Department of the Classics, Harvard University

On the History of the Greek Author(s): Aryeh Finkelberg Reviewed work(s): Source: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 98 (1998), pp. 103-136 Published by: Department of the Classics, Harvard University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/311339 . Accessed: 18/07/2012 08:59
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Department of the Classics, Harvard University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.

http://www.jstor.org

ON THE HISTORYOF THE GREEKKOXMOX1

ARYEH FINKELBERG

Anaximander'sidea of the eternal power of Dike ruling natural phenomenaimplies the idea of a cosmos ... Thereforewe arejustified in describinghis conception of the universeas the spiritualdiscovery of the cosmos ... The idea of a cosmos ... conveniently symbolizes the whole influence of early natural philosophy upon the culture of the Greeks." These much cited words are from WernerJaeger'sessay "The discovery of the world-order," publishedin 1933 as a partof his monumental Paideia,2 which played a significant role in stimulating the scholarly discussion of the history and meaning of the Greek x6<oto;, but seems to be responsiblealso for some of its essential shortcomings. Jaegersought to accountfor the emergenceof a new vision of the world which was broughtaboutby the Presocraticthinkers. His approachwas conceptual: in discussing the Presocratics' theories he did not argue from their use of xKo~to;,and therefore his conclusions are formally independentof terminologicalconsiderations. Yet in calling the emergence of the new vision of the universe "the discovery of the worldorder,"as well as in having defined it and systematically referredto it as "cosmos," he intimately linked the Presocratics' "spiritualdiscovery" with the term x6'aoto;, which was thus supposed to convey the very essence of this vision; the "idea of a cosmos" turnedout to be the In the subsequent discussion the terminological concept of xKrto;. word has come to be treatedas the acknowledgedPresocraticterm for the new and distinctive vision of the world, so that the ultimate objective of the study has been, not to determine the precise scope of the
"... 1 An earlier draft of the first part of this paper was read at the annual meeting of the Israel Society for the Promotionof Classical Studies held at the Haifa Universityon 31 May-1 June 1995. 2 Quoted afterthe English translation: Jaeger,Paideia: TheIdeas of GreekCulture, W. trans.G. Highet (Oxford 1947) 1.160-161.

104

Aryeh Finkelberg

application of the word, but rather-partly tacitly, but mainly explicitly-to explain how the word came to convey the conception of the "cosmos."3Of course, such an approachhas not favored a critical analysis of the evidence. The currentnotion of IxCdoog "the combinationof order, fitness as is and beauty"4 the inexhaustiblesource of the scholarlytalk of the Presocratic vision of the universe as a structuredsystem exhibiting the the beauty of a perfect arrangement.Unfortunately, notion is speculative: the association of the derivativesense-"world"-of ic6ago with and its other derivativesense "adornment," with its primarymeaning, has never been empirically proved, but is in fact an artificial "order," semantic configuration. According to this logic the use of ix6ito; in must also have preservedits the derivativesense of, say, "adornment" and link with the primarysense "order"5 have been closely associated in with the word's other secondarysenses, e.g., "government." and X6aoto; in the sense of "adornment," x6"too; the sense of "order," K6xoio; in the sense of "world"are homonymic uses, and the divergentsenses of a word do not produce a cumulative meaning. The vitality of this the speculativenotion may be tracedto the mannerof implementation: lack of evidence is compensated by question-begging speculative
3 The meaning of K?aoiogin the Presocraticswas briefly discussed by K. Reinhardt, Parmenidesund die Geschichteder griechischen Philosophie (Bonn 1916) 174-175; his zu conclusions were critically assessed by O. Gigon, Untersuchungen Heraklit (Leipzig 1935) 52-55. Subsequentto the publicationof Jaeger'sPaideia there came the full-scale as a terminological concept by W. Kranz: "Kosmos als investigations of K6Cio philosophischer Begriff friihgriechischerZeit," Philologus 93 (1938/39) 430-448, and Nachrichten d. Gdtt. "Kosmos und Mensch in der Vorstellungfrihen Griechentums," Ph.-hist. KI., 2.7 (1938) 121-161. The Presocraticuses Gesellschaftder Wissenschaften, were examined briefly by G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments2 (Cambridge 1962; first edition: Cambridge 1954) 311-315 (on which see G. Vlastos's critical comAJP 76 [1955] 344-347) and at length by C. H. Kahn, Anaximents, "On Heraclitus," manderand the Origins of Greek Cosmology(New York 1960) 219-230. The discussion culminatedin J. Kerschensteiner's comprehensivestudy Kosmos. QuellenkritischeUnterhave been (Munich 1962). The general uses of K6oatog suchungenzu den Vorsokratikern in surveyed by H. Diller, "Der vorphilosophischeGebrauchvon K6otog;und KOagE~v," Festschrift Bruno Snell (Munich 1956) 47-60, and in the first chapter of Kerschensteiner's Kosmos 4-25. Relevant comments on the uses of Ka~tog; as well as concise summariesof the semanticdevelopmentof the word are found in some otherauthors. 4 W. K. C. Guthrie,A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge 1962-1981) 1.208 n. 1. 5 Which obviously is not the case, see, e.g., 11.4.145, or Hdt. 7.31.

OntheHistory theGreek KOXMOX of

105

assumptions,6and a circularway of reasoning runs from the supposed to of meaning of x6o(togo an interpretation the general purportof Presocratictheories, and from these theories to the meaningof xoGtog. While it is clear that we try not to read the later senses of x~oogto into the earlier uses, scholars often take the cosmological application for granted;the typical approachis to take the word at the outset as referring to the world and to construe the text in the light of this assumed meaning. A more critical attitude, adopted by Kirk, led to conclusions greatly differing from the currentviews; Kirk was attacked from the speculative positions7 and his approachcondemned as "too strict and narrow."8 does not, however, seem too strict to demand It from those who claim certaintexts to be the first instancesof a new linguistic usage to take on themselves the onus probandi. It seems to me somewhat too liberal to grant conveniently the cosmological application of x6'rto; in a given Presocratictext without seriously checking the possibility of other meanings. The danger of the anachronistic of rendering can be avoided only if the exclusive appropriateness the the of cosmological sense or, alternatively, definiteinappropriateness all the other senses of the word may be shown. But when the cosmological applicationof the word in a given text is proved beyond reasonable doubt, it still remains to decide whether it
One of the most instructiveexamples is perhapsthe following, Jaeger (above, n. 2) 160: "We do not know whetherAnaximanderhimself used the word cosmos in this connection: it is used by his successor Anaximenes, if the fragmentin which it occurs is corto rectly attributed him." This is a cautious and philologically conscious statement.Kahn (above, n. 3) 219: "As Jaeger has put it, the philosophy of Anaximanderrepresents 'the discovery of the cosmos,' and there is no good reason to suppose that this discovery was ever called by any other name." (Note that Kahndoes not believe that in AnaximenesB 2 the Koa6to; is genuine.) For another,no less conspicuous, example, see the following note. 7 By Vlastos (above, n. 3) 344, 345 n. 19: "[Kirk concludes that] the word Kratog; could only mean 'order,'not 'world,' at this [sc. Heraclitus']time.... I am not ... confident ... that was not used even in sixth century speculationfor 'world' ... the Kotog; Milesians would certainlyneed a substantiveby which to refer ... to the world(s) which issue from the arche ... such a need is bound to be met sooner or later, and ... it could be met very early by the use of i6Cogo;since the notion of the world as an orderly was, of course, present from the beginning." (Vlastos's more specific arguarrangement ment, ibid. 345-346, against Kirk, namely that HeraclitusB 30 "is evidence that KoG?.og, though it implies, does not just mean, 'order,'for what is in question here is not merely that nobody made the order of the world, but that nobody made this orderlyworld [Vlastos's italics],"regrettably begs the question.) 8 M. Marcovich,Heraclitus. Editio Maior (Merida 1967) 99.
6

106

Finkelberg Aryeh

exhibits the usual or contextual meaning of the word. The failure to draw this fundamentallinguistic distinctionhas ensued in the artificial as assumed by scholars to be the renderingof xo6a`ao; "world-order," transitional meaning between the primary sense "order" and the derivative"world."Yetjust as x6pagLo; used, for example, by Herodotus with referenceto Polycrates' furniture(3.123.1), does not mean "furniso ture-adornment," being used with reference to the world, the word does not acquire the hybrid sense "world-order."The conventional is as "world-order" to be discarded,and the word renderingof x6aLo; is to be renderedas either "order" "world"dependingon whetherthe or use is occasional, and thereforethe sense "world"is only contextual,or regular,and hence the meaningis usual.9It goes without saying that the usual meaning "world"of should not be admitted unless the x6aLo; characterof the use can be argued. systematic This would seem to call into question the currentscholarly consensus. In what follows I propose a reexaminationof evidence on more critical grounds. I hope to show that a strict and open-mindedscrutiny of evidence, free of speculative presuppositions,leads to conclusions considerablydifferentfrom the familiarpicture. I In describing Socrates' philosophical interests at Memorabilia 1.1.11, Xenophon says: "he did not even discuss, as most others, the natureof all things, inquiringinto how what the men of wisdom call the runs and by what necessities each of the heavenly phenomena xoa6oo takes place." These words indicate that by the time they were written was already put to terminological use, but for Xenophon the 6Loo term was still a peculiar technical idiom of a definite provenance,and the commentatorsgenerally agree that the usage must have been relatively new.10 If, for the purposeof the argument,we assume the earliest date of Memorabilia 1.1-2, viz. soon after the attack against Socrates published by Polycrates in 393/2 B.C., still the testimony remains incompatiblewith the currentview of the fifth- and even sixth-century
9 Thus, for example, Aristotle's oipav6;, when used with reference to the world, is but renderedneitheras "heaven"nor as "world-heaven," "world." 10See, among others, Gigon (above, n. 3) 54; Kirk (above, n. 3) 314; Plato Gorgias, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1959) 308; Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 226 n. 5.

OntheHistory theGreek KOXMOX of

107

terminologicaluse of xdogog. It has been contended that Xenophon's phrase only means "that it is the philosophers who call the world ,doagog, not that they have started doing this fairly recently."" Yet Aristophanes'philosophical parodies demonstratethat until at least the twenties of the fifth century B.C. the Athenian public was well acquainted with contemporaryphilosophical writings, and Socrates' mentioning, in Plato's Apology 26D-E, a drachma as the price of Anaxagoras' book in the Athenian market place, even if ironically exaggerated, shows that the situation was not much different some The fifth-centuryphilosophersaddressedtheir twenty-five years later.12 books to the general reader and their phraseology could hardly strike this reader as peculiar.13 has also been suggested that Xenophon's It remarkmay have reflectedthe Athenianusage while elsewhere, notably in Ionia, the sense "world"was established much earlier. Yet except Archelaus,all the philosophersactive in fifth-centuryAthens were visitors from abroad, including Ionia. Easy explanations do not work; there must be something wrong with either Xenophon's testimony or, more probably,the currentaccountof the Presocraticusage. The beginning of the terminologicalcareerof xKogo; is traditionally associated with Pythagoras whom, it is generally maintained, Greek doxographycreditedwith using the word as "world." Yet the examination of the testimony hardlywarrantsthis view. We have two principal 2.1.1 (= DK 14, 21): Iua)0odpaxppro; reports. AMtius y6axE xTil ptobvjcThe 6Kaiov EiXrig ordinary Z;v r&)v reptoX~lv ao)fo
"x6EO.14 0,oov 11Vlastos (above, n. 3) 345; cf. Kahn (above, n. 3) 220; D. Lanza, Anassagora: testimonianzeeframmenti (Florence 1966) 217, ad B 8. 12The Athenianreadermust, then, have been well acquaintedwith Anaxagoras'usage, and thereforeO. Gigon's suggestion, Kommentar zum ersten Buch von XenophonsMemorabilien (Basel 1953) 17, ad loc., that Xenophon's "wise men" may refer to Anaxagoras, is hardlyplausible. 13Therefore Kranz's explanation (above, n. 3) 446-447, that "dem attischen Durchwar noch un 400 Kosmos fiir Weltall ein Ausdruck der Gelehrten,"is schnittsbuirger ratherhe unconvincing. Besides, Xenophon definitely was not a "Durchschnittsbtirger"; was a literateperson with a wide range of interests, including the philosophical. Kranz's strong contrast between "learnedpeople" and "averagecitizens" seems to be somewhat anachronistic,but at any rate Xenophon did not addresshis writings to citizens who did not readbooks. 14 Photius, Bibl. 440a27, who draws on Stobaeus (see H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci4 [Berlin 1879] 44), glosses i1 Eptox7 as 6 o'pctvy; and specifies AMtius' rdtit; z'v 6owv e as the perfection and beauty of the heaven. In Achilles Isag. 129d rz xx&v a gloss on is Stobaeus' 1irOv ~"ov For Achilles' dependence on Stobaeus see Diels, ibid. Eptoxr. his 327a; for his inaccuracyin transcribing sources see ibid., 21-26.

108

Aryeh Finkelberg

sense of nrEptox is "an enclosing, compass," and in its two other i occurrencesin AMtius word means "circumference, the envelopment."15 This being so, the phrase l r'OvXiov rEptoxi most naturallyrefers to the (outer) heaven.16 The other reportis D.L. 8.48 (= Dox. 492; cf. DK 28 A 44): ro'rov [sc. Pythagoras]6 'axIopi'v6g ;rlotv ... Kai Xtv KIdcov K xTIv a o1pav(xv Rpfxrov 6volitixoat yfiv oxpoyyAyXrjV- 8& b [sc. OE)opao(To; HIapxpEvi8rl called the earthspherical], 0;q8E Zv(ov 'Haiobov xrX. The opposition rbvo5pav6v --,rv yfiv suggests that the sense of the ouipav6; is "heaven"ratherthan "world.""17 agreement The between AMtius'and Diogenes' testimonies makes it likely that they come from a common source, and we have no special reason to question the Theophrastean It provenanceof the information.18 should however be realized that the reportcannot be taken at face value. What is reportedis a Pythagoreantraditionwhich, we can infer, authorizedthe use of ic"aogo;in the sense of "heaven." Since the attributionof this terminological invention to Pythagorasconforms to the Pythagoreans' routine practice, it is impossible to know how old this use really was. The only historical evidence the reportfurnishes is the use of K61oto; for "heaven"by the Pythagoreansof the last generations. We shall returnto this meaningof the word later. Another reportthat has been adduced to prove the Milesian use of K6coo; in the sense of "world"is a phrase from the Theophrastean
15 [Plut.] Plac. 3.892E (=Diels [above, n. 14] 364a16), cf. LSJ, s.v. nrEptoxii, Stob. 2; Ecl. 1.29.1 (= Diels [above, n. 14] 369b26 = DK 68 A 93). 16 Cf. Kranz (above, n. 3) 432 (who however is preparedto go beyond the report, and 436-437); U. Hilscher, "Anaximander the Beginnings of Greek Philosophy"in D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen eds., Studies in PresocraticPhilosophy (London 1970) 1.297 n. 41 (first published in Hermes 81 [1953] 255-277, 385-417); J. Mansfeld, The Pseudoch. 6Pio6g&6ov I-II and Greek Philosophy (Assen 1971) 42 Hippocratic Tract Fept n. 26. 17Cf. Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 42 n. 26. 18As Gigon (above, n. 3) 54, points out, the reportwould fit with Theophrastus'charto acteristicinterestin the history of philosophicalterminology.The attribution Pythagofor ras of the use of KoLo;og "world"in Achilles' report(see above, n. 14) and in Schol. is ov t6; Hom. ad II. 3.1 (... i7 at 1ov rtn luv0ay6po Ei'prlyrat) a result of KxLov informationhave of the deterioration the tradition. The Theophrastean origins of AMtius' for been disputed because the alleged attributionto Pythagorasof the use of xoaCtog "world"does not conform to certainscholars' idea of the terminologicaluse of the word. because this Thus, for example, Vlastos (above, n. 3) 345 n. 19, questions the attribution would be too late a date, while Kirk (above, n. 3) 313 and n. 1, 314, because the date would be too early.

On the History of the GreekKOXMOX

109

account of Anaximander'sApeiron preservedin Hippolytus (Ref 1.6.1 = DK 12 A 11: tot; oiupavot? icac and Simplitv v a toi; icc cius (Phys. 24.13 = DK 12 A 9: tot; oiupavo; Kioov) Ev 'tot; avdrot; It Ko~6icoL)g). has been supposed that the locution reflects Anaximander's own words,19but the supposition is speculative.20 Besides, in the account the pluraloi.pavo" refers to Anaximander'spluralworlds: Hipe vat, v ( auPpaivet yiv(o8E pol. ibid., tpbS k toitco ivty dcV&Stov ro1; oiUpavoi`;;Simpl. Phys. 41.17 (absent from DK): ?; [sc. t~i1 Oat K t a1~Epol) e(P t(TV o] X&i6toV IdvrItV ittrav EFva Ti ?tv o~paov(v cf. Ps.-Plut. Strom. 2 (DK 12 A 10): tob TCetpov yEV eo; e0,yev; ~XV Tj ; (pavat 'rTv Uoyav aitrav tvExLV' Ol Rtav)1bC yeV&e(o tE K ao tIvo; toi Consequently the phrase ij; [sc. ti6; (p0op~x.21 paE(o; ( n A &iravTo; &ienipov]y~veioat rol; oiupavol5; (Hippol. ibid.) / yveoOat rol; oiupavo6d; (Simpl. Phys. 24.13) speaks of the generation of worlds from the Apeiron, and hence icai tbv v a(rot; K ctiov / tot; Ev aXrot; 6outou; can scarcely mean other than "and the arrangementsin them." Incidentally,the translationof the ou.pavot as "heavens" would also result in rendering the / as icogo; Kcogot "the heavens and the arrangement(s)[enclosed] in "arrangement(s)": them." The earliest philosophical text in which cK6ogo; occurs is Anaximenes B 2. Yet the fragmentshows unmistakablesigns of a late has, with good reason, come rewordingand the genuineness of o~iogo; under suspicion.22But even if the word is assumed to be genuine, the
19 Reinhardt (above, n. 3) 175, followed, among others, by Gigon (above, n. 3) 53-54, Kranz(above, n. 3) 433, and Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 29-38. 20 As Kirk (above, n. 3) 312, rightly comments, "thereis no suggestion thatTheophrastus is quoting Anaximander."Cf. Vlastos (above, n. 3) 345 n. 19; Guthrie(above, n. 4) 1.111, and others. 21 Zeller's suggestion, followed by F. M. Cornford,"Innumerable Worldsin Presocratic Philosophy,"CQ 27 (1934) 10-11, Kranz(above, n. 3) 433, and Kahn(above, n. 3) 46-53 in (who abrogatedthis interpretation the Preface to the 1985 reprint),that oljpavot refer to Anaximander's celestial rings, is untenable; cf. Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 45 n. 40; A. Finkelberg,"PluralWorlds in Anaximander," AJP 115 (1994) 502-504. Kirk (above, n. 3) 312, is correct in pointing out that o-pavc6ois used in the regularPeripateticsense of "world." 22 See K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie (Munich 1926) 209-211; cf. Gigon (above, n. 3) 54; and for a more balanced view: Vlastos (above, n. 3) 363 n. 55; G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge 1983) 159; Kerschensteiner(above, n. 3) 77-83; Guthrie (above, n. 4) 1.131-132; G. Wihrle, Anaximenesaus Milet (Stuttgart1993) 63-66.

110

Aryeh Finkelberg

fact thatits immediatecontext suffereda rewordingmakes the fragment worthless as evidence of Anaximenes' linguistic usage. Another text which for a long time has been referredto as an authenticwitness of a is very early cosmological use of cK6aojo; the first two chaptersof the tract De hebdomadibus.23 However, as Mansfeld pseudo-Hippocratic has demonstrated, entire tract,including the first two chapters,is of the The a much later date, most probablyfirst century B.C.24 earliest induin authenticoccurrenceof cK6aojo; the philosophicalcontext is, bitably then, in Heraclitus. However for the purposes of the argumentI postpone the discussion of Heraclitus'fragmentsuntil we reachconclusions regardingthe use of the word in the firsthalf of the fifth century. In the extant lines of Parmenides'poem appearstwice, but i6oto;S in B 8.52 exemplifies the both instances are irrelevant:K6aojov nkiov and traditionaluse with reference to the order of a narrative,25 icara' in B 4.3 is the epic formulafor "in order,orderly."26 Nevertheio6otov less some critics wish to understandParmenides' icara 6icotaov as but whatever sense modem commentators "throughoutthe world,"27 the Greek audience must have taken the expression to may suggest, mean "orderly," Parmenidescould not have been unawareof this.28 and Of the two extant occurrencesof the word in Empedocles the first is in B 26:
23See Kranz(above, n. 3) 433, Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 54-55, and others. 24For the historyof the discussion of the date of the tractsee the firstchapterof Mansfeld (above, n. 16), esp. 16-30. 25See Diller (above, n. 3) 57; Kerschensteiner(above, n. 3) 9-10; see also A. H. Coxon, TheFragmentsof Parmenides(Assen 1986) 218. 26Cf. DK 1.232, ad loc.; Kirk (above, n. 3) 313; Diller (above, n. 3) 55; Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 119-122; M. Finkelberg, "Homer's View of the Epic Narrative: Some Formulaic Evidence," CP 82 (1987) 135-138; see also L. Tarain,Parmenides (Princeton 1965) 47-48; E. Heitsch, Parmenides (Munich 1974) 147; Coxon (above, n. 25) 189, and others. 27As, for example, G. Calogero, Studi sull' eleatismo (Rome 1932) 22 n. 1; Parmenides (Frankfurtam Main 1969) 47; or D. O'Brien in P. Aubenque U. H61lscher, ed., Etudes sur Parmdnide (Paris 1987) 1.21-22. 28On Parmenides'dependenceon the traditionalepics see W. Jaeger, The Theologyof Early GreekPhilosophers (Oxford 1947) 35-36, 92-96, 104; H. Schwabl, "Zur'Theogonie' bei Parmenidesund Empedokles,"WS 70 (1957) 278-289; id., "Hesiod und Parmenides. Zur Formung des parmenidischenProoimions,"RhM 106 (1963) 134-142; A. P. D. Mourelatos,The Route of Parmenides(New Haven 1970) 6-37; Coxon (above, n. 25) 7-17.

On the History of the GreekKOYMOY

111

KpwatrOt RptcLnogivoto K-1CX0oto, Et ei; 0,CX Cccd ciS~ueoat gept ev ai'f;. icd(pOwt yp 3tLtv a'ria, &8 acura &t' 8e Oeovta ,a,,(v Ire yivovtat 6vOpornot ai &ov EOvea "t OPrlpv ei; icore gtvvtDtXotrlit aUVEPX6,ev' ieva cK6aoov, i icaora(popoujeoVa (6) 6ore 69'aow ,,x0t, x' Nieo; r Inv 1neeVEpOE (7) eia6icev ev yeVrlltat. gPivto0v'ta Assuming that lines 4-6 are of cosmological ratherthan biological in line 5 does not designate the frame of purportand therefore Kotaog; animal bodies, the rendering of the word depends on whether the refers to the phrase "now coming together by Love into one of the gradualunificationof K6acto;" the elements, viz. the intermediaryperiod manifold world, or to the ultimate condition of the perfect unity, viz. the Sphere. Now it is evident that line 7-"until, growing together into one, they [sc. the elements] are subdued and become the whole"29--describesthe ultimate condition of the perfect mixture, and this meaning is furthersupportedby the contrast with the first line of the fragment(Kpaerouaot-1nt where the reference is to vep0e y the ultimate condition of Strife.30 ,vrlrat)7 depicts the ultimateconBut if line dition ratherthan the intermediary period, lines 5 and 6-"now coming togetherby Love into one K6ago;, // now again being borne apartfrom each other by the hatred of Strife"-must also describe the ultimate conditions, the reigns of Love and of Strife respectively. Consequently the "one icoaCo;o" line 5 must refer to the perfect mixtureof the four in The other Empedocleanfragmentin which elements, i.e., the Sphere.31 is found is B 134: Kct6og;
29 Or, alternatively,"become totally subdued,"although J. Bollack, Empidocle 3: Les Origines: commentaire1 (Paris 1969) 131, seems correctin that the translationof to'rn&v as an adverbis contraryto Empedocles' usage, cf. M. R. Wright,Empedocles: TheExtant Fragments(New Haven 1981) 183. 30 The contrast is emphasized and correctly explained by Wright (above, n. 29) 183: ... the roots are 'underneath'in the opposite sense to their prevailing (cf. line 1), because they are not separateand dominantmasses but are in such a mixing ... that none of their characteristics visibly distinct." is 31Cf. E. Bignone, Empedocle (Turin 1916) 420. Kirk (above, n. 3) 313, if I correctly understandhim, reaches a similar conclusion: "K6atov here means 'group,' or 'arrangement, organism'." J. Bollack, "Sur deux fragments de Parmenide," REG 70 (1957) 61, argues that the x6Tog; in B 26.5 is not an equivalent of opitpo; og cKXorepig: he adduces as a parallel B 17.7 which, he infers, must indicate the general direction of the

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

ev & Lpt

112

AryehFinkelberg 01)~c x0 XVAPOgie C 6UoKXc6OtyuiCOCOicxat, o0 C eV &ctovtot, XC&Rti v(Oxoto

KE(pxX11 1CItc

oiu n6o&0,oi30o, yoiva, xaviiev9a, oC9 itr-i6a

ic (pp v iepi~J apwro; Xo ETCUioivov, Oml &XX, x aCrati sppovriotKilov OavrIa ovxouaa oftv. 0

This descriptionof the spp~iv icpij should be comparedwith Empedocles' portrayal of the Sphere in B 29: oi y7p &cr vxtkoto 6o // hXlgiot &~ioovrato, oi~i6Egn, oi~ ooiva( ( , oU EToCLa y yTvvrievt~ , xxi oo;g Ertv acix~. The fact that the two o ipaqpo;g rl K &XXX& descriptions are practically identical suggests the identity of their respective subjects-the (ppi"viepi and the Sphere.32Nevertheless Empedocleanscholarsrefrainfrom the identification: takingfor granted that must mean "world," they conclude thatthe (ppi~v iepij must be ac6oog god contemporaneouswith the manifold world. Yet Empedocles' belief in a cosmic god contemporaneouswith the world is otherwise unattested, either in the extant fragments or in the doxographical reports,33and the whole idea rests on the rendering of K?ioo;S as "world." However this sense is unnecessary,for, as we have seen, in B 26.5 Empedocles uses the word to designatethe Sphere. This being so, it is obviously preferablenot to renderthe iK6ctog; "world"and thus as to avoid the unnecessary multiplicationof entities assuming an addicosmic developmentratherthan its final stage. Unfortunately, Bollack fails to quote the identical line B 20.2, which would hinder his argument.Kerschensteiner(above, n. 3) 128, says that since the Sphere is not an ordered structure,Empedocles could not have but designatedit as K6YoLo;, this is to beg the question. Besides, the general presumption is that K6oYLo; 8&' necessarilysuggests the idea of an innerstructure wrong: OvZ~E KYJog ai z (Hdt. 7.36.5). div 6riv 32The more so as both fragmentsbelong to one poem, viz. On Nature. Diels' removal of B 134 to the Katharmoi was, not without reason, called by G. Zuntz, Persephone (Oxford 1971) 218, the abuse of evidence; see Bignone (above, n. 31) 631-649; WS 48 (1930) 3-7; Zuntz, ibid., 214-218; N. van der Ben, C. Horna, "Empedocleum," TheProem of Empedocles' Peri Physios (Amsterdam1975) 11-15, 33 Kranz(above, n. 3) 443, refers to Sext. 9.127 (= DK 31 B 136), but if Sextus' words have a textual basis in Empedocles, it need not be other than B 134. K. v. Fritz, "NOYX, NOEINand Their Derivativesin Pre-SocraticPhilosophy(ExcludingAnaxagoras).PartI" in A. P. D. Mourelatosed., ThePre-Socratics.A Collection of CriticalEssays2 (Princeton 1993) 62 n. 125, compares the idea of the divine <ppilv supposedly pervadingthe world with B 110.10, but there is a great distancebetween the unifieddivine mind and the statement that all things severally have intelligence and share in thinking, a view which is relatedto the perceptiveability of the "roots."

On the History of the GreekKOWMOI

113

tional, and otherwise unattested, cosmic deity alongside the Sphere, similar to, and yet separatefrom it. Moreover it may be arguedthat if the four "roots"mixed in equal proportionmake blood which is the thought organ in men (B 98; B 105; Theophr.De sensu 10 = DK 31 A 86), the Sphere, which is the perfect mixture of the four elements in equal proportion(B 17.27 seems to state that the elements are of equal which is, of course, the bulk), must in its entiretybe a thought organ34 .pp'v iep" of B 134; this must be the ultimate explanationwhy Empedocles "hymns"the Sphere "as god."35 The ioagog, throughwhich the "dartswith swift thoughts,"must, then, be the Sphereratherthan qpp1lv the articulatedworld.36But if the K6dogo; nevertheless admitted to is refer to the developed world, the fact that Empedocles uses the word indifferentlyto denote the Sphere of Love and the world would entail the contextualcharacterof the meaning "world"in B 134.5. 1vi 'rch Anaxagoras B 8: o6 EX(pptorat XXhXhov Ev t6 KdoygJ i p noVcIon7at cna 'oiCo0h -6 Ogp~tv & to xuxpou oiit) t6 iC o06u: Simplicius quotes the fragmentas illustrat"toi Oepgo^. uXpbv&an6 doctrine"in ing Anaxagoras' everythinga portion of everything."If he is right, the specification "in the one world" becomes irrelevant37 and even misleading, for it suggests that the "inseparability" things is of due, not to their intrinsic nature, but to their belonging to "the one Now the phrase "the things ... are not separatedfrom one world."38 another ... neither the hot from the cold nor the cold from the hot" implies that "things"are opposites like the hot and the cold, and therefore these are opposites that cannot be separatedfrom each other.39 The
phrase 9v -oovi

specifies what precisely opposites are meant to be inseparable, and Anaxagoras' illustration-the hot and the cold-suggests that "the one is "the one, the same order"to which complementaryoppoxotjog"
34Cf. Wright(above, n. 29) 238. 35 Simpl. De anima 70.17; cf. 68.2 and Phys. 1124.1. 36This would dispense with the anachronisticimmaterialityof the which, on the <ppriv, rendering ic6~ago as "world," scholars are compelled to allow; see, e.g., Reinhardt (above, n. 3) 143; Guthrie(above, n. 4) 2.260, and others. 37 Not mere "beinahepleonastisch"(Gigon [above, n. 3] 53). 38 Lanza (above, n. 11) 217, ad B 8, believes that the phraseconfirmsthe Anaxagorean doctrineof the uniquenessof the world, but does not explain how the supposedreference to this doctrinehere may be pertinentto Anaxagoras'meaning. 39 Schofield (above, n. 22) 371, aptly recalls Heraclitus' doctrineof the unity of opposites.

K6ogip, which qualifies t(A, viz. the opposite things,

114

Aryeh Finkelberg

sites belong: the things that, like the hot and the cold, in the one array are not separatedfrom one anothernor cut off with an axe.40If so, the sense of the phrase "one K6ctoog"here is precisely the same as in Empedocles26.5-"one arrangement."41 Melissus B 7: (2) ... Ei ov ytxp E&rpototvrat, a&vaycrjl yi1l 6ioilov t6 lrp6aeOv 6v, t E o c"t6v yivs 0at ... &q fvat, &XX &nt6XXaUOat (3) &XX'o-08& yp K6aLo; 6 lrp6aoiv tEacoo'trljfjvat Eov Gvixgo6v-6 6 Since Melissus' argument "il t6Xrat yivertat. ov ob~iC &n6 oiutre is directed against the changeability of 9b~6v and has nothing to do with cosmology, the sense "order,arrangement" the K6a0io`is obviof for ous: "noris it possible for it [sc. 'b i6v] to be rearranged, the previously existing order does not perish, nor a nonexisting one come into It being."42 seems evident that, if by the time of the composition of this text K6aogo; its was alreadya currentterm for "world," use in the argument could mislead the reader into thinking that Melissus argues the unchangeabilityof the world.43Yet he does not seem to have considVlastos (above, n. 3) 345, objects to Kirk's construal(above, n. 3) 313, of Anaxagoas "the one group or category ... probably,the continuumformed by ras' "one is each pairio6atog" of opposites":". .. his [Anaxagoras']K6~oCtogindeed a continuum,but a single one wherein 'everythinghas a portion of everything,'not the many continua of his multiple pairs of opposites, which would not be 'one world"' [Vlastos's italics]. Unfortunately,the argumentis a petitio principii, but apartfrom this Schofield (above, n. 22) 371, must be right in that the continuaof opposites were regardedby Anaxagoras"as providing the best illustrationof his general theory that 'in everything there is a portion of everything'." is 41 Euripidesfr. 910 (= DK 59 A 30: dav~r&ooti0cxOopav cotov &ayrjpv) (<pi6aJEg thoughtto be an echo of Anaxagoras'teaching. Kahn(above, n. 3) 220, says thatIc60otog here is an instance of the "philosophical"use of the word in the fifth century. Yet the it phrasenot only allows the rendering"order," even suggests it: "perceivingthe unaging does not make good sense. world of deathlessnature" 42Reinhardt(above, n. 3) 174, contended that ico6atoo means here "einen bestimmten Zustand,eine Phase dieser Welt ..." The construaldisregardsthe purportof Melissus' argumentand was rightly dismissed by Gigon (above, n. 3) 52; cf. Kirk (above, n. 3) 313; Vlastos (above, n. 3) 345; Guthrie(above, n. 4) 2.115; Schofield (above, n. 22) 396, and others. Stel43 As it has misled some critics (notablyH. Diller, "Die philosophiegeschichtliche lung des Diogenes von Apollonia,"Hermes 76 [1941] 365-366; cf. Kahn [above, n. 3] 229) into thinking that Melissus may have attackedthe idea of the changeabilityof the world maintainedby contemporaneousphilosophers. Now, regardless of whether these it philosopherscalled the world ico6atog, seems clear enough that whateverMelissus may intend to show to be unchangeable,he argues the impossibility of its alterationqua rt of (= arrangement) rb 6v that he demonstratesto be unalterd6v,and it is the c6aJto able.
40

On the History of the GreekKOXMOX

115

ered the possibility that his audience could hesitate to refer 6 K66ogo; 6 v to rbnup6~0( 6v, for otherwisehe most probablywould pp6e0ev ~vhv have avoided the use of the word or would have specified it as 6 r cp6oaOev 6oago;i6vrowvor d6vro;---cf. ralooGkrOVMv Ed6vzov t in the next sentence.44 In all the instances examined thus far Kc60to;seems to be invariably used in the traditional sense "order,""arrangement."Only in one occurrence, at Empedocles B 134.5, the word may be, though not too likely, taken as applying to the world. If this is indeed Empedocles' referencehere,juxtaposed to the applicationof ICoGxo;to the Sphereat B 26.5, it attests to the occasional characterof the use and the ensuing contextual characterof the sense "world." Considering also that the established sense "world"most probablywould precludeMelissus' use of the word in his argument,we may infer that by the middle of the fifth century the word still did not acquire the cosmological sense. With this conclusion in mind we may turn now to Heraclitus. In his occurs in B 30, 89, and 124, though only in B 30 its fragments K6GJaoo is unquestionable.45 authenticity B 30: v o0ME (r6voe), a-rbyv a rv, o0re t? Kx6oov axx' t6v Oet i jv delicai tadv ai fo at *inp ai&,oov, oativ MvOpnov inoiiEsv, gtpa icta &tnooe~vv-iegvov grpa. The fragmentis gend&iro6gevov held to be the first instance of the use of with reference erally i6cotoa to the world, but this is not at all certain, for the reference to the ordered alterations of fire is equally possible: "This order[ed sequence],46the same of all [things], did none of gods or men make, but it ever was and is and shall be: everliving fire, kindling in measures and extinguishing in measures." Theoretically speaking, B 30 may be an instance of (a) the usual meaning "world,"(b) the contextualmeane?w Et 6vrowV, 6vrov Eil, Mullach; 44MS; aooCrLov xv CEaiKOGtjrEi* ioWV Heidel. 45 The word is found also in B 75, but Diels's assessment of it as a fragment,disputed by Reinhardt(above, n. 3) 194 n. 2, has been generally abandoned,see Gigon (above, n. 3) 52; Kirk (above, n. 3) 312-313; Marcovich (above, n. 8) 10; J. Bollack and H. Wismann, Hiraclite ou la Separation (Paris 1972) 234, C. H. Kahn, The Art and Thoughtof Heraclitus (Cambridge1979) 216, and others. 46 "Orderedsequence, series" is one of the most fundamental and well-established meanings of ic6'tog in Homer and afterwards, as for instance, in II. 24.622, Od. 13.76-77, or Hdt. 8.67; the same sense the word has in the epic formula in iactr K6tov application to song. For further examples see Kerschensteiner(above, n. 3) 5-24; cf. Kranz(above, n. 3) 430-431.

116

Aryeh Finkelberg

or ing "world," (c) the usual meaning "order." Option (a) is hardlycompatible with our conclusion thateven some fifty years later "world"was not the usual meaning of Kop`og either in the Greek West (Empedocles) or, what is especially significant,in Ionia (Anaxagoras,Melissus). The decision is, then, between (b) and (c), and reasons in favor of the latteroption seem to be more cogent. If by Heraclituswished to refer to the orderof the world, he K6itog would have had to clarify this because, as we have seen, this was not a customaryapplicationof the word. It has been repeatedlyarguedthat as SE specifies the K6oatog that very order which we see aroundus, However since beside its deictic sense "8E i.e., the orderof the world.47 has another principal meaning, that of referring forward, Heraclitus' supposed specification must have been misleading. Habituallytaking in the general sense of "order," and naturallylooking for its K6ctgog of all in the text itself, Heraclitus'readerwould readspecificationfirst vov pov pa the suitable ily find in &wr6A'gevov ptgtpa Iai &roope3vvCTP of reference of the word and consequentlywould understandthe point to the orderedalterationsof 66E as proleptic, viz. relating the fire. In other words, Heraclitus'x6oog contemporariescould hardly understand 6og`og;as "the order of the world"; rather they would have understood it as "the order of the fire's kindling and extinguishing." Further, Heraclitean scholars regularly mistranslate -rv antbyv because "this world [or as the word is as &RntVtOWV "the same for all,"48 the artificiallyrendered,"world-order"], same of all [things]"does not make sense.49But the phrase"thisorder,the same of all [things]"does, portrayingas it does fire's regularalterationsas changes of the global scale. Finally, the reference to the world would turn the phrase "none of gods or men made" into the denial of the view that the world was
47 Kirk (above, n. 3) 314; cf. J. Burnet,Early GreekPhilosophy4 (London 1930) 162; Reinhardt(above, n. 3) 175-176; Kranz(above, n. 3) 441, and others. 48Reinhardt(above, n. 3) 170 n. 1, followed by Kirk(above, n. 3) 308-309, and others, as a gloss. excises rov aurbyv nicvryov 49 One may however wonder whether "this world-order,the same for all" is better. "one as the masculine and understands Vlastos (above, n. 3) 346-347, takes the nctivryov of of the waking as distinctfrom "private and common x6atCot" those asleep (B ocagog" differs from 89). Apartfrom the questionableauthenticityof Kicago; in B 89, its grammar that of B 30. When the "common"is related to men, as in B 89 and also in B 113, the idea is conveyed by the dative ("the common [binding]for everybody"),but when it is related to things, as in B 114, by the genitive ("the common [principle]of everything"), and it is the latterconstructionwhich is found in B 30.

OntheHistory theGreek of KOXMO1

117

brought into existence by a creator, an idea which no Greek (at least until Plato's Timaeus)held, and the solemn rejection of which would But have soundedto Heraclitus'audiencepointless and grotesque.50 the assertionthat the orderof fire's alterationswas not broughtaboutby an extraneous agent is an informativestatementof the self-sufficiency of cosmic fire.51Considering all this, the fragment seems to be properly understood as speaking of the ordered eternal sequence of the fire's measuredalterations,which is also the sequence of all things; the idea thus conveyed is comparablewith Anaximander's i toi Xpbpvou tr;tq (B 1).52 B 89: 6 'Hpdlhxt T6 (Plat i rtot;~ yprlYop6atvwia ti Kotvbv 'vo IOTOV i'tov onooUpE(PEGOtt. dEvat, t(v 8F Kol VotltvoV Ev c(ojlov o Diels accepted the first clause and the word i'tov in the second one, but, as Gigon pointed out, icotvov instead of 4,v6v in the first clause indicates that it also underwenta rewording.53 This casts doubt on the genuineness of co'ato;, which may well be a gloss. And there can be little doubt that it is indeed a gloss: the word means "one's world,"54 but such a metaphoricaluse presupposes the usual meaning "world," which was not the case even half a centurylater. B 124: &ronep odapla EiKfi KEXU?xWvoV 6 K0h1ZGto;, q(PTGV 'HpdlKhtTo, [6] IX6opto;.If K6~6to;is assumed to be a part of the quotation, and if Diels's emendation adppta for adp4 of the MS is accepted, then Heraclitus'contrastwould be between a randomheap of sweepings and the most beautiful co6ijto;. Both the Theophrastean context and the intrinsic meaning of the opposition suggest that the
50 The difficulty is concisely stated by G. E. R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy (Cambridge 1971) 273 n. 3: "It is strikingthat in Fr. 30 Heraclitusdenies that the world-order is the productof 'any god or mortal' ... This is such an explicit denial that it looks as if it is directed against some specific myth or theory. Yet we have considerabledifficulty in identifyingthis with any certaintyfrom our availableevidence." 51 This notion was reportedby Theophrastus,as reflected in a number of dependent accounts in which the fire's kindling and extinguishing are said to be KxtrXd tvx Eiap?tavrlv &vdyXrv(Simpl. Phys. 22.33 = DK 22 A 5) or simply Eitapkvxprlv (D.L. = DK 22 A 1, 8), cf. HeraclitusB Ka' 137. 9.8; Aet. 1.7.22; 1.27.1; 1.28.1 52On the synonymy of ro'atog; rd(t; see Kerschensteiner(above, n. 3) 11 and and n. 5, 12 and n. 1, 17 n. 1. 53Gigon (above, n. 3) 10; cf. Kirk (above, n. 3) 63-64; Marcovich (above, n. 8) 100; Kahn(above, n. 45) 104, T. M. Robinson,Heraclitus (Toronto1987) 138. 54 Or, as Kirk(above, n. 3) 63, puts it, "thesum of one's experience";cf. Kranz(above, n. 3) 441.

118

Aryeh Finkelberg

contrastturns on the idea of order;55 meaning of ~c6opo; is, then, the but "order," it remains unclear whether the word is used absolutely or with reference to the world, thus exhibiting the contextual sense of "world." If the cosmological context of Theophrastus'quotation is taken as indicative of the similar purportof Heraclitus' saying, the latter may have been (though not necessarily) the case, but Theophrastus cites the phrase for a rhetorical effect and therefore his context is indecisive.56 The only secure conclusion seems, then, to be thatK16opo; is employed here in its usual sense of "order"; whetheror not the word was used with reference to the world must remain undecided. Yet in speculatingon the possibilities one should rememberthat it would not be particularlydiscriminatingto postulate a contextual sense in ignorance of the context. It may also be observed that while the idea of in orderlinessis pivotal in the supposedlyHeracliteanuse of K6copo; B 124, in its cosmological application, as exemplified in Empedocles B 134.5 and B 29.5, the word does not distinctivelysuggest this idea. We turn now to the philosophersof the second half of the fifth century. The relevant fragments are those of Diogenes of Apollonia and Democritus.57 Diogenes B 2: aco heoei6oKEt t "iv Uav EToV &p r tx mtdvayvra svuxa&7et thsC w doorXpO vi i0xoC ndv.icde "tohe'o arjattrepototh 0at P ocnr6o* a y XtX E6v ca, (p KOCYJO) v qv, rqic 5op icai &tIpKca eo6vta "tO E x t0e t Kodo 6vxa, Ei 'iYp a i V'r 6)a )t oa pauveEat v J1?) i -v , pqoat, iaci 'Sepovtoi &rtEpoi'trpov 8v TTf tt toYPov '6 a)Ct&6 e'r"tErMtE 6v RoXaXc; ~xa &'trepotoi'ro, o68api4 o 9te t(doayeaOt a&XXfXot 186varo KcX. The emphatic repetition"in this I6o'Jo;9" may seem to suggest a conand trastwith some other ico1ao; or K6coraot, indeed the doxographical
55Cf. Gigon (above, n. 3) 52; Marcovich(above, n. 8) 550. 56Cf Kranz(above, n. 3) 440-441; H. Frainkel, ThoughtPatternin Heraclitus," AJP "A 59 (1938) 319; Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 97 and n. 2. 57In the fragmentswhich came to us under the name of Philolaus (whose floruit may see be as late as c. 400 B.C., C. A. Huffman,Philolaus of Croton[Cambridge1993] 1-6), in the sense "world"is quite frequent.Since, however, the authenticityof these ic6oato fragmentsis controversial,it would be more prudentto reach our conclusions independently of these texts and to check their use of the word as against the conclusions arrived at.

OntheHistory theGreek KOXMOX of

119

traditionascribes to Diogenes the belief in a pluralityof worlds.58Now Diogenes Laertiusadduces the first sentence of Diogenes' book (B 1): "I believe that at the beginning of any accountthe authorought to make his starting point indisputable .. ." The opening words of B 2 ("my opinion, in sum, is ...") and its general content suggest that the fragment is such an "indisputablestartingpoint," and indeed Simplicius, who cites it, says that it directly followed the proem. Consequently even if a few sentences between B 1 and B 2 are missing, it seems obvious enough that they were not dedicatedto the theory of pluralworlds. From the philosophical point of view as well the contrastbetween our world and other worlds is scarcely possible here, for the principle Diogenes is formulatingis universal. It follows that on the assumptionof the established sense "world"for -6Ko?to;, emphatically repeated the demonstrativemust be pointless. Further,if ic60go; means "world," Diogenes' wording appears intolerably and surprisingly pleonastic, 'r comparedwith his usually succinct style: ei y'&p av [tFi6] T0 KG[(1o wi wad p ii3 Kid 6,raxx [oa qxpaiveE6v'tx[viv], yi iS' wpi i p t6t pp Rp -drKIo? 'rat Ev eitou~rov rt ixh. Finally, the phrase rx I6vrxo], Y~oe av ( tv '06e 6avrao vuv suggests a contrastwith rx& 'r5Fe r K0oJL if is renderedas "world," which, yields k6vtxa Kr6t~o) 7tp~oev, Kdoog the patently impertinentopposition between the present and previously existing componentsof the world. Diogenes' opposition is between the apparentlymanifold and essentially unified nature of things,59and the temporal specification of the manifold as "existing now" habitually puts this metaphysicalcontrast on the cosmogonical plane; therefore the implied ra or rather t6 bv (8oe ) ic6ct'o ~bv tp6o0ev is unified natureitself, viz. the arche.60 of then, must refer to the general arrangement things,61irreroapog;, of whether this is the articulatedworld or the uniform arche. spective The latter application is exemplified by Empedocles' use of KcJopog; with referenceto the uniform Sphere, and Melissus' use with reference to homogeneous being; if in Empedocles B 134.5 KoJCpog assumedto is refer to the world, Diogenes' usage would exactly parallelEmpedocles' in that the word would apply to both the uniform arche (which is
58D.L. 9.57; Ps.-Plut. Strom.12 (= DK 64 A 1, 6), etc. 59So correctlyKerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 178. 60Cf. Reinhardt (above, n. 3) 174. 61Cf. Kirk(above, n. 313. 3)

120

AryehFinkelberg

comparable with the homogeneous Sphere) and the differentiated world. The emphaticallyrepeateddemonstrative the list, otherwise and pleonastic, of the world components are thus intended to specify the of as and sense "arrangement" Ko6~jto; "cosmological arrangement," the fact that Diogenes was at pains to secure this sense shows that by his time the word was not habituallyused in the cosmological context. In Democritus'fragments co6aiog; the sense "world"occurs twice, in in B 274 and B 34,62but both instances are unreliable. The authenticity I of B 247 (&v6pi aotp noa yfi 6 yap atii. VUXfiG &ya0fiGXatpi; has been rejected for the reason that the phrase con; JtntagKoa6Jog) sists of two corruptediambic trimeters,63 this meter is hardlyinciand for the phrase is a banal variation on a sentiment popular in dental, It fifth-centuryAtheniandrama.64 is noteworthythat in the second line of the trimeter the meter is broken precisely by the unmetrical As KoCYIo;g.65 to B 34, it comes from David the Armenian,a Christian Neoplatonistof the sixth century,Prolegomena38.14 (Busse):

)inavri 6p&04ev p[~v cati6c(rEp v w Xr 6povTa otov T& ~t6vo(g t 6& otov T av6p6r(iEta e Kai 6pXovTawaxi 6eta, S ap6pvlxva
ictai v 'r
'z8& 6;vx %?t6vC0&p r(J cal'rca0opoFvat,

t ep (bXv va px& 6ooyxa 0a, 1 &v0pdrOt iicP, CrLP v t icax K6p bt

oPXoUxtv wa -tx gev piovov;

.... ov tp6') acrbv v Awtl6'Kptrov & 6 vw; 8a

&

fl En?tteoupa. apxov'tat W6o0tCFp

62In B 180, B 195, and B 274 the meaning is "adornment"; B 258 and B 259 the in referenceis to political order. 63J. Freudenthal, Theologiedes Xenophanes(Breslau 1886) 38 n. 3. Die 64Both in tragedy (e.g., Eur. fr. 777, 1047 N) and in comedy (e.g., Aristoph. Plut. 1151); the maxim is cited also in prose writers(Thuc. 2.43; Lys. 31.6). See DK ad B 247; Hermes 59 (1924) 369-371; S. Luria, "Zur R. Philippson, "Demokrits Sittenspruche," Geschichte einer kosmopolitischenSentenz,"Proceedings of the Academyof Sciences of the USSR, 1925, 78-81; id., "Einstellungendes Klassikertextesbei Stobaios,"RhM 78 (1929) 88-90; cf. Kerschensteiner(above, n. 3) 173 and n. 4, but the popularityof the sentimentalreadyin the second half of the fifth centurymakes her suggestion of the Stoic provenanceof B 247 unnecessary. 65Some scholars (notably S. Luria, Demokrit [Leningrad1970] 602, who denied the genuineness of B 247, see the previous note, but later changed his mind) are ready to admit that Democritus could cite the popular verse maxim; if this was the case (which does not seem particularlylikely), the unmetricalK6otog;could not originally belong to Democritus'quotation.

tpxovtat icai

ica 6pxolotv (; 6 60lt

...

'r

WoRtep Xoyo;, 6

OntheHistory theGreek KOXMOX of

121

of David has no doxographicalauthority,and his attribution the notion of ttxpb; Kx6`tLo Democritusdoes not find supportin other sources. to The earliest instance of the term is in Aristotle who, without specifying its provenance, applies it to animals in general.66The term, again in applicationto animals, is related by Galen to "men of antiquityexpert in inquiry into the nature of things."67 Scholars are willing to see in Galen's reference to ancient philosophers of nature an assistance to David's attribution, this seems to be a mistake:the parallelbetween but the world and man suggests a world ruledby Reason, which the parallel between the world and animal does not; these are two conceptions of different philosophical provenance. In the Atomists' world there is nothing akin to the human intelligence, and therefore of all the Presocratics Democritus is the least likely choice for being credited with But not only is the formulatingthe conception of man as microcosm.68 philosophical plausibility of David's attributionscant, the comparison he draws between the world and man is patently Platonic, and his appeal to the authorityof Democritus is surprising. Considering that the microcosmic theory was quite popularin laterphilosophy in general and in Neoplatonism in particular,and seeing that beside Democritus there is no other Presocraticphilosopheraddressedin either of David's extant works,69the question arises whether the Democritus referredto is the Abderite, or ratherthe prominentthird-centuryNeoplatonist of the same name, whose theory of soul (which is significantfor our case) was influentialenough to be included in a doxographyeventually used
66 Phys. 252b26. The argumentAristotle considers in Phys. 8.2 is that if it is possible for an animal to rouse itself from rest to motion, it may be possible for the universe as a whole to be now at rest and now in motion. Luria (above, n. 65) 425, says that he is "deeply convinced" that not only the term, but the views considered by Aristotle, are Democritus', but Guthrie (above, n. 4) 2.471 n. 2, seems closer to the truth when he remarks that "this is certainly not an analogy of which Democritus would have approved." 67De usu part. 3.10 (= DK 68 B 34). 68The idea was implicit in Presocraticthoughtfrom its very beginning, but, as Guthrie (above, n. 4) 2.472, comments, "the most striking thing about their [the Atomists'] achievementis the extent to which they freed themselves from the anthropomorphic conception of the universewith which the microcosmic theory is most naturallylinked." 69 Save, of course, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. David's reference, In Porph. 105.11 (Busse), to Heraclitus' mannerof writing as exemplifying &a`pemais irrelevant, for since Aristotle's Rhetoric Heraclitus' style was commonplace;note the popular dictum (cf. D.L. 2.22 = DK 22 A 4) concerningthe deepness of Heraclitus' meaning which David adduces.

122

Aryeh Finkelberg

But by Stobaeus.70 even if we assume thatDemocritusmeanthere is the Abderite, David's appeal to his authorityin connection with the Platonic theory of the microcosm would allow two explanations:either the as notion of jtipo K6icago; such was intimately associated in the Greek traditionwith Democritus' name, or David mistakenly credited him with the Platonic conception of the microcosm. The fact that in mentioningthe microcosmic theory Aristotle and Galen fail to refer to Democritus, as well as the general silence of Greek doxographyabout the Democriteanprovenanceof this popular notion, speak against the formerpossibility,and thereforethe latteris more probable.71 It thus emerges that the fifth-centurytexts do not furnish any clearas cut evidence for Koago;o "world." The word is consistently used in and its primarysense of "order, arrangement," even in this sense no systematic employmentof it in cosmological speculationsis traceable. On the contrary,certaininstances of the Presocraticuse (notably,Melissus' and Diogenes') suggest that the word had no distinctive cosmological connotations. Xenophon's testimony that "world"was not among the proves to be correct. fifth-centurysenses of 6oCjgo; II A philosopherwho began to teach in Athens in the last years of the fourth century, Epicurus, defined Koago; as nTIptoijr ti oupavoi, The definit a ~oapaCE ix yiyv ai itdrvTa qpactv6~geva neptZoiaa.72 tion need not much surpriseus, for "heaven"is a well attestedsense of the GreekKiago;. This meaning is explicitly statedin the Epinomis,73
70 Ecl. 1.49 (1.370.1-2 Wachsmuth).

71As H. Langerbeck,A6i; intpoagii (Berlin 1935) 77, saw. The title of Democritus' book Mipb S; may have been an ultimatesource of the confusion. 72Pyth. 88;6idiooto;S 'oapa oTpEpocatl roi cf. 112: ritva& ~~Ipo; Palvet oi CdRvov Tb ' axoT i, K6 ro'roroC -to oE arvat, niEpi0 r ... &XX&cxKai &vrlv po; o 'outnv'verxl ppEqEat Ccx aXaca Krx. yiF-IcwXovaxi'y lrOEplEarivcxl id (0O;uruCii roi irEPiirOXEiV,Kai r 'C, For furtherinstancesof this use in Epicurussee flepi pqaFo;o ta', col. IIIa-IVain D. Sedof and ley, "Epicurus the Mathematicians Cyzicus,"CronacheErcolanesi 6 (1976) 37-38. 73Epin. 987B7: the sphere of the fixed stars is said to be what "one would especially seems to be used exclusively in the call Although in the Epinomis K6oagIo; r?toago;." sense "heaven"(977B2; 986C4; 987A5, B7, D8), the only generally recognized instance and of this meaning remains 987B7, though the synonymy of -co"ago;,"OXtIRno;, cf. at oibpavd; 977B2 (for this use of"OkvXno; Parm.B 11.2-3) is often noted, see, e.g., Kerschensteiner(above, n. 3) 50; Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 43; cf. W. Burkert'sobserva-

OntheHistory theGreek KOLMOY of

123

is frequentin Aristotle,74 found in the thirdcenturyin Cleanthes'Hymn to Zeus75and in the astronomicalwork of Euclid,76is reportedin the first century A.D. by Philo to be a regular use of the word,77and is recorded by Greek lexicographers.78 The use is attested as early as t KOO IsocratesPanegyricus 179: cti yxNp tri yj; Et&taindal; )Ib io '11 Riv 'Aaiaoq6; 8' E'pU'PTn% , 8Xoa rt [[tijRCVr; Koa, Rtvrl; K laoovjgvrle Xi. The speech, which was finished c. 380, was not of course an esoteric philosophical piece; we may thus infer that by this time the use of in the sense "heaven," viz. synonymouslywith o^Opav6q, K6atgo; was fairly popular. This conclusion finds supportin Isocrates Busiris 12, composed several years earlier: &dpa olou) yocptot; Rev r6nouno u tot;n;8' r to; REv nr' alo )i rov ... Rpsov Xzrauovoivo0u, &F Rv 8taCpi0tpogRLvou;, Cai"rlv i7v o6pav [sc. Egypt] v Xa,,iaroc tob Krk. The sense in which Isocrates uses xK6ajo; KEtiivylv hereK6aoto clarified by the comparison with Herodotus 1.142: oi &8 is best tov tO ioC '"o0ve;o-rot ... o. loRv o1Jpovo wK(Xt O)po)evLv K) tO) vot nt6ktax... yxp oT9pia ati7' tx ivo t'aTzoXavov i6SpaodU6 It tb inotist f9 'Ilovi oite x& o.tes... tx& inb roi Xt 0IUXpo sTe .tu gv al It Kai &ypoi itew6gtva, tix 6k 'nb ToGOspgoi [s KiiaO g 8Fo;g.79 thus emerges that where Herodotussays 6v to4 oupavoi, iatc Xoao toi
tion, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism,trans. E. L. Minar Jr. (Cambridge, Mass. 1972) 245 n. 36, that "at 986C the word [is] connected in an emphaticway o6atgo; with paths of the stars." 74E.g., Meteor.340b10, 12; Met. 1063a15;EN. 1141bl. 75Ap. Stob. Ecl. 1.1.12 = H. v. Arnim, Stoicorumveterumfragmenta (Stuttgart1905) 1.122.3-4: ao' 86i n&; 6E 6ato;, Xtaao6oFevo;nEptiyyatcv,//Iieirat. Cf. Arius Did. c fr. 33 Diels (above, n. 14) 467.7 (= Arnim, 1.34.27): r*v 8' iXtIovIKaiTiv aGXkvrlv 6io
76 Phaen.

t 6.15 (Menge): YIaOor' 6t& Tfij; lVo I'Civ ininE6ov &8 69piroyv E~i rbv o6agIovi (cf. 12.14); 8.29: ic6ajgotneptarpoqi~;Xp6vo; aOriv, ) FiCninTov iV o' ,r. i1 lccxaTovT&vx&haviv earipoy &ir jvaToki; ini iv & &ava'tOXijv 'an'Vt rTv tVij; napaylverat &q' o lnoToiv '6Trnouv ini acxbyv v6nrov. Ev totvvy 6 6ato; 77 Philo De aet. mund. 6.73 (Cohn-Wendland): yFcxTat ao;Ka' tiv [np&Tov] Ag oao2x$aica oipavo) Ica rIapoov KaTx& neptoXiv ((ai) yi; cKac in' abxrfi zv for ('ov iaic quTwv, KaO' eTpov ii'6vo; o;pav6;q nK. For the use of o6aIgo; "heaven"in general literaturesee Diod. 1.169.17, 19; 173.8 (Milller). 78 Pollux 4.158 (247.24 Bethe): obpav6;q, c6a0TCo;, AiCiko;, Cvat, S3ca iv TO T& iicuxy, & oi inokoit xakooatv nKcr.Hsch. Lex. 2812 (3.354 Schmidt): n6xo;~,o(8ta oupavo6, -o6ago;o kX. 79 For other instances of Herodotus'use of oupav6q in the sense of "climate"see J. E. Powell, A Lexicon to Herodotus2 (Cambridge1938), s.v. iC6atao;.

riiv ri'v &'xvacxohiv, 8' n' &vaToXfi; K*6aooGRo &d'n' pop&qOapeaOl, pt'vin8 Oi wvavCI o(98ion Ii'rcapaivovra;. rtavt6I1Oo`(6t&oviEK

124

Aryeh Finkelberg

Isocratesuses ev ahcaio' toU Isocrates' use of 6oago;for KxoCgo)v. "climate"testifies that as early as about390 B.C.the synonymy between olpav6o and K6ago; was so close and familiaras to make possible the occasional use of the latterin derivativesenses of the former. in the sense of "heaven"is frequent in Plato, The use of Kcoog; although it is often overlooked by translators and commentators.80 Leges 820E-821B: AO. ao[pov 86i1 ,Rb OrlOtyV v`otg, av loitg e'tX& oaa opaotr7 OeNv ?X oioa oi 7a1i To9vavtiov ... .bv &poCnqcl t~y3toaov TiRt&O oitCe o'me.stoXrunpaygoIcai 5Xov [bv KIca0ovqpNThv ?rleltv 88&v veiv tI&g yp o38U' otov etvat--zo F_ oairig t n toitoiAEpvvovzaog--oa to vavtiov ytYv6pievov 6po; g &v yti~yveo~ 'otcevov ov 6tXX' ... KA. eic6ra iarpov r?npt~gdOrla xi otoorov oiyetg" ave'upfioogv; The two referencesto the study of the stars and the subsequentdiscussion (821B-822D) of the tracksof the heavenly bodies indicate that the inquiryinto tbv gyytorov O0bvcail iXov tbv 6i0agov is astronomyand here ratherthan "world."8' thereforeK6ogo; must mean "heaven" &' a t Philebus 28E: cb vo6v nidvra pydvaoit fig; coal 6taovcooaEdt 'v o oS acot ove(g CoXO6poouKct?l (iou ot oehal Vrl;g doalpyov iaocldolg with the sun, &;tov Icxr. Plato's counting "theK6(coog" neptupopa; ri1g and the heavenly revolutionas visual manifestationsof the moon, stars, Mind's orderingactivity again favors the sense of "heaven." Similarly, in Criti. 121C3, where Plato says that Zeus called all the gods into ' "their most honorable residence" which icarx eoov nravro;gro the I aCi op& ioc yeveaeog Er KcT6xoot P3EP3cuia E~,FEv, the whole heaven" not only avoids the translation"in the middle of idtvraa oddness of the location of the god's residence "in the middle of the whole world"(in the midst of the sphericalearth?in between the earth the and the sky?) but is distinctly suggested by the icaOopQ, basic sense of which is "to look down."
80But see D. J. Furley's comment, Aristotle On the Cosmos (Cambridge,Mass. 1978) 349 note c. 81Also in its two other occurrencesin the cosmological context in the Laws (897C8 in means "heaven"; 897C this sense is furtherwarranted the comand 967C5) Kico"Tog by parisonwith Plato's explanationof the benefitsof sight in Tim.46E-47C.

OntheHistory theGreek KOLMOI of

125

Timaeus27A: "8o4ev y xp iifRivTipgatovgLv, iCTOvTa cuTpovott'pyov to. Ei&vat l XlctoXa Kcxtatov fLgov Kal 7Lcpi qcpeTCoog 7avLbrg t ig to K6ogo(TO) InetnrOTgtjvov, o nIpTov Xyetiv p06pOevov &rbt Ei; yev~(oeS, eevx&v &k 5vOp8nyov (pa3ntv Kxh. The phrase &p6dgpievov-FXUexe&v suggests a series of consecutive accounts, more than two-of the world and of man-as the traditionaltranslation of the as "world"makes it mean. Again, on the currentrendering, KoRog Plato's emphasis on Timaeus' being an astronomerappearsirrelevant: to account for the generationof the world and of man one might well (and would better) have been a philosopher. The meaning "heaven" suits the context better: "beginningfrom the generationof the heaven and going down to the creation of man" is indeed a series of accounts in which Timaeus' expertnessin astronomymay find its properapplication. The fourth-centuryuse of Ka6~1og "heaven"brings us back to for Aitius' report,accordingto which Pythagoraswas the first who called yiv tilv 8T(ov rneptoxlyv 6cogov. The phrase resembles Epicurus' neptoxTi tig oupavob, and, more remotely, Aristotle's 6 KX6og -rti ri"vyiiv.82As we concluded above, the reportreflects rteptxov the use of K6Rgog the Pythagoreansof the last generations,and we by c6gog can now see why it may have drawnTheophrastus'attention:it became currentin Athens at the beginning of the fourth century B.C.and was takenup by philosophers. Another semantic developmentwhich took place in this period was the extension of the meaning of oupav6g;which, in addition to its primary sense of "heaven,"came to mean "world." The first instance of this use seems to be Rep. 509D: ... 68o evat, alpacitexItv ;e tb TV vo-roi YVvoug Iai 6tonlou, 86'a~ 6patoi, i~va ouipavou b a?6t)o tIl ei?inv 860 ( ot a coipi eooa t nrepi t6 voxa. The meaning is frequent in Plato83and is well instanced in Aristotle.84The use is attested in
82Meteor 339b4. Cf. 6 epi qtiv yfiv 6KoCgo; which is composed of the four elements 6 o 6 Iog; (Meteor.340b12) located below 6 (Meteor 339a19, 340b8, etc.). This is 0' ; ExivoU oi xo. (Meteor 339b18; ~icaog; [sc. aether]irThprlS n7pir,& avo cpopx; iTog cf. fr. 26 Ross). Cf. Theophrastus'similar subdivision of the heaven into the upper and lower regions, De igne 351.19-25 (Wimmer): il npcfirrl a(cpppa, which consists of the element whose nature is and and i'lxepi rv figyi~; cpcaipav [sc. uixro; cKacapa, yFveFatv (that Theophrastusconceived of the oapcapa]which is cKaxi cx-arax &d formeras filled withegLytvtvrl ratherthan aetheris immaterialhere). the Oepgo6v 83E.g., Tim.28B2; Pit. 273C1; Phlb. 30B5; Lg. 896E1, etc. 84E.g., Phys. 212b17; De caelo 301a17; Met. 990a5, etc.; the third sense of ocpav;6 in Aristotle's definition at De caelo 278b10-21: "In yet another sense we call 'the

126

Aryeh Finkelberg

philosophers,but if it were not popularenough, Plato could not hope, as he most probablydid, his wordplayin Republic 509D be understood by the generalreader. Plato's use of for "world"is well exemplified, but it seems o6og; that not in all instances in which the word is traditionallytranslatedas "world"does it have this meaning. Gorgias 507E-508A: cpaq 86'oi odpaKaXhiKeXt;, Kai aocpoi,Jo vbv cai yfiv ;caiOECoCg &vOpthnou;g (otvoviav ouvxetv Kcai iai 'ilv Cai Kooglt6trl-a Kai aocppoo;vlv Kcai8tccat6trlTa,KcaiTb pt,~av "Xov [to1o x taia K6Cdoaov 6 raipe, oi~ drCoogitav Coaiocotv, 8t6, The currentrenderingof the ico(tog; as "world"or o`Ni doXao(iav. some is raises "world-order" problems. First, K6oaLog contrastedwith but can dwKoX(aoia, "world" hardlybe the opposite of "intemperance."85 Secondly, -rbOXov can scarcely mean "the universe"here: the denial is that the universe may be called "intemperance" absurd, and moreover, in the sense "universe"to ~iXovneed not be specified by the oXov does not refer to the universe, it demonstrativeto^ro. But if -r6 iOXov to^ro is the fellowship of cannot be called "a world-order."rbo "the heaven and the earth, gods and men" ("the heaven and the earth" stand here for the respective abodes of gods and men, not for cosmological entities) which rests on "orderand temperanceandjustice." For this reasonthe sages refer to this all-embracingcommunityas a (moral) and order,not disorderliness86 intemperance,and that is why the intemperate, who "is incapable of fellowship" "would be dear neither to a fellow-man nor to a god."87
heaven' the body encircled by the extreme circumference:the whole or totality we are in habitto call 'the heaven'." 85To avoid the difficulty translatorsresort to awkwardverbal additions:"... they call this universe a world-order ... not a world-disorder"(Dodds [above, n. 10] 308, ad 508A3); ". .. they call the sum of things the 'ordered'universe ... not the world of disorder and riot" (W. D. Woodheadin E. Hamilton and H. Cairns eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato 2 [Princeton1963] 290). 86For the moralsense of &riooa(ia Plato cf. Symp. 188B. in 87Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 223-224, is correctin stressingthe moral and political, ratherthan cosmological, purportof the passage. The sages Plato refers to are commonly maintainedto be the Pythagoreans(see Dodds [above, n. 10] 308, ad 508A3; cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato. The Man and His Work[London 1926] 128-129; Guthrie [above, n. 4] ibid., and others) and the passage is often taken as witnessing the 4.284, Kerschensteiner, Whether or not it is Pythagorean(for a balanced view see Pythagoreanuse of Ki6otgo;. Burkert[above, n. 73] 77-79), the linguistic use is quite regular:the sense of the K~6ojto;

OntheHistory theGreek KOLMOZ of Phaedrus 246B-C:

127

X1 RCX cxv XVUX a av0XC

, &m o8pavcv irtv-ra tt'o E1U1Xat Xoi zoC ; 'vxTo 7reptroXi, .XToT'-v Xo1)A d8 ytYvotFVrj.TOza Cgtiv o0v 'Tv 6opov -rEici dvmroa K o~oa 1cuaiin;Rtspotvrvl pte poiropsi T E l & <pUpEat 8totKE1C, 8 tEpoppl )oaOa o;g v oGtpEEO) 'tvog0 o &vt1iXPrlat, oT eoax, c&ta yri'vov Xa4Coixoa KcXk. KaotmoOl1

The verb 8totiko is usually takenhere in the sense "to manage,to control,"the ensuing translationbeing: "when a soul is perfect and winged it travelsin the heights and controls the whole world."88 the parallel Yet with Kacott o0dEac suggests the other sense of &8otl~, namely "to inhabit"(cf. Tim. 19E), while the contrastbetween r6v oK6aoov and o&toa yrji'vov ,a[poioax indicates that the reference is &totw1 to the heaven. The soul journeys throughout the whole universe, rndtva oupav6v, taking now one form, now another:when it is "perfectand and inhabits rndvra winged" it travels in the heights ([tewexoporopd) "the whole heaven"(precisely as Plato portraysthis in the r6v K6aoaov, where he depicts the procession of gods and souls following paragraphs the heaven);but when, strippedof its wings, it falls from the throughout The passage is heaven, it enters o0&toa yqi.vov, viz. inhabitsthe earth.89 of great interest:the fact that which standsfor "heaven"is conK6oog trastedwith o0pav6g which stands for "world,universe"suggests that by that time (presumablythe mid-sixties of the fourth century B.C.90) had K6coog; still not acquiredthe sense of "world." If I am correct that the rendering of as "world" in Grg. Kcoog; 508A3 and Phdr 246C2 is erroneous, it emerges that this meaning is found only in the late dialogues, notably, the Timaeus,Politicus, and Philebus (i.e., presumably from the fifties of the fourth century B.C. onwards). Since these dialogues seem to be the first Greek texts in which is used in the sense of "world" (we shall return to Ko6oLo;S
is "social order"which Plato associates with the related moral notions, coojit6zr;qand
88 See, e.g., Platon. Oeuvrescompletes,5ed. L. Robin 4 (Paris 1961) 3e partie.Phetdre R. 246C, translation; Hackforth,Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge1952) 70. 89Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 43 n. 31, 122 n. 288, is preparedto recognize in the K6otgo; sense of "heaven"here. 90For a concise critical survey of the studies concerningthe chronology of Plato's diain logues, see L. Brandwood,"Stylometryand Chronology," R. Krauted., The Cambridge Companionto Plato (Cambridge1992) 90-120.

128

Aryeh Finkelberg

Xenophon's Memorabilia in a moment), it seems reasonable to conclude that the usage was Plato's own terminological innovation. The way in which the term is treatedin all three dialogues supportsthis conclusion. In Timaeus28B3, before he starts to employ the word in the new sense (in 24C1 is used in the political context, and in Ko61o; 27A6, as we have seen, in its regularsense of "heaven")Plato defines n Kcoa~o;as a synonym of oi6pav6g (in the sense of "world"):6 8 ir& 11 a XXo _ovowX ogi6vo; W ia'TXV xi ' oIapav;--ii KOgOO; oTt lro'TE same manner, the first K-tX. In the ixotto, tro~0' iyIV davotd0om'o time the term occurs in the Politicus (269D8) it is expressly introduced as a synonym of oUpaxv6g(=world): 8v &i8oiUpavbv m c6xl ov ici LEv CX cap1ovplv nxapx noXXav xro yevvvioavxog 7rn(OvotdKxa1CEv, ai Finally, in the first of the two occurrences of the Etzei?rlXpEv KcTX.91 word in the terminologicalsense in the Philebus (29E1; 59A3; as in the Timaeus,here too the very first appearanceof the word, in 28E4, is in the sense of "heaven")its conventional characteris carefully pointed out: Ta-rxbv8i Xca3g XnRpi ro8 ~v It thus &8 K6otLov XTyogv. seems evident that Plato did not expect that his use of for Koatgo; "world"would be readily understandable outside the Academy.92 There was however one writer who immediately noticed Plato's terminological innovation. Above I allowed for the sake of the argument that Memorabilia 1.1-2 is of an early date, but now we may try to determineits chronology with a more precision. If these chapters are of an early date indeed, the peculiar sense in which, according to Memorabilia 1.1.11, Now the "the men of wisdom" used Kacoog;can only be "heaven."93
91In both dialogues all the occurrencesof ic6ogio; subsequentto the definition are in the terminologicalsense. The only exception is Tim.40A where the meaning is "adornment"(so correctlyF. Astius, LexiconPlatonicum [Leipzig 1835] 207, s.v. cK6aoog;; Cornford's "world"is a mistranslation),though Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 43 and n. 31, seems and correctin detectingthe pun on "adornment" "heaven." 92 W. Burkert,"Platonoder Pythagoras? Zum Ursprungdes WortesPhilosophie,"Herwas mes 88 (1960) 159-177, suggested that the term (plXoYocpia inventedby Plato rather than by Pythagoras.If my conclusions are correct, xc6'ogo, currentlyconsidered a distinctively Pythagoreanterm, was also Plato's innovation.If so, Philolaus' fragments--at occurs in the sense of "world"(B 1, B 2, B 6, B 17; all these least those in which ic6aoog; are accepted by Burkert[above, n. 73] 218-277; and Huffman [above, n. 57] 15-37 and passim)-must be a post-Platonicforgery. It is not for nothing that in accountingfor the doctrinesAristotlefailed to mentionPhilolaus' book. Pythagorean 93 So in F W. Sturz,LexiconXenophonteum (Leipzig 1801) 1.776, s.v. Kc6o`o;.

On the History of the GreekKOWMOI

129

discussion of "the natureof all things"is specified by Xenophon as the runs"and inquiry into "how what the men of wisdom call the Ko"tgoq into "by what necessities each of the heavenly phenomenatakes place." The latter inquiry is astronomical;if the means "heaven,"the KoqoLto; former would be astronomicaltoo, and the whole discussion of "the natureof all things" would turn out to be about astronomyalone. The sense of the K6co0o;must, then, be "world." This being so, Memorabilia 1.1-2 cannot be earlier, or at least much earlier, than Plato's Timaeus.94 Xenophon's "the men of wisdom" are thus the Academy, and it is their peculiaruse of Ko6Lgo; recordshere and imitates elsehe where: 6'rbv Xkov aoov T ... o'rto t&x KioalvVzoxv p v rpd&x'Trv oa'itt'tov (Mem.4.3.13).95 6p&'opat gt'ytorxo Plato seems to have not intendedhis new usage to replace the traditional ones: he used Ko~0ao; interchangeablywith oppabv6;,and in the Laws he returned to the use of the word in its regular meaning, Aristotle contin"heaven,"a use which he never entirely abandoned;96 ues to use in the sense of "heaven,"and in reference to the K6oo; world he uses 6o .ato; less frequentlythan ou'pav6;. At the same time Aristotle's use of the word in Plato's terminologicalsense suggests that the term was not eventually discarded in the Academy, and hence its absence from the Laws seems to have been due to Plato's ad hoc decision ratherthan to a principledrenunciationof the usage. It seems that in working on the TimaeusPlato felt the need for an additionalterm for "world" which would convey semantic nuances absent in o)pav6;. as What, then, could be Plato's reasons for introducing 6oag.o; an additional term for "world"? The traditional scholarly association of
94 Perhaps the new usage was initiated earlier in the Academy, in oral discussions; Xenophon's referencemay be to the oral use of the term ratherthan to specific dialogues. All this however must remain purely speculative. Our textual evidence is Phdr. 246C, which is the terminuspost quem (presumably,the sixties of the fourth century), and the Timaeus, which is the terminus ante quem (presumablythe fifties). The Memorabilia, which is now commonly considered a unified composition, must, then, be later than Phaedrus and probablyeven later than Timaeus. For a critical survey of the discussion of the date of the Memorabilia,see R. Nickel, Xenophon(Darmstadt1979). 95 Cf. the way in which Xenophon conveys a similar idea in Cyr.8.3.13: ... eeoFo yeE

6Wv 6ttyv Icr. ... oi cai -rivE-riiv 96 Lg. 821A2, must mean a meaning which sugis 897C8;Xhv oiv(*Xoxotv "order," (at967C5 ic(6ogo; in sengested vo; ... 6 8taicExcoogincgi))oa caZr' by o-opavov theprevious we that in the irtv0' of is in 27A6and tence); recall Kc6oL'o; sense "heaven"found Tim. Phlb. 28E4(i.e.,in both cases before formal the introduction newterminological of the sense)
andin theCritias whichpresumably followstheTimaeus (121C3), immediately.

130

Aryeh Finkelberg

K6oJog;with beauty and orderliness seems to be irrelevant. Timaeus 29A: "If this K6o0og;is beautiful (KcX6;) and the creator good, it is obvious that he looked to the eternal [pattern],but if what is awful to say is right, then to the created one. It is clear to everyone that he looked to the eternal, for it [sc. this K60oYog] the most beautiful is (iKktolrno;) of creations .. ." Clearly, the assumption that cK6o"o; strongly implies the idea of beauty would turn Plato's reasoninginto a in is sophistry. As to the idea of "order," Plt. 273B5 the Kcoaog; said to be in a state of disorder before it comes to its present orderly condition.97 Plato's meaning can perhaps be better isolated if we consider the word from the linguistic point of view, namely, that of its morphology and the semantic field to which it was linked by Plato's innovativeuse. in Using K6~C1og; the sense of "world"was the extension of its sense of "heaven"by analogy with the extendeduse of This extenoopa(v6g. sion of meaning brought cK6?oo;into a semantic relation with 8towhich were used / t;6 KooaIo) and its derivative8td&Kcooao; a/ctaro in the cosmological context alreadyin the fifth century.98 There is how/ ever a principal morphological difference between 8tdKootog; on the other: while the on the one hand, and 8StaK16(Xojt otg, formeris the verbalnoun relatedto K6ctJog,as the designationof its StaxooF`o action, viz. cosmogony, the latter,if relatedto the verb, comes to designate the result of its action, viz. the world as an outcome of cosmogony.99I would therefore suggest that Plato sought for a term
97 Note that the logical subject of the phrase 'v ,riEZXov&tr(aiat lXpiv ei; zrv no,,fi; is 0K60ojo; (272E5, 273A1). 6 viyvK~6ojgov a0ptPto(uOtParmenidesB 98For the first time in 8.60, which is the first known occurrenceof the The word (zrv oot Ey 6c8tcoojpov otuc6rz andvrozor`pazro). verb 8taoopj(io was used 0 by Anaxagoras(B 12) with referenceto the cosmogonical activity of the Mind. 8toiCooigo;is a verbalnoun and as such designates action-"(distributive) marshalling,setting in order,regulating"(as was stressed by Reinhardt,[above, n. 3] 175, but ignored by Kranz [above, n. 3] 434; see also Kerschensteiner[above, n. 3] 13). Its use in the resultative sense is derivative, and hence later. For this reason in ParmenidesB 8.60 and in the Atomists' book titles--MEyaq properrendering o8tiKooajo; and Mtcpb &8tdrooKgo;-the of the word must be "[world-]ordering"ratherthan "[world-]order"(in Parmenidesthis sense is authenticated the fact that the 6t&acoolgo; which the goddess is promising to by relate turns out to be a cosmogony; Kahn's interpretation[above, n. 3] 227, of the in B 8.60 as "the system of the naturalworld"neglects both the morphology 8t~IKootgo; of the word and the contentof the Doxa). 99As Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 13, cf. 14, 16, observed.

On the History of the GreekKOLMOZ

131

which would be a resultativenoun in respect to the action conveyed by 8taKooaglo, and icoogo was just the word. This suggestion seems to be corroborated a semantic developmentwhich evidently took place by outside the Academy but which seems to have been motivated by the same terminological need-I mean the extension of the use of
o86acoardlot; the ensuing world. The first instance of this use is Aristotle Metaphysics 986a6, which is the only occurrenceof the word in the cosmological context in Aristotle, but in later authorsthe use is abundant.100 This usage conforms to the general semantic developmentof the word which graduallycame to be used also in the resultativesense.101As a and became synonyms, and in the course result, taocdoagrlot; K6Jogo; of time these terms generally replaced the use of oupav6; in the sense of "world." 8t61ooago; / to designate, not only cosmogony, but also

III It remainsto examine the semantic developmentas a result of which Kcoaogo came to designate the world's several regions. Presumably in drawing on current exegeses Plutarch construes the five aoCioot Timaeus55C-D as earth, water, air, fire, and heavens,102 and scholars are prepared to follow his interpretation, thus allowing "world's The regions" as Plato's intended meaning of Koa6goti.103 passage reads as follows:
in the Stoics: 100Ps.-Arist. De mundo 391bl 1 (StoaKcolrolat),400b32 (Sta6Kooago;); D.L. 7.137; Arius Dyd. ap. Eus. Prep. Evang. 15.15 (= Arnim [above, n. 75] 2.169.19), etc. 101This use seems to be first attestedin Thuc. 4.93, where the word is applied to battle order.In Plato Stoacirlo;t; occurs several times, but never in the cosmological context; it is however noteworthythat he uses the word predominantly the deverbativesense. In in Symp. 209A7 the meaning is "the orderingof society"; in Critias 118A1 "the organizing of the territory" the works describedin the next paragraphs; Lg. 853A3 "the arrangin by ing of the law"; in Tim.23E2 the sense is ambiguous,but it seems that what is meant to have been recorded is the chronicle of founding the city ratherthan its constitution;the only clear instance of the resultativemeaningis Tim.24C4. It may, then, seem thatPlato's was too strong to put the word to the feeling for the deverbativesense of &taKcdoaglo; terminologicaluse in the resultativesense. 102 E. 389F-390A; De De or 430B-C. def. 421F-422A, 422F-423B, 103 D. Archer-Hind,The Timaeus Plato R. of (London 1888) 198-199, ad loc.; A. E. Taylor,A Commentaryon Plato's Timaeus(Oxford 1928) 378, ad loc.; F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London 1937) 221; Kerschensteiner(above, n. 3) 51-53; cf. Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 43.

132

Aryeh Finkelberg

& 81i Ei vr6voXa Xoy~t6Igvo; ttXgE &knopoin~drepov it ~xovrx;, 'r6 lgiv &Xnipou;Xpl Kcogou;o fvat Xiyetv i irCnpaXq v 66y(iya &nEipou; ijyiatxr' &v ?vor;q 7(xipov trvb; devat &A evat, 7n6'rEpov Eva i i xv axbro); lunrtpov xpe~Ov Fxrl0ex o ne_<(uxd;au yetyv nori npoonicnt, taXXov &v a(xiq o'Trg . LiKCxOq 6taunopi7otj 'r jgivo3v 6i1 nap' 1[t(6v va acxbyv ixar&x & 'rv eiK6CaX6yov nTUcx6o vrtrljvut el 6v, EXXo;g Ei; 6XX(a nirl 5dot. 860x phiq; 'rtepa Timaeus' unaccounteddigression from the discussion of the primary bodies to the question of how many i6~o0aotshould be assumed is puzzling. However, what seems clear is that the question posited in the first clause refers to the numberof worlds allowed to be in existence, which is confirmedby the comparisonwith Timaeus31A-B.1'4 But if the io6agot in the first clause means "worlds,"'"xva vre (x i~i' a'rooi in the next clause and 'vaxatxr6v in the last one must also refer to worlds. Plutarch'sexegesis is unwarranted: whateverthe purportof the passage Besides this may be, the K6aoLotmeans "worlds,"not "regions."105 Timaeuspassage two other texts have been referredto as supposedly testifying the fourth-centuryorigins of the notion of the universe as stratifiedinto several oajogot. Damascius De Principiis 321 (Ruelle) = Eudemus fr. 150 (Wehrli, 70.12-19): ~ &S 6 evaoCt &di mic Xp6vov cxi EpEFicrj; E1pto; Z&vmro [.tv ~aXvg(Pninp6 X8oviav Tcv 8voiv, I'x; srpEi; npcjaX;q &pxd;, 'ilv x 'Xv &8Xp6vov notiIoat -KTouy6vov aXi 6io poZ& xr&; XrlV av, Ualoto 7np ici irveiwcoa ci {6p, riv pnkuijv,oxtt, npitv roi cai g C 1v v tCvTe vorl ou, vo)v TnoxilV &rlv 8tplvtt LZFotg uov oivat 8&0v, rlV vTC 'aixTbv iv'Zxov KacXcL[tiVjv, yewvev ( ibo) inEv, nesvtEKoopgov. n7epi & tol)Tov (kxog i'ag Eo K(Xtpo;. pcXvxIt
o1v 6p0e Eva '04 oCpavbv ii InoXX Kai neirpou; Xytv i nrpoostpjiKcaOEv, nI6epov ... 68t& iv 6pe6terpov; va, Ei'nspCa-r nap6d&itYga taOra 86Erl1itoOpyrg1vo;otat "tb oizre &0ooijZ'&nIEpo; e~nicO1eV6 rnot~vKC6ogou;, 6XX' Ef 688 govoyevi~; o pav6;

105 Though conceding Plutarch's interpretation,Cornford (above, n. 103) 220-221, wonders:"Itstill remainsa puzzle why Plato should speak of the notion that thereare five cosmoi = regions in the one world as an alternativeto a single cosmos = world or an indefinitenumberof worlds"[Cornford's italics].

OntheHistory theGreek KOEMOX of

133

Damascius draws here on Eudemus, and Kerschensteiner106 suggested that the explanationof the Pherecydian as must be his, tuXo'o coatoot for, she argues, the surmise i'owg bespeaks Eudemus' attemptto EittEnv construe, in following Aristotle Metaphysics 1091b8, Pherecydes' approach as midway between theology and natural philosophy. The suggestion does not appeartenable when Damascius' whole passage is considered. The first two underlined phrases are clearly Damascius' own surmises, and the third is quite on a par with them. The explanation of as og must, then, be Damascius' (and it rtevr_4guXo; nrev'rco~o may be added that this explanationneed not be more relevantthan his two previous conjectures). Furtherevidence of the early use of Kc6?aog for several cosmic regions has been found in the Theophrastean report on Anaximanderdiscussed above (pages 108-109), the plural acoigot in which have been admitted to refer to the elemental spheres.107 Yet Simplicius' plural seems to be due to a corruption,the correct version But being the singularKacoiogin Hippolytus.108 if nonetheless Simplicius' version is preferred,the grammaticalparallelbetween rob; oipaseems to suggest the meaning "a single vou; and toi; K6tomago in each single oiUpav6;(world)." At any rate, if (arrangement) coato;S Theophrastusis supposed to have describedthe cosmic stratain others' doctrines by the term co6aogot, may certainly be expected to have he used the term in his own stratification of the universe (De igne 351.19-25), which is not the case. Yet although the notion of the world's several a6oigot cannot be traced back to the fourth century B.C.,its preconditionsare plausibly already there. Mansfeld109aptly compares the notion of regional with the popularview of the universe as composed of concenK6at1ot tric elemental spheres,110 well as with the subdivisions of the heavas in the early Academy"' and the Aristotelian distinction enly region
(above, n. 3) 53-54 and n. 1. (above, n. 16) 44-45; cf. Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 44. 108 See Finkelberg(above, n. 21) 486, 493-494. 109Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 43-44. 110See, for instance, Arist. De caelo 287a30-b14; and in the Stoics: D.L. 7. 137, 155; for furtherreferences see Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 114 and notes 250, 251, 252; 115 and notes 253 and 256. Mansfeld traces this view back to Aristotle,but it was alreadyprefigured in the Presocraticcosmologies. Ill Xenocrates fr. 15, cf. fr. 5 and 18 (Heinze = fr. 213, 83, 215 IsnardiParente);Heraclides Ponticus fr. 96 (Wehrli). Cf. P. Boyanc6, "La religion astralede Platon ' Cic6ron," REG 65 (1952) 331-335; Burkert(above, n. 73) 245 n. 36.
107Mansfeld
106 Kerschensteiner

134

Aryeh Finkelberg

between the upper and lower heavens. As to the term 6co(toq, Epinomis 987B advises to reserve the name for the sphere of the fixed stars alone, but in the second partof AMtius' reporton Philolaus, which, we as Burkerthas shown, is a Platonic concoction,112 find the typically is the in Platonic threefold division of the heavens113 which ioa'to; name of the sphereof the five planets, the sun and the moon, as distinct which is the outerheaven, and from oUpav6;, which is from"Okhgnro;, ro l)1noo(krlvov Kai R-pPyetovjgipo;. Thus it seems that the name Kojogo; was applied to more than one, if eventuallynot to all, heavenly regions, and it was but a short step to make this cumulativeuse systematic. Again, Aristotle's two senses of Koa(log, the upper and lower heavens, readily suggest the terminological distinction between two We meaning heavenly KG6got.114 may thus suppose that the "regional" of K6opog; a generalizationof its use in the sense of "a (particular) was heavenly region (sphere)" for all the world's spherical strata.115The which seems to be the first tractDe hebdomadibus, pseudo-Hippocratic in of 6o'Tgoq the "regional"sense, confirms known instance of the use this conclusion. In the first two chapters of the treatise the world is divided into seven ro4t; (1.41, 50, 63 Roscher), jgoipat (1.70), or g'pip (1.78) which severally (1.43, 70, 2.15, 42) and collectively (1.95) are referred to as K6oJgot. These are the outer heaven, the spheres of the stars, of the sun, of the moon, of air,of water,and the earth,beneathwhich there are other Ki6ogotoiot 8 -rv t0bv j opttolyv jloto vetv 18v (2.1). The is feature of these K6opGot that, except for the earth and the peculiar outermostheaven (2.15), all of them (including the spheres of air and
112Aet. 2.7.7 = DK 44 A 16; Burkert (above, n. 73) 244-246. 113Burkert's"of the cosmos" (above, n. 73) 245 and n. 36, repeatedin Mansfeld'srefer-

ence (above, n. 16) 43 n. 34, to Burkert,is mistaken. e' Adv. haer 3.31: E{vat 5& yet [sc. Aristotle] &51o 114Epiphan. tbv &vwKai Ko6ogoT TbvKXdOC CT X,. 115It should be noted in this connection that the Stoics seem to have used the term a(paipa for both the celestial spheres and the elemental sphericallayers:Arius Did. fr. 31 &% Diels (above, n. 14) 466.9 (=Arnim [above, n. 75] 2.169.1) ... rnepteXeo0at rtdoa T&; cov ( Tfi T&v ocpaipaq. t&v 5e nr(avwgevwvdyrlxo&(hav&v nmXb Irxavwgjvw0iv & Toi Kp6vou, tger& Ta(xriv TijvTzo-At'd, &~havwvTilv tlV tdhrlv elvat TeX& (xZCv) Tv icaijleC' etra ilv toi "Apeog,Pefij; &e% to3 TfiT 'Ap(poSi'lT, ilV & i 'Eptoi,j i azr(lV i i&o't tSi jlV TvfiG iAvl Rald(ovdo av tzcod~pt ... nDR&8 eFxa lv toi illioi, TV (TO) i6azo, ov pog, oP v (PEP U p tail ae&lIv TjilV t To TEXEvETo3Xa aR rlV t' qK oralgeovToDlrogot ceIteIVl X. Ta(av 5% til%T- Yiq Rept Cb goov

OntheHistory theGreek KOXMOX of

135

water as well as the subterranean ones) move in circles (2.6, 47). This bizarrebehaviourof the 6oaTjotsuggests their origin in the astronomical theory of the homocentric rotating spheres. The Hebdomadiccosmology seems to be a generalizationof the astronomicalmodel for the world as a whole, and the use of K6o'tot for the designation of all the elemental spheres must be part of this generalization. If so, the tract evidences the derivationof the use of K60ototin the "regional"sense from the use of the word for heavenly spheres.l16 More specific conclusions must remain conjectural. The source on which the Hebdomadicauthorpresumablydrew could hardly be astronomical. First of all, Eudoxus' spheres were known as and uptipa1t,17 certain features of the Hebdomadicpicture suggest its philosecondly, sophical, ratherthan astronomical,provenance. Indeed,the name of the outermost sphere 6 (2.15, 42) evokes Epinomis 06Xrtigto; Kcotio; where 6o(0og;, and are 977B, "Okugnrog;, oaUpav6g used synonymously of the outerheaven (cf. as the name of the outer heaven in the "Ohrtog; Platonic account of Philolaus); if Roscher's emendation lprilrou for Xcipitro(1.44) is accepted, this epithet of the outermostsphere would parallel Theophrastus' description (De igne 351.24) of his rpdokrl but apcixpa as Ktircxog; above all, the immobility of the outermost is conspicuous:in so far as it is not the sphereof the fixed stars, K6cLog; it cannot come from an astronomicaltheory. To these it may be added that a person who, like the Hebdomadic author,does not hesitate to locate the fixed stars and the planets in the same spherecan hardlybe a reader of astronomicaltreatises. The source of the De hebdomadibus must, then, have been a philosophical tract in which the theory of the homocentricrotatingspheres was adaptedto the Academic-Peripatetic stratificationsof the heaven into several main regions, and these concentric stratawere termed K6O(0ot. The piece seems to have originated in Platonic-Peripatetic circles: Eudoxus' theory (as improvedby Callippus) of the homocentric spheres was introduced into philosophy and adaptedby Aristotle;the Hebdomadicterminology suggests Academic,
= Cf. Corp. Herm. 1.1.7: EirthxKoagIot the seven planets. 117Both in astronomical and general literature,see, e.g., Arist. Met. 1073b17; Eucl. Phaen. 12.6 (Menge); Arch. Aren. 256.1 (Heiberg); Diod. 1.172.32, 34 (Miiller). It is however noteworthythat ic6agog was the established astronomicalterm for the sphere whose radiusis the straightline between the centers of the earthand sun, see Arch.Aren. must be derivativeof its 218.2, cf. 218.24, 31 etc. This terminological use of K6ogog meaning "heavenlysphere." 116

136

AryehFinkelberg

and if Roscher's emendationis accepted, also Peripatetic,provenance, while the use of KoG'Tot for all the heavenly regions is a generalization as of Platonic (but perhapsalso the astronomical-K6oJlgo; the term for the solar sphere)usage. But whateverthe detailed points of semanticdevelopmentmay be, it besides the use in seems evident that the "regional"sense of 6oajgo;, the sense of "world,"is anotherextension of its meaning "heaven.""118 The word which meant "heaven" and then "a (particular)heavenly of sphere,"came to designate also all the other "spheres" which the universe was commonly believed to consist.119 Assuming Mansfeld's date of the De hebdomadibus,this use must be late, aroundthe first century
B.C. TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY

118 Not the narrowing of the sense of "world" as is generally supposed; see, e.g., Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 58-59; Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 44 and n. 35. 119 in This is the exact meaning of icoaJgog its "regional"use. The meaning was never lost and the word seems to have been used only for the world's strata or strata-like 6 regions, as in Herm. ap. Stob. Ecl. 396.17; 405.1 (Wachsmuth),where 0'er6polo; are and K6oagog 6 ~irntx6vioqK6Tagog distinguished(LSJ, s.v. c6ajgogiv, "of any region in Stobaeusis misof the universe"[LSJ's italics], with referenceto 6 pverdpoato Kpog6to of leading). The popularconstrualof the word as referringto "partialarrangements" the world (as, for instance, in Cornford[above, n. 21] 9: "K6ajgothere [in Hippolytus'report in on Xenophanes]might mean successive 'arrangements' which dry land and sea are distinct ... Or the may be those other 'climes, sections or zones of the earth'which Ka6aot have suns and moons of their own (Adt. 2.24.9)," or in Kirk [above, n. 22] 178 n. 1: "... the ambiguous use of Kdoagot [in the same report of Hippolytus] ... there properly i.e. 'world-arrangements,' of the earth'ssurface .. ."), is a linguistic fancy.