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ISRAELS ELECTION: GAME CHANGER OR PREDICTABLE BORE

Israelis will go to the polls on January 22nd to elect a new parliament, and by extension government, an event that has so far attracted relatively little international attention. Understandably so, Benjamin Netanyahu just led the most stable coalition term in two decades and his re-election is unanimously assumed to be a given his putative challengers from the centre being unable to find or coalesce around a credible candidate.1 If this election does have a headline, it is the coming of age of Israels new right, encapsulated in the candidacy of Naftali Bennett the new leader of the Jewish Home Party, who are storming to third place in the polls having shared the honour of being the equal smallest party in the outgoing Knesset. Bennett served in the elite IDF Sayeret Matkal unit, is a kippa wearer, deeply rooted in the national religious movement, radically pro-settler and even annexationist in his position on the territories, a hi-tech dot.com millionaire, soft-spoken, young, of American parentage and a former adviser to Netanyahu. Israels most popular political satire show Eretz Nehederet (A Wonderful Country) compared him to a new software app, the iBennett, a modern version of the old settler model no beard, no crazy-mystical gaze, smaller kippa but with occasional glitches.

Daniel LEVY

Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, ECFR

daniel.levy@ecfr.eu

STABILITY BETWEEN BUT NOT WITHIN ISRAELS ELECTORAL BLOCS

Contemporary Israeli politics basically breaks down into four political-electoral components the Zionist right/far right/national religious right, the Zionist centre (and small Meretz left), the ultra-orthodox bloc, and the bloc overwhelmingly representing Palestinian Arab citizens. There is remarkable stability from the outgoing Knesset and in polling for these elections in terms of the number of seats each bloc is expected to win. The fluidity, and it is considerable, is in the movement of votes and seats within the blocs, and especially the largest two the right and centre. Of course polls are only polls and elections can surprise - there are suggestions that up to one fifth of voters may be undecided and that polling methodology may be faulty in over-emphasising calls to fixed landline telephones. The Palestinian Arab and ultra-orthodox (or Haredi) blocs show the least fluctuation. The Haredi parties the Sephardi Shas and Ashkenazi United Torah Judaism both have to contend
1. The leaders of the Labor, Hatnua and Yesh Atid parties, Shelly Yachimovitch, Tzipi Livni and Yair Lapid respectively, all reject the tag left or centre-left and insist they are centrists, only Meretz flies the Zionist left flag

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with uncharacteristic internal dissent and breakaway factions, notably on the Shas side with ex-MK Haim Amsalem having formed his own more integrationist party. Yet they are likely to retain their strength (circa 10-12 and 5 -6 seats respectively), albeit without Shas receiving any perceptible boost from the return of former leader Aryeh Deri from a prison-induced absence or from the weakening of the Sephardi appeal of the new Likud-Beitenu joint list. Likewise the largely Palestinian Arab parties the more Islamist United Arab List, nationalist Balad, and communist and coexistence oriented Hadash are set to retain their almost equally divided share of 10-11 seats, although this could be negatively impacted by a trend of ever-lower voter turnout among the Palestinian citizens of Israel. The politics of this bloc continues to be shaped by their exclusion, including by the centrist Zionist parties, as potential legitimate coalition allies (or even opposition allies) and the efforts by the right to ban their participation in elections. Recently these efforts were again squashed by the Supreme Court, but if a more extreme Knesset continues to push a ban and succeeds in its judicial reforms then future non-participation cannot be ruled out and would be a huge game changer in Israeli democracy. Last elections the Zionist centre bloc was represented by two parties, Kadima and Labour securing a combined total of 41 seats (28 and 13 respectively). A side story in this election will be the near disappearance of Kadima. Yet, in polling, the centre bloc maintains almost the exact same number of MKs - with Labour now in the mid to high teens, Livnis Hatnuah and Lapids Yesh Atid both scoring plus/minus 10 seats and Kadima perhaps scraping back in with 2. The remaining margin is likely to go to the left Meretz party, up one or two seats in polls from its existing three. The early promise of a dramatic Labour resurgence under Shelly Yachimovich and her socio-economic platform has largely fizzled out. Nevertheless, the centre bloc in parliament will now be less rightist (Kadimas faction included a number of settlers and their sympathizers as well as initiators and supporters of harsh anti-democratic legislation). A strengthened Labour will include a more prominent core of progressives, Livnis new party list will also be characterised by a more consistently liberal-democratic orientation than the hodgepodge that was Kadima, while the Yesh Atid party is least predictable, defined by little more than its leaders attractive TV persona, but unlikely to reveal itself as extreme. The most significant and potentially consequential shifts are taking place within the right wing bloc. Ne-

tanyahu kicked off this election season by creating a unified list between his Likud Party and the Yisrael Beitenu Party of former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman the Likud-Beitenu list. That combination had 42 seats (27 + 15) in the outgoing Knesset but is predicted to drop to the low to mid thirties. Overall, the nonHaredi rightist bloc seems to be holding at about the 50 MK mark. Given the way the joint Likud-Beitenu list is composed, the Likud is headed to become a rump faction of only about 22 members. Almost all those lost votes seem to have simply shifted one step rightwards and found a new home in the Jewish Home party under Naftali Bennett. A party even further to the Kahanist right, Otzma LeYisrael (Strength to Israel) may also cross the threshold and receive two or more MKs. It should not go unmentioned that the Likud list is itself more hard-line, having upgraded a cohort of MKs who overtly advocate a greater Israel annexationist policy and having purged the handful of members considered defenders of western style democracy (notably, Dan Meridor, Michael Eitan and Benny Begin).

WHAT THESE ELECTIONS ARE NOT ABOUT

With all the personal rivalries, splits, mergers, and divisions within the political camps there is precious little by way of any substantive policy debate, even by Israeli and general western standards. It might for instance surprise readers to know that Iran has barely featured at all in this campaign season. This has also not really been about the Palestinians. Naftali Bennett may have produced a plan for annexing 60% of the occupied West Bank and formalising an apartheid system.2 In election rallies, ads and interviews Bennett emphasizes social issues, military service and his version of Jewish values, de-emphasising not only that plan but also the settler radicalism of his list. This theme of dont mention the Palestinians is a driving motif also for the centrist leaders of the Labour Party and Yesh Atid with their focus on domestic issues. Only Tzipi Livni (and Meretz) place the two-state option and the conflict front and centre, but Livnis prescriptions convey a decidedly stale feel, irresponsive to the changing regional realities and growing strength of Hamas and eliciting something of a been there; tried that reaction from the public. All of which allows Netanyahus message of staying the course to go largely unchallenged. Efforts to recreate the mobilisation around social economic issues of the huge summer of protests in 2011
2. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BeHT9TlrARc

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have largely fallen flat, despite the efforts of Shelly Yachimovichs Labour party. Yachimovich seemed to believe that she could ignore national security issues and set an agenda of its the economy stupid. It was a nave strategy, one that has marginalised the Labour party by placing it outside the national security conversation and has led to Labour losing seats in the course of the campaign. By not being seen as a rival candidate to Netanyahu across the gamut of national issues Yachimovich has also made her economic platform less relevant. Even the secular-religious fights of yester year and the question of universal IDF conscription are lacking a cutting edge and passion this time around3. Shas and Liebermans still Russian oriented party continue to sling mud at each other across the state-religion divide but they have been sitting in government together for so long that no one takes this too seriously. The build-up to January 22nd is best understood as a Tribes of Israel election taking identity politics to a new level. Israelis seem to relate their political choices almost exclusively to embedded social codes rather than contesting policies. Floating votes may exist within tribal structures, but movement between tribes is almost unheard of.

partners in a future Netanyahu coalition, Yachimovich is on record as saying no to this option, Livni has been the most pointed in campaigning against the area of Netanyahus policies least likely to change - national security, and while Yair Lapid seems most keen to join, he offers Netanyahu the most meagre moderating cover at home and abroad and is an un-tested quantity in terms of coalition reliability. What is clear is that all the policy issues that have been ignored during the election will soon have to be addressed by the new government. Assuming a rightist coalition the most intriguing question would appear to be the ways in which the enhanced radicalism of the parliament and government will find expression. The outgoing Knesset already contributed to shrinking the democratic space in Israel to an impasse in peace efforts and frenzy of settlement activity that produced unprecedented European frustration and condemnation, discomfort in the US-Israel relationship, albeit with Netanyahu maintaining the upper hand, and glimpses of Palestinian diplomatic activism, notably at the UN. It also climbed Israel quite high up a tree in threatening to militarily strike Iran. The Palestinians are not going anywhere, at least not of their own volition. The next coalition will likely find it even harder to pretend that a speech by the Prime Minister in 2009 in which the phrase two states was uttered is a genuine policy commitment. Two states was never formally adopted as government or Likud policy, it does not appear in the platform or the campaign of the Likud-Beitenu party and it is safe to predict that it will also not be adopted by Netanyahus next government. The defining fault-line of the new coalition is anticipated to be between pro-active annexationists and status quo merchants, meaning yet more deepening and entrenching of occupation. In the old Israeli political map those considered solutionists were the two-staters. In the emerging Israeli political map the new solutionists advocating action now are Greater Israel annexationists (a significant cohort of the Likud-Beitenu and Habayit Hayehudi lists). Expect the status-quo camp to carry the day, and international reaction to yet more violations of international law to still be plodding and rhetorical rather than meaningful, but two connected factors should not be underestimated what Israeli overreach could unleash and the possibility of a more challenging Palestinian counter-strategy eventually emerging, especially in the new regional environment. The empowered ultra-nationalist camp will also look for gratification inside the green line, continuing, pos-

SO WHY MIGHT THIS ELECTION BE SO CONSEQUENTIAL?

Given the above it is hardly surprising that much of the Israeli election conversation is already about the morning after and is replete with speculation regarding the composition of a future Netanyahu-led coalition. The current assumption is that Netanyahu will have less convenient coalition options than he did in the previous Knesset there is unlikely to be an Ehud Barak to sound reasonable at home and aboard, in particular in Washington. It will be very hard to exclude the large group of settler radicals that constitutes Bennetts Habayit Hayehudi, the Likud faction will be smaller and itself more extreme, the ultra-orthodox and newly strengthened national religious will make for less easy bedfellows and Lieberman himself may have reasons to force elections relatively early in the term of the new Knesset.4 While none of the centrist parties can be definitively ruled as potential
3. Yair Lapid also happens to be the son of the now deceased Shinui party leader and Minister Yosef Tommy Lapid, who made his own transition from TV punditry to politics, perfecting a fiery brand of hateful anti-clericalism lacking in his off-spring 4. He is being indicted on charges of fraud and breach of trust and if convicted but not imprisoned would have to sit-out the remainder of the Knesset term, hence his possible interest in an early dissolution of parliament.

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sibly with greater success, its pursuit of anti-democratic and discriminatory legislation, its aggressive provocations towards the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and its impressive record of securing appointments for its camp in key governmental agencies while ousting the remaining islands of liberalism, with a notable target being the composition and competences of the Supreme Court. All of which will take place in a more restricted, overtly political and less pluralist media environment. Without being too alarmist, should they succeed especially on judicial issues the Jewish state may enter uncharted territory in its long journey of divorce from democratic principles. Finally the domestic front also carries the seeds of trouble for a prospective Netanyahu coalition. To an outsider the differences between the nationalreligious and ultra-orthodox may appear to revolve around rather opaque definitions of religious practice, degrees of acceptance of modernisation and even choices of garments. There are though fundamental disagreements that are much more likely to come to the fore in a parliament and coalition in which there is almost an equity of power between the national religious and the Haredi. The massively emboldened national religious Habayit Hayehudi party has, in its campaign, been touching the rawest nerves in relations between the two religious sectors and in how they view the state. There will be potentially explosive divisions over issues of army service, control of religious councils and funding priorities that could get to the core of their competing interpretations of how Jewish law views the very existence of the State of Israel a supreme value for religious nationalists versus a reality of dubious religious legitimacy for the Haredim. Issues that have been swept under the carpet and that have allowed for a relatively easy coexistence might now surface in unpredictable ways. The Shas spiritual leader Rabbi Ovadia Yossef has already threatened that his community will leave the country if attempts

are made to draft them into the army.5 These should create fertile ground for a revival of the centre left and a return to the politics of serious contestation next time elections come around. Netanyahu has made several mistakes in this campaign, including the alliance with Liebermans party and the way in which his attacks on Bennett have served only to strengthen the latter and he has reminded everyone how susceptible he is to pressure. The clarity offered by hardliners on the right and their potential overreach should encourage a rethinking, a rebranding and a proffering of a genuine alternative by the opposition. The cohort of new MKs is set to include some overtly progressive rising stars, notably highly placed women on the Labour list - 4th placed Merav Michaeli and 8th placed Stav Shaffir, alongside a possible strengthening of Meretz. Prospective fallout between the Haredi and nationalist camp could also be utilised to build new coalitions if the centre left is able to overcome its anti-Haredi animosity. However, any prospect of a return to genuinely competitive elections would require four ingredients that are glaringly missing from the opposition as January 22nd approaches a credible leader, a degree of unity, a substantive alternative vision for Israel and an ability to be sufficiently democratic and inclusive as to make common cause with the political representatives of fellow citizens who are Arab-Palestinian, not Jewish or Zionist. This election will likely mark an acceleration of the long predicted, not least by former Israeli leaders OImert and Barak, Israeli journey towards a hegemonic nationalism resembling apartheid-era South Africa the remaining question is whether the next Knesset also manages to produce a genuinely democratic and fighting alternative.
5. Ovadia Yosef attacks maverick Amnon Yitzhak, The Jerusalem Post, January 6th, 2013.

Daniel LEVY Daniel Levy is the Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at ECFR. Mr. Levy worked in the Israeli Prime Ministers Office as special adviser and head of Jerusalem Affairs, following which Mr. Levy worked as senior policy adviser to then Israeli Minister of Justice, Yossi Beilin. He was a member of the official Israeli delegation to the Taba negotiations with the Palestinians in January 2001, and previously served on the Israeli negotiating team to the Oslo B Agreement from May to September 1995.

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