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Strategic Analysis
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The Politics of the New Global Architecture: The United States and India
Jeffrey W. Legro Version of record first published: 26 Jun 2012.

To cite this article: Jeffrey W. Legro (2012): The Politics of the New Global Architecture: The United States and India, Strategic Analysis, 36:4, 640-644 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.689533

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Strategic Analysis Vol. 36, No. 4, JulyAugust 2012, 640644

Commentary The Politics of the New Global Architecture: The United States and India
Jeffrey W. Legro
Abstract: The nature of international politics is changing with respect to two key developments: the relative decline of the United States and the gridlock in major global international institutions like the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation. The emerging strategies of two different countries, the United States and India, suggest that international relations will increasingly take place in other arenas, specically in regional groupings, bilateral networks and transnational ties.

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rime Minister Manmohan Singh recently declared, Institutions of global political and economic governance created more than six decades ago have not kept pace with the changing world.1 So leaders of the BRICS countriesBrazil, Russia, India, China and South Africagathered in Delhi in late March 2012 to rewrite the rules. The BRICS resolved to circumvent the US stranglehold on the international nancial system by trading in local currencies and once again expressed their aspirations for a new development bank. Yet it was not so long ago that India was forming a strategic partnership with the United States to deal with the emerging world order. There is a logic behind this seeming contradiction, one that speaks to a new architecture in world politics. The relative decline in US power, the rise of new future global giants like India and China and a seeming gridlock in international institutions are dening traits of the early 21st-century global system. These changes are prompting signicant shifts in national strategies as seen in the plans of two very different countries, the United States and India. The American response has been to shift its politics from global multilateral forums to other arenas in the international system such as regional organisations, bilateral webs and even non-state transnational links. Although Indias strategic culture and position in the system is very different, it has also turned to multi-alignments in other arenas beyond traditional global institutions. These similar reactions point to a new politics of global governance. The policies and speeches of US foreign policy ofcials in the Obama administration reect the shift towards architecture thinking, one that goes beyond global multilateral institutions. To be sure, global common problems still exist. The 2010 US National Security Strategy develops a solid case as to why collective global action is needed to deal with terrorism, the spread of nuclear weapons and materials, sustained economic growth, climate change, pandemics and armed conict. Yet it also begins

Jeffrey W. Legro is Randolph P. Compton Professor at the University of Virginia. In 2011, he was a Fulbright-Nehru Senior Researcher at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Analyses in New Delhi.
ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online 2012 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.689533 http://www.tandfonline.com

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by acknowledging the declining dominance of the United States and it recognises that more actors(now) exert power and inuence at the global level. It starkly posits that the old international system is buckling.2 The US response to this situation is not to abandon global institutions but to look towards other arenas to get things done. The strategy calls for invigorating existing alliances with regional powers and partnerships with emerging new powers aimed at enhanced regional capabilities in the context of an evolving division of labor among local, national, and global institutions.3 It also acknowledges the salience of transnational relations: . . . individuals, corporations and civil society play an increasingly important role in shaping events around the world.4 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been particularly clear in arguing for a new global architecture that connects different levels of the international system, including the transnational.5 Solving foreign policy problems today requires us to think regionally and globally, to see the intersections and connections linking nations and regions and interests, to bring people together as only America can.6 Similarly she has contended that the United States should develop organisations that harness the power of civil society movements.7 She has forcefully expressed the need to engage directly with the people of these [foreign] nations. Finally she has articulated one of the core notions of the US approach. If some nations dont want to join, we will press ahead with others.8 This is not unilateralism per se; it is a go elsewhere strategy wherein the range and exibility of the arenas where the US can pursue diplomacy yields inuence.9 Strategy in the Obama administration has stressed the importance of building relations with emerging centres of inuence. As Secretary Clinton declared:
We will also put special emphasis on encouraging major and emerging global powersChina, India, Russia and Brazil, as well as Turkey, Indonesia and South Africato be full partners in tackling the global agenda. I want to underscore the importance of this task, and my personal commitment to it. These states are vital to achieving solutions to the shared problems and advancing our prioritiesnon-proliferation, counter-terrorism, economic growth and climate change, among others.10

This idea is not limited to the current administration or to democrats. For example, Eric Edelman, a leading defence ofcial in the Bush administration, has argued for the desirability of working with regional powers, though he would pick democratic partners such as India and Brazil.11 The US shift to other political arenas in world politics to gain leverage is not new. US ofcials were aware of the power of regions when the UN was founded and put together a series of regional pacts aimed at containing the Soviet Union. At the end of the Cold War, US Pentagon ofcials formulated a regional defence strategy. The US has deployed such strategies, of course, in the past when global level dynamics became stuck, including in economic affairs. The creation of the AsiaPacic Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) helped to convince the Europeans to give in on some of their objections to US opposition in other areas (i.e., the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).12 Rather than simply rely on the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or G20, the US has recently turned to new regional forums (the Trans-Pacic Partnership) and bilateral ties (stationing US troops in Australia) to deal with the rise of China and concerns about its mercantilist strategy.13

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Today the United States also appears intent on broadening its effort to utilise one of the newest arenas of global politics: transnational relations. Secretary of State Clinton has announced the creation of a new fund to support civil society and embattled non-governmental organisations (NGOs) around the world.14 The First Lady Michelle Obama has publicised a 100,000 Strong Initiative programme to boost the number and diversity of US students studying in China.15 The State Departments 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) notes: To be effective in the 21st century, American diplomacy must extend far beyond the traditional constituencies and engage new actors, with particular focus on civil society.16 It explicitly recognises that non-state actors can enhance US foreign policy and help manage collective action issues that plague international order.17 The QDDR concludes that the United States needs to do more in terms of syncing US efforts in the transnational arena with those in other arenas:
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Because new transnational forces are increasingly challenging the capacity of 20th century institutions, and emerging centers of inuence are changing the geopolitical landscape, our diplomats have to be prepared to build new partnerships and institutions and reshape old ones at both the regional and global level.18

The US State Department in 2011 launched a new Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society to match the dialogue it has had with major powers such as China and India. Secretary Clinton has created the new position of a Senior Advisor for Civil Society and Emerging Democracies to lead efforts in this area.19 The tendency to look for new avenues of inuence in world politics by seeking new options is not limited to the United States, as is clear by the developments in Indian foreign policy. Indias traditional non-alignment does not need to be neutrality or nonengagement, but instead could also mean manifold ties. Parag Khanna and Raja Mohan have proposed:
[a] neo-Curzonian foreign policy . . . premised on the logic of Indian centrality, permitting multidirectional engagementor multi-alignmentwith all major powers and seeking access and leverage from East Africa to Pacic Asia.20

In India there is an emerging appreciation for the fact that Indias go-it-alone attitude in the past has not always served its best interests. Indias wise man of foreign policy Shankar Bajpai notes that Indias xation with non-alignment has a dangerous legacywhich we still fail to recognise as having done us more harm than good.21 Particularly in the relationship with China, India when on its own without partners has, in the words of a senior Indian diplomat, gotten screwed. His view is: Whether you are dealing with friends or you are dealing with enemies it is always very important to have options, to have alternatives. Friends should know you have alternatives as much as your adversaries. That gives you room for manoeuvre, that gives you autonomy.22 India today, while recognising the nature of new international politics, sees nonalignment not as go-it-alone, but as multi-alignment. Hence, India made use of its reinvigorated bilateral relationship with the United States to rewrite the rules of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet India has also begun a strategic economic dialogue with China in order to ensure it has options with its increasingly powerful neighbour to the north-east and hinted at an IndiaChinaUS dialogue.23 Most recently, India has overcome past fears about dependence to join an IndiaJapanUS strategic

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dialogue.24 In its region India is leading a reinvigorated South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and in concluding its nuclear deal with the United States it made adroit use of its diaspora to steamroll opposition to the agreement within the United States.25 The BRICS grouping is yet another effort in Indias bid to create a swing space in the evolving international architecture by embracing new relationships, not avoiding them. The audacity of the BRICS grouping is that it goes beyond the global, regional and bilateral links among states that have come to dene the new architecture. BRICS is multilateral but not geographically tied and not an encompassing global grouping. The challenges to BRICS effectiveness are daunting, none more so than the mistrust between its Big TwoIndia and China. But it will remain a desirable option for Delhi; another arrow in its multi-engagement quiver. In the global arena of the next few decades, countries can be expected to exploit their web of bilateral ties, regional organisations and even transnational links to gain leverage in international politics. Some states will have more power in these various arenas than others and be better able to swing among arenas.26 But the desire of world leaders and emerging powers to develop alternatives, especially alternatives to global multilateral institutions, will be increasingly evident in the strategies of most major countries. The politics of the 21st century will be dened by the relative ability of countries to gain leverage in and among the multiple arenas of the international political architecture.

Notes
1. Prime Ministers Statement at the BRICS Summit, The Hindu, 29 March 2012, at http://www. thehindu.com/news/resources/article3257669.ece (Accessed 4 April 2012). 2. See National Security Strategy, The White House, May 2010, pp. 16, 48, at http://www. whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/05/27/a-blueprint-pursuing-world-we-seek (Accessed 19 April 2011). 3. Ibid., p. 55. 4. Ibid., p. 16. 5. Most recently, see Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacic Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacic_century?page= full (Accessed 6 December 2011), where she argues: Our strategy will . . . proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights. 6. Quote from A Conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Council on Foreign Relations, 8 September 2010, at http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy/conversation-ussecretary-state-hillary-rodham-clinton/p22896 (Accessed 19 April 2011). 7. See Hilary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities, US Department of State, 12 January 2010, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/ rm/2010/01/135090.htm (Accessed 19 April 2011). See also The Obama Administrations National Security Strategy, The Brookings Institution, 27 May 2011, at http://www.brookings. edu/events/2010/0527_national_security.aspx (Accessed 19 April 2011). 8. A Conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, no. 6. 9. For theoretical arguments along these lines, see Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2000; Daniel W. Drezner, All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007; Marc Busch, Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade, International Organization, 61(4), 2007, pp. 735761.

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10. Hilary Rodham Clinton, Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, 15 July 2009. 11. Eric Edelman, Understanding Americas Contested Primacy, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2010, at http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/10/ understanding-americas-contested-primacy/ (Accessed 27 September 2011). 12. See Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 456457. See also Robert B. Zoellick, An Architecture of US Strategy after the Cold War, in Melvyn P. Lefer and Jeffrey W. Legro (eds.), In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2011, p. 40. 13. Jackie Calmes, A U.S. Marine Base for Australia Irritates China, New York Times, 16 November 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillardexpand-us-australia-military-ties.html (Accessed 22 November 2011). This shift has had a geographical component as seen in a Pentagon strategy document: while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacic region. See Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Department of Defense, January 2012, at http://www.defense.gov/news/ Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (Accessed 9 April 2012), p. 2. 14. A Conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, no. 6. 15. First Lady Michelle Obama Urges American Youth to Strengthen U.S.China Ties, at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofce/2011/01/19/rst-lady-michelle-obama-urges-americanyouth-strengthen-us-china-ties (Accessed 22 November 2011). 16. We cannot partner with a country if its people are against us . . . Non-state actors bring considerable political and nancial resources to bear on collective challenges. They mobilize populations within and across states to promote growth, fundamental human values, and effective democratic government . . . Civil society, universities, and humanitarian organizations can often act in areas or in a manner that a government simply cannot: as neutrals or aid providers in conict zones; as thought-leaders; and as intermediaries between states or between states and peoples. The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR): Leading through Civilian Power, US Department of State, Washington, DC, December 2010, at http:// www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/ (Accessed 17 April 2011), pp. viii, 1. 17. QDDR, p. 14. 18. Ibid., pp. 2526. See also pp. 5859. 19. Ibid., p. 59. 20. Parag Khanna and Raja Mohan, Getting India Right, Policy Review, February/March 2006, p. 4. 21. K. Shankar Bajpai, Attempts to Revive Non-alignment Are in Vain since it Was Never Meant to Be a Policy or a Movement in the First Place, Business Standard, 6 March 2012, at http://business-standard.com/india/news/k-shankar-bajpai-namthe-pitfallsrevisiting-it/ 466785/ (Accessed 4 April 2012). 22. Interview with a former senior Indian Ministry of External Affairs ofcial, New Delhi, 29 August 2011. 23. Ranjan Mathai, Keynote Address at MEA-IISS-IDSA DialogueForging Stability in Asia, IDSA, 21 November 2011, at http://www.idsa.in/KeynoteAddress/ForgingStabilityinAsia_ RanjanMathai (Accessed 22 November 2011). 24. IndiaUSJapan Trilateral Likely This Year, The Hindu, 5 November 2011. 25. Jason A. Kirk, Indian-Americans and the U.S.India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?, Foreign Policy Analysis, 4, 2008, pp. 275300. 26. Jeffrey W. Legro, The American Pivot: The Role of Position in an Era of Decline, Typescript, 1 October 2011.

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