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Pricing With Market Power: (A) Group 1. (B) Group 2. (C) Total Market
Pricing With Market Power: (A) Group 1. (B) Group 2. (C) Total Market
Lecture 25
Third degree price discrimination is the practice of dividing consumers into two or more groups with separate demand curves and charging dierent prices to each group (see Figure 1). Now maximize the prot:
10 10 10 9 9 9
MC
6 Price
P1
Price
Price
P2 MR2
2 3 4 5 Quantity 6
Q1 MR1
0 1 2 3
D1
4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10
Q2
0 1
D2
7 8 9 10
QT
0 1 2 3 4
MR(QT)
5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10
(a) Group 1.
(b) Group 2.
Figure 1: Third Degree Price Discrimination. (Q1 , Q2 ) = P1 (Q1 )Q1 + P2 (Q2 )Q2 C(Q1 + Q2 ); rst order conditions =0 Q1 =0 Q2 M R1 (Q1 ) = M C(Q1 + Q2 ),
and
give
Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].
2 Peak-Load Pricing
and M R2 (Q2 ) = M C(Q1 + Q2 ); nally, M R1 (Q1 ) = M R2 (Q2 ) = M C(Q1 + Q2 ). Because M R1 = P1 (1 and M R2 = P2 (1 we have 1 ), |E1 | 1 ), |E2 |
since
Sometimes a small group might not be served (see Figure 2). The producer only
10 10 10 9 9 9
MC(QT)
6 Price Price
P2
Price
MR1
1
D1
2 3 4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10
Q2 MR2
0 1 2 3
D2
4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10
QT
0 1 2
MR(QT)
3 4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10
(a) Group 1.
(b) Group 2.
Figure 2: Third Degree Price Discrimination with a Small Group. serves the second group, because the willingness to pay of the rst group is too low.
Peak-Load Pricing
Producers charge higher prices during peak periods when capacity constraints cause higher M C. Example (Movie Ticket). Movie ticket is more expensive in the evenings. Example (Electricity). Price is higher during summer afternoons. For each time period, MC = MR (see Figure 3).
Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].
3 Two-Part Tari
10
10
MC
MC
6 Price Price
PM
PL
MR2
QM
0 1 2 3 4 5 Quantity
D2
MR1
0 1 2
QL
3
D1
4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10
10
(a) Period 1.
(b) Period 2.
Two-Part Tari
The consumers are charged both an entry (T ) and usage (P ) fee, that is to say, a fee is charged upfront for right to use/buy the product, and an additional fee is charged for each unit that the consumer wishes to consume. Assume that the rm knows consumers demand and sets same price for each unit purchased. Example (Telephone Service, Amusement Park.). When there is only one consumer. If the rm sets usage fee P = M C, consumer consumes Q units (see Figure 4), and the rm can set entry fee T = A, and extract all the consumer surplus. If setting P1 > M C, total revenue is
R1 = A1 + P1 Q1 ,
and cost is
C1 = M C Q1 ,
then the prot is
1 = A B1 .
If setting P2 < M C, total revenue is
R2 = A2 + P2 Q2 ,
Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].
3 Two-Part Tari
10
CS A MC
6 Price
D Q*
0 1 2 3 4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10
10
10
CS
7 6 Price
A1 B1 P1 D Q1
0 1 2 3 4
CS B2 A2 P2 Q* Q2
6 7 8 9 10
MC
Price
MC
D
1 2 3 4 5 Quantity
Q*
5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10 0 0
Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].
3 Two-Part Tari
and cost is
C2 = M C Q2 ,
then the prot is
2 = A B2 .
Either B1 or B2 is positive, so the best unit price that maximized the producer surplus is exactly M C.
Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].