G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989 RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of the Mayor of Baguio City during Elections. Having garnered the highest number of votes, Petitioner was elected and proclaimed winner while Respondent garnered the second highest number of votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a petition for quo warranto contesting the election of the Petitioner on the ground that the latter is a naturalized Australian citizen and was divested of his Philippine citizenship having sworn allegiance to the Queen of Australia. Petitioner opposes to the contrary. Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an elective official must be a citizen of the Philippines. From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were not possessed by the petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent, having garnered the 2nd highest number of votes, can replace the petitioner as mayor. HELD: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.

G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990 MATEO CAASI, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

FACTS: Merito Miguel was sought to be disqualified for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of 18 January 1988, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, and on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on 18 May 1987. The COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr. held that the possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States HELD: Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrants (not a visitors or tourists) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently (See Question 21 of Miguels

application). To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any elective office. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on 18 January 1988, he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

G.R. No. 93986 December 22, 1992 BENJAMIN T. LOONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NURSHUSSEIN UTUTALUM and ALIM BASHIR EDRIS, respondents. FACTS: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age. Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the subject of this petition. Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. ISSUE: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law. HELD: No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002 EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioners proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondents proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents proclamation was valid HELD: The respondents proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorates choice

G.R. No. 154512 November 12, 2002 VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR. respondents. FACTS: Edward Hagedorn had already served for 3 consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. He did not run in the immediately following regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor, Socrates, faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office. On August 23 of the same year, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot th run for the said post for his 4 consecutive term. ISSUE: Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election. HELD: Yes. The court ruled that the rationale behind the 3-term rule was to prevent consecutiveness in holding office. In the case of Edward Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of his third term and before the recall election.

G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009 SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Respondents. FACTS: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 19982001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

ISSUE: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160 HELD: NO. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve

G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002 RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., respondents. FACTS: Ramon Talaga was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor. He then ran for a third term but lost to his opponent. In June 1998, his then opponent faced recall proceedings and in the recall elections of May 2000, Talaga won and served for the unexpired term. For the May 2001 elections, private respondent filed his COC for the mayoralty post. This was questioned on the ground that he had already served as mayor for 3 consecutive terms. ISSUE: Whether or not an assumption to office through recall election should be considered as one term in applying the three-term limit rule. HELD: Negative. The court held that Talaga cannot be construed as having beenelected and served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the 1998 elections was considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two years, Talaga lived as a private citizen.

G.R. No. 133495 September 3, 1998 BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents. FACTS: Jose Capco was first elected as vice mayor but upon the death of the then incumbent mayor, he occupied the latters post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for 2 more terms as mayor. He again filed his candidacy for mayor for the succeeding election but was protested against. ISSUE: Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served that term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the constitution. HELD: Negative. The court held that when Capco occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbents death and served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of mayor, he served first as a vice mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other.

G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006 FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

FACTS: Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Francis Ong. The petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule. Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as Mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. The First Division of COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution dismissing the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing that Francis might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004 but the mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Alegre was the "legally elected Mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte." ISSUE: Whether or not Ongs assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. HELD: Affirmative. Ong is disqualified as even if the COMELEC had declared Alegre to be the legally elected mayor in the 1998 elections, it was without effect as the declaration only took place AFTER the expiration of the contested office.

G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003 ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA, respondents FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. During his third term, the municipality was declared as a component city. This event marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, since the post is vacant, Latasa was mandated to serve a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Latasa filed his COC for the 2001 elections but was protested against by Sunga, saying that Latasa is not eligible to run for mayor since he already served for three consecutive terms from 1992-2001. ISSUE: Whether or not Latasa is disqualified from running again for mayor, but this time, for the CITY OF DIGOS. HELD: Affirmative. Upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city, Latasa continued to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There may be some changes in the political and economic rights of Digos as an LGU but no substantial changes occurred as to petitioners authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.

G.R. No. 189034 January 11, 2010 CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III, Petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON, Respondents. Facts: Petitioner & private respondent are candidates for Legislative Representative in Cebu in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed petition to declare another candidate, Edilito Martinez, as nuisance candidate. The petition was only resolved almost a month after the elections, with Edilito declared as nuisance candidate. Salimbangon was declared the winner in the elections. Petitioner made a protest to the HRET, contending that the votes MARTINEZ and C. MARTINEZ were not credited to him, and said votes could have made him win the election. The HRET held that the votes were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real

intention of the voter, as Edilito was still a candidate during the election day, and said votes could be for either of them. ISSUE: Whether or not the effect of declaring a candidate a nuisance candidate takes effect on election day, even if made after elections HELD: YES. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.