Social Justice contemplates equitable diffusion not only of wealth but also of political powers (Sec 1, Article XIII,

1987 Constitution.

Social Justice - 1987 Philippine Constitution

Social Justice (Sec 10) Old Concept: It is neither communism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces of the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Expanded Meaning of Social Justice:- Social justice under the 1987 Constitution is broader than the concept of social justice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution and, in fact, broader than the definition in Calalang vs Williams. Social Justice under the 1987 Philippine Constitution includes all phases of national development, instead of being merely limited to the removal of socio-economic inequities. NOTES: Social Justice contemplates equitable diffusion not only of wealth but also of political powers (Sec 1, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution) Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor.
ART II,SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. Art II ,SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. ART III,SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. ART III,SECTION 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Art XVIII,SECTION 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.

SOCIAL JUSTICE ON Labor SEC. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organizations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be

provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.

ARTICLE 233. Privileged communication. Information and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission. Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them **

Art 226 ( labor code) BLR and Labor Relations Divisions in the Regional Office of DOLE shall have original and exclusive authority to act, to their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, ON ALL INTER-UNION AND INTRA-UNION CONFLICTS, and all disputes and grievances or problems arising from or affecting LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS in ALL workplace whether agricultural or non-agricultural. EXCEPTION: Except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of CBA which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration EUBP VS BAYER PHILS AND Avelina Remigio.et al FACTS : EUBP is the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of BAYER Phils. And is and affiliate of FFW(Federation of Free Workers). EUBP , in 1997,negotiated a CBA with BAYER but the former rejected the 9.9% wage increase proposal of the latter resulting in a bargaining deadlock. Respondent Remigio without authority from EUBP accepted the proposal of BAYER

and later this was questioned by EUBP and reprimanded Remigio. On January 7,1998, DOLE secretary issued an arbitral award ordering EUBP and BAYER to execute CBA retroactive to January 1, 1997. Said CBA was registered with the Industrial Relations Division of DOLE-NCR. Remigio disaffiliate from EUBP and then formed a new REUBP group with the other union members asking BAYER to remit to the new group union dues. Bayer confused, placed the union dues collected in a trust account until the conflict between EUBP and REUBP is resolved. EUBP filed a complaint of ULP(unfair labor practice) against BAYER for not remitting union dues. BAYER in return turn over the collected union dues to Anastacia Villareal, treasurer of REUBP. Aggrieved, EUBP lodged acompaint before the IRD of DOLE against REUBP praying said group be expelled from EUBP for commission of acts that threaten the life of the union. 0n 1999, Labor Arbiter dismissed the ULP complaint by EUBP since the cause of BAYERS failure to remit can be traced to the intra-union conflict between EUBP and REUBP.On Dec, 1999, EUBP filed again another ULP complaint against BAYER on ground of non-remittance of union dues and against REUBP on the grounds of ULP by organizing a company union, gross violation of CBA, and violation of their duty to bargain. Afterwards, REUBP and BAYER agreed to a new CBA then EUBP filed a motion for the issuance of TRO/INJUNCTION before NLRC. The regional director of IRD DOLE dismissed the issue on expulsion but upon appeal by EUBP to BLR reversed the ruling and ordered BAYER to respect the authority of EUBP .On June 2000, Labor Arbiter dismissed the second ULP complaint for lack of jurisdiction. NLRC does not have jurisdiction on cases of intra-union disputes and union dues. (Jurisdiction falls under the BLR and Labor Relations Division of DOLE).EUBP filed a rule 65 petition to CA. Likewise denied. ISSUE:WON the act of the management of BAYER in dealing and negotiating with Remigios splinter group despite a validly existing CBA with petitioner can be considered ULP? WON the acts of Remigios group and REUBP constitute ULP? RULING: Yes,the issues raised by petitioners do not fall under the circumstances of an intra/inter-union dispute .Petitioners do not seek a determination of whether EUBP or REUBP which is the true set of union officers. The issue raised pertain only to the validity of the acts of management in the light of the fact that it still has an existing CBA with EUBP. The question was whether BAYER is liable for unfair labor practice was within the jurisdiction of NLRC. An employer should not be allowed to rescind unilaterally its CBA with the duly certified bargaining agent it had previously contracted. Art.253 (LABOR CODE) Where there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate or modify such agreement during its lifetime. This is the reason why it is axoiomatic in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization that has been duly certified as the exclusive bargaining representative and

the employer becomes the law between them. A registered CBA serves as the covenant between the parties and has the force and effect of law between them during the period of its duration. Compliance with the terms and conditions of the CBA is mandated by express policy of the law primarily to afford protection of labor and to promote industrial peace. On the second issue, No, since the acts of the splinter group of Remigio essentially involve an intra-union dispute that cites disaffiliation and legality of the establishment of REUBP, issues that are outside of the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Intra-union disputes jurisdiction falls under BLR and the Labor Relations Division of DOLE.

INTRA-UNION DISPUTE-refers to any conflict between and among the union members, including grievances from any violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of disagreement over any provision of the unions constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union, CBA is entered into in order to foster stability and mutual cooperation between labor and capital. On Art 253, Parties to CBA can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least 60 days prior to its expiration. ** A corporation cannot suffer or be entitled for moral damages since it is being artificial person(no feelings, no emotions). Only nominal damages were awarded in this case P250,000

lawphil

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 152322 February 15, 2005

ERNESTO C. VERCELES, DIOSDADO F. TRINIDAD, SALVADOR G. BLANCIA, ROSEMARIE DE LUMBAN, FELICITAS F. RAMOS, MIGUEL TEAO, JAIME BAUTISTA and FIDEL ACERO, as Officers of the University of the East Employees Association, petitioners, vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS-DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT-NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, RODEL E. DALUPAN, EFREN J. DE OCAMPO, PROCESO TOTTO, JR., ELIZABETH ALARCA, ELVIRA S. MANALO, and RICARDO UY, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 rendered by the Court of Appeals, dated 24 October 2001 and 15 February 2002, respectively. The Facts Private respondents Rodel E. Dalupan, Efren J. De Ocampo, Proceso Totto, Jr., Elizabeth Alarca, and Elvira S. Manalo are members of the University of the East Employees Association (UEEA). On 15 September 1997, they each received a Memorandum from the UEEA charging them with spreading false rumors and creating disinformation among the members of the said association. They were given seventy-two hours from receipt of the Memorandum to submit their Answer.3

The acts of the respondents allegedly fall under General Assembly Resolution No. 4, Series of 1979, to wit: 1. Circulating false rumors about the progress of the negotiations for collective bargaining; 2. Creating distrust or loss of trust and confidence of members in the Association; 3. Creating dissension among the members; 4. Circulating false rumors about the work of the Association or sabotaging the same; 5. Withholding from the Association and/or members material information as to their rightful entitlement to benefits and/or money claims; 6. Acting as a spy against the Association or divulging confidential matters to persons not entitled thereto; 7. Such other offenses, which may injure or disrupt the functions of the Association.4 Through a collective reply dated 19 September 1997, private respondents denied the allegations. Thereafter, on 23 September 1997, they sent a letter dated 22 September 1997 to the Chairman and Members of UEEAs Disciplinary Committee, informing them that the Memorandum of 15 September 1997 was vague and without legal basis, therefore, no intelligent answer may be made by them. They likewise stated that any sanction that will be imposed by the committee would be violative of their right to due process.5 The Disciplinary Committee issued another Memorandum, dated 24 September 1997, giving the respondents another seventytwo hours from receipt within which to properly reply, explaining that the collective reply letter and supplemental answer which were earlier submitted were not responsive to the first Memorandum. Their failure would be construed as an admission of the truthfulness and veracity of the charges.6 On 01 October 1997, the respondents issued a denial for the second time, and inquired from the Disciplinary Committee as to whether they were being formally charged.7 On 09 October 1997, Ernesto Verceles, in his capacity as president of the association, through a Memorandum, informed Rodel Dalupan, et al., that their membership in the association has been suspended and shall take effect immediately upon receipt thereof. Verceles said he was acting upon the disciplinary committees finding of a prima facie case against them.8 Respondent Ricardo Uy also received a similar memorandum on 03 November 1997.9 On 01 December 1997, a complaint10 for illegal suspension, willful and unlawful violation of UEEA constitution and by-laws, refusal to render financial and other reports, deliberate refusal to call general and special meetings, illegal holdover of terms and damages was filed by the respondents against herein petitioners Ernesto C. Verceles, Diosdado F. Trinidad, Salvador G. Blancia, Rosemarie De Lumban, Felicitas Ramos, Miguel Teao, Jaime Bautista and Fidel Acero before the Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). A few days after the filing of the complaint, i.e., on 10 December 1997, a resolution11 was passed by UEEA which reads as follows: RESOLUTION WHEREAS, the Association has gone thru a most arduous, difficult, and trying times in working to obtain the best terms and conditions of employment for its members, specifically for the period 1992 to 1996; WHEREAS, said difficulties are in the form of near strikes, cases with the Department of Labor and Employment and its

agencies, as well as with the Supreme Court; WHEREAS, the general membership (has) shown exceptional patience and perseverance and generally (had) demonstrated full trust and confidence in the Association officers and accordingly approved the manner and/or actions undertaken in pursuing said difficult task of arriving at a most beneficial agreement for the general membership; NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved that: ... b) the general membership reiterate its loyalty to the Association and commends the Association officers for their effort expended in working for the benefit of the whole membership. APPROVED. Manila. 10 December 1997. On 22 November 1999, a decision12 was rendered by Regional Director Maximo B. Lim, adverse to petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent[s] [are] hereby ordered: 1. to immediately lift suspension imposed upon the complainants; 2. to hold a general membership meeting wherein they (respondents) make open and available the unions/associations books of accounts and other documents pertaining to the union funds [and] thereby explain the financial status of the union; 3. to regularly conduct special and general membership meetings in accordance with the unions constitution and bylaws; 4. to immediately hold/conduct an election of officers in accordance with the unions constitution and by-laws. Accordingly, the claims of complainants for damages [are] hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, within ten (10) days upon receipt of this Order, the complainants are hereby directed to submit a written report whether or not the respondents had complied with this Order. The petitioners appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and Employment (BLR-DOLE). During the pendency of this appeal, or on 07 April 2000, an election of officers was held by the UEEA. The appeal, however, was dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution13 dated 22 September 2000, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision dated 22 (November) 1999 of Regional Director Maximo B. Lim, DOLE-NCR, is AFFIRMED. Meanwhile, Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000, was passed by the UEEA, wherein the members allegedly reiterated their support and approval of the acts and collateral actions of the officers.14 A Motion for Reconsideration15 was filed by the petitioners with the BLR-DOLE, but was denied in a Resolution16dated 15 January

2001. A special civil action for certiorari17 was thereafter filed before the Court of Appeals citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In a Resolution18 dated 22 February 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A Motion for Reconsideration19 was filed which was granted in a Resolution20 dated 24 April 2001, thus, reinstating the petition.
1awphi1.nt

On 24 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision21 dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. A Motion for Reconsideration22 was thereafter filed by the petitioners. In a Resolution23 dated 15 February 2002, the Court of Appeals modified its earlier decision. The decretal portion of which states: WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of this court is MODIFIED. The 22 September 2000 and 15 January 2001 resolutions of the BLR insofar as they affirmed the part of the 22 November 1999 decision of the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR ordering the immediate holding of election are HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. All the other aspects of the assailed Resolutions are AFFIRMED. Not satisfied, the petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari24 before this Court. The Issues The petitioners raise the following issues: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDING THE DOLENCR AND BLR-DOLE DECISIONS BASED ONLY ON THE COMPLAINT AND ANSWER; 2. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HOLD THE ELECTION OF APRIL 7, 2000 AS INVALID AND A NULLITY; 3. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO UPHOLD BLR-DOLES FINDING THAT THE SUSPENSION WAS ILLEGAL; and 4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED NON-HOLDING OF MEETINGS AND ALLEGED NON-SUBMISSION OF REPORTS ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, AND WHETHER THE DECISION TO HOLD MEETINGS AND SUBMIT REPORTS CONTRADICT AND OVERRIDE THE SOVEREIGN WILL OF THE MAJORITY. 25 The Courts Rulings We shall discuss the issues in seriatim. First Issue: was the court a quo correct in upholding the DOLE-NCR and BLR-DOLE decisions based only on the complaint and answer? Petitioners contend that the complaint filed by the private respondents in DOLE-NCR was a mere recital of bare, self serving and unsubstantiated allegations. Both parties did not submit position papers, and the DOLE-NCR resolved the case based only on the complaint and answer. Also, by failing to submit a reply to the answer, private respondents, in effect admitted the petitioners controversion of the charges.26 They further argue that the private respondents did not exhaust administrative remedies and that the requirement of support by at least 30% of the members of the association pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV, Article I,

Department Order No. 9 of DOLE, was not complied with.27 Private respondents, on the other hand, assert that the records show that despite their failure to submit their position papers, they nonetheless moved that the case be resolved by DOLE-NCR based on the complaint, answer and available exhibits or annexes integrated with the aforesaid pleadings.28 The principle of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies that would warrant the dismissal of the case should not operate against them because they were deprived of their right to due process when they were indefinitely suspended without the benefit of a formal charge which is sufficient in form and substance.29 The respondents also point out that the thirty percent (30%) support requirement pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV, Article I, Department Order No. 9, is not applicable to them because their complaint was primordially predicated on their suspension while the rest of the causes of action were mere collateral consequences of the principal cause of action.30 It is worthy to note that the BLR-DOLE, in its Resolution dated 22 September 2000, underscored the negligence of herein petitioners not only in the submission of their pleadings but also in attending the hearings called for the purpose.31 Even the Court of Appeals, in its decision, made this observation, thus: It is apparent, however, that petitioners were to blame for their predicament. They repeatedly failed to appear in a series of conferences scheduled by the DOLE-NCR, asked for resetting of hearings, and requested for extension of time to file its answer. Hence, when they again did not attend a hearing on a date they themselves asked for, private respondents (complainants therein) moved for the submission of the case based on their complaint, position paper and annexes attached thereto. When DOLE-NCR directed the parties to submit their respective position papers, petitioners again moved for extension of time to file the same. When another notice was given to the parties to comply with the directive, petitioners prayed for another extension of time. (Private respondents, however, reiterated their earlier motion to have the case resolved based on available pleadings.) After six (6) months or so, petitioners finally filed not their position paper but their answer.32 The Court of Appeals was justified in upholding the DOLE-NCR and BLR-DOLE decisions based on the complaint and answer. We cannot accept petitioners line of reasoning that since no position papers were submitted, no decision may be made by the adjudicating body. As ruled by Regional Director Maximo B. Lim in his decision, the complaint and the answer thereto were adopted as the parties position papers. Thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.33 Labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases, with the least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process.34 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.35In this case, it cannot be said that there was a denial of due process on the part of the petitioners because they were given all the chances to refute the allegations of the private respondents, and the delay in the proceedings before the DOLE-NCR was clearly attributable to them. The argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be sustained. One of the instances when the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded is when there is a violation of due process.36 In this case, the respondents have chronicled from the very beginning that they were indefinitely suspended without the benefit of a formal charge sufficient in form and substance. Therefore, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot squarely apply to them. On the matter concerning the 30% support requirement needed to report violations of rights and conditions of union membership, as found in the last paragraph of Article 241 of the Labor Code,37 we likewise cannot sanction the petitioners. We have already made our pronouncement in the case of Rodriguez v. Director, Bureau of Labor Relations38 that the 30% requirement is not mandatory. In this case, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa,39 held in part: The respondent Directors ruling, however, that the assent of 30% of the union membership, mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor Code, was mandatory and essential to the filing of a complaint for any violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization (such as the arbitrary and oppressive increase of union dues here complained of), cannot be affirmed and will be reversed. The very article relied upon militates against the proposition. It states that a report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization maybe made by "(a)t least thirty percent (30%) of all the members of a union or any member or members specially concerned." The use of the permissive "may" in the provision at once negates the notion that the assent of 30% of all the members is mandatory. More decisive is the fact that the provision expressly declares that the

report may be made, alternatively by "any member or members specially concerned." And further confirmation that the assent of 30% of the union members is not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor Relations is furnished by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, over "all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor management relations," making no reference whatsoever to any such 30%-support requirement. Indeed, the officials mentioned are given the power to act "on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts (1) " upon request of either or both parties" as well as (2) "at their own initiative." Second Issue: was the election held on 07 April 2000 valid or a nullity? This issue arose from the fact that the original decision of the DOLE-NCR dated 22 November 1999, ordered petitioners, among other things, to "immediately hold/conduct an election of officers . . ." Petitioners, it must be recalled, appealed from the DOLENCR decision to the BLR-DOLE. During the pendency of the appeal, however, an election of officers was held on 07 April 2000. Subsequently, the BLR-DOLE affirmed the decision of the DOLE-NCR, but with the pronouncement that ". . . the supposed election conducted on (07) April 2000 is null and void and cannot produce legal effects adverse to appellants."40 The petitioners contend that since the election was held on 07 April 2000, and the original complaint before the DOLE-NCR was filed on 01 December 1997, the former could not have been the subject of the complaint. There was, according to petitioners, reversible error in the BLR-DOLEs adding to the DOLE-NCRs decision, the nullification of the 07 April 2000 election. The BLR DOLE should have limited itself to affirming, modifying or setting aside and canceling the provisions of the dispositive portion of the DOLE-NCRs decision which was subject of the appeal. The election was held because the term of the petitioners (extended for five years under Republic Act No. 671541 ) expired on 07 April 2000. As amended by Republic Act 6715, paragraph (c) of Article 241 of the Labor Code now reads: (c) The members shall directly elect their officers in the local union, as well as their national officers in the national union or federation to which they or their local union is affiliated, by secret ballots at intervals of five (5) years. It just so happened that the holding of the election coincided with the DOLE-NCR decision.42 The private respondents, in answer to this, point out that the 07 April 2000 election, as appearing in the 22 September 2000 Resolution of the BLR-DOLE, was set aside not on the flimsy reason that there was no complaint to invalidate it, but due to the appeal of the petitioners questioning the BLR-DOLEs order. The appeal effectively suspended the effect of the DOLE-NCR Regional Directors order for the immediate holding of election of officers in accordance with the unions constitution and bylaws.43 On this matter, the Court of Appeals made the following observation: Consequently, the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR erred in ordering the immediate holding of election of officers of UEEA, and the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)-Department of Labor and Employment, insofar as it affirmed this particular order, committed an act amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, despite of this finding, the election of UEEA officers on 7 April 2000 cannot acquire a semblance of legality. First, it was conducted pursuant to the aforesaid (erroneous) order of the Regional Director as manifested by the petitioners. Second, it was purposely done to pre-empt the resolution of the case by the BLR and to deprive private respondents their substantial right to participate in the election. Third, petitioners cannot be allowed to take an inconsistent position to later on claim that the election of 7 April 2000 was held because it was already due while previously declaring that it was made in line with the order of the Regional Director, for this would go against the principle of fair play. Thus, while the BLR was wrong in affirming the order of the Regional Director for the immediate holding of election, it was right in nullifying the 7 April 2000 UEEA election of officers. It was simply improper for the petitioners to implement the said order which was then one of the subjects of their appeal in the BLR. To hold otherwise would be to dispossess the BLR of its inherent power

to control the conduct of the proceedings of cases pending before it for resolution.44 Based on the prevailing facts of this case, we affirm the foregoing findings of the court a quo. We cannot hold the election of 07 April 2000 valid as this would make us condone an iniquitous act. Said election was perceptibly done to hinder any resolution or decision that would be made by BLR-DOLE. The Regional Director indeed ordered the immediate holding of an election in its Order dated 22 November 1999. The records show that the petitioners questioned this order of the Regional Director before the BLR-DOLE by way of appeal,45 and yet, they conducted the election, allegedly because it was due under Republic Act No. 6715. Why this was done by the petitioners escapes us. But as rightfully observed by the BLR-DOLE: . . . Indeed, it is obvious that the general membership meeting and election of officers was done purposely to pre-empt our resolution of this case and, more importantly, the participation of appellees in the election. This cannot be tolerated.46 Third Issue: was the indefinite suspension of the private respondents illegal? We rule in the affirmative. The petitioners posit the theory that the records do not support the findings of the BLR-DOLE that no investigation was conducted making the suspension illegal because of lack of due process. It is best to remind the petitioners that this Court, as we have held in a long line of decisions, is not a trier of facts.47 The instant case is a petition for review on certiorari48 where only questions of law may be raised. The exceptions49 to this rule find no application here. This being the case, the findings of fact of the DOLE-NCR and the BLR-DOLE as affirmed by the Court of Appeals to the effect that no investigation was conducted, shall not be disturbed. As properly held by the court a quo: Petitioners have failed to show that the findings of facts and conclusions of law of both the DOLE-NCR and BLR-DOLE were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion or without substantial evidence. A careful review of the pleadings before Us reveals that the decision and resolutions of the concerned agencies were correctly anchored in law and on substantial evidence.50 Fourth Issue: is the non-holding of meetings and non-submission of reports by the petitioners moot and academic, and whether the decision to hold meetings and submit reports contradict and override the sovereign will of the majority? We do not believe so. This issue was precipitated by the Court of Appeals decision affirming the order of DOLE Regional Director Maximo B. Lim for the petitioners to hold a general membership meeting wherein they make open and available the unions/associations books of accounts and other documents pertaining to the union funds, and to regularly conduct special and general membership meetings in accordance with the unions constitution and by-laws.51 It is to be recalled that the private respondents, when they filed a complaint before the DOLE-NCR also complained of petitioners refusal to render financial and other reports, and deliberate refusal to call general and special meetings. Petitioners do not hide the fact that they belatedly submitted their financial reports and the minutes of their meetings to the DOLE. The issue of belatedly submitting these reports, according to the petitioners, had been rendered moot and academic by their eventual compliance. Besides, this has been the practice of the association.52 Moreover, the petitioners likewise maintain that the passage of General Assembly Resolution No. 10 dated 10 December 1997 and Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000, following the application of the principle that the sovereign majority rules, cured any liability that may have been brought about by their belated actions.53
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As found by the Court of Appeals, the financial statements for the years 1995 up to 1997 were submitted to DOLE-NCR only on 06 February 1998 while that for the year 1998 was submitted only on 16 March 1999.54 The last associations meeting was conducted on 21 April 1995, and the copy of the minutes thereon was submitted to BLR-DOLE only on 24 February 1998.

The passage of General Assembly Resolution No. 10 dated 10 December 1997 and Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000,55 which supposedly cured the lapses committed by the associations officers and reiterated the approval of the general membership of the acts and collateral actions of the associations officers cannot redeem the petitioners from their predicament. The obligation to hold meetings and render financial reports is mandated by UEEAs constitution and by-laws. This fact was never denied by the petitioners. Their eventual compliance, as what happened in this case, shall not release them from the obligation to accomplish these things in the future. Prompt compliance in rendering financial reports together with the holding of regular meetings with the submission of the minutes thereon with the BLR-DOLE and DOLE-NCR shall negate any suspicion of dishonesty on the part of UEEAs officers. This is not only true with UEEA, but likewise with other unions/associations, as this matter is imbued with public interest. Undeniably, transparency in the official undertakings of union officers will bolster genuine trade unionism in the country. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals subjects of the instant case, are affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.

33

Section 3, Rule XIV, Department Order No. 9, Department of Labor and Employment. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154448, 15 August 2003, 409 SCRA 267. Allied Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144412, 18 November 2003, 416 SCRA 65.

34

35

36

Information Technology Foundation of the Phils. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, 13 January 2004, 419 SCRA 141, citing Paat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107, 10 January 1997, 266 SCRA 167.
37

ART. 241. RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR ORGANIZATION. ... Any violation of the above rights and conditions of membership shall be a ground for cancellation of union registration or expulsion of officer from office, whichever is appropriate. At least thirty percent (30%) of all the members of a union or any member or members specially concerned may report such violation to the Bureau. The Bureau shall have the power to hear and decide any reported violation to mete the appropriate penalty.

41

An Act to Extend Protection to Labor, Strengthen the Constitutional Rights of Workers to Self Organization, Collective Bargaining and Peaceful Concerted Activities, Foster Industrial Peace and Harmony, Promote the Preferential Use of Voluntary Modes of Settling Disputes, and Reorganize the National Labor Relations Commission, Amending for These Purposes Certain Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 152322 February 15, 2005

ERNESTO C. VERCELES, DIOSDADO F. TRINIDAD, SALVADOR G. BLANCIA, ROSEMARIE DE LUMBAN, FELICITAS F. RAMOS, MIGUEL TEAO, JAIME BAUTISTA and FIDEL ACERO, as Officers of the University of the East Employees Association, petitioners, vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS-DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT-NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, RODEL E. DALUPAN, EFREN J. DE OCAMPO, PROCESO TOTTO, JR., ELIZABETH ALARCA, ELVIRA S. MANALO, and RICARDO UY, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 rendered by the Court of Appeals, dated 24 October 2001 and 15 February 2002, respectively. The Facts

Private respondents Rodel E. Dalupan, Efren J. De Ocampo, Proceso Totto, Jr., Elizabeth Alarca, and Elvira S. Manalo are members of the University of the East Employees Association (UEEA). On 15 September 1997, they each received a Memorandum from the UEEA charging them with spreading false rumors and creating disinformation among the members of the said association. They were given seventy-two hours from receipt of the Memorandum to submit their Answer.3 The acts of the respondents allegedly fall under General Assembly Resolution No. 4, Series of 1979, to wit: 1. Circulating false rumors about the progress of the negotiations for collective bargaining; 2. Creating distrust or loss of trust and confidence of members in the Association; 3. Creating dissension among the members; 4. Circulating false rumors about the work of the Association or sabotaging the same; 5. Withholding from the Association and/or members material information as to their rightful entitlement to benefits and/or money claims; 6. Acting as a spy against the Association or divulging confidential matters to persons not entitled thereto; 7. Such other offenses, which may injure or disrupt the functions of the Association.4 Through a collective reply dated 19 September 1997, private respondents denied the allegations. Thereafter, on 23 September 1997, they sent a letter dated 22 September 1997 to the Chairman and Members of UEEAs Disciplinary Committee, informing them that the Memorandum of 15 September 1997 was vague and without legal basis, therefore, no intelligent answer may be made by them. They likewise stated that any sanction that will be imposed by the committee would be violative of their right to due process.5 The Disciplinary Committee issued another Memorandum, dated 24 September 1997, giving the respondents another seventytwo hours from receipt within which to properly reply, explaining that the collective reply letter and supplemental answer which were earlier submitted were not responsive to the first Memorandum. Their failure would be construed as an admission of the truthfulness and veracity of the charges.6 On 01 October 1997, the respondents issued a denial for the second time, and inquired from the Disciplinary Committee as to whether they were being formally charged.7 On 09 October 1997, Ernesto Verceles, in his capacity as president of the association, through a Memorandum, informed Rodel Dalupan, et al., that their membership in the association has been suspended and shall take effect immediately upon receipt thereof. Verceles said he was acting upon the disciplinary committees finding of a prima facie case against them.8 Respondent Ricardo Uy also received a similar memorandum on 03 November 1997.9 On 01 December 1997, a complaint10 for illegal suspension, willful and unlawful violation of UEEA constitution and by-laws, refusal to render financial and other reports, deliberate refusal to call general and special meetings, illegal holdover of terms and damages was filed by the respondents against herein petitioners Ernesto C. Verceles, Diosdado F. Trinidad, Salvador G. Blancia, Rosemarie De Lumban, Felicitas Ramos, Miguel Teao, Jaime Bautista and Fidel Acero before the Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). A few days after the filing of the complaint, i.e., on 10 December 1997, a resolution11 was passed by UEEA which reads as follows: RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, the Association has gone thru a most arduous, difficult, and trying times in working to obtain the best terms and conditions of employment for its members, specifically for the period 1992 to 1996; WHEREAS, said difficulties are in the form of near strikes, cases with the Department of Labor and Employment and its agencies, as well as with the Supreme Court; WHEREAS, the general membership (has) shown exceptional patience and perseverance and generally (had) demonstrated full trust and confidence in the Association officers and accordingly approved the manner and/or actions undertaken in pursuing said difficult task of arriving at a most beneficial agreement for the general membership; NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved that: ... b) the general membership reiterate its loyalty to the Association and commends the Association officers for their effort expended in working for the benefit of the whole membership. APPROVED. Manila. 10 December 1997. On 22 November 1999, a decision12 was rendered by Regional Director Maximo B. Lim, adverse to petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent[s] [are] hereby ordered: 1. to immediately lift suspension imposed upon the complainants; 2. to hold a general membership meeting wherein they (respondents) make open and available the unions/associations books of accounts and other documents pertaining to the union funds [and] thereby explain the financial status of the union; 3. to regularly conduct special and general membership meetings in accordance with the unions constitution and bylaws; 4. to immediately hold/conduct an election of officers in accordance with the unions constitution and by-laws. Accordingly, the claims of complainants for damages [are] hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, within ten (10) days upon receipt of this Order, the complainants are hereby directed to submit a written report whether or not the respondents had complied with this Order. The petitioners appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and Employment (BLR-DOLE). During the pendency of this appeal, or on 07 April 2000, an election of officers was held by the UEEA. The appeal, however, was dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution13 dated 22 September 2000, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision dated 22 (November) 1999 of Regional Director Maximo B. Lim, DOLE-NCR, is AFFIRMED. Meanwhile, Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000, was passed by the UEEA, wherein the members allegedly reiterated their support

and approval of the acts and collateral actions of the officers.14 A Motion for Reconsideration15 was filed by the petitioners with the BLR-DOLE, but was denied in a Resolution16dated 15 January 2001. A special civil action for certiorari17 was thereafter filed before the Court of Appeals citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In a Resolution18 dated 22 February 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A Motion for Reconsideration19 was filed which was granted in a Resolution20 dated 24 April 2001, thus, reinstating the petition.
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On 24 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision21 dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. A Motion for Reconsideration22 was thereafter filed by the petitioners. In a Resolution23 dated 15 February 2002, the Court of Appeals modified its earlier decision. The decretal portion of which states: WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of this court is MODIFIED. The 22 September 2000 and 15 January 2001 resolutions of the BLR insofar as they affirmed the part of the 22 November 1999 decision of the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR ordering the immediate holding of election are HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. All the other aspects of the assailed Resolutions are AFFIRMED. Not satisfied, the petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari24 before this Court. The Issues The petitioners raise the following issues: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDING THE DOLENCR AND BLR-DOLE DECISIONS BASED ONLY ON THE COMPLAINT AND ANSWER; 2. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HOLD THE ELECTION OF APRIL 7, 2000 AS INVALID AND A NULLITY; 3. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO UPHOLD BLR-DOLES FINDING THAT THE SUSPENSION WAS ILLEGAL; and 4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED NON-HOLDING OF MEETINGS AND ALLEGED NON-SUBMISSION OF REPORTS ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, AND WHETHER THE DECISION TO HOLD MEETINGS AND SUBMIT REPORTS CONTRADICT AND OVERRIDE THE SOVEREIGN WILL OF THE MAJORITY. 25 The Courts Rulings We shall discuss the issues in seriatim. First Issue: was the court a quo correct in upholding the DOLE-NCR and BLR-DOLE decisions based only on the complaint and answer? Petitioners contend that the complaint filed by the private respondents in DOLE-NCR was a mere recital of bare, self serving and

unsubstantiated allegations. Both parties did not submit position papers, and the DOLE-NCR resolved the case based only on the complaint and answer. Also, by failing to submit a reply to the answer, private respondents, in effect admitted the petitioners controversion of the charges.26 They further argue that the private respondents did not exhaust administrative remedies and that the requirement of support by at least 30% of the members of the association pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV, Article I, Department Order No. 9 of DOLE, was not complied with.27 Private respondents, on the other hand, assert that the records show that despite their failure to submit their position papers, they nonetheless moved that the case be resolved by DOLE-NCR based on the complaint, answer and available exhibits or annexes integrated with the aforesaid pleadings.28 The principle of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies that would warrant the dismissal of the case should not operate against them because they were deprived of their right to due process when they were indefinitely suspended without the benefit of a formal charge which is sufficient in form and substance.29 The respondents also point out that the thirty percent (30%) support requirement pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV, Article I, Department Order No. 9, is not applicable to them because their complaint was primordially predicated on their suspension while the rest of the causes of action were mere collateral consequences of the principal cause of action.30 It is worthy to note that the BLR-DOLE, in its Resolution dated 22 September 2000, underscored the negligence of herein petitioners not only in the submission of their pleadings but also in attending the hearings called for the purpose.31 Even the Court of Appeals, in its decision, made this observation, thus: It is apparent, however, that petitioners were to blame for their predicament. They repeatedly failed to appear in a series of conferences scheduled by the DOLE-NCR, asked for resetting of hearings, and requested for extension of time to file its answer. Hence, when they again did not attend a hearing on a date they themselves asked for, private respondents (complainants therein) moved for the submission of the case based on their complaint, position paper and annexes attached thereto. When DOLE-NCR directed the parties to submit their respective position papers, petitioners again moved for extension of time to file the same. When another notice was given to the parties to comply with the directive, petitioners prayed for another extension of time. (Private respondents, however, reiterated their earlier motion to have the case resolved based on available pleadings.) After six (6) months or so, petitioners finally filed not their position paper but their answer.32 The Court of Appeals was justified in upholding the DOLE-NCR and BLR-DOLE decisions based on the complaint and answer. We cannot accept petitioners line of reasoning that since no position papers were submitted, no decision may be made by the adjudicating body. As ruled by Regional Director Maximo B. Lim in his decision, the complaint and the answer thereto were adopted as the parties position papers. Thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.33 Labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases, with the least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process.34 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.35In this case, it cannot be said that there was a denial of due process on the part of the petitioners because they were given all the chances to refute the allegations of the private respondents, and the delay in the proceedings before the DOLE-NCR was clearly attributable to them. The argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be sustained. One of the instances when the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded is when there is a violation of due process.36 In this case, the respondents have chronicled from the very beginning that they were indefinitely suspended without the benefit of a formal charge sufficient in form and substance. Therefore, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot squarely apply to them. On the matter concerning the 30% support requirement needed to report violations of rights and conditions of union membership, as found in the last paragraph of Article 241 of the Labor Code,37 we likewise cannot sanction the petitioners. We have already made our pronouncement in the case of Rodriguez v. Director, Bureau of Labor Relations38 that the 30% requirement is not mandatory. In this case, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa,39 held in part: The respondent Directors ruling, however, that the assent of 30% of the union membership, mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor Code, was mandatory and essential to the filing of a complaint for any violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization (such as the arbitrary and oppressive increase of union dues here complained of), cannot be affirmed and will

be reversed. The very article relied upon militates against the proposition. It states that a report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization maybe made by "(a)t least thirty percent (30%) of all the members of a union or any member or members specially concerned." The use of the permissive "may" in the provision at once negates the notion that the assent of 30% of all the members is mandatory. More decisive is the fact that the provision expressly declares that the report may be made, alternatively by "any member or members specially concerned." And further confirmation that the assent of 30% of the union members is not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor Relations is furnished by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, over "all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor management relations," making no reference whatsoever to any such 30%-support requirement. Indeed, the officials mentioned are given the power to act "on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts (1) " upon request of either or both parties" as well as (2) "at their own initiative." Second Issue: was the election held on 07 April 2000 valid or a nullity? This issue arose from the fact that the original decision of the DOLE-NCR dated 22 November 1999, ordered petitioners, among other things, to "immediately hold/conduct an election of officers . . ." Petitioners, it must be recalled, appealed from the DOLENCR decision to the BLR-DOLE. During the pendency of the appeal, however, an election of officers was held on 07 April 2000. Subsequently, the BLR-DOLE affirmed the decision of the DOLE-NCR, but with the pronouncement that ". . . the supposed election conducted on (07) April 2000 is null and void and cannot produce legal effects adverse to appellants."40 The petitioners contend that since the election was held on 07 April 2000, and the original complaint before the DOLE-NCR was filed on 01 December 1997, the former could not have been the subject of the complaint. There was, according to petitioners, reversible error in the BLR-DOLEs adding to the DOLE-NCRs decision, the nullification of the 07 April 2000 election. The BLR DOLE should have limited itself to affirming, modifying or setting aside and canceling the provisions of the dispositive portion of the DOLE-NCRs decision which was subject of the appeal. The election was held because the term of the petitioners (extended for five years under Republic Act No. 671541 ) expired on 07 April 2000. As amended by Republic Act 6715, paragraph (c) of Article 241 of the Labor Code now reads: (c) The members shall directly elect their officers in the local union, as well as their national officers in the national union or federation to which they or their local union is affiliated, by secret ballots at intervals of five (5) years. It just so happened that the holding of the election coincided with the DOLE-NCR decision.42 The private respondents, in answer to this, point out that the 07 April 2000 election, as appearing in the 22 September 2000 Resolution of the BLR-DOLE, was set aside not on the flimsy reason that there was no complaint to invalidate it, but due to the appeal of the petitioners questioning the BLR-DOLEs order. The appeal effectively suspended the effect of the DOLE-NCR Regional Directors order for the immediate holding of election of officers in accordance with the unions constitution and bylaws.43 On this matter, the Court of Appeals made the following observation: Consequently, the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR erred in ordering the immediate holding of election of officers of UEEA, and the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)-Department of Labor and Employment, insofar as it affirmed this particular order, committed an act amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, despite of this finding, the election of UEEA officers on 7 April 2000 cannot acquire a semblance of legality. First, it was conducted pursuant to the aforesaid (erroneous) order of the Regional Director as manifested by the petitioners. Second, it was purposely done to pre-empt the resolution of the case by the BLR and to deprive private respondents their substantial right to participate in the election. Third, petitioners cannot be allowed to take an inconsistent position to later on claim that the election of 7 April 2000 was held because it was already due while previously declaring that it was made in line with the order of the Regional Director, for this would go against the principle of fair play.

Thus, while the BLR was wrong in affirming the order of the Regional Director for the immediate holding of election, it was right in nullifying the 7 April 2000 UEEA election of officers. It was simply improper for the petitioners to implement the said order which was then one of the subjects of their appeal in the BLR. To hold otherwise would be to dispossess the BLR of its inherent power to control the conduct of the proceedings of cases pending before it for resolution.44 Based on the prevailing facts of this case, we affirm the foregoing findings of the court a quo. We cannot hold the election of 07 April 2000 valid as this would make us condone an iniquitous act. Said election was perceptibly done to hinder any resolution or decision that would be made by BLR-DOLE. The Regional Director indeed ordered the immediate holding of an election in its Order dated 22 November 1999. The records show that the petitioners questioned this order of the Regional Director before the BLR-DOLE by way of appeal,45 and yet, they conducted the election, allegedly because it was due under Republic Act No. 6715. Why this was done by the petitioners escapes us. But as rightfully observed by the BLR-DOLE: . . . Indeed, it is obvious that the general membership meeting and election of officers was done purposely to pre-empt our resolution of this case and, more importantly, the participation of appellees in the election. This cannot be tolerated.46 Third Issue: was the indefinite suspension of the private respondents illegal? We rule in the affirmative. The petitioners posit the theory that the records do not support the findings of the BLR-DOLE that no investigation was conducted making the suspension illegal because of lack of due process. It is best to remind the petitioners that this Court, as we have held in a long line of decisions, is not a trier of facts.47 The instant case is a petition for review on certiorari48 where only questions of law may be raised. The exceptions49 to this rule find no application here. This being the case, the findings of fact of the DOLE-NCR and the BLR-DOLE as affirmed by the Court of Appeals to the effect that no investigation was conducted, shall not be disturbed. As properly held by the court a quo: Petitioners have failed to show that the findings of facts and conclusions of law of both the DOLE-NCR and BLR-DOLE were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion or without substantial evidence. A careful review of the pleadings before Us reveals that the decision and resolutions of the concerned agencies were correctly anchored in law and on substantial evidence.50 Fourth Issue: is the non-holding of meetings and non-submission of reports by the petitioners moot and academic, and whether the decision to hold meetings and submit reports contradict and override the sovereign will of the majority? We do not believe so. This issue was precipitated by the Court of Appeals decision affirming the order of DOLE Regional Director Maximo B. Lim for the petitioners to hold a general membership meeting wherein they make open and available the unions/associations books of accounts and other documents pertaining to the union funds, and to regularly conduct special and general membership meetings in accordance with the unions constitution and by-laws.51 It is to be recalled that the private respondents, when they filed a complaint before the DOLE-NCR also complained of petitioners refusal to render financial and other reports, and deliberate refusal to call general and special meetings. Petitioners do not hide the fact that they belatedly submitted their financial reports and the minutes of their meetings to the DOLE. The issue of belatedly submitting these reports, according to the petitioners, had been rendered moot and academic by their eventual compliance. Besides, this has been the practice of the association.52 Moreover, the petitioners likewise maintain that the passage of General Assembly Resolution No. 10 dated 10 December 1997 and Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000, following the application of the principle that the sovereign majority rules, cured any liability that may have been brought about by their belated actions.53
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As found by the Court of Appeals, the financial statements for the years 1995 up to 1997 were submitted to DOLE-NCR only on

06 February 1998 while that for the year 1998 was submitted only on 16 March 1999.54 The last associations meeting was conducted on 21 April 1995, and the copy of the minutes thereon was submitted to BLR-DOLE only on 24 February 1998. The passage of General Assembly Resolution No. 10 dated 10 December 1997 and Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000,55 which supposedly cured the lapses committed by the associations officers and reiterated the approval of the general membership of the acts and collateral actions of the associations officers cannot redeem the petitioners from their predicament. The obligation to hold meetings and render financial reports is mandated by UEEAs constitution and by-laws. This fact was never denied by the petitioners. Their eventual compliance, as what happened in this case, shall not release them from the obligation to accomplish these things in the future. Prompt compliance in rendering financial reports together with the holding of regular meetings with the submission of the minutes thereon with the BLR-DOLE and DOLE-NCR shall negate any suspicion of dishonesty on the part of UEEAs officers. This is not only true with UEEA, but likewise with other unions/associations, as this matter is imbued with public interest. Undeniably, transparency in the official undertakings of union officers will bolster genuine trade unionism in the country. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals subjects of the instant case, are affirmed. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. Tinga, J., no part.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 191-204; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona and Mariano C. Del Castillo concurring.
2

Rollo, pp. 205-207. BLR-DOLE Resolution dated 22 September 2000, pp. 1-2; CA Rollo, unnumbered and page 66. CA Rollo, p. 66. CA Rollo, p. 99. CA Rollo, pp. 100-105. CA Rollo, p. 123. Rollo, p. 193. Rollo, p. 89. CA Rollo, pp. 122-127. CA Rollo, p. 188.

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Rollo, pp. 50-67. Rollo, pp. 88-92. Rollo, p. 22. Rollo, pp. 93-108. Rollo, pp. 109-112. Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rollo, p. 140. Rollo, pp. 141-151. Rollo, p. 152. Rollo, pp. 191-203. Rollo, pp. 153-174. Rollo, pp. 205-207. Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rollo, pp. 13-14. Rollo, p. 254. Rollo, pp. 15-17. Respondents Memorandum, pp. 5-6. Rollo, p. 224. Ibid. Rollo, p. 90. Rollo, p. 138. Section 3, Rule XIV, Department Order No. 9, Department of Labor and Employment. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154448, 15 August 2003, 409 SCRA 267. Allied Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144412, 18 November 2003, 416 SCRA 65. Information Technology Foundation of the Phils. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, 13 January 2004, 419

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SCRA 141, citing Paat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107, 10 January 1997, 266 SCRA 167.
37

ART. 241. RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR ORGANIZATION. ... Any violation of the above rights and conditions of membership shall be a ground for cancellation of union registration or expulsion of officer from office, whichever is appropriate. At least thirty percent (30%) of all the members of a union or any member or members specially concerned may report such violation to the Bureau. The Bureau shall have the power to hear and decide any reported violation to mete the appropriate penalty.

38

G.R. Nos. L-76579-82 and L-80504, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 239.

39

Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa was an Associate Justice when the case Rodriguez v. Director, Bureau of Labor Relations (Ibid.) was decided by the Supreme Court.
40

CA Rollo, p. 69.

41

An Act to Extend Protection to Labor, Strengthen the Constitutional Rights of Workers to Self Organization, Collective Bargaining and Peaceful Concerted Activities, Foster Industrial Peace and Harmony, Promote the Preferential Use of Voluntary Modes of Settling Disputes, and Reorganize the National Labor Relations Commission, Amending for These Purposes Certain Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
42

Rollo, pp. 17-18. Rollo, pp. 224-225. CA Resolution dated 15 February 2002; Rollo, pp. 206-207. Rollo, pp. 68-86. Rollo, pp. 91-92.

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Sesbreo v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, G.R. No. 106588, 24 March 1997, 270 SCRA 360;San Miguel Foods, Inc.- Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 116172, 10 October 1996, 263 SCRA 68; Mafinco Trading Corp. v. Ople, G.R. No. L-37790, 25 March 1976, 70 SCRA 139; Chemplex (Philippines) Inc. v. Pamatian, G.R. No. L37427, 25 June 1974, 57 SCRA 408.
48

Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, G.R. No. 137147-48, 18 November 2003, 416 SCRA 15. Rollo, p. 195. CA Rollo, p. 269. Rollo, pp. 21-22. Ibid.

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Rollo, p. 201. Rollo, pp. 258-259.

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