BRYANT Melissa (BRYM27608907)

American Foreign Policy under Barack Obama

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Dans le cadre du cours POL1600 Introduction aux Relations Internationales

Professeur : Dominique Caouette

Dpartement de science politique Universit de Montral

Le mardi 5 juin 2012

Introduction

The authority of America as a purveyor of foreign policy is inarguably the greatest in the world. This consists not only of its diplomatic strength, but also its military might and its granting of aid to many countries. According to the US State Department, the overall goal of American foreign policy is to create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.

The influence of American foreign policy is evident throughout history. Since the end of World War One, the US has gained preeminent global status by eschewing its former policy of nonintervention. It is now firmly established as the major world power and hegemon. Different presidents have espoused different agendas, but the overall influence has remained largely unchanged.

The Bush administration (2000-2008) undertook unilateral measures that damaged American credibility and led to higher external disapproval ratings. On a strict policy level, the foreign policy of the Obama administration has not differed greatly from that of his predecessor. The major change has been tonal, and in his increased willingness to seek global partnerships. Since taking office, Obama has pursued a measured, multilateral approach to the handling of international issues (Drezner 2011, 67).

The world is currently approaching a new era of global politics. Entrenched positions and the East-West divide have made international consensus a more difficult task. This situation is heightened by the rise of the BRIC countries, specifically China and Russia, which have had several ideological clashes with the US. Due to their growing power and influence of these nations, it appears evident that no international decisions can be taken without their approval.

This therefore leads to the question Has the Obama administrations foreign policy emphasis on multilateralism generated appreciable results and increased their standing around the world?

This research paper aims to prove that although current American foreign policy has achieved considerable successes under Obama, sustained and future success is contingent on the cooperation of international partners such as Russia and China.

The paper will be divided into case studies that examine US foreign policy concerning the Arab Spring, as well as its ongoing stance on nuclear non-proliferation.

Theoretical framework and presentation of the concepts used

The theory of neo-liberalism, with a focus on the concepts of complex interdependence, neoliberal institutionalisation and hegemonic stability will provide the contextual framework for the argument.

Neo-liberal thought claims that, even in an anarchic system of autonomous rational states, cooperation can emerge through the building of norms, regimes and institutions. States are disposed to collaboration, as they are more concerned with absolute gains than relative gains. They possess common interests that go beyond the realm of security and/or economic issues (MacLeod 2010, 115) .

A crucial tenet of this philosophy is the complex interdependence theory, attributed to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. This idea posits that the trans-national connections between states are increasing, while the use of military force and power balancing are decreasing (Keohane & Nye 1977, 86). Consequently, states are so interdependent that cooperation is viewed as the more sensible solution.

Keohane and Nyes concept of neo-liberal institutionalism is also important. This theoretical approach recognises the importance of institutions in regulating and shaping the international system. States are further compelled to work together, thus enabling cooperation and reducing the uncertainties inherent in the anarchic international system.

The neo-liberal interpretation of the hegemonic stability theory states that the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single nation-state is the dominant world power. This hegemon is mandated with developing and enforcing the rules of the international system, and must have the capacity to enforce these rules through its political and economic strength.

American foreign policy has long been dominated by realist leanings, with its historical emphasis on military strength and the accumulation of power. The unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a continuation of this trend. The US viewed Saddam Hussein as a threat to its stability and did not wait for multilateral approval of military operations.

However, there have also been several examples of neo-liberalism in American foreign policy. The US has used the UN system to push for international consensus on global issues. It has compelled the world community to work together to resolve conflicts such as the first Gulf crisis.

Moreover, it has signed multiple international treaties to facilitate global cooperation in fields such as technology and the environment. For the past 60 years, the US has acted as the global hegemon, exerting unparalleled influence on the international system. It bears the brunt of the costs of the UN system, but is also the dominant voice in that arena (Keohane 2005, 131).

Obama vowed to rebuild American alliances to meet the challenges of the 21st century. He adopted a multilateral approach towards the resolution of complex international issues such as nuclear disarmament. He sought legitimacy from NATO and the UN in the conduct of American foreign policy. His adherence to a more nuanced, neo-liberal school of thought is clear.

Analysis of the problem

American response to the Arab Spring

The advent of the Arab Spring surprised many foreign policy experts. That the self-immolation of one man could be the impetus for widespread civil resistance across the Arab World seemed highly unlikely. Yet, as of June 2012, long-time dictators have fallen in Egypt and Libya, while oppressive regimes in Syria seem to be on their last breath.

The initial American response to the Arab Spring was timid. Obama applauded the democratic efforts in Tunisia, but was reticent on the Egyptian revolution due to the longstanding partnership between the US and Hosni Mubarak. However, as the government-sponsored violence increased, the Obama administrations rhetoric became progressively forceful, until Obama himself called for Mubarak to resign in February 2011.

Obama adopted his most aggressive actions in response to the Libyan Civil War. His administration pushed for the passage of UN Resolution 1973, which, among other things, imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and authorised all necessary means to protect civilians, with the exception of foreign military boots on the ground. This formed the legal basis for military intervention in the crisis.

The US, the UK and France lobbied hard for Russian and Chinese support in this initiative. Both countries had perennially shied away from interventionist measures. Although they did not vote

in favour of the resolution, they simply abstained against it, and did not use their veto power to block its passage.

However, once the military intervention began, these two countries were highly critical of the given justification. They accused the western P5 powers of overstepping the bounds of the resolution and of trying to meddle in domestic affairs. This situation foreshadowed the upcoming split in perspectives.

Scholars concur that Obama has managed the tensions relatively well despite his limited ability to affect the revolutionary outcomes. He has put the USs voice behind popular demands for freedom and democracy across the Arab world, and assisted in toppling unpopular dictators in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen (Harling & Malley 2010, 18)

Cognisant of a war-weary American public and continuing domestic financial malaise, Obama has been hesitant to put forward a more assertive foreign policy approach. He is also aware that further unilateral moves by the US would not only damage its international credibility, but also may not be as effective as a multilateral resolution. However, this policy of multilateral engagement has been costly, most notably in relation to Syria.

International response to the Syrian uprising has been critical, and the global community has become increasingly horrified at the mounting death toll. Nonetheless, Russia and China blocked a US-led Security Council Resolution calling for Syrian leader Bashar-al-Assads departure. Authorities from these countries have maintained an unwillingness to sanction the regime, and

have pointed to the Wests distortion of Resolution 1973 as one of the reasons why they will not support similar manoeuvres in this case. Consequently, it has been difficult for the Obama administration to isolate the Syrian government.

While Bush argued that the only possible response to 9/11 was to deepen Americas military and political commitments in the Middle East, Obama sought to enhance Americas security by reducing these commitments. He advocated disarmament over military build-ups and substituted regional balance-of-power agreements for unilateral manoeuvres.

It was christened a multi-partner world, in which the US would call on other countries - rivals as well as allies - to assist it in preserving global order (Mead 2010, 62). The American national security doctrine was re-defined to make room for more multipolarity. However, Russia and China have not consistently responded in a favourable manner. This has made Obamas attempts at outreach a complicated task.

Nuclear non-proliferation

The Obama administration has always prioritised global nuclear non-proliferation. The president initially adopted conciliatory measures towards rogue states, preferring diplomacy and discussions to more aggressive tactics. However, when those overtures failed, the administration then had to rely on multilateral institutions and partnerships to advance its objectives.

The Obama administration attempted to reset relations with Russia, which culminated with the signing of the New START (for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in April 2010. This agreement was aimed at slashing each countrys strategic nuclear missile launchers by half, while establishing a new inspection and verification regime. As the US and Russia possess the worlds largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons, this was a significant step for the disarmament movement.

Although the Russian reset helped to accomplish one of Obamas goals, he still wanted more progress on the control of nuclear materials. He then turned to Iran and North Korea, two states that had made the international community wary over their nuclear intentions. However, no quick resolution or consensus could be reached on these issues, which are still ongoing.

As part of his non-proliferation agenda, Obama wanted to ensure that those who broke the rules would face harsh sanctions. Obamas earlier efforts at engagement gave him greater credibility when he sought broad support for sanctions on Iran: hence, the passage of a Security Council resolution in June 2010.

The administration's attempts to change North Koreas behaviour have also been unproductive. Nonetheless, it has facilitated other important diplomatic benefits for the US. China has gradually applied more pressure on North Korea to change its truculent ways. Furthermore, the American-South Korean alliance is probably as strong as it has ever been.

Although there have been no further breakthroughs when it comes to disarming the world, Obama has strengthened the international communitys commitment to non-proliferation. Iran and North Korea face growing isolation from the emerging global order. Sanctions levied on the two regimes are increasingly being felt by their governments.

However, it must be noted that Obama has also experienced significant setbacks in this regard. His mixture of words and actions represented a clear strategic concept, but the results fell short of the administrations expectations. It appears that the nuclear disarmament agenda is stalled, and will continue to be so in the near future.

China still has not used its strong influence over North Korea to effect a meaningful change. The process of START disarmament is moving at a slower pace than expected. The Iranian sanctions have not yet compelled that government to abandon their nuclear programme. Conversely, they seem to be having the opposite effect, as Iran has only become more bellicose in recent years.

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Analysis

Obama erred in believing that an improved global standing would give the US greater policy leverage. Its standing did rebound, but this shift did not translate into an appreciable increase in its soft power. Bargaining in the G-20 and the UN Security Council did not get any easier. Allies did not change their opinion under the weight of US influence (especially evident in relation to the Iranian and Afghan crises).

The other problem was that China and Russia did not view themselves as American partners. One of the administration's major goals was to have China become a responsible player in the current liberal international order (Subramanian 2010, 50). The other was to bolster the American-Russian alliance so that the US could depend on Russias support in international affairs.

However, any advances that were made did not fundamentally change the suspicious nature inherent in both these relationships. Moreover, some saw the new US strategy as a cover for shifting the burden of providing global public goods to the rest of the world. It was also perceived as promoting narrow US interests (Shepherd 2010, 243).

Perhaps the greatest failure is the US inability to mitigate distrust over its long-term intentions. Almost every American policy is perceived by Russia and China as part of a sophisticated conspiracy to frustrate them. Meanwhile, the US has increasingly been disconcerted by the unwillingness of these two countries to take its side on fundamental global issues.

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Conclusion

There was inevitable tension between Obamas soaring rhetoric and his reality of pragmatic governance. His administrations foreign policy has been an effort to reconcile his lofty vision with political realism. Due to the domestic and global situations he has faced, pragmatism has dominated his foreign policy choices.

It is clear that Obama has been largely non-ideological in his management of American foreign policy. He is neither an idealistic liberal nor a reactive realist. This approach has been effective, conveying a degree of openness to the views of other leaders and the interests of other nations while still projecting confidence and leadership.

Obama has garnered some noteworthy successes, including significantly weakening Al-Qaeda, rebuilding the US international reputation, and achieving the aforementioned Iranian sanctions. The US still has the worlds strongest military, as well as a powerful network of allies and vast experience in global leadership.

However, there have also been some notable setbacks, including the lack of progress on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the US continued low standing in the Muslim world, and an Iran still bent on acquiring the means to produce and deliver nuclear weapons. Much of Obamas political capital has been spent on domestic issues, and his global honeymoon has long ended.

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Some have praised his stewardship, whereas others have criticised him of not having concrete and consistent strategies. Domestically, the American political right has long blasted him for being weak, and for what they say is apologising to American enemies through his overtures to Russia, Iran and China. Even some of those in his political party concur.

Obamas foreign policy has been sensible as opposed to flashy. He has competently protected and advanced American interests in most areas, with few signature accomplishments (aside from the killing of Osama bin Laden) that might create a distinctive historical legacy. He has veered away from the Bush stance of unilateralism to one that is more respectful of other nations.

However, it is clear that the intransigence of Russia and China must be eliminated in order for Obama to fully manifest his foreign policy objectives. Without their cooperation on issues such as the Arab Spring and nuclear non-proliferation, Obama will fail to come to any meaningful resolution of those respective crises.

If Obama is re-elected, he will have more opportunities to establish a lasting legacy in foreign policy achievements. As it currently stands, he has definitely earned a passing grade. Furthermore, he should be given more credit for redeeming Americas global stature after the mishaps of the Bush administration. Obama has steadfastly worked to achieve his goals of multilateralism, and though not always successful, he has remained committed to his cause.

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Bibliography

Drezner, Daniel. 2011. Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Foreign Affairs 90 (4): 57-68. Keohane, Robert. 2005. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little Brown. Macleod, Alex and OMeara, Dan. 2007. Thories des relations internationales: contestations et rsistances. Montral : CEPES. Harling, Peter and Malley, Robert. 2010. Beyond Moderates And Militants: How Obama Can Chart A New Course In The Middle East. Foreign Affairs 89 (5): 18-25. Meade, Walter. 2010. The Carter Syndrome. Foreign Affairs 177 (7): 54-68. Shepherd, Robin. 2010. Appeasement Obama Style. European View 9 (2) 241-247. Subramanian, Arvind. 2011. The Inevitable Superpower. Foreign Affairs 90 (5): 49-54.

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