European Journal of Social Psychology Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 31, 677691 (2001) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.

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Effects of exposure to sexist humor on perceptions of normative tolerance of sexism

THOMAS E. FORD*, ERIN R. WENTZEL and JOLI LORION
Western Michigan University, USA Abstract The results of an experiment supported the hypotheses that (1) for men high in hostile sexism, exposure to sexist humor creates a perceived social norm of tolerance of sexism relative to exposure to nonhumorous sexist communication or neutral humor, and (2) due to this `relaxed' normative standard in the context of sexist humor, men high in hostile sexism anticipated feeling less self-directed negative affect upon imagining that they had behaved in a sexist manner. Finally, exposure to sexist humor did not affect the evaluative content of men's stereotypes of women relative to exposure to neutral humor or nonhumorous sexist communication for participants high or low in hostile sexism. Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. The public sentiment over the use of disparaging humor (e.g. racist or sexist humor) in public domains has become increasingly critical (Apte, 1987; Barker, 1994). At the core of this criticism is a belief that humor provides a `socially acceptable' mechanism for demeaning, harrassing and oppressing disadvantaged groups (e.g. Bill & Naus, 1992; Mackie, 1990). For instance, as LaFrance and Woodzicka (1998) pointed out, lawsuits have been led against corporations (e.g. Chevron Corporation in 1995) claiming that disparaging humor (i.e. sexist jokes) in the workplace constitutes a form of harassment; and survey research (e.g. Frazier, Cochran, & Olson, 1995) indicates that the general public is increasingly dening sexist humor as a form of sexual harassment. In keeping with these changes in the social climate, researchers have begun to shift their attention away from the traditional focus on understanding the conditions that moderate people's amusement with disparaging humor (e.g. Cantor & Zillmann, 1973; La Fave, McCarthy, & Haddad, 1973; Wicker, Barron, & Willis, 1980) to an examination of the social consequences of disparaging humor. Hobden and Olson (1994), for instance, found that telling `lawyer jokes' led participants to report having more negative attitudes toward lawyers. Also, Maio, Olson, and Bush (1997) found that Canadian participants who recited humor material that disparaged Newfoundlanders reported having a more negative stereotype of Newfoundlanders. So, it appears that telling disparaging jokes can have a negative impact upon the joke teller's attitudes and stereotypes of the disparaged outgroup.
*Correspondence to: Thomas E. Ford, Department of Sociology, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008, USA. E-mail: fordt@wmich.edu

Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 23 September 2000 Accepted 30 January 2001

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Exposure to disparaging humor, however, may not affect stable, internal knowledge structures such as stereotypes of the disparaged out-groups. Olson, Maio, and Hobden (1999) found that exposure to disparaging humor did not affect the evaluative content or the accessibility of stereotypes of the disparaged outgroup relative to nonhumorous disparagement or neutral humor. As Olson et al. suggested, this nding was surprising given the assumption made by the general public and humor theorists alike that disparaging humor functions to develop and reinforce shared stereotypes of outgroups (e.g. Berger, 1993; La Fave, Mannell, & Guilmette, 1977; Stephenson, 1951; Zenner, 1970). Indeed, according to the inuential incongruity-resolution theory of humor appreciation, a mutual understanding of the stereotype would be required for the jokes to be humorous (Suls, 1972, 1983). There is evidence, however, suggesting that exposure to disparaging humor does have a negative social consequence. Ford (2000) demonstrated that exposure to sexist jokes led to greater tolerance of a sexist event in comparison with exposure to neutral jokes or nonhumorous sexist communications, but only among participants high in `hostile sexism' (people whose attitudes toward women are rooted in antagonism and indignation) (Glick & Fiske, 1996). These ndings cannot be easily explained in terms of a priming effect. If exposure to sexist humor simply functioned to prime or trigger chronic motivation to respond in a sexist manner among people high in hostile sexism (e.g. Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Barndollar, 1996), then exposure to sexist material should have increased tolerance of the sexist event when presented in a humorous or nonhumorous manner. Exposure to sexist material, however, only affected tolerance of the sexist event when it was presented in a humorous manner. Accordingly, Ford (2000) suggested that humor, as a medium for communicating disparagement, played a critical role above and beyond the specic content of the sexist communication. Specically, by communicating derision of women in a light-hearted or jovial manner, sexist humor expands the bounds of appropriate conduct in the immediate context creating a social norm of tolerance of discrimination against women. Furthermore, Ford argued that people high in hostile sexism are more prone to responding to a sexist event in accordance with the norm implied by the sexist humor because they are likely to have less strongly internalized convictions that regulate their behavior independent of such normative standards of conduct. Indeed, research has shown that people high in hostile sexism are less internally motivated to respond toward women in a nonsexist manner relative to people low in hostile sexism (Ford & Lorion, presentation at the annual conference of the National Communication Association, Seattle, WA, 2000). A couple of ambiguities still remain, however. First, Ford (2000) did not directly examine the effects of sexist humor upon perceptions of social normswhat others in the immediate context consider appropriate or inappropriate conduct. Thus, he could not assess whether sexist humor has different effects upon perceptions of social norms as a function of individual differences in hostile sexism, or whether the effect of sexist humor on tolerance of a sexist event for people high in hostile sexism was indeed mediated by a perceived norm of tolerance of sexism. Second, stereotypes of women were not measured in the research by Ford (2000). Furthermore, individual differences in prejudice were not measured in the research by Olson et al. (1999) which found no effects of disparaging humor on the evaluative content of participants' stereotypes of disparaged outgroups. Thus, it remains possible that disparaging humor could affect the evaluative content of stereotypes of an outgroup for people who are high in prejudice toward that group. In the context of the present research, sexist humor might affect not only tolerance of sexism among men high in hostile sexism, but also the evaluative content of their stereotypes of women. Also, Olson et al. (1999) measured the effects of disparaging humor on stereotypes of outgroups that were high in status or social power (e.g. men, lawyers). Olson et al. concluded that disparaging humor might only affect the perceiver's stereotypes insofar as the targeted outgroup is relatively disadvantaged or low in status (e.g. women). The present research was designed to address these ambiguities. Specically, we investigated more fully the effect of sexist humor upon perceptions of social norms among people high in hostile sexism
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and people low in hostile sexism. In addition, we examined the role that those perceptions play in mediating the effect of sexist humor on tolerance of sexism more generally. Finally, we examined whether individual differences in hostile sexism moderate the effect of sexist humor on men's stereotypes of women. EFFECTS OF SEXIST HUMOR UPON PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL NORMS Humor as a medium for communicating derision undermines the seriousness of the underlying sentiment (e.g. Attardo, 1993; Berlyne, 1972; Bill & Naus, 1992; McGhee, 1972). Specically, it activates a conversational rule to switch from the usual serious mindset to a playful or noncritical mindset for interpreting the underlying message (Attardo, 1993; Berlyne, 1972; Mannell, 1977; McGhee, 1972; Sev'er & Ungar, 1997; Ziv & Gadish, 1990). Berlyne (1972), for instance, suggested that, `Humor is accompanied by discriminative cues, which indicate that what is happening, or is going to happen, should be taken as a joke. The ways in which we might react to the same events in the absence of these cues become inappropriate and must be withheld' (p. 56). Accordingly, Ford (2000) suggested that by making light of the expression of sexism, sexist humor communicates a `metamessage' (Attardo, 1993) or normative standard that, in this context, sexism need not be taken seriously or scrutinized in a critical manner. We propose, however, that whether or not sexist humor actually creates the implicit norm of tolerance of sexism depends on whether or not it is successfulwhether the receiver also switches to a noncritical mindset for interpreting the underlying derision. When the receiver switches to a noncritical mindset, he or she tacitly consents to a shared understanding (a social norm) that it is acceptable in this context to make light of sexismto treat it in a light-hearted, noncritical manner (see Emerson, 1969; Francis, 1988; Khoury, 1985 for similar arguments regarding the communication of socially inappropriate sentiments through humor). The receiver's acceptance of the sexist humor, then, contributes to the construction of an implicit local norm of tolerance of sexism. Furthermore, as a result of its salience in the immediate context, this local norm of tolerance of sexism may essentially replace broader norms of appropriate conduct (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Consequently, in the context of sexist humor, instances of sexism are likely to seem less socially inappropriate. In contrast, the receiver could recognize the inappropriateness of switching to a playful mindset for interpreting sexist sentiments (Apt, 1987; Barker, 1994; Mannell, 1977; Sev'er & Ungar, 1997), and thus challenge (reject) the normative standard suggested by the humor (Attardo, 1993; Francis, 1988). The receiver's opposition to sexist humor implies that there is not a shared understanding that it is acceptable to make light of sexism. In fact, when the joke teller knows that the receiver has rejected the humor he or she is likely to `take it back' and similarly oppose a noncritical interpretation of the underlying sentiment (Johnson, 1990; Kane, Suls, & Tedeschi, 1977). The receiver's opposition to sexist humor, then, prevents the construction of a local normative standard of tolerance of sexism. As a result, the broader nonsexist standards of conduct should not be displaced by the sexist humor, and instances of sexism should still be perceived as socially inappropriate. Consistent with this reasoning, Ford (2000, Experiments 2 and 3) found that when participants high in hostile sexism were induced to interpret sexist jokes in a serious or critical manner (as they would nonhumorous communication), the effect of the sexist humor on tolerance of a sexist event was nullied. Individual Differences in Hostile Sexism We further propose that individual differences in hostile sexism moderate the extent to which people consent to or oppose the implication of sexist humor that derision of women need not be taken
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seriously. Therefore, individual differences in hostile sexism should moderate the extent to which people perceive a local norm of tolerance of sexism upon exposure to sexist humor. People high in hostile sexism should be more likely to consent to the noncritical standard for interpreting derision of women that is implied by sexist humor and thus perceive a shared normative standard of tolerance of sexism in the immediate context. Given their antagonistic attitude toward women (Glick & Fiske, 1996) people high in hostile sexism are less likely to have well-internalized nonsexist convictions that naturally elicit a critical response to the humor and its underlying meta-message (Ford & Lorion, 2000). Indeed, research has shown that people are likely to be less critical of sexist humor to the extent that they hold sexist attitudes toward women (e.g. Butland & Ivy, 1990; Henkin & Fish, 1986; LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1998; Losco & Epstein, 1975; Moore, Grifths, & Payne, 1987). Most notably, LaFrance and Woodzicka (1998) found that people high in hostile sexism were less critical of and more amused by sexist humor in comparison to people low in hostile sexism. People low in hostile sexism are likely to have well-internalized nonsexist convictions and attitudes, which, because they are contrary to the sentiments communicated in the sexist humor, naturally highlight the inappropriateness of the humor and its meta-message that sexism need not be taken seriously. Because of their opposition to the sexist humor, people low in hostile sexism are not likely to perceive a shared normative standard tolerance of sexism in the immediate context. The Mediating Role of the Normative Standard Implied by Sexist Humor The present research was also designed to test whether a perceived norm of tolerance of sexism mediates the effect of sexist humor upon evaluations of a sexist event for people high in hostile sexism. People high in hostile sexism are more attuned to external norms for deriving their standards of appropriate conduct toward women relative to people low in hostile sexism (Ford & Lorion, 2000). Furthermore, research suggests that violations of one's standards of appropriate conduct are likely to result in self-directed criticism or negative affect such as disappointment and shame (e.g. Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier, 1999; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). Thus, if sexist humor creates a perceived local norm of tolerance of sexism for people high in hostile sexism, then, upon exposure to sexist humor, they should experience less self-directed negative affect upon imagining that they had behaved in a sexist manner. However, when perceptions of the local normhow others in the immediate context would respond to a sexist eventare controlled statistically, the effect of sexist humor upon self-directed negative affect should be nullied.

THE PRESENT RESEARCH: OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES In the present research, male participants who were either high or low in hostile sexism were exposed to either sexist jokes, sexist statements, or neutral jokes. Then, participants read a vignette in which a male supervisor addressed a female employee using a pet name intended to suggest a level of romantic intimacy that is inappropriate and potentially threatening in the work place. Then, to assess perceptions of normative tolerance of sexism, participants rated the extent to which they thought others in the immediate context (other participants) would be offended by the supervisor's response. Next, participants were asked to imagine that they had behaved like the supervisor, and to indicate how they would feel about themselves for having done so. Finally, participants completed an open-ended measure of stereotypes of women.
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We had initially collected data for both male and female participants. However, we excluded data from female participants (n 54) for a number of reasons. First, the hostile sexism scores for women were very lowthere were not enough women high in hostile sexism in any of the experimental conditions to adequately test for interactions involving sex of participant. Second, the self-evaluations in response to imagining that one had behaved like the supervisor in the sexist vignette could be difcult to interpret for women. For women, it is possible that negative self-evaluations could be due to either behaving in a sexist manner or behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with heterosexual interaction scripts (i.e. addressing another woman using a pet name that implies romantic intimacy). Thus, even women who are relatively tolerant of sexism might report negative self-evaluations in response to the sexist vignette. Third, Ford (2000) found that, across three studies, the effect of exposure to sexist humor on tolerance of a sexist event was greater for individuals who were high versus low in hostile sexism, and that sex of participant did not moderate this interaction effect. Thus, the moderating role of sex of participant has already been tested in previous research that was better designed to so (in the Ford, 2000 studies, participants were not asked to evaluate themselves after having imagined behaving in a sexist manner). Finally, if exposure to sexist humor does activate negative stereotypes about women, the effect should be particularly evident among men as they are presumably less motivated by social identity concerns to maintain a positive view of women.1 We hypothesized that among men high (versus low) in hostile sexism, exposure to sexist humor would create a perceived norm of tolerance of sexism relative exposure to nonhumorous disparagement of women (i.e. sexist statements) or neutral humor. Furthermore, due to this `relaxed' normative standard in the context of sexist humor, men high in hostile sexism were expected to anticipate feeling less self-directed negative affect upon imagining that they had behaved in a sexist manner. In addition to testing these hypotheses, the present study examined whether exposure to sexist humor affects the evaluative content of stereotypes of women differently for men who are high versus low in hostile sexism.

METHOD Participants and Design Participants were 61 male undergraduate students in sociology, marketing, and communication courses. Participants were placed in one of six conditions in a 3(Type of Communication: Sexist Jokes, Sexist Statements, Neutral Jokes) 2(Hostile Sexism: High, Low) between-subjects design. Procedure To assess individual differences in hostile sexism, Glick and Fiske's (1996) Ambivalent Sexism Inventory was administered to participants in their classes.2 Two weeks later, a different experimenter conducted an ostensibly unrelated study with the participants in their classrooms. The experimenter introduced the study as an investigation of communication behavior in social interactions, and
1 It is noteworthy that the results of the present study are generally consistent with those of a preliminary study using similar procedures in which female participants were also included. 2 Glick and Fiske's (1996) Ambivalent Sexism Inventory assesses benevolent sexism as well as hostile sexism. However, like previous research (Ford, 2000), there were no meaningful effects involving benevolent sexism on the dependent measures in the present experiment. Thus, we do not report any analyses that include benevolent sexism as a between-subjects factor.

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informed participants that they would read several short stories describing social interactions that occurred among a group of staff members at an organization. The experimenter told participants that the interactions were ctitious, but to imagine that they were members of the work group and that they were watching each interaction as it actually occurred. The experimenter then gave participants a booklet containing four vignettes.3 The rst three vignettes described interactions that occurred among the staff members as they socialized during their `lunch hour'. The rst vignette described one staff member's recount of her weekend. The second vignette was used to introduce the manipulation of type of communication. In the sexist joke and neutral joke conditions, the vignette began with the following statement, `After Cindy's story (the rst vignette), the group discussion gave way to an exchange of the staff members' favorite jokes. Here are a few of those jokes.' Participants then read ve jokes told among 3 female and 2 male staff members. In the sexist joke condition, the rst joke was neutral (nonsexist), and the remaining four were sexist (e.g. A man and a woman were stranded in an elevator and they knew they were gonna die. The woman turns to the man and says, `Make me feel like a woman before I die'. So he takes off his clothes and says, `Fold them!'.) Three of the sexist jokes were told by women and one was told by a man. In the neutral joke condition, all ve of the jokes were nonsexist. Pretesting indicated that the four sexist jokes were rated as signicantly more sexist but equally as funny as the neutral jokes. In the sexist statement condition, the second vignette began with this statement: `After Cindy's story, the group discussion gave way to an exchange of social commentaries. The following statements are excerpts from that discussion.' Participants then read ve statements made by 3 female and 2 male staff members that were designed to communicate the content of each of the jokes from the sexist joke condition but in a nonhumorous form (e.g. `I still say that a woman's place is in the home and it's a woman's role to do domestic duties such as laundry for a man'). Pretest ratings indicated that the sexist statements were perceived to be less funny than their corresponding jokes, and that each of the sexist statements was perceived to be equally as sexist as its corresponding joke. The third vignette described one of the staff member's recount of a recent ski trip that he had taken with a friend. Finally, the fourth vignette described the critical sexist event which was adapted from one used by Bill and Naus (1992). A new female staff member, Paula, was treated in an inappropriate manner by her male supervisor. Specically, upon inquiring about her responsibilities, the supervisor responded in a patronising manner by communicating low performance expectations and by addressing Paula using a pet name, `darling', that was intended to suggest a level of romantic intimacy that is inappropriate and potentially threatening in the work place. Inman and colleagues (Inman & Baron, 1996; Inman, Huerta, & Oh, 1998) have shown that people are likely to perceive negative intergroup behavior as discrimination insofar as the group membership of the `perpetrator' and `victim' conform to their conceptions of the prototypical case of discrimination (e.g. men derogating women; Whites derogating Blacks). The critical sexist event in the present research conforms to the prototypical instance of sex discrimination: a man derogating a woman. As a result, participants should be ready to see sexism in the supervisor's patronising behavior (Inman & Baron, 1996). Furthermore, pretest ratings indicated that the supervisor's behavior was perceived as sexist. See Ford (2000) for a more complete description of all of the pretesting procedures and results.4 After reading the sexist vignette, participants rated the extent to which they thought that others in the immediate context (i.e. other students completing the booklet) would be offended by the supervisor's response to Paula and how critical they would be of the supervisor's behavior. Responses were made on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). Then, participants were asked to imagine
3 To minimize perceptions of pressure to respond in a socially desirable manner, participants completed their booklets individually without interaction with others. Furthermore, to ensure anonymity, participants did not put their names on their booklets. 4 Descriptions of each vignette can be obtained from the rst author.

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that they had responded to Paula as her supervisor had, and to indicate the extent to which they would feel (a) critical of themselves, (b) ashamed of themselves and (c) disappointed in themselves for having done so. Responses were made on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). Next, participants completed an open-ended measure of stereotypes of women and lawyers. Similar to procedures used by Olson et al. (1999, Experiment 2), participants were asked to list up to six traits that they thought described the ``typical'' group members. Then, participants rated the positivity of each trait using a scale ranging from 1 (extremely negative) to 7 (extremely positive). Ratings of lawyers were included to reduce suspicion of the true purpose of the study. Finally, participants were asked to write at least one sentence giving their personal reactions to the experiment. Based on these responses, two participants (one from the sexist joke condition and one from the sexist statement condition) indicated suspicion of the true purpose of the study. The data from those participants were not included in any analyses. RESULTS Participants were placed in the high or low hostile sexism conditions based on a median split on the distribution of scores from the hostile sexism scale (Md 2.55, range 3.54). The mean score was 1.92 in the low hostile sexism condition and 3.23 in the high hostile sexism condition. Normative Tolerance Ratings Responses to the items asking participants to rate how offended others would be by the supervisor's remarks in the sexist vignette, and how critical others would be of those remarks were highly correlated (r 0.69). Thus, an aggregate measure of perceived normative tolerance of the sexist behavior was calculated by averaging the two items. Responses were reversed scored so that higher scores indicate perceptions of greater normative tolerance of the sexist behavior. A 3(Type of Communication: Sexist Jokes, Sexist Statements, Neutral Jokes) 2(Hostile Sexism: Low, High) ANOVA was performed on the aggregate measure. There was a signicant main effect of hostile sexism, F(1, 55) 6.15, p < 0.05, indicating that, in general, participants high in hostile sexism thought that others in the immediate context would be more tolerant of the supervisor's sexist remarks (M 4.19) in comparison to participants low in hostile sexism (M 3.31). This main effect was qualied by the predicted type of communication hostile sexism interaction effect, F(2, 55) 3.38, p < 0.05. The mean normative tolerance ratings pertaining to this interaction effect are presented in Table 1. In keeping with our hypothesis, for participants high in hostile sexism only, exposure to the sexist jokes led to a perceived norm of tolerance of the sexist event relative to exposure to sexist statements or neutral jokes. Planned contrasts revealed that participants high in hostile sexism who were exposed to sexist jokes perceived a more tolerant norm (M 5.20) in comparison to their counterparts in the sexist statement condition (M 3.83), F(1, 55) 4.98, p < 0.05, or the neutral joke condition (M 3.50), F(1, 55) 8.13, p < 0.01. Also, participants high in hostile sexism who were exposed to the sexist jokes perceived a more tolerant norm relative to participants low in hostile sexism who were also exposed to sexist jokes (M 3.13), F (1, 55) 13.21, p < 0.01. Affective Reactions to the Sexist Event A measure of anticipated negative affect was calculated by averaging responses to the items asking participants to rate how critical of themselves they would be, how ashamed of themselves they would
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Table 1. Mean normative tolerance ratings of the sexist event as a function of type of communication and hostile sexism Type of communication Sexist jokes Low hostile sexism High hostile sexism M SD n M SD n 3.13b 1.38 12 5.20a 1.25 10 Sexist statements 3.41b 1.43 11 3.83b 1.41 9 Neutral jokes 3.44b 1.07 9 3.50b 1.37 10

Note: Adjacent means that do not share a common subscript differ at p < 0.05. Higher scores indicate greater perceived normative tolerance of the sexist behavior.

be, and how disappointed in themselves they would be if they had behaved like the supervisor in the sexist vignette. The Cronbach's alpha for this measure was 0.94. It was predicted that participants high in hostile sexism would anticipate experiencing less selfdirected negative affect upon exposure to sexist jokes in comparison to the sexist statements or neutral jokes. No such differences were predicted among participants low in hostile sexism. To test this hypothesis, a 3(Type of Communication) 2(Hostile Sexism) ANOVA was performed on the negative affect ratings. There was a signicant main effect of type of communication, F(2, 55) 3.34, p < 0.05. Post-hoc analyses suggested that, in general, participants in the sexist joke condition anticipated experiencing less negative affect (M 3.53) than participants in the neutral joke condition (M 4.63). More importantly, the predicted type of communication hostile sexism interaction was signicant, F(2, 55) 4.63, p < 0.05. The mean negative affect ratings pertaining to this interaction are presented in Table 2. Consistent with our hypothesis, planned contrasts revealed that participants high in hostile sexism who were exposed to sexist jokes anticipated experiencing less negative affect (M 2.37) in comparison to their counterparts in the sexist statement condition (M 3.93), F(1, 55) 4.76, p < 0.05, or the neutral joke condition (M 4.70), F(1, 55) 11.25, p < 0.01. They also anticipated experiencing less self-directed negative affect than participants low in hostile sexism who were also exposed to sexist jokes (M 4.50), F(1, 55) 10.26, p < 0.01. For participants low in hostile sexism, there were no differences in negative affective ratings as a function of type of communication.
Table 2. Mean anticipated negative affect ratings in response to imagining behaving in a sexist manner as a function of type of communication and hostile sexism Type of Communication Sexist jokes Low hostile sexism High hostile sexism M SD n M SD n 4.50b 1.67 12 2.37a 1.36 10 Sexist statements 3.33b 1.79 11 3.93b 1.40 9 Neutral jokes 4.56b 1.67 9 4.70b 1.33 10

Note: Adjacent means that do not share a common subscript differ at p < 0.05. Higher scores indicate greater negative affect. Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 31, 677691 (2001)

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We hypothesized that the effect of exposure to sexist jokes upon the negative affect ratings for participants high in hostile sexism would be mediated by perceptions of normative tolerance of the sexist event. To test this hypothesis, we performed a path analysis for participants high in hostile sexism following the procedures described by Baron and Kenny (1986) (see Figure 1). As shown in Figure 1, we rst regressed the negative affect ratings on the type of communication variable (sexist jokes versus the other two conditions combined). This direct effect was signicant,  0.58, t(27) 3.66, p < 0.01. We then regressed the normative tolerance ratings on the type of communication variable. That path was also signicant,  0.50, t(27) 2.92, p < 0.01. Finally, we regressed the negative affect ratings on both type of communication and the normative tolerance ratings. The path from normative tolerance ratings to the negative affect ratings was signicant,  0.83, t(26) 9.32, p < 0.01. However, the direct path from type of communication to the negative affect ratings was no longer signicant,  0.17, t(26) 1.87, p > 0.05, suggesting that the effect of type of communication on the negative affect ratings was indeed mediated by perceptions of normative tolerance for the sexist event. Stereotypes of Women The positivity ratings for the attributes that participants listed as stereotypical of women were averaged to form an overall stereotype positivity rating. There was a modest negative correlation between hostile sexism and the stereotype positivity rating (r 0.26, p > 0.05) suggesting that, overall, men higher in hostile sexism tended to have more negative stereotypes of women. To determine whether exposure to sexist humor inuenced the evaluative content of men's stereotypes of women, a 3(Type of Communication) 2(Hostile Sexism) ANOVA was performed on this aggregate stereotype positivity rating. The analysis revealed no signicant effects. Similarly, analyses performed

Figure 1.

Path analysis for participants high in hostile sexism

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on the positivity rating of the rst stereotypical trait listed, presumably the most accessible trait, revealed no signicant effects. According to our analyses, then, it does not appear that sexist humor inuenced the evaluative content of men's stereotype of women; nor is there evidence that sexist humor made negative stereotypical traits more accessible.

DISCUSSION The ndings of our experiment are consistent with those of previous research showing that exposure to sexist humor created greater tolerance of a sexist event among people high in hostile sexismpeople who have antagonistic attitudes toward women. Furthermore, our ndings make a unique contribution to the existing research by addressing ambiguities about the mechanism by which sexist humor inuences perceptions of a sexist event among people high in hostile sexism. First, the results of our experiment suggest that among participants high in hostile sexism, exposure to disparagement of women through humor is more likely to create a perceived local norm of tolerance of sexism than exposure to nonhumorous disparagement or neutral humor. Nonhumorous disparagement does not activate a conversational rule that the underlying message need not be taken seriously and that the usual critical reactions to the underlying message can be suspended (e.g. Attardo, 1993; Berlyne, 1972). As a result, upon exposure to nonhumorous disparagement of women, the perceiver essentially brings to bear the usual critical reactions to such sentiments that would be appropriate according to more general nonsexist norms of conduct. Indeed, it is possible that nonhumorous disparagement makes broader nonsexist norms more salient. Similarly, neutral humor does not imply that disparagement of women need not be taken seriously in the immediate context. In addition, the nding that exposure to sexist humor created a perceived norm of tolerance of sexism among men high (but not low) in hostile sexism suggests that the receiver's response to derisive humor (i.e. acceptance versus rejection) is important in the construction of that local norm. Previous research suggests that people high in hostile sexism are more likely to approve of sexist humor and to be amused by it (Ford, 2000; LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1998). Thus, in the present research, it appears that by their approval of sexist humor, participants high in hostile sexism essentially acknowledged or consented to the normative standard implied by the humor that in the immediate context sexism need not be taken seriously; rather, it is socially acceptable to make light of sexism-to treat it in a lighthearted, noncritical manner. Their perceptions of greater tolerance of sexism among others in that context, then, were presumably based on their denition of the context as one in which people need not be critical of sexism. This nding is consistent with sociological analyses suggesting that the meaning of a joke is derived from both the joke itself and the receiver's response to it, as well as the social context in which the joke occurs (e.g. Fine, 1983; Murphy & Pollio, 1975; Pollio, 1983; Zijderveld 1968). Fine (1983), for instance, suggested that jokes indicate a shared or common perspective regarding the message of the joke only insofar as the receiver approves of the joke. Furthermore, the results of our path analysis support our hypothesis suggesting that for participants high in hostile sexism, the effect of sexist humor upon anticipated affective reactions associated with behaving in a sexist manner was indeed mediated by their perceptions of normative tolerance of sexism. Because sexist humor created a perceived norm of tolerance of sexism for participants high in hostile sexism, and because they are relatively more attuned to external norms for dening how one ought to behave (Ford & Lorion, 2000), the thought of behaving in a sexist manner represented less of a violation of their standards of appropriate conduct. In the relaxed normative context of sexist humor, sexist behavior represented less of a discrepancy with participants' ought-self (Higgins, 1987, 1989).
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It should be noted, however, that an alternative interpretation of our results is that among sexist participants, perceptions of normative tolerance of sexism did not mediate the effect of sexist humor on anticipated affective reactions associated with behaving in a sexist manner. Rather, the anticipated affective reactions mediated the effect of sexist humor upon perceptions of normative tolerance of sexism. Specically, participants high in hostile sexism could have experienced more positive affect in response to the sexist jokes than those low in hostile sexism. And, consistent with research by Schwarz and Clore (1983), it is possible that participants high in hostile sexism used this positive affect as a basis for inferring how they would feel about themselves upon behaving in a sexist manner. Furthermore, according to research on the false consensus bias (e.g. Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), participants high in hostile sexism could have then used their own anticipated affective reactions as a basis for inferring others' reactions to the sexist behavior. Although this alternative interpretation cannot be ruled out in the present study, it is not consistent with ndings from previous research. Central to this interpretation is the assumption that participants high in hostile sexism experienced more positive affect upon exposure to sexist jokes than those low in hostile sexism. Ford (2000), however, found that, in each of three experiments, there were no differences in reported mood states between participants high versus low in hostile sexism who were exposed to sexist humor (or any other type of communication). Thus, the proposed interpretation supported by our path analysis is more consistent with the empirical literature and thus seems more plausible. The proposed interpretation is also consistent with other research showing that highly prejudiced people's standards of appropriate conduct are more likely to vary depending on their perceptions of the social norms in a given context (Monteith, Deenen, & Tooman, 1996; Wittenbrink & Henly, 1996). Wittenbrink and Henly (1996), for instance, found that participants high in racial prejudice reported more prejudiced racial attitudes in the context of prejudiced normative standards than in the context of nonprejudiced normative standards. Participants low in prejudice, however, were unaffected by the normative standard. It appears that the effect of the social environment on self-regulation in intergroup settings diminishes only insofar as nonprejudiced standards have truly become incorporated into one's own set of personally important self-regulatory guides (Moretti & Higgins, 1999). It is also noteworthy that, in the present research, three of the four sexist jokes were told by women suggesting that the group gender of the joke teller may be critical in conveying a norm that sexism need not be taken seriously. Indeed, Ford, Johnson, Blevins and Zepeda (presentation at the annual conference of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, IL, 1999) found that the gender of the joke teller serves as a cue for dening how sexist jokes should be interpreted. Among participants high in hostile sexism, sexist jokes were likely to be interpreted in a serious, critical manner when delivered by men but not when delivered by women. Presumably, when sexist jokes were delivered by men they were perceived as overt expressions of prejudice or hostility toward women thus highlighting the inappropriateness of the jokes and the implied message that sexism need not be taken seriously. Furthermore, Ford (2000, Experiment 3) found that when sexist jokes were told by men, and therefore interpreted in a more critical manner, the effects of those jokes upon tolerance of a sexist event were ameliorated for participants high in hostile sexism. Finally, the results of our experiment suggest that exposure to derisive humor may have little effect upon stable knowledge structures such as stereotypes of the disparaged outgroups, even among people high in prejudice toward those outgroups. Exposure to sexist humor did not affect the evaluative content of men's stereotypes of women relative to exposure to neutral humor or nonhumorous sexist communication, even for men high in hostile sexism. This null effect is consistent with previous research by Olson et al. (1999) and further highlights the social consequence of sexist humor.
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Humorous versus Nonhumorous Forms of Disparagement The results of our experiment are also relevant to a body of research showing that disparagement of social groups in general may contribute to a climate of hostility toward members of the disparaged group. Although our research did not nd evidence that nonhumorous disparagement of women increased tolerance of sex discrimination, other research has found that exposure to nonhumorous forms of disparagement can affect social judgment in a discriminatory manner. Most notably, Greenberg and his colleagues have found that overhearing a person use a derogatory ethnic label (DEL) led White participants to devaluate an AfricanAmerican target person (i.e. Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985; Greenberg, Kirkland, & Pyszczynski, 1988; Kirkland, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1987; Simon & Greenberg, 1996). In a recent investigation of the effects of DELs, Simon and Greenberg (1996) found that participants who held negative attitudes toward AfricanAmericans rated an AfricanAmerican target less favorably on positive trait dimensions after hearing a White person use a DEL to refer to the AfricanAmerican target. Target evaluations among participants having positive racial attitudes were not affected by exposure to the DEL. Interestingly, all participants devaluated and experienced hostility toward the person who made the DEL. This latter nding is consistent with debrieng observations from previous research (e.g. Kirkland et al., 1987) in which participants reported being disturbed and angry at the person making the DEL. Greenberg and Pyszczynski (1985) and Kirkland et al. (1987) offered a purely cognitive explanation for the effects of overhearing a DEL. Specically, they suggested that overhearing a DEL activates negative stereotypes and attitudes about the targeted group, making them more likely to come to mind and inuence social judgment provided that the target's behavior is not inconsistent with those views. Blanchard, Lilly and Vaughn (1991) suggested an additional possibility based on `normative' social inuence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Specically, when a prejudiced social norm is created explicitly through direct expression of prejudiced attitudes by people in the immediate context, an individual might respond in a more prejudiced manner due to perceived pressure from others. In any event, exposure to disparaging humor appears to affect social judgment through a different mechanism than nonhumorous disparagement such as a DEL. In the present research, exposure to nonhumorous disparagement of women did not lead to the perception of normative tolerance of sexism or personal tolerance of sexism even among people high in hostile sexism. In addition, the ndings by Simon and Greenberg (1996) and Kirkland et al. (1987) that participants (even those high in racial prejudice) responded in anger and hostility toward a person using a DEL suggest that exposure to the DEL did not inuence social judgment by creating a shared understanding that racial discrimination need not be considered in a critical manner. In contrast, the present research suggests that, for people high in prejudice, humorous disparagement can create the perception of a shared norm of tolerance of discrimination which they may use to guide their own reactions to discrimination in that immediate context. The present research, then, adds to the general literature on disparagement of social groups by demonstrating the harmful potential of humor as a medium for communicating disparagement.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION The present research reveals that exposure to sexist humor led to a perceived social norm of tolerance of sexism for men high in hostile sexism. Men high in hostile sexism used those
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normative standards as guides for evaluating their own (imagined) sexist behavior. As a result, upon exposure to sexist humor, they anticipated experiencing less self-directed negative affect associated with behaving in a sexist manner. Finally, exposure to sexist humor did not affect the evaluative content of men's stereotypes of women relative to exposure to neutral humor or nonhumorous sexist communication, even for participants high in hostile sexism, thus highlighting the social consequence of sexist humor.

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