A critique of modern philosophy

Abstract: In this paper I challenge modern philosophys self-conception as an absolute critique (i.e., a critique of everything/anything). I argue that such a conception is not only misconceived, it is also ideological in character. Looking back to its origins, I develop a genealogy of modern philosophys selfunderstanding in order to deconstruct it and disassociate it from possible alternative conceptions of philosophy, arguing for a more modest conception of philosophy as a subject which provides tools for developing human powers of reflection.

The wise in every age conclude, what Pyrrho taught and Hume renewed, that dogmatists are fools. Thomas Blacklock1

This is an essay (exercise/askesis) in the philosophy of philosophy, and not merely in metaphilosophy, to paraphrase the opening lines of Timothy Williamsons recent book. As Williamson rightly claims, to talk about philosophy is itself doing philosophy (Williamson, 2007, pp. ix-x). In this sense, a discourse about philosophy cannot be metaphilosophy, done from beyond and above (from an Archimedean vantage point beyond the bounds of specific space and time) (cf. Heidegger, 1956, pp. 21ff.). Willard Quine, following Otto Neurath, has likened science (and) philosophy to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by plank while staying afloat in it (Quine, 1960, p. 3). Quine uses this metaphor principally to demonstrate the piecemeal character of philosophy, but it can also be invoked (as I do here) to allude to its immanent

Acknowledgements: Quoted in Popkin, 1993, p. 517.

character. This discussion is closely connected to the nature of philosophy (or at least to the prominent part of it). Philosophy is not only a reflective but also a self-reflective enterprise;2 in it, reflection and self-reflection are intertwined in a unique way. Sociologist and philosopher Jrgen Habermas has connected this double reflexive character of philosophy to the essence of natural language itself:

Because of the reflexive character of natural languages, speaking about what has been spoken, direct or indirect mention of speech components, belongs to the normal linguistic process of reaching understanding. The expression metalinguistic judgments in a natural language about sentences of the same language suggests a difference in level that does not exist. It is one of the most interesting features of natural languages that they can be used as their own languages of explication. (Habermas, 1998, p. 39)

What Habermas says about natural language applies to philosophy as well, and it is intimately connected to the reflective character of philosophy. Philosophy has existed in many cultures, and it can be safely said that, in a sense, if the properties of reflection and self-reflection are coterminous with human life, philosophy is also coterminous with it. Such reflective attitudes towards the self, the universe, and the other can be found in various places across space and time, and the

Reflection involves distance from the object of enquiry, while self-reflection requires that the subject

maintain a certain distance from herself.

commonality among them can be observed (v. Cohen, 1995; Moore, 1995; Saksena, 1995; Mei, 1995). However, this slight, almost banal, observation should not lead one to conclude that philosophical reflection has taken the same form across space and time, and thus elide the distinctions and specificities which give particular attempts at reflection and self-reflection their unique flavour.3 Modern philosophy4 shares general characteristics with the philosophical activity of other eras and epochs of human civilisation, but that is not what is interesting in understanding its essence: what is interesting is its uniqueness, that which gives it its differential characteristics (in the lingua of Aristotelian logic, what we are interested in is not its genus but its specific difference). Modern philosophy emerged during a revolutionary epoch in the history of Europe, an epoch defined by a transition from the medieval worldview to the modern worldview (so-called modernity). This specific development not only defines (at least in part) the modern world (and especially its view), but also the self-image of philosophy itself: the self-image that philosophy is debating intensely as the distance from the founding act is becoming remote (v. Williams, 2000; Cottingham, 2009; Solomon, 2001).

Of course, many philosophers deny that philosophy has existed or can exist in any culture. For them,

philosophy needs the fulfilment of specific social conditions in order to exist. Its safe to say, however, that in making such claims they have a very specific conception of philosophy in mind, and not philosophy in general (Barry Stroud is one such philosopher: see Stroud, 2001, p. 28. Cf. Cohen, 1995).
4

Although I use the term modern philosophy throughout the paper, it should be clear that my critique is

focused on certain specific conception of it (as represented by Graham Pirest, for example); thus, my claims about modern philosophy should be read this in mind.

The revolutionary character of modern philosophy is most manifest in the writings of its undisputed father, the Frenchman Ren Descartes,5 who claimed that all knowledge needs a radical new beginning and new foundations.6 Descartes was writing in a period (and the same is true of Francis Bacon) when:

. . . familiar teachings of centuries about religion, politics, and science were publicly questioned and sharply disputed across a war-torn Europe. The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century and the on-going Catholic Counter Reformation, together with the proliferation of religious sects and the foundation of new religious orders, highlighted the fragile intellectual foundations on which the apparent unity of Christianity had relied. (Clarke, 2006, p. 69)

This points to the important fact that modern philosophy emerged in a milieu in which Christianity was still a dominant and ruling force, but was nonetheless finding itself increasingly on the defensive, and was losing ground to the new emerging forces of rational debate. Philosophy7 was one of those forces, and this helped define the self-

Some have suggested two fathers, one for the French side and the other for the English side; the English

one is Francis Bacon (Copleston, 1994, p. 1).

6

For my perspective in this paper, what is of primary importance is the idea of a radical new beginning in

Descartes, and not the specific method (that is, the method of radical doubt) which he uses to accomplish it.
7

Of course, philosophy at the time was not separated from science, and the founding fathers especially.

Descartes was a great scientist and mathematician (especially the latter) in his own right, and had a crucial

image of philosophy as the revolutionary force without parallel, which corresponds to, and is attested by, the notion of philosophy as a new beginning (at times an absolute beginning) put forth by both Descartes and Bacon. Just like Francis Bacon, his contemporary in England, Descartes thought that a new beginning had to be made in human knowledge. The old philosophy of schools could not be reformed: Aristotelianism had to be rejected in toto (Matthews, 1989, p. 88, emphasis in the original; v. Copleston, 1994, 1).8 Similarly, Francis Bacon saw in the emergence of the new philosophy and the new sciences the prospect of an entirely new age, which would be quantitatively and qualitatively different from its predecessor. The issue here is not whether they were justified in their assumption that they were making a complete break with the past; it suffices for my argument to establish that this is how they saw things. Moreover, as Frederick Copleston aptly notes, they were not entirely unjustified in this self perception: Men such as Bacon and Descartes were doubtless unaware of the extent to which their minds were influenced by former ways of

impact on the early development and orientation of Sir Isaac Newtons thought. This also partially explains mainstream philosophys partiality towards science.
8

Hence Descartes prejudice against preconceived opinions (praejudicia) (Cottingham, 1998a, 8; cf.

Gadamer, 2004 [1975], pp. 276-277). For the theme of an absolute new beginning one should of course consult Descartes Discourse on Method (see Descartes, 1985, pp. 111-151). Descartes often couches his argument in terms of not relying on others opinions, and thinking through the matter for oneself, and he claims that common sense is often a better guide than scholarly tomes. This can legitimately be taken as an expression of modern individual self-determination, but, more crucially, Descartes is trying to establish a new tradition, a new common sense (as opposed to the dominant but receding tradition and idea of common sense).

thought; but their consciousness of standing at the threshold of a new era is not unjustified (Copleston, 1994, p. 10). Thus, modern philosophy began its life as part of a revolutionary movement that heralded a new age, different from the one it was aiming to replace. Furthermore, it started its life in an environment in which it was a minority view, albeit one which was growing.9 These two facts make it natural that the critique10 of dominant worldviews11 (medieval civilisation and its remnants in this instance) became the main vocation of modern philosophy and part and parcel of its self-image not critique in general, as in the critique that must accompany any philosophical reflection, but a specific conception of critique, which characterises (and understands) itself as limitless and absolute. The great German philosopher Immanuel Kant famously articulated this notion when he wrote:

Our age is the genuine age of criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion through its holiness and legislation through its majesty commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect

It is interesting to note that almost none of the founders of modern philosophy were professional

philosophers based in universities (only Kant, who is a much later author), and almost all of them wrote in the vernacular and not in Latin, the scholarly language of the day (Copleston, 1994, p. 5). Descartes and Bacon did both write in Latin, and also in French and English respectively. Locke and Hume wrote all their major works in English; subsequently, Kant wrote mainly in German.
10

In this paper I use the terms critique and criticism interchangeably. Be they actually dominant or imagined to be so.

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that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination. (Kant, 1999, p. A xii n, emphasis in the original)

Note here that it is reason which grants the sought-after unfeigned respect reason is the sole authority which decides which other authorities deserve respect, and to what extent. On the other hand, although we find similar requirements for reason elaborated on later in the Critique (A 738-B 766), its clear that in order to gain respect reason doesnt need to (shouldnt) submit to any other authority but itself; reason, in the Kantian conception, is self-justificatory in a way in which no other faculty or authority is. What is of further interest (from our perspective) in this paper is Kants use of the universal quantifier to determine the range of criticism (everything). There are no exceptions; the critique is total.12 True, Kant was writing in an age considerably different from that of Descartes and Bacon if not already the Age of Enlightenment, it was at least much nearer to it than that of Descartes and Bacon. Here is how Kant himself saw things:

If it is now asked whether we live in an enlightened age, the answer is: No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment. As matters now stand, a good deal more is required for people on the whole to be in the position, or even able to
12

Critique is total, but this totality doesnt necessarily imply a wholesale critique (that is, a critique of

everything at once) it can be carried out piecemeal. Thus the totality of critique in the sense used here shouldnt be confused with wholesale critique; a total critique can take either piecemeal or wholesale routes (more on this in the main body text, below).

be put in the position, of using their own understanding confidently and well in religious matters, without anothers guidance. But we do have distinct intimations that the field is now being opened for them to work freely in this direction and the hindrances to universal enlightenment or to humankinds emergence from its self-incurred tutelage are gradually becoming fewer. (Kant, 1999, p. 21, emphasis in the original; translation slightly amended)

And here we can see that the self-conception of philosophy has already started to become detached from the founding act (as something which is universal irrespective of space and time). A word or two must be said about Kants notion of critique and its relation to that of Descartes. Kants enterprise is clearly very different from that of Descartes in many respects, and not only in the fact that Kant was living much nearer to the actual Age of Enlightenment than Descartes. Kant, crucially, doesnt share Descartes commitment to the methodic doubt as a way to establish absolute and certain foundations of knowledge.13 He doesnt share Descartes search for absolute certainty either (in this he is much closer to Nietzsche than to Descartes);14 Kant instinctively realises that the demise of the medieval Christian world also meant the demise of the idea of absolute certainty,
13

On Descartes methodic doubt and its revolutionary character see Williams, 1998, pp. 28-49. Kant as is well known does claim apodictic certainty for his system (see for example Kuehn, 2006,

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especially p. 655), but such a claim is limited to cognitive knowledge and its conditions, and does not encompass reason and its territory as a whole. There is a vast grey area outside this, which will always remain as long as we are humans. In this, Kant is much closer to John Locke than to Descartes, although comparatively speaking John Locke is more agnostic than Kant.

and as a true believer in reason he was willing to sacrifice certainty as a price for believing in reason and reason alone, and believing in it in its own terms. Kant also differs from Descartes in his rejection of presuppositionless knowledge; for Kant, belief in reason is not presuppositionless (although he does think that reason must justify its presuppositions in its own manner if its to retain its authority). With these qualifications, Kant retains Descartes notion of absolute critique in the following substantial sense: every authority and every source of knowledge must justify itself on the altar of reason in order to deserve consideration and legitimacy, and there is no authority which has a right to compete with the authority of reason. Kants oft-talked about humility is not about this point at all; he doesnt concede anything as far as the absolute authority of reason is concerned. His humility is related, rather, to another point. What he does concede is that in order to retain its authority, reason has to justify it, even if in its own terms, and that this justification cannot be based on presuppositionless15 and absolute grounds, but is an ongoing project.16 His humility pertains to the fact that his positive estimate of the powers of reason in certain aspects is much weaker than that of Descartes.

15

Thus critique can be total (in its relation to external worldviews) without being presuppositionless

(internally) as long as the presuppositions are justified (internally). Also, total critique is not necessarily opposed to piecemeal critique (a critique can be total in its intentions but piecemeal in its execution; or, alternatively, it can be total externally but piecemeal internally). For a critique to be total (critique of anything/everything) it only needs to hold that in principle everything is amenable to critique.
16

The construction of reason is to be seen as process rather than product, as practices of connection and

integration rather than as once and for all laying foundations (ONeill, 1992, p. 292, also p. 303).

Thus, Kants notion of critique is not aimed at absolute certainty, and it doesnt arise from scepticism. The attitude of questioning is to be differentiated from scepticism. The attitude of questioning is aimed at alien17 authorities the authorities that are not vindicated by reason. Reason is absolute, but not in the sense of being presuppositionless: it is only absolute in the sense that every authority must justify itself in front of it in order to be considered a legitimate authority (be it a theoretical or practical authority). Again, reason itself needs vindication, but in its own terms, while everything else be justified in reasons terms. As Kant puts it:

This is evidently the effect not of the thoughtlessness of our age [i.e., the Age of Enlightenment or age of criticism], but of its ripened power of judgment, which will no longer be put off with illusory knowledge, and which demands that reason take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of
17

For Kant, the essence of reason is freedom: [t]he very existence of reason depends upon freedom

(Kant, 1999, p. A738/B766). The authorities which rely on coercion or dictatorial powers (such as God, Church, State, religion, nature, etc.), whose dictates are givens that cannot be questioned, are termed by Kant alien authorities because their nature is alien to the essence of reason, i.e., freedom. Kant also terms these authorities arbitrary because, even in principle, their dictates cannot be shared by everyone (the Christian Churchs commands make sense only to its devotees, for example); reasons dictates are at least in principle sharable by everyone. Obviously, this argument is valid only if Kant is working here with a very thin conception of reason, which is the common property of all (mature) humans. In my opinion, however, Kants argument fails precisely because he presupposes a very substantive conception of reason that hinges on and presumes the notion of autonomy (self determination). (My interpretation here is heavily indebted to ONeill, 1992, p. 293 and passim, though ONeill doesnt make the objection I allude to at the end; also, see her other seminal works, referenced below in the text. Cf. Schneewind, 1998, pp. 483-507).

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self-knowledge, and to institute a court of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless pretensions, and this not by mere decrees but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws; and this court is none other than the critique of pure reason itself. (Kant, 1991, pp. A xi-xii, emphasis in the original)

While everything else is answerable to reason and its authority, reason is answerable only to itself. Hence, Kant differs from Descartes not in delegetimising all authorities, which are in potential or actual competition with reason, but in determining how to justify the rational enterprise and how to build the edifice of reason once the negative work has been performed. Here we can see that Kant clearly comes to differentiate between what is revolutionary and what is conservative in the modern philosophical enterprise. The negative critique (critique of competing (alien) authorities) is absolute and revolutionary, while the positive enterprise is conservative (and constructive).18 Kants notion of critique is much more complex than can be fully explored here, but it can be claimed with some justification that his notion of philosophy as the custodian of reason, as the critique of everything, has remained. This is clearly evident in a recent attempt at delimiting the essence (specific difference) of philosophy by a wellknown and well-respected contemporary philosopher and logician, Graham Priest. The following two passages are pertinent to our discussion:

18

For an elaboration on these points, see the seminal works of Onora ONeill (1989, 1992, 2004).

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What distinguishes the role of criticism in philosophy is, I think, precisely that there is nothing that may not be challenged. Anything is a fit topic for critical scrutiny and potential rejection, including . . . even the efficacy of critical reasoning itself. (Priest, 2006, p. 201, emphasis in the original)

I suggest, then, that philosophy is precisely that intellectual inquiry in which anything is open to critical challenge and scrutiny. (Ibid., p. 202, emphasis in the original)

As a good logician, Priest qualifies his claims carefully: he says he does not mean to suggest that every philosophy (or philosopher) actually criticises anything/everything;19 he is only claiming that if they wanted to they could do so. Philosophers qua philosophers and philosophy qua philosophy can potentially criticise everything and anything; nothing is sacrosanct. Priest considers the counterexample of medieval philosophers, who typically did not question the claim that God exists, and insists that this does not violate their status as philosophers because if they had wanted to question the existence of God they could have done so (p. 201)! This is a bizarre example, and a poor one at that. Barring physical impossibility, and barring logical impossibility, anyone could potentially do anything. What is special about philosophy in that? Such a thin conception of potentiality dilutes the notion of criticism to such an extent that it becomes trivial.

19

Henceforth, where possible, I shall refer to criticism of anything/everything simply as absolute critique or

absolute criticisms.

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Priests dilemma here corresponds to the one faced by modern political theorists, who, in order to make room for a diversity of beliefs, have put forth the idea of reasons that all can accept as the final arbitrator of disputes in the political arena. James Bohman and Henry Richardson (2009) have justifiably taken them to task by pressing them to come up with an example of reasons that a person could not accept. As they write:

To be sure, there are plenty of reasons that, as it may be, a person does not accept. Perhaps not caring about flowers, you do not take the presence of famous orchid garden to be a reason to visit Fiji. With a sufficient effort of imagination and enlarged thinking, however, surely you could come to accept that as a reason to go there. That is an empirical possibility. (p. 257, emphasis in the original)

They conclude: [t]he important question, for our purposes, is really whether it is ever the case that a reason that one single person intelligibly accepts is not also that could be intelligibly accepted by each and every person (p. 258). Surely the answer should be a resounding no. With such a thin conception of potentiality, if one person can accept something, then surely anyone else should (in principle) be able to do so. In a similar vein, like his modern counterpart, the medieval philosopher qua philosopher (and I would say qua human being) could surely (in principle) have rejected or doubted the existence of God (and some actually did).20 The dilemma faced by Priest is that if he works with a

20

In both the Christian and Islamic discourses in the Middle Ages one occasionally finds the names of

authors who questioned the idea of God altogether. In general, the discussion of the arguments for the proof

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thin conception of the possibility of criticism, this dilutes the uniqueness of the philosophy he wants to establish. If he works with a robust conception of the possibility of criticism (however defined), then he cannot claim that there was equal (or near equal) possibility of denying the existence of God in medieval philosophy qua philosophy, as in modern philosophy (and in fact in modern philosophy it is the exact opposite: it is becoming increasingly difficult to be a robust theist doing philosophy in our time). One could avoid this dilemma by either denying that medieval philosophy, by Priests lights, was really a philosophy (one could claim that it was, rather, a theology in disguise).21 Perhaps Priest would not like to take this route because he is eager to preserve the universality of philosophy. Or, one can take the route of distinguishing between philosophy in general and the specific forms it takes, in which case Priests description would fit modern philosophy (especially its self-image) but not philosophy as such. I have so far differentiated between philosophy as such and the specific forms it takes, and I would argue that modern philosophy (at least its self-conception) as an absolute critique22 is one conception of philosophy among many, and it is the product of

of the existence of God by Christian and Islamic philosophers of the Middle Ages on their own are sufficient to establish that such a group of people existed, even though, naturally enough (and consistent with my theory) their names have largely gone unmentioned in the dominant discourses of the age.
21

According to a different conception of philosophy than Priests, such a dilemma would not necessarily

arise. Thus, one can define philosophy as a conceptual analysis at the highest level of generality and abstraction: in which case, one can find much to admire in medieval philosophy despite the many substantive claims about reality, which we no longer find persuasive.
22

As should be clear from the body text as a whole, I am not claiming that Priests conception of modern

philosophy is a majority view in todays mainstream philosophy. In fact, I believe it is not.

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the specific circumstances in which modern philosophy emerged as a revolutionary force in the 16th and 17th centuries in Western Europe. This specific form cannot be universalised without confusing philosophy in general with one of the specific forms it (historically) took. Insistence on accepting a self-conception of modern philosophy as the philosophy, I would argue, is against the spirit of philosophy itself (and against the spirit of reflection and critique in general). It would be tantamount to closing off the openings for thinking, because one of the things crucial for thought and its prosperity is to always keep open alternatives the avenues of thinking differently. Difference is crucial not for its own sake but because it is our only panacea against the tyranny of the same. As Michael Foucault puts it: But then, what is philosophy today philosophical activity, I mean if it is not the critical work of thought on itself? And if it does not consist in the endeavour of knowing how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, rather than legitimating what is already known? There is always something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others, to tell them where their truth is and how to find it, or when it presumes to give them naively positivistic instruction. But it is its right to explore what might be changed, in its own thought, through the practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it. The essay which should be understood as the test by means of which one modifies oneself through the play of truth and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication is the living body of philosophy, at least if we assume

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that philosophy is still what it was in times past, i.e., an ascesis, an exercise of the self, in thought. (Foucault, 1992, pp. 8-9)23

This is not to claim that difference is value in itself; it is only to say that without the possibility of real alternatives there is no thinking. Thus, when we press and question a specific philosophy which claims to be universal,24 we do so in the interest of thinking, reflection, and critique in sum, in the interest of philosophy itself. But thinking also needs particularity, specificity, and situatedness within particular traditions in order to prosper. By denying its own specificity,25 its own situatedness, modern philosophy26 also denies the very source of its own life because there is no thinking without thinking in a particular space and time. Thinking transcends particularity only by locating itself surely and securely within its own particularity (and
23

I have used here the modified translation by Professor Clare OFarrell, found on her website

http://www.michel-foucault.com/quote/2001q.html [accessed on 27 November 2010].

24

The philosophy which in so doing denies (hides from) and forgets its specific origins. Of course, its

possible to universalise such a philosophy, but thats another matter. Also, my objection is not to the claim to universality; my contention is, rather, that the claim is false.
25

Again, my problem with the conception of modern philosophy in question is not its claim to universality

as such, but its specific claim that its critical in a way in which other traditions (including philosophical traditions) are not. Basically, in my opinion, the claim to absolute critique (taken on face value and without explanation provided in the text) is self-contradictory (or at least incoherent).
26

As should be clear from the paper overall, I dont make any claims about modern philosophy as a whole;

my argument is only against certain interpretations of what modern philosophy is, as exemplified by the specific authors I discuss in the text.

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by self-consciously recognising this). Thus, it is in the interest of thinking that we expose the fallacy of modern philosophys claim to universality (which involves the denial of its own particularity). It is also in the interest of thinking itself that we defend various minority traditions of thinking against the imperialistic onslaught of modern philosophy.27 The mistake behind the claim that philosophy is absolute critique is to ignore two distinct but interrelated aspects of criticism. Let us call them internal (positive) criticism and negative (external) criticism respectively. Internal criticism is a form of self-criticism in which one critiques ones own ideas or ones own world view (at the level of the system).28 In external criticism, on the other hand, one criticises another worldview at the level of individual ideas, or at the system level. Internal criticism can also either be an immanent criticism where one acts and argues within the framework of [her] own ideas, or it can be carried out as the philosophical activity of reflecting on those ideas at a more general level and trying to make sense of them (Williams, 2000, p. 491). The latter activity still remains within the ambit of immanent criticism as long as this making sense of stops at the points which are essential to our view (without which our view would lose its rationale and collapse as a coherent and self-evident whole for us). If we transit to that latter option, internal criticism loses its immanent status and becomes a
27

Every critique is self-interested. Philosophy teaches us self-reflection and enhances our powers of

reflection, imagination, and alternative thinking, but how we use those powers is not determined by philosophy, its determined by us, our interests, and the wider social conditions.
28

There is also a possibility for internal critique of worldviews other than our own for example,

empathising with them to such an extent that we internalise them, although whether such identification is possible is controversial.

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transcendent29 criticism, and no longer remains internal; it transforms itself into a species of external criticism, since now were reflecting on our fundamental ideas in a neutral or impartial way (as if from the viewpoint of someone outside our worldview we become strangers to our own view), in the same way in which we criticise a view which is external to our view. To put this categorisation in the context of the birth of modern philosophy: as we have seen, its self conception as absolute criticism emerged at the particular juncture of history when philosophy (and her allies) was a minority activity pitted against the stilldominant but receding and retreating worldview that had prevailed in Europe since the Middle Ages (whether it goes under the name of feudalism, or Christendom, or Christian civilisation). At the time, philosophy naturally criticised everything/anything it could lay its hand on precisely because it was a minority view aiming to destroy and overcome the prevalent worldview. But the same cannot be true today, when modern philosophy (and her allies) is without doubt a dominant force (although this obviously does not imply that they have absolute power).30 Even today, modern philosophy is at its best when it takes aim at the remnants of the old forces. But it is a totally different ballgame when

29

Kant uses transcendent to refer to objects (Objects) that cannot be encountered in experience

(quoted in Kant, 1999, p. 717 n6; original quote is from Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reiner, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900), vol. 18, p. 10 ). My use of transcendent here is different from that of Kant, and merely alludes to the fact that in transcendent criticism, relation of immanence with the object of criticism is totally severed.
30

For my argument here I dont need to presume that philosophy itself is a dominant force in todays

world; its sufficient to suppose that the worldview presupposed by the modern philosophical enterprise is dominant today.

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philosophy indulges in positive criticism. Self-criticism when it is transcendent criticism (that is, a species of external criticism) is always much harder than criticising others, and in this, modern philosophy is no different than other traditions. As Bernard Williams, one of the most outstanding and perceptive of post-war British philosophers, writes:

History presents alternatives only in terms of a wider us: it presents alternative ways, that is to say various ways, in which human beings have lived and hence can live. Indeed, in those terms we may be able to conceive, if only schematically and with difficulty, other ways in which human beings might live in the future. But that is not the point. What in this connection seem to be simply there, to carry no alternatives with them, are elements of our ethical and political outlook, and in those terms there are no alternatives for us. Those elements are indeed unhintergehbar . . . we can identify with the process that led to our outlook because we can identify with its outcome. But we cannot in our thought go beyond our outlook into the future and remain identified with the result: that is to say, we cannot overcome our outlook. (Williams, 2000, p. 494, emphasis in the original)

The point is not that we cannot factually overcome our outlook. That would be empirically wrong; people overcome their outlooks all the time (even if such people are

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essentially always a minority in non-revolutionary or normal times).31 Moreover, not only can individuals factually overcome their outlook, civilisations can transform themselves entirely into radically different ones (something comparable to what happened in the transformation of medieval civilisation into modern Western civilisation). The latter, however, is much rarer: civilisational shifts dont occur everyday. What Williams is claiming is that in normal circumstances (be it on an individual level or on a civilisational level), fundamental precepts of a worldview are immune from criticism in a way in which non-fundamental precepts or precepts of another system are not.32 Its
31

Straightforward examples of this are conversions: people converting from one religion to another,

atheists becoming religious, religious people becoming non-religious, secular, or atheists, and so on.
32

This essentially corresponds to Quines view about the types of statements which can be revised easily

(without much disturbance to the system as a whole in which they are embedded), and the types of statements that cannot be so revised (without drastic changes in the system as a whole) (see Quine, 1961, pp. 20-46). For Quine, some beliefs are more fundamental or important than others, in the sense that revising or giving them up would involve many more far-reaching changes elsewhere in our belief system in order to maintain their coherence. But for Quine this is a continuum that is, a matter of degree and even at the most fundamental area of the continuum there are no beliefs that are so fundamental that they are immune to potential revision. One group that Quine has in his sights are the empiricists/positivists who thought you could start with foundations of sense data of which you were absolutely certain, and then build up all knowledge from those foundations (akin to the way that Descartes thought you could build up knowledge, although his foundation was of course different from the empiricists sense data). There is, however, no fundamental difference between Quines and my position here; in my opinion, one does not need to subscribe to foundationalism in order to preserve Williams distinction between essential and non-essential elements of a worldview. Quines distinction between elements which require wide-ranging adjustments if rejected, and elements which do not require wide-ranging changes, will suffice. Thus, when

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only in times of crisis (the crisis of explanation, as Williams calls it) that fundamental precepts become amenable to criticism.33 But the crisis of explanation itself can be divided into two types: the crisis which can be resolved by internal revisions without any fundamental changes, and the crisis which cannot be resolved without revising (or giving up) some or all of our fundamental precepts. If most of the fundamental precepts of our worldview become suspect, or lose their hold on us, then the crisis of explanation can be termed a fundamental crisis. There are two possible ways to overcome a fundamental crisis. The civilisation concerned can reinvigorate/rejuvenate itself without giving up any of the fundamental precepts this can happen, for example, by giving a new rationale or new justification to the old ideas or it becomes unable to hold on to the old ideas, in which case it

Williams talks about essential elements of our worldview, I take him to mean those elements the rejection of which would require wide-ranging adjustments to our worldview.
33

Michel Foucault explains the same point in his distinction between the history of ideas and the history

of thought: I would like to distinguish between the history of ideas and the history of thought. Most of the time a historian of ideas tries to determine when a specific concept appears, and this moment is often identified by the appearance of a new word. But what I am attempting to do as a historian of thought is something different. I am trying to analyze the way institutions, practices, habits, and behavior become a problem for people who behave in specific sorts of ways, who have certain types of habits, who engage in certain kinds of practices, and who put to work specific kinds of institutions. . . . The history of thought is the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience, or a set of practices which were accepted without question, which were familiar and out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions (Foucault, 2001, p. 74). What Foucault calls here problematisation is the same thing that Williams calls crisis of explanation.

21

ultimately gives way to a new set of fundamental precepts and transforms itself into a new civilisation (there are, of course, many other options, like extinction or assimilation into another dominant civilisation, a prospect faced by many civilisations today vis--vis the dominant modern Western civilisation). The transformation into a new civilisation, however, doesnt mean that the civilisation totally abandons its erstwhile ideas whats required is only that the fundamental precepts are rejected and/or their internal configuration is changed, and, with that in place, previous ideas can still retain their role, albeit with changed emphases, reinterpretations, and reconfigurations (all of these are empirical points).34 Thus, the point is not that we cant (may not) potentially or actually doubt the essentials of our worldview; the point is, rather, that the probability of it is very low as long as a worldview is dominant.35 The insight behind all this is that every civilisation creates an intellectual climate (an intellectual milieu)36 in which certain things seem obvious, self-evident, and more probable; and certain other things less so.37 In the medieval Christian civilisation, the belief in God and its particular Christian
34

Thus, both Descartes and Kant make good use of the concept of God in their positive system once the act

of demolition is over, but their conception of God and its role in the worldview they erect is fundamentally different from that in the Christian civilisation of the Middle Ages. Kants idea of autonomy is a rejection of the idea of servitude and complete submission to God (found in classical Judaism, medieval Christianity, and Kants own days in Pietism) (for perceptive remarks see Kuehn, 2001, pp. 53-54). Its beside the point to say that Descartes or Kant dont reject the idea of God altogether; what really matters is their conception of God, and thats no doubt essentially different from the one predominant in the Middle Ages).
35

This is almost a tautological claim, but its significance is often not fully realised. See Taylor (2007, pp. 2-4 and 25-28) on this point. In the beautiful words of Paul Feyerabend: . . . argument works only on people who have been

36

37

properly prepared (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 299).

22

interpretation was a natural thought to occur, and thinking against it was normatively and factually difficult and improbable, but in the age of crisis (roughly from the 16th to the 19th centuries) such doubts became easier, and eventually lead to the collapse of medieval Christian civilisation as a whole. Muslim civilisation faced the same dilemma, with the advent of the age of colonialism, and still is in a transitional phase. The same rule applies to modern Western civilisation, including its philosophical schools, but since its so overwhelmingly dominant today, not only culturally, but economically and technologically, this situation is hard to see. Thus Williams point, as I see it, is not an argument for relativism, but about the way human rationality works.38 It might be claimed at this point that the fundamental difference between modern philosophy and the civilisation it defends (and is associated with) is that, whereas in Christian or Jewish civilisations (for example) its normatively prohibited to critique their fundamental precepts ([i]n religion one is explicitly not allowed to question certain things Priest, 2006, p. 201), in modern philosophy (and, in the case of Priest, in philosophy as such), criticism of everything is normatively justified even if the factual constraints determine the actual possibility and extent of such criticisms. The point is powerful, but only on the surface. If we look at the actual philosophical practice of, say, Descartes or Kant (and their descendants), we realise that although philosophy (and modern civilisation in general) claims that its normatively permissible to criticise any of its precepts, in actual fact the odds of this happening are the same as criticising God in a Christian, Islamic, or Jewish civilisation. It might be normatively permissible to raise

38

Hence I do not controvert truth claims made by modern civilisation. I only controvert its claim about its

critical ethos.

23

fundamental questions about reason, autonomy,39 etc., but in actual practice its almost always a normal criticism (internal criticism), and never a fundamental critique. The point will only be proven if we see fundamental critiques of reason or autonomy within modern philosophy and worldview as a normal practice (and I submit this is not only not the case but conceptually speaking can not be the case). A word or two must also be said about the distinction between piecemeal criticism and wholesale criticism. It might be objected that there is an ambiguity here that Ive overlooked in my explication of Williams quote, above. It might be claimed that Williams (or I on his behalf) has failed to acknowledge ambiguity in his (or his and my) position. It is one thing to say that you cannot question everything all at once, and that all questioning has to be done from a fixed point or outlook that we take for granted, but it is another thing to say that there are some things that we cannot ever question, and that there are some fixed points or aspects of our outlook that we must always take for granted. The first could be true, while the second false. Going back to the Neurath/Quine analogy of the boat, our critic might add that it is one thing to say that you cannot rebuild all the bits of the boat all at once. If you are going to, e.g., rebuild or alter the left side of the boat, then for those purposes you have to take the right side of the boat as a given or fixed point in order to get anything done. But it would be quite another thing to say that there are some bits of the boat that cannot ever be changed or rebuilt: the right side of the
39

Just think of the rage and disgust poor fundamentalism (a term never properly defined and arbitrarily

used) elicits at all intellectual levels. The reason is because fundamentalism presents a view of religion that supposedly transcends the well-defined limits of the Enlightenment tolerance of religion (see Habermas, 2006, pp. 3-25, especially pp. 10-11; cf. Rawls, 1996, pp. 64ff. and passim). The list of gag rules keeps piling up.

24

boat could be altered or changed too.40 But the criticism misses the point here. For my argument, the distinction between peicemeal and wholesale criticism is irrelevant. To start with, the boat analogy leaves many other options out of view; e.g., it might be the case that the boat is so rotten that there is no option for repairing at all piecemeal or otherwise. In such cases the better option might be to jump to another available boat. But, aside from this, the more fundamental point is whether a criticism is fundamental or not, not whether its piecemeal or wholesale. A similar point applies to a crisis of explanation, which is fundamental if it requires abandoning our fundamental precepts; its only of secondary concern whether such abandonment is piecemeal or a wholesale.41 A wholesale critique can be non-fundamental, for example, when one jettisons her precepts en masse, but the precepts involved dont belong to the core of her worldview; or, a piecemeal critique can be fundamental when it progresses in piecemeal fashion, but pertains to the core of our worldview. Thus, the issue here is not whether criticism is piecemeal or wholesale the issue is rather whether the critique pertains to fundamentals of our worldview or not. My claim in this paper is simply that modern philosophy is no different to any other worldview in the dynamics of change sketched above. Modern philosophy, which has the reputation of throwing everything upside down, taking nothing as sacrosanct, apparently has its own idols in front of which it trembles lest it utter any unwarranted words. I am not talking about the fringes here; I am thinking of mainstream modern
40

Thanks to . . . for pressing me to clarify these points. Generally speaking, in civilisational transformations, piecemeal changes occur over long stretches of

41

time and are followed by the event of wholesale transformation, the so-called revolutionary event. In this reading, piecemeal changes and wholesale changes are not contradictory (rather, they are complementary).

25

philosophy. In modern philosophy one would search in vain for any fundamental critique of the notions of autonomy, democracy, secularism, and science.42 There are powerful internal critiques, internal debates, and rivalries regarding different interpretations of these concepts, but no fundamental critiques in the sense of the fundamental elaborated above. The typical response is expressed with atypical honesty and frankness by Burt Dreben (referring to John Rawls political liberalism):

What Rawls is saying is that there is in a constitutional liberal democracy a tradition of thought which it is our job to explore and see whether it can be made coherent and consistent. . . . We are not arguing for such a society. We take for granted that today only a fool would not want to live in such a society. . . . If one cannot see the benefits of living in a liberal constitutional democracy, if one does not see the virtue of that ideal, then I do not know how to convince him. To be perfectly blunt, sometimes I am asked, when I go around speaking for Rawls, What do you say to an Adolf Hitler? The answer

42

I think philosophers are justified in taking science seriously. What is missing is the distance from science

(and a certain irreverence towards it) which should be natural for a view which prides itself on its openended and critical character. Thus, for example, I would like to see more persistent problematisation of science as a generic word or concept (what we should take seriously are facts and not science as such; there is also the sort of rubbish which goes along with the factual element in discourse about science). The same point goes for the other concepts mentioned above. It should be added here that I presume the veracity of the point made in the text without any real argument; if Im wrong in this assumption, my argument in this paper will collapse.

26

is [nothing]. You shoot him. You do not try to reason with him. Reason has no bearing on this question. So I do not want to discuss it. (Dreben, 2003, pp. 328-329)43 A typical medieval philosopher would no doubt have held the same sentiments about an atheist, a diehard royalist in the early modern age would have harboured similar views about a democrat, and so on. What makes political philosophy (for example) remotely special in this regard? It is only modern philosophys self-conception as absolute critique that makes the otherwise understandable views of Williams and Dreben (however atrociously expressed by the latter) so bizarre. Again, I am not advocating any form of relativism and its cogency here. Recall that I have not denied the universality of philosophy as such; I am only disputing the specific self-understanding of modern philosophy as absolute critique.44 What the above discussion makes clear is that modern philosophys claim to be an absolute critique is only true when it is engaged in external (negative) criticism; normally it is not true when it engages in internal criticism, especially when this internal criticism involves the fundamentals of the modern worldview.

43

Lest anyone think that these are isolated views of the characteristically combative Dreben, and not those

of Rawls, one should be reminded that Rawls himself likens the views that reject constitutional democracy to war and disease: he talks about the practical task of containing them as they are war and disease (Rawls, 1996, pp. 64 n.19, also pp. 64ff.). But one does not just contain diseases, one tries to eradicate them!
44

So, those philosophers who have a different conception of philosophy or modern philosophy are not my

targets here. Although not all modern philosophers theorise about what modern philosophy is (in fact they rarely do), they might still have the same conception of philosophy or modern philosophy criticised here.

27

I have argued above (persuasively I hope) that Priests notion of philosophy as absolute critique is mistaken; it should rather be taken as a self-conception of modern philosophy only. I have argued further that modern philosophys self-conception as absolute critique mostly applies to its criticism of external forces, and not to the fundamentals of its own worldview. When it comes to this it is as meek as any other enterprise in modern society (and at times even more so because of the guilty consciousness that stems from the explicit claim of its own status as absolute criticism). Having accomplished the above, it is easy to summarily dispose of three corollaries that Priest derives from his notion of philosophy as absolute critique, viz: a) philosophy (read modern philosophy) is subversive; b) it is unsettling for students; c) it is universal in its import. I will briefly examine all these claims (and reject them as they stand the rejection emanates from my discussion in the paper up to this point).

Subversiveness of philosophy. Modern philosophy indeed claims to be subversive; but it is subversive only when it critiques external forces (forces that are still lingering on from the dark ages, in its view). When it comes to its own internal matters, philosophy is not only not subversive, but is in fact highly conservative in the original sense of the word (the contemporary supporters of the American Republican Party do not have exclusive copyright on the term). It is conservative in the sense that it is the custodian of the worldview and civilisation that replaced the medieval Christian civilisation of Europe, and which then imposed itself (through whatever means) on almost the entire world.45

45

My analysis here and below is purely functional; I dont assume that philosophers or philosophy do any

of this consciously. This should exclude any suspicion of a conspiracy theory approach.

28

There are, naturally, differences of interpretation and emphasis among its different foci, but generally speaking it is a civilisation based on a strong belief in secularism, constitutional democracy, human rights, capitalism,46 and science. There are internal debates about these fundamentals within philosophy, but there is no dispute whatsoever about their desirability and the need to defend them singlehandedly. Philosophy today is part of a well-established, global university system;47 most philosophy departments around the world follow the same sorts of topics, subjects, authors, and debates. Philosophers are not wandering outsiders. They write not in vernaculars as such, but in the official language of the empire (English) or in a few other main languages (predominantly French and German) which replaced Latin as the official languages of higher education in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries and onwards.48 Philosophers are, relatively speaking, highly paid professionals, and part of the ruling elite (defined broadly): responsible49 for producing and reproducing the standard discourse about the self, the other, and the universe, and the relationship between them. Philosophy today has
46

The bankruptcy of the so-called critical and innovative powers of modern thinking becomes starkly clear

when one realises that, despite financial crises and pending environmental disaster, modern thinking (including philosophical thinking) has not gone beyond the dichotomy of capitalism and socialism (both part of Enlightenment thinking one mainstream, the other maverick), and the most innovative one gets is to advocate a middle ground between the two!
47

For the influence (economic, cultural, and social) of the university (and college) system especially the

humanities and social sciences in America (the most advanced capitalist country), for example, see Gross, 2008, pp. vii-xvii.
48

My claims here exclude the Eastern European scene, with which I have only very superficial

acquaintance.
49

Responsibility construed in functional terms here.

29

almost the same role (perhaps combined with journalism and novel (fiction) writing, and now increasingly popular science writings) that religion played in the Middle Ages.50 Philosophers are at the forefront of defending modern civilisation, and at the battlefront of science wars, religious wars, evolutionary wars, etc.51 It is a travesty to consider philosophy as a subversive force in todays world; it is the prime conservative force today. In fact, it is the custodian of conservatism, as far as defending the basics of the prevailing secular capitalist worldview is concerned.52

Philosophy as unsettling subject for students. As a reflective subject, philosophy questions our assumptions about ourselves, the other, and the universe (for example) there is no doubt about that. However, any reflective subject will do this; one can go

50

As Richard H. Popkin writes: Seventeenth-century epistemological and religious scepticism has left a

legacy that continues to affect our twentieth-century world. (It would seem that one function of our present professional philosophers is to act as a new priestcraft, exorcising the sceptical demons as they turn up, day after day (Popkin, 1993, pp. 514-515). Note, however, that my construing of a sceptical problem is much broader than that of Popkin, and the quote here should be read in the context of the paper as a whole.
51

Just notice the plethora of books in recent decades defending evolution, science, etc. authored by

philosophers.
52

Again, I dont make any claim about the actual influence of philosophy today; my claim is primarily

about philosophys self-conception and, more fundamentally, its relation to the modern worldview. Philosophers generally tend to minimise their own influence (in line with their overall victimhood narrative), but my own impression of philosophys influence is that its much deeper, especially on the general humanities, social sciences and, through them, wider culture. This influence is augmented by the existence of public intellectuals like Jrgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, Michel Foucault, and others. Thanks to . . . for urging me to clarify this point.

30

through unsettling experiences reading history or physics, depending on the way they are taught and the way they are received. Where philosophy is the subject that makes reflection and its possibility its prime concern, it is bound to be more unsettling than any other subject studied within the modern university. But the unsettling experience Priest is referring to must be more fundamental than the sort of unsettling experiences I just mentioned; it is related to his notion of philosophy as absolute critique hence, it must be conceived as the absolute unsettling experience. Is philosophy unsettling in the absolute sense? Perhaps, but principally only for students coming from backgrounds radically different from the secular modern worldview propagated by modern philosophy; it is not (typically) unsettling in the absolute sense because it doesnt challenge students with background beliefs mostly congruent with the modern worldview. Thus, a believing Jew, or Muslim, or Christian (to give a straightforward example) will generally feel the force of the absolutely unsettling nature of philosophy (if she lets herself be pulled by the lure of philosophy, that is), but a secular, progressive, animal loving, environment-cherishing liberal will be unlikely to experience any such discomfort.53 The reason is obvious from our discussion in this paper. Modern philosophy is absolute critique only vis--vis the views which are external to its own preferred views; its venom and its cutting sword are reserved exclusively for the views which are historically challenged by her, and not the views which are constructively favoured by her (a different sort of critique is applied in that context).

53

She would (typically) rather find confirmation of her views (and hence comfort and reassurance) in her

experience with philosophy.

31

Philosophy as a universal pursuit. I believe in the universal import of philosophy, so I would not deny Priests claim that philosophy has this quality. But it is also clear from the context that what Priest is claiming is not the universal import of philosophy as such, but his specific conception of philosophy as absolute critique. But, as I have shown, this conception of philosophy is specific to a particular juncture in human history, and, furthermore, is true only as self-understanding of this specific philosophy, and not of its reality. In reality, even this specific philosophy is absolute critique only in the limited facets of its praxis. Modern philosophy emerged out of a revolutionary period in human history and as a revolutionary force, but it faces the dilemma that any revolutionary force must face. Once it is successful, every revolution must abolish any possibility of further revolution or counter-revolution (recall Kafka: Every revolution evaporates and leaves behind only the slime of a new bureaucracy. The chains of tormented mankind are made out of red tape. Janouch, 1971, pp. 119-20). Any revolutionary force, once successful, must become fundamentally a non-revolutionary and conservative force;54 its main purpose becomes safeguarding the house it has successfully built. Its revolutionary venom expresses itself mainly in safeguarding its victory against opposing forces. This is something very natural, and we cannot blame modern philosophy, or any other
54

Even capitalism (or the bourgeois class, to be specific), which was hailed by Karl Marx as a

revolutionary force par excellence, became conservative once it established its hegemony; we have only to look at its current dilemma, where the systems imperatives require it to move on from an oil-based economy, but self-entrenched interests refuse to go along with it. This is something part and parcel of human nature conjoined with the human condition. For a very perceptive review of the future of capitalism see Lanchester, 2012, pp. 7-10.

32

revolutionary force, on that account. What we can blame modern philosophy for, though, is its pretension that even after the victory it remains some sort of a revolutionary minority pitted against endless powerful enemies that are threatening to engulf it from every direction. This is just not true. One of the fundamental problems with Priests conception of philosophy is that he sees philosophy as a permanent revolutionary force (see Priest, 2006, p. 202).55 Thus, although he admits that there is a difference between normal and revolutionary science, in fact following Khun he claims that a certain dogmatism is essential to both the teaching of science and to its progress (ibid.). On the contrary, philosophy, claims Priest, is always revolutionary! Priest thinks that a certain dogmatism that is essential to progress in science is not only not essential for philosophys progress, but in fact would undermine the very meaning and existence of philosophy (Priest thinks that when science is in its revolutionary phases the distinction between philosophy and science becomes blurred: ibid., p. 202). This stance that philosophy is a quintessentially revolutionary enterprise is not new to Priest, but one would have hoped that Wittgenstein56 and countless other philosophers might have educated us out of this nonsense. Alas, this is a vain hope. There is no end to revolutionary pretensions. Martin Wolfson, writing in 1958, claimed the following, which succinctly captures the mindset of those who believe philosophy to be inherently revolutionary:

Philosophical interpretation is inherently a fighting stance for change. This is

55

In this he is one with Heidegger (see Heidegger, op. cit.). No wonder Priest has such a low view of Wittgensteins work, or at least his conception of philosophy.

56

33

why the intellectual life in its true self can be nothing but revolutionary. It is tragic to the intellectual life when intellectuals forget this. Philosophy, therefore, is a revolutionary enterprise. If philosophy purports not to be, it is either apologetics or counterrevolutionary. (Wolfson, 1958, p. 323)

But even old Kant, who made revolution central to his philosophical enterprise, knew thats not true. As he puts it:

Criticism is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in its pure cognition as science (for science must always be dogmatic, i.e., it must prove its conclusions strictly a priori from secure principles); rather, it is opposed only to dogmatism, i.e., to the presumption of getting on solely with pure cognition from (philosophical) concepts according to principles, which reason has been using for a long time without first inquiring in what way and by what right it has obtained them. Dogmatism is therefore the dogmatic procedure of pure reason, without an antecedent critique of its own capacity. (Kant, 1999, Bxxxv, emphasis in the original)

Once the initial revolutionary task is accomplished, its all back to normal. The argument of this paper has been that philosophy, like any other human activity, can be revolutionary, counterrevolutionary, and/or apologetic depending on the time and

34

conditions. Descartes and Kant were true revolutionaries because they were living in an age of revolution. But the heirs of Descartes and Kant cant claim the same, because their revolution has long-since succeeded, and today they are necessarily apologists of that system. Again, this not to deny the existence of true revolutionary philosophical individuals, ideas, and minority traditions, but, firstly, those traditions are by definition not norms, and, secondly, they dont belong to the tradition of Descartes and Kant.57 Thus, the idea of philosophy as a permanent revolutionary activity is just a figment of Priests imagination, and an expression of modern philosophys propensity for self-aggrandisement; it does not correspond to reality. Priests ambition to become the Trotsky of philosophy is doomed. Like any other human activity, philosophy has its normal and revolutionary periods; what is normal is normal philosophy, and not a revolutionary philosophy.58 Like the sciences, and like human civilisations, revolutionary

57

Its no wonder that works like After Virtue (McIntyre, 2007 [1981]) belong to the Thomistic tradition and

not to the Cartesian or Kantian traditions.

58

It is hardly surprising, then, that those who consider philosophy to be a permanent revolutionary activity

are compelled to continuously hark back to presumed revolutionary periods of their discipline for Heidegger it was going back to the Pre-Socratics, for example. It also explains the certain infatuation with the mythic figure of Socrates, the martyr of philosophy. But, if we take my account as the correct interpretation then we can accommodate such figures from the past and in the present without making philosophy into what it is not: that is, a timeless revolutionary force. Compare this with Karsten Harries, 2001, pp. 47-73, who claims that the origin of philosophy lies in a sense of homelessness, and that [t]hose who are secure in the knowledge of their place have little need for philosophy, just as those who think themselves at home are not likely to suffer from homesickness (p. 61). I can agree with Harries on this if we add two clauses to his definition: a) that it applies in revolutionary times only; b) such philosophy is not restricted to any particular content. Modern philosophy and its proponents felt a sense of

35

periods in philosophy are exceptional and far apart. The only way philosophers can maintain the aura of perpetual revolutionary activity for their trade is by falsely claiming that, even today, they are a minority, often a persecuted minority (even though the persecution is not as bad as it used to be: it mainly consists of the occasional closure of philosophy departments, and in the belief that the philosopher kings of our age are not given their due or share of power, or those in power dont heed to their advice as often as they should). This self-perception of philosophers that they are a permanent minority comes out in the following quote from a prominent Kantian, Allen Wood:

The obstacle, now as in the eighteenth century, is simply that the world is ruled by enemies of this enlightened ethos [i.e., the life of reason and self reflection, in other words life according to philosophical ideals Ali], and hence those who in it cannot integrate what Foucault . . . calls the philosophical life into their real lives. This in turn is because, as Diderots dialogue already made dramatically clear, even the most enlightened individuals do not belong to a society whose practical life coheres even minimally with demands of reflective reason. (Wood, 2001, p. 116)
homelessness in the late Middle Ages because they were in fact not at home in that world, and wanted to build a new world in which they would be at home. But today, when they have built the home, philosophers cant pretend that they are still homeless. At most they can worry about the condition of the home, and its viability in the face of future challenges. On the other hand, those who feel homeless in the modern world are true revolutionaries today even if the content of their ideas is very conservative by the lights of the proponents of modern philosophy, or the modern worldview in general.

36

One can say only two things about Woods claim here: either his conception of philosophy is so hopelessly idealistic that it cannot be fulfilled, by definition; or, if he is talking about philosophy in more historical and realistic terms, the claim that Enlightenment ideals are not ruling force today (at least in the developed world) seems to me not just not true. Of course, these ideals arent absolutely dominant, but absolute dominance is itself another unrealistic ideal. Of course, the claim that philosophy today belongs to the ruling party doesnt mean that there are no internal conflicts between different groups within the party, and is not to deny that philosophy is a minority within the ruling party. Gary Malinas explains one form that these internal conflicts take and its nature succinctly:

Philosophers reflect the interests of masters to whom philosophers are beholden. . . . At their best, philosophers identify the fundamental presuppositions and assumptions of the societies and institutions to which they belong. They explore their consequences, test them for consistency, and compare them with alternatives. At their best, the only master that philosophers serve is reason itself, while recognising that norms of good reasoning carry their own presuppositions and assumptions that are not exempt from scrutiny. The reluctance of philosophers to shackle their examinations of social and institutional norms and the practices based upon them can put them in conflict with the aims and projects of the institutions that employ them. These conflicts become poignant when institutions are

37

committed to parochial aims that define boundaries philosophers are prone to ignore. (Malinas, 2011, p. 65) This, in my view, properly explains some of the internal conflicts that some philosophers get into from time to time, but they are precisely internal conflicts; alternatives and strategies which are in contention are almost as a rule internal as well. Such conflicts are part and parcel of any living system, and there is nothing unique about the modern system of governance, and philosophy as a party to that system. Modern philosophy is one of the ruling forces in the world today,59 and when it denies its ruling character, its conservative function (conservative relative to the system as a whole, and not necessarily regarding internal alternatives within the system), it becomes an ideology; and it is modern philosophy qua ideology and not qua philosophy that must be rejected. All ideologies are dangerous; especially the ideologies with revolutionary pretensions. This is a lesson which we have (or should have) learnt from Paul Feyerabend, among others:

All ideologies must be seen in perspective. One must not take them too seriously. One must read them like fairytales which have lots of interesting things to say but which also contain wicked lies, or like ethical prescriptions

59

Again, here Im not making any claim about the relative influence of philosophy in the modern world.

My claim is that it is a group within the ruling party. The internal power struggle of the ruling party doesnt concern me here.

38

which may be useful rules of thumb but which are deadly when followed to the letter. (Feyerabend, 1981, p. 156)

The notion of philosophy as absolute critique is one such fairytale today, and it is doubly dangerous because it is the custodian of other modern fairytales, such as science, constitutional democracy, etc. Again, this is not necessarily to reject philosophy, science, or constitutional democracy, but to reject the elements of them which have become ideological. There is nothing inherently good or liberating about philosophy or science. Feyerabends discussion of science in this context provides strong support for the view I have taken in this paper towards modern philosophy. Comparing the different roles that science played in the 17th and 18th centuries to the one it plays today, he writes:

Any ideology that breaks the hold of a comprehensive system of thought has on the minds of men contributes to the liberation of man. Any ideology that makes man question inherited beliefs is an aid to enlightenment. A truth that reigns without checks and balances is a tyrant who must be overthrown, and any falsehood that can aid us in the overthrow of this tyrant is to be welcomed. It follows that 17th and 18th century science indeed was an instrument of liberation and enlightenment. It does not follow that science is bound to remain such an instrument. There is nothing inherent in science or any other ideology that makes it essentially liberating, Ideologies can deteriorate and become stupid religions.

39

(Feyerabend, 1981, pp. 156-157, emphasis in the original)60

This exactly parallels my argument in this paper regarding modern philosophy, and especially the distinction between the role it played when it was a minority revolutionary force and the role it plays today, when it has become a dominant power (at least) in its own specific realm. I have argued that the conception of modern philosophy as absolute critique is only one among others; even still, it has its own limitations. I have also argued that the effort to universalise such a specific and narrow conception of philosophy is ideological in its character and inherently oppressive, especially in societies (and minority traditions within modern philosophy) which do not share the historical experiences of 17th- and 18th-century Europe.61 Without rejecting this ideologically driven notion of philosophy outright, philosophy in general as a liberating force has no future in the contemporary world. But I want to conclude by saying that such an ideologically driven notion of philosophy is not the whole philosophy; fortunately, it is only a small part of it as it is practiced throughout the world, including America and other first-world countries.62 And

60

For an uncanny resemblance between Feyerabends argument here and Karl Poppers notion of scientific

method as critique see Popper, 1969, pp. 190-192; the difference, however, is that Popper is still enthralled by the myth of absolute critique while Feyerabend is not: he merely uses it pragmatically.
61

This last claim follows from my discussion of the different roles of internal and external criticism within

modern philosophy.
62

One of the reasons for this might be that most philosophers do philosophy rather than philosophising

about what it is; so, it might still be the case that they implicitly share the view of philosophy propounded

40

this is because philosophy as reflection on reflection, as thinking about thinking, is something universal and part of the human condition. Reflection and self-reflection, whether attributed to evolution or considered as God-granted gifts, are regarded by most cultures as the essence of humanity, differentiating humans from other beings, and philosophy as the study of this unique capacity and the impulse to develop instruments to enhance this capacity is an important human endeavour which is needed in every society and culture, in order for those communities to survive and develop a human civilisation imbued with the virtues of honour, courage, self-respect, and independence of mind. Despite the role of philosophy as a dominant ideology in todays world, the bulk of the philosophical enterprise is not ideological but constructive. This type of philosophy is necessary to develop the thinking and reflective capacities of individual, society, and culture. Every society and every culture needs these tools in order to deepen its understanding of itself and the other: reflectively, independently, and critically. In this paper, I have used Priests views as a foil to develop my argument, but, to be fair to him, most of his work in philosophy is not ideological at all. It is only when he attempts to develop his self-understanding of philosophy qua philosophy that part of it comes across as highly ideological. Priests work, especially in logic, is in fact revolutionary; and any culture would be impoverished if it were to be deprived of such a contribution. What we need is Priests great efforts in logic, not his ideological views about what philosophy is.

by Priest, but are not bothered about it much. It might also be possible that Priests view is not a majority view. In a recent excellent collection of essays (perhaps with the exception of Nussbaum and Apels essays) at least Wood seems to share Priests view of philosophy (see Ragland and Heidt, 2001).

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Similarly, just to give one more example, the counter-example method used by modern analytic philosophers should be learnt, and should be part and parcel of the modern university education system because it is a great tool in enhancing the power of the imagination,63 which in turn is crucial for developing the capacity to see alternative scenarios when considering an issue, and consequently for assessing any issues regarding any subject matter critically and thoughtfully, and arriving at a considered judgement about it. We can add on particular examples here, but that is something to be left for another occasion. What I have tried to do in this paper is to make a case against a particular conception of philosophy, and to show that it is not the only conception of philosophy: this, I believe, is the first step towards reasserting the liberating role of philosophy in the contemporary world.

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