EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE Definition: Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly stated should

be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. (Ichong Case)

Quinto v. Comelec Facts: Ichong v. Hernandez [a statute which regulate the retail business; VALID] Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain

a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival. Issue: WON RA No. 1180 is unconstitutional and violates the equal protection clause. Held: The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.) Subjects of Protection 1. natural persons 2. artificial persons property only

Classification Requirements o It must be based upon substantial distinctions o It must be germane to the purpose of the law.

o o

It must not be limited to existing conditions only. It must apply equally to all members of the class.

CASE: Pp. v. Cayat, 68 Phil 12 Syllabus: Facts: Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the following information was filed against him: That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read: SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a nonChristian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court. The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and. (3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state. Issue: WON Act No. 1639 denies equal protection of the laws. Held: No. Act No. 1639 does not deny equal protection of the laws. Syllabus: 1. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. a. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." b. That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian

tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the nonChristian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization. c. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security. d. that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application. Requisites of due process: To constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. Example: Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442). Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. Victoriano v.Elizalde Facts: Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the

Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows: Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement. On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350. Issue: WON Act No. 3350 violates the equal protection of the law. Held: Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements. Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements between an employer and a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating

with labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements continues. Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the other employees, because they are differently situated, are not granted the same privilege, does not render the law unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature involves inequality. Biraogo v. Truth Commission Facts: At the dawn of his administration, President Noynoy Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010. The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is created to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ONLY, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. The commission is expected to finish their investigation on or before December 31, 2012. Barely a month after the issuance of EO No. 1, two cases were filed before the SC assailing the validity and constitutionality of the said EO. Issue: WON EO 1 violates the equal protection clause. Held: Yes. It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Sereno Dissenting: Syllabus: 1. The majority Decision defeats the constitutional mandate on public accountability- it effectively tolerates impunity for graft and corruption, and its invocation of the constitutional clause on equal protection of the laws is an unwarranted misuse if the same and is a disservice to those classes of the people for whom the constitutional guarantee was created as a succor. 2. Prioritization per se is not classification.

Dumlao v. Comelec Facts: The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides: Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation. Issue: WON BP 52 is based on a substantial distinction. Held: Yes. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated. Ceniza v. COMELEC Facts: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BP 51 and the COMELEC resolution. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection. Issue: WON there is a violation of equal protection.

Held: There is no violation as it is based upon substantial distinction. The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan Facts: Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC. Issue: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.

Held: The classification satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera 26 requiring that it "must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. A different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Trial in the Sandiganbayan is conducted by three Justices constitutiong each division, and their unanimous vote is needed for decision, which conceivably will be more carefully reached than that od the other trial courts. Makasiar, J Dissenting Opinion Sec. 7, par. 3 of PD 1606 denies petitioner equal protection of the law. The constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority to create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and corruption but does not authorize to limit the right to appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandigan bayan to only the SC. Present number of Sandiganbayan magistrates denies an accused an equal protection of the law as it dimishes chances of an acquittal.

Held: The classification between male and female contract workers is valid. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified. Intl. School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing Facts: International School (IS) pays its teachers who are hired from abroad, or foreign-hires, a higher salary than its local-hires, whether the latter are Filipino or not (most are Filipino, but some are American). It justifies this under the dislocation factor that foreigners must be given a higher salary both to attract them to teach here, and to compensate them for the significant economic disadvantages involved in coming here. The Teachers Union cries discrimination. Issue: WON unwarranted discrimination exists. Held: Discrimination exists. Equal pay for equal work is a principal long honored in this jurisdiction, as it rests on fundamental norms of justice. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

Phil. Assn. of Service Exporters v. Drilon Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. Issue: WON the classification is valid.

DECS v. San Diego Facts:

MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 issued that: A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, DECS rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. He challenged the constitutionality of the rule invoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power and a violation of equal protection clause from other profession. Hence, this action. Issue: WON the implementation of three-failure rule violates the equal protection clause. Held: No. There is a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subjected to NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.

prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. Issue: WON there is a substantial distinction. Held: No. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

Facts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be

Quinto v. Comelec Facts: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369. Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Issue: WON there is a valid classification. Held: Not a valid classification. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. Though there is a substantial distinction between appointive and elective officials, it will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public.[34] The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain.

tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly competitive market." Issue: WON RA 8180 is unconstitutional. it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. It discriminated against new players as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage- the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

Biraogo v. PTC Tatad v. Secretary Facts: Petitioner Tatad seeks the annulment of Section 5(b) of R. A. No. 8180 which provides: b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress. He argues that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad. Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the