SAARC and India

Policy Issues hinge on security and democracy

The entire project of SAARC is dependent on Indias capacity to bind the neighbouring states in multiple networks of ties to promote regional cooperation. India not only shares frontiers with all the SAARC countries, but also ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious histories. If India can persuade SAARC members to view south Asia as a viable regional entity, it can promote projects of development cooperation. But thats easier said than done. For, the success of such an enterprise depends on how well the problems pertaining to security and democracy are addressed. Rajen Harshe Indias refusal to attend the 13th summit of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the eventual postponement the SAARCs Dhaka summit of February 2005 has raised a number of questions regarding the likely course and the prospects of regional cooperation in south Asia. Indias decision to keep out of the summit apparently was shaped by two major concerns. First, some of the recent events in Bangladesh such as the attack on Sheikh Hasina, the deaths of Belaluddin, a journalist, and former finance minister Shah A. Kibria in two separate bomb blasts have made India apprehensive of the deteriorating law and order conditions in Bangladesh. Besides, Khaleda Zia regimes support to insurgent groups in Indias northeast and persistent attacks on democratic and secular parties by anti-India fundamentalist groups linked to the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have merely compounded the security related anxieties of India. Under these circumstances, Dhaka as a venue of the summit with the prevailing political turmoil in Bangladesh made India wary of security arrangements in the host country. Second, King Gynendras seizure of power in Nepal, through suspension of the democratic and constitutional processes, also prompted India to refrain from sharing the platform with the Gynendra regime that has undermined the nine-year-old constitutional monarchy in Nepal. Since it is inconceivable to visualise any form of cooperation within south Asia without the active participation of an overwhelmingly powerful state such as India the 13th SAARC summit had to be postponed. The postponement of the summit has made the other members of SAARC, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan apprehensive of Indias hegemonic role and its capacity to virtually block any move towards cooperation among the seven SAARC member states. Indeed, the lack of rapport between India and other SAARC member states could as well damage the likely projects of development cooperation within SAARC. Considering the enhanced significance of the organisations like SAARC in the context of globalisation, it may be worth taking a fresh

look at SAARC amid a deteriorating security environment as well as the questions related to democracy and development within south Asia. In general, the SAARC and its course of development has to be reviewed and appraised in the context of the world wide resurgence of regional cooperative movements that constitute a major response to the challenges of globalisation. In fact, the post cold war world has been witnessing the advent, refashioning and resurgence of multiple kinds of regional organisations in the developed as well as developing countries. The European Union (EU), North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) offer perhaps the most obvious examples of this process. These cooperative ventures are also being built around dominant regional powers. For instance, Nigeria and South Africa are the sheet anchors of organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or Southern African Development Community (SADC) respectively. Plausibly, the entire project of SAARC is dependent on Indias capacity to bind the neighbouring states in multiple networks of ties to promote regional cooperation because India shares frontiers with all the SAARC countries. It also has commonalities in ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious terms with all its neighbours. Being the most powerful and virtually the core state within SAARC, India has the greater responsibility to visualise and build, along with its neighbours, south Asia as a regional entity. By taking a lead in persuading other SAARC members to think about south Asia as a viable unit India can promote projects of development cooperation that can bring about regional harmony. And yet, if the problems pertaining to security and democracy are not addressed India will not be able to play the role of a catalyst stimulating cooperative movements. Spill-Over Effects of Crisis in Nepal Indias dilemmas in the region may be highlighted with a few evocative illustrations from Nepal, which, at this juncture, seems to have captured the centre stage of Indias concerns in south Asia. Internally, the Maoists are challenging the political system of Nepal. Owing to its acute social problems including abject poverty, inequalities generated by the caste ridden social structures and gross asymmetry in income distribution, Maoism has over the decades gradually begun to appeal to sections of the Nepalese population who were disgruntled with the existing political system. The Maoist group captured nine seats in the parliament of Nepal in 1996. Frustrated by the slow pace of change within the constitutional framework the Maoists chose to carry on the fight against the existing system with the idea of overthrowing it through the armed struggle. By now the Maoist rebels underground. They have not merely established control over 40 per cent of the territory of Nepal but gathered active support of over 2-3,000 armed prachanda or fierce fighters along with a militia of over 15,000 men. Over the years, they have created sound linkages with the other extremist groupings across the borders including those in the Terai region of Nepal that border India, the Maoists/ Naxalites of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh and the north-eastern insurgents in India. In the nine years of insurgency in

Nepal, the Maoists have continuously widened their base of operations by providing smuggled arms to the ever-expanding number of recruits. The resulting deteriorating state of law and governance in Nepal has already claimed thousands of lives. The Deuba regime allegedly failed to tackle the Maoist rebels and improve the law and order situation, which, in turn, gave king Gyanendra a pretext to take over the reigns of administration in Nepal. The developments in Nepal cannot be viewed in an isolated manner because the countrys strategic location has high value for major powers. Any power able to station space linked surveillance, intelligence and navigation systems on the high mountains of Nepal can gain geo-strategic leverage in several Asian regions from central to south east Asia. Since Nepal borders China and India, the dominant forces in Nepal can prove crucial to either of these powers. Besides, the Nepalese frontier is only 185 miles away from New Delhi. That is why, stability and friendship with Nepal is essential for India to strengthen its security. Since the Indian government has supported the Nepalese regimes with arms to handle the Maoist rebels, the latter are likely to seek support from China while in opposition or in power. Moreover if Nepal slides towards China and India fails to control the north eastern insurgencies, external powers like China and Myanmar are likely to play a more significant role in Nepal, Bangladesh and north eastern affairs. Moreover, Nepal has already become one of the priority centres of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, which is headed by a Brigadier. The links between the ISI, terrorist Islamic outfits in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan continue to be a constant source of security threat, especially after the Pakistani-sponsored terrorists hijack of the Indian Airlines plane flying between Kathmandu and Kandahar in December 1999. The ISIsponsored terrorist centres in Bangladesh are, in their turn, linked with multinational terrorist outfits such as Al Qaeda. Similarly, till 2003, the rebels of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) enjoyed support from Bhutan. At one stage the ISI and HarkatUl-Mujahideen, a terrorist outfit of Pakistan, were actively supporting the ULFA through funds as well as by imparting training in six districts of Assam. Out of these districts of Kokrajhar, Goalpara, Darrang and Nalbari share borders with Bhutan. Vitiating Security Environment Apart from vitiating the security environment through their subversive military related threats the terrorist outfits are linked to the underworld as well. In fact, south Asias location between the two largest areas of illicit opium production, namely Golden Crescent, comprising north western countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan and Golden Triangle consisting countries such as Myanmar and Bangladesh in the east pose problems to health security. At this juncture opium, heroin and hashish are exported across the borders as well as via the sea-lanes to Sri Lanka and Maldives. India itself cultivates opium poppy illicitly of over 1200 to1500 tons annually.

Besides Nepal the threat of terrorism has and is likely to pose challenges to development cooperation from two other major countries namely, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Since the 1990s Pakistan-sponsored cross border terrorism has played havoc in the states of Jammu and Kashmir. Through the bomb blasts in different parts of India including major cities like Mumbai and Kolkota as also the abortive attempt to explode the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001 the militant Islamic outfits were able to unleash a reign of fear in the Indian psyche [Harshe 2003]. However, with the ongoing Indo-Pakistan talks to promote peace and President Musharrafs assurance that Pakistan will prevent any terrorist operations from its soil has, at least, brought a momentary semblance of peace in the subcontinent. However, it is going to be difficult for any regime to dismantle wellentrenched terrorist infrastructures in Pakistan. Likewise, in spite of the three-year-old Oslo-initiated reconciliatory process between the Sri Lankan government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), peace seems to elude Sri Lanka. After the ceasefire, the government virtually granted de facto control to the LTTE over the areas in the northeastern parts. Apparently the government aimed at devolution of powers within the federal framework but such devolution has added to the new resolve of LTTE to press for independent eelam especially after the devastating impact of tsunami in northeastern Sri Lanka. The LTTE wants to monopolise post tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction work in the northeast. This has held up the formation of joint mechanisms comprising the government and the LTTE to disburse funds in the tsunami-affected areas. If the third party mediation from Norway is able to activate the stalemated peace process in Sri Lanka the possibility of war could be averted in the island. The presence of terror and terrorist outfits is pervasive in the entire south Asian region and without evolving collective mechanisms to combat terrorism it will not be easy to contain the spectre of terror as whole in the region. It also needs to be noted that the promotion of constitutional and democratic processes and the formation of democratically-elected regimes indeed carry the inner strength to usher in dialogic processes. Such processes can bring all the major parties, including the representatives of terrorist outfits, to the negotiating table to hammer out differences and search for solutions to controversial issues. By promoting dialogic processes within and between the states and civil societies within the SAARC countries it may be feasible to mitigate the impact of terrorism. Relying on merely coercive methods can hardly contain terrorist activities. For, any coercive measures aimed at brutally suppressing the terrorist groups tend to invariably trigger retaliatory measures from the latter leading to the loss of lives of innocent civilians. Among the SAARC countries domestic regimes of Pakistan and Nepal are deviating from the basic democratic norms that could cause serious concerns while building the SAARC as a regional organisation. In the ultimate analysis, smooth functioning and strengthening of SAARC is certainly dependent on the bourgeoning network of economic and commercial ties among SAARC member states. Countries like India and Pakistan need to come together to form the basis for weaving region-wide networks of such ties. Indo-Pak Cooperation

Indeed, the strain between India and Pakistan may be mitigated if both the countries concentrate on the economic dimensions of their ties. However, there is no direct correlation between strained relationship and trade ties. For instance, under General Zias military dictatorship Indo-Pakistan trade received an impetus when Pakistan raised the quota of permitted tradable Indian goods from 42 to 249 in 1987. The trade between the two countries peaked to US $ 354 million as they went through nuclear tests in 1998. In 2001, under the Musharraf regime, Indian exports to Pakistan were the highest ever i.e. US $ 219 million. [Quoted in Taneja 2004: 326]. Furthermore, the informal cross border trade as also the trade carried through places like Dubai, Afghanistan and countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) between the two countries is roughly worth U.S. $2 billion. (Ibid) There is also a dire need to explore trade potentials between India and Pakistan. Certain unfavourable factors such as the lack of mutual confidence as well as information, mutual apprehensions and at times misinformation have obstructed the course of building smooth trade ties. Moreover, India has accorded the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan, as a trading partner, while Pakistan has not reciprocated with the same facility to India. India is in a position to export diverse kinds of items including iron ore, steel, transport equipments like scooters, motor cycles and passenger cars, plastics, textiles, drugs, pharmaceuticals and a number of agricultural products to Pakistan. In its turn, Pakistan can export fruits, nuts, spices, pulses and metal scraps to India. India is the more sound and powerful of the two economies and hence Pakistan is apprehensive of Indian goods invading the Pakistani market. Since India has already opted to offer favourable trade terms to the goods from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh it can conceive of applying the Gujral Doctrine of non-reciprocity in its trade relations with Pakistan to counter such apprehensions1 [Harshe 1999]. It also needs to be underscored that there is enormous potential to promote Indo-Pakistan cooperation in the energy sector. Apart from meeting Indias mounting demand as supplier of energy Pakistan can make full use of its location on the transit route from the energy heartland of Iran to India. If the oil pipeline from Iran via Pakistan to India becomes functional Pakistan will be in a position collect hefty transit fees of roughly U.S. $600 to 800 million annually. The oil pipeline project would go through only when the agreements between the three countries ensure the security of oil supply. If there are diversified sources of pipelines gas, India will be able to reduce its dependence on more expensive liquid natural gas. Trade and other forms of interactions could be facilitated through road links such as Srinagar-Muzaffarabad or Mumbai Karachi ferry service. There are also immense possibilities of promoting cooperation in Information Communication Technology (ICT). Healthy trade and development related ties between India and Pakistan would have spill over effect in stimulating the trade ties in the entire south Asian region. The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement signed in 12th Islamabad summit of the SAARC of January 2004 will come into effect in January 2006. The agreement will, hopefully, enhance the prospects of intra-regional trade. In fact, the trade between India and the SAARC countries in the post liberalisation phase has been posting a growth rate of 19.99

per cent as compared with world trade that has grown by 18.7 per cent. According to a trade forecast by Assocham the trade between India and the SAARC countries is likely to grow five-fold and touch the figure of Rs 100 crore by 2013. (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/business February 20, 2005). Only a sound basis of trade and commercial ties will permit SAARC countries to execute a broader developmental agenda. Such an agenda should involve a projects against illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, environmental degradation, practices of child labour, trade in drugs and small arms as well as cross border terrorism, AIDS and diverse forms of social discrimination. SAARC can become truly functional if the two powerful nuclear states choose to function as major partners in promoting the regional trading and other cooperative ventures in the context of the south Asian region.

I.K. Gujral was Indias foreign minister and later Prime Minister for a short while under short-lived coalitions that ran India from 1996 to 1998. The Gujral Doctrine is a device to bring about harmony among south Asian states where a powerful state like India voluntarily forgoes the principle of reciprocity in bilateral ties. It was applied by India in its trade ties with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which favoured the latter countries.

References Harshe, Rajen (1999): South Asian Regional Co-operation: Problems and Prospects, Economic

and Political Weekly, Vol.XXXXIV, No.19, May 8-14, pp. 1100-1105. _______ (2003): Cross- Border Terrorism: Roadblock To Peace Initiatives Economic and Political Weekly, Vol XXXVII, No.35, August 30, pp.3621-3625
Taneja, Nisha (2004): India-Pakistan Trade Relations: Opportunities For Growth Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXIX, No 4, pp. 326-27