Malinias vs. COMELEC G.R.

146943 Tyrone John Judit FACTS:Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a candidate for congressional representative of Mountain Province. On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELECs Law Department for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Victor Dominguez (Dominguez for brevity) was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Teofilo Corpuz (Corpuz for brevity) was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Anacleto Tangilag (Tangilag for brevity) was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol grounds. the COMELECs Law Department recommended to the COMELEC en banc the dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable cause. ISSUE: Whether or not there was violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881. HELD: Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 defines the term partisan political activity as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.[29] Malinias asserts that, in setting up a checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province and in closing the canvassing room, Corpuz and Tangilag unduly interfered with his right to be present and to counsel during the canvassing. This interference allegedly favored the other candidate.While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of the checkpoint, they did so to enforce the COMELECs firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968, among others.[30] There was no clear indication that these police officers, in ordering the setting up of checkpoint, intended to favor the other candidates. Neither was there proof to show that Corpuz and Tangilag unreasonably exceeded their authority in implementing the COMELEC rules. Further, there is no basis to rule that private respondents arbitrarily deprived Malinias of his right to be present and to counsel during the canvassing.The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the checkpoint was plainly in accordance with their avowed duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the vicinity of the canvassing site. Thus, the act is untainted with any color of political activity. There was also no showing that the alleged closure of the provincial capitol grounds favored the election of the other candidates.

Chavez vs. COMELEC G.R. 162777 Tyrone John Judit FACTS: Petitioner Chavez entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the North Expressway. Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa, a tripartite alliance of three political parties: PROMDI, REPORMA, and Aksyon Demokratiko. Respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32, the provision assailed herein. Petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law Department. The COMELEC ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners image on the billboard is an act of a premature campaign. HELD:It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning: Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period.

Lanot vs. COMELEC G.R. 164858 Tyrone John Judit FACTS: Henry P. Lanot, Vener Obispo etc. filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC. Lanot, Obispo, and Eusebio were candidates for Pasig City Mayor, while Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz were candidates for Pasig City Councilor. Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside of the designated campaign period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him. Eusebio denied petitioners allegations and branded the petition as a harassment case. Eusebio further stated that petitioners evidence are merely fabricated. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts constitute a premature campaign HELD: Based on the findings of Director Ladra, the questioned acts attributed to Eusebio all occurred before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004. Indeed, Director Ladra applied Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio precisely because Eusebio committed these acts outside of the campaign period. However, Director Ladra erroneously assumed that Eusebio became a candidate, for purposes of Section 80, when Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a candidate, for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying the facts - as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the existence of a candidate, one who has filed his certificate of candidacy, during the commission of the questioned acts.

Adiong vs. COMELEC G.R. 103956 Tyrone John Judit FACTS: the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15 speaks of the lawful election propaganda and section 1 of the same resolution provides for the prohibited forms of election propaganda. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas." ISSUE: Whether the resolution is valid. HELD: The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled: For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.

Philippine Press Institute INC. vs. COMELEC G.R. 119694 Tyrone John Judit FACTS: On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772. The resolution speaks of free comelec space. In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. ISSUE: Whether the resolution is in violation of the Constitution on payment of just compensation HELD: The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

Osmea vs. COMELEC G.R. 132231 Tyrone John Judit FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on Elections. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming elections. Petitioner Emilio M. R. Osmea is candidate for President of the Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking reelection. They contend that events after the ruling in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections "have called into question the validity of the very premises of that [decision]. ISSUE: HELD: The term political "ad ban," when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for even as 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. There is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising. The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. The only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates but require the COMELEC instead to procure space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the candidates. These decisions come down to this: the State can prohibit campaigning outside a certain period as well as campaigning within a certain place. For unlimited expenditure for political advertising in the mass media skews the political process and subverts democratic self-government. What is bad is if the law prohibits campaigning by certain candidates because of the views expressed in the ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason.

TELEBAP vs. COMELEC G.R. 132922 Tyrone John Judit FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners challenge the validity of 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. ISSUE: HELD: The basic flaw in petitioner's argument is that it assumes that the provision for COMELEC Time constitutes the use and operation of the stations of the GMA Network, Inc., This is not so. Under 92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not take over the operation of radio and television stations but only the allocation of air time to the candidates for the purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal opportunity, time, and the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution. Indeed, it is wrong to claim an amendment of petitioner's franchise for the reason that B.P. Blg. 881, which is said to have amended R.A. No. 7252, actually antedated it. The provision of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 must be deemed instead to be incorporated in R.A. No. 7252. And, indeed, 4 of the latter statute does. For the fact is that the duty imposed on the GMA Network, Inc. by its franchise to render "adequate public service time" implements 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Undoubtedly, its purpose is to enable the government to communicate with the people on matters of public interest. It is noteworthy that 40 of R.A. No. 6388, from which 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 was taken, expressly provided that the COMELEC Time should "be considered as part of the public service time said stations are required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public information and education under their respective franchises or permits." There is no reason to suppose that 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 considers the COMELEC Time therein provided to be otherwise than as a public service which petitioner is required to render under 4 of its charter (R.A. No. 7252). In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, 92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege.

SWS vs. COMELEC G.R. 147571 Tyrone John Judit FACTS: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides "Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.". The implement section 5.4, Resolution 3636, section 24(h), dated March I, 2001, of the COMELEC enjoins surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective. ISSUE: Whether section 5.4 of the Fair elections act is valid. HELD: This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in 5.4. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate bogus survey results calculated to mislead voters. Candidates can have their own surveys conducted. No right of reply can be invoked by others. No principle of equality is involved. It is a free market to which each candidate brings his ideas. As for the purpose of the law to prevent bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the Government can deal with this natural-enough tendency of some voters. Some voters want to be identified with the "winners." Some are susceptible to the herd mentality. Can these be legitimately prohibited by suppressing the publication of survey results, which are a form of expression? It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions." To summarize then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

Pilar vs. COMELEC G.R. 115245 Tyrone John Judit FACTS: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14). Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13). Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures notwithstanding his having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after his filing. HELD: The petitioner is liable. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact." Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

Bautista vs. Comelec G.R. 154796-97 Tyrone John Judit FACTS: On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareo ("Election Officer Jareo") refused to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election Officer Jareo with the Regional Trial Court. The latter ordered Election Officer Jareo to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. In compliance with the trial court's order, Election Officer Jareo included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareo referred the matter of Bautista's inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the COMELEC Law Department, in which, it recommended the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Department's recommendation before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002. During the election, Bautista gathered the highest number of votes, Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers ("Board of Canvassers")7 proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay. ISSUE: Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the alleged disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista. HELD: Petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an ineligible candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before the election, however, the same is not yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.Since Bautista failed to qualify for the position of Punong Barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong Barangay.