C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y F U S I O N C E N T R E M E D I T E R R A N E A N B A S I N T E A M P R E S E N T S

The Syrian Opposition

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The Syrian Opposition

Compr Comprehensive Information on Complex Issues p
Linda Lavender Middle East Desk Officer linda.lavender@cimicweb.org

Introduction Figure 1: Syrian Opposition The Syrian Opposition is a broad term used to refer to political and armed military groups, exiled dissidents and grassroots activists seeking to oust the Assad regime in Syria, according to BBC. Some analysts suggest that Syrias opposition is divided, fragmented, and inefficient which they assert, would not translate to a coherent alternative governance system in a post-Assad Syria. In contrast to this depiction, foreign journalists in Syria report a mature and sophisticated opposition leadership. Over the 18-month old uprising, opposition leadership working within the country have developed a remarkable unanimity and consensus in their views on the struggle, the future and what is needed, according to journalist Nir Rosen. Disorganized Like a Fox, an article by Elizabeth OBagy, asserts that the international community has failed to understand the difference between decentralised leadership and fragmented or absent leadership. Access to Arabic satellite networks, the Internet, opposition websites and especially Facebook have allowed for savvy local leadership, capable of thinking and acting strategically to lead the Syrian revolution.
This CFC report outlines the main opposition components, both political and military, comprising the Syrian Opposition, highlighting the decentralised-interconnectedness. The list of groups covered in this report is by no means exhaustive, as opposition members and activists continue to create new organisations and committees to meet the challenges of this complex conflict.

Political Opposition
In Syrias Political Opposition, Elizabeth OBagy of the Institute of War claims that Syrias opposition takes many forms and is composed of diverse groupings and coalitions working towards the ousting of President Bashar Assad. Expatriate groups working from outside the county as well as grassroots protest movements within the country share the common goal of toppling the Syrian regime, but often differ in modes of operation and their vision of what a post-Assad Syria would look like. Syrian National Council (SNC) The Syrian National Council was created in September 2011 in Istanbul, Turkey. The organisation is led by Syrian exiles based primarily in Turkey and France and is a coalition of several groups that seek to offer a credible governance alternative to the current regime, according to the BBC. The SNC membership includes the Damascus Declaration for Democratic Change, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, select members of the Local Coordination Committees (LCC), Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC), National Bloc, the Assyrian Democratic Organisation and Kurdish factions. The goal of the organisation is to create a democratic, pluralistic, and civil state; a parliamentary republic with sovereignty of the people based on the principles of equal citizenship with separation of powers, smooth transfer of power, the rule of law, and the protection and guarantee of the rights of minorities. Ranging from Marxist intellectuals to conservative Islamists, the spectrum of ideologies has made for disunity and infighting among member organisations and the SNC has struggled to receive support from Christian and Alawite minorities in Syria, as it is a largely Sunni Muslim organisation. The current SNC president, Abdulbaset Sayda, is a Kurd and a founding member of the organisation. His election into the position was seen
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by many outsiders as an intentional move to garner support from ethnic-Kurds within Syria who have been wary of the organisation that is dominated by Sunni-Arabs. Organisationally, the SNC is made up of a General Assembly composed of 310 members from various member groups, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) (see Figure 2.). A General Secretariat comprising 26 representatives of the member groups elects an Executive Committee of eight members including a chairman who is elected for a renewable term every three months. However, divided by rivalries, agendas and differing tactics, the SNC has yet to fully establish itself as the government in waiting. There are many within the international community that doubt the SNC could form an interim government if Assads regime falls, according to the Guardian.
Figure 2: Syrian National Council Organisational Chart

Source: Institute for the Study of War

The SNC has numerous obstacles to overcome in order to achieve unity, according to OBagy. As noted earlier, the SNC is largely Sunni in composition with the inclusion of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and a second Islamist bloc consisting of the Group of 74, an off shoot of businessmen from the Brotherhood. Many Syrians, even some of the SNCs own members, have accused the council of being a front for the Brotherhood and are distrustful of the Brotherhoods intentions. Additionally, the Kurdish issue has proved to be particularly difficult to overcome. Both the SNC and the Muslim Brotherhood have resisted Syrian-Kurds demands for federalism in Syria, similar to the autonomy enjoyed within Kurdish Iraq. Kurdish opposition groups accuse the SNC of acquiescing to Turkish pressure to prevent political decentralisation in Kurdish Syria, reports the CEIP. The publishing of the National Charter: the Kurdish Issue, on 02 April was a failed attempt by the SNC to overcome the autonomy issue, but the document fell short of meeting the needs of the Kurdish leadership as it failed to address the unique issues facing the Kurdish people and their rights but instead stressed the need to preserve Syrias territorial integrity. As a result, the Kurdish National Council chose to break from with the SNC. Additionally the SNCs cohesion has been tested by disagreements over how to respond to the regimes increased violence, as the SNC was initially reluctant to support armed resistance. From its inception, the SNC has maintained it will not negotiate with the Assad regime and has rejected countless opportunities to engage in dialogue throughout the 18-month-long conflict. However, by 12 March 2012, al Arabiya reported that the SNC demanded military support through the establishment and protection of humanitarian corridors and a no-fly zone over Syria. Additionally, the SNC said it would begin to coordinate the channelling of weapons to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The SNC has sought to keep the uprising peaceful and at times has had difficulty working with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) which seeks to topple the Assad regime through military force. According to the BBC, the perceived ineffectiveness of the SNC by other Syrian opposition groups has resulted in a challenge to the organisations legitimacy by a rival organisation, the National Coordination Committee (NCC). Nevertheless, in April 2012, the Friends of Syria, an international working group focused on resolving the Syrian conflict, recognised the SNC as a legitimate representative of all Syrians. The group is now seen as the main opposition interlocutor with the international community. Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Holding the largest number of seats in the SNC, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), also referred to as Ikhwan, is the historical nemesis of the ruling Baath party of President Assad. Of all the opposition groups within Syria, analysts believe Ikhwan is the best-organised and has the largest and most coherent group within the SNC, enjoying almost 25% of the councils 310 seats, according to CEIP. Under the leadership of Mohammed Riad Shaqfa, the Syrian MB had remained a tightly knit group of exiles rather than a mass political party. This reality is due to the fact that membership in the MB under Assad was a capital offence. The MB appeals to mostly moderate
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Sunni Muslims with more conservative Sunnis associating with Salafi groups. Ikhwan helped to establish the SNC in an effort to demonstrate its willingness to work with secular Syrians and on 25 March 2012, the MB issued a pledge and charter outlining its commitment to a civil constitution, full democracy, equality irrespective of ethnicity, religion, or gender and freedoms of opinion and belief. Assyrian Democratic Organisation (ADO) ADO is a national, political and democratic movement seeking to the safeguard the existence of the Assyrian people and the realisation of its legitimate national aspirations. The Damascus Declaration CEIP reports that the Damascus Declaration (DD) is a secular umbrella opposition group taking its name from a 2005 drafted statement, crafted by numerous opposition groups, which demanded a multiparty democracy in Syria. The DD was a founding member of the SNC; however, some of its own members are part of the rival National Coordination Committee (NCC). Kurdish Supreme Committee The Kurdish Supreme Committee is a coalition of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), the Peoples Council of Western Kurdistan and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Erbil, Iraq. The coalition seeks to gain greater autonomy in the Kurdish regions of Syria. Following the withdrawal of Assads forces from a number of Kurdish regions; many cities were declared liberated with the raising of the Kurdish flag, thereby advancing the Kurdish liberation movement. The head of the SNC had accused some Kurdish factions, particularly the PYD and the KNC, of cooperating with the Syrian regime in exchange for the control of Kurdish regions in the country. Local Coordination Committee (LCC) The LCC are grassroots activists engaging in the armed rebellion against the Assad regime. They are the grassroots component of the opposition and have threatened periodically to withdraw support from the SNC when the LCC perceives the SNC is trying to monopolise power, according to al Arabiya. The National Bloc for Change The National Bloc for Change seeks to build a democratic Syria that protects civil, religious, political and economic rights of its citizens. The National Bloc was formed in February 2012 by 80 opposition figures including clerics, lawyers and activists. The National Bloc, at its inception, indicated that it was concerned that neither the SNC nor the NCC accurately represented the fabric of Syrian society, reports al Arabiya. The National Bloc supports the revolution and the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC) The SRGC is an umbrella organisation of almost four dozen opposition groups, according to Christian Science Monitor. Founded in August 2011, the SRGC supported collective action and was for unity among opposition groups, reports al Akhbar. The SRGC actively supports armed rebels through provincial military councils (see Figure 3 below). National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) The National Coordination Committee, formed in September 2011, is comprised of 13 left-leaning political parties, three Kurdish political parties, and independent political and youth activists within Syria. According to the Associated Press (AP), many members are former political prisoners of the Assad government. The NCC, headed by Hussein Abdul Azim, differs from the SNC in its willingness to dialogue with the Syrian regime if certain preconditions to talks are met. The NCC stipulates that the regime must first withdraw its military from the streets, end attacks on peaceful protestors and release all political prisoners. Additionally, the NCC calls for the annulment of Article 8 of the Syrian constitution1, lifting the state of emergency in Syria, allowing foreign journalists entrance into the country and prosecution of those responsible for violence. Until recently, the group has been strongly opposed to any foreign military intervention into the conflict and advocates for economic sanctions and other diplomatic measures to increase pressure on the Assad regime, according to Foreign Policy.
The annulment of Article 8 of the Syrian constitution would end the ruling Baath Partys monopoly on power and allow other parties to compete freely for public office.
1

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Members of the NCC are committed to three principles knows as the three Nos No to a foreign military intervention No to sectarian and communal incitement No to violence and militarising the uprising In light of the political differences with the SNC and support by outside countries in the conflict, the NCC refrained from attending gatherings such as the Friends of Syria conferences held in Tunis, Istanbul and Paris. The NCC members were also reluctant to associate with the SNC, as members saw SNC as a front group for the United States and were concerned by the influence the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys in the SNC, according to Foreign Policy. Recently, however, the NCC joined the SNC and representatives from other groups and coalitions on 02 July at a conference convened in Cairo under the auspices of the Arab League. The meeting produced two documents that set out a National Pact and a Joint Political Plan for the countrys Transitional Phase as well as agreement in general terms to support the FSA.

Grassroots Opposition The grassroots opposition differs from the political opposition in that its primary objective is to overthrow the regime. Few grassroots activists have articulated what would come after the fall of the Assad regime. According to OBagy, the grassroots opposition displays a level of organization and coordination that could prove invaluable to future unification efforts and some experts see these activists as the nucleus of the future government.
The opposition is a mixture of junior and senior activists led by doctors, lawyers, clerics and other community leaders. They are from the poor and middle classes, which the Assad regime marginalised both politically and economically in his government. Most grassroots activists are not motivated by ideology, but simply by a desire for freedom, dignity and basic human rights unlike their counterparts in the SNC or NCC who are associated with ideological political parties, suggests OBagy. Their secret members meet in basements or homes and often only communicate via Skype. Despite communication challenges, grassroots organisers are often able to coordinate their activities with the SNC and also attempt to give direction to the operations of the FSA. International media have focused predominately on the SNC as the representative of the Syrian people, mistaking the grassroots protest movement as a mass of youthful demonstrators; however, a closer look reveals a mature and capable leadership driving the uprising as capable organisers and leaders have emerged over the course of the past 18months, according to the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. Not only have these grassroots activists organised the opposition on a local level they have managed to create more formal structures, called Revolutionary Councils, to coordinate the activities of the opposition.

Figure 3:

Grassroots Hierarchy

Revolutionary Councils (Majilis Thawar) have committees for organising demonstrations, media outreach, security and armed operations, medical teams and humanitarian aid. Some of the more sophisticated councils have become Adapted from: Institute for the Study of War states within a state with elected leadership overseeing a variety of operational capabilities, reports CNN. Activists report that currently there are more than 50 councils throughout the country, which are primarily located in or close to urban areas. The most well-known councils are located around Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Deraa, Idlib, Deir al Zor, Damascus and al Raqqa. Councils serve as the primary points of contact for Local Coordinating Committees (LCC) (Tansiqiyyat), which have become the organisational backbone for the

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Syrian revolution. There are approximately 400 different LCCs operating throughout Syrias cities and suburbs. Figure 2 above reveals the loose hierarchy of the grassroots oppositions organisation2. The Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC) The SRGC is the largest grassroots coalition, representing approximately 70% of the Revolutionary Councils and the majority of the LCCs, according to the Guardian. SRGC is highly organised and coordinates closely with the LCCs under its care through secret networks of communication. The mission of the SRGC is straightforward: help express [the oppositions] one voice. The groups operations are also clear: mobilisation and organisation, press and media and diplomatic advocacy. The relationship between the SNC and grassroots organisations has been called ambiguous. OBagy suggests that the generation gap between the grassroots groups and the SNC creates a disconnect. The more youthful grassroots opposition is distrustful of an established opposition like the SNC that has been politically active, but seen as largely ineffective, since the early 1980s. Grassroots opposition groups have commented on their connection with members of the armed opposition within the country. One Revolutionary Council member shared that his group often worked with armed rebels in coordinating demonstrations in order to ensure a certain level of protection for civilian demonstrators. OBagy shared that often the groups overlapped. Some members of the LCCs were activists by day, but armed rebels by night. Both the grassroots opposition and the armed opposition enjoy popularity among civilians as they are largely seen as the popular resistance juxtaposed with the SNC and the NCC which advocate on their behalf but remain isolated from the realities of the conflict. Civilian Protection Commission (CPC) Formed in February 2012 by a former Shabiha3 member, the CPC is an example of local organisation that has a high level of cooperation with the FSA and grassroots political activists as well as having the ability to connect with a broader network of activists and opposition leaders, according to OBagy. The CPC was created in response to the ongoing bombardment and siege in Homs when it became clear that Homs required a joint effort on behalf of all military and civilian disciplines. The formation of the CPC received an overwhelming response from both armed opposition groups and civilian activists and within days, numerous battalions formed around Homs to support the CPC. So respected is the CPC, they sent representatives to the Friends of Syria meeting in Tunis. OBagy suggests that the formation of the CPC is an excellent example of the grassroots organising abilities within Syria. With a need identified, it was addressed innovatively and quickly in addition to uniting armed and political elements of the opposition.

Military Opposition
According to Joseph Holliday of the Institute for the Study of War, the armed Syrian opposition is identifiable, organized and capable, even if it is not unified. The rebels resiliency will make the Assad regimes endurance difficult; however, most experts state that the predicted, imminent fall of the Assad regime is premature. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) functions more as an umbrella organisation in the uprising rather than a more traditional military chain of command, asserts Holliday4. Free Syrian Army (FSA) Led by former military officer Colonel Riyad al Asaad, the Free Syrian Army was formed in August 2011 by army deserters and was initially created to protect innocent civilians when protesters were increasingly targeted by Syrian forces and paramilitary members called Shabiha, reports the online Fikra Forum. The FSA is based in Turkey and is a proponent of foreign military intervention, according to Andrew Cordesman of the Center for
2

The illustration represents the rough hierarchy of political activists in Syria. In many cases the Revolutionary Councils and the Revolution Command Councils are indistinguishable, but according to OBagy this is the most important level of political organisation and military opposition integration. Additionally the SRGC has demonstrated the ability to influence and work with the local groups, but does not directly control them. 3 Shabiha are civilian-army militias that fight alongside Assad forces in the uprising. Their brutality has been linked to a number of massacres in Syria. 4 See Annex A at the end of the report for a sampling of the battalions operating within the context of the FSA.

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Strategic & International Studies. Colonel Asaad claims to have 100,000 fighters in the FSA, according to the Voice of Russia. In recent weeks, the ranks of FSA have swelled by thousands of civilian activists, according to the Financial Times. Former activists make up as much as 70% of some FSA units and activist groups are clearly beginning to coordinate their activities with the FSA. The line between activists and fighters is often blurred, as some activists are protestors by day, but take up arms at night. The New Republic reports that there are upwards of 100 semi-autonomous battalions operating under the FSA. The FSA acknowledges that up to this point, it has not been capable of confronting the 200,000-strong Syrian army. Instead, the FSA has adopted guerilla tactics carrying out a war of harassing the regime army until it is exhausted. According to Colonel Malik al Kurdi, a spokesman for the FSA command, [w]e cant keep control of an area, so this is a circular operation, moving from one place to another, one city to another. Observers of the Syrian conflict suggest that the FSA is playing an increasingly important role in the uprising, according to World Affairs Journal. Holliday suggests that the armed opposition has demonstrated a propensity for organisation at the local level and the rebels across Syria have shown willingness to share in the brand-name of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). One journalist who has met many armed opposition fighters states that the rebels are not armed gangs but found them to be a popular armed struggle or insurgency, [who] use the term muaqwama, or resistance to describe themselves with a majority of members drawing from the civilian population. Defectors have constituted an important organising force within the opposition and Colonel Asaad states that the FSA has 1,500 officers who have defected from the Syrian army. In comparison to the Libyan rebels, another journalist remarked that the FSA is much more organised indicating that the defectors provided stability and capabilities. Nevertheless, the FSA is an organically developing entity that continues to modify its tactics to meet needs in the uprising. As the uprising continues into its eighteenth month, some splits have emerged in the national leadership of the FSA as General Mustafa al Sheikh, a recent defector from the Syrian Army, has emerged as a potential rival to Riyad al Asaad, reports World Affairs Journal. The armed opposition is overwhelmingly Sunni, raising concerns within the international community that the group is potentially sectarian and radical. While the Assad regime seeks to portray the opposition as Salafists, Jihadists, Muslim Brotherhood supporters, al-Qaeda and terrorists, a journalist on the ground indicated that this was not the case stating instead that, they [opposition] are not fighting for Islam but they are inspired by it. The online Fikra Forum concurs with this statement, as activists and people connected with the FSA believe that a small percentage, 5-10% of the FSA, could be comprised of Salafis or Muslim Brotherhood. The FSA has shown significant advances in recent weeks, according to The Commentator. Following the successful bombing that killed four top inner-circle officials in July 2012, the FSA loosely controls most of the border crossing between Turkey, Syria and Iraq and as the humanitarian crisis deepens within the country, the FSA has continued to help the wounded by transporting them to clandestine hospitals or across the border, according to President Michael Gabaudan from Refugees International. Also, the FSA has taken a lead role in providing humanitarian aid including drinking water and cooking gas to those remaining in Syria, notes the Financial Times. Islamist Brigades Another armed opposition element operating within Syria is the hardcore Islamist brigades claiming to be waging a jihad against the infidel Assad and his Shiite supporters [Iran and Hezbollah], reports The New Republic. The independent jihadists are largely comprised of an expanding pool of domestic youth who feel abandoned by the international community. Several Syrian opposition groups have expressed concern over the recent growth in jihadist militias joining the FSA to fight against the regime, according to the Voice of America. Foreign Fighters in Syria The flow of foreign fighters into the country with the intention of supporting Syrian rebels seems to be closely related to the flow of weapons, suggests Holliday. While experts acknowledge that foreign-fighters have the ability to bring additional capabilities to the opposition, they may also import a more radical ideology that could potentially hurt opposition efforts. Iraqis represent the bulk of foreign- fighters but it is believed that they may actually be Syrians just now returning to Syria after fighting with Sunni Arab insurgents during Iraqs unrest. Also, Iraqi Kurds may cross the border into Syria in order to strengthen ties with their Syrian-Kurd neighbours.
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Other foreign fighters include the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group which has ties to al Qaeda, while other fighters are joining from Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco and the United Kingdom. Al Qaedas primary foot soldiers in the Syrian conflict are the Jabhat al Nusrah li-Ahli al Sham (Front for the Protection of the Levantine People), according to Ed Husain of the Council on Foreign Relations. The group is composed of foreign and Syrian. Husain suggests that their growing strength and acceptance among FSA is demonstrated by their increasing activity on the ground. In March 2012 al Nusrah claimed responsibility for seven attacks in Syria as compared to 66 attacks in June 2012. Al Nusrahs operations have been primarily within the cities of Aleppo and Damascus with the aim of creating an Islamist state in all, or part of the country. Foreign fighters in Syria are not strictly supporting the combat efforts of the opposition. According to several accounts by FSA fighters, as early as May 2012, Iranian troops and Hezbollah fighters have been fighting opposition forces alongside Assads troops. Men with Lebanese accents have been reported to be fighting with the Syrian army. Also one defected lieutenant described working with a non-Arab-speaking Iranian who accompanied his unit when it was ordered to suppress demonstrations in Deraa in the summer of 2011. Most recently, on 27 August, the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran openly acknowledged it had sent Iranian Revolutionary Guards to assist the Syrian government in putting down the uprising.

Planning for Transition Syrias opposition groups have already laid groundwork to take control of security and administration after what they consider will be the inevitable end to the Assad regime, according to the Financial Times. Described by one activist as flawed and murky plans, most experts anticipate a period of chaos. However, Rami Khouris article An Orderly Post-Assad Transition challenges the notion of a gloomy Syrian future pointing to an indigenous structure for governance that is already in place. Khorui maintains that the protracted conflict has allowed for the creation of hundreds of activist groups and committees with immense legitimacy, authority and logistical capability in governing at the local level. Upon Assads ousting, many are concerned about the possibility of reprisal attacks against the ruling minority sect of Alawites; however, Khouri asserts that the Syrian people are too intelligent and sophisticated to allow themselves to sink into a dark pit of sectarian warfare. The growing complexities of the 18-month-long conflict, with the addition of a number of outside actors seeking to influence the outcome of the uprising, have only added to the uncertainties in a post-Assad Syria. For now, of primary concern to the international community is the potential spill-over violence that a civil war could generate within neighbouring countries. Hamzeh Al-Moustafa, Syrian researcher at the Doha-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies said in order to provide stability and deter sectarian fighting, it becomes clear the preservation of the Syrian army as an entity is a necessity if any political transition of power is to succeed in Syria.

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Annex A: Armed Rebel Groups within the Free Syrian Army

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