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PATRIOT
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES
Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to
protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 15 February 1992. Other requests for this
document will be referred to Commandant, USAADASCH, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
FM 3-01.87
Patriot
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Contents
Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................ vi
Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to
protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 15 February 1992. Other requests for this
document will be referred to Commandant, USAADASCH, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
i
Geographic Data Parameters ............................................................................ 2-3
Automatic Battalion Initialization ........................................................................ 2-5
Battalion FIDOC and Operational Parameters .................................................. 2-9
ABT/TBM Defended Assets ............................................................................... 2-16
Weapon Control Status...................................................................................... 2-19
Tab 76—Counter-ARM Threat Parameters ....................................................... 2-25
Deployment/Command Planning ....................................................................... 2-30
Battalion Communications Control Data Entry .................................................. 2-31
Communications Net Loading............................................................................ 2-37
Volumes Allocation ............................................................................................ 2-49
ICC/CRG Deployment........................................................................................ 2-51
Fire Unit Tactical Initialization ............................................................................ 2-60
Fire Unit Standard Emplacement....................................................................... 2-61
Battery Tactical Initialization .............................................................................. 2-66
Tactical Initialization........................................................................................... 2-67
Data Initialization Sequence .............................................................................. 2-68
Roll-Crossroll Alignment .................................................................................... 2-70
Radar Alignment Procedures............................................................................. 2-72
Manual Alignment Procedures........................................................................... 2-74
Location Data Confidence Level........................................................................ 2-76
Tab 14—Target Display Control ........................................................................ 2-76
Data Buffer Transfer .......................................................................................... 2-79
Radar Mapping .................................................................................................. 2-81
Alternate Search Sector Control ........................................................................ 2-84
Missile Depletion Rules...................................................................................... 2-88
GLIF Threshold .................................................................................................. 2-91
Chapter 3 PATRIOT AIR BATTLE OPERATIONS .......................................................... 3-1
Patriot Crew Responsibilities ............................................................................. 3-1
ICC Air Battle Operations................................................................................... 3-10
Track Management ............................................................................................ 3-12
Target Identification ........................................................................................... 3-19
Target Engagement ........................................................................................... 3-21
Threat Assessment ............................................................................................ 3-22
Methods of Control............................................................................................. 3-23
ii
Status Monitor.................................................................................................... 3-25
Fire Unit Surveillance......................................................................................... 3-26
ABT Search Sectors .......................................................................................... 3-26
TBM Search Sectors.......................................................................................... 3-27
A-Scope Operations........................................................................................... 3-29
Target Classification .......................................................................................... 3-31
Identification....................................................................................................... 3-34
Interaction of Fire Unit and ICC Identification Process...................................... 3-41
Engagement Eligibility........................................................................................ 3-43
Threat Assessment Process .............................................................................. 3-46
Tactical Ballistic Missile Considerations ............................................................ 3-48
ATM Capability................................................................................................... 3-49
Remote Launch.................................................................................................. 3-58
Launcher Dead Zones ....................................................................................... 3-67
Patriot Missiles................................................................................................... 3-73
FIDOC and Operational Parameters ................................................................. 3-76
Missile Selection ................................................................................................ 3-83
ATM Mission ...................................................................................................... 3-85
ECCM Operations.............................................................................................. 3-86
Ground Level Interference Filter ........................................................................ 3-100
Track While Scan............................................................................................... 3-102
Counter-Antiradiation Missile Operations .......................................................... 3-104
Chapter 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL ................................................................................... 4-1
Patriot Command and Control Structure............................................................ 4-1
Patriot Command and Control Processing ........................................................ 4-2
Master ICC Operations ...................................................................................... 4-3
Master ICC Communications ............................................................................. 4-5
MICC Display ..................................................................................................... 4-7
Fire Unit to Fire Unit Operations ........................................................................ 4-10
Data Links .......................................................................................................... 4-14
TROPO Linkage Using HSDIO Card ................................................................. 4-15
Data Languages................................................................................................. 4-15
Appendix A PATRIOT DATA SHEETS................................................................................. A-1
Manual Orientation and Alignment Data Sheets ............................................... A-1
iii
Technical Manuals ............................................................................................. A-1
Appendix B RADAR MAPPING ............................................................................................ B-1
Data Acquisition ................................................................................................. B-1
Preliminary Mapping Procedures....................................................................... B-2
Mapping Display and Control Selections ........................................................... B-4
Mapping Process ............................................................................................... B-8
Clutter Mapping.................................................................................................. B-15
Mapping Interference ......................................................................................... B-17
Appendix C AUTOMATIC EMPLACEMENT ........................................................................ C-1
Automatic Emplacement Overview.................................................................... C-1
Determining Satellite Coverage ......................................................................... C-3
Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver ................................................................. C-3
North Finding System ........................................................................................ C-10
Automatic Emplacement Status Monitor............................................................ C-12
Appendix D RSOP REQUIREMENTS................................................................................... D-1
Fire Control Configuration.................................................................................. D-1
Launcher Emplacement ..................................................................................... D-2
5-Point Initial Search Lower Bound Data........................................................... D-4
Fiber-Optic Cable Deployment (DLU Launcher)................................................ D-5
Remote Launcher Employment ......................................................................... D-7
Appendix E ALTERNATE ALIGNMENT PROCEDURES .................................................... E-1
Mixed Mode Emplacement ................................................................................ E-1
Manual Alignment Without PADS ...................................................................... E-3
Appendix F WORLDWIDE UTM CONVERSION PROCEDURES AND TABLES............... F-1
Maps, World Models, and Datum ...................................................................... F-1
Universal Transverse Mercator Overview.......................................................... F-3
Appendix G FIX-OR-FIGHT CRITERIA................................................................................. G-1
Fix-or-Fight Guidance ........................................................................................ G-1
Categories of Responses................................................................................... G-3
Fault Alert Filter Use .......................................................................................... G-7
Executing the Diagnostics ................................................................................. G-8
Appendix H BATI AND TACI FLOWCHARTS...................................................................... H-1
Appendix I TASK ORGANIZATION WITH HAWK.............................................................. I-1
Engagement Operations .................................................................................... I-1
iv
Alignment Methods ............................................................................................ I-3
Automatic Fire Distribution ............................................................................ I-6
Local Engagement Control Parameters............................................................. I-7
Friendly Protection ............................................................................................. I-8
Hawk Weapons Control ..................................................................................... I-11
Defense Design ................................................................................................. I-12
HIMAD Task Force Training .............................................................................. I-16
Glossary ................................................................................................................................ Glossary-1
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. Bibliography-1
Index ........................................................................................................................................... Index-1
v
Preface
This field manual (FM) is an in-depth guide to Patriot tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
It is intended for use by Patriot and Hawk commanders at all levels and their staff, tactical
directors (TDs), tactical director assistants (TDAs), tactical control officers (TCOs), tactical
control assistants (TCAs), leaders, and trainers.
The manual includes chapters on initialization procedures, air battle operations, strategies, the
interfacing of Hawk and Patriot fire units (FUs), and command and control (C2),
communications. This FM also includes embedded training software programs for operators at
the battalion and firing battery. The appendices contain Patriot blank forms, Radar Mapping,
Determining Satellite Coverage, Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Position (RSOP),
Alternate Alignment Procedures, Worldwide Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Conversion
Procedures and Tables, Fix or Fight Criteria, and Battalion Tactical Initialization Flowcharts.
Also included are Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3 (PAC-3), and Configuration-1 and -2 software
and hardware update capabilities.
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction to Patriot
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
This chapter is a guide to Patriot operations. Its focus is on how to use the
immense combat potential of the Patriot system and how to synchronize
Patriot operations with other air defense (AD) operations. The intent is to
provide battle crews and staff planners with a clear understanding of
system processing and software parameters to allow them to fight with
their weapon system intelligently.
DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
1-1. FM 3-01.87 is a companion to FM 44-85. These manuals should be read
together. FM 44-85 describes the doctrinal framework with in which tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) described in FM 3-01.87 must function.
This manual discusses these subjects at length as they have a direct impact
on Patriot TTP. The classified material corresponding to the text in this
manual is in the Special Text (ST) (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U), which contains the
classified values referenced by the code numbers in bold and underlined
(example: P4-123).
SCOPE
1-2. This manual applies to Patriot units assigned to both corps and echelons
above corps (EAC) organizations. FM 44-85 discusses differences in missions
and applications.
AUDIENCE
1-3. In writing this manual, it was assumed that readers will be at least
acquainted with Patriot tactical and system operations. While hands-on
experience with the weapon system is not a prerequisite, it is helpful for a
better understanding of the system. Information from other sources was
incorporated in an attempt to make it easier to understand system
operations.
DISCREPANCIES
1-4. This manual does not replace any technical manuals (TMs). If any
discrepancies are found that exist between this field manual (FM) and any
TM, assume the TM is correct on technical issues, as it is more likely to be
up-to-date. Any discrepancies that are found in any classified information
code numbers must be referred to the USAADASCH War Fighter Division,
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FM 3-01.87
PATRIOT
1-3. This manual was written for Patriot officers, noncommissioned officers
(NCOs), and enlisted soldiers. It is specifically directed toward the battalion
S3, the battalion electronics missile maintenance officer (EMMO), battalion
TDs, TDAs, and battery TCOs, and TCAs.
HAWK
1-4. Appendix I contains Patriot system processing for Hawk communications
and task force (TF) operations. It speaks directly to Hawk battle crews and to
Patriot operators. Hawk officers and trainers should read this appendix
closely. They include techniques and procedures for Hawk Phase III units
controlled by the Patriot information and coordination central (ICC).
SOFTWARE
1-6. This manual is mostly about software and its applications. When
necessary, for understanding, the manual discusses hardware. Patriot crews
and planners should keep in mind that many, if not most, TTPs employed by
Patriot units are either embedded in the system software or impact in some
manner on the software. Much of the air defense operations planning
performed by the battalion S3 finds its expression in the tab entries made by
battle crews before the battle begins, and in manipulation of the software
during the battle.
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FM 3-01.87
1-3
Chapter 2
Initialization
This chapter addresses the ICC and engagement control station (ECS)
initialization process. It stresses the importance, interaction, appropriate
values, and operator functions that must be conducted during
initialization. The Patriot system is a software-controlled automated
weapon system that requires specific parameters to ensure effective
operations. The battery and battalion with minimal human intervention
automatically implement firing doctrine (FIDOC) to include warning
procedures, alert statuses, rules of engagement (ROE), and supplemental
fire control measures. The system's ICC and ECS must be properly
initialized to ensure that system operations are maximized.
Initialization consists of the procedures necessary to configure Patriot
software for battle operations. The initialization sequence for an ICC is
contained in TM 9-1430-602-10-1 and for an ECS in TM 9-1430-600-10-1.
Initialization ensures operational readiness of the battalion and fire units
(FUs). It also results in a full current data base and establishes digital
data links with both intrabattalion and extrabattalion elements. The
classified material corresponding to the initialization process in this
chapter is in (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U), which contains the classified values
referenced by a code number in bold and underlined (example: P4-123).
BATTALION INITIALIZATION
2-1. This section on battalion tactical initialization (BATI) provides
information about the role initialization plays in battalion mission
accomplishment and how initialization fits into the overall operation of the
ICC as a command and control (C2) system. The kind of information required
for BATI is especially important for the battalion S3, because it attempts to
relate tactical situations to data contained in the ICC tactical data base. This
section includes—
• The sources of data parameters comprising BATI.
• Information or data required for BATI.
• Where initialization data comes from.
• Who should provide data required for BATI.
• How initialization data values are selected.
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2-2
FM 3-01.87
B A T I INIT IA L IZ A TIO N
STRUCTURE
CATEGORY T A B U L A R D ISP L A YS TAC OPS
G E O G R A P H IC D A T A T A B 58 T A B 59 T A B 12
P A R A M E TE R S T A B 72 T A B 62
F P F ID O C A N D TAB 1 T A B 78
T A B 76
ID P A R A M E TE R S T A B 10 T A B 79
C O M M U N IC A TIO N S
T A B 67 T A B 69
CONTROL AND TRACK
R E P O R TIN G T A B 68 TAB 2
P A R A M E TE R S
T A B 73
IF F P A R A M E TE R S TAB 6
T A B 74
F P S U R V E ILL A N C E
T A B 55
P A R A M E TE R S
A S S ET S/D E FE N D E D
T A B 70 TAB 5
AREAS
W EAPONS CONTRO L
T A B 61 T A B 71 TAB 5
A N D ID VO L U M E S
DEPLOYMENT
T A B 59 T A B 62
P L A N N IN G D A T A
IN ITIA L IZ A T IO N T A B 13 T A B 50
T A B 90
PRO CESS CO NTROL T A B 99 T A B 51
D IS PL A Y C O N T R O L T A B 16 TAB 0 T A B 14
A N D R E P O R TE D
IN F O R M A TIO N T A B 43 T A B 12
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FM 3-01.87
made in the initialization data tabs. Weapons control and ID volumes are
handled on these tabs in a similar manner that Tabs 70 and 5 handle assets.
2-5
FM 3-01.87
2-6
FM 3-01.87
2-7
FM 3-01.87
0 =INTERNATIONAL
(ddd:mm:ss,a)=DLRP LONGITUDE 1 =CLARKE 1880
(dd:mm:ss,a)=DLRP LATITUDE 2 =CLARKE 1866
3 =WGS-84
(n)=NORTH REFERENCE: 0=TRUE, 1=GRID 4 =EVEREST
5 =BESSEL
( n n )=UTM ZONE FOR GRID NORTH REFERENCE
Figure 2-5. Screen Display of Tab 58
2-26. Because the BNSCC is the center of the ICC display, it should be
central to the area of operations (AO), or wherever battalion elements are
deployed. The BNSCC should be chosen from the S3 operations map with
overlays depicting the battalion AO. A map coordinate, chosen in the center
of the area of operations, ensures that the ICC tactical display will provide
adequate coverage of the AO.
2-27. The data link reference point (DLRP), north reference, universal
transverse mercator (UTM) zone for grid north reference, and UTM world
model entries (WGS-84 is to be used) in Tab 58 are required to support track
reporting to non-Patriot elements. The DLRP allows all air defense artillery
(ADA) and joint track reports to be referenced to a common point. The DLRP
is customarily designated by the joint forces air component commander
(JFACC) or the airspace control authority (ACA) through operational data
(OPDAT). One DLRP is usually used for an entire theater of operations. The
DLRP is required for Hawk fire units (FUs) and some higher echelon units
(HEUs), when these elements are part of the TF. The BNSCC and the DLRP
must be within 17 degrees (latitude and longitude) of each other. The DLRP
must be the same for all elements exchanging data within the data link
network, to include joint and combined forces.
2-28. North reference, UTM zone for grid north reference, and UTM world
model entries are used when tracks are reported from an external battalion
source that uses a grid north reference system. Patriot ICC software
processing converts grid north-referenced coordinates to a true north
reference. Accordingly, the default and recommended setting for the north
reference on Tab 58 is 0=TRUE. The UTM zone for grid north reference entry
is required only if grid north was selected for the north reference (the grid
north reference system is sensitive to latitude). The ICC and Patriot batteries
must use World Geodetic System-84 (WGS-84) to ensure proper track
reporting and correlation. The proper model is found in the legend of military
maps and may vary, depending on the location and the theater of operations.
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FM 3-01.87
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FM 3-01.87
ID MODE
2-33. The ID mode, either automatic or manual, can be set independently for
the ICC and the battery. In the manual ID mode, the TD or TDA enters the
ID for each track, except for TRUE FRIEND which requires receipt of a valid
Mode 4 IFF response. In the automatic ID mode, (auto IFF/SIF state Tab 6),
the FP assigns a track ID based on evaluation of the track using active and
passive ID criteria. The ICC, in the automatic ID mode, assigns track
identification based on FP track reports. The ICC and individual firing
platoons ID modes are set in Tab 1. The S3 or the commander implements
the selected ID mode. Their decision is based on guidance from tactical
directives, tactical standing operating procedures (TSOPs), and operation
orders (OPORDs), as well as the known data link architecture and the control
chain in which the battalion must operate. When Patriot has ID authority,
the system should be in automatic ID mode. Otherwise it should be in
manual.
ID WEIGHT SET
2-34. The ID weight set is a parameter used by the weapons control computer
(WCC) for ID processing. There are three ID weight sets numbered 1 through
3. As a track history is maintained by the system, an ID score is computed
continuously. The ID score depends on whether the track was reported within
(and correlated to) certain types of ID volumes. Whether the track exceeded
maximum safe velocity and whether any IFF responses were received, an ID
score is computed. Each ID weight is assigned specific values for different ID
volume correlation, maximum track speeds (passive ID criteria), and IFF
response (active ID criteria). Criteria having values in the ID weight set
are—
• Friendly origin volume correlation.
• Hostile origin volume correlation.
• Negative or positive IFF and SIF classification.
• Minimum safe velocity.
• Restricted and prohibited volume correlation.
• Safe passage corridor (SPC) volume correlation.
2-35. ID weight set 3 is for wartime operations. ID weight set 2 is used during
periods of transition from peace to war, while weight set 1 is used during
peacetime operations. Before using weight sets 1 or 2, however, units should
be thoroughly familiar with (S)FM 44-100A(U). It is important to note that
for automatic ID processing to work correctly, the ICC and ECS must use the
2-10
FM 3-01.87
same Patriot ID weight set. Accordingly, the TD or TDA at the ICC must be
aware of ID mode changes made at the FU. Hawk units subordinate to the
ICC must use a Hawk ID weight set having the same weights as the current
Patriot ID weight set.
2-36. Criteria for a pop-up target are normally not allowed. Minimum safe
velocity is allowed only when a slow and low joint criteria is in effect. Slow
target engagements are authorized only when the threat of enemy helicopters
is high and clutter returns are not significant. SIF friend is authorized when
SIF alone is joint criteria for a friendly ID.
2-37. Page 3 controls TBM firing doctrine. Normally TBM A and TBM B
engagement mode are selected as automatic. Also, the normal method of fire
for both TBM A and B is ripple. Ripple fire used for TBMs is slightly different
than that used for ABTs. The time delay between firings for TBM ripple is
P4-1 seconds while the time delay for ABTs is P4-2 seconds. For the
classified values, see (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U). Urban low-altitude trajectory
control is normally off except when low-altitude TBM intercepts could cause
damage in built-up areas. Consultation with civil authorities may be
necessary to get a proper assessment of whether the risk of damage caused
by low-altitude intercepts outweighs the risk of not engaging. When TBMs
are a threat to Patriot defended assets, the TBM A dive calculation should be
on and the dive altitudes and angles should be used. Default values for dive
angles and altitudes for Tab 67 and are found in (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
2-11
FM 3-01.87
the low threshold. Certain criteria have to be met before the system
recognizes a Mode 4 response as valid. A low threshold setting has less
stringent requirements for Mode 4. Normally, the high threshold is selected
to gain a higher confidence that a positive Mode 4 response is valid since that
normally leads to true friend identification. The Mode 4 low randomness
entry is used for system control of Mode 4 interrogations. A Mode 4 low
randomness entry of YES allows the system to continue using Mode 4 if the
interrogator cannot maintain randomness of transmitted codes. Low
randomness is normally on.
2-40. ENABLE SIF entry of ON will make the FP ENABLE SIF switches
active at on-line Patriot batteries. With ENABLE SIF ON, fire units may
interrogate tracks with Modes 1, 2, or 3A. Mode 2 code returns are not
correlated against any other codes and are not used for track ID assignment
in the auto ID mode. Mode 2 code returns are displayed on the ECS track
AMP data tab and uptold to the ICC for display on the track AMP data tab.
The enable Mode 4 entry has a similar effect at the Patriot batteries. An
enable Mode 4 entry of ON will start on-line Patriot battery FP ENABLE
MODE 4 switches. Normally, both Mode 4 and SIF are on.
2-41. Mode 1 and Mode 3 correlation control entries allow the system to use
SIF correlation. It is not mandatory to authorize the use of Mode 1 or Mode 3
correlation. The Air Tasking Order (ATO) will define which modes will be
used. However, both may be enabled at the same time. If both are enabled,
the aircraft must respond correctly in both modes for positive correlation. The
default value for Mode 1 correlation and the Mode 3 correlation is 1=Use.
However, normally only one mode will be used for correlation based on the
ATO.
2-42. Precise time of day is automatically provided in Tab 6 to Patriot FPs
with the AEE PLGR and up-linked to the ICC, upon transition to TAC OPS
when a valid communications link is established. Tab 6 data field related to
the time of day (TOD) and identified as SOURCE = aaa, [(aaa = OPR
(operator) or global positioning system (GPS)]. Operator entry of TOD is
indicated by OPR and GPS indications (provided the precession lightweight
GPS receiver (PLGR) indicates TOD). An operator cannot override PLGR
provided TOD.
2-43. The precise time of day determination is an inherent function of the
GPS PLGR that will be used by the ECS and ICC. Precise time of day is
required to support told-in target correlation. Timely target cueing and target
hand-off also require PTOD. Both the ECS and ICC will now use PLGR
standard time to ensure that external synchronous communication links can
be correctly established, that ACOs are established at their proper time, and
the external source data correlation is correct. The PLGR standard time shall
be used to synchronize time of day (TOD) for Patriot. By using the PLGR
standard time, operator input will no longer be required for time
synchronization. This will allow Patriot to be in time synchronization with all
other PLGR time users. Current TOD control processing will be retained to
support units without PLGR capabilities. Operator entries will be disabled
for units that have PLGR and are receiving quality PLGR TOD data. Units
with PLGR data shall be able to provide TOD to HEUs and adjacent units if
they do not have PLGR based TOD.
2-12
FM 3-01.87
2-44. The ICC can establish its own TOD, but, the TOD may be overridden
when an FU with a PLGR TOD comes in line. If the local ICC is the BN TOD
master, then the Tab 6 TOD entry is required to establish the TOD for the
battalion network. If the local ICC is not the TOD master, then Tab 6 TOD
entries cannot be made on-line. When TOD entries are made in Tab 6 during
BATI, date and time are also used to display the last ICC data base update in
Tab 99 (Figure 2-58). FPs with precision lightweight GPS (PLGR) receiver-11
will have automatic emplacement enhancement capability and precise time of
day (PTOD). Tab 6 also allows the TOD to be entered or reset for the use of
the SIF codes, which are time-dependent. The time, day, and year
information are required for use at the ICC if the ICC does not have any
Patriot batteries on-line and if a battalion TOD master has not been
established in Tab 2.
2-45. When the ICC transitions to TAC OPS, the first Patriot on line will
send PTOD to OPS and establish active communications links with
subordinate Patriot FPs equipped with the ICC and be designated the TOD
master. As all other Patriot FPs come on-line, the lowest numbered FP will
then be designated the TOD master.
2-13
FM 3-01.87
2-14
FM 3-01.87
and either tactical information link TADIL-B or NATO track numbers. Use
the default values for the altitude bands. The medium speed category should
be above MSV and below pop-up thresholds, if used. Otherwise, use default
values. Normally, TADIL-J track numbers should be used, depending on the
multi-TADIL environment.
TAB 40
2-53. Tab 40 controls special intelligence data. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
TAB 43
2-54. Tab 43 controls specified intelligence data. For more information see
(S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
INITIALIZATION PARAMETERS
2-57. Tab 70 (Figure 2-11) is used to enter initialization parameters that
define the ABT or TBM asset. Tab 70 is available during initialization and
during TAC OPS and CMND PLAN mode. Entering a zero in the ID data
field may erase entries in Tab 70. Asset ID, location, radius or polygon, TBM,
and asset threat category (ATC) are entered via Tab 70. Separate ABT and
TBM assets capability provides improved defense design in the following
areas:
• More accurate definitions of defended areas.
2-15
FM 3-01.87
2-16
FM 3-01.87
ASSET AS ASSET AS
DEFINED DISPLAYED
2-17
FM 3-01.87
GENERALIZED VOLUMES
2-62. Tab 71, weapons control and ID volume definition will be discussed.
BATI Tab 71 is used to enter initialization parameters that define the
weapons control and ID volumes.
2-63. There are several types of generalized volumes definable by Tab 71
entries. The polygon and cylinder volumes may be defined as a pure weapons
control volume (having only a weapons control attribute). A pure ID volume
(having only an ID attribute); or a composite volume (having both a weapons
control and an ID attribute) may be used to define a weapons control and ID
volumes. The polygon and cylinder volumes may be additionally defined as
(or given attributes for) a friendly origin, a hostile origin, a prohibited volume
(PV), or a restricted volume (RV). Friendly origins have a friendly ID
attribute, while hostile origins, RVs, and PVs all have a hostile ID attribute.
Corridor volumes must have a safe passage corridor (SPC) attribute, a
friendly ID attribute. SPCs are defined by a centerline, and width, and have
additional correlation criteria. The IFF passive ID (PID), IFFON, PIDON are
special volumes, defined as a line. They are used as an ID processing
boundary for automatic IFF interrogations in AUTO ID, MSV, SPC, PV, RV,
and pop-up target classifications and are only performed between the Patriot
battery and the IFFPID, and IFF on (IFFON) lines. Track speed and heading
information are used to correlate targets to specific volumes, except for
IFFPID and general points.
2-64. Tab 71 entries to define different weapons control and ID volumes will
now be discussed. Figure 2-14 shows the format of the tab.
2-18
FM 3-01.87
2-66. Minimum risk routes, low-level transit routes, transit corridors, air
routes, standard use Army aviation flight routes, and other similar airspace
control measures are friendly ID volumes. Friendly origin volumes such as
joint or multinational air bases are friendly ID volumes also.
2-67. Airspace outside of airspace control measures and within a missile
engagement zone (MEZ) is usually entered as a hostile ID volume. Restricted
operations zones may be hostile volumes. Enemy airbases also may be hostile
ID volumes.
2-68. The IFF on-line is a line volume. The passive ID on-line is a line
volume. Usually, the two are combined into a composite IFF and passive ID
on line. For units supporting corps or close to the enemy, their lines normally
coincide with the fire support coordination line (FSCL). For rear area units,
an artificial line is used to ensure that the ID function supports the
engagement function. In this case the line is usually 100 km from the closest
battery.
2-19
FM 3-01.87
referenced to the first point used to define the SPC centerline. The three
directions are—
• "F"—FORWARD: one way from first entered point to the last.
• "R"—REVERSE: one way from last entered point to the first.
• "B"—BOTH: two-way corridor.
2-74. SPC DIRECTION is another correlation criterion along with track
altitude, heading, speed, and corridor tolerance criteria. Most aerial routes
are both but this will be determined in the ACO.
2-75. The SPC WIDTH data entry defines the width of all corridor segments
defined in and centered about the volume boundary points. This entry only
applies if the SPC attribute entry is Y. The corresponding volume IDENTITY
must be defined as friendly. The SPC width is defined in the ACO. No buffers
are used.
2-76. When defining coordinates for volume/asset, the system incorporates
latitude-longitude (LAT-LONG), MGRS, and Geographic Reference
(GEOREF) as alternate input formats. This enhances the flexibility of the
system and eliminates hand conversion of other coordinates into UTM. The
system allows entry of UTM, GEOREF, MGRS, and LAT-LONG formats in
Tabs 70, 71, and 72. Use the coordinate system used in the ACO to enter data
into Tab 71.
Aerial Routes
2-77. All aerial routes and similar ACM receive safe passage corridor
attribute (SPCA). The ID volumes must be friendly.
2-78. The Tab 71 SPC TOLERANCE data entry field only applies if the SPC
attribute is also selected on the page. This value is used to correlate tracks
with the safe passage corridor based on the track heading. The SPC
TOLERANCE is the allowable deviation in degrees from the corridor
centerline (the corridor centerline is defined by a series of points, also entered
on the page). The normal tolerance is 30 degrees.
2-79. The software defines safe passage corridor width to the nearest tenth of
a kilometer. Width may range from 1.0 km to 20.0 km. Each time an aircraft
enters an SPC and correctly aligns with the corridor heading within the
period specified called the Safe Corridor Alignment Interval, it receives
positive credit. However, if an aircraft turned too early, it violated the
heading condition of the corridor segment it was entering. Pilots have some
heading flexibility while turning within the bounds of the SPC. There is an
area designated around the SPC bend that allows for correlation with either
corridor segment heading. A circle with a radius equal to 3/4 the width of the
corridor is defined in the FU evaluation, decision, and weapon assignment
(EDWA) logic processing. The center of this circle is the center line point at
the bend as currently defined for the SPC in the data base. If an aircraft is
found to be inside the SPC borders but does not align with the heading of the
corridor segment, then a check is run to determine if it lies within one of
those circles. If this is the case, the aircraft is inside a corridor bend and the
heading checks for both connecting corridor segments are to be performed.
This ensures that the aircraft will pass either heading condition as it
2-20
FM 3-01.87
navigates through the turn so that SPC credit will be preserved, even if the
aircraft turns early or late.
2-21
FM 3-01.87
(PVA). In rear areas the entire MEZ may be a PVA. Airspace control
measures (ACM) run through the PVA providing minimum risk to friendly
aircraft and missiles.
2-87. Friendly and enemy air bases within the low-altitude detection range of
Patriot may be designated either friendly or hostile origin volumes,
respectively. Friendly air bases are normally within a MEZ or a restricted
volume to protect friendly aircraft.
2-88. The entire MEZ is a restricted volume attribute (RVA). ACM run
through the RVA providing minimum risk to friendly aircraft and missiles.
2-22
FM 3-01.87
were used to mark boundaries that are not required for tactical operations.
This wastes points and computer processing time and is an improper use of
volume entries of Tab 71, All Volumes and Point Entry. General mapping
capability is considered necessary to add situational awareness for AD
operations and is used as such by all AD units. For example, based upon the
location and subsequent deployments, a Patriot battalion could have coverage
into an adjacent area operating with different identification and engagement
constraints. With boundaries available as display only information, the
operator could more accurately apply the published tactical directives.
General purpose mapping displays enhance the operator's familiarization
with an area and prove very useful in unfamiliar theaters of operation.
2-91. General purpose mapping gives the system the capability both at the
ICC and ECS to identify for display any line, point, or area to be used for
general operator information but not used in EO processing. The volumes and
points identified in Tab 71 are not affected by this capability. The display
definition contains entry of UTM, GEOREF, LAT-LONG, or MGRS
coordinates, and identity (free form) and entries by cursor placement. The
capability allows definition of twenty individual displays and is available
during initialization and tactical operations. Data buffer transfer from the
ICC to the ECS is provided. Displayed points and lines are in low brightness
so as to be distinct from other displays.
2-92. Tab 72, General Purpose Maps Entry, allows the operator to define,
control, and display general purpose maps. The tab is available in both
initialization and tactical operations. A free-form identity operator entry is
provided for the purpose of naming the map. Data entry of up to eight
coordinate points is provided by keyboard entry or cursor placement and
hooking via Tab 72. Special case items and general point (ICC, CRG, FSCL)
are entered in Tab 72. The MASK TERR/MAPS S/I at the ECS expands the
function for selecting general maps. The Gen Points S/I at the ICC must be
selected to display general points entered in Tab 72. If Tab 72 is selected
during tactical operations, the console at which it is displayed is removed
from EO due to the secondary use of the hook keys.
2-23
FM 3-01.87
2-24
FM 3-01.87
2-98. Each table can be used as either the present or future code set. At least
one table per set of codes is required, based on the SIF table selection (Table
1 or Table 2), in Tab 6. It is advisable to have the future set of codes entered
in case the set currently in use is compromised. Tab 74 is available for data
entry during initialization and during TAC OPS at the ICC. Compass rose
IFF codes are handled as COMSEC information, as specified in the unit
standing operating procedure (SOP). Compass rose SIF correlation technique
and Tab 74 are seldom used.
2-25
FM 3-01.87
2-26
FM 3-01.87
provided when the target reaches the target-to-mask angle threshold above
the masked terrain elevation angle (see Figure 2-20).
TARGET-TO-MASK
ANGLE
1
LNIP 2
LNIP
2-27
FM 3-01.87
2-106. High threat cutoff threshold for TBM and ABT indicates the ATC of
targets that may be engaged when the high missile cutoff threshold has been
reached. For example, if the high threat cutoff threshold for TBM and ABT is
3, then subordinate fire units will be ordered to engage threats having ATC
values of 1 or 2. This processing continues until the low missile cutoff
threshold is reached. At this point, ECSs are ordered automatically, to
engage threats having ATC values above the low-threshold cutoff value
setting.
2-107. The recommended value for high threat cutoff for TBM and ABT is set
to protect all assets and defended areas equal to asset priority. ICC
engagement processing uses these parameters based on the engagement
mode. In the automatic engagement mode, the ICC will not send automatic
engage commands to ECSs unless these conditions are met. The TD or TDA
must initiate engagements if lower ATC threats are to be engaged. When
conducting an engagement in the semiautomatic engagement mode, the TD
or TDA is alerted (with a low missile alert) that the missile cutoff threshold
has been exceeded. Recommended high threshold is 8. Recommended low
threshold is 2.
2-28
FM 3-01.87
contained in Tab 79. Tab 79 sets firing platoon identification parameters and
shows target velocity thresholds.
2-110. Tracks located between the FU location and the PID/IFPID on-lines
are evaluated for pop-up criteria (if an IFPID is defined, assigned, and
activated through Tabs 71 and 5). Note that tracks located in a friendly origin
volume are exempt from the pop-up evaluation, and classification of a track
as a pop-up will have a permanent effect upon the ID score of the track. The
criteria for a Pop-up may be authorized in both forward and rear areas, but is
normally not authorized to Patriot batteries when friendly air forces have air
superiority because friendly tracks will receive the negative identifier. The
tactical director (TD) must use the aerial intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) and coordinate with the S2 during planning. The TD
recommends pop-up criteria to the S3/battalion commander based on mission,
enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) and
observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of
approach (OCOKA).
2-111. Minimum safe velocity (MSV) authorizes Patriot batteries to use the
MSV criteria in the ID weight set. MSV classification is applied to low- and
slow-flying tracks. Tab 79 contains altitude and speed thresholds used to
apply the MSV criteria. If a PIDON/IFPID has been established in the data
base, minimum safe velocity evaluation is used on targets between the
PIDON/IFPID and the Patriot battery location. If the PIDON/IFPID has not
been defined, then MSV evaluation is performed on all tracks. The MSV
classification temporarily affects the track ID score, and MSV ID scoring is
performed only when the track remains below the MSV threshold. In the
automatic ID mode, ID assignment is made using the MSV criteria (if
authorized), while an ID recommendation is provided in the manual ID mode
using MSV. The MSV authorization should normally be considered for use by
Patriot batteries in both the forward and rear operations areas. Usually, safe
velocities and altitudes are identified in the ACO or special instructions
(SPINS).
2-112. The slow target engagement authorization allows Patriot batteries to
engage tracks classified as slow targets. The minimum speed used for the
slow target classification is defined in Tab 78 as the minimum speed
threshold for TBEQ. Slow target engagements should not normally be
authorized, as this helps to keep the TBEQ clear at the ECS. Slow target
engagements should be authorized if helicopter attacks or enemy airmobile
operations are anticipated. Slow target engagements should specifically not
be authorized if friendly helicopter forces are operating in the Patriot
coverage area.
DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING
2-113. The deployment planning Tab 50 (see Figure 2-3) will appear for the
second time during initialization. The TD/TDA should select
DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING for the initialization mode.
2-29
FM 3-01.87
2-30
FM 3-01.87
PAGE A PAGE B
• Communications • Track Filter Control
• Unit Type ID Code - Address • Special Information Reporting
• Unit Type • Track Heading Limits
• Link Address - Non-PADIL • Non-Patriot Tracks
• Link Station with Modem • Track Position Limits
• Link Station without Modem
• Direct Link Number
• Direct Link Relay Indicator
2-31
FM 3-01.87
2-32
FM 3-01.87
2-33
FM 3-01.87
2-34
FM 3-01.87
code address S/I entry sets up the address switch on the console). Non-Patriot
units (not an MICC, SICC, or LICC) require a link station with modem data
entry because the RLRIU location interfacing the modem must be known.
The modem number also must be initialized. Requirements for non-Patriot
units with modems are essentially the same as Hawk FUs (as previously
discussed for Tab 68). Operators should note that Patriot units work together
directly with the routing logic radio interface units (RLRIUs) that comprises
the distributed data network. Patriot units use the Patriot air defense
information language (PADIL) protocol. Non-Patriot units, which use ATDL-
1 or TADIL-B protocols must be connected to a modem that is connected to
the link station RLRIU. The RLRIU converts the ATDL-1 or TADIL-B
protocol to PADIL for transmission to other Patriot RLRIUs on the network.
The use of modems for Hawk FUs and ATDL-1 or TADIL-B extra-battalion
units must be carefully planned because there are a finite number of modems
for network interfaces. There are five modems at a CRG and six at an ICC
(five usable). Additional four modems are installed in the ICC to support
SMU operations. The link station without the modem entry in Tab 69
indicates where the defined extra-battalion unit directs link entry to the
network. The direct link number identifies the RLRIU address used by the
RLRIU to support the direct link. The direct link relayed entry is required to
establish the direct link, as a direct link relay will be discussed later. Tab 69
entries for TADIL-A and TADIL-J links are only available with U.S. and
NATO Patriot systems upgraded with Configuration-2, PDB-4, and
communications Phase I modification.
2-128. A capability at the ICC allows for higher echelon (HE) to provide
target ID information through the Tactical Command System (TCS). The
current auxiliary (AUX) ports can be initialized as AUX-PADIL links to
receive HE data. The data is received at the TCS and is translated to Patriot
PADIL language and sent to the ICC through CP8.
Extra-Battalion Unit Track Filter
2-129. Page B, Tab 69 defines the extra-battalion unit track filter settings.
There is a corresponding page B of Tab 69 for each extra-battalion unit
defined in page A (Figure 2-26). Page B format is shown in Figure 2-27.
EXTRA-BN TRACK FILTER CONTROL PAGE B *69*
ac =UNIT ID CODE/SOURCE ADDRESS S/I
(n)=SPECIAL INFORMATION REPORTING ALLOWED: 1=YES, 0=NO UNIT ID
(nnn)D TO (nnn)D=TRACK HEADING REPORTING LIMITS CODES
(nn.n) TO (nn.n) =TRK ALTITUDE REPORTING LIMITS HEU=HE
NON-PATRIOT TRACK ***TRACK POSITION LIMITS**** BN A-F=
ID PRI AMPS REPORTING AOI INPUT BA-BF
(aa)(aa)(aa)(aa) UTM CTR =(zzheeeennnnn) (zzheeeennnn) AUX1-3=
(aa)(aa)(aa)(aa) E-W EXTENT=(nnn)KM (nnn)KM A1-A3
(aa)(aa) (aa) N-S EXTENT=(nnn)KM (nnn)KM
(aa)*SPACES DELETE* ALL LINKS TDL-A+J ONLY
Figure 2-27. Screen Display of Tab 69, Page B, Extra-BN Track Filter
2-130. Special information reporting should not be transmitted to the
extra-battalion unit unless the unit has a legitimate use or need for this
information. Since the Patriot system has a unique ID process, it may be
advisable to filter out certain primary identity amplification (PRI ID AMP) to
avoid confusion on some non-Patriot data links. Otherwise, track filtering
2-35
FM 3-01.87
2-36
FM 3-01.87
COMMUNICATIONS PERCENT
ENTITY LOADING REMARKS
LATERAL DIRECT 14.52 MAXIMUM OF FIVE DIRECT LINKS ALLOWED (WITHOUT ANY
LINKS TYPES OTHER DIRECT LINKS OR RELAYS). LOADING FOR
CRG AND ECS LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEMS ONLY.
DIRECT LINKS TIED TO ICC (NOT ROUTED THROUGH
CRG/ECS) DO NOT LOAD THE NET.
LATERAL DIRECT LINK 14.52 MAXIMUM OF ONE DIRECT LINK RELAY ALLOWED.
RELAYS LOADING FOR CRG AND ECS LINK STATION WITHOUT
MODEMS ONLY. DIRECT LINKS TIED TO ICC DO NOT LOAD
THE NET. THE DIRECT LINK RELAY ENTRY IN TAB 67
DETERMINES DIRECTION OF LINK.
COMMUNICATIONS PERCENT
ENTITY LOADING REMARKS
OVERHEAD FOR 2.47 COUNTS IF BN HAS ONE OR MORE PATRIOT BATTERIES IN
PATRIOT BATTERY THE NET.
HAWK FIRE UNIT 5.08 UP TO 12 HAWK FIRE UNITS DEFINABLE (OUT OF A TOTAL
OF 12 FIRE UNITS). LOADING FOR CRG LINK STATION
MODEMS ONLY. USE OF MODEMS IN THE ICC DOES NOT
LOAD THE NET.
2-37
FM 3-01.87
ATDL-1/PADIL MODEM 7.26 USE OF PADIL MODEMS REDUCES DATA RATES. LOADING
FOR CRG LINK STATION MODEMS ONLY. USE OF ICC
MODEMS DOES NOT LOAD THE NET.
SICC
This example network shows a master ICC (BN “with a direct link to a
Bn
“C” subordinate ICC (BN “C”) and another direct link to a lateral ICC
(BN “C”) which is routed through a CR or ECS.
2-38
FM 3-01.87
2-139. Tab 67 entries are required at the three ICCs for communications
control. Table 2-2 shows example data entries for the three ICCs. The
Remarks column of the table contains selections made in Tab 67.
AT AT AT
DATA ENTRY MICC SICC LICC REMARKS
BN ID LTR/SOURCE A C B EXAMPLES ONLY. EACH ICC WITHIN
EACH BN NET MUST HAVE A
DIFFERENT BN LETTER DESIGNATION.
RLRIU ADDRESS SET 1 2 2 ONE IS USED AS AN EXAMPLE ONLY.
NUMBER
DIRECT LINK RELAY NONE NONE NONE NOT REQUIRED—NO DIRECT LINK
NUMBER RELAY.
RELAY TYPE NONE NONE NONE NOT REQUIRED—NO DIRECT LINK
RELAY.
MASTER ICC
2-140. Table 2-3 shows how the MICC defines the SICC and LICC in Tab 69
using the two direct links. The required entries stipulate that the MICC must
know the battalion ID of the other ICCs (entered in Tab 67 at the other ICCs
as shown above). Since direct link 3 is directly connected to the ICC ("ICC
only" entered for link station without modem), this direct link does not
contribute to net loading. Direct link 5, from MICC to LICC, is routed though
a CRG or ECS ("Other" entered for link station without modem), and
therefore raises net loading 21.79 percent in the MICC battalion net.
2-141. Table 2-3 does not contain all Tab 67 required data entries (such as
ATDL-1 and TADIL-B addresses), but depicts only the entries pertaining to
the direct link requirements. Notice that all ICCs are using a different ID
code or battalion letter designation and different RLRIU address sets for each
direct link. The direct link relay and relay type entries are not used for direct
link initialization. (These entries have been shown in Table 2-2 to make this
point.) Required use of these entries for direct link relays is discussed in the
next section.
2-142. Tab 69 must be used to define the direct links during BATI. Each ICC
in the deployment example is required to define the other ICCs as extra-
battalion units in Tab 69. Since the SICC (Battalion C) does not communicate
directly to the LICC (Battalion B), but communicates through the MICC
(Battalion A), only the MICC needs to be defined as an extra-battalion unit
by the SICC. The same requirement applies to the LICC, where only the
MICC has to be defined in Tab 69 at the LICC.
2-39
FM 3-01.87
FOR FOR
DATA ENTRY SICC MICC OR REMARKS
LICC
UNIT ID BN C BN B THESE ENTRIES MUST AGREE WITH THE BN ID
CODE/ADDRESS S/I DESIGNATIONS ENTERED ON TAB 67 AT THE
OTHER ICC.
SUBORDINATE ICC
2-143. Table 2-4 shows how the SICC defines the MICC in Tab 69 using
direct link number 3. Table 2-4 also indicates that Tab 69 entries used to
define the MICC at the SICC must correspond to the data entries made at
the MICC itself. By defining the MICC, Battalion C defines itself as an SICC.
2-40
FM 3-01.87
LATERAL ICC
2-144. Corresponding Tab 69 data entries at the LICC are shown in
Table 2-5. In the deployment example, the relationship between the LICC
and the MICC is lateral. Battalion B depicted as the LICC in relation to
Battalion A may be an MICC itself and have direct links to its own
subordinate ICC. The ID code, unit type, and link station must correspond
with the entries made on Tabs 67 and 69 at other units. It should be noted
that initialization entries for Tabs 67 and 69 must corresponded but must be
made from each ICC’s frame of reference.
2-41
FM 3-01.87
2-145. Direct link relays are also initialized in BATI through Tabs 67 and 69
data entries. A direct link allows an ICC to relay data communications with
two other ICCs. The main advantage of using a direct link relay is flexibility
in configuring the UHF network. As with direct linking, direct link relays
contribute to net loading of all three battalions involved in initializing the
direct link relay. Direct link relay must be planned with caution and
considered only when net loading is not critical. There is only one direct link
relay allowed within a battalion UHF net. To explain direct link relay
initialization requirements for Tabs 67 and 69 entries, it is necessary to use
another deployment example. Figure 2-29 depicts the use of a direct link
relay among three ICCs. It shows an SICC acting as a relay unit for another
SICC, which allows communications from the relayed SICC to the MICC.
Notice this configuration requires three separate direct links numbers for the
direct link relay.
2-42
FM 3-01.87
DIRECT LINK 2
(Routed through
CRG / ECS)
DIRECT LINK
RELAY ICC
SICC CRG
Bn B or ECS
DIRECT LINK 1
(Directly routed
between ICCs )
SICC
Bn C
This example network development shows an SICC (Bn B) acting as a direct llink
relay to relay data communications from another SICC (Bn C) to the MICC (Bn A).
2-43
FM 3-01.87
AT AT AT
DATA ENTRY MICC SICC SICC REMARKS
BN ID A B C EXAMPLES ONLY. ICCs WITHIN A
LTR/SOURCE BATTALION NET EACH REQUIRE
ADDRESS S/I DIFFERENT BN LETTER DESIGNATIONS.
RLRIU ADDRESS 1 2 1 THE RELAYING ICC (BN B) MUST USE A
SET NUMBER DIFFERENT RLRIU ADDRESS SET
NUMBER THAN THE RELAYED ICC. THIS
REQUIREMENT PERTAINS ONLY WHEN
DIRECT LINK RELAYS ARE INITIALIZED.
DIRECT LINK NONE 3 NONE ENTRY NOT REQUIRED FOR RELAYED
RELAY NUMBER ICC BUT REQUIRED FOR RELAYING ICC.
THE DIRECT LINK RELAY IS ASSIGNED A
NUMBER AT THE RELAYING UNIT. THIS
NUMBER MUST BE DIFFERENT THAN THE
DIRECT LINK NUMBERS USED BETWEEN
THE RELAY ICC AND EACH RELAYED ICC
ENTERED IN TAB 69.
RELAY TYPE NONE 0 NONE THIS ENTRY IS REQUIRED ONLY IF A
DIRECT LINK RELAY NUMBER IS
(UP/ ENTERED ON TAB 67. THE DIRECTION OF
DOWN) THE DIRECT LINK RELAY IS REQUIRED
FOR USE IN THE NET LOADING
COMPUTATION. SINCE THE DIRECT LINK
RELAY IS GOING FROM MICC TO SICC
THROUGH THE RELAY, THE DIRECTION
IS UP/DOWN. THIS ENTRY IS NOT
REQUIRED AT THE RELAYED ICCs.
2-148. The other direct link numbers are defined on Tab 69. Tab 69
initialization data requirements for the example network deployments are
discussed for each ICC. Tab 69 entries for Battalion B relay ICC, will be
discussed first and are depicted in Table 2-7.
2-44
FM 3-01.87
(Battalion A). The unit ID entry of HE and the unit type entry of 2
establishes Battalion A as the MICC in relation to battalion C, an SICC. The
link station with modem entry of 2 (other) is used here because direct link 2
uses a CRG or ECS to connect the direct link from Battalion C to Battalion B
as shown in deployment example. Direct link 3 between Battalion C and
Battalion A is relayed, requiring a 1 (yes) entry in Tab 69, direct link relayed
field.
Table 2-8. Tab 69, Entries for Direct Link Relay—Relayed SICC
FOR MICC
DATA ENTRY REMARKS
UNIT ID CODE/ADDRESS HE THE HE ENTRY IS USED BECAUSE BN A IS AN
S/I MICC IN RESPECT TO BN C.
UNIT TYPE 2 BN A IS DEFINED AS AN MICC EXTRA-BN UNIT.
(MASTER
ICC)
LINK STATION WITHOUT 0 THE LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY IS
MODEM (OTHER) "OTHER" BECAUSE BN C IS LINKED WITH BN B
THROUGH A CRG OR ECS. SEE FIGURE 2-29.
DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 THIS IS THE THIRD DIRECT LINK FOR THE UHF
NETWORK
DIRECT LINK RELAYED 1 DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 TO THE MICC (BN A) IS
(YES) BEING RELAYED THROUGH THE RELAY ICC (BN
B). THEREFORE, THE DIRECT LINK RELAYED
ENTRY IS YES.
2-151. Table 2-9 contains Tab 69 entries for Battalion A. The MICC must
define both SICCs as extra-battalion units in Tab 69. At Battalion A, unit ID
code entries for Battalion B and Battalion C must correspond to the battalion
ID code address S/I entries in Tab 69 at Battalion B and Battalion C. Both
unit type entries are the same (subordinate ICC). For the link station without
modem entries, Battalion B requires an ICC only entry, while Battalion C
requires an "other" entry. (The direct link from Battalion C is routed through
a CRG or ECS as previously discussed.) Direct link number entries (1 and 2
for Battalion B and Battalion C, respectively) correspond to Tab 69 direct link
number entries for the MICC (Battalion A) at both SICCs. Direct link 1 for
Battalion B is designated as not relayed, while direct link 2 is designated as
relayed. Again, these entries correspond with the Tab 69 entries for Battalion
A made at both SICCs. To summarize, configuration of a direct link relay
contributes heavily to net loading. Establishment of the initialization data
parameters in Tabs 67 and 69 for all three ICCs involved with the relay must
be carefully planned and closely coordinated.
2-45
FM 3-01.87
Table 2-9. Tab 69, Entries for Direct Link Relay—Relayed MICC
FOR FOR
DATA ENTRY RELAY RELAYE REMARKS
SICC D
SICC
UNIT ID CODE/ BN B BN C THESE ENTRIES AT THE MICC MUST
ADDRESS S/I CORRESPOND WITH THE TAB 67 SICC
ENTRIES CONTAINED IN TABLE 2-7.
UNIT TYPE 4 4 BN A IS DEFINED AS AN MICC EXTRA-BN UNIT
(SUBORD (SUBORD AT THE RELAY (BN B) WHICH IS AN SICC.
ICC) ICC)
LINK STATION 1 0 THE LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY
WITHOUT (ICC (OTHER) IS "ICC ONLY" FOR BN B BECAUSE BN A IS
MODEM ONLY) LINKED INTO THE RELAY ICC (BN B). THE LINK
STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY IS
"OTHER" FOR BN C BECAUSE BN C IS LINKED
THROUGH A CRG OR ECS INTO THE RELAY
ICC (BN B).
DIRECT LINK 1 3 THE RELAYED MICC IS USING DIRECT LINK
NUMBER NUMBER 3, FOR THE DIRECT LINK TO THE
SICC (BN C) THROUGH THE RELAY ICC, BN B.
THE MICC IS ALSO USING DIRECT LINK
NUMBER 1 TO COMMUNICATE TO BN B.
DIRECT LINK 0 1 DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 TO THE MICC (BN A)
RELAYED (NO) (YES) IS BEING RELAYED THROUGH THE RELAY ICC
(BN B), THEREFORE THE DIRECT LINK
RELAYED ENTRY IS "YES". DIRECT LINK
NUMBER 1 LINKS THE MICC (BN A) DIRECTLY
TO THE RELAY ICC (BN B). THE DIRECT LINK
RELAYED ENTRY IS "NO" FOR THIS LINK ONLY
(TAB 69).
TAB 2
2-153. Tab 2 will appear for the second time. Again, no entries are required at
this time.
TAB 51
2-154. Tab 51 (see Figure 2-22) will appear for the second time. Enter FP
DEPLOYMENT for the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION.
2-46
FM 3-01.87
DISPLAYED SECTOR IS
ROTATABLE BY ENTRY OF
TRIAL AZIMUTH (ENTERED
PTL IS FINAL DISPLAY)
TRACK
SEARCH HAWK
BOUNDARY
BOUNDARY (CURSOR TYPE 1)
(DASHED LINE)
(SOLID LINE)
CURSOR PATRIOT
POSITION BATTERY
nn
DENOTES FP n DESIGNATION
LOCATION NUMBER
Notes:
1. Text and arrow annotations with symbols are
explanatory only and not displayed with the HAWK FIRE SIZE OF SYMBOL
cursor. UNIT = SECTOR
DESIGNATION BOUNDS AS
2.Unit designations (flags and numbers) do not NUMBER ENTERED IN
move with the cursor. TAB 68
3. Not to scale. (DEFAULT
VALUE = 90KM)
2-47
FM 3-01.87
+
SYMBOLOGY (SLAVED TO
CURSOR AT A TRIAL LOCATION
WITH TAB 59 CURSOR TYPE 1
SELECTION {HAWK})
HAWK FP 11
11 SYMBOL RADIUS
8 (SECTOR BOUNDS)
DEFINED BY TAB
59 ENTRY (PAGE B)
“ FINAL” PLANNED HAWK FP8
LOCATION AS ENTERED ON 3 5
PAGE B TAB 59
“FINAL” PLANNED PATRIOT FP5
“FINAL” PLANNED PATRIOT FP3 LOCATION WITH 35-DEGREE PTL AS
LOCATION WITH 0 DEGREE PTL AS ENTERED ON PAGE A TAB 59
ENTERED ON PAGE B TAB 50
NOTES:
1. Text and arrow annotations with symbols are explanatory only and not
displayed with the cursor.
2. Unit designations (flags and numbers) do not move with the cursor.
3. Not to scale.
2-48
FM 3-01.87
TAB 51
2-159. Tab 51 (Figure 2-22) will appear for the third time. Enter ASSETS
ALLOCATION for the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION.
TAB 70
2-160. Tab 70 (Figure 2-11) appears for the second time. Defended assets are
automatically to batteries by BATI. ABT assets must be within a P4-5 kms
area in front of the battery and for TBMs the assets must be within the
highest Pk foot print area. If more than six ABT assets or three TBM assets
are assigned to a battery, the TD/TDA must take action to deactivate excess
assets.
TAB 51
2-161. Tab 51 (see Figure 2-22) appears for the fourth time. Enter VOLUME
ALLOCATION for the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION.
VOLUMES ALLOCATION
2-162. Volume allocations in Tab 61 (Figure 2-34) are used to activate or
deactivate volumes and points for individual Patriot batteries. (Data entered
for each Patriot FP in Tab 59 is initially used to allocate volumes and points.)
The activity status displayed in Tab 61 next to the volume or point ID reflects
the overall system activity status either A=Active, B=Behind, I=Inactive,
T=Time, *=Time Controlled Volume Revoked by the operator, or blank for the
volume or point. Tab 61 can be used to make the volume or point inactive for
individual FPs if the overall status is active. Volumes and points are
activated when the ID volume is added to the FP’s Tab 61. Spaces between
volumes in Tab 61 indicate the number of units used. For example, a three-
segment corridor will display the volume ID and two blank data fields before
the next volume title is displayed. Tab 61 is available in initialization and in
TAC OPS/CMND PLAN. It reflects activity status changes made in TAC OPS
by Tab 5.
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FM 3-01.87
TAB 51
2-166. When Tab 51 (Figure 2-22) appears for the fifth time, enter
ALTERNATE SECTORS in the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION data field.
ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL Tab 55 will appear.
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FM 3-01.87
TAB 51
2-169. Tab 51 (Figure 2-22) appears for the sixth time. Enter ICC/CRG
DEPLOYMENT in the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION data field.
ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT
2-170. Tab 62 (Figure 2-36) is the ICC and CRG deployment and
communications assignment tab. The ICC location is used to report the
location of the ICC data links. The ICC location in Tab 62 should not be
changed during TAC OPS. Entering HE as a communications link is
especially important since it allows data exchange with higher headquarters
over TADIL-B.
2-51
FM 3-01.87
2-172. CRG UTM locations must be entered in Tab 62. Tab 62 entry of the
CRG location lets the ICC know that the CRG routing logic radio interface
unit (RLRIU) exists in the distributed data network. (With a CRG UTM
location entry in Tab 62, the ICC accepts information sent from the CRG
RLRIU address.) The CRG's UTM location is also used for deployment
planning purposes. The CRG's symbol is displayed for planning
communications links and antenna azimuths to the CRG under Tab 62
control. UTM locations and communications entries in Tab 69 are used to
display communications unit locations at the ICC only. This information is
used in conjunction with deployment planning through Tab 62. The display
enables the signal officer (SIGO) to plan links and antenna azimuths for the
communications unit supporting the extra battalion unit defined in Tab 69.
2-173. When a UTM LOCATION data entry is made and Tab 62 is entered,
the communications domain of the unit is shown on the tactical display.
Figure 2-37 shows the communications domain symbols used. FP
2-52
FM 3-01.87
ALERT DISPLAYED
MAX # OF WHEN MAX UNIT
DEFINED UNIT TYPE ALLOWED NUMBER OF COMM LOCATION UNIT TYPE
AND DESIGNATION COMM LINKS LINKS EXCEEDED ENTRY ON ENTRY ON
2-175. Use of Tab 62 entries and alerts ensures that each unit can support
the number of planned links. If a third communications link is entered for a
Hawk fire unit on Page A, and Tab 62 is entered, an ENTRIES NOT
COMPATIBLE-HAWK alert would be displayed because Hawk fire units are
allowed a maximum of two links. Communications links for a typical
deployment are shown in Figure 2-37. Communications links defined in Tab
62 consider the type of unit only. Note that location and unit type information
for display is provided from entries in Tabs 59, 68, and 69. Terrain elevation
data is not considered in link processing. This means that a line-of-sight
(LOS) analysis must be performed to ensure that the planned
communications link is viable.
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FM 3-01.87
+
SHOWING COMM LINK DOMAINS, RELATIVE
UNIT POSITIONS, AND COMM LINK AZIMUTH
20 KM
SYMBOL MOVES
WITH/SLAVED TO CRG 3
CURSOR POSITION UNIT SYMBOL AND POSITION
DESIGNATION
NUMBER
DISPLAYED UPON
ENTRY OF TAB 62
5
LOCAL ICC
Notes: 1. Text and arrow annotations with symbols POSITION
BATTERY/FIRE
are explanatory only and not displayed UNIT POSITION
with the cursor.
2. Unit designations (flags and numbers) do
not move with the cursor.
3. Not to scale.
TAB 51
2-178. Tab 51 (see Figure 2-22) appears for the seventh time. Enter
DEPLOYMENT INPUT COMPLETE in the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION
data field.
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FM 3-01.87
TAB 50
2-179. Tab 50 (see Figure 2-3) appears. Enter DATA INPUT COMPLETE in
the SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE field.
TOD MASTER:
COMM STATE: A=ALLOW, D=DISALLOW, M=MONITOR FP
HEU =(a) FP1 = (a) FP 7 = (a) BNA = (a) BN
AUX1 =(a) FP2 = (a) FP 8 = (a) BNB = (a)
AUX2 =(a) FP3 = (a) FP 9 = (a) BNC = (a)
AUX3 =(a) FP4 = (a) FP10 = (a) BND = (a) CURRENT NET
FP5 = (a) FP11 = (a) BNE = (a) LOAD:
FP6 = (a) FP12 = (a) BNF = (a) nnn PERCENT
Figure 2-39. Tab 2, BN Communications Configuration Control
2-55
FM 3-01.87
2-56
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2-57
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FP (one Patriot battery per page). The STAT data field displays if the volume
is active (A) or inactive (I). Entries to the STAT data field are accepted if the
activity status is not B or blank (no communications with the FP). Changes
made to volume status or to activity status via Tab 5 are reflected in BATI
Tabs 61 and 71.
2-190. Volumes are displayed in order by type and priority as hostile ID
volumes (including hostile combined weapon control volumes), friendly ID
volumes (including friendly combined weapon control volumes, weapons
control only volumes (without leading ID volume attribute), IFFON Line,
IFPID LINE.
2-191. For each volume identified in Tab 71, a time to activate and deactivate
can be entered. The operator, upon receipt of the ACO, can access Tab 71 and
enter the activation and deactivation time for each volume as per ACO
request. All times include day (dd), time (hhmm), month (mm), and year
(yyyy). If the fields are blank, the STAT field of Tab 71 or Tab 5 will control
the activation and deactivation of the volume. If a time is entered then Tab 5
will indicate a (T). The volume active/inactive status can be specified to
change in unison to comply with the ACO and thus avoid a mixture of
old/new ACOs. The ECS Tab 71 is the same as the ICC Tab 71 except that it
is set up for 55 units and 250 points.
Asset Allocation
2-192. Asset allocation is initially made using fire unit employment planning
information entered in Tab 59. As Patriot batteries come on line (or
communications become active), then BATI reallocates assets based on
reported locations, PTLs, and azimuths. After processing, asset status
information is then available for display via Tab 5 in TAC OPS. Tab 5 is
updated when—
• An asset overall activity status is changed using Tab 70.
• Inputs are made to Tab 70.
• The active deployment is completed.
• A Patriot battery status changes to limited or full operations.
• A Patriot battery location and azimuth is initially reported.
• A change of a Patriot battery azimuth (reorientation) is reported.
• The retrieve and compare FP (RCFP) data process is completed.
• A successful data base transfer to Patriot battery(ies) is completed.
2-193. Definition of assets (location size and priority), and allocations to
Patriot batteries are made based on the assigned mission and emplacement
of the subordinate fire units within system constraints. There are limits to
coverage provided by subordinate fire units; therefore, deployment planning
must ensure that adequate weapons coverage for assets is maintained. There
are also limits upon the active number of assets allocated to each Patriot
battery. Asset priorities must be designated judiciously, especially when the
available coverage is thin and the number of assets is high. Fire units
themselves are assets.
2-194. To summarize, initialization and control are accomplished using
different tabular displays. Tab 70 is used to define the asset and set the
2-59
FM 3-01.87
overall activity status. Tab 5 displays the status of the asset for each Patriot
battery and is used to make active or deactivate “in-coverage” assets
allocated to each Patriot battery during TAC OPS.
2-60
FM 3-01.87
terrain map. This initialization sequence follows the STD EMP sequence but
does not allow the operator to enter data in the radar location, Tab 81. Short-
term reinitialization is a procedure used to reinitialize the system. It also
requires a valid data base. This procedure is generally used to access tabs
(except Tab 68, which is available but not changeable) that are not available
during on-line tactical operations so those minor updates to the data base
may be made.
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FM 3-01.87
2-62
FM 3-01.87
BN
BN
Figure 2-44. Tab 12, FP Locations/Boundaries–BN
2-206. If a fire unit is entered in Tab 59, then entries for FU communications
will be required in Tab 68. If an FU is defined in Tab 68 in the normal
initialization sequence, then the software will expect a location and PTL
entry in Tab 59 to complete initialization. Fire unit communications data
requirements will be discussed later as part of the communications control
and track reporting parameters' category.
2-207. The entries for Tab 91, FP data acquisition mode (Figure 2-45),
Tab 81 RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ENTRY (Figure 2-46), and
Tab 85, LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMENT (Figure 2-47), vary based on
the type of emplacement used. The required operator inputs for each method
are shown below.
2-208. Normally, the automatic emplacement (AE) capability will be used to
emplace and ready the unit for action. When performing an AE, the RS and
LS can be at any azimuth because the PLGR and the NFS rotate with the
shelter. However, it is always a good practice to align the system, RS and LS,
2-63
FM 3-01.87
at the mechanical stow azimuth. This will always provide a known reference
of where the alignment was accomplished. This alignment reference could
then be used when the RS or LS has to be returned to the alignment position
for manual data entry. When performing an automatic data reentry (ADR) or
a manual emplacement, the RS and LS must be emplaced using a secondary
method to determine position and azimuth data for the RS and LS(s). The AE
METHOD DATA ENTRY FIELDS for each tab must be filled in as follows:
• Tab 91.
§ Data Acquisition Mode.
§ STD Emplacement Type (1) Auto.
§ UTM = Approximately RS LOC (if necessary).
• Tab 81.
§ UTM World Model.
§ Wind Speed.
• Tab 85.
§ LS Number.
§ Depletion Priority.
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FM 3-01.87
• Tab 81.
– UTM World Model.
– Altitude.
– RS at Exact Alignment Azimuth.
– Location Data Confidence Level.
– Aligned By.
– Wind Speed.
– Mils = RS Emplacement Azimuth.
– Roll/Cross Roll.
• Tab 85.
– LS Number.
– UTM.
– Meters Altitude.
– Depletion Priority.
– Mils = LS Emplacement Azimuth.
– LS Roll/Cross Roll.
2-210. An additional emplacement method is available to allow launchers to
be emplaced manually with automatically emplaced radar. This mixed mode
emplacement will allow the operator to manually emplace a launcher in
either TACI or K7. Launchers that are in a mixed mode emplacement do not
require GPS and NFS equipment. If emplaced in automatic mode, manual
data may no longer be entered. Launchers must then be deassigned then
2-65
FM 3-01.87
2-66
FM 3-01.87
TACTICAL INITIALIZATION
2-214. TACI establishes the ECS tactical data base and allows certain data
parameters to be input into the system before tactical operations are
initiated. TACI data parameters (Figure 2-50) have been categorized to help
understand how ECS processing uses initialization data. Tabular displays
are used to input and display the data parameters in each category. Some
data categories are used internally by the weapons control computer (WCC)
and are not related to battalion C3. Other categories provide data for ECS
displays. The tactical control officer (TCO) and the tactical control assistant
(TCA) control the TACI process. Other tactical operations (TAC OPS) tabular
displays that are related to initialization tabs and which impact on TACI are
included.
2-67
FM 3-01.87
TACI INITIALIZATION
STRUCTURE
CATEGORY TABULAR DISPLAYS
DATA ACQUISITION
TAB 91
SEQUENCE
RS AND LS LOCATION
TAB 85 TAB 81
ALIGNMENT DATA
RADAR CONTROL
TAB 54
PARAMETERS
ALTERNATE SEARCH
TAB 55
SECTORS SURVEILLANCE
TAB 73
DATA IFF/SIF TAB 6
PARAMETERS TAB 74
END OF MANUAL
TAB 98
INPUT DATA
2-68
FM 3-01.87
2-69
FM 3-01.87
ROLL-CROSSROLL ALIGNMENT
2-222. The importance of Tab 81 cannot be overemphasized. The data from
this tab affects all major system areas in terms of surveillance, target
position and reporting, missile acquisition, and triangulation. This tab
establishes the exact location and pointing angle of the radar, which are
extremely important parameters. The operator must ensure that the
procedures defined in the TM are adhered to when entering data. A Patriot
basic rule that must be followed is: whenever entering data in Tab 81, the
radar must be at the position at which it was aligned.
2-223. Three factors affect the boresight of the radar: the pointing azimuth,
roll, and crossroll. When manufactured, the radar antenna is mechanically
boresighted perfectly level with the radar (zero roll and crossroll) to ensure
accurate alignment. Because this condition cannot be achieved in the field
environment, the boresight of the radar must be electronically adjusted. Roll
and crossroll are the electronic "Kentucky windage" used by the WCC to
boresight the radar.
2-224. Roll is the side-to-side level of the radar, while crossroll is the front to
rear level. When the roll and crossroll readings entered in Tab 81 reflect the
actual level of the radar set base, then the boresight of the radar is correctly
aligned. With errors in the roll and crossroll, the boresight is wrong, target
positions reported will be incorrect, and the acquisition beam for the missile
will be positioned incorrectly.
2-225. To understand the effects of crossroll, refer to Figure 2-51. The figure
shows the radar set boresight (top) with zero crossroll and shows the effects
of positive and negative crossroll errors in relationship to tracking a target
(bottom). Zero crossroll and boresight are necessary.
2-70
FM 3-01.87
ZERO CROSSROLL
IVE
G AT LL
NE SSRO
O
CR
BORESIGHT
2-71
FM 3-01.87
BORESIGHT
ZERO CROSSROLL
2-72
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2-73
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2-74
FM 3-01.87
2-240. EL RDR TO NREF TOP data is needed only if the launcher line-of-
sight emplacement procedure is going to be used to determine launcher
location. If PADS provides the launcher location, then no entries are required
in this data field. To perform this measurement, a survey rod is required with
the NREF M2 aiming circle. The combination of this data and the subsequent
data field, in conjunction with the angles measured in the LS line-of-sight
procedure and in Tab 85, provide LS location.
2-241. EL RDR TO NREF BOT data field is the same as the previous data
field and is a measurement from the radar M2 to the bottom of the NREF
survey rod. The combination of these two data fields provides the distance
from the radar to the NREF M2. No entry is required if PADS provides
launcher location data.
2-242. BRNG NREF TO RDR is a bearing measured in mils clockwise from
the NREF M2 to the RDR M2. This data in combination with BRNG RDR TO
NREF will provide the radar-pointing azimuth. Extreme care must be taken
when measuring this angle. Time permitting, a two-man approach should be
used; that is, two crew members take the measurements at both aiming
circles to confirm that they come up with the same answer.
2-243. ROLL is a measurement taken in mils with an M1 gunner's quadrant
on the radar to determine the actual roll of the radar. This measurement is
also used in determining the radar-pointing angle. Time permitting, the two-
man rule also applies here. Measurements must be taken at the aligned
position.
2-244. CROSSROLL is a measurement taken in mils with an M1 gunner's
quadrant on the radar to determine the radar's pitch angle. As with all
alignment measurements, extreme care should be taken in taking the roll
and crossroll measurements. A common error in taking these measurements
is to fail to annotate correctly the direction of the "arrow" by indicating a plus
or minus sign. Time permitting, the two-man rule also applies here.
Measurements must be taken at the aligned position. Supplementary roll and
crossroll measurements will be taken at the radar-pointing angle (PTL or
STL) after transitioning to tactical operations. This value will be used as a
reference for follow-on supplemental roll and crossroll measurements made
every 24 hours. If a difference of more than 2 mils is noted, then the radar
must be rotated to its aligned position, roll and crossroll measured, and the
system reinitialized with the new values. Refer to the radar TM for proper
radar set supplementary roll and crossroll procedures.
2-245. When manually emplacing the system, soldiers may use the NFS to
obtain roll and crossroll readings if they are operational. When the system is
manually emplaced, roll and crossroll is not automatically updated by the
system. Soldiers must verify roll and crossroll every 24 hours as outlined
above. Tolerances for manual alignment are ±2 mils for the RS and ±3 mils
for the LS.
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FM 3-01.87
confidence selected in this data field has a direct application with the ICC
site calibration process. The entry made in this data field results in an
azimuth error state (AES) being applied to this fire unit and transmitted to
the ICC when communications are established. The AES received from the
fire unit will dictate the amount of azimuth correction applied during site
calibration, as well as the correlation box sizes used in target correlation at
the ICC. An accurate AES will ensure smaller correlation boxes and smaller
azimuth correction by the ICC. Again, as with the other alignment data, care
should be taken as to which entry is applied to this data field. The following
guide will be used in determining which confidence level to apply:
• 0 = SURVEY—applied if the radar is within 10 meters of the known
location.
• 1 = MODIFIED SURVEY—applied if the radar is between 10 and
40 meters of the known location.
• 2 = MAP—applied if the radar is between 40 and 120 meters of the
known location. The radar location must be resurveyed if its position
is more than 120 meters from a known location.
2-247. ALIGNED BY is the confidence level of the radar alignment
performed. This entry, in conjunction with the location confidence level,
provides the AES. An accurate pointing angle of the radar will result in a
smaller AES. The radar alignment performed must be within one degree. The
following will be used in determining which confidence level to apply:
• 0 = SURVEY—applied if the alignment was performed with survey
accuracy and the pointing angle of the radar is known to be within 7
mils. The north reference provided by PADS and the alignment
performed with the M2 aiming circle do not provide the survey
accuracy necessary for this selection.
• 1 = COMPASS—used for the majority of Patriot alignments using the
M2 aiming circle. This method ensures survey accuracy is achieved.
The known pointing angle must be within 1 degree. If the pointing
angle error is larger than 1 degree, the radar must be resurveyed.
The selection of compass results in a larger initial correction factor
being used in the ICC site calibration process.
2-248. WIND SPEED data field changes the ICC correlation and
triangulation box sizes as a function of the wind speed at the fire unit. An
entry in this data field affects the AES reported to the ICC. Considering the
AES reported, the ICC applies the appropriate correlation and triangulation
parameters. If the wind speed is above 35 nautical miles per hour (41 statute
miles), then 1 = GALE + ABOVE is selected. The wind speed data control is
located in Tab 81, page 2.
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FM 3-01.87
amplifying data, tag data on the situation display, and range in Tab 14
(Figure 2-55). If initialization data is to be entered manually, the other MS
may assist in the initialization process at this point.
TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL PAGE 1 *14*
2-77
FM 3-01.87
=RLRIU ADDRESS
Figure 2-56. Screen Display of Tab 68
2-254. RLRIU ADDRESS SET NUMBER defines which RLRIU set is
used within the battalion. Either set may be used, but all elements in the
battalion must have the same set. The battalion SIGO determines which
set is to be used. There are two sets of RLRIU addresses (1-2) in the
Patriot communications software. The RLRIU address that must be
entered into the various RLRIUs depends on which set is used and the
fire unit number. If the LOCAL FP NUMBER and the RLRIU ADDRESS
SET NUMBER do not match the setting on the RLRIU, the operator is
provided an alert informing him of the error. The operator must change
the FP NUMBER, RLRIU SET NUMBER, or the actual setting on the
RLRIU. RLRIU sets are listed in Table 2-12.
PFP 1 01 21
PFP 2 02 22
PFP 3 03 23
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FM 3-01.87
PFP 4 04 24
PFP 5 05 25
PFP 6 06 26
ICC N/A N/A
ICC (A) 41 41
ICC (B) 42 42
ICC (C) 43 43
ICC (D) 44 44
ICC (E) 45 45
ICC (F) 46 46
CRG 1 11 31
CRG 2 12 32
CRG 3 13 33
CRG 4 14 34
CRG 5 15 35
CRG 6 16 36
ALL 00 00
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FM 3-01.87
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RADAR MAPPING
2-262. Radar mapping is an important function within the Patriot system as
it establishes the lowest angle that the radar will search. If pointed too high,
aircraft can fly undetected under the search beams. If pointed too low, the
radar will expend precious radar time resource canceling clutter from ground
returns to the lower search beam. Mapping performs two functions. The first
is the establishment of the operational search lower bound (OSLB) and the
second is the establishment of the system clutter map. Because of mapping's
importance, a detailed explanation of the process and the specific functions of
the operator in conjunction with each tab are provided in the TM. This
section will only highlight each tab and discuss its overall use.
2-81
FM 3-01.87
• Set the WPS CTL S/I to ON (estimate that at least 1 minute has
passed since page 2 of Tab 81 was entered).
• Reenter the data and enter Tab 95.
ENTER ELEVATION IN ONLY ONE FIELD ABOVE FOR LEVEL INITIAL BOUND
BEARINGS TAKEN WITH M2 AIMING CIRCLE ALIGNED WITH RS AZIMUTH
2-82
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FM 3-01.87
To save time, the drawing of masked areas can be done while the clutter map
is in process.
2-84
FM 3-01.87
2-271. The DROP FROM LEFT SIDE and DROP FROM RIGHT SIDE entries
can reduce the azimuth from the left and right ABT search boundary. These
can be reduced in 1-degree increments, to no more than 5 degrees of the
search sector.
2-272. The DROP LOWER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS and DROP
UPPER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS entries allow the operator to
drop search beam rows in short- and medium-range search, thereby changing
the lower and upper elevation search angles.
2-273. The DROP LOWER LONG RANGE ROWS and DROP UPPER LONG
RANGE ROWS entries allow the operator to drop search beam rows in
long-range search, thereby changing the lower and upper elevation search
angles.
2-274. The DROP SEGMENTS field uses four data entries associated with
each sector control (SECT 1 and 2). Activation of these entries results in the
entire search sector being deactivated. The operator may drop all of the five
surveillance search sectors. Short pop and lower medium elevation search
sectors cannot be dropped independently; other sectors must be dropped with
them. As a basic rule, the system will not allow a hole in search coverage.
You may reduce it from the bottom or from the top, but you cannot take a
section from the middle.
2-275. The DROP LONG-RANGE SEARCH entry allows the operator to
reduce the maximum long-range search. Currently, the radar searches to
radar maximum (RMAX) range. This entry allows the operator to reduce the
range to where the radar will only search out to the range defined in this
data field.
2-276. The DROP SHORT-RANGE SEARCH entry allows the operator to
reduce the short-range search of the radar. Currently, the radar searches
from radar minimum (RMIN) to RMAX range. The previous entry allows the
operator to move RMAX in. This entry allows the operator to move RMI out
so that short-range search will begin farther away from the radar. This range
must be at least 4 kilometers less than the range applied in the drop long-
range data field.
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FM 3-01.87
2-278. The DROP LOWER TBM ROWS and DROP UPPER TBM ROWS
entries allow the operator to reduce the elevation of the TBM search sector.
This reduction of elevation search sector is accomplished by eliminating beam
rows from the lower or upper portion of the search sector.
2-279. The DROP SEGMENTS USING ONE FIELD entry allows the
operator to drop two of the three TBM search sectors, either individually or
simultaneously, through this entry. The middle TBM sector may not be
dropped.
2-280. During engagement operations, Tab 55 is used to drop specific ABT
search sectors. The horizon, short-range, pop-up and lower medium-range
search sectors may be dropped at the TBM alert by way of ALTER SECT 1
switch-indicator. This assists in minimizing clutter returns. It is appropriate
for TBM-only missions. In the ABT mission, the dropping of ABT search
sectors other than long-range should not be performed. Dropping long-range
may be considered as a manually induced saturation alleviation process.
2-281. Upon entering Tab 55, the automatic initialization sequencing tabs are
completed. The operator must then input the launcher location data and a
Tab 6 entry if this was not done concurrently by manstation 3 during
initialization. The common data base items must also be entered at this time
if a data transfer was not accomplished. If a data base transfer was
performed, the operator should check and may make a hard copy of the
following tabs at the ECS for reference: Tabs 1, 6, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78,
and 79.
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2-87
FM 3-01.87
is caused by poor satellite data, the LS should be placed to "local" and a crew
member should determine the PLGR parameters.
2-290. The UTM location is a UTM coordinate provided by the PADS. There
are also line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight procedures in the launcher TM for
determining launcher location if PADS data is not available. The launcher
emplacement accuracy relative to the radar is ±10 meters.
2-291. The METERS ALTITUDE field is the altitude of the launcher above
sea level in meters. The data field will accept a 100 meters below sea level
entry. The altitude is normally provided by the PADS system.
2-88
FM 3-01.87
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FM 3-01.87
2-301. Tab 98 is available only in TACI and must be selected by the operator.
This tab is selected when the operator has completed all data entries and
reviewed all the tabs in the initialization process. Upon entering this tab
(Figure 2-67), the initialization process is concluded. The operator is then
provided with two alerts that must be acknowledged for the data base to be
written. Upon completion of the data base write, the operator is directed to
enter tactical operations.
GLIF THRESHOLD
2-305. New software, PDB-4.2, updates Tab 1 with another page to include
the capability to select a GLIF and track-while-scan (TWS) velocity threshold
(36 km/hr to 144 km/hr). This will provide track and engagement capability
for slow speed track threats in clutter. The default value is set to 40 m/sec. If
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FM 3-01.87
that threat value is not saved to the TACI data base, then it will return to the
default value when the software is rebooted. (See Figure 2-68.)
2-91
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2-1
Chapter 3
3-1
FM 3-01.87
identifying all targets. He should have the FRNDLY PROT and (as
appropriate to the tactical situation) the ECCM ASSIST S/Is enabled in the
Console Mode group. The FRNDLY PROT S/I enables alerts associated with
the identification processing (ID, conflicts, violations, et cetera). The A-scope
is displayed at this manstation. Other switches should be activated as
outlined in the tactical control officer's responsibilities in Table 3-1.
MAP DATA
Identification areas Monitor party line for air battle.
WPN control areas
Defended areas
Mask terr/maps
TRACK DATA
Friends Apply or remove cease fire, hold fire, or engage hold.
Unknowns Monitors clutter conditions and activate clutter
Track numbers mapping.
Other switch-indicators as Perform A-scope evaluation.
required.
Make firing doctrine changes.
Direct radar emission control schedule.
Direct system reorientation.
Monitor status alerts and assess selected alerts.
3-4. The TCO ensures, through Tab 1, that the system is in the assigned
identification mode. He monitors the situation display, alert line, and tabular
display area. He uses the Track Amp Data tab display to identify targets
while in the manual identification mode and confirm identity while in the
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FM 3-01.87
automatic ID mode. The TCO also uses this tab and the situation displays to
assist him in determining clutter and false targets. False targets are
normally indicated as such with a "false" or "slow" indicator in the ENGST/M
data field of the Track Amp Data tab. These targets may also exhibit erratic
speed, direction, and altitude indications. If these tracks are false targets, the
TCO (if not busy) may consider dropping track.
3-5. The alert states and majority of the firing doctrine changes will be
accomplished at the ICC and data-transferred to each battery. The TCO will
monitor these transfers and ensure through tabular display (Tabs 1, 5, 6, 70,
71, 73, and 74) and the situation display that the changes have been
implemented. The TCO will implement changes that are provided to the
battery through voice communications. These changes will include activation
and deactivation of assets, volumes, IFF codes and tables, identification
weight sets, hostile authorizations in Tab 1 (Pop-up, ECM, MSV, and Slow
Target Engage) SIF authorization, and ID mode. This also ensures the unit is
in the correct ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL radar search
mode.
3-6. To ensure that nonhostile aircraft are not engaged, the TCO is
responsible for applying the engagement overrides (HOLD FIRE, CEASE
FIRE, ENGAGE HOLD, or change target ID to friend) according to the
current rules of engagement. The TCO is also responsible for removing
engagement overrides. The CEASE FIRE override may be removed by the
TCA as dictated by the situation.
3-7. Manual IFF interrogation of targets is performed by the TCO. He
monitors the SIF and IFF response evaluation of targets via the Track Amp
Data tab. The enabling or disabling of Mode 4 Enable and SIF Enable S/I is
his responsibility in coordination with the TCA.
3-8. The TCO will perform ECM target evaluation when time permits. He
uses the A-scope presentation when required to assist him. The TCO also
monitors system operations and performs manual clutter map as necessary.
3-9. System reorientation orders are received and acknowledged by the TCO.
The actual reorientation is performed by the TCA.
3-10. The TCO monitors the TAC OPS net (party line 2) for target
identification information from the ICC. He maintains close coordination
with the TCA and keeps the battery command post (CP) advised. The TCO
provides guidance and leadership as appropriate. If only one console is
operational, the TCO operates it and performs TCA functions as well as the
friendly protect function.
3-3
FM 3-01.87
FUNCTION RESPONSIBILITIES
Weapons Control Engage targets centralized (semiautomatic)
Engage targets as directed by battalion engage targets in self-
defense.
Decentralized (semiauto) engage targets as directed by the TCO.
Engage targets in the TBE QUEUE.
3-12. The TCA ensures that the system is in the correct engagement mode,
search mode, and mode of control. Furthermore, he is responsible for
configuring the system according to the current alert state. This may include
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FM 3-01.87
correct configuring system for the correct weapon control status, depressing
the areas enable switch, activating SIF enable, activating mode IV enable,
changing from threshold low to threshold high, or activating ECCM enable.
He also controls system radiation (off, active, or passive) based on direction
provided by the TCO, ICC, or battery CP. He places the radar in the
appropriate search mode (ABT or TBM) as directed. The TCA activates the
launching stations. The TCA also monitors the status panel for launching
station status and missile count. The display areas that are monitored by the
TCA include the situation display, tab area, alert line, and the status panel.
These are not listed in priority. Their importance depends upon the tactical
situation.
3-13. The TCA engages targets employing the rules of engagement and
supplemental fire control measures in effect. In the centralized mode of
control and semiautomatic engagement mode, all engagements are directed
by the battalion fire direction center (FDC). This is the normal method of
engagement operations. The TCA acknowledges the fire control order and
engages the target. If the target must be engaged immediately, the ICC
operator must augment the engage command with a voice command such as
"Engage your target 005 now!" The right to self-defense is never denied, but
the TCA must announce the intention to engage a self-defense threat to the
TCO and double-check self-defense criteria and procedures before
engagement. In some situations, such as when friendly air forces have air
superiority or when the possibility of fratricide exists, self-defense
engagements may be restricted (but not denied) by the airspace control
authority. Situation awareness is of prime importance under these
circumstances.
3-14. In the decentralized mode of control and in the semiautomatic
engagement mode, the TCA manually engages targets when directed by the
TCO in the order of the to be engaged (TBE) queue. In the automatic
engagement mode, he monitors the engagements. The TCA provides kill
assessments as appropriate. Depending on the ROE, normally in the
autonomous mode, the TCA places the system in weapons hold and does not
fire except in self-defense or in response to a formal order.
3-15. The TCA monitors cease fires applied to targets within his area of
responsibility. He may apply engagement hold on a target as appropriate.
The TCA monitors the air defense control (ADC) net (party line 1).
3-16. Strobe engagements are performed by the TCA when directed by the
TCO. Strobe engagement method is the preferred method of engagement
against ECM strobe targets.
COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR
3-17. The communications operator monitors and operates the systems
communications equipment. As such, he monitors the tactical FM sets, makes
periodic checks of the data links, routing logic radio interface unit, and the
three UHF stacks. He is responsible for having the assigned address in the
RLRIU, ensuring all communications equipment is configured according to
the current communications plan, and passing and receiving tactical reports
to and from the battery CP (SAMSTAT, missile count, and engagement
3-5
FM 3-01.87
ICC CREW
3-18. The ICC is operated by a crew of three—one officer and two enlisted
soldiers. The officer is normally a captain or a senior lieutenant and is called
the tactical director (TD). The TD performs the friendly protect function. One
enlisted soldier (operator/maintainer) operates manstation 1 (MS 1). He
performs the weapons controls function and is called the tactical director
assistant (TDA). The second enlisted soldier operates manstation 2 (MS 2)
and is called the communications operator. There are three separate crews
that man the ICC during 24-hour operations.
TACTICAL DIRECTOR
3-19. The TD is responsible for the battalion air battle operations.
Specifically, the TD's most important duty is identifying all targets. The TD
has the FRNDLY PROT switch-indicators activated. Alerts associated with
identification and engagement overrides are displayed on this manstation.
Other switches should be activated as outlined in Table 3-3.
3-20. The TD ensures that the ICC and ECSs are in the assigned state of
readiness, state of emission, and ID mode. The TD monitors the battalion
status panel and communications status with the FUs and higher echelons.
The TD selects appropriate tabs and monitors subordinate unit status and air
battle parameters. If entered data is incorrect, the TD applies the correct
condition via electronic data transfers or voice. The TD supervises the
battalion radiation schedule and unit search modes (TBM/ABT). In addition,
the TD maintains maintenance schedules, ensuring that the battalion is
prepared to perform its air defense mission.
3-21. The TD is responsible for resolving target identification. This ensures
that friendly aircraft are protected and not engaged. The TD directs IFF/SIF
interrogations as required by the situation. The TD is responsible for
applying all engagement overrides (HOLD FIRE, CEASE FIRE, or ENGAGE
HOLD).
3-22. The TD monitors the higher echelon net and alert messages, and
responds to all except engage commands. The TD normally coordinates
directly with the brigade or master battalion level TD. The TD monitors
party line 2.
3-23. The TD assesses the operability of MS 3 and the environmental control
unit, monitors' communications status, and directs the actions of the
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FM 3-01.87
communications operator when faults exist. When one console is out of action,
the TD operates the other console and performs both TD and TDA functions.
SWITCH ACTION Monitor battalion status panel and note FDC equipment
and higher echelon communications status.
3-7
FM 3-01.87
3-25. The TDA is responsible for performing all functions associated with
engaging targets under the supervision of the TD. The TDA monitors the
battalion status panel and ensures that the batteries are in the assigned
mode of control and weapon control status, including areas enabled. The TDA
monitors the batteries' equipment and communications status indicators, as
well as missile inventory of each battery and for the battalion.
3-26. The TDA calls up appropriate tabs and notes the batteries' operational
and missile statuses. The TDA ensures that the batteries and the FDC are in
the assigned engagement mode. The TDA directs the batteries to activate or
deactivate radar search mode and IFF based on the TD's orders and the
battalion emission control (EMCON) plan. The TDA keeps continuous track
of FU radar search mode, IFF, and operational status.
3-27. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, the TDA assigns all
engagements as directed by the TD within the battalion. The TDA assigns
engagements using the TBE queue that indicates which targets are most
threatening and the best battery for the engagement. The TDA responds to
all higher echelon engagement alerts and takes appropriate action. The
TDA's authority to order engagements is provided by voice command or alert
message from higher echelon when the battalion is operating centralized to
higher echelon. When the battalion is decentralized, the TDA's authority to
engage is based on the rules of engagement and supplemental fire control
measures in effect.
3-28. The TDA monitors cease fires and hold fires applied to targets within
his area of responsibility and may apply engage hold on a target as
appropriate. The TDA monitors status monitor alerts, assesses weapons
control computer, peripherals, and MS 1 faults, and monitors the system
built-in test equipment (BITE) panel. The TDA normally monitors the ADC
on party line 1.
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FM 3-01.87
COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR
3-29. The communications operator (MOS 31F) is responsible for monitoring
and operating the battalion task force data and voice communications. The
communications operator monitors CRG status and the network link status
via the Communications Fault Data tab and make periodic checks of the data
links, RLRIUs, modems, and the three UHF stacks. The communications
operator initializes the joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS)
terminal and switch multiplexer unit (SMU), and monitors them for proper
operation via Communications Fault Data tab. The communications operator
assists the TD in making assessments of communications faults. They
monitor the antenna mast group and are responsible for rotating and
elevating the UHF antennas when required. The communications operator
implements all communications ECCM in the ICC including the use of the
power amplifiers. The communications operator is also responsible for
implementing and monitoring the battalion communications plans, properly
patching all channels, monitoring the CRGs, and coordinating changes to the
plan with the ECS and CRG communications operators and battalion
communications control. They are also responsible for passing and receiving
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FM 3-01.87
tactical reports to and from the battalion tactical control station (TCS)
(SAMSTAT, missile count, and engagement reports).
3-10
FM 3-01.87
FIRING DOCTRINE
3-33. Page one of Tab 1 is used to enter subordinate fire platoon and
battalions (BN). Alert states, DEFCON air defense warning (ADW), missile
attack warning, and chemical/biological/radiological environmental warning
states for each subordinate battalion. Page 1 also reports the local ICC alert
state commanded by higher echelon unit (HEU) and allows entry of the
achieved local ICC alert state.
3-34. Air defense systems provide command and control, and the following
functions must be performed: air picture generation (track management),
target identification, threat assessment, and fire distribution. In support of
these functions, the ICC becomes part of the total air defense architecture
with overall decision responsibility in the functional areas listed above. The
ICC relies on track data and status from its subordinate units and higher
headquarters and performs independent evaluations of the ICC's integrated
air picture.
3-35. Data flows into and out of the ICC over digital data links supplemented
by voice communications. The ICC has the capability for manual entry of
voice told data into its computer when voice communications are being used
as a backup for digital data links. This, and data received over the digital
data links, must be organized, assembled, and operated on to develop system
status, track information, and action recommendations. This data is provided
to the commander or operator by means of pictorial situation displays,
tabular data displays, alert messages, and hard copy printouts. The ICC
computer programs can perform tasks independently, accept operator input
through manual controls, and respond to these inputs by implementing
required actions.
3-36. The display and control (D&C) function provides operator interaction
with the ICC software system. D&C accepts and processes all keyboard
entries and switch actions. D&C also presents data to the operator in both
tabular and situation displays, as well as front panel and battalion status
panel indicators and readouts. Tabular data may be presented as a hard copy
printout as well as a cathode ray tube (CRT) display.
3-37. The D&C function uses data from all the other functions for display
generation. Track data is taken from track management. System
initialization and status monitor data include FU locations, volumes,
corridors, available equipment including communications, and operational
modes. Command and coordination software provides launch-now-intercept-
points (LNIPs), predicted intercept points (PIPs) and to-be-engaged queue
data (Figure 3-1). The various Patriot subsystems provide message alert
data. In turn, operator actions can include the manual input of voice told
messages as well as engagement, system control, and track evaluation switch
actions. Many of these actions will initiate other functions.
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FM 3-01.87
TRACK MANAGEMENT
3-40. The track management software are a key element of the ICC. It
ensures the continuity of track data within the battalion and brigade. Track
management performs track correlation, site calibration, triangulation, and
saturation alleviation, and exchanges this information with its local fire units
and subordinate or adjacent battalions.
3-41. No search or track functions are performed at the ICC. All track data is
provided to the ICC from its local fire units or external element, higher
echelon, or other battalions. Whenever the ICC receives a track, it opens a
battalion track data record (BNTDR). BNTDRs are designated as either local
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FM 3-01.87
or remote. Local BNTDRs are tracks that are being updated by a local fire
unit or subordinate battalion. Remote BNTDRs are tracks that are being
updated by a source other than a local unit, such as a higher echelon or an
adjacent battalion. Local tracks are displayed at the ICC with a high
brightness and remote tracks are displayed with a low brightness. Remote
tracks are not displayed at a Patriot fire unit.
3-42. The ICC will establish and maintain different track numbers for each
BNTDR. This is necessary for a common track due to each reporting source
having its track numbering assignment system. Up to 12 FU track numbers
on a common track can be maintained based on each FU reporting the track.
The ICC also stores up to 6 battalion track numbers to account for
subordinate or adjacent battalions. Additionally, 3 auxiliary, 1 ATDL-1,
1 TADIL-B, and 1 NATO track number can be maintained. The FU numbers
are used for correlation and communications purposes between the ICC and
FUs. To facilitate display and voice coordination, a common ATDL-1 number
is maintained on all battalion to battalion data links for each common track.
3-43. The ICC track management process also maintains an input file for
each track reported by the batteries. The Patriot fire unit input buffers and
the Hawk input buffers contain all the information for ID, IFF, ID history,
position, and engagement status reported by the unit on the track. The Hawk
input data buffers are used by the ICC software programs for ID
determination and conflict resolution, and track status maintenance and
reconstruction.
TARGET CORRELATION
3-44. Correlation is the function of comparing the individual track reports
from each reporting source and, if appropriate, combining these reports into a
single track file. The ICC performs automatic target correlation on all tracks
that pass an initial check. This check addresses the age of the track, when it
was last updated, if it is slow, false, has no velocity, or is not a virtual target.
If it passes these criteria, the ICC will attempt to correlate the track by using
track number, track position, velocity, and range rate. These correlations
have to meet variable correlation boxes that are defined as a function of the
type of track (local or remote), the type of radar, (Patriot or Hawk pulse
acquisition radar [PAR], continuous wave acquisition radar [CWAR], or high-
powered illuminator radar [HIPIR]) and the accuracy of the radar
emplacement. The Patriot correlation boxes are the most restrictive.
CORRELATION BOXES
3-45. Correlation boxes require two operator inputs to determine the initial
correlation box values for the FU location and azimuth uncertainty. The
inputs in the FU’s Tab 81 during initialization that affect correlation are
LOCATION CONFIDENCE and ALIGNED BY. The location uncertainty is
the maximum distance error between the "true" radar location as determined
by these methods: maps, modified survey, or survey. The azimuth
uncertainty is the maximum deviation of true azimuth of the radar to
measured azimuth as determined by the method of alignment—compass and
survey. Initial correlation boxes are then computed as a function of both
3-13
FM 3-01.87
SITE CALIBRATION
3-46. The site calibration process is an automatic function performed at the
ICC that attempts to continually improve alignment data for the Patriot fire
units using only targets of opportunity. The process is divided into two
unique categories of azimuth calibration, pitch and roll (or roll and crossroll)
corrections.
3-47. Azimuth calibration selects correlated target with favorable trajectory
characteristics for possible use. Then the calibration process selects two fire
units that are both tracking the correlated target, then calculates the
computational uncertainty of the calibration process. This determines what
the new azimuth uncertainty would be if this target data were used to
calibrate these specific fire units and is a function of the target FUs
geometry. The location uncertainties translate into a large minimum
obtainable azimuth uncertainty. Conversely, if the radar location uncertainty
is the smallest possible, then the azimuth calibration process has the
potential to reduce the correlation box azimuth uncertainty to the smallest
possible radar location uncertainty.
3-48. When a good target and fire unit pairing is found (one that would
improve or reduce one or both of the fire units azimuth uncertainty), then five
data points (20 seconds) are gathered to enable integration over time and
minimize the effects of errors in the message transfers. The process then
computes the azimuth correction for the fire units. A comparison is made to
determine if the correction values are larger than the previous azimuth
uncertainty. If this is the case, then the process has detected an inconsistency
in the data or in other terms, a site error, and alerts the operator.
3-49. Site errors are caused by two phenomena. The first is when the radar
azimuth determined from initialization has an uncertainty greater than what
was defined in the Tab 81 ALIGNED BY data field. An example is that
0=SURVEY was entered and the error uncertainty was such that
1=COMPASS should have been entered. This is usually detected on the first
calibration attempt of a fire unit. The second case is when the initialized
radar location deviated from the true location by more than the distance
defined for the LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL indicated on
Tab 81 (0=SURVEY, 1=MODIFIED SURVEY, and 2=MAP). This condition
does not usually cause a site error until several calibrations have been done,
and it usually results in bouncing the calculated azimuth around the true
azimuth. This eventually causes a correction larger than the previous
azimuth uncertainty. Both of these conditions will cause site error alerts.
When the ICC operator observes this, the unit that reported most often
should investigate it. As an example, the operator will see Site Error FP1,
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FM 3-01.87
FP2 and Site Error FP2, FP4. Fire unit 2 should be directed to recheck its
alignment data. Roll and crossroll calibration is a process that smooths the
elevation differences between fire units within the battalion to improve the
battalion's pitch and roll as a whole. This process does not generate a site
error alert.
3-50. An automatic emplacement at an FU results in the best location and
angular confidence levels being sent to the ICC. The FU alerts LOCATION
DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL of SURVEY = 0 and ALIGNED BY of
SURVEY = 0 are sent to the ICC when the final automatic emplacement is
achieved. Considering these inputs, the ICC establishes the initial correlation
cells. ICC site calibrations are accomplished on all FUs whether they were
emplaced manually or automatically. Because of the accuracy of the precision
lightweight global positioning system receiver (PLGR) and north finding
system (NFS), site error alerts are not expected when site calibrations are
performed on FUs that were automatically emplaced.
3-51. If site error alerts are repeatedly observed, the ICC operator should
perform the following:
• Determine which FU is continually defined in the alert.
• Determine if the FU was emplaced manually or automatically.
• If the FU was emplaced automatically, have the crew members check
that there is no radar (RS), PLGR, or NFS fault.
• Time permitting, have the FU crews perform a new automatic
emplacement.
• If the FU was manually emplaced, have crew members recheck the
alignment and ensure that the data was entered correctly.
• Confirm that the data in Tab 81 is correct.
3-52. If site error persists, the FU should then perform the semiannual
preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). If out of tolerance,
intermediate maintenance (IM) should be notified. If the alert reports a large
difference (1,000 meters or more), then the TD or TDA should check Tab 12 to
ensure that the ECS crew did not make an obvious error in entering data.
The reported location received should be confirmed by voice with the battery
to ensure that the correct Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) (Patriot) or
latitude and longitude (Hawk) were entered. If everything appears to have
been entered correctly and the system reports no site error, an effort to
correlate targets between batteries should be attempted. If correlation occurs
without problems, the battery should be considered correctly positioned. If
not, the battery should first attempt to clear the fault by rebooting the
system. If site error still occurs, the unit must reinitialize the system.
3-53. Alerts are generated by the site calibration process along with the "site
error" alert. The ICC will receive the alert FPn AZIMUTH = nnn if the
azimuth at a particular fire unit is corrected more than 0.5 degrees. When
the ICC operator observes this alert, he should select Tab 12, FP
LOCATION/BOUNDARIES-BN, and note the azimuth range in the CURR
AZ data field. As a matter of practice, this tab should be selected and hard
copies made each time communications are initially established with a
subordinate unit.
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FM 3-01.87
3-54. The fire unit will also generate the alert UPDATE DATABASE TAB 8
when the following conditions occur:
• A corrected radar azimuth—a site calibration occurred and the
corrected azimuth was sent to the battery.
• An updated azimuth uncertainty—the azimuth error state (AES) has
changed due to a calibration.
• An updated elevation uncertainty—the AES has changed due to a roll
or crossroll correction.
• A data buffer transfer—the ICC has sent a data buffer transfer to
that unit.
3-55. The operator should perform a data base update upon receipt of the
alert UPDATE DATABASE—TAB 8 to ensure that the corrected information
is written on the data base. If necessary, verify the roll and crossroll, PLGR
and NFS information, and as a last resort, have the survey section survey the
equipment position again.
3-56. The current azimuth of Patriot batteries displayed in Tab 12 should
also be noted. Prior minor azimuth changes indicate that site calibration has
occurred and the FP azimuth was corrected. Figure 3-2 shows the Tab 12
format. Note: FP1 through 6 are reserved for Patriot FPs and FP7 through
12 are reserved for Hawk and THAAD FPs.
FP LOCATIONS/BOUNDARIES – BN PAGE 1 *12*
FP UTM LOCATION PTL STL1 STL2 STL3 CURR AZ LF-
BOUNDS-RT
1
2
3
4
5
6
BN
BN
Figure 3-2. Tab 12, Pages 1 and 2
TRIANGULATION
3-57. The triangulation process provides the Patriot system with the
capability to counter ECM. There may be occasions when the jamming source
3-16
FM 3-01.87
is able to deny range data to the fire unit. When this occurs, that track is
reported to the ICC as a strobe with azimuth and elevation. This strobe will
also be detected by other fire units within the battalion and reported to the
ICC, provided there is overlapping coverage. The ICC then performs a strobe
correlation process, called triangulation, to determine the target's range and
provides this information to the reporting fire units. The triangulation
process is performed with data from adjacent Patriot battalions and
subordinate Patriot battalions (MICC to SICC).
3-58. As with target correlation, triangulation also has boxes associated with
its processing—Tab 81 and the radar azimuth corrections from site
calibration. The triangulation boxes are also based on the geometry of the
target to fire units and tracking accuracies of the jamming tracks. In
addition, with the missing track component of range, the triangulation
process is more sensitive to alignment errors, especially at longer ranges.
This leads to the caution that observing correlation at the ICC is not the only
indication of "good enough" survey data. If site error alerts are observed, they
should be investigated, or the triangulation performance will be
unacceptable. The triangulation process uses a variety of track reports in
deriving at the appropriate solution. These include: three strobes, a skin
track and strobe with range estimate, two strobes with range estimates, and
a strobe and strobes with range estimate. A range estimate track is one
where target range is estimated.
3-59. Triangulation provides an effective method of countering ECM
(Figure 3-3) as follows:
• Fire units automatically report strobe track data to the ICC.
• The ICC automatically provides fire units the triangulated solution
with range.
• ECM track evaluation, engagement, and missile guidance.
3-17
FM 3-01.87
RS
ECS
ACTUAL
JAMMER
POSITION
TRACK DATA
FROM FIRE UNITS
RS
ECS
SATURATION ALLEVIATION
3-60. Saturation alleviation is invoked when the number of tracks at the ICC
is greater than a prespecified system level to ensure that the most important
battalion track data record (BNTDR) is retained. The least important are
dropped. The two types of saturation alleviation are when the number of
tracks is too great and when the radar is saturated with too many actions.
The ICC has eight levels of saturation alleviation, which are displayed to the
left of the ICC alert line. The following is a description of each level:
• NULL—no tracks being dropped; display field is blank.
• HWK ST—displayed when the pulse acquisition radar (PAR),
continuous wave acquisition radar (CWAR), or subordinate battalion
strobes are being dropped.
• REMOTE—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion remote
track is received, does not correlate, and there are no BNTDRs
available. This level deletes "old remotes," then HEU remotes, and
then adjacent battalion remote friends, one by one, to accept all local
first track and subordinate battalion remote tracks.
• FRND-1—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion remote
track is received, does not correlate, no BNTDRs are available, and
all "old" and HEU remote BNTDRs have been deleted. This level
deletes long-range friendly tracks to accept all local, first track,
subordinate battalion remotes, and Patriot missile (PAM) tracks.
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FM 3-01.87
TARGET IDENTIFICATION
3-62. With an accurate air picture established, the next process is track
identity evaluation. When tracks correlate, the ICC compares IDs, sets the
appropriate hostile or friend description, and displays and resolves identity
conflicts.
3-63. The ICC accepts ID data from all sources listed in the track
management section (see Figure 3-4). The ICC automatically performs ID
conflict resolution (see Table 3-5) hierarchically that considers the unique
qualities of the various reporting units (for example, a reporting source-
specific hierarchy). These processes ensure a common, best ID result
throughout the battalion. Using embedded conflict resolution tables, the ICC
resolves most conflicts automatically. In cases that require operator input,
the manual resolution procedure, designed to aid in a rapid decision action by
the operator, is used. Patriot fire units report all identification data with
identity to the ICC such as—
• IFF results.
• Identification and weapons control volume correlation.
• Identification evaluation results.
3-19
FM 3-01.87
REEVALUATION
TRACK ID
INFORMATION ECS
RS
ID INFORMATION
AND BATTALION ID
ICC
TRACK ID
INFORMATION
ECS
RS
3-20
FM 3-01.87
FRIENDLY PROTECTION
3-65. The ICC automatically inhibits the engagement of a track identified as
a friend, unknown, or assumed friend and prohibits the operator from
engagement of such tracks. The ICC automatically sends a HOLD FIRE
command to any FU or battalion initiating engagement of friends or assumed
friends.
TARGET ENGAGEMENT
3-66. The ICC automatically assesses the threat of all tracks reported to it.
The first step in the process is consideration of the track's eligibility for
engagement (see Figure 3-5). The ICC determines the track's eligibility
automatically by considering its identification with its weapon control
status—WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, or WEAPONS FREE. In a
WEAPONS HOLD volume, no targets are recommended for automatic
engagement. In a WEAPONS TIGHT volume, only hostile ID tracks are
recommended. In a WEAPONS FREE volume, both hostile and unknown
identified targets are recommended. Friends and unknown assumed friends
are never recommended.
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FM 3-01.87
Residual Area
W EAPONS TIGHT
V l
Patriot
W EAPONS HOLD
Fire Unit
VOLUME
W EAPONS FREE
Patriot V l
Fire Unit
Fire Units report to the ICC weapon control volum e correlation on each track
ICC assigns the track the m ost restrictive weapon control status, if there is a:
• fli
W EAPONS HOLD over W EAPONS TIGHT or W EAPONS FREE
• W EAPONS TIGHT over W EAPONS FREE
THREAT ASSESSMENT
3-67. Threat assessment must perform two major subfunctions, target
evaluation and engagement control. Target evaluation includes both
classification and identification of tracks based on track position, track
history, IFF interrogation, and information provided from both extra- and
intra-battalion sources. Logic must be provided to protect friendly aircraft by
preventing or terminating engagement against them. Engageable tracks
must be examined for their potential enemy threat to battalion assets.
Engagement control must provide for FU selection and target assignment
considering operator and higher echelon’s input as well as FU capabilities
and prespecified selection criteria.
ENGAGEMENT STATUS
3-68. Engagement status data must be provided to the display and control
and communications control functions. Threat assessment processing must
receive FU status including missile inventories from status monitor, target
position data from track management, and engagement directives from both
display and control, and communications control functions.
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FM 3-01.87
THREAT EVALUATION
3-69. The ABT threat assessment process continually reevaluates each
eligible enemy target to determine its threat to a defended asset (up to 36
assets can be defined) or to the general area of the battalion. The threat
assessment process considers an enemy track location, speed, heading,
altitude, and its predicted intercept point relative to each asset location. The
targets are continually threat ordered automatically, and are based upon the
priority assigned to the asset they are threatening. The 18 most threatening
targets are presented on the TO-BE-ENGAGED DATA 1 tab for the
operator's use.
METHODS OF CONTROL
3-73. The ICC can function in either a centralized or decentralized method of
control. Centralized is where the ICC directs the subordinate units’ (FUs
and/or battalions) engagements. In a decentralized method of control, the
ICC allows subordinate units to conduct their engagements while it performs
a management-by-exception role. In the battalion role, the ICC can direct all
the engagements of its subordinate FUs (centralized to the ICC), or allow the
subordinate units to be decentralized.
3-74. Decentralized allows subordinate units to conduct their own
engagements while performing a management by exception function, and
cueing the ICC operator when a decentralized battalion is not conducting a
high-priority engagement. The ICC can also function as a subordinate ICC in
either method of control, centralized to higher echelon (awaiting command on
engagements) or decentralized from higher echelon (actively directing its
engagements).
3-75. The ICC performs the engagement assignment process in either the
semiautomatic or automatic engagement mode. In either mode, the operator
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FM 3-01.87
3-24
FM 3-01.87
Hostile Assigned to FU A
Hostile Assigned to FU B
Fire Unit A
Fire Unit B
STATUS MONITOR
3-81. The status monitor function provides fault detection at the ICC,
controls the ICC mode, and monitors battalion status. Battalion status
includes both communications and FU capabilities. The status monitor also
provides a time mark to synchronize battalion time and maintain the
battalion geometry and status data.
3-82. Inputs to status monitor include FU status messages and
communications line status through the communications controls function,
BITE data, and manual inputs from display and control. The status monitor
employs display and control to initiate status alerts to the ICC operators. It
also uses communications control to initiate status messages to higher
echelon.
3-83. The ICC continually monitors the status of all on-board hardware as
well as the operational status of all of its subordinate units. The equipment
status of the ICC, all Patriot, Hawk, and task force FUs is always provided
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FM 3-01.87
for the operator's review, and the operator is alerted to any change in that
status.
3-84. The operational and engagement status of all subordinate units is
provided by tabular displays. This status is also displayed on the battalion
status panel. This status is also used in the ICC's fire distribution process to
determine which fire unit or battalion is currently the most appropriate for
the engagement of each candidate target. Communications status to all
subordinate, adjacent, auxiliary, and higher echelon units, as well as relays,
is continually monitored and provided to the operators through tabular
display and status panel presentation.
3-85. This group of programs, very similar to those at the ECS, provides
automated assistance for rapid location of failed components within the ICC.
The fault isolation display-aided maintenance procedures called up by the
operator will display the step-by-step repair procedures to permit the
operator to isolate the problem.
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FM 3-01.87
ALT
PTL
UMR
LMR
LR
SRP
HORZ
FU FU RANGE
3-27
FM 3-01.87
sectors: lower TBM (LTBM), upper TBM (UTBM), and extra high TBM
(XTBM) (Figure 3-8).
ALT
PTL
XTBM
UTBM
LTBM
UMR
LMR
SRP
HORZ
FU
FU RANGE
TRACK PROCESS
3-93. After the search process has detected a target, it is given to the track
process. The track function selects the optimal radar track rate and
waveform to continue track on that target until it leaves the fire unit track
coverage. The track rate and waveform are selected based on the range and
altitude of the track. The FU track coverage is ±60 degrees of the radar
pointing angle and P4-13 degrees to P4-14 degrees in elevation. The track
range is from P4-15 kilometers RMIN to P4-16 kilometers RMAX. After a
stable track has been obtained on a target by the fire unit, its position and
status are reported to the ICC. Tracks that are in preclassification status or
designated as clutter are not forwarded to the ICC. In the passive search
mode, targets within an FU track sector may be downtold from the ICC. The
ICC provides azimuth, range, and elevation to the FU. The FU will schedule
the radar to perform a single search action at the position provided by the
ICC. The FU will acquire and track only the told-in target until it is engaged,
dropped, or leaves the FU's sector. Once the target is under track, a track
data record (TDR) is opened on the target. When a TDR is established, the
identification of enemy aircraft and threat assessment processes are
initiated. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U) for further details on the TBM search
sectors.
3-94. The formation size is reported by the track function and is reflected in
the data fields of the Track Amp Data tabs in the ICC (ID/S) and FU
(ID/SZ/IDS). The size of the formation is dependent on the return received
due to several closely spaced aircraft or one large aircraft. There are specific
range and angle parameters that will result in the objects within the
formation being defined separately and placed in individual TDRs. The
formation size reported and displayed by Patriot is from 2 to 7. A blank in the
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FM 3-01.87
A-SCOPE OPERATIONS
3-97. The operator can also use the A-scope display to assist in determining
target track type. The A-scope display presents two digitized ranges versus
amplitude traces on the tabular display area. The A-scope display is
associated with the alert, nnn USE A-SCOPE, and the A-SCOPE switch-
indicator. For the alert to be displayed on a manstation, that manstation
must have the ECCM ASSIST switch-indicator selected. The nnn USE
A-SCOPE alert is generated when surveillance detects and tracks a target as
a repeater jammer. The alert is informing the operator that assistance is
required to further classify the jamming target. The alert will appear once a
minute if no action is taken. The operator should hook the target,
acknowledge the alert, and select the A-SCOPE switch-indicator. A dual trace
will appear in the tab display area with a target (TGT) definition data field.
The operator should review the dual trace and determine if the target is a
quiet track, repeater jammer, or unknown track type.
3-98. If the upper and lower traces are the same and the separation distance
is the same (Figure 3-9), the track is probably quiet and a 0 should be entered
in the data field. This will cause the system to attempt to track the target
with quiet track waveforms.
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FM 3-01.87
3-101. If a glob of many traces appear on both lines, it is probably clutter, and
the operator should enter a “2” in the data field and push the DROP TRACK
switch-indicator on that target.
3-102. A-scope cannot be selected on all targets. If the target is being
processed by a pulse doppler waveform, then the A-scope function is not
allowed on that track. The operator is alerted when this condition exists. If
only a single trace appears, the target is being tracked as either a quiet,
continuous, or noncontinuous jammer. If a dual trace appears, the target is
being tracked as a repeater jammer. The range displayed is an estimated
range of the target.
3-103. When A-scope is selected, it is mutually exclusive of the tab display
and static data displayed on the situation display. Volumes, assets, and other
data, if displayed, will be erased. When A-scope is cleared, the static data will
automatically be redisplayed.
3-104. The ECCM ASSIST switch-indicator should not be selected unless the
operator anticipates the use of A-scope (alerts from the system to use
A-Scope). Nonuse of the A-scope process will not degrade system capability.
A-scope should be used in performing the antihelicopter SOJ mission. This is
described later in this chapter.
TARGET CLASSIFICATION
3-105. When surveillance establishes a new track, EDWA begins pre-
classification and classification track processing. The classification process is
discussed in the next section.
PRECLASSIFICATION PROCESS
3-106. The preclassification filter (PCF) attempts to determine if a new track
is actually an aircraft, or if it is chaff or clutter. The principal characteristics
of chaff and clutter tracks are: never moving far from the original position,
erratic speed changes, very low speeds, and spurious high speeds. It is
important to realize that a track that begins as chaff or clutter may switch to
a valid ABT. The opposite is also possible, but unlikely.
3-107. Targets that are continuous (range denying) jammers, targets told-in
from the ICC, and targets classified as TBM tracks bypass the PCF. In each
of these cases, it is assumed that the track is real. All other tracks are
periodically reevaluated by the PCF until they are determined to be real (or
the track is dropped). No further EDWA processing is performed on a track
until this occurs. Tracks that have not passed the PCF are not uptold to the
ICC. They are displayed at the FU as general points with speed and heading
symbology. The operator may manually bypass the PCF by hooking the
general point and identifying it through ID switch action (not recommended).
3-108. The primary test in the PCF determines if a track has moved a
significant distance from its first recorded position. The required distance is a
small percentage of the track's original range. Tracks passing this test must
also pass additional tests for track characteristics that are consistently
outside the acceleration or velocity capabilities of enemy tactical aircraft. All
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FM 3-01.87
tests must be passed before the track can pass the PCF. These additional
tests can be divided into two categories, slow speed tests and false target
tests.
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FM 3-01.87
3-116. A chaff or clutter track may appear real for a period of time. The PCF
is not completely effective in preventing chaff and clutter tracks from being
considered for engagement. Some of these tracks pass through the filter. To
help prevent engagements in these cases, both the slow speed tests and the
false target tests are repeated every time EDWA reevaluates the target
(approximately every four seconds). Tracks that fail these tests will be
classified as slow or false, respectively. This will inhibit automatic
engagement and require reconfirmation for manual engagements.
CLASSIFICATION PROCESS
3-117. The target classification process evaluates track velocity, altitude, and
rate of climb or dive against a set of performance characteristics that
differentiate between confirmed classifications (ABT, TBM A, TBM-B, and
unengageable TBM) and presumed classifications (presumed ABT and
presumed TBM).
3-118. The following discussion is for information purposes only. The operator
has no input into the classification process. Classifications cannot be changed
by operator action. The operator cannot visually distinguish the presumed
classifications. The rules of engagement are identical for presumed ABT and
ABT, and for presumed TBM and TBM. Presumed ABTs and ABTs share the
same visual symbology. Presumed TBMs (PTBMs), TBM As, TBM Bs, and
unengageable TBMs are represented by the same symbol on the display.
TBM As and TBM Bs can be distinguished by the TBM A or TBM B indicator
presented below the ESTAT/S field in the FU Track Amplifying Data tab.
3-119. An unengageable TBM can be distinguished by hooking it and
observing that no LNIP is displayed (indicating that engagement is not
possible) and observing that the Track Amplifying Data tab shows no status
in the ESTAT/S field and no TBM A or TBM B indicator. Confirmed TBM
classifications do not change. A TBM B, for example, may be unengageable
due to its trajectory being outside the TBM engagement volume, but TBM B
will still be displayed in the Track Amplifying Data tab.
3-120. All tracks are initially classified as presumed ABTs. Targets that
achieve a confirmed classification exit the classification process. Targets with
presumed classification are periodically reevaluated to determine if they can
be assigned a confirmed classification.
3-121. A TBM cannot sustain flight within the ascent or descent limits that
define ABT performance for very long. If the performance of a presumed ABT
remains below that of a TBM A for a fixed time, it is classified as an ABT. An
ABT classification is also assigned if a presumed TBM exhibits
characteristics that are never associated with TBMs. These include emitting
ECM and beginning a climb after it has been observed to be definitely
descending. If the range of a presumed TBM is changing very slowly, then the
track is most likely clutter interference. In this case, classification is set to
presumed ABT to force the track through the PCF.
3-122. A track will probably be assigned a classification of TBM A if the track
exceeds the maximum performance of most ABTs but is less than the
minimum performance of any TBM B. One of the exceptions is for tracks
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FM 3-01.87
exhibiting a climb rate at higher altitudes than the capability of specific high-
performance aircraft. These tracks are classified as presumed TBM and
periodically reevaluated. They should eventually receive a confirmed
classification since an ABT cannot climb at this rate indefinitely.
3-123. If the track exceeds the maximum performance of a TBM A, it will be
classified as a TBM B. TBM B trajectories are so high and their velocities are
so great that their performance almost never overlaps that of TBM As or
ABTs.
3-124. Tracks that fall above the maximum performance of TBM Bs are
classified as unengageable TBMs. These tracks are moving too fast for
Patriot capability and cannot intercept tracks exceeding P4-17 mps.
IDENTIFICATION
3-125. Once a target is classified as an ABT (or possible ABT) the system
undergoes periodic identification reevaluation to determine identity (ID). The
FU can assign IDs of friend, assumed friend, unknown, or hostile
automatically (in automatic ID mode) and the operator can assign these IDs
manually (in either ID mode). The true friend ID is automatically assigned
only when a valid Mode 4 IFF response is received; it cannot be manually
assigned. The special friend ID, normally assigned only by ID switch action,
may also be automatically assigned when battery tracks correlate with
higher echelon tracks, in which case the FU accepts the ID. Targets that are
classified as PABTs lose any ID information they have acquired if they are
reclassified as a TBM. All TBMs are considered as hostile.
3-126. The FU acquires two types of ID information, passive and active.
Passive ID criteria are: the presence of continuous ECM that prevents the
radar from acquiring range, correlation with generalized ID volumes (friendly
origin, hostile origin, prohibited, and restricted volumes), safe passage
corridors (SPCs), minimum safe velocity (MSV), and pop-ups. The only active
ID criteria are SIF and Mode 4 IFF interrogation responses.
GENERALIZED VOLUMES
3-127. The generalized volume is designed to accommodate two specific
functions. The first is the multipurpose volume and the second is to
incorporate additional criteria into the volume correlation. A volume may be
created with multiple attributes assigned to the volume. For example, RV,
PV, WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, WEAPONS FREE, SPC, and
friendly or hostile origins may be assigned to one volume. Besides the
physical (spatial) correlation within this multipurpose volume, the target
may have additional criteria for correlating with a volume. These correlation
criteria are limits on a track's ground velocity (speed) and on a track's
heading. Additional criteria are optional and the conditions for correlation
can differ from volume to volume.
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FM 3-01.87
ATTRIBUTES
3-128. There are two primary types of attributes that can be assigned a
volume. They are identification attributes and weapons control attributes. A
volume may contain identification, weapons control, or both types of
attributes. The identification attributes are further defined in two categories,
friendly or hostile attributes. The friendly attributes are friendly origin and
safe passage corridor. The hostile attributes are hostile origin, restricted
volume, and prohibited volume. A volume may contain either friendly or
hostile attributes but not both friendly and hostile. There are three weapons
control attributes: WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, and WEAPONS
FREE. A volume may not have more than one weapon control attribute at a
time.
OVERLAPPING VOLUMES
3-129. To account for the possibility of overlapping volumes, an order of
precedence has been established for identification and weapons control
attributes. For identification, friendly attributes take precedence over hostile
attributes. If a volume with a friendly attribute(s) overlaps with a volume of a
hostile attribute(s) (shared airspace), a track that correlates with both
volumes would be given the attributes (identification flag [s]) of the friendly
ID volume. The most restrictive weapons control mode attribute from all
volumes with which a target correlates during a given evaluation is applied
to the target. WEAPONS HOLD will take precedence over WEAPONS
TIGHT or WEAPONS FREE. WEAPONS TIGHT will take precedence over a
WEAPONS FREE. It is important to note that this new order of precedence
does not affect the use of the residual weapons control mode. Correlation with
a weapons control volume takes precedence over the residual weapons control
mode regardless of how restrictive. For example, a track that correlates with
a WEAPONS FREE volume with a residual state of WEAPONS HOLD will
be given the WEAPONS FREE control mode.
VOLUME TYPES
3-130. A distinction must be made between dual-purpose volumes and pure
weapons control volumes. Dual-purpose volumes have both identification
control attributes and weapons control attributes. Pure weapons control
volumes consist solely of a weapon control attribute. The weapons control
volumes enabled condition (areas enabled) applies only to pure weapons
control volumes. A target is tested for correlation with a pure weapon control
volume only if the volumes enabled condition is in effect. A weapons control
attribute from either a dual-purpose volume or from a pure weapon control
volume is applied to a target only if the target correlates (meeting all
correlation criteria) with either type of volume.
ID PROCESSING
3-131. Some basic rules govern the evaluation, decision, and weapon
assignment (EDWA) passive ID processing logic for generalized volumes.
They include the following—
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FM 3-01.87
VOLUME CORRELATION
3-132. The passive identification process first checks the target's spatial
correlation with the volumes defined. If the target correlates spatially, then
the speed attribute is checked next. After the speed check, the heading check
is performed. These attributes (speed and heading) are checked based on the
entries made in Tab 71. If no entry was made for an attribute, the check is
bypassed. The target must correlate with all attributes to be given credit for
correlating with a volume. If the target fails to meet either the spatial
correlation or any of the additional attributes assigned to that volume, then
the target does not correlate.
3-133. The safe corridor alignment interval entered in Tab 79 (0 to 99 sec)
still works the same for friendly volumes entered with an SPC attribute,
corridor width, and direction in Tab 71. The safe corridor alignment interval
also applies to the heading criteria entered for a friendly volume (with an
SPC attribute but without corridor width). For targets which correlate with a
friendly volume that is not a corridor (SPC attribute without width or
heading entered in Tab 71), additional evaluations are allowed to correct an
incorrect speed or to get back into the volume (spatial correlation) before the
target loses SPC credit.
DEFINITION
3-134. Generalized volumes are defined in Tab 71 during initialization
according to the applicable ACO. The operator may alter the parameters of
these volumes during tactical operations through Tab 71 or deactivate them
through Tab 5.
PASSIVE ID LINE
3-135. Identification volumes such as prohibited volumes (PVs), restricted
volumes (RVs), and safe passage corridors (SPCs) are not considered for
correlation beyond the Passive ID Line (PIDON) or IFF Passive ID Line
(IFFPID). Therefore, if a PIDON/IFFPID is active, a target within any of
these volumes that is beyond the PIDON/IFFPID will not receive credit for
correlation. The IFF passive ID line/IFF on passive ID line replaces FSCL for
passive ID processing.
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FM 3-01.87
ECM EMMITTERS
3-136. The presence of continuous ECM (that prevents radar range
acquisition) tags a track with the ECM ID history indication. This ID
indicator is displayed on the Track Amplifying Data tab beside ECM EMIT.
This is a permanent hostile indicator. Only continuous ECM is allowed to set
ECM history, because quiet (non-ECM emitting) friendly tracks sometimes
receive credit for the two other Patriot ECM categories (noncontinuous and
repeater). This can occur when a friendly aircraft crosses in front of a
jamming source or due to the presence of chaff or clutter. Thus, the ECM
history indicator will usually be associated with a strobe. The target may
appear as a range-resolved jammer due to triangulation or radar burns.
Radar burn-through occurs on a strobe at a relatively short range when the
power of the Patriot radar allows it to defeat the ECM and obtain a skin
track. The operator may choose to have the system automatically ID all
tracks that carry ECM history as hostile through Tab 1. This will not affect
tracks that have been manually identified by the ICC or FU, identified by
HE, or identified as a true friend. The selection is normally not used. It is
likely that any friendly aircraft jammers operating in forward areas will be
identified as hostile if this selection is made.
FRIENDLY ORIGIN
3-137. Friendly origin (FORG) and hostile origin (HORG) volume correlation
are performed once (immediately after the preclassification filter has been
passed). It is not possible for a track to correlate with both a FORG and
HORG. Correlation with either of these volumes is displayed beside the
ORIGIN indication in the Track Amplifying Data Tab, FORG correlation is
displayed as F, and HORG correlation is displayed as H.
3-138. PROHIB VOL/RESTR VOL. PV and RV correlation are performed on
every reevaluation after the preclassification filter has been passed. When a
PV correlation occurs, PVs are not tested on subsequent reevaluations. The
same is true for RVs. Correlation with a PV is displayed in the Track
Amplification Data tab beside PROHIB VOL. RV is displayed beside RESTR
VOL.
3-139. SAFE CORR. SPC correlation is temporary and is performed on every
reevaluation after preclassification. However, if correlation is lost with an
SPC during one reevaluation, SPC history is not immediately lost. Only if a
previously correlated track fails to correlate in position or velocity with an
SPC on 4 consecutive reevaluations or has failed to correlate in heading
within initialized limits (Tab 71, CORR TOLERANCE) for more than a preset
time interval (Tab 79, SAFE CORRID or ALIGN. INTERVAL), correlation
will be lost. This is to account for targets in a turn within a corridor. SPC
history credit is displayed on the Track Amplifying Data tab beside SAFE
CORR.
3-140. SAFE ELV. The minimum safe velocity (MSV) test is performed on
every reevaluation after preclassification, only if it has been authorized in
Tab 1 and the track is within the PIDON/IFFPID. MSV is a temporary
friendly indicator. A track receives credit on each reevaluation that its
altitude and velocity are below the MSV thresholds defined in Tab 79. It loses
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FM 3-01.87
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FM 3-01.87
EVALUATION RESULTS
3-146. The evaluation results of IFF responses are displayed in the lower part
of the Track Amplifying Data tab for Modes 1 and 3 in the line RESPONSE
(RSPS). The Track Amplifying Data tab is in Figure 3-11.
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FM 3-01.87
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FM 3-01.87
AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION
3-150. If the SIF FRND entry in Tab 1 is set to YES and positive SIF is
detected on a track, the ID is set to friend regardless of other ID. The ID will
not be changed again automatically. This does not change the ID of tracks
that are already manually identified, identified by HE, or are true friends.
3-151. Conflict SIF is possible only if both Modes 1 and 3 are selected in
Tab 6 and the response is valid for one mode and invalid for the other. CSIF
does not have any ID weight in weight set 3, so it does not have any effect on
automatic ID. It is displayed beside IFF EVAL in the Track Amplifying Data
tab as confirmed (CONF).
3-152. Positive SIF is generated if the IFF response(s) for the selected
mode(s) is valid. PSIF provides a friendly weight. It is displayed beside IFF
EVAL as positive (POS).
3-153. Negative SIF is generated if the IFF response(s) for the selected
mode(s) is not valid. NSIF provides a hostile weight. It is displayed beside
IFF EVAL as NEG.
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FM 3-01.87
FLIGHT PATH
SPC
FRIENDLY
ORIGIN
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FM 3-01.87
MANUAL ID
3-162. Manual ID processing is relatively simple. When the fire unit operator
manually IDs a track using the HOST, FRND, UNK, or SPEC switches, the
ICC will be notified via the ID CONFLICT alert. The ID, chosen by the ICC
to resolve the conflict, is downtold and the FU automatically accepts it.
ENGAGEMENT ELIGIBILITY
3-164. Various factors must be examined for each target evaluation which
affect engagement eligibility. These include target ID, residual weapon
control state, target correlation with weapons control volumes, threat
eligibility, and target speed (slow and false target criteria). A friendly
identity (Special Friend, True Friend, Friend, or Assumed Friend) negates
the need for any threat assessment. In the case of an Unknown identity, it
must be determined which weapon control state the target is in. If no threat
assessment is performed, the target is not processed for engagement. A
hostile identity makes the target immediately eligible for manual
engagement, but the automatic engagement eligibility of the target is
prohibited if it has correlated with a WEAPONS HOLD volume or if residual
WEAPONS HOLD applies.
THREAT ELIGIBILITY
3-166. Threat eligibility is based on target range, velocity, and heading. Only
when a track is close enough to have an acceptable Pk is it threat assessed.
Figure 3-13, provides a visual representation of this process. The eligible
target range threshold and the maximum acceptable intercept range can be
altered using the operator range bias in Tab 1. This bias should only be used
if directed by the force commander. If a track is close enough to be threat
assessed, it is checked for either inhibiting condition.
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FM 3-01.87
NOT ASSESSED
ANY TARGET THAT IS
PREDICTED TO PENETRATE
THE MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE
INTERCEPT RANGE IS
THREAT ASSESSED
ASSESSED
NO OUTBOUND TARGET
BEYOND THE MAXIMUM MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE
ACCEPTABLE INTERCEPT INTERCEPT RANGE (BASED
RANGE IS THREAT
ASSESSED ON Pk)
BATTERY LOCATION
THREAT ASSESSMENT
3-167. After a target qualifies as an eligible enemy threat, the target will
undergo detailed threat assessment. Detailed threat assessment consists of
threat category assignment, TBEQ processing, and launch decision
processing.
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FM 3-01.87
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3-172. Time to last launch (TTLL) is the time remaining to the last
opportunity to initiate an engagement so intercept will occur before the
target penetrates the asset boundary. This is a very forgiving calculation. It
assumes that the target is heading directly towards the center of the asset at
its current speed. It also assumes that the Patriot missile has to fly to the
farthest point on the asset boundary to perform the intercept. Also, a delay
time, equal to the maximum time from engagement initiation to missile
launch, is considered. Thus, if the target is not heading directly towards the
asset, an engagement at TTLL=0 will be intercepted outside the asset
boundary.
SELF-DEFENSE
3-176. The alert “nnn SELF DEFENSE THREAT” is generated by processing
in the threat assessment logic that determines when a track is an enemy
threat to the FU. This logic assumes an instantaneous turn towards the FU
at the current target speed. The TTLL for the target is calculated based on
the FU's minimum range engagement boundary. If the TTLL is less than
24 seconds and the track is eligible for engagement, the alert is displayed.
Sometimes this causes confusion (see Figure 3-14). A track may get the alert
just before its LNIP becomes invalid. If so, an engagement is not possible.
This should occur only when the target does not overfly the FU.
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MINIMUM RANGE
ENGAGEMENT BOUNDARY
KILL ASSESSMENT
3-178. The track KA is set to no kill (NK) for several reasons—the track
continuously emits (range denying) ECM, track energy increases; or the KA
evaluation time expires before track energy is observed to increase or
decrease significantly. The # symbol is removed when a KA state of NK is
assigned to the track.
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FM 3-01.87
TESTS
3-179. These are all commonsense tests. If a track continues to fly at the
same speed for a period of time after intercept, or it begins accelerating, then
it has not been killed. A killed track also does not continue to emit continuous
ECM. KA processing is not performed for TBMs. If the intercept goes to
completion, the KA state is set to Pk. If the intercept fails the KA state is set
to NK.
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TBM tracks also may be transmitted to adjacent battalions whose FUs are
threatened.
3-185. When the battalion's mission is to provide asset defense (such as
protecting an airfield or harbor area) against TBMs, two-fifths or more of the
batteries should be in the ABT and TBM surveillance mode, respectively.
Where the primary enemy is ABTs, one- to two-fifths of the batteries in the
TBM surveillance mode may be enough to provide necessary protection.
3-186. TBM polygon assets and the possibility of multiple launch sites make
it feasible to split the launch sites with the RS PTL and align launch stations
to the specific azimuth of the launch sites. This reduces missile fly out time.
If single launch sites are the only threat, then align both the RS and LSs
toward the launch sites.
ATM CAPABILITY
3-187. The PDB-4 upgrade has modified the ICC and FU software to
accommodate the changes in hardware and consequently has greatly
enhanced the system's ATM capability. With the hardware improvements,
the Patriot system can now counter a larger spectrum of TBMs. It also
provides for greater asset defense in addition to improving the self-defense
capability.
HARDWARE
3-188. The hardware changes in the system have primarily been in the
Patriot guidance enhanced missile. These consist of improvements to the
S-band fuze reaction time, improved sensitivity of the C-band track via
missile (TVM) seeker, and higher TVM data rate. The improvement in
sensitivity of the TVM seeker is accomplished through the addition of three
low-noise C-band amplifiers to the front end of the receiver. This low noise
amplifier change requires modifications to the seeker antenna monopulse
feed and to the intermediate frequency (IF) receiver. The S-band fuze
improvement requires changes to the fuze processor to provide greater
sensitivity and earlier detection of targets. The higher TVM data rate in the
missile hardware changes a programmable read-only memory in the timing
and control unit.
SOFTWARE
3-189. Overall, there have been two major functional improvements in the
software to counter TBMs. First, the system has an improved overall defense
capability against a wider range of TBMs. Furthermore, there is a capability
to provide limited TBM defense for critical assets within the high lethality
engagement zone. This is in addition to the normal FU self-defense
capability. All the software functional areas (surveillance, guidance, EDWA,
and status monitor) have been modified to provide this enhanced TBM
capability. The FU software accounts for the availability of the GEM and will
select the appropriate missile for the mission being conducted.
3-49
FM 3-01.87
Target Classification
3-190. The target classification modifications include the addition of the new
Type B TBM and logic changes that account for updated intelligence data on
aircraft performance. The classification process also includes told-in
processing from other ICCs. The target characteristics and flight profiles of
various threat aircraft, TM, and TBM targets are compared to performance
boundaries defined within the software. From these flight profiles, the logic
will distinguish aircraft and TMs, from TBMs, arriving at a specific
classification for every track. The target classification process provides
several categories of classification within a presumed or confirmed category.
3-191. Presumed ABT (PABTs) target classifications are applied to targets
whose previously observed flight profiles do not demonstrate characteristics
that would allow a confirmed classification. All targets are initially classified
with the default of PABT.
3-192. Targets with the presumed classification continue to be processed by
the classification logic so that they may be positively classified. Before the
determination of a positive classification, the target maintains a presumed
status but is treated equivalent to a confirmed classification for engagement
purposes. A PABT will be treated as an ABT track, and a presumed tactical
ballistic missile will be treated as a TBM A.
3-193. Targets that have not yet received a confirmed classification are
processed by the classification logic each time it is evaluated by EDWA. Once
a target receives a confirmed classification, it is no longer processed by the
classification logic. Therefore, its classification will not change due to local
processing. A target may have a classification change due to a told-in
classification from the ICC. If a presumed TBM is determined to be emitting
ECM, its classification is changed to ABT.
3-194. The classification logic distinguishes TBM Bs. The TBM B threat is
easily discriminated from TBM As and ABTs by its greater flight dynamics
and higher altitude. The TBM B velocity profile almost never overlaps
profiles for TBM As or ABTs.
3-195. The classification logic compares target climb rate versus altitude
against the maximum altitude attributed to any aircraft. If the maximum
altitude rate or velocity profile is exceeded but is less than that for a TBM B,
the target is classified as a TBM A. If the climb rate is greater than most
aircraft, but within the capability of specific high-performance aircraft, a
PTBM classification is assigned. The logic accounts for the small probability
of an aircraft climbing rapidly at high altitudes and ensures that the target
will continue to be processed by the classification logic until a confirmed
classification is established. The classification logic sets a target dive
indicator if the descent rate of the target exceeds a specific threshold. If, after
this indicator is set, the target is observed to be climbing, the classification is
set to ABT. This logic assumes that TBMs will not change from a dive phase
to an ascent phase.
3-196. A level flight time test is performed for ambiguously classified targets
with an altitude less than 15 kilometers and an altitude rate within the
performance region of both ABTs and TBMs. If over a prescribed time frame,
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FM 3-01.87
Threat Assessment
3-197. The threat assessment process has been enhanced to include critical
asset defense and accommodation of a ballistic trajectory used for a TBM B
ground impact point (GIP) calculation. ABT (seen as AT on the display)
assets will be threat assessed against a radius from the center point not the
actual size of the ABT asset, while pure TBM (seen as TB on the display)
assets will be assessed against the entire asset.
3-198. The threat assessment logic determines if a TBM is a threat by
predicting the TBM GIP. The GIP is determined by predicting the TBM
trajectory from its current position to the ground. Due to the trajectory
differences between TBM As and TBM Bs, different trajectory logic is
required. For a target to enter the threat assessment logic, it must have
reached its apogee and be on the downward descent of its ballistic trajectory
during periodic TBM threat evaluations. The trajectory predicted for TBM A
targets will initially be ballistic, with a dive angle toward the target during
the final phase of flight. TBM B targets are predicted to fly without a dive
maneuver.
3-199. A ground impact point area prediction uncertainty is defined around
the GIP. This area is called the GIP box. It is a representation of where the
system thinks the missile will impact plus additional area to account for
system error. The software uses the location of the highest priority asset in
the GIP area of uncertainty to determine if the trajectory prediction should
be modified for a dive maneuver or remain ballistic. If the asset is beyond the
predicted ballistic GIP, then no dive maneuver is calculated for Type A
TBMs. If the asset is between the ballistic GIP and the missile, dive
maneuvers are then calculated for Type A TBMs. The area of uncertainty
around the ballistic GIP has been defined large enough to contain the most
severe turn-down maneuver expected.
3-200. This GIP box has varying dimensions based on type of TBM. The
lengthwise direction of a GIP box is along the direction vector of the TBM
trajectory. This rectangular area of uncertainty is used to determine if the
battery or an asset is potentially threatened (site location within the
uncertainty box centered around the predicted GIP) or whether an active
asset is potentially threatened. This GIP box is never displayed, only the GIP.
For further details on the GIP box, see (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
3-201. The GIP is always computed but is displayed only when certain
parameters are met. If the TBM is threatening the FU or an activated asset,
the GIP is automatically displayed. If the TBM is non-threatening, the GIP is
displayed only when the target is hooked. The GIP box is never displayed, see
Figure 3-15.
3-51
FM 3-01.87
TBM
Trajectory
GIP Box
Ground
Impact Point
3-52
FM 3-01.87
3-204. Once the GIP is initially calculated, based upon TBM flight path, the
FU and assets are then evaluated to determine which is most threatened.
The evaluation logic first evaluates the FU to determine if the TBM is a self-
defense threat. If the FU coordinates are within the GIP box, the TBM is
determined to be a self-defense threat. As such, the asset threat category
(ATC) is set to the highest priority value (ATC=1), regardless whether other
assets are also threatened.
3-205. If the FU is not within the GIP box, the other active assets are
evaluated. The system uses the following procedures to determine if an active
asset is threatened. If any of the multipoint TB asset coordinates are within
the GIP box, the TBM is determined to be an asset defense. For an AT asset,
software first draws (but does not display) a circle with a radius of
2 kilometers around the ABT asset. If the GIP box intersects this 2-kilometer
circle around the ABT asset, the system will consider the ABT asset
threatened and process that TBM for engagement. If the GIP box does not
intersect the circle, the ABT asset is not threatened, and the system will not
produce an automatic engagement (Figure 3-16).
Causes No
Engagement
Causes
Engagement
Asset
3-53
FM 3-01.87
TBM
M ax
Altitude
Min
Range Max
3-54
FM 3-01.87
PTL
3-211. The altitude and ground range engagement zones will render the TBM
as engageable if the LNIP is predicted within these zones or if the LNIP is
predicted to land within these zones (TTFL is greater than zero, see
Figure 3-19). These engagement zones are the maximum system capabilities
for Patriot, and the area on the ground can be defended with a limited degree
of protection. The most forward areas of the GIP may only cause a single
intercepter to be launched, which will dramatically decrease the Pk.
3-55
FM 3-01.87
TBM B ( )
Does Not Dive
Dive Point
Altitude
TTFL = 0
Type A
TTLL = 0
Type B
Range
Intercept Boundary
for Last Launch
3-56
FM 3-01.87
Low Pk
Remote LS
3-57
FM 3-01.87
REMOTE LAUNCH
3-224. This section defines LS emplacement criteria, the engagement decision
and weapons assignment process at the FU and the defense design
considerations when implementing remote launch (Figure 3-21). TBM
defense design is based on launcher locations and the footprints related to the
defended area for the launcher, not the radar. Establish the TBM defense
design around the footprints for the expected threat. There are two separate
locations where launchers may be positioned to counter the threat: local
launchers and remote launchers phase-I. Orient the radar PTL pointing
towards the center of the threat launch locations. The launchers must be
pointed directly at a threat launch location to achieve the smallest crossing
3-58
FM 3-01.87
angle and highest Pk. Whenever possible, orient launchers in pairs towards
the threat launch locations for redundancy.
VHF
Fiber-Optic Cable
P4- 23 kms
Local Remote
LAUNCHER EMPLACEMENT
3-225. LSs are categorized according to emplacement geometry, as shown in
Figure 3-22. Local LSs must be located within P4-24 kilometers of the radar
coordinates, and within the sector limits of 80 degrees from the radar PTL. A
remote LS is defined as any LS exceeding the P4-25 kilometer radius from
the radar. Remote LS emplacement is constrained by RS to LS
communications and by missile acquisition. The maximum radial distance
imposed by these constraints is not to exceed P4-26 kilometers. The remote
launch sector limits are defined as the track sector limits.
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FM 3-01.87
Maximum Range
From Radar
PTL
Track Track
Bounds Bounds
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FM 3-01.87
features between the RS and LS exceed 2o (local LS) or 0.5o (remote LS) above
LOS, radar acquisition of the missile may not occur.
MISSILE ACQUISITION
LOS
LOS
MISSILE
ACQUISITION ??
??
LOS
LOS
3-61
FM 3-01.87
guidance and TVM will provide missile uplink by the nontracking radar
before obtaining line of sight to the target. At extended range, the
communication link is susceptible to many factors as indicated below. The
associated considerations and operator actions will ensure a greater
likelihood of establishing and maintaining communication with remote
launchers:
• Atmospheric conditions—Weather and temperature changes affect
the signal-to-noise ratio.
• Terrain—Terrain changes also effect the signal-to-noise ratio. Each
location has its attributes. Generally, as elevation increases, so does
signal strength. At longer ranges, it is advantageous for the LS and
ECS to be at the highest elevations possible.
• Line of sight—This is necessary for data link upgrade (DLU)
communications with remote LSs.
• Surrounding noise—Background noise has an effect on the signal-to-
noise ratio.
3-62
FM 3-01.87
Altitude
Ground Impact
Range
Local LS Remote LS
Figure 3-25. Missile Fly-Out Time
3-231. For remote launch, threat assessment has incorporated LS selection
logic. With remote launch for TBMs, engagement decision parameters are
dependent upon the LS selected. Remote launchers are favored in LS
selection if remote launchers contain the correct type of missile available for
TBMs.
3-232. Remote LSs are favored for TBM asset defense—
• When it is too late to engage with local LS to defend a remote asset.
• When the total ATM missile inventory at the local LSs has decreased
to a specific low missile limit.
• When only ATM missiles are available at all launchers.
3-233. Under certain conditions a remote LS may not be advantageous, even
though one of the previously stated factors exists. When these conditions
exist, a local LS is chosen, if possible. These conditions are as follows:
• Only non-ATM missiles are available at the remote LS, and ATM
missiles are available at local LS for TBM engagement.
• The TBM trajectory is not anticipated to enter the engagement zone
of any of the remote LSs.
• There is unfavorable engagement geometry at all remote LSs, and the
local LS geometry is better. These conditions result from the ABT LS
dead zone test, the TBM LS engagement zone, and a TBM distance
and angle check.
3-234. Generally, local LSs are favored for ABT defense and for TBM
self-defense of the battery. The shorter distance from battery to impact point
results in more favorable engagement geometry. Remote launchers are more
effective for asset TBM defense.
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FM 3-01.87
TTFL, and TTLL. When the target enters the TBEQ, either from the
automatic process or from an operator engage switch action, the appropriate
LS is selected and a missile is reserved on that LS for an eventual
engagement. If the selected LS becomes unacceptable, EDWA will assign
another LS collocated with the radar, or reassess the target again when it
reenters the TBEQ.
LAUNCHER SCORING
3-236. An LS scoring system determines the best ready LS from all the
launchers evaluated. A score is computed for every LS evaluated. The LS
must be in remote and must contain at least one available missile. LSs that
are not scored will not be selected during the current weapons assignment
evaluation. There are several constraints that prevent LS scoring for a
particular LS. For example,—
• The LS is currently in use.
• The predicted intercept is in the LS dead zone.
• SEM and SOJC engagements are restricted to local launchers.
3-237. LS scoring is based on several elements. The specific parameters
selected are a function of whether it is an ABT or TBM engagement. The ABT
engagement is further defined for long range (>25 kilometers) and short
range (<25 kilometers). The operator has no control over the LS scoring
parameters other than the depletion rule set in Tab 78. The elements for
scoring are—
• LS intercept angle acceptability check (37o) for ABT only.
• TTLL criticality.
• Missile types for enemy threats (ATM for TBM engagement, SOJC for
SOJC).
• Patriot missiles initial turn angle (TBM only).
• Distance and angle from impact point to LS (only for TBM
engagements).
• LS assignment preference (TBM uses a remote LS, self-defense uses a
local LS).
• Missile frequency availability.
• Missile address conflicts.
• LS missile depletion.
• LS number.
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FM 3-01.87
• The missile must still be reserved and available for the pending
engagement. The missile must also be appropriate for the current
classification. The case in which the missile may no longer be
appropriate is after a classification change from a presumed state to a
confirmed state requiring a different missile type (for example, PABT
to TBM A or PTBM to ABT).
• For ABTs, the LNIP must be outside the LS dead zone, and the dead
zone is not predicted to interfere with asset defense.
• For TBMs, the LNIP must still be within the LS engagement volume.
If no LNIP is entered, the TBM will enter the LNIP in the future. A
remote LS is rejected if the LNIP is closer to the radar than to the LS.
This precludes tail chase engagements. LS is rejected if an intercept
is predicted behind the LS.
• A target becomes a strobe and a remote LS is assigned.
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FM 3-01.87
3-242. The range of the remote launcher TBM engagement zone is a function
of how far forward the remote launcher is emplaced. There are four regions
forward of the radar that effect the range of the TBM engagement zone. See
Figure 3-26.
2
REMOTE LS
REGIONS
LOCAL LS REGION
3-66
FM 3-01.87
EZ 4
EZ 3
EZ 2
EZ 1
REGION 2 REGION 4
REGION 3
LOCAL REGION 1
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FM 3-01.87
PTL
REGION 3
REGION 2
LOCAL
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FM 3-01.87
ICC PROCESSING
3-252. The ICC battalion command and control (BCAC) software has been
modified to account for battery processing of remote launchers. For the ICC
to correctly assess enemy targets relative to a battery, it must know the
remote LS positions to appropriately calculate TFLT, LNIP, TTFL, and
TTLL. All Patriot battery LS positions are uptold if the FU has any remote
LS. The FU also reports the LS that it has selected for a particular target. If
the FU does not report an LS assignment for a particular target, the ICC will
use the FU position for performing threat assessment.
3-253. At the ICC, an asset defense file (ADF) is developed which lists the
closest batteries to active assets defined. This is a course check to determine
if a threatened asset can be defended. With the arrival of remote launch, the
ADF now considers the closest batteries of the closest remote launcher(s)
reported by the batteries. As previously discussed, the fire unit(s) now sends
the remote launcher locations to the ICC. The ICC ADF only considers the
remote launcher(s) reported from its local fire units. An MICC's ADF, for
example, does not include the remote launchers from a subordinate ICC. The
MICC's ADF considers the subordinate ICC's batteries and its own locations
as well as any remote launchers reported from its own batteries. The closest
battery, local battery, or local battery remote launchers are used for the
threat assessment calculations and fire unit selection.
TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
3-254. The defense design process is essentially unchanged, although minor
modifications incorporate remote launch. It is recommended that remote
region 3 be the maximum region for the emplacement of remote launchers
(METT-TC dependent).
3-255. Remote launch is a battalion-level decision. Deploy remote launchers
as a last resort. Plan the defense to use only local launchers first. If the
defense needs to be improved and if it can be by using remote launch, do so.
However, realize that remote launch operations place a greater demand on
the battalion's resources (personnel, equipment, maintenance, and logistics).
3-256. Short-term missions such as initial lodgment protection force build-up
protection missions, and protection of staging and assembly areas may all be
operations suited for remote launch. Available airlift may require the
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FM 3-01.87
3-70
FM 3-01.87
3-71
FM 3-01.87
ASSET 4
ASSET 5
ASSET 3
LS7A LS8B LS6B
LS8A LS7B LS5B
LS5A
LS6A
LS2B LS3B
LS2A LS3A
LS1B LS4B
LS1A LS4A
B BTRY
A BTRY
Figure 3-29. Reconstitution Possibilities
3-264. Should A or B Battery (Figure 3-29) become nonoperational, all the
LSs protecting Asset 4 can be used by the operational battery. All
emplacement constraints for the LSs over Asset 4 must be met for both
batteries. The LS must be within angular limits, range limits, LOS limits,
and PTL support limits.
3-265. Launchers used for remote must be automatically emplaced. The
launchers have to be reemplaced by the gaining unit automatically. To
accomplish this
• The crew members at the remote LS must—
– Ensure the correct LS address is set.
– Change frequency, hopsets/transmitter set (if different).
– Set net start time.
• The crew members at the ECS must—
– Ensure that the other ECS has deassigned the remote launcher.
– Establish the remote LS Tab 85 data base.
– Ensure the remote LS is in SYNC.
– Reorient the LS as needed to support the PTL.
3-266. Each battery in the battalion will load all six hopsets and appropriate
lockout sets in each radio. Each battery will then operate on a unique hopset
3-72
FM 3-01.87
and its assigned lockout set. When a group of remote launchers are to be
transferred to another battery, the launcher operator must ensure that the
launcher is at the alignment position (normally stow). If not, the operator
must rotate the LS to the alignment position, change the launcher address,
radio hopset, and set the time to coincide with the receiving unit. The PLGR
system provides a very accurate time source for the system.
3-267. The primary function of remote launchers is to intercept TBMs; the
missile load should be all GEMs. If this is not possible, the mix of GEM and
ATM missiles should be balanced between the local and remote locations. The
same missile selection rules still apply for TBM and ABT engagements
allowing all missiles to be used for these engagements (ATM1 and ATM
engagements from local launchers only). If radar frequency pairs are lost, the
remaining missiles with the same frequency pairs will not be selected for
firing. This will reduce the number of available missiles on that launcher. No
more than two missiles with the same frequency pair should be loaded on one
launcher. Missile dash numbers are stenciled on the rear of the missile
canisters.
3-268. The GEM Pk curves are a result of the enhancements to the Patriot
system hardware and software modifications. These include hardware
modifications that result in earlier detection and software improvements for
remote launch, enhanced missile trajectory shaping, and better fusing. The
synergism of these improvements results in a larger region of higher Pk. The
actual Pk values are defined in (S)FM 44-100A(U).
3-269. With this policy, the LS crewmen will only have to verify the remote
LS setup. The ECS operator will only have to enter the sharable remote LS
into the data base. This cannot be done in advance because of communication
protocol between the ECS and LSs. The LS only talks when spoken to. If two
ECSs have the same LS in their data base, both will try to establish
communications with the LS. This will result in the LS not synchronize to
either ECS.
PATRIOT MISSILES
3-270. The Patriot missile inventory includes four different missile types.
They are referred to as the Standard, SOJC, ATM, and ATM1 missiles. The
standard and SOJC missiles are also referred to as PAC-1 missiles, while the
ATM missile is the PAC-2, and the ATM1 missile is the GEM. There are no
visual differences between the missiles. Reading the noun nomenclature from
the data plate on the canister makes identification as to which type missile is
in the canister. Nomenclature and missile type is as follows:
• MIM-104A Standard
• MIM-104B SOJC
• MIM-104C ATM
• MIM-104D ATM1 (GEM)
3-271. Using the system software, the operator can identify the type of
missiles uploaded on the launchers by observing the Missile Inventory tab S/I
(see Figure 3-30). With the fielding of each new missile, all the capabilities of
the previous missile were retained. The LS ID, missile status, and missile
3-73
FM 3-01.87
STD
ASOJ
ATM
ATM1
NO GUIDANCE FREQUENCIES— MISSILES
Figure 3-30. Missile Inventory S/I, Pages 1 to 3
STANDARD MISSILE
3-272. The MIM-104 Standard missile was the first missile type fielded with
Patriot and contained an analog fuze. This fuze was replaced by a digital
version of the fuze with the fielding of the MIM-104A. Both of these missiles
provide excellent performance against ABTs and adequate performance
against certain TBMs. The warhead fragment size limits performance against
TBMs to a Mission Kill.
SOJC MISSILE
3-273. To counter the long-range ECM threat, use the MIM-104B or SOJC
missile. The guidance and navigation hardware was modified to allow the
SOJC missile to fly a lofted trajectory to the jamming source and seek out the
strongest emitter during the terminal phase. To achieve the lofted trajectory
needed to maintain missile maneuverability at long range, missile acquisition
is delayed for the SOJC mission. The SOJC missile can fly five times longer
than the standard missile without the uplink/downlink between the RS and
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FM 3-01.87
missile. The SOJC missile retains the same performance against ABTs and
TBMs as the standard missile.
LAUNCHER CONFIGURATIONS
3-276. Missiles will be loaded on launching stations to facilitate reload
according to mission priorities. When the unit has a mix of missile types, the
different types will be evenly distributed across the launching stations. If the
unit has a TBM-only mission, the ATM missiles will be loaded in the upper
positions on the launching station, and the ATM1 missiles will be loaded in
the upper left/lower left or upper right/lower right positions. If the unit has
an ABT-only mission, a standard and an SOJC missile will be loaded in the
upper positions. If the mission is mixed, TBM and ABT, the ATM or SOJC
missiles will be loaded in the same manner as the ATM1 missiles (upper
left/lower left, upper right/lower right). These configurations in a mixed
missile type basic load will facilitate reload without removal of nonexpended
missiles.
3-277. Distribute the GEMs on the launchers so that the loss of a launcher
will not significantly reduce ATM capability. This will provide for redundancy
in case of launcher malfunction. GEMs should be loaded on the upper left and
lower left positions or upper right or lower right positions for easy access for
missile reload. Furthermore, even distribution will maximize launch rate of
3-75
FM 3-01.87
these missiles. For example, if the battery has four GEM missiles, then put
the missiles on two separate launchers.
3-278. Each missile has a pair of assigned frequencies that are set at the
factory. These frequencies are used for communication with the missile.
Along with ensuring that the launcher is configured with the correct type of
missiles (STD, SOJC, ATM, and ATM1), the TCO and battery warrant officer
must ensure that a correct frequency mix is also distributed on the launcher.
The missile distribution should not exceed two missiles with the same
frequency pair per launcher. This will minimize the loss of a launcher due to
the radar exciter group not being able to support certain frequencies.
SYSTEM INFORMATION
3-279. Information about uploaded missiles is available to the operator in
page 1 of the Fault Data tab, the Missile Status, and the Missile Inventory
tab. The guidance frequencies information in the Fault Data tab indicates the
number of missiles that are supported in frequency by the radar. Those
missiles that have no frequency support are not usable for engagements. The
Missile Status and Missile Inventory tabs give the operator a "by missile"
indication of the missile status. Pages 1 and 2 show the status by launcher
for each bank. Missiles with no guidance frequencies supported by the radar
will show a B for NOT SELECTABLE. Page 3 is a missile summary by type
for all the available launchers.
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FM 3-01.87
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FM 3-01.87
3-283. When enabling the nominal override, the missile selection for TBM A
changes. The system will primarily select the GEM when the TBM GIP is
within P4-48 km radius from the selected launcher. Outside P4-49 km radius
the system will select a PAC II missile. The missile selection criteria is based
on the higher Pk achieved by the GEM against the nominal targets within
the P4-50 km radius.
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FM 3-01.87
3-288. The TBM A and B method of control should be left at the default value
of Ripple versus TBM A and B, when first arriving in the theater of
operations. This option should not be changed unless intelligence information
or engineering data is provided indicating that adequate system performance
is achievable against the existing enemy threat with a single missile.
3-292. Not all TBM As can or will perform a dive maneuver. Tab 1, page 3,
enables or disables the dive calculation as appropriate. The enabling or
disabling of the dive calculation is based on the enemy TBM. If the IPB
indicates that there are no enemy Type TBM As in the theater of operations
that can perform the dive maneuver, then the dive calculation should be
disabled. If the threat includes TBM As that dive, then the dive calculation
should be enabled. When performing a point or specific asset defense to
counter the diving Type TBM A, the dive calculation should be enabled.
However, when performing an area defense in which synthetic or false assets
are input to provide a large area of coverage, the dive calculation should be
disabled. The default value for the dive calculation is 1 for enabled.
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FM 3-01.87
Direction of Flight
TBM
Ballistic Trajectory Prediction
Height of Dive
Dive Angle
Ground Impact
Point
SELF-DEFENSE
3-295. Fire unit TBM self-defense has the highest priority, whether the FU is
entered as an asset or not. However, when entering the FU as an asset, it
must be assigned the highest ATC or equal to the highest asset ATC. Special
logic has been applied which ranks FU TBM self-defense threats highest on
the TBEQ. This logic also reserves guidance, launcher, and/or missile
resources to protect the FU if there is a conflict between an asset and the FU.
3-296. The FU operator will be provided the alert “nnn SELF-DEFENSE” if
the FU is in the manual TBM engage mode. The operator should
acknowledge the alert, which hooks the target and then engages it.
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FM 3-01.87
ASSET DEFENSE
3-297. The Patriot system can provide TBM asset defense, ABT asset defense,
or a combination of both. When an asset is defined in Tab 70, it will be
labeled as a TB for TBM asset or AT for an ABT asset. When activated, the
Patriot system will provide either ABT and/or TBM defense if as described
above. The intercept point is within the high-lethality region (engagement
zone) for TBMs. A 2-km radius is entered in Tab 70 for AT threats, and the
threat is assets against the TBM GIP box. For large assets to be defended,
multiple points (a minimum of three, up to a maximum of eight points) can be
defined such that a TBM impacting anywhere within this defended region is
certain to be assessed as a threat.
3-298. Tab 70 now allows the following four measures when initializing
assets for TBM defenses:
• Enter the TBM asset as a point defense (this method is not
recommended as it assesses the threat the same as PDB-3).
When defined as a point, the actual radius will be used for the threat
assessment when engaging the TBM. When entering a center point
with a radius, the software uses the entered radius for threat
assessment and not a 2-km radius as with ABT/TBM assets. In order
for the system to engage the TBM, the TBMs GIP box must intersect
the defended asset’s defended area.
• Enter a TBM asset as a point with a radius when there are vast
distances between TBM assets that exceed GIP box parameters. The
radius entered can be from 00.1 to 99.9 kms. However, the S3 must
ensure that the radius entered does not exceed the high lethality
region of the TBM warhead.
• Enter the TBM asset as a polygon asset. This is the
recommended method when having to defend a large TBM
asset or area. A minimum of three points can be entered, up to a
maximum of eight points. (This allows the S3 to tailor the defended
asset).
• Enter the ABT/TBM asset as a point with a radius. This will allow an
asset to be threat assessed against an ABT threat and will ensure a
GIP assessment against a TBM threat.
3-299. After emplacing the firing batteries to achieve optimal TBM defense of
assigned assets, a determination must be made as to the most appropriate
UTM point for asset definition through Tab 70. If both an asset and the
battery are threatened, then the TBM is assessed as a self-defense threat. If
multiple assets are threatened, then the TBM is assessed as a threat to the
highest priority asset.
3-300. A probable kill is the normal, if an FU initiates a kill assessment state
for TBMs indicating successful intercept. It is determined by the guidance
function when the missile achieves a negative closing velocity and does not
respond to a subsequent uplink query. For ABTs, a follow-on energy
calculation is performed, with a time-out, to indicate if target breakup and
consequent deceleration have occurred. Based upon remaining energy at the
conclusion of the time-out, a confirmed kill or no kill is determined. This
process is not attempted by the FU for TBMs because of the TBM speed,
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MISSILE SELECTION
3-309. There are now four types of missiles in the field. Table 3-7 is a
summary of the software missile selection logic that will accommodate the
specific engagement selected. If the mission is an ABT engagement, then the
standard missile is selected first. If there are no standard missiles, then an
SOJC missile will be selected, followed by an ATM, then ATM1 missile. The
EDWA logic first determines which launchers have the required missile for
the engagement, and then selects the best launcher. The operator can not
change the logic for missile selection. The only control the operator has in
this process is by selecting or deselecting (Operate or Standby) specific
launchers. This selection criterion incorporates the PDB-4.2 software
upgrade. Selection of the GEM for all TBM Bs is done in PDB-4.1 update
software. The TBM A nominal override capability found in Tab 1 is
accomplished in the PDB-4.2 update.
STD 1 4 4 3 4 4 4 4
SOJC 2 3 3 1 3 3 3 3
ATM 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
ATM1 4 2 1 4 2 1 1 2
NOTES: ATM IS A PAC-2 MISSILE.
ATM-1 IS A GEM.
IF RADAR CROSS SECTION (RCS) IS NOT MAINTAINED BY THE SYSTEM, THE RCS IS ASSUMED TO BE HI.
RCS TESTS APPLY ONLY TO QUIET TARGETS.
IF THREAT IS IN THEATER, ENTRY OF YES IS REQUIRED AND A COMBINATION OF PAC-2 AND GEMs MUST
BE LOADED ONTO THE LAUNCHERS.
MISSILE DISTRIBUTION
3-310. The anticipated enemy threat and the FU's mission must be
considered when distributing missile types. For example, a high-value asset
within range of enemy TBMs should be protected by an FU with
predominantly ATM missiles. Other considerations include the threat in the
days following the first attack.
FIRING PROCEDURES
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DETECT TBM X, Y, Z
TBM X Dot, Y Dot, Z Dot
ENGAGE POSITION IN
METERS VELOCITY IN METERS/SEC
INTCPT
TOD HEADING
IN
DEGREES
TOTAL VELOCITY
TBM RAID IN METERS
TYPE TBM UTM GIP UTM SIZE PER SECOND
A or B POSITION POSITION
ATM MISSION
3-313. The ATM mission is conducted at the FU and coordinated through the
ICC. As previously mentioned, the FU operates in the automatic TBM
engagement mode, minimizing operator intervention, in the rapid reaction
required to counter the threatening TBMs. Manual engagements of
engageable nonthreatening TBMs should not be performed unless specifically
directed by higher echelon. The following are tactical implications of the TBM
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ECCM OPERATIONS
3-317. The Patriot system counters ECM in a variety of ways. The fire unit
performs the main effort to neutralize ECM. Using the repertoire of
waveforms within the radar, frequency diversity, or a combination of both,
the Patriot system is effective in the ECM or chaffs environment. If jamming
is so intense that the radar cannot determine target range, then the fire unit
reports the information as a strobe (azimuth and elevation) to the ICC, which
then performs triangulation and provides the needed range data to the fire
unit.
3-318. Triangulation requires track data from several fire units on the same
target source, so overlapping coverage is an important element in Patriot
defense design. The standoff jammer counter (SOJC) feature, using the
virtual target (VT) process provides the Patriot system with an excellent
capability against a range denied formation of SOJs. The strobe engagement
mode (SEM) also provides the fire unit with the capability to engage range-
denied targets. The Patriot system has been extensively tested in severe
ECM environments, to include the complete range of jamming, chaff, and
their combinations, and has performed outstandingly.
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3-319. The SEM provides the fire unit operator with the ability to engage
range-denied tracks. Jamming targets with sufficient power can be range
denied to the Patriot radar. When this condition occurs, the track data on
that target is processed as a strobe track, which only has azimuth and
elevation data. This strobe data is sent to the ICC and, provided there is
overlapping coverage, is processed by ICC triangulation, which will
determine the target's range. This range is then provided to the fire units. At
the fire unit, the strobe line will disappear and the target symbology will
appear at the designated range. The normal engagement process will then
apply to this target. In the fire-unit-to-fire-unit (FUFU) mode, each unit does
the triangulation. Triangulation is the normal means of countering
range-denied targets.
3-320. Target range—Target range is an absolute requirement for an
engagement. Missile initial turn, apogee, and TVM are some of the items
based on range. If range cannot be provided via triangulation, the ECS
operator can still conduct an engagement on a range-denied target via SEM.
3-321. Methods of deriving range—There are two methods of deriving
range in SEM operations. The first is a defaulted range of P4-59 kilometers
that is set in the software and cannot be changed by the operator. The other
is a range estimate that can be entered by the operator using the situation
display cursor and the RANGE EST switch-indicator. An FU operator will
perform the following procedures in conducting a SEM.
3-322. Using default value—The operator hooks the strobe of interest.
Strobes normally appear from the FU location to the range designated in
Tab 14. Once the strobe is hooked, it will extend down to the FU location. The
operator will then engage. The default value of P4-60 kilometers is used for
the programming of the missile's initial turn and apogee. Missile position,
radar position, and TVM are used in determining the actual range of the
target. The default method is the preferred option because it provides the
most effective capability against a close-in to long-range strobe target.
3-323. Using range estimate—The operator can also engage a strobe track
using the range estimate method. To conduct this engagement, the operator
first hooks the strobe track. Using the situation display cursor, the operator
places the cursor at the expected or provided range of the jammer then
pushes the RANGE EST switch-indicator in the Engagement Initiate group.
The hooked strobe will move along the strobe line to the range designated on
the CRT. The operator then engages the target. The missile's initial turn,
apogee, and TVM are programmed on this estimated range. The target's
actual range is then determined when the missile is airborne through the
missile's position, radar position, and TVM. This method is the least
preferred of the two options, due to the uncertainty of the range provided by
the operator.
3-324. Tactical considerations—The strobe engagement mode should not
be used unless the fire unit is operating in the autonomous method of control.
When operating as an integrated battalion, the ICC can provide accurate
range data by way of triangulation. The ICC will also use the wedge edge
process and provide a virtual target at the appropriate range of an SOJ
formation. When employing the strobe engage mode, the default range
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FM 3-01.87
method should be used. This will ensure that a close-in target is detected. It
is uncertain where the operator would get an accurate range to be used with
the range estimate method.
( ) COMMAND:
1 = CORRELATE JAMMER POSITION
2 = CORRELATE NRT-LOCAL TRACK
3 = CHANGE TRACK NUMBER
( ) ( )
Figure 3-34. Tab 15, Operator Correlation and Track Number Change
3-87
FM 3-01.87
3-330. Use the width of the formation to determine the number of VTs that
need to be created. This is a judgment call on the part of the TD. He should
create VTs evenly spaced across the wedge to increase the probability of
providing a good range.
3-331. If more than one VT is to be created, each should be sent to the
separate batteries providing the wedges. This will evenly distribute firepower
and minimize the impact on each battery's multiple simultaneous
engagement capabilities.
3-332. A firing doctrine should be maintained. Fire one missile at each VT,
then evaluate, and fire again if necessary.
3-333. SOJC missions must be planned ahead of time. For the S3, this means
placing batteries where they will be most likely to successfully engage at
relatively long ranges, and it may also mean dedicating a battery or batteries
to this mission. The long fly-out times, the manual operator actions, and the
heavy use of TVM involved dictate that the battery has as few other
distractions as possible.
3-334. SOJC should be used sparingly and wisely. Jamming formations
should be considered as high-priority targets. In determining when to initiate
an SOJC engagement, the operator must consider the following:
• SOJC engagements are manual. They require several operator
actions, and therefore compete heavily for the operator's time.
• SOJC engagements are lengthy (due to missile flight time), therefore
reducing the total number of available missiles in flight and available
missiles in TVM.
• The engagement reduces missiles available for engagement,
preventing or delaying engagement of higher priority ingressing
ABTs or TBMs.
3-335. The VT provides a point in space for stable missile flight in a heavy
ECM environment. The SOJC missile has been fielded. The PAC-2 missile
incorporates all the specifications for SOJC. This will simplify the problem of
determining how to distribute missiles.
ECM WEDGES
3-337. The wedge edge process provides information that allows the ICC
operator to determine the range and lateral extent of an SSJ formation. This
process is the keystone to the SOJC mission. As with triangulation, this
capability is optimized in a coordinated battalion defense that maximizes
overlapping coverage. The overlapping coverage ensures the generation of
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3-89
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FP1
FP2 FP3
TAB AREA
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FM 3-01.87
3-343. To ensure real target acquisition by the missile, the VT must be placed
in the vicinity of multiple jammers or real targets. A VT may be created
within specific bounds on the scope. However, if a real track is not within
certain range and angle gates of the VT, the operator will receive the alert
NO REAL TGT/RE-ENG when he attempts to engage the VT. The operator
can acknowledge the alert and engage the track.
3-344. VTs may be created at the ICC or batteries. FUs should only create
VTs with the assistance/coordination with the ICC. To create a VT, the
operator must position the situation display cursor at the display location
where he wants the VT to appear. It must be noted that VTs can only be
created at ranges of 55 kms or more. The intensity of the jamming source
that produces the wedge edge will vary at times, thus allowing the system to
triangulate individual targets for short periods of time. The range of these
targets is a further indication of the range at which the VT should be created.
3-345. The operator then selects Tab 4 (Figure 3-36) through keyboard entry,
and enters a C in the TARGET CONTROL data field. At the ICC, the
operator also enters the FU number that the VT is being sent to in the FU
ADDRESS data field. Upon entering tab, the ICC display coordinates are
translated to system coordinates, and the VT's location is sent automatically
to the designated FU and forced on the display. The operator may create up
to three VTs per Patriot battery.
FP1 FP2 FP3 FP4 FP5 FP6 ICC BNA BNB BNC BND BNE BNF
CURSOR-FP RNG —
VIRTUAL TARGETS—
HOT ASOJ MSLS —
WEDGES— BAND A
BAND B
BAND C
BAND D
Figure 3-36. ICC Tab 4, Virtual Target Control
3-346. In Figure 3-37 the ICC operator created three VTs and spread them
across the lateral expanse of the jamming formation. While all three can be
sent to one FU, it should not be normal procedure to assign more than one VT
to an FU at any one time. This is because when a VT is created, a TVM slot is
reserved for that VT. Creation of more than one VT per FU might result in
degradation of the FU's self-defense option due to lack of TVM slots. The VT
appears as a hostile target symbol with the "S" modifier. The VT is
automatically transmitted to the appropriate FUs and is forced on the
display.
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FM 3-01.87
S
S
FP1
FP2 FP3
TAB
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FM 3-01.87
3-349. To drop a VT, the ICC operator hooks the VT, selects Tab 4, enters a D
in the TARGET CONTROL data field, and enters the tab. This sends a drop
track message to the appropriate battery.
3-350. The automatic engagement mode does not apply to VTs. VTs will not
be automatically engaged. The PFE, SELECT FP, 2ND FP, or direct
assignment to a battery is ignored, and the command is sent to the tracking
battery.
3-351. The battery should only conduct one VT engagement at a time. The
appropriate TVM slot is selected and reserved when the VT is assigned to or
created at the battery. Therefore, VTs should not be assigned or created
unless an engagement is to follow immediately.
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3-94
FM 3-01.87
– Press RANGE EST and verify that jammer symbol now moves
along the target line to the range selected. The range estimate
may have to be redesignated many times prior to pressing ENG.
– When a range estimate is entered, the software range estimating
cannot be performed.
– If an incorrect range estimate is entered and the operator wants
to return to the software method (preferred), the track must be
dropped. When the track is reacquired, the software method may
then be used.
– If the jammer symbol remains in the selected range for more than
4 seconds, press ENG and monitor the engagement.
– If the range data is less than 30 seconds old, the target symbol
jumps to the designated range, then returns to its original
location within 4 seconds. Move the cursor over the target symbol
and press RANGE EST. The target range is redesignated.
– Press ENG and monitor the engagement.
3-359. The following method must be performed in addition to the operator
responses to an engage fail alert as indicated in TM 9-1425-602-12-2:
• If the missile symbol does not appear.
• If the target symbol never moves:
– If the engagement was a software estimate range engagement,
re-engage by the software estimate range method.
– If the engagement was an operator estimate range engagement,
reengage by the operator estimate range method.
• If the target symbol moves rapidly and never stabilizes:
– If the engagement was a software estimate range engagement,
wait 10 seconds for the strobe line to reappear and reengage by
the software estimate range method.
– If the engagement was an operator estimate range engagement,
drop the track and reengage by the software estimate range
method when the track is reestablished.
• If the target symbol stabilizes in the range, verify the target now that
the range is known, and:
– If the target is to be reengaged, wait 10 seconds for the strobe line
to reappear by the software estimate range method.
– If the initial engagement was an operator estimate range method,
position cursor over the target symbol and press RANGE EST,
then ENG.
• If the target is not to be reengaged, perform the following:
– If the initial engagement was the software estimate range
method, no further action is required.
– If the initial engagement was the operator estimate range
method, drop the track.
3-360. The role of the ICC has a key role in the SOJC mission. It is the
control center that will determine (from information provided by the
batteries) if there is a jamming formation and where the formation is located.
It is from the battery display of wedges that the ICC operator will make the
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FM 3-01.87
determination on where and how many VTs to employ. The distance between
where the wedges cross will determine the number of VTs to be created. This
will be a judgmental call by each operator.
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FM 3-01.87
FP
TAB
AREA
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3-99
FM 3-01.87
bottom two rows of the lower medium-range sector. Figure 3-42 is an example
of how this is accomplished.
LMR
LMR
SP
SP
HZ
GLIF DETECTION
LMR
LMR
SP
SP
HZ
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3-101
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3-102
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3-103
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PASSIVE LOW POWER MODE ARM ID AND SELECTIVE MANUAL AUTO ARM ENGAGEMENT
EMPLACEMENT ENGAGEMENT
REDUCED SEARCH MANUAL ARM ENGAGEMENT
CONCEALMENT FREQUENCY DIVERSITY
FREQUENCY DIVERSITY
EMCOM REDUCED SEARCH
PROCEDURES PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE
3-104
FM 3-01.87
3-105
FM 3-01.87
3-394. ARMs are a classification of target, which will be displayed using the
tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) symbol. The TASM symbol is a V with
a horizontal slash through it (V). The impact point is a V with a line below it
(V). Along with the target display, the predicted impact point may also be
shown.
3-395. In order to classify ARMs as a unique target type, distinct from TBM
and ABT, several software tests have been incorporated. The ARM
classification process occurs throughout the ARM flight, while a parallel TBM
or ABT process also takes place.
3-396. The first software test uses positive and negative ARM checks. If the
track receives a negative ARM classification at any time, then the parallel
TBM or ABT logic will immediately provide a classification and the track will
never again be considered for ARM ID. This enables the system to always
have a ready TBM or ABT classification or ID to eliminate delays in changing
from ARM to another track category. Any one of the following tests may
generate a negative ARM classification:
• True friend, friend, or positive SIF response to IFF/SIF interrogation.
• Target exceeds altitude, total velocity, and vertical velocity limits.
• Inconsistent flight phases (ascent, turndown, and descent).
3-397. In order for the system to satisfy positive ARM processing, two
preconditions must be met in addition to passing one of three sets of tests.
The two preconditions are—
• Target does not exceed ground range limit (this value can be set in
Tab 76).
• Target does not exceed RCS limit (this value can be set in Tab 76).
3-398. The three sets of tests are—
• SET 1: track originates from formation split of an ARM carrier or is a
new track that correlates with a known or presumed ARM carrier.
• SET 2: target altitude and acceleration during ascent phase are
within ARM limits for a minimum required period of time.
• SET 3: target dive angle and heading off of LOS flight profile during
descent phase is within ARM limits for a required period of time. The
system checks if the horizontal angle between the radar LOS to the
ARM and the ARM velocity vector is within the approach angle
specified in Tab 76. The system also checks if the vertical angle
between the radar LOS to the ARM and the ARM velocity vector is
within the dive angle specified in Tab 76.
3-399. The second ARM algorithm discrimination method uses velocity and
vertical velocity to distinguish higher speed arms. The third ARM algorithm
discrimination method uses the boost and descent phase of lower speed
ARMs.
2-400. Set 1 ARM test uses track split/correlation methods to aid in any ARM
classification type. Set 2 ARM test discriminates between High Speed-1/2 or
Low Speed ARM types using altitudes, velocities, and vertical velocity
measurements. If an ARM classification type is set by the set 3 test, the
classification type will be a Nominal ARM.
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FM 3-01.87
3-401. The system allows tailoring of the ARM classification logic to the
tactical situation by specifying minimum and/or maximum values for
kinematics and physical characteristics. This capability reduces the chances
of misclassification when the tactical scenario presents an ARM with known
characteristics. Once a target has been classified as an ARM, the system
processes it differently for engagement to include threat determination, LS
selection, missile selection, method of fire, and engagement priority.
3-402. If the automatic engagement mode is selected, the system makes an
additional test to determine if the ARM is actually guiding to and
threatening the radar. This test is similar to Set 3 positive ARM indicators
shown above, but the heading limits are more restrictive.
3-403. In order to conserve missiles, the system attempts to use shoot-look-
shoot (SLS) whenever it predicts that there is an adequate amount of time. If
there is insufficient time for SLS, the system selects modified ripple method
of fire.
3-404. ARMs are ATC-1 targets. Self-defense ARM engagements will be
prioritized at the same level as self-defense TBM engagements.
3-405. Activation of the CARM S/I, the system will immediately implement
one or more countermeasures as specified in Tab 76 at initialization. The four
selectable countermeasures are—
• Frequency diversity—This countermeasure ensures that the system
is spreading the radar emissions over the full set of frequencies
enabled by the operator. This makes ARM guidance more difficult for
some ARMs and forces others to use a less sensitive, wideband mode
(such as, forces the ARM carrier to fly in closer toward the radar prior
to launching its ARM).
• Reduced search—This countermeasure extends the ABT search frame
times in the horizon and short-range pop-up sectors and drops the
long-range search sector. This reduces the number of pulses available
for the guidance accuracy of the ARM.
• ARM automatic engagement mode—This countermeasure will enable
the system to automatically engage ARMs threatening the FU.
3-406. The following provides the operators with better situational awareness
and facilitates their decision to select the CARM Mode S/I. The system will
provide the operators with three levels of warnings:
• General ARM threat warning—The system provides a general alert
"ARM Threat Warning" that indicates that an ARM attack has
occurred at another FU. It will be routed by the ICC digital data link
(DDL) to an FU that does not have the CARM mode S/I activated.
• ARM carrier alert—The system provides an alert "NNN ARM
Carrier" that indicates the target number is an ARM carrier (based
on external source data). Engagement may be required regardless if
the system assesses the track as a nonthreatening ABT. The alert
will be generated when a track is first identified as an ARM carrier.
• ARM attack alert—The system provides an alert "NNN ARM Attack"
to indicate that an ARM has been identified as attacking (self-
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FM 3-01.87
Note: The Weapon Control S/I must be selected at each console in order
for both TCA and TCO to receive ARM associated alerts.
3-407. The sequence of events and associated CARM actions are from the
perspective of Patriot operator actions. The ARM countermeasures and
advantages are relative to attack phase. Patriot operations from
emplacement through ARM engagements are illustrated in Table 3-8.
CANDIDATE ARM
PATRIOT COUNTERMEASURES ATTACK
SYSTEM ACTIONS ADVANTAGES PHASE
SITE SELECTION SELECT RS SITES MINIMUM VISUAL/IR/SLAR DELAYS OR DEGRADES 1
AND PATTERN RECOGNITION RISTA DETECTION AND
PREPARATION TARGETING
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FM 3-01.87
3-408. Tab 76 will be used to tailor the ARM classification logic to the tactical
threat and select the countermeasures. This will be used when the CARM
Mode S/I is activated.
ARM COUNTERMEASURES
3-410. Restrictive ROE that prevent the system from engaging targets other
than TBMs will negate the benefits of this feature and will seriously
jeopardize the survivability of the radar in an ARM threat environment.
Therefore prior coordination of rules of engagement and aggressive pursuit of
management by exception engagements are necessary.
3-411. The use of countermeasures in the CARM mode may have benefits to
enhance radar survivability, but it introduces performance tradeoffs. Thus,
selection of countermeasures (Tab 76, page B) must be tailored to the mission
and tactical situation of the individual FU. Table 3-9 discusses benefits and
drawbacks of each countermeasure and recommends conditions for their
activation or deactivation.
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Frequency diversity ON Ensures that the system All frequencies may be ONFor all nominal
is spreading the radar detected. missions.
emissions over the full OFFIf frequency
set of frequencies diversity is strictly
enabled by the operator. prohibited in all cases.
This makes ARM
guidance more difficult
for some ARMs and
forces others to use a
less sensitive, wideband
mode.
Reduced search OFF This countermeasure Targets may ingress into ONFUs in nominal
extends the ABT search coverage more deeply ABT only missions
frame times in the before detection than without significant
horizon and short-range with nominal frame times. terrain masking.
pop-up sectors and OFFFUs in cruise
drops the long-range missile, small RCS
search sector. This target defense roles or
reduces the number of in terrain masking
pulses available to the environments or where
ARM. pop-up targets pose a
significant threat.
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3-412. EDWA calculates a ballistic ground impact point for a track when it is
classified as an ARM, even before it is considered a threat to the fire unit
(ATC = 9). The ARM is considered to be a threat to the fire unit if either of
the following exists:
• If the ARM flight path is directly towards the fire unit and the ARM
GIP box touches the fire unit location, the GIP is re-computed and the
GIP symbol is displayed on the situation display at the fire unit
location. The ATC changes to 1.
• If the ARM flight path is not directly at the fire unit and the ARM
GIP box touches an imaginary horizontal line P4-75 km, left or right
and perpendicular to the PTL. The ARM GIP is re-computed and the
GIP symbol is displayed on the situation display at the fire unit
location. The ATC changes to 1.
3-413. In general, the CARM mode S/I should only be elected during a
threatening condition due to the performance tradeoffs that may be imposed
by the countermeasures. In order to obtain the full benefit from these
countermeasures, the S/I should be selected under the following conditions:
• The battalion is in the TBM mode.
• The battalion is in any other mode other than TBM and has received
any one of the three ARM alerts.
• Under the discretion of the commander.
3-414. When the ICC operator determines the ARM attack, ARM carrier, or
ARM warning condition no longer to be present, a voice command should be
issued to secure from CARM mode. Upon receipt of this command, the ECS
operators should deselect the S/I and verbally inform the ICC.
3-415. ARM carriers (designated by “Ann” target numbers) should be
considered for selective long-range engagement according to the preplanned
ROE. Such an engagement may remove the threat of an ARM attack and
save missiles (nominally two per ARM) which would have been expended if
the carrier were allowed to launch them. This engagement may also protect
another radar that may have been targeted by the carrier. Restrictive ROE
which prevent the system from engaging ABT targets will negate the benefits
of this feature.
3-416. Automatic ARM engagement is preferred due to the potentially short
timelines available for manual engagement in self-defense. An ARM may be
identified prior to its terminal dive and engaged manually. However, there
are potential disadvantages to manual engagement action—
• The ARM classification logic may not have completely settled (for
example, a negative ARM indicator may not yet have been violated).
• The ARM may not have been successfully guiding to the radar and
would not have been threatening, resulting in the waste of one or two
Patriot missiles.
• When manually attempting to engage the ARM, the system WILL
NOT LAUNCH the missile until missile release time equals 0.
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Chapter 4
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4-2
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MICC COMMUNICATIONS
4-15. The ICC can work together with nine external elements. These may be
five subordinate or lateral battalions (GEHOC, ICC if subordinate, and/or
MICC if lateral). External links to higher echelons control are the CRC,
tactical air operations center (TAOC), and airborne warning and control
system (AWACS). These three TADIL-B auxiliary links are not designed for
air battle operations, but designed for information inputs. The MICC has up
to 12 external links directly tied to FUs (of which 6 may be Patriot and 6 may
be Hawk FUs).
4-3
FM 3-01.87
4-4
FM 3-01.87
4-5
FM 3-01.87
the data link. The chart is relatively simple to use. The SIGO simply lines up
the number of directly subordinate Patriot batteries along the left side with
the number of directly subordinate Hawk FPs along the top, and reads the
number of allowable external links in the center of the chart (subject to the
limitations noted). For example, if the task force contained four Patriot
batteries and four Hawk FPs, the allowable number of externals is four.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
NUMBER OF PATRIOT FIRE UNITS
0 10 10 10 10 10 9 8 8 7 6 6 5 4
1 10 10 10 9 8 8 7 6 6 5 4 3 -
2 10 9 8 8 7 6 6 5 4 4 3 - -
3 8 8 7 6 6 5 4 4 3 2 - - -
4 6 6 6 5 4 4 3 2 1 - - - -
5 5 5 4 4 3 2 1 1 - - - - -
6 4 4 3 2 1 1 - - - - - - -
4-27. A second method of ensuring that the net load is below 100 percent is
shown in Figure 4-2. This chart allows the SIGO to determine the total net
load percentage before initialization. On the chart, local fire units are the
Patriot, THAAD, and/or Hawk units that are tied to the battalion. External
modem units are any battalion or higher level ATDL-1, PADIL, or TADIL-B
connected to the battalion (any external unit tied directly to an ICC modem
does not count). Refer to Chapter 2 for a description of direct links. Direct
relay links heavily load the net and limit operational application.
4-6
FM 3-01.87
MICC DISPLAY
4-28. A system weapon control tab is available via S/I to provide functions of
displaced switches. The SYST/WPN CONTR S/I is on the console between the
HAWK ENG SUM and ICC STATUS tab. This tab is the data base for
method of control (MOC) weapons control state (WCS), and areas enable for
the ICC and subordinate battalions and FUs. Though the tab is the data base
for subordinate battalion ID mode, it only displays the ID mode for the local
ICC. ID mode control for the local ICC and FUs is via Tab 1.
4-7
FM 3-01.87
4-29. The System Control and Weapons Control tab provides for addressing
all subordinate elements. Only the local ICC and selected (SLCT) subordinate
elements use the source address function. ENTER TAB processes the
commands established in the fields. For example, selecting all with the WCS
data field command to TIGHT and hitting ENTER TAB enters WCS TIGHT
into the data bases of local FUs and subordinate battalions. The local ICC
must recall the tab and place itself in WCS TIGHT using the local function.
Only an MICC configuration displays lateral ICC parameters, and only an
MICC can enter a change for another Patriot battalion. For a discussion of
weapon control status and areas enable, see battery level operations.
4-30. The Site Amplifying Data tab provides the MICC operator with the
ability to monitor specific data for subordinate battalions. This data is a
replication of the data displayed on the battalion and FP status panels and
other Battalion Status tabs. The site amplifying data is provided in a tabular
display that is selected via a keyboard hooking process. To select a Site
Amplifying Data tab, the operator must ensure that the subordinate
battalion locations are displayed on the situation display. These locations, to
include the subordinate battalion FUs, are provided from the subordinate
battalion when communication is established with them. To display the
battalion and FP symbology flag, the operator must have SECTOR BOUNDS
and/or GENERAL POINTS S/Is selected. The operator then places the
situation display cursor over the flag of the battalion of interest and presses
SEL TAB, HOOK, SEL TAB. The Site Amplifying Data tab for that battalion
will automatically be displayed. The battalion flag does not have to be hooked
to get the tab. The operator may hook a subordinate unit flag of a battalion,
and the Site Amplifying Data tab for that battalion will appear.
4-31. The Site Amplifying Data tab consists of three different pages (see
Figure 4-3). Page 1 addresses the items displayed on the battalion status
panel. Page 2 is available only if the hooked battalion has one or more Patriot
batteries assigned. The data on page 2 replicates the information found in the
Battalion Status and Operational Assessment tabs. It also provides the
battalion authorization in terms of pop-up, ECM, MSV, SIF. Up to six
battalion displays will be provided. Page 3 provides the status of ABT and
TBM search, missile guidance, and launch commands.
4-8
FM 3-01.87
4-9
FM 3-01.87
TRK THRT ID/S ESTAT/S UNIT TLR TLL E/MI CONFLICT ID:
RECOMMEND ID:
ORIGIN:
GEOREF ALT SPEED HDNG TYPE AGE IFF EVAL:
SAFE VEL:
IFF CONDITION: SAFE CORR:
MODE: 4 1 2 3 PROHIB VOL:
CODE: RESTR VOL:
RSPS: ECM EMIT:
TRKNG FP: 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ POP UP:
7/AH204 8/ 9/ 10/ 11/ 12/ BN/
Figure 4-4. ICC Tactical Tab S/I Track Amp Data
4-10
FM 3-01.87
4-11
FM 3-01.87
4-12
FM 3-01.87
IM ENGINEERING DATA
TGTN/RT: TOBS : XL : TOTR :
AZIMUTH: TNNA : YL : TOBLCM :
ELEV : TR/JT : ZL : PRIMRY :
RANGE : DRANG : XLD : FSID :
VEL : DSINA : YLD : RTRID :
HEADING: DSINB : ZLD : RTRI :
ALT : FF : DX : RFST :
MMODE : TVMMOD : DY : CLASS :
RECMODE: LPDC : DZ : PRI :
FB: 023 169 285 437 NUMSRC : TOF :
FU1 FU2 FU3 FU4 FU5
Figure 4-6. IM Engineering Data Tab
DATA LINKS
4-46. The designs of each data link is different and serves a different purpose.
Data link differences are important to understand because, for example,
4-13
FM 3-01.87
4-14
FM 3-01.87
van and run the wire to the ECS entering through the hole in the floorboard.
Cut a patch cord and plug into the RLRIU port. If the distance between the
ECS and the TROPO van does not allow reliable communications to be
established, a remote multiplexer combiner (RMC) must be used. Place the
RMC on the tailgate of the ECS and connect it to the TROPO van using a
CX-11230 coax cable. Replace a DPLMA circuit card in the RMC with an
HSDIO circuit card and connect it to the ECS via the WF-16 wire as
described above. Since there is a built-in HSDIO card in the Configuration 2
Patriot ICC, the additional HSDIO card should be placed in the TRC-170
TROPO van that is located at the same end of the Patriot ECS (Figure 4-7).
CONFIGURATION 2 ICC
TROPO HAS BUILT-IN HSDIO CARD
HSDIO
CARD NL
N N
LA IO
E T
IR C
-W NNE
4 O
PATRIOT ICC
N
EC AN
C
TIO
NN E L
CO WIR
4-
DATA LANGUAGES
4-54. Data links are integral to engagement operations. The data links
include PADIL, TADIL-A, TADIL-B, TADIL-J, and ATDL-1. Battery-level
engagement operations use only the PADIL data link. Both battalion and
brigade levels can use any data links and communications media. The
communications media, in the form of data links, include HF, UHF,
SATCOM, and Troposcatter. Though UHF is the primary Patriot
communications medium, the other media are critical to the reliable,
long-range data links that are so essential for ADA support of air and land
operations.
4-55. PADIL is a secure point-to-point full duplex link (transmits and
receives simultaneously) for exchanging information between Patriot
battalions and batteries at a rate of 32 kbps. PADIL provides two-way,
simultaneous exchange with multirouting to enhance survivability.
4-15
FM 3-01.87
AMG
ICC
AMG
PADIL NETWORK
4-16
FM 3-01.87
USAF USMC
USN
USAF
USN
LINK-11/TADIL-A NETWORK
ALLIES
ALLIES
ALLIES
CUSTOMS
4-17
FM 3-01.87
4-63. Short Broadcast (SBC)—A net participant can transmit a single block of
local data without being interrogated by the NCS. When operating in the
SBC mode, which is used only as required for certain tactical situations,
transmission of data is initiated manually.
4-64. Net Synchronization—This consists of a continuous series of preambles.
It is initiated manually by the operator and continues until manually stopped
by the operator. Operationally, it is often used as a first step in verifying
radio frequency connectivity between units.
4-65. Net Test—This consists of a 21-frame repeating test pattern. This test
pattern is a subset of the address codes. The transmission begins with
preamble frames and a phase reference frame and is then followed by a test
pattern.
4-66. Net Test Mode—This is a test of connectivity between units. It is also a
useful signal for setting the data terminal set (DTS) audio input and output
levels. The net test signal should be input to the DTS at 0 dB/m. The net test
also checks the DTS's Patriot unit address-receive circuits.
4-67. Radio silence is the absence of any transmission. A Patriot unit in radio
silence will receive data from other members of the net but will not respond if
it is polled. AWACS operators prefer this operating mode for Patriot (receive
only). The early warning information supplied by low fidelity sensors will not
correlate with Patriot data leading to uncertainty of combat ID.
4-68. UHF multipath occurs when the transmitted signal follows paths of
different lengths. The received signals are out of phase with each other
causing interference and phase error. As a result, units operating within a
ground wave coverage area and within the ionospheric refraction zone will be
subject to multipath interference. The fading in and out of the signal can be
monitored on the audio channel. In UHF, multipath transmissions may occur
when the signal is reflected from a large metal structure. Two actions that
can be taken are the relocation of operating units or changing of frequencies.
Higher frequencies are better than lower frequencies during the day.
4-69. UHF shadowing occurs when the signal is blocked by an obstruction.
Relay availability is an important consideration when planning UHF links
over extended areas. E2C and E3A aircraft operating on the same frequency
as the desired link will normally provide this function given the 24-hour
stationing that they normally provide in an operational environment.
4-70. TADIL-B (Figure 4-10) is a secure point-to-point full duplex link for the
transferring of data from land-based units. Links also exist between airborne
and land-based intelligence units. TADIL-B provides two-way simultaneous
data exchange between systems.
4-71. TADIL-B communication is capable of operation in either HF, UHF
satellite communications (SATCOM), or through landline. When operating in
the UHF band, TADIL-B provides a line of sight (LOS) that may provide
coverage of up to 80 kms over level terrain, but the planning range is 40 kms.
Currently, the only mode of operation that TADIL-B can perform is
point-to-point.
4-18
FM 3-01.87
CRC
PADIL PATRIOT
BATTALION ICC FIRE UNITS
TADIL-B
4-19
FM 3-01.87
4-20
FM 3-01.87
CRC
PADIL PATRIOT
BATTALION ICC FIRE UNITS
ATDL-1
4-21
Appendix A
TECHNICAL MANUALS
A-2. The technical manuals provide step-by-step procedures for setting up the
M2 aiming circle and determining orientation and alignment. These
procedures are found in the operator level technical manuals (TMs). When
conducting manual orientation and alignment, use the radar operator
manual TM 9-1430-601-10-1 and for the launcher, use the launcher operator
manual TM 9-1440-600-10.
A-1
FM 3-01.87
PATRIOT
RADAR LOCATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA
LONGITUDE
LATITUDE
Z Z h e e e e e e n n n n n n n
UTM
AND
METERS ALTITUDE
EL RDR TO MIR
Elevation of Mirrors
.
from radar M2.
BRNG RDR TO NREF
Bearing of Radar M2
.
sighted on NREF M2.
EL RDR TO NREF TOP*
Elevation of Range Pole
.
Top from Radar M2.
EL RDR TO BOT*:
Elevation of Range Pole
.
Bottom from Radar M2.
BRNG NREF TO RDR
Bearing of Radar M2
.
from NREF M2.
ROLL .
CROSSROLL .
AZIMUTH RING READING
DATE 0 = International 3 = 1856 Clark
UTM WORLD MODEL 1 = 1880 Clark 4 = Everest
TIME 2 = 1866 Clark 5 = Bessel
A-2
FM 3-01.87
PATRIOT RADAR
SUPPLEMENTAL ROLL AND CROSSROLL
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
A-3
FM 3-01.87
FORM 1
PATRIOT
LAUNCHER LOCATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA
USED WHEN ALIGNING ON UNSURVEYED SITE
LS NUMBER
BRNG NREF TO LS
Bearing of reference
.
M2 sighted on launcher M2.
BRNG LS TO NREF
Bearing of launcher
.
sighted on reference M2.
BRNG LS TO RS
Bearing of launcher M2
.
sighted on radar M2.
EL LS TO RS
Elevation of launcher M2
.
sighted on radar M2.
ROLL .
CROSSROLL .
UL UR
MISSILE UMBILICALS CONNECTED
LL LR
A-4
FM 3-01.87
FORM 2
PATRIOT
LAUNCHER LOCATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA
USED WHEN LS UTM, ALTITUDE, AND ORENTING LINE
ARE PROVIDED AT A SURVEYED SITE
LS NUMBER
Z Z h e e e e e e n n n n n n n
UTM
METERS ALTITUDE
ORIENTING AZIMUTH
LS M2 stake to position stake.
.
BRNG NREF TO LS
Bearing of reference.
.
TRUE AZIMUTH OF LS .
Azimuth from launcher M2
through canister alignment pins. .
BRNG LS TO NREF
Subtract from 6400 mils
.
and enter here.
ROLL .
CROSSROLL .
UL UR
MISSILE UMBILICALS CONNECTED
LL LR
A-5
FM 3-01.87
PATRIOT LAUNCHER
SUPPLEMENTAL ROLL AND CROSSROLL
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
A-6
Appendix B
Radar Mapping
This appendix provides guidance and procedures for performing all types
of radar mapping operations (see radar mapping in Chapter 2). The
battery commander determines whether mapping is required; however,
the possibility of RF detection by the enemy during the mapping sequence
requires that the battalion commander or the S3 make the tactical
decision to map or not to map during passive defense operations. Mapping
may disclose the battery's location to the enemy before Patriot is ready to
fight. Not mapping affects system capability to engage low-flying aircraft.
DATA ACQUISITION
B-1. Before fire unit emplacement, site data must be determined and
collected for the initialization process by the RSOP team. The following are
considerations and procedures for establishing the ISLB:
• Single or multipoint ISLB data are entered in Tab 96 for each search
azimuth assigned (PTL and STLs).
• Tab entries (single or multiple) are based on terrain (RS UTM to
visible horizon, normally 10 kilometers). Note: Normally, the RS is
not to be positioned with prominent terrain features between the RS
UTM and RMIN. If there are prominent terrain features (positive or
negative elevations) between the RS UTM and RMIN, they must be
considered when calculating up to five points. For example, if there is
a sloping hill in front of the RS, determine the elevation at RMIN.
The same applies to a depression.
B-2. The RSOP OIC recommends ISLB, because—
• The RSOP team is physically on the ground to be occupied by the RS.
• The RSOP team has a topographical map.
• The RSOP team carries an M2 aiming circle that is used to determine
elevation angles.
B-3. The RSOP OIC validates the assigned PTL. The battalion S3 assigns the
PTL based on required area of coverage, threat, and anticipated hostile
avenue-of-approach. The RSOP OIC may recommend a change to the radar
location, based upon terrain or some physical obstruction not shown on the
map.
B-4. Once the radar site is selected and the PTL is validated, the RSOP OIC
makes a recommendation on the type of ISLB to use, that is, single or
multiunit. The RSOP OIC will transmit the proposed location to the battalion
commander for approval.
B-5. Using a topographic map, prominent terrain features are determined by
reading elevation contour lines. Changes in altitude, positive or negative, of
B-1
FM 3-01.87
D=CURRENT RS AZIMUTH
( )D=PTL ( )D=STL1 ( )D=STL2 ( )D=STL3
( )D=TBM SEARCH SECTOR SKEW BEARING ANGLE: -15 TO +15
( )=RADAR TRAIN COMMAND: 0=RS TO PTL 1=RS TO STL1
2=RS TO STL2 3=RS TO STL3 4=RS TO AZ ( )
AZIMUTHS MAPPED: TO , TO , TO , TO
( )=PASSIVE EMPLACEMENT 1=YES 0=NO NO OSLB DATA AVAILABLE
( )D=LEFT MAPPING BOUND AZIMUTH
( )D=RIGHT MAPPING BOUND AZIMUTH
B-2
FM 3-01.87
WARNING
To prevent injury, ensure that all personnel are
clear of the radar before entering the train
command. Visual inspection and audible alarm
procedures are required.
B-9. Enter radar azimuth train commands to PTL. Next, enter tab and
reorientation occurs. After reorientation, Tab 95 will reappear.
B-10. CHECK ACTUAL RS AZIMUTH alert appears. Acknowledge the alert
by pressing ALERT ACKNOWLEDGE.
B-11. Observe the D=CURRENT RS AZIMUTH data field in Tab 95. Visually
confirm RS heading. Should the RS AZ exceed + _ 2 degrees of commanded
azimuth, the alert RS AZIMUTH FAULT will appear. Manually return the
radar to the last alignment position, recall Tab 95, and perform the
procedures again.
B-12. The alert SOUND ALERT BEFORE RADIATING appears.
Acknowledge the alert. Crew members visually inspect the RS to ensure it is
positioned correctly.
B-13. ENTER TERRAIN MAP CONTROLS alert appears. Acknowledge the
alert.
B-14. Enter Tab 95 again. Then Tab 96 will appear. Enter single or
multipoint ISLB data provided by RSOP (Figure B-2).
INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND DATA ENTRY *96*
POINT 1 POINT 2 POINT 3 POINT 4 POINT 5
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )=MILS BEARING
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )=MILS ELEVATION + -200
ENTER ELEVATION IN ONLY ONE FIELD ABOVE FOR LEVEL INITIAL BOUND
BEARINGS TAKEN WITH M2 AIMING CIRCLE ALIGNED WITH RS AZIMUTH
Figure B-2. Tab 96, Initial Search Lower Bound Data Entry
B-15. In level terrain, if the elevation does not vary by more than 4 mils from
either level or from the starting point at the PTL, enter the average positive
or negative mils reading in the first data field (elevation). The azimuth would
be entered 0000. This is a single point ISLB.
B-16. In unlevel terrain, select the five most prominent terrain features and
enter the azimuth and either positive or negative elevation readings. Up to
five terrain features can be entered for each assigned search azimuth, two of
which can be beyond the search sector (one on each side).
B-3
FM 3-01.87
B-4
FM 3-01.87
B-5
FM 3-01.87
B-6
FM 3-01.87
Note: Display D is a supplemental display used for review. It may also be used to
elevate or lower a designated OSLB after each pass through the sector with Display A.
B-27. Display D and Tab 93, sector mapping review control (Figure B-7)
appears following completion of A mapping. Tab 93 allows the operator to
compute the missing OSLB for the remaining azimuths or to repeat the
mapping of those azimuths missed.
( )= SECTOR MAPPING REVIEW CONTROL *93*
0 = COMPUTE MISSION MAP DATA
1 = REPEAT DISPLAY OF SKIPPED AZIMUTHS
B-7
FM 3-01.87
MAPPING PROCESS
B-31. In Display C (Figure B-5, page B-6), the initial display presents returns
based on the ISLB (up to +_ 9 degrees) entered in Tab 96. The displayed ISLB
can be lowered 8-quarter beam widths or raised 12-quarter beam widths from
the entered ISLB using the cursor position keys up and down.
Note: There must be a five-second pause between cursor up or down
actions to allow for software to paint the sector display. Also, it is the
operator's responsibility to keep count of tab cursor actions. If based on these
actions, the ISLB in Tab 96 is to be changed.
B-32. The cursor position keys are used to display the elevation that contains
the fewest high-intensity returns. The lowest intensity or grazing returns is
displayed.
B-33. The ISLB becomes the OSLB (operational search lower boundary) by
pressing the HOOK key. If the HOOK key is pressed, the OSLB is for all 69
azimuths, including the azimuths in Display A, basically locking the ISLB
cursor at the OSLB position. In Display A it is possible to unlock the OSLB
cursor for a particular azimuth(s) by use of the CANCEL HOOK key.
B-34. If ENTER TAB is used without HOOK, the ISLB will default to the
Tab 96 entry. Tab 97 (refer to figure B-3, page B-4) reappears when ENTER
TAB or HOOK is accomplished in Display C. The following actions can now
be taken:
• Enter A—Select Display A for individual azimuth mapping.
• Enter 0—If at the PTL, clutter mapping will be skipped. If at an
STL, Tab 95 will reappear for entering a new RS azimuth to be
used for another STL or the PTL.
• Enter 1—To perform clutter mapping at the PTL B-36. In Display
A, RHI presentation (Figure B-8), two cursor symbols are provided to
assist mapping operations. A key controlled cursor (ISLB/OSLB) is
used for setting the OSLB. On the first azimuth displayed, the key
controlled cursor will appear at the ISLB entered in Tab 96. On
subsequent azimuths, the key controlled cursor will follow the ISLB
line. The operator cursor is used for setting masked terrain map
(MTM) points. On every azimuth displayed, there are three cursor
controlled hooked points for use in masked terrain mapping. The first
MTM point is set at the bottom of the OSLB beam at RMIN. The
operator sets the other two. Figure B-8 provides an example of a set
OSLB and two hooked MTM points.
B-8
FM 3-01.87
OSLB
OSLB
SET
TERRAIN PROFILE
kms
Figure B-8. Example of a Set OSLB and Two Hooked MTM Points
Note: This is only if an ISLB was not hooked in C map. If an OSLB was
set in C map (hooking the ISLB), the key controlled cursor will be positioned
at that OSLB for all 69 azimuths. CANCEL HOOK can be used to unlock the
cursor for a particular azimuth. Extreme care should be taken in selecting
the OSLB as, once set, the radar will not search below it.
B-35. In the PPI (Figure B-9), the fan description is as follows:
• Fan A—Equates to beam row 7, which is the lower elevation
(1/2 beam width) beneath the ISLB, or previously set OSLB.
• Fan B—Equates to beam row 9, which is the ISLB, or previously
selected OSLB.
• Fan C—Equates to beam row 11, which is the upper elevation
(1/2 beam width) above the ISLB, or previously set OSLB.
B-9
FM 3-01.87
CURRENT
AZIMUTH BEING MAPPED
AZIMUTH
RADAR RETURNS
B-10
FM 3-01.87
RETURNS CORRELATED
IN ELEVATION AND
ADJACENT
AZIMUTH INDICATING
AZIMUTHS
CONTIGUOUS TERRAIN
CURSORS
B-11
FM 3-01.87
establishing the OSLB, the cursor will be placed two beam positions
above the close-in, high-intensity returns.
• Once the key controlled ISLB cursor is set at the appropriate
elevation beam, the HOOK key is pressed, and the ISLB now becomes
the OSLB azimuth.
B-439. Azimuth skipping (Figure B-11)—If there are no returns on the RHI
presentation, take the key controlled cursor down to the word SKIP and press
HOOK, followed by ENTER TAB.
KEY
SKIP CONTROLLED CURSOR
CURSOR
B-12
FM 3-01.87
Note: Tab 93 will only appear when 1 to 7 azimuths were skipped during
Display A mapping as entered in Tab 97. Tab 93 will not appear for azimuths
on which the SKIP cursor function was used. Automatic computer
interpolation will be accomplished for those azimuths.
B-44. Display D (Refer to Figure B-6, page B-7) and the HORP display
(Figure B-12) will appear with the PRESS ENTER TAB TO CONTINUE
alert. This display is intended to review and evaluate the selected OSLB. The
HORP display (Figure B-12) is a horizontal plot of the ISLB and the OSLB.
The ISLB entered in Tab 96 is averaged and the results displayed as a
dashed line on the HORP. The OSLB created by the operator is displayed as
an asterisk line on the HORP. The operator should compare the OSLB to
what the terrain actually looks like (visual or from a topographical map) to
ensure that there is some comparison. If grossly in error, the operator should
perform the mapping procedure again. Upon acknowledging the alert and
entering the tab, Tab 97 and Display D will reappear.
LT AZ RS AZ RT AZ
ELEVATION +5 +5 ELEVATION
(DEGREES) (DEGREES)
+4 +4
+3 +3
+2 +2
ISLB
* *** *** * *** * * ISLB
+1 *
*** *** * ** *** ** * * ** +1
0 * * 0
-1 OSLB -1
B-13
FM 3-01.87
20
***
*
***** 25
EQUATES TO OSLB
B-14
FM 3-01.87
was accomplished on both consoles, Display E and Tab 92 will appear on both
consoles. This is not normally the software Sequence Controller, that is,
console is not in ECCM ASSIST. However, MS 3 can clear the CRT by
entering a 2 in the second data field, followed by ENTER TAB. MS 1 will
continue with masked terrain drawing if Display A was used.
B-48. If STL(s) were mapped, the display and tab will not appear until PTL
mapping is completed. Display E appears at the PTL (Figure B-13).
Surrounding the center of the crow’s-foot is a ring of symbols equating to the
OSLB elevation. Within the sector will be clusters of coded altitude symbols.
These symbols are based on the MTM points hooked during Display A
mapping. These clusters equate to hills or mountains within the sector that
can be correlated to a topographical map.
B-49. Each sector is able to have a maximum of six masked terrain corrals
(three-sided dashed lines). The operator hooking both sides of the cluster
draws these corrals. The WCC will create the depth. Due to the six-corral
limitations, concentration on the most significant (highest) terrain features is
essential.
Note: A common pitfall is drawing masked areas without first planning
for the use of the six masked areas. The operator can run out of masked areas
by drawing too many around less significant terrain features. An advisable
procedure is to draw masked areas around the most significant terrain
features first, and then move on to the less significant features.
B-50. The most accurate method of assigning corral altitudes is to refer to a
topographical map for that particular hill or mountain. In place of that, use of
the average elevation (from Tab 92—appropriate symbology) is
recommended. This altitude assignment is for operator information only, and
the same number can be used for more than one masked terrain. The display
of meters or feet was selected in Tab 14. For example: if the masked area
(***) has altitudes from 350 meters to 410 meters, the average altitude is
380 meters. The altitude is rounded to the nearest 100 meters, so the first
entry in Tab 92 will be 04. The same entry is made for other corrals
surrounding "*" symbology.
B-51. Upon completing the PTL sector, a 1 is entered in the second data field
to advance to the next sector to be mapped (STL). When masked terrain
drawing is completed, a 2 is entered in the second data field of Tab 92,
resulting in the alert MASKED AREAS MAP COMPLETED. If a 1 is entered
and there are no more sectors to be mapped, Display E and Tab 92 will clear,
and the alert will appear.
CLUTTER MAPPING
B-52. Initialization clutter mapping is an automatic software process with the
operator acknowledging and complying with applicable alerts. During
initialization, this process will occur only with the radar at the PTL. Clutter
mapping is selected on Tab 97 (refer to Figure B-3).
B-15
FM 3-01.87
B-53. If operator authorized via a 1 entry in Tab 97, the clutter map process
will be accomplished at this time simultaneously with Display E and Tab 92
being displayed. The following alerts will appear:
• CLUTTER MAP WAITS RADIATE-ENBL—Operator sounds the
external alarm and presses the RADIATE-DISABL S/I (light OFF-
radiation ON).
• CLUTTER MAP IN PROGRESS—This alert will be displayed every
60 seconds until the clutter map is completed. This process may
take up to 5 minutes. Note: The clutter map update programs
(CMUP) S/I is not illuminated during TAC clutter mapping.
B-54. The system maps ground clutter within the beams of the OSLB and
within two elevation beams above the OSLB (horizon and short-range pop-
up). The results of this clutter map will be written on the data base tape upon
completion of initialization. This procedure is accomplished in standard
emplacement and long-term reinitialization. It should be noted that the
clutter mapping process is relative to the OSLB setting. Note: If clutter
mapping was not performed during initialization, an automatic clutter map
will be accomplished the first time the system is in RADIATE ENABLE. At
this point, the RS can be commanded to the PTL or an STL in PASSIVE
SEARCH. The radar being in a listen mode only, no reorientation or zero-
degree slew clutter mapping can be accomplished. The first time the radar is
commanded to ACTIVE SEARCH, an automatic clutter map will be
accomplished. This process can take up to 40 to 50 seconds.
B-55. In K-7 (tactical operations software), the clutter map is updated on a
continual basis during ACTIVE SEARCH; however, it has a low priority
relative to most radar actions. The operator can effectively raise the priority
of the clutter map update by the following two methods:
• By pressing the CLUTTER MAP UPDATE switch-indicator, the WCC
will initiate the clutter map process at a higher priority; however,
this method can take up to 15 minutes to complete (depending on
WCC activity). During the period that the clutter map is in progress,
the S/I will remain illuminated. Upon completion of the clutter map
process, the operator must update the recovery storage unit (RSU)
data base. Note: Before suspension of tactical operations (with
exception of march order), writing an EMP recovery tape is required
to record the latest clutter map update data.
Note: Prior to suspension of tactical operations (with exception of
march order), a data base update is required to record the latest
clutter map update data.
• The highest priority for clutter map update occurs when a
reorientation command is given to the radar. This clutter map process
is completed within 40 seconds and is automatically written to the
data base. Another method of achieving this clutter map is to perform
a 0-degree slew. This procedure is covered in TM 9-1430-600-10-1.
Note: The clutter map update procedures, less the reorientation
command to an STL or PTL, are usually performed in response to
increased clutter appearing on the CRT. It should be noted that if
performance of the preceding procedures does not clear the increased
B-16
FM 3-01.87
MAPPING INTERFERENCE
B-57. Both man-made and natural interference can prevent or hamper the
manual mapping process. Excessive interference is interference that appears
across most or all azimuths. It can be man-made, caused by ECM or chaff,
and/or it can be natural, caused by severe weather. Manual mapping should
not be performed in a severe weather, ECM, or chaff environment. Clutter
map updates should not be accomplished when the above interference is
present. This could result in large areas being blanked due to interference
such as a large thunderstorm. Be aware of what outside environmental
conditions are causing the clutter before performing any type of a clutter map
update.
B-58. Non-excessive interference is either man-made or natural that usually
appears on a limited number of azimuths (Figure B-15). The recommended
procedure is to skip the affected azimuth(s). The WCC will automatically
interpolate the OSLB for the affected azimuth(s), based on the previous and
next azimuth's OSLB settings. Use of the SKIP cursor function prevents the
interference from being entered in the map data file.
B-17
FM 3-01.87
ECM INTERFERENCE
B-18
Appendix C
Automatic Emplacement
This appendix discusses detailed procedures for automatic emplacement
of the Patriot system. Patriot relies on the proper alignment of the radar
set and launching stations. It is important for the alignment to be
performed accurately and quickly. The precision lightweight GPS receiver
(PLGR) and the North Finding System (NFS) have been incorporated in
the Patriot FU to provide automatic emplacement (AE).
LS
LAM /LMM PLGR
PLGR
DLU GNIO
ECS NFS
DLU LCU
RS
RLRIU
PLGR
W CC CUG IOCT IOCT DACU GNIO
NFS
RAM/RMM
RW CIU RWCIU
C-1
FM 3-01.87
data. This allows the Patriot system to assume mission status with more
reliable RS and LS emplacement data. ECS initialization in the automatic
mode will receive radar and launcher data in Tabs 81 and 85 automatically.
C-4. LS emplacement guidelines, mixed mode emplacement procedures and
automatic data reentry as discussed in this manual have not changed. For
PLGR equipped units, the decision point for transitioning from TACI to K7
has changed. Due to the reduced emplacement timeline if more than
4 minutes have elapsed since entry of Tab 85, the unit should remain in TACI
until the LS is auto emplaced. If less than 2 minutes have elapsed, the
operator should go to K7. If between 2 and 4 minutes requires a decision by
the TCO based on the mission and on the number of LS auto emplaced. Given
the reduced timeline for PLGR, it is likely that all LS will be auto emplaced
before the completion of TACI providing that Tab 85 is entered immediately
after Tab 91 has been entered.
C-5. The AE may fail for either an equipment problem or poor satellite data.
Equipment problems will be reflected on page 4 of the Fault Data tab and the
operator should take the appropriate action to clear the faults. For an RS
fault the operator can reboot the radar or for LS faults the operator could
deassign/reassign the particular launcher. These actions send a reset to the
individual GNIO module. If this does not clear the fault, then AE diagnostics
must be run.
C-6. Poor satellite data failure occurs when the satellite coverage is
unsatisfactory, or even though there are sufficient satellites, their geometry
is not good. In some cases, even if the satellite coverage is predicted to be
good, one or more satellites may be off-line and the operator will be unaware.
If the automatic emplacement fails due to poor satellite data, the operator
should direct a crew member to go to the radar PLGR and, viewing the front
display, determine the status of the following parameters. If the parameters
are within the tolerance defined below, and then another AE should be
attempted by rebooting the system. If they are not within the specified
tolerance, then a manual emplacement should be conducted.
C-7. Operator can now use the percentage value displayed on page 4 of the
Fault Data tab (Figure C-2) to make emplacement time line decisions. If some
or all LSs have not auto emplaced when TACI is finished, the TCO or TCA
must evaluate the emplacement status to determine how close to completion
each LS is. Mission requirements and the emplacement status for the LS to
auto emplace are key factors in making this decision. The guideline is, if
emplacement status that indicates more than 70 percent, the unit should
remain in TACI until the LS are auto emplaced. If emplacement status
indicates less than 30 percent, the unit should go to K7. When the RS data is
between 30 percent and 70 percent this requires an operator decision based
on the mission and on the number of LS already auto emplaced.
C-2
FM 3-01.87
C-3
FM 3-01.87
elevation data for each LS and RS. A minimum of three satellites is required
to ensure accurate location and altitude information.
C-14. The global positioning system is made up of three major segments:
space, control, and user. The GPS space segment consists of 24 satellites (21
navigational and 3 operational spares) orbiting the earth in six orbital
planes. The satellites continuously transmit RF (radio frequency) signals to
earth that contain the satellite's position and time of day. The satellites
operate in circular 20,200 kilometer orbits with precise spacing within the
orbits to ensure that a minimum of three satellites are in view of any user for
worldwide coverage (Figure C-3).
MY POSITION IS...
C-4
FM 3-01.87
SATELLITES
MASTER
MONITOR CONTROL GROUND
STATIONS STATION ANTENNAS
C-5
FM 3-01.87
SATELLITE 1
SATELLITE 1
MY POSITION IS…
MY ELEVATION IS…
THE TIME OF DAY IS…
USER MY SPEED IS...
EQUIPMENT
C-6
FM 3-01.87
C-24. The PLGR is located in the curbside utility bay of the RS and on the
turntable pedestal on each launcher. On the RS, the PLGR antenna is
attached to the top of the main antenna array, while on the launcher the
PLGR antenna is attached to the DLU antenna mast support.
C-25. While the PLGR/NFS combination removes the operator from the
survey loop, it is not as simple as turning the ON/OFF switch to ON. There
are some critical time lines that must be understood by the TCO and TCA at
the battery and by the S3, TD, and TDA at the battalion. The time periods for
three requirements listed below must elapse before the WCC will have
location and altitude data for Tabs 81 and 85:
• RS PLGR position fix.
• LS PLGR position fix.
• RS to LS differential distance calculation.
C-26. For the RS PLGR to get a position fix, the PLGR must have power
applied, be in the field of view of three satellites, and receive an approximate
UTM location seed. When these conditions are met, the initial position fix
should be available within five minutes or less. The same conditions and time
apply to the LS PLGR. The radar and launchers must be in "remote" for the
data to be sent to the WCC. To obtain RS to LS differential distance, the LS
and RS PLGRs must have obtained a position fix based on 15 consecutive
position fixes at 18-second intervals. The time to compute this differential
distance is 4.5 minutes.
C-27. The differential distance computation is required because of missile
acquisition and spherical error probable (SEP). SEP applied to measurement
states that 50 percent of the time the measurement is within the error limits.
This also means that 50 percent of the time the measurement is outside the
error limits.
C-28. The launcher emplacement accuracy requirements for Patriot missile
acquisition are that LS locations be within 10 meters in each axis relative to
the RS. The SEP for the PLGR is 10 meters. The radar location is the base for
all relational measurements in the Patriot system. The location error for the
launcher is noted in relation to the radar, see figure C-6. As the PLGR has an
SEP of 10 meters, the UTM location fix received by the PLGR will fall outside
the relative error allowed for missile acquisition half of the time. To ensure
that the UTM location used for the LS is within acceptable error limits, the
WCC will sample the UTM location of each PLGR 15 times, compute the
differential distance, and average these readings to establish the UTM
location of the LS. This process also ensures that the RS and LS PLGRs are
using the same satellite constellation and removes any satellite bias errors.
Tests conducted at Raytheon facilities in Massachusetts and at White Sands
Missile Range (WSMR) using known survey locations established that 15
samples are adequate to ensure the LS location falls within the accuracy
error limits. Factors that effect PLGR location fixes are satellite positions,
masking, vegetation, and buildings. Determination of altitude for the LS,
relative to the RS, uses the same 15 samples consecutively with the location
samples.
C-29. PADS should not be used to confirm the accuracy of the PLGR. Its
accuracy is a function of how accurate the alignment stake is, and whether
C-7
FM 3-01.87
10-METER LOCATION
ERROR ALLOWED
RADAR LAUNCHER
LOCATION
GPS SAMPLINGS
4.5
MINUTES
0 5 10 15 20
MINUTES
TAB(s) 85 AUTO
NFS EMPLACEMENT
Tab 91
SPINDOWN COMPLETE
ENTERED,
COMPLETED
Tab 85 (s)
RS TAB 81
ENTERED
PLGR AUTO EMPLACEMENT
INITIAL FIX COMPLETED
(AVERAGE TIME)
C-8
FM 3-01.87
C-31. If the ECS transition from TACI to K7 before the relational data for the
LS location and altitude has been established, the sampling process starts
again. To establish a decision point on where to transition from TACI to K7,
the TCA or TCO who enters Tab 85 will record the time that Tab 85 was
entered for each LS. As the TACI process is finished, the TCA or TCO will
review the alerts and recall each Tab 85. If all the LSs have established
location and altitude as indicated by an alert, and Tab 85 has been filled in,
then transition to K7 can occur with all LSs green and ready to fire. If some
or all LSs have not auto-emplaced when TACI is finished, the TCO or TCA
must evaluate the time line to determine how close to completion the
emplacement of each LS is. Mission requirements and the time remaining for
the LS to auto-emplace are key factors in making this decision.
C-32. As a rule of thumb, if more than 8 minutes have elapsed since entry of
Tab 85, the unit should remain in TACI until the LS is auto-emplaced. If less
than 4 minutes has elapsed, the unit should go to K7. Between 4 and
8 minutes require a decision based on the mission and on the number of LSs
auto-emplaced. When Tab 81 and 85 data from PLGR and NFS is filled in,
these tabs must be hard copied and retained in the site data book for that
location. This data can be entered manually to reinitialize the LSs and RS if
the data base is lost. This can only be done if the LSs and RS have not been
moved in horizontal position and if the trainable platforms are returned to
the position where ADR data was derived (for example, mechanical stow).
C-33. To work in the automatic emplacement mode, the PLGR must be
initialized. Initialization is done manually at the PLGR using the front
display and keypad. Entries required are datum code (WGS-84), approximate
location, elevation, Zulu time, and date.
C-34. The following are the cold start procedures for the PLGR:
• Cold start procedure is performed once to initialize the PLGR and
must be redone whenever the PLGR batteries are removed or
replaced. Besides initializing the system, the cold start also includes
loading the appropriate codes.
• Power must be applied and the PLGR must be able to communicate
with the satellites. As it can take up to several hours to complete the
proper initialization, it would normally be performed in the motor
pool before the start of any anticipated use of the system.
• Code load procedure is a stand-alone procedure that will be used
when the system has been previously initialized, but for some reason
has lost its codes. The operator receives a 2 HOURS TO PLGR
CODES EXPIRES alert when the current code is about to expire.
• The SA code expires at 2400 hours Zulu time and the new code is
automatically transmitted by the satellite(s). This new code is
automatically accepted by the receiving PLGR if it is on during the
changeover time.
• If the PLGR is off during the code changeover time, it will attempt to
get the new code when it initially communicates with the satellites.
The operator can determine if the PLGR has the correct code by
noting the mission duration indicator on the PLGR control panel.
C-9
FM 3-01.87
C-10
FM 3-01.87
accuracy. NFS provides roll and crossroll measurements within the range of
±100 mils (±5.6o) with an accuracy of ±2.0 mils.
C-41. The NFS provides this azimuth accuracy within the latitude range of
65o South to 65o North (This covers the entire world between the Arctic Circle
in the north and the Antarctic Circle in the south.). The NFS also provides
azimuth data when operating between 65o to 75o South and 65o to 75o North,
but the alignment error will exceed ±2.0 mils. However, this error will not be
greater than a factor of 0.063 per degree when operating in this latitude
range.
C-42. The NFS is required to provide the azimuth, roll, and crossroll data
within 2.5 minutes after an alignment command is received from the WCC.
The normal operating temperature range is between -32o F and +125o F. The
alignment time increases to 8 minutes if operating between -50o F and -32o F.
For proper alignment within the 2.5-minute time frame the NFS must be
seeded with the approximate UTM location of the NFS. This seed occurs
automatically via the WCC when the operator selects automatic
emplacement and enters Tab 91. If the UTM coordinate entered in Tab 91 is
not within approximately 40 kilometers of the actual location, the NFS will
require excessive time in determining accurate azimuth, roll, and crossroll.
C-43. The NFS has a local and remote mode similar to the radar and
launcher. When power is applied to the NFS, it performs a self-test. Upon
successful completion of this test, it reverts to the local mode. The GNIO will
report the NFS as no-go while it is in a local condition. The NFS is
commanded to the remote mode based on actions taken by the ECS or LS
operator. As such, the ECS and launcher operators must ensure that correct
procedures are followed. For example, the inadvertent interruption of power
while the launcher is in the remote mode may result in an erroneous NFS
no-go condition being reported by the status monitor once power is restored.
The following actions will command the NFS to the remote mode:
• During initialization—
– The initial system boot will command RS NFS to remote.
– Entering Tab 85 with AUTO EMPLACE selected will command
that LS NFS to remote.
• During tactical operations—
– Rebooting the system will initiate a remote command that
reinitialize the radar and the launchers NFSs defined in the data
base.
– An actual launcher reorientation will initiate a remote command
to the NFS. A "0" degree slew will not initiate the remote
command.
– Deassigning and then reassigning a launcher via Tab 07 and Tab
85 will initiate a remote command to that launcher's NFS.
– When the ECS detects a launcher mode change from local to
remote, initiate an NFS remote command to that launcher.
C-44. The following procedure can result in a launcher NFS no-go condition if
the NFS is in the local mode. If the launcher is placed into local via the LS
key rather than from the ECS, and then powering down, conditions will be
C-11
FM 3-01.87
established for a subsequent NFS fault. At this point, the ECS would see a
"LSna MODE FAULT" because the LSs are in local, and the ECS has it in
remote. The NFS no-go condition will occur when the LS is powered-up and
placed in remote. At this point, the LS NFS is in local (a no-go condition) and
the ECS will not sense a change from local to remote because it already has
that launcher in remote. Consequently, no NFS remote command will be sent
by the ECS, resulting in an erroneous NFS no-go condition.
C-45. The NFS does not require any adjustment or calibration at the
organizational level. The interface cable for the NFS is hardwired with
jumper wires to provide the correct azimuth, roll, and crossroll orientation
and rotation. This prevents the interchange of RS and LS interface cables for
the NFS.
C-46. The NFS has a built-in self-test that is accomplished within 20 seconds
of power application. BIT will detect 99 percent of the NFS mission-oriented
faults and isolate the malfunction to a battery replaceable unit (BRU). The
NFS BIT is accessible through the maintenance control system (MCS)
diagnostics.
C-47. Caution should be taken when removing the NFS. If an operator is not
familiar with the process, it is easy to mistake the mounting plate bolts for
the NFS mounting screws. The NFS mounting screws are Allen head screws
and require an extended Allen wrench and torque wrench. For further detail
information, refer to TM 9-1430-605-14&P.
C-12
FM 3-01.87
EMPLACE EMPLACE
RS GPS = LS GPS NFS STATUS LS GPS NFS STATUS
RS NFS = 1A 1a
RS EMPLACEMENT 2A 2a
STATUS = 3A 3a
4A 4a
5A 5a
6A 6a
7A 8a
9A 9a
Figure C-8. Fault Data Status Tab S/I, Page 4
FP STATUS PAGE 1 OF 2 S/I
C-13
FM 3-01.87
data for that end item. This feature eliminates the need for crew members to
perform a supplemental roll and crossroll measurement every 24 hours.
Doing a zero degree slew is accomplished by sending the RS or LS from the
current position azimuth to the same azimuth.
C-14
Appendix D
RSOP Requirements
This appendix discusses the requirements to properly move and emplace
the Patriot battalion and battery equipment. The mission of the RSOP
team is to select proper terrain and equipment positions that enable the
Patriot battery to perform its assigned mission. The RSOP team performs
reconnaissance to prepare two primary areas required for any new
location—the fire control area and the launcher area. Additionally, the
RSOP team must designate locations for the battery support element. The
RSOP team directs the PADS survey party to establish the UTM
coordinates, altitude, and orientation azimuths for the RS and each LS.
D-1
FM 3-01.87
PTL
RS
10 METERS
EPP III
8 METERS
ECS
11 METERS
AMG
LAUNCHER EMPLACEMENT
D-2. A typical launching platoon emplacement for an ABT mission is shown
in Figure D-2. All the launching stations are emplaced within the primary
sector and that at least four launching stations are available if the radar set
is retrained to cover either of the secondary sectors.
D-2
FM 3-01.87
PTL
STL 2 STL 1
TRACK BOUNDARY
SEARCH BOUNDARY
LS LS LS LS
LS LS
LS LS
PTL
TRACK BOUNDARY
LS LS LS LS
LS LS
LS LS
D-3
FM 3-01.87
the radar or lower in elevation than the radar. Never select terrain that
places the launching stations (local or remote) at a higher elevation than the
radar. Figure D-4 shows the position criteria. The principal criteria for
position selection are—
• An area approximately 6- by 15-meters (20- by 50-feet).
• An additional 10- by 15-meter area to the side of a launcher if missile
reload is planned at the site.
• Level terrain of not more than a 10-degree slope.
• All LSs deployed within the PTL and at least four launchers in each
STL.
• A backblast area of approximately 90 meters behind the LS, clear of
personnel and equipment.
• An area between the RSs and the local LSs of 120 to 1,000 meters.
• An area between the LSs of at least 90 meters for explosive safety.
• LS locations within ±80 degrees of the PTL.
90 METERS
MISSILE
BACKBLAST
AREA
120 METERS
MINIMUM
FIBER-OPTIC
CABLE
RS
EPP III
ECS
AMG
D-4
FM 3-01.87
POINT 1
PTL
POINT 2 POINT 4 POINT 5
POINT 3
MASKING
D-5
FM 3-01.87
route the fiber-optic cables so that vehicle traffic entering the new location
does not damage the cables. When positioning the fiber-optic cables at the LS
location, ensure that the cable remains clear of the backblast area (refer to
Figure D-4). Initially, daisy chaining the fiber-optic cables from the two
primary LSs is acceptable (Figure D-6). As soon as possible, cables should be
run directly to each LS.
PTL
FIBER-OPTIC CABLE
LAID BY LS CREW
LS LS LS
LS LS
LS
LS LS
FIBER-OPTIC CABLE
LAID BY RSOP TEAM
D-6
FM 3-01.87
• Terrain dictates all FOC cables are needed between ECS and LS.
Total cables in the chain are eight.
• All cables have one repair splice. Total cable splices in the chain is
eight.
• LS1 is powered down. SBU optical bypass has been activated (no
electrically repeated signal).
D-10. Using the information provided above, the total attenuation from ECS
to LS2 is 23.24 decibels. System margin is equal to loss budget—system loss.
System margin = 30 - 23.24 decibels = 6.76 decibels.
GEM
MISSILE
ANTENNA
MAST
VHF
UP TO 10 km
REMOTE
VHF LAUNCHERS
FO
ENGAGEMENT
CONTROL STATION
REMOTE
LOCAL
LAUNCHER LAUNCHER GROUP
D-7
FM 3-01.87
D-12. The RSOP team should deploy remote launchers using the same
emplacement criteria as any launching station. The terrain for the remote
launcher group should be level with the radar or lower in elevation than the
radar and close to the PTL. Select terrain that places the remote launching
stations within line-of-sight of the radar. The principal criteria for position
selection are—
• An additional area to the side of a launcher for missile reloads.
• Level terrain of not more than a 10-degree slope.
• Launchers deployed close to the PTL and at least two launchers in
each RL-1 group.
• An area between the RSs and the remote LSs of 120 to 10,000 meters.
• An area between the LSs of at least 90 meters for explosive safety.
• Remote LSs must have VHF line-of-sight with the ECS.
• An area that can be defended against ground attack.
D-8
Appendix E
EMPLACEMENT PROCEDURES
E-4. The following procedures will be used to perform a mixed mode
emplacement:
• At the appropriate time, during TACI or K7 operations, the PADS
vehicle will be backed up close to the curbside utility bay or to the
front of the RS. The reason for this maneuver is to position the PADS
as close as possible to the PLGR antenna mounted on the RS.
• Obtain the automatically derived data (Tab 81) from the site data
book and initialize the PADS using the UTM, altitude, and World
Model information.
• The PADS vehicle may be moved away from the RS once the
initialization data has been entered and when the PADS will allow.
The PADS initialization process may now be completed elsewhere.
This will allow the fire unit to radiate, if needed.
E-1
FM 3-01.87
E-5. Upon completion of the PADS initialization process, the PADS team will
establish a mixed mode reference stake in the battery area (recommend
vicinity of the fire control section). This stake will be used to reinitialize
PADS if mixed mode emplacement is required in the future. This reference
stake is good only for the fire unit that provided the Tab 81 data. Each fire
unit will have its reference stake. Refer to Figure E-1. The RSOP team then
moves to the launcher positions that are to be manually emplaced and
provides normal manual emplacement stakes.
PADS
RADAR
STAKE
REFERENCE
POINT
E-2
FM 3-01.87
Note: Only data obtained from the M2 and M1 can be used in the mixed
mode emplacement. Data from the NFS cannot be used in place of M2 and
M1 data. This procedure must be followed when mixing manually and
automatically derived data. Not following this procedure may result in a
reduced probability of missile acquisition.
E-3
FM 3-01.87
00
BEARING OF RADAR
TO NORTH REFERENCE
NORTH REFERENCE
4800 0 STAKE
M2
RS
RS
00
M2
RADAR ALIGNMENT STAKE
WITH UTM AND ALTITUDE NREF
BEARING OF
NORTH REFERENCE
TO RADAR
E-4
FM 3-01.87
E-13. Use the most detailed map available. A scale of 1:25,000 is preferable to
1:50,000. When selecting the points on the map that are to be used for the
resection, the points must be visible from the radar location and must have
an angular displacement from each other of at least 45 degrees.
LS
NORTH REFERENCE
STAKE
BEARING OF LAUNCHER
TO NORTH REFERENCE
M2 BEARING OF
NORTH REFERENCE
TO LAUNCHER
LS
BEARING OF LAUNCHER
TO RADAR SET
M2 M2
RS NREF
RS
E-5
FM 3-01.87
E-6
FM 3-01.87
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
E-18. Simple trigonometric rules explain the emplacement of the radar and
launching station when using this alignment method. The RS location
establishes one corner of a triangle, the NREF stake is another corner, and
the LS is the third corner. The top and bottom elevation readings of the
stadia rod determine the distance between the RS and the NREF stake
(Figure E-7). M2 measurements between the LS and RS, LS and NREF, and
RS and NREF determine the angles of the triangle. Given the known
distance of one side of the triangle and the angles, the WCC can calculate the
UTM coordinates and altitude of the LS in relationship to the RS.
E L E V A T IO N O F R A D A R T O
TO P O F N O R TH R E FE R E N CE
S T A D IA
ROD
M2
RS
NREF
STAKE
E L E V A T IO N O F R A D A R T O
BOTTOM OF NORTH REFERENCE
E-19. The following steps explain the procedure of setting up the M2 aiming
circle for NREF:
1—Set up and center NREF M2 over stake for the NREF M2.
2—Level NREF M2 taking extreme care to ensure M2 is absolutely level.
E-7
FM 3-01.87
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
E-21. Since M2 aiming circle measurements must be taken from the LS to the
RS, to the NREF, and the NREF to LS, emplacement time for the fire unit
will increase considerably. To ensure LS to RS orientation and alignment is
as accurate as possible, take all M2 readings for each LS twice. If the two sets
of readings differ by more than .5 mils, retake the M2 readings for those LSs.
To ensure the best possible angular measurements, locate the launching
stations as close to the RS as possible while not violating RF hazard and
explosive safety restrictions. If PADS equipment becomes available after
performing these procedures, use the PADS to survey the RS and LS
locations and update Tabs 81 and 85 with survey data.
E-8
Appendix F
F-1
FM 3-01.87
F-2
FM 3-01.87
F-3
FM 3-01.87
nnaaannnnnn
--- - - - ----- --
| | | | | |_ 100's of m-- northing
| | | | |_____ 100's of m-- easting
| | | |________ 100,000 m grid square designation-- northing
| | |__________ 100,000 m grid square designation-- easting
| |__________________ Zone grid latitude (C to X)
|_____________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)
F-4
FM 3-01.87
F-7. Because the 100,000-m square grid designations are defined numerically
in terms of easting and northing, any given position can also be defined with
only numeric designations. Grid designations in the Northern Hemisphere,
the origin of each zone (which is the intersection of the equator and the
central meridian of the zone) is defined as 0 meters northing and 500,000 m
easting. In the Southern Hemisphere, the origin of each zone is defined as
10,000,000 m northing and 500,000 m easting. Therefore, a position may be
defined in UTM numeric designation by specifying the zone, hemisphere,
easting and northing (Figure F-3).
nnheeeeeennnnnnn
--- - ----------- --------------
| | | |________ meters--northing
| | |_____________________ meters-- easting
| |____________________________ hemisphere (N or S)
|_______________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)
F-5
FM 3-01.87
F-9. To convert a UTM letter grid coordinate into a UTM numeric coordinate,
follow the procedures indicated here:
• Step 1. Transcribe the zone designation of the UTM letter grid
designation to UTM numeric designation. This number does not
change.
• Step 2. If the coordinate is in the Northern Hemisphere, add N to the
UTM numeric designation; if not, add S (Refer to Figure F-3,
page F-5).
• Step 3. Find the UTM zone designation (left column) in Table 3
(Figure F-5).
• Step 4. Find the 100,000-m grid square--easting letter (center
column) adjacent to the UTM zone designation (Figure F-5).
• Step 5. Find the number in the right column corresponding with the
100,000-m grid letter. Add this number to the UTM numeric
designation (Figure F-5).
• Step 6. Transcribe meters easting (five digits) to the UTM numeric
designation.
• Step 7. (See Figure F-6) Find the grid zone latitude letter in the left-
hand column of Table 1 or 2 (Northern Hemisphere) or Table 4 or 5
(Southern Hemisphere) based on the spheroid for the map sheet being
used.
• Step 8. (See Figure F-6) Find the 100,000-m grid square—northing
letter in the second or fourth column adjacent to the zone grid
latitude letter.
F-6
FM 3-01.87
• Step 9. (See Figure F-6) Find the UTM number in the third column,
which corresponds to the 100,000-m grid letter and add it to the UTM
numeric designation.
• Step 10. Transcribe meters northing (five digits) to the UTM numeric
designation.
F-10. For the following example, refer to Figures F-5, F-6, and F-7. The
conversion of 38RPN7634529560 is taken from a map sheet that uses the
world geodetic system spheroid to UTM numeric. First (Step 1), transcribe
the UTM zone designation (38) of the UTM letter grid to UTM numeric. The
R in 38RPN7634529560 is in the Northern Hemisphere, so N is added to the
UTM numeric (Step 2) which now reads 38N. Looking at Table 3, zone 38 is
found in the second set in the UTM zone column (Step 3). The 100,000-m grid
P (Step 4) corresponds to 6 in the adjacent column, which is added to the
UTM numeric (Step 5) to make it read 38N6. Add the 5-digit easting of 76345
(Step 6) to make it read 38N676345. The grid zone latitude letter is R, so
looking at Table 1 (based on world geodetic system spheroid), we locate the
letter R in the left-hand column (Step 7). The 100,000-m grid square—
northing letter is N. Because the UTM zone (38) is even, the fourth column of
Table 1 is used to locate the letter N (Step 8). Adjacent to the N under the
UTM numeric column is the number 27, which is now added to the UTM zone
designation (Step 9) to make it read 38N67634527. Now the 5-digit northing
of 29560 is added (Step 10) to complete the conversion to UTM numeric which
now reads 38N6763452729560 (see Figure F-7).
F-11. The Worldwide UTM Conversion Tables (Figures F-8 through F-12) are
actual conversion tables used by Patriot. See Figure F-5 for an example of
easting conversions and Figure F-6 for northing conversions.
F-7
FM 3-01.87
F-8
FM 3-01.87
F-9
FM 3-01.87
F-10
FM 3-01.87
F-11
FM 3-01.87
F-12
FM 3-01.87
F-13
FM 3-01.87
F-14
FM 3-01.87
F-15
FM 3-01.87
F-16
FM 3-01.87
F-17
FM 3-01.87
F-18
FM 3-01.87
F-19
Appendix G
Fix-or-Fight Criteria
This appendix contains fix-or-fight guidance for planners, S3 officers, and
ICC and ECS crews. This guidance is generic in nature and is not
intended to be the sole source of information used in the decision-making
process for fix-or-fight. Leaders must also consider the mission at hand.
In addition, test action numbers (TANs), which accompany status monitor
faults, require analysis by the system maintenance technician to
determine the true operability of the system.
FIX-OR-FIGHT GUIDANCE
G-1. The fix-or-fight guidelines and synopsis provide guidance to the tactical
control officer and the tactical director in deciding the appropriate response
to system failures during combat. The objective of fix-or-fight guidance is to
allow units to continue to fight as long as possible and logically, despite
system failures.
SCOPE
G-2. Fix-or-fight guidelines take effect when the unit is ordered to Battle
Stations. In the training environment, fix-or-fight guidelines are used when
the unit is ordered to assume Blazing Skies. Patriot's status monitor and
built-in test equipment conduct frequent checks on Patriot's many functions.
Whenever the results of a test action are outside established engineering
parameters, an appropriate indicator is given to the operator through the
display and control console and the fire unit status panel in the engagement
control station. The appropriate indicator and alert are presented as soon as
possible.
G-1
FM 3-01.87
Radar search TBM–NO-GO DECISION RTG unable to support the TBM mode.
Radar search ABT–DEGRADED System can be used for ABT mode.
Radar track ABT–DEGRADED
Missile guidance–DEGRADED
If TVMAP or RTG, no guidance available.
Missile guidance–NO-GO DECISION A unit without guidance may support BN
surveillance if radar search and tracking
equals DEGRADED or GO.
If FAULT DATA Tab indicates TVMAP,
Missile guidance–DEGRADED DECISION guidance capability is reduced. If the fault
data tab displays TVMCP, guidance
capability against jammers is reduced.
All other indicators FIGHT Notify the ICC and battery CP.
G-2
FM 3-01.87
CATEGORIES OF RESPONSES
G-7. Status monitor and built-in test equipment provide an extensive amount
of equipment status information to the operator. Much of the equipment
status information, however, is not tactically significant during wartime
conditions. Therefore, fix-or-fight guidance, considering that an operator
must make prompt decisions in response to fault indications during air
battle, is drawn from tactically significant fault indicators. Fix-or-fight
categorizes the tactically significant faults into response categories of must
fix, decision, and fight. There is a subset of the fight category, fight-while-fix,
in which the fault can be corrected without interrupting the air defense
artillery operations.
MUST FIX
G-8. During tactical operations, the operator must evaluate fault indications.
With some software failure indications the operator determines the “must fix”
conditions. For example, if there is no system residual capability and initial
immediate operator corrective actions do not clear the fault, the system must
be fixed.
Reorientation No-Go
G-10. A reorientation no-go fault is a serious system fault that will not permit
correct system operation. This fault occurs when an attempted reorientation
has failed. The result is that the north reference is lost. Actual target
positions are probably in error although they appear to be normal on the
situation display. Missile acquisition may not be possible, and the system
cannot support battalion operations.
G-3
FM 3-01.87
DECISION
G-12. The fault indications in this category do not mean there is no residual
air defense capability retained. Neither do these faults mean that sufficient
residual capability exists relative to the air defense mission that a fight is
automatically made. Fault indications in this category require a quick
correlation between the operational assessment tab, target symbology, and
the fault data tab information.
Search No-Go
G-13. In most cases, a search no-go in the operational assessment tab
indicates that the status monitor has detected a condition that prevents
successful search and track operations. However, these fault indications can
be generated by conditions that do not effect the full envelope of the system's
capabilities to search and track. The operator should correlate his operational
assessment tab indication with the presence and stability of target symbology
on the scope. If all or some of the same target symbols are still displayed and
if they are stable, the operator should continue engagements. In case of
continued operations, the operators should be aware that some targets within
the battery's radar coverage might go undetected. In such cases, the TD
should use the adjacent batteries' overlapping coverage in the affected sector
to manually oversee the sector.
Track No-Go
G-14. A track no-go indication in the operational assessment tab normally is
accompanied by a search no-go. The same guidance and rationale for a
decision apply for a track no-go indication as they do for a search no-go.
G-4
FM 3-01.87
residual missile guidance capability exists and the only decision remaining is
whether or not to retain the battery for surveillance support to the battalion.
FIGHT
G-17. All other status monitor indicators fall into this category. These faults
vary in impact upon the air defense mission from no adverse effect to
moderate impact. However, the faults in this category are such that the
battery should be used, if needed. In many cases, system contingency modes
or redundancies compensate for the lost capability. In other cases, some
capability is lost and there is no backup, but the fire unit can still make
significant contributions to the battalion's conduct of the air battle.
G-5
FM 3-01.87
and manual switch actions may require repetition. Such faults should be
apparent to the operator. If the condition seriously hampers the operator, his
tasks can be transferred to the other display console.
G-21. Target identification faults refer to the IFF system. Since other means
for target identification exist, these faults would result in a decision to
continue operations for as long as contingency identification exists.
Contingency modes include—
• Alternate IFF modes in instances where the identification fault
applies to only a single mode of the IFF system.
• Told-In target identification from higher echelons.
• Passive identification via the automated track history comparison to
the passive criteria initialized in the tactical data base.
Reorientation Degrade
G-22. This condition indicates that the radar set azimuth is different from
expected. It can occur following maintenance, in which the radar set was
rotated manually. It can also occur following a radar set retrain command in
which the radar set failed to achieve its expected azimuth within two degrees.
The system can normally be used if the current azimuth satisfactorily covers
the assigned search sector. Otherwise, reorient the radar set to the desired
azimuth.
FIGHT-WHILE-FIX
G-24. This category is a subset of the fight category. The only difference
between the two is that faults in this category can be corrected without
interrupting the battery from its conduct of the air defense mission.
C-E Faults
G-25. C-E faults are degrades and no-gos in the UHF communications system
as shown by the communications indicator on the fire unit status panel.
These faults can be due to breakdowns of individual links within the network
and can be repaired while the net is operational. If the fault is serious enough
to result in a no-go, the battery can continue to fully support search, track,
and guidance in an autonomous mode.
G-6
FM 3-01.87
G-7
FM 3-01.87
control station (ECS). Before conducting the air battle, the filter should be
disabled (EQUIP CONTR S/I on) to direct alerts to manstation one, since the
TDA is a trained maintenance person and able to interpret and assess a
majority of the alerts. During the conduct of the air battle, the filter should
be enabled (EQUIP CONTR S/I off) at both manstations so that the number
of alerts is reduced.
G-8
Appendix H
H-1
FM 3-01.87
AUTOMATIC
INITIALIZATION
TAB
TAB 13 MODE CNTL SEQUENCE
START (CHANGE ICC MODE) TAB 90 TAB 40
TAB 01 TAB 54
0 = RECOVERY 1 = INITIALIZATION
TAB 06 TAB 70
TAB 10
SEE TAB 71
FIGURE
H-2 TAB 14 TAB 74
TAB 50 INITIALIZATION
CONTROL
(SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE) TAB 76
SELECTIONS
TAB 78
0 = MANUAL DATA
INPUT CONTROL 2 = RETRIEVE & COMPARE ENTER
FPS DATA (RCFD) TAB
3 = DEPLOYMENT SEE
ENTER
TAB 00 TAB INDEX PLANNING TAB FIGURE
(HOOK TAB NUMBER) F-3
4 = DATA INPUT
SEE
COMPLETE
FIGURE
INITIALIZATION F-4
TABS (LISTED AT ENTER TAB ALLOWS
RIGHT) ARE TRANSITION TO TAC
DISPLAYED AS OPS BY PRESSING
SELECTED BY ENGAGE CONTR
OPERATOR FOR SWITCH INDICATOR
DATA ENTRY DATA BASE CONT
REVIEW TABS ARE ENTER TAB. TAB 50
ALSO SELECTED IS DISPLAYED
VIA KEYBOARD TAB 98 W / INITIALIZATION
(SEL TAB ## SEL MODE = 3
TAB)
TAC OPS
TAB 2, BN
COMMUNICATIONS
TAB SELECTION CONFIG CNTL
VIA KEYBOARD (ALLOW EXTRA BN FINISH
COMMO)
H-2
FM 3-01.87
SEE
FIGURE
H-1 ENTER TAB
PRESS “ENGAGE CONTR”
SWITCH TO TRANSITION
TO TAC OPS
TAC OPS
OPERATOR SELECTS
TAB 02 VIA KEYBOARD
(SEL TAB 02 SEL TAB)
RE-ESTABLISH EXTRA BN
COMMUNICATIONS AND FINISH
ENTER TAB
H-3
FM 3-01.87
TAB 50
START Initialization CNTL
(Select initialization mode)
Data Conflicts Data Conflicts
TAB 74 TAB 78
2 = Retrieve and
compare FP data
Data Conflicts Data Conflicts
TAB 73 TAB 79
TAB 90 Data Collection
Required data:
FP type HAWK ATDL
TAB 68 TAB nn DATA CONFLICT:
address, link station
FP Comm Control FP j.k alert is displayed.
and modem # (for TAB 12 FP
HAWK only). All conflicts between data bases Locations/
printed out on HCU on a tab Boundaries - BN
by tab basis
Enter tab begins RCFD
H-4
FM 3-01.87
00 = DEPLOYMENT
INPUT COMPLETE In TAC OPS/CMD plan enables transition to TAC
OPS via ENGAGE CONTR 3/1. Data base tape TAC OPS
written upontransition to TAC OPS
H-5
FM 3-01.87
TABS
ALERTS
TAB 91
START DATA ACQUISITION
DATA ACQUISITION
STANDARD NO
Notes:
EMPLACEMENT
1. Auto emplacement of LS will
only start if LS is in remote.
2. Alert may appear earlier. YES
Entry of Tab 98 only allowed
if RS has completed auto
emplacement. MANUAL
EMPLACEMENT
3. Alerts may occur earlier. TYPE
AUTO
RS STARTS
NOTE 1
AUTO EMPLACING
TAB 81
FP LOCATION
ALIGNMENT DATA
RS AUTO EMPLACING
COMPLETE TAB 81
FP LOCATION
ALIGNMENT DATA
TAB 14
TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL
TAB 68
ENTER COMM CNTL DATA DATA COMMUNICATIONS
CONTROL
TAB 99
FP DATA TRANSFER
CONTROL
TAB 54
CONTINUED
ENTER RADAR CNTL DATA RADAR FREQUENCY
NEXT PAGE
CONTROL
H-6
FM 3-01.87
ALERTS TABS
CONTINUED FROM
PREVIOUS PAGE
START YES
SEQUENCE
SET WEAPON CNTL S/1
NO
ENTER RS AZ COMMAND
TAB 95
CHECK ACTUAL RS AZ RADAR MAPPING
CONTROL SUMMARY
SOUND ALARM
BEFORE RADIATING
TAB 96
ENTER TERRAIN INITIAL SEARCH LOWER
MAP CNTRLS BOUNDARY DATA ENTRY
TAB 97
SELECT ENTRY
MAPPING DISPLAY/CONTROL
TAB 92
DRAW MASKED AREAS MAP MASKED AREAS ALLOWS FOR TAB 55 CHANGES
DRAWING CONTROL
TAB 85
ENTER FIDOC DATA LAUNCHER LOCATION
ALIGNMENT
MANUAL
TAB 81
HARD COPY LS na DATA TAB 85
AUTO HARD COPY
H-7
FM 3-01.87
H-8
Appendix I
ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
I-1 Patriot hardware and software ease the complexity of engagement
operations in a Patriot pure battalion. Incorporating Hawk into a Patriot
battalion provides tactical flexibility but requires battle crews to understand
the elements of the technical interface between Hawk and Patriot. Though
initializing and maintaining engagement operations in a Patriot/Hawk task
force is complex, Patriot software capabilities provide planners and crew the
capability to design and execute effective task force operations.
I-2. The design of the TF allows Patriot ICC operators to control Hawk Phase
III to reduce the possibility of simultaneous engagement. Control
configuration, coordination, and Hawk deployment can further reduce
simultaneous engagement. For TBM engagements, it may be necessary to use
range bias fires for the TF, use Patriot negative range bias (refer to
discussion in Chapter 2) but do not use range bias for Hawk.
CAUTION
The design of Patriot and Hawk software optimizes
intercept Pk with range bias set to the default values.
There is a high risk of negatively affecting system
effectiveness when adjusting range bias.
I-1
FM 3-01.87
referred to as a Hawk fire unit (FU). See Figure I-1 for an example of task
force organization.
BASELINE
HEU
ICC
PAT R IOT HA W K
BAT T ERY FIR E U NIT
DEFENSE DESIGN
I-6. The task force will fight with a baseline of five Patriot batteries and four
Hawk fire units. This organization provides the battalion task force with the
capability of improved jammer triangulation and correlation, and facilitates
excellent area coverage.
I-2
FM 3-01.87
TASK ORGANIZATION
I-10. The software capability of both the Patriot battery and Hawk FU
enhances engagement effectiveness by automating the ICC software for
Hawk identification, threat assessment, and engagement tasks. The software
also accommodates the Hawk Phase III improvements of passive
identification, increased update rates on specific track assignments, and
improved radar search patterns. This provides Hawk with reduced reaction
times and increased probability of automatic and manual HIPIR locks.
I-11. The size of the TF is a function of METT-TC and overall system
capability. The ICC can control up to 12 subordinate FUs. The combination of
FUs controlled depends upon the types of FUs (Patriot or Hawk) assigned to
an ICC. Any combination of FUs may be subordinate to an ICC if there are no
more than six subordinate Patriot batteries. An operator can assign 12 Hawk
FUs, if all FUs are Hawk. Enter Patriot units in the data base through Tab
59 as units 1 to 6; the software will not accept Patriot in fields 7 to 12. Unit 1
can be a Patriot battery with FP2 a Hawk FU until assignment of unit 6,
after which the software will accept a Hawk FU. The ICC accommodates FUs
by way of the PCP or a battery configuration with communications through
the battery command post.
ALIGNMENT METHODS
I-12. Alignment for both weapon systems is critical. The following are
descriptions of the methods used for Patriot and Hawk alignment. For the
Patriot system, the PLGR is the main tool for determining location, altitude,
and a north reference angle required for emplacing Patriot, with PADS
system used as the backup. Patriot FUs emplace using true north as the
angular reference. This system enables track management to provide
excellent track correlation, and strobe triangulation provides the accuracy.
I-13. Alignment within the Hawk unit is also important. When operating
with Patriot, alignment procedures must be accurate enough to ensure track
correlation and rapid HIPIR radar lock. Consequently, when operating within
a TF, the survey section assigned to the Patriot battalion should be sent to
the assigned Hawk units to provide accurate location, altitude, and
alignment data. This will ensure correlation between Patriot and Hawk FUs
using the remote three-dimensional air picture.
I-3
FM 3-01.87
HAWK
S IT E O R IE N TE D
P A T R IO T
O R IG IN A L H A W K C O R R E L A T IO N
CELL, RADA R TYPE DEPENDANT
I-4
FM 3-01.87
the track data update rate. This gives Hawk a higher probability of
reacquiring the target.
I-16. The air picture provided to Hawk is still controlled through a filtering
process provided in Tab 68 (Figure I-3). Besides filtering by altitude and
range, the operator can now also filter by identification.
I-5
FM 3-01.87
FLIGHT
PATH
RANGE
OFFSET
(RO)
HIGH
LETHALITY NORMAL
LETHALITY
RANGE
(RNG)
LEGEND:
RNG = DISTANCE FROM HAWK FU TO TARGET
RO = RANGE OFFSET FROM HAWK FU TO TANGENTAL
TARGET PATH
I-6
FM 3-01.87
I-7
FM 3-01.87
I-30. Negative range bias should not be used for the Hawk units assigned
because this would increase the TTFL; in effect, reducing the range at which
Hawk could engage. Positive range bias should only be used if it is apparent
that Hawk FUs are not being selected as the primary FU over Patriot. As an
alternative, using Patriot negative range bias (this will increase Patriot
TTFL) should be considered. This would decrease the range at which Patriot
could engage, thereby enhancing the probability that Hawk would be chosen
for engagement. This alternative has advantages over the use of Hawk range
bias in that Patriot Pk would be increased, while Hawk processing of targets
for engagement would be unaffected. It must be reiterated at this point that
the preferred ways to ensure that Hawk gets first shot are through
positioning of Hawk FUs to support engagements. Patriot tactical directors
will need additional training.
FRIENDLY PROTECTION
I-31. Friendly protection for Hawk candidate FUs is a function added to the
FU selection process to determine if a local Hawk candidate FU is prohibited
from engaging a track because of friend protection criteria. A hostile or
unknown track is considered friend protected if there is an ICC ID friend or
IFF mode IV friend within a specific zone about the hostile or unknown track
(Figure I-5).
I-8
FM 3-01.87
N N
AZIMUTH AZIMUTH
W E W E
S S
HAWK FU SITE A HAWK FU SITE B
I-9
FM 3-01.87
TRK TH ID ESTAT/S FP TLR TLL E/MI - TRK TH ID ESTAT/S FP TLR TLL E/MI
PA 02 H ENGI/8 8 02 25 1/06 -
101 -
PA S PENG/ 2 15 35 0/23 -
112 -
-
-
-
-
-
IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING
I-35. The identification processing for both Patriot and Hawk has been
improved. Phase III Hawk has an automated passive identification scheme
that closely parallels the Patriot system. The Patriot passive identification
scheme is the baseline. The track processing through the passive algorithm
remains fundamentally unchanged. The weight sets and ID sums for Friend,
Unknown, and Hostile have not been modified and still apply. The software
supports the interoperability functions listed below:
• Use Patriot passive identity data when available.
I-10
FM 3-01.87
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
I-37. Automated conflict resolution has been incorporated in the software
based on a series of ID conflict resolution tables developed for the various C2
nodes. However, ID conflicts still occur and they require operator
intervention. The ICC operator is required to resolve an identity conflict once
the alert has been displayed and before the operator can continue to review
other alerts. To resolve the conflict, the operator must select an identity for
the track and then acknowledge the alert. The sequence is —
• Step 1—Acknowledge the alert. This hooks the target and generates
the alert "ID S/I REQUIRED."
• Step 2—Note ID indicator lights on console to determine target
identification at the ICC.
• Step 3—Select ID. Determine whether to disagree with the conflict or
agree and press the appropriate ID S/I.
• Step 4—Acknowledge alert.
I-38. If the operator selects automatic ID at the ICC, then conflicting sources
will automatically be commanded to accept the ICC identity. The operator in
this case does not necessarily become the identity source even though the
identity push-button was used. The previously established identity source is
maintained. If the operator selects an identity to agree with the conflicting
source, then that identity and source will be used. This conflict processing is
consistent with the "source-specific" identity resolution tables. The intent is
to minimize conflict situations and maximize automatic identity
dissemination.
I-11
FM 3-01.87
I-40. The TF operations officer must ensure that the data base in use has
been provided to Hawk in the TF. This can be accomplished by making a
hard copy of the Patriot data base and providing this to subordinate Hawk
FUs. Of course, Hawk TCOs must be taught how to read Tab 71, but this has
the further advantage that system IDs for airspace control measures become
standardized throughout the TF. Phase III Hawk performs volume
correlation on the same data base as Patriot.
ALTITUDE CORRELATION
I-41. For Hawk tracks with altitude such as an HIPIR track, the ICC
correlation function uses the altitude provided and performs normal volume
correlation. For CWAR and PAR tracks that do not have an altitude,
successful correlation with a volume is achieved if the altitude limits for the
radar fall within the altitude limits of the volume. For example, if the
altitude limit of the radar is 5,000 feet and the volume is from ground level to
30,000 feet, the target would correlate. However, if the lower limit of the
volume is 10,000 feet, then the target would not correlate.
DEFENSE DESIGN
I-43. Terrain and the mission are major factors in deciding whether to fight
as pure battalions or to task-organize. If there is no requirement for
overlapping coverage between Patriot and Hawk, then pure Patriot and
Hawk battalion operations may be favored. Yet, if there is a requirement to
have Hawk operate in Patriot coverage, then TF organizing should be
strongly considered. This places both weapon systems under the ICC’s
command and control which provides improved track correlation, target
identification, threat assessment, weapons assignment, automatic
engagements, and friendly protection. These enhanced functions result in
more positive target identification and increase system responsiveness and
survivability.
I-44. If a TF is to be organized, then it should consist of no less than three
Patriot FUs. This helps ensure that the TF retains good triangulation with
the Patriot batteries.
I-12
FM 3-01.87
I-45. METT-TC assists in determining the exact size of the TF. A mix of three
Patriot batteries and four Hawk FUs is a good baseline to start with. This
facilitates excellent area coverage and is within the human factor workload of
the ICC operators. It also facilitates the assignment of the remaining Patriot
batteries and maintains Hawk administrative integrity.
HAWK INTEGRATION
I-46. The basic philosophy of conducting defense design for Patriot and Hawk
TF has not changed. Patriot is to be planned as the "base piece," then
augmented by Hawk. The first position consideration of Hawk should be
about 10 to 30 kilometers forward in the Patriot sector, in valleys and low
areas not covered by Patriot. This ensures that the Patriot air picture is
provided to Hawk and that Hawk will detect the low flyers coming up the
valleys and in areas not covered by Patriot (Figure I-8). Hawk should be
placed within 20 kilometers if TBMs are expected, and Hawk will be treated
as a defended asset for Patriot.
ABT DIRECTION
OF ATTACK
H
H H
P P P
P
I-47. Hawk engagement of ABT targets forces the threat up into Patriot
coverage. If the terrain is not suited for this type of deployment, then Hawk
should still be employed between 10 and 30 kilometers forward and within
Patriot coverage. This ensures that Hawk FUs are selected for engagement
before Patriot, thereby initially using the Hawk missiles to counter the air-
breathing target threat. Lastly, Hawk can be deployed on the flanks and rear
of the Patriot FUs. Special consideration must be given to the deployment of
Hawk Phase III systems to ensure there is minimum or no opportunity for
simultaneous engagement of an ABT by both Hawk and Patriot. This can be
accomplished only through proper placement of Hawk within Patriot's
coverage.
I-48. Identification filters should not be applied to the subordinate Hawk
units. The range filter should be set to P4-76 kilometers, thereby providing
early warning to the Hawk FUs. The altitude filter should be set to P4-77 kft.
I-13
FM 3-01.87
I-49. Hawk should initially operate centralized to the ICC. Both HIMAD
systems in the TF have the capability of performing volume correlation in
support of weapons control and passive identification. TF operations officer
(S3) must now ensure that the data bases generated for the mission considers
the Hawk elements assigned. Hawk has the ability to enter by tabular
display restricted volumes, prohibited volumes, safe passage corridors, safe
velocity, and weapon control status. The weights associated with each volume
are initialized by the Hawk operator through the remote control unit and
stored in memory.
I-14
FM 3-01.87
IIFFPID
H
H H
HOO1
P
SPC DEFENDED
ASSET
I-53. Patriot Tab 71 shows the comparable Hawk Volume Entry Tab for the
RV and PV (see Figure I-10). In the Patriot system, once the volumes have
been defined via tabular display, they are then allocated during the
deployment phase of initialization to each of the Patriot FUs assigned. They
are then transferred or downloaded via data link to each of the Patriot
batteries. This process does not apply to Hawk assigned to the TF.
Consequently, separate actions are necessary to assure that their data base is
provided to them.
I-15
FM 3-01.87
VOLUME DATA
VOLUME DATA
Figure I-11. Hawk Volume Entry for Restricted and Prohibited Volumes (Type 2 and 3)
I-54. One of the most important items that the TF operations officer must
establish is the weight set that each system will use. Patriot normally uses
weight set 3 for its passive ID process, and should continue to do so. As
previously mentioned, Hawk can initialize on-line the weights for each type of
volume. The following weights should be initialized in the Hawk Block IV
system to ensure that the same identification is produced by both systems
I-55. These weights are the same as those of weight set type 3 within the
Patriot system. In weight set type 3, the thresholds for target identification
are identical for both systems. The use of the above numbers in the Hawk
system will result in the same target identification being generated for the
same volume violations.
I-56. The defense design found in Figure I-9 illustrates that the area where
Patriot expects the target to be made hostile (eligible for engagement), is
I-16
FM 3-01.87
I-17
FM 3-01.87
happens for both Hawk and Patriot during some of the most common data
and voice commands and responses.
I-18
FM 3-01.87
then evaluated for engagement by other FUs. The TD receives the alert "FP
x: DA010 NO ENGAGE."
I-68. If the TDA attempts to issue an engagement command to Hawk and
there is no HIPIR radar available for assignment, the ICC will issue the alert
FU BUSY. High-powered illuminator radars (HIPAR) are considered
unavailable for assignment if they are currently firing on another target or if
they have previously been issued an Engage or Cover command and the
timers have not expired.
I-69. The ICC normally uses the Hawk high-lethality envelope for LNIP
calculations as the region for engagement recommendations. The Hawk
range bias discussed earlier in the section expands the area in which Hawk
FUs are considered for engagement recommendation. It does not, however,
alter the range at which the Hawk unit will get an IN RANGE and therefore
should not be used. This is different from Patriot range bias, in that Patriot
units may shoot at targets beyond the range at which the computer
determines to be the optimum range. Patriot can engage targets whose time
to launch release (TLR) exceeds 0, though this happens at the expense of a
lower probability of kill. The recommendation is to use Patriot negative range
bias, but only when the deployment of Hawk units, allow Patriot to shoot first
every time.
I-70. The Cover command can only be issued manually. The TD or TDA must
manually hook the target, designate the desired Hawk FU, and send the
command. Unlike the engage command, the cover command can be issued on
any target, approaching or receding. One exception is; the Cover command
will be rejected if the target is beyond the range initiated by the ICC in Tab
68. The alert will be "TARGET OUT OF COVERAGE."
I-71. The ICC may manually apply a Cease-Fire by hooking the target and
pushing the Cease Fire switch-indicator. If the HIPIR is assigned to that
target, a Cease Fire will be received at the Hawk FU. A Cease-Fire may also
be manually or automatically applied to a target by control echelons above
the Patriot ICC to which a data link exists.
I-72. Without any operator action, a Cease-Fire will be sent to Hawk
whenever it does not respond within the specified time period to an Engage or
Cover command. The response that will inhibit the issue of the automatic
Cease Fire is either will comply (WILCO) or the HIPIR assigned status
issued by the Hawk FU, and the HIPIR is assigned. If the Hawk FU does not
respond, the TD receives a NO RESPONSE alert and a Cease Fire is issued
automatically.
I-73. The TD or TDA can apply a Hold Fire to a target in the same manner as
a Cease Fire and it may be manually or automatically applied to a target by
control echelons above the Patriot ICC to which a data link exists. When the
HIPIR is assigned to a target that has a Hold Fire applied, every time the
HIPIR reports its status to the ICC, the ICC will send a Hold Fire command
to the Hawk unit. If the TCO or RO sends a CANTCO or REJECT, and the
HIPIR stays assigned to the target, it will appear momentarily that the Hold
Fire was removed. However, within seconds, another HIPIR report will be
sent to the ICC and the Hold Fire will be reissued.
I-19
FM 3-01.87
I-74. The ICC sends an automatic Hold Fire if the FU is assigned to a track
with an ID of unknown assumed friend. For Phase III FUs, the letters AF
will appear on the second page of the track data tab and the symbol U will
appear as dashed, not recommended. These tracks will continue to be
displayed on the Phase III Hawk high threat list, if appropriate.
I-75. Hold Fire will be issued automatically whenever the HIPIR is assigned
to an ID friend track or if the target ID is changed while the HIPIR is
tracking it. The Hold Fire in this last case will be issued immediately, usually
before the ID change is visible and the FRIEND ENGAGED lamp is
illuminated.
I-76. The ICC operator can issue a Cease Engage to a specific Hawk FU, but
since this is not a command that the Patriot system uses, there is no switch
action for it. The TD issues the Cease Engage command using the Hawk
engagement summary tab (Figure I-6). A Cease Engage will automatically be
issued in two circumstances.
I-77. First, if the HIPIR is assigned to a remote told-in track that is being
dropped for lack of radar track updates, the ICC will issue the Cease Engage
command to keep from having the FU continue to search for a track on which
it cannot provide legitimate location data. If the Hawk radar operator (RO)
has detected a track at this azimuth and location and if the radar was
originally assigned based on an Engage or Cover command, then it is possible
that the continued attempt to acquire lock might be desired. This must be
coordinated orally between the TCO and the TD.
I-78. Second, when the ICC has determined that the current HIPIR
assignment is not as critical as another, it will issue a Cease Engage. Instead
of waiting for the Hawk FU to become free, the ICC looks for a timely
response. It will automatically issue the Cease Engage command to free up
the radar for a new engagement. This Cease Engage for a higher priority
target is different from the one above in that the Hawk TCO will observe a
command symbol on a different target at the same time the Cease Engage is
displayed.
TERMINOLOGY
I-79. There are certain terms that cause confusion during task force
operations. The following list, contains a partial list of common terms:
• Engagement. Hawk operators often consider the process of assigning
the HIPIR through to the termination of an assignment to be an
engagement if there is a missile fired. Patriot's use of the term relates
only to firing a missile.
• Tracking. If the TD asks if the Hawk FU is tracking a target at some
location, the TCO usually responds, "No," if the HIPIR is not assigned
to that target. Patriot considers it tracking if a track data file has
been established. A CWAR or PAR track report sent to the ICC can be
the source of this track data file. This can lead to confusion.
• Patriot TDs and TDAs must understand the word tracking the way
the Hawk operators understand it; that is, that the HIPIR is locked
on the target in question and is tracking its progress. Hawk
I-20
FM 3-01.87
I-21
Glossary
Glossary-1
FM 3-01.87
AO area of operations
APOD aerial port of debarkation
ARM antiradiation missile
AS antispoofing
ATC asset threat category
ATDL-1 Army Tactical Data Link-1
ATM antitactical missile
ATO air tasking order
aux auxiliary
AWACS airborne warning and control system
Glossary-2
FM 3-01.87
Glossary-3
FM 3-01.87
Glossary-4
FM 3-01.87
Glossary-5
FM 3-01.87
HF high frequency
HIB Hawk input buffers
HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone
HIMAD high- to medium- altitude air defense
HIPIR high-powered illuminator radar
HOLDF hold fire
HORG hostile origin
horz horizon
host hostile
hrzn horizon
HSDIO high-speed data input/output
HWK Hawk
Hawk homing all the way killer
Hz hertz
I/O input/output
ICC information and coordination central
ID identification
IDR interface data record
IDS identification size
IFF identification, friend or foe
IFFOFF IFF off
IFFON IFF on
IFFPID IFF passive identification
IM intermediate maintenance
indep independent
int interrogated
IOCT input/output control terminal
IP intercept point or indicate position
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPOUT impact point out of coverage
IR infrared
ISLB initial search lower bound
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
Glossary-6
FM 3-01.87
Glossary-7
FM 3-01.87
Glossary-8
FM 3-01.87
NK no kill
NLOS non-line-of-sight
nm nautical mile
NREF north reference
NSIF negative SIF
NTL non-tactical link
NTT non-tactical tape
Glossary-9
FM 3-01.87
Pk probability of kill
PL phase line; party line
PLGR precision lightweight GPS receiver
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
pos positive
PPI plan position indicator
PPO Patriot Project Office
PPS precise positioning service
PSIF positive SIF
PTBM presumed tactical ballistic missile
PTOD precise time of day
PTL primary target line
pts points
PTY party
PV prohibited volume
PVA prohibited volume attribute
pwr power
RAD radius
RAM radar action message
RCFD receive and compare FP data
RCS radar cross section
rcvr receiver
RDR radar data record
rdr radar
rdr radar
RF radio frequency
RHI range height indicator
RIP ripple fire
RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
RLRIU routing logic radio interface unit
RMAX (maximum) range
RMC remote multiplexer combiner
Glossary-10
FM 3-01.87
S/I switch-indicator
S2 Intelligence Officer
S3 Operations Officer
S4 Logistics Officer
SA selective availability
SALVO salvo fire
SAR satellite access request
SATCOM satellite communications
SBC short broadcast
SBU slave bus unit
SEM strobe engagement mode
SEP spherical error probability
SICC subordinate ICC
SIF selective identification feature
SIGO Signal Officer
SINCGARS single-channel ground and airborne radio system
SLAR side-looking aircraft radar
SLCT selected subordinate elements
Glossary-11
FM 3-01.87
SLS shoot-look-shoot
SMT system maintenance technician
SMU switch multiplexer unit
SOC site-oriented correlation
SOE state of emissions
SOJ standoff jammer
SOJC standoff jammer counter
SOP standing operating procedures
SPC safe passage corridor
SPCA safe passage corridor attribute
spec special
SPOD seaport of debarkation
SPS standard positioning service
sq square
SRP short-range pop-up
SRPOP short-range pop-up
SSJ self-screening jammer
ST special text
STANAG Standardization Agreement (NATO)
std emp standard emplacement
STL secondary target line
STO standing tactical order
SYSCON system control
sz size
Glossary-12
FM 3-01.87
Glossary-13
FM 3-01.87
TROPO troposcatter
TSD tactical storage device
TSOP tactical standing operating procedures
TSR time slot reallocation
TTFL time to first launch
TTLL time to last launch
TTLR time to launch release
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TVM track via missile
TVM-AP track via missile-analog processor
TVM-CP track via missile-correlation processor
TWS track while scan
TWUD tactical weapon control computer unit diagnostics
Glossary-14
FM 3-01.87
XMTR transmitter
XTBM extra high tactical ballistic missile
Glossary-15
FM 3-01.87
Glossary-16
Bibliography
AR 310-25. Dictionary of United States Army Terms. 15 October 1983 (Change 1, 21 May 1986).
AR 310-50. Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes. 15 November 1985.
AR 380-5. Department of the Army Information Security Program. 25 February 1988.
(C) AR 380-19-1. Control of Compromising Emanations (U). September 1990.
AR 710-2. Inventory Management Supply Policy Below the Wholesale Level. 31 October 1997.
ARTEP 44-635-11-Drill. Patriot Crew Drills for Electric Power Plant and Antenna Mast Group.
29 June 1998.
ARTEP 44-635-12-Drill. Patriot Crew Drills for Information and Coordination Central (ICC),
with Electric Power Unit II (EPU II) and Communications Relay Group (CRG).
29 May 1992 (Change 1, 04 March 1994).
ARTEP 44-635-13-Drill. Patriot Crew Drills for Engagement Control Station (ECS) and Radar
Set (RS). 13 July 1992 (Change 1, 15 July 1994).
ARTEP 44-635-14-Drill. Patriot Crew Drills for Launching Station (LS) and Missile Reload.
30 June 1992 (Change 1, 15 July 1994).
ARTEP 44-635-15-Drill. Patriot Crew Drill for Launching Station (LS), Forklift Missile Reload.
03 October 1995.
ARTEP 44-635-MTP. Mission Training Plan for an ADA Battalion, Patriot. 03 October 1995.
ARTEP 44-637-30-MTP. Mission Training Plan for an ADA Battery, Patriot. 03 October 1995.
BR-13394 REV L Raytheon Publication—Dictionary of Acronyms and Terms for the Patriot
Missile System (10th Edition, January 1995).
DA Pamphlet 310-35. Index of International Standardization Agreements. 15 December 1978.
DA Pamphlet 385-1. Small Unit Safety Officer/NCO Guide. 22 September 1993.
FM 1-100. Army Aviation Operations. 21 February 1997.
FM 3-3. Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance. 16 November 1992. (Change 1,
29 September 1994).
FM 3-4. NBC Protection. 29 May 1992 (Change 2, 21 February 1996).
FM 3-5. NBC Decontamination. 17 November 1993.
FM 3-100. Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals. 8 May 1996.
FM 5-34. Engineer Field Data. 30 August 1999.
FM 5-100. Engineer Operations. 27 February 1996.
FM 9-6. Munitions Support in the Theater of Operations. 20 March 1998.
FM 9-43-2. Recovery and Battlefield Damage Assessment and Repair. 03 October 1995.
Bibliography-1
FM 3-01.87
Bibliography-2
FM 3-01.87
Bibliography-3
INDEX
battalion initialization structure, FP deployment support, 2-47
A 2-2 lateral ICC, 2-41
A-scope operations, 3-29 initialization sequence, 2-3, H-2 subordinate ICC, 2-40
ABT, 2-4, 2-11, 2-15, 1-16, 2-50, geographic data parameters, master ICC, 2-39, 4-3, 4-5
3-1, 3-23, 3-26, 3-47, G-2, I-13 2-3
connectivity, 4-18, 2-52
identification, 2-4, 2-10, 2-28, ICC mode and data base
external links, 4-3, 4-6
1-19, 3-34, 4-5, I-13, I-16 selection, 2-5
counter-antiradiation missile
kill assessment, 3-47, 3-48, initialization control, 2-6
operations, 3-104
3-82 requirements for direct links,
ARM countermeasures, 3-108
ABT/TBM defended assets, 2-16 2-38, 2-39
through 3-110
generalized volumes, 2-18 battalion FIDOC, 2-9
counter-ARM threat parameters,
air and missile defense task force, ID mode, 2-10 2-26
2-17, 3-25, I-2 ID weight set, 2-10, 2-29, I-16 launch decision parameters,
air battle management, 3-10, 4-1 IFF/SIF control, 2-11 2-26
Air Defense Artillery (ADA), 2-1, missile depletion rules, 2-27, identification parameters, 2-4,
2-8 2-87, 2-88 2-28
employment planning, 2-59 battery tactical initialization, 2-66
planning, 2-5, 2-30, 2-37, 3-65, data collection control, 2-66 D
4-18, 4-19 data initialization sequence, data buffer transfer, 2-79
airspace control measures, 2-18 2-68 data communications, 2-78
airspace control order (ACO), roll-crossroll alignment, 2-70 data communications control,
2-18, 2-20, 2-29, 2-59, 3-36 2-78,
alternate alignment, E-1 C ATDL-1, 2-32, 2-39, 4-14, 4-21
antihelicopter standoff jammer, clutter and chaff tracks, 3-32 PADIL, 2-38, 3-20, 4-2, 4-7,
3-31, 3-97, 3-99 4-15, 4-16
command and control, 2-1, 3-69,
assets and defended areas, 2-4 4-1 TADIL-A, 4-16, 4-17, 3-88
asset defense, 3-47, 3-51, 3-63, structures, 4-1 TADIL-B, 2-15, 2-35, 2-38, 4-3,
3-69, 3-81 4-14, 4-18, 4-19
processing, 4-2
asset priority, 2-28, 3-45 TADIL-J, 2-35, 4-14, 4-19
command planning, 2-4, 2-6,
ATM mission, 3-85 2-30, H-5 data links, 4-2, 4-14, 4-16, 4-19
automatic emplacement, 2-62, command, control, and decentralized, 2-8, 3-5, 3-23, 4-5,
2-69, 2-72, 2-87, C-1 communications, 1-2, 2-2 defense design, 3-50, 3-69, I-2,
status monitor, 3-25, C-12 communications, 2-4, 2-31, 2-33, I-12
2-34, 2-37, 2-46, 2-55, 2-78, deployment/command planning,
B 4-3, 4-5 2-30, H-5
battalion initialization, 2-1, n2-2 battalion communications, display and control program, 3-12
2-31, 2-35, 2-46
automatic battalion initialization, doctrinal framework, 1-1
2-5 FP communications, 2-33
BATI and TACI flowcharts, communications operator, 3-5, E
H-1 3-9
early warning, 2-27, 4-18, I-13
battalion communications communications net loading,
control, 2-31, 2-35 2-37
Index-1
FM 3-01.87
ECCM engagement mode fight, G-5 local launcher, 3-56, 3-57, 3-65,
selection, 3-95 fight-while-fix, G-6 3-67
ECCM operations, 3-87 must fix, G-3 remote launcher, 3-56, 3-57,
ECCM wedges, 3-27, 3-89 3-62, 3-70
FP locations/boundaries, 2-63
emplacement configuration, D-1 location data confidence level, 2-
friendly origins, 2-18, 4-2
62, 2-74, 2-76, 3-14, E-6
engagement control, 2-13, 3-1,
3-78, I-7
G M
engagement operations, 2-86,
GPS, C-1, C-3, C-5, C-13
4-1, I-1, I-7 manual orentation and alignment,
GLIF threshold, 2-91
standoff jammer, 3-27, 3-88, data sheets, A-1
3-97 ground level interference filter
mapping display and control, B-4
(GLIF), 3-100 through 3-103
strobe engagement mode master ICC operations, 2-39, 4-3
(SEM), 3-62, 3-86
master ICC communications, 4-5
virtual target (VT), 3-86, 3-88, H
METT-TC, I-12, 2-29, 2-33
3-90 through 3-94 hostile criteria, 4-2
missile selection, 3-78, 3-83, 3-84
initial search lower bound weight sets, 2-10, I-10, I-16
(ISLB),3-82, B-1, B-3, B-5, D-4 missile engagement zone, 2-22
radar alignment procedures, I
2-72 N
ICC air battle operations, 3-10,
roll and crossroll tolerances, north finding system (NFS), 2-65,
2-75, E-3 Air defense functions, 3-10
2-69, 2-75, C-10
manual alignment, 2-74, E-3 firing doctrine, 3-11, 3-84, 3-88,
3-94
enable TBM A dive calculations, O
3-79 saturation alleviation, 3-18
operational search lower bound
extra-bn communication track management, 3-12, 4-4 (OSLB), 2-81, 2-83, B-6, B-8
control, 2-34, 2-35 triangulation, 3-16, 3-18, 3-86
ICC ECM operations, 3-87 P
F TBM and ABT defended passive ID line, 3-36
fault alert filter, G-1 assets, 2-15 Patriot crew responsibilities, 3-1
fiber optic cable deployment, D-5 identification, 2-4, 2-34, I-16 communications operator, 3-5,
FIDOC and operational identification processing, 3-39, 3-9
parameters, 2-9, 2-91 I-10 tactical control assistant, 3-3,
TBM A engagement mode, identification parameters, 2-28 3-4
3-78 manual ID, 3-43 tactical control officer, 3-1, 3-2
TBM B engagement mode, origin volume checks, 3-41 tactical director, 3-6, 3-7
3-78 safe passage corridors, 2-20, tactical director assistant, 3-7,
fire control configuration,D-1 2-21, 3-41, 3-8
fire unit tactical initialization, 2-60 IPB, 2-29, 3-80 Patriot missiles, 3-73
ABT search sectors, 3-27, ATM, 3-66, 3-75, 3-84
3-100 J ATM-1 (GEM), 3-48, 3-55, 3-73,
TBM search sectors, 3-28, JTIDS, 3-9, 4-19 through 4-21 3-75, 3-84
3-79 SOJC, 3-73, 3-74, 3-84
JFACC, 2-8
fire unit to fire unit operations, standard missile, 3-73, 3-74,
4-10 3-84
L
fix or fight criteria, G-1 PLGR, C-1, C-3, C-6, C-7
launcher emplacement, 3-59,
fix-or-fight guidance, G-1 PTL, 2-48, 2-81, 3-59, 3-79, B-1
3-66, 3-68, C-7, D-2
decision, G-1, G-4 point defense, 3-81
launcher dead zones, 3-68
Index-2
FM 3-01.87
Index-3
FM 3-01.87
26 SEPTEMBER 2000
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0022704
Distribution:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with
the initial distribution number 115827, requirements for FM 3-01.87.
PIN: 078423-000