Iranian Revolutions ComparativePerspective in

NIKKI R. KEDDIE

IRANIAN REVOLUTION of 1978-79 shockedtheworldand setin motion search a forcauses. Mostof the resulting analysestendto locatetheorigins therevolution of in the errorsof the shah and of variousAmericans, althoughsome scholarly works assaysocioeconomic explanations theupheaval. Enough timehas now passed to for permita greaterrange of investigations, one written and fromthe comparative perspective oughtto be revealing. This essaywillventuretwotypesof comparison: (1) internal-comparison, a fewsignificant on points, withotherIranian rebellions and revolutionary movementssince 1890-and (2) external-comparison,more briefly, withother great world revolutions, employingtheoriesof revolution that seem to fit Iraniancase. Both are difficult tentative the and because Iran's exercises, "Islamicrevolution" appears to bear little to ideologicalresemblance revolutions in the Westor to Iran's "constitutional revolution" 1905-11. of Westernrevolutions have tended,especially theirradicalphase, to shift the in to leftand move towardsecularism; even ifreligious ideologywas dominant, in the as EnglishCivilWar of the 1640s,itwas not fundamentalist, was it proclaimedby nor the leaders of the existing religiousstructure. the Islamic revolution, In however, muchof the leadershipcame fromthe orthodoxclergy, who propounded a return to Islamic fundamentalism.' Even recent socioeconomictheoriesof revolution, whichtend to stressthe role of the the peasantry (probably because of the partial exampleof Russiaand theclearerones of China and otherThird Worldcountries), do notapplyto eitherIranian revolution; peasantry a living mainly arid or semion arid land, dependent on landlords or others for irrigation, and unprotectedby forest mountain or shelter guerillawarfare for seemsto produceneither middle the nor the close associations peasantry needed to organizepolitically. contrast, By the supposed impermeability moderncitiesto successful of mass revolution, especially in the absence of peasant support,was disprovedin both Iranian revolutions; the THE

Earlier of versions thispaperweredelivered 1981at theUniversity California, in of Seminar Social on Irvine, and History Theory and at theConference Islamand SocialMovements, on of University California, Berkeley. Thanksare due to Ira Lapidus,Edmund Burke,and Gene R. Garthwaite suggesting for revisions the to and manuscript to EricHooglund, Andrew and and of Newman, theeditors staff theAmerican Historical Review fortheir help in preparing forpublication. it is ' Fundamentalism here used formovements to callingfora return scriptural Fundamentalist religion. movements mostly are nineteenth- twentieth-century and and aimsat or achieves a phenomena, noneof them truere-creation thereligious of past.

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cities were vulnerablein 1905-11 largelybecause the shah had no significant but military forceand in 1978-79 owingnot onlyto the shah's miscalculations also to the amazing unanimity of and organization the urban populationagainsthim. Iranians,who in peaceable periods seem eager to please and loath to disagree in openlywiththe powerful, whether the home or withpolitical have in superiors, the lastninety yearsengaged in an unusual numberof large-scale popular revolts and revolutions. With the exceptionof several northernprovincialrevoltsafter WorldWar I and thelargedemonstrations againsttheshah in theearly1960s,all of theserebellions spread to Iran's major cities, and some encompassedtribal areas as well.Indeed, Iran standsin the forefront rebellious of and revolutionary countries in the twentieth century-unmatched, myknowledge, the Muslim,Hindu, or to in Western worldforthe numberand depth of itsmovements; onlyChina, Vietnam, and possibly Russia providecompetition. This claimmaybe unexpectedto some,notonlybecause modernIranianhistory is not generally known but also because Iran's two major twentieth-century revolutions, and especiallythe second, appear so aberrant.They do not fitvery closely widespreadideas of whatmodernrevolutions should be like.Yet thereis no doubt thatthe Islamicrevolution 1978-79 provideda thoroughgoing overthrow in of the old political, social,and ideologicalorder,althoughwhatwillreplaceit is not yet clear. And the constitutional upheaval of 1905-11 was massive enough in participation and important enough in alteringthe political system deservethe to name "revolution." Severalmovements thatwere not revolutions containedrevolutionary elements. The mass rebellion againsta British tobaccoconcessionin 1890revoltsin the provincesof Gilan, Azerbaijan,and 92, the reformist-autonomist Khorasan afterWorld War I, the rebellionsin Azerbaijan and Kurdistanafter World War II, the mass-supported nationalization oil movement under Mosaddeq that ruled the countryfrom 1951 to 1953, and the popular antigovernment efforts demonstrations the early1960s all involved, a greateror lesserextent, of to to throw foreign off control over the Iranian economyand to buildan independent and state. society

To ATTEMPT ANYTHING MORE THAN SUPERFICIAL COMPARISONS among Iran's rebellions,not to mentioncomparisons betweensome of theseupheavalsand revolts in other Muslim and non-Muslimcountries,requires locatingthe various Iranian movements the last century of withinthe framework modern Iranian history. of Under the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925), Iran was increasingly subjectto Western economicpenetration and domination, and Russia.As particularly GreatBritain by in manyThird World countries, Westernpowersexacted fromIran treaties that limitedcustomsduties to 5 percent,thus virtually creatinga free trade area for Westernimports, which oftenundersold Iranian handicrafts. AlthoughOriental thatthe rise in carpetsbegan to be a significant exportaround 1875, it is unlikely carpet exports compensated for the fall in productionof other craftsand the consequentdiscontent and displacement theirartisans. of In the same period the decrease in Iran's handicraft offset exportswas partially

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by risingraw materialand agricultural exports,particularly opium, cotton,and fruits and nuts.The commercialization agriculture carpets, of and whichcontinued in the Pahlavi period (1925-79), increased economic stratification between the ownersof land, water,or workshopsand those who worked for them.Whether therewas generalimmiseration an increasein prosperity a questionon which or is scholarsof the Qajar period have disagreed.2 But the increasein stratification and the peasants'increasedvulnerability famine, to owingto theirdependence on land plantedin cash crops like opium thatwere subjectto bad marketyears,brought new sourcesof discontent the peasantry, to just as the displacement craftsmen of contributed the grievances middle-level to of urban residents. Iran did, however, have an advantageover countries like Egyptand Turkey,whichhad a muchlarger trade withEurope and far more European residents, that the nativeIranian in bazaar structure remained largelyintact.And wealthyimport-export and local merchants and moneylenders proved important everyIranian revolution. in The Qajars did much less than the Middle Eastern rulers of, for example, Turkey,Egypt, and Tunisia in trying strengthen central to the government the and armyin orderto resist further encroachments eitherbyWestern powersor bytheir own neighbors.Turkey saw a long series of efforts, beginningin the eighteenth to century, strengthen both its military and educationalsupport and its technical structure; the firststage of those efforts culminatedin the reformsof Sultan Mahmudin the 1820s and 1830s.And Egyptunder MuhammadAli saw even more significant until Western powers limited both the economic transformations independenceand military strength the Egyptian of in government the 1840s. Iran had no parallel developments.Largely abortive reformsunder Crown Prince Abbas Mirza (d. 1833) and chiefministers AmirKabir (d. 1851) and Mirza Hosain Khan (d. 1881) leftIran without modernizedarmy, a bureaucracy, educational and
2 Gad G. Gilbarhas notedthatin the late nineteenth earlytwentieth and centuries grainproduction fell greatly, that so wheat and barley changedfrom export import to commodities. consequent intheprice The rise of foodstuffs resulted bread riots, in oftenled by clerics, and demandsthatgrainexports discontinued. be Large-scale merchants encouraged transferring production from grain and cotton opium,which to according to Gilbarimproved welfare almostall groupsengagedin opium production marketing. the of and Gilbar, "Persian in Agriculture the Late Qajar Period,1860-1906: Some Economic and Social Aspects," Asianand African Studies, (1978): 321-65. RogerT. Olson'smoredetailed 12 study opiumgrowing sale indicates of and thatopium production aided the better but subjected off poorerpeasants and townspeople large price to in fluctuationsagricultural staples and,occasionally, famine. to Emphasis opiumclearly on increased socialand economic stratification. Olson, "Persian GulfTrade and the Agricultural of Economy Southern Iran in the Nineteenth Century," MichaelE. Bonineand Nikki Keddie,eds.,Modern in R. Iran:Tle Dialectics Continuity of andChange (Albany, N.Y., 1981), 173-89. Claiming certain "a of improvement thestandard living the in of peasants," Gilbar stated, "First, there various are piecesofevidence showthat to in peasants many areashad a morediversified diet, daily consuming commodities which they couldhardly haveafforded before. Sugar,tea, tobacco, opiumare perhapsthebestexamples articles and of which peasants consumed largequantities in in thelate 19th century." There are problems Gilbar's with analysis. onlyhas he presented Not for evidence four commodities are unhealthful shouldnotbe cited proof a "more that and as of diversified diet," he has but daily also failedto notethatthesefouritems quitelikely replacednutritious that, hisownevidence, ones by were becoming expensive. The experience mostmodern of countries suggests a kindofdietary that Law Gresham's works supplant to fruits, vegetables, meatwhenlessnutritious lesscostly and and products becomeavailable, and British documents wellas travel as literature support contention theexperience modernIran the of that proves exception. no Some of Gilbar's otherpoints moreconvincing, theargument farfrom are but is settled, and Willem Floor, a paperat a 1981conference Harvard theIranian in M. at on revolution 1905-11,argued of forthegeneralimmiseration Iraniansin theprerevolutionary of period.For myarguments conclusions, and see Nikki Keddie,Roots Revolution: Interpretive ofModern (New Haven,1981),esp. 54-57. R. of An Iran Histor

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system. The small Russian-officered Cossack Brigade,founded in 1879, remained the Qajars' onlymodern military force. This lack of change is not altogether surprising. Iran had much less contactwith the West than did Middle Easterncountriesborderingon the Mediterranean and had a very arid terrain witha scattered population.As a result, country very the was difficult subjectto centralized to control.Othercountries similar in circumstancesAfghanistan and Morocco, for example-also saw relatively little centralization or modernization the nineteenth in century. The shahs had to permitconsiderable devolutionof power to groups not totally tied to the center.Among these were nomadic tribes (often organized into confederationsfor the main purpose of on dealingwiththe authorities), whose mobility, mastery gunfighting horseback, of near the separate languages and cultures,and geographicallocation (frequently were borders) made them semi-autonomous units.Their ties to the government frequently limitedto annual paymentsor to cavalryduties in case of war. Even some local governorsor mayorshad considerableauthority, althoughthe central government exercisedincreasing controlover them,especially under Naser ed-Din Shah (1848-96).3 The lack of centralization Iran was also dependent on the increasingpower in and pretensions the Shi'i ulama. By the earlynineteenth aftera long of century, priorevolution, usulior mujtahidi the schoolof ulama won out over the rivalakhbari school. The latterclaimed that individualbelieverscould themselves understand the Quran and the Traditions(akhbar) the Prophetand the Imams and did not of who claimed the rightof ijtihad("effort need to followthe guidance of mujtahids, to ascertaincorrectdoctrine").The usulis,in contrast, claimed that,althoughthe bases of beliefwere laid down in the Quran and the Traditions, learned mujtahids werestill needed to interpret doctrineforthe faithful. usulidoctrine As developed, of particularly under MortazaAnsari,thechiefmarja'-e taqlid ("sourceof imitation") the mid-nineteenth century, everybelieverwas requiredto followthe rulingsof a livingmujtahid, and, whenevertherewas a singlechiefmujtahid,his rulingstook precedence over all others.4 The usuli ulama have a strongerdoctrinalposition thando the Sunni ulama. While not infallible, mujtahids qualifiedto interpret are the willof the infallible twelfth, Hidden Imam. In additionto doctrinalpower,whichextendedto politics wellas religion and as exceeded law,the Iranian Shi'i ulama had economicand social powerthatsimilarly thatof the ulama in most Sunni countries.Shi'i ulama, unlikemostSunni ulama, directly collectedand dispersedthe zakatand khums taxes,and theyalso had huge of vaqfmortmains wellas personalproperties, as controlled mostof the dispensing justice,were the primary educators,oversaw social welfare,and were frequently courtedand even paid by rulers.Althoughmostof the ulama were oftenon good
1983),and "Khansand Kings: in 3 See Gene R. Garthwaite, The and Khans Shahs: Bakhtiari Iran(Cambridge, M. Iran,159-72; Willem Floor, in History," Bonineand Keddie,Modern of The Dialectics Powerin Bakhtiari Two Iran between Revolutions 83-95; ErvandAbrahamian, Role of the Lutis in Iran," ibid., "The Political chaps. Roots Revolution, of 2 of The 1982);JohnMalcolm, History Persia, (London,1815);and Keddie, (Princeton, on articles Iraniannomads. anthropological see information, thenumerous 2-3. For additional 4 Especially and see Juan R. Cole, "ImamiJurisprudence the Role of the Ulama: MortazaAnsarion in and R. in the Emulating SupremeExemplar," Nikki Keddie,ed.,Religion Politics Iran(NewHaven,1983),33(n.p. [Iran],A.H. 1300 [1883]). an-Najat Sirat 46; and MortazaAnsari,

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termswiththe crown,theyresisted Qajar encroachments theirpower,whereas on in most Sunni states, the ulama became more and more subordinateto the government. Some of the Iranianulama workedforthestate, as thenineteenth but century progressedconflicts betweenimportant ulama and the secularauthorities increased. The relative independence of the ulama facilitatedtheir alliance with the bazaar-a termused to designatethoseengaged in largely traditional, urban,smallscale production, banking, and trade-and itsartisans, merchants, moneylendand ers. The bazaar has long been the economic,social,and religiouscenterof towns and cities, and even in recenttimeshas encompasseda large populationand share of theeconomy. earlyas the 1830s bazaariscomplainedto thegovernment about As the large-scale importation foreignmanufactures, of whichunderminedtheirown Iranian tariffs, productionand trade. Given the long-term trade treaties limiting war withthe Western therewas littlethe government could do, shortof risking powers,even if Iranian rulershad been more energetic. or Regardless, then,of whether certainindividuals groups were betteror worse offas the resultof the Westernimpact on Iran, includingBritishand Russian protectionof Qajar rule, various groups in societyhad reason to be actively who discontented withthe Qajars and withWesternincursions. Those craftsmen the weredisplacedhad clear grievances, and manyof thempetitioned government for redress. Even those merchantswho prospered,however,saw that Western merchantsreceived favored treatment-Westerners were exempt, for example, fromroad and municipaltaxes thatIranian merchants had to pay. And the ulama were opposed to the limitedsteps the Qajars took towardWesterneducationin missionaries wereallowed,forinstance, teachChristians Iran. The ulama also to Except objectedto stepstowardreform and to concessions grantedto Westerners. in thedenselypopulatedareas of heavyrainfall, Gilan and Mazenderanon the like too and too subjectto landlord Caspian,however, peasantswere generally scattered controlof land and water to organize or coordinatemovementsof discontent, were willing although those who migrated and became urban subproletarians in not participants urban-based rebellions, onlyin the Qajar periodbut also, and to a greaterextent, the revolution 1978-79.5 in of
5 Middle Research Information East and "RuralParticipation theRevolution," in see Especially EricHooglund, ibid., 7-12. Ervand Project Reports, (1980): 3-6; and MaryHooglund,"One Villagein the Revolution," 87 of whatI see as partly derivative features the article havestressed Abrahamian FarhadKazemiina seminal and its nonrevolutionary character-namely, absenceof significant Iranianpeasantry explaining generally in the in has been foundcrucial leading middlepeasantry, which elsewhere outside market and of a substantial ties Studies, Peasantry ModernIran," in Iranian "The Non-Revolutionary peasant revolts; Abrahamian Kazemi, and historians, socialand comparative haveunderstated, though thanmany less 11 (1978): 259-304. The authors its of and The aridclimate mostof Iran has meantthat peasants therolesof geography, technology, ecology. have they havebeen,as theauthors settled and,hence,moredifficult organize; to havealways beenlessdensely came irrigation systems easily that on expensive underground noted, morethanusually dependent relatively mayalso havedecreased peasant revolutionary dominance overpeasants underlandlord control. Tribalkhans' and given scattered villages strong havebeenfrequent couldnotspread, but potential. Local peasant rebellions to landsofChina, example, for wereconducive productive, organized and localpower. The densely populated, has A middlepeasantry peasantry. strong a farmoreorganized and rebellious, and organizable, frequently is by This based on environment supported Iran'sown largely been due to suchan environment. argument rice-growing densely settled, peasantsare foundin the high-rainfall, experience; Iran's mostrevolutionary Abrahamian Kazemihave and on discussed, though with stress ecology. less province Gilan, theauthors of as base of theissue. moretheecological covered of theimportant all questions, I wouldemphasize but

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Among the discontented the nineteenth in was also a smallbut growing century groupof intellectuals, or manyof whomhad mercantile government who positions, learned of Westernways. Frequently theirknowledgeof the West was obtained second hand, by travelto India, Istanbul,or Egyptor by temporary migration to RussianTranscaucasia.Hundreds of thousandsof Iranians,mostly settled workers, in semi-permanently the Transcaucasus, which also supported a few Iranian intellectuals. Several educated Iranians, most notablyMirza Malkum Khan and SayyedJamal ed-Din "al-Afghani," also traveledas far as France and England. Those who wentabroad were generally struck Westerneconomicdevelopment, by comparative justice,and lack of arbitrary rule; theirmanuscript contain writings praiseof Western waysand criticism Iran's autocratic of rulers, petty venal officials, clerics, and arbitrary courts,and of the low statusof women.6 To a large degree, the recurring alliancebetweenthe bazaarisand manyof the ulama on the one hand and secularizedliberalsand radicalson the otherhas been based on the existenceof common enemies-the dynasty and its foreign supporters-rather thanon any real agreementabout goals. The ulama wantedto extend theirown power and to have Shi'i Islam more strictly enforced;the liberalsand radicalslooked for greaterpoliticaland social democracyand economicdevelopment; and the bazaaris wanted to restrict favored foreigneconomic statusand competition. The alliance formedby manyof the ulama, the bazaaris,and a few secular intellectuals firstshowed its power followingthe issuance of a tobacco concession in 1890; Iran granted to a Britishsubject a full monopoly on the purchase,sale, and exportof all tobaccogrownin Iran. Not onlydid thisfollowa whole series of concessionsto Europeans, but it also covered a widelygrown, exported,and profitable crop ratherthan previously unexploitedproducts,like mostminerals. Thus, growers and merchants became aroused bythethreat their to livelihoodas well as by nationalistic fervor.Activeand oftenmassiveprotests in mostof Iran's citiesin 1891, largely byulama in partnership led withbazaaris(and withsome Russian behind-the-scenes encouragement), culminatedin a successful boycott tobaccodealing and smoking(as againstthe willof the Hidden Imam). of The shah was forcedto cancel the tobaccomonopolyin early 1892.7 The tobaccorebellion 1890-92 shared withlaterrevolutionary rebellious of and movements substantial a anti-imperialist antiforeign and component. Althoughthis componentis also found in most of the world'scolonies and dependencies,antiimperialism seems to have been strongerand to have resulted in more mass rebellions and revolutions Iran than in otherMiddle Easterncountries, in withthe possibleexceptionof Afghanistan. Despite the lesserdegree of directcontrolthat
see Mirza Malkum Khan(Berkeley Los Angeles, and R. 1973);Nikki Keddie, Sayyid 6Especially HamidAlgar, Jamalad-Din "al-Afghani" (Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1972); and Mangol Bayat,Mysticism Dissent: and in Socioreligiouns Thought QajarIran(Syracuse, N.Y., 1982).Among important the works analyses and of primary Qajar reformers Persian Fereidun in are Adamiyyat, Fekr-e Azadi(Tehran,A.H. 1340[1961]);MirzaAqa Khan Kermani al.,Hasht et Behesht (n.p.,n.d.); Nazemal-IslamKermani, Tarikh-e Iranian bidari-ye A.H. 1332 (Tehran, [1953]); Ibrahim Safa'i, Rahbaran-e (Tehran,A.H. 1344 [1965-66]; Sefatallah Mashruteh Jamali Asadabadi, ed., Maqalat-e Jarmalivyeh (Tehran,A.H. 1312 [1933-34]); Iraj Afshar and AsgharMahdavi, asnadva Mainmu'eh-ve madarek-e nashodeh bareh-ye chap dar Sayyed Jamal ad-Dinmashhur Afghlani be (Tehran,1963); and Mohammad Mohit asar-e MirzaMalkum Tabataba'i, Majmueh-ye Khan(Tehran,A.H. 1327 [1948-49]). 7Nikki R. Keddie,Religion Rebellion Iran: TheTobacco and in Protest 1891-1892 (London,1966),and the of Persian, French, Russian, and English sources citedtherein.

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of foreigners Iran have had in comparisonwiththose in manyothercountries in the Middle East and NorthAfrica,Iranians,along withAfghansand a fewothers, have been more resistant foreigndominationthan have most other peoples. to in Resistance oftenbeen lessobviousor militant Iran thanithas in Afghanistan, has have alternated with sincein Iran periodsof externalaccommodation foreigners to feeling has alwaysbeen strong. periodsof activerebellion. But Iranian antiforeign Among the territories subjugatedin the originalwave of Muslimconquest,Iran was the onlylarge area thatretainedits own language and a greatdeal of itsold since 1501, Shi'i modifiedby Islam. Iran's statereligion culture, albeitconsiderably influences than Sunni Islam appears to have been even more resistant foreign to bothmainbranchesof Islam seem to Islam. (If thecomparisonis extendedfurther, and than have the dominantreligions have been more resistant Westernization to traditions non-Muslim of Asia and Africa;thusIranianShi'i Islam maybe the most resistant all non-European religionsto European culture.)Part of Shi'i Islam's of on prohibiting in strength thisregard lies in itsinsistence ritualpurity-including fromentering mosques preventing nonbelievers physical contact withnonbelievers, and for and shrines, century certainly, and the like. Throughout the nineteenth many Iranians much longer than that, the growing economic, political,and of was perceivedlargelyas the usurpation the ideologicalinfluence Westerners of were thus rights of believers. Economic, political,and religious resentments typesof grievgroups tended to stressdifferent intertwined, although different were considered ances. Governments seen as complaisantto foreignunbelievers almost as culpable as the foreignersthemselves.Not just in 1891 but in the of constitutional revolutionof 1905-11, the oil nationalization 1951-53 under of of Mosaddeq, the demonstrations 1963 around Khomeini,and the revolution A for depredations.8 responsible Western 1978-79 Iraniansheld theirgovernment similartheme has certainly most notablyamong the been sounded elsewhere, Muslim Brethernand other Muslim militant groups in Egypt,Pakistan,and the a has Arab East, but in Iran the question of government accountability attracted Attackson any regime that permitted following. wider and more revolutionary in voiced by respectedrepresentaWesterninvolvement Iran have been strongly tivesof the orthodox ulama and the bazaar, which partlyaccounts for Iranian influence also arose fromthe fervor. The strength Iranian revulsionto foreign of were out to undermineIran and Islam, long-held beliefthatWesternnonbelievers and Shi'i Islam's encouragement self-sacrifice combat enemies has certainly to of For many, and domination. added to resistance foreigners to based on exploitation Shi'ismand nationalism were part of a singleblend.

THE

that clearlymerit the title IRANIAN MOVEMENTS TWO TWENTIETH-CENTURY revolution 1905-11 and the "Islamic"revoluof "revolution"-the"constitutional" tionof 1978-79--demonstrate importance thisIranian outlook.In part,the of the events preceding the firstIranian revolutionin this centurywere merely a of continuationand intensification the tobacco rebellion of the 1890s. The
8

Richard Cottam, W. Nationalism Iran (2d edn.,Pittsburgh, in 1979);and Keddie,Rootsof Revolution.

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economicand politicalpower of Britainand Russia grew rapidlyafter1892. The tobacco "victory" saddled Iran with a ?500,000 paymentto the Britishtobacco company in compensationfor its lost monopoly. On May 1, 1896, Mirza Reza Kermani,instigated the antishah,pan-Islamicactivities SayyedJamal ed-Din by of "al-Afghani" and his Iranian and Shi'i circlein Istanbul,assassinatedNaser ed-Din Shah. The shah's weak successorsquandered far more money on courtiersand extravaganttrips abroad than had his father.The son obtained the necessary moniesfromtwo Russianloans, grantedon the basis of further Russianeconomic concessions. The British, to be outdistanced Russia in.therace forprofit not by in the Middle East, retaliated requiringfurther by the concessions, chiefly D'Arcyoil concession, whichresultedin the first significant exploitation Middle Easternoil of (following discovery 1908). its in The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and the Russian revolution 1905 gave of impetusto an Iranian oppositionmovementthat had been growingsince 1901. Aftera century successivedefeats,an Asian power had defeated a European of power,an eventthatbolsteredpride throughout Asia. This feeling was particularly in thosecountries, strong like Iran, thathad experiencedRussianpenetration and oppression. Many considered it significant that the only Asian power with a constitution defeated the only Westernpower without had one, and constitutions came to be looked upon as the "secretof strength" Westerngovernments. of In Iran, as in a numberof Asian countries, treatises explainingconstitutions their and virtues began to circulate, and news of Japanese victories was happilyand rapidly spread. The Russian revolutiondemonstratedthe possibility, least in its first at stage,of a mass revoltweakeninga despoticmonarchy it and forcing to adopt a constitution. Both the Russo-JapaneseWar and the Russian revolution also if effectively,temporarily, took Russia out of Iranian internal an politics, important consideration thosewho expected Russia to intervene the powerof the Qajars to if was threatened weakened.9 or The constitutional revolutionbegan late in 1905, when respectedsugar merchantsraised the price of the commodity the face of risinginternational in prices. The merchants were bastinadoed,and a rebellionbroke out in the streets. When some of the ulama tooksanctuary (bast), shah promiseda "house ofjustice"and the otherconcessions. But the promisewas not fulfilled, a new rebellion and brokeout in 1906, highlighted a new ulama bastin Qom and a bastby roughlytwelve by thousand bazaaris at the Britishlegation.The crown then promised to accept a constitution, a parliament and was soon elected.The constitution 1906-07 was of modeled on the Belgian constitution, with one major exception. The Iranian constitution provided for a committee fiveor more mujtahidsto pass on the of compatibility all laws withthe Islamicsharia,althoughthisprovisionwas never of enforced.The framersintended real power to reside in the parliamentand its ratherthan in the crown,but parliament ministers, was rarelyable to wrestpower fromthe shah.
"The change in Iranian attitudesat thistime is clear in doctrnncsts pertaininlg Iran in the BritishForeignl to Office.Also see Nikki R. Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iraniani Nationalismii," Keddie, ed., Iroa: in anidSocietv (London, 1980), 13-52. Religon, Politics,

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The revolution became stormy and violentwhen a new shah, Mohammad Ali, closed parliament by a coup in 1908. Revolutionaryguerrillas (fedayin and mojahedin) held out againstthe crown,first Tabriz and laterin Gilan,and then in marchedsouthto takeTehran along withBakhtiari tribesmen movingup fromthe south.The second constitutional period saw a splitbetweenthe moderateparty, led by clerics, and the democrats, who had a programof agrarianand social reform. But theBritish and theRussiansprovidedtherevolution's coupdegrdce late 1911. in The Russians presentedan ultimatum demanding,among other things, thatthe Iranians get rid of theirpronationalist Americanadviser,Morgan Shuster.The British,who had signed an entente with Russia in 1907, went along with the Russian demands, Russian and Britishtroops moved in during 1911-12, and parliament was closed.'0 Although parliament passed some social, judicial, and educational reform measures,the revolution was chiefly aimed at reducingmonarchical and political, foreign power through the introductionof a Western-style constitution and This instrument parliament. and thisbody were seen as the best means to limit Iranian autocracy.Some of the revolution'sparticipants expected Iran and its people to be able to return more Islamicways(likethebarberwho said he would to shave no more beards, now that Iran had a constitution, since shavingwas nonIslamic),while a smallernumber hoped to become more Western,if only to be strongenough to escape Westerncontrol.In thisrevolution, unlikethatof 197879, ulama leadersdid not adopt a new political ideology. Those who supportedthe revolution were content occupya highproportion the positions parliament to of in and to have a veto over legislation. One of the ulama wrotea treatise defending constitutionalism the best government as in the absence of the Hidden possible Imam, but there is no evidence that it was widelyread." Many of the ulama acceptedthe constitution a means both to limit shah's powerand to increase as the their own; some became disillusionedby secularistlaws and trends and quit oppositional politics, Justas the revolution 1905-11 followedsmaller"rehearsals"-themovement of againstthe all-encompassing concessionto Baron Juliusde Reuterin 1872 and the tobacco protestof 1891-so the revolution 1978-79 builton resentments of and that surfaced in earlier protestsand movements.The immediate organizations
0 The Persian literature thisrevolution enormous. includes on is It invaluable classics Nazemal-Islam by Kermani, Ahmad Kasravi, Mehdi Malekzadeh, and SayyedHasan Taqizadeh as wellas majorbackground works Fereidun by Adamiyyat Homa Nateq.For themainbooksin English, EdwardG. Browne, and see The Persian Revolution1905-1909 (Cambridge, of 1910);and Robert McDaniel, ShusterMission the A. The and Persian Constitutional Revolution (Minneapolis, 1974). Other PersianworksI have found usefulin studying the constitutional revolution includeAminad-Dauleh,Khaterat-e siyasi, Hafez Farman-Farmaiyan ed. (Tehran, 1962);Abolhasan Bozorgomid, mast barmast Az ke (n.p.,n.d.); "HaidarKhanAmuOghli," Yadgar (A.H. 1325 3 [1946-47]): 61-80; and Mehdi Qoli HedayatMokhber as-Saltaneh, Khaterat khaterat va (Tehran,A.H. 1329 [1950-51]). 11The defense constitutionalism written 1909 byAyatollah of was in Na'ini.Although is discussed H. it by Algar, amongothers, haveseen no Persian Western I or booksthat refer itbefore republication an to its with introduction Ayatollah by Taleqani in 1955; see Algar,"The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in TwentiethCentury Iran,"in NikkiR. Keddie,ed., Scholars, and Los Angeles,1972). Na'ini Saints, Sufis(Berkely and withdrew bookfrom the see apparently and circulation after publication; AbdulHadi Hairi,Shi'ism its shortly inIran Constitutionalism (Leiden,1977),124, 158.

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post-WorldWar II periodwas markedbytheriseof leftist organizations, especially theTudeh party, in whose manystrikes includeda generalstrike theoil fields, and of autonomistmovementsin Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, which expressed in considerable part genuine local sentiment.Then came the oil nationalization movement, whichdemonstrated in and culminated the deep anti-imperialist feeling nationalization oil in 1951 and thetwo-year of of primeministership Mosaddeq. He was overthrown withthe aid of the United Statesand Great Britain.Last in the serieswas the economicand political crisisof 1960-64, highlighted demonstraby tions in 1963 that resultedin many deaths and broughtabout the exile of the religious leader of the movement, AyatollahKhomeini,in 1964. Pahlavirule reversedthe Qajars' policieson modernization thedevelopment and of the military, and after 1925 Iran was subjectedto acceleratedmodernization, secularization, centralization. and Especiallyafter1961, the crownencouragedthe rapid growth consumer-goods of of industries, pushed the acquisition armaments even beyond what Iran's growingoil-richbudgets could stand, and instituted agrarian reformsthat emphasized government controland investment large, in mechanizedfarms.Displaced peasants and tribespeoplefled to the cities,where theyformeda discontented subproletariat. People were tornfromancestralways, the gap betweenthe rich and the poor grew,corruption was rampantand well known,and the secretpolice,withits arbitrary arrestsand use of torture, turned Iraniansof all levelsagainstthe regime.And the presenceand heavyinfluence of foreigners providedmajor,further aggravation. Ironically, OPEC oil priceriseof 1973 thatthe shah helped engineerwas one the cause of his undoing. He insistedon using the oil moneyfor radical increasesin investment armaments and thatthe economycould not bear: Iran faced galloping inflation, shortagesof housing and consumergoods, and an increaseof rural to urban migration thatcompounded the other problems.In addition,Iran became economically overcommitted oil incomefellafter1975. To cool theeconomy, as the shah appointedJamshidAmuzegar prime minister 1977, but steps Amuzegar in took to bring down inflation brought more hardship and discontent. major A cutback in construction, already in decline since early 1976, brought massive unemployment, whichespecially affected recent urban migrants, a reduction and in paymentsto the ulama increased the discontent this influential of class. In late 1977, partly emboldenedby statements Amnesty by International, Internationthe al Confederation Jurists, of and President Jimmy Carter,Iranian intellectuals and professionals began to circulatepetitions and letterscalling for an extensionof 12 democratic rights. A largeeducated and student class and a newly politicized class of urban poor, aided and influencedby the mosque network,provided the backbonefora new mass politics. Early in 1978, the semi-official paper Ettela'atpublished an inspired and scurrilousassault on Khomeini,who was then attackingthe regime from Iraq.
12 The economic and political eventsof the 1970s are wellcoveredin F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,1979); R. Graham, Iran: TheIllusion Power of (rev.edn., London, 1979);and Keddie,Roots Revolution, 7. of chap

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forty-day Demonstrations with casualties ensued. Thereafter,on the traditional recurred,and religious,liberal,and leftist mourningintervals, demonstrations forcesgradually coalesced againstthe regime.Khomeiniwentto France,wherehe leaders in Iran; the liberalNational could easilycommunicate withrevolutionary weretoo Frontleadershipreached an accord withhim; and the shah'sconcessions few and came too late. The shah's gestureof appointingShahpour Bakhtiaras expulsionfromthe National Front.Bakhtiarwas primeminister to Bakhtiar's led had become,even unable to preventKhomeini'sreturnto Iran. And the ayatollah formanysecularists, symbolic revolutionary leader. In February1979,air force the technicians, supported especiallyby the MarxistguerrillaFedayan-e Khalq and in Muslimleftist guerrillaMojahedin-eKhalq, took power for the revolutionaries Mehdi Bazargan, took office. Tehran, and Khomeini'sappointed primeminister, Thenceforth,at least until 1983, the revolutionmoved ever more toward Khomeini's brand of absolutistreligious radicalism. First, the National Front ministers resigned.Then, when U.S. embassypersonnelwere taken hostage by young "followers Khomeini'sline" on November 4, 1979, Bazargan and his of foreign minister, IbrahimYazdi, were forcedto resignin the face of theirinability Abolhasan Bani to obtain the hostages'release. Khomeini'schoice for president, withdecreasingpower,and he was ousted in June Sadr, kepthis post longer,but into 1981. Khomeini'sIslamic Republican partycame overwhelmingly controlof the cabinet and parliament.Once the party achieved a virtualmonopoly on have been heard rumblings government, however,it lostcohesion,and increasing of internal the within rulinggroups-on such issuesas disagreements-dissension further and successionto Khomeini's policy, land reform, personalpower,foreign While of positionas the holder of velayat-e faqih("guardianship thejurisprudent"). Khomeini-type religious radicals were firstin the ascendant, in early 1983 and a and blockedmeasuresforland reform conservatives became more powerful influences appeared to trade. Bazaar and othermiddle-class monopolyon foreign and central be growing,and there were moves toward politicalnormalization controlover religiousradicals.

on Iran's twomajorupheavals THE THEORIES OF REVOLUTION that shed light in this centuryare James C. Davies's J-curvetheoryof revolutionand Crane emerge aftera Davies suggeststhat revolutions Brinton'sAnatomy Revolution. of sharp period of considerableperiod of economic growthfollowedby a shorter, economic contraction and decline. C.-E. Labrousse had already described the thatpreceded the French by economicimprovements followed a sharp downswing Revolution.'3 matchesthe prerevolutionary experienceof Iran in Davies'sJ-curve of the 1970s. To a lesser degree, the revolution 1905-11 may also fitthe model, followed in sincesome scholars century have a periodof growth thelate nineteenth
AMONG i3See Davies,"Towarda Theory Revolution," Davies, of in ed., When Revolt Why Men and (NewYork,1971), regime au debut la revolution a lafin et de de La 137-47; and Labrousse, Crise l'economiefran(aise de l'ancien (Paris, 1944),introduction.

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and Russia's by economicdifficulties stemmedfromthe shah's extravagance that economicand political troublesafter1904. thatbestfits revolution the Apart fromDavies's model,the comparative pattern 14 of 1978-79 is Brinton's moredescriptive thanexplanatory typology. The political, troublesof an ancienregimethatmade rule in the old way economic,and financial impossible and forcedaccommodation withnew groups were clearlyseen both in and in the revolution 1978-79. the lesser crisesthat preceded the revolution of of Such crises, in somewhat different form, were especiallycharacteristic the financial situation beforetheEnglish(seventeenth century) and French(eighteenth of century) revolutions discussedby Brinton.And political alienation theintellectufromthe courtwas as characteristic als and the elite,including government figures, of Iran in the 1970s as itwas of Russia in the earlytwentieth The gradual century. to and somewhatunexpectedmovementfromdemonstration revolution, characboth Iranian revolutions. teristic Brinton's of As has revolutions, also characterized late as the summer of 1978, aftermany major demonstrations and riots,most Iranian intellectuals voiced the viewthatthe movement was over,havingachieved its goal of liberalization withthe shah's promises,especiallyof freeelections, and manypersonsclose to the Khomeiniwingof the movementhave insisted thathe and his followers not expect the shah to be ousted anytime did soon. The Iranian revolution 1978-79 does not conformexactlyto the patternof of to To growingradicalization fundamental all fourof Brinton'srevolutions. locate Khomeinion a right-left is notas easyas itmayseem. On theone hand,he is a scale in of a application scripture (exceptwhenitdoes fundamentalist,believer a literalist not suithim); on the other,he is not only a fierceanti-imperialist, particular with dislikefor encroachments the United States and Israel, but also a man with by concern for the poverty-striken, concern that has been manifestedin such a programsas freeurban housing,state-supplied utilities, further and land reform,
and theevents 1978-79; see Bill, of between Brinton's views A. 14James Billhas notedthecorrespondence 36 of in Middle Iran," EastJournal, (1982):22-47,esp. 30. The closeness this "Power Religion Revolutionary and in he in of apparent thefourgreatrevolutions discussed: fit apparent Brinton's is ownsummary thepatterns the on before revolution came,and the "First, thesewereall societies thewholeon theupgradeeconomically in of peoplewhofeelrestraint, revolutionary movements seemto originate thediscontents notunprosperous crushing oppression.... Second,we findin our prerevolutionary cramp, annoyance, rather thandownright is definite indeedverybitter the machinery clearly society and classantagonisms.... Fourth, governmental .. on expansion . attendant economic inefficient,. partly because new conditions . .-specificallyconditions methods... laid an new and the growth new moniedclasses,new waysof transportation, business of . conditions. Fifth, . . many adaptedto simpler, moreprimitive intolerable strain governmental on machinery or in and of themselves, lose faith thetraditions habits individuals theold ruling of class... come to distrust or classbecomes their humanitarian, go overto theattacking groups.... [T]he ruling class,growintellectual, from within its is to politically inept.... [I]t is almostsafe to say thatno government likely be overthrown and Thatlossofability may until to territory itlosestheability makeadequateuse ofitsmilitary policepowers. of with the showitself theactualdesertion soldiers policeto therevolutionists,in thestupidity which in and or and the of or government managesitssoldiers police, in bothways.... [W]ith attainment poweritis clearthat though The groupwhich dominates thesefirst stages callthemoderates, we [therevolutionists] notunited. are periodtheextreme to emotional of they lookmostimmoderate.... [A]tthecrisis supporters theold regime of radicals, complete the are revolutionists, in power.... This pervasiveness theReignof Terrorin thecrisis as in of and struggles wellas of periodis partly explicable terms thepressure warnecessities of economic of to of othervariables: it mustprobably but also be explainedas in partthe manifestation an effort achieve or uniformity . is theirasceticism ... .. intensely moraland religious ends here on earth.... A striking The of of Brinton, Anatomy Revolution condemnation whatwe maycall the minoras wellas the majorvices." (Vintage Books,rev.edn.,London, 1965),250-51, 550.

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despitetheirscantsuccess.Perhaps "populist"is the closestpolitical adjective-with the simultaneous leftist and rightist characteristics xenophobicand sometimes and fundamentalist componentsthatthatword connotesin Americanhistory. Populist rebellionsthat have appealed to the subproletariat the West have sometimes in turned into autocratic and even fascist movements,and some Iranians and Americanswould say thatthischange has occurred,or is occurring, Iran. in Brinton,in his typology revolution, of posited the fall of the radical element during a Thermidor,in which most people, overtaxedby the rule of virtueand justice,long formore accustomed, laxer ways.This deradicalization in turnoften is followedby autocratic, usually military rule; in France Napoleon succeeded the Directory, and in Russia Stalin replaced the NEP. Neither of these stages has occurredin Iran as of early1983,but bothare possibilities. Indeed, theearlyphases of Thermidormay be discernible;Iran has taken major stepstowardnormalizing its economic and politicalrelationswithideologically divergentregimes-notably Turkey, Pakistan, and some Western and Eastern European countries.And, as althoughmuch of Iran's internal and externalpolicyhas not softened of March 1983, the growth in strengthof the conservativefactionin governmentand Khomeini's December 1982 decrees providing some protection legal rights for may be earlysignsof a Thermidor. With the rise of social history, have socioeconomicexplanationsof revolutions become more generalthan Brinton's phenomenological comparisons. Althoughits revolution 1978-79 can be explained in termsof socioeconomic of causation(as I have attempted do above and elsewhere),Iran fits to less neatlyinto mostexisting socioeconomiccomparativeschemes than it does into the basic J-curveor more variedBrintontypology. model forIran's The closestsocioeconomic revolutionary or experienceappears to be the Marxistformula, without any of the elaborations 15 in thatrevolution modifications added recently. This formula, essence,postulates the occurswheneverthe relations production-particularly controland ownerof of shipof thesociety's basic means of production-have changed beyondtheability the old forms of political power and state organizationto subsume the new economic order. This situationessentially obtained prior to both Iranian revolutions. of dominantgroups Duringthe revolution 1905-11 the majority economically of and classes-the growingand oftenthriving class of big and medium merchants, the landlords,particularly those engaged in growingcash crops, and the tribal
somevariations, several in works from Communist the '- Marxand Engels'basicviewis stated, with Manifesto onward. Recent theoretical works touching comparative on revolution influenced somedegreebyMarx and to includethose by Theda Skocpol,Charles Tilly,Eric Hobsbawm, George Rude, and Barrington Moore. Although theseshed muchlight such topics "primitive on as rebels" (Hobsbawm), autonomy thestate the of (Skocpol), nature urbanand ruralrebellious the of crowds why somesocieties havehad (Rude),and thereasons majorrevolutions others (Moore),they and not havelessto saythanhas Marxon thekindofforces led to that revolution Iran. Naturally, in examining Iranianrevolution nottheir the is aim,butcertainly moreworknow needs to be done by social historians and sociologists producegeneralhypotheses theories to or thatwill encompass Iranianphenomenon, the especially sinceit maynotbe thelastof itstype. Skocpolhas modified in someofherviews theaftermath theIranianrevolution; Scopkol, of see "Rentier Stateand Shi'a Islamin the IranianRevolution," Theo?y Society, (1982): 265-83, with and 11 R. comments Eqbal Ahmad,Nikki Keddie, by and Walter Goldfrank, L. ibid., 285-304.

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khans-were decreasinglyrepresented by the Qajars. The crown made few under whichtradecould flourish to or attempts make lawsand createconditions to build up the stateso as to be able to limitforeigncontrol.At the same timethe for the had no strategy increasing Qajars, unlikesome otherMiddle Easternrulers, loyalty the ulama; instead,the crownadded to the causes of ulama disaffection of whileallowingtheirindependentpowerto grow.AlthoughIran did not yethave a lay strong bourgeoisiein the modernsense,groupswhose interests in rationalizing control, and tradeand manufacture, decreasingforeign the economy, encouraging But weregrowing size and influence. thelastQajar shahstendedto squanderthe in and travelforcourtfavorites members and foreign state'sfundson luxuriousliving consequences. the financial of the royalfamily without foreseeing disastrous betweenmajorclassesand theautocracy In therevolution 1978-79 theconflict of helped createa of is even clearer.The reversal Qajar policytowardmodernization most of the membersof whichbecame of stratum society, sizable,well-educated the and entered. professions othersfromthisstratum bureaucrats and technocrats; in also industrialists sprangfromhumbleorigins the artsor private industry. Many overthegrowing and subproletariat's bazaar. In additionto theworkers' grievances riche-that is, but privileges onlyof foreigners of the richas well,Iran's nouveau not the relatively privilegednew middle and upper classes and rich bazaaris-were and discontented.Their economic futures were often determinedarbitrarily in irrationally fiatfromthetop,whiletheyweredenied all real participation selfby governmentand the political process. Both the successes and the failuresof modernization different classes,fromtheurban poor to thenew middleclasses, put And such contradictions were also feltby at odds withthe autocratic government. which were economicallyoppressed and denied their own national minorities, languagesand cultures. thatalready coalesced in twomain ideologicalstrains These variousdisaffections desire for existed in embryoin the revolutionof 1905-11: the liberalor leftist to wish and Westernization, thefundamentalist to return a "pure"Islam,particularby ly as interpreted AyatollahKhomeiniand those around him. The latterwon out-hence the appellation "Islamic revolution"-but the grievancesbehind the as revolution were at least as much socioeconomic cultural.16

To COMPARE THE REVOLUTIONS of 1905-11 and 1978-79 to each other can century to as contribute much to our understanding Iran in the twentieth as of compare themjointlyto theoriesand paradigmsdeveloped by Westernscholars. and can Althoughmanypointsof similarity difference be noted,the moststriking point of comparison may be stated as an apparent paradox: the constitutional revolution, despite the leading role played by manyof the ulama, resultedin an
16 Foran important comparative discussion therevolution 1978-79,see GarySick's of of forthcoming book. He has coveredsome of the same pointsin preliminary in fashion a recent see article; Sick,"Washington's Encounter theIranianRevolution," Nikki Keddieand EricHooglund, with in R. Iranian eds.,The Revolution and theIslamic Republic (Washington, 1982), 127-31, and his transcribed remarksin the ensuing"General Discussion," ibid., 155-68.

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almost wholly Western-style constitution and form of government, while the revolution 1978-79, in whichsecularleftists liberals-in additionto religious of and forces-played a major role, resulted in a self-styled Islamic republic and a constitution stressing Islam. This is not,moreover, simply matter constitutions. a of The revolution 1905-11 was clearlysecularizing a numberof spheresof life of in and law, while that of 1978-79 was just as clearlyIslamicizing, despite the far greaterWesternization education,law, government, of culture,and the economy thattaken place by then. It is true that the revolutionaries both the first in and eighth decades of this century were fightingagainst autocracy,for greater and forconstitutionalism, thattherewas much ideologicalcontinuso democracy, ity. Nonetheless, ideologyof the revolutionary the leaderswas quitedifferent the in tworevolutions. Why? The answerto thisquestionlies largely the natureof the enemyperceivedby in each group of revolutionaries. 1905-11 the revolutionaries In werefighting against a traditionalist regime and a shah whose dynasty had made veryfew efforts at of to of benefit Iran. At the beginning Westernization, includingreforms potential the century, in non-ulama reformers particular, but also some liberal therefore, members the ulama, founditeasy to believethatthe politically economically of and encroachingWest,which was obviouslymore powerfulthan Iran, could only be combattedif some Western ways were imitated.Nineteenth-century reformers called for Western-style armies,legal reforms, clearlyorganizedcabinetsystem, a and modern economicdevelopment.For Muslims, manysuch ideas werejustified of by appropriate interpretations the Quran and Muslim Traditions favoring to change,acquiringknowledgefromoutsideIslam,and takingthe stepsnecessary became a matterof interestafter the oppose unbelievers.When constitutions in Russo-Japanese war, the idea of adoptinga Western-style constitution order to limit autocracy and achievethe secretof Westernstrength gained greatly. Nor was thisa ridiculous notion.Most Iranianswere not yetreadyto overthrow Qajars, the but manywantedto curb theirarbitrary power; a constitution seemed-and under bettercircumstances have been-a good way to accomplishtheirrelatively might limited objectives. Both partsof the Iranianconstitution (whichlasteduntil1979),the Fundamental Law of 1906 and the SupplementaryFundamental Law of 1907, were largely derivedfromthe Belgian constitution. clear intent The was to have a constitutional of to monarchy verylimited power,a primeminister his cabinet(appointments and whichrequiredthe approvalof parliament), and guaranteesof freedomof speech, the press,and other civilrights.The provisionfor an appointed senate, half of whose memberswere to be designatedby the crown as a conservative counteruntil 1950, and a key weightto the majlis("lowerhouse"), was not put into effect provision insistedupon by ulama leaders-for a committee at least fiveleading of members theulama to pass on thecompatability majlislegislation of of withIslamwas never enforced, for reasons that have never been adequately explained. Perhapsthe ulama under the leadershipof SayyedAbdollah Behbehanialreadyso dominatedthe first majlisthatthe ulama no longer feared the passage of secular laws contraryto religious doctrine, or perhaps Behbehani secretlyopposed

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the enforcing provision because itmight have reduced hisown power.In anyevent, revolutionary leaders in 1905-11 foundtheirmodel in Western-style liberalism and constitutionalism, many of the ulama at least permitted adoption of the and the constitution. Others broke away as the implicationsof secularizationbecame 17 clearer, and manytriedto blockcertainaspectsof Westernization. The growth of new bourgeois forcesand of secularistideas continued for many decades after 1911. In 1978-79, however, the perceived enemy had changed, and the Iranian response was correspondingly different. For fifty years the Pahlavi dynasty had forcedtheWesternization Iran. In the courseof thatWesternization customs of the and beliefsas well as the prerogatives onlyof the ulama but of manybazaaris not and ordinary peasants,nomads,and the urban poor were attacked.Far more than the Qajars, the Pahlaviswere perceivedas toolsof Western Westernized or powers, chiefly UnitedStatesand Israel. No longercould Iraniansacceptstrong the armies, Western-style industries,and modern legal codes and educational systemsas in solutions, themselves, Iran's problems.Even the liberalconstitution been to had subjectto autocraticmanipulation. The regimecame to be seen as, among other things, Western, too and theredeveloped among the alienateda search for roots and fora returnto "authentic" Iranianor Islamicvalues.The nationalism thathad read modern,liberalvirtues into pre-Islamic Iran-expounded by intellectuals like the nineteenth-century Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani and the twentieth-century Ahmad Kasravi-had been largely coopted by the Pahlavi shahs. The shahs promotedpre-Islamic motifs theirspeechesand in theirarchitectural in styles, and Mohammad Reza even sponsored a wastefulmythomaniacal celebrationof a fictitious hundredth of and abortivetwenty-five anniversary the Iranian monarchy ly changed the starting date of Iran's calendar from Mohammad's hira to the of foundation the pre-Islamicmonarchy. of Althoughmanyeducated Iraniansclung to theirown liberalor leftist versions thispre-Islamic and Westernformof nationalism, some important intellectuals by the early 1960s began to turnto new ideas. In a famousessay,jalal Al-e Ahmad attackedsuch "Westoxication," suggesting that Iranians look ratherto theirown and Oriental ways. Later he tried to rediscoverIslam for himself, although his critical accountof his pilgrimage makes itdoubtfulthathe succeeded. Clericaland lay religiousoppositiongrew at the same time,and some intellectuals published new essaysand republishedwithnew introductions worksby religiousreformers likeJamal ed-Din "al-Afghani" and the early twentieth-century AyatollahNa'ini, who had in 1909 writtenthe firstreasoned clericaldefense of a Western-style
17The role of the ulama in the revolution 1905-11 has becomea pointof controversy, partbecause in of scholars havelettheir interpretation history of reflect their viewofulamaaction sincetheearly1960s.In 1969 viewoftheulama'simportance the and HamidAlgarstated evenmorestrongly previous than authors general progressivism butSaid AmirArjomand various then, in articles Willem Floorin a recent and M. re-evaluation and haveplayed downtheprogressive oftheulamain 1905-11as inother role periods. Algar, See Religion State inIran,1785-1906 (Berkeley and Los Angeles,1969),esp. chap. 14; Arjomand, "The Ulama'sTraditionalist 17 Middle East Studies, (1981): 174-90,and "The Stateand Opposition Parliamentarianism, to 1907-1909," of Khomeini's IslamicOrder,"IranianStudies, (1980): 147-64; Floor,"The Revolutionary 13 Character the IranianUlama:Wishful Thinking Reality?" or of Middle 12 IntermationalJourmal EastStudies, (1980): 501-24; and Keddie,Religion Politics, and 73-98.

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constitution the best protectionagainst autocracy.The importantguerrilla as of group,the Mojahedin-eKhalq, combinednew interpretations Islam withsocialist ideas thatwere oftenclose to those of the greatoratorand hero of progressivist none of thesegroups Islamicrevolutionaries, Shariati(d. 1977).18Significantly, Ali or individuals should properly termed"fundamentalist" even fully be or "traditionalist."Most merelywishedto escape the relatedevilsof internal despotismand of "Westoxication"-socioeconomic culturaldependence on the West. and of to versions an indigenous Increasingnumbersof Iranians shifted progressive and combat Islamic ideology perceived as likelyto restore Iranian self-esteem Westernization. Such versions were possiblebecause so manyliberaland even leftist ideals werecontainedin different Liberalideals were strandsof the Islamicrevival. perhapsbestrepresented Mehdi Bazargan and, in a more traditionalist by by way, in AyatollahShariatmadari, both of whom were important the revolution. The more progressive of interpretations Islam came fromthe verypopular Ayatollah Taleqani and from Shariati,and leftist ones chiefly fromthe Mojahedin. Many continuedas late as 1978-79 to advocateenforcement the constitution 1906of of 07, although they stressed the necessityof implementing provision for a its committee comprisedof fiveor more of the ulama to ensure the compatability of laws withthe sharia. Even the interpretations the AyatollahKhomeini,which in the end largely of won out, were not, despite theirpartially "fundamentalist" emphasison scriptural moralityand punishments,really traditional.They contained new ideological elementsappropriate to an Islamic revolutionand to direct rule by the ulama. Khomeini'snotion of direct ulama rule is new to Shi'ism,as not only Western scholarslike myself also a Muslimsupporterof Khomeinihas noted: but were inhibited thedoctrine theinherent by of of illegitimacy [T]hemujtahids tosomeextent in political authority the absenceof the Imam.The usuliposition notconsider the did of possibility theemergence one of themujtahids themujtahid themujtahids,the of as of as Imamhimself. And thisconfusion there was whenImamKhomeini returned Tehran to from Parisduringthe Revolution. a timehe was called"Naib-i-Imam." was only For It that and he becameImamKhomeini. course, gradually he word"naib" dropped was Of the of title Imamdoesnotmeanthat isthetwelfth he Imam.Itsimply means heistheleader that oftheUmmah this at In moment. other words, isa newdoctrine this something to"first akin among equals.". . . [W]hile other in [people] follow can matters, can they mujtahidsreligious also follow ImamKhomeini thepolitical as of leaderof theIslamic State, theRevolution, indeedof the Ummah has today.So, the Revolution in a sensetakentheShi'iapolitical thought further. actualpractical An it difficulty created situation has a where is possible for oneofthemujtahidsbecome of is on to ImamoftheUmmah. this, course, a great And advance theearlier position theShi'iapolitical of thought.'9
18On these 8 Roots Shi'i chapter part2 of Keddie, "Contemporary Thought," intellectuals, Yann Richard, see Trends to 1960." and of chapter8 part 1: "Intellectual Literary ofRevolution; Keddie,Roots Revolution, and of whichgive an idea of theircriticism the worksof these intellectuals, Among the most important put are Islamic reforms someofthem forth, that and suggest alternative the "Westoxication" manyIranians of raushanfekran va (Tehran,A.H., 1341 [1961-62]), and Dar khedmat klianat-e Jalal Al-e Ahmad,Gharbzadegi 'Alavi Bani Sadr,Eqtesad-e tauhidi Tashayyo'-e va Tashayyo'-e (Tehran,n.d.); Abolhassan (n.p.,n.d.); Ali Shariati, Mahmud Taleqani, Islamva (n.p., n.d.); and Ayatollah Safavi(n.p., A.H. 1352 [1973?]), and Islamshenasi eqtesadi-ye (n.p.,n.d.). gharb Malekiyyat moqayesehnezamha-ye dar be 19KalimSiddiqui[sic, and Islamic Revolution: Achievements, Obstacles, Goals(London, 1980), Siddiqi]etal., Tlhe 16-17.

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The victory Khomeini'smore absolutist of versionof Islam, withthe additionto of existing doctrines ulama power the notionof directrule,did not come because mostpeople reallypreferred thisto the more latitudinarian progressive or version of otherclericaland lay Islamicthinkers because,as a corollary his doctrinal but to absolutism wellas hischarismaand leadershipqualities), (as Khomeiniwas themost uncompromising opponent of the Pahlavis,of the monarchy and of foreign itself, controland culturaldomination. There is some convergence,not whollyaccidental,between the "Manichean" worldoutlookof Khomeiniand other Muslimthinkers and the more widespread phenomenonof "Third Worldism." The Manicheantrendsees theworldas largely divided into thejust Muslimoppressed and the Westernor Western-tied oppressors, and the more general ideologyof the Third World similarly sees itselfas economicallydrained and culturallycolonized by an imperialistWest. Such perceptionsof "we" and "they,"the Third World and the West, evince little appreciation internalproblemsand class and othercontradictions of within either culture.Shariati,Bani Sadr, Ghotbzadeh,and otherswere directly influenced by varietiesof Third Worldism, including the sophisticatedversion of Marxist dependencytheory espoused by Paul Vieille,long Bani Sadr's friendand mentor, and the ideas of Frantz Fanon, whom Shariatiadmired. Khomeini himselfhas probablynot been immune to such currents. least one studentof Khomeini's At thought has noted the ayatollah's brand of Third Worldism and tentatively it attributed to contacts withPalestinians Iraq, sincesuch arguments in enteredhis talks and writingsduring his exile there.20 The fusion of "modern," secular Manicheanism,"traditional" Islam, and uncompromising hostility monarchy, to dependence, and imperialism created a revolutionary ideologythatdistinguished the revolutionaries fromthe Westernand Westernized oppressorsas much as the constitutionalist ideology of 1906 distinguished revolutionaries from traditional, nonmodernizing autocrats. The blend of Islam and Third Worldismfitsan anti-Western, anti-imperialist mood, particularly among studentsand those sectionsof the urban population who-in contrastto the minority WesternizedIranians with Western-style, of usuallywell-paying jobs in the government privatesector-were eitherpoor or or in the traditional economy.The revolutionaries 1905-11 dislikedRussian and in British encroachments, theirmain wrath but was directed againsttheQajar dynasty and itsinability organizea strong to and functioning stateand nation.Even though the main wrathof the revolutionaries 1978-79 was apparentlyalso directed in againsta dynasty and a shah, the cases are not reallyparallel.The late shah, with whatever degree of accuracy, was seen as a willing tool of the West,whose culture
20 Gregory Rose, "Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery Islamic Identity the Thought of Ayatollah of in Khomeini,"in Nikki Keddie,ed., Religion Politics Iran(New Haven,1973),166-88. Also see Nikki R. in and R. Keddie,"Islamic Revival ThirdWorldism," as inJ.-P. Digard, Le Cuisinierlephilosophe: ed., et HommageMaxime a Rodinson (Paris,1982),275-8 1. Manyof Khomeini's speechesare availablein roughtranslations fromthe Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and someof hisworks translated Hamid Algar, are in ed., Islam and Revolution: Writings DeclarationsImam and of Khmeini (Berkeley, 1981).Notyettranslated thevery is important early bookbyKhomeini, Asrar Kashf-e (n.p.,n.d. [ca. 1944]),in which attacked he boththePahlavi monarchy and secularist intellectuals did notyetcompletely but reject monarchy call fortotalrulebyclerics. or

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and economiccontrolhad pervaded Iran in a wayfarmore offensive mostthan to and they was thecase in 1905. Iraniansassociatedthings Western withtheirplight, thought theirculturaland economicproblemscould onlybe solvedby a returnto whattheysaw as purelyIslamicways.Hence, the paradox of a more"traditionalist" Islamic,more "antimodern" reactionin the revolution 1978-79 than in thatof of growth 1905-11 can be explained primarily a reactionto the rapid,exploitative as in of Westerninfluence, Westernizing of rulers,and of new formsof imperialism the intervening period.

and the desire to returnto Islam is not unique to Iran; it is found in different forms thoughout much,if not most,of the Muslim world, sometimes in revolutionary ideologies and movements.These movementsdo not reject modern technologybut call for a returnto Islamic and fundamentalists. traditions, which are interpreted differently reformists by and Often,as in Iran, enthusiasmfor ideas like constitutionalism republicanism continues, but in an Islamic context. The independent power, wealth, and ideologicalclaimsof the Shi'i ulama probablyallowed its membersto become the of first leaders of a twentieth-century Islamicrevolution. The unique strength the Shi'i ulama and their consequent revolutionary leadership does not, however, in negate the possibility relatedrevoltsand revolutions non-Shi'ilands. Similar of conditionscould provide the foundation and the desire for revolt, possibly intensified the Iranian example and military by successmuchas theRusso-Japanese War and Russian revolutionin 1905 contributed the Iranian constitutional to of of revolution 1905-11. The importance the organizednetwork socioideologiof cal ties between the Iranian ulama and Iran's urban residentsbears some resemblanceto the urban organizationof new Muslim groups in Egypt and elsewhere,despite lesser participation the ulama in non-Iranianmovments.21 by and socialism have been tried And the widespreadfeelingthatWesternliberalism and foundwanting also important. is have not run theircourse. Most The changeswrought the Iranian revolution by ratherfor Iranians who foughtfor an Islamic republic(and manywere fighting wanteda well-functioning, or secularversions justice,democracy, even socialism) of state-the kind of government egalitarian suggestedby Shariatiand by Khomeini in in 1978. The growth open discontent and itssuppression a seriesof smallcivil of is warsand rampantexecutions sincethe revolutionary victory evidencethatmany, for and probablymost,were not fighting whattheygot. What theydid in factget laws and rules (often"Islamic"at includeseconomic decline and upheaval, strict most in the sense that literalistQuranic and other legal punishmentshave trials and summary sometimesbeen enforced in Muslim countries),arbitrary
THE DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE WEST 21On theimportance Shi'iurbannetworks theorganization fulfillment theIranianrevolution, of to and of forces contempoin and intellectual especially Skocpol, see "Rentier Stateand Shi'a Islam."On theeconomic East: eds.,RichandPoorStates the in Middle rary Egypt, especially MalcolmH. Kerrand El Sayed Yassin, see The Predicament York,1981). (New Egypt the Arab and New Order (Boulder, Colo., 1982);and Fouad Ajami, Arab

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punishments (not Islamic in any sense), a scrambleforwealthand power among on some of the ulama, new restrictions women, and the like. Granted, the revolutionhad its more positiveaspects: some concern for the poor and for equalizationof incomesas well as limitedkindsof local self-government self and management. Some Iraniansalso pointto the declinein U.S. influence a benefit as of revolution, how much thisdeclineis a real advance in the absenceof a wellbut functioning economyand a unitedcountry questionable. is The current balancehas to not proved satisfactory most Iranians,althoughthe mullas have shown themselvesfarmore politically organizedand capable of holdingonto powerthanmany, bothwithin and outside Iran, would have expected.