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1 Third Degree Price Discrimination

14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007


Chia-Hui Chen
November 16, 2007

Lecture 25

Pricing with Market Power Outline


1. Chap 11: Third Degree Price Discrimination 2. Chap 11: Peak-Load Pricing 3. Chap 11: Two-Part Tari

Third Degree Price Discrimination

Third degree price discrimination is the practice of dividing consumers into two or more groups with separate demand curves and charging dierent prices to each group (see Figure 1). Now maximize the prot:
10 10 10 9 9 9

MC

6 Price

P1

Price

Price

P2 MR2
2 3 4 5 Quantity 6

Q1 MR1
0 1 2 3

D1
4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10

Q2
0 1

D2
7 8 9 10

QT
0 1 2 3 4

MR(QT)
5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10

(a) Group 1.

(b) Group 2.

(c) Total Market.

Figure 1: Third Degree Price Discrimination. (Q1 , Q2 ) = P1 (Q1 )Q1 + P2 (Q2 )Q2 C(Q1 + Q2 ); rst order conditions =0 Q1 =0 Q2 M R1 (Q1 ) = M C(Q1 + Q2 ),

and

give

Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].

2 Peak-Load Pricing

and M R2 (Q2 ) = M C(Q1 + Q2 ); nally, M R1 (Q1 ) = M R2 (Q2 ) = M C(Q1 + Q2 ). Because M R1 = P1 (1 and M R2 = P2 (1 we have 1 ), |E1 | 1 ), |E2 |

P1 1 1/|E1 | = ; P2 1 1/|E2 | |E1 | < |E2 |, P1 > P2 .

since

Sometimes a small group might not be served (see Figure 2). The producer only
10 10 10 9 9 9

MC(QT)

6 Price Price

P2

Price

MR1
1

D1
2 3 4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10

Q2 MR2
0 1 2 3

D2
4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10

QT
0 1 2

MR(QT)
3 4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10

(a) Group 1.

(b) Group 2.

(c) Total Market.

Figure 2: Third Degree Price Discrimination with a Small Group. serves the second group, because the willingness to pay of the rst group is too low.

Peak-Load Pricing

Producers charge higher prices during peak periods when capacity constraints cause higher M C. Example (Movie Ticket). Movie ticket is more expensive in the evenings. Example (Electricity). Price is higher during summer afternoons. For each time period, MC = MR (see Figure 3).

Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].

3 Two-Part Tari

10

10

MC

MC

6 Price Price

PM

PL

MR2
QM
0 1 2 3 4 5 Quantity

D2

MR1
0 1 2

QL
3

D1
4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10

10

(a) Period 1.

(b) Period 2.

Figure 3: Peak-Load Pricing.

Two-Part Tari

The consumers are charged both an entry (T ) and usage (P ) fee, that is to say, a fee is charged upfront for right to use/buy the product, and an additional fee is charged for each unit that the consumer wishes to consume. Assume that the rm knows consumers demand and sets same price for each unit purchased. Example (Telephone Service, Amusement Park.). When there is only one consumer. If the rm sets usage fee P = M C, consumer consumes Q units (see Figure 4), and the rm can set entry fee T = A, and extract all the consumer surplus. If setting P1 > M C, total revenue is
R1 = A1 + P1 Q1 ,
and cost is
C1 = M C Q1 ,
then the prot is
1 = A B1 .
If setting P2 < M C, total revenue is
R2 = A2 + P2 Q2 ,

Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].

3 Two-Part Tari

10

CS A MC

6 Price

D Q*
0 1 2 3 4 5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10

Figure 4: Entry Fee of One Consumer.

10

10

CS
7 6 Price

A1 B1 P1 D Q1
0 1 2 3 4

CS B2 A2 P2 Q* Q2
6 7 8 9 10

MC

Price

MC

D
1 2 3 4 5 Quantity

Q*
5 Quantity 6 7 8 9 10 0 0

(a) Price Higher than Marginal Cost.

(b) Price Lower than Marginal Cost.

Figure 5: Two-Part Tari.

Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].

3 Two-Part Tari

and cost is
C2 = M C Q2 ,
then the prot is
2 = A B2 .
Either B1 or B2 is positive, so the best unit price that maximized the producer surplus is exactly M C.

Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].

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