Alvin Seminar Handout

The Traditional Stories A New Approach to A, C & E Results & Open Questions Refs Proofs & Illustrations
Individual Coherence & Group Coherence

Branden Fitelson
1
Department of Philosophy
&
Center for Cognitive Science (RuCCS)
Rutgers University
branden@fitelson.org
1
This is joint work with Rachael Briggs (ANU), Fabrizio Cariani (NU), and
Kenny Easwaran (USC). We are working on a joint paper, to appear soon [1].
Branden Fitelson Individual Coherence & Group Coherence 1
Here are two traditional (individual) epistemic norms:
The Truth Norm for Belief (TB). Epistemically rational
agents should only believe propositions that are true.
The Consistency Norm for Belief (CB). Epistemically
rational agents should have logically consistent belief sets.
Fact. (TB) entails (CB). Suppose S violates (CB). Then, some
of Ss beliefs are false. Therefore, S violates (TB).
Here, entailment means satisfaction preservation. (TB)
is a local/narrow norm, and (CB) is a global/wide norm.
Problem. The norm of deductive consistency does not seem
to line-up/jibe very well with evidential norms. Informally:
Evidential Norm for Belief (EB). Rational agents should only
believe propositions that are supported by their evidence.
In (suciently complex) preface cases, agents seem to
satisfy (EB) while violating (CB) [3, 13]. I take this as a datum.
Ill describe a new coherence norm that avoids this problem.

Suppose we have a panel of three judges (J
1
, J
2
, J
3
). This
panel will vote on an agenda, which stems from:
Question. In the reunited Germany, should the German parliament
and the seat of government move to Berlin or stay in Bonn?
Suppose the panel votes on these two (atomic) premises:
P = the parliament should move.
G = the seat of government should move.
There is also the following conclusion whose truth-value is
determined by the truth-values of the premises:
B = both the parliament and the seat of government should move.
Suppose the judges render the following judgments (votes):
P? G? B?
J
1
yes no no
J
2
no yes no
J
3
yes yes yes
For each judge, the conclusion column is determined by the
premise columns (i.e., we assume each judge is cogent).
Example of doctrinal paradox/discursive dilemma ([14], [18]).
Doctrinal Paradox/Discursive Dilemma
P? G? B?
J
1
yes no no
J
2
no yes no
J
3
yes yes yes
Majority yes yes yes & no?
Naive majority rule for aggregating all judgments can lead

to inconsistent aggregations of premises + conclusions.
Various alternative aggregation procedures have been
proposed, so as to ensure overall consistency. Example:
Premise-Based Procedure. Use majority rule on the
premises, and then just enforce deductive closure.
The premise-based procedure seems reasonable (esp. if the
premises make up the agenda that is explicitly voted on).
Premise-Based Procedure
P? G? B?
J
1
yes no no
J
2
no yes no
J
3
yes yes yes
Majority: yes yes (ignore)
Conclusion (from closure): yes
So, the premise-based procedure is a way of restoring
deductive consistency to a nave majority aggregation rule.
Another consistent approach is the conclusion-based
majority procedure. In our example, this would return no
for the conclusion (B) and nothing for the premises (P/G).
Procedures silent on some members of some agendas are
called incomplete. These sometimes seem sensible [15].
There are other approaches to judgment aggregation that
are guaranteed to preserve consistency.
Among the most popular of these nowadays are the
so-called distance-based aggregation methods [17].
These methods are holistic they do not assume
independence. Idea: pick the closest (according to a global
distance measure) consistent prole as the aggregate.
The upshot: traditional stories about individual (epistemic)
coherence presuppose that deductive consistency is a
requirement of individual epistemic rationality.
Traditional stories about judgment aggregation borrow this
presupposition, and (as a reult) require procedures to
render consistent outputs when given consistent inputs.
Next: a new story about (individual) coherence, and its
ramications for the judgment aggregation literature.
Our new approach is inspired by work of de Finetti [4] and
Joyce [12, 11] on grounding coherence norms for credences.
Let b(p) = r = Ss credence in proposition p is r. And,
let B(p) = S believes that p. And, consider this analogy:
p is true
B(p)
::
??
b(p) = r
Ramsey [19] gives reasons to be skeptical that this analogy
can be completed in an epistemologically useful way. His
main target is logical/a priori probability as truthmaker.
Hjek [8] argues that the analogy is useful, provided ??
gets lled-in with the objective chance of p equals r.
If we follow Hjeks advice, then provided that objective
chances must be probabilities (!) [10] we get probabilism
as the analogous coherence norm for credences.
Apart from [10], there are serious epistemic problems with
this analogy. Hjek himself discusses a crucial example.
the coin that I am about to toss is either two-headed or two-tailed,
but you do not know which. What is the probability that it lands
heads? . . . reasonably, you assign a probability of
1
2
, even though
you know that the chance of heads is either 1 or 0. So it is rational
to assign a credence that you know does not match the . . . chance.
This is disanalogous to rational belief, since it is never
rational to believe something that you know is not true.
We think this is a counterexample to any useful (narrow)
truth norm analogy between full belief and partial belief.
Ramsey has a dierent strategy for trying to ground
probabilism as a coherence norm for credences.
He oers a pragmatic argument for probabilism, which has
become known as the Dutch Book Argument (DBA).
I wont discuss the (DBA) today (idea: if Ss credences are
non-probabilistic, S is susceptible to sure monetary loss).
de Finetti [4] and Joyce [12, 11] have oered epistemic
arguments for probabilism via considerations of accuracy.
Joyce [12, 11] thinks of Ss credence b(p) as Ss estimate of
the (numerical) truth-value of p. He gives an argument for
probabilism that is based on the accuracy of Ss estimates.
In order to understand the accuracy norm(s) appropriate to
credences (in Joyces sense), we rst need to say something
about how to measure the (in)accuracy of credences.
Following Joyce, well associate the truth-value T (at each
world w) with the number 1 and the truth-value F with 0.
The inaccuracy of b(p) at w is bs distance (d) from ps
numerical truth-value at w (this is gradational inaccuracy).
Norm of Gradational Accuracy. A rational agent must evaluate
partial beliefs on the basis of their gradational accuracy, and she
must strive to hold a system of partial beliefs that has an overall
level of gradational accuracy not guaranteed to be lower than
that of any alternative system she might adopt.
Example. Suppose S has just two (contingent) propositions
P, P in their doxastic space. Then, there are two salient
possible worlds (w
1
in which P is T, and w
2
in which P is F).
And, the overall inaccuracy of b at w [I(b, w)] is given by:
I(b, w
1
) = d(b(P), 1) +d(b(P), 0).
I(b, w
2
) = d(b(P), 0) +d(b(P), 1).
Various measures (d) of distance from 0/1-truth-value
have been proposed/defended in the historical literature.
de Finetti [4] endorsed the following measure of distance
from truth-value (in one of his arguments for probabilism):
s(x, y) = (x y)
2
.
The distance measure s gives rise to a measure of overall
inaccuracy (I
s
), which is known as the Brier Score. In our toy
example, the Brier Scores of b in worlds w
1
and w
2
are:
I
s
(b, w
1
) = s(b(P), 1) +s(b(P), 0) = (b(P) 1)
2
+b(P)
2
.
I
s
(b, w
2
) = s(b(P), 0) +s(b(P), 1) = b(P)
2
+(b(P) 1)
2
.
If one adopts the Brier Score as ones measure of bs
inaccuracy, then one can give an accuracy-dominance
argument for a probabilistic coherence norm for credences.
de Finetti [4] proved the crucial Brier-dominance theorem:
Theorem (de Finetti). b is non-probabilistic if and only if
there exists a probabilistic credence function b
such that
b
has a strictly lower Brier Score than b at every world.

It helps to visualize what happens to a non-probabilistic b:
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
There are various controversial assumptions in Joyces
accuracy-dominance argument for probabilism [9]. We have
two forthcoming papers criticizing Joyces argument [6, 5].
We can, by analogy, apply the Joycean strategy to full belief.
When we do, we get a compelling coherence norm for full
belief. And, we avoid the problems faced by Joyces
argument for probabilism (i.e., it works better for full belief !).
The basic idea is to move away from the old accuracy
analogy toward a new accuracy-dominance analogy.
Let B be the set of qualitative judgments (beliefs/disbeliefs)
of an agent S (at a time). A new (global/wide) analogy:
B is accuracy-dominated
B is incoherent
::
b is Brier-dominated
b is not a Pr-function
Filling-in this analogy requires answering two questions:
How should we gauge the (in)accuracy of B at a world w?
How should we explicate B
accuracy-dominates B?
For simplicity, we restrict our discussion to nite, logically
omniscient, opinionated agents who make denite judgments
regarding each proposition in some Boolean algebra 1.
I.e., for each p 1, S either believes p [B(p)] or disbelieves
p [D(p)], and not both (and no suspension of judgment).
First step: say what it means for beliefs/disbeliefs to be
(in)accurate. This is easy and uncontroversial. Of course:
B(p) is (in)accurate at w i p is true (false) at w.
D(p) is (in)accurate at w i p is false (true) at w.
Second step: say what it means for one judgment set B
(over an algebra 1) to be accuracy-dominated by another B
.
The analogous way to think about accuracy-dominance for
sets of qualitative judgments involves comparing numbers
of inaccurate judgments in each of the judgment sets, i.e.,
One set of judgments B
(strictly) accuracy-dominates
another B (over a full algebra 1) i B
contains strictly fewer

inaccurate judgments than B at every possible world.
On this approach, we obtain the following coherence norm:
(CB
) S should not have a qualitative judgment set B that is

(strictly) accuracy-dominated by some alternative set B
.
What is the precise content of (CB
)? Is it non-trivial? And,
how does it relate to our evidential norm (EB)?
It turns out that (CB
) is non-trivial, and it is very closely

aligned (in lock-step with) with our evidential norm (EB).
First, consider (CB
) from the point of view of its violation.

(I) Theorem. S violates (CB
) i B contains a subset such that,

at every possible world, most members of are inaccurate.
(CB
) is strictly weaker than (CB).

(CB) (CB
). If S satises (CB), then Ss judgment B set will

be perfectly accurate in some w ( B is non-dominated).
(CB) (CB
). Notably, minimal inconsistencies (lotteries,

prefaces) need not violate (CB
). [See, also, Extras #1.]

Next, consider (CB
) from the point of view of satisfaction

of the norm. Heres a sucient condition for satisfaction:
(II) Theorem. S satises (CB
) if their B can be probabilistically

represented in the following strict
1
2
-threshold fashion:
(L
B
) There exists a probability function Pr such that, p B:
B(p) i Pr(p) >
1
2
, and D(p) i Pr(p) <
1
2
.
I.e., S satises (CB
) if there is some Pr() that probabilies

each of Ss beliefs and dis-probabilies each of Ss disbeliefs.
In light of this Theorem, the following seems plausible:
() If S violates (CB
), then S violates (EB). [i.e., (EB) (CB
)!]
On most accounts of propositional justication [? 20, 7], an
agent S with evidence E is justied in B(p) [D(p)] only if
there is some Pr() such that Pr(p E) >
1
2
_
Pr(p E) <
1
2
_
.
So, pace [13], if S violates (CB
), then S must have some

qualitative judgment that is not supported by her evidence!
Here is the big picture of relationships between norms:
Local/Narrow Accuracy Norm: (TB)
}
Global/Wide Deductive Consistency Norm: (CB)
}
Global/Wide Coherence Norm (Non-Dominance): (CB
)
}
Local/Narrow Evidential Norm: (EB)
The full picture of logical relationships between norms:
(TB)
(CB)
(CB
)
(EB)

We have already seen that majority rule (applied both to
premises and conclusions) need not preserve deductive
consistency. That is, (CB) is not preserved by MR.
Question. does majority rule preserve our qualitative
coherence, viz., is (CB
) preserved by MR? Answer. No!

However, we do have the following positive result:
(III) Theorem. If each of a set of judges has a consistent
judgment set, then the majority prole must be coherent.
So, while MR does not necessarily ensure that consistent

individual proles aggregate to a consistent group prole, it
does ensure that consistent individuals aggregate to a
coherent group (i.e., one that is not accuracy-dominated).
Three Open Questions. (1) Does any supermajority short of
unanimity ensure (CB
)-preservation? (2) Which incomplete

majority procedures continue to ensure Theorem (III)? (3) What
do distance-based coherent aggregation methods look like?
[1] R. Briggs F. Cariani, K. Easwaran, B. Fitelson, Individual Coherence & Group Coherence, to
appear in Essays in Collective Epistemology, J. Lackey (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2013.
[2] F. Cariani, M. Pauly and J. Snyder, Decision Framing in Judgment Aggregation, Synthese, 2008.
[3] D. Christensen, Putting Logic in its Place, Oxford University Press, 2004.
[4] B. de Finetti, The Theory of Probability, Wiley, 1974.
[5] K. Easwaran and B. Fitelson, An Evidentialist Worry about Joyces Argument for Probabilism,
Dialectica, forthcoming.
[6] B. Fitelson, Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyces Argument for Probabilism,
Philosophy of Science, January 2012.
[7] R. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, Rowman & Littleeld, 1995.
[8] A. Hjek, A Puzzle About Degree of Belief, manuscript, 2010.
[9] , Arguments for or Against Probabilism?, BJPS, 2008.
[10] P. Humphries, Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities, The Philosophical Review, 1985.
[11] J. Joyce, Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief, in
F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief, 2009.
[12] , A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism, Philosophy of Science, 1998.
[13] N. Kolodny, How Does Coherence Matter?, Proc. of the Aristotelian Society, 2007.
[14] L. Kornhauser and G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, The Yale Law Journal, 1986.
[15] C. List, Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective,
Episteme, 2005.
[16] C. List and B. Polak, Introduction to Judgment Aggregation, Journal of Economic Theory, 2010.
[17] M. Miller and D. Osherson, Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation, Social Choice
and Welfare, 2009.
[18] P. Petit, Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma, Philosophical Issues, 2001.
[19] F. Ramsey, Truth and Probability, 1926.
[20] T. Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford University Press, 2000.
B B
L
B
X & Y B D
11
32
X & Y B D
7
32
X & Y B D
13
32
X & Y D D
1
32
Y B B
18
32
X Y B B
24
32
X D D
12
32
X B B
20
32
(X Y) D D
8
32
Y D D
14
32
X Y B B
31
32
X Y B B
19
32
X Y B B
25
32
X Y B B
21
32
X X B B 1
X & X D D 0
Here is a concrete example, which illustrates how
the coherence norm (CB
) works.
Consider a very simple agent S with a language
containing two atomic sentences X and Y. This
gives rise to an algebra 1 with 16 propositions.
Let Ss judgment set B be as depicted in the
table. B violates (CB
). [Consider the subset

over the state descriptions of the language.]
Fact. Ss B isnt accuracy-dominated by any
deductively consistent set, but B is (uniquely!)
accuracy-dominated by the coherent set B
.
Note: B
satises (CB
), since there is no subset

of B
that is majority inaccurate in every w.

Another way to see the coherence of B
is to note
that it has a probabilistic representation [L
B
]
with a strict
1
2
-threshold (of course, B does not).
On this slide, well prove Theorem (I). First, some notation.
Let (B, w) = the # of inaccurate judgments in B at w.
(I) Theorem. S violates (CB
) there exists a B such that,

at every possible world, most members of are inaccurate.
Proof of (). Suppose Ss judgment set B is dominated by a
set B
. Let B be the set of judgments on which B and B
disagree. Since (B
, w) < (B, w), for each world w, and B

and B
disagree on all and only the members of , it follows

that, at every w, most members of are inaccurate.
Proof of (). Suppose B is such that, at every possible
world, most of its members are inaccurate. Let B
agree with
B on all judgments outside of and disagree with B on all
judgments in . Then, B
must dominate B.
On the next slide, we prove Theorem (II). Let 1(B, Pr) be the
expected score of B, relative to Pr(). 1(B, Pr) is dened in
terms of the proposition-wise score of B at w, (B, p, w).
(B, p, w) =
_
_
_
1 if Bs judgment re p is inaccurate at w,
0 if Bs judgment re p is accurate at w.
Note: the score of B at w is just (B, w) =
p
(B, p, w).
Thus, the expected score 1(B, Pr) is the expectation of the
sum
p
(B, p, w). Because expectation is linear, 1(B, Pr) is
therefore the sum of the expectations of the (B, p, w). So:
1(B, Pr) =
p
E((B, p, w), Pr) =
w
Pr(w)(B, p, w)
=
_
p
_
_
_
w=p
Pr(w)(B, p, w) +
_
w=p
Pr(w)(B, p, w)
_
_
=
p
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
w=p
Pr(w) 1 +
_
w=p
Pr(w) 0 if D(p) B,
_
w=p
Pr(w) 0 +
_
w=p
Pr(w) 1 if B(p) B.
_
_
_
_
_
_
=
p
_
_
_
_
_
Pr(p) if D(p) B,
Pr(p) if B(p) B.
_
_
1(B, Pr) is minimized if, p, Pr(p) >
1
2
B(p) B and
Pr(p) <
1
2
D(p) B. This implies Theorem (II).
Consider a language w/16 state descriptions s
1
, ..., s
16
. Let:
p = s
1
s
2
s
3
s
4
q = s
1
s
5
s
6
s
7
r = s
2
s
5
s
8
s
9
s = s
3
s
6
s
8
s
10
t = s
4
s
7
s
9
s
10
= p, q, r, s, t
Here are four key facts about the set .
(i) Any two sentences in are logically consistent.
because any pair shares a state description.
(ii) Any three sentences in are logically inconsistent.
because every state description occurs exactly twice.
(iii) Any four sentences in are coherent (if jointly believed).
Theorem (I) + the fact that it is not guaranteed that such a
judgment set will contain a subset such that, at every
world, a majority of s members are inaccurate.
(iv) is not coherent (if jointly believed).
Theorem (I) + the fact that, at every world, a majority of
members of any such judgment set must be inaccurate.
p q r s t
J
1
B B B B D
J
2
B B B D B
J
3
B B D B B
J
4
B D B B B
J
5
D B B B B
Majority B B B B B
Each judge can be coherent because judgment sets with 4/5
beliefs (and 1/5 disbeliefs) over can be non-dominated.
This is because there will be worlds in which a majority of
such judgments are accurate. (For example: in worlds that
make state description s
1
true, p, q and t are all true.)
However the (80%!) majority believes all members of . And,
any judgment set containing these judgments must be
dominated. So, majority rule doesnt preserve coherence.
On the next slide, well sketch a proof of our positive
Theorem (III). The key will be to use Theorem (II).
Recall, Theorem (II) ensures that that if a judgement set B is
representable by some probability function via a strict
1
2
-threshold, then that judgment set B must be coherent.
For majority acceptance on individually consistent and
complete inputs this is clearly true. The probability
function in question is just the pattern of individual votes:
For all p, Pr
(p) =
# of judges for p
# of total judges
.
To verify this, note that Pr
() satises the Pr-axioms.

Additivity is the only axiom that deserves comment.
Suppose p, q are m.e. If p is accepted by
r
y
of the judges
and q is accepted by
s
y
of the judges, then (by consistency +
completeness) p q will be accepted by
r+s
y
of the judges.
By Theorem (II) and the existence of Pr
(), it follows that

majority rule on consistent and complete proles always
yields coherent aggregations. That is, if judges satisfy (CB),
then their majority aggregate must satisfy (CB
).

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The Traditional Stories A New Approach to A, C & E Results & Open Questions Refs Proofs & Illustrations

Individual Coherence & Group Coherence

Ill describe a new coherence norm that avoids this problem.

Naive majority rule for aggregating all judgments can lead

has a strictly lower Brier Score than b at every world.

contains strictly fewer

) S should not have a qualitative judgment set B that is

) is non-trivial, and it is very closely

) from the point of view of its violation.

) i B contains a subset such that,

) is strictly weaker than (CB).

). If S satises (CB), then Ss judgment B set will

). Notably, minimal inconsistencies (lotteries,

). [See, also, Extras #1.]

) from the point of view of satisfaction

) if their B can be probabilistically

) if there is some Pr() that probabilies

), then S violates (EB). [i.e., (EB) (CB

So, pace [13], if S violates (CB

), then S must have some

Global/Wide Coherence Norm (Non-Dominance): (CB

Branden Fitelson Individual Coherence & Group Coherence 16

) preserved by MR? Answer. No!

So, while MR does not necessarily ensure that consistent

)-preservation? (2) Which incomplete

). [Consider the subset

), since there is no subset

that is majority inaccurate in every w.

) there exists a B such that,

. Let B be the set of judgments on which B and B

, w) < (B, w), for each world w, and B

disagree on all and only the members of , it follows

() satises the Pr-axioms.

(), it follows that

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