Elections for Sale!

Why we should legalize markets in votes

Prepared for St Johns University, April 16th, 2012. James Stacey Taylor Department of Philosophy The College of New Jersey jtaylor@tcnj.edu Introduction Debra Satz: No one defends the outright sale of voting, Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 34. Bans on vote buying are both ubiquitous and uncontroversial. Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, California Law Review 88, no. 5 (2000), 1323.

In this paper I will argue that concern for autonomy should (at least conditionally) support vote buying.

The (Too Simple?) Moral Case for Markets in Votes Increasing the well-being of both buyers and sellers Required by respect for autonomy

Objection: But perhaps adding options to a persons choice set could compromise her ability to exercise her autonomyand maybe the option to sell a vote is one of these.

The Argument from Deliberation Allowing vote buying will undermine voters autonomous decision-making powers. Response: This overlooks the fact that the sellers in a vote market will price their votes dynamically, rather than statically.

Vote Sales, Forcing Options, and Constraining Options Forcing options Would the typical vendor be forced into selling? Allowing a market in votes would change the background conditions against which the decision to sell or to refrain from selling is made, and

so (given the likely motivations of others in her economic situation) some persons would be motivated to sell to minimize the worsening of their situations. As such, allowing a market in votes might compromise the instrumental value of voters autonomy to them. Constraining options Would the typical vote vendor be likely to be worse off with respect to her autonomy after the sale of her vote that she was before? Given that she would sell her vote even to a party that would work against her interests, she might be.

Responses to the Above Objections The two arguments above are dependent on three empirical claims: (1) That the typical vendor in such a market will be poor; (2) that there are political parties whose policies will adversely affect the ability of the poor to exercise their autonomy to a greater degree than those of their political rivals, and (3) that the political parties whose policies will clearly be worse for the poor than those of their rivals will be able to monopolize the purchase of votes from the poor by outbidding their political rivals to such a degree that they are able to overcome the scruples that the typical poor vendor might have about selling her vote to them. While (1) and (2) and likely to be true, (3) is likely to be false, at least within Western democracies.

Titmuss, Votes, and Extinguishing Options Introducing some options might extinguish others, and hence reduce the instrumental value of the autonomy of those who would have otherwise chosen the extinguished options. Response 1: The conceptual response: distinction between the coercive prohibition of an option and its mere extinction. Response 2: The empirical, quantitative response.

Conclusion While few are Wilde-ly enthusiastic about a market in votes, it should cease to be that market which dare not speak its name.