HIGHLIGHT ON HAZOP FOR ENGINEERING SAFETY REVIEW

By : Alvin Alfiyansyah

HAZOP HISTORY
Safety problems in the oil and chemical process industries are mainly related to plant operation, equipment reliability and process design. In many areas, it has been possible over the years to recognize the events that could lead to safety or operating problems, and to build up codes of practice for the safe design of equipment. However, with advancing technology, it is not always practicable to keep abreast of the developments and maintain comprehensive codes, particularly in the major risk areas. Even if this were possible, the use of equipment-oriented practices as the sole basis for ensuring adequate design is obviously not very satisfactory. Complementary methods of examination, which are process-oriented, are also required. As a result, it has become necessary to develop and adopt procedures which carry out a formal identification and assessment of all the possible hazards of any proposed new design (or alteration) in order to supplement the knowledge of the specialists and the experience summarized within codes of practice. These formal procedures offer an enormous potential to improve the safety, reliability and operability of a modern process plant by recognizing and eliminating potential problems at the design stage. Moreover, the importance of the formal identification and elimination of such problems has been accentuated by the economic pressures

for larger single-stream units and operation in closer proximity to known hazardous conditions. The need for a set of formal hazard identification and elimination procedures resulted in the development of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. HAZOP methodology stems from two methods of studying risk: The first method, the "operability study", was developed by ICI (1963, Heavy Organic
Chemicals of ICI led by Production Manager (K.W. Gee) developed first ever simple Hazard Investigation (That is, what we now call HAZOP) and in 1968, D.M. Elliott and J.M. Owen of Mond Division of ICI described the use of Critical Examination) and is now widely

used throughout the chemical and petroleum industries. It is based upon the supposition that most problems are missed because the system is complex rather than because of a lack of knowledge on the part of the design team. It can be used to examine preliminary process design flowsheets at the start of a project, or detailed piping and instrument diagrams at the final design phase, or during operation. The second method, "hazard analysis", provides a quantitative examination after a serious hazard has been identified either by an operability study or by some other procedure. It is based upon a cause, logic, or fault tree that relates the events or coincidences capable of leading to a specific hazard. This tree is then quantified so that the probability of the
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resultant hazard can be understood. The consequences of the event are also examined, using mathematical modelling techniques, so that the risk of the event can be quantified. To summarize, the Operability Study identifies hazardous or unacceptable situations and Hazard Analysis quantifies the effects. The term HAZOP brings together the methods used by both. First published paper on HAZOP was H.G. Lawleys 1974 paper presented on AIChE Loss Prevention Symposium

First used HAZOP technique outside ICI occurred in 1967 when R.E. Knowlton led a study for Ilford Ltd. First Contractor to do so was probably Chemetic International, then part owned by ICI First HAZOPs guidelines developed by Chemical Industries Association in 1977 whose encourage its use and development.

Table- 1 Benefits of Hazop Study (8 years experience of ICI Mond Division in UK) CRITERION No. of major mods to plant No. of minor mods to plant Time from start-up flowsheets rates to design WITH HAZOP 0 3 1 WITHOUT HAZOP 2-3 10-15 3

Why HAZOP, not just process safety design review ?

Process Safety Review is a technique for identification of hazards and related issues which relies on expert review. It is not a team technique, although it is possible for the 'experts' to get together with project team members to discuss the findings from their reviews and brainstorm possible solutions. It is not necessarily a structured review, although individual reviewers may try to use such a method. In general the time allowed for such a review is also

significantly shorter than the time taken by a HAZOP team. The principle of an independent review by an expert is a good one, and could be used as a precursor to HAZOP, but it would normally be preferable to ask the 'expert' to be a member of the HAZOP team. For an existing plant, a technique called 'Safety Audit' is often used. This is once again an expert review, but may have different objectives to HAZOP, and can therefore be complementary. While a major objective is to identify hazards and propose actions, it can also review issues
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not covered by a HAZOP study. For example, the techniques will normally include time spent interviewing plant staff, including operators, supervisors and managers. It can therefore make an objective assessment of staff training, understanding of hazards, emergency preparedness, availability and use of procedures, consistency of operating practice between shifts, and a number of issues which HAZOP will not necessarily identify. Contracting organizations and company engineering departments often rely on a technique called 'design review'. Sometimes this is a team review, but rarely is it as thorough and systematic as HAZOP. Sometimes it is a 'squad check' or normally we call IDC in Technip, where each engineering section comments on a design independently, and these comments are then brought together. This technique rarely considers safety as a review topic!

A greater drawback to relying on codes of practice is that adherence to them does not take into account the operation of the process as a whole, or variations from normal operation, but only ensures that particular pieces of equipment are adequate when considered alone. Since codes are usually drawn up as a result of an occurrence, they do not necessarily anticipate large, infrequent events. The recommendations that are included in codes of practice are often based on the absolute minimum standards acceptable to all parties drawing up the code, since it is usually a consensus document. Frequently the recommendations put forward in a code of practice are totally arbitrary. Such things as separation distances are often not based on hazard assessment, and are related more to emergency service access than to the possible consequences. This is because the codes are general in their application and cannot take into account specific site details such as site topography, numbers of employees, operating procedures, and engineering design features. Another limitation to risk control by codes is that apart from the exclusion zone no recommendations are included for land-use. This can result in new housing or other activities being planned within an area that is subject to an unacceptably high risk. Cumulative risks from adjacent sites are also ignored. Although the codes are stringently applied at the time approval for the site is sought, they are not well enforced once this approval has been granted.

Engineering Codes and Standards are not Enough?

Sometimes may be one person who experienced enough (say had 30 years experience), the engineering codes and standards are enough in define safety. But, In well defined areas, such as those of major risk, a code of practice has usually been developed to which the equipment can be designed. Pressure vessel design is a good example of the use of codes of practice. However, with the inevitable rapid advances in technology it is not always possible to keep up with developments and maintain comprehensive codes of practice even in major areas.

Summarized of HAZOP study, procedure and methods point are defined as below :

HAZOPs Aims
~To identify the causes of all deviations or changes from the design intention. ~To determine all major hazards and operability problems associated with deviations. ~To decide whether action is required to control the hazard or the operability problem. ~To ensure that the actions decided upon are implemented and documented HAZOP studies may be carried out at any time in a plant's life, from the early concept phase to the end of its operating life, said from Concept Phase Studies to Design Phase Studies, and continue to pre Start-up and on Existing Plants.

HAZOP Procedure

- Defining the purpose, scope and objectives - Selecting the HAZOP team members - Preparing for the study - Conducting the study (using HAZOP Software is an option) - Recording and reporting the results - Conducting the follow-up actions

HAZOP Methods
An interdisciplinary team of experts systematically examines every part of the process or facility to discover how deviations from the design intention can occur Use guide words to consider the consequences on the system of deviations from design conditions Identify causes of deviations and potential consequences Identify safeguards and corrective measures to reduce risks or eliminate hazards

Advantages of HAZOP

Creative and flexible approach to identifying hazards Provides means to reveal hazards and operability problems at design stage Minimizes cost required to implement appropriate safeguards in new facilities Participants gain a thorough understanding of the system Good for new processes Methodical assessment of all deviations from design Easy to document, +/- 1 hour per section Can be performed at design stage and at operation stage

HAZOP Limitations
Requires well defined system or procedure Assumes design is correct for normal operations Easy to get sidetracked Is time consuming Requires trained personnel to conduct review Provides no numeric ranking of hazards Focuses on one-event failure Never guaranteed that all accident situations, causes, and effects have been considered Different experts different assumptions/results
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Reference : 1. Introduction to HAZOP , Hazop Leader Training, DNV Technica, 2001 2. Facilities Risk Management, Maurice Stewart, LDI, 2002 3. Introduction to HAZOP and Other PHA Technique Course, IIPS, 2005 4. Application of HAZOP and What-If Safety Review to the Petroleum, Dennis P. Nolan, Noyes Publication, 1994 5. Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation With Worked Examples, 2nd Edition, CCPS, 1993 6. Loss Prevention in the Chemical Process Industries, 2nd Edition, F.P. Lees, Buttenworth-Heinnemann, 1996

Select process section or step

Explain design intention of the process section

Repeat for all process sections or steps

Select a process parameter

Repeat for all process variable

Apply guide word to process parameter to develop meaningful deviation

Repeat for all guide word

Develop action item

List possible causes of deviation Identify existing safeguards to prevent deviation

Assess acceptability of risk based on consequences, causes, and protection

Typical HAZOP Study (Schematic)

The following table gives an overview of commonly used guide word - parameter pairs and common interpretations of them.

Parameter / Guide Word

More

Less

None

Reverse

As well as

Part of

Other than

Flow

high flow

low flow

no flow

reverse flow

deviating deviating contamination concentration material

Pressure

high pressure

low pressure

vacuum

delta-p

explosion

Temperature

high low temperature temperature

Level

high level

low level

no level

different level

Time

too long / too late

too short / too soon

sequence missing step backwards actions skipped

extra actions

wrong time

Agitation

fast mixing

slow mixing

no mixing

Reaction

fast reaction / runaway

slow reaction

no reaction

unwanted reaction

Start-up / Shut-down

too fast

too slow

actions missed

wrong recipe

Draining / Venting

too long

too short

none

deviating pressure

wrong timing

Inertising

high pressure

low pressure

none

contamination

wrong material

Utility failure (instrument air, power)

failure

DCS failure

failure

Maintenance

none

Vibrations

too low

too high

none

wrong frequency