Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Personhood & Self: An Introduction
Personhood & Self: An Introduction
Personhood & Self: An Introduction
Jack Hunter
Wednesday, 28 November 2012
What is a person?
What is a person?
The word person derives from the Latin word persona, meaning mask.
What is a person?
The word person derives from the Latin word persona, meaning mask. There is a difference, however, between personhood and personality.
What is a person?
The word person derives from the Latin word persona, meaning mask. There is a difference, however, between personhood and personality. Personality might be thought of as a mask, but personhood is what lies beneath the mask.
What is a person?
The word person derives from the Latin word persona, meaning mask. There is a difference, however, between personhood and personality. Personality might be thought of as a mask, but personhood is what lies beneath the mask. How do we recognise what is and what isnt a person?
What is a person?
Marcel Mauss conceived of the person as a category of the human mind.
What is a person?
Marcel Mauss conceived of the person as a category of the human mind. What kinds of features must an object/entity possess in order to be categorised as a person?
Malays on the island of Langkawi become complete persons, that is, kin, through living and consuming together in houses. Identity and substance are mutable and uid. These perceptions suggest a processual view of kinship and personhood. (Carsten 1995:223)
Malays on the island of Langkawi become complete persons, that is, kin, through living and consuming together in houses. Identity and substance are mutable and uid. These perceptions suggest a processual view of kinship and personhood (Carsten 1995:223) The concept of Noman can be glossed variously as mind, intention, will, agency, social conscience, desire, or personality. It clearly covers a wide range of meanings. These meanings have to be seen processually, in terms of the life-cycle and of social interaction (Strathern & Stewart 1998:175)
Wednesday, 28 November 2012
Not all persons are necessarily human. The American ethnographer A. Irving Hallowell coined the term other-thanhuman persons to refer to the spiritual inhabitants of the Ojibwa world-view.
Not all persons are necessarily human. The American ethnographer A. Irving Hallowell coined the term other-thanhuman persons to refer to the spiritual inhabitants of the Ojibwa world-view. For the Ojibwa the world is inhabited by many different persons, including human beings, ancestral spirits (referred to as grandfathers), animals and even, on occasion, inanimate objects like rocks.
Since stones are grammatically animate, I once asked an old man: Are all the stones we see about us here alive? He reected a long while and then replied, N o ! B u t s o m e a re . . . t h e O j i b w a recognize, a priori, potentialities for animation in certain classes of objects under certain circumstances. The Ojibwa do not perceive stones, in general, as animate, any more than we do. The crucial test is experience. (Hallowell 2002 [1960]:24)
Not all persons are necessarily human. Perspectivism refers to the conceptions, common to many peoples of [South American] according to which the world is inhabited by different sorts of subjects or persons, human and nonhuman, which apprehend reality from distinct points of view (Viveiros de Castro 1998:469)
Theories
Cognitive approaches:
Theories
Cognitive approaches:
Personhood concepts result from innate cognitive categories:
Theories
Cognitive approaches:
Personhood concepts result from innate cognitive categories: Species-specic, naturally emerging cognitive predispositions constrain the range of variability in person-related concepts cross-culturally (e.g., to do with what is intuitively recognizable as an intentional agent/action, how individual identity is construed, how people think about the relation between biological and psychological properties of the person, etc.) (Cohen & Barrett 2011:104)
Theories
Cognitive approaches:
Personhood concepts result from innate cognitive categories: Species-specic, naturally emerging cognitive predispositions constrain the range of variability in person-related concepts cross-culturally (e.g., to do with what is intuitively recognizable as an intentional agent/action, how individual identity is construed, how people think about the relation between biological and psychological properties of the person, etc.) (Cohen & Barrett 2011:104)
Socio-Constructivist approaches
Theories
Cognitive approaches:
Personhood concepts result from innate cognitive categories: Species-specic, naturally emerging cognitive predispositions constrain the range of variability in person-related concepts cross-culturally (e.g., to do with what is intuitively recognizable as an intentional agent/action, how individual identity is construed, how people think about the relation between biological and psychological properties of the person, etc.) (Cohen & Barrett 2011:104)
Socio-Constructivist approaches
Personhood concepts arise through social interactions and cultural inuence.
References
Carsten, J. (1995). The substance of kinship and the heat of the hearth: feeding, personhood, and relatedness among Malays in Pulau Langkawi. American Ethnologist, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 223241. Cohen, E. & Barrett, J.L. (2011). In Search of Folk Anthropology: The Cognitive Anthropology of the Person. In J. Wentzel van Huyssteen & Erik P. Wiebe (eds). (2011). In Search of Self: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Personhood. Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. Colman, A.M. (2009). Oxford Dictionary of Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
de Craemer, W. (1983). A Cross-Cultural Perspective on Personhood. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly: Health and Society, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 19-34.
Geertz, C. From the Natives Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding. Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 26-45.
Hallowell, A.I. (2002 [1960]) Ojibwa Ontology, Behaviour, and World View. In G. Harvey (ed.) (2002) Readings in Indigenous Religions. London: Continuum. pp. 17-50.
Lillard, A. (1998). Ethnopsychologies: Cultural Variations in Theories of Mind. Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 123, No. 1, pp. 3-32.
Luhrmann, T.M. (2012). When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship With God. Knopf.
Mauss, M. (1985). A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion Of Person; The Notion of Self. In M. Carrithers, Collins, S. & Lukes, S., (1985). The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-26.
Spiro, M. (1993). Is the Western Conception of the Self Peculiar Within the Context of the World Cultures? Ethos, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 107-153
Strathern, A. & Stewart, P.J. (1998). Seeking Personhood: Anthropological Accounts and Local Concepts in Mount Hagen, Papua New Guinea. Oceania, Vol. 68, No. 3., pp. 170-188.
Viveiros de Castro, E. (1998). Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 469-488. Wednesday, 28 November 2012