
360
ARISTOTLE
duced certain particular materials must be ready to hand. For the same reason, the extent to which Nature
1
1 Plato had already sharply distinguished the atria from the avvahia, the efficient causes (81' Si/ ytyverai ti) from the indispensable conditions (&Veu Sv ov yiyveTai) cf. Div. 642 sqq. i.
;
Siapifffievtav ivTois
KaTa
tpiKotrotpiav
by the eompul
-
eoTi
7)
8'
eV
Tp'nt).
Aristotle tinction.
tovtwv t&v
iffriv
Sia-trep
tovto
t\
5'
farofleVeajs.
:
Gen.
<pi<ris
between design and natural necessity, between what is required by the conception or form of a thing and what proceeds from
the nature of its material the former is the Si' o, the latter the oZ ovk avev the former is independent and unconditioned, the latter is for a purpose and con: ;
An.
fj
i.
4,
717, a, 15
ttav
jleKTiovi ii. 6, 743, b, Se Tavra, KaBdirep elwopev (743, a, 36), \skt4ov ylveaBai T7? pev 4 avdyKTjs, Ty 8' ovk e avdyicqs dAA'
eWa
ditionally necessary.
To these
"
v\7f
\ey6fievov Kal
at KtvijO'eis 4,
ai
vndpxei 8e to 8' fi'ev airAtSs to?s di'Sfois, to e'| virode<rctis Kal tois iv yeviaei iratriv. Ibid. 642, a, 1 eiVly apa Sio drr.'ai aurai, t6 6' oZ eveica Kal t6 4 avdyKi\s iroAAa yap ytveTai Sti avdyKri. taws 8' aV tis airop^ffeie
(pvo'iv u/xolws
:
....
TaoTrjs.
De An.
ii.
416,
a,
9:
SoKeT Se Tlfftv Tj tov irvpbs <pvo~is ottAws atrfa tt)s Tpotpris Kal ttjs
Keywres
avdymns' t&v pei/ yap Siio Tp6irav ovBeTepov oT6v re ivdpxeiv, t&v
i
.Tb Se ovvalT lov ov fi)]v avKus ye alriov, aAAd [ia\\ov T] \fivx^lGen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 24 sq. : it is not the matter which is the producing cause, for it is merely pasavffio'eais elvat
.
.
fiev
tios effTiv,
sive
and moved
the xvpttaTepa
METAPHYSICS
can realise her end
301
the mode
itself
:
that
Just in proportion as
we
shall
have productions
which serve no end at all, but are developed incidentally as the result of some natural coherence and necessity, in
oirio is ti ?iv efovu and the i+op<p4\. production The physical is the mere tool of the that which
anything
and
it
necessary to
as
causative conception
heat does
not atiy more of itself effect production than the saw saws of itself Part. An. iii. 2, 663, b, 22 irSs
:
tov KaraSimilarly Aristotle distinguishes (Anal. Post. ii. 11, 94, b, 27) eVe/cci tlvos and e'f
evefcd
the instrument of its activity the former must precede in origin the thing which it aims at producing the latter must follow it. Cf. on the whole subject Waitz, Arist. Org. ii. 409 sq. Part. An. iv. 2, 677, -a, 15
;
Ke'xpiTai, \eyicptv.
avdyx-qs
v.
5) the commoner applications of avwyKaiov to that 08 &i>ev ovk cVSexetoi (rjv, Sec. as avvairiov, to that which is f}iaiov and to that which is avayKaiov in the proper sense to awKovv ( = cltt\us avay;
KaraxprJTai fiev oZv iyioTe 7] tpvo~Ls els to w(f)e\ifloy tois irtpiTTtlifjLao'iv, OV flfy 5itt TOVTO Si (tfTZLV TTOLVTa evena t(vos, dWd tivwv uvtmv Totovroiv erepa e avdyKTjs ffvfifialvei
toSto iroAAo. So according to Gen. An. v. 1, 778, a, 30, only that has an end to serve which appears universally in all nature's productions or in certain classes
Sia
the fiii hSexipevov &K\as Quite in conformity with %X* lv this is the statement of Eudemus ajivd Sim pl. Phys. 63, a, that matter and aim are the two causes of motion. Within the sphere of conditional necessity there is again ((?6'. An. ii. 6, 742, a, ] 9 sq. ; where, however, 1. 22, we must read, not ov evena but with Cod. PS. and Wimmer toItov 6c) a twofold distinction made between that which as efficient cause conditions the
koIov') viz.
-
of them ; individual varieties on the other hand have none the eye has an end to serve ; the fact
:
that
c.
it is
8 Jin.,
eveicd
avfifiaivEi
tV kivt\tikj\v. According to Metwph. viii. 4, 1044, b, 12, the eclipses of the moon appear to serve no end; Set 6 Zevs oix birws tov uItov av^ari, aAA* e dvdyKrjs to yap avax^ev ^vx^vat Set Kal to i^u^flej/ SSwp
t)\v aiTiav
'
362
ARISTOTLE
shall hereafter
We
this
view
is
and how many phenomena he accounts for by the resisAgain the same property of Matter is also the source of all contingency in Nature. By the contingent,' 2 Aristotle, who was the
1 '
first
carefully
to
examine
all
this
conception, 3 under-
stands in general
that which
is
neither contained
necessity of its
by the
is
normal. 8
yevd/ievoy
viffdat
That
we must assume
1
the
existence
of
KariKBuv rb $' nu|<tovtov ysvojxeyov rbv ffiTov dpolas 5e koL elf rtp aufifiaive t. &7T<$AAl/Tai 6 (TITOS iv T7? a/W, OV tovtov eveica 3ei itirus airSkriTai, aWarovro o~vfifie07iKey(Phys. ii. individual organs 8, 198, b, 18) of animals are without purpose the bile is a irrplrTtafia kclI oi>x tvexd vivos (Part. An. ibid. 1. 13), the stag has no use for its antlers (ibid, iii. 2, 663, a, 6, 664, a, 7). The same is true of all superfluous materials which are unemployed ; such materials are &XPVo-tov or even tSsv irapci (piaiv ti (Gen. An. i. 18, 725, a, 1, 4) we must therefore decide even in reference to one and the same material whether it serves a purpose or not: lymph (i'x^p), eg., which consists partly of half-assimilated and partly of corrupted blood, is in the former aspect a'lfiaTos xfyw, in the latter *{ avdyxris (Part. An. ii. 4 fin."). Necessity of this latter kind, as is indicated in the passage quoted above from Phys. ii. 8, coincides with contingency.
;
Whether
also of all
freedom
choice in man, from which alone contingent effects really spring (to it alone at least these are referred in Be Interpr. c. 9, 18, b, 31, 19, a, 7), Aristotle does nottellus. InP/iys.i.5,196,b,17, sq., he expressly excludes free purpose, as such, from the domain of tvxv'Sv/j.$i$iiKbs in the narrower
of
'*
sense, rb arrb tvxt\s. 3 As he says himself, Pliys. ii. 4. 1 An. Post. i. 4, 73, a, 34, b, 10 Arist otle calls /cofl' aui-cfc, 8<ra KoX xm6.px ft Te * v T(? rl iCTlV . .
: .
H/rois tSiv
^vwapx^PTay
.
.
avTo'is
aura
avrb, to Se ju^
8t' o.vto'
:
ffv/x0e^7]K6s.
Top.
i.
5,
. .
5e iffTiv OTtpovv
evl
Kal
rtp
avrw
tea]
fiij
iirdpxew, cf.p.234,n. l,on ivS^xifievov and Svjiutov, p. 213, n. 4, p. 214, n. 3, on o-vpfjefiiiicos. 5 Metapli. v. 30, init. : ovixfie-
/**V
tivi
METAPHYSICS
363
such a principle, and not ascribe everything to the operation of necessity, Aristotle proves in the first place
by the witness of universal experience, and in particular by the fact of the Freedom of the Will. 2 But he finds
1
all
all
from
this
many
The
latter
have always a
fail
of
its perfect
accomplishment
owing
owing to the same disturbing cause, they which they did not origin-
design. 5
contingent or accidental
ofrr'
event
is
'6\us
tarw
iy rots
eivat,
p.$i
aei ivepyovffi
/it)
rd Svyarov
Kal
dp.oiws.
Metaph.
r)
vi.
2,
1027,
curia,
7)
a,
13: Hare
1026
b,
31 sqq.
(xi. 8).
Phys.
ii.
8Atj
tarai
iirl
evhexop-ivn
5 init. ; Be Ccelo, i. 12, 283, a, 32 to /xcv yap avripur6v etyri Kal rb dirj tuxI* rrapa to ail Kal rb &s eirl rb Tro\b r) ov 7) ytv6p.evoi/. Phys.
ii.
might not the 8, 138, b, 34 appearance of design in nature be explained by supposing that of her chance productions only
:
those survive which are fitted No ravra fisy yap Kal to live ? irtivra rh (pvtret r) ael oSru yiverai r) ws iifl to iroXb, tuv 5' otto rixv* Kal rov avrop-Arov ouSev. So Be
:
Ccelo,
1
ii.
8,
289, b, 26.
c. 9,
rb iro\i &\\as, rov vii. 7 (see p. 345, ffvpfiePr\K6ros n. 5,svpra), v. 30, 1025, a, 24: oiSe atrtov wpur/j.tvov ov8hy rov Sri <rvji.^^r)K6ros, aWa. to rvxiv, touto S' a6piarov. Cf. n. 5 infra. 4 See pp. 360 sqq. svpra, Gen. An. iv. 10, 778, a, 4 fioiXerai plv ovv r) <pvais ro7s rovrcay \r&v a'arpaiy'] aptBfioU apt6fielv ras yeyeo'ets Kal ras reXevras, ovk aKpifioi Se Sid re rriv rrjs SXris aopiffriav Kal 5m rb yivtaQal TroXKas "PX^'i ^ T " s > yevtmis ras Kara. tpvoiv Kal to? tpOopas ip.Troh't&vo-ai
rrapk rb &s
',
Be
Interpr.
18, b, 31,
ttoXX&'kis
atrial
tuv
irapa
tpvaiv
19, a, 7.
3 Be Interpr. c. 9, 19, a, 9 there must be contingency, 8ti
:
avp.Ttnrr6vro>v
elfflv.
See further
p. 341 sqq.
s
See
n.
3,
supra.
Phys.
ii.
364
"
ARISTOTLE
Now,
since these
means by which ends are realised, and which these means belong,
sense of the
Contingency, in Aristotle's
word,
may
But
activity in
obedience to a purpose
or conception of
is
an object is realised. 3 That which does not proceed from it is unessential and there;
5, 196, b,
juev
KtrTi
5'
17
tuv
5e yivofiemv
5' otf
.
to
.
tov
8tra
re
a-nb
titxvo'as
(pvtreats.
0"U/xj3ej3ij/cbs
ctirb
ri^ys
tpafiev elvai
ru
'
fiev
ajrb
aX.ri.av
wpiap.ivov y
adptffTOV
Akin
to this, but
unimpor-
yap av t$ kv\ trvfiflalii. It is chance, for instance, if one comes to a place, for another purpose and is rewarded in a way he had not thought of or if he (ifetaplt. v. 30) digs a hole and finds a trea<rv/j.&el3>iKbs
;
or if he desires to sail to one place and is carried to another or, generally, if from action directed to a definite end
sure
something else
results,
by reason
of the intervention of external circumstances, than that which was intended (oVa? /lit toD (rvfi^avTOs eVe/ca yevriTai, ov e to alrtov, Phys. ii. 6, 197, b, 19). If the action is one of voluntary choice (irpooiperdv) such a chance (according to the passage just
yap to
OVTOS.
ffvfiPeflriKbs
4yyvs Ti toD
fi)j
ii.)
must be
METAPHYSICS
366
on the
non-existent.
While
it is
something
far
more
first
becomes still clearer From Matter Aristotle is other considerations. from not contented with deducing merely what one is apt to
'
'
The
between
z
is said to
and yet procreation, which depends upon it, occupies a most important place in the scheme of the philosopher. 4
1
30,
Sil rb airb meppia Btj\v ipptv ylyverai naSSv ti irciflos. Cf. (yen. An. iv. 3, 767, b, 8 sqq., ii. 3, 737, a, 27, and p. 353, n. 4, supra. 3 Be An. ii. 4, 415, a, 26, and other passages. That this is in/)
but
ovtie
x. 9
init.
it
is
asked
tiik
ri
yvi>ii
avSpbs ovk ?5ei Siatpepa ... (<}oi> BrjKv nal appiv frepoit r<p
tca'iTOL
/cafl'
in
remarked by Ensbl,
d.
avrb tov cpov aurq ri Siatpopa koX 011% us Acwcottjs ko! fieAavia, aAA' fi (<pov, /col rb
eTSei,
BTjKv Kal rb appev iitipxei ; and the answer is that a distinction in kind rests on iyavriSrTjTes iv t$ \6yip alone, not on those h ttj
&\rj.
Kara rfy
<r<6/iaTi.
Bedeut. d. \>\t\ Arist., Rhein. Mus. N.F. vii. 410. 4 It is even stated, Gen. An. i. 2, 716, a, 17, b, 8, that the sexual distinction, depending as it does on difference of function, is koto rbv K&yov and is one ou Kara rb rv%bv p-vpioi/ ovSi koto t%v Tv/ovo-av Svyafitv.
366
ARISTOTLE
we
shall
have occasion to observe that the which Aristotle always represents as even in their physical nature different in kind from human beings, are yet at the same time to be regarded
Similarly
lower animals,
as imperfect
(owing,
we must
Furthermore,
it
to Matter that
we must
and cor-
&A\ri\a.
Sceu
o\ik
rov
a,
/iera-
PdWetv
SAtj;
[iev
7]
fj /ify,
ion tovtwv
25:
6'<ra
vii.
1035,
.
oZv
0A.TJ
ffvvei\7ifj.fieya
rb eJSos Kal
.
iorlv
cis
cpOt'iptTai
trfj
ravra
1
ffvveiKrjirTai T])
. .
.
SAtj,
aAV
avev
fj
9 ; Metaph. vii. 7, and other passages. Cf. p. 345, n. 5), as Aristotle himself distinctly says. Cf. Metaph. vii. 15 (see p. 220, n. 2, supra), ix. 8, 1050, Corr.
ii.
vAtjs
ravra 8 ov
<p$*lperai
oKas
is xii.
f)
said
3,
yivsais
&\\oi/
oiKla re
Kal
cpBopa
elol
roitrojv,
a\K
b,
rp6iroy
i)
[Or as this
4,
is
expressed Phys.
iii.
203, b, 30: 4vB4xe<r6ai yap i, tli/ai ovSev 5tatp4pet eV rots a(8tots.~] \6yos 8e 8Be. iraffa. Svvafiis a ua T7js avrttpdffs&s kcriv [the possibility of being invohes the possibility of not being, &c] rb apa Svvarbv elvai 4vo4x*rat Kal elvai Kai p.)} tlpai (cf p. 234, n. 1), to 5' v5ex6fiei/ov jU^ 4lpai <p8apr6? (similarly, xiv. 2, init.). The motion, therefore, of every
(
as such, as
1.
we must understand
1069,
;
22, but only its union with this or that material has a be-
xii.
1,
thing is combined only thus is the possibility of the opposite sta'e (the Simuis rijs avricpdfftas, 11. 25, 30 sqq.) overcome ?j yap oicrla
perishable
wilh
effort, for
Lonffit. v. 3. 465, 4ortv 4vavr[ov Kal ottoi aSi/varov uv eft) ipBapiivai fi'l) toriv But we may not infer from this the indestructibility of any mateafivvarov yap rip vKtjv rial thing
b, 7
:
ooa pLtraPiWei.
fill
exoj/ri
TrdvTti fihv
obn 4i/4pyeia,
:
alria tovtov; viii. 4, 1044, b, 27 oiide iravrbs V\ij iarlv a.K\' '6ffwv
yevetris
itrrt
yap 4veivat rb Bep/tbv i) evBb 4i/S4x*rai Ttav 8' tlvai btivvarov $i Bepfibv fj euflu tj \gvk6v iorat yap ra irdBri Kix"pio-fi4va
rb
t
['
Kal
fiera^o\ij
ets
would
METAPHYStyS
said of all badness
ences
'].
1
367
and imperfection, although the perpossibility of opposites, since its conception has for ever been realised in it and will always continue to be realised. Evil
jronjTLKbv Kal
fiev Troiet
u.h.
o%v,
rb
iraBrjTMbj/, ael
^irapiMeiv. Ue Ccelo, i. 12, nothing that is without beginning can have an end, and nothing that is without end can have had a beginning, since this could only be if it were its nature at one time to be, at another not to be. 8e T0L0VTU1V SlW/U? T7JS j) O.VTTI
283, a, 29
:
avTKpdtreojs
elval Kal
fii).
Kal
r)
i*A?j
atria rov
1 Metaph. ix. 9, 1051, a, 15; Aristotle seems, indeed, to assert the very opposite of this lut&ymi Se Kal eirl tSiv KaKuv rb re\os Kal ivepyeiav elvai x**P ov T V S Suvdfj.ews rb yap ftuvdatvoi' Taurb &;j.(pa) ravavria. 8rj\ov apa 8Yi ovk 4<TTt rb K7.Kbv -rrapa to irpdyfia/ra vrrrepov yap -rfj (pvffei rb aaiow rrjs
:
tV
'
'
Suvd/xeas. But this only means lhat since every Siva/us contains the possibility of opposite determinations (see p. 234, n. 1, supra)
what is merely Svva^i bv we cannot attribute one of two mutually exclusive qualities, such as good and bad, as the Platonists had done in explaining matter as evil (cf. Biv. i.
to 642, 6, 721, 737). Nevertheless, the ultimate cause of evil can only reside in the Huvd/tei in, in other words, in matter, and this is indicated by Aristotle himself when, in the passage just quoted, he proceeds ovk apa ovb" iu ro7s 4 apxvs Ka ^ r0 ^s aidiois ovdey iffrtv otire KaKbv otire a/j.dprri/jia ofae dietp9ap/x4yov Kal yap r) $La<p8opa tSov kukwv io-riv. There is no imperfection in the eternal, since it exists continually eVepyeia, and therefore excludes the
:
the possibility of its turning out bad as well as good deper.ds. Eternal reality excludes evil, since it has either no matter at all, or one which, as perfectly definite and formed, is incapable of opposite determinations while mutability and change, on the other hand, are sure indications of evil and imperfection. (On this subject cf also Eth. N. vii. 15, 1154, b, 28 fJ.eTa(3o\7i 8e irdvTaiv yXvKvrarov, Kara rby TTOlfiTyjy, Sia wovripiav Tiyd. uxrirsp yap dvQponros
:
r)
tpvffts
Seo/jLZVTi
oi35'
jUeTaj3oA^s
4trietKr)s.)
'
ou
yap
'
so we shall find that Aristotle traces all imperfect forms of natural existence to the' resistance which the matter offers to the form and by a parity of reasoning he would have been forced to refer the
otn- A?)
:
And
368
feet
ARISTOTLE
and imperishable heavenly bodies are no
less
formed
seek
we must
Form. 2
Matter,
all
those
and Form.
Aristotle
certainly
of the
and
we could have wished and thereby he bequeathed to his followers in the Middle Ages a rich op-
man, incorporeal beings free which we must nevertheless regard as being also individual existences. 3 Yet when the Form becomes actual in any material, it is the latter alone which explains why the
source of moral evil to the body, his general scheme is alone passive and changeable, had he not, as we shall see hereafter, left this question wholly vague. Aristotle himself has not overlooked this objection. He
which in
(pwitcwv fj.ev aiSlcay Se ovcriuv aWos \6yos. Xatas yap evia ovk e^et fi\t\v.
1)
oil
roiairriv (as
Similarly xii. 2, Kwnriv. 1069, b, 24. The ether, for instance, of which the heavens and the heavenly bodies consist, is said to have no ivuvTiwais and therefore to be subject to no
t6ttov
more infra, solution which the Schoolmen in their doctrine of angels devised, to the effect that each of these pure spirits, as specilically different from every
this,
3
On
The
change in
its
substance.
It has
METAPHYSICS
Form is
never present in
it
369
Form
as such
that
is,
in the pure
is
The Form
or Concept
-
always a
and capable
species resolve
Form
any longer exists, 4 arid consequently they must be distinguished from one another by their Matter. 5 Aristotle is unable to apply this principle unwaveringly 6 through 1
See p. 219,
;
n. 4,
and
p. 221,
trwl\71tAfl4v(p
rp
S\rj
ov voiovtrtv.
6 avQpumos,
supra and upon eTBoj as the object of the conception see notes on pp. 216 and 341, &c, and cf. p.
173, n.
2
fi\ay(a ov trotet
ws
r\
liXij
yap
2.
difference]
Metaph. viii. 8, 1033, b, 21 the form is not something apart from definite material things, h\hh rb roibvtie tnytafa'ti, r6Se Kal upifffJLtvov ovk %ffriv, aAAa irute? Kal
yevvoi e rovde rot6vde.
is itself
yap
iXSyj
Se
H\7j
Kairot erepai at ffdpKes Kal ra bo-ra eg,wp 88e Kal 5Se tiXXa rb avvoXov
krepoy
p.ev, eltiei
But
this
the distinctive mark of uni versalit y see pp. 333, kcsupra. ' Phys. ii. 1, 193, b, 1 v p.op<pii Kal rb eTSos, ou x"'f iC'' av ** ^**' ^ Kara rbv \6yov. Metaph. viii. 1, v. infra, n. 6. 1042, a, 26 sqq. * See notes at pp. 216, 221,&c. supra. 5 Metaph. vii. 8 fin. (cf c. 10, 1035, b, 27 sqq.) the form unites with the matter, rb 8' airav fjBri rb tol6v5* el&os 4v TaurSe rats <rap|l
; : ;
.
6 There are certainly passages in Aristotle in which that which constitutes the difference between individuals of the same species seems to be included in the conception of their eTSoi
it cannot be overlooked that theconceptionje.^.jOf man, which according to the passage just quoted is an infima species, does not exclude certain individual
thus
Kal bvrois
KaWlas
T$
Kal 1,taKpd.ri}s
H\7jy,
'
'
rty
krepa
iireiH 8Vai
yap, ravrb 5e
effiet
aro/iov yap
rb et5s iffrt rb
x. 9, 1058, a,
fiev
37
\6yos rb
eiffly
8' $Atj,
[lev iy rip
\6ytp
4yavrt6ri\res
differences which have a reference, not to the matter alone, but also to the form of the individual members of it (e.g. their bodily form). No clear distinction, however, is anywhere drawn between this individual form, and the universal form or class concep-
common
VOL.
I.
B B
370
ARISTOTLE
;
out
but
of
it ia
no room
for
several individual the contrary, the former always resolves itself finally into the latter. Metaph. ko! xii. 5, 1071, a, 27, it is said twc iv ravT(j) etfiet erepa [sc. ra aroLxetd iffriv], ova eXfiet, a\K' &tl rwv KadeKaarrov &\\o, tf re ff^j SKtj Kal rb Ktvrjaav Kal rb eifios
essence things
;
or Socrates.
:
The only
lies
on
ground of individuality
the matter
S\ri
in
iv iravrl
r$
yevofievcp
iveari,
fore is]
(1.
18).
true
v\tj
aWtos
Kal
7}
ipri,
KaO/iKov
5e
\6ytp
fiopipv,
&
r6fie
X<apiffr6v
iffri
itrrt.
an
eiSos of his
own
different
from
and
of
that of everyone else, still the one does not differ from the other in kind. They will differ from one anot her, therefore, only in so far as they belong to different subjects or in other words, in their actual embodiment, not in their character apiBixlp, not eifiei. Metaph. vii.3(cf.p.372,n.3),1029, a, 1, it the name ovala seems to is said belong in the first place to the
viroKeiaevov
irpwrov
'
roiovrov 5e
rp6nov fiev riva t) #A7j Keyerat, &\\ov 8e rp6wov i) fioptpt], rpirov Se Since, then, by rb iu ToiiTwK. iiroKeifievov or substance the individual thing as the subject of all its predicates is elsewhere understood (cf. pp. 332sqq., 300,&c), we should naturally refer /*op</>J) here to the form of the individual thing qua individual. But from the further explanation, c. 8, it appears that this /j-optph iv t$ al(T0riT$ (1033, b, 5), this is e?Sos t) obtrla \ey6pevov, is only the unrealised form which first makes this definite thing into a thing which is defined in this or that way (r65e into a roidvfie, 1. 23) in the actual Ihing, i.e. in the
the similar statement, Metaph. v. 8(seep.372,n.2,m#7i). Theform is a TdBe in so far as it expresses a definite kind of being (man, beast, &c.) but it becomes the form of a definite individual thing in being united with a definite material. Considered apart from this union it is a universal, and it is not true to conclude, as Hektling does (Form u. Mat. 56), from the fact that Phys. iv. 3, 210, b, 29 sq., seems to reckon the et&os as well as the BXij a constituent element of the thing, that it is the constitutive principle of individual being.' This is true rather of the material in which the form
; '
matter, but
hand
individualised. Even Be 1, 412, a, 6 leads, to no other conclusion. It is there said Xeyofiev firf yivos ev ti rSov ovruv t))v ovalav, ravrys 5e rb faev Sis v\T}V, h Ka8' avrb fiev ouk eari rifie ti, erepov fie nop<pi)v Kal eifios, Kad' t)v ^5?) Keyerai rifie ti, koI rpirov rb 4k roirav. The thing is called this definite ihing, i.e. a thing of this kind, becauseits material has received this form so the rdSe means here also, not the individual, but the specific peculiarity. Still less in such passages as
is first
An.
ii.
METAPHYSICS
individual
Metaph.
yap rb
tov
*
871
Forms of
sensible things. 1
Every Individual
Aoy
xii. 6, 1071, a, 20 (hpx>l ica8' 'iKaarov tuv Kaff eicaffayQpanros yap hv&p&irov Ka66aAV tiffTiv oi/Sels, a.X\a Tlti\ebs
'Ax'AAe'ojs, &c.)
itis(asHERTLlNG
says at p. 57), stated 'in plain words that the form, like all first
principles, must be individual.' Peleus, however, is not the mere form of an individual but a real
individual thing, since it gives to the individual its peculiar nature, and is thus distinguished from the essence (jb r\ fjv efoai), which is always, at least in sensible things, a universal. He admits, however, that these two conceptions, which in certain passages Aristotle undoubtedly recognises as distinct, are as a rule
individual ; and he has become so by the union of the form man with this particular human body. Moreover, ISiov elSos (Meta/ph. xii. 5, 1071, a, 14) refers, not to the individual form of this or that man, but to the form man in general. So also the remark (JDe An. i. 3, 407, b, 23) that any soul may not enter any body, since all
have their
IStov e/Bos
ko.1
noptfiiv,
mean
man may
is
872
ARISTOTLE
and everything
indiffer-
is
an Individual. 2
'
two terms
ently
3
.
'
object of sense
is
and
'
individual
all this,
'
If Matter
the cause of
it is
it is
imposonly
contri-
sible to
suppose that
distinguished from
:
Form
it
by privation and non-existence rather must bute something of its own to Form.
perienced this difficulty is undeniable but it does not therefore follow that he did not make the attempt, and that he intended from those elSri which coincide with class conceptions 1o distinguish a second kind of eYS?j which represent, not what is common to the class, but what is peculiar The truth is to the individual. that there is no place in his scheme for such individual forms. For since according to the wellknown view that the form has neither origin nor end (see p. 342 and this must hold also of the form which as r65e ti is in an individual existence see preceding note) the individual forms of sensible things, if there are such, must be in aclual fact separable from the things whose form they are but this in Aristotle's view is wholly inadmissible. Metaph. vii. 11, 1037, n, 1: Kal iravrbs yap #A.7j rls itrriv t fi-fj
:
of multiplicity, Kafoot trvpfiaivfi y' frtwTlas ol fiiv yap 4k rrjs V\7jS TTOWCL TTOlOVffiV ipCuVtTdt .
.
which, however, Plato did not deny, since it is just because the same material gives only one specimen, that material things constitute a plurality even when there is no distinction of kind between them
S'
4k fiias S\tjs
fif-a.
rpdirefa
Metaph. iii. 4 Ccited p. where he says if there were nothing but individual things, there would be nothing but sensible existence xii. 3,
Cf.
342, n. dupra)
1070,
0A.7J
i)
a,
ovffiai
5e rpeis,
17
fiiv
. . .
(here = elSoj) T<JBe ti. els V, al e|u tis en TpiT7j f/ 4k tovtwv, t) Ka6' %KaaTa. De Ccelo,
Si
i.
9,
Form as such
and
something
differ-
ItrrL ri fy sIvcll icul e?5os aino Ka& Ibid. xii. 8, avrb &Wa T<!5e ti. This only cited p. 339, n. supra. has there refers, however, as been already remarked, to the individual members of an infima
ent from form in the material if, for instance, there existed only one single circle, the circle would still continue to be something different from this circle. The one would be the cTSos, the other e?5os 4v ttj S\ri Kal twv ko9'
Ka<TTOv.
4-irel
aivdriTds
yap
rav
species.
2
iTnjpxfv.
e.g.
See
elSos 4v
same
thing.
'
METAPHYSICS
a higher value, when
373
we
is is
Substance,
and
if
Form,
we have
just
seen,
always
universal,
and
if
is
therefore the
Matter
then
it is
we cannot
and that
of
Form and Matter which alone is Substance, Indeed, the substratum since we have defined Substance as
'
(vTToicslfievov)
and have
also recognised in
Matter the
substratum of
all
Yet it is impossible Full and original reality for Aristotle-to admit this. belongs to Form alone Matter, on the contrary, is no more than the bare Potentiality of that whereof the Actuality is Form. Not only, therefore, is it impossible that
primitive Substance of
all
things.
its
Form
expressly identifies
Form with
Substance."
existences,
He
to
and absolute
which
1
it
belongs, 5 so that
See pp. 331 sqq: See pp. 300, 333, and notes. See pp. 344 sq. * Kg., Netaph. i. 3, 983, a, 27 iii. 4, 999, b, 12 sqq. vii. 4, 1030, b, 5, c. 7, 1032, b,' 1, 14
2
3
; ;
(tISos
Se
\4-ya
teal
rd rl
fy
elycu
kniarov
. . .
tV
irpinriv
ovaiav
\iya
5"
c. 10, 1035, b, 32, c. 1037, a, 29, c. 17, 1011, b, 8 viii. 1, 1042, a, 17, o. 3, 1043 b, 10 sqq.; ix. 8, 1050, a, 5; Gen et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 6 Meteor iv. 2, 379, b, 26, c. 12, 390, a, 5 Part. An. i. 1, 641, a, 25; Gen An.i 1, 714, a, 5. Cf. p. 214, n 5 Metap/i. vii. 6 in answer to
1 1
, ;
t[ fy thai),
374
ARISTOTLE
Further, he will not suffer anything else
of the thing.
It
is
Substance (ovala)
in the full
is
used, 1 since
it is
and
strict sense of
it
the word.
The question
to a
is
Form which
diffi-
unaffected
by change
remains
Here we detect a
culty, or rather
to
altogether.
In
his
in the Form, or in
Whole produced by
would not be known
eirrai snurT-fip.Tf,
ovtc
ktmv
fi
exist, things
(ruv
5'
fihv
to
3).
said that they are different only in the case in which a conception beHkcuttoi/
;
ouic
eWai ivra
xa6'
1031, b,
p.ii
all 8cra
o-ujiij3e^j7/c!)j
aira 1032,
/col
a,
5: tUv
mere predicate), whereas on the other band when the conception expresses the essence of the thing itself they are one and the same. Kg. the conception of whiteness is different from the
\cvitbs
wpiruv
eic&o-Ttp
'iv
'
tvBpanros;
on the other
chat Kal eKarrrov t& aind c. 11, 1037, a, 33 sqq. Cf. the following notes and Metaph. v. 8, 1017, b, 23 (rvpfidivei Sii koto Siio rpoirovs tJjv ovalav KiyzaBai, r6 6' iwoKeip.<=vov
Kal
etrri
;
hand the ivl efocu is not different from the iv, the 07089! eTj/oi from
the aya$bv, nor again
a,
1,
effxarov,
&
"
/Mpceri
kclt'
&\\ou
cf. viii.
3,
from the niitAor, the tyvxji eTvai from the if<ux^. Otherwise (not to mention other reasons) conceptions would not
niic\<p
thai
Aeycroi, (col % av r6Se ti iv Kal x a>P"rT '' $ [where, however, as Schweglek and Bonitz rightly remark upon this passage, we can only understand the \6ycp xapurrbv to be meant on which cf viii, 1 ; see p. 369, n. 6, supra]
; ,
;: :
METAPHYS^S
the combination of
both. 1
375
his
Bat
answer
is
far
from satisfactory.
He
admits
that Matter
cannot
;
he
since
the substratum of
3
all
amid change.
Matter
the
is
Nor
is
it
sufficient to
maintain that
Form,
latter
4
being
for
actually,
the
former
only poten-
tially so
roiovrov Se t6 eWos.
1
how can we
r)
conceive of a Substance
8'
l/caWou
init. (cf .
'
fj-aptpr;
teal
VII. 3
:
at p. 370)
'
.we may use substance in various ways as equivalent to the rl fiv elvat, the KaOoAov, the yevos,
earlv ovala Kai ri il\ri SrjKov. yap rats avrtKeipevais tieraf}o\a?s earl ti rb inroKelfievov raisftera^oKah. Cf. p. 344. Ibid. ix.
oti
ev
irdaais
7,
1049,
a,
34
the substratum of
:
the r6Se ti
the {nroKeifievov. By the last, vii. 10, 1035, a, 1 el oly 4arl rb again, we may understand either fiev ii\7] rb 5' eloos rb 8' 4k tovtuv, the u'Ajj or the popipii or the com- Kai obaio. i] re uky Kai rb elbos Kai posite product of both. Of rb 4k roiricv. Phys. i. 9, 192, these, however, the Ka96\ov, and a, 3 (cf. pp. 342 sqq. and notes) with it the yevos (on the relation fifie7s i*ev yap uAtjv Kai areprjatv of which to the naBiAov, see p. erep6v (parley elvat, Kai rovruv rb 213 sq.), are quietly set aside, fiev ovk tty elvat /caret avfifief3-qKbs, c. 13 (of. p. 333, suj/ra) and r\\v liKtjv, r))v 5e aript\atv /ca0' since the popipii coincides with avrfyv, Kai rijv fiev eyyvs Kai ovalav the ri Jiv ehat there only remain 7rwy, tV ii\7iv, r)\v be arepi\atv the three above-mentioned sig- oiSa/xus. Be An ii. 1 (see p. 669, nifications of ovala. Cf. c. 13 n. 6, supra). * Metaph. viii. 1, 1042, a, 26 init., viii. 1, 1042, a, 26 sqq. ibid. c. 2 ; JDe An. ii. 1 (see p. eart 8' ovaia rb viroKel/ievov, &\\us ixKKws 8' & \6yos 369, n. 6, supra) ; Ind.Arist.5i5, fiev tj V\t], . . a, 23 sq. Kai, 7] fiop<pri, rplrov be rb 4k 2 Metaph. vii. 3, 1029, a, 27, rovruv c. 2 init. 4irel 8* 7) fi.lv after adducing several reasons us inroKetfievrj Kai us v\t} ovaia in support of the view that the OfioXoyeirat, afar] 8' 4<Trlv i) ovvd/xet, substance = the matter, he goes \otwbv Tf)p us 4vepyetav ovalav ruv aSimrov Se xal yip rb on aiadrjruv etireTv rls 4a.rtv. Ibid, Xwpiffrbv Kai rb r6Se ti inrdpxeiv fin. : tpavepbv Sij 4k ruv etpiijievuv 5oK6i ix&KiffTa rrj ovtrlq, Sib rb rls r) alaBrirr) ovaia 4arl Kai irws eTSoS Kai rb e afl$o?v ovaia 5<ieief i) fiev yap ws 0A?7, t) 8' us /j.op(pj), av elvai fiaWov rijs SKtjs, Hrt 4vepyeta ' Cf. i) Se rplrri t) 4k further, p. 345 sqq. rovruv; xiv. 1, 1088, b, 1 (against ' Metaph. viii. 1, 1042, a, 32 the Platonic doctrine of an abso: : . . . . ; : :
'
376
ARISTOTLE
is
which
is
merely potential
that
is,
an absolute existence
opposed not
all to
composite product of
show how
is
Form
is
in itself
always
individual Substance.
burdened with Matter, and that Substance is originally In like manner he fails to tell
us
how Matter
devoid of
many
it
impressions of a die
Finally,
is
why
birth
joint product of
Form and
:
Form
tV
pen
lutely great and small) avdynri re iicdffTov S\ijy tivat rb 5u: cuiei ToiovroVf StffTe Kal oi/ffias to Se Tp6s ri oi/re duvd/iei ovffla otlre
'
fiaWov
rrjs
SAris.
toivvv e| b.p.<polv ovo-lav, Xe7 5e t$/v ck re rrjs v\t]s Kal rrjs fioptprjs, atpereov ' barkpa yap Kal S^\tj.
2 Aristotle frequently distinguishes between conceptions of pure form and of form inherent in a definite material; the standing example of the latter is the irifibv as distinguished from the Koihov so also axe, saw, house, statue, and even soul. Cf. Phys. ii. 1, 194, a, 12, ii. 9 Jin. De An. i. 1, i03, b, 2, ii. 1, 412, b, 11. iletaph. vii. 5, c. 10, 1035, a, 1 sqq. b, 74, c. 11, 1037, a, 29.
;
ivcpyziq.
tV
Metapli. viii. 3 init. irlore KavBdvei irdrepov atitxalvei rb uyofia aivBnov oitrlap tj tvepyeiav Kill /xop^y, olov i) oik'.o. x6repuv or\ptiov tov hoivo'u on (TKeVatr/xa e TrhivtSwv Kal KiBav aSl Kei/itvasv, tj rrjs ivepyelas Kal toO eiSovs oti o-Keirair/ia vii. 3, 1029, a, 5 ei to elBos rrjs 8\i)s irpoVepop Kal fiaWov oi>, Kal toD e a/itpoiv j,p6repov iffTai line 29 rb elSos <al to 4 aptpoiv oiola $6^(uv ttv
:
tV
tV
METAPHYSICS
or Matter separately. 1
677
For even
if
we can suppose
that
it is
hard to imagine
Forms
difficulties exhibit
the same
we discerned in dealing with the notion of Substance. The fact is that Aristotle combines in his Metaphysics two different points of view, which he
fails to
harmonise.
On the one
side
to
is
always Universal.
On
He
cannot
explain
how
may
coexist in one
philosophy,
dictions arise.
At one time
is
Individual which
Form
Matter causes
It is repre-
mere Potentiality.
So the un-rairqv
1 Metapli. vii. 15 cited at p. 219, n. 4, supra, and the passage ffomc. lOcitedatp. 366,n.l; ibid. viii. 1 1042, a, 29 rplrov tie rb 4k
, :
ovalav Kiyoiev.
avdynri
5})
attiiov elvai
1)
<pdapriit>
&vev tov
ovtiels
<p8*ipe<r9ai
koI
.
yiyveaBai
voiel
oiiBe
rb
t6
8'
tilSos
roirav
[form
:
and matter],
;
ou
7EW5,
tie
:
a\Aa
4k
effTi
voielrai
c. 3,
r65e
u.
yiyverat
init.
tovtuv
1043, b, 10 oiitie to Cv oy K *d
eivai
'
Sri
&i>0panr6s
te!
ivia
etirep
&i/eu
tiitrovv,
a\\6. ti
4o"tlv,
el
Kal ovk
elalp,
Set
b
.
irapa
. .
ravra
oi/ffla
o~Tty[ial,
Taud
tiki]
7)
& 4cup-
Kal o\cos
Ta
elfSTJ
Kal
ai fioptpal, ov
ovpts rijv S\tju Xeyovfftv. el oZv tout' oXtiov tov elvai Kal ovirias [so Bonitz], toCto outV av t)\v
yap to KevKbv yiyverai, aAAa rb vhoi> Kcvk6i>. Cf, pp. 341 sqq., and notes there.
378
ARISTOTLE
we cease to wonder that Aristotle's
and Universal,
among
the
also
and to a
among
.
Form and Matter, Potential and Actual. By means of this distinction he explains how Unity can also be Multiplicity how the Genus and Differences form one Concept; how the many Individuals constitute one Species how Soul and Body make one Being. It is this alone which enables
;
him
to solve the
had stumbled.
problem.
and Potential, they are in a position of essential correlatbe notion of the Potential implies the possibility
of
its
becoming Actual
it is
that
Everything
;
become actual must be potential and conversely everything that is potential must at some time or other become actual, since what is never to be actual
that
is to
Nor does
Aristotle
mean
and
assertion that a thing is potential only so long as it is actual but he forbids us also to say (ibid. c. 4 init.) 8ti Swarbv /xlv toSI ouk iarai Se, since this could only
;
METAPHYSIQS
by Potentiality any mere
Potentiality.
379
Matter
is
in itself or in
is
its
capacity
Form
and consequently
it)
1
Matter of
for
itself implies
is
provoked by
to
is
itself.
On
is
Form
it
But the
distinguished
be said of that which by its very nature could not be but this could not be potential, and he therefore denies (as was pointed outatp. 366,n. 1-) that in things of eternal duration there can be any potentiality without actuality.
; 1
koI dpin.hv, is
from compulsion, avdjRTi irapa tV <5ftuV, and the falling of a stone quoted as an example of the former (similarly Metaph. v.
5,
1015, a 26, b,
sq.,
xii. 7,
17
Matter
Kal
is
ti/u'eo-flai
na\
tov
Oelov
ayadou
and this is the principle upon which we must explain the movement of the world by God and of the body by the soul.
koI ifiTov,
Cf.
xii.
1072, b, 3:
ibid,
a,
ki><
:
lis
ixivov
26
-ri
ipdopexrhr
is
The longing
referred to
no
cjnscious desire, but a mere natural impulse, and is frequenl ly referred to by Aristotle as the cause of the natural movements of bodies. Thus (Phys. ii. 1, 192, b, 18) we are told: a work of art ouSe/aiav Spufy ?xfi ficra$o\tjs efi<pvTot/ whereas the product of nature has. Cf. Metaph. v. 23, 1023, a, 8, where koto tV avrov cpuaif and Kara tV o.\itov Anal. dpii^iv are parallel phrases
t
Hebtmng, Mat. u. Form, 91). Nevertheless we cannot but recognise in the use of these expressions the psychological analogy from which the terminology is borrowed, reminding us as it does of the earlier hylozoism. 2 Aristotle as a rule makes no distinction between these two terms (see Trendelenburg, De An. 296 sq. Schwegler, Arist. Metaph. iv. 221 sq., 173 sq. Bonitz, Ind. Arist. 253, b, 35
;
and
if
he seems to do so in individual
passages, yet is the distinction of each from the other so loosely defined that in different passages the same is assigned to both. Thus motion is usually called the entelecheia of matter, the soul the entelecheia of the body (cf. Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 26, 201, a, 10, 17, 28, 30, b, 4 viii. 1, 251, a, 9 Be An. ii. i. 412, a, 10, 21, 27, b, 5, 9, 28, 413, a, 5 sqq., c. 4,
; ;
Post.
ii.
11,
94,
b,
380
ARISTOTLE
Form and
Motion, 1
The
correlation
therefore
of
its
Causes.
(3) Motion
and
the first
Cause of Motion.
the definition
we have
quoted.
in
other words,
.
it is
417, a, 28,
own end
life,
thought,
pression occurs Metaph. xii. 8, 1074, a, 35, c. 5, 1071, a, 36, as applied to the pure, immaterial form, viz. God. Phys. iii. 3 im.it. the action of the moving cause is
called ivipyua, the change effected in that which is moved ivreKexeui, a use which seems quite proper, as the latter and not the former is brought to completion by motion ; yet in the passage that follows ivTe\4xeia is used of both, and in Metaph. ix. 8, 1030, a, 30 sqq. it is said, with reference to the two kinds of activities distinguished above in the case of those whose end is outside of themselves, the energeia is in that which is moved in the case of the others, in that which acts. It is therefore impossible to point to any fixity in the language used to express the distinction between these two terms.
: j
energeia, while on the other hand that which is subordinate to anend outside itself and ceases with its attainment, e.g. buildiDg, walk(On ing, &c, is called motion. these two kinds of activities, v. also c. 8, 1050, a, 23 sqq.) Metaph. ix. 3, 1047, a, 30 again seems to appropriate ivTe\ix eia to the state of completion, v4pyeia to the activity directed to its attainment, or to motion (Sokci yhp
eyep-yeia ii&KiffTa
r)
kIptjo'is
eTjxu),
1050, a, 22. Also Be 5, 417, b, 4, 7, 10, 418, a, 4, eVTEAe'xe m stands for the completed state. (That Metaph. xi. 9, 1065, b, 16, 33, repeatedly uses
c. 8,
account of the spuriousness of the former passage.) Elsewhere motion is called ev4pycia a.Te\ris, 4v. tov i.Tf XoOr, and as such is distinguished from the mrASr 4v4p-
' Phys. iii. 1, 201 a, 10, b, 4 % tov Suvifiei Spros ivreXixeta $ toiovtqv, Klj/7i(ris iffriv 7] TOV
,
:
Svvarov,
tpavepbv
fi
Buvarbj',
Klvrjcris
'6ti
:
eVrEAe'xeia tariv c. 2,
;
202, b, 7
xtpriais
irTeAexeia tow
METAPHYSICS
881
Matter by Form, the transition from Potentiality to Actuality. The movement of building, for example,
1
which a house
is
But motion
the
brass,
which a statue
brass
cern
it
in so far as
it is
for
qua brass
remains
it
made
Ktiftjrov
into a statue. 2
it
$ kivt\t6v
viii. 1,
251,
tpafxtv Bij
t\v
X^tav rov
kiv7jtov rj klvt}t6v. So Metaph. xi. 9, 1065, 'b, 16, 33 see preceding note. That only this transition and not the condition attained by
; 1
sqq.).
(
Bbentano's explanation
Von der mannigf. Bedeutung des Seienden nach Arist. p. 58), according to which motion is the actuality which transforms a
potential being into ' this potential being,' or which constitutes or forms a potential as potential,' is without support either in Aristotle's use of terms or in actual fact. For, in the first place, the entelechy of the Bvvd/iet iv is not that by which the Svv. tv first comes into being j and, in the
'
means of it, only the process of actualisation, notthe actuality, is meant by the expression entelecheia or energeia is obvious not less from the nature of the case itself than from the repeated description of motion as an uncompleted energy or entelechy
(see pp. 383, n. 1, 379, n. 2). The same distinction elsewhere occurs.
Pleasure,
is
e.g., is
said not to be a
its Kiviitris
becoming Bvvi.nn avSptas, i.e. brome. Aristotle, however, has stated the meaning of his definition unambiguously in the
passage immediately following, and so has the author of Metaph. xi. 9.
382
is
ARISTOTLE
clear,
be
special or
is
particular
movement;
such movement
always
some
general notion of
If, on the other hand, we take the movement, it may be denned as the
process
by which Potentiality
is
lopment of Matter by Form, since the material qua material is mere Potentiality which has not yet in any
respect arrived at Actuality.
all
destruction.
is
never as-
what we have said, to regard becoming and decaying as forms of motion, maintaining that though every motion 2 is change, all change is not motion this distinction must be accepted as a relative one which does not hold of the general idea of motion and so Aristotle himself on other occasions 3 employs motion and change as synonymous terms. The doctrine, however, of the different kinds of motion belongs to Physics.
It follows from
motion is intermediate between and actual being it is Potentiality struggling potential into Actuality, and Actuality not yet freed from Poten;
tiality
in
other
It
is
distinguished
from mere
by being
sense
an
its strictest
is
by
directed
201, a, 9
viii.
E.g. P/iys.
c.
iii.
1,
sqq. 261,
2 into.
a, 9,
7,
METAPHYSICS
to
383
an object has
is
object-
thought, for
motion
is
instance,
whereas
therefore
particular
only an unaccomplished
effort. 1
Hence each
motion
is
opposite
from
it
that which
has to become.
2
Where
there
is
no opposite,
there
Consequently all motion implies is also no change. two principles that which moves, and that which is moved, an actual and a potential being.
it it
lacks
Mere Potentiality is unable to produce motion, for Energy and so likewise is pure Actuality, since
Motion
Phys.
Bri
iii.
2,
201, b, 27
tov
rS>v
WV
%VeKO.
7}
KlvTJfftS,
tV
icivrfftv
vpafcisj) ov
aXriov
otfre
els
hvyo.}xiv
aXX*
i\
etcelvri
.
Trpa^ts
otfre
yap rd Svvarbv
e
Kal
afxa
t7]V
{HefidSiKev,
ovS*
oiKoSofie?
Kal
*
iroabv
drat
Kiveerat
avdyicys
cf'KoS6fn)Kev,
ovre t& evepyeia iroffhjr, t) re K^yrjo'ts evepyeia jxev tis. elvat done?, areX7)s 5e- aXriov 8' 2ti arehes rb Svvarbv t oh early t) ivepyeta. It is therefore neither a ffrepTfo-ts, nor a Svvafxts. nor an ivepyeia ottXt). (So Metaph. xi. 9, 10K6, a, 17.) VIII. 5, 257, b, 6: Ktveirai rb kivt)t6v
oZv
a,
ivepyetav
Cf.
C.
Xeya, eKeivTjv Se
8,
1050,
23 sqq. and
ii.
p. 379, n. 2,
supra\ Be An.
/fal
5,
'yap tarty
t)
Kiv7)ffis
areXfys pevrot
i)
yap
Ktvrjots
rovro 8' itrrl Suvdfiet Ktvovfievov ovk ivre\ex^ia rb Se Svvdfxet ets 5' effrt iyreXexeiav fiah't^et. t) kIvijo'is ivreXex^ta kivtjtov areXi]s' rb Se Ktpovv fjtiii evepyeia icr'v. Metaoh. ix. 6, 1048, b, 17 Se rwv vpd^eav fi>v icrl irepas ovSe/xia reXos aA\a rS>y irepl to rov oToy laxvaiveiv reXos, t) io-Xvaffia 3 avra Se Srav io-xvalvy auras iffrly iv KtVT]0'i fii) inrdpxovra
:
7)v, 7) 8'
rereXefffxevov
2
225,
a,
a,
eW
2, 1069, a, 13: els evavrt^aeis av elev rots KaBeKaffrov at (xera&oXai avdyKT) St} jAsrafiaXXeiv t^v VXtjv SvvafxevT]V Ixfifya CTrel Se Strrbv t6 ov, fieraBdXXet iry iK tov Swdfj.ei ovros eistfrd ivepyeia 6v. Cf. p. 342 sqq.
32,
xii.
'
'
; .
884
ARISTOTLE
the
Potential or Matter
:
Form upon
'
even in that
which moves
the soul
as
is
itself
we always
it
itself,
we
different
from
not
the passive.
While Becoming,
therefore, is impossible
is
Even
in cases
yet another
must have come before it in actual existence. The organic individual is produced from seed, but the
1 Phys. iii. 2 (p. 383, n. 1), viii. 257, b, 8; Metaph.ix. 8esp. 1050, airav b, 8 sqq. xii. 3 ; Phys. vii. 1 rd kivov/izvov lm6 tivos avdyKT] iciveiirBcu even in the case of
5,
that which apparently is selfmoved, the material which is moved cannot be at the same time the moving cause, since if a part of it is at rest the whole
3fstaph, ix. 1, 1046, a, 28] a\\' $ Kx&piffTcu, rairrj t6 /lev Trftpvxe irately to Be irtkff^Lif. Nothing that is single, therefore, is selfmoved, a\\' avdyKr/ Biripyjadai rd Kivovv iv eicdffTtp irpds rd Kivoi/ievov olov iirl twc aij/vxuv dpw/iev, orav Kivij ri ruv iptyiyuy aura- a\ha (rvfipalyii not ravra \mi tivos ael KiveiffBai yevoiro 5' hv tpavepbv
must also be at rest but neither can rest and movement in the self-moved be dependent on anything else. The true explanation is to be found in the above account, and Phys. iii. 2 Gen et Corr. ii. 9 neither form
of it
;
:
in itself nor matter in itself explains becoming; rrjs /lev yb.p ^"r ' Ka ' T ^ Skt/s rb ir&ax fiV KivelaBai, rd Se iroieiv Kal Kivetv See further, crepas Svvi/ieus.
341 sqq. 2 See preceding note and Phys. it is impossible iii. 4, 255, a, 12 that a {rvvex^s teal trvfjupvts should yhp ev icol be self-moved j?
p.
: ;
c. 5, 257, b, 2 ; rb ai/rb avr6 klvovv TrdvTjj Kivziv avrb avr6 (pepoiro yhp Uv ohov KaX <pfpot r)\V' avrty tpopan, %v hv Ka\ irofiov rip eiSri, &C, en b'tapiarcu on weirai rd Kwr/riv, &c. (see p. 383, n. 1). Therefore, we certainly hear nothing in Aristotle of any Identity of Mover and Moved' (Biesk, Phil. d. Arist. i. 402, 7, 481) nor does the existence of something which at the same time
rets
;
SiaipoiVi
alrtas
hZhvarov
Sij
'
'
moves and is moved (Phys. iii. 2, 202, a, 3 and above) in any way
prove
it,
if
airafle's
[cf
: .
METAPHYSICS
seed
is
386
the
egg
is
meets with a potential being, and no obstruction from without intervenes, then the corresponding motion is
necessarily produced. 2
takes place
The object in which this process that by which is the thing moved or Matter
;
it is effected is
Motion,
therefore, is the
ael
ix. 8, 1049, b, 24 tov Suvdfj.fi Svtos yiyveral rb evepyeia ov virb ivepyeia ivros, oTov
1
Metaph.
e'/c
flOVO'lKOV, ael
:
avdpwiros 4 avftptfarov, p.ovfftKbs inrb KIVOVVTOS TIVOS TTpC&TOV. ipavepbv 8ti lrpbrtpov ry 1050, b, 3
'
Kal
tbffirep
evepyeta erepa irpb eTepas 'etas rrjs tov ael kivovvtos Trpd/Ttas. xii. 3, (cited in note to p. 356, supra) ; xii. 5, 1071, b, 22 sqq. c. 6, 1072, a, 9 TrptiTspov ivepyeia Svvdfiecos ej Se pi4\\ei yeveats Kal <p6opa e?>/ai, &\\o Sel etval ael evepyovv aWws
:
.
Kal &\\ais.
Gen. An.
ii. 1,
734, b,
'
^ Tex v V vn evepyeta Svtos ytveTai e/c tov Svvdtiei tolovtov. Phys. iii. 2 fin. elSos Se ael otffeTal ti to Kirovy, ... & eVrai apxb "al aft-ioi/ ttjs Kiviio-ems, OTO.V Kivij, oTov 5 eVTeKexeta avBputov SvvdfieL ovtos iros noieZ iK Ibid. C. 7 avQpimov dvBpanrov. viii. 9, 265, a, 22 ; Metaph. vii. 7, o. dfin., ix. 9 fin., xii. 7, 1072, b,
21
KaKelvas avdyKT], bWav us . SivavTai [under the conditions which limit their activity and passivity] TO KOltlTlKOV Kal TO TfaB'OTlKbv Tr\T]0'ia(wo'i, to liev iroietv to Se jrdo'Xetv, eKeivas S' ovk avdyKt\ avrai fiev yap [the irrational] irao-at jxio. ivbs 7TOi7/TiK$/, ^Kelvat Se twv evavTiwv, $0Te afia iroi4\o'ei TavavTla (sb that if necessity forced this power of choice to be exercised on both alternatives, opposite effects must be produced at one and the same time). For even in the case of the latter, so soon as the choice has been made, the result necessarily follows tnrOTepov yap av opeynTai Kvpius, tovto iroti)o'ei,
.
'
t$
30 sqq.
init.
2
;
Be An.
viii.
of. also p.
Phys.
Only an apparent exception to this is introduced by Metaph. ix. 5, where it is said (1047, b, 35) we must distinguish between irrational and rational forces;
is necessarily produced the active and passive principles are in the condition >s
effect
when
Svvavrat
and
VOL.
I.
38G
ARISTOTLE
:
'
moved
Phys. iii. 3, where this is discussed at length. V. 1.224, b, Kivr)<ris ovk iv i) 4, ibid. 1. 25
:
t$
eiSei
aAA' iv *r$
KtvovfiivtjJ
Kal
kwt)T$ kot' ivipyeiav. vii. 3: the aAAo.Wis takes place only in the De An. iii. 2, material thing.
426,
7)
a,
2
. .
iroiri<ris
.
flivtp
yap TOV
TTOlTjTLKOV
Kal
moves which
also the
it
medium
througl
iv
t<
2 3
irdffXOVTL
aA\'
iroiovvTi.
See further
iii.
p.
ovk iv t$ 358-9.
Of. p. 378-9.
Phys.
r*Kix eLa T0 ^
fidivei 5e
moves {e.g. the air o water) and that the motion o the thing which is moved is com municated to it frota this, whei it has passed from the throwei But since this motion continue
after that of the thrower ha ceased, while (according to hi
tovto
&ob" iifia -rb Si Trparov b, 24, vii. 2, inii. Kivovv . . ctfia T($ Kivovfiivtp iffri' Xiyoi 5e rb ap.a, on ovSiv ianv
:
auTwv
^i6to|i5'
irrl
Ktvovvrds which is then shown to be io-Tiv true of all kinds of motion. Ibid.
iravrbs
Kivovfiivov
viii. 2,
255, a, 34, c. 1, 251, b, 1 sqq.; Gem. et Con: i. 6. 322, b, 21, c. 9, 327, a, 1; Gen. An. ii. 1, 734 Kivelv t yap pii airriuevov a, 3 aSAvarov Metaph. ix. 5. Cf. n. 1 supra, and p. 387, n. 3. That this
: ;
presupposition) the motion of th medium must cease simultane ously with that of the throwei he adopts the curious solutio that the medium can still pre duce motion even when it ha itself ceased to be moved oix'dix iravirai kivovv Kal klvovucvov a\X Kwoxip-fvov fi'ev fi/ia orav a Kivai
:
TraicnjTai Kivmv, kivovv Se tri icrn (267, a, 5;. The law of inertia, ai
contact of the moving force with that which is moved, is conceived of by Aristotle as not merely a momentary one giving the first impulse only, but as lasting during the whole continuance of the motion, is obvious especially from his account of the motion
How
moving
to say.
sqq.,
By what
is
however {Phys.
viii. 4,
De
Cailo, iv.
METAPHYSICS
387
even of what
touching
'
is
:
it
acts only
through contact
it
its
object
to
by xlt^CL^TJ
related
2
the
thinking subject as
Form
to
Matter
and
in like
manner God,
in
we
Motion
is
as eternal as Jh
it
Form and
sents, 4
repre-
and that
For
if it
must
and
must have come into being, movement would have taken place before the first motion. If they did exist, we cannot suppose that they were at rest, since it was of their very nature to move. But if it be granted that they did move, some active force must have operated to endow them
If they did not exist, they
so a
not proved even that they are moved by anything else at all.
1
Cf. p. 203, n. 3.
which touches is not touched by anything which touches it again] ... Sore fl ri Ktvet axlvriTov or,
eVeii/o fiev
''
Metaph.
xii.
9,
1074, b, 19,
an
Sltttoito
tow kimjtou,
Be An. iii. 4, 429, b, 22, 29 29 sqq. 3 Gen. et Corr. i. 6, 322, b, 21 nothing can affect another without being in contact with it, and in the case of things which at the same time move and are moved, this contact must be mutual (323. a, 20 sqq.); eori 5' ms iviore (pa/iev Tti k vobv awrecrOat 5' awrSutfj.6vov tov Ktvoufiivou, to
:
ixelvou Se obSev
oxik
<pafj.ei>
yap iviore
v/jlwv,
a\\'
keit d. Welt
d.
(Untersueh
Halle,
z.
Phil.
Griechetl
18'J).
1873,
pp
137
vov /i^
CC
388
ARISTOTLE
thii
ii
movement
is
before motion.
It
The
cessation of a
movement
always conditioned bj
first.
Ai
t
in the former argument we were forced to admit process of change antecedent to the first, so here w( Motion is cannot escape one subsequent to the last. therefore without beginning or end; the world was never created and it will never perish. 2 Yet, although Motion from this point of view is infinite, there is another aspect in which it has its limita1
tion.
it
the assumption of a
is
nol
moved by anything
which
could
else.
Without
this
assumption we
because
should be involved in an infinite series of moving causes, never produce actual motion,
first
cause
and without
ical k\vt\o~iv, ?irep t
on
avdyKi) ehai
xP^ vm t&Bos tl Kiviio-eais. With reference apparently to this passage, Metaph. xii. 6 proceeds: oiSi xp6i'ov ou yap oT6v re rh itpi-npov
koX iZtrrepov eivai koL
t]
ab'&vaTOV
<p8apTJv<u
KivT\<riv
^
9iv.
yei/4o~6ai.
t)
ju$)
uvros xpdvov.
ae!
yap
Further, if
Time is without beginning and end (on this see infra, p. 406, &c.) motion must be so also, since
Time, as we shall find, cannot be conceived of apart from motion. Cf. Phys. viii. 1, 251, b, 12 ei 8^
:
&<rirep
4cttlv 6
KiVijtrfs
<)
avdyxri
thai,
and
after proving^tbe infinity of time in both directions he goes on at 1. 26 : a\\a /*V eV-ye xpdvov, (pavfpbv
irciflos. % nivfios^s The same inference follows from the staternent (Pliys. vi. 6, 236, b, 32 sqq. Metaph. ix. 8, 1050, b, 3) that every change and process presupposes a previous one. 2 In this form, viz. the question as to the eternity of the world, the present subject will recur in Ch. IX. infra.
METAPHYSICS
that,
389
This conclusion cannot be avoided by presuming that the object moved produces its own motion, since it is
necessary for the motive force already to be what the
become and hence the same thing cannot at the same time and in the same relation be both moved and moving. We are forced, therefore, to admit a primum mobile. That principle, again, might be either something moved and therefore something The first of these self-moving, or something unmoved.
object
moved
is
to
'
cases,
however, resolves
itself into
the
second,
for
must
which
of necessity be different
from what
it
moves.
Unmoved
Or
Substance,
is else-
the cause of
all
motion. 2
where more briefly demonstrated since all motion must start from a motive principle, a motion which has no beginning presupposes a motive principle which is as eternal as the motion itself, and which, as the presupposition of all motion, must be itself unmoved. 3 Thus,
then,
as this
we obtain three elements that which merely is moved and never causes motion, = Matter that which
:
is itself
moved,
= Nature
that
which causes motion without itself being moved, = God. 4 Our previous pages will have shown that this position
1
irivra tpdaprd.
oW aBivarov
?j
KiVrj-
and
aw
fiv.
<)
yevtaBai
c. 7,
<j>8aprjvat
ad yap
. .
(a), 2, where it is agreed that neither efficient nor formal nor even final causes permit of a
ii.
nivovp.evov
4
regressus
3
infinitum. xii. 6, 1071, b, i avdyKri ehai riva atStov ovaiav aKivT}TOV. ai Te yap obtrtal npuirai
ad
Phys.
Metaph.
Metaph.
xii.
7,
rav
tivrav,
koX
et
ttaaai (pOapra),
390
js
ARISTOTLE
not an isolated one in Aristotle's philosophy.
is
Form devoid of Matter the Absolute Subject which as perfect Form is at once the motive force and the end of The gradations of existence, ascending the Universe.
1
from the
tion
first
consummaformed the
In the same
in
God.
And
this
thesis
actually
God
in Aristotle's treatise
on Philosophy. 2
from
reflection
upon
well-known
fragof of
stress
Nor
are these arguments without their justifitoTj Bircois yivojxivovs toiJttjj ivBovirtaafiobs
Cf pp. 355, &c, and the passages quoted, pp. 395 sqq., on God as highestform, pure energy and supreme end. Metaph. xii. forty &pwrrov &el 7, 1 072, a, 35 [in every sphere of being] 3) avdXoyov rb irpterov. 2 Simpl. De Ccelo, 130, Seliol. in Ar. 487, a, 6 {Ar. Fr. 15)
:
Kal
iv
ras
yap,
<fn\<rlv,
fj
t$ iwvovv
fyiaiv
yivt\rai
i|<ux^,
tote
r^v Utov
airoXafiovtra
irpofiavrvierai
re
/to!
irpoayoptiei
tJ niWovra.
"
Kiyei Be
Trejil
tootou iv rots
jrepl
4>i\o(To<plas(as
towhichseeCh.il.
iv oTs icrrl ri
represents Patroclus and Hector as prophesying at death. iK rovrav oiv, Q-qaXv, iwev6i)ffav ot
So
Homer
$4\rtov, iv rovrots iirrt ti Kal apiarov. eirel oiv iv tois ovaiv iarlv &\\o &\\ov fiiKriov, iativ &pa ri Kal aoioToi/, SVep ejjj av rb Bttov."
iombs
/jlsvoi
yap
fiefl'
Tipipav
piv
fjAtoj-
Fr. 13, b, SBXT. Math. ix. 2Q:'ApurTore\risSeaTrbSvo7vapxiv JWoiay 6euv%Key* yeyovivai iv rots avdpiirois, mci re rav irepl r\v
\fivxh" <rvfi.f}atv6vTa>v Kal a?ro rav Itertt&pav. a\\' otto /t'ev rav vepl
iv6iuaav elval
toioutjjs
utriov.
*
Kivfiatws
also
from the n.
<piAo<ro<j>las
in
: :
METAPHYSICS
cation in
his
891:
certain points of
in
form of his teaching more akin to Platonism. Presentiments which exhibit themselves in prophetic
earlier
an obscure
the divine
human and
The beauty
its parts,
connection of
the
stars,
and
the
whom we
Being placed
far above
them, from
whom
alone
the simple
movement
harmony
Conse-
37, 95,
which
re-
cum autem
turn
terras
nox opacasset,
minds us
'
si
terra semper accepissent autem fama et auditione, esse quoddam numen et vim Deorum deinde aliquo tempore, patefactis terrse faucibus, ex illis abditis sedibus evadere in hajc loca, quaa nosincolimus, atque exirepotuissent cum repente terrain et maria coelumque vidissent, nu. . :
ccelum totum cernerent astiis distinctum et ornatum lunaeque luminum varietatem turn cresoentis turn senescentis
solem
magnitudinem
que
omnium ortus et occasus atque inomni seternitate ratos immutabilesque cursus haec cum viderent proTecto et esse Deos et haec tanta opera Deorum esse arbitrarentur.' According to ClC. Ar D. ii. 49, 1L'5, Aristotle seems to have pointed to the instinct of animals as a teleological argument for the being of God. For the fuller discussion of this see infra. 2 Besides the passage from Be Ccelu, i. 9 quoted ra/ra, inn..6at p.
eorumque
:
.
'
395,
cf,
Metajili, xii.
7,
10(2, a,
392
ARISTOTLB
upon teleological principles as well as the identification which he elsewhere establishes between the force of nature working to fixed ends and God 2 are not a mere
spirit of his
whole system.
The
If,
35 sqq., where God is described as the apiarov or ov evcua, and as thus the efficient cause of motion in the world but especially c. 10, where the question is discussed TTOTeptOS ?X ei ^ T0 " #Aou (pVffiS t2> ayaBbv Kal rb frpurrov, .Trorepov Kex^ptff^evoy ti Kal avrb lead' avrb,
;
b, 21, 24).
Speusippus, we accept a whole series of primary principles we destroy the unity of all being (see the passage, Div. I. p. 854, 1) ra Se tfvTa ov fSo&Xerai iroXireveffBai KaKus. " ovk ayaBbv iro;
\vK01pavi7]
'
els
Kolpavos
etrTcu."
% t))V
Ttip,
t)
afjuporepais,
Sitrirep
where he
:
is
In the case of an army the good resides as well in the general as in the order of the whole in the former, however, in a still more primary sense than in the latter. The universe is comffTpdrevfia.
:
ovk
odffa
<p{>aris 47rei<rob'i6b'7is
ruv
pared to an army
reraKrai
oiZtws
irpbs 7rws,
Ttavra. Se <rvv-
Kal
ovx
ti.
ex et
>
Stcrre
fi7j
eTvai Barepcp
Bdrepov
fiilBej/,
aAA' ia-rC
yap ey airavra avvTeraKrat, except that each creature is more fully subject to this order just in proportion to the nobility of its nature, even as in a. household the freeborn are subjected to a stricter discipline than the roiavTT] yap eKdffTov apxh slaves. avruv 7] (pilaris eo-riv. A67W 5' oTov els ye rb StaKptOTJvai avayKT) airaow eKBetv, Kal aAAa oiirus einlv av
trpbs p-ev
We have the same point of view in Fr. 16, preserved to us only by an unknown scholiast, where Aristotle says given several apxal, they must be either ordered or disordered. But the latter is impossible, since from disorder no natural order, no k!(T/uos, could have arisen ; ei Se t er ayp.ev at.. 3) 4 eavruv erdxBri' inb ea>Bev rivbs alrias ; but aav even in the former case exovai TI
rpayipSia.
: if)
Kotvbv rb ffwdirrov aitras KaKeTvo r) The comparison of the apxt. order of the world with that of an army is further developed in
All other systems are founded of necessity upon the opposite principle Aristotle's is the only exception, ov ydp iffTty kvavriov Tip
els
KotvaveT airavra
rb
&'Aov.
See Div.
i.
p.
143
sq.
Tr. p.
786 281
De
(piffis
METAPHYSICS
393
its
also,
that Aristotle
motion
is
itself
the condition of
all
change.
The further
being eternal,
it
characteristics of the
Supreme Being
Motion
it must be continuous (crvvexrjs), and"so must be one and the same throughout. But such a single motion is the product of a single mobile and a single motum. Hence the primum mobile is single and is as eternal as motion itself. In the next place what has been said about the continuity and uniformity of
1
is
absolutely
itself
unmoved
since
that
which
is
moved, being
it
an unbroken and
is
consequently
of
the
and
this unconditional
6,
by
Phys.
viii.
259,
a,
13
sqq.,
the
nptUrn atStos /to! pla Kiry/ris, that of the fixed stars, it is shown how single motion presupposes a, single moving cause. Cf. p.
391, n. 2. On the constancy and unity of motion we shall have more to say in the next chapter. 2 Phys. viii. 6, 259, b, 22, c.
10, 267, a,
24 sqq.
3 In Fr. 15 (preserved to us by SlMPL. Be. Cceh, 130, 45, K., Schol. in Ar. 487, a, 6), from the treatise n. <pt\oa-o<plas, the immutability of God is proved on the ground that the kp&ti<ttov can neither suffer change from anything else nor feel in itself the need of any such change, (It must be granted to BbeNAYS, Dial. d. Arist. 113, and Heitz, Ar. Fragvi. p. 37, that
394
ARISTOTLE
is
held together.
it
It is
further
is
is
incorporeal.
Only that
;
on
that
is
merely potential
is
by nature
which there
no element of unrealised
is
possibility. 3
necessarily material.
is
A Being that
Swdpei
The the Aristotelian fragment. passage in Plato's Republic, ii. 380, D sqq., as Simpl. remarked, served as the original of it.) The same reason is assigned also in the De Casio, i. 9 (see p. 395, n. 6) for the immutability of
God, and in Metaph.
b, 26, for
xii. 9,
1074,
must
;
n. 2.
7,
1072, b, 7 6Tel 8' 4(TTL Tt KtVOVV avrb aKtVTJTOV hy, 4vepyeia %v, tovto ovk iifSe^erat
fiWwv %x* iV
ovtiafiws
avdytcrjs
That which is merely prove. potential can both be and not be. to 8' iv^ex^^voy/j.}} elvai tpBaprbv, atrXcos, fy tovto o,vt6 [relatively to e^"" that], b \iycTat 4vS4x e "^ al [the former, if I say, ' it is possible the latter, if I for A not to be say, ' it is possible for not to be in this place, or not to be so great, or not to have this quality '] . an\us 8e to kot' obfflav [but that is absolutely perishable whose substance can cease to be], olden a\pa twv cupddprwv air\as Svvd/j.eL
-7)
'
dpa iarlp Hv ' koX tj avdynri Ka\>s [i.e. in so far as it is necessary it is good, since, as is immediately explained, its necessity is neither external nor merely relative, but absolute /ify ivSex^^ov &\\ais,
4ot\v ov avdyKr\s
3
a.Tr\ias
tiiiriav.
ouSe
tw
if
oAA
airKws
a.va,yKa2ov~\
4k
6
roiavTTjs
dpa
t\
apxv s
^pnjTat
ovpavos Kal
2
tpilffis.
Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 12 there were a kiv^tikov which did not realise itself in action there would be no eternal uninterrupted motion di/Scxerat ya.p to Svi/apLiv %xov fify ivepyew. But this would be equally true, ei
:
After showing that the luipyeia precedes the 5iW/r in all the three respects of \6ytp, Xpfof and ova-la, Aristotle goes on, Metaph. ix. 8, 1050, b, 6 (following immediately on the passage
evepyhffti
t]
ob ya.p IffTOi kIvtjo'is d'/'Sios ivdeX*t at y ap rb Svvdfj.e iov fiA dvai. Sei dpa elvai apx^v ToiavTTjv ris y\ ovffia
ivtpyeta.
quoted at
icaX
ctAA.a jity p. 385, n. 1) Kvpuorepas [actuality has a higher reality than the Sim/us]. Tci fixv yap ai'5ia irpWcpa rij oiiffio
:
this proof (eVSe'xeo-flai J) e?i<ai ou5ec SiacbepeL iv to'ls ofSiou) Aristotle states also Phrjs. iii. i, 203, b,
'
METAPHYSICS
be immaterial and therefore incorporeal.
incorporeal can be unchangeable
2
1
395
Only the
subject to
Moreover
is
always
limited.
motion, for
power
is
just
primum
incorporeal, indivisible
in a word,
it
must
10
Suvarbv
fiev to&1, it
ouk
effrai Be,
Phys.
viii.
;
10, 266,
a,
immediately follows that we can never say of anything which by its very nature can cease to be, that it mill never cease to be and consequently it cannot be of the nature of that which never ceases to be
;
from which
Metaph.
xii.
Metaph.
c.
xii. 8,
1,
supra),
7 (see p 1074, a, 35
:
7 Jin. 394, n.
;
cf.
n.
Be
(the cuBiok).
1
Cf. p.
6,
347
sq.
xii.
Caelo, i. 9, 279, a, 16 e|w Be roO ovpavov SeSetKTCu otl o&t' itmv afire eVBe^rrai ysviaQai awp.a. (pavepbv aoa '6ri ottre tokos o&re Ktvbv oijTe xpdvos 4o~tIv %a>9ev
avtv
%p6vos ai/Ta
uirep t)jv
iroieT yTjpdoKetv.
VKrts.
aiSlovs
yap
Bet, ei ire'p
ye
teal
&\\o
2
tuv
i^urdTto rerayfievtav
After what has been said above, this does not require any further proof. All change is a
transition from possibility to actuality, which is only precluded where there is no matter, and therefore no Swdfiei Sv. Cf. (besides p. 359 sqq.) the proof in
the expression ali>v, Aristotle proceeds rb tov iravrbs ovpavov re\os Kal rb rbv 7raWa y_p6vov Kal t^v airsipiav irepU-xpi1 tcAos aldtv
:
Phys.
vi. 4,
itTTtv, airb
ei\Tj<pdis
changes must be
is in
3
We
Cf.
tV
,
bdev
a/tav-
Kal
this
aWois
i^iiprrirai
b"
1032,
a, 20, c. 10,
1035, a, 25,
pvs, rb elyal re Kal ijv. It is thus seen that the highest Deity (rb 0etov vav rb irparov Kal aKp6~ Tajav) must be unchangeable.
: :
396
ARISTOTLE
By
a converse process,
it
all
primum
mobile and
that
which
it
moves are
is
single. 1
motion, or God,
(to Tt
tfv
therefore
or,
Nothing but pure selfcentred thought is free from materiality, for even the soul has an essential relation to the body, and in all
in other words, is Thought.
corporeal
substances
form
is
involved with
matter.
selves,
with. 2
itself,
and therefore they require material to work But the Supreme Being has no end beyond because it is the ultimate end of everything. 3 It is
and that we must do so is obvious from the fact that the subject of
this explanation is expressly said ?|ai tov obpavov, inrepr^p ^urdTto tpophv the incor-
*x* 1 <pav\ov ovQkv, oftr' eV5ee? rwv avrov khAHv oiStvds iffTiv. (Cf. p. 393, n. 3.) As to whether this account, indeed, was to be taken as referring to the primal mover or the primally moved (the outmost sphere) the old commentators
. . .
[nom.]
Kivfi<rei
oijr'
to be that which is
poreal, immovable, all-embracing, the Qetov irp&TOv Kal a.Kp6rarov, the cause of all being and life. 1 Metaj)h. xii. 8, 1074, a, 31
Tr\elovs
according
to Simpl. in loo., Alexander as well as his Peripatetic predecessors, gave the preference to the second, the younger (Neoplatonic) expositors to the first explanation. Alexander's view
trepl
eKatrrov apxfr,
Se ye
TroWal
i,\K'
S<ra
yap \6yos Kal 6 aiirbs ttoWwv rb 5e tI %v tlvai ovk e^et &\tjv rb irparov
aptdfi^i
its
.
'
^i/TXe'xeio yip.
2
3
Cf. p. 400, n. 1.
De
$'
Casio,
ii.
12, 292, b, 4
<?X'""r '
Tip
&>S
'
SpiCTTB
effTi
oiBiv
Su
irpdl-ews
yap avrb ib o5 evexa, 7] Se Trpa^ts ael 4<mv v Svfflv, orav KaX ov eVe/ca ^ Kal rb toiitov evetta.
METAPHYSICS
897
from Actuality
the
we
separate Potentiality
faculty of thinking
from actual
Thought
(dscopia).
But
no undeveloped potentiality and even in the case of man, it is only his finite nature which renders him incapable of uninterto the Deity, for his substance contains
;
rupted thought.
fect activity, 1
The nature
an
perfect
fection. 2
God, therefore,
is
He
and
vitality
and
is
the source of
What, then, are the contents or subject-matter of this Thought ? All thinking derives its value from the object of thought but the Divine Thought cannot be dependent for its validity on anything beyond itself, nor can it relate to anything except the best. But the best is
;
JV. x. 8, 1078, b, 20 facTi tou irparrew atpaipoufj-evov, eTi Se fjiaWov rod iroietv, rl A.6iir6Toi irAV Beupia ; Sxrre i) tou 0eou ivepyeia, p.aKapi6rr]rt Siatpe1
:
Eth.
Tij)
87)
(6 avBp&irwos vovs 6 ruv <rvvBeruv) at isolated moments when it contemplates perfection, not in broken fragments but in its en-
man
poucra,
9eupr}rlK7]
S71
7)
avBpamtvatv
rarr)
evdatfioviKwrdrri.
;
Metaph.
c. 9,
1074,
we cannot think of the b, 28 divine thought either as resting or as in a state of mere potentiality,
ovrws 8' e^ei ^avrrj aurrjs rbv anafra alui/a. 2 Metaph. xii. 9, 1074, b, 25 :, $rj\ov roivvv Sri rb Bei6rarov koX rip.ul>rarov voei zeal oi nera/ldWei els x^P " 7"P V p-eraPohT) real xlvriois ris ^897 rb roiovrov.
tirety:
7}
j/6r]<ris
Metaph.
Be
[Sj)]
xii. 7,
for
e<
/tj)
vivais [actual
aAAii
S/iva/xis,
<pap.iv
a'iSiov
thought]
tariv,
&pwroy,
teal
lip-re (ai)
ko! al&iv
(rvvexhs
atStos virdpxei
r$
Betp
Ibid. 1075, b, 7 (following Bonitz's text) pure reason is indivisible as is therefore the discursive thought of
avrtji rijs voi)treu)s.
:
rovro yap 6 8e6s. De Casio, ii. 3, 286, a, 9 fleoG 8' ivepyeia aBavatria toOto 8' eVt! fai) atSios.
:
; '
:
398
ARISTOTLE
itself. 1
nothing but
Pure
Spirit,
thought and
its
thought 4
'
less, of course, can affected by any emotion from without. Hence trie statement (Mh. JT. viii. 9, 1158, b, 35, 1159, a, 4, or more definitely Mud. vii. 3, 12, 1238, b, 27, 1244, b, 7, 1 245, b, 14, and from this treatise M. Mor. ii. 11, 1208, b, 27), that God does not love but is only loved, and that between Him and man there is too wide a separation to permit of mutual
Still
[?],
airb
eavrb
yiviianei
'
God be
(t
>P ia T0 v '
'
See preceding note and Me(paiverai b" ael aAAou taplb. xii. 9
:
r)
i7riffT7)firi,
t)
eV e'nW
eirl
r)
;
t)
fiev
Twv
rb
ovffia ai
ti i)v eTvai, 6
eirl
8e tG>v deuprjTLKuiv
i]
v6i}o~is.
obx erepov oZv ovtos tov voovfievov Kal tov vov, offa fi7) v"\t\v ex el T0
tov 4 Jin. (cf. c. 5 and c. 7 init.) eirl pey yap tuv &vev H\riS rb avr6 etrri rb
aitrb
eVrai,
Kal
t)
v6t\o'is
iii.
:
<pt\la.
voov/ievov
/j.la.
De An.
Metapli. xii. 9, 1074, b, 17 yap fir/Sev yoe?, ri av eXi\ rh (refjLi'bv, a\V ex el ibffTrep Uv el 6 KaBeuSattf e%Te voe?, tovtov 8' ixWo
eXre
Metaph.
xii.
9: 1075, b, 7:
[ify
ovk av i] apiffTif] ovffia ota. yap tov voelv rb rifiiov ??j out^j vwdpxet. eTi 8e t'l voet . yap avrbs avrbv r) erepSv ti. Trirepov oZv Siatfyepei ti t) ovQev rb voelv rb Ka\bv r) rb tvxov ; r) Kal otottov rb SiavoelffOai irepl iviwv ; S7j\ov tolvvv (as at p. 397, n. 2); further, at 1. if 29, vovs were the mere power of thinking, Sr)\ov, 'oti &Kho ti av eit\ rb Tif/.id>TGpov r) 6 vovs, rb voovfievov teal yap rb voetv Kal t) v6tjo~is inrdpl-ei Kal rb x^P lffrov voovvtl uitrr' el ovk av eTYj rb <pevicrbv tovto, . apiarov ti vdijffis avrbv apa voe7, eZirep itrrl rb kp&tlo~tov, Kal eariv fj v6i\ais voi)<reas v6i\ai%. c. 7 (see Be An. iii. 6, 430, b, 24 : n. 4). el 8e Tivt p.r) 4otiv evavrhv twi/
Kvpiov,
.
aSialperov Trav
-/)
exov S\riP t supra. This view is set forth in the passage immediately following that quoted p. 394, n. 1 : Sia-
rb
&c, see
5
p. 397, n. 1,
7u>y!)
8'
e&Tlv
o'la
r)
[sc.
t$
irpiircp
klvovvtC\
ri/iir.
aplo-TTj fiiKpbv
XP^ V0V
oStio
fiev
rifuy
'
'
evepyeia [so BONITZ, i) rightly following Alexander, instead of r) r)5. evepy.'] tovtov Kal 8m tovto [i.e. because not God's activity alone, but activity in general, is pleasant, for in this passage, as often in this book, lucidity is sacrificed to an excessive brevity of style] iypi\yoptris
qiovT]
alo-flrjo-is
v6t)Bis fySurrov
4\irloes Se
Kal
j.tv?i/iai
8ia ravTa.
i]
Ser6ricns
r)
'
METAPHYSICS
399
These
Divine
propositions
of
Aristotle
first
concerning the
Spirit
contain
the
attempt to find a
Theism.
as
self-conscious
intelligence
And on
all
the
we
systems of
how
are
we
God
from
we may
yet preserve
his per-
sonality,
and
vice versa ?
;
Aristotle represents
God
as
self-conscious Spirit
Him
declares not only action and creation, but the direction of the will itself towards an object, to be incompatible
avr^v rov ko.9' aurb apitrrov /udAioTa toS p.a\i<rra [pure thought has for its object that which is absolutely best, and all the more fitly the purer it is],
kh&'
koI
i)
passage
is quite general, referring neither to the divine nor to the human reason exclusively ; 1. 24, however, continues el oZv oftras
:
abrbv Se voei 6 vovs Kara. fieraXr$iv votjtos yap yiyverat rov vorjrov Btyy&voiv Kal voaiv, oStrre ravrbv Kal vot\t6v. rb yap SeKrtKbv vovs rov vorjTOv Kal ttjs ovffias vovs,
tote, S 6ehs ael, Bavjiao-r6v el Se fiaWov erl BavfiaindtTepov. exei Se wSi, Kal (ti$\ Se ye virdpxet. tj ytip vov evepyeta fa}}, 4Ke?vos Se 7] ivepyeia 4vepyeia Se tj KaB' avrijv ine'ivov fai] apitrrf] Kal alSios. <pafj.ev Si], ., as at p. 397, n. 3, supra. Further cf. Eth. x. 8, cited at p. 397, n. 1: ibid.
> '
.
eS
ex el & s wis
tivity] o SoKel 6 vovs Belov ^%eiv, Kal t] Beapia to %Sunov Kal b\piffrov
vii. 15,
154, b, 25
ael
rf
e%
rov
tj
<pvo"Ls
utA?)
ecrrat
etf),
(and therefore actual knowledge, and not the mere capacity of knowing, is the best and most
On this meaning blessed state. of Beupla vid. BONITZ, Ind. Ar. From 1. 18 328, a, 50 sqq.)
(Ji
x a ^P ei
rfiovty
:
and
Betp
1323, b, 23
r$
Si'
r(
Se
v6t]<ris
T]
xaB'
o6tV)
this
rfyv <pi<riv.
;;
400
ARISTOTLE
That neither
iroiycris
nor
tion,
(Bbbntano, Psyclwl.
d.
Arist.
voiria-is
in having its
end in
itself,
247 sq.) that Aristotle desires to deny to Deity only such actions (irpdrrw, universal 'action' must be ascribed to God on any view) as result from felt need, and that therefore, while denying that Trp&TTeiv contributes anything to the blessedness of God, he does'not deny that it belongs
to
Him
generally.
Aristotle cfoes
eu7rpo|i'a being the te'Aoj) and includes every form of activity, even the pure activity of thought. No other meaning will suit the words, MA. vii. 15, oel fi air 1 irpa^is and in a similar sense Pol.fSts above, 1. 16 sqq., distinguishes irpdeis irpbs ertpovs, ras rutv airof$aiv6vrav xdpiv ytyvopivas he tou irpdrreiv in a word,
)}
;
METAPHYSICS
the limits of an isolated self-contemplation.
irpd^ets ia>Tepuca\,
401
But
this
actions which
called
elsewhere
irpSJis
are
simply
in the narrower sense of the word from tos airoTeAeTr, Kal t&? airrwv eyeKa Becapias Kal titavofoeis, and attributes only the latter to God, in opposing the view that the practical life is superior to the theoretic ffx\f yap av d Bebs ?x oi koKus Kal iras 6 kut[ios, cits oiiK elalv QurepiKal irpdeis irapi ras oiKelas ras avratv. Still less is jt a pertinent objection that in using popular lan;
.
Kal
7j
(puiris
ou8ei>
fi&Trjv
Gen. et
^vreKexv iroi^cras t^v @ebs here means the which governs force divine nature, whose relation to the first cause of motion is left, as we shall see, wholly undefined ; nor can we draw any conclusion.from this use as to Aristotle's view of God as the absolute supra6
Bibs,
yeveffw),
reason, any more than from the frequent use of Beol as in Eth. x. 8, quoted above, and
mundane
out further specification of its nature. But if action does not belong to God, neither can will, for as will (Trpoaipeais) is dpxh irpd^ms and originates in turn in a desire on the one hand and the conception of an end on the other, it always presupposes an ^fti/ri; V|u (EthM. 2, 1139, a, 31) and these ideas it is impossible to reconcile with Aristotle's conception of God. Furthermore, faifcuats, De An. iii. 10, 433, a, 23, is defined as rational desire ; but desire cannot in any sense be ascribed by Aristotle to God ; nor can we admit the assertion of Brentano, p. 246, that because he ascribes to Him j/Sovii, he must also have ascribed to Him something corresponding to desire in us. It is only of sensuous Ainrri and ^Bovfy that Aristotle says (De An. ii. 2, 413, b, 23) that it involves iiriBvfila ; he expressly adds that he is not here speaking of Nous ; and ibid, iii,- 7, 431, a, 10 he declares opetcrtKby and ipevKTixby to be identical with
alaBririKbv,
4.32, b, 27,
and remarks
iii.
9, 10,
viii. 14, 1162, a, 4, x. 9, 1170, a, 24, we may argue that Aristotle was a polytheist. Tloieiv also in these passages .seems to be used quite generally and not
ibid.
433. a, 14, of. Eth. vi. a, 2, 1139, 35, that the rod BeapririKbs (therefore also the divine) does not deal with the
(pevKtbv
and
SiajKi-iy
by which
It
desire
is
is
always conditioned,
any more than troiryriKbv, Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 12 (to which Bbbntano appeals, but which is nowhere directly
to be limited
applied to God by Aristotle) to the narrower sense discussed bears merely the it p, 182
;
evident that those passages in which Aristotle uses the common conceptions of God as generally admitted premisses from which conclusions may be drawn e.q. Top. iv. 5, 126, a, 34 Eth. x. 9, 1179, a, 24, or, indeed, such quotations as Eth. vi. 2, 1139, b,
;
13y8, a,
15prove
and merely
indi-
'
VOL.
I.
402
solution
'
ARISTOTLE
is
.wholly unsatisfactory.
On
On
and
in
deter-
mined
as
much by
the variety of
its
objects as
by
changes of intellectual
these conditions
states. Aristotle by destroying and confining the function of the Divine Eeason to a monotonous self-contemplation, not quickened into life by any change or development, merges the notion of personality in a mere abstraction. The difficulties which perplex us when we come to consider the operation of God upon the world are not
object of desire for his own sake, universe and the desires the whole order of nature' (Brent. 247), receive no support whatsoever from Aristotle. Such a conception, on thecontrary, is wholly irreconcilable with his idea of God, for all desire is an effort after something; not yet attained, and in a <p6<ris tov dpiarov rervxTjttuio (Metaph. xii. 8, 1074, a, 19) any such- effort is inconceivable. 1 On this point also Aristotle
xii.
10(seep.391,n.2,sw!r)offers
either.
no support to
is
Aristotle
has expressed himself with a defimteness that leaves no room Neither the view of for doubt. B$hnt. (Psych, d. Arist. 246 sq.),
that in knowing Himself, God knows the whole creation as well, nor Schneider's modification of it (De Cauxa finali Arist. 79 sq. cf. also Kym, Metafihys. Untera. 2j?2, 256), to the effect that God knows the intelligible world as the totality of the forms that are contained in his thought, finds
any
justification
in
Aristotle's
writings.
here inquiring in what way the world contains the good. The only answer which he gives, however, to this question is contained in the words iea\ y&p iv rp Tci|ei rb 3 koI S (TrpaTtiybs, Ka\ paAAoj/ oStoi ov yip oStos $& ri/v rdiv a\y int fori Sick tovtov iariv. If we apply this to the idea of God and the world it certainly follows that ihe perfection of the universe resides in the first place in God as the first cause of motion, and secondly in the universal order that owes its origin to it. On the other hand, thecomparison of the world to an army gives no clue to the method in which the order of the universe proceeds from God (for this was not the question under discussion). As we evidently cannot conclude from it that God sketches plans, issues commands to his subordinates, &c. (though this way of representing God's government of the
METAPHYSICS
less
403
weighty.
Aristotle describes
God, as we have
also more and the ground of
primum
mobile, but
'
While we
belief in
him a
Providence which
common
Kal
apx^L elffiv. On the other hand we read in Metaph xi. if there be 7, 1064, a, 34 sqq.
Tf
atpddpraiv
an
ovffia
x 01 P t0 T ^
e?7)
'
Ka ^
okIvtitos,
ivravB' ay
a\nt\ av
irov
Lt\
apxi2
n. 1,
3
and
i.
p. 391, n. 2,
supra,
Be
Cailti,
On
1 see Ch. XVI. infra. How little the passages referred to are to be taken literally is obvious from the fact that the gods (fleol) are always spoken of in them in the plural. But if we have thus first to translate them into language possible to the philosopher in Order to discover his true meaning, it is a question whether we have not to mnke as great a, de:
Metaph.
xi.
2,
1060, a 27,
;
words
Tnta{irij
t^v
duction from their literal content as in the parallel cases which will be discussed infra, at the end of the section in Ch. IX. on the Universe.
4
avr^i TtSv
Anaxagoras
i.
is
praised
may be
4,
984, b, 15, cf. Phi/s. viii. 6, 256, b, 24) for having made vovs oItios rov Kutrfiov
3,
{Metaph.
leave
it
in
doubt whether there be such an apxh or not, but they do not speak of God as an individual The words in iii. 4, are ibeing.
Kal T7js T<ews TrriffTjs, and it is remarked Phys. ii. 6, 198. a, 9, that avr6fiaTov and r&x 1 always pre suppose a vovs and a <pi<ris.
!
D D
404
ARISTOTLE
human Beason an
But if we attempt to bring these convictions into harmony with his theology as above discussed, we are met by many questions to
indwelling element of Divinity. 2
which
it is
In the
thing
else,
obvious that
if
God
exercises
He
cannot be the
primum
mobile.
Here,
met by the notion to which we have already alluded that Form, without moving itself, exercises a power of attraction over Matter, causing it to move in its direction. God moves the world in this way: the object of desire and the object of thought cause motion without moving themselves. But these two motive forces are ultimately the same (the absolute
however,
are
:
we
'
good)
of desire
is is
apparent beauty,
real
beauty
but.
by our notion
and not
vice versa.
Thought, therefore,
the
set
starting-point or principle.
Thought, however,
of thought;
is
of the two
1
series
is
absolutely intelligible, 3
sq. 13, b,
ii.
and in
Gen. An.
3,
736, b, 27, 737, a, 10; De An. i. 4, 408, b, 29; Part. An. ii. 10, 656, a, 7, iv. 10, 686, a, 2S, 373. 3 NorjT^ Sh y er4pa owroix'a lead' oSiffy. By this 4repa ffuo-Toixi'a we are to understand, as the more recent commentators right-
and as is obvious the series of being and g-ood. The expression refers to trie Pythagorean and Plutonic doctrine of the universally prevalent antithesis of being and notbeing, perfection and imperfection, &c, which Aristotle had discussed at length in the 'EicXoy^. tSiv "&vo,vt(wv (see p. 61, n, l',
from 1.
35,
ly point out,
METAPHYSICS
this
tual.'
40o
as simple
Being stands
'
'
first,
defined
and ac-
The final cause operates like a loved object, and that which is moved by it communicates motion to the
God, therefore,
is
rest.' 2
the
primum
all
mobile only in so
far
as
He
is
Governor, as
obey, but
who
own hand
to the work. 4
And He
it
fulfils
As Form in
to
pass
from
God upon
sort. 5
Without doubt
where
of.
Metaph.
iv.
2,
1004, 1093,
Phys.
201, b, 25, i. 9, 192, a, 14 ; Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 319, a, 14. 1 Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, a, 26 see Bonitz and Schwegleb. 2 Ibid. 1072, b, 3 Kivei Sh us ipupevov, Kivovfievov (better Cod.
;
:
would certainly be strange, for if God is the first mover He must be the first operator, since the KtviyrtKbp airiov and the TcotTjrtKbv are the same (DeAn. iii. 5 init. Gen. An. i. 21 729, b, 1 3 Metaph.
; ,
ET
3
Kivovph'tp) 5e
toAXb
Kiyei.
also do the movers of the celestial spheres (to be discussed infra, Ch. IX. in the sec-
As
on the Spheres) these cause motion, according to Metaph.xii.8, 1074, a, 23, us t4\os oZtrat <popas. 4 Cf. Metaph. xii. 10 init. and
tion
;
fin.
s The subject, however, is here only treated generally the question is not whether God moves the world but how He
moves
it,
and
it is
therefore
ir-
relevant
when Bbbntano,
'
ibid.
235 sqq., contests the assertion that God is not the first operative principle, but only the final that according cause, of being to Aristotle no operation at all belongs to Him. This assertion
'
1071, b, 12; Gen. et Corr. i.7,324, b, 13: eari Se rh voii]TiKbv atriov us tidevij apxh Tys Kivycreus') and only a certain kind of iroiyo-is is denied of God (see p. 400, But it is quite another n. 1). thing to say that according to Aristotle God operates upon the world not directly but indirectly, not by Himself exercising activity upon it, but as perfect being by eliciting its activity by his mere existence ; He is efficient cause only in virtue of his being final cause. Nor is it sufficient to discredit this s'atement to adduce passages in which God is described in general as the moving or efficient principle of the world. No one doubts that this
xii. 6,
is so. it
'
'
To prove our view wrong, would be necessary to produce passages in which direct action upon the world is attributed to Him ; it would be further neces-
406
this
ARISTOTLE
doctrine
system.
the
unity of formal,
and
final causes,
and their
moreover,
We find in
the
it,
investigations
Moved meet
to
It
enables Aristotle
make God
Him
in its
machinery on
It
it
on the other.
of reconciling the
upon a divine
supernatural Being.
we
had a
is
produced by
it
On
the other
and
definite point,
motion to the
attraction
stotle's
which
is
is
Cosmos
But the
unchangeable Being
only object of His
'
finally to
harmonise
it
with the
Cf. p. 412, n.
1.
'
METAPHYSICS
407
more important the above doctrine is for Aristotle, the more obviously does it reveal the weak side of his
theory.
The notion
Further,
perfection,
if,
as
is
1 As Theophrastus easily discerned, Fr. 12 {Metaj>h.), 8 5J? et etyeais, aWws re teat rod
own
this
it
which
it
desire is
;
produced
aplffrov, jUetce
tyvxys,
%P$VX
Scheader,
:
Arist.
de
Volunt.
Doctr. Brandenh. 1847, p. IS, A, 42) asks ei yhp Ipif 6 niaixos, &S tpTJfft Kal 'ApitTTOTeKTJS, TOV VOV
kjX Ktvelrat irpbs avrhv, ir68ep e\ei
T&{yrn\v
3
causes the motion as little can mean that the end produces it by itself alone, apart from any efficient principle. The fact is that the efficient cause is not here regarded as different from the
final.
t%v
etpeffiv
in such a case conceive of two independent causes at work, the attractive force and the
fore justified in denying that Aristotle held this notion in the face of his own plain and re-
itself
to be
peated statements and the interpretations of them in this sense by the most faithful of his disciples ; all the less as it is hard indeed (as the discussion in Theophrastus, -fV. 12, 5, clearly proves) to say in what other way motion can, on Aristotle's principles, be conceived of as proceeding from the absolutely Unmoved. Beentano (as above, 239 sq.) thinks, indeed, that there is nothing so totally in contradiction to the Aristotelian doctrine as the view that ' matter is the efficient principle because it moves of itself to meet God, who is its end.' As little, he says, can ' the end produce anything of itself
attracted, Aristotle represents the relationship otherwise. He ascribes to the mover a $bvap.is Troirjri/cj), to the motion merely a Simpis iraflrjTiK^ (MetapJi. v. 15, 1021, a, 15, ix. 1, 1046, a, 16 sqq.). It is impossible, therefore, for him to attribute to that which owesits motion to something else, any independent efficiency of its own. On the contrary, the efficient and the final cause, as has been shown at p. 356 sq., he conceives of as in essence one.
without an
efficient
principle.'
But nobody has asserted either When the one or the other.
it
is
said
that
God
causes
Their apparent severance under certain circumstances is only a phenomenon of the sensible world, where form realises itself in matter, and therefore (cf pp, 368 sq.) in a plurality of individuals. In the intelligible world, however, efficient and final cause are always one and the same, and accordingly it is impossible to speak of an end producing anything apart from a principle
.
'
408
ARISTOTLE
motum must be
in contact 1 with
the
must be
in
he endeavours to
exclude the notion of contiguity in space from this contact idea for he often employs the expression
; '
an immediate
Moreover, he asserts 4
motum
is
pimum
mobile,
but not
vice versa.
is
contradiction that
we
of efficiency. Similar to the not think of ascribing any such action of God Himself is that of quality to matter, and we should the spheral spirits, which produce hesitate scarcely less to attribute motion in their respective spheres to plants and animals a ' longing as being themselves the end of after the divine as Aristotle does the motion cf p. 405, n. 3. It is in De An. ii. 4, 416, a, 26 sqq. (see still more strange that BeentaNo Ch. X. pt. 2, infra). Even the goes beyond the view which he doctrine of a plant and animal combats, in saying, p. 210, that soul would scarcely justify such a according to Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, view in our eyes, as from such a a, 26: 'God moves as known;' soul the thought of God is necesBut just as for since matter, as he himself sarily excluded. adds, cannot know God, it would Aristotle here attributes to nonfollow from this that God does rational existence an unconscious not move matter at all. The- yearning after rd Beiov, so the assertion, however, rests upon conception of a world animate a misunderstanding. Aristotle throughout, so natural to the says (cf p. 404) rb opem-bv icai rb Greek and yet resting ultimately voTjrbv Kivei ov Ktvovtxtvov . . on an untenable anthropological vovs Se virb rod j/otjtov KiveiTat analogy, enables him to view the Kivei 8e &s 4pdifievov. As astral spheres, which he holds votfrbv God moves only Nous (to to be of a far higher nature than which, however, motion can he as- any earthly existence (see Ch. IX. cribed only in an improper sense on the Universe), in the same light. 1 cf. Ch. XI. at the commencement Cf. supra, p. 386. 2 and at the end,i/ra); the world, on Gen. et Corr. i. 6, 323, a, 20. 3 the other hand, He moves as epeSjUeCf. supra, p. 203, n. 3. 4 vov by means of the Spejtr which Gen. et Corr. ibid. ; see p. He causes. We, indeed, should 387, n. 3, bvpra.
;
.
'
METAPHYSICS
409
still
upon us
God
its
circumference.
is
For since
is
taken to be motion
except circular
continuous
and
uniform
first
According to Aristotle, this might be effected either from the centre or the circumference of the world, for
both of these places are apyal, and
command
faster
the whole
movement.
is
He
moves
than the
and that which is nearest to the cause of motion ought to move at the quickest rate. 4 In defending this position he might hope to evade the objection that
centre,
It is
we cannot
He
To explain the
1
Phys.,
viii.
7,
see p. 421
Ccelo,
i.
Ccelo,
i.
9, 6,
sq.
"
395,
n.
Ibid.
c. 8 sq.
Be
assertion
Metaph.
xii. 6,
1071, b, 10.
3 Phys. viii. 6 Jin., c. 8fin.; Metaph. xii. 6 pi.; c. 8, ]073, a, 23 sqq. * Phys. viii. 10, 267, b, 6 ; Be
x. 23 ; 218) that God is to Aristotle rb irepas toS oipavov. 5 CI. De Ccelo, i. 9 (cited as above, at p. 395, n. 6) and p. 432,
(Sext. Math.
Sypotyp.
iii.
n. 5.
410
infinite diversities
ARISTOTLE
and subdivisions of its motion, by and uniform activity, would be im-
means of
possible.
this simple
much with
refer-
mover a number of subordinate but equally eternal substances, whose business it is to cause the special motions of the planets. The same provision
1
As
produced
we
2
some
its
Only
is
it will
not do to
equally general in
operation
for
orbit of the
The
to its
own
particular
:
what position do these particular Forms, which operate as creative forces in finite things and
question rises
constitute their peculiar essence, occupy with respect to
God
Or what
as they
are
we
Metaph.
fuller
xii.
8,
For
explanation
IX. infra.
* Metajjh. xii. C, 1072, a, 9 to secure the uniformity of the motion of the world (ireptSStp 1. 10 isprob. corrupt), SeT ti dtl Htveiv iiaavTcos ivepyoiv. si Se
METAPHYSICS
the changes of birth and destruction
spheres with the spirits
411
the
P
1
heavenly
What
We
cannot suppose
them
to be God's creatures
2
;
such a
being are uncreated and indestructible not only follows from the eternity of the world and its motion, but is also expressly stated by Aristotle cf. p. 474 sq. and Ch. IX. infra.
;
2 As Bkentano holds them to be, Psych, d. Arist. 198, 234 sqq. Bullingbr goes even further, Des Arist. Erhabenheit iiber alien,
Dualismus etc. (1878), p. 2 sq. According to his view, Aristotle (p. 394, n. 1, and 395, n. 6), and supposed not only the whole to Him we are justified in applyworld, but even the material of ing " eh Kolpavos eVrw " (p. 391, n. which it is made, to originate in a 2). The commander, however, is divine act of creation. Thus 'the not therefore the creator of his material out of which God subordinates. And as little does creates the world would, accord- it follow from Metaplh. ix. 8, 1050, ing to Aristotle, be nothing else b,3 (seep. 385,n.l,?y?ra)that the than the power and might etern- creative activity of God precedes ally actual in God, whereby the all being in time; for the del world is actualised,' &c. (p. 15). kivovv irptiiTus does not (as ,Ps. It will be sufficiently evident from Alex, in loc. certainly thought) the account already given in the refer to God as the first cause of text that speculations are here motion in the universe. On the attributed to Aristotle which contrary (as is obvious from the are as foreign to the range of his explanation upon p. 1049, b, thought as they are in conflict 17 sqq. which the &tnrep eiirofiey with his definite declarations. recalls), the reference is here to 3 That God is called irpiirr\ the fact that every individual dpxh (see p. 403, svpra), proves thing presupposes as the condinothing for this may mean, not tion of its production another similar already existing thing, only that He has produced every thins but also that He is the and this likewise another, ewj toO
' ' ;
1
order
:
i.e.
dpxh,
come
to the first
member
until we of the
412
ARISTOTLE
it
but
arises with
question which has first impulse to the whole series, the pri/mum movens in each case (not the irparov wi/oBy); and this is the reason why the ael kiv. irp. is repeated from p. 1049, b, 26, where (as Phys. viii. 10, 267, a, 1, 3) this is unin
given the
doubtedly
stotle
its
meaning.
Ari-
was precluded from holding any theory of creation by his view of the eternity of the world. Such a theory, moreover, is incompatible, not only with the
assertion that to God belongs neither trp&TTtiv nor itoieiv (see p. 400, n. 1), but also with the principle ex nihilo nihil Jit {Phys. i. 4, 187. a, 34, c. 7, 190, a, 14;' Gen. An. ii. 1, 733, b, 24 Metaph. iii. 4, 999, b, 6, vii. 7, 1032, a, J 3, 20, b, 30, c. 8 init., ix. 8, 1049, b, 28, xi. 6, 1062, b,
;
24), from which we have not the smallest right to make an exception in favour of the Deity, as
of every subsequent theism this One who conis impossible. ceives of God as the substance of the world, and of finite things as mere manifestations of the divine force immanent in them, may, and even must, in consequence, declare that the one is as One, on eternal as the other. the other hand, who treats God as a personal being outside the world, distinguishing other beings from Him as so many independent substances, would involve himself in a palpable contradiction were he to hold that the latter are eternally created by the former. Creation as an act proceeding from a personal will must necessarily be in time, and an individual being in order to produce other beings must necessarily exist before them. For only eansce irnmanentes have
does. 1 p. 210, indeed, believes that the eternity in time of immaterial substances as little dispenses with the necessity of an efficient principle for them as the eternity of motion dispenses with the necessity of a, mover ; in other words, he endeavours to reconcile the eternity of the world with the theory of its creation by means of the conception of an eternal creative activity in God. But upon the principles of the Aristotelian as
contemporaneous effects eausce trameuntes always precede their effects the father precedes the
; :
son, the artist the work of art, the creator the creature. Such a contradiction we should be justified in attributing to Aristotle, only if we could show that he held alike to the eternity of the
world and to a creative activity of God. The opposite, however, is the case. Aristotle holds, indeed, quite definitely the doctrine of the eternity of the world, but of a creative activity in God we not only find no word in his writings, but he expressly de-
METAPHYSICS
respect to the
413
Forms
of sensible things,
and
to the order
It is equally impossible
upon
as the result of
God. 2
If,
universe as
any personal interference on the part of the ancient Greek view of the interpenetrated by divine forces is in open
is
one of his
scientific
away
his
own
and well-considered statements, on the that he has neglected to bring them into harground mony with views that were pressed upon him from
definite
another side.
He
Forms
as the
eternal
self-
development produces alteration in individual things, and the harmony of whose transmutations is guaranteed
no
As
shown
nor on the theory that world is eternal can we understand when it could have taken place cf. p. 412. > Cf. infra, p. 420 sq.
i(68, n. 1),
the
we must supply certain important conceptions, and goes on Indeed, that all existences must be traced back to, referred ultimat ely to, living thoughts of God, and that these must be treated as the simple substrata upon which concrete existences and their mutations ultimately rest, hardly requires to be exphysics,
:
'
pressly stated,
see p. 298, n.
is
2,
If
nothing
meta-
worth?
We
may, moreover,
as-
:'
414
AR1ST0 TLB
first place, this
in the
Forms
as such,
substances (the
plained.
&c.)
it
is
no support in Aristotle's own utterances, and in more than one point The object it contradicts what he indisputably taught. of Divine Thought, according to Aristotle's definite
with respect to the Forms.
It finds
God Himself:
not only
ex-
which constitute their internal essence, must remain remote from Him, since they are always something different from Himself, and stand far below that which alone
cluded, but even the
viz.
God
That dynamic activities which have gone out from God, and therefore also finite being which is animated by these,
p.
and
577
n.
'
istences to the self-development should seek to return to Him, is of the divine thought on which quite comprehensible.' So also they rest, and the obstructions Hid. iii. a, 113 sq. Even Metaph. xii. 9 contains and disturbances in this. selfdevelopment to its connection with nothing to support Brandis's matter or potentiality and the view (cf. also Kyji, Metaph. Aristotle there harmonious variations in the de- Uhters. 258). velopments of different individual asks how we are to conceive of existences, by an anticipation of the thought of the divine spirit the conception of a Itarmonia if nothing is thought of by him (not if nothing is attained by prrpstahilit"; to the unity and perfection of the ultimate reality, his thought ') his power of thought the unconditioned spirit of God, must be as worthless as that exwhich is their common substra- ercised in sleep ; if something tum.' Cf. further his p. 578, where other than Himself is thought of, the central point of the Aristote- then is the worth of his thought lian theology is sought for in the to be measured by the worthiness doctrine ' that all determination of its objecfj But this does not in the world is referable to dy- mean that the Divine thoughts namic activities, and these again constitute the essence of things.
1 ; '
:
METAPHYSICS
being. 1
nnrryftrsely
;
415
t hin gs
the .Forms of
onnnnt h e
thougQta^fjhe^DeJi^sijnc^^cording to Aristotle, the Form is the substance of the th ings andSubstance can
neith er be
predicated of
n or.JielQng
Again,
to
anvthjng. 2
we
find
no analogy
divine thoughts
indeed,
it
is is
the proposition
of God,
that there
emanate from
Him
struggle to return to
Him
again, Aristotle
himit-
self rather
by means of the
foraes. 5
Nor
is
it
For supposing
and of their mutations, the relation of finite God would be one of immanence the Deity
:
would by virtue of his thoughts be inherent in things, and the latter would have in. God the permanent ground
of
their
shifting
properties.
Instead of Aristotle's
arrive at
is it
dualistic theism,
we should
and
p. p. 97,
system
of
dynamic pantheism. 6
1
impossible to
See p. 398, n.
sq.,
1,
and
373
sq.
s 'Eirurr^/Mj is the very example which Aristotle mentions ot that which is at once predicate and inherent attribute of a sub-
stratum; seep. 214, nAfin. supra. * P. 397, D. 2, supra. s Uf. p. 404 sq., p. 344, n. 1, and p. 379, n. J, and on the doctrine that motion resides in the motum and therefore in the
material, 386, n. 1. This is made
still
more
41
ARISTOTLE
duced that fusion of things diverse and fundamentally distinct which meets us in the spurious book upon the
World and
it
still
quite uncertain
how we
Deity.
upon the subject we can only say that he placed them side by side, without explaining satisfactorily the existence and the special motions of finite things by the operation of the Deity, or even They are given attempting such an explanation. factors, just as Matter is a given factor which he does
From
his utterances
Form
or Deity.
It is true
Koopavit), is
God being
Unmoved to
the
Moved or,
^rh
in
tajrii.),
rb
tie
tout'
irepl
fjS-n
Xdyov
irKelu
Se7rai
iroia
irKeiovos
xal
rrjs
According to Kym, supra. God is said to be, not only the creative conception, but also the material cause of the world, the indwelling purpose and the productive force that is immanent This, however, is a mere in it.
fin.
e^eVecus,
rivav,
eVeiS^
to Kvit\Ma [the heaveDly spheres] k! at <popal rpiitov rma imevavrtai ko.1 rb avjjrvrov [? we should have expected dyaBbv or
Upttrrov] Kai ov xfy'" a<pav4s.
cite
assertion, and is not proved to be Arisrotle's own opinion by any detailed investigation into his declarations on the subject.
1
r'
apxai
v\eious,
ei's
So-te
Spefij/
[?]
rb
aip.<puvov airiiv
Uvrav
Cf.
THEOPHB. Ft.
12 (Me-
tV b.p\<jTt\v oiStt/ias
(j>avep6i>.
'
ill
Pirsics
CHAPTER
PHYSICS
VIII
i
A.
The Idea of Nature and the most General Conditions of Natural Existence
we have
:
seen, with
unmoved and
of
this
inits
reality
though, in
treating
proper subject,
we were
some
Natural Philosophy
which
subject to Motion. 1
we
fact, which possesses them or is related Hence the whole domain of corporeal existence belongs to Natural Science. 2 But it regards form only
and the
Cf. p. 183, n. 3.
De
Casio,
i.
1 init.
T)
r/
irepi
rpvaews
Kai to
otrai
eirio-Tf)fJi.ri
ff\^ov
7rAeTT7|
Kivf)ffeis,
ct(
5e
Trepl
Ka ^ Ta * ras apx&s,
elffiv
eVel Sf rav (piaei 1, 298, b, 27 \eyon4vav t& pev ia-ra ovaicu to 5' epya Kal traBri roirwv [by outn'at, however, he here means both simple and composite bodies]
. . .
tpavepbv 'on
tt}s
irepl
fftop.&Tuiv
rr/tf
irXeiariiv ffvfifialpei
iffroplas
irepi
ttjs
rota{ni}S
tpvffei
ovtrias
(pvatus
elvai
Ttav
iffTl
yap
o-vvcirr&rajv
Ttt 8'
to
fiev
vaffai
yap
at
aci/iara
the
'
human
body],
t'ur'.v
e^" <m" Ka
;
fieyeSos [as
man], to
apxal tuv
iii.
Mttaph.
vi. 1,
Ixivruv
(xi, 7)
and elsewhere
VOL.
I.
.E
. :
ii8
AnistbtLS
It must, however,
be rememsubject to
it
is
motion and
repose.
;
Mathematical
natural bodies
indeed, Mathematics
may be
distin-
natural
;
'
when
it
motion
and
between
The
dis-
drawn between rational and irrational forces, on the ground that the former may act in either of two opposite directions, the latter only in one, and that the former, therefore, are free,
on the other haDd, which
is
is
realm of Nature. 4
Yet
Form and
:
Does the
1
Form
:
Metaph.
tyvxrjs
ftirri
1,
1026,
rrjs
a,
irepl
4vtas
fii] i.
OeuprJGcu
5 rov
Pliys.
^v
ii.
1,
192, b, 13
to
tiev
(pvffucov,
aVeu
1,
tiKijs
yap %x 0VTa
Be
tpvffei
coutoTs apxhv
iariv.
Be An.
An.
i.
Part.
2
1,
ii.
Phys.
koX rrrdVetos,
to
piev
/col
koto
riirov,
<piatv,
t& to Se
nal
6pyA)v
kK'vyi
.
Be
mathematician as well
physicist is occupied
as the
etc.
ovbe/xlav
form of bodies,
ri
Sib
i.h\'
ex 61 p*TafSo\ijs tpupvrop, as he proceeds in the rest of the chapter further to explain. Motaplh. xii. 3,
ffu/ijSej87jK<STa fleapeT ?f
1070,
'
<pvaiKois]
dbai
'
Tex"V opx^
2,
auTc>. *
ey
koI
x w pKii
XaP
yap
etc.
Trepirrbti
Io-toi
1046, b, 4]
Se tpitris
apxh
lv
Metaph.
ix.
2 init.
c. 6, c.
&vev Kivii(reus,
cropf
Sk Ka\
8,
c.
1060, a, 30 sqq.
13, 22, b, 39.
De
Inierpr,
harovv ko\ Mpwiros oviceri. Cf. what follows and 183, u. 3, supra.
PHYSICS
or in the Matter ?
it
419
might be asserted that everything requires some Yet Aristotle is material in order to be what it is.
1
first alternative.
Form
it is
the material
neral
in
it
we wish to determine the gedefinition of Nature, we must not consider what is material, so much as the moving and informing
therefore,
'
force.
Nature
is
natural
itself.
5
But
1
Pliys.
ii.
1,
193, a,
9-30.
v.ifoi.: T\irpim\
Xeyopivt)
icrrlv
r)
Metaph. v. 4, 1014, b, 26. 2 Phys. ii. 1, 193, a, 28 sqq. o. Metaph. as above, 2, 194, a, 12. 1. 35 sqq. Part. An. i. 1, 640, b, 28, 641, a, 29, b, 23 sqq. 3 For a fuller discussion of
this point see infra
4
ovaia
f)
took
fj
ixivruv
airi.
"PXV
"iviifftas iv avrois
vi. 1, 1025, b, 19 [xi. 7, irepl yip tt)x 1064, a, 16, 30] roiairnv iarlv qialav [ij 4>u(n/ri)]
:
iv
ri
ij
apxh T vs
iv airy
Kivfiacws
:
ical
and p. 357-8.
scientific investigator
still
'6aif
paWov
'i\i\
SC
:
^ avhraKiv. Phys. ii. 1, 192, b, 20 &s ofays rrjs tpvaews apxys rivbs Kal
ixiivriv <pvais early
iwapx"
Kara
irp&Tios ko9'
1-
ain't)
Kal
pit
<tuju/8si8jjk<Ss.
32
(piais
piv
(or 1. 26 irepl toioutoj/ tv 8 itrri Svrarbv Kiveiirfloi). It is indifferent whether nature is described as the substratum of motion merely, or of rest as well, since, according to Aristotle, rest (^pe/tfe, o-TdVu) belongs as an attribute only to those things to which motion belongs; or at least can belong, and is merely oWpTjiru Kii^crewr. .Phys. iii. 2, 202, a, 3, v 2, 226, b, 12, c. 6 init vi. 3, 234, a, 32 c. 8 239, a, 13, viii. 1, 251, a, 26.
ariireas
X E 2
420
ARISTOTLE
'
force
'
with accuracy
On
the
Nature as a Single Being, attributing to her a life which permeates the world throughout, and a definite design which determines and unifies all its parts. He talks of the aims which
one
side
he
1
considers
In a
analogy of the
2
human
soul
and the
Though he
remarks that the designs of Nature are not determined by deliberation like those of an artist, 3 and though in
general
we cannot
attribute to
him any
real
the
mains. 4
regards
On
living
He
this
to them,
and he
how
Nor
how Nature
insisting
it
is
When
of divinity, he denies
1
to
See the end of this chapter, Proofs of this are innumerable it will suffice to refer to the discussion of design in nature which follows in the text, ' As will be shown in its proper place. ' By analogy is meant, not
; ' '
a,
v)
yap n&vov
if)
(Ufi-e^ei \rb
ruv
lyiiv
tuv
yvuptfiav fcjW fidMo-Ta irdvTwi/. iv. 10, 686, a, 27: man stands upright iih. rb t^iv <pvo-iv aiiTov KaX -r^v ovalav tlvat 9etav ipyov Se tov Beior&rdv to votiv koI <ppove!v.
Cf.
iii.
DIS,
6
with what follows Bbak113 sqq. As in PaH. An. ii. 10, 656,
a.
13 sqq. (cf the divine in man, and therefore the highest activity is the theoretic.
x. 7, 1177, a,
:
Mil. N.
p.
1
65, n. 1)
vovs
is
PHYSICS
and
from this point of view he will Dot allow that
is
421
Nature
as a whole
divine,
an immediate exhibition of divine force in natural phenomena. Nature and God are so used synonymously, 2 and a share in divinity is conceded to all natural
3 existences, however trivial.
So
far
God
is
the
first
cause of motion,
all
motions in the
Him
On
if
we
of the
primum movens
to
sphere
we have
Mover a series still more necessary in order to explain the much greater variety of movements in the realm of nature to assume a train of independent substances endowed with motive power of their own. How the harmony of these movements or their conjunction in an orderly system is effected, it is hard to say. It cannot be by the
1 Dlvin. p. S. c. 2, 463, b, 12 since beasts also dream, dreams cannot be divine ; they may, however, be demoniacal ; y yap tpviris Stufiovla, a\\' ov Beia. 2 De Ccelo, i. i fin. <S Bebs xai
: :
e'xei
b, 21
Betas
moral disposition]
afaias
^eVii'
Sid
nvas
atrial
vwdpx*'.
fioipa,
The
BeTai
t]
tptiffis
Gen.
as to
et Corr.
10, 336, b,
27 sqq. (see
402 sqq.
Mh. N.
vii. 14,
1153, b, 32
Tt
Svvdfieus fyyov,
fyrts
trdvra yap
<p4ffet
%x il
^^'
422
ARISTOTLE
universe
and
it
would be
illegitimate
to
attribute
on the
1
it
in his writings.
Consequently
it
as
or,
we ought to combine these two points of view, and, if But meantime we may so, how we ought to do it.
permit Aristotle further to unfold his view of Nature.
The most important idea with which we have to deal in the Philosophy of Nature is that of Motion. In our earlier researches we had to examine this idea in its general bearing therefore what now remains is that we
;
motion in
its
stricter
and more
sq.
p.
380
as the
what
exists potentially.
By
analysing
we
iroieiv ois
ruv
8e
yip
vtro
ris
eViUf'Af ta
twv
avBpwir'ivuv
8ew yiverai, ti>a*ep Sofcei, Kal eifij av t&Koyov xalpstv re aiiToiis t apiffrtp al t$ avyyevetrr&Ttp (toDto 5' av ?7) i vovs) Kal robs ayair&vras /tuUirrra rovro Kal rk/iavras co/Te-
te real icoAws wpirTOVTas. Hti Se m&vra ravra Tip tro<p$ jua\trr6' vwdpxei, ovk aoT)Kov. 8eo<j>i\4o~TaTOS apa. It is obvious that Aristotle is here arguing
fievovs
Kal
Cf. pp.
389 sqq.
, :
PHYSICS
guishes three kinds
:
423
and decrease; qualitative motion, or alteration; and motion in space, or locomotion to which may be added
and destruction.
For,
Now
if
all
these
kinds of movement
third kind
may be
we
Motion
closely,
in Space.
we examine
them more
the
increment
that which
is
it
its
form
in other
1 Phys. v. 1, 225, a, o. 2, 226, 23 (Metaph. xi. 11, 12), cf. Metaph. viii. 1, 1042, a,. 32, xii. 2 imit.. Phys. viii. 7, 260, a, 26, 261 Gen. et a, 32 sqq., vii. 2 i/nit. Corr. i. 4, 319, b, 31; Be An. i. Long. v. 3, 465, b, 3. 406, a, 12,
a,
5,
229, a, 30
cf.
SlMPL.
30;
Be
Coelo, iv.
3,
310, a, 25.
Phys. 201, b, who extends the statement to the Peripatetic school in general, remarking, however, that Theophrastus, among others, did not keep strictly to this use of language) elsewhere
;
change (/lerajBoAifr) from being to being, from being to not-being, and from not-being to being. The first is
kinds
of transition
motion in the stricter sense, the second destruction,, the third Motion he then origination. divides into the kinds mentioned the text (/cfvjjim Karh /leytBos, in
icara irdOos
Aristotle treats this also as a form of motion, and uses ' mol ion as synonymous with ' change.' See p. 382, n. 3, svpra. PhysMi. 2, 243, a, 21 (cf. Be An. i. 3, 406, a, 4) distinguishes two kinds of loco'
motion
latter
e\|ir,
calls
,
26) tion again together, thus enumerates four kinds of i^ra^oKr) r) Kara rb ri (yevetris Kal (pOopa), r] Kurd, rb noaov (atityiffis teal <p9lffis), r) Kara, rb trotbv (aAAofotrts), t) Kara, rb to 5 (<popd). That these are the only categories under which motion can be thought, is shown Phys. v. 2, where change of sub:
and Kara rbtov, as he them Phys. viii. 7, 260, b, and, taking birth and destruc-
ogle's,
SiVjitris,
the
third
ever,
first
may be
two.
sqq.
Be
c.
Ingr. An.
2, 704, b, 22 {Mot. 703, a, 19); the statement mPhet. i. 5, 1361, b, 16, is less exact. "Clais is either Shtis in the stricter sense, or irKriyf) Meteor, iv. 9, 386, a, 33 ; Be An. ii. 8, 419, b, 13,a,ndcf. Probl,
c.
An.
10,
424
ARISTOTLE
is
an augmentation of matter,
Similarly decrease
is
of
these two
results
from the coincidence of something which prowith something in which it is produced, of an and a passive element 3 This coincidence, then,
local contact, for (although the
duces
active
it
without locomotion. 4
Even the
tion,
is
last species of
movement
in space.
If
one
were to assume
existence,
an absolute beginning or
could
not,
end of
such a transmutation
But
birth
sense
1 Vide the full discussion in Gen. et Corr. i. 5. 2 Phys. viii. 7, 260, a, 29, b. 13. 3 Xlaiew in the physical sense is synonymous to Aristotle with aKKoiovv, ir&ax*w with aWoiovo-ffai. Cf. Phys. iii. 3 fin. &\\oia>:
fiev yty r\ rod aWoioirov, fj aWoiuiTbv, vTt\4x ela ""' '^ 7*ptp.<orepnv 7] rod Svvdfiet ironywcov
ens
'
tovto 8' oh i) Klyrio-is wddos 8e naff So-ov iAAoiourat p.6vov. On a further meaning of iroieii/ see in n. 1 to p. 400. 4 Phys. viii. 7, 260, b, 1 sqq., where it is further remarked that all qualitative changes are ultitnately resolvable into rarefaction and condensation, which involve change of place. Gen. et Corr. i- "> 322, b, 21 sqq. c. 9, 327, a,
irdurxovTiirddos
1, cf. p.
5
386.
ko! iraBriTiicov
fi
toiovtov.
Gen.eta,
Corr.
oil
i.
6, 322, b, 9,
323,
17
yhp oT6v re
to
irav
to kivovv
iroieiv,
efrrcp
u-piowy
i,VTt8^o-o/ifv
Gen. et Corr. i. 3, among other arguments, shows that matter would in the end be all used up, if destruction were to
: :
PHYSICS
being of some
It is
sort,
425
1
and
Its
is
and
ends
its
existence
beginning
is
the
2
end,
and
quently, in so
different
Conseend the beginning, of something else. far as generation and destruction are
from change,
affects
it
the
surit is
individual object.
The
individual changes
when
it,
as a whole, begins or
on the contrary we regard the universe and not the individual, then generation and destruction coincide partly with composition and division, partly
Now
its
cause
becoming implies a
'
'
being by which
'
it is
mean
13).
a,
7,
261,
a,
5iJ|f y' av
ri
irdflr;. birth and destruction by change in the iiroKeipevov, whether in respect of its form (\6yos) or its matter c. 4, 319,
in the
ruv
Ktvfi(rea>vb'iaTOVTO,o'Tiyv4(r8ai
10: aWoiaxris fi4v iffTtv, Hrav vtrofievovTOS tov vtroKei(i4vov aladtjtov ovtos, peraPdWri iv toTs avTov Tra&effiv .... hrav 5' 8\ov fierab,
t
twc yivofievav yivdfievov, zeal tovov avrb teal tov eTepov irp6repov. Cf p. 38 1-7.
jrpdrepSv ri Kiveitr8ai
fiaWri fiij iiirofievovros aia^Tyrov tivos as vwoKifj.4vov tov avTov yeveffis ^877 to toiovtov, tov Be
.
.
23
Sia to
QBopa..
4
Aval y4veaiv.
tV toBSe yivzaiv
avayIbid,
Cf.
aWov
tV
ii.
fisTafiox4iv.
'A\\ola>o-is is
produced by change
where he argues that generation is effected by definite materials becoming transmuted and determined in certain ways by the agency of efficient forces destruction, on the other hand, "by the conquest of the passive matter over the determining form. 5 Cf Phys. viii. 7, 260, b, 8
sqq.,
. :
426
ARISTOTLE
Since
this, as
produced.
tion,
we saw
Again, if movement must precede all generation. must of nemovement in space precedes generation, it
cessity precede growth, change, decrease,
tion
which has previously been generated. 2 Therefore this species of motion is the first in the order of causality, as 3 well as in the order of time and in the logical order also. Notwithstanding what has just been said, Aristotle
from explaining natural phenomena by the merely mechanical principle of motion in space, as the Atomists
is far
had done.
his
Even purely
seeing that
opinion, be
satisfactorily
method,
many
of
them
are only
to
be
the
conceived as modes of
qualitative
alteration,
or
transmutation of materials. 4
Trite-
TvKvaicris 5e
Ha8' as yevecris Kal <p8opc\ \4yerai tuv ohoi&v. crvyKpivdiieva Sh (co! Kara -rivov Suutpiv6iii>a dvdyKi)
pcrqS&Aeu'. Phys. ibid. 261, a, 1 sqq. Gen. et Corr. ii. 10 init. 2 Phys. ibid, b, 7. It is here further pointed out in proof of the
1
dent of these conceptions, and none of them are applicable to the heavens (260, b, 19 sqq. Gen. et Corr. ii. 10 init.). So also movement in space is the only one of these conceptions which has to do with the eternal, and is of infinite duration (260, b, 29, 261, a, 27 sqq.). Aristotle also argues that because it is the last in time in respect to individual existences,
it
priority of ' movement in space,' that, while it is presupposed by the others, it does not presup-
must be the
first
in nature (260,
pose them. Without the movement of the heavens, neither generation nor destruction, neither growth normaterial change, could take place. Movement itself, on the other hand, is indepen-
b,30,261,a, 13);andheholdsthat it causes the least change in the nature of the thing moved, and is the motion which the self-moving produces in preference to every other (261, a, 20). 3 Ibid. 260, b, 16 sqq. 4 Seep. 304,n.3,andp.306,n.5.
: ;
PHYSICS
rise
427
which, subserve
them
is
Lastly, if
it
be true that
'
becoming'
development, and that the importance of Aristotle's natural philosophy consists, to a great extent, in having
first
made
this
notion
it
of development possible
it is
and
consciously given
clear that
Aristotle could not favour opinions which started with an express denial of any becoming or qualitative alter' '
ation,
and
left
means to its end all that is corporeal and determined by natural necessity. Next to Motion in Space, and not without direct relation to it, come investigations by which Aristotle
further illustrates the idea of motion in his Physics and these include discussions upon the Infinite, Space, Time, the Unity and Continuity of Motion, 2 &c.
The
1
Infinite
See p. 307, n.
and
cf. p.
359, sq. supra. - He describes those conceptions, indeed, generally, iii. 1, 200, b, 15 sqq. c. 4 vnit., as belonging to the discussion upon motion, and deals with the first three in bks. iii. and iv. before the section upon the kinds of motion but the way in which he treats them shows that he is thinking chiefly of locomotion.
3 The discussion of thisconception Aristotle introduces vaPhyt. iii. 1, 200, b, 15, -with the words Soxet 8' r> itfojjo-is eivai rav avv^xav, rb 5 Jxtrfipov ifitfta'tverai irpwrov iu raj auvex**; c. 4 init. be remarks that natural science deals with masses, motion, and time, each *- of which is either finite or infinite, On what follows see Zbllee,P/<. d. Gr. pt. i. 186.
: 1
i-^UvX<
428
ARISTOTLE
.
Aristotelian philosophy
went
so far as to
make
:
it
an element of
all
things, and
this
therefore a substance.
'
Aristotle begins
'
by proving
does not belong to the to be impossible Then he shows order of substances but of qualities.
infinity
1
is
inconceivable.
For sup-
pose
body is that which is limited by or if it be a number, numbers are capable superficies of being counted, and that which can be counted is not 2 Lastly, and more especially, an infinite body infinite.
it
to be a body,
;
It could not
number, an infinite body could not be made up of them unless one of them were infinite in magnitude, and such an element would leave no room for the rest. 3
And
In
to think of it
as
simple
is
equally impossible.
is
world
concerned, no
and
its
quite impossible
and to which it and this law determines the difference in weight between bodies every body without exception must exist
it
abid?
tends
no
5
definite locality,
no distinction of up and
after, right -8*~~^
it is
7 init.
*
and
1
left.
Moreover, whereas
204, a
;
Phys.
iii. 5,
see p. 312,
4.
i.
n. 2,
2 3
and
p. 325, n. 2,
ibi.d.
supra.
Phys.
Be
Casio,
iv.
PHYSICS
either
429
move
straight lines
up and down
movements.
The
former
is
by
their nature
movement
is is
end. 2
infinity
'
could not
move
at all, since it
would take
infinite
ceivable space. 3
an argument
formless
being
shape
we
indeterminable, which
which cannot be limited in such a way as not to leave some portion of it outside. 4 The infinite first becomes a whole and complete when it is enclosed by means of form. But the world cannot be conceived except as complete and a whole. 5 It is therefore impossible that
init. u. 7, 274, b, 8, 29. 276, b,
6 e
In c. 6, 273, a, 21 sqq., the same conclusion is reached by showing that infinite bodif "tup t be infinitely heavy or light," *>ut
sqq.
yap o5
Aristotle's words are oi juTjSez/ c|w, a\?C ot aei rt cotI, tout' foreipoV iaTtv,
:
is
merely
verbal,
'
uv
liriSiv
e|to
an infinitely heavy or an infinitely light body is an impossieither exhibit infinite speed or be absolutely immovable. 1 As is shown, at unnecessary length, De Coelo, i. 5, 271, b, 2ri sqq. 272, b, 17 sqq. c. 7, 275, b,
bility, since
it
meaning
nothing
on
must
the other hand, 'that of which a part always remains beyond.' 5 P/iys.iii. 6 see at p. 350, sup. Gen. An. i. 715, b, 14 ri Si <j>i<ns tpt&yzi to &TTipov to fi\v yap
:
awc.pov OT\es,
te'Xos
4,
T\
12.
2
De
Coelo,
i.
6 mit.
Also
21
c. 7,
sqq.
203, b, 22 sqq.) that infinite space presupposes also an infinite body, he afterwards sets asidc(iv. 5,212, a, 31, b, 8, 16 sqq.;
430
ARISTOTLE
minable magnitude. 1
Yet we cannot entirely do without it. Time, and is measured by time, are without beginning or end. Magnitudes are capable of infinite division, number of infinite increase. 2 Hence we
motion, which
cf
.
De
Casio,
i.
9,
see p. 395, n. 6
supra) by his peculiar definition of space as the boundary between the enclosing and the enclosed. The boundary of the world itself is, therefore, according to his view, not in space beyond it there is no space either void or occupied. Phys. iii. 5 Jin. Hti p.tv abv
' ; 1 :
ouk effTL (rufxa l&iretpov, (puvepbv k Tovray. c. 6, 206, a, 16 ri Se/ii^eBos Sti but' ivcpyeiav oiiK etrriv anetpov, eipTjTat ; ibid, b, 24.
ivepyeia
2
/xl)
Phys.
iffriv
iii.
6, init.
8ti
S'
et
&Keipov
etrrai
an\us,
tis
TroWa
aSvvara. ffvfi&alvet,
5t)\op. tov re
apxh K0^ TfAeuT^, Kal ra fieycBrj ov Siatpera els fisyeBTj, leal aptdfiis ovk etrrat &Tipos. Aristotle proves in particular (1) the eternity of time, and with it the eternity of motion which is measured by time. Besides the passages quoted p. 388, n. l,seePkyi.yiii. 1,251, b, lOsqq. and cf. Mctaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 7. He argues that as every present is the middle point between the past and the future, and every moment is a present, it is wholly impossible to conceive of any moment of time which has not a before and after, and therefore of any which could be a first or a last moment, a beginning or an end of time. (2) He proves the infinite divisibility of
:
yap xp6vov
317, a, 2 sqq., I)e Caelo, iii. 8, 306, b, 22). The assumption of indivisible bodily surfaces or lines is not only incompatible
i. 2,
with the fundamental principles of mathematics (Be Cmlo, iii. 1, 298, b, 33 sqq. c. 5, 303, a, 20, c. cf. the treatise n. 7, 306, a, 26
:
arofiuif
ypafinuv), but
it
would
likewise make the most universal of all physical phenomena, viz. motion, impossible, for, magnitude and time being alike indivisible, it is impossible to traverse one part before another. In respect, therefore, of each of the indivisible elements and accordingly also of the whole which is constituted by them motion could only be predicated as a thing of the past, never as a thing of the present (Phys. vi. 1, 231, b, 18 sqq.; cf. c. 2, 233, a, 10 sqq. c. 9, 239, b, 8, 31), and all difference of velocity must also in like manner vanish (ibid. c. 2, 233, b, 15 sqq.)
PHYSICS
431
must conclude that the infinite exists in one sense and not in another: or in other words, that it has The divia potential hut not an actual existence.
sibility of
magnitudes in space
is
is
indefinite
yet
we
an infinitely small particle. The multiplication of numbers has no limit In a word, yet there is no infinitely great number. the infinite can never be represented in actuality. It is always potential, and in its two manifestations takes
therefore argue that there
1
may not
opposite directions
division,
infinite
change
is
excluded in
things indivisible, for change involves division between an earlier and a later condition {Phys. vi. 4 init.). In particular, when we come to the indivisible elementary bodies and surfaces of Democritus and Plato, we shall find these beset by a whole series of new difficulties in addition to the above. (3) Lastly, as there is no highest number, number is capable of infinite multiplication. This, however, has never been disputed, and therefore requires
rb bmeipov. Only we must not suppose that this potentiality can ever become actual, Sktts rb
ov Set \afi$dveiv us To*5e o\A' del 4v yev4ffei % (pdopa. Sec. ; o. 7, 207, b, 11 (on the infinity of number) Sore Swa/dti /teV cVtiv, ivtpyeiq b" off dA\' del
aireipov
Ti
rbs 6 aptOfibs ovros ttjs SixoTOfiias, ovSe jiieVet t\ aireipta aKAa ylverai,
oxTirep teal 6 xp6vos KaX d apidpbs rov It is shown also, Gen. et Xpovov. Corr. i. 2, 316, a, 14 sqq., with respect to infinite divisibility, that
no proof.
6, 206, a, 12 sqq. [to foreipov], ttus 5' elvvu rb /liv oS. \iyerat 5jj to Suvdfiet to 5e evreKexeitf, ko! rb fciretpov eoTi /iht/ irpotrBeffet %ffri 5e koX cupcupetrei. rb 8e fieyedos '6rt /j.kv Kar' Mpyeiav ovk %tniv airfipov, etpTjrat, Staipetrei 6 Iffriv ov yap cwe\eiv Tas Xa\evbv arSfiovs \eiirerai aitv Swdfiei chat ypafifids
1
Phys.
iii.
troas
fiev cCTi
it never can be actually realised in fact and therefore exists only potentially. It is just because it merely iv Svvdfiei that the is
Infinite
is
reckoned
among
p. 350, n. 1,
'
'
% Phys. iii. 7. Time, however, even Aristotle holds to be infinite in both directions.
432
as
ARISTOTLE
infinity of force.
an
This
is
also,
however,
is
manifested
may
first place,
with their space, and several bodies could not successively enter the
tified
same
space.
No more
can
it
be idenis it
inseparable from the body which is in space that which circumscribes, but that which
scribed.
is
nor is
circumit
In the third
place,
as
may
exist
and move
The place of each particular body 4 is therefore formed by the (internal) limits of that which surrounds it, and space in general by the limits of the
surrounds. 3
world. 5
See notes to p. 395, supra. Phys. iv. 1-4, cf. esp. 211, b, 5 sqq., 209, b, 21 sqq. 3 To irepas rod irepUxovros awfiaros, or, more accurately, to toC irepiexopTos irepas aKivTjrov
2
1
It is strange that space should here be called as in c. i, 212, a, 20 (cf n. 3, supra) rov oipavov ti to %ax aTOV Ka airr6fieyoy rov kivtjtov
.
-l
irp&Tov. b, 7.
4
Cf.
De
Coelo, iv.
3,
310,
Phys. toVos
init.,
Phys.
iv. 5,
212,
a, 31, b, IS.
; for we are told (v. below and p. 377) that the vault of heaven moves continually in a circle. Aristotle means, however (c. 4, 212, a, 18 sqq. c. C, 212, a, 31 sqq., viii. 9, 265, b, 1 sqq.) that just as in the case of a ball which spins round its own axis without otherwise moving the circumference is as
PHYSICS
Aristotle obtains the notion of
recess. 1
438
ily
Time by a similar Time cannot exist without motion, since it is by the movement of thoughts that we perceive it.
motion
itself is inseparable
is
om
le
in one case
tster,
whereas time
is
is
universally
fast.
same, and
movement
it.
always equally
It
illows that
ut
f
is different
from
It is the
The number is the now.' Time is occasioned y the movement of the now.' It is this that makes
motion in respect to what
'
is earlier
and
later. 2
nit of this
'
me
at once a continuous
'
Dntinuous, in so far as
it
now
was in the past discrete, in so far snt moment as 3 s its being is different in each moment. These notions of Time and Space involve the innity of the former and the finitude of the latter and
;
'&
already
know
Aristotle's
istinction
;ationary
between them. 4
In like manner his concepPhys. iv. o. 11, of. p. 220, a, te Sii 6 xp^"os t$ vvv 5 ral HnjpT\Tai Kara to vvv ; 2) 9, b, 9
:
as the centre, the jcular motion affecting merely pari s, since only those change s leir position, so the highest eavens move only in a certain jspect, and are in space only Kara uyn/3efl7)is, and in so far as their arts move and are in space {lie 'alio, v. 5, which passage Branii. b, 748, wrongly suspects), a like sense it is said (212, a, 8) that the river is stationary, ad that only the individual 'aves move. 1 Phys. iv. 10, 11. 2 'AptO/ibs Kara to Kivfiffeus pdrepov Kal Sarepov, c. 11/*. De
owe^s
7)
tbairtp
Kal d
?jv
nirnais eel &K\ti Kal ctM.17, XP^ V0S ' 8' 'P- a ** XpdVos
'
6 avrSs
ttot'
rb
1
'
5"
airy
erepov.
Ilrid.
3, imit.
to Se vvv
trvvexei
XP^ V0V
IS,
tbv irape\e6vra Kai <r6fievov, Kal oKws ire pas XP& V0V eoTii> . Siaipet tie Bvvdncf xal rj /ikv rotovro, ie! ertpov rb vvv, y Se avvtiei, del rb avr6 eon Se ravrb Kal Kara touto % Sialpeais Kal ri evutris, t4 5'
.
ttvai ov tovt6.
4
Cf.
p.
Iwlo,
i.
9,
279,
I.
a, 14.
supra.
VOL.
F R
14
ARISTOTLE
If
is
enclosed,
that there is no
>ace
1
where there
no body
on
minute and patient arguments, to conic the widely-received assumption of a vacuum, which,
lis
The reasons with which they had supported it appear him inconclusive. Movement does not need to be exlained by such an hypothesis, since we can imagine that
i
Condensation
may be
rare-
The expansion which ater, for example, experiences when passing into air hat is, into steam) may be explained by the alteration
ction to its entrance into them.
'
materials,
phenomena of gravity by the tendency of the ements to reach their natural place. The vacuum
the
ould rather put a stop to the possibility of motion,
all
sides,
one cannot
It
How one
ford
direction
body to would
special
it
no distinction of natural
it.
No
On
the
immutable.
3.
Pliys.
i.
iv.
12,
221, b,
"
De
c. 9,
Coilo,
9,
279, b^
8 init.
WYSICS
435
would be equally impossible, on the hypothesis of infinite vacuity, to assign any reason for rest in
Nature.
Again,
if
bodies
fall
medium through
which they are moving, everything would have to fall or rise with infinite rapidity through the infinite rarity.
of the void.
On
fall
if,
ceteris paribus,
greater masses
void,
where there
are
is
no resistance to
how
we
to
conceive that an
empty space exists beyond the space occupied by bodies, since, if a body entered that space, there would then be two spaces, an empty and a full, the one within the And what is the use of such a void space, other ? Besides, by since every body has its own extension ? maintaining that there is empty space or any space at all beyond the world, one would end in the contradiction 2 of asserting that a body could be where no body can. If empty Space is impossible, empty Time, filled with no movement, is equally inconceivable, since Time is nothing but the number of motion. 3 Aristotle, in fact,
l
maintains the eternity of motion as having neither bePhys. iv. 8 cf De CceVi, iv. In estimating the force of these arguments we must, of course, take account of the state of scientific knowledge at the time, and of the presuppositions which were shared by Aristotle 8ee and the Atomists alike.
1
;
.
2.
ovSe xp6vos zotIv |o) tou ovpavov' iv airavrtykp rfatp Svvat6v virdp^at au/ia- icsvbv $' ehai
icevbv
(paaiv
iv
f.^1
ivvwdpx^
(ra>fia,
oti
o6t'
iviix*
viii. 1,
yevctrBai trafia.
Phys.
p.
442, infra.
2
irp6Tepov
i.
De
Ccelo,
9,
279, a,
11
XP^ V0V
o$ffi\s
SjUa Se
Ktvfoetos;
itrriv
FF
43C
ARISTOTLE
On this point he suggests the remarkwhether there could be Time without a And ho answers it by saying that Time in its essence
:
it
cannot be
But we
should
make a mistake
if
we sought
to discover in this
remark any inclination to the idealist theory of Time which has obtained so vast a.n importance in modern
philosophy.
Its
Time
and Space in as pure and abstract a sense as is familiar Although he does not go so far as Plato, who to us. identified Space with extended substance, and Time with the motion of the stars, 3 yet he never attempts to
make an
Xpivos
Time
in
Kiv},treus apiS/ibs
of its existence;
S,h.
v.
TOBSTKIK
Kal KivTjfftv
26
avir/Ki]
eivat oe!
xP& vov
a\\a
fity elye xp^ vov i <t>avepbv Sri avdyxri etvai Kal Kirqaiv, eiirep &
Xpivos irddos ti Kivfoeus. De Ccolo, outside the a, 14 9. 279, world there is no lime, for XP^ V0S apiS/ibs Kii/^o-eais- Kivqcrts 5' avtv Cf. p. (pviriKov ffdtfiaros ovk %ffnv. 395, n. fi, supra. 1 See p. 387, swprn. 2 Pliys. iv. 14, 223, a, lfi sqq. esp.l. 25: Si ,u?j5ej/ &\\o mtyvxev
i.
:
1857, p. ltil sqq.], olotf ei evSexercu KlvTjffiv eli/at &vev Aristotle is not quite ^ V X^ S consistent in his answers to the question, what faculty of the soul it is that perceives time. According to the above passage and Dr. An.iii. 10, 433, b, 5 sqq., we must suppose that it is the reason, and that the sense of time is limited to rational beings. In the De Mem. i. 450, a. 9-23, on the other hand, he assigns it to the TpuTow
xii.
-
Mm.
apidfuXv ixSiWtoi/
oSo-Tjs,
ti
<l"jxh 6iai
koI
"
ifivxys
I'oSs,
x^"
$ u xris
ph
a\K' % tovto o itotc iv iariv d xP 6vos [apart from the soul time, as such, cannot exist, but only that which constitutes the essence of time, the reality that lies beneath it as i he substratum
time (ibid. 449, b, 28), to many of the lower animals {ibid, and
c. 2, 1,
Hist. An.
d.
i.
Qr. Abth.
i.
Pirrsics
ersal forms of sense,
e
}
4;j?
and the existence in which that he cannot of space without physical locality, higher and ravity and levity. 2 He limits existence in space, ;rictest sense, to that which is surrounded by body different from itself, arguing from this that there is no space beyond the world, and
manifested.
We
have seen
>
world as a whole
3
arts.
is not in space, but only its In the same way the homogeneous parts
b.erent
lly in
noved on the one hand, and on the other a subject. He remarks expressly, however, that I
me
t is
is
is called
the
leed, to the
body moved.
}dies cease,
Time
le further discussion of
otle's
ts
Motion which
is chiefly
is
found
to
drawn
which bear more directly upon his doctrine of vim movens and the structure of the universe. He
8,
swpra.
lys, therefore,
:
Phys.
iv.
8 the movements of dies (fire, earth, &c.) ivov on itrri ti i t6tos, il ex ei T '"" Sii/cfuv (a
:
real significance). 8 ^ee p. 429, n. 5, supra. 4 Phys. iv. 5, 212, b, 4. 5 Phys. iv. 11, 219, b, 5. De Ccelo, i. 9 see p. 436,
;
ri.
3, nvjird,
and
p. 3&.", u. 6.
ARISTOTLE
meaning of coexistence
in space, of contact,
He
and the same object He in the same relation at one and the same time. 3 asks what constitutes uniformity of motion and its opposite 4 in what cases two movements, or movement and repose, may be said to be opposed to each other
is,
how
ment
ad infinitum? that time and space in this respect correspond, and that in reality it is only with
1 S,uo ixkv olv Phys. v. 3 \4yerai tout' eivtu Hark t6ttov, bffa
:
x u P^ s
Be
5e fila Klvrjffis
7]
Ty
afcpa aua,
fi6vov 6vros
fjiTiSky
ical
fiera6 iffri
tuv
iv TauT^J yevet
[join with
.
api8fi$, the latter is the case when not only the thing moved and the kind of its motion (&\Wa><m, <popa, Sec, together with their special varieties) but also the time is the same, 228, a, 20 t^v
:
TauT^J]
ou
itpe^rjs
iffriv.
tc air\ws
li ia. 1 5 6
fjilav \K\viiffiv]
. . .
avdytcrj teal
ei
ffvvexV *ivat
al
cwe^s,
....
\eya
8'
elvai
(fupe^es
Ibid, b, 15 sqq.
[continuous], oto rabro yhtfrai teal ev to kicaTepou irepas ols airTovrai. In the awexes, therefore, there must be unity as well as contact. On a<pi) cf. Gen. et dorr. i. 6, 323, a, 3. 2 Phys. v. 4 init. motion is either yevet or eXSti or airX&s ilia. For other senses in which motion is said to be ' one,' see ibid. 228, b, 11 sqq. Cf. vii. 1, 4, pp. 125, 139,
:
Phys.
v. 5, 6.
vi. 1 sq.
; see p. 430, n. indivisible unit of space and time (the point and the moment) is therefore (as is shown Be An. iii. 6, 430, b. 17 sqq.) never found existing actually and independently as a x wP laT ^ v y k> lt only as contained potentially in
Ibid. 2, supra.
The
known
PHYSICS
inite
439
do
raversed in the
3
infinite
be whereas spaces are only same sense which the time of motion of the the he
infinite
said
to
in
'
establishes
indivisibility
iresent
He
very
attains
completion in an indivisible
of
its
moment
beginning
is
never
He shows that
and
is
infinite
time or an
move
ay distance at
ipply
all
in a finite time. 5
These conclusions
to prove that
inally,
by asking
movement
of infinite
Phys. vi. 2, 233, a, 13 sqq. Ibid. c. 3, and again c. 8, lere he adds in the transition jm motion to rest, the motion its as long as the transition its j while, therefore, a thing is ming to rest, it is moving still, 3 Ibid. c. 4 (cf. also p. 430,n. 2). rtion according to this passage divisible in a double sense st in respect of the time occuid, and secondly in respect of
2
: :
and
p. 311,
We see from
a,
m. 231,
b,
'
ARISTOTLE
e necessity of a
primum
it
there
is
iginning or end,
)t
le
and the same cannot continue without a break. 4 same argument proves that only circular motion
If all movemust be either in a straight line, or rcular, or mixed, 5 a mixed movement could only be of Ldless duration and continuous if both the others
iswers all the necessary requirements.
ent in space
uld.
is
ts
Movement
points
in
straight
line
cannot
have
movement G
and though
terminal
at
which
it
it
ceases,
may be
infinitely often
enables
it
to
move
Phjs.
viii.
1-6
7
;
see p.
387
'
IMd. 261,
a,
31 sqq.
supra.
2
Phys.
viii.
!'.
3 Generation from not-being being destruction from being not-being increase from less greater decrease from greater less alteration from one state another, e.g. from water to
;
forms of moin this division reckon all curvesexceptthecircle. e An infinite one is impossible, not only in itself (see p. 430, n. 2,
tion
Among mixed
we must
>am.
supra) but also because the world is not infinite. ' All this is explained at length, Phys. viii. 8, 261, a, 27263. b, 3, 264, a, 7 sqq. c. 9 init.
PHYSICS
without changing
sure for
all
441
1
its
place as a whole.
It is the
mea-
is entirely
uniform,
whereas in rectilinear
movement
rapidity increases in
How
of the
primum mouens
we have
already shown.
is,
as the
most primitive kind of change on which all others are dependent, Aristotle cannot agree with the mechanical
theory of physics in merging
all
Three
Is there a qualitative
?
between
sorts of
matter
Is there a quali-
Is there such a
com-
Phys.
viii.
9,
265, b, 1
of.
p. 398, i.
-
motions
bodies: in other words, the downward motion of heavy, and the upward motion, of light bodies. With forcible movements the opposite is the case. 3 Physs. viii. 9, 265, b, 8 sqq. * The seventh book of the Physics is passed over in the
of elementary
that the latter must move along with the motion, c. 3 goes on to show that dWoiwtris concerns only
the sensible qualities of things; c. i inquires in what case two movements are commensurable, and c. 5 finally proves that the same force moves half the mass in the same time twice as far, in half the time the same distance as the whole likewise that the same mass is moved, by the same force, in the same time, the same distance, in half the time half the distance, while half the mass is moved by half the force the same distance on the other hand, it does not follow that twice the mass is moved by the same force half as far as half the mass, or the same mass by half the force half as far as by the whole force for the force may not perhaps be able to move it at all. The same is true of the other kinds of change.
; ;
ARISTOTLE
ties ?
bions,
The Atomists answered all three of these Anaxagoras and Empedocles at least the
third, in the negative.
id
elf
and the
Aristotle feels
obliged to answer
all affirmatively,
combating
>wn system.
to admit,
and
Yet
LSt
which we have
to
guard
man who
occupies one
e first places
is
among
In order to form
his
ripartial
judgment of
and to appreciate
that
we
tota
of observation which
we have
to so boundless
:tent at
our command.
He
tnd
3
naked whose experiments were confined to a few and for the most part very unreliable empirical
did not extend beyond the reach of the
ises.
Of
all
our
mathematical,
ences
(Arist.
optical,
and
:.
Kuno
sq.,
Fischbe, Franz
'.
sq.) to Aristotle's
ing heat.
and Meyer's
refer-
EHFSICS
443
Chemical analysis, correct meafor some few others. surements and weights, and a thorough application of
The
attractive
nomena, the conditions of chemical combination, pressure of air and its effects, the nature of light, heat, combustion, &c. in short, all the facts on which the
physical theories of
modern
if
science are
It
based, were
would have
own
day. 1
None
is
and consider
only original
this view, not
differences of shape
Both deny qualitative variety in matter, and magnitude as the and real distinction. Aristotle opposes
it
merely because
mathematics, because
superficies,
1
it
which brings us
262 sq.
2
Cf. supra, p.
Cf.
270
sq.
i
'
ARISTOTLE
indivisible lines
,
'
Again
fill
it
he allows no vacuum. 4
impossible
are the
Nor
which beset
this theory
ew
hich
me ? 6
Le
And
oduced ? Fire would have to become heavier and cend more slowly in proportion to its bulk much r would be heavier than a little water. 7 Again, while jperience shows that all the elements are mutually
;
diffi-
ilties
Plato, indeed, and Xenocraactually adopted this assumpin ; cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 807, 2 ad fin. 868. 2 Be Ccelo, iii. 1, 299, a, 6, 300, Cf. Gen. et 7, c. 7, 306, a, 23. <rr. ii. 1, 329, a,, 21 since the iSni) 9\n of the Timceiit is not
1
Ibid.
c.
Ph.
d.
Gr. pt.
i.
must read rA. ffiifiara raw emweSav, the gen. ItrnriSav being governed by ir\^flei) cf. the corresponding objection to the Pythagoreans, p.
;
311, n. 5, 6 supra.
Casio,
:
Be
7,
'
Be
c. 5,
312, b, 20 sqq.
they according to Plato and smocritus) seeing that when 3 or water is divided, each part again fire or water Whereas e parts of a ball or pyramid
3
how we are to interpret these objections in the month of Aristotle. B Be Casio, iii. 7, 306, a, 1 sqq. Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 676, 1, 2.
ready been shown
PHYSICS
445
it is
and that
as easy to think of
a superimposition of surfaces
as of the
composition
assumed by Plato. 2
water
and
earth,
is
In the
qualities
last
hypotheses of Plato?
fire
was formed of globes, on account of its mobility and disruptive force Plato thought it was made of pyramids,
;
its
move
in their
therefore
The Atomic theory of Democritus and Leucippus is him with more respect 6 but he holds that
Ibid.
sq.
1.
20
cf.
Plato, Tim.
56
D
2 3 4
which
Ccelo, iii. 1, 299, b, 23.
c. 8,
it
De
Ibid.
306, b,
9.
Ibid. 306, b, 29 sqq., where farther objected that balls and pyramids are easily moved only in a circle, whereas tire has an upward movement. Again, if to it is its corners that give
it is
heat-producing power, all elementary bodies must likewise produce heat as well as everything that has mathematical shape, for they all have coiners. Fire changes things which it
tire its
balls or pyramids. Fire separates only dissimilars, whereas it unites similars. Further, if heat be united to a particular shape, so also must cold. 5 Pkoclus at a later date defended it in a, separate treatise against his attacks Simpl., Sohol. in Ar. 515, a, 4. Cf. the discussion in Gen. et Corr.i. 2,315, b, 30 sqq., the chief sentences of which are cited in
;
Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 771, 4 also, on the Platonic theory, cf. De
;
a pyramid or a
Ccelo,
iii.
7, 306, a, 5 sqq.
ARISTOTLE
so is far from
may
homo-
In the first place, it is open to all the which beset the hypothesis of indivisible Next, as in the case of Plato, it is clear that
we
attribute a distinct
ady
not inclined
dmit an
shape among
atoms
the elementary atoms are to be distheir size, one element could not be
;uished only
by
If
all
If they are
composed of heterogeneous
;erials,
his circumstance,
then they would influence one another while in conSee, besides p. 306, the statequoted p. 430. n. 2, all of h are more or less directly
collision. It is certainly hard to how a cohesive body could be constituted of such atoms. The
;s
see
means which Democritus adopted for securing this end by attributing corners and hooks to atoms, by which they may hang on to
one another (Zbll. Ph.
i.
When,
for
796,
2,
798,
4),
mce, he shows that atoms J not cohere in a solid body, he t speaking of the atoms of 3rn physics, which attract and one another, are held in librium,&c.,inmanydifferent but of the atoms of Democriwhich act upon one another mechanically by pressure or
[
but appear to Aristotle, as they appeared (according to Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 121) to his follower
Strato, fantastic
a s
4
and absurd.
See
Seep. 331
s,
De
Ccelo,
4,
303, a 24 sqq.
Cf. p. 306, n. 6.
FHYSICS
ict,
r
447
1
In the same what the Atomists deny. ay a reciprocal influence would exist between them were like warmth, for instance "certain qualities
which
is
it
is,
however, equally
properties. 2
suppose them
endowed with
definite
Lgain, there is
nd
ae
invisible
destroyed:
if
they
either inside
them
they
nd
different
from what
is
moved
4
in which case
same
object.
hings.
midal in
totle,
fire spherical,
Ari-
of gravity.
all
Democritus,
bodies mutually
phere they
le inequality in the rate of their descent is Gen. et Corr. i. 8, 326, a, to which, however, it ight be replied that they refuse unite because they are not juid but solid bodies. ' Ibid. 326, a, 1-24.
1
caused by
Ibid. 326, b,
2.
sqq.,
"
p.
both views alike and on the same grounds. Cf. alsq Gen, et Corr
j. 8,
326, a, 3.
4 48
ARISTOTLE
air,
vapour, &c.
all
the atoms
fall
downwards
in the void, but that the greater fall quicker than the
For the same reason, he held that the weight of composite bodies, supposing their circumference equal,
corresponds to their magnitude after subtraction of the
empty
interstices. 1
is
Aristotle demonstrates
:
that this
no above or beneath in and consequently no natural tendency infinite space, downwards all bodies must fall with equal rapidity in
hypothesis
false
there
is
which he saw to be implied in the Atomic hypothesis, but the truth of which Democritus was as far from recognising as he was.
to be facts,
tive,
it
On
ancient science.
It is true, as
but this
Cf.
779
sq.,
real advance upon the atomic theory, but only as a means .of
Seep. 307,
n. 4,
PHYSICS
appears to him so inconceivable that he considers
sufficient
449
it
ground
space. 1
must
all
itself light
and by virtue
own nature
disposed to
else.
size,
Although
it
may
would necessarily be heavier than a small quantity of earth or water. This, however, he thinks impossible, 2
and he says
it
is
manifest
when we
consider
a phenomenon
on the hypoIf gravity
which seems
thesis of absolute
homogeneity in matter.
would be heavier than a small one of denser, and If, on the contrary, it is said that the more vacuum a body contains the lighter
terial
Cf..PAys.iv.8,216,a, 13:
p'oTT^y
opSa-
ravr6v
HKtjv,
|UJ/
exovra $ &<*-
koX pffi
f)
ra\\a dfioius
&vw, aAA'
fi
v<rrepl(ov
4it6\i&6p.epov, koI
iroWa
ra
/jLeyedq irphs
a\\T\\a.
&are Kal
Sta
&AA.' aSvvarov.
riva yap aWlav olffQ^fferai Barrow, iv /xiv yap rols irK^pefftv ^| avdyKi)s
'
Barrov yap SiatpeT rjj Jcr^ui' rb pLti(ov laoraxv Spa n6.vr %arat
.
[in
a vacuum].
2
i\\' aSuvarov.
:
[as
of
ro"\
r&v
^tcpa bKiywv [small atoms] el Se p.syd\wv Qapvrepa elvai. rovro carat, (rvfifi^fferat iro\bv aepa Kal iro\ii trvp vSaros elvai rovro 5' fraptirspa Kal yqs bKiyris. iarlv aSivarov. Cf. previous n. Ibid. c. 5, 312, b, 20 sqq. (where, however, in 1. 32 we must read eiy Si Sio, rh. /iera^ii irus tarai iroiovvra, &c, as Prantl does in his translation, though not in his
text).
r$
fity46et Siatptpivroiv
avayKaiov
VOL.
I.
G G
450
it is, it
AMSTOTLE
may
be answered that a great mass of denser and vacuum than a small\
sort.
body corresponded to the proportion between its bulk and the empty interstices, ever so great a lump of gold or lead might sink no faster, and ever so great a bulk of fire rise no faster, than the smallest quantity of the same
stuff.
He
concludes that
we
cir-
'
when
we
by the
Not only
formation.
Unless we admit
this,
we must
explain
(with
the
apparent transmutation of
matter
either
3
.
We have already
latter
how
far Aristotle is
by Plato. On the other hand, were we to imagine that one and the same corporeal substance, like wax, assumed first one and then another elementary form, and that this metamorphosis was in
solution as maintained
Aristotle here follows Plato's view see Zkll. Ph. d. Gr. i. 678 sq. Strato, on the other hand, returned to that of Democritus
1
; ;
312, b, 20 sqq.
XX.
308, a, 21 sqq. 309,
P.
Hi sqq.
Be. Coelo,
PHYSICS
451
As
to the theory of
Atomists,
it is
Aristotle thinks
in the
first place, at
variance
Experience shows
alter.
is
One substance
formed of several.
When water
phenomenon is not,
and order of the parts, nor has a mere separation or combination of materials taken place, but, while the substance remains the same, certain of its qualities have
changed. 4
is
made from
air,
a body
air,
Conversely,
when
air is
all
produced
Be
Casio,
iii.
305, b, 28
is
that underlies
the elements
The meaning
that
we may suppose
the ele-
alike (as was actually done by Philolaus, cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr.
i.
ments formed of atoms of a definite shape earth of cubical, fire of quadrilateral, atoms without adopting Plato's view of the constitutionof these bodies, and that the conversion of one element into another may be explained, not as its resolution into its primal surfaces and the combination of these into a new form, but as a transformation of the material
376
sq.).
By
thus conceiving
of the
we should involve ourselves in the difficulty already mentioned, p. 444, n. 3. 2 See p. 430, n. 2, supra. * Gen. et Corr. i. 1, 314, b, 10 sqq. Be Casio, iii. 7, 305, b, 1.
divisible,
Metaph. i. 4 Gen.
sqq.
8,
989,
a,
i.
22 sqq.
9,
et Corr.
327, a, 14
452
ARIST6TLE
so large
even bursts
How
is this
to be explained
on the hypo-
thesis that it
new
added to
it,
but
all
come
into existence
is
and perish
are
fire is
How
we
to conceive of such
formation
at
There must be
definite points
all
Becom-
we should be
whether absolutely
seen, 4 or such
;
we have already
as above, 305, b, view of gravity precludes the admission that the greater weight of water as comCailo,
De
5 sqq.
Aristotle's
is
due merely
to its greater density. The atomists of that time could not possibly explain the expansion of fluids into steam as the result of
increased repulsion in the atoms at least the atoms of Democritus are certainly incapable of internal change. Empedocles and Anaxagoras,( with
1.
457
iii.
sq.
'
whom
Aristotle, Hid.
1,
16 sqq.,
first
446, n.
; :
PHYSICS
as are divisible
for
453
why
when
larger
No more
can
1
it
natural locality, and hence would be a mathematical and not a physical body, and would not exist in space.
Hence
we
and
as
is
so
and
Lastly,
how
are
we
to
imagine the
'
Be
Casio,
iii. 7,
305, a,
lf>
Be
Ccelo,
iii.
6.
Be
Ccelo,
iii.
4,
303,
a 24,
4, 187, b,
7, 305, b,
where the words vvo\ei\fiet y&p ciei, Sec, must mean 'since the larger atoms would fail to obtain
release,' so that in water, for ex-
ample, a residuum would be left which could not be turned into air.
ARISTOTLE
3d with, since bodies only require to
be
divisible,
but
it really
of
them which
interpenetrate by
not do so either. 1
y
movement
Where
the
mere process of
Aristotle
assumed
operation of real
and
he extended
it
which he understands
action
and passion
'
The
itions of
such transformation, as of
movement,
is
illy
is
i
When two things meet, of which one what the other is potentially, then, so far
is
as
3
Gen. et Corr. i. 8, 326, b, 69, 327, a, 7 sqq. Gen. et Corr. i. 6, 323, a, is likewise the movens motum, partly iijwnobile, 7 must be true also of the Kal yap rb kivovv iroietv ri Kal rb iroiovv Kivetv. oil pAjv Siatf>(pu ye Kal Set Siopifeiv i otiv re itav rb klvovv iroietv, rb iroiovv avri&ifffofiev rep wri. rovro 8' oh j) KiVrjtris
>
voie'iv iariv.
s
Tbid.
c.
9 init.
riva 8e rp6irov
irlaxeiv, Xeyw)j.ev \a06vres apxh" r)]V iroWdtcis i\fr\jxhi\v ei ydp eon rb /lev Suva/let t<S 8' ivre\exea TomuToy, iretpvKev oil ry fiiv rrj b" oil irdaxeiv, iA\i navrji Ka8'
/col
.
'oaov itrrl
roiovrov,
ijrrov
5e
Kal
ical
/iaWov $ roiovrov
Jjrrov.
p.a\\6i> iari
PHYSICS
455
all
the other. 1
movement,
Where one
it
possible
where both
partly-
inevitable. 2
since of things
which belong
colour, for
and a
is
since
change
patient
Hence the agent and the must be generically similar, but specifically different and so the old moot point as to whether likes or unlikes influence each other is decided by the law
in
it
an opposite condition.
Hence
It has
n. 3, supra. 5 Gen. et Corr. Hid. 324, a, 9 Kal eihoyov <j8jj t<S ts itup 5i6
:
movens.
Ibid. 327, a, 1, c. 8, 326, b, Lcmgit. Vit. 3, 465, b, 15. Cf. p. 378 sq. supra. 3 Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 323, b, 1 5324, a, 14, with which cf. the quotations on p. 340 sqq.
1.
*
2
deppaivetv
Kal
Kal
to tyvxpbv
^X lv
S\as rb ttoihitikov dfioiovp eavr<p to irdffxov t6 re yap iroiovv Kal to iraaxov evavria iffrl, Kal r\ yeveais els ToivavTiov. liar' av&yicn to irdurxov els to iroiovv ixeTafia'Weiv o&Vw yap %(nat eh TovvavTlov t\
Like
all evavTia.
Bee
p. 224,
yeveais.
ARISTOTLE
patient
is
'
matter,' to
which a
1
terminate 'form
far as
I'm, it
it
is
In
is
must
capable of receiving
ent
is
similar in kind.
If the
But
:
this
for as
primum movens
is
unmoved,
power
on the contrary, the lowest force that acts is material, and its operation
a iraQos
on
its
own
part. 3
The
by
this
why
all
tive influence
it occasions, is to
is
subject in
% e.
actuality,
lints,
to change,
offers
and being
nowhere
4 tive force.
The question about the mixture of materials must judged from the same points of view. A mixture 5 a combination of two or more materials, 6 in which
1
with that which he expresses the passage quoted p. 454, n. 3, der the form of potentiality
al
supra. For the above, see Gen. et Con: ibid, from 324, a, 16 to the end of the chapter ; and cf. c. 10,
n. 2,
s
d actuality.
Ibid. 324, b, 6 qv \eyo)iv S/ioius
r
328, a, 17.
:
tV
&>s
fiev
yhp
el-new tJ;x
$iv eivai
twv
favTiKeifievav dtrore-
n.
iovv,
nds to the
;
According to Gen.
et
Corr.
i.
10.
e
PHYSICS
either the one is
457
merged
formed which
it
is
ofjLooo/jjSpss.
In other words,
consists neither
the absorption of one sort of matter into another, nor a merely mechanical junction or interminglement of
oth, 3
but in
chemical combination.
When
two
laterials are
They
4
new
material,
wherein
they
it.
Such a
8'
relation,
'
however, only
a,
sqq. 328, a, 19 sqq., that only le union of substances(x<<'pia'Ta), )t that of qualities or of the rm with the matter or of the
Ibid.
tie?
328,
10:
Ti,
<papev
imaterial efficient cause with 3 passive object, can be called a ixture (piis). To us this seems
according to 991, a, 14 (cf. ELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 890, n. 4, id ibid. i. 881 sqq.) he had me occasion to make this rervation. That the substances, oreover, which are mixed can ily be of a material nature is If -evident for the incorporeal
iperiiuous
'etaph.
i.
;
but
9,
to fjiix9ev dfioiofiepes elval [or as it is previously expressed : eei tou avrbv \6yov tw ij\a) to fioptov] KaX tiHrnep Tiv SSarus to fiepos u'5wp, oBtw koI too Kpa94vros. On the dp.oioy.eph see the end of Ch. IX. infra, and cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr.
elnep
jue/xixtfcu
i.
879, n.
3
2.
Sui/fleo-ir,
(ibid. 328,
a,
xiv. 6, 1092, a, 24, 26) from M'I's or upaais. In Metaph. vii. 2, 1042, b, 16 aivris is further distinguished as the class notion
airafles.
1
As happens
b,
in
et
it
the
Corr.
is
case
i.
burning (Gen.
7,
9,
under which Kpacris comes. 4 As Anaxagoras, the Atomists and, later, Epicurus supposed.
5
10),
where
not a
Ibid. 327, b, 22
Bvvd/iei
eVe!
5' <?<tt!
ixture that takes place, but the odaction of fire and the deruction of wood, or, in other >rds, the change of wood into The same is true of nutrie. >n, and generally of all cases in
lich
to
t&
KaX
fl)]
elvai,
ivepyelq
fieir
eTepov avrwy,
airep
yeyovSros
en
etcarepov
f/aav
y.ixBT\vai
KaX
o'jk
7]
airoAwAoVa
Siva/ats
....
(rtb^eraL
ya,p
sqq.).
;
not a case of
can
1.
but a\\ola<ns.
be
458
ARISTOTLE
when
the materials brought together are
occurs
'
;
mutuand when,
in
its qualities
many
Where
these con-
manner that both, while combining, change at the This combination, attended by the same moment.
simultaneous transmutation of the materials combined,
is
mixture. 3
Aristotle
is
mechanical physicists.
is far
He
goes further,
from being
is
satisfied
with that
confined to material
mediate
merely
tions of
phenomena.
final
causes
plete mixture of this kind (to irdvTT) fiefiixBai, De Sensu, a 3, 440, b, 11), as distinguished from a mere compound of smallest parts was called t\ 8Y ohov Kpcuris. 1 This is the case when their material is of the same kind but their qualities are of an opposite character ; ibid. 328, a, 19 sqq. 31 ; cf, p. 454, supra. s Ibid. 328, a, 18 towards the end of the a, where the above is thus expressed mixture takes place iire'iirep itrrlv ?j>m toiouto oTa
:
irafljjTiK<
re
inr'
aAA^Awy
icol
eii6pi-
<rra
zeal
eiSiaipera [according to
what Aristotle says, ibid. 328, b, these two coincide with one
another], touto yhp otr
avdynri
fisfuy/iiva
eTvoi,
otf-r'
en
rairi.
cmhws
jxi^iv
tV
[the previously mentioned apparent mixture] a.W eori /ukt6v /iev 6 tin tb6punov %v ttaSi^uAv j?
ko! toijjtikoi' a! -roioittp /uiktoV.
3
Ibid. 328, b, 22
t\
5e yw|is
ruv
fiiKTWv
aWoiwOh'Tuv
evaxris.
PHYSICS
459
above material necessity, the design of the universe above the physical explanations of nature, the teleological.
Our researches up
If Nature
is
End.
has
its
determined.'
End.
If everything which
Final Cause, 3
and movement
the
'
in general
Ari-
stotle
human
action
directed
Hence while combating the theory of an anima mundi in the form in which it had been held by Plato, he adopts himself a similar view. 5 He
towards an end.
1
any motion at
all.
It
would be
p. 462, n. 2.
3
p. 379, n. 1. i. 3, 406, b, 25 sqq. ; ii. 1, 284, a, 27 Metapk. xii. 6, 1071, b, 37. sqq. Aristotle rejects this theory in
5
See See
p. 404, p. 383,
and and
p. 396, n. 3.
Be An. Be Ccclo,
inconsistent with its perfect happiness that it should be intermixed with the body of the world and, burdened with the latter, should have unintermittently to produce, like an Ixion with bis wheel, a, motion which
the first place because he cannot regard the soul as in any sense a iiigtum and therefore not even as tavrb kuiovv (see the beginning of Ch. X. infra). He further objects that Plato conceives of the soul of the world as something extended in space. But it would be impossible to suppose that its thought
had no affinity with its nature and which therefore involved exertion. Nor, indeed, is it shown
bow
it produces it. Lastly, the soul cannot be apxh as asserted in the Pluedrus, if, according to the Timieus, it comes into existence only with the world.
460
refers not only the
ARISTOTLE
movement
of the outermost sphere,
which communicates
moved by them
human
He
life
Every
vital activity is
we
shall see, 4
Hence
follows that
1
Cf. p. 373 sq. and see the section in tlie next chapter concerning the Spheres. Aristotle is so far justified from his own point of view in treating both the world as a whole, and its individual parts as animated with life, as he does also Be Cmlo, ii. 12 followed
by Eudemus (Fr. 76
Phys. 283 m. Lelne d Ar. v.
:
b,
Simpl.
cf.
d.
5e yeyoj/e irore kIvtj(Tis ouk nficru Trp6repov, Kal <p6epeTai ird\iv oUtus
mtm, in Fiehte s Ztschr f. Phil. lx. 3 1 ). God is a part of the universe in the same sense in which reason is a part of the man and of the same nature is the relation of the spheral spirits to their spheres. Each of these spirits, however, animates only the sphere which it moves and the primvm movens only the irparos oipav6s. While the movement of the latter, indeed, extends to all the other spheres, yet in their case it is
;
% oSr' eyevero fy Kal ael corai, Kal tout' aBdvarov Kal arraugtov virtipxei toTs oltrtj/, oiov wfj ris
jUTfBei/,
&ffTG KivelfrOai
ofre (pQelperai,
aW
ael
oiitra
rots
<p6o~et
(rvvetrrato'i irafftv.
In these words Aristotle seems to have in mind the passage from Heraclitus, quoted Zell. Ph. d.
Gr.
3
i.
586, 2.
iii. 11, 762, a, 18: 5' iv yfj Kal eV vypoi ra $a Kal tu cpvra 5ia to eV tISup yy 8' vSari iri/eu^a, eV. vTrdpXtsw, iv Se
Gen. An.
yiverai
ph
Toiircp
iravTl
6ip[t,6Tt[Ta
ij/vx'kIiv,
something communicated from without like the motion of the driver on a carriage their own proper motion, on the other hand,
1
^ux^ s
tivai
At the commencement of
Chap. X. infra.
PHYSICS
461
and deducing its movement from the incorporeal forms which govern all material change and shape, Aristotle is driven, as was Plato on similar grounds, to adopt of 2 God and necessity a teleological theory of nature.
1
nature
always
strives, as far as
;
perfection
nothing
;
is
plete in her
of her productions
we may
and
far
more
own purpose
it
is,
them repay
1
investigation. 4
d.
642
rStv
sqq.
rrr/pdifiao'i
With what follows, of. Eittee's exhaustive treatment of the whole subject, iii. 213 sqq. 265 sqq.
t)
Gen. et Corr. 10, 33o, b, 27 : eV arcaatv ael rov fieKriovos opeyeaBat tpafaev rtyv
Casio, i. 4 fin. 6 Bebs Kal ouSev fidrrii/ trotovtrit/. ii. b, 26, 290, a, 31 ouk 8, 289, cctip eV rots tputrei rb &>s %rv\*v
:
De
tpvtrts
Be Vita et M. c. 4, 469, 28 rfyv <pvo"ii> dpufiey 4v iraffiv 4k ruv Suvaruv trotovaav rb KahKto-rov. Gen. An. ii. 6, 744, b, 36
<pvoiv.
a,
r)
....
c.
1
oifdep
1,
Ingr. An.
ovBev
a\6yws ouSe
a,
:
288, t) cpvtris ael iroiei rtav eV5e2 XPlilvwv rb Pdhrurrov. Polit. i. et oZv t) <pvfns 8, 1256, b, 20 are\es nolti M^Te firfBev fifae
fiariji/ irote?.
c. 5,
/uLttiv.
Part. Ah.
5'
19
t)
fiaWov
o. 4, 739, b, 19. 704. b, 15 r) tyiais aAA.' ael 4k ruv ej/Sexop.ei/wi' rfj oiiaio. irepl eKaffrov yevos <$ov rb fapurrov * SioVep ei f}4\rtov w5I, ourws Kal e^ei Kara tphaiv. Even in the most insignificant prod acts of nature we may perceive the effort after perfec-
Likewise
c. 2,
iroiet \i.6.rt\v
c.
tion of. foil. n. and Mh. JV. x. taws Se Kal 4v rots 2, 1173, a, i <pav\0LS 4ffri ri tpvaiKbv ayaBbv Kpetrrov t) Ka6' aura, o 4$ erat rov oiKeiov 070805. vii. 14, 1153, b, 38
;
Trout irepiepyov.
De An.
<piais /u?*te
iii.
9,
432, b,
21
r)
7roieI
Part. An.
i.
5,
645, a, 15
ARISTOTLE
shows, is Form, but the form of everything is deterned by the function for which it is designed. All icoming has its goal, and the terminal point of all )tion is also its end or object. 2 This pursuit of fixed
1
3igns in nature
3
is
It is impossible
to ascribe to chance
what
He
lays
especial
bodies, the
upon human
action, inas-
8ei
i
oijffTIS
0T(
tyiv.
trri
yhp
tois' '<pvaiKOts
As Heraclibade the strangers welcome the bakery where they found a, saying that God was there
ti SavfiaffT6v.
D,
1
ovrw Kal
eKatrrov
irpds t-^v
tuv
&W
firr]0~iv
irpotrUvat
teAos TTJS KlV^ffCUS, TOVTO %<TX a ~ tov Kal to oi 'ivexa. c. 8, 199, a, 8 iv Scots t4\os eVt/ ti, tovtov eveKa KparTerai to irpSTepov Kal to i<pens, &c. Ibid. 1. 30, see p. 356, supra. Part. An. i. 1, 641, b, 23 iravTaxou Sk Kiyofiev TtJSe Tovfie ej/e/ca, 8xou av (paivrjTai reAos ti
: :
fify
trpbs
&
7]
Ka\ov. rd [it) tvx^vtus &AA' eVe/ca rivos rots tt}s (ptiffeas epyois icrl Kal iiffTa o5 5' eVe/ca o-vveffTTjKev yiyove TeAous t^v tov KaKov lav elK-qcpcv. (Of. 0. 1, cited previous- n.) Cf also Meteor, iv. 12, 300, $.Travra 5' itnlv upto'fj.iva 10 epytp to p.\v yap bvvafxtva uv t<J aitTtov epyov o.\tj9us itnlp era, olov 6 otp8a\fi6s [sc. a\7]9ws <a\)i.ds io-Tiv] el 6pq, t6 Be /j,^
os Tivbs
i
fjLiro5i(ovT0S f
&<TTe
elvat
tpavepbv
OTl
b,
IffTl
Ti
TOIOVTOV,
&
ii.
5^
1,
Kal
193, 7] Aeyopevri as yiveo-is [see Metaph. v. i init.~] bb6s iffTtv is <pvmv r\ . &pa
(toAoSjucy (pictv.
Phys.
12
T)
(pio-is
/j-op<ph
cpvins.
De An.
ii.
4,
415,
b,
16
3
7ro(e?,
wairep yap 6 vovs eVek( tov Tbv abrbv Tp6irov Kal 7j tpvvis.
b, 15,
28 26
Phys. ii. 8, 198, b, 34, 199, 23 Pari. An. iii. 2, 663, b, Gen. An. i. 19, 727, b, 29, cf
;
;
Phys.
ii.
2, 194, a,
tvtKo.
28
i)
5e
De Cmlo, ii. 8, 289, b, ouk iaTiv iv toIs (piffei Tb iis Tvx*v, ou5e Tb TravTaxov Kal iracrtv vtrdpxop t6 airb tvxtjs.
p. 362, n. 5
:
is
t4\os Kal ov
uv yap
PHYSICS
much, that
is
463
pletion of nature,
If
we must admit
large,
where the order is more strict, and the regularity more unbroken. Whence, indeed, could the laws which govern the former have sprung except from the latter ? 2
Consequently the discovery of
first
final
It
must
to the whole
not
to the
But
if it is
suggested that, in
rov avrofidrov roiovev
1 Phys. ii. 8, 198, b, 32-199, cUAA b, 26, cf. viii. 1, 252, a, 11 fjL$]P ovSev ye UraKrov ruv tpvffei /cat
:
rov
ffvffrrivai,
d.
Kara
iraeri
tpvffiv
'
Tafews.
;
drtovv. (palverat.
Cf
650,
Ph.
Gr.
i.
579,
1.
b,
25
Iletaph. xii. 10, xiv. 3; see p. 391, d. 2, supra. 1 Part. An. i. 1, 641, b, 12: eveKti rov irotel trdvra. (pvffis 7] tpaiverat' yap, Siffirep iv rots Te^yaarots
aiirols
iffrlv
t)
/*a\Kov Se
T)
rivos
eveKa'
atriov
yap rovro
rexyt],
roiavri],
oiirws
ev
rts
rots
rrpdyfiaffw
&\\7]
much as Nature materials with a thing that is to dAA' ovx aSrri rov
et
apxh
Kal
aWia
%v txofiev
Con:
ii.
9,
re\ovs. 335, b, 29 it
tyvxpbv
nadairep [as well as] rb 8epfj.bv teal e/c rov iravr6s. Stb fiaWoy
etKos rbv ovpavbv yeyepyjo-Bai inrb rotavrns airias, ei yeyove, Kal tlvo.i Bia Toiai>T7]v alriav ft-aWov t) ra ftpa to Qvyrd rb yovv rerayfxevov Kal rb foptajievov tro\v fiaWov
'
(paiverai
yfias,
6TUX e
ovpaviots
rb
a\\or'
&Wus
5'
Kal
ruv
[lev
C4 av tKaffrov
yeveffBat,
(pvtret (patrlv
eivai Kal
rbv
ovpavbv
to give the causes of a thing. Matter is merely the motum, the rnovens in the province both of nature and art is something quite different the Kvpioirepa airia is the form. Materialistic physics, instead of giving us the real causes, can tell us only of implements of production as if one in answer to the question ' ,Who saws the wood 1 were to reply,
sufficient
; : '
464
ARISTOTLE
reasonable
Even
Art, he
reflect,
it is
artist unconsciously.
Moreover,
we
mind
We
to
first
immanent
design,
point
so
essential
Aristotle's
The
saw.'
and
d.
p. 307, n.
Gr. pt. i. 788, 1, 3, 893, 2, on the neglect of final causes in ancient physics. Part. An. i.
1,
039, b, 14
tpaiverai Se Trpdrrj
twos
'
5'
\6yos
iv rots
Te
rots
/caret
t4xvv v
iv
<ft6o~ei
o-vvsaTT\K6a~iv.
Ibid. c. 5, 645-, a, 30: in the investigation of the animal organism the question is, not of the individual parts or the matter, but of the %\ri \i.op<tft\, of the
<rw0e<ns
1
lEVtOTl TO tvttta TOV, Kal iv (pvoti. Aristotle has here in view the art that has become a fixed habit and second nature in the artist. Such art he conceives of, however, not as belonging to the artist, but as inherent in 'Art' itself, seeing that the creative principle resides, not in theartist, but in the artistic conception which operates in him, and which Aristotle therefore identifies with
the
Tf'x>"j itself
cf.
the passages
and Gen.
oca yap
7roie?
'
et Corr.
i.
7,
324,
tj
and the
ii.
i*d\
o\i\ ovo-ia.
:
34
/ii)
%xa
t)]v airiiv
Phys. tiw Se to
8,
ii\T)V,
airadrj
tivTa,
olov
laTptlcl]
avT^j
yiveadai, lav
/j.i]
to kivovv
operative
emphasis on
Te%vri ov
iv
f$o
ri
uAeuf tou
t\
Kal yap
iv Trj
el ivrjv
t$
|ii\<p
vaurrrjyuch, dfioitcs av
#{Tt' t
cf.
Gen.
<pVOSL iirolei
TiX v V
An.
ii.
G,
744, b, 21.
PHYSICS
lis
465
mastery in nature
for,
mot be entirely overcome by form. We have alvn (p. 359 sqq.) that Aristotle finds in matter the rk of chance and blind natural necessity. Both
timately coincide, since chance
es not
is
precisely that
happen as the fulfiment of some design, raduced by the way, in consequence of the of intervening causes which are indispensable ainment of a further end. This characteristic
existence renders
it
produces
l
many
mere necessity
yet she
still
endeavours as
rible to
make
em-
same
rigour, but
must take
)unt
F
the
disturbances 'introduced
and
feeling
satisfied
when her
itions
361, n. An. ii.
i/ios
6,
supra. 744, b, 16
f)
aya8bs, xa\
rfojflex ^{
<pvirts
Wetv
3
&v eon
XPV<rr6v.
and nutrition of animal orgarisms Gen. An. ii. 4, 738, a, 3r sqq., iii. 2, 663, b, 31. Cf also p. 361, n. 1, and Part. An. iv. 5, 679, a, 29, where he says of the juice
;
.
of the cuttle-fish
t\
8e
qbau
S/:a
rials (ire/Hrnfyiara,
t$
Totovrtp TreptTTt&jiaTt
jen.
:
An.
i.
18, 724, b,
ir/jos
8
0u^0etav
ko.1
HH
460
It is
ARISTOTLE
from this resistance offered by matter to form
all
irregular natural
phenomena
and the
'
like.
He
regards
them
result
and failure of the which she originally intended. 2 Such phenomena arise from form not being completely master over matter. 3 Moreover, we may note that he even conunfulfilled design, as a mutilation
siders
it
nature
when
Metaplt.
ii.
n. 1,2, supra.
%via
Kara rexPVP 4p
too, 4p Se rots
ots
to
opBtos eveicd
ctfiap-
(see his p. 212) that the doctrine of Nature rests according to Aristotle rather on opinion than on science, seems to be due to a mistranslation of Anal. Post. i.
33, 89, a, 5, where t] <j>itrts ri roiavrij (i.e. to &vb*ex^fl * vov Ka^
ravo/j.4pots eVe/ca fl4p rivos iirix^lpe'irat aAA' airoTU-yxaVeTai, dfio'us av %x ot Ka^ ^ v T0 * s <pV(TlKO?S Kal TO TepaTa afiapr^fiara iKeipov rod
eVe/ccS
3
too.
eo*Ti
ri,
clear from the as context) is taken as =t\ (piais roia&ri) and Nature is so also
fiAAws
<?x 6 "'>
is
iraph.
<pvffiv
8'
ov traffav
irepi
rfyv a>5
4-irl
to iroAu
41;
(i.e. o/3e/3aios).
Gen. An. iv. 3, 759, b,\Q sqq. Aristotle is here speaking of abortions which want essential parts of the human body as well as those which have more than the proper number, and applies the above explanation to both r4\os yap ra>v fiiv Kivhatav (form-giving
1
:
not gener-
comes from
motion)
Kparovueviis,
to
icaBoKov
.
irav /x^i Kpar^ffr) r}]V Kara % koto to e?Bos <pvo~LS. Cf. previous n.
(piaiv,
tV
fi^l
v\iip
li&XuTTa touto 8' eor! fJMw . Cf. to repas apamjpia ris 4aTty. also 767, b, 13 to Sh ripas ovk tutna rov ko! apayKa'op irpbs
. :
4 Gen. An. ii. 3, 767, b, 5 o 4oik&s reus yovevfriv ijb7i rpoitop riva ripas 4arip.
:
tV
alriav,
aAAa koto
:
trvn&cliriKbs i.payKaiop.
Phys.
ii.
8,
199, b, 1
ei
5))
i. 6, 1255, b, 1 yap, SoTrep i avQpdmov avSpwirov Kal eV frqplwp ylpeffdai 6i\piov, o!iru xal 4 ayaBav aya9ip :
Polit.
ofio5o-i
PHFSICS
467
Indeed, he
Again the
man was insufficient to overcome the matter woman in the act of procreation. 2 brutes are dwarfish as compared with human
members
of their body are
3
;
make men
form of
Moreover,
5
among
the animals
we may discern
the mole,
or, to
may
distinguish
:
between "more perfect and less perfect animals such as have blood are more perfect than such as have none 6 the tame than the wild 7 those which possess but one
centre of organic
life
with several. 8
7]
Se
1
</>wris
0ov\erai
7roi6ij/
t&
. .
.
tSiv 4\evBepwv
irufiPalvei
t&v SoiXav,
.
8e
iroWdms
-rohvavTiiv.
1, 732, a, 16. 1254, b, 10 tS /j.h %/i.epa [&>a] tup aypiav fe\-riu tyvaur. Aristotle admits, however, himself, Part. An. i. 3, 643, b, 3, that the division of animals into tame and wild is a false one, as all tame animals are found also in a wild condition.
ii.
'
Gen. An.
i.
Polit.
5,
tV
20
t3aa.ii
Cf
c.
12, 695, a, 8.
Children
are
686, b,
also, for
it
consists in a
mere capacity,
iv. 5,
reason,
iv. 10,
vavdbq; 10 ; Ingr.
c.
Part. An.
it is
682, a,
:
6,
An.
*
11,
710, b, J2;
De Mem.
588, a, 31
Hist.
An.
iv. 8,
533, a, 2.
added nature, indeed, desires to give to such creatures only one central organ, but, being unable to do this, she is forced to give them several, In the Problems (x. 45) the writer goes so far as to say that
where also
hh
468
ARISTOTLE
They
display design but
too, as
9
;
and they
we
shall
lowest stage of
have an animate existence, although only in the its development and in its most rudioutline.
mentary
Aristotle
life,
recognises a degree of
though the least possible, in Thus Nature as a what appears to be inorganic. 3 whole is the gradual conquest of Form over Matter continual progression towardsmore perfect development That which is absolutely first, or Form, in its of life.
temporal origin
is last,
since all
into
in
4
the
thought)
'
is also
It follows that
complex
exist-
the
organic to
this
the inorganic. 5
not carry
He
first
applies
it
which he
to-
perfect forms
nature produces wild plants and animals in greater quantity than tame ones, because it is easier to make what is imperfect than what is perfect, and because nature, like art, is only able to create the better after long pracThis, however, is an extioe. aggeration of the Aristotelian doctrine of nature's weakness. Cf. Gen. An. iii, 7, 767, b,
1
Ch. X. infra, at the end of pt. i. ' Part. An. ii. 1, 646, a, 25 t& 8<rrepa rfi yeviati irpSrepa tV (piitriv iarX, ko! irpurov rb rij yevtaei
Te\evraioi>
irpojipav
ko.1
.
tV
:
tV
yAvtaiv,
ixoptp4\v.
t$
\6ytp
tie
tV
8,
ittio-Tov
1
Metapli.
ix.
050, a, 7 airav eV apxbv jSaBi'fei rb yiyv6^vov kxI t4\os aox^l y&P <ri oE ei/eKa, toS rekovs 5' eveica y
yivstris.
19, 24.
2
Phys.
8,
h
iv.
Seealsop.205,n.2,SM/>. Part. An. 646, b, 4. Meteor. oel Se, n&Moir 12, 389, b, 29
5
:
See
p. 460, n. 3,
supra
and
SrjKov [ri e/caoToc] eV! -rSav iaripav a! S\a>s $aa ofoi; opyava ki\ %v(kS.
PHYSICS
469
R IX
W.
ThAMi'' Elements
^^fcviierii.i
inquiries into
consic^H^Hmthe
actual constitution of
His pre-
we
live a definite
beginning in time
some,
1
world we see
to
is
only one
among an
is
infinite series of
Aristotle eternal
declare
that
our world
begotten. 3
itself
tov.
upon him. 4
Although
d.
in his system
Gr. pt.
2
i.
it
not
"We have a clearer idea of the true nature of man than of flesh, bones, &c, and a better idea of the nature of the latter than of the elements. T6 yap ov cVekh jjkktto 4vrav8a SrjXov bnov irKiiarov tt)s Sitrirep vKr\s yap i tci %<rxara
'
sq.
The atomic school held the existence of both Anaximander, Anaximenes, Diogenes, and Empast.
pedocles placed the series in the On Heraclitus cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 586, 2 ad Jin.
629, la<Z
3
i
\r\<pBeiyi,
T)
&X\o
Trap'
r)
/wj.,andonXenophanes,
avTriv,
7)
5'
ovaia ovdey
&Wo
\6yos,
ret
Se peTav
iyybs
1
elvat
As he says himself
De
Fr.
Ccelo,
1
in the i. 10, 279, b, 12. Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 119 (Ar.
On
the latter
cf.
Zull. Ph.
18), quotes
probably from
470
Aristotle
from
it,
eterna*)
langeable as that
iverse
which
is
produced by
time.
how
ual
parts
may
change, 2 cannot as a
Aristotle, ind<
a beginning in
essly states this
result in the
works
to us, although
contents himself, in
eitBlr in one or both of them, to suppose
nulla
a irporepa /xera^o\i] TTfS irpciiTTrjs. Similarly we should have to conclude that as a preliminary to
the transition from creation to destruction of the world or rice rersa a change must take place in the creative force or in the material upon which it works.
If both remain unchanged their mutual relation must also remain unchanged, and therefore But also the resultant effect.
fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita esse eum undique aptum ut nulla vis tantos queat motus mutationemque moliri, nulla seneotus diuturnitate temporum existere ut hie ornatus unquarn dilapsus occidat.' (Cf. Plato, Tim. 34, B, So Ps. 68, E, and elsewhere.)
Philo, JEtem. M. ii. 489 (Ar. Fr. 17), where it is declared to be Seicr; aBedrris to regard the 6parbs Bebs as no better than any human product. The See p. 387, supra. latter is even quite compatible with the doctrine of the birth and destruction of the world.
1
" 3
On
Phys. viii. 1, 251, a, 20 sqq. where, in opposing the view that motion had ever a beginning, he says had the movent and the mobile existed without producing any motion, the transition from rest to motion could only have been effected by a previous change
:
according to Aristotle, God is eternal, unchangeable and matter, on the other hand (setting aside the doctrine of the immutability of the material of which the heavens are made), we know can only suffer change through the operation of the moving cause. If, therefore, the latter is unchangeable, its relation to the matter and the universe which is its product must be unchangeable. This is the argument indicated by Cicero in the passage quoted above,
it
to
PHYSICS
471
is
eternal,
For
if
the prim,
it
which
same.
produ
vsprld
,as
It cannot'
a creative, at another
as a destructive
from Aristotle's
stars are
of the immutability
of the material of
made.
birth
a
;
Notre
of a beginning;
absolute
have
in Ari-
had
beginning
consilio
inito
whence
may
moment? or why should that which has been from all eternity cease at this particular moment to exist? (283, a, 11) It is its own nature which constitutes athing
without beginning
or end,
and
Aristotle devotes De C/rlo, 10-12, to the proof that the heavens are without beginning and end, confining himself, however, almost exclusively to the attack on the Platonic view, that, while they will endure forever, ihey yet had a beginning in time. His chief argument against it is that beginning and endlessness, end and beginninglessness, are mutually exclusive. That which exists for an endless period can neither begin nor cease to be in either case there must be a
1
i.
time in which
it is
not (see
c, 12,
excludes being the nature of that which has had a beginning and is liable to perish must, on the other hand, include it. The latter, therefore, cannot last for ever any more than the former can begin or end(l. 29sqq.;Cf. p. 366, n. 1,/w. and the passage quoted, ibid, init. from Metaph. ix. 8). The views, on the other hand, of those who hold that the world has both beginning and end are here only lightly touched upon. The atomic view Aristotle considered that he had disposed of
;
of
moreover, should that which has not existed for all 3ternity begin to be at this par-
Why,
the world, while in reference to the view of Heraclitus and Empedocles he contents himself
with remarking
(c.
10,
280, a,
472
stotle's system,
ARISTOTLE
but even such a fundamental change in is presupposed by
is
The question
world in time,
<*lhe The
<ff>
but only of
its
The universe
This op^feition
:
at once revealed
by the testimony of our senses and Aristotle can hardly have come to it in any other way. The unalterable nature of the stars and the changeless regularity of their
movements form,
a contrast
'
to terrestrial corruptibility
we #re
realms,
forced to
subject
recognise two
to
different
essentially
laws.
demonstrate
its
necessity.
he argues, are
capable of
is
movement
But
movement compound
from the
in space
of both.
The
it
first
two,
circumference,
and
If these
are the
sqq.
(529, 1
Zbll. Ph.
d.
Or. pt.
ad fin.) that it attributes to the world a mere change of form and not a veritable birth
and destruction, That it was the observation of this which led Aristotle in
'
the
first
instance to
make
his
PHYSICS
*
473
Those, on the most primitive and ancient bodies. which exhibit a composite movement, must be contrary, formed by combination from them, and receive their
particular bias
is
and
also rectilineal,
movement must be
other, the
more
unbroken and
is
contrary
Accordingly there
must
exist
two
the
one origin-
move:
ment. 1
it is
Eectilineal
movement has
opposite directions
either
which exhibit
for the
one or
must be of opposite natures, destined the other kind of motion that is, they must
it
:
which
is
it
out contrariety.
it
and
kind of
rectilineal motion.
any com-
municate either upward or downward motion to it by force, 2 since if the one were unnatural to it the other must be
distinction between two realms of being is obvious from his whole treatment of the subject, Cf. also p. 366, n. 1. 1 Be Calo, i. 2, 268, b, 14 sqq. According to the principle
'
already laid down (c. 2, 269, a, 10, 14) as the basis of the discussion (see p. 224, n. 3), %v hi ivarriov, which, when thus universally expressed, is certainly
open to dispute.
474
its
ARISTOTLE
motion
change. 2
opposite,
of the matter out of which a thing has grown, and therefore that which,
all
bodies,
which
and where
there
1
is
Ibid.
269, b, 18-270, a,
/j.iv
yap ev84x*Tat
I
&Wov ko!
irepov
sc.
Kti'rjtriif
7) be accepted except provisionally as of universal validity. As is shown in the sequel, it is inapplicable to the SEther. The position upon which the latter
(Aristot. Thierhtnde, 393) in casting a doubt upon Aristotle's clearly expressed meaning, merely on the ground of the actual difficulties that beset the theory.
2
He
a, 13, b, 1
Kal avavl-es
teal
real
ai/aKKoiayroi/, aiSioy
conclusion rests, (viz. that movement in a circle has no opposite). Aristotle, indeed, endeavours (c. 4) further to establish by
special proofs. But he cannot prove that the motion may not be crooked or oblique for if we have two opposite motions on the same or on parallel lines which deviate in opposite directions, it does not make the slightest difference whether the
;
%x ov ^Te fpOlfTtv, d\A' ayhparov al dvaXkoianov teal awaBis. Cf. Metaph. viii. 4, 1044, b, 7, xii. 1, 2, 1069, a, 30, b, 25. 3 On this point, cf. also p.
out' avfy}aiv
341 sq.
4
Be
Ccelo,
i.
3, 270, a,
13-35.
The immutability
straight or circular. the courses of the fixed stars and of the planets are actually in opposite directions ; why may these bodies not, then, consist of different jetherial substance ? are not
lines
are
Moreover,
body which has no opposite might have been proved more simply and conclusively from the proposition (p. 341, and p. 353 sq. above) that all change means transition from one state into its opposite, and that a thing can only be
of the
operated upon by
its
opposite.
Aristotle, however, does not here adopt this method, as his investi-
gation
We
Meyer
in
his
PHYSICS
475
For he contends that if the spaces of the heavens, as well as the intermediate space between heaven and earth, were full of air or fire, then the bulk of these elements,
considering the magnitude of the stars and their distance
by them.
'
We
all
body
is
superior to
no evidence of the
heaven or
its parts.
The name
'
aether
'
may
from del
dsiv,
treatise tion.
1
Such a proportion involves is as much air and as much fire as will be produced by the transformation of all water into air and all air into fire on
that there
the basis of the existing quantitative extent of these bodies. 2 Meteor, i. 3, 339, b, 13-340,
a, 18.
270, b, 11. ou5e Sis a\A* airetpdicis Se? voiiifeiv t&s uvtzs atpiKveiaBai S6^as els ri/ias. De, Ccelo, 270, b, 19. See Meteor. 339, b, 27, where the same reason is given in almost the same words, and Metapli. xii. 8 ad fin. See infra, the section of Ch. IX.
Ccelo,
i.
3
4
3,
ov
yap
aira|
Plato, Crat.
410, b.
: ;
470
ARISTOTLE
The conclumust be distinguished from all Without opposition and without
1
elementary matter. 2
1
De
Casio,
i.
i.
3,
Meteor,
3,
339,
2,
that
stars
is
meant by the
is
and
following
c.
these
passages
5.
De Mundo,
392, a,
On
the name ' aether,' cf. Zell. Ph. d. Or. i. 897, 4 ad fin. 2 Although it is called mparov ittoixov, Dp Cado, iii. 1, 298, b, Meteor, i. 1, 338, b, 21 c. 3, 6 339, b, 16, 340, b, 11, rb ruv acrrptav (TTOix^ov; Gen. An. iii. 3, 737, a, 1, it is yet expressly distinguished in these passages from the four o-TDixeta. Gen. An.
; ;
possess of motion and change in space, and that in this sense we might even attribute SAtj to vovs (Heetling, Hid. 23). Aristotle certainly says, Metaph. viii. in the case of 4, 1044, b, 7 ytwtrral ovaiai, we have to deal
:
it is
both with their matter and form otherwise with (pvaucaX piv atbioL 8e ovaiai. iaws yap tvta ovk 6X I faviv, ff oil roiavTfjv aWa.
(
ii. 3,
736, b, 29,
it is
called Urepov
Matter,
Meteor, 3, 340, b, 7 (cf p. 488, n. 3, infra), erepov o-Sjua irvpds T Kal aepos ; and De Cosh, i. oiicia ctefiaros 2, 269, a, 30 &\hri irapa ras ivravda ffvffra'fftis 6etor4pa Kal Trporepa rofrruv andvtuv cf. ibid. o. 3 (following n.). If, therefore, we understand by oToixeia only such simple bodies as stand to one another in the relation of opposites, and pass
o-toix*'""'
. ;
i.
however, is denied of the heavenly bodies only in the sense in which it belongs to temporal
things.
Aristotle
means that
S\ri
is
if
we understand by
which
a
thing
inroKetfievov
yeveVecos
<p8opas
into one another, we cannot reckon the aather among these. Only when we extend the meaning of the word to embrace all simple bodies can we call it a aroix&ov. On the other hand, it is, to say the least of it, inaccurate and misleading to say that according to Aristotle the celestial spheres have no material substratum (Bbkntano,
'
'
Gen. et Corr. i. 4, 320, a, 2), the uncreated and eternal has no ii\i) in this sense but if we take it in the more general sense of the substratum of change, the Swd/iei ov, it has 0Ai7, inasmuch as it is capable of movement in space. That this is all that Aristotle means is obvious from the parallel passages, xii. 2, 1069, b, 24 ndvra b" S\nv ejfei oaa ^ra^dWei
SeKTticbv (as it is defined,
;
. . .
tca\
kivt\t&.
&AA&
ou
Tr68ev ttoi
viii. 1,
1042, b. 5
Hebtling,
Mat. und Form, 22), that 'the a3th er consists of a material which is 'no material, of an immaterial
material
'
(Kampe,
Erliennt-
yap avdyKii, e? ti S\tj>/ l^ei tOttik^v, toZto Kal yevvvr^v Kal (pedpriiv lx e '"; u. 8, 1050, b, 20: ouS' elf ti KLva6fievov aifiiov, ovk tan Kara Zvva.fi.tv Kivoi/ievov a\\' ?) n68iv ttoi [only in respect of
PHYSICS
mutation,
it
477
it
is
The
circular
all respects.
If
movement
is
peculiar to the
ffither,
their
move-
ment
is rectilineal.
But, as
lineal motionfollows
two opposite
toward the circumference and toward the centre. That which tends naturally downwards is heavy that which
;
rises is light.
opposites of heavy
and
light. 2
he holds, be reduced to quantitative differences of magniit is original tude, of mathematical figure, or density
;
and
qualitative.
The
Demo-
by the mathematical qualities of atoms, or, with the elder physicists, by the rarefaction and condensation
can it be said to move merely Suvi/iet and not ivepyelq, inasmuch as it is not yet in the place to which it is moving]
toutou
S'
locality
is
same sense
the the
can
the
[i.b.
toS irSBev
iroi /civet-
same sense
aSai] S\riv aiiSh KoiXiet virapx^tv. Be Cmlo, i. 9, 278, a, 10 sqq. Aristotle expressly says 6 oipavbs
:
as
universal
conception
;
is
as to the former. ' It is called Beibs, Meteor, i. also, similarly, Be 3, 339, b, 25 Cmlo, i. 3, 270, b, 11, 20 f) vptirri ovata ray crati&Twv, rb irpdrov
;
:
different
from
former
is
elSos
the the
<ru>/ia,
'irepdy
rihv
irapa.
yyv Kal
ii. 1,
irvp
Ibid.
284,
Still latter rij SAp ^fuy^vov. less can we 'infer from Metajrfi.
4, that the 'celestial globes are incorporeal beings (like the sether, they are frequently called Beta, a-diiara, &c. : see Ind. Ar. 742, a, 43-60) ; we cannot, therefore, suppose for a moment that
viii
Later philosophers, such as a, 4 Cicero's Epicurean (TV. Be. i. 13, 33, cf. Krische, Ibrsch., 306 and the pseudo-Justin sqq.)
Cohort,
2
c. 5,
473
478
ARISTOTLE
We
have
first
But those who deduce the differences of matter from a condensation and rarefaction of some one original element are, besides other arguments, met by
the objection that they do not explain the distinction
They
it
confine
as some-
are
Again, since
it
includes
two tendencies, upward and downward, we must in the first place assume two bodies, of which one naturally
sinks, the other rises, the
In the second
we must imagine an
intermediate element, or
rather
Of
these four
two are earth and fire, the other two water and air. Earth is absolutely heavy and entirely devoid of lightness fire is absolutely light and entirely devoid of heaviness. The one moves straight to the centre, and therefore sinks below all other bodies the
;
De
See p. 443 sqq. Aristotle discusses this view Ceelo, iii. 5, of. iv. 5, 312, b,
20
b,
29 sqq.
PHYSICS
rises
479
air,
above
all
other bodies.
Water and
on the
fire,
Water
;
is
air heavier
than
fire,
but lighter
sink of
Under no
;
possible circumstances,
fire
forcible
movement, does
when
is
;
fills
them is withdrawn. 1
earth
Earth
everywhere except in earth air, everywhere except in and water 2 fire, nowhere. 3 Therefore of two
more
air
may be
heavier
a hundredmore
All
weight of wood,
for instance,
We
1
may
definitely
by
another
process
Properly, indeed, they ought to rise into the higher ; Aristotle admits himself, Be CceU, iv. 5, 312, b, sqq., that this does happen unless external force be applied, without, however, explaining a circumstance which has so im-
world cannot consist of sether alone, for it must have an immovable centre. There must therefore be a body whose nature it is
to rest at the centre and move towards it, and therefore also one of an opposite nature. thus have earth and fire, which in turn require water and air as intermediate elements, 5 For what follows, see Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 3. The true author of this theory of the elements is said to be Hippocrates (according to IDELEK, Arist. Meteor, ii. 389, who appeals to Galen, De Mem.
We
portant
theory.
2
bearing
air
upon
his
is
That even
has weight
an empty one
3
ibid. c. 4, 311, b, 9.
Aristotle,
in the
to, finds
passage
in this
just
referred
sec.
i.
Be
ideas
certain for several reasons. In the first place, neither of the works here referred to, n. Qicrios hpBp&irov and n. aapicuv, can be
480
ARISTOTLE
but
all qualities
perceptible
by the sense of
moisture. 2
reducible to
four
warmth,
The
cold, dryness,
Now, by joining
Zell. Ph.
sq. 897.
1
these
attributed to Hippocrates.
Cf.
d.
Gr.
i.
205, 211,
619
have not here to do with these, as they do not indicate a particular kind of action and
passion; the elements, on the other hand, stand to one another in that particular relation of action and passion {ibid. 329, b, 20), which the treatise on birth and destruction chiefly discusses. 2 Ibid. 329, b, 24 Bcp/ibv 8e Kal tyvxpbv teal bypbv Kal ^Tjpbv ret
:
We
cxlvii., olv.
Again, while the treatise n. <pi<rios avBpditov recognises (c. 1 mit.) JSmpedocles's four elements and even makes heat and cold, dryness and moisture the constituent elements of every living thing (c. 3), it yet does not bring these two positions together as Aristotle does, or deduce each of the four elements from the various combinations of those four pronor, indeed, perties into pairs does Galen (see snpra) claim this
;
fiev
t$
ironjTiKa elvat
ra Se rQ
[from
tjiuxpiy
iraBrirtKa.
\eyerai
'
rb ffvyKplvov ra
for
it.
The
treatise n. aapKuv,
on
the other hand, refers (at i. 425, k) to the Aristotelian account of the elements, but this merely proves
that
it is later than Aristotle. That heat and cold, dryness and moisture, were regarded as the
evSpurrov %v \i\pbv Se rb a6piarov Sptf), Svff6purrov Se. (Cf. Meteor, iv. 4, 381, b, b, 29.) The qualities \eirrbv, iraxb, yKlffxpov,
t
fiev oiKeicit
tcpavpui', fiaXatchv,
iv.
init.
eirel
5e
rerrapa Si&piffraL atria ruv trrot~ Xe'wv, &v ra fiiv Sio irorqriKa, rb iepfibv Kal rb \jivxpbv, to 5e Silo iraByriKa, rb ripbi> Kal rb iyp6v 7j Be irtffris rofrruv ex rijs eVaywy^s. <f>a!i/6Tai yap iv irS<ric j/ per
PHYSICS
four properties in pairs,
481
we
two impossible combinations, four that are possible, in which one active and one passive property are always united, and thus four simple bodies or elements are
exhibited
or air
earth. 3
2
1
warm
and
dry, or fire;
;
warm and
moist,
Kal
ypvxp^TTjs opi^ovffai
to.
to dpoyevrj Kal
vypalvovffai
CTKA-qpuVOVfTat
fify
dfioyevij, Kal
Kal
^Tjpaivovffai
Kal
Kal jUaAaTTOUfTai, TK
iiypa
5e
?]pa
Kal
dpi6fieva Kal
ra elpy/ieva Trddt] irdffx 0VTa" Of. c. 4 init. c. 5, 382, a, 27 sqq. c. 10, 388, a, 21, c. 11, 389, a, 29. 1 In his description of, these four primary substances and their fundamental attributes Aristotle Thus is not quite consistent. Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 329, b, 7, 13, c. 3, 330, a, 30, 33, and Meteor, i.
2, 339, a, 13,
TaWa
stituent parts of any kind (evuirdpxovTa), and thus even the component parts of a conception or a demonstration, as well as the form as constituent part of the thing, but in a more special sense the e'vvndpxov &s S\tjv (Bonitz, Ind. Arist. 702, a, 18 sqq.) stands for the ultimate material constituents of bodies themselves, that els o Siaipeirat ra
aWa
3, els h
etSet Siatpepovra
a,
1014,
32
cf.
3,
983, b, 8],
ev1
roAAa ff&puna
SiaipeTrai,
he calls the latter (heat, cold,&c.) both aroixe1aa.nA apxal, the bodies of which they
vTr&pxov Svvdfiei ^ eyepyela, avrd 8 effriv atiialperoj/ els erepa t< etSei
Ccelo, iii. 3, 303, a, 15). So Gen. et Corr. ii. 7 init. Meteor. i. 1 init. (rav aroxeiwv twc ffcofia;
{Be
tikSiv)
ii.
De
Casio,
iii.
3 init.
c.
init.,
304, b, 33. Gen. et Corr. ii. 1, 328, b, Meteor, i. 3, 339, 31, 329, a, 26. b, 5. Gen. An. ii. 3, 736, b, 29. Metaph. i. 4, 985, a, 34 ra i>s iv Key6p.eva atoixela], vXqs eiSei Part. An. ii. 1, 646, a, 13 even to Ka\o6fieya vir6 Tivtav <TT0ix e * so that we clearly see that he is merely following in this the
i.
[Phys.
4, 187, a, 26,
iii.
5,
and The
oppositions,
moreover,
which
On
voy,
I.
I I
: : .
'
482
ARISTOTLE
1
Their own primitive and into which all are resolved. and indecomposable nature is proved by the fact that though they can, by transmutation, pass into each other, they never excrete any other body from them2 Every composite body in the terrestrial kingselves. dom contains all of them. 3 Yet they are never revealed 4 For example, to our experience in perfect purity. elemental fire must not be confounded with a flame, which is produced by an intensification of its warmth, as ice is by an intensification of the cold natural to Elemental fire is caloric, or warm and dry water. evaporation 5 flame, on the contrary, is no constant
1
De
Coclo,
iii.
3.
Metaph.
v.
QepfiOTTiTOs,
faffTrtp
'
Kal KpiffTaWos
TT7JtS
3,
see p. 481, n. 1, and elsewhere. 2 De Cmlo, iii. 3, 302, a, 19 sqq. 3 As is more fully proved,
et Corr.
ii.
^VXp6T1\TOS
tyvxpdTTjTos
6
TJ
70p
Kal
7J
elffiv, ti fiev
.
Gen.
4
8.
Gen. et Corr. ii. 3, 330, b, 21 ovk eari Se rb irvp Kal b a}jp Kal
cKaffTov
[lev iffTiy,
Tutv
eifyrjfievuv
airKovv,
el oZv 7} 8e 8epfi6niTos KpvffTa\\&s io~Ti iritis vypov tyvxpov, Kal to irvp eWcu fe'ffis ijpou Qepfiov. Stb Kal ouSep otfr' eV KpvtTTtiWou ytyverai o&t' 2k Trvp&s.
a\\a iukt6v
olov
e5f
to
8'
oirAa
toiovto
is
made about
v. 4,
Meteor,
i.
3,
340, b, 21,
ov irvp, Kal to r$ aepi aepoeides Cf. daolas Sk Ktwrl twv &\\av. Meteor, ii. 4, 359, b, 32, where,
referring to the distinction between wet and dry vapour, which foti is discussed below, he says b" oSre to iypbv avev toO lipoG otire to tyipbv &vev tov vypov, aAAa irdvTa ToOra \4yeTcu Kara Ibid. ii. 5, 362, a, 9 {mepoxhv. dry vapours are only produced where moisture is present, lbid.iv. According to Phys. iv. 7, 214, 8. a, 32, air is intermingled with water whereas, in De Sensu, c. 5,
:
341, b, 22; cf. 1. 13: wpaTov fiev yap inrb t)\v iyKVKXlov tyopav effTl rb Beppbv Kal typbv, t Ksyofiev irvp avfitvvfiov yap t& koivSv, &c. What is called ' fire is a kind of inflammable material (4ir6KKau^a)which,
'
tV
smoke, can be kindled by a motion. Heraclitus had identified fire with heat in general (see Zell. Ph. d. Gr. the i. 588 sq.) distinction between fire and the heat of fire appears in his school (Plato,
like
little
;
Aristotle had a Crat. 413, o). special reason for emphasising this distinction, as is indicated
443, a,
*
4, this is
controverted
cf
Mbybe,
25
;
Arist. Thierhwnde, 404 sq. Gen. et Corr. ii. 3, 330, b, to 5e irDp IvtIv v7rep/8o\)(
by the above passage from the Meteorology. For it was impossible that between the aerial and
the celestial sphere there should
'
rnrsics
material, but a
483
phenomenon
occasioned,
tation
of moist
(air
proper and
distinctive characteristic
the dryness of
air,
of water, the
fire.
2
'
moisture
'
the warmth of
and an active quality, 3 it follows that all act upon and are acted on by one another, that they mingle and are
transformed into one another
may
pass into
all
be a region of fire, as he was forced to hold there was, if fire included only visible flame. Meteor, ii. 2, 355, a, 9 y fiiv yap (p\b 5ia ffwe^ovs vypov
'
which
[with which that improperly called rpotpii. Long. Tit. 3, 465, b, 24, Vita et M. c. 5, 470, a, 2, does not conoh yhp 7} alrij odea Biapevei flict] ovBeva xpdpov &s eltretv. Ibid. c. KaBdirep to tuv 3, 357, b, 31
Kai oi rpecperai
is
' :
pt6vTav vSdrtov Kal to ttjs (pKoybs peB/ia. Vita et M. c. 5, 470, a, 2. 2 Gen. et Corr. ii. 3, 331, a-, 3 ov fi^jv oAV ottAcSs 76 TeTTopo 01/ra [t& (TToix^ta] epos e'/caoTfJy
:
are regarded as the passive or material qualities (see p. 480, supra), earth and water are held to be the matter of all bodies. Fire, on the other hand, represents in a special sense the element of form (Gen. et Corr. i. 8, 335, a, 9 sqq.), for here, as elsewhere, the containing element stands to the contained in the relation of form to matter
Casio, iv. 4, 312, a, 11) Similarly, more reality is attributed to heat than to cold, inas. much as the former is a positive, the latter a negative, attribute ; the one is classed as being, the other as not-being ( Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 318, b, 14). 3 See pp. 479 sq. supra. 4 Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 329, b,
and moisture
eoTi,
yri
juec
\i\pov
fiaWov
$1
(Be
tyvypov, iiSaip Se tyv%pov fj.a\\ov vypov, oAfp S' vypov fiaWov ^ if Bepfiov, irvp Se Bepfiov fiaWoy ^
|7)po5.
Meteor,
iv.
4, 382, a,
3.
among other things, that earth and water alone are inhabited by living beings (on which vide below), because they alone For tuv tro>fi.6.Tu>v. Sxrj are although cold is held by Aristotle
says,
22, c. 7,
and elsewhere
1
see pp. 2
450
sq.
supra.
1
ARISTOTLE
;
all
opposed
same way
as their distinctive
are
opposed.
this opposition
is,
the
more
difficult
is
common and conflict only in respect of the In the latter case the alteration of one property in one of them occasions a complete transmutation into
property in
other.
the other
step
we
by such a change for only the element intermediate between the two that are opposed is produced, and
it
morphosis
complete.
cold of water,
humidity
that
we common
is
obtain air
to water
but
it
is
only
when the
we
obtain
fire.
and air has been removed If the humidity of water disto earth
appears, earth
fire,
and water must be which are wholly opposed to one another are metamorphosed by an indirect process those which are but partially
the coldness
common
it
withdrawn.
Hence
into
earth;
;
water
directly
earth directly
into water or
fire,
Thus
all
the
Gen. et Corr.
ii.
4.
PHYSICS
485
self-
For
if
its
natural place,
it,
and
if its
having
then
all
by
force,
must move
to these
earth
it
mediate spaces.
Hence
is
and
eether,
we
live.
We
is
forcibly retained in a
locality
must be
Cf.
Ph.
680.
d.
Gr.
i.
619,
2
and
tovto Kal iriGaybv, is aSitvaroi/ fiij rbv ainbv elvat irepl irdvTwv tovtuv \6yov, Kal 5ia<p4peiv TaxvrrJTi Kal
flpaSvTTJTi rrjs fLTa[3o\rjs eVl irivtu>v re Kal tpSopav elvai Kal yiveaiv,
toutjjj/ p.4vtoi rerayp-evcos trvuPa'-
(pavepbv 8ti tcixKcji re fffTttl 7] yeveais tois aw\o?s adfi-aai, &c. 3 Meteor, ii. 3, 357, b, 27 it
tiio-re
:
asked, irorepov Kal t\ BdAarra ael Stap.di'zi twv alr&v oicra p.opiai> a.pi9p.<p, $ Tip efSei Kal Ttp irotr$
is
(
yeip
irainv
avTOts.
358, b,
Siap.4vet,
29
aire
6
a\\a n6vov
irepl
nTo/3a\A(Jj'TO)y
ael
Ttov
fiepuv,
KaBdirep aijp Kal rb TraWipov titiwp Kal rb Tvp. ael yap &\\o Kal uK\o
Kal
yap Kal
yiverai tovtwv eKaaTov, rb 8' elSos toS vKiiBovs eKda-TOv tovtwv pevet,
<p\oybs
f>evp.a.
(pavepbv
5J)
Kal robs t6ttovs avp.ix.eTa$dX\ei rd t' emiroKd(ovTa Kal ra KOTifrra iraKiv. Cf. also ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 2, 576, 620. Paivet
486
ARISTOTLE
;
and
if all
bodies
outside
it,
only that in
conclusion
and consequently no space, since space is which a body is or can be. The same
1
is
Several
causes of motion,
which would be
has no matter
specifically similar,
and consequently
itself.
it is
single
and complete in
continuous and
so
too. 2
must be
however,
we
must manifest
us
answer that this argument would be only conclusive if there were an extra-mundane
duals, Aristotle bids
itself,
we ought
is
now
in
and complete. 4
278, b,
eiirl
De
Ccelo,
i.
8, C. 9,
irAefouj obpavol
o8t'
eVSe'xerai
'
This metaphysical proof, held in prospect De Ccelo, i. 8, 277, b, 9, is given Metaph. xii. 8, 1074, a, 31 sqq. cf. also p. 388 sq., and on matter as the source of multiplicity, p. 368 sq.
2
;
oX\' eh ko.1 fidvos ndi TeAeios oStos ovpavSs iariv. Ibid. i. 1 fin. particular bodies are infinite in number ; to Si iroc ov toSto p6pui Te'Aeiov avayxatov elvcu koi KaBdiref ToSvofia (rrinalvfi, irdvry, real /u}j tj
3
''
Be
Casio,
i.
cf. p.
:
Ibid. 279,
a,
ph
a
;
PHYSICS
487
is
deter-
five
simple bodies.
Since
motion
is
motion to the
distinction,
rest,
we
obtain in the
first
place the
that in which circular motion and that in which the opposite movements up and down hold sway i.e. that which is full of asther, and that which contains the four elements. In both of them the materials lie in spherical layers one above the other. For since similar materials uniformly strive to reach their natural localities, which in turn are determined by their distance from the centre of the world,
it
the earth
solid sphere, 1
the world. 2
1
Besides theargumentquoted
in the text, Aristotle proves the rotundity of the earth (De Casio, ii. 14, 297, a, 6 sqq.) from the form of its shadow on the moon
during an eclipse, from the different stars visible in the north and the south, and the fact (already touched on 296, b, 18) that falling .bodies do not move in parallel lines but only at similar angles towards the earth. WithregaTd
to the last,
sqq., he adduces the fact that when we move even a short distance north
as
Be
Casio
south, some of the stars or visible over the horizon seem to change their positions. He re-
there
it
is
room
doubt whether
had been
for ascer-
tained by accurate observation and experiment, or whether it was not an inference from the theory that all bodies which have weight gravitate towards the
centre.
488
A&ISTOTLE
its
material, 1
2
its
are hollow
spheres
first
then of
fire.
Aristotle, however,
last,
remarking that composed partly of moist and partly what we call air is of dry vapour, the latter produced from earth, the former from water and the moisture of the earth the drier kinds mount upwards, the more humid, from their
:
the Indian and Atlantic Oceans are all one sea, he further Be thinks worthy of respect. An. iii. 3, 428, b, 3, Meteor, i. 8, 346, b, 2, he tells us that the sun is larger than the earth. 1 DeCoelo,ii. 14, where Aristotle opposes the view that the earth moves, both in the form in which it was held by Philolaus (Zbll. PU. d. Gr. i. 388), and in the form given to it by Hicetas, Bcphantus,
that
proper motion is rectilinear and For the toward the centre. same reason all other motions must be denied of it. For since its natural motion is toward the centre, and all bodies rest when they arrive at the place toward which they naturally gravitate, motion away from the centre caDnot belong to any part of it and the whole must be at rest. The rotation of the world
''
presupposes a fixed centre, which Aristotle conceives of as corporeal see p. 480, supra. 3 Thus, heavy bodies when thrown upwards in a straight line return to their starting-point (ibid. 296, b, 25 sqq.). Moreover, astronomical phenomena find a satisfactory explanation on the hypothesis that the earth rests (297, a, 2), while on the opposite hypothesis irregularities must result; for instance, the stars could not always rise and set at the same points (296, a, 34 sqq.). The motion referred to in Anal. Post. ii. 1, 89, b, 30, is the earthquake. 4 The proof of this, Be Casio, ii. 4, 287, b, 1 sqq., is as follows as water always accumulates in the deepest parts, and the nearer the centre the deeper any part is, water must continue to flow towards the centre until all the deep places are filled up, i.e. until its surface is at all points equidistant from the centre. The proper place for water is the space occupied by the sea, Meteor.
;
'
'
ii.
2,
PHYSICS
greater gravity, sink
489
so the former
fill
downward
the
The
touches
at all points. 2
But considered
in themselves,
is
no space.
Lastly, the
all
moveis is
the
same point
which
same
point. 5
1 Meteor, i. 3, 340, b, 19 sqq. 341, a, 2, c. 4, 341, b, 6-22; of.i. ii. 2, 7, 344, b, 8, 8, 345, b, 32 354, b, 4 sqq. ; Be Ccelo, ii. 4, 287, a,, 30 ; on the difference be-
described by the are spinning of a smooth body, and of which, therefore, each section
which cuts the axis at right angles forms a circle whose centre is on the line of the axis.
Simplicius gets out of the difficulty by remarking that, while in the case of other shapes there is only one axis that will serve the purpose, in a sphere you may take any you please an explanation with which we may rest content on so trifling a point. 5 Or as Simplicius, in loco, of all lines which explains it: return to the point from which they started, and thus inclose a space, the circle is the shortest just as of all surfaces of equal extent that which is circular, of all bodies of equal bulk that which is globular, has the smallest Even with this circumference.
;
follows that the celestial and the fiery spheres are at all points in contact with one another. a For what follows see Be
it
Coelo,
1
ii.
4.
Alex,
early
figures
apud
date,
Simpl.
in,
loeo,
observed at an
this
viz.
a whole series of
attribute
all
share
those
490
ARISTOTLE
finer
The
its
matter
is,
the more
world
require.
Still
we cannot regard
all
Nature, in Ari-
opinion, reconciles
opposites by a gradual
process,
and the
which composes
the
terrestrial
heaven,
diminishes as
approaches
atmosphere. 3
In proceeding
heavens, Aristotle
guided by observation. 4
elhmpivis, &c.
All the
is
explanation the argument is a lame one. It is obvious that Aristotle accepts the globular form of the earth on the direct evidence of the senses, and merely adds these other proofs as supplementary evidence. 1 laid. 287, b, 14 Sti ph oZv
:
KAMPB
wrong
in supposing that it is the air as the matter of the fiery region and not the sether that is
(T(f>aipOL0-i]S
ilTTLV
6 KOtTflOS StjXov
iK Toirtev, Kal 8ti kot' aKpi$eiav evropvos otSras &<rre tnjBev fiiire
X^tp6Kfi7jTov *X elv irapa'nKTjtriws 1 ju^t aAAo [njdiv rav Trap rjuiv v
1
here spoken of. The &vw /iexP l at\iivi)s does not mean the region below the moon, but the upper regions reaching down as far as the moon, and lying between it and the starry heavens. Moreover, cru/u< trepov atpos cannot possibly mean the air, but, as 1. 10 immediately says, the
TtpuiTov
no
terres-
completely adapted for an exactly symmetrical form. 2 According to the above argument, the smallest elevation or depression in the outer surface of the celestial globe would presuppose a, void space outside
of
it.
3
the aather. We must not, however, conceive of a mixture of elementary substances which cannot extend to the region of circular motion, but merely of differences in the degree of
or
density.
1 According to Eudemus (in Sim PL. I)e Casio, Schol. in Arist. 498, a, 45) Plato had thus stated the problem of astronomy rlvaiv
:
rb 340, b, 6 treX^djs Urepov etvat cufiA <pa/j.iv Ttvpds re Kal aepos, ob fii)v aAA* eV ai/T$ ye rb pill KaBapiircpov elect! rb 8' ^ttoi/
Meteor,
&va>
i.
3,
/tee
yap
Kal
Me'xP'
{nroredeiff&v
vcov Ktvijffeuv
6fj.a\uv
Kal Teray^U-
BiaffxBri
to
irepl
ra$
Kif^crets
PHYSICS
401
'
move
and from this time forth Greek astronomy held to the view that
function consisted in discovering hypotheses which would explain the phenomena as satisfactorily as (on their somewhat hardy assumption) the motion of the stars is explained by the theory of uniform motions. Thehighestcriterion of the truth of a theory is -rb <r<ieo8<u to <t>aiv6/ieva. To take only a few instances cf. the quotations from about Heraclides, in Zbll. and Ph. d. Gr. i. 881, 1, and in Bockh, D. Itosm. Syst. d. Platon, 134 sqq. Aristotle's statements about Callippus, Metaph. xii. t$ 8' ijAi'ou real 8, 1073, b, 35
its
: ; :
naff itiuurrov
<r<paipas
. . .
tSiv
fj-ia
irKav(ofj.4voiV
erepas
e\drTovas
. .
elvai,
&c.
rb
[lev
olv ir\rj6os tuv fftpatpuv eVrw tocovtov . rb yap avayicaiov cuptiadw rois IffxvpoTepois \4yeiv. Be Cwlo, il. 12, 292, a, 14 irepl 877 Tofrraiv C^TeTv fiev Ka\us <=x el real t^*/ 4tt\ ir\etov a&veaiv, Kalirep
:
liixpas
ixovras a<popp.ds, Sec. c. 5, 287, b, 28 the desire to explain everything is a mark either of great zeal or great folly. The extent, however, to which attempt is open to blame the
; :
depends upon the motive which inspires it, and the strength of a man's conviction of the truth of
ir6repov avBpairlvas ^ his views KapTepix&Tepov, rats p.ev oZv axpienLfieffrepaLS avdyKals '6rav rts t^XTI' T Te x^P tv ^X lv ^ e ^ T0 ' s e ^P~ IffKovffi, vvv 5e t^ (paivofxtvov fiiyreov. Cf. also Part. An. i. 5, 644, b,31,
:
rq> (re\T}v7is
Svo
tjjero
en
;
izpoffQe-
reas elvai
trtpaipas,
to,
<t>aivofj.tv<x
the statements and quotations from Geminus, in Simpl. Pkys. 64, b, and what the latter says of old astronomers the partly following Eudemus and Sosigenes, 3e Cwlo, Sckol. in Arist.
el fj.4\het ris
airoSaVeiy
el
KaX
Kara
.
fiiKpbv etpair-
472, a, 42, 498, a, 43, 499, a, 7, 500, a, 25, 501, b, 28, 502, b, 5 sqq. 503, a, 23, 504, b, 32 sqq. Aristotle adopts the same criterion. He asserts only those positions which are warranted by the facts where the latter are
;
observation, cf ibid.
n6repov, KaGdirep
irepl
639, b, 7:
ot /j.a0TjfiaTiKol to.
oStw
ibv
<pa.w6p.eva.
irpajTov
tpviriKov
irepl
to.
t&
a
Bewp^ffavTa
ti
Kal
kcuttov, eiretff
inadequately known, or do not speak with sufficient plainness, he makes no pretence of absolute icertainty, but is content
with'probability. Thus Meta2>li. -xfL 8, 1073, b, 38, 1074, a, 14, after declaring (1073, a, 11) that the investigation is not yet concluded, he says avayxaiov Si el
:
real tcls alrlas, fj &K\us irws. (That Aristotle wouid decide for the former method is obvious.) Aristotle himself was a most
/xtWovo'L
ffvyredeltrat
irairat
ra
careful observer of known facts ; see p. 46, n. 1, supra. 1 Aristotle speaks, of course, only of the stars known to the ancients, and visible to the naked eye.
492
ARISTOTLE
i.e.
from west to
could
east,
move
in
its
freely
star
sphere,
imagine at least as
stotle does
many
they saw
Ari-
movements and
periods. 1
The
stars,
he
is fixed, this
phenomenon must be
of the heaven or the
movement
Many of the older philosophers held that the stars were carried round by the air or the rotation of the world. Besides
Xenophanes and Heraclitus, who
held that the stars were nebulous masses, this view was shared by Anaxagoras, Demooritus, and perhaps even Anaximenes ; Empedooles held that it was true of the planets but not of the fixed
stars,
which were
set
immovably
in the arch of heaven (see Zell. Ph. d. Or. i. 226 sq. 500, 622, 715, 799, 898, 3). Anaximander seems to have been the first to start the theory of spheres (ibid.
206 sq.) which was subsequently adopted bythePythagoreans(iiia!. 384, 1, 449) and by Parmenides (ibid. 528). Plato adopted it from the Pythagoreans (ibid. i. 685), and was followed by Eudoxus and Callippus, the leading astronomers of Aristotle's time (see p. 497 sq., infra). It seemed
forced upon them by the difficulty they had in conceiving of a free motion of the stars, the idea of universal gravitation not
PHYSICS
493
case
move independently,
for in this
how
could
we
which the stars move and that of their spheres ? We cannot refer an invariably regular phenomenon to an
accidental coincidence.
In
although there
no
real connection
between the
two.
Hence we
them. 1
move, but the stars are fixed and carried round by This hypothesis satisfactorily explains why,
Mere rolling, howwould not carry them on their way 3 and the fact that the moon always shows us the same side proves that
ever,
is
the least
Toils
fiey
kvkAovs
KtveitrOai
they have no motion of their own within move their own spheres, but with them] Kal IvSeSe/iha tois
to Se Sorpa
Tifiepc?!' [i.e.
organs of locomotion, the corresponding shape, viz. rotundity, s Moreover, Aristotle adds, it sun which appears is_ only the
to roll at its rising
and setting
kvkAois
2
<j>epc<reai,
and
this, like
d.
Gr
phases,
and by the teleological argument that since nature does nothing in vain she must have given the stars, which require no
681,
5
1.
In his refutation of
494
ARISTOTLE
Now
sphere revolved on
rate.
its
own
move-
many
spheres
Ari-
was bound
and the matter which composed them performed such revolutions only as our eyesight seems to witness to; moreover, he was obliged to suppose that the spheres contained within the universal globe, in which there was no vacuum whatever, had no room for any other
kind of movement.
1
He went
further,
and connected
velocity
crease
and decrease of
Unequal motion presupposes change either in motum or movens, or both, but this is impossible with regard to the heavens. For it is obvious to
the senses that the parts of the (highest) heavens are uniform in their movements, while with regard to the heavens as a whole the same conclusion is forced upon us when we consider that unequal motion is only possible where force is either added or withdrawn, and that every with-
tion with the irptSros oipavhs, the Insphere of the fixed stars.
PHYSICS
his peculiar theory of motion with these views.
495
All
motion depends upon the contact of a mobile with a motive body, and this law must apply to the motion of
the spheres, since one movens in the same matter can
1 only produce one kind of motion,
motion ultimately proceeds from an unmoved cause, and every motion which has no beginning from an eternal
cause of movement, 2
we must imagine
for
as
many
eternal
movement of the spheres as there are spheres required 3 The heavenly for the phenomena to be accounted for.
bodies are no dead masses, but living beings
drawal of force (aBwa/iia) is an unnatural condition inapplicable
to the heavens, &c.
stotle
;
"
there
asks,
Bereov
tV
sonsholdequallyof thespheres of the planets considered individually and apart from ,the influence of their spheres upon one another Arias of the first heaven. stotle, at 288, a, 14 of the passage quoted above, confines himself
1073, a, 26: iirel 5e rb Kivoifievov av&yKi} vir6 rivos Kiveiff&ai, Kal rb rrpunov klvovv aKivTjrov eivai Ka&
abrb, Kal
tV
a'tSiov
Kivqaiv
inrb al-
blou KivetiySai Kal rfyv filar vtp' evbs, Spcofiev 5e irapa rijv rov iravrbs r^v
arr\rjv
(popup
oijcras
.
. .
%v KiveTv
ras
tpa/ikv
The moveto the latter only. ments of the lower spheres are compounded of those of the
true account The higher. of the motions of the planets (attributing to them acceleration and retardation of velocity) is declared to be iravre\&s &Koyov icol irX&apaTi ijiowv, 283, a, 4. 1 Phxjs. viii. 6, 259, a, 18 (v. above p. 293, n. I): jiia BJ [v KivTIffts] el Vtp' v6s T6 TOV KIVOVVTOS Kal epos TOV KlVOVfltVOV.
2
rty &\\as
tpopas
ray irhavhrav
avdyKfj Kal rovrav eKacTTTjv tSjv tpopuv V7r' aKtvfjrou T KivziffBui Kaff avrb Kal aiSiov
aXSlovs
oufflas.
(pviris
aiStos
rb klvovv
rb Trp6repov
Cf. p. 388
way
in
oiitrias ovo~iav avayKaiov eivai. tpavepbv roivvv 8ti rotravras re olio-Las avayKaiov eivairi\v re tpvtriv aiSlovs Kal OKLvi\Tovs KajS* auras Kal avev fieyeSovs. BBENTANO'S view that these eternal beings
p. 404.
3 After showing the necessity of an eternal incorporeal cause of motion, Metaph. xii. 7, Ari-
De
:
b, 1)
a\V
pels
(hs irepl
o'Wfiiruv
rdi\tv
avTwv
p.6vov
Kal
fiovdb'av
496
ARISTOTLE
as
must be
many
of a
'
souls,' to preside
The
empty
interspace. 1
The centre of
this
system
;
is called
and so the
and each
as
is
it
motion of the
fiev
atyvxw
Sel 8'
8e
irapnav
hiavoovutQa
us fierex&Tuv
irpdl-eus teal inro\apf$<ij'eiv fays. It is true that avruv seems to refer to the stars, not to their
are ixnited severally to spiritual beings which stand in the same relation to them as the humaE soul does to the body which it
spheres, and that we are at liberty to picture with Kampb (Erltewntnissth. d. Arist. 39 individual star as sq.) each
2,
285,
a,
29:
efi\fivxos
So 284,
1,
An.
i.
animated by a
so, for if
spirit
but
the
passage does not compel us to do the spheres are animate the stars which are part of them
must share
Elsewhere,
xii.
their life
and
action.
8 (see p.
previous note), he expressly says that there cannot be more eternal unmoved beings than there are spheres, and this is only what we should have expected from him, since it is only from the movement of the stars that he infers, in the way indicated in the preceding note, the existence qf>such beings. Moreover, it' "is only the spheres, and not the stars, which are said by him to be moved. It is only these, then, that have ' souls of
cf.
'
their
own,
or,
strictly, it is
641, b, 15 sqq. As, however, the mover of the highest sphere lies outside the world and is unmoved, Plato's conception of the ' world-soul (which, indeed, Aristotle expressly rejects, see p.459, n. 5) is as inapplicable to it in its relation to its sphere as it is to the other spheral spirits in then relation to theirs. 1 Aristotle denies that there is any ' void ' (see p 433, sq. supra), and accordingly conceives not only of the astral spheres but oi all the others, even the lowest, as in immediate contact with one another. Meteor, i. 3, 340 b, 10 sqq. 341, a, 2 sqq. ; Be Casio ii. 4, 287, a, 5 sqq. 2 Cf pp. 473 and 478, supra Phys. iii. 5, 205, b, 30 sqq. ; Dt Cash, i. 6 init. ii. 4, 287, a, 8 and elsewhere.
'
.
PHYSICS
spheres, that the terms above
to
497
and beneath are applied and consequently that we come to speak of right and left, front and back, in the world. In this case, reckoning from
opposite
points in the circumference,
the globe the upper, reckoning from the planetary sphere, the northern. 1
1
own
peculiar
See Be Oelo, ii. 2 (cf. Phys. passage just referred to) and the lucid explanation in Bockh, I). kosm. Syst. d. Platon, p. 112 sqq. The differences here spoken of apply only to motion, and therefore properly only to that which to living and self-moved is such the upper is (285, a, 23) rb oBev i] idvr\<ns, the right hand rb a<j>' o5, the front rb i<j>' t y KivnaLs. (Of. Ingr. An. c. 4, 705, If we apply this to b, 13 sqq.) the world, that is the right side of the xpoJTOs oipavbs from which in other its motion proceeds words, the east. This motion is conceived of (285, b, 19), as it was by Plato (see Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 684, 1), as proceeding in a circle towards the right, as when in a circle of men anything (as, for instance, the cup or the talk
;
motion will be that which carries the point in the periphery which has received the push past one who stands in the line of the axis in front of him in other words, that which proceeds from the right in a forward direction and thence to the left. This, however, will be the case with the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars only if the head of one standing inside of it be upon the south pole with that of the spheres of the planets which move from west to east, on the other hand, only on the opposite supposition. According to Aristotle, therefore, our antipodes are in the upper hemi:
;
at table, Plato, Symp. 177, d, 214, B, C, 222, E, 223, C) is passed along by each to his neighbour on the right. The Trparos ovpavbs
therefore represented (285, a, 31 sqq.) as standing inside the circle of the heavens in the line of its axis, touching one of the poles with its head, the other with its feet, and as giving the ball at some point upon its equator the push with its right hand which sets it spinning. The natural direction of such
is
sphere, which he also calls (obviously from a different point of view than that just indicated) the right side of the world we in the lower hemisphere and on the left side. On the other hand, reckoning from the courses of the planets, ours is the upper and right-hand, theirs the lower and left-hand, side. He points out, indeed, that we cannot properly speak of a right and a left at all in connection with the world as a whole (284, b, 6-18 e7reiS^Se rives eiffiv dl (paffiv elvai 8eibv Kal apiarepby tov ovpavov efrrep 8ei irpoffdirretv t$ tov iravrbs trepan rafcas rets dpxa-s
;
n
.
VOL.
I.
K K
498
ARISTOTLE
communicated by the presiding incorporeal
but in
all
motion,
being
and the rapidity of this rotation vary in the several spheres. At the same time the spheres are connected
with each other in such a way that the inner, or lower,
are carried round by the outer, just as if the axis of each
its
el
Sk $6? Kal
left, exist ou
iv avr$ i-p o\<p ; Tngr. An. 5, 706, 11, he finds it natural that
motion should proceed from the upper front and right side, y /J.ev yap dpxh rifiiov, rb 8' &vca rod kxtw Kal rb Trpoffdev rov uiricBev
Kal
tJ>
8e|i2j/
inner with the surrounding spheres Plato had conceived of as existing between the spheres of the planets and of the fixed stars, when in Tim. 36, c, 39, A (cf. Ph. d. Gr, i. 683), he represents the axis of the former as inserted in the latter, and accordingly attributes to the planets a spiral motion compounded of the motions of both circles. One would suppose from Arist.
tov dpiffrepov
rifiicii-
Tepov (though it might be said with equal truth, &>s Sia rb -ras
dpxas
icn-iv).
iy
Totirois
tivai
ravra
Tt/jicvreoa
tup
di'TUca/xfi'wv pLopiojv
So in Be Ca-lo, iii. 5, to the question why the heavens move from east to west and not in the contrary direction, he gives the answer that since nature orders everything in the most perfect possible way, and forward motion is superior to backward, the heavens have received that motion which, according to the description of right and left in u. 2, is to be regarded as a for-
It
is clear,
however,
the
was
The allusion, Meteor. one. 362, a, 32 sqq., to the north pole as the upper, the south pole as the lower, is an unimportant use of ordinary language. ward
ii. 5,
not the case. Plato's proof that the spheres of the planets are carried round by the sphere of the fixed stars appeared to them fantastic. Only those spheres they conceived of as connected with one another which belonged
PHYSICS
409
number
of the spheres
and
also the
direction
and rapidity of
revealed to us by observation. 1
For
this
of Cnidos,
who may be
founder of
upon accurate
planets.
observation, 2
spheres, twenty-six
motion, he thought
stars,
and
fastened.
On
whole assemblage of the stars was the other hand, he assigned four spheres
The
first
sphere
was intended
same
planet.
Aristotle,
on
the contrary, extended Plato's doctrine to the relation of all the upper spheres to those that are contained within them, as is clear from his hypothesis of retrogressive spheres (see infra),
(Cf. also
De
Casio,
ii.
12, 293, a,
troWa
ri)S
re\evra'as
move
EXoilffijs
fj
0epeToi.
^i/SeBe^eV?)
He
justi-
Be
Simpl.
n2
500
wesb.
AJilSTOTZE
The
second, which was fastened into
it,
revolved
completing
its
course in the
the ecliptic.
365J days) to traverse the zodiac in the plane of The others, likewise carried round by the sxirrounding spheres, but differing from them in direction; and the period of rotation, were meant to explain the variations which are observable between the apparent motion of the stars and that produced by the two first spheres. The lowest sphere of each planet supports the Callippus 2 added seven other spheres star itself. two apiece for the sun and moon, and one apiece for Mercury, Venus, and Mars. 3 Aristotle approves of this, as being the more probable theory, 4 without remarking
1
of
Eudoxus
Abh.
d. Berl.
Alwd. 1830,
p.
67
sq.
1 For a fuller account of the theories of Eudoxus and Callippus, see besides the scanty allusion in Aristotle (J&etaplh. xii. 8, 1073, b, 17) Simpl. ibid. 498, b, 5-500, a, 15, who depends partly upon the work of Eudoxus n. 1a.xS>v, partly upon the account of Sosigenes, but has not altogether avoided falling into mistakes, and Theo. Astronom. p. 276 sqq. ed. Martin, in whom, however, his editor (p. 55 sq.) points out serious errors. In explanation, cf IDELER, ibid. 73 sqq.
'
KRISCHE, Forschungen, p. 288 sq., who are followed by Bonitz, Arist. Metaph. ii. 507 sq., and
Arist. Metaph. iv. 274 sq. PRANTL, 'Apiar. ir. oip. 303 sqq. 2 According to Simpl. ibid.
;
Schwegler,
perhaps only of his pupil Polemarchus) who on the death of the latter betook himself to Aristotle at Athens. Simplicius knows of no work by him, but gives some account, taken from Eudemus's History of Astronomy, of the reasons which led him to dissent from Eudoxus. a AKIST. ibid. 1073, b, 32 Simpl. ibid. 600, a, 15 sqq. Theo, ibid. 278 sq. IDBLBB, 81 sq. KRISCHB, 294 sq. 4 It is obvious from the passage quoted p.490, n. i,supra, that he did not attribute complete certainty to it. According to Simpl. 503, a, 3, he even brought forward several objections to it in the Problems. The passage, however, does not occur in this treatise as we have it, which makes it all the more difficult to decide
;
; ;
upon
its
genuineness.
a, 23,
this astro-
PHYSICS
that his
501
own
sphere assigned
1
by Eudoxus and Callippus to each planet superfluous. At the same time he judges an important rectification of the theory to be needful, on account of this very coherence of the heavenly system. For if each sphere
carries
round in
its
Course
all
in
it,
assumed spheral system would be altered communication of movement from the spheres of one planet to To meet this difficulty Aristotle, those of another. accordingly, inserts some other spheres between the lowest of each planet and the highest of that which comes next beneath, meaning them to obviate the
result of the
should
move
to
2
at the
rate as those
destined
direction
neutralise,
but in an exactly
many
marks, 603, a, 38 sqq. (where, however, 1. 41, we must read <rwoiroKaflio-Tajo'aj/), a special sphere is not required to explain the daily rotation of the planets from
east to west,
since,
in conse-
quence of this connection the motion of the spheres of the fixed stars communicates itself to all that are contained in it. 2 concentric For if two
whose axes lie in the same line, and of which the inner
spheres,
one is fixed to the outer by the poles of its axis, spin round the common axis with relatively equal velocities in the opposite directions, each point of the inner sphere is at each moment precisely in the position in which it would be if both spheres were at rest. The two motions have completely neutralised one another in their effect upon the inner sphere and all that depends upon it, as Sosigenes, in Simpl. ibid,. 500, b, 39,
truly explains.
602
ARISTOTLE
'
as the
movements
collective
:
none of these may be communicated to another planet, whereas the daily revolution from east to west excited in each planet by its first sphere does not require to be
neutralised. 2
It is only the
moon which
requires no
moon
consequently,
adds twenty-two
1<\>aipo.i
ave\tTTOV(rai
(supaa-
(pepofievaif
cf.
Sosigenes 502,a,43,T&s rav vTreo&vu Kivficreis, 1074, a, 2-12), i.. 'spheres which serve to turn those beneath them backwards,'
not as
does.SlMPL.
ib.
to
opposite to that of the next above them," and in this way to keep them in the same position relatively to the fixed stars as they would ha'e held had the planetary spheres above them produced no effect upon them at all ("t&s dveMrroiaas Kal els rh
alirb ajtoKa.BiaTi.aas ttj
Beast
tV
Trp^TTiv aipaipav
reraynevov
ibid. 1074, a, 1
sqq
Theophrastus
This supposition is as erroneous as the view, discussed p. 501, siopra, that the- theory of a special sphere for each of the planets with daily rotation from east to 'west is compatible with Aristotle's system of the spheres. For since, according to his view, the sphere of the fixed stars in its revolution carries round with it all that is contained in it, each further sphere which revolved in the same direction and at the same velocity would only add one more to the number of the daily rotations of the spheres contained in it, unless this result were obviated by a special arrangement
of
stotle
this.
called these spheres dvTavtupepovbecause they carry those o-oi, that are beneath them back,
and
less
Svcurrpoi, all
are star498, b, 41, where, however, the retrogressive spheres appear to be con-
some, but
them
(Simpl
ibid.
action of the primeval spheres of each planet which run parallel with the heaven of fixed stars,
starless spheres
PHYSICS
Mara,
tAM
giving in
all
fifty-five or,
we add
entities
1
fifty-six
many
eternal incor-
poreal
unmoved
from
whom
The progress of observation could show that the theory of spheres, even as thus conceived, was inadequate to explain the phenomena
spheres proceed.
not
fail to
epicycles
'
triumphantly against
agonists of Aristotle's system admitted that his theory of retrogressive spheres was an ingenious attempt to
rectify
1
Metaph.
cf.
Simpl.
ibid.
i
Md.
oualav
Set
dpitrrov
Ka0' avrijv tov TervxuKvlav re\ovs elyai vofilfctv, ovfisfila &v ettj iraph
diraOii Kal
rafrras
irepa
(pvtris
[sc.
diratifys
&c],
eiaiv
oA\o
rovrov
dviyKri
eiVe
dpiBfjuOV elvat
ray
obiriuv.
rdv ydp
groundless the traditional reading is obviously meaningless.) Here also we can see that his theory is founded upon observation. In 1. 12 he remarks that if we were to leave the sun and the moon out of our reckoning, the number of the (planetary) spheres would be 47 but the difficulty is so obvious that Sosigenes conjectured this to be a slip for 49 (Simpl. ibid. 502. a, 11 sqq.). Krische, with whom Bonitz and seemingly also Schwegler agree, refers the remark to the eight retrogressive spheres under Mercury and the sun but it is not easy to see how the <r<pcupai cLve\irTov(rai belonging to the sun and the moon could have been left out.
;
;
hv &s re\os ovocu (popas. (Instead of tc'\o us, however, in 1. 20, we must clearly read with Bi nitz t4\os; Brentano's objection to this emendation, Psychol, d. Ar. 344 sq., is
cTepat Kivoiev
ibid.
Greek Theory of the Moon's Orbit,' Rhcin. Mu. xii. (1857), 120 sq. 3 Of the Peripatetic Sosigenes (as to whom, see Zell. Pli. d. Gr. i. 696, 701) Simpl, says,
604
ARISTOTLE
circle of fixed stars,
it,
'iL. /0He
or the
'
first
heaven,' as
Aristotle called
celestial world.
is
most perfect
purpose by a
single motion.
In
its
single sphere
it
carries
an innumotion
is
Its
direction,
it it
from
right to right. 3
Moving without
it
trouble,
requires
no Atlas
to support
:
nor any
sail to
carry
round by
2a>triyevris ey-
ayxivotav aiirov &c. Simpl. proceeds, 502, b, 5 sqq., to give the arguments which he
few motions, the next above that and the next again reach higher attainments, the former by the aid of many, the latter by the
aid of few, motions. Finally the highest heavens attain the highest with one single motion. In answer to the second question, Aristotle remarks that the first sphere far excels the others in vital and original energy (i/oijcrai
yb.p
broughtagainstAristotle'stheory. Be CaHo, ii. 12, Aristotle asks how it is that the number of motions belonging to each planet does not increase with their distance from the primurn movens, but the three middle planets have one motion more than the two above and below them and, further, why the first sphere contains so many stars while the converse is the case with the others, several spheres being assigned to each star. In reply to the former question (292, a, 22) he says that whereas the Most Perfect needs no action (see p. 396, n. 2, 3, and p. 397, n. 1), of all that is beneath Him one thing attains its
1 ;
Set
rijs
ckA<xtt]s
TroWty fnrtpoxhv
irpc(ST7js irpbs
but that the nearer each is to first the more are the bodies which it carries, seeing that the lower spheres are carried round by the upper. Aristotle himself seems, from the way in which he introduces them, 291, b, 24, 292,
14 (cf p. 169, n. 3, and p. 490, place no great reliance upon these explanations. The problem, however, appears to him too important to be altogether passed over. There are questions which he approaches with a species of religious awe, but which nevertheless lie very near
a,
.
n. 4) to
end by a few actions, another requires many, others still make no effort to attain their end at all, but content themselves with a distant approach to perfection.
his heart.
-
at all,
it
nearest to
has
1,
supra. supra.
PHYSICS
force. 1
505
motion embraces all and generates all Unbegotten and indestructible, affected by no earthly distress, comprehending in itself all time and space, it rejoices in the most complete existence that has been allowed to any bodily thing. 2 Less
Its
motion.
perfect
is
Instead
we
its
course.
Their
a pure
and deviating
Be
Casio,
[<5
ii.
ancients were right when they assigned the heavens, as alone indestructible, to the gods, for i b
is
&tp6apros Kal
irdfTt\s
ayvi\Tos,
IVi
8'
aira8ris
io-rlv,
OvrjTTJs
Svo'xzpzias
in
i.
9,
by
irpbs
rb nySe/tias avdyKqs, t)
Qepeffdai
irav
Karex^t
toiovtov
fi,
KaiKvovca
&\K(as
Kal
'
TrecpvKdra avrbv
yap
rb
hr'ntovov,
BiaI. 9,
St6irep ica\us e^ei arvfncelOeiv eavrbv robs dpxaiovs Kal /idhia'Ta irarpiovs rjfj.oJf a\Tj6eis elvai \6yovs, us tariv
Scrqyxep av
afiiu&Tepov
Kal
addvarSv ti Kal Beiov rwv 4x' VTCav ftev kIvtiviv ix^ VTUV * roiairrjv
The
Hate
a\ka
paWov
4o~rl,
rairriv
t)
tuv &Wcav
irepas.
KVK\otpopia r4\sios
Kal
ovtra irepiex et
ixoiaas
fiev
irepas
ovSeiiiav
oSt'
tipxV %x ovaa
>
a\\' a^Kavffros odffa al/ rbv &tretpov XP& V0V rwv ^' tZv /lev al-ria ttjs apxvs fi/ Be The vavKav. T^ v SeX ^"''!
oiSre Te\evrriv,
&^
passage which follows (quoted p. 396, n. 6), refers partly to the same subject, even although the description contained in it refers primarily to God and not to the heavens. All that was said of the aether, p. 473 sq., is equally applicable to the wpwros ovpavbs, which, according to the account p. 490, n. 3, is formed of the purest aether.
506
ARISTOTLE
circle are produced.
is
1
from the
of
these motions
affected
by the
a further proof
complete self-sufficingness.
Nevertheless,
of the
which is removed from mutaand impression from without, and which partakes
of perfection. 3
As
the aether
is
elements, so the stars without exception occupy a position of superiority to the earth.
celestial
De
Ccelo,
ii.
motion
39,
vii.
that of the daily motion round the earth) constantly decreases towards the centre. s Cf pp. 474 and 505, n 2, supra, and Phys. ii. 4, 196, a, 33 rbv obpavbv Kal ra 8et6raTa twv <patvofi4.
Metaph. xii. 8, 1074, a, 17 (see p. 503, n. 1, supra). The stars are therefore called Bi?a a^ix.a-ra,
vav.
Metaph.
ibid.
1.
30,
lie Ccelo,
ii.
further each is the longer it takes to complete a revolution, inasmuch as the motion of the stellar heavens from east to west has a stronger counteractive influence upon that of the planets from west to east the nearer it is to it. As Aristotle expressly appeals to mathematical proofs for the truth of the latter proposition, we must understand it to mean that of concentric circles or spheres which revolve round their axes in the same time, the outer ones move swifter than the inner,
12, 292, b, 32; likewise the heavens, ibid. 3, 286, a, 11. 1 Part. An. i. 1, 641, b, 18 to yovv Terayfievov Kal to wpw-
/xaWov Qa'verai iv rots 5' #AAot ra dvTjra imXKov. Metaph. iv. 5, 1010, a, 28 6 yap irepl 7]fj.as tov alaOTjTov
fxivov voKit
&A\' oStos oiidkv ws rod tto.vt6s iariv. By thus dividing the universe into a terrestrial and a celestial part, Aristotle intends to distinguish between the sublunary world, the materials of which are
fidvos
'
&v
e'iTreTv
j+opiov
; :
PHYSICS
Aristotle,
like
507
Plato,
animated by rational
fore
and ascribed
1
to
these
we can
boast to
have acquired
about them. 2
view we can trace the consequences of a metaphysic which deduced all motion
In
this
ultimately from
incorporeal
it
essences
but
it
is
also
possible to recognise in
a reflection of those
modes of
supplied by the four elements, and in which birth, death, and qualitative change take place, and the world of the heavenly spheres,which consists of aetherial matter and which, while exhibiting motion in space, admits neither growth nor transformation of any kind. Similarly, De Ccelo, i. 2, 269, a, 30, b, 14
vetpvKe
ris
ovffia
trtlip.aros
doctrine, Metaph. i. 9, 990, b, 34, 991, b, 13, iii. 6, 1002, b, 15, 17, 22, 467. 1 Mh. N. vi. 7, 1141, a, 34:
avBpc&Trov iro\b Beidr'epa
oToy (pavepdrard
avviarttKev.
dWrj
preceding note. 2 Part. An. i. 5 mit. the beings in the world are either unbegotten and imperishable, or begotten and perishable o-u/ijSe:
f}i]Ke
oijffas
5e
.... Zari
ri
irapa
ra
(Tio/iara
ra
aspearrfKe
rwv
ivravBa ir\e7ov ; c. 8, 276, a, 28 sqq. b, 3, ii. 12, 292, b, 1, where rav &<rrpa>v and tvravBa are opposed Meteor, ii. 3, 358, a, 25 tout' del yiveadai Kard riva rd^tv, fas ev$eXerai /jLere^ety ra tvravBa rdews. In ordinary language 4vravBa and respectively the ^i indicate
:
irepl Se rav tpBapdpxetv Betcpias rav (pvray Te real fflav eviropovfiev fjiaWov irpbs rty yvwffw Sta to ffyvrpoipov. ^x i ^' exdrepa ydpw.
rav
Kara fiiKpbv rty rifit6rijra rod yviapi^eiv Vitiiov % ra irap* yfuv airavra, ibtrirep Kal rav ipafievuv to Tvxbv Kal fitKpbv fidpiov KartBe'iv
fiev
el
yap
Kal
upper and the under world (e.g. Soph. Ajax, 1372 Plato, Mnp.
;
iariy % iroWa erepa Kal 9l5i6v fieydha 5i' aKpifieias ZSelj/ ra 5e 8ia to fiaWov Kal ir\eiu yvwplfeiv
avrwv
71/j.vy
iiriffri\iii\s
330, D, v. 451, b; Apol. 40, B, 41, B sq., and elsewhere), in Plato also the sensible and ideal world (Thecet. 176, A, Phredr. 250, a), as also in Aristotle, where
i.
12 (supra, p. 169, n.
3).
be
is
describing
the
Platonic
608
ARISTOTLE
Aristotle
him-
indeed,
is
perfectly conscious
of this connection
faith of his nation. 2
The
relation
between the
terrestrial
earthly things.
the
difference
for
no other
reason*,
forces
them
to
move
in
But since everything that moved must be moved by something else, it follows
Zbll. Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 686 sq. See p. 505, n. 2, supra,
p.
8,
1
and
xii.
Meta/ph.
:
Kal ravras ras 5o'{as eKeivuv otov Aeityava irepuretruaiai p-expi T0 " v ^ v ^ P*** ^ v ^arpios
tpBeipoixevwv
-
rrapaSeio-
8<j|a
xal
t\
irapa
rav
Trp&rrwv
iirl
rai Be irapa ruv apxaiwv Kal irafiiraAoiaii/ iv fiiBov o-xhpari KaraAeAei,u,iieVa tois Sarepov Sri 8eol re eltriv otroi [the starry heavens] Kal TfpUx ei T & fleiov 2\ijv ipiffiv. to Se \oiira. nvBiKas ^817
tV
vpoarjicrai
irpbs
tV
weiB&s
rmv
xv.
iroWuv
Kal irpbs tJ)k els robs vipovs avBpairoKal rb <rv/i(p4pov xpijffiv eitiets re yap rovrovs Kal rav
elsewhere;
347,
1)
aWoiv
Kal
(<ptev
roirois
mean that the Divine Providence reaches only as far as the moon
and does not extend
to the earth, representation agTees with the true Aristotelian doctrine may be gathered from what has been already said, at pp. 403, 410, and 42l. 4 See pp. 453 sq. 477 sq. mp.
irapaTrh^ffia
elf
S>v
tis xvp'""1 * a " T & *<tf o p-ivov rb npurrov Sri deobs cpovro ras irpdras
oifftas eivai
Belies
How
far
this
av eiprjaOai
vo/tt-
aeiev
Kal
euprt/ieimis
rb Svvarbv IkoVt7)s
PHYSICS
an impulse from without.
509
The immediate sources of Their movement occasions the changes of warmth and cold, which, in the opinion of Aristotle, are the most generally active forces in the elementary bodies. 2 Although the stars and their spheres are neither warm nor cold, 3 yet, by their movement, they generate light and heat in the stratum of air that lies nearest to them as, indeed, all swiftly moving bodies warm and even set fire to surrounding substances by friction. This is particularly true of the place in which the sun is fastened,
;
Meteor,
5'
e'|
i.
2,
339,
a,
21
(Tti
avdyKTis ffuvexft s 1VU3S tivros \_d nepl rfyv yijy Kotr/tos] rats tpopah, (bffre iraffav aifTov avu>
T?jf
bvvap.iv
Kvfiepvatrdai
eKcldev.
trvfj.@aiv6vTaiv irzpl
Kal
yyv
Kal
to
burn, and the lead of arrows and bullets to melt (on this widely spread error of the ancients, cf. Ideler, Arist. Meteor, i. 359 sq.) it must therefore heat the air that surrounds them. toSto p.iv oiv aura iKdepfiaiverai bid rb eV de'pt
tpepeaOai,
KtvfitTGi
w
. . .
iv ii\7js
eibet
yiyvofiivuv atria xph vorffc 1 "* rb 5' ofrrus aXnov ws '66ev 7] ttjs
Kiv^ffecas
fievoiv a, 14.
'*
del kivovc. 3,
iKTrvpovffdai,
tov
8'
aiTiareov
340,
azpos vtrb
(Tipatpav
See
It
eKelvfjS
lc0epfi.aive<T6ai,
fi
Kal
ravrr)
they
fi&MffTa
bep.evos.
should be, seeing that the tether, of which they consist, admits none of the opposites which constitute the qualities of the elements. Some further reasons against the view that they are of a fiery nature are given, Meteor.
i.
avrov koI aviffxvros Kal virep 7j/xas ovtos yiyvtrai tj deppdTris. That
3 fin.
:
DeCmlo, ii. 7, 289,a, 19 the rj Se stars do not consist of fire, 6spp6Tris air' avrwv Kal rb tpas yiveral TrapeKrpi&Ofjievov tov aepos Motion virb rfjs ixeiywv (popas. causes wood, stone, and iron to
the sun has this effect is explained, Meteor, i. 3, 341, a, 19, in the course of an exposition which agrees with the passage just quoted, in terms similar to the above. See further Meteor, i. 3,
340, b, 10,
i.
7,
344,
a, 8.
The
whole account, however, would suggest many difficulties even to an Aristotelian. For how can light and heat proceed from a
510
so slow of
ARISTOTLE
motion as the rnoon.
Again the solar movewhich baa jjii.mil the 1 air, to burst and rush violently downward. If the motion of the sun were uniformly the same in relation to the earth it would produce a simple and unvarying effect either of generation or of destruction. But the inclination of the sun's path makes it unequal. The sun is sometimes nearer and sometimes further from the different parts of the earth, and the alternation of birth and death is a result of this circumstance. 2 Whether one connects the former with the proximity and the
fire
latter
and
single
cold,
celestial
it
the motion of the whole sphere that produces them? We should require in that case to suppose that the sun stands out of its sphere like a promontory, Or how does it agree with the account here given that the fire and air region is separated from the solar sphere by the lunar 1 Meteor, i. 3, 341 a, 28. 2 Gen. et Cm r. ii. 10 eVel i) Kara rfy fyopav Kivi}trLs SeSeiKrai *6ri a'ISios, avayKT} rovrotv ovrwv ical yeveiriv elvai ffuvexws 7] yap <popa Troi-ficrei rty yeveiriv 4vSe\exus Sta
is
1
:
when
fi
rjj ava>p.ah(q
yap havrluv rhvavrla airia. Sib Kal oix V irpibrv <ppa. atria eirrl yeveireas Kal tpBopas, d\\' r/ Kara rbv \obv kAkXov eV touttj yap
ical
rb
KiveiirBai
Sio
oiv auvex '" s v T0 " <^ ou 4>P" air la, rod Be npoaievai ko! airierai t\ iyKhiais <rvp.$aivei 700 &re fiev rr6ppto 71'j/eadai ore 8' iyyis. avlirov Be rov Staar-fifiaros ivros avii>p.a\os %urai
Ktrr,ireis
.
rrjs p.ev
T)
k'ivt\o-is
'
Kal
t$
dirievai
ravrbv
.
rovro Kal
Kal
el rip
ir6pp'j>
ylyeirBai tpdelpei
irpotrievai
rb Trpotrdyew Kal dirdyeiv rb yevvr\rik6v. But as both birth and . death are eternal, ipavepbv '6ri /iifis /liv oVcrms rijs tpopas ovk evSeXerai ylveixBai afupa Sia, rb ivavrla elvai rb yap airb Kal utraArus
. .
iroWaKis
yevvfy
Kal rip voWdKis dire\9e7t> <p9elpei rav yap ivavrltov rdvavrla airia.
i.
9,
346, b, 20,
ii.
2,
ex
"
<" e '
T^
rreipvKe
iroietv.
ffitrre <jtoi
yeveais del
IWai f)
tpBopd.
infra.
: '
PHYSICS
derance of one over the other,
same.
1
511
still
by causing
flying to
if prevented by no controlling influence, they would severally occupy. The materials of the world are thus continually con-
The endlessness
The substances
which are further removed from the highest cause having no right to indestructible existence, the Deity has enthus
1
dowed them with perpetual becoming instead, and has 3 left no gap or discontinuity in the universe.
' '
Gen. An. iv. 10, 777, b, 16: the generation, evolution, and the life of animals have their natural periods, which are determined by the revolution of the sun and the moon, as we might koX yap 9epfi6Tt]Tes Kal expect
:
acifji.ara.
atriov
/J.PV
yap roirov
'
4ffr\v
el
rj
els
aWyjAa
pJi]
uerdfio.fru
yap
eKCUTTW
KaX
tfSl]
nere^aWev
rov
irKtifrlov,
av
StecTT^Keo'ay.
/.ieT a{3d\\ei
oZv Sta t)}v (popay dnrKrjv oZffav 5ict Be rh fj.era^dWeiv ovk ivBex eTal
fj.4veiv ovtiev
TJ/ueiy
P*XP
ffvfifierpias
Tivbs
avruv ev
vvBep.1%
is
X^P a
only
irotovffl
ras yevetrets, fxerh 8e ravra ras <p8opds. tovtqiv 8' exovtrt rb nepas real Trjs apx^s Kal ttJs TeXev-
Teray/ievri.
Here
also it
by
TOVTUV KtvfjlTClS tS)V affTpCOV. The changes in the temperature of the air depend upon the sun and moon those in the water upon air and wind. Whatever is or comes into being in them must
TTJS at
;
the sun effects the constant transmutation of the elements, as is placed beyond a doubt by the arguments in the Meteorology which are discussed below.
3 Gen. et Coir. ii. 10, 336, b, 26: toOto 8' eiKiyws <jvn$i$i\xev eirel yap ev a-waaiv aei rov $e\riovos bpeyeaBai (pafiev r^v tpvtriv, /SeAriov Be rb eTvai ?/ rb fiij eTvai, tovto 8' dhvvaTov ev Snraffiv Ondpxeiv Bta
.
Gen. et Carr.
St SriKov ex
ii.
S|iia
rovrav
rb
irnppai TTJS
apxys
aip'lcrTaoSai, Tip
Aenrofievcp rpiircp
tw
els
%Aov
Seis
512
ARISTOTLE
mutation
for as the
fixed
intervals,
movement
of the heavens
is circular,
kind of
all
circle,
mena produced by
He
first
;
fiery circle
next
6
those of the
finally
7
and
those
23 sqq.
3 The object of the treatise is 'iaa avp.set forth thus, in c. 1
:
yiveaiv.
Ibid.
11 fin.
Kara tpvoiv fiev, araKroripav /j.4vroi rrjs rov irp&rov ffroix^iov rS>v frcofidroiv, Trepl rov yeirviuvra
flaivei
r&v
atrrpav,
Xpovif Kai
ri
<p8opa Kai
?j
yevttris
t\
tpvffiv. Sib Kai oi xpdvot Kai ol IkoVtojc apiBfibv %x'"rl Ka^ rovrtp hiopi^ovrai irdvrtcv yap Iffri rdis Kai iras fiios Kai xpdvos /AgTpe?rai Trpt6Stp Tr\^y ov rip avrtp irdvres.
fiioi
Kara
aipos eTvai Koiva ird07j Kai vSaros, en 8e yyjs oaa eiS7j Kai fiepT] Kai -wad] rav
offa t deirifiev av
p.(pav.
With these
investigations
Experience, moreover, is in harmony with this theory dpS/j.v yap Stl trpoffi6vros ft,ev rov r,Klov
:
and
1
iv.
9 iii.
fiecei
[i.e.
6.
yevetrls
iffrtv,
airt6vros 5e
<p6to~is,
rdtros rij
It is
fieri,
rovrov
:
true that in many cases death takes place quicker. The reason of this, however, is to be found in the disproportionatenessof the materials.
2
circle], trpSiros 5e 7repl rrjv yrjv ; and again riiros Kowbs BBoto'i rt
ual aepos,
'
i.
9 init.
iii.
3,
Ibid.
IDELBB.
PHYSICS
513
The
seem to have
been finished.
now forms
which
offers a
we should
chemistry.
and organic
various
In the
first
of
these
sections
phenomena, such as meteors and aerolites, 2 together with the Comets and the Galaxy, are explained to be
and inflammable vapours set on by the motion of the stars. 3 Comets are bodies of this vapour in a state of slow combustion, moving
collected masses of dry
fire
Similar in kind is the Milky Way, its vaporous material being excreted and inflamed by the movement of the whole heaven. 5
,
clouds.
Under the
influence
of solar
the
1
air,
See
were thought to
forecast.
On
3
3
4, 479, n. 4, 490, n. 3, and 509, n. 4. 4 Ibid. a. 6-7, especially 344, a, 16 sqq. and c. 8, 345, b, 32 sqq. In harmony with the account of the nature of comets which he here gives, Aristotle endeavours (344, b, 18 sqq.) to explain those
comets held its ground among the most distinguished astronomers until the time of Newton,
6
Ibid.
c. 8, esp.
346, b, 6 sqq.
meteorological
phenomena
{e.g.
where the attempt is made to explain in detail, on the basis of this supposition, the form and appearance of the Milky Way.
I,
VOL.
I.
S14
ARISTOTLE
Then they condense, change
again to earth. In this manner
from
air to water,
and
fall
moving up
and down in a circle when the sun is near, the column of air, or warm exhalation, rises when it retreats, the stream of water flows downwards. 3 Aristotle makes use of this phenomenon to explain the clouds and
;
snow and
hail, 5
and goes on
to
connect with
of the sea. 7
it
The former
\\
The
sea,
though
no
less eternal
its
is
always yielding a
portion of returns to
it
salt
and
taste
is
for
are generated
in other
the water of the rain and the streams, and being by reason
of
its
it
remains
The reason
i.
given,
ibid.
'*
o. 3,
Air, which is a compound of moisture and heat, when it cools down, is transformed into
i.e.
water
see
Ibid.
i.
m. 0.
Ibid, at 346, b, 32. Ibid. o. 10-12. 6 Ibid. c. 13, 349, b, 2-c. li Jin., where he gives a survey of the most noted rivers and their sources. The matter of c. 14 will be further touched upon infra. ' Ibid. ii. c. 1-3.
5
PHYSICS
behind in the
.evaporation
sea.
515
Dry evaporation
Both are mingled in the lower atmosphere, but the dry exhalations rise aloft and are carried round by the rotation of the upper regions.
rain.
maining moisture
to cool
warm
one another. 2
terior
of the
may be
In the earth
itself stones
all
damp
1 Ibid. i. c. 13, 349, a, 12 sqq., 4-6, especially c. 4, where the subject is further developed. Cf. also Idelbe, i. 541 sqq. ; Meteor, i. 3, 341, a, 1 Probl. xxvi. 26. 2 Upon this avTiirepiaTaais, a
Somno,
ii.
conception which plays a great part in Aristotle's philosophy of nature, as it did in Plato's before, and in the Stoics' after, him, see
also Meteor,
i.
12, 348, b, 2
De
sqq.
516
ARISTOTLE
But the fourth book, which is not properly connected with the others, makes a new start. Taking the four elementary characteristics, and regarding warmth and cold as active, dryness and moisture as
bodies.
1
latter,
in their
several manifestations.
generation,
these principles, being combined in due proporand acting on the material substratum of a being,
its
substance 4
cor-
when
the
warmth
ments of a being is withdrawn by some external heat, and consequently form and distinctness are destroyed. 5
Among phenomena
may be reckoned
Of the two
2 3
Meteor,
iv.
1,
378,
b,
28:
irpwrov ixev odv Ka$6\ov tj ccttAt) yeveais Kal 7/ tpvtriK^i fiera$o\^ ro6rtnv ruv Swdqietiov 4ffriv %pyov Kal
7)
iraaa yap i\ Kara fpiatv ipBopa els rovff dS6s earui. L. 16 otitis S' i&rl ipdoph. rrjs iv exdartp vyp$ oliceias Kal /caret tpvtrtv 8epfi6r7]ros
:
far'
aWoTpias Bepfidnjros
7j
'
aflrT} 8'
ai/TiKei/icM) tpSopa.
4
Kara
fyiaiv.
%<m S' ii a.ir\rj 31 Kal tpvtriK)] yeveats fierafioK)) im6 roirwv ruv Svvdfieuv, Bray ex a"ri \6yov, ix TTJs iiroKttfieinis KAijs
Ibid.
1.
:
joint effect of ^vxpirt\s oiKela, and 8epfi.6ri\s aKKorpia. Moisture, however, is (ace. to 1. 8 sqq.) a
eKdtrrri ipicei
ai
a?Tai
S' [i(A7j]
elalv
elpnfievai
Svv6.fi.eis
iraflijTiKa'.
yeyvwtrt
5
Se
Kparovvra
Kparfj,
rrjs tfAijs.
Ibid. 379, a, 2
Stop Si
fill
necessary means, all generation being the result of the action of moisture (which is evipiarov; seep. 480, n. 2, supra) upon dryness in obedience to the efficient force of nature destruction begins Stop
;
Kara
rb bpiQ6p.evov
e\\iis,
aTrAp yeviffei
<nj<|<is.
havriov
/uaAiaTa
koivov
irtyis, ireiravffis,
Smriira
PHYSICS
517
is
more
easily determinable
moisture,
characteristics of
qualities they
1
This comsoft. 2
bination produces
Every body, again, which has must be stiff, and all stiffness
Consequently,
own
definite
form
3 4
a form of dryness.
we
and
Homogene-
warmth and
cold. 6
as effects of heat, airityia, a>)i6rqs, ixiiXvais, aT&Ttvais as effects of cold. Cf. Meteor, iv. 2 sq. 1 eio-1 8' al per Ibid. u. 4 dpx<d tSc irafiarinv al iraB-trrucal iypbv Kttl \t\piv . . ivel 5' iffrl rb fiev vypdv eiidpuTrov, rb fie ^tjpbv Sua6purTov [see p. 480, n. 2,supra\,
: .
5 e
c. u. c.
5 init.
5-7. 8 init.
c.
10, 388,
a,,
iyioiAv ti
-rip
ifyu
ical
toTs fiSiiriuuri
irpbs
rb yap iypbv t$ ivpv alTiov tov 6pi(eadat ... /cal Sio tovto dfi<poit> itrr\ rb &>pur\x.kvov awna. Aeyfrai Be run
wdcrxoviriv
&WriAa
ffToix^W ISiairara
u.a\
Ibid. 382, a, 8 sqq. c. 5 init. rb &pifffievov irafia oliceicp 8pa (cf p. 480, n. 2), as distinguished
.
the nature of homogeneity, cf. Part I, 879, 2. Homogeneous bodies (dftoLOfLeprj') are defined in general as those composed of one kind of material, whether that material be simple and elementary or compound, in the narrower sense as those composed of the latter. Opposed to the homogeneous is the heterogeneous (duofioto/xipis), or that which is composed of different held materials mechanically together, as is the case especially with organic bodies. See, besides the passages referred to above, Meteor, iv. 10, 388, a, 13. c. 12 init. ; De An. i. 5, 411, a, 16-21, where besides cf b, 24 sqq
20 sqq.
On
Sfioiofiep^s
we
have
d/wieifiiis,
-rb
which
is
518
ARISTOTLm
1
and composition, passing to the detailed discussion of living beings with the remark that homogeneous bodies serve as the matter of heterdto describe their qualities
In
we
physics which
is
We cannot
therefore here do
more than
Part. An.
S/ioiofiepfi
9,
655, b, 21,
.
where
explained by o-vy&vvfia toTs S\ois Ttfc /i4p7i cf the Ind. Arist. under the word. According to Philop. Aristotle distinguished in his Eudemvs between elementary homogeneous and organic bodies. In a quotation from this dialogue occur the words (Ar. I'r. 1482, do-v/ia, 10, cf. p. 482, supra) fierpia eot! tuv <rTOtxel<w V v6<ros
is
; :
common
Siva/us)
property
of
many
bodies with
it is in-
ruv dfioLOfiepav r? affdeveia ruv opyaviKuv rb aiaxos they are perhaps, however, only inserted by the reporter by way of ex.
.
separably united (ou x aP"rr ^)' That which gives actuality to this property (ti tovtov Ivipyeia rov Siatpai/ovs fj Stafpaves t] vtgAe'xem rov Siacpavovs, 418, b, 9, 419, a, 10) and as it were colour to the transparent object is ligh t, which again is caused by fire or
',
defined as
irapovffla
roioirov nvbs
planation. 1 Ibid. c. 8-1 1. Caps. 8 and 9 treat, especially of stiffening by heat and cold; of melting by heat and moisture ; of softening, bending, extending; of breaking, bruising, splitting, &c. ; caps. 10 and 11 treat of the constituent elements of homogeneous bodies and the properties by which they
r$
446, a, 25 sqq
the view of
Em-
may
pedocles that light is motion passing from heaven to earth, on the ground of the immense distance at which we see it. Light, to Aristotle, is the effect of motion (see 468 sq. supra), but is not ^er se a motion, but rather a definite
state which is produced in a body as a whole in consequence of a qualitative change (aWolao-is) such as freezing {Be Sensu, c. 6, 446, b, 27 sqq.) It is asserted at the same time that vision is the
PHYSICS
as
it
519
will
motion which passes from an object to the eye through the transparent medium (De An.
;
7, 419, a, 9, 13, iii. 1, 424, b, De Sensv, 2, 29, c. 12, 435, a, 5 438, b, 3). That, he says, which by its presence causes light, by its absence darkness, is also that which on the border of transii.
parent things produces Colour. For colour resides only on the surface of bodies, and belongs, therefore, only to those which have definite limits as light is
:
points of view in the most exhaustive manner, pp. 86-159, as also Baumkbe, Arist. Lehre v. d. Sinnesvermogen (1877), p. 21 sqq. Sound is said to be motion caused by the concussion of hard bodies and transmitting itself through the medium of the air. It was to describe this idea of the sound-medium that Theophrastus and other Peripatetics
said to be eV aopiffrcp rw Siatpavei (De Sensu, o. 3, 439, a, 26), so colour is defined (ibid. 439, b, 11) as rb rov Suupaj/ovs ey ff6fJ.ci.Ti White and black &>piai>.iv!f Tipas: correspond on the surface of bodies to light and darkness (439, b, 16), and from these two primary colours come all the
others, not merely by the mechanical confusion of their atomic elements, nor by the shining of one through the other, but also by a real process of mixture, such as is described at p. 420. If they
invented the word Sti/xts, formed upon the analogy of Suupai/^s, just as in like manner they invented Slofffios to describe the medium by which smell is transmitted, Phi lop. De An. L, 4 cf. ibid. M, 8, u. 10, o. Those notes are high which make a forcible impression on the ear in a brief time, i.e. quick notes those on the other hand are deep which take a longer time to produce a weak impression, i.e. slow ones (De An. ii. 8, 419, b, 4-420, b, 5). Bodies which are fastened into
; ;
are mixed in simple numerical proportion, we have pure colours if otherwise, impure. Inclusive of black and white, Aristotle enumerates in all seven primary colours (ibid. 439, b, 18 to the end of the chapter, and also c. 6, 445, b, 20 sqq., and c. 4, 442, a, 19 sqq.
others and carried round by them as the stars are, produce no sound by their motion (De Casio, ii. 9, Smell is held to 291, a, 9 sqq.) be caused by dry materials which are dissolved in moisture, i.e. in water or air (eyxv/ios {tjp<(t7)j, 443, a, 1 b, 4 ; note that the earlier and provisional description of dtrpii as KaiwiiSns avaBv/ttains, De Sensu,
Cf
De An. ii.
;
7 vnit.
iii.
1 sqq.
Meteor,
443,
a,
21).
c. 5,
This
is
how they
(De
become objects
Sensu,
;
to the sense
sqq.,
i.
5, 342, b, 4).
upon colour starts what different premisses vide Peantl, who treats Aristotle's doctrine of colour from different
;
De An. ii. 6 cf. Baumkbe, 28 sq.) In the same way Taste is the effect of
the union of dry or earthy material
520
ARISTOTLE
the law discovered by the Pythagoreans which declared that the harmony and discord of sounds depended upon certainnumerical relations is considered also to apply, not only to colours, but to
tastes (xm<>0- Be i^ensu, 4, 442,a, 19 sqq. c. 7, 448, a, 15. Aristotle compares seven principal tastes to the seven primary colours. Further investigations into the nature of %viu>\ he reserves (De Sensu, c. 4 Jin.) for the <pv<rto\oyia irepl raiv tpvrZv. Upon the treatise attributed to him ir. x v l"'"'-> see PThe sense of Touch has 84, n. 1.
with moisture, which, however, in this case is not that of water and air, as in the case of smell, but of water alone. The object of the sense of taste is x"M ^ X"M^ S again is defined as to yiyvifuvov
:
virb
Kara
hvvap.iv
[i.e.
aWouoTUcbv
ivepyeiav
As
(Anrapbv
and
a\fivpbv,
bpi/Mv
and
;
and ojfi) are a mixture of sweet and bitter if these elements are mingled in a certain proportion we have pleasant tastes otherwise, unpleasant ones (De Sensu, c. 4 Be An. ii. 10, Baumk. 32 sq.). In this way
aio-TTipbv, arpv<pvbv
;
;
for its object all those general qualities of bodies (Be An. ii. 11, 422, b, 25, 423, b, 26), which are ultimately resolvable into terms of the elementary oppositions referred to on p. 479, supra, and do not, therefore, call for further special notice here.
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