ANKARA NVERSTES SYASAL BLGLER FAKLTES ANKARA UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

V
SD

IFO

ULUSLARARASI KONFERANS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Ankara, 22-23 Ekim / October 1998

Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi Yayn Yayn No: 582

ANKARA NVERSTES SYASAL BLGLER FAKLTES ANKARA UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ULUSLARARASI KONFERANS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Ankara, 22-23 Ekim / October 1998

Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi Yayn Yayn No: 582

ISBN 975-482-481-9

Ankara niversitesi Basmevi Bilgisayar sisteminde dizilip, ofset tesislerinde baslmtr. Ankara 1999 - Tel: 213 66 55

NDEKLER
Cumhurbakan Sayn Sleyman DEMREL'in Mesajl Ankara niversitesi nsz Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi Dr. Dekan Prof. Dr. Celal GLE'nin XX SinaAKN'in Sunuu XI 1 ... 7 19 the Emergence of Modern 29 Study) 41 47 Yl Avrupallama ve 51 59 67 73 85 91 99 103 107 129 143 155 VII

Dzenleme Kurulu Bakan Prof.

D r . Vladimir I. D A N I L O V : Atatrk ve Trkiye'nin Siyasal Modernlemesi Prof. D r . zer O Z A N K A Y A : Prof. Roberto Turkey (Comparative Gonzlez Trk Devriminin Demokrasi Kuramna Katklar Kemal Atatrk:

Prof. Dr. Sina A K S N : The Nature ofthe Kemalist Revolution GOMEZ:

Ass. Prof. L l a m b r o F L O : Ataturkism an Initiative of a Modern Political Culture N a d a Z I M O V A : Atatrk and the dea of a Republican State Dr. M u h a m m e d N U R E D D N : Kemalizmin Karakteri O r h a n K O L O L U : Hzl adalama Modeli Olarak Atatrklk Prof. Dr. Blent DVER: Hmanizma ve Atatrk Dursun ATILGAN: ada Trkiye'nin Temeli Kemalist lkeler Prof. Dr. Kamel Abu JABER: Mustafa Kemal Atatrk Prof. Carter V. FINDLEY: Reflections on the Early Turkish Republic in WorldHistorical Perspective Ord. Prof. Dr. Anna MASALA: Mustafa Kemal Trkiyesi ve Avrupa Edouard SABLIER: De Gaulle's Turkey Prof. Dr. Nimetullah HAFIZ: Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Balkan Devletlerinde Yanklar Yrd. Do. Dr. Mustafa TRKE: Atatrk Dneminde Trkiye 'nin Blgesel D Politikalar (1923-1938) Prof. Dr. brahim TATARL: ki Dnya Sava Arasndaki Dnemde Atatrk ve Modern Trkiye'nin Bulgaristan Parlamentosu'nda Deerlendirilmesi Prof. Dr. Baskn ORAN: Kalanlarn yks (1923 Mbadele Szlemesinin Birinci ve zellikle de kinci Maddelerinin Uygulanmasndan Alnacak Dersler) Cumhuriyetin lnnn 75.

Gazmend SHPUZA: Arnavutluk le Trkiye Arasnda Diplomatik likilerin Kurulmas (1923-1926) Prof. Dr. Ljiljana COLIC: Refkctions of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk's Reforms in the Kingdom ofYugoslavia Mustafa MEHMET: "Atatrk nklplar" ve Romanya Trk Toplumu Prof. Dr. David KUSHNER: Some Observations on slam and Secularism in Turkey Erik CORNELL: The Essence of Secularism-Land shall by hav be Buut Nazl KANER: Atatrkln adalk Gr ile slam Geleneklerin bir Sentezi Var mdr? Cumhuriyet Trkiyesi'nin Fikir Hayatndaki Gelimeler: Smiha Ayverdi rnei Prof. Dr. Eugen BUCHER: The Position of the Civil Law of Turkey in the Western Civilisation Dr. Ali KAZANCIGL: Turkey's Democracy in the 1990s: a Retrospective and Prospective View Prof. Dr. A. Rait KAYA: Siyaset, Demokrasi, Medya Prof. Dr. Alpaslan IIKLI: Kreselleme ve Kemalizm Prof. Dr. Cem EROUL: Devletin Yeniden Yaplandrlmas Sylemi ve Trkiye'nin Demokrasi Gereksinimi Vicente Guillermo ARNAUD: Atatrk and Modem Turkey Bernhard Tjin Liep SHIE: Atatrkism and Modern Turkey; the Early Reforms of Atatrkism and the Perspectives tovvards the Development of a Democratic Society 1923-1950 Prof. Dr. Djaparidze Shota ISMAILOVICH: Atatrk and Republic of Turkey on the New Stage ofPolitical Orientation Dr. Menter AHNLER: Atatrklk ile Demokrasinin Trkiye 'de ve Mslman lkelerdeki Gelecei Jean-Louis BACQUE-GRAMMONT (eviri: Yrd. Do. Dr. Berrin CEYLAN ATAMAN): 1938 Sonunda Paris Basnnda Atatrk ve Eseri zerine Baz Dnceler Prof. Dr. Gertnde DURUSOY: L'Impact des Initiatives d'Atatrk sur la Vie Culturelle en Turquie Dr. Xavier JACOB: Atatrk et la Laicite Prof. Robert MANTRAN: Souvenirs et Reflexions sur la Periode PostKemalienne de 1945 1954 Prof. Jacques THOBIE: La Republique de Turauie: la Voie de la Puissance Regionale Prof. Dr. Dan BERINDEI: Nicolae Titulescu et la Turauie d'Atatrk

175

183 191 197 205

209 217

231 251 257 275 281

287 297 313

331

361 371 387 395 423

IV

Dr. Nahas M. MAHIEDDIN: L'lnfluence des Idees de Mustafa Kemal Atatrk sur l'Elite Politique et Culturelle en Algine durant la Periode de l'Entre DeuxGuerres Penda M'BOW: La Lecture de l'Experience La'iaue du Senegal la Lumiere de Celle de la Turquie sous Mustapha Kemal Atatrk (1881-1938) Prof. Rafa BEN ACHOUR: Modern Tunisia and Turkey (A Comparative Study in the Light of The Kemalist Principles) Dr. Bill N. MR: Cumhuriyetin Bakenti Ankara Dr. Horst UNBEHAUN: Irade-i Milliye Gazetesi ve Mill Mcadele Dneminde Sivas Basn zerine Gzlemler Prof. Dr. Justin McCARTHY: Population Change and the Creation of the Turkish Republic Masami ARAI: Milliyetilik lkesinin Unutulmu bir ncs: Ahmed Ferid Bey ... Prof. Mehmet Ali EKREM: Atatrk Trkiyesi ile Romanya Arasndaki Diplomatik likilere Toplu bir Bak Prof. Dr. Yusuf HAMZA: Atatrk ve Makedonya Trkl Prof. Dr. Petrika THENGJILLI: Kemalist Trkiye'de ve Arnavutluk'ta Kadn Hareketi (Tarihi Kyaslamalar) Constantine D. ZEPOS: Evolution of the Kemalist Doctrine, from a Greek a Standpoint Prof. Dr. Elmira MURADALIYEVA: Azerbaycan Tarihiliinde ve niversite Kurslarnda Atatrklk Kavray Prof. Dr. Anvar KASIMOV: Communication between Trk Republics Prof. Dr. Inom A. ASROROV: Using the Experience of Turkey in Economy Reform of the Republic ofTajikistan Dan TSCHIRGI: Turkey's Challenges in the Arab World Prof. Dr. Robert ANCIAUX: The Foreign Policy of Turkey in the Middle East and the Actuality of Atatrk's Thought: from the Pact of Saadabad to the Peace Process Dr. Youssef Mouhamed IRAKI: The Plane of the Ghazy Mostafa Kamal Pasha in the Independence War and the Egyptian Attitude towards this War 19201923, According to the Egyptian Archives Dr. Ycel GL: The Last Pitched Battle of the First World War and the Determination of the Turkish-Syrian Boundary hine Prof. Abderrahmane el MOUDDEN: fim Abd Al-Karim's and Kemal's Movement in the 1920s: what Connections? Dr. Arshi KHAN: State-Society Relationship in Turkey and India: a Comparative Study

433 455

467 475 487 509 525 533 539 553 559 565 577 581 589

601

613 623 639 653

Prof. Dr. Zheng-hua DONG: Chinese Views of Atatrk and Modern Turkey Prof. Dr. Jaemahn SUH: Kore-Trk likilerine Genel bir Bak Prof. Duncan Bnce WATERSON: Atatrk, ANZAC andAustralia Prof. Gerrit OLIVIER: The Relevance of Kemal Atatrk in the Turkey of the Future Prof. Dr. Victor Morales LEZCANO: Garda Gomez, a Valuable Clog in the Mediterranean Policy ofSpain in the Mist of the Cold War Prof. Dr. Tapani HARVIAINEN: The Northernmost Trk Community- a Case of Euro-Islam in Finland Arshad-uz ZAMAN: Atatrk Seen from Bangladesh Prof. Dr. Ergun TRKCAN: Trkiye'nin Teknoloji Tercihleri: 1923-1998 Dorular-Yanllar; mknlar-mknszlklar Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. efik Alp BAHADIR: Turkish Economy on the Threshold of the 21st Century: a Critical Review ofSome Recent International Appraisals Prof. Dr. Bilsay KURU: Kamu Ekonomisinde bir Yneticilik rneinden zlenimler: Selahattin anbaolu ve Sanayide Modern Giriimcilik Prof. Geoffrey LEWIS: Bilmeyen Ne Bilsin Bizin? Adnan BNYAZAR: Atatrk'n Yaratmak stedii Bilgi Toplumu Prof. Dr. Ezel Kural SHAW: The Language Factor as the Keystone of the Turkish Republic's Reform Program Prof. Gyrgy HAZAI: Trkolojinin Trkiye 'de Cumhuriyet Dnemindeki Gelimesinin Baz Sorunlar stne Tamer BACINOGLU: The Perception of Kemalism in German Journalism since the End of the Cold W ar Dusan MIHAJLOVIC: Atatrk, one View of the Life and Achievement of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk at the End of the 20th Century Konferans Program Dzenleme Kurulu (Organizing Committee)

669 677 689 701 713

723 731 741 761 773 781 787 797 809 817

835 841 853

VI

CUMHURBAKANI SAYIN SLEYMAN DEMREL'N MESAJI

Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, balangtaki btn imknszla, aresizlie ramen, ada uygarlk seviyesine ykselmek ve tm vatandalarna ada uygarln tm nimetlerini ulatrmak gibi ok byk bir iddiayla kurulmutur. Geen 75 ylda, bu hedef dorultusunda ok byk ilerleme kaydedilmitir. Trkiye, her alanda bir kalknma hamlesine girimi ve nemli lde baarl olmutur. Cumhuriyet, esasen kkl ve kapsaml bir dnmn, bir adalama projesinin ifadesidir. Trkiye'de Cumhuriyet'in iln balbana byk bir devrimdir. Takip eden devrimlerle, ekonomik, sosyal, siyasal yaammzda kkl deiimler gerekletirilmi, yeni bir devlet yaps ierisinde modern bir toplum ortaya kmtr. Byk Atatrk'n esiz dehas ve ileri grll sayesinde, ada demokratik almlar mmkn klacak dinamik bir yapda kurulan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, zaman ierisinde demokratik, laik ve sosyal hukuk devleti niteliine kavumutur. nsanln, uzun mcadeleler ve edindii tecrbelere dayal olarak ulat devlet yaps da budur. Bu devlette, kiiler deil, kanun ve kurallar hkimdir. Temel hak ve hrriyetler, Anayasa'nn teminat altndadr. Her insan, dili, dini, cinsi, etnik kkeni ne olursa olsun, demokratik bir devletin vatanda olarak, eit hak ve hrriyetlere sahiptir. Nfusunun ok byk bir blm Mslman olan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, bu nitelikleri sayesinde, dnyadaki halk Mslman olan 55 lke ierisinde, gelenek, adalk ve slm' badatrabilen tek lkedir. zellikle dinsel ve etnik kkene dayal atmalarn ska yaand, dnyann en nazik corafyasn tekil eden blgesinde demokratik ve laik yapsyla Trkiye bir bar, istikrar ve gven adas durumundadr.

vn

Bu bakmdan, Trk milleti Cumhuriyetin ve kurucusu byk Atatrk'n deerini iyi bilmektedir. Onun ilkelerine bal olarak onun gsterdii hedef dorultusunda azim ve kararllkla yrmeye devam edecektir. Bu erevede, "Atatrklk ve Modern Trkiye" konulu konferans memnuniyet ve takdirle karlyor, dzenleyenleri tebrik ediyorum. Konferans iin lkemize gelen deerli bilim adamlarna hogeldiniz diyorum. Bu vesileyle, konferansn baarl ve verimli olmasn diliyor, tm katlmclara selm ve sevgilerimi iletiyorum.

VIII

ONSOZ
Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75. Kurulu yl dolaysyla 22-23 Ekim 1988 tarihlerinde Fakltemizce dzenlenen "Atatrklk ve Modern Trkiye" uluslararas konferansnda sunulan teblileri bu kitap ile yaymlamann mutluluunu yayoruz. 29 Ekim 1998 tarihinde 75. yan kutlayan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti gen, dinamik, uygar ve ada bir devlettir. Bugn iin Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, hr dnceye ve insan haklarna saygl, laik, demokrasi ilkelerine bal, gl bir devlettir. Modern Trk Devleti, fikri gcn Atatrk ilke ve devrimlerinden ksaca Atatrklk'ten almtr. te 22-23 Ekim 1998 tarihlerinde dzenlediimiz uluslararas konferansta da 75. yln kutlayan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin bu baars ve onun kurucusu Byk Atatrk'n ilke ve devrimleri eitli ynleriyle ele alnarak iki gn boyunca tartlmtr. Bu konferansta yerli ve yabanc toplam 81 akademisyen ve aratrmac bildiri sunmutur. Yabanc akademisyen ve aratrmaclar, 22'si Avrupa, 12'si Asya, 6's Afrika, 5'i Amerika, l'i de Avusturalya olmak zere, 46 deiik lkeden lkemize bu konferans iin gelmilerdir. Ankara niversitesi Cumhuriyetimizin ilk niversitesi olmasnn yansra bnyesindeki faklteleri ile, Atatrk ilke ve devrimleri dorultusunda Cumhuriyetimizin temellerinin atlmasna ve yceltilmesine ok deerli katklarda bulunmutur. Ankara niversitesinin geliim tarihi, Cumhuriyet ile btnlemi; niversitemiz, Cumhuriyetin dayand temel deerlerin korunmas ve toplumda yaygnlatrlmasn varolu nedeni ve ana misyonu kabul etmitir. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi de, lkemizin en kkl eitim kurumlarndan birisi olarak, Atatrk ilke ve devrimlerinin dorultusunda Cumhuriyetimizin, siyasi, mali, hukuki ve idari yaps ile anayasal dzeninin oluturulmasnda ve korunmasnda nemli sorumluluklar stlenmitir. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi'nin bu tarihi sorumluluklar arasnda, hi phesiz; Cumhuriyete, demokrasiye ve zellikle Atatrkle sahip kacak kadrolar yetitirme misyonu da bulunmaktadr. Dolaysyla, Cumhuriyetimizin 75. ylnda, Atatrklk ve Modern Trkiye konusunda bu kapsamda uluslararas bir konferansn niversitemiz ats altnda Fakltemiz

IX

tarafndan dzenlenmesi bir raslant deildir; bilakis bizler iin daima hatrlanacak bir onur kaynadr. Sz konusu uluslararas konferans ve teblileri toplayan bu kitap youn bir alma sonucunda hazrlanmtr. Konferansn ve bu kitabn yayna hazrlanmasnda zverili bir ekilde alan bata Dzenleme Kurulu yeleri, asistanm Korkut zkorkut, matbaa tashihlerini yapan Fakltemiz Aratrma Grevlileri olmak zere, Dileri Bakanl yetkililerine ve emei geen herkese Fakltem ve ahsm adna kalbi teekkrlerimi iletiyorum. Cumhuriyetimizin 75. yln bir kez daha kutlarken, bu kitabn Cumhuriyetimizin aydnlk yarnlarna, Atatrkle ve zellikle ada, hr, demokrat, laik ve hukuk stnln benimseyen Trkiye'nin, Atatrk'n izdii yolda ilerlemesine olumlu katklar yapmasn itenlikle arzuluyorum. Prof. Dr. Celal GLE Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi Dekan

SUNU
Konferansmz Atatrk, Atatrklk ve Atatrk Devrimi konusunda bir durulua, bir berrakla ulatmz bir sraya rastlad. Atatrk'n lkenin yazgsna nderlik etmee balamasyla birlikte, Trkiye'de ona kar byk bir sevgi ve hayranlk beslenmitir. Atatrk hemen her admnda o denli baarlyd ki, baka trl olamazd. Fakat bu sevgi ve hayranln anlamaya, deerlendirmeye engel olduu da dorudur. Ama aradan uzunca bir zaman geti. stelik Trkiye'de 1980'den sonra Atatrk'e kar iddetli eletiriler yneltildi. Bundan cesaret alan eriatlar, bu olumsuz koroya katldlar. Bylece Atatrklk zerinde kafa yorulmaya ve Atatrkln ne olduu "kefedilmeye" baland. Bugn pek ok insan bu gelimelerin nda Trkiye'nin sorunlarnn aresini Atatrklkte grmektedir. Fakltemizin dzenledii uluslararas konferans, yukarda da belirttiim gibi, byle bir dneme denk geldii iin daha da anlaml olmutur.

***
Konferans ve bu yayn olanakl klan Dileri Bakanlna ve katlmaclara en bata teekkr ediyorum. Ayrca Ankara niversitesine, Fakltemizin memurlarna, Avrupa Topluluu Aratrma ve Uygulama Merkezine, Aristo Tours'a, ve tabii Dzenleme Kurulundaki ve dzeltmenlik yapan arkadalara pek ok teekkr borluyuz. Bizimle yakn ibirlii yapan Dilerinden Sn. Dr. Menter ahinler'i ve Sn. Can nder'i de unutmuyoruz. Giriimi candan benimseyen ve baars iin byk aba gsteren Dekanmz Prof.Dr. Celal Gle'ye zel olarak teekkr ederim. unu da belirteyim ki galiba btn bu ileri genellikle zevkle yaptk. Kendi hesabma sylyorum, fakat sanrm Dzenleme Kurulundaki arkadalar da bana katlrlar, toplantlarmz ho, arkadaa bir havada geiyordu. Toplant gnlerini adeta iple ekiyordum. Prof.Dr. Sina AKIN Dzenleme Kurulu Bakan XI

ATATRK VE TRKYE'NN SYASAL MODERNLEMES

Dr. Vladimirl. DANILOV* Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin 75. yl Trk toplumu hayatna ok byk deiiklikler getirmitir. Asrn balarnda Trkler kendilerini bir millet olarak korunmas iin savamaya mecburdular. Bugn ise Trk devleti blgesel bir sperg olarak saylabilir. Milli kurtulu hareketinin tekiltlanmasyla zaferle sonulanmasnda, yeni Trk devletinin kurulmasyla kuvvetlenmesinde, Atatrk'n yakn arkadalaryla birlikte cumhuriyetin ilnndan evvel hazrladklar temel prensiplerin rol son derece bykt. 1919 yl Mays aynda Mustafa Kemal Samsun'dan stanbul'daki Sadarete unu belirtiyor: "Millet milli hakimiyet esasn ve Trk milliyetiliini kabul etmitir. Bunun iin alacaktr". Bylece Osmanl tarihinde ilk defa imdiye kadar egemenliin timsali olan padiaha kar millet koyulmutur. Ayn zamanda balca birletirici faktr, kurtulu hareketi bayra ve sonra yeni Trk devletinin kurulmasyla kuvvetlendirilmesinin de bayra olarak Trk milliyetilii prensibi teyit edilmitir. 1920 yl Nisan aynda alan Byk Millet Meclisi, ellerinde btn yasama ve icra iktidarn temerkz ettiini ve Ankara hkmetinin kurulmasn ilan etmitir. Bu hususta Mustafa Kemal Nutkunda yle diyor: "Efendiler, bu esaslara mstenit olan bir hkmetin mahiyeti, suhuletle anlalabilir. Byle bir hkmet, hakimiyet-i milliye esasna mstenit halk hkmetidir. Cumhuriyettir". Bylece ta o zamanlarda mstakbel devletin ekli prensip olarak belirlenmitir. 1923'te gereken artlarn olgunlatklar zaman Cumhuriyet iln etmitir. O zamanlardan beri Cumhuriyetilik, Anayasada tesbit edilmi olan devletin sarslmaz bir temeli olmutur. Daha 20'li yllarn balarnda Kemalistler, halklk prensibinin gelitirilmesine zel bir nem veriyorlar. Grlerinin sisteminde halklk, hakimiyet-i milliye ile Trk milliyetilii yansra balca unsur olmakta* Moskova.

dr. Mustafa Kemal'in 1920-1921 yllarndaki demelerinde syledii gibi "...bizim nokta-i nazarlarmz -ki halklktr- kuvvetin, kudretin, hakimiyetin, idarenin dorudan doruyay halka verilmesidir, halkn elinde bulundurulmasdr". Ve "Siyaset-i dahiliyemizde iarmz olan halklk, yani milleti bizzat kendi mukadderatna hakim klmak esas Tekilat- Esasiye Kanunumuzla tesbit edilmitir". Aslna baklrsa Mustafa Kemal bununla gelecek Trk devleti iin balca demokrasi prensibini ileri srmektedir. Yani toplum, halk, padiahn Allah'tan alm iktidarn inkr ederek idareyi ellerine alyor. Tabi temsil bir organ ve bunun kurduu hkmet vastasyla. 1921 yl Ocak aynda kabul edilen Tekilat- Esasiye Kanununda yeni bir terim ortaya kmtr "Trk Devleti". Bylece saltanatn mukadderatn nceden belli etmitir. Kemalist prensipleri, yeni Trk devleti siyasal tekiltlanmasnn esaslarn tayin etmitir. Cumhuriyet iln gn Mustafa Kemal; "Memleketimizi asriletirmek istiyoruz. Btn mesaimiz Trkiye'de asr, binaenaleyh garb bir hkmet vcuda getirmektir" diye belirtmitir. O zamandan beri Trk toplumu siyasal Batllama yolunu tutmu demek bir abartma olmayacaktr. Trkiye iin Batllama modernlemenin ekli olmutur. 20'li yllarn balarnda Trkiye, Batl siyasal sisteminden rnek alarak demokratikleme srecine balamtr. Batl siyasal sistemin muhakkak unsuru siyasal okuluktur. Mustafa Kemal bunun yani ok partili sistemin prensip olarak taraftar idi. 1924'te bir ecneb muhabirin sorularna cevaben yle diyordu: "Hakimiyet-i milliye esasna mstenit ve bilhassa Cumhuriyet-i idareye malik bulunan memleketlerde siyasi frkalarn mevcudiyeti tabidir. Trkiye Cumhuriyetinde de, yekdierini mrakip frkalar tekevvn edeceine phe yoktur". Fakat Atatrk'n zamannda Trkiye'de fiilen tek partili sistem vard. Bunun iin baz batl /hem siyasi hem ilmi/ evrelerde kemalistler, otoriter, bonapartist bir rejim kurduklar iin tenkit edilmitir. Bununla ilgili hatrlyalm ki Kemalistlerin balca prensipleri arasnda devrimcilik prensibi de yer almtr. Trk Devletini yani Cumhuriyeti kurarak Kemalistler siyasi, iktisadi, sosyal, kltrel alanlarda muazzam reformlann programn ileri srmlerdir. Trk milliyetilii prensibi toplumun eitli evreleri hamlelerinin bu program gerekletirmek iin seferber edilmesine yardm etmitir. yle sanyorum ki Atatrk bata olmak zere Kemalistler, bu safhada toplumun muhtelif kesimleri partiler halinde bir birine kar koymak deil bunlar bir partiye milli karakter vererek bu partinin idaresinde birletirmeye karar vermitir. Galiba Kemalistler, reformlar iinin parti hizipleri ile anlamazlklarnda batabileceklerini sanmlardr. Zannediyorum ki 20-30'lu yllarda tek parti rejimi reformlarn baaryla yaplmasna yardm etmitir.

Siyasal adalama yani batllamann baarya ulamas iin bu yolda ciddi engeller yaratabilecek olan halifelikle ve umumi olarak slm dini ile mnasebetler tanzim olunmalyd. Bu hususta belli ncller ittihatlar tarafndan yaplmtr. Bunlar, Bat deerlerinin benimsenmesi iinin kolaylatran laiklik anlamnn alamasna balang koymulardr. Kemalistler bu sahada daha ileri gitmilerdir. Saltanatn kaldrlmas 1924'te halifeliin de yokedilmesine yol amtr. Bununla beraber btn maarif sistemi laik bir esasa dayatlp Bat rneklerine uygun olarak yeni bir kanunlar sistemi yaratlmaya balanmtr. slm gibi nazik bir meselede Mustafa Kemal'in gsterdii nezaketlilik kaydedilmelidir. 1924 yl Mart aynda mecliste konuurken unu belirtmitir: "...slm dinini,., bir siyaset vastas mevkiinden uzaklatrmak ve yceltmek gerekli olduu gereini gryoruz. Mukaddes ve tanrsal inanlarmz ve vicdani deerlerimizi, karanlk ve kararsz olan ve her trl menfaat ve ihtiraslara grn sahnesi olan siyasetten... kurtarmak milletin dnyevi ve uhrevi saadetinin emrettii ebir zarurettir. Ancak bu suretle slm dininin ykseklii belirir". Ama total bir batllamann gerekletirilmesi iin halifeliin kaldrlmas kafi deildi. Gitgide laiklik ilkesi iktidarda olan CHP saflarnda benimsenmi ve 1928 yl Nisan aynda devlet dinine ait Anayasa maddesi kaldrlmtr. Laiklik prensibi, evvel iktidar partisinin sonra devletin de balca prensiplerinden biri olmutur. Bu prensibin hayata geirilmesi, siyasal modernleme iini ok kolaylatrd. Kaydedildii gibi tek partili sistem geici bir mahiyet tayordu, Kemalistler siyasal plralizmi prensip olarak inkr etmiyorlard. kinci Dnya harbinden sonra i ve d koullar deimi ve CHP idaresi baka partilerin kurulmasna izin vermitir. Bylece demokrasinin gelimesinde nemli bir adm atlmtr. Bu balca temsili organ olan meclis faaliyetinde tesirini gsterdi. oulcu demokrasi yerini pluralist demokrasi almtr. Parlamento sonraki faaliyetleri tecrbesi, bir takm ilgi ekici hususiyetleri ile arasra ciddi buhranlara yol aan problemleri de gstermitir. Malm ki demokrasinin muhakkak bir emaresi, yapc bir muhalefetin, serbest tartmann ve uzlamann var olmasdr. Her toplum tartma erevelerini kendi hususiyetlerine gre tayin eder. Syleyebiliriz ki Trkiye'de ok partili sistemin kanun erevelerin tesbit edilmesi baz zamanlarda siyasi mcadeleyi ciddletiren bir problem olmutur. 1924 yl Trkiye Anayasasnda siyasal sistemin ancak baz esaslar belirlenmitir. Harpten sonraki yllarda ise Anayasa hukuku byk bir gelime gstermitir. Bilindii gibi Anayasada icra organlar yasamadan ayrlmtr, yarg organlarnn yaps ile yetkileri belirlenmi, iktidarn dallarnn fonksiyonlar ayarlanmtr. Anayasa mahkemesi kurulmu, si-

yasal partilerin, sendikalarn, meslek cemiyetlerin, derneklerin faaliyetleri esaslar da ayarlanmtr. Btn bunlar Trkiye'yi toplumun siyasal tekiltlanmas bat standartlarna ok yaklatrd. br taraftan Bat'da kaydedilmeyen bir fenomen Trkiye'de grlebilir: Harpten sonraki yllarda Trk anayasasnn gelimesinde ordunun rol son derece bykt. Malm olduu gibi 1961 Anayasas, onun 197173 yllarnda deimi ekli, 1982 Anayasas ordunun aktif itirakiyle ve idaresi altnda hazrlanmtr. Zikredilen Anayasann kyaslanmas ilgin bir ey gsteriyor. 1961 anayasas Trkiye tarihinde en demokratik olmutur. 1971-73'de ve sonra 1982'de demokratik zgrlkleri kstlanm ve ayn zamanda icra iktidarnn bilhassa Cumhurbakann yetkileri geniletilmitir. Bu sre Trk toplumunun lkenin gerek artlarna uygun olabilecek vatandan haklar ile vazifeleri, ahsiyetin zgrlkleri ile devlette istikrar arasnda muvazemenin aray olarak nitelendirilebilir. Bu sre sona varmam, devam vardr. Dier ark lkeleri ile kyasla Trkiye'nin siyasal modernleme tecrbesi daha srekli ve reticidir. Bu tecrbe kantlyor ki modernleme sreci elikili ve arasra actan bir mahiyet tamaktadr. Bu sre erevesinde muhakkak olarak Bat siyasal standartlar yerli geleneksel deerlerle karlamaktadr. Bylece her asrilemekte olan toplum modern ile gelenek arasnda muvazene aray problemi nnde bulunmaktadr. Yllar, Trk devletinin olumasnda ok byk rol oynam olan Kemalist prensiplerini kanlmaz bir surette denemekte, bunlara dzeltmeler getirmektedir. Bu hususta milliyetilik ve laiklik prensiplerine deinelim. Kaydedildii gibi Trkiye'de asrileme arasra actan bir surette gemitir. Trk devlet adamlarndan smail Cem bir makalede yazd gibi Trkiye modernleme srecinde bir iddetli kltr sarsntsn yaamtr. Trkiye'nin meriyette bulunmu olan siyasal kurumlar ile ideoloji bakmndan demokrasiye ve plralizme hi hazr olmad iin bunlar da lke iin bir sarsnt olmutur. Bu faktrlerin tesiri altnda toplumun ounu kurtulu hareketinde ve Cumhuriyetin inkiafnda birletiren Trk milliyetilii baz sahalarda ayrc bir karakter almtr. Bir Trk yazarn kaydettii gibi "Trk bayraklarn sallayan Kemalistler, liberaller, kurt iaretleri ve hilalli bayraklarla lkcler, sosyal demokratlar... hemen herkes orada..." te bugnk milliyetilik byle. 80' li yllarda Anavatan Partisi, "yeni milliyetilii" kurmak, onun erevesinde balca siyasal eilimlerini birletirmek, bylece milliyetilie birletirici karakter geri vermek teebbsn yapt. Bir mddet iinde bu teebbs baarl olmutur.

Bugnk Trkiye'nin jeopolitik durumunun bir zgnl var: bir taraftan Dou dnyasndan ksmen km, slm dnyasnda tam olarak entegre olmam, dier taraftan da Bat dnyasna tamamiyle kabul edilmemi. Byle bir durum da ynelmi bir nevi milliyetilii douruyor ki kendini "Trkn Trkten baka dostu yok" ifadesinde gsteriyor. Laklik prensibi sylendii gibi abuk ve efektif modernlemenin zorunlu bir art olmutur. Bununla beraber bu abuk asrileme, Batllama toplum iin bir sarsnt olmutur. Yine smail Cem'in syledii gibi "Yedi asr boyunca hakim olmu din mahiyette kltr varlndan, bu varl temeli olan itimai ve siyasi kurumlardan ksa bir mddet iinde modern kurumlara gei gerekletirilmitir". Burada iin iki tarafna iaret edelim. Trkiye Anayasasnda dini siyasi karlar iin istismar etmeyi yasaklyan bir madde var ve byle bir yasak tasvip edilmelidir. Din fanatizm ile gericiliin her belirmesi de muhakkak knanmaldr. Ama iin baka taraf da vardr toplumun hayatnda modernizm ile gelenekilik arasndaki muvazenedir. Hzl Batllama geleneki unsurlar arka plna itmitir. Ama bugnk toplumda bu unsurlar gitgide daha fazla aranmaktadr. Bylece toplum dizginsiz kltr Batllama taraftarlan ile geleneksel varlklar taraftarlar arasnda bir arpma tehlikesi ile kar karya gelmitir. Trk toplumu 75 yl zarfnda siyasi, iktisadi, sosyal, kltrel gelimesinde muazzam baarlar kazanp dinamik bir inkiafta bulunmaya devam etmektedir. Bu ilerlemede elikilerin ortaya kmas tabi bir ey olup dinamik bir toplumun gelecek gelimenin optimal yollarn araynda baarl olaca phesizdir.

TRK DEVRMNN DEMOKRAS KURAMINA KATKILARI

Prof. Dr. zer OZANKAYA* I. GR Bildirimin konusu, Atatrk'n dnce ve eylem nderliinde gerekleen ve bir "uygarlk projesi" deerinde olan Trk Devriminin, demokrasi kuramna kalc nitelikteki temel katklarn sergilemektir. Bir uygarlk projesi nedir? Bilindii gibi bir insan topluluunun "toplum" (=societe, society, Gesellschaft) oluturabilmesi iin, kurumlam olarak yerine getirilmesi zorunlu olan temel ilevler vardr: devlet, aile, eitim, ekonomi ve stn deerler dizgesinin yerine getirdii ilevlerdir bunlar. te bir insan topluluunda bu temel ilevlerin an gereklerine ve zlemlerine gre etkin biimde karlanmasn salayan dnce ve deerler dizgesine "uygarlk projesi" denilir. Atatrk'n nderliindeki Cumhuriyet devrimi, kanmca, devleti, aileyi, eitimi, ekonomiyi ve stn deerler alann demokratik ilke ve lklere gre dzenlemeye ynelik byle uygarlk projesi kapsamnda bir giriimdir. Atatrk kadar, lmnn zerinden altm yl getii halde hl toplumuna yn verip hedef gsterebilen, onda umut ve heyecan yaratabilen, hatta btn dnyada dnceleri, eylemi ve kiilii ile sevgi ve sayg ile anlan devlet adam ya da politikac her halde istisna saylacak kadar azdr. Bu uluslararas sempozyumun kendisi de Atatrk'n bu niteliine bir kanttr. Sekin topluluunuzun da ayn gzlemi paylatna inanyorum. Daha nce de uluslararas dzeyde tannm bilimadamlar ve dnrler bunu yapmlardr ve yapmaktadrlar. Fransa'da rnein Maurice Duverger, Georges Duhamel, Arjantin'de Blanco Villalta, Almanya'da Herbert Melzig, tam da benim bildirimde savunduum noktalar n plana karm olduklar iin hemen aklma gelen isimlerdir. Ne var ki uluslararas politikalarn konjonktr, bilimadam ve dnrlerin grlerini geni kitlelere bazan duyurmak, bazan da duyurmamak dorultusunda ilemektedir.
* Ortadou Teknik niversitesi retim yesi.

Bunlarn bu yolda sk sk bavurduklar bir tez var: Deniliyor ki, hibir ey yoktan ortaya kmaz. Atatrk'n gerekletirdii toplumsal devrimler, Osmanl ynetimince, zellikle de II. Abdlhamit ynetimince byk lde gerekletirilmiti. Atatrk var olan bu yapy gelitirdi (Geri kimileri de bozdu diyorlar). Bir de Atatrk yalnz deildi. O'nunla birlikte alanlar bulunduu da anmsanmal uyars yaplyor. Hibireyin yoktan olumad, her olayn bir ncesi, bir hazrlk sreci bulunduu apak bir gerektir; (evidence, bedahet) denilen bir eydir. Bir nderin tek bana hereyi yapamayaca da byledir. Bu neriler bilgilerimize birey katmaz. nsanlk tarihinde r am hangi nder, hangi devlet kurucusu, hangi din kurucusu, toplum yaamnn hi deilse snrl kesimlerinde bir gereksinim, bir zlem biiminde hi alglanmaya bile balanmam bir dzeni, hi yoktan ortaya atmtr? Ve bu nderlerin hangisi yalnz bana alarak dzenini kurmutur? Atatrk'le ilgili olarak yaplan byle sylemlerin en azndan bilimsel ortamlarda yeri olmamas gerektiine inanyorum. nk bilimin geerlilik ilkelerinden biri nitelik ile nicelik arasndaki fark gznnde bulundurmay gerektirir. rnein okullarn bilgisiyarla, fizik, kimya laboratuarlaryla, video gstericileriyle donatldn varsayalm. Ama o okullarda zgr dnmeye yer verilmiyorsa, rnein sosyolojiye, felsefeye katlanlmyorsa, Darvin kuram yasaklanyorsa, bilimsel yntemin objektiflik, sorgulayclk ilkeleri anlatlmyorsa, otoriter bir kltr veriliyorsa, byle okullarn, Atatrk'n "Dncesi, kltr, vicdan zgr kuaklar yetitirme" grevini verdii demokratik cumhuriyet okullarnn ncs olduu ne srlebilir mi? Bildirimin asl konusuyla ilgili olarak da bir noktaya deinmek istiyorum. "Trk Devriminin ve Atatrk'n Demokrasi Kuramna Katklar" yolundaki bildiri bal, hep Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n Batl dnrlerden ve Bat dnyasnn kltrnden etkilendiini duymaya alm olanlarn tuhafna gidebilir. Geri Atatrk'n dnce ve eyleminde Bat Uygarlnn ve Batl dnrlerin etkisi olduu aktr. Ama Mustafa Kemal'in de stelik baarl uygulamasn da yapt dncelerinin ayn Bat dncesine yani demokrasi uygarlna katk niteliinde olduu gereince belirtilmelidir. Benim bildirimin amac ve konusu da budur. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n ve O'nun nderliinde gerekleen Trk Devriminin demokrasi, yani zgrlk dvasna ok temelli birok katklar olduu sylenebilir. Smrgecilie ba kaldrma, saltanat ve halifelik gibi kurumlardan toplumunu kurtarma, zgrlk kavramn yceltme, insanln yarsn, hem de en iyi yarsn oluturan kadnlarn erkeklerle eit hak ve zgrlklere kavumasna nderlik etme, sosyal adalete dayal bir dzen kurma, yurt iinde ve uluslararas yaamda bar egemen klmaya alma, hepsi kukusuz demokrasi davasna yaplm ok deerli katklardr. Ancak btn bu katklarn temelinde yatan, bu demokrasi devriminin baar gvencesini oluturan husus, Atatrk'n ulusal egemenlik kavramna verdii tanm, bu tanmdan dolay da topum dzenini her trl dokt-

riner ideolojik kalplar altna dme tehlikesinden saknabilmi olmasdr. Bence bunlar demokrasi kuramna katk saylacak deerdedir. Bugn btn uygar insanl yakndan ilgilendiren nemli olaya dikkatimizi ekerek grm aklamaya alacam. Bunlardan biri, Cezayir'de yllardanberi yaanan kanl olaylardr. Kanmca bu kanl i kavgada, ulusal egemenlik ilkesinin yani demokrasinin, "ounluk her ne isterse yapabilir." biiminde anlalmak istenmesi yatmaktadr. Buna karlk Trk Demokrasi devrimini 1924'te, 1930'da, 1960'ta, 1998'de koruyan ana g, Mustafa Kemal'in ulusal egemenlik ilkesinin basit bir "ounluk oyu"na indirgenmesini reddeden anlay olmutuur. Deinmek istediim ikinci olay, Sayn Mikhail Gorbatchev'in Perestroika adl kitabnda Sovyetler Birlii'nin k nedeni olarak gsterdii "Kuramn dogmalatrlmas" olaydr. Gorbatchev "Kuram dogmalatrdk, zgr dnceyi boduk, bireylii sildik. Sovyet toplumunun tm ynleriyle demokratiklemesi gereklidir." diyordu. Oysa Sovyetlerdekiyle ayn tarihlerde giriilen Trk Demokrasi Devrimi, Atatrk'n dnce nderliinde doktrinleri reddediyordu. Mustafa Kemal'in toplumun herhangi bir doktrinin kalplar iine sokulmamas iin gsterdii zenin demokrasi iin ne deerli bir katk olduunu vurgulamak istiyorum. nc olarak dikkatlerinize getirmek istediim olay, Polonya'da Leh Walensa'nn, bunca olup bitenlerden sonra, "Ne kapitalizm, ne de sosyalizm, demokrasiyi salayamyor. nc bir yol bulunmal." deme noktasna gelmi olmasdr. Kapitalizmi kusursuzmu gibi gsterip bir doktrin gibi uygulamaya koyulan, bylece demokrasinin ekonomik boyutlarn gzard eden lkelerde anarinin ve mafyann kol gezmeye baladn grenler, Mustafa Kemal'in u uyarsn anmsamadan edememektedirler: "Devlet her trl ekonomik etkinliin dna itilecek olursa, devlet kurmaktan asgari ama olan gvenlik ve adalet hizmetlerini bile gereince yerine getiremez!" Benim bildirimde Trk Devriminin Demokrasi Kuramna Katklar olarak dikkatlerinize sunacam konular da bu konuyla ilgilidir: Ulusal egemenlik ilkesinin geerli tanm, doktriner yaklamn toplumlarda ykmlara yol amas ve demokratik dzenin ekonomik dzene ilikin boyutlar. II. TRK DEVRMNN DEMOKRAS KURAMINA KATKILARI Atatrk devrimi, "demokratik dzenin meruluk lleri ile bilimsel yntemin geerlilik ilkeleri arasndaki paralelliin" bilinciyle yaplmtr. Bu bilinle, yeni Trkiye toplumu "Egemenlik kaytsz, koulsuz ulusundur!" ve "Yaamda en doru yol-gsterici bilimdir!" diyen iki stun zerine kurulmutur.

Atatrk, "Demokrasi, geleceini akl ve bilimden alr. Bunlardan yoksun bir ynetime demokrasi demee olanak yoktur." derken bu birliktelii dile getirmektedir. A. Ulusal Egemenlik Kavramna Getirdii Tanm Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n demokrasi kuramna katk oluturduuna inandm ulusal egemenlik temelde, ulusal egemenliin basit bir "ounluk egemenlii" demek olmadn vurgular; tersine, ulusal egemenlik dzeninde insan ve yurtta hak ve zgrlklerinin doutan, vazgeilmez, devredilmez haklar olduunu kabul eder. Bu haklar hibir gerekeyle, hibir yolla ortadan kaldrlamazlar. nsan ve yurtta hak ve zgrlkleri ounluk oyuyla ortadan kaldrlmak yle dursun, byle bir oylamann nerilmesi bile ulusal egemenlik dzeninde gayrmerudur. Bundan dolay her yurttan, din, mezhep, soy, sop, snf, eitim, cinsiyet ..farklar olmakszn doutan ve vazgeilmez, devredilmez olarak sahip bulunduu insan hak ve zgrlklerinin oy yoluyla ortadan kaldrlmasnn ad ulusal egemenlik deil, "ounluk diktatrl"dr, yani bask ynetimidir. nsan hak ve zegrlklerinin bata geleni ise "baskcla kar direnme hakkTdr. rnein kadnlarn erkeklerle eit yurttalk haklarndan yoksun klnmas, ya da vergi dzeninin bir dinin ya da mezhebin llerine dayandrlmas, kamu grevlilerinin belli bir toplum kesiminden seilip atanmas, vb., oy yoluyla kararlatrlacak eyler deildir. Byle bir oylamann nerilmesi bile gayrmerudur; bu yola gidecek bir hkmet meruluunu yitirir ve bireylerin "zulme kar direni hakk" doar. Laik toplum ve devlet ilkesinin Trkiye Cumhuriyeti anayasasnn deitirilmesi bile nerilemeyecek maddesi yaplmas, ulusal egemenlik kavramnn bu ieriinden dolaydr. 3 Mart 1924 tarihli er'iye ve Evkaf Vekleti'ni Kaldran Yasa'nn ilk maddesi, "Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde insanlararas ilikileri dzenlemek zere yasa yapmak yetkisi yalnz Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi'nindir. Din adna yasa yaplamaz" derken, bu ulusal egemenlik ilkesini temel almaktadr. Birka yldanberi Cezayir'i kana boanlarn grlerinin temelinde, "ounluun her istediini yapabilmesi" gerekesi yatmaktadr sanyorum. Trkiye'de de ounluun kendilerine oy vereceini zan ve iddia ederek "Bakalm ounluun istei kanl m gerekleecek, kansz m gerekleecek?" sylemine bavuranlar, yine ulusal egemenlii, basit bir ounluk oyuna indirgeyebileceklerini sanmaktadrlar. Oysa, "Demokrasi kendini savunmayan bir dzen deildir." diyen Atatrk Cumhuriyeti, 1924'te bu yola giden Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Frkasn hkmet kararyla kapatmt. Ayn yolun yolcusu olmak isteyen bir baka parti, 75 yl sonra bamsz Anayasa Yargsyla kapatld. Trkiye'de demokrasi kltr, "ulusal egemenlii, insan ve yurtta haklarn inan ve duygu smrs eliinde oy yoluyla bile olsa ortadan kaldrma yoluna indirgeyecek her giriimi "gayrmeru" sayacak lde kklemitir. Bu, Atatrk'n ulusal egemenlik kavram tanmnn demokrasi kuramna yapt bir katkdr. Aslnda bu katk yalnz Trkiye iin deil, btnyle slam dnyas iin ok deerli bir katkdr. zgrlk dzeninin

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Ulusal egemenlii doutan devredilmez insan haklar temeline oturtan ve baskya kar direnme hakk gvencesine balayan Atatrk'n kendisim bir bireysel insan olarak tanmlaynda, bu "baskya kar direni hakk ogesyle donanm bir zgrlk anlay yattn gryoruz. "zgrlk ve bamszlk benim karakterimdir. Bence bir ulusta erefin, haysiyetin, namusun ve insanln varl ve sreklilii, kesinlikle o ulusun zgr ve bamsz olmasna baldr. Ben bir kii olarak bu saydm niteliklere ok nem veririm ve bunlarn bende bulunduunu ne srebilmem iin, yesi olduum ulusumun da zgr ve bamsz olduunu grmek ihtiyacndaym". Grld gibi Mustafa Kemal, bireysel eref ile ulusal erefin ayrlmaz biimde birbiriyle balantl oluduunu, zgr bir toplumda yaamayan bireylerin gereince erefli insanlar olarak yaayamayacaklarn dnmektedir. Bundan dolay da genlik alarndan balayarak baskc ynetimlere kar direnme hakkn da ierdiini dnd zgrlk lksne kendisini adamtr. Kurtulu Sava ve Cumhuriyet Devrimlerini ayn anlayla yrtmtr. Saltanat ynetimini srdrmek isteyenlere kar, rnein zmir'de annesinin mezar banda, bunlarn bir blm de yannda olduklar halde, sesini ykselterek: "Annemin mezar banda and olsun ki ulusal egemenlik dzenini savunmak iin annemin yanna gitmekte bir an duraksamayacam!" Ayn konuyla ilgili olarak TBMM'nde, ulusal egemenlik ilkesini kabul etmek istemeyenlere kar, bu yolda "kimi kafalarn kesilebileceini" sylerken iaret etmek istedii ilke yine "bask ynetimine kar direnme hakk" ilkesidir. Konya'da genlere seslenirken yine ayn aklkla bu eyi vurgular: "Dini kendi tutkularna ara yapan hkmdarlar ve onlara yol gsteren hoca sanl hainler hep bu sona dmlerdir. ..Artk bu ulusun ne yle hkmdarlar, ne yle bilginler grmee katlanma gc ve olana yoktur . Eer onlara kar benim kiisel tutumumu renmek isterseniz, derim ki, ben bir kii olarak onlarn dmanym; onlarn olumsuz ynde atacaklar bir adm, yalnz benim kiisel inancma deil, o adm benim ulusumun yaamyla ilgili, o adm ulusumun yaamna kar bir kast, o adm ulusumun yreine gnderilmi zehirli bir hanerdir. Benim ve benimle ayn dncedeki arkadalarmn yapaca ey, kesinlikle ve kesinlikle o adm atan tepelemektir. 11

SSSf^^Zgg^

^ l g l *?"" a g d a m s l m a n halklarn dinsel inanlar ile ulusal fff dzeni arasnda bir badamazlk bulunmadmgrmeler yolunda deerli b l r katicdr. Bunun btn dnyada da, demokrfsi lksnn baarsna yaplm bir katk olduu aktr (Ne var ki, siyasal p a r t i S ileyii henz yeterince bu anlay 1a uydurulamam, nas olursa olsun bS

bulunanlann srgit partilerinin banda

ri hep bundan ibarettir. Sizlere bunun da stnde bir soz soyeyeym. un varsaym ~.~~~, olarak, izlere bunun da stnde bir sz syleyeyim: bir atanlara karssnda MZiere uuuu u !,_ QHm v a a ^ bunu a l l a y S Meclis olmasa, yle olumsuz adm atanlar karasnda herkes ekilseve ben kendi basma yalnz kalsam, yine tepeler, yine oldu< X i L ve ben kendi bama yaln rrm!" Demokraside daha eski bir gemii olan Batl devletlerin ancak faizm ve komnizm belalarn yaadktan sonra 1946 Evrensel insan Haklar Bildirgesi'ne "Zulme kar direnme hakk"n temel insan ve yurtta hakk olarak koymu olmalar, Trk Devriminin bu konudaki nceliinin kantdr. B.Alt-Yap, st-Yap Ayrmnn Yapayl Marksist dnceyi paylaanlar, 1980'e gelinceye kadar Atatrk nderliindeki Trk Devrimini "st yap devrimleri", "kk burjuva devrimleri" diyerek eletiriyorlard. Bununla bir yandan toplum yaamnda asl belirleyici etkenin ekonomi olduunu, eitim, anayasa dzeni, aile kurumu, yaz ve dil, sanat ve bilim alanlarndaki devrimlerin etkisinin nemli olmadn savunuyorlard; bir yandan da ekonomide genel, zorunlu ve kollektivist bir planlama yapmak gerektiini ne sryorlard. Oysa tam da bu konuda Friedrich Engels'in tarihi Marc Bloch'a yazd ve ar bir z eletiri ieren mektupta belirttiklerini gz ard ediyorlard. Mustafa Kemal'in ise bu mektubu okuyup okumadn bilemeyiz ama, Engels'in kanlmas gerektiini syledii yanltan bilinli olarak Trk Devrimini sakndn biliyoruz. Artk ok bilindiini sandm bu mektupta Friedrich Engels unu yazyordu: "Ekonomi yanna gerektiinden ok arlk tanyan kimi genlerin bu tutumlarnn sorumlusu, Marx ve ben, biziz. Biz kartlarmzn inkr ettii temel ilkeyi vurgulamak iin baka etkenlerin karlkl etkileim iindeki yerini belirtmeye zamanmz, yerimiz, hatta frsatmz olmuyordu. Bizim nerimiz 'Ekonomik etken tek belirleycidir.' dedirtmek zere zorlanrsa bo, soyut, anlamsz bir nermeye dntrlm olur. nk anayasalar, hukuksal biimler, siyasal, felsefi anlaylar, din anlaylar ..bunlarn hepsi de tarihsel mcadelenin gidiini etkilerler ve birok durumda ar basarak onun biimini belirlerler". Engels'in belirttii yanln yol at ar sonular, 1980'lerde Sayn Mkhal Gorbatchev tarafndan Perestroika adl kitabnda u ac szlerle dile getiriliyordu: "Kuram dogmalatrdk. zgr dnceyi ve bireysel giriimi boduk. Bugnk Sovyet toplumunun tm ynleriyle demokratiklemesi zorunludur". Mustafa Kemal de hem de Kurtulu Sava srasnda, "Admz bilelim, kapitalist miyiz, sosyalist miyiz, bolevik miyiz; admz bilelim" eletirsiyle karlayordu. Bu isteklere kar verdii yant, bilimsel ynteme, dolaysyla demokrasinin llerine uygun bir yantt: "Efendiler,"

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diyordu, "Deimelerin sabit ve durgun kurallar yoktur. Bir topluma mutluluk getiren bir sistem, bir bakasnn ykmna neden olabilir. Onun iin biz benzememekle ve benzetmemekle vnmeliyiz. Kendimiz olmalyz". NUTUK'ta da izledikleri yolu daha ak bir biimde bu gerekeye dayandrr: "Bizim programmza kar kanlar, onu, grmeye alk olduklar bir kitaba, yani doktrine benzetemiyorlard. Oysa bizim programmz temelliydi ve ilemseldi. Biz de isteseydik, uygulanamayacak dnceleri, kuramsal ayrntlar yaldzlayp bir kitap yazabilirdik. yle yapmadk. Ulusumuzun maddi ve manevi gelime gereksinimleri dorultusunda, szlerin ve nazariyelerin nnde gitmeyi tercih ettik". "Szlerin ve kuramlarn nnde gitmek". Bu, 'Yaam kuramlar izlemez, kuramlarn yaam izlemesi gerekir' bilincini anlatmaktadr. Bu bilinle Atatrk, st yap-alt yap ayrmnn analitik bir abadan teye bir anlam tamadn, gerekte toplumsal yapnn her biri tekini derinden etkileyen bir btnlk oluturduunu gznnde bulundurarak devrimi ynetmitir. Bu bakmdan eitim kurumunun ekonomik ve toplumsal gelimenin balbana bir kaldrac olarak kullanlabileceini gstermitir. nk, Trk devrimi asl olarak eitim yoluyla gerekletirilen bir devrimdir. "retici bilgi, beceri ve alkanlklaryla" ada demokratik insan yetitirmei amalayan Trk eitim kurumu, ayn zamanda ekonomik kalknmann da verimli etkeni olmutur. 'Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin temeli, kltrdr." diyen Trk devriminin, bir toplumu toplum yapan, gl ve gnenli klan g kaynaklarnn hem dncel gler, hem de maddi gler olduunu belirtmi olmasnn demokrasi kuram asndan nemi byktr. "Bireyler dnr olmaldr. Bireyler dnr olmadka bir toplumu iyiye de ktye de herkes yneltebilir. Onun iin biz rgtmzde ie kyden, mahalleden, yani bireyden balyoruz". "Dnceler ad, akl ve manta aykr ise, o toplumun hayat hastalkldr." der Atatrk. Bir yandan "bilgi, beceri ve alkanlklaryla insan" esinin "eitim" kurumunun rn olduu gereini vurgulayarak, ayrca halkn cokulu katlm salanmadka ne bir ulusal bamszlk savan kazanmaya, ne de bir kalknma plan ve programn baaryla uygulamaya olanak bulunmadn grp gstermekle, eitimin "st yap" deil birinci snf bir "alt yap" esi olduunu gsermi, "st yapalt yap" ayrmnn analitik amala bavurulan bir soyutlamadan baka bir ey olmadn ortaya koymutur. Bu sayede "Demokrasi, asl olarak dnseldir, ahlakidir; asla bir mide konusu deildir. Demokrasiyi bir mide konusuna indirgeyenler, yurttan zgrlk ihtiyacn uyutmak isteyenlerdir." kavrayna da ulamtr; bylece toplumu her trl diktac ynetimden saknmann gvencesini de getirmitir. Eitimin ekonomik kalknmann etkin bir kaldrac olduunu kantlamakla, "kalknma kuramna" da nemli bir katk yapmtr Trk Devrimi. 13

C. Demokrasinin Ekonomik Gerekleri Polonya'da Sosyalist diktatrle son veren tarihsel olaylarn nderi Leh Valensa "Piyasa ekonomisinde on kiiden dokuzu bakas iin alyor. Ama on kiiden onu da oy hakkna sahip. Bu nedenle hem sosyalist sistemi, hem de kapitalist sistemi birlikte uygulamak gereklidir." deme noktasna gelmi bulunuyor. Atatrk'n ekonomi konusunda Trk Devrimine temel olan dnce ve eylemleri, sanldnn tersine, yalnz Trkiye'nin o gnk koullaryla snrl olmann tesinde, ekonomik demokrasiye ilke dzeyinde bir katk niteliindedir kansndaym. Bence Atatrk'n devletilii, kapitalizmin de marksizmin de demokrasinin nde gelen ltleri asndan elitirisine dayal bir uygarlk tasannu niteliindedir. Ekonomik dzen konusundaki bu dncelerini, Atatrk 1929'da kendi eliyle yazd, ama Prof. Afetinan imzasyla yaynlanmasn uygun grd ve tm orta retim kurumlarnda ders kitab olarak okutulan "Yurtta in Medeni Bilgiler" adl kitapta dile getirmitir. Bu sistemlerden kapitalizm bu gne dein sz konusu sorulan yantlamaya, eletirileri karlamaya girimemi, -her bunalma dtnde en yetkili azlar ayn sakatlklar dile getirmekle birlikte- ounlukla yalnzca bunlar duymazlktan, bilmezlikten gelmekle yetinmitir. Zorlayc genel planlamaya dayal sosyalizmin ise, yakn tarihte aka baanszln itiraf zorunda kalp uygulanma iddiasn terkettiini biliyoruz. aa) Atatrk'n Kapitalizme Ynelttii Eletiriler Atatrk Medeni Bilgiler'de kapitalizmi, "yalnz bana yaayan birey" d-kurgusuna (fksiyonuna) dayal olmakla eletirir; "yalnz serbest rekabetle bir lkede ekonomik dzen kurulamaz; kurulabileceini sananlar, kendilerini bir serap karsnda aldatlmaya koyuverenlerdir" der. Atatrk kapitalizm konusundaki bu grne, bu sistemin tam da temelini oluturan ana dnceyi sorgulayarak varmaktadr: Bilindii gibi kapitalizm, "toplum yaamnda devletin, yalnzca gvenlik, adalet ve darya kar savunma grevlerini yerine getirmekle yetinmesini, ekonomik etkinlikleri ise tmden bireylere ya da irketlere brakmasn" savunur. Atatrk, toplumda gvenlik, adalet ve bamszl korumann yalnzca devletin grevi olduunu, bunlarn ayn zamanda devletin bata gelen, asl grevleri olduunu kabul ederek konuya girmekte ve kapitalizme bugn hl yantlanmayan u soruyu yneltmektedir: "Devlet, hi bir ekonomik etkinlikte bulunmad takdirde, devlet kurmaktan asl ama olan bu temel grevleri, yani gvenlii, adaleti ve da kar savunmay yerine getirmekte glklerle karlamayacak mdr?" Atatrk, karlaaca kansndadr ve gerekeleri unlardr:

14

"Devletin temel grevlerini gereince yerine getirebilmesi, sal yerinde, yurttalk bilinci gelikin, an bilimi, teknii ve sanatyla donanm yurttalarn varlna baldr. Bunu ancak devlet salayabilir. "Devlet, lkenin gvenlik ve savunmas iin yollarla, demiryollaryla, limanlar, deniz aralaryla, her trl ulam aralaryla, ulusun genel servetiyle yakndan ilgilidir. lke ynetimi ve savunmasnda bu saylanlar, toptan, tfekten, her trl silahtan daha nemlidir. zellikle para, her trl aracn zerinde bir varlk silahdr. "Ekonomik ve kimi toplumsal iler, bir yandan bireylerin yararlan ile ilgilidir. Bunun iin bireyciler, bu ilere devletin karmasn kii zgrlne saldr gibi grrler. Ama bu iler iinde btn ulusun ortak yararna ilikin olan noktalar da vardr. zel yarar, ounlukla genel yararla elime iinde bulunur. Bir de zel yararlar en sonunda yarmaya dayanr. Oysa yalnz yarmayla bir lkede ekonomik dzen kurulamaz. "nk zgr yarma, gl ile zayf kar karya brakr. kinci olarak, kimi ortaklaa yararlar vardr ki, bireyler ve irketlerin bunlar salamaya gleri yetmez. Ya da yeterince krl bulmadklar ini o ileri yapmazlar. Oysa bunlar ulus iin yaamsal bir nem tarlar ve devlet onlar yapmak zorunda kalr. Devlet herkesin ortak yararn ve ilerlemesini dnr. Bireylerin ise zel kar duygusundan ne lde uzaklatrlabilecei incelenmee deer. Ayrca uluslarda zgrlk ve uygarlk gelitii oranda devletin grevleri ve sorumluluklan da oalr. Ulusal servetin dalmnda daha yetkin bir adalet, emek harcayanlarn gnen dzeyinin ykseltilmesi, ulusal birliin, demek ki i ve d gvenliin, zorunlu kouludur. Genel yarara hizmet eden genel kurumlarn oaltlmas ile yalnzca karsever olan etkinlikler snrlandrlr ve yurttalar arasnda ahlki dayanma gelime olana bulur". Atatrk'n kapitalizme ynelttii bu eletiriler, bu dzenin en eski uygulaycs olan lkelerde, en koyu yanda olan tannm nderlerce de dile getirilmitir: Ancak, yalnzca youn bunalm dnemlerinde! rnein kapitalizmin anayurdu olan negiltere'de, kapitalizmin nde gelen siyasal temsilcisi olan Muhafazakr Parti'nin nderlerinden Winston Churchil, 1920'lerde bir ara partisine kstnde, onun izledii ekonomik politikay yerden yere vurmutur. Bunu yaparken dayand gerekeler, Atatrk'n kapitalizme kar yapt btn uyarlarn hakl olduunu gsteren gerekelerdir. "Muhafazakr Parti ierde smrye, bunu rtmek iin darda saldrganla, gmrk ve vergi hokkabazlklarna, bir parti makinesinin zulmne, bol bol duuygusalla ve yurtseverlik sylevlerine, milyonlarca insana pahal yiyecek, milyonerlere ise ucuz igc salanmasna dayal, kurulu byk karlar arasndaki bir konfederasyondur. ...ngiliz halkna verilmekte olan en byk zarar, kentlerde ar hzla nfus birikmesi, kylerin boalmas, nfusun topraktan kopmas, zenginle yoksul arasnda

15

doal olmayan ar fark, genlere gerekli beceri ve alma dzeni salanamamas, ocuk igcnn smrlmesi, iiler iin hibir belirli rahatlk ve gnen dzeyi salanamamas; br uta ise, baya ve zevksiz bir lksn hzla bymesi. ngiltere'nin asl dmanlar bunlardr; engel olmazsanz, gcmzn gerek temellerini bunlar yerle bir edecektir". Nitekim ngiltere, 2. Dnya Sava'ndan sonra Bat Avrupa'da kapitalizmin bu ykml sonularn dzeltmek ve "gnen devleti" kavramyla anlatlan "toplumsal adalet"in gerektirdii dzeltmeleri yapmak zere devleti ekonomik etkinliklerle dorudan doruya ilgilendirmek yolunda ba ekmitir. Kapitalizmin ngiltere gibi yine anayurdu saylan Fransa'da yaanan bunalmlar ok daha ar olmu, lke birok kez i savala kar karya kalmtr. Bunlardan birinde, 1958'de Franszlar ulusal bar ve birlii salamas iin General de Gaulle'e bavurduklarnda, bu koyu katolik ve muhafazakr devlet adam, bunalmn nedenlerini ve zmn, Atatrk'n kapitalizmde iaret etmi olduu sakncalar sanki aynen yineler gibi, yle aklamt: "Bir gn makina ortaya kt. Sermaye de onunla evlendi. Bu ift dnyaya sahip oldu. Pek ok insan, herkesten ok da iiler ona baml duruma geldiler. leri iin makinelere, cretleri iin patronlara baml olduklarndan, kendilerini manen, ahlaken dkn, maddi bakmdan da tehdit altnda gryorlar. te sonu: Snf kavgas! Her yerde bu var; iliklerde, tarlalarda, brolarda, sokakta; gzlerin, ruhlarn derinliklerinde. nsan ilikilerini zehirliyor, devletleri deliye eviriyor, uluslarn birliini bozuyor, savalara yol ayor. ..Her insan toplumda, yerini, payn ve saygnln elde edemedike, bu demokles klc balarmz zerinde sallanmaya devam edecektir". bb) Atatrk'n Sosyalizme Ynelttii Eletiriler Atatrk, devletin ekeonomik konularda da dzenleyiciliini ilke olarak kabul etmek gerektiini savunurken, bunun "demokrasinin belirgin nitelikleri asndan" kimi sakncalar douracan da gz ard etmiyordu. Bu konuda syledikleri, dorudan doruya sosyalist ya da kollektivist dzene kar ynelttii eletiriler niteliindedir: 'Devletin ekonomide dzenleyicilii kabul edildiinde karlalacak olan glk udur: Devlet ile bireyin karlkl etkinlik alanlarn ayrmak: Bireylerin kiisel etkinlikleri ekonomik gelimenin ana kayna olarak kalmaldr. Bunun iin, ilke olarak devlet bireyin yerine gememeli, bireysel giriim ve zgrl smrlandrmamaldr. Ama bireyin geliimi iin genel koullar gznnde tutmaldr. Bireylerin geliimine engel olmamak, onlarn her bak asndan olduu gibi, zellikle ekonomik alanlardaki zgrlk ve giriimleri nnde devlet etkinlikleri ile bir engel oluturmamak, demokrasi ilkelerinin en nemli temelidir'. 16

'Devletin ekonomik etkinliklerinin snrn izmek konusunda da hazr reete sz konusu deildir. Bu snrn, yurttan bireysel giriim ve zgrln kstlamayacak biimde saptanmas, her eyin yantn bulduu ne srlen, deimezlik iddiasndaki doktrinlerle olmaz; lkeyi ynetmee yetkili klnan, yani ulusun zgr seimiyle ibana gelen hkmetlerin gelitirecekleri programlarla olur'. Burada yine Atatrk'n ulusal egemenlik ve bilimsel yntem ilkelerine besledii derin gveni gryoruz. Sosyalizmin kendi zamanndaki uygulamasn temsil eden boleviklie ynelttii eletiri tam da bu noktalarda dmlenmektedir: "Bir toplumu, bir blm insanlarnn dncelerine zorla tutsak etmek ve clz bamllar olarak yaatmak, doal ve akla uygun bir hkmet sistemi deildir. Boleviklikte biz bunu gryoruz". Atatrk bunlar yazdktan yaklak 60 yl sonra, Sovyetler Birlii'nin en yetkili kiisi, Komnist Parti Genel Sekreteri Gorbatchev, sosyalist sistemi hemen ayn szlerle en ar bir biimde elitiriyordu: "Sosyalizmin dogmalatrlp dondurulmas yznden kuram tekeli kuruldu ve kiilere tapnma yolu ald. Ynetim ve iletmecilikte ar merkeziyetilik kuruldu. Geni ynlarn giriim ve yaratclna gvenilmedi. ..nsan ilgi ve karlarnn ok trllnn gz ard edilmesi, bireylerin kamu yaamna etkin biimde katlmasnn kk grlmesi, eitlikiliin abartlmas, savurganl inanlmaz llere vardrd. Kamu mallar alanlara deil, parti yneticilerine sunuldu. Kuram dogmalatrdk, zgr dnceyi boduk, giriimi engelledik. Uakl ve dalkavukluu zendirdik. Bugnk Sovyet toplumunun tm ynleriyle demokratikletirilmesi zorunludur". Atatrk, kollektivist dzenin bu ykm getirici yanlarn grm olduu iin, "bizim izlemei uygun grdmz devletilik ilkesi, btn retim aralarn bireylerden alarak, zel ve bireysel ekonomik giriim ve almaya meydan brakmayan sosyalizm ilkesine dayal ..bir sistem deildir. Bizim izlediimiz devletilik, bireysel emek ve etkinlii ilke almakla birlikte, olanak lsnde az zaman iinde ulusu gnence ve lkeyi bayndrla eritirmek iin, ulusun genel ve yksek yararlarnn gerektirdii ilerde, zellikle ekonomi alannda devleti fiili olarak ilgilendirmektir." diyordu. Atatrk, bylece, kapitalist dzenin "yalnz bana yaayan birey", sosyalist dzenin ise bireylerden soyutlanm devlet" gibi gerek d dncelere dayal olduunu gryor ve u uyary yapyordu:

17

"Devlet ve birey dediimiz zaman bu szcklerin soyut anlamn deil, tek gerek olan "toplumsal insan", yani toplum iinde yaayan bireyleri anlatmak istiyoruz. te bu insann iki trl kan vardr: Bunlarn bir blm kiisel, brleri ortaklaa karlardr. Toplumun yaamn koruyan bu ortaklaa karlardr. yice dnlrse, bu iki trl kar birbirine eittir. nk toplumsal insann yaam iin her iki trl kar ayn lde gereklidir". Atatrk, kapitalizmin ve sosyalizmin bu doktriner zelliini kendi deyimiyle "demokrasinin belirgin nitelikleri asndan" bylece ortaya koyduktan sonra, "devletilik" olarak adlandrd kendi ekonomi politikasn u gerekelere dayandrmaktadr: "Cumhuriyetimiz henz ok gentir. Gemiten kendisine miras kalan btn yaamsal iler, zamann zorunluluklarn karlayacak lde deildir. Siyasal ve dnsel yaamda olduu gibi ekonomik ilerde de bireylerin girimeleri sonucunu beklemek doru olmaz. nemli ve byk ileri, ancak ulusun genel servetine ve devletin btn rgt ve gcne dayanarak, ulusal egemenliin uygulanp yrtlmesini dzenlemekle grevli olan hkmetin olanak bulduu lde zerine alp baarmas beklenmelidir. br kimi devletlerin ikinci derecede grp bireylerin giriimlerine brakmakta saknca bulmayacaklar ilerden birou bizim iin yaamsaldr ve birinci derecede nemli devlet grevleri arasnda saylmaldr". Atatrk, daha zmir ktisat Kongresi'nden balayarak ekonomik bamszln gereini vurgulam ve "iktisat siyasetimizin nemli amalarndan biri de, genel karlar dorudan doruya ilgilendirecek kurumlan ve iktisadi kurulular, mali ve teknik gcmzn izni orannda devletletirmektir" demitir. 1927 ylnda Cumhuriyet Halk Frkas genel kuruluna sunduu ve oy birlii ile kabul edilen program da, devletin ekonomi alanndaki yeri konusunda unlan ngryordu: "Ekonomik geliim iin getirilecek yasalarn ve devlete alnacak nlemlerin, yalnzca halkn genel yararlar dncesine dayal olmas balca amacmzdr. Ne denli nemli olursa olsun, zel bir karn salanmas ya da korunmas iin devlete nlem alnmasna ve zellikle bireylerin zel karlar iin devlet hazinesinden dorudan ya da dolayl herhangi bir kar beklemenin olanaksz ve uygunsuz olduunun bir inan durumuna gelmesine zellikle nem veriyoruz". SONU Bu aklamalarn nda baklnca, "Trk devrimi yalnz Trk ulusu iin deil, btn uygar insanlk iin dikkatle incelenmee deer bir hareketin addr." diyen Atatrk'n, yapt iin ne kadar bilincinde olduu da grlmektedir.

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THE NATURE OF THE KEMALST REVOLUTON

Prof. Dr. Sina AKIN* 1. The Renaissance of Kemalisin: Foreigners who visit Turkey are in many cases surprised at the ommipresence of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk. Everywhere they see his statues, busts, pictures. I think they mostly interpret this as a "personality cult" and tend to think of it in negative terms. The explanation for Atatrk's ommipresence is this: it is he that personifies the Turkish Revolution. Most other revolutions are the work of many personalities. The French Revolution cannot be identified with a single person. With the Soviet Revolution we see the preponderance of Lenin, but he was able to guide the revolution, after it came to power, for 7 years only. Without Stalin, one cannot understand the Soviet Revolution. Perhaps the role of Mao-Zedung in the Chinese Revolution is comparable to Atatrk. He ruled China for 27 years. Hovvever, his successors have wellnigh repudiated him. There is also the question of the complementarity of various communist leaders. With Mao, one cannot help noticing the role and complementarity of Stalin, Lenin and Marx. With Atatrk, no such complementary figures come to mind. Atatrk is the victorious leader of the struggle for independence, he is the founder of the Turkish Republic, he is the leader of the Turkish Revolution. One can say that it is a complete "success story". That is why his person is the symbol of the Republic and its Revolution. What the motto liberty-equality-fraternity represents for the French Revolution, Atatrk represents for the Turkish Revolution, he is its symbol. You cannot be for the Turkish Revolution and against Atatrk. But I think you can be for the French Revolution and against, say, Robespierre, Rousseau, Danton, Voltaire ete. For many decades after the death of Atatrk, the great majority of the Turks have felt nothing else than an unadulterated love and admiration for him. it is clear that such a elimate of opinion was not conducive to a critical evaluation of Kemalism. Kemalism was explained rather superficially by the official six principles (republicanism, populism, revolutionism, secularism, statism, nationalism) which were inseribed into the Constitution of 1924. it cannot be said (in general) that these principles
Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi retim yesi.

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vvere analyzed in depth. Criticism and, indeed, hatred for Atatrk and for ali that he stood for existed among Islamic fundamentalists, but until 1945 they vvere vigorously repressed. They continued to be repressed after 1945, but with much less vigour. Nevertheless, they vvere generally treated as a ort of lunatic fringe. Things began to get serious with the founding of the religious-minded National Salvation Party (MSP) in 1972, which polled nearly % 12 in the elections of 1973. This support for the religious party and its successor was to increase ver the years. The military junta which engineered the coup of 1980, embarked upon a policy of creating an official ideology called "Turkish-Islamic synthesis", coupled with a policy of severe repression of the Left, including the Kemalists. The curious thing is that ali this was done in the name of Kemalism1. With the resumption of multi-party politics in 1983, the Left intelligentsia began to criticize the junta. Some of this criticism was also directed tovvards Kemalism itself. These vvere the so-called proponents of "civil society". Some of them also advocated the dismantling of the Republic founded by Atatrk, in order to set up a "second republic". This often violent criticism of Kemalism encouraged many Islamists to come out into the pen vvith their negative vievvs of Kemalism. Thus, a strange alliance betvveen some of the secular critics of Kemalism and certain Islamists vvas struck2. Ali this vvas very painful for the Kemalists vvho vvere thus forced to think how the arguments of the anti-Kemalists could be refuted. it can be said that anti-Kemalist criticism has hastened the process tending tovvards a better comprehension of Kemalism. I say "hastened" because it is generally natural for social phenomena to be better interpreted and understood vvith the passage of time. Movements like the Renaissance and Enlightenment receive their names and are better understood vvith the lapse of time. Turkey lived Kemalism from 1919 until Kemal's death in 1938 and then until 1950. Today Turkey begins to comprehend Kemalism and this comprehension has led to a renaissance of Kemalism. 2. The Philosophical Nature of Kemalism: Kemalism is a movement of enlightenment. To give a single example, Atatrk expressed this idea vvhen he called, in the name of the Republic, on teachers to "raise generations vvith free ideas, free consciences, free knovvledge"3. Atatrk vvas thus adopting the famous formula of the poet Tevfk Fikret, vvho in a poem had thus described himself. Suat Sinanolu defines the philosophi1. For an account of recent Turkish history, see Bernard Levvis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey; S. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey; F. Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975; S. Aksin, Trkiye'nin Yakn Tarihi, 1789-1980. For an account of the doings of the 1980 junta: B. Tanr, "Siyasal Tarih", Trkiye Tarihi ve Bugnk Trkiye, 1980-1995. S. Aksin, "Dnce Tarihi", Bugnk Trkiye, 1980-1995, pp. 267-73. 25 August 1924. E.Z. Karal, Atatrk'ten Dnceler, p. 80.

2. 3.

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cal aspect of Kemalism as the "limitless freedom of the mind"4. Philosophy professors Bedia Akarsu and Macit Gkberk have also defined Kemalism as a movement of enlightenment5. Atatrk was a hmanist. Even in the most dangerous moments of the War of Independence, he did not declare a holy war. His gentlemanly conversation with the Greek Commander Trikupis who had fallen prisoner in 1922, his refusal to tread on the Greek flag that was laid out at his feet, the words he pronounced for the Anzac dead in 19346, attest to his humanism. On one occasion, he described war, unless fought in defence of the motherland, as a erime7. While totalitarian and racist dictatorships were triumphing throughout most of Europe, and many Turks were attracted to these currents, Atatrk stood fast. His invitation and \velcome to 142 German academicians thrown out from their universities by the Hitler regime in 1933 beause they were Jewish or dissident is another eloquent indication in this direetion. 3. Kemalism as a Model for Development: The Kemalist model of development can be characterized as "integral development". This means wholesale, all-out development. To get hold of the West's machines, instruments, factories is not enough. Behind this technology lies the West's science. We have to adopt that too. Otherwise the technology we adopt will look and be artificial in our hands. But the upper reaches of science enter into the domain of philosophy. Therefore we have to adopt Western philosophy and the humanities (human sciences) of vvhich it is a part. Naturally we must not forget that social sciences are an indispensable part of the sciences. On the other hand, for the development of philosophy we must not neglect its relation with the arts and culture in general. Thus we see that technology-science-philosophy-the arts and culture form a whole. For them to thrive, we need freedom of thought, respect and appreciation for science, culture, the arts and those engaged in these domains. Such persons and institutions should not be under the pressure of social, political, religious dogmas. in the Kemalist model of integral development, the creation of a university is as important as the construction of a railroad; the opening of a conservatory is as important as the building of a factory. To understand the model of integral development we can contrast it with its opposite: the model of material development. One of the best ex4. 5. S. Sinanolu, Trk Hmanizmi. As early as 1960, B. Akarsu had described the Kemalist Revolution as the Turkish Enlightenment. "Atatrk ve Aydnlanma", Atatrk Devrimi ve Temelleri, pp. 93-7. M. Gkberk, "Aydnlanma Felsefesi, Devrimler ve Atatrk", ada Dncenin Inda Atatrk. . demir, Atatrk and the Anzacs. Anzac stands for "Australia and New Zealand Army Corps", troops that fought for the British in the Dardanelles campaign (19151916). 16 March 1923. M.K. Atatrk, Atatrk'n Sylev ve Demeleri, II.

6. 7.

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amples of this model are the petroleum-rich sheikhdoms. These countries can afford to buy the latest technology: the most modern cars, airplanes, computers, factories. They are able to purify sea-water and to cultivate the desert. Nevertheless, these countries, while enjoying the fruits of the latest technology, in respect to social and cultural conditions, live more or less in the 9th century. Ali that technology and those computers do not impede their living in the 9th century. in Turkey, after 1950, the integral development model was to a certain extent abandoned and a shift towards the material development model occurred. Thus the construction of roads-dams-factories took first place, and social and cultural development was pushed somewhat into the background. 4. The Ideological Program of Kemalism: This consists of the six principles (or "arrows") proclaimed by Atatrk's Republican People's Party. The first principle is republicanism. Critics of Kemalism have pointed out the absence of the principle of democracy. To them, republicanism, with the many examples of dictatorial, even totalitarian republics is not a meaningful principle. This, of course, is a pertinent observation, but it does not quite apply to Atatrk, in 1929, he wrote a school textbook of civics with the aid of Afet nan. This was published under the name of nan. When nan re-published the book in 1969, she disclosed that it was to a large extent co-authored by Atatrk and included therein photocopies of Atatrk's handwritten manuscript. This included the section on political regimes. According to him, democracy is the best regime and it is superior to constitutional monarchy. Not only was this a case of Atatrk's intentions. While many European countries seemed to be heading towards some kind of totalitarian dictatorship, the Kemalist regime was relatively democratic. A proper assessment of the degree of democracy of a regime can be made by comparing it with other contemporary regimes. Ancient Athens, in spite of so many slaves, foreigners and women who enjoyed no political rights whatsoever, can be called a democracy because it was more democratic than other contemporary regimes. in the same manner, the Kemalist regime, in spite of its being a single-party regime, seems to have enjoyed more democracy than the general average of European democracy. it is for this reason that the 142 German academicians who were dismissed from their universities by Hitler's government, chose to settle down in Turkey. There is no reason to believe that these academicians, many of whom were brilliant, were so naive or helpless as to go from one dictatorship to another dictatorship. Today Turkey is more democratic than in the time of Atatrk. However, this does not make us very much happier, because since the interwar period, Europe, on the whole, has overtaken and surpassed Turkey in this respect. The principle of nationalism was of a non-aggressive, nonexpansionist, freedom-loving nature. "Peace at home, peace in the world"

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was Atatrk's watchword. This nationalism was not racist. Atatrk said, "Happy is he who calls himself a Trk"8 (not "who is a Trk"). The definition of Turkish nation was: "Turkey's people who founded the Republic of Turkey"9 (1929). Every citizen of the Turkish Republic was considered a Trk, whether ethnically Greek, Circassian, Kurdish, Armenian or Jewish. This nationalism was not rightist, conservative. it was a nationalism that was not content with limited ambitions such as making Turkey the most powerful state in the region or in the Islamic world. it aimed at making Turkey competitive among the most advanced nations in the world and in every feld. Turkey had to be in the forefront not only in the economic or military fields, but also in art and literatre, human rights and science. Right-wing, conservative nationalists generally tend to accentuate economics, military povver and politics. Revolutionism means spreading enlightenment everywhere and, if possible, to everyone in Turkey, to realize integral development and to strive actively to achieve these ends. These aims have not yet been attained and are relatively long-range, but it is necessary to get there as soon as possible. Until Turkey does that, revolutionism should be in the agenda. Populism means a policy favoring the people. The concept of people can be (and was) interpreted to mean ali classes and groups in the population, but it encompasses primarily low-income groups such as the peasants, workers and others. it is a policy which tries to promote the material and cultural development of such groups. it should not be confused with the populism that means flattery of the masses. Hovvever, in a multi-party system this is not so easy to resist. in theory, at least, it can be said that in a single-party system policies vvhich are not popular with the masses, but which in the longer term will benefit them, are easier to pursue. The Kemalist regime, except for two attempts at multi-party politics, was until 1945 a single-party regime. If the Revolution has attained an appreciable diffusion among the population, it can presumably continue its progression in a multi-party system as well. For this, one large political party at least (even if it is not in power) should defend a principled Kemalism and the other large parties too, should, in the last analysis be Kemalist. Statism (or etatisme) is a principle developed from experience. Turkey's nascent capitalist class was unable to create an appreciable level of industrialization in the 1920's. Further, the 1929 World Depression was the cause of much misery. Statism was born from these needs. During the Kemalist era and aftervvards, it was able to create an industrial system. Statism, beyond creating industry and enabling the state to regulate the
8. 9. Speech delivered on the lOth anniversary of the Republic (1933). A. Afetinan, Meden Bilgiler ve M.K. Atatrk'n El Yazlar, pp. 351-2.

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economy, provided its workers with proper housing, schools, health-care, a social and cultural environment. in other words, the functions of populism and welfare state were also thereby fulfilled. Until 1980 statism performed important functions-not only in Turkey but also in some developed capitalist countries as well. The French automobile manufacturing firm Renault, for instance, has been for many years a successful state enterprise. in the 1980's a world-wide campaign was launched against the idea of state enterprises. The collapse of the Communist system further enhanced this campaign. Not only in former Communist countries, but also elsevvhere, the privatization of state enterprises has become the order of the day. As regards Turkey, this can be said. Though the Turkish capitalist class has made great progress, it is not possible to say that it is as developed as in most industrial countries. Thus, statism vvill necessarily continue to ha ve a function to perform in Turkey. Further, I don't believe that state management is intrinsically unproductive. If governments, in other vvords, the political vvill so decide, they can make state enterprises profitable. But if they unnecessarily plunge them into debt, if they refuse to make new investments for renovation, if they are filled vvith vvorkers who are not needed, if qualified managers are not appointed, it means that such governments do not vvish state enterprises to thrive. Today if the State Monopoly in Turkey can provide the whole country with three different brands of rak (a distilled alcoholic drink) but is unable to produce enough beer and matches, this is because it is so desired. The manufacture of beer and matches has been opened to private initiative and for the beer and matches of private frms to seli as much as possible, it is necessary that the state should produce a small amount of these, that it should not are to maintain their quality ete. Another point. Hovvever well-persuaded people may be of the iniquities of public enterprise, they are also avvare that they provide employment. Public opinion polis shovv this. Thus, it is very likely that a party vvhich is more prone to privatization vvill receive less votes. This means that the eleetors vvil tend to cast protest votes that vvill strengthen extremist parties. This is something vvhich is unhealthy for any democracy. As far as Turkey is concerned, at least, until Turkey attains European levels of development, it seems necessary to maintain statism on the agenda. An all-out privatization drive seems to me to fit very badly vvith a demoeratic multi-party system. Another principle is secularism. This is the separation of religion and vvorldly affairs. No religion or sect can interfere in state affairs, and cannot claim any privileges vis--vis the state. The state's laws and policies cannot be affected by a religion or sect. The state should be impartial tovvards ali religious groups. On the orther hand, the state should not in24

terfere in religious affairs. This is the rule, but the state may sometimes be in the position of interfering in religious affairs. For example, if a religious group calls its members to practice human sacrifce or wants them to commit suicide, the state should interfere. in the USA, the group called Christian Scientists believes that faith is the cure for illnesses and they therefore refuse medical are. If a child in that community is suffering from appendicitis and the parents refuse medical are, I think the state should intervene and save the child. in Turkey, there is an official Directorate of Religious Affairs that looks after the religious affairs of Sunnite Moslems. This is an intervention by the state, but I think it is necessary. This has two advantages. By supervising the majority (the Sunnis), it can prevent anti-secularist movements amongst them. Secondly, if the Directorate were to be abolished, there would be a great scramble among Snni groups to control the mosques. in every case that a group or groups would be left out, they vvould be forced to construct their own mosques. A large portion of the national wealth would have to be mobilized to build new mosques. Whereas now, mosques are under the jurisdiction of the Directorate and as such, are pen to ali groups. Some advocates of the sheria (religious legal system) perceive secularism as a wrong done against islam, it is impossible to agree with this view. The sheria was a chain which tied islam to the Middle Ages. The breaking of this chain in Turkey has given islam the opportunity to become a religion of the modern world, of the advanced countries. Medieval islam can have little attraction for modern people. Besides, the abolition of the sheria is for Turkey and other Moslem countries as well, a question of development and progress. The sheria and those who favour it, cali for the seclusion of vvomen. This means that, for instance in Turkey, half the population will be pushed out of the universal race for development and progress. One cannot take part in a race using only one leg. Countries that seclude vvomen can entertain little hope of becoming one of the advanced countries of the world. Furthermore, the seclusion of women generally means a regression of their cultural level. Male children learn their language (mother-tongue) from their mothers, not from their fathers. Our most important cultural instrument is our language, and the teaching of language by mothers is the most basic education. The basic education of a boy whose mother knows, say, only 500 words will be very different from the basic education given by a mother who knows 1500 words. in other words, the seclusion of vvomen vvill negatively affect the quality of the men too. Another advantage of secularism is that since it provides for the impartiality of the state before ali religious groups, it is a guarantee of domestic peace. in Turkey, traditional enmity betvveen Sunnis end Alevs can be ended only by secular policies. Failing this, we vvill vvitness, as we did in 1978 in Kahramanmara and in 1995 in stanbul, bloody fghts or massacres.

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Some people in Turkey, unfortunately including some statesmen, are of the opinion "the state can be secular, a person (for instance, a Moslem) cannot be secular". I disagree with this view. A person who accepts secularism is, for me, a secular person. Such a person can also be a believer (Moslem, Christian ete). Thanks to the Turkish Revolution, there are many secular Moslems in Turkey, Moslems who accept secularism. Naturally, many of them fully perform their religious duties. As enlightenment spreads, the number of secular Moslems can be expected to inerease. islam is a religion which has spread to many corners of the globe. it is to be expected that islam, like ali other great religions, should inelude many branehes or seets. They are ali Moslem, but they have their differences. Otherwise, they would not form separate groups. Respect for other groups is necessary for peace and brotherhood in islam. Secular islam in now one of these groups and other sects owe respect to Secular islam and vice-versa. 5. The Necessity for the Kemalist Revolution: From time to time one comes aeross certain observers who seem to assume that the Kemalist Revolution was a ort of personal program of Atatrk, imposed on an unvvilling nation by a victorious leader who had saved it from disaster. If this were the case, the Revolution would not have survived him for long. it would have been soon dismantled and Turkey would have gne back to its old ways. Whereas it is now 60 years since his death and even if the Revolution has been dramatically slowed down since 1950, the edifce of the Revolution is in many ways intact. Thus, we have to come to the conclusion that the Revolution was an objeetive necessity, not the whim of a dictator. Let us now see vvhat that necessity was. The Turks, within the framevvork of the Ottoman Empire, had achieved the feat of conquering South Eastern Europe up to "the gates of Vienna". With the treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, began the process of pulling back from Central Europe and the Balkans. it lasted more than 200 years, the result of successive military defeats. Since Balkan nationalism practiced from the very start vvhat has lately been called "ethnic cleansing", this process was very painful for the Turks, for very many of whom the Balkans were their homeland. Throughout this ordeal, the Turks had one last consolation: in the last resort they could live with dignity in Anatolia, from where they had come centuries ago. On the eve of World War I, the Ottoman Empire stili held on to a relatively small piece of territory in Rumelia, namely, Eastern Thrace, including Edirne. World War I was another disaster for the Ottomans. However, the peace treaty that the Empire had to sign at Sevres in 1920 was a traumatic shock of gigantic dimensions for ali Turks. They now realized that just as they had been pushed out of Rumelia, now they were being pushed out of

26

Anatolia. The Empire thereby lost not only Eastern Thrace, it was to lose the northern half of the Aegean to Greece, and East Anatolia to Armenia. There was no question of ascertaining the ethnic composition of these territories. These dispositions vvere purely based on the principle of "historic rights". A thousand years earlier there vvere no Turks in these territories, so the victorious Powers had no qualms about giving them out, vvhatever the ethnic composition of the time. The Turks vvere thus being pushed out of Anatolia, or else being reduced to some kind of abject subjection. it must have appeared obvious to many Turks that this process would not stop with Sevres, but that it would -as it had in Rumelia- continue its inexorable progression. Thanks to the War of Independence, this disaster was averted, and the Treaty of Lausanne replaced that of Sevres. But it became clear that to make the Treaty of Lausanne permanent, the backvvard social, political, cultural conditions of Turkish society had to undergo radical revolutionary change. This is precisely what the Kemalist Revolution set out to do. it is also the reason why the Revolution has stood fast for so long. If the Revolution had not been launched, it was very likely that the Treaty of Sevres, or something similar vvould have reappeared on the first occasion. The aim of the Revolution was to give the Turks as much education and culture as was received by Europeans and to make them as productive as Europeans, or in other vvords, to make Turkey a European country. 6. The Partial Counterrevolution: in order to better understand the present position of Kemalism in Turkey, it is also necessary to explain the partial counterrevolution of 1950. Already in the time of Atatrk, counterrevolutionary elements were at vvork within his party, the Republican People's Party (RPP). As I indicated, the counterrevolution in question was a partial one. Probably no one among Atatrk's follovvers wanted to go ali the way back. The trauma of Sevres prevented that degree of reaction. What the conservatives wanted was to freeze or slow down the Revolution, while preserving the main body of revolutionary achievements. The end of World War II gave them their chance. Turkey's isolation, the result of non-participation in the War, pushed smet nn, successor of Atatrk, to establish a multiparty system. To make sure that the main opposition party should not question the Kemalist Revolution, nn partly forced and partly persuaded his rivals within the RPP to create such a party (called the Democratic Party). They were mostly rightist, conservative elements. This rightism was reinforced by two developments. Soviet Russia's repudiation of the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression in 1945 and its attempt to establish control of the Straits and to gain territory in East Anatolia became the pretext for a strongly anti-left, McCarthyist movement. nn greatly reinforced this movement by banning socialist

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parties and socialist publications. This strong swing tovvards the right also affected the RPP itself. Hasan Ali Ycel, the successful Minister of National Education, who was one of the foremost architects of the famous Village Institutes and truly a man of the enlightenment, had to abandon his post. His successor set about to denature these 'miracular' Village Institutes. When the Democratic Party came to power in 1950, these tendencies became a general movement. in 1951 the People's Houses (478 of them) and the People's Chambers (numbering 4322) which were allaround cultural centers, were closed dovvn. in 1954 the Village Institutes shared the same fate. Gne was the enlightenment program of the Revolution. The integral model of development naturally suffered terrible blows by this development. The Kemalist Revolution was frozen. To conceal this fact, great emphasis was placed on "ceremonial Kemalism". Kemalist anniversaries were commemorated vvith increasing fervour and Atatrk's iconography filled every corner of public life. The RPP somehovv was unable, or unwilling to conduct an opposition based on the demand for a return to the Kemalist Revolution. Its often very strong opposition was mainly based on a demand for greater political freedom. After the military intervention or coup of 1960, which brought a new constitution and a great measure of freedom to the political system, intellectuals vvere attracted by socialism and social democracy, rather than by Kemalism. Hovvever, the fail of communism, the rapid rise of fundamentalism in Turkey, the heavy criticism of Kemalism gave rise to the renaissance of Kemalism to which I referred to earlier.

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KEMAL ATATRK: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY

Prof. Roberto Gonzlez GOMEZ* Modern Turkey emerged from the ruins of the formerly powerful Ottoman Empire, as a result of a struggle for national liberation led by a political genius: Mustafa Kemal Atatrk. He headed the great movement of eastern peoples for their national independence and development, against the hegemonic ambitions of the traditional European imperial povvers. The 75th Anniversary of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic is an excellent opportunity to take stock of that great historical experience from which extremely valuable lessons can be learned, bearing in mind that this century is about to end and humankind faces a new era of enormous challenges and unsuspected possibilities. .1. Although the Kemalist Revolution and the foundation of modern Turkey are, on their own right, a part of the great movement for the liberation of colonized peoples, the Turkish Republic emerged in the territory at the center of what was a great empire that encompassed domains in Anatolia, as well as vast regions of Europe, Asia and the north of Africa. But the Ottoman Empire, that reached its apex under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566), undervvent a process of decline in the 17th century conducive, during the 19th century and the early 20th century, to an almost colonial dependence from the great powers of those times. The final crisis of the empire a Russian Tsar had called "the sick man of Europe" was brought about by its participation and defeat in World War I (1914-1918), as an ally of the Central Povvers. The victors then set to the task of definitively solving the so-called "Eastern Question", by virtually dismembering the remains of the Empire by means of the Treaty of Sevres, perhaps the most stringent and despoiling one imposed upon the vanquished.
* Institute of International Relations, Havana, Cuba.

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A set of causes explains this protracted and painful process of decline: the use of the accumulated capital for military purposes and luxuries; the concessions made to the European powers through capitulations that prevented true, autonomous development; the scant integration achieved within the framevvork of a multi-national Empire, that would foster broad movements for independence during the 19th and the 20th centuries; the deterioration of the state administration and the army; the growing separation between the corrupt ruling elites and the masses; the system of obedience to the Sultanate, inspired in a brand of islam with dogmatic characteristics1. in short, like a distinguished Latin American politologist said, "the Ottoman Empire was essentially the result of a political 'tour de force' that built, on the basis of an entirely servile dedication to the Sultan, legitimized by religious conceptions, a militaryoriented society [...] whose inability for cultural and economic change, due to the double rigidity engendered by its set of values and by its notions about participation, proved to be fatal in the long run, despite its political and military successes"2. The attempts to curb that decline, that began in the late 18th century and lasted one hundred years, failed to change the nature of the system. Hovvever, it is worthwhile remembering some of the main stages experienced by the movement that pitted "modernists" and "conservatives" against each other, from whose legacy beneftted the revolutionary Kemalist movement, in a dialectic of denial-integration-surpass, conducive to the creation of modern Turkey. Reformist attempts began with the establishment of military schools after the western model, under Selim III but mainly under the authoritarian rule of Mahmud II, who laid the groundwork for a modern army after he annihilated the jannizars in 1826, subdued the Islamic clergy, and was thus able to rally the support of broad intellectual sectors and of the state bureaucracy, receiving the sobriquet of the Ottoman Peter the Great. These first steps were followed by the "Tanzimat" (reorganization) period under Sultan Abdu-1-Mejid, who reigned from 1839 until 1877. This stage culminated with the 1876 Constitution under the Sultanate of Abdu-1-Hamid, that granted, albeit belatedly, the Ottoman citizenship to ali of the Empire's subjects, at a time when nationalist movements were already on the rise. This stage was characterized by some political and cultural reforms and by a formal constitutionalism that remained in place until 1908, although it was ignored by the essentially despotic government of Abdu-1-Hamid. On that same year, the movement of the Young
1. 2. See Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 4-6. Some interesting assessments about the decline of the Ottoman Empire in Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fail of the Great Powers, Vintage Books, New York, 1987. Helio Jaguaribe, Sociedad, cambio y sistema politico, Editorial Paidos, Buenos Aires, 1972.

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Turks deposed Abdu-1-Hamid and replaced him with the weak Mehemet V, who was to reign until 1918. Their aim was to strengthen the Constitution and see that it was obeyed as the law of the land. The Young Turks took measures toward modernization and democratization, that were soon disrupted by contradictions with the national minorities within the Empire, and by the Pan-Turkish leanings that prevailed within the Union and Progress Party, the movement's main political tool. The outbreak of World War I and Turkey's alignment to Germany, driven by the top echelons of the Young Turks, led to the consolidation of an authoritarian power that curbed the movement's reformist drive. Perhaps the most outstanding nationalist thinker of that time, Ziya Gkalp (1875-1924) was associated to the Young Turks. Gkalp tried to intellectually link the Turkish nationalism to the \vesterly-secularist trend and with a more moderate brand of islam, that would attain a great influence ver the Ottoman intelligentsia of his time3. One century of reformist endeavors did not succeed in substantially altering the structure of the Ottoman power, nor in curbing the hopeless decline of the Empire, but left a set of ideas and institutions aimed at a western-style modernization, democratization, cultural reforms based on secularization, and the assertion of the Turkish nation on a linguistic basis. This was an essential legacy of which the Kemalist nationalist Revolution would avail itself and excel it. II. The Revolution, fostered by Mustafa Kemal since he entered the north of Anatolia in May, 1919, was a movement primarily aimed at conquering national independence, facing the intentions of the imperialist powers that had won the war, who sought to dismember the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, he integrated in a new, more coherent and radical conception, in keeping with the 20th century, the modernizing tradition of one century of failed attempts at reform. He availed himself of what turned out to be specially favorable circumstances, brought about by the Ottoman defeat in the world conflict, the neocolonial ambitions of the victors, and the \veakness and corruption of the Sultanate then headed by Vahdettin, incapable of assuming the defense of the Empire, much less of the Turkish nation, and mobilized the popular reserves to forge a new nation from the ruins of the disappearing multinational Empire.
3. I have based this synthesis mainly on the aforementioned work by Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics, as well as in the historical background from the work by the Argentinian writer Jorge Blanco Villalta Atatrk, Trk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi, Ankara, 1982, first part.

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Mustafa Kemal, the most outstanding military man in the Empire during the great war, the hero exalted by the defense of the Dardanelles that earned him great national prestige, emerged as the unifier of the patriotic and popular forces and the undisputed animator, the leader of the process of national reassertion and modernization4. Not only other outstanding military chiefs rallied around him; he also joined together important sectors of the people, of the imperial officialdom, of the urban middle classes, of the intelligentsia, and even of the provincial Islamic clergy, in a great national patriotic front. The nationalist movement's first aim to defeat of the occupying powers which Greece had joined, and their intents to dismember the nation- was accomplished in barely four years, by virtue of an enormous war effort despite the fact that its strength and resources were inferior to those of its adversary. Mustafa Kemal's military genius stood out again at that time, as did the quality of his leadership and his unbending will directed at consolidating his fatherland's independence. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne culminated that heroic endeavor, for it declared null and void the Sevres' attempt at expoliation. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lausanne was the only one signed on an equal footing with the victors, by one of the powers defeated in World War I. That political and diplomatic triumph Consolidated the victory of the nationalist arms and the independence of Turkey, and paved the way for the transforming and creative stage of the nationalist revolution, inaugurated by the abolition of the Sultanate and the proclamation of the Republic on October 29, 19235. Mustafa Kemal would also be the main motive force and inspirator behind this task. The hero of the Dardanelles and of the war of liberation was not only a great military leader, but also a man of culture, a connoisseur of history, a political thinker with a modern projection, influenced by the example of the French Revolution and by advanced democratic thinking. Since his early youth he wished to overcome the secular backvvardness of the old Ottoman Empire by adopting the advances made by vvestern civilization in various fundamental domains, albeit adapting and integrating them into the Turkish national culture. Let us summarize the principal aspects of the process that transformed the Turkish society so deeply:
4. Kemal's reputation as a military leader, and his feats during World War I are sufficiently well-known. About his decisive role in the defense of the Dardanelles, see the most recent and perhaps more complete history of that conflict, by British historian Martin Gilbert First World War, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, Second Impression, October, 1994, Chapter 8. Also see the aforementioned work Atatrk, by Blanco Villalta, second part, specially chapters 7 and 8. For an excellent review of the war of liberation by a Turkish source, see A. Afetinan, A History of the Turkish Revolution and Turkish Republic, The General Directorate of Press and Information of the Turkish Republic, Ankara, 1981. Also see Blanco Villalta, Atatrk, third and fourth parts.

5.

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* The creation of republican institutions, with the Great National Assembly and a presidential executive power as their main pillars, were the basis of a modern, centralized political system that granted the citizenship of the new Turkey to ali Ottoman subjects. * For Kemal and for the most advanced sector of the nationalist movement, the cornerstone of the effort toward modernization was the secularization of the state, an extremely diffcult task in a Mslim country, almost 90% of whose population was illiterate and where the old imperial leaders vvielded, at the same time, the spiritual leadership of islam. To a certain extent, abolishing the Sultanate was a step toward laicization, followed by the abolition of the Caliphate, the replacement of religiously inspired laws by legal codes based on European models, the assumption by the State of the educational system based, since then, on scientifc notions, and the gradual, but relatively swift granting of equal civil and political rights to women. * nce the process of secularizing the State and the educational system was completed, a radical cultural reform was undertaken by replacing the Arabic alphabet with the Latin one, and by simultaneously cleansing the Turkish language of words taken from the Persian and Arabic languages. This reform would not only contribute povverfully to the development of the Turkish national culture, but it would also facilitate the huge anti-illiteracy endeavor, essential for the country's development. * nce the national independence had been achieved, the republic had been proclaimed and the political and juridical institutions had been restructured within a secular framework, the economy would henceforth play a central role in consolidating the new nation's sovereignty. Like Kemal Atatrk himself emphasized in a speech delivered in 1921, "[...] when one speaks of full independence this means, of course, total political, financial, economic, judicial, military, cultural, ete, freedom in ali respeets. Being deprived of any one of those I enumerated would mean, in the strictest sense, that the nation and the country lack full independence"6. Being a great military leader, he knew that military victories had no enduring meaning "unless they are crowned with economic victories [...] therefore, to continue reaping the benefcial effects of our great and brilliant victory, our economy and our economic independence must be 7 secured, reinforced and expanded" . The 1929-1933 world crisis impelled the adoption of a state-led development and industrialization program. The Soviet experience with five-year plans was undoubtedly influential in this direetion, although that experience was assumed pragmatically, without doctrinarian strict6. 7. Quotations from Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 1982, p. 18. Quotations..., op.cit., p. 69.

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ness, faced by the need to have the State play an essential role in this domain due to the difficulties to attain foreign funding and the relatively poor development of the national capitalist entrepreneurial sector8. The State, as the paramount motive force of the country's development, totally or partially assumed the direction of the main branches of the economy, and laid the groundwork for an industrialization process, the economic foundation for the country's entry into modernity. The great endeavor for economic transformation mainly influenced the urban environment during the first two decades of the Republic, whereas the agriculture did not experience a similar development9. These political, institutional, educational, cultural, religious and economic transformations shaped an undoubtedly revolutionary change in a country that had been the seat of a decaying empire for centuries. A scholar who has carried out in-depth studies about this experience emphasized that "[...] vvithin the span of three-quarters of a century, Turkish society had evolved from absolutism to constitutional monarchy and then on to the Republic [...] from a multinational theocratic empire to a national secularist state, from a peasant economy to industry, from total dependence abroad for industrial products to relative self-sufficiency"10. it was indeed a transformation from above, carried out by a coalition of social sectors that included important military leaders, representatives from the State's officialdom, most intellectuals and the urban bourgeoisie, but one that succeeded in attracting the support of broad masses of the people for the task of saving and renewing the fatherland, called for by Atatrk's political genius".
8. The non-doctrinarian spirit that favored the introduction of economic planning is quite revealing for, although the Republican leadership was inspired by the Soviet model and was even adviced by a Soviet delegation headed by Professor Orlov, at the same time it requested the cooperation of a North American commission led by W.D. Hines and E.W. Kemmerer. See William Hale's The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey, Croom Holm Ltd., London (reprinted), 1984, p. 56. See also Soviet author Gennadi Starchenkov, "Problems of Investment and Employment Planning in Turkey" in the collection The Near and Middle East Countries: Economy andPolicy, Academy of Sciences, Moscovv, USSR, 1982. Like a senior French diplomat, also an expert in Turkish affairs, has aptly pointed out, two great revolutions influenced Atatrk's Revolution: the French Revolution in the political and institutional realms, in the process of secularization and, in general, in the country's republican orientation; and the Soviet Revolution in regard to economic development and the State's leading role. See Eric Rouleau, "Turkey: Beyond Atatrk" in Foreign Policy, No. 101, Summer, 1996. 9. in regard to the urban emphasis of endeavors toward economic transformation and the relative stagnation of agriculture, see Helio Jaguaribe, opt.cit, p. 65, and also William Hale, op.cit., p. 62. 10. Kemal Karpat, op.cit., p. 75. 11. For the conceptualization of revolutions from above, see Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1977. Also, by Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, Verso, London, 1981, pp. 25-31.

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The Kemalist Revolution was a national revolution, in the sense that its leader limited it to the territory and the genuinely Turkish population that made up the historical core and the basis of the old Ottoman Empire, thus distancing himself from the hardly realistic aspirations of PanTurkish trends, traditional in certain previous nationalist modernizing circles, like that of the Young Turks; on the other hand, it was a nationalism based on more secular and rational tenets than the one expounded by thinkers like Gkalp; the Revolution was also republican, for it abolished the Sultanate and assumed this form of government as the most apt for a modern, civilized State; it was also popular or poplist, in the sense that it united various sectors of the nation in the struggle for effective independence and transformation of the nation, considering such sectors not as divided into antagonic classes, but as functional and complementary secfors, joined by the shared interest of saving the fatherland; secular, because it separated the State from the Islamic religion, considered as a component of the citizens' private lives,as a basic requisite demanded by the modernizing endeavor; etatist because it granted a central and basic role to the new State in economic development, which made Turkey the frst among developing countries to implement a state-directed industrialization program; lastly, it applied revolutionism, in that it deeply transformed, in a few years, the nation's structures, ossifed under the Ottoman rule, without becoming radically socialist like the Soviet Union, a country with which the new Turkey maintaned excellent relations during the frst tvventy years of the Republic, that proved to be quite important and significant during the war of liberation and the drive for industrialization in the 1930s. Bearing in mind that Turkey was a basically agrarian, backward, Islamic country and, furthermore, the see of that religion's spiritual leadership; that, 90% of its population was illiterate; that it lacked modern scientific and technical development and administrative and technical personnel in sufficient quantities, and that it had been obliged to honor a part of the debts contracted by the Ottoman Empire and had grave limitations for receiving foreign funding, the Turkish national revolution probably was the most feasible experience in those historical circumstances. Thus, nationalism, republicanism, secularism, populism etatism and revolutionism were the bases of Kemalism, not only as the ideology of a single party --the Republican People's Party founded by Atatrk, but of a great national endeavor from which emerged the modern Turkish nation. The Kemalist Revolution --one of the first national-populist revolutions of this century that took place in one of the continents subjected to western colonization, in a region of primary geostrategic importance, the bridge between Europe and Asia, the question around which revolved traditional diplomacy for several centuries undoubtedly has an enormous meaning in this century. For the peoples of Asia, and specially for Mus-

35

lims, it had a strong demonstrative effect. it proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that it was possible to conquer and consolidate national independence, and to undertake autonomous development, adapting the best achievements of western civilization, while reaffirming national cultural values. it was the first State to prove it was possible to secularize islam as an essential step to enter modernity, vvhile it anticipated by decades the demands of what would be later called the Third World, decidedly approaching the prioritized task of economic development. Atatrk himself clearly expressed the international meaning of the Turkish Revolution, when he said in 1922: 'Turkish struggle does not concern Turkey only. If the struggle initiated by Turkey was only in its name and for its own account, it would perhaps have been of shorter duration and less bloody. Turkey has mounted an enormous and substantial effort. Because what it defends is the cause of ali oppressed nations, the cause of the entire Orient, Turkey is certain that until final victory, ali nations of the Orient which support it will march along"12. III. in these last years of the 20th century, when humankind is about to enter what is already envisaged as a new historic era, the pertinence and topicality of the example of the great national movement headed by Kemal Atatrk is unquestionable. it is quite well known that two majr processes are the original causes of the historic change we are witnessing: * The collapse through implosion of the bloc of European socialist states headed by the Soviet Union, the event that had a more immediate resonance and greater significance in the politico-strategic sphere, put an end to the forty-year long world confrontation, the Cold War; * The process of globalization of the economy, that impels the formation of large regional spaces for integration and of competing geoeconomic blocs. With the end of the Cold War, the East-West rivalry has been displaced by the protagonism and the competence among economic megablocs, that will perhaps become geostrategic blocs in the near future, as new power relations take shape and circumstances contribute to strengthen the supremacy of the only extant superpovver: the United States. The bipolarity that dates back to the years of the Cold War has been replaced by the strategic unipolarity of the United States, while a renewed trend toward multipolarity has simultaneously appeared.
12. Quotations..., op.cit., p. 35.

36

The end of the great global East-West confrontation, however, has not meant a new era of peace. If the peril of a Third World War with nuclear \veapons has moved away, local and regional conflicts based on worsening ethnic and national rivalries and by religious fundamentalism are increasing, in a context of ever deepening North-South differences, of growing deterioration of the natural environment and the rise in transnational erime. The much publicized dividends of peace are novvhere to be seen but, on the contrary, the world is entering a fluid, turbulent, convulsive transition period, fraught with renewed perils, during which the yet obscure, unpredictable traits of the international system of the 2st century will take shape. in this stage of historic transition and re-shaping of international relations in a tremendously complex world scenario, the great powers point to the creation of a "new world order" somewhat prematurely announced by the then President of the United States George Bush vvhen he exulted ver his 1991 "splendid little war" in the Persian Gulf. The task seems difficult, given the dimensions and the complexity of the current international scenario, that rather appears "out of control", as a well-known North American academic and statesman emphasized in one of his last vvorks13. Mainly if that attempt at reordering the world is undertaken according to the traditional hegemonic policies of the great powers, if ali the peoples but specially the peoples of the South, that make up the overvvhelming majority of humankind are not brought into a just, equitable world order. The attempt will prove inviable and will bring about negative and unpredictable consequences, if it purports not to reorder, but rather to polie the world. And while two-thirds or humankind struggle in the midst of poverty, underdevelopment and exploitation, the big powers of the North try to impose economic and political models; declare socialist and State-led experiences obsolete; minimize, vvhen referred to States in the South, basic tenets of International Law such as sovereignty and self-determination, and proelaim a questionable "right to intervene" under the most unlikely pretexts. Hovvever, the indeed real and robust sovereignty of the great povvers is reaffirmed more strongly than ever before, in the context of a veritable crisis of values vvithin the dominant nations of the North, acknovvledged by outstanding seholars14, of a visible lack of great political fgures and of a strategic thinking capable of creatively facing today's challenges, of presenting a far-reaching, coherent project for the future of ali humankind, not only of one-third of it. That is why there is a special significance in the legacy of the nationalist Revolution from which the modern Turkey emerged, and its great
13. Zbignievv Brzezinski, Out of Control, Charles Scribner's Sons, USA, 1993. 14. Brzezinski, op.cit.

37

leader, Kemal Atatrk, whose thinking is, in many essential aspects, fully valid in a global sense as well as in ~or mainly in regard to~ facing the new challenges that confront the peoples of the developing world. Let us look at some aspects of that fundamental legacy: * To defend national independence and self-determination uncompromisingly, when faced with the hegemonic ambitions of the great powers, and to be willing to make ali necessary sacrifces to defend it and make everyone respect it. * To strengthen and consolidate national independence by means of an all-encompassing development, but mainly by economic development. * To grant equal importance to educational and cultural development, assimilating the scientific and technical achievements of the most advanced civilizations, and adapting them to the national traits. * To cast the State in a central role in the guidance of the development process, essential to Third World countries. * To strengthen one's own nation in a context of utmost respect for other nations, their culture and traditions. * To renounce unreal and absrd expansionist ambitions of a territorial nature, or based on ethnic or religious Messianisms. * To base one's own security on the respect for the security of ali other peoples, thus establishing an effective peace policy. The world has certainly changed since the Turkish Republic was proclaimed 75 years ago. The current scientific and technical revolution and the globalizing forces of the economy are impelling an increasing interdependence among the peoples, and the need to integrate in order to create new markets and larger economic spaces. But integration can only be achieved by means of cooperation based on respect for the will and the interests of the peoples, not by imposition. Interdependence must further the links among peoples and cultures in a context of respect and mutual enrichment, not by a voluntarist and coercive reaffirmation of models previously established by the hegemonic centers. That is why Kemal Atatrk, whose almost prophetic vision enabled him to foresee in the mid-1930s the outbreak of the Second World War and practically also its outcome, could foretell that "colonialism and imperialism will disappear from the Earth and will be replaced by a new era of harmony and cooperation betvveen nations vvithout any discrimination 15 as to color, creed and race" . Naturally, in order to achieve that new era of harmony among the peoples he knew quite vvell, and said it clearly,
15. Quotations..., op.cit., p. 114.

38

that "mutual security is a basis for happiness which ali nations of the world should strive for" and that, "unless such security is extended to cover ali nations, it will not serve to assure world peace"16. A thought to the point, whose effective application stili is an aspiration of the international community, specially of the peoples of the South, who are a majority, for whom security implies not only independence and the lack of threats, but also the possibility of an autonomous development, free of impositions, as a basis for well-being. in this context, and bearing in mind the role the United Nations is called upon to play in the aftermath of the Cold War, what the great leader of the Turkish Revolution said about its predecessor, the League of Nations, is quite significant: "it must, he pointed out, manifest itself and develop as an institution which is not an instrument of domination by the strong, but as one which assures harmony and balance between nations and which helps conflicts to be reviewed and settled vvithin fair and equitable premises"17. in short, a current, full-fledged program of action for the supreme world organization was outlined. A new world order truly just and humane requires, to summarize, statesmen with far-reaching vision and a strategic thinking capable of designing a better future for ali. Men of the stature of Kemal Atatrk, who left an immortal legacy of struggle, of resistance against imperialist ambitions, of national reaffirmation and of brotherhood among the peoples, and an inspiring political thinking at whose center is the beautiful idea -for his country and for the world that humankind's and civilization's prosperity and progress depend upon achieving the aim, which to him was essential, of "Peace at home, Peace in the World".

16. Quotations..., op.cit., p. 108. 17. Quotations..., op.cit., p. 108.

39

ATATURKISM AN INITIATIVE OF A MODERN POLITICAL CULTURE (COMPARATIVE STUDY)

Ass. Prof. Llambro FLO* The formation of a political culture especially of a democratic one is not an easy undertaking. A new political culture usually comes into life when the former institutional tools are overthrovved or modified. As a result it will reflect several viewpoints or complicated attitudes connected to the past but also fixed into the memories, traditions, manners of people or different groups. However we must say that a political system of government has a decisive role on the political culture. On one hand it feeds her formation and on the other hand guarantees a successfull development. The establishment of a democratic order is a difficult undertaking, as a result in long historical periods few countries has reached the right to be democratic. Being aware of that, a great number of authors and scholars paid attention to the same "possibilities" or "possible conditions" considered as favourable for the success or failure of the democratic order. These "possibilities" are connected to: a) historical sequences; b) concentration in the social & economic order; c) the level of socio-economic development; d) equalities and inequalities; e) subcultures, cleavage, patterns and governmental effectiveness; f) foreign domination; g) the beliefs of political activists; Selecting the last "possibility" and studying it in a comparative specter everyone could see decisive importance. Atatrk belongs to the cate* University of Tirana.

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gory of illustrious people that completely addicted themselves to the modernization of Turkey. Since the first steps tovvards the country transformation, Turkey had the necessary features of a modern state; a) a national state independent and compact out of the subordinate or superintendence complecities towards the others (for the first time in history Turkey comes as a nation-state with a homogenity; 95 per cent of the population were Turks); b) popular sovereignty (the overthrovv of the sultanate; liquidation of caliphate, proclamation of the republic confirming the separate powers into the government); c) the undertaking of new governmental functions connected to the legal guarantee of human rights and providement of general welfare (the approval of a new constitution; officialism of Atatrks principles). On the framevvork of a whole institutional detachment from the old empirial past, the Atatrk's propensities created the base of a new political culture. His propensities reflected ali the activities of the future. The acceptance and the assimilation of the western civilization values were the prior purposes of the Atatrk's reforms. He said; "civilization is the West, the modern world, Turkey must be a part of it if country has to survive. The nation has to apply explicitly in form and contain ali the manners that civilization offers to ali nations". Speaking about the western civilization he does not mean only the modern technology of production but also the embracement and the application of vvestern ideals. These ideals setting on the bases of modernization and durable systems were much concerned to the modern political culture and to the systems of government. The reverse case, the totalitarian regime gives and example of the political culture as a ideological indoctrination imposed to the people. This phenomenon was accompanied by the acceptance of an unique ideology; the marxism-leninism ideology, and by the submission tovvards the party-state will, things that created a whole barrier between two worlds, forcing people to believe that the western world was an hostile one. The broad masses of the people in Turkey attempted, for the first time a defined distinction betvveen state field of activity and social feld of activity. This distinction is one of the fundamental features of the modern state. Such a state pretends to regulate or to control the economic, cultural or social activity vvithout absorbing it. One of the Atatrk's principles was "etatism". it is concerned to the state role in economy. Its execution required creation of the state sector. Different authors have reached the conclusion that "etatism" of Atatrk

42

applied in the 30" has been influenced by the Russian model of planifcation". As a matter of fact state undertakings in Turkey were fruits of neccessities not of ideologies. The state sector was supposed to serve to the private initiatives and undertakings, in order to help them grovving up. The private properties were never touched but were seen as fundamental base of development. At death's door, Atatrk required a further liberalization on the bases of market economy. So the state feld of activity and the economic field of activity would be separate but also having an impact to each-other. Since the years of Atatrk's reforms the private sector of industry grew up in a certain way, meanwhile the agricultural product remained behind and concentrated to the private owners' control. in this way the framevvork for the individual initiatives on the bases of the free economic undertakings has been created. This was one of the possibilities that the democratic rule and the political culture offered to the people. in the same time the Atatrk's reforms in different felds of life as in society, cultural education, role of women, were concerned to what is called "the reveal of individuals" or "the birth of individuals". At the beginning of the nineteenth century in Turkey was seen the inclination towards similiar principles but without success. The exposure of the individuals and of their personalities was the core of the new political culture and of its implementation. For both countries, Turkey and Albania, the historical past brings a lot of similiarites concerned to the heritage of agrarian society. in this kind of society, people remained fixed in a community of closed enclaves based on families, groups or social divisions. This small divisions were pray of a manipulation from state hierarchy. This relations suffocating the individual personality put it independent place towards the state authority, stimulating at the same time the laziness, the poverty or the revolt sometimes in the harshest forms. The transformation that was result of Atatrk's reforms gave to the individuals a decisive role in the building of a new society, opening to the individuals new possibilities on having equal treatments on personality development. These prerogatives made the base of individual development leaving an pen path to some phenomenons like self-organization, self-dicipline, self-respect and tolerance among several social groups that accepting rank differences denied class struggle. in such relations were seen the features of new political culture, of legal acceptance, of concious responsibilities towards the systems of government. Communism as an ideology applied from Enver Hoxha and his followers vanished every distinction betvveen state and society vanishing the first feature of a modern state that's a condition of existence for the rule

43

of law and state. So the society was a tool of state and ali the human resources were now under the state control. Several slogans like "the socialist industrialization", "agrarian collectivization", forced individuals to renounce their properties, and privileges. So the individuals were forced to renounce the economic liberty, their initiatives, things that are fundamental for the ongoing processes of a modern society, and vvhich are considered as natural rights of individuals. The totalitarian communist regime made a radical change. Everything that in a modern state belongs to the society and private sector was turned into subject activity of parties and state-party. So every aspect of social life and intellectual and cultural activities was control subject of party and state. A totalitarian regime was the contrary side of a liberaldemocratic s tate with its individuals in center and base. The marxism-leninism indoctrination that grew up on the basis of a class struggle gave some divine features to the state control. Changing every aspect of individual life and keeping individuals much connected to the state vanishing one of most important features of individuals-their "self-existence" the totalitarian regimes created their own "political culture". This was a political culture of a forced and blind obedience of spiritual and mental dividining. in such a context by, the totalitarian regime, state and government were as "closely allied" as "distant" to the mass of people. "Closely allied" because the individuals were forced to expect everything by the government. "Distant" because the individuals were subject of state-party control that dissapointed them feeding only with the so called general welfare that consisted in lack of wide consume daily goods. Pretentions of individuals on governmental system remained unfolded and their responsibilities could'nt take the legal institutional colour based on self-organization, self-dicipline, moral respect vvithin the society. The end of the totalitarian system showed the falsiety of the regime slogans, like "the creation of new individual". The explosion of an "absolute liberty" that sometime was understood as destruction of public buildings, made clear to everyone that the so-called "culture & public behavior" or "order & silence" were only slogans imposed to the people. During the transition the democratic rule suffered the impact of the totalitarian political culture claimed in the above-mentioned aspects of life; like a) in the closely allied relations between government & individuals, b) in a kind of ambiguity towards the government and its staff, c) in respectless feelings tovvards the government and legal-state, 7) in hardness, behavior that sometimes passed every limit and changed into extremism. Involving on further events, development in Turkey we could say that Atatrk's reforms were fundamental for a new political culture that reflected later on the functions of a modern state. However the formation of a political culture went on gradually, at the time when different things 44

conditioned on some incomplete aspects. Based on Turkish studies and authors, especially in Turgut zal edition 'Turkey in Europe & Europe in Turkey", everyone can reach some conclusions. The Turkish case witnesses a connection between political and cultural reforms from one hand and the economic beneftions that modernization brings from the other hand. Since years ago in Turkey the popular demand on political rights stand above the economic possibilities, so with the modernization, attention was paid to the political and cultural reforms. in such a context through political achievements and economic ones a disbalance was created. This had its impact on internal disorders that happened in every ten years so the governmental interventions overpassing them stimulated the military interventions. The cultural reforms were more successful in the urban segments of population than in rural segments that made 80% of the population. The rural population was inclined by the identification of cultural achievement with difficult conditions of life, than the blame belonged to the governmental circles. in the case of Atatrk, the modernization, reforms and their successful implementations were personified to him, turning his figre in a kind of salvator cult. These merits were attributed to Atatrk and he completely deserved them but later on, a lot of politicians pretend such attributes requiring to blame their opposite colleagues for the difficult moments that every nation passes through. Overpassing of these phenomenons was a neccessary thing because nation-states are strong and they do have an economic and political stability when they do pay attention to the role and importance of state institutions. Such problems usually stimulate political scientists in studying different aspects of political development like: the preparatory phase that people need in order to accept the modern political culture or the fact that borrowing from vvestern worlds were just invitated or rightly applicated and implemented in other countries. Of a great importance are the positive sides reflected in the recent political culture of Turkey. An expression is the wide acceptation of democracy and democratic rule. Let us turn the point to some of Turgut zal's conclusions: Comparing to the other nation-states a specifc aspect is that the peaceful transition was fruit of a two-party system of government. During the elections of 1950 we see a general suffarage and democratic periods are longer than authoritary ones. This fact is strictly connected to the people participation in more than 11 national elections and local

45

elections. Observations and studies done by different people make clear to every one that people are inclined to support the multi-party systems waiting to appreciate their personal well-being. The social groups of interest will be essential democratic instruments especially through respectation of human rights. Comparing to some other countries the Turkish people are characterised by a tolerant behavior tovvards the political opposite. Touchable and radical transformations are fruit of an urbanization of masses (in 1923, 90% made the rural population while in 1990 60% of people made urban population), and urban or rural development. A great impact had the industrial growth, the mass-media and cultural exchanges through European countries (more than 4-5 million tourists coming to Turkey every year). in spite of great distinctions between rural and urban areas or diffirent social groups the mass of people was concious on effectivity that individual has, an effectivity expressed in every attempt for creation or growth of vvelfare within the possibilites that individuals have. Recent study cases showed that every kind of improvement in social life, life conditions, new resources has only a minimal impact from government because the country development is not only a state prerogative. An comtemporary inclination is the so-called "limited government" or "minimal government" which assures on implementation of individual rights an an governmental undertaking of resposibilites that new technological developments require. Ataturkism and reforms that belong to it, speedy developments that were results of reforms, implementation together with the achievements of further periods, increased the prestige of Turkey in the world.

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ATATRK AND THE IDEA OF A REPUBLICAN STATE

NadaZIMOVA* The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the transformation of Turkey from the traditional Ottoman Sultanate into a modern republican state was one of the most impressive developments following World War I. That transformation and foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 is conneced with the activity of the leader of the Turkish War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, in 1981, we commemorated the lOOth anniversary of his birth. Atatrk's centennial was an occasion not only for world-wide celebration, but also an impetus for majr scholarly activities about his role and achievement. Similarly, the 75th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey offers new opportunities to study how much the primary aims of the republican Turkey and the main tenets of earlier Turkish modernization efforts had in common. The present contribution does not attempt to deal with full range of issues that may be implied by its title. Its purpose is a more modest endeavour, an account of one strand in the tangle of the large subject feld: a reconsideration of the process of the formation of the Turkish republican state, or at least some of its most important features. Though that process itself occurred in the early of the 1920's, its roots go back as far as the mid-19th century. At that time, the beginnings were seen of the movement of the Young Turks who were later to rise in the revolution of 1908. Their activity is to be seen within the entire context of the lengthy reform transformation of the Turkish society and the development of the Turkish national consciousness. That development cannot be characterized as a mere processs of quantitative growth of one single quality. The Turks, as Bernard Lewis stresses, "despite the survival of the Turkish language and the existence of what was in fact, though not in theory, a Turkish state"1 had identified themselves as Muslims and subjects of the Ottoman state and
Charles University, Prague. Lewis, Bernard, The Emer gence of Modern Turkey. OUP, London 1961, p. 2.

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dynasty. Hence, the basic elements of Ottomanism and the religious adherence to a universal Islamic identity were absorbed into Turkism of that newly arising Young Turks Movement. Its main alm was not yet the creation of Turkish national state; rather, it intended to transform the Ottoman State into a constitutional monarchy. Although the Young Turks were organized into an effective movement which was able to seize power and take further initiatives, it did not find positive solution to the main problems of the declining Empire and failed to avert the profound crisis of the Ottoman society. The World War I and the resulting defeat of the Ottoman Empire meant not only the threat of partition by the victorious powers, but also an endangerment of the fundamental prerequisities for the existence of the Turkish nation. How did the Turks react to the changed situation and develop new attitudes to the different problems facing them at that period? As a reaction to the partition plans of the Allies, the Turkish resistance groups known as Societies for the Defence of Rights had already been formed in various parts of Anatolia. One of the Turkish military leaders who had no intention of submitting to the occupying Allies was Mustafa Kemal. Disregarding the Sultan's instructions to pacify the country, he set about the task of organizing a resistance movement, the main aim of which was to prepare the ground for the armed defence of Anatolia. During his early military career, he was very close to the Young Turks movement and even certain dynamic features of the Turkist ideology served him as an impetus for his further activities. in this connection. Let us make reference to his mission to Libya in 1908 where he was sent by the Committee of Union and Progress to look into that Ottoman province's political and social problems. As Rachel Simon writes: "Although Mustafa Kemal's success in establishing modern politics in Libya was limited by the region's traditionalist character... he did succeed in laying out the basic pattern of Kemalist political activity of later years"2. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal shared the idea of maintenance of the Ottoman Empire in a constitutional form with the Young Turks Movement, at that time. After World War I, the traditional institution of the Sultanate and Caliphate were no longer capable of coping with their political and social responsibilities. There were the historical circumstances of the Turkish War of independence that brought Mustafa Kemal from a moderate constitution-monarchical thinking towards new thoughts on nation and state which led him to the acceptance of the republican doctrine. Hence, in spite of his earlier efforts to accommodate traditional political usages to new necessities, he was to adopt a new, and radical position.
2. See her contribution Prelude to Reforms: Mustafa Kemal in Libya, in: Atatrk and the Modernization ofTurkey Ed. by Jacob M. Landau. Boulder 1984, p. 21.

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He gave up the idea of maintaining the integrity of the heterogenous Ottoman Empire, and he raised the idea of a state aiming at the transformation of the Turkish traditional ways of life and institutions as a necessary internal parallel to the defence of the survival and preserving the independence of the Turkish nation-state3. Although not proclaimed until October 29th, 1923, the republic was implicit in a series of measures implemented by Mustafa Kemal in the course of the armed struggle for the Turkish independence. Thus the creation of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara in 1920 after the shortlived Ottoman Parliament in istanbul is vvorth mentioning. The former body adopted a large number of resolutions and laws intended to make certain that the emerging republican state would be built on entirely new principles. As I have noted elsewhere "...the newly forming state in Anatolia would not have been able to exist either in the form of, or with content of some ort of monarchy or Ottoman Sultanate, if it were to remain operative in the long run. On the contrary, a vigorous, modern and internally strong republican Turkey was the only long-run perspective and possibility for the Turkish nation and state"4.

3. 4.

See ayc, Abdurrahman, Atatrk ve Tarih Boyutu iinde adalama, in: Atatrk Aratrma Merkezi Dergisi. Volume 6, No 16, 1989, p. 59-60. See also Erolu, Hamza, Atatrk ve Cumhuriyet, Ankara 1989, p. 22-38. Zimov, R, The formative roots of the Turkish republican state. in: Rapports, Corapports, Communications tch4coslovaques pour le IV. Congres de l'Association Internationale d'Etudes du Sud-Est Europeen, Praha 1977, p. 492.

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CUMHURYETN LNININ 75. YILI AVRUPALILAMA VE KEMALZMN KARAKTER

Dr. Muhammed NUREDDN* 29 Ekim 1923 tarihi Trk Devletinin, 1299 ylndaki ilk doumundan sonra ikinci doum tarihidir. Bu tarihten sonra Trkiye'nin Avrupa'nn corafi, kltrel ve uygarlk bakmndan bir paras olmas umudunun gerekletirilmesi imkan da olumutur. Esasen, Avrupallama Atatrk'le beraber balamamtr. Bazlarnn kabul ettii zere, 1839 Tanzimat ve 1856 Islahat Fermanlar ile 1876 Anayasas sadece devletin ileyiini iyiletirmek, dahili patlamalarn nne gemek ve ilerleme iin yaplm reformlardr. Bazlarna -Batc eilimlere gre ise, Avrupa yolunda atlan admlardr. Ancak, hayat tarz ve kltrel anlamda Avrupa'ya dn, pratikte Mustafa Kemal ATATRK'le balamtr. Atatrk, Avrupa'ya ierik ve ekil olarak uyulacak bir rnek nazaryla bakmtr. Bu itibarla Atatrk, devlet iin resmi bir yntem olarak Avrupa medeniyetini kabul eden ilk Trk lideridir. Attrk, "Yeni Trk neslinin kurmas gereken uygarlk, ekil ve ierik olarak Avrupa medeniyetidir. Zira tek bir uygarlk vardr. Bu, Avrupa medeniyetidir. Btn dnya insanlar, hayat ve saygnlk salamak iin Avrupa medeniyetini almak zorundadr." demitir. Ancak, Trkiye'nin Avrupa'ya yolculuu Atatrk'e gre bir bakma slam'dan ayrlmas anlamna gelmektedir. Atatrk bununla Bat'y Trkiye'ye kar birletiren "Trkiye'nin slami kimlii" kartn Batllarn elinden almay hedeflemitir. Ayrca, uygulamada anlalmtr ki, Atatrk'n Bat medeniyetini son derece beenmesine ramen, modernleme uygulamas balamnda kendine zg fikir ve grleri vard. Bunlar temelde Avrupa medeniyetiLbnan niversitesi, Edebiyat Fakltesi, Beyrut.

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nin deerleri ile kesimiyordu. Atatrk, milliyetilii, btn toplumun Trk olduu ve tek bir Trk milletine mensubiyet olarak anlamtr. Bu anlayn "Ne mutlu Trkm diyene" sz ile ifade etmitir. Atatrk, 1929 yl dnya ekonomik bunalmnn ykc etkilerinden korunabilmek iin Sovyet ekonomisini taklit etmitir. II. Dnya Savann akabindeki uluslararas gelimeler Batllama projesini gerekletirmesi iin Trkiye'ye altn bir frsat yaratmt. Trkiye, NATO'ya 1952 ylnda gvenlik bakmndan katld. 1959 ylndan itibaren, Bat Almanya, Fransa, talya, Belika, Hollanda ve Lksemburg arasnda imzalanm olan Roma Antlamasndan sonra Ortak Avrupa Pazar adna k gsteren Avrupa'nn yeni ekonomik projesinin bir paras olmak iin urat (Trkiye, bundan nce de 1946 ylnda Bat'nn ve Avrupa medeniyeti deerlerinden biri olan demokratiklemeyi kabul etmiti). AT ile Trkiye arasndaki ilikilerde, mevcut eitli ekonomik problemlere ilaveten, 12 Eyll 1980 askeri darbesinden sonra demokrasi, zgrlk ve insan haklar problemleri de ileri srlmeye baland. Avrupa, Portekiz, Yunanistan ve spanya'ya Toplulua katlma iin demokrasinin uygulanmasn temel bir art olarak kabul ederken, Trkiye bunu, kendinin iilerine Avrupa tarafndan bir mdahale olarak gryordu. Anlamazlk derindi ve her iki taraf demokrasi ve zgrlk kavramlarn kendi grleri esasna dayandryordu. 1983 ylnda demokrasiye ekingen ekilde dnle birlikte, Trkiye ile AB arasndaki ilikilerinde biraz dzelme oldu. Seneler sren kesintiden sonra her iki taraf arasndaki Ortaklk Konseyi tekrar 1986'da topland. Babakan Turgut zal, grnen bir nebze mit ndan faydalanmak zere abalad ve 14 Nisan 1987 tarihinde srpriz bir ekilde AT'ye tam yelik iin talepte bulundu. Bu talebin gerisindeki ana etkiler, ncelikle Trkiye'nin batllama projesinde adm atmaya devam etmek, Yunanistan engeli ile baetmek ve uyum salamaktr. Yunanistan, gerekten AT ile Trkiye'nin btnlemesi ynnde ilerlemeyi engellemede rol oynad. 1988 ylnda Dileri Bakan Mesut Ylmaz, "Trkiye Bat'nn dier kurumlarnda ye olduundan, AT'ye de ye olmas gereklidir" diyerek istemini tekrarlad. Trkiye'nin talebinin incelenmesi iki buuk yl srd. Beklendii gibi, bu yelik Trkiye'nin yaamakta olduu siyasi ve ekonomik problemlerin AT ile uyumad gerekesi ile reddedildi. Souk savan sona ermesi ve 1991 ylnda SSCB'nin dalmas ile Trkiye'nin evresi nemli deiikliklere urad. Trkiye'nin menfaatleri

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ile dorudan ilgili baz alternatifler ortaya kt. "Trk Devletleri" arasnda siyasi btnlemenin yaplmas giriimleri dodu. Turgut zal buna doru kuvvetle yneldi. Ayn ekilde zal, Karadeniz'e kyda lkelerle ekonomik birlik kurulmasna alt. Fakat yeni alternatiflerin ufkunun snrl olduu ortaya kt ve Ankara yeniden AB ile Gmrk Birlii alternatifine yneldi. Anlama 16 Mart 1995'te imzalanarak 1.1.1996'da uygulamaya geti. Ancak, Trkiye ile SSCB arasndaki ilikilerin seyrinde nemli olay, AB lkelerinin 12-13 Ekim 1997 gnlerinde Lksemburg'daki zirve toplants olmutur. Burada daha nce komnist olan Avrupa lkelerinden onbirinin toplulua katlmas kabul edilmitir. arpc olan, Trkiye'nin AB'nde ve katlmas ngrlen lkeler listesinde yer almamasdr. AB'ne kabul edilebilecekler listesi aamasnda soyut mzakere vaadi bile alamamasdr. Trkiye'nin tepkisi gerekten sert olmutur. Trkiye Ortaklk Konseyi toplantlarm boykot karar ald. Trkiye'nin ye olmas nedeniyle katlmakta olduu AB kurullarnn yapt toplantlara katlmasn dondurdu. KKTC ile federasyon yolunda adm attn aklad. ki taraf arasnda karlkl sulamalar ve keskin ihtilaflar ortaya kt. Trkiye'nin Tanzimattan beri balayan Avrupa yolu bilfiil kmaza girmiti. TRKYE NEZDNDE AVRUPA'YA YNELMENN GELECE Avrupallk seenei -genel olarak Bat- Kemalist sistemin direklerinden birini tekil etmitir. Hatta 1996 Haziran ay sonunda slamc Necmettin Erbakan'n kurduu hkmet dahi AT ile btnlemeyi kuvvetlendirme gayretlerine devama iaret etmitir. Ancak, her iki tarafta da kesin olarak cesaret verici bir durum szkonusu deildir. A) Trkiye Ynnden Siyasi hayattaki askeri messesenin kuvvetli etkisine ve 3 askeri tarbeye ramen, sivil toplum kurulularnn, demokrasi ve zgrlkler alannda Trk toplumunda gerekletirdii byk ilerlemeyi hi kimse inkar edemez. Bu arada, parlamento ve belediyeler sahasnda demokratik tecrbe, egemenliin partiler arasnda, bu balamda 1996 ylnda hkmete slami bir partinin gelii takdire deer. Ayn ekilde iletiim zgrl -mevcut tm kstlamalara ramen- III. dnya lkelerinden olduka ileri bir aamadadr. Trkiye'nin ekonomik dinamikliinin kuvvetinin, zellikle sanayinin ve Avrupa endstrisi ile rekabetinin ve meydan okumas-

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nm farkedilmemesi mmkn deildir. Ancak, buna ramen Trkiye'nin Avrupa'ya yneliinin nnde, aadaki engelleri kaydetmek mmkndr: Bir: Trk toplumunun eitli gruplarnda AB'ye girme konusunda hemfikir bir irade bulunmamaktadr. slamclarn muhalefeti ki, etkili gler iin de Trkiye'nin siyasi istikametinde nemli bir oran oluturmaktadrlar, bu grup sadece bir siyasi parti, Refah (bugn Fazilet) Partisi ile snrl deildir. Ayn zamanda eitli laik partilere de dalmlardr. Bunlara ilaveten, sivil ekonomik ve eitim sektrlerindeki gler laiklere geince, onlar da tek bir grte birlememilerdir. Yetmilerin sonlarnda Ecevit Hkmetinin tutumu Ecevit'in bizzat kendisinin 90'larn ortalarnda bile Gmrk Birlii'ne kar tutumu, birok ekonomik sektrlerinin (tam yelik iin atlmas gerekli bir adm olan) Gmrk Birlii'ne muhalefeti, Trkiye iindeki bu alandaki blnmeye ak rnektir. ki: Trkiye'de egemenlik sorunu, son derece hassas bir konudur. Tam yelik, byk lde baz egemenlik kararlarndan vazgemek anlamna gelmektedir. Trkiye iin belirlenen siyasetlere izin veren ilerde, snrl olma durumunda, tarihi ve corafi sebeplerle, uzlalmas mmkn deildir. Trklerde geleneksel olarak yabancdan ekinme eilimi, kukulanma duygular mevcuttur. te bu durum AB ile tam yelik yolunda Trkiye'yi son derece ekingen klmaktadr. : AB'ye yelik, demokrasi, insan haklar ve zgrlklerine saygy gerektirmektedir. Bu sayglarn odanda aznlklarn kltrel kimliklerine sayg bulunmaktadr. Trkiye bu noktada bir ok hassasiyet ve phe ekmektedir. Sz aznlklardan olunca, Trkiye'de Krt meselesinin durumu ile balantlanmaktadr. Trkiye Krtleri, siyaset ve kltr sokaklarnda haklar olan bir aznlk olarak tannmalar iin urat. Bu sorun karsnda Trk siyasi geleneinde gemiin handikaplar hakim olmaktadr. Bunlardan zellikle Trkiye'nin Gneydousunda Krtler iin otonomi tesisi ngren 1920 tarihli Sevr Anlamas handikapdr. Trklerin uygulad Lozan Anlamas, rklar aznlk olarak kabul etmemekte; sadece Yahudi, Yunan ve Ermeni gibi gayrimslimleri aznlk olarak kabul etmektedir. Buna gre Trkler eitli siyasi ynelilerinde tehlike ve paralanma 1923 Lozan Anlamasnda izilen btnle aykrla kar karak, mstakil rk aznlk olarak, Krtlere kltrel kimliklerini ve siyasi geliimlerine yardm edecek eylerden ekinmektedirler. Bu tehlike, en yksek seviyede ifade edilmitir. Bunlardan biri, Cumhurbakan Demirel'in 1995 Mays ay balarnda Bat'y Trkiye'yi blmek istedikleri konusunda sulamasdr. Ayn ekilde 12 Aralk 1997 tarihinde AT Bakanlarnn Trkiye'yi insan haklar konusunda Ankara'nn phesini arttran "rk aznlklara (dini deil) iaretle Ankara'y aznlklara sayg ve korumalarn kabul ettiini aklamasna davet etmesini", Lozan Anlamasnn inemesi saymas. Buna gre Trkiye'nin insan haklarna tam olarak uy54

mas, AB'nin anladna gre bu byk bir phe konusu ve birlie katlma nnde engel tekil etmektedir. Drt: AB'ye yelik iin demokrasinin tam olarak uygulanmas art, Trk siyasi hayatnda Trk askeri messesesinin merkezi rol ile Anayasa ve kanunlarnda hrriyetlere konan tm ksntlarla atmaktadr. I. Dnya Sava enkaz arasndan modern Trkiye'nin bir asker olan Atatrk nderliindeki ordunun rol ile kurulmasnn irtibat, 1918-1923 yllan arasnda milli kurtulu srasnda 1923'den bugne kadar Trkiye'nin i ve d siyasetinde batan sona kadar esasl rol almasna zemin hazrlamtr. Kamuoyu tarafndan orduya Cumhuriyetin, laikliin ve lke btnlnn teminat nazaryla baklmaktadr. Bu ekil, yan devaml hale gelen siyasi istikrarszl ve sac, solcu ve slamc partiler arasndaki atmalar beslemitir. Szkonusu iktisadi ve harici sebeplerin bir araya gelmesi, Trkiye'nin AB'ye katlma sorununu birok phelerle evrelemektedir. Bu girift etkenlerin, dini ve tarihi kkleri olan bazlarn yoketmek sadece ksa vadede deil uzun vadede de zorluklara kar karyadr. Trkiye AB'ye katlma nndeki engelleri kabullenmektedir. te Avrupa'nn "tacizci" artlar kabul edilmeyince, AB'nin -zgrlklerin yerletirilmesi, demokrasi, insan haklarna sayg, enflasyonu durdurma iin ciiddi gayret ve nfus art gibi- koyduu artlan yeterli ekilde tatbik edilmeye gayret edilmedi. Trkler bakmndan, tarihi handikaplar ve varln evreleyen tehlikeler nazar itibara alarak dnlmektedir. nsan haklar meseleleri, demokrasi ve zgrlklerle ilgi kurulduunda AB'ye ye olmalar taleplerinde duraksyorlar. Bu konudaki Avrupa'nn artlarna uyma ve ayn zamanda tam yelik talebi uruna gz yummalar mmkn olmamaktadr. B) Avrupa Ynnden Rol itibariyle temel olarak AB'ye bu ana kadar katlma konusunda baarszlktan Avrupa sorumludur. Avrupa her defasnda AT'ye katlma imkannn tartmas ncesinde Trkiye'ye yeni artlar ilave etmektedir. artlar listesi taciz derecesinde bymtr. Ayn ekilde Avrupa, Trkiye'nin AT'ye katlmay ehliyetli klacak artlarn ne olduunu hibir zaman dikkatle belirlememitir. Avrupa, daha nce Portekiz, spanya ve Yunanistan'n durumlar mukayese edildiinde, AB'ye katlmaya aday lkelerin artlar ile halen Dou Avrupa lkelerinin durumlar karlatnldnda ifte standart vurgulanmtr. Bu taklm iin yelik listesinin hazrlanmasnda da ve yelie kabul srasnda da ayn ekildedir. Hrriyetlerin, demokrasinin, insan

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haklarnn, aznlklarn tannmasnn durum ile tm bu devletlerdeki iktisadi durum, eitli aamalarda Trkiye'nin durumundan daha iyi deildir. Hatta Trkiye'nin durumu, bu problemlemlerin bazsnda, zellikle ekonomide bu devletlerden ok daha iyidir. AT Trkiye'ye Yunanistan'la ihtilaflarn zmesi ve Kbrs problemini halletmesi artlarn ne srmektedir. O artlar daha nce Yunanistan'dan talep etmemitir. imdi de Kbrs Rum Ynetimine art komamaktadr. Buna benzer rnekler oktur. Dahas, Avrupa Trkiye ile ilikilerinde istanbul'un 1453 ylnda fethinden beri oluan anlayn aamamtr. Bu anlay, hala Trkiye karsnda Avrupa'nn tavrnn dinamiini oluturmaktadr. Bu anlay Trk ve Mslman arasnda da bulunmaktadr, islami rakip bir din ve Avrupa kimlii iin tehlike olarak grmektedir. Bu hviyet, douda Hal savalarnn balangcndan (Miladi 11. asr sonlan) ve 1453'ten beri olan Hristiyan dini kimliidir. AT'nin tutumu, Avrupa medeniyeti "mstakbeli"ne giri iin, Trkiye'nin slami gemii ve mevcut slami evresi ile kopmaya raz olan laik Atatrk sekinler nezdinde byk bir hayal krkl olarak yank buldu. Trkiye'nin "Batllama" tecrbesinin zerinden 75 yl gemesine ramen, "Kemalistler" kendilerini hala Avrupa kulbnn dnda ve kendisine kotuklar "rya"nn dnda bulunuyorlard. Avrupa'nn artan artlar, kemalist sekinleri, Trkiye ile AT ilikilerinde "gizli dm" veya "kayp halkay" aramaya sevkediyordu. Bu halkadaki aratrma bizi Osmanl devletinin meneinden bugne kadar iki taraf arasndaki ilikilerin gemiinin zetine gtrmektedir. Trkiye'de, Avrupa Trkiye'yi Mslman olduu iin reddettii grndeki islamclar, bu dnce emberinde, kendileri yalnz deillerdir. Hatta, Ylmaz, iller gibi dier Trk laikleri de zaman zaman bunu ima etmiler ve AT'yi sadece Hristiyanlarn klb olarak nitelemilerdir. "Tm balan kessek, btn camileri yksak, Avrupa'nn gznde Osmanllar olarak kalacaz. Osmanl, yani slam: Karanln birikimi, tehlike ve dman". Bu sz Trk dnr Cemil Meric'e (1979) aittir ve gerein bir yzn yanstmaktadr. Ancak bu ifade, bizatihi Avrupalnn azndan knca byk bir tasvib toplamtr. Avrupal liderlerin ve dnrlerin dilinde terennm olunan (bunun en mehuru AT Komisyonu Bakan Jack Delor) gr ve szler oktur. Bunlar, Trkiye ile Avrupa arasnda dini, kltrel ve uygarlk uyumazln aksettirmektedir. 4 Mart 1997'de AT devletleri Hristiyan Demokrat Partilerinin yaptklar toplant, ayrldnda, phenin (belirsizliin) ortadan kalkmasnda ak, hatta nihai bir durakt. Bu toplantdan kan aklamay ve toplanty

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kat ve kat nemli klan, Avrupa Komitesi Bakan ve Avrupa Parlamentosu Bakannn katlmasna ilaveten, Hristiyan Demokrat 7 bakan, lkelerinin de (Belika, Almanya, spanya, Lksemburg, rlanda ve Avusturya yardmcs) hkmet bakanlarnn da katlm olmalar onlarn grlerini AT'nin resmi bir tutumu haline getirmektedir. Aklamada, Trkiye'nin AT'ye katlmasnn ne yakn vadede ne de uzun vadede mmkn olmad yer almaktadr; nk bugnk Avrupa "Medeniyet projesini gelitirme" tutumu iindedir. Hristiyan Demokrat Partilerin genel bakanlarnn toplantnn sona ermesinden sonra cmleye son noktay aka koymak konusundaki aklamasnda, eski Belika Babakan (Wilfrid Martinez) "Biz Trkiye ile ok youn yardmlamadan yanayz; ancak, Avrupa projesi bir uygarlk projesidir" beyan yer ald. Bylece eski Belika Hkmet Bakan Leo Tindemanz tarafndan "Avrupa ile Trkiye arasnda uygarlk uyumazl bulunmakta olduunu" sylemi oldu. Atatrk'ten sonraki Kemalist dncenin problemlerinden biri, Trkiye'nin Avrupallama mefhumunun AT kurumlarnda yelikte temsil edilmesini sadece mekanik bir adm addolunmasdr. Bu ise dnce ve ilerleme slubunu alma anlamndaki Avrupallamann z ile AB yelii arasn ayrdetmeye almamtr. Trklerin, lkelerinin bir ksmnn Avrupa ktasnda oluunu mesned kabul etmeleri onlar tek bana Avrupa medeniyetinin bir paras olmalar hakkn vermemektedir. Avrupa Ktasnn bir paras olmakszn Avrupal olmalar mmkn olduu gibi, Avrupa'nn gbeinde olsalar bile Avrupal olmamalar da mmkndr. Avrupa, kavramlar, rnekler ve deerler manzumesidir; corafi alan veya kurum iskeleti deil. AB'ye katlmas 12-13 Ekim 1997 tarihlerinde kesin olarak reddedilmesinden sonra Trkiye, bu gn, alternatiflerini, ilerleme ve sonra da Avrupallama mefhumlarn yeniden belirlemeleri durumu ile kar karyadr. Laik ve Kemalist sekinlerin yeniden tarihi ve gerei daha ince bir ekilde okunmalar gerekmektedir. lerleme yollarn alacaklarndan mit ettikleri belirginlemitir. Bu AT yelii ve onun gerekleri bakmndan veya onun dndaki sebepler bakmndan olsun, sabit olan odur ki, Trkiye'nin Avrupa'dan umudu Cumhuriyetin kuruluunun 75. ylndan sonra, gerek ksa ve uzun vadede kmsenmesi mmkn olmayan zorluklarla yz yzedir. Ancak, yukarda belirtilenler nda, Trkiye'de Kemalizmin mevcut medeniyet rneklerinden herhangi birine tam olarak uyum salad sonucunu karmak mmkn deildir. Onun, uygarlk reformlar ameliyesi bakmndan kendisine has kavramlar vardr.

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HIZLI ADALAMA MODEL OLARAK ATATRKLK

Orhan KOLOLU* Atatrk'n Trk toplumuna kazandrdklarn devrim niteliiyle aklayabilmek iin 1919-1938 yani kendi etkenlik dnemi erevesinde deerlendirmek doal bir yaklamdr. Devrim kendisinden, ncesinden kopmak ve sonrasn da biimlendirmek zelliine sahip bir giriimdir. Bu niteliiyle Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Osmanl Devleti'nden tamamen ayr bir yap olduunu sylemek dorudur. Ancak devrimin kendisinden nceki oluumlardan etkilenmemi olmas dnlemeyecei gibi, toplumun zmseme srecinde yaamaya devam edeceini kabul etmemek de mmkn deildir. Bu sebeplerle ben olaya Tanzimat giriimiyle balamak ve devrimleri 1945'de bir daha geri dnlmemek zere demokrasiye geilmesiyle devam eder saymak eilimindeyim. Hatta 1950'de tarafsz seimlerle iktidarn el deitirmesini olayn dorua erimesi sayyorum. Btn bu adalama srecimizde Atatrk Devrimlerini de etkileyen bir ortak yntemin varl dikkati ekiyor. 1839 Glhane Ferman'nda 150 yldr toplumun kuvvet ve refahn kaybettii, yeni yasal ve kurumsal dzenlemelerle 5-10 ylda kalknlabilecei, yani sorunlarn zmlenebilecei belirtilmitir. Bylesine 'Acilci' davranlmasnda, bu kadar ksa bir srenin ngrlmesinde hi phesiz daha fazla beklemenin imkanszlnn farkedilmesi kadar, uygun ve zamanl olup olmad konusunda gelebilecek eletirilerin etkisizletirilmesi arzusu da rol oynamtr. 100 yl sonra 1945'de demokrasiye gei karar verildiinde de ayn sorunlar gndeme geldi. Amerikal siyaset bilimci, profesr Dankwart A. Rustow konu zerinde smet nn'yle yapt konumaya dayanarak Trkiye'de demokrasinin sadece d politika ihtiyalarnn rn olmadn belirtir:
* Aratrmac Yazar, stanbul.

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"Trkiye'de tek parti rejiminden hr seimlere imkan verecek ok partili rejime geii zorunlu klan yeterli i sebepler de bulunuyordu. Kemal Atatrk'n temellerini att, gnmzn Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni douran Trk stiklal Sava halkn egemenlii adna gerekletirilmitir ve gemiinde iki yasal muhalefet tecrbesi de vardr..." phesiz demokrasi kararyla nn, 'kinci Adam' olduu Atatrk Devrimleri'ni hedefine ulatrm oluyordu; ama bu, onun da zamanlamann uygun olup olmadyla sorgulanmasn engellemedi. Hem de, Atatrk'n partisi CHP'nin ynetici kadrolar tarafndan, toplumun henz demokrasi iin yeterince olgunlamam, dolaysyla kararn erken olduu gerekesiyle 1920'de Ankara'da Byk Millet Meclisi'nin almaya balamasndan itibaren yava yava admlar atlan devrimlerin topluma hazmettirilmesi iin sadece yarm kuaklk bir zaman gemiti. stelik kinci Dnya Sava yllan, balatlm giriimlere ve salanm kazanmlara zorunlu duraklamalar getirmiti. Bu durumda 1925 ve 1930'da rastlanan direnlerin tekrar belirmesi olaslndan endie ediliyordu. Ksacas 'acele etmee gerek olmad' belirtiliyordu. nn demokrasiye gemekte kararl davranmakla, hatta partisinin iinde aksi tezi savunanlar tasfiye etmekle 100 yldr sren 'Acilci gelenek'ten ayrlmayacan kantlam oldu. Gerekten btn bu adalama izgimiz boyunca alnan her nemli karara zamanlamasnn uygun olup olmad sorusuyla ve toplumun hazrlkszl gerekesiyle kar klmtr. Tanzimatlar Mslim-Gayrimslim eitsizliini kaldrdnda da, 1876 anayasas ve meclisinde de 1923'de cumhuriyetin ilannda da ayn sorular gndeme gelmi ve 'olmasa da olur' mantn ileri srenler grlmtr. Gnmzden geriye baktmzda, 21. yzyla adalama abasnda en ileri Orta-Dou ve slam lkesi olarak girmemizin birbirini izleyen 'gerekli miydi ve zaman myd' sorularyla karlam giriimlere medyum olduu gereiyle karlarz. Hepsi de birbirini tamamlayan 'acilci' kararlardr. adalamay hedefleyen btn kadrolarn -Tanzimatlar, Yeni Osmanllar, Jn Trkler, Kemalistler- neden byle bir yntemi tercih ettikleri sorusu hep akllar igal etmitir. Soruyu kanlmaz klan Osmanlnn duraan, hi deimeyen bir toplum olmamasdr. 16. yzyln son eyreinden, bir zamanlar batllar da hayrette brakan sistemlerinin yozlamaya baladn farkettiklerinden itibaren Osmanl yneticileri zm aramaya girimilerdir. 'Kitab Mstebah' yazarndan ve Koi Bey'den balayarak hep mevcut sistemin slah ve uygulayclarn drstletirilmesiyle ilerin yoluna girecei umudu beslenmitir. Sisteme dnemlerin koullarna uygun dzeltmeler de getirilmitir. Ancak bunlarn yeterli olmad sistemin dndan alntlar gerektii 18. yzyln ilk eyreinde farkedilmi ve bu yola girilmitir. 19. yzyla girerken sistemin sorgulanmas balad. Bir zamanlar geri saylan batnn baarl bir sistem olutur60

duu ve bunu ok hzl ve srekli yeniletirdii de farkedildi. Hem aray kapatmak hem de o yinelenme hzna eriebilmek iin ayn derecede hatta daha hzl olmak gerekiyordu. Batnn aydnlanma ve Sanayi Devrimi ile eritii noktalara ulamann zorunluu belirmiti. Gnmzde de hl, Osmanl kurumlarnn slahyla zm bulunmam olmasn eletirenlere rastlanyor. Hatalar, kurumlar bu yntemi Osmanl ynetiminin yz yla yakn denedii ama baar salayamadn unutmalardr. Son anda, tam zlmenin nlenemeyecek hale geldiini farkettiklerinde Sultan ve yardmclar ortada grnen tek zm formlne sarlmlardr. Bir dier sk eletiri de bu yntemin toplumun sorunlarn zememi olduu hakkndadr. Bu sebeple srecin doruunu oluturan Atatrk Devrimleri ve Cumhuriyeti hedef alan eletirilerin younluu dikkati eker. Unutulan husus Osmanl dnemindeki giriimlerin i sorunlardan ok d etkenlerle frenlenmi olmasdr. Paralanma srecine girmi bulunan devlet, adalama azminden vazgememekle birlikte emperyalistlerin hrslarn engellemek iin daha da byk aba sarfetmek zorunda kalmt. Bu yzden atlan bir ileri adm bazen bir ya da iki geri adm izliyordu. Ancak, Sevr'i zorlayanlara silah gcyle Lozan' kabul ettirip toplumu tam bamszla kavuturduktan ve lkenin i ilerine hibir yabanc devletin karmamasn saladktan sonra Atatrk'n devrimci aceleciine bavurmas, en uygun zaman yakalam olmann bilincinde olduunu kantlar. Gerekten her biri en az 60-70 senedir tartlan ama kesin ekil verilememi konularn hepsi 6-7 yllk bir sre iinde karara baland. Bunlarda tekrar geri admlar atlmasn nlemek ve Osmanl kararszlna dnmemek iin de gereken kurumsal ve yasal yaplar oluturuldu. Cumhuriyetin Osmanl'dan apayr bir yap olduu gr ve eskiyle hibir balants kalmad anlaynn kkeninde bu farkllama vardr. Bu kopuun en belirgin ekilde grld alanlar cumhuriyetin ilan ve laikliin kabul olmutur. in ilgin yan ok hzla birbirini izleyen devrim kararlan iinde en ihtiyatla alnan ve aceleye getirilmeyen bu ikisi olmutur. Hakimiyet-i Milliye deyimi 1908'de kinci Merutiyet'in ilanyla youn ekilde kullanlmaya balanm, Parlamento 'nun sultana nazaran yetki stnl pekitirilmiti. Ankara Byk Millet Meclisi daha da ileri bir adm att ve 1921 anayasasyla bunu kesin olarak belirtti. Atatrk'n, hemen cepheye gidip savamaya girimesini isteyenlere kar nce, yetkiyi sadece milletten alan bir yasama ve yrtme organ oluturmaya zen gstermesi, hatta buna tam devrimci nitelikle yarg yetkisini de verdirmesi, konuya ne kadar nem verdiini gsterir. 1920-1922 arasnda ulusal hareketimizi deerlendiren btn Batl gzlemciler, Ankara'da bir cum-

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huriyetin kurulmu olduunu belirtmilerdir. Akas 1923'te verilen karar bir oldu bitti deildir. Faaliyete gemi bir oluuma isim verilmesinden ibarettir. Bu kararn, Kurtulu Sava'na destek vermi ve ilke olarak cumhuriyete kar olmadklarn belirten baz kimselerce de 'erken' diye nitelenmesi, asl kendilerinin bu srecin farknda olmadklarn kantlar. Gnmzde dnyada says zaten bir avu kalm olan hanedanlar hakknda kendi toplumlarndan ykselen eletiriler, ilevi kalmam bir kurumu yaatmaya almann ne sonu vereceinin kantdr. stelik bu kurumun devamn isteyenlerin, batdaki gibi simge olmasn deil, aksine eskiye dn iin ara yaplmasn tasarlandklar da hemen farkedilmitir. Hilafet kurumunun kaderini de cumhuriyetin deil, son yarm yzylda ona oynatlan roln belirlediini kabul gerekir: - slam dnyasnn yzde doksann smrgeletirmi olan Avrupa devletlerinin kontrolleri altnda bir halife oluturma abalar; -Osmanl ynetimi altndaki Araplarn buna destek vermeleri; -ittihatlarn btn Mslmanlar kurtarma hedefli cihad giriimlerinin Mslmanlardan destek bulmamas; -Son Osmanl sultan/halifesinin ngiliz politikasna tam teslim olmas yetmiyormu gibi ulusunun bamszln istemediini kantlar ekilde zafer zerine onlara snmas; -1923 sonunda bu smrgeci glerin Snni slamn halifesini Trkiye'nin adalamas abalarna kar kullanmak iin, Hintli ii liderler araclyla giritii kkrtma oyunlarna dier Mslmanlarn da katlmas. Son zamanlarda ak ak saltanat ve hilafet lehinde, cumhuriyet ve laiklik aleyhinde yrtlen kampanyalar aslnda btn adalama giriimlerini geriye dndrme arzusunun ifadesinden baka birey deildir. Sadece gayri-mslim vatandalarmz deil, nfusumuzun byk bir ksmn oluturan Alevi vatandalarmz gibi, din konusunu kendi zel sorunu sayma ve bakalarn kartrmama yanls asl byk ktleyi de dlamaya kalkan bu davrann, insan haklarn yok etmekten baka bir amac bulunmad aktr. Her iki konudaki kararlarn aceleyle deil aksine uzun bir gelecek hesaplanarak alnm olmas, Atatrk'n devrimlerini gvenceye salamak iin peinen tedbirli davranm olduunu kantlyor. Gnnde, rnek ald bat toplumlarnn da nne geen bir ierikle kabul edildii iin ar aceleci bulunmu ve bazlarnca Islama aykr grlm olan 'Kadn haklan' konusunun da imdi adalama kartlar tarafndan adalamay baltalamak iin kullanld grlyor. Baka alanlarda insan haklarn kabul etmeyenlerin sadece trban iin eylem dzenlemesi davranna samimiyetsizliinin kantdr. nsann aklna 'Neden bir fes eylemi yapmyorlar?' sorusu geliyor. Oysa asl tepki fesin braklmasna gsterilmiti. Bunun tek bir aklamas vardr: Braknz 62

Trkiye'yi, bir zamanlar btn slam dnyasnda toplumun simgesi saylan ve yasaklanmasna tepki gsterilen bu bal imdi Mslmanlarn hibiri ciddiye almyor, elence arac sayyor. Devrimler iinde, bana gre, en hzl gndeme getirilip, niteliine gre en hzl ekilde gerekletirilen harf devrimidir. Gemi ihtiam ne olursa olsun, artk dnyada geerlilii kalmam bir kltrden kopmann arac olmutur, Yeni Trk Harfleri. Buna da eletiri kitlelerden deil, o eski kltr ok iyi bilen nadir uzmanlardan geldi. 'Kkmzden kopuyoruz' feryatlar ykselmitir de, neden o kk anlayabilmek iin Osmanl sisteminin, nfusun yzde nden fazlasn okur yazar hale getiremedii sorusunu kendilerine yneltmemilerdir? Yoksa hayallerindeki Trk toplumunun Osmanl'daki gibi obanlk yapacak bir aznlk tarafndan ynetilmesinden baka hedefleri yok mu?... Gnmzde de tembel aratrmaclarn 'Bize retmediler ki' diyerek Osmanlcay bilmemenin suunu devrimlere yklemee altklarna tank oluyoruz. Osmanlca ancak uzmanlarn iine yarar. Ingilizceyi, Franszcay, bilgisayar, interneti renmek iin olaanst aba sarfedenlerin, ilerine yarayacaksa Osmanlca renmeye gayret etmeyip bakalarn sulamaya kalkmalarn tembellikten baka bir eyle izah etmeye olanak yoktur. Bizdeki grn aksine batl dnrler harf devrimiyle demokratikleme arasnda, ok sonralar farkedeceimiz bir ilikiyi o dnemde kaydetmilerdir. Prof. Pittard'n ei Noelle Reger yle yazmtr: 'uras muhakkak ki, eer Kk Asya sihirli bir ubukla bir gnden dierine btnyle deimezse, en azndan okuma yazma bilen birka milyon insan, bugn lkeyi yneten birka bin entellektelin yerini alacaktr. Ve byk bir ounluk kk bir aznln yerine geeceine ve her gn artarak gneteki yerini isteyeceine gre bir demokrasi kendiliinden belirecektir(...) Otoritelerinin ktlelerin eitim noksanna bal olduunu sanmalar sebebiyle sultanlarn asla kabul etmek istemedikleri eyi cumhurbakan hayal edebilecei en byk iyilik olarak mtalaa ediyor. Bu mutlakyeti ynetici byk bir demokratik ruha malik deil mi?' apka hari btn devrimleri onaylayan, kadn haklarnn alelacele verilmesini doru sayan Halide Edib'in harf devrimini otuz yla yaymay nermesi de ilgin bir aknlk rneidir. Bunun 'hibir zaman yaplmasn' demekten baka bir anlam tamad aktr. Ekonomi ve Sanayi atlmlarnn Atatrk dneminde yeterince gelimemi olmas da bir eletiri konusudur. Kapitlasyonlar kaybedenlerin 1930'lann ortalarna kadar sren ambargolarn, bu alanlar iin gerekli kadrolarn yetitirilme srecini, yatrm ve giriimlerin rn vermesinin bal olduu zaman dnmek istemeyenler, bugn Trkiye'de zel giriimin eritii uluslararas dzeyin kkeninde o hazrln bulunduunu

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unutmamaldrlar. Trk sermayesi de, giriimcilii de ivmesini ve kadrolarn devlet kurumlarndan almtr. Yirminci yzylda dnyada yaanan bu en kapsaml ve en hzl yap deiikliinin hatalar, yanllar, arlklar olmam mdr Mmkn m? ...Hereyden nce devrimin mant eskiyi amak iin en uca gitmeyi emreder. Onu izleyecek hazmetme sreci srasnda kendiliinden dzeltmeler, vazgemeler ve yeniden yaplanma gereksinmeleri belirecektir. Toplumsal deimenin yasalar bunu zorunlu klar. Hele bu son derece ksa bir sreye sdrlmsa. Ayrca Trkiye, demokrasiyi acilci bir ekilde gndeme getirdii gibi, emeki haklarn da ii snf lkede belirmeden yasallatrarak, Atatrk geleneini btn adalama admlarnda kullandn gstermitir. Btn bu giriimlerin sonucunda Cumhuriyetimizin 75. ylnda, 21. yzyla girilmek zereyken, Trk toplumu en kapsaml yap deiiklii aamasna ulam bulunuyor. Tanzimattan itibaren yzyl boyunca hep yukardan ynlendirilmi olan adalama imdi toplumun tabanna kadar inmi bulunuyor. Kyls, iisi, aydn ve giriimcisiyle yepyeni ve Osmanl dneminde grlmeyen bir 'cumhuriyet insan' var ortada. Avrupa 'Rnesans insannn ortaya kmasyla btn dnyay etkileyen dnemini balatmt. Trkiye de 'cumhuriyet insan' ile dnyada yeni yerini alacak adalamasn tamamlayacaktr. Bu deiimde hereyimiz yerine oturmu btn sorunlarmz zlm mdr? ...Tabii ki deil. Aksine her toplum kesiminin yerinin ve gcnn belirlenme aamas tamamlanmam olmasndan doan bir bunalmn iinde bulunuyoruz. Bunu sistemin bozulmasndan ok, kapsaml deimenin doal sarsnts olarak grmek gerekir. Bylesine kapsaml bir deimenin hi sarsntsz kklemesi mmkn deildir. stelik biz, batllarn yzyllara yaydklar bir oluumu ok ksa bir sreye sktrmak durumunda da kaldk. 75 yln bilanosuna baktmzda demokraside, btn eksiklerine ramen, nemli bir aamaya eritiimiz, sanayi ve ticarette blgemizde bir g olarak belirdiimiz inkar edilemez. Bunlar Osmanl mirasndan, sfrdan eritiimiz alanlardr. evremizdeki, bir ou da petrolle zengin lkelere baktmzda aradaki fark kolayca anlalr. Trkiye'den baka adalamay bu hzla gerekletiren baka Orta-Dou ve slam lkesine rastlamyoruz. Buna ramen hepsi de bizden daha byk bunalmlar inide bulunuyorlar. Bir gn Trkiye'nin eritii noktalara varmay dnrlerse daha da fazlasn yaamayacaklar m? ...ada dnya dzeyi ile gittike alan aray kapatabilmek iin bir gn rnek aramaya kalkarlarsa nerelerden geeceklerini Trkiye'nin son 150 yllk tarihini okuyarak renebilirler.

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Bugnn Trk genliinin ar yaknmalar da hzl bir deimeyi istiyor olmalarnn rndr. abuk sonular bekliyorlar. Bunun sakncalarn yayoruz, ancak iyi bir yan da var: Daha ok almak zorunda olduklarn kendileri de anlam durumdalar. Vardmz yeri yeterli bulmuyorlar. Bu da Atatrk'n koyduu hedefin ve gsterdii yolun izlendiini gsteriyor. Onuncu Yl Nutku'ndaki szlerini bir hatrlayalm: "Az zamanda ok ve byk iler yaptk. Bu ilerin en by, temeli Trk kahramanl olan ve yksek Trk kltr olan, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'dir... Fakat yaptklarmz asla kfi grmeyiz. nk daha ok ve daha byk iler yapmak mecburiyetinde ve azmindeyiz. Yurdumuzu dnyann en mamur ve en medeni memleketleri seviyesine karacaz. Milletimizi en geni refah vasta ve kaynaklarna sahip klacaz. Milli kltrmz, muasr medeniyet seviyesinin stne karacaz. Bunun iin, bizce zaman ls, gemi asrlarn gevetici zihniyetine gre deil, asrmzn srat ve hareket mefhumuna gre dnlmelidir. Geen zamana nisbetle daha ok alacaz. Daha az zamanda, daha byk iler yapacaz. Bunda da muvaffak olacamza phem yoktur... nk Trk milletinin yrtmekte olduu terakki ve medeniyet yolunda, elinde ve kafasnda tuttuu msbet ilimdir". Atatrk, toplumumuzu bu hedefin raylarna oturttuktan sonra izlememiz gereken yntemi de ok almak, srarl ve hzl davranmak ve nihayet ynlendiriciliimizi bilime balamak bylece belirtmitir. Bu toplum iin yapabileceklerinin azamisini yapm ii bizlere brakmtr. Gnmzn bunalmlarndan, onu sorumlu tutmak yerine aramzdan ayrldndan beri geen altm ylda bizler neler yapm olduumuzu saptar yani z eletirimize giriebilirsek kurtulabiliriz.

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HMANZMA VE ATATRK
Prof. Dr. Blent D VER * Hmanizm^ Kavram Hmanizm nedir? En geni anlamyla hmanizm (hmanizma) insan temel l, ana parametre olarak alglayan bir dnce sistemidir. Hmanizm, bu adan, insanlar sevmeyi, insana deer ve nem vermeyi, insanlarn rahat ve huzurunu salamay amalayan bir hayat ve dnya gr ve anlaydr denilebilir. Hmanizm olgusuna eitli ynlerden baklabilir. Edebi hmanizmden bahsedilebildii gibi, felsefi ve dini hmanizmden, etik deerlere dayanan bir hmanizmden de sz edilebilir. Dar anlamda hmanizm denilince de, Orta an sonlarna doru talya'dan balayarak eitli Bat Avrupa lkelerinde yaylmaya balayan ve eski klasik Yunan ve Roma dnemlerine ait eserleri tercme etme, bunlar inceleme ve yayma ura anlalmaktadr. Hmanizm (hmanizma) kavramn bu ekilde tanmladktan sonra, nce Bat'da tarihsel sre iinde hmanist dncenin nasl olutuunu, bu hareketin Rnesans, Reform hareketlerine ve Aydnlanma ana nasl etkide bulunduunu, ana hatlaryla, ortaya koymaya alacaz. Hmanizm, geni anlamda alnrsa, kukusuz eski dnemdeki klasik in ve Hint uygarlklarn ve bu alarda yetien din adamlarn ve filozoflar da gz ard etmemek gerekecektir. rnein, eski dou kltr ve felsefesinin en nemlilerinden biri olduu herkese kabul edilen bilge Konfiys, tpk ada Sokrates gibi, "btn insanlar iyi ve mutlu bir yaamn yollarn ve yntemlerini bilmelidir" diyordu. Konfiys btn insanlar kucaklayan bir sevgi felsefesinde kn bye saygsn, byn de ke sevgisini, her zaman, gstermesini tlyordu". Trklerde, geni anlamda alnnca, hmanist dncenin, felsefi kkeni, dn kayna, batdan farkl olmakla beraber hi olmad da sy* Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi. 1. Trkemizde bu terim, hem Franszcadan bize geli ekliyle, hmanizm olarak kullanlmakta hem de asl kk olan Ltincede syleni biimiyle, hmanizma olarak gemektedir. Biz tebliimizde bu iki terimi de ayn anlamda kullanacaz.

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lenemez Yunus Emre "yetmi iki millete ayn gzle bakmayann Allah'a asi olacan bize sylememi miydi? Yine O, Yaratan'n ve yaratlann ayn sevgi pnarnda odaklatn bizlere duyurmam mydYunus gibi bir dier byk dnr ve mutasavvf Mevlna Cellettin-i Rmi bir iirinde "Mslman, Mecusi, Hristiyan, putperest kim olursa olsun, bize derghmza gelsin" diyerek btn insanlar ayrm yapmakszn sevginin potasnda eritiyordu. Tpk Konfys gibi o da "bizim yolumuz u gzelim dnyada btn insanlarla birlikte mutlu yaama yoludur" demekteydi. Bat 'da hmanist dncenin geliimi Hmanizmin dar ve geni anlamlarna eitli alardan baktktan sonra imdi de Bat'da hmanist dncenin ve hmanist kltrn nasl gelitiini ana hatlaryla gzden geirelim. Tebliimizin banda da sylediimiz gibi, hmanist hareket ilk defa Orta ada talya'da ortaya kt ve dier Avrupa lkelerine yayld. nsanlk tarihinin en nl yaptlarndan biri olan "lhi Komedi" nin yazar Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) ile, bilinen hristiyan hmanistlerinin kukusuz en nemlilerinden biri de yine talyadan km olan air Francesco Petrarca (1304-1374) Rnesans dneminin en gze arpan hmanistlerinden biri olmutur, O'nun en nemli yapt olan ve 1470 ylnda yaynlanan Canzoniere (arklar) adl yapt gnmzde bile tazeliini ve diriliini korumaktadr. Yine Ortaa talyan hmanistlerinden biri olan Floransa'l Giovanni Boccacio (13131375)- Decameron adl yaptnda, ortaaa zg dini tesirlerden ve kilisenin gnah anlaynda uzak bir biimde, Floransa burjuvazisinin ak, evk ve ne'e yaamn cokulu biimde dile getiriyordu. Bat'da yeni alarda da, talya dnda, baz nemli hmanist dnrlerin ve yazarlarn ortaya ktn burada syleyelim. Bunlara rnek olarak "Delilie vg" adl yaptn sahibi Hollanda'l Erasmus'u (14691536) fikri ve inanc urunda ban vermekten ekinmeyen ngiliz St. Thomas Morus' (Utopia adl eseri ok nldr) (1478-1535); College de France'n kurucularndan Fransz G. Bude'yi (1467-1540); ncili franszcaya evirmi olan Lefevre d'Etaples'i (1450-1537) gsterebiliriz. Bu saydmz hmanist dnrlerin, Martin Luther ve Calvin gibi, katolik kilisesinin basklarna kar byk mcadele vermi ve tarihte adet yeni bir sayfa aam olan teologlar tarafndan iddetle eletirilmesi olduka dndrcdr. Bu iki reformatr yukarda adlarn zikrettiimiz hmanistleri ilk an pagan (putperest) anlayn yaymaya almakla sulamlard. Yeni alarda, bu saydklarmz dnda "De Jure Belli Acpacis (Sava ve Bar zerine)" adl eseriyle bilim dnyasnda nemli yanklar uyandrm olan Hugo Grotius'u (1583-1646) burada anmak gerekir. O bu nl eseriyle ada Devletler Hukuku'nun ilk temellerini de atmtr denilebilir.

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Yeni alarn bir baka nl hmanist yazar da Montaigne'dir (1533-1592). Etienne de la Boetie'nin ada ve arkada olan Montaigne'nin dilimize de evirilmi olan Denemeler (Essais) adl yapt hmanist bir ncnn parlak klarn bir deniz feneri gibi, yeni kuaklara gndermekte ve onlar aydnlatmaktadr. Burada zerlerinde uzun uzadya durmay gerek duymadmz dier hmanist aydnlar da yakn zamanlarda Aydnlanma ann gerek ncleri olmulardr. Tolstoi, Dostoyevski ve dierleri bat'nn hmanist kltrnn temel direkleri olarak karmzda durmaktadrlar. F.C.S Sebiller "Hmanizm zerine incelemeler" (1907) adl yaptnda, yeni hmanist dncenin her trl doal metafizii reddettiini belirttikten sonra, her trl bilginin insann ihtiyalarna ve insanlara salad yararlara gre deer kazandn vurgulamaktadr. Sonu olarak diyebiliriz ki; t eski alarda, Yunan ve Roma uygarlklarnda, Euripides, Sofokles, Aristofanes, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetos gibi dnrlerin ortaya attklar insan ve insann erdemleri zerine kurulu felsefe, baz kaba, otoriter ve totaliter sistemlerde, baskc rejimlerde dnem dnem sner gibi olmusa da aslnda hmanizma ruhu, tarihin hibir devrinde kurumayan bir rmak gibi gnmze kadar ulamtr. ATATRK VE HMANZMA Atatrk'n, tebliimizin ilk ksmnda deindiimiz Ortaa'daki klasik hmanist dnrleri rnein, Dante, T. Morus ve Erasmus gibi dnrleri incelediine dair elimizde somut bilgi ve bulgular yok. Atatrkn ktphanesiyle ilgili aratrma ve almalarda da bu konuda biz yeterli bir ipucuna ulaamadk. Yukarda bahsettiimiz yazarlar ve dnrler, Ortaa hristiyan kilisesi inanlarna temelden bal kalmakla beraber, bu inanlar Antika Yunan ve Roma felsefeleri ve edebiyat rnleriyle badatrarak, yeni bir insan ve dnya anlayn dile getirmilerdi. Yeni ve yakn alarda ise laikleme hareketleriyle birlikte gitgide dini kaynaklardan uzaklaan, G. Bude, H. Grotius, Montaigne gibi hmanistler Atatrk'n inceleme ve okuma kaynaklan arasnda yer almyor. Ama hmanist dnceyi sadece batdaki baz yazarlarn ve dnrlerin tekelinde saymak da, kanmzca hatal bir yaklam olur. Tebliimizin ikinci ksmnda da belirttiimiz gibi, dou dnyasnn da kendine zg bir insan ve dnya anlay ve felsefesi bulunmaktadr. u kadar var ki, daha ok mistik dini inan ve temellere dayanan doulu air ve yazarlardan Atatrk'n etkilendiine dair resmi kaynaklarda bir bilgi yoktur. 69

u halde Atatrk'n hmanist dnce vee hareketlerle ilgisi nedir diye hakl olarak sorulabilir. Evet hmanizmi dar anlamda alrsak, yani hmanizmi klasik Yunan ve Roma ana dnmek, bu aa ait dilleri ve eserleri incelemek ve yaymak diye anlarsak, Atatrk'n dncelerinde byle bir ey bulamayz. Esasen mrnn byk ksm uzun sren sava ve daha sonra hummal devrim hareketleriyle geen aksiyon adam Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'ten byle bir ey beklemek, onun yetitii Osmanl toplum ve kltr ortam da gz nnde tutulursa, fazla bir ey ummak olur. Ama hmanizmi daha geni bir perspektiften ele alrsak, yani hmanizmi insan sevgisinden, bar zleminden, insanlararas dayanma ve yardmlamadan kaynak olan bir felsefe ve dnya gr olarak dnrsek durum deiir. Atatrk, aada bahsedeceimiz bir ok konumasnda emperyalizmi yermi, srekli bar savunmu ve yeni nesillerin saldrganlktan ve agzllkten uzak olarak yetitirilmesini istemitir. Evet imdi de Atatrk'n bar, dayanma, insan sevgisi ve onuru gibi "hmanist" yaklamlar sergileyen eitli konumalarna ksaca bir gz atalm:2 O, bir konumasnda yle der: "... beeriyetin hepsini bir vcut ve bir milleti bunun bir uzvu addetmek icab eder. Bir vcudun parmann ucundaki acdan dier btn aza mteessir olur" yine ayn konumasnda yle devam eder "Dnyann filn yerinde bir rahatszlk varsa bana ne dememeliyiz. Byle bir rahatszlk varsa tpk kendi aramzda olmu gibi onunla alkadar olmalyz." Atatrk, ayn paralelde bir baka konumasnda unlar sylyor: "... bugn btn dnya milletleri aa yukar akraba olmulardr ve olmakla meguldrler. Bu itibarla insan mensup olduu milletin varln ve saadetini, huzur ve refahn dnmeli, ama kendi milletinin saadetine ne kadar kymet veriyorsa btn dnya milletlerinin saadetine yardmc olmaa elinden geldii kadar almaldr." Atatrk 1931 ylndaki bir konumasnda insanlk kavramna deinirken aynen yle der: "Artk insanlk mefhumu vicdanlarmz temiz tutmaya ve hislerimizi yceletirmeye yardm edecek kadar ykselmitir" Yine devamla O, "insanlar mesut edeceim diye onlar biribirini boazlatmak gayr insani ve teessfe ayan bir sistemdir. nsanlar mesut edecek yegne vasta, onlar birbirine sevdirerek karlkl maddi ve manevi ihtiyalarn temine yarayan hareket ve enerjidir."
2. Btn bu alntlar iin bkz. E. Ziya KARAL, Atatrk'ten dnceler, Trk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi, Ankara 1956.

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Atatrk yurtta ve dnyada devaml bar idealinin ylmaz bir savunucusu olarak u grleri de ortaya koyar "Eer devaml bar isteniyorsa insan kitlelerinin vaziyetlerini iyiletirecek uluslararas tedbirler alnmaldr. nsanln btnnn refah, alk ve basknn yerine gemelidir. Dnya vatandalar haset, agzllk ve kinden uzaklaacak ekilde terbiye edilmelidir". Evet, insanlar "birbirine dman eden faktrleri ortadan kaldrmann en nemli arac, kukusuz eitimdir ve Atatrk bu gerei stne basa basa zenle vurgulamtr. Atatrk daha 1921 ylnda, Mecliste yapt bir konumada, bir lm kalm sava veren Trk ulusunun asla sava taraftar olmadn, dnyaya yle haykrr: "Meclisimiz ve onun hkmeti sava ve macerac olmaktan uzaktr. Bilkis bar ve gvenlii tercih eder ve insan, meden ideallerin gereklemesine fevkalade taraftardr". SONSZ Atatrk dneminden sonra Cumhuriyet Trkiye'sinin batl hmanist dnce kaynaklaryla dorudan, ve ilk elden tanmas H. Ali Ycel'in Milli Eitim Bakanl zamannda olmutur. Cumhuriyet dneminde batl ve doulu klsiklerin trkeye evrilmesi, Liselere Yunanca ve Ltince derslerinin konmas, Dil Tarih Corafya Fakltesinde bu klasik dillere ve onlarn kltrlerine geni yer verilmesi daima olumlu almalar ve abalar olarak anlacaktr. Ne varki, hmanist kltrn Trk dn hayatna aydnlarn hayat felsefesine ve siyasal yaama yeterli derecede nfuz ettiini sylemekte, bu gn bile, pek mmkn gibi gzkmyor. zellikle son yllarda, para gibi, rating gibi maddi l ve deerlerin btn deerlerin nne gemesi yoz bir kltrn ortaya kmas sonucunu dourmutur. nsan erdemleri, ve insan bilgisi byle dnemlerde geriye geriye itelenmekte, kolay yoldan n ve stat kazanma ve an kazan tutkusu toplumlar adeta bir kanser gibi kemirmektedir. Ama biz, Schiller'in Ne'eye vgsnde canl ifadesini bulan ve L. Van Beethoven'in 9. Senfonide lmszletirdii yksek insanlk duygularnn birgn mutlaka zafer kazanacana inanyoruz, Unutmayalm, lotus iei bataklklarda yetiir. Ama gzel eyler de bir dnem sonra, bataklklarda amaz m?

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ADA TRKYE'NN TEMEL KEMALST LKELER

Dursun ATILGAN* GR Trkiye'nin kurtuluu gerekleip, Lozan Bar Antlamas yapldktan ve yeni doan Trkiye Devleti'nin snrlaryla birlikte uluslararas tannmasndan sonra, gazeteciler Mustafa Kemal'e: "hedefinize ulatnz m?" diye bir soru yneltirler. Yant ksaca udur: "En nemlisi asl imdi balyor". Trkiye'nin kurtarlmas, elbetteki, devlet olabilmesinin asl temelini oluturmaktadr; ancak, ada uluslar arasnda yer alabilmesinin salanmas "Kemalizm" kavramna anlam kazandran asl sonu olmutur. Bu da, asker baardan sonra Kemalist ilkelerin temelini oluturduu olaanst kapsaml bir spektrum zerine ina edilen Trk devrimidir. Kemalist ilkeler program, Mustafa Kemal'in balatt hareketin ilk safhalarnda O'nun asl lks olmutur. O, kurtulutan kurulua giden yolu buna gre izmitir. Alt ilkenin ancak 1937'de Anayasa'ya girmi olmas, Kemalizm'in bir doktriner sistemi ya da irrasyonel temele dayanan bir inan sistemi deil, pragmatik bir dnce sistemi olduunun kantdr. Kanmzca, bu ilkeler kronolojik bir sraya gre deil sistematik bir sraya gre dikkate alnp irdelenmelidir: Ulusuluk, Halklk, Cumhuriyetilik, Laiklik, Devletilik, Devrimcilik. ULUSULUK Mustafa Kemal'in yaamnda en geni yer tutan ilke, bize gre, Ulusuluktur. Bugn, Almanlarn rk siyasetinden dolay eitli Bat l* Almanya Atatrk Dnce Demekleri Genel Bakan, Kln.

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kelerinde, ama zellikle de gnmz Almanya'snda -bilinen nedenlerden dolay- baz ekimser tavrlara neden olan Ulusuluk kavram, Atatrk Trkiye'si iin u anlamlara gelmektedir: - okuluslu bir Osmanl mparatorluu'ndan vazgeme (hem de zellikle 1. Dnya Sava'nn galibi Batl itilaf devletlerinin nfuz alanlar ve kolonial siyaset gttkleri yllarda), - Panturanizm ve Panislamizm fikrinden vazgeme, - "Ulusal Dikdrtgen" iinde (bugnk Trkiye'nin haritas) ulusal egemenlik ve tam bamszlk. Bu konuda, Mustafa Kemal'in hakl gerekesi udur: "nk bugn dnya uluslar sadece bir egemenlik tr tanyor, o da ulusal egemenlik", - Ulus devlet olma, yurttalk kavramnn gerekletirilmesi ve mmetlii reddetme, - Bizzat kendisinin "Ne mutlu Trkm diyene" zdeyiiyle, yeni devletin yurttalarnda yeni bir kendine gven ve ulusal deer bilinci uyandrma, - Saldrganl ve yaylmacl asla hedef edinmeyen ve dnya yzndeki tm uluslarla bar ierisinde, kardee yaamay ilke edinen, yeni bir yurtseverlik duygusunun baarlmas, (Trk ulusuluunun bir tehlike olarak grlmemesinin en ak ve kesin kant, bu gen devletin 1932'de Milletler Cemiyeti'ne alnmak zere davet edilmesidir). - Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin temelinin ne rka, ne de dine, ancak kltre dayandrlmas, - mparatorluktan kalan tm etnik gruplara eit halklarla birarada bar ierisinde yaama olanann salanmas. Mustafa Kemal'in Ulusuluk ilkesi ve anlay yine O'nun tanmyla u formlde aranmaldr: "Yurtta bar, dnyada bar". HALKILIK Halklk (poplizm) ilkesinin anlam, semene ho grnme politikas olarak alglanamaz. Bu ilkenin anlam, kader siyaseti gdenlerin, halk soktuu uyuukluktan kurtarp, onun "birlik ve beraberlik gc"ne dinamizm kazandrmaktr. Halklk ve Ulusuluk bu anlamda birlikte dnlmelidir. "Eer bir ulus kendi yaam ve haklar iin tm gcn ortaya koymazsa, onun iin kurtulu yoktur. Biz iimize kyden, komudan, evremizdeki insanlardan, yani fertlerden balayarak ilerleriz. Her fert kendini kurtarmak iin tm becerisini ortaya koymak zorundadr. Bu suretle aadan yuka1A

riya, tabandan tavana salam bir yap oluturulur". Bu, Mustafa Kemal'in uygulamak istedii programn, bireylere ykledii sorumlulua ilikin olaanst nem tayan bir saptamasdr. Halkn ortak yaam ve ama bilincinin ekillenmesi ve glenmesi, igalci kuvvetlere kar bakaldrmada ve Kurtulu Sava'nda olaanst zveriyle almada ortaya koyduu dayanma sayesinde sreklilik ve anlam kazanmtr. Buna ramen, bu gelime kurtulutan sonra da eitli nlemlerle desteklenmitir. Buna ilikin olarak en somut rnek eit haklar konusudur. Yeni devletin kuruluunda halkn sadece bir blmnn fiili katlm szkonusu olsayd, byk bir blmnden ykmllk beklemek safdilik olurdu. Mustafa Kemal tarafndan kurulan "Halk Partisi"nin programnda, ki ad bile bal bana bir programdr, halklk u ekilde tanmlanmtr: "Bizim iin insanlar yasa nnde tamamen eit muamele grmek zorundadr. Snf, aile, fert arasnda bir ayrm yaplamaz. Biz, Trkiye halkn eitli snflardan oluan bir btn olarak deil, sosyal yaamn gereksinimlerine gre eitli mesleklere sahip olan bir toplum olarak grmekteyiz " Bu anlamda her ferdin eit tutulmasnn gereklemesi, ancak, eskiden kalan eitsizliklerin ortadan kaldrlmasyla mmkn olabilirdi. Nitekim de yle oldu. Bu konuda kaydedilen en etkili devrimci atlmlardan bazlar unlardr: Kadn-erkek eitlii konusunda gerekli nlemlerin alnm olmas, retim birliinin gerekletirilmi olmas, her yurttan renebilecei yeni bir Trk alfabesinin hazrlanmas ve her yurttan devlet organlar nnde eit muamele grmesi konusunda alnan nlemler. Grld zere. Halklk ilkesi, kylsyle-kentlisiyle. yalsylagenciyle. kadnyla-erkeiyle her ferdi yetki ve sorumluluk asndan bilinlendirme temeline dayandrlmtr. CUMHURYETLK Bu ilkenin ana hedefi, Halkln kamu hukuku asndan perinlenmesidir. 620 yllk Osmanl dneminde egemenlik sadece hanedann, yani kiinin elindeydi. Artk egemenlik kii ii deil, "res publica" yani kamu iidir. 29 Ekim 1923'te ilan edilen cumhuriyetin temel koulu zaten 1921 Anayasasnn 1. maddesinde de ngrlmtr: "Egemenlik kaytsz, artsz ulusundur". Bu da. Mustafa Kemal'in kafasndaki ynetim biiminin balangtan beri ne olduunun bir kantdr. ou yurttalarn bu yeni ynetim biimini kavramas elbette zamana gereksinim gstermitir. Yzde yzlk bir "halk hakimiyetV'nm. ger-

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ekletirilmesi her ne kadar Mustafa Kemal'in asl amac idiyse de, ki gzlemciler buna tanklk etmektedirler, bu srecin de belirli bir zaman kesitine gereksinimi olduu ortaya kmtr. rnein, 1924 ve 1930 yllarnda denenen muhalefet partisi kurulmas sonucu ortaya kan durumlar gibi. Bilindii zere, bu partiler zellikle anayasal kazanmlarn kart kimselerin biraraya geldii partiler olmulardr. Mustafa Kemal ve arkadalar, sorumluluk ahlk nedeniyle, tam anlamyla oulcu olmayan bir demokrasiyi, amalanan ana hedefleri tehlikeye sokmamaya tercih etmiler ve bylece de kartlarnn amansz eletirilerine rza gstermilerdir. Aslnda bu da o zamanki aamada demokratiklemenin bir gerei olarak grlmeli ve deerlendirilmelidir. O gnlerin muhalefetsiz partisindeki "kanatlarm fikir ayrlklarnn, bugnk ok partili ve ok muhalefetli meclislerinkinden daha keskin ve daha canl olduunu sylemenin bir abartma deil, bir gerek olduunu Meclis tutanaklar da kantlamaktadr. Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi, hibir ekilde diktatrlerin szde "Halk Temsilcilii"nde olduu gibi bir kukla deildi. Ve de en son karar veren o Meclisti. Belki unu da ifade etmek gerekir: Bugn Amerika Birleik Devletleri Bakannn yetkileri erevesinde bir mdahale hakk vardr. Mustafa Kemal'in de o gnlerde bu anlamda bir mdahalesi olduu dnlebilir (Son zamanlarda Bakanlk sistemi tartmas balatld. Eer bu sistem daha halk ve daha demokratik bir sistem olsayd, Mustafa Kemal, bunu zaten gerekletirmi olurdu). Sonu olarak denilebilir ki, Cumhuriyetilik, halklk esasna dayanan demokrasinin ulusuluk ilkesiyle ve de laiklik harcyla birlikte deerlendirilmesi gereken, aklc uygulamay salayan bir ynetim biimidir.

LAKLK
En etkili ve nemli ilke kesinlikle bu ilkedir. Aslnda bu szcn anlam din ile siyaseti ve dolaysyla da din ile kamu yaamn birbirinden ayrmaktr. Osmanl mparatorluu zamannda siyaset dinin emrine sokulmutu. Hatta bazan din de siyasetin emrine sokulabiliyordu. Bunun byle olmasndaki tarihsel neden, slam dininin kurucusunun hem siyas ve hem de din lider olmasndan ve bunun yllardan beri bir gelenek haline getirilmi olmasndan kaynaklanmaktadr. Akla hemen u soru gelebilir: "Mustafa Kemal'in kamu yaamyla dini birbirinden ayrmas karar nereden kaynaklanmtr?" diye. Burada bir din dmanlndan sz etmek tamamen yanl olur. nk Laiklik din kart bir ilke deildir. Din, kiinin zel yaamnn bir parasdr. La-

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iklie gre, insan yaamnda ibadetin dnda her trl tasarruf, dine, daha dorusu kutsal kitaba gre deil, anayasaya, yasalara ve kurallara gre yaplr. Devlet yaamnda, hukukta, aile yaamnda, kltrde, eitimde v.s. artk laiklik ilkesi ana temeldir. O'nu bu karara iten ama din deil, siyasdir. Bunun gereklemesi iin de nce siyasetin dinin emrinden kurtarlmas zorunluydu. Mustafa Kemal henz gen bir subayken u kanaate varmt: "Mevzuatn ve hareket tarzn Kuran 'dan ve hadisten alan bir devlet, bilimin ve adaln gerisinde kalr". Bir lkenin, a yakalam olan lkelerle boy lebilmesi, onlarn arasnda srekli olarak sesini duyurabilmesi, o lke yurttalarnn akln kullanmasna ve bilime ncelik vermesine engel tekil eden kurum ve kurallarn ortadan kaldrlmasyla mmkn olabilirdi. Mustafa Kemal bu gerei gznnde bulundurmu ve baz adalk deerlerini -savata dman olmasna karn- Batl lkelerden almtr. O, 1924 ylnda yapt bir konumada "Dnya yzndeki herey iin, madd ve manev her ey iin, yaam iin ve baar iin en doru yol gsterici bilimdir, tekniktir. Bilimin ve tekniin dnda yol gsterici aramak, dncesizliktir, bilgisizliktir, yanllktr" demitir. Bilime ve teknie ncelik verme konusunda asl engeli oluturan Hilafet, Halife'nin ahsnda siyas ve din temsilcilik bulmutu. Bunu ortadan kaldrma plan, hem yurt iinde ve hem de yurt dnda kart glerin direniiyle kar karya kalmtr. Cumhurbakan Mustafa Kemal, d glerin bu konudaki planlarnn Trkiye'nin i ilerine karmak olduunu saptayarak, 1 Kasm 1922'de Saltanatn kaldrlmasnda olduu gibi, enerjik bir ekilde Hilafet yanllarna kar kmas sonucu, 3 Mart 1924 te Hilafet'in kaldrlmas byk bir ounlukla gerekletirilmitir. Bylece, eyhlislamlk, din mahkemeler ve fetva usul, dervilik nian, medreseler de kaldrlmtr. 1928 ylnda, Anayasa'daki "Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinin dini slamdr" maddesi kaldrlmtr. Bylece din ve mezhep ayrln kurumlatran yasalara son verilmi ve nce devlet laikletirilmitir. Yani, laik devlet, bundan byle meruluunu ne Tanr'dan, ne de kiiden alacaktr; ancak ve sadece ulusal ynetimden alacaktr; planlanan devrimler birer birer gerekletirilecektir: Eit haklar, uygarla giden yolun almas, eitim birliinin salanmas, tek evlilik v.s. zellikle Latin harflerinden oluan yeni Trk alfabesi amaca hizmet edecektir:

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1. Yaz ve konuma dilinin herkes iin ayn olmas, 2. Sesli harfler asndan zengin olan Trk diline en uygun yaz eidinin seilmi olmas, 3. Dnyann byk bir blmyle iletiimin kolayca salanabilmesi. Bu yenilikler olaanst bir tempoyla ama sadece okulda deil, okul d alanlarda da gerekletirildi. Mustafa Kemal'in eitim ve retime verdii nem o kadar aktr ki, kendisi bizzat yeni harflerle dersler vermitir. Bu, dil bakmndan yaplan ilk devrimdi ama hepsi deildi. Kemalistleri en fazla dndren husus, "Osmanlca" denilen dilin sarayda ve yksek tabaka tarafndan konuulan, bir de sade halk tarafndan konuulan ve de bu dilin nemli bir blmnn, daha dorusu % 70'e varan bir blmnn Farsa ve Arapa kkenli kelimelerden olumasyd. Artk, Trk dilinin yabanc szcklerden temizlenmesi gerekiyordu. Bu baarl bir ekilde gerekletirildi. yle ki, Mustafa Kemal'in 1927 ylndaki "Sylev"inin, daha sonraki yllarda Trkeletirilmesi gerekti. Ezan bile artk Trke okunuyordu. Kur'an dili Arapa ise sadece camilerde geerliydi, Hristiyan dinindeki Latince gibi. Trk Dilinin yabanc szcklerden arndrlmas 1932 ylnda kurulan "Trk Dil Kurumu" ile akademik bir seviyede de desteklendi. Bir yl nce de "Trk Tarih Kurumu" gerekletirilmiti. Bu kurumlar gerek "kltrel kimlik" ve gerekse "ulusal kimlik" bakmndan da nemli grevler yapmlardr ve Mustafa Kemal'in zel vasiyetnamesinde yer almlardr. Laik devlete giden yolda en byk engellerden birini eriat mahkemeleri oluturmutur. Bu mahkemelerin kaldrlmasndan sonra, Trk Meden Kanunu, Trk Ceza Kanunu, Trk Ticaret Kanunu ve Borlar Kanunu kartlarak, devletin temeli Bat Hukuk Sistemine oturtulmutur. Bundan byle, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde bireylerin ilikisini, yurttadevlet ilikisini dzenleyen hkmlerin yasalatrlmas TBMM'ne, uygulamas da T.C. hkmetine ait olmutur. Artk her bakmdan zgrlne kavuturulan bir toplumun fertlerinin d grnyle de uygar olmas gerekirdi. Bu nedenle Trk toplumu, fes, sark, araf, pee gibi dinsel olduu sanlan ba ve beden giysilerinden de kurtarld. Ataerkil bir aile yapsna sahip olan anlaya gre, kadn, igdlerine egemen olamayan, zayf bir varlk olarak grlmekte ve erkein koru-

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mas gerekmekteydi. Bu anlay Trklerde olmamasna karn, slam dinini kabul ettikten sonra, Acem ve Arap etkileri sonucu edinilmi ve de onlar gibi giyinmeye ve davranmaya balamlard. ok evlilik, cariye alma usul, ailede her eyin erkein emrine brakld bir anlay hakimdi. te bu anlay da tm kurumlaryla ortadan kaldrld. 19 Mays 1919'dan itibaren Mustafa Kemal'in att her admda laiklik temel alnmtr. Ulus kendi kaderini kendisi tayin edecektir (Amasya Genelgesi) Egemenlik kaytsz artsz ulusundur (TBMM'nin kuruluu) Yeni Anayasa yaplmas (1921) Saltanatn kaldrlmas (1922) Cumhuriyetin ilan (1923) Halifeliin kaldrlmas (1924) Cumhuriyet Anayasasnn gerekletirilmesi (1924) Hukukun laikletirilmesi (er'iye mahkemelerinin, Mecellenin kaldrlmas, yeni yasalarn karlmas, kadn haklarna ilikin kkl dzenlemeler) Eitim ve retimin laikletirilmesi (Medreselerin kaldrlmas, eitim birliinin salanmas, niversitelerin kurulmas) Kltrde laiklik (Tekke, zaviye gibi kurumlarn kapatlmas; dil, yaz, gzel sanatlar, giysi, takvim, l konularnda yeni dzenlemeler) Hafta tatilinin pazar gnne alnmas; milad takvimin kabul; arlk ve uzunluk l birimlerinin Batl lkelere gre dzenlenmesi Soyad yasasnn kabul.

Bu yasa 1934 ylnda karldktan sonra. TBMM tarafndan Mustafa Kemal'e ATATRK soyad verilmitir. Biz, buradan itibaren, artk ATATRK adyla aklamalarmz srdreceiz.

DEVLETLK
Bu ilkenin anlam, devletin iktisad yaama mdahalesidir. Yllarca sava stne sava yaam ve aydnyla, iisiyle, kylsyle byk kayplar vermi olan bir imparatorluun enkaz zerine kurulmu olan gen Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti'nin, i yaamnn her alannda, yatrm yapc, retici ve yol gsterici bir tutum iinde olmas kanlmazd. Trkiye tarm iin elverili ve byk bir lke olmasna karn, tarm igc bakmndan yeterli olanaa sahip olmadndan, topran byk bir ksm ilenemiyordu, ulam aralar yoktu, yeterli uzman yoktu, en-

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dstriden sz etmek olas deildi, temel ihtiya maddeleri bile ithal edilmek zorundayd, yatrm yapacak gte kapital sahibi insanlarn says hemen hemen yok gibiydi, retim konusunda yeterli bilgiye sahip yetimi eleman yoktu, demiryollar, limanlar, byk kentlerin alt yaplar v.s. yabanc firmalar tarafndan iletiliyordu. Bu nedenler dolaysyla da devlet kasasna giren bir gelir yoktu. Buna ek yk olarak da Osmanl borlarnn uzun bir sre denmesi gerekiyordu. Yeni devlet bu borlar altnda ezilmekteydi. Durumun bu derece ac ve cidd olduu ve Lozan antlamasnn henz yaplmad bir tarihte, ubat 1923'te, Atatrk zmir iktisat Kongresi'ni toplad. O, bu kongrede iktisad hedeflerin ncelikliini u szlerle dile getiriyordu: "Asker ve siyas zaferler ne kadar byk olurlarsa olsunlar, eer bunlar iktisad zaferlerle talandnlmazsa, yaratlan zaferler srekli olamaz, ksa bir sre sonra sner. Bu bakmdan, en gl ve parlak zaferimizin salayaca bayndrlk yararlarn saptayabilmek iin, iktisadiyatmzn, iktisad egemenliimizin salanmas, glendirilmesi ve yaygnlatrlmas arttr". Atatrk, bu anlamda varlkl kimseleri yatrm yapmaya aryordu. Ancak, o tarihte, varlkl kimselerin says yok denecek kadar azd. unu da unutmamak gerekir: Halk bir siyaset izleyen Atatrk, elbetteki meydan sadece zengin tabakaya brakmazd. Yabanclardan bor almay -ulusal onurun zedelenmemesi, bamszla glge drlmemesi ve emperyalist lkelerin tuzana dlmemesi iin dnmyordu. Tm bu nedenlerden dolay, devletin iktisad yaama mdahalesi kanlmaz oluyordu. zmir ktisat Kongresi'nde yeni devletin tez elden almas gereken nlemler yle sralanyordu: Vergi sisteminde reform, yeni kredi kurumlarnn dzenlenmesi, ulatrma sorununun zlmesi, topraksz kylye toprak datm, ticar speklasyonlara engel olunmas, yeralt kaynaklarnn iletilmesi, yerli sanayiciyi gmrk vergileriyle korumaya gidilmesi, bunlara ilikin yeni yasalarn karlmas... zmir ktisat Kongresinde alnan bu kararlarn nda u nlemler alnd: - Aar denilen ar vergi kaldrlarak, Atatrk'n "Ulusun efendisi" olarak niteledii kyl byk bir ykten kurtarld. - Kooperatifler kurularak, araclara, speklatrlere frsat verilmedi. - Ziraat Bankas gelitirildi, sermayesi arttrld ve bu bankann kaynaklarndan ok kk faiz karl kk krediler salanarak, kyly zendirici nlemler alnd. Afetler ve benzeri nedenlerle zarara uram olan kylnn borlarn erteleme gerekletirildi.

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- Ziraat okullar alarak, tarmda bilgili ve bilinli teknisyenler yetitirme amaland ve Ankara'da bir de "Yksek Ziraat Enstits" kuruldu. - Karadeniz blgesinde ay ve ttn, Akdeniz blgesinde narenciye ve pamuk yetitirilmesi iin zendirici nlemler alnd. - Hayvanclk ve ormancln gelitirilmesi iin yeni giriimlerde bulunuldu. - Atatrk, bizzat Orman iftlikleri kurarak, hem ada tarm aralarn ve yntemlerini oralarda denettirdi ve hem de bu iftlikleri birer Tarm okulu durumuna getirdi. - 1926 ylnda kartlan bir yasayla, endstriyi zendirici, Trk Ticaret yasas, Gmrkler yasas kartlarak da, sanayiciye yol gsterici ve onu koruyucu nlemler alnd. - Byk bir ticaret filosunun kurulmas konusunda retim merkezlerine mal destek salayacak almalar balatld. Havaclk ve Denizcilik desteklendi ve tevik edildi. - Etibank kurularak, Trkiye'de yeralt kaynaklarn iletme konusunda kaynak yaratld. - Baz iletmeleri devlet stlendi. (Demir yollan Osmanl imparatorluu zamannda toplam olarak 3000 km'lik bir demiryolu mevcut iken, 8 yl ierisinde buna 2000 km'lik bir demiryolu daha eklendi). - T.C. Merkez Bankas kurularak, devletin finans temeli oluturulmu oldu. - Planl kalknma yntemleri kabul edildi. Burada, bugn bile henz zlememi olan bir sorunun altn izmekte yarar vardr: Atatrk, 1937 ylnda toprak reformunu gerekletirmek iin ie koyulmutur, ancak ne yazk ki, nce hastal buna engel olmu, sonra da mr yetmemitir. Devlet, iktisad amaca ulamak iin, zel teebbsn olanaklarnn yetmedii yerde kendisi iktisadiyat ynlendirici kurulular oluturdu. rnein, Makina Kimya Endstrisi Kurumu. Aslnda, yzde yz bir devletilikten szetmek olanakszdr. Ancak, ksm devletilikten szetmek olanakldr. Dolaysyla Atatrk'n ekonomik modeline "Karma Ekonomi Modeli" denilmektedir. Kapitalizm ile devlet sosyalizmi arasnda bir ekonomik yol. Bylece Atatrk, insann devlet tarafndan smrlmesine ve insann insan tarafndan smrlmesine olanak vermeyecek olan bir model oluturmutur. Yeri gelmiken unu da vurgulamak gerekir: 1929 ylndaki dnya iktisat buhran srasnda, iktisad olarak Trkiye'den ok gl devletler, totaliter rejimler kurmaya gidecek kadar sa ve sol vurgunlara uramlardr. Ama. Atatrk Trkiyesi. bu buhrandan sistem yaras almadan kmay baarmtr.

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DEVRMCLK Bu kavram Bat dillerine bazen "Revolution" bazen de "Reform" olarak evrilmektedir. Osmanl dneminde "Devrim" kavramndan nce "htilal" ve "nklap" kavramlar kullanlmtr. "htilal, kurulu bir hkmeti g kullanarak ykp, yerine bir baka hkmet kurma" anlamna gelmekteydi. "nklap ise, parlamento, hkmet ve eitli kurullarca saptanarak uygulanmas dnlen, ekonomik, kltrel v.b. alanlarda yaplacak deiiklikler" anlamnda kullanlyordu. Yani, "nklap" kurulu bir devlet dzenine ya da hkmet biimine kar karak, onu deitirme, kaldrma anlamnda deil, tam tersine, gereklemesi devletin, hkmetin aracl ile istenen deiiklikler getirilmesi anlamn tayordu. Bu kavramn, Bat dillerinde kullanlan "Reform" kavramna yakn bir anlam tad sylenilebilir. "Devrim" kavram ise, var olan toplumsal dzeni temelden deitirmek, yeniden organize etmek anlamna kullanlmaktadr. Bat dillerindeki karl da "Revolution" kavramdr. erik bakmdan siyasal devrim, sosyal devrim, kltr devrimi gibi farkl tanmlar vardr. Atatrk'n gerekletiridi Trk Devrimi szkonusu olunca, "Ulusal Kurtulu Sava kazanldktan sonra demode olmu geleneklere dnerek, onlara bal kalarak kendilerini gelimi uluslarn smrsne brakan uluslar, geri kalmlktan kurtulamazlar" dncesini anlamak gerekir. zgrlne ve bamszlna kavuan uluslar, kendi geleceklerinin sorumluluklarn kendileri tayacaklardr. Bu uluslar, kendi istekleriyle, kendi gleriyle kendilerini her alanda yenileme yollarn bulmak zorundadrlar. Aslnda, Atatrk'n gerekletirdii devrimler, Trk Devrimi'ni oluturan birer halkadrlar. O, ok iyi bir zamanlamayla Osmanl dneminin khne kurumlarn ortadan kaldrm, bo ve anlamsz ideolojisine son vermi ve dnsel olarak tasarmn yapt devrimleri siyasal, sosyal, kltrel, iktisad, sanatsal vb. alanlarda, birer birer gerekletirmitir. Ama, Trk ulusunun uygar ve ada dzeyde tutulmasnn salanmasdr, yani srekli devrimciliktir. Bu ilke, Osmanl mparatorluu zamanndaki fel edici uyuukluk yerine, zendirici ve canl tutucu anlayn ve davrann ncelik almasn amalayan bir ilkedir. Trk devrimi, kaynan iddetten almayan, zorbalktan almayan bir devrimdir. 1789 ve 1917 devrimlerinin temelinde iddet vardr. Atatrk, bundan kanmak iin ok byk gayret sarf etmi ve baarmtr. Buna karn Trkiye'de 1920'lerde ve 1930'larda yaplan devrimler byk apta devrimlerdir ve tarihte ok nemli bir yer tutmaktadrlar. Bu ilkenin son ilke olarak alnmasnn nedeni kavramsal bir zellikten kaynaklanmaktadr: Trk devrimi, daha nceleri yaplm olan Fransz ve Rus devrimlerinde olduu gibi, sadece (ulusuluk, cumhuriyet ya

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da iktisadiyat gibi) siyas adan deerlendirilmemelidir. Dier ilkeler de dikkate alnarak, srekli devrimin her alanda geerli olmasn mmkn klacak bir devrimler btnnden szetmek yerinde olacaktr (Atatrk, btn baarlarnn kaynann Trk ulusu olduuna inanan bir devlet adamyd. O, "devrimler" yerine "Trk Devrimi" denmesini istemitir). Osmanl zamanndaki kat kuralclk karsnda, zellikle devletilik ilkesinde grld gibi, an gerektirdii lde gelitirici nlemlerin alnmas gereklidir. Devrimcilik ilkesinin gsterdii ana hedeflerden birisi de, Trkiye'nin ada uluslarn dzeyine karlmasdr. Ayn zamanda, bireyin zgrl ve mutluluu konusundaki gelimeler Trk ulusunun yaamna da geirilmelidir. Atatrk bu konuda unu sylyor: "Yaptmz ve yapmakta olduumuz devrimlerin amac, Trkiye halkn, tamamen yeni ve btn anlam ve biimleriyle uygar bir sosyal toplum durumuna ulatrmaktr. Devrimlerimizin asl amac budur. lke mutlaka ada, uygar ve yepyeni bir lke olacaktr." ABD bakan adaylarndan Wendel Wilkie'nin 1942 ylnda syledii u szleri sylemeden gemek istemiyorum: "Mustafa Kemal ile arkadalar tarafndan ynetilen devrim, yalnz siyas olmakla kalmam, uluslararas ilikileri, bilim, kltr, toplumsal kalknma sorunlarn iine alan bir genilie ulamtr". "Atatrk'n ve O'nu izleyen yetenekli, azimli arkadalarnn nderlii sayesinde, Trkler eski ark'm peesini -kelimenin hem asl hem de mecaz anlamyla- yrtm bulunuyorlar. Peenin, ulusun gznden synlmasyla ortala yaylan k, emin olabilirsiniz ki, srekli kalacaktr. nk, eski gelenekleri ykan bu devrim, kollara iaret taklmadan, niformalara brnlmeden, kitleleri asab heyecanlarla dalgalandrmadan yaplm, baka bir lkeye saldrmadan ortaya konmutur". SONU te burada ksaca dile getirdiimiz ilkelerin tasarm, gerekletirilmesi ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ada uluslar arasndaki saygn yerini almas, onbe yl gibi ok ksa bir zaman dilimine sdrlan ve dnyada ei grlmemi byk bir eserdir. Bu eser, hakl olarak, hibir eyi rastlantya brakmayan, kendisine ve halkna tam gven duyan, kararlln simgesi olan ATATRK adyla zdelemitir. O, devletimizin ve ulusumuzun, saygn devletler ve ada uluslar dzeyine karlmasn ve blnmez btnln silahla salamad. O, bunu, yukarda deindiim ilkelerle, ama bata da laiklikle, retim birli-

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iyle, dini siyasetin dnda tutmakla ve altyapya verdii youn emekle salad. Hemen hemen 50 yldan beri Atatrk Devrim ve lkelerinden sapmann lkemize ve ulusumuza, birliimize ve dirliimize ne denli zarar verdiini grmek ve ona gre en bata bireysel olarak sorumluluumuzu bilmek zorundayz. Bazlar "Atatrk' amak" dncesini ortaya atmaktadrlar. Onlara verilecek en yerinde yantn nce "Atatrk'e ulamak" olduu kansndaym. Bugn ne yapmalyz ki, "O'nun gsterdii yolda yryoruz" diyebilelim? Bunu dilimiz Trke'de; din ile devlet arasndaki gerginlie son veren, akla ve bilime ncelik veren, i barn olmazsa olmaz harc olan laiklik ilkesinde; eitim ve retim birliinde grebiliriz. Devrimin sreklilii dilimizde iyi grlr. Osmanllar zamannda hemen hemen hi konuulmayan ve yazlmayan Trk dili, Atatrk'n dil devrimi sayesinde bir bilim dili, bir kltr dili olarak kendini kantlamtr. Dilimizi "din dili Arapa"dan, Acemce'den Atatrk kurtarmtr. O'nun kurduu Trk Dil Kurumu kurtarmtr. Erkeklerinin ancak % 10'unun, kadnlarnn ise sadece % l'inin okuma-yazma bilebildii Trkiye, ada lkeler arasnda ancak Atatrk Devrim ve lkeleri sayesinde yerini alabilmitir. karlacak en sade bilano ve alnacak en byk ders bu gerekte yatar.

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MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATRK

Prof. Dr. KamelAbu JABER* Since the advent of islam, no other man, ruler or othenvise, managed to challenge the system from vvithin like Attatrk did. in other cultures perhaps only Martin Luther, Kari Marx and a few others have dared to challenge the very fundamentals of the systems in which they found themselves. Were I an historian of the 24th or 25th century, I might have the beneft of hindsight with regard to the Kemalist experiment. As it were, it is only a few decades old; and ongoing experiment whose end results are yet to be seen. it is, novvadays, being met with fierce resistance by poplist islam which clearly sees in it a challenge to its very core values. in fact, hardly had two or three decades passed when the first serious stirrings of resistance were vvitnessed. As time passed, two camps were forming: the Kemalists, who were among the intellectuals and high ranking military; and the masses of Anatolia who, like most peoples of the Middle East are religious by the very nature of their existence. Religion to them, is the warm blanket vvrapped around their lives, protecting and giving sustenance to their spiritual and mundane needs, hopes, and aspirations, even their very lives. Among the three majr groups of the area: Arabs, Turks and Iranians, the dialectic betvveen nationalism and islam is a continuing process whose end result is an earnest search for identity. The search takes place at several levels and in varying degrees of intensity depending on time and place. Often it is violent, both physically and intellectualy, a symptom of societies in that very difficult historical process of transition. Caught between the imperatives of both modernity and traditionalism, with one foot frmly planted in the familiar, though increasingly less comfortable mansion of" the past, with the other, already treading in the realm of change. Because of the traditional mode of life of these societies, the response came invariably from above. Since awarness came in the wake of
* President, Institute of Diplomacy, Amman.

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the first military contact with the west, the response was a perceived need to change accordingly to meet the coming challenge. Among the first to be introduced to western ways were the military who were immediately aware of the imbalance between their societies response and the outside challenge they faced. Unlike other Middle East reformers, however, Mustafa Kemal stands unique in his conception of the situation as well as the totality of his response. "Change or Perish" meant to him change in every sphere of life, not just the military. Whereas Reza Pehlavi and later his son, as well as Jamal Abdul Nasser, the Syrian military of the 1940's and many other Middle East reformers concentrated most of their efforts on the military, Atatrk's approach was total. There was need to change the mode and the style of thinking which, he thought, necessitated that the premises of life and living must be completely altered. it was not only the military, or the outvvard manifestations of life that needed to be changed, but also the very soul of the individual and the en tire society. However, he was not out to negate religion nor did he wish to challenge the faith, but simply the system which had its own interpretation of life1. This is evident from his proclamation to the Syrians "...As a coReligionist I pray you not to heed the strife stirred amognst us..."2. From his early days Atatrk was tormented by what he viewed as the inadequecy of the Ottoman Empire in meeting both the domestic and foreign challenges it was facing. He saw in the Ottoman Empire an archaic system that was too much entangled, not only by tradition, but also by its associaation with its subject peoples. As a Turkish nationalist, he was not too unhappy with the demie of the Empire, a process which he sepeeded up with energy. To him, the imperial system was tantamount to the traditional life which he saw as a cause for backwardness and retardation. Pan Turanium was too romantic, unwiedly and also another form of outside entanglement bound to retard the birth of a new purely Turkish nation. The principles of his revolution, nationalism, secularlism and rationality, populism and etatism had a deep intellectual and emotional impact on his followers. However he "remained free ...to weigh strategies and costs in 3 transforming the society..." . Later, Halpern correctly adds that Attatrk was a "...brilliant organizer, an educated propagandist, and a charismatic personality without ties to any group whch hight obstract healthy change. He never allowed his ideology to become rigid, but rather it evolved as a broad guideline to pragmatic action"4.
1. 2. 3. 4. See Halpern, Manfred, The Politics ofSocial Change in The Middle East And North Africa. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 4th printing, 1920, p. 1229 and p. 289. Zeine n. Zeine, The Struggle ForArab Independence, Beirut, Khayat, 1960, p. 123. Ibid, p. 36. Ibid, p. 362.

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Raised from early childhood in a non traditional manner, a process which his father espoused, it was natural for him to reject any association with the "backward" peoples the Empire ruled ver. This explains not only his emphasis on western, non-Arab, non Middle Eastern garb, head dress ...ete, but also his rejection of the very seript in which Ottoman language, history, culture and its religious core were \vritten. His was not a piecemeal reformist program but a total revolution against the existing order and its replacement with a new one. The core values must change and the core values of the order in which the Empire languished, he thought, were arehaic and more concerned with form and ceremony than substance. He seems to have arrived at his own conclusions, ali by himself, \vithout the anticlerical tradition which Marx found strong in vvestern societies and which encouraged him to think of religion as the opium of the masses. in a speech at inebolu in 1925 Atatrk spells out clearly and rightly his view of the need to modernize. He says "...Before the impetuous torrent of civilization resistance is futile: it is quite without merey towards the heedless and refractory. in the face of the might and superiority of civilization, vvhich pierces mountains, flies in the sky, sees everything from the atoms invisible to the eye to the stars, and vvhich enlightens and investigates, nations striving to advance with a medieval mentality and primitive superstitions are condemmed to perish or at least to be enslaved and humiliated. But the people of the Turkish Republic have decided to live to eternity as a civilized and progressive community, and have torn to pieces the chains of slavery with a heroism unequalled in history"5. it is the totality of his revolutionist approach that is astonishing as well as his frank daring to challenge the existing status quo. it is not enough to say that his father inspired him, for hovvever true that may have been, it does not explain the genuine commitment or the sustained determination that drove him to challenge the totality of the order of life in vvhich he was born. After ali, the Ottoman Empire was a great achievment of the genuis of the Turkish people: their disipline, their administration and their sense of mission. Under the circumstances, one vvould have assumed that reform, not total revolution, vvould have been the response. Would it not have been more natural for Mustafa Kemal, the proud Trk that he was, to take pride in Ottomanism vvhich was an expression of Turkish civilization? Surely he was avvare that the empire, with vvhatever shortcomings it may have had in his eyes, vvas one of the last great empires that survived on equal footing with other empires of its time. These and similar questions may never be satisfactorily ansvvered though speculation may continue well into the future. The fact remains,
5. Ibid, p. 289.

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hovvever, that Atatrk had his own vision as well as the courage to pursue it. Not only that, but to inspire thousands of others, decades after his death, to continue pursuing his dream. Today's Kemalist Turkey is an expression of that dream which is now, as it was in the beginning, attempting to assert itself and to expand. Resistance also is strong and the continuing clash of visions as to what Turkey should look like deepens the sense of identity crises. it is an experiment in progress whose end result is not yet in sight and may never be resolved in a way that will satisfy ali Turks. For one of the most important ingredients of that experiment is that here is a country trying to break away from the imperatives of its geopolitical and cultural milieu and heritage. One may ponder whether Kemalist secularism can wrench a country that is predominantly in Asia not only geopolitically but also in tradition, culture and religion and push it into another cultural dimension and time frame. The question receives further significance when one comtemplates a comparison between Turkey and her neighbours, the Arabs and the Iranians. As a revolution from above, it has inspired not only successive generations of Turkish leaders but other Middle Eastern leaders as well. Yet it remains a unique experiment whose majr features have survived its founder. Kemalism survives today in a tradition that continues to insist on distancing Turkey from its regional cultural context and the traditional religiosity of the people. Along with the attempt at this distancing has been an attempt at the Turkification of islam6. Atatrk also introduced the concept that change is an absolute necessity for survival. "Change or Perish" he advocated, relying on the state as the instrument to induce change. This in itself was yet another revolutionary concept he introduced. The traditional Middle East government kept aloof from any attempt at introducing change or interfering in the lives of its people: its functions rarely exceeding being that of a policeman maintaining order and a tax collector replenishing the treasury of the state. Neither function endeared it to its subjects. The Leader dropped a rock in a quiet pool. it is indeed difficult to enumerate the many sweeping changes he brought about. in an "other directed" society that received its inspiration from tradition and religious sources, he attempted to introduce vvestern rationalism to the engineering of life. The national approach, socio-politically and economically speak6. See the editorial in Hurriyat, stating that "...The Turks are no longer followers of the Arabs. They depend on their own interpretation of islam..." quoted in al-Dustur, Amman, January 17, 1998, p. 17.

ing, meant that the old order had to be abandoned. That decisions, he also realized, must be made by more than one man and that responsibility eventually must be shouldered by both the rulers and the ruled. However, he had no illusions about the need for leadership from above: a tradition which he introduced to the politics of the region. Like himself, Today's guardians of the revolution, come from the military establishment. Religious political, social, cultural, linguistic, legal and even changes in dress and style, introduced by him were an expression of his belief in their importance and in the absolute necessity to detach Turkey from one century and place it into another. in historical terms, very few persons, prophets or othervvise, challenged the totality of their society the way Atatrk did. He was indeed one of the few such rebels who succeeded in making his dream a reality. The dream is stili an ongoing process, at some times accelerated and at other times challenged. This dialectic will certainly go on well into the future and however it may be assessed today, it has already changed the intellectual landscape not only of Turkey itself but way beyond its frontiers. Shaking the very fabric of the social order as well as its belief system the way Atatrk did, has already happened. What the outcome will be may never be known in our life time. Again, had I been vvriting from the perspective of the 24th or 25th century I may have reached firmer conclusions. Yet I cannot help but marvel at this lone man who dared to stand outside the circle whose parameters were dravvn by an existing social order and shake it to its very roots. His belief in the possibilities of social and spiritual engineering is indeed a rare occurrence in history. As we remember Kemal Atatrk today, we remember a man of courage, and vision; A man whose very name sheds light on his greatress. As if Mustafa, the chosen, was not enough, he was given the title of Kemal, the perfect, by his teacher, and that of Atatrk, father of the Turks by his country. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk is surely a national symbol, and vvill remain an icon in Turkey and the region at large.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Bozkurt Gven, "Secular Trends And Turkish Identity", Perceptions, December 1997February 1998. Brockelmann, Cari, History of The Islamic Peoples, London, 1944. Daniel Pipes, "The Birth of A New Middle East Alliance", Washington Times, January 2, 1998.

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Dankvvart A. Rustow, "The Army And The Founding of The Turkish Republic", World Politics, Vol. XI July 1959, No. 4. Ersin Kalaycolu, "Turkish Foreign Policy Vis a Vis Regional Security and Cooperation in The Middle East", Paper presented at the Arab-Turkish Seminar, Amman, Arab Thought Forum, 18-19 March, 1996. Harb, Mohammad, "Moaz Cohen: An Ottoman Jew and a Turani Leader", Majalat alArabi, No. 282, May 1982. Ibraham, John, "Turkey Living in The Long Shadow of Atatrk", The Financial Times, May 26, 1997. hsanolu, E, "Arab Turkish Relations", Occasional paper, No. 2, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, 1998. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, "The Dynamic of Change And Development in Jordan", in C.F. Pinkele and A. Pollis, eds., The Contemporary Mediterranean World, New York, Praeger, 1975. Khadduri Majed, W'ar And Peace n The Law Of slam, Baltimore, 1955. Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs, New York, Ithaca University Press, 1962. Luke, Sir Harry, The Old Turkey And The New, London, 1955. M.C. Kurop, "Greece And Turkey: Can They Mend Fences?", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1, January/February 1998. "Generals And Politics", The Economist, July 19, 1997. Peretz Don, The Middle East Today, 4th ed., New York., Praeger, 1983. Said Edvvard, Culture and Imperialism, New York, Vintage Books, 1994. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1997. "Turkey At The Crossroads", Dialogue, London, April, 1995. Villalta, J.B., Atatrk, trans. from Spanish to English by VVilliam Campbell, Ankara, Trk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi, 1979. Zeine, N. Zeine, The Struggle For Arab Independence, Beirut, Khayat, 1960.3

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REFLECTIONS ON THE EARLY TURKISH REPUBLIC N WORLD-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Prof. Carter V. FINDLEY* As much as has been written about modern Turkey in recent years, scholars seldom look at Turkey in a world-historical perspective. Archival empiricism reigns so supreme among Turkish historians that some would disdain this enterprise. For nationalist historians, the desire to formulate a canon of national uniqueness is another obstacle to the comparisons on which world history depends. This is unfortunate, because the history of modern Turkey differs from the histories of other nations in important respects, while also resembling them in others; and the only way to evaluate these differences is in the broad, comparative perspective, to which neither archival empiricism nor nationalist doctrine can give access. To illustrate this point briefly, I would like to explore several facets of early republican history that can only be appreciated fully when viewed in the vast space-time perspective of world history. I shall refer to these facets under the following headings: * Turkey's reorientation toward the West * Turkey's national indepencence struggle * Early republican Turkey and the changing world system * Atatrk in global perspective. My presentation will be in the form of an essay, rather han a research paper. each of my points could, however, be developed and documented at length. TURKEY'S REORENTATON TOWARD THE WEST Ali of us see the founding of the Turkish Republic as a decisive shift toward the West, a shift that ended the Ottomans' protracted wavering between Islamic Empire and secularist modernity. in a nationalist prespective, we see this as a unique change. While there is much truth in this
* Ohio State University.

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view, it has a price. Being cut off from the past creates uncertainty about the present and future. Ahmed Hamdi Tanpnar devoted his novels to exploring this problem, and Turkey's experiences since his death in the early 1960s have illustrated it with increasing complexity. A world historical perspective helps, I think, both to emphasize the importance of Turkey's modern transormation and to reconnect it with Turkey's past. Turkey is practically unique among the world's nations in being located at the pivot between two of the zones where the world's most influential civilizations have developed. in Bozkurt Gven's vvords, Anatolia is "the West of the East and the East of the West"'. Whoever lives in this land always has a choice between cultural orientations in different directions. Anatolia's history includes many reorientations, with long periods of stability in between. in the second millennium BCE, for example, the Hittites' sphere of influence extended as far as Aleppo. A visit to the antiquities museums of Ankara and Aleppo makes clear that both regions shared Hittite culture. A millennium later Asia Minr was integrated into larger political entities, first the Achaemenian Empire of Iran to the east, then the Empire of Alexander coming from the West. Later, the Roman Empire made Anatolia a key component -as a visit to Ephesus reminds us of an empire that encompassed the entire Mediterranean world and more, before the breakup into eastern and western empires again reinforced ties to the East2. The Turkish dynasties reshaped this eastward orientation in an Islamic mode, preserving it until the Turkish republic reoriented Turkey to the West. If there is anything that may change the ancient phenomenon of pivoting between East and West, it is the dawning era of globalization, vvhich gives Turkey choices among a number of regions that will be important to it in the future. in any event, only historical amnesia can make us see Turkey's cultural reorientation under Atatrk as a unique turning point in the history of this country, rather than as the fulfillment of a potential often realized before. To say this is not to downplay the achievements of the Atatrk era. Rather, it is to relieve the sense of rootlessness that comes from not being able to see the events of the 1920s and 1930s in a larger context that recognizes the unique potential for cultural change that its geography confers on Anatolia. This is one important lesson from the world historical perspective. TURKEY'S STRUGGLE EXCEPTIONAL NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Theoretical research now being done on the comparative history of revolution is beginning to formulate a distinction between constitutional
1. 2. Bozkurt Gven, Trk Kimlii, Ankara, 1993, 168. Geoffrey Barraclough, The Times Concise Atlas of World History, Maplevvood, NJ, 1992,20-23,30-31.

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revolutions and social revolutions. Constitutional revolutions aim to seize power within a model of parliamentary govemment whose legitimacy is affrmed. Social revolutions aim to destroy a form of govemment whose legitimacy is denied. They acquire their "social" character from the need to neutralize or eliminate the defenders of the old order3. To quote the French, who had a good bit of experience in this kind of thing, you have to crack eggs to make an omelette. Of course, there is more to the characterization of revolutions than the mere distinction between "constitutional" and "social". in countries that are dominated, or threatened with domination, from outside, there is the need to sever or at least minimize external dependency ties. Some societies also attempt cultural revolution, which theorists of revolution have generally neglected. Finally, what about countries that do not exactly fit our analytical categories, or that are ambivalent about whether the changes they live through should be classed as revolutions or not? Where does Turkey's national independence struggle fit into these categories? If we think of the national independence struggle of 19191922 as part of a terminal crisis of the Ottoman empire, a crisis that lasted from 1908 until the founding of the republic in 1923, then it is easy to see that Turkey belongs to the constitutional revolution category, if Turkey had a revolution. Even the abolition of the imperial government in stanbul and the establishment in its place of a republican government in Ankara does not change this; what mattered was the revolutionaries' long-term loyalty to the model of parliamentary government. However, Turks of the period clearly differed among themselves ver whether they had a "revolution" (ihtilal) or only a non-violent change (inkilap). Between 1919 and 1923, they often used the term "national struggle" (milli mcadele). Most Turks specifically did not want social revolution, although they did opt in the 1920s for cultural revolution, which is usually an even-more-violent out-growth of social revolution. How does one explain this puzzle? it may help to begin with the question of Turkey and imperialism. The Ottoman empire was a doubly imperial state. That is, terms like "empire" and "imperialism" applied to it in two senses, which were very different from each other and implied very different levels of legitimacy. One imperialism, endowed with strong historical legitimation, was the indigenous Ottoman-Islamic imperialism: rule ver a multinational empire, which the Ottomans tried until the last possible moment to preserve. The other imperialism was the European one: the attempt, based on inequalities in power, to reduce the Ottoman Empire to semi-dependency, to colonize outlying parts, and to suppport anti-Ottoman national liberation
3. Nader Sohrabi, "Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia, 1905-1908", American Journal of Sociology, 6 (1995), 1383-1447.

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struggles among subject nationalities. The Ottomans' attempts to hold the empire together and to resist European encroachment generated complex responses, including an effort to promote both an Ottoman supranationalism and, among progressive intellectuals, constitutionalism. After a brief first period of constitutional rule in 1876-1878, this corabination of ideas resurfaced in the Young Trk movement of 1889-1918. The Young Turks triumphed with the Young Trk Revolution of 1908, but their triumph was undermined by European landgrabbing and the onset of the empire's terminal crisis, which lasted roughly from 1908 until 1923. The Ottomans' commitment to constitutional revolution and their avoidance of social revolution become comprehensible from the widespread fear that revolution (ihtilal) would provoke the breakup of the empire, vvhereas the more moderate transformation implied by the world inkilap, in a political context already committed to constitionualism, might help hold it together. on into the early republican years, we find certain Ottoman intellectuals, like Halide Edib Advar4, who did talk about revolution, and others, like Yakup Kadri Karaosmanolu5, who did not. The idea of inklap was also trivialized or tamed in a sense by using the term to refer, not only to Turkey's transformation in general, but to individual ones of the early republic's reforms. While any hint of revolution seems to disappear at that point, we could add that the breakup of the cosmopolitan empire and the creation in its place of a nation-state, or somethineg close to one, did serve as a kind of proxy for social revolution. The critical social variable for the late Ottomans had been, not class, but ethnicity. The Ottomans did not experience the class conflict of social revolution so much as they experienced the ethnic conflict of a collapsing multinational state. With its fail, practically ali the non-Turkish ethnicities disappeared from the domestic scene; what had been internal problems became external, and usually less pressing issues; and the Turkish leadership was lef t facing what it saw at the time as a classless Turkish population that needed to be molded into nationalisn and citizenship. Ali the forms of "difference" lodged within this citizenry would not become chronic and acute issues, for Turkey as for other countries, until the 1960s and later. in the brief comment on constitutional revolution with which I opened this discussion, two elements remain to account for. One is how Turkey coped with external dependency relations. in the most immediate, short-term sense, it did so by winning against the Greeks in the military
4. 5. Halide Edib Advar, Ateten Gmlek, stanbul, 1997, consistently using the term ihtilal; for example see pp. 84, 90-91, 98, 99, 101, 104, 109, 121-123. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanolu, Panorama, stanbul, 1987, many references to inkilab, for example on pages 43, 44, 45, 53, 56, 62, 65, 108, 109, 111-114, 118, 121-122, 125, 148, 150, 175, 211, 215, 218, 222, 227, 301, 337, 350, 366, 484, 487, 494-496, 500,551-553,555-557,572.

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phase of its national independence struggle (1919-1922). This victory enabled Turkey to become the only one of the povvers defeated in World War I to secure a renegotiation of the peace settlement that had been imposed on it. in a longer-term sense, the restructuring of external economic relations was affected by changes in the world system, changes so significant that I would like to take them as the theme of my next section. The other element stili to account for is that of cultural revolution, which began at the end of the national struggle and continued through the 1920s. Amid many social and cultural reforms, several measures can be thought of as revolutionary in impact. The most notable is the replacement of Islamic empire with secular republic. Building on an Ottoman feminist movement that extends back to the 1860s, the emancipation of women -including the abolition of polygamy and full voting rights by 1935-- also amounts to revolutionary change. So do the alphabet and language reforms (inklap) launched in 1928. The language reform was intended to purify the Ottoman language of foreign, specifically Arabic and Persian elements, and give it a national character. The language and alphabet reforms together were designed to make the cultural inheritance of the Ottoman Empire inaccessible to later generations of Turks; for better or worse, they have. American commentators, insufficiently sensitive to Turkish terminology, tend to refer to the Turkish experience of the 1920s as a revolution. Turkish terminology, as we have seen is more nuanced. Here, truly, is a "national struggle" (milli muadele) later generations speaking the new Turkish have sometimes made it into a "national liberation struggle" (milli kurtulu sava). This national struggle was carried out within the conceptual framework of a constitutional revolution. it eschevved violent revolution (ihtilal), and yet produced cultural revolution. This is a case that merits more careful study by theorists of revolution. EARLY REPUBLICAN WORLD SYSTEM TURKEY AND THE CHANGING

The story of how Turkey severed or transformed external dependency relations, vvhile usually treated in terms of Turkish initiatives such as the abolition of the capitulations, is also a story of changes in the world system, particularly from 1929 on. The point I wish to stress is that in a world characterized throughout the last two centuries by progressively tightening global interlinkages, the years between the two vvorld wars represented an exceptional conjuncture for any nation just emerging from a national liberation struggle. The military exhaustion of the majr european povvers in world War I was clearly one factor in enabling the Turks to emerge victorious in 1922. The 1929 depression and the collapse of world trade then ensured that the interwar years would be the only majr interval since 1800 during which global interlinkage loosened rather than 95

tightened. For a developing nation to be independent at this time, as few in Asia or Africa were, implied majr opportunities, as well as challenges, if a way could be found to profit from this conjuncture. The stakes were high. Japan, the only independent developing nation in Asia that can be compared with Turkey in this period, clearly made unfortunate choices with its turn toward militarism in the 1930s and ended up paying a hideous price. If we interpret "Asia" in the inclusive sense, Turkey was the second most successful Asian developing nation, after Japan, at this time. How well did Turkey profit from this exceptional conjuncture? The most interesting point here has to do with Turkey's economic response to the global crisis of 1929. If we compare Turkey's performance after 1929 with that of other independent developing countries, of which most were found in Latin America, we find that for most, the economic crisis quickly provoked political crisis as well. Not only Japan's turn away from democracy, but also the collapse of the old Liberal leaderships in majr Latin American countries and their replacement with a variety of poplist strongmen, like Getlio Vargas in Brazil or Juan Peron in Argentina, illustrate this point. in Turkey, hovvever, the early republican leadership, which had shown a lack of original ideas about economic policy in the 1920s, showed a new capacity to innovate in economic policy in the 1930s and -not incidentally- held on to power in a way that was almost unique among the developing countries with vvhich Turkey can be compared. The critical innovation was the new policy of etatism or devletilik, as it is called in Turkish. The policy was apparently distilled out of recent European and American economic policy and, perhaps especially, out of the Soviet Five-Year Plan of 1928. it involved centralized planning, import substitution behind high protective barriers, and creation of a public sector in vvhich the state would lead in the development of majr industries. What is significant about this in world-historical perspective is that Turkey was the frst developing country to adopt this policy package. Mexico followed soon after and, incidentally, also avoided the kind of regime crisis seen in Brazil and Argentina. This same import-substitution policy package became typical of developing countries ali ver the vvorld, as their numbers increased with decolonization after World War II. Versions of the policy characterized the entire Third World until the 1980s turn toward privitization. What is important here is not the ultimate profitabilty of the policy: it did make sense during that loosening of global interlinkage that led even the most highly developed countries tovvard protectionism and autarkism. What I want to emphasize is Turkey's vanguard role in formulating this policy. This does not mean that other developing countries adopted the policy from Turkey. There were countries, like Iran and Egypt, that closely follovved developments in Turkey; hovvever, countries further

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away probably came up with with similar policies because they faced similar problemss and had the same sources to draw on. For Turkey, the significance of this policy innovation should be rated highly. However much a drag this policy package may have become on development after the 1960s, for the 1930s, it helped Turkey deal with a global economic crisis, and it may have played a key role in enabling the new republic to escape the kind of upsetting regime change that the Depression precipitated in many other developing countries. ATATRK N GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE The worldwide demographic catastrophe of the years just before the Turkish Republic was founded -including not only World War I but the comparably deadly influenza pandemic of 1918 are very diffcult for historians to assess. Certainly, no country was hit harder than Turkey. Although not often remarked on as such, one consequence is probably the weak or ill-inspired leadership that appeared in many countries in the 1920s or 1930s. Who today can name in sequence ali the U.S. or French presidents, or ali the British prime ministers of this period? What a paradox, then, that the Turkish people, whom many statesmen of the World War I era thought were as dead as the Ottoman Empire, should have produced perhaps the most charismatic leader of their entire history in the midst of such catastrophe. The scope of a brief presentation, and my declared purpose of looking at the early Turkish Republic from a world-historical perspective, limits, but also guides, what I can say about this subject. The fastest way to make the point I wish to make is to say that of ali the strongman leaders of the 1930s, Atatrk is the only one who is stili revered by a substantial proportion of his countrymen. I will leave it to specialists to examine why this is so. I cannot pretend to have done profound research on Atatrk myself. Hovvever, I can name a few qualities that the specialists will have more to say about. For example, he was not only a sklled military commander, but also a man with a vision for the future of his country. He possessed the verbal skils to articulate this vision in a clear and inspiring way. while a deciseve and dominant leader, he listened to a lot of other people. His creativity, and that of the people with whom he surrounded himself, was well illustrated in the initiatives to end the cultural dividedness of the late Ottoman era by reorienting Turkey as a secular, Western-style republic, and to launch the statist economic policy of the 1930s. While aspects of his private life are controversial, his behavior suggests that he took seriously the idea of being a father to his country, that he did not seek to create a dynasty and ensure it riches, as some other leaders have done. Ali of these things have been said before, and others can say them better than I. However, I do not think the global comparison with other leaders of the period, which I have

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just offered, has been commonly made; and it surely offers one of the best indicators of Atatrk's exceptional character. CONCLUSION Is it only a coincidence that the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean world has done more than its share to stimulate the development of world history as a field of study? Two of the most important pioneers of the field, Arnold Toynbee and William McNeill, both began in Greek studies. I cannot claim to walk their footsteps, and indeed my interest in world history is secondary to my interest in Turkish studies; however, I, too, came to the study of world history through an interest in this part of the world. Toynbee's thinking about relations among civilizations was greatly influenced by his experiences in Turkey in the early days of the national struggle. He had come to like the Turks, and what he saw stimulated his thinking about what happens when civilizations collide. Many of his ideas are now quite outdated, and his theories about Ottoman history are quite maddening to anyone in Turkish studies. However, he wrote eloquently about other facets of Turkish history, such as the early Turks of the steppes, or Mustafa Kemal and the early republic. And, as a scholar trained in classical studies, he believed that the nation state provides too narrow a canvas for the study of history. Hovvever eccentric Toynbee was, these are lines of thought that historians of the Turks ought to take seriously. The Ottoman Empire, certainly, was no nation-state. And where indeed is there a canvas big enough to depict the entire history of the Turks, if it is not the canvas of comparative global or at least Eurasian history? I hope the few things I have been able to say here today will stimulate others, too, to comtemplate the Turkish experience in global perspective.

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MUSTAFA KEMAL TURKYES VE AVRUPA

Ord. Prof. Dr. Anna MASALA* Sayn Bakan, Ekselanslar, Aziz Dostlarm. Benim iin Ankara'da sizlerle beraber Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin 75inci kurulu yldnmn kutlamaya davet edilmi olmak byk bir ereftir. Bence 29 Ekim 1923 uzun Trk tarihinde en nemli gnlerden biridir; nk sadece Cumhuriyetin ve yeni Trkiye'nin douuna bal deil, Mustafa Kemal'in byklne ve Trk milletinin yeni ufuklarna da baldr. 29 Ekim 1923'de Trk milleti Mustafa Kemal ile birlikte bamszlk iin savam Atatrk ile hr ve modern bir lke yaratmtr. Ancak Atatrk'n bykln herkesten ok bilen sizlerle Atatrk'den bahsetmek ok zor. Bu, zellikle benim iin ok zor. Benim iin kalbi Trk bir yabancnn gzleriyle yeni Trkiye'nin gereine bakmak ok zor. Belki de, benim gibi Trk tarih ve kltrn iyi bilen ve Trk kalbi olan bir yabancnn Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin 75inci yldnmn baka yabanclarla kutlamas, onlara byle kkenli ve onalt devletin yaratcs olan ve Afrika, Asya ve Avrupa'da topraklar bulunmu olan bu milletin, I. Dnya Savann sonunda ve mparatorluun yklmasyla, tam 29 Ekim 1923'de yeni bir hayata doduunu, bugn imparatorluk dnemindeki kadar geni olmasa da, yine Trk snrlar iinde hr olup, kltrnn, milli kimliinin verdii gururla Avrupa'ya ynelmekte olduunu anlatmas gerekir. Bu 1998 yl Trkiye'nin nemli bir yldnmn daha belirtmektedir; bu, yeni Trk harflerinin kabuldr, lini Terin-i Sani yani 1 Kasm 1928 tarihinde Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi 1353 sayl kanunu kabul etti ve Atatrk Latin Harfleri Komisyonunun toplanmasndan gn sonra, bu reformu o kadar istiyordu ki, 10 Austos 1928 tarihinde Glhane'de yeni Latin alfabesinden bahsetti. Daha sonra Atatrk'n istemi olduu dier kltrel ve sosyal reformlar geldi. Ama bence harf devrimi
Emekli retim yesi, Roma.

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Kemalist cumhuriyetin aynas olup, Dou iin de, Bati iin de nemli bir ders olmutur. phesiz Kurtulu Sava, zaferi, Cumhuriyetin douu, Atatrk'n kiilii, modernleme dostlar iin de dmanlar iin de srpriz olmutur. Ancak gemi olan 75 yl ve gelecek yllar o zaferin ve o reformlarn kalc ve belirleyici olduunu gstermektedir. Atatrk ile gen Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa'ya doru bakmaya balamtr. Ama bugn, 75 yl sonra kabul edene etmeyene bu Trkiye'nin Avrupa'ya dahil olduunu syleyebiliriz. Getiimiz yzyllarn Akdeniz tarihini iyi okuyacak olursak Osmanl mparatorluu ile Hristiyan devletler arasndaki savalarn ve mparatorlua bal Avrupa topraklarnn tesinde Trklerin ticari, kltrel ve siyasi alanlarda Avrupa ve Akdeniz'in hayatnda her zaman bulunduklarn grebiliriz. Dnyada baka hibir lke Osmanl mparatorluu Trklerinin etnik, dini, kltrel ve dil farkllnda gsterdii anlaya ve yine Osmanl mparatorluu Trklerinin kendileri iin teknoloji ve modernleme alanlarndaki ilgilerine sahip olmamtr. Bir talyan tarihi olarak, geen yzylda mparatorluun bakentinde dostluk, i ve eref bulmu olan btn vatandalarm hatrlamalym. Mzisyen, doktor, subay, retmen, mimar, sanat ve her dzeydeki iiden bahsediyorum. mparatorluun sonu ile Cumhuriyetin douu arasnda binlerce vatandam stanbul'da yayordu, hristiyan kiliseler akt ve Trk ve Trk olmayan birok renci yabanc okullara gidiyordu. Osmanllarn bu anlay ruhu hibir zaman lmemitir. Ancak Cumhuriyetle, Atatrk ile, reformlar ve laiklik ile Trkiye modern dnyaya almtr. Avrupa Trkiye'ye "Asya'nn kaps" diye bakyordu, bugn Trkiye'nin Dou iin "Avrupa'nn kaps" olduu sylenebilir. Sevgili dostlarm, Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin hayatn derinlemesine okudum. Atatrk'n eserlerini ve reformlarn ok iyi rendim ve bu lkenin geleceini de dnyorum. Buras, bu lkenin 75 ylda kaydettii ekonomik ve teknolojik ilerlemeleri sralamann yeri deildir. Ben Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin yzn, genlerinin yznde gryorum. Atatrk'n ok gen yata lm olmas ne yazk! 1938 ylndan sonra yaam olsayd sevgili lkesinin II. Dnya Savann ykmlarndan nasl kurtulduunu grecekti ve vcudu fikirleri kadar dayanm olsayd Anadolu'da ve sevgili Rumeli'sindeki gelimeleri grecekti. Byk kara ve demir yollan, yeni binalar ve mahallelerin ina edilmesi, su ve elektrik yollarnn kuvvetlendirilmesi okul, fabrika ve niversitelerin kurulmas, btn bunlar, nc bine geni topraklarn deil, kendi topraklarnn sahibi olan bir Trkiye getirmektedir. nc binin yeni Trkiye'si ise genlerine tarihi ve erefli

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kltrn unutmadan ilerleme yolunda devam etme grevini vermektedir. Bu Atatrk'n arzusuydu, bu sizin arzunuz olmaldr. Btn dnyada kadnlarn haklarndan ve erkeklerle ayn dzeyde olabilmesinden bahsedilir. Ama Trkiye'de en nemli Kemalist devrimlerden biri kadnn i ve kltr hayatna katlmasn salayandr. Vatandam kadnlardan nce Trk kadnlar oy hakkn kazanmlardr. Trk kadnlar retmen, devlet memuru, avukat, mhendis, diplomat, niversite profesr, doktor ve sanat olabilir. Daha nce, Trkiye'de veya baka lkelerde yaptm konferanslarda Osmanl kadnn altn kafeste bir blbl olarak tanmlamtm; Atatrk bu kafesi at ve gzel blbl uarak havaland ve btn dnyada Trkiye'nin adn ve erefini korumaktadr. I. Dnya Savann ykmlarndan Trkiye'yi kurtarmak iin sadece Atatrk gibi bir asker ve O'nun ordusu gibi bir ordu yetmezdi. Bir hukuku, bir kltr adam ve siyasi bir deha gerekiyordu. Atatrk bunlarn hepsiydi, halk da O'na laykt. 1919'da Samsun'a ayak bastnda Atatrk yalnz deildi, Trkiye'nin kalbi orada, onunla beraberdi. Trk bayranda ay ve yldz var ama Atatrk o bayran gneidir. Atatrk arkeoloji, tarih ve btn bilim dallarnda gelimeyi salamak istemitir. Yeni ve modern niversitelerin, devlet orkestralarnn, Trk Tarih Kurumunun, Halk Evlerinin ve dier btn kltrel kurumlarn Trkiye'ye yabanc bilim adamlar getirerek de olumasn salamtr. Sevgili dostlarm, Teknoloji yolunda devam eden geleceinizi glendirin, ancak tarihinizi unutmayn. Atatrk Trkiye'nin gemiini hibir zaman gznnden karmad. Atatrk'n istei zerine Trk Tarih Kurumu'nun almalaryla, Anadolu, restorasyon ve tarihi kazlarla btn hazine ve medeniyetlerini gzler nne sermitir. Atatrk'n bu kltrel sezgisi sayesinde Trkiye, topraklarndaki btn bu antik medeniyetleri dnyaya sunarak byk bir mze haline gelmitir. Bu eski sanat eserleri geen yzyln anlaryla birlikte yaamaktadr; bu sebeple de Trkiye kardeimiz saylmaktadr. Gazi Kemal Paa'ya Trk milleti Ata-Trk adn vermi, siz de O'nun evlatlarsnz. O'na laykolun. Trkiye yaadka -bin yaasnAtatrk'n ad yaayacaktr. Atatrk'n ad yaadka Trkiye yaayacaktr. XX. yzyl sizin douunuzdu, gelecek bin yl sizindir. 101

Bence Trklerin dostu olmak bir ereftir. Trk olmann bir eref olduunu son 75 ylda gstermi olduunuz gibi dnyaya gstermeye devam etmek de genlerin grevidir. Tanr hepimize birlikte gelecek cumhuriyet yldnmlerini kutlama imkann, torunlarmza da yzyllarca sevgili Trkiye'mizi kutlama mutluluunu versin. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesine zel bir selam gndermek istiyorum nk byk Trk diplomatlar burada yetimektedir. Yine zel bir selamm da, dnya apnda Trkiye'ye eref katan ve geleneksel Trk diplomasisine uyacak ekilde onun haklarn tantan Trk diplomatlarna gitmektedir. Hepinize ve Atatrk'n ansna sayglar.

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DE GAULLE'S TURKEY
Edouard SABLIER* Like most of the great figures that made History, Charles de Gaulle, who shaped the destiny of his country, was an historian himself. He could not ignore the similarity of fate that the centuries imposed on France and Turkey. During fi ve hundred years, the two Nations had relations that the General described as "usually happy, sometimes painful, but always exceptional". Painful they were when, faithfull to the Entente Cordiale France sided with Britain, whose aim at the time was to wreft away provinces from the Ottoman Empire. Thus French and Turks fought cach other during the Great War. "The relations were happy, said de Gaulle to the Turks, when your Sultans and our sovereigns agreed on their policies. it was Sultan Soliman (that you Turks cali "Kanuni", the "Legislator", but that we, French, stubbornly cali "The Magnificient") it was Sultan Soliman who sided with Franois Premier against the Austrian Empire. Soliman granted France extremely favourable conditions for settlement and trade, knovvn as the "Capitulations". it was Selim the Third with Napoleon; Abdul Aziz an Napoleon the Third". The General would recall the interventions of the Ottoman navy to relieve the pressure exerted by the ennemtes of France during Franois Premier's captivity in Spain. in my native town of Nice, people frequently refer to the presence of the Turkish fleet, keeping at distance the English vessels during the Revolution. And, if I am not mistaken, the wife of Sultan Soliman was also a native of Nice. De Gaulle would proundly recall that France was the first country in the West to recognize modern Turkey, built by Atatrk to succeed, after tremendous upheavals, the Ottoman Empire.
* Historian, Paris.

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The General never concealed his admiration for Kemal Atatrk. He often compared the action of the Ghazi with his own: fght to liberate the national territory from the occupation forces; fundation of a republic adapted to our times; impositions of democratic institutions. For de Gaulle, the ties between France and Turkey did not result only from the reciprocal esteem the two countries pledged to cach other across so many events. As they conducted their action in the vvorld, both nations also felt the urge to coordinate their policy.. Recalling the profound transformation of France in its structures and traditions, the replacement of past protectionism by ever growing external exchanges, de Gaulle praised the national affirmation and the genious impulsion that Atatrk developed to push ahead ali the material resources and human capacities of the Turkish Nation. in the vvorld as it is, Charles de Gaulle considered that the respective situation of Turkey and France gave the two nations reasons to bring their policies closer. "Turkey, he said, controls the Straights between Europe and Asia. Her territory stretches along the huge shelf of Anatolia, in contact with three continents, keeper of the gates to Peace, but also, possibly, to War. Thus Turkey holds great and positive potentials, but at the same time is exposed to the gravest risks". "France opens out on the Atlantic, the Northern seas and the Mediterranean. She is the center of a Western world formed by the countries of the Rhine and the Danube, the British Isles, the Italian and Spanish peninsulas. For these reasons, he said, the country is under external pressures to shed her national personality". And de Gaulle concluded: "So both Nations are dedicated to maintain their integrity and their independance, to allovv nobody to dispose of their land, their sky, their coastlines. They are under pressure to maintain their territory and to press on with ali their weight in the events and the settlements that concern both". The best example of the common views expressed by the two countries, is found in the Middle East. Both France and Turkey condemn the dangier of destruction threatening the state of Israel and the occupation of arab territories. As for Cyprus de Gaulle proclaimed that "nothing can prevent that those who are Turks remain turks and those who are Greeks remain greek. The visit of General de Gaulle in Turkey was a triumph. He was cheered by the people ali along his moves. Before leaving the country, he

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paid a hcariful hommage to the Mausolee of Kemal Atatrk, saluting in the Livre d'Or: "Le Grand Homme qui a accompli la tche exceptionnelle du Renouveau d'un Peuple.." (The Great Man who succeeded in the exceptionnal task of renewing a People"). ("The Great Man who succeeded in the exceptionnal task of renevving a people".) A dedication that could be adressed to himself! Charles de Gaulle was deeply conscious of the close links existing between France and Turkey. For him, as for ali historians, the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire, was the "French Century". in every field, trade, industry, culture, armed forces or social behaviour of the "effendis ", the French model was present. in the course of History, for the French, everything that came from the East was Turkish: bath, meals, coffiee, dresses, la turque". And for the Turks, everything that came from europe was "French": food, toilets, dresses and, alas!, even venereal diseases! The association was specially important among the generations of Turks to whom France provided a second culture. Almost everyone in the ruling classes spoke the French language as fluently as their own. By a striking coincidence, the visit of Charles de Gaulle in Trukey marked the hundredth anniversary of the foundation of Galatasaray. The General remembered with pride, that the year 1868, in which the illustrious college was founded, marked the begining of what was to be the march toward modernization. He recalled that Sultan Abdul Aziz created Galatasaray at the close of a solemn visit to France. The project was adopted thanks to the efforts of the grand Vizir Memet pcha and Fuat pacha, with the cooperation of the French minister of Education. Victor Duruy. De Gaulle also recalled that in France the Ecole des Langues Orientales, founded by Colbert, the Minister of Louis the Fourtheenth, gave birth to generations of French men and women who discovered with love the Turkish language and culture. And the School of Administration was organized in Turkey, after the Second World War, with the collaboration of the French "Ecole Nationale d'Administration", created by de Gaulle himself. For Charles de Gaulle, the visit was a triumph. He was warmly and genuinely acclaimmed by the people in ali his appearances. Before leaving Ankara, he paid a moving visit to the Mausolee of Atatrk. On the

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Livre d'Or, he wrote his salute to "le Grand Homme qui a accompli la tche exceptionnelle du Renouveau d'un Peuple". A dedication that could also be adressed to the chief of the Free French. As a Frenchman who had the privilege, thirty years ago to the very day, to accompany general de Gaulle in ali his visits in this country. I can assure you that the sympathy he expressed was genuine. More than nce did I hear him murmuring to himself: "Quel grand peuple! Quel Pays !". (What a great People! What a Nation!".) If Charles de Gaulle was alive to-day, I can assure you that not one Member of the French Parliament would have dared to identify himself with declarations that represent insulting accusations against modern Turkey!...

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TRKYE CUMHURYET'NN BALKAN DEVLETLERNDE YANKILARI

Prof. Dr. Nimetullah HAFIZ* Yzyllarca Balkan topraklarnda varln srdren Trk ulusu buralardaki dier uluslarla tarihe dayanan akraba ve dost birlikleri vard. Ayn topra ilemiler, ayn kaderleri paylamlardr. Dtan gelen byk dmanlk neticesiyle yzyllar ierisinde dostluk ilikileri sonuna dek zedelenmitir. Sra ile devletler bamszlklarna kavuur kavumaz yllarca kurduklar dostluklar dmanlklara evirmilerdir. Korunmu olan ehir, ky ve dini objelerini Trklerin yakp yktklarn gstermilerdir. Vergisini demiyenleri asp kestiklerini hatta kaza koyduklarn yaymlardr. Bir kilise terkedilmekten hasara uramsa Trklerin yaptklarn, bir duvarn bir kesi veya bir ta krlmsa Trklerin ykmak istediini, ama buna halkn tepki gsterdikleri nedeniyle yklmadan gnmze dek byle korunabildiklerini ileri srmektedirler. Balkan tarihinin hibir dneminde Osmanllar dneminde olduu Trkler ile Balkan yarmadasndaki halklar arasnda ei bulunmayan huzur ve gven bozuldu. 1699 ylnda Karlofa antlamasndan sonra Osmanl devleti blge kayplarna uradktan sonra Rumeli'den yava yava byk lde Trk ulusu gneye akmaya balad. Bunun dnda olduka sayda Trk, canlarn kurtarmak iin Anadolu'ya gmlerdir. Rumeli Trkleri'nin karanlk gnleri bu yldan balamtr. Bu karanlklar gittike hem genilemi hem de kabarmtr. ou, saclar altlarndaki breklerini, ateliklerindek yemeklerini, tm mal ve mlklerini brakarak balarn, oluk ocuklarn kurtarmak iin kimileri Kosova ve Metohiya ehirlerine, kimileri ise Yunanistan'dan, Bulgaristan'dan, Romanya ve hatta Arnavutluk'dan kaanlarla birlikte anavatanlarna yerlemilerdir. Bu nedenle Kosova ve Metohiya hemen tm ehirlerinde "muhacir mahleleri" vardr. Trk ulusunun bu korkun gleri tek Osmanl dneminde deil, Osmanllar'in bu yerlerden bsbtn uzaklatklarndan sonra bile devam etmitir. Bu nedenle Macaristan'dan gneylerde Trklerin yerletikleri ky ve kentlerine dek tm teki yerlerde yzyllarca Trk mimarisi, Trk edebiyat, bir szle tm Trk kltr bsbtn tarihten silinmitir. Trklerin veya Ms* Pritina niversitesi, Filoloji Fakltesi, Trkoloji Blm retim Grevlisi.

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lman dinine mensup olanlarn yaadklar yerlerde camilerin, hamamlarn, emelerin, tekkelerin, trbelerin kimileri Bosna Hersekte, Yugoslavya'nn Karada Cumhuriyeti'nin gneyinde, Srbistan Cumhuriyeti'nin gney ve gney dousunda, Arnavutluk'un bir iki kentinde, Romanya, Bulgaristan ve Yunanistan'n dou blgelerinde kimi Trk mimari yaptlar gnmze dek ayakta kalabilmitir. Fakat yine bunlarn byk bir says harap durumdalar. Bunlarn onarmalaryla ilgilenen yok, hatta, zellikle Yunanistan, Bulgaristan ve Romanya'da Osmanllardan kalma tarih deeri olan ev, cami, tekke, trbe, eme gibi objelerin onarlmalarna izin verilmemektedir. Fakat her eye ramen 1912 ylndan sonra Balkan yarmadasnda her devlette kalan Trk ulusu, aznlk olarak her kltr geliiminden geri kalmsa da, gnmze dek kulak ve gzleri Kk Asya'ya dikili olmakla, yaad blgedeki tarih yaptlarn, dillerini, azdan agza taman her tr halk edebiyat metinlerini, kendi zel kitaplklarnda divan edebiyatndan kalan yazma yaptlar ve gelenek ve greneklerini gzbebekleri gibi kskanlkla korumu, gnmze dek yaatmlardr. O srelerde Trkiye'de olup bitenleri gzetliyor, orda yaynlanan kitap, dergi ve gazeteleri kimi giden gelenler araclyla okur, baka dost, akrabalarna verir, Trkiye'deki olan bilenlerle ilgili tartmalar srdrrlerdi. 1915 ylnda patlayan anakkale Sava ayrca Balkanlardaki Trk ulusunun ilgisini ekiyordu. O srelerde anakkale Sava'nda ortaya kan trky hemen aralarnda sylemeye balamlardr. Hatta anakkale trksn sylerken coarak kendi duygularn da eklemeden kalamamlardr: "anakkale iinde sra sra stler Stler altnda yatar baba yiitler". Byk nder Atatrk'n ortaya kmasyla onun yrtt stikll Sava ile ilgili bura Trk halk ok yaknlardan ilgilendi. Hudut d yaadklar halde gerek Trk stikll Sava'ndaki baarlaryla gerekse ulu nder Atatrk'le ilgili Trkiye'de yaymlanan kitap, dergi ve gazete araclyla metinler, iirler elde edilmitir. Bunlarn arasnda Trkiye'de sylenen kimi trkler de kaydedilip sylenmitir. Bu trklerin sylendiklerini ancak burada yazlm iki yazma mecmuadan renebildik. Bu mecmualarda ayn trk birinde "Yldrm Gazi Mustafa Keml Paa arks" ve tekisinde "Kemal Paa arks" bal altnda bulunmutur. Bu trknn birka ktasn almadan geemiyeceiz: istihkmn sa solu Dman dolmu ose yolu, Aman yeti Kemal Paa Gider elden Anadolu.

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Ankara 'da anl ordu Her tarafa adr kurdu, Kemal Paa harp edecek Cmle asker hazr durdu. Elveda sana ey pederim Balasanz ben giderim, Kapmza dman gelmi Tepeleyerek defederiz. "Pek namyz" "Pek anlyz"*. Bura Trkleri kendi evrelerinde okuduklar gibi bu yazlara kendi taraflarndan kendi duygularyla kimi eklemeler de yapmlardr, hatta zgn iirler de yazmlardr. Elimize geen bir yazma yaptta henz adn renemediimiz bir halk ozan stikll Sava ve Atatrk'le ilgili bir destan yazmaya girimise de ne yazk ki drtlkten baka yazmasn srdrememitir. Yaasn Mustafa Keml Paa ol Hoda 'nn arslan Ykt ta'ss eyledi Devlet-i Al-i Osman' Ann erefine yazdm i bu destan Dinleyin nice malup eyledi Yunanistan '.2 kinci Dnya Sava'ndan sonra Balkan yarmadasnda yetien Trk aznlnn kimi airleri zellikle Atatrk'n lm yldnm mnasebetiyle iirler yazp onun ululuunu, kahramanln ve ona kar duyduklar iten sevgi ve sonsuz sayglarm dile getirmilerdir. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti ve onun kurucusu Atatrk'n otoritesi ve bykl Balkan yarmadasnda tek Trkler arasnda grlm, vlm ve onlarla ilgili kimi trkler, destanlar sylenmi, onlarla ilgili vgl iirler, makaleler ve hatta kitaplar da yaynlanmtr. Girite sz ettiimiz gibi tarih boyunca Trkiye aleyhinde yaplan yzyllarca propagandalar yapldysa da Trk ulusuyla babaa yaayan Arnavut, Bonak, Bulgar, Makedon, Romenler ve hatta Rumlar bile Balkan Savalar ve Birinci Dnya Sava'ndan yani Osmanl mparatorluu'nun zmesinden sonra Trkiye'de yrtlen Kurtulu Savalar ve Trkiye Cumhurbakan ile ilgili ya trkler sylenmi, ya da destanlar, iirler, vgler, hatta kitaplar
1. 2. "Yldrm Gazi Mustafa Keml Paa arks" iin daha geni bkz. Prof. Dr. Nimetullah Hafz, "Yugoslavya Trk iirinde Atatrk --Gldeste--" 1983, Ankara s. 89-93. Bu destann btnl u yazda yaynlanmtr: Nimetullah Hafz, "Yugoslavya'da Trk Destanlar", Uluslararas Folklor ve Halk Edebiyat Semineri Bildirileri, 27-29 Ekim 1975; 1976, Ankara, s. 58 ve evren, No. 10, Haziran 1976, Pritine, s. 131138 (37-46).

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bile yazlp yaynlanmtr. Fakat 1938 ylnda Atatrk'n lmesiyle onun her alanda llmez deerli yaptlar ortaya atlp aydnlanm ve onlarla kesin olarak saylarn bilemiyeceimiz dzyaz yazlar, kitaplar baslmtr. rnek olarak alfabetik srasyla Balkan memleketlerini ele alyoruz.

ARNAVUTLUK'DAArnavutluk'ta Trklk sndrlmtr. Yeni yetien Trk asll kuaklar anadilinden bsbtn uzaklam, kendi duygularm edebi yaptlarn tek Arnavut dilinde yazp duyurtabilmilerdir. Arnavutluk'daki Trk ulusu buralarda ne kadar sndrlmse de Trk asll olan ve belki de anadilini bsbtn unutmu Trkler, Arnavut dilinde bir destan kukusuz azdan aza Arnavutluk'dan Makedonya'ya tanarak orada iitilip derlenmitir. "Ey Sultan ' deviren yce millet Yaa yce millet, acl millet, Bir devri kapatp yeniyi aan kuvvet. Sultan bizi nasl da anlad hey, Milleti paralk etmiti hey, Yeni ad Paa'ya biz taktk hey, Yeni bir ad, byk bir ad verdik hey, Mustafa Kemal adn verdik hey. Yedi kral hepten kalkt ayaa, Mustafa Kemal'e durdu kavgaya. Kemal kalkt kahramanca ayaa Kim ki Trktr diniyle, imanyla, Hemen kalksn ayaa, oturmasn 3 Hazrlansn vatann savana " . Bu a bilinmeyen destandan baka Arnavutluk'da Trkiye Cumhuriyeti veya Atatrk iin bir ey yaynlanmamtr. Ancak 1987 ylnda Kopi Kuuku'nun "Mustafa Qemal Ataturku" (Mustafa Kemal Atatrk) adl ilk kitab yaynland. Bu kitapta "Giri"ten sonra Atatrk'n ocukluu ve genlii, Jn Trkler ve Atatrk, Ulusal Savunmada Savalar (1918-1920), Halk Kurtulu Sava (1920-1922), Reform Yllan (19241938) ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin D Siyaseti ve Atatrk deleri balkl yazlarda hem Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin siyaseti hem de Atatrk'n o3. Atatrk iin sylenen bu Arnavut Halk Destan iin hem zgn hem de evirisi iin daha geni 1. tabannotu yaptna bkz. S. 96-99.

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cukluundan lmne dek yaam, savalar, almalar, devrimleri ve ilkeleri geni biimde okuyuculara aklanmtr4. Ayrca 1987 ylnda Arnavutluk tarihisi Gazmend Shpuza da "Ataturku dhe Shqiptaret" (Atatrk ve Arnavutlar) adl, baka deerli bir kitab Tirana'da yaynlad. Gazmend Shpuza bu kitabyla yzylmzn 20-30 yllarnda Arnavut-Trk likileri ve Arnavutluk'da Kemalizm reformculuunun yanklarn ortaya atmaya almtr. Bu ana konu dnda bu kitapta Giri'te Atatrk'n inkilaplk karakterini ve ksaca Trkiye stikll Sava ile Atatrk'n askeri komutanln, eskiden Arnavut ve Trkler arasndaki ba geleneini ve Trk stikll Sava ve Kemalizm reformlarnn Arnavut basnndaki yanklarn gstermeye almtr5. Kopi Kyku "Mustafa Qemal Ataturku" (Mustafa Kemal Atatrk) adl kitabn yeniden 1993 ylnda Tirana'da yaynlad. Kopi Kuuku'nun bu kitab bu kez geniletilmi ve Enver Hoca'dan sonra yaynladndan zerinde bir sr dzeltmelerle yaynlanmtr6.

BULGARSTAN'DABulgaristan'da 2.000.000 Trk yaad ise de sk komnist basklarndan yeni kurulan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne ve onun kurucusu ulu nder Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'e duyduklar byk sevgilerini dile getirememilerdir. Hatta Bulgar milliyetileri orada byk sayda olan Trk ulusunu Trkiye Trklerinden olmadklarn, onlarn Azeri Trklerinden geldiklerini inandrmaya almlardr. Balangta Azeri okullarn amay dndler7. Bunu baaramayacaklarn gren Bulgar bykleri daha ge Trke okullar atlar ve bura Trklerine Trk dmanln kalemlemeye altlar. te bu nedenle kimi Trkler bu duygularn kaleme alamamtr, hatta kimileri kendi anayurtlar olan Trkiye'ye aleyhtarln gstermitir. Fakat tek bir Bulgar, Atatrk'n bykln grerek onun ulusal amacna yetimek iin gstermi olduu kahramanln ve ulusuna aydnlk vermek iin cehaleti ldrp gmdn Bulgar dilinde Bulgarlara duyurmaya almtr: "Frtnalar denizlerin stnde kotu, Hemen korkun dalgalar estirip cotu, Btn engelleri ykt, devirdi, Ne korkuttuKseni, ne yolundan evirdi*.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Bkz. Kopi Kyyku, Mustafa Qemal Ataturku, 1987, Tirane. Bkz. gazmend Shpuza, Ataturku dhe Shqiptaret, 1987, Tirane. Bkz. Kopi Kyyku, Mustafa Cemal Ataturku, 1993, Tirane. Bu bilgileri Bulgaristan trkbilimcisi Dr. Rza Mollov'dan edinmiimdir. rfan nver Marsattnolu, Atatrk in Trkiye Dnda Yazlan iirler Gldeste 1994, Ankara.

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Kitap olarak Atatrk'le ilgili yaynlanan ilk kitap Parakev Paruev'in "Mustafa Kemal Atatrk" balkl yaptdr. Geni olarak hazrlanm bu kitap be blme ayrlm bir durumda sunulmutur. Birinci blm olarak Osmanl mparatorluu knn nedenleri, ikinci blm kahramanl nc blm stikll Sava, drdnc blm reformatr olarak Atatrk ve beinci blm Atatrk'n dedii "Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh" deyimi ayrntl olarak verilmitir9. Daha gelerde, yani 1983 ylnda Bulgar Trkleri'nden Halil Recebov 14 X 20 sm. Boyutlu ve 161 sayfal "Ideologijata na Mustafa Kemal Atatturk" (Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n deolojisi) adl kitabn yaynlad. Bu kitapta Atatrk ideolojisi ana blmden verilmitir. Birinci blmde Kemal Atatrk ideolojisinin kuruluunda sosyal-siyasi durum, ikinci blmde felsefe ve sosyoloji asndan Kemalizm, ve nc blmde Kemal Atatrk ideolojisinde balca prensipler diye incelenip aklanmtr10.

ROMANYA'DARomanya'da 140.000 Trk vardr. Bunlar da Bulgarlar gibi hemen hemen ayn basklar iinde Atalarna anonim bir trky kulaktan kulaa duyurtmu ve unutulmasn diye kaydetmilerdir. Bu trky derleyen Mehmet Ali Ekrem Bey 1991 ylnda Bkre'te "Blbl Sesi" kitabnda yaynlamtr. Bu trkde Romanya Trkleri inn Dalar'nda sava yrtldn, savata den ehitler yznden ocuklarn babasz kadklarn dile getirmi ve sonunda bunun bir kader olduunu bilerek kan kardelerinin kurtuluu iin bu stikll Sava'n yrten Atatrk'e "Yaa Mustafa Kemal Paa, yaa" msrasyla desteklemilerdir: inn Dalar 'nda oturduk kaldk ehit olanlar, deftere yazdk, Kader byle imi ey garip ana Yaa Mustafa Kemal Paa, yaa. nn Dalar 'ndan bir top patlad Kar dmanlarn d atlad Kader byle imi ey garip ana Yaa Mustafa Kemal Paa, yaa. nn Dalar 'nda aylarca kaldk Babasz yetimlerin haline baktk. Kader byle imi ey garip ana Yaa Mustafa Kemal Paa, yaa.
9. Paraev Paruev, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, 1977, Sofija. 10. Halid Redzepov, Ideologijata na Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, 1983, Sofija.

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nn Dalar 'ndan neferler gezer Karda dmanlar martinan sezer Kader byle imi ey garip ana Yaa Mustafa Kemal Paa, yaan. Fakat yazl ve Trk dilinde kitap olarak Romanya'daki Trk ulusundan ancak Dr. brahim Temo Atatrk daha sa iken 1937 ylnda Bkre'te "Atatrk' Niin Severim?" adl ve 13 X 21 sm. boyutlu kitabn yaynlamtr. Bu 16 sayfal kitapkta Dr. brahim Temo Atatrk'n portresini vermeye alm ve onun, tm almalar sayesiyle gstermi olduu byk baarlarn olduu biimde aydnlatmtr. Temo, Osmanl mparatorluu'nun knden sonra Mustafa Kemal'in 19 Mays 1919 ylnda Samsun'a ktn gn gece uykularn feda ederek vatan kurtarmak iin izdii stratejik ve siyasi programlara dayandn, Anadolu'ya ayak basan ve lee konan kargalar gibi ve slam kan imekle sarho dveli mttefkann kararm gzleri nnde millete hakimiyet, cesaret srumu zerk ettiini, askeri ve mlk-i idareler perian bir halde iken bir araya topladn ve zerlerine hakimiyet ve cesaret yamurlar yadrmakla Trkiye'ye yeniden hayat verdiini yazdktan sonra "Atatrk' Niin Severim?" adl kitabnn sonuna "te bundan tr Atatrk' btn yrekle severim. Evet severim ve seveceim" cevabn eklemitir12. Kitabn sonunda nazari dikkate olarak "Krk senelik hareketi milliye ait nota ve hatratm yaknda nerolunacaktr." bir tmce de eklenmi bulunmaktadr. Gerekten iki yl sonra (1939) bu sz ettii kitap Romanya'da Mecidiye kentinde "ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Teekkl ve Hidemati Vataniye ve nklb Milliye Dair Hatralarm" adl kitab da yaynlanmtr13. Bu yapt dnda Romen ulusundan da Atatrk'e dair iir yazan olmutur. O da lon arion adnda bildiimiz bir Romen Trke'yi iyi tandndan Balkan yarmadasnda Trk yaynlarn olduka izlerken Atatrk ilkelerini iyi kavram ve bu nedenle iir yazmakla Atatrk'e duyduu sempatisini gstermeden geri kalamamtr. on Arion Trke "Atatrk'n Ant Kabri nnde" ve "Atatrk'e Candan Selm" balkl iki iir yazmtr. kinci iirinden iki ktasn rnek olarak alyoruz: Bara, kardee dalgalanmakta bugn bayrak Atatrk'n umutlar dile gelmi Alfabede baknz mavi gzlerine Eylemleriyle ieklenmi bugn toprak.
11. 8. Tabannotundaki ayn yapt, s. 145. 12. Dr. brahim Temo, Atatrk' Niin Severim?, 1937, Bkre. 13. Bu kitap 1987 ylnda Arba Yaynlar'nda "ttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin Kurucusu ve 1/1 No'lu yesi brahim Temo'nun ttihad ve Terakki Anlan" adyla 278 sayfa olarak yaynlanmtr.

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Rzgrda sesleniyor bize byk nder Uykusunu hi rahatsz etmesin dman Kardee yaasn Toros, Karpat, Balkan Ve yaasn Ata'nn rn Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Ve yaasn Trkler1*. Romanya'da Romen dilinde Atatrk'le ilgili iki kitap da yaynlanmtr. 1969 ylnda "Atatrk fauritorul turciei moderne" (Modern Trkiye'nin Kurucusu Atatrk) kitabn Mehmet Ali Ekrem, 1974 ylnda ise "Atatrk" kitabn Petre Ghiata hazrlayp yaynlamtr. Mehmet Ali Ekrem bu kitabnda Jn Trklerden balayarak general oluuna dek geni bilgiler verdikten sonra onun Anadolu'da ulusal rgtl, Cumhuriyet iln, savalarda tm baarlar, modern Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluu ve tm reformlar ayrntl ayrntl gstermitir15. Mehmet Ali Ekremden sonra Petre Ghiata da 1975 ylnda Bkre'te "Atatrk" adl kitabn yaynlad. Bu yaptta Petre Ghiata Atatrk'n yaam ile askerlii, saval, inklpl, harf, dil devrimcilii ve tm dier almalar ile ilgili bilgiler Romen ulusuna sergilemitir16.

YUGOSLAVYA'DAEski Yugoslavya'da Slovenya, Hrvatistan, Bosna-Hersek, Karada, Srbistan ve Makedonya diye alt cumhuriyet oluturuyordu. Srbistan Cumhuriyeti'nde ise Voyvodina ve Kosova zerk Blgeleri de bulunuyordu. Slovenya'da Slovenler, Hrvatistan'da Hrvatlar, Suplar ve Bonaklar, Bosna Hersek'de Bonaklar, Srplar ve Hrvatlar, Karada'da Karadal ve Arnavutlar, Srbistan'da Srplar, Arnavutlar, Romlar (ingeneler), Gorallar (Mslman Pomaklar) 15.000 Trk, Makedonya'da ise Makedon, Arnavut, Srp, Torbeler (Mslman Pomaklar) ve 150.000 Trk yaamakta idi. Krallk Yugoslavyas'ndan sonra yani 1944 ylndan 1991 ylna kadar birlikte yaam ve her ynde babaa byk baarlar gstermilerdir. Bir btn olarak Yugoslavya'da Trkiye ve kurucusu Atatrk'le ilgili Balkan yarmadasndaki teki devletlere nazaran, olduka kitap, yaynlanmtr. Bu kitaplarn bir ksm Sarejevo'da tekileri ile Belgrat'da yaynlanmtr17. Bosna Hersek'de Bonaklar da drt yzyldan fazla Osmanl idaresinde kaldndan din, kltr, gelenek, grenek ve hatta dil alannda ayrlmaz bir paras olmutur. Tarih basklar yznden uzun bir sre Avus14. 15. 16. 17. 8. Tabannotundaki ayn yapt, s. 143-144. Mehmet Ali Ekrem, atatrk fauritorul Turciei moderne, 1969, Bucureti. Petre Ghiata, Atatrk, 1975, Bucuret. Aratrmalarmz sayesinde 1938-1998 yllar arasnda Krallk, Eski ve Bugnk Yugoslavya blgelerinde, Srpa, Trke ve Arnavuta tefrika biimindeki yazlar dnda, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Atatrk'le ilgili 20 kadar kitap yaynlandn renmi olduk.

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turyallarn ve Krallk Yugoslavya'nn blgeleri olmutur. Fakat buna ramen her sre Trkiye ile balarn sk tutmutur. 1912 ylndan balayarak gnmze dek Trkiye'deki olaylar gzetlemi, ona kar var gleriyle destek gstermilerdir. Atatrk'n yrtt stikll Sava'na uzaktan destanlar sylemilerdir. Fakat ne hayr ki tm bu destan ve trklerden tek bir destan Aliya Nametak sayesiyle derlenebilmitir. Bu destan olduu gibi rnek olarak alyoruz: Bu yaz Be Nisan 'da Mustafa Kemal'in Ferman geldi Yunan hududunda, Ethem Paa 'ya: "Tm erler bugn hazr olsun. Cumartesi saat on birde ocuklar hcum etmemiz gerek, Kim uzun sava meydannda ehit olur siperde Mustafa Kemal'e hakkn hell etmek dilek. Onu unutmayacaktr Kemal Gnein evreni evresince ". Yunanllar kendilerini kurt sanrlar, misal Ama Trkler bugn onlar yendi ercesine Yallah, dediler, Allah ' andlar Ve keskin kllarn kardlar. Svariler meydana saldrdlar ki taraftan piyadeler hcuma getiler Kolarn kurban iin beslendii gibi Kahramanlar ise bugnler iin, ebedi. 1925 ylnda Belgrat'da "O naim Muslimanima" (Mslmanlanmz Hakknda) adl bir kitap yaynland. Bu kitabn adna bakarak kitab yazan Dragia Lapevi bizim tantmak istediimiz Trkiye ve Atatrk'e dair deil, o, Yugoslavya'nn gneyinde bulunan Makedonya'daki Mslmanlar hakknda sz etmektedir. Fakat sonunda iki sayfa kadar ferece hakknda konuurken iki fotoraf da eklemitir. Fereceyle ilgili Halife Abdl Mecit ve Atatrk' andndan bu yapt da zikretmeden geemiyoruz. Yazar 61. sayfasnda Halife Abdl Mecit, olu ve ferecesiz kz, 60. sayfada ise Mustafa Keml Paa ei Ltife Hanm ve Mehmet Paa ile ekilen iki fotoraf da verilmitir. Bu fotoraf Trk kadnlarnn gzleri19 ni atn gstermek amacyla alnmtr . Daha gelerde Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurucusu, Trklerin atas ve en byk reformcusu Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, ululuuyla, otoritesiyle
18. 2. Tabannotundaki yapt, s. 94-95. 19. Dragisa Lapcevic, O naim Muslimanima (Socioloske i etnogerafske beleske), 1925, Beograd, s. 61-62.

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dnyay fethetmeye balyor. Dnyann birok memleketlerinde olduu gibi Yugoslavya'da da byk bir hzla onun hakknda eitli kitaplar yaynlanmaya balyor. Bu kitaplar Yugoslavya'da Mslman alemi Atatrk'e kar byk bir sempati duyduunu, kendi kumandanlar gibi saydn gstermitir. Bylece Maksim Svara adnda bir yazar "Gazi Mustafa Kemal-Paa" adl yaptn 1931 ylnda Sarayevo'da yaynlyor. Yazar nszne ok geri bir biimde balamaktadr: "Be yz bin kanda ve dildalarmz Trk Cumhuriyeti iinde yaamaktadr. O devlette rejimin az ok tannm kiileri muhacirlerimizin torunlardr. Bunun iin memleketimizde Trkiye durumunun gelimesiyle ilgilenmektedir. Yalnz tek bundan deil, zaman akmna gl tutulmasyla ulusunun geleceini baka ve yeni yne evirmeyi bilen byk bir kiiyi takdir etmek iin bu kitab yazmaya giritim. Bu kii gerekten bir yandan kendisinin ortaya kmasyla, te yandan gsterdii baarlar iin zen kazanmtr...", "Onlarca yl nce Lord Salisburry Trkiye'yi reformlatrmak, ldrmek demektir" dedi. Bukadar ar sz Avrupa'da uzun sre kulaktan kulaa tand, fakat Gazi Mustafa Kemal-Paa'nn eserleri bunun doru olmadn gsterdi. Hi olmazsa Trkiye'yi reformlamas iin olanak vard. Zaten reformsuz Trkiye kalamaz. Bu olanak ise Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin elindedir..." Yazar eserinde Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in yaam, devrimi, Jn Trkler, savalar, Enver Paa, I. Dnya Sava, Cumhuriyet'in kuruluu ve tm getirdii reformlar hakknda 109 sayfada olduka geni bilgi vermitir. 1928 ylnda stanbul'da Dolma Bahe Saray'nda Mustafa Kemal'in ynetmenliinde dzenlenen toplantdaki dil devrimiyle ilgili kararlar Maksim Svara'ya gre bu tr eitim ve retim Trk ulusuna bir yurtseverlik niteliini kazandrmtr20. 1932 ylnda Belgrat'da "Turska" (Trkiye) adl bir kitap daha yaynland. Bu kitab hazrlayp yaynlayan Dr. Zivko Topalovic (Jivko Topalovi) dir. Dr. Zivko Topalavic bu kitabn 1931 ylnda stanbul'da dzenlenen kinci Balkan Konferansna gittiinde kaynaklanp hazrlandn ve iindeki malzemelerin bir kiisel yaantnn dnce ve duygularnn ifadesi olduunu, okuyuculara bu biimin en sevimli olacan ve bylece az ok elence ile Trkiye gerekliinin anlalmasna ynelteceini ve ayan grdklerini ve etkilendiklerini ileri srmektedir. Kitapta Eski Dou Uygarlk, Dolma Bahe Saray'nda Trk Gecesi, Topkap-Eski Slutanlarn Saray, Eski stanbul'dan, Bosfor Boaznda, Peri Saraylar, Geri Trkiye'den, Trkiye'nin Hareket Gleri, Uygarln Yata ve Trkiye Bilmecesi balklar altndaki yazlarda Yeni Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin gerekleri sergilenmitir. Fakat yazar 16 sayfalk "Trkiye'nin Hareket Gleri" bal altndaki yazsnda Trkiye'nin tarm, zanaat, inaat ve dier zenginlikleriyle ilgili bilgiler verdikten
20. Maksim Svara, Gazi Mustafa Kemal-paa, 1931, Sarajevo.

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sonra "Bu ekildeki Trkiye, gerekten dnyada en demokrat bir devlettir. Tz, ngiltere ve svire'de olduu gibi her yurtdaa maksimum siyasi hak vermektedir" tmcelerini de eklemeden geememitir21. Belgrat'da Knez Pavle Mzesi de 14-30 Nisan 1937 tarihlerinde dzenlenen resim ve yayn (kitap, gazete ve dergi) sergisinin katalogunu hazrlayp ayn ylda "Izlozba turskih slika i publikacja" (Trk Resim ve Yayn Sergisi) adyla yaynlamtr. nsznde Salah Cimcoz: "Trkiye Cumhuriyeti rejimi Avrupa enstitsn rnek alarak Sanat Akademisi'ni rgtlemitir. Genlerin seve seve gittii bu akademi Trk sanatnn gelimesi iin mit vermitir" dedikten sonra Piri Reis'in Amerika haritasn, M. al'nn Atatrk portresini ve ondan sonra Namk smail, Hikmet, efket, Sabiha, Arif Bedin efik Bursad ve Bedri Rahmi'nin birer resmini kitabn iine almtr22. Fakat 1938 ylndan sonra Trk ulusunun ulu nderi Atatrk'n lmnden biraz nce M. Svetovski'nin "Atatrk Trkiyesi" Balkan Enstits tarafndan yaynland. 227 sayfay bulan bu kitapta "Anadolu", "Anadolu'nun iei Ankara", "Asker Olarak Kemal", "nklap Olarak Kemal", "Yurt Atas Olarak Kemal", "Yeni Temeller zerinde Trkiye", "Tek Ulus-Tek Parti", "Halk ktisadi", "Milli Kltr", "Askeri G Olarak Trkiye" ve "Dnn Hatralar" balklar altnda yazlar bulunmaktadr. Yazarn nsznden anlalyor ki bu kitap halk Mebusu Rfk Atay'n hazrlayp yaynlayaca Yugoslavya monografisi kitabnn karl olarak bu kitap Kemal Atatrk'n dnd ve gerekletirdii Yeni Trkiye'nin tantm olacaktr23. Ayn 1938 ylnda, aynen Belgrat'da H.C. Aumstrong'un 1932-1935 yllan arasnda sekiz kez baslan "Kemal Paa (Bozkurt)" adl yaptn Mihajlo A. Ozerovic ngilizce'den evirerek Atatrk'n lmnden nce ilk basksnda (XXX+399 s.) 12, Atatrk'n lmnden sonra (XXX+447s.) ikinci basksnda ise 18 sayfalk kendi nsz ve 50 sayfalk sonsz ile yaynlamtr. 448 sayfay bulan bu yaptta bizi en ok ilgilendiren Mihaylo A. Ozerovi'in bu sayfalardr. Yazar XXII sayfasnda unu kaydetmitir: "Gazi Mustafa Kemal kilometre kare says bakmndan olduka az, fakat daha gl, dzenli Trk ulusal ve bamsz devletini gerekletirebilmitir". "Sonsz"nde Ozrenovi "Balkan Antlamasndan Saadabad Antlamas'na Dek", "Gl ktisat-Bamszln Garantisi", "Marmara zerinde Sonsuz zgrlk", "skenderun Sorununda Atatrk'n Yenilgisi", "Kltr ve Ulusal Eitimci Atatrk", "Onbeinci Yldnm", "Saat Ka", "Atatrk, Nereye?!", "Atatrk'n Son stei", "Yugoslavya'da
21. Dr. Zivko Topalovic, Turska, 1932, Beograd. 22. Muzej Kneza Pavla, Izlozba turskih slika i publikacja, 1937, Beograd. 23. M. Svetovski, Ataturkova Turska, 1983, Beograd.

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Yanklar" ve "Bakan smet nn", altbalkl yazlarda genel olarak Atatrk'n yaam, almalar, savalar, lm ile ilgili geni bilgiler verdikten sonra "Yugoslavya'daki Yanklar yazsn yle bitirmitir: "Kemal Atatrk'n deerli yaptlar tm insanlk uruna her sre rn verecektir"24. Yine Belgrat'da 1937 ylnda Trkiye'yle ilgili yeni bir kitap basndan kyor. Fakat bu kitap baka adan hazrlanmtr. Bunu, kitabn adndan da anlyabiliriz. "Privreda savremene Turske" (ada Trkiye'nin ktisad). Evet kitap Trkiye'nin iktisadini geni bir biimde aklamaktadr. Yazar bu kitab, kitabn ilk sayfasnda syledii gibi "Kral Aleksandar ve Kemal Atatrk'n temel vurduklar Yugoslavya-Trkiye Dostluuna" yazm olduunu bildirmektedir. Yazar bu tmceden sonra Kemal Atatrk'n yaam ve yaptlar ile ilgili buuk sayfada ksaca bilgi vermektedir. Bu yazdan sonra Cell Bayar'n nsz gelmektedir. Cell Bayar o srelerde Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Cumhurbakan idi25. Bu kitaplardan sonra kinci Dnya Sava'na kadar Trkiye Cumhuriyeti ile ilgili kitap daha yaynland. "La Nouvelle Turquie" (Yeni Trkiye'nin Douu) adl kitap iki sayfalk Franszca yazlm bir yazya Trkiye tarihi, mimar, sanayi, eitim... ile ilgili 69 fotoraf eklenerek bir foto albm olarak yaynlanan bu kitabn ilk sayfalarna Srpa tercmesi de eklenmitir. Fakat 1969 ylnda yaynlanan bu kitabn kimin tarafndan hazrland henz bilinmemektedir26. 1939 ylnda Belgrat'da Dr. Zoran Sv. Tomi'in 287 sayfal "Kemal Atatrk tvorac Nove Turske" (Yeni Trkiye'nin Kurucusu Kemal Atatrk) adl27 ve Sarayevo'da Edhem N. Bulbulovi'in 239 sayfal "Turci i razvitak Turske Drzave, sa uvodom u kulturnu i politicku povijest slama" (Trkler ve Trk Devleti'nin Gelimesi, slam Siyasal Tarih ve Kltrne Giriiyle)28 deerli kitab yaynland. kinci Dnya Sava'ndan sonra yani 1944-45 yllarnda Eski Yugoslavya'nn Makedonya Cumhuriyeti'nde Trk varl kabul edildi ve Trk dilinde okullar ald ve gazeteler yaynlanmaya balad. Fakat Kosova Trklerinin hakk inendi. 1951 ylna dek Kosova ve Metohiya Trk halk kendi dilinden, tarihinden, bir szle kendi kltrnden uzak kald. 1951 ylnda Kosova ve Metohiya Trkleri de bu kltr zgrlne kavutu. Okullar Trk dilinde ald, Kltr Gzel Sanat Dernekleri kuruldu. O yllarda Trkiye ile Yugoslavya arasndaki ilikiler de genilemeye balad. Bu balar nedeniyle gazetecilerin hazrladklar makalelerden
24. 25. 26. 27. 28. H.C. armstrong, Kemal Pasa (Sivi Vuk), 1. ve 2. Bask, 1938, Beograd. Dr. Dragoslav P. Mihajlovic, Privreda savremene Turske 1937, Belgrat. La Nouvelle Turque, 1939, ? Dr. Zoran Sv. Tomic, Kemal Atatrk tvorac Nove Turske, 1939, Beograd. Edhem N. Bulbulovic, Turci i razvitak Turske drzave sa uvodom u kulturnu i politicku povijest Islama, 1939, Sarajevo.

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oluan "Savremena Turska" (ada Trkiye) adl kitap da tarihi zikredilmemi ama bildiimiz kadar 1952 ylnda yaynland29. ki yl sonra, yani 1954 ylnda Mithat onti'in hazrlad "Turska i njen polozaj u svetu" (Trkiye ve onun Dnyadaki Durumu) adl30 kitab basld. Ondan sonra 1998 ylma kadar daha drt kitap yaynland. Bunlar da Sinan Sermet'in Sarayevo'da (1976) "Turska-Turisticki vodic" (Trkiye-Turist Rehberi)31, Prof. Dr. Utkan Kocatrk'n Trk dilinde (1994) Uskp'de "Atatrk"32, Vojislav Lalic'in Belgrat'da (1997) "Turska bez Ataturka" (Atatrksz Trkiye)33 adl kitaplardr. Yugoslavya'da Trk halk (Makedonya ve Srbistan'daki Trkler) arasnda Atatrk'le ilgili, nce nazm eklinde yazlar yaynlanmaya balad. Bylece ilk iir 1964 ylnda lhami Emin'in "Kan" mahlasyla yazd ve Trkiye'de "Varlk" dergisinde baslan oldu. Ondan sonra 1966/ 67 yllarndan itibaren Uskp'de kan "Birlik", "Sevin", "Tomurcuk" ve "Sesler" adl kan gazete ve dergilerde Atatrk'le ilgili iirler yazlmaya ve yaynlanmaya devam ediyor. yle ki 1967 ylnda Nimetullah Hafz tarafndan yazlm ve "Sesler" dergisinde "Ben" (Yugoslavya'daki Trk), "Sen" (Trkiye Cumhuriyeti), "O" (Atatrk), "Biz" (Balkan yarmadasndaki Trkler), "Siz" (Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ndeki Trkler) ve "Onlar" (stikll Sava'nda len Kahramanlar) balklar altnda yaynland34. Nimetullah Hafz'in Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne yazd "Sen" iirinde Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin tad, boyak, sevimlilik, aydnlk ve onun bu en byk zlemi ve umudu olduunu gstermeye almtr. "Sen Acunun en tatl denizi Denizin en derinlii Denizin en gzel gkllsn. Sen Ylalarn en sevimli ilkyaz lkyazn en boyakl iei iein en sevimli kokuusun. Sen Dalarn en sk orman Ormann en yeil aac Aacn en byk yaprasn.
29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. Savremena Turska, ?, Beograd. Midhat Concic, turska i njen polozaj u svetu, 1954, Beograd. Sinan Sermet, Turska-Turisticki vodic, 1976, Sarajevo. Prof. Dr. Utkan Kocatiirk, Atatrk, 1994, skp. Vojislav Lalic, Turska bez Ataturka, 1997, Beograd. Bkz. Nimetullah Hafz, Ana Kuca, 1983, skp.

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Sen Gndzlerin gnei Gecelerin ay, yldz Gkyznn den ldayansn. Sen Benim en scak zlemim zlemimin en byk umudu Umudumun en yce zgrlsn. Sen neden iplie benimsin Ben trnaktan tepeye seninim ster yrekli olaym, ister yreksiz". Fakat Atatrk'n adn iirlerde kullanmak korkulduundan Nimetullah Hafz "Atatrk" adn "O" kii adl ile hitap etmekle mecbur kalmtr. rnein: "O, en byk sava kazand size O, en byk olduunu gsterdi onlara ". Ondan hemen sonra Arnavut ulusu ilk olarak Kosova zerk Blgesi'nde skender Bey'in lmn ve Trklere kar gsterdii kahramanl ile ilgili toplantlar, hatta akademiler dzenlemeye balad. Trk halk da bu haktan yararlanarak 1967 ylnda Doruyol Kltr Sanat Dernei'ne bal "Nazm Hikmet" yazn kolu, ilk olarak Atatrk Akademisini dzenlendi. O ylda Tito Yugoslavyas'nda, belki de Balkan yarmadasnda ilk olarak Prizren Kltr Evi salonunda Hda Leskoval'nm yapt 3 X 5 m. boyutlu Atatrk'n portresi asld. lk Atatrk Akademisi'ni Yazn Kolu Bakan Nimetullah Hafz aarak Atatrk ilkelerini dinleyicilere tanttktan sonra Yazn Kolu yeleri 20 kadar iir ulu nder Atatrk'e sundular. Bundan sonra Atatrk'n lm yldnmleri bir gelenek duruma geldi. Her lm yldnmnde yazn saatleri dzenlenmekte, onunla ilgili bilgiler verilmekte, iirler okunmakta ve skp'de "Birlik", "Sevin", 'Tomurcuk" ve "Sesler", Pritine'de "Tan", "evren", "Ku" ve "" adl gazete ve dergilerde yaynlanmaktadr. rnein, Nusret Dio lk "At" adn tayan iirinde Atatrk' u ekilde tasfir etmektedir: "-Atalarmz arasnda bir ata, Atatrk.Yalnz gkler mavi deil, gzlerin de maviydi, Yalnz ormanlar gr deil, kalarn da grd, Masmavi gklerde bir gne prl prl parldard, Gr ormanlarda bir anaceylan iin iin alard " 3 5 .
35. Yugoslavya'da Atatrk'e Dair Yazlan tm iirler iin 1. Tabannotundaki yapta bkz.

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Daha gelerde, zellikle Atatrk'n lm yldnm nedeniyle, Pritine ve Prizren'de yaynlanan Trke gazete ve dergilerde Atatrk'le ilgili birka airin iirlerinin yaymlandn grmekteyiz. rnein 1970 ylnda smet Jable'nin "Atatrk" balkl iirinin ilk ktas aynen yledir: "Herkes alyor 10 Kasmlarda stanbul sokaklarnda, Bakyorum, aalar titriyor ormanlarda, Kadnlar siyah gller takm salarna, Bangr bangr genler ve ihtiyarlar alyor ardna ". Altay Suroy Recepolu, Arif Bozac, skender Muzbe, Bayram brahim Rogoval, zbeyin Aksoy, Bahise Potok, Nimetullah Hafz, Zeynel Beksa ve Osman Baymak iirlerinde Atatrk'n edebiyete g etmesiyle duyduklar byk zntlerini iirleriyle dile getirmeye almlardr. Bayram brahim bu duygularn "Alyoruz ardnzdan" balkl iiriyle iirinin son ktasyla u ekilde belirtmeye almtr: "stanbul aalar tam sar yapraklarn dkerken Kl kl topluyoruz gnelerinizi, Sylenen iirlere baka baka krslerde Alyoruz hngr hngr ardnzdan biz de ". Belirtmi olduumuz bu iirler meyannda, bu byk kayb, iir eklinde Yugoslavya'daki Trk ocuklarna duyuran ve retenler de vardr. rnein: "Ne mutlu bize Atacm" adl iir aynen yledir: "Ne mutlu bize Atacm Ne mutlu bize ki, Btn ocuklarmz Sana ark syler Senin yolunu izler, Btn analar en ilk Senin adn ocuklarna retir, Senin fotoraflarn gsterir". Bu iirlerden sonra Yugoslavya'da Trk aznlnca Atatrk'le ilgili iirler sre sre yazlmaya ydevam etmi ve Trk dilinde yaynlanan gazete ve dergilerde yaynlanmaya ydevam etmitir. Bylece imdiye dek Arif Bozac'nn Avni Engll'nn, Bahise Potok'un, Bayram brahim Rogoval'nn, Hasan Mercan'n, skender Muzbeg'in, smet Jable'nin, Mrteza Bura'nn, Osman Baymak'n, zbeyin Aksoy'un, Sabit Yusuf un, Suat Engll'nn ve kr Ramo'nun birer veya birkaar iiri yazlm bulunmaktadr.

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YUNANSTAN'DAYunanistan'a gelince durum biraz bakadr. Yunanistan ile Trkiye NATO yeleri olduklar halde aralarnda kendi komu halklarna eit derecede kltr ve eitim haklarn verilmesi aralarnda imzalanmtr. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti tm imzaladklarna son derece zenle nem vermektedir. Yunanistan ise yllardr bu imzaladklarn inemektedir. eitli basklar yaparak bura Trk ulusunu yurtlarndan uzaklatrmaya almaktadr. Objeler tarihi yaptlar olsa bile eski evlerin tamir edilmesine izin verilmemektedir. Mal ve mlkn satabilme hakk verilmi, fakat satnalma hakk alnmtr36. Bylece her alanda bura Trk ulusunun huzurunu bozmutur. ou frsat bularak Bat Trakya'dan Anadolu'ya getmilerdir. Bu nedenle Trk ulusunun says olduka azalmaktadr. Gnmzde Yunanistan'da Bat Trakya adlandrlan blgede 150.000'e yakn Trk yaamaktadr. Onlar kendi yalaryla kavrularak yayn dnyasn srdrmekle edebiyatlarn, gelenek greneklerini, bir szle kltrlerini srdrp geniletmektedirler. Bu kltr etkinlikleri iinde laik Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin gnmzdeki deeri ve onun kurucusu Trk lideri Atatrk'n ilkeleri ile ilgili yazlar da yazp duygularn ortaya atmlardr. Lozan Antlamasndan sonra 70 yl kadar Bat Trakya Trk edebiyatnda iir tr en yaygn olduundan Atatrk'e ve onun doum ve lm yldnmleri ile ilgili en ok iir yazan Alirza Saraolu'dur. Ondan fazla iiri yaynlanmtr. "Sabahn Mjdesi" iirinde Alirza Saraolu u dizeleri sralamtr: "Mustafa Kemal Paa mill heyecand dn Ulusal ahlant, umuttu, imand dn, Sabahn mjdecisi ebedi bir afakt O, Trklk'n gneiydi hep aydnlatacakt". "Trkln Gnei Atatrk" iirinde ise: "Ey Trkln gnei, ey Trkln nderi Byk bir istikble yaklayor ulusun Her gn gidiyor biraz biraz daha ileri En byk engelleri de ayor ulusun ". Alirza Saraolu "Dnm" iirinde ile Atatrk'n bir Trk evld olarak gsterdii en byk hizmetini gstermi ve bununla gerekten "Atatrk" unvann almas hakkna sahip olduunu bu iki msras ile gstermitir. "te o kara gnde kt Mustafa Kemalim Dnyaya bir kez daha retti Trk kim"
36. Bunlar Yunanistan' geerken oradaki Trk halkyla yrttm konumalar araclyla iitmi ve grmmdr.

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Alirza Saraolu'ndan baka Rahmi Ali de Atatrk'le ilgili olduka iir yazmtr. ki sral "Sen" balkl iiri O'nun deeri nedeniyle lmediini, daha yaadn gzel bir biimde gstermeye baarmtr: "Sen, durmadan yryen altn asn Gnllerdesin, lmedin, sasn". Rahmi Ali Antkabir'i ziyaret ettiinde Atasnn byklnden comu ve O'nun bykln zel Defter'de yazmak istediini "Antkabir'deki zel Deftere" balkl iirinde aydnlatmaya almtr: Ben ilim bilirim seni, Yaamda en gerek yol. Trk bilirim dillerden dmez, almak, mutluluk, insan, Savaa kar bar, Hastaya doktor. Ve elveda ana, yoksula ekmek, Bir de hrriyet bilirim zincire inat, Tm insanla sayg duymu. Rahmi Ali "10 Kasm iin Drtlkler" balkl drtlkl iirinde O'nun lmnden sonra her Trkn gnlnde bir sevgi, sayesinde alnlarnn ve yarnlarnn aydn olduunu, O'nun gidilecek doru yol olduunu, gn getike izinde giden evltlan olduunu ve sonunda yolda sapan olan olsa da bile bugn veya yarn gene onun yolunu izleyeceklerini dile getirmektedir: "Halk dilinden dmez oldun Gidilecek doru yoldun Trk yurdunun kaderini Deitiren kii oldun..." "Gn getike byr adn, zindeyiz, der, evldn. Yoldan sapan sana gelir, Bugn olmasa da yarn... " Bat Rumeli Trk yazarlarndan Mustafa Tahsin de Atatrk iin olduka iir yazmadan geememitir. Mustafa "Atatrk ve Bar" iirinde Atatrk'n "Yurtta bar, cihanda bar" demesiyle baladktan sonra Trk kardeliini unutanlar ile ilgili birka dize sralamaktan geememitir:

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"Tm insanlar karde, bar ne gzel Ne var ki ATAM, Bar iin zerinde titrediin Bu blgede, Kardelii unuttular Fitnelii soktular". Bu tr konuya "retmenliini silmek istersen Atam" iirinde devam etmitir: "Yaz tahtasnn banda, Elinde tebeir... retirsin kolay okuyup yazmay. Ama gel gr ki, Adamlarn iinde eskiye zlem debreir". te Mustafa Tahsin bu nedenle "Atam O Kadar Lazmsn ki" iirini yazm, her eye ramen yine de Atasnn yokluunu ve O'na byk zlem hissettiini gstermitir: Sen hereyimiz olmusun, Gzmz, dncemiz, yolumuz, Bilincimiz ve yorumumuz. ylesine aydnlksn ki, Yolunda amak olanakszken; Yine de o kadarlzmsn ki...31 Bu airlerden baka Hseyin Alibabaolu "Atatrk", "Yaralyz", "Atatrk"; Naim Kzm "Ak Her Yanmz Sana", Glten Mustafa "Evrenin nc Gnei"; Hseyin Saliholu "Atatrk", "Yolunu Benimsiyorum", "Atam"; Sevkan Tahsinolu "Atamn Gzleri", "Eer" ve dierleri iirleri yazarak Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurucusu Atatrk'e sonsuz sayg, sevgi ve sadklklarn gstermeye abalamlardr. Bat Trakya Trk aydnlan iirler dnda Trkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Atatrk konulu siyasal ve yaznsal makaleler, denemeler, masal ve mensur iirler de olduka yazmlardr. Bu konulu yaptlar arasna Alinza Saraolu'nun "Atatrk ve Laiklik ilkesi"; Salhaddin Galip'in "Atatrk Cumhuriyeti'nin 10. Yldnm ve Bat Trakya"; Mustafa Kasabal'nn "Baretmen Atatrk ve 10 Kasm"; Mcahit Mmin'in "Gelien Dnya Olaylar ve Atatrklk", "Atatrk' Anarken"; Mustafa Hafz Mustafa'nn "Gcn Halktan Alan", "lmsz Atatrk, Sen Msterih Ol", "zlenecek Gerek Yol Atatrklk"; Salih Halil'in "Olaylar Yreinde
37. Yunanistan'da Trk yazarlarnn tm iirleri ile ilgili bilgi iin bkz. Feyyaz Salam, Yunanistan (Bat Trakya) Trkleri Edebiyat'nda atatrk, 1992, stanbul.

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Durmak" yazlan ile ve "Atatrk lebilir mi?" "Atatrk ld Diyemem", "Atatrk ve Genlik", "On Kasm Yapraklan", "Atatrk'n lmszlk Yldnm" gibi balkl yaynlanan gizli (rumuzlu) yazlar girmektedir. Bundan baka Yunan asll olanlar da Atatrk'n doru, drst, sulhsever, dostsever olduunu grm, ona kar sevgileri domutur. te Kbnsl Yunan halk ozanlar arasndan Azinas, Atatrk'n lmn duyar duymaz duygulanarak onun hayat, ahmalan, savalar ve sonunda lm ile ilgili Rumca "Kemal Atatrk'n Hayat ve lm" balkl ve 154 dizeli destanyla bilgilerini Rumlara dkmtr. Biz bu destann ancak en nemli blmlerini almaya alacaz: Bu byk adamn, Trkiye nderinin Nefret ve ktl kaldrmak oldu ilk ii. Diyelim amazlk iinde olduu Yunan 'la Ki hi nedensiz barmaz dman idiler Oturup anlatlar Ve kkl bir dostluun temelini attlar. Arkasndan bu dostluk halkas byr Ve tm Balkanlar ierir Bitsin artk nefret ve sava lke kalknmas nde gelir. Uyan ulu nder, Trkn atas, uyan. Halkn vnc, ulusun batac uyan. Uyan ve evreni gzet: Yarattn yeni kua gresin Sevdiklerini, konumak istediklerini Ve seni izleyen dostun Metaksas ' gresin: Bak nasl ya dkerek yannda durmaktalar. Sen lmedin Kemal, lmszsn Yayorsun ve herkes hayrandr sana Dost yreklerdedir senin yerin Sen unutulmazsn Adn unutulmazdr3*. Atatrk'n lmnden sonra Yunanistan'da, Rumlar tarafndan Rumca hem Trkiye Cumhuriyeti hem de Atatrkle ilgili pek yaz yazlmam, fakat sonunda Atatrk'le ilgili ilgin bir kitap basndan kyor.
38. 8. Tabannotundaki yapta bkz. S. 112-125.

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Bu "Kemal Atatrk" adl kitab yazan Simeon Soltaridis'dir. Simeon Soltaridis stanbul'da domu ve 20 yanda iken Yunanistan'a gettikten sonra Selanik niversitesi'nde Trkoloji eitimini gren bir kiidir. 45 yanda Atina'da Elefterotipia gazetesinde gazeteci ve yazar olarak alan bu kii imdiye dek Trk-Yunan ilikileriyle ilgili sekiz kitap yaynlamtr. Bu nedenle Abdi peki bar dln de kazanmtr. "Atatrk" adl bu kitap Atatrk'n 1927 ylnda Halk frkasnda yapt konumalarnn tercmelerini iermektedir. Simeon Soltaridis bu kitabn nsz'nde Atatrk'n sylevlerini deerlendirirken onunla ilgili unlar sylemitir: "Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin ikinci Kongresi'nde (15-20 Ekim 1927) yapt sylevlerinin evirisi, tarihi aratrma bakmndan ok nemlidir. Dierlerinin yan sra "konu kaderi" hazrlayan Yunan strateji planlar ve Pontus'da Elen Cumhuriyeti kurulmas gibi konulara da deiniyor olmas nedeniyle, bu nem bizim amzdan daha da artmaktadr. evirinin amac, Trk askeri ve siyasi yneticilerinin dnce tarznn anlalmasna olduu kadar, Yunan tarafnn o dnemde yapt olas yanllarn kaydedilmesine de yneliktir. Karlatm birok glkler nedeniyle evirinin gecikerek alt yl srm olmasna karn, almann Yunan-Trk ilikilerinin dnem noktasnda bulunduu bir dneme rastlamasndan dolay yine de byk mutluluk duyuyorum". "Her iki cildin evirisi byk harcamay gerektireceinden, ibu eviri, sylevlerin baz blmlerini iermektedir. "Byk Hasta"mn yani Osmanl mparatorluu'nun, 1919 Maysnda can ekitii malumdur. Egemenliindeki birok topraklarn igal etmi olan Byk Gler Bab- Ali'yi dalma srecine sokmulard ve halkn byk bir ounluu ile gen askerlerin kabullenmedii antlamalara zorluyorlard. Osmanl mparatorluu'nun dalmasn ngren bu zm kabullenmeyen ve Namk Kemal ile Ziya Gkalp'in fikirlerinden etkilenenler arasnda da bir Pantrkizm ve milliyetilik duygusu ve mcadele ruhu tayan Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'de vard". Simeon Solaris Atatrk sylevlerinin demokratik rejime ve yeni Trkiye'nin korunmasn ve idamesini emanet ettii genlere byk nem verdiini, askeri lkletirmekte, genleri mcadeleye zendirmekte, ortak d politikaya dikkat edilmesini salk vermekte, din liderlerin gcn snrlayc Bat tipinde yeni bir devlet modeli yaratmakta ve Trk politikasnn ana eksenini oluturduu son derece nemli olduunu ileri srmektedir. Bu nedenle Atatrk sylevlerinin Trk politikasnn eksenini oluturduundan bu evirinin de Yunanllara olduka nem tadn salk verirken sonunda unlar da eklemitir: 126

"Bu yapt okurken, Yunan tarafnn o zaman izledii taktik ve zellikle Mustafa Kemal'e kar meydana gelen ayaklanmalardan ve zellikle erkez Ethem'in isyanndan zamann Yunan yneticilerinin yararlanp yararlanmadklar, hatta Bab- Ali ile danmalarda bulunup bulunmadklar konusunda kendi kendimize birok sorularla karlaacaz. Bunlardan baka, kendi kendimize, Mustafa Kemal'in da ve zellikle de Rusya'ya yapt almlar grldkten sonra, Yunan ordusunun Kk Asya kylarnda ilerlemeyi durdurmasnn gerekip gerekmediini ve ayrca Dou Trakya konusunda doru politika izlenip izlenmediini de soracaz... Nihayet elde edebilecekleri ekonomik ve siyasi karlar zamannda sezen yabanc glerin neden Trk liderleriyle anlamalar yaparak Yunan glerini usuz bucaksz Anadolu topraklarnda terk ettiklerini grecek ve anlayacaz. Hatta bunun cevaplarn da bu yaptta bulacaz. Bu yapt okunduktan sonra varlacak sonular, bize yeni beliren durumlar gslemekte de yardmc olacaktr39. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurucusu ulu nder Atatrk'n Balkan yarmadasnda tarih boyunca yayn ve basn ile ilgili yanklar zerine en ksa bir biimde durduk. Fakat bunu tamamiyle incelemek, tm yaptlar ortaya atmak ve zerlerinde gerektii kadar durup her devlette yaayan ulus ve halklardaki tm yanklar inceleyip eletiriler yapmak iin daha ok geni bir sreye gereksinme vardr. nk bu yanklarn kimisi Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurucusu ve Trk adalama hareketinin lideri Atatrk'n byk asker komutanl, kimisi onun "Ya istikll ya lm" ilkesiyle Trk bamszlk savan kazanmak iin tm engelleri yenerek lik, demokratik ve ada Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluundan balayarak ulusuyla babaa byk inklpl, kimisi ise onun "Yurtta bar, cihanda bar" ve "nsan hereyden evvel mensup olduu milletin varl ve mutluluu iin almal; fakat baka milletlerin de huzur ve refahn dnmelidir" ilkeleri ile ilgili ayrntl bir sr vgler sunmaktadr. Sre getike hem Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin hem de kurucusu Atatrk'n deeri artmaktadr. Bu nedenle bu konularda daha ok dnceler ortaya atlacak ve bir sr daha yaz ve kitaplar yaynlanaca dncesindeyiz.

39. Simeon Soltaridis, Kemal Atatrk, 1995, Atina.

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ATATRK DNEMNDE TRKYE'NN BLGESEL DI POLTKALARI (1923-1938)

Yrd. Do. Dr. Mustafa TRKE* Osmanl mparatorluu'ndan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne geite, Trkiye iki devrimi bir arada yaamtr. lki, yabanc igal kuvvetlerine kar verilen silahl mcadele ile egerekleirken, ikincisi; Osmanl dneminden kalan ynetici snf tasfiye etmeye-dntrmeye ynelikti. Bu iki sre birlikte yaanarak birbirini beslemi ve imparatorluktan ulusdevlete geite kavramsal dzeyde hem i politika hem de d politika alanlarnda alglama farkllamasn birlikte getirmitir. Mondros mtarekesini takiben Osmanl devletini temsil eden stanbul ynetiminin kendi g dayanaklarn, yani; askeri rgt, siyasi rgt ve aydnlarn muhafaza edememesi ve d politikada zamannda taktiksel ve fiili ricatta bulunamamas stanbul ynetiminin bir anlamda sonunu hazrlamtr. Buna karn, Mondros mtarekesinden sonra Anadolu'da filizlenen direni glerini birletirerek, askeri g dayana haline dntren Osmanl devletinin resmi eitim kurumlarnda yetien 'yeni' brokrat snf, Amasya, Erzurum, Sivas ve birok yerel kongrelerde ortaya kan oluumu Birinci Meclis'e tayarak meru bir platformda, siyasi otorite haline gelerek, hem kavramsal dzeyde hem de fiilen imparatorluk alglamasndan syrlarak, ulus-deylet oluturma giriiminde geri dnlmez admlar atmtr. Bu srete stanbul'dan Ankara'ya gelen aydnlar bu oluumun ideolojisini yaymlardr. Ankara ynetimi, ayn zamanda, dzensiz direni glerini birletirip dzenli bir ordu haline dntrerek iktidarn askeri g dayanan da gerekletirmitir. Anadolu ve Rumeli Mdafa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri bir siyasi parti olmamakla birlikte, iktidarn siyasi rgt dayanan oluturmas ve Ankara'nn meru siyasi merkez olmasn gerekletirmesi bakmndan nemli roller oynamtr. Ksaca, bu dnemde iktidar olma ve iktidarda kalmann vazgeilmez g dayana; askeri rgt, aydnlar ve siyasi rgt, Ankara ynetiminin eline gemitir. Bu g dayanan yabanc igal kuvvetlerine kar ynlendirmeyi baard lde Ankara ynetimi uluslararas nitelikte tannm ve
ODT, Uluslararas likiler Blm retim yesi.

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kabul grmtr. Ayn dnemde, Ankara ynetimi ttihatlardan kalan ideolojik eilimlerin bazlarn reddederek bazlarn ise iselletirerek kendisinden nceki dnemin ideolojik eilimlerini rafineletirmitir1. deolojik dzeyde imparatorluktan ulus-devlete geii gerekletiren 'yeni' brokratik ynetici snf, Osmanl kurumlarnn ounu yeniden dzenleyerek, bir ksmn ise ilga edip yerine yenilerini kurarak Kemalizmin temellerini atmtr. Osmanl'dan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne gei sreci elbette iktisadi ve siyasi deiiklikleri de birliktke getirmi ve Trkiye'de iktisadi ve siyasi gcn yeniden dalmna yol amtr. Bu srete Kemalistler iktisadi alanda kapitalizmi ina ederken iki Dnya Sava aras dnemin global dzeyde genel geer zelliklerinin dnda olmayan kapitalist kalknma stratejisini uygularken bu dnemde yaygn bir eilim olan kapitalizmin otoriter zelliklerini benimsemilerdir. Uluslararas ilikiler alannda, Kurtulu Sava dneminde uygulanan Trk d politikasn formle edip uygulayan asker-sivil kkenli brokratik snf, Sevr'den Lozan'a kadar geen srede ortaya kan uluslararas dzeydeki faktrel deiiklikleri kendi lehine dntrebilecek politikalar zamannda reterek siyasal bamszl gerekletirmilerdir. Ankara'nn baars, Lozan anlamasyla resmilemekle birlikte, Lozan'da zmlenemeyen kimi sorunlar da mevcuttu. Haluk lman, Oral Sander, smail Soysal ve mer Krkolu'nun bu dnem zerine yaptklar almalar, Lozan'da zlemeyen, ertelenen ve Lozan'da grlmeyen fakat Lozan ertesinde d politika sorunsallar olarak ortaya kan ncelikli sorunlar; musul sorunu, Trkiye-Suriye snr sorunu, Trkiye'nin ngiltere ve Fransa ile Sovyet Rusya arasnda bir denge oluturma sorunsal, talyan tehditi, Bat'dan korku, Osmanl borlar, nfus mbadelesi sorunu, Patrikliin durumu, yabanc irketlerin milliletirilmesi ve yabanc okullarda yaplacak Trke eitim olarak tanmlamaktadrlar2. lman, Sander, Soysal, Krkolu ve dier birok aratrmacnn dile getirdii gibi, bu sorunlar zamana yaylm ve diplomatik yolla zm bulunmaya allmtr. Bu almalar Atatrk'n d politika anlaynn genel erevesini izmektedirler. Bu nedenle, burada, yukarda bahsedilen almalara gndermeler yaplmakla birlikte 1923-1938 dnemi Trk d politikas blgesel dzeyde ve konu baznda irdelenerek bu dnemde Trkiye'nin karlat blgesel problemler ve bunlara kar gelitirilen stratejiler tanmlanarak Atatrk dneminde Trk d politikas analiz edilmektedir.
1. 2. deolojik alanda yaanan rafineleme eilimi iin bkz; Mustafa Trke, deolojik Tendencies in the Republic of Turkey: the Case of Kadro (1932-1935), Doktora Tezi, (Manchester University, 1993), ss. (11-46). A. Haluk lman, "Trk D Politikasna Yn Veren Etkenler (1923-1968) I, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi Dergisi, 23/3 (1968), ss. (241-273) bu makalenin devam olan ikincisi A. Haluk lman ve Oral Sander tarafndan kaleme alnmtr; mer Krkolu, "An Analysis of Atatrk's Foreign Policy 1919-1938", Milletleraras Mnasebetler Trk Yll, 1980-1981, Say XX, (Ankara, 1986), ss. (133-187).

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Osmanl mparatorluu'ndan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne Geide Taktiksel ve Fiili Ricat Osmanl mparatorluu'ndan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne geite ulusdevlet oluturma ve dnemin uluslararas ilikiler anlayn analiz etme asndan nemli bir yeri olan Misak- Milli, alt izilerek belirtilmelidir ki, zamana gre geni ve dar anlamlarda yorumlanmtr: Misak- Milli snrlar ilk etapta geni yorumlanarak Mslman Trk ahali alglamas n planda tutulurken, zaman iinde deien koullara bal olarak drt blgenin ikisinde taktiksel dier ikisinde ise fiili ricat yaplarak Misak- Milli dar anlamda yorumlanmtr. Petrol rezervlerinin bulunduu Musul, Trk nfusun ounlukta olduu Bat Trakya'da fiili, stratejik nemi olan Boazlar ve doal hinterland asndan nem arzeden Sancak blgesinde taktiksel ricat yaplmtr. Trk nfusun ounlukta olmasna ramen Yunanistan ile Bulgaristan arasnda nemli srtmelere neden olan Bat Trakya ve geni anlamda Makedonya sorunu karsnda Trkiye Bat Trakya'da bulunan Mslman Trk aznln haklarn kurumsal dzeyde korumaya zen gstermekle birlikte, bu blge zerinde fazla srarl olmamay tercih etmitir. Lozan grmeleri ncesi ve srasnda Musul konusunda Trkiye diplomatik zm aray politikasn kabullenmitir. Ankara hkmetinin Birinci Meclis dneminde Musul konusunda askeri bir harekata kalkmaynn temel nedenini unlar olduunu ileri srmek mmkndr: Bu blgenin Britanya iin vazgeilmez neme sahip olmas, dolaysyla ciddi bir askeri atmay gerektirmesi ve blgenin Trkiye iin nemli olmakla birlikte, ncelikli ve vazgeilmez olmamasyla ilgilidir. Musul konusunda Birinci Meclis dneminde yaplan diplomatik giriim, yani Chester projesi ile ABD'nin devreye sokulmas abas da, Ankara hkmetinin lehine dnmemitir. Musul konusunda ngiltere ile yeniden bir savaa girmek Trkiye asndan olduka riskliydi. Ayrca, baka hesaplar da yaplm olabilir. Speklatif olmakla birlikte, Ankara'nn u noktay hesaba kattn varsaymak mmkndr: Musul'un Trkiye snrlar iinde kalmas durumunda, Britanya desteinde bu blgede bir Krt devleti kurulmas politikas tekrar tekrar gndeme getirilebilirdi ki, bu, Trkiye iin sreklilik arzeden bir istikrarszlk kayna olabilirdi. Hzl bir ekilde d ilikilerinde normalleme srecini balatmak isteyen Ankara iin, bu, istendik bir durum olamazd. Bu nedenlerden dolay, Ankara, Musul sorununu nce erteleme ve mmkn olduunca diplomatik yoldan zme stratejisini semitir. Sorun, Lozan'da ertelenmi, daha sonra Milletler Cemiyeti'ne intikal etmi fakat sonuta Musul Trkiye snrlar dnda kalmtr. Trk-Fransz ilikilerinin genel erevesini izen 1921 Ankara anlamas Trkiye-Suriye snr konusunda kimi belirsizlikleri ierse de Sancak sorununun diplomatik yolla zmne de zemin oluturmutur. Bu konuda Trkiye sorunu zamana yayarak bir anlamda taktiksel ricat yaparak uluslararas konjonktrn kendi lehine olduu dnemi bekleyerek aama aama sorunu zmtr. Musul ve Sancak konularnda benzer strateji takp edilmekle birlikte Musul konusunda taktiksel

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ricat fiili ricata dnrken, Hatay konusunda uluslararas konjonktrn Trkiye lehine dnmesiyle Trkiye fiili ricatta bulunmak durumunda kalmam ve diplomatik bir zafer kazanmtr. Lozan'da nemli bir d olitika sorunsal olan Boazlar konusu, Lozan'da bir anlama zeminine oturtulmakla birlikte aada ayrntl bir ekilde irdelenecei zere Lozan'daki zm ileriye ynelik savunma problemini de birlikte getirmitir. Boazlar konuunda Ankara hkmeti, 1921 Moskova anlamasyla ngiltere, Fransa ve talya'ya kar Sovyetler Birliini devreye sokmutur. Lozan'da ise yeni bir manevra yapmtr. Lozan'da tez tartlmtr: Trkiye'nin tezi; Boazlarn egemenliinin Trkiye'ye verilmesi, Sovyet tezi; Boazlarn egemenliinin Karadeniz'e kys olan lkeler tarafndan belirlenmesi ve Bat'nn tezi olan ncs Boazlar ynetiminin ve dolaysyla egemenliinin Avrupal devletler tarafndan belirlenmesi. Kendi tezinin kabul edilmemesi zerine Trkiye, Sovyetler Birlii'nin Boazlar'da kalc olabilecei endiesiyle diplomatik bir manevra yaparak, ilerde deitirmek umuduyla taktiksel ricat yaparak Bat'nn tezini kabul etmitir. y Lozan Sonras Blgesel Sorunlar ve Blgesel Gvenlik Alar Ara-

Lozan anlamasn takiben Trk d politikasnda ncelikli sorunsal kendisini aka hissettirmitir. Bunlardan ilki, Trkiye'nin yakn ve uzak komularyla olan ilikilerinin normalleme srecine sokulmas, ikincisi; blgesel dzeyde gvenlik alar oluturma ihtiyac ve ncs; Trkiye'nin tehdit alglamas ve buna kar gvenlik a oluturma araydr. Lozan sonrasnda Trkiye'nin imzalad anlamalar incelendiinde grlmektedir ki; Trkiye bir dizi iyi komuluk ve saldrmazlk anlamalar imzalamtr. Bu anlamalar aka ifade etmektedir ki, Trkiye ncelikle yakn komularyla ilikilerini hzl bir ekilde normalletirmeye almtr. Uzak komularyla olan ilikilerinde, zellikle Britanya ve Fransa ile olan ilikilerinde normalleme sreci doal olarak Musul ve Hatay sorununun zmlenmesi ve uluslararas konjonktrn deimesine bal kalmtr. Sovyetler Birlii ile olan ilikisinde ise; lozan Boazlar szlemesinin Sovyetler Birliini byk lde dlamas nedeniyle Kurtulu Sava srasnda kurulan yakn iliki yerini daha temkinli olmaya brakmtr. Nitekim, 1925 ylnda Musul konusunda, Trkiye Britanya'ya kar Sovyetler Birlii'nin desteini almaya alt durumda Sovyetler Birlii'nin cevab olumsuz olmutur. Trkiye ilikilerini hzl bir ekilde normalletirmeye zen gsterdii snr komular arlkl olarak Balkanlar'da olmutur. Lozan grmeleri srasnda Bulgaristan'n Ege denizine Bat Trakya'dan bir koridor ile 132

k salanmas talebine scak bakan Trkiye3, dnemin anti-revizyonist Bulgaristan babakan Stambuliski ile karlkl iyi niyet ilikisi kurarak Bulgaristan ile ilikisini ksa srede normalletirmeyi gerekletirmitir. Fakat 1923 ylnda Stambuliski'nin bir darbe ile iktidardan uzaklatrlmas ve bu tarihten itibaren Bulgaristan'da iktidara gelen hkmetlerin revizyonist politika araylar iinde olmas Trk-Bulgar ilikilerini bozmamakla birlikte, ilikiler normallemenin tesine geememitir. Ayn dnemde Trkiye'nin ilikilerini zenle normalletirmeye ve gelitirmeye alt snr komusu Yunanistan'dr. Trk-Yunan ilikilerinde Lozan anlamasyla nemli mesafe kat edilmekle birlikte, ilikilerin normallemesi ancak 1926 ylnda nfus mbadelesinden arta kalan mlkiyet sorununun zlmesinden sonra balam ve 1930'lu yllarn ilk yarsnda iki lke arasnda savunma, uluslararas platformlarda birlikte hareket etme ve birbirinin haklarn gzetme gibi konularda olduka ileri dzeyde ikili ilikiler kurulmutur. 1930'lu yllarn banda hem iki lkenin st dzey yneticilerinin karlkl ziyaretlerine hem de iki lke arasnda ve zellikle Trkiye'nin Yunanistan'a ynelik zverili ticari ilikisine4 baknca iki lkenin de ilikileri gelitirme konusunda zen gsterdikleri aktr. Bu gelime yalnzca iki lke yneticilerinin iyi niyetli olmalaryla aklanamaz. Kald ki, iki lke ynetiminde bulunan insanlar ksa sre nce savamak durumunda kalmlard. likileri bu derece iyilemeye ynelten nedenler irdelendiinde grlmektedir ki iki lke arasnda kar rtmeleri iki lke yneticilerini yaknlamaya sevk etmitir. rten karlar nelerdi? Trkiye asndan bakldnda Trkiye'nin Yunanistan ile yaknlamasn gerektiren nemli bir savunma sorunu vard. yle ki; Lozan anlamasna gre Trkiye'nin Balkanlar snrnda (TrkiyeYunanistan ve Trkiye-Bulgaristan snrlarnda) ve Boazlarda birbirine yakn askerden arndrlm iki blge oluturulmutur. Arada kalan blgede ise Trkiye ancak ar silahlardan yoksun inzibat grevini ifade eden askerler bulundurabilecekti. Bu durum aka Trkiye iin ciddi bir savunma zaaf oluturmaktayd. Nitekim bu dnemde yaplan yorumlara gre Trkiye'ye kar Balkanlar'dan gelebilecek bir askeri saldr durumunda Trkiye'nin Trakya'ya en yakn askeri merkez olan Bursa'dan asker sevk edebilmesi bir hafta alabilirdi. 1924 yl deerlendirmelerine gre, eer Trkiye ayn anda hem Balkanlar'dan hem de Akdeniz'den ayn anda bir saldrya urarsa Trkiye'nin savunma gcnn olduka riskli olaca dorultusundayd. Hatta 1924 ylndaki bir sylentiye gre 5 talya ile Yunanistan arasnda bu dorultuda gizli bir anlama yaplmt . Doruluk derecesi dk olsa da bu tr bir sylenti dahi Trk siyasi ve askeri elitini bu konuda ciddi bir ekilde dnmeye sevk etmi olmaldr. Aynca, i politika asndan radikal reformlarn uygulanmaya koyulduu
3. 4. 5. Tevfik Rt Ara, Grlerim, Birinci Kitap (stanbul, n.d.); T.I. Geshkoff, Balkan Union: A Road to Peace in Southern Europe, (New York, 1940). Bu konuda bkz; Mustafa Trke, Turkish Balkan Relations in the Light ofthe Balkan Entente 1930-1934, M. Phil Thesis, (Manchester University, 1990), ss. (77-91). ibid.

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bir dnemde Trkiye'nin herhangi bir savaa girmesi olduka riskliydi. te bu savunma problemidir ki Trkiye'yi Yunanistan ile olan ilikisinde hzl bir ekilde normallemeye ve gelitirmeye sevk etmitir. Yunanistan asndan da Balkanlar'da savunma problemi vard. Geni Makedonya blgesi Yunanistan, Bulgaristan ve Srp, Hrvat ve Sloven Krall (1929'dan itibaren Yugoslavya adn ald) tarafndan bllm ve Bulgaristan'da bulunan IMRO rgt Bulgaristan ynetimini revizyonist politikalara tevik etmekteydi. Yunanistan, Bulgaristan' potansiyel tehdit olarak alglamaktayd. Dolaysyla Yunanistan'a kar oluabilecek bir ittifak Yunanistan'n savunmasn zor duruma sokabilirdi. Bu nedenle Yunanistan da Trkiye ile olan ilikisini iyiletirmeye zen gstermek durumunda kalmt. Dier bir ifade ile Lozan sonras dnemde her iki lke de savunma ihtiyalarndan doan nedenlerle birbirlerine kar cephe almak yerine yaknlamay terci ettiler. Sorun yalnzca savunma ihtiyacyla snrl da deildi. Her iki lkede i politika asndan d politikada tansiyonun drlmesini gerektiren nedenler vard. Yunanistan Kralclar ve Venizelos srtmesi ile alkalanrken6 Trkiye'de yeniden ina dnemi i reformlarla gereklemekteydi ki d politika alannda risk almamay gerektiriyordu. Yunanistan ve Trkiye asndan birbirlerine kar irredentist bir politika takip etmek hi de anlaml deildi. Lozan'da tanmlanan snrlar her iki lke iin de korunmas gereken snrlar olarak kabul grd. Bu demekti ki Yunanistan ve Trkiye oluan statkoya bal kalmay tercih etmilerdi. te bu nokta da artk bir motto haline gelen 'Yurtta Bar Dnyada Bar' sylemi hem blge hemde Trkiye asndan statkonun korunmas anlamna geliyordu. 1930'lu yllarn ortalarna kadar Trkiye Yunanistan ile kurduu yakn iliki tarzn Bulgaristan ile de kurmaya gayret sarfetti. Fakat, Bulgaristan kavramsal dzeyde statkoyu kabul edemedi. Kyl partisi lideri Stambuliski'nin 1923 ylnda iktidardan uzaklatnlmasyla birlikte IMRO ve Bulgar ordusunda bulunan revizyonist kanatn oluturdu koalisyon statkoyu kavramsal dzeyde redderek d politikasn Neuilly anlamasyla belirlenen snrlarn deitirilmesi temeline oturtmaa alt lde Bulgaristan ile komular arasnda ciddi srtmeler yaanabilirdi. Bulgaristan'n snr anlamazl olmad tek komusu Trkiye idi ve Bulgaristan'da azmsanamayacak sayda Trk aznlk bulunmasna ramen Trkiye irredentist taleplerde bulunmamakta ve Trk aznl bu dorultuda ynlendirmekten kanmaktayd. Bulgaristan'da Dou Trakya blgesi zerindeki taleplerinden vazgemiti. Bu nedenlerle Trk-Bulgar ilikileri normalleti. Ancak bu TrkBulgar ilikilerinin daha ileri dzeye karlmasna yetmeyecekti nk Bulgaristan halen statkoyu kabul etmemekte ve bu nedenle de d politika alglaynda Trkiye'den farkl bir izgi takip etmekteydi. 1920'li yllarn ikinci yars ikili ilikilerde Trkiye'nin komular ile ilikilerinin normallemesi ve iyiletirilmesi politikas 1930'lu yllarda
6. Bkz, G. Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillbom Republic, (Berkeley, 1983).

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yeni bir boyut kazanacakt. 1930'lu yllarda Trkiye blgede ilikilerini blgesel oluumlarla salamlatrmaya almtr. Bu blgeler Balkanlar, Akdeniz ve Orta Dou'dur. 1934 ylnda Trkiye, Romanya, Yugoslavya ve Yunanistan arasnda imzalanan Balkan Pakt ile 1930'lu yllarn ortalarndan itibaren Akdeniz blgesinin gvenlii konusunda Trkiye'nin srarla Britanya ve Fransa'y iine alan bir savunma ittifak arayna girmesinin temelinde yatan neden Orta Dou blgesinde 1937 ylnda Trkiye, ran, Irak ve Afganistan arasnda imzalanan Sad-Abad Pakt'ndan bir ka adan farklyd. lk iki blgede Trkiye Mussolini talya'sn Trkiye'nin savunmasna kar tehdit olarak grmesi ve buna kar askeri bir savunma ittifak oluturma aray iinde olmasna karn, Sad-Abad Pakt'nda temel sorunsal askeri bir savunma ittifak aray deil fakat istikrarszlklara yol aabilecek faktrlerin kontrol altna alnmas ve blgede hi deilse asgari istikrarn salanmasn hedeflemekteydi. Konuyu biraz daha amak gerekirse, yukarda bahsedilen Lozan sonras Trkiye'nin karlat savunma zaaf hem Balkanlar hem de Akdeniz blgesini ilgilendiriyordu. Ayrca, ayn anda hem Balkanlar'dan hem de Akdeniz'den gelebilecek bir saldr karsnda Trkiye'nin savunma gc kolayca krlabilirdi. Bu nedenle, Trkiye iki cepheden saldr gelmesini nleyecek oluumlara katlmak ve desteklemek ihtiyac duymaktayd. Bu dorultuda, Trkiye ncelikle Balkanlar'da Trkiye, Yunanistan ve Bulgaristan arasnda bir ittifak oluturulmasna gayret etti7. Fakat Yunanistan ile Bulgaristan' statkoyu koruyacak bir zeminde bir araya getirmek mmkn olmad iin Trkiye, Bulgaristan ile ilikisini bozmamakla birlikte Trk-Yunan ikili ilikisini glendiren 1933 tarihli Entente Cordial oluturuldu. Trkiye Bulgaristan' bu oluuma katmaya tevik edici formller aramasna ramen Bulgaristan srarla bu oluuma katlmad. politika asndan Bulgaristan'n bu oluuma katlmas mmkn gzkmemekteydi, nk revizyonizmi reddeden bir hkmetin iktidarda kalmas olduka zordu. l bir ittifakn gerekletirilmesinin mmkn olmad bir durumda Trkiye iin hedef Bulgaristan'a kar askeri bir cephe oluturmaktan ok Bulgaristan'n veya herhangi bir Balkan devletinin Balkanl olmayan bir devletle (bunun talya olduu aktr) birlikte Trkiye'ye kar bir cephe oluturmasn nlemek ana hedeflerden biriydi. Balkan Pakt'nn maddelik ana metnine eklenen 9 maddelik protokol ve Balkan Paktn takiben Trkiye-Yugoslavya ve Trkiye-Romanya arasnda imzalanan askeri anlama8 birlikte incelendiinde grlmektedir ki Trkiye'nin Balkan Paktndan beklentisi Bulgaristan'a kar bir cephe oluturmaktan ok talya'nn herhangi bir Balkanl devletle ittifak halinde Trkiye'ye kar askeri bir saldr durumunda Trkiye'nin Balkanlarda yalnz kalmasn nlemekti. Trkiye asndan Balkan Pakt savunma
7. 8. Bkz, Trke, Turkish-Balkan Relations ..., ss. (63-77). ibid., ss. (92-132).

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zaaf sorunsalndan yola klmakla birlikte Balkan Pakt'nn siyasi boyutu da bir ka adan olduka nemliydi. Balkan Pakt, Balkanl devletler tarafndan oluturulan blgesel bir oluumdu. Balkan Pakt Milletler Cemiyeti'nin ngrlerine aykr deil, ona uyumlu idi. Dier bir ifade ile, Balkan Pakt uluslararas sisteme kar oluturulan bir giriim deildi. Son olarak, Balkan Pakt ne Almanya ne de Sovyetler Birlii'ne kar ynelen bir oluumdu. Balkan Pakt yeleri hi bir anlamda Almanya'ya kar bir hedef belirtmediler. Byle bir sorunsallar da yoktu. Yani, Balkan Pakt ne Kk Antant'in bir uzants ne de Fransa'nn bu dnemde kurmaya alt Almanya'y evreleme politikasnn bir paras idi9. Balkan Pakt Sovyetler Birliine kar oluturulan bir giriim de deildi. Nitekim Trkiye bunu Balkan Pakt'na ilitirilen bir ekince mektubuyla belirtmiti: Trkiye Sovyetler Birliine kar silahl bir harekata girimeyeceini belirtti. Benzer bir ekincede muhalefette bulunan Venizeloes'un srar zerine Yunanistan tarafndan koyulmutu. Yunanistan'n ekincesi ise talya'ya kar Yunanistan'n askeri bir harekata girmeyeceini belirtmesiydi10. Bu iki ekince Balkan Pakt'nn Balkan dndan gelebilecek bir saldrya kar savunma gelitirmesini daraltmakla birlikte Balkan Pakt'n takiben imzalanan askeri anlamalar Trkiye, Yugoslavya ve Romanya'y talya'ya kar birlikte hareket etmeye sevk edebilecek zemini oluturmutur. Aka grld gibi, Trkiye ince bir diplomasi ile kendisini askeri anlamda Sovyetler Birliine kar riske atmayacak ancak kendisine kar askeri bir tehdit olarak grd italya'ya kar Balkanlarda ittifak zeminleri oluturmaya almtr. Yine siyasi nitelikte Balkan Pakt'nn nemli bir zellii bu pakt ile Balkanlarn pasifletirilmesi, dier bir ifade ile, Balkanl devletlerin birbirlerine kar ittifak halinde saldrya geebilecek bir zemin oluturmamas bakmndan da nemlidir. Balkan Pakt'na ye iki lke arasnda bir anlamazlk sonucu sava karsa dier lkeler bu savaa katlmak zorunda deillerdi. Ancak, saldran lke bir baka lke ile ittifak halinde imzac devletlerden birisine saldrrsa dier imzac devletler saldrgan devletlere kar saldrya urayan devletin yardmna geleceklerdi. Balkan Pakt, sonu itibaryla anlamazlklarn savaa dnmesini nlemeye alan bir diplomasi rneiydi. Trkiye'nin savunma asndan kendisini zayf hissettii bir baka blge Akdeniz'di. 1919-1923 aras yllarda Trk-Italyan ilikileri Yunanistan'n Anadolu'ya ynelik igalci tutumuna bal olarak deiimler gstermektedir. Birinci Dnya Sava'ndan galip kan devletler arasnda yer almasna ve 1915'de Londra'da kendisine Anadolu ve Kuzey Afrika'da toprak verilmesi sz verilmesine ramen bunlarn gereklememesi ve Anadolu zerine yaplan paylam hesaplarnda talya yerine Yunanistan'n n planda tutulmas talya'y politika deiikliine yneltmitir.
9. Mustafa Trke, "The Balkan Pact and Its Immediate Implications for the Balkan States", Middle eastern Studies, 30/1,1994. 10. Trke, Turkish-Balkan Relations ..., ss. (92-132).

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talya, Yunanistan'n Anadolu'yu igaline scak bakmamtr. Bu durum Ankara ile talya ynetimleri arasnda yakn ilikiler kurulmasna zemin hazrlamakla birlikte, bu yaknlama uzun sreli olamamtr. Bunun temel nedeni Mussollini'nin 1922'de iktidara gelmesiyle birlikte talya'nn giderek yaylmac emellerini n plana karmas ve talya'nn Akdeniz'de ciddi bir tehdit oluturma potansiyelinden kaynaklanmtr. Birinci Dnya Sava sonunda Almanya'nn yenilmesi bir anlamda talya'y blgesel bir g pozisyonuna getirmi ve hem Balkanlar'da hem de Akdeniz'de hesaba katlmas gereken bir g olarak alglanmaya balamtr. talya, Balkanlar ve Merkezi-Dou Avrupa'da bulunan revizyonist devletlere siyasal destek vererek bu blgelere nfuz etmeye almakta, Kuzey Afrika'da kendisine toprak verilmesi taleplerinde bulunmaktayd. Bununla birlikte aka Trkiye'yi telaffuz etmese de Anadolu'nun Akdeniz blgesine ynelik talepleri olduunu ima etmesi Trkiye'de ciddi kayglar uyandrmtr. Mussolini talya'snn gerekten Trkiye'ye ynelik reel hesaplar yapp yapmad, yapsa dahi bunu hayata geirmesinin mmkn olup olamyaca bir tarafa, italya'nn Oniki Adalar elinde bulundurmas ve genilemeci bir politika izleyeceini hem sylem dzeyinde hem de pratikte Habeistan' igal ederek gstermesi doal olarak Trkiye'yi talya'ya kar temkinli olmaya zorlamtr. Trkiye aka talya'y tehdit olarak alglamtr. Bu durumda Trkiye Akdeniz gvenliini ilgilendiren bir savunma ittifak arayna girmitir. talya'ya kar savunma ittifak ancak Trkiye'nin uzak komular ile gerekletirilebilirdi. Bu dorultuda Trkiye Britanya, Fransa ve mmkn olursa Sovyetler Birlii'nin iinde bulunduu bir savunma ittifak arayna girdi. Trkiye 1935 ve 1936 yllarnda italya'ya kar oluturmay tasarlad ittifak dile getirmesine ramen Britanya ve Fransa Sovyetler Birlii'nin iinde bulunduu akdeniz gvenliini ilgilendiren bir savunma ittifakna kar ktklar gibi 1939 ylna kadar talya'ya kar Fransa, Britanya ve Trkiye'den oluabilecek bir oluuma da scak bakmadlar. Britanya ve Fransa'nn hesaplarna gre talya hem Akdeniz'de hem de Balkanlar'da Almanya'nn rakibi durumundayd ve bu nedenle Trkiye'nin talya'ya ynelik Akdeniz'de oluturmay ngrd savunma ittifak nerisine scak bakmadlar. 1939 ylna gelindiinde ise artk ncelikler deimiti. Trkiye iin ncelik savan dnda kalmak iken Britanya ve Fransa ge kalm bir ittifak arayna girdiler. Bu nedenle 1939 ylnda Akdeniz gvenliini ilgilendiren Trkiye, Fransa ve Britanya arasnda imzalanan l anlama Trkiye asndan ge kalm bir anlama idi. Trkiye'nin Akdeniz blgesinde tehdit olarak alglad talya'ya kar askeri bir ittifak arayna girmesine ramen Britanya ve Fransa'nn karlar ve ncelikleri Trkiye'ninkilerle rtmedii iin Trkiye'nin bu abas sonu vermemitir. Ancak unutulmamaldr ki, Trkiye bu srede iki nemli konuyu gndeme getirmi ve ikisinde de kendi lehine kararlar alnmasn gerekletirmitir. Bunlardan ilki Lozan Boazlar szlemesinin 1936 ylnda Montr szlemesine dntrlerek Boazlarn

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ynetiminin ve egemenliinin Trkiye lehine dntrlmesidir. kincisi ise, Hatay'n Trkiye snrlarna katlmasdr. Her iki durumda da Trkiye zamanlama konusunda dikkatli davranm ve konuyu zellikle Fransa'nn itiraz edemeyecei durumlarda gndeme getirmitir. Her ne kadar Akdeniz gvenlii konusunda Britanya ve Fransa'y yanna alan bir savunma ittifak oluturamasa da Montr Boazlar szlemesiyle Trkiye Balkanlar snrnda karlat savunma zaafndan byk lde kurtulmay baarmtr. Hatay sorununun zlmesiyle birlikte Trk-Fransz ilikilerindeki gerginlik yerini yaknlamaya brakmakla birlikte Trk-Suriye ilikilerinde gerginlik dnemi balamtr. 1923-1938 aras yllarda Trkiye'nin nem verdii bir baka blge Orta Dou blgesidir. Burada Trkiye'nin blgesel oluumlara katlma isteinin temelinde yatan neden ak bir tehdit alglamasndan ziyade blgede ortaya kabilecek istikrarszlk faktrlerini pasifletirmeye ynelik olmutur. Bu dorultuda imzalanan Sad-Abad Pakt bir savunma ittifak deildir. Dolaysyla her hangi bir devlete kar askeri anlamda ynelmek ve ona kar cephe oluturmak gibi bir noktadan hareket edilmemitir. 1937 ylnda imzaland haliyle Sad-Abad Pakt Trkiye, ran, Irak ve Afganistan tarafndan oluturulan bir saldrmazlk ve blgesel siyasi istikrar salamaya ynelik bir anlamadr. Bu anlama ile taraflar birbirlerine snr sorunlarndan dolay saldrmayacan ve en nemlisi birbirlerinin i ilerine mdahale etmeyeceklerini beyan etmekteydilir". ran ile Irak arasnda attl-Arab konusunda anlamazlklarn srd bir ortamda ran ile Irak'n birbirine kar saldrmazlk sz vermeleri taraflarn anlamazln savaa dnmesini nlemek gibi temel bir hedefi ortaya koyduklarna iaret etmektedir. Bunun kadar nemli bir baka konuda blge devletlerinin birbirlerinin i ilerine karmamay ve bu dorultuda tekilatlarn kurulmasna izin vermemeyi taahht etmeleridir ki, bu durum blgedeki Krt airetlerinin pozisyonlar ile ilgilidir. Krt airetleri blgede dank bir ekilde bulunmaktayd ve blge devletlerinin birbirlerinin i ilerine mdahale etmelerine zemin oluturmaktayd. Bu durum blgede kendini yeniden reten istikrarszlk kayna haline gelebilirdi. stikrarszlk kayna oluturabilecek bir baka potansiyel ise blge devletlerinde bulunan Trki nfustu. Hem Irak'da hem ran'da bulunan Trki nfus istendii durumda blgede istikrarszlk kayna haline getirebilirdi. Trkiye bu dorultuda bir politika izlemese de byle bir potansiyelin bulunmas karlkl mzakerelerde sz konusu edilmi olmaldr. Blgede yaanabilecek her trl istikrarszln Trkiye'yi etkileyebileceini kestirdii iin, Trkiye blgede bulunan Trki nfusu istikrarszla sevk edecek politikalardan zenle saknd gibi Sad-Abad Pakt'n imzalamakla Trkiye blgesel dzeyde istikrarszlk kayna oluturmayacan beyan etmekteydi. Trkiye irredentist taleplerinden
11. smail Soysal, Trkiye'nin Siyasi Andlamalan (1920-1945), I, (Ankara, 1983); smail Soysal, "1937 Saadabad Pact", Ortadou ve Balkan ncelemeleri Vakf, 3, (stanbul, 1988).

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vazgemi ve tasarlad ulus-devlet modelinde da yaylmak yerine i btnlemeyi salamaya ynelik i reformlara ncelik vermiti. Trkiye i btnlemeyi salamak amacyla yaplan reformlar yerletirmek iin dardan yaplabilecek mdahaleleri azaltmaya ve etkisizletirmeye ynelik d politikalar retmeye almtr. Trkiye-Sovyetler Birlii ilikilerinde dier blgesel oluumlardan farkl bir yap vard. Trkiye kuzey komularyla ilikilerini Sovyetler Birliini oluturan birlik yeleriyle ayr ayr yrtmek yerine Sovyetler Birliinin merkezi ynetimini esas almtr. Bu durum 1920 Gmr anlamasn takip eden yllarda aka grlmektedir. Gmr anlamasyla Dou snrnda sorunlar dondurmakla salad avantaj 1921 ylnda Moskova anlamasnda Trk-Sovyet yaknlamasna dntrm fakat bu yap Lozan anlamasnn Boazlar szlemesiyle eski yaknln kaybetmekle birlikte ilikiler gerginlememitir. 1930'lu yllarda iki lke arasndaki iliki iki blgede kavramsal dzeyde, uluslararas arenada ise diplomatik giriimlerle birbirlerini destekleyici nitelikte olmutur. 1933 yl Haziran aynda Britanya, talya, Fransa ve Almanya'nn imzalad Drtl Anlamann ngrd Avrupa Direktrl oluturulmasnn aksine ayn yl Sovyetler Birlii'nin nerdii ve hem Dou'da ran ve Afganistan'n hem de Balkanlar ve Merkezi-Dou Avrupa'da Yunanistan hari btn devletlerin imzalad Mtecavizin Tanmlanmas giriimini Trkiye imzalayarak desteklemitir12. Bu giriim blgesel dzeyde bir savunma anlamas olmamakla birlikte, blgesel ve kavramsal dzeyde blge lkelerinin birbirlerinin i ilerine karmamay ngrd iin Trkiye'nin Blgesel politikalaryla uyum iindeydi. Bu nedenle Trkiye-Sovyetler Birlii ilikilerinde kavramsal dzeyde blgesel politikalarda rten d politika normlarn yakalamak mmkndr. Uluslararas arenada Trkiye, Sovyetler Birlii'ni yanna ekmeye almtr. Trkiye'nin Milletler Cemiyeti'ne yelii konusunu Sovyetler Birlii ile grmesi ve onun olurunu almas ayrca 1934 ylnda Sovyetler Birlii'nin Milletler Cemiyeti'ne yeliini aka savunmas, Akdeniz blgesi gvenlii konusunda Sovyetler Birlii'nin iinde olduu bir oluum araynda bulunmas ve Balkan Pakt'nn imzalanmas ncesinde Sovyetler Birlii'nin uyarlarn dikkate almas gstermektedir ki Trkiye uluslararas ve blgesel politikalarnda Sovyet faktrne nem vermekteydi. Uluslararas Sistemin ngrleri ve Atatrk Dneminde Blgesel D Politika ki Dnya Sava aras dnem bir btn olarak ele alndnda Atatrk dneminde uygulanan blgesel d politikalarn ne lde uluslararas sisteme kar veya ngrleriyle uyum iindeydi sorusu zerinde dnlmesi gereken bir konudur. Sava sonras uluslararas sistemin temel
12. Drtl anlama iin bkz; Trke, Turkish-Balkan Relations..., ss. (46-63).

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ncelii vard. Uluslararas sistemi sava ncesi uluslararas ilikiler anlayna gre; yani g dengesi anlayna gre yeniden dzenlemek uluslararas sistemin iki ba aktr olan Britanya ve Fransa'nn ncelikleri arasndayd. Paris Bar anlamalar adyla bilinen snr dzenlemeleri ve Milletler Cemiyeti bu dorultuda gerekleti-oluturuldu. Birleik Devletler Bakan Wilson'un idealist yaklam, kimi ilke ve normlar yerletirmeye almas itibaryla nemli olmakla birlikte, bu genel ereveye damgasn vuran realist anlayn dna kan bir giriim olmaktan uzakt. Dier bir ifade ile uluslararas sistem g dengesi politikasna dayal realist yaklama gre yeniden ina edilmeye allyordu. Dnemin iki nemli aktr, Britanya ve Fransa'nn iki ayr ncelii daha vard: Sovyet Rusya'nn evrelenmesi ve Almanya'nn gden drlmesi. Bu nceliklerin yansra uluslararas sistemin nemli aktrleri ulus-devletlerin kurulmasna kar kmadlar ve hatta tevik ettiler, fakat ulus-devlet modellerinde blgesel dzeyde farkl politikalar rettiler. Orta Dou blgesinde manda ynetimlerini kurup tevik ederlerken Merkezi-Dou Avrupa'da bamsz egemen ulus devletlerin olumasn desteklediler13. te tam bu noktada Trkiye nemli bir rnek tekil etmitir. Uluslararas sistemin aktrlerinin ngrd manda ynetimi kurulmas projesine kar bamsz ulus-devlet oluturma dorultusunda Trkiye'de ciddi bir hareket geliti. Bu anlamda Kurtulu Sava uluslararas sistemin ngrlerini blgesel dzeyde kendi lehine evirmesi itibaryla Orta Dou'daki rneklerden farkllk arzetmekle birlikte, Merkezi-Dou Avrupa'daki rneklerle benzerlikler gstermektedir. ki Dnya Sava aras dnemde Trkiye'de uygulanan d politika, uluslararas sistemin nemli aktrlerinden Britanya ve Fransa'nn Sovyet Rusya ve Almanya'nn evrelenmesi politikasna uygun hareket ettiini gsteren bir ip ucu yakalamak mmkn gzkmemektedir. Fakat, ayn zamanda, Trkiye, Britanya ve Fransa'nn bu politikasna kar bir politika da uygulamamtr. Trkiye Britanya ve Fransa'nn ncelikleri farklyd ve herbiri kendi ncelikleri dorultusunda politika rettiler. Ksaca belirtmek gerekirse, iki Dnya Sava aras dnemde Trkiye'de uygulanan d politikann uluslararas sistemi ykmak veya onu radikal bir ekilde deitirmek gibi bir hedefi yoktu. Fakat, alt izilmesi gereken nokta, bu dnem d politikasnn ana hedeflerinden birisi uluslararas sistemin ngrd blgesel politikalar askeri ve diplomatik manevralarla kendi lehine dntrmeye almasdr. Bunu takiben, blgesel dzeyde oluturulan gvenlik alarna katlarak Trkiye karlat blgesel nitelikli sorunlar blgesel dzeyde zmeye gayret etmitir. Bu da uluslararas sisteme aykr deildi.
13. Bkz. Elie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East, (Oxford: Oxford University Peress, 1992); Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914-1921, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

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SONU Ankara'da oluan 'yeni' brokratik snf, d politika alannda uluslararas sistemin ngrd blgesel politikalar kendi lehine dntrmeyi amalam ve bunda azmsanamyacak derecede baar gstermitir. Osmanl mparatorluu'ndan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne gei dnemi kimi alanlarda taktiksel ricat yapmaya elverili ortam sunmu, Ankara hkmeti de bu tarihsel kavakta, silahl mcadeleyi deien koullarda ortaya kan yeni faktrlerle anlaml irtibatlandrarak gerektiinde taktiksel ve fiili ricat yapmtr. Atatrk dneminde uygulanan blgesel d politika, uluslararas sistemin kendisini yapsal anlamda deitirmeye ynelik olmamtr. Bu dnemde Trkiye uluslararas sistemin ngrlerini kendi lehine dntrmeye alarak bu dnemin realist yaklamna uygun bir strateji takip etmitir. Blgesel gvenlik anlamalar iki Dnya Sava aras dnemin tipik zelliklerindendir. Dnemin uluslararas rgtlerinden Milletler Cemiyeti arlkl olarak Britanya ve Fransa'nn kontrol altnda olmas, blgesel sorunlara zm retecek mekanizmalar retememesi ve halen 19. yzyldaki g dengesi politikasna dayal realist yaklamn alamamas doal olarak dier aktrlerde olduu gibi Trkiye'yi de realist blgesel politika arayna sevk etmitir. Bu dnemin dier nemli bir zellii ise Trkiye'nin ikili anlamalarn oklu anlamalara ekmeye almasdr. Bunun temel nedeni yukarda tartld gibi Trkiye'nin karlat savunma problemiyle ilgilidir. Trkiye savunma zaaf olan blgelerde oklu gvenlik alar oluturmaya alm ve bu konuda Balkan Pakt rneinde hedeflerine byk lde ulamtr. Fakat Trkiye tehdit alglamasnn en keskin olduu Akdeniz blgesinde talya'ya kar Britanya ve Fransa'y uzunca bir sre ikna edememi ve dolaysyla Balkanlarda elde ettii baary Akdeniz blgesinde elde edememitir. Trkiye Sad-Abad Pakt'n imzalayarak Gney Dou snrnda savunma sorunsalndan ok blgedeki istikrarszlk faktrlerinin kendilerini yeniden retmesini ve atmaya dnmesini nlemeye ynelik olmu ve dolaysyla bu blgede siyasi istikrarn salanmasn hedeflemitir. Bu dnemde Trkiye'nin savunma giderlerinin genel btedeki yeri % 30'lardan giderek ykselie gemesi ve ikinci dnya sava arifesinde % 50'ye ulamas 1930'lu yllarn ikinci yarsnda uluslararas konjonktrn ne kadar hzl deitiini gstermektedir. Bu eilim bir anlamda bu dnemde gvenlik anlaynda askeri savunma boyutunun ne kadar nemsendiini gstermesi asndan nemlidir. Fakat, ayn derecede nemli olan bir baka nokta; bu dnemde Trkiye'nin diplomasiye de nem vermesidir. Salkl ve temellendirilebilir analiz yapabilmek iin gerekli olan kabine tutanaklar bulunmad iin kesin sonular karmann mmkn olmamasna ramen, izlenen d politikann verdii ip ularndan yola 141

karak bu dnemde d politikay formle eden asker-sivil brokratlarn g alglaynda hem savunma gerelerine sahip olma hem de gcn ikili ve oklu ilikilerle salamlatrlmas gerektii dorultusunda bir kanlar olduunu ileri srmek yanl olmaz. Atatrk dneminin d politikasna damgasn vuran bir baka zellik bu dnemde Trkiye'nin Lozan'da belirlenen snrlar ve Sava Sonras oluan statkoyu kabul etmesidir. Bu Atatrk dneminde Trkiye'nin statkocu bir yaklam kabul ettiini gsterir ve bu kendisini "Yurtta Bar Dnya'da Bar" zdeyiinde yeterince ifade etmitir.

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K DNYA SAVAI ARASINDAK DONEMDE ATATRK VE MODERN TRKYE'NN BULGARSTAN PARLAMENTOSU'NDA DEERLENDRLMES
Prof. Dr. brahim TATARL* Trkiye]de ve btn dnyada olduu gibi, Bulgaristan'da da Atatrk'n 60. lm yldnm ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75. yldnm ile bal olarak geni boyutlu etkinlikler yaplmaktadr1. Bunun balca nedeni, Mustafa Kemal'in XX. yzyln en byk kumandanlarndan, ender dnrlerinden ve devlet adamlarndan biri, Trk halknn Ulusal Kurtulu Sava'nn (1919-1922) nderi ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurucusu ve lmne dein Cumhurbakan olmas ve her alanda byk hizmet ve katklardr. Onun yetenekli liderliinde Trk halk bamszln korumu ve yepyeni bir devlet ve toplum dzeni kurmutur. Modern Trkiye Balkanlar'da, Yakn Dou ve Orta Dou'da Akdeniz blgesinde,
Hak ve zgrlkler Hareketi Eski Milletvekili, Sofya. Bu balamda 8-9 Ekim 1998 tarihinde Sofya'da Bulgar Ordusunun Askeri Kulb'n, zamannda Atatrk'n iki kez atee militer olarak bulunduu tren salonunda Mustafa Kemal ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti konulu bilimsel konferans, Bulgaristan'n il merkezlerinden Kircali'de (3 Ekim 1998), Burgaz'da (5 Ekim 1998), umen'de (10 Ekim 1998) ve Razgrat'ta (11 Ekim 1998) Atatrk, Modern Trkiye ve Bulgaristan arasndaki iyi komuluk ilikileri konulu bilimsel seminerler yaplmtr. Birincisine Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nden Gvenlik Askeri Akademisi komutan Tmgeneral Orhan Yney ve Hacettepe niversitesi Okutmanlarndan Prof. Dr. Cihat znder katlmlardr. Bilimsel Konferans Bulgaristan'n Cumhurbakan Yardmcs Todor Kavalciyev, Bulgar Ordusunun Genelkurmay Bakan General Miho Mihov, Bulgaristan'da Atlantik Kulb Bakan ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Sofya Byk Elisi Tahsin Burcolu tarafndan selamlanmtr. Birok rapor ve bildiri okunmutur. Birok resmi ahs, bakan, milletvekili, toplumcu, politika adamlar ve bilginler hazr bulunmutur. Rejiyonel seminerler Belediye Bakanlar, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Plovdiv Genel Konsolosu hsan Ycel ve TC Burgaz Genel Konsolosu Babr Hizlan tarafndan selamlanm, Bulgaristanl bilim adamlar ile Trkiye bilginleri rapor ve bildiri okumulardr. Kircali'de Edirne Trakya niversitesinden Do. Dr. Cevat Celep, Tekirda Eitim Mdriyetinden mfetti Yavuz Yaln, Burgaz'da tekrar Do. Dr. Cevat Celep, umen'de Edirne Trakya niversitesi Rektr Prof. Dr. Osman nci, Rektr Yardmcs Prof. Dr. Recep Mesut ve Rektr Danman Prof. Dr. Bilgi akr, Razgrat'ta Bursa Uluda niversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakltesi Dekan Yardmcs ve Tarih Blm Bakan Do. Dr. Yusuf Ouzolu seminerlere katlmlardr.

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dnyada uluslararas ilikilerde gvenlii, bar ve ibirliinin blgesel ve blgest devlet gc haline gelmitir. Atatrk'n izdii bu yolda Trkiye Cumhuriyeti 75 yl devam etmi ve gelecekte de bu yolda yryeceinde kuku yoktur. Bundan nceki bilimsel almalarmda Atatrk ve devrimlerinin Bulgaristan'da 1919-1939 yllarnda bilim alannda2, ksmen o zamann basnnda3, sonra da 1944 ile 1990 dneminde deerlendirilmesi4 ve Bulgar-Trk dostluunun oluum ve geliimi zerinde durmu5, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin d politikasn aratrmtm6. imdiki bildirimde Atatrk ve Modern Trkiye'nin Bulgaristan Parlamentosu'nda deerlendirilmesini aratracam, eitli yanam ve konumlar izleyeceim, yeni veriler ortaya koyacam. Temel kaynak olarak Bulgaristan Milet Meclisi istenografk gnlklerini, oturum zabtalarn, Resmi Devlet gazetesini vs.7 kullanacam. nce unu belirtmek istiyorum ki, Bulgaristan'da, Osmanl hakimiyetinden ayrlmasndan, bamszln kazandktan sonra iki devlet ynetim biimi uygulanmtr: 1. Monarizm (1879-1946) 2. Cumhuriyet (1946'dan bugne dein). Birinci dnemde Bulgaristan'n devlet ve toplum yaps, 1879'da Tirnovo'da kabul edilen Anayasa ile dzenlenmitir, bu Anayasa a iin olduka demokratik niteliktedir. O zamana dein Avrupa politik dnn ve uygulamalarn bulularn gz nnde bulundurulmutur. zellikle insan hak ve zgrlklerine nem verilmitir. Bulgaristan anayasal monarizm ilan edilmitir. Devlet Bakan makamna nce Prens Aleksandir Batemberg (1879-1876), sonra Ferdinand I
2. Tatarl I., Deloto na Atatrk votsenkata na bilgarskite ueni ot perioda 1919-1939 g. (1919-1939 Dneminde Atatrk'n Bulgar Bilim Adamlar Tarafndan Deerlendirilmesi). -"Balkanistika" N 1, Bulgar Bilimler Akademisi Balkan lkeleri Aratrmalar Enstits, Sofya, 1986, s. 292-308. Atatrk ve reformlarnn Bulgaristan'da Deerlendirilmesi stne.- X. Trk Tarih Konegresi, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler, c. VI, TTKB, Ankara 1994, s. 2812-2849. Tatarl I., kinci Dnya Sava ncesi Bulgar Basnnda Atatrk ve Reformlar. I. Byk Bulgar Toplumcusu, Yazar ve Gazetecisi Todor Kojuharov'un Gzyle Mustafa Kemal. Atatrk Aratrma Merkezi Dergisi, c. XIII, Temmuz 1997, s. 38, s. 451464. Tatarl I., Sava Sonras Dneminde Atatrk ve Reformlarnn Bulgaristan'da Deerlendirilmesi stne (1944-1990). XI. Trk Tarih Koenegresi, Ankara 5-9 Eyll 1990, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler, c. VI, TTKB, Ankara 1994, s. 2603-2614. Tatarl I.T., En Yeni Zamanda Bulgaristan-Trkiye Dostluk likilerinin Fikir Yn. III. Uluslararas Trk Kltr Kongresi, 25-29 Eyll 1993 Ankara. BulgaristanTrkiye yi Komuluk, Dostluk ve birlii likilerinin Geliiminde Yeni Bir Aama. Hak ve zgrlk, s. 9, 18 ubat 1993. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n Balkanlarda ibirlii ve Dostluk Politikas. Uluslararas kinci Atatrk Sempozyumu, 9-11 Eyll 1991, Ankara. Retrospeksiya na vinnata politika na Republika Turtsiya. ot distansiyata na vremeto (Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin D Politikasnn Rejonstruksiyonu. Zaman Mesafesinden) Prava ei svobodu, S. 28, 22 Temmuz 1998. Bulgar Parlamentosu'nun "Stenogratski dnevnitsi" bal altnda srekli stenograf gnlkleri (ig), bunlara ekler ve ayrca da resmi "Drjaven vestnik" (Devlet Gazetesi) aynlanmaktadr.

3.

4. 5.

6. 7.

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Saks-Koburg-Gotski (1887-1908) ar sfatyla (1908-1918) ve Boris III (1918-1943) almlardr. Onun lmnden sonra da Simeon II zamannda regentlik ynetimi uygulanmtr (1943-1946). Kralclk ilkeleriyle parlamentarzim arasnda bir balans, bir birlik ve btnlk aranmtr. Bir yandan devlet bakanna genelde lkenin i ve d politikasnn ynetimi, silahl kuvvetlerin kumandanl, Babakann atamas gibi yksek yetkiler tannmaktadr. te yandan seim yolu ile gelen ok partili bir parlamento, lkenin yasa organdr, yrtme gc parlamenter kontrol altnda bulundurulmaktadr. Anayasada glerin yasa, yrtme ve yarglama olmak zere ayrm, esaretin yasa, insan haklar ve zgrlkleri ilkeleri kabul edilmitir. Ortodoks hristiyanlk devlet dini ve teki dinlere zgrlk tannd halde, genelde Bulgaristan laik bir devlettir8. yle ki, Devlet Bakan, Bakanlar Kurulu ile birlikte Parlamento, temel devlet gc merkezlerinden birini oluturmaktadr. lkenin i ve d politikasnn oluum ve geliiminde byk rol oynamaktadr. Halkn idaresini ve bamszln ifade etmektedir. Bu adan Atatrk'n ve Modern Trkiye'nin Bulgar Parlamentosu' nda deerlendirilmesi, eitli politik formasyonlarn, glerin yanam ve pozisyonlarnn aklanmas bakmndan byk nem tamaktadr. Bu konuya baz aratrmalarda fragmenter olarak deinilmitir. Fakat bir btn olarak Atatrk'n ve Modern Trkiye'nin deerlendirilmesi ele alnmamtr. Nitekim bildirimin konusu da budur. ki Dnya Sava arasndaki dnemde Mustafa Kemal'in kiilii ve tutumu, Trkiye'nin i ve d politikas Bulgaristan'n Millet Meclisi almalarnda -gerek parlamenter komisyonlarda, gerekse genel oturumlarda- geni yer almaktadr. Bu da ok doaldr. ki komu lke arasnda pek ok ortak sorunlar vardr. Bunlarn aratrlmas ve zme balanmas gerekmektedir. Atatrk ise bunlara damgasn vurmutur. Btn bu sorunlar geni monografik aratrmalara konu olabilir. Ben bildirimde bu yllarda Bulgaristan'n Millet Meclisi'nde geni tartmalara konu olan baz temel sorunlara deineceim. Sava sonras yllarnda birok bakmdan Bulgaristan ile Trkiye kader kardeleridir. Her iki lkenin halklar Birinci Dnya Sava'na srlmtr. Sava sonras dneminde yenilgiye urayan devletler arasnda bulunmaktadrlar. Birine Neuilly Anlamas, dierine Sevres Anlamas dayatlmak istenmitir. zellikle 29 Eyll 1918 tarihli Selanik ve 30 Ekim Mondros Silah Brakmndan sonra, stanbul'daki Mttefik Komiserleri, Merkez Glerle, bu arada Bulgaristan ve Trkiye arasndaki diplomatik ilikileri yasak etmilerdir. Bundan dolay iki lke arasndaki direkt diplomatik ilikilerin yeni batan kurulmas gerekmektedir. Bu amala gizli, yar resmi, sonra da resmi giriimlerde bulunulmutur. Bizzat Mustafa Kemal ve Aleksandir Stamboliyski Trk-Bulgar dostluk ve ibirliine byk nem vermilerdir. Mustafa Kemal daha 24 Ekim 1919'da Trakya-Paa li kumandanlarndan Cafer Tayyar ve Arif Bey'e
Bk. Blgarski konstitutsii i konstitutsionni proekts (Bulgar Anayasalar ve Anayasa Taanlar) Drl: V. Metodiev, L. Stoyonv, Sofya (S.) 1990, s. 20 vd.

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kadar direktiflerinde Bulgarlarla ibirlii yaplmasn tlemektedir, Bulgar dostlarna selamlarnn ulatrmasn dilemektedir9. San Remo konferansnda Dou ve Bat Trakya'nn Yunanistan'a verilmesi kararma kar Trkler ve Bulgarlar beraber sava vermektedirler. Cafer Tayyar Bulgar temsilcileriyle temasta bulunmu, hatta onun Yunanllara esir dmesinden sonra yzlerce Trk subay ve binlerce Trk askeri Bulgaristan'da snak ve konukseverlik bulmu, sonra da Trkiye'ye dnerek Ulusal Kurtulu Sava'na katlmtr. Gemilerle Anadolu'ya yardm gnderilmitir. Ankara'da TBMM'nin 23 Nisan 1920 tarihinde alndan bir hafta sonra, 30 Nisan 1920'de Mustafa Kemal Parlamento adna Franszca olarak Bulgaristan'n Babakan Aleksandir Stamboliyiski'ye bir mektup gndermi, TBMM nin kararlar ile tantrmtr10. Hakl olarak bu Yeni Trkiye ile Bulgaristan arasnda ilk diplomatik temas olarak saylmaktadr. 1921 Maysnda Aleksandir Stambolyiski'nin tleri stne BHP milletvekillerinden Angel Groskov Kundalov, Jandarma Yaveri Yzba Grigor Pisarev, tccar Paskal Ehev vs. katld bir heyet Trkiye'ye gnderilmitir. Ankara'da bizzat Mustafa Kemal Bulgar milletvekili, ismet nn de Jandarma yzbasyla grmler, baz cepheleri ziyaret etmilerdir. Bunu baka Bulgar heyetleri izlemitir. Sofya'da da bir zaman Ankara hkmetinin resmi temsilcisi olarak Mustafa Kemal'in yakn adamlarndan Cevat Abbas (Grer) bulunmutur. Bulgaristan'n Edirne Konsolosu T. Markov 25 Ocak 1923'de zmir'e gitmi. Onu Mustafa Kemal iki kez kabul etmitir. 28 ubat 1923 grmesi iki saat srmtr. Byk kumandan ve devlet adam ona yle demitir: "Bize Balkanlar'da dost bir halk lazmdr. Bulgar halk ise, corafi, politik ve ekonomik bakmdan bizim gereksinimlerimize en uygundur, iki halk arasnda bir dostluk bizi de, sizi de daha gl ve daha bamsz yapacaktr"". Bulgaristan'n Babakan, byk devlet adam Aleksandir Stamboliyski de 26 Ekim 1922 tarihli Millet Meclisi oturumunda, lkenin d politikasn sunarken Mustafa Kemal'e ve Trk halknn Ulusal Kurtulu Sava'na en yksek deer vermitir: "Yeniden incelenmesi gereken imdiki Yakn Dou sorunu zerinde duracam. Trkiye'nin, onun byk devlet, politika ve askeri faaliyetisi Kemal Paa'nn ahsnda hizmetini itiraf etmemiz gerekir. lme yarglanmasna sebep olan bir zamanki cretkarl, onun gayretleri ve etrafnda bulunanlarn gayretleri sonucunda biz bu 12 sorunun yeniden incelemeye getirildiini grmekteyiz" . Btn dnyadaki etkilerini belirtmitir: "Ankara, hakszlklara urayan mslman dnyas iin Mekke ve Medine'dir; hakszlklara urayan hristiyan dnyas
9. Gazi Mustafa Kemal, Nutuk-Sylev, Vesikalar-BElgeler., c. III AKDTYK, TTYK., TTKB Ankara 1989, s. 1893. 10. Velikov, St. Kemaliskata Revolutsiya i Blgarskata obtestvenost (1918-1922) Kemalist Devrimi ve Bulgar Kamuoyu (1918-1922) Sofya 1966, s. 61. 11. Ayn yapt, s. 75. 12. Stenografik Gnlkler, XIX AMM. III Dne, 70. Oturum, 26 Ekim 1922, s. 135.

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iin Kuds'tr. Ve eer hakszla urayan insanlk herhangi bir kimseye herhangi bir zaman yapt kaldrmas istiyorsa bu Ankara faaliyetilerine yaplmaldr"13. Byk analiz ve sentez gcne sahip olan Bulgar politika adam ve demokrat Aleksandir Srabloliyski byk asker ve devlet adam, ada Mustafa Kemal'in liderliinde Ulusal Kurtulu Sava'nn dnyada douraca sonular ve zellikle Versalle-Neuilly dzenini altst edeceini pekala sezmitir: "Anlamalarn revizyonu sorunu artk incelenmeye konulmutur; sizler ise hatrlyorsunuz ki, Trklerin gayretlerinden nce hatta revizyon sznn hatrlatlmasna bile olanak verilmiyordu. Revizyondan sz edilmemesine srar edenler bugn bu fikri en ok benimsemilerdir. Sevr Anlamasnn revizyonu ile bu anlamalarda yer alan btn ar maddelerin revizyonu gereklilik icab balyacaktr"14. stanbul'a doru Mustafa Kemal'in kumandanlnda ilerleyen Trk ordularnn karsnda Yunanistan'n Dou Trakya'y boalttn, Bulgaristan ile Trkiye ileride de hem hudut olacaklarn bildirmi ve iki devlet arasnda dostluu bir kez daha belirtmitir: "Byk glerin imdiye kadarki anlamalarna gre de Trkiye ilerde de bizim komumuz kalacaktr. Bizim onunla ilikimiz yalnz dostluk olabilir. Bizim ekonomik karlarmz onunla dostluk ierisinde yaamamz dikte etmektedir. Onun politik karlar da Avrupa'da Bulgaristan ile bar ierisinde, dostluk ierisinde yaamasn dikte etmektedir. Biz hogrmz, onun topraklarna el koymamak yolunda btn gereken delilleri vermi bulunuyoruz ve o bunda phe gsteremez..."13 Aleksandir Stamboliyski, bar, dostluk ve ibirliine ynelik d politikay btn Balkan devletlerine kar uygulamak istemitir. Bu adan Yunanistan'a da mnasebet almaktadr. Bu balamda yeni bir Yunanistan'a hitap etmektedir. Eski cinayetlerine dnmemesine armaktadr: Anadolu ve Trakya saldrganln kesinlikle yarglamaktadr: "imdi onu oradan kovdular. Hatta Trkler onlar kovmam olsalard dahi, bakalar 16 onlar kovacaklard. O arada kalamazd." Hatta Yunanllar Bat Trakya'dan geri ekilmeleri ve bar politikasna dnmelerini istemektedir. ki komu devlet arasnda diplomatik ilikilerin yenilecei gnlerde Bulgaristan'da askeri hkmet darbesi yaplmtr. Bunu, III. Komnist Enternasyonalin ve Sovyet Rusya'nn kkrtmalaryla yaplan Eyll ayaklanmas izlemi ve i gerginlii derinletirmitir, iki lke arasndaki diplomatik ilikilerin ihyas iki yl ertelenmi. Bu srada Lozan Konferans balam ve Bar Anlamasyla sonulanmtr. Yeni Trkiye artk
13. 14. 15. 16. Ayn kaynak, s. Ayn kaynak, s. Ayn kaynak, s. Ayn kaynak, s. 135. 135. 136. 135.

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andlamay yenilen bir devlet olarak deil, yenen, eit bir devlet konumundan imzalamtr. Bar koullarnda Kemalist devriminin yeni aamas balam, politik, ekonomik ve kltr alanlarnda, yeni hukuk devleti ve politik yaamda, her ynde gelimeye gereken btn devletlerle bar ve ibirlii politikas uygulanmtr, nihayet 1936 Montr Konferansyla her trl yabanc glerin mdahele kalntlar ortadan kaldrlmtr. Bulgaristan'da Prof. Aleksandir Tsankov'un hkmeti 9 Haziran 1923'ten 1926 ylna dein erkte kalmtr. D leri ve Mezhepler Bakan tannm asker ve politika adam Hristo Kalfov olmutur. politikasnda BHB hkmetlerinden tamamen ayrlan yeni hkmet, baz ar sac ve saldrgan partilerin gayretlerine ramen, Aleksandir Stamboliyski zamanndaki izolasyon politikasndan kmak hatt srdrlmtr. ki yl gergin grmelerden sonra Ankara'da 18 Ekim 1925 tarihinde Trkiye-Bulgaristan Dostluk Anlamas ve oturma Szlemesi imzalanmtr. Fakat ratifikasyonu Andrey Lyapef (1866-1933) hkemeti zamannda yaplmtr. Dileri ve Mezhepler Bakanlna tannm politika adam Atanas Burov (1875-1945) getirilmitir. XXI. AMM.nin 28 Mays tarihli 95 ve 96 oturumlarnda baz parti ve evrelerin temsilcileri antlamay eletirmi ve ratofikasyonuna kar kmlardr. Byle olduu halde, hkmet parlamentoda destek bulmu ve anlama tasvip edilmitir. Ulusal Liberal Parti'nin iki kanad da Aleksandir Tsankov ve Andrey Lyapev hkmetlerinin d politikalarn desteklemitir, zellikle bu partinin milletvekillerinden tannm toplumcu ve politika adam Dimo Krev (1884-1928) Mustafa Kemal'e ve Trk halknn Ulusal Kurtulu Savana yksek deer vermitir. O yle demitir: "Trk Cumhuriyeti'ni rahatna braknz da, Trkiye'nin tarihide yaamad bir ann, mutlak, tamamen yalnz bana diyeceim, uluslararas bamszlnn ilk gnlerini sevgiyle yaasn. Bu lke baka insanlardan gereksinimini duyacaktr. O zamanlar da gelecek, o zamanlar da basacaktr. Zaman abuk geecek. Memleket imdi tarihsel bir romantizm dneminde bulunmaktadr"17. Osmanl mparatorluu zamanndan miras kalan milliyetler ve dinler mozaiini gznnde bulunduran Bulgar milletvekili ulusal sorunda kemalistlere hak vermektedir: "Siz sanyor musunuz ki bu dinler, milliyetler -bunlara Trk dinsel tarikatlarn da katarsak- mozaii, Trkiye ve dinleri milliyet sayan bir anlay bugn daha fazla tahamml edilebilinir mi?" 18 Bu balamda Lozan Anlamasnda aznlklarn dinlere gre milliyet sayld anlayn da belirtmitir. Belki de Balkanlar'da ilk kez Dimo Krev, Halklar Cemiyetindeki tartmalardan ilham alarak ulusal devletlerin egemenlii, toprak btnl temelinde insan haklarn ve aznlklara dahil vatandalarn haklar tezini savunmutur. Bu ilke, kinci Dnya Sa17. Stenografik Gnlkler, XXI AMM. III. Muntazam Dnem, 94. Oturum, 25 Mays 1926, s. 1863. 18. Ayn kaynak.

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vandan sonra, Birlemi Milletler rgt ve Avrupa Birliinin uluslararas belgelerinde temel prensiplerden biri olmutur19. Millet Meclisinde Bulgaristan-Trkiye Dostluk anlamasn, kendisinin Dileri ve Mezhepler Bakanl zamannda imzalayan Hristo Kalfof Parlamentoda raporcu olarak arzetmitir. Bu diplomatik belgeye byk deer vermitir. O anlamann imzalanmasnn motifleri zerinde durmutur. O yle demitir: "Nedenler unlardr: Yneticilerinin ahsnda Trklerin, 1922 yl Kasmnda onlarn silahlarnn kazand zaferle grlerinde derin deiiklikler oldu, onlarla savata bulunan ve onlarla byk savaa katlmayan lkeler iin nemli sonular veren grler benimsediler"20. Bunlar ifadesini imzaladklar anlamalarda buldular. Bunlarn balcalar, kapitlasyon rejimini kaldrmak, tam eit koullarla andlama imzalamaktr. Bu, Bulgaristan Trkiye Dostluk Anlamasnda da grlmektedir. rnein, bundan nceki dnemlerde, XX. yzyln bandan beri askda kalan sorunlarn bir Prokol'le zlmesidir. Bu, salkl ve srekli bir barn ve dostulun gvencesidir. Babakan tannm devlet adam Andrey Lyapev de zetinde yle demitir: "Ben imdiye kadar hatipleri ve onlarn eletirilerini dinledim ve msadenizle byk bir memnuniyetle unu belirtmeliyim ki, hibiri bu anlamalarla tam raz olmayan anlamda bizim Gney-Dou komumuzla, Bulgar halknn en iyi ilikiler isteiyle eretik bir fikir ifade etmemitir"21. Protokol'n getirdii zmlerle ilgili kesinlikle unu belirtmitir: "Eski durumu nasl geri evirebiliriz? Sizden hibiriniz bu sorunla ilgili ne yaplabileceini gsteremedi, ne de gsterebilir, ne de gstermek istemedi; ben dahasn da syleyeceim: kovulan ahalinin yerlerine yeniden yerlemesi iin are aramak arzu edilir birey deildir. Bu, halklar iyi bir sonuca hibir zaman grlemez"22. Onun fikrince, Anlama ve Protokol faktik bir durumu biimlendirmektedir. Sonra 1913 olaylar ve Birinci Dnya Sava sonundaki sreler zerinde durmutur. Bat Trakya'nn Neuilly Anlamasna gre Byk Glere, fakat sonra Yunanistan'a verildiini, Yunanllar bu blgeyi, Dou Trakya'y ve stanbul'u almak amacyla kullanmak istediklerini, fakat Sakarya'dan sonra, Mustafa Kemal'in zaferinden sonra Anadolu'dan ayrldklarn ve Dou Trakya'dan aynlmalarn belirtmitir. Anlamann imzalanmasnn salkl bir manta dayandn ve gereklere uygun olduunu bir kez daha kaydetmitir. Oturma Szlemesine de yksek deer vermitir. Bu balamda gene Mustafa Kemal'in ynetiminden sz etmektedir. Bulgaristan Baba19. Bk.: Tatarl ., Zatita na Pravata na Maltsinsvata (Vtrena i Mejdunarrodnopravna uredba) (Aznlk Haklarnn Savunusu) ( ve Uluslararas Hukuk Dzenlemesi), "Demokratieski progled", s. 1 (1996) Sofya s. 377-400. Ulusal Aznlklar Haklar ereve Anlamas. "Hak ve zgrlk", No. 12 25.3.1998, No. 13 1.4.1998, No. 14 15.3.1998. 20. Stenografik gnlkler XXI AMM., III. Muntazam Dnem, 94. oturum, 5 Mays 1926, s. 1871. 21. Ayn kaynak, s. 1875. 22. Ayn kaynak, s. 1875.

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kanna gre, anlamalarnn imzalanmasnn balca sonular unlardr: 1. Bulgaristan'da hukuk dzenini salamlatracaktr, zellikle mlkiyeti gznnde bulundurmaktadr. 2. Yksek gmrk vergileri kaldrlacaktr. 3. Komulardan biriyle btn mnakaalar ortadan kaldrlacak, her iki lke arasnda itimat kurulacak, her trl phe kaldrlacak. Bunlar Babakana gre, ok nemlidir. 4. TBMM, dnemi sonunda bulunmaktadr. BTDA'nin ratifikasyonunu yapmak niyetindedir. zet olarak yle demitir: Bizim almalarmz, dnyada barn salamlatrmas iin kayg gsteren btn devlet adamlar tarafndan en adilane bir biimde deerlendirilecektir. Bu trde her anlama durumun salamlamasna yararl olacaktr. Bugn Bulgaristan'n, endiesi olmayan salam bir devlet olmaktan byk ihtiyac vardr. Bu ynde biz Gney-Dou komumuz ile kabul ettiimiz bu anlamalarla gitmekteyiz. Biz bu istikamette kararl olarak btn teki komularmzla da hareket edeceiz. Bizim bu hareketimiz adilane deerlendirilecektir. mit ettiimiz sonular en iyi olmaktan baka olamaz"23. BTDA.nin ve Oturma Prokol'nn imzalanmasndan be yl, onaylanmasndan da drt yl sonra, Ankara'da 6 Mart 1929'da Trkiye ile Bulgaristan Arasnda Tarafszlk, Uzlatrma, Yargsal zm ve Hakemlik Anlamas (TBUHA) imzalanmtr. ay sonra XXII. AMM.nde Andrey Lyapev Hkmeti tarafndan oylamaya sunulmutur. Anlama Parlamento'nun 23, 27 ve 28 Mays tarihlerinde 101, 102 ve 103. oturumlarnda incelenmitir. Anlamann Onaylama Yasa tasars milletvekillerinden Hristo Silanov tarafndan okunmutur. Parlamento'da Demokratik Sgovors partiler koalisyonun ounluu vardr. O anlamay Bulgar-Trk ilikilerinde bir aama saymaktadr. XXII. AMM.nde, koalisyona katlan gmen Trakya rgt milletvekilleri, bundan nceki Parlamento'da olduu gibi, bu kez de, BTUYHA'ya kar kmlardr. Onlarn grlerini Dimitir Popnikolov ileri srmtr. Onun konumas adeta saldr niteliini almtr. Trkler ve Yunanllar dman ilan edilmitir. Trakya, Bulgar yurdunun kopmaz bir paras, her zaman bir srf Bulgar blgesi saylmtr. Konumas, Dileri ve Mezhepler Bakan tannm politika adam ve banker Atanas Burov'un sert yantna uramtr. Elementer popler tarih bilgilerine dayanan konumay rtm ve parlamento dzeyi altnda ve politik bakmdan muzir bulmutur. Ulusal Liberal Parti milletvekillerinden V. Kozniki anlamay iki devlet arasnda ilikilerin nemli bir baars saymtr. O yle devam etmitir: Biz bu anlamay sevinle karlyoruz ve komumuz olan Cumhuriyete ulu reformcusunun rejiminde yeni ekonomik ve kltr gelimesinde byk baarlar dileriz; Gazi Mustafa Kemal dnyay dahisiyle hayran etti o lkesini slah etti. Savatan yenilgiyle kan memleketinde halkn galip zirvesine ykseltmitir24.
23. Stenografik Gnlkler, XXII AMM. II. M. Dnem, 101. Oturum, 23 Mays 1929, s. 2305. 24. Ayn kaynak, s. 2335.

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Milletvekillerinden G. Vasilev anlamaya byk nem vermitir. Bulgaristan'n savata ok kayplar verdiinden zlmtr, fakat Trkiye'nin ok daha byk kayplar verdiini belirtmitir. Byle oldu halde Trkiye kendisini toparlam ve her alanda kalknmaktadr. Bu balamda G. Vasilev u gerei saptamtr: "...unu belirtmeliyiz ki, Trkiye bize bakarak ok daha byk kayplar vermitir. Ben size beyan etmek istiyorum ki, size inanla konuuyorum. Bugn karmzda baka bir Trkiye bulunmaktadr. Bu, 1912 Trkiye'si deil; bu hatta 10 yl nceki Trkiye deil. Bu, Abdl Hamid'in ve onun ecdadnn zamannn imparatorluunda olduu gibi deil, imdi olumakta olan gerekten bir Trk ulusu imdi tamamen baka temeller zerinde konsolide olan bir Trk devletidir"25. O Trkiye'deki kkl deiikliklerin etkenlerini aratrmtr. Bulgaristan'a bakarak bunlarn balcalar unlardr: "Trkler iki olumlu eyden faydalanmlardr: topraklarndan, Kk Asya gibi bir materikten ve dier yandan gerekten kendilerinin Cumhurbakan, Gazi Mustafa Kemal gibi yeni bir insandan yeni bir devlet adamnn varlndan"26 konumasnn devamnda G. Vasilev Atatrk'n baz ok nemli izgilerini belirtmitir: "Bildiiniz gibi, Mustafa Kemal burada atee militeyi olarak bulunmutur, biraz Bulgarca bilmektedir, Bulgar toplumu ve Bulgar ordusu ile temaslar vardr, bu biz Bulgarlar, ona Avrupa'da olduundan daha fazla tanmak olanan verdi. O, 1908'den sonra tandmz Gen Trk tipinden deildir. Gen Trkler eski Trkler'den mparatorluu o zamana dein yneten Sultan oligarisinden nemli dende farklayorlard. Fakat Mustafa Kemal her ihtimalde bambaka, Gen Trkler'den de bambaka bir niteliktedir; Mustafa Kemal Trk halkn kurtard; kendisinden nce kimsenin yapamad bir biimde, onlar son bar anlamasnn en iyi koullarnn kazanlmas iin areler buldu; Mustafa Kemal Trk kadnn kurtard; Mustafa Kemal Trk yurttan, mlk sahibini, Trk sanayicisini yaratt; benim kanatimce Mustafa Kemal'in yapt en byk reform, Latincenin kabuldr. Benim mtevazi, fakat samimi kanmca memlekette yapt en byk, en verimli devrimdir..."27 Yeni alfabe Trk ulusuna ve yeni kuaklara kolaylk yaratacaktr, Avrupa halklarna Trk dilini renmelerine, on yzyllk kltrlerini renmelerine yardm edecektir. G. Vasilev baz ok deerli, evristik nitelikte dnceler ileri srmtr. Onun kanaatine gre, ancak Bulgarlarla Trkler bir btn olarak Asya ile Avrupa arasnda kpr olabilirler, iki ktay corafi ve ekonomik bakmndan birletirebilirler. Bu adan ve her bakmdan anlamaya deer vermi ve desteklemitir. Parlamenter tartmalarnn sonunda, Andrey Lyapev'in koalisyon Hkmeti'nin Dileri ve Mezhepler Bakan, byk demokrat ve devlet adam Atanas Burov geni ve esasl bir konuma yapmtr. Milletvekillerinin konumalar zerinde durmu, muallefetin iddialarn rtm, so25. Ayn kaynak, s. 2336. 26. Ayn kaynak, s. 2336. 27. Ayn kaynak, s. 2342.

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rular yantlamtr. Uyumu bozmak isteyen birka muhalif milletvekillerinin hatal pozisyonlarn iddetle elitirmitir, memleketin byk ulusal karlar ile baz blgesel ve zel karlarn arasndaki ilkesel ayrm vurgulamtr: "Bulgaristan Parlamentosu'nda ve Bulgaristan'n ynetiminde hepimiz Bulgar politikas yapmalyz. Trakya politikas deil, Makedonya deil, Dobruca politikas deil"28. Gerek 1925'de imzalanan anlama ve aneksinin, gerekse yeni antlamann sorumluluunu kabul etmektedir. O BTDA'nin iki lke arasndaki sorunlarn kompromis sonucunda imzalandn belirtmitir: "Bu kompromisler (uzlama) in faydas udur ki, bu karlkl zverilerle, iki devlet arasnda normal dostluk ilikilerinin ihya edilmesine engel olan salksz bir durumu ortadan kaldrlmtr. te Bulgaristan'n baars bundadr, ite Trk Cumhuriyeti'nin baars da bundadr. Yenilen yok, yenen yok; aldatlm yok, aldatan yoktur; iki akll hkmet vardr. Onlar, kendi devletlerinin doru deerlendirilmesi sayesinde bu anlamayla aralarnda salkl bir durum yaratmlardr ve aralarndaki daha byk bir yaknlk ve en byk barl ibirlii yolunda daha da gelimeler olanaklar kazandrmlardr..."29 Trakya gmen rgtlerine dayanan milletvekillerinin temelsiz ve tehlikeli iddialarn yarglayan Dileri ve Mezhepler Bakan Atanas Burov gerek Bulgaristan'da, gerekse Trkiye'de iki devlet arasndaki dostluk ve ibirlii politikasn kmaza sokmak isteyen gleri iddetle eletirmi ve bunlarn ne tehlikeli sonular dourabileceini vurgulamtr: "Eer Trk hkmeti onlarn aklna uysayd, burada biz sizin aklnza uysaydk nasl bir durum ortaya kacakt? Benim tasvir ettiim olacakt sessiz bir harp durumu. Ben sizin hepinize bir ar da bulunuyorum: ya nmakaal sorunlarnz olan bir devletle anlaacaksnz ya bunlar harple zeceksiniz yahut da bar isteyen bir devletin karlarna uygun olmayan bir gerginlik ve d ilikilerde salkl olmayan bir durum kalacaktr. Bu lemden baka k yolu yoktur"30. ngilizlerin izledii "splendidi izoleyin", kendi glerine mutlak gvenlik politikas Bulgaristan gdemez. Byle romantik saflk politikas devleti soyutlamaya, btn komularyla iyi olmayan ilikilere sevketmektedir. O, ada sorunlarn gemiin kanl prizmas asndan zlemeyecei kansndadr. Yalnz akll insanlar ve akll devlet adamlar dostluk ve ibirliini semektedirler. Nitekim Atanas Burov yeni ada uluslararas, insansever bir politika yanlsdr. Bulgar-Trk ilikilerini bu adan deerlendirmektedir. te byk devlet adam Andrey Lyapev Hkmeti ve zellikle Dileri ve Mezhepler Bakan byk politika adam atanas Burov gibi kiilerin srarl ve sistemli almalar sayesinde Bulgaristan'da iki komu arasndaki dostluk, bar iyi komuluk ve ibirlii d politikas hatt stnlk kazanmtr. XXII. AMM BTTUYHA.ni kabul etmitir. Byle28. Ayn kaynak, s. 2342. 29. Ayn kaynak, s. 2342. 30. Kemal Atatrk, Izbrani reci (Seilmi Nutuklar) Sofya 1981, s. 279-280.

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likle Bulgaristan-Trk ilikilerinde yeni bir dneme girilmitir. Bu anlama 1934 ylnda daha be yl uzatlmtr. Bundan sonra da Bulgar Parlamentosu'nda zaman zaman BulgarTrk ilikileri konu olmutur. Bulgaristan'n politik yaamnda nemli deiiklikler olmutur. 29 Temmuz 1931'de Andrey Lyapev hkmeti son bulmutur, iktidara Babakan olarak Aleksandir Malinov (1867-1938) hkmeti gelmitir. O da Halk Blok koalisyon hkmetidir. Drt ay sonra Babakan Nikola St. Moanov (1872-1951) olmutur. Bulgaristan ile Trkiye arasndaki dostluk ilikileri srdrlmtr. Bizzat Babakann ynetiminde bir Hkmet delegasyonu Trkiye'yi ziyaret etmi. Bizzat Atatrk'le Nikola Muanov arasnda grmeler olmutur. Mustafa Kemal Trk-Bulgar dostluk ilikilerinin geliimine yeni g vremitir. 21 Aralk 1931 tarihinde yle demitir: "Bulgaristan'da geirdiim gzel (ho) gnleri unutmayacam. Bulgar halknn dostu idim, dostuyum ve dostu kalacam. ocukluumdan beri Bulgar halkna sonsuz sevgi beslemekteyim. Selanik'de her zaman Bulgar ocuklaryla arkadatm. Bulgarlarn her mutsuzluu bana tasavvur edilmez istirap ektiriyordu. Her zaman Bulgaristan'a yardm etmek iin mmkn hereyi yapmmdr. Trkiye ve Bulgaristan dost olmaldrlar. Bulgaristan'a kim kar ise, o Trkiye'ye de kardr"31. Nikola Muanov'un Hkmeti 19 Mays 1934'e dein devam etmitir. Fakat askeri hkmet darbesi yaplmtr. Devlet ynetimine Babakan Kimon Georgiyev'in hkmeti gelmitir. Takriben bir yl sonra tekrar ok partili politik yaama geilmitir. Bu dnemde de Bulgar-Trk dostluk ve ibirlii ilikileri devam etmitir. Baz konular zaman zaman eitli vesilelerle Bulgar Parlamento'sunda konu olmutur. Bunlarn arasnda zellikle Mft (eriat) Mahkemelerinin Yetkilerinin Snrlandrlmas Yasa Tasars'nn incelenmesi ve kabul edilmesiyle ilgili parlamento tartmalar birok ynden nemlidir. Biz baz ettlerinizde bu konu zerinde durmu bulunuyoruz. Bu soruna XXIV. AMM.nin I. Olaanst Dneminin 8, 13, 14 Temmuz 1938 tarihli 28., 29. ve 30. oturumlar hasredilmitir. Bizim konumuzla ilgili olarak bu tartmalarda Atatrk'n bir kumandan ve devlet adam olarak, modern Trkiye'nin deerlendirilmesidir. Bu dnemde artk Atatrk devrimlerinin oluumu ve geliimi tamamen kesinlemi, yeni Terkiye'nin i ve d politikas byk baarlar kazanmtr. Bunlar Bulgar Parlamentosu'ndaki tartmalara da yansmaktadr. imdi de eitli partiler bu sorunlara kendi alarndan mnasebet almaktadrlar. Atatrk'n kiilii ve Devlet kuruculuu alanndaki devrimleri ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin i ve d politikasn en doru tannm politika adamlarndan, toplumcu ve byk bilim adam Prof. Petko Stoyanov deerlendirmitir. O yle demitir: "B.B. milletvekilleri sayg ve iyi niyet gstererek unu ifade etme31. Stenografk Gnlkler, XXIV AMM. 1938 c. II, s. 8124.

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liyiz ki son 20 yl iersinde Trkiye Cumhuriyeti muazzam bir ilerleme yapt... Biz, Trk halknn ve Cumhuriyeti'nin ahsnda -tekrar ediyorumtarihin, gericilik olarak, brakt hereyden zgr bir ulus karsndayz. Geri tarihsel artklarn ortadan kaldrlmas iin -ou kez aclarla- eitli yntemler uygulanm ve uygulanmaktadr; fakat uluslararas rekabetler, birbiriyle yarlar ve blge taksimat alam olan, 15 milyondan fazla nfusu bulunan bir lkede, ulusal kstek engel olan hereyi bertaraf etmenin kolay birey olmadn bilmek gerek. Bir ulusal birlie ulaabilmek iin pek ok araca ihtiya vardr. Trk halknn, gerekten de lkeyi ykselterek bugn Yakn-Dou'da, Trk devletinin ahsnda, en modern ve her trl zverilere hazr, kltr ve ilerleyiin temsilcisi yapan yneticilerinin idealizmini tanmak gerek". O modern Trkiye'de sanayiin ve zellikle ky ekonomisinin byk baarlarn belirtmitir. Bu ynden devletilik yanam ve ilkesinin byk nemi olmutur.Petko Stoyanov Bulgar-Trk Dostluu Cemiyetinin bakanln uzun zaman yapmtr. O yle demitir: ...Ben iddia ediyorum ve sanyorum ki, bunlar kimse rtemez ve siz, hepiniz kabul edeceksiniz ki, btn nemli sorunlar zdmz, Trkiye Cumhuriyetinden baka komumuz yoktur ve yneldiimiz gerektii tarihsel izgiye hemen hemen gelmi bulunmaktayz. yle ki, dzenlenecek ne varsa, bunlar tarihsel esasndan fazla, gerek yaam ve gerek kar temeli zerinde yaplacaktr... Bizim komu olmamz ve bu halk ile her zaman komu kalmamz daimi bir politika gerektirecektir"32. Onun kansna gre, Trkiye'nin zengin kaynaklar, nemli corafi konumu ve nemli bir ekonomik birim olmasnn iki devlet arasndaki ilikilerin gelimesinde byk nemi vardr. zetleyerek diyebiliriz ki, Bulgaristan'n yksek yasama ve anayasal arlk devletinin en yksek merkez ynetim kurumlarndan biri olan Millet Meclisi'nde iki dnya sava arasndaki dnemde, Bulgraistan-Trkiye bar, iyi komuluk, ibirlii ve dostluk ilikileri sistemli ve srekli konulardan biri olmutur. ok partili parlamenterizm koullarnda eitli politik gler bu sorunlara kar kendi konumlarndan mnasebet almlardr. Genelde Bulgar Parlamentosu Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'e yksek bir kumandan, Trk Ulusal Kurtulu Sava'nn lideri, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurucusu ve lmne kadar deimez Cumhurbakan, modern Trkiye'nin i ve d politikasnn mimar, ada boyutlu bir devlet ve politika adam olarak ve yeni Trkiye'nin oluumu ve geliimine en yksek deer vermitir. Bu bakmdan Bulgaristan Balkanlar'da ve belki dnyada birinci yerlerden birini almaktadr. Atatrk ve Stamboliyski'nin temellerini attklar Bulgar-Trk dostluu kinci Dnya Sava yllarnda bile korunmu ve Sava sonras yllarnda, Bulgaristan'da totaliter politik ve toplumsal dzen dnemindeki baz mstesnalarla, devam etmitir. Bulgaristan'da totalitarzmden demokrasi ve piyasa ekonomisine, plurastik bir kltr dnemine gei yllarnda yeni boyutlar almtr.
32. Ayn kaynak, s. 8124.

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KALANLARIN YKS (1923 Mbadele Szlemesinin birinci ve zellikle de ikinci maddelerinin uygulanmasndan alnacak dersler)*
Prof. Dr. Baskn ORAN** I. GR 1923 Nfus Mbaledelesinin Tarihsel Ortam Trkiye ile Yunanistan arasnda yaplan 1923 zorunlu nfus mbadelesi1, Birinci Dnya Savann sonunda Mttefiklerce desteklenen Yunan igalinin bir sonucu olan Trk Kurtulu Savann (1919-22) bitiminde toplanan Lausanne Bar Konferansnn bir parasdr. 'Trk ve Rum Nfuslarnn Mbadelesine likin Szleme ve Protokol2, "Yakn Dou Sorunlar zerine Lausanne Konferans, 1922-23" biiminde adlandran konferansta kabul edilen on sekiz belgeden biridir.
* ** 1. 2. (ngilizce'den evirenler: Ar. Gr. Atay Akdeveliolu ve Ar. Gr. Dr. zlen Knek). .. Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi retim yesi. Bundan sonra ksaltlarak, sadece "Mbadele" olarak yazlacaktr. Bundan sonra ksaltlarak, sadece "Szleme" olarak yazlacaktr. Szlemenin ikinci maddesinde sz geen karlkl etabli'lere ilikin olarak bu makalede kullanacam terminoloji hakknda bir aklamada bulunmak istiyorum. Szlemenin ikinci maddesinin a fkras, istanbullu etabli'leri (ve sonuta iki adada oturanlar da) ifade etmek iin "Yunanllar" (Greeks) terimini kullanmtr nk Bat dillerinde baka bir seenek yoktur. Bu terim yerine, Osmanl mparatorluunda ve Trkiye'de yaayan, Yunanca'nn bir diyalektini konuan Bizans kkenli (neredeyse srf) Ortodoks nfusu belirtmek iin "Rumlar" terimi tercih edilecektir. (Trke'de 1820'den beri Rum terimi, Yunanistan dnda yaayan ve bu lkenin vatanda olmayan tm Hellenler iin kullanlmaktadr). Bu yaplrsa ncelikle, "Rum"un bir Yunanistan vatanda olan "Yunanl"dan (Trke'de Yunanl kelimesi "lyonyal"dan tretilmitir) fark ortaya konulabilir, ikincisi ve daha nemlisi, bu ekilde bir kullanm tercih edilmelidir nk szkonusu aznlk kendisini "Yunanl" biiminde deil, "Rum" (Romal [Dou] anlamnda Romios/ Romioi) olarak adlandrr. Bunun da nedeni, Yunanistan' gl biimde bir akraba devlet olarak benimsemi olsalar da soylarnn dorudan Roma-Bizans'tan geldiine inanmalardr. (Bkz. Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority of istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-74, second edition, Athens, Centre for Asia Minr

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Bu belgelerden (en nemlisi olan Lausanne Bar Antlamas da dahil olmak zere) on alts Konferans'n sonunda 24 Temmuz 1923'de, geriye kalan iki belge de (Konferans'n balamasndan yaklak iki ay sonra ve dier on alt belgenin imzalanmasndan da yaklak alt ay nce) 30 Ocak 1923'de imzaland. Bu iki belgeden biri szkonusu Szleme, dieri ise "Sava Esirlerinin Mbadelesi ve Sivil Tutuklularn ladesine likin Trk-Yunan Antlamasyd. Bunlarn konularnn "bar antlamasyla hibir ilgisi yok"tu, ama bunlar "mmkn olan en ksa zamanda ele alnmal"yd3. Bir dier deyile, erkenden imzalanmasnn da gsterdii gibi, Szleme Bar Antlamasnn bir n kouluydu. Szleme ve zellikle de zorunlu nitelii, 1990'larn zel konjonktrnde zel bir neme sahiptir. Ama, bu tarihsel deneyimin bugnn aznlk, mbadele ve mlteci konularna bir miktar k tutabilmesi iin nceden cevaplanmas gereken bir soru var: Mbadeleyi kim istedi, zorunlu olmasn kim istedi ve neden? 1) Her eyden nce, Mbadele ve onun zorunlu nitelii Mttefikler (zellikle ngiltere) tarafndan teklif edildi4.
Studies, 1992, s. 17). "Rum Ortodoks" yerine "Rum" teriminin tercih edilmesinin asl nedeni, Szlemenin ikinci maddesinin a fkrasnda Ortodoks kelimesine yer verilmemi olmas deil, Katolik veya Protestan Rumlarn (aznlk iinde ok az sayda bir aznlk oluturan bu gruba, bu makalede yer verilmeyecektir) varlklarna ramen, "Rum" teriminin daima "Ortodoks Rum"la ayn anlamda kullanlagelmi olmasdr. Dier yandan, Szlemenin ikinci maddesinin b fkras, Bat Trakyal etabli'itn ifade etmek iin "Mslmanlar" terimini kullanmtr nk mbadelenin yapld dnemde din kavram etni kavramndan ok daha nemlidir ve byk olaslkla Mttefikler ve Yunanistan Trklerle birlikte tm Mslmanlarn Yunanistan' terk etmesini salamak iin bu kullanm istemilerdir. Ayrca Trkiye de, Bat Trakya'da Trklerle birlikte dier Mslmanlarn da kalmas iin bunu istemitir. Buna ramen bu makalede baz nedenlerle, "Mslmanlar" terimi yerine "Mslman-Trkler" kullanlacaktr. Bunun ilk nedeni, Trklerin Osmanl mparatorluunun kurucu ve temel unsuru olmalar ve a fortiori, Millet Sisteminin tm Mslmanlar tek bir topluluk olarak kabul etmesiydi. Bunun doal sonucu, zellikle Balkanlarda "Trkler" ile "Mslmanlar"n ayn anlamda ve birbirleri yerine kullanlagelmesidir. (Dnemin Avrupallar tarafndan yaplan ok sayda haritada Osmanl mparatorluu "Trkiye" adyla gsterilmitir. Franszca sefaire Turc (Trk olmak) deyii, Mslman olmay ifade eder. Bu yzyln banda ili'ye g eden Araplar ve Filistinliler hl "Turkos" olarak adlandrlrlar). "Trkler" teriminin kullanlmasnn ikinci ve daha nemli olan nedeni, gnmzde yz on bin ksur kiiden oluan (yaklak yetmi bin etnik Trk, otuz be bin Pomak etnik kkenli Mslman, ve be bin Roman etnik kkenli Mslman'n bileimi olan) bu aznlk, ok derin dinsel inanca sahip olmasna ramen, zellikle 1980'lerden bu yana kendisini "Trk" olarak kabul etmekte ve Trkiye'yi tam bir akraba devlet biiminde grmektedir. Bu dncenin nedenleri otuz ikinci dipnotta ele alnacaktr. Aznlklar (ve Mbadele) Alt-Komisyonu Bakan Montagna'nn 10 Ocak 1923'de belirttiine gre. (Seha L. Meray, Lozan Bar Konferans, Tutanaklar, Belgeler, Takm I, C. I, Kitap 1, Tutanak No. 20, Ankara, Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi Yaynlan, 1969, s. 321. Egemenlik sorunlarnn ve Boazlarn grlmesinin ardndan, Konferans 1 Aralk 1922'de sava esirlerinin deiimini grmek zere topland. Ama, ngiliz Dileri Bakan ve konferansn bakan olan Lord Curzon, gndemde bulunmamasna ra-

3.

4.

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Lord Curzon mbadelenin zorunlu olmas gerektiini dnyordu nk, mbadele zorunlu olmazsa anlamay uygulamak aylarca srerdi. Mbadele kapsamndaki Trkler bir an nce Trakya'da ekime balamalyd, Yunanistan durmadan gelmeye devam eden mltecilere yer bulmak zorundayd; mbadeleye tab olan halkn geride brakt mallar iin tazminat demek de bylece daha kolay olacakt5. Bununla birlikte, btn bunlarn ardndaki asl neden, Mttefiklerin, aznlklar sorununa radikal bir zm bulunursa "yeni dnya dzeni"ni kurma sorunlarnn nemli lde azalacan dnmeleriydi. 2) Mbadeleyi arzulayan ikinci taraf Yunanistan'd nk hereyden nce, bozguna urayan Yunan ordusuyla birlikte Trkiye'den kaan Kk Asyal Rum mltecileri (o dnemde Yunanistan nfusunun drtte biri olan, bir milyon kadar insan) yerletirecei geni alanlara ihtiyac vard. Mbadelenin zorunlu niteliine gelince, Venizelos bunun gnll olmas gerektiini, ama zorunlu veya gnll, konuyu herhalkrda tartmaya hazr olduunu aklad. Venizelos iin asl nemli olan, istanbul'daki Rum nfusu (gayri mbadil olarak belirlenen blgedeki yz on bin kii sonuta mbadele edilemez olarak kararlatrld) zorunlu mbadele dnda tutmakt. nk diyordu Venizelos, Rum mltecilerinin says yle ok artacaktr ki, "Yunanistan ABD'den kendisine uygulad gmen kotasnda art yapmasn talep etmek zorunda kalacaktr"6. Tabii, Venizelos'un bir baka ve byk olaslkla daha nemli bir nedeni vard: Yunan irredantizminin (Megali dea, byk lk) ampiyonu olarak, uzun zamandan beri Yunan kamuoyunu "yonya" (Bat Trkiye) Yunan olacak lksyle besliyordu. imdi stanbul Rumlarnn mbadelesini Yunan halkna hazmettirmek ok zor olacakt nk bunun anlam aka Megali dea'dm ve hatta stanbul'dan ("kinci Roma", Kutsal Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikliinin bulunduu yer) vazgeilmesiydi7. Damen, Milletler Cemiyetinin Mlteciler Yksek Komiseri nl Dr. Nansen'in Trk ve Yunanl nfuslarnn mbadelesi konusunda bir rapor okuyacan aklad. Dr. Nansen'e gre Yakn Dou'da ve hatta Avrupa'da bansn ve ekonomik istikrarn salanabilmesi iin asl nemli olan konu bu sorundu. Dr. Nansen, Balca Mttefik ve Ortak Devletlerin temsilcileri tarafndan, bar antlamasn beklemeden acilen uygulanmak zere aznlklarn mbadelesi konusunda bir antlama hazrlamas iin stanbul'a davet edilmiti. Ayrca, Yunanistan hkmetinin resm onayn alan Dr. Nansen, Ankara hkmetiyle de konu zerinde az veya ok konumutu. Ankara da Dr. Nansen'e mbadele konusunda yapc bir tutuma sahip olduunu en az drt kez bildirmiti. (Meray, op. cit., Tutanak No. 8, s. 115-16). 5. Ibid, s. 123. 6. idem. 7. Konferansn sonraki aamalarnda Venizelos, zorunlu bir mbadele fikrini geri ekmeye alyor grnd ama bu tutumu gereki deildi ve byk olaslkla sadece bir diplomatik hareketti. "zel komite"deki (sonradan Aznlklar Alt-Komisyonu

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has, Patriklik kurumu byk olaslkla Yunanistan'daki Aynaroz'a tanacakt ve bu da kanlmaz olarak, iki rakip kurum (bamsz Yunanistan Kilisesi ile Ekmenik ve Primus inter Pares olan Patriklik) arasndaki srtmeyi mthi artracakt. Yunanistan'n tam Trk snrnda bulunan, nemli saydaki Trkn mbadele d tutulmasn kabul etmesine gelince, bu da Patrikhane'nin ve stanbul Rumlarnn ok nemli olan yerlerinde kalmas iin Venizelos'un demek zorunda kald bir fiyatt. 3) Mbadeleyi isteyen, hatta ok isteyen8, nc taraf da Trkiye'ydi. Trk heyetinin bakan smet Paa, bir mbadele olursa bunun stanbul ve zmir dahil olmak zere tm Trkiye'deki Rumlan kapsamasn istiyordu9. smet Paa, Bat Trakyal Mslman-Trklerin mbadele d braklmasn da ileri srd. smet Paa'nn tm Rumlarn gitmesi gerektii yolundaki dncesinin gerisinde yatan nedenler eitliydi: Bir kere, Hristiyan aznlklar Osmanllarn iilerine karmak iin Byk Devletler tarafndan kullanlan daima 1 numaral neden olmulard. kinci olarak, yaplacak bar antlamasnda "Aznlklarn Korunmas" balkl bir blm de bulunacakt ve bu adan, (en nemli gayri Mslim aznlk olan) Rumlardan mmkn olduunca kurtulmak bu "pozitif haklar"n olas mdahale etkisini en aza indirecekti. nc olarak, Rum aznln ve Patrikhane'nin igalci Yunan ordusuyla ibirliine ilikin anlar henz ok tazeydi ve Kemalistler, imdi ortam uygunken, Yunan irredantizminin hl srdrlebilecei umutlarn kesin biimde yok etmeye kararlydlar. Dier taraftan, tam ve zorunlu bir mbadele iin Trk isteinin arkasnda yatan dile getirilmemi bir neden vard: O dnemde Dou Avrupa ve Balkanlarn tm devletleri (zellikle yeni devletleri) gibi Trkiye de A'dan Z'ye bir ulus inas srecine girmeye hazrd ve bu giriiminde gayri Mslim aznlklar ciddi bir engel olarak deerlendiriyordu. smet Paa'nn Bat Trakyal Mslman-Trkleri mbadele d tutmak isteyiinin nedenine gelince, Trk heyeti bunu yle ifade etti: Milli
daha sonra da Mbadele) Trk delegesi olan Dr. Rza Nur, 1928'de yazd ve 1960'da aklanmak zere elyazmas halinde British Museum'a teslim ettii anlarnda, o srada Yunanistan hkmetinin mbadeleye kar kma olaslndan bahseder (Lausanne Konferans srasnda Venizelos hkmet yesi deildi). Bkz. Rza Nur, Hayat ve Hatratm, C. III, stanbul, Altnda Yaynevi, 1967, s. 1113. Mttefiklerin zorunlu mbadele nerisi Dr. Rza Nur iin ok ho bir srpriz olmutu. Anlarnda yle yazar: "Hayrette kaldm. Bu mbadele benim Trklk noktasndan esas emelim idi; fakat byle tarihte grlmemi bir eyi nasl teklif edeceim diye tedenberi dnp duruyordum. imdi kendi kendine ortaya geldi. Yani gkten dm minkudret oldu". Rza Nur, C. III, s. 1040. Meray, op. cit., s. 121.

8.

9.

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Misakmzn10 nc maddesi, Trklerin ounlukta olduu bu blgede plebisit yaplmasn ngrr. Burann kaderi henz belirlenmemitir. Dier taraftan Trkiye, bu rasyonel nedenin yansra, stanbullu Rumlarn Mbadele d tutulmalar artk kanlmaz olduuna gre, kendi snrna bitiik bu Yunan blgesinde stanbullu Rumlarla bir "simetri" oluturulmasn ister grnyordu". Mbadelenin Hukuksal/Sosyo-Politik Ynleri ve Sonular Szleme on dokuz maddeden ve bir protokolden olumaktayd. Ama, sz edilecek nemli iki ana maddesi vard: 1) Birinci maddeyle Szleme, kural zorunlu mbadele olarak koyuyor ve kesin olarak gidecekleri tanmlyordu: Trkiye'den Rum Ortodoks12 dinine mensup Trk uyruklaryla, Yunanistan'dan slam dinine mensup Yunan uyruklar. Bu maddenin sonucu olarak yz elli be bin alt yz otuz be Mslman Yunanistan' ve yz seksen dokuz bin dokuz yz on alt Rum Ortodoks Trkiye'yi terk etti13. Yukarda belirtildii gibi, Yunanistan bir milyonu akn mlteciye ev sahiplii yapmak zorundayd nk Austos 1922'de Yunan ordularnn yenilgisiyle ("Mikrasiatiki Katastrofi") Trkiye'den kaan bir milyon civarnda mlteciyi14 kabul etmek zorunda kalmt15. 2) kinci maddeyle Szleme, istisnay belirtiyor ve kalmalarna izin verilecek olanlar ("etabli") tanmlyordu: Trkiye'de 30 Ekim 1918'den nce stanbul Belediyesi snrlar iinde yerlemi olan stanbul Rumlar16, Yunanistan'da da Bat Trakya Mslman nfusu.
10. Meclisi Mebusan tarafndan 28 Ocak 1920'de kabul edilen bir bildiri olan Misak Milli, adil ve kalc bir bar iin minimum talepleri ieren bir belgeydi. Kemalistlerce bu belge, ulalmas gereken kutsal hedef olarak kabul edildi. 11. Bat Trakyal Trklerin mbadele d tutulmasn grmelerin hemen banda Lord Curzon nerdiinden, smet Paa krl km oldu. Bkz. Meray, op. cit., s. 124. 12. Bu nedenle, Mbadele Katolik veya Protestan Rumlar kapsamyordu. Trk heyeti "Trk vatanda Rumlar" ifadesini nermiti nk "Trkiye'de Yunan irredantizmini ortadan kaldrmak" istiyordu. (16 Ocak 1923 leden sonraki oturum, Meray, op. cit., Seri I, C. I, Kitap 2, Tutanak No. 4, s. 312). 13. C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities, London, Oxford University Press, 1934, s. 446. 14. imir kaanlarn saysnn yarm milyondan az olduunu ve bunlardan yz elli bin kadarn da 1919 sonrasnda Yunanistan'dan veya Rusya'dan Anadolu'ya g edenlerin oluturduunu sylemektedir. (Bilal N. imir, Sakarya'dan zmir'e, 1921-22, kinci basm, Ankara, Bilgi Yaynlan, 1989, s. 381.) 15. nc maddeye gre, mbadele konusu olan blgelerden 18 Ekim 1912'den sonra g edenler, birinci maddenin kapsamnda kabul edileceklerdi. 16. Bununla birlikte, birinci maddenin tersine, sadece Ortodoks Rumlar deil, stanbul'daki tm Rumlar mbadele d yani etabli olarak ilan edilmilerdi. Bunlarn bir ksm Yunan uyruu idi.

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kinci maddenin sonucunda yaklak yz otuz bin Mslman-Trk Bat Trakya'da ve yaklak ayn sayda Rum da istanbul'da kald. Alt ay sonra, Lausanne Bar Antlamasnn on drdnc maddesinin ikinci paragraf, anakkale Boaznn azndaki iki aday gvenlik nedeniyle Trkiye'ye verirken, Gkeada (mroz; Yunanca mbroz) ve Bozcaada (Yunanca Tenedos) adalarnn esas itibariyle Rum olan nfuslarn mbadele dnda brakt. 1920'de iki adada yaklak dokuz bin Rum yaamaktayd17. Birinci madde gmenler yaratt. Bu insanlardan, tayabilecekleri eyalar alp yaadklar yerleri terk etmeleri istendi. Geride braktklar mlklerinin e deerini, gittikleri akraba devletlerinde alacaklard. Bu gmenler pek ok nedenden dolay ac ektiler: nceden dnlemeyen pek ok sorun, Szlemenin uygulanmas srasnda ortaya kt ve sekiz yl sonraya kadar zlemedi. Bu insanlar vatanlarnda komularna ve anlarna kadar arkalarndaki hereyi terk etmek zorunda kaldlar. Bazlar yeni lkelerinde konuulan dili bile anlamyorlard18. Uzun zaman iki taraf da yeni vatandalar tarafndan yabanc gibi algladlar19. Dier yandan, byle kkten bir deiimin kanlmaz olarak yaratt saysz sorunlar, 10.6.1930 Ankara Antlamas mbadillerin zel ve kiilik haklaryla ilgili sorunlarn znceye kadar Trk-Yunan ilikilerini zehirledi ve bu ilikiler ancak bu tarihten sonra normale ve hatta dosta bir ilikiye dnd. kinci madde ulusal aznlklar yaratt. Kalmasna izin verilen bu insanlara, bar antlamas yapldnda "Aznlklarn Korunmas" ksmnda formle edilmi olan aznlk haklar verilmiti: Gayri Mslim Rumlar iin otuz yedinci maddeden krk drdnc maddeye kadar (temel olarak 1919 Polonya Aznlklar Anlamasndaki haklarn benzeri) ve Mslman17. Alexis Alexandris, "Imbros and Tenedos: A Study in Turkish Attitudes Toward Two Ethnic Greek Island Communities Since 1923", Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. VII, No. 1, Spring 1990, s. 27. 18. Sadece Trke konuan Karamanl Ortodokslar ve sadece Yunanca konuan baz Ege adalar Mslmanlar (zellikle Giritliler) gibi. 19. Yunanistan'a gitmek iin Trkiye'yi terk eden zellikle zmir ve stanbul'dan pek ok Rum Ortodoks, Yunanistan'daki Yunanllardan daha yksek bir toplumsal snfa mensuptular. Bu nedenle, otokton Yunanllar bu olay kskanlkla karladlar ve yeni gelenleri Turko Sporos (Trk dlleri) diye kmsediler. Dier yandan, onlar da kendilerini otokton Yunanllardan ayrdlar, izmirli Rumlar Nea Smirni'yi ve Panionion spor kulbn kurdular, istanbullu Rumlar Faliron'a yerletiler (hl burada yayorlar) ve AEK {Athletiki Enosis Konstantinopol) spor klbn desteklediler (hl destekliyorlar). Bir dier yandan, Trkiye'ye gitmek iin Yunanistan' terk eden ok saydaki Mslman'n alkanlklar, muhafazakar Anadolulu Trklerden daha liberaldi. Yerliler onlar "yar gavur" olarak adlandrdlar, muhacir olarak kmsediler ve iki grup arasnda uzun sre karma evlilik grlmedi.

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Trkler iin karlkllk yaratan krk beinci madde (Trkiye'nin gayri Mslim aznlklarna tannan haklar Yunanistan kendi Mslman aznl iin de tanyacaktr)20. Ama bu haklarn ou ileride ayrntlaryla anlatlaca gibi, kat zerinde kald. Sonu olarak, kalmalarna izin verilenlerin tecrbeleri, ayrlmalar gerekenlerinkinden daha zor oldu. Birinci maddeyle terk etmesi gerekenler ok ac ekmelerine ramen, onlarn sorunlar az ok bir kuaa zg oldu. 1923 gmenleri yeni lkelerine uyum saladka bu sorunlar tamamen yok edilemese de nemli bir oranda azald. Ama, kalmasna izin verilenlerin tecrbeleri baz nedenlerden dolay son tahlilde daha zor oldu: Birincisi, aradan yetmi ksur yl getii halde bu insanlar akraba lkelerinde hibir zaman benimsenmediler ve daima bir kede, bazen taciz grerek yaadlar. kincisi, bu iki tarafl olumsuz davran biimi geen zaman iinde hi azalmad. Tam aksine, iki etabli topluluun yaamlar, 1960'lardan sonra bir baka insan unsur konusu (Kbrs sorunu) Trk-Yunan ilikilerini zehirlemeye baladnda daha da zorlat. nc ve bu makalenin konusu asndan daha nemli olan, ikinci maddeyle yaratlan bu iki etabli topluluk yarm asrlk bir arayla birinci maddeyle terk etmeye zorlananlarn kaderini paylamaya zorlandlar: Kendi akraba devletlerine g etmek zorunda kaldlar. Bazlar mlteci ve uyruksuz durumuna dtler. Gerei sylemek gerekirse, kentli olduu iin son derece dk nfus art oranna sahip stanbul'daki Rum aznlk, yz on bin civarndan gnmzde iki bin be yz civarna ve iki adadaki Rum nfus da
20. Rum aznln haklar Lausanne sisteminde (Bar Antlamasnn yukarda belirtilen maddeleri, Mbadele Szlemesi ve bir de 10.6.1930 antlamas) getirilenlerden ibaret olduu halde, Bat Trakyallarn aznlk haklar iki ayr belgede daha dile getirilmitir: 1) Atina Antlamas ve 3 numaral protokol (14 Kasm 1913). kinci Balkan Savann sonunda Osmanl mparatorluu ile Yunanistan arasnda yaplan bu ikili antlamayla Yunanistan'daki Mslmanlarn haklan koruma altna alnmtr. (Bkz. Baskn Oran, Trk-Yunan likilerinde Bat Trakya Sorunu, gncelletirilmi ikinci bask, Ankara, Bilgi, 1991, s. 62-64. Antlama metni iin bkz. Nihat Erim, Devletleraras Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri, Ankara, TTK, 1953, s. 477-88); ve 2) Yunanistan'daki Aznlklarn Korunmasna likin Antlama (Sevres, 10 Austos 1920). Bu ok tarafl antlama, Yunanistan ile Balca Mttefik ve Ortak Devletler arasnda yaplmtr. (Bkz. Oran, op. cit, s. 72-75. Antlamann metni iin bkz. British Foreign and State Papers, Vol. 113, s. 471). Buna ramen, Yunanistan eitli diplomatik yazlarla, bu iki antlamann geerliliini tanmadn Trkiye'ye bildirmitir. (Bu antlamalarn geerliliinin hukuksal bir deerlendirmesi ve Yunanistan'n bu tavrnn olas nedenlerine ilikin politik bir analiz iin bkz. Oran, op. cit, s. 101-112).

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yaklak be yze gerileyerek, uygulamada kurutuldu21. Krsal nitelikli olduundan ok yksek bir nfus art oranna sahip olan Yunanistan'daki Mslman-Trk aznln 1923'te yz yirmi bin ksur olan nfusu ise artacana azald. nk o tarihten beri yz bin il drt yz bin arasnda bir Mslman-Trk nfus Yunanistan' terk etti22. Bu bakmdan, kalmalarna izin verilenlerin yks, gidenlerin yksne oranla bize daha ok ey retir. Bunu gstermek iin her iki aznln durumuna, sz edilen uluslararas belgelerin verdii haklar balamnda ve Trk-Yunan ilikileri kapsamnda gz atmaya alacam23. II) ki Aznlk ve Trk-Yunan likileri Her iki aznln durumunun tarihsel srete karlkl ilikileri bir ekilde etkiledii bir gerektir. Ama, Szlemenin uygulanmaya balamasyla iki lke arasndaki ilikiler, bu iki aznln yaamlarn mukayese kabul etmeyecek kadar daha fazla etkilemitir. Bu konu ana dnemde incelenebilir. 1) lk hlaller: Stratejik blgelerden etabli boaltlmas (1923-30) Szleme'nin uygulanmaya balamasyla ihlaller de balad. lk olarak, iki taraf da stratejik blgelerde bir ounluk oluturan etabli'lerden kurtulmaya alt. Yunanistan'da snrdaki Evros ilindeki Mslman-Trkler boaltld ve 1922'de Bat Trakya'da ounluu oluturan Mslman-Trkler (tm Bat Trakya'da yz yirmi dokuz bin yz yirmi Trk'e karlk, otuz bin dokuz yz on Yunanl vard ve bu blgedeki topraklarn %84' Trklere aitti24) kendi topraklarnda saysal bir aznla dntler. nk, 1922 Sonbaharnda Meri nehrini geerek Dou Trakya'dan gelen Rum
21. Helsinki Watch [Lois Whitman], Denying Human Rights and Ethnic Identity The Greeks of Turkey, USA, March 1992, s. 29. 22. Helsinki Watch'n Austos 1990 tarihli bir raporunda, %2'lik nfus art oranyla bile (bu oran ok dk verilmitir) Bat Trakya Mslman-Trk aznlnn saysnn gnmzde be yz bin civarnda olmas gerektii hesaplanmtr. (Helsinki Watch [Lois Whitman], Destroying Ethnic Identity - The Turks of Greece, USA, October 1990, s. 2. 23. Bat Trakya Mslman-Trkleri uzman olarak nce onlarn asndan sorunlara bakacam ve sonra da Trkiye'deki Rum aznlk zerine tartmasz uzman olan Alexis Alexandris'in daha nce deindiim kitab ve makalesinde yazd biimde madalyonun dier yznden sorunlarn grnmn zetlemeye alacam. Trkiye'deki Rumlarn durumu, Alexandris'in almalarndan (bkz. ikinci ve on yedinci dipnotlar) ve ayrca ABD'nin yaymlad yllk insan haklan raporlarnn Trkiye blmnden takip edilebilir. Yunanistan'daki Trklerin durumu ise, benim kitabmdan (yirminci dipnot), Helsinki zleme raporlarnn Yunanistan'daki Trklere ilikin olanlarndan (yirmi ikinci dipnot) ve de ABD'nin yaymlad yllk insan haklan raporlarnn Yunanistan blmnden takip edilebilir. 24. 23 Kasm 1922, Meray. op. cit., Seri I, C. I, Kitap 1, Tutanak No. 3, s. 41, 42, 54, 61.

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mlteciler serbeste Bat Trakyal etabli'lerin mlklerine ve srlerine el koydular ve gvenlik gleri onlar durdurmad. Sonunda, Trkler hereyi brakmak ve Trkiye'ye snmak zorunda kaldlar25. Bir yl sonra (1924) Bat Trakya'daki Yunanllarn says yz seksen dokuz bini buldu26. Ayn zamanda, 1913 Atina Antlamas (yirminci dipnota baknz) gereince Trk toplumunun Mft ve Bamft seimleri iin 1920'de bir yasa yapld (yasa 2345/1920) ama hi uygulanmad ve Trk toplumu kendi din liderlerini seemedi. Trkiye'de anakkale Boaz az yaknndaki iki adann sakinleri iin zel bir kendi kendini ynetme ayrcal ieren yerel ynetim kurulmasn ngren Bar Antlamasnn on drdnc maddesi de hibir zaman uygulanmad. Hatta, 1927'de 1151 sayl yasayla bu insanlarn kendi ana dillerinde eitim yapma haklan da reddedildi27. 2) Yaknlama Dnemi (1930-54): Etabli sorunu ve dier ikili sorunlar 1930'da zld. Ortak korkularn da yardmyla (nce 1930'larda Mussolini'nin "Mare Nostrum" politikas ve daha sonra da Stalin'in 40'larda ve 50lerin banda izledii politika) Trkiye ile Yunanistan dosta ilikiler kurdular. Bu dostluk atmosferi ayn zamanda iki etabli toplumuna da yansd ve sorunlar yattrd. 1951'de imzalanan bir "Kltr Anlamas", aznlk okullar iin retmen deiimini mmkn kld ve "yanl bilgilerin" ders kitaplarndan ayklanmasna karar verildi. Yunanistan'da ilk defa 1954'te aznlk okullar resmen "Mslman" yerine "Trk" adyla anld ("Papagos Yasas", 3065/1954).
25. Alexandris, The Greek..., s. 120-121. Bu gerek, Konferans'ta Venizelos tarafndan itiraf edilmiti (Bkz. 1 Aralk 1922, Meray, op. cit., Tutanak No. 8, S. 122). Yunanl Tarm Bakan Anastas Bakkalba 1950'de yeniden seilebilmek iin bastrd brorn ikinci sayfasnda yaklak altm bin Rum mltecinin, Trkelere ait olan evlerden tahliyesine ilikin bir emri iptal etmiti (Bkz. Trakya [O. N. Fettaholu tarafndan Iskee'de 1932'den 1964'e kadar yaymlanan Trke gazete], 24 Mays 1954). 26. Dimitri Rentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact Upon Grecee, Paris, La Hague, Mouton et Co., 1964, s. 136 iinde, A. A. Pallis, Racial Migrations in the Balkans, s. 327. 27. Burada, 1926'da Rum Ortodoks Partikhanesi'ne, bar antlamasnn krk ikinci maddesinin ilk paragrafnn (kiisel ve aile stats) verdii haklardan feragat etmesi iin uygulanan basklardan sz etmiyorum. nk bu sadece Rumlar deil, tm gayri Mslim aznlklar ilgilendiriyordu ama bu da Rumlarn durumlarna ilikin olarak anlmaldr. (O tarihte, svire Medeni Kanunu Trkiye'ye uyarland ve resm nikah zorunlu oldu. Gayri Mslim aznlklara da buna uygun biimde nce resm nikahn ve ardndan isteniyorsa dinsel trenin yaplmas yolunda telkinlerde bulunuldu. Yahudiler ve Ermeniler bunu hemen kabul ettiler ama Rumlar daha sonra "ikna edildiler." Bkz. Alexandris, The Greek..., s. 136 ve sonras).

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nemli bir blm stanbul'da domu olup 1922'de Trkiye'den ayrlm olan Yunanistan uyruklarnn28 30.10.1930 antlamasyla Trkiye'den oturma ve alma izni alarak Trkiye'ye yerlemeleriyle, Trkiye'de Rum aznln "altn a" balad. ki lke Balkanlarda en iyi ortaklar haline geldi. 50'lerde iki adada Yunanca eitim yeniden balatld. Amerikan etkisiyle ikili ilikiler geliti ve bu da Partikhane'nin yeniden canlanmasn salad. Dier yandan, her iki etabli toplumu asndan, sorunlar zne dokunulmadan olduu gibi brakld. Yunanistan'da 1953'te "Bulgaristan'dan gelebilecek komnist szmalara kar" bir "Yasak Blge" ilan edildi. Kuzeydeki bu dalk alanlarda yaayan Pomak kkenlileri gneydeki Trk kkenlilerden ayrmak iin Bat Trakya'nn 1/8'i batdan douya doru, "Asker Mnhasr Blge"yle evrildi (bu durum hukuken hl devam etmektedir). Bugn hl devam eden arazi sorunlar, yukarda sz edilen Trakya gazetesinin koleksiyonlarnda Mays 1952'de balad. Trkiye'de o srada laik Trk milliyetiliinin en parlak dnemi yaanyordu ve bu durum, Rum toplumu zerine zellikle, Karamanl bir Rum Ortodoks din adam olan Papa Eftim'in Trk Ortodoks hareketi biiminde yansd. Dnya kiliselerince tannmas reddedilen bu hareket, Trkiye'deki en nemli Rum kurumu olan Patrikhane'yi bask altna ald29.
28. O dnemde Trkiye'de baz sektrlerde uzman zanaatkarlar bakmndan igc a vard nk lkeden ayrlan gayri Mslimler bir boluk brakmlard. Yunanistan'da ise tam tersine fazla nfus ve isizlik vard. 30.10.1930'da imzalanan anlamadan biri, iki lke arasnda serbest dolama imkan tanyordu. Bylece, isiz Yunanllar bata stanbul olmak zere, Trkiye'ye geldiler ve yerletiler. Saylar bilinmemekle birlikte, Robert Skinner'n Atina'dan ABD Dileri Bakanlna gnderdii zel bir raporda (25 Ekim 1930, 767.68/684), Venizelos'un 1930'da antlamalar imzalamak iin Ankara'ya geldiinde ok acil "yeni i alanlarna" ihtiya duyduu belirtilmitir. Bkz. Records of the Department of State Relating to the Political Relations of Turkey, Greece and the Balkan States, 1930-39, mikrofilm No. MT1245. (Dr. Ayhan Aktar'a bu belge iin teekkr ederim). Dier yandan, 30.10.1930 antlamasnn Yunan uyruklular iin getirdii geni olanaklar, saylarnn ok fazla olmad anlalan Yunanistan'dan gelenlerden ok, 1923'te etabli saylm Yunan uyruklu istanbullu Rumlar iin nemli olmu, onlara bir stat salamtr. 29. Bu hareket Trk hkmeti tarafndan ne yaratld ne de desteklendi ama ok fazla hogr grd. Bkz. Alexandris, The Greek..., s. 149 ve sonras. Bu makalede "Vatanda, Trke konu" kampanyalarndan, 1930'larda ticaretin TUrkletirilmesinden ve 1942 Varlk Vergisinden bahsedilmemesinin nedeni bu uygulamalarn sadece Rum aznla deil, tm gayri Mslim aznlklara ynelik milliyeti hareketler olmasdr. rnein, Kemalist ekonomik milliyetiliin kt nl Varlk Vergisi, lke ekonomisi zerinde gayri Mslimlerin kurduu yar-tekeli krmak iin kullanld. Sava dneminin sefalet ortamnda bu olaanst vergiye ok ihtiya duyulduu da bir gerekti; ama sonuta, dnemin pro-faist atmosferinde, gayri Mslim aznlklara kar ayrmc bir uygulama yaand. Bu olayn Rum aznln balca ikayetlerinden birini oluturmas doaldr.

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3) Dn Olmayan Nokta: Kbrs Karmaasnn Balamas (1955 sonras) Mslman-Trk Aznln ikayetleri: 1954'te Yunanistan Kbrs sorununu30 Birlemi Milletlere tad ve bundan sonra iki toplum iin de felaket dnemi balad. 6-7 Eyll 1955'te Kbrs sorununu protesto eden sokak gsterileri ksa srede zmir ve zellikle stanbul'daki Rum mlklerini tahrip eden ve can da alan bir vandalizme dnt31. 1963 Noelinde Kbrs Trklerinin Kbrs Rumlarnca katledilmesi de 1964'te stanbul Rum toplumu iin felakete dnen dier bir Trk tepkisine yol at: Bu olaylara tepki olarak Yunanistan'a kar misilleme araynda olan Trk hkmeti, 30.10.1930 antlamasn feshederek Trkiye'deki on bin Yunanistan vatandann oturma ve alma izinlerini iptal etti. Bu Yunanllara sadece 1930 antlamasnn sonucunda gelenler deil, doal olarak, Yunan vatanda stanbullu Rumlar da dahildi. Yaygn biimde Yunanistan vatandalaryla evlendiklerinden ve Kbrs sorunu da ortadan kalkacak gibi grnmediinden, zamanla bunlarla birlikte Rumlarn ekirdek ksm da gitti. stanbul'un tarih Rum toplumu neredeyse tamamen yok oldu. Ayrca, iki adada Yunanca eitim 1964'te yeniden yasakland ve 1965'te pek ok Rum mlk, ak hava hapishanesi ina etmek iin istimlak edildi. Bunun sonucunda adalardaki Rum aznlk da Yunanistan'a gitti. 1964 olay sadece Rumlar iin bir felaket balangc deildi; nk iki aznlk ayn parann iki yz gibiydi ve Yunanistan'a kar mtekabiliyet kalmadndan Bat Trakya Mslman-Trklerinin durumu da ok zorlat. 1967 Albaylar Cuntasnn Atina'da iktidar ele geirmesiyle herey daha da ktleti. Eitim: Aznlk okullarnn ynetim kurullarnn seilmesine izin verilmedi. inde "Trk" kelimesi geen tm iaretler ve balklar yasakland. "Papagos Yasas" (1109/1972) iptal edildi ve Trk okullarna yeniden "Mslman" okullar denmeye baland. 695/1977 sayl yasayla, 1966'da Pomak kkenli genleri retmen olarak eitmek iin kurulan Selanik zel Pedagoji Akademisi mezunlar bu okullara ncelikli olarak
30. Nfusunun 1/5'i Trk, 4/5'i Rum olan Kbrs adas Byk Britanya'ya balandktan sonra Yunanistan ve Kbrs Rumlar Enosis (Yunanistan'la birleme) istemeye baladlar. 31. Dier gayri Mslim aznlklara zarar veren bu zc olay ilk bata, Londra Konferans srerken halkn desteine sahip olduunu ispat etmek iin hkmet tarafndan organize edilmitir. Fakat, lmpenlerin katlmyla ve polisin hogrsyle tam bir apulculua dnmtr. Devrin Babakan Menderes, 1960 hkmet darbesinden sonra yarglanm ve Trkler, hereyi balatan Selanik'teki Atatrk evinin bombalanmas olaynn aslnda bir tertip olduunu renebilmitir.

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tayin edildiler ve bu zellikle Pomak32 rencilerin uzun sreli okul boykotlarna yol at. 1984'ten itibaren lise rencilerinin Trke dersleri de dahil snavlarn Yunanca vermeleri zorunluluu getirildi ve bunun sonucunda 1985'ten sonra Gmlcine Lisesi mezun vermemeye balad. Dier yandan, 1968 Kltr Prokolne gre Trkiye'den gelmesi gereken retmen ve kitaplarn Yunanistan'a girmesine izin verilmedi. Sonuta, stanbul'daki benzerlerinin aksine Amerikan, ngiliz, Alman okullanna gitme anslar olmayan Bat Trakyal genler orta ve daha yksek dereceli eitim iin Trkiye'ye gitmeye altlar. Bunlarn byk ounluu geri dnmediler nk Trkiye'den alnan diplomalarn denkliini Yunan makamlar tanmyorlard. Toplumsal rgtlenme: 2345/1920 sayl yasaya gre, toplumun din liderleri (Mftler) Mslmanlar tarafndan seilmeliydi. Bu yasa hibir zaman uygulanmad gibi, Aralk 1990'daki bir kararnameyle (No. 182) iptal edilerek, mft atama yetkisi Milli Eitim ve Din leri Bakanlna verildi. Toplum bu mfty "Hristiyanlarn Mfts" olarak adlandrmakta ve bu durumu dinsel zgrle ar bir darbe biiminde alglamaktadr. Yunanistan'da devlet Ortodoks din adamlarnn seilmesi srecine mdahale etmemektedir. Dier yandan, toplumun ekonomik ve toplumsal omurgasn oluturan Mslman vakflar, Ocak 1991'de karlan Cumhurbakanl kararnamesi gerei blgesel idarecilerin sk kontrol altna girmitir.
32. Bat Trakya'daki Pomaklar "Trklerden daha Trk" ve "Romanlar Pomaklardan daha Trk" diye bilinir. Bu sbjektif kimliin ok sayda nedeni vardr: 1) Yunan ynetimi Pomaklan "Byk skender'in zorla Islamlatrlm torunlar" diye anar. Bu dindar toplumda bu durum byk bir tepkiye yol amaktadr. 2) Pomaklar yaamlarn glkle salayan da insanlardr, insanlar bu tr zorluklarla mcadele ederken srekli olarak ideolojik bombardmanla karlarlarsa bu ideolojiye ters etkiler ortaya kabilir. Yunanistan hkmeti onlara kendileri iin kullanmadklar isimlerle hitap edince, bu "ideolojinin olumsuz ilevi" devreye girmekte ve ayn hkmete kar tepki yaratmaktadr. 3) Hkmet daha az kt olan seip srarla "Trk" yerine "Mslman" terimini kullandnda, aznl paraya blmek yerine, istemeyerek de olsa birletirmektedir. 4) "Onlar/dierleri" kavram baka bir din tarafndan temsil edildiinde din ulusal kimlii daima desteklediinden, Yunanistan'da slam Trkln belkemiidir. 5) Daha nce yukarda bahsettiim gibi (bkz. ikinci dipnot) Balkanlarda "Trk" "Mslman"la ayn anlamdadr. 6) Pek ok nedenden dolay Trk olmak, Pomak olmaktan (afortiori, Roman olmaktan) daha prestijlidir: Trkler Osmanl mparatorluunun varisidir, aznln en zengin unsurudurlar, Bat Trakya aznlnn ounluunu (yz on binde yetmi bin) olutururlar, akraba devletleri vardr, dier iki unsurun yoktur. Ve dahas, Trkiye aktif biimde Bat Trakya aznlnn sorunlaryla ilgilenen tek lkedir. 7) Aznlk Yunan ounlukla kyaslanamayacak kadar fakirdir. Burada nemli zellik yanyanadr: Mslman (dinsel zellik), Trk (etnik ulusal zellik) ve yoksul (snfsal zellik). Bilindii gibi, bir zelliklerden herhangi ikisi yanyana geldiinde ok patlayc bir durum oluturmaktadr. Bu arada unu da belirtmek gerekir ki, Pomak kkenli aznlk konusundaki Yunan resm politikas 1990'larn sonunda radikal biimde deimitir. Yunan yetkililer bu aznlk mensuplarna artk "Siz Pomaksmz" propagandas yapmakta, Pomakca szlk ve gramer yaynlamaktadr. Bu deiiklik, dalk blgeye yaplan youn yatrmlarla birlikte gtrlmektedir.

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Sivil toplumun rgtsel yaps asndan tarihleri 1927, 1929 ve 1936'ya kadar geriye giden aznlk dernei, baklarndaki "Trk" kelimesinin Trkiye vatandaln ifade ettii ve bunun Yunan Mslmanlann tarif etmek iin kullanmnn kamu dzenini tehlikeye sokaca gerekesiyle, Kasm 1987'de kapatlmtr. Gmlcine'de zellikle kuzeydeki "Yasak Blge"den gelen Pomaklann katlmyla bu uygulamay knayan byk bir gsteri dzenlenmitir. Temel Haklar ve zgrlkler: Eskiden sadece polis basks varken, aznlk iinde Trklk bilincinin artmasna paralel olarak yetkili makamlar da basky arttrd ve can ile mala ynelik kitlesel saldrlar grlmeye baland. 29 Ocak 1990'da yerel bir radyodan yaynlanan yanl bir haber sonucu baz gruplar Mslman-Trklerin iyerlerini tahrip ettiler ve aralarnda mft vekili ile bir milletvekilinin de bulunduu elli kiiyi yaraladlar. Polis olaylara mdahale etmedi. Austos 1991 ve Temmuz 1998'de benzer saldrlar meydana geldi ve yine etkin bir polis mdahalesi olmad. Dava ama hakk, seme ve seilme zrl ve adil yarglanma hakk ortadan kalkt. Eski bir milletvekili olan (ve pheli bir trafik kazasnda len) Sadk Ahmet "Bat Trakya'da Yaayan Mslman Trk Aznln ikayetleri ve stekleri" balkl bir metin hazrlayp on bin imza toplad iin otuz ay hapse ve yz bin Drahmi para cezasna arptrld. (Buna ilaveten, Sadk Ahmet ve eski bir milletvekili olan brahim erif on sekizer ay hapis ve er yl siyasal haklardan mahrumiyet cezas aldlar). Bu cezalara neden olan sulamalar, kampanyalarnda "Trk" kelimesi kullanarak vatandalar aka veya dolayl yollardan iddete yneltmek ya da toplumsal bar zararna halk arasnda ayrmcl kkrtmakt. Mahkeme salonunda traji-komik sahneler yaand. Yarg Komnist Partisinden Hristiyan bir tana "Politik propaganda yapyorsunuz" diye bard. Savc da Sadk Ahmet'e dnerek "Bak dinleyiciler senin hakknda ne dnyor, senin sonun avuesku'nunki gibi olacak" dedi. Nisan 1990 seimlerinde Dr. Sadk Ahmet bamsz milletvekili olunca, Kasm 1990'da seim sistemi deitirilip bamsz adaylara %3 lke baraj art getirildi ve bylece bir Mslman'n bamsz olarak milletvekili seilme olasl ortadan kalkt. Yunan vatandalk yasasnn (3370/1955) on dokuzuncu maddesi kullanlarak (saylar tam bilinmeyen ama yzlerle binler arasnda deien) Bat Trakya Mslman-Trkleri ifadelerine bile bavurulmadan veya etkili bir itiraz hakk olmadan vatandalklarn kaybettiler ve uyruksuz kiiler oldular. ABD ynetimi, "Yunanl olmayan etnik kkenli kiiler geri dnmeme niyetiyle lke dna karlarsa vatandalk hakkn kaybedebilirler" diyen bu rk maddeye gnderme yaparak: "[Yunanistan'da] srgn anayasaya aykrdr ve uygulanmamaktadr, fakat ynetimin tek tarafl kararyla, Yunanl etnik kkenden olmayan szkonusu Yunanistan uyruklarnn vatandalk haklarn kaybetmeleri buna istisna oluturur"

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demitir. Yunanistan' savunmasz bir duruma sokan bu madde 1991'de Babakan Mitsotkis tarafndan "baka bir dnemin rn" olarak sulanm, ama Avrupa Birliinin youn basks sonucu ancak Temmuz 1998'de kaldrlmtr. 1955-98 arasnda uyruksuz kalan kiilerin stats hakknda hl hibir aklama yaplmamtr. On dokuzuncu madde Bat Trakya aznlnn seyahat zgrln engelleyen baka bir metotla birlikte de kullanlmtr. 1985'ten balayarak polis, Trkiye'ye ziyarete giden ve ounlukla okumas-yazmas olmayan Mslmanlarn pasaportlarndaki "geri dnmek dahil" ibaresini karalamtr. Bu kiilerin geri dnte Yunanistan'a giriine izin verilmemi ve bu kiiler on dokuzuncu madde gereince vatandalktan karlmlardr. Yukarda belirtilen "Yasak Blge"den dolay seyahat zgrlnn kstlanmas son zamanlarda yumuatlm olmakla birlikte, lkede sregelen bir dier uygulamadr. Aznlk, ev tamir ruhsat ve iftiler iin yaamsal nemde olan traktr ehliyeti almakta ve iyeri amakta ayrmcla maruz kalmaktadr. Bununla birlikte bu konularda da son yllarda Avrupa Birliinin etkisiyle yumuama grlmektedir. Ekonomik Alan: Bat Trakya aznlnn %70'i iftidir. 1922'de Bat Trakya'daki topraklarn %84'ne sahiptiler ama imdi bu oran sadece %20-40'tr. Bu durum, Yunanistan'n u drt uygulamasndan kaynaklanmaktadr: lk olarak, Ortodoks nfus devlet tarafndan sadece bu i iin verilen ucuz kredilerle Mslmanlarn topraklarn satn almaya tevik edilmektedir. kincisi, yasalar sistematik biimde ayrmc bir ekilde uygulanmaktadr. Aznln verimli arazileri politik nedenlerle (hapishane, niversite inas gibi nedenlerle) istimlak edilmektedir. Toprak birletirme (anadasmos) kural Trklerin aleyhine iletilmektedir. ncs, zilyetlik belgeleri ve tapular tannmamaktadr. Drdncs, 1965'ten beri 1366/1938 sayl yasayla aznln yeni mlk edinmesi engellenmektedir. Bu yasayla, Yunanistan'n yzlmnn neredeyse yarsn kapsayan ky blgeleri, snr blgeleri ve adalarda gayri menkul alm satm ve hatta zilyetlik hakk zel bir izne balanmtr. Hristiyanlar iin herhangi bir sorun yoktur ama Mslmanlar iin vardr. Bununla birlikte bu sorun, bir ngiliz vatandann ky blgesinde arazi satn almak isterken zorluklarla karlamasndan sonra Avrupa Birliinin youn basksyla hafifletilmitir (bkz: 30 Mays 1989 tarihli Avrupa Adalet Divan karar). Genel Deerlendirme: Yunanistan'n Bat Trakya'da ikili bir hedefi olduu grlmektedir. Pomak kkenli Mslman aznl asimile etmek ve Trk kkenli Mslman aznln g etmesini salamak. Bu basklarn ve ihlallerin sonucunda Bat Trakya aznl daima Trkiye'ye g etme eilimine sahip olmutur. Aznln baz yeleri Almanya'ya almaya gitmi ve burada Bat Trakya'daki ihlalleri anlatan aktif kurulular oluturmulardr.

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Yukarda belirtildii gibi, 1923'ten beri yaklak drt yz bin kii Bat Trakya'y terketmitir. Bunlardan bazlar on dokuzuncu madde sonucu uyruksuz kalan kiilerdir. Dier yandan, drt unsur bu aznln saysnn aa yukar ayn kalmasn salamaktadr: Birincisi, Yunanistan yaamak iin ekonomik adan Trkiye'den daha uygun bir yerdir. kincisi, Trkiye 1960'larn sonundan beri anariyle ve 1984'ten beri de terrle alkalanmtr. ncs, bu topluluk esas olarak bir kyl toplumudur ve kyller kolay kolay topraklarn terketmezler. Drdncs ve en nemlisi, Bat Trakya aznlnn nfus art hz %2,8 gibi yksek bir orandr (Yunanistan ortalamas sfra yakndr). Rum Aznln ikayetleri Eitim: Trkiye Rumlarnn eitim konusundaki sorunlar, Yunanistan'daki Mslman-Trk aznlkla ayndr: Kitaplar, retmenler, okul ynetimi, okul binasnn tamiri vs. Bununla birlikte, Bat Trakya'daki durumla bir fark vardr: "Rum" kimlikleri inkar edilmemektedir33. Bir istisna dnda, okul tabelalarndaki "Rum Aznlk Okulu" ibaresi yerinde durmaktadr: stanbul Rum Fener Lisesinin giriindeki tabelada Yunan harfleriyle yazl olan "Irkmzn Byk Okulu" yazs, 114 yllk skee saat kulesinin Arapa harflerle yazlm mermer tabelas Mays 1970'de krldktan sonra indirilmitir. Toplumsal rgtlenme: Trkiye Rumlarnn bu alanda Yunanistan Trkleriyle benzer sorunlar vardr: Patriin Ortodoks din adamlar tarafndan seilmesine ramen, 1862 tarihli "Rum Patriklii Nizamat"na dayanan gelenek gerei, Trk ynetimi Hristiyan din adamlarnn hazrlad seim listesinden baz isimleri kartarak her seime mhahalede bulunmutur. Bununla birlikte, son seimde hibir isim listeden kartlmamtr. Rum dinsel vakflar, Trk ynetiminin basksna maruzdur. Yeni vakf ve okul kurulamamakta, mevcutlar da yeni tanmaz mal edinememektedir. 1971 tarihli Anayasa Mahkemesi kararyla, Heybeliada lahiyat Okulu kapatlm ve Ortodoks din adamlarnn Trkiye'de eitilmesi imkansz hale gelmitir. Hatta, bu yzden Patrikhane'nin bizzat kendisi yok olma srecindedir. Temel veya ekonomik haklarla ilgili dier ihlaller srekli meydana gelmektedir. rnein okul ve vakf kurulu yelerinin seimine mdahaleler vardr.
33. Lois Whitman'n The Greeks of Turkey almasnda bu ynde bir paralellik arandndan hataya dlmtr. Yukarda daha nce belirtildii gibi (baknz ikinci dipnot), "Rum" terimi stanbul aznlnn eski zamanlardan beri kendi kendine verdii bir isimdir: [Dou] Romal anlamndaki Romios, Romioi kelimelerinden gelir. 1821 ihtilalinden sonra kurulan Yunanistan yurtta demek olan "Yunanl" adn kendileri iin hibir zaman kullanmamlardr. Bu balamda, Osmanl Sultanlarnn 1453'te stanbul'u fethinden sonra kendilerine "Sultan- klimi Rum" demeleri anlamldr. Tpk Krtlerin en azndan 1639'dan beri Trk askerlerine yine ayn nedenle "Rum askeri" demeleri gibi.

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Genel Deerlendirme: Bu basklarn ve ihlallerin sonucunda, stanbul ve iki adadaki Rum aznlk Yunanistan'a g etmitir. Atina'daki Faliron ve Nea Sinimi civarnda yaayan bu kiiler hl Trk vatandalklarn korumaktadrlar ama, torunlar Trke bilmeyen Yunan vatandalar olmulardr. Says iki bin be yz gemeyen ve ounluu yal olan Trkiye'deki Rum aznlk neredeyse yok olmutur. te yandan, Bat Trakya'daki Trk aznlk ayn sorunlara ramen saysal gcn korumay baardna gre bu azalmann baka nedenleri de olmaldr. Birincisi, 1964'te Yunan vatandalar Trkiye'den karldktan sonra Trk ordusuna grev yapmak istemeyen (ve subay olamayan) gen Rumlar da Trkiye'yi terk ettiklerinden, Trkiye'deki Rum toplumunun evlilik olanaklar ok daralmtr, ikincisi, Rum aznlk yzyllardr ekonomik bakmdan rahat kentliler olarak yaamlardr ve Bat Trakyallarn aksine topraa baml deillerdir, dolaysyla ufuklar da snrl deildir. Avrupa'yla kurulan ticari balar sayesinde ve zellikle 1975'te Yunanistan'n AET'ye yelik sreci baladktan sonra, Kbrs olaylarndan dolay basklarn da younlamasyla Rumlar, kii bana geliri Trkiye'nin drt kat olan Yunanistan'a gitmeye balamlardr. Bu g hareketi ok sancl olmu, fakat bu insanlar sermayelerini Atina'ya transfer etmiler ve ilerini orada yeniden kurmulardr. Bu durum, bir Japon aratrmacsnn "footloose Greek merchant"34 terimiyle ifade etmek istedii eydir. ncs, polis tacizinin yansra, ortann st ve orta snf toplum olan Rumlar Trkiye'nin anarik atmosferinden ok etkilenmilerdir. Drdncs, kentli olduklar iin ok dk bir nfus art oranna sahiptirler. Bu ltlerin bazlar iki adadaki Rumlara uygulanamaz. Daha ziyade krsal olan bu aznlk asndan, topraklarnn ellerinden alnnn yansra, stanbul Rumlarnn neredeyse yok olularnn yaratt psikolojik atmosferin olumsuz bir etki yapt sylenebilir. III) 1923 Deneyiminden karlabilecek Sonular Sovyet deneyiminin sona ermesi 1990'larda uluslararas politikada yeni bir dnem balatt. Avrupa'da artk uzak gemi saylan birtakm aclar aznlklar ve mlteciler tekrar ve daha gl biimde yaamaya baladlar. Pandora'nn Kutusu yine almt. Avrupa'da ve her yerde yeniden ortaya kan bu sorunun zm iin, bu konuda uygulanm en radikal zmden, yani Yunanistan ile Trkiye arasndaki 1923 zorunlu mbadelesinden dersler karabilir miyiz?
34. Iwao Kamozavva, "Ethnic Minority in Regionalization, The case of Turks in Western Thrace", Population Mobility in the Mediterranian World, Tokyo, Mediterranian Studies research Group at Hitotsubashi Universitey, 1982, s. 129.

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Yetmi be yl sonra Szleme'yi ve uygulamalarn bu adan tekrar gzden geirmek en azndan ilgin olacaktr. nk Birinci Dnya Sava sonras dnemle, Souk Sava sonras dnem arasnda nemli paralellikler olduunu dnmekteyim. 1) iki dnem de ulus devlet iin ok nemli gei dnemleridir. lkinde temel olay mparatorluk'tan Ulus'a geiti. kincisinde ise Ulus'tan 35 Kreselleme'ye geitir . tur. 2) ki dnem de, zamanlarnn iki elikili eilimine sahne olmu-

a) Milliyetilik rzgarlar: lk dnemde bir yandan 1820'lerde Osmanl imajn kullanarak kendi ulusal kimliini oluturan Yunanistan'n irredantist politikas devam ederken, te yandan Trkiye yz yl sonra ortaya kan Yunan tehdidini kullanarak kendi ulusal kimliini oluturmaya almtr36. kinci dnemde bir yandan ilk dnemde yaylmacl engellenen Srplarn irredantist politikas devam ederken, dier yandan Bosnallar kendi ulusal kimliklerini, Arnavutlar ve Makedonlar da kendi ulusal devletlerini Sup tehdidini kullanarak oluturmaya almaktadrlar.
35. Kreselleme ok tartlan bir kavramdr ve bundan dolay bu konuda daha uzun bir deerlendirme yapmak gerekmektedir. Kreselleme, styaps (kapitalizm) ve alt yapsyla (aklclk, laiklik, insan ve aznlk haklar, demokrasi, vs.) Bat sisteminin yaylmasn ifade eder. Bugn (1990'lar) kreselleme nc dnemini yaamaktadr. Daha nceden kapitalizmin ihtiyalarna cevap veren iki dalga olmutu: 1) 1490'larn kresellemesi: Bugn bizim "smrgecilik" olarak adlandrdmz olguyla sonulanan merkantalist devrenin ticaret politikalarnn zorunlu kld corafi keifler ve 2) 1890'larn kresellemesi: Endstri devriminin tekelci dneminin ihtiyalarnn (ucuz hammadde, yeni pazarlar, sermayenin marjinal verimliliini artrmak iin yeni blgeler, ar nfus iin yeni yerler gereksinmesi) zorunlu kld Bat yaylmas; ksaca bugnk deyiimizle, "emperyalizm". Birinci kreselleme zayft, ikincisi daha glyd ve ncye giden yolu at. Bu son kreselleme son otuz yl iinde gerekleen baarl ve birbirini tamamlayan gelime tarafndan yaratlmtr: 1) 1970'lerde okuluslu irketlerin ortaya kmas, 2) 1980'lerde iletiim alannda devrim, 3) 1990'larda Sovyet sisteminin k. tik gelime btn dnyay iine alabilecek ekilde pazar geniletti. kinci gelime insanlarn lkeleri yerine kafalarn fethetme olana salad ki, bu kar klmas ok zor bir fetihti. ncs (ilk ikisinin birleik bir sonucu olarak) ekonomik ve siyasi uluslararas gelimeler zerinde Bat'mn tekelci denetimini salad. Burada, "territory" kavramndaki kkl deiikliin (pazarn ulusal devletten dnyaya genilemesi) tm dnyadaki insanlar zerinde iki ok nemli etki yapacak olduunun altn izmek nemlidir. 1) Territory kavram ok byk nem tadndan, "anavatan" alglamas deimektedir: O deiince zaman gelince bireyler iin herey deiecektir. 2) Kreselleme tm dnyay Bat'nn bir yansmas haline dntrdnden, Avrupa tarihi, dnya tarihinin bir yansmas haline gelmektedir. 36. Herkl Milas, Trk-Yunan likilerine Bir nsz, Tencere Dibin Kara, stanbul, Ama, ubat 1989, s. 21.

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b) Kreselleme rzgarlar: tik dnem ikinci kresellemenin doruk noktasyd. kincisiyse, kresel pazarn biimlendirici etkisi altnda ulusal kimliklerin yok olularnn uzun dnemde kanlmaz gibi grnd ncs kresellemenin balangcdr. 3) ki dnem de, kart nedenlerle, an milliyeti patlamalara tank olmutur. Szlemenin iki ana maddesi, bugnn bilinciyle tekrar gzden geirildiinde, mbadelenin yetmi be yllk tecrbesine ait son gzlemleri yapabiliriz. Madde 1: 1) Birinci maddenin uygulamas ok baarl olmutur. Baarldr, nk amacn gerekletirmitir: Ulus devleti etnik temizlikle arndrmak. Btn olayn beklenenden daha fazla zamanda ve abaya malolduu ve daha ok acya yol at dorudur ama, Szleme'nin/ulus devletin bakyla 1930'un sonuna kadar herey yatmtr. Bu baarnn asl teknik nedeni, sahnedeki tm nemli aktrlerin (ngiltere, Yunanistan ve Trkiye) halklarn radikal hatta zorunlu mbadelesini gl bir biimde istemeleridir. 2) Bu durum gnmzde de benzer bir tecrbenin yinelenebilecei anlamna gelmemektedir. Birinci Dnya Sava sonras dnem, insan haklar yerine aznlk haklar kavramna nem vermiti. nsan haklar, uluslararas hukuk ve uluslararas ilikiler terminolojisinde bile yoktu. Bu kavram, Souk Sava sonras dnemin "kutsal inei" olmutur ve insan kitlelerinin uluslararas organizasyonla zorla yerlerinden edilmelerine izin vermeyecektir. Madde 2: 1) kinci maddenin sonucu baarszlk olmutur. Baarszlktr, nk ilan ettii amac gerekletirememitir: Ulus devleti ok kltrl/etnili/dinli bir topluma hogr gstermeye zorlayamamtr. Bu "ama"a yle isteksizce giriilmitir ki, karlkl aznlklar evsahibi devletlerinin bir paras olduklarn hibir zaman hissetmemiler, evsahibi devletler de onlar reddedilmesi gereken yabanc bir doku olarak alglamlardr. Bu baarszln pek ok nedeni vardr: a) Geriye doru bir bakla bugn, uluslararas alandaki baz nedenlerden dolay, karlkl aznlklarn bu kaderinin daha Szleme'nin imzaland ilk gn apak olduu grlmektedir. 172

ki devlet de kendi uluslarn ve ulus devletlerini yaratmak iin doal olarak sabrszlanan Dou Avrupa'nn yeni kk devletleri arasndayd. Fakat ksa srede bir gerein farkna varmakta gecikmediler: "Yeni Dnya Dzeni'ni kendileri iin mmkn olduunca sorunsuz klmak ve bu arada da bu kk devletleri denetim altna almak isteyen Balca Mttefik ve Ortak Devletler, birtakm zel aznlk koruma maddeleri empoze ediyorlard. Kklerin devlet ve ulus kurmas, bu maddeleri kabul artna balanmt. Oysa, kk devletlerin hi byle bir eye niyetleri yoktu. Bu maddelerden kurtulmaya, hatta daha iyisi, aznlklarn hayatn zorlatrarak bizzat bunlardan kurtulmaya altlar. Bu nedenle, bu baarszln temel nedeni, karlkl aznlklarn daha en bata "istenmeyen ocuk" olmalaryd. ki ana aktr (Trkiye ve Yunanistan), bu aznlklar mecburen kabul ettiler veya daha kts bunlar kar tarafn brakt "beinci kol" olarak algladlar. b) Yunanistan ve Trkiye bu ok g tecrbe iin hi de ideal partner deillerdi. Tarih gemileri atmalarla doluydu, ulus kurma srelerini yayorlard, dinleri farklyd, insan konularn yansra ekitikleri baka noktalar vard (Ege, Kbrs vb.). zellikle Kbrs sorunu korkun bir arpan etkisi yapt. c) Aznlklarn iki nemli stratejik alanda (Yunanistan'da Trkiye snrna bitiik olan Evros ili ile Trkiye'de anakkale'nin azndaki iki adada) kalmalarna izin vermek iyi bir fikir deildi. d) Karlkllk, iki aznln da balca kozuydu. Fakat sonunda bu rasyonelliin fazlasyla krlgan olduu ortaya kt: Bozulduunda, istenenin tam aksi bir ilev grmeye baland. 2) Btn bunlar, bugn de benzer bir tecrbenin tekrarlanamayaca anlamna gelmemektedir. Kresellemenin yaylmasyla, ok kltrclk Souk Sava sonras dnemde en nemli e haline gelmitir. rnein, Yunanistan'n son iki yldaki sicili, baz d dinamiklerin (kreselleme), bir devletin aznlklarna kar olan salksz tutumunu iyiletirmede olumlu bir etkisinin olabileceini gstermektedir. Yunanistan'n AB'ye tam yelii, uyruksuz insanlar ve gmenler yaratmak iin Yunan hkmetince yaygn biimde kullanlan iki ok nemli yolun tkanmasn beraberinde getirmitir: naat ruhsat ve arazi alm izni verilmemesi ve vatandalk yasasnn on dokuzuncu maddesinin uygulanmas. Dier yandan, byle bir gelime iin Balkanlar hi de ideal bir yer deildir. 1920'lerin milliyeti arlklar, milliyetilik ann al enlikleriydi. 1990'lann milliyeti arlklar ise bu an kapan trenleridir. Bu nedenle daha da renkli olmalar olaandr. 173

ARNAVUTLUK LE TRKYE ARASINDA DPLOMATK LKLERN KURULMASI (1923-1926)

Gazmend SHPUZA* 28 Kasm 1912'de Arnavutluk bamszlnn ilan edilmesi Arnavut halk ile Trk halk arasndaki ilikilerde yeni bir aama at. lkemizin Osmanl mparatorluu'ndan siyasal adan koparlmas iki lkenin halklarnn yzlerce yllk bir dnemde kurup pekitirdikleri yakn dostluk balarna son vermek anlamna gelmiyordu, iki halkn en ilerici unsurlarnn iki lkenin siyasal, toplumsal ve kltrel ilerlemesinin yararna yakn ibirlii, bu dostlua hz kazandrd1. Mustafa Kemal daha gen iken Arnavutluk'ta olaylarn bilgisinde idi. Arnavut sorunuyla yakndan ilgilendi. Bu, bir rastlant deildi. Selanik'te domu ve Manastr'da renim grm atatrk Arnavutlar ve Trklerin yakn temaslarda bulunduklar ve evlilikler araclyla birbiriyle kaynatklar bir ortamda byd. Mustafa Kemal'in Arnavut sorunuyla ilgilenmesinden, genellikle Balkan sorunuyla ilgilenmesinden kopuk deildi. Birinci Dnya Sava sonunda Arnavutluk ve Trkiye sava galipleri Byk Devletlerin ve uaklar olan Srp, Yunan vb. devletlerinin oven egemen evrelerinin pazarlklar ve ilhak planlan sonucunda ulus olarak kaybolma tehlikesiyle kar karya bulunuyorlard. Bu planlar 26 Nisan 1915 tarihli kt nl Londra Antlamas gibi gizli antlamalarda belirlenmiti. 1878 Berlin Kongresi'nde ve 1913 yl Londra Bykeliler Konferans'nda balam son derecede Arnavut dman siyaseti sonuna kadar gtrmeyi amalayan Londra Antlamas, 7. Maddesiyle, Arnayut2 luk'un tam paralanmasn ngryordu . Antlamann 3. Maddesi tal* 1. Tirana Bilimler Akademisi. G. Shpuza, Ataturku dhe shqiptaret, Shtepia Botuese "Nentori", Tiranw, 1987, 11. 19-47, G. Shpuza, Ataturku dhe shqiptaret, Shtepia Botuese "dituria", Tirane, 1964, ff. 24,55; G. Shpuza, Ataturku dhe shqiptaret, "FLAKA e vellazerimit" gazetesinde, skp, Augstos 1996. M. Cami, Lufta antiimperialiste e popullit shqiptar ne vitet 1918-1920, Tirane, 1969, f. 16-17; eshtja shqiptare ne aktet nderkombetare te periudhes se imperi-

2.

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ya'nn Anadolu'da alaca topraklar da ngryordu. Dahas talya, Trk topraklarn paralamak iin caniyane eylemde yalnz olmayacakt, ortaklar da vard. Bar Antlamalar ve Paris Konferans, gizli antlamalarn ngrdklerini kesinletirmek ve yaama geirmek iin almaya baladlar. Arnavutluk ve Trkiye siyasal-ulusal adan lm cezasna arptrldlar. Yenik devlet olarak Trkiye, Mustafa Kemal'in syledii gibi, Osmanllar mparatorluu'nun Birinci Dnya Sava'nn yenik kmas salt bir gereke olarak hizmet ediyordu. Byk Devletlerin tarafsz kalm Arnavutluk'un rnei de bunu doruluyordu. Buna karn Arnavutluk haritas en glnn emperyalist mantndan hareket edilerek yeniden paralanmak iin diplomasinin yeil masasna konuldu. Ulusal lmle kar karya bulunan Arnavut halk ve Trk halk, kendi anayurtlarn kurtarmak iin lm kalm savaa katlmak iin ayaa kalkt. Ulusal Lunya Kongresi (Ocak 1920) ve Kurtulu Vlora Sava (Mays-Eyll 1920) ile Arnavut halk Esat Paa Toptani tarafndan nderlik edilen ve d dmanlarn ua olan en karanlk gericilikle hesaplatktan sonra emperyalistlerin Arnavutluk'u tamamen paralamak iin planlarn un ufak etti. Arnavut halk, talyan askerlerini Vlora'dan, yani Balkanlar'dan uzaklatrp denize dkerek komu egemen oven evrelerin lkemizin kuzey, dou ve gney blgeleri konusunda iddialar boa kard. Yeni uygun durumda ve halk kitlelerini kapsam yurtsever coku ortamnda, byk Srp ovenlerin kuzeyde Ikodra'ya ve douda Pekopi'ye ynelik askeri mdahalesine gs germek zor deildi. Bu savata, halkmz, kk olmasna karn, hem sayca hem de silah asndan birok kat daha byk ve daha gl olan askeri birliklere, dmanlarn koalisyonuna cesaret ve gvenle mcadele etti. Ayn zamanda ilerici dnya 3 kamuoyunun yardmn grd . Ayn dnemde Trk halk da gneydouda ngiliz-Fransz igalcilerine kar savayordu. Bu sava daha 1919 ylnn banda balamt. Bu savan bana kan Mustafa Kemal bamszln salanmas uruna Trk halknn btn ulusal glerinin birlemesini gerekletirmek iin yetenekli ve kuvvetli bir kii oldu. Trkiye'nin d ve i dmanlarna kar, emperyalist-oven gericilie, saltanata ve gerici din adamlarna kar sonuna kadar kararl bir tutum taknd, lkenin karlarnn gerektirdiinde tereddt edilmedi, halife sultana ve kliine de kar kt.
aliznit, Permbledhje dokumentesh me nje veshtrim historik nga Prof. Arben Puto, veli. II (1912-1918), Tirane, 1987, f. 634-641. Kongresi i Lushnjes dhe Lufta e Vlores, Tirane, 1974, 1. 207-215.

3.

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Uzun tarihsel dnemler iin, zellikle geen yzyln son eyreinden balayarak Arnavut halk ve Trk halknn ayn kaderi paylatklar sylenebilir. Onlar, topraklarnn paralanmas tehlikesinden srekli olarak tehdit edilmitir, hatta ulus olarak varlklarn da yitirebilirdi. 18761878 yllarnda Rus-Trk savandan, Balkan Savalar ve emperyalist savatan sonra iki halk, ayn kandan kardelerinin kitle halinde uzaklatrlmasyla elik edilmi grlmedik soy krmna tabi tutuldu. Arnavut halk ve Trk halk, kendi devletlerinin bamszln ve toprak btnln koruma savanda, Byk Devletlerin emperyalist ilhak siyaseti ve Balkan egemen evrelerinin oven siyasetiyle kar karya bulundu. Balkan egemen evreleri emperyalist siyasetin hizmetine girerek bundan yararlanmaya altlar. Bunun sonucunda, o dnemde Arnavut halknn sava halklarn antiemperyalist cephesinin paras idiler. ki halk arasnda siyasal ya da askeri anlamalar yoktu, ama ortak zaferlerdi, halklarmzn birbirine verdikleri karlkl, deerle yardmd. Arnavut halknn Gney blgelerde oven tehlikeye kar direnii zmir'in Trk-Yunan cephesini zayflatt. General N. Trikupis'in kabul ettii gibi, bir tmen bu cepheden ekildi4. Bu cephenin zayflamas ngiliz kumandasn ilgilendirmiyordu. nk ngilizler o dnemin Yunan siyasetilerine Bat'da ikinci cephenin almasnn durdurulmas ynnde bask yapyordu5. Bu koullarda, lke iinde ve dnda Arnavut yurtsever basn Trk halknn hakl savana byk bir ilgi gsterdi. Savan balanmasn dikkatle izledi. "Kosova Ulusal Savunmas" (Mbrojta Kombwtare e Kosorvs) Komitesi yayn organ "Populli" (Halk) gazetesi, daha 1919 ylnda, Trk halknn antiemperyalist savan hakl dava ve btn halkn eseri diye niteliyordu6. Arnavutluk'ta halk, ulusal kurtulu uruna mcadele eden Trk halkn manevi adan destekledi, Trkiye'de az bir kitle oluturmayan Arnavutlar da Trk kardelerinin yannda yer ald, onlarn davasnn zafere ka7 vumasna katkda bulundu . Arnavutlarn bu savaa katlmas mda7 haleci yetkililerin Arnavutlara kar bulundu . Arnavutlarn bu savaa katlmas mdahaleci yetkililerin Arnavutlara kar dmanca tut8 mundan dolay da yaygnlat . Birok Arnavut, Trk halknn zgr4. 5. 6. 7. 8. N. Trikupis, Dhiiqis negallon monadhon en polemo 1918-1922, athen, 1934, 99100. Historia e Shqiperise, veli. 2, Tirane 1965, f. 486; M. Cami, Protokol shqiptarogrek i Kapshtices, Studime historike, 1975, nr. 4. Gazeta "Populli", nr. 4, 13 Kasm 1919; G. Shpuza, Pikepamjet epolitikoshoqerore te gazetes "Populli" (1919-1920), in: "Studime historike", nr. 1, 1970; Kongresi i Lushnjes dhe Lufta e Vlores, Tirane, 1974. AQSH, F. Nr. 251, D. Nr. 200, v. 1923, f. 3, Lozan'da Arnavut delegesinin smet Paa'ya gnderilmi mektup, 14.1.1924. Ayn yerde, D. Nr. 103, v. 1922, f. 1-2, tarih: 9.8.1922.

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lk savanda verdikleri yardm nedeniyle nianlar ald Trk hkmetince*. te yandan, esir olmu ve daha sonra kaabilmi Trk askerleri ve subaylar Arnavutluk'ta snak ve konukseverlik buldu10. Bu koullarda Arnavut-Trk ilikilerini glendirme koullar yaratld ve iki lke arasnda diplomatik ilikilerinin kurulmasna yol ald. Arnavutluk ile Trkiye arasnda ilikileri kurma koullar Arnavutluk'ta 1920 ylnda ulusal devrimin ve Trkiye'de 1918-1923'te ulusal devrimin zaferlerinin sonucunda kuruldu. Arnavutluk'ta gerici elemanlar km Osmanl imparatorluk ile yeni Trkiye arasnda eitlik iaretini koymaya balad. Ayn zamanda aslsz iddialarda bulunarak Arnavut hkmetinin Mustafa Kemal'in hkmetiyle her anlamasna kesinlikle kar olduunu aklad". Bu arada, Ankara'da milletvekili Cevat Abas'in ynetimindeki 10 kiilik bir komisyonun, Arnavutluk ile diplomatik ilikiler kurma giriimlerine balad haberi, resmi Arnavut organlarna duyuruldu. Sylendii gibi, bu komisyonun temsilcileri talya'ya ulamt12. 1923 yl Hazirann ortasnda Arnavutluk'un Belgrad temsilcisi Trkiye'nin Belgrad temsilcisi Cevat Bey'e, Arnavutluk hkmetinin Ankara hkmetiyle diplomatik ilikileri kurmak istediini aklad. Trk temsilcisi Arnavut hkmetinin siyasetinden olumlu biimde sz ettikten sonra, hkmetinin de bunu istediini cevap verdi13. Bu grmeden sonra, Arnavut basnna gre, Trk hkmeti Arnavut hkmetine iki devlet arasnda konsolosluk anlamasn hazrlamak amacyla temsilcilerini Ankara'ya gndermesini davet etti14. Parlamento bakan Eref Fraeri'nin ynetimindeki Arnavut heyeti 17 Ekim gn stanbul'a gidip dosta karland. Ertesi gn Ankara'ya 15 hareket etti . Arnavut heyeti Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ilan edilmesi ve Mustafa Kemal'in bakanla oybirliiyle seilmesi ncesinde Ankara'ya ulat. Ankara'dan Tirana'ya rapor veriyorlar16. Gzel bir rastlant idi.
9. Gazeta "Demokracia", Gjirokaster, nr. 175, 6.10.19228. 10. Arkivi Qendror Shteteror (Shkurtimisht: AQSH), F. Nr. 251, D. Nr. 147, v. 1923, f. 5-6,6.4.1923. 11. Bisedimet e Keshillit Kombetar, 1921, nr. 6, f. 80-83, 87. 12. AQSH, F. Nr. 249, v. 1922, D. Nr. 1-453, Tirane, 28 qershor. 13. Ayn yerde, F. Nr. 251, D. Nr. 199, v. 1923, f. 23, Tirane, 19 qurshor. 14. Gazeta "Shqiperia e re", 24.6.1923. 15. AQSH, F. Nr. 251, D. Nr. 200, v. 1923, f. 8, stanbul, 17 Ekim 1923. 16. Ayn yerde, f. 11, Ankara, 30 Ekim 1923.

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Kasmn ilk haftasnda heyeti onurla kabul eden Dileri Bakan smet Paa, Arnavut tarafna, Balkanlar'da Arnavutluk'un glenmesi ve salamlamasnn Trkiye'nin yararna olduklarn belirtti, ayrca komu lkelerin Arnavutluk siyasetiyle ilgilendi17. 13 Kasm 1923 tarihli "Vakit" gazetesi Arnavut-Trk grmelerinin balandn bildirdi. Trk tarafn temsil eden kr Kaya yapt al konumasnda Arnavut halkn Trk halkna balayan eski dostluk gelenekleri zerinde durarak, Trk hkmetinin Arnavutluk'un bamsz bir siyasal yaama layk olduunu belirtti. kr Kaya'nn vurgulad gibi, grmelerin hzl ve memnuniyet verici biiminde tamamlanmasna hizmet edecekti. kr Kaya grmelerin Trk-Polonya antlamasn rnek alacan da ekledi18. Grld gibi, Trk temsilcisi genellikle Arnavut-Trk dostluk geleneklerinden sz etti. Arnavut temsilcisi de Arnavut halk ve Trk halknn yeni devrimci geleneklerini, Birinci Dnya Sava srasnda ve Savatan sonra zgrlk abalarn vurgulad. O, yine Arnavutluk ve Trkiye arasnda ortak karlarn var olduunu syledikten sonra iki lkenin z glerine dayanarak kendisini kurtardn ve mevcut durumlar iin bu glere borlu olduunu belirtti19. Bu szler iki halkn gemii iin nemli ve byk bir gerei yanstyordu. stanbul'da kan Arnavut "Paqja" (Sulh) gazetesi kr Kaya Bey'in szlerine cevap vererek bu Arnavut temsilcisinin aklamalarn pekitirerek unlarn zerinde duruyordu: "Bu iki halk yalnz uzun beraberlik ve aile ilikileri balamam, yalnz mali ve ticari ilikiler yaknlatrmamtr; dier birok ey de iki ulus arasnda dostluk ve gveni artryor. Her Halk, birbirine, bamszlk uramalar iin de manevi sempati duyuyor. Trkiye yalnz bir ulusal dnceye sadk olan evlatlarnn yardm sayesinde kutsal topraklarn yabanclarn izmesinden kurtard; kk Arnavutluk'da yalnz kendi evlatlar sayesinde lkeyi dmanlarn igalinden kurtard"20... Arnavut heyeti bu grmelerde iki tarafn grevinin iki lke arasnda eski dostluu pekitirmek olduunu aklad ve Arnavut devletinin ilk dostluk anlamasn Trk kadeleriyle balamasndan sevincini dile getirdi. ki devlet arasnda diplomatik ilikilerin kurulmasna iaret eden Dostluk Antlamasna ve Konsolosluk Anlamasna gelince de, iki heyet
17. Ayn yerde, f. 34, Ankara, 30 Ekim 1923. 18. Libri i Qarkoreve i vitit 1923-1924-1925, (Ministria e puneve te Brendshme), nr. 6, TiranS, 1925, f. 317, 320, 321; Gazeta "Paqja" (Sulh), istanbul, 19 Kasm 1923, Trk-Arnavut Dostluu makalesinde. 19. Ayn yerde. 20. Ayn yerde, 17 Aralk 1923, Trkiye ve Arnavutluk makalesinde.

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btn konularda hemen anlamaya vard. 15 Aralk 1923'te Ankara'da Arnavutluk ile Trkiye arasnda Dostluk Antlamas imzaland21. Antlamada unlar deniyordu: "Madde 1. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti hkmeti ve Arnavutluk hkmeti arasnda ve vatandalar arasnda bar, sevgi ve ebedi dostluk devam edecektir. Madde 2. ki ynetim, iki hkmet uluslararas haklarn temelinde diplomatik ilikiler kurmak iin bir araya geldi. ki taraf her lkenin diplomatik ve konsolosluk yetkilerinin ayn haklar, ayn onurlar ve bamalara sahip olacaklar koullarn kabul etti. Madde 3. ki taraf vatandalk antlamas iin anlamaya vard. Madde 4. Bu antlama tasdik edilecektir. Bu, Ankara'da yaplacaktr. Belgelerin teati edilmesinden sonra, antlama 15 gn ierisinde yrrlne girecektir. ki tarafn delegeleri bu antlamay imzalad ve mhrlediler"22. O dnemde stanbul'da kan Arnavut basn da daha derin ortak menfaatleri yanstt. Grmelerin devam ettii gnlerde "Paqja" (Sulh) gazetesi unlar yazyordu: Bu antlama, bu dostluk anlamalar birbirimize srekli gven ve dostlua yol aacaktr. ki taraf bu dostluk ve gvenden saysz yararlar salayacaktr23. lke iinde yaymlanan basn da Arnavut-Trk ortak menfaatlerinin var olduunu belirtiyordu. Kora'da yaymlanan "Shqiptari i Amerikes" (Amerika'nn Arnavut) gazetesi unlar yazyordu". "ki devletin, iki halkn iyi niyetlerine dayal iten dostluk ilikileri kuracana seviniyoruz24. te, bu anlamalarn imzalanmas lke iinde ve dnda Arnavut basnnda geni bir yank buldu. Anlalan ki, o Dnemde istanbul'da Arnavut dilinde yaymlanan "Paqja" ve "E drejta" gazeteleri grmeler ve tamamlanmalarn daha byk bir ilgiyle, daha yakndan izlediler. Onlar bu anlamalar, bunlarn iki halk arasnda dostluun glenmesi ve iki lke arasnda ilikilerin daha da gelimesi ynnde nemlerini doru biimde deerlendirdiler. Ama yine de bu gazeteler, yurttalk antlamasnn, Trkiye'deki Arnavutlarn hukuki ve mlk konumun dzenlenmesine ilikin
21. "Gazeta e Kores", 12.1.1924, makale: Traktatet turko-shqiptare; Gazeta "Dielli", Boston (USA), 9.2.1924, makale: Traktatet midis Shqiperise dhe Turqise; N.P. Alpan, Tarihin nda bugnk Arnavutluk, Ankara, 196, s. 96.1 22. "Paqja" gazetesine gre, nr. 5, 11 Aralk 1923. 23. Ayn yerde, 17 Aralk 1923. 24. "Shqiptari i Amerikes" gazetesi, 1 Aralk 1923.

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mitlerini hakl karmadn25 ve dier milliyetlere gre Arnavutlar daha uygun duruma getirdiini yazdlar26. Birka Balkan gazetelerinin yazdklar tersine27, Arnavut-Trk ilikilerin kurulmas ve glenmesi dinsel temeller zerinde ya da Osmanl imparatorluu'nun ykntlar temelinde yaplmad, bu vesileyle imzalanm anlamalar saldrgan nitelikli deildi, dier komu lkelere kar deildi. Tarih, bunun en iyi kant idi. Arnavut-Trk dostluk ilikileri Balkanlar'da bansn glenmesine hizmet etmitir, hizmet etmeye devam ediyor. Mustafa Kemal 13 Mart 1926 tarihinde de Arnavutluk'un ilk Ankara bykelisini kabul ederek bu istei ifade etti. Arnavutluk temsilcisi "Tarihin aknda ortak kaderleri paylam iki ulus arasnda yzlerce yllk dostluk balarn pekitirmeye var gleriyle alacana hazrln dile getirdi. Mustafa Kemal u cevab verdi: "Tarihin ok eski dnemlerinde birok alanda kaderler paylam iki halk arasnda dostluk balarnn salamlamas almamzda, iki lkenin menfaatlerine hizmet etme ve iki ulus arasnda yakn ibirlii dnemini ama almamzda benim ve cumhuriyeti hkmetin yardmn bulacanza emin olabilirsiniz"28. 1928 Eyllnde Arnavutluk'ta kralln ilan edilmesi ve Zog'un kendini kral atamas Arnavut-Trk ilikilerinin daha da genileyip derinlemesine engel oldu. Mustafa Kemal yeni krall ve kraln tanmad29. Sonra, Trkiye Arnavutluk arasndaki ilikilerinde bunalmdan hemen nce, bir Arnavutluk heyetinin 1931 Ekiminde stanbul'da Balkan Konferansna katlmasyla olaan duruma dnmeye balad. Ama, iki devletin arasnda bu yumuak iklimi ok devam edemedi. Zog'un kzkardei Prenses Saniye ikincisi ikinci Abdlhamit'in olu Prens Abid ile evlendi. ve d kamu oyunun hi beklenmedii bu akrabal balarnn Arnavutluk-Trkiye ilikilerini olumsuz ynde etkilenmeme olanakszd.
25. Ayn yerde. 26. "E drejta" (Hak) gazetesi, nr. 17, 3.1.1924; "Shqiptari i Amerikes" gazetesi, 2.1.1924. 27. "Amalthia" gazetesi, 20.10.1923; 5.12.1923 tarihli "Hora" gazetesinde "Yunanistan'a kar bir Arnavut-Trk antlamas" bal bir makale vard. 28. Bilal N. imir (Trk Kurumu yesi), Atatrk'ten eli Ruen Eref naydn'a ynerge (Trk-Arnavut ilikileri zerine), in: Prof. Dr. Ahmet kr Esmer'e Armaan, Ankara, 1981, s. 299-316. 29. G. Shpuza, Atatrk ve Arnavutluk-Trkiye likileri, in: "Atatrk Yolu", Mays 1993, yl 6, cilt 3, say 11, ss. 311-322.

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Dostluumuz konjktrlerin ya da ann siyasetlemesi ve ideolojiklemesinin vn deildir. Tam tersine, bunlara gs germi ve kinci Dnya Savandan nce ve Souk Savan ilk dneminde pek uygun olmam aamalar baaryla amtr. Arnavutluk-Trkiye ilikilerinde grlen yalpalamalara ramen bu ilikilerin ktletii durumlarda da Arnavutluk ilerici kamuoyu Atatrk'n siyasal ve toplumsal reformlarn dikkatle izleyip yanstyordu. Bu yank, lkemizdeki duruma, Arnavutluk halknn nnde drn ve zlmesi gereken grev ve sorunlara yakndan bal olarak yaplyordu. Bu ynde ilerici gzeticiler hkmetten sansrn saptad snrlar atlar30. Arnavutluk'ta demokratik devriminin zaferi ve Trk hkmetlerinin Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n ilkelerine uygun d bir siyaseti izlemeleri, iki lkenin karlarna uygun olarak halklarmz arasndaki dostluk ilikilerinin gelimesi iin koullar yaratt. lkemizle Trkiye Cumhuriyeti arasndaki ilikiler, dostluk ve ibirlik ruhu iinde gelitirmitir ve gittike daha fazla bu yolda geliiyor. Bu, 1992'nin hazrnda imzalanm yeni Dostluk Antlamas ifade ediyor. Halklarmz ve lkelerimiz arasndaki sevgi ve sayg gelecekte bu ilikilerin daha da geniletilip pekitirilmesine iyi bir zemin yaratyor.

30. G. Shpuza, Trk Inkilabn arnavutluk'ta yanks, Boazii University nternational Conference on Atatrk, stanbul, November 9-13, 1981; G. Shpuza, Jehona e Revolucionit Kombetar Trk dhe e reformave qenaliste ne Shqiperi, in: "Studime historike", nr. 1, 1987, ff. 39-60; G. Shpuza, La revolution turque et les reformes kemalistes. Leur echo en Albanie, in: "Studia albanica", 1987, nr. 2, pp. 105-124; G. Shpuza, Trk nklabnn ve Kemalist Reformlarn Arnavutluk'ta Yanklar, Atatrk Kltr, Dil ve Tarih Yksek Kurumu, Trk Tarih Kurumu, IX. Trk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara, 5-9 Eyll 1990; G. Shpuza, Dr. brahim Temo ve Atatrk zerine, Atatrk Kltr, Dil ve Tarih Yksek Kurumu, Trk Tarih Kurumu, XII. Trk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara, 12-16 Eyll 1994.

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REFLECTIONS OF MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATURK'S REFORMS N THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA

Prof. Dr. Ljiljana COLIC* "The Turkish revolution has achieved complete success and brought Turkey tovvards prosperity... The unanimously elected president of the new republic is Kemal whose revolutionary determination, national consciousness and ability of a statesman are firmly vvoven into the events announcing and, I dare say, providing great and universal renaissance of Turkey... Regarding the prospect of a long period of national progeress and International peace secured by the epoch of prosperity and consciousness, hardly few individuals among our people will not look forward to this new and happy epoch in Turkey". it was on November 24, 1923 that Dragisa Lapcevic, a journalist, cultural and political worker, had made such a judgement. Two chapters in his analysis of our Muslims were dedicated to the current political situation in Turkey and to its creator Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, with a photo of him and his wife printed at back page1. Since then the events that took place in the Republic of Turkey, its cultural, economic and entire progress as well as its legendary president had become the inexhaustible topic of the Yugoslav press, newspapers, magazines and several books in the succeeding years and decades up to the Second world war. The cited quotation clearly states that the new-born Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (i.e., the Kingdom of Yugoslavia since 1929), which was striving for national and international peace and prosperity itself had excepdet the prospective reforms and changes in the Republic of Turkey with obvious affinity, though they were indicated just in clues down there.
Faculty of Philology, Belgrade. Dragisa Lapcevic. O nasim muslimanima, (Of our Muslims), Belgrade 192, 50-56; 61-62.

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"My humble body is going to turn to dust one day, but the Republic will eternally remain!" These celebrated words were propounced by Mustafa Kemal Atatrk; nevertheless, the memory of him and of his deeds will last forever. His name, as one of the greatest and wisest statesmen of the 20th century, echoes occasionally in the Yugoslav press even nowadays; therefore the author of this text has recently published an appropriate article on the anniversary of Kemal Atatrk's death; titled Ataya Sayg2, it appeared in the weekly newspaper "TAN", which is issued in Turkish language in Pristina. Hovvever, let's stick to the chronological order. in the beginning, a question appears whether it was a difficult assignment for Yugoslav king Alexander and mister Mustafa Kemal Atatrk to bring the two previously confronted peoples together and make them truthful friends. Serbian literatre and historiography from the beginning of the 20th century offer us several examples of sincere friendship between individual representatives of the Serbian and Turkish people. Such a friendship was a frequent topic in the short stories of the Serbian vvriter, Grigorije Bozovic, who wrote under the pseudonym mer Filipovic. Hovvever, our attention will be paid to a Turkish-Serbian friendship from real life that, vvith brotherly devotion and mutual respect, tied Fethi Pasha, Turkish deputy in Serbia of that time and Atanasije Popovic, professor and a journalist in the First decade of the 20th century. it was recorded that Fethi Pasha had nce told mister Atanasije the following vvords: "We, the Turks, knovv very vvell that we ha ve taken your lands from you by the sword; and that we shall have to bring them back to you by the sword again when the time comes for that for they have alvvays belonged to you"3. it was but a few years later, during the frst Balkan war, that the last remaining areas of land were freed from the rule of the Turkish Empire. Fethi Pasha was killed in the war, as the Seventh corps commander in chief, he met his death, fighting bravely, loyally and persistently at the head of his army to the last moment. He died honourably and was celebrated by his own kindred and respected by the Serbs. The Serbs had realized historic inevitability of being slaves to a great empire; on the other hand, the Turks had acknovvledged the inevitable end of their imperial power in due course.
2. 3. Ljiljana Colic, Ataya Sayg, TAN, Pristina, yl XXVII, say 1413, 9.11.1996, 1-2. Cika Tasa, (Anniversary book dedicaret to professor Atanasije M. Petrovic, on his seventieth birthday), Belgrade 1936, 26.

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Exhausted by the wars that lasted for centuries and the turmoil of the moment, both the Serbs and the Turks felt they wanted national and international peace, domestic prosperity and entire welfare; they had enough concern and vvisdom to offer friendship to one another. President of the Republic of Turkey Gazi Mustafa Kemal and king Alexander Karadjordjevic performed this act in their name. The only negative reactions to Atatrk's reforms in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia came from Islamic conservative circles which kept warning Yugoslav Muslims of the danger that islam would die out in Turkey. Namely, they highly disapproved of ali local changes that could even indirectly affect the regulations of behaviour and everyday life of the Muslims. As professor Darko Tanaskovic, Ph.D., correctly observes, "They believed the cracks of a whip had driven people in Anatolia away from islam and inappropriately distorted Islamic religious values"4. ibrahim Hakk Cokic, who owned and edited the Mslim journal "Hikjmet", led that clique. During the years 1929 and 1930, he published a feuilleton titled "Views on Turkish anti-Islamic reforms", using the pen name Charmen. He wished to point out the allegedly disastrous effects of Atatrk's reforms, with the only affirmative judgement for his plans of constructing roads and railway, building factories and improving industrial production. Hovvever, ali other changes had to face great resistance and keen eriticisin. Dressing standards, sehooling system reforms, introducing civil law and banking system, ete, were understood as an inappropriate approach to Europe that would lead to extinction of Islamic religion in the Turkish nation. "Kemal's followers have taken the national alphabet away from their peeople by mere force, in spite of its being healthier, more practical, advanced and useful since it can be learnt and exercised in reading with less difficulties. I am convinced Koran can not be written in Kemal's alphabet, for it would make unpardonable confusion in the meaning of Koran", claimed ibrahim Cokic, having precisely informed the readers about the Arabic phonetic system and the confusion that 5 would come out of vvriting Arabic words in Latin letters . During Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such opinions were opposed by the wishes for progress that appeared among elite cultural circles of Yugoslav Muslims. Mustafa Mualic's book Orient in the West, was dedicated to the efforts of these circles and to the meritorious promoters of progressive ideas, who fought against the economic
4. Darko Tanaskovic, La Scene politigue Yougoslave travers le journal de langue turque Sada-yi Millet (1927-1929), in N. Clayer, A. Popovic, T. Zarcono, Presse turque of presse de Turgie, Vana Turcica, T23, Institut Franais d'Etudes Anatoliennes et Editions ssis, stanbul 1992, 314-325. "Hikjamet", 29. Muharrem 1348. Tuzla (7.7.1929), god. I, br. 4, 116.

5.

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and cultural backvvardness of Yugoslav Muslims. The author pointed out the influence modern Turkey had on the cultural emancipation of Yugoslav Muslims above ali. He considered Kemal Atatrk one the three greatest reformers in the history of the world; according to him, the other two were Russian emperor Peter the Great and Japanese emperor Micuhito6. Among Yugoslav Muslims, modern views were represented by the members of "Gajret", the Society for Cultural and Educational Progress of the Muslims, founded in 1903; it was initiated by some progressive Mslim intellectuals, who published the magazine with the same name and Gajret's annual calendar. Besides, several pro-Muslim journals, with exceptionally progressive correspondents, were issued in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia6. Among them, the most prominent were correspondents of the Sarajevo journals "The Reform"1 and "The New Time"*. One of the initiators and associates was Dzevad Sulejmanpasic who, being an ardent Mustafa Kemal Atuturk's supporter, was remembered as the leading cultural reformer among Yugoslav Muslims in the frst decades of the twentieth century. ibrahim Cokic used the pseudonym Chareman to criticize and ridicule social changes in Turkey in his newspaper "Hikjamet", "Kemal's supporters arouse greatest affnity among the Russian Bolsheviks"9, he pointed out. With the same fervour, he attacked Dzevad Sulejmanpasic for trying to popularize the Turkish national development on "The Reform" and "77te New Time" pages. The admiration Dzevad Sulejmanpasic felt for the personality and deed of the modern Turkey creator is best illustrated by the fact that in 1928 the Mslim Organization of Reformation was founded in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia at his initiative; this organization owned the journal "The Reform". The polemic betvveen these two influential Muslims was not led on the pages of the two journals exclusively. Alluding at Cokic's journal "Hikmajet", Dzevad Sulejmanpasic published the book "Independent Thought and Pro-Hikmajet Ideas", in which he stressed how archaic ideas obstructed social development of Yugoslav Muslims. Sulejmanpasic intended to prove the possibility to connect islam with modern civization in each of his writings, either political or artistic. He found constant inspiration in Atuturk's deeds, and that had marked his work; hence, he
6. 7. 8. 9. Mustafa Mualic, Orijent na zapodu, (Orient in the West), Belgrade 1936, 337. "Reforma", (TheReform), Sarajevo, 1928. "Novo vrijeme", (The New Time), Sarajevo 1928-1931. "Hikmajet", god. II, br. 16, Tuzla 3. Rebiul-ahir 1349. (28.8.1930), 125.

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remained recorded in Yugoslav historiography as "Kemal of Yugoslav's Muslims"10. Save few rare exceptions, with ibrahim Hakk Cokic as the leading figre, the development of friendly relations and cooperation between two states aroused undivided affnity and complete approval of entire Yugoslav public. it is evident not only from the way the Yugoslav press reported of each event that occurred in the Yugoslav-Turkish relationship but also from the considerable attention that was paid to the breach of the new Turkish state with its past as well as to its cultural and economic progress. Some two hundred nevvspaper articles, studies and books were dedicated to Atatrk and to the Turks up to the Second vvorld vvar". Yugoslav publishers were particularly efficient after the First Conference of the Balkans, held in October 1930. it was not until then that a firm conviction in the peaceful principles Kemal Atatrk led in foreign affairs was established, although the pact of friendship had been signed fve years before. On the other hand, time had to pass to demonstrate the contribution of Mustafa Kemal's reforms in their highlight. The first considerable paper on Gazi Mustafa Kemal in Yugoslavia was published in 1931; it was exceptionally appreciated by the readers and appeared in the second edition12. in the following year, a book was published titled "Turkey", whose author Zivko Topalovic, Ph.D., was the member of Yugoslav delegation at the Second Conference of the Balkans that was held in istanbul13. This work, like other texts on the young and prosperous Republic of Turkey, was a result of personal evidence and direct perception. Though the first Yugoslav visitors to Turkey were intellectuals, well informed about the social, economic and political situation down there, their descriptions express surprise at first sight, and consequent delight at the second; that's why both popular and scientific essays have an emotional touch that resulted out of the political climate. On the tenth anniversary of the date vvhen the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed, the whole series of convenient articles were published nearly in ali Yugoslav nevvspapers. During October and November 1933, the Belgrade daily "Politika", a newspaper with the largest circulation in the country, issued seventeen texts dedicated to the Republic of Turkey
10. Mustafa Mulaic, Orient in the West, 405. 11. Mirjana Teodosijevic, Prilog bibliografiji radova o Mstafi Kemalu Atuturku u Jugoslaviji od 1921 da 1984 godine, (Supplement to the bibliography ofworks on Mustafa Kemal Atatrk in Yugoslavia from 1921 to 1984), Istorijiski casopis, (Historical journal) XLII-XLIII, Belgrade 1997, 373-4000. 12. Maksim Svara, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasa-njegov zivot i djela, (Gazi Mustafa Kemal pasha-life anddeeds) Sarajevo 1931, 111. 13. Zivko Topalovic, Turska, (Turkey), Belgrade 1932, 87.

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and Kemal Atatrk, it was then that king Alexander had paid an offcial visit to Turkey and the Yugoslav press reported of the heartly vvelcome he had been given in istanbul. Personal friendship and mutual respect of the two statesmen immensely helped develop friendship and cooperation between Yugoslavia and Turkey. The Turkish public and particularly Mr. Kemal Atatrk accepted the news of king Alexander's assassination in Marseillos in 1934 with genuine sorrow and sympathy with the Yugoslav people in their grief. in the telegram he had sent to Prince Paul to commemorate the late Yugoslav king, Gazi Mustafa Kemal expressed, "his delight to have the honour of having been his sincere friend and truthful brother"14. The death of Yugoslavia's king didn't affect close political, economic and cultural relations between the Turks and the Serbs. Not only that they were described with affnity by the press, but they were discussed on political debates and sessions in offcial institutions. During the session of the Yugoslav Senate held on July 9, 1934, Uros*Kurulj, Ph.D., had given an addres on the Balkan Treaty and the Convention with Turkey. On that occasion Mr. Kruulj, Ph.D. said: "Thanks to the great reformer and hero Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the modern national Republic of Turkey has become a phenomenon worth to be admired and follovved as an example. Altogether with the other states of the same views, it is going to play another historical part. it's no wonder the Republic of Turkey and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia have come to the same track since we are connected not only by identical interests but also by identical opinions and views on modern political relations"15. it is difficult to make the right choiece among such a variety of interestinge literatre. One of the most interesting pieces is certainly a special issue of the illustrated journal "Sunday" from May 19, 1935. it was titled "The New Turkey" and had the image of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk printed 16 on the covers . Most of articles were written owing to Mrs. Anita Delijanic, nicknamed Mirit and resulted from personal experience and contacts with her respectable contemporaries of the Turkish cultural and public life, like Mr. Rushdi Ara, Shukri Kaja, Hajdar Aktaja and others. The journal was enriched by many illustrations and texts that described almost ali aspects of Turkish reality of that period; therefore, it is an exceptionally reliable and interesting guide through Turkey that could have been made solely by a woman with sharp look and keen mind. Mustafa Shait's poem "Waterfall" and three short stories by Shirin Ajdin and Faik Rfk
14. Hadzi-Todor Dimitrijevic, Spomenica o tragicnoj srrti viteskog kralja Aleksandra I Ujedinitelja, (The memary oftragie death ofour brightly King Alexander I, the Unijier). 15. Ures Kralj, Senatski govori, (The Senate Addresses), Belgrade 1934, 50. 16. "Ilustrovani st NEDEUA", (SUNDAY, illustrated weekly), god. XVI, br. 428, Belgrade 19.5.1935.

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Ataja were translated and published in order to present modern Turkish literatre to Yugoslav readers, whe the six final pages were dedicated to business advertisements. When a treaty was signed between the two countries in 1936, Yugoslav scientists got the access to Turkish documentary archives. Expectation of the treaty was widely publicized among Yugoslav scientists. The daily paper "Politika" had issued an article with the following headline "On the Brink of Opening istanbul Archies-New Working Fieldfor Our History"". Turkish scientific institutions welcomed Yugoslav explorers on one hand, while Yugoslav science opened the door to Turkey on the other. Ali these activities were marked by the influence of an outstanding man to whom the Yugoslav people had expressed their gratitude on every occasion. The third scientific publication edited by the Institute of the Balkan Studies, which was founded in Belgrade in 1933, was a book by Dragoslav Mihajlovic, Ph.D., titled "Economy of Modern Turkey"1*. As stated at the beginning, the author dedicated the book "to the Yugoslav-Turkish friendship initiated by king Alexander I and his exxcellencyy Kemal Atatrk, the modern Turkey creator". The scientific text is preceded by introductory pages with a photo of Mr. Mustafa Kemal's figre altogether vvith a biography of his; instead of his own introduction, D. Mihajlovic had published a letter written by Mr. Dzelal Bajar, minister of the people's economy of Turkey, considering it the best possible introduction on the topic. Inspired by the friendly feelings after his stay in Turkey, Mr. Milan Svetovski wrote the book "Atatrk's Turkey" that was published, as stated in the introduction, "On the great fifteen anniversary of the revolution". The book described Gazi Mustafa Kemal and his deeds in almost lyrical manner and was enriched by occasional quotations from the most 19 celebrated Atatrk's speeches . The book that, in our opinion, presented a great Turkish hero, patriot, reformer and statesman in the best way was published a year later. it is the work "Kemal Ataturk-the creator of modern Turkey", whose author, Zoran Tomic, Ph.D., used to be a Yugoslav diplomat in Turkey in the thirties. Great part of this large analysis (page 11-105) occupied the intro17. A. Ivic, Pred otvaronjem carigradskih arhiva, (On the Brink of Opening stanbul Archives) "Politika", Belgrade, 27.11.1933. 18. Dragoslav Mihajlovic, Privreda savremene Turske, (Economy of Modern Turkey), The Institute of the Balkan Studies, Belegrade 1937, 171. 19. Milan Svetovski, Ataturkova Turska (Atatrk's Turkey), Belgrade 1938, 227.

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duction of his excellencyy Mr. Subhi Tanner, Turkish ambassador in Romania of the time20. Writing about the Republic of Turkey, Yugoslav authors had completely accepted and esteemed authentic opinions of the respectable men from Turkish political and public life. This fact indicates great mutual confidence that existed betvveen the intellectuals of two countries and helped making firm friendship betvveen our peoples. "If only we had been better acquainted with the Turks, we vvould have felt more respect for each other"21, wrote Glisa Elezovic, the pioneer of the Turkish studies in Serbia, who was also an expert in Turkish language and history and ex-student of the Serbian Grammar school in istanbul. Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatrk and king Alexander Karadjordijevic had helped us get to know each other better and become closer. What we owe them is mutual respect.

20. Zoran Tomic, Ph.D., Kemal Ataturk-tvorac nove Turske, (Kemal Ataturk-Modern Turkey Creator), Belgrade 1939, 285. 21. Glisa Elezovic, Bolnica Bajazito II u Jedrenu, (Bayazit II's Hospital in Jedrene), Prilozi za istoriju zdravstvene kltre, (Supplement to The History of Medical Culture), XVII, 5, Belgrade 1942, 16.

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"ATATRK NKILAPLARI" VE ROMANYA TRK TOPLUMU

Mustafa MEHMET* Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasyla, Anadolu'da, birbiri ardnca gerekletirilen gz kamatrc yenilikler, Byk ATATRK'n muazzam eserlerinden saylmakla, bu gibi yeniliklere "Atatrk nklplar" demekle, en doru bir tanmlamay yapm oluruz, kansndaym. Lkin, Atatrk nklplarn ancak Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin siyas snrlar iinde mtalaa etmek, konuya dar bir adan bakmak demek olur. Zira, aslnda, bu inklplar, bir taraftan, Douya-slm dnyasna doru uzanrken, dier taraftan da, zellikle, Balkanlarda yaayan Trk-slm toplumlar arasnda derin etkiler yaratmtr. Fakat, Balkan Trkleri arasnda gelien modernleme hareketleri, derli-toplu bir ekilde aratrma konusu tekil etmemi olup, birka makale veya dolayl temaslar haricinde, daha ok, o zamanlarda yaymlanan gazete stunlarnda yanstld hlde, hl aratrmaclarn beklemektedir, diyebiliriz. Ayn durum, byk Trk milletinin Avrupa'ya doru bir uzantsn oluturan: Romanya Trk-slm toplumu iin de geerli saylabilir. Ancak, burada takdim etmeye alacamz teblide de, zaman dikkate alnarak, konuyu btn ayrntlaryla inceleme frsatn bulamayacamz itiraf etmeliyiz. Buna ramen, bu vesileyle, konuya daha yakndan ilgi uyandrm ve baz hususlar belirtmek frsatn bulmu oluruz tahmin ederim. Gerekten, Atatrk nklplaryla ilgili olarak, Romanya'da yaayan ve Evld- Fatihan adyla bilinen Trk halknn geirdii merhaleler, dikkate deer bir rnek tekil eder. Nitekim, Anadolu'da gerekletirilen yenilikler, Romanya Trkslm toplumunu da artacak derecede etkilemi ve onun yaam tarznda byk deiiklikler meydana gelmesine yeni yeni ufuklar am bulunmaktadr.
Tarih Aratrmacs, Bkre.

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Fakat, eitli inklplarn, topyekn, yani, hep birden uygulanmayp, pei peine ve baz aralklarla gerekletirilmi olmalar, her reform vesilesiyle, ortaya kan konularla ilgili olarak, Romanya Trk toplumu arasnda da, muhtelif boyutlarda heyecan uyandrm ve yanklar meydana getirmitir, diyebiliriz. Nitekim, daha Saltanatn kaldrlmasndan (1922) balayarak, Cumhuriyetin iln (29 Ekim 1923), Hilfetin ilgas (1924), Medrese ve er' Mahkemelerin ortadan kaldrlmas (1924), Tekke ve Zaviyelerin kapatlmas (1925), Kyafet Deiimi (1925), Meden Kanunun kabul (1929) ve zellikle, Alfabe inklb (1928), Trk kadnlarnn toplumdaki yerini belirleyen kararlar (1930-1934) ve dier yenilikler, Romanya Trk-slm halk arasnda da derin izler brakmtr. Bunlar ve eitli yorumlar, o zamanlarda Romanya'da baslan gazete sayfalarnda grebiliyoruz. Baz kar propagandalara ramen, zellikle gen ve aydn tabakalarn, Atatrk inklplarn uygulama hususunda byk gayret sarf ettikleri belirtilmektedir. Hatt, o zamanlar, Romanya'ya sman ve "Firariler" olarak tanmlanan baz kimselerin kar faaliyetlerini nlemek amacyla, derhal harekete geenler olup, "Memleketimizdeki firarler ne lemde?", "Rahat durmayan firarler" ve daha baka balklar altnda makaleler yaynlanyordu (Dobrogea, Say: 484-498, 502 1923). Cumhuriyetin ilnndan sona, o zamanlar, Romanya'nn 4 Sancak (l) Mftsnden mteekkil bir heyet, Ankara'ya giderek, bizzat, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paa'ya: "Cumhuriyet kararn tebrik eylemilerdir" (Dobrogea, 1923, Say: 507-513). Ayn zamanda, Hilfet Makamnn ilgasyla, byle bir makamn halk nazarnda mukaddes sayld dikkate alnarak, bu hususta "hi bir ma'zr-i er' olmad" anlatlmak suretiyle, halkn aydnlatlmaya alld anlalmaktadr (Dobrogea, 1924, Say: 532). Hatt, Halifelik konusuyla ilgili olarak, baz Avrupa gazetelerinde, urada veya burada "yeni bir Halife bekleniyormu" eklinde kan haberlere verilen cevaplarn birisinde: "Fakat, bilmiyorlar ki, bu asrda, Halifenin ve Hilfetin mns kalmamtr" deniyordu (Yldrm, Say: 71, 1933). Yani, sras geldike, Atatrk nklplarnn, birer birer, ele alnarak, incelenmekte olduunu ve bir taraftan, cehalete ve koyu taassuba kar mcadele edilirken, dier taraftan da, halkn bilinlendirilmesi hususunda, deta, kampanyalar yrtlmekte olduunu syleyebiliriz. Bu tr mcadeleler ve kampanyalar, zellikle, 1928 ylnda, Ltin Alfabesinin uygulanmaya balamasyla, daha da belirgin hle gelmitir. Bu konu ile ilgili olarak, yle bir hususu da belirtmekte yarar olduu kansndaym: Trkiye'de Ltin harfleri kullanlmaya balar balamaz (1 Ekim 1928), Romence balkl dergilerin birinde (Revista Musulmanilor din

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Dobrogea=Dobruca Mslmanlarnn Dergisi; No. 1-6, 1928), II. Merutiyetin nemli simalarndan saylan Makedonyal Nikolaye Batzaria, 30 Kasm 1928 tarihinde, Ltin harfleriyle baz ilnlar, iirler ve eitli makaleler yaynlamaya balamtr. nceleri, ve gibi harfler bulunmasa da, sonralar, bunlar da temin edilmitir. phesiz, Alfabe inklbnn en fazla etki yapmakta olduu alanlar, okullar ve gazetelerle, dier nevi yaynlar olmutur, diyebiliriz. Dier reformlarda olduu gibi, alfabe konusunda da, Atatrk'n ismi n plna karlmakla, halk, daha ok, "bekleme"yi tercih ediyor ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin nereye doru gitmekte olduunu saptamaya alyordu. Ayn zamanda, Romanya Trk toplumu da, Balkanlarda yaayan dier Trk toplumlar gibi, Anadolu'da gerekletirilen yenilikleri uygulamaya aba sarf ediyordu. Nitekim, burada da, Arap harfleriyle tedrisat, ancak Kur'an okumay renmekle snrlanyor ve dier tedrisatn Ltin alfabesiyle yaplmasna allyordu. Bu hususta, zellikle, Trkiye'den getirilen okul kitaplarndan da yararlanlyordu. En byk glklerden birisi, phesiz, yeni alfabe ile tedrisat yapabilecek elemanlarn bulunmay idi. Ancak, Romen okullarndan mezun olanlar, bu hususta baz kolaylklara sahip oluyorlard, diyebiliriz. Lkin, zellikle 1935 ylndan sonra, yani, o zamann T.C. Bkre Bykelisi Hamdullah Suphi Tanrver'in Mecidiye Medresesini ziyaret etmesinden sonra, gerek burada ve gerekse Silistre Medresesinde, Ltin Alfabesiyle tedrisata nem verilmeye balanmasyla ve dier Trk okullarnda yetien gen aydnlarla, Modern Trk Alfabesiyle okuma-yazma da o derecede artmaya balamtr. Zira, zellikle, din grevlileri yetitirmek zere kurulmu olan Medreseler, bu kez, retmen de yetitiriyorlard. Geri, Romanya'da yaynlanan Trke gazetelerde, Ltin harfleriyle neriyata geiin hayli zaman aldn syleyebiliriz. Bazlar, hem Arap harfleriyle ve hem de Ltin alfabesiyle yaynlanyordu. Ancak, bu sreci, Modern Trk Alfabesine kar gelmekten ziyade, baka sebeplere atf etmek daha doru olabilir. Bunun bir sebebi, madd zarara uramak korkusu ve dier sebebi de, okuyucu bulmakta glk ekme endiesi olabilirdi. Nitekim, gazetelerden birinde, okullarda Ltin alfabesiyle tedrisatn genelletirilmesi aka savunuluyor, fakat, ayn gazetede, "umum dncelerimizi bildirmek iin, Arap harflerini kullandk", zira, bunda, biz, bir mecburiyet grdk ve bu mecburiyeti az bir zaman daha hissediyoruz" eklinde mtalaalar yrtlyordu (Yldrm, 1934, Say: 118). Hatt, ayn gazeteye gelen mektuplarn birinde gazetenin, her ne kadar, Mslmanlara mnasip grlmedii sylense de, gazeteyi iade etmenin asl sebebinin, baka olduu anlalyor: "Gazeteniz, deniyor -bu

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mektupta- biz Mslmanlara lyk olmad iin, Gagavuz milletine lyktr. Sebebi de, okumay bilmiyoruz" (Yldrm, 1935, Say: 142). Ltin alfabesi uygulanrken, aydn tabaka, ayn zamanda, Trkenin sadeletirilmesine de hizmet ediyordu. Nitekim, "Halkn lisan, hakkn lisandr" veya "halk olmak, hak olmaktr" gibi sloganlar ortaya atarak ve yeni tretilen kelimelerle, gazete sayfalarnda lgateler dahi dzenlemek suretiyle, Trkenin kolay anlalmasna yardm etmeye gayret sarf edildiini grmekteyiz. Hatt, baz ar kelimelere parantez iinde, yeni kelimelerle aklk getirerek, bunlar, okuyuculara retme yoluna da gidiliyordu. Aslnda, Romanya'da yaayan Trk-slm toplumu, uygulamaya konan yeniliklerle, gelecei hakknda endieye dmyordu, demek, doru olmaz kansndaym. Zira, Balkanlarda bulunan dier Trk-slm topluluklar gibi, bu toplum da, yzyllardan beri gelen bir takm detlerle, gelenek ve greneklerle har-neir olmu ve onlarla gnlk yaamna devam ediyordu. Bunlar, bir rpda skp atmann kolay olmayaca herkes tarafndan bilinmekte idi. Ayn zamanda, Trk toplumunun yaad ortam dahi, bambaka, yani, Hristiyan leminden oluan bir ortam ve tbi olduu Devletin yasalar dahi, baka baka mahiyetler arz ediyordu. Keza, iki toplum arasnda derin, dil, din, kltr, gelenek ve grenek farklar da bulunuyordu. te, bu gibi unsurlar ve zellikleri dikkate alarak, halkn endiesini ve "Ne oluyor?" veya "Nereye doru gidiyoruz?" gibi sorularn anlayla karlamak gerektiini syleyebiliriz. Fakat, btn bu gibi endielere ramen, gerek Kadlk messesesinin kaldrlmas ve gerekse kadn haklaryla ilgili reformlar da, Romanya Trk toplumu arasnda, glkler kanlmakszn, zaman ierisinde, uygulanmaya konulmu ve bu toplumun da, modernleme yolunda, gzle grlr admlar atmasna engel olunmamtr, diyebiliriz. Nitekim, Kadlklarla ilgili tartmalar, daha 1925 ylnda balam olup, ancak, Romen yasalarnda, bu konu ile yaplan tadilt, tedricen uygulandndan dolay, tamamyla tatbikine on yl sonra geilebilmitir. Mesel, 14 Nisan 1925 tarihinde, Kadlklarla ilgili bir yasaya: 'Tarafeyn, isterlerse, er' meselelerim Romen mahkemelerinde grdrebilirler" eklinde bir madde eklenmitir (Tuna, 1932, Say: 230). Fakat, ancak, 3 Nisan 1935 tarihinde, Kadlk messesesi kaldrlarak, bunlara ait davalar, Romen mahkemelerine devredilmitir (Yldrm, 1935, Say: 127). Bununla beraber, "Sancak" (l) mahkemelerinde, Trkslm cemaatin sorunlarna cevap verebilecek zel mstearlar bulundurulmaya devam edilmi olup, bunlar, kinci Dnya Sava sonlarna kadar 194

grevlerini srdrmlerdir. Halk arasnda, hep "Kad" olarak adlandrlyorlard. "Fes" ve "araf' gibi, kyafetle ilgili Reformlar da, hayli tartma konusu olmu, fakat, yine de, derin sorunlara sebebiyet vermemitir, diyebiliriz. Zaten, bunlarn uygulanmasna, ortam da msait grnyordu. Bu hususta, fesin, bir Yunan serpuu olduu sylenirken, apka giymenin de, tabi bir ey olduu, halka aklanyordu (Yldrm, 1936, Say: 145). Dier taraftan, kadnlarn da, dnyay kendi gzleriyle grmeleri gerektiini savunanlar bulunduu kadar, "pee" veya "araf gibi, "irkin kyafetler de", yabanclar, 'Trkler hakknda yanl fikirler beslemee sevk etmektedir" veya "kyafet meselesinin, meden lemdeki ehemmiyetini anlamann zaman gelmitir" diyenler de ortaya kyordu (Yldrm, 1935, Say: 127 ve 137). Aslnda, Romanya Trk toplumu arasnda cereyan eden modernleme hareketlerini, o zamann Romen Devleti de hogr ile karlyordu, diyebiliriz. Nitekim, daha 14 Kasm 1878 tarihinde, Romanya Prensi ARL (Carol), Ibrail (Braila) Kasabasndan, Dobruca Halkna hitaben yapt bir ilnda, bir taraftan, Romen Devletinin, Trk-slm toplumunu, himayesi altna almakta olduunu ve dier taraftan da, gerek dil, din ve gerekse gelenek ve greneklerine riayet edileceini resmen beyan etmi bulunuyordu. Sonralar, Dobruca'nm idar tekilat, mezhepler ve adl kurulular, eitim ve retimle ilgili birok yasalarn veya dzenlemelerin uyguland da grlmektedir. Bunlardan bazlar, Dobruca blgesinde yaayan Trk-slm toplumun kaderiyle ilgili ve onun modernlemesine yardm edecek mahiyette yasalar veya dzenlemeler olarak telkk edilebilir. Hatt, Atatrk inklplarn takip eden maddeler, sz konusu inklplarn, Romanya Trk toplumu arasnda uygulanmalarn tevik edici maddeler saylabilir. Modernleme davasnda, Romen Devletinin gstermekte olduu anlay takdirle karlarken, aydnlarmz: "Romen Devleti, her zaman olduu gibi, bu hususta da bizleri hr brakmtr" eklinde yorumlarda bulunuyorlard (ardak, 1938, Say: 10). Hatt, bazlar, daha da ileri giderek, bir taraftan: "Romanya'da yaayan Dobruca Trk, Balkan Hkmetlerinde en byk msamaha ve himayeye mazhar olmu ekalliyet bir millettir" derken, dier taraftan da, "Romen Hkmeti ve milleti de bize lsz bir sempatik vatanda nazaryla, en byk cemlekrlklar ihsan eylemi bir Devlettir" gibi hkmlere de yer veriyorlard (ardak, 1938, Say: 17). Bu gibi cemlekrlklardan bahsederken, ayn Kral Carol, biri Kstence kasabasnda ve dieri de Bkre ehrinde olmak zere, Trk-slm

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toplumuna iki cami de ina ettirmi ve onlar ibadete atrmtr. Bunlardan, Bkre Camisini, Komnist rejim yktrarak, onun yerine, Komnist Partisinin ileri gelenlerine ait bir Ant yaptrmtr. Ancak, onlara o mukaddes toprakta ebediyyen kalmak nasib olmad zira, 1989 ihtillinden sonra, oradan karldlar ve onlarn yerine "Mehul Asker" Ant kuruldu. Bizlere tahsis edilen cami ise, etraf binalarla evrili olup, kefedilmesi mkl bir yerdedir. Zaten, yarm yzyl kadar sren dikta rejimi dneminde, yzlerce cami ve mescitlerimizden, bugn ayakta kalanlarn says, 40-50'yi gemese gerektir. tekiler, yktrlm veya harabeye evirilmitir. Bu itibarla, Romanya Trk-slm toplumu, imdiki durumda, dier dinlere kyasla, en geri saflarda yer almaktadr. Ayn zamanda, ocuklarmza anadilleri olan Trkeyi retmek iin, elimizde hi bir okul binas yoktur. ocuklarmz, deta, tolere edilmi gibi, Romen okullarna ait binalarda, hafta sonlarnda, 2-3 saat Trke okumakla, ana dillerini renmeye almaktadrlar. Bu da, her snf iin, ellerinde ancak bir kitap bulunmak suretiyle yaplmaktadr. Bu ekilde devam ettii takdirde, yarm yzyldan beri anadillerini ancak aile iinde konumaya maruz braklan halkmza, gzel Trkemizi, gerektii ekilde ve yeteri kadar retmenin imkn olmad meydandadr. te, bu gibi nedenlerden dolaydr ki, Romanya'da hl ayakta kalabilen Trk toplumu, bizler, anadilimiz bata olmak zere, her bakmdan, kendimize eki-dzen vermek ve kendimizi ihya etmek zorundayz. ayet, Romanya'da, bundan sonra da, Trke konuulmas arzu ediliyorsa ve eski dnemlerde olduu gibi, gerek Karadeniz sahilinde ve gerekse Tuna boylarnda, camilerimizin ve mescitlerimizin minarelerinde ezan sesleri iitilmesi isteniyorsa, btn imknlarmz seferber ederek, canla-bala almak ve mcadele etmek, hepimizin zerine den kutsal bir grev saylmaldr. Bunlara cevap veremediimiz takdirde, Avrupa'da kenar Trklerini oluturan bizlerin, gemi dnemlerde, Peenek, Kpak ve daha baka Trk kavimlerinin, oralarda, tarihe ml olduklar gibi, er veya ge ayn akibete maruz kalacamzdan kimsenin phesi olmamaldr, kansndaym. te, birka kelime ile de olsa, Romanya'da yaamaya devam eden Trk-Islm toplumunun gelecei hakknda mitvr olabilmek iin, kendi gcmzn yansra, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinin de, hatt, tm Trk dnyasnn da, yakndan ilgilenmeleri gerektiini ve zamann, her gn veya her yl ile, biraz daha gelip gemekte olduunu bilgilerinize arz eder, sayglar sunarm. 196

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON SLAM AND SECULARISM N TURKEY

Prof. Dr. David KUSHNER* Much has been said and written about the position of Islara in Turkey with a variety of interesting approaches and interpretations. This paper attempts to deal with the subject solely from the point of view of secularist political leaders and public figures who belong to the Turkish mainstream, ignoring for the moment spokesmen of extremes either among Islamists or pious secularists. it is suggested that a characterization of their vievvs would give us an idea of what the common notions on islam and secularism in the Turkish public are. To a great extent these political leaders reflect in their discourse the views of the Turkish elite, if not the vast majority of the people generally, while at the same time they, in turn, make an impact of their own on Turkish public opinion. The paper is based on the speeches and statements of different Turkish leaders. On the danger of fundamentalism or reaction in Turkey, political leaders can be said to have displayed a mixture of elf confdence and apprehension. Confidence in the survival of the secular order has been typically expressed by those who were criticized by their political opponents for tolerating manifestations of reaction or cooperating with Islamist groups. it has also been typically expressed when talking to concerned westerners worried about the fortunes of secularism in Turkey. Virtually every political leader has, at one time or another, shared this confidence with several reasons mentioned: the constitution was a suffcient guarantee against reaction and would simply not allow a return to the old order; the secularist politicians and parties themselves were alert to the dangers and would not allow a return to the past; and the fact that secularism, in the eyes of many of these leaders, has had time to establish itself in Turkey and that the principle of secularism has been internalized by the new generations which rose after the Kemalist revolution.
University of Haifa.

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And yet, this elf confidence of the Turkish secularist elite has not prevented political leaders from voicing their concems and worries ver the threat of fundamentalism. This might sound contradictory but is explainable, first, in terms of the political battle between parties and politicians and, secondly, in terms of the common fear that even though fundamentalists vvere perhaps not going to win the war, they might stili win some battles along the way. There have been two main sins which Islamist groups have been accused of by the secularists: For one, the Islamists wished to return Turkey to a medieval order, with its outdated notions and rules. in Kenan Evren's speeches, for example, we can find strong attacks on reactionaries on this account. in his view the old beliefs and practices of the Islamists did not befit modern nations and just as they vvere the reason for the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the past and threateen Turkey's progress in the present1. The other sin attributed by the secularist leaders to the Islamists, has been their exploitation of religion for political purposes. Secularists have argued that the goal of these groups was not at ali religion but to gain political power for themselves and in this sense these movements vvere political not religious. in the process they have not only mixed religion with politics -a grave matter in itself- but helped enhance division and strife vvithin Turkish society. They have also committed a serious offense against religion itself which by nature preached love and brotherhood. With ali their attacks on fundamentalism and reaction, secularist leaders have alvvays stressed that their criticism had nothing to do with islam itself. Secularism did not mean being anti religious or atheist and the fact was that in Turkey, while the state was secular, the people vvere not vvithout religion-they vvere by and large Muslims. Moreover, for the people of Turkey, islam vvas not just a mark of identity but, as many leaders vvould say, a living and practiced religion. As Sleyman Demirel nce described them the Turks vvere, in fact, the "best Muslims"2. Turkish leaders vvould often describe themselves, too, as actual believers. in the vvords of Erdal nn, for example, "Our religious sentiments are our 3 most lofty and sensitive ones" and as Evren recalled, even Atatrk vvas not a man vvithout religion (dinsiz). His sole purpose vvas to separate religion from politics and save religion from fanaticism (yobazlk)4. The concept of islam that emerges in the pronouncements of Turkish leaders is then of a religion vvhich is totaly devoid of extremism and fa1. 2. 3. 4. Speech in Kastamonu, 13 August 1983, Cumhurbakan Kenan Evren'in Sylev ve Demeleri, 1982-1983, (Ankara, 1983), p. 382. Turkish TV, 22 April 1992, quoted in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), Central Europe and the Balkans, 24 April 1992. Anatolia in Turkish, 3 July 1993, quoted in FBIS, Daily Report-West Europe (DRWE), 6 July 1993. Speech in Kahramanmara, 17 January 1981, Cumhurbakan Kenan Evren'in Sylev ve Demeleri, 1980-1981, (Ankara 1981), p. 164.

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naticism, is stripped of ali medieval rules, and has no role to play in shaping political institutions. it is, instead, a declaration of faith in God and his messenger, and a moral message. As prescribed in the Holy Book, it enjoins man to abstain from evil, do good and carry out certain religious rituals and social duties. it is a religion which is based on the principles of love, brotherhood, peace, equality and justice. The value of islam for Turkish society is seen accordingly on several levels: it is an instrument for elevating the moral standards of society; it serves, together with national values, to combat foreign and destructive ideologies; and most important, it plays a crucial role in unifying society and nation. it does so because it is, after ali, the common denominator between people which transcends divisions of sect, religious order or ethnic background and also because its very teachings do not permit rancour and feud, but speak of love and brotherhood. As such it is closely bound with Turkish nationalism itself. This point was explained by zal: What holds together or rather brings together our unity and our cohesiveness is the fact that we are ali citizens of the Turkish Republic. This is the frst point. Everybody who lives in this land, everybody who was born here and everybody within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic who is a citizen of this country is a frst class citizen... with no distinction being made. Our state is secular. But what holds our nation together and what serves in a most powerful way is our national cohesivenesss and what plays the essential role is islam5. it is with this message of islam that, Turkish leaders have, not suprisingly, addressed the various religious and ethnic groups in the country which in past decades have in some cases shown signs of alienation and restlessness. it has been felt that islam, perhaps even more than nationalism, can bring the desired unity among ali these groups. Since Sunnis and Alevis are, after ali, Mslim, and so are Turks and Kurds, islam can serve as an effective link between them. it is no wonder that in speeches delivered in reegions where Snni Alevi strife was evident, and vvhere Kurdish militant groups have been active, Turkish leaders would often emphasize this common religious belief. Furthermore, it is with this kind of islam, a religion of faith, ritual and moral and social message, that Turkish secularist leaders have been ready to promote among people, vvhether through sermons in mosques or in religious classes in the school system. Some secularist intellectuals, it is true; may have rejected any role in Turkey for islam, but virtually ali political leaders have seen the need for it. in this sense, the Trk islam Sentezi, has not only been the article of faith of a particular group among
5. Milliyet, 30 January 1989.

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intellectuals or politicians, but has been shaped by ali of the mainstream political leaders. With this brief expose of islam in the eyes of mainstream Turkish leaders, two basic questions come to the fore. One has to do with the compatibility of the secularists' conception of islam and the traditional one. it has been widely accepted, after ali, that islam does regulate the behavior of believers in every aspect of their lives and sees the political organization of the religious community as an important foundation of religion itself. How is it possible to reconcile this with the view of islam which resolutely rejects any notion of a religious-political community and the binding character of the Holy Law? Remarkably, some of the public figures and politicians have adressed themselves to the problem. According to Erdal nn, his was the very reason Atatrk and his associates were forced to set boundaries between what was regarded as the affairs of the state and the affairs of religion and view islam as a religion of faith and ritual alone6. in this sense, Atatrk may have been a religious reformer himself. zal, on his part, stated that islam should not actually be seen as one single path but a middle road, and there were many ways of compromise between the paths7. What was needed perhaps was a fresh lok at islam and Evren may have been pointing in that direction when he claimed that certain Koran verses ostensibly sanctioning outmoded rules had not been properly interpreted8. The most interesting statement, perhaps, belongs to Demirel, in whose speeches one often detects and intellectual bent. Many times, he said, secularists did not understand islam while Islamists did not understand secularism. He admitted that some of the laws in islam actually deal with earthly issues and regulate relationships betvveen mand and man, which are, according to the strict secularist approach, the domain of society alone. But though Turkey may have deviated from this in her legislation, these laws were adapted to the conditions of the time just like had been done in early islam and just like what was done in other Mslim countries. it is true that the Koran refers to the rule of God, but the right of a nation to rule itself is not contradictory to the divine orders of God. in his words: Many times in the Koran God telis the Muslims to rule the country through justice. God also says give the right to rule to those who are capable. Here we see that God wants the people to be ruled by the people. So, ifyou hand power ver to those who are capable of running the country, then you are fulfilling God's yvishes. The country may stili be considered. Mslim and is considered so by others9.
6. 7. 8. 9. TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, 20 January 1987, B: 56, O: 1, p. 55 Cumhurbakan Turgut zal'n...Konuma, 5 March 1991 (Ankara 1991), pp. 18-19. Speech in Van, 24 August 1983. Evren 'in Demeleri, 1982-1983, p. 422. Turkish Daily News, 21 April 1994.

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The other question relates to the compatibility between islam's role in society and state as seen by the secularists and the principle of secularism itself. This is essentially a debate betvveen secularists, and more specifically betvveen those who are prepared to give islam a greater role in society and those who consider themselves the devout guardians of secularism. The mere view of Turkey as Mslim country has been one issue of debate. Referring to the above quoted statement by zal on islam as a factor making for cohesiveness in Turkish society, one commentator, Cokun Krca, for example, raised his objection saying that zal's words were contradictory to the nationalist conception. "Defining the foundation of society as religion", he said, "would, in addition to dividing citizens according to religious and philosophical beliefs and practices, also produce the result of splintering society by ethnic group. That is why secularism and nationalism are a whole"'. The issue featured strongly in the late 1960's vvhen Turkey decided to join the Islamic Conference. Some writers and commentators raised the question vvhether this was in accordance with secularism, and government leaders sounded somevvhat hesitant at first about the move and opted for a kind of gradual affiliation with reservations put on resolutions. in answer to criticism, they would refer to the fact that Turkey's population was, after ali, Mslim, that it shared a heritage with other Mslim countries and that the organization was political, not religious. With time, challenges and criticisms of this ort have largely subsided. More important, presumably, have been the debates regarding the right relationship betvveen state and religion in Turkey. The most common definition of secularism has been the one which stands on the separation betvveen state and religion. Secularist leaders have ali been united in ruling out any interference by religion in state affairs, but the problem vvas vvhether the state was allowed, on its part, to involve itself in religious matters. Ironically, perhaps, it vvas often the Islamists themselves vvho argued that by regulating vvomen's garb, or religious education, for example, the state vvas acting in a vvay vvhich vvas inconsistent with the total seperation betvveen the two domains prescribed by strict secularism. That the issue vvas problematic vvas admitted by Demirel vvhen he said, "We have one problem vvhen the government vvithdravvs its hand from religion. We have another type of problem vvhen its does not. The secularism of the government is a debatable issue"11. But most secularist leaders seem to have accepted the right of the state to involve itself in religious affairs, if only because the traditional "guardians" of religion could not be trusted to disseminate and promote the right kind of islam. If the state vvants islam to be progressive, and fulfil its proper role in society, it simply had to interfere. Many vvere surprised vvhen the secularist offcers vvho instigated the 1980 takeover in
10. Milliyet, 30 January 1989. 11. Nokta, 13Octoberl991.

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Turkey initiated the expansion of religious education in state schools, but Evren explained this in the follovving terms: Our children will thus learn about their religion in state schools, through state lessons. in this manner we are serving the principles oflaicism. Laicism does not mean that the citizens should be left ignorant on the issue of religion and thus be left in the hands of the instigators of sectarian differencesn. One aspect of secularism, most common in addresses made to members of different denominations or sects vvithing Turkish society or else in those directed to the outside wold, has been "religious freedom". Each citizen is allowed to believe in whatever religion or faith he wishes, or not to believe at ali. As put by Tansu iller, "the concept of contemporary laicism which means that the state will respect the right to beliefs and function independent of these differences in belief will continue to be our fundamental principle"13. Obviously, no challenges to the principle of religious freedom could have appeared in the discourse of political leaders, but this definition of secularism could also be pen to question. Did religious freedom hinge upon the state being secular? Was it not possible for states based on religious foundations to be tolerant towards other religions, or, conversely, could secular states not be hostile to one particular religion or religion generally? These questions seem not to have featured at ali in the pronouncements of political leaders. However, it has been noted by some that the Ottoman Empire vvhich was far from being a secular state, stili did not limit the freedom of religion and allovved its citizens to practice whichever religion they wished14. in any event, vvhatever contradictions exist between the Turkish secularists' view of islam and the traditional conception islam, or between islam as they see it and strict secularism, political leaders are, of course, excused if they are sometimes inconsistent or do not succeed in bridging between al these concepts. The point to stress is that for Turkish political leaders both islam and secularism have been important in serving the interests of Turkish society and state in that they uphold the prime goals of national unity and territorial integrity. islam can be used to bridge betvveen different ethnic groups and denominations, while secularism serves the same purpose by lessening the value of religious differences. islam is the obvious link between Turks and Kurds. For the members of the different Mslim denominations and sects both islam and secularism are instrumental. in its broad lines islam is, after ali, shared by ali of them, but if this is not enough, one has secularism to obliterate the
12. Speech in Erzurum, 23 July 1981, quoted in SWB-Middle East, 25 July 1981. 13. TRT TV, 30 June 1993, quoted in DR-WE, 2 July 1993. 14. Metin Gven, President of Council of State, Dnya, 21 February 1994.

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religious differences. Secularism is also important as supporting the integration of Turkey's non Mslim minorities and is valuable in facilitating Turkey's integration in the family of Western nations. in conclusion, ali too often secularism in Turkey has been seen as being motivated predominantly by the need to overcome the forces of reaction and to ensure the country's modernization. Equal value should be given, however, to considerations of national unity. These considerations must have played their part in Atatrk's promotion of secularism, and they are certainly recognized by present day political leaders. But islam, too, although not a constitutional principle, has had an importance of its own and should be recognized for what it is -a vital bond holding Turkish society together. Their coexistence is nothing new in Turkish history. Back in Ottoman times statesmen spoke in Ottomanist terms to win ver the non Muslims and in the process accelerated the process of secularization of the state. At the same time they continued to uphold the religious institutions and symbols of the Empire for the purpose of assuring the loyalty of their Mslim citizens. Facing similar problems, Turkish statesmen in both periods followed similar policies and there is thus more continuation between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic than meets the eye.

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THE ESSENCE OF SECULARISM-LAND SHALL BY LAW BE BUILT

Erik CORNELL*

When the Ottoman Empire some 200 years ago commenced its policy of modernization the decision was taken against a background of repeated military defeats. it was obvious that somtehing had to be done to regain strength and ability equitable with the Central and West European powers. Not only military technology but also military training -i.e. not only technical capacity but also psychological aspects- had to be brought back to international standards. This second aspect met with resistance from conservative circles who believed that technical capacity could be imported in isolation. A grovving realization that modernization required not only modern weapons but must be accompanied by psychological and intellectual aspects led, after some half century to the introduction of 'Tanzimat', the Ottoman policy of Reorganization of the 1830's, which can be compared to the Soviet Union's 'perestrojka' of the 1980's. When reorganizing a key issue consists of the introduction of new laws and the reformation of the entire legal system. Consequently Tanzimat brought with it the importation of Western laws and the establishment of law courts which coexisted with but, however, were not allowed to contradict Sharia. This meant that the constitution of 1876 consequently established a Parliament which was no legislative body as this power stayed with the Sultan/Caliph as the representative of God. II A characteristic feature of the Western legal system is that its roots go back to pre-Christian times-Roman law and the various laws of the Germanic peoples. in Sweden for instance the provincial laws were kept alive through oral tradition and the oldest manuscripts date back to the 13th century. On that basis a unified body of laws for the whole country replaced them in the 1350's and remained valid untill they were in turn
Former Ambassador of Svveden to Turkey; Bromma.

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replaced by new and revised laws in the year 1734, which is stili the symbolic date of the now existing law of the land. it is interesting to note that in 1347 the Church refused to accept changes in its status and consequently in Sweden no new church law, valid for the whole country, could be promulgated. it is incontestable that the Church exerted a strong influence on legislation but the example mentioned clearly illustrates how secular law was able to assert itself. it managed to do so not only against religious domination but also against the absolutism of kings. in vvestern societies there has been ali through history a medley of legal counterweights to absolute power, be it from the side of religious or temporal powers: local assemblies with judicial rights, feudal lords, parliaments, estates, guilds and similar institutions which managed to safeguard and legalize inalienable rights for individuals as well as for corporations. Certainly these rights could be violated or abrogated, as illustrated by e.g. the inquisition, but only temporarily. From these starting-points, in spite of numerous setbacks, development slowly proceeded along the ne or stages: state governed by law -democracy- human rights. To explain this development two factors, related to religion, should be highlighted. The first is Jesus's maxims "My kingdom is not of this world" and "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar's and unto God the things which be God's". The second factor is that Christianity started as the religion of the oppressed who during the first centuries were persecuted by the Roman state. Disobedience to overlords as welll as the individual's right to protection against the state enjoyed religious sanction from the very outset. Violent oppression was nevertheless often abused by both religious and temporal powers. But the dualism betvveen State and Church encouraged propensity for change and facilitated the secularization process of Western countries. it was of paramount importance that the religious establishment could not monopolize the educational system. When universities were established they had separate faculties for theology and for law. III By contrast islam was the religion of the conquerors and the religion comprised the law. From the very beginning the ruler's power and religion were united. This meant a totaly different attitude to state power and to people of another opinion. The cold hard truth of these divergent attitudes is to be found, on the one hand in the original Christian sanction of rebellion against state power and, on the other hand the claim of islam to represent an order of state and law vvhich is founded on divine revelation. The fundamental validity of this divergence must not be blurred by contradictory historic events and circumstances. it is an undeniable fact that religious tolerance was much more characteristic of the world of islam than of Christianity, as exemplified by the treatment of Jews and the 206

'Millet' system of the Ottoman empire. This is a reflection of power politics. Unbelievers did not constitute a threat to the Caliphate in its heyday vvhilst the Christian states at that time in their fight for survival cultivated intolerance. During later centuries and especially under colonialism the situation became reversed. in principle there existed no source of law or legislative power other than Sharia. But, as Prof. Feyzioglu has also shown, the running of the enormous and complex Ottoman Empire made it inevitable to institute legal regulations "which were not of eriat origin, and sometimes not even compatible with it". An interestinge case in point is the 'Devshirme' system whereby Christian boys were forcefully converted to islam and served as the Sultan's slaves both as soldiers and civil servants up to the posts of Pasha and Grand Vezir-in spite of the fact that the Koran prohibits both conversion by force and a Moslem to be the owner of Moslem slaves. The very concept of law could not avoid being influenced by an order where not only the rank and file of Government service but also the Empire's highest dignitaries by definition had limited legal capacity. it becomes an observation only, not a conclusion, that lawmaking and legal practices are an expression of human activities aimed either at control ver society for the rulers' own benefit, or aimed at progress and improvement to society. As such law-making constitututes a creation and expression of human thought. If a 'fetva' proves unrealistic, as the famous one prohibiting the use of a printing press, the reason could only be a human shortcoming. If individuals who are responsible for such shortcomings are allowed to exert a dictatorial or monopolistic influence, propensity for change will be strangled and progress will not be achieved. Monopolistic influence inevitably leads to failure and must be replaced by a procedure which encompasses popular participation, i.e. manifestation of "common sense" in the original and true meaning of the expression. IV Thanks to the reforms in practice and thought introduced by Tanzimat a base for the creation of a secular Turkish Republic already existed. However, the forces of tradition and resistance to change were stili strong and Atatrk had to overcome them in order to accomplish his task, which was based on the conviction that ali political power should derive from the will of the people. The unprecedented size of this task and his performance has been eloquently illustrated by the great historian Toynbee, who wrote: "Imagine for a moment that in our Western world, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the scientific and intellectual revolution at the end of the 1700's, the French Revolution, and the industrial revolution had ali been compressed into one human lifetime...". To this list must, I think, be added both the thorough legal reforms as manifested in e.g. the

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introduction of Code Napoleon, and also the progress of parliamentary democracy of the 19th century and of Atatrk's own times. Atatrk inspired one of the most far-reaching legal reforms in history, the consistent fullfilment of the reforms initiated by Tanzimat in securing the supreme rule of secular law. He also made sure that the will of the people became reflected in legislation by a freely elected legislative body. Atatrk's impressive successes in this field are ali the more admirable when the political and intellectual climate of the 1920's and '30's is taken into consideration. At the same time that Atatrk founded the Turkish Republic and set up the future route according to the famous six arrows, a number of both Western and Eastern European countries experienced serious setbacks into dictatorship and lavvlessness. These countries were liberated partly due to a devastating war from which Turkey was spared, partly thanks to the principle finally acknowledged ali ver Europe only a few years ago, that political power must derive from the will of the people.

The theme of this Conference is "Atatrk and Modern Turkey". Against the background sketched above it is easy to state that without Atatrk there would be no modern Turkey as we know it. His vision was farsighted and cleared the way for propensity for change both immediately and gradually, depending on conditions set by the circumstances. This method reveals that his intention was to create, not only a political system satisfied with its own achievements, but a vigorous society capable of coping with ali the unforseeable challenges with vvhich it would inevitably be confronted in both the near and distant future. This inspiration served Turkey well during Atatrk's lifetime, and our presence here today bears witness that it has also served Turkey well since his demie. Moreover, it teaches us that the struggle for the preservation and continuous refnement of these democratic, scientific, and intellectual goals demands vigilance and conviction from the men and women of each emerging age class. Each generation must again and again, like links in a chain, in a never ending process be convinced of the validity of these goals and the necessity to defend them. This is a concern not only for the Turkish people and Turkey; it is valid for ali of us regardless of his or her place in life.

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ATATRKLN ADALIK GR LE SLAMI GELENEKLERN BR SENTEZ VAR MIDIR? CUMHURYET TRKYES'NN FKR HAYATINDAK GELMELER: SMHA AYVERD RNE
Nazl KANER*

Bugnk sempozyumda sunmak istediim tebliin konusu ilk bakta belki baz sorulara sebep olabilir, nk Smiha Ayverdi gibi, eserlerinde Atatrk'n ad hemen hi gemeyen ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluunu, muhteem Osmanl-Trk tarihinin biti noktas sayan, mutasavvf, tutucu-mslman, hatta reaksiyoner bir yazarn, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75. kurulu yldnmn konu alan bir sempozyumda ne ilgisi olduu sorulabilir. Smiha Ayverdi 1905 ylnda dodu, 1995'te vefat etti. Yaam Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin tm devam sreci iindedir. Biyografisi, yazar olarak eserleri ve dier btn etkinlikleri -ki burada onun sempozyumumuzla olan ilikisi ortaya kyor- Cumhuriyetin kurulduu 1923 ylndan, gnmze kadar ki, sosyo-politik gelimelerle karlkl bir etkileim iinde bulunmutur. Onun rnei Cumhuriyetin ilk dnemindeki Atatrk reformlarnn belirli insanlarn kiisel yaam duygularn nasl ve ne lde etkilediklerini, te yandan da bu etkilerin yansmalarnn ne suretle toplumda nem kazanabildiklerini gsterecektir -ki burada Trk-slamsentezi gibi bir ideolojinin gelimesine bulunduu katk da ortaya kmaktadr. Konumuz "Atatrklk ve Modern Trkiye"dir. Tebliim Atatrk devrimlerinin belli bir blmne: tarih, mill tarih olarak yeniden yazmak suretiyle yeni bir kimlik yaratmak giriimi ile ilgilidir. Ayn zamanda Cumhuriyet'in ilk dneminde balayan bu srecin gnmzde ne lde -zellikle Osmanl tarihine baknda- belirgin olduu sorusunu tarih ak iinde ele almak istiyorum.
* Freiburg niversitesi.

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ok sk belirtildii gibi Cumhuriyet'in kurucular, Cumhuriyet'in kuruluu ile birlikte, Osmanl gemi ve kimlikleri ile balarn resmen koparmlardr. Bu balamda Osmanl mparatorluunun ykl sebeplerini islam ortamna dayandrmlar ve sadece tarihin Osmanl yzyllarndan deil ayn zamanda slam ile de balarn koparmlardr. zellikle 1920 yllarnn slam' yalnz devlet hayatndan deil, kamu ve kltr hayatndan da uzaklatrma nlemleri belirli rneklerdir. Bat uygarlnn deerlerini bir kltr devrimi eklinde mslman bir halka yaknlatrmaa almlardr. Atatrk'n amac yeni bir ruh yaratmakt: 'kaderci' ve 'tl' Osmanl insann yerine, yenilie inanm, aktif bir insan geecekti. Yeni kimliin, Trk kimliinin -ki bu Trk kavram 20. yzyl balarna kadar daha ok 'kaba, cahil, kyly' tanmlyordu- oluturulmasnn aralarndan biri Osmanl tarihi yerine yeni bir Trk tarihi yaratmak, modern, uygar ve batya ynelmi bir Trkle dayanmak, bir de Osmanl kltr mirasndan uzaklamakt. Smiha Ayverdi'yi Trk fikir hayatnn dikkati ekecek kadar erken bir dneminde, yani 1940 yllarnda, byk zellik tayan bir konu almalarnn temelini tekil edecek younlukta ilgilendirecek ve kendini artk btn hayat boyunca, yakn zamanda esasn slam ile Trkln birletirmesi olarak tanmlayaca Osmanl toplum ve tarihinin parlak ve zlemli anlatmna, hatta topyalatrmasna adayacaktr. Aada 1. Smiha Ayverdi'nin, kltr kimlii veren unsurlarn kopuunun bir sonucunu aklayan ksa bir biyografisini sunmak, 2. Ayverdi ve evresinin politik gelimelerle karlkl etkileniini gstermek ve 3. kendi kiiliinin ve etkinliklerinin, kimlik aray konteksti iinde toplumca benimsenmesini dile getirmek istiyorum. II Smiha Ayverdi 1905 ylnda siyasal kargaa ve bir zlme ortam iinde dnyaya geldi. Yakn tarih ve iinde bulunduu zaman, bir yandan asker yenilgiler, milliyeti aznlklarn isyan ve mparatorluktan kopmalar, te yandan mparatorluu ayakta tutmak iin, batdan ilhamn alan, siyas ve idar reform nlemleri, yeni ideolojiler, yeni fikir aknlarnn birbirine karmasyla belirlenir. Sonunda, Birinci Dnya Sava felaketi ve Osmanl mparatorluunun tarih sahnesinden silinip yerini gen Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne brakt bilinir. Smiha Ayverdi'nin ocukluu ve genlii grld gibi son derece hareketli ve sarsntl bir zamana rastlar. Bu durum onda, sosyal alkantlara zellikle hedef olan bir snfa, eski aristokrasiye mensup olduundan, derin izler brakacaktr: Ayverdi Osmanl konak hayatnn klasik erevesi iinde, bu yaam biiminin gelenek ve alkanlklar ile evrili olarak yetiti. Bu hayatn kendine gre nasl olduunu -uzakta kalan bir gerein ardndan bakarak- kitaplarnda btn ayrntlaryla tarif eder. Eski Osmanl toplumunun sosyal uyum iindeki ortak hayatn, yoksulla210

nn aleyhine deil onlarn faydasna kullanlan madd refah, madd kltrn estetiini ve daha bir oklarn burada vurgular. Oysa ben, Ayverdi gibi o an elit tabakasna mensup olan nesilde bu yaam biiminin kaybolmas zellikle ayn zamanda madd refahn da kaybolmas, sonu olarak yaam gveninin de kaybolmas, derin izler brakp onu etkileyen birinci husus olduunu belirtiyorum. Onu etkileyen ikinci husus ise mutasavvf Ken'an Rif Bykaksoy ile olan ilikisidir. 1908 ylnda stanbul'da derghn kuran Ken'an Rif, Ayverdi'nin de annesinin mridi idi. Onu ocukluundan beri tanyordu ve 1927 ylnda kendisi de o evreye katlarak, nce mridi ve daha sonra 1950'de, lm zerine, halifesi olmutu. u halde Smiha Ayverdi'nin yetimesini (socialization) byk lde belirleyen unsurlar, bir yandan Osmanl aristokrasisinin yaam alkanlklar, te yandan da annesi zerinden kendisine intikal eden slamtasavvufu olmudur. Cumhuriyet'in kuruluunda ve Kemalist devrimler erevesi iinde gerekletirilen sosyo-politik deiimi, devrimcilerin hedefledii kimlik deiimi bakmndan, Ayverdi'nin sosyalizasyonuna damga vuran hususlar ieren bir bak asndan yeniden yorumlamak istiyorum: Bu yeni cumhuriyeti deer lleri iinde, Smiha Ayverdi anakronik, obsolet'in yani Osmanl elitinin ve slam-tasavvuf evresinin temsilcisi olarak modern bir toplum olmak yolundaki engellerin temsilcisi durumuna dm. Buna tepkisini de -ou adalarndan burada ayrlr- bu "obsolet"e bal kalarak gstermitir. III lgi ekici olan, daha sonraki yllarda, bu "obsolef'in an gelime sreci dorultusunda grd kabuldr. Bu balamda, Smiha Ayverdi'nin almalarna -ok snrl da olsa- bir gz atmak gerekir. Ayverdi geni bir edeb eser brakm, bazlarn kendi kurduu bir ok kltr derneklerinde de faaliyet gstermitir. Atatrk'n lm yl, 1938'de, yaynlanan -mistik konulu- ilk roman ile ann edeb eilimlerinin (trend) dnda kalmsa da 1946 ylna kadar yedi roman daha yazm, bunlarda geri tasavvuf ana temay oluturmakla birlikte, Ayverdi ada, bir ok yazarn ilgi gsterdii ve 1950 yllarna kadar edebiyat dnyasnn balca temas: batllama konusunu da ilemitir. Ayverdi'nin dilei din ahlak ve dounun geleneklerini anlatmakt. Bat nndeki tutumu, batnn deer ve ilkelerini kendi kabule ak olmamakla birlikte, batl renim ve retimi gerekli grdnden, bat kart olarak nitelendirilemez. Ayverdi grlerini 194O'l yllardan itibaren belirli bir deiimin gzlendii fikir dnyas iinde savundu. 1946 ylnda ok partili sistem getirilmi, Islamn kamu hayatna dn (1945-50 yllar arasnda kurulan 24 partiden sekizi slam karakter ve amalarn aka vurgulamlard) ve Trk milliyeti akmlarn yeniden canlandnn ilk iaretleri grlmeye balanmt. Bu akmlar giderek karlkl etkileneceklerdir. 1950 ylnda yaplan seimlerin sonucunda Demokrat Parti iktidar olur. De211

mokrat Parti, nde gelen yneticilerinin devletin seklerlik ilkelerine dokunmamak iin byk aba gstermelerine, din siyasete kartrmyacaklarn ve din akmlar cesaretlendirmeyeceklerini vurgulamalarna ramen, gerek seklerlik anlayna gerekse seklerliin uygulanmasna belli bir lde genilik getirdi. 1950 yl Smiha ve kardei mimar Ekrem Hakk iin nemli bir yl olur. Ekrem Hakk ve Aydn Yksel "Fetih Cemiyeti"ni kurarlar. Gene Ekrem Hakk'nn katlm ile, etken yeleri arasnda Smiha Ayverdi'nin de bulunduu "stanbul enstits" tesis edilir. Bu derneklerin hedefi ncelikle din deil, tarih stanbul kenti ve Osmanl mimarisiyle uramaktr. Osmanl kltr ve geleneklerini tekrar canlandrmak gayesi n plandadr. Ne var ki bu abalarn ardnda, cumhuriyeti tarih yazmnn geliimine bir gz atmamz gerektiren belli bir tutum yatmaktadr: Cumhuriyet milliyetiliinin yerlemesi ile Trk tarihi fiilen yeniden yazlm oldu. ok halkllk kimliini temsil eden Osmanl kavram 19. yzyl ak iinde ve aznlk milliyetilii karsnda anlamn kaybedince, yerine baka bir kavram getirmek gerekti. Saray vak'a nvislerinin geleneksel tarih yazmnda "hanedan tanrsal irade tarafndan ynetimine gnderilen ebed devlet" ("devlet-i ebed'mddet") kavram aznlklarn milliyetilik akmlar srecinde anlamn kaybetmi, ortaya yeni bir gereke kmt. Bu gr, bir yeni Trk tarihinin varln idrak ettikten sonra bu tarihin slam ile ilikisinin nasl olmas gerektiini irdeledi: ya slam tarihi iinde ya da tamamen ondan ayr -ve ncelikle kendi mill devletinin meruiyetinin hangi temele dayandrlaca. Balangta milliyetiliin slam'la badat savunulurken, Atatrk bir bakma "Trk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti"nin ncs olarak 1928/30 yllarnda, Osmanl tarihini reaksiyoner olarak gsteren ve Osmanldan nce var olan, zgr ve demokratik bir Trk ulusunu ona kar karan Trk Tarih Tezini ortaya att. 1931'de kurulan "Trk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti" (sonradan "Trk Tarih Kurumu" adn almtr) tarafndan yazlp yaylan bu resm Trk tarihi zellikle yeni Cumhuriyet'in yaymlad okul kitaplarnda grnyordu ve Osmanl devletini olumsuz tasvir ediyordu. Bakentin Ankara'ya tanmas, dilin arap ve farsa szcklerden arndrlmas ve Trk dilini btn dillerin kayna ilan eden "Gne Dil Teorisi" gibi modeller, "z Trklk" dncesinin ve Osmanl gemiinden soyutlanmak siyasetinin en belirli rnekleridir. Bir sre Osmanl devleti, Orta Asyadaki "Altn a"n yannda kabul edilmez nitelikte saylmtr. Artk bu deiecekti. Atatrk milliyetilii millete gurur duyaca yeni bir kimlik ve gemi vermek istemekle beraber aslnda az ya da ok belirgin baz eksiklikler brakmtr. ok zaman temalatnlan, yeni bakenti ina iin Ankara'ya giden baz Cumhuriyet aydnlarn rahatsz eden stanbul hasreti bunun sembolik bir ifadesini tar (mesela Yakub Kadri Karaosmanolu "Ankara" romannda Cumhuriyet aydnlarnn bu ruh durumunu anlatr). imdi burada konuyu tekrar Smiha Ayverdi'ye balayabiliriz. Ayverdi, deindiim gibi, Cumhuriyet elitinin balangta ortadan kaldrmak 212

istediini, bilinle ve dorudan doruya temsil etmektedir: Cmhuriyet'in bir bakma tahtndan indirdii stanbul tarafndan temsil edilen Osmanllk ve slam'la zdelemek. Smiha Ay verdi ve onun mistik -din evresinin tutum ve etkinlikleri, Cumhuriyet'in yaratt bu eksiklikleri hedef alyordu. Onun 1950 yllarndan itibaren, kendince zc ve ykc saylan- ve artk Trk ve slam geleneinden kopmak olarak yorumlad -Osmanl gemiinden kopmaa kar kmak forml altndaki almalar, bir kimlik boluunu doldurma abas olarak nitelenebilir. Eski mparatorluun sembol stanbul'u youn bir tartmaya amann ilk adm olarak daha nce anlan iki dernein ("Fetih Cemiyeti" ve "stanbul Enstits") kurulmas da, olduka yeni bir eilimi gsterir. Osmanl ve slam tarihini yeniden 'kefetmek'- ve bu tarihe yeni bir unsur, Trk milliyetiliini, katmak. Smiha Ay verdi 1952 ylnda iki bakmdan anlmaa deer "stanbul Geceleri"ni yaymlad. stanbul'un eitli mahallelerinin tasviri Ayverdi'yi 'eski', Osmanl Trkiyesi zamanna gtrr. Bu Trkiye ona, Trklerin kendi elleri ile gelitirip incelttikleri, ancak bat etkisi ile yozlaan uygarln -bu dnemin ada edebiyata soysuzlam saylp reddedilmesine ramen- hznle hatrlatr. Ve Ayverdi burada ann gemii alglama tarznn da ak bir eletirisi olan kendi anlayn dile getirir: "gemi zamana harb iln etmek onunla olan mnsebet ve ainalmz bir cehil ve gaflet sngs ile tepelemek de gene bizi kurutup tketir. nk bugnk gn, dnk gnn yuvarlana yuvarlana u zamana geliinin oldurduu bir keyfiyettir. Biz gemiimizin meyvesiyiz ". Pedagojik amalarn ise 1964'te kan ve aile tarihi olan "brahim Efendi Kona"nda belli bir ekilde aklyor: "Biz, mparatorluk Trkiyesi'nin hemen de son evldlar. (...) grp duyduklarmz, tadp kokladklanmz, kudretimiz lsnde, gelecek nesillere intikal ettirmek mecburiyet ve mes'liyetinin altnda bulunuyoruz". Burada sultanlk kuann son mensubu, grg tan bir ocuk ve eski toplumu benimsemekle kalmayp, kinci Sultan Abdlhamid'i iddetle savunan bir tutucu olarak, batmakta olan, daha dorusu batm bir dnyay anlatr. mparatorluun yklmasndan itibaren ykselmekte olan Trkiye'yi mill uyann bir eseri olarak kabul etmez, tam tersine, ncelikle batnn zararl fikirlerinin etkisi, Gen Trkler, masonlar ve Selanik dnmelerinin eliyle, Trk-slam birlii ve kltrnn ykl olarak grr. Artk "Osmanl" kavram Ayverdi iin "Trk-slam birlii" kavram ile e anlamdadr ve milliyeti fikirlerin onun slam-mistik temeline yaptklar etkiler ok ak bir biimde grlr. slam ve Trk milliyetilii bileiminde Ayverdi nihayet dncelerinin somut erevesini bulmu ve yazlarn artk bu ereveye sdrmdr. Ne var ki Ayverdi yepyeni bir dnceyi benimsemi olmuyordu. slam ile Trkln birletirilmesi fikri yzyl balarnda Ziya Gkalp ve Yusuf Akura gibi baz milliyetileri de heyecanlandrmt. Mesela Halide Edib Advar'n 1912 ylnda yaymlanan topik roman "Yeni Turan"da, radikal Trkln savunucular "Yeni Turan213

llar"n mzii dinsel bir biim ve mevlev karakteri tar ya da mahallenin imam onlarn safndadr. ttihat ve Terakkinin yayn organ "Tanin"de -ki "Yeni Turan" o gazetede tefrika edilmiti- 1918 ylnda yaymlanan bir ba makalede "Trk kltrnn yksek ahlak kuvveti" ile "slam ve hilafetin manev kuvveti" birletiinde Trkiye'nin yeniden byk g olaca savunuluyordu. te bu forml 1970'lerde "Trk-slam Sentezi" olarak tanmlanmtr. IV 1961 anayasasndan sonra btn siyasal akmlarn yelpazesinde bir hareketlenme ve sada bir lde yeniden yaplanma grld: slam ve Trk-milliyeti cereyanlar i ie girdiler. Bu gelimede itici g 1960 yl balarnda kurulan ve Trk soluna kar daha etkili bir savam iin ortak bir ideolojinin manev dayanan arayan tutucu Trk aydnlarnn dernei olan "Aydnlar Kulb"nden kaynaklanmtr. Bu kuramsal ereve daha sonra, 1970 ylnda kurulan "Aydnlar Oca" ve onun bakan ve ef ideologu brahim Kafesolu'nun ynetiminde hazrland. Bylece milliyeti ve islamc evrelerin ortak bir ideolojik at -"Trk-slam Sentezi"- altnda birlemesi, geni lde gerekleti ki, bunun ilk baarlar 1970'li yllarda kurulan sa koalisyon hkmetlerinde grlr. Trkslam Sentezi'nin varlk gerekesi Trk kltr mirasnn slam ile kaynamasn ilke alan bir Trk tarihini yeniden yazma talebi iindedir. Trklerin slam'la karlamalar sonunda "mill kltr" meydana gelmi olmaktadr. Trk kltrnn pay toplumsal kurumlarn yaratc gcn olutururken, slam kltrnn pay eriat temelinde bir islam devlet dzeninin kurulumas deil, modern, tutucu, bir Trk mill devletinin inasdr. Trk fikir hayatndaki gelimeler uzun yllar gz nnde bulundurulursa, Ayverdi'nin yaz ve etkinliklerinin giderek ve Trk-slam Sentezi'nin gelimesine paralel olarak "outsider" konumundan geldii grlr. Bu akma ok yakn bulunmakta idi -phesiz burada onun bu akmn oluumuna ne lde katks olduu sorusu akla gelmektedir. Bilindii zere Ay verdi daha 1950'li yllarda Osmanl (yani 'Trk-slam') gemiin benimsenmesi gibi daha sonra Trk-slam Sentezi'nin temel dncesi olarak geliecek konular ele almt. Trk-slam Sentezi savunucularnn etkili siyasal ve kltrel alanlarda nemlerinin giderek artmas, Smiha Ayverdi'nin 1970-1980 yllarnda resm evrelerde mazhar olduu takdirlerden de anlalabilir. Kitaplar okullara tavsiye edilmi, toplumsal ve edeb angajman sebebiyle bir ok armaanlara layk grlmtr. V Gittike artan poplaritesinin gsterdii gibi Smiha Ayverdi'nin edeb ve dier almalarnn Trkiye, daha dorusu stanbul toplumunun belli bir kesiminin ihtiyacna cevap verdii ve onun bu ihtiyac karlaya214

bildii aktr. Pedagojik amalanna gre belli bir evreye, yani Osmanl sonras kuaa dorudan doruya ynelmi, 1960 ylndan itibaren yaam ve eserlerinin genlerde uyandrd ilgi de kantlad gibi, arad hedefe ulamtr. Kendi Osmanl ocukluu ve genliini yazmas istei de, esasen dardan, 1974'te gen bir edebiyat bilimcisinden gelmiti. Bugn hepsi en az sekiz kitapta toplanan anlarn yazmaa balamakla da kendi dndaki beklentilere karlk vermi olmaktadr. ncelikle gen kuakta bu kadar ilgi gren bu anlara gre, temeli slam ve Trklk olan, dil ve uyumlu bir toplum dzeni Osmanl dneminde gereklemitir ve hatta Ayverdi'nin taraftarlarna gre bu dzeni kendi ocukluunda yaad biimi ile nakletmektedir. Ayverdi kendisine verilen o an grg tan nitelii ile, artk var olmayan ve kendince her eyin daha gzel, daha iyi olduu bir a ile gen nesiller arasnda bir kpr olmutur. Ve Ayverdi slam ve Trkl yceltirken hayali bir gemie dayanarak -Trk-slam bir millet olarak- kendi kendilerini yceltmek abalarnn da kayna olur. VI Burada artk kimlik konusuna deinmek gerei ortaya kyor ve buraya kadar tanmladklarmn Trk toplumu iinde baz eilimler ile ilikisinden sz etmek istiyorum. Smiha Ayverdi'nin edeb almalarnn k noktas; bir yanda mistik slam'n yaylmasdr ki, ona gre, bu, Trk'e z nitelikleri ile balantl olarak Trk milletinin insanlarna davran kurallar ve ynleri getiren bir ahlak sistemi, deerler ve normlar sistemi tekil eder; te yandan da bat dnyasna ynelmeyi eletirmektir. Ayverdi'ye egemen olan dnce, Trk toplumunda gzlemlediini sand ve her zaman dile getirdii kltrel kimliin kaybolmas korkusudur. Atatrk devrimleri; daha nce de deindiimiz gibi, Ayverdi'nin kimliinin kaynan oluturan alanlar: Osmanllk, slam, daha dorusu mistik slam hedef almt. Edward Said: "kltrel kimlik kolayca verilmez. Gemiin getirdii birikim, grenek ve gelenekler ve ok eitli kltrel, politik ve sosyal pratiklerin ve ifade tarznn temelinde ortaklaa ina edilir" diyor. Atatrklk birikim, grenek ve gelenekleri kopararak yeni kimlik yaratmak istemiti. Grnen odur ki toplumun btn kesimleri iin muhteval ve srekli bir kimlik tesisinin alternatifi olamad. Kemalizmin eitli yorumlarnn gelimesi, vaktiyle kovulmu baz -zellikle slam'la ilgiliunsurlarn yava yava geri dndn gstermektedir. Smiha Ayverdi'nin eser ve etkinlikleri nceleri kk bir reaksiyoner hcre saylan evresinde ve bu evrenin daha sonra edindii byk sosyo-politik etkenlik, Kemalizm'in yaratt bir kimlik boluuna kar bir tepki olarak yorumlanabilir. slam'la zdeletirilen ve resmen reddedilen Osmanl kltr miras, eksik duyulan bir toplumsal durumu yorumlama rnekleri salayan yeni bir terkible adm adm tekrar canlandrlm-

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tr. Bu yeni terkib islam dini ile Trk milliyetiliinin kaynamasdr. Kaynandan 'mill kltr'n doduu byle bir kltr miras, hem Osmanl gemiine ve buna bal olarak slam gelenee devamllk verir, hem de te yandan 'modern ereve', yani Trk mill devlet dncesi ve bir anlamda da Kemalist miras muhafaza etmi olur. Professr Udo Steinbach da Trk-slam Sentezi'ni ok yerinde olan bir ifade ile "islamisch gefarbter Kemalismus" yani "islamlam Kemalizm" olarak nitelemektedir. Ayverdi'nin abas, 'aydnlatma' vazifesi grmek ve zellikle gen nesilleri kendi anlad biimde tek gerek ahlak sistemi ve davran kodeksi sayd slama yaklatrmakt. Burada gemii kullanyordu. Milliyetilikten doan bir "Trk-slam" Osmanl dncesi, onun ahlak tasavvurlarnn ve ayn anda sosyal uyum iinde birlikte yaamann ideal toplum topyasnn gsterilecei bir dzey oluyordu. Kemalizm'in douu ile birlikte bir negatif kavrama dnen "Osmanllk", ideolojik bir kavram olarak, tersine dnt. Yozluk, knt, gericilik ve hurafecilik olan sembolik ierii, toplumsal uyum, yksek uygarlk dzeyi ve gerek inancn gerek Trklkle sentezi gibi olumlu kavramlarla yer deitirdi. Toplumun eletirisinde lt ilevini koruyarak 'kt rnek' saylrken, bir ideal durumuna geldi. Smiha Ayverdi bu sbstitsyon sreci iinde nemli bir rol stlenir. Ayn anda tarihin hem objesi hem sjesi olarak ve otantik olduu saylan anlarn yazmak suretiyle, eski cemiyetin "gerekten" nasl olduuna, neden yle olduuna ve imdi neden yle olmadna hem tanklk hem de araclk edebilmitir. Byle bir ideolojiyi gen ve Cumhuriyet'te bym nesillerin bir blmnn kendine ekecek gce nasl sahib olabildiini sormak gerekiyor. Buna bir yant bulmaktan ok uzak olmama ramen, bir grn nemli olduunu sanmaktaym; tek yanl olarak kutuplatnlan ve uzun bir zaman ihmal edilen Osmanl gemiinin siyaset alanna ekilmesidir. Sonu olarak u dnceyi ileri srmek istiyorum ki, Smiha Ayverdi'nin almalarnn sebeb ve sonular, Osmanl'dan Trk toplumuna geiin byk deiim dneminde, yani Atatrk'n byk devrimlerini gerekletirdii ve zellikle Osmanlnn yerine modern, Bat'ya ynelmi, sekler Trk yaratmak istedii srele balayan ve bazlar iin hl zlememi olan Trk toplumunun bir ihtilafna iaret etmektedir. Bu 'yeni Trk yaratma' dncesi, zellikle aydn evrelerin geni bir kesimince baar ile gerekletirilmi olsa bile; geride 'dou' ile 'bat' arasnda hl yerini arayan, kendi topluluunu her eyin stnde grmek eilimini tayan ve uzun sre ihmal edilen tarihi ycelterek, adalamakla gittike etinleen geree bir alternatif yapacana inanan bir ktle kalmtr. 216

THE POSITION OF THE CIVIL LAW OF TURKEY N THE WESTERN CIVILISATION

Prof. Dr. Eugen BUCHER* I. Turkish Civil Laws is not only Swiss, but European in character it is common knovvledge that the legislator of modern Turkey when in 1926 codifying its civil law, followed the example of the codes of Svvitzerland, i.e. the Swiss Civil Code (SCC) and the Code of Obligations (SCO), both in force there since 1912. The Turkish and Swiss Civil Codes are (except for minr modifications) identical, therefore allovving the view that Turkish and Swiss private law are the same. This understanding is not only the view of the layman and of foreigners, but is also prevalent amongst the lawyers and in the doctrine of Turkey. Said interpretation of the legal situation in Turkey is most flattering to Switzerland and to every Swiss lawyer but it is correct only, as long as we are prepared to apply the understanding of law as predominant in the heroic periods of the creation of the modern codifications, i.e. the identification of the law with the then fathered codifications or, the other way round, to reduce law to the then born codes. This concept of law is no longer valid but gives more and more room to other views. The celebration of the birth of modern Turkey, including its westernised private law seems to be the appropriate occasion to discuss the consequences of the new understanding of law for the situation of Turkish private law which in many respects is historically exceptional. Eventually it shall be shown that Turkish law is in character Swiss, but at the same time predominantly European.
University of Bern.

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//. Law is increasingly understood as not being represented by codifications exclusively, but by legal tradition For quite a while in Continental Europe the identifcation of law and codifcation has been predominant. This approach attributed unheard authority to the codifications, reducing law to more or less well made texts labelled "codes". But in the last decades things have changed. The evolution since the coming into existence of the great codes has shown that law is a phenomenon much more complex than what can be deducted from the texts of the existing legislation, the rules of the codes not offering more than general guidelines whilst the ali to numerous legal questions raised by daily life may be answered only on a higher level of lawunderstanding. in order to fnd and apply the law correctly it is indispensable to consider not only the vvording of the codes, but legal tradition in a double sense: First the legal tradition as existing before the act of codification, ruling details which where not preserved in the codes which necessarily generalise and abstract from details. Fundamental is the fact that the Codes, \vhatever dimension they may have (be they short as the French Code Civil, or verbose as the old Allgemeine Landrecht of Prussia) can never be comprehensive, i.e. cover ali thinkable problems of life. Second since the coming into existence of the codes a tradition of legal practise and court decisions develops which cannot be disregarded in the future. The court decisions (hopefully inspired by sensible legal doctrine) produce evolution as well as modifcation of the law: By adding rules not provided for in the codes they amplify the law, by departing from what has previously been understood to be the law of the code they change the law from time to time. That the identification of law and codes is no longer admissible becomes evidenced by the fact that in the area of the Civil Law tradition, i.e. in continental Europe (where the concept of codification of the law has its origin), the creation of codes complying with the original great and ambitious concept of codification is no longer possible. Today nobody is prepared to believe that e.g. the French Civil Code, the German BGB or the Austrian or Swiss Codes could in a foreseeable future be substituted by a new national text or by a text created collectively by the European Union: Not only foreseeable divergences of views of the legislators in the substance make such plans illusionary, but first of ali the absence of any generally admitted concept of codification; there would be no agreement on what substance to include rules in a code, everybody being aware that to the unforeseeable bulk of questions raised by daily life at ali events only a modest amount of answers can be provided. The pretension attributed to codes to represent the law in its entirety does not meet reality. But justice must be given whether or not the applicable code is providing an appropriate basis for the issue. Therefore, if the code is silent, another set of rules must become applicable should the

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decision pretend to be based on law. Such rules are valid law even if not contained in a code. This part of law is called most appropriately "tradition", a term making reference to two fundamental elements: - "Tradition" connects law with the dimension of time, i.e. making clear that its sources go back to the past, and its claim to be applied goes to the future, an element missing in the notion of "code" which by its nature is abstract from time, i.e. vvithout any reference to past and future. Law and its rules must be of general application, i.e. not consist in individual and casual decisions. Non-codifed law which necessarily is constituted by single occurrences (court decisions, establishing of rules in treaties by law-authors ete), has no other means to grant the element of general applicability than pretending that its rules come from the past and go to the future. Such generalisation ver time, or continuity, is an indispensable element of non-codifed law, discontinued law being possibly created only by codification. The precondition of generalisation implies furthermore the restriction that principles presented as being exceptional and not supported by general acceptance do not become part of the legal tradition. The element of time opens the possibility to limit tradition time-wise, i.e. at its beginning, at its end or both. Obviously it would be possible in a given context to restrict the notion of a determined tradition to a determined time-period (e.g. the 17th century), to a period ending by the time of the enaetment of a given code or starting vvith the same event. in its nicest concept tradition is vvithout limitation, thereby implying that good law may adapt to changing circumstances but in its core remains unchanged for a considerable and unlimited period. in many contexts -and presumably in this short presentation- the range of time comprised by the term tradition is elf explanatory. - While codes by definition are limited to the area of sovereignty of the state enaeting it, "tradition" lacks delimitation in space and therefore requires specification. Tradition may be limited to the area of a national unit, but may be common to a much bigger area (e.g. the area of a language, to continental Europe or may in some contexts even have global application). For more precision it may be worth-while to finally state that "legal tradition" in the above sense is a remainder, a notion defined by negation, i.e. the law which is not contained in the given codes. it can mean many things. in the present context it should be understood in its largest possible delimitation, i.e. comprising ali law rules, vvhatever their origin may be, which could, be it by direct or by so called analogous application, influence us (may we be lavvyers or laymen) when looking for the aetual law-rule applicable to a legal problem upcoming today. The material representing such tradition comprises the legal literatre and law practice (first of ali the court decisions), may they refer to the period before or after the act of codification.

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///. National codifications lose ground to a supranational approach to law. The excessive authority attributed to the codes as a consequence of their being identified with the law is today not only questioned by their incapacity becoming evident to provide suffcient solutions to the problems created by every days' life. These days the European unifcation is reducing dramatically the importance of national boundaries, thereby necessarily questioning the predominance of the national codes which rely on them: The in Brussels persistently reiterated claim for a unification of the Civil Law of the nations participating in the EU illustrates the reduced authority of the existing codes of the member states regardless the fact that such claim has actually little chance to be realised. This evolution questions the understanding of the codifications as exclusive sources of law and implies the belief in the existence of a legal culture of supranational character and of a common legal tradition existing since time immemorial. Thereby the actual idea to form a unified European Code of Civil Law stimulates and requires an until now unknown interest in the common legal tradition existing before the creation of the modern codes which had put an end to it. This comparative interest (be the comparison historical or inter-local) goes by far beyond the (for the time being not realistic) perspective of European unification of the core area of the European civil law. Therefore it shall involve also Swiss and Turkish researchers and law-teachers although neither Switzerland nor Turkey actually participate in the European unification. IV. To what extend do Swiss (and therefore Turkish) codifications reflect local Swiss or common European traditions? When comparing a national legal system with the legal tradition of a greater area, necessarily the question arises with respect to each of its details vvhether the rule under consideration is influenced by the supranational tradition or constitutes an element developed in the framevvork of the respective national law. To know to what extent two Swiss codifications adopted by Turkey, i.e. the Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO) and the Swiss Civil Code (SCC), show the influence of the supranational continental law tradition or represent legal solutions as developed inside the area of today's Switzerland is a question so comprehensive and general that an answer (which necessarily would consist of thousands of remarks clarifying the background of any and every detail oif the SCC and the SCO) cannot be provided in the present text. Only a few general observations may be presented. Codes never rise out of a legal desert; they presuppose a basis of legal culture and a background of juridical science and theory. in the first

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pait of the nineteenth century such a basis of autonomous character could not come into existence in a small area such as Switzerland, ali the less as at that time said area was predominantly agrarian and as such providing little incentive to develop a class of lawyers having profound professional training. The juridical culture in the 19th century could only consist in the participation of Swiss lavvyers in the legal culture of the neighbouring countries. Personalities such as Friedrich Ludwig Keller (1799-1860) and Johann Caspar Bluntschi (1808-1881), both originated in Zrich (in the early 19th century stili a very small city) studied in Germany and became legal authorities in their home town contributing to the foundation of the University and its Law Faculty (1833). Bluntschli has direct involvement in our problem being the main author of the "Privatrechtliche Gesetzbuch" (PGB) for the Canton of Zrich of the years 1854/56 which did not only receive wide international attention with noticeable impact in Germany but was the most influential model for the SCO and SCC, therefore being part of the historical background of the actual Turkish codes. By mid-century both Keller and Bluntschli made an important career in Germany as law Professors and legal writers, even participating in German politics, their deeds giving evidence of the close intellectual connection of Svvitzerland with the German area. -The main author of the old SCO of the years 1881/83, Walther Munzinger (1830-1873), had studied in Berlin as well as in Paris; he was teaching at the Bernese Faculty i.e. French Law, and his draft of the SCO shows considerable influence of the French tradition. Eugene Huber (1849-1923), best known of ali Swiss authors in Turkey, was for four years Professor in Halle (Germany) before accepting a chair at the Bernese Law Faculty when in 1892 being invited to draft the Swiss Civil Code. As a rule Svviss students of law, whenever they could afford it, performed a substantial part of their studies at German Universities; a tradition which came to an end only in the nineteenthirties. Altogether the involvement in the legal culture of central Europe of Switzerland as well as of the personalities directing the several procedures of codifcation is evident, and likevvise evident the integration of the Swiss codifications in the framevvork of the continental legal tradition. When trying to allocate the content of the Swiss codes either to authentic national Swiss law-sources or to the law-tradition common to ali countries of Europe the assumption will be realistic that the latter (i.e. the European) influence is -contrary to the actually prevailing view- by far more important than that of national character. Said rule is, as may be added, not restricted to the Svviss codes but applies also to a codification such as the German Brgerliche Gesetzbuch (BGB) which is to a much larger extent than realised by the today's German lavvyers indebted to the French Code Civil, to the Zrich PGB and to the old SCO of 1881/3 (see below). Undoubtedly the SCC, considerably more than the SCO, includes a large amount of details which are authentic, i.e. reflecting local lavv221

traditions or being original creations of Eugene Huber. But even when coensidering details of minr importance the assumption of their being of local (national) heritage can be erroneous: The Art. 719/III and Art. 725/11 of the SCC making reference to swarms of bees have been praised as typically Swiss and symptomatic of the legislator's realism and love for details. But looking closer to the history of codifcation one realises that swarms of bees swarm not only in the SCC but in many European codification (see e.g. ABGB of Austria 384, Cdigo Civil of Spain art. 612/1, II, German BGB 958, Italian Codice ivile art. 924) as well as in many codifications of other continents (see e.g. the Civil Codes of Argentina, Art. 2545 and Brasil, Art. 593 par III), the origin and cause of this swarming being the Institutes of Justinian, book 11/1, 14 and 15 dealing with the matter. The most important authentic contributions of the authors of the Swiss codes and their personal merits arefirst the formal presentation of the code-texts, second the wise selection of the one to adopt from diverting solutions offered by the then existing codes and literatre, and thirdly and fnally their having avoided shortcomings and mistakes of other codes, substituting questionable mechanisms by better solutions. it is not questioned that the legislative technique and language of the Swiss Codes, that of the SCO as well as of the SCC, is hardly surpassed by other codes. Inspired by the example of the French Code a model has been developed realising a convincing balance between acceptable legislative simplification and comprehensiveness in substance as far as necessary. The systematic is easy to understand; more than most others the Swiss code may aspire to be consulted and understood even by laymen. important progress has been realised in the law of obligations by evolving the heritage of the French Code Civil (FCC): Remarkable is e.g. that the SCO gives immediate effect to the declaration of the thereto entitled party to terminate a contract as a consequence of non-performance (SCO Art. 107) whereas the FCC art. 1184/111 only admits dissolution of the contract by judicial decision. The same situation exists with respect to the termination of a sales-contract for defects of the delivered object (FCC art. 1648; SCO art. 205) or rescission of the contract for lesion (FCC art. 1674; SCO art. 21). in general the SCO and the SCC in its basic elements are close to the German BGB, although this code is different in style and in the subtance of many details. The similarities may be more the consequence of the lawyers designing the Swiss codes being thoroughly familiar with the German tradition than that of influence by the existing text of the BGB or the drafts to it. -Nevertheless the position of the SCO in relation to the BGB needs special attention. The SCO and the SCC, both becoming effective as per st. of January 1912, create the impression that the SCO is

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subsequent to the German BGB of 1900. That is correct for the the SCO but not for the SCO. The fact is falling more and more into oblivion that the actual SCO is based on the original Code of Obligations of the years 1881/83 preserving its elementary features. Therefore most German lawyers cannot be aware of the fact that a series of very fundamental elements of the BGB are clearly influenced by if not copied from the SCO of 1881/3: - the rule of 326 BGB allowing to rescind a contract if the other party fails to offer performance in due course did not exist in previous codifications in german language nor in the "Dresdener Entwurf" (Draft to a German Law of Obligations; 1866). This solution was first introduced to a modern codifcation by the SCO of 1881/83 and from there taken ver by the German legislator, forerunners being the condition resolutoire, art. 1184 of the FCC and 1401s. of the Zrich PGB (1854/6) which in turn influenced the German Commercial Code of 1861 (seles contract, 354-356; for more details see Bucher, p. 419 ss. in "Pacte, convention, contrat", nelanges en l'honneur de Bruno Schmidlin, Geneva 1998). - Error (and other cases of defective consent) is not nullifying the contract as in the tradition of Roman Law and ali previous codifications including the FCC, the Austrian Allgemeine Brgerliche Gesetzbuch (ABGB) and even the "Dresdener Entvvurf' of 1866 (Art. 59). Instead of constituting nullity it only creates a cause for annulment by the erring partner, a solution better meeting the needs of early clarification of the legal situation in questionable contracts. This innovation was suggested for the first time by Munzinger (Art. 33 of his draft of 1870 to a Swiss Code of Obligations) and became law subsequently in Art. 18 of the SCO of 1881/83 (actually Art. 23 of the SCO). 119-124 of the German BGB are clearly following the example established by the old SCO. Other elements of the BGB have their model and example directly in the PGB of Bluntschli: The innovation to separate the entrusting of the power of representation from the contractural relationship of the parties (i.e. abandon the then generally accepted model integrating the power of representation in the contractual relationship between the authorising and the authorised person; see ABGB of Austria 1002 ss. and even more explicit the Art. 1984-2010 of the French Civil Code integrating the rules of representation in those of the mandat-agency), goes back to 949954 of the Zrich PGB which introduced that system for the first time. it was subsequently adopted by Art. 83-91 of the "Dresdener Entwurf' from where it passed to the BGB (in German literatre thesee merits are attributed to German authors). On the other hand the fact is worth being noted that the authors of the Swiss codes successfully resisted the temptation to follovv the German evolution, i.e. the example of the legislator of the BGB, with respect to some of their decisions which are fundamental but questionable and to-

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day mostly qualified as being unlucky. in the present context three examples may be mentioned: - The Swiss legislator renounced to install the notion of "Rechtsgeschaft" as a key element of contract law and handling of private law relations in general, this notion being on one hand highly abstract and missing any specific relation to practical problems as its content, on the other ambiguous and contradictory. The model followed by ali other codifications to decide on the relevant issues in the context of contract avoids many diffculties caused by said notion. - "Verzug" (mora, demeure, a kind of default) presupposes under the BGB a fault of the non-fulfilling debtor: This prerequisite is neither adequate in the contex of interests for delay nor does it fit the possibility of 326 to terminate the contract for default of the debtor. - in the context of the contract-type of "Auftrag" (mandate) the legislator of the BGB slavishly follovved (and even overstated) the Roman law by establishing the condition of the mandate to be gratuitous, a rule depriving this important type of contract of practical application and leaving the members of the liberal professions, lavvyers, doctors, bankers and other groups, without an adequate contractual basis of their professional activity. V. The antagonism between the traditions of the Continental Civil Law and the Common Law Finally we have to determine what constitutes the so called "contimental" or "European" law tradition of which the Swiss law is a part. The modern civilised world, as far as its law systems are concerned, may be divided in two parts: the group of the English speaking countries on one hand, ali the remaining countries on the other (some interesting intermediate, "mixed" systems or archaic local traditions do not require consideration in the present context). Although these days the theory is prevalent that the differences of these two systems are diminishing and in the outcome of minr importance, the undersigned takes the opposite view and thinks that notvvithstanding similarities on the surface and a process of mutual influence the existing differences are fundamental. The more fundamental the legal issue under consideration, the greater the given divergences. This is explained by history. The diverging evolution of the two systems started when the Normans, having conquered England, established strict rules and order including a well organised framevvork of law-courts there. This event was new and unique for the Middle Ages, a situation in total opposition to what was then known in Europe. in Europe the political power was split in innumerable fractions excluding the emergence of reliable court-systems. Substantive law, as far as determined, was of local applicability only; its diversity hindered its

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being developed or taught properly. The universities as created since the 12th century did not teach local laws which vvhere of limited intellectual interest and doubtful practical importance. Their teaching subject was Roman Law which admittedly had in the first centuries of its being taught no validity and direct applicability. This law was presented as a historical subject but at the same time as an imaginable model of an ideal law which could come into existence in a better future. For the majority of the students the studying of Roman Law may have been simply a means of education in a non-ecclesiastical subject and a medium of intellectual training. Whereas on the continent education in the actual applicable law hardly existed, in England, a caste of barristers emerged forming professional groups (the inns of court) who took ver the professional formation and subsequently even received the competence to elect the judiciary. This legal education provided by the inns was focused on lawpractice exclusively, thereby giving emphasis to its procedural aspects whereas substantive law was of less importance and by tradition considered to be simply the reflex of the existing procedural remedies. Roman law was taught at the English Universities but had, as well as any kind of a thereto related theory, no importance for the application of law and was therefore of no interest to the practitioner of law (Canon Law, originating in the Roman tradition and applicable in succession and family-or maritime matters ~"wills, wives and wrecks" before the Admiralty Courts, makes an exception to said rule but eventually had no permanent influence on the English legal tradition in general). in the outcome, the law tradition as created in England (and subsequently adopted in its outline in the colonies) is determined by the practitioners' approach to law. Theoretical legal treatises having a decisive influence on the substantive law as realised in courts do not exist nor is legislation present which in its importance could be compared with codes of the Continental tradition: The substantive law is basically contained in the court decisions which are binding; by the maxim stare decisis they constitute in their entirety the legal system. On the continent we have the opposite situation: By tradition, Court decisions have no influence on the creation and development of substantive law. Creating and develeoping law has been (and stili is) the task of the legal theory, i.e. legal teaching and legal writing: The Civil Law tradition of the continent cannot be understood vvithout the stupendous phenomenon of the reigning legal theory there, represented on one hand by innumerable law faculties attracting fabulous numbers of students and on the other a prolifc mass production of law books. it was again this tradition of legal theory which created the concept of codification, providing the basis for the drafting of the great codes of private law which up to these days are deemed to be the decisive source of law. it is only very recent that these codes are loosing ground insofar as court practice starts claiming attention and establishing itself as a secondary source of law.

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in our days the antagonism of the basic structures of the two legal systems (mostly called "Civil Law" and "Common Law") continues to dominate the global legal scenery. it consists in the fact that one of them is determined by legal theory which has a background of a tradition of two millenia and being actually reflected to a large extent by codifications, whereas the other gives no room to theory but is relying mainly on the experience of court practice gathered during a couple of centuries. Simplifying the picture on may say that the English speaking countries adhere to the system of England of vvhich they vvere formerly colonies, while the other areas follow the tradition of Continental Europe. This is obvious for the countries being former colonies of Spain, Portugal or France (i.e. mainly Latin America), but the same is true for most parts of the near and the far East as well as for the countries having been formerly part of the Sovjet empire. Whereas the adoption of the Common Lawsystem is practically restricted to former colonies of England, the same is not at ali true for the modern Civil Law tradition: it was created in Europe during almost a millenium and gained in the last three centuries acceptance world-wide: The fact that Japan, old China, Korea and other empires of the far east adopted codes following that tradition, shows that this concept of law was not introduced as a consequence of perseverance of former colonies but as a result of free choice. That is also the situation of Turkey having never been dominated by a foreign power implanting its legal system there. Turkey, by choosing Swiss law as a model for its own codes, declared at the same time its determination to integrate itself into the community created by the European civil Law and integrated itself into the tradition of the Civil law area. Turkey therefore must adhere to the elements characteristic for said tradition. This country seems to be determined to preserve the great clutural heritage of the continental European civil law. That being so, it is bound to follow the approach to law vvhich is dominated by legal theory and science. To adopt the approach to law as prevalent in the English speaking world vvhich renounces to a large extent to reliance on theoretical thinking would constitute a breach vvith a tradition vvhich is its ovvn since three quarters of a century.

VI. Some conclusions as to the fter e of the Civil Law, its being developed and taught The above references to the past should allow some conclusions for the future. As the development of the Civil Law up to its actual status was determined by the evolution of the underlying legal science and theory, the history of continental lavv is the history of the thereto related science and theory. What is the actual situation of this discipline, what are its tasks and actual aims? The most spectacular element appearing in our days and changing the ideas of contemporary society and even of lavvyers

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(by tradition a conservative breed) may be labelled as "internationalisation": an increase of information with respect to other countries, an increase of uniformity of thinking and lifestyle. The consequences for the lavvyers-community in Europe: The need to get acquainted with foreign legal systems and even to familiarise with plans to give up national laws in favour of unifed laws, will result, so we dare hope, in an increased interest for foreign law. Such an interest necessarily leads back to the past, i.e. to times preceding the "nationalisation" of European law and antecedent to the creating of national codes. it was the period of "nationalised" law which put an end to the previously existing common legal culture; the search for a futurecommon legal culture cannot but start from the one existing in previous centuries. The actual evolution favours a change of the thinking and academic habits of the lawyers-community: They are invited to a more comparative approach to law and to an increased integration of past evolutions into the understanding and interpretation of the today's law. This evolution will probably on longer ranges have even more impact in Turkey because there -as will be explained below- the understanding of the law was more than elsevvhere focused on the national codes and neglecting the historical basis of the actual (code-) law. Every act of codification constitutes a long-term risk to legal science and investigation, which are in danger to reduce themselves to an interpretation or even rephrasing of the legal texts --not only neglecting the historical background of the codified law and therefore partly missing to understand the raison d'etre of the existing codes, but disregarding something even more important than the understanding of the codes: the anticipated exposition of possibly upcoming practical legal problems even if those are not covered by codified law offering solutions to them. Historical experience shows that in the twentieth century in France the legal literatre dedicated to the FCC could not maintain its previous standing; the German literatre of the last years is not sufficiently reassuring that it will be able to maintain its previous standard and will not degenerate to an uncritical and mainly technical reporting of actual court decisions and recent legal vvriting. To sum up: History provides some evidence that the creation of a civil code constitutes a shock and long-term threat to our discipline, the science of law. If this is true, the legal researchers in Turkey suffered two shocks and a double threat: The act of national codification, i.e. the creation of the Turkish Civil Code was only one of two events, because the adopting of the Swiss Code led back to the event of the Swiss codification. If the Turkish lavvyer tries to overcome the bar to the past established by his national codification, he does not fnd himself in an ambience of precodification, but in the Swiss procedure of codifying law: His search for the substance as existing before codification and providing the basis for codification must surmount two barriers separating the actual code-law

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from its pre-existing legal background. That may explain that the Turkish scientific tradition is perhaps more unhistorical (i.e. disregarding the tradition preceding the process of codifcation) than that of Switzerland or Germany. Swiss lawyers knowing about the scientific endeavours of their Turkish colleagues are surprised and deeply impressed by their thorough knowledge of the actual Swiss literatre and court-decisions. The situation is flattering both to the courts of Switzerland and to the legal authors of this country. That cannot hinder the undersigned to plead for an increased dedication (be it by reducing the time devoted to the Swiss aspects of their law) to the supra-national and common European lawtradition which is the basis and a constituting element of the Swiss codes and therefore also of the Turkish codes. The material inviting to be considered when looking to the common sources of Swiss and Turkish law may be outlined as follovvs. If we concentrate mainly on the law of obligations and contracts the legal tradition influencing the Swiss codifcation (i.e. mainly the SCO of 1881/3), its main source is the German tradition of the 19th Century and to a lesser extent French law. in the area of today's Germany two lines concurred: The Roman Law-tradition as represented by the doctrine of the "Pandects" on one hand, on the other the then existing codifcations (the Handelsgesetzbuch, some Codes of particular States and, most important, the "Dresdener Entwurf fr ein Obligationenrecht" i.e. the Draft of Dresden for a Code of a German Code of Obligations published in 1866). The French tradition relevant for the Swiss codes was represented by the literatre to the FCC of the 19th Century. More profound investigation will not restrict itself to the mentioned material near at hand. More radical research will take into account that both lines of tradition, i.e. the German as well as the French, cannot be understood without looking into the materials of the preceding centuries. Then Roman Law was dominant, almost exclusively in the German tradition, but contrary to a \videspread view~ also in the French tradition. in Germany authors like Carpzov (1595-1666), Vinnius (1588-1657) or Voet (1647-1713), the latter two of Dutch origin, have been amongst the most influential, in France Jean Domat (1625-1696), author of "Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel" ("The Roman Law principles put in an order as taught by natural reasoning") and Robert Jos Pothier (1699-1772), i.e. the author of a renown "Droit des Obligations". in addition, for the Law of the Coutumes, one has to look to the short "Institutes Coutumieres" of Loysel (round 1600) and Bourjon, who was not only providing a systematic presentation of the principles of ali then existing coutumes but inspired the authors of the Code Civil to the three-partition of its text (Consultation of Roman Law authors of previous generations such as those of the late sixteenth century, e.g. Cujacius and Donellus, or three

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centuries back, Azo, Accursius, Bartolus or Baldus, will be exeptional only). -in order to shovv that an understanding of the actual French code is not possible vvithout going back to its Roman sources two examples may serve: The possibility of legal representation when concluding contracts is introduced to the code by inclusion in the mandat (CC art. 19842010), which rather strange concept can only be understood by knowing that the Roman law tradition rejected altogether representation ("procuration" in the French text) by the rule alteri stipulari nemo potest, vvhilst mandatum was a well established type of contract. The unlucky "effet translatif' of contractual obligations, i.e. the effect to transfer title in the moment of the conclusion of the sales-contract, was not only against the (Roman Law-founded) tradition of the European continent in general, but also against traditional French law. As the undersigned recently tried to show in ZEuP (Vol. 1998, p. 615-669) this surprising substitution of an old and until then not questioned rule for a new system in the Code of 1804 is the attempt to recast the old Roman rule periculum est emptoris (the risk is with the emptor). it is self-evident that not only French law, but even more its German counterpart cannot be understood vvithout considering the legal literatre of the centuries preceding the acts of codifcation. The undersigned cannot refrain from putting a personal footnote to express his vievv that in a long-term prespective the inclusion of some elements of classic Roman lavv both in the curricula of the Law Faculties as vvell as in legal writing will be inevitable. Investigations with respect to the original Roman Lavv may be lef t to specialists; the existing secondary literatre, mainly in German but also in Italian, Spanish, French or English, provides an adequate basis to pen a comparative Roman Lavv dimension for the Turkish lavvyer. it may be added, that as a consequence of the internationalisation of our lives the actual trend favours Roman Lavv vvhich is in many places of popularity previously unknovvn: One of the facts evidencing this allegation is the most comprehensive book of Reinhard Zimmermann, The lavv of Obligations - The Roman Foundation of the Civilian Tradition (st ed. 1990) vvhich had and stili has incredible success in the area of Civil Lavv and not less in that of Common Lavv. This comprehensive publication is perfectly appropriate to provide the reader vvith insight into the background of the actual lavv of obligations as it may add a supplementary dimension to his understanding of lavv in general. Promising signals (as said success of Zimmermanns magnum opus) exist so that actually in Germany as vvell as in Svvitzerland amongst the young generation of lavvyers in academic research there is more interest in understanding the historical background of modern lavv. in the area of Latin speaking countries the connection to the past has never been as seriously interrupted as in Germany and Svvitzerland (Frence, vvhere an unhistoric approach to lavv is deeply rooted for ver a century is an excep229

tion to the other countries of Roman language). Certainly, in the future more should be done in ali these places to understand the past. Turkey, as I tried to show, has good reasons to go the same way. ~A last remark: Turkish Law may now or in the future have the chance to become a model for other countries: We think primarily of some areas of the former Sovjet empire. Not knowing how far actually the Turkish influence reaches: A comprehensive knowledge of the historical background of the Turkish legal system could not only contribute to an even better understanding of their own law by the lavvyers of this country but could make this law better understandable and more attractive to others. VII. Final remark: Die concept of codification as promoted by Eugene Huber and being realised in the SCC Accepting the view that ali codes and also the Swiss and Turkish codes cannot pretend to represent the entirety of law but presuppose the collateral existence of an unwritten, but none the less real and effective law tradition, is diminishing the prestige and importance of the codes. This view inevitably lessens the historic weight of the reception of the Swiss codes in Turkey. The position as develeyod in these lines is apparently apt to reduce the prestige of the Swiss codifications and that of the author of the Civil Code, Eugenue Huber. Be that as it may: Whatever prestige the Swiss Codes and their author have, it is not the consequence of said reception only but in ali events most well deserved. On the contrary: when the community of lavvyers begins to question the validity of the traditional (and in the ideology of codification itself comprised) identification of law and codification today, this position has been anticipated by Eugene Huber, pretending for "his" code application only in cases "which come within the letter or the spirit of any of its provisions" (SCC Art. 1 par. 1, English text by Ivy Williams). This relativism with respect to the importance of codes was at the last turn of centuries much ahead of time, impressing the legal community of that period. The ideas developed here can therefore claim to be in line with the understandineg of the nature and impact of the codes by Eugene Huber.

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TURKEY'S DEMOCRACY N THE 1990s: A RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE VffiW

Dr. Ali KAZANCIGL* The democratization of Turkey has been a cyclical process, alternating expanding cycles (1946-54; 1961-70; 1983-92) and regressive cycles (1955-60; 1971-80; 1993-?). The country was under military rule in 1960-61, 1971-73 and 1980-83. This paper will frst describe, briefly, the latest and stili on-going regressive period. it will, then, analyze some of the long-term features of the Turkish polity, which may help in understanding the up and downs of Turkish democracy. Finally, it will consider the prospects and conditions for a sustainable democratization process. A DECADE OF DEMOCRATIC REGRESSION The 1990s will not be remembered as a particularly favourable period for Turkish democracy. Early in the decade, the 1991 general elections were held in a climate of optimism about the democratic regime's chances of consolidation and its ability to cope with majr challenges such as the Kurdish question, political islam and socio-economic reforms. The nightmarish second half of the 1970s, during which the governments helplessly watched the country sink into a quasi-civil war, the 1980 coup d'Etat and the ensuing equally disturbing three long years of military rule, were left behind. As of 1983, the democracy had gradually recovered. By 1991, it looked as if the elimination of non-democratic features were a serious possibility. After ali, such an outcome would have been well-deserved, given the strong determination shown by the nation to build a democracy through a long democratic transition, which had started with the introduction of multipartism in 1946, and the first free elections in 1950, which saw the victory of the opposition. The optimistic mood soon changed and a spiral of democratic regression set in. Despite the progress democratization had made since 1983, the legacy of the military regime was stili there. The left was permanently disabled, the trade unions, professional organizations, and other civil so* Director, UNESCO, Paris.

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ciety bodies, were cut off from political activities. Democratic politics was severed from its social base. The constraints against political and social plurality were too firmly entrenched in the new Constitution and laws to be dispensed with easily. An important factor in such a pessimistic turn was the absence of parliamentary majorities following the 1991 and 1995 elections. This produced heterogeneous and ineffective coalition govemments, in contrast to the stronger majoritarian govemments of the 1983-91 period. A succession of weak govemments and lack of credible leadership (Turgut zal was, from 1983 to 1991, a controversial but effective Prime Minister) left the majr problems unattended, hence their aggravation. Hence also, the more active involvement of the Army in the political process, as the military bureaucracy was worried about the inability of the civilian power to cope adequately with two issues they considered to be vital: the terroist actions of the Kurdish guerrilla movement, PKK (The Workers' Party of Kurdistan) in South-East Anatolia, and Islamic fundamentalism. Both had grown in the 1980s and continued to do so in the 1990s. The result was the Army's interference in the civilian political process. On 28 February 1987, when the National Security Council -a constitutional body, where the military members are in the majority and elected ones in minority, and which is the real seat of power~ imposed a series of anti-islamist measures upon the coalition government led by the islamist Prime Minister Necmeddin Erbakan, in association with Tansu iller's True Path Party. This govemment resigned in June 1997. The Welfare Party was subsequently banned for anti-constitutional (antisecular) activities, and immediately replaced by the Virtue Party. Whether justified or not, this "soft" intervention was a defeat of democracy. it meant the resurgence of a familiar configuration in Turkish polity: weak and ineffective representative institutions (both the executive and the legislative) on the one side, and a tutelary Army, resuming its role as the ultimate defender oef the secular republic and the integrity of the country, on the other. it is remarkable that, so far, democratization survived such recurrent crises, and expanded again up to a certain point, to take another regressive turn. Within such cycles, gradually, a number of fundamental elements of democracy have been established. They include regular elections; active political parties (but they are clientelistic and their internal functioning is non-democratic) representing different ideologies, rightist and leftist, as well as elitist-secular and conservative-islamist; and the emergence of an organized and dynamic civil society. Hovvever, democratization has not been able to gain enough strength, against numerous anti-democratic features. There is a conspicuous absence of transparency and accountability in the state and public adminis232

tration (Etat de droit, Rechtsstaat). Certain state orgeanizations, including the military and the intelligence service (MT), are not subject to the control of representative institutions. Domestic security issues are to a large extent given to the Army, instead of the polie forces, which are undertrained and under-equipped. There is no appropriate system of checks and balances betvveen the executive and legislative povvers. The Parliament is ineffective, with little investigative powers and not always involved in majr domestic and external issues. The judiciary is not independent. The state security courts are not compatible with an independent justice. The record on human rights and fundamental freedoms is dismal. Numerous articles in the 1982 Constitution are not democratic, and there are sorne 800 laws and decrees stili in force, adopted by the 1980-83 military regime. The above-mentioned democratic deficiencies are well-known to the public opinion. Most of the non-democratic features remain unattended and generate unacceptable situations. There are violations of human rights, torture and brutality by security forces, political assassinations (some 4.000 since 1991), the authors of vvhich are very exceptionally arrested, and journalists in prison (some 40 according to European sources, 10 according to a declaration made by the Minister of Justice in August 1998). Another majr problem is the Kurdish question which has been on the political agenda ever since the PKK started its violent activities in 1984. None of the governments ver 15 years ever seriously tried, in parallel to the legitimate military action against terrorism, to look for democratic solutions to the problem. Fundamentally, a question of identitarian claims and recognition of cultural rights, as well as a problem of socioeconomic development, it should have been treated as a democracy and human rights problem. With a deplorable lack of political vvisdom, the Kurdish question was reduced to PKK terrorism. Democratically elected deputiees, defending a non-violent solution were jailed in 1984; political parties promoting the same approach have been banned. in the meantime, 35.000 persons have died, ver 3.000 villages have been destroyed or emptied, 3 million persons had to emigrate to urban zones. The penetration of the state and political parties by criminal organizations, and corruption have reached incredible proportions. The "clean hands" operation started in 1998 by the current government, if it is to be successful, will have to be accompanied by a serious pruning of corrupt individuals in the political parties and State administrations. The legal system is anachronic. For example, while the Mafia chiefs, protected by the secret services and corrupt politicians are only very exceptionally arrested and condemmed, 16-17 year-old secondary school students who had vvritten leftist slogans on street walls in Manisa have

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been condemned and jailed for several years; university students who were peacefully protesting in front of the National Assembly in Ankara against the rise of public university registration fees are being prosecuted for having threatened the security of the state! Expressing an opinion can stili be a erime. Understandably, the citizens' confidence in the political system is low. According to an opinion poll taken in August 1998, 76% think that there are elose links between the criminal organizations and the political parties, and 66% believe that such links will never be elucidated. The trust in demoeracy has been decreasing: accordineg to another poll, the confidence in the Parliament was 44.9% in 1995 and 37.7% in 1997. The highest rate of trust was for the Army: 70% in 1995 and 68.8% in 1997. The political and moral crisis has affected the relations betvveen individuals. According to the "World Values Survey" figures concerning Turkey, in 1991, only 10% of Turks found their fellow citizens worthy of trust. This figre dropped to 6.6% in 1997, vvhile it is 60% in Sweden, 52% in China and 36% in the USA, Turkey being at the bottom of a list of 44 nations which participate in the world-wide survey1. LONG-TERM FEATURES OF THE TURKISH POLITY: A HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY PERSPECTIVE Modernity from above: Demoeracy is indissociatably linked with modernity, but so is totalitarianism as the 20th century has amply demonstrated. Demoeracy saw day-light in Western Europe, where modernity emerged through interaction betvveen a specifc mode of political sovereignty2 -fragmented and de-totalized, from feodality onwards~, the capitalist market economy and the civil society. it also involved a secular political culture, vvhich developed through the 16th century Renaissance and the 18th century Enlightenment. Where modernization was generated not by the society, but by the State, such as in Germany and Italy, demoeratization was delayed. Turkey's historical path was different: there was no fragmentation of political sovereignty, no capitalism, no civil society. Modernization was initiated, in the 19th century, from above, led by the bureaucratic elites, in the absence of an organic society and a modern nation. The Kemalist revolutionaries, thanks to whom this process culminated in the establishment of the Republic in 1923 and the subsequent radical reforms, had no other alternative: their approach to modernity could only be from
1. 2. Figures quoted in Kongar, Emre (1998), 21. Yzylda Trkiye, stanbul, Remzi Kitabevi. Weber, Max (1978), Economy and Society, Berkeley, University of California Press, Vol. 2 (G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds.).

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above3. The chance of the Turkish Republic was that Mustafa Kemal and his followers were authoritarian by necessity and not by ideology, in contrast to other non-democratic regimes in Europe, betvveen the two World Wars. As noted above, the Kemalists' overarching goal of raising the country to the level of the "contemporary civilization", i.e. Western societies, included modernization and secularization as a frst priority, and democratization as a later priority. in fact, they made two controlled attempts to create opposition parties (Progressive Republican Party in 1924 and Free Republican Party in 1930), but both experiences failed. The authoritarian modernization process was instrumental in creating certain conditions which facilitated the emeregence of a democracy later. These included a Republic based on the principle of popular sovereignty; the legitimisation of the modernization through an elected parliament; various institutional arrangements to routinize the charismatic authority of Atatrk (the "Father of the Turks"); the separation of the State and religion. The priority was given to secularization and socio-economic as well as cultural modernization. These were to be protected, if necessary at the expense of democracy. This option became clear early, following the 1925 Sheikh Said revolt vvhich expressed a mixture of rural, Islamist and Kurdish resistance, in eastern Anatolia. The instrument of modernization was to be the State elites only. The groups vvhich were not within the State framework, such as the ones organized along religion and ethnicity, as well as leftist movements and social classes; were either banned or considered with suspicion. The approach to modernity was non-participative, solidaristic and nationalistic. High stateness, civil society and individuation: A strong "State tradition" is central to the Ottoman-Turkish historical formation4. The modern State established by the Kemalists had continued this pattern5. Gramsci's characterization of the Eastern European countries, where "the state is verything", while society is "primitive and gelatinous", in opposition to the West, where the state is "the moat" of the civil society, which is a for6 tress-like "Study structure" , applied also in Turkey, at least until the 1950s. The republican State elites monopolized political power, initiated and carried through the cultural and social reforms, created a State-led na3. 4. 5. 6. For a more detailed analysis, see Kazancgil, Ali (1991), "Democracy in Mslim Lands: Turkey in Comparative Perspective", International Social Science Journal, N. 1128. Heper, Metin (1983), The State Tradition in Turkey, Walmington, UK, The Eothem Press. Kazancgil, Ali (1994), "High Stateness in a Mslim Society: the Case of Turkey", in Doan, M. and Kazancgil, A. (Eds), Comparing Nations, Oxford, Blackwell. Birnbaum, Pierre (1986), "State, Ideologies and Collective Action in Western Europe", in Kazancgil, A. (Ed), The State in Global Perspective, Aldershot, UK, Gower/UNESCO.

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tional economy and industry, quite remarkable achievements, due to a State that was almost "everything". in 1945, the decision to introduce multipartism was taken in a topdown fashion, by the President of the Republic, smet nn, it was a "pacted transition", negotiated between two elite groups, one group representing the political "centre", and the other the socio-economic "pe7 riphery" . This type of transition presents the advantage of avoiding violent conflicts, but the disadvantage of starting a non-participatory process, a feature which has survived until now. The 1945-50 period is a vvatershed in the history of the Turkish democracy, with the "peripheral" elites starting to have a share in political power. The monopoly of power which the state elites were exercizing was going to be increasingly challenged. The public sector-led establishment of a national economy and industry had induced a private business sector (the timid beginnings of which went back to the Young Trk era -1908-1918). The groups of entrepreneurs, who also benefted from the war years for further capital accumulation, as well as the groups of big land owners and farmers became more vocal and claimed participation in political power. This was a considerable novelty in Turkish polity, where political sovereignty was traditionally not fragmented. Now, next to the status groups, drawing their power from the State, social groups, getting their strength from the economy and society a bourgeoisie emerging from its infancy were to have access to government. The fragmentation of sovereignty, a fundamental condition of democratization, had at long last been introduced into the Turkish historical formation. in the 1960s and 1970s, the market economy expanded, and together with it, the class differentiations between the entrepreneurial class and a better organized vvorking class. The centre-periphery (a characteristic of a status society) did not completely disappear, but Turkey became a capitalist economy and a class society. The pluralist regime had allovved different ideologies to compete openly in the political arena. The statist world view was now faced with the social democratic, extreme-left, conservative-liberal, slamist, extreme-rihgt ideologies. The State was stili the central actor, but it was challenged by different social groupt, which the mode of modernization, chosen in the 1920s and 1930s, had tried to keep under control or suppress. To such social, ideological and religious differentiations, as of the 1950s, the State elites and especially the military bureaucracy responded by activating their historical role of the ultimate guardian of the secular republic. They exercized a tutelage ver representative institutions and governments, and intervened in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 vvith different
7. Mardin, erif (1973), "Center-Periphery Relations: a Key to Turkish Politics?", Daedalus, Winter.

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degrees of involvement in the political game, whenever they considered that "deviation" from the original pattern became too wide. in the course of these four decades of democratic transition and the establishment of a dynamic market economy (Turkey is by no w a majr regional economic povver), two related basic features oef a modern democracy ~a civil society and a process of individuation- have emerged. Together with the market economy, these two elements indicate the irreversible differentiation and plurality of Turkish polity. As a result, the political povver has a multiplicity of sources. The State institutions, and especially the military bureaucracy, see some of the expressions of these developments as threats to the unity of the Republic. The civil society has grown in opposition to the State, but also, in some respects, to politics8. The development of a strong market economy, the remarkable expansion of entrepreneurship, the on-going individuation process have fostered a more autonomous and pro-active civil society. it is stili not as "stury" as the Western ones, but it is grovving and getting stronger. According to offcial fgures, the civil society bodies include 50.000 associations, 2.700 foundations (vakf) and 1.200 employers' and workers' organizations, co-operatives and professional bodies9. Civil society mobilized itself in the 1990s around the issues of human rights violations, the anti-democratic legacy of the 1980-83 regime, the absence of a political solution to the Kurdish question, and the criminalization of the State and politics. The most important role of civil society in democratization, especially in the specific historical circumstances of Turkey, is the structuration of the claims and actions emerging from individuals and social groups, vvhich have not so far been adequately recognized by the State elites, and often by political parties. Against the inability of the State to accept the reality of a pluralist society, the weakness of representative institutions and the lack of credibility of clientelistic political parties, the civil society is channelling the public protest and generating ideas for democratic policy reforms. in this respect, the more articulate proposals to reform democracy come from civil society, such as the TSIAD (Turkish Industrialist' and Businessmen's Association) report on "Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey", vvhich identifes antidemocratic legal and administrative instruments and practices, and proposes democratic alternatives10. The same is true as far as the political soin Turkey, the concept of civil society is sometimes confused with the civilianization of politics, justice and domestic security matters, as against their militarization. This is an important issue for the democratization, but civil society has another meaning. it refers to autonomous structures and organizations, differentiated from the State and the political class, even if it is closely articulated with the latter. 9. Trk Tarih Vakf (1996), Sivil Toplum Kurulular Rehberi, stanbul. 10. TSAD Publications, 1997, No. T/97, 1-212. TSAD also diffused reports on the creation of an Ombudsman, on local authorities and on Associations. 8.

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lutions to the Kurdish question are concerned: a frst report was issued in 1996, by the Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce. in 1998, another "Report on the East and South-East", presented by business organizations and foundations" called for a free public debate on the question and proposed concrete measures, such as the teaching of Kurdish in public schools, radio and television programmes in Kurdish, arabic and Persian. it made proposals concerning economic development, and educational and health services in these regions. The social democratic political parties had also made similar proposals, but they were timid and were not followed-up by their promoters with the necessary vigour. The civil society mobilization against criminalization and corruption takes various forms: a month-long, country-wide citizens' protest in February 1997, "a minute in the dark for transparency" against human rights violations, corruption, as well as Islamic fundamentalism, the "Saturday Mothers", manifesting nce a week in stanbul against unidentified political crimes, or the "City Mothers", a campaign by Islamist women against real estate speculation in stanbul. There are also mobilizations around the social question (education and health), gender issues and the rights of homosexuals. The themes of local democracy and citizenship, as the link between the individual and his rights and freedoms, and the political sphere are also regularly raised. Individuals in Turkey are learning, through their associative actions, that in a democracy citizenship also means the appropriation of human rights, and protestation against misconduct by the political and economic powers. Another important development is the participation of Islamist groups in civil society mobilization, which has generally been conducted by the secular, Westernized groups. This creates something unusual and promising for the future of democracy: a dialogue and co-operation between ideologies and cultures which have always been antagonistic and hostile. Civil society introduced into the public debate concepts (and neologisms) which have been ignored by the State and politics: partnership (ortaklk), caucus (koza) plurality of agency (ok aktrlk) participation (katlm), multiculturalism (okkltrlk). These nations enrich and modify the citizens' behaviour, and the very definition of citizenship. They also reflect the growing autonomy of the individual, his/her gradual emancipation from primordial, communitarian bonds. What remains to be seen is whether the resources and initiatives of the civil society can be linked to representative political system. Such a development would help the latter to be.come more responsive to societal
11. The stanbul chamber of Commerce (TO), the Economic Development Foundation (IKV), Foundation for Social and Economic Studies (TSEV).

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demand, more participatory and deliberative and thus stronger. An obstacle to this is the anti-democratic constitutional and legislative framework inherited from the 1980-83 period, which had established barriers between the societal plurality and the political sphere. There is a campaign, which started in 1994, to obtain a modification of the restrictive law on associations, dating from 1980. it was launched by a group of some 90 foundations, which work tovvards the establishment of a "Third Sector", between the public and private sectors12. This initiative enjoys the support of the President of the Republic, Sleyman Demirel, as well as of the majr industrial groups. Majr political parties, even the social democratic ones (Democratic Socialist Party DSP, and the Republican People's Party CHP), are not yet permeable enough to civil society. There are certain small parties which work along those lines, like the zgrlk Dayanma Partisi (DP), Demokratik Cumhuriyet Partisi (DCP), Demokratik Bar Hareketi, and a vvomen's movement, Kader, the aim of vvhich is to increase the participation of women in politics. Their existence is an important indicator of the rise of an pen society in Turkey, but their influence is stili limited. Such developments aim at acting against the current tendency of the State to homogenize artificially social plurality, by excluding and banning, in the name of an authoritarian understanding of modernity and secularism, instead of interpreting them democratically. Their influence is stili very limeted, but their signifcance is considerable. One cannot overemphasize the crucial role of the civil society, and of the individuation process, for the future consolidation of a stable, participative and deliberative democracy in Turkey, through a State and a political system which vvould eventually accept, accommodate and represent the plurality of society. in Western Europe, the emergence of a dominant social class with an independent economic base the bourgeoisie around which an autonomous civil society was structured, through tensions and struggles with the \vorking class, to a democratic status and notions13. When the Kemalist revolutionaries established the modern Republic, Turkey had neither a capitalist economy, nor a bourgeoisie or an 4 organized vvorking class' . Now there is a bourgeoisie with an independent economic base and an increasingly autonomous civil society. The Kemalist Republic played a central historical role in this, but the State is stili not able to accept the plurality that such a development entails. it is time that the State vvhich had initially modernized Turkey from above, become the protective "moat", to repeat Gramsci's metaphor, and let the
12. Trkiye nc Sektr Raporu, stanbul, TSEV, 1994. 13. Moore, Jr. Barrington (1966), Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Harmondsworth, UK, Penguin Books. 14. As Yusuf Akura had observed in 1917, "If the Turks fail to produce among themselve a bourgeois class, the chances of survival of a Turkish society composed only of peasants and officials will be very slim". Berkes, Niyazi (1964), The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Montreal, McGill University Press.

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civil society and representative institutions continue the democratic modernization, in articulation with a Rechtsstaat. Laiklik, Secularization and Islamism: Laiklik, the separation of the State and the religion, the core principle of the Republic, introduced into the Constitution in 1937, has undoubtedly been a factor favourable to Turkey's transition to democracy. However, this Turkish version of the French concept of laicite, from which it differs in many respects, does also create problems for democracy. in France, laicite involved a strict separation of the State and the Church. in Turkey, religion was expelled from the State, but it was brought back in the political arena, after the passage to competitive party politics. However, the dissociation was not complete, since the State has kept control ver religion. The Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet leri Bakanl), situated within the Prime Minister's office and managed by a Sunnite Mft, controls cult matters; the imams are paid by the State. Ali this is the continuation of the Ottoman practice of State control ver religion15. in France, laicite means the strict neutrality of the State vis--vis ali religions. The religious administration in the Ministry of the Interior is managed by secular bureaucrats. The Turkish Republic is not neutral vis--vis religion. The religious administration represents Sunnite islam. The three minorities recognized under the Lausanne Treaty the Greeks, Armenians and Jews~ have their own religious authorities, also controlled by the Turkish State. Only recently has the Republic realized that the Alevis (a heterodox religion of Shiite origin), who are an estimated 20% of the population, have not been treated as fairly as they should have been. The identity cards of Turkish citizens carry the mention of their religion, which is not consistent with the republican principle oef the privacy of religious belief. To sum up, religion is not altogether pushed out of the public sphere. Laiklik is to be compared to secularism, which is a broader notion. Secularism may or may not include the constitutional separation of the State and religion, but, de facto, in secularized societies, the plurality of religions and their equal treatment are accepted without restriction. This is the case, for instance, in Norway, where the King is the Chief of the Lutheran Church, and yet this country is secular. The reason I chose the example of a Protestant nation is that the configuration of State-religion relations in Mslim societies is comparable to those existing in the Reform countries: unlike the French laicite in vvhich two powerful, centralized institutions --the State and the Catholic Church-- have confronted each other for centuries and ended up with a negotiated separation in 1905, in Protestant and Mslim societies, the State is facing a multiplicity of confessions, such as the Lutherans, Calvinists and a whole range of other denominations in the first case, and the Sunnites, Shiites, legal schools such as Haneftes, and a hot of tarikats in the second case.
15. The Ottoman practice in this respect was close to the Byzantine ceasoro-papism, as I argued in: Kazancgil, Ali (1991), op-cit.

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Therefore, while the constitutional separation of the State and religion in Turkey is obviously an excellent measure and should not be modified (amongst Protestant countries, Sweden is currently in the process of doing the same), the secularization model fits Turkey's conditions better than laiklik16. Ali the more so that secularization means, in the broadest sense, the acceptance of plurality, whether religious, social or cultural. it also means a clearer distinction of the private and public spheres in relation to religion. it is thus more democratic. What is needed in Turkey is to foster a secularization which concerns individuals, society and the State. The way laiklik is currently understood and practised is not democratic. it is exclusionary, generates polarization and hence is detrimental to social cohesion and peace. it forces the State-society relations to revolve around a cultural issue laiklik vs. Islamism instead of economic and social issues. Culturalism has monopolized the public space, to the detriment of secular, pluralistic, democratic politics. The antagonistic counterpart of laiklik is Islamism, or the political islam. This opposition dates from the very beginning of the OttomanTurkish modernization which started in the 19th century, around the question: how can the State be saved? The answer by the Ottoman religious bureaucracy ulema was to return to a strict application of shariat, and that of the palace bureaucracy was to turn to the West and import the necessary administrative and technological innovations. The latter approach prevailed, but the former never gave up the struggle throughout the 19th century. This opposition between two irreconcilable world views was radicalized under the Young Turks and the Kemalists in the 1910s and 1920s. The current State elites stili operate along the idea of the absolute incompatibility of these two world views. So do Islamist leaders and their followers. They position themselves in relation to the State and aim at comquering it. in the 1980s and 1990s, they moved in this direction, through education in religious secondary State schools (mam Hatip Liseleri) and a strategy of entrism in public administration. When the Welfare Party was in power, leading the coalition government, from July 1996 to June 1997, the temptation to take ver the Republican State existed. However, the Welfare Party never resorted to violence. Its chief, Necmeddin Erbakan, a seasoned traditional politician, and most of its leading figures were, with a few exceptions, rather moderate. Radical Islamist politicians vvere vocal and implemented a "stategy of tension", but formed a small minority. in the public, even under the Welfare government, opinions against the imposition of shariat (60%) outnumbered the pro-shariat ones (25%)17. in the 1995 elections, the Welfare got 20.7% of the votes. While the totalitarian tropism of Islamists is not to be underestimated, they vvere, by and large, respectful of the democratic rules.
16. seeibid. 17. Erder, Necat (1966), Trkiye'de siyasi parti semenlerinin nitelikleri, kimlikleri ve eilimleri, stanbul, TSES.

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They appealed to a larger percentage oef voters, because of their better organized party structures and militants who work actively at the grassroots level, the generally competent management of the municipalities they control. Also a sizeable leftist popular electorate voted for them, because they were disappointed by the social democratic parties. Welfare established networks at the local political level, co-operated with the tarikat, which have a large social base, and developed charitable and educational associations. Clearly, Welfare was on its way towards a mass party, which would have inevitably led it tovvards becoming more of a very conservative right-wing party, and less of an extremist one. After the closing of the Welfare, in December 1997, its successor, the Virtue Party, inherited the same characteristics. Furthermore, it seems to have been more moderate and to abandoned the objective of conquering the State. The programme of the Virtue refers only to the principles of democracy, human rights, freedoms, and socio-economic development. in fact, slamists have been vvorking for years with a civil society context, on issues such as human rights there is an Islamist human rights association, Mazlumder (Association of the oppressed), the counterpart of the secular Turkish Human Rights Association, as well as the environment, pluralist democracy, gender, inter-religious dialogue and individuation. There is now an increasing transversal dialogue, within civil society, between the Islamist associations and social democratic and other secular democratic associations on problems of common interest. The Virtue Party's leadership is more moderate than the Welfare's. its social base is getting broader and more heterogeneous. There is an increasingly powerful group of Mslim entrepreneurs and industries. Ultimately, the majority of islamists today are individuals and groups who are already part of modernity, or strongly aspiring to be part of it, but through their own discourse, symbols and cultural codes, and their discourse is becoming more pen to the issues of modern society and to public debate. it is less radical, more consensual; less obsessed by the conquest of the State and more inclined to act within competitive politics and the civil society. The individuation process is influenceing islamists. The individual choice concerning the relation to the religion and its understanding is gaining ground. This does not mean that the majority of them has already become strict democrats. Also, given the historical experience of Turkey, it is unavoidable that democratic and ideological vigilance but not unnecessary coercion, which was recently used against the Islamist mayor of istanbul, Mr. T. Erdoan be exercized vis--vis islamists. Hovvever, to ignore the above developments that are gradually changing the outlook of political islam is not in the interests of democratization. There will probably be more conflictual situations and tensions betvveen the islamists and secularists, but the likelihood is that the Turkish society is in the process of

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overcoming the perennial diffculty posed by the political islam to ali Mslim societies trying to achieve democracy. Nation, identity, citizenship and plurality: The modern nation was built in Republican Turkey around the idea of one State, one nation. The Kemalist reforms aimed at giving the modern nation a cultural and linguistic content. They were successful, particularly in introducing a Turkish language shared by ali strata of the society. Mustafa Kemal's project was to work tovvards a civic nation, following the French model, based on the voluntary participation of citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin. Ali those who considered themselves a Trk and spoke Turkish would be part of the nation. The Republican State was, after ali, able to build somethinge which did not exist in 1923: a modern Turkish nation. This is a signifcant achievement. in reality, hovvever, despite the secular State the ethnic and religious components kept their importance. Thus, the modern Turkish nation became a mixture of civic as well as ethnic nation, borrovving from both the French and German traditions. Turkey had to face and is stili facing the problem created by the ethnic nation model: the incorporation of communities is more difficult in this model. The identitarian problems are more acute. Furthermore, the Republic was not able to allocate the resources necessary to accelerate the incorporation of different ethnic and language groups through economic development, and provision of adequate social, health and educaetional services. one reason was the scarcity of resources. The other was the unwillingness to accept the social and identitarian plurality and thus build the nation from such a diversity, in a proactive manner. Instead, the course chosen was not to acknovvledge the existence of different ethnic origins and different languages. As a result the integration into the nation of these groups was left to a great extent to individual trajectories. This short-sighted approach inevitably carried a heavy price tag, which is being paid nowadays. Under such circumstances, the ideal of a civic, or as the President of the Republic, Sleyman Demirel, calls it, "constitutional" citizenship could not be fully realized. Today, the concept of citizenship stili contains ethnic (Turkshness) and religious (Sunnite Mslim) components as vvell as civic ones. Hence, the continuous public reference to citizens' ethnic or religious origins, such as "citizen of Greek, Armenian, Jewish origin", "Alevi citizen", and more recently "citizen of Kurdish origin". No-one would think of referring to a person as a "Sunnite citizen". If the Christian Turks migrated to Anatolia from Moldavia, and Shamanist Turks from Central Asia, would they also become citizens with an "origin"? Ali these practices are, of course, incompatible with a secular State, in vvhich the origins of citizens are not to be referred to in public sphere, since they belong to his private life; they should be abandoned if the Republic is committed to a civic, constitutional citizenship and to downplay-

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ing its ethnic and religious components. The only legitimate utilization of such elements of individual identities in the public sphere would be in the context of the implementation of "positive discrimination" policies, such as the "affrmative action" in the USA, to help underprivileged ethnic groups to improve their living conditions and thus integrate fully the nation. The Canadian political philosopher, Charles Taylor, called this approach the "politics of recognition"18 of the identities of individuals belonging to minoritarian groups, in order to respond to their specific needs, and thus strengthen the cohesion and unity of the nation, not by coercion, but through democratic multicultural policies. The Kurdish question illustrates perfectly some of these contradictions. The two basic dimensions of this question are: firstly, it is an issue of cultural identity and claims for the recognition of cultural rights. Secondly, its emergence (beyond the specific aspect of PKK terrorism) is a consequence of Turkey's having become a modern, pluralist society. The Kurdish question follows a different pattern in Iran and Irak, where feudal-type war-lords and their communities struggle against the central power and with each other. in south-eastern Turkey, pre-modern communitarian, tribal social structures have been weakened, if not altogether eliminated; the social relations and the linkage and/or opposition to the State are being individualized. The PKK mobilized a limited number of people for terrorist actions around modern concepts such as nation, nationalism or class, and not around tribalism. To violence, which has arisen in the context of modernity, the response should be elaborated through modern democratic approaches. The Kurdish question in Turkey cannot be reduced to PKK and the military solution can only win ver and this was largely achieved- terrorism. But it cannot replace the necessary recognition of cultural rights and pro-active policies oef integration. There is a recognition, at least, in the civil society, and amongst a limited number of politicians, that the Kurdish problem is a problem of democracy and human rights. Such a recognition should be shared by the State institutions and ali the political parties, as a matter of national policy-making. WHITHER TURKEY'S DEMOCRACY? What are the prospects for democracy in Turkey? Its current outlook is a very contrasted one. We have seen above that there are quite a number of established democratic institutions and practices. They are, however, counter-balanced, and even out-weighed, by non-democratic features. What would be the conditions that would allow the consolidation of the Turkish democracy, so that it escapes cyclical fatality?
18. Gutman, Amy (ed.) (1992), The Politics of Recognition, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

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Before attempting to formulate some of the required conditions, let us remember what democracy is. I shall not provide here a definition, since a number of them can be found in social science literatre19, but draw attention to a fundamental characteristic of this regime which is particularly relevant to the current situation in Turkey: democracy is a form of government based on the principles of transparency and certainty of procedures and uncertainty of outcomes. The outcome will be what a majority of citizens and their elected representatives adopt, through democratic procedures. Only in non,democratic regimes are the outcomes predefned by power-holders, and some allegedly democratic procedures used to confirm them. The quality and strength of democracy depends on the participation of citizens and ali stake-holders in the decision-making process. Tocqueville observed, in 1835, that in democratic regimes, citizen's participation is the most important element, and that "selfgovernment" has its own specific efficiency in terms of active citizens and societal peace20. Let me turn now to certain conditions which would help the Turkish democracy to resume its expansion: 1. The reinforcement of representative institutions and introduction of participatory procedures On representation, the proposals made in the already mentioned TSAD report constitute a good basis for discussion. An institutional reform, which would include changes in the 1982 Constitution and the legislation in different areas so as to eliminate systematically ali clauses that limit human rightss and fundamental liberties and give greater prerogatives to non-elected bodies, ver the elected ones. None of the State institutions should be placed above the Parliament and the elected government. The National Security Council should be civilianized. The justice should become independent and democratic, through legal reform and the abolition of the State security Courts. A better balance is to be established between the executive and the legislative powers. The prerogatives of the Parliament, especially its investigative povvers, should be up-graded. The executive is powerful in Turkey, provided that the electoral system guarantees stable majorities. I do not think that a Presidential, or a French-type semi-presidential system would fit Turkey's conditions, for in not so well-established democracies, they generate legitimacy cri21 ses .
19. For an extensive overvievv, see for example, Lipset, Seymour Martin (editor-in-chief) et al (1995), The Encyclopedia of Democracy, London, Routledge (4 volumes). 20. Tocqueville, Alexis de (1951), De la democratie en Ameriaue, in euvres completes, T. 1, Vol. 11, Paris, Gallimard (published frst in 1835). 21. Linz, Juan (1990), "The Perils of Presidentialism", Journal of Democracy,, Vol. 1, No. 1.

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The much-talked-about modifications in the electoral law, from the proportional towards a najoritarian system, to avoid fragmentation and increase governmental stability, may provide good results, only if they are done not on short term tactical considerations. Rather such a refonn should aim at a fair representation of ali majr political movements and encourage the re-grouping of similar ones, which are split in Turkey, not so much around political differences but around competing leaders. Currently, this is the case in the centre of the right and centre of the left, the only united majr political movement being the islamists. in parallel, the law on political parties should be amended, so that they become democratically organized bodies, whose main function is to agregate demands from the citizens who vote for them, instead of being, as they are now, clientelistic machineries exclusively serving a leader. Institutional reforms concerning the electoral system and political parties are not unimportant, but the main reason for the volatility of voters and fragmentation are the secular political parties' inability to satisfy the demands of their electorate. As regards mechanisms for the participation of citizens, they are stili to be invented, at the national and local levels. Advisory citizens' councils, mixed committees involving the administration and citizens' representatives, contractual arrangements between the State, local authorities and civil society organizations on social, educational, health, cultural, urban issues of direct relevance to the daily life of individuals and groups are some of the measures that can be debated and promoted. An authentic public participation in public administration's decision-making process requires a dynamic deliberative process. This concern should be a priority in an institutional reform. The combination of representative and participative deliberative democracy is the best way to put into practice the principle of popular sovereignty, the condition of which in present-day Turkey reminds one of the 18th century French essayist Chamfort's aphorism: sovereignty belongs to the people, but the people should not exercize it! 2. A democratic, transparent, accountable and decentralized State and public administration As noted above, the modern Turkish State stili has an extremely stroneg centrality in the political system and society. A well-structured State, concentrating on its classical sovereignty functions defence, external security, justice- is an asset. An efficient public administration, which serves the common interests of citizens and provides the necessary public infrastructures and services, is also an asset. This is what Turkey needs. Beyond this, in a complex, differentiated society, with a strong market economy and an increasingly organized and vocal civil society, the State institutions should exercize a minumum interference in domestic political 246

prosses and law and order issues. The republican State is to become a democratic State. This involves transparency and accountability. in Turkey, the State and public administration operate as "black boxes". The recent scandals, which displayed the extent of the criminalization of the public space, should be an occasion to proceed with far-reaching reform of the State institutions and administrations. Indeed, curbing corruption and de-criminalizing the State and political parties is a basic requirement of democracy. Another feature of a democratic state is the deconcentration of power and decentralization of the administration. Devolution of central prerogatives to regions, departments and municipalities bring the public authority closer to local realities and to the needs of the citizens. in recent years, more decision-making power was granted to municipilaties. Much more decentralization is needed. The example of France, another land of State centrality, vvhich implemented an ambitious programme of decentralization, with elected regional assemblies, increased power to departmental assemblies and to municipalities can be follovved. 3. The Public debate: afundamental requisite of democracy A comparative advantage of democracy is its ability to adjust continuously to new situations and generate appropriate solutions and decisions through negotiation and mutual concession, betvveen competing organized interests. At the centre of this prosses, there is the continuous debate in the public space, in which ali stake-holders in democracy would participate, without taboos, or holy cows, to raise majr political and societal issues and to look for solutions supported by a majority of citizens and political forces. public debate vvould contribute to the policy-making process. it is striking to notice how limited is the critical and contradictory debate on vital issues such as the Kurdish question, human rights, a new definition of citizenship and nation, the management of diversity in society, the declining quality of life and growing social inequalities and pauperization, gender and environment. Innovative ideas and proposals from civil society do not penetrate the political sphere, yet, unless democratically debated, there will be no naturation and a relative consensus on what would be the solution to the flaws of democracy. Thus the establishment of conditions for a public space of free debate on ali important past and present issues in Turkey is a majr priority. 4. The Media The role of the media is, of course, crucial in fostering the public debate and beyond, supporting the democratic process as a whole. There is

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no democracy without complete presss freedom (with certain legal limits, such as the protection of private life), and an economically healthy, independent media. Like in many other areas, the situation is contrasted. There is a plurality of journals, and public and private radio and television channels, both national and local, which actively contribute to the democratic process, especially by disclosing numerous scandals concerning corruption and criminalization of the public life. However, there are two majr problems in the privately owned media system. One is that, with few exceptions, ali majr journals and private radio/television channels are owned by big industrial groups. The other is the limitations to the freedom of the press, because of antidemocratic legislation, limiting the freedom of speech. Consequently, Turkey has both a dynamic, influential media and one of the worst records in the world of joumalists in jail! A new democratic legislation on the media is a must, to protect the media freedom from infringement by the State, political parties (information of public television and radio is stili too official) and the capital. 5. Regulating the market economy and placing the social question on top of the nation's agenda Turkey has a dynamic market economy. it needs, hovvever, a modernized regulatory framevvork which does not constrict the dynamism of business, but protects the consumers, collects taxes, secures a fair redistribution of the fruits of economic grovvth. A democratic regulation of the market is necessary, not only for reasons of social equity, but for ethical reasons as well: like politicians and the State, there is too much corruption and criminalization in business. The political parties, even at the left, seem to have forgotten not only the necessity of regulating the market but the social question as a whole, the problems of unemployment, grovving poverty and social exclusion, declining real wages, the plight of vvage-earners and salaried people under annual inflation rates of 100%. The only political force which has an audible discourse on social inequalities is the islamist one, vvhich partly explains its appeal amongst the popular classes, at the expense of social democratic parties. Without the rediscovery of the social question by the political parties, democratization will not progeress in Turkey. 6. Removing constraints against civil society There is a whole anti-civil society legislation to be reformed. Democracy cannot blossom without full freedom of association, strong trade unions and a vigorous associative sector, ali the more so that civil society 248

is a majr source of ideas and proposals for politicians, in terms of social and political innovation and reform. 7. Human right, human dignity and ethics ver and above the "raison d'Etat" The recognition and implementation of the civil and political, as well as socio-economic and cultural rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals are a conditio sine qua non of democracy. They are the institutional/legal expression of respect for human dignity. Human rights have been built on the principle of the superiority of the rights of the individual ver the rights of the community and the State. There can be no democratic society unless this principle is accepted and implemented as a legal, ethical and political commitment. This should become a norm shared by the Turkish State and societyHuman rights teaching, at ali levels of the educational system, should be promoted. This is the more effective way of establishing respect for human rights and dignity amongst the future generations. Such programmes should also aim at eliminating stereotypes concerning the "other", racism and xenophobia. They should promote humanistic values. A related issue is the elaboration of ethical norms of behaviour in public aministrations, politics, business and various professions, as a mode of self-regulation, generated through debate and consent. in democratic secularized systems, democratically elaborated ethics is a central element, rather than the imposition of a moral order. CONCLUSION The implementation of such democratic reforms would need long years of effort. it would not be a smooth and easy path to take. Two factors would be instrumental in triggering such a process of reforms: widespread, systematic public debate, supported and facilitated by ali the democratic institutions, groups and the media, as well as mobilization of the civil society organizations for political and social reform. The case is an urgent one. Democracy in Turkey is in danger.Years of political immobility, the deplorable score on human rights, the absence of institutional and legal, as well as economic and social reforms, deep social inequalities (Turkey is among the top 10 as regards rates of social inequality, according to UN figures), and corruption and criminalization

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have created a situation of anomie in the country. The extreme-right wing elements have a strong hold in certain centres of power. There is a climate of aggressive nationalism. The ingredients of an authoritarian rule have been accumulating. The moment of truth has come, as regards democratization. For most of the 1990s, successive governments declared their strong determination to consolidate democracy, stop human rights violations, modify the legislation, ete. Sad to say, not much was done. Yet, Turkey has institutions, civil society organizations, and dedicated citizens vvorking tovvards a Consolidated, non cyclical democracy. Will they be able to achieve this goal? I am confident that, ultimately, they ill

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SYASET, DEMOKRAS, MEDYA

Prof.Dr. A. Rait KAYA* Siyaset, kitle iletiim aralar ve demokrasinin birbirleriyle dorudan ilikili olduu ok eskilerden bu yana bilinir. Ancak, varsaylan, kabul edilen bu iliki farkl kuramsal aklamalarn da konusudur. yle olsa da tm yaklamlar giderek karmaklaan toplumsal yaamda kendisi de farkllaarak daha karmak bir nitelik kazanan siyasetin (iktidar ilikilerinin) kitle iletiim aralaryla daha fazla i ie girmi bir grnm kazandn kabul ederler. Sz gelimi, temsili demokrasinin kitle iletiim aralar olmakszn maddi gereklik kazanmas olanakl deildir. Bu nedenle liberal dnceden kaynaklanan "demokratik teorinin" temelinde kitlelere dzenli, doru ve yansz bilgileri zgrce aktard varsaylan bir medya sistemi bulunur. Gnmzde sadece hacmi ok genilemi olan medya almalarnda deil, siyaset biliminde ve genel olarak toplum biliminde medya sorunlar merkezi bir konum kazanmtr. Bunda, kukusuz, kreselleme olarak isimlendirilen iinde yaadmz srecin nemli bir pay bulunmaktadr. Bilindii gibi kreselleme olarak isimlendirilen srecin temel esi iletiim teknolojilerindeki srama, yeni gelien iletiim aralar ve artan iletiim olanaklardr. Medya bundan byle, gerek bir ekonomik faaliyet alan olarak, gerekse de toplumsal yada bireysel gnlk yaamn iinde ok geni bir zaman kaplayan, merkezi bir konum kazanmtr. Bu baskn durum hem zel alan hem de kamusal alan iin geerlidir, iletiim alanndaki teknolojik ilerlemelerden beslenerek gelien bir sylem bu durumun hem gnlk yaama sunduu olanaklar hem de demokrasi balammda aabilecei yeni ufuklar gl bir biimde dile getirmektedir. Kimilerine gre gelimeler yeni trden dorudan demokrasiye geiin olanaklarn sunmakta, teledemokrasi gibi yeni demokrasi formlarndan sz edilmektedir. Doal olarak eletirel yaklaanlarn vurguladklar artam sosyal kontrol ve maniplasyon olanaklardr. Konu etrafnda yaygn ve ciddi bir tartma vardr. Farkl ve ok aylan deerlendirmeler olsa da tartmaya katlan taraflarn tmnn kabul
ODT, Siyaset Bilimi Kamu Ynetimi Blm retim yesi.

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ettii ortak nokta kitle iletiim aralarnn demokrasiye katklarnn esasnn onlann toplum yelerine dorudan deneyimlerinin dnda kalan olay ve oluumlar hakknda doru, yeterli ve yansz bilgi ile dnce aktarmn salamalarndan kaynaklanddr. Kitle iletiim aralarnca byle donatlan bireyin hem rasyonel kararlar alabilecei hem de katlmnn artaca varsaylmaktadr. Ksacas ada toplumda demokrasinin olmazsa olmaz koullarndan birisi zgrce enformasyon salayan medyadr. Oysa, gerek medya aratrmalar gerekse kolayca yapabildiimiz gzlemler medyann bilgi ve dnce aktarm ilevinin gnmzde tm dnyada medya etkinlii ierisinde ikinci plana dtn gstermektedir. Artk, medya ierikleri, zellikle grsel-iitsel medya da esas itibariyle elenceye, elendirmeye hasredilmektedir. nk, medyay ynlendiren ve halcim anlay tarafndan ynlendirmesi arzulanan piyasa kurallardr. Demokrasiyi gzeten bir medya belirli bir gazetecilik anlayna dayanr. Piyasa kurallanna temsil edilerek iletilen medya ise byle bir gazetecilik anlayna sahip olamamaktadr. Nitekim, doru, yansz ve dzenli haberdar klma ilevi, yaln bir anlatmla yerini abesle ve sululukla dolu ya da vurdulu-krdl bir ierie brakmtr. Artk, medyann enformasyon salama ilevi yerini byk lde ngilizcede "information" ve "entertainment", Trkede "haber" ve "elence" szcklerinin birletirilmesiyle oluturulan "infotainment" ya da "habelence" ilevine brakmtr. Bu noktann douraca sonular asndan zerinde nemle durulmaldr. Durumu, gnlk yaam ierisinde siyaset-dnn (non-political) arlnn art olarak niteleyip, geemeyiz. Bu ayn zamanda kitlelerin siyasal yaama katlm balamnda siyasete kar (anti-political) bir gelimedir. nk, hereyden nce siyasete hasredilen zamann daraltlmas ve kamusal ilginin siyasal boyutlar tayan sorunlardan uzak tutulmas demektir. Demokrasi deneyiminde ileri mevzilerde yer alan lkelerde bile gnmz de siyaset-medya-yurtta ilikisinin yeniden ve demokratik bir ileyi salyacak biimde yeniden kurulmas istemi bu durumdan kaynaklanmaktadr. zelletirme, "deregulasyon" ve "tekelleme" gibi srelerle ve "yeni sa" dncenin salad hegomonya ile piyasa mantna tmyle teslim olmu olan medyann salkl demokratik bir toplum iin son derece sakncal ileyiini amaya ynelik yeni medya dzenleri tanmlanmaya allmaktadr. Bu genel deinmeler nda Trkiye'ye bakldnda ksaca kreselleme olarak ifade edilen sre erevesinde medya ortam ve dzeni balamnda son derece kkl deiimler yaand grlyor. Osmanl toplumuna gazetenin yani modern kitle iletiim aracnn girii lkenin yeni bir aamasna sramakta olan kapitalizm ile eklemlenme srecinin yani bir bakma kreselleme olgusunun rndr. D dinamiklerin zorlamasyla lkede oluan basn ksa bir sre iinde siyasal mcadelenin temel bir alan olmutur. Genel bir deerlendirme yaplacak

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olursa basnn demokrasi ynnde saf tuttuu ve demokratik bir ilev yerine getirdii sylenebilir. Nitekim, siyasal erkin bask ve denetimi de bu nedenle Temmuz 1908'i izleyen bir yldan az bir sre ayr tutulursa ok youn olmutur. Cumhuriyet Trkiye'sinde ise, 1950'lere kadar zgrlkler balamnda kstllklar ve yetersizlikler srse de basnn toplumsal gelimede zel bir misyon stlendii, toplumsal ilerleme iin nemli grevler yerine getirdiini syliyebiliriz. kinci Dnya Sava sonrasnda, kapitalizmin yeniden biimlendii baka bir aamada, 1950'ler Trkiye'sinde yaanan deiim basn alannda da yansma bulmutur. Yeni bir basn yasas ve gazetecilere rgtlenme hakknn verilmesi ile zgrleme yolunda yetersiz de olsa greli ileri admlar atlmtr. Ancak, siyasal iktidar ile basn patronlar ve yneticileri arasnda akal ilikiler de bu dnemde kurumlamaya balamtr. Bununla beraber, basnn ana gvdesinin gzergah demokrasi fikrini genelde nde tutan bir yol olmutur. 1980'li yllarda gerekleen yeni kreselleme sreci ise 199O'l yllarda Trkiye'de medya alann tmyle farkl bir grnme tamtr. Nicel olarak ok nemli gelimeler kaydedilmitir. Trkiye yoksul bir medya ortamndan varsl bir medya ortamna gemitir. Buna karlk toplumun demokratiklemesine ve katlmn artmasna hizmet edebilecek, sosyal ve kltrel gelimeye katkda bulunabilecek, toplumsal eitliliklerin artmas ve oulcu bir toplumun gelimesi ynnde katkda bulunabilecek niteliklerde bir medya ortamnn olumadn grmekteyiz. nemli bir dnm anlamna gelen ortamdaki deimeleri yle zetleyebiliriz: 1. Alanda mlkiyet konusunda nemli ve kkl deiiklikler olmutur. ncelikle radyo-televizyon alannda kamu tekeli kalkm ve ok sayda zel radyo ve televizyon kurulmutur. Bunun kadar nemli baka bir gelime de medya alannda faaliyet gsteren sermayenin niteliinin deimesidir. Esas itibariyle medya (basn) d alanlarda birikmi sermaye medya alanna hakimiyet kurmutur. Basn alannda mevcut sermaye gruplarndan da ayakta kalabilenler varlklarn basn d alanlara da yaylarak srdrebilmilerdir. Bu gelimeyi getiren bir etmen doal olarak medya kuruluu sahibi olmann salad g ve prestij ile medya organnn bask uygulamak iin kullanlabilme potansiyelidir. Bir ikinci temel etmen ise bundan byle medya alanna yaplan yatrmlarn eski durumun tam aksine ok yksek karllk oran gerekletirebilmekte olulardr. Hzl ve kkl teknolojik gelimenin zerinde durulmayan, sz pek edilmeyen ancak, ok nemli bir etkisi de budur. 2. Sz edilen gelimelerin bir baka sonucu Trkiye'de medya alannda tekelleme eilimi tm olumsuz unsurlaryla birlikte snr tanmaz

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bir aamaya ulamtr. Tm dnyada belirgin biimde gzlemlenmekte olan tekelleme hareketlerinin Trkiye'ye zgn boyutu bu gelimelerin 'Avrupa dzeyinde dev kurulular' oluturulmas gibi bir retorikle gururla ilan edilebilmesidir. Bu durum tekellemenin olumsuz sonularna kar alnabilecek nlemleri batan olanaksz klmaktadr. 3. Yeni oluan radyo-televizyon dzeni hukuksal n dzenlemesi olmakszn, Anayasa ve yasalara ramen, kaotik bir biimde gereklemitir. Bu gelime radyo-televizyon alannda da, basn alannda da kural tanmazl kural haline dntrmtr. rnein, RTK frekanslar belirleme ve imtiyazlar tahsis etme grevini yerine getirmemitir, hala da getirememektedir. Yine yasann tekellemeyi engellemek iin ngrd hkmler yokmu gibi davranlmaktadr. Basn alannda da promosyonu dzenliyen kurallar dikkate alnmadan etkinlikler rahata srdrlebilmektedir. 4. Ticari baary salyan herey mubahtr anlayyla hareket eden medya kurulular siyasal yaamn tkanklklarla dolu ortamnda bir tr zerk konum kazanarak zaman zaman yarg ve yrtme organlar yerine kendilerin ikame eden bir tutum alabilmektedirler. 5. Medya kurulular ticari karlarna dorudan engel karmad srece dnce ve dnceyi aklama zgrl ile basn zgrl konularna ilgilerini nemli lde yitirmi durumdadrlar. Buna karlk alanda yasal kstllklar ve fiili engeller varlklarm srdrmektedirler. 6. Gazetecilik meslei tmyle tahrip olmann eiindedir. Bu yanda 'reyting' yapt ya da tiraj getirdii varsaylan astronomik cretli ancak ou kez basn yasasna gre yaplm bir szlemesi -ve gvencesi- olmayan ke yazan ya da ynetici grevdeki vedetlerin dier yanda da dk cretli ve hibir gvencesi olmayan haber yapmclarnn yer ald meslek ciddi bir inandrclk bunalm iindedir. Gazetecilik mesleinin sendikal rgtlenmesi neredeyse tmyle tasfiye olmutur. Buna karlk etkinlik alanlarna gre uzmanlam dernek says artm; profesyonel rgtlenmeler meslein yapl ve ahlaksal ilkelerinden ok dernek yelerinin meslek d bireyci, hedonist karlann savunur hale gelmitir. Sralanan bu gelimeler sonras bir deerlendirme yaplrsa gnmzde Trk medyasn demokratik siyasal srece katk balamnda, geneli itibariyle, 'yararllar' safndan karp, 'zararllar' safna yerletirmek durumundayz. Konunun nemini artran bir baka etmen de Trkiye'de siyasal sistemin yaps ve politik kltr itibariyle medyann olumsuz etkilerini dengeleyebilecek kitle iletiimi aralarn demokratik, katlmc bir siyasal-toplumsal yaam iin katklarda bulunabilecek hale dntrecek nlemlerin acil olarak tartmaya almasnda daha fazla gecikilmemelidir.

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Kitle iletiimi alannda sorunlarn alabilmesi iin ne tr nlemler alnabilecei dnldnde ise mutlaka u iki konu gz nnde tutulmak zorundadr: 1. Kitle iletiimi alannda yaplacak dzenlemeler mutlaka genel bir demokratikleme perspektifi ieren, demokratiklemeye katkda bulunmaya hedefleyen bir bakla ele alnmaldrlar. Kitle iletiim aralar demokrasiye katklarn ancak salkl demokratik bir toplumda yapabilirler. Dolaysyla kitle iletiiminin demokratiklemesi genel demokratikleme srecinden soyutlanamaz. Bu nedenle medyann durumu birok baka kurumla birlikte ele alnp yeniden dzenlenmelidir. 2. Bu genel perspektif yannda ncelikli bir baka konu da 'gazeteci' kavram ile 'gazetecilik meslei'nin rehabilite edilmesidir. Bu amala gazetecilik meslei yeniden tanmlanmal, gazetecinin pratiinin kitle iletiim alanndaki ticari amal etkinliklerden ayrt edilebilen ok zel, kamusal nitelikli bir etkinlik olduu ve bununla snrl kalmas gerektii kabul edilmelidir.

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KRESELLEME VE KEMALZM
Prof. Dr. Alpaslan IIKLI* Kreselleme herkese ho armlar yaptran bir szck. Herkes, kendi bal olduu inan sistemi veya ideoloji asndan, kreselleme kavramna scak bakmasn tahrik eden ve mmkn klan nedenler bulabilir. Fareli kyn kavalcsnn kavalndan da herkesin kulana ho gelen nameler dkld iindir ki btn kyn ocuklarm peinden srkleyebilmiti. Tarih Boyunca Kreselleme Yanllar Gerekten de btn byk dinler ve balca ideolojiler, belli anlamda bir kreselleme zleminin retisini yaymlar, takipisi olmulardr. Hazreti Muhammet, tm insanlar slamiyet mek misyonunu tayordu. Onun kurmak istedii zdelemeyen ve belli snrlarla evrili olmayan dayanmaktayd. Dolaysyla, o da kresel boyutlu mn vermiti. ats altnda birletirdevlet, belli bir ulusla bir mmet kavramna bir deiikliin sava-

Dier byk dinlerin kurucular da (sa da, Musa da, Buda da...) kresellii bakmndan benzer bir hedefe ynelmi deiller midir? Bambaka bir dnya grn ele alalm: Marks da belli anlamda bir kreselleme ngrmtr. Onun kavramsallatrd proletarya enternasyonalizmi de evrensel lekli bir kreselleme temelinde biimlenmi bir dnya demektir. te yanda, Hitler'i de kresellemeci saymamz gerekir. nl komedyen Charlie Chaplin'in, onu karikatrize ederken kre eklindeki bir balonla oynarken temsil etmesinin baka ne anlam olabilir? Acaba Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n kreselleme konusundaki yerini nasl belirleyebiliriz?
Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi retim yesi.

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Atatrk'n tututurduu kurtulu alevi, Anadolu bozkrlaryla snrl bir amaca ynelmi deildi. O, smrgeciliin ve emperyalizmin yeryznden ebediyen silinecei bir dnyann kurulmasna katk salamak amacyla yola kmt. O, bandan beri bilincinde olduu bu durumu, 9 Temmuz 1922'de yapt bir konumasnda yle aklamaktadr: "Trkiye'nin bugnk mcadelesi yalnz kendi nam ve hesabna olsayd belki daha ksa, daha az kanl olur ve daha abuk bitebilirdi. Trkiye azm ve mhim bir gayret sarfediyor. nk mdafaa ettii btn mazlum milletlerin, btn arkn davasdr."1 Atatrk emperyalizme kar savam ve bu yolda unutulmaz bir ders vermiti. Ancak, o, dnya uluslarnn birbirlerine yaknlamasndan yanayd. Onun iin "yurtta sulh" demekle yetinilemeyeceini bilmi; "cihanda sulh" arzusunu da eklemeyi ihmal etmemitir. Atatrk'n, insanlarn kresel boyutta birlikteliine iaret eden grleri, Romanya Dileri Bakan Antonescu ile konumasnda ok ak bir biimde dile getirilmitir. Diyor ki: "...insan mensup olduu milletin varln ve saadetini dnd kadar, btn cihan milletlerinin huzur ve refahn dnmeli ve kendi milletinin saadetine ne kadar kymet veriyorsa btn dnya milletlerinin saadetine hadim olmaa elinden geldii kadar almaldr. Btn akll adamlar takdir ederler ki, bu vadide almakla hibir ey kaybedilmez. nk dnya milletlerinin saadetine almak, dier bir yoldan kendi huzur ve saadetini temine almak demektir."2 Atatrk'n, insanln kurtuluunun bir btn olarak kresel zmlerle gerekleebileceini ve bu yolda varlmas gereken nihai hedefin bir "birleik dnya hkmeti"nin kurulmas olduunu ok daha ak bir biimde ortaya koyan ifadeleri de vardr. Bunun iin, onun "Sylev"indeki u cmlelere gz atmamz gerekecektir: "Baylar, tm insanlarn, deneyim, bilgi ve dncedeki ilerlemesi ve geliimi [sonucunda]; Hristiyanlktan, Mslmanlktan, Budizmden vazgeerek basitletirilmi ve herkes iin anlalacak hale konulmu, evrensel, saf ve lekesiz bir dinin kurulmas ve insanlarn imdiye kadar kavgalar, pislikler, kaba arzu ve itahlar arasnda bir sefalethanede yaamakta olduklarn kabul ederek btn vcutlar ve zekalar zehirleyen ktlk tohumlarn yenmeye karar vermesi gibi koullarn gereklemesini gerektiren bir 'birleik dnya hkmeti' hayal etmenin tatl olduunu yadsyamam."3
1. 2. 3. Atatrk'n Sylev ve Demeleri, Atatrk Aratrma Merkezi, Trk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi, 1989, 4.bask, cilt:2, s.44. Atatrk'n Sylev ve Demeleri, age, s.325-6. Kemal Atatrk, Nutuk, Trk Devrim Tarihi Enstits, stanbul, 1962, s.713.

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Btn bunlardan sonra, bugne dek yeryznn sahne olduu belli bal dnce akmlarnn ve inan sistemlerinin hemen hepsi gibi Kemalizm'in de kresellemeci olduu sonucuna varabiliriz. Ancak, bunlarn her birini dierinden ve dierlerinden ayran derin farklar bulunduunu grmek zorunda olduumuzu da unutmamamz gerekir. Bu farkll yaratan, ne trde, ne nitelikte bir kreselleme salanmak istendiidir. Bu erevede nem tayan en can alc fark ise nasl bir iktidarn egemenlii altnda kreselleilecei sorusuna bulunacak yanta gre aklk kazanabilir. Dolaysyla, Kemalizm'in nihai amac ile gnmzdeki kresellemenin yneldii hedef arasndaki fark da bu soru balamnda aratrmak gerekecektir. Nasl Bir Kreselleme? Yukarda deindiimiz kresellemeci eilimlerin her birinin kendisine zg bir iktidar yaplanmas ngrd ve bu iktidarn belirledii bir egemenlik kavramna gre biimlenmi bir dnya amaladklar bellidir. Gnmzn kresellemecilerinin ne tr bir iktidarn egemenlii altnda, nasl bir kresellemeden yana olduklar her zaman aka ortaya konulmu deildir. ou yerde, kresellemek iin uluslararas pazara almak ve bu pazarn yasalarna kaytsz artsz teslim olmak gerektiini ileri srerler. Onlara gre, Adam Smith'in 19. yzyl balarnda syledii gibi, uluslararas pazarn da bireysel kararlarn bilekesinden ibaret olan nl "grnmeyen el"den baka yneticisi yoktur. stelik iddia etmektedirler ki ezen-ezilen, smren-smrlen elikisinden sz etmek modas gemi bir arky terennm etmekten farkszdr; artk, uluslar arasnda kendi deyimleriyle bir "karlkl bamllk" dnemi balamtr ve emperyalizm dnemi sona ermitir. Bu iddialar karsnda ncil'deki nl sz anmsamamak elde deil: "eytann en byk kurnazl kendisinin olmadna bizi inandrmasdr". Gerekte ise Adam Smith'in szn ettii gibi bir serbest rekabet dzeni, yalnzca baz ders kitaplarnda yer alm; gerek yaamda hi bir zaman gereklik kazanmamtr. Gerekte tm pazarlar gibi uluslararas pazarn da sahibi vardr. Uluslararas pazar, tm pazarlar gibi, bir grnmeyen elin deil; giderek grnen, IMF, Dnya Bankas gibi uluslararas odaklarda somutlaan uluslararas boyutlu tekellerin egemenlii altndadr. Yeryznde bir "dev irketler ve cce devletler" dnemi balam bulunuyor4. Saylar beyze varan ok uluslu irket, dnya ticaretinin %70'ini elinde tutmaktadr. Kresellemeye kout olarak etkinlik alanlar genileyen uluslarst iktisadi g odaklan, tek kutuplulaan dnyada rakipsiz kalan sper
4. Ignaciot Ramonet, "Firmes geantes Etats nains", Le Monde diplomatique, juin 1998, s.l.

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gcn ve onun banda yer ald G7 halkasnn siyasal stnlklerinin ve iktidarlarnn asl dayanan oluturmakta ve bu iktidarn hizmet ettii temel kan temsil etmektedirler. Bugne dek aklanm olan grler iinde, gnmzde giderek belirginlemekte olan kreselleme gereinin gerek yzn ortaya koyan bir rnee, nl ngiliz yazar Bernard Shaw'un yazdklar iinde rastlamaktayz. Bernard Shaw, Fabian Cemiyeti'nin bir yesi olarak bu yzyln banda yaynlad 3Fabianclk ve mparatorluk3 isimli kitapnda bugnn kreselleme olgusuna alacak lde benzeyen ve dolayl bir sonu olarak bu olgunun gerek yzn tehir eden grler ortaya koymutur. Shaw'a gre, "bir ulusun kendi topraklarnda, dnyann geri kalan ksmnn karlarn nazara almakszn dilediini yapma hakkna sahip olmas fikri, artk geerliliini yitirmitir". nk Shaw, dnyann, insanln ortak mal olarak grlmesi ve dnya kaynaklarnn etkin bir biimde kullanmnn, tm dier "dar ulusal karlara" gre ncelik tamas grndeydi. Dolaysyla, ideal zm bir Dnya Federasyonunun kurulmas olabilirdi. Ancak bu gelimenin ok uzanda bulunulduunu kabul eden Shaw, "mevcutlar iindeki en sorumlu mparatorluk Federasyonunun (Imperial Federation) onun yerini almas"n savunmaktayd5. Bu ok samimi anlatm erevesinde savunulan, elbette ki emperyalizmin egemenlii altnda tam bamszlk ilkesinin silinip gitmesinden, bir baka deyile, ok sayda bamsz ve demokratik rejimler yerine tek ve evrensel bir imparatorluk rejiminin kurulmasndan baka bir ey deildir. Gnmzde, kreselletii sylenen dnyay bekleyenin de bundan ibaret olduu her gn biraz daha iyi anlalyor. Bu yndeki gzlemler ve tehisler giderek yaygnlamaktadr. Amerikan asll iktisat Susan Geor5 ge, bir "Dnya Bankas mparatorluu"ndan sz eder olmutur . te yandan, Kanada'l profesr Chossudovsky, bir "kresel totalitarizm" ann 7 balamakta olduuna iaret etmektedir . Fransz dnr Alain Mine ise, yeni bir Orta a'a dnten sz etmektedir8. Kresellemenin yeni bir tr imparatorluk demek olduuna dair grler, yalnzca bu oluuma eletirel bir gzle bakanlar tarafndan ileri s5. 6. 7. 8. Bernard Shaw, Fabianism and the Empire, bkz:G.D.H. COLE, A History of Socialist Thougt, Volume i, Part I, Londra, Macmillan, 1963, s. 190-191. Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli, Faith and Credit, The World Bank's Secular Empire, Penguin Books, Londra, 1994. Michel Chossudovsky, "Comment eviter la mondialisation de la pauvrete'", Le Monde diplomatique, Ocak 1997, s.4. Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, s.33; Anthony Giddens, The Third Way, Cambridge, 1998, s. 138.

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rlmyor. Kresellemenin yandalar arasnda da kurulmakta olan kresel yaplanmann dpedz bir imparatorluk olduuna dair grler eksik deil. Amerikadaki nl ve etkin kurululardan biri olan, Carnegie Endowment vakfnn kdemli aratrmaclarndan Robert Kagan'n da yeni bir imparatorluun kurulmakta olduundan kukusu yok. Ancak, ona gre, tepesinde Amerika'nn yer ald bu yaplanma bir "alicenap imparatorluk"tur ve "aslna bakarsanz Amerika'nn alicenap hegemonyas dnya nfusunun byk ounluunun karnadr". Bu ekilde biimlenen yeni dnya dzeninde, demokrasi tamamen gndem dna itilmitir ve sorun, hangi imparatorluun daha iyi olaca tartmasna indirgenmi bulunmaktadr. Kaan, hangi imparatorluun daha iyi olduunu yle aklamaktadr: "ABD'nin hatalar ne olursa olsun baka bir g onun yerini ald takdirde dnya yeni durumu daha sevimsiz bulacaktr. Amerika zaman zaman kstah ya da bencil olabilir, gcn kullanmada a gzlle kaabilir. Ancak, kusura baklmasn ama kiminle karlatrldnda? Amerika'nn gc Fransa'da olsayd Franszlar'in daha az zorba, bencil ve hata yapmaya az meyilli olduklarna inanan kar m? (...) Eer dnyada tek bir sper g kalacaksa bu gcn ABD olmas herkesin yararnadr."9 Amerika'nn ulusal gvenlik danmanlarndan ve yakn tarihinin nde gelen isimlerinden Brzezinski de, 1997 tarihli kitabnda, bugnn dnyasn benzer izgilerle tanmlamaktadr. Ona gre, "rakibinin k, Amerika Birleik Devletleri'ni esiz bir konuma soktu. Birbiri ardna hem ilk hem de tek kresel g haline geldi. Amerika'nn kresel stnl baz bakmlardan, daha snrl blgesel etkinlik alanlarna ramen eski imparatorluklar andrmaktadr. Bu imparatorluklar glerini vasallar, tbiler, protektoralar ve smrgeler hiyerarisine dayandrmlard; bunlarn dnda kalanlara da genellikle barbar gzyle baklrd."10 Kresellemenin Demokrasiyle elien Sonular Karsnda Kemalizm Grlyor ki, yalnzca ulusal devlet olgusunun son bulduu bir dnem balatlm olmamakta; ayn zamanda, demokrasi de szde kalmaya mahkum edilmekedir. Amerikan hegemonyas olarak tanmlanan, gerekte, uluslararas sermeyenin kresel egemenliidir. Amerikan halk da, Amerika da saylar giderek artan yoksulluk snrnn altndaki nfus da bu imparatorluun tebaasdr. Dolaysyla, Kemalizm'in "egemenlik kaytsz artsz ulusundur" ilkesine karlk, "egemenlik kaytsz artsz uluslararas sermayenindir" ilkesi egemen klnmaktadr. Bugnn dnya9. Robert Kaan, "Alicenap mparatorluk", Foreign Policy (Trkiye basks-lstanbul niversitesi yayn), Yaz 1998, s.24, 26. 10. Zbigniev Brzezinski, Byk Satran Tahtas, Sabah kitaplar, s.13.

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sndaki Kresellemenin, Kemalizm ile derin elikisi de ncelikle bu noktada kendisini gstermektedir. Demokrasinin tarihe gmlmesi yolundaki bu gidiin, baka pek ok ey ile birlikte Kemalizm ile elimesi ve Kemalizm'i kendisi iin bir ayak ba gibi grmesi doaldr ve kanlmazdr. nk Kemalizm, tarihsel olarak demokratikleme ile e ynl ve hatta zde bir akmdr. Atatrk dneminin ne kadar demokratik olduu konusunda bir yargya varabilmek iin, bu dnemi rnek olarak kabul ettiimiz veya zihnimizde canlandrdmz ideal bir modelle karlatrmamz elbette ki yanl olur. Herhangi bir rejimin veya hareketin demokrasi asndan tad anlam ve nem, ncelikle, iinde yer ald topluma demokratikleme dorultusunda salad kazanmlarla llebilir. Konuya bu adan baklnca, her eyden nce u ok ak ve sade tarihsel gerein anmsanmasnda yarar vardr: Bamszlk olmadan demokrasi olmaz. "Ekonomik smrye ynelmi byk devlet, smrecei vesayet altndaki devlette demokrasiye raz olmaz."11 Atatrk, egemenliin saldrgan devletlerin ve onlarn kuklas durumuna dm olan padiahn elinden alnarak milletin eline gemesini mmkn klan bir kurtulu hareketine nderlik etmekle, demokrasinin kurulmas iin gerekli ve vazgeilmez olan temellerin atlmasn salamtr. Kemalizm'in demokrasi asndan lkeye ne kazandrdn gereki bir biimde deerlendirebilmek iin, lkeyi nereden alp nereye getirdiini nyarglardan arnm olarak grmek gerekir. u ok ak gerein bilinmesi gerekir ki Kemalizm, lkeyi saltanattan alp, "ok partili" dzene getirmi olan rejimin addr. Bunu syleyince kimilerinin, "uluslararas konjonktrn zorlamalarnn kanlmaz sonular Kemalizm'le aklamayalm" diyeceklerini biliyorum. O zaman sormak gerekir, bu uluslararas zorlamalar, niin tran iin, Suudi Arabistan iin geerli olmamtr da bu blgede yalnzca lkemizde hkmn icra edebilmitir. Atatrk'n ifade ettii boyutlarda bir ok partililik, bugn dahi salanabilmi deildir. Atatrk'e gre, kapitalist toplumda, snf temelinde bir siyasal rgtlenmenin gereklemesi ve her snfn kendi siyasal partisini kurmas "pek tabiidir". O, bu konudaki dncelerini, 7 Aralk 1923'te Balkesir'de Paa Camisi'nin minberin yapt nl konumasnda yle aklamtr. "unu arzedeyim ki, baka lkelerde partiler mutlaka iktisadi maksatlar zerin kurulmu ve kurulmaktadr. nk o lkelerde eitli snf11. Muammer Aksoy, Atatrk ve Tam Bamszlk, Cumhuriyet yaym, stanbul, Eyll 1998, s.13. Kemalizm ve demokrasi ilikisi iinde bkz: A. Ikl, Sosyalizm Kemalizm ve Din, ikinci bask, Tze Yaynclk, Ankara, 1998, s.28-49.

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lar vardr. Bir snfn karn korumak iin kurulan bir partiye karlk, dier bir snfn karn korumak maksadyla bir parti kurulur. Bu pek tabiidir."12 Bir rejimin demokratikliinin ls, ann dier lkelerindeki rejimlerle karlatrlarak da ortaya konulabilir. Bu erevede yaplacak bir karlatrma, Atatrk dneminde lkemizde yrrlkte olan rejimin demokratiklik dzeyinin, ayn dnemde, deil Ortadou veya Arap lkelerinde, Avrupa lkelerinde grlenlerden de daha ileri olduu sonucunu ortaya karr. Batda o dnemde, talya'da faizm egemendir. Almanya'da nazizm trmana gemitir. Fransa, hzla nazi egemenlii altna girmitir. Dou Avrupa'da da durum farkl deildir. Batda diktatrle kaym olan lkelerin hepsinde, Trkiye'de Atatrk dneminde grlen durumdan farkl olarak, rkln, azgn bir Yahudi dmanlnn ve azgn bir sol dmanlnn kol gezdii bilinmektedir. Kukusuz, Batda yukarda deinilen lkelerin dnda ngiltere ve ABD gibi lkeler de bulunmaktadr. Bu lkelerle yaplacak bir karlatrma da Atatrk dnemi Trkiye'si asndan olumsuz bir yargya varmamz sonucunu dourmaz. Yeter ki bu lkelerin demokratiklik dzeyi deerlendirilirken, egemenlikleri altnda bulunan tm topraklarn ve tm insanlarn durumu nazara alnarak yargya varmak gerektii unutulmasn. ngiltere, yalnzca adadan ibaret deildir ve Byk Britanya olarak ele alnmas gerekir. ngiltere "kpekler ve inliler giremez" trnden levhalarla donatt in'de, Hindistan'da ve tm smrgelerinde yaptklaryla birlikte dnldnde; keza, ABD, gnmze dek lkesindeki zencilere kar uygulad politikayla... birlikte deerlendirilince; Kemalist dnemin demokrasi ve insan haklar sicilinin greli olarak bir hayli dzgn olduu sonucuna varmamak mmkn deildir. Atatrk dneminin demokratiklik dzeyi irdelenirken, demokratik katlmn ne lde salanm olduuna da bakmamz gerekecektir. Bu konudaki tespitler ortaya konulurken, 1924'te semen yann 18'e indirilmesi ve 1934'te kadnlara seme ve seilme hakknn tannmas ncelikle akla gelir. Gerekten de henz ortada belirmi bir talebin bulunmad bir dnemde genlerin ve kadnlarn siyasal katlm hakknn tannmasna bylesine zen gsterilmi olmas son derece anlamldr. Ayrca, unutmamamz gerekir ki demokratiklik asndan rnek saylan pek ok lkede bile kadnlarn siyasal haklarn elde etmeleri, ok daha sonraki dnemlerde ve etin mcadeleler pahasna mmkn olabilmitir. Siyasal katlmn salanmas asndan ok byk nem tayan, fakat nedense, zerinde yeterince durulmayan ok nemli bir gelime de
12. Atatrk'n Sylev ve Demeleri, cilt: 2, s. 101.

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seme-seilme hakkna snfsal staty belirleyen baz ltlere gre konulmu olan snrlarn kaldrlmasdr. 1876 Tarihli 1. Merutiyet Anayasasnda yer alan ve 19O8'de balayan 2. Merutiyet dneminde de yrrlkte kalan bir hkme gre, "hini intihapta (seim zamannda) bir kimsenin hizmetkrlnda bulunan"lara milletvekili seilme hakk tannmamt. Bylece iilerin milletvekili olmalar yasaklanm oluyordu. Ayrca, 28 Ekim 1876'da karlan Talimat- Muvakkate, seilme hakkn "az ok emlak sahibi olma koulu" ile snrlandrmt ve milletvekillerini seecek olan ikinci semenin "merkezi vilayet, liva ve kazalarn idare meclisi yeleri"nden olumasn ngrmekteydi. Sz edilen idare meclisi yelerinin seimi ise, iller Kanununa gre, nce ylda en az 50 kuru vergi demek ve daha sonra da miktar belirlemeksizin vergi ykmls olmak kouluna balanmt. Keza, 1908'de yrrle giren ntihab- Mebusan Kanununa gre de semen olabilmek iin "Devlete az ok vergi demek" gerekmekteydi. Tm bu snrlamalar, Cumhuriyetle birlikte yrrlkten kalkt. 1921 ve 1924 Anayasalar, seme ve seilme hakkn tm yurttalara tand. ntihab- Mebusan Kanunu, 1934'e kadar yrrlkte kalmasna karn, semen olabilmek iin "Devlete az ok vergi demek" koulunu ngren hkm, 3 Nisan 1923'te kaldrld13. Baka lkelerde herkese seme ve seilme hakkn salamaya ynelik hareketlere ve bu hakkn tannd tarihlere, ok byk tarihsel nem verilmitir. rnein, ngiltere'de bu misyonu grm olan artist hareketin, yalnzca ngiltere tarihinde deil, dnya tarihinde ok mstesna bir yeri vardr. Fransa'da genel oy hakkn ilk defa tanyan 1848 Anayasas, ok derin bir devrim hareketinin sonucunda yrrle girmitir ve dnya tarihinin nemli dnm noktalarndan biri olarak anlr. Emperyalizmin boyunduruundan yeni kurtulmu bir lkede, seme seilme hakknn tm yurttalara tannmas bakmndan da tm mazlum milletlere rnek ve nclk etmi olan Kemalist devrimin bu ynnn ou yerde ihmal edilmi olmas; bu devrimi, zora dayanan ve zora dayal bir rejim kurmay amalayan bir hareket olarak gsterme abalaryla uyuan sonular vermitir. Atatrk dneminde siyasal katlmn yaygn bir biimde gerekletirilmesi ynnde gsterilen kararlln daha pek ok rnekleri vardr. Bu erevede, halkevlerinin ve ky enstitlerinin ilevlerinin yalnzca kltr ve eitim alanyla snrl kalmayp, demokrasiye ierik kazandrmak ve demokratiklemeye katk salamak bakmndan da byk nem tadna iaret etmek gerekir.
13. Bkz. Cem Eroul, Devlet Ynetimine Katlma Hakk, mge, Ankara, 1991, s. 200201.

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Kemalist devrim, padiahn kulu olmaya koullandrlm bir mmetten, eit ve zgr yurttalardan oluan bir ulus domas ynnde ok byk bir azim ve kararllk gstermitir. Bunun iindir ki Atatrk, retmenlere yle seslenmekteydi: "Biz sizden dncesi zgr, vicdan zgr, anlay zgr kuaklar istiyoruz." Atatrk, kendi dneminde kurulmasna n ayak olduu pek ok nemli kurumun, devlete baml, tepeden inme emirlerle ynetilen brokratik kurulular olarak deil; katlma ak, zerk bir yaplanma iinde kurulmasna zen gstermitir. Anadolu Ajans, Telgraf Telefon Anonim irketi, Trk Dil Kurumu, Trk Tarih Kurumu bunlar arasnda sralanabilir. Atatrk, ekonomik alanda da katlmdan yana olduunu gstermitir. Bu konuda kooperatiflerin bir numaral yesi olmak suretiyle nc ve rnek olmak istemitir14. Atatrk dneminde gzlemlenen bu genel durum, basn yayn hayatnda da yansmalarn gstermitir. "Kurtulutan hemen sonra basnn az ok zgr olduu sylenebilir." Daha sonraki dnemlerde de bir takm kstlamalara ve snrlamalara ramen, "basn hayatnn hayli canl olduu sylenebilir".15 Kemalizm'in kendi dndaki sola tand dnce, ifade ve basn zgrlnn snrlarnn da greli olarak belirgin bir biimde geni olduunu ayrca gzlemleyebilmekteyiz. Kimileri, Halk Frkasnn alt okun iinde demokrasi ilkesine yer verilmemi olmasn, Atatrk'n demokrat olmaynn kantlarndan biri olarak ileri srerler. Oysa, Atatrk'n bizzat kaleme alarak Afet nan'n imzasyla yaynlatt "Medeni Bilgiler" kitabnda, "halklk" ilkesinin, "demokrasi prensibi"nin eanlamls olarak kulland anlalmaktadr. "Bu prensibe nazaran, irade ve hkimiyet milletin umumuna aittir ve ait olmaldr. Demokrasi prensibi, hkimiyeti milliye ekline inklp etmitir."16 Kemalizm'in yznn hi bir tereddde yer brakmayacak lde demokrasiye dnk olduunda kuku yoktur. Bu nedenledir ki Mustafa Kemal, bizzat kendisinin Halife olmas dorultusundaki nerileri elinin tersi ile geri evirmitir. Bu nedenledir ki Mustafa Kemal, yaamnn son dnemlerinde Recep Peker tarafndan hazrlanan, rejimin faist modele gre yeniden yaplanmas dorultusundaki program nerisini son derece iddetli bir tepki
14. Bkz: Ahmet Taner Klal, Kemalizm Laiklik ve Demokrasi, mge, Ankara 1994, s. 26-27. 15. Sina Aksin, agm, s. 246. 16. A. fetinan, Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatrk'n El Yazlar, 2. Bask, TTK Yaynlar, Ankara, 1988, s.27.

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gstererek reddetmitir. stelik, Peker'in bu nerisi, tsmet Paa tarafndan da okunmadan imzalanm olmasna ramen... Bu olay karsnda syledikleri dndrcdr: "Grlyor ki varmak istediimiz hedef, henz en yakn arkadalar tarafndan bile, zerre kadar anlalm deildir... biz yle bir idare, yle bir rejim istiyoruz ki; bu memlekette bir gn -eer dnyada hkmdarlk aleyhinde gittike artan kuvvetli cereyan muvacehesinde kalanlar varsaPadiahla taraftar olanlar dahi frka kurabilsinler..."17 Aradan geen zaman, Atatrk' anlamayanlarn, daha dorusu anlamamakta srar edenlerin saylarnn azalmadn, hatta artmakta olduunu gsteriyor. Bugn, "Kemalist teokratizm", "Kemalist faizm" gibi anlalmaz yaktrmalarla ortaya kanlar honut etmek iin Atatrk'n ne yapm olmas gerektiini kestirmek kolay deil. Acaba Atatrk'n, demokrasi aray iinde olduunu bu baylara kantlayabilmesi iin, Kurtulu Savan balatmadan nce ngiliz igal kuvvetleri komutannn gzetimi altnda bir referandum dzenlemesi mi gerekirdi! Kemalizm, tm propagandalarn aksine, bamszlk, antiemperyalist z dolaysyla yalnzca Trkiye'de deil, tm mazlum uluslar asndan demokratikleme abalarnn en temel dayanaklarndan biridir. Atatrk, eitli yazlarnda ve konumalarnda yansyan bu dorultudaki grlerini 13 Eyll 1920 gn Meclis'e sunduu ve tartmalarda "Halklk Bildirisi" olarak anlan "Tekilat Esasiye Kanunu Lyihas"nn ikinci maddesinde yle zetlemitir: "Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi Hkmeti, hayat ve istiklalini kurtarmay tek lk ve ama bildii halk, emperyalizm ve kapitalizm egemenliinden ve zulmnden kurtararak, ynetim ve egemenliin gerek sahibi klmakla amacna varaca kansndadr."18 Kreselleme yanllarnn ulusal devleti bir "dinozor" olarak ilan etme ve tarihin karanlna gmme abalarnn ciddiyeti de asl burada kendisini gstermektedir. nk, ulusal devletin yklmas, eer salanabilirse, ayn zamanda demokrasiye indirilmi bir darbe olacaktr. Bugn iin yeterince demokratik olmayan ulusal devleti daha da demokratikletirmenin yollan bulunabilir. Oysa, ulusal devletin yerine kurulmak istenen uluslararas sermayenin egemenliine dayal bir tr imparatorluk rejimi ile demokrasinin badatrlmas mmkn deildir. nk, uluslar st denilen iktidar odaklarnn, uluslararas sermayenin karlarnn ifadesi olan ncelikleri ile halkn zlemlerinin gereklemesine ortam salama potansiyelini tayan demokrasi arasnda almaz bir
17. Hasan Rza Soyak, Atatrk'ten Hatralar, Yap Kredi Bankas, stanbul, 1973, s. 5759. 18. Ceyhun Atf Kansu, Ya Bamszlk Ya lm, Bilgi Yaynevi, Ankara, 1997, s. 109.

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eliki vardr. Bu nedenledir ki demokrasiye ynelik saldrlarn bir paras olarak, Kemalizm'in somut kazanmalarnn en nemlilerinden birisi olan ulusal devleti ykma niyetleri de gndemdedir. mmet esasna dayal devlet kurma veya rk temele dayal blnmeler yaratma hevesleri, ulusal devleti ykarak uluslararas sermayenin boyunduruunu glendirme dorultusundaki planlarla mkemmelen rtmektedir. mmet esasna dayal devlet demek, Suudi Arabistan gibi olmak demektir. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin yerine rk temele dayal devletiklerin kurulmas ise, en iyi olaslkla, yresel feodal unsurlarn dizginlerinden bsbtn kurtulmalar demektir. Her iki durumun da blgenin petrolleri zerinde karlar bulunan kresel gler asndan bulunmaz ittifaklar ve frsatlar sunacanda kuku yoktur. Kresellemenin Getirdii Ekonomik ve Sosyal Modelin Kemalizm ile elikisi Kreselleme ve Kemalizm arasndaki bir dier eliki de nasl bir ekonomik ve sosyal modelin benimsenmesi gerektii konusunda kendisini gstermektedir. Batl sanayilemi lkeler, iine dtkleri bunalm amak ve emeki kitlelerde ykselen talepleri savuturmak amacyla 2. Dnya Sava sonras dnemde sosyal devlet kurumlarn hayata geirmiler ve bundan bekledikleri yararlar nemli lde salamlardr. Kukusuz, Batl egemenlerin sosyal devletin hayata gemesi yolunda tavizler vermelerinde komnizmin emeki kitlelere ynelik vaatlerinin cazibesinden duyulan kayg da nemli bir rol oynamtr. Sosyal devletin douu, liberal gre duyulan gvenin temellerinin sarslmas sonucunda mmkn olabilmitir. Liberal gre kar, iktisadi doktrinler yelpazesinin ok deiik dilimlerinden 19. yzyl boyunca da ok nemli eletiriler yneltilmi; ancak, bunlarn etkileri vakitsiz ten horoz rneine benzer sonulara varmt. Liberal dnceye kar eletirilerin ciddiye alnmalar ve etkili olabilmeleri iin pek ok bunalmn ardndan 2. Dnya Sava felaketinin de yaanmas gerekmitir. Sonuta, vakitli ten horoz rol ingiliz iktisats Keynes'e dmtr. Keynesi kuram, sosyal devlete yeil k yakacak biimde yorumlanm ve bu ynde belirleyici etkiler dourmutur. Bu arada, Keynes ncesi Keynesileri de unutmamak gerekir. Amerikan devlet adam Roosevelt bunlardan biridir ve uygulad New Deal politikas ile Keynesi kurama uygun, devletin mdahaleci ve dzenleyici rolne arlk veren bir iktisat politikas sergilemitir. Atatrk'n ekonomik ve sosyal politikasn, sanayileme ncesi bir toplumda uygulama alan kazanm olmas dolaysyla, sanayilemi lkelerde ortaya km olan sosyalist akmlarla tpatp benzerlik iinde gr-

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mek olana yoktur. Ancak, uras tartlmaz bir gerektir ki Atatrk, 19. yzyl liberalizminin Avrupa'y ne denli felaketlere srklediini ok iyi grm; bu nedenle, izlenmesine nclk ettii yolun liberalizmden farkl olduunun altn srarla izmitir. Bu nedenledir ki konumalarnda, "bizi yutmak isteyen kapitalizme ve bizi mahvetmek isteyen emperyalizme" kart bir dorultuya iaret ederek "emeiyle geinen zavall bir halk" olmann gerektirdii bir yaplanmay hedeflediini ortaya koymutur. Hepsinden nemlisi, alt ok halinde belirledii hedefler arasna halklk, devletilik ve devrimcilik ilkelerini koymak suretiyle, ekonomik ve sosyal felsefesinin zn hi bir tereddde yer brakmayacak bir biimde zetlemitir. Bylelikle belirledii yol, liberalizm ile taban tabana zttr ve devlet mdahaleciliinin ve dzenleyiciliinin nemini Keynes'ten ok nce kavrayp, hayata geirmek suretiyle ileri grlln bu alanda da kantlamtr. Evrensel dzeyde Keynesilii tahtndan indirmi; "devleti kltmek" dorultusunda lklar atarak kamu giriimciliine ve sosyal devlete kar bir sava balatm bulunan kresellemeciler, bu konuda da karlarnda Kemalizm'i buluyorlar. Kresellemenin kanlmaz uzantsn oluturan zelletirme abalarndan tutunuz, parasz eitime kar srdrlen kampanyalara kadar, kresellemenin ayrlmaz sonularn oluturan her ters adm, ister istemez Kemalizm'in kazanmlarn tahribe ynelmi oluyor; dolaysyla, temelinde Kemalizm ruhunun yatt engellere arpmas kanlmaz oluyor. Bylece, kresellemenin demokrasinin yan sra sosyal devleti de hedefleyen saldrlar, Kemalizm ile ve onun ayrlmaz btnleyicisi olan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti ile zorunlu bir hesaplamay gndeme getiren ayr bir unsur oluturuyor. Kreselleme, Uluslararas Smr ve Kemalizm Unutmamak gerekir ki Kemalizm'in, tarihsel olarak, bir dier nemli zellii de smrgeciliin zlmesi srecine nclk etmi bir hareket olmas gereinden kaynaklanmaktadr. Bu yzdendir ki kreselleme, ayrca, uluslararas smrye kazandrd olaanst boyut ve ivme dolaysyla da Kemalizm ile derinden elien sonular dourmaktadr. Gnmz dnyas ile ilgili belli bal veriler, esasen ok bozuk olan uluslararas gelir adaletsizliinin, kreselleme sreci ile birlikte hzla derinlemekte olduunu ortaya koymaktadr. Bir baka deyile, smrgecilik yeniden kalka gemitir. Oysa dnyann bugn iine dt bunalmdan kurtulabilmesinin gerek zm, sosyal adalete evrensel bir boyut kazandrmakszn mmkn grnmyor. Bat, bugne dek yalnzca ve her ne pahasna olursa olsun kendisini kurtarmak istedii iin, bir trl kurtulamamaktadr. Yoksulluk, adaletsizlik iinde kvranan ve smrye aralk eden baskc re268

j imler altnda inleyen insanlarn ounlukta olduu bir dnyada, sosyal refah adacklarn yaatmann bir snr olduu grlmtr. Sanki ncil'de denildii gibi "cann koruyann cann kaybedecei" bir kere daha kantlanmaktadr. Willy Brandt bu gerei, u cmlelerle ortaya koymutu: "...zengin ve yoksul lkeler arasndaki mesafeyi kltmek, frsat eitliine adm adm yaklamak, bizatihi nem tayan sosyal adaleti gerekletirme mcadelesinden ibaret olmayan bir meseledir. Bu, ayn zamanda, yalnzca yoksul ve ok yoksul uluslar asndan deil, varlkllar iin de bir z kar sorunudur."19 2. Dnya Sava sonrasnda temelleri atlm olan Bretton Woods kurumlarndan beklenen, dnyann yoksul lkelerinin ihtiya duyduu dorultuda bir sermaye transferinin salanmasna hizmet etmeleriydi. Ne var ki ekonomik gc elinde bulunduranlarn istekleri dorultusunda bu kurumlarn ilevlerinin tamamen tersine evrildii grlmtr. Bugn yeryznde daha nceki smrge dnemlerinin hepsini geride brakacak lde Gney'den Kuzey'e doru bir kaynak akm balatlmtr20. "Bylece 1982-1990 yllar arasnda sekiz ylda, yoksullardan zenginlere doru, yalnzca bor servisleri yoluyla, 2. Dnya Sava sonras dnemde Amerika'nn Avrupa'ya yapt Marshall yardmlarnn sekiz kat tutarnda bir gelir tranasfer edilmitir". Yoksul borlu lkelerdeki ortalama yurtta, alacakl bir OECD lkesindeki ortalama yurttatan 55 defa daha yoksul olduundan [IMF gibi uluslararas kurulular araclyla salanan bu sre] tatan kan karmaya benzemekte".21 Birlemi Milletler tarafndan ortaya konulan, 1992 ylna ait veriler, dnya nfusunun en zengin %20'sini oluturan kesimin, dnya gelirinin %82,7'sini aldn; buna karlk, en yoksul %20'sini oluturan kesimin ise %1,4'n aldn gstermektedir22. Kreselleme olgusu uluslararas gelir dalmndaki adaletsizlii bsbtn derinletirmitir. 1965'te G7 lkelerinde kii bana den gelir miktar, dnyann en yoksul 7 lkesinin 20 katyd. 1995'te ise G7 lkelerinde kii bana den gelir, en yoksul 7 lkedekinin 39 katna ykselmitir. Baz gelimekte olan lkeler sanayilemi lkelerden daha hzl bymektedir, fakat yine de bu byme oran kii bana den gelir orann kapatacak kadar hzl deildir. Afrika'da son 30 yldr bu fark gittike art19. "An Introduction by Willy Brandt", Nord-South, A Programme for Survival, The MT Press, Cambridge, 1980, s. 17. 20. Susan George, The Debt Boomerang, Pluto Press, Londra, 1990, s. XVII. 21. Ayn eser, s. XV-XVI. 22. UNDP, Human Development Report 1992, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992.

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mtr. Ortalama kii bana gelir sanayilemi lkelere gre %7'dir. Latin Amerika'da deiim birden bire olmutur; 1970'lerin sonunda Kuzeydeki dzeye gre ortalama kii bana gelir 1/3'ten 1/4'e dmtr."23 1998'de patlak veren Asya Krizi, "Asya Kaplanlar" denilen lkeler grubunda da ok hzl bir ke neden olmutur. Konunun ok arpc bir yan da IMF'nin yapsal uyum programlarnn hedefi olan lkelerin durumunun, dierlerine kyasla greli olarak daha da ktye gitmi olmasdr. "Eyll 1997'de bizzat IMF tarafndan, yapsal uyum programlarnn etkilerini aratrmak iin hazrlanan, uzun 'dzeltmelerden' getikten sonra yaynlanan bir almann sonulan ok retici. Kii bana milli gelir, 1981-1995 yllar arasnda yapsal uyum programlarndan 'faydalanan' lkelerde yzde 0,1 dm, faydalanmayan lkelerde ise artmaya devam etmi."24 "Yine IMF'nin bu kendi aratrmasna gre programlardan 'faydalanan' lkelerin d borlarnn GSMH'ye oran, 1980-85 arasnda yzde 82'den yzde 154'e, 1991-1995 arasnda da yzde 56'dan yzde 76'ya ykselmi." IMF, yapsal uyum programlarnn uyguland "en yoksul" lkelere de bakyor. 1980-1995 arasnda d borlarn GSMH'ye orannn yzde 52'den yzde 154'e ykseldiini tespit ediyor.25 Demek oluyor ki uyum programlarna tabiiyet lsnde, IMF'ye bamllk artm oluyor. Uluslararas gelir dalmndaki bu bozukluk, yoksul lkelerde, beslenme yetersizliinin neden olduu hastalklarn ve ocuk lmlerinin artmas gibi gstergelerle elenmektedir. Trkiye'de de, Cumhuriyetin en yoksul dnemlerinde bile alt edilmi olan hastalklarn dirilmesi ve "sokak ocuklar" dramnn Latin Amerika'y hatrlatacak llerde ba gstermesi gibi belirtiler, Kemalist devlet anlayndan ayrlp, kresellemenin yrngesine kaymann zorunlu kld bir modelin benimsenmesinin bedeli olarak yorumlanabilir. Kreselleme, Mikro Milliyetilik ve Kemalizm Kreselleme, bir yandan ulusal devleti tarihin karanlklarna gmme kararlln tayan bir oluum niteliiyle varln duyururken; dier yandan ve bu durumla e zamanl olarak, mikro milliyetilik denilen akmlarn hz kazandna tank olmaktayz. Bu yolla, ulusal devleti zayflatmaya ve sonuta tahribe ynelik bir baka unsur daha elde edilmi olmaktadr. Etnik temele dayal ayrlk hareketlerin tahriki ve himayesi, bu yndeki eilimlerin en etkili ve en ok grlen tezahr olarak karmza kmaktadr.
23. Birlemi Milletler Ticaret ve Kalknma Konferans, Ticaret ve Kalknma Raporu 1997 (Trk- tarafndan evirtilip yaynlanmtr), Ocak 1998, s. 13-14. 24. International Herald Tribne, 29.4.1998; Ergin Yldzolu, "Camdesus'un Glmsemesi", Cumhuriyet, 20.5.1998. 25. Le Monde diplomatique, Mays 1998; E. Yldzolu, agm.

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Trkiye'deki sorunun temelinde yatan ve ayrlklk tahriklerine ortam hazrlayan unsurlarn banda blgeler aras gelir adaletsizlii gelmektedir. talya rnei de gstermektedir ki etnik veya dinsel ayrlklar olmasa da, blgeler aras gelir adaletsizlii olduu srece, ayrlk eilimlerin ortaya kmas kanlmazdr. talya'nn kuzeyindeki zenginler arasnda, gneyin yoksullarndan ayrlarak Avrupa ile daha avantajl bir entegrasyona girme araylar bu yzden gldr. Keza Yugoslavya rnei ortaya koymaktadr ki deiik etnik topluluklar asndan kltrel haklarn tannm olmas bile, blgeler aras gelir adaletsizliinin blnme yolunda tahrikini ve istismarn nlemeye yetmemektedir. Hrvat iktisats Branko Horvat, Yugoslavya'nn paralanmasna yol aan nedenlerin banda, Slovenya ve Hrvatistan gibi zengin yrelerin, yoksul blgeleri srtlarndan atmalar halinde Avrupa ile birleme konusunda kavuacaklarn umduklar olanaklarn cazibesinin rolne iaret etmitir. Dolaysyla, Trkiye'de mevcut sorunun zm bakmndan ncelikle yaplmas gereken, blgeler aras gelir dalmn, blclk tahriklerine yer brakmayacak bir yapya kavuturmaktr. Bunu yapmak yerine, yoksul blgelerden byk kentlere ynelik akn nlemek gerekesiyle, bir sre nce stanbul ve zmir gibi byk kentlerin belediye bakanlarnn Osmanl ehreminini rnek gstererek savunduklar gibi vize uygulamaya kalkmak, kimsenin, zellikle de yoksul kesimlerin yararna olmayan bir blnmenin ilk adm olmaktan baka bir sonu vermez. Ksa bir sre nce Kuzey Irak'tan ve lkemizin gneydousundan yola kan yoksullar, kafileler halinde gemilere binerek i bulmak umuduyla talya sahillerinden Avrupa'ya giri yapmak istemilerdi. Onlar, kresellemenin kendileri bakmndan da olanaklar sunacan sanmlard. Kadn, ocuk, hasta demeden gerisin geri denize dndrldklerinde ac gerei tatm oldular. Kreselleme sermaye iindi. Sermaye, k hzyla yeryznde kol gezmek olanana sahip olmutu; ama, emek iin serbest dolam hakk yoktu. Berlin duvar yklmt; ne var ki Avrupa kalesinin etrafndaki surlar eskisinden daha muhkem hale getirilmiti. Buna karlk, ayn talya, parlamentosunun salonlarn ayrlk terrist rgt PKK'nn temsilcilerine tahsis etmekte bir saknca grmemitir. Kukusuz, bu rgte kanat geren; gizli ak desteklerini esirgemeyen tek lke talya deildir. Tek kutuplulaan dnyann hiyerarik dzeninde, kendine denleri sadakatle yerine getiren Rusya da Suriye'den kaan terrist rgt bakanna kaplarn amtr. Bir sre nce, lkemizde mevcut ayrlklk sorununa zm bulmak gerekesiyle, TESEV (Trkiye Ekonomik Sosyal Etdler Vakf) bir giriim balatmt. TESEV, "Krt Sorunu" olarak tanmladklar soruna zm bulmak amacyla, srail-Filistin barnn salanmasnda rol oyna26 m iki Amerikal uzman da davet ettiini aklamt . Keza, ayn tarih26. Milliyet, 24 Ocak 1996.

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lerde istanbul Belediye Bakan Tayyip Erdoan'n davetlisi olarak Trkiye'ye gelen, 68 Paris'inde anarist kanadn lideri olan, imdi Avrupa parlamentosu yesi sfatn tayan Daniel Cohn Bendit de benzer aklamalarda bulunmutu. Yakn tarihlerde Almanya'daki yurttalarmzn katld baz toplantlarda konutum. Bu toplantlarda baz kiiler, ellerine verilmi bir kattan okuyarak sanki aralarnda anlamasna bana u soruyu sordular: "Yaser Arafat'a da yakn zamana kadar terrist deniyordu. imdi ayn masaya oturuldu. Abdullah calan ile de ayn masaya niin oturulmasn; Trkiye'de de siyasi zme niin gidilmesin?" Onlara verdiim yant u oldu: Israil-Filistin sorunu ile Trkiye'de etnik olarak tanmlanan sorun arasnda paralellik kurabilmek iin insan, eer kt niyetli deilse, ok cahil olmas gerekir. Trkiye'de her trl etnik kkenden yurttalara ak olan iler, srail'de Filistinlilere kapaldr. srail'de bir Filistinli cumhurbakan olabilir mi, Meclis Bakan veya bakan olabilir mi? srail'de bir Filistinli Odalar Birlii Bakan olabilir mi? Yarg olabilir mi? General olabilir mi?... Hepsinden getik, ii olabilir mi? i olursa eit ie eit cret alabilir mi? Kimileri, btn bu gerekleri gz ard ederek, srail-Filistin sorunu ile Trkiye'deki sorun arasnda paralellik kurmak suretiyle Misak- Milli'ye kar ciddi bir saldrya alet olduklarnn farknda deillerdir. Gerekte, srail-Filistin sorunu, aralarnda derin dmanlklar bulunan iki ulusu bir arada yaatma sorunudur. Trkiye'deki sorun ise asrlardr bir arada yaam bir ulusun insanlarn iki dman kampa ayrma sorunudur. Benden nce tebli sunan Sayn Kazancgil, Trkiye'de insanlarn etnik kkenlerinin anmsanmasn eletirmitir. Bir kere daha grlyor ki Trkiye'nin ii kolay deildir. Bir yandan, baz etnik kimlikleri tanmamakla itham edilmekte; dier yandan, baz etnik kkenlerin anlmas eletiri konusu olmaktadr. Kald ki insanlarn etnik kkenlerinin anlmas, Trkiye ile snrl bir tutum deildir. Son olarak Prenses Diana olay dolaysyla, tm Bat basnnda, Diana ile birlikte len (veya ldrlen) gencin babas olan, nl Harrod maazalarnn sahibinin ad anlrken "Arap asll" olduunun belirtilmesine zel bir zen gsterildiini grm bulunuyoruz. Bu arada, Kissenger'in de, Monica Levvinsky'nin de ve daha pek oklarnn da Yahudi asll olduklarn bizler Bat basnndan renmedik mi? Kimi Batl evrelerin nyarglarnn aksine, Trkiye'de Avrupa'da grld trde bir etnik ayrmclk hi bir zaman olmamtr. Avrupa'da faist veya nazist rejimler kurulduklarnda, yaptklar ilk ey, aznlktaki etnik grubu bask altna almak, konsantrasyon kamplarnda toplayarak yok etmek olmutur. Oysa, Trkiye'de demokrasinin ve z-

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grlklerin en ok tahribe uratldklar dnemlerde bile byle bir durum grlmemitir. 12 Eyll rejimi dneminde ok sayda kamu grevlisinin ve niversite retim yesinin grevine, savunmalarna ba vurulmakszn ve gereke gsterilmeksizin son verilmitir. Bunlar arasnda, etnik nedenlerle grevine son verilmi olan tek kii yoktur. Deiik etnik kkenden insanlar, 12 Eyll rejiminin kurduu niversite dzeninde de etkin ve nemli grevlerini srdrmlerdir. Trkiye'nin durumundaki bu farklln, kimi Batl gzlemcilerin anlamalar zor olan baz tarihsel nedenleri bulunduunda kuku yoktur. 1492'de spanya'da Katolikler tarafndan yaklma tehlikesiyle kar karya gelen Yahudiler, snacaklar yeri Osmanl topraklarnda bulmulard. Hitler'in zulmnden kaan Yahudi asll bilim adamlar da Atatrk zamanndaki niversitelerde, yalnzca snmak deil, zgrce bilimsel faaliyette bulunmak olanan elde ettiler. Trkiye'nin rklk ve yabanc dmanl konusundaki farkn douran unsurlar arasnda, geleneksel Anadolu hmanizmasna ek olarak ve ondan etkilenmi bir unsur olmas dolaysyla Kemalizm'in nemli bir yerinin bulunduunu kabul etmek gerekir. Sonu Cumhuriyetin, 75. ylna eritii bir tarihsel aamada, tm dnyada etkisini duyuran bir gerek olarak ortaya km bulunan kreselleme olgusuyla derinden elitiini grm bulunuyoruz. Bu eliki, ulusal devlet, demokrasi, sosyal devlet ve uluslararas smr gibi konularda younlamaktadr. Cumhuriyete ve onun temellerinde yatan Kemalizme ynelik saldrlarn son yllarda olaanst bir kabarma gstermesini, bu elikiden bamsz olarak akla kavuturmak olanaksz grnyor. Cumhuriyete ve Kemalizm'e ynelik saldrlar, hedefleri ayn olmakla birlikte, deiik saflardan kaynaklanyorlar. Bu saldrlarn banda, dinsel grnme brnm olanlar geliyor. Cumhuriyetin ilk yllarnda, hemen hepsinin arkasnda emperyalizmin irkin yznn srtmakta olduu belirlenmi olan bu tr saldrlarn saysz rnekleri grlmtr. Atatrk'n "Sylev"inde anlatlan Sait molla olay, eyh Sait isyan vs. ... bunlardan ilk azda akla gelenleridir. Din smrs olgusu, 2. Dnya Sava sonras yllarda ve zellikle 50'li yllarda yeniden ba kaldrmtr. Bu durum, d politika asndan tam bamszlk izginin terk edilmesi ve "Kk Amerika" olma hayalleriyle ssl yeni bir yrngeye girilmi olmasyla yakndan ilgilidir. Bu olgunun, 80'li yllardan bu yana, kreselleme rzgarlarn da arkasna alarak olaanst bir ivme kazandn gryoruz.

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Kemalizme ve Cumhuriyete ynelik saldrlarn bir dieri de 2. Cumhuriyeti olarak tanmlanan harekette ifadesini bulmaktadr. Bunlarn grleri, Trkiye'nin demokratiklemesinin Kemalizm'den kurtulmu bir Cumhuriyetin kurulmasyla salanabilecei biiminde zetlenebilir. Gerekte ise onlarn yaptklar, lkeyi Ortaa karanlna srklemek isteyenlerle veya blc eilimlerle, dorudan veya dolayl yollarla ele vermek suretiyle demokrasinin en basit gerekleriyle ilgisi olmayan bir "kresel totalitarizm"in oluumuna katk salamaktr. Cumhuriyetin daha demokratik ve daha sosyal olmas, elbette ki gereklidir. Ancak, bu gerekliliin yerine getirilmesinde Kemalizm'in vazgeilmez bir temel oluturduunu grmezlikten gelmek, insann bindii dal kesmesinden farkszdr. Ancak u da var ki Kemalizm'e ve Cumhuriyete ynelik saldrlar, halkn bu deerlere sahip kmas konusundaki duyarlln artrmak sonucunu da beraberinde getirmektedir. 75. Yln bylesine iten ve canl bir ilgiyle kutlanmasnn anlam da budur. Demokratik kazanmlarn yeni bir tehditle kar karya geldii ve smrgeciliin yeniden hz kazand mevcut kreselleme aamasnda, bu asrn banda mazlum milletlerin kurtuluu mcadelesini balatm olan Trk halknn, ayr bir sorumluluu vardr. Elbette ki tarihin arkn geri dndrmek olana yoktur ve kreselleme grmezlikten gelinemez. Ancak, kreselleen dnyann ayn zamanda demokratik olmas ve sosyal adalet temelinde biimlenmesi de reddedilemeyecek bir zorunluluktur. Bunun iin, evrensel lekli bir demokrasinin oluumuna ve azgn bir canavar gibi yeryznde kol gezen uluslararas sermayeye gem vuracak bir uluslararas demokratik iktidarn yaplanmasna katk salamak da hi bir ulusun uruna mcadele etmekten geri kalmamas gereken bir hedef olarak somutlamaktadr. Giderek daha yksek sesle dile getirilen, yoksullarn da sz sahibi olacaklar bir 27 Gvenlik Konseyinin oluturulmas ve Avrupa parlamentosuna kout gerekten demokratik ve etkin bir "Dnya parlamentosu"nun kurulmas28, bu hedef ynnde ulalmas gereken ilk menziller olarak tm insanl beklemektedir. Kemalizm'in ada yorumundan karlabilecek sonu da ancak bu ynde olabilir.
27. Nijeryal Nobel edebiyat dl sahibi Wole SOYNKA, soruyor: "Niin Gvenlik Konseyini demokratikletirerek ie balamayalm? Yetkilerini niin geniletmeyelim ve olumakta olan bu yeni dzende kaderleri sz konusu olanlara, niin biraz daha gerek anlamda sz hakk tanmyalm?". Bkz: Ignaciot Ramonet, "Changer l'ONU", Le Monde diplomatique, Ekim 1992, s. 1. 28. Anthony Giddens, age, s.145-146.

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DEVLETN YENDEN YAPILANDIRILMASI SYLEM VE TRKYE'NN DEMOKRAS GEREKSNM

Prof. Dr. Cem EROUL* 1. "Devlet" konusu, 1980'li yllarn bandan beri, hem gelimi dnyada, hem de Trkiye'de, siyasal gndemin ana maddesi haline gelmitir. Gelitirilen sylem yle zetlenebilir: eitli bilim alanlarnda gerekletirilen dev ilerlemeler, retim glerinde bugne dek benzeri grlmemi bir atlma yol amtr. letiim devrimi, bilgiyi, dolaysyla da retim gizilgcn (potansiyelini) annda btn dnyaya yayabilmektedir. retim etmenleri iinde en devingen olan sermayedir. yleyse, retimin en st dzeye kmas, sermayenin herhangi bir engelle karlamadan doal kaynaklarn ve emek gcnn bulunduu yerlere eriebilmesine baldr. Bu da, mal ve para dolam nndeki btn engellerin ortadan kaldrlmas demektir. 1991 ylnda sosyalist blokun yklmas, dnyann dngsel (ideolojik) blnmesine son vermitir. imdi artk tek engel, ulusal ie kapanklklardr. Bunun da bekiliini ulusal devletler yapmaktadr. Bugn dnya apnda en byk sermaye birikimi arsulusal ortaklklarn (ok uluslu irketler) elindedir. Bu ortaklklar amzn retim aknclardr. Bu aknclarn at oynattklar tmleik (entegre) dnya pazarnn istikrar parann deerinin korunmasna baldr. Bunu salamak da, bamsz merkez bankalarnn grevidir. yleyse, dnyada gelimenin, gnencin (refah), ilerlemenin, dolaysyla da barn ve mutluluun egemen olmasn istiyorsak, ulusal devletleri, arsulasal ortaklklara ve bamsz merkez bankalarna ayak ba olmaktan karmalyz. 2. Ayn sylemin Trkiye'deki uzants yle zetlenebilir: Trkiye'de devlet, hem kafa yaps (zihniyet), hem de rgtlenme biimi bakmndan a d kalmtr. Bugnk dnya gerekleri karsnda, titiz bamszlk ve ulusu Kemalist anlay artk bir tutuculua dnmtr. Treni karmak istemiyorsak, hemen dnyaya almak, devleti hantallktan kurtarmak, ynetimde ve eitimde Amerikanvari bir anlay benimsemek zorundayz. Bunun iin, tpk bilimyurtlarnda (niversitelerde)
Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi retim yesi.

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yaptmz gibi, devletin doruunda da bakanc bir ynetim yaps kurmalyz. Devleti retim alanndan tamamen ekmeliyiz. Kamunun elindeki btn geimsel (iktisadi) aralar zelletirmeliyiz. Merkez bankasn tam bamsz klmalyz. zeksel (merkezi) karar yetkisini olabildiince datmalyz. Yerel ynetimleri alabildiine glendirmeliyiz. Devlet birimlerini bir iletme anlay ile yeniden yaplandrmalyz. Yurtta, devlet denen iletmenin hem payda hem de mterisi olarak grmeyi devlete retmeliyiz. 3. Bu sylemin ngrd kkl deiiklikler, hem dnyada hem de Trkiye'de yirmi yldr aralksz olarak gerekletirilmekte. Bu yndeki bask da durmadan artmakta. Dnya apnda, mal ve para dolamnn nndeki engeller geni lde kaldrlmtr. zelletirme, bir orman yangn gibi btn dnyay sarmtr. Dnya Bankas, yapsal uyum dnleri (kredileri) yoluyla, el atabildii btn lkelerde yeni devlet anlayn kurumlatrmakta. Ulusal devletin arsulusal ortaklklara glk yaratabilecek tm yetkilerinin elinden alnmas iin uslara durgunluk verecek abalar harcanmakta. Son zamanlarda gelitirilen Yatrmlara likin ok Tarafl Szleme (MAI) tasars bunun en arpc rneklerinden biri. Trkiye'nin de buna taraf olmas iin, hem dtan hem de iten bask yapldn herkes biliyor. 4. Yirmi yldr yrtlen kreselleme siyaseti, dnyada olsun Trkiye'de olsun, artk kolaylkla gzlenebilecek somut sonulara ulamtr. "Gelimi kapitalist lkeler iinde dahi yoksulluk sosyal bir afet halini almaya balarken, dnya leinde gelir eitsizlikleri dayanlmaz boyutlara varyor. Dnya leinde en zengin % 20'lik nfus diliminin dnya geliri iindeki pay, 1960 ile 1991 arasnda, % 70'den % 85'e kyor! Dahas var: Dnyann en zengin 358 kiisinin servetleri toplam, yeryz nfusunun en yoksul % 45'lik blmnn yani 2,3 milyar insann toplam yllk gelirine denk dyor!"1 Ayr ayr her lkede buna olanak veren ey de, kendi yurttan koruyabilecek olan ulusal devletin gitgide devreden karlmas. "Trkiye'de son on be yln iktisat politikalar, belki ilk kez bu kadar ak bir ekilde ynetim reformlar ile i ie girerek ilerlemitir. Yapsal uyarlama olarak anlan reformlar, hem merkezi hem yerel kamu ynetiminin ve genel olarak devletin tasfiyesi anlamna gelmitir."2 5. Btn bu gelimelere, ancak siyasal sylemin "bilimsel, nesnel ve yansz" olabileceine inananlar aabilir. Kreselleme sylemi, istendii denli demokratik, usu (aklc), zgrlk, bireyselci bir klfa brndrlsn, iin gerei udur ki, bu sylemin arkasnda sermayesini arsulasal
1. 2. Prof. Dr. Ouz Oyan (1998), "Kreselleme Paradoksu: Sylenceden Gereklere", Trk- Yll '97, C.2, Ankara, Trk- Aratrma Merkezi, s. 18. Do. Dr. Birgl Ayman Gler (1998), "Yapsal Uyarlama Reformlar ve Devlet", ayn kaynak, s. 83. Burada alntlanan grn kapsaml bir aklamas iin ayn yazarn u yaptna baklabilir: Yeni Sa ve Devletin Deiimi, Yapsal Uyarlama Politikalar, Ankara, TODAlE Yay. No: 266, Nisan 1996.

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ortaklklarda toplam olan snfn karlar yatar. Bu snfn "lkesi", yeryzndeki hibir devletin lkesiyle akmaz. Arsulusal sermayenin lkesi, bu sermayenin girdii devletlerde nfusun aa yukar bete birini oluturan ve yeterli alm gcne sahip olan bir dilimi kapsar. Konuya Trkiye asndan bakarsak durum yle zetlenebilir: Nfusun yaklak % 20'si, kresellemi dnyann yurttadr. Geriye kalan % 80'i ise bu dnyann klesidir, kurbandr, ya da son zamanlarda ok tutulan bir deyile, "dlanm"dr. 6. Trkiye'nin nnde iki temel seenek vardr. Ya, 1980'li yllarn bandan beri izlenen yolda yrmeyi srdrmek. Ya da, nfusun byk ounluunun karlarna ncelik veren yeni bir yola girmek. ounluun karlarna ncelik vermek, demokrasinin yolunu izlemek demektir. Grld gibi demokrasi, snfsal bir yelemin (tercihin) addr. Demokrasi, lkenin byk ounluunu oluturan emeki ynlarn, arsulusal sermayenin kreselletirme saldrsna kar koymasnn aracdr. Siyasal atmada, ana g oda devlettir. Devlet kimin elindeyse, g ondadr. Arsulusal sermaye bunu ok iyi bildii iindir ki, yirmi yldr kendine ba erek (hedef) olarak devleti semitir. Devlet eritilerek, paralanarak, yerelletirilerek, zelletirilerek iyice etkisiz duruma drlebilirse, o zaman demokrasi bile bu sermaye iin bir tehlike olmaktan kar. Btn kavgann odann devlet olmas bundandr. Ksacas bugn Trkiye'de demokrasi sorunu bir avu aydnn zgrlk davas olmann ok tesinde, kran krana bir snf savann en etkili silahdr. Bu snf savanda arsulusal sermayeden yana olanlar devletin "yeniden yaplandrlmas"n savunmakta; emeki ynlardan yana olanlar ise "demokratikletirme"yi istemekte. 7. Hibir devlet, yalnzca u ya da bu snfn ya da toplumsal katmann arac deildir3. Ancak hibir devlet de tarafsz deildir. Bugn Trkiye'de devlet esas olarak varlkl snflardan yanadr. stelik de iinde mide bulandracak lde zorbalk eilimleri barndrmaktadr. acl (modern) tanma gre demokrasi, ounluun tze (hukuk) devleti kurallarna bal ynetimidir. ounluun ynetimi, devletin yoksul snflarn etkisine almas demektir. Tze devleti de, zorbalk eilimlerinin artlmasn gerektirir. ounluun ynetimi, birka ylda bir, o da birtakm dnce ve rgtlenme yasaklaryla sk skya kuatlm bir ortamda yaplan seimlerle salanamaz. Demokrasi, halkn her alanda ve srekli olarak devlet ynetimine katlmasyla gerekleebilir ancak4.
3. 4. Devletin kuramsal bir zmlemesi iin bkz. Cem Eroul (1990), Devlet Nedir?, Ankara, mge Kitabevi Yaynlar. (Tkenmi olan bu kitap ayn yaynevince yeniden baslmakta). Devlet ynetimine katlmann koullan ve yollan iin bkz. Cem Eroul (1991), Devlet Ynetimine Katlma Hakk, Ankara, imge Kitabevi Yaynlan. (Tkenmi olan bu kitap ayn yaynevince yeniden baslmakta).

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8. Demokrasinin ilkeleri evrenseldir. Uygulamada, bu evrensel ilkeler her lkenin somut koullarna gre biimlenirler. Trkiye'de de demokrasinin erevesi tarihsel koullar tarafndan izilmitir. Trkiye gerekten demokratikletirilmek isteniyorsa, bu koullar gz ard edilmemelidir. Trkiye, birtakm tarihsel nedenlerle, devlet biimi olarak ulusal egemenlie dayal cumhuriyeti semitir. rnein hkmdarlk, rnein Tanr egemenliine dayanan bir devlet biimi ile Trkiye demokratikleemez. Ayn ekilde Trkiye, ta 1909'dan beri, siyasal dizge (sistem) olarak parlamenter dizgeyi semitir. Siyaseten sorumsuz ve yetkisiz devlet bakan ile meclis karsnda siyaseten sorumlu hkmet esasna dayanan bu dizge, tpk cumhuriyet gibi, bizim demokrasi geleneimize mal olmutur. Bu dizgede her zaman dzeltim yapma olana vardr. Ancak, dizge btnyle bir yana atlp bakanlk ya da hele yar-bakanlk gibi dizgeler kurulmaya kalklrsa, var olan krk dkk demokrasinin bile ortadan kalkmas byk bir olaslk olarak belirir. 9. Trkiye'de demokratiklemenin salanmas iin ne yapmak gerektii herkese biliniyor. Bu alanda yeterince aratrma, inceleme ve yayn yapld. Trkiye'de ounluun ynetim hakkn tze devleti erevesi iinde gerekletirmenin biricik yolu, insan haklarn uygar lnlere (standartlara) ykseltmektir. Bunun iin de, bata anayasa olmak zere 12 Eyll buyurganlnn kalt olan tzel yap ortadan kaldrlp demokrasiye ara olacak yeni bir yap kurulmal, te yandan da, ynetim ile yarg iinde yuvalanm olan demokrasi dman eler artlmak. Bu demokrasi d eler, yine herkesin bildii gibi, faistler, eriatlar ve devlet zorbal ile kiisel karlarn birletiren "ete"lerdir. 10. Ne var ki, bugn devlette demokratikleme istenci (iradesi) yoktur. Bugnk snfsal dayana ve iinde barndrd zorba eilimlerle, devletin kendi kendine byle bir isten gelitirmesini beklemek de bo bir dtr. yleyse, demokrasiyi devlete dayatmaktan baka zm yoktur. Bunun da yolu, istekli partilerin, partililerin, sendikalarn, derneklerin, odalarn, rgtlenmemi kmelerin, ksacas, rgtl olsun ya da olmasn tm yurttalarn katlaca bir demokrasi cephesi oluturmaktr. Bu cephe herkesin zerinde kolayca anlaabilecei nerilerin sralanaca bir "ilk erekler bildirgesi" benimsemelidir. Sonra da, bu erekler iin, hi beklenmeden hemen demokratik eylemlere giriilmelidir. Eylemlerde hep demokratik yollar kullanlmas ve hep tzel deiiklikler istenmesi, bunlar bastrmak iin bahane arayanlara frsat vermeyecektir. Bu biimde alacak her yeni yasal kap, demokrasi alannn bir para daha geniletilmesine olanak verecektir. 11. Halk bilinlenmeden gerek karlarn koruyamaz. Smrclerin ve demokrasi dmanlarnn arkasna halkn taklmasn engellemenin birinci koulu, halka bilin gtren dnce ve eylem insanlarnn gvenliini salamaktr. Onun iin, bir kere yaam hakk kesenkes (mutlaka)

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korunmaldr. kence bitirilmelidir. Dnce ve rgtlenme haklarn demokratik ller dnda snrlayan btn yasal dzenlemeler ayklanmaldr. Ayrca, kadn-erkek eitliine glge dren btn dzenlemeler de kaldrlmaldr. Bu sylenenlerin hangi somut nlemlerle gerekletirilebilecei ise ok iyi bilinmektedir. Bunlar birok kez yazlp sylenmitir. Burada hereyi bir kez daha yinelemeye kalkmann anlam yoktur. Demokrasi yolunda nasl ilerlenecei bellidir. Yeter ki istensin. 12. Son olarak u da belirtilmelidir ki, ulusal karlar savunmann iine kapanmayla hibir ilgisi yoktur. Aksine. Bugnk dnyada ulusal karlar savunmann zorunlu koulu da almaktr. Ne var ki, bu almada eitlik ilkesine titizlikle uyulmaldr. Bunu salayacak olan da devlet gcdr. Bir devlet ancak demokratik olursa, kendi halkna eit davranlmasn salayacak gc toparlayabilir. Dolaysyla seim, da alma ile almama arasnda deildir. Seim, yapsal uyum yoluyla arsulusal sermayeye teslim olma ile demokrasi yoluyla onurlu bir dnya ibirliine katlma arasndadr.

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ATATRK AND MODERN TURKEY

Vicente Guillermo ARNAUD* The life and military career of Mustafa Kemal, Atatrk since The Grand National Assembly in its session of the 24th November 1934 gave Kemal the surname of "Atatrk", which means the Ancestor or Father of the Turks, as well as his impressive achievements on the military, political, economic and social life of Turkey, has been studied thoroughly by many authors and scholars, both Turkish and foreign. One of his more important biographies was written by an Argentine, Jorge Blanco Villalta, who lived in Turkey, first accompanying his father who was an Argentine Diplomat accredited in Turkey, as Consul General of Argentina in istanbul, and afterwards as an Argentine Diplomat himself, beginning his career as a Viceconsul in istanbul and afterwards as Argentine Ambassador in Turkey in 1975. His book "Atatrk" was first published in Buenos Aires, in Spanish, in early 1939, and Blanco Villalta's Atatrk's biography was the first in the vvorld to be published after the death, in istanbul, on November lOth, 1938, of the great reformer that was Atatrk. Blanco Villalta's book on Atatrk is based on documents and his personal experience during the five intense years he spent in Turkey from 1930 to 1935. Thanks to Jorge Blanco Villalta's father's position as Consul General of Argentina in istanbul and his own position as Vice-Consul, he had the privilege of attending receptions of an offcial nature vvhere Atatrk was also present. He also came across Mustafa Kemal at the Park Hotel, vvhere the latter was in the habit of going, and vvhere he used to dine and enjoy dancing, in the hail on the lovver floor. Blanco Villalta telis us that Atatrk was interested in the vvay he danced the Argetine tango, a style of music that is stili very popular tin Turkey, specially in istanbul. Blanco Villalta admired, and stili admires, the great figre of Kemal Atatrk. He vvrote "As a military leader, his genious in strategy places him among the most outstanding of those captains vvhom history has raised high, and it is enough to reember him as the victor in those legen* Ambassador, Buenos Aires.

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dary scenes at the Hellespont and on the high Anatolian plateau, in battles which remain as lessons in the military art, and in amazing stength of will. Again Kemal the statesman succeeds the general, and in a matter of a few years causes his people to advance centuries along the road to progress, through a revolution both in law, social affairs, politics and economics; along the true road to spiritual and material progress". in his Prologue to the frst English edition of "Atatrk", Blanco Villalta also says: ".. .we can now see that the victory was not merely a local triumph, as was then thought. No; it was the sign of the deliverance of ali the oppressed peoples of the East and Africa, the beginning of the end of colonialism, and e advent of so many countries's struggle for freedom and their entry to the international community. Atatrk is the banner of ali those who believe that ali peoples and ali men should have equal rights and opportunities. However, he did not only make a change in the direction of political history at world level: also transcendent are the principles on which he founded the organization of the new Turkish State which he created; principles which were realisic and advanced, sufficient for the urgent needs of the moment, yet which have been shown sound in retrospect through time. Kemal was against any theocratic form of government, yet he allowed religious belief to labour in the broad feld of the individual's free conscience". At the end of his Prologue to the English edition of his "Atatrk", Blanco Villalta, writing in Ankara in 1976, says: "Atatrk has passed beneath the bronze arches of history not so much as one of the greatest commanders of ali time, nor as a man who liberated a nation and built a new, modern and prosperous state, but rather and principally, as one of the greatest philosophers of political theory. He contributed a political plan which has wide possibilities for the future of man; a system which at the moment it was proclaimed was completely revolutionary: a political system of an economic and social character, in which the direction of the economy is the fundamental responsability of the State, which intervenes as far as is necessary and useful, and no further; and a people which is absolutely free to elect its rulers, free to adopt its own ideas, free in conscience, and possessing the right of choice." Blanco Villalta's biography of Atatrk has been translated to Turkish, English and other languages. During my own term of duty in Turkey, as Argentine Ambassador (1984-1988), I witnessed the great respect and influence that Blanco Villalta's book had in Turkey. Before passing on to the organization of Modern Turkey I wanted to emphasize that Atatrk's life and achievements and the inception of modern Turkey is well known in Argentina and in the Spanish speaking world, especially, but not only, through Blanco Villalta's biography of Atatrk. Also this is a way to pay my respect to a colleague that has done so much to strengthen the relations between our two countries: Argentina and Turkey.

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We are now going to concentrate on the Republic of Turkey and how it developed under the guidance of Atatrk. First we will give a chronological guide to the social changes that occured in Turkey. October 13th, 1923, Ankara was declared the capital of Turkey. October 29th, 1923, was the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey. Also the election of Mustafa Kemal as First Magistrate. March 3rd, 1924, abolition of the Califate. April 8th, 1924, abolition of the religious courts. February 17th, 1925, abolition of the tithe. September 2nd, 1925, decree closing the tekkes (monasteries) and dissolving the religious orders. November 25th, 1925, law compelling the vvearing of hats. December 26th, 1925, adoption of the international calendar. February 17th, 1926, adoption of the new Civil Code. October 28th, 1926, first population census. May st, 1928, adoption of international numerals. November 3rd, 1928, reform of the alphabet. June 5th, 1929, law on agricultural credit cooperatives. July 2nd, 1932, first Turkish Historical Congress. July 18th, 1932, entry of Turkey to the League of Nations. September 26th, 1932, first Turkish Language Congress. tion. in 1934 the first five-year industrial plan went into practical applica-

With the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, by 1922 the Turks had created a new independent Turkish State. The new Turkey had abolished the capitulations and signed treaties with other States. The country was free to begin a new era of progress and reconstruction. in that moment Mustafa Kemal proposed a constitutional amendment by which Turkey became a Repuclic on October 29th, 1923. This amendment was accepted and Mustafa Kemal was elected the first President of the Turkish Republic.

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After adopting the republic form of govemment Turkey was determined to complete secularization and to prevent ali interference by religious influence, which was regarded as having been the principal obstacle to modernization. On March 3rd, 1924, the Great National Assembly passed three laws: 1) expelling the Ottoman dynasty; 2) abolishing the Caliphate, the Commissariat of sheria, the recognized office for the religious affairs, and evkaff, the pious foundations; and 3) attaching ali the educational and scientifc institutions, including the religious colleges, to the Commissariat of public instruction. For the first time Turkey tried to separate religion from the State. A new constitution which was extremely democratic in form was adopted on April 20th, 1924. To win ver the peasantry, who constituted the majority and who did not regard the new adopted radical measures favourably, the tithes, which lay heavily on the agricultural classes, were abolished and military service was reduced to 18 months. The deficit in the revenue resulting from abolition of the tithes was met by a heavier taxation of the urban population. Because of a Kurdish insurrection, religious orders were arbolished and the tekkes, monasteries, were closed as having influenced the Kurdish rising. A decree ordered the army to adopt a kepi and the civil servants to wear hats. A law passed in November 1925 abolished the fez and obliged every man to wear hats, women were not included. On February 1926 the National Assembly adopted a new civil code, which was almost a translation of the Swiss civil code. With this new civil code Turkish legislation was wholly freed from Islamic influence. The laws concerning marriage, divorce and inheritance, which had been totally different from those of western Europe, were altered, and polygamy and repudiation of wives was legally prohibited. A decree of 1928 discarded the Arabic alphabet and imposed the Roman instead. in spite of the economic depression of the 1930's a big effort was made to proceed with the economic reconstruction of the country. This was fostered by the formation of a number of State banks to each of which was delegated the establishment and control of State industrial and mining enterprises and public Utilities. Many occupations, until then mostly exercised by foreigners, were reserved for Turks, with the purpose of promoting and encouraging their education in trade and commerce. 284

in 1932 a five-year industrial plan was promulgated and an important program of economic and educational reforms was launched. The metric system was adopted. English replaced French, Arabic or Persian as the principal foreign language to be taught in the schools. On December 6th, 1934, the Great National Assembly changed the constitution so that ali Turkish men and women were henceforth entitled to vote in legislative elections as soon as they had reached the age of 23 and to become elected at the age of 31. At the same time it was also decided that the President of the Republic was to be elected from among the deputies. During 1935 women were for the first time elected to the Great National Assembly. The International Women's Congress met at istanbul in April of the same year. Sunday was introduced as the weekly rest day, in place of Friday as is the habit in Arab and Islamic countries. The old Turkish titles -such as "pasha"- were abolished. Family names were introduced, as in vvestern Europe. Today, and we are speaking now of 1998, the Republic of Turkey is a modern country and the memory of Atatrk's policies and deeds are remembered with devotedness. I myself have travelled in modern Turkey (1984-88) and have seen the permanent progress in industry, infrastructure, Communications systems, building of good roads ali along the country, the growth of tourist facilities, ete. Also today the Republic of Turkey is an aetive member of the United Nations; a member of NATO; of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation that has its Permanent International Secretariat in istanbul; of the OECD; of the Council of Europe; of the Western European Union; of the Economic Cooperation Organization. Since September 12th, 1963, Turkey has an association agreement with the European Economic Community and from January st, 1996 Turkey has entered in a Custom Union with the European Union. A member of the World Economic Organization since March 26th, 1995. Also of U.N. specialized agencies; economic, political and fnancial organizations, ete. The relations of the Rebuplic of Turkey with the Republic of Argentina are excellent. During my term as Argentine Ambassador to Turkey two agreements were negotiated between our two countries: a Trade Agreement and a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

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With reference to the interaational trade between our two countries, in 1996 Argentina exported goods to Turkey valued at 139 millions of dollars and imported for the amount of 13 million US dollars. in 1997, up to November, Argentina exported for 183 million dollars and imported from Turkey for 27 million US dollars. in the years 1996-1998 there has been negotiations, seminars and business workshops between the MERCOSUR and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, with the special participation of Turkey and Argentina.

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ATATURKISM AND MODERN TURKEY; THE EARLY REFORMS OF ATATURKISM AND THE PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 1923-1950
Bernhard Tjin Liep SHIE* Central Question With this essay I want to show that the basis for Modern Turkey was laid in the period of 1923-1950 and that despite several constraints a begin was made with the actual democratization of the Turkish Society. 1923 and 1950 delimit this period, because the former is the year when the Turkish Republic was proclaimed, while the latter marks the year when the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) -founder of Modern Turkey- was legally put out the center of power by the Demokrat Parti -the Democratic party- after the first democratic elections in this country. Introduction it is known that Turkey has evolved from the Othman empire which culminated in 1680. The decline started after a fruitless effort to conquer Vienna. Circa 1900 this processs of decline reached its peak: economically seen, the country was bankrupt, it was torn due to social unrest and it was mostly in a situation in which there was a permanent state of war with the majority of the surrounding countries. The Europeans then referred to this country as the "ili man" and considered the Turks to be barbarians and an incompetent nation. The young Turks tried to end this desperate situation for the country. After several fruitless efforts they succeeded in taking ver power in 1908. The movement in which young offcers would later play a central role wanted to reSuriname.

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form the country on the basis of European state principles modern for those days. Two trends can be distinguished in this movement. A more liberal wing advocating a great Turkey in which also non-Turks could be included and a Turkish nationalistic school wanting to form an exclusively Turkish state. it is this group that founded the Committee of the Unity and Progress and that laid the basis for the Turkish Republic. Their efforts to stop the deterioration of the Empire were not successful. During the Balkans war at the eve of the first World War ali regions of the Balkan peninsula were lost except for Constantinople and its surroundings. Their leaders saw to it that an alliance was formed betvveen the Othman Empire and Germany. These countries fought together in the first World War against the Allied Powers. This fight ended up against Germany and its allies, thus also against the Othman Empire. This resulted among other things in an intense interference of the Allied Povvers with the course of events within this Empire after the war. Certain parts were ripped off, foreign troops invaded the country and considerable parts were occupied. Meanwhile the future of the Othman Empire was also a point of discussion at the peace talks held in Paris, in 1920 the treaty of Sevres was concluded, in which among other things capitulation of the Othman Empire was formally settled. This treaty was disastrous for the Othman Empire: it had to give up practically ali areas in the north-east, south-east and the West of the country and moreover the Allied Power got practically complete military and economic control of the Turkish nuclear area, Anatolia.. No wonder that in Turkey itself great opposition arose against this treaty very disadvantageous and even humiliating for Turkey. Mustafa Kemal and the realization of the Republic of Turkey One of the most remarkable leaders of the early hour of the opposition was the officer Mustafa Kemal. As the leader of the army he had a respectable record of services. it is well-known that he played an important role in 1915 in beating off the invasion of the Allies at the Dardanelles. He had not very much moved in politics up to then. it is known that although not participating in the movement of the young Turks, he sympathizes with their ideas up to a certain extent. No wonder that he mainly emphasizes foreign oppresson in organizing the opposition. Practically everyone in Turkey agreed on this; also the traditional leaders of the country. His reform plans would only later take in a central position. After he had ended up the fght for independence suc-

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cessfully, a treaty was signed on 24 July 1923 in Lausanne in which the Allied Power corrected the humiliating treaty of Sevres of 1920. Turkey regained complete sovereignty and also the regions with a Turkish population. Amidst this favourable situation for Turkey Kemal founded the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) the Republican People's Party on 29 August 1923. The Reforms Republic Now it was high time to proclaim the Republic. This happened on 29 October in Ankara, the new capital city. Within this new form of government the Sovereign Power was with the people. And it is this people that choose the leader, the President. Actually it was Kemal Pasja that had the power together with a number of loyal military and civilian employers ali of whom belonging to the Republican people's Party. As from 1934 when choosing a family name became compulsory by law for everybody in Turkey, Kemal got the surname of Atatrk "Father of the Turks". Nationalism in this period of transition political stability and strong political leadership was required. The position was often silenced or ruled out with a brutality that was not necessary. We cannot speak of a movement of the people here. We can better describe it as a movement lead from the top by a small and very povverful group or sometimes even by one man. Stili we see nationalism taking a central place in reforming the country. This had to give the Turkish nation a feeling of pride anew and it had to teach them national solidarity after ali those humiliating situations during the Othman Empire I. The linguistic reform with its eliminating non Turkish (mainly Arabic and Persian) words suited in this. The replacement of the Arabic alphabet by the Latin one also ftted in this policy. As a part of this policy several codes were introduced as well. These codes had to emphasize unity and equality of ali citizens for the law. The penal code of Musoline served as the example for the organization of penal law. in doing this sometimes articles were copied that hampered growing into a democratic state. So it was decided in article 141 that founding organizations based on class could be punished with the capital punishment and article 142 says that efforts to throw social order could be punished with long imprisonment. in every day life these articles were often interpreted in such a way that nearly ali opposition or alleged opposition was ruled out and on ground of these articles people were taken to court. The defendant's lot depended in these cases on the judge's being accidentally liberal, it is not until 1945 that this would improve when other parties were allowed to participate in the elections besides the only part -the Republican

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People's Party- that could do so up to then. it is understandable that in such a political climate not too rapid a growth of democratic opinions will occur. Economics reforms At the start of the new republic it already had ali economic characteristics of a developing country: among other things a economy that does not grow, a negative balance of payment, very great differences betvveen rich and poor. Furthermore more than 60% of the labour force worked in the agricultural sector, of which the greater part as small-scale farmers who produced mainly with simple means particularly for their own consumption and they were exploited by the landowning class. Moreover the country had a poorly developed industry and infrastructure and it was economically dependent on foreign countries, especially on Europe. This had to be tackled with immediately. The state was assigned a central role in reforming the economy. Economic independence of foreign countries was the aim. As a part of this policy enterprises were nationalized and national companies were set up to increase industrial production. The state was forced to take the lead in doing this, because the weak private sector could not use the space oered to set up enterprises itself. Around 1951 51% of the industrial production came from stateowned enterprises. industry had been boosted heavily, also because income of the rural areas was allocated for investment in industry. The infrastructure, particularly to improve industrial development, was dealt with seriously. Private individuals were more successful in small-scale handicraft enterprises, mainly producing utensils, simple agricultural tools and other handicraft products. From times immemorial istanbul had been the main center oef these activities. it would be among other things this group in the urban centres where democratic views would grow. The opposite was the case with the great masses in rural areas where reforms of the Republic hardly got through. Then for a long time people had been at the mercy of the landowning class and the skimming practices of the government with respect to industry. The ongoing economic reform in the neighbouring U.S.S.R. served as a model in realizing economic reforms. Working with fve year plans and the strong ties of the reformers with the only political party permitted were the things taken ver from this model among other things. This often resulted in not putting the right man on the right place with ali its consequences for the economic process. A democratic tradition cannot develop positively in such a sphere where officers dominate.

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Secularization For the Kemalists it was clear that the islam would be one of the greatest obstacles in reforming the Turkish society according to western standards. The Kemalists thought this religion to be inextricably linked up with the abuses of the Othman Empire. No wonder that the Khallifaat was abolished in 1924. it formally was the highest spiritual leadership that the Turks have had since the sixteenth century. Instead of this the Directorate of Religious Affairs was introduced. it was under direct supervision of the prime minister. in this way the state could control islam considerably. Formally the separation of church and state was provided for constitutionally. in everyday life this was translated into: replacing Islamic schools by governmental institutes, prohibiting being dressed religiously in public, no longer reading the Koran in Arabic, closing shrines and other holy Arabic places as well as a great number of mosques and only educating religious leaders at institutes approved of by the state. The introduction of new codes meant to regulate everyday life in society was radical as well. This was modelled after civil law and law of obligations of Swiss and commercial law of Germany and Italy. These regulations replaced the eriat, the holy Islamic law which had been the foundation of Othman society for ages. Islamic characteristics were also withdrawn from family proceedings, the latter were adjusted to European vievvs. So everybody had to choose a surname. Women were legallyy equal to men and in 1935 women also acquired the rights to vote and to be eligible for election. Divorces had to be pronounced by the judge. Polygamy was prohibited and a minimum age for boys and girls to get married was introduced. Latin letters replaced Arabic. The Islamic calendar was substituted by the European and Sunday became the official day of rest. This secularization process is one of the most important reforms that took take place within the framework of the revolutionary process and that had to help to create a favourable breeding ground for a real society modelled according to Western standards. Initially especially urban life was changed due to these reforms. in rural areas where the majority of the Turkish population lives, the situation was practically unaffected. Big groups were even hostile to these reforms. The question arises if the reform of such emotive matters had not been dealt with too radical and militaristic as a result of vvhich the effects aimed at were not or at least insufficiently achieved. Many Turks, the majority Islamic from origin were therefore very suspicious of Kemalism and its reforms. in such an unsteady situation in which people did not trust reforms one could not expect the development of a new society based on democratic principles. I think the reformers

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made big mistakes in the secularization process. These mistakes concerned the content and were of a tactical nature as well. A happy few, the elite of society (soldiers and civilians) formulated an ideology vvithout involving the mass or their organization to thereupon impose this ideology on the mass. No vvonder that they have not reached their main objective of making Turkey a modern European state in which the secular element dominates just like that. Educaon According to the Kemalist education was the means par excellence to modernize society. As from 1931 a general compulsory education was introduced and primary, secondary and vocational education were set up. Higher and university education were also taken are of. Ankara became also the second city for university and higher education. The new language of instruction was Turkish, purified from foreign influences as much as possible. This education was very much nationalistic-oriented. Sili big groups, especially in rural areas, would not have acess to education due to poor facilities and even the absence of shhools in some places. For many children that got education, primary education was terminal education. n general we may state that education facilities have not been satisfactorily. There were therefore not enough educated leaders, graduates, technicians and skilled labourers. The majority of society was illiterate by then. This resulted in the mass staying out of the reforming process with ali its consequences for their place in society and their social mobility. This also meant that they could not be made pen to new ideas among which to democracy. Womens's liberation Within Islamic tradition as applied in the Othman Ernpire women were assigned a very subordinate role in relation to men. The Kemalists were determined to put an end to this situation. As stated earlier women were legally equal to men and they acquired the rights to vote and to be eligible for election. Prohibiting polygamy also improved the social position of women. Despite the legalized equal states of man and woman, the Turkish society kept being a typically male society. As a result of the reforms women could also be employed, but not on an equal base. in rural areas where they were the workers together with their children the situation stayed practically unchanged. The new legal regulation indeed improved the position of women somewhat but for real emancipation women would have to organize themselves and fight long and hard. in such circumstances the majority of the women living in rural areas could irhpossibly develop democratic ideas. in the cities the situation was another, here women made the frst steps tovvards a more democratic society.

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The role ofthe army The command of the Turkish army played a central role in the making of the Turkish Republic. it played a leading role in the battle against foreign oppression shortly after the frst World War. it were the generals especially Kemal Pasja that mobilized the people and that led it from victory to victory, so that the treaty of Sevres 1920, very humiliating for the Turks could be corrected at concluding the treaty of Lausanne (1923). it is therefore not surprising that the military played a fundamental role in organizing and arranging the new republic. Very often even military techniques had been applied to rapidly impose reforms. in the arrangement of the republic after Western model not very much was to be noted of democratic principles already accepted generally in Europe. This is not surprising because the situation in Turkey was quite another one after the fail of the Othman Empire. Secularization of society was emphasized mainly. in doing this they acted radically upon the islam, the other powerful element of Turkish society. Most Turks were islam and they opposed actively as well as passively to these measures, however vvithout success. The country was ruled with the one party system until 1945. The Republican People's Party with a military dominance was the only party. The Kemalists were forced to abandon their neutralistic policy, formally pursued in the war, for a pro Western one. From that period on the Turkish army had been more and more supported by the American army especially with respect to technology and material. The pressure of the American forced the Turkish governmet to give their citizens more freedom and let them involve and participate really in ruling the country, as long as Turkish ideas were not opposed to American interest. This meant that more democratic reforms were carried through. Among other things more political parties were allowed. As soon as the people got the opportunity to organize politically for an election, that was in 1950, the military (Republican People's Party) were resolutely rejected by the electorate. The elections were won by the Demokrat Parti, the Democratic Party, with an enormous majority. in the first elections in 1946 they gained only some seats. it is a fundamental merit of Atatrk and his followers that they have laid the basis for modern Turkey which is mostly expressed by secularization. No wonder that the military will do their utmost to preserve the secular nature of state Turkey, one of the pillars of Kemalism, next to ali other reforms introduced after Kemalism. After Atatrk Until his dead in 1938 Atatrk was the undisputed leader. Formaly he had ruled the Republic of Turkey as president, but he did it with dictatorial authority. Appointing a successor with as much prestige as he had,

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was thus very diffcult. Eventually ismet inn his right-hand-man and his comrade-in-arms was elected Presidend. in the beginning he continued pursuing his guru's policy. After breaking out of the second World War he was forced to adjust his domestic as well as foreign policy. Although Turkey kept its membership of the League of Nations (since 1932) and was formally neutral, this country concluded a treaty of friendship with Germany in 1941 which was later ceomplemented with a commercial and a payment treaty. The Allied Power did its utmost to win President inn ver to their side. They succeeded in doing this only towards the end of the war, because the founders of the new organization of nations, namely the United Nations, demanded from Turkey that they had to declare war to the Axes Powers to be allowed to participate in the inaugural meeting in San Francisco. Turkey declared war to Germany and Japan in 1945. From then on the country mainly joined the West. This development was favourably for the West, as a result of Turkey's strategic position. After ali the country forms the link betvveen the Balkan and the Middle East and betvveen the Black sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Furthermore this couuntry was also economically important because of its big amount of natural reseources. I earlier mentioned the military link that began to develop with the United States. This orientation tovvards the West also happened because of Russia's territorial claims on the regions in north-east Turkey after the second World War. in 1948 Turkey thus became a member of the organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.). in 1949 it became a member of the Council of Europe and in 1952 it ganied membership of N.A.T.O. The pressure of this change in direction in foreign policy forced the Turkish government to further democratize the country. This also happened as a result of the influence the large landowners and the commercial bourgeoisie played in the economy of the country, this had already began during the second World War. They demanded a liberal approach with respect to economy as well as to politics. in this way the Turkish government had to abolish the one party system formally (1945). A series of very small political parties were then founded. in the general elections, held for the first time in 1946, they had not the slightest chance to win, due to their mutual disunity and the short time they had to prepare for the elections. The Republican People's Party, having ali opportunities to prepare well for these elections and having at their disposal the public service, won the elections gloriously. Soon it appeared that this democracy introduced also had its constraints. Left-oriented groups did not got the space to organize themselves in the growing coldwar-atmosphere. Turkey more and more tied itself to the united States law. "Aid to Turkey and Greece" came into force on 22 May 1947 and the United States and Turkey concluded the agreement on Aid to Turkey on 12 July 1947. it was decided on in this agreement that the Turkish government was not allowed to use the information and material supplied 294

by the U.S. for other purposes than those acceptable for the American government. As from 1948 Marshall aid was thus made available as well. These funds were used to improve agriculture. in this way the American now had, besides the strong military influence, a strong hold on the Turkish economy. in this political climate the Democratic Party dominated by the large landowners and the commercial elite got ali chances to develop fast. They managed to bundle practically ali oppositional groups. The bnding element was the loathing for military oppression, for the dictatorship of the republican People's Party. The above shows that during the rule of Presi dent inn, especially after 1945 democracy could nce again develop itself. Leftist groups were formally ruled out by the pressure of right and the cold-war-atmosphere. This restricted the chances of the Turkish society to further develop into a democratic society according to Western standards. CONCLUSIONS The current problems of Turkey can only be solved well after making a good analysis of the faults made within the period 1923-1950. The basic for Turkish democracy was laid by Kemalism with ali its shortcomings. The central role of the army within the center of power at the times of realizing democratization should have been finished earlier. This in order not to have the majority of the population alienated from this process. If reforms should become rooted to the society than they should not be imposed upon from the top or by a small group. These reforms should be made in consultation with the people or its real representatives. Abandoning the neutralistic policy by the Turkish government for a more Western (American) attitude has not brought about a sound democratic development in this part of the world due to the situation of coldwar. Leftist groups were not given a chance sufficiently or not ali and were even prohibited often. Kemalism succeeded in restoring national pride of the Turkish nation within a reasonable term. With this the basic condition was laid for he develeopment oef a democratic society. in formally separating church and state and in the secularization process not enough space to move had been left for the islam. Due to this the majority of the Turkish society began to feel itself enemies of the reform process and behaved as such, every time they got the chance to do so.

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LTERATRE 1. Barchard D. Turkey and the West. London 1985. 2. Info-Trk. Extreme right in Turkey. Brussels 1988. 3. Kinross L. Atatrk. The rebirth of a nation. London 1964. 4. Landau J.M. Radical politics in modem Turkey. Leiden 1974. 5. Lewis B. The emergence of modem Turkey. London 1961. 6. Lijphart Arend Democracy in plural societies. A comparative exploration. New Haven and London 1977. 7. Mansur Fatma. Process of independence. London 1962. 8. zgden Doan. Turkije facisme en verzet. Amsterdam 1973. 9. Palmer R.R. A History of the modern world. New York 1978. 10. Pierce J.E. Life in a Turkish village. New York 1964. 11. Sunier Thijl. Turkije. Amsterdam 1989. 12. Shaw S.J. History of the Ottoman empire and modem Turkey (Vol. 1 en 2). London 1977.

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ATATRK AND REPUBLIC OF TURKEY ON THE NEW STAGE OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Prof. Dr. Djaparidze Shota ISMAILOVICH* The history of mankind, the history of the human society at a full speed is rushing people to the future. Historical ascents and downfalls rapidly alternate. Every elapsed year, month and even day instantly becomes the property of the past; hovvever, changes of centuries ali the more draw people nearer to the present times, putting new aims before them global problems to solve. Just it is at this cross-roads of the historical changes, during the search of the global problems solution that our dreams, experiences, daily thoughts and troubles, vital adversities entangle us into the common pool of the social or family routine activities so strongly that we sometimes forget the merits of the people who have traced invaluable signs in the history of social progress, in the perfection of the state governance structure, in the restoration of state independence of the enslaved nations, in the cause of joining the state to the advanced civilization. in defnite scientific circles, in the judgements of western political figures the vievvpoint concerning the search and establishment of new forms of state governance stands out, it supposes that every stage, every social-economic structure is always led by advanced people who prepare a solid basis of palitical mentality, instil new theoretical regulations and humanitarian ideas; that every stage had erudite and far-sighted people; they established political parties and organizations to foresee the future on a scientific level and to convince the population; they were not afraid of being arrested, exiled and repressed, They made a sacrifice of their own lives in the struggle for the truth; they helped the society to accept new and progressive ideas and to inculcate them in life. Thomas Cariyle (1795-1881), the English publicist, historian and philosopher, to whom the conception about "The Cult of Heroes" belogns, notes: "It's a very simple truth, that the man who possesses the
* Shota Rustaveli University, Batoum.

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highest wisdom, its hidden spiritual power, is much stronger than not only dozens or thousands of people, but the whole mankind; he stands among them like the one possessing the strength of an angel with a heavenly sword against which and shield or tower is helpless". it's known that historical regularity an epoch gives rise to great public or political figures; these people influence the historical regularity, foresee many social and political phenomena, accelerate progressive movement ahead thanks to their erudition, organization latent and energy. But at the cross-roads of the twenty-first century when disiptegration of socialism begins transition to market economy, search of the new state governance forms has became an irrevocable process, the abovementioned people must not be turned into icons or monuments, but their activities in every sphere of life must be studied deeply as their rich spiritual and scientific inheritance presents a huge interest for us. Ali the more so that at the cross-roads of the twenty-first century the history of mankind and famous political, state and social figures should be vvritten anew; not only because nothing has been written and published during 70 years when everything was seen through the prism of a singleparty system and the philosophy of marxism-leninism, but because, firstly, the history of human society, its political mentality, the history and biography of the famous political, state and military figures is deeper and richer than it is given in already published works, secondly, the generation of the tvventy-first century has a new and healty vision of the world, people and phenomena; the new generation sometimes eritically values the activities of the previous generation; thirdly, every branch of the historical science has been supplied with the new and fresh political mentality, with the new documents and facts requiring deep studies and interpretation. Proceeding form this censideration we decided to introduce to the students and to the readers, who are interested with the problems of politology, the famous son of the Turkish people, the well-known political figre and statesman, the leader of the national liberation movement, the first president of the Rebuplic of Turkey and the founder of the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatrk. His name is firmly connected with the history of Turkey, with the perfection of its political system and advance of the Turkish people to the world arena. The attention of the author of these lines to this political man is caused by the follovving factors: firstly, while visiting the Republic of Turkey, in particular, the Samsung University, we witnessed a great respect and love to Atatrk on the part of scientists, students, ordinary people for his historical merits; secondly, unfortunately, for many years the 298

history of interrelation between Georgia and Turkey was only described as hostile; certainly, it's true that there were both wars and bloodsheds, but we mustn't forget that at the cross-roads of the tvventy-first century the history has to be written anew taking into consideration the new mentality and the new political method of approach; the time and the epoch require to research and to write positive moments and friendly reladions betvveen the two peoples; the president of the Republic of Turkey Suleiman Demiral says: "Epochs have sperated people from one another; the new epoch restoras broken relations; peoples embrace one another. it has brought a great joy to the Earth"; just proceeding from this standpoint we must consider the history of the relations betvveen Georgians and Turks; thirdly, the study and scientific generalization of Kemal Atatrk's political and state activities will help to deepen and to strengthen the friendship between the two peoples and between Georgia and Turkey; Mustafa Kemal Atatrk begueathed to the famous representatives of the Turkish people: "Turkey needs a strong neighbour to the east of Turkey and Geargian can became such neighkour. During the reception o fthe delegation from Turkey the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Adjaria Mr. Aslan Abashidze said: "The interchange of historical documents will help to strengthen and to develop the relations betvveen Georgia and Trkiye The history of Georgia, the 300-year history of Adjaria are firmly connected with the past of Turkey" (The nevvspraper "Adjara", May, 30, 1998).

The personality of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk accupies a place of honour in the long and very interesting history of Adjaria; the political and economic situation of Turkey in the 20-th century is directly connected with his name. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk succeeded in creating the basis for the development of his country, which alloved to retain the national originality and to play a special political and economic part in the region. Kemal Atatrk put into the foundation of the Turkish State those important principles which today turned Turkey into one of the most signifcant countries in the vvorld. in the contemporary history of the state among political and social figures, Kemal Atatrk occupies a place of honour not only in the Turkish history, but in the history of the vvhole Mslim (and not only Mslim) vvorld. That's why the studying of Kemal Atatrk's biography needs a creative and scientific method of approach. ble. Today the names of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk and Turkey are indivisi-

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Ali his life was firmly connected with the thoughts of the future of Turkey and the Turkish people. His main problem was to include Turkey and its population into modern civilization. From his childhood he dreamed to conduct such reforms in Turkey which would turn his country into a strong and developled state. Kemal Atatrk was born on the lOth of December 1881 in Salonika, in the family of an official. Atatrk's father Ali Riza Efendi died in 1888 and his mother Zubeidie Hanim died in 1923. Atatrk get the primary education in a private school. When he became 12 years old, he was sent to a military progymnasium in Salonika, then he continued to study also at a military secondry school, in 1899 he became an officer. Beginning from 1902 he was a student of the istanbul Military Academy which he gradiuated in 1905 and became a commander of the Turkish Army. At the military school Kemal Atatrk took an interest in the ideas of Turkish bourgeois nationalists of Tanzimat period. He became an active partiacipant of the departures of oppositionally disposed officers against. Sultan Abdulhamid II. Kemal Atatrk and his followers considered it necessary to overthrow the Turkish empire and to establish good relations with neighbouring countries. The defeat in the First World War caused a difficult situation in Turkey. On the 30th of October, 1918 the Great Britain and the government of Sultan Turkey signed a peace treaty. The peace treaty gave a right to the countries of Atlanta to lead their troops in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, to occupy strategical points near the straits, According to the peace treaty Turkey had to withdraw its troops from ali Arabian regions, Iran and the Transcaucasus. Alliad powers got a right to engage Baku and Batumi which were earlier occupied by Turkey in 1918. The Turkish empire found itself before the danger to lose its state. But it wasn't in the interests of Atlanta to defeat Turkey completely as Atlanta considered Turkey to become in the future the powerful bridge-head against the increasing possible aggression in the Caucasus and in the Near East. The young Kemal Atatrk understood that the peace treaty created the danger for existence of the Turkish State. He noted that the First World War caused the impoverishment of the Turkish people and that it was necessary the selfless struggle to keep the independence of Turkey. He had a capable of observation and foresight. He could think analytically and operatively decided the most complicated problems. He united ali 300

layers of the societys intellectuals, landowners, peasantry, poor and rich men. He declared the rescuing of the country as a common affair. That's why he hadn't special orientation at some class or layer. in the period after the Mudros Treaty the allied powers occupied the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles straits, the East Traka, a great many regions of Anatolia, landed a descent in izmir. England instituted control ver Anatolia-Bagdad railway also sent its own troops to the Black-Seacoast ports; factually England, France and Italy divided the Turkish territory among themselves, and on May, 15, 1919, stimulated by Antanta, Ggreece occupied the city of izmir and its surroundigns. On August, 10, 1920, the Antanta countries forced the Turkish gorvenment of that period to sign the Sevre Treaty, according to which the Turkish territory was divided among the allied povvers, the England protectorate was instituted ver Egypt, and the Antanta countries control was" instituted ver the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles straits. The Antanta countries were also given the right to interfere in Turkish home affairs, at any time convenient for them. in fact, Turkey became a colony of England, France and Italy. Turkish state found itself on the verge of loosing its statehood and at such critical time it needed on energetic and courageous state and political figre with a bright mind, who would manage to save the country. Fortunately for the Turkish people it was Mustafa Atatrk, who undertook his mission. As early as in 1919 he already called Sultan Mehmed VI and his government for an organized opposition against the Antanta countries, however, the Turkish Sultan and his followers revealed a complete loss and proved to be unable to organize the Turkish people for a fight against the invaders. it was only Kemal Atatrk, who managed to organize people for a fight to secure the country's independance. On May, 19, 1919 he was sent from istanbul to Anatolia for inspection. At this time Kemal Atatrk was a general and had the title of Pasha, also he was considered a personal aide-de-camp of his excellence the Turkish Sultan. Ali this helped him to manage a speedy organization of people against their enemy. From Anatolia Kemal Pasha notifed Sultan that the whole population of Anatolia is ready for a fight to save the national interests and those of the state, to draw the enemy out of the Turkish territory. Of course, the demands of Atatrk were absolutely inadmissible for Sultan and the circles around him, who were under the influence of the allies, so he was summened back to istanbul. Atatrk did not return to istanbul, he resigned from his military past and on August, 9, 1919, at the order of the Turkish Sultan, Kemal Atatrk was devoid of ali his military

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titles for disobedience to Sultan's order, and he was sentemed to death by court-martial. in spite of this Kemal Atatrk turned Anatolia into a centre of national-liberation movement. He gathered around himself patriotically disposed people, at whose direct participation the "freedom-saving Society" was established, and on which Kemal Atatrk took an active part. This society presented a whole program of conducting a fight against the invadersand the country's liberation. On July, 21, 1919 a secret meeting of some army corps commanders, which decided to convene an A11-. Turkey congress in Sivas, with the purpose of elaborating a program of the national movement, and cali a meeting of the Turkish eastern vilayets rights defend society in Erzurum. This meeting was going on from July, 23, 1919 till August, 7. Before the opening of the meeting Kemal Atatrk was elected president of the eastern vilayets right defence committe. And in Sivas, in September 1919, at the All-Turkey congress, the committee of patriotic forces was elected with Kemal Atatrk at the head. This committee became, in fact, provisional government of Turkey. Because of the treacherous policy of Sultan and his goverment the representational committe headed by Mustafa Kemal, officially took ver the function of the provisional goverment, so that they could be in readiness for the fght against the occupants. On March, 19, 1920, the representational committee adopted a resolution to convene a national assembly in Ankara. The assembly (mejlis) was convened in the April of 1919, in Ankara. Out of 175 participants of mejlis 116 deputees were the supporters of Kemal Atatrk. The declaration says the follovving. On the reasons of convocation the national assembly: Turks are a nation, which decided to take up the vvhole power in its hands, restore its legislative state, retain state independence and for this reason it convened a national assembly in Ankara. The national assembly declared the independence of Turkey and its integrity. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was elected the frst chairman of the natinonal assembly. And on May, 3, 1920, the government was formed with Mustafa Kemal Atatrk at the head. The national assembly cancelled ali prior statutes, agrements and legislative acts adopted by the Sultan's goverment. Of course, such situation was absolutely inadmissible for Antanta and they started to activate levers against Kemal Atatrk and his authorities. in April 1920 at the instigation of outside forces Cherkez and Abaz revolts began in Turkey. Antanta also instigated Greece and promised it great help in its fight against Turkey putting forward territorial claims. At first the Greek army was successful and it broke far into Turkey, however, thanks to Kemal Atatrk's military talent the Turkish army, in an unequal fight, on March, 31, 191 won a victory ver the Greek army,

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the Turkish army was headed by ismet Pasha. The formation of national authorities in Angora with Kemal Atatrk at the head greatly raised the warriors' spirit and predetermined the success of the half-starring unarmed Turkish army winning a victory after a victory ver the numerous and well-armed enemy. The victory at Inenious exhilarated the Turkish population greatly. in May 1920 the Turkish "Green Army" was formed, incorporating, besides the regular army parts, ali partiotically disposed Trk citizens, who were indignant at the shameful agreement of Sevre and mudros. On the whole, Kemal Atatrk became a man, around whom ali patriotic forces were gathered, and, what is more important, his strong will made it possible to give a great rise to Turkish national-liberation movement, vvhich in the long run played a decisive role in ousting the enemy from the country. On July, 9, 1921, also supported by Antanta, Greece launched a great battle against Turkey, seizing strategically important cities. The Greek army approached Ankara at 50-km's distance. At this time the Turkish authorities summoned the last reserves to the army, and what is most important, despite a great opposition the national assembly granted Mustafa Kemal the rights of the highest commander-in-chief, simultaneously endowing him with extraordinary rights for a three-month period. On September, 13, 1921 an unparalleled in the Turkish history battle of Saharia, which ended in a great victory of the Turkish army, here Mustafa Kemal displayed an excellent talent of a commander-in-chief. The Saharia victory strengthened the international positions of Turkey and, what is more important, created an opposition in the allies' camp. in August, 1921, the armed forces of Italy were withdrawn from Anatolia, and in 1921 Turkey-France treaty was signed in Ankara. France evacuated its armed forces from Kiliki, and Turkey confirmed its friendship with Russia. in 1922 at Kemal Atatrk's immediate leadership the Turkish army was reorganized, in the result of vvhich it became more ablebodied and on a morally higher level. Turks rendered a deadly blow to Greeks, in the result of vvhich on September, 9, 1921, regiments of the Turkish army entered the city of izmir. The Greek army defeat on Turkey was a great sensation for Europe, it was ranked as the Antanta policy failure in Turkey, so the Antanta leaders offered turkey an agreement, and a treaty was signed betvveen Antanta and Turkey, vvhich is known as Mudani Treaty. it was a comparative compromise, Turkey regained east Trakia, and the Antanta military forces were given the right to stay in istanbul, in the Straits Zone, till a peace treaty vvas signed. 303

After the ousting of the invaders Turkey became an arena for farreaching descussions, especially the right-wing opposition was active, it expressed the interests of" feudals and clerical circles, which stood in opposition against the rights defence sociaty with Kemal Atatrk himself at the head. The opposing parties tried to recognize the rights of the Turkey, Sultan and his goverment. in order to put an end to the opposition parties antinational activity the Turkish great national assembly decided to accuse the Sultan goverment members with a charge of high treason, and liguidate Sultan's power altogether. This issue was under discussion in three commissons simultaneously constitutional, law and Shariat. The clergy representatives were against cancellation of the Sultan power, viewing it as encroachment against religion. in order to free himself of this charge Mustafa Kemal came out with a great speech on the history of islam, Arab haliphat and Osmans. When the three commissions joint session was held with Mufrid-Efendi as the chairman, the bili on Sultan power and haliphat liguidation cancelled, opposition won, hovvever, Mustafa Kemal made a speech for a second time, in which he sounded most argumentative against this fruitless discussion. These arguments were so important, that they may be accepted as the fundamental statutes in the cause of the future. Turkish state constitutional legislative construction. "Dear Sirs-he said-we ought to remember sovereignty and nobody can be given povver in the result of academic discussion. Sovereignty acquisition is possible through forceful actions, or, it may be said, through violence. Through violence, by force did Osman's children acquire power ver ali Turks, for ver six centuries did they domineer ver this nation. At present this nation has risen against its usurpers, it claims to achieve what belongs to it by the right of sovereignty. We are vvitnessing the fact... If you who are gathered here-commissions together or separately realized and saw this, in my opinion the nation acted worthily. in another case the truth will speak for itself. in this case several heads may "fly away" altogether. When Mustafa Kemal started to discuss the theological side of this question, one deputy from Ankara, Hoja Mustafa Efendi in terrupted him. "Excuse me, we have been discussing this question from an absolutely different vievvpoint. Now we understand." Bili on Sultan liquidation was adopted on November, 1, 1922, and at the great assembly Haliphat sessation from Sultanat was approved. By the same Bili the vvhole povver was fransferred to the national assembly; as a compensation new Caliph election was allovved only from the circle of Osman dynasty. On November, 17, 1922, Sultan Mehmed VI furfvely left istanbul, and on November, 18 Prince Abdul Mejid was inaugurated caliph and he was recognized caliph of the vvhole muslim vvorld, vvhich fact had just a nominal significance.

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Mustafa Kemal became, in fact, the founder and organizer of the new staty of Turkey. in 1922 a number of measures were taken to strengthen the authority and tho weaken the Sultan supporters' circles. in 1923 Mustafa Kemal published nine principles of the national party organization. These principles declare the independence of Turkey form foreign states, also, provided for protection of justice and law in the country, it also recognized creation of favourable conditions for successful implementation of radical reforms in every part of Turkish social life. These principles became profram documents for the national party, they provided for its success in the elections. in the Great national Assembly elections national party won 263 seats out of 286. On August, 13, 1923 Mustafa Kemal was elected the head of the Turkish State, and Fekhti Ali-bey became head of government. Despite the fact that Turkey starting on a road of state republican rule a long time age, stili, declaration of Turkey as a republic was connected with great difficulties. Crerical circles and feudals close to them opposed it strongly. On December, 29, 1923, Mustafa Kemal presented a draft composed of three articles to the national party and mejlis for discussion: 1. The Turkish state government form-republic. 2. The highest legislative body of the Turkish state-the Turkish great national assembly. 3. The council of ministers in the executive body of the Turkish state goverment. This draft was approved and adopted by mejlis on the same day. The opposition could not contradict them. Turkey declaration as an offcial republic was Mustafa Kemal Atatrk's one more great victory. The republican government form was juridically formulated, and Mustafa Kemal declared it in Anatolia on April, 23,1920, Mustafa Kemal became the first president of Turkey, and ismet Pasha organised the frst government. On the very next day of declaring the rebuplic the question of Caliphate arose. Mustafa Kemal made speeches in different regions of the country bringing arguments for Caliphate being absolete, theocratic regime being baseless, this helped that part of population, who lived in rela305

tively bad canditions, to share the essence of Mustafa Kemal policy. Population understood, that Haliphat already belonged to history, but Mustafa Kemal was a great supporter of Islamic religion, and it was his great desert, that the 2nd article of the provisional constitution of 1921 said: "the official religion of the Turkish state is islam", the great national assembly mejlis adopted it vvithout debates. This article entered the 1924 constitution in an unchanged form. in 1924 Caliphate was cancelled, likewise in the same year vacaf s and Shairat's ministry was also cancelled. it was replaced by ahead office of religious cults, who undertook the management of mosques, they had the right to give posts or to dismiss imams, sheiks the head of the head office was appointed by President at the presentation of the cabinet of ministers, and he was subjected to the council of ministers. Shariat courts were gradually liquidated and they were replaced by civil courts. Thus, under the wise leadership of Kemal Atatrk Turkey by its home and foreign policy gradually became a civil state. Ali these changes were depicted in the Turkish republican constitution, adopted by the great national assembly on April, 20, 1924. According to the Turkish Constitution the whole power belonged to people. The constitution of 1924 endovved President with great power. He was the commander-in-chief of armed forces, received diplomatic representation of foreign countries, appointed the chairman of the council of ministers, signed the bills adopted by the great national assembly, however, president like ali other deputees, was responsible to the great national assemble, At Kemal Atatrk's initiative Turkey was divided into provinces, regions, villages, ete. At the same time, it is thanks to Kemal Atatrk that the Turkish consittution finally introduced such general for mankid principles as a person's inviolability, freedom of consciousness and elision, freedom of speech and press, inviolability of personal property. The constitdution strengthend the general character of the state goverment, carried out centralization of authorities, which became a turning point for the Young Turkish state. Kemal Atatrk's one of the greatest success was the introduetion of a new civil code in 1925, on the result of which Turkey nce and for ali put an end to the mediaeval norms of life. 306

Civil marriage was introduced. From January, 1, 1929, the law of "Turkish citizenship" was introduced. Mustafa Kemal directed his policy forwards recreating the system of education. A great many foreign specialists were invited to the country, new curricula were elaborated, a unified elementary school was formed "ilk okul", 5-year schooling system was introduced. Teacher's salaries of lyceum and schools got raised. New teacher-training colleges for girls were opened in istanbul and Ankara; library work was ameliorated, sports was centralized. Kemal follovvers carried out cultural reforms, which helped Turkey to do away with mediaeral backvvardness. The Trk village cultural advance was especially naticeable. The Trk republic foreign policy was greatly changed, Kemal Atatrk developed entirely new principles of foreign policy; the solution of those issues, which remained unsolved at the Lozana conference, became the most important task of the Turkish foreign policy. The first among them was the problem of Iraq-Turkey border-the town of Mosuli. in 1924-27 Turkey established diplomatic relations with Poland, Albany, Hungary, Australia, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and others. On the whole, the aim of Turkish foreign policy was to establish food neighbourly relations especially with neighbouring countries. Mustafa Kemal has alvvasys emphasized this task. He noted that Turkey "is immediately interested in establishing good-neighbourly friendly relations with Balkan neighbours". it is natural that this question did not mean Balkans only, Georgia was also neighbouring to Turkey country, though at this time Georgia had lost its state independence. it had by force been placed in the structure of the Soviet Union, however Turkey had never lost interest in Georgia. And Georgia, on its part, did not have the right to establish independent relationship with Turkey. in spite of this, an agreement was signed between Turkey and Georgia in the town of Karse, knovra as the Karse agreement. Mustafa Kemal did not limit himself by deeping the relations with just the European states. He was likevvise interested in strengthening relations with Asian countries, namely, with Iran and Afganistan, as well as with oriental countries. 307

in the period of Mustafa Kemal's government Turkey made peaceful development the first and foremost task of its foreign policy. So Mustafa Kemal tried to normalize relations with ali countries, especially western states, since Mustafa Kemal and his followers did not want to have any factors interfering with those great reforms, that were under way in Turkey. Their successful implementation depended on peace, so in 1931 one of the poits of the Turkish leading party program was "peace in the country, peace in the world". The same idea was sounded in the speech of the foreigh minister Tevpik Rushti- bei in 1931, July, 16, in mejlis, where he said, that the main line of Turkish foreign policy is establishing relations with ali the countries of the world. The USA ambassador Mr. Grue noted concerning the Turkish foreign policy: "The Turkish government in most sensitive to its prestige, it concludes and is ready to conclude numerous trade agreements with representatives of ali other nations". Turkey managed to normalize relationship with England, France, USA, what is most important, with Greece, which fact allowed Turkey to participate in the conference of balkan countries held in Athens in 1930, where the Balkan Union was formed as a constantly active organization, with its secretariat and assembly. The Balkan Union second conference was held in Turkey, first in istanbul, then in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal met the conference participants. Then follovving conferences were held in Bukarest and Saloniki, hovvever, because of some internal contradictions, especially because of Bulgaria and Albany, who invariably put forward the question of national minorities inhabiting other countries, this Union was soon disintegrated, and in 1933 was replaced by Balkan Antanta, with Turkey, Grece, Rumania and Yugoslavia as its memkers. in 1931 Turkey declared readiness to enter the League of Nations. in July 1931, at the session of mejlis, the forign minister Tevpik-Rushtubey declared: "The idea of the League of Nations existence, is an idea that is looked on with respect by the Turkish population, we can say, it is our idea". He also said: "Turkey has a lot of friends in the League of nations". in 1932 the League of Nations Council unanimously approved Turkey as a member state of the League. A French delegate rightly noted: "Turkey will be a bridge between the West and the East, which is most useful for the League". "Turkey joining the league of Nations has confirmed the fact, as the Turkish historians say, that Turkey refused to cooperate with only one country-Russia". Turkey also continued to cooperate with the Soviet Union, which was its principal trade partner.

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Of course, Turkey's recognition on the international arena enabled it to solve its own economic problems, especialy in the development of industry. Mustafa Kemal's main motto was that "it was impossible to achieve independence without industry". in 1934 the economic program aimed at construction of textile factories, metallurgic plants, sugar factories and chemical factories. At the same time it was necessary to create a firm market, in 1934 the adapted economic program was successfully implemented. in fact, industrial rise started in Turkey. This enabled Turkey to raise Standard of living and strengthen internal positions. At the same time Mustafa Kemal continued political reforms. The idea of the unity of Turks stood on the foreground. in 1934 the population census was held, and in 1934, June, 28, the bili on surnames was adopted, which facilitated civil registration and by a special bili of the great national assembly Mustafa Kemal was given the name Atatrk, meaning "Father of Turks". in 1934 changes were introduced on the election system and women were for the first time given the right to be elected deputees. in the second part of the 30-ies Turkey came nearer to the vvestern countries. The European capital was given a free way, which blew a new spirit in the Turkish economy. in 1938 Kemal Atatrk died. Kemal Atatrk formed such a strong basis for the conutry's construction, that Turkey was strongly built on it. Turkey was turned into one of the advanced states of Asia Minr and Europe, and influences neighbouring countries; political principles and the system of the country's economic government elaborated by Kemal Atatrk plays a leading role in the life of Turkey today, and can be follovved by those countries which have started on a new way of life. This is especially true of the countries placed on the post-soviet situation, making then frst steps of independence; Georgia, Turkey's closest neighbour, among them. Turkey, in spite of complicated zigzags stili continued the political course established by Kemal Atatrk, which changed it into an independent and free country. This political course communicated Turkey with leading countries of the world and switched it into the vvorld's economic process, where it plays its own role and has great perspectives for the future. in 1961 the new constitution of Turkey was adopted in 1980, January, 29, the Turkish Parliament adopted a program of Turkey's economy stabilization, elaborated by President Turgut Ozal, the program gave rise to the Turkish economic potential complete activation. it is the result of 309

this program realization, that since the 80-ies a new program of economy improvement is being elaborated. The former foreign minister of Turkey Hikmet etin wrote, that Turkey's geopolitical location and its being among civilized countries is unique. Turkey entered the western vvorld with its diplomacy, by way of agreements, and with its religion, what is most important. Turkey is, at the time, a bighly developed democratic country, it is a member of the Islamic vvorld, it is a model for those republics of the former Soviet Union, which have started on road of new life and when the population speaks Turkish... Because Turkey is a bridge for Asia. Turkey is Europe's shortest way to neighbouring countries. Turkey shores democratic changes in civilized countries. That is why it transferred from an associate to a real member of European Parliament, which is a phenomenon of great importance for Turkey. On the whole, the leaders of today's Turkey emphasize their continuing the great policy to which Kemal Atatrk laid a foundation, the greatest fact was establishing peace in the region and Turkish policy was directed to cooperating with other countries in a civilized vvay, when possible, render help too to weak states. Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus being a vivid example of this. Not nce did they get help from Turkey in the cause of local economy and independence strengthening. An economic support is alvvays follovved by a political support, in the result of vvhich a real friendship is formed betvveen countries, based on the principle of mutual profit. Today eminent political figures of Turkey continue the road of Kemal Atatrk, among them today's President Suleiman Demirel - a figre of great renown. He, during the time of his being President, did a lot of good for the Turkish republic. He is a person, who is leading a rightful policy of raising Turkey to the standards of a civilized country. Led by him Turkey today is a politically active country, whose vievvpoint is shared by advanced states of the vvorld. Turkey has most close economic and vvarm political relations with caucasian countries, especially with Georgia, which is undoubtedly President Demirel's desert. President Demirel's speech at the opening ceremany of Akbaltsikhe passing point attests to the policy. "People arrived in this geographical part, - said Mr. Suleiman Demirel, - serve that future, vvhich will lay a foundation for two countries as well as of multilateral relationships. The relationships not only of these two countries, but also multilateral ones, the barriers betvveen us were not the fault of either Georgian or Turkish authorities. Today we are celebrating the cancellation of these barriers.

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Today the people, who had stood with their backs on each other, have tumed round and are looking each ather in the eyes, luggins each other. This border point opened between Georgia and Turkey is and will be a gate of exemplary friendship. This border point, closed 70-80 years ago, is being opened today, and near is the day, when it will no longer be necessary to issue a visa, a man entered from here will continue his way as Far as Mid-Asia" (newspaper "Bridge", August, 18, 1995). Turkish consistent policy is attested to by President Demirel's words: "By developing cooperation with Mid-Asian and Transcaucasian states we do not attempt at creating zones of influence, we do not rival and do not have conflicts with other countries (newspaper "Milieti", June, 18, 1993). The political orientation of Turkey, as we have already noted, is European way, the way of progressive civilization development. The life of the former prime-minister Tansu Chiler is a vivid example of this. He figuratively noted, that many people consider Turkey to be a European country, its future being closely connected with Europe. it was so in the past and Turkey will go on this road in the future. This is a new intrepretation of traditional political road, to which Kemal Atatrk laid a foundation. Turkey is a very close country for Georgia. The complex historical processes were natural, however, there were also moments of friendship, friendly political relations from the 90,ies, especially since Georgia declared independence, entered a completely new phase. Both countries are paying a great atcention to the caucasion regional problems, both countries have simultaneously confirmed their devotion to Helsinki closing act, to new Europe, to the principles given in Paris Chart, significant sleps were made to deepen relations in the felds of science, culture, tourism, education. There is a new turning point in the Georgian-Turkish relations. On April, 1, 1996, a declaration signed in Ankara by the presidents of Georgia and Turkey, "Presidents expressed their firm opinion, that everybody must protect the principles of independence, sovereignty, eqsual rights, territorial integrity, in any form, noninterference in each others activities for the sake of establishing peace and security in the region". (newspaper "Bridge", July, 29, 1996). in the same declaration one more question of Turkey-Georgian economic relations was touched upon, the question of Karsi-Tbilisi railway construction, ete.

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The present Georgia-Turkey relations is a sample of how goodneighbourly and good will relations can be developed betvveen two states, even when on the states is strong and the other is just making the first steps tovvards independence, and it is natural, that the external and internal enemies are doing their best that these steps should not be made. The present allitude of Turkey to Georgia showed that it is possible to establish honest and equal relations between a weak and a strong country policy. it was this that Kemal Atatrk was aspiring to, he always tried to obtain good will neighbours for Turkey, peace is and will be the main guarantee for any country's development and success.

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ATATRKLK LE DEMOKRASNN TRKYE'DE VE MSLMAN LKELERDEK GELECE

Dr. Menter AHNLER* Atatrkler nlerine kan tm engelleri aarak, gl ve modern bir devlet oluturmak iin almlardr. Atatrk ulusuluk dini konuda, dardan gelen her trl baskya karn halkn bamszl ilkesinden sapmamtr. Bu kararl srecin sonucunda Trkiye, Osmanl mparatorluu zamannda lkedeki tm kesimlere szan yabanc etkilerden giderek kurtulmutur. Dini tarikatlarn zellikle halkn gerici kesimi zerinde srdrdkleri bask karsnda etkin bir laiklik kavram, baka bir deyile Atatrk laiklik oluturulmutur. Atatrkler bamszlklarn koruma kaygsndan dn vermeksizin, adalama amacyla teknolojisi ve fikirleriyle model oluturan Bat'ya bilinli olarak ynelmilerdir. Bu balamda Atatrkler, yurtdnda bata SSCB olmak zere, tm gl devletlere ve komu lkelere ynelik drst bir d siyaset izlerken, yurt iinde gerekletirdikleri devrimlere kar oluabilecek her trl engeli ortadan kaldrmlardr. Nitekim 1924'de kurulan muhalefet partisinin kapatlmas olay, bunun en belirgin rneidir. Bununla birlikte Atatrk devrimlerin ncelikle demokrasiye gei sreci srasnda korunmas gerekirken, Demokrat Parti hkmetinin, bu sre iinde, demagojiye ynelerek Atatrk ilkelerinden sapt gzlenmitir. Kktendinciler, Atatrkln temel ilkesi olan laiklie kar tutum almas iin siyasi iktidara bask yapyorlard. Ekonomik alanda ise Demokrat Parti hkmeti, lkedeki ekonomik gelimeyi salayabilmek iin kendi deme gcn dikkate almakszn, Osmanl dneminde getirilen uluslararas mali denetimi hatrlatrcasna, yabanc kredilere bavurmu ve sonuta yabanc mali glerin eline dmt. Devrimlerin gerekletirilmesi amacyla, diplomatik alanda izlenen bar ve gvenlik siyaseti, 1945'ten itibaren yeni d tehditlerin olumas nedeniyle bir savunma siyasetine dntrlrken, yurt iinde Atatrk devrimlerin yozlatrlmasna ynelik tehditlerden tr bir kayg duyulmamt.
Dileri Bakanl.

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Menderes hkmeti bu alanda daha da ileri giderek, Kbrs anlamazl srasnda, 6 Eyll 1955 gn, stanbul'da ortaya kan halk gsterilerinde olduu gibi, d siyasetteki olaylar bir i siyaset arac olarak kullanmaktan ekinmemiti1. slamiyetilie dn yolunu aan Demokrat Parti dnemi, Atatrk'n, devrimlerin, gericiler ve kktendinciler tarafndan, demokratik bir dzende saptrlabilecei konusundaki kayglarn hakl karmt. Demokrat Parti'nin yerini, iktidara gelen Adalet Partisi almt. Adalet Partisi hkmetinin bana ilk kez krsal kesimi temsil eden bir Babakan; Sleyman Demirel seilmiti. Sleyman Demirel otoriter bir dzen yerine, demokratik bir siyaset izleyerek Menderes'in hatalarn yinelememeye byk zen gsterdiyse de, kktendincilere dnler verilmesini nleyemedi. CHP'nin yeni bakan Blent Ecevit ise 1973'de, Erbakan'n slamc Milli Selmet Partisi ile hkmet orta olmaktan ekinmemiti (Milli Selmet Partisi 1983'de Refah Partisi adyla ortaya kacakt). Ecevit'in slamclara verdii dnler, 1947'de nn'nn verdii dnlere benzer niteliktedir. Bu balamda 1975 ylnda Demirel, hkmet ortaklnn vazgeilmez koulu haline gelen Milli Selmet Partisi ile ortaklk kurmakta hibir saknca grmemiti. 12 Eyll 1980 askeri mdahalesi, Atatrk laiklik kavramna tamamiyle uygun bir dorultuda gereklememiti. Fakat Atatrk ilkeleri her vesileyle vurgulanm, zellikle Kenan Evren'in konumalarnda ve yeni okul programlarnda, Atatrk'n yceltilmesi zerinde srarla durulmutu2. Oysa yalnzca Atatrk'n kiilii zerinde srarla durulmasnn yanl yorumlara yol aabileceine daha nce deinmitik. Evren 1982 Anayasas'nn 24. maddesi ile ilkokul ve ortaokullarda dini retimi zorunlu hale getirmiti3. Bu gelimeyi Fsun stel yle yorumlamaktadr: "Ger1. Trkiye, 1923 Lozan Antlamas ile Kbrs'n Byk Britanya'nn egemenliine girmesini kabul etmiti. Byk Britanya'nn adada iki ayr halkn varln kabul ettii bir srada, Kbrs Rumlar iin "kendi kaderlerini saptamak" hakkn isteyen Yunanistan, sorunu 1954 ylnda Birlemi Milletler rgt'ne gtrmt. Adada Trkler ve Rumlar yaarken, yasad bir kurulu olan "EOKA", terrist bir kampanya balatarak aday Yunanistan'a balamak anlamna gelen, "Enosis" istiyordu. Trk halknn bu olaylar fke ile izledii bir ortamda, Selanik'te, Atatrk'n evine bomba koyulduu sylentisinin yaylmas zerine 6 Eyll 1955 gn zmir, Ankara ve stanbul'da olduka sert geen tepki gsterileri balamt. Biz bu olaylar Menderes hkmetinin kamuoyunun dikkatini i olaylardan uzaklatrarak, d sorunlara ekmek iin uygulad bir siyasi yntem olarak deerlendirmekteyiz (Bakn. Menter ahinlerTrkiye'nin 1974 Kbrs siyaseti, Rumeli Kltr ve Dayanma Dernei, istanbul, 1979, s. 24). Fransa Maslahatgzar da olaylar "dini fanatizmin gsterisi" olarak deerlendirmektedir. (Fransa Dileri Bakanl arivleri, seri 37. Maslahatgzar Pierre Siraud'nun Bakan A. Pnay'a gnderdii 17 Ocak 1956 gnl rapor, s. 62). Xavier Jacob, "les tendances actuelles de l'enseignement" in Paul Dumont ve Franois Georgeon, La Turquie au Seuil de L'Europe, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1991, S. 119120. Xavier Jacob, a.g.e., s. 23.

2. 3.

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ek bir toplumsal destekten yoksun olan askeri rejim, bu eksiklii kendi ideolojisinin kapsamna din faktrn sokarak gidermeye almt"4. Aslnda rejimi, Ulusuluk ve slamiyet ittifakyla glendirmek iradesi, Trk-slam sentezini savunanlarla tamamen denk dyordu. Trker Alkan'a gre Evren konumalarnda sk sk Atatrk laiklie ters den grlere yer vermekteydi. te yandan ordunun sert dzeninin etkisi altnda kalan aydnlar, hibir hukuki yntem uygulanmakszn tutuklanm, iilerin sendika kurma, grev yapma haklar kstlanmt. Baz siyasi partilerin ve siyasetilerin 1983 genel seimlerine katlmalar yasaklanmt5. Evren tarafndan desteklenen ve Adalet Partisi'nin mirass olan Anavatan Partisi'nin (ANAP) kurucusu Turgut zal, Trk-slam sentezinde ok daha ileri bir aamaya ynelmiti. zal, Menderes hkmetini hatrlatr bir yol izleyerek lkeyi liberal ekonomiye amt. zal, ekonomik alanda kaydettii baarlardan sonra, Menderes'in bile cesaret edemedii temel bir yasa inemi ye Atatrkl, geerliliini yitirmi bir ideoloji olarak yarglamt. zal'n yeni laiklik anlay tarikatlara ve kktendincileri yreklendirmiti. zal, Erbakan rneinde olduu gibi katksz bir Mslman olarak hareket ederken, "Allann ipine smsk sanln" eklinde bildirilerde bulunmu6, Babakan olarak Mekke'de byk bir Hac ziyareti gsterisini yapmaktan da ekinmemiti. Refah Partisi, 1991 Ekim aynda yaplan genel seimlerde %17 orannda ald oylarla 40 milletvekili kardktan sonra, 27 Mart 1994 gnl yerel seimlerde de stanbul ve Ankara Belediye Bakanlklarn kazanmt. Bunun yansra Doru Yol Partisi'nden zmir Belediye Bakan seilen zfatura, Refah Partisi'nin eski bir yesiydi. Bu srecin sonunda Refah Partisi'nin 1996 ylnda yaplmas ngrlen genel seimlerde en az %20 oy almas olasl ortaya kmaktayd. Bu oy orannn gereklemesi durumunda, Anavatan Partisi ile Doru Yol Partisi iinde bulunan ve Refah Partisi'ne gre elbette daha lml olan slamclarn birlemeleri ve l bir hkmet ortakln oluturmalar olasl akla gelmektedir. slamclarn kuraca ortaklk ise, Atatrk laiklie indirilen sert bir darbe olacaktr. Kktendinciler, resmi makamlarn hogrleri sayesinde devlet kurulularna szmlardr. Deerli Atatrk ilhan Seluk, 1993 Kasm aynda, kktendincilerin resmi kurululara szdklarn ve eriat yanllarnn zellikle Milli Eitim Bakanl ile Diyanet leri Bakanl'nda younlatklarn aklamtr7. Trkiye'nin enflsyon, isizlik gibi ekonomik glklerle, PKK gibi siyasi sorunlar zebileceine inanmaktayz. Ancak Trkiye'nin en byk sorunu, kktendincilerin demokratik grnt altna snarak, uzun
4. 5. 6. 7. Jacques Thobie ve Salgur Kanal, Industrialisation, communication et rapports sociaux en Turquie et en Mediterranee depuis 1850, Editions Isis, Analecta Isisiana, stanbul 1993, s. 393. Trker Alkan, 12 Eyll ve Demokrasi, Kaynak Yaynlan, istanbul, 1986, s. 32-33. alar Krak, Trkiye'de Gericilik 1950-1990, mge, Ankara, 1993, s. 373. 15 ve 25 Kasm 1993 gnl Cumhuriyet gazeteleri.

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srede de olsa mutlaka iktidar ele geirmek istemeleridir. Bu balamda Anayasa Mahkemesi Bakan Yekta Gngr zden, Gnaydn gazetesine 13 Eyll 1994 gn verdii bir demete, dini duygulan smrerek yaratlan tehlikenin Krt terristlerle, ekonominin bozulmasndan doan tehkilerenden ok daha ciddi nitelik tadn vurgulamtr. ncelememizde slamiyetin, demagog siyasetiler tarafndan 1945'den 1994 ylna kadar siyasi amalarla kullanlm olduunu saptarken, Alexandre Jevakhoff un bu siyasetileri Menderes, Demirel ve Ecevit olarak sraladn gzlemekteyiz8. Bu listeye zal' da ekleyebiliriz. Gncel yaamda dini unsurlar hl siyasi partilerin en gl yanlarn oluturmaktadr. Siyasi partilerin en nemlileri, Refah Partisi ile ileride kurmalar olas hkmet ortaklklar nedeniyle bu partiye kar esnek bir tavr taknrken, lml Mslmanlar, Atatrk ilkelerden dn verme pahasna bu partideki semen kitlesine ho grnmeye almaktadrlar. Bize gre kktendincilerin oluturduklar tehlikeyi nlemenin tek aresi, Atatrklerin birlemesidir. Anavatan ve Doru Yol Partileri kendi kurulularndaki kktendincilerden arnmaldrlar. Ayrca bu partiler sosyal demokratlarla hkmet ortaklna girimekten ekinmemelidirler. Nitekim DYP ile SHP hkmet ortaklnda olduu gibi CHP ve DSP ile de ibirliine gidilebilmelidir. Turgut zal'n 1993 Nisan aynda lmnden sonra siyaset yaamnda yeni "Gen Trkler" akm balamtr. Hkmet orta SHP Genel Bakan Erdal nn'nn istifasyla birlikte yeni siyasetiler kua olumaktadr. Eski siyasetilerin hatalarn yinelemeyecek nitelikte grnen yeni Atatrk gen liderler, laikliin ve demokrasinin savunucusu olmak zorundadrlar. Anavatan Partisi Bakan Mesut Ylmaz, DYP Bakan Tansu iller, SHP Bakan Murat Karayalm, CHP Bakan Deniz Baykal gibi. Bu balamda 1961 Anayasas'nn hazrlayclarndan biri olan balantszlk, bamszlk, ulusal gurur ve lkeler arasnda tam eitlii savunan, yeniden Atatrk d siyasetin gdlmesini amalayan Profesr Mmtaz Soysal'n 1994 Austos aynda Dileri Bakan olarak atanmasn, Atatrkle doru bir alm olarak kaydedebiliriz. Yeni "Gen Trkler"in gnmzde karlatklar kktendinciliin ykselmesi tehlikesi, ulusal Kurtulu Sava srasnda mcadele ile arm yapmaktadr. Ulusal birlii salamak, laiklik ve Cumhuriyet ilkeleriyle, devrimlerin korunmas iin gnmzde verilen mcadele, yine ayn mcadeledir. Gnmzn gen siyaset yneticileri, glerini laiklik yanls kesimden alrken, ulusal egemenlik kavramnn nemini, artk askeri bir mda8. Alexandre Jevakhoff, a.g.e., s. 463, Oktay Akbal, "Nasl bir demokrasi?", 26 Haziran 1994 gnl Milliyet.

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haleyi ngrerek deil, tam aksine demokratik yollara bavurarak vurgulamaktadrlar. Bu balamda Refah Partisi'nin demokratik yntemle genel seimleri kazanmas durumunda, ordunun mdahale edebilecei kukusu zerinde duran Ruen akr'm grn, yabanc lkelerden gelebilecek bir saldr veya terrizmin iddetlenmesi durumlar dnda, gereki bir temele oturtamyoruz9. Babakan iller, 22 Temmuz 1994 tarihinde Le Figaro gazetesine verdii bir demete, askeri darbeye ilikin grn aka belirtmektedir: "Hayr. Askeri darbenin yaplabileceine inanmyorum, nk demokratik gler hibir zaman Trkiye'de bylesine gl olmamlard. Ordu, demokratik yntemler sonucunda belirlenen bir seenei engellemek iin mdahale etmeyecektir (...) Bizim bu siyasi gelime aamasna ulatmza inanyorum. Ordu, demokrasi yolunu nlemek gibi bir dnce iinde deildir"10. Bu gr dorultusunda hareket edersek, Michel Bozdemir'in "1950 ylndan bu yana, Trkiye'de sivil toplumun sekin yneticileri devlet ynetimine getirildikleri her dnemde, siyasi dzenin parlamento kurallar erevesinde gelimesini istikrar iinde salamay baaramamlardr" grn" ters yz ederek, sivil Trk toplumunda ilk kez tam bir siyasi olgunluktan sz edebiliriz. Nitekim siyasi yneticiler, devrimlerin sorumluluunu yklenip bunlar uygulayamadklar iin kez askeri mdahale ile karlamlardr. Atatrklerin, bir daha bylesine byk bir tepki gstermeleri iin, ancak eriat dzeninin yeniden kurulmas gibi ok ciddi bir tehlikenin sz konusu olmas gerekecektir. Bundan byle 75 yllk Atatrk dnemi miras alan Trk genliinin verecei mcadelenin, artk "Halkn ounluuna karn halk iin" dncesiyle deil, "Halkn ounluu ile birlikte halk iin" ilkesiyle srdrlmesi beklenmelidir. Bu geliim srecinde Avrupa'ya da sorumluluk dmektedir. Atatrklerin aydnlanma giriimleri sonucunda Trkiye, 1 Aralk 1964 gn Avrupa Topluluu'na ye olmak zere ilk bavuruda bulunmutur (13 Aralk 1995'de Trkiye'nin Gmrk Birlii'ne girmesi onaylanmtr). Trkiye, 14 Nisan 1987'de Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluu'na bu kez tam ye olmak zere bavururken, daha sonra ortaya kan glklerden olduka tedirgin olmutur. nk Trk halknn bir kesimi, Avrupa seeneine kar kmakta, slamiyete ve Mslman lkelere ynelmeyi yelemekteydi. Ozal'n, 1980'li yllarda izledii iktisat siyaseti de ayn amac gtmekteydi12. Refah Partisi, Avrupa seeneine kar kma hareketinde
9. Ruen akr, a.g.e., s. 130. 10. 22 Temmuz 1994 gnl Le Figaro gazetesinde Claude Lorieux ile "Isoler Ankara, c'est faire le lit des islamistes" bal altnda yaplan sylei. 11. Michel Bozdemir, "Societe ivile versus societe militaire en Turquie" in Jacques Thobie et Sungur Kanal, dir. Industrialisation, communication et rapports sociaux, a.g.e., s. 405-406. 12. Valerie Morel, La Turquie entre l'Europe et l'Asie, matrise d'etudes europennes (Basma Kodmani-Danvish ynetimindeki tez) Marne la Valle niversitesi, 1993, s. 9.

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ncln srdrmektedir. Bu partinin yneticisi evket Kazan, Avrupa Birlii'ni, "Papa'nn buyruu ile sadece Hristiyan uluslar arasnda oluturulan Hristiyanlar kulb" olarak yorumlamaktadr13. Tansu iller ise verdii bir demete, slamc eilimin tehlikesini vurgulamaktadr: "slamclar, Bat'nn olumsuz tutumunu ve iktisadi buhran kullanmaktadrlar. Ben iktisadi durumu dzeltme ykmlln stme alyorum. Ancak Trkler gururlu insanlardr. Avrupa'nn onlar srekli olarak dlamas sonucunda bir tepki doacak ve bundan slamclar yararlanacaktr. te bu aamada, Batl dostlarmz etkili olabilirler (...) Eer Batllar gereini yapmazlarsa, Avrupa'nn onlar srekli olarak dlamas sonucunda bir tepki doacak ve bundan slamclar yararlanacaktr. te bu aamada, Batl dostlarmz etkili olabilirler (...) Eer Batllar gereini yapmazlarsa, Avrupa'nn eiinde kurulacak olan slamc rejimler bar tehdit edeceklerdir"14. Trkiye'nin dini bir rejime mi ynelecei, yoksa laik mi kalaca konusunu, Bernard Lewis yle aklamaktadr: "Her iki seenek de olasdr. Bu alanda Avrupa'nn alaca karar etkileyici olacaktr. Trkiye Avrupa Birili'ne girmek iin bavuruda bulunmutur. Sz konusu bavuruya verilecek olan yant nemli sonular douracaktr. Trkler, yzyl akn bir sredir yneldikleri Avrupa'dan dlandklarn hissettikleri anda, byk bir olaslkla d krkl iinde dier tarafa doru ynelebilirler15. Baka bir deyile Trkiye'nin Avrupa ile btnlemesi sonucunda, kktendinci slamclarn g kaybna uyrayacaklar ne srlebilir. Sonu olarak Trkiye, aydnlanma mcadelesinde her eyden nce kendi gcne gvenlidir. Trkiye, slamclardan kaynaklanan tehlikeyi nlemekteki sorumluluun tesinde, Dou ve Bat arasndaki ilikilerin can alc unsurlar olan Hristiyanlk ve slamiyet arasnda dengeleyici bir rol oynamak durumundadr. SSCB'nin dalmas, Irak'n bozguna uramas, ran'n yalnzla terkedilmesi, Trkiye'yi blgedeki tek g ve istikrarn temeli haline getirmektedir16. Bu balamda Trkiye Karadeniz lkeleriyle birlikte "Kara17 deniz Ekonomik birlii rgt"n kurmutur . Mslman, Hristiyan ve Museviler arasnda gerginliin artt bir dnemde, Mslman dnyasnn gerek anlamda tek laik lkesi Trkiye, byk dinler arasnda yattrc, lml bir ortamn yaratlmasnda etkili olabilir. nk Trkiye Mslman dnyasna laik bir demokrasi rnei sunarken, izledii gereki d siyaset yannda, Atatrklk, slamiyet ve ada dnya arasnda
13. Alain Louyot, a.g.e., s. 107. 14. 22 Temmuz 1994 gnl "Le Figaro" gazetesi. 15. 6 Kasm 1993 gnl "Le Monde" gazetesinde Profesr Bernard LEWIS ile yaplan sylei. 16. Dominique Lagarde, "La Turquie entre reve d'Orient et reve d'Occident", in Arabies aylk yayn, 1994 yaz says, s. 16-17. 17. Karadeniz Ekonomik birlii'ne ye olan lkeler: Trkiye, Yunanistan, Bulgaristan, Romanya, Ukrayna, Rusya Federasyonu, Grcistan, Ermenistan, Azerbaycan.

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en etkin uzlama yntemini yaratmtr. Trkiye'nin, Avrupa Birlii'ne katlmak zere bavurmasnn en hakl nedenini ada dnya ile btnleme iradesi oluturmaktadr. Avrupa, bu aamada Trkiye'nin etkin konumundan yararlanacak ya da bu lkeyi, "yeni kimlik aray"na doru ynlendirecektir18. Avrupa Birlii'ne tam ye olarak katlmas, Avrupa'nn Dou'daki grntsne olumlu bir deiiklik kazandraca gibi, iki ayn kltr dnyas arasndaki atma unsurunu yattrc nitelikte olacaktr. Bunun tesinde Bat modeli Mslman lkelerde yeniden deer kazanmaya balayacaktr. Mslman lkeler ve Atatrk Devrimler Atatrk devrimler, Mslman lkelerin gelecei zerinde de gerekten nemli rol oynayacaktr. Nitekim Trk Kurtulu Sava, Mslman lkelerde "mmet" yerine "ulus" kavramn getirmitir. Atatrklk, teokratik ve yar-teokratik rejimlerin tam aksine, halk egemenliine dayanmtr. Bu adan Atatrklk, halkn dini inanlarnn smrlmesine son vererek, demokrasiye gei srecinin en etkin siyasi yntemini oluturmutur. Demokrasi halklarn dini inanlar dorultusunda bakaldrmaya eilim gstermedikleri Mslman lkelerde, teokratik rejimlerin yklmas, Atatrk siyasi yntemle gerekletirilebilecektir. Halk egemenliini gerekletirme mcadelesi veren aydnlar ve subaylar, aradklar siyasi yntemi bandan beri Atatrklkte bulmulardr. Bu siyasi yntem, Mslman lkelerde Atatrklk adn tamasa da, demokrasi ve laiklik kavramlarnn yerletirilmesinde baar kazanma olasl, Bat lkelerinin etkisinden ok daha fazladr. rnein Cezayir, Bat'ya en yakn ve Bat modelinden dorudan etkilenmi bir lke olarak, hibir zaman Trkiye'nin demokratik ve laik koullar dzeyine ulaamamtr. Fransa 1962'den bu yana srdrd etkinlie karn, Cezayir'in siyasetine yn verememitir. Bu nedenle Cezayir'de demokrasi srecinin, ancak aydnlarla birlikte subaylarn bir ksmnn, Atatrkln, "halkn ounluuna kar, halk iin" ynetimini vurgulayarak gerekleebilecei kansndayz. Atatrklk, slamiyetin yeniden douunu salamtr. 1920'li yllarn banda, Trklerin slamiyet gr yar-teokratik bir dzen kalb iinde dondurulmutu. eriat kurallar ile dini eitimin arl yannda, tarikatlar, tekkeler, btl itikatlar varlklarn srdryorlard. Atatrklk, tarikat ve tekkelere son vererek Kuran'm Trkeye evrilmi olmas, halkn slamiyetin temeli olan bir kaynaa ulamasn
18. Dominique Lagarde, a.g.e., s. 20.

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salamtr. Bu balamda dini ynetimlerin gelitirilmesi ve camilerin yenilenmesi, dinin halk iinde benimsenmesi ve halka mal olmas srecini younlatrmtr. Nitekim dini alanda Atatrk, insan onuruna sayg ile birlikte akl ve pozitivist deerlere arlk veren z bir slam anlayn savunuyordu. Bu konuda dncesini yle aklamaktayd: "Bir dinin doal olmas iin akla, teknie, bilime ve manta uygun olmas gerekir. Bizim dinimiz btn bu niteliklere uygundur"19. slamiyetin gerek deerini tekrar kazanmas iin, yeniden manevi yerini bulmas, dolaysyla din adamlarnn siyasi alandan ekilmesi, tarikatlarn, eyh, emir, dervi gibi dini unvanlarn kaldrlmas gerekmekteydi. Geleneklerin almas ve dnya ileriyle manevi yaamn ayrlmas hareketi, Ibni Badis gibi baz yeniliki Mslmanlarn arzularyla da uzlamaktayd. Atatrklk, zellikle geleneksel Osmanl hogrsn daha anlaml bir biimde kullanarak, Trk Mslmanlarn yaamnda ilk kez dinin zorlayc niteliini bireysel bilin zgrlne dntrmtr. Kktendincilerin ortaya srdkleri savn tam tersine, bu zgrlk slamiyetten kopma hareketini oluturmam, Trkiye'nin nfusunun yzde 96's Mslman kalmtr. Bilin zgrl ve Atatrklk ile getirilen lml uygulama sonucunda daha ekici bir nitelie brnen Trk slam anlay, Mslman dnyasnda da uygun bir rnek oluturmutur. Atatrkler, eriat dzeni altnda yaayan dier Mslmanlardan farkl olarak, zgr Mslmanlardr. Halk egemenlii ilkesi, herhangi bir kiiye veya gruba dini ve siyasi ayrcaln tannmasna kar geldii iin, islamiyetin dousundaki halk nitelii yeniden ortaya koymaktadr. Atatrklk her ne kadar kktendincilerin deimez saldr hedefi olarak saylmsa da, Mslmanlarn demokrasiye ulamalar ve aydnlanmalarnn en etkin rneini oluturmaktan geri kalmamtr. Anadolu htilli, kitlelerin Anadolu'da lm-kalm mcadelesi olarak gereklemiti. Daha sonra Atatrk devrimler, ncelikle kentlerde byk bir hzla uygulanrken, birok etnik grupla birlikte dini deerlerine yzyllarca bal kalarak mparatorluk iinde yaamaya alm olan krsal kesimlerin, devlet-ulus ile laiklik kavramlarn benimsemeleri ylesine kolay olmamtr. Bu nedenledir ki Trkiye iin kktendincilere ve tutuculara kar srdrlen "bitmeyen mcadele", yaamsal deerini hl korumaktadr. Demokrasi ile laiklik sava, ayn amala verilen mcadeledir. Teokratik dzene son vererek, onun yerine "halk egemenlii" adyla demokra19. Akil Aksan, Citations de Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, Kltr Bakanl, Ankara, 1982, s. 54.

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siyi yerletiren, laiklik ilkesidir. Gen Atatrkler bu mcadeleyi sonuna kadar srdrmekte kararldrlar. Avrupa'nn yardm olsun veya olmasn, Trkiye amacna ulat zaman, Atatrkln Mslman dnyas zerindeki etkileri artacaktr. Tarih, yakn bir zamanda, Mslman dnyasnda laikliin gereklemesine, sonuta baka isimler altnda da olsa, zde Atatrk demokrasilerin kurulmasna tank olacaktr. Tarihi adan Atatrkln, gvenilir ve srekli bir siyasi deneyim olduu bir gerektir. Nitekim Atatrk rejimin, Birinci Dnya Sava'ndan sonra devrimci bir hareket olarak uygulanan komnizmle karlatrldnda, ok daha olumlu gelimeler kaydettii gzlenmektedir. Otoriter devlet dzenlerindeki benzerliklere ve yeni bir halk kimlii yaratmak yolundaki benzer iradelerine karn Atatrklk ve komnizm ok farkl sonulara ulamlardr. Trkiye kaydettii ekonomik gelime ile farkllk yaratm, OECD, NATO, AB ve Avrupa Konseyi gibi uluslararas kurululara doru ynelmitir. Aynca Trkiye, komnist rejimlerin demokrasiye gei dneminde karlatklar dalma olgusunu yaamakszn, baz sorunlara karn demokrasiye gei srecini baaryla gerekletirmitir. Profesr Maurice Duverger'e gre Atatrklk yolu, demokratik geleneklerden yoksun ve gelimekte olan lkelerin, demokrasiye gei sresini hazrlayan en gereki rnektir20. Duverger, Atatrkl, Jacobinci ve Marksist-Leninist modellerden ayrmakta, "devrimci diktatrln" nc zgn rnei olarak ortaya koymaktadr. Gelimekte olan lkelerde halk kitlelerinin siyasi eitim sorunu, demokratik koullarn olduu gibi benimsenmesini zorlatrmaktadr. Bu balamda Mslman dnyasyla kyasland zaman, gncel deerleriyle etkin bir rnek oluturan Atatrk laikliin, amalanan ada dzeye henz ulamad grlmektedir. Trkiye'de laiklik ve demokrasi yolunda verilen mcadele, bu dzeye ulalmasn salayacaktr. Her eye karn Atatrklk, "srekli bir devrim hareketi" nitelii ile Mslman lkelerde ulusal bamszlk ve egemenliin, adalamann ve laikliin salanmas yolunda, her zamankinden daha etkin ve uygun bir yntem olarak ortaya kmaktadr. Atatrklk, 52 Mslman lkenin geleceini deitirebilecek ve en azndan slamiyet, Hristiyanlk ve Musevilik arasnda bin yl sren gerginlii yattrabilecek en uygun toplumsal ve siyasi aydnlanma hareketini temsil etmektedir. slamc kktendinciliin zellikle Akdeniz blgesinde egemen bir ideoloji olarak yerlemeye alt bir dnemde, Atatrk deerlerin mirass Trkiye, Mslman dnyas ile Bat dnyas arasnda karlkl anlay salayabilecek tek lkedir.
20. Prof. Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques, Paris, 1951, s. 308-309.

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THE FUTURE OF KEMALISM AND DEMOCRACY N TURKEY AND THE MSLM COUNTRIES* The Kemalists have vvorked to establish a strong and modern country by surmounting ali obstacles in their path. Despite outside pressures on the subject of religion, Kemalist nationalism has not deviated from the principal of popular independence. At the end of switch in time frame Turkey had got rid itself of ali foreign infiltration of influence vvithin different regions of the country as it had in the Ottoman times. With effective pressures on the religious fundamentalist sector the laicism of Kemalism has been established. Kemalists approximated Western models in technology and aimed to become contemporary with Western countries, but vvithout making compromises such that Turkey's independence would go unprotected. While observing a very direct and honest foreign policy with ali powerful countries and neighbours, especially the USSR, they removed ali obstacles to the implementation of reforms within the country, an example being the closure of the opposition party formed in 1924. Whereas the protection of the Kemalist reforms, particularly in the nation's transition to democracy was necessary, the Democratic Party's demagogic deviations from the Kemalist principles of govemment have been noted. The religious fundamentalists were pressuring the govemment to stand against laicism, the basic principle of Kemalism. The govemment, to be able to ensure economic development, had overlooked its spending ability and had, in borrowing, fallen into the hands of foreign financial powers reminiscent of the financial capitulations made during the last stages of the Ottoman Empire. The firm policy of peace and stability in matters of international diplomacy, maintained to ensure the continuity of reforms, was transformed to a policy of defense after 1945 when the formation of outside threats was perceived. But intemal threats to the Kemalist principles had not been a cause for concern. The govemment had in fact taken risks in using events in foreign policy as tools in intemal policies, as in the 6 September 1955 events in stanbul which arose in connection with the Cyprus conflict of the same year'.
This is the english translation of the previous text which was written by Dr. Menter ahinler. According to the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, Turkey accepted that Great Britain would dominate Cyprus. During a period when Great Britain accepted the existance of two separate populaces on the island, Greece who desired Cyprus Greeks to have the right to "determine their own destiny", brought up the problem in U.N. in 1954. While Turks and Greeks were living on the island, "EOKA" which was an illegal organisation aiming for "ENOSIS" which meant annexation of the island to Greece. While Turks were observing these events with anger, demonstrations took place in izmir, Ankara and stanbul on 6 September 1955 upon the spread of the rumour that a bomb was placed in the house of Atatrk in Salonica. We evaluate these events as a political method by the Menderes govemment to divert the attention of the public opinion. French Ambassador considers these events as a "demonstration of radicalism".

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Having reopened the path to Islamism the government confirmed its worries that it could be misled by the religious fundamentalists through use of the democratic processes to compromise reforms. The Justice Party replaced the Democratic Party and came to power with a Prime Minister who represented the rural people, Sleyman Demirel, who observed democratic policies and who, much as he tried not to repeat his predecessors' errors of judgement, could not prevent making concessions to the religious fundamentalists. The new leader of the Republican People's Party, Blent Ecevit, did not hesitate to form a coalition government with the religious National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan (National Salvation party re-emerged as Welfare Party in 1983), in 1973, and the compromises made to him by Ecevit are comparable to those made by nn in 1947. Later in 1975, Demirel formed a coalition with the National Salvation Party. The military coup d'etat of 12 September 1980 did not altogether develop in a line compatible with Kemalist laicism. However, the Kemalist principles were emphasised at every opportunity, especially in the public addresses of Kenan Evren and in new school programs, and respect for Atatrk was insisted upon2 despite the possibility of encouraging misinterpretations of Kemalism by focusing attention on the person of Atatrk. Religious education became mandatory in primary and middle schools3. Fsun stel interprets this as an effort by the army to insert religion into the context of its own ideology to make up for the void of true popular support for the military government4. The attempt to support the regime by an alliance of religion with nationalism suited those who defended this alliance. According to Trker Alkan, Evren frequently expressed views in his speeches which conflicted with Kemalist laicism. On the other hand, under the harsh order of the army many intellectuals were arrested without due legal process, and the rights of vvorkers to form unions and strike were restricted. The participation of some of the politicians in the 1983 elections was prohibited5. The Motherland party, heir of the Justice Party and supported by Evren, came to power with Turgut zal, who advocated further advances within the Turk-Islam alliance. He follovved the Democratic Party's liberal economy line. After his success, he ventured to criticise Kemalism as an outdated ideology. His understanding of laicism gave heart to the religious sector. Adopting a strict Mslim persona he had advised "firm adherence to God's leash"6, and made a very conspicuous Haj trip to Mecca.
2. 3. 4. Xavier Jacob, "les tendances actuelles de 1'enseigmement" in Paul Dumont and franois Georgeon, La Turquie au Seuil de L'Harmaffan, Paris, 1991, p. 119-120. Xavier JACOB, Ibid, p. 23. Fsun stel, "La Synthese turco-islamique entre traditionalisme et modernisme" in Jacques Thobie and Salgur Kanal, Industrialisation, communication et raports sociaux en Turquie et en M6diterran6e depuis 1850, Editions Ists Analecta Isisiana, stanbul, 1993, p. 393. Trker Alkan, 12 Eyll ve Demokrasi, Kaynak Yaynlar, istanbul, 1986, p. 32-33. alar Krak, Trkiye'de Gericilik 1950-1990, imge, Ankara, 1993, p. 373.

5. 6.

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At the 1991 general elections, the Welfare Party won 17 % of the votes and took 40 seats at the Grand National Assembly. Subsequently, on 27 March 1994, the party won in local elections in istanbul and Ankara while the winner of the zmir local elections for the seat of mayor was a former Welfare Party member. At the time, Welfare was expected to win 20 % of the votes in the elections estimated to be held in 1996. If this were realised, a tripartite coalition, formed with the support of proIslamic members of the Motherland Party and the True Path Party, was expected. This would be a severe blow to Kemalist laicism. The religious fundamentalists had infltrated the civil service and state institutions. ProKemalist lhan Seluk revealed that they were especially entrenched in the Ministry of Education and the Religious Affairs Directorate7. it is believed that Turkey will solve economic problems such as inflation and unemployment and political problems such as the PKK Kurdish terrorism. But Turkey's gravest problem lay in the ambitions of the religious fundamentalists to acquire power under the guise of democracy. in this respect, the President of the Constitutional Court, Yekta Gngr zden in an interview with Gnaydn nevvspaper on 13 September 1994 commented that the danger created by exploitation of religious sensiments in Turkey was a more serious issue than either terrorism or economic problems. Those politicians who had, between 1945 and 1994, manipulated islam demagogically toward achieving political ends have been identifed as Menderes, Demirel and Ecevit8, Ozal could also be added to this list. in daily life, religious issues stili constitute the strongest platform of the political parties. While the main parties entertain a placatory stance towards Welfare for, perhaps, possible political partnership, pro-Islamic members compromise Kemalist principles to appeal to the electorate of Welfare. To prevent the dangers posed by the religious fundamentalists, Kemalists must nite. The Motherland and True Path Parties must clear their membership of fundamentalist elements, and must not refrain from entering coalition partnerships with the Social-Democratic parties. Hence, as in the case of the True Path Party and the Social Poplist Party, the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Left Party can cooperate. After the demie of Turgut zal in 1993, a movement of Young Turks emerged on the political scene. Also with the resignation of Erdal inn from the Social Poplist Party a new band of politicians emerged, those who strive not to repeat old mistakes and regard the necessity of de7. 8. Cumhuriyet, 15 and 25 November 1993. Alexandre Jevakhoff, loc. cit., p. 463, Oktay Akbal, "Nasl bir demokrasi", 26 Haziran gnl Milliyet.

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fending laicism and democracy. The leaders of the main parties, Mesut Ylmaz of Motherland, Tansu iller of True Path, Murat Karayaln of the Social Poplist Party and Deniz Baykal of the Republican People's Party are examples of these politicians. in this respect, the appointment of Mmtaz Soysal, one of the authors of the 1961 Constitution and the proponent of Kemalist foreign policy, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in August 1994 can be regarded as a proper step toward advancing the principles of Kemalism. The confrontation of the new Young Turks with contemporary religious fundamentalism is reminiscent of the Liberation War. The struggle now as it was then is to ensure national unity, and to protect laicism, republican principles and Kemalist reforms. The young political leaders of today must draw their power from supporters of laicism and must assert the importance of national sovereignty, not by military means, but by democratic methods. The fears of Ruen akr about a possible military overthrovv of a Welfare government is very unlikely unless terrorism increases or another overseas attack takes place9. The views of Tansu iller on a future military coup d'etat, as expressed to Le Figaro newspaper on 22 July 1994 were that she didn't believe it possible, as democratic powers had never been stronger in Turkey. She furthered that the army would not interfere with the democratic desicions of the people, as Turkey had indeed reached such a stage of political maturity, and that the army is not intent to impede democracy10. If one accepts this, one can refute the statement by Michel Bozdemir that "since 1950 the distinguished leaders of the civilian population, whenever brought to manage the state, have not been able to manage the progress of the political order according to the parliamentary codes"11. The political leaders have faced overthrow by military coups three times because they have taken on the responsibility of reforms and have implemented them. For the Kemalists to allow such a reaction again, a serious danger such as the reintroduction of Sharia vvill have to arise. Therefore, the struggle of the Turkish youth now should be "with the people, for the people", rather than the old "against the people, for the people". in this struggle Europe bears responsibility as well. As a consequence of Kemalist principles enacted Turkey made an application for membership to the E.E.C on 1 December 1964. and on 13 December 1995 its entry to the Customs Union was confrmed. Af ter reapplying for membership to the EU on 14 April 1987. Turkey faced internal conflicts as some Turks expressed preference for economic union with the Mslim
9. Ruen akr, loc. cit., p. 130. 10. Le Figaro 22 July 1994: Claude Lorieux and 'Isoler Ankara c'est faire le nid des islamisies'. 11. Michel Bozdemir, "Societe ivile versus societe militaire en Turquie", in Thobie et Sungur Kancal'dr. Industrialisation, communication et rapports sociaux. loc. cit., p. 405-406.

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countries. The economic policy of zal in the 1980's pursued this aim12. The Welfare Party, spearheading this movement allowed its president evket Kazan, to refer to the E.E.C. as "The Christian Club formed amongst Christian countries according to the will of the Pope" 13 . Tansu iller has emphasized the dangers of Islamism in Turkey by reminding the people that "the Islamists are using Europe's negative stance tovvards Turkey and the economic situation to their political advantage. I take on the responsibility of setting the economy right. Hovvever, Turks are a proud nation and if the E.E.C. continues to reject. Turkey's public reaction will only develop to be used by the Islamists. At this stage our European friends can be effective (...) If the West doesn't do what is necessary Islamic regimes at the threshold of Europe will threaten peace"14. On whether Turkey will remain laic or take up a religious regime the speculations of Bernard Lewis have been that "both choices are viable and the decisions of Europe will be effective. Turkey has applied for entry to the E.E.C, and the response to this will bear significant consequences. If Turks feel rejected by a Europe they have oriented to for several centuries, they may shift their allegiances"15. in other words, in the event of Turkey's joining the European Union, it could be assumed that Islamists will lose povver. Hence, Turkey must show its strength in its struggle for advance. Beyond the issue of preventing the dangers posed by the resurgence of Islamism, Turkey plays a balancing role between islam and Christianity in vital East-West interaction. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the uncertainty of ties with Iraq, and the West's rejection of Iran shows Turkey to be the sole povver and basis of peace and stability in the area16. in this respect, Turkey has established the "Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation". At a time when the tensions betvveen Muslims, Jews and Christians is mounting, Turkey being the only truly laic country among the Mslim countries, can be effective in the maintenance of conciliatory and warm relations betvveen the great religions. Turkey has already created a most effective reconciliation betvveen islam. Kemalism and the modern vvorld, vvhile constituting a model of laic democracy for the Mslim World. The aim of joining the E.E.C. is justified by the nation's desire to be a modern and civilised one. Europe vvill either make use of Turkey's stance or vvill push it to seek "a nevv identity"17. Turkey's
12. Valrie Morel, La Turquie entre l'Europe et l'Asie, maitrise d'etudes europennes, Basma. Kodmani-Danvish ynetimindeki tez, Marne la Valle niversitesi, 1993, p. 9. 13. Alain Louyot, loc. cit., p. 107. 14. Le Figaro 22 July 1994. 15. Le Monde 6 November 1993: Professor Bernard Levvis. 16. Dominique Lagarde, "La Turquie entre reve d'Orient et reve d'Occident", in Araimes Summer, 1994, p. 16-17. 17. Dominique Lagarde, loc. cit., p. 20.

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acceptance by Europe along with its positive influence on the Eastern aspect of the continent will create a peaceful zone for the skirmish tendencies of the two cultural worlds. Furthermore, the European model will regain value in the Islamic world. The Mslim Countries and Kemalist Reforms The Kemalist reforms will in reality play an important role in the future of the Mslim countries. The Liberation War set the concept of 'nationhood' against the existence of 'mmet' or (religious community at large). Kemalism, in contrast to the theocratic or semi-theocratic regimes is based on popular sovereignty. Kemalism has thus ended the political exploitation of public desires and has provided an effective model for a transition to democracy. in the Mslim countries where people do not rise up against religious domination, democracy can be established through Kemalist policies. Those Mslim officers and intellectuals seeking means to realise popular sovereignty can find the appropriate political model and method in Kemalism. The influence of Kemalism in establishing laicism and democracy surpasses that of the West. For example Algeria very close to and under the influence of Europe, has never been able to attain the democratic and laic conditions of Turkey. Despite its efforts since 1962, France has not been able to influence the political climate in Algeria, as the Kemalists's approach "against the people, for the people" could. Kemalism has ensured the rebirth of islam. At the start of the 1920's Turkey's understanding of islam was frozen in a semi-theocratic order. Given the counterweight of the Sharia and religious education, the religious orders, temples and superstitions were comfortably afloat. Kemalism, by bringing an end to the religious organisations, has maintained the Quran as the only source of islam. The translation of the Quran has enabled the people to go directly to the source for spiritual guidance. This, together with the organisation of religious affairs, and the renovation of the mosques, has brought religion to the level of the people. Thus, Atatrk defended an islam which allovved for the dignity of the mind and positive thinking of the individual and explained that "for a faith to be natural it has to be compatible with the mind, and the logic of knowledge and technology. Our religion harbours ali of this"18. For islam to reestablish its true spiritual place, the removal of religious men and in18. Akil Aksan, Citations de Mustafa Kemal Atatrk Dileri Bakanl, Ankara, 1982, p. 54.

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stitutions from politics and education was necessary. The separation of state and religion to surmount the backward pull of tradition was also recommended by reformist Muslims like Ibn Badis. Kemalism has transformed the oppressive nature of religion to a matter of personal belief and consideration through the Ottoman basis of tolerance. This, contrary to the claims of religious fundamentalits, has not alienated people from islam but has, in fact, helped 96% of the Turkish population to maintain their faith in islam. Thus, the Kemalist liberation of islam has provided an attractive model for a true understanding of faith in the Mslim world. Kemalists, as distinct from the Muslims living under the order of Sharia, are free Muslims. The principle of popular sovereignty forbids any individual or group from claiming religious or political sovereignty and therefore has allowed islam to return to its popular essence. Though criticised by the religious fundamentalists, Kemalism has indeed been instrumental in the democratization and intellectual enlightenment of Muslims. The Anatolian Revolution developed as a struggle for survival. The Kemalist reforms had been easier to implement in towns and cities but had not been so easy in rural Anatolia, where people had been steeped in ethnic values for many years and were incapable of understanding the merging concepts of nation and state, and the secular necessity at the foundation of such a merger. Thus the fight against religious fundamentalism maintains its vital importance today. The struggles for democracy and laicism are made for a common aim. it is the basic principle of laicism that establishes the democratic character of a society, establishing hence a "people's sovereignty". Young Kemalists are dedicated to this fght, and with or without the help of Europe, when Turkey succeeds in ridding itself of religious intolerance completely, it will have constituted an exceptional model for ali Muslims in the world. History will soon vvitness Kemalist democracy established in the Mslim world even if under other banners and terminologies. From a historical point of view it is a fact that Kemalism is a sound and enduring political philosophy. in fact the comparison of Kemalism as a revolutionary regime with the Soviet order after the World War I proves it to be the more effective and progressive, despite the similarities of the authoritarian basis of both govemments. Turkey has achieved distinction in its reform efforts in orienting itself to such organisations as O.E.C.D. N.A.T.O., the E.E.C. and the Council of Europe. Turkey has not suffered political and social collapse in its transition to democracy as did the former communist orders; indeed. Kemalism has been desribed by scholars

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like Maurice Duverger as a model for the democratization process19. in developing countries, the political education of people endangers the democratic process. in this respect, although Kemalist secularism stands as a great accomplishment in the Mslim world as a whole, Kemalism has not been able to meet the standards of the modern world. The struggle in Turkey to meet this Standard constitutes an even more effective model for the future of Mslim countries. in conclusion, Kemalism represents the most suitable model of political and social development for the future of ali 52 Mslim countries and for the achievement of a moderation of world tensions between islam, Christianity and Judaism. Thus, at a time when religious fundamentalism is vvaginig a fight to establish itself in the Mediterranean, Turkey, as the heir to Kemalist principles, stands as the sole country to realise the mutual understanding that it is possible to create between the Mslim and the Western Worlds.

19. Prof. Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques, Paris, 1951, p. 308-309.

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1938 SONUNDA PARS BASININDA ATATRK VE ESER ZERNE BAZI DNCELER*

Jean-Louis BACQUE-GRAMMONT** (eviri: Yrd. Do. Dr. Berrin CEYLAN ATAMAN)*** yi belgelenmi ve biimlenmi, Atatrk'n1 lm karsnda Semih Vaner'in Paris basnnn tutumu zerinde bugn klasik olan eseri, ok zengin malzemelere deerli bir balang oluturur. Yazarn kullandna ek olarak balk bakmndan zengin ve hassas noktalar yakalayan, blgesel basn da eklemek yerinde olacaktr. Ayrca, bakentte yaynlanan haftalk veya aylk sreli yaynlarn da yakndan incelenmeyi hakettii kanaatindeyiz. Bu sunuun erevesi bizi bunlardan n semeye gtrmektedir. Bir yandan ulusal ve uluslararas datm ok byk olan haftalk bir gazete: l'Illustraon. Dier yandan, nemli kiilerce beenilen aylk dergi La Revue des Deux Mondes, son olarak ise, o dnem iin yaplm, ncelikle 'geni kitlelere' seslenen haftalk resimli haber dergisi, Vu dergisinden sz edeceiz. Yaklak Yzyllk bir Kurum: L'IUustration Son derece saygn bir dergi sz konusu olunca, tantm iin bir sunu gerekmektedir. L'IUustration 1843'de kurulmutur. Resimli basn ilk kullanan Fransz rnei olarak kendisini okuyucularna tantm, nn ve gelimesini bu ekilde elde etmitir. Zaman iinde, rportajlarn drstl, yazlarn kalitesi, litografyalar, fotoraflar l'Illustration dergi* Bu alma yazan tarafndan ynetilen "Tarih ve Osmanl tarihinin yardmc bilimleri" aratrmas program ve Paris'teki Milli Bilimler Merkezi'ne bal Aratrma nitesi Dernei no: 390 ile istanbul'daki Fransz Anadolu Aratrmalar Enstits ibirlii erevesinde oluturulmutur. Burada sunulan aratrma, basnda Atatrk'e bak iinde "olduumuz gibi"nin hazrlanmasnda gerekletirilen ile eanl yrtlmtr. ** Directeur, Centre National, Sucy-en-Brie. *** Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi retim yesi. 1. Semih Vaner, "Bilans du regime republicain turc dans la presse franaise la mort d'Atatrk", Paul Dumont et Jean-Louis Bacque-Grammont ed., La Turauie et la France lepoque d'Atatrk, collection Turcica, I, Paris, 1981, s. 273-295. Ayn olay karsnda baka lkelerin basnndaki tutum zerine benzer almalarn sunulmasnn byk yarar salayacan bu vesile ile belirtmek isteriz.

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sini gerek bir kurum haline getirmitir2. 1900 ylnda basks 50 000'i gemi, 1 908'de 100 000'i bulmu ve birinci dnya sava srasnda 200 000-300 000 arasnda olmutur. Bizi ilgilendiren 1938 yl ise 142 000 adetle on yln en dk basksnn olduu tarihe karlk gelmektedir: Bunun 115 000'i abonelik yoluyla satlmtr. Bununla birlikte 1932 yl iin elimizde bulunan veriler bize basknn drtte birinin, basmdan hemen sonra ihra edildiini gstermektedir3. Byk formatta (28x36 cm), lks deilse bile zenli sunumu ve yllk olarak zel say ve eitli edebi eklerle donanm olan bu haftalk dergi yabana atlacak gibi deildi. Bununla beraber, son derece belirgin politik angajmanlara kar yzyln bandan beri yayn zerinde gl olan, Bashet ailesinden ekindikleri iin, kamuoyundaki etkisi greli olarak dkt. 1938 dolaylarnda dmanca tutum ortaya kmtr: Allerjiyi andran bir antisovyetizm, birok kez ifade edilmi olan Roma ve Berlin rejimlerine kar bir antipati ve Front Populaire hkmetine ve onun brakt tm ilere kar kma. Bugnn "sessiz merkeziyetiliine" karlk gelen, dnemin kkten sosyalizmi ile yaknl olan baz stunlar ak olarak grlyor olsa dahi, bu net bir politika izgisi belirlemeye yetmemektedir. ki u arasnda ilan edilmi mesafe, lml olarak nitelendirilebilecek kamuoyu gznde, yllar boyu elde edilmi objektif olma nn glendiriyordu. erie gelince, sanatsal aktalite yannda, ulusal olduu kadar uluslararas politikalara ayrd nemli yeri saptamak iin, bu derginin ulalabilir tm kolleksiyonlarna bakmak gerekmektedir. Bu saygn haftalk derginin yeni Trkiye'ye atfettii deeri grebilmek iin yapm oldumuz sondajlar bize aka derginin, Trkiye'ye, bir yaknlk ve sempati duyduunu gsteriyordu. Bu yaknlk gen bir politik snf ve dnemin fransz entellektelleri tarafndan da paylalmaktayd. Ayrca, gen cumhuriyet tarafndan ortaya atlm idealler ve ayn zamanda onlara ulaabilmek iin duyulan ve yaylmakta olan byk istek yanklar uyandryordu.
2. [HGPF], Histoire generale de la presse franaise, publiie sous la direction de Claude Bellanger, Jacques Godechot, Pierre Guiral et Fernand Terrou, III, De 187 1940, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1972, s.387: L'llustariton (...) franszlarn rakipsiz kalite dergisi olmaya devam ediyordu ve okuyucu kendisini bu dergiye adeta adamt. Uzun bir gemii ile bu dergi teknik ilerlemelerin de ncln yapmtr. 1933'deki alnda, Bobigny matbaas Avrupa'nn en modern donammlanndand. Jean-Noel Marchandiau, L'Illustration, 1843/1944. Vie et mort d'un journal. Paris Bibliothecjue historique Privat, 1987, s.325-329. 206.855 adet basmdan 12.280'i fransz smrge ve kolonilerine ve 45.106's dier lkelere gnderilmitir. 6 lkede 2000 abonman gemitir. Belika (10.306), svire (3.995), ABD (2.996), Hollanda (2.225), talya (2.118), Romanya (2.024) ve 7 lkede de 1000 abonman gemitir: spanya (1.971), Polonya (1.788), Portekiz (1.902), Kanada (1.361), Brezilya (1.168), Arjantin (1.178), Msr (1.157). Trkiye 694 aboneye ulayordu. Almanya (895) ve ngiltere (864) ile karlatrldnda olduka az gzkyor. Fransz koloni ve smrgelerinde sadece Magrebli olanlar 1000'i geiyordu (4.172 Cezayir'de, 2.123 Fas'ta, 1.272 Tunus'ta), bunlara bir de in hindi eklenebilir: Kouang-Tcheou (1.381).

3.

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Neredeyse yzyllk olan l'Illustration, kendi yolunda devam ediyordu, haberin ivediliine gre, gerek resimlerde, gerekse yazlarda kaliteyi feda etmek konusunda ok fazla endie duyulmuyordu. Bu bakmdan 10 Kasm 1938'de Atatrk ldnde, 12 Kasm tarihli ve 4993 no.lu haftalk dergi durumu pek yanstmyordu. Hatta 19 Kasm tarihli gazetede bununla ilgili en kk bir haber bouna aranyordu. "stanbul'da Dolmabahe saraynn eski hkmdarlk salonunda Atatrk'n naa etrafnda sabahlama'yi gsteren, tam sayfa bir fotoraf grmek iin 26 Kasm tarihli ve 4995 sayl dergiyi beklemek gerekiyordu (s.405): Fotorafn altnda ksa bir yaz "19 Kasm'da stanbul'da ve daha sonra 21'inde Ankara'da yaplan grkemli cenaze trenlerine4" ayrlmt. Resim olduka etkileyici biimde - hi de ar grlmeyen bu sfat resmin alt yazsndan alyoruz- sarayn badndrc ve atafatl dekoru ile, yarm daire biiminde hazrlanm alt tane yanan meale ve bunlarn ortasnda snm yirmi kadar lambadan oluan olduka byk bir Osmanl sokak lambasndan oluan katafalkn sadelii arasndaki tezatln altn izmiti5. Dier yandan, 405. sayfadaki resmin altndaki yazda, cenazeye katlan Fransz temsilcilerinden nemli bazlarnn isimleri ve ayn zamanda Atatrk zerine bir makale yer almaktadr. Gerekten de 411 ve 412. sayfalarda "Cenevre muhabiri" Noelle Roger'nin "Trkler'in Atas zerine Hatralar" balkl ve ok hznl olmayan bir yazs bulunmaktadr. Yzyln banda yaynlanan, bu yazarn Trkiye ile ilgili ilk eseri olan, En Asie Mineur, M Turquie du Ghazi, olduka tannm bir eserdir. Paris'te Dou Dilleri Ktphanesinde bulunan bir kopya bize
4. Bu altyaznn tam metni yle: Birka sayfa sonra zel muhabirimiz Mme Noelle Roger'nin Kemal Atatrk'n eserinin kiisel hatralarndan oluan bir makalesi yer alacaktr. Dolmabahe saraynda "Trklerin babasnn tabutu etrafndaki gecelemeyi gsteren son derece etkileyici olan bu fotoraf elimize geti. Katafalka konur konmaz, ipekten bir Trk bayrana sarl drt general ve iki piyade erinden oluan eref blnce beklenen naa eski kraliyet salonuna konmutu ve burada, gn boyunca, ok byk bir kalabalk, 19 Kasm da stanbul'da, sonra da grkemli ekilde 21 Kasm'da Ankara'da yaplan cenaze trenlerinden nce, naan nnde sayg yry yapt. Fransz delegasyonunu ileri Bakan Albert Sarrault'nun bakanlnda General Georges, Labord'un yardmc Amiral'i Albay Collet ve deniz kuvvetlerinden bir grevli temsil ediyordu. Fransa'ya hareket etmeden nce, M. Albert Sarrault nn tarafndan kabul edildi. L'lllustration'nun Atatrk ismindeki tremaya gsterdii saygdan, nn ayn ekilde yararlanamyordu. Sadece franszcann kullamna dikkat edersek, trema bir sesli harf boluudur ve e, i ve u harfleri zerine konur bu kurala uyulursa nn yazlr. Dergide bu konuda baz tereddtler yaand grlmektedir. Biraz tartmal da olsa, sol sayfa (s.404) trenin havasn kuvvetlendirmeye katkda bulunmaktadr: k giyimli olarak, alt te bir sayfay, gven mektubunu sunmak zere bir saltanat arabasna binmeye hazrlanan talya'daki yeni Fransz Bykelisi Andre Franois-Poncet'nin fotoraf i sslemektedir. Bu diplomatik sahneler kapak sayfasnn te ikisini kaplayan fotoraflard: "Roma'da gven mektubunu sunmak zere, Fransz Bykeliliinin bulunduu yere gitmek iin Farnese sarayn terkeden saltanat arabalarnn kortejini konu alyor."

5.

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kaynakaya ilikin yararl bilgiler sunmaktadr*. Balk sayfasnn arkasna yaptrlm 14-15 Nisan [1930] tarihli dergiden kesilmi ancak bal belirtilmemi bir yaz bulunmaktadr7. Yazarna olduu kadar, Kemalist Trkiye'ye de vgler yadran ve Noelle Roger'nin8 daha nceki eserler listesinden hemen sonra yer alan bu anonim yaz, yazarn eserlerinin byk rportajlardaki kurgu literatrne getiini gstermektedir9. unun da altn hemen izmek gerekir ki, uzmanlkta sadece bir balang denemesi yapan Noelle Roger iin, tarihi olarak nl olduu kadar politika insan da olan Gabriel Hanotaux tarafndan bir nsz elde etmesi az bir eref saylmazd10. Sadece bu iki balk iin dahi olsa akademisyen olanlar Noelle Roger'nin sunduu Trkiye imajna kaytsz kalamazd: 1928'de gerekleen Latin Alfabesinin kabul edilmesi ve eitim seferberlii iin kampanya, Anadolu'ya gerekleen ilk seyahat bu hanma eitimin genelletirilmesi ile politik, sosyal, bilimsel ve entellektel yaamn tm alanlarnda Avrupa rneinden beklenebilecekler arasndaki mantki zinciri zel olarak vurgulama frsatn vermitir. Bylece Gabriel Hanotaux, 3. Cumhuriyetilere yakn fikirleri olanlara cokulu bir destek vermekten geri kalmyordu. Ayrca Danion, Condoret ve Lakanal gibi isimleri de kendisine referans gsteriyordu. Bunun yannda ideallerin bar koullarda ve "Cumhuriyetin siyah svari erleri"nin sempatik trk kuzenleri sayesinde gereklemesinde yine Gabriel Hanotaux'un katklar vardr. Trk halk "lmek istememi bir halk"tr, ite Trk halk gerekte budur. Bu halkn yaamak ve ayakta kalmak iin gereini yapacana nasn inanmayalm? Bu gerekli yenilenmeyi Gazi ve ekibi halkn disiplinine, bir okul retmeni edasyla emanet etti ve (hereyi en basit haliyle sylemek gerekirse) Anadolu Trkiye'si sz dinliyordu: Anadolu okumay, dnmeyi,
6. [RAM], Noelle Roger, En Asie Mineure. La Turguie du Ghazi. Preface de Gabriel Hanotavc, collection Voyageuses de Lettres, Paris, Fasquelle, 1930 [L'exemplaire de la BILO porte la cote AP.VIII.70.] BILO says AP.VII.70 kodunu tad. 7. Bir sayfa arasna konulmu rusa bir gazeteden bir kupr farkediliyor. zerinde el yazsyla Rul'Un, 21 Mays 1930 tarihli, 21. saysndan geldii yazyor. Bu notta, Noelle Roger'nin kitabnn eletirisi olduka olumludur. 8. Onbir roman balndan sadece La Route de L'Orient roman yazarnn yeni ilgi alanyla ilikilidir. 9. (....) On ya da 15 cilt olan eser ona hakl bir n kazandrd. 10. 1894'den 1898'e kadar dileri bakan, diplomat Gabriel Hanotaux (1853-1944) Fransz-Rus ibirliinin temel sorumlularndan biriydi. 1897'de Fransz Akademisine seildi, dier yandan tarih eserleri ile tannyordu ve zellikle de l'Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu ve L'Historie de la Nation Francaise. Gabriel Hanotaux daha sonra deinilecei gibi saysz kere bu dergiye katkda bulunmutur. L'IUustration'nun 10 Kasm 1938 tarih ve 4994 says (s. 503-505). "Gabriel Hanotaux au prieure d'Orchaise" makalesine ayrlmtr.

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almay reniyordu. Anadolu, klavuzunun yolundayd. Hibir ey, tutuk tutuk ve heceleyerek latin alfabesini torunlar yannda okuyan bir bykbabann bulunduu snf tablosu kadar etkileyici olamazd. Bu yaz artk byk babay artmyordu, herkes bu sayfaya eilmi ve okuyordu, artk fessiz ve peesiz bir halkn yeni hayat balyordu. (...) Bugn, Dou'da, imparatorluklar kurmak retmene aittir. Kim kutsal tanrnn yollarn deeleyebilir? Amaca ulaan kim olursa olsun, phesiz bu abay gsteren bir ulus, evrenin dikkatini hakketmitir. Bu eski topraklarda, kendi isteiyle kendini yenileyen bir insanln gsterisini bize sunan bu kitabn Fransa'da yaynlanmas iyidir". Kitapta nsz oluturan, betimlenmi rneklerden byk lde esinlenmi, halka ve yneticilerine seslenen bu vc cesaretlendirmeler Kemalist Trkiye ile ilgili o zamann frankofon edebiyatnda bir istisna tekil etmiyordu. Yaplmas gereken bir anket kaydyla, bize gre, Noelle Roger, son on yln, sadece trk halknn gelecekteki sorumluluklar zerindeki srarnn etkili olduu yazarlardan biri deil, ayn zamanda Atatrk'n ayn konu zerindeki sylemlerinin yanklarnn ok erken bulduu kk saydaki topluluk iinde yer almaktadr. Bu konu en karmak ama en tannm ekliyle udur: "ki Mustafa Kemal vardr: Biri, benim, lml ve yok olacak; dieri biz, diye konumam gerekir, ulusu yeniden yaratan ve sonsuza kadar yaayacak olan" te Noelle Roger'nin 26 Kasm tarihli l'Illustration dergisindeki makalesi bu alnt ile tamamlanmaktadr.. Drdnc stunda drt ayr konu bal yer almaktadr: lk ikisi yedi yl nce "Kk Asya"da ok geni bir biimde gelitirilmiti: "Baehrin yaratlmas", "alfabe reformu", "Atatrk, alma odasnda, dilbilimci" ve "Atatrk ve evlatlk kzlar". Yazar ve redaktrn yeni Trkiye'nin kurucusu iin vermeyi dnd
11. RAM, s. 12. Kendince anonim bir saymc, yukarda szn etmi olduumuz basn kuprnde akademisyenin nsz hakknda unlar yazyordu: Bayan Noelle Roger'nin yeni cildini takdim eden Bay Gabriel Hanotavc'dur. Hi kimse bunu daha fazla bir otorite ile yapamazd. Uzun zaman, Bay Gabriel Hanotaux, Fransa 'nn eski bir politika geleneini dikkate alarak kendisini Trkiye 'nin, eski Trkiye 'nin, Pierre Loti'nin ve "Desenchanitees"lerin Trkiye'sinin dostu olarak gsterdi. Eski sempatiler onun kalbinde lmemiti. O, bu halkn artc enerjisine ahit olagelen ve tarihte tek olduu sylenebilecek, kendi ayaklar zerindeki dikiliin kefini, beklenmedik yenilenmesini selamlyordu. Yeni Trkiye, geirmekte olduu bu yeni dnemde banda Mustafa Kemal ve smet Paa gibi adamlar bulduu iin inanlmaz bir ansa sahip oldu, bu kar konulmaz bireydi. Ama bunun yannda unu da belirtmek gerekir ki, ulus olarak da bu cesur reformcularn kendisinden istedikleri abay tayacak gce ve yetenee sahipti (...).

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ierik okuyucuya bu bir dizi simgesel grntlerden baka hi bir ey sunmamaktadr. lkenin radikal olarak yzn deitirecek, beklenmedik bir bakentin oluturulmas erevesinde, bilgiye12 ve modern uygarlk seviyesine duyulmam bir abayla tanan bir halk, bilime merakl devlet adam ve nihayet kadn haklarnn koruyucusu: Makaleye herbiri bu yzleri yanstan drt fotoraf elik eder: "Ankara'nn yeni semti, Yeniehir'de Gazi Bulvar" 411. sayfann st yarmn oluturmaktadr; i ksmda ise "lk kadn pilot Sabiha Gken Trkiye evresinde bir seyahat iin manevi babas Atatrk'ten izin almaktadr", 412. sayfada "Etnografya mzesi, Ankara'da Antkabir yaplana kadar Atatrk'n cenazesinin bekletilecei yer, sada nnde Ankara ehrine hakim ata binmi Atatrk heykeli olduu halkevi" Gazi'nin kiiliini bilimin ve ehirciliin gelimesine balyordu. Nihayet drdnc fotoraf 412. sayfann sol stnde ksa bir sre nce rklk zerine bir incelemesini okuduumuz Prof. Pittard ile rk ve dil zerindeki raporlar alma odasnda inceleyen Atatrk' gstermektedir. Solda, manevi kzlarndan biri, tarih retmeni Afet". Fotoraflarn alnd kaynan yokluu bizi bu fotoraflarn ya dergideki arivlerden ya da Noelle Roger tarafndan bize ulatrlan arivlerden elde edildii varsaymna gtrmektedir. Son resmin altndaki yaz, imdiye kadar grdmz unsurlar birbirine balamtr. unu belirtmek gerekir ki, Noelle Roger, Helene Dufour'un kaleminin adyd ve svire Antropoloji etdlerinin nclerinden biri olan Eugene Pittard (1867-1962) ile evliydi, 1916'dan itibaren Cenevre niversitesinde Profesr, 1901'de bu ehrin etnografya Mzesini ve 1912'de de svire Antropoloji Enstits'n kurmutu. 1949'a kadar srm olan hocal baz nemli grevlerle srm: Bilimler Fakltesinde dekan (1929-1933), Cenevre niversitesinde rektr (1940-1942)13 gibi. Eugene Pittard'in aratrmalar, Dordogne'un tarih ncesi aratrmalarndan Balkan yarmadasndaki halka ve oradan da ksakafal insanlarn buradan ayrlarak Avrupa'ya cilal ta devrini getirdiine inanlan, Kk Asya'y uyaryordu. Atatrk ise ok yakn bir slami gemi ile Yukar Asyadaki Turanclk tohumlarndan Trkiye Cumhuriyetini belli bir mesafede tutmaya alyordu. Eugene Pittard ile Noelle Roger'nin otomobil ile 1928'de Dou Anadolu'ya ok iyi koullarda gerekleen seyahatleri,
12. Noelle Roger'nin makalesinden bir nceki makalenin Becquerel'ler olarak anlan ok itibarl bir fiziki ailenin yzyllk faaliyetlerine ayrlmas bir rastlantdan ibaret olabilir mi? 13. Cenevre niversitesinin, Eugene Pittard'ca kurulan Antropoloji ve Ekoloji blmnn imdilik mdr Alain Gallay'a Eugene Pittard'n lm zerine yazlan drt yaznn basmn borluyuz ve burada ona bu deerli belge iin teekkrlerimizi sunuyoruz. Mare R. Sauter'e ait bu yazlar Actes de la Societ helvetique des sciences naturelles, 1962, p.231-235; les Archives suisses d'Anthropologie generale, XXVII. 1-2, 1962, p.1-12; les Archives des Sciences editees par la Socite de Physiue et a Histoire Naturelle de Geneve, 16/1, 1963, p.152-157. M. Lobsiger-Dellenbach, le Bulletin Annuel du Musee et Institut d'Ethnographie de la Ville de Geneve, 5, 1962, dergilerinde yaynlanmtr.

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devlet adam ile antropolog arasndaki birleme zerine dayanmt ve takip eden yllarda bu seyahat baz somut sonular getirecekti. Bir yandan Eugene Pittard, karsnn rneinden hareket ediyor ve ayn seyahati14 yazyordu, bu bilginin ilgi alan ve meraklar hissedilir biimde farkllk gsteriyordu. Her durumda, Mustafa Kemal ok ateli bir partizand, tartmasz bir bilimsel ve ahlaki otoriteye sahipti. Eer anabilimi, o zamann koullarnda titizlikle deerlendirirsek aadaki ditiramp bugn okurken biraz titreyebiliriz15: u sralar - Yunan buzlar zldnden beri- bir trk mucizesinin olduu sonucu kanlmazdr. Bu mucizeyi tm lkenin tartmasz itaat ettii istisnai bir adam yaratmtr. Mustafa Kemal Paa, Cumhuriyet diktatr, byk Halk Partisinin Bakan, Trkiye'nin kaderini elleri arasna almay, en gzel insani isteklerle bu halk yeniden yaratmay ve silahsz obanlar yardmyla bir ordu yapmay, bir lkenin ykntlaryla refah yaratmay bilmitir. Dier yandan, Eugene Pittard ve Atatrk arasndaki, Atatrk'n yaamnn son aylarna kadar devam eden konumalar, sadece Trk Tarih Toplumu Dergisinde16 bir antropolog makalesi olmakla kalmam, ayn zamanda, Afet nan tarafndan Trkiye'de yrtlm ve sonular Cenevre niversitesinde Doktora tezi olarak sunulmutur ve Eugene Pittard bakanlnda bir jri nnde savunulmutur. Sonra bu eserin son hali isvire'de17 yaynlanm ve Atatrk'n lmnden sonra
14. [PAM], Eugene Pittard, travers l'Asie Mineure. Le visage nouveau de la Turue. (...) Paris, Societ d'Editions Geographiques, Maritimes et coloniales, 1931. 15. Op. cit. s.68. Bugn, "rk" konusunda uzman bir antroplog, cumhuriyeti de olsa bir "diktatr"n vgsn yaparken, siyaset olarak namuslu olmadnn dnlmesini risk edebilir. Oysa, ikinci dnya savandan nce "diktatr" Romallarn atfettikleri anlam iinde, kltc anlam olmakszn kullanlyordu. "Irk" konusuna gelince bu, baz nl kuramclar dnda, Littre'nin deyimiyle sadece "ayn aileden gelenler" diye kabul ediliyordu. Halk niversitelerindeki hareketlerde demokrat ve insanseverlie inanm olan Eugene Pittard, ne totaliter rejimlere ne de "rk"lan hieraize eden doktrinlere sempazi duymazd. 16. Eugene Pittard, "Neolitik devirde Kk Asya ile Avrupa arasnda antropolojik mnasebetler", Belleten, H/5, 6, 1938, p.19-38, Franszca version'u ise "Les relations antropologiques entre l'Asie Mineure et l'Europe la priode neolithique... Belleten, 11/ 5-62,p.21-39. 17. Anadolu, trk "rk"nn lkesidir. Cenevre niversitesinde sosyoloji doktoru, Ankara Dil Tarih'te Prof. Trk Tarih Kurumu Bakan, Bayan Afet inan tarafndan Trkiye'nin nfusunun antropolojik zellikleri zerine yaplan aratrma (64 000 kiiye bir anket^M. Eugene Pittard'm Cenevre niversitesi Rektr nsz ile Cenevre niversitesi Ekonomik ve Sosyal Faklte Dergisi Yayn. Cenevre.

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onun ansna iki yaz yaynlanarak merhumun bilime18 katklar hatrlatlmtr. Ksaca, Atatrk'n eserlerine ve kiiliine ok aina olmayann frankofon bir okuyucu, L'Illustration dergisinin 4995 nolu saysndan u sonucu kartabilirdi. Uluslararas politik hayatndan ok deerli (sekin) bir ehre kaybolmutur, bu ehre Loti'den intikal eden tm ark hatralarndan kopuk ve phe yok ki dnn sultanlarndan ok Jules Ferry'nin fransz okulundaki retmenlerine yakndr.

#**
L'Illustration'nun 3 Aralk (4996 nolu) zel says, tamamen sonbahar Salonuna ayrlmtr. 19-21 Kasm'da olan, Atatrk'n cenaze treniyle ilgili bir yaz bulmak iin 10 Aralk tarihli 4997 sayl dergiyi beklemek gerekiyordu. Ama, bu gecikme, olaya ayrlan istisna yer ile telafi edilmitir: Parlayan19 resimlerle bezenmi drt sayfalk bir ek, "Yeni Trkiye'nin Kurucusunun Duygulu Cenazesi" bal altnda yaynlanmtr (s.491-494). On fotoraf elik etmektedir: - "Limana giden cenaze korteji stanbul Yeni Cami nnden geerken" s.491, sa st kede eyrek sayfa (foto: Engelmenn); - "Ankara'ya nakledilecek olan cenazenin stanbul limanlarna gelii" s.491. Yarm Sayfa aada, (foto: Saboh Juaye) - "stanbul'daki trenler esnasnda halkn znts (acs)" ki fotoraf, eyrek sayfa, s.492 (foto: Anadolu Ajans) - "Kortejin geiinde yal bir kadn alyor", s.492, sol alt a (foto: belli deil)
18. "Hommages la memoire d'Atatrk. Atatrk'n htrasn tazim." Belleten, III 10, 1939, p.172-182, 183-189; "Un chef d'Etat, animateur de l'antrhropologie et de la pre'histoire: Kemal Atatrk", Revue Antropologique, 49, 1939, p.5-16. Burada PAM'ns. 309'daki son cmleleriyle birok adan ok sayda fikre konu oluturan Eugene Pittard' terketmeyi neriyoruz. Bugnn sunduu tm vahim sorunlar arasnda, tm dnyada, meditasyon birliktelii, Trkiye 'nin Bat 'ya eilmesi, bana gre, her bakmdan en ereflisi olarak gzkmektedir. Trk halkna uzun seneler politik huzur, ekonomik ilerleme dilemek gerekir. Kendisine verdii grev o kadar yksektir ki, btn dncesini ve gcn uygulamaya ihtiyac vardr. Bu sadece tm iyi niyetlerin bir araya gelmesiyle gerekeir. Trkiye'nin gelecei Avrupa'y bu lkeye kar duyarsz brakmaz. 19. L'Illustration'un bu dnemdeki kullanmnda, zellikle n plana karlm drder sayfalk iki tip zel ek ayrt ediliyordu. Bir yandan helinogravrl klie defteri, "kirli beyaz" kat zerine baslm, derginin geri kalanndan daha az kaygan ve klielerin inceliine deer katan. Dier yandan, daha ar bir kat zerinde, mat yzeyli ve ptrl dizgiciliin gzelliini ortaya koyar. 4997 no.lu say eski konsey bakan, 3. Cumhuriyetin sekin simalarndan, Josephe Caillaux'nun (1863-1944) "lmsz Fransa iin" balkl makalesine ayrlmtr.

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- "Ankara sokaklarnda cenaze kortejinin geii, cenaze kllarla donatlm, yzlerce asker tarafndan tanmakta. Fonda ise, silahlar ve fransz denizcileri s.492 ve 493 te bir sayfa (foto: Anadolu Ajans) - "Ankara'da Atatrk'n naann trenli sergisi. Trk ordusunun generalleri eski eflerinin nnden resmi geit yaptlar", s.493, sadaki sayfann te ikisi, (foto: Engelmann) - "Cenaze treninden bakan Atatrk'n kz kardei' s.494, sol st adan (foto: Ali). - "Cumhurbakan nn ncsnn tabutu nnde sayg duruunda" s.494 bir ncekinin altnda, ayn boyutta, (foto: Trampus) - "Ankara etnografya mzesinde Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin kurucusunun cenazesinin sergilenmesi", s.494 aada te bir sayfa (foto: Tramplus). Bu youn resimli baskda, yaz eyrekten az yer kaplamaktadr ve ilk bakta ok dikkate alnmamaktadr. Yaz cenazenin "olgusal" anlatmdr ve dier birok kaynaktan bildiklerimiz dnda bize hibir ey retmemektedir. Yabanc delegasyon eflerinin adlarnn hatrlatlmas ve ayrca rtbelerinin bilinmesi her lkenin olaya verdii nemin bir takdiri asndan yararldr. Fransa tarafnda, deerli bir kariyere sahip20 ve o srada i ileri bakan21 olan radikal sosyalist ve 1925-26 arasnda Trkiye Cumhuriyetinde Fransz Bykelisi Albert Sarraut'nun seilmesi ok anlamldr. Ayrca bu yaznn sonnunda, ismet inn tarafndan, cenaze gnnden bir gn sonra Atatrk'n ansn selamlamak iin, millete yneltilmi bir konumann tercme edildii uzun blme zel bir nem atfetmek gerekir. Gerekte, rportajdaki diyaloglar bir kenara koyarsak, zamann fransz basnnda bu trden deklarasyonlara bu kadar yer ayrlmas ska yaplmamtr. Burada bizi ilgilendiren salam bir yaplanmayla farkedilen a iin akl banda bir ifade ve sonuta durumlara ve ilgili halka 22 uygun hitabettir .
20. Milletvekili, senatr, inhindinin 1911'den 1914'e ve 1916'dan 1919'a kadar genel guvernr, 1933'de ve 1936'da Konsey bakan ve birok kez bakan 21. zellikle dndrc ve daha sonra zerinde duracamz uluslararas politika durumu dikkate alndnda, 10 Nisan 1938'den beri Konsey bakan olan Eduard Daladier'nin kiisel olarak bu vesileyle Trkiye'ye gelmesi kolayca anlalyor. 22. Sz konusu metin yledir: Atatrk'n lml cesedi, hayatn hizmete adam olduu, sevgili milletinin saygl kollarnda ebedi istirahatine tanmtr. Atatrk, tarihinin en haksz, ve en zalim sulamasna maruz kaldmz zaman kendisini gstermitir; o tiirk ulusunun susuzluunu ve hakl davasn ilan etmitir. Onun yksek sesi ki, balangta nemini farkedememitik, tm dnyann vicdanna hibir zayflk belirtisi gstermeyen bir gle girmitir. En byk zaferleri kazandktan sonra Atatrk hayatn sadece trk milletine haklarn vermek iin geirmitir. Ulusumuzun byklne, gcne, erdemlerine, uygarla, yatknlna ve bunun kendisine getirdii insani grevlere sarslmaz bir inanc vard. Onun esas ura kt bir ynetimle ve kt bir anlayla geride braklm trk toplumunu gl ve insanln en temiz anla-

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Gerekte, eer I'Illustration'nun Atatrk'n lmne ve cenaze trenine verdii nemi takdir etmek istiyorsak iki noktann ncelikli olarak dikkate alnmas gerekmektedir. nce, karlatrlabilir durumlar ile bir karlatrma oluturulmal. Oysa bu son on yllk dnemde son derece ender grlmektedir. Doal olarak kraliyet cenazelerini ayr bir kategoriye koymak gerekmektedir: Monarik geleneklerin zerinde olan atafatl trenler 1934'de I. Albert ve 1936'da V. George'un trenleri byk savan ittifaklar dost uluslarn simgesel kiiliklerini oluturmaktadr ve bunlar snrl katklaryla kaydadeer bir politik eser brakmamlardr. Paralel olarak Polonya rnesansnn kahraman Mareal Pisudski'ye (1867-1935) nce Varova'da grkemli bir tren, daha sonra da Krakov'da bir tren yaplmtr. Bu kii, ok yksek dzeyde23 yabanc temsilci ektiyse de, L'Illustration'da bu olay24 zerine yazlm iki makale, yl sonra Atatrk iin yazlacak olana gre son derece snk kalmaktadr. Oysa, sz konusu olan Polonya hepimizin dost lkesiydi, ama yeni diplomatik gelimeler, Paris'te kukular uyandryordu25. Dier yandan, bunun iyi bir nedeni olsa da Almanya'ya ak bir biimde dmanca davranna ramen ve kzlorduya kar ortak mcadele birlii tekrar biraraya getirmi olsa da, Piltsuski'nin Avusturya Macaristan ordusundaki eylem balangc ve ne Atatrk'n hmanist idealleri ne de onun ak biyla, en mkemmelinden modern bir devlet yapmaktr. .... Onun lmnn dnyada bulduu saygy insanln gelecei iin umut verici bir belirti olarak selamlyorum. Bu szler trk milleti adna, bizim yasmza yazlaryla ve topraklarmzda valye askerleriyle ve sekin kiilikleriyle katlanlara kar, benim minnetimin ifadelerini oluturmaktadr. Esiz kahraman Atatrk, lke sana minnettardr. Hayatn adadn Trk halkyla birlikte senin nnde eiliyoruz. Hayatn boyunca, bizi ruhundaki atele canlandrdn Senin sndrlemez bir meale gibi yanan aziz hatran, emin ol, ruhlarmz daima uyank tutacaktr" Franszca asndan dzgn olsa da baz kullanmlar bu yaznn trk yneticilerce tercme edilmesinden kaynaklanmaktadr. 23. Fransz tarafnda o zamanki konsey bakan Pierre Laval ve byk savan yaayan tek maraeli Mareel Petain. Bu kiinin varl ayn savata ef olan bir kumandannn cenazesinin sz konusu olmasyla aklanmaktadr. Bu sava Fransa'da ve ngiltere'de mareal olmu Ferdinad Fosh (1851-1929)'un dirilmi Polonya'dan nc kademesini elde etmesini salamtr. L'Illustration'da yaynlanm fotoraflarda, Konsey bakan ile mareelin yan yana durmalar, sonra da nazi Almanyasnn temsilcisi Mareel Goering'in makamnda grnmeleri, garip bir ekilde dikkat ekici grnmektedir. 24. 18 Mays 1935 tarihli ve 4811 nolu say s.75'de helgravurl grntdeki tek sayfann arkas, "Polonya'nn kurtarcsnn" lmne ksa bir yaz ve biri tam sayfa fotoraf ayrmaktadr. Aslnda Normandiya yolcu gemisinin denize indirilmesine ayrlan 1 Haziran tarihli 4813 sayda, alt resimle, sadece iki sayfa Foch'un cenaze trenlerine ayrlmtr. 25. Polonya ve SSCB arasndaki saldrmazlk anlamas 25 Ocak 1932'de sonuland. Ayn yl Dileri bakan olarak atanan Albay Beck, kendi tarafnda nazi hkmetiyle bir yaknlama iine girer ve bu 26 Ocak 1934'de "karlkl silahszlanma ahlak anlamasyla ile somutlar. Fransa ise mttefikinin krmz veya kahverengi sirenlerin arksna boyun emesinden dolay endielenmitir. 12 Mays 1935'de Pilsudski ld srada Laval 1921 anlamasnn balarn kuvvetlendirmek iin -zellikle- Varova'da bulunur. Bu 3 Aralk 1937 anlamasyla yaplacaktr.

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imde destek bulduu geni halk katlmnn olmad 1926'da kurulan dikta rejimi, fransz kamu oyundaki imajnna zarar veriyordu. Dier yandan, o zamanki aktaliteyi dikkate almak gerekir. 10 Kasm 1938 tarihli I'Illustration dergisi, Mnih anlamalarndan iki ay sonra ve uygulamaya konulduunu izleyen haftalarda yaynland. Bu durum kapak fotorafndan balayarak arln koyuyordu: "ekoslovak Cumhuriyeti'nin yeni bakan Hacha" ve yasa boulmu yzler karanlk bir fon zerinde ak lekeler- Avrupa haritasndan ay sonra silineceini bildiimiz ekoslovakya bugn ok dokunakl gzkyordu. Bu megul edici aktalite Atatrk'n cenaze treni ile birleiyordu, 490. sayfadan bir nceki sayfann bal "imdiki eko-Slovak". Yukarda, geni olarak sunulmu bir paralanma haritas ve her ynden saldran bir vcut26. 495 sayfa Trk devletinin bakannn cenaze treniyle ilgili zel eki izleyen 495. sayfa bir ka giriimi srasnda ldrlen, "demir perde"nin efi "Cornelius Codreanu ile bir sylei" baln tamaktadr ve bizzat nazilerce can skc arlk olarak nitelenen rumen hareketinin kurucusunun szlerini korkun bir aknlkla vermektedir. Sonra 496 ve 497. sayfalarda "Ebre'in yeni sava" zerine bir yazya arpc hava fotoraflar elik etmektedir, bu fotoraflar o zaman 28 aydan beri sertlikle sregelen spanyol i savandaki glkleri ve bize Cumhuriyet direnmesinin son sraylarnn ay sonra sona ereceini hatrlatyordu. Daha ileride s.507-510'da, I'Illustration'nun zel muhabiri Robert Chenvier, Fhrer'in bilinmeyen bir yz mimar ve ehirci Adolf Hitler balkl rportaj d politika konusunda hi bir soruna deinmedii gibi sylei yapld kiinin konusunda da gven vermiyor27, s.511-512 "Atlantik deniz filosu" bal tayan bu iki sayfa, gerekten bu nedenle azgn denizde yol alan gl fransz gemilerinin gzel resimleriyle okuyucuyu telkin ederek bu kt izlenimleri silmeye alyordu. Silahlanma yar, topraklardaki bakaldrmalar, milliyetilik ve totaliter ideolojiler zerindeki srarlar kukusuz, 1938 sonundaki dnya yenilikleri hrnl tevik ediyordu ve bu bnyede Atatrk'n eseri, Avrupa uygarlk deerlerinin inancn canlandrabilecek bir eydi.
26. Kk yamaclar, bykler tarafndan yenilmitir, metni okurken birazda rahatszlk iinde, Gney Karpatya'daki Ruthenie'yle ilgili ar istekleri gzlemliyoruz: Polonya ve Macaristan onlar ayran dar toprak parasn kaldrmak ve ortak bir snr oluturmak istemektedir. Almanya, imdiye kadar Roma 'da ok olumlu karlanan bu projeye radikal olarak scak bakmaktadr, ama Polonya Berlin'i kendi fikrini kabul ettirmekten vazgememitir. Bir yl sonra, tarihinde beinci kez paylalan, Polonya, ekoslavakya'dan fazla topraa sahip olamayacaktr. Hi bir Macarn yaamad Ruthenie, Hitler ynetimince 1939 ilkbaharnda Budapete'deki mterisine hediye edilmitir. 27. Berchtesgaden'deki nl ikametgahnda Hitler, normalde, kendi zel fotorafsnnkinden baka objektif grmek istemezdi. Hitler, L'Illustration'un zel muhabiri Louis Deschamps'n hatrn sayarak onun rahat davranmasna izin verdi. Hitler bu derginin kendisine pek scak bakmadn bilmiyordu. Dier yandan, onun en tercih ettii bo zaman uralar zerine yapt gsterinin Robert Chenevier'yi etki altnda braktn farkediyoruz.

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NEML KLERN DERGS: LA REVUE DES DEUX MONDES 1829'da kurulmu, edebi, politik ve bilimsel bir aylk dergi, olduka ciddi grnmlyd ve kesinlikle resim iermiyordu. Bu dergi, iyi durumda, muhafazakar, sekin bir okuyucu kitlesine hitap ediyordu. Edebiyat eletirmeni Ferdinand Brunetiere (1893'den 1907'ye) ynetiminde lml bir katoliklie geen dergi, Byk savan hemen ncesinde eldeki okuyucu kitlesini biraz kaybetmekle birlikte (1914'de 40 000 bask)28 Rene Doumic (1916-1937) zamannda Action Francaise fikirlerine yaknd. Atatrk'n lmnden nceki iki ayda, dergi Rene Pinon'un sancak29 olay zerine ve 1928-1933 arasnda Ankara'da Fransz bykelilii yapm ve Trkiye'yi fevkalade tanyan Charles de Chambrun'un Gazi ile ilk karlamas zerine iki makale yaynlar30. Noelle Roger Atatrk'n lmn izleyen haftalarda, onun ansna sayg olarak geldiinde31 Trkiye, hala etkili olan bu stunlarda stn bir ekilde vard. Bu makale, yazarn 1928'de Trkiye seyahati srasndaki hatralar ile 1938 ilkbahar ve yaz esnasnda yapm olduu seyahatlerindeki izlenimlerinin bir karlatrmasyd: Ankara'nn grkemli gelimesi (s.603608), tarmsal ilerleme (s.616-618), salk (s.618-6199) ve kamu eitimindeki (s.616-623) ilerlemeler gibi... Noelle Roger makalesini, Atatrk'n lkenin bamszln, Cumhuriyet ve lkenin geleceini emanet ettii genlie hitabesinden ald geni alntlarla sonulandrlmaktadr. nemli olan, 23 sayfalk metnin bize rettiinden ok, bu yaznn nemi, bu deerli dergide igal ettii yer ve Atatrk'n ve etkin ve zengin olan sekin bir tabaka nezdinde uzun sre ve olumlu bir ekilde ynettii Kemalist Trkiye'nin imajyd. NC BR GAZETECLK: VU Bu yeniliki dergi ile az nce deindiimiz dergi arasndaki ztlk byktr. Lucien Vogel adnda biri tarafndan on yl nce kurulmu olan "Vu" dergisi, Flllustration formatna benzer bir formatta haftalk yaynla28. HGPF, s.391: [La Revue de deux Mondes] prestijini koruyordu ama akademik katklarn kalitesine ramen Rene Doumie'nin ynetiminde formln yenilemeyi bilemedi ve ada dnce akmlarnn dnda kald. 1938 Ocak'nda Andre Chaumeix des Ddbats, Doumic'in yerini alyordu fakat o da hala ok olumlu bir giriim olan bu yzyllk dergiyi canlandrmay baaramyordu. 29. "La Turquie et le sandjak d*Alexandrette", no 37, l e r fevrier 1937, p.719-720; "Les accords franco-turcs", no 46, l e r aot 1938, p.713-719. 30. "De Stamboul a Ankara. Ma premiere entrevue avec Ghazsi Mustapha Kemal", no 47, l e r octobre 1938, p.762-769. Bu makalenin yayn ile Atatrk'n salk durumundaki ktlemenin ayn zamana denk gelmesinin tamamen bir rastlant olup olmadn bilmiyoruz. 31. "La Turquie de Kemal Atatrk, Anadolu", no 48, novembre-decembre 1938, p.601623.

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nyordu ve ayn kalnlktayd32, fakat baz nemli farkllklar vard: resim nemliydi ve ierii belirliyordu; sayfa dzeni genelde artc etkileri hedef almakta, daha sonra Match, Lifew ve benzer haftalk dier dergilerde grlecei gibi, zafer "ok fotoraflar"33 sayesinde elde edilecekti. Vu ile olaylar hemen, birden snra ulayordu. Bu magazin siyasal yaamdan ok, "toplumsal olaylar" starlarn ve hkmdarlarn hayat, sansasyonlar ve politik hayatn gizemleri ile ilgileniyordu. 557 say ve 16 Kasm 1938 saysnda s. 1446-1447'de Atatrk konusunu buluyoruz. unu sylemek gerekir ki, bu dnemde, bir makalenin sol sayfadan balayp iki sayfaya yaylmas ok grlen birey deildi. Bir mesaj aktarlmas iin kullanlm teknikleri anlamaya alan bir okuyucunun bak asndan incelenirse, magazin stilinde bir zellik ortaya kmaktadr. Gz, hemen ve canl bir biimde okumann balayaca noktaya ekilmekte, sol st kede, siyah bir dikdrtgen iinde beyaz byk puntolarla iki satr olarak yazlm: "Trklerin babas" latin harfleriyle (en romain) "ld" italik olarak yer almtr. Takiben, hemen sada alt satrlk blok, itinal olarak hierarize edilmi, bir balk. nce "tandm" kk harflerle, sonra ikinci bloktan nce ikonografi izgi eklinde, Atatrk'n frakl herbiri ayn formatta (4,5x5,8 cm) sekizlik bir seri fotoraf, bir resim alt yaz olmayacak deyimlerle34 sunulmu ve solda u tanmlanyor: "stnlk, alay, aalanma, inanma: Kemal Atatrk sava sonrasnn ilk diktatr". Bu balk altnda ikinci satrda byk harflerle: "Mustafa Kemal Paa" sonra nc blokun drt satr, kelimelerin ilk harfleri koyu ve dierleri soluk byk harflerle: "Bakent Yapt Bir Kasabadaki Diktatr" yazyordu. Bir ka dakika iinde, okuyucu, belki de Atatrk hakkda ok yzeysel bir bilgiye sahiptir, onun ldn ve ok byk eyler yaptn renir ve grntler bu kii ile okuyucu arasnda ainalk yaratr. Bundan sonra, artk bak btne ynelmektedir, onun iki farkl ynn temsil eden iki byk boy resim vardr, bylece onun hakknda daha derin bilgiler elde edilebilmektedir. Sol sayfada: "Kemal Atatrk, byk harekatlarda cumhurbakan sfatyla "Trklerin Atasnn' yerini ksa bir sre nce alm olan, smet nn ile (solda) konuuyor". Gece kyafetini giymi olan manette grlen kii, arabasnda ayakta, kendisi gibi sivil olan inn'ye ve iki subaya enerjik talimatlar verirmiesine hkmetmektedir. efin otoritesini eyleme dkt bu resim, bala gre simetrik ve az yer kaplayan sa st ada yer alan ve onu gmlek32. Her iki durumda da 28 sayfa olan l'Illustration buna gnll olarak 40 sayfa kadar ilan, reklam ve karikatr ekliyordu. 33. HGPF, s. 598: Lucien Vogem 1921'de Jardin des Modes'a geri dnd. 1928'de kurduu VU ilk byk fotorafl fransz dergisiydi: Modern, helogravurle baslan bu derginin baars hemen farkedilmedi. 1938'e ait bask saysn bulamadk. ki yl nce, sahibi ile arasnda geen bir tartma Lucien Vogel'i ynetimden uzaklatrmt. Oysa Lucien Vogel dier yandan, lmne kadar l'Humanite gazetesininde redaksiyon efi olan Paul Vaillant-Couturier'nin (1892-1937) kayn pederi idi. 34. Bu fotoraflardan en azndan drd, Trkiye'de resmi arivlerde korunmad ve daha nce hi grme frsatn bulamadk.

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li ve kravatsz olarak tm sadelii ile gsteren "Kemal Atatrk halkna yakn bir diktatr oldu" alt yazl baka bir resimle dengeliydi, onu bu resimde tannm bir Trk dans olan 'zeybek'i yaparken gryoruz. Alt sol ada, son bir resim 1447. sayfann solunda, hemen hemen ortada yle bir alt yaz ile yer alyor: "Angora, obanlarn kasabas. Bugn Ankara, modern bakent, n planda, Kamu leri Bakanl". Yeilin yokluu ile daha da arlaan bu beton bloklarndaki sertlik arlasa da buradan kan fikir, imkanszn baarsdr. ki sayfann te ikisini igal eden ve bilginin younluu, kelimeler ve resim bileiminden dolay bu kadar etkili olan ikonografk mesaj burada sona ermektedir. Bu koullarda ve sayfann te birinin kapland bu yaz snrl bir neme sahip ikonografinin sanki szl bir anlatm gibiydi. Bu iin emanet edildii yazar, kendisi hakknda sylemedii hi bir eyi bilmediimiz Titanya tarafndan tutulmutu. Paris-Ankara arasn hava yoluyla onsekiz gnde yapmay baaran ve Trkiye bakentinde geirdii alt haftann unutulmaz hatralarn koruyan gen gazeteci 1924 sonunda Trkiye'de ilk rportajn yapmt. Her ne kadar buna benzer ok ey okuduysak da, grkemli bir antiye, ayn zamanda geici yaplama halinde olan bir bakent, yeni Trkiye'nin bakanlklarnn yer ald ve saygn kordiplomatiin derme atma koullarndaki yerleimi, yar uykulu kasaba olan Ankara'nn35 son derece diri tanmlamasndan zevk alnyordu. Neeli bir toplumu bir araya getiren ulus tarafndan seilmi birinin gaz lambas ile aydnlatlm sala mekannda resmi olmayan bir akam srasnda millet meclisinde Mustafa Kemal'in brosunda onunla yaplan grmelerin hikayesi, insan ve eseri, kiisel zenginliinden kan otoritesi bizzat kendi kendine muhalif olmas, ksaca bakalar gibi olmayan bu diktatrle bylenen bir Titanya'yi ortaya karyor.

#**
Bu almann banda da hatrlattmz gibi Atatrk'n lm fransz basnnda ounluun saygsn uyandrmtr. Burada sunduumuz rnekler aykrlk tekil etmemektedir. Stunlarnda onlara ayrdklar ve yararl bir lm arac olabilecek greli yer bir yana braklrsa, sonuta onlar bize Atatrk ve Trkiye hakknda bilgi vermekten ok, tr ve okuyucu kitlesi asndan ok farkl fransz sreli yaynlarnn haberi ele al anlaylar hakknda bilgi veriyor. Bu yazy, Fransz basn organlarnn daha ok monografiyi36 konu aldn grmeyi ve ayn zamanda modern Trkiye tarihinin byk ve toplumsal tarihinin karsnda e zamanl tepkilerle ilgili aratrmalarn artmasn dilemekten baka nasl sonulandrabiliriz?
35. Yine de unutulmu bir gerein hatrlatlmasn not etmek gerekir. Bu bir adamlar ehriydi, birka kyl haricinde, kadn yoktu, Avrupallar gelmeyi dnmemilerdi ve Trkler saraylarn ve ipek atlyelerinin bulunduu ehirlerde kalmlard. 36. L'Illustration veya Petit Parisien'nin konu aldklar gibi.

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VU. 557, 16.XI.1938, s. 1446.

VU.557, 16.XI.1938,s. 1447.

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VU.557, 16.XI.1938,s. 1446.

VU. 557, 16.XI.1938, s. 1447.

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VU. 557, 16.XI.1938, s. 1446.

VU. 557, 16.XI.1938, s. 1446.

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VU.557, 16.XI.1938,s. 1447.

VU. 557, 16.XI.1938,s. 1446.

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J'ai connu

VL.557. 16.XI. 1938. s. U4(-I447.

VU. 557, 16.X1.1938, s. 1446.

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VU. 557, 16.XI.1938, s. 1446.

L'Illustration, 4997, 10.XII.1938, s. 494.

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L'Illustration, 4997, 10.XH.1938, s. 494.

L'Illustration, 4997, 10.XII.1938, s. 491.

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L" Illustration, 4997, 10.XII.1938, s. 490-491.

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L'lllustration, 4997, 10.XII.1938, s. 491.

L'Illustration, 4995, 26.XU.1938, s. 412.

L'Illustration, 4995, 26.XI.1938, s. 412.

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L'Illustration, 4995, 26.XI.1938, s. 411.

L'Illustration, 4995, 26.XI.1938, s. 411.

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L'Illustration, 4997, 10.XII.1938, s. 492.

L'Illustration, 4997, 10.XII.1938, s. 492.

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L'Illustration, 4997, 10.XII.1938, s. 492-493.

L'Illustration, 4997, 10.XII.1938, s. 491.

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L'Illustration, 4995, 26.XI.1938, s. 405.

L'Hlustration, 4997, 10.XII.1938, s. 492-493.

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L'IUustration, 4997, 10.XH.1938, s. 492.

L'IUustration, 4997, 10.XH.1938, s. 492-493.

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L'Illustration, 4997, 10.XII.1938, s. 494-495.

L'Illustration, 4997, 10.XU.1938, s. 493.

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L'Illustration, 4997, 10.Xn.1938, s. 494.

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L'IMPACT DES INITIATIVES D'ATATRK SUR LA VE CULTURELLE EN TURQUIE

Prof. Dr. Gertrude DURUSOY* C'est pour moi un grand honneur de pouvoir prendre la parole devant cette assemblee dans le contexte des celebrations du 75eme anniversaire de la Republique de Turquie. Je tiens remercier les organisateurs de m'avoir donne cette occasion car s'il n'y avait pas eu Atatrk et ses reformes, personnellement, je n'aurais pas eu le courage d'epouser un Turc, de venir m'etablir a vie dans ce pays o je peux pratiquer ma foi aussi bien qu'en France. En tant que femme, et d'origine etrangere, je n'ai pas senti la moindre discrimination dans ma carriere academique. Indirectement, je le dois aux initiatives d'Atatrk qui ont pris racine dans la vie republicaine du pays. Beaucoup de nations sont fieres des figures de proue de leur histoire. La Turquie contemporaine a eu le privilege de germer d'abord dans l'esprit de Mustafa Kemal, cet homme exceptionnel et polyvalent qui lui a fak prendre, de faon resolue, la voie de l'Occident. D'autres chercheurs sont mieux qualifi6s que moi pour retracer la vie unique de ce leader; ce sur quoi je voudrais insister aujourd'hui, c'est de voir quelles sont les initiatives de cet homme d'Etat qui ont, encore de nos jours, un impact indeniable sur la vie culturelle de cette jeune republique qu'est la Turquie. II nous faut, pour ce faire, jeter un tres bref coup d'ceil sur les aspects culturels de la vie du temps de l'Empire Ottoman. Ayant pour capitale stanbul, c'est dans cette ville que battait le cceur administratif, politique et culturel de l'empire. Le sultan etait un souverain temporel en meme temps que spirituel puisqu'il etait le calife, l'autorite supreme de 1'islam. La reference a la religion d'Etat avait imprime un caractere propre la vie publique et aux coutumes du pays. Les evenements culturels d'importance (rejouissances publiques lors de la circoncision du prince heritier ou du mariage d'une princesse imperiale e t e . ) avaient done toujours lieu istanbul et l'Anatolie se sentait moins concernee. Le thetre, au sens occidental du terme, a timidement fait son entree dans l'Empire Ottoman a IsUniversit d'Ege, izmir.

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tanbul et izmir vers la moitie du XIXeme siecle mais n'a connu son veritable essor que sous la republique. Les formes traditionnelles de spectacles, le Meddah, l'Ortaoyunu ou le celebre Karagz etaient prisees du public aussi bien dans la capitale que dans les villes de province. Elles sont toutes caracterisees par l'absence de texte. La tradition orale fournit le sujet et c'est l'improvisation des acteurs qui, chaque fois, donne un caractere nouveau a la representation. Cette derniere pouvait avoir lieu dans le palais du Sultan pour lui et la Cour ou en ville, sur une place publique, pour la masse des spectateurs. Metin And, specialiste du thetre turc, resume les caracteristiques des formes traditionnelles de la maniere suivante: l'imitation est de mise, aussi bien imitation d'une action que d'une personne; les dialogues sur la scene doivent produire un contraste, de maniere que deux heros se proflent et que l'un ait la possibilite de surpasser l'autre; cte des dialogues, des chants et des danses agrementent le spectacle; grce l'improvisation l'effet de l'illusion est complet1. II en va de meme pour la musique classique. II faut attendre la Republique pour qu'un large public s'initie a la musique occidentale, si differente de la musique traditionelle turque qui continue toujours prendre sa place dans la vie culturelle du pays. Nous en reparlerons. Dej en 1934 Rene Rinon ecrivait ceci: "L'oeuvre de Mustafa Kemal est une des plus etonnantes tentatives qui aient jamais ete osees pour transformer un peuple, le rajeunir, le galvaniser et l'organiser"2. Or, le temps allait effectivement lui donner raison. Le fait que Mustafa Kemal ait choisi la bourgade d'Ankara pour en faire la capitale du nouvel Etat republicain (loi du 13 octobre 1923) temoigne de son profond desir de faire participer le pays entier toutes les reformes et activites du nouvel Etat de modele occidental. Rudolf Nadolny, ambassadeur du Illeme Reich en Turquie de 1924 1932, caracterise, dans un article publie en 1936, la personnalite du premier president de la maniere suivante: "Er ist nun einmal der Schpfer der neuen Trkei, der Nationalheld ihrer Freiheit und der spritus rector ihres Aufstiegs. Seine energisch zupackende, dabei mit Weisheit und berlegung gemischte Initiative ist die anerkannte Triebfeder aller Neuerungen, und diese haben sich bisher bevvhrt"3 Nadolny n'est pas le seul avoir fait ces observations. Avec le recul, Arnold J. Toynbee a formle ainsi la grandeur de l'impact d"Atatrk sur sa nation: "Sa politique ne consistait en rien moins qu' obtenir la conversion totale des Turcs au mode de vie occidental. Entre 1920 et 1930 il mit en ceuvre un programme, le plus revolutionnaire peut etre qu*on ait jamais applique deliberement et systematiquement dans un pays en un espace de temps aussi court. (...) En Turquie, l'emancipation de la femme, la sepa1. 2. 3. Cf. Metin And; Geleneksel Trk Tiyatrosu. Ankara, 1969. pp. 47-49. Rene Pinon: Mustafa Kemal, in: Atatrk-Pensees et Temoignages. Ankara, 1981. p. 186. Rudolf Nadolny: Die Turkische Innenpolitik unter Atatrk, in: Atatrk in deutscher Sicht, Kln, 1988, 5 eme edition, p. 19.

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ration de la religion et de l'Etat, le remplacement de 1'alphabet arabe par l'alphabet latin, furent decretes entre 1922 et 1928..."4 Edouard Herriot, horame politique franais ayant occupe plusieurs postes de ministre - entre autres celui de ministre de l'Education Nationale-, souligne en rentrant de Turquie en 1934, entre autres, la grande transformation subie dans ce domaine: "L'une des oeuvres les plus remarquables du nouveau regime est certainement celle qu'il a realisee pour l'instruction publique. La Republique proclamee le 29 octobre 1923 se trouvait en presence de deux sortes d'ecoles: les medresses - ecoles religieuses - et les etablissements d'Etat. Les medresses furent supprimes par la loi du 3 Mars 1924. Le nouveau regime se proposa de repandre une culture moderne en meme temps que laique, democratique et nationale, les cours religieux furent supprimes, l'enseignement secondaire devint gratuit et accessible a tous les merites; les jeunes filles s'instruisaient selon les memes programmes que les jeunes garons. Le regime republicain avait adopte l'alphabet latin; le Ghazi imposa cette nouvelle reforme, proceda lui-meme des demonstrations au tableau noir et provoqua un mouvement d'emulation que la loi consacrait. On dut transformer les caracteres d'impression, les signes telegraphiques, les grammaires, les dictionnaires, les enseignes, les inscriptions publiques. On estime que cette simplifcation permet aux e"coliers turcs de gagner deux annees dans l'etude de leur langue. De toute evidence, elle facilite les relations de la Turquie avec le reste de l'Europe; elle lui permettra de jouer un role actif dans la vie et la culture internationales..."5 II est evident que sur la base de telles transformations, la vie culturelle tout entiere allait prendre un essor immense que nous allons evoquer par la site. L'alphabet latin est dans l'esprit d'Atatrk le meilleur moyen d'entrer en contact avec le monde Occidental. Comment realiser cette tche? II demande en juin 1928 au ministre de l'Education Nationale de creer une commission pour l'introduction du nouvel alphabet. Voici comment Falih Rfk Atay rapporte la maniere dont Atatrk prit la decision: "When I brought the alphabet which our Commission had devised to Kemal in istanbul, he asked me what our ideas were about bringing it into use. I told him we had discussed two schemes, one involving a fifteen-year changeover period, the other a fi ve year. ( ) He looked at me and said, "This . will either happen in three months or it won't happen at ali."6 Cette energie autoritaire a permis a Mustafa Kemal de mettre en pratique sa vision d'une Turquie moderne dont nous proftons encore de nos jours. Cette maniere radicale avait un revers, la perte du contact avec les ceuvres du
4. 5. 6. Arnold J. Toynbee: Conversion la vie occidentale. in: Atatrk - Pensees et Temoignages. Ankara, 1981. p.229. Edouard Herriot ite dans: Paul Dumont: 1919-1924 La emoire du siecle. Mustafa Kemal inverte la Turauie moderne. Bruxelles, 1983. p.157/158. Falih Rfk Atay: The Atatrk I knew. Traduit par Geoffrey Levvis. stanbul. 1981. p.244

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passe", mais les avantages ainsi acquis d6passent de loin ce handicap ine"vitable. L'ecole et l'enseignement ne se bornerent pas au primaire et au secondaire, l'enseignement superieur connut du temps d'Atatrk un essor extraordinaire, meme si au debut ce ne fut qu' istanbul et Ankara. La toute nouvelle niversite d'Ankara dut ouvrir une Faculte des Lettres, denommee Faculte des Langues et d'Histoire-Geographie, marquant l'accent des priorites donner. D'ailleurs, Atatrk a instaure en dehors de 1'niversite deux institutions chargees de faire des recherches supplementaires, l'une dans le domaine de l'Histoire et l'autre dans le domaine de la langue turque. "Atatrk avait tres bien compris combien il est indispensable pour une societe nationale qu'une langue se developpe en partant de ses propres sources et selon ses propres regles et il travailla luimerae et appuya toujours ce mouvement, resultat naturel de la reforme de la langue."7 De son cte, Emre Kongar, en tant que sociologue, voit dans l'adoption radicale de l'alphabet latin le pas symboliquement le plus important dans le processus d'acquisition d'une nouvelle identite menant, quant a la creation d'une nouvelle societe, d'une nouvelle structure politique et d'une nouvelle culture8. L'acte decisif qui separa la Turquie du monde islamique et qui lui fit prendre le cap de l'occidentalisation fut la loi du 2 mars 1924 abolissant le califat. A ce propos, D.G.Osborne du Foreign Office fait les remarques suivantes: "... The Caliphate of the House of Osman is abolished and ali the members of the house are to follow the Caliph and the late Sultan into exile. it is an historical event of the first importance. Their property is to revert to the state. Justice and education are to be entirely purged of their religious associations... Kemal has alvvays been determined to make a clean sweep of ali contributory causes of the decay of the Turkish Empire and to give the ne w Turkish state a fair and fresh start... A tremendous revolution has been effected by entirely pacific means, and it is impossible not to admire the courage, determination and statesmanship of Kemal."9 Cette loi fut une revolution elle seule car le Sultan Yavuz Selim avait rapporte cette dignite d'Egypte istanbul en 1517 et par son abolition non seulement la Turquie mais tout le monde musulman se trouvait prive tout jamais de son autorite spirituelle. Ce nouvel etat de fait a eu des consequences directes sur la vie quotidienne qui n'etait plus regie par les lois de la Chariah et ce aussi bien du point de vue politique, social, civil que culturel. Dans son article du 15.3.1924 dans le Temps, Paul Gentizon evoque la portee de cette mesure radicale: "L'Europe peut etre satisfaite: l'operation que depuis l'aube du dix-neuvieme siecle elle n'avait cesse de suggeer au gouvernement ottoman est des maintenant accomplie. En trois
7. 8. 9. Commission Nationale Turque pour l'UNESCO: Atatrk Vie et (Euvre. Ankara 1981.p.227. Cf. Emre Kongar: Atatrk zerine. stanbul, 1994. 2de ed. p.91. ite dans Salh R. Sonyel: Atatrk - The Founder of Modern Turkey. Ankara, 1989. p. 107.

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jours, la Rpublique turque a realise plus de reformes que la vieille Turquie en trois siecles. Se debarrasant d'un geste brusque des dernieres entraves theocratiques, elle s'est elancee ans frein dans le sillon des idees europeennes. C'est l'ecroulement complet d'institutions que tous les penseurs et ecrivains occidentaux consideraient jusqu' hier encore comme immuables et figees. (...) La Republique turque vient en effet de couper le cordon ombilical qui la reliait aux traditions asiatiques; elle vient d'adopter en bloc tous les principes de la civilisation occidentale, sa mentalite, son ideal. Elle vient de dire definitivement: adieu l'Orient."10 Depuis 75 ans, la Republique de Turquie connait la separation de la religion et de l'Etat et cette laicite fut la base du developpement dynamique ulterieur. Une reforme en entrane une autre; le jour ferie passe du vendredi au dimanche et le sermon de la priere du vendredi n'est plus prononce en arabe mais en turc. Suat Sinanolu precise: "En 1925, c'est l'adoption du chapeau, connu comme embleme des infdeles, et la promulgation de la loi vestimentaire qui envoie au rancart les fez, tcharchafs, voiles et mille autres accessoires anachroniques."u Le 24.8.1925 on adopte les normes intemationales pour le calandrier et l'heure. On abandonne le calcul partir de l'Hegire pour adopter le calendrier gregorien occidental. La secularisation de la vie sociale a en particulier, instaure la monogamie, la o 1'islam permettait d'avoir quatre epouses. De meme, le mariage civil est rendu obligatoire et peut etre suivi du mariage religieux. Atatrk, tout en respectant le Coran, demande qu'il soit traduit en turc, il en va de meme pour l'appel la priere du mezzin. En effet, ce qui comptait pour lui, c'etait que le peuple turc soit conscient de son identite nationale dans tous les domaines de sa vie. L'etat de dependance de la langue arabe devait absolument en etre elimine. D'autre part, l'adoption du code civil suisse le 17 fevrier 1926 a permis une transition plus rapide vers le modus vivendi europeen et les coutumes occidentales; comme l'a remarque Willy Sperco: "Toute distinction juridique entre croyants et infideles disparait; tous, egaux devant la loi, sont soumis aux codes turcs dont le civil est copie entierement sur celui de la Suisse, le penal sur celui de l'Italie, le commercial sur celui de l'Allemagne."12 Les Turcs de l'Empire Ottoman utilisaient des patronymes; mais par une loi, promulguee le 21.6.1934, obligation est faite de porter un nom de famille comme dans tous les pays occidentaux. Ces innovations vont restructurer la societe turque et lui faciliter l'acces aux structures et organisations intemationales. Mais a cette epoque, la tche de Moustapha Kemal n'est guere aisee comme nous le communique H.C. Armstrong: "He had already torn up the whole political fabric, changed a monarchy
10. Paul Gentizon, ite dans: Paul Dumont: Op.cit. p.154. 11. Suat Sinanolu: Visage de la Turuie. Ankara. 1981. p. 128. 12. Willy Sperco: Moustapha Kemal Atatrk. Paris, 1958 p.135.

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into a republic, reduced an empire down to a country, made a religious State into a lay republic, ejected the Sultan, the Caliph, and repudiated ali connexion with the Otoman Empire. Now he set out to change the whole mentality of the people - their old ideas, their habits, their dress, manners, customs, ways of taking, ali the most intimate details of their lives, vvhich linked them with the past and their Oriental upbringing."13 A ce propos, Georges Duhamel qui avait vu la Turquie en 1924 et l'a revue en 1954 nous donne son opinion: "La revolution menee a bien par Mustapha Kemal et ses collaborateurs n'a pas ete purement politique: elle a touche tous les departements de la connaissance, de l'expression, des relations humaines, de l'edifcation sociale. Pour prendre la place qui lui etait due dans la communaute des peuples, la Turquie s'est ralliee, audacieusement et courageusement, a une forme de civillisation scientifique, sociale et morale qui s'est imposee depuis un siecle tous les peuples que l'on dit evoluees. La Turquie a, ans vaines hesitations, adopte le code civil, l'etat civil, le caractere romain, la methode inductive et, notamment, tous les systemes pedagogiques necessaires une nation qui entend produire des eli tes avec generosite. Les resultats obtenus en une trentaine d'annees sont de nature justifier toutes les esperances."14 Or, apres 75 ans d'existence la Republique turque peut etre fiere de ses realisations dans les domaines o Atatrk avait amerce" des innovations. En effet, toutes les reformes entreprises avaient un double but: donner aux habitants du nouvel Etat la conscience de leur identite et les rendre capables d'etre au meme niveau de civilisation que les autres Etats du monde occidental. Jean-Paul Roux n'a pas tort d'affirmer qu'au cours de l'Histoire "Le mot turc, qui n'a done valeur ni ethnique ni religieuse, n'evoque pas davantage une notion d'Etat ou de nation. A aucun moment de leur histoire, les Turcs n'ont ete tous reunis en un seul lieu, l'interieur de frontieres delimitees, sous une autorite commune."15 Atatrk a su faire prendre conscience a tout un peuple de son identite turque et non arabopersane et l'adoption de l'alphabet latin fut un instrument de choix dans cette realisation. Meme dans les campagnes, le nombre des illettres s'est mis diminuer. L'identite colleetive trouva son expression dans differentes formes de la culture et la notion de patrie prit son plein sens surtout qu' Atatrk avait trace des frontieres fixes au pays en rejetant d'emblee toute idee expansionniste. Sa devise "Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh", savoir "Paix dans le pays, Paix dans le monde" excluait toute velleite d'agrandir le territoire.
13. H.C.Armstrong: Grey Wolf. Mustafa Kemal. An intimate study of a dictator, London. 1947. 14eme ed. p.213. 14. Georges Duhamel: Prtiface Yeni Trkiye: Bir Bat Devleti, traduetion en turc par Can Ycel de La Turauie Nouvelle, Puissance d'Occident du meme auteur, en 1954, reeditee en 1998. 15. Jean-Paul Roux: Histoire des Turcs. Deux mille ans du Pacifique la Mederranee. Paris. 1984. p.22.

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Pour comprendre l'Atatrkisme dans le domaine de la vie culturelle du pays l'on peut se joindre Emre Kongar qui le considere comme "la possibilite de saisir ce qui est contemporain" et non comme une hostilite a l'Islam ni comme une admiration aveugle de l'Occident16. En l'occurrence, la creation du Conservatoire d'Etat Ankara du vivant d'Atatrk est un des exemples typiques d'innovations dont l'impact se fait encore sentir de nos jours. Les matres venaient de l'etranger si dans la branche choisie il n'y avait pas d'expert turc qualifie. II en va de meme pour le ballet, art insouponne l'epoque ottomane et qui prit son essor en Turquie en meme temps que les compositeurs du pays produisirent leurs ceuvres. L'adaptation aux formes occidentales de la culture se fait relativement vite, car tout est nouveau et offre des possibilites infinies. C'est ainsi que "L'interdit dont etaient frappes les arts figratif s sous le regime ottoman a empeche pendant des siecles la naissance d'une peinture et d'une sculpture turques. Le regime republicain a accorde l'importance requise ces deux arts..."17 Auparavant, seuls les artistes etrangers avaient la possibilite de peindre des paysages ou faire des portraits que, la plupart du temps, ils ramenaient dans leur pays d'origine. Des nos jours, certains peintres turcs jouissent d'un renom international ou vivent meme l'etranger o ils s'integrent pleinement dans les courants artistiques contemporains. Pour ce qui est des realisations architecturales, l'epoque ottomane est tres riche en chefs-d'oeuvre de styles divers que ce soient des edifces civils comme les palais, les caravanserails, les ponts, les btiments publics ou les edifices religieux tels que mosquees, medresses, btiments des fondations religieuses (vakhf) ou couvents. Avec la Republique, les architectes turcs eurent concevoir et realiser des thetres, des salles de concert, des operas, des palais de justice, des plans d'urbanisation et autres. Tout ce qui avait trait la vie publique, administrative et culturelle de la societe contemporaine se realisait dans le meme contexte que dans les autres pays du monde. Atatrk ne se lassait pas de verifier les progres accomplis dans les differents arts. Dans le cas de la musique, il a fait la remarque suivante: "J'avais lu dans Montesquieu qu'il etait impossible d'elever le niveau d'un peuple ans tenir compte de son got en musique. Rien n'est plus vrai. Voil pourquoi je me considere comme engage developper cet art. La musique faite dans ntre pays n'est pas de la musique turque. C'est une ancienne musique byzantine. Ntre musique nationale n'est faite que par les bergers, dans les villages. Mais elle aussi, il faudrait environ quatre siecles pour l'elever au niveau de l'actuelle musique occidentale. Ce erait trop attendre. C'est pourquoi nous nous efforons d'adopter la musique europeenne."18 C'est cette approche realiste et pragmatique qui est le secret du succes de la plupart des innovations prevues. Revendiquant la
16. Cf. Emre Kongar: Kltr zerine. stanbul. 1984. p.51. 17. Suat Sinanolu: op.cit.p. 186. 18. Atatrk par lui-meme. in: Atatrk. Pensees et Temoignages. Ankara, 1981. p.42.

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ne"cessite" d'&udier les ph6nomenes linguistiques par des me"thodes scientifques, Atatrk ne manque pas d'insister, encore en 1937, sur la ne"cessite de produire des ceuvres litte'raires: "L'art de dire et d'ecrire des mots, de faon susciter chez les auditeurs ou les lecteurs un puissant int6ret; d'exprimer toutes sortes d'idees et les plus grands sentiments dont le caractere d l'homme soit capable, enfin tout ce qui laisse une empreinte dans la memoire humaine, c'est la litterature. Voil pourquoi la litterature, en prose aussi bien qu'en vers, peut, tout comme la peinture et la sculpture et surtout la musique, etre conside"ree comme l'un des beauxarts"19 La technologie de l'epoque, en l'occurrence le developpement de la radio et des possibilites qu'elle offre dans la transmission du savoir et de certains arts comme la musique a toujours connu le soutien du premier president de la Republique turque. Avec Atatrk, la place de la femme dans la societe a subi des transformations impensables jusqu'alors. II etait le premier a affirmer: "Une societe qui se contente de voir un seul des sexes qui la composent s'adapter aux conditions modernes, se condamne par la rester plongee plus qu' moitie dans la faiblesse. Un peuple, s'il desire le progres et la civilisation, doit comprendre cette verite" et en tirer les conse"quences (...) Si done, ntre societe" a besoin de science et de technique, il faut qu'hommes et femmes les acquierent dans la meme mesure."20 Le diplomate argentin, Jorge Blanco Villalta, temoin oculaire pendant cinq ans de la vie en Turquie au debut de la Republique, a fait, entre autres, les observations suivantes: "Turkish women showed themselves less reluetant than men to accept modern life; they did not wait for legislation before throvving off their ancient yoke. They happily entered the ne w way of life; thousands of women took employment in various enterprises and factories; they entered the schools and penetrated every level, since no one would have dared to obstruct the will of Turkish women to emancipate themselves (...) When the Civil Code was adopted in 1926, women felt the proteetion of the law within their homes and outside them."21 Atatrk a pense qu'il etait temps d' accorder aux femmes l'egalite des droits politiques La Grande Assemblee Nationale vota en 1930 la loi permettant aux femmes turques, bien avant certaines de leurs consoeurs 22 europeennes, de voter et d'etre elues lors des eleetions municipales . En 1936, elles furent eligibles au parlement et la meme annee, vingt femmes y furent elues, representant les cireonseriptions o elles s'etaient presentees. De plus en plus, et des 1926, les femmes entrent dans la vie publique et professionnelle au meme titre que les hommes. Et Atatrk avait 6te tres fier de voir en 1937 la premiere aviatrice turque, Sabiha Gken. Par ailleurs, la o sur scene au siecle dernier les hommes avaient joue les
19. ibid. p.41. 20. ibid. p.27. 21. Jorge Blanco Villalta: Atatrk. Translated from Spanish by William Campbell. Ankara, 1982p.369. 22. Cf. Sadi Irmak: Atatrk. Bir an Al. stanbul, 1984. p.234.

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rles de femmes, la priode rpublicaine voit ddsormais les femmes en personne. Le rle de l'universite est preponderant dans l'evolution culturelle et scientifique d'une nation. Dans ce domaine aussi, l'impact des decisions d'Atatrk est encore capital pour la vie academique actuelle. La Faculte des Lettres d'Ankara, creee sur son initiative en 1935, en est un exemple frappant. En effet, son souci de permettre aux jeunes de s'ouvrir aux cultures des autres nations et celle du propre pays, dans le passe comme dans le present, est Toriine des priorites dans l'ouverture des departements de langues dans cette faculte: langue et litterature turques (y compris l'ancien turc et le turc moderne); anciennes langues et cultures de l'Asie Mineure (surtout sumerologie et hittitologie); langue urdu et culture du Pakistan; langues orientales (en particulier arabe et persan); philologie de l'lnde; philologie hongroise; philologie russe; philologie classique (grec et latin); langues germaniques; langues romanes (en particulier franais et talien). Plus tard, s'y ajouterent la sinologie et la philologie anglaise. Recemment, l'etude du japonais et de quatorze langues europeennes s'y est ajoutee. Cette faculte est encore aujourd'hui celle du pays o le plus de philologies sont representees. Les langues et l'Histoire ne sont pas les seules disciplines que favorise Atatrk. II s'attache faire progresser son pays dans tous les domaines; par consequent, il conseille d'ouvrir des facultes de medecine, d'agronomie, de droit, d'economie ete... II envoie l'etranger, aux frais de l'Etat, d'une part de jeunes enfants doues pour un art precis et, d'autre part, ceux qui savent des langues pour qu'ils y fassent des etudes les preparant s'engager au retour dans une carriere academique. Ce procede est encore en vigueur de nos jours pour que soient formes bonne ecole les assistants des nombreuses universites nouvellement creees, o le corps enseignant est deficitaire; il part du meme principe que celui des premieres annees de la Republique: gagner du temps dans la marehe vers le progres afin d'etre simultanement au meme niveau scientifique et culturel que les autres pays. En outre, l'ouverture a l'Occident fut telle que dans les premieres annees apres la mort d'Atatrk fut cree, sur 1'initiative du ministre de l'Education Nationale, Hasan li Ycel, un Bureau de Traduction o un millier d'ceuvres classiques de toutes les langues fut traduit en turc pour que le peuple puisse, lui aussi, elargir son horizon. Ce Bureau travailla de 1940 1966 mais l'habitude de traduire est restee: de nos jours, les editeurs s'efforcent de proposer leurs lecteurs les titre internationaux connus. Qu'il s'agisse de la science ou de la culture, de congres ou de festivals internationaux, la Turquie moderne a reussi a prendre sa place dans le concert des nations grce au coup de gouvernail decisif donne au bon moment par Atatrk, le fondateur de la Republique.

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ATATRK ET LA LAICITE
Dr. Xavier JACOB* Les reformes accomplies par Mustafa Kemal Atatrk au cours des quinze premieres annees de la jeune Republique Turque sont bien trop connues pour qu'il soit necessaire de les detailler une fois de plus. Je me contenterai, a titre d'introduction, de les enumerer rapidement, et ceci tout d'abord pour rappeler les faits, mais aussi pour faire mieux voir l'ampleur de l'oeuvre accomplie, en laissant voir comme vol d'oiseau un resume de ces reformes. Ensuite ce sera l'arriere-plan de ces reformes qui sera resume et les buts poursuivis en cela par le Gazi. Voici done une liste succinte de ces reformes: Le ler novembre 1922 la Grande Assemblee Nationale vote l'abolition du Sultanat, tout en maintenant le Califat; mais desormais celui-ci ne sera plus qu'une institution purement religieuse, ans autorite politique'. Le 13 octobre 1923, Ankara est proclamee capitale de la nouvelle Turquie, Le 29 octobre 1923 est proclamee la Republique et Mustafa Kemal est elu President de la Republique. Le 3 mars 1924 sons accomplies trois reformes essentielles: c'est tout d'abord l'abolition du Califat et l'expulsion de son dernier titulaire, Abdlmecit; l'abolition du Ministere des affaires religieuses et la creation de la Presidence des affaires religieuses, rattachee au Premier Ministre; et enfn l'unification de l'enseignement, rattaehant toutes les institutions scolaires au Ministere de l'education nationale, alors qu'auparavant une bonne partie de ces institutions dependaient des autorites religieuses.
Ambassade de Vatican, Ankara. Cette date du ler novembre 1922 est la date officielle de l'abolition, car c'est cette date que fut votee la loi ce sujet. Mais en realite c'est depuis le 20 avril 1920 dej, lorsque TAssemblee Nationale reunie Ankara s'etait proclamee seule autorite legitime en Turquie, que le Sultanat n'avait plus qu'une existence fantomatique.

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Le 8 avril 1924 sont supprimes les tribnaux religieux dont les principes juridiques etaient bass sur la Loi Coranique. Le 5 novembre 1925 est promulguee la loi sur le chapeau, interdisant le port du fez traditionnel et du turban. Le 30 novembre 1925 toutes les dervicheries ("tekke") sont fermees et les confreries interdites, leurs biens confisques; les titre tels que cheikh derviche ete. sont egalement supprimes. Le 30 novembre egalement est fixe au parlement le grand panneau proclamant "La souverainete appartient de faon inconditionelle et ans restriction au peuple." Alors que selon la doctrine musulmane classique la souverainete appartient Dieu seul. Le 26 decembre 1925 l'heure europe'enne et le calendrier gregorien sont introduits. Le 17 fevrier 1926 est introduit le nouveau Code Civil, pour l'elaboration duquel celui de la Suisse a servi de modele. Parmi les nouveautes apportes ainsi il faut signaler la monogamie et la liberte religieuse partir de l'ge de dix-huit ans. Les prescriptions coraniques qui ne seraient pas en harmonie avec les prescriptions du nouveau Code sont ipso facto consideYes comme caduques. (Preambule du Ministre de la Justice.) Le 10 avril 1928 les dispositions concernant la religion sont rayees de la Constitution. (L'art. 2 de la Constitution disait que la religion de l'Etat etait l'slam et selon l'art. 26 l'Etat devait veiller l'application des prescriptions de la Loi Coranique.) Le 3 novembre 1928 est votee la loi sur l'introduction du nouvel Alphabet Turc, c'est--dire l'alphabet latin; loi applicable partir du ler janvier. Le 22 janvier 1932 a lieu pour la premiere fois la lecture publique du Coran en langue turque, dans la mosquee de Yerebatan, istanbul. Le 18 juillet 1932 la Presidence des Affaires Religieuses preserit que le chant de l'Appel la priere ("Ezan") soit fait en turc. Le 21 Juin 1934 est votee la loi sur le nom de famille; quelques mois plus tard, le 24 novembre 1934, une loi speciale donne au Gazi Mustafa Kemal comme "nom de famille" celui d'Atatrk, et c'est sous ce nom qu'il entrera dans l'histoire. Le 3 decembre 1934 est votee la loi qui inerdit le port de vetements ou insignes religieux en-dehors des ceremonies religieuses; le loi est applicable partir du 13 decembre.

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Le 5 de"cembre 1934 le droit de vote, actif et passif, est accorde' aux femmes. Le 27 mai 1935 le dimanche est adopte comme jour de repos. Le 5 fevrier 1937 la laicite est offciellement introduite dans la Constitution, l'article 2. Atatrk meurt le 10 novembre 1938, a stanbul. Cette enumeration, meme si elle est un peu seche, laisse pourtant entrevoir les dimensions assez prodigieuses de ce qui e ete realise au cours d'une quinzaine d'annees. Est-ce cause de l'ampleur de ces innovations qu'elles ont ete qualifiees de "Revolution" -nklap- et non pas de "Reformes" ("Islahat")! Meme si dans les aires francophones on parle plus volontiers de "Reforme" - "Les Reformes Kemalistes". Peut-etre. Mais il existe d'autres motifs encore. En effet l'Empire Ottoman avait ertrepris depuis de longues annees des Reformes nombreuses et variees. Si les plus connues sont celles qui sont entres dans l'histoire sous le nom de "Tanzimat" faites dans la premiere moitie du XIX eme siecle, celles-ci ne sont pourtant pas les seules ni les plus anciennes. Des la fin du XVIII eme siecle les autorites gouvernementales avaient reconnu depuis longtemps les retards importants de l'Empire Ottoman face aux europeens, surtout dans le domaine militaire, et avaient done conelu la necessite de reformes ou plus exactement d'une modernisation. Et comme c'est surtout dans le domaine de l'instruetion. Ainsi, le sultan Abdlhamit Ier cree en 1773 l'Ecole Imperiale d'Ingenieurs Maritimes - "Mhendishane-i Bahri-i Hmyn". En 1795 Selim III inaugure l'Ecole Imperiale d'Ingenieurs Militaires- "Mhendishane-i Berr-i Hmyn" qui devait developper principalement rartillerie. En 1827 Mahmut II cree l'Ecole superieure de Medecine et de Chirurgie "Tphane ve Cerrahhane-i mire", qui allait devenir par la site la Faculte de Medecine. Suivent ensuite l'Ecole des sciences militaires - "Mektep-i Harbiye" (1834), ete. Avec ces deux dernieres institutions on touche dej le domaine civil; ce dernier est ensuite enrichi de l'Ecole des Arts et Metiers (1848), l'Ecole Normale pour Garons (1848). En 1862 est inauguree la premiere niversite, mais elle rencontre une forte opposition et deux annees plus tard un incendie oblige les autorites la fermer; elle rouvrira ses portes en 1870 et en 1890. En 1869 le sultan Abdlaziz cree l'Ecole Normale pour Jeunes Filles - "Darl-muallimat" - ainsi qu'une Ecole d'Art Normale pour Jeunes Filles - "Kz Sanat Okulu". ans oublier le lycee de Galatasaray - "Galatasaray Sultanisi", - egalement en 1868. Parallelement ces reformes de l'enseignement sont realisees des reformes dans l'administration. A cette fin est creee en 1838 l'Ecole d'Ad-

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ministration - "Mektep-i Mlkiye " -, qui deviendra par la site la Faculte des Sciences Politiques. D'autres reformes suivront, on ne peut les enumerer toutes; celles-ci ont ete citees a titre d'exemple pour montrer que le mouvement reformiste remonte assez loin dans le passe de l'Empire Ottoman. Pourtant toutes les mesures prises manquaient d'efficacite; c'est pour cela que les mesures de reforme se succedaient un rythme accelere, de meme que les ministres qui les proposaient. A titre d'exemple: entre les annees 1908-1914 il y a eu quinze ministres de l'Education, et entre 1919-1923 ce sont dixsept ministres qui se sont succedes la tete de ce Ministere2. De meme entre les annees 1913-1919 sont crees trois nouveaux types de Medrese pour la formation des imams, mais un seul type a pu survivre jusqu' 1923. La meme chose est vraie pour l'administration, o la surabondance de personnel et de bureaucratie etouffait l'efficacite. Une fois la Guerre de Liberation ou Guerre Turco-Grecque victorieusement finie, le Gazi se trouvait devant la tche enorme de la reorganisation du pays, qui etait "un champ de ruines", comme il l'a dit luimeme3. Constatant que les innombrables "Reformes" entreprises au cours du XIX eme et debut du XX eme siecles n'avaient pas donne les resultats escomptes, le Gazi a renonce aux "Reformes" pour recourir une "Revolution". De meme que l'Anatolie en ruines devait etre reconstruite materiellement, le pays devait egalement etre reorganise, c'est--dire reconstruit dans ses structures administratives et ideologiques. Reparer un vieux costume en y mettant une piece neuve ne servait de rien, car la piece neuve n'allait pas tenir, le costume etant trop vetuste et use. Apres la conquete de l'independance Atatrk voulait creer une Turquie nouvelle et moderne. Dej le 2 novembre 1922, done le lendemain de l'abodition du sultanat, il avait declare au correspondant du "Petit Parisien" "La nouvelle Turquie n'a aucun rapport avec l'ancienne Turquie. Le Gouvernement Ottoman est passe l'histoire. Maintenant une nouvelle Turquie est nee"4. Emre Kongar a note que la revolution kemaliste est constitue d'un dyptique: le premier volet c'est la Guerre de Liberation, et le second, ce sont les reformes ou revolutions. Si le Traite de Lausanne, signe le 24 juillet 1923, etait l'acte final de la premiere partie, la proclamation de la Republique, le 29 octobre 1923, etait l'ouverture du
2. 3. 4. Osman Ergin, "Maarif Tarihi", vol. IV, p. 1053-1054. Sylev-Deme, I, 398. Sylev-Deme, III, 72.

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deuxieme acte; et cette revolution etait avant tout politique et ide"ologique, ajoute Kongar5. Pour realiser ces projets Atatrk a ete influence de faon plus ou moins consciente par plusieurs antecedants. D'abord une influence qu'on peut qualifier de negative et que nous venons de voir: c'est le fait que les Reformes du passe avaient ete plutt steriles, qu'il fallait done recourir d'autres moyens. Ensuite aussi des antecedants positifs, qu'il faut au moins evoquer, meme si tous ne nous sont pas connus. Atatrk s'interessait beaucoup l'histoire. Tout d'abord l'histoire de la Turquie et des Turcs, tout naturellement. Mais egalement celle des autres pays, y compris celle de la France des derniers siecles, la Revolution et ses suites, bien qu'il n'avait pas beaucoup d'admiration pour Napoleon (of. Sylev-Deme. III, 123-124). Pour s'en convainere il suffit de regarder sa bibliotheque privee, o l'on peut voir un bon nombre de livres qu'il n'a pas seulement lus, mais annote"s, avec des passages soulignes ou des remarques marginales. (Pour plus de details on peut consulter les deux volumes de Grbz Tfeki "Atatrk'n okuduu Kitaplar", 303 et 493 pages, Ankara, 1983 et 1985). Atatrk savait egalement que la Revolution franaise n'etait pas restee un fait isole, mais qu'elle avait suscite des mouvements similaires en d'autres pays, meme si certains de ces mouvements ont echoue. De plus il avait sous les yeux le modele de la laicite franaise, de la separation de l'Eglise avec l'Etat qui avait ete realisee alors que lui-meme etait une officier6. Cette situation toute nouvelle et, du moins au debut, quelque peu etrange, avait donne pleine liberte" au Gouvernement dans sa legislation, et aussi l'Eglise dans son organisation. Cela ne signifie pourtant pas qu'Atatrk aie simplement copie ou imite ce qu'il avait vu ehez d'autres; d'ailleurs il n'avait pas beaucoup l'habitude de se laisser mener par d'autres. II n'a pourtant pas neglig6 de tirer proft des leons du passe7. En outre, dans l'Empire Ottoman egalement il y avait eu, dans la seconde moitie du XIXeme et au debut du XXeme siecles, des mouvements revolutionnaires, par exemple en 1876 et 1908. Mais c'est surtout dans le domaine de l'ideologie et de 1'islam que de nombreux et vifs debats
5. 6. 7. Kongar, Emre: "21. Yzylda Trkiye", p. 17-18. Atatrk, ne Salonique en 1880, avait 25 ans lorsque fut realisee en France la separation complete de l'Eglise et de l'Etat. En proposant au Parlament la separation du Califat et du Sultanat, avec l'abolition de ce dernier, le 22 novembre 1922, il a expliqu6 assez longuement que dans le passe dej, du temps des Abbasides de Bagdad et des Mamelouks en Egypte, les deux fonctions etatient separees. (Sylev-Deme, I. 287-298).

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avaient ete l'ordre du jour au cours des dernieres decennies du declin de cette Empire. Et parmi les questions disputees - famille, education, culture et technique, ete. - fgurait egalement celle des rapports entre l'Islam et l'Etat. Car il ne manquant pas de gens pour accuser l'Islam, ou plutt ce qui passait pour etre la doctrine musulmane, d'etre la cause principale ou meme unique la situation arrieree et au sous-developpement de 1'empire Ottoman, corarae Atatrk lui-meme l'a remarque8. II faut mentionner d'abord un precurseur ou franc-tireur: Ali Suavi (1939-1878). Journaliste, directeur d'ecole ete. il soutient la separation de l'Islam et de l'Etat, l'abolition du Califat, la traduetion du Coran en langue turque et la laicte". Par certains de ses propos, qui etaient inous alors, il avait non seulement fait prendre conscience de certains problemes mais egalement provoque des reactions et des de"bats dans l'opinion publique. De nombreux auteurs se mirent ensuite en debattre. Ziya Gkalp, dans un article publie en 1913 avait elasse les diverses opinions ou tendances qui etaient en presence a ce moment en "Trois Courants": le courant turquiste, le courant islamiste et enfin le courant modernites, selon une elassification adoptee par le meme Gkalp une quinzaine d'annees plus tard9. Le plus ancien de ces courants erait celui des Modernistes ou Occidentalistes. Et cela est assez comprehensible, car tres souvent le terme meme de Reforme, l'ordre du jour depuis le milieu du XIXeme siecle, etait aynonyme de modernisation ou d'occidentalisation. Selon eux, pour parvernir un relevement de l'Empire il faut avant toutes choses changer les mentalites, la faon de penser; voici la premiere reforme faire et la plus importante. Parmi les principaux representants de ce courant il faut mentionner Abdullah Cevdet, medecin et un des fondateurs du comite Union et Progres -"ttihat ve Terakki"-. Un autre representant bien connu est Tevfik Fikret, poete et opposant au regime absolutiste du sultan. Le courant islamiste s'est constitue ensuite, principalement pour reagir contre certaines propositions du premier courant, qu'ils jugeaient inadmissibles parce que incompatibles avec la doctrine islamique. Ils pronaient un retour 1'slam dans toute sa purete, avec la mise en pratique de tous les preceptes de la Loi Coranique et de tous les details de la Tradition, meme s'il faut pour cela recourir a la force de la polie, ajoutaient certains d'entre eux. Les noms les plus connus de ce mouvement sont Mustafa Sabri, qui fut quatre fois cheych-l-slam, dervi Vahdet, directeur du quotidien "Volkan", tentances reactionnaires et Sait Nursi,
8. 9. Sylev-Deme, II. 90. Titre d'un article- " Cereyan"- paru dans "Trk Yurdu", III, 35. Puis une petite broehure, parue er 1918 intitulee "Trklemek, islamlamak, Muasrlamak" - "se turquifier, s'islamiser, se moderniser".

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Toriine du mouvement des Nourdjous encore present dans la Turquie actuelle. Enfn le courant du Turquisme et Nationalisme. Importe par A. Aaolu et Yusuf Akura, de Russie, ou il avait pris naissance parmi les Turco-Tatares, et developpe Salonique autour de la revue "Gen Kalemler" - "Les Jeunes Plumes" - Ce courant soutenait chaleureusement le regime constitutionnel, dont il disait que c'etait le regime musulman authentique. Mais ses adeptes critiquerent bientt les institutions de ce regime et s'attaquaient egalement aux occidentalistes. Tout comme les deux autres courants, celui-ci egalement souffrait de scissions internes. On peut y distinguer deux groupes: les Turquistes purs, qui ventaient les traditions turques pre-islamiques d'Asie Centrale, et les Turquistes-slamistes, qui tentaient de conciller l'Occidentalisme et l'Islamisme; leur reprsentant le plus connu et le plus influant etait ce meme Ziya Gkalp, disciple de Durkheim. Ces trois courants ou Ecoles, malgre leurs differences de vue, poursuivaient pourtant tous les trois le meme but: trouver un remede aux maux dont souffrait l'Empire Ottoman depuis de nombreuses decennies. II y avait done dans la capitale ottomane un bouillonnement d'idees et de propositions la recherche de quelque panacee qui guerirait l'Empire de tous ses maux. Mais comme certaines de ces propositions ne plaisaient pas au pouvoir en place, certains de leurs tenants dont d se refugier l'etranger, en particulier en France. Entre toutes les solutions et modeles proposes et ce que fera un peu plus tard Atatrk, il y a pourtant des differences dont au moins quelquesunes meritent d'etre relevees. Si l'on regarde le modele de la Revolution franaise, on constate qu'une des differences les plus manifestes, c'est que la Revolution franaise etait une revolution sanglante; il n'est pas facile de totaliser le nombre des vietimes qu'elle a faites. Tandis que les revolutions kemalistes se sont maintenues beaucoup plus dans le domaine ideologique. II n'y a aucune comcaraison quant su nombre de vietimes. En second lieu, ceux qui, vers la fin du XIXeme siecle, se livraient des debats au sujet des moyens ou remedes pour redonner une nouvelle vigueur ce pays, avaient tous, - Occidentalites, Turquietes ou Islamistes - en vue le salut de l'Empire Ottoman qu'ils eherehaient sauver: chacun etait a la recherche des reformes qui seraient plus aptes et efficaces pour realiser ce projet. Atatrk par contre n'a plus parle de ReTormes- "Islahat"- mais de Revolution -"nklap"-, c'est--dire d'un nouveau commencement, d'un ordre nouveau, et cela dans tous les domaines: Regime,

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administration, justice, education, relations Etat-Englise, ete10. II a realise cela avec perseverance, opiniatrete, en mettant en place les innovations enumerees ci-dessus, jusqu' ce que le principe de la la'cite fut lui-meme inserit dans la constitution, le 5 fevrier 1937. Quels etaient les buts poursuivis par le Gazi en introduisant ces reformes qui etaient proprement une revolution, en particulier en insistant si fortement sur ce qui concernait la laicite? Certains auteurs, surtout dans le passe11; on voulu interpreter les reformes kemalistes dans le sens d'une declaration de guerre contre l'slam. De fait un bon nombre de ces innovations allaient l'encontre de ce qui etait considere traditionnellement comme partie integrante de l'slam authentique. Et, ajoutent-ils, Atatrk aurait ete* oppose l'slam parce que celui-ci erait un obstacle au progres et la modernisation. Mais en y regardant de faon un peu plus objeetive, il nous faut d'abord constater que la pratique religieuse n'a jamais ete interdite; on ne peut trouver aucun loi en ce sens. Les mosquees etaient toujours ouvertes et frequentees. U y a une grande difference entre le revolution kemaliste et la rvolution de Russie, qui etait presque contemporaine, ou la Revolution franaise du passe. Lors d'un entretien avec Maurice Pernot en novembre 1923, est posee la question de savoir si la politique de la nouvelle Turquie ne sera pas opposee la religion, et Atatrk repond: "Loin d'avoir une politiques opposee la religion, nous avons meme le sentiment que du point de vue religieux elle est defectueuse." Et un peu plus loin, dans le meme entretien, il precise: "La nation turque doit tre plus religieuse, c'est--dire elle doit tre religieuse en toute simplicite, veux-je dire. Tout comme je erois ma religion et la verite elle-meme, je suis egalement convaincu de cela. Elle ne comporte rien qui soit oppose a la conscience, qui soit un 12 obstacle au progres" . Ces dernieres paroles sont dej une reponse ceux qui supposent qu'Atatrk etait oppose l'slam parce qu'il voyait en lui un ennemi du progres; telle n'etait done pas son opinion. Au mois de janvier 1923, lors de son entretien avec la population d'zmir, il declare egalement: "Nos ennemis nous accusent d'etre sous l'influence de la religion et c'est ce fait qu'ils attribuent ntre situation arrieree et ntre decadence. Ceci est faux. Ntre religion n'a jamais demande que les femmes restent inferieu10. cf. plus haut p. 4 (Sylev-Deme, III, 72). 11. Fischer: "Die Neue Trkei und der islam", (1932), p.60. 12. Sylev-Deme. III, 93. - Dans le meme sens B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 412, eerit: "The besis of Kemalist religious policy was laicism, not irrelig-

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res aux hommes." Puis il continue en parlant de l'egalite entre hommes et femmes. Mais un peu plus loin, dans le meme entretien, il ajoute: "Ntre religion est la plus raisonnable et la plus naturelle, et c'est simplement pour cette raison qu'elle est venue en dernier lieu. Du fait qu'une religion est naturelle il faut ncessairement qu'elle soit conforme la raison, a la technique, la science et la logique. Ntre religion est absolument conforme tout cela"13. Meme si certaines de ces innovations allaient l'encontre de ce qui tait considere comme element essentiel de 1'slam, Atatrk ne semble pas avoir cherche eradiquer 1'islam en Turquie; si tel avait ete son but il semble qu'il aurait eu recours des moyens plus radicaux. Atatrk a parle plusieurs reprises des buts qu'il poursuivait par les mesures de lacisation, mais ans faire jamais un expose methodique et detaille ce sujet. Dans le Discours (p. 640), apres avoir mentionne l'Unification de l'enseignement, il passe l'abolition du Califat, qui etait une des mesures les plus radicales dans la voie de la laicisation, il dit tres brievement: "Nous nous rendions egalement compte de cette verite qu'il est indispensable d'assurer le relevement de la foi islamique en la degageant de la condition d'instrument politique, qu'en vertu de la coutume elle occupe depuis des siecles." Dans son allocution faite l'occasion de l'ouverture du Parlement le ler mars 1924, c'est--dire trois jours avant l'abolition du califat et l'expulsion de son dernier titulaire, Abdlmecit, les explications sont un peu plus dtaillees. Apres avoir parle de l'armee, qui a ete ecartee de la politique, le Gazi continue: "De meme, nous constatons le fait qu'il est indispensable que le foi slanique, laquelle nous sommes attaches avec conviction et dont nous sommes heureux, doit etre relevee et maintenue au-dessus de la position qui en fait un instrument politique, comme elle l'a ete depuis des siecles (applaudissements, cris de bravo!). Delivrer au plus tt et de faon definitive nos croyances et convictions, qui sont sacrees et divines, des affaires politiques et de tous les organismes politiques, qui sont compliques et versatiles et ou se manifestent des interets et convoitises de toutes sortes, est une necessite requise pour le bonheur terrestre et spirituel du peuble (applaudissements). C'est de cette faon seulement que la sublimite de la foi islamique se manifestera (tres juste!)" 14 . Un des premiers buts etait done certainement de liberer les autorites gouvernemantales de l'emprise des autorites islamiques; que celles-ci ne eherehent plus jouer un role politique, mais s'occupent uniquement des problemes concernant l'slam.
13. Sylev-Deme, II. 90 et 94. 14. Sylev-Deme, I, 348-349.

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II aurait ete possible, peut-on retorquer, pour etablir et sauvegarder cette non-immixtion des autorites islamiques, de limiter de faon claire et precise les attributions, fonctions et devoirs du Califat, ans aller jusqu' l'abolition pre et simple de cette institution. C'est bien ce qui qui avait 6te fait lors de l'abolition du Sultanat, le ler novembre 1922, tout en maintenant le Califat, qui ne devait plus avoir aucun role politique mais etre seulement une autorite religieuse. Mais apr6s que le dernier sultan-calife, Vahdettin, se fut enfui sur un navire de guerre anglais, le 16 novembre 1922, son successeur, Abdlmecit, aurait cherche s'attribuer de nouveau des fonctions politiques, en demandant de recevoir des visites de politiciens etrangers; et par son comportement, ses "sorties en grand apparat" il aurait cherche jouer un rle politique dans le pays15. Atatrk n'etait pas partisan des demimesures, dans cette question comme dans les autres, et dans un telegramme du 11 janvier 1924 smet Pacha (nn), il dit entre autres "le Calife lui-meme et le monde entier doivent savoir de faon categorique que le Califat et la charge du Califat, tels qu'ils ont ete maintenus et existaient, n'ont en realite, ni materiellement ni politiquement parlant, aucun sens et aucune raison d'etre. Le Republique turque ne peut, en se laissant influencer par des sophismes, exposer au danger son independance et son existence". Et il ajoute que si le Calife demande d'avoir des relations avec les corps offciels, "cela constitute une violation flagrante de 1'independance de la Republique". L'abolition du Califat etait done normale; Atatrk en parle avec quelques-uns de ses collaborateurs et il conelut: "Nos opinions s'accordaient sur la necessite de supprimer le Califat"16. Les motivations sont les memes: rimmixtion du Califat dans la politique et la preservation de l'autonomie totale du Gouvernement de la Republique. Le premier motif, du moins celui qui revient le plus souvent, c'etait que les autorites islamiques ne devaient plus chercher s'immiscer dans le domaine de la politique, qu'elles n'aient plus aucune autorite ni meme aucune influence en ces domaines. Mais outre ce motif de l'inde"pendance absolue du Gouvernement de la Republique, Atatrk avait egalement parle du "relevement de la foi islamique". Cette motivation, qui semble avoir etonne certains auteurs17, demande de fait eclairaissement. Pour comprendre ce que Gazi entendait par la il n'est pas inutile de glaner egalement quelques precisions dans ses discours et allocutions. L'expression en elle-meme devrait dej etre assez comprehensible: en liberant les autorites islamiques, c'est-dire pas seulement le Califat mais egalement le "elerge", de toute preoc15. Discours, 637-638. 16. Discours, 638-639. 17. Kinross, 385.

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cupation politique elles pourront se vouer plus librement aux problemes de l'slam. En outre, lorsque le probleme du Califat etait debattu dans la presse, le depute de Karahisar-i Sahip (aujourd'hui Afyon-karahisar), M. Hoca kr Efendi, avait fait de la propagande en faveur du maintien du Califat, et au mois de janvier 1923 il avait meme publie une brochure en ce sens. A cette occasion Atatrk parle des "idees absurdes que des ignorants... propagent sous le couvert de "preceptes religieux," et un peu plus loin il ajoute qu'il est necessaire de "se rendre compte de l'absurdite des idees illogiques et des preceptes impraticables qu'ils semaient a tout vent, et qu'il etait done necessaire de purifer la religion en la degageant des 'mythes'. Et il revient une fois de plus sur l'abus des eroyances religieuses en vue d'avantages politiques: "Au cours des siecles, il y eut, il existe encore aujourd'hui, tant a l'interieur qu' l'exterieur, des gens qui, profitant de l'ignorance et du fanatisme des peuples, essayent de se servir de la religion comme d'un instrument pour assurer leurs visees politiques ou leurs interets personnels"18. Le but semble done avoir 6te, d'une part, en degageant l'slam de tout engagement politique, de donner a cette institution une fonetion purement religieuse; d'autre part egalement, de prevenir que, sous le couvert de "principes musulmans" ou de "preceptes religieux" on ne puisse enseigner n'importe quoi, d'abuser les eroyants; ou encore de donner un caraetere sacre et intangible des interpretations personelles. Atatrk ne voulait done pas que des profiteurs ou parasites abusent des sentiments du peuple pour en tirer quelque avantage personnel, qu'il s'agisse d'avantages materiels ou d'ascendance politique. Ainsi, au cours d'un entretien avec la population d'zmir, le 31 janvier 1923, il declare entre autres: "...les profiteurs, se drapant dans des habits religieux, eherehent a tromper et a egarer toute la nation. Jusqu' present ils ont eherehe le faire"19. Quelques annees plus tard, en 1929, dans un entretien avec le correspondant de la "Vossische Zeitun", il precise: "afin que le peuple sache que la seule preoccupation des hommes de religion est de se rassasier ("kendi karnlarn doyurup") et qu'ils n'ont pas d'autres soucis..." 20 . Au sujet de l'exploitation de la religion des fins politiques, il dit dans le Discours (p. 672): "Si un politicien, qui n'a peut-etre jamais fait une priere dans sa vie, recommande dans ses sermons la population innocente de faire des oraisons supplementaires, la nuit, en-dehors des cinq prieres coutumieres du jour, son but demeure-t-il indechiffrable?!"

18. Discours, 552. 19. Sylev-Deme, II, 92. 20. Sylev-Deme. III, 124.

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En plus des profteurs, c'est egalement contre les ignorants et l'ignorance religieuse que le Gazi veut lutter. Au cours de l'entretien avec M. Pernot dej ite plus haut, le 29 octobre 1923, propos de la politique de la nouvelle Turquie, qui ne sera pas anti-religieuse, il ajoute: "...le fait est que dans ce peuple asiatique... il existe encore une autre religion, plus complexe, faite de croyances erronnees et superstitieuses. Mais ces ignorants, ces pauvres, seront eclaires le moment venu. Si eux ne peuvent pas marcher vers la lumiere, ils se detruisent et se condamment eux-memes. Nous les en empecherons"21. Et le 30 aot 1925, s'adressant la population de Kastamonu, il declare entre autres: "II y a eu jusqu' present des gens qui ont rouille, ont endormi le cerveau de la nation. Les superstitions qui doivent se trouver dans leurs esprits seront radicalement extirpees. Aussi longtemps qu'elles ne seront pas eliminees, il est impossible de faire parvenir la lumiere de la verite dans le cerveau. "Un peu plus loin, apres avoir parle des confre erries - "tarikat" -, il ajoute: "Je n'accepte absolument pas que de nos jours il existe dans la societe civilisee turque des gens assez primitifs pour chercher, en presence de la luminosite de la science, de la technique de la civilisation dans toute son etendue, le bonheur materiel et spirituel dans la guidance de tel ou tel cheikh". (vifs applaudissements"). Et toujours dans la meme allocution a Kastamonu, apres avoir parle" des fonctionnaires de la Presidence des Affaires religieuses, qui sont les reprsentants officiels de l'Islam turc, il ajoute: "Mais je vois un grand nombre de personnes n'ayant pas de fonction qui se revetent continuellement du meme costume. J'ai rencontre parmi ces derniers des gens tres ignorants et meme des illetres. Ce sont surtout des ignares de ce genre qui se presentent en certains endroits comme s'ils etaient les repr6sentants du peuple"22. Ce que le Gazi avait done egalement en vue, en plus de la lutte contre les profteurs, c'est aussi la lutte contre l'ignorance, contre les croyances et pratiques superstitieuses, qui sont souvent presentees comme doctrine officielle et authentique de l'Islam, par des gens ans aucune competence ni autorite, mais qui se presentent comme s'ils avaient une fonction officielle. Ce sont les "ignares de ce genre" qu'il faut denoncer et eliminer pour les remplacer par des hommes de religion cultives et connaissant bien les doctrines de l'Islam. Dans le meme but, pour former des hommes de religions qui ne soient plus des ignorants, il prevoit, dans son allocution au parlement du ler mars 1923, que pendant les mois d'ete, lorsque les ecoles sont en vacances, les imams des villages soient rassembles dans quelques vingtcinq ou trente centres, pour un stage de trois mois. Et la meme occasion
21. Sylev-Deme. , 95. 22. Sylev-Deme, II, 225.

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il annonce la creation d'une commission qui aurait pour mission d'etudier la philosophie et les sciences occidentales en vue de pouvoir etablir une comparaison avec la sagesse islamique23. C'est dans le meme but de former un "clerge" instruit qu'en automne de cette meme annee sont ouvertes dans differentes villes de Turquie une trentaine d'Ecoles pour imams-predicateurs ainsi qu'une faculte de theologie istanbul, en mai 1924. Ainsi, lorsque, l'occasion de l'abolition du Califat, Atatrk parlak de "relevement de la foi islamique", il pensait en premier lieu l'elimination des profiteurs et des ignorants, mais egalement une meilleure formation des "hommes de religion", car c'est le meilleur ou mme le seul moyen pour lutter efficacement contre l'ignorance en ce domaine. Dans la domaine de l'education du peuple, et en particulier des responsables de l'Islam, Atatrk a bien vu que l'important n'etait pas simplement d'enseigner des techniques nouvelles, venues d'Europe ou d'ailleurs, comme l'avaient voulu certains "reformateurs" dans l'Empire Ottoman du XIXeme siecle, mais de changer les mentalites, les faons de penser et de raisonner. Plusieurs fois dans ses allocutions il revient sur ce point. Dans son allocution la population d'nebolu, le 28 aout 1925, il explique que "les nations qui s'efforcent de marcher avec des mentalites moyengeuses, avec des superstitions primitives, sont vouees a la disparition, ou bien au moins etre prisonnieres et meprisees." Et il precise qu' "il est vain de s'opposer aux flots de la civilisation, celle-ci est ans pitie pour les imprudents et les rebelles"24. Et c'est pour pouvoir plus facilement realiser ce chargement de mentalite qu'il ferme les dervicheries et dissout les confrerie. En evoquant ces dernieres Kastamonu, le 30 aot 1925, il declare: "Sachez bien que la Republique Turque ne peut pas etre le pays des cheikhs, des derviches et des guides. La voie la plus juste, la plus vraie, est la voie de la civilisation"25. Mais d'autres motifs ont egalement joue un rle important dans ces mesures de lacisation. Un de ces motifs, c'est que dans un pays o vivent des citoyens appartenant des religions diverses, la liberte de conscience devient une necessite. Atatrk explique cette situation en octobre 1927, dans le Discours (pp. 556-558). II constate d'abord que dans les Constitutions de 1921 (art. 7) et de 1924(art. 26) il est prevu cju'une des attributions de la Grande Assemblee Nationale etait la mise en vigueur des prescriptions de la Loi Coranique, et qu' l'article 2 il y est dit que "la religion de l'Etat turc est l'Islam". Et il conclut: "Un Etat possedant parmi ses sujets des elements appartenant des religions differentes, qui est oblige d'agir avec justice et impartialite vis--vis de chacun d'eux... un tel Etat est oblige de respecter la liberte d'opinion et de cons23. Sylev-Deme, I, 317-318. 24. Sylev-Deme, II, 222. 25. Sylev-Deme, II, 225.

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cience"26. Et il ajoute que dej ce moment il avait voulu supprimer ces clausules, mais s'etait heurte une forte opposition; et il avait cede, "pour ne pas faire le jeu de ceux qui guettaient un pretexte pour attribuer l'expression 'Gouvernement lai'c' un sens d'irreligion". (ibid.) Un autre motif pour vouloir et realiser la laicisation, c'etait done de parvenir la liberte de conscience et de religion pour tous. Pourtant, le but principal et dernier, dans ces reformes de la laicisation comme dans toutes les autres, c'6tait de faire de la Turquie un pays civilise, moderne, d'en faire un pays qui soit au meme niveau que les autres pays modernes, qui puisse de nouveau oecuper une place honorable parmi les autres nations. C'est ce qu'il declare clairement la population de Kastamonu, le 39 aot 1925: "Le but des revolutions que nous avons faites et que nous sommes en train de faire, c'est de faire parvenir le peuple de la Republique turque a etre une societe totalement moderne et civilisee au plein sens du mot et dans tous ses aspeets. Les esprits qui ne peuvent pas accepter cette verite, il faut les eliminer"27. Et quelques jours plus tt le 28 aot 1925, nebolu, faisant allusion la modernisation du costume, en particulier la suppression du fez, il ajoute: "Le peuple turc doit montrer qu'il est civilise, egalement par son costume"28. Dans son allocution au Parlement, le ler novembre 1928, parlant de l'adoption du nouvel alphabet il declare: "Lorsque la Grande Assemblee Nationale aura decide de faon definitive l'adoption de l'alphabet turc, cela constituera de par soi-mme un pas important dans la lutte pour le relevement de ce pays"29. Et pour expliquer la population pourquoi il lui demande de changer de costume, et en particuler d'abandonner le fez, pour adopter le costume europeen, c'est de nouveau, afin de montrer me'me par son exterieur que le peuple turc fait partie du monde civilise30. Et dans le Discours (p. 675) il declare ouvertement que le fez "etait sur nos te"tes comme l'emblme de l'ignorance, du fanatisme, de la haine du progres et de la civilisation." Si un des motifs aux reformes c'est de faire de la Turquie un pays civilise, sur la voie du progres, cette civilisation elle-meme doit etre tout
26. L'Empire Ottoman se trouvait affront au meme probleme. II l'a r6solu grce au systeme des "Millet" - "Nations" - qui accordait chaque communaute religieuse une certaine liberte dans-1'administration et la legislation. 27. Sylev-Deme, II, 224. 28. Sylev-Deme, II, 220-221. 29. Sylev-Deme, I, 377. 30. Sylev-Deme. ", 220-221. - Pour l'abolition du fez, ce sont egalement des experiences personnelles penibles vecues par Atatrk lui-meme en Sicile, en France et en Bulgarie qui ont en partie contibu6 a insister sur l'importance de la tenue exterieure (cf. Kinross, pp. 31-32 et 42-43).

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d'abord un moyen pour redonner la Turquie la place qu'elle merite sur l'echiquier mondial; mais c'est egalement pour eviter que se renouvellent les catastrophes dont le pays vient de sortir. Ainsi, encore Kastamonu, le 30 aot 1925, Atatrk explique: "Nous avons connu des souffrances. La cause en est que nous n'avons pas compris la situation du monde. Ntre pensee, ntre mentalite sera ivile; nous ne donnerons pas d'importance ce que dit celui-ci ou celui-l. Nous serons civilises; nous en serons fers. Regardez l'ensemble du monde turc et musulman. Parce que leurs mentalites n'ont pas pu s'adapter la largeur et la hauteur de ce que demande la civilisation, quelles souffrances n'ont-ils pas endurees. Nous egalement, si jusqu' present nous sommes restes arrieres et la fin avons sombre dans la boue de la derniere catastrophe, c'est a cause de cela"31. Ces derniers exemples peuvent sembler n'avoir aucun rapport -ou certainement un rapport tres lointain - avec la laicite. Ils sont pourtant tres utiles pour montrer quel etait dans l'ensemble des reformes realisees par Atatrk - qu'il s'agisse de la lacisation ou des autres reformes - le but ultime, le plus important qu'il avait en vue; et c'est pour cela qu'ils ont ete evoques ici. Et ce but dernier, c'est le relevement de la Turquie, de faire de sa patrie un pays civilise, moderne qui sera au meme niveau culturel et technique que les autres pays europeens; toutes les reformes n'etaient que des moyens pour parvenir cette fin. Ainsi, dans le Discours (p. 676) il declare que l'ensemble des reformes ont ete realisees "pour prouver que ntre peuple n'est pas d'une mentalite fanatique et reactionnaire." Et dej la date du 29 octobre 1923, le jour meme de la proclamation de la Republique, il declare dans une interview M. Pernot: "...Nous voulons moderniser ntre pays. Tous nos efforts visent constituer en Turquie un Gouvernement moderne, c'est--dire occidental"32. Et le but ultime de la lacisation c'etait egalement la modernisation de la Turquie, ce n'etait pas une fin en soi. Dans ses annees de jeunesse dej, lorsqu'il etait offcier Salonique ou ailleurs, Atatrk s'etait plusieurs fois exprime en ce sens, comme le rapportent ses biographes, turcs et trangers. On pourrait, en guise de conclusion, resumer l'ensemble de ces considerations en ces quelques lignes. Par les mesures de lai'cisiation Atatrk poursuivait plusieurs buts: empecher une emprise trop forte des autorites musulmanes sur le Gouvernement, c'est--dire assurer l'autonomie totale du Gouvernement r6publicain; lutter contre ceux qui cherchent exploiter les sentiments religieux du peuple en vue d'avantages materiels ou politiques, c'est--dire lutter contre les "faux" cheikhs ou guides, et arriver former un "clerge" instruit, n'ayant plus la mentalite moyengeuse, mais une mentalite nouvelle, moderne; eliminer les croyances et prati31. Sylev-Deme. II. 216. 32. Sylev-Deme. III, 91.

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ques superstitieuses, les "mythes"33; assurer la liberte de conscience; mais en tout dernier lieu, comme but ultime: arriver a constmire une Turquie nouvelle, forte, moderne. Car, comme beaucoup d'autres avant lui, Atatrk avait constate que depuis de nombreuses decennies l'Empire Ottoman se trouvait dans un etat de regression croissante. Depuis sa jeunesse il souffrait de cette situation penible, et il revait d'une Turquie nouvelle, moderne, forte et civilisee. II connaissait les differentes theses- Nationalisme, Modernisme, Islamisme- avec leurs variantes proposees par des penseurs ottomans dans la seconde moitie du XIXeme et au debut du XXeme siecles, pour remedier a cette situtation. II avait egalement constate que les nombreuses Reformes qui avaient ete introduites dans le passe pour relever l'Empire en decadence n'avaient pas donne les resultats escomptes. II en a conclu qu'il fallait recourir des moyens plus drastiques que des reformes de detail, qu'il fallait renover l'ensemble des institutions, au lieu de "Reformes" faire des "Revolutions", comme en France et ailleurs. Une fois la Guerre de Liberation victorieusement terminee, il se mit l'oeuvre, introduisit les differentes "Revolutions" qui devaient contribuer la creation d'une Turquie moderne. Une de ces Revolutions etait la laicite. Elle n'etait qu'un moyen parmi d'autres, meme si c'est la Revolution qui est, tres souvent, le plus fortement mise en evidence.
BIBLIOGRAPfflE "Discours du Ghazi Mustafa Kemal" (octobre 1927), 677 pages, Leipzig, 1929. "Atatrk'n Sylev ve Demeleri", trois volumes, 5 eme e'dit., Ankara, 1997. Aydemir, evket Sreyya: "Tek Adam", trois volumes, Ankara, 963-65. Berkes, Niyazi: "The Developement of Secularism in Turkey", 540 p. Montreal, 1964. Ergin, Osman: "Trkiye Maarif Tarihi", cinq volumes, stanbul, 1939-1943. Fisher, Harald: "Die Neue Trkei und der islam", Kulmbach, 1932. Jaeschke, Gotthard: "Der islam inder Neuen Trkei", 1951. Kinross, Lord: "Atatrk, the Rebirth of a Nation", Londres, 1966. Kongar, Emre: "21. Yzylda Trkiye", Ankara, 1998. Lewis, Bernard: "The Emergence of Modern Turkey", 2. edit. Oxford, 1968.

33. Ici se pose naturellement la question de la definition du "mythe" et des superstitions: quelles sont les croyances ou pratiques qui entrent ou n'entrent pas dans cette catdgorie.

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SOUVENIRS ET REFLEXIONS SUR LA PERIODE POST-KEMALIENNE DE 1945 A 1954

Prof. Robert MANTRAN* Arrive en Turquie en aot 1945 venant de Beyrouth, j'ai d'abord connu Ankara: apres le survol de paysages d'apparence steppique, j'ai decouvert ce qui m'a semble une oasis de verdure, au sein de laquelle se devolappait une ville d'allure moderne, occidentale, quoique d'aspect quelque peu rigide. Demeure seulement quelques jours Ankara, je n'y ai pas alors totalement saisi la profondeur du changement d'une petite ville anatolienne en capitale d'un Etat moderne, ni fait la connaissance de personnalites turques si ce n'est, sur le conseil de mon matre Jean Deny, de Mehmed Fuad Kprl qui m'a reserve le plus amical accueil. Dans les premiers jours de septembre 1945 j'ai decouvert istanbul qui a ete pour moi une revelation passionnante. Rapidement, je me suis mis parcourir, etudier et chercher comprendre non seulement cette ville et son passe historique, mais aussi ce qui faisait la caracteristique de cette nouvelle Turquie, et j'ai pris contact avec des savants, des intellectuels, des artistes rencontres au Trkiyat Enstits, Edebiyat Fakltesi, Gzel Sanatlar Akademisi, tels Halide Edip et Abdlhak Adnan Advar, Cavit Baysun, Sabri Esat Siyavugil, Mehmed Tayyib Gkbilgin, Selim Nzhet Gerek, Sedat Hakk Eldem, Zeki Faik zer et bien d'autres. Cotte epoque se situait peu d'annees apres la mort d'Atatrk et sa succession avait ete assuree par smet nn; on etait encore dans le regime politique du parti unique, le Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; en 1938-39 la Turquie avait conforte ses liens avec la France et la Grande Bretagne, et elle avait alors recupere le sandjak d'Alexandrette qui devait devenir le Hatay. Le deroulement de la seconde guerre mondiale a ensuite entrane la Turquie dans diverses prises de position, ans pour autant qu'elle perde sa qualite de puissance neutre, sauf a l'extreme fin de la guerre: proche de la France et de la Grande Bretagne jusque'en 1940, elle s'est ensuite rapprochee d'une Allemagne victorieuse l'Ouest et conquerante en URSS, ce qui a provoque chez certains hommes politiques la tentation de la renaissance du panturquisme et du pantouranisme, tentative rapidement condamnee et vouee
* Membre de l'Institut de France, Aix-en- Provence.

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l'e'chec. En 1943 s'est produit un retournement d'attitude qui a conduit a des relations plus affirmees avec les Etats Unis et la Grande Bretagne, pour finalement aboutir au debut de 1945 une declaration de guerre L'AUemagne et a la participation a la creation de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Cette periode de guerre a pee lourdement sur les finances de la Republique, a entrane une hausse considerable du cot de la vie et un developpement du "marche noir"; pour y remedier, un impt exceptionnel, le varlk vergisi, a ete institue sur les biens des individus , impt qui a pee surtout sur les non-musulmans et sur les etrangers residant en Turquie. L'immediate apres-guerre, que j'ai vecue istanbul, a ete marquee par un certain nombre de faits caracteristiques qui n'ont pas pour la plupart suivi la ligne politique instauree par Mustafa Kemal. Pourtant un certain consensus de l'opinion s'est manifeste et je l'ai constate sur place: en depit du fait que la ville ait ete dechue de son role de capitale, que l'attention de Mustafa Kemal et d'smet nn se soit portee avant tout sur Ankara, qu'un rigoureux systeme policier se ft etendu sur la ite, il n'en demeure pas moins que le regime kemaliste avait recueilli l'approbation de la population, malgre l'absence d'une veritable democratie, et que les milieux qui, par leurs traditions ou leur education, auraient pu se montrer reticents ou regretter "l'ancien temps" (la Republique n'est alors gee que de moins de vingt-cinq), ont effectivement adopte le nouveau regime politique, meme si celui-ci a pu leur apparatre parfois excessif dans divers domaines. Neamoins bien des Stambouliotes, notamment dans les milieux intellectuels, artistiques et economiques, ne peuvent s'empecher de considerer avec quelque condescendance la petite ville "provinciale" que demeure leurs yeux Ankara; et de fait cette epoque istanbul est bien la premiere ville intellectuelle du pays (I'Universite d'Ankara est de creation toute recente), ses peintres, ses musiciens n'ont pas de rivaux dans la capitale et l'essentiel de la vie economique a pour base istanbul. Mais c'est dans les relations exterieures que des problemes ont surgi, remettant en cause certains principes et aspects de la politique etrangere de Mustafa Kemal, pacifiste, sinon neutraliste. De fait, la fin de l'hiver 1944-45, le gouvemement sovietique, tres critique de l'attitude progermanique de la Turquie en 1941-42, abroge le traite d'amitie et de nonagression conclu entre les deux pays en 1925 et renouvele en 1931, et emet des revendications: restitution des provinces de Kars et d'Ardahan, cession d'une partie de la Thrace orientale a la Bulgarie (entree dans l'orbite sovietique), revision de la Convention de Montreux sur les Detroits et demandant en outre l'installation de bases militaires sur ceux-ci. Toutes ces demandes sont rejetees par le gouvemement turc qui cherche un appui plus marque des Etats Unis. A la site des pressions americaines qui s'exercent partir de l'ete 1945 et qui poussent a l'instauration en Turquie d'un regime plus ouvert, plus democratique, plus liberal, des per-

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sonnalites politiques turques se lancent dans une critique virulente de l'autoritarisme, du dirigisme et de l'absence de concertation du Parti Republicain du Peuple, et quatre d'entre elles, dont Mehmed Fuad Kprl, fondent en janvier 1946 le Parti Democrate (d'autres partis ont ete crees la meme epoque); celui-ci recueille l'opinion favorable des milieux intellectuels et economiques, en particulier istanbul o il est soutenu par le journal Vatan d'Ahmed Emin Yalman. Le systeme du parti unique voulu par Mustafa Kemal est done abandonne, ainsi que celui des candidats aux eleetions designes par ce parti. C'est dans ces cireonstances que l'Union Sovi6tique renouvelle au cours de l'hiver 1945-46, de faon imperative, ses exigences precedentes, et que des propagandistes tures communistes appuient ces revendications, ce qui provoque des manifestations de reaction violente, istanbul en particulier o les bureaux et les imprimeries des journaux procommunistes ou de gauche sont saccags, et le gouvemement turc interdit toute propagande, toute action communiste. Peu apres, au printemps 1946, on peut voir arriver a istanbul des navires de guerre americains parmi lesquels le cuirasse Missouri et le porte-avions Leyte qui jettent l'ancre dans le Bosphore, hauteur de Dolmabahe, demonstration impressionnante qui calme les ardeurs sovietiques. Desormais, la Turquie va rallier le camp occidental, ce qui s'est coneretise ulterieurement par l'adhesion la doctrine Truman, la conelusion d'un accord de cooperation militaire tureo-americain (septembre 1947), l'entree dans l'Organisation de cooperation economique europeenne (1948), l'envoi d'un corps expeditionnaire en Coree (1950) et en 1952 l'admission l'Organisation du Traite de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN/NATO) dont une des bases navales est ensuite etablia a izmir. Cette politique pro-occidentale est, dans l'ensemble, conforme celle qui a dte suivie par Mustafa Kemal, meme si, dans les annees 30 il avait plutt insist6 sur la notion d'amitie et de non-agression avec les pays 6trangers. On retrouve cet aspect un peu plus tard, lorsque le Parti Democrate arrive au pouvoir, dans la conelusion du Pacte Balkanique avec la Grece et la Yougoslavie (1953), puis du Pacte de Bagdad avec I'Iran, Firak, le Pakistan et la Grande Bretagne (1955), ce qui replace la Turquie dans une position eminenment diplomatico-strategique, largement voulue et soutenue par la politique de "containment" des Etats Unis. Sur le plan interieur, le systeme kemaliste subit aussi des atteintes dans plusieurs domaines, a partir de 1946 et surtout de 1950. c'est d'abord, ainsi que je l'ai dej signale, l'abandon du monopartisme et l'emergence du Parti Democrate, d'inspiration liberale: les eleetions de juin 1946, trop proches de sa creation, ne donnent celui-ci qu'un nombre limite de sieges la Grande Assemblee Nationale (64, contre 395 au P.R.P. et 6 des independants), mais 18 sieges sur 27 istanbul, signe de la contestation par cette ville de la preeminence d'Ankara. Au cours des 389

ann6es suivantes, le P.R.P. s'efforce d'assouplir son action en democratisant ses structures (election des principaux responsables au lieu de la designation par le president du Parti, role plus important donne aux sections locales, Maisons du Peuple consacrees desormais des tches culturelles et non plus des relais politiques) ce qui lui permet de gagner quelque audience dans le pays. Durant la meme periode, le Parti Democrate, dont la ligne politique est encore trop floue, connat des oppositions internes dues aux partisans d'un conservatisme affirme qui finalement quittent le P.D. et fondent le Parti de la Nation dont l'une des figures les plus marquantes est le marechal Fevzi akmak, brillant acteur de la Guerre d'Independance. Les dirigeants du Parti Democrate mettent alors au point un programme liberal largement diffuse dans toute la Turquie l'occasion de la campagne pour les elections prevues en mai 1950: suppression des monopoles d'Etat, liberte d'action et soutien aux entreprises privees, diminution des impts, budget equilibre, aide aux agriculteurs, pouvoir judiciaire plus affirme et independant du gouvernement, toutes propositions eloignees des principes du kemalisme. Le P.D. est concurrence sur sa droite par le Parti de la Nation qui prne un liberalisme encore plus accentue et surtout des mesures caracteristiques en faveur de la pratique religieuse. La campagne electorale de 1950, que j ' a i suivie avec attention, s'est deroulee dans un climat exceptionnel de participation. d'enthousiasme et l'on sentait vraiment qu'un vent de democratie soufflait alors sur la Turquie: de fait, il y eut 90 % de votants. Me trouvant la veille du scrutin, le 13 mai, dans le bureau du Consul Gen6ral de France istanbul, Louis Lagarde, fin connaisseur du Proche Orient et surtout de la Turquie, celui-ci m'a annonce pour le lendemain un bouleversement complet de la situation politique du pays, avec une imposante majorite pour le P.D. Effectivement, le resultat fut, pour beaucoup, une norme surprise: le P.D. remportait 420 sieges, le P.R.P. 63 et le Parti de la Nation 1. C'etait une veritable revolution, et smet nn accepta ans reticence le changement pere, estimant que, depuis 72 ans, la Turquie avait pas a pas fait l'apprentissage de la democratie, meme durant la periode de gouvernement autoritaire d'Atatrk, car celui-ci avait petit petit introduit chez les Turcs une education politique qui se manifestait desormais au grand jour. smet nn abandonna done la prsidence de la Republique et a sa place acceda Djell Bayar, tandis qu'Adnan Menderes devenait premier ministre et Mehmed Fuad Kprl ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. A ce point de la situation, on pourrait avancer que le regime politique institu6 par Mustafa Kemal avait vecu, ne correspondant plus aux aspirations des Turcs, lasses par un gouvernement autoritaire sur lequel ils n'avaient pas prise (et l'echec anterieur du parti liberal de Fethi Okyar etait l pour le prouver), e"crases par une machine economique dirigee direetement par les plus hautes instances politiques, meme si les ressources

390

et les productions du pays e"taient desormais le bien des Turcs, mme si des progres sensibles avaient ete effectues. L'avenement du Parti Democrate a considerablement modifie les donnees economiques de la Turquie; les aides aux agriculteurs, la mecanisation extremement rapide de l'agriculture, 1'eleVation du prix paye pour certains produits, comme le ble et le coton, favorisent l'essor de la production agraire; le capital prive ctoie ou remplace le capital d'Etat dans les investissements industriels et commerants, les banques se multiplient. Une activite debordante se manifeste dans toutes les villes, en particulier istanbul -mais parfois de faon intempestive et irrealiste- et il est incontestable qu'alors la cooperation americaine a pee d'un grand poids, notamment dans les domaines industriel et militaire et dans le developpement des voies de communication, par exemple dans le sud et le nord-est du pays: la Turquie constitue une base strategique face une eventuelle menace sovietique (on est a ce moment en pleine "guerre froide") et elle a montre son engagement dans le camp occidental plus d'une reprise apres 1950. Un autre point demande etre souligne. Durant la presidence d'Atatrk et jusqu'aux lendemains de la guerre, la laicite avait ete 6rigee en doctrine incontoumable et la religion, ecart6e de toute intervention dans la gestion de l'Etat, etait devenue un fait avant tout personnel. Si, dans les campagnes plus ou moins retirees, la pratique religieuse continuait, il n'en etait pas de meme dans les villes et je me souviens qu'en 1945 les grandes mosquees d'Istanbul apparaissaient etrangement vides, mme l'occasion des grandes fetes musulmanes. On peut toutefois se demander si, en depit des efforts accomplis pour repandre l'instruction et les principes du regime republicain, en de nombreux points du pays le concept de laicite avait reellement penetre et si le mot et le principe moral de "Republique" avait un sens pour bien des gens en dehors des notions d'appartenance un pays dote de ce titre, de defense de la nation et de respect pour la personne d'Atatrk. II est certain que ce principe de laicite ne suffsait pas remplacer celui de religion, fondement du comportement de beaucoup d'individus qui n'appreciaient pas les restrictions sinon imposes, du moins montrees comme necessaires pour la liberation des citoyens. A cet sujet, un temoignage significatif a ete la publication du livre de Mahmud Makal, instituteur envoye dans un village d'Anatolie centrale, dans lequel il decrit les problemes auxquels il s'est trouve confronte, dont quelquesuns d'essence religieuse (Bizim Ky, 1950). Le P.D. a pris conscience de cette situation et dans son programme electoral, outre les aides multiples aux pay ans -qui representent encore la majorite de la population- figurent des mesures en faveur de la religion et de sa pratique: enseignement religieux dans les ecoles, developpement de la Faculte de theologie d'Ankara, autorisation de construction de mosquees, tolerance envers les confreries religieuses, toutes propositions qui lui attirerent des suffrages. 391

Certains leaders musulmans, au lendemain des elections, penserent qu'il n'y avait plus de frein a leur action et outrepasserent en paroles et en actes les limites supposes: le gouvernement de Menderes dut calmer energiquement les ardeurs de ces propagandistes. Incontestablement, la politique laique de Mustafa Kemal etait serieusement battue en breche et si certaines dispositions ne furent pas remises en question, il n'en demeurait pas moins que l'on assistait a un renouveau de la pratique islamique; de fait, j'ai pu constater qu'en 1954 les grandes mosquees autrefois vides etaient maintenant remplies de fdeles lors des grandes cremonies, mais aussi dans les occasions journalieres. Et si on a pu avancer que Mustafa Kemal, par ses reformes rompant brutalement avec la tradition religieuse, avait envisage la creation d'un "islam turc" (ainsi que me l'avait confe un de ses anciens secretaires), l'engouement pour la religion partir de 1950 montrait qu'en ce domaine il avait echoue, ou bien qu'il lui avait manque du temps pour introduire une eventuelle reforme. ans insister sur d'autres aspects apparus apres 1950, comme l'appui apporte l'etude de l'histoire de l'Empire ottoman et non plus seulement celle des peuples turcs anciens, voire des Seldjoukides, l'ouverture des Archives ottomanes (et je dois ce sujet rendre hommage au souvenir d'mer Ltfi Barkan qui m'en a revele les arcanes et a Midhat Sertolu qui m'en a facilite la consultation), on pourrait considerer que l'arrivee au pourvoir du Parti Democrate constitue un retour en arriere. [En fait, il apparat que si, en grande majorite, des reformes devaient etre apportees, celles-ci n'auraient pu etre conues ni etre mises en application ans l'evolution des esprits ans l'essor donne par Atatrk au developpement des idees, ans l'existence de milieux intellectuels qui avaient pu aquerir connaissances et sens critique. Mais alors qu'Atatrk pouvait imposer ses choix, les dirigeants du Parti Democrate ont use d'une tactique electoraliste avant tout, correspondant certainement une demande de liberalisation emanant d'une bonne partie de la population; les transformations, les innovations apportees par le P.D. ont, jusqu'en 1954, ete approuvees par la grande majorite des Turcs et le succes du Parti aux elections de 1954 en a ete un temoignage. La site, helas, ne devait pas etre aussi glorieuse... J'ajouterai qu'en matiere de politique etrangere, le P.D. a d prendre en compte les changements intervenus depuis la fin de la guerre dans les pays balkaniques et que, en raison du probleme de ses relations tendues avec l'URSS, les rapports avec les pays communistes des Balkans ne pouvaient qu'etre froids; ils furent meme tres difficiles avec la Bulgarie lorsque celle-ci entreprit en 1951 d'expulser des milliers de Turcs installes depuis des generations dans ce pays. L'attitude restrictive du marechal Tito en Yougoslovie vis--vis de l'URSS, les communes prises de position des Grecs et des Turcs et le soutien americain contribuerent la conclusion en 1953 d'un Pacte balkanique, lointain souvenir, mais bien

392

different, du Pacte balkanique de 1934, et qui ne devait d'ailleurs connatre qu'une breve existence. De mme on peut souligner la conclusion du Pacte de Bagdad en 1955, territorialement comparable au Pacte de Saadabad de 1937, mais d'inspiration anglo-americaine et lui aussi d'une duree limitee. En ce qui concerne les relations avec les pays arabes, il faut noter la constante reticence des Syriens, en raison de la cession aux Turcs du sandjak d'Alexandrette, les contacts peu approfondis avec les autres pays arabes du Proche Orient et surtout la reconnaissance de facto de l'Etat d'Israel, la Turquie etant alors le seul pays musulman avoir fait ce geste. Trop de souvenirs reciproques d'un passe mal vecu, trop de contentieux non tranches mettaient des obstacles des relations franches et ouverteset, de ce point de vue, on retrouve, en gros, la politique de Mustafa Kemal qui n'avait pas oublie l'attitude hostile des pays arabes pendant la premiere guerre mondiale. En outre, la politique laique de la Turquie ne facilitait pas le rapprochement, meme si l'effort de modernisation entrepris par Atatrk et surtout sa politique independante etaient soulignes: mais n'oublions pas qu'avant 1939 les Etats arabes etaient sous le contrle direct des Anglais et des Franais. Je me souviens que, quelques annees plus tard, me trouvant en Tunisie, le directeur des Archives tunisiennes m'avait declare combien il admirait l'oeuvre d'Atatrk, mais, avait-il ajoute, "quel dommage qu'il ait ete athee". Dans cette mme Tunisie, Habib Bourguiba s'est, dans certains domaines, inspire des reformes d'Atatrk. Et il n'est pas interdit de penser que les principes initiaux du Parti Ba'as de Syrie et d'Irak et que diverses reformes introduites par Nasser en Egypte ont pu etre inspires par les actions d'Atatrk. Enfin, aujourd'hui encore, on ne peut nier que, meme s'il y a eu une eVolution des idees politiques en Turquie, la mystique du kemalisme n'est pas absente et qu'elle constitue un principe moral, un fondement absolu de la Turquie contemporaine.

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LA REPUBLIQUE DE TURQUIE: LA VOIE DE LA PUISSANCE REGIONALE

Prof. Jacgues THOBIE* II paratrait particulierement incongru de vouloir apprecier, notamment en matiere de politique exterieure, l'oeuvre de Kemal Atatrk l'aune des evenements qui ont suivi sa disparition en 1938, et plus encore de la situation presente, 75 ans apres la proclamation de la Republique de Turquie; cet exercice, on se demande bien quel homme d'Etat, si grand fut-il, pourrait ans dommage tirer son epingle du jeu. En revanche, il est possible d'essayer d'apprecier, en se referant aux principes poses par le fondateur de la Republique pour la gestion de la politique etrangere du pays, et sa vision generale des relations internationales, dans quelle mesure ses successeurs ont pu, dans le foisonnement evenementiel pour une large part imprevisible, s'inspirer de l'heritage transmis, dont la conservation meme implique de necessaires adaptations. Tel est l'objectif de ce court essai et des quelques reflexions qui vont suivre. Les principes commandant la politique de la Republique, notamment vis--vis de son proche environnement international, tiennent ans doute, pour une bonne part la conjoncture du moment, mais ils ont incontestablement, pour Mustafa Kemal, une valeur plus generale. La norme fondamentale est celle de la souverainete nationale. Relatant les discussions qu'il avait eues Samsun, en 1919, avec quelques amis, Atatrk declare en 19270 "II n'y avait qu'une seule resolution prendre, celle de creer un nouvel Etat turc, base sur la souverainete nationale et jouissant d'une independance ans reserve ni restriction aucune"1. II en decoulait qu'une fois fondee dans des limites aussi proches que possible des exigences du Pacte National -tel est l'objet, entre autres, du traite de Lausanne- la nouvelle Turquie menerait une politique pacifique, impli2 quant l'abandon des ideologies panottomanistes, panislamistes et pantouranistes.
* 1. 2. Viry-Chatillon. Discours du Gazi Mustafa Kemal, president de la Republigue turque, octobre 1927, traduction franaise, K.F. Koler Verlag, Leipzig, 1929, p. 8. Ceci va de pair avec la mise en place d'un Etat lajue.

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En effet, le besoin et le dsir de paix sont correlatifs au principe de souverainet6 nationale. Le vigoureux raccourci "Paix dans le pays, paix dans le monde"3 souligne le realisme kemaliste en matiere de politique exterieure, celle-ci devant etre proportionne'e la capacite emanant du dynamisme inteme de l'Etat: "La politique exterieure est en etroite relation avec la structure interne de la societe, car la politique exterieure qui ne prend pas appui sur la structure interne est vouee a l'echec. Plus la structure interne d'une societe' est solide, plus sa politique exte"rieure est ferme et puissante"4. Mais la volonte de montrer sa place dans le concert international passe par 'etablissement et le maintien de la paix: "Ntre politique etrangere, franche et loyale, est fonde"e en premier lieu sur l'idee de paix. Chercher resoudre un probleme international par des moyens pacifques est une voie conforme nos interets et ntre mentalite"5, declare Mustafa Kemal en 1929. La Turquie s'engage done, sur le plan international, ne jamais employer la force pour faire aboutir une revendication6. Dans le droit fil de ces principes, Mustafa Kemal nourrit de grands espoirs dans la securite colleetive, soit globale, en inte'grant la Societe des Nations en 1932, soit regionale avec le Pacte de Saadabad, en 1937. Tels sont done les principes qui guident les decisions de la jeune Republique de Turquie. II faut remarquer que le pays, disons en 1929, la meilleure annee entre 1923 et 1940, avec ses 15 millions d'habitants, son PIB global estime 977 millions de dollars, soit 69 dollars par habitant, , peine remis des epuisantes consequences de la Grande Guerre et de la guerre d'independance, et bientt atteinte par la grande crise, doit songer d'abord, ainsi que l'a recommande le president, a affermir les bases interieures de la puissance. Or, sept decennies plus tard, grce ans doute sa magnifique position geostrategique et des evolutions conjoncturelles economiques et politiques souvent favorables, mais en meme temps dans la foulee des normes posees par le fondateur de la Republique, la Turquie se trouve propulsee dans la voie, fortement convoitee, de la puissance regionale. La presentation de quelques indicateurs, tant economiques que politiques, nous aideront mesurer le ehemin pareouru. I. LA METAMORPHOSE INTERIEURE L'evolution demographique est dans une large mesure influencee par les transformations economiques et les conditions de vie. De 1927 a 1998, la population de la Turquie s'est pratiquement multipliee par cinq, passant de 13 pres de 65 millions d'habitant. Cette remarquable pro3. 4. 5. 6. Exprimee en 1931, cette sentence de Mustafa Kemal a ete choisie comme devise par le Turkish Daily News. Cette r6flexion date de 1923. Citations de Mustafa Kemal Atatrk (runies et traduites par Akil Aksan), MAE turc, pp. 112-113. Id.,p. 115. La promesse fut tenue, et pour la rdcuperation de la pleine souverainete sur les D6troits (Accords de Montreux de 1936), et pour l'annexion du Hatay en 1939.

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gression a suivi, pour l'essentiel, l'evolution classique d'un pays en voie d'industrialisation. Durant les deux premieres decennies de la Republique, le taux de croissance a stagne autour de 2%, resultat d'une forte natalite et d'une forte mortalite, et durant les annees de guerre, les incertitudes de l'avenir et les restrictions de toutes sortes, ont fait baisser le taux de croissance de moitie, 1.05%. Remonte plus de 2.1% des la deuxieme moitie des annees 1940, le taux de croissance annuel va s'envoler, des annees 1950 au milieu des annees 1970, entre 2.5 et 2.7%, avec un record dans la deuxieme moitie des annees 1950 , 2.85% C'est une periode d'intense industrialisation, o les taux de mortalite, notamment le taux de mortalite' infantile, sont en baisse constante, alors que la natalite continue de se maintenir a un taux eleve. La chute du taux de croissance demographique de la seconde moitie des annees, aux environs de 1.7%, chiffre encore considerable, compare ceux des pays europeens. Encore faut-il noter une notable difference dans les structures demographiques entre l'Est et l'Ouest du pays. Ainsi, dans les annees 1970, "60% des menages du pays, essentiellement dans l'Anatolie de l'Ouest et dans les villes, pratiquaient dej plus ou moins la restriction volontaire des naissances, la natalite restant dans l'Est totalement incontrlee"7. Par exemple, le nombre d'enfants par femme, qui etait de 5.4 pour l'ensemble de la Turquie, de 3.9 en milieu urbain et de 4.3 dans les villages de l'Ouest, s'elevait 7.4 en Anatolie orientale. Cette evolution demographique s'est accompagnee de deux phenomenes qu'ont egalement connus, a des degres divers, les autres pays europeens: l'urbanisation et l'emigration. La Turquie n'echappe pas au mouvement contemporain generalise d'urbanisation de la planete. En 1927, la population urbaine etait de 20.3% de la population totale8. Le transfert du trop plein des campagnes vers les villes s'est amorce au cours des annees 1950: "Le taux d'accroissement des villes a ete deux trois fois superieur a celui de la population rurale pour chaque periode intercensitaire entre 1950 et 1980, date apres laquelle la population rurale a commence de9 cliner en chiffres absolus" . Aujourd'hui, 70% des Turcs habitent en ville, de la ville petite et moyenne la capitale regionale, de la capitle a la megapole d'Istanbul. Quant l'emigration, nee de la pression demographique et de l'urbanisation, elle s'est developpee massivement et durablement de 1961 1973, vers l'Europe occidentale, surtout en Allemagne, plus limitee et provisoire, partir de 1974, en direction des pays du Golfe
7. 8. Xavier de Planhol, Les nations du prophete, Fayard, 1993, p. 738. Sauf indications contraires, toutes les statisticjues non commerciales de ce papier sont tirees de Trkiye istatistik yll, Devlet statistik Enstits Matbaas, Ankara Kasm, pour les annees correspondantes. Sauf indications contraires, nos remarques commerciales proviennent de ntre etde basee sur la publication statistique annuelle de VInternational Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade. Marcel Bazin, "Urbanisation et systemes urbains au Proche-orient", dans Revue geographique de l'Est, septembre 1997, p. 117. Voir sur le meme sujet, CEMOTI, Metropoles et metropolisation, n 24, juillet-ddcembre 1997, 320pages.

9.

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et de la Libye10. Si les capacites spatiales et economiques d'absorption d'un supplement de"mographique restent encore ouvertes, il est cependant probable que la baisse du taux de croissance de la population se confirmera dans les anne"es venir. L'economie, productrice de richesse, constitue la base essentielle de la puissance. La position geographique, les richesses humaines et naturelles, les echanges internationaux, jouent cet egard un rle de premier plan, mais la coherence et le dynamisme du developpement viennent de la politique economique. Or, en quelques decennies, la Turquie est passde du statut de pays peu developpe celui de pays industrialise. Dans quelle mesure les choix de la periode kemaliste ont-ils nourri et accompagne les grandes options concemant l'economie du pays apres la seconde guerre mondiale? En matiere d'economie, on peut dire que le kemalisme est un pragmatisme, avec le passage de la tentation liberale a l'etatisme economique. Et cette dualite d'approche trace, en quelque sorte, les strategies venir. Ainsi, le Congres economique d'zmir, en 1923, preconise plutt le maintien, du moins pour quelques annees, de l'economie liberale, mais la volonte d'industrialiser le pays, pour en raffermir l'independance, menera au choix, a partir de 1929, d'une politique de substitution aux importations, impliquant des investissements auxquels seul l'Etat pouvait faire face, faute d'une accumulation privee suffisante. Ainsi sont mises en place, ans souci de rentabilite, les grandes infrastructures necessaires au demarrage de l'industrialisation: ans etre veritablement favorable l'experience turque, la grande crise ne fera que renforcer l'option etatique, relayee sur ce point par la deuxieme guerre mondiale, o l'on vit apparatre une accumulation proprement turque du capital. Les debuts de la planification visent a donner le maximum d'effcacite a un systeme destine permettre de combler, autant qu'il est possible, le retard economique accumule, et constitue, selon l'heureuse formle de Salgur Kanal, un "capitalisme de rattrapage d'Etat". II faut toutefois noter que cet "etatisme economique" ne vise nullement a la disparition d'un secteur prive, toujours en place, mais dont l'evolution n'entre pas dans les options prioritaires de l'Etat. L'introduction par les Democrates, a partir de 1950, d'un liberalisme economique prematre et mal encadre (1'"etatisme liberal"), mais aussi la fin d'une conjoncture favorable apres 1952, aboutissent une grave crise economico-financiere la fin des annees 1950 et entranent, apres le coup d'Etat militaire de 1960, le retour la strategie de substitution aux importations et la mise en place de trois plans quinquennaux. Ce developpement de l'experience kemaliste des annee 1930, dans une conjoncture naturellement nouvelle, va conforter la vocation industrielle de la Turquie
10. Alain Jund, Paul Dumont, Stephan de Tapia (sous la direction de), Enjeux de l'immigration turque en Europe, L'Harmattan, 1995, p. 304.

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pendant une quinzaine d'annees, mais l'essoufflement de ce systeme et la crise petrollere de 1973-74, vont declencher, la fin des annees 1970, une crise des paiements exteYieurs liee une grave penurie de devises, exigeant l'adoption d'une nouvelle strate'gie conomique fonde"e sur les objectifs suivants: l'ouverture de l'economie turque au commerce mondial travers le developpement des exportations de biens et services pour "couvrir une plus large part des importations necessaires au renforcement de la modernisation et de l'industrialisation du pays" et aussi de permettre aux mecanismes du marche et la concurrence internationale de jouer "un rle plus important dans l'affectation des ressources, dans la lutte contre les comportements routiniers et dans l'introduction des innovations"11. Des reformes de grande envergure destinees la liberalisation des echanges, la promotion des exportations et la privatisation de larges pans de l'economie sont depuis lors mises en place. Cette integration progressive de l'economie du pays au marche mondial et la division internationale du travail semble s'effectuer, ans evi ter un cot social fort lourd, d'une maniere plus souple et plus efficace que dans la plupart des anciens pays socialistes la sovietique. Ainsi, en s'appuyant sur les potentialites internes du pays, mais aussi en utilisant d'importantes aides financieres exterieures, comme l'aide Marshall et les retombees economiques de la participation a l'Alliance atlantique, travers la mise en place, sur un front alors pionnier, d'une economie du developpement, et son adaptation necessaire la conjoncture internationale, la Turquie republicaine modernise ses infrastructures, mecanise son agriculture, et installe industries lourdes et manufacturieres, lui permettant d'acceder a part entiere, au milieu des annees 1980, la civilisation industrielle'2. En depit des difficultes et des rechutes, tous les indicateurs convergent la hausse sur le long terme. Le PNB par habitant es estime (aux taux de change courants) 69 $ en 1929, 200 $ en 1945, 400 $ en 1970, 1390 $ en 1980, 1790 $ en 1991 et 3.016 en 1996; en parite du pouvoir d'achat, les chiffres sont plus optimistes, 1634 $ 1975, 3327 $ en 1885, 4840 $ en 1991, 6133 $ en 1996, mais la progression est comparable. Ainsi, pour ne pas multiplier les chiffres et pour nous appuyer sur des statistiques coherentes, notons qu'entre 1975 et 1996, le PNB par habitant a ete multiplie par 3.513, ce qui correspond
11. Salgur Kanal, "La place de la Turquie dans la division internationale du travail", dans la Revue du monde musulman et de la Mediterranee, numero 50, sous la responsabilite de Daniel Panzac, intitule "Turquie, la croisee des chemins", Edisud, 1988, p. 158. 12. Jasques Thobie et Jean-Louis Bacque-Grammont (publi6s par), L'accession de la Turquie la civilisation industrielle, Actes du colloque d'istanbul 2-4 decembre 1985, Isis, Istanbul-Paris, 1987, 235 pages. 13. Pourcentage comparable celui de la France, mais avec une pression demographique considerablement plus forte. Sur les 175 pays de la planete, la Turquie vient au 70e rang pour 1' "indicateur de dveloppement humain" (PNUD), au 62e rang pour le PIB par habitant parite du pouvoir d'achat, au 17e rang pour le PIB global parite du pouvoir d'achat (Etatdu monde 1998, La Decouverte, 1997, pp. 644-662).

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une croissance annuelle moyenne de 3%. Pendant la mme periode, le taux de croissance annuel moyen du PNB global avoisine les 6%, de quoi faire rever nombre de vieux pays industriels europeens. Pour 1997, prix constants, le PIB global a progresse de 7.2%, et le PNB de 8%14. La performance est particulierement remarquable, avec un net decollage partir de 1980, en ce qui concerne le commerce exterieur de la Turquie. Entre 1970 et 1996, alors que la valeur (en dollars courants) des exportations mondiales est multipliee par 20, la valeur des exportations turques est multipliee par 36; pour les importations, leur valeur mondiale est multipliee par 18, et celle des importations turques par 46. II en decoule naturellement d'importantes augmentations de parts de marche. L'evolution de la nature des marchandises importees et exportees n'en est pas moins signifcative. Alors que jusqu' la fin des annees 1960, la Turquie exporte essentiellement des produits primaires, agricoles et miniers, les produits manufactures prennent alors de plus en plus d'ampleur dans ses echanges commerciaux (tant l'exportation qu' l'importation) avec les pays industrialises de l'OCDE. Ainsi, les echanges entre ces pays et la Turquie "se font produits manufactures contre produits manufactures, et non comme auparavant produits primaires contre produits manufactures"15. Ces derniers passent le cap des 50% dans les exportations de la Turquie au millieu des annees 1980 et frlent aujourd'hui les 70%. Son commerce avec des pays moins avances se situe, en revanche, entre l'ancien et le nouveau modele des echanges. Ces performances economiques, somme toute fort honorables, ont permis, avec des aides exterieures, notamment celle des Etats-Unis apres 1945, le maintien et le developpement d'une armee nombreuse (autour de 600.000 hommes) et assez bien equipee, l'une des plus puissantes de la region. Or, cette armee qui, ans remonter 1908, a joue un rle de premier plan, travers la guerre de Liberation, dans la mise en place de la Republique, se considere, et est largement reconnue, comme la depositaire de la legitimite kemaliste, garante de l'integrite territoriale, de l'unite nationale et de la lacite de l'Etat. Elle s'estime done en droit d'intervenir dans le processus de demoeratisation politique, ouvert par l'introduction du multipartisme en 1946 et par l'experience de l'alternance avec le succes des Democrates en 1950. Ainsi, trois reprises, dans des conditions tres specifques, en mai 1960, en mars 1971 et en septembre 1980, l'appareil militaire, estimant la republique en danger, interrompra pour un temps le fonetionnement des institutions democratiques, mais ces episodes autoritaires se termineront a chaque fois par le retour, selon des modalites diverses, un re"gime constitutionnel fonde sur le multipartisme et
14. Internet, Devlet istatistik Enstits, 31.3.1998, p. 2. 15. Salgur Kanal, Jacques Thobie, "Le commerce de la Turquie avec l'Europe depuis 1923", dans inan Kra'a Armaan, Galatasaray niversitesi Yaynlar, Ankara, 1994, p. 132.

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la dmocratie parlementaire. Depuis 1983, les hautes instances militaires continuent de jouer un effcace rle politique travers l'action du Conseil national de securite (MGK), qui a obtenu, en juin 1997, la demission du gouvernement majorite islarniste de M. Necmettin Erbakan, puis la formation du cabinet de coalition dirie par M. Ylmaz, et la dissolution du Refah Partisi. Notons enfn que dans le cadre de la formation du complexe militaro-industriel, l'armee s'est constitue'e un domaine conomique non negligeable16. n. LES AMBITIONS REGIONALES Disposant d'une population nombreuse et industrieuse, d'un potentiel economique en reguliere croissance, d'une armee solide, la Turquie, seule ou dans le cadre de relations exterieures privilegiees, mene une politique regionale tres active, dont nous voudrions ici presenter les atouts et aussi les diffcultes. Les espoirs nourris par Mustafa Kemal vis--vis de la securite collective se sont concretises, pour la Turquie d'apres guerre, par son rle de membre fondateur de l'ONU et par son adhesion l'Alliance atlantique, fondement intangible de la politique exterieure de la Turquie depuis 1952. ans doute des ombres etaient-elles apparues dans les relations entre la Turquie et les Etats-Unis, sur les contraintes de l'alliance, notamment autour du probleme chypriote, mais la persistance de la guerre froide contribuait figer les situations regionales, interdisant Ankara toute initiative. L'implosion de l'URSS et la disparition de son glacis europ6en, la naissance de nouvelles republiques independantes, en Europe et en Asie, ont ouvert la voie, pour la Turquie, l'exploitation plus effcace de sa magnifque position geostrategique, et au developpement d'une politique rdgionale a la fois plus volontariste et plus differenciee. A. LA TURQUIE ET VEUROPE 1. La Turquie et l'Union Europeenne ans tre une fixation, la volonte d'obtenir l'integration de la Turquie l'Union europeenne reste un objectif strategique d'Ankara: "L'adhesion l'U.E. reste pour nous un objectif tres important, mais ce n'est pas pour nous une obsession" declare smail Cem, minis7 tre rurc des Affaires etrangeres, le 5 mai 1998' . Et comment pourraitil en 8tre autrement, lorsque, outre de solides arguments histori16. Voir par exemple Michel Bozdemir, "Une nouvelle forme de complexe militaroindustriel", dans Pouvoirs, n 34, 1985 et "Societe ivile versus societ6 militaire en Turquie", dans Jacques Thobie, Salgur Kanal, Industrialisation, communication et rapports sociata en Turquie et en Mediterranee orientale, L'Harmattan, 1994, p. 401-413. 17. A la confrence-debat du Comite France-Turquie sur "La Turquie, la France et l'Europe", Bulletin du Comite France-Turquie, n 8, mai 1998, p. 4.

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ques18, l'on observe l'evolution du commerce exterieur de la Turquie; depuis les debuts de la Republique, la Turquie a constamment effectue plus de 50% de son commerce avec l'Europe occidentale. Pour ne s'en tenir qu'aux 25 dernieres annees, on constate une evolution parallele des importations et des exportations turques avec les quinze pay s de l'actuelle Union europeenne: au debut des annees 1970, ces pays comptent pour 52% dans les exportations et 55% dans les importations de la Turquie; les pourcentages se tassent un peu du milieu des annees 1970 au milieu des annees 1980, en liaison avec la crise petroliere, les efforts d'Ankara se portant vers les pays arabes fournisseurs de petrole. Une remontee significative se confirme partir de 1987-1988, les pourcentages atteignant, en 1996, 52% pour les exportations et 59.4% pour les importations. Que la Turquie soit d'Europe, voil qui ne fait aucun doute, en tout cas pour la France. Associee la Communaute europeenne des 1963, candidate malheureuse l'integration en 1987, membre de l'Union douaniere depuis janvier 1996, la Turquie fut justement ulceree par le sommet europeen de Luxembourg, en decembre 1997, qui decida d'engager une procedure d'adhesion avec onze pays, y compris Chypre, ans y comprendre la Turquie. Si l'on peut regretter le style, il y a aussi des arguments de fond. Lors de la reunion precitee du Comite France-Turquie, le ministre franais delegue aux Affaires europe"ennes, Pierre Moscovici, apres avoir fortement reaffirme la vocation europeenne de la Turquie, rappelle "la position constante des Quinze" selon laquelle "les conditions politiques (et economiques) permettant d'envisager les negociations d'adhesion ne sont pas reunies". Le ministre souligne que "la Turquie sera jugee sur la base des memes criteres que les pays candidats", et ajoute qu'en ce qui concerne "la poursuite de la democratisation et le respect des droits de 1'homme, les progres, dans le domaine de l'Etat de droit sont lents et leur traduction concrete encore trop faible du point de vue europeen... Naturellement, nous savons que pour les autorites turques la question n'est pas de repondre aux exigences de l'Union, mais bien aux aspirations de sa propre societe ivile et aux necessites de la Turquie. C'est la une demarche normale et naturelle"19.
18. ans insister sur l'assise europeenne de l'Empire ottoman, on peut se referer la tradition kemaliste. Mustafa Kemal aimait repeter que le modele de la Turquie etait l'Europe occidentale et il en faisait sa pratique: developpement, notamment avec l'Allemagne, d'un commerce mutuellement avantageux, mais recherche de l'alliance politique avec les democraties, 1'Angleterre et la France. 19. Bulletin ite du Comite France-Turguie, pp. 6-7. P. Moscovici enchane: "Nous serions de pietres Europeens si nous considerions que ces questions ne concernent que la Turquie. Si nous agissions ainsi, comment croire que nous proposons un contrat de vie commune? Je le dis avec force: le jour o nous ne denoncerions pas les cas de torture ou de disparitions, le jour o nous ne criticjuerions pas les coups portes la liberte de la presse ou aux libertes politiques et judiciaires, en Turquie comme dans d'autres pays qui aspirent adhdrer l'Union, je pense par exemple la Slovaquie, ce jour-l nous aurions renonce construire un avenir commun. Je dis cela en toute serenite et en toute amitie smail Cem, qui appartient, comme moi, la famille politique du socialisme democratique".

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D'autre part, le Conseil europen n'a pas ferme" la porte, mais defini "une strategie pour preparer la Turquie a l'adhesion", qui consiste "en un developpement des potentialites de l'accord d'Ankara, un approfondissement de 1'Union douaniere, une mise en oeuvre de la cooperation financiere et la participation certains programmes et agences communautaires". Dans ce contexte, P. Moscovici appelle "renouer le fil du dialogue", son collegue . Cem lui ay ant en quelque sorte repondu par avance: "La Turquie a cesse d'etre un pays peripherique de l'Europe. Elle devient un pays qui est au coeur de l'Eurasie. Oui, nous sommes Europeens, nous avons des liens speciaux avec l'Europe, nous faisons partie de l'Union douaniere et esperons faire partie de l'U.E... Nous ne sommes pas "ancres" sur le Conseil de Luxembourg, nous voulons arriver un nouveau compromis, nous voulons que nos rapports avec l'U.E. soient tres positifs". Cela annonait ans doute le rapport remis, le 20 juillet 1998, au gouvermement autrichien, qui preside alors l'U.E., comportant des suggestions pour relancer et developper les relations entre la Turquie et l'U.E. Ankara attend d'abord de l'Union que lui soient verses les 400 millions de dollars promis dans le cadre de l'accord d'union douaniere et actuellement bloques par un veto grec20. Souhaitons que cette tentative turque de reprise du dialogue ave l'U.E. soit bien accueillie Bruxelles. 2. La Turauie et l'autre Europe (Centrale et Balkanique) Cette region a acquis pour la Turquie une importance particuliere apres le rejet du socialisme sovietique et la desintegration de la Yougoslavie. A dire vrai, ntre critere commercial concernant les douze pays europeens hors de l'U.E. (et ans les pays de l'URSS-CEI), n'est guere encourageant. Tant les importations que les exportations turques, qui comptaient autour de 15% du commerce total jusqu'au debut des annees 1980, ont vu leur pourcentage ensuite regulierement baisser, pour stagner ces dernieres annees a 5 ou 6%. La cooperation concertee entre la Turquie et les pays de l'Association europeenne de libre echange (AELE), qui est entree en vigueur le ler avril 1992 n'apporta que des resultats decourageants. La Turquie fut associee, des sa creation, a la Banque europeenne pour la reconstruction et le developpement (BERD), destinee aider les economies des pays de l'Est, et qui est entree en fonction le 16 avril 1991. Le gouvernement turc, qui possede 1.15% du capital de la banque, entend ainsi participer aux appels d'offre pour les entrepreneurs turcs et favoriser la participation de frmes turques aux investissements dans les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale. Temoins d'un reel dynamisme, on note quelques cas de delocalisation industrielle, dans le secteur du textile, en Roumanie et en Pologne. Depuis sept ans, et bien que portant sur des sommes modestes, les exportations turques sont en progres en Bulgarie,
20. Nicole Pope, "La Turquie tente une reprise du dialogue avec l'Union europeenne", Le Monde, 28.7.1998.

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en Yougoslavie et en Pologne, et les importations de Bulgarie, de Roumanie et de Tcheco (slovaquie) montrent une tendance la hausse, mais il est ans doute trop tt pour dire si cette croissance sera durable. La Turquie a cherche a la fois avec determination et prudence, tirer parti de la nouvelle configuration balkanique. Rassuree sur le ort de la minorite turque de Bulgarie, la Turquie a signe avec ce pays plusieurs accords bilateraux, y compris un "Trake d'amitie, de bon voisinage, de cooperation et de securite". Ce fut egalement le cas avec l'Albanie et la Roumanie. Le gouvemement et l'opinion turcs se sont interesses de tres pres la crise Yougoslave: des fevrier 1992, la Turquie a recommu l'independance de la Slovenie, de la Croatie, de la Bosnie-Herzezovine et de la Macedoine, et etabli avec ces pays des relations diplomatiques, particulierement chaleureuses avec la Macedoine21. Ankara a suivi de pres les affaires bosniaques: des avril 1993, la Turquie envoie une fregate pour les patrouilles de l'OTAN en Adriatique, et 16 chasseurs pour participation au contrle de la No Fly Zone; Ankara ayant enfn obtenu, apres dix-huit mois d'attente, le feu vert des Etats-Unis, commencent se deployer sur le terrain, en juin 1994, les 1500 soldats turcs de la Force de protection des Nations-Unies (FORPRONU)22, qui passeront, la paix revenue, dans la Force chargee de l'application des accords de Dayton (novembre 1995), dans le cadre de l'OTAN (IFOR). Cette politique dynamique n'est que moyennement appreciee par le voisin grec, avec lequel la Turquie nourrit un copieux contentieux: affaire chypriote, eaux territoriales, espace aerien, plateau continental, Union europeenne, notamment. Au demeurant, la politique balkanique de la Turquie n'est pas liee a des nostalgies imperiales, mais bien plutt, dans la pre tradition kemaliste, au souci d'exercer une influence sur un espace geographique qu'elle souhaite stable et paisible, et qui est son passage oblige vers l'Europe occidentale. Faut-il en voir un debut de concretisation, dans cette reunion "historique" d'Heraclion, en Crete, o se sont retrouves, les 3 et 4 novembre 1997, les chefs d'Etat et de gouvermement de sept pays des Balkans (Albanie, Bulgarie, Grece, Macedoine, Roumanie, Turquie, Yougaslavie) plus le representant de la Bosnie. Soucieux, dans une optique "d'integration europeenne et euro-atlantique", de transformer leur region "en un espace de cooperation et de prosperite 6conomique", les participants ce sommet se sont engages a "respecter l'integrite territoriale des Etats et le reglement pacifique des differends"23. Acceptons-en l'augure.
21. Internet, Turkey, "Relations with the Balkan Countries", 13.4.1998, page unique. 22. Turkish Daily News (desormais T.D.N.) notamment les 23 et 25.6.1994. Voir egalement dans ce meme journal, Tartcle de Adnan alayan, "Turkey exerts its influence in the Balkans", le 19.7.1994. 23. Didier Kuntz, "Huit pays des Balkans s'engagent renforcer la stabilite de la region", Le Monde, 6.11.1997.

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3. La Turquie et la mer Noire L'initiative turque remonte Y\& 1990, quand la commission turque des Affaires 6trangeres met sur le chantier un projet destini faire acc6der une nouvelle dimension les relations 6conomiques entre les pays ctiers de la mer Noire: Turquie, URSS, Roumanie, Bulgarie, Le projet a ete stimule par la bonne tenue des relations commerciales entre la Turquie et l'URSS: les exportations croissent de 105% entre 1983 et 1989, font un bond de 96% entre 1989 et 1990, et encore un progres de 15% en 1991; les chiffres sont encore plus spectaculaires pour les importations: +253% entre 1983 et 1989, +156% entre 1989 et 1990, +57% encore en 1991; entre 1983 et 1991, les exportations vers l'URSS passent de 2.4% 4.5% du total des exportations turques, et les importations d'URSS, de 1.3% 9.2%. Un document de base est etudie Moscou, en juillet 1991. Les evenements de la fin de l'annee vont entraner un elargissement du projet. La "Declaration du Bosphore" portant creation de l'aire de Cooperation economique de la mer Noire (CEMN) est paraphee stanbul, le 3 janvier 1992, par les ministres des Affaires etrangeres de neuf pays. Elle fut signee, au sommet d'istanbul, le 25 juin 1992, par onze pays: la Turquie, la Bulgarie, la Roumanie, l'Ukraine, la Russie, la Moldavie, la Georgie, l'Azerbadjan, l'Armnie, et deux nouveaux venus, l'Albanie et la Grece. Ce texte de dix-huit articles, reprenant les principes de l'Acte final d'Helsinki, se donne pour but de garantir la paix, la stabilite et la prospe"rit en mer Noire, et promet une cooperation ouverte et souple dans un tres large champ d'activite: transports, energie, tourisme, sante, minerais et siderurgie, agroalimentaire, midecine veterinaire, informations economiques, Quelques mois plus tard, tous les elements sont mis en place en vue de la creation d'une Banque de commerce exterieur et d'investissement de la mer Noire, et des groupes de travail fonctionnent. Cette organisation, dont le siege est stanbul, est bien accuellie en Turquie o la presse, dans son ensemble, celebre le prestige interaational qu'en retire le pays, et les espoirs de developpement des regions attardees de la mer Noire. En realite, presque rien de concret n'a ete rdalise: la crise economique qui mine durablement les pays de l'ancienne URSS et ses anciens satellites europeens, le manque de disponibilites financieres et l'inexistence d'un investissement exterieur, le dumping russe prejudiciable certains secteurs 6conomiques turcs, poussent l'immobilisme. Et la visite Moscou du president Demirel, en decembre 1996, l'occasion du troisieme24 sommet de la CEMN25, ne suffira pas debloquer la situation. Pourtant les relations commerciales entre la Turquie et ses partenaires de la CEMN sont plutt encourageantes: entre 1989 et 1996, les ex24. Le second sonunet de la CEMN s'est tenu Thessalonique. 25. Internet, MFA, "turkish-Russian Relations", 13.4.1998, p. 1.

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portations turques dans cette zone ont ete multiplies par 6 et les importations par 4.5, les pourcentages respectifs par rapport au commerce total de la Turquie, passant de 4 12.6% aux exportations et de 5 9% aux importations26. Quelles sont done les causes de ce pietinement de la CEMN et comment serait-il possible d'y remedier? Deux raisons paraissent determinantes. La premiere tient au comportement des deux plus importantes puissances de la region: la Turquie et la Russie se soucient plus, presentement, de soigner leurs relations economiques bilaterales, qui se presentent du reste sous des auspices plutt favorables27, que de jouer les incitateurs et les pilotes pour leurs partenaires de la mer Noire. La seconde raison tient au manque de capitaux; ne conviendrait-il pas de rendre operationnelle cette Banque d'investissement de la CEMN, une toute petite partie du capital initial n'ayant jusqu'ici ete versee que par quelques participants. On pourrait alors commencer par le commencement, organiser des informations mutuelles, sous formes d'expositions par exemple, pour analyser le potentiel de chaque membre et apprecier dans quels secteurs ils sont complementaires ou en concurrence, organiser des zones de libre echanges, stimuler par des programmes adaptes, le tourisme, la communication, les transports, l'import-export28. Alors ans doute la CEMN deviendrait-elle attractive pour le capital etranger, conjoneture indispensable a la viabilite de cette seduisante organisation29. II faudra neanmoins patienter encore un peu pour voir, selon la belle formle d'un diplomate, la mer Noire devenir "le coeur de l'Europe". B. LA TURQUIE ET LES REPUBLIQUES TURCOPHONES DU CAUCASE ETD'ASIE CENTRALE Ce fut avec un enthousiasme bien comprehensif que se firent les retrouvailles entre la Turquie et ces cousins, plus ou moins loignes (notamment quant a la langue), qui avaient ete perdus de vue, au temps o tout se decidait Moscou. Ankara reconnat dans les meilleurs delais ces nouvelles republiques independantes: Azerbadjan, Ouzbekistan, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan et Trkmenistan et l'on eehange des ambassadeurs. Des avril 1992, le premier ministre S. Demirel fait une tournee dans la region,
26. Voir nos annexes 1 et 2. 27. La visite Ankara du premier ministre russe Victor Chernomyrdin, les 15-16 decembre 1997, fut l'occasion de faire le point: on nota les bonnes performances du commerce russo-turc, on decida de renforcer les bonnes positions de la Turquie dans le btiment en Russie (8.2 milliards de dollars), on constata qu'un million de Russes visitent annuellement la Turquie, on signa, entre autres, un important accord pour la fourniture de gaz naturel russe la Turquie, travers la mer Noire, qui devrait permettre de doubler les achats de gaz russe en 2007. Internet, document ite, pp. 2-3. 28. Dr. zeyir Garih, president du groupe Alarko, "Making waves on the Black Sea: how to aetivate the BSEC", T.D.N., 19.9.1997. 29. On peut aussi penser qu'en tirant curieusement la mer Noire de l'Adriatique la Caspienne, on n'a pas simplifie les problemes.

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o il propose des projets de cooperation conomique et culturelle. ans doute evoque-t-il, pour la Turquie, la "responsabilite de representer... un monde turc qui s'etend de l'Adriatique la Muraille de Chine", mais il precise bien -tradition kemaliste oblige- qu' "une alliance entre la Turquie et les republiques turcophones n'est pas l'ordre du jour"30. Un langage similaire sera tenu, un an plus tard par le president zal, en visite dans ces jeunes republiques, mais l'on nourrit l'espoir, dans la conjoncture du moment, que le "grand frere" apparaisse comme un modele de modernite: democratie, laicite, economie de marche. Ces nouvelles republiques ne sont pas depourvues de richesses naturelles (petrole, gaz, coton), mais beaucoup reste faire pour assurer les bases d une cooperation economique internationale autonome: completer leurs legislations, disposer d'une monnaie credible, regler leurs conflits, parfois armes, internes et internationaux. Du cte turc, le secteur economique d'Etat, et le secteur prive avaient prevu un programme en trois etapes: accumulation de contacts pour mieux se connatre, fondation d'une Banque turque de reconstruction et de developpement, dans le style de la BERD, puis d'une Banque de commerce Turquie-Asie. Si le premier point s'est largement realise, le deuxieme reste limite a la creation d'une Agence turque de cooperation et de developpement, chargee de diffuser le modele economique turc; quant la Banque de commerce, c'est la Trk Eximbank qui en assure la fonction. La conscience a ete rapidement prise du fosse existant entre l'enormite des besoins et les possibilites, notamment fnancieres, de la Turquie. Faute ans doute d'une concertation prealable insuffsante, les resultats du premier sommet, Ankara, en octobre 1992, des six pays turcophones furent mitige's. Ankara ne signa avec ses partenaires qu'une declaration d'intention sur la cooperation economique, et le president zal ne put obtenir un communique politique commun sur tous les conflits en cours touchant le monde turcophone: Haut-Karabakh, Tadjikistan, Bosnie, Chypre. On decida cependant de renforcer les contacts et de rendre periodiques ces reunions au sommet. Malgre cette relative deception, la Turquie ne menagea pas ses efforts compte tenu de ses moyens: les aides et les investissements financiers prives dans les domaines de la banque, des transports, notamment aeriens, des textiles, du btiment, atteignaient, en 1996, pres de 4 milliards de dollars, et frleraient aujourd'hui les 10 milliards de dollars, plaant la Turquie au cinquieme rang des pays investisseurs de la region; des efforts furent menes pour essayer de faire decoller les echanges commerciaux, pour developper les secteurs des telecommunications (notamment la tele"vision) et de la presse; des aides furent accordees pour l'adoption de l'alphabet latin, des bourses distribuees a des milliers d'etudiants reus dans les universites turques. Le gouvernement turc soutient une action culturelle d'essence niverselle, tandis que
30. T.D.N., 29.4.1992 et Le Monde, 6.5.1998.

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les islamistes se montrent particulierement actifs dans le domaine de la presse engagee et de l'aide financiere la construction de mosquees et d' "ecoles religieuses". Toutefois, l'action economique et politique de la Turquie doit tenir compte de l'immediat environnement international. S'il parat s'etre etabli un implicite partage des tches avec l'Iran, qui a suscite" la creation d'une "zone de cooperation de la mer Caspienne", l'action de la Russie, anxieuse de raaintenir un droit de regard sur toutes les regions de l'ancienne URSS, pose un tout autre probleme. Sami Kohen, editorialiste du Milliyet, ecrit: "Le retour de la Russie politique et militaire nous a ramenes sur terre. Son action en Georgie et dans le conflit entre l'Armenie et l'Azerbaidjan, au Tadjikistan, a montre les limites de son desengagement, et le peu de capacite de la Turquie a s'opposer de front au gant russe meme affaibli"31. L'attitude d'Ankara dans le conflit du Haut-Karabakh, gele, mais non regle, par le cessez-le-feu de mai 1994, montre suffsamment qu'elle n'en a nullement l'intention. Dans cet interminable conflit, la Turquie a adopte" une politique de prudence, lui menageant, travers une diplomatie tres active, la possibilite d'apparatre comme un mediateur, ans pour autant cacher une sympathie particuliere pour Balkou32. Cette diplomatie a revetu deux styles: la maniere Demirel, qui consiste "agir avec attention et sang-froid"33, visible dans le fait que la Turquie s'est bien gardee d'envoyer plus que des conseillers militaires aupres des "freres aze"ris"; la maniere Ozal, destinee " faire un peu peur aux autres"34, qui se concretisera lorsqu'en septembre 1993, Ankara concentrera des troupes a la frontiere armenienne. Cette episode montre bien que l'action turque est la resultante d'un desir de renforcer son influence dans les republiques turcophones, et de celui, non moins resolu, d'eviter tout ennui serieux avec le grand voisin du nord. On reste ici encore dans le droit fil kemaliste. Et cette equation a un denominateur commun: le petrole. Le realisme qui a preside au sommet d'istanbul, en octobre 1994, a bien pris la mesure de ces complexes rapports de force. Les grandes manoeuvres se font autour des petroles de la Caspienne, dont les rserves sont, selon des estimations americaines recentes, comparables celles du Kovveit ou de l'Iran, dont 90% en Azerbaidjan et au Kazakhstan. Deux points retiendront ntre attention. D'abord la participation du capital turc dans les petroles de la Caspienne. La TPAO est partie prenante dans l'Azerbaidjan
31. Milliyet, 2.2.1994. 32. Symbolisee par l'inauguration en grande pompe du "Pont de l'Espoir", sur l'Araxe, entre la Turquie et le Nakhitchevan, le 28 mai 1992, par le premier ministre S. Demirel, le pr6sident de l'Azerbaidjan I. Gambarov, et aussi le pr6sident de la region, Gaidar aliev. Le Monde, 30.5.1992. 33. Une attitude semblable prevaut dans les conflits georgiens et techetchenes. 34. Le Monde, 5.2.1994.

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International Operating Company35, majorite" anglo-ame'ricaine, destinde l'exploitation des champs petroliers Azeri, Chirag et Guneshli, au capital de 7.5 milliards de dollars. La participation de la Turquie est fonction de ses disponibilites financieres et de ses propres besoins 6nerge"tiques. Lors de la signature Bakou, le 20 septembre 1994, apres trois ans de ne"gociations.du "contrat du siecle", la compagnie turque obtenait 1.75% du capital. Quelques mois plus tard, la partie Azerbaidjanaise ne pouvant faire face ses engagements, retrocedait une partie de son capital la TPAO, portant ainsi la part turque 6.75 % 36 . ans doute corame moyen de pression sur le choix des itineraires d'evacuation, le ministere russe des Affaires etrangeres a fait savoir qu'il ne reconnaissait pas ces accords, alors que la compagnie russe Lukoil est partie prenante pour 10% du capital. En ce qui concerne le Kazakhstan, c'est le considrable champ de Tenguiz qui attire les convoitises. La Turquie semble ici faire bande part. Apres l'Americain Chevron, le Birlemi Mhendisler Brosu (BMB) signe, en 1993, un important contrat selon lequel il s'engage remettre en exploitation quatre sites petroliers et construire une centrale electrique37. Le contrat, mal calcule, devra etre rev a la baisse. Un autre contrat de recherche sera signe, en janvier 1994, entre les autorit6s Kazakhes et la Kazak-Turk Bunay C . II ne semble pas que la Turquie soit partie prenante dans le consortium international de sept compagnies, majorite anglo-americaine, qui signe un enorme contrat, le 19 novembre 1997, pour l'exploitation du gisement off shore de Kachagan38. La Caspienne etant une mer enclavee, la question de l'evacuation du petrole vers l'exterieur est particulierement cruciale. Et ici, s'opposent, pratiquement depuis le debut, le projet russe et le projet tura En ce qui concerne le petrole de l'Azerbaidjan, la Russie possede naturellement un atout grce l'existence du tuyau Bakou-Novorossiisk par Grozny, avec cependant l'inconvenient de traverser la Tchetch6nie. Ce qui faisait ecrire au Cumhuriyet en septembre 1994: "La guerre de Tchetchenie illustre la politique expansionniste russe. II ne erait guere avise de confer Moscou le borinet du petrole de la Caspienne, dont la Turquie fera un meilleur usage. Les principaux clients du petrole de la Caspienne sont les Occidentaux. Or, la Turquie appartient justement l'Occident"39. Argument bien faible face une entente entre le principal actionnaire (ameri35. Le consortium est compose' de la faon suivante: part amricaine (Amoco, Exxon, Pennzoil, Unocal) 43.7%; part anlaise (BP-Stattoil) 19.2%; part russe (Lukoil) 10%; part norvdgienne 8.6%; part turque (TPAO) 6.75%; part saoudienne (Delta) 1.75%; la compagnie nationale d'Azerbaidjan (SOCAR) 10%. Le groupe japonais Itochu a obtenu une sous-participation. Internet, MFA "Caspian Oil Reserves" et Le Monde, 21.11.1997. L'Iran se trouve ainsi e'carte' de l'exploitation petroliere en azerbai'djan. 36. Le Monde, 22.9.1994 et 24.4.1995. 37. T.D.N., 14.7.1992. 38. Le Monde, 21.11.1997. Le rcent accord entre la Russie et le Kazakhstan sur le partage de la Caspienne va d6bloquer le processus. 39. ite par Le Monde, du 5.2.1994.

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cain) et celui (russe) qui contrle de fait le terrain, sur un projet alternatif, "la voie ouest", Bakou-Soupsa (Batoum) par Tbilissi, en cours d'achevement, avec prolongement possible vers Novorossiisk travers l'Abkhazie separatiste, o la presence de troupes russes n'a suffi jusqu'ici ramener le calme. A partir de ce port, l'eVacuation a lieu travers le Bosphore, o la Turquie a renforce, depuis 1994, les conditions de passage, au nom de la securite et de l'ecologie, les nouvelles regles etant strictement appliquees par les tankers russes; le projet russe envisage e"galement le ehemin de l'Europe par le port Bulgare de Bourgas. Les projets tures Bakou-Ceyhan par la "voie est", avaient, notamment aux yeux des Am6ricains, l'inconvenient, soit de passer par l'Iran, soit, comme celui de la vallee de l'Araxe, de cumuler les inconvenients iranien et armenien. Ce qui pousse la Turquie considerer que le petrole irakien reste encore a l'ordre du jour. En attendant que la conjoneture sous-regionale s'ameliore, la route turque vers la Mediterranee est parfaitement possible, par le raccordement d'un tuyau, soit Tbilissi, soit Soupsa vers Ceyhan, travers l'Anatolie orientale. Encore faudra-t-il s'assurer de la neutralite du PKK, un tuyau etant fort facile saboter40. Si bien que la "voie ouest" semblerait devoir donner satisfaction et la Russie et la Turquie, pour peu que les flux permettent d'alimenter les deux itineraires. Or, il semble bien, en effet, que cette voie soit, pour le moment, egalement envisagee pour l'evacuation du petrole Kazakh voire turkmene. D'o le projet que le gouvernement turc a presente, en mars 1998, l'Azerbaidjan, au Trkmenistan, au Kazakhstan et la Georgie, pour un oleoduc de 1.800 kms reliant Bakou Ceyhan par Tbilissi (ou Soupsa), Erzurum, Erzincan, Sivas, Tokat, Kayseri et Adana; le cot des travaux est evalue, par les experts tures, 2.5 milliards de dollars; l'Azerbaidjan veut contrler 51% des parts, le reste etant essentiellement detenu par la firme turque Botas. Les Etats-Unis apportent leur soutien ce projet, mais les compagnies interessees trouvent le projet turc beaucoup trop coteux, et font pression sur le president Aliyev pour son abandon41. Des discussions sont egalement en cours entre la Turquie et le Trkmenistan pour l'evacuation de son petrole et de son gaz vers l'Europe. Mais ici la "voie iranienne", voire une "voie chinoise", interferent. Les reunions au sommet poursuivent leur rythme periodique. Leurs communiques repetitifs temoignent de la lenteur des evolutions. En 1996, Tachkent, au quatrieme sommet, le president Demirel s'est prononce pour un rechauffement des liens entre la Turquie et les presidents des republiques tureophones. On s'est engage renforcer les relations bilatera40. "MGK [Le Conseil national de scurite] to discuss PKK link with Baku-Ceyhan pipeline", T.D.N., 17.9.1997. 41. "La Turquie veut sa part du petrole et du gaz de la CEI, l'enjeu energetique de la Caspienne", dans La Turquie, supplement au Monde du 23.7.1998, p. 13. Voir T.D.N., 31.10.1998. Une premiere deeision devrait intervenir la mi-novembre 1998.

410

les et multilaterales, a respecter la democratie, les droits de l'homme, renforcer l'economie de marche. On a decide de prote"ger et de repandre la culture turque reue en heritage. Sur le plan economique, on cherchera, une fois de plus, a ameliorer les relations commerciales42. Et c'est bien la, en effet, que le bt blesse. Les echanges de marchandises entre la Turquie et ses partenaires turcophones stagnent un niveau d'une extreme faiblesse. Entre 1993 et 1996, en moyenne annuelle, les exportations turques vers les cinq republiques turcophones comptent pour 521 millions de dollars, soit 2.7% du total des exportations turques; aux importations, les chiffres sont respectivement de 165 millions de dollars et 0.5% et encore les chiffres sont-ils la baisse. Les deux premiers clients de la Turquie sont l'Azerbaidjan et l'Ouzbekistan et le principal fournisseur le Kazakhstan. Ceci demontre, s'il en etait besoin, qu'il est difficile pour ces jeunes re"publiques de modifier rapidement les flux commerciaux Ii6s dans le cadre de l'URSS, surtout quand on ne dispose pas de disponibilites financieres pour acheter les produits fabriques et les equipements turcs. C'est ainsi que l'essentiel de la production marachere d'Azerbaidjan prend toujours le ehemin de Moscou; la CEI n'est pas ici un vain mot. Seul le petrole et le gaz de la region viendront secouer sensiblement les presentes pesanteurs. Malgre tout, le "T6" affirme sa vitalite43, et rien ne pourra desormais se faire dans cette zone ans l'avis de la Turquie, qui peut aussi etre un utile relais pour les pays riches occidentaux, et conforter de ce fait son role de ple regional. On peut egalement imaginer la mise en place d'un partenariat russo-turc pour la modernisation de cette nouvelle "Eurasie". Ce erait ans doute la meilleure maniere de faire tomber les accusations russes ans fondement de panturquisme, mais ni d'un cte, ni de l'autre, les conditions economiques et politiques ne semblent actuellement reunies. C. LA TURQUIE ET LE MOYEN ORENT Et voici le troisieme monde qui fait l'objet, de la part de la Turquie, d'une particuliere attention. Resolument tournee vers l'Europe, la Turquie n'a jamais completement neglige ses voisins et partenaires du Moyen-Orient. ans doute, en ce qui concerne les pays arabes, l'histoire a-t-elle laisse des traces qui ne sont pas encore completement effacees, mais les contraintes de voisinage, les implications de son appartenance l'OTAN, et aussi les affaires, conduisent la Turquie developper une politique moyen-orientale. Celle-ci devint plus aetive lorsque Ankara a ree42. T.D.N., 23.10.1996. 43. Le cinquieme sommet des pays turcophones s'est tenu, en juin 1998, Astana, la nouvelle capitale du Kazakhstan. 44. Voir M. Bazin, S. Kanal, R. Perez, J. Thobie, La Turguie entre trois mondes, L'Harmattan, 1998, 450 pages.
44

411

quilibre, partir du milieu des annes 1960, l'occasion de la deuxieme crise de Chypre, sa position face au probleme israelo-palestinien, et ameliore ses relations avec les pays arabes, ans abandonner Israel. La tentative de revitalisation de l'Organisation de cooperation economique (OCE) n'a pas donne, jusqu'ici, les resultats escomptes. Cette organisation a fait site, en 1985, a l'Organisation de la cooperation et du developpement regional (OCDR), foncee, en 1964, par la Turquie, l'Iran et le Pakistan, parallelement au CENTO (nouveau nom du Pacte de Bagdad apres la defection irakienne de 1959), avec ses objectifs propres: libre echange de produits et de services, creation de societes mixtes, cooperation en matiere de banque, d'assurance, de transports. La reanimation de cette structure rapidement ankylosee, ne fut guere suivie d'effet. Apres la dislocation de l'URSS, les cinq republiques turcophones et le Tadjikistan ont et6 admis l'OCE. Les quelques mesures concretes de"cidees Teheran, en 1992, n'ont pas ete suivies de realisations. Une normalisation des relations de la Turquie avec l'Iran, plutt ambigues45, et avec le Pakistan, pourrait peut-tre redonner vie cette structure de cooperation. Jusqu' la guerre du Golfe, les relations de la Turquie avec l'Irak ont ete dominees par un souci de ravitaillement energetique concretise par les oleoducs Kirkouk-Yumurtalk, la crise energetique et la guerre Irak-Iran ayant ete l'occasion d'un veritable boom commercial turc, qui s'est elargi a l'ensemble du Moyen-Orient. La croissance des importations se fit en deux bonds: le premier est lie la crise energetique, et couvre les annees 1972-1979, les importations turques de cette region passant de 132 millions de $ a, 1.110 milliard de $, soit une multiplication par 8 et une progression moyenne annuelle de 140 millions de $; le deuxieme bond, lie la guerre Irak-Iran, va de 1979 a 1985: les importations, qui croissent encore de 1.110 milliard 3.5 milliards de $, sont multipliees par 3, avec une progeression moyenne annuelle de 398 millions de $. La croissance des exportations marque naturellement un certain retard vigoureusement rattrape: de 1979 1985 celles-ci progressent de 391 millions 3.3 milliards de $, sont done multipliees par 8, avec une hausse annuelle moyenne de 482 millions de $. II n'est pas tonnant que le Moyen-orient ait pris alors une place considerable dans le commerce total de la Turquie: aux importations, le pourcentage passe de 8.5% en 1972, a 40.5% en 1982,83; aux exportations, de 17.3% en 1979 42.9% en 1982-83. En 1981-83, le commerce de la Turquie avec le Moyen-Orient passe devant celui avec les Quinze de l'actuelle UE, et meme, en 1982, avant celui avec toute l'Europe. Durant ces belles annees, la Turquie aehetait surtout du petrole, et vendait de l'agro-alimentaire, des materiaux de construc45. Le president iranien Rafsandjani a 6t6 accueilli Ankara en decembre 1996 (Le Monde, 24. 12.1996), mais il est evident qu'un veritable dblocage de la situation diploraatique depend de l'attitude americaine et de l'eVolution politique Teheran. ans doute le "Mondial", compte-t-il pour peu dans l'affaire!

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tion, des textiles et divers produits fabriqu6s; il faut y ajouter l'exportation d'un savoir-faire, travers le travail d'une emigration temporaire, et le tourisme arabe en Turquie46. Depuis 1985, le commerce avec le Moyen-Orient a stagne autour de 3 milliards de $ pour les importations et de 2.5 milliards de $ pour les exportations, alors que le commerce en direction de l'Europe (et aussi de la Russie et des Etats-Unis) continuait de progresser, si bien qu'en 1996, le Moyen-Orient ne compte plus que pour 9% aux importations et 13% aux exportations de la Turquie, mais reste cependant de justesse, ex-aequo avec la CEMN, le deuxieme partenaire commercial de la Turquie apres les Quinze de l'UE. Le choix de la Turquie pendant la guerre du Golfe -qui marque une incontestable flexure par rapport la politique anterieure dans la region lui est economiquement prejudiciable, cause de l'embargo impose l'Irak par les Nations Unies, entranant notamment la fermeture des deux oleoducs Kirkouk-Yumurtalk. C'est la raison pour laquelle la Turquie a souhaite tres tt l'allegement des sanctions contre l'Irak. Lors de son voyage Amman, en aot 1994, le president Demirel a preconise" ans dtour la leve"e "au plus tt" de l'embargo impose" Bagdad, un des raembres de sa delegation pre"cisant: "L'embargo va contre les interets de la Turquie. Nous sommes les principaux perdants"47. Les pertes subies par Ankara etaient alors evaluees 4 milliards de $ par an, selon des hommes d'affaires, une vingtaine de milliards selon le gouvernement turc. La mise en route de l'operation "petrole contre nourriture" depuis 1995, n'a pas sensiblement modifie le tableau, meme si une certaine compensation est realisee travers une contrebande sur laquelle les Etats-Unis ferment les yeux, car elle s'exerce au profit d'un pays ami: des centaines de camions-citerne irriguent la Turquie de ptroles irakiens, ce qui couvrirait le quart de ses besoins energetiques. Mais cela n'a rien de comparable avec la reprise du fonctionnement normal des exportations irakiennes de petrole48. L'autorisation donnee par l'ONU a Bagdad d'importer des equipements pe"troliers peut laisser presager une prochaine detente dans ce secteur. Sur le plan politique, les cons6quences sont plus discutables. Des sa mise en place, la Turquie a participe l'operation "Provide Comfort", et obtenu, de ce fait, un droit de regard sur la "zone d'exclusion" du Kurdistan irakien, dans la mesure o le contrle aerien de cette region par les Americains, les Anglais et les Franais s'effectue a partir de la base tur46. Voir nos courbes en annexe. Voir aussi, par exemple, B.A. Labaki, "L'evolution des relations 6conomiques arabo-turques de 1970 1992", dans La Turuie entre trois mondes, op. cif., pp. 287-316. 47. Le Monde, 31.8.1994. L'action de la Russie et de la France, pour ne pas etre negligeable, comme on a pu l'observer lors de crise americano-irakienne de fevrier dernier, n'a pas russi convaincre les Etas-Unis sur l'essentiel. 48. Le Monde, 21/22.6.1998. Selon un porte-parole de la Maison-Blanche, ces ventes illicites la Turjuie ne representeraient que "moins de 1% de la valeur totale des sanctions economiques".

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que d'Incirlik, avec une autorisation d'Ankara, renouvelable tous les six mois; la cooperation turque se poursuit avec l'operation americaine "Northern Watch". Cette situation place la Turquie et ses voisins orientaux au coeur de la question krde. Ankara se plaint du "vide" ainsi etabli sur ses confins irakiens, et deplore qu'en consequence le PKK ait pu y etablir des bases de repli. Cela a conduit la Turquie developper sur une ample echelle, et avec des resultats divers, la tactique adoptee, quand la conjoncture en etait favorable, par les trois pays nombreuse population krde: exploitation des divisions kurdes en utilisant telle ou telle faction ou partis kurdes du pays voisin; exercice du "droit de poursuite". Ainsi l'armee turque mene, depuis 1992, des operations militaires, parfois d'envergure comme en 1995 et 1997, et de moins en moins temporaires, sur le territoire irakien (contrle par le PDK de Massoud Barzani, allie d'Ankara), avec la bienveillante neutralite des Etats-Unis49, ce qui entrane des protestations de Bagdad et quelques sentiments melanges Teheran et Damas,malgr6 les "accords de securite" periodiquement signes entre les trois pays. Cette attitude, dont l'objectif principal est clairement precis6, la destruction des camps de repli du PKK, ne met pas en cause, selon Ankara, la position fondamentale de la Turquie sur "l'integrite territoriale de l'Irak". C'est ce qu'expliquait au Monde, en novembre 1992, le premier ministre S. Demirel en disant: "Nous sommes contre la creation d'un Etat krde en Irak du Nord"50. Cette position a ete maintes fois reaffirmee depuis. Dans cette meme region, et autour des memes problemes, la Turquie dispose d'un atout particulier, l'eau. Tous les observateurs souligment l'importance et la gravite du probleme, certains n'he'sitant pas dire que si le petrole a sous-tendu la plupart des conflits de la region au XXe siecle, l'eau jouera ce rle au XXIe siecle. ans disposer d'un potentiel aussi considerable qu'on l'a parfois ecrit51, la Turquie constitue un appreciable chteau d'eau notamment avec les sources et le cours superieurs de deux grands emissaires de la region: l'Euphrate qui coule ensuite en Syrie et en Irak, et le Tigre qui arrose l'Irak. Et comme l'appareil juridique international, en matiere d'utilisation des eaux de fleuves transnationaux, est pratiquement inexistant, l'avantage demeure au pays d'amont, le reste etant matiere discussions et a accords eventuels. La ralisation progressive en Turquie du grand projet du sud-est (GAP) avec la mise en place d'importants barrages sur l'Euphrate
49. Mais aussi Finquietude d6clar6e de l'Union europe'enne. L'intervention turque de 1995 a ete condamne'e par le Parlement europeen. Voir par exemple Le Monde, 25.3.1995 et 6.4.1995. 50. Le Monde, 22/23.11.1992. 51. "La Turquie n'est pas un pays qui dispose d'une excessive capacite en eau. Bien que la Turquie dispose pour le moment de plus de ressources en eau que nombre de ses voisins, elle peut etre regardee comme un pays qui se trouvera dans la situation de ne pas pouvoir faire face ses besoins dans un proche avenir". Internet, MFA "Turkey's Position Relating to the Water Ressources", 13.4.1998, p. 1.

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(Keban, Karakaya, Atatrk, Birecik) est l'objet de protestations repetees de la Syrie et de l'Irak. Le Turquie, qui se defend de vouloir utiliser l'eau comme une anne, adopte deux sortes de comportement, l'un plus tactique et bilateral, l'autre plus strategique. En ce qui concerne le premier point, et en attendant de futures decisions, un protocole a ete signe52, lors de la visite Damas, en 1987, du premier ministre Turgut zal, assurant un debit de 500 mVs la Syrie, contre l'engagement de ne plus abriter les combattants du PKK. Cet accord de circonstance a ete, pour son versant hydraulique, selon les autorites turques, strictement respecte. II sera suivi de quelques autres du meme type, et trouvera un aboutissement politique favorable la Turquie, avec l'accord syro-turc signe adana le 20 octobre 1998, par lequel le president Hafez el Assad s'engage ne plus soutenir le PKK et refuser l'entree en Syrie de son chef Abdullah calan53. Sur un plan hydraulique tripartite, un Comite technique conjoint a ete mis en place en 1980, et sa cinquieme reunion, en novembre 1984, la Turquie a presente un "Plan en trois etapes pour l'utilisation equitable et raisonnable des cours d'eau transfrontaliers du bassin du Tigre et de l'Euphrate". II s'agit d'etablir sur la base de criteres scientifiques acceptes par tous, l'inventaire des sources de l'eau, de la qualite des terres, et de proceder sur cette base l'evaluation de la demande d'eau, les bassins du Tigre et de l'Euphrate etant consideres comme un seul systeme hydraulique54. Remises sur le tapis plusieurs reprises, ces propositions ont toujours ete rejetees, specialement par l'Irak, qui estime qu'elles aboutiraient finalement paralyser ses demandes d'eau partir de l'Euphrate. Le probleme, dont les implications geostrategiques sont considerables, reste done entier pour le moment55. Bien qu'elle ait tourne court, il convient d'evoquer l'idee lancee par Turgut zal, en 1986, d'un "pipeline de la paix", qui aurait conduit les eaux du Ceyhan et du Seyhan vers les pays arabes travers deux tuyaux, l'un de 2700 kms menant Djeddah par la Syrie et la Jordanie, l'autre de 3900 kms menant aux pays du Golfe par le Koweit. Les contacts diplomatiques pris par Ankara, en 1988, en vue de la realisation de ce grandiose projet, estime alors a 20 milliards de dollars, ont revele immediatement la reticence des pays du Golfe a se placer en situation de dependance pour une ressource aussi strategique que celle de l'eau. La guerre du Golfe n'a
52. Internet, MFA "Water Dispute in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin", p. 2. 53. Cet accord n'est en fait que la confirmation solennelle, sous les bons offces du president egyptien Hosni Moubarak, de 1' "accord anti-terroriste" syro-turc d'avril 1992; les deux textes dans turkish Probe, publication hebdomadaire du Turkish Daily News, 25.10.1998, pp. 11-12. 54. Internet, MFA, "The Three-Staged Plan", 2 pages. 55. Le ministre d'Etat Salih Yldrm a suggere de faire payer la Syrie et l'Irak les surplus d'eau du Tigre et de l'Euphrate, mais il semble bien que des reglements internationaux s'opposent la vente d'eau aux pays en aval. "Water issue heats up again", T.D.N., 13.9.1997.

415

fait qu'aggraver cette crainte; un diplomate turc qui l'interrogeait sur ce projet la fin de 1991, le ministre de l'Eau et de l'electricite des Emirats arabes unis, declarait: "Les Etats du Golfe ont decide de geler ce projet, les usines de dessalement cotant nettement moins cher"56. Enterre sous sa forme primitive, le projet pourrait renatre dans une perspective plus modeste, Israel s'etant dclare dispose pay er l'eau qui viendrait de Turquie. C'est qu'en effet, les relations entre la Turquie et Israel sont au beau fxe. En signant, le 23 feVrier 1996, avec Israel, un accord militaire de coope"ration et d'entranement, la Turquie a-t-elle contribue" a modifer sensiblement les rapports de force dans la region? A s 'en tenir au texte, il s'agit d'un accord purement technique, qui prevoit l'utilisation de l'espace aerien turc par l'aviation israelienne pour des missions d'entranement, le perfectionnement de pilotes turcs en Israel, des ventes de materiels, des visites des flottes respectives dans les ports du partenaire. L'accord est renouvelable annuellement57. Mais, comme toujours en la matiere, des raisons plus profondes expliquent l'existence et la solidite de cet accord. Pour la Turquie, il s'agit de tenir un moyen de pression sur la Syrie, non seulement au sujet de la protection des groupes armes d'calan, dont la situation ne semble guere avoir evoluee en depit de l'intense action diplomatique d'Ankara aupres de Damas, mais aussi pour renforcer sa position sur la question des eaux de l'Euphrate et du Tigre, dont Damas et Bagdad demandent un partage 6galite; Ankara y voit aussi un renforcement de sa position en Mediterranee orientale, au moment o des discussions serieuses devront s'ouvrir sur le probleme de Chypre58 et le contentieux egeen greco-turc. Quant a Israel, qui beneficie de ce fait d'un desenclavement unique dans la region, cet accord est destine a favoriser une meilleure position de la Syrie et du Liban concernant l'action du Hezbollah et les futures negociations censees aboutir a une paix globale dans la re"gion. La cooperation en matiere de lutte anti-terroriste se trouve egalement renforcee. Depuis le retablissement, en 1991, de leurs relations diplomatiques au niveau des ambassadeurs, le climat entre Israel et la Turquie s'etait constamment rechauffe". Cette attitude etait d'autant plus comprehensible que la Turquie ne pouvait que se rejouir de la mise en route du "processus de paix" israelo-palestinien, et c'est dans cette conjoncture qu'est prepare et signe 1'accord. Les elections israeliennes de mai 1996 et le retour au pouvoir du Likoud n'auront pas d'influence sur les relations turcoisraeliennes. En fait les deux pays, nonobstant la difference considerable en surface et en nombre d'habitants, ont de nombreux points communs: la Turquie et Israel visent a avoir une influence regionale, si le decideur uni56. Le Monde, 29.1.1992. 57. T.D.N., 25.5.1996. L'accord n'a ete rendu public qu'en avril 1996. 58. On peut d'ailleurs se demander si cet accord n'a pas pee dans la dcision recente des Chypriotes grecs de renoncer la commande de missiles russes S-300.

416

que le veut bien: or Washington approuve chaleurusement l'accord turcoisraelien qui se situe, du reste, dans le droit fil des accords americanoisraeliens destines a renforcer leur cooperation dans le domaine militaire et de la securite", et signes Jerusalem par le president Bili Clinton, juste apres le sommet de Charm-el-Cheikh59, le 13 mars 1996. Le volet economique est non moins important. En progres constant depuis de nombreuses annees, les relations commerciales israelo-turques ont veritablement fait un bond depuis dix ans. De 1986 1996, les achats de la Turquie Israel ont ete multiplies par quatre et les ventes multipliees par dix; il est vrai que les sommes en cause sont encore modestes -respectivement 185 et 239 millions de dollars- mais elles devraient augmenter rapidement la site d'un accord de libre-echange permettant Israel de concurrencer l'Europe sur le marche turc. Un diplomate israelien explique: "Nos deux conomies sont complementaires: la Turquie dispose d'une industrie lourde, nous avons en revanche une haute technologie dont elle a besoin"60. Les Israeliens peroivent la Turquie comme le marche' d'avenir, d'autant plus que des societes mixtes leur permettent d'acceder l'Asie centrale61. Les reactions, notamment des pays arabes, ne se sont pas fait attendre. Outre les protestations de la Syrie et du Liban, pays (avec l'Iran) les premiers vises, c'est l'Egypte qui a emi les demandes d'explication les plus vigoureuses. Le sommet arabe, qui s'est reuni au Caire, fin juin 1996, a discute et critique les developpements de l'accord militaire turcoisraelien. Les debats ont ete particulierement axes sur les aspects strategiques de cet accord: si l'on prend en meme temps en compte le traite israelo-jordanien de 1994 et le stationnement en Jordanie d'une escadre aerienne americaine operant au-dessus de l'Irak, on constate une situation d'encerclement de la Syrie et du Liban, qui constitue, vu du cte arabe, un prejudiciable moyen de pression. Le ton particulierement dur du communique final est d surtout l'Egypte, qui supporte mal de voir ainsi ebre'che' le rle regional qu'elle est en droit de vouloir tenir. Pourtant l'On se contente de demander la Turquie de revenir sur son accord. II faut du 62 reste noter que, ni d'un ctd, ni de l'autre, au niveau gouvernemental , on
59. Le Monde, 15.3.1996. 60. Nicole Pope, "Le rapprochement entre Israel et la Turquie inquiete fortement les pays arabes", Le Monde, 13.5.1997. 61. Laurent Mallet, "La politique israelienne dans les Republiques turcophones", dans La Turquie entre trois mondes, op. cit., pp. 417-434. 62. II n'en fut pas de meme dans la presse, notamment dans la presse turque. Hormis dans la presse islamiste, les commentateurs turcs se dchanent contre les protestations arabes. Voici, par exemple, comment l'ambassadeur Cokun Krca interpelle les pays arabes: "Qui etes-vous et comment osez-vous tenter de dicter la Turquie sa politique exterieure? Vous demandez l'eau gratuite, mais vous ne vendez jamais votre petrole un prix raisonnable... Le gang separatiste n'est-t-il pas ravitaille par Damas? Est-ce nous qui avons signi les premiers un accord avec Israel?". Yeni Yzyl, 29.6.1996.

417

ne cherche dramatiser la question. Les pays arabes confirment qu'il n'est pas question d'organiser un front des pays arabes contre la Turquie63, et Ankara cherche les rassurer. Le president Demirel se rendra finalement au Caire, en septembre 1997, o il reaffirmera au president Hosni Moubarak que le trake" israelo-turc n'est dirie contre aucun pays tiers; il fait envoyer un message Yasser Arafat confirmant la volonte d'Ankara de soutenir le "processus de paix", et un autre a Saddam Hussein64. II est trop tt pour pouvoir apprecier leur juste valeur les dividendes que pourra retirer la Turquie d'un accord qu'il erait du reste excessif de qualifier d'alliance. II n'empeche que celui-ci ouvre ans doute un chapitre nouveau dans la geopolitique du Moyen-orient. Faut-il voir, dans le rapprochement discret mais certain entre la Syrie et l'Irak, comme l'esquisse d'un contrepoids strategique Syrie-rak-Iran, face l'axe TurquieIsrael-Jordanie? C'est le genre de question qu'aime poser l'historien des relations internationales, mais elle s'applique ici une region qui a prouve tant de fois sa volatilite qu'il est imprudent, pour le moment, d'y esquisser une reponse circonstanciee. CONCLUSION Nous avons tente, trop succinctement, de presenter les legitimes ambitions regionales de la Turquie, travers les 75 ans qui nous separent de la fondation de la Republique, et de reperer, a travers les enjeux, les atouts et les difficultes, la marque du message kemaliste, condition de ne pas considerer ce message comme un dogme fie, mais comme un appel au mouvement, comme une reponse dynamique aux defis de ntre temps65. Nous n'avons pas insiste sur les freins aux developpements de l'influence regionale de la Turquie, qui sont apparus au cours de ntre circuit. Le manque de disponibilite's financieres, pour un pays lui-mme fort endette, constitue un serieux handicap, car nombre de clients, meme privile'gies, ont besoin qu'on leur avance l'argent avec lequel ils se procureront les produits turcs. II faut bien sr evoquer ici une trop forte inflation, qui certes n'est pas contradictoire avec la croissance, la France des annees 1950 en a fait l'experience; mais sa persistance, bon an mal an, autour de 70-80%, entretient un desequilibre, qui conforte les arguments des adversaires de l'integration de la Turquie a l'U.E. Un PNB par habi63. T.D.N., 1.7.1996 et Le Monde, 19.6.1996. 64. lnur evik, "Has Demirel really convinced the Egyptians?", T.D.N., 18.9.1997. 65. Menter ahinler ecrit: "Pourtant, malgre les efforts des intellectuels, le kemalisme ne constitue pas une ideologie. C'est un mouvement revolutionnaire permanent ouvert aux critiques et aux evolutions. II est evident que certains de ses principes ont connu des transformations... En ce sens, le kemalisme est non seulement un mouvement actuel, mais aussi une valeur internationale", Origine, influence et actualite du kemalisme, Publisud, 1995, p. 242. Editiion turque: Atatrkln Kkeni, Etkisi ve Gncellii, ada Yaynlan, istanbul, 1996, 381 p.

418

tant qui, meme parite de pouvoir d'achat, represente la moitie de celui de la Grece, avec une profonde disparite entre l'ouest et l'est du pays. II faut aussi noter, comme nous l'avons evoque, la presence d'ambitions regionales concurrentes, l'ensemble se trouvant sous la houlette du decideur principal, mais nullement absolu, les Etats-Unis. Parmi les freins, j'accorderai une particuliere importance au probleme krde, la question du Sud-Est. Dans ce drame, deux principes kemalistes semblent en apparente contradiction. Outre que le terrorisme doit etre condamne ans reserve, le respect de l'integrite territoriale de la Turquie (et des autres etats de la region) ne peut etre mis en cause. A cela se superpose le message kemaliste, et qui est du reste egalement une vision gaullienne, selon lequel ans le consensus et la paix interieures, il ne peut y avoir de diplomatie liberee et pleinement effcace. En gerant, dans la pratique, la synthese de ces deux principes, Kemal Atatrk a acquis la qualite unanimement reconnue d'eminent stratege, pour avoir su, en temps opportun, prendre les decisions militaires et politiques adequates. "Au moment o les autorites turques annoncent avoir jugule le fleau du terrorisme, n'est-il pas temps d'engager des mesures qui ne se limitent pas la seule repression"66? Bien sr, il appartient aux autorites turques et a elles seules, d'apporter une reponse cette question et d'ouvrir ainsi les voies une solution politique et democratique. Car les atouts de la Turquie l'emportent et de beaucoup: une population nombreuse, travailleuse et creatrice, une economie dynamique avec un systeme bancaire moderne, un commerce en pleine croissance et une integration de plus en plus solide la division internationale du travail, une armee nombreuse et instruite, une emigration qui sait sauvegarder ses attaches culturelles, une volonte, notamment avec le GAP, d'attenuer le desequilibre entre l'est et l'ouest du pays, un Etat lac facteur de stabilite, une position geostrategique remarquable, impliquant un jeu geopolitique multiple en meme temps que de multiples responsabilites. La Turquie est entre trois mondes, mais elle est presente sur plusieurs fronts: volontaire vis--vis de l'Union europeenne, vigilante dans les Balkans et en Egee, organisatrice sur la mer Noire, prudente mais constructive au Caucase et en Asie centrale, engagee et derangeante au Moyen-Orient. II est clair que, dans tous ces secteurs, rien ne peut etre vraiment decide ans le mot de la Turquie. II reste neanmoins que ce pays n'est pas encore en mesure de peser du meme poids dans tous les domaines. C'est ce qui dnme aux choix strategiques d'Ankara, un impact qui marquera durablement la region l'aube du XXIe siecle.

66. Pierre Moscovici, Bulletin (cit) du Comiti France-Turguie, p. 7.

419

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ANNEXE 3
L'EVACUATION DES PETROLES DE LA CASPIENNE
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422

NICOLAE TTULESCU ET LA TURQUIE D'ATATRK

Prof. Dr. Dan BERINDEI* La periode d'entre-les-deux guerres a ete une periode o tant la Turquie que la Roumanie se sont affirme en tant que puissances moyennes et elle ont connu un developpement important. La Turquie a trouve dans Kemal Mustafa, dans Atatrk, le dirgeant predestine donner au pays les dimensions d'un Etat moderne et la nation turque une nouvelle place dans le monde. II a sut imposer meme aux grandes puissances a respecter les aspirations du peuple turc. La Roumanie, son tour, a paracheve ses frontieres nationales et s'est montree capable d'unifier sur le plan institutionnel l'ensemble du territoire et de sa societe, en assurant aussi son developpement economique. Sur le plan de la politique exterieure, ce fut Nicolae Titulescu qui representa brillamment l'Etat roumain pendant les deux decennies qui ont suivi la fin de la premiere guerre mondiale, en s'affrmant parmi les plus importants diplomates de l'epoque. En 1930 et en 1931 il fut elu deux fois, successivement, president de la Societe des Nations. Ministre plenipotentiaire Londres, representant permanent de la Roumanie a Geneve aupres de la Societe des Nations, ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de son pays, meme quand les gouvernements changeaient, plusieurs fois propose en tant que premier ministre, Titulescu fut le principal artisan de la politique exterieure roumaine. Ce fut aussi l'un des hommes d'Etat roumains les plus importants de l'epoque qui ont considere la Turquie un pays ami et un allie necessaire. II resta fidele a ce point de vue jusqu' la fin de sa vie, relativement breve, qui eut lieu en 1941, a 59 ans, apres que le roi Carol II l'eut evince, en ete 1936, de la direction de la politique etrangere roumaine. La vision de politique exterieure de Titulescu comprenait en ce qui concerne la Roumanie l'implication du pays dans un vaste systeme d'alliances; tout d'abord, celle avec la France, ensuite celle avec un groupe
President de la Section des Sciences Historiques et d'Archeologie de TAcademie Roumaine, Bucarest.

423

de pays voisins qui ont forme la Petite Entente et celle avec les pays balkaniques et aussi l'alliance avec la Pologne. En meme temps, il avait une vision niverselle de 1'entente entre les peuples, de la paix et de la securite collective et egalement de la necessite du desarmement. "La paix, disait-il devant le Reichstag Berlin, le 6 mai 1929, est un phenomene en mouvement. C'est une chose vivante, qui se realise par etapes. La paix ne signifie pas repos, ce n'est pas indifference. La paix n'est qu'un but, qu'une direction. Mais cette direction cache aussi l'accomplissement et le ehemin est dej pareouru partir du moment qu'on a mis le pied sur la route"1. L'extraordinaire campagne de liberation entreprise par Atatrk a eu des echos puissants dans tout le monde, inelusivement en Roumanie, pays interesse aux problemes de la zone de la Mer Noire. En automne 1922, la Grande Bretagne tenta meme provoquer une implication militaire roumaine, Lloyd George considerant qu' "une cooperation militaire entre la Roumanie et les Allies" etait "d'une grande importance"2. Mais le gouvernement roumain, lie aussi a la France, qui repoussait les propositions extremes anglaises, refusa de s'impliquer. D'ailleurs, Titulescu qui representait ce moment le gouvernement roumain Londres, conseilla plusieurs reprises au ministre des Affaires etrangeres Duca une position prundente par rapport au probleme3. Par contre, la Roumanie allait participer la Conference de Lausanne. Le "Journal d'Orient" signalait dans son numero du 20 juin 1923 qu'Ismet Pacha qui dirigeait la delegation turque "faisait appel dans les moments plus diffciles de la Conference aux bons offices et l'intermediaire de Monsieur Diamandi"4, qui etait le delegue adjoint de la delegation roumaine. D'ailleurs, en mai 1923, Djevad Bei, qui allait representer plus tard la Turquie en Roumanie, publiait un article dans le journal "ikdam", dans lequel il affirmait avec raison qu' "il n'existe pas entre la Turquie et la Roumanie de conflit national ou historique"5. Le 24 juillet, le haut commissaire roumain Aurelian qui representait son gouvernement en Turquie presenta le jour meme de la conelusion du traite, des felicitations au ministre turc Adnan Bey, en lui montrant que "le peuple roumain participe la joie du peuple turc" et que "la situation geographique des deux pays, leur proximite de la Mer Noire, une excellente voie de com1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Nicolae Titulescu, Pledoarii pentru pace (Plaidoyers pour la Paix), Bucarest, 1996, volume paru par les soins de George G. Potra et de Constantin Turcu, p.151, 176. Mehmet Ali Ekrem, Relatiile romno-turce ntre cele dou rzboaie mondiale (Les relations roumano-turques pendant rentre-deux-guerres), Bucarest, 1993, Mehmet Ali Ekrem, p.19. Nicolae Titulescu, Documente diplomatice (Documents diplomatiques), Bucarest, 1967, p. 88, 90-91. Mehmet Ali Ekrem, op.cit., p.23. Eliza Campus, ntelegerea Balcanic (L'Entente balkanique), Bucarest, 1972, p. 12.

424

munication entre les deux Etats, sont de nature faciliter la reprise et le developpement des rapports commerciaux entre eux"6. Le 29 octobre 1923 la Republique de Turquie 6tait proclamee, Mustafa Kemal etant elu son president. Une nouvelle etape etait ainsi inauguree dans l'histoire de la Turquie modeme, mais egalement des nouvelles possibilites etaient offertes au developpement des rapports entre la Roumanie et la Turquie. Les relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays fonctionnaient de nouveau7. II est significatif que le consul general turc de Sofia declara au debut de 1924 au repr6sentant diplomatique roumain en Bulgarie, qu' "un seul Etat a fait une reception amicale ntre envoye et celui-ci est la Roumanie"8. En meme temps, les deux Etats se trouvant dans une situation nouvelle par rapport la priode prec6dente cherchaient les voies propices la defense de ce qu'ils avaient obtenu et aussi leur affirmation sur le plan international. Les principes de politique ext&ieure d'Atatrk, visant la conservation de la paix et au droit des nations l'independance absolue ne pouvaient que convenir la Roumanie. Vers la fin de la trosieme decennie de ce siecle, l'evolution internationale accelera le rapprochement politique et diplomatique des deux pays. La Roumanie beneficiait du traite conclu avec la France en 1926 et Egalement des traites qui la liaient aux deux autres pays de la Petite Entente - la Tchecoslovaquie et la Yougoslavie -, mais maintenant s'imposait d'un cte du point de vue des interets roumains fortifier la Petite Entente et en meme temps constituer encore une aliance regionale avec les pays balkaniques ou au moins la majorite d'entre eux. La Turquie suivait une politique similaire l'egard de la zone des Balkans et meme on lui doit en bonne mesure l'initiative du systeme d'alliance qui allait se former. Dej en juillet 1923, Nincic, le ministre des Affaires Etrangeres yougoslave a soulev le probleme d'une entente entre son pays, la Roumanie, la Turquie et la Grece9. Mais le processus de conclusion d'une telle entente trana pendant un nombre d'annees. Tevfik Rt Ara, ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de la Turquie visita Belgrade et - la site de sa visite - la Yougoslavie se montra en principe disposee, au d6but de 1926, la conclusion du pacte balkanique10. Hussein Raghib Bei, le representant de la Turquie Bucarest, presenta en fevrier 1926 Jean Duca, ministre roumain des Affaires Etrangeres, le plan turc en vue de la constitution d'une entente balkanique". Vers la fin de la meme annee on parlak avec une certaine insistance d'un "Locarno balkanique" et en mme temps, le 21
6. Mehmet Ali Ekrem, op.cilt., p.23. 7. Ibidem, p. 27. 8. ElizaCampus, op.cit., p.14. 9. Ibidem, p. 13. 10. Ibidem, p.29. 11. Ibidem, p.31.

425

decembre, le journal "ikdam" suggerait qu'une telle entente "pourrait etre realisee l'initiative de la Roumanie", ce qui aurait servi "a consolider la paix et la tranquillite" dans les Balkans12. Au cours des mois suivants, Rt-Ara s'est engage dans de nouveaux pourparlers ce propos, en discutant Geneve surtout avec les representants des pays balkaniques, entre autres aussi avec Titulescu. C'est aussi le moment o il a lance la devise "Les Balkans aux Balkaniques!" et il a exprime l'opinion qu'ainsi pourrait etre realise "un bloc formidable"13. En aot 1927, Duca exprimait a Titulescu son desir "que soit donne aux rapports avec la Turquie un caractere de la plus etroite et cordiale amitie"14, ce qui, par ailleurs, correspondait pleinement aux sentiments de ce dernier. En mai 1928, V.Anastasiu avait ete reu en audience par Atatrk et retenu plus d'une heure15. L'annee suivante, le gouvernement roumain decida de btir Ankara un btiment de la legation roumaine. A partir d'octobre 1930 jusqu'en 1933 inclusivement se sont deroulees, chaque annee la site, les Conferences balkaniques, instituees par le Bureau international de la paix. Titulescu, qui ce moment s'affirmait en tant qu'une personnalite preeminante de la diplomatic internationale etant elu president de l'assemblee de la Societe des Nations - manifesta des octobre 1930 son interet majeur par rapport la conclusion d'une entente balkanique16. Les Conferences balkaniques furent en bonne mesure des laboratoires o on prepara la constitution de cette entente. Pour Nicolae Titulescu, comme pour Tevfik Rt Ara, le pacte balkanique devint un objectif central. En fevrier 1931 fut lancee une invitation au ministre des Affaires Etrangeres turc par le gouvemement de Bucarest17. Cette visite sera encore retardee, mais la voie vers 1'entente etait ouverte. Apres Athenes et istanbul, Bucarest fut en octobre 1932 le siege de la troisieme Conference balkanique. A cette occasion, Titulescu, en tant que ministre des Affaires Etrangeres du pays hte, a tenu un discours, dans lequel il a plaide" une fois de plus pour la paix, en soulignant le fait que "la paix ne se proclame pas, elle doit etre conquise!". II a mis en evidence l'importance d'une entente entre les Etats balkaniques, solidaires par "un passe qui a contribue puissament a leur fraternisation" et, en meme temps, il a signale le fait que dans les Balkans etait constate "un 18 courant novateur, dont le but est de construire l'edifice de la paix" .
12. Ibidem, p.39; voir aussi Constantin lordan, La Turquie kemaliste et l'idee du pacte balkanique dans les annees 1925-1926, dans "Revue des etudes sud-est europeennes", 19, no 2, p.311-323. 13. Eliza Campus, op.cit., p.40. 14. Ibidem, p. 45. 15. Mehmet Ali Ekrem, op.cit, p. 40. 16. Eliza Campus, ap.cit., p.59. 17. Mehmet Ali Ekrem, op.cit., p.41. 18. N.Titulescu, Documente diplomatice.., p.467-468.

426

En fvrier 1933, la Conference de la Petite Entente deroulee Geneve decida sa reorganisation dans le sens d'une accentuation de son nite et de ses fonctions. Parallelement, des evenements internationaux inqui6tants se proflaient, ce qui poussait vers une solution aussi dans le probleme du Pacte balkanique. A Geneve, entre Titulescu et Rt Ara eurent lieu des entretiens positifs, le ministre turc invitant Titulescu Ankara et lui laissant "toute la latitude" en ce qui concernait la redaction du traite 19 de non-agression turco-roumain . D'ailleurs, Titulescu avait convaincu Paul Bancaur de la justesse des revendication turques concernant les Detroits, rendant ainsi un service important au ministre turc et la Turquie20. En juillet, la Roumanie et la Turquie compterent parmi les huit pays qui signerent a Londres la convention pour la definition de l'agression21. Entre temps, apres le traite turco-grec, fut conclu aussi le traite entre la Turquie et la Yougoslavie. Donnant site a une decision de la Conference de la Petite Entente deroulee a Sinaia, Titulescu arriva Ankara le 14 octobre 1933, sa presence etant saluee avec une evidente sympathie dans la presse turque. Le journal "Milliyet" saluait en Titulescu "non seulement l'eminent ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Roumanie, mais aussi l'un des plus importants diplomates de l'Europe contemporaine"22. Le 17 octobre fut signe le traite d'amitie, de non-agression et d'arbitrage et de conciliation. Le journal "Hakimiyeti milliye" le considerait "l'un des plus precieux anneaux de la chane de la paix balkanique"23. Dans le preambule du traite etait mentionnait "l'esprit de mutuelle confiance" des deux pays et dans le premier article on proclamait "la paix inviolable et l'amitie sincere et perpetuelle entre le Royaume de Roumanie et la Republique de Turquie"24. A l'occasion de la signature du traite, Rt Ara declara que "les peuples turc et roumain, n'ont jamais cesse dans leur existence parallele se sentir attires l'un par l'autre"; quant Titulescu, il declara que "la nation turque a, selon lui, parmi nombreux d'autres, trois qualites inestimables: un puissant sentiment national, une loyaute profonde, une generosite innee"25. II affrma encore que "I'amiti6 du peuple turc et du peuple roumain est basee sur une attraction instinctive, qui a resiste a toutes les vicissitudes de l'histoire"26. En quittant Ankara, le ministre des Affaires Etrangeres roumain confessa qu'il partait "anime d'une emotion tres forte
19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. Mehmet Ali Ekrem, op.cit., p.45. Eliza Campus, op.cit., p.91. N.Titulescu, Documente diplomatice..., p.507-510. Ion M.Oprea, Nicolae Titulescu, Bucarest, 1966, p.237. Ibidem. N. Titulescu, Documente diplomatice..., p.523-524; tout le traite': p.523-528. Mehmet Ali Ekrem, op.cit., p.46. Eliza Campus, op.cit., p. 102.

427

et tres agreable". "Tres forte, continuait-il, parce que je suis plein d'admiration face aux rsultats miraculeux obtenus par le peuple turc au cours des derniers dix ans. Tres agreable, parce que j'ai rencontre chez les dirigeants turcs une comprhension de l'esprit d'humanite qui explique tres bien la politique pacifique men6e par la Turquie par rapport aux nations du monde"27. En feVrier 1934, les quatre ministres des Affaires Etrangeres des pays balkaniques qui 6tatient arrive's une platforme commune et en plus s'etaient lies entre eux par des traites sont arrives conclure Belgrade le pacte balkanique, en le signant meme; pour donner une satisfaction la Grece - selon un telegramme envoye par Titulescu au roi Carol II 28 - on avait toutefois retarde jusqu' Athenes la conclusion officielle. Le 9 fevrier 1934 l'Entente Balkanique etait signee Athenes. Titulescu fit une declaration la presse, en soulignant que "ce trake est n realite, l'un des instruments de paix les plus puissants"29. Deux semaines plus tard, Titulescu intervenait aupres de Rstu Ara, afin que celui-ci actionne aupres de Venizelos qui s'etait engag6 dans des intrigues hostiles la ratification30. L'intervention prouvait la bonne entente qui fonctionnait entre Bucarest et Ankara et egalement entre les deux ministres. Par ailleurs, ismet nn allait envoyer un message a Venizelos, en donnant site la demarche du ministre roumain31. En mai 1934, Rt Ara, r:pondant l'invitation de Titulescu, vint Bucarest. "La Roumanie et la Turquie sont destinees pratiquer une amitie sincere et active", declara Titulescu lors du banquet offert au ministre turc. "...la rapidite' avec laquelle les rapports politiques de nos deux pays se sont intensifies, ajoutait-il, prouve que ce que nous considerions comme une verite' d'instinct, etait, au fond, un contact avec une realite invisible, mais bien proche". "Nous avons assez souffert, disait encore Titulescu. Les Balkans ont 6t6 pendant trop longtemps les champs ensanglantes d'une humanite' en folie pour que les dirigeants responsables ne se soient pose" la question : que faire pour que l'histoire ne soit plus une repetition ininterrompue d'un passe odieux?". II n'oublia pas d'ajouter encore, la fin de son discours, en levant le verre " la sante de l'illustre President de la R6publique de Turquie, Son Excellence Gazi Mustafa Kemal" et en s'adressant a Rt Ara, que "les grands dirigeants de votre pays jouissent ici de l'admiration et de Testime dont ils sont 31 dignes" . Titulescu n'oublia pas aussi d'evoquer les moments o lors des reunions internationales, les deux diplomates etaient arrives d'etablir les
27. 28. 29. 30. 31. Mehmet Ali Ekrem, op.cit, p.47. Eliza Campus, op.cit., p. 123. Ibidem.p.128. Nicolae Titulescu, Documente.., p.548. Eliza Campus, op.cit, p.133.

428

meilleures relations. "Places, en vertu des commandements de l'ordre alphabetique face face, autour d'un tapis vert, durant les longs mois de conferences de Geneve, nous evolumes tous les deux, Monsieur le Ministre, de l'observation a la sympathie, de la sympathie a l'action et de l'action l'organisation"32. A son tour, le ministre turc allait evoquer "les paroles cordiales" par lesquelles Titulescu avait soutenu l'admission de la Turquie dans la Societe" des Nations, en les consid6rant "paroles pleines 33 d'affection et de sympathie" . De Bucarest, les deux ministres partirent ensemble vers Belgrade34. Toujours au mois de mai, le ministre plenipotentiaire roumain Filotti fut reu par Atatrk, qui, selon le rapport du diplomate, "expirima beaucoup d'amitie envers la Roumanie"35. Au cours des mois suivants l'Entente Balkanique fut ratifie'e par tous les quatre partenaires. Elle entra en vigueur le 3 juin 1934, quand les quatre ministres - dont Titulescu et Rt Ara - signerent un proces-verbal Geneve36. Le 1 aot, Titulescu signa ensuite la convention militaire qui fut conclue entre son pays et la Turquie37 En automne, les representants de l'Entente Balkanique se runirent a Ankara, o furent adoptes les Statuts du nouveau organisme international. A cette occasion, lors du dner offert par Rt Ara, Titulescu tint un discours dans lequel, entre autres, il adressa un eloge la Turquie d'Atatrk. "...Vous nous avez demontre d'une maniere superbe, disait-il, comme il ete possible, sous la direction du grand dirigeant de la R6publique de Turquie, avec methode, travail et sobriete, secouer le joug du temps, en le transformant de matre en allie"38. En 1934 et dans les annees suivantes le Conseil permanent de l'Entente Balkanique tint ses reunions auxquels participa regulierement Titulescu. Entre les partenaires regnait la bonne entente et on avait aussi realise une etroite collaboration. En 1935, ensemble, Titulescu et Rt Ara eurent des entrevues avec Flandin et Laval, le premier ministre et le ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de France. Ensemble, ils s'opposerent a la tendance des grandes puissances de re"gler elles seules l'ordre international et surtout, ensemble, ils actionnerent lors de l'invasion de l'Ethiopie par l'Italie. Toujours ensemble, ils manifesterent leur fidelite au pacte de la Societe des Nations. Un tres interessant bilan sera fait part Titulescu, lors de la Conference constitutive de la presse de l'Entente Balkanique, le 11 juin 1936.
32. Nicolae Titulescu, Pledoarii pentru pace..., p.399-404. 33. Mehmet Ali Ekrem, op.cit., p.51. 34. Ibidem, p.52. 35. Ibidem, p.54. 36. Eliza Campus, op.cit., p. 141. 37. Ibidem, p. 146. 38. Nicolae Titulescu, Documente diplomatice..., p.580-582.

429

"Pourquoi, avait-il dit alors, les Turcs n'inspirent-ils que confiance et affection, pourquoi l'Anatolie rappelle-t-elle tellement certains de nos paysages et notamment ceux de mon village natal, tel point qu'en Turquie je me considere chez moi?". La reponse il la donnait lui-meme: "C'est que nous ne sommes, nous, peuples balkaniques, qu'une seule famille, que les malheurs de l'histoire ont coupe en morceaux et qu'actuellement, en nous trouvant ensemble, nous constatons journellement que nous n'avons pas faire a des etrangers qui doivent faire leurs preuves pour gagner les bien-faits de l'amitie, mais des freres qui revendiquent, d'ores et dej, leurs droits". La conclusion etait aussi significative: "Dans des cadres differents la Petite Entente et l'Entente Balkanique poursuivent des buts identiques. Par la superposition des deux Ententes, la Paix a, de Prague Ankara, 70 millions de soldats"39. Des le 10 avril 1935, le gouvernement turc avait envoye une note circulaire par laquelle il demandait aux puissances la modification des Statuts des Detroits elabores lors de la Conference de Lausanne. Le 22 juin 1936, furent inaugures les travaux de la Conference de Montreux. En avril la decision de la Turquie avait surpris Titulescu, irrite que l'initiative n'avait pas 6t6 annoncee auparavant aux allies40. Mais, des la fin du meme mois, les asperites, qui etaient en realite de surface, furent eliminees. Numan Menemencioglou, le secretaire general du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres de Turquie eut une entrevue tres cordiale avec Titulescu, la site de laquelle, par une note officielle du 29 avril 1936, adressee a la Turquie, la Roumanie se declara prete de s'engager dans le processus de negociations41. En juin, les deux organismes, la Petite Entente et l'Entente Balkanique exprimerent leur plein soutien la Turquie42. Quand les travaux de la Conference de Lausanne furent inaugures, Titulescu se pronona avec fermete en faveur des demandes de la Turquie, en declarant, des le 22 juin, que "tout ce qui touche la securite de la Turquie touche aussi la securite de la Roumanie". II ajoutait: "Je dirai que les Detroits sont le coeur de la Turquie, mais elle sont aussi en meme temps les poumons de la Roumanie", etant "ntre seule sortie vers la mer libre". En plus, il soulignait le fait que la Turquie avait eu le merite de recourir la voie legale, aux negociations, ans mettre les autres puissances devant un fait accompli et pour cela il exprimait au gouvernement turc sa "gratitude". II finissait en souhaitant la "Turquie amie et alliee": "suc43 ces, justice"! Dans une autre intervention du 9 juillet 1936, Titulescu a mis en evidence qu'il ne pouvait "concevoir un avenir ans que la Roumanie ne soit pas cte de la Turquie'>44. Enfin, le 20 juillet, toujours Ti39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. Nicolae Titulescu, Pledoarii pentru pace.., p.471-475. Eliza Campus, op.cit., p.192. Ibidem,p.l93. Ibiden. Nicolae Titulescu, Documente diplomatice.... p.780-782. Ibidem,704.

430

tulescu exprimait sa "confiance illimitee dans la loyaute de la Turquie"45. Dix jours plus tard, en faisant le bilan des relations entre les deux pays, ismet Inon manifestait la "reconnaissance" de son pays la Roumanie. "Nous avons confiance en la Roumanie et nous l'assurons qu'elle peut avoir confiance en nous", concluait-il4*. Mais Titulescu se trouvait la fin de sa brillante carriere politique et diplomatique. Le 29 aot il fut evince du gouvernement pour n'y plus revenir. En realite, le roi Carol II ne le voulait plus parmi ses ministres. En ce qui fut des rapports entre la Turquie et la Roumanie rien ne changea et en tout cas les deux pays ont continue de se trouver dans les meilleures relations, mais Titulescu ne sera plus present. Son rle historique avait cesse. Toutefois, on ne peut et on ne doit pas oublier sa contribution quant au developpement des rapports de bonne et cordiale amitie entre la Roumanie et la Turquie pendant la periode de l'entre-deux-guerres. Dans la perspective de l'histoire il reste une personnalite emblematique et un grand ami de la nation Turque.

45. Ibidem, p.802-803. 46. Eliza Campus, op.cit., p.197.

431

L'INFLUENCE DES IDEES DE MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATRK SUR L'ELITE POLITIQUE ET CULTURELLE EN ALGERIE DURANT LA PERIODE DE L'ENTRE DEUX-GUERRES
Dr. Nahas M. MAHIEDDIN* Le but c'est l'idee Mustafa Kemal Atatrk Lorsque Atatrk annonce la naissance de la Republique turque, et bien que pres d'un siecle se soit ecoule depuis que l'Algerie est separe'e de l'empire ottoman avec lequel elle a partag une partie de son histoire pendant plus de trois cents ans1, les Algeriens n'ont cesse de manifester ouvertement leur sympathie envers la Turquie, une maniere, parmi tant d'autres, pour eux d'exprimer leur refus de l'occupation coloniale. Ce sentiment apparat tant dans la chanson2 que dans des actions caractere humanitaire comme, par exemple, lors du conflit opposant la Turquie l'Italie au sujet de la Tripolitaine en 19113. Cette turcophilie "active"4,
* 1. 2. 3. niversite d'Oran. Sur cette periode, voir entre autres, Mahfoud Kaddache, L'Algirie durant la piriode ottomane, O.P.U., Alger, 1991; Voir egalement, Mouloud Gai'd, L'Algine, sous les Turcs. Ed. Mimouni, 2eme ed., Alger, 1991. J., Desparmet, La Chanson d'Alger pendant la Grande Guerre, in Revue Africaine, n 73, 1932, p.54. Sur l'initiative des Algeriens de la ville d'Oran, une souscription en faveur des bless6s ottomans a t lancee par le journal El Hack (novembre 1911). Elle a e'te' continuee par le journal L'Islam pour le dfipartement d'Alger et par des chefs religieux pour le Constantinois. L'operation a permis de r6unir la somme de 410.000 francs de 'poque. Voir C.R. Ageron, Les Musulmans algeriens et la France (1871-1919), Paris, 1968, tome II, p.1044. Selon A. Merad, Topinion musulmane en Alg6rie, ulc^ree par l'exode des centaines de familles tlemcniennes, trouva un derivatf dans la demonstration publique de turcophilie lors du conflit italo-turc propos de la Tripolitaine" qui ajoute "la mase musulmane, demeure... profonde'ment turcophile, moins ans doute par option politique consciente que par esprit de solidarit6 religieuse et attachement sentimental au Califat" (A. Merad, Le reformisme musulman en Algine de 1925 1940, ed. Mouton et C, Paris-La Haye, 1967, p. 50). J. Desparmet, La turcophilie en Algirie, in Bulletin de la Soci6t6 de Gdographie d'Alger et de l'Airique du Nord, 22e annfe, 1917, p.68. Sur le sens et les limites de

4.

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permettait aux AlgSriens de corapenser, d'une part l'absence d'un lien rompu avec un pays qui "incarnait au plus haut point les forces d'Orient"5 et d'affrmer, d'autre part une identite que les conquerants franais souhaitaient, sinon faire totalement disparatre, du moins alterer ou fortement attenuer6. C'etait done une forme dereaction que les Algeriens opposaient la logique de rupture initiee, des le debut de l'occupation, par les autorites coloniales qui avaient ordonne, par exemple, de faire disparatre les invocations contenues dans la priere du vendredi afin que le nom du Sultan ne soit plus ite7 et qui avaient tout mis en ceuvre pour couper les liens unissant 1'Algerie a un ensemble sociocul trel auquel elle appartenait depuis plus d'un millenaire. Or, c'est un lieu commun que d'affrmer que "les memes liens spirituels et temporels unissaient la population de la Regence d'Alger... a celle du bassn oriental de la Meditterranee. Hommes, idees, biens circulaient d'une extremite l'autre du monde musulman en un courant continu, malgre l'eloignement, la precarite et les difficulte's des voyages et la lenteur des moyens de transport"8. Mme les crises9 et parfois "un fort sentiment anti turc... notamment dans les tribus"10, ne pucette tureophilie, voir Ali Merad, La tureophilie dans le debat national en Algine au debut du siecle (1911-1918), in Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine, n 31-32, decembre 1983, Tunis, p.387 et suiv. 5. Jean Paul Roux, L'islam en Occident, Ed. Payot, Paris, 1959, p. 12. 6. Marcel Morand, Etudes de droit musulman algerien, Ed. A. Jourdan, Alger, 1910, p.101; P. Lucas et J.C. Vatin, L'Algerie des anthropologeus, Ed. F. Maspero, Paris, 1975, p.38. 7. C'est le g6n6ral de Bourmont (1773-1846) qui etait Ministre de la Guerre en 1829 et qui avait envahi Alger en 1830, qui est a Toriine de cette mesure. Voir Jean Serres, La politique turaue en Afriaue du Nord sous la Monarchie de Juillet. Ed. Librairie orientale P. Geuthner, Paris, 1925, p.43. En agissant ainsi, l'autorite' coloniale detruisait aussi les symboles "d'un empire qui etait l'une des plus vastes struetures politiques qu'et connue la partie occidentale du monde depuis la desintegration de l'empire romain" (Albert Hourany, A History of the the Arab Peoples, ed. Faber and Faber Ltd. Londres, 1991. Trad. franaise par Paul Chemla, Histoire des peuples arabes, ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1993, p. 289). 8. Pierre Bardin, Algeriens et Tunisiens dans I'Empire ottoman de 1848 1914. Ed. du C.N.R.S., Paris, 1979, p.l. 9. II est vrai que le rattaehement de l'Algerie l'empire ottoman ne s'est pas fait ans difficulte. "Le gouvernement de l'Algerie, ecrit l'historien turc Emin Oktay, n'echut Hzr Reis apres la mort de Baba Oru et de son frere shak Reis qu'apres une bataille contre les Arabes indigenes (Yerli araplar)". Voir Emin Oktay, Tarih. Lise 111, stanbul, Atlas Kitabevi, 1983, p.99. 10. Benjamin Stora, Histoire de l'Algerie coloniale 1830-1954. Ed. Enal-Rahma, Alger, 1996, p.12. Ces crises sont parfois la consequence de l'abus d'autorite de certains Beys, surtout dans le Constantinois pendant tout le premier tiers du XIXe siecle, mais sont liees aussi aux difficultes economiques et financieres que connaissait la Regence (Voir Mahfoud Smati, Formation de la nation algerienne. Ed. Zaiacha, Alger (s.d.), p.90.) II y a lieu de noter aussi l'hostilite' envers les Turcs de certains "marabouts" et autres "mystiques" (Voir Kamel Filali, Sainteti maraboutique et mysticisme. Contribution l'&tude du mouvement maraboutiaue en Algine sous la domination ottomane. These, faculte des Sciences historiques de I'universit6 de Strasbourg, 1995). Mais il faut souligner neanmoins que "les cheikhs de confreries ou de confederations religieuses furent longtemps les instruments les plus efficaces de la caste militaire turque" qui trouva appui galement au niveau de certaines tribus comme les

434

rent entamer la sympathie des Algeriens envers les Turcs. Si, en fait, de nombreuses regions sont restees independantes du pouvoir central" et si un certain relchement des liens entre la Sublime Porte et Alger etait observable, la souverainete des Sultans n'a jamais, pour autant, ete remise en cause12. C'est pourquoi au lendemain de l'occupation franaise, les Algeriens, tout en organisant la resistance, ne cesseront de proclamer leur "obedience vis vis du Souverain ottoman, Roi des Musulmans"13. Ainsi, cet etat des choses et tous ces 6venements n'ont pas eu la longue comme conse"quence et pour autant "une volonte de sortir du cadre fix6 par les Ottomans"14. Les Algriens et les Turcs restaient fortement lies15, les premiers esperant toujours en la Turquie, seule "capable, selon eux, d'apporter nouveau 1'homme providentiel"16 en suivaient avec attention et inquietude tous les developpements de la situation que vivait l'Empire17. L'attachement au Califat ottoman etait certainement aussi l'expresDouairs et les Smala en Oranie (Voir Marcel Emerit, L'Algerie l'epoaue d'Abdelkader, 6d Larose, Paris 1951, p.10; Emir Abdelkader, Mudhakirt, (Memoires de l'Emir Abdelkader), ed. Dr al-Umma, l 6 r e 6d., Alger, 1994, p.108, cit6 par M. Smati, Les elites algeriennes sous la colonisation, tome 1, ed. Dahlab, Alger, 1998, p.30) et dont certains membres, en retour, se virent octroyer des fonctions administratives sous l'autorite du Bey Mohamed el K6bir (1779-1796) Oran (Voir Mohamed ben Abdelkader, Tuhfat al-z'ir ed. Dr al-Yakaza, Beyrouth, 1964, p.217, ite par M. Smati, Les elites.., op. cit., p.30). Sur cette meme question pour l'Est du pays, voir M. Emerit,L'Algerie..., op. cit., p.237. Sur le systeme de gouvernement de 1'Algerie ottomane, voir un bon resume dans Andre Raymond, Lesprovinces arabes (XVIe-XVIIIe siecles) in Histoire de l'Empire ottoman (sous la direction de Robert Mantran), ed. A. Fayard, 1989, p.404 et suiv. Par ailleurs, il y a lieu de relever que les Turcs n'etaient plus tres nombreux au debut du XIXe siecle (environ 15 000 hommes). Certaines archives, notamment celles remontant la seconde moitie du XVIIIeme siecle, confirment cette impression de relative autonomie de la Regence d'Alger vis vis de la Porte sur les plans politique et diplomatique malgr 1'allgeance religieuse affirmee des autorites d'Alger envers le Sultan ottoman. Voir smet Terki-Hassaine, Relations entre Alger et Constantinople sous le gouvermement du Dey Mohamed Ben Othmane Pacha (1766-1791) selon les sources espagnoles, in Osmanl Tarihi Aratrma ve Uygulama Merkezi (OTAM), Ankara niversitesi, n 5, 1994, p. 181. Petition des habitants de Constantine adressee au Parlament britannique en janvier 1834, citee par J. Serres, op. cit., p.132. Voir egalement la lettre redigee le 3 aot 1837 par Hadj Ahmed, Bey de Constantine au Sultan ottoman: "...Le pays est le vtre, ses gens sont les vtres aussi, nous sommes de fideles et obeissants serviteurs de Votre Majeste imperiale..." (A. Temimi, Le Beylik de Constantine et Hadj Ahmed Bey (1830-1837), Tunis, 1978, p.256, ite par A. Raymond, Les provinces arabes..., article precite, p.256). B. Stora, Histoire..., op. cit. op., p.12. M. Smati, Formation..., op. cit. p.94. D'ailleurs, on peut admettre l'ide'e que les peuples de l'Empire ottoman et ce, "jusqu'au debut du XXe siecle, pensaient plus reformer l'Empire que le detruire, car les peuples qui le composaient taient conscients... que l'Empire representait une civilisation commune". Dimitri Kitsikis, L'Empire ottoman, coll. "Que sais-je?", P.U.F., Paris, 3e ed., 1994, p. 109-110. B. Stora, Histoire... op. cit., p.13. C'est ainsi que l'on peut live que "les Algeriens sont perturbe's par la conquete de la Tripolitaine turque par l'Italie..." (p.21), que durant l'annee 1917, "on s'inquiete des faits qui se droulent dans l'Empire ottoman, menace de demembrement par les Al-

11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17.

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sion d'une certaine nostalgie, car la population algerienne n'a vait pas d'autre espoir, sinon l'attachement aux symboles. C'est pourquoi, "les portraits de Mehmet V, le Sultan-Calife sont accroches dans les moindres bourgades"18. Ce mouvement s'amplifie avec le temps pour atteindre son apogee avec la premiere guerre mondiale. "La turcophilie, ecrit Mahfoud Smati, devient une sorte d'ide'ologie en Algerie"19 et touche toutes les couches de la population, ans qu'elle ait pour autant une seule et meme signification pour tous. Raisons religieuses et raisons politiques se melent pour les uns mais non pour d'autres. Neanmoins, pour tous, elle exprime une appartenance identitaire et une personnalite" distinctes de celle du colonisateur20, tant et si bien que pour certains observateurs, la turcophilie des Alge"riens "est un phnomene social total qui explique tous les mouvements qui agitent la societe algerienne. La confiance que les indigenes de 1'Algerie font a la Sublime Porte est l'une des causes principales de l'opposition que nous rencontrons dans leurs mes" ecrivait l'un d'eux21. Le jugement est certainement exagere, mais il montre bien le profond attachement des Algeriens aux Ottomans, attachement d'ailleurs entretenu par la presence dans l'Empire d'emigres algeriens (dont le nombre augmente sensiblement au dbut du XXe siecle) et qui occupent parfois de hautes fonctions dans l'Administration et dans l'armee ottomanes. Certains d'entre eux s'engagent dans la vie politique de l'Empire, notamment au moment o les Jeunes Turcs arrivent au pouvoir22, d'autres exercent des metiers qualifies comme ingenieurs, medecins, ete...23. II est done evident que cette situation n'etait pas seulement due une quelconque sympathie entre les deux nations. Elle coneretisait, en quelque sorte, une forme de fdelite au passe tant lointain que plus recent. II
18. 19. 20. 21. 22. H6&..." (p.25) et qu'" en octobre 1918, la capitulation de la Turquie les bouleverse..." (p.29) in Jacques Simon, Messali Hadj (1898-1974), 6d. Tiresias, Paris, 1998. B. Stora, Histoire..., op. cit., p.43. M. Smati, Les ilites..., op. cit., p.258. A. Merad, La turcophilie..., art. pr6cite, p. J. Desparmet, La turcophilie en Algerie, in Bulletin de la Societe de g6ographie d'Alger et de l'Afrique du Nord, 2e partie, XXIIe annee, 1917, ite" par M. Smati, Les lites..., op. cit., p.259. Si l'on se limite aux seuls enfants de l'Emir Abdelkader, l'ane, Mohammed, devient senateur de l'Empire (il meurt en 1913), le second, Monieddine, fa& Constantinople, est nomm gdnral de division titre honorifique et aide de camp du Sultan, sera lui aussi membre du S6nat. Abdelmalek fait carriere dans l'armee ottomane et atteint le grade de lieutenant-colonel avec le titre d'aide de camp du Sultan. Le sixieme enfant d'Abdelkader (qui dpouse la soeur de izzet Pacha, chambellan et favori du Sultan Abdulhamid) devient, sous le gouvernement des Jeunes Turcs, Prdsident du Comit6 Union et Progres de Damas et est meme charge par la Porte d'organiser la resistance contre les Italiens en Tripolitaine. II devient en 1913 dpute et vice-president de la nouvelle Assembld Constantinople. Revue du Monde Musulman, n5, juin-juillet 1907, in M. Smati, Les elites..., op. cit., p, 257. Notons, par exemple, que parmi les tous premiers professeurs nommes l'Ecole Superieure de la Marine, fondee dans les annes 1870, il y avait un Algerien "qui connaissait des langues europ^ennes" (A. Hourani, Al Filer al'arabf 'Ar alNahda. 1798-1939. Trad. arabe Karm 'Azkl. Ed. Diyar al-Nahr li-nasr. Beyrouth, 2e eU, 1977, p.61.

23.

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est utile d'ailleurs de rappeler que "la Turquie n'a jamais reconnu officiellement la domination de la France sur l'Algerie"24. Des 1830 les autorites de la Porte affrmaient aupres de l'Ambassade de France la suzerainet du Sultan sur la Rgence25. Encore en 1835, celui-ci continuait de declarer que "les Regences de Tripoli, de Tunis et d'Alger lui appartenaient"26 et enfin l'on pouvait observer que jusqu'au debut du XXeme siecle, les cartes qui ornaient les bureaux des hauts fonctionnaires de Constantinople portaient l'inscription "Afrique du Nord Ottomane" de la Tripolitaine la frontiere marocaine27. Par ailleurs, si le peuple algerien manifestait ouvertement son attachement au Sultan parce qu'il symbolisait la plus haute autorite en islam d'une part et la Turquie, parce qu'elle "representait egalement sur la scene internationale une grande puissance" 28 d'autre part, les Turcs de leur cte ne cessaient de denoncer dans les
24. P. Bardin, Algeriens et Tunisiens..., op. cit., p.27 et p.205. Sur le plan international, notons egalement que le gouvemement britannique considere, encore en 1853, l'Algerie comme une dpendance ottomane (P. Bardin, Algeriens et Tunisiens..., op. cit., p.35). 25. Archives du Ministere franais des Affaires etrangeres, Serie Turquie, Correspondance politique (1830-1896), Depeche de l'Ambassade de France du 30 decembre 1830 relatant un entretien avec le Ministre turc des Affaires etrangeres, citee par P. Bardin, op. cit., p.61. 26. Extrait de correspondance transmise au Bey de Tunis par le Sultan ottoman, ite par J. Serres, op. cit., p.137. Meme lors de l'insurrection de 1871 des "khouan de la confrerie Rahmanya sous l'autorite' du Cheikh al-Haddad et ses fils avec le Bachagha", il apparat que la Porte continuait de mener une politique avec pour objectif de mettre fin l'occupation de l'Algerie par l'armee franaise. En effet et selon des lettres decouvertes depuis quelques annees dans les Archives turques d'lstanbul, on apprend qu'une Association musulmane de bienfaisance algerienne ("al-am'iya alkhayriya al-slmiya") est entre en relation avec le Grand Vizir Aly Pacha dont elle obtient encouragement et une promesse d'aide. Mais, celui-ci meurt en decembre 1871 et aucune site n'est donnee cet accord car il semble que le successeur Mohammed Nadim Pacha ne soit pas interesse par une nouvelle action politique ottomane en Mediterranee occidentale. Voir A. Temimi, Buht wa wak'ik, Ed. Dr alTunusiya 2 e 6d., Tunis, 1980, p.6 ite par Mahfoud Smati, Les elites algeriennes sous la colonisation, tome 1, Ed. Dahlab, Alger, 1998, p.72. II est vrai qu' l'Ouest de la Mediterrane'e, Alger ne constituait plus "une place forte contre l'expansion espagnole" comme c'etait le cas quelques siecles auparavant o la ville tait le centre de pouvoir ottoman le plus important du Maghreb, car il etait "capital pour le Sultan... de maintenir un solide poste frontiere l'ouest l'epoque de cette expansion. Alger etait alors le port d'attache d'une force navale ottomane qui dfendait les interets de l'Empire en Mdditerranee occidentale... comme elle etait aussi le siege d'une importante concentration de janissaires peut etre la plus grande de l'empire hors d'lstanbul" (Albert Hourani, A History ofthe Arab Peoples, ed Faber and Faber Ltd., Londres, 1991. Trad. franaise par Paul Chemla, Histoire des peuples arabes, ed, du Seuil, Paris, 1993, p. 302, 307). 27. Charles-Andre Julien, Histoire de l'Algerie contemporaine. P.U.F., Paris, 2 6 m e 6d., 1977, p.l. Le fait que la Turquie continue de conside'rer l'Algerie comme une province ottomane entrane un certain nombre de difficultes avec us autorite's franaises propos de la situation juridique des Algdriens etablis dans l'Empire. Les autorites turques les considerant comme Ottomans, la France comme sujets franais (P. Bardin, Algeriens et Tunisiens..., op. cit., p.27, 38-39, 40-41). 28. Ali Merad, L'slam contemporain, coll. "Que sais-je?". Ed. Dahlab, Alger, 5* ed., 1995, p.25.

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journaux les exactions des Franais contre les Algeriens29 et de repondre certains articles de la presse franaise, notamment lorsqu'elle pretendait deTendre les droits des Algeriens etablis en Turquie, mais en fait avec l'intention de contrecarrer la politique d'ottomanisation menee par le Sultan Abdulhamid30. Ainsi, le peuple turc manifestait egalement sa sympathie et sa solidarite avec la resistance organisee par l'Emir Abdelkader, meme si elle apparaissat sous une forme quelque peu pittoresque parfois mais qui ne manquait pas de surprendre les etrangers31. C'est dans cette ambiance, qui caracterisait tant le debut du vingtieme siecle, qu'apparaissent trois personnages aux origines et aux parcours differents mais qui, en fait, se completent dans la mesure o ils etaient representatifs des differentes composantes de la population et o chacun d'eux cristallisait et exprimait ses aspirations. "...Ferhat Abbas, exemple de l'evolue, instruit dans le tradition franaise,.. symbole... de l'emergence de la mobilite sociale des elites et des notables: intellectuel lucide.. il prche la conciliation et la synthese...; Abdelhamid Ben Badis, figre emblematique... de l'Islam algerien, ... pere du personnalisme musulman algerien..., et Messali Hadj, autodidacte, parti de l'immigration..., expression plebeienne du declassement social de la societe algerienne"32. Bien qu'issus de milieux differents et ayant suivi des parcours, dont le moins qui puisse etre dit est qu'ils ne sont pas toujours convergents parce que ne partageant pas une mSme ideologie ou n'ayant pas toujours une meme apprehension des problemes de la societe, les trois hommes representaient bien une epoque et partageaient avec la population algerienne ce sentiment de turcophilie plus haut decrit et notamment la meme admiration pour Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, non seulement pour le soldat nationaliste qu'il etait mais aussi pour l'homme politique qui se revelera par la site et qui permettra la Turquie de sauvegarder son independance et d'entrer de plain-pied dans le XXeme siecle. Cette attitude commune aux trois
29. A tel point que parfois l'Ambassade de France dans la capitale ottomane intervenait pour faire modrer les critiques lancees contre la politique franaise au Maghreb par certains journaux turcs (P. Bardin, op. cit., p.l 16). 30. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que repondant un article du journal Le Temps (du 10 septembre 1910), le journal Le Jeune Turc (du 14 septembre 1910) re"torque: "avant de pretendre vous occuper en Turquie des Algeriens qui fuient votre joug, pensez done leur accorder ehez eux les liberte's qui leur reviennent" (P. Bardin, Algeriens et Tunisiens..., op. cit., p. 197). 31. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que dans un des marehes de Ramadan (sergi), en l'occurrence celui qui se tenait dans la cour de la mosquee de Beyazid, les passants pouvaient voir "de mauvaises lithographies relatives la conquete de l'Algerie: elles representaient des Arabes tranehant la tete d'un general franais, et des lanciers franais se vengeant sur les partisans d'Abdelkader" in Charles White, Three years in Constantinople or domestic manners ofthe Turks in 1844. Londres, 1845, p.209, ite par Franois Georgeons, Le Ramadan stanbul. De l'Empire la Ripubliaue, in Vivre dans l'Empire ottoman. Sociabits et relations intereommunautaires (XVIIIe-XlXe siecles), L'Harmattan, 1997, p.59. 32. Benjamin Stora et Zakya Daoud, Ferhat Abbas. Une autre Algirie. Casbah eU Alger, 1995, p. 100.

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homraes envers Atatrk exprime d'une part le sentiment de sympathie de tous les Algeiiens envers la Turquie qui n'a en rien change malgre' la Revolution operee dans ce pay s apres la chute de l'Empire, et c'est la une preuve qu'il s'agit d'une sympathie pour la Turquie et pour le peuple turc et non pas seulement pour la personne du Sultan ou du Calife, et d'autre part l'admiration de celui qui concretise le mieux et le plus effcacement le nationalisme et l'amour de l'independance et de la liberte" mais aussi et pour beaucoup, le modernisme Mais si la sympathie peut expliquer partiellement l'attitude de la societe dans son ensemble, elle reste insuffisante quand il s'agit d'analyser et de comprendre celle de l'elite. En effet, cette derniere est censee ne peut asseoir son point de vue et ses preferences sur les seuls sentiments. Aussi, les convergences de points de vue et d'opinions et les idees communes exprimees par les uns et les autres, revelent-elles un partage de reference commune ou une influence mutuelle et r6ciproque des uns sur les autres, si ce n'est le resultat d'un mimetisme dont les facteurs peuvent etre multiples. II nous parat done opportun d'essayer de montrer que cette convergence d'idees, d'opinions et de principes d'action entre certains elements de l'elite algerienne de cette epoque et Mustafa Kemal Atatrk est due beaucoup plus a une relative similitude de la situation politique, economique et sociale entre la Turquie et l'Algerie, ainsi qu' l'attachement des references culturelles communes qu' un mimetisme motive par la seule admiration envers un homme. Nous tenterons ensuite de proceder une comparaison des aetions menees par les uns et les autres pour etre en mesure de determiner non seulement l'importance, mais aussi les limites de l'influence de Mustafa Kemal Atatrk sur les representants de la societ6 algeiienne au cours de la periode de l'entre deux guerres. References culturelles communes et similitude des situations. Tout d'abord, il nous faut faire remarquer que Ferhat Abbas, Abdelhamid Ben Badis, Messali Hadj et Mustafa Kemal Atatrk appartiennent 33 tous, une decade pres, la meme generation , bien que ce dernier soit leur ane. Generation cheval entre la fin du XIXe siecle et le debut du XXeme, elle vit une periode critique et riche en evenements pour le monde musulman en general. Dans ces regions, dej l'Algerie est une colonie franaise depuis pres d'un siecle et la Turquie se libere peu peu mais non ans difficulte d'un Empire qui se meurt. Ces deux pays sont situes dans une region qui interesse les "grands" de l'epoque et comme Tecrit Gerard Khoury, "c'est le moment au cours duquel les grandes puissances sont passees de la question d'orient ottomane la question d'orient arabe"34. Aussi, ce qui s'y passe interesse autant la Turquie, ac33. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk est ne en 1881 et Abdelhamid Ben Badis en 1889. Messali Hadj est ne" en 1898 et Ferhat Abbas en 1899. 34. Gerard Khoury, Le demembrement de l'Empire ottoman: question d'Orient ou d'Occident? in Les nouvelles questions d'Orient. Hachette, 1991, p.9.

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teur central des e"ve"nements du moment, que 1'Algerie, parce que faisant partie du monde arabe et ayant egalement fait partie de l'empire ottoman. L'Algerie, dej victime du partage en cours, ne peut done rester insensible ce qui se passe plus specialement en Turquie, pour les raisons dej evoquees et parce que c'est le pays en qui certains ont pendant longtemps esp6r6 une intervention salvatrice. C'est pourquoi il n'est pas surprenant d'observer, tant au niveau de la societe" en general qu'au niveau de l'elite, que les evenements qui se deYoulent dans ce pays sont suivis avec attention et sont commentes meme au cours des reunions familiales35. Ainsi, en 1911, la conquete de la Tripolitaine turque par l'Italie inquiete les Algeriens, tout comme d'une maniere plus generale "ils s'inquietent des faits qui se deroulent dans l'Empire ottoman, menace de demembrement par les Allies"36, et les defaites de la Turquie sont vecues comme des catastrophes37. Toute la socite algerienne vit au rythme d'istanbul et lorsque les troupes turques sont enfin victorieuses, c'est toute la jeunesse algerienne des annees vingt qui vibre38 comme lors de "l'evacuation de Constantinople en 1922 qui est saluee par des explosions de joie et o les etudiants des medersas manifestent en affichant les portraits de Mustafa Kemal"39. Beaucoup plus qu'un heros, Mustafa Kemal apparaissait done comme un nouveau symbole de la liberte et de l'independance. L'eloignement physique entre les deux pays n'interdisait pas pour autant un engouement sentimental que l'histoire explique en partie, et n'empechait pas non plus une circulation des informations, et par l meme des idees, meme si "apres la premiere guerre mondiale, les nouvelles sont lentes transmettre"40. En rlalite", les hommes se de"plaaient plus ou moins facilement et les journaux edites en Orient etaient lus en Algerie malgre" le contrle de l'administration coloniale.
35. Jacques Simon, Messali Hadj (1898-1974), la passion de l'Algerie libre. Ed. Tiserias, Paris, 1998, p.29. 36. J. Simon, Messali Hadj..., p.25. 37. J. Simon, Messali Hadj.., p.29. C'est notamment la cas lors de l'occupation de Constantinople au cours de la fin de l'annee 1918 et surtout lorsque le general Franchet d'Esperay, qui prend le commandement de TArmde d'Orient en fvrier 1919, se rend l'Ambassade de France sur un cheval blanc offert par un Grec, rappel quelque peu vengeur des 6v6nements survenus en 1453 dans cette ville (Jean Bernachot, Les armees alliies en Orient apres Varmistice de 1918, 4 vol., 1972-1978, tome II, p.12). Cet eve'nement est appre'hende' avec une sensibilite' acerue par les Algeriens, d'autant que ce gen6ral est Franais, done soldat du pays colonisateur, et est ne Mostaganem, une ville situee sur la cte ouest de l'Algerie, done representant de cette colonisation. 38. J. Simon, Messali Hadj..., p.33. 39. B. Stora et Z. Daoud, Ferhat Abbas. Une autre Algerie. Casbah ed., Alger 1995, p.35. A l'occasion de cet 6v6nement, Ferhat Abbas, dan un article date de novembre 1922, paru dans le journal constantinois Le Trait d'Union, crit "...en effet, nos elus se f61iciterent de la victoire du peuple turc -dont le seul erime est d'etre musulman-, victoire obtenue au prix de combien de sacrifces contre la cupidite du capitalisme europeen, celui de la France, helas! en bonne place" (cit in A. Merad, Le reformisme..., op. cit., p. 50). 40. G. Khoury, Le demembrement..., article precit, p.9.

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Mais au-del de cette ambiance, l'Algerie et la Turquie, bien que les circonstances historiques soient differentes, vivaient une mSme situation politique de faiblesse par rapport l'Occident. En effet et bien que les raisons soient differentes, l'Algerie et la Turquie etaient dans une situation tant politique qu'economique et sociale difficile. Aussi, dans ces deux pay s, l'elite etait amenee reflechir sur les causes de cette situation et sur la maniere d'y remedier. Or, cette epoque, cette reflexion se faisait partir de l'observation du developpement de l'Europe qui supposait (et qui s'appuyait sur) une puissance militaire et economique certaine. On voulait done en comprendre les conditions et choisir les meilleurs moyens qui permettraient de realiser cette evolution necessaire41. Aussi, n'est-il pas surprenant d'observer un changement dans les idees, notamment au cours de la seconde moitie du XVIIIe siecle. Idees alimentees d'ailleurs par la Revolution franaise, mais attentivement suivies en Turquie42. L'eVenement n'etait pas non plus ignore en Algerie43. Neanmoins, pour ce qui est de la Turquie, avant Atatrk, tous les changements proposees etaient de portee limitee par la crainte de provoquer l'opposition ouverte des traditionalistes conservateurs, notamment dans le domaine juridique, en evitant d'introduire une quelconque modification a la legislation d'inspiration musulmane en vigueur44. Mais "les premieres reformes initiees par les Sultans Selim III -17891807- et Mahmut II -1808-1839-, puis le mouvement general de reorganisation connu sous le nom de Tanzimat, qui fait site l'edit imperial de Glhane de 1839, (et qui) prennent un tour technique accentue... engen (drent) (neanmoins) un phenomene de secularisation politique et sociale45.... (qui) debouche sur un renforcement de l'Etat et des pouvoirs du Sultan (et affaiblit) les autorites religieuses et leurs competences traditionnelles", meme si cette evolution n'etait pas, l'epoque, inspiree par un quelconque sentiment antireligieuK46. Toutefois, l'opposition et l'iner41. La decadence du monde musulman est perue par les Musulmans eux-memes des le debut du XVIIeme siecle. Voir A. Hourani, Al Fikr al 'Arabi ...op. cit., p.60. 42. A. Hourani, Al Fikr.., op. cit., p.61. Voir galement Bernard Lewis, The impact ofthe French Revolution on Turkey. J. World, Hist., 1953, p.105. 43. Voir Hamdan Khodja, Le Miroir, ed. Sindbad, Paris, 1985. Introduction de A. Djeghoul. On peut y lire que "les citadins (Algrois) sont largement ouverts sur l'Europe" (p.14). L'auteur du Miroir, Hamdan Khodja (mort istanbul en 1842) a 6t6 un conseiller du Dey Hussein, Polyglotte, il voyage beaucoup en Europe et en Orient. Professeur de Droit Alger, c'est aussi un homme de double culture, en turc et en arabe et a redige plusieurs ouvrages. D ne cache pas son attrait pour la modernite' europeenne et sa pensee politique est nourrie des principes de la Rdvolution franaise (Introduction, p. 15 et suiv). 44. N. Berkes, Historical Background of Turkish secularism, in R. Frye, islam and the West. The Hague, 1957, p.56. 45. "Les Tanzimat ont ete tres loin dans l'invention d'un modele de lacite assez original" ecrit Olivier Abel in La condition ldique. Reflexions sur le probleme de la la'icit en Turquie et en France, CEMOTI, p. 42. 46. J.P. Burdy et J. Marcou, La'icite/Laiklik: Introduction, in "Laicite en France et en Turquie", Cahiers d'etudes sur la M6diterran6e et le monde tureo-iranien (CEMOTI), n 19, 1995, p. 15.

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tie des milieux traditionalistes faisaient que la demarche du pouvoir restait ans grande portee pratique47. Au contraire, avec la Revolution menee par Mustafa Kemal, les changements se realisaient et de faon plus radicale tant dans le domaine politique et economique que juridique et culturel. L'impact des 6venements de Turquie etait grand dans le monde en general et dans le monde musulman en particulier. Les Algeriens suivaient evidemment ce mouvement, meme si l'epoque l'elite eclairee se limitait quelques individualites et que l'information circulait difficilement en raison des entraves apportees par l'Administration coloniale entre 1'Algerie et les pay s d'Orient48. Dans les milieux algeriens, les nouvelles de ce qui se passait en Turquie, suscitaient autant d'admiration que d'espoirs et faisaient l'objet de discussions, certes passionnees, mais ans plus. La raison est que le pouvoir politique et de decision etaient aux mains des etrangers. II n'en demeurait pas moins que l'action ainsi menee dans la nouvelle Turquie par Mustafa Kemal interessait les Musulmans d'AlgeYie parce qu'ils y voyaient un exemple utile et opportun pour eux. II est remarquable d'ailleurs d'observer que les milieux colonialistes franais donnaient, cette epoque, une image negative de Mustafa Kemal parce que le personnage maintenait en eveil le nationalisme algerien, ce qui n'etait evidemment pas du got des europeens d'Algerie49. Ainsi, "le journal Le Temps du 24 juillet 1920 considere avec epouvante le manifeste de Mustafa Kemal qui appelait le monde de 1'islam s'unir avec les communistes pour combattre les puissances imperialistes"50. II n'est done pas etonnant que des leaders comme Ferhat Abbas, Abdelhamid Ben Badis ou Messali Hadj, qui suivaient l'evolution politique et sociale en Turquie, aient leurs points de vue au sujet de l'action de Mustafa Kemal tout comme ils avaient conscience du profit qu'ils peuvaient en tirer dans le cadre de leur propre aetivite sociale et politique en Algerie et ce d'autant que la philosophie qui sous tendait l'action du nouvel homme fort en Turquie ne leur etait pas totalement etrangere. En
47. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que l'application du nouveau Code de commerce a ete retarde, les, milieux religieux considlrant qu'il abordait des domaines dej regis par le droit musulman et qu'il etait done superflu de legife'rer nouveau (Voir A. Hourani, AlFikr..., op. cit., p. 68). 48. Les journaux moyen-orientaux entraient elandestinement en Algdrie par la Tunisie et le Maroc ou l'occasion du pelerinage la Mecque (A. Merad, La formation de la presse musulmane en Algerie. IBLA, n" 105, l e r trim. 1964, p. 23) en raison de l'interdietion qui frappait les journaux etrangers ainsi que ceux publies en langue arabe en Algerie au cours de la premiere guerre mondiale (M. Kaddache, Histoire du nationalisme algerien, ed. ENAL, Alger, 2e 6d., 1993, tome I, p. 38). Des informations sont egalement apportes par des migrants revenant de Turquie qui racontent ce qui se passe dans ce pays dans les annees vingt (B. Stora, Messali Hadj..., op. cit., p. 37). 49. Nahas M. Mahieddin, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk dans la presse en Alge'rie durant la piriode coloniale. Communication presentee l'occasion du IHeme Colloque international sur Atatrk. Lefkoe (R6publique turque de Chypre du Nord), 5-6 novembre 1995, sous l'egide du Atatrk Aratrma Merkezi (Ankara-Turquie). 50. J. Simon, Messali Hadj..., op. cit., p.33.

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effet, il y a un de"nominateur commun auquel tant Mustafa Kemal que F. Abbas, Messali Hadj et A. Ben Badis faisait continuellement reference. C'est la Revolution franaise. Pour Mustafa Kemal, cette Revolution "a repandu dans le monde entier l'idee de la liberte... La democratie turque a suivi la voie ouverte par la Revolution franaise"51. Les leaders algeriens reposeront leur action sur ces memes idees. Mais si cette reference parat evidente pour un Ferhat Abbas qui a eu le privilege de parcourir avec succes un cursus scolaire et universitaire complet dans les institutions de l'education franaise et pour un Messali Hadj, dont la formation, meme si elle est celle d'un autodidacte, reste puisee dans la culture franaise. La surprise vient, par contre, d'un personnage forme et eduque la culture arabe et islamique. En effet, A. Ben Badis, qui a fait des etudes primaires traditionneles (etde du Coran et de la langue arabe, puis frequentation de la Zaytuna a Tunis)52 situait, lui aussi, son action au sein de cette meme philosophie a Toriine de la Revolution franaise et on retrouve les memes accents kemalistes dans l'editorial du premier numero de son journal Al-Muntakid: "Nous avons prealablement declare' que nous menerons ntre tche avec le soutien de la France democratique, cette France qui a repandu les lumieres de sa civilisation sur toute la Terre..."5i. II semblait done admis par l'elite algerienne de l'entre deux guerres que le contexte politique et social en Algerie est semblable celui de la Turquie et qu'une meme demarehe pouvait etre entreprise dans ces deux pays pour mettre en place des institutions qui reposent sur une meme philosophie. L'ceuvre d'Atatrk avait done une fonetion legitimante aux yeux des Algeriens, car elle expurgeait ces idees et ces institutions etrangeres de leur contenu symbolique exclusivement occidental et les isolait du contexte de domination coloniale qu'elles pouvaient vehiculer en raison des situations historiques particulieres. Mais cette demarehe impliquait par ailleurs l'acceptation du systeme normatif qui decoulait logiquement de ces principes revolutionnaires, un systeme etranger aux societes de tradition islamique. Neanmoins, l'exemple d'Atatrk permettait de l'inscrire legitimement dans la culture algerienne, comme il a pu s'inserire dans la culture turque, toutes deux fortement marqu6es par l'Islam. La specificite de l'environnement culturel et sociologique n'etait done pas forcement consideree comme un obstacle l'adoption d'une nouvelle pensee politique, d'un nouvel ordre social ou meme d'une nouvelle demarehe intellectuelle. Les idees de la Revolution franaise ne sont pas apprehend6es comme des lements de differenciation et leur adoption par la Turquie est
51. Dclaration faite en 1928. Akil Aksan, Citations de Mustafa Kemal Atatrk. Ankara, 1981, p.50. 52. Sur la vie et l'oeuvre de Abdelhamid Ben Badis, voir Ali Merad, Ibn Badis, commentateur du Coran. Ed. Sned, Alger-Oran et P. Geuthner, Paris, 1971; A. M6rad, Le Reformisme musulman en Algerie de 1925 1940. Ed. Mouton et Co, Paris-La Haye, MCMLXVII; Sabri Hizmetli, Cezayir Bamszlk Mcadelesi nderi Bin Badis. Trkiye Diyanet Vakf Yaynlan, Ankara, 1994. 53. C'est nous qui soulignons. Journal Al-Muntaqid, ite in A. M6rad, Ibn Badis commentateur du Coran. Ed. Sned, Alger-Oran et P. Geuthner, Paris, 1971, p.38.

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une de"monstration de leur ad6quation une socie'te' musulmane qui se voulait moderne. II ne faut neanmoins pas penser que les leaders algeriens de cette epoque avaient des ides bien arretes quant la maniere de concretiser cet ideal. Leur demarche militante evoluait dans un contexte colonial et leur objectif premier etait d'obtenir le plus rapidement possible des droits en faveur des Algeriens dans le cadre des institutions legales. II est toutefois remarquable d'observer que leurs echecs ne les font pas desesperer de l'idal enseigne par la Republique et il est permis de penser que l'action de chacun d'eux etait aussi de nourrir et d'entretenir cet ideal, pour garder foi et confiance en l'avenir. La mise en oeuvre concrete n'etait pas encore l'ordre du jour, et s'ils avaient eu diriger le pays, nul doute alors que l'application de tous ces principes aurait necessairement pris en consideration les realites sociales et culturelles de l'Algerie. Car, meme Mustafa Kemal, qui affirme s'inspirer de la Revolution franaise, precise que "ses idees n'ont fait qu'ouvrir une voie qui s'est developpee selon les caracteres qui sont propres la Turquie, car chaque nation realise ses reformes en tenant compte de la situation et des conditions du milieu social de l'e'poque considereV54, mais "si les pays sont differents, declare Atatrk, la civilisation est une et pour pouvoir progresser, une nation doit prendre part cette civilisation unique"55. Par consequent, toute societe\ peut tout en gardant sa specificite, adherer a des principes devenus universels, et faire ainsi partie de la Civilisation. Ainsi, tant en Algerie qu'en Turquie, une distinction est operee entre la France des Lumieres, des droits de 1'Homme et de la Liberte, porteuse de la civilasiton de la France representee par les colons qui refusent de reconnatre aux Algeriens mme les droits les plus elementaires56, ou par des penseurs ou des politiciens soucieux de conquetes et de domination travers le monde. Cette adoption d'un modele politique et culturel etranger et des valuers occidentales au moment meme o l'Occident mene une 57 politique d'hegemonie en Mediterranee en fonction de ses seuls interets ans prendre aucunement en consideration ceux des pays qu'il domine ou souhaite dominer (et l'Algerie et la Turquie en font partie) signifie qu'ils
54. A. Aksan, Citations..., op. cit., p.50. 55. A. Aksan, Citations..., op. cit., p.55. 56. Ainsi, et pour ne citer que ce seul exemple, le premier vceu des colons, 6mis au cours de leur Congres qui s'est tenu le 21 mars 1908 est fort clair: "l'instruction primaire des indigenes doit etre supprim^e" (C.R. Ageron, Les Musulmans algeriens.., op. cit., tome, 2, p.162). En 1921, sur une population algerienne estime'e 4.923.186 habitants, seul 43.460 fr6quentaient le systeme educatif (du primaire au sup6rieur) soit moins de 1% de cette population. Par contre, pour une population europ6enne comptant 791.370 personnes, 132.993 dtaient inscrites dans les etablissements scolaires primaires, secondaires et supdrieurs, soit plus de 16%. (M. Kaddache, Histoire du nationalisme..., op. cit., tome I, p.38). 57. Ce qui radicalise davantage les mouvements nationalistes dans cette rgion du monde et notamment en Turquie (Sergio Vallejo, El movimiento nacionalista turco durante elperiodo de entreguerras, in revue, Awrq, vol. XVII, Madrid, 1996, p.43).

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sont apprecies en tant que tels, qu'ils seront tt ou tard mis en oeuvre et que cette situation de domination n'est que conjoncturelle et qu'elle cessera. Attitude certes idealiste, elle n'en constitue pas moins l'expression d'une croyance bien ancree dans les esprits. "Les institutions fondees sur l'esclavage des nations sont partout condamnes s'ecrouler" declare Atatrk58. Optimisme et mise en perspective a long terme apparaissent en effet tant chez les leaders algeriens que chez Mustafa Kemal. Personne ne doute que les lendemains seront meilleurs et Ferhat Abbas ira meme jusqu' declarer: "Les Franais n'ont mme pas l'esprit d'empire. Cela finira mal, et ils perdront tout la fois"59. Mais beaucoup plus qu'une appreciation sur le devenir de la colonisation, c'est surtout une profession de foi quant aux choix futurs propos de l'organisation et du fonctionnement de la societe de tradition musulmane en Algerie qui est faite, et ce niveau il est possible de penser que l'action de Mustafa Kemal sert de modele dans la mesure o, comme il a ete dit plus haut, elle legitime l'adoption de principes qui ne se situent pas toujours dans la realite des traditions vecues par les societes musulmanes. Aucun des trois leaders algeriens de Fentte deux guerres ne refuse done les fondements philosophiques et juridiques qu'implique la reference aux principes de la Revolution franise. Ainsi done, Mustafa Kemal d'une part et Ferhat Abbas, Abdelhamid Ben Badis et Messali Hadj d'autre part se retrouvent dans une meme logique de pensee meme s'il y a lieu de souligner que les conditions historiques sont differentes et que l'evolution de la situation interne des deux pays est egalement differente. En outte, seul Mustafa Kemal a mis en oeuvre ces principes d'action. Cependant l'experience turque permet aux trois leaders algeriens d'observer et de mesurer la "faisabilite" de cette politique sur le terrain et c'est partir de son succes qu'ils ont pu continuer repandre leurs idees et les faire accepter par la societe algerienne de l'epoque, d'ailleurs predisposee a les faire siennes. C'est dans cette mesure que l'on peut parler d'influence du leader turc sur la pensee des trois militants algeriens et a ttavers eux l'essentiel de l'elite politique et culturelle du pays. Aussi, convient-il present d'examiner les domaines d'influence et l'importance de celle-ci pour mieux en determiner les limites. Importance et limites de l'influence de Mustafa Kemal sur l'elite algerienne de l'entre deux guerres. II est possible de resumer la pensee d'Atatrk autour de deux grands themes: nationalisme et modenisme60. C'est done ttavers une demarehe
58. A. Aksan, Citations..., op. cit., p.20. 59. B. Stora et Z. Daoud, Ferhat Abbas..., op. cit., p.58. 60. Nahas M. Mahieddin, La pensee politique d'Atatrk a travers son ceuvre. Memoire de Licence, polycopie, niversite d'Alger, 1971; Ahmet Taner Klal, La Turquie entre l'Europe et l'Asie (Texte d'une confe'rence donnee le 17 mars 1995 la Faculte de Droit de Nancy), in Oluum/Genese, n 42, mai-juin 1996, p. 39.

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axee sur ces deux questions que nous tenterons de mesurer l'influence de Mustafa Kemal Atatrk sur chacun des trois leaders algeriens. Tout d'abord, il ne fait aucun doute, en ce qui concerne le nationalisme, qu'il nat essentiellement du sentiment d'appartenance une collectivite avec laquelle on partage son destin et semble pre"exister toute declaration ou reflexion son sujet. II est done inopportun de tenter d'expliquer son apparition et son developpement, pour quelque nation que ce soit, par la seule influence venue d'ailleurs. Neanmoins, il demeure vrai que la demarehe et les methodes entreprises pour le mettre en ceuvre efficacement peuvent etre reprises d'une experience menee ailleurs, soit pour son revetement ideologique, soit pour ses aspects pratiques. Dans l'experience algerienne, et pour nous limiter a la seule periode de l'entre deux guerres, le nationalisme s'exprime, bien sr, par le refus de la domination etrangere et la necessite de combattre l'occupant jusqu' la liberation totale du pay s. II s'exprime 6galement travers une revendication culturelle et notamment le droit d'enseigner la langue arabe61. Mais durant cette periode, le nationalisme, en tant que mouvement, ne s'exprime pas ehez F. Abbas, comme ehez A. Ben Badis ou Messali Hadj d'une maniere identique, ni quant la demarehe a suivre, ni sur les objectifs a atteindre. L'evolution se fera avec le temps et sous la contrainte des evenements et tous finiront par demander l'independance totale du pays, comme l'exigeait Messali Hadj depuis le debut de son aetivite militante. Mais contrairement a Atatrk, F. Abbas, A. Ben Badis et Messali Hadj ne sont pas des soldats de metier et n'ont pas participe militairement la lutte armee pour la liberation de l'Algerie, l'art militaire n'est done pas dans leur competence62. Contrairement Atatrk egalement, aucun de ces trois personnages n'a eu exercer direetement et effectivement le pouvoir. II n'est done pas possible de savoir comment ils auraient applique dans la realite les principes dont ils se preValaient63. C'est done par le seul examen rlise au seul niveau des idees et de la pensee exprimee par chacun de ces hommes que nous essaierons de rechercher l'influence qui a pu s'exercer entre eux et sur chacun d'eux. Dans le contexte des mentalites dominantes dans la societe algrienne au cours de la seconde moitie du XIXe siecle, nombreux sont ceux pour qui l'invasion coloniale de l'Algerie releve de la fatalite. Mais certains, par contre, essayent d'etre plus rationalistes et considerent que la defaite s'explique par l'existence d'un rapport de forces defavorable aux
61. C'est l'une des principales revendications de l'Association des 'Ulemas algeriens avec leur tete. Abdelhamid Ben Badis. 62. U y a lieu de rappeller que Mustafa Kemal Atatrk pronait la separation entre le militaire et le politique. (Voir Menter ahinler, Origine, influence et aetualite du kemalisme, ed. Publisud, Paris, 1995, p.57). 63. Seul Ferhat Abbas a eu une action politique conerete au niveau institutionnel officiel en presidant le Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (GPRA) siegeant Tunis avant l'independance et en presidant, pendant une courte periode l'Assemblee Nationale algerienne apres 1962.

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Alg6riens. Tous considerent neanmoins que cette situation de domine's ne peut etre definitivement acceptee et qu'il y sera mis fin tt ou tard, d'une faon ou d'une autre. Dans ce domaine il a ete dej rappele que les Algeriens ont pendant longtemps considere la Turquie comme le pays d'o viendrait l'intervention decisive. Mais apres la premiere guerre mondiale, le contexte change et les idees evoluent dans un sens plus realiste. La situation generale tant de l'Algerie que des autres pays de la region est mieux appreciee par les Algeriens. Aussi, adoptent-ils une demarche plus objective dans le cadre d'une reflexion plus "nationale" qui s'pere consciemment dans le cadre de categories ideologiques mieux definies et mieux apprehendes. C'est alors qu'apparaissent les divergences d'appreciation sur la situation et des actions mener. Pour les uns, il convient d'etre realiste et de n'agir qu'en fonction du possible en respectant un processus le"galiste et en menant un combat sur le seul terrain politique. Mais les initiatives enteprises soit directement par le biais de partis politiques officiels, soit indirectement par l'interme'diaire d'associations agrees n'aboutissent pas d'autant que le cadre legal dans lequel etaient mene"es ces actions ne permettait nullement de remettre en cause la souverainete franaise en AlgeYie. Les militants se limitaient revendiquer des droits sociaux et culturels. Quant aux droits politiques, ils ne pouvaient etre demandes que dans le cadre des lois franaises. Pour d'autres, par contre, il faut etre plus radical. Messali Hadj est l'un d'eux... Des les annees vingt, il revendique ouvertement l'independance de l'Algerie. Avec le developpement de la situation, tant sur le plan interne qu'international, les idees evoluent et tous, meme les moins "revolutionnaires" comme Ferhat Abbas, finissent par prendre acte que les autorites coloniales resteront sourdes aux revendications presentees dans la legalite, et rejoindront les partisans de la lutte pour l'independance. A. Ben Badis adoptera une demarche quelque peu analogue64. Certes, il n'est pas dans ntre propos de retracer les parcours des uns et des autres a ce sujet mais ce qui parat opportun de relever et d'analyser dans le cadre de cette etde, c'est le rapport qu'entretiennent ces trois hommes avec Atatrk en tant que soldat puis comme homme politique dans le cadre du combat nationaliste et l'impact de ce rapport sur leur demarche. Au-del de faits anecdotiques , il y a une reelle admiration de la part de chacun des trois leaders algeriens envers Mustafa
64. Sur les parcours suivis par chacun de ces trois personnages au niveau politique, voir les ouvrages de Benjamin Stora, de Zakya Daoud, de Jacques Simon et de Ali Merad, pour nous limiter aux seuls auteurs les plus cites dans cette etde. 65. Ainsi Ferhat Abbas signe certains de ses articles journalistiques "Kamal Abencerage" en reTerence Mustafa Kemal et porte en guise de coiffe, la toque en astrakan, tout comme Atatrk. Par ailleurs, il propose, mais ans succes, que le croissant et l'etoile du drapeau algerien soient disposes de la meme maniere que sur le drapeau turc (B. Stora et Z. Daoud, Ferhat Abbas.., op. cit., p.17). De son cte, Messali Hadj, devant des offciers franais attables dans un cafe Tlemcen, crie "vive Atatrk" ce qui lui vaudra quelques ennuis avec le commissairat de polie de la ville (J. Simon, Messali Hadj..., op. cit., p.34).
65

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Kemal66. Celui-ci incarne d'abord la rsistance a l'occupant et ce nationalisme n'est pas pour leur de"plaire. Les victoires d'Atatrk sont autant de victoires pour les Algeriens qui ne manquent aucune occasion pour manifester leur enthousiasme et leur solidarite avec les Turcs devant la communaute europeenne d'Algerie67. L'action d'Atatrk et surtout ses victoires sur les Allies vont surtout apporter la preuve aux leaders algeriens que la victoire n'est pas tributaire d'un rapport de force favorable en raison seulement des equipements materiels disponibles. II y a un plus qui reide dans les hommes et les hommes seuls et Mustafa Kemal en est l'exemple parfait, lui qui declarait dans un discours prononce en 1927: "Quand j'ai debarque Samsun, au mois de mai de l'annee 1919, je n'avais aucune force materielle. Ma force, c'etait la morale et la dignite dont j'etais imbu"68. Cette leon de courage donne ceux dont le nationalisme etait latent les raisons d'esperer et surtout comment il fallait agir. C'est ainsi qu' ce sujet, A. Ben Badis crira: ..."Pour la defense des Etats, les sacrifices sont necessaires, ...la puissance appartient aux peuples forts..."69. II y a dans cette declaration des propos qui rappellent, en effet, ceux d'Atatrk qui declarait aussi en 1919: "Quand son independance est en danger, la nation.. n'adopte qu'une seule attitude: verser jusqu' la fin son sang pour son salut"10. C'est cette meme idee que l'on retrouve chez Ferhat Abbas: "Un pays qui vit sous le regime colonial est un pays esclave.. Nous sommes un peuple comme les autres et nous voulons vivre dans la
66. Cette admiration pour le personnage se manifestera aussi au moment du deces d'Atatrk. Ferhat Abbas ecrit dans le journal L'Entente (n 97 du 17 novembre 1938) sous le titre "L'Islam en deuil. Le plus grand musulman des temps presents meurt Constantinople": "La mort de Mustafa Kemal, homme de guerre, homme d'Etat, endeuille non seulement la Turquie, mais tous les Musulmans epris de progres et de liberte... Le 'Pere de la Turquie' est en realite le fondateur de la Citd musulmane de demain ...Pleurons la mort du grand reformateur et souhaitons que, l'exemple de son oeuvre, les peuples musulmans se levent pour realiser avec autant de courage et de nettete de vue les reformes susceptibles de faire renatre la vie moderne une multitude humaine courbee sur 'les vestiges morbides et caducs d'un pass6 materiel et moral jamais revolu'". II ecrira encore dans ce meme journal (n 99 du l e r dec. 1938): "...L'Orient lui devra beaucoup et nous, Algeriens, nous donnons toute ntre admiration celui qui en quinze ans, d'une Turquie agonisante a fait une nation d'avant-garde pour tout l'Orient musulman et en particulier pour les arabes". Ibn Badis, quant lui, 6crira dans le journal Al hihb (nov. 1938, p. 130): "Que Dieu soit mis6ricordieux pour Mustafa Kemal! Qu'il fasse pencher la balance de ses oeuvres et qu'll l'agre, pour ses mrites, au nombre des Bienfaisants!". Quant au peuple algerien, il suffit de relever le tdldgramme envoy par les jeunesses du Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA) de Grande Kabylie et publid dans le journal El Ouma (n 28 du 18 decembre 1938) par lequel "ils adressent leurs condel^ances les plus attristes au gouvernement et au peuple turcs et ont espoir que ismet inn suivra la voie du de'funt, ce grand homme le plus aime et approuve des nations musulmanes". 67. II a ete dej signal comment la Iib6ration d'Istanbul a ete fetee par les etudiants des medersas. 68. A. Aksan, Citations de Mustafa Kemal Atatrk. Ankara, 2 6 m e ed., 1982, p.42. 69. ite in A. Mrad, Ibn Badis, commentateur..., op. cit., p.206. (C'est nous qui soulignons) 70. A. Aksan, Citations..., op. cit., p.18 (C'est nous qui soulignons).

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dignite"71. Mais le discours est ici beaucoup plus politique, comme l'est d'ailleurs l'attitude de Messali Hadj qui observe avec attention la demarche de Mustafa Kemal lorsque celui-ci convoque Ankara une Assemblee constituante nationale. Cet evenement lui permet de voir le processus de formation d'une nation moderne72. La modernitd apparat done aussi comme un des aspects de la demarehe a suivre pour mettre en place les institutions parce qu'il devient evident que la finalite de toute societe qui met en ceuvre son nationalisme est de s'organiser par et pour la construction d'un Etat pour lequel il y a lieu de choisir un systeme de gouvernement et de definir un projet de societe. En Turquie et dans ce domaine, le choix d'Atatrk est la Republique et il expose dans plusieurs de ses discours les raisons de cette prefrence II considere que "le regime qui correspond le mieux a la nature et l'esprit de la nation turque, c'est la republique"73, En outre, et pour etre logique avec ces choix, il met fin des institutions au contenu symbolique fort, mais devenues inefficaces et anachroniques comme le Califat. Or c'est au sujet de ces deux questions qu'il est interessant d'observer les reactions des leaders algeriens. A propos du regime republicain, il est evident que pour Ferhat Abbas et Messali Hadj, bien que professant des courants ideologiques differents (le premier est plutt liberal, le second est beaucoup plus gauche), il ne fait aucun doute qu'il ne peut y avoir d'autre choix pour l'Algerie. Bien evidemment on peut penser que l'elite algerienne formee l'ecole republicaine franaise ne peut penser autrement, et meme s'il n'y a pas a ntre connaissance, de reactions direetes de s part au moment de la proclamation de la Republique en Turquie, il decoule des propos tenus par eux que le point de vue de Mustafa Kemal est partage. En effet, certaines affirmations ne peuvent etre interpret6es que comme l'acceptation d'un certain nombre de principes qui sont en totale rupture avec les conceptions classiquement appliquees dans les societ^s de tradition musulmane. II en est ainsi, par exemple, lorsque des "Jeunes Algeriens" en lesquels se reconnaissait Ferhat Abbas, declaraient: "... A part une sympathie certaine, procedant de la communaute de religion, nous n'avons rien de commun avec 74 les Turcs, les Persans ou les Egyptiens" . Ce type de reflexion signife que l'individu ne se definit plus par son appartenance communautaire (Umma), mais par rapport une appartenance nationale. Ce n'est done plus le droit des fouqaha qui devrait etre applique en la matiere, mais celui defini et pose par l'Etat national. Nous sommes done en presence d'une nouvelle theorie constitutionnelle. C'est celle qu'adopte Atatrk
71. 72. 73. 74. B. Stora et Z. Daoud, Ferhat Abbas..., op. cit., p.216-217. J. Simon, Messali Hadj..., op. cit., p.31. A. Aksan, Citations..,, op. cit., p.16. Extrait de la lettre de Mokhtar Hadrj Said, avocat Constantine, reproduite par Ch. Benhabiles, L'Algerie franaise vue par un indigene. Ed. Fontana, Alger, 1914, cit in M. Smati, Les elites..., op. cit., p.239.

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pour la Turquie. C'est celle voulue aussi par les leaders algriens dont les declarations sur cette question visent en fait un double but. D'une part, montrer qu'ils acceptaient se soumettre un modele constitutionnel modeme. D'autre part faire reconnatre, par l'Autorite coloniale, des droits civils et politiques aux Algeriens dans le cadre de la Republique franaise. L'exemple turc constitue done une experience de la transposition d'un systeme occidental un pays d'Orient et il est utile pour les Algeriens de suivre la demarehe de Mustafa Kemal dans la mesure o la societe algerienne et la societe turque peuvent etre considerees comme sociologiquement semblables. Dans ce domaine encore l'action d'Atatrk va, dans une certaine mesure, legitimer le transfert d'institutions occidentales vers un pays musulman et Ferhat Abbas pourra done demander aux Musulmans d' "adopter ans reserve la civilisation occidentale et de ne plus regarder vers l'Orient"75, situant ainsi son discours dans la logique de la pensee de Mustafa Kemal qui declarait en 1924: "Le mouvement des Turcs a garde, depuis des siecles, une direetion constante. Nous avons toujours avance de l'Orient vers l'Occident"76. Mais la Republique pensee dans le cadre de la philosophie propre la Revolution franaise, comme le font Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, Ferhat Abbas ou Messali Hadj, remet en question la nature et le type de rapports qu'entretient l'individu avec l'institution politique, dans la mesure o, dans une societe de tradition musulmane comme le sont la societe turque et la societe algerienne, cette relation etait fondee sur l'appartenance religieuse. La Republique cree entre l'individu et l'Etat un rapport de nature politique nouveau. Aussi, la logique des principes de ce nouveau droit constitutionnel, conduit-elle attribuer a l'Etat un caraetere lai'c. En Turquie, Mustafa Kemal le declare clairement: "L'Etat turc est laic"77. En Algerie, les declarations de Ferhat Abbas et de Messali Hadj vont dans le meme sens. Dans son Manifeste de 1943, Ferhat Abbas pose clairement le principe de la separation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat78. Tout comme Atatrk, Ferhat Abbas n'est pas antireligieux, mais il n'accepte pas les posi75. B. Stora et Z. Daoud, Ferhat Abbas..., op. cit., p.69. 76. A. Aksan, Citations..., op. cit., p.41. 77. A. Aksan, Citations..., op. cit., p.56. Cette declaration de Mustafa Kemal Atatrk est faite au cours d'un discours datant de 1930. Contrairement ce qu'ecrit Gerard Groc, (in Textes officiels sur la laicit, Revue du CEMOTI prcitee, p. 313) le mot "lai'c" apparat done dans le vocabulaire politique des cette date et non en 1931, mais il est vrai que dans le vocabulaire juridique et institutionnel, le terme ne devient officiel qu' partir de 1937 (dans rarticle 2 de la Constitution apres la revision du texte initial de 1924 -Loi 3115 du 5 feVrier 1937-) tout comme il est rappeler que des lois adoptees anterieurement ces dates sont considdrees comme "lacisantes". Voir l'enumeration qui en est faite par . Ozankaya, Trkiye'de Laiklik Atatrk Devrimlerinin Temeli, 4 4 m e ed., istanbul, 1990, p. 191 et suiv. (ite in G. Groc, art. precite, p. 315). 78. B. Stora et Z. Daoud, Ferhat Abbas..., op. cit., p.120.

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tions h6g6moniques de la religion79. Messali Hadj, plus gauche, ne peut reflechir differemment. Abdelhamid Ben Badis, au contraire, bien qu'il aspire la modernite et adhere au modele republicain quant l'organisation institutionnelle de la societe, n'admet pas pour autant tous ses fondements philosophiques, parmi lesquels la laicite. Pour Ben Badis, celle-ci ne peut mener qu' la perte des valeurs religieuses et morales. Or en tant que defenseur des principes enseignes par 1'islam, il ne peut pas prendre la responsabilite d'encourager ses coreligionnaires sur cette voie. Pour lui, comme pour beacoup de Musulmans, la laicite est l'instrument utilise par l'Occident pour mettre en peril toute la Communaute. Cette idologie nee de la Revolution franaise (pays colonisateur), est done d'autant plus dangereuse qu'elle vient d'un monde conquerant et qu'elle est se"duisante de par sa nouveaute, meme si elle semble ne favoriser aucune des religions connues. C'est son attrait qui la rend d'autant plus sournoise qu'elle est souvent presentee comme le secret du succes de l'Europe80. Mais le realisme du reformiste constantinois lui permet neanmoins de ne pas tomber dans l'erreur de defendre ce qui n'a qu'une valeur symbolique et c'est pourquoi sur la question du Califat, Ben Badis rejoinf contre tout attente, le point de vue d'Atatrk81 et va ainsi s'opposer ouver79. B. Stora et Z. Daoud, Ferhat Abbas..., op. cit., p.57. En Turquie, l'6poque, et meme pour les responsables du Parti, comme le Secretaire general Recep Peker, "la laicite ne signife absolument pas l'absence de religion, ou la volonte de son absence. En Turquie, l'exercice du culte, ainsi que chacun le souhaite, est garanti par la Constitution. Un citoyen qui est religieux par convietion personnelle, peut tres bien malgre sa fidelite' sa conscience, etre sincerement laque" (G. Groc, art. precite, p. 319). Cette presentation de la laicite en Turquie a et6 resumee par la formle suivante "La Turquie kemaliste est devenue une societe non religieuse mais pas areligieuse" (E.B. apolyo, Ziya Gkalp, ttihad ve Teraki ve Merutiyet Tarihi, stanbul, 1943. Voir egalement, G. Jaeschke, Der islam in der neuen Trkei, in Die Welt des islam, NS, Leiden, 1951, p. 149). 80. Bernard Levvis, Comment L'islam a dicouvert l'Europe, 6d. La Dcouverte, Paris, 1984, p.184-186. Les Franais sont spe'cialement VISS dans la mesure o il s'agit de leur Revolution et qu'ils colonisent des pays musulmans. Bernard Lewis ite d'ailleurs un passage d'un ouvrage turc qui montre bien l'6tat d'esprit dominant au cours des XVIHe et XDCe siecles dans l'Empire ottoman "...apres avoir fait des ravages en Europe, les Franais portent leur regard vers l'Orient. Leur iniquite et leurs complots se retournerent alors contre la Communaute de Mohammed" (E. Z. Karal, Fransa-Msr ve Osmanl mparatorluu (1797-1902), stanbul, 1938, p.108). 81. Sur chacun des reproches faits Mustafa Kemal, Ibn Badis donne son avis (sur le Califat qu'il considere comme devenu fantomatique et docile aux influences etrangeres; sur la traduetion du Coran en turc, il y voit un bienfait pour "la noble et glorieuse nation turque"; sur les 'Uldmas et les ordres religieux, il donne raison Atatrk d'avoir abaisse le elerge et les organisations maraboutiques; et sur l'abolition de la legislation ottomane, il declare qu'elle ne refletait que la jurisprudence hanefte "qui est loin de repondre aux besoins d'aucune nation de la terre, toutes las epoques") (A. Merad, Le reformisme..., op. cit., p. 374). On remarquera la tolerance d'Ibn Badis par rapport la rigidite' de Rachid Rida sur la question de la traduetion du Coran (A. Merad, Le reformisme..., op. cit., p. 374; J. Jomier, Le commentaire coraniaue du Manar, Paris, 1954, p. 338.

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tement aux theologiens du Machreq, notamment ceux de 1'niversite d'Al Azhar82. Comme Atatrk qui qualifie le califat de "mythe du passa" qui n'a plus sa place dans le monde contemporain"83, Ben Badis le considere egalement comme "une chimere"84 et appuie Mustafa Kemal dans son action en "reprochant aux milieux panislamistes d'Orient leur inaptitude voir le vrai probleme, et leur propension se perdre en discussions oiseuses et en vaines attaques contre le regime de Mustafa Kemal"85. Celui-ci trouve done un defenseur inattendu en la personne de Ben Badis qui considere que "les ve"ritables adversaires de I'Islam sont le calife et les ehefs des confreries religieuses86 et que "sa sympathie va pour les Turcs honorables, les liberateurs des peuples et non pour ceux qui baissent la tete.. ceux-l ne meritent pas son attention, qu'ils soient calife ou cheikh al-Islam"87. Ce modele de reformes qui'implique l'entree dans la modernite semble done accepte" par les leaders algeriens de 1'entre deux guerres et la societe algerienne de l'epoque et notamment la jeune generation manifeste son enthousiasme envers les changements qui s'pere en Turquie depuis la Revolution initiee par Mustafa Kemal88. Meme "la laicite et le principe de l'egalite des hommes et des femmes, impressionnent la jeunesse mu82. "Les sunnites etaient deus devant les r6formes lacisantes de Mustafa Kemal auquel ils reprochaient non seulement l'abolition du Califat, mais surtout son offensive contre les cadres religieux de la societe turque" (A. Merad, Le Reformisme..., op. cit., p. 320). Pour des raisons n'ayant aucun lien avec la religion, la presse colonialiste en Algerie, defendait les partisans du maintien du Califat. On peut, en effet, lire dans le journal L'Echo d'Oran (n 19421 du 3 novembre 1922): "...Les kemalistes entendent faire du Calife une sorte de fantoehe ans droits ni pouvoirs, elu et revocable leur gre\ Nous doutons fort que les fideles de I'Islam qui vivent hors des frontieres de la Turquie soient satisfaits de cette profanation accomplie par un parti o figurent des Musulmans affilies des seetes athees". On peut done comprendre que l'attitude d'Ibn Badis sur cette question soit egalement motivee par cette prise de position des Franais d'Alg&ie. 83. A. Aksan, Citations..., op. cit., p.55. 84. Journal "Al Shihb", mai 1938, p.61, cit6 in A. M6rad, Le Reformisme..., op. cit., p. 377. 85. A. Merad, Le Reformisme..., op. cit., p.374. C'est apres le Premier Congres Musulman de Jerusalem de dcembre 1931 qu'Ibn Badis adopte une attitude critique vis vis des milieux panislamistes d'Orient (A. Merad, Le Reformisme..., op. cit., p. 374). 86. Journal "Al shihb", novembre 1938, p.130. Dans cet article. Ben Badis qualifie la califat de "pseudocalifat" (khilfa z'ifa). 87. "...Pour bien montrer qu'il n'tait pas d'accord avec la plupart des theoriciens du panislamisme, qui avaient tendance traiter la Turquie comme le bouc missaire de l'Islam, Ibn Badis va jusqu' exalter la glorieuse histoire du peuple turc, et rendre hommage aux merites de Mustafa Kemal..." (A. Mrad, Le Reformisme..., op. cit., p. 374-375). 88. D y a l une continuit et une unanimitd remarquables dans l'acceptation de l'experience turque. Dej, la revolution des Jeunes Turcs et leur programme de politique sociale et economique avaient reu l'adhesion des 'Ulemas et des Jeunes Algeriens. Le meme ralliement intervient avec les reformes d'Atatrk. La modernite' pronee par l'un et l'autre rfgime semble etre le denominateur commun qui explique cet engouement pour ces expe'riences.

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sulmane algerienne"89. Ferhat Abbas en prend acte et s'appuie sur I'exp6rience turque, pays musulman, "pour affirmer que la foi islamique n'est pas inconciliable avec les necessit6s sociales du monde modeme"90, mais, et ce sont la les limites de l'influence d'Atatrk sur l'elite algerienne. Tout comme Ben Badis, Ferhat Abbas pendant un moment, ne voudra pas renier certains aspects de l'identite algerienne, comme par exemple, permettre aux naturalises de rester soumis aux regles du droit musulman en matiere de statut personnel. L'evolution observe chez ce dernier ne doit pas pour autant etre interpretee comme une reelle evolution de sa pensee sur cette question, mais plus simplement une attitude politique visant acculer l'autorite coloniale et demontrer ainsi son manque de volonte d'accorder aux Algeriens leurs droits legitimes. On peut done comprendre que cette limite apportee a l'exemple turc quant a la legislation n'etait, en fait, qu' une faon d'affirmer son existence en tant qu'entite sociale differente de celle constituee par les Europeens installes en Algerie et tait done liee au contexte colonial91. Bien e'videmment, c'est aussi la limite que ne peut franehir A. Ben Badis pour qui l'appartenance l'Islam ne peut se concevoir ans le respect d'un minimum de regles du droit musulman, notamment en matiere de droit familial92. La volonte de maintenir une liaison etroite entre la legislation musulmane et la defnition de la personnalite algerienne est done l'expression d'une reappropriation de l'identite de soi et de sa culture que la colonisation tente de detruire. Au del done d'une affrmation religieuse, c'est aussi et surtout une forme de resistance la deculturation et la depersonnalisation entreprise par le colonisateur. Mais meme cette limite que l'on peut considerer comme logique dans le contexte algrien de l'epoque, constitue en elle-meme une confirmation de la pensee d'Atatrk. Celui-ci affirmait, en effet, que "chaque nation a ses propres traditions, ses propres moeurs et ses propres particularites nationales... et qu'aucune ne doit imiter fidelement une autre"93. Comme en echo, Ferhat Abbas disait de son cte' "l'Etat, la Nation, la so89. Le journal "la voix des Humbles" qui experimait le point de vue du mouvement des "Jeunes Algeriens" publie en 1936, des extraits d'une etde sur la condition ivile de la femme turque modeme. 90. A. Merad, Le Reformisme... op. cit., p.319. 91. La position de Ferhat Abbas evoluera et rejoindra celle d'Atatrk lorsqu'il suggerera en 1935 aux autorits franaises d'imposer une solution colleetive ce probleme (Voir B. Stora, Ferhat Abbas..., op. cit., p.72). 92. r la jeunesse algerienne, qui admirait le regime kemaliste, voyait dans la condition ivile nouvelle de la femme turque, la realisation de leur iddal meme, d'autant qu' " partir de 1930, ecrit A. M6rad, on voit se dessiner en Algerie... un courant favorable 'emancipation de la femme indigene, ...sous la double influence de la Turquie et de l'Egypte" (A. Mrad, Le Reformisme..., op. cit., p. 319). Voir sur cette question egalement Joseph Castagne\ Le mouvement d'imancipation de la femme musulmane en Orient, in Revue des Etudes slamiques, 1929, p. 161. 93. A. Aksan, Citations..., op. cit., p.47.

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ciete, les lois ne s'improvisent pas, ni ne se copient sur le vision. Ils sortent des entrailles du peuple comme l'enfant de celles de la mere. C'est la culture, la terre et la nature de l'homme qui forgent et conditionnent les institutions d'un pays"94. Cette convergence de points du vue entre le fondateur de la Turquie moderne et des leaders algeriens aux origines et aux parcours differentes montre l'universalite et l'humanisme d'une rflexion qui s'abreuve a meme source: le peuple. S'il y a influence des uns sur les autres, c'est parce qu'il y a partage des memes aspirations et des memes inspirations. Mustafa Kemal revelait les siennes dans chacun de ses discours. En cela, Atatrk, etait beaucoup plus qu'un citoyen turc, un citoyen de 1'espace du pays qu'il a dirie, mais beaucoup plus, il etait un "citoyen du temps". C'est pourquoi sa pensee n'a pas seulement reu l'adhesion des Turcs, mais encore celle de beacoup d'autres pays qui, travers leurs dirigeants, confirment ainsi ses propos: "plus que les traites, ce sont les sentiments qui lient les nations"95. L'exemple des liens et des rapports entre la Turquie et l'Algerie en est certainement une bonne illustration.

94. F. Abbas, Autopsie d'une guerre, p.22, ite in B. Stora et Z. Daoud, Ferhat Abbas.. op. cit., p.85. 95. A. Aksan Citations..., op. cit., p.l24.+

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LA LECTURE DE L'EXPERIENCE LAIQUE DU SENEGAL A LA LUMIERE DE CELLE DE LA TURQUIE SOUS MUSTAPHA KEMAL ATATRK (1881-1938)
Penda M'BOW* La celebration autour du fondateur et premier President de la Republique turque constitue un evenement majeur. Quelle signification peut-on lui donner? II est evident qu'on peut en faire plusieurs lectures, selon qu'on est militaire, militant des droits de la personne humaine ou encore de la modernisation des societes musulmanes. Je vais commencer par expliquer sur ce qui m'interesse chez Mustapha Kemal Atatrk. Ce millenaire finissant s'ouvre sur l'ere de la mondialisation, le triomphe du liberalisme1. La globalisation, avec ses exigences de remise en question, mais aussi de penuries, ne manque pas d'ebranler nos certitudes, de brouiller nos reperes, toujours est-il qu'il en resulte que nous avons bel et bien perdu la ele des imaginaires politiques avec lesquels, hier encore, nous pensons l'ordre et le desordre du monde; il n'y a plus personne pour eroire que quelque chose pourrait changer quelque part... sauf peut-etre nous, ntre survie en depend grandement. Surtout faut-il se resigner a ce que dans l'espace laisse inoccupe par l'epuisement d'ideologies sophistiquees et la devaluation de la pensee politique, ne puisse s'engouffrer qu'un brutal areha'sme dont nul ne saurait aller plus loin que de le condamner vertueusement? C'est ainsi que toutes les societes contemporaines ont a charge de gerer, au-del de 1'effondrement du communisme, la disparition de cette sper reference laquelle l'existence meme du communisme etait indispensable, savoir l'ideologie. Alain Finkielkraut parle, tout simplement,
Faculte des Letters, UCAD, Dakar. Fukuyama F., lafn de l'Histoire et le dernier homme. Paris, editions Flammarion 1992.

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de l'humanite perdue2. Dans cette situation, o nous sommes confrontes la necessite, voire l'urgence, d'une re-definition des reperes utilisables, le religieux est ans cesse requis: tentatives pour stabiliser des errances identitaires, recuperations institutionnelles ou encore instrumentalisations grossieres. Surtout indicateur privilegie des tensions qui traversent les societes, le religieux apparat comme un vecteur de reideologisation, fondamentalement utilise pour mettre en question les categories d'une democratie de-ideologisee du fait de l'effondrement du communisme. Aujourd'hui, face la recherche de nouveaux equilibres, le religieux apparat comme un lieu privilegie pour observer les mutations lentes des societes: individualisation, diffrenciation, ete. Ces mutations aceroissent la distance prise a l'egard des instances normatives centrales (Etat, ideologies dominantes), comme si, avec le passage de l'ere du debat sur la societe, la demande du sens, plus aigue d'un fait des formidables transformations enregistrees ces dernieres annees, etaient aujourd'hui pensees independamment d'une demande de normes. La laicite a t-elle encore un sens? C'est dans ce cadre que le legs de Mustapha Kemal, un horame d'Etat moderne d'un pays petri de valeurs islamiques qui pendant des siecles, dans ce domaine a joue un rle de phare, merite d'etre revisite. Ntre communication tournera autour de quatre axes: - Les origines de la laicite - Leons de l'experience lai'que sous Mustapha Ke"mal. - Experience de la laicite au Senegal - Valeurs republicaines, ecole lai'que au Senegal. I. Aux origines de la laicite: l'Occident Cette notion de laicite, on peut l'apprehender travers l'histoire de l'Occident o elle a vu le jour mais aussi par exemple de la Turquie sous Mustapha Kemal Atatrk, la forme la plus achevee jusqu'ici dans une societe musulmane. La premiere utilisation du terme lai'que remonte la ille Republique en France (1879) lorsqu'il s'est agi d'affirmer avec force que Nul ne doit etre inguiete pour ses opinions, memes religieuses. Mais la justification de l'idee de laicite est rendue possible par cette fameuse assertion determinant le principe de la distinetion des domaines spirituel et temporel: Rendez Cesar ce qui appartient Cesar, Dieu ce qui appartient Dieu (Mathieu. XXII, 21).
2. Finkielkraut A, L'humanite perdue. Essai sur le XXe siecle. Paris, Seuil Octobre 1996.

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Toute l'histoire des rapports de l'Etat et de l'Eglise toume autour de cette dialectique qui s'est traduite en France par le gallicanisme; une doctrine affrmant une certaine independance administrative sinon dogmatique de l'Eglise de France l'egard de la Papaute. Le Gallicanisrae peut se resumer trois principes essentiels: - Principe de la distinction des deux pouvoirs temporel et spirituel et de 1'independance administrative sinon dogmatique l'egard du spirituel; - Principe de la negation de la subordination complete du clerge de France l'egard du Pape tant du point de vue du temporel qu' celui de la discipline; - Principe de l'autorite legitime du roi de France sur l'Eglise gallicane quant au temporel et la discipline. Le refus par l'Etat de toute sujetion envers les Eglises equivaut au sens large, la laicite. Les Eglises se montrent plus ou moins entreprenantes envers l'Etat. Ainsi pour des raisons historiques, la forme de reaction que l'on peut aujourd'hui, legitimement, appeler laicite de l'Etat est dans une large mesure un phenomene specifiquement occidental, et meme franais; c'est en France que la laicite a pris naissance et a ete elaboree de la maniere la plus systematique qu'elle trouve aujourd'hui son expression la plus homogene. Pour instaurer ce regne de la laicite l'on entend agir patiemment, en se servant des institutions. Deux etapes sont conside"rees cet egard comme fondamentales: la lai'cisation de l'Etat et la separation des Eglises et de l'Etat. Si cette doctrine de laicite de l'Etat s'est historiquement developpee, ce fut dans une large mesure en face de l'Eglise catholique, cause de sa centralisation, de la rigueur de ses dogmes, de sa morale, de sa discipline. La laicite (lacisme) n'est certes pas monolithique, on peut, cependant, y trouver, dans de contexte historique precis, des constantes : anticlericalisme, rationalisme, positivisme, scientisme, atheisme... il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une doctrine personnelle de ceux qui la professent, mais on veut en faire une doctrine officielle : la republique comme telle devait etre laque. L'idee laque renferme une conception philosophique qui porte sur l'independance et la capacite de la raison. C'est cette conception que la republique devait triompher. Elle ne pouvait y reussir qu'au detriment du christianisme, disons du religieux erie en principe de gouvernement des hommes. Pourtant, malgre tout, l'influence des Eglises (religieux), de l'Eglise catholique en particulier, persiste, ou reste possible. On se demande si la

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separation, du moins telle qu'elle est communement interpretee, n'est pas une erreur politique, si l'Etat n'est pas maintenant desarme face de ces groupes de pression. (Cf. tout le debat suscite par la visite du pape en France, en 1997) Certains le pensent, pour qui la lacite implique avant tout que l'Etat s'arme contre 1'influence des Eglises sur les gouvernants ou sur les citoyens, dans le droit fil des doctrines gallicanes des legistes de l'Ancien Regime ou de Bonaparte. Ce qui fait que toute definition liminaire de la lacite, au sens o on l'entend ici, ne peut etre qu'imprecise. Toute Eglise, des qu'elle a un minimum de structures, de hierarchie, des qu'elle propose, au-del du culte proprement dit, un humanisme ses fideles, exerce une influence sur ceux-ci et cherche accrotre le nombre. Dej par la, peu ou prou, elle entre en concurrence avec l'Etat; parfois, elle tente de le dominer, moyen plus facile qu'efficace en profondeur d'dtendre son influence, et l'on voit sevir; le clericalisme aboutissant la theocratie. Comment l'Etat va t-il se comporter? Leur laissera t-il la liberte, sauf conserver sa propre independance? L'enjeu est l'importance : souverainete de l'Etat, responsable du destin national par sa legislation et sa politique; liberte des citoyens, croyants ou incroyants, en face des Eglises; concorde menacee entre citoyens divises par leur croyances, et, done probleme de 1'nite nationale. II. islam et laicite : l'exemple de la Turquie de Mustapha Kemal Atatrk 1. Actualite du debat L'actualite du debat se trouve liee la problematique de 1'islam et la modernite qui n'est pas nouvelle meme si aujourd'hui, le de"bat tourne essen tiellement autour de: - islam et demoeratie - islam et laicite - La place de la femme dans 1'islam - Les societes musulmanes face la modernite Depuis la fin du XIX", un courant culturel reformiste vit le jour l'interieur de quelques pays arabes, principalement l'Egypte. Ce courant est ne la site de quelques changements sociaux et economiques ainsi que des contacts avec la civilisation europeenne. Une elite de penseurs prit la tete du mouvement. Ils voulaient adapter 1'islam et ses enseignements aux exigences nouvelles de l'epoque. Mais, ils re"ussirent surtout lancer un appel au retour un islam primitif. Seulement cet islam primitif tel qu'il est vecu au temps du Prophete, peut-il solutionner les defis qui se posent aux societes musulmanes actuelles face a un monde domine par une technologie de plus en plus sophistiquee? Mustapha Kemal est certai-

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nement l'un des premiers avoir compris les enjeux et essay6 d'y apporter des solutions. 2. Mustapha Ke"mal et la reVolution turque Mustapha Kemal, le pere de la Turquie moderne a tres certainement herite de la Reforme ottomane du d6but du XIX" mais surtout d'une longue tradition politique liee l'Empire depuis Soliman le Magnifique. Son itineraire le montre parfaitement. Mustapha Kemal est un homme politique d'une exceptionelle carrure. Sa personnalite a largement domine un regime de type presidentiel qui, en outre, a su acquerir l'adhesion de la population, consciente des progres de leur pays. Les capacites de Mustapha K6mal se fondent sur une volonte politique mais aussi sur une solide formation. Des l'ge de 15 ans, en 1895, le jeune Kemal entre au lycee militaire de Monastir et en 1899 a ecole de guerre de Stamboul, enfn l'Academie de guerre, d'o il ort en 1905, avec le grade de capitaine. Des cette periode, il prit une option politique en s'opposant au regime despotique du sultan Abdl Hamid II mais aussi aux jeunes turcs qui l'ont renverse' en 1908. Son cte nationaliste, malgre sa volonte de moderniser la Turquie en s'inspirant de l'Occident ne fit aucun doute. Ainsi lors de la premiere guerre mondiale, il s'implique dans la defense de Gallipoli attaque par les allies de l'Empire ottoman, eux-memes. En 1919, lorsque le gouvernement de Stamboul place la Turquie sous la protection des grandes puissances, Mustapha Kemal repond en affirmant la necessite de defendre l'independance absolue de l'Etat et de la nation. C'est le debut de sa carriere politique et la lutte pour l'independance qui va etre proclamee le 4 novembre 1922. L'abolition du sultanat marque le debut de la construction d'une Turquie nouvelle par Mustapaha Kemal. Pendant quinze ans, jusqu' sa mort, le 10 novembre 1938, Atatrk a tente de liberer son pays de ses entraves en amenant ses compatriotes un niveau avance de civilisation materielle, sociale et intellectuelle. Quelles leons peut-on tirer de l'oeuvre de Mustapha Kemal? La revolution turque a commence en 1908, par le renversement violent d'un ordre politique ancien pour en etablir un nouveau. II s'agit la d'un exemple, extremement important pour nous, a cause de la place que l'Islam occupe en Turquie mais aussi du rle de l'elite, y a joue. Cette revolution turque ne se fit pas ans resistance mais elle trouva un large soutien aupres des populations. Le cot eleve de la modernisation militaire entrana une aggravation de la fscalite et un durcissement du pouvoir. Atatrk fut aussi, entoure de certains des reformateurs les

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plus actifs et qui furent des hommes de temp6rament, parfois tres autoritaires, exerant une autorite offcielle, et qui donnerent d'ailleurs a celleci une vigueur et une omnipre'sence nouvelles. Pour vaincre les resistances des conservateurs, il fallut abroger ou reduire les contrepoids traditionnels au pouvoir souverain, qu'affermirent encore davantage les instruments modernes de l'autorite. Ces changements, et le renforcement du despotisme qui en re"sulta, ne se frent pas ans resistance. Au vaste choix d'ideologies laiques, la rvolte reagit. Les idees liberales, patriotiques et memes revolutionnaires gagnerent les etudiants et certains cadets (militaires). II faut reconnatre que l'oeuvre de Mustapha Kemal a agi dans un pays o les esprits etaient prepares aux changements. Dans l'ancien regime turc on trouve ces aspects prerevolutionnaires familiers que sont une penurie des ressources financieres associees a une expansion du commerce, une re"forme administrative l'incurie du gouvernement, une remise en cause des allegeances fondamentales chez les dirigeants et intellectuels un refus progressif du consentement chez de plus en plus de gouvernes. Le role de l'elite dirigeante fut capital. II existait plusieurs de ces 61ites administratives, religieuses et militaires, qui ne se definissaient pas d'abord par la classe economique mais par la formation, les fonctions et les methodes de recrutement. Leur constitution, leurs rivalites et leurs vicissitudes sont essentielles la comprehension de la revolution turque. Elle fut l'aboutissement d'un long processus par lequel l'elite gouvernante turque se transforma, transforma l'Etat et finalement le pays. Ce changement s'explique aussi par l'elargissement et la diversifcation de l'elite elle meme, qui finit par recruter dans les couches beaucoup plus larges de la population, de sorte que les elements de plus en plus nombreux de la nation turque s'interessent activement, sinon participerent la conduite des affaires du publiques. Le processus est accelere par le developpement economique, la diffusion de l'education, l'essor des moyens de communication de masse3. Ainsi l'experience est differente de celle de l'Occident o les lements ont ete: la lutte entre l'Eglise et l'Etat, la Renaissance, la Reforme et la contre-reforme, l'eveil scientifique, l'humanisme, le liberalisme, le rationalisme, les Lumieres, toutes les grandes aventures, tous les grands conflits d'idees. Les grands bouleversements sociaux, economiques et politiques : la grandeur et la decadence de la feodalite, Femergence des communes, la renaissance du commerce, l'essor de la nouvelle bourgeoisie, l'affrontement de l'argent et de la terre, de l'Etat-cite, de l'Etat-nation et de l'Empire. Le bouleversement turc est le prototype des revolutions nationalistes teinte d'un certain mi3. Bernard Lewis, islam et Lacite. Naissance de la Turguie moderne. Paris, Fayard 1988.

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me'tisme de l'Occident. Le volontarisme de Mustapha Ke"mal Atatrk a 6\oign6 pendant longtemps, la Turquie du spectre de l'intdgrisme. II introduit dans un amendement de la Constitution, le 9 avril 1928 portant sur la lacite de l'Etat; en fustigeant l'influence retrograde des sultans sur l'instruction publique, Atatrk exige que la religion soit releguee une pratique individuelle. Les mesures d'Atatrk sont toutes plus audacieuses, les unes que les autres : de la suppression de la polygamie l'abolition des ordres religieux, en passant par l'interdiction du port de fez. Que dire de tout cela, au moment o dans certains pays musulmans, on n'ose meme pas debattre de la polygamie ou de signe distinctif comme le voile? On ne peut qu'etre admiratif devant l'he'ritage d'Atatrk lorsqu'on sait, par exemple, que la femme turque a beneficie du droit de vote avant la Franaise, des 1934. Au moment o le debat sur la separation des pouvoirs religieux et politique fait rage dans divers pays musulmans, la memoire de Mustapha Kemal Atatrk est plus que jamais vivante chez les Senegalais. II est certainement, l'un des leaders des pays musulmans les plus 6tudies dans les 6coles senegalaises. Pourquoi, cet intert pour Mustapha Kemal et son experience? II faut le rechercher dans les options qu'il prit pour moderniser* l'Etat et la societe turcs. Qu'en est-il de l'experience senegalaise. . Oue peut-on dire de l'experience laque de l'Etat du Senegal.4 Le Senegal, contrairement a la Turquie n'a pas connu de revolution. Neanmoins, au moment de l'independance en 1960, il adopta la constitution de la 5e Republique, le centralisme bureaucratique, la lacite, la liberte d'organisation syndicale, le systeme legal base sur le code napoleonien (quelques modifcations mineures y interviendront). L'article premier de la constitution stipule que : La Republique est laque, democratique et sociale. Elle assure l'egalite devant la loi de tous les citoyens, ans distinction d'origine, de race, de sexe, de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances. II faut considerer ce niveau le caractere confrerique de 1'islam senegalais et contrairement la Turquie, l'Etat du Senegal n'a pas interdit les confre'ries religieuses; ses rapports avec l'administration depuis la periode coloniale, le role du clerge catholique, dans le systeme ducatif, les prises de positions politiques parfois spectaculaires de certains hommes chefs religieux (rapports difficiles de Chiekh Tidjane Sy, un chef religieux avec le gouvernement de Senghor, le Ndigel politique -consigne de vote pour un candidat des elections- de Lahad, chef de la confrerie des
4. Cf Roman Lormeir, The secular state and islam in Senegal, in David Westerlund, Questioning the secular state. The worlwide resurgence ofpolitics. London 1995. pp. 183-197.

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Mourides) et de groupes religieux (Moustarchidines et les 6v6nements de 16 fevrier 1994. Ce groupe religieux tendit une embuscade, lors d'une manifestation politique et tua 3 policiers parmi ceux qui etaient charges d'assurer la securite des manifestants.) Au Senegal, l'Etat n'est pas, fondamentalement, menace dans ses options laques, meme si on note des interferences entre le politique et le religieux. II n'est pas rare de voir le politique lui meme, s'appuyer sur le religieux, parfois le manipuler a des fins electoralistes, pour neutraliser certains secteurs de la societe. Le jeu peut etre dangereux s'il y a crise de l'Etat. Par contre les choses deviennent plus compliquees lorsqu'il s'agit de transformer la societe. Les limites s'expliquent par: - Un contexte plus global dans lequel evoluent les Africains. Dans un article sur la signification de la Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789 dans la constitution des Etats d'Afriaue Noire francophones, Marc Debene e"crit qu'en Afrique, l'etat de ses structures exclut, au stade actuel que le citoyen puisse tirer pleinement profit des droits et libertes qui lui sont theoriquement reconnus. P.F. Gonidec impute cette situation au sous-developpement dans ses dimensions culturelles (l'analphabetisme vidant de leur contenu certaines libertes, telle evidemment, celle de la presse), economiques ou politiques. Loin de disposer des libertes concretes (ou reelles pour reprendre la terminologie classique) l'Africain ne erait souvent titulaire que de libertes abstraites5. L'emprise des autorites religieuses sur leurs fideles, ce qui peut entraner des dysfonctionnements entre les exigences d'un Etat moderne et les necessites de conforter le pouvoir de la part des autorites religieuses (les difficultes de l'Etat a harmoniser les multiples fetes religieuses, l'accaparement des mediats d'Etats par le discours religieux, la fermeture des ecoles par les marabouts, le statut de ville libre de Touba, le probleme de la fiscalite dans le secteur informel, les aspects religieux lies la crise casamanaise -un mouvement irredentiste dans le Sud du pays, ete.) Cette situation se trouve parfois renforcee par les idees preconisees par le mouvement reformiste senegalais ne sous la houlette de Cheikh Toure dans les annees 50. Certains points de vue peuvent constituer un frein la modernisation de la socite. Des sa naissance, 1'Union Culturelle musulmane opta pour l'Etat islamique, l'instauration de la Shari'a et une critique de l'Islam confrerique. A partir des annee 70, L'UCM perd son caraetere de mouvement islamique de reforme critique, independant.
5. Debene Marc, La signification de la declaration des droits de THomme et du Citoyen de 1789 dans les Constitutions des Etats d'Afrique Noire francophone. Rev. Jur. Afi numeroU 1990. p55.

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Sous Senghor, les initiatives premieres,^ en vue d'une reforme politique sont discontinues, la caractere laic de l'Etat fut affirme avec force. Ce changement devient clair au moment de l'elaboration du Code de la Famille. La codifcation pour une Loi nouvelle de la famille debuta sous Mamadou Dia (decret du 12 avril 1961). En 1965, Senghor designa de nouveau, le comite des options pour le Code de la famille. Cette commission avait en charge l'unification des differentes formes de Lois, comment faire coexister les Lois relevant de la coutume indigene, la Shari'a et le code napoleonien. Apres 6 annees de travail, le Code de la Famille fut presente aux Senegalais en 1972. Ses principales caracteristiques: - L'unification de la loi - L'affirmation avec force du caractere laic de la societe. - La reconnaissance des principes des droits individuels et le principe de l'egalite de tous les citoyens Qualifie" d'athee (Declaration du conseil superieur Islamique sous l'egide d'El Hadj Seydou Nourou Tali), le Code est, relativement, pratique en milieu urbain; par contre, il reste ignore dans les zones rurales completement sous l'influence des religieux. Ainsi le Khalife general des Mourides, Abdoul Lahad Mbacke", recusa la validite du Code de la famille sur toute l'etendue du territoire de Touba, o seule sera appliquee La Loi de Dieu. D'ailleurs en 1977, le President Keba Mbaye tirait sur la sonnette d'alarme, le Code de la Famille n'etant pas rigoureusement applique; au moment o l'administration, sous Senghor, rejeta sa revision (ce fut, precisement le 19 novembre 1977). La critique du Code de la Famille est l'exercice favori des islamistes (un triomphe d'ailleurs, avec l'echec du debat sur la polygamie). Avec Abdou Diouf, on n'entre dans une nouvelle ere concernant les relations entre l'Etat et les islamistes. Le caractere laic de l'Etat est attaque dans les prches et publications des groupes islamistes (l'Etudiant musulman; Etudes Islamiques). La lacite est presentee comme l'arme la plus dangereuse de l'arsenal de la civilisation occidentale selon Cheikh Tour6, dans Etudes islamiques 1979). Le 31 Decembre 1983 (Cf. le Soleil du 2 Janvier 1984), A. Diouf repond en disant que la lacite n'est ni atheisme ni propagande anti- religieuse. Les islamistes attaquerent l'Etat, l'ecole laique, heritiere de l'ecole coloniale. La revendication de l'introduction de l'etude de la religion, sous la pression des arabisants, fut accept^e par les Etats generaux de l'Education en 1981 sous Iba Der Thiam qui fut en ce moment, Ministre de l'education nationale. IV. Valeurs republiques et ecole laque L'ecole est un enjeu de societe pour les parents d'eleves d'aujourd'hui, la finalite de l'ecole est avant tout l'acquisition par les enfants 463

et les adolescents d'un bagage d'instruction suffisant la recherche d'une profession dans la vie. Cette demande si legitime qu'elle soit, ne doit pas pour autant occulter la fonction ideologique de l'enseignement; par ideologique, on entend la fonction educative et civique qui doit etre le complement de l'instruction proprement dite. Or l'ecole republicaine traverse une crise d'education, dont tout ntre vivre ensemble est tributaire. [L'enseignement lajue est un enseignement qui ne depend pas d'autorites religieuses et marque sa totale neutralite sur les questions concernant la religion. II s'oppose l'enseignement confessionnel]. Mustapha Kemal, ce niveau prit des mesures hardies, en plaant les etablissements d'enseignement sous le contrle de l'Etat; Atatrk veilla personnellement sur la formation des instituteurs, les propagandistes de la nouvelle Turquie ( ce niveau, il fait penser Jules Ferry, le pere de l'ecole laique en France). II convient done aux citoyens de s'interroger et de savoir ce qu'ils veulent: ou ceder aux pressions de toutes les minorites, et enfoncer la societe dans un communautarisme qui nie toute son histoire moderne et prepare les ghettos, et abolit la conscience civique; ou confrmer les principes d'un pluralisme soumis une volonte generale. L'ecole reste en ce domaine peut-etre encore plus qu'en d'autres, la matrice de ntre avenir. Dans ce sens, on n'invente rien car, par exemple, le siecle des Lumieres fut place sous le sceau de l'instruction. Non que les philosophes, et en particulier les eneyelopedistes aient eu une doctrine en la matiere, mais toute leur reflexion etait motivee par la question de la connaissance et done de la transmission des progres de I'esprit humain. Rousseau dans Emile ou l'education, publie en 1762, recuse l'ecole comme lieu oblige d'apprentissage des savoirs, et preconise une harmonie entre spontaneite naturelle et education livresque. Diderot, dans son plan d'une niversite (1775), s'enflamme quant lui pour la mise en place d'une education publiaue dans toutes les sciences qu'il conseille... et commence son chapitre De l'instruction par l'affirmation qu'instruire une nation, c'est aussi la civiliser. Cependant tous affirment la priorite a la connaissance et sa diffusion, preoccupation que partagent d'ailleurs toutes les elites politiques. Quelques grandes idees se degagent. La premiere est la secularisation de l'ecole, la fin du monopole ecclesiastique et l'attribution de la gratuite, que la majorite des philosophes des Lumieres considerent comme la consequence logique du choix d'un service publie d'Etat pour assurer l'instruction. La troisieme est la conception nouvelle des contenus, moins orientes vers la speculation et les humanites, davantage axee vers un savoir utilitaire, faisant large place l'etude scientifique et technique, et diversifee au point de confiner parfois a l'encyclopedisme, la Constitution de 1791 pose, en effet, le principe d'une instruction publique, gratuite et commune tous les citoyens. 464

Dej avec l'esprit de la renaissance, mouvement artistique et litteraire, caracterise par un retour l'antiquite greco-romaine, par une certaine liberation l'egard du christianisme medieval et de la scolastique et le progres de l'humanisme mouvement intellectuel qui met en valeur la dignite de l'homme apparat une aspiration une nouvelle forme d'education, plus proche de la vie, plus individualiste, accordant une egale importance au developpement du corps qu' celui de l'intelligence. Le combat contre l'obscurantisme - l'attitude hostile la diffusion de l'instruction, notamment dans la masse du peuple - etait un credo des philosophes des lumieres, de meme que contre l'analphabetisme. Le fait de savoir ni lire ni ecrire, est fort repandu dans ntre pays. Si le Senegal a toujours opte pour l'enseignement laic, il n'en demeure pas moins que l'enseignement religieux est d'un enjeu important. II existe dans le pays, des ecoles privees dirigees par l'Eglise catholique, des organisations islamiques et qui reoivent un soutien fnancier de l'Etat. Les efforts du gouvernement du Senegal pour organiser et contrler le systeme d'education islamique remonte au XIXes lorsque l'administration coloniale cree l'Ecole des otages o l'ecole va etre transformee par la site en Medersa en 1908. On y etudie la langue arabe et les sciences islamiques comme le fqh (jurisprudence), hadiths (tradition prophetique) et kalam (theologie). Ce programme etait fixe par le colonisateur. En 1903, 1906, 1911, des decrets ont cherche limiter et contrler les ecoles coraniques. Cette politique s'est heurtee un mur de resistance de la part des populations. L'administration coloniale initie des lors, une politique de cooperation vis vis de certains marabouts. Le Senegal independant envoie des etudiants se former Fes, en Tunisie, au Caire... et le premier College national d'enseignement Francoarabe est cree en 1965. De nos jours, un des aspects de cet enseignement religieux, est l'impossibilite de la part de l'Etat de contrler le contenu des programmes d'enseignement des ecoles religieux qui se multiplient, face un systeme educatif en crise. La campagne de sensibilisation dirig6e par l'UNICEF vers les Talibes (jeunes donnes pour une formation des chefs religieux et qui mendient dans la rue), montre toute l'ampleur du sujet. Un autre theme qui interesse l'enseignement laic est lie a la scolarisation des filles. Ces deux dernieres annees, la prise de conscience par rapport au faible taux de frequentation de l'ecole par les filles6, 38 ans apres les independances, montre les faiblesses de ntre pays concernant
6. Enseignement primaire, 46%. Enseignement moyen, 37%. Enseignement superieur, 26%.

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son projet de societe moderne. La crise structurelle de ntre systeme educatif peut compromettre les objectifs de developpement et entraner une crise des valeurs republicaines. Conclusion L'oeuvre de Mustapha Kemal Atatrk est plus que jamais actuelle pour tous les pays musulmans qui veulent etre au rendez-vous du 3e millenaire car le combat pour la lacite permet de liberer la femme, de lui donner les moyens d'acceder la citoyennete. Les socie"tes musulmanes doivent gagner le pari de la modernite, surtout au moment o certains penseurs dans le monde musulman participent elever le niveau du debat en demontrant que laicite et islam ne sont ni incompatibles ni antinomiques. On a, toujours, defini, l'Islam comme un tout: une doctrine morale, politique et religieuse. Et on s'appuie, generalement, sur cette idee pour rejeter toute forme de separation entre les differentes formes de pouvoir. Seulement, une lecture sereine du Coran montrera qu' aucun element defnissant le pouvoir temporel n'y figre. Voil une solide base de reflexion sur la laicite dans l'Islam. Ainsi la tension qu'on essaie d'entretenir entre les forces de modernisation assimilees souvent comme une tentative d'occidentalisation et un conservatisme d'essence musulmane ne peut pas avoir de bases solides. BIBLIOGRAPHIE COMPLEMENTAIRE
Lewis B., islam et laicite. La naissance de la Turquie moderne. Paris, Fayard 1988. Mantran R., Histoire de la Turquie Paris, 1996. zal T., La Turquie en Europe. Paris 1988. Villalta J. Blanco, Atatrk. Ankara, 1979/1982.

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MODERN TUNISIA AND TURKEY (A COMPARATIVE STUDY N THE LIGHT OF THE KEMALST PRINCIPLES)
Prof. Rafa BENACHOUR* The relationships between Tunisia and Turkey began officially in 1574 (13 Semtember), when the conjugated Turkish forces of Algiers, Tripoli and the fleet of Sinan Pacha, took ver La Goulette and Tunis, freeing Ifriqiya from the Spanish protectorate. Tunisia becomes a Turkisb province. Since then, the course of the intellectual and political life in Tunisia has never ceased to be influenced by intellectual and political events of Turkey. To illustrate this influence, let's point out that the Tunisian reformism in the XIX th century has been deeply inspired by the Turkish one. The fundamental Pact decreed in 1857 has been inspired from the Ottoman declaration "Hatti Cherif'. The same is true for the constitution promulgated on 26 April 1861. it is important to note that the great men of State, such as the Minister Khair-Eddine, have been largely influenced by what were happening in the Ottoman metropolis and notably by the Tanzimat of 1839 and the reform of 1856. For Khair Eddine and his supporters, formed in the military School of the Bardo, it aimed at countering the European domination by borrowing to the Occident the tools of its power, namely: the modern State, while adapting it to a Mslim civilisation based on its real foundations1. Reforms undertaken under the reign of Ahmed Bey posed poles of the Tunisian nationalism, similarly that Tanzimat posed poles of the Turkish nationalism. Later, the movement of Tunisian national liberation, while adopting the inheritance bequeathed by the Tunisian reformers has been deeply marked by what was happening at Constantinople. Thus, the revolution of 1909, that had to be the starting point of the transformation of the Empire into an endowed modern State
* 1. Rector of the University of Sciences, Techniques and Medicine of Tunis. Look Khair Eddine : Essai sur les reformes necessaires aux Etats musulmans, presente par Magali Morsay, Aix-en-Provence, Edisud, 1987, (Coll.archives maghre'bines).

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with liberal institutions on the western model has exerted on Tunisians a real fascination. Indeed, in February 1907, the movement "Young Tunisians" on the model of the movement "Young Turks" emerged in Tunisia. This movement that constituted the outline of the Tunisian nationalism and whose main representative was Ali Bach Hamba, endowed with a solid western culture and an Arabic education, has fixed as objective to reform the Tunisian society so that that it could rejoin the triumphant and developed western civilisation. The "Young Tunisians" have often expressed their affnities with the "Young Turks", even their solidarity with them. At a frst stage the "Young Tunisians" did not oppose the regime of the protectorate. They saw there a historical necessity and probably a factor of evolution. Thereby, their action was especially turned to the denunciation of excesses of the protectorate regime and to the demand of political, institutional, administrative and educational reforms. Affinities between "Young Tunisians" and "Young Turks" have strengthened notably after the Italian aggression against the ottoman Tripolitainia in 1911. This event has been the basis of certain radicalism and a stronger repression on behalf of the French authorities. Confronted with the repression, the leader of the movement, Ali Bach Hamba chooses to exile in Turkey where he remained till his death. Later, the Tunisian national movement reproduced that of Turkey, and followed with interest the evolution of this country after the war, especially since the abolition of the Califat in 1924. For the Tunisian leaders, the triumph of the kemalist revolution bore a lot of hope. Being positivists and rationalists as Attaturk, they also aspired to the establishment of a modern State endovved with a constitution and having for objective a radical transformation of the Tunisian society at ali levels: religious, social, economic and cultural. Looking at the process of setting up the State as well as the kemalist principle2, we will find a very important likeliness with the principles that have been behind the establishment of the modern Tunisian State. The establishment of the Republican State: After having succeeded the Revolution of Anatomy and following the Congress of Erzurum whose decisions will be ratified by the national Congress of Sivas, Kemalists decided to create a constitutional Assembly
2. ahinler (Menter), Origines, influence et actualite du Kemalisme, Paris; Publisud, 1995., Notamment: p. 57-96.

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"The Great National Assembly" meeting for the first time on 23rd April 1920. This Assembly was endovved with ali the powers. After the success of the war of independence, Mustapha Kemal took advantage of this particular conjuncture to convince the Great National Assembly of the necessity to abolish the Sultanate3 and to set up a national sovereignty. This decision was taken on st November 1922. Aftenvards, the Republic was proclaimed on 29th October 1923, as for the Califat, it will be suppressed on 3rd March 1924 and the new secular and a republican constitution adopted on 20th April 1924. The Tunisian approaches are very comparable to the Turkish ones and one can only underline a certain likeliness between elf willed approaches resolutely of both Mustapha Kemal and Habib Bourguiba. Indeed, in the case of Tunisia, as soon as the internal autonomy was proclaimed by the agreements of 3rd June 1955, Bourguiba and the Destourians imposed on the Bey of Tunis the ratification of a decree of 29th December 1955, on the establishment of a "National Constituent Assembly" whose first meeting had been fixed by the same decree on the 8th April 1956 and whose task was to "endow our Kingdom with a constitution". After the organisation of general elections, and only fve days after the proclamation of the Tunisian independence in accord with the agreements of 20 March 1956, the National Constituent Assembly has met on 8 April 19564. in his speech the President of the Assembly5 declared that "there is no way to discussing the Assembly's authorities. it is endovved with ali of them". From 25 July 1957, the NCA decided the abolition of the monarchy and the proclamation of the Republic deeming that its mandate was not limited, as anticipated in the decree of 1955 to adopt a monarchical constitution and that it could undo the task that it initially appointed. nce the assizes of the new established regime, the Assembly could attend to the drafting of the constitution properly, a task that will be finishedonJune st 1959. Secularism. If Tunisian leaders adhered to the fundamental kemalist principles, they observed and stili observe certain reserves as for the principle of sec3. 4. 5. The abolition of sultanate did not imply ipso facto, the abolition of the Califat because of the cleavage between the two institutions. Tunisia was not independent. Habib Bourguiba.

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ularism. Tunisian leaders were indeed against any form of theocracy, but deemed that the State did not have to clash with what constitutes the essential value of the Tunisian people, namely islam. There is therefore, a critical adherence to the principle of secularism, the corner stone of the kemalism. Thus it is during one of the first meetings of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly on April 14, 1956, Tunisian constituents have asserted the foundations of the society and the new Tunisian State. They adopted the first article of the constitution that provides "Tunisia is a free State, independent and sovereign: Its religion is islam, its language is Arabic and its regime, the republic". The meaning of the reference to the Mslim religion in article 1 of the Tunisian constitution does not have to be exaggerated6. Firt of ali, the Tunisian constituents have chosen quite a vague wording: "ts religion is islam". A debate has attempted to know vvhether this refers to the religion of Tunisia, which is merely a sociological reality that can't be questioned; or whether it refers to the religion of the State, which implies some institutional consequences as the form of the State, the exercise of power, the structure of the state bodies ete. Yet, the constitution clauses are in accord with the first interpretation. Similarly the evolution of the Tunisian State has gne in this senses. Without ever reaching secularism, the Tunisian State has evolved towards secularism. Tunisian leaders from 1956 till nowadays have taken decisions vvithin a scope of a secular state and society. Thus on 3rd August 1956 a personal statute book was promulgated that was fundamentally opposed to the religious order. Now, in this code, polygamy is punished, divorce can only be declared judiciary. Women can ask for divorce ete. Similarly, the charaic order was abolished and a modern and unique judicial system instituted. The regime of the habous was equally abolished. As concerns the relationships of the State with the religious institution, the Tunisian attitude has been influenced by kemalism. indeed, the religious University of the Zitouna, pivot of the social organisation for centuries had been dismantled and reduced to a mere faculty of theology within the organisation of the new University of Tunis. Ali charaic dignitaries (Sheik El islam, Cadhis, Muftis...) were suppressed and the traditional costumes of the Zeitouna (turbans, ete.) became forbidden for those who were to work in the modern educational system.
6. Ben Achour (Yadh). islam et constitution, Revue tunisienne de droit, 1974. P : 77; and. Politique, religion et droit dans le monde arabe, Tunis, Ceres produetions, 1992.

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Despite this attitude, the State has not abandoned the religious reality. On the contrary, it has tried to get hold of it. Religious institutions have been put under the authority of a state administration (the direction of the cult within the responsibility of the Prime minister) and there was only a symbolic function that had been preserved, namely that of the Mufti of the Republic. These similarities show that the pirinciple of secularisra has rather marked the Tunisian leader actions during the establishment of the Tunisian State. This influence or at least any reference, even covert to the Kemalisin, seems to have known a renewal in the late 1980s because of the strengthening of the fundamentalists' tendency and the issues relative to the relationships between the State and the religion. Indeed, claims for a thorough secularism on the Turkish model have been requested to safeguard both the State and the religion from mutual overlapping. These requests contradicted those that favoured a strengthening of the religion and especially the withdrawal of some reforms undertaken in 1956 as the prohibition of polygamy, the legalisation of adoption, women emancipation considered by the fundamentalist as contrary to the religion. On 20 March 1988, The President Zine Ben Ali has taken a decisive action by stating that the code of the personal status would neither be questioned nor abandoned. Thereafter various measures have been taken to consolidate women's rights namely concerning the granting of the Tunisian woman nationality to her children and equality betvveen the father and the mother in the management of the family matters (education, travel and financial issues)7. This secular and modern attitude of the society can be revealed by the situation of religion outside the political fields. Thus, as concerns political life, the law of 28 April 1989 forbids the constitution of any political party on a denominational, ethnic, racial or regional basis. Similarly political parties have to act to consolidate the national rights i.e. the republican regime, the sovereignty of the people, principles of the personal status code, the equality betvveen men and vvomen and the protection of children. Since a constitutional amendment of 27 October 1997, the article 8 of the constitution stipulates: "the political parties should contribute to the training of citizens to organise their participation to the political life. They have to be organised on a democratic background. Political parties have to respect the sovereignty of the people, the values of the Republic and ali principles relative to the personal status.
7. Cf: International conference on Islamic Laws and women in the modern world, Giant forum, Islamabad, 22-23 December 1996.

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The political parties are committed to banish any form violence, fanaticism, racism and discrimination. No political party can organise itself on principles, objectives, activities or programs, based on a religion, a language, a race, a sex". in the same way, it's important to point out the clauses of the 1988 law on mosques, that had attempted to banish politics from their precincts enabling them to be solely in charge of the religious service and forbidding any other type of activities. Populism Populism and the rejection of any class war have always been part of the Tunisian policy. Here again, a comparison with kemalism is necessary. Thus the preamble of the Tunisian constitution reads the following "let's proclaim the will of this people, that has freed itself from foreign domination thanks to its strong cohesion and to its struggle that against tyranny, exploitation and regression to strengthen its national unity". The strategy of the new State aimed at the emergence of a new man free from his former tribal and elan alliances. it is important at this stage to point out in this respect that Tunisia, contrary to Turkey, has not been confronted with a problem of ethnic multiplicity. A somewhat linguistic and religious harmony, in addition to a centralised national state organisation had favoured since the beginning of the XVII th century the emergence of a Tunisian national entity. Nevertheless, the newly independent State could fear at its beginnings the appearance of any type of tribalism. Leaders have always insisted on the necessity to insure the stability of the State and to struggle against anything that might threaten national unit. The policy of the State has tried therefore to fulfil notional solidarity, balance between regions, education for young children at school age, acceptable house conditions and health for ali. The key vvord was welfare for ali. As stated by a writer "What symbolises a republican State, the rhetoric used by its leaders and the scope of their prerogatives and interventions have given birth to a modern pedagogy aiming at the emergence of a new man, a responsible individual, freed from obsolete mentalities and ready to en8 compass the rationality of the science and the technique" . The state control Another kemalist principal has inspired Tunisian leaders in the establishment of a stable, modern and national State: namely State control. This has enabled it to interfere and direct choices in almost ali felds of activities, because it had substituted a class of businessmen that didn't exist yet and played a leading role in the social and economic life.
8. Camau (Michel), La Tunisie, Paris. P.U.F. 1989, p. 61.

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During the 1960 decade, no political, economic, cultural, social, religious, sports, corporatist institution has escaped the tutelage of the State - Party. Here again we observe the influence of the Kemalism. So during the frst years of the independence the State has had an overall control ver the important areas of the economy. Besides, it has opted for a planned economy and for agricultural collectivisation. it's only in the beginning of the 70s that the State had given up this policy and chosen to pen up to the exterior and to somewhat liberalise its economy. At the political level as well, the importance of a state controlled policy is seen in the choice of a one party regime: the Neo Destour that changes since 1964 into the P.S.D. (Parti Socialiste Destourien) and had a total monopoly on the political life. Here again the kemalist influence is quite obvious on the Tunisian leaders. Hadn't Mustapha Kemal established the Turkish Republican Party which changed in 1931 into Republican Party of the People whose statutes as a unique party will be inserted into the Constitution. As for secularism, Tunisian leaders have not gne as far as Mustapha Kemal. The unique party has not been constitutionalised. it was actually a unique party de facto.

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CUMHURYETN BAKENTANKARA
Dr. Bill N. MR* 13 Ekim 1923 tarihinde, Ankara ehri Trkiye'nin bakenti oldu; eski bakent stanbul brakld. O tarihten beri Ankara, Trkiye Devleti'nin bakentidir ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasna da deimez baken olarak gemitir. 1998 yl Ekim aynda Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75. ya gnn kutlarken, ayn zamanda Ankara'nn bakent oluunun da 75. yldnmn kutluyoruz. Cumhuriyet ile Cumhuriyetin bakenti, gn farkyla yattrlar. Bakent deitirmek, byk bir karardr; her yerde, her zaman nemli olaylardan saylr. Ankara'nn bakent seilmesi daha da ilgi ekici ve anlaml bir olaydr. 1920'lerde Ankara pek ekici olmayan kk bir Anadolu kasabasyd; eski bakent stanbul ise oldum olas gz kamatrc bir imparatorluklar bakentiydi. Ankara gibi snk bir Anadolu kasabasnn anl anl stanbul'u bakentlik tahtndan indirivermesi, sskack bir gencin, ar sklet dnya ampiyonu koskoca bir boksr bir yumrukta nakavt edivermesi gibi ilgintir. Ankara'nn bakent seilmesi ayn zamanda anlaml bir olaydr. nk bylece, yeni Trk Devletinin arlk merkezi stanbul'dan Anadolu'ya kaymtr. Osmanl mparatorluu dalmt, Trkiye topraklarnn byk blm artk Anadolu'dayd. yleyse yeni Trk Devletinin de gzleri imdi Anadolu'ya evrilmiti. Bakentin istanbul'dan Ankara'ya tanmas, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin devlet politikasnda da kkl deiiklik anlam tar. Bakent deitirmek, Devletin yap deitirmesiyle dorudan ilgilidir. Trkler, tarih iinde, eitli corafyalarda eitli Devletler kurmular ve eitli bakentler semilerdir. Anadolu Seluklu Devleti'nin bakenti Orta Anadolu'da Konya ehri idi. Bat Anadolu'da kurulan Osmanl Devleti'nin ilk bakenti, Uluda eteklerindeki Bursa ehri oldu. Bu gen Devlet, Marmara denizini ap gney-dou Avrupa'ya doru genilemeye balaynca, bakentini de Bursa'dan Meri nehri kyndaki Edirne'ye kayBykeli.

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drd; arlk Anadolu'dan Balkanlara kayd. 1453 ylnda stanbul fethedilince, Osmanl Devletinin bakenti de hemen Edirne'den stanbul'a tand. Osmanl mparatorluu, Asya ve Avrupa ktalar zerine kurulmutu. Bu iki ktann tam kavak yerinde bulunan stanbul, bakent olarak mparatorlua pek uygun dmt ve be yzyl kadar Osmanl payitaht olarak kald. Osmanl imparatorluunun dalmas zerine de Anadolu'da kurulan yeni Trk Devleti Osmanl payitahtn brakp kendisine Anadolu'nun gbeindeki Ankara'y seti. Bu, tarihin akna uygun bir seim olmutur. Bakentin Anadolu'ya tanmas dncesi biraz eskidir. zellikle stanbul'un yabanc devletlerin silahl tehdidine urad dnemlerde bakenti daha gvenli bir yere tama fikirleri de su stne kmtr. Bakent lkenin en gvenli bir yeri olmak gerekirken, zayflayan Osmanl mparatorluunun payitaht artk yabanc tehditlerine kar pek korunamyordu. 1878'de Rus ordular, 1913'te Bulgar ordular Trakya'y ineyip geerek stanbul kaplarna dayanmlard. 1920'de ise ngiliz, Fransz, talyan mttefik kuvvetleri bakent stanbul'u resmen igal ettiler. Bu durumda gzler, ister istemez Anadolu'ya evrildi. Olaylar gelitike yeni bakent aday olarak Ankara ne kt. 27 Aralk 1919 gn, Mustafa Kemal Paa ve Heyet-i Temsiliye yeleri Ankara'ya gelip yerletiler. Atatrk ve arkadalarnn bu gelileri, Ankara tarihinin bir dnm noktas oldu. O tarihte Heyet-i Temsiliye Anadolu'da bir defacto hkmet durumundayd ve lkeyi fiilen ynetiyordu. Heyet-i Temsiliye'nin karargah Ankara dahi bir fiili hkmet merkezi durumuna geldi. 16 Mart 1920'de Batl Mttefikler (yani ngiltere, Fransa ve talya) istanbul'u igal ettiler. Bunun zerine, 23 Nisan gn yeni Parlamentomuz Ankara'da topland. 2 Mays 1920 gn Ankara'da ilk Hkmet resmen kuruldu. Yeni Hkmetin kurulmasyla Ankara fiilen bu Hkmetin merkezi durumuna geldi. Ama Ankara'nn hukuken Trkiye'nin bakenti olabilmesi iin yl daha beklemek gerekti. Ancak Lozan bar antlamasnn yaplmas ve yabanc igal kuvvetlerinin Trkiye'den ekip gitmelerinden sonradr ki Ankara resmen bakent ilan edildi. 2 Ekim 1923 gn yabanc igal kuvvetlerinin son kalntlar Trk topraklarn boaltp gittiler. te o zaman bakent ii kesin olarak ele alnd. 9 Ekim 1923 gn, Dileri Bakan smet Paa (nn) ve arkadalar u tek maddelik yasa tasarsn TBMM'ne sundular: "Trkiye Devleti 'nin makarr- idaresi (bakenti) Ankara ehridir."' Tasarnn gerekesinde -doabilecek tepkileri yattrmak iin olsa gerek- stanbul'un Halifelik merkezi olarak kalaca syleniyor ve "Yeni
1. TBMM Zabt Ceridesi, 2. Devre, 1. Sene, cilt 2, s. 665.

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Trkiye'nin bakentinin Anadolu'da ve Ankara ehrinde seilmesi gerektii" vurgulanyor. Bunu gerektiren nemli nedenlere de ksaca parmak baslyor: Yurdun g ve gelime kaynaklarn Anadolu'nun ortasnda kurmak, i ve d gvenlik, corafi durum ve strateji, deniyor. Tasar, komisyonlardan abucak geti ve 13 Ekim gn TBMM'de oy okluuyla, 27 sayl karar olarak kabul edildi. Kararn sadeletirilmi metnu udur: "Karar No. 27: Ankara ehrinin Trkiye Devleti'nin bakenti olmasna ilikin Malatya Milletvekili smet Paa Hazretlerinin 2/188 sayl yasa nerisi zerine Anayasa Komisyonunca dzenlenen 10.X.1923 tarihli mazbata, (TBMM'nin) 13.X.1923 tarihli otuz beinci birleiminin ikinci oturumunda okunarak olduu gibi kabul edilmi ve Ankara ehrinin Trkiye Devleti'nin bakenti olmas byk ounlukla kararlatrlmtr." te bu kararla Ankara resmen Trkiye'nin bakenti olmutur. Bu metin bir yasa deil, bir TBMM karar idi. Bakent karar, be ay kadar sonra, 1924 Anayasamzn 2. Maddesinde yle yer ald: "Trkiye Devleti'nin dini din-i slamdr; resmi dili Trkedir; makam (bakenti) Ankara ehridir." Bu hkm, daha sonraki anayasalarmzda da yer almtr ve bugnk Anayasamzn da deimez 3. maddesini oluturmaktadr. Bakentin Ankara'ya tanmas, stanbul'un bakentlik tahtndan indirilmesi, stanbullular pek honut etmedi. Baz stanbul gazeteleri, bakent deitirme kararn buruk bir dille eletirdiler. Tann gazetesi Bayazar Hseyin Cahit (Yaln), "Ankara'y makam idare (bakent) yapmak iin ileri srlen esbap hi de makul ve mantki deildir" diye yazd. Bakent Ankara'ya tannca, Trk devlet adamlarnn dnyadan, uygarlktan kopmu olacaklarn, Avrupa'dan uzaklaacaklarn ileri srd. "Merkez-i hkmetin Ankara'ya ekilmesinde en ok korktuumuz ey, devlet adamlarmzn tamamyla suni deta dnyadan eddi in ile ayrlm bir muhit fikri ve ruhu dahilinde mahpus kalmalar ihtimalidir" dedi. Ankara'nn Hakimiyeti Milliye gazetesi, Tanin bayazarna cevap verdi: Bakentin Ankara'ya tanmasyla, Anadolu'ya uygarlk gtrmenin amalandn belirtti. yle yazd: "Hseyin Cahit Beyi temin ederiz ki, Ankara'nn merkez-i hkmet ittihaznn en byk mili, bahsettii o eddi in'i ykmaktr!... Anadolu'yu, Anadolu ahalisini, eddi in ile btn lemden, medeni dnyann btn fyuzatndan imdiye kadar ayran stanbul Hkmetleri olmutur!... Bu kerre hkmet merkezinin Anadolu'nun gbeine intikali, eddi in'i krarak Anadolu'yu, Anadolu ahalisini hkmet vastasyla, doru-

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dan doruya btn medeni lemle temasa getirmek, beeriyet leminin mterek mesai ile husule getirmi olduu btn feyizlerden, btn nimetlerden behredar etmek emeline matuftur. "2 Hseyin Cahit, eletirilerini srdryor : "Ankara'da bulunan merkez-i hkmet, milleti, vatan daha yakndan grecek deil... Hele Avrupa 'yi bsbtn gzden gaip edecektir." diyordu. Ankara'nn szcs Hakimiyeti Milliye, bu iddiaya da alayc biimde cevap veriyordu: "Aman efendim! Fatih zamanndan beri stanbul'da bulunan merkez-i hkmet, milleti, vatan o kadar yakndan ve drst bir ryet ile grm, takdir etmi ve ihtiyalarn o kadar tehalkle ve devaml bir surette tatmin eylemitir ki, memleket mran ve refah iinde bouluyor!... Netice meydanda: Anadolu Trk' Altay Dalarndan getirdii sapan ve kans, Sleyman ah zamannda tad kafas ile olduu gibi kalmtr... "Evet, Avrupa'y gzden gaip eyleyeceiz. Fakat manevi Avrupa'y deil, maddi Avrupa 'yi ve bununla biz hr, serbest, mstakil bir millete layk olan ahsiyetimizi muhafaza ye takviye etmi olacaz. Avrupa'nn mtemadi tehdidi altnda bulunan stanbul, ...sknet, huzur ve muvazenesini gaip ediyordu... "Biz, merkez-i hkmeti Ankara'ya nakletmekle, bamz zerinde asl duran Demokles klcn krm olduk; huzur ve skunetimizi temin ettik; binaenaleyh Avrupa 'nn maneviyatna daha ziyade yaklaarak, hr ve mstakil bir millete yakan skunetle o maneviyattan istediimiz tarzda, istediimiz kadar da istifade edeceiz. Bununla beraber, bu mktesebat dorudan doruya Anadolu'nun orta gbeine nakledeceimizden, btn Anadolu, btn millet ayn derecede, ayn tarzda istifade eyleyecektir... "Evet, Ankara tozludur. Lakin... Tozlar iinde memleketi kurtarmaya azmetmi olanlar, bu kerre de memleketi bu tozlardan kurtarmaya azmetmilerdir. te merkez-i hkmetin Ankara 'ya naklinin hikmet ve srr. "3 Hakimiyeti Milliye gazetesinin bu imzasz bayazlar, bir bakma Hkmetin grn ve istanbul gazetelerine tepkisini yanstyordu. Basnn bakent polemii epeyce srd, istanbul basn sylene dursun, Ankara bakent olmutu artk. Ankara halk bayram ediyordu. O gnlerde Hakimiyeti Milliye'de st ste u manetler gze arpyor: "Ankara en ve Ankarallar Mesut!" {HM., 15.10.1923, No.941)
2. "Devlet Merkezi" (Bayaz), Hakimiyeti Milliye, 16.10.1923, No. 942. 3. "Hkmet Merkezi" (Bayaz), Hakimiyeti Milliye, 18.10.1923, No. 944.

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"Ankara'da 3 Gn 3 Gece enlik!" (HM., 16.10.1923, No. 942) enlikler, elenceler de bitiyor. Sra geliyor yeni bakentin bayndrlk ilerine. Hakimiyeti Milliye1 de yle balklar grlyor: "Ankara'nn mar Etrafnda" {HM., 7.11.1923, No. 961) "Ankara'nn marna Doru", (HM., 14.11.1923, No. 967) "Ankara'nn marndan: Elektrikle Tenvirat", (HM., 20.11.1923, No. 972) te yandan Ankara'nn bakent oluu, yabanc elilikler konusunu gndeme getirdi. Trkiye'ye atanm ve atanacak yabanc diplomatik temsilciler Ankara'ya ne zaman tanacaklard? Trkiye'de yeni bakentin seildii ve Cumhuriyetin ilan edildii srada, Ekim 1923'te, Ankara'da yalnz Afganistan ve Sovyet Bykelilikleri vard. Bir de Mougin adl bir Fransz Albay, bir eit temsilci sfatyla Ankara'da oturuyordu. teki yabanc diplomatik temsilcilerin hemen hepsi stanbul'dayd. imdi bunlarn Ankara'ya tanmalar gerekiyordu. nk, Devletler hukukuna gre, yabanc Eliler atandklar lkenin bakentinde oturmak durumundaydlar, stanbul ise artk bakent deil, sadece bir vilayet merkeziydi. ngiltere, aylar ncesinden ie koyulmu, bakent Ankara'ya kar cephe almaya hazrlanmt. Bunun tesinde ngiltere, Ankara'ya kar bir ortak cephe oluturmaa alyordu. ngiltere Dileri Bakan Lord Curzon, 24 Ekim 1923 gn Paris, Roma, Vaington ve Tokyo Bykeliliklerine gizli bir ifre talimat gnderdi ve Mttefiklerin Ankara'ya kar anlap birlikte hareket etmelerini istedi: "Ankara 'nn Trkiye 'nin bakenti olarak seilmesi kesinlemi olduundan, Trkiye 'de diplomatik temsilcilik sorununun mttefiklerce yeniden gzden geirilmesi gerekmektedir... "Majesteleri Hkmeti, antlamann (Lozan antlamasnn) onaylanmasndan sonra stanbul'a bir Bykeli gndermeye hazrdr; yeter ki, Bykeliye, Trk Hkmetinin stanbul'daki bir temsilcisi ya da Bykelinin Ankara 'daki bir temsilcisi araclyla, Trk Hkmetiyle i grme kolayl salansn. Majesteleri Hkmeti, her halkrda Ankara 'ya bir Bykeli gndermemeye kararldr. "Nezdinde bulunduunuz Hkmetin, Majesteleri Hkmetin bu grlerini paylap paylamadnn... bildirilmesini rica ederim. "4
4. Bill N. imir, Ankara...Ankara. Bir Bakentin Douu, Bilgi Yaynevi, Ankara: 1988, s. 251.

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Lord Curzon, Ankara'ya bir Bykeli gndermeyeceini sylyordu. stanbul'daki ngiliz Yksek Komiser Vekili Mr. Henderson da ingiltere'nin Ankara'da Bykelilik amayacan sylyordu. 3 Kasm 1923 gn, Dileri Bakanlnn stanbul'daki Temsilcisi (Murahhas) Dr. Adnan Beye (Advar), "Majesteleri Hkmeti, Ankara 'da en kk bir ev bile yapmak niyetinde deildir" diyordu5. Henderson, Londra'nn nabzna gre erbet vermek istercesine, "Ankara'nn uzun sre bakent olarak kalamayacan" da ileri sryor, Ankara'ya Eli gnderilmemesini savunuyor ve yle yazyordu: "Ben, bugnk (Trkiye) Byk Millet Meclisinin iki yllk mr olacan ve Ankara'nn da iki yl bakent kalacan sanyorum. stanbul'un ekim gc kukusuz byktr, ama Trk Hkmetini tekrar Boaz kysna ekebilmek iin iki yldan fazla da zaman geebilir... "Majesteleri temsilciliinin Ankara'ya tanmas, Trk Hkmetini ve Mustafa Kemal'i elbette ok memnun edecektir. Ama bu tanma, Majesteleri Hkmetinin tatsz ve aalayc bir taviz vermesi anlamna gelir kansndaym. "6 ngiliz diplomatlar, gen Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin uzun mrl olamayacan dnyorlard. Onlarn tahminlerine gre, birka yl iinde Osmanl Saltanat tekrar diriltilebilecek, o zaman bakent yine istanbul'a tanacakt. Byle bir bouna beklenti iinde, Ankara'ya kar sonuna kadar direnmeye kararl grnyorlard. Hem kendilerini, hem de bakalarn yanltyor, aldatyorlard. ubat 1924'te stanbul'a gelen ngiliz Elisi Ronald Charles Lindsay, henz Anadolu kysna bile ayak basmadan, ayann tozuyla, Ankara'nn bakent olarak kalamayacan Londra'ya yle rapor etti: "Bakent iinin nereye varaca zerinde kehanette bulunmaktan hi holanmam, ama unu cesaretle syleyebilirim: Gnn birinde stanbul'un tekrar payitaht olaca kesindir." dedi7. Bir diplomatn, nemli bir konuda, bu kadar kesin konuarak kendi hkmetini yanltmas iin, dorusu, yalnz "cesaret" deil, biraz da "cehalet" gerekir. Nevil Henderson da, Londra'da hazrlad 30 Mart 1924 tarihli raporunda, Ankara'ya, Bykeli gndermemek gerektiini savunuyor ve yle diyordu:
5. bid., s. 254. 6. tbid., s.258: FO 371/9164/E.11304: Handerson'dan Curzon'a rapor. 20.11.1923, No.765. 7. bid., s. 267: F.O. 371/1019 : Lindsay'den Mac Donald'a rapor 19.3.1924.

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"stanbul'da oturacak Bykelinin temsilcisi olarak Ankara'ya bir diplomatik sekreter atanarak Trk Hkmetiyle iliki salanabilir... "Sorunun bir baka yn de vardr. Mustafa Kemal, ...kendi prestijini arttrmak iin Bykelileri Ankara 'da oturmaya zorlamak da isteyebilir. Sylemeye gerek yoktur ki (Mustafa) Kemal'in prestijini arttran ey, bizim prestijimizi azaltr. Bykelimizin ikmetghn Ankara'ya tatmak iin Trklerin bize antaj yapmalar tehlikesi vardr. Trkler bu yola sapmasalar bile, temsilciliimiz bir gn Ankara 'ya tanacaksa (Bykelilik derecesinden) Elilik derecesine indirilmelidir. "8 Bu rapor, Dileri Bakanndan ve Babakandan geerek Kral'a kadar karld. Kral George, 5 Nisan 1924 gn, "Windsor Castle" balkl kda buyruunu yle not ettirdi ve altna parafn koydu: "Bu nerileri artl olarak onaylyorum: "1- yice bilinsin ki, ikmetgh stanbul'dan Ankara'ya tanrsa Trkiye 'deki ngiliz misyonu Elilik derecesine indirilecektir. "2- Ankara 'da yalnz diplomatik sekreterlik ve personeli iin deil, ayn zamanda, oraya periyodik ziyaretlerde bulunacak olan Bykeli ve maiyeti iin de elverili ve yeterli olacak bir bina yaplsn. "9 Bylece ngiltere, Devletler hukuku kurallarn ve teaml bir kenara itip Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin bakentine kar cephe alm oldu. Cephe almakla da yetinmedi, Ankara'ya kar Fransa ve talya ile birlikte bir "ortak cephe" oluturmaya soyundu. Paris ve Roma'da st ste diplomatik giriimlerde bulundu ve Mttefiklerini de Ankara'y boykot etmeye ikna etti. Lozan Bar Antlamas yrrl girdikten sonra, 1 Mart 1925 gn, ingiliz ve italyan Bykelileri, stanbul'daki Trkiye Dileri Delegesi Nusret Bey'e, ayni mealde birer nota verdiler. Fransa Bykelisi de ayn dorultuda szl bildirimde bulundu. Her de, Bykelilerin Ankara'da deil, stanbul'da oturacaklarn resmen Trkiye'ye bildirdiler. ngiliz notas yle kaleme alnmt: "Sayn Delege, stanbul, 1 Mart 1925

"Majeste Kraln ve hkmetinin Trkiye'deki ngiltere diplomatik temsilciliini bir Bykeliye tevdi etmek niyetinde olduklarn, Mr. Austin Chmaberlain'dan aldm buyruk zerine Ekselanslarnn bilgisine sunmakla onurlanrm.
8. Ibid. s. 269. FO. 371/10193 : Henderson'un muhtras, 30.3.1924. 9. Ibid. s. 270: Kral George'un 5.4.1924 tarihli buyruu.

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"2. Bykeli stanbul'da oturacaktr. Ama gerektike sk sk Ankara 'ya gidecektir. "3. Bykeli Ankara 'da, bu amala atanacak bir memur tarafndan srekli olarak temsil edilecektir. "4. Yukardaki noktalar Trk Hkmetinin bilgisine sunmalarn Ekselanslarndan rica ederim. "Derin sayglarm kabul buyurunuz Sayn Delege. (mza) R.C.Lindsay"10 ngiliz Bykelisi Lindsay, stanbul'da bu notay verdikten sonra 15 Mart 1925 gn Ankara'ya geldi ve ertesi gn Cumhurbakan Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paa'ya gven mektubunu sundu. Bakent Ankara'da drt gn kaldktan sonra stanbul'a dnerken, 19 Mart gn Trk Hkmetinin cevabi notas kendisine elden verildi. Trk Notas udur: "Ekselans Ankara, 19 Mart 1925

"Britanya Kralnn ve Hkmetinin Trkiye'deki diplomatik temsilciliini bir Bykeliye tevdi etmek niyetleriyle ilgili olarak Ekselanslarnn Nusret Beye vermi olduklar 1 Mart tarihli notaya karlk aadaki dnceleri bilginize sunmakla onurlanrm. "nce, Trkiye 'de bir Bykeli tarafndan temsil edilmek kararlarndan dolay Britanya Majesteleri Hkmetine teekkr ederim. "Devletler hukuku ilkelerine ve uluslararas teamle gre, krallarn ve hkmetlerini Trkiye Cumhurbakan katnda dorudan dorudan temsil edebilmeleri iin Bykelilerin ancak Trkiye'nin bakenti olan Ankara'da resmi ikametghlar olabilir. "Bundan baka, yabanc misyon eflerinin hkmetlerini ilgilendiren konularda dorudan Dileri Bakan ile i grmeleri arzu edilir ve bu her iki lkenin yararna olur. "Bu genel kuraln Trkiye iin deitirilmesine hibir neden ve olanak yoktur. "Cumhuriyet Hkmeti, yabanc misyonlara bir cemile olsun ve onlarn Ankara'ya tanmalar en iyi koullarda yaplabilsin diye, elinden gelen btn kolaylklar gstermitir ve gstermeye hazrdr. Hatta Trkiye ile diplomatik ilikileri bulunan devletlere Bykelilik ve Elilik bina10. tbid. s. 297-298 : DBA-Mt. 8/17 ve F.O. 424/626, No. 91/1.

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lan yapmalar iin arsa vermeye hkmete yetki tanyan bir yasa Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisine sunulmu bulunmaktadr ve bunun yaknda oylanaca umulmaktadr. "Bu artlar altnda, bugn stanbul'da oturan misyonlara geici olarak tannm olan kolaylklarn, bunlarn tanmalarn kolaylatrmak ve o zamana kadar gnlk ileri aksatmadan yrtebilmelerini salamak amacyla tannm olduunu Ekselanslarnn ltfen anlayacaklarn umarm. "Hem bu esaslar ve hem de yabanc misyonlarn Cumhuriyet Hkmetleriyle dorudan doruya ve srekli temasta olmalarnn, gerek yabanc devletlerin gerekse Trkiye 'nin yce karlarna uygun olaca gz nnde tutularak, bu misyonlarn mmkn olan en ksa zamanda Ankara'ya tanacaklarn umarm. "Derin sayglarmn kabuln rica ederim Ekselans. (mza) Dr. RT"11 Bu nota zerine ngiliz Bykelisi Lindsay, Ankara'ya kar direnmeyi ve Byk devletler arasnda oluturulmu ortak cepheyi devam ettirmeyi Londra'ya yle nerdi: "Byk devletlerin yapacaklar tek ey, direnmek(tir). ..Eer Byk devlet direnilerini gevetmezlerse, teki devletler de yan izemezler kansndaym... u halde en nemli nokta cephe birliidir (Unity of front)." dedi ve bu direni sonunda Mustafa Kemal rejiminin devrilebileceini de ima etti: "Bu ortak direnile ne elde edilecektir, sorusu akla geliyor... Direnmekle herhalde zaman kazanm oluruz ve bu tek adam (Mustafa Kemal) 12 rejiminin ne kadar mr olduunu kimse syleyemez" ngiltere, bakent Ankara'ya kar "cephe birliini" ayakta tutabilmek iin Mttefikleri Fransa ve talya'y bask altnda tutmaa alyordu. Bu amala giriimlerini srdrd. Paris'teki ngiliz Bykelisi Lord Crewe, 21 Mart 1925 gn Fransa Bakan ve Dileri Bakan Edouard Herriot'ya bir muhtra sundu. Bykelilerin stanbul'dan Ankara'ya tanmalarn isteyen Trkiye'ye kar ortaklaa sert tavr konmasn ve sert bir cevap verilmesini istedi. Londra'nn grne gre, Trk Hkmeti, Bykeliliklerin Ankara'ya tanmalarnda srar ederse, Bykelilikleri Elilik dzeyine drmek ve bunu Trk Hkmetine resmen bildirmek
11. lbid. s. 305-306, DBA-Mt. 8/17 ve FO 424/262, s. 130-131, No. 129/1. 12. lbid. s. 308, FO. 424/262, s. 129-130, No. 129: Lindsay'dan>Chamberlain'a rapor, 24.5.1925, No. 224.

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gerekirdi. ngiltere, kendi bakentini semi olmaktan baka bir "suu" olmayan Trkiye'nin cezalandrlmasn veya aka tehdit edilmesini mttefiklerine kabul ettirmee alyordu. Fransa, byle bir tehdide yanamad. ngiliz Muhtrasna verdii 24 Mart 1925 gnl cevapta, "Fransa Hkmeti, Trkiye'deki mttefik temsilciliklerinin Elilik dzeyine indirileceini Ankara'ya sylemenin uygun olmayacan...sanmaktadr" dendi13. Ama, Fransa ve talya, Bykelilerin Ankara'y boykot etmeleri konusunda ngiltere'yi yine desteklediler.. 1925 yl Nisan ay sonlarnda, ngiltere, Fransa ve talya Bykelilikleri, ayr ayr, Trkiye'ye birer nota verdiler. stanbul'da oturan Bykelilerin Ankara'ya tanmayacaklarn, ama Trk Hkmetinin Ankara'da Bykelilik biras yapm iin bedava verecei arsalar memnuniyetle kabul edeceklerini bildirdiler. Trkiye, Batl devletin bu notalarna geten ge cevap verdi. Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin bakentinin Ankara ehri olduunu bir kerre daha resmen Bykelilere hatrlatt. Onlarn gnlk ilerini kolaylatrmak iin Dileri Bakanlnn stanbul'da bulundurduu temsilciliin (Hariciye Vekleti Dersaadet Murahhasl'nn) uzun sre orada braklmayacan da bildirdi. Ankara'daki Elilik ktipleri ise Bykelilerin yerini tutamazlard...14 Karlkl notalamalar burada durdu. Bykelilerin stanbul'dan Ankara'ya tanmalar zamana brakld. ngiltere'nin Ankara'ya kar oluturduu ve ban ektii "ortak cephe" zamanla gevemee yz tuttu. Yabanc devletler, arka arkaya, Ankara'da Elilik, Bykelilik binalar yaptrmaya, birer ikier Ankara'ya tanmaya baladlar. Bakent Ankara'ya kar pek sert bir tavr taknm olan ngiliz Bykelisi Lindsay'in de giderek az deitirmee alt grld. Lindsay, Mart 1925'te, "Ankara srekli bakent kalmayacaktr" diyordu. Cumhuriyet rejiminin birka yl iinde yklabileceini, yklnca bakentin tekrar stanbul'a kayacan ileri sryordu. Kasm 1925'te Ankara'ya tekrar gelince gr deitirmee balad. Bu defa unlar rapor etti: "nemli bir konuda eski grm deitirmem gerek. Bakent olarak Ankara'nn kaderi, bugnk rejimin kaderine sk skya bal. Son raporlarmda da belirttiim gibi, rejim gittike glendiine ve yerine oturduuna gre, Ankara ehri, hakl olarak yar srekli bakentlikten daha fazlasn mit edebilir. " 1 5
13. lbid., s. 310, FO. 424/262, s. 122/2, M. Herriot'dan Marki Crevve'a nota, 24.3.1925. 14. lbid. s. 311-320. 15. lbid. s. 327, FO 424/263/E.7370, s. 60-61, No. 22: Lindsay'den Chamberlain'a rapor. 23.11.1925, No. 865.

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Ankara'ya kar nyargl davranm olan ngiliz Bykelisi Lindsay'in Trkiye'deki grevi, 1926 ylnda sona erdi. Onun yerine atanan yeni ngiliz Bykelisi Sir George Clerk, 22 Kasm 1926 gn gven mektubunu Cumhurbakan Gazi Mustafa Kemal'e sundu. Yeni Bykeli, bakent Ankara konusunda selefi gibi nyargl davranmad. Daha tarafsz, daha gereki bir tutum izledi. Onun zamannda ngilizler, Ankara'nn gerekten bakent olduuna ve bakent kalacana inanmaya baladlar. "Ankara, iki yl bakent kalr", "Ankara geici bakenttir", "yar srekli bakenttir" gibi yersiz pheler, artk ngiliz raporlarnda grlmez oldu. Bu arada stanbul'dan Ankara'ya tanan Eliliklerin says yldan yla artt. 1925'te stanbul'da 18, Ankara'da ise 4 diplomatik temsilcilik vard. Ertesi yl, Ankara'ya yerleen Eliliklerin says iki katna kt. Say gittike artyor, Elilikler arka arkaya Ankara'ya tanyorlard. Ankara'ya kar oluturulmu olan "direni cephesi" 1927 ylnda zld. ngiliz Bykelisi Clerk unlar rapor ediyordu: "stanbul'daki Trk Dileri Bakanl Delegelisi fiilen kaldrlm durumdadr. Artk btn iler Ankara'da grlyor. Kordiplomatii Ankara'da oturanlar, stanbul'da oturanlar diye ikiye ayrmann hi gerei kalmad... "Ankara'da Elilik ve Bykelilik binalar yapmnda srekli bir ilerleme var. Almanya Bykelilii 1928 sonbaharnda Ankara'ya yerlemeyi planlamtr. Almanya Bykelilii iin Ankara'da yaplmakta olan, irili ufakl yedi bina hzla ykseliyor. "Polonya Elilii binas yava yava tamamlanyor. Fransz ve Amerikan Bykelilikleri, bina yapmak zere arsa almaya urayorlar. Romanya, Avusturya Elilikleri ve daha birok Elilik, Ankara 'da ev kiraladlar... "Genel olarak bakente tanma eilimi gittike artyor. "
16

1928 ylnda, Ankara'ya kar "direni cephesi" bsbtn kt. Batl " bykler", yani ingiltere, Fransa, talya arasndaki birlik de zld. talya, ngiltere'nin itirazlarna aldrmayarak Ankara'da Bykelilik binas yaptrmaya ve Bykeliliini Ankara'ya tamaya karar verdi. stanbul'da oturarak Ankara'da i grlemiyordu. Fransa, Bykelilik binas yaptrmak iin Yakup Kadri Beyin ban seti. Trkiye Maliye Bakanlnca sahibinden satn alnan ba, Fransa'ya hibe edildi. Ankara'ya tanmaya yanamayan yalnz ngiltere kalmt. ngiliz Bykelisi Sir George Clerk, ilk defa 1929 ylnda, Kraln Doum yld16. Ibid. s. 340-41, FO.424/268/E.709, s.36-37, No. 17: Clerk'ten Chamberlain'a yaz. 15.2.1928, No. 102.

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nm resepsiyonunu resmen Ankara'da dzenledi. Bylece Trkiye'nin bakentini tanm oldu. Bundan hem Bykeli, hem de Trk makamlar memnun kalmlardr. Alt ay sonra Bykeli Clerk, Londra'ya unlar rapor etti: "Ankara artk kesinlikle Trkiye'nin bakentidir ve kordiplomatik gitgide buraya temelli olarak yerlemektedir, ikametgahlarn elektrik, yol, su, gaz gibi maddi artlar artk stanbul'daki kadar iyidir, hatta daha da iyidir. Ankara artk Trkiye'de grevli diplomatik misyonlarn temelli evidir. " n Bykeli Sir George'un Trkiye'de kald yllarda (1926-1933) ngiltere, bakent Ankara konusundaki tutumunu deitirdi. Trkiye'nin bakentine kar direnmekten vazgeti. Ankara'da Bykelilik binas yaptrd, ingiliz Bykelileri burada oturmaya baladlar. "Ankara ancak birka yl bakent kalabilir" diye karamsar dnm olanlar yanlmlardr. Bugn Ankara bakent oluunun 75. yln kutlamaktadr. Mdafaa caddesinde, Genelkurmay Bakanlnn karsnda bir yazt vardr. Orada, mermer stne kaznm, Atatrk'n u szleri okunmaktadr: "Ankara merkez-i hkmettir ve ebediyyen merkez-i hkmet kalacaktr!"

17. Ibid. s. 348, FO 424/272/E.465: Clerk'ten Henderson'a rapor. 22.1.1930, No.33.

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RADE- MLLYE GAZETES VE MLL MCADELE DNEMNDE SVAS BASINI ZERNE GZLEMLER
Dr. Horst UNBEHAUN* 'Trk milletinin esaret kabul etmiyen sesi yurd ve dnya ufuklarnda bir bayrak gibi dalgalanmya balamt. Bu stn hareketin erkek bir ses organna ihtiyac vard. O da ancak bir gazeteyle duyurulabilirdi." Vehbi Cem Akun bu szlerle Sivas Kongresi adl eserinde "Atatrk htilalinin lk Gazetesi rade-i Milliye" blmne girerek eski Sivas milletvekillerinden Rasim Bey'in hatratndan u cmlelerini de aktaryor: "Gazetenin bir fkrann veya zmrenin amal ve maksadna hadim olmayp btn milletin irade ve amalim temsil ettiini gstermek iin de sahib-i imtiyaz ve mdir-i mes'ulnn ttihad ve Terakki ile, dier zmre ve fkralarla uzaktan yakndan bir alkas olmamas lzumu kongre murahhaslarnn bazlarnn, bilhassa Bekir Sami Bey tarafndan serdedilmi ve bu eraiti haiz bi taraf bir adam bulmak da bana tevdi edilmiti."1 Mill Mcadele'nin, 1919 ylnn Eyll aynda Sivas Kongresi esnasnda kurulmu ilk basn organnn douu byle anlyor. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluunun nmzdeki gnlerde kutlanacak 75inci yldnm vesilesiyle Sivas basn tarihinin Mill Mcadele yllarn ana hatlaryla izerek kesin cevaplar vermektense, gelecekte ne gibi sorular zerinde durulmas gerekebileceine dair nemli grdm birka noktaya deinmek istiyorum. lk nce, 1918 ncesindeki Anadolu basnna ksa bir bak atalm. ttihat ve Terakki Frkas'nn ynetimi altnda ksa bir zaman uygulanm bir hrriyet devrinden sonra, kinci Dnya Harbinde Anadolu'da 19091910 yllarnda kurulmu bir sr gazete, ksmen madd imknszlklar dolaysyla, kapanmt. Osmanl devletinin malubiyetinin ardndan
* 1. Erlangen-Nrnberg niversitesi. Akun (1963), s. 161.

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Anadolu'nun nemli blmlerinin tilaf devletleri ve Yunan kuvvetleri tarafndan igal edilmesi deiik blgelerde yerli halkn direnmesini douruyordu. Bazlar yeni kurulmu birka Anadolu gazetesi bu kuvva-y milliye gruplarn desteklerken, stanbul basn, ister tilf devletlerinin uygulad sansr dolaysyla, ister Osmanl sultanna kar bir sadakat veyahut ingilizler'e kar duyulan sempati dolaysyla, bata Mill Mcadele'ye mesafeli duruyordu. Hatta baz gazeteler ciddi eletirilerde bile bulunuyordu. Kololu, Trke yayna hazrlad K.Yust'un 'Kemalist Anadolu Basn'2 adl eserinde verilen bilgileri ele alarak Anadolu gazeteleri hakknda bir liste hazrlad3. Onu temel alrsak, Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Trkiye Ansiklopedisinde Vilayet gazeteleri zerinde verilen istatistik veri4 ve oar'n 'Mill Mcadele Basn'5 adl eserinde toplad bilgilerle birlikte u tespitlere varlabilir. 1. 1918 ylnda Anadolu'da yirmi ksur Trke gazete kmaktayd. Bunlardan 16's (Kololu sadece 7 tanesini sayyor) resm nitelikli vilayet gazeteleri idi. Halbuki, adlan verilen gazetelerin hepsinin harp yllar boyunca kp kmamalar ile ilgili kesin bir ey sylemek gtr. Bunlarn bazs Birinci Merutiyet ncesinde veyahut esnasnda kurulmutu, bazs ise kinci Merutiyet devrinde. En eskisi 1867'de Erzurum'da kurulmu Envar- arkiyye6 idi. Bunun dndakiler: Ankara (1874); Aydn (1874); Bolu (1913); Diyarbekir (1869); Kayseri'de Erciyes (1910) ve Kayseri (1914);7 Bursa'da Hdavendigar (1869);8 Eskiehir'de Karacahisar (1916); Balkesir'de Karesi (?); Kastamonu (1872); Konya (1869);9 Elaz'da Mamuret'1-Aziz (1883); Adana'da Seyhan (1872); Sivas (1880)10 ve Trabzon (1869). nemli zel gazeteler arasnda Konya'da Babalk (1910)" ve t
Orijinali Rusa olarak 'Anatolskaya Peat' bal ile 1922'de Tiflis'te yaynlanmt; Trkesi: K. Yust (1995): Kemalist Anadolu Basn; Yayna Hazrlayan: Orhan Kololu. 3. Kololu (1984), s.58-59. 4. Varlk (1985), s. 100-101. 5. Coar (t.y.). 6. Bkz. Yaar (1971). 7. Bkz. nder (1972), s. 31-37. 8. Bkz. Tayla (1997), s.13-21. 9. Bkz.: Ttengil (1966), s.50; Varlk (1985), s. 101. 10. Kololu (1984), s.59, kurulu tarihini 1883 olarak veriyor; skit (1939), "Tahlil ve Tarihe blmnde, s.241, kurulu tarihi olarak 1887 yln veriyor; Varlk (1985), s.101, kurulu tarihi olarak 1878 yln verip dilini Trke olarak tespit ediyor. Gerekten 'Sivas' vilayet gazetesinin birinci numaras 12 Ocak 1880 (31 Kanunuevvel 1295) Trke'de Arap ve Ermeni harfleriyle baslmtr. Birka yl sonra sadece Arap harfleri kullanlmtr. En azndan No. 81'e kadar (6 ubat 1882/25 Kanunusani 1297) hem Arap, hem Ermeni harfleri kullanlarak baslmtr, resm ktphanelerdeki bundan sonraki nsha no. 188'dir (8 Eyll 1884/27 Austos 1300). Bu ise sadece Arap harfleriyle baslmtr. 11. Kololu (1984), S.59, kurulu tarihi olarak 1920 yln veriyor. Halbuki gazete ok daha nce, 1910 ylnda kurulmutu, 1917'de Trksz adn alm, 1918'de tekrar Babalk olarak km; bkz. Coar (t.y.), s. 151. 2.

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(1917) bulunuyor, Giresun'da Ik (1918), Trabzon'da kbal (1909) ve stikbal (1918)12. 2. 1922 ylna gelindiinde Anadolu'daki basn hayat ylesine ilerlemiti ki, o yln ortalarnda en azndan 60 sreli yayn organ kmaktayd. Aralarnda Mill Mcadele'nin erken safhasnda yerel mdafaa- hukuk cemiyetlerinin organlar niteliinde kan Ayntap (Gaziantep), Yeni Adana (Adana), Babalk (Konya), Aksz (Kastamonu)13 ve stikbal (Trabzon) bulunuyordu. Bazlar da Mill Mcadele'nin scak gnlerinde kuruldu: Anadolu (Antalya), Misak-i Mill (Kayseri)14 ve Satvet-i Milliye (Harput) gibi. 3. te yandan, o senelerde yaynlanm gazete ve dergilerin says, Anadolu'da Mill Mcadele ncesi ve iinde ne kadar deiik politik ve ideolojik bak alarnn bulunduunun bir simgesidir. Ancak ortak olduklar tek bir konu vard: Anadolu'dan karlmas gereken dman(lar). Deiik mdafaa- hukuk cemiyetleri organlarndan baka milliyetiliin farkl temsilcileri vard, ttihat ve onlarn muhalefetinde olan Itilf basn, baz sol grl veyahut Hilfeti-tutucu gazeteler de yer yer bulunuyordu15. Bugn hl bu gazetelerin ou hakknda, Yust'un 'Kemalist Anadolu Basn' balkl eserinde 1922 yazdklarndan fazla birey bilmiyoruz. Bunun tesine giden, Coar'n 'Milli Mcadele Basn' eserinden rendiimiz nemli birka anekdot var. Halbuki, Trkiye basn tarihinin bu nemli yllarnn sistematik bir tetkiki henz yaplamamtr. Bununla birlikte, Anadolu gazeteleri tarihsel bir kaynak olarak kullanldnda, Mill Mcadele'nin - taraftarlar ve kartlarnn bak alarndan - blgesel ve yerel gelimesine dair ok ayrntl bilgi edinme frsatnn bulunacandan kuku yoktur. Sivas Kongresi ve rade-i Milliye Sivas Kongresi toplanmadan evvel, Mustafa Kemal Anadolu'daki Mill Mcadele'nin baarl olabilmesi iin, mill hareketin propagandas12. Bkz. Albayrak (1994), s. 243-244; 63-66; 99-118. 13. Bkz. Demirciolu (1982), S. 63-79. Orada u ilgin tespitler yaplmaktadr: "Gazetimiz Kuvvay Milliye ile domu ve Kuvvay Milliyenin ceryan inkiaf ve terakkisini takip etmitir." (s. 73). "Gazete karacaz. Fakat nasl ve ne ile, be on paramz vard bunu byle sarf edebilirdik. Fakat bu para ancak ay yahut be ay gazeteyi yaatabilirdi: Sonra en mhim mesele gazetecilik nedir hi bilmiyorduk. Byle en nazik bir zamanda dmanlarn, sarayn divan harplerin btn milletin nsh hayatn kemirmek iin di biledikleri bir zaman da bu kadar maddi noksanlklarla (Milli)ci bir gazete karmak ne demekti. Fikrimizi atmz byklerin ekserisi bize bu hususta nasihat etti..." (s.64). 14. Bkz. nder (1972), s. 49-50. 15. Yust Anadolu basn 5 grup olarak tasnif ediyor: 1. Tutucular: tilfclar, ngilizciler; 2. Liberal Milliyetiler; 3. Anadolucular; 4. Radikal Milliyetiler: ttihatlar; 5. Halk Komnistleri. Yust (1995), s. 151-153; bkz. Kololu (1984), s. 57.

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n yapan ayr bir gazete gerektiini kavramt. lkedeki karmak durum ve bu arada yaymlanmaya balayan gazetelerin destekledii politik grlerin eitlilii karsnda kemalist bak asn yanstan bir yayn organnn devreye girmesi kanlmaz bir zorunluluktu. Bu propaganda silah Mill Mcadelenin baarya ulamasndaki nemli etmenlerden de biri olacakt. Bilimsel literatrde Irade-i Milliye gazetesinin Mill Mcadele'deki rol ve onu yaatan kiiler zerine snrl bilgiler verilmektedir. Sivas Kongresinin son gnnde gazetenin karlmasna ilikin karar verilip, ilk nshas gn sonra 14 Eyll 1919'da karlr16. Rasim Bey tarafndan nerilen Sivasl Selttin (Ulasalerk) imtiyaz sahibi, yaz ileri mdr Mfit (Kansu) olur. Gazete, kemalist mill hareketin saflarna giren Sivas valisi Reit Paa'dan gerekli izin alndktan sonra17 'Sivas' adl vilayet gazetesi18 gibi, Sivas'n tek matbaas olan Vilayet Matbaasnda baslr19. Balangta klie olmad iin normal harflerle baslm gazete logosunun altnda 'metlib ve ml-i milliyenin mdfi'idir' ibaresi bulunur20. Tiraj 1000 ile 2000 arasnda oynayan ve 100 paraya satlan gazete
16. Bu karar iin bkz. demir (1969), s. 104: "Rauf Bey - Propaganda iin bir gazete karlacakt; arkadalarmzdan bir heyet baz evrakmzn neri ve yazlar yazlmasiyle megul olmaldr; kongre daldktan sonra herkes husus ileriyle megul olur; bunu imdiden halletmelidir." Reis Paa - "Bu heyeti imdiden tayin edelim." Rauf Bey - "Msaade buyurulursa Hami Bey, Vasf Bey, Sreyya Bey ve Mehmet kr Bey tayin edilsin." (Muvafktr! sedalar). Mazhar Mfit Bey - "Sreyya Bey kabul etmediinden husrev Sami Bey dahil olmaldr; Hami Bey esasen yaz yazmak suretiyle itirak ediyor." Fazl Paa - 'Bu Irade-i Milliye' gazetesi daim mi neredilecek?" Husrev Sami Bey - "Tabi daim ." Reis Paa - "Haftada iki kere." Fazl Paa "O halde Sivas'ta bunun iin daim bir heyetin bulunmas lzmdr." (Muvafktr! sedalar)." 17. Ulusalerk (1941), s.5, bu izni almak iin yerel makamlarn uygulad bir sr geciktirmelerden bahsediyor; bkz. Yldrm (1992), s. 326. 18. Bu resmi gazetenin, Mill Mcadele'nin banda ve Sivas Kongresi esnasnda kp kmadna dair kesin bir bilgi yok. stanbul Atatrk kitaplnda bulunan ilk 81 says hari (1880-82), gazetenin bir koleksiyonundan bahsetmek mmkn deil: 1925 ylna kadar sadece tek tk nshalar bulabildik. Mill Mcadele'den ncesine ait mevcut son says 23 Temmuz 1914 (10 Temmuz 1330) tarihli 1353nc saysdr. Mevcut olan bir sonraki says 25 Mart 1920 (1336) tarihli 1461inci saysdr. Gazete haftada bir defa kmakla beraber zaman zaman dzensiz kmtr. Buna gre bu iki says arasnda bulunan yzden fazla saysnn bazlarnn 1918-1919 yllarna ait olduu kuvvetli bir ihtimaldir. 21 Haziran 1920 (1336) tarihli 1466nc says, 'imdilik haftada bir defa nerolunur' belirtilirse de, 'Sivas' vilayet gazetesinin 1920 ylndan itibaren ayda bir iki defa ktn gsteriyor. 19. Kocabaolu/Birinci (1995), s.l 10, Sivas Vilayet Matbaasnn kurulu tarihinin 1865/ 66 olduunu belirtiyorlar. 20. Selhattin Bey bunu yle izah ediyor: "Amal ve metalib-i millye neler idi: Dmanlarmz Trk yurdunu paralamak ve Trk milletinin varlna son vermek istiyorlard. Malp olarak ktmz umum harpten sonra akdedilen Mondoros mtarekenamesi, Trklerin oturduu yurd paralarn btn olarak milletimizi brakm olduu halde sznde durmayan dmanlarmz stanbul, zmir, Balkesir, Adana, Antep, Urfa, Samsun ve Merzifon gibi Trk ehirlerini ve civarlarnn igale balamlard." Akun (1963), s. 162.

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nceleri haftada bir karken daha sonra haftada iki ve bazen de 5 gn yaymlanr21. Gazetenin karlmasndaki ilk przler ve personelin, ittihat olmayan kemalist propaganda yaparak crm ilemekten korktuklar, grevli kiiler tarafndan anekdot eklinde anlatlr22. Bunun dnda literatrde, Mustafa Kemal'in, gazetede neredilmek zere birka makaleyi, zellikle Ferit Paa kabinesini ar bir ekilde eletirdii 'Hareket-i Milliyenin Esbab' balkl ilk bamakaleyi, smail Hami'ye dikte ettiinden bahsedilmektedir. smail Hami sz konusu makalenin altna kendi imzasn koyduu iin, birok yazara gre, Mustafa Kemal ile smail Hami'nin aras bozulmutur23. lk zamanlarda, Mustafa Kemal'in Trk halkna ynelttii beyanname ve mesajlar, Sivas Kongre tutanaklarndan baz blmler gazetede yaynland. Gazetenin, igalci kuvvetlerin kontrolnden karlmak iin yerel makamlarn resm zarflarna konularak, Anadolu'nun birok yerine ve hatta stanbul'a dahi gnderilmi olduu belirtilmektedir24. Bunun gibi ok genel bilgiler Akun (1963), Coar (t.y.), Oral (1973) ve apolyo (1969) tarafndan, ksmen detayl bir ekilde kaynak gsterilmeden, toplanmaktadr. Bundan sonra uzun bir zaman birok yazar yeni bilgi eklemeden, sadece bu bilgilere dayanarak yaz yazmlardr25. ou yazarn ifadelerinde, Mustafa Kemal 1919 Aralk aynda Heyet-i Temsiliye ile birlikte Sivas'dan Ankara'ya gittikten sonra Irade-i Milliye gazetesinin kontrolden kt aktarlyor. Buna gre, Mustafa Kemal gazeteyi ilk nce Ankara'ya gtrmek istemi, fakat bu istei yerel eraf tarafndan reddedilmitir26. Bunun zerine Mustafa Kemal 1920 ylnn banda Ankara'da 'Hkimiyet-i Milliye' gazetesini kurmutur. Bu gazetenin Mill Mcadele'de bundan byle ayr bir yere sahip olaca, kemalist milli hareketin en nemli propaganda arac ve Anadolu gazetelerinin ou iin en nemli haber kayna olaca bir gerektir.
21. Oral (1973), s. 41. Sarszen (1941), ilk saylan hemen tkendiine gre tirajn arttrlmas zorunda kalndn aktaryor. 22. mtiyaz sahibi Selhattin Ulusalerk ve Abdlkadir Sanszen rade-i Milliye gazetesinin kurulu tarihinin bir yldnmnde 14.9.1941 tarihli Ulus gazetesinde bu gibi bilgiler vermektedir. Bkz. Akun (1963), s. 161-168; bu olaylara ahit olanlarn birka nemli hatralarn aktaryor. 23. Bkz.: apolyo (1969), s. 192; Gz (1991), s. 34; ve Coar (t.y.), s. 114. 24. Gololu (1969), s. 254; orada bu olaya ahit bir memurun ifadesi veriliyor. 25. Bkz.: nuur (1993), S.352-353; ztoprak (1981), s.ll ve 385; Gz (1990), s.33-35; ve Yldrm (1992), s.325-330. Baz yazarlar da eski eserlere dayanarak orada bulunan hatalar da yeniden retmi bulunuyorlar, rnein rade-i Milliye gazetesinin iki stun zerine kurulduu ifadesi: bkz. apolyo (1969), s. 192; nuur (1993), s.352; halbuki bu, ancak gazetenin ilk 3 says iin doru, daha sonra stun zerine, 19. Nisan 1921 tarihli no. 68'dan itibaren drt stun zerine kurulmutur; no. 254 (3 Kanunevvel 1922) 5 yahut 6 stunlu kmtr. 26. Bkz.: Akun (1963), s. 164-165; Coar (t.y.), s.64; Yldrm (1992), s.329, Sanszen (1941), s.5'e atfederek; Oral (1973), S.41.

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zkaya, Genelkurmay Asker Tarihi ve Stratejik Etd Bakanl, Atatrk Arivinde bulabildii belgelere dayanarak rade-i Milliye ile ilgili birok yeni bilgi eklemitir. Yazar, 1920 ylnn banda tilaf devletleri Anadolu'ya kar basn ve haber blokaj uyguladklarndan, bu gazetenin hemen hemen tek haber kaynann Hkimiyet-i Milliye ve daha sonra da Anadolu Ajans olduunu tespit etmitir27. Gazetenin 1920 ylnda Anadolu'daki abone olanlara gnderilii ile ilgili eitli dzensizliklerin sz konusu olduu da zkaya tarafndan gsterilmitir. Abone olanlar Ankara'ya direkt bavurarak gazeteden ikayeti olmular ki, Mustafa Kemal bizzat bu konuya ilgilenmek zorunda kalmtr28. Mustafa Kemal Sivas'tan ayrldktan sonra rade-i Milliye Hlis Turgut29 tarafndan ynetildiinde, gazetenin kemalist fikirlerden saparak blgecilie kaym olduu birka yazar tarafndan belirtiliyor. ddia edilen bu eletirel tutum ile ilgili bir aklk bulunmuyor. Her ne kadar eletiri yapm ise de prensip olarak Mill Mcadele'nin taraftar olduu tahmin edilen bu gazetenin niteliini tespit etmek iin Yust en azndan birka ipucu veriyor. rade-i Milliye'nin d ilerinde Ankara'nn grn paylaarak igalci kuvvetlere kar sk sk ar bir polemie girdiini dile getiriyor. Yazar, gazetede zaman zaman bir Rus-Trk dostluundan bahsedidiSki, Moskova'da imzalanan^ TrkRus-dstluk anlamasnn birinci yildonm (Mart' 1922) vesilesiyle bu olaya bir bayaz ayrap az sayda tara gazetelerinin biri olduunu yazyor30. Yust'un, Anadolu tara gazetelerinin bir istisnas olarak, rade-i Milliye'nin Ankara'da toplanan Byk Millet Meclisi'nin yapsna ynelik yorumlar yapt yolundaki tespiti de dikkate deerdir. Yust, gazetenin bir makalesinden Byk Millet Meclisi'nin yaps ile ilgili unu aktaryor: "Batnn tm hukuk ilmi yasalarna ramen, Meclis(,) bnyesinde yrtme ve yasama grevini yrtyor. Bu haliyle, grlmemi ar koullar altnda varln kantlam ve kabul ettirebilmitir. Bu nedenle tarihte grlmemi bir rnek tekil ediyor. (...) BMM ynetimi ne monarik anayasal, ne cumhuriyet ynetimidir. BM Meclisi'ni yaratarak, Trkler dnyada en gelimi en ideal drdnc ynetim tarzn yaratm oluyorlar. Bu nedenle tm lkeler, zamanla bu hkmet formln benimsemek zorunda kalacaklardr."31
27. zkaya (1985), s. 911. 28. zkaya (1985), S. 903-904; baka bir yerde (s. 909) zkaya, Nazillili Mevki Komutan Servet Bey'in Mustafa Kemal'a ektii bir telgrafta (14.1.1920) rade-i Milliye'nin dili zerine ikayetlerde bulunduunu belirtiyor. 29. Mevcut saylardan grld gibi imtiyaz sahibilii her zaman Selhattin Ulusalerk'te idi. 30. Yust (1995), s. 123-124. 31. A.g.e., s. 124.

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Yust'un rade-i Milliye ile ilgili bir baka gzlemi udur: "Gazete, eitim ve halkn (kylnn) ekonomik durumuna liberal eilimle yaklayor. Kylnn, ehir tccarlar ve simsarlar tarafndan smrlmesini protesto ediyor, kylye tarm iletmecilii tavsiyelerinde bulunuyor ve ynetime okullarn kurulmas gereini vurguluyor."32 Yust, devamla, Irade-i Milliye'nin kendisini bir 'Halk Gazetesi' olarak adlandrdn da aktaryor. Yust tarafndan verilen bilgi ne kadar snrl ise de, en azndan gazetenin niteliini ima edecek mahiyettedir. Gazetenin, Sivas Kongresi sonrasnda her eyden nce Kongre tutanaklar, beyannameleri, Mustafa Kemal yahut Heyet-i Temsiliye'ye ekilmi telgraf suretleri ve stanbul hkmeti ve igal kuvvetlerine kar propaganda yazlar ierdii birok yazar tarafndan belirtiliyor. Bu tespit gazetenin ilk devrinde doru olmakla birlikte, sonra niteliini deitirmi olmas da muhtemel ve aratrlacak nemli bir konudur. Hlis Turgut ve Hayri Ltfullah Beyler Coar bu balamda, rade-i Milliye'nin Sivas'ta birbirine zt iki eraf grubunun birisinin eline getiini belirterek bir ipucu veriyor33. Aada ayrntl bir ekilde sunulmaya allan, dnemin Sivas basn tarihindeki gelimeler gsteriyor ki, Mill Mcadele seyrinde, onu deiik motiflerle destekleyen ayr g gruplar birbirine girerek kendi nfuzlarn korumak ve arttrmak iin uratlar. Bu ekimenin odanda Hlis Turgut ve Srczade Hayri (Ltfullah) bulunduu iin zgemilerinden ksaca bahsetmekte yarar vardr. Hlis Turgut 1886 Sivas doumlu. 1912'de Mlkiyeyi bitirdikten sonra Sivas Vilayeti Maiyyet Memurluuna tayin edildi. 1913 arkla ve Divrii Kaymakam Vekilliklerine, ayn yln Aralk aynda Sivas Vilayet Matbaas Mdrlne getirildi. Mart 1914'te Sivas Belediyesi reis muavinliine seildi. Yedek subay olarak Kafkas Cephesinde Birinci Dnya Harbine katld. Ekim 1917'de Nahcvan Mutasarrf Vekilliine atand. Mtarekeden sonra Sivas'a dnd ve Sivas Kongresi topland zaman Mustafa Kemal'e yardmc oldu. Mill Mcadele boyunca Sivas belediyesinde deiik grevler aldndan, hatta ksa bir sre belediye bakanlnda bulunduundan bahseden rivayetler de var. 1919 Anadolu ve Rumeli Mdafaa- Hukuk Cemiyeti Sivas ubesini kurup Sivas evresinde tekilatn tamamlad. Sivas Merkez Heyeti Bakan oldu. Sonra Temsil Heyeti tarafndan Zara Kaymakam Vekilliine atand. Nisan 1920'den Aralk 1922'ye kadar Sivas Ummi Meclisi Azalm yapt. Austos 1923'de 2. dnem Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi Sivas mebusu oldu. lk nce Cumhuriyet Halk Frkas yesi idi, 1924 ylnn sonuna doru yeni
32. A.g.e., s. 124. 33. Coar (t.y.), s. 118.

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kurulan Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Frkasnn saflarna katld. Mustafa Kemal'a kar hazrlanm zmir suikast giriimine dolayl olarak katlm olduu iin 1926 ylnda idam edildi.34 Srazade Hayri Bey (Src), zaman zaman Hayri Ltfullah adn kulland, 1888 Sivas doumlu. Sivas'taki orta tahsilinden sonra istanbul Darlfnun Hukuk Mektebine katld, bitiremedi. Sivas Kongresi ncesinde Sivas Mdafaa- Hukuk Cemiyeti'ne katld. Ankara'daki Byk Millet Meclisinin ilk devrinde Sivas mebusu olarak ksa bir sre grev yaptktan sonra vazgemi ve (Ekim 1920'de?) Sivas'a dnm. 1909 ylnda Sivas'ta karlan ilk zel gazete Vicdan'da, sonra Kzlrmak gazetesinde de Hayri Ltfullah adn kullanarak yaz yazmaya balad. Mill Mcadele ve onu takip eden yllarda kemalist ve Cumhuriyet Halk Frkas yesi olarak Hlis Turgut'a muhalif bir tutumla bu faaliyetine devam etti. O yllarda hem belediye hem vilayet idaresinde deiik grevlerde bulundu. 1926-1930 ok faal bir belediye bakan olarak Sivas'a bir su ebekesi getirirek byk hizmet etti. 1932'de ld.35 Sivas'ta Hakikat gazetesinin sahibi ve genel yayn ynetmeni Ahmet Turan Grel, birok kiinin sz konusu dneme ait hatralarna dayanarak Hlis Turgut ile Hayri (Ltfullah) Src arasnda belediye meclisinde ciddi bir ekime ile ilgili kuvvetli bir ihtimal bulunduunu belirtiyor. Buna gre Hlis Turgut ttihat ve Hilafeti bir bak as savunarak Mill Mcadele ve sonularna kar mesafe tutmu; Hayri Ltfullah'n ise kemalist olmasndan phe yokmu. Fakat Grel nemli bir ey ekliyor: Bu iki zatn birbirine girmeleri politik bak alarnn farkl olmalarndan ok kiisel sebeplerden kaynaklanyormu. Hlis Turgut Mill Mcadele ncesinde veya balarnda belediye bakan seilmiken Srczade Hayri Bey etrafndaki grup tarafndan ksa zamandan sonra drlm. ekimelerinin temelinde bu olay yatyormu.36 rade-i Milliye gazetesinin ne zaman Hlis Turgut'un ynetimine gemi olduuna dair ancak bir tahmin yaplabilir. Bu gazetenin 42nci saysna kadar bir koleksiyon varken daha sonra sadece birka nsha elimize gemi bulunuyor. Bu da, ans eseri saylabilir, nk 1922 ylnda (byk ihtimalle 'Sivas' gazetesi koleksiyonu da dahil olmak zere) btn gazete koleksiyonlar ile birlikte Sivas Vilayet Matbaas yanm.37
34. Bkz.: ankaya (1968-1969), s. 1521-1522. Aslanolu (1979), s. 71; Gz (1991), s. 141 ve 206-207; Tuncay (1981), s. 163; Aybars (1995), s. 451-452. 35. Bkz. Alkan (1989b), s. 22/86, dipnot 13. 36. Mart 1998'te Ahmet Turan Grel ile ahs grme. Sivas 1973 l Yll (t.y.), s.496'da ise, Hlis Turgut Sivas belediye bakanlar listesine girmemitir. Bu rivayetin doruluu hakknda u anda kesin bir kant yok. 37. Akun (1963), s. 165, o zamanki matbaa mdr olan Abdlkadir Sanszen'in 19.4.1941 tarihli Ulus'taki yazsna atfederek u ifadesini aktaryor: "Elde kalan koleksiyonlar ve perakende nshalar da matbaa ile beraber yand."

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Gazetenin koleksiyonlar gzden geirilirse u kanaata varlabilir: En azndan 42nci sayya kadar, yani 1920 ylnn Mays aynn sonuna kadar Selhattin Bey (Ulusalerk) imtiyaz sahibi ile mdir-i mes'ul grevlerini stlenmi bulunmaktadr. Bir belgeye gre 17 Kasm 1920'de "imtiyaz sahibi ve mesul mdr" Selhattin Bey Rus veya Azerbaycan eliliinde bir i hakknda Mustafa Kemal'a bavurmutur38. Bu bilgi, Selhattin Bey'in gazeteyi devam ettirmeye imkn veya isteinin olmadna iaret ediyor. Mevcut olan daha sonraki says ise 19 Nisan 1921 tarihli 68inci saysdr, bu sayda Hlis Turgut'un mdir-i mes'ul grevinde bulunduu belirtiliyor39. 84 ve 95 saylarnda da (6 ve 29 Haziran 1921) bu durum devam eder. Coar ise, Hlis Turgut'un ynetimi altnda rade-i Milliye Gazetesinin iki defa Sivas stiklal Mahkemesi tarafndan kapatldn, 1921 ubat aynn banda uygulanan kapannn iki buuk ay kadar srdn belirtiyor40. 1920 ylnn ikinci yansnda, Hlis Turgut'un mdir-i mes'uliyetinde Irade-i Milliye ilk defa bir sre kapanm olduunda Hlis Turgut'un onun yerine dare-i Milliye gazetesini karttna dair birka ipucu var. Grel bunu yle dile getiriyor: "dare-i Milliye: rade-i Milliyenin birinci kapanndan sonra, 1920'de Hlis Turgut tarafndan karlmtr. rade-i Milliye ikinci defa yayma balaynca, bu gazete kapatlp rade-i Milliye ile yayma devam edilmitir."41 Grel'in bu kanaati deiik kiilerin hatralarna dayanyor. Bunun dnda Milli Ktphane sreli yaynlar katalogunda bu gazetenin 1920 ylna ait bir says kaytldr42. O kayt altnda ise, dare-i Milliye gazetesinin deil, rade-i Milliye'nin 27nci ve 1 Mart 1336 tarihli nshas kmaktadr ki bunun hatal bir kayt olduunu burada vurgulamak gerekir. Bu da, dare-i Milliye gazetesinin resmi kaytl tek bir nshasnn bulunmad anlamna geliyor. Bunlardan, gazetenin banda sadece iki harfin deitirilmesiyle rade-i Milliye'nin, birinci
38. Gz (1991), S.35, imir (1981), s. 101-102'ye atfederek. 39. Bu sayy Oral (1973), s.41, yanllkla no. 18 olarak tespit ediyor (bkz. tpk basm ayn sayfada). 40. Coar (t.y.), S.l 18: "stikll Mahkemesince mahkm edilen Hlis Turgut'un mdrmes'ul olduu devrede iki defa kapatld. 1921 ylnn ubat bandaki kapan iki buuk ay devam etti." Oral (1973), S.41: "Yaz ileri mdr Hlis Turgut an blgecilii yznden gazete istiklal Mahkemesince iki defa kapatlmtr". Grel (1994), S. 144: "Sivas Mebusu - zmir suikasdnda aslan - Hlis Turgut'un sorumlu mdr olduu srada iki defa rfi idare mahkemesi tarafndan kapatlmtr. 1921 yl ubatndaki kapan ikibuuk ay srmtr." Sivas stiklal Mahkemesi 20 Ekim 1920'den 15 Mart 1921'e kadar alyordu; bkz. Aybars (1995), S. 85-87. 41. Grel (1994), s. 144. 42. Gner/Kabata (1990), s. 338, bu gazeteyi de kayt ediyorlar. Milli Ktphane'deki tek says 27nci says olarak belirtiliyor, fakat sicil numarasnn verilmesi unutulmutur (1962 S 155). Ayn yerde gazete banda yle bir ibare aktarlyor: "dare-i milliyye, Metlib ve ml-i milliyenin mdfiidir. Sahib-i imtiyaz ve Mdr-i mes'ul: Sabahaddin Sivas. (Haftada iki defa)." Burada Gner/Karata mdrn adn Sabahaddin olarak verirlerse de, Selhattin olmas gerek. Bkz. Sivas 1973 l Yll (t.y.), s. 199.

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kapannda ayn imtiyaz sahibi ve ayn mesul mdr ile dare-i Milliye ad altnda yayna devam etmesi bir ihtimal olarak grlebilir. rade-i Milliye ikinci defa 1921 ylnn ubat ayndan itibaren iki buuk ay kadar kapanmtr. Birinci kapannda olduu gibi, imdi de rade-i Milliyenin bu kapanndan ksa bir sre sonra yeni bir gazete kyor. Gaye-i Milliye Gaye-i Milliye gazetesinin k tarihi 2 Mart 1921'dii43. Bu gazetenin drt stun halinde yaynlanmas sz konusu ise de, zaman zaman baz sayfalar iki stun eklinde kmtr. Resmi imtiyaz sahibi olarak Maksut Azmi, mdir-i mes'ul olarak da Zeki Erturul grnyor44. Gazete "Cum'a ve Pazarertesinden baka hergn" kyor ve kendisini "siyas, ilm, edeb, iktisad gazete" olarak nitelendiriyordu. Gazete logosunun altnda, rade-i Milliye ve dare-i Milliye tarafndan kullanlan "metlib ve ml-i milliyenin mdafi'idir" ibaresi yerine "istikll ve sa'adet vatandr" slogan bulunuyordu. Bu gazete phesiz kemalist bir basn organyd. rade-i Milliye gibi, Gaye-i Milliye de Ankara'da kan gazetelerin ve Anadolu Ajansnn ("A.A.") birok makale ve haberini, bazen de Trabzon'da kan stikbal ve Kastamonu'da kan Aksz gibi baka Anadolu gazetelerinin yazlarn da bast. "Ankara Haberleri" ile "Vilayet Haberleri" balklar ve Sivas'n yerel yahut blgesel haberleri devaml bu gazetede yer alyordu. Gazetede yeralan yazlarn nemli bir blm de Ankara'dan alnan 'garp cephesi' ile ilgili ve uluslararas haberlerden oluuyordu. mtiyaz sahibi Maksuz Azmi'nin yazd bayazlarn dnda, vali Cemal, Sivas shhiye mdr ve Heyet-i Merkeziyye yesi Ferruh Niyazi ile belediye 45 bakan Rza (Yurdakul), fikirlerini dile getirmitir . Baka yazarlar arasnda Yenihan mfts Mehmet Tevfk ve Fazlullah Beyler bulunuyor. Bu demektir ki, vilayet idaresi ile yerel politikada rol oynayan nemli kiiler bu gazetede ortak bir forum bulabildiler. Grel, Gaye-i Milliye'nin resm bir mesuliyeti mmkn olmamakla beraber yine Hlis Turgut tarafndan karlm olduunu iddia ediyor.
43. Bu gazetenin 1-39 saylarnn bir koleksiyonu (2 Mart 1921 - 29 Nisan 1921) Ankara'daki nklap Tarihi Enstits Ktphanesi'nde bulunmaktadr. Byk ihtimalle, onun mr Nisan aynn sonu veya Mays aynn bana kadar srmtr. 44. Ouncu (17 Nisan 1921) saysndan itibaren Ahmed Faik mdir-i mes'ul olmutur. 45. rnein, 4nc saysnda (8 Mart 1921), belediye bakan Rza Bey'in, Byk Millet Meclisi Reisliine sunduu bir telgraf metni ile cevab vali Cemal tarafndan bildiriliyor.

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Grel'in kanaatna zt olarak, Gaye-i Milliye'nin, Hlis Turgut'a muhalif bir nfuz grubunun elinde bulunduu Gz ve Coar tarafndan iddia edilir*. rade-i Milliye ve Gaye-i Milliye arasndaki ilikiye, biraz da olsa, trade-i Milliye'nin 68inci saysnda (19 Nisan 1921) k tutulur ki, bu nsha rade-i Milliye gazetesinin iki buuk aylk kapanndan sonra ilk saysdr. phesiz mdir-i mes'ul olan Hlis Turgut'un yazd 'Niin gizli kalsn' bayazsnda gazetenin kapanna sebep olan yahut onu destekleyen olaylar anlatlr. Gazetenin kapanna ilikin sulamalar reddedildikten sonra47 bu yazda ok artc izahatlarda bulunulur. Kapanndan nceki 67nci saysnda, Irade-i Milliye'nin basld Vilayet Matbaasnn grevlilerinin, gazetenin ikinci sayfasnda bir makale uydurup sahtekrlk etmi olduklar iddia edilir. Bununla, her halde, gazetenin kapan iin bir gereke retilmi olabilir48. Dahas, o makalenin, rade-i Milliye'nin kapanndan ksa bir sre sonra karlan Gaye-i Milliye'nin szde 'birinci says' olduu ne srlr, nk bu gazetenin birinci saysnda49, sahte olduu iddia edilen makalede olduu gibi ayn ekilde vilayet idaresi ar bir ekilde eletirilmektedir. ddialar doru ise, Hlis Turgut ve vilayet idaresi arasnda bulunan ciddi anlamazlklar dolaysyla birka kiinin, Hlis Turgut'un ynetimi altnda bulunan rade-i Milli46. Bkz.: Grel (1994), s. 144; Gz (1991), s. 35, Hlis Turgut'un ynetimi altnda radei Milliye, daha sonra Gaye-i Milliye birer nfuz grubunun eline getiini belirtirse de, mevcut gazete nshalarna gre her iki gazete daima Vilayet Matbaasnda nerolunduunu gsteriyorlar. O zaman zaten Sivas'ta baka matbaa yoktu, ilk zel matbaa 1930 ylnda Kmil Kitap tarafndan kurulmutur. Gaye-i Milliye'nin adresi olarak Vilayet deil, 'Sivas'ta Hkmet Caddesinde husus daire' gsterilmitir. Coar (t.y.) s. 118: "rade-i Milliye'nin kapanmas ile dier bir grubun szcln yapmak zere Gayeyi Milliye gazetesi 2 mart 1921'de neredilmeye baland. (...) Mill mcadelenin en buhranl gnlerinde Sivas eraf ikiye ayrlm ve bu gazeteler de bu ikilii krkleyici neriyat yapyordu. Gayeyi Milliye'nin mr ksa olmutur." Ayrca bkz. nl (1987), s. 39. 47. "Bir milletin kahr ve tedmirine yryen hain kuvvetlerin karsnda ilk sada-y itiraz ykselten o mhn kuvvetlere ilk darbe-i intikam konduran (?) yine 'rade-i Milliye'dir. Maateessf 'rade-i Milliye'nin yn (?) ihmal olmayan tarih hizmetleri ona yabanc olan ve onun kymetini idrak edemeyenler tarafndan arasra unutulmu ve tarih-i intiarnda iki defa sekte-i ta'tile uramtr ki: bundan dolay gazetemiz millet nazarnda mes'ul olmasa gerektir. 'rade-i Milliye' niin susmutu? 'rade-i Milliye' hi bir kuvvet ve ahsiyet karsnda mesleinden inhiraf etmez ve edemezdi, tki buuk aylk sukt- yaymakta (?) bu mebrur mesleinden inhiraf etmemek gayesini ta'kiben ihtiyar etmitir." 48. "Karilerimizden rica ederiz; bundan iki buuk ay evvel kan 67 numaral 'rade-i Milliye' serlevhasyla kan gazeteyi okusunlar: Birinci sahifesi kuds bir vazife-i misafirperverinin uzayp uzad bir levha-y ihtiram... bu sahife bil zeyn tamam tamamna rade-i Milliyenindir. Bir de ikinci sahifeyi evirsinler 'muhasebe-i vilayetinin i yz' serlevhas altnda i'rz- ahsiyenin 'millet ve memleket zararna ihtira' ve icad edilen mfteritn ma'kus utmi... ite bu stunlar dolduran arcif 'rade-i Milliye'nin pk ve teyiz stunlarn telvis etmek, onun lekesiz tarihine iras- levs eylemek dncesiyle hrszca dere edilmi kahren ve cebren neredilmi eylerdir." 49. Her halde 2 Mart 1921 km ilk saysnda 'Meslek ve Gayemiz' yazs kastediliyor.

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ye'yi kapatma arzusu vard. Bunlar ya vilayetteki baz memurlar, ya da kendi balarna bir gazete karma dncesinde olanlard. Nitekim, rade-i Milliye gazetesi kapandktan birka hafta sonra Gaye-i Milliye'nin kmas iddialardaki doruluk paym glendirmektedir. Bu gelimeler sonucunda akla u soru geliyor: Hlis Turgut byle iddialar Irade-i Milliyenin kapanndan sonraki ilk (68inci) saysnda - ki, bu da Vilayet Matbaasnda baslmtr - nasl yapabildi? Kendisi bu soruya sz konusu yazsnda u cevab veriyor: "Evet; niin saklayalm. Vilayet matbaasnn cebbar amirleri gazetenin srf kendi yollarna altrmak hevesiyle, mesleine tecavz ettiler. nk: o gn kuvvet onlarda idi. nk: 'rade-i Milliye' memleketin selmeti namna onlarn oturduu makama ihtiram ediyordu. Teessf olunur ki: Kanunun tatbikine memur olanlar onu ayaklar altnda inedi. Ve gazetenin kanunen mahfuz olan hakk- hrriyetine tecavz etti."50 u anda bu olayla ilgili tam bir akla varmamz mmkn olmamakla beraber, Gaye-i Milliye ile Hlis Turgut'un ynetiminde olan rade-i Milliye arasnda bir ekime olduu anlalmaktadr. rade-i Milliye, kapanndan sonra 19 Nisan 1921'den itibaren yeniden yaynlanmaya baladnda Gaye-i Milliye Gazetesi bir sre daha yaynna devam etmi, sonra kapatlmtr51. Hayri (Ltfullah) Src, rumuzlarna rastlanmadndan byk ihtimalle bu gazetenin mevcut saylarnda yaz yazmamtr. Belediye bakan Rza (Yurdakul) Bey'in bildirileri bulunduuna gre, gazetenin, o zaman belediye meclisini kontrol eden nfuz grubuna yakn olduu varsaylabilir. Bunun gibi ayrntlar karmak ve de bu grup ile Hlis Turgut arasindaki ilikilerinin nasl olduu sorusuna cevap vermek ancak yeni belgeler ktnda ve gazetelerin tetkikleri sonucunda mmkn olacaktr. Toparlamaya alrsak: Hlis Turgut rade-i Milliye gazetesinin mdir-i mes'uliyeti 1920 ylnn sonunda Selhattin Bey'den alm olmal. Ksa sreli birinci kapan srasnda, Hlis Turgut dare-i Milliye'yi kartarak dolayl olarak yayn devam ettiriyordu. 1921 ylnn ubat aynn banda, rade-i Milliye'yi ikinci defa kapatmak zorunda kalmsa da, 19 Nisan 1921'de yeniden karmaya balad. Daha sonraki gelimeleri, gazetenin mevcut olan tek tk nshalarnn araclyla ancak snrl olarak ele alabiliriz. 84nc sayda (6 Haziran 1921) H.L. rumuzlarn kullanarak byk ihtimal, Hayri Ltfullah (Sr50. Ayn yaz; vurgu H.U. 'a aittir. 51. Gaye-i Milliye'nin bilinen ve eldeki mevcut son says 29 Nisan 1921 tarihli 39uncu saysdr. Gazetenin kapan ile ilgili kesin bilgi yoktur. 39uncu saysnda yeni bir diziye balanldna gre, her halde son says olmasa gerektir. Sivas 1973 l Yll'nda ise (t.y.), s. 199, bu gazetenin bir yl kadar karlm olduu iddia ediliyor.

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c) bir yaz yazmtr. 118inci (8 Austos 1921) ve 134nc (14 Eyll 1921) saylarnda Hayri Ltfullah'n, gazetenin sermuharrrir grevinde olduunu gryoruz. Hlis Turgut o zaman mdir-i mes'uliyetini devam ettiriyordu, fakat ismi artk gazetenin banda deil, sonunda bulunuyordu. Demek ki, sonra byk bir rekabete giren iki yazar 1921 ylnn ortalarndan her halde 1922 ylnn baharna kadar ayn gazetede alarak, deiik rivayetlere gre baz konularda ayr yahut zt fikirlerde bulunmu olsalar gerektir. Coar bu balamda u tespitte bulunmaktadr: "rade-i Milliye, Hlis Turgut'un idaresi altnda ve bilhassa byk taarruzdan 6 ay kadar nce blc yaynlarn iddetlendirmi, 1922 ilkbaharndaki belediye seimlerinde ahsi kavgalara daha da balanmt. 1922'nin mart aynda son nshasnn kt tahmin olunuyor."52 rade-i Milliye gazetesinin bu nc kapanna, byk ihtimalle Hlis Turgut'un kendi kaleminden km "Teklifi Milliye iyi tatbik edilmedi, zenginler himaye edildi, fakirlere daha ok ykletildi" balkl makale sebep olmutur. Bu olay Byk Millet Meclisi'nde tartma konusu yapan Erzurum Mebusu Hseyin Avni Bey, o zamanki sansr tatbiki ile ilgili baz aydnlatc bilgiler veriyor53. Hseyin Avni Bey "matbuattaki sansr meselesine dair suali"nde ilk nce sz konusu eletirel makale dolaysyla rade-i Milliye gazetesinin sahib-i imtiyazn her bakmdan savunuyor, hatta onu tebrik ediyor ve Sivas ve btn memlekette hakim olan brokratik zihniyete atyor: "Bu gazetenin byle bir iddiasndan, byle bir murakabesinden dolay mkfat edilmesi lzm gelirken, her naslsa Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisinin yapmak istedii inklb, memurlar kavnyamyor, zihinlerine sokamyor. Onlarnki skenderikebir gibi... Bir nahiye mdr btn kudretini bir hkmdar gibi icra etmek istiyor. Efendiler, mstebit memurlarn artk bu memlekette yeri yoktur ve yayamyacaklardr. (...) Bu zat likaderin; ilmiye, faziletiyle memlekette tannm bir zat olduunu sylyorlar. Hkmet nasl bu zatn hrriyetini takyit, milletin matbuatn tazyik eder? Nasl matbuatn, serbestisini takyideder? lim, irfan, fazilet
52. Coar (t.y.), S. 118; bkz.: apolyo (1969), S. 192; Gz (1991), s. 35. nl (1987), s. 39, Hlis Turgut'un ynetimi altnda blclk yapan yaynlarnn 1922 Mart ayma kadar srdn iddia ediyor. Oral (1973), s. 41, "... rade-i Milliye 1922 ylnda matbaasnn yanmas zerine tamamen kapanmtr" eklindeki iddiada bulunuyorsa da, ve de bu yangnn Mcadehe-i Milliye'nin kndan nce, yani 1922 ylnn ilk aylarnda olduunu ima ediyorsa da (s.42), tarihler hakknda yanlm olabilir. Vilayet matbaasnn gerekten 31 Kanunusani 1338 (1924) tarihinde yanm olduunu ve matbaann yeniden inas hakkndaki kararlarn ksa bir sre sonra verilmi olduunu Birlik dergisinden reniyoruz: bkz. 2 Mart 1338 tarihli 19uncu says, s.7, ve 9 Mart 1338 tarihli 20nci says, s.4. 1922 ylnn ilk aylarnda bir yangn (daha) km olsayd Vilayet Matbaasnda baslm Dilek dergisinin 15 Kanunusani 1338 (1922) tarihinden itibaren dzenli bir ekilde (iki haftada bir) kmas zordu. 53. T.B.M.M. Zabt Ceridesi (1959), On sekizinci tima, 1.4.1338 (1922) Cumartesi, s. 441-443. Gz (1991), s. 35, bu kayna yanllkla yle veriyor: T.B.M.M. Zabt ceridesi, 1.4.1923.

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bu mudur? Rica ederim nasl nefestir ki, milletin sadasn tkar? Boazn skar? Bu kfi gelmiyormu gibi bir de o zat memuriyetten azlediyor. Dahiliye Vekleti buna maz ayneder. Onun sebebi de, kendisinin memur olmas gazete sahibi imtiyaz olmasna mniymi. Bunu memuriyetten azletmek suretiyle de u gazetede iln ediyor; 'Meclisi dare Baktibi Salhaddin Efendiye. Gazetecilik ve siyasetle itigal ettiinizden dolay azledildiiniz tebli olunur'." 54 Hseyin Avni Bey, Selhattin Bey'in vali Ali Haydar Bey'in imzasyla azledildiini; halbuki, ayn valinin baka bir gazetede (Dilek dergisinde) sz konusu makalede arzedilen fikirlere benzer birok fikri deiik makalelerde iledii iin aslnda kendisinin istifa etmesi gerektiini ileri sryor. Sonra Hseyin Avni Bey, Selhattin Bey'in 17 Mart 1338 (1922) tarihli savunmasn rade-i Milliye gazetesinden iktibasla Byk Millet Meclisi'ne okuyor. Orada, Selhattin Bey "rade-i Milliye gazetesi sahibi imtiyazl ile Meclisi dare Bakitabetinin kanunen kabili telif olmamasndan ve memurinin siyasetle itigali memnu bulunmasndan dolay ikisinden birisinin tercihi ve dierinin terki hakkndaki emirlerini", sahib-i imtiyazlnn "memuriyete mni bir ciheti bulunmad"na deinerek reddediyor. Kendisinin stelik "gazetenin umuru tahririyesiyle" megul olmadn savunarak mesuliyetini, adn vermeden mdir-i mes'ul olan Halis Turgut'a yklyor ve emrin geri alnmasn rica ediyor55. Sansr hadisesinin sonucunu ancak tahmin edebiliriz: Emir geri alnmam, Selttin Bey en azndan bir sre memuriyetten uzak kalm, gazete azl emrinden sonra kapanm ki, Hseyin Avni Bey zlerek unu kaydetmitir: "Bu inklp, tarih milletin memurlarna bakn efendiler; birinci ileri inklp bir gazeteyi kapatmak oluyor. Bu gibi zevat ya istibdatlarndan, ya bizden vazgemelidirler."56 Mcahede-i Milliye rade-i Milliye gazetesinin kapanmas zerine Hayri Ltfullah'n ynetimi ve Hilmi Abidin'in imtiyaz sahiblii altnda ayr bir gazete karld: Mcahede-i Milliye. Bu yeni gazetenin kuruluunda, Irade-i Milliye'nin kapanml yannda, belediye seimleri dolaysyla Hlis Turgut ve Hayri Ltfullah arasndaki rekabetin bir rol oynad tahmin edilebilir.
54. A.g.e., s. 441-442. 55. A.g.c, s. 442-443. 56. A.g.e., s. 443. Yust (1995), s. 124, 1 Mays 1922'ye kadar rade-i Milliye'nin 250 saysnn km olduundan bahsediyor. Bu rakam takriben olabilir ve de gazetenin 1 Mays 1922'de kmakta olduu anlamna da gelmeyebilir. Nitekim, Yust da aratrmasnda 250nci saynn 1 Mays'ta ktn iddia etmiyor, sadece 1 Mays'a kadar gazetenin ulat nsha saysnn 250'ye vardn belirtiyor. Kezalik Hakk Tarik Us Ktphanesinde bulunan 134nc says 14 Eyll 1921 tarihlidir ve "Cum'a ve Saldan ma'ada her gn kar" ibaresinin gazetede belirtilmesinden hareketle dzenli bir kn varsayarak tarih hesabyla 250nci says Mart 1922'ye denk gelmektedir yani gazetenin kapan tarihi ncesinde km olabilir.

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Mcahede-i Milliye'yi, buna gre, Hlis Turgut ve onun nfuz grubuna kar kan kemalist bir basn organ olarak deerlendirmek sannz yanl olmaz. Bu gazete hakknda ise ok az bilgimiz var. Gazete 23 Mart 1922'de kurulmu, "gnar" kyor ve kendisini "ilm, siyas, edeb ve mstakil-l efkr gazete" olarak nitelendiriyor57. Elimizdeki tek mevcut nshas olan 36nc saysnda (20 Terinisani/ Kasm 1922)58 "gnar kar mstakil-l efkr Trk gazetesidir" diye bir ibare bulunuyor. Bu says, ksmen drt stunlu olmak zere, alt stun zerinde kurulu idi. Matbaa hakknda bir bilgi verilmiyorsa da, Vilayet Matbaas olmas ihtimal dahilindedir. Bu gazetenin yerel nfuz dengeleri iin ne gibi bir rol oynadn u anda sylemek g. mrnn ne kadar srdne dair Oral bir ipucu veriyor: "Mcahede-i Milliye gazetesi. Atatrk'n Sivas'ta att Kurtuluu Basn tohumu yeermi ve yeni yeni meyveler vermitir. Bu gazete, bunlardan biri olarak iki yl yaamtr."59 Bu da, Mcahede-i Milliye'nin en azndan Cumhuriyetin ilanna kadar, belki de 1924 ylnn bana kadar kt anlamna geliyor.60 Hayri Ltfullah daha sonra 1925 ylnn Temmuz aynda Kzlrmak gazetesini dirilterek basn hayatn devam ettirdi61. Bu gazetenin idarehanesinin adresi olarak "Halk frkasnda" verilmektedir. Bu gazetenin 19091911 ve 1914-1917 devirlerinde sahib-i imtiyaz olan Kmil (Kitap) u ifadesiyle bu olaya k tutuyor: "nc neri 925 senesidir. Bu sene iinde Sivas Halk Frkas bir gazete karmaa ve Kzlrma ihya etmee karar vermiti. (...) 925 senesinde Kzdrma halk frkasna devrede57. Bu bilgi, Coar (t.y.), s. 117 ve Oral (1973), s. 41'de birinci saysndan verilen bir tpk basm kesitinden kyor. Aslanolu (1979), s. 106, bu gazete daha 1920 ylnda kt iddia ederse de, byle bir ipucu yok. Resmi ktphanelerde tek bir nshas olmayan gazetenin 36nc saysnn bir nshas Sivas'ta Cumhuriyet niversitesi Ktphanesinde bulunmaktadr. Bu sayda ise, kurulu tarihi yok. Gazete logosunun da birinci saysna nazaran deitirilmi olduu anlalr. 58. Bu sayda smet Paa'nn ynetime Lozan'a gnderilen Trk heyeti zerine uzun bir yaz yannda, Lozan konferans vesilesiyle Lord Curzon ile M. Poincare'nin yaptklar grme ve yerel haber olarak da Zara ilesinde bir yatl okulun al ile ilgili haberler bulunmaktadr. Ankara haberlerinde Byk Millet Meclisi oturumlar ile ilgili bildirilerden baka Abdlmecid'in Hilfet makamn stlenmesi konusunda yaplan mzakere zerinde Ankara Ajansndan aktarlan bir makale yer alyor. Sivas'tan sadece ksa bir lm haberi veriliyor. Bu saynn her iki sayfasnda deiik yazlarda zikredilen politikaclarn resimleri de basldr. 59. Oral (1973), S. 41. 60. Oral (1973), . 42: "... 23 Mart 1922'de, Hilmi Abidin ve Hayr Lutf tarafndan Mcahede-i Milliye adl bir gazete daha karld ve Cumhuriyetin ilnna kadar yaad." 61. 3nc says 3 Austos 1925 tarihlidir. Bkz. Alkan (1989c), s. 16/208. Kzlrmak gazetesinin bu dizisinden 4nc (10 Austos 1925) saysndan balayarak Cumhuriyet niversitesi Ktphanesinde nemli bir koleksiyon bulunmaktadr. mtiyaz sahibi belirtilmezken, Srczade Hayri "sermuharrir ve mdiri" olarak gsteriliyor. 62. Kmil (1933), S. 21. Bael (1935), s. 207, Kzlrmak gazetesini 'C.H. partisinin lk yayn (Nairi efkr)' olarak nitelendiriyor.

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rek imtiyaz hakkmdan feragat etmitim."62 Bu demektir ki, Hayri Ltfullah bu gazeteyi CHF'nin yerel bir basn organ olarak kard. Belediye meclisinde kendi menfaatlerini bu ekilde daha iyi savunma imknna sahip oldu ve bunun semeresini de 1926'da belediye bakan seilmesiyle grd.63 rade-i Mlliye'nin sonu rade-i Milliye'nin, 1922 ylnn Mart aynda niha kapanm olduu birka yazar tarafndan iddia ediliyorsa da, bu gazetenin, birka ay ara verdikten sonra, o yln sonbaharnda yeniden km olduu anlalyor.64 Gazetenin bu drdnc devrinden elimize geen tek nshas olan 3 Kanunuevvel (Aralk) 1922 tarihli ve 254nc saysnda ayr bir mdir-i mes'ul gsterilmemesinden, Hlis Turgut'un gazetede bir daha grev almadn, hl imtiyaz sahibliini koruyan Selhattin Bey'in gazeteyi kendi bana kardn reniyoruz. Selhattin Bey'in ynetimi altnda da gazete tamamen deiik bir ekil almtr. 254nc saysnda grld gibi, ebad bytlm, stun says drtten altya karlmtr. An saysnda ok ilgin bir haber yer almaktadr. "Sahib-i imtiyazmz gitti" balkl yazda, Selhattin Bey'in Sivas'a pek uzak olan Cebel-i Bereket kazasnda memurlua atanmas bildirilir: "Gazetemizin sahibi mcahede-i milliyenin ilk nair-i efkr olmakla ilelebed iftihar edecek olan rade-i Milliye'nin mdiri Salahattin Bey Pazarertesi gn deruhte ettii yeni vazifesine, Cebel-i Bereket Tahrirat Mdirliine gitti." Byk bir ihtimalle rade-i Milliye gazetesi ksa bir sre sonra bu ekilde mrn tamamlamtr, sz konusu say onun son says bile olabilir. Bu balamda bir soru sorulmas gerek: Selhattin Bey'in Sivas'tan pek uzak bir yere gnderilmesinin sebebi nedir? ayet, daha nce bir hakszlk sonucu memurluundan azledilmise bu, tabi ki, Selhattin Bey 65 iin bir frsat hatta bir telfi olabilirdi . Fakat bu durum u soruyu beraberinde getiriyor: Acaba, istenmeyen bir gazeteci olduu iin mi tayini byle kt?
63. Austos 1926'da Sivas belediye seimleri srasnda Kzlrmak gazetesinde Hayri Ltfullah tarafndan yaplan seim propagandas ile ilgili bkz. Alkan (1989c), s. 16/ 208-17/209. Alkan, Kzlrmak gazetesinin deiik yazlarn tetkik ederek Hayri Ltfullah'n, aralarnda belediye bakan Abbas Bey'in de bulunduu belediye meclisindeki rakiplerine ynelik hesaplamasn gsterebildi. Alkan (1989 a, b, c). 64. Gazete'nin 'gn an kar' belirtmesi ve 250nci saysnn 1 Mays 1922 tarihinden nce kmas (bkz. Yust (1995), s. 124) Irade-i Milliye'nin son devrinin 1922 Kasm aynda balad ihtimalini akla getiriyor. 65. Miicahede-i Milliye, 20 Terinisani, s.2., 'arkadamz' Selhattin Bey'e tebriklerini sunar.

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Sonu rade-i Milliye gazetesinin, deiik bak alarn savunduu birok dnemler vardr. Bunlar sralarsak, 1919 yln sonundaki birinci dnemde Mustafa Kemal'in kontrol altnda ve Selhattin Bey'in ynetiminde bulunan Mill Mcadele'nin ilk propaganda arac olarak grevini srdrmtr. Gazete ikinci dnemde, 1920 ylnn sonuna doru Hlis Turgut'un ynetimi altnda Ankara'y ve Sivas Vilayet idaresini giderek eletirel yorumlara balad halde, her zaman kemalist niteliini korumu gibi grnyor. Bununla birlikte, kemalist mill hareketin baarl olup olmamasnn henz kesinlemedii bir zamanda gazetede yaplan eletiriler Sivas stiklal Mahkemesi tarafndan iki defa kapan iin yeterli gereke saylm olsa gerek. Kemalist harekete katlan, fakat eski tip brokrat niteliini koruyan mirler ise, adaletsiz bir ekilde uygulanan vergi toplamasna ynelik bir eletiriyi, ne kadar kemalist ve iyi niyetli olursa olsun, 'inklp bir gazeteyi' kapatmak iin iyi bir frsat biliyorlard. Gazetede kemalist hareket ile ilgili yaplan eletiriler konusundaki bilgi gibi, gazetenin kapanlar srasnda karlan dare-i Milliye ve Gaye-i Milliye, daha sonra da Hlis Turgut'un rakibi olan Hayri Ltfullah tarafndan karlan Mcahede-i Milliye gazeteleri hakkndaki bilgilerimiz de henz snrldr. imdiye kadar biriktirilmi veri ise yle bir senaryoyu dndryor: rade-i Milliye gazetesi Mustafa Kemal tarafndan Mill Mcadele'nin propaganda arac olarak ngrlmekle birlikte, Sivas'ta ittihatlk ile kemalist pozisyonlar savunan yerel g odaklarnn ekimesinde taraf oldu. Bu ekilde basn, yerel eraf gruplarnn belediye meclisindeki nfuzlar ile ilgili bir ztlamaya zemin oldu. Bu gelimeler nda Mill Mcadele'deki Sivas basn tarihi, kemalist hareketin, 1925 senesinden itibaren Sivas'ta (ve btn Trkiye'de) muhalefeti tasfiye etmesine bir temel ve rnek olarak kavranlabilir66. Mevcut gazete saylarnn sistematik bir ekilde aratrlmas ile -ki, henz yaplmamtr- bu konuda yeni bilgiler retilebilir. Anadolu gazeteleri Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin deiik devirlerinde, hatta gnmze kadar, Kemalizmin en cra vilayetlerinde de yerel ve blgesel almlanyla nasl idrak edildiini ve hayata geirildiini yahut hangi engellerle karlatn anlayabilmek iin imdiye kadar az kullanlm bir hazine olma niteliini korumaktadr. Anadolu gazeteleri ve kaynak sorunu Son dnceden hareketle birka nemli noktaya da deinilmesi gerekir. Mill Mcadele tarihinde ayr, hatta sembolik bir yere sahip olan
66. Bkz. Alkan(1989a,b,c).

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rade-i Milliye ve Sivas'ta km dier gazeteler zerine literatrde biriktirilmi veri ve bilgi yetersiz ve ounlukla anekdot eklindedir. Rusa'da yazlm olduu iin Yust'un 'Kemalist Anadolu Basn' adl eseri ancak Kololu sayesinde birka yl nce unutulmutuk kaderinden kurtulmutur. Bylelikle altml yllardan beri Mill Mcadele Basn zerine bildiklerimize nemli ipular ve bilgiler eklenmitir. Mill Mcadele zamannda Anadolu gazetelerinin ounu, sistematik bir ekilde deilse de, en azndan ierikleri bakmndan tasnif etmek asndan nemli n almalarnda bulunan bir yazardr, Yust. Bu konuda temelli bir aratrma noksanlndan bahsetmek herhalde yerindedir. Anadolu gazeteleri, Osmanl devletinin sonu ile Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ilk devirlerine ynelik tarihsel tetkiklerde imdiye kadar ancak istisna olarak ve ok snrl bir ekilde kaynak olarak deerlendiriliyor. Elbetteki, bu almalar geniletildiinde ok nemli sonulara varlabilir. Kocabaolu, Osmanl devletinden Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne intikal sresi ile ilgili, Birinci Dnya Harbi devrinde ve Mill Mcadele ile Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulu yllarnda resm istatistiklerin hemen hemen bulunulmay dolaysyla ok ciddi bir kaynak sorunundan bahsediyor: "Trkiye'de resm rgt ve kurumlarn yansra dzenli belgeleme ve kayt ilemlerini gelitirebilmi zel kurum ve rgtler de bulunmadndan, anlan belge boluu vardr. Bu boluu doldurmada dnemin sreli yaynlarna bavurmak bir zorunluluktur. Oysa Trkiye'de basn tarihine ilikin olarak yaplan almalar ok snrldr ve byk boluklar iermektedir. Yayn rgtnn bu balamdaki almalar da aratrmaclara yardmc olmaktan ok uzaktr. Bu alandaki boluk yle ileri boyutlardadr ki, pek de uzun bir gemii olmayan basn tarihimizin tmn kapsayacak almalarn bireysel olarak altndan kalkmak olanaksz grnmektedir."67 Aratrmaclar iin bir baka sorun da zellikle Arap harfleriyle yazlm Anadolu gazetelerine ynelik bilimsel almalarda ortaya kan ciddi zorluklardr. Vilayet gazetelerinden balayarak ikinci Merutiyet devri gazeteleri zerine Mill Mcadele ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulu ve devrim yllarna kadar tam koleksiyonu mevcut olan ok az gazete vardr. stelik gazete nshalar yahut koleksiyon ksmlarnn Trkiye'nin drt bir tarafnda bulunan ktphanelere dalm bulunmalar da bu kaynaklara ulamakta nemli bir engel tekil etmektedir. Bugne kadar btn Trkiye apnda bu gazete koleksiyonlar ieren sistematik ve ciddi bibliyografik bir tarama denemesi yaplmamtr.
67. Kocabaolu (1981), s. 95-96. 68. Duman (1986); elik/Akyz (1987); Eski Harfli Trke Sreli Yaynlar Toplu Katalogu (1987).

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Geri, deiik ktphanelerin gazete koleksiyonlarn kapsayan birka nemli katalog bulunmaktadr68. Ancak byk kk gazete koleksiyonlar, tek tk nshalarn bulunduu btn ktphane ve arivleri de iine alacak ekilde merkez bir katalog ise henz mevcut deildir. Bu yolda nemli bir adm "Mill Mcadele Dnemi Basn (1919-1923)" ktphane katalogudur69. Fakat bu almada da, Trkiye'de yerel ve blgesel nitelikte olan btn ktphane ve arivlerin sistematik bir ekilde taranmasndan vazgeilmitir. Gerekli olan proje ise, istanbul ve btn Osmanl vilayetlerinde karlm gazetelerden balayarak Trkiye basn tarihinin btn devirlerine ait gazete ve dergi katalogu eklinde bilgisayar yahut internete balantl bir kayt sisteminin kurulmasdr. imdiye kadar tarih bir kaynak olarak az deerlendirilen Anadolu gazete ve dergilerine ynelik aratrmalar iin, byle bir katalog almas vazgeilmez metodik bir unsurdur. Son sz olarak, zellikle Arap harfleriyle yazlm Anadolu gazete koleksiyonlar olan ktphane ve arivler ile ilgili bir tespit yaplmaldr. Var olan koleksiyonlar, sistematik bir derleme faaliyetinden ok tarih tesadflerin sonucudur. Sk sk tara merkezlerinde bulunan baz nemli koleksiyonlar da ancak ans eseri Trkiye Cumhuriyeti devrinde tarihiliin belki en byk kbusundan kurtulmu olabildiler: Burada kbus kelimesiyle kasdedilen, szde "gereksiz" belgeleri, aralarnda eski gazeteler de bulunmak zere, ynlarla SEKA'ya gnderme "gelenei"dir. Cumhuriyet dneminde resm veya zel belgelere kar gsterilen byle bir ilgisizlii hem talihsizlik, hem de tarihsizlik olarak deerlendirebiliriz, nk bir ulusun tarih ierisindeki yolculuunda brakt ayak izlerinin silinmesiyle kar karyayz. Baz gazetelerin tek tk birka nshas kald, ok gazetenin sadece adlar biliniyor; ka gazetenin adnn bile unutularak tarihe karm olduu ise tahmin edilemez. Bu alanda hi de i ac olmayan bir kaynak durumu sz konusu iken, eldeki btn koleksiyonlara gerekli bakm yapld da maalesef sylenemez.
BBLYOGRAFYA Albayrak, Hseyin (1994) Trabzon Basn Tarihi ve Batum, Gmhane, Rize, Giresun, Ordu, Samsun Basn. Cilt 1: 1869-1928. Ankara: Trkiye Diyanet Vakf Yayn Matbaaclk ve Ticaret letmesi. Alkan, Ahmet Turan (1989a) stikll Mahkemesi'nin Sivas Gnleri ve Muhaliflerin Tasfiyesi I: Tarih ve Toplum. 1989.62. s. 18/82-22/86. Alkan, Ahmet Turan (1989b) stikll Mahkemesi'nin Sivas Gnleri ve Muhaliflerin Tasfiyesi E: Tarih ve Toplum. 1989.62. s.9/137-14/142. 69. Gner/Kabata (1990), s.309-374.

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Alkan, Ahmet Turan (1989c) stikll Mahkemesi'nin Sivas Gnleri ve Muhaliflerin Tasfiyesi El: Tarih ve Toplum. 1989.64.S.15/207-19/211. Aslanolu, brahim (1979) Her Ynden Sivas. Ekler ve Dzeltmelerle nc Bask. Sivas: Kmil Kitabevi. Akun, Vehbi Cem (1963) Sivas Kongresi. Yeni Vesikalar lvesinde kinci Bask. stanbul: nklap ve Aka Kitabevleri Koli. ti. Aybars, Ergn (1995) stikll Mahkemeleri. Cilt I-/1920-1927. zmir: Daaan Matbaas. Bael, M. Fahreddin (1935) Sivas Blteni. Sivas: Kmil Matbaas. Coar, mer Sami (t.y.) Mill Mcadele Basm. Gazeteciler Cemiyeti yay,. No.5. y.y. ankaya, Ali (Mcellitolu) (1968-1969) 'Son Asr Trk Trihinin nemli Olaylar ile Birlikde' Yeni Mlkiye Trihi ve Mlkiyeliler (Mlkiye eref Kitab). IV. Cild, 1909-1923 Mekteb-i Mlkiyye Me'zunlan (Mertiyet. Mtreke ve Mill Mcadele Devri Mlkiyelileri). Ankara: Mars Matbaas. elik, Fevzi/Akyz, Sevgi (1987) TBMM Ktphanesi Sreli Yaynlar Katalogu, T.B.M.M. Ktphane-Dokumentasyon ve Tercme Mdrl Yaym No.l 1. Ankara: TBMM Basmevi. Demirciolu, Aziz (1982) 100 Yllk Kastamonu Basn (1872-1972). 2. Basm. Kastamonu: Dorusz Matbaas. Duman, Hasan (1986) stanbul Ktphaneleri Arap Harfli Sreli Yaynlar Toplu Katalogu (1928-1928). stanbul. Eski Harfli Trke Sreli Yaynlar Toplu Katalogu (1987) Ankara. Gololu, Mahmut (1969) Sivas Kongresi. Ankara: Banur Matbaas. Gner, Zeki/Kabata, Orhan (1990) Mill Mcadele Dnemi Beynnameleri ve Basn. Atatrk Kltr Merkezi Yayn - Say 38. Ankara: Atatrk Kltr, Dil ve Tarih Yksek Kurumu. Grel, Ahmet Turan (1994) Sivas'ta Karanlkta Kalan bir Gemi: Sivas Basn: Revak/ 94. s.141-152. Gz, Nurettin (1991) Trkiye'de Basn-lktidar likileri (1920-1927). Ankara: Gazi niversitesi Basn-Yayn Yksek Okulu Matbaas. demir, Ulu (1969) Sivas Kongresi Tutanaklar. Ankara: Trk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi. Inuur, M. Nuri (1993) Basn ve Yayn Tarihi. Gzden Geirilmi 3. Basm. stanbul: DER Yaynlan. skit, Server (1939) Trkiyede Matbuat Rejimleri. Matbuat Ununum Mdrl Neriyatndan. stanbul: lk Matbaas. Kmil (Kitap) (1933) Kzdrman Tarihesi. Rub'u Asr Evvel Ki Kzlrmak. Kzlrmak, Onuncu Yl Cumhuriyet Bayramnn Ayn Say. Sivas: Kmil Matbaas. Kocabaolu, Uygur (1981) 1919-1938 Dnemi Basnna Toplu Bir Bak: A.. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi Basn ve Yayn Yksek Okulu Yllk 1981. Say VI. s.95-127. Kocabaolu, Uygur/Birinci, Ali (1995) Osmanl Vilyet Gazete ve Matbaalar zerine Gzlemler. Kebike, 1995.2. s.101-121. Kololu, Orhan (1984) Kemalist Anadolu Basn (1918-1.5.1922). K. Yust, Anadolu Basn, Tiflis 1922, 213 Sayfa: Tarih ve Toplum. 1984.11. s.55-60. Oral, Fuat Sreyya (1973) Cumhuriyet Basn Tarihi 1923-1973. Ankara: Sanayii Nefise Matbaas.

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nder, Ali Rza (1972) Kayseri Basn Tarihi (1910-1960). Ankara: Ayyldz Matbaas A.. zkaya, Ycel (1985) Milli Mcadele Balangcnda Basn ve Mustafa Kemal Paa'nn Basnla likileri: Atatrk Aratrma Merkezi Dergisi. 1.3.Temmuz 1985. s.871-911. ztoprak, zzet (1981) Kurtulu Savanda Trk Basn (Mays 1919-Temmuz 1921). Trkiye ile lgili D Haberler ve Bunlarn Basnndaki Tepkileri. Trkiye Bankas Kltr Yaynlan. Ankara: TtSA Matbaas. Sanszen, Abdlkadir (1941) Ulus, 14..9.1941, s.5. Sivas 1973 l Yll (t.y.) Ankara: nder Matbaa. apolyo, Enver Behnan (1969) Trk Gazetecilik Tarihi ve Her Yn ile Basn. Ankara: Gven Matbaas. imir, Bill (1981) Atatrk ile Yazmalar I (1920-1923). Ankara. Tayla, Mustafa (1997) Bursa Basn (1868/69-1983). Bursa Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yaynlar. Eskiehir: Karaca Ofset. T.B.M.M. Zabt Ceridesi (1959) Devre: I; Cilt 18; tima Senesi: 3. Ankara T.B.M.M. Matbaas. Tuncay, Mete (1981) Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Ynetimi'nin Kurulmas (19231931). Yurt Yaynlan 1. Ankara: Yurt Yaynclk. Ttengil, Cavit Orhan (1966) Diyarbakr Basn ve Blge Gazeteciliimiz (Baz 'Ek'lerle Yeni Basm). stanbul: stanbul niversitesi ktisat Fakltesi. Ulusalerk, Selhattin (1941) Ulus, 14.9.1941, s.5. nl, Cemalettin (1987) Anadolu Basnn yks: Yank. 2 Eyll - 4 Eyll 1987. Varlk, Blent (1985) Yerel Basnn ncs: Vilyet Gazeteleri: Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Trkiye Ansiklopedisi 1, s.99-102. Yaar, Muammer (1971) Anadolu'da lk Trk Gazetesi (Envar- arkiyye). Ankara: Trk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi. Yldnm, Hseyin (1992) Irade-i Milliye Gazetesi: Atatrk Aratrma Merkezi Dergisi, VIII. 23. s.325-330. Yust, K. (1995) Kemalist Anadolu Basm (Tiflis 1922). Yayna Hazrlayan: Orhan Kololu. ada gazeteciler Dernei Yay. No. 17. Ankara: Kozan Ofset Matbaas. Gazete ve Dergiler Birlik Dilek Gaye-i Milliye Gazetesi Irade-i Milliye Gazetesi Kzdrmak Gazetesi Mcahede-i Milliye Gazetesi

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POPULATION CHANGE AND THE CREATION OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

Prof. Dr. Justin McCARTHY* in terms of both mortality and physical destruction, the events that overtook the Turkish people between 1912 and 1922 were among the most disastrous in history. But that time is remarkable for more than the brutality visited on the Turks. it is also remarkable that after World War I, at a time when Europeans and Americans provided massive amounts of aid to other peoples, no one cared about Turkish suffering. it is remarkable, in a world that readily catalogs human suffering and easily assigns blame, that very few have ever recognized Turkish suffering. And it is remarkable that the Turks managed to survive their losses and create a nation. it is possible to describe Turkish suffering statistically. Even though statistics do not portray the depth of human misery, they can help us grasp the extent of suffering. The data are dawn from archival and published material of the Ottoman and Turkish Republican governments. Where possible, tables and fgures are given here by Republican provincial boundrais. However, due to the nature of the statistics, it is sometimes necessary to give data for the larger Ottoman provinces (vilyets). Figures on mortality offer the most meaningful picture of the suffering of the Turks. in Anatolia, what today is Turkey in Asia, nearly three million Muslims' were lost in World War I and the Turkish War of Independence that followed (Figre One). The mortality in some provinces was staggering: in Van Province, 62% of the Muslims who were present before the wars were gne by the end of 1922. in Erzurum Province, 31% were gne; in Bitlis, 31% in Hdavendigr (Bursa), 10%; in Aydn (zmir), 10%. By comparison, in what became the U.S.S.R., 8% of the
Department of History, University of Louisville. it is impossible to identify ethnic or linguistic groups in Ottoman statistics, because the Ottomans kept population records only by religion. Figre One is drawn by subtracting the Mslim population in 1922 from the population in 1912. it does not include immigrants from the balkan Wars, althouhg the figre of almost 3 million lost does so.

509

population disappeared in World War I and the Russian Revolution. France lost 1% of its population in the war. The populations of Germany and Great Britain did not decline during the war. Mortality alone does not describe adequately the situation in Turkey. Those who remained in the Turkish provinces were not only the natives of Anatolia and eastern Thrace who had survived the wars. Waves of immigrants had come to anatolia and Eastern Thrace, adding more misery to regions where there was not enough food for those already there. 414.000 Turks had been expelled to Turkey (i.e., what was to become the area of the Turkish Republic) from the Balkan countries during the Balkan Wars. Nearly 300.000 fled from the Southern Caucasus primarily from Arrnenia, during World War I and the Independence War. 431.000 more came to Turkey after the wars, primarily from Greece. After the wars, approximately 10% of the population of Turkey had come from other lands. They had arrived as refugees, vvtihout possessions, dependent on the charity of a destitute land and people. Table One indicates the scale of the "international immigration" (i.e., from regions that had been part of the Ottoman Empire until conquered) to those Turkish Republican provinces that accepted the greatest number of refugees from the Balkans. The actual proportions in 1922 were somewhat smaller, because some of the migrants had died, especially in the Independence War. The population of the area of the Ottoman Edirne Province, occupied in both the Balkan Wars and the Independence War, must have died in great numbers. Nevertheless, in-migration assured that Edirne actually gained population in the wartime period~the only Turkish region to do so. it became a province in which half the inhabitiants vvere newcomers. Newcomers also made up for some of the population loss in the Western Anatolian provinces. Large number of internal migrants added to the international refugees in the anatolian provinces. During the Independence War, more than 1.2 million Turkish refugees fled from the Greek invasion. in the East, there were more than one million Mslim refugees from the Russians and Armenians. When the wars vvere ver, many of these refugees returned to their home provinces, but many did not. Many, of course, had died while exiled. Figre Two, which records the percentage of Turks who vvere living the their district (kaza) of birth, indicates that the greatest proportions of immigrants vvere found in the provinces that had been occupied by Russians and Armenians (the East), the French and the Armenians (Cilicia), and the Greeks (The West). Most of the migrants in the Turkish provinces had come to their new homes from some distance. This is demonstrated by the numbers who had come from other provinces or other countries (Table Two). The figures in the table are for 1935, because Turkey did not include data on birth dis510

trict in the earlier 1927 census. If earlier data had been available, they would have shown even higher proportions of residents born elsewhere, because of deaths of migrants and new births from 1927 to 1935. This has the effect of adding numbers born in the districts and subtracted some migrants.Had 1922 figures been available, the percentage of migrants in the populations might have increased by 25% or more. (For example, the proportion of migrants in Edirne Pro vince in 1922 was probably at least 50%). Prior to the wars, the Anatolian Turks had primarily been a settled people. Despite often temporary migration for work and military service, most Anatolian Turks continued to live in the same regions as their forefathers. This was especially true of women. Now masses of people had moved permanently. For many, as will be seen below, their old homes and villages were destroyed, so living in new regions was to be expected and perhaps welcomed. The mortality and migration of the Muslims changed the relative demographic importance of the Turkish provinces. Figre Three indicates a shift in importance from the East to the West. While Northern and Western Anatolia had for centuries been more densely settled and more economically developed than Eastern Anatolia, the comparatively greater destruction in the East and migration to the Western provinces exacerbated this condition after the wars. This undoubtedly contributed to the much more rapid advancement of the West in Republican times. Where population is more dense, education are economy are more easily developed. Many Turkish cities lost population in the wars (Figre Four). They were reduced in size and changed in character. The Christian populations of most were gone.Van and izmir were largely destroyed. in izmir, however, the natural attractiveness of the region seems to have drawn thousands who rebuilt quickly. This was not true of Van, which had become a small city in a ravaged province2. Judged by its population, Anatolia was a much changed land in 1922. The Turks had experienced great mortality and they lived in different places. Demographic relationships between provinces, between regions, and betvveen the rural and the urban had ali changed. Figre Four does not accurately reflect the scope of the changes that faced the Turks. in numbers, the city populations do not appear much different. There were stili significant populations in the Anatolian cities.
2. Note that it was only possible to enumerate the populations of central districts (kazas) not cities themselves, because Ottoman statistics recorded kaza populations only. Figures on cities in the Ottoman period are usually lacking.

511

Those populations, though, were often living in ruins. Wartime destruction (Table Three3) of Western Anatolian cities meant that many city populations lived in rough housing, in tents, or without roofs on dwellings. Careful statistics compiled for the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Peace Conference listed 54.300 buildings destroyed by the Greeks in the cities, 88.000 in the contryside. There were no comparable statistics for the war zone of Eastern 'Anatolia, but the figures collected by the American observers, Niles and Sutherland, leave no doubt that destruction was as bad in the East as the West. The Americans stated that in the city of Van only 3 of the 3.400 pre-war Mslim homes remained at war's end. in the Van Province, three-fburths of the Mslim homes had been destroyed. No Mslim houses remained in the city of Bitlis. it is difficult to estimate the extent of agrarian loss in Anatolia. Statistics are nonexistent for much of the East, and changing borders make it impossible to accurately compare Ottoman and Republican statistics even in some provinces for which data exists. Table Four is indicative, however, of widespread destruction of livestock. When one considers the need of horses, donkeys, and mules for sowing and taking crops to market, the loss of so many animals must have put an incredible burden on agriculture. Moreover, the figures do not consider the lack of seed grain or other factors such as the almost complete destruction of olive trees in many provinces. Such loss would have contributed greatly to agricultural disaster. The conclusion to be drawn is obvious: Not only were the Turks without homes to live in, they were without food to eat. Economic loss in Turkey matched other losses. Indeed, losses of farms, city buildings, animals, and human beings were ali economic loss. Industrial loss was also great, as exemplified by zmir. Prior to the wars, as enumerated in 1910, zmir had contained 27% of the grain milis in Anatolia~30% of the grain milling capacity. it was a majr textile manufacturing center, the main center of box making, a majr center of production of food commodities, printing, and publishing, and contained ali for of the biggest Ottoman oil companies (petroleum and vegetable oils). Aydn Province, of which zmir was the center, paid more taxes than any other province in Anatolia. it was the center of the latest technology, housing, for example, almost half of the steam-powered milis in Anatolia. in most areas of manufacturing, zmir was second only to stanbul in the Ottoman Empire. Now it was ali destroyed, burnt to the ground. Other Western Anatolian cities naturally shovved less destruction of manufacturing potentialthere was less to destroy. Hovvever, it can be noted that 42% of the grain milis in Anatolia were cited in cities destroyed by the Greeks, as were a similar percentage of other industries.
3. The names of cities in Table Three are listed as they appeared in the source. See Sources.

512

The most difficult of the Turkish losses to understand and explain is personal-psychological and social loss. it is impossible to quantify sorrow for the dead, the anguish of seeing villages and homes destroyed, or the fear that you and your children will soon die of starvation. Yet, next to death itself, it was most likely the worst of ali the losses. One simple statistic (Table Five) can help explain part of the Trk's social loss. The table illustrates the proportion of adult women to men in three war-torn provinces (Ottoman boundaries), as recorded in the first Republican census. in a normal population, the numbers of men and women would be similar. Both because they were fihters and because their enemies singled them out for death, Turkish males died at a greater rate than Turkish females. This left behind women without husbands, fathers, brothers, and sonsvvomen alone in a traditional society in which this had been largely unknown. The social burden and psychological state of these women can only be guessed. This is not, however, the worst of the "psychological" anguish suffered by the Turks. That must have been the sorrow of children without parents, and of parents who watched their children die. Strangely, the destruction of Anatolia is seldom considered as part the history of the leadership Mustafa Kemal Atatrk. The perilous state of the Turks whom he led surely had a great effect on his leadership. Those Turks were in many ways a different people than they had been in Ottoman times. They were living in ne w places, vvith new neighbors, often from different lands. Not only the old political system was gne, but the old buildings, the old businesses, the old farms, even the old families. People who have suffered so much are likely to either withdraw almost catatonically into their old ways, hugging to themselves what little is left of their old happiness, or vvith the right leadership they can become pen to change, knowing that change is needed if the disasters are not to be repeated. Indeed, they are likely to vvelcome change if they trust the author of change. Atatrk's leadership meant that the Turks accepted necessary change. it is impossible to properly appreciate the real difficulties facing Atatrk and his success in meeting them unless one understands the desolate state of Turkey at the beginning of the Turkish Republic. The task that faced the survivors of the wars was immense. The success of the Turkish people and of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk is thus ali the more impressive. Atatrk did not simply take a land and change its politics, nor did he only take a poor land and make it richer. He took a destroyed land and built it anew. He took a broken land and made it whole. Knowing the terrible state of the land he rebuilt can only lead to an amazed respect for Mustafa Kemal. it can be said, of course, that others suffered during the war years. Greeks, Armenians, and others also suffered. They also went on to reju-

513

venation. But they did not do it alone. The world assisted them. Americans alone egave more than $100 million to Armenians, creating orphanages, schools, agricultural programs, and industries. The Greeks, who accepted great numbers of refugees, but whose land had not been destroyed in the wars, received donations from America, Switzerland, Holland, Britain, and other countries. Loans to Greece at very favorable terms (one for $60 million, another for $45 million) built water works, drained swamps, and reclaimed land. A further $95 million in American governmental and private business funding aided Greece and its industrial development. Europe and America were \villing to aid the Greeks and the Armenians, and it was right to do so. Who was willing to help the Turks, vvho suffered as much and more? No one. The Turks were on their own. Nevertheless, Atatrk succeeded. The Turks succeeded, and survived, on their own.
SOURCES smet Paa (nn), "Memorandum Respecting Turkish Claims Against Greece", Lausanne, 20 January 1923, Public Record Office, F.O. 371-9061, no. E969. Justin McCarthy, "American Commissions to Anatolia and the Report of Niles and Sutherland", Proceedings of the Eleventh Congress of the Trk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1994. , Death and Exile, Princeton, New Jersey, 1995. , Muslims and Minorities, New York, 1983. , "The Population of Ottoman Europe", Illrd Congress on the Social and Economic History ofTurkey, stanbul, 1990, pp. 275-298. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, Ba Veklet, statistik Umum Mdrl, 28 Terinievel 1927 Umum Nfus Tahriri, Ankara, 1929. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, Babakanlk, Devlet statistik Enstits, Osmanl Dnemi Tarm statistikleri, 1909, 1913 ve 1914, hz. Prof. Tevfik gran, Ankara, 1997. , Osmanl Sanayii 1913, 1915 Yllan Sanayi statistik, hz. Prof. A. Gndz kn, Ankara, 1997.

514

Edirne

l|stanbu|

Mslim Losses 1912-1922

GAINED 32%^ '

FGRE 1
Ut

O\

Percentage Living in District of Birth

FGRE 2

85-100 75-85 65-75 <65

Population Density

Persons

30 -

Per 20 Square Kilometer 10-

FGRE 3

00

1912 Otheref Armenians K3 1922 Greeks Population in Central Kazas 1912 and 1922 Muslims

Total

HGURE4

TABLE1

Drti

LO LO
T

O. LO

Oi LO

C\J O)
1

o Q_ c O) CO O) LO O) CM o co co o> o CM co" oo" o" o" . co ^~ a h- LO o o

_
""
" "

o
CM 00
h>. co O) o" LO CM LO

co o o>

CM ^ O)
w.

00 00 C 00 LO" co"

CM

d) Z3 H
C/

,s. CM

o CM co CM o LO CM LO LO 00 00 o T .jL CO ^* O) 00 CM CM O) LO" oo" co" o" a>" o" LO" o" LO CM CM co co co

O O 00 co CM CD O T - CM CM O) LO co" co" O) "C

w o

co

co
O)

^ ^ ^

LT

8 " >
CD C

co o> LO CM co o o LO 00 o CO" co" o" oo" "* co

il V.

:g c
LU

CO CO

c
"O
<

co

av.

>

>

.>
c C0 o
C0

co
_N

Si

O) o

in I

B JO

c75

519

TABLE2

Resident Population Born in Other Districts and Provinces, 1935

Percent Not Born in Same District 41 50 48 39 24 39 29 Percent Not Born in Same Province 40 48 46 33 17 35 26

Province Edirne Krklareli Tekirda Ar Kars zmir Bursa

520

Buildings Destroyed During the Greek Invasion of Anatolia Cities Manisa Alaehir Salihli Kasaba Gemdens Aydn Nazili Senhe Mihalk Pazow_Keuy Bilecik Sout Yeniehir Buildings Destroyed 13,633 of 14,773 4,350 of 4,500 2,000 of 2,200 6,126 431 2,121 of 6,326 Ali AU Cities Bozyk Pazarck znik Karamrsel Yalova Eskiehir Mihalk Buildings Destroyed 748 644 615 830 232 905 694 405 307 394 AU AH 648 847 286 AU AU Ali Ali Part

6,243 Ali 1,731 Most 1,965 Ali 408 948 AH AH Total

TABLE3

1,867 Part 1,971 Most

Susak
Kedos evril Eme Pandrma Afyon K.H. 54,205

2,245 Ali 1,187 Half

1,305 Most

TABLE4

Jfe W ^^
HORSES 1913 LOST zmir Aydn Denizli Bursa Afyon Manisa Eskiehir 42,711 40,774 24,008 12,013 17,015 14,223 7,126 1,832 3,730 528 18,186 31,210 21,815 40,711

Animals Lost inthe Warof Independence

Sancaks for which data is available

DONKEYS & MULES 1913 LOST 25,068 13,962 4,830 3,314 630 954

SHEEP 1913 LOST 429,752 156,031 188,424 191,046 322,989 621,157 394,101 29,581 28,249 39,916 28,260 86,137

21,893 24,502 28,202

28,079 13,170 15,796

1 120,009

522

TABLE5

Turkey in 1927 Excess of Females Aged 20+

Aydn Vilyeti Hdavendigr Vilyeti Erzurum Vilyeti

23% 30% 40%

i
p i 1
m

TB

1^

1 I

Aydn

1
Erzurum

Hdavendigr

523

MLLYETLK LKESNN UNUTULMU BR NCS: AHMED FERD BEY

Masam ARAI* I Atatrkln, daha dorusu Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin temel ideolojisi saylan 6 Ok'un nemli elerinden milliyetilik, 6 Ok'un baka unsurlar gibi, Atatrk'n 1920'li yllardan beri syledii ve Ziya Gkalp'in de 1910'lu yllardan beri yazd grlerin en son biimidir.1 Ancak, Ziya Gkalp'in milliyetiliinin ekirdeinde hem Osmanlln hem de Turancln etkilerinin bulunduu bilinmektedir. Bu etkilerin yaygn olduu kinci Merutiyet dneminde bunlardan kurtulmak o kadar zor ki Yusuf Akura Osmanl aydnlarnn hemen hepsinin Osmanllk erevesinden dar gidemedii sylemitir; kendisi ise Pan-Trkizmin nderlerinden idi. Ayn dnemde kurulup Cumhuriyet Trkiyesi'nin ilk yllarnda da milliyetiliin halka yaygnlatrlmas iin etkin faaliyetlerde bulunan Trk Ocaklarnn kuruluunda nemli rol oynayan ve bu yzden ilk bakanlna seilen Ahmed Ferid Bey, bu iki etkiden kendisini kurtulan enden kiilerden biridir. Cumhuriyet'in ilanndan sonra Ahmed Ferid Bey, iki yl kadar leri Bakan grevini stlendikten sonra Atatrk'n iktidarn rakipsiz bir duruma getirdii 1925 ylndan emekliye ayrld 1943 ylna kadar, yani hayatn en canl ve en verimli yllarn, nce Londra'da sonra Varova ve Tokyo'da bykeli olarak geirmitir. Kendisine Tek soyadn takan bu aydnmz Trk tarihi ve fikir tarihi uzmanlarnca unutulmu daha dorusu dikkatlerinden kamtr. Tebliimizde, bu durumdan yola karak Ahmed Ferid Bey'in hayatna ve fikirlerine biraz da k tutmak iin kendisinin Cumhuriyet ncesindeki almalarn ortaya karmaya uraacaz. almamz, bir yandan milliyetilik ilkesinin niteliini daha da iyi anlamak amacn, te yandan da sonra yaplacak aratrmamzn giri niteliini de tamaktadr.
* 1 Tokyo niversitesi. Taha Parla, Trkiye'de Siyasal Kltrn Resm Kaynaklar, (cilt 3: Kemalist TekParti deolojisi ve CHP'nin Alt Ok'u). stanbul: letiim, 1992, s. 39-40.

525

ynlanmaya balanm olduunu aklar.6 Ancak yazara gre bu yayn almalar da yeterli deildir. nk bunlar da sadece hkmetin her yaptna zensiz bir hcumla yetinirler, ve "bu suretle de bazen ka yapalm derken gz karlyor" der.7 Szgelimi Ermeni sorununa ilikin Osmanl kamuoyu eletirilir.8 Ferid Bey'e gre sz konusu kamuoyu yle zetlenebilir: Ermeni isyanlar anlamszdr. nk eer neticesinde zerk bir idaresi kurulursa memleketleri Ruslar tarafndan zaptedilecek ve milliyetleri de kaybolacaktr. Eer Osmanl idaresi altnda kalrlarsa Ermenilie dokunulmayacaktr. Bu gre kar Ahmed Ferid Bey, "burada nazarmzdan uzak tuttuumuz bir nokta vardr" der ki o da "evvel birka bin seneden beri yaamakta bulunan bir milliyet ne birka senede ne de birka yz senede ortadan kalkabilir... Saniyen bizde kaybettikleri, dorudan doruya hayat!" Ferid Bey devam ederek "isyan meselesine gelince zulmden ikyeti kimse men edemez." der. Ferid Bey'in gzyle Osmanl Devletinin durumu o kadar kt ki isyan bile reddedilemezdi. Her eyden nce yaplmas gereken, durumu deitirmektir. Durumu deitirmek iin kendilerini deitirmek gerekir. Sadece Anayasann yeniden yrtlmesiyle halkn saadetinin temin edilebileceini inanmayan, ve mazilerini vmekle hele "mdahale ve muavenet"i eletirmekle durumun dzeltilebileceini inanamayan Ahmed Ferid Bey, halkn ilm seviyelerini ykseltmeye almay ve "teebbs-i ahsye say"i vurgular.9 Bylelikle 2 yl nce Paris'te Prens Sabahaddin ve adem-i merkeziyet taraftarlarna kar kan Ferid Bey, mdahale ve teebbs-i ahsi kelimelerini kullanarak ne basit merkeziyetilie ne de kolayc direni hareketine katlabileceini belirtmi ve mparatorluk iinde ulusal hareketi srdren Trk olmayan uyruklara da bir dereceye kadar sempati duyabildiini gstermitir. Ne var ki Ferid Bey de bir Osmanl vatanseverlerinden idi. Mezkr yaznn yaynlanmasyla hemen ayn zamanda Kahire'deki Trk gazetesinde Yusuf Akura'nn " Tarz- Siyaset" makalesi ktktan sonra buna karlk olarak Ali Kemal'in kmseme niteliindeki muhalif yaz-. s ortaya knca Ahmed Ferid Bey arkadan desteklemek iin bir makale hazrlamtr. Geri bu makalede Ferid Bey, Ali Kemal'in gr noktasn tek tek ykmaya alr; fakat sonuta arkadann fikrini de kabul etmeyerek Osmanllarn ittihadn savunmutur. Ferid Bey'e gre, olanakszln Akura tarafndan belirtilen Osmanl milleti siyaseti, yani hakim millete baka milletleri zmlemek siyaseti, Tanzimat'tan beri uygulanmaya allan bir politikadr ve "atiyen pek parlak neticeler va'd etmese de elyevm en sehl'l-ta'kb, en ziyade bir politakadr."10 Elbette ki Ferid
6 7 8 9 10 ibid., s. 3/a-7/b. ibid., s. 3/a-8b. ibid., s. 3/a-9/a. ibid., s. 3/a-10/a-b. Ahmed Ferid, "Bir Mektup", Akuraolu Yusuf, Tarz- Siyaset. stanbul: Matbaai Kader, 1911/12, s. 60.

528

Bey de tm Osmanl snrnn savunulamayacam ve snr iindeki her uyruun Trkletirilemeyeceini anlayabilir, ancak yine de yle der: "Biz tekmil elimizdekini mdafaa ve temsile, siyaset-i Osmaniyeyi ta'kbe hasr- efkr eyleriz."" Bylece Ermenilerilerin ulusal hareketine sempati duyabilen bir aydnn zmleme siyasetini reddetmemesinde Osmanllarn kald zor durum iyice aksedilir. Ancak Ferid Bey fikrini daha da ilerletecektir. III Merutiyetin ilanndan sonra Ahmed Ferid Bey stanbul'a dnp buyandan Mlkiye Mektebi'nde siyasal tarih okutmaya balam, te yandan da ttihad ve Terakki'ye bal Ktahya mebusu olarak Meclisteki faaliyetlerine balamtr. Ancak, bilindii gibi, ttihatlar arasnda gc elinde tutanlar Selanik'teki kadrolar olup Avrupa'da faaliyetlerde bulunan Jn Trkler ise vatanlarna dndlerse de, Dr. Nzm ve Bahaeddin akir dnda, nemli rol oynayamadlar.12 Byle bir ortam iinde Ahmed Rza bile Millet Meclisi bakanln stlenirken de dorusu rafa konmutur. Onun istei zerine Ahmed Ferid Bey de Millet Meclisi baktipliini kabul ettii halde kendi yeteneini tmyle gsterebildii bir durumda bulunmad sylenebilir. te yandan Rza Nur'un yazdna gre Ferid Bey'in o sralarda da yazmaya devam ettii ra-y mmet gazetesi 31 Mart Olay ncesinde ittihatlara kar kanlarn toplad yayn organlarndan biri olmu, ve bu gazetede en ok yaz yaynlananlardan biri de Ferid Bey'mi.13 Bu gazetede kan yazlaryla ilgili olarak ayrntl bilgilerimiz olmad halde Ferid Bey'in ittihatlara zellikle Selanik'teki Merkez-i Umm yelerine yaknlk duymamas muhtemeldir. 31 Mart Olayndan sonraki siyasal hayatnda ise Ferid Bey'in ttihat kadrolarla arasnn daha da ald belli olur. 1909 sonlarnda Mecliste meydana kan Lynch sorunu ve spirtolar Kanunu meselesi zerindeki tartmalarda Ferid Bey, Rza Nur'la birlikte Kabineyi ve arkasndaki ttihat kadrolar eletirmitir.14 Ertesi yl kurulmaya balayan ttihatlar iindeki muhalefet gruplarndan Hizbi Terakki denilen bir topluluk iinde de Ferid Bey'in ad Rza Nur ve 15 Rza Tevfik'inkinin yannda grnr. Bu yln ilkbaharnda Arnavutluk'ta patlayan isyan zerine Ahmed Ferid Bey, Arnavut milletvekilleriyle birlikte hkmetin bask politikas16 n eletirmitir. Hseyin Cahid'in yazdna gre bu sralarda Ahmed
11 12 13 14 ibid., s. 63. Erik Jan Zrcher, Turkey: A Modern History. London: I. B. Tauris, 1993, s. 98. Dr. Rza Nur, Hayat ve Hatratm, cilt 2, stanbul: Altnda, 1967, s. 294. Tank Zafer Tunaya, Trkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, cilt 3, stanbul: Hrriyet Vakf, 1989, s. 61-63. 15 ibid, cilt 1, stanbul: Hrriyet Vakf, 1984, s. 31. 16 ibid, s. 541-542.

529

Ferid Bey Balkanlar durumu ile ilgili olarak dikkate deer szler etmitir. yle demi: "Bizi nasl olsa Rumeli'den kovacaklar. Oradan atlacamza kendiliimizden brakarak Anadolu'da toplansak daha iyi olmaz m?"17 Ayrca Ferid Bey Balkan Harbi'nden sonra bakentin Anadolu'ya naklini savunmu, ve seenek olarak Kayseri'yi gstermitir.18 Bylece Ferid Bey, Trk olmayan Osmanl uyruklarna olan basklar eletirip Osmanl Devleti'nden ayrlmak isteyenleri geri getirmeye almaktansa bir Trk Devleti iin aba harcamak istemi gibi grnr. Bir Trk milliyetisi olarak Ferid Bey, 1911 Kasmnda kurulmu ve daha nce kendisiyle birlikte ttihatlar eletirenlerin de iinde nemli roller oynadklar Hrriyet ve tilaf Frkas'na katlmam ve 1912 yl Temmuz aynda kendi frka kurmutur. kinci Merutiyet dnemindeki ilk milliyeti-Trk parti saylan ve dolaysyla Hrriyet ve tilafllar tarafndan "fahi bir hata" ve "tehlikeli bir oyun" diye nitelendirilen bu frka,19 adn Mill Merutiyet Frkas olarak belirtilip Arap lkeleriyle Arnavutluk ve Rumeli'de "temsil-i mill ve tevhid-i ansr" politikalarndan vazgetiini aka duyurduu iin Yusuf Akura tarafndan vlmtr.20 imdi arkada Akura'nn milliyeti fikriyle Ferid Bey'in dncesi arasndaki farka geip Atatrklk prensiplerinden Milliyetilik ilkesinin bir ncs olarak Ahmed Ferid Bey'in fikrinin nemini gstermeye alacaz. 1914 ylnda yaynlanan Nevsal-i Mill adl bir kitap iin yazd ve 'Trk Oca: Gen Ocaklya' baln koyduu yazsnda Ahmed Ferid Bey, nce Osmanlln temelini destekleyen unsurun, Habsburg mparatorluundaki Almanlar gibi, Anadolu Trkl olduunu tespit edip Trk Oca'nn belirledii hedefi ver.21 Ancak sonra Ferid Bey, "keskin kl kullananlar yanl hamlelerden saknmaldrlar" diyerek Ocakllara faaliyetini snrlamak ister.22 Gerekten Ferid Bey, milliyetiliin baka milletleri yaralayabildiim anlayan bir milliyetiydi. Bu yzden genlere syle tavsiye eder: "hayalperverlikle birden Bahreyn ve Ken'an'a, ran ve Turan'a uuvermemelidir"23 Ad geen yerler Arap lkeleriyle mparatorluk dndaki Trk lkelerini temsil eder. u halde buralara kar Osmanl Trklerinin davranlar nasl olmaldr? Ferid Bey yle demekle ak bir cevap verir: "Filhakika hayalin zarif kanatlarna binerek Arap badiyelerinde dolamaktan ne fayda kar? Osmanl politikasnn bu yanl ilhamndan artk tamamen itinap etmeliyiz. nk kanl misallerle kanl
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ibid., s. 524; cilt 3, s. 462. ibid., s. 482. ibid., cilt 1, s. 353. A.Y., "Tanzimatlk Aleyhine", Trk Yurdu, cilt 3, say 11, 1913, s. 350. Ahmed Ferid, "Trk Oca: Gen Ocaklya," Nevsal-i Mill, s. 188-189. ibid., s. 189. ibid.

530

ilde grdk: az tama bize ok ziyan getirdi. Binaenaleyh Trk, yine kaybetmemek isterse, Arab'n bu necip slm kardeinin hakik ve samim bir dostu olmal ve Halep-Kerkk hadd-i kavmsine dindrne riayet ederek faaliyet-i milliyesini bu hududun umaline hasretmelidir."24 Turan sorununa gelince de: "Hudutlarn berisinde, milletler beyninde byle ise, hudutlarn tesinde devletler arasnda evleviyetle byle olmak lzmdr... Turan hayali, bugn bir hayal-i mahal olmasna ramen Moskof siyasetini bilzum tahvif ve tevik eyler."25 der. Ferid Bey'e gre: "Trk mefkuresi galip gelmek iin dahil ve haric siyasetinde itidal ve tedbiri kendine rehber etmelidir."26 Ona gre korunmas gereken vatan, nce "Trk ili hududunun demir kazklan" sayd Edirne, Rize, Rodos, ve Sleymaniye ierisindeki topraktr.27 u kadar ki daha da nemlisi bu toprak iinde de Araplara gsterilecek olan itidal ve tedbirin ayns istenilmektir. Yine Ferid Bey'in dediine gre: "Trkln u mlk-i mahsusunda bile bi-perva yrmekliimize ihtimal yoktur. Buralarda da yine mutedil, ihtiyatperver, ve hatta lzmunda kalbimiz szlayarak, fedakar olmak mecburiyetindeyiz. Krtlere, ba-husus Ermenilere, bize kar akal-i kall olan u kavim ve bu millete kar da bugn iltizam- cebir ve iddete deil, belki ihsn- imtiyaz ve fevaide mftakir bulunuyoruz."28 Artk sylemeye gerek yok ki Ahmed Ferid Bey terakki fikriyle birlikte milliyetiliin insaniyet iin en salam ve gerekli ilke olduu inanlan bir dnemde bu fikrin yaran olduu kadar keskin kl diye nitelendirilecek bir zellii de kavrayan bir kiiydi; ve bu yzden "yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh" diyen Atatrk'r savunduu Milliyetilik ilkesinin gerek bir ncs olduu da kukusuzdur.

24 25 26 27 28

ibid., s. 189-190. ibid., s. 190. ibid., s. 189. ibid., s. 189-190 ibid., s. 190.

531

ATATRK TRKYES LE ROMANYA ARASINDAK DPLOMATK LKLERE TOPLU BR BAKI

Prof. Mehmet Ali EKREM* Byk nder, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, Trk ulusunun "terakki ve hrriyetine hizmet salayan bir Dehadr"1. Daha sonra milli kurtuluunu gerekletiren ve bamsz Trk devletini salayan, modern Trkiye'yi kuran muazzam bir ahsiyettir. Sunacamz bildiri Atatrk Cumhuriyetinde, Trkiye ile Romanya arasnda diplomatik ilikilere toplu bir bak konulu i ve d kaynaklara dayanyor. 1918-1944 devresindeki, 26 yl kapsayan, yalnz zetini, ok ynl ilikileri kaleme alnyor. 'Trkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Byk Romanya arasndaki balarn evrimi" "Balkan Antant dahilinde Romen-Trk mnesebetleri" baln tayor. Romanya Babakanlk Arivlerinden, Romanya Dileri Bakanl Arivlerinden, Romen Merkezi Devlet Arivlerinden, Milli Bilim Akademisi Ktphanesinden toplanan belgelerden, Romanya ve Trkiye'de yaynlanan sz konusu devrenin incelendii tarihi kitaplardan, dergilerden ve yabanc dillerde kan kitap ve dergilerden kaynaklanyor. Hatrlanan yllarda Trk-Romen ilikileri, her alanda, kayda deer gelime kaydetti. Bu tr gelimenin balca nedenleri iki lke arasnda toprak ihtilaf gibi sorunlarn bulunmamasdr. Atatrk'n "Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh" ilkesine dayanan Trk devletinin d siyasette de temkinli, iyi niyet ve anlayl davran, iki dnya arasnda bagsteren talyan ve Alman faist rejimlerinin ve orta ve
* 1. Bkre. "MLLYET": E. Pitard, "A' Travers 1' Asie Mineurs: Le vissage Nueveau de la Turquie". Paris. 1934, s.63.

533

gney-dou Avrupada balayan toprak revizionism tehlikesine kar ortak gvenlii salamak ihtiyac gsterilmektedir. Aralk 1918 ylnda birlemi, hr ve bamsz Romen devleti kurulmutur. Bu devlet tarihte Byk Romanya ismiyle de anlmaktadr. O devrin Romen hkmeti ulat yeni milli hudutlarn muhafaza edebilmesi iin Orta,-gney-dou Avrupadaki devletlerle ve dier Avrupa devletleri ile ortak gvenlii ama tutan siyasi ve askeri ittifak teebbslerine girimitir. Trkiye'nin durumuna gelince, birinci dnya harbinin yaratt vahim neticelerden tr revizionist lkeler saflarna kolayca kayabilirdi. nk birinci dnya harbi Trk ulusunun geni topraklarn kaybetmesine neden olmutur. Fakat byle olmad. D politikada da tpk i politikada olduu gibi, salam gerekilie dayanan Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, milli Kurtulu harbi yolu ile izilen milli hudutlarn tesine gemeyi hi bir zaman dnmedi. Bu prensip ruhunda d politika yrten Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, bata komu devletler olmak zere tm devletlerle dostluk ilikileri kurdu. Atatrk'n gtt bu d siyaset ve o yllarda Romen dileri bakan grevinde bulunan, sekin diplomat Nikolaie Titulesku'nun kk Antant gletirmek siyasetine paralel olarak Balkan lkeleri arasndaki ilikilerini pekletirmek, bu blgede bar muhafaza etmek ynnde giritii siyaset iki lkenin, d siyaset sahasnda ibirlii yapmalarna elverili zemini hazrlamt. ki komu devlet Balkan Antenti'nin kurulmasnda (1944) "Tarafszlar Antentinin kurulmas denemelerinde ve bylece d saldrlarn nlenmesi urunda blgevi ortak gvenliin salanmas hususunda ibirlii yapmlardr". kili ibirlii ve ilikilere gelince, Birinci Dnya Harbi dolays ile kesilen Trk-Romen ilikileri 1923 ylnda, Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin kuruluundan birka ay nce yeniden tesis edilmitir. Romanya'nn Trkiye Cumhuriyeti ile iki dnya harbi arasndaki ilikilerinin en nemli dayanan 12 Ekim 1933 ylnda Ankarada imzalanan Dostluk, saldrmazlk, arbitraj ve uzlama pakt ve 9 ubat 1934 te Atinada aktedilen Balkan Pakt tekil etmitir. Diplomatik ilikiler yeniden kurulduktan sonra iki komu lke arasndaki siyasi, ekonomik ve kltrel temaslar artm, eitli seviyelerde karlkl ziyaretler younlamtr. Trk-Roman ilikilerinin olumlu gelimesi Romanya'daki Trk aznl iin de hayrl olmutur. Trkiye devleti, hele Trkiye'nin o devirdeki Bkre bykelisi Abdullah Suphi Tanrver'in olumlu tutumlar ve dik534

katli davranlar ve srarlar sayesinde bu cemaatin siyasi, milli ve kltrel haklara riayet politikas hissedilir derecede fazlalamtr. Milli kltrleri gelimitir. Ayrca, Romanya'da Trk cemaatinin Atatrk'n ynettii Milli Kurtulu harbine ve daha sonra Trkiye Cumhuriyetindeki gerekletirdii devrimleri modern Romanya seviyesine ulatrmtr. zetini ksaca takdim ettiimiz bu bildiride Trkiye'nin milli kurtulu sava ve Romen "kamuoyu" blmnde milli kurtulu savann Romanya'da uyandrd geni yanklar, Romen devletinin Lapsanne Lausanne (Lozan) konferansndaci tutumu Trkiye devleti iin hayati nem tayan bu almalar esnasnda iki lke delegeleri arasnda bazen iyi ve bazen souk mnasebetler kaleme alnyor" deniliyor. Montreux konferans'nn hazrlanmas ve cereyan Trk-Romen ilikilerinde dier nemli bir an tekil etmitir. almalarda Romanya'y temsil eden dileri bakan Nikolae Titulesku' Trkiye'nin karlarn ve tutumunu desteklemitir. Montreux konferansna ve konferans esnasnda iki devlet heyetleri arasndaki temaslara ve ibirlii ve konferans ncesi Trkiye'nin giritii hazrlayc mahiyetteki diplomatik faaliyete zel bir ilgi hasredilmitir. 1936 ylndan itibaren Trkiye ile Romanya arasnda aktedilen ekonomik ve ticari ilikilere ve bunlar arasnda yer alan trafik anlamasna giriildi. Mareal Fevzi akmak'in 1936 ylnda Romanya'y gezisi ve bu vesile ile yaplan askeri ilikiler, mzekereler ve daha sonra gerekletirilen "l" ve "drtl" askeri antlamalarn gerekletirilmesi kararlatrld. 1947 ylnda zamamn Romen dileri bakan Viktor Antenesku Ankara'y gezdi ve bu vesile ile nemli anlamalar aktedildi. Hemen unu ilave etmek gerek ki Atatrk'n 1938 de vefat etmesi Romanya'da olduu gibi btn dnyada da znt yaratt. Hele Dobruca 2 halk bu haberi znt ile mahalli gazetelerde kamuoyuna duyurdu . Atatrk'n lmnden sonra Trkiye ve Romanya arasndaki mnasebetlerin seyri Trkiye'nin yeni Cumhurbakan smet nn'nn ynetmenliinde Trk d siyasetinin Atatrk'n izinde gelitii bildirilerek, Balkan Pakt ile ilgili Trk ve Romen ilikileri zerinde duruluyor. Bu alanda, Cumhurbakan smet nn'nn "Balkan Pakt'nn" nemi gittike artyor, milli bamszlnn korunmas, Balkan lkeleri arasndaki balarn devaml ekilde peklemesinin zorunlu olduu vurgulanyor. "Trkiye hkmeti bu yolda hareket etmi ve edecektir", szleri ile Balkanlarla ilgili Trk siyaseti ifade ediliyor.
2. "Trk Birlii", 13 Terinevel, 1934.

535

O dnemde Romanya'da Trkiye'yi temsil eden Suphi Tannverin btn ve bilhassa Dobruca Trkleri arasnda ok derin bir sevgi ve hrmetle anldn syledikten sonra, unlar ilave etti: "Tarihin, pek byk tarihisi, edip ve diplomat olarak, kaydedecei Suphi Tanrver'in her vesile ile Romanya hakknda syledii ve yazd tevecch ve sevgi dolu szleri, her zaman kalbimizi kendilerine kar minnet ve kranla arptrmaktadr"3. "Trk Birlii" gazetesinde 29 Haziran 1939 da yaynlanan saysnda unlar kaytldr: "Bu mesud haber Romanya'da, bilhassa Romanya Trkleri arasnda ok sevinli tesirler brakt. Memleketimize ayak bast gnden beri Trkiye'nin sadk dostu Romanya'da yaayan Trklerin itimai ve kltrel durumlar ile yakndan alkadar olarak Dobruca Trklerinin ebedi minnettarln kazandran, iyiliklerde bulunmutur". Yalnz Romanya'da yaayan Trkler arasnda deil, Romen kamuoyunda da Atatrk'n simas Romanya'da bir sembol eklini almtr. Romanya'nn murahhaslarndan ve ayan azalarndan bay Floresku'nn u szleri zikir etmeden geemiyeceim: "Asrlardan beri, Romen milletinin Trk milletine kar olan hissiatnn bir tercman olan szlerini, u tarihi hadiseyi anarak belirtiyor: Romanyann en byk voyvodu Stefan el MARE, lm deinde yatyordu. Etrafndakiler byk bir endie ile Ona sordular: - Sen lrsen Meldevann istikbli ne olacak? Byk voyvoda tereddtsz u cevab veriyor: - Btn milletlerin en drst Trk milletidir. Onun dostluuna gvenebilirsiniz"5. Trk-Romen ilikilerinde nemli bir konuyu Romanya'dan getirilecek gmenler oluturuyordu. Gmenler hakkndaki meseleleri grmek zere ileri bakan, zamann sorumlusu B. kr Yaya'nn bakanlnda Bkre elimiz ve dileri bakanlk genel sekreteri Numan Menemenolu ve ynetim bakan hazr bulundular. Bu vesile ile bir takm kararlar alnd. "Tan" gazetesi ayn vesileye hasrettii yazda unlar kaytldr: "Romanya hkmeti ile gmen ileri zerine yaplan mzakereler tam bir anlama ile sona erdi. Bundan sonra Romanya'dan yurdumuza g edecek muhacirler eskisi gibi btn emlaklarn ve ilerini tasfiyeye mecbur kalmayacaklardr. Gmek istiyenlerin emlaki Trk ve Romen azalarndan teekkl edecek bir komisyon tarafndan tesbit edilecek ve bunlarn kymetlerini bildiren makbuzlar verilecektir"6.
3. 4. 5. 6. "Trk Birlii", Birinci terin. "Trk Birlii", 29 Haziran, 1939. "Trk Birlii", 13 Terin evel. "Tan", 24 Ocak, 1936.

536

Trk-Romen ilikilerinin dier bir konusu u olmutur: Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Bkre elisi Suphi Tanrver, Romanya kltr bakanl nezdinde yapt teebbs zerine, Romanya'da yaayan gagavuz ocuklarnn Trke okuyabilmeleri iin msade edilmitir. Bunlardan biri Kavarna kasabasnda ve dierleri de Basarabya'daki (imdi Moldova) Uzun adr ve Komrat kasabalarnda bulunan Trk retmenleri tarafndan verilen ders okuyorlar. Ksaca takdim ettiimiz "ki dnya sava arasnda Trk-Romen ilikileri", balkl bildiride devaml unlar ifade ediliyor: "Mareal Antonesku hkmeti, hele harbin balangcnda, Trkiye'yi Mihver devletler saflarnda yer almas denemelerine, bu alanda basklarna ramen, iki lke arasndaki dostluk ilikileri kesilmemitir. Bilakis, Trk-Romen diplomatik ilikileri, hele bykeli Hamdullah Suphi Tannverin Mareal ton Antonesku ve Mihai Antonesku ile ikili temaslar eklinde, youn ekilde srdrlmtr."7 Hele Mihai Antonesku Trkiye'nin Bkre sefirine, Trk hudutlar gvenliini ilgilendiren Balkanlardaki Alman hareketlerine ve durumlarna dair bilgi vermitir, ikili temaslar esnasnda. Ayn vesilelerle Mihai Antonesku Trk hkmetinin "harb d" siyasetine kar takdirlerini de ifade etmekten ekinmemitir. O yllarn Romen yneticileri, hele 1943 ylnn sonuna doru ve 1944 ylnda, Trk hkmeti aracl ile mttefik gler ile ayr bar denemelerinde bulunmulardr. Antonesku iktidar yllarnda Trkiye ile Romanya arasnda birka ticari ve ekonomik antlama da aktedilmitir. "Vatan", "Tanin", "Haber" ve dier gazetelerden aktarlan makalelerle Trk kamuoyunun Romen ulusunun geleceine gsterdii kayg ve romen devletinin ayakta kalmasnn Balkan devletleri camias iin nemi, Hitler aleyhtar koalision devletler ile Romanya arasnda yaplan antlamalara titizlikle riayet edilmesi, Romanya'nn, bizzat kararlatrd yolda gelimesine baldr. Daha sonra vukua gelen durum bellidir. 1944 te Sovyet igalinden sonra Romanya'da komnist rejimi kurulmu ve bu lke bu ynde gelimeye balamtr.

7.

"Trk Birlii", 29 Haziran, 1939.

537

ATATRK VE MAKEDONYA TURKLUGU

Prof. Dr. Yusuf HAMZA* Sayn Bakan, Sayn Bakanlk Divan, Sayn Sempozyum yeleri, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti'nin Kuruluunun 75. Yldnm mnasebetiyle dzenlenen "Atatrklk ve Modern Trkiye" konulu uluslararas bu sempozyuma Makedonya Trkleri'ni temsilen bana da katlma frsat veren Atatrk Kltr, Dil ve Tarih Yksek Kurumu ve Atatrk Aratrma Merkezi'ne Makedonya Trkleri ve ahsm adna teekkr ediyor, sizleri sayglarmla ve basan dileklerimle selmlyorum. Bugn sunacam bildirinin konusu "Atatrk ve Makedonya Trkl"dr. 18 sayfadan, 40 dipnottan ve 33 bibliyografik nottan oluan bu bildiriyi hazrlarken en ok Trk, Makedon, Bulgar, Srp, Hrvat, ingiliz vd. kaynaklardan faydalandm. Efendim, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, "Trk tarihi bir btndr. Bu yzden bir btn olarak aratrlmal, incelenmeli ve okutulmaldr" diyordu. Ancak bize, Makedonya'da yaayan Trkler'e maalesef mill tarihimizi bir btn olarak okutmadlar, aratrmamza ve incelememize izin vermediler. Bize bu uzun ve zengin tarihin sadece Osmanl dnemini istedikleri gibi okuttular. Osmanl ncesi Trk ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihinin, Trkln, Atatrk ve Atatrkln okutulmasn istediimiz andan 1 itibaren eitli basklara maruz kalyorduk .
Pedagoji Fakltesi, skp. 1994 ylnda bir Trk bilim adam ve eitimcisi olarak Makedonya Eitim Bakanl tarafndan kurulan Trk, Makedon ve Arnavut ilkokullar ve liseleri iin Tarih Dersi Program Hazrlama Komisyonu'na ye olarak alnmtm. Ancak, Komisyon almalar srasnda Trk tarihinin balangcndan gnmze kadar bir btn olarak okutulmasn, aratrlmasn ve incelenmesini ve bu dorultuda programn dzenlenmesini istediimden tr, ad geen bakanlk bu komisyonu datt ve yeni kurduu komisyona beni ye olarak almad. Yeni komisyon Osmanl ncesi Trk tarihine yer vermeden tarih dersi programn hazrlad. Bkz.: Gayur eh, Zaman ve Hatra.-Hill (skp). Yl: X(1997). Say: 86/87. Sayfa: 2.

539

Kk bir Balkan lkesi olan Makedonya'nn yzlm 67741 kitf'dir. Ancak, bu blge Balkan Savalar'nn neticesinde imzalanm Bkre Muahedesi'yle Bulgaristan, Srbistan ve Yunanistan arasnda paylald. Bu paylamla Makedonya'nn % 14' Bulgaristan'a % 33' Srbistan'a ve % 53' Yunanistan'a verildi. Makedonya adnn lirler'den kalma bir kelime olduu sylenmektedir2. Makedonya, 1991 ylnda Sloven-Srp ve Srp-Hrvat Sava'yla tasfiye edilmeye balayan Yugoslavya'dan savasz ayrlmay baararak 8 Eyll 1991'de tam bamszln iln etti ve Makedonya Cumhuriyeti adyla 8 Nisan 1993 ylnda Birlemi Milletler Tekilat'na kabul edildi. Makedonya'ya tarih boyunca eitli kavimler yerleti. Bunlar arasnda 378 ylndan itibaren Orta Asya'dan Karadeniz'in kuzeyine ve oradan Avrupa'ya ve Balkan Yarmadas'nn en gney noktasna kadar inen Hun Trkleri de bulunuyordu. Bu Trk boyunun Makedonya'ya ayak basmasyla bu blgede Trklk balad. Bu Trkln bugn tam 1620 yllk bir gemii vardr. Ancak, 1620 yllk bu uzun dnemi imdiye kadar bilim messeselerimizin olmay veya faaliyette bulunan Makedon bilim messeselerinde Trk bilim adamlarnn bulunmay yznden aratramamzdr. 1980'lerden sonra yaptmz baz ksm aratrmalarla Makedonya Trk biliminde hissedilen ihtiyac karlamaya, varolan boluu doldurmaya, ak ve tutarsz olan baz Makedon, Arnavut, Sup, Bulgar, Yunan vd. Balkanllarn bilim tezlerine cevap vermeye veya onlar rtmeye altk. Bu srada, Osmanl ncesi Makedonya, Srbistan, Hrvatistan ve Bulgaristan Trkl dahilinde Hun, Avar, Bulgar, Vardar, Ouz (Uz), Peenek, Kuman", Seluklu ve Osmanl Trkleri'nden Makedonya'da ve Balkan Yarmadas'nn dier yerlerinde kalan madd kltr izlerini deerlendirmeye altk3. Bu izlerin az Hun, Avar, Bulgar, Vardar, Ouz, Peenek, Kuman ve Seluklu, ou ise Osmanl Trkleri'nden kalmtr. Bu Trk izleri en ok Balkan unsurlarnn dillerinde, kltrlerinde, antroponim, hidronim, toponim vd. nitelik ve deerlerinde hatt fizyono4 milerinde bile grlmektedir . Osmanl Trkleri'nden nce Makedonya'ya ve Balkan Yarmadas'nn dier yerlerine iskn eden Trk kavimleri, bu topraklarn tarihinde ok nemli rol oynadlar. Bu topraklarda yeni bir medeniyet r atlar. Yaptklar byk ilerle ad geen yarmadann sosyo-etnik yapsn, olaylarn ve tarih aknn ynn ve kaderini deitirdiler. Onlar, bu topraklarda attklar Roma, Bizans, lir, Gepid, Longobard, Slav vd. kavimle2. 3. 4. Bkz.: Anastas Totev, Edna analogiya vo istoriyata na makedonskiot narod vo 1913 g.-Makedonski pregled (Sofya). God. IV (1992) Kn. 4, 100. Bkz.: Yusuf Hamza, Osmanl Dneminden Makedonya'da Kalan Trk zleri. - Trk Osmanl De Dnyas Tarih Dergisi (stanbul). Yl: 1997. Say: 129, 17-18. bidem, 17-18. Bu konu hakknda daha geni bilgiler iin bkz.: Yusuf Hamza, Osmanl ncesi Srbistan Trkl (I-V). Be blmden tefrika. - Trk Dnyas Tarih Dergisi (stanbul). Yl: 1997. Say: 130, 27-28; Say: 131, 20-21; Say: 132, 24-26; Yl: 1998. Say: 133, 42-44; Say: 134, 18-20.

540

rin kltrlerinden stn gelerek, bu kavimleri sosyo-ekonomik ve kltrel adan etkilediler. Onlara her bakmdan hocalk, rehberlik yaptlar. Balkan Yarmadas'na slm Dini'ni getirdiler5. Ancak, Orta Asya'dan Karadeniz'in kuzeyine ve oradan Balkan Yarmadas'na yeni Trk kafilelerinin gelmeyii yznden 378-1371 yllan arasnda bu topraklarda kalan Trkler, yan yana yaadklar Slavlara, Macarlara, Romenlere, arnavutlara, alnanlara, Rumlara vd. kyasen aznlkta kalarak, bu milletlerin dillerini ve dinlerini kabul etmek mecburiyetinde kaldlar. Onlar arasnda eriyip kayboldular. Ancak, sz konusu Trk kavimlerinden kalan baz gruplar Seluklu ve Osmanl Trkleri'nin Balkan Yarmadas'na gelmesine kadar Trke konutular, din yinlerini Trke yaptlar. Edebiyatlar, sanatlar, folklorlar, mzik folklorlar vd. nitelik ve deerleri vard6. Grld gibi Osmanl'dan nceki Trkler, yerli Hristiyanlar arasnda dank halde yaamalarna ramen mill nitelik ve deerlerini, baka bir syleyile Trklklerini korudular. Onlar 1292, 1336 ve 1362 ylndan sonra Makedonya'y ve dier Balkan topraklann fethetmeye balayan Seluklu ve Osmanl Trkleri'ne katlarak, Balkan unsurlarna kar savatlar. Osmanl Trkleri'nin Balkan ve Avrupa topraklarnda hzl ilerlemesine ve iskn etmesine yardmc oldular. Balkan Trkl'nn yaamasnda ok byk katklar oldu. 1371-1912 yllan arasnda Osmanl Devleti'nin Balkan Yarmadas'nda kalmas iin zemin hazrladlar. Sz konusu topraklar orduyla fetheden Osmanl Trkleri ise eski Trk kavimlerinden kalan ve Anadolu'nun deiik yerlerinden getirilen binlerce Trk ailesiyle 550 yl uzun bir sre ierisinde olduka baarl bir ekilde idare ettiler. Onlar bu dnemde Balkan Yarmadas'nn etnik yapsn milletimizin lehine deitirdiler. Bu dnemde Sava ve Tuna'nn gneyinde bulunan topraklarn nfusunun % 50'sinden fazlasn Trkler ve dier Mslman milletler oluturuyordu7. Osmanl Trkleri Avrupa ve Balkan tarih biliminin ne srd gibi Avrupa ve Balkan topraklanna istilc olarak deil, kurtarc olarak geldiler8, ite bu kurtarclar arasnda Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n de atalar bu5. Tuna Bulgar Trkleri 832-862 yllar arasnda din tercihini yaparken, slm ile Hristiyanlk arasnda hangi dini seeceklerinin tereddt ierisindeydiler. Ancak slm Dini'nin corafi uzakl ve Balkan Yarmadas'ndaki zayf etkisi yznden, komulukta olan Bizans'n insafsz basksna maruz kalan Tuna Bulgar Trkleri Ortodoksluu kabul etmek mecburiyetinde kaldlar. Bkz.: Yusuf Hamza, Makedonya'da Trk Eitimi. Osmanl'dan nceki Dnem. - Hill (skp). Kasm Aralk 1997, 7. Makedonya'da bugn bu Trk boylarndan kalan edeb rnlere ve zellikle baz efsanelere rastlanmaktadr. Bu yllarda Makedonya'nn skp, Selanik, Manastr, Kavala, Serez, Drama, Kprl, Akehir, yenicevardar, doyran, koana, Itip, Kalkandelen, Gostivar... vd., Srbistan'n Belgrad, Semendire, Ni, Leskova, Vranye, Talca, Pirot, Ujitse, Kurunlu... vd., Kosova'nn Prizren, Pritine, Gillan... vd., Bulgaristan'n Sofya, Filibe, Rusuk, Plevne, Silistre... vb., Bosna'nn Sarayova, Mostar, Banyaluka, Tuzla, Zenitsa, Dervent; Doboy... vb. hatt Hrvatistan'n Osiyek bile bir Trk ehriydi. Osmanl Trkleri Balkan Yarmadas'na gelmeden evvel bu yarmadada yaayan halk kendi idarecilerinden ve din adamlarndan ok byk eziyet gryordu. Bu yzden,

6. 7.

8.

541

lunuyordu. Atatrk bu gerei "Benim atalarm Anadolu'dan Rumeli'ye gelmi Yrk Trkleri'ndendir"9 szleriyle dile getiriyordu. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n doduu yllarda Makedonya vilyetten ibaretti. Bu Trk blgesinin ok kark etnik ve din yaps vard. Bu yllarda Makedonya nfusunun byk ounluunu Trkler oluturuyordu10. Byle olmasna ramen, komu Balkan devletleri Bulgaristan, Srbistan, Yunanistan, Romanya ve bu blgede yaayan aznlklar Makedonya'da yaayan Trkleri imha etmeye alyorlard. Bu dorultuda siyas ve terr eylemleri dzenleyerek, 1878-1912 yllan arasnda bu Trk blgesini Avrupa'nn yanardana dntrdler. Makedonya'da yaayan aznlklar ise Osmanl Trk Vatan'nn yerine Makedonlar, Bulgaristan', Srbistan', Yunanistan' ve Rusya'y; Bulgarlar, Bulgaristan' ve Rusya'y; Suplar, Srbistan' ve Rusya'y; Rumlar, Yunanistan'; Ulahlar, Romanya'y ve Yunanistan'; Arnavutlar kurmaya altklar Arnavutluk'u; Yahudiler ise Filistin'de kurmaya altklar israil'i dnyorlard. Trk Vatan'n Trk'ten baka dnen yoktu. Bu yzden ktada topraklar olan Osmanl Devleti'nin birlik ve btnlnn korunmas sadece Trk milletinin omuzlarna kalmt. Ancak, ayn anda onlarca isyann bastrlmasna, sk sk Rusya, Srbistan, Yunanistan vd. Balkan Hristiyanlaryla sava halinde olan ve binlerce ehit veren Trk milletinin nfusu gnden gne azalyordu. Bu yllarda Osmanl Devleti'nde Trkler'in nfus art % 8.8 iken, Bulgarlarn nfus art % 21.4 idi11. Grld gibi Avrupa, Rumeli Trkl'n bu ekilde imha etmeye alyordu. XIX. ve XX. asrda genellikle isyanlar ve savalar Osmanl Devleti'nin avrupa kesiminde kyordu12. Bu isyanlarn bastrlmasna ve savalara sadecee Trkler katlyordu. Avrupa gayet planl bir ekilde nce Balkan, daha sonra ise Anadolu Trkln13 imha ederek "Dou Sorunu"na zm getirmeye alyordu. Bu yzden 1804-1912 yllan arasnda Rumeli'de kartt isyan ve savalarla, zellikle 1875-1878 Byk Dou Bunalm ve 1912/13 Balkan Savalan'yla Makedonya'da
bu halk, Osmanl Trkleri'ne kurtarc gzyle bakt. Balkan halk, Osmanl idaresinden hi bir bask grmeden, gnll olarak slm' kabul etti. ok dil bir messese olan Osmanl Devleti'nde be buuk asr huzur ve gvence iinde yaad. Bkz.: edomir Mitrinovi, Nai Muslimani. Sarayevo 1926, 27; Svetozar Markovi, Sirbiya na istoku. Beograd 1926, 17; Hugh Seton - Watson, Nacije i drjave. Zagreb Globun 1980, 149. Bkz.: Makbule Atadan, Byk Kardeim Atatrk. - Yeni stanbul, 1 Kasm 1952 - 22 Mart 1953 tarihleri arasnda tefrika halinde kan anlar. Ayn: Atatrk Ansiklopedisi 1881-1908. Cilt: 1. Hazrlayan: mer Sami Coar. stanbul, Doan Karde Matbaaclk Sanayii A.., 1973, 14. Bkz.: K. Gersin, Macedonien und das turkische Problem. Wien 1903, 24. tbid., 24. 1804 ve 1813 Srp, 1821 Yunan, 1856 Romen, 1875 Bosna Srp, 1876 Bulgar, 1878 Makedon Kresna, 1903 Makedon Kuova, 1909-1912 yllar arasnda Arnavut vd. isyanlar kmt. 1876 Trk-Srp, 1877/78 Trk-Rus, 1897 Trk-Yunan, 1911 TrkItalyan ve 1912 Birinci Balkan Sava kmt. Anadolu Trkl'n Birinci Dnya Sava ve Trk stikll Sava yllarnda imha etmeye alt.

9.

10. 11. 12.

13.

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dahil olmak zere Rumeli Trkl'ne byk darbe indirmeye muvaffak oldu. Bu savalar srasnda yzbinlerce Trk katledildi, evinden oldu, mal mlk gaspedildi. Bylece, Avrupa, sz konusu savalarla, Balkan Yarmadas'nn etnik ve din yapsm Hristiyanlarn lehine deitirmeye alt. Ancak, istedii amaca ulaamad. nk Balkan Savalar'ndan sonra da ad geen yarmadann Tuna ve Sava rnaklannn gneyinde bulunan topraklarda kalan Trkler'in Mslman Arnavutlar'n ve Bonaklar'in says Hristiyan unsurlarn saysndan daha oktu. Bu yzden Avrupa ve Balkan devletleri ittifak kurarak Balkan Yanmadas'n Trkler'den temizlemek iin kinci Dnya Sava ve bu savatan sonraki yllarda totaliter rejimlerle14 ve 1992-1995 yllar arasnda sren Bosna Sava'yla temizlemeye altlar. imdi ise bu devletler bir de Kosova Sava'n balattlar. Mustafa Kemal 1881 ylnda Selanik'te dodu. lk, orta ve yksek asker eitim ve renimini Selanik, Manastr ve stanbul'da grd. Yaad ve eitim grd yerlerde dnemin olaylaryla ve sorunlaryla, oralarda yaayanlarla, zellikle aznlklarn gsterdikleri faaliyetlerle ilgileniyordu. Onlar yakndan tanmaya alyordu. Onlarn Trkle kar besledikleri dmanlk duygularn, Osmanl Devleti'ni ve Trk milletini nasl imha etmeye ve Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya nasl atmaya altklarn grd. Bu durum O'nu ok dndryordu ve ok zyordu. Ancak, O, Makedonya ve Rumeli Trkl konusunda karamsar deildi. O, byk Trk dmanlannn erge bir gn Osmanl Devleti'ne ve Trk milletine kar taarruza geeceklerini ok iyi biliyordu. Balkan Savalan'yla balayan bu taarruzu nlemek iin elinden geleni yapmaya alt. Devlet yetkililerine fikirlerini syledi. Ancak, onlar, Mustafa Kemal'i dinlemediler. Bu yzden, O'nun Balkan faciasnn neticesinde kaybolan Rumeli hakknda sk sk "Ben iin banda olsaydm Rumeli elden kmazd"15 dedii bilinmektedir. Mustafa Kemal, Makedonya ve Rumeli Trkl'nn ok zor artlar altnda ayakta durabileceine inanyordu. Trk milletinin dmanlannn 16 sayca ok olduunu bildii iin Makedonya ve Balkan Trkl'nn hayatta kalabilmesi iin ok alt. Bu almalar zellikle 1913 ylnda merkezi Sofya'da olmak zere Sofya, Belgrad ve Tsetinye Ataemiliterli14. Yugoslavya, uygulad din, eitim, kltr, ekonomik vd. basklarla 1953-1990 yllar arasnda 296 bin Trkn Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne g etmesine sebep oldu. Bulgaristan 1944-1989 yllar arasnda yzbinlerce Trkn Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne zorla g etmesini az bularak kalan iki buuk milyon Trkn adlarm ve dinlerini deitirme yoluna gitti. Yunanistan, Romanya ve Arnavutluk da ayn metodlan kullandlar. 15. Bkz.: Yusuf Hamza, Osmanl mparatorluu'nda II. Merutiyet'in ln. skp, Logos - A 1995, 292, (Dipnot No: 924). 16. Trk milletinin ve Trkln tarih boyunca ve bugn en byk dmanlar Yunanlar, Rumlar, Ermeniler, Ruslar, Srplar, Bulgarlar, Yahudiler, ngilizler, Franszlar, Almanlar, iskender Bey zamannda ve 1878'de Prizren Birlii'nin kuruluundan sonra Arnavut rklar, XIX. asrn ikinci yansndan itibaren Arap rklar vd. milletlerdir.

543

i'ne atand srada younlatrd. O, Sofya'da bulunduu srada Balkan Savalar'ndan sonra da Bulgaristan nfusunun yarsndan fazlasn oluturan Trklerin dil, din, eitim, renim, sosyo-ekonomik, kltrel, siyas vd. meseleleriyle yakndan ilgilendi. Bu meselelere zm getirmeye alt17. Mustafa Kemal, Sofya'da, Osmanl Devleti'nin ve Rumeli Trkl'nn hayatta kalabilmesi iin yksek bir politika izlemeye alt. Balkan Savalar'nda Yunanllar'n igal ettikleri Trk topraklarnda siyas ve silhl eylemlerde bulunabilecek Trk-Makedon silhl birliklerinin kurulmas iin almaya balad. Bu amaca ulamak iin Sofya'da faaliyet gsteren Sandanistlerle temas kurdu. Onlara, Makedonya'nn Yunanistan kesiminde ve Trakya'da Yunanlar'a kar silhl eylemlerde bulunmas iin gizli denekten iki bin altn lira verdi18. Bu srada Yunanllar tarafndan igal edilen topraklarn kurtuluu iin alan "Bulgar" generali Aleksandr Protogerov'un Makedonya Komitesi'yle temas kurdu. Mustafa Kemal'e "scak" bakan bu komitenin yeleri hatt bir kez O'na Sofya'da "Printon Oteli"nin lokantasnda bira iesi atan bir "Bulgar" komitacsn ldrdler19. Mustafa Kemal, Birinci Dnya Sava'nda anakkale'de dman kuvvetlerini denize dkt. Ruslar Kafkaslar'da malubiyete uratt. Dman kuvvetlerini baka cephelerde de yendi. Ancak, Almanya'nn malubiyete uramasndan sonra, Osmanl Devleti sava kaybetmemesine ramen Mondros Mtarekesi'ni imzalamak zorunda kald. Mustafa Kemal, 1919'da, Anadolu'yu ve Dou Trakya'y igal eden dman kuvvetlerine kar Trk stikll Sava'n balatt. Fevkalade iyi ynettii bu savan sonunda Dou Trakya'y ve Trk milletinin ve Trkln gzbebei olan Anadolu'yu kurtardktan sonra 29 Ekim 1923 ylnda bugnk modern ve gl Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti'ni kurdu. Mustafa Kemal, Trk istikll Sava yllarnda Misak- Mill'nin hudutlarn izdi. Ancak O, bu hudutlarn dnda kalan Trkleri, zellikle 20 Rumeli Trkleri'ni asla unutmad . Fakat, Trk stikll Sava'nda her
17. Bkz: Atatrk Ansiklopedisi. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Siyas Tarihi. Cilt: 1. Hazrlayan: Kemal Zeki Gencosman. stanbul, May Yaynlan 1981, 175, 186-188, 190-192, 196200. 18. Ibid., 177-178. 19. Ibid., 178-180. 20. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n Ankara'da gazeteci Mc. Arthur'un "Trkiye'nin gelecei hakknda dnceleriniz nedir?" sorusuna "Allah nasip eder, mrm vefa ederse, Musul, Kerkk ve Adalar alacam Selanik de dahil olmak zere Bat TRakya'y Trk hudutlar iine katacam" dedii bilinmektedir (Bkz.: Samiha Ayverdi, Vatan Topran Nfus Tutar. - Trk Dnyas Tarih Dergisi. Drdnc Yl (1990). Say: 42, 41-42. Bu cevapla, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, aslnda, Trklerin byk ounlukta olduklar Makedonya'nn Ege kesimini de Misak- Milli'nin hudutlar dahiline almtr.

544

eyden evvel Anadolu kurtarlmalyd. nk, Trklk Anadolusuz yok olurdu. Anadolu Trkln anasdr. Mustafa Kemal'in, Makedon halknn sempatisini kazanmak iin Trk stikll Sava srasnda Yunan ordusuna zorla alnan, ancak bu ordudan kaarak Trk Ordusu'nu snan Makedon genlerin son derece dikkatli ve iyi davranma emrini verdii bilinmektedir21. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, yapt kkl inklplarla ve koyduu ilkelerle btn dnyada, zellikle komu Balkan lkelerinde ok sevilen ve takdir edilen bir devlet adam oldu. O'nun izledii d politikann neticesinde 27 Kasm 1933 ylnda Belgrad'da Trkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Yugoslavya Krall arasnda Dostluk, Saldrmazlk ve Uzlama Anlamas, 9 ubat 1934'te ise Atina'da Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, Yugoslavya, Yunanistan ve Romanya arasnda Balkan Antlant imzaland. Bu anlamalarn imzalanmasndan sonra Yugoslavya Krall, orada yaayan Trkler'e daha "esnek" bir tavr almaya balad. stibdad rejiminin uyguland bu lkede Trkler de dahil olmak zere btn aznlklar ilkretim okulunun sadece IV. snfna kadar Srpa eitim grebiliyorlard22. Bu dilde haftada iki saat din dersi de alabiliyorlard. Ancak, Yugoslavya Karal I. Aleksander, Atatrk'e ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne besledii saygdan dolay, Trkler'in din derslerini ana dilinde almalarna izin verdi. Atatrk'n yapt inklplar Yugoslavya Krall'nda yaayan Trkler'in hayatna yava ve zor yansyordu. nk, bu Balkan lkesinde yaayan Trkler'in ana dilinde okullar, gazete, dergi, kitap ve radyo gibi tantm aralar yoktu. Trk yazar ve okurlarnn says da ok azd. Bu yllarda Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne turist olarak veya baka bir sebeple gitme ve oradan gazete, dergi ve kitap getirme imkn yok denecek kadar azd. Bu yzden bura Trkleri'nin Atatrk, Atatrklk ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti hakknda bilgi edinme olanaklar ok snrlyd. Yugoslavya Trkleri, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti 'ndeki olay lan ve gelimeleri genellikle Srp basnndan takip ediyorlard. Srp basnnda ise Atatrk ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti hakknda kan yazlar tatmin edici deildi. Ancak Atatrk'n lmnden sonra O'nun brakt eserinden ilham alan Makedon mellifi Mite Svetovski 1938'in sonunda "Atatrk Trkiyesi"23 ve Srp mellifi Dr. Zoran Tomi 1939'da "Yeni Trkiye'nin KurucusuAtatrk"24 kitabn kard. Baz hatalarn olmasna ramen bu iki kitap Atatrk ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti hakknda ok deerli bilgiler vererek byk bir boluu doldurdu, byk bir ihtiyac giderdi. Ancak, bu kitaplar okuyan Trkler'in says yok denecek kadar azd.
21. Bkz.: Necdet Atac, Osmanl mparatorluu'ndan Sonra Trk-Makedon Birliktelii. Tantm (stanbul). Yl: 12 (1990). Say: 127/128. Sayfa: 49-53. 22. Yugoslavya'da lise ve yksek renim grme, yksek lisans, mastr ve doktora yapma imknndan yoksun kalan baz daha varlkl Trk ocuklar Avrupa'da ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde renimlerine devam ediyorlard. 23. Bkz.: Mite Svetovski, Ataturkova Turska. Beograd 1938. 24. Bkz.: Zoran Sv. Tomi, Kemal Atatrk - Tvorats Nove Turske. Beograd 1939.

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Makedonya Trkleri bu yllarda Trklk, Atatrk, Atatrklk ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti hakknda istedikleri bilgileri Trk gazete, dergi, kitap ve radyo gibi kaynaklardan alamadklarndan dolay, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nden Makedonya'ya kaan baz kt niyetli kiilerin ve evrelerin Atatrk'n ve Trkiye'nin aleyhine yaptklar propagandaya maruz kaldlar. Atatrk'n fikirleri ve nerileri zerine TBMM'nin Saltanat ve Hilfeti kaldrmasn, Cumhuriyet'in ilnn, kyafet, harf, hukuk, dil, tarih, sosyal, liklik vd. inklplar sindiremeyen bu kiiler, Makedonya'da frsat bulduklar zaman Atatrk' ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni ktlemeye altlar. Atatrk', yapt inklplar yznden suladlar. Aleyhine edebildikleri kadar kt propaganda yaptlar. Banda baz din adamlarnn bulunduu bu evreler belirli yerlerde etkili oldular. Kendilerine taraftar topladlar. Trkler ve dier Mslmanlar arasnda Atatrk'e kar kamuoyu meydana getirmeye altlar: Yaptklar propagandann etkisi btn Makedonya'da grld ve hissedildi. Bu tr propagandalar gnmze kadar yapld ve halen yaplmaktadr. kinci Dnya Sava'nda Makedonya'y ve Yugoslavya'y igal eden faist gler Trkler'e de byk mezlim yaptlar. Bu yzden, bu glere kar yrtlen savaa Trkler de katld25. Savatan sonra kurulan Yugoslavya'nn ve Makedonya'nn sosyo-ekonomik, kltrel ve siyas hayatna Trkler'in de alnmas lzmd. Ancak iktidara gelen komnist idareciler Bosna'da ve Voyvodina'da kalan Almanlar'a yaptklarn26, Trkler'e de yapmak istediler. Baka bir syleyile Almanlar' ve Trkler'i Yugoslavya'dan kovmay veya eriterek yok etmeyi dndler. Bu dourultuda Trkler'e de dil, din, eitim, renim, kltr, sosyoekonomik ve siyas basklar yapmaya baladlar. Trkler'in mallarn, mlklerini gaspettiler, zorla Sovyet tipi kolektiflere koydular. Girmek istemeyenleri dvdler veya ar cezalara arptrdlar. Angarya alarak aylarca yollarda, tnellerde, barajlarda altdlar. Trkiye radyolarn dinledikleri iin hapis cezasna mahkm ettiler veya alma kamplarna gtrdler. Birlemi Milletler Tekilat'nda, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti tem27 silcisinin Sovyetler Birlii temsilcilerine verdii sert cevaptan dolay ,
25. Makedonya'da kinci Dnya Sava srasnda hayatn kaybeden alt bin kiiden yars Trk't. 26. Tito, ikinci Dnya Sava'ndan hemen sonra, Yugoslavya'da Avusturya-Macaristan mparatorluu'ndan kalan, ancak bu sava srasnda Hitler'i destekleyen ve Alman kuvvetlerine yardm yapan 600 bin Alman' doldurduu trenlerle Avusturya hududuna gtrerek hudud d etti. Tito ok kinlenmesine ramen Trkler'e byle bir harekette bulunamazd. nk Trkler de savaa katldlar. Fakat Tito, Sloven Edvvard Kardel, Yahudi Moe Piyade, Srp Aleksandr Rankovi, Makedon Lazar Kolievski vd. Trk dmanlarnn nerisi zerine sinsice bir ekilde Trkler'i yapt basklarla yldrarak Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne ge zorlad. 27. 1947'nin sonunda Birlemi Milletler Tekilt'nn Genel Kurulu'nda yapt konuma srasnda Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni de sert bir dille eletiren Sovyetler Birlii temsilcisi Viinski'ye Trkiye Cumhuriyeti temsilcisi Selim Sarper'in verdii sert cevaptan sonra Yugoslavya idarecileri Trkleri hedef aldlar. Komnist Bloku, Trkiye Bat Bloku'nun "megafonu ve tahrikisi"dir dedi. Moe Piyade ise Belgrad "Borba"

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Trkler'e yaptklar basklan artrdlar. Bu basklarn art aslnda daha sonra Trkler'e plnladklar mezlimin n habercisiydi. Onlar Austos 1947'de Makedonya Trkleri'ni cezalandrma kararn aldlar. Bu cezalandrmayla ayn zamanda hem Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne, hem Bat Bloku'na bir ders vereceklerini dndler. 1944'te asmakla, kesmekle iktidara gelen komnistlerin kurduklar plnlar en erken ve en iyi sezen Makedonya Trk mnevverleri ayn ylda tekiltlandlar, Trklk ve Atatrk inklplarn ve prensiplerini esas alarak skp'te "Ycel" adnda bir tekilt kurdular28. "Ycel", tekilttan ok Trkleri ve Trkl korumak ve yaatmak iin komnizme kar ynelik bir tepki hareketiydi29. Trkln ve Atatrkln bu harekete yansmasn en iyi ekilde ona katlmak isteyen yelerin itikleri ant'n metninden grmek mmkndr. Ant metninin tamam yledir: "Deil kendi karlar iin Trk dmanlarna hizmet etmek, Trk aknclarnn kanyla sulanm topraklarda, Atalarna yarar ekilde Trk'n benliini ve onurunu korumak, Komnizm gibi yabanc ideolojilere kar koymak, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni sevmek, Trk'n mutlu gelecei olan Atatrkl yaymak zere, Bugnk dnyamzda biricik hr Trk devleti olan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin menfaatleri iin, icabederse canm vereceim"30. Trklkten, Atatrk ve Atatrklkken ilham alan Ycel Hareketi'nin gayesi Makedonya Trkleri'nin eitim, renim, kltr ve bilim sorunlarna zm getirmek ve mill uuru kuvvetlendirecek faaliyetlerde bulunmakt. Ycelciler komnizme kar sert bir tepki gsterdiler. Makedonya Trkleri'nin komnizmin leti haline gelmesini nlemeye altlar. Onlar, Atatrk'n yapt harf inklbndan esinlenerek Makedonya'da yeni trk harfleriyle "Birlik" Gazetesi'ni kardlar31. Trke
Gazetesi'nde yazd "Bosfor Ddks" makalesinde Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne ve Trkler'e ok di bir dille saldrd. Bkz.: erafettin Ycelden, Ycel. - Trk Dnyas (stanbul). Yl: IV (1969). Say: 12, 6-8; Sabahattin Zaim, Hrriyetini Kaybetmi Trkler ve Mill Trk Tekilt "Ycel". - Trk Dnyas. Yl: IV (1969). Say: 14, 1-4; Altan Deliorman, Yugoslaya'da Mslman Trk'e Byk Darbe. kinci Bask. stanbul, Boazii Yaynlar 1975, 187-193; Ahmet Cebeci, Balkanlar'da Trklk Hareketleri. - Trk Kltr (Ankara). Yl: XXVII (1989). Say: 311, 135; . YUcelden, yugoslavya Trkleri. Trk Dnyas El Kitab. Ankara, TKAE 1976, 1086-1098; Mehmet Rasim, Yugoslavya Trkleri. - Ocak (stanbul). Say: 6 (1973), 55-68. Bu harekete retmen, hoca, hkim, memur, ulema, zanaat, tccar vd. mesleklerden olanlar katld. Bu hareket olaylarn iinde ve olaylarla beraber Trkln istikametinde geliti. Komnist idareden Trkler'in lehine baz hak ve hrriyetler koparmaya alt. Bkz.: A. Deliorman, op. cit., 189-192. . Ycelden, Ycel, 6. Bask ve terr yaparak iktidara gelen komnistler 23 Aralk 1944 ylnda bu gazeteyi de ele geirdiler ve daha sonra komnist partinin Makedonya'dak Trke yayn organ yaptlar.

28.

29.

30. 31.

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okuma, yazma kurslar dzenlediler. Bu kurslarda Trk dili ve edebiyat ve Trk tarihinden baka dersler de verdiler.Yetitirdikleri retmenler Makedonya'nn en uzak Trk kylerinde bile altlar. Trk okullan iin yeni Trk harfleriyle ilk alfabeyi, ilk okuma ve baka ders kitaplarn hazrladlar. Baz tiyatro eserlerini yabanc dillerden Trkeye tercme ettiler. Btn bu almalar yaparken, retmenlerde Trkle, Atatrk ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne kar olan sevgiyi artrmaya altlar. Ancak komnistler 1947 ylnda Ycelcileri rejim ve vatan haini iln ederek tevkif ettiler. Onlar bu harektele Makedonya Trkl'ne byk darbe indirdiler32. Bu olaydan sonra Makedonya Trkl zlmeye balad. Makedonya Trkleri maruz kaldklar basklar ve mezlim yznden korku, gvensizlik ve nefret dolu gnler geirdiler. kinci Dnya Sava'ndan sonra bir Komnist Balkan federasyonu kurma hayaline kaplan Yugoslavya idarecileri Arnavutluk'un gnln almak iin Bat Makedonya Trkleri'ni Arnavutlar'n eline braktlar. Bu frsattan faydalanan Arnavutlar, ad geen blgede yaayan Trkler'e tam anlamyla bir eitim ve kltr soykrm yaptlar. Trkler'in bir ksmn Arnavutlatrmaya muvaffak oldular. Arnavutlar'n bu jenosidine Makedonya ve Yugoslavya idarecileri gz yumdular. Bundan dolay bugn, Trk kkenli olan ve Trke konuan, ancak Arnavut gibi dnen, Arnavut gibi yaayan, kendine ben Arnavut'um diyen ve Arnavut lks iin alanlara rastlamak mmkndr. 1944 ylnda kurulan Makedon-Arnavut ve Srp-Arnavut ittifaknn gayesi Makedonya'da ve Yugoslavya'da ok nemli bir faktr oluturan biz Trkleri eriterek Arnavutlatrmak veya Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne ge zorlayarak her zaman iin Trk meselesine zm getirmekti. 1948"de Yugoslavya'nn Sovyetler Birlii'yle aras alnca, bu devletin idarecileri szde daha "esnek" bir politika izlemeye, bu srada Trkiye'ye ve Bat demokrasisinin dier lkelerine yaklamaya baladlar. Bu politikann neticesi olarak Yugoslavya basnnda II. Dnya Sava'ndan sonra ilk kez Atatrk ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'yle ilgili olumlu yazlar kmaya balad. Byle bir hava ierisinde 1953'te Tito, Ankara'y ziyaret etti. Bu ziyaret srasnda imzalanan anlamalar arasnda Yugoslavya
32. Austos 1947'de tevkif edilen Ycelciler'in adl tahkikat alt ay srd. skp Mahkemesi'nde yaplan durumalarn sonunda ok sert kararlar alnd. uayip Aziz, Ali Abdurrahman, Nazmi mer ve dem Ali idama mahkm edildiler. Haklarndaki karar 33 gn sonra infaz edildi. erafettin Ycelden, Refik erif, Kemal Rsim, Abdlkerim Sezen ve efik Ersoy 20, Fettah Sleymanpai 15, Muzaffer Sleyman 13, Fazl Fanda, Sait Hac Bill, Mehmet Daim ve Kemal Rfat 12, Ali Halil Mustafa 10, Hsamettin Vardar 9, Ahmet Halil Mustafa 8, Refik Osman, mnir Sleyman, Halit kr, dris Sait Yunus 5, Burhan Haim 4.5, Halil Yusuf 4, Fahrettin smail 3, Zekir Eyp, Yunus Eyp Yunus, Mustafa Hrit 2.5 yl ar hapis cezasna arptrld. Bu srada 2, 1.5 ve 1 yl ar hapis cezasna mahkm edilenlerin says da oktu. Bkz.: S. Zaim, op. cit., 3-4; A. Deliorman, op. cit., 189-192.

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ve Balkan Trkl'ne en byk darbeyi indirmi olan "Serbest G Anlamasna bulunuyordu. Bu anlamann imzalanmasndan sonra, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, Yugoslavya Trkleri'ni, Bonaklar' ve Mslman Arnavutlar' kabul etmeye balad. Bylece Yugoslavya'dan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne youn Trk g balam oldu. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, "Trkn yaad her yer Trkndr"33 gereinden hareket ederek, 1923-1938 yllan arasnda D Trkler'in Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne g etmesini uygun grmedi. Ancak onlara, yaadklar lkelerde btn temel hak ve hrriyetlerin temin edilmesi iin faaliyetlerde bulundu, tedbirler ald. O'nun 29 Ekim 1933'te D Trklerle ilgili "...Kklerimize inmeli ve olaylarn bld tarihimizin iinde btnlemeliyiz. Onlarn (D Trkler'in) bize yaklamasn bekleyemeyiz. Bizim onlara yaklamamz lzmdr..."34 dedii bilinmektedir. Ancak, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti yetkilileri Atatrk'n bu talimatna sayg gstermediler. O'nun izledii D Trkler politikasndan vazgetiler. Bu Trklerle ilgilenmemeye baladlar. Onlar ihmal ettiler. Bu ilgisizliin neticesinde Balkan devletleri taarruza getiler. kinci Dnya Sava srasnda ve bu savatan sonra Balkan Trkl'ne Balkan Savalan'ndan sonra en byk darbeyi indirdiler. Onlar, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'yle eitli g anlamalar imzaladlar. Bu anlamalar arasnda bulunan "Serbest G Anlamasnn da imzalanmasyla onbinlerce Makedonya ve Yugoslavya Trk'nn Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne g etmesine sebep oldular. Bylece Makedonya'y ve Yugoslavya'y Trkler'den boalttlar. 1953-1959 yllar arasnda yaplan "Youn G" srasnda Makedonya Trk mnevverlerinin ve Ycelcilerin ou Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne g etti. G edenler arasnda ok sayda Trk ve Atatrk vard. Bu gle Makedonya'daki Trkle ve Atatrkle de byk darbe indirildi. Gn azalmasndan sonra, paralanan aileleri ve yaknlarn ziyaret etmek iin Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne giden Makedonya Trkleri, orada, Trklk, Atatrk ve Atatrklkle ilgili kitaplar, eitli gazete ve dergilerde kan yazlar okudular. Bu kitaplardan ve neriyattan Makedonya'ya da getirmeye baladlar. Ancak, Makedonya hududunda bu kitaplara iade edilmemek artyla el koydular. Buna ramen Trkler ou defa Trklkle, Atatrk ve dier konularla ilgili olan kitaplar gizlice Makedonya'ya getirmeye muvaffak oldular. Bu kitaplar balangta Trkler arasnda elden ele dolaarak okundu. Fakat, zamanla Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne yaplan ziyaretler younlatka Makedonya'da sz edilen konular hakkndaki bilgiler de artt.
33. S. Ayverdi, op. cit., 41-42. 34. Bkz.: Bu nsezinin, Bu Talimatn Gerei Yapld M? - Haber Blteni. Ahmet Yesevi niversitesi Muhtevelli Heyeti Bakanl Yayn Organ (Ankara). Yl: 1 (1997). Say: 1. Sayfa: 4; Balkanlar'da Trk Kltr (Bursa). Yl: 6 (1996). Say: 21, 2.

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1960'lann banda Dnya Bamsz Devletler Hareketi'nin lideri olma hevesine kaplan Tito, Yugoslavya'da yaayan aznlklara eitim, renim, kltr, bilim, sosyo-ekonomik ve siyas haklarn geniletilmesini emretti. Geniletilen haklar arasnda Trk liselerinin ve liselere dengi meslek okullarnn, Pedagoji Akademisi'nin dahilinde Trk Dili ve Edebiyat Blm'nn almas35, "Sesler" Dergisi'nin kmas, TV'de Trke yaynlarn yaplmas, Yugoslavya'nn dna turist veya ii olarak serbest ka iznin verilmesi, Trk mnevverlerinin Anavatan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde dzenlenen seminerlere katlmas gibi haklar bulunuyordu. Ancak, Yugoslavya'da ideolojik planda hibir geveme olmad. Yine tek partinin diktatrl devam etti. Dnce, basn ve yayn hrriyeti salanmad. Adalet ve insan haklar diye bir ey yoktu. Her eye Komnist partisi mdahale ediyordu. Bu parti, houna gitmeyen bir kelime iin bile insanlar iinden eder veya hapise arptrrd. Bu partinin banda bulunan ve Makedonya'y kendilerine mal etmeye alan rk Makedonlar aznlklarn milliyetiliklerinde Makedonya ve kendileri iin byk tehlike grdklerinden dolay, Makedon rklnn dnda faaliyet gsteren btn milliyetiliklere ve milliyetilere kar insafsz sava atlar. Bu savan neticesinde susuz olmasna ramen ok insan hapis vb. cezalara arptrld. Bu yllarda Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne yaplan ziyaretler de younlat. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Eitim Bakanl tarafndan Makedonya Trk mnevverlerine dzenlenen seminerlerde Trk dili, edebiyat, tarihi, folkloru ve mzik folklorundan baka Atatrk inklplar ve ilkeleri, Trk stikll Sava, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihiyle ilgili ok deerli bilgiler verildi. Bu yllarda skp "Birlik" Gazetesi'nde, "Sesler" ve "Sevin" dergilerinde Atatrk ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti hakknda kymetli yazlar kt. "Sesler" Dergisi Atatrk'n 100. Doum yldnm mnasebetiyle Kasm 1981 saysnn tamamn Atatrk'e adad36. Ancak basnda ve yaynda yaplan "geveme" Trk eitiminde, reniminde ve biliminde hissedilmedi. Bu "geveme"den sonra da Makedonya'da her eyi kontrolnde tutan Komnist partisinin diktatrl devam etti. Bu ideoloji diktatrl Trklk'te ve Atatrk milliyetiliinde de aslsz olarak tehlike grd. Makedonya'daki Trkln ve Atatrk milliyetiliinin gayesi baka etnik kkenden olanlarn btn nitelik ve deerlerine sayg gstererek, hatt onlarn btn ihtiyalarn bile tanyarak Makedonya Trkleri'nin ve btn Trk milletinin ykselmesi ve ycelmesi iin almakt. Byle olmasna ramen Makedon idarecileri bu milliyetilii de hedef olarak aldlar. Onlar, Atatrk'n, Trk stikll Sava'nn, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Osmanl ncesi Trk tarihinin, Trk rencilerine okutulmasn yasakladlar. Derslerde bu konulara temas etmek, hatt Atatrk'n adn bile anmak yasakt. Byle olmasna ramen, biz Makedonya Trk eitimcileri ve bilim adamlar bulduumuz her frsatta sistematik bir ekilde talebele35. 1975'ten sonra bu blm Filoloji Fakltesi'nin dahilinde faaliyet gstermeye balad. 36. Bkz.: Sesler (skp). Yl: XVII (1981). Say: 160, 51-128.

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rimize Trklk, Atatrklk, Trk stikll Sava, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Osmanl ncesi Trk tarihine vd. konulara gizlice temas ederek talebelerimize gerekli olan bilgileri verdik. Makedon, Srp, Arnavut, Bulgar vd. Balkanllarn biz Trkler iin ne srdkleri tutarsz tezleri verdiimiz doru bilgilerle rtmeye altk. ok eyi aydnla kavuturduk. Bylece ocuklarmz ve genlerimizi hibir konuda tereddt ierisinde ve bilgisiz brakmadk. Onlar Trklk ruhunda eitmeye ve yetitirmeye altk. Bylece bu ocuklar ve genleri Atatrk'n dedii gibi gelecekte daha byk iler yapmak iin hazrladk. Onlar mutlaka gelecekte kendilerinde daha byk kuvvet bulacaklardr. Btn bu faaliyetleri komnizm diktatrl ve terr altnda yapmaya muvaffak olduk. Bylece Makedonya Trk mnevverleri olarak kendimize den Trklk grevini gayet vicdanl ve gayet baarl bir ekilde icra ettik. 1990'larda ken komnizmin yerini ok partili sistemin almasndan sonra, Makedonya'da mill ve din esaslara dayanan onlarca cemiyet, dernek ve siyas parti kuruldu. Biz Trkler de Trk Demokratik Birlii'ni kurduk. Bu tekilat btn Trkleri kendi ats altnda toplad. Tekiltn programn Trklk, Atatrk inklp ve ilkelerine gre dzenledik. Fakat ne y azk ki, biz Makedonya Trkleri'nin tek yol olarak benimsedii Trkle ve Atatrkle ramen gelecei tehlike ve kukularla doludur. 1992'de siyas partiye dntrlen Trk Demokratik Birlii, "Ycel" Tekilt'ndan sonra Trkln ve Atatrkln esaslarna dayanarak kurulan ikinci bir Trk tekiltdr. Bu tekiltn dahilinde faaliyet gsteren ve bakanln yaptm Eitim, renim ve Bilim Komisyonu'nun insiyatifi zerine Aralk 1990'da Atatrk'n 110. Doum yldnmn kutlama program dzenledik37. Bu program uyarnca 1991 yln Atatrk'n 110. Doum yldnmn kutlama yl olarak iln ettik. Bu etkinliklerin dahilinde yerli38 ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nden gelen bilim adamlar39 22-24 Nisan 1991 tarihleri arasnda skp, Kalkandelen ve Gostivar'da toplanan binlerce Trk'e Atatrk ve Atatrklk ile ilgili konferanslar verdiler. Atatrk'n doum gn 19 Mays', 1991'den itibaren eitli etkinliklerle Genlik ve Spor Bayram olarak kutlamaya, Atatrk'n lm gnn ise her yln 10 Kasm'nda anmaya baladk.
37. Bkz.: Yl Sresince Atatrk Saygyla Anlacaktr. - Birlik (skp), 12 Ocak 1991, 19. 38. Yerli Trkler'den Do. Dr. Yusuf Hamza, Prof. Dr. Muzafer Tufai, Prof. Mustafa Karahasan ve gazeteci-yazar Avni Engll konferans verdi. Makedonlar'dan da konferans veren oldu. skp'te Akad. Dr. Manol Pandevski, Kalkandelen'de ise Dr. Gligor Todorovski verdi. Bkz.: Atatrk'n Milliyetilii Gerekidir. - Birlik, 25 Nisan 1991, 12. 39. Trkiye'den gelen bilim adamlar arasnda Prof. Dr. Yaar Ycel, Prof. Dr. Hasan Eren, Prof. Dr. Utkun Kocatrk, Prof. Dr. Nihat Nirun, Prof. Dr. Hamza Erolu, Prof. Dr. Cevdet Kk, Prof. Dr. smail Parlatr ve Do. Dr. Cihat znder bulunuyordu (bidem, 12).

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Trklk, Atatrk ve Atatrklk bugn biz Makedonya Trkleri'nin eitim, renim, bilim, kltr, sosyo-ekonomik ve siyas hayatnda iyice yerlemitir. Bata "Birlik" Gazetesi, "Sesler", "Vardar" ve "Sevin" dergileri olmak zere, Makedonya'da btn gazete ve dergilerde bu konularla ilgili yazlar kyor. Radyo ve TV'de zel programlar dzenleniyor, belgesel yaynlar yaplyor. Ders programlarnda olmamasna ramen Trk ilkretim okullarnda, liselerde, meslek liselerinde ve fakltelerde her frsatta Trklk, Atatrklk, Trk stikll Sava, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, Osmanl dnemi ve bu dnemden nceki Trk tarihiyle ilgili bilgiler veriliyor, aratmalar ve incelemeler yaplyor. Ancak byle olmasna ramen gnden gne Trk nfus saysnn azalmas ve Makedon ile Arnavut basklarnn artmas yznden Makedonya Trkl'nn hibir gelecei kalmamn-. Bu Trklk bugn Makedon-Arnavut ittifaknn kurbandr. Bu iki unsurun esareti altnda bulunmaktadr. Makedonlar ve Arnavutlar biz Trkleri her alanda kenara itmilerdir. 378 ylndan itibaren yaadmz, ancak Makedonlar'dan, Suplar'dan ve baz dier Balkan kavimlerinden nce yerletiimiz bu topraklardan atmaya almaktadrlar. Biz bu topraklarda 1620 yl nce, zellikle 1292 ve 1371 ylndan sonra yeni bir medeniyet r atk. ok deerli madd kltr izleri braktk. Komu kavimlere ok ey rettik. Her alanda onlara yardmc olduk. Ancak onlar bugn tarih boyunca yaptmz byk iyilie karlk olarak bizleri eritmeye veya 1620 yllk malmzdan, mlkmzden etmeye alyorlar. Makedonlar bizi Arnavutlara kar kkrtmaya alyor, ancak belirli durumlarda ortak dinimiz slm'n yznden onlarla zdeletiriyor ve onlara uyguladklar politikay bize de uyguluyorlar. Arnavutlar ise bize "siz Trk deilsiniz. Siz Trklemi veya sadece Trke konuan Amavutsunuz" diyerek Arnavutlatrmaya alyorlar. Byle bir Makedon-Arnavut kskacnda bulunan biz Trkler k Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne g etmekte aryoruz. te Makedonya Trkl'nn vaziyeti, dram veya trajedisi byledir. Makedonya Trkl'nn izah edilen vaziyeti iin kabahati sadece Makedonya ve Yugoslavya idarecilerinde aramamak lzmdr. Bu kabahati Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n lmnden sonra Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin yetkililerinde de aramak lzmdr. nk bu yetkililer sz konusu g anlamasn imzalamakla tarih bir hata yapm oldular. Onlar Atatrk'n D Trkler politikasn izlemediler. Bu politikay izleselerdi, Makedonya Trkleri'ni Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne getirmeyeceklerdi. Bylece 40 1953 ylnda Makedonya nfusunun % 25'ini oluturan Trkler'in says bugn 800 bine ulaacakt. Bu say bugn Makedonya'da, Balkan Yarmadas'nda ve Avrupa'da ok nemli bir faktr oluturacakt.

40. Bu ylda yaplan nfus saymnda bu Balkan lkesinde 1304514 kiinin yaad tespit edildi. Bkz.: Statistiki godinik na Republika Makedoniya. T. XXXII. Skopye, Zovod za Statistika na R. Makedoniya 1997, 94.

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KEMALST TRKYE'DE VE ARNAVUTLUK'TA KADIN HAREKET (TARH KIYASLAMALAR)

Prof. Dr. Petrika THENGJILLI* Her millet yzlerce yllk tarihinde nl ahsiyetlerini karmtr. Bu ahsiyetler belirli tarihi aamalarda oynadklar rol ile ulusal boyutlar am, kendi dnceleri ve eylemleri ile ise tarihi aamann snrlarn da aarak deerlerini sonraki aamalarda da korumulardr. Bu ahsiyetler zaman ve mekan asndan geni yanklar uyandrmlardr. Trk halknn meru evlad ve Arnavutluk halknn dostu Mustafa Kemal Atatrk de bu ahsiyetlerden biridir. Atatrk, 75. kurulu yldnm nedeniyle bu bilimsel toplantda bir araya geldiimiz Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin, bir ada devletin mimardr. Bu 75 yllk dnemde Trk devletinin konumu yle bir dzeye ykselmitir ki, birok lke ve halk buna imrenebilecektir. Ekonomik, siyasi, sosyal, eitim ve kltr alanlarnda nemli baarlar elde edilmitir. Bu tebliimde, ada Trkiye'de kadn hareketine deinerek bunu Arnavutluk'taki ile kyaslandracam. Ortak ve zel ynleri belirtmeye alacam. Genellikle Osmanl mparatorluunda, zellikle Arnavutluk'ta kadn hareketi gecikmitir. Osmanl mparatorluunda 1792'de baslm "Kadn Haklar Savunmas" adl ilk kitabn yaynlanmasndan tam 100 yl sonra erkek tarafndan Osmanl vatanda olan kadnlarn baz basit haklan hakknda ilk fikirler yaylabilmitir. O dnemde kadnlarn eitim ve kltr durumu ok kt idi. lk Trk parlamentosunda Arnavut milletvekili Abdl Frasheri 1878'de yle diyordu: "Bu ar, yzlerce yllk uykudan ne zaman uyanacaz? Kadnlar hi takdir etmediimizi ilave etmek istiyorum. stanbul'da bile de bir kz okulu yok. Kzlar ve kadnlar insan olarak niye nitelemiyoruz? Kzlarn eitiminin erkein eitiminden nce geldiini unutmamalyz. Biraz dnn, cahil bir anne nasl salam huylu ocuklar yetitirebilir?" lk kadn derneklerine ramen, kadnn eitim ve kltr dzeyi 1912 ylna kadar ayn dzeyde kalmtr. Kadnlarn yzde 90'ndan fazlas okuma yazma bilmiyordu. 1912 ylndan sonra kadn hareketi yrmeye * Tirana niversitesi.

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balamtr. Trkiye'de tekilatlanm kadn hareketi Mustafa Kemal'in adna baldr. Atatrk'n kadnlara ve haklarna zel bir saygs vard. Kadnlar iin syledii szler de (ada, gelecek, az szller, ryada grdklerimiz vb.) bunu kantlyor. Atatrk'n hayatn konu alm yazarlara gre, kadna sayg, Atatrk'n ocukluuna baldr. Daha ocukluunda kadna sayg duygusunu hissetmeye balamtr. Annesi Zbeyde Hanm, kzkardei Makbule ve genel olarak ailesi ve akrabalar Atatrk'n gerekletirdii birok reformun giriimcileri olmutur. Atatrk toplumun gelimesini kadnn katlmas ve kalknmas olmadan dnemezdi. Bunun iin yasa yoluyla, retimde, devlet makamlarnda, yasama makamlarnda, eitimde ve dier alanlarda erkek ile kadn arasndaki eitlik ilan edilmitir. Mustafa Kemal'in genel olarak reformlar, zellikle kadn reformlar Zogucu Arnavutluk'ta iki farkl yank bulmutur. lerici basn bu reformlar cokuyla karlayarak Trk kadnnn lkesinin siyasi hayatna katlmasn takdirle karlarken, devlet basn reformlar yalnz arafn kaldrlmasyla indirgemeye almtr. Bylece Arnavutluk'ta devlet makamlarnn bu taleplerin karsnda korkusu ifade ediliyordu. Daha 1923 ylnda Arnavut yurtsever yazan Mihal Grameno Trk parlamentosunda bir kadnn seilmesiyle ilgili olarak baz Arnavut milletvekillerinin fanatik tutumuyla alay ederek yle yazmtr: "Maazallah... biz erefli adamlar bir kadnn parlamentoya girmesini kabul etmeyiz. Bir kadnn mecliste bulunmasna izin vermediimizi gstermek iin, bizim uaklar ve denizaltlaryla Trkiye'ye sava ilan edeceiz." Kemalist Trkiye'de kadnn konumu hakknda geni bir devrim yaplrken, Arnavutluk Kraliyeti'nde baz ilerici unsurlar kadn sorunlarn basnda yanstmaya alyordu. Sava iki lkenin kadn hareketinde bir dn noktas idi. Kadnlarn hangi durumlarda silaha sarlarak savatklar bilinir. Arnavut ideologu ve Abdl Frasheri'nin kardei emsettin Sami Frasheri yle yazmtr: "Bir sava srasnda kadnlarn hangi cephede bulunduklarna bakn. O taraf hakldr, nk kadn dayanlmaz bir durum olmadka silaha sarlmaz." Bu anlaml szlerin doruluunu Trkiye'de antiemperyalist devrim gibi Arnavutluk'ta antifaist sava da gstermitir. 1923 ylnda Mustafa Kemal bir konumasnda unlar sylemitir: "Anadolu'da kadnlarn abalarm dnyann baka bir lkesinde ya da halknda gremeyiz. Dnyada hi bir kadn Anadolu kadnnn halkn kurtuluu ve zaferi uruna verdii hizmeti veremez." Arnavutluk'ta da kadnlar zgrlk ve demokrasi lkleri adna Antifaist Dnya ttifaknn paras olan savaa nemli bir g olarak katlmtr. 6000 Arnavut kadn silaha sarlarak kocalar ve kardeleriyle birlikte savam, dier yzlerce ve binlercesi de geri cephede faaliyette bulunarak sava var gleriyle desteklemitir.

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Kadn haklaryla ilgili olarak Kemalizmin balca zellii kadnerkek farklarnn kaldrlmas ve kadnn nsan kelimesine dahil edilmesidir. Bugn de dnyada kadn konusunda yaplm byk ilerlemelere ramen, birok sosyolog kadn sorununu, ikinci derecede bir sosyal durumda bulunan bir grup insann paras olarak ele alyor. Daha 1930'lu yllarda Atatrk toplumun gelimesini kadnn katlmas ve katlmas olmadan anlayamazd. Atatrk'e gre, "Soyun yalnz yarsyla yetinen bir topluk zayf kalr. Bir millet ilerleyip modernlemek isterse, bu ilkeyi rehber almak zorundadr." 1920'li yllarda Trkiye Cumhuriyetinde hayatn btn alanlarnda erkekle kadn arasnda eitlik ilan edilmitir. Arnavutluk'ta ise 1914 ylnda savatan sonra ilk yasalar erkekle kadn arasnda eitsizliin hukuki temelini ortadan kaldrmtr. lk kez olarak Arnavutluk kadn oy hakkn kazand ve i, cret, sosyal sigorta, eitim vb. alanlarnda erkekle eit konumu yasal yol ile ald. Atatrk'n kadn konusunda kapsaml ve zgn anlaylar vard. Bu alana geni katklar var. 1923 ylnda zmir'de yapt bir konumada unun zerinde durmutur: "Bu dnyada her eyin kadnn eseri olduuna gvenmeliyiz." Her eyden nce retime katlmasdr. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde elde edilen basanlara ramen, Mustafa Kemal Trk toplumunun sosyal aksaklklarn tahlil ederek bunlar kadnla ilgili tutuma balyordu. O unlar belirtiyordu: "Toplumumuzda aksaklklarn nedeni kadnlarmza gsterdiimiz kmseyici tutuma baldr. Yaamak, faaliyette bulunmak demektir. Bu nedenle, toplumun bir yaps faaliyet iinde bulunursa ve baka bir yaps almazsa, bu toplumun faaliyeti ok azalr." Komnist Arnavutluk'ta kadnlarn ie katlmas ynnde kkl dnmler gerekletirildi. kinci Dnya Sava arifesinde, tarm retimi dnda hayatn btn kesimlerinde 668 kadn alyordu, bunlarn yzde 94' de okuma yazma bilmiyordu. 1989 ylnda ise kadnlarn ie katlm % 80,1 idi. 1940-1960 yllarnda ileriye ynelik admlar atld. Kadnlara i yerleri ald, maalarda eitlik uyguland, cretli doum izinleri verildi, salk ve sosyal merkezler ebekesi, ilk nce kentlerde ve daha sonra ocuk yuvas ve anaokulu ebekesi kuruldu ve geniledi, ok ocuklu annelere ikramiye verildi. Bu nedenle Arnavutluk'ta kadnlarn ie katlm % 41,3'e kt, Polonya'da ise % 36, Bulgaristan'da % 27,6 idi. Demokratik Trkiye'den farkl olarak komnist Arnavutluk'ta kadnlarn ie katlm ekonomik etkenler ve devletin sosyal ekonomisi tarafndan, ideolojik sosyalizm erevesinde gerekletirilmitir. Kadn sorunu byk bir sosyal sorun, ii snfnn mcadelesinin paras, sosyalizmin inasnn zorunluluu ve sosyalist devrimi hayatn btn alanlarnda ilerletmek iin genel devrimci hareketin paras olarak ele alnd. Devlet partisinin subjektivist siyaseti hazr ideolojik emalarn klesi olduundan dolay gerek d idi. Bu siyaset toplumun zel olarak kadnlarn menfaatlerine ters

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derek siyasi sistemi snrlandrc sisteme dntrd. Elektrikli beyaz eyalarn var olmamas, en gerekli besinlerin snrl olmas, birok ana tketim mal ve ime suyu sknts gibi etkenler kadnlarn ie katlmn ok zorlatryordu. Arnavutluk kadn aile iinde ve dnda ok yorucu ilerle kar karya bulunuyordu. Bu durum demokratik dnmler dneminde etkisini gstermitir. Teknolojik geri kalmlk gerekesiyle, tesisler ve fabrikalarn kapatlmasndan sonra 1993 ylnda kadnlarn ie katlm % 50'ye dt. Kadnlarda isizlik oran % 10.8'den % 24.1'e kt. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk Trk toplumunun kalknmas ve ilerlemesini kadnlarn ycelmesine zlmez biimde bal olarak bakyordu. Daha 1920 ylnda unu vurguluyordu: "Halkmz kuvvetli halklar arasnda yer almak istiyorsa, bugnk zorunluklardan biri kadnlarn ycelmesidir." Atatrk'e gre, kadnlarn ycelmesi erkekler ve kadnlar arasnda eit eitim ve kltrle birlikte devam etmeliydi. Atatrk kzlarn kapal eitimine kar idi, bunu Tanzimat dnemindeki saray ve konak eitimine benzetiyordu. Atatrk iki cinsiyet iin eit olan genel eitiminden yanayd. Arnavutluk'ta da ayn siyaset izlendi, ancak baz belirleyici zelliklerle. Mustafa Kemal ocuklarn eitimini ve kltrlemesini slam dinine de dayandryordu, izmir'de 31 Ocak 1923 tarihinde unu aklamtr: "Hibir zaman dinimiz kadnlarn erkeklerin arkasnda kalmalarn istememitir. Allann emrettii ey kadn ve erkek Mslmanlarn beraberce bilim ve kltr renmesidir. Kadn ve erkek bilimle kltr arasn, bunlar bulup ara olarak kullansnlar. Trk toplumunun hayatnda kadnlar bu alanlar ve dier alanlarda geri kalmamaldr, belki de daha ileriye gideceklerdir." Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin kurucusunun talimat zerinde, ada Trk devletinde kitlesel nitelik kazanan ve eitli genel ve meslek okullarndan oluan byk bir eitim sistemi kuruldu. Komnist Arnavutluk'ta erkekler ve kzlarn eit eitim grmelerine gelince, Marksizm-Leninizmin ilkeleri Arnavut milliyetilik ilkeleriyle birlikte rehber alnd. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde olduu gibi Arnavutluk'ta da zorunlu ilk retim sistemi kuruldu, genel okullar, meslek okullar, bir niversite ve baz dier yksek eitim okullarndan oluan eitim sistemi kuruldu. ki lkede kzlarn eitim grmesi alannda gerek bir devrim yapld. Osmanl mparatorluu'nda 1913 ylnda 3083 erkek okulu ve 388 kz okulu vard. Erkek retmenlerin says 6913 iken bayan retmenlerin says 983 idi. Erkek rencilerinin says 243.445, kz rencilerin says ise 40.455 idi. 1930-1931 ders ylnda stanbul niversitesi Hukuk Fakl556

tesinde yalnz 3 kz renim grrken 1970-1971 ders ylnda bu fakltede kz renci says 2030'a kt. Bu ders ylnda Trkiye'nin niversitelerinde kz ve erkek rencilerin orantlar aadaki gibiydi:
Faklteler Dil-Edebiyat Matematik Tp Sosyal Bilimler Uygulama Bilimleri Tarm ve Ormanclk Teknik Bilimler Sanat Kzlar (%) 51,92 45.08 37,09 29,57 33,36 27,61 19,70 56,86 Erkek (%) 48,08 56,92 63,91 70,43 66,64 72,39 80,30 43,13

Kz rencilerin yksek eitime geni biimde katlmas ilerlemenin gstergesidir. Arnavutluk'ta 1938-1939 ders ylnda 643 ilkokul ve 11 lise vard. Diktatrlk yllarnda kzlarn eitim grmesi konusunda ilerlemeler oldu. Arnavutluk'ta 1970-1971 ders yl izelgesine bakalm:
Okul Tirana niversitesi Tp Fakltesi Doal Bilimler Fakltesi Siyasi-Sosyal Bilimler Jeoloji-Madencilik Tarih-Filoloji ktisat Mhendislik Toplam r. says 7141 1427 1340 259 396 1240 700 1779 Kz says 2446 632 484 102 30 762 279 229 Kzla 34,2 44,3 36,11 39,3 7,5 54,1 42,9 12,9

Bu mukayeseye bakarak baz fakltelerde rakamlarn uyumlu olduklar, bazlarnda ise farklarn az olduklar neticesine varlyor. 1990 ylnda 45 yana kadar Arnavutluk kadnlar renimliydi. 1000 kii bana 8 niversite rencisi ve 234 renci vard, bunlarn yars kz idi. Doktor, retmen, hukuku gibi baz mesleklerde grevlilerin ounluunu kadnlar tekil ediyordu. Kadn retmenler ilkokul retmenlerinin % 59'unu ve lise retmenlerinin % 49'unu oluturuyordu. niversite retim yelerinin % 32'si kadndr. 1994 ylnda doktor unvanna sahip olanlarn yzde 19'u kadn idi. Yarglarn yaklak % 30'u kadndr. Kadnlarn eitim haklarna siyasi alanda haklar da ilave edildi. Trk kadnlar ky muhtarlndan belediyelere ve Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi'ne kadar seilme hakkn kazand. 1935 ylnda Byk Millet

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Meclisi'nde 18 kadn milletvekili vard. O yldan 1983 ylna kadar 121 kadn Trk parlamentosunda milletvekili olmutur. Komnist Arnavutluk'ta da bu alanda siyasi ve ideolojik nedenlerden dolay byk bir ilerleme kaydedildi. 1966 ylnda kadn milletvekili says 1945 ylnkine gre 13 kat artt. 1966'da kadn milletvekilleri toplam milletvekili saysnn % 16,3'n tekil ediyordu, 1970'te ise bu orant % 27,3'e kt. 1996 ylnda seilmi yerel makamlarn grevlilerin % 36's kadnlar tarafndan tekil edilirken, 1970 ylnda bu rakam % 45,9'a ykseldi. Grnen o ki, bu ykselme zorla yaplm, toplumun gerek ilerleme dzeyini gstermiyordu. Komnist diktatrln devrilmesinden sonra hissedilir bir d oldu. 1992-1996 yllar Arnavutluk parlamentosunda yalnz 21 kadn milletvekili vard, toplam milletvekili says ise 140 idi. 64 belediye bakannn yalnz 2'si, 310 komn bakanndan yalnz 2'si kadn idi. 12 validen hikimse kadn deildi. 36 belediye kurulu bakanndan ikisi kadnd. Belediye kurullar yeleri toplam says 920 iken kadnllarn says 98 idi. l kurullar yeleri toplam says 930 iken, yalnz 94' kadnd. Bugn Arnavutluk kadn milletvekili says toplam milletvekili saysnn % 5,5'ini oluturuyor. Eski komnist Dou Avrupa lkelerinde ise bu rakam % 13-16'dr. Avrupa parlamentosunda 143 kadn milletvekili vardr. Sonu olarak unlar belirtebiliriz: Trkiye Cumhuriyetinde olduu gibi kadn hareketi, baland ve geldii noktalar esas alnarak, byk bir ilerleme kaydetmitir. Ancak yine toplumlarmz erkekseldir. Ama bugnk dnyamzda kadnlarn grd muamelelerin erkeklerinkiyle eit olduu bir toplum henz yoktur.

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EVOLUTION OF THE KEMALST DOCTRINE, FROM A GREEK A STANDPOINT

Constantine D. ZEPOS* I would like first to thank the Dean of the faculty of Political Science of the Ankara University Professor Dr. Celal Gle for the honour of his invitation to me to participate at this international Conference. The present occasion is indeed unique. it combines oportunities to pay tribute and appraise the historic role of Kemal Atatrk in the formation of modern Turkey, with the celebrations of the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Thanks to eminent historians and experts on Turkish history who participate at this conference, we shall look with a renewed interest upon the daunting events centerring around the year 1923. Events which fashioned the course of a new Turkey, under a leadership whose political imprint is strongly felt to the present times. My own contribution does not aspire to be a breakthrough in historical research. it is only guided by an avvareness of how closely were interlocked developments in Greece and Turkey at that time. Also by a concern of how shall develop GreekTurkish relations at the dawn of the 3rd millennium, the new era which should pen new horizons of peace, humanity and \velfare. Regarding the first point, I presume you would agree that the establishment of the Turkish Republic is correlated to a great extent to Greece itself, not necessarily vvith the events which led to the outbreak of war in 1912, the first Balkan war, but rather vvith the fate of that part of Hellenism which for two and a half millennia was deeply rooted in Anatolia and Thrace. These territories, Kemal Atatrk determined, would cnstitute the seat of the sovereign Turkish people, designating incidentally the new westward borders of Turkey. Approaching the main theme of this conference, I shall seek to draw as best as I can a general comparative evaluation ver the events under review, an approach which as I have just indicated, may help to shed in a
* Retired Ambassador, Athens.

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dispassionate manner some further light to the long term significance of the achievements of Kemal. The stature of Kemal Atatrk dominates modern Turkey and the same can be said for the influence of the Kemalist ideology in present times. The six principles contained in the frst proclamation of the People's Republican Party, form the gist of that ideology. They act as guiding lines in the Constitution and serve political options made by Turkish Governments. it is obvious that Turkey was and will remain "kemalist", although the need for a revision of the official doctrine is manifest, and the requirements for modernisation are always persent. Among the six principles we can distinguish those which basically need not to be altered, namely those confirming the republican character of the state, its popular foundation (halklk), which confrms the sovereignty of the people, and that of the secular state, which denotes the definitive separation of religion from state affairs. The question may be put whether the remaining three principles should not, for the sake oef the best interests of Turkey, undergo a revision. in this respect one could name the principle of nationalism, insofar it points to a total homogenisation of ethnic, cultural, religious and other distinct features of the Turkish society and to what was believed should be a uniform frame oef nationality or nationhood. The next would be the principle of "statetism" (or "etatism"), insofar it rejects generally accepted models of development in the frame of a liberal economy, and fnally the principle of reforms, vvhich lacks suffcient precision. The last remarks should not be seen as spreading seeds of doubt on the kemalist doctrine. it is notevvorthy that the doctrine itself determines that its components are far from static or frozen, and should be seen as apt to renewal, while preserving ali their vitality1. in that spirit should be seen some laudable attempts advocating for the revision of the initial concept of nationhood, by vvhich it was suggested that a monolithic and compact Turkish nation should succeed to the previous amalgam of ethnic, religious and cultural elements, vvhich vvas characteristic of the social pattern of the Ottoman state. These diverse elements, it vvas thought, retained a large degree of autonomy, incompatible vvith the idea of a centralist national state, vvhich Kemal Atatrk imposed by his svveeping reforms. Against a structurally centralised state, to vvhich total allegiance by ali citizens vvas expected, there vvas no room for the religious internationalism propagated by islam to flourish and for that same reason, neither of much freedom for social and economic distinction and "cohabitation" of non Turkish ethnic minorities.
See Athanase E. Paresoglou, "The Turkish Political System", in "Turkey Today", Ed. (in Greek) ELIAMEP and I Sideris, 1995.

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Again, for the sake of comparison against the events which under the leadership of Atatrk led to the building of a centralised modern state, one is inclined to recall the support given at the beginning of this century by a few Greek idealiste to the idea of preservation of the Ottoman empire, which they thought should take the form of a multinational federation. They held a sincere belief that the cultural ties which existed between the multiethnic inhabitants of Anatolia were sufficient to secure 2 their coexistence and cooperation . it proved at the time an utopian vision. However in our times that vision reflects the ideological undercurrent of a whole system of political and legal precepts, aimed at the protection of minorities. it corresponds as well to the norm of preservation of the territorial integrity of multinational and federal states. in the same vein of thoughts I would wish to refer to that cardinal catastrophic event of exodus of Greeks from Anatolia and Thrace3, as well as of Turks from Greece, a topic that cannot be ignored as we are passing under review the stages of creation of the Turkish Republic. I shal not speak of my own thoughts when referring to the tragic events which again occurred 75 years ago, but of those of a most talented writer and an enlightened mind of modern Turkey, Yaar Kemal who some time ago, speaking in public, deplored the lack of political courage and vision which, as he put it, vvould have prevented to submit 1.500.000 Greeks and 500.000 Turks to the most cruel fate of forced expatriation. What Yaar Kemal said should not be heard as a lament on things past, of what could have been avoided, but rather as an appeal for the acceptance of the "otherness", an appeal to national tolerance, and as rejection of ethnic cleansing. The events of 1923, namely the outcome of the war of independence, form a new historic departure for Turkey. She then enters into a new relationship with the western world and aspires to a new European identity which atatrk is striving to secure to her. On the other hand, the same events mark for Greece the end of a historic period, loaded with visions not of Byzantine splendour, but of a purposeful irredentist move to expansion into territories where lived millions of Greeks. it can be said with certainty that page of Greek history, and that of the Great Idea since then were defnitively closed. it vvould be groundless to argue otherwise. Hovvever a new page in the relations of the two countries did pen between Greece and Turkey, after the final settlement of territorial issues, the exchange of populations and other important matters by the signing of
2. 3. See Professor Thanos Veremis, "History of Greek-Turkish Relations, 1453-1998", Ed. (in Greek) ELIAMEP and I Sideris, p. 53. On ythat issue the "Centre for Asia Minr Studies" of athens, under the directorship of Professor P. Kitromilidis remains the main source of research and historiographic matterial published under its aegis.

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the Peace Treaty at Lausane, as well as by the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliaion and Arbitration and other acts signed in 1930. in the aftermath of these developments there should have been opportunities oef building a new relationship betvveen the two countries. At this juncture one could argue that the magnitude of a conflict betvveen peeoples which have engaged against each other in war, establishes to each one of them a deep traumatic phsycological experience, which in the course of time becomes a common feature of their respective consciousness. What each people experienced separately becomes a common awareness of the hardships of war and of devastation, vvhile the causes oef conflict beceome irrelevant in the course of time. The example of the Euroepean nations which confronted each other during the 2nd World War -Greece being among them- is propitious to show that the common sharing of traumatic experiences caused by cruel confrontation overrides the reasons which led to the conflict. Previous conflictual attitudes were transformed to a new behaviour of mutual respect, enhanced by the desire of conciliation among peoples, after having committed themselves to the same values and to a new form of conduct in the servie of peace. Unfortunately, and in spite of many individual examples reflecting a shared conviction for the need of a common conduct to safeguard peace, Greece and Turkey have not reached that common ground, which at any rate is visible in the direction of Europe. Stili, some first steps to that direction were made, as far Greece and Turkey are concerned, by their respective leaders, after they sealed with the signing of the treaties mentioned, almost exactly 68 years ago, the beginning of a true peace era4. Venizelos and Atatrk can be recognised as having performed a twin role. They both excelled as revolutionaries as they started their respective ways to power. They were the protagonists to the conflicts as well as to the building of peace betvveen the two nations, vvhile they devoted themselves vvith passion to modernise their respective states. Venizelos, it must be said, usually an uncontested political leader, often faced an acute antagonism vvithin the democratic and parliamentary system of vvhich he was a strong proponent. He lost povver at the hight of the Anatolian campaign, in November 1920, after an electoral defeat vvhich was reminiscent more of the ostracism of Aristide the just by the Athenian assembly, than the result of fatigue of an electorate vvhich vvas about to complete a ten years vvar effort. Ladies and Gentlemen, The political heritage of Kemal Atatrk is as vast as the country vvhich he led to national independence, to vvhich he gave a national iden4. Among other important sources see: Alexander Alexandris "Historical framework of Greek-Turkish Relations" Chapt. B "Greekturkish friendship (1930-1938)", Ed (in Greek) Gnosi and ELIAMEP, 1988.

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tity and for which he strived to pave the way to a modern world. His famous pronouncement "Peace to Turkey, peace in the whole world" was not a cry of necessity, but rather an act of faith to a new destiny, although there has not been since a clear end to the tumultuous and often dramatic upheavals which shake internally this conutry. it is at a Turkey of internal and external peace the world is placing its expectations. Stili, one does not have to look too far to take note of the commitment of Turkey to the same values defended by the West, reading the Summit Declaration of the Countries of South Eastern Europe, made in Antalya along similar lines as those initiated exactly a year aego by the same conference in Crete. A firm commitment to peace and a common will to strengthen good neighbourly relations, to promote democratic values, the rule of law, human rights, including rights of persons belonging to national minorities emanate from this declaration, and point the way a modern "kemalist" Turkey is engaged in. in contemporary terms "modernity" and "modernisation" are equivalent to the values and principles vvhich have just been mentioned. As previously stated, they should not be seen as static or frozen, but as the source of a constant trend to a final and effective improvement. From this standpoint, the kemalist doctrine determines the principles upon vvhich a modern Turkish society should be build. On the other hand, from the evaluation of this forvvard movement, as regards its acceleration and firmness, stem the difficulties encountered by Turkey in her relations with the European Union. To be absolutely clear, the point of contention betvveen Turkey and the E.U. derives from the emphasis the latter is giving to the alignment of Turkey "..of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European Union". We are at a deadlock, as the strict and indiscriminate requirements for accession formulated by the E.U. in view of its enlargement on the one hand, and the lack of efficient diplomacy, on the other have prevented Turkey from consolidating her grip on the E.U. which could have been the result, beyond her association relationship, of her participation to the European Conference. Such outcome in the long run would have given to Turkey the opportunity to fulfill in a different manner the important role to vvhich she is already committed in the oil rich areas of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Her special influence in that area is due to a variety of ethnic, cultural and other factors. Hovvever that role is facing the risk of being accomplished in isolation. Turkey could be seen as a server or intermediary of majr economic interests of the industrialised West, rather han acting from an enhanced position of a country whose European identity and profile are not in doubt. As a multicultural country of secular and Islamic currents, of the Kurdish and other traditions present in one way or another as minorities vvhich have enriched its physionomy, Turkey would enjoy a special 563

kind of solidarity from her European associates, as long eas she would be able to reform, extending to modern requirements the precepts of the kemalist doctrine and to meet the european political standards to which she aspires. There are more than one barrier to this evolution, which have to be overcome. This is a task which among other necessitates total freedom from wrong perceptions in this country, which sometimes sees herself in a state of siege from her western neighbours, namely the Greeks. Which also does not see the merits to her own best interests of letting her brothers, those who are members of the Turkish Cypriot Community, to beneft of the welfare and security advantages the accession of Cyprus as a whole to the E.U. can provide to them, in anticipation of a future accession of Turkey. I shall not dwell on other equally important and emphatic points the E.U. is raising vis--vis Turkey, in particular those regarding its relations with my own country. Instead, I would wish to conclude by quoting a few words taken from the Crete and the more recent Antalya Summit Declarations, relating to a simple truth and a great ambition, and I quote: "...Europe cannot be complete without the countries of South Eastern Europe, vvithout our peoples representing civilisations and cultures, which have traditionally contributed to the formation of a contemporary European identity". This is a commitment capable of liberating us from a number of dangerous misconceptions. Thank you.

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AZERBAYCAN TARHLNDE VE NVERSTE KURSLARINDA ATATRKLK KAVRAYII

Prof. Dr. Elmira MURADALYEVA* Ouz kkl, dili bir, gani bir, kltr bir olan Azerbaycan'n Trkiye ile mnasebetinin tarihi zellii var. Azerbaycan Trkiyeni sadece gonu bir devlet gibi deyil, karta gibi kabul edir. 1918 yl Ermeni krgnndan Azerbaycan Trkn hilas eden Trkiyeli kartalarna hemie minnettardr. Bugn 75. yldnmn kayt etdigimiz Trkiye Cumhuriyeti hakkn, edaletin, bamszln, demokrasiyann simbolu gibi yaayr ve btn Trk dnyasnn mididir. Baa atan XX. yzyle nezer salarken grrk ki, bu yzyli ferglendiren en byk elametlerden biri dalan imparatorluglarn zerinde yeni, bamsz milli devletlerin doulmasdr. Artk XX. yzyln balangcnda Rus imparatorluunun dalmas Trk ve Mselman dnyasnda ilk olarak Cumhuriyet ilan olunmas ile baa atd. Bu, AZERBAYCAN HALK CUMHURYET idi (28 Mays 1918). 23 ay yaam bu Cumhuriyet Azerbaycan halknn tarihinde ve taleyinde mhm hadise oldu. Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti'ni yaradan ehsler, bada MEHMET EMN RASULZADE olmakla, Azerbaycan Trkleri'nin erefini hilas etdiler. Ayn zamanda "Ya istiklal, ya lm" uarn ireli atm lmsz ATATRK'n nderlii ile 29 Ekim 1923 ylnda TRKYE CUMHURYET'nin temelleri goyuldu. Lakin, Osmanl Trkiye iin de zaman hadiseleri ok keskin goymudu. Birinci Dnya Sava'ndan yenik kan devletlerden biri de Trkiye idi. Trkiye, mttefiklerinden daha uzun sre sava iinde kalmt. 1911'den 1918'e kadar: nce talyanlara, sonra Balkan devletlerine, en sonunda da Bat ttifak devletlerine kar. 1918'de yenik den devletler arasnda, silaha yeniden sarlan ilk lke Trkiye oldu ve Kurtulu Savan kazand.
* Azerbaycan Devlet niversitesi, Baku.

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Birinci Dnya Sava'nm balanmas erefesinde Avrupa devletleri Osmanl Trkiyesi'ni z aralarnda bltrmek hakknda danklara balamdlar. Onlarn 1915-1917 yllarda birbiri ile baladklar saziler imparatorluun demek olar ki, btn topraklarnn elinden alnmasn ve z aralarnda bltrlmesini nezerde tuturdu; Dou vilayetleriRusya'ya kemeli idi; Surya ve etraf -Fransa'ya; Mesopotamya, zmirAydn demir yollarnn kedigi erazi- ngiltere'ya; Anadolu ise Almanlar iin nezerde tutulurdu. Osmanl mparatorluu'nun taleyane 10 Austos 1920 yl stanbul hkmetinin Antanta devletleri ile imzalad Sevr barmas hukuki cehetten hail etdi. Barmann artlar ile Osmanl Trkiyesi z ordusunu burakmal (Antantann nezaretine tabe olan cemi 15 bin asker saklaya bilerdi), herbi donanmasn eslinde lev etmeli idi; Trkiye znn Surya, Felestin, Arapistan yarmadas, Transiordanya ve Mesopotamya'daki topraklarndan mahrum olmu, Dou Frakiya'dak erazisinin ekseriyetini itirmi (Trkiye'de serti saklanlm olan stanbul ve onun etrafndan baga); zmir ise eslinde Yunanistan'a verilmidi. Ermenistan'a bamszlk verilmesi ve onun erazisinin Erzurum, Van, Trapezund ve Bitlis vilayetlerine kadar genilendirilmesi barmada ayrca matte gibi nezerde tutulmutu. Krdtan hkmeti yaratlaca da barmada kayt edilirdi. Barmann artlar ile Trkiye'ye yalnz Merkezi Anadolu yaylas kalmal idi. Barmann maliye-iktisadi meselelere hasr olunmu matteleri btvlkte gareti mahiyete malik idi. Barmaya gre Osmanl Trkiyesi eslinde mstekil bir devlet gibi z feliyyetini dayandrrd. O dvr sonralar Atatrk z bhle deyerlentirmiti: "Osmanl memleketleri tamamile paralanmt. Ortada bir ovuc Trkn yaad bir ata yurtu kalmt. Son mesele bunun da bltrlmesini hayata keirmekten ibaret idi. Osmanl devleti, onun istiklali, padiah ve halife, hkmet-bunlarn hamisi z mezmununu itirmi ifadelerden ibaret idi". Bylece Atatrkn nderlii altnda Trk halk, bir yandan emperyalismi azimkar biimde reddederken, te yandan da ulusal bamszln elde etmek amacyla yiite dgt. "Ya istiklal, ya lm" uan altnda Atatrk ilk bakta mmkn olmayan bir eraitte tarihde z layikli yerini tutmu olan Milli zgrlk mcadelesine balk etti. Mudros barmas ile balanan (30 Ekim 1918) ve Sevr mkavilesi ile hayata keirildigi zenn edilen Trk halkn Anadolu topraklarndan ikartmak ve tarihten silmek istehen korhunc sihaset ba tutmad. 1918-1922 yllarda kalebe alm Milli zgrlk mcadelesi bamsz Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin yaradlmas ile neticelendi. 11 Ekim 1922 ylnda Antanta devletleri ile imzalanan Mudanya barmas ile blh araitine kecildi. Trk ve Yunan kuvvetleri arasndaki dylere son koyuldu. 1 Kasm 1922 ylnda Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi'nin karar ile Saltanat ve Halifelik birbirinden ayrld ve Saltanat lev edildi.

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Artk nvbe sulh hakknda grlere gelmidi. 20 Kasm 1922 ylnda Lozan sulh konferans topland. Aylarla devam eden grler keirildi. Nehayet, 24 Temmuz 1923 ylnda Antlama imzaland. Trkiyenin esas topraklar z iktiyarnda kald ve yeni Trkiye Devleti'nin bamszl btn dnya terefinden testik olundu. Diplomatya sahesinde elde edilen bu sonluk ok ehemmiyetli idi. Bu barma, Atatrk'n ifadesi ile, "Trk milleti aleyhine yzylliklerden beri hazrlanm ve Sevr barmas ile baa attrld zenn edilen byk bir sui-gesdin levini ifade eden bir sened idi."1 Nehayet, 29 Ekim 1923 yl Meclis toplantsnda Cumhuriyet ilan olundu ve millet vekili Mustafa Kemal Cumhurbakan seildi. Cumhuriyetin ilan ile devlet kurumunun dnyaviletirilmesi lazm idi. Halifeli Cumhuriyet ola bilmez. Buna gre 3 Mart 1924 ylnda BMM'nin kabul ettii bir yassayla halifelik kaldrld. Bundan sonra devletin modern bir ekil almas ve milletin masir sivilizasya seviyesine en ksa zamanda ata bilmesi yolunda byk devrimlerin yolu almt. Ama yeni Trkiye Cumhuriyetini tam bamsz, ada bir devlet haline getirmekti. Teokratik devlet aparatnn dnyavi siyasi kurulula evez edilmesi Mustafa Kemal'in byk tarihi hidmetlerinden biri idi. "Btn eyimiz Trkiye'de ada, bat devletleri numunesi ile bir hkmet kurmaktr".2 Halifeliin yzyllar boyu hkmranlk ettii bir cemiyette byle bir radikal tetbir cesaretli olmakla byk terekki idi. Mustafa Kemal'i meraka ynelten bir konu da halkn bu devrim eylemlerini nasl karlad idi. Bunu renmek iin, Mustafa Kemal Anadolu'nun birok kentini gezdi, devrimin gerekliliini anlatt, yaplan devrimlerin halka benimsetilmesine alt. 1934 ylnda BMM hususi bir kanunla Mustafa Kemal'a "ATATRK" soyadn verdi. Atatrk'n Trk halkna hadihe ettii en byk tarihi eseri Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'dir. Atatrk'n nderlii ile Trkiye'de aparlan reformlarn mumbeeri ehemiyeti inkaredilmezdir. Atatrk ilkeleri; cumhuriyetilik, milliyetilik, halklk, devletilik, layiklik, devrimcilik birok ulus, ilk nce yeni yaranm Trk Cumhuriyetleri iin rnek olmudur. Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 10. ylnda Atatrk z tarihi konumasnda Sovyetler Birlii'nin gelecekde paralanacan uzakgrenlikle kayt etmiti: "Bugn Sovyetler Birlii idaresinde dili bir, inanc bir, z bir kartelerimiz vardr. Onlara sahip kmaa hazr olmalyz. Hazr olmak yalnz o gn susup beklemek deildir. Hazrlanmak lazmdr. Milletler buna nasl hazrlanr? Manevi kprlerin salam tutarak. Dil bir kprdr... nan bir kprdr... Tarih bir kprdr...". Bugn Atatrk'n bu uzakgrenlii gereklie evrilmi. Alt bamsz Trk devleti mvcuttud gnmzde.
1. Utkan Kocatrk. Atatrk. Baku, 1991, s. 60 2. Orada, s. 61

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Sovyetler Birlii'nin kmesi ile (1991) bamszlk gayesi bir siyasi meram olmu, yaranm yeni Trk Cumhuriyetleri iin Atatrk ilkeleri ne ekilmitir. Azzerbaycan Milli demokrasi mcadelesinin nderi Ebulfez Elibey bir siyaset adam gibi Trkiye'nin, Trk halklarnn zgrlk, kurtulu yolundaki rolunu okgzel bilirdi. Onun "Azerbaycan'n yolu Trkiye yoludur. Azerbaycan'n yolu Atatrk yoludur" fikri byk bir tarihi balln ifadesi gibi seslendi. Elibey'in halle 60'c yllarda balayan siyasi faaliyetinde Trkiye bir siyasi model gibi, devlet ve iktisadiyet znegi gibi aratrlrd.31990 ylda o, verdii msahibede demidir: "Ben Atatrk sistemini ok holahram ve Atatrk alnn heyrini ok grmem, tecrbeden km grmem, ondan da istifade etmek isteyirem... Mustafa Kemal'in fikrini, hettini daha ok sevdiime gre ona mraciyet edirem."4 Kemide Trkler Kk Tanrya sitayi edirdiler. Orhon Kitabelerinde deilir: "Ey benim halkm! zne dn! Sen zne dnende byk olursan!" Bu uar Trk halklarn zne kayt, zn derk etmee arr. Milli znderk ve zntestik, milli uurun formalamas Atatrk dnce sisteminin mhm terkip hissesidir: "... Kklerimize inmeli ve olaylarn bld tarihimizin iinde btnlemeliyiz". Bu anlaylar ilk nce tarihi bilikler aharnda gelimektedir. Atatrk iin Kurtulu Sava ne kadar byk bir nem tamsa, ylece Trk tarihi davasn da her iin stnde tutmutu. Atatrk'den nce Trklerin tarihi slam tarihi, Osmanl tarihi iinde eridilirdi. Bunun iin Trklk tarihinin, corafyasnn ve kltrnn derinliini, geniliini aratrmak, yanl fikirlere cevap vermek, dnya sivilizasyasnda Trklerin tarihi, hakk ve kltr olduu hakkta aratrmalar aparmak esas vazife idi. Bu aratrmalarn caciblii ondan da Mi gelirdi ki, son yzyllikler iinde Trklerin tarihi dnya tarihinden silinmek, yok olmak tehlkesi garsmda idi, unutmaa, unutturulmaa meruz kalmt, hatta Trkn Avrupa, Anadolu, Kafkas corafyasnda yeri, hakk, tarihi olmad bir fikir srlrd. Bylece, Trk halklarnn etnocorafi ve etnotarihi problemleri her zaman keskin siyasi tartma mvzusu olmu ve elede olmaktadr. Trkln ada missiyas Milli uurun gelimesi iin gereklidir. Ayni zamanda Milli uur Milli bamszln gazanmas, onun dnmezliginin teminatnda halledici amildir. Meselenin tarihine enerek grrk ki, arlk ve Sovyet imparatorluklarnda yaam Azerbaycan Trklerinin, Trkstan halklarnn, Krm ve Volga Tatarlarnn, Balkar ve Garaaylann, Gagauzlann tarihi z kknden kopardlarak oksayl zerbelere meruz kal3. 4. Kmil Veli Nerimanolu ilk defe konsepsiyon eklinde Elibey'in hidmetini aklayp. // EbUifez Eli Eli Bey. stanbul, 1992 Eblfez Elibey. /Bu benim talegimdir. Baku, 1992, s. 74, 113

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mlar. Neyin bahasna olursa olsun Trklkle, Milli-azadlk ideyas ile bal olan dnceleri, fikirleri komnist vetenperverligi, Sovyet beynelmilelcilii ile evez etmek idi. Trk halklarn bir-birinden ayrmak, onlarn gedim devlete, kltre malik olduunu gstermemek Sovyet milli siyasetinin balca istigameti idi. nk vaktile ok byk erazide yaayan ve yzyllikler boyu bu erazilerde Trk kltr ve tarihinin kalklann sbt eden halkn bykln, menevi zenginliini kabul etmek emperyann milli siyasetine katyan uygun gelmirdi. Yakn zamana katar, mtehassisleri nezere almasak, ehalinin byk ekseriyeti Trk halklarnn gedim tarih ve kltr, devlet kuruluu ile, kemi Sovyet imparatorluu erazisinde heyli Trk halkn yaadn ve onlar arasnda tarihen manevi yaknlk olduunu bilinirdiler. okcildli "Vsemiranaya istoriya", "Istoriya drevnego mira" (3 cildde), "storiya srednih vekov" (2 cildde), "Sovetskiy ensiklopedieskiy slovar", habele yzlerle tariha aid derslik ve monografyalarda Trk halklar iin alasmaz bir yaran nezeriyesi uydurulmudu. Byle ki, Trk halklarnn umumi tarihi arasnda sn'i uurumlar yaratlr, bir-birinden tecrid halda aratrlr, numtrk kknden uzaklatrlr, bu halklar "gelme" adlandrlmlar. Tarihi biliklerin ktlevi esas olan renv kitaplar emperyann nezareti altnda sifarile hazrlanrd ve bylece itimai fikir esil hakikattan uzaklatrlrd. Bu ifariin icraclar olan bir para yerli alimler Merkezin (Sankt-Peterburg ve Moskova) konsepsyas ile yklenmidi. Azerbaycan tarihi zre akademik mumiledirici nerlerin5 esas gtrlen konsepsyonun balca tezileri bunlar olmudur: Azerbaycanllar (Azerbaycan Trkleri deil) znn Trk kklerinden kopartlp, ranKafkas soykknden treyib doulduu, Medya tarihi ve medyallar ile "gohumluu" inandrlr. Gya azerbaycanllar Trk dillerinin birinde ("Trkdilli halk") danan bir halk gibi bu topraklara XI. yzylda gelmiler, onlarn tarihi slama, Mongollara, Trklere kar mbarizeden ibarettir; Rus halk Azerbaycanllar nasl Dou istibdadndan kurtard; milliyeti Azerbaycan Halk Cumhuriyetine kar Rus inkilapdemokratlarnn mbarizesi ve hilasedici rol, kommunizmin igl yollarnda kazanlan kalebeler, ieklenen Azerbaycan, Sovyet halklarnn kartalk ailesine mensupluk, karlkl yardm ve emektalk Azerbaycan halkn geni inkiaf yoluna kartm, i ve d dmenlere kalip gelmee imkan vermidir. Azerbaycan terekkisini baga bir istikamette aktaranlar, onu SSR'den kenarda, bamsz grmek isteyenler halkn dmenleridirler. Lakin muhtelif vaktlarda Azerbaycan uyannn nderleri olmudur. 60. c yllerden Sovyetler Birlii'nde Azerbaycan Trkolojinin esas mer5. Azerbaycan tarihi. 3 cildde. Az. SSR limler Akademisi. Baku 1958, 1960, 1963; storiya Azerbaydjana. Az. SSR limler Akademisi. Baku, 1979.

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kezine evrildi. Azerbaycan'da Trkln inkiaf manevi hayatn btn sahelerine kcl tesir gsterdi. Ama Sovyet ideolojisi buna mane olurdu. Bhle ki, 60. c yllerin sorlrond Azerbaycan tarihini milli zeminde yazmaa karar veren, "partiyallk prinsiplerinden kenara km" Z. Bnyatov, M. smaylov, S. Aliyarl gibi tarihiler ok ciddi tezyige maruz kaldlar.6 Eyni zamanda Azerbaycan'n tarihini, edebihatn milli konsepsiyon esasnda hazrlad iin, Azerbaycanllarn soykkn Trk kkne balad iin, Azerbaycan Tarihi haritalarn dzgn verdiyi iin I ci cild Azerbaycan ensiklopedisi lev edildi. 1975 ylnda kazak airi Olcas Sleymanov'un "Az i Ya" eseri Sovyet imparatorluunda partlay etdi. Hakim Rus milliyetiliine, ovenizmine gl bir zarbe vuruldu, iki hisselik "gor Destan"nn Trk meneine ve kadim Trk-umer ilikilerine neredilmi formaca ilimi-bedii esse, mazmunca politik pamflet idi. Avrupasentrizmini, Rus ovenizmini ifa eden bu eser milli trkolojinin, tarihiliin inkiafnda ok byk rol oynad. Azerbaycan Sovyet tarihiliinde ilk olarak 1983 c ylnda limler Akademisi'nde keirilen "Azerbaycan halknn etnogenezi" adl ilmi seminarda bir kurup tarihi alim -Y. Ysifov, S. Aliyarl, G. Geybullayev, K. Aliyev- yeni ilmi faktlarla k ettiler. Derin aratrmalar esasnda onlar sbut etmiler ki, Azerbaycan Trkleri "gelme" olmam, erken dvrden Trk dilinde danm ve he bir baka halktan dnmemiler. Bu klarn yazs o vaktlar iin grnmemi balk altnda ner edildi.7 Prof. S. Aliyarl'nn bu topluda ap olunmu mekalesi- "Ob etnoganaza azerbaydjanskogo naroda" -1990c ylnda AB- da yeniden ap olundu8. Bylece Azerbaycan tarihiliinde soykk problemi zre ilmi konsepsiyonun yaradlmas ynnde uurlu bir attm atld. Lakin 80 ci yllarn ortalarnda Moskova'da kan Merkezi wurnallarda ("storiya SSSR", "Vopros istorii") Azerbaycan Trklerinin esil soykkn aratranlara kar kampaniya baland. Azerbaycan aydnlarna yene "Trk", "Pantrkist" gibi siyasi damgalar vuruldu. Umumiyetle, SSR dvrnde Azerbaycanllarn etnik kimliyi zre ne limler Akademisi nezdinde, ne niversite kuruluunda mtehassis hazrlanmamd. Bu problemin tarihi Merkezin gsterii ile bir para tarihinin inhisarna verilmidi. Bu bir daha onu testikleyir ki, Sovyet tarihiliinde etnogenez problemi "bal", gadaan olan mvzu idi.
6. 7. 8. Bak: Sov. KP XXIV kurultaynn kararlar ile alakadar olarak ideoloji ii daha da glendirmek sahesinde respublika partiya tekilatlarnn vazifeleri hakknda materiallar. 29-30 ekim, 1971. Baku, 1972, s. 38 K probleme etnogeneza azerbaydjanskogo naroda. Baku, 1984 Aliyarov Sleyman. On the Genesis of the Azerbaidzanian People (Tp Ward aFormulation of the problem). // Soviet Antropology and Archeology. New-ork, 1990

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Sovyetler Birlii'nin kmesi ve Trk Cumhuriyetlerin bamszlk kazanmas neticesinde tarihiler iin ilmi esaslarla eserler yazmaa, dzgn bilige ktlevi yiyelenmek imkan yaranmdr. Atatrk'n "tarih gerekleri tehrif eden bir sanat deil, eksine, onu aip gsteren bir ilim sahebi olmaldr" fikri yalnz devletin ve milletin bamsz olmas ile gerektir. Artk gnmzde Azerbaycan tarihinin bir ok mvzular hakknda hakiki ve tam bilige ktlevi yiyelenmek imkan yaranmtr. limin niversite merkezlerinde aydnlarn bu sahede aratrmalar mumiletirilmi eserlerde, dersliklerde z eksini tapmdr.9 "Azerbaycan tarihi"nin (1994) mellifi merhum Prof. Y. Lsifov Azerbaycan Trklerinin soykk hakknda yazrd ki, "bezi tetkikatlanmz artk eynenmi konsepsiyon ile silahlanarak halkmzn gneyda Farslar'dan, guzeyda Kafkas dilli Etnoslar'dan dnme gibi esassz fikri tarihimize zramaa alrlar. Halbuki ne Farslar'm, ne de Kafkas dilleri ailesine mepsup olan Etnoslar'n ktlevi surette Trklemesini gsteren he bir tarihi sbt yoktur. Tarih boyu Azeri Trkleri Farsmeneli ve Kafkasdaki baga Etnoslarla konu olmu, onlarn meyen kismi Azerbaycan'da meskan salmtr".10 Prof. S. Aliyarl'nn redaktesile yazlm "Azerbaycan tarihi" kitab Azerbaycan tarihiliinde uurlu bir hadise oldu. tiler boyu ilimi seminarlarda, konferanslarda, renciler auditoryalarda ireli srlen konseptual ideyalar, Azerbaycan tarihinin mhm problemleri byk zehmet hesabna hazrlanm ve bu kitapda z eksini tapltr. limi adamlarn deyerine gre, bu kitap Azerbaycan'n bamszlnn ifadesidir. Kitapda uzun yller Azerbaycan tarihinin saktalatrlmasna hidmet etmi yanl ve sererli konsepsiyonlardan farkli bir konsepsiyonun -milli konsepsyonun yaradlmas ynnde uurlu bir attim atlm ve en esas ise Azerbaycan tarihi alimlerin gerek ilimi esaslarla eserler yazmasna yol almdr. Kitapta yenilik oktur. Bunlardan biri- yeni kaynaklarn kitapa dmesidir. Prof. F. Krzolu Yunandilli kaynaklarda eski Trklerin n Asya, Aralk, Gara ve Hezer denizleri blgelerinde yaamas hakknda bir sra yeni melumatlar ze karp ye bunlar "Azerbaycan tarihi" kitapnda geni istifade olunup. Vey ah smayl'n Musa Durgutolu'nun adna ferman ilk defe kitapta istifade edilip byle kaynaklar oktur.
9. M. Ismaylov. Azerbaycan tarihi. Baku, 1992; Azerbaycan Tarihi (en kadim zamanlardan XX esredek). I cild. Z. Bnyatovun ve Y. Ysifovun redaktesile. Baku, 1994; Azerbaycan tarihi. Uzak kemiden 1870 ci yllara kadar. Prof. S. Aliyarl'nn redaktesile. Baku, 1996 10. Azerbaycan tarihi, Baku, 1994, s. 209, 210

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Bu eserin yeni alfabe ile (latn alfabesine dayanan) ner edilmesi de Azerbaycan tarihiliinde nemli bir hadisedir, nk Trk halklar ile aradaki harf duvarlar yklr. Kitapn byk bir blmnde Azerbaycan Trklerinin yaran problemi "sosyal sifari"den uzak, ilimi prinsipler esasnda aratrlm ve Azerbaycan tarihiliinde yaran probleminin renilmesinde elde edilmi yeni ilimi baklar esasl ekilde testiklenmidir. Kitapta "kayt olunur ki, "dnyann bir ok lkeleri gibi, Azerbaycan da tarihen okmilletli bir memleketdir. Burada uzak kemiden balayarak Kafkas-ber dillerinde danan (Udinler, Mizgiler ve b.) ve randilli (Tatlar, Tallar ve b.) toplumlar oklukda olan Trksoykkl bir halk ile yana ve birlikde yaamlar ve yaamaktatrlar... Ama dnya tarihinde kke bir-birine yakn olan veya olmayan her halkn z yaran yolu vardr"." Azerbaycan Trklerinin bir halk gibi tarih sehnesine kmas ilimde byk marag douran mvzulardan biridir. Ancak bugne gibi bir sra tarihiler bu mvzuya ilimi bakmdan deil, en'enevi imparatorluk siyaseti "bakmndan" yanamaktadrlar. Kitapta problem zre "tarihilik emperializmi" aratrlr. Kibin her hangi kkden yaranp dnyaya gelmesi Merkez-Sankt-Peterburg ve Moskova- ilim adamlarn sanki bu halklarn zlerinden daha ok rahatsz edirdi. Bu he de tesadfi deildi. z "byk siyasetini" btn sahelerde yapmak isteyen Merkez, zerinde aalk ettii halklarn kemiine yalnz znn "lp bidiyi" bir kalip vurmaa alrd. Trk halklarnn "ilkin veteni" yalnz Altay blgesi sayld. Onlarn hepsinin IX-XI yzyldan nce Iran ve Kafkas-ber kknden olduu, yalnz sonralar dnp Trklemee uradklar inandrlrd. Buna uygun olarak "Trkdilli halk" anlay ortaya atlp vetendalk gazand. S. Aliyarl kayt edir ki, "tarihilik emperializmi" eslinde bu problemin renilmesi zerine yasak vurmutu. Son zaman "tarihilik emperyalizmi"ne kar- inlilerin, Farslarn, Ruslarn inadl cehdlerine bakmayarak, ada Trk halklarnn corafi ve siyasi tarihlerinin mhkem temeli goyulup. Bu, o demekdir ki, Atatrk'n "tarih bir milletin kann, hakkn, varln he bir zaman inkar ede bilmez" fikri ada tarihiliimizde z tezdiini tapir. Analoji olarak Azerbaycan Sovyet tarihiliinde taleykl baka bir probleme de bak ziddiyetli idi. Gzey Azerbaycan'n Rusya terefinden igali (1801-1828) ve Azerbaycan'da smrgecilik sisteminin kurulmas hakknda gerek konsepsyon yok idi. Kaynaklarn melumatlar inkar edilerek, "'birleme' knll bir akt, mterekki tarihi hadise" gibi verilirdi. 12 Bhle bir deyerlendirme hetta kitaplarn balna karlrd. Azerbaycan tarihinin bu probleminden yazan melliflerin oku Azerbaycan'n Rusya terefinden igalna hakk gazandrlaa, buna medenilediricilik don geyindirmege alrd.
11. Azerbaycan tarihi, Baku, 1996, s. 156 -12. Azerbaycan'n Rusya'ya birletirilmesi ve onun iktisadiyat ve medeniyet sahesinde mterekki neticeleri. Azerbaycan SSR tmler Akademisi. Baku, 1955.

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60 c yllarn sonunda S. Aliyarl "Kuzey Azerbaycan'n Rusya ile birletirilmesi ve ekonomik vaziyeti" adl ilk dolgun, itti aratrma yapd.13 Bu resmi teze kar kmak idi.14 Yeni aratrmann neticesi ondan ibaret ede ki, "birletirme" adlanan proses herbi smrgeclik boyunduruu idi, "birlemenin" neticesinde Gzey Azerbaycan Rus metropolyasmn iktisadi smrgecine ve hammal bazasna evrilmidi. Bu konsepsyona kar metbuda kampaniya baland, "birlemenin" resmi ideoloji esasnda mterekki ehemiyeti mdafie olundu. Bugn bu mesele zre sifarisiz, ancak ilimi-tarihi bak stnlk tekil edir. Bu konserpsyonun dzgn olduu Baku niversitesinin 75. yldnmne hesr edilmi yncakda en yksek devlet seviyesinde testiklendi.15 arlk Rusya'nn Kafkas'da yerittigi smrgecilik siyasetinin balca cehetlerinden biri de burada kkl etnodemografya deyiikligi yaratmaa almas idi. Ipyotrun vaktnda Rus hkmeti ile sk elage saklayan Ermeni kilisesi yeni Hristiyan devletinin blgede mhkemlenmesini arzulamakla Kafkas'da Ermenileri hehemon etnosa evirmek ve tarihi Trk topraklarn benimsemek maksadleri drd. XIX. yzyln evvellerinde Rusya'nn Kafkas'da apard iri mikyasl savalar eraitinde bu plann reallamas iin elverili zemin yarand. Rus igali zaman neinki halkn soyad inkar edildi, hapine lkenin adnn- "Azerbaycan" mefhumunun resmi devlet senetlerinde ilenmesi lev olundu ve sonralar ise haritelerden de silindi. Bu vaktdan Rusya'nn resmi senetlerinde, o cmleden Rusya ve ran arasnda balanm Glstan (1813) ve Trkmenay (1828) barmalarnda Kafkas Azerbaycan'nn ad yok, kemi hanlklarn adlan kayt olunmudur.16 Yalnz 28 Mays 1918 yl Azerbaycan adnn devlet anlay gibi Halk Cumhuriyeti terefinden testik olundu. Mehmet Emin Rasulzade 1925 ylnda stanbul'da okuduu kendi mhazereleri zaman kayt etmidi: "Rusya idaresindeki mselmanlara "Trk" dedirtmek indi artk kazanlm bir davadr. Yalnz "Trk" kelmesi deil, "Azerbaycan" ad da kazanlmdr". Azerbaycan Halk Cumhuriyeti devrildikden sonra da Azerbaycan ad resmen mhafize edildi. Azerbaycan Halk Cumhuriyeti mvcudluunun tarihi ehemmiyetinden biri de mehz bu faktdr. 27 Nisan 1920 yl istilas ile devlet faktiki bamszln itirse de, Azerbaycan SSR gibi formal da olsa bamsz kald. Bugn Azerbaycan'n milli bamszla kavumas Atatrkln beyinlere ve yreklere hakim olmas iin erayit yaranm ve bu yolda byk almalar gerektir. Sosializm rejiminin demir perdeleri Atatrk'
13. Bu barede bak: Taha Akyol. Azerbaycan Sovyetler ve tesi. stanbul, 1990, s. 122, 123 14. Sov. KP XXIV kurultaynn kararlar..., s. 38 15. Baku Devlet niversitesi'nin 75. yllk yubileyine hesr olunmu tenteneli merasimde Azerbaycan Respublikas prezidenti H. Aliyevin nitki. // Azerbaycan gazetesi, 29.XI.1994, s. 2. 16. Azerbaycan tarihi, Baku, 1996, s. 602-607; 618-624

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dnce sisteminin yaylmasna imkan vermidi. Sovyetler Birlii'nde mehur siyasi ve herbi hadim Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in seilmi eserleri Rus dilinde iki defe ner olduu halda,17 Azerbaycan Trkesinde ilk defe olarak yalnz 1991 ylda k z grmdr.18 Son yller M.E. Rasulzade adna Baku Devlet niversitesi'nde bir sra ilimi almalar mdafye olunmudur. Bunlara Atatrk'n eserleri, nutuklar tarihi kaynak gibi istifade edilmidir.19 Kemi arlik ve Sovyetler Birlii dneminde tarih bir ilim gibi esasen son 70 ylde hamlkla okunurdu. Lakin bu tarihde ilmilik siyasiideoloji mey arlarla evez olunmudu. Neticede bu tarih Trk halklar iin z tarihlerinin yrenilmesine deil, unudulmasna hidmet edirdi. Orta ve Ali mekteblerde esas dikkat Rusya tarihinin renilmesine yneldilmidi. SSR daltmdan sonra Trk dnyas tarihini esasl aratrmas ile yana, onun renmesi iin de geni imkanlar yaranmdr. Azerbaycan niversiteleri kuruluunda Trk halklar tarihi krsleri alm ve renciler iin mvafik kurslar okunumaktadr.20 Prof. Dr. Turan Yazgan'n bakanl ile Trk Cumhuriyetlerinde alan Trk mektepleri, kitap maazalar, kongrede toplantlar, seminar ve grler, "Trk Dnyas Aratrmalar", "Trk Dnyas Tarihi", "Sosyal Siyaset" dergileri Trk dnyas iin ok byk bir hizmetter. 1990 ylnda Kayseri'de keirilen Birinci Byk Uluslar Aras Azerbaycan Kongresi Azerbaycan'n tarihine dahil olmu byk tarihi olay idi. Son yllar Azerbaycan'da Trklk fikrinin yaylmasnda Azerbaycan Aratrmalar Vegfi nemli yer tutur. 1997 ylnda Azerbaycan'da Trklk ve Azerbaycanlk problemlerine hesr edilmi ilmi-nezeri konferans keirildi. Konferansn materialler toplu ekilde ner olunup.21 Trklk ve Azerbaycanlk problemlerine bir ok tetkikatlar cevap aktarr. Prof. Sleyman Aliyarl kayt etmedi ki, indi Transkafkas lkelerin tarihi corafyas, etnik (ulusal) kimlii mvzusu ok mhmdr. Tesadfi deildir ki, London niversitesi bu yaknlarda "Transkafkas ser17. Kemal Mustafa. Put novoy Tursii. T. I-IV. Moskova, 1929-1934; Atatrk Kemal. zbranyye reci i vstupleniya. Moskova, 1966 18. Utkan Kocatrk. Atatrk. Tercme ve kaytlar Dnyamal Veliyevindir. Baku, 1991. 19. Rven Kilasov. Revoltsii v peryov etverti XX veka. (Dva etapa turetskogo revoltsionnogo dvijeniya). M.E. Rasulzade adna BD. Baku, 1993; Igbal Aayev. 1917-1920 ci yller Azerbaycan tarihi Trkiye tarihnaslnda. Avtoreferat. M.E. Rasulzade adna BD. Baku, 1993 20. Medhiyeva Nisbet. Rusya impariyas terkibindeki halklarnn tarihi. 1800-1917. M.E. Rasulzade adna BD. Baku, 1993; Mehdiyeva N. Trk halklarnn tarihine dair materiallar. BD. Baku, 1994; Trk ve Kafkas halklar tarihinin bezi meseleleri. BD. Baku, 1997. 21. Azerbaycann Trklk ve Azerbaycanlk problemleri. Azerbaycan Aratrmalar Vekili'nin 25-26 Nisan 1997 ylda "Azerbaycan'n Trklk ve Azerbaycanlk problemleri" mvzusunda keirdigi ilmi-nezeri konfransn materiallar. Baku, 1998

574

hedleri" bal ile geopolitik seryada ayrca bir kitap ap etmidir.22 Azerbaycan tarihiliini deyerlendirerek, S. Aliyarl yazr ki, indi tarihiliimiz zml bir keid anmna gelmidir. O, ciddi bir meselenin stnde dayanr. Bezi tarihilerimiz saya gelmez eski etinliklerin stne yenisini getirirler: Gzey Azerbaycaru "Azerbaycanllkdan" karmaa alr, "buras Azerbaycan deil, irvan olmudur" syleyir ve yazrlar. Gya irvanda XX. yzyle gibi yalnz randilli Tatlarn yaamas, bu sonuncularn ise "yalnz Azerbaycan'da Sovyet hakimiyeti kurulduktan sonra geti olarak Trklemeye baladn" yazrlar.23 Buna cevap olarak S. Aliyarl yazr: "Eer irvan'da yaayan toplum yalnz 1920 ci ylndan sonra "Trklemeye balam" idise, Aamesih irvani, Niat, Mehvei, Vaiz Efendi, Esger, Gasm, Mehcur, eker, Nabi Efendi, Lahc, Asef, Bahar, Naci gibi XVIII-XIX. yzyllarda Trke yazp yaradan onlarca "irvani"ler tarihimizde olmazd.24 Kitapta ap olunmu Prof. vket Tayevan'n megalesi de bu mvzu ile sesleir. Burada Azerbaycan tarihinin saktalatran, onun tarihi btvln inkara alan Iran melliflerine tutarl cevap verilir. Yllar boyu Azerbaycan ad etrafnda mbahiseler siyasi mahiyet tamaktadr. Bugnde ran tarihileri gerezli bir yazlarla k edirler ki, "Arran ve irvan topraklar bezen Arran ve irvan, bezen ise Kafkas adlandrlmdr.25 Keen yzyln evvellerinden balayan Gneyli-Guzeyli ayrlk ehalinin, btv halkn yaddanda uzun yller boyu yaamdr. Mellif bu fakt testikleyen bir resmi senedi -Rusya devletinin ran'daki memurunun melumatn verir. 1903 ylda Rusya'nn Tebriz'deki ba konsulluunun Azerbaycan eyaletinde yerli ehalinin bu devlete mnasibeti hakknda neticesi bhledir: "Buradaki Azerbaycanllar onlar iki hisseye ayrdmz iin bize nifret besleyirler". Konferansn nemli ceheti o oldu ki, mvzularla bal ilk defe olarak ilim adamlar ile yana siyaset adamlar da Trkln ve Azerbaycanln ada yozumunu vermee almlar. Bu ilimi ve siyasi muhitler arasnda temasn glenmesi bakmndan da az ehemiyet kesb etmir. Problemin ideoloji bir sistem gibi gavranlmas da dikketi calp edir. Bu iki anlay bezen eyniletirilir, bezen ise kar-karya goyulur. Bu barede sohbet aanlar Azerbaycancl yegane ve mmkn ideoloji sistem, milli ideoloji gibi kabul edirlir. Lakin bu fikre olan opponentler/Nesib Nesibza22. Transcaucasian Boundaries. The SOAS/GRC Geopolitiks Series. London. 1996. Kitabn "Azerbaycan Respublikas: devlet serhedleri kemide ve indi" adlanan altnc blm S. Aliyarl terefnden yazlmdr. 23. Neskolko zameaniy po povodu kenieskih prosesov v orvane. // Doklad AN Azers. SSR, t. XLII. Baku, 1986, s. 72. 24. Aliyarl S. Trklk ve Azerbaycanclk tarihi kaynaklarn nda. // Azerbaycan'n Trklk ve Azerbaycanclk problemleri, s. II, 12, 21 25. Tayeva . Azerbaycan ad etrafnda mbahiselerin siyasi mahiyeti. II Azerbaycan'n Trklk ve Azerbaycanclk problemleri, s. 32

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de, H. brahimli ve b.kayt edirler ki, bu ite klassik irsden istifade zeruridir, Azerbaycancl Trkln haricinde aktaranlar yanl fikirdedirler. Konferansda kabul edilmi ortak beyanatda kayt olunmudu ki, Trklk, Azerbaycann heyat ehtiyaclanndan domu, milli bamszln ve tehlkesizligin teminatna ynelmi, milli uurun, milli medeniyetin, dilin formalamasnda, gelimesinde mstesna rol oynamdr. O, hehemonuluga, tecavze kar dayanan zn mdafye ve mhafize telimidir. Azerbaycanlk zel Azerbaycan medeniyeti ve bu medeniyetden doan milli bamszlk siyasi idealinin gereklemesi barede telimdir. O istiklaliyeti, unitarl, vahidliyi- milli btvl hedef trmdr.26

26. Konferansda kabul edilmi ortak beyanat, s. 157

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COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TRK REPUBLICS

Prof. Dr. Anvar KASIMOV* The problem confronted at first by the new Trk republics founded within the borders of the former Soviet Union and Turkey, dialect from the current profound difference in dialect between the Trk communities. These communities spoke two dialects before the 1917 October Revolution and easily communicated with these dialects. Before the October Revolution aatay and Anatolian Trk vvere spoken, there was no difficulty in communication, books published in istanbul, Tashkent, Kazan and Baku vvere read easily every where and there was profound political, social and cultural communication. Within the Soviet period, as a result of the attempt to create different nations and in this way, to spoil the unity of the Soviet Union, language lost its identity of a "common" element to every nation and turned to a number of different languages. Indeed, differences in the alphabet and reading vvere created that made it difficult to read a book in region other then the Trk region vvhere it vvas published. On the other hand, vvithin the same period, Turkey experienced an alphabet revolution. Among the examples to be given in this cultural communication framevvork are the lOOth anniversary celebrations of 2st March Nevvroz Holiday and the lOOOth anniversary celebrations of Manas Epic, celebration of Al-Bukhary, Al-Fergany and Al-Horezmi. Hovvever, vvith the development of relations, it vvas seen that it vvas also a vvide gap in communication relations betvveen the Trk republics. Turkey started communication of the interstate level by being the first country to recognize Central Asia Trk Republics. The first step tovvards mass communication started vvith the broadcast of the Voice of Turkey radio station vvas to crate for the language needs of Central Asia. The first step other independence, it is the start of broadcasting of EurUniversity of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent.

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asian TV that was established on 27 April 1992 as a unit depend on TRT Television Office. With the need for the formation of many-sided communication sources, the frst step of the "News Agencies Union of the Trk Speaking Countries" were taken. This Union was organized on 2627 November 1992 in Ankara, with the cooperation of TICA and UNESCO. Ones again, within this framework, the formation of the "Union of Eurasian Press" was decided on with the conference on the "Role of the Press in the Meeting of the Trk Republics". This decision was reached on 20-21 October 1993. in addition of these, such project as joint film and cinema production, joint project for the Eurasian Station, joint attempts concerning television education, a relationship between private television in Turkey and TV stations broadcasting in the other Trk Republics and joint press publication were created. While some of these projects were materialized, some of them were not. Moreover, such good example of cooperation as the Council of Trk World Writes and the Occasion of Trk World Poetry were seen among cooperators. With Eurasian Television, a broadcasting policy has been through of with the aim of enabling the Trk countries and communities having a common language, culture, race and history to come closer, and of realizing cooperation becoming the joint station of ali the Trk Republics. Joint newspaper and magazine publications between the Trk republics and Turkey have been mostly produced with Turkey as a source, and have greatly materialized. Today "Zaman" newspaper that being printed for ali the Trk republics is functioning as a bridge to communication by publishing the news both about Turkey and ali the Trk republics. It's important to note that even TICA's Eurasian studies magazine directed tovvards Trk publics and published in their dialects, is a joint communication activity. The first step of the News Agencies of Union of Trk Speaking Countries (NAUTSC) that we will approach as one of the first attempts of producing an important communication netvvork were taken at 26-27 November 1992 at the Conference of Cooperation in Communication held in Ankara. The inability of the News Agencies of Union of Trk Speaking Countries to reach the expected goals, and the inability to take concrete steps in the matters dealt with at the general council meeting stem from the finalcial difficulties that the Trk republics now confront and that we believe are temporary.

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Apart from the fnancial difficulties, another reason why NAUTSC cannot achieve the efficiency and success is the deficiency in such technical materials as telephone, fax and modem. Moreover, there are the human sources that are inexperienced in the international circulation of news and inefficient in the display of the required performance. After the Central Asia and Azerbaijan, Trk Republics gained their Independence, the attempts at cooperation mass communication have not until now produced the desired results. A majority of the reasons that account for the inability of the attempts to develop are economic. The most important reason for NAUTSC not to be of the desired quality despite the excitement of its supporters of its foundation and their pointing out to its need, lies it these economic problems. it should be noted here that the NAUTSC is the most important element in the cooperation of mass communication started among the Trk Republics, and that it is desired to function on a horizontal communication model. The reason for this inefficiency is the fact that the NAUTSC offces of some of the republics are deprived of the necessary technological infrastructure. The telephone communication is expensive, and that there is not enough paper to place in the fat machine. Another problem of the offces of NAUTSC outside Turkey is the absence of suffciently experienced personel in the flow of international news. it is seen that there is fruitful cooperation with respect to newspaper and magazine publication. Hovvever, is the variety of the information needed by the Trk public option related to the Trk republics is taken into consideration, it vvould be useful of the nevvspapers and magazines increased the news and information they gave the Trk republics. The foremost issues that come out in the researches made about the content of the massages communicated via the TV station may be cited as follows: 1. Dealing with the epies that have a joint cultural value (i.e., Krolu, Manas, Borkurt Ourhan and the like) 2. Dealing with the parsons that have devoted themselves both to the Trk culture scientific life and art, and to humanity (i.e., Ahmed Yesevi, Ibn-i Sina, Alisher Navoi, Fizuli, Yunus Emre, Mevlana, Mahmat Kagari, Ali Kuu, Mahdum Kuli, Abay, Genceli Nizami, and the like) 3. Trade and economic activities. 579

it is obvious that this joint channel will gradually be watched more with the dramas, documentaries, music and other programs produced in the Trk republics. it is natural that in order for this joint channel to materialize the necessary infrastructure needs to be created. This infrastructure does not consist of the "Joint Broadcasting Council". in addition to this council, there is a needed for the establishment of a Eurasian TV bureau. The responsibility of this bureau for the flow of news, and the creating of a forum that does program research and production. The Trk film, music, culture, art, and folk festivals and competitions should be held by means of some inions. Moreover, joint awards in the branches of journalism, poety, art and profession should be considered within the framework of these activities. The project of connecting the Trk republics to the Internet via TICA is continuing. in addition to this attempts have been made to establish a Trk world information bank and to transfer information between the Trk world libraries and Universities. However, a concrete result has not been obtained from these projects. We hope that efforts will continue with the same eagemess and enthusiasm as at the onset.

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USING THE EXPERIENCE OF TURKEY N ECONOMY REFORM OF THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

Prof. Dr. Inom A. ASROROV* The Republic of Tajikistan is young sovereign state of Central Asia. To fnd its place in the world system, it is necessary to reform economy by intensive rate. Before 1992, the Rebuplic of Tajikistan was the part of USSR, and its economy was subordinated to the aims of common economic complex of USSR. Forming structure of economy in RT was quit up to the requirements of economy of common large state. Hovvever, after disintegration of USSR, after distraction of economic relations between union republics, such structure couldn't sit demands on independent economy of sovereign state. it's having to reconcile in motion. it's the frst. The second, the Republic of Tajikistan is transition from comand-administrative to the market economy. So, economy must be demand on the market, i.e., it should be effective, rentable, export orientally and responsive to the science-technical progress and realization these problems demand on serious economy reform. The third, economy of Tajikistan is in crisis conditions and suffered in the result of the civil war (1992-1994). Way out of the crisis is impossible without economy reform. The processes of economy reform is complicated, demand to take into account not only concrete local conditions of each state, but also international experiences in decision of analogous problems. Turkish experience of economy reform is more interesting. The first, Turkey has 75 years of experiences of independent development of economy. Turkish Republic was proclamed in 23 Oct., 1923. The large experiences in decision of political the economical problems were gain in the course of this period.
* President, Inst. of World Econ. and Int. Reis., Dushanbe.

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The second, Turkey is one of the nearest our neighboxr and our problems are likeness. The problems have been already decided successfully by Turkey and the ways of their decision are interest for us. Let's cali some of them. 1. Providing vvith progressive structural improvement in economy Systematic works vvere conducted in Turkey. With the coming to the government in 1994, civil government by the head of Mr. T. Osal worked up the new economic programm, which considerable grovvth of the share of industries, and the sphere of services envisaged in the number of first turn- measures. 1984 was particular for Turkey-the year interval between forth and fifth of five-year plan. The rate of GPP in a whole, as compared with 1983 totalled 5,9%, including agricultural vvere 3,7%, industry was 9,3% and the sphere of services-5,2%. First of ali, the success is explained by more rapid development of export of the productions, the share of agricultural goods and raw materials also considerable came down. So, by the growth of export on 28,5%, the share of product was increased at 72,1%, but agricultural goods came down at 24,5%, as for raw materials of external industry its share totalled 3,4%'. in 1985, the new five-year plan of economic and social development was addoption, where the structural changes in economy vvere payed special attention. The sphere of the structure of investment vvittness about its share of industry and energy totalled 34,7%, agricultural-20,7% and other sphere-15,4%. port. it's to show preference to investment in industry, able to product ex-

in the result of such structural policy of the government, the share of industry, energy and building totalled in 1989-33,3% against 28,6% in 1980. There vvere 3113,5 thous. peoples in industrial sector of economy, vvhich totalled 18,5% of economic active population of the country. As compared vvith 1962 there vvere 1350 thous. people in the industry or 10,5% of economic active population2. The share of the sphere of services in GPP are considerable increased. it totalled 58,4% in 1990, and in 3 199361,8% . The change of structure of economy pirmited Turkey to increase the product of GNP: in 1987-7,5%, in 1988-3,6%, in 1990-9,2%, 1993-5%4. The rate of GNP in developed market states (USA, Japan, Great Britain, Germany) totalled 2,3%. The volume of export in 1990 totalled $13 bili., and in 1993-$4,8 bili5.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Typnna: HOBue TeHneHum aK*necKoro paroM B 80-e ram. M: Hayica, 1991, c. 59. TaM x^cio73. Ayna Apnca ceronna, 1994, Ns 2, c: 12. Aiflu Apj*a ceronRH, 1994, Ns 2, c: 12. A*HH A*pJ*a cercmHS, 1994, Ns 2, c: 12.

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2. Providing with competitiveness of goods of turkish firms on the world economy. The experience of intriduction of achievement of sciences, techniques and progressive technology in the industry are interest for Tajikistan. There are some ways of decision of the problems. The first, it's to creat joint ventures with investment or attractive the investment in the way of the building of private foreign enterprises or their branshes. For example, the competitivenesty of productions of chemistry industry were achieved in that way. The production of the chemistry means of protections of plants, varnishes, dyes and some kind of dye-staffs. Private investment take active part in the development of machine and electrican industries. Progressive world technology strike in industries of Turkey by this way. Production and assembly of transportation by the licence of vvesteuropean and american companies are taken leading place in machinbuilding. The transnational coorporations active work in auto-tractor assembly industries of Turkey, such as "Ford", "Fiat", "Reno", "Mersedes", "Gambler Bens", "British Motor", "Crasler", and others closely coorperating with local large privare capital. The second way, it's the development of new productions, determining of NT in the ali branches of economy. From the begining of 80-years the new branches of radio and electronic industries are formed and intensively developed. The production of telephone, radio and teletechniques, electronical apparatuses, assembly of computers are increased on the base of wide applying of west technology. The third way is introduction new techniques and technologies. it's creation own sciences-techniques base, the work up the science problems and introduction its result. The centre of science-technics investigations "Tubitac" is monitoring for the research activity of universities and other organizations, coordinating of their activities, following the novelties, using in ali sectors, search fnances for new researches and so on. Ali three ways of introduction of achievement of science and technics are interest for RT. 3. Conducting the agrarian reform in Turkey in autumn 1984, the law on agricultural reform were work up and produce shown to Majlis. The complex juridical provosions promoting to decide the urgent problems of the landovvneship and landtenure contain in the law. in what articles of the law and their realization are RT interest for?

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The necessity and the methods of struglle are pointed out in article N21. These problems are big scourge for national landowneship. Our experience witness about it: After October revolution the land of landlord were given to the peasants. it was impossible to effectively use the agricultural techniques because of their small size. At present time, large state farms and collective farms are reorganizing and forming small farmer on their place. There is no private property on the land in Tajikistan. But the most international organozations (IMF, World Bank) insist us to impelement the private property on the land. I consider, that if this happend, then private property on the land must have the limites as in Turkey. The strip, receiving by peasants coressponding the mention law isn't carried out to buy and sail, leasing and passing to other person in any form, besides heir-at law. it's interesting the methods of setting up of land the strip for a one family: The strip must provide to the owner the gross income in the volume of 1 bili. lir (accor. to the prices of 1984). 4. Privatization of the state property To the moment of intensive conducting of economy reform (80years) the leading place in system of property placed the state property in Turkey. At present time in Tajikistan, the share of the main funds of state enterprises increas 95% of ali the main foundation of economy. State property is not anly in Turkey, but also in developed countries show on the bad side. The state enterprises, confrotation between departments managment of state enterprises in the problems of employment, wages, investment plans, demand on loans, reconsilation of producting process and others are influence for their manoeuvrebilty. So, in other countries (in England, during Mrs. Thatcher), as in Turkey in the aim of increasing effectiveness production begin to limit the strenghening the participant of the state, in the process of production and starting to privatization of the state property. For development the process of privatization in Tajikistan should be used some forms of privatization, using in Turkey. The following factors are: a) "Buying" of state privatization. The means consist of that state enterprises become joint company of private and its shares selled to personalls of this enterprises. They can be selled as in credit, as at the expense of special funds. b) Selling to people the right for using and extract income from explotation state enterprises buildings and so on. 584

The right for using the first bridge through Bosfor was selled in that way. it was not selled the bridge, but it was selled the income of its and adjoing access road for gaining receipt means to use for the furthering investments for payment of expenses for building and appearing creditor debts. Such form of privatization should be used in Tajikistan according to the land. Providing with land in the state property can be seli the right for using the part of land to a property. c) State creates an enterprises or the state enterprises to take to private capital for exploration on the definite condition and definite time, including in right to sale of goods and services. The list of such enterprises define by high coordination council on economic questions and declareby many enterprises in Tajikistan, vvhich aren't worked. These enterprises should be take to the private capital for exploration. d) Leasing form. in Turkey, the law No 3226 was passed in 1985, in corresponding to leasing form of movable and unmovable property were lead to the local and foreign leaseholder, leasing system is used both in Turkey and in the foreign countries. By leasing relationship of leaseholder with state realize through the leasing company. There are many other forms of privatization in Turkey. But Tajikistan is great interest to the abovementioned forms. 5. The measures of reducing of budgetary deficit The budget of Tajikistan is deficient, so any experiency of its redusing, including the experience of Turkey are great interested. First, the government decide to release itself from considerable part of these expenses, by means of strengthening of local budgets. The second, the Government begin to pay attetion to creation and using out budgetary funds. There are 100 out budgetary funds. The source of their formation are taxes, early receipting in state budget, special increment to the import from own activity. The aims of these funds are to give the subsides and privilege credits to the state private enterprises, cooperatives, and also to the individuals. Another out budgetary source of financial resources state are loans. State emit securities guarated income. it permite the state to attract considarable means from monetary market. The third non-inemissiv financial source is savings of compulsion. in April 1 1988 the law N 3417 was adopped. The law is establishing the compulsory deducation from wages of ali workers originally in the rate of 2% and from the businessmen's income -3%. These rates were increased at 4 and 6 % correspondingly. According to the law, collected in that the private savings-account in agricultural banks and ali these are using for investment. The accumulation on these
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account are the personal property of their owners. However, they will be able to use this only after 15 years and take only 60% of accumulation sum. 6. The development of foreign tourism The tourism is payed more attention in Turkey and it's not accidently. This sphere is one of the main chanel of receipt of currency, which play considerable role not only in descharge of state budgetary deficit, but also in development of economy of Turkey. Turkey received $2,7 bili. from the tourism in 19906. Can Tajikistan use the experience of Turkey in this plan? Have we object, which can attract the foreign tourism? Of course! The first, it's archaeologycal objects, historical monuments, having more 2-3 thous. age. We can turn some of our cities (Panjakent, Khudjant, Ura-Tube, Kulob) to the town-museum as bukhara, Khiva and Samarkand in Uzbekistan. The second, these are resorts; sanatoriums, using the recreation resources, natural resources of the republic. The third, it's the mountaineer. The forth, it's the various faun of mauntain regions. But Turkey have the advantage in the development of net infrastructure of tourism. Tajikistan should be study the turkish experience in the sphere of tourism. 7. Reforming of external economic relation of Turkey The investigation the economy reform of Turkey, we should pay attention to the reforming of external economic relation of Turkey, which are also interest for Tajikistan. in 60-70 years Turkey conduct the policy of import of substitution. This policy was directed at creation of the base of national industries. it leaded to strengthening of the state sector of economy and state industries. The policy rested on protectionism, meaning the defence of national industries from compititions of foreign goods. So, first of ali import was particulaly hard regulated by means of licences, quotas. As to export, it vvasn't hard controle. But in spite of this, the import of substitution model, oriented the production at the satisfaction of home market reguirements, in defnite degree, redused the opprtunities not only export, but also ali economy. The stabilization programm of civil government, which came to power in 1983, work up on the base of monetary conseption of market mechanism, envisaged the role of state by every kind of encouragement
6. TypiiHJE HCBble TeaneHiim 3COKnecKoro pasonu B 80-e ram. M: HayKa, 1991, c.

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of initiative private capital in development of export and competition. The principle of market effectiveness spread the extrenal economic sphere. it was means of change of hard state regulating foreign trade, particulaly import, is liberalization. But, for ali that the state don't forfeit its regulation role, so long as keep the aim of every kind encouragement of receipt of currency, but svvitched ver the limititation import to every kind of encouragement of export. Liberalization of import in Turkey have began in 1984. The quotas were disaffrmation. Accor. to the new import regime, ali imported goods vvere included in one of the three lists. Goods, which were ban to import, including in the first list. Goods, which must took the permission from official povver to import, included in the second lists. This list called the limiting. in the third lists vvere that goods which exported free and this lists called the liberalization. in 1985 the frst list was considerable reduced. At present time the third lists aren't maked at ali. Liberalization of import had for an object to creat the competiton of home goodsproducers, producting the analogous goods they to work ver competitiveness of own productions. At present time, insignnificant limited of import have an object to providing the development those spheres of industries, which production aren't competitiveness. At present time the main measures are taken, directing to creation of competitiveness of industries and realization the transition from the policy of encouragement of export to the policy of exportoriented industrialization. The fnancial-economical measures of ecouregment of turkish export are interest for Tajikistan. These measures are the follovving: 1. For production of competitiveness goods grant the spot export loans, to free from taxes; 2. To grant the loans according to the special foundations of encouragement of export. 3. If receipts from export come into the country in the fixed dates, the taxes, including in the cost of goods completely or partially paying back to the producer. 4. From the special foundation of stabilization price are payed the ecouregment premium. 5. The produsers of exported goods allot the assignation for import neccessary components. 6. Export industries free from tax. This experience can be use by work up of external economical policy of the Republic of Tajikistan.

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TURKEY'S CHALLENGES N THE ARAB WORLD

Dan TSCHIRGI* Kemal Atatrk's dictum to the effect that Turkey's foreign policy Turkey should seek "peace at home and peace abroad" carried farreaching and clear implications. in the first place, those few words left no doubt as to Kemalist political priorities: pride of place was given to domestic goals. Foreign policy was, therefore, the handmaiden of domestic policy, the latter's instrument for national objectives seen as enhancing the internal vvellbeing of the Turkish state. A second majr implication emerged as a necessary corollary to the frst. If Turkey's approach to foreign affairs was to remain steadfast as a tool for promoting interests that were ultimately of a domestic nature, pragmatism and flexibility in the conduct of international relations must be preserved. in this, Atatrk's outlook paralleled that of the founding father of another republic, George Washington, who cautioned his countrymen to retain an unswerving commitment to their state's own "interest and duty" and shun "habitual hatred or ...habitual fondness" for other countries in the conduct of foreign affairs. in the years since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the Kemalist approach to foreign policy has generally been maintained. Nowhere has this trait been more evident than in the modern history of Turkish relations with the Arab World. Although Turkey has not infrequently been accused of having maintained an unhealthy "aloofness" from the Arab World, the record demonstrates varying and selective levels of interaction between Ankara and Arab capitals, particularly in the decades since World War II. Economic, political and social ties neither vvithered nor were placed in abeyance during this period, although they were visibly calculated, in keeping with Turkey's concepts of its own interests. On the whole, Ankara has reason to be satisfied with the outcome of its approach to Turkey's Arab neighbors. This is not, hovvever, to say that Turco-Arab relations have been free of friction. On the one hand, a degree of tension arose in the 1950s as Arab Nationalist currents grew both suspicious and resentful of Turkey's role as a pro-Western bastion during
* The American University, Cairo.

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the Cold War. Even more serious, and enduring, has been the legacy of the Kemalist Republic's pre-World War II incorporation of Hatay, to which Syria has never relinquished its claim. This underlying source of tension betvveen Turkey and Syria has led to further complications in relations betvveen the tvvo states, particularly nce the Kurdish issue came to provide a point of increasing strain betvveen Ankara and Damascus. More recently, of course, Turkey's support of the international coalition's vvar against Saddam Hussein's Iraq plunged relations vvith that country to a low point as well. in the years since, repeated Turkish military incursions seeking to deny northern Iraq as a base for Kurdish separatists have further soured relations vvith Baghdad. Finally, both Syria and Iraq have been alarmed and offended by Turkey's massive project for the development of southeastera Anatolia, vvhich has reduced the flovv of vvater to those tvvo Arab countries. Despite such elements of stress vvith the tvvo Arab states immediately on its borders, Turkish-Arab relations since World War II have been generally positive. Moreover, the current level of tensions vvith Iraq is probably best viewed as an abberation occasioned by the combined impact of Saddam Hussein's sudden challenge to the vvorld community and the aftermath of the Gulf War, vvhich left northern Iraq effectively beyond the limits of Baghdad's mandate. The relatively high levels of trade betvveen the tvvo countries that prevailed prior to the Gulf War, as well as their shared political interest in combating Kurdish separatism, will probably reemerge as strong inducements for a mending of fences nce Saddam Hussein's regime passes from the scene. Seen in perspective, even the long-standing frictions betvveen Turkey and Syria have been handled by both sides vvith the clear purpose of avoiding outright conflict. The dynamics of the tensions that broke out betvveen the tvvo states in the fail of 1998 seem to reinforce this point. On the other hand, the Arab World's very diversity has helped Turkey develop fruitful relationships vvith Arab states. Turkish contractors and manufactured goods found markets in the Gulf States, North Africa and Egypt. While overall levels of trade remained modest in comparison to Turkey's economic relations vvith Europe and other areas, they vvere not insubstantial. Arab oil producers (including of course Iraq prior to the Gulf War), vvere unvvilling to sacrifice the Turkish market on behalf of Arab nationalist ideology or Syria's territorial claims against Turkey. Turkey's adhesion to the Islamic Conference in the 1970s was more indicative of the value it accorded to economic ties vvith the Arab World than of any erosion of secularist Kemalist principles vvithin the regime. in short, then, by the closing decades of the Tvventieth Century, Turkey's relations vvith the Arab areas ver vvhich the Sublime Porte nce held almost unchallenged svvay had metamorphosed into a rather satisfactory pattern of interstate relations, marred but not seriously disrupted by

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tensions with Syria--to which later those with Iraq were added. The Arab World remained important to Turkey, primarily as a source of petroleum, but decidedly overshadowed in Ankara's foreign policy perspective by other regionsEurope and the United States. Only in the 1990s did there begin to emerge signs that the future might see Turkey inclined to pursue a more energetic approach to the Arab World. As Mustafa Aydin has shovvn, the Gulf War marked something of a minr watershed in high policymaking circles1. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's enthusiasm for a reinvigorated Turkish presence in the affairs of the Middle East was a departure from Ankara's earlier determination to retain its distance from the tumultuous world of inter-Arab politics. This tendency was opposed by many within the forign policy establishment, with the result that Ozal found himself largely constrained by the more traditional outlook. Nonetheless, the late prime minister's early eagerness to enhance Turkey's regional role may yet turn out to have been a harbinger of things to come. in the late 1990s, another indication of Turkey's moving toward a possibly greater role as a regional actor came in the form of Ankara's stepped up military relationship with Israel. This development was widely seen in the Arab World as going beyond simple joint exercises; being, in fact, a scarcely veiled strategic alignment. Turkish efforts to persuade Arab critics that Turkey's military ties to Israel were not aimed against any other regional actor have been resoundingly unsuccessful. With the Arab-Israeli peace process steadily becoming more tattered, feeling in the Arab World was strongly opposed to the potential emergence of a Turkish-Israeli axis that might dominate the region's foreseeable future. Finally, the 1998 dashing of Turkey's hopes for an invitation to join the European Union raised serious questions about the country's foreign policy goals. To the growing and politically significant Islamist trends in Turkey, the EU's stance not only stood as proof that Turkey should never have given greater priority to ties with the West than to those with the Islamic World but also that the time had now definitely come for Turkey to give far greater attention to Middle East affairs. Whatever the merits of this view, factors not directly related to internal Turkish politics seem to support the prospect that Turkish policymakers will indeed have to become more involved with the Middle East, and particularly in the Arab World, in the coming years. Chief among these are the Arab World's general political instability and the nearly insatiable desire of Arab regimes to acquire cutting-edge weaponry; the burgeoning
Mustafa Aydin, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Gulf War of 1990-1991, Cairo Papers in Social Science, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring, 1998), (The American University in Cairo Press, 1998).

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power of Islamist political currents and the attendant social changes that mark leading Arab states; and, fnally, the heightening prospect that the Arab-Israeli conflict will remain a potentially explosive issue for years to come. These are not discrete, but rather interrelated, phenomena vvhich together form a welter of challenges that will demand the attention of Turkish policymakers. The Arab World The Arab World has justifably gained recognition as one of the most problematical areas on the planet. History dictated that the Arabs would, in general, become fully responsible (at least technically) for their own affairs only in the wake of World War II. The legacy of a past that has impinged forcefully on the recent history of the Arabs is a factor that cannot be discounted. Most Arab states function within boundaries established by external imperial actors, and do so vvithin a corresponding tradition of authoritarianism that provides little inspiration for "popular" initiatives in civic affairs. Indeed, the dominance of the state is so ingrained in Arab societies that a self-conscious concept of "civil society" has emerged in the past decades only slowly, painfully and in multiple and confused forms. While much ink and breath has been expended in recent years touting the developmentor condemning the lack of development-of "civil society" in Arab states, many discussions along these lines reveal a glaring difficulty in their basic premise. To address the question of "civil society" without qualification is to presume that an unambiguously recognized national society exits. it is precisely here that conditions in much of the Arab World raise inevitable questions. Whether one refers to Jordan, Syria, Iraq, the Gulf states, or even Egypt as well as most of North Africa, the identification of state nomenclature with "society" is problematical. Significant numbers of Jordanians, Syrians, Iraqis, Egyptians and citizens of other Arab states do not simply equate their passport with their social identity. Religious, tribal, regional and class affiliations often play a far greater role than mere citizenship in defning societal identity. The bottom line, of course, comes to rest on the cliche that the Arab World is stili very much involved in the process of state-building-but one must recall that cliches exit because they are so obviously true. The importance of this is that much of the internal instability of Arab states, most of the pattern of inter-Arab frictions and hostilities, much of the catalogue of Arab-non-Arab tensions and, fnally, the prevalence of authoritarian regimes (and correspondingly low levels of political institutionalization) that mark the Arab World can be linked to problems arising from the tenuous societal base upon which state-building has perforce had to proceed. Arab regimes have had little recourse but to seek to sustain their legitimacy through any means possible, and the easiest of these 592

has frequently been to rally support against some real or imagined threat, vvhether internal or external. A natural consequence has been that Arab regimes are distinguished by their drive to acquire and amass sophisticated military capabilities. in itself, the high level of modern armaments prevailing in the Arab World provides valid grounds for concern on the part of ali who interact with the region. in such an environment regimes may find the temptation to utilize military force irresistible and political tensions can therefore ali too rapidly escalate into overt conflict. Quite apart from the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict, the frequency of inter-Arab armed clashes since World War II stands as sad proof of this. On the other hand, the determined pursuit by most Arab regimes of ever more technologically advanced weaponry portends little likelihood that the threat of sudden military confrontations in the region will diminish in the foreseeable future. As shown by the 199091 Gulf War, the Arab World's resources and its strategically important geographical position not only preclude the possibility that the world can remain indifferent to majr upheavals in the area but also heighten the prospect that such eventualities will be further complicated by one or another form of external intervention. While the struggle to create and sustain regime legitimacy has been a majr factor in the Arab World's militarization-and, therefore, in the region's underlying instability-the pursuit of economic development has been another majr avenue through which the search for regime legitimacy has proceeded. it too, both historically and at present, has been a field in which policies have in effect been double-edged svvords demonstrably capable of promoting regional instability. The post-World War II era witnessed the rise of directed economies throughout the Arab World (with the exception of Lebanon). Whether one looked at the traditional states of the Arab Gulf or the so-called competing progressive states that sprouted in the wake of the rise to power in Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the story was essentially the same. Command economies predominated and the authoritarian bent of Arab political systems was justified by the rhetoric (or, in the case of the rentier Gulf States, the practice) of the state's role as the economic engine whose efforts would rebound to the vvelfare of ali citizens. By the early 1970s, hovvever, the failures of state-controlled economies in the Arab World were evident. ver the next twenty-five years neoliberal perspectives slovvly gained ground in the region. A variety of factors have intervened to make the Arab World's switch from state-centric to market economies a protracted, somevvhat tentative, and uneven process. Among these, of course, are limited resources, the legacy of populist-welfare ideologies, the endemic political instability that stili wracks the region, and the full range of interlocking structures built up to sustain the state's erstwhile economic role. However, the chief constraint has been, and remains, political.

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Put bluntly, the issue boils down to the reluctance of established authoritarian elites to relinquish political power vvithin the context of a diminished role for the state in economic affairs. At a more sophisticated level, the issue is more accurately described as fnding and developing the optimum relationship between political and economic subsystems. it must be kept in mind that the Arab World's svvitch to neoliberal models of economic development has been part of a generalized trend marking the so-called Third World for ver two decades and, furthermore, that it remains yet unknown whether this market-oriented approach will be the key to self-sustained economic growth. in any event, while it is clear that "economic liberalization" must have political consequences, it is by no means evident that these will necessarily promote "political liberalization" (defined as "democratization". Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that comparative empirical evidence so far tends to indicate a high probability that-depending on cultural and historical factors~the politically liberalizing impact of economic liberalization measures will vary vvidely. in other vvords, in some national contexts, economic liberalization may leave authoritarian patterns of political life virtually unchanged, or perhaps even strengthened, while in others economic and political liberalization may correlate positively to varying degrees2. On the vvhole, the Arab World's "deep history" as well as its more recent experience appear to give little reason to hope that economic liberalization will correlate smoothly, or to any great degree, vvith political liberalization. The contemporary vveakness of civil societies in the Arab World strengthens this conclusion. The most likely prognosis must therefore be that despite its pursuit of economic development through neoliberal market-oriented measures, the political environment in the Arab World will remain predominantly authoritarian. Thus, the preservation of regime legitimacy can be expected to remain an immediate and high-priority concern of governments throughout the region. The inevitable corollary is that most of the Arab World can also be expected to continue being characterized by relatively weak levels of political institutionalization. Apart from such generalities, there is little that can be maintained vvith any strong probability regarding the likely political impact of economic on the Arab World in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the case of Egypt-currently the leading Arab state that has most seriously committed itself to eradicating a command economy legacy through economic liberalizationprovides a possible scenario of more general import. While Egypt's experience obviously need not necessarily herald vvhat is
2. Dan Tscbirgi (ed.), Development in the Age of Liberalization: Egypt and Mexico. (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996).

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to come in other Arab countries, it just as obviously connot be ignored as a possible harbinger. The plaudits from the International Monetary Fund and other Westren institutions that Egypt came to enjoy for its commitment to economic liberalization by the late 1990s should not obscure the fact that those no w providing the accolades had long been singing a totally different tne. Egypt's first moves toward liberalizing the command economy erected under Gamal Abdel Nasser came under Anwar Sadat in the early 1970s, together with the country's overall redirection of foreign policy. Although strenuously applauded and encouraged by the West, it was not long before international proponents of neoliberal economics voiced frustration ver the pace of Egyption economic reform. Throughout most of the 1980s and early 1990s, the regime of Hosni Mubarak came under increasing public criticism from the World Bank, the IMF and the American embassy in Cairo for footdragging and a lack of will in effecting key measures required by structural adjustment. Such accusations were routinely dismissed by Egyptian spokesmen, who argued that vvhile the regime's commitment to liberalization was unshaken, the pace of reform was dictated by the regime's better understanding of Egypt's national life. in the mid-1990s, however~and particularly after a new cabinet took office in early 1996-a much publicized invigoration of Egyptian liberalization occurred. Privatization moved forward at an unprecedented speed, the Cairo stock exchange blossomed, greater efforts were made, and with some success, to attract foreign investment. The private sector responded enthusiastically and the international community began to sing Egypt's praises as an example of successful economic reformer. Of interest here is not an appraisal of the economic effectiveness of Egypt's long drive to liberalization, for that is stili highly debatable3. Instead, the political developments that have accompanied Egypt's economic liberalization are important in this context. By the late 1990s, these have begun to crystallize into broadly identifiable patterns that do not bode well for those hoping that economic liberalization will be accompanied by political liberalization-that is, "democratization" or the movement toward a more inclusive and participatory political system. Put briefly, Egypt's slow process of economic liberalization has resulted in a limited expansion of political participation, a process through which the bureaucratic old guard of Egypt's dominant political party has
3. it must be noted that even this applies particularly to both the scope and significance of the heightened drive toward liberalization that has characterized the country since the mid-1990s. Although there is no gainsaying the fact that the pace of Egypt's economic reform increased sharply relatively to earlier years, it is by no means clear that the private sector is on the way to becoming the majr engine of economic growth.

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lost influence to more reform-minded cadres and, more significantly, to members of the country's small, but increasingly active, entrepreneurial class. in effect, the regime's relationship with the latter appears to have developed on the basis of a bargain vvhereby in return for its political support and grovving participation in Egypt's economic life, the entrepreneurial class has won a degree of influence in economic policymaking4. Beyond this, however, the regime has made it increasingly plain that it will not countenance any erosion of Egypt's authoritarian political system. Thus, it has taken particular are in recent years to constrain demands that economic liberalization be accompanied by democratization. Associational groups aiming to build up Egypt's nascent civil society have come under particularly strong government pressure. By the summer of 1998, existing legislation, which in itself already virtually eliminates true associational autonomy in Egypt, was in the process of being amended in ways that vvould erect even stronger structures. After the mid-1990s, press laws were altered with a view to giving the government far greater legal power to impose sanctions, including jail terms, for the expression of opinions deemed unduly critical of the regime. Inevitably, a majr target of official muscle-flexing was Egypt's liberal intellectual community~a heterogeneous and largely unorganized mass of thinkers, writers and artists that includes classical liberals with whom John Stuart Mili would feel comfortable and various shades of Marxists, Nasserists and traditional Arab Nationalists. Although obviously divided along multiple ideological lines, such intellectuals have tended to share at least two characteristics. First, while largely suspicious of economic liberalization (at least insofar as it constitutes a goal of Egypt's current regime), they have nonetheless accepted that liberalizing economic reform cannot be avoided; yet, they insist that it must be paralleled by true political liberalization. Second, such intellectuals in the main cling to a secular view of politics. Without being privy to the innermost councils of the Mubarak regime, it is impossible to know with certainty the calculations behind the Egyptian authorities'campaign to restrain and intimidate the country's liberal, politically secular intellectual community. Hovvever, the undeniable increase in official action against this group in the past few years suggests an obvious underlying rationale. Thus, the fact that most of the spate of legal actions against journalists, vvriters, university professors and human rights groups have been justifed on grounds of Islamic law or morality indicates that the regime seeks not only to silence critics who hope to transpose economic liberalization into the political realm but also
4. On majr trips abroad, President Hosni Mubarak is now often accompanied by sizeable groups of businessmen. For example, when visiting France in the spring of 1998, Mubarak journied with ver 130 top Egyptian businessmen.

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to enhance its own legitimacy in the eyes of Egypt's largely apolitical masses by projecting itself as a defender of Islamic values. If, as seems the case, this is true, serious questions arise. Can Egypt's largely secular new entrepreneurial class be bolstered by a regime whose repressive policies are increasingly justified in terms that promote the predominance of conservative Islamic social outlooks? Indeed, will a society in which the ambience appears to be sliding more and more into a conservative Islamic mode be conductive to successful economic liberalization that aims at the country's integration into the world system? Will the apparent contradictions in life-styles and values that separate the largely secularist entrepreneurial class from the masses of the Egyptian public fade away as a by-product of successful economic reform, or will they catalyze social unrest before the hoped for "trickle down" effect of economic liberalization occurs? Such questions will be ansvvered by events in the coming years. At the moment it is quite clear that Egypt's economic reform amounts to a race against time. Success will be marked by the beginnings of sustained economic growth; failure will be most likely be marked by extensive social upheaval. in the meantime, the Islamist factor will continue to be a majr feature of the country's political life. By so ostentatiously linking its search for legitimacy to Islamic values, Egypt's current regime tacitly acknowledges that the majr domestic political challenge it faces comes from political, rather than militant, Islamic movements. Although the latter are capable of carrying hurtful terrorist actions, they do not pose a serious threat to the regime's survival, nor does it seem likely that they vvill do so in the foreseeable future. Egypt's organized political Islamic movements are another matter. Whether openly active, such as the country's Labor Party, or quasiclandestine, such as the now banned Mslim Brotherhood, these groups possibly do stand as credible competitors for the support of Egypt's middle and lovver middle classes; or at least they would were the political system liberalized and freely competitive in the electoral marketplace. This, of course, is why the Mslim Brotherhood and its fellovv travelers in the Islamic political opposition share with secular liberal intellectuals the sting of legalized repression. it is not inconceivable that there may be a budding irony in the regime's furtherance of a conservative Islamic atmosphere in today's Egypt. For if and when the Mslim Brotherhood and other Islamic political groups are allovved free scope to operate, the broader Egyptian public may find them more appealing than the incumbent regime. in this sense, Egypt is similar to other majr Arab countries that have long been under the rule of authoritarian regimes. Although the rise of political islam has so far been blocked in the Arab World, its potential 597

as a mobilizing force capable of challenging the status quo has grown. Turkey, long since divided ver the role of islam in its own affairs, cannot remain unaffected by the fortunes of political islam in the Arab World. Significance for Turkey The regional context in which Turkey must face future relations with its Arab neighbors is marked by low levels of political institutionalization, highly charged desires for modern armaments, and tenuous political legitimacy which is increasingly challenged by Islamist political ideologies. Complicating the equation is the fact that the leading Arab states inevitably must soon face leadership changes, if only because of their current leaders' age. This is true of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and others. An already uncertain and problematical region will therefore soon undergo significant changes that cannot be foreseen. At the same time, five specific issuesfour of vvhich directly involve Turkey while the fifth could conceivably come to affect Turkey directly continue to generate various degrees of tension and carry the potential of erupting into overt conflict. The four issues in vvhich Turkey is directly involved are: Turkey's traditionally strained relations with Syria ver the Hatay/Alexandretta region; Turkey's struggle against Kurdish separatism; Turkey's development of the southern Anatolian region and the ensuing reduction of water resources available to Syria and Iraq; Turkey's current intervention against Kurdish forces in northern Iraq. The fifth issue that, as demonstrated by the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, has the potential of involving Turkey in a general regional upheaval, is the stili unresolved Arab-Israeli problem. it is clear that Turkey's most immediate problems with the Arab World are linked to its relations with Syria and Iraq. While a change of regime in Baghdad might easily lead to a cessation of Turkism military activity in northern Iraq as well as to a restoration of productive ties between Turkey and Iraq (based largely on both countries economic needs and shared dislike of Kurdish nationalism)5, any radical improvement in relations with Syria is apt to require far more time and be more problematical. Turkey's massive development scheme for southeastern Anatolia has caused frictions with both Syria and Iraq but Ankara's apparent willingness to ensure sufficient supplies of water to both countries has contained these. As Syria and Iraq's need water requirements increase in the
5. Turkey's purchases of Iraqi oil and Iraq's reliance on pipelines through Turkish territory for exporting part of its oil are only one aspect of economic links between the two countries that ha ve been disrupted since the 1990-91 Gulf War. Prior to that conflict Turkey and Iraq also benefited from the formers role as the bridge for overland movement betvveen Europe and the Gulf area.

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future, the question will be whether Turkish flexibility will be sufficient to ensure that water does not become a majr point of contention with either of Turkey's immediate Arab neighbors. The Arab-Israeli problem is of course essentially beyond Turkey's control. However, so long as it remains unresolved that issue has the potential to spark a generalized regional conflict into which Turkey might be dragged. This consideration leads to two conclusions. First, to the extent possible, Turkey would do well to remain alert to any opportunity to encourage Arabs and Israelis to reach a final settlement. Rather than remaining as distant as possible from the Arab-Israeli problem, this would imply a more proactive stance as a neutral, but interested, third party. Second, Ankara would best handle very gingerly any further development of Turkey's recently heightened military ties to Israel. Under currently prevailing regional circumstances, nothing could so nite the Arab World in an anti-Turkish perspective as the further development of a TurcoIsraeli strategic military partnership. in sum, Turkey's challenges in the Arab World fail into two categories. On the one hand, there is the overall political context of the Arab World, marked by authoritarian structures, weak institutionalization, the rise of a highly competitive Islamic political ideology, and inevitably impending changes of regime in majr Arab countries. Ali this indicates an environment that will long be problematical and probably chronically prone to crises whose nature cannot be foreseen. On the other hand, the five outstanding issues that currently or potentially promote tensions betvveen Turkey and Arab countries constitute more immediately pressing areas that Turkish foreign policy must continue to address. The Arab World, though broadly sharing common characteristics, is not homogenous. I have argued elsevvhere that this provides wide scope for Turkey to pursue a mixed approach to the region that will maximize benefits by developing closer ties with some Arab states while reducing frictions and the potential of friction with others6. in achieving this, the legacy of Atatrk's approach to foreign policy will be key. Flexibility and pragmatism based on the clear principle that foreign policy must serve the basic domestic interests of the state and its population will undoubtedly be the most effective pillars upon vvhich to base Turkey's future relations with the Arab World.

6.

Dan Tcshirgi, "Turkey and the Arab World: Regional Partnere or Regional Rivals in the twenty-first Century", (Ankara: Ankara University, 1998)...incomplete citation.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY N THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ACTUALITY OF ATATRK'S THOUGHT: FROM THE PACT OF SAADABAD TO THE PEACE PROCESS
Prof. Dr. Robert ANCIAUX* Turkey belongs to four regional under systems: the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus-Central Asia (since the implosion of Soviet Union), it is moreover an essential land and air crossway between Europe and Asia, and, by sea, between Russia and the Mediterranean. This capital geostrategic position of Turkey brings normally the great powers to bring pressure ver Turkey in order to make it enter in their alliance system. The management of Turkey's foreing policy appears then as a very complex matter and is essentially defined by some variables as the state of international relations, and by three stable parameters: the political and economical integration of Turkey in the Western World; the need to preserve the sovereignity and the territorial integrity of the Republic; the willingness to develop friendly relations with the neighbouring states and to improve regional security and stability in the peripheric areas in order to secure its security and to be able to concentrate on the accomplishment of its project for society. The end of the cold war being a source of geopolitical mutations Turkey is confronted to a fundamentaly instable political environement which is likely to create e threat for its security. Threated by the turmoils that wave at the same time the four regional under systems to vvhich it is bound, Turkey is fundamentally in position to be set up as a stabilizing element as it was under the rule of Atatrk. The current situation being one of the most critical and uncertain of the seventy fve years of existence of the Turkish Republic, an increasing number of political responsi* niversite Libre de Bruxelles.

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and realism at the level of the evaluation of the balance of power and the management of international relations. II. Turkey in the cold war The neutralist policy inaugurated by Atatrk was duly followed by his successor, ismet nn, until the end of the second world war. Immediately after the end of the second world war, its territorial sovereignety being threatened by the expansionist views of the Soviet Union, Turkey got the protection of the United States, entered the cold war as a part of the Western bloc and became a NATO member in 1953. The choice made by Turkey was not only tactical but also affective as the political, economical and cultural anchoring to the West constituted one of the fundamental targets laid down to the Republic by its founder. The cold war provided then to the Turkish Republic the conceptual framevvork by which was expressed its political and social choices until its end. However, the entry of Turkey in the cold war opened, between 1950 and 1963, a highly controversial period for its diplomacy, mainly regarding its policy towards the third world and the Middle East. "in Turkey proper, as stated by Kemal Karpat, a number of people, espacially contemporaries of Atatrk who were faithfull to his neutralist policy objected to membership in NATO if in exchange Turkey assumed obligations incompatible with her interests in the Middle East".2 From about 1950 to 1963, Turkish diplomacy conformed strictly to the line of policy defined by the United States and to an approach of the problems and the evolution of the Middle East viewed through the american prism of East-West competition. in this context Turkey appeared as the first muslim country to recognise the State of Israel and to establish diplomatic relations with it. Even it Turkey, given its internal political tendencies, was more in accordance with Israel than with the Arab countries, the nature of its relations with Israel was more in accordance with the requirements of the western alliance than with its proper national interest in the area. Moreover, as far as the Turkish political deciders are concerned, they shovved a complete misunderstanding of political developments and of the nature of the evolution that affected the arab world. This was in great
2. Karpat, Kemal H., Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1975, P. 116.

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part due to the fact that the Turkish Republic since its foundation did not pay any attention to the arab world, given its behaviour towards the Ottoman Empire during the first world war, as the Arabs were considered as inconsistant and unreliable. With a wrong appreciation of the real political evolution of the Middle East in mind, the Turkish governement, at the beginning of the fifties, planned to bring Turkey in the position of a keystone of a pro-Western middle eastern military alliance. This policy resulted in the establishment, in november 1955, of the Baghdad Pact vvhose members were Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. From the very beginning the Pact was considered by most of the Arab States as an imperialist military tool placed at the disposal of the United States and directed against the arab nationalist regimes. Turkey was therefore regarded with high suspicion by the counries of the third world. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nasser received an acolade as a leader of the Third World, while Turkey became isolated because of her strong defense of NATO and blistering attacks on nonalignement, neutralism, socialism and communism3. Nevertheless, the Baghdad Pact contributed to strengthen its ties with Iran, whose relations with Turkey were already friendly since the foundation of the Republic. in Turkey itself, the Baghdad Pact was bitterly criticised by opponents inspired by the neutralist tradition initiated by Atatrk. For these critics the identification of Turkey with western imperialism was counter productive as it isolated Turkey from the world outside of the vvestern alliance4. Nevertheless whatever the bitter criticism of the foreign policy of the Menderes government can be justified as being in complete contradiction with the principles inherited from the period of Atatrk, one has to recognise that the world order originated by the cold war until 1963 left almost no choice to littel and middle size states except a more or less strict alignement on one of the sper powers, especially if they were, as Turkey, directly threatened by Soviet territorial claims. As far as the Turkish governement was concerned in the fifties, it remained nevertheless in relative accordance with Atatrk's legacy globally on at least three points: the rejection of communism, the defense of the territorial integrity of the Nation, which implied at this moment strong military ties with the West, and the pursance of westernisation of the country on social, economical and political grounds. Moreover, it is obvious that in the framework of the cold war and the division of most of the world into two antagonist blocs left no way for practising a policy of neighbourliness which was the basis of Atatrk's foreign policy of proximity, and a fun3. idem, pp. 118-119. 4. idem, p. 120.

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damental step in the establisment of international relations based on his main slogan "Peace at Home. Peace in the world". This period of total conformity to American guide lines gave place, from 1963, to a phase of diversification and autonomisation of Turkey's foreign relations. The passage to new guide lines in foreign policy, more in accordance with the Kemalist philosophy in international relations was encouraged by the new prospects opened by the detente and the growing disagreement with the west about the question of Cyprus. The passivity of Great Britain, one of the three warrants of the respect of the Cypriot Constitution regarding the intercommunal conflict in the island, and the banning of Turkey from intervening in the Island as one of the three warrants of the status of Cyrpus resulted in worsening the relations between Turkey and its western allies. in order to gain support for its position on Cyprus, Turkey, while remaining faithful to NATO, worked to improve its relations with the communist bloc and to draw closer to the third world countries, and especially to the Arab States. One of the main caracteristics of the new way the foreign policy was looked at, is the trend to reestablish neighbourliness with the Balkan states and, in particular, with Middle Eastern neighbours. in this respect Turkey resumes in April 1963 its diplomatic relations with Egypt, head of the progressist arab world and one of the leader of the non aligned countries. Thereafter, Turkish missions travelled throughout the Middle East, from december 1964 to january 1965 to explain of Turkey's position and to touch on the prospect of a turco-arab conference in order to settle contentious problems. At the same time Turkey proceeded to a readjustement of its position in the israelo-arab conflict. A new step in the way of reidentification of Turkey's foreign policy with the spirit of Atatrk's teaching was made when the Prime Minister declared in 1965 before the Great National Assembly that "the Turkish Republic, in conformity with a tradition established since its foundation remains concerned with the elimination of colonialism and the emancipation of the afro-asiatic peoples."5 Besides these openings towards the third world, Turkey got more and more heavily involved in the international islamic organisations. The positive results of this initiative became quickly perceptible since 1964 as the Mslim World Congres and, since 1969, the Organisation of the Islamic Onference, support at each meeting Turkey's theses about the Cy5. TYIR, chronology, 1965.

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prus question. in turn, Turkey condemned at these same meetings the occupation by Israel of arab lands. The rapraochment between Turkey and the arab countries proved also beneficial on the economic level and in 1970 the "Chamber of Commerce reported that the Turkish exports to Arab countries increased by about 38 percent ver the previous year."6 The progression of the volume of exchanges between Turkey and the Arab countries increased spectacularly in the eighties. The deepening of the turco-arab relations proved particularly beneficial with Iraq as it gave way to the construction of a pipe-line linking the oil fields of Kirkouk to Drtyol and of a gas pipeline bringing gas to Turkish industrial centers, so that Turkey could benefit of oil and gas at attractive prices. Sole problem, the relations with Syria remained tense for most of the time, given the fact that, besides the dispute about the province of Hatay, Syria feels, moreover, his water supply threatened by the great hydraulic works known as GAP project, undertaken by Turkey in order to promote the development of South-East Anatolia. From 1974 until the end of the seventies the reference to the legacy of Atatrk in the making of the foreign policy of Turkey was often stressed especially in the governements led by Blent Ecevit. This trend is well reflected in two speeches. in the first one it was said that Turkey must normalise its relations with the non aligned nations and with the nations which have recently gained their independance (...) Turkey must use the honour and the prestige it gained as a country which has inaugurated the wars for national independance of our century7. in a second speech the prime minister declared that Turkey had not to limit its role in the Middle East as a guarantor of the interest of the great povvers8. Since 1963, the evolution of Turkey's foreign policy focuses with priority on the national interests which brings often Turkey to adopt positions in opposition to the United States' positions, especially about the Middle East. So, while asserting its anchorage to the West and its belonging to the familiy of the liberal democraties to which it is bound by its political and economic culture, Turkey assumed, at the same time, it middle eastern identity and deepened its relations with the Arab and muslim world. This new political line was obvious in the treatment of the Palestinian question, Turkey voting at the UN ali the resolutions favourable to the PLO's theses and its international recogniton. in november 1974, Turkey voted resolution 3.236 recognising the inalianable rights of the Palestin6. 7. 8. KARPAT, K., op. cit, p. 132. TYIR, 1973. TYIR, 1974.

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ian people to selfdetermination, idependance and national sovereignity. in 1979 an Office of the OLP was opened in Ankara. Despite, the coming down in favour of the Arab viewpoints on the question of the Arab occupied territories and on the resolution of the Palestinian problem, Turkey endeavoured to maintain serene relations with Israel which, in the context of the cold war, as Turkey belonged to the western bloc. At the same time Turkey played a role of growing importance in the OIC in the economic and financial fields, but the deepening of Turkey's involvemet in the international islamic insitutions was not felt by the Turks, with reason, as to be in contradiction with the secular principles of the Republic. Since the presidence of Turgut zal the presence of Turkey developed essentially an economicist approach of foreign relations. Under the leadership of President zal Turkey conducted an active policy of penetration of the middle eastern markets not only in the fields of construction and civil engineering but also in the field of the. setting up of a network of services. in the same time Turkey, faithful to a tradition of non immixion in internal affairs of other states since the foundation of the Republic, endeavoured to observe a strict neutrality in the disputes between the various states of the Middle East. This is why Turkey remained neutral in the Iraq-Iran conflict, despite pressures from both its western allies and the Arab countries, and tred to maintain friendly relations with the islamic Republic of Iran in spite of radical contradiction betvveen the two models of society. III. Ups and dovvns of the post cold war The end of the cold war and of its bipolar order with its rigid system of alliances gave Turkey's foreign policy more autonomy., and even more possibilities for flexibility. Nevertheless the end of the cold war resulted in a recomposition of the geopolitcal environment and the implosion of the communist bloc placed Turkey in an area of unrest and instability, and, as far as the ancient satellites of Soviet Union are concerned, economically stricken. At the same time the end of the cold war resulted in a growing distanciation from its westera allies towards Turkey, and a drastic diminution of western aid. Turkey proceeded then at a redeployement of its foreign policy taking advantage of pertaining to three regional systems consisting of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus-Central Asia. The establishment, at Turkey's initiative, of a zone of Cooperation of the States of the Black Sea is one of the most significant examples of the dynamism and the adaptability of Turkey's foreign policy. in August 1990, the second Gulf war gave Turkey a ne w opportunity to enhance the value of its geostrategic position as an adavanced strong-

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hold of NATO in an area vital for the economic interest of the industrialised countries. But the Turkish contribution to the success of the international anti Irakian coalition did not prove to be globaly beneficial for Turkey. Of course, the geostrategic importance of Turkey was again recognised by the United States which resumed its aid. but this aid was far to compensate the loss of the Iraki market and the downswing of the investment capacity of the Gulf States whose financial capacities were considerably affected by the cost of the Gulf crisis of 1990. Nevertheless, at the end of the Gulf war, Turkey managed to solve in a relative satisfactory way most of the equations produced by the consequences of the end of the cold war. it actually recoverd a relatively favourable place in United States' strategy and could again rely on its protection. Moreover, Turkey, in accordance with a Kemalist tradition, could maintain its neutrality in regional disputes and remain on neighbourly terms with almost ali its middle eastern neighbours until 1996. During the first half of the nineties, Turkey was consistently invited by the Arab states to play fully its role of a regional power in order to work on the side of the Arab and Mslim world at the constitution of a stable and peaceful regional order in the Middle East. With the European Union Turkey's diplomacy was less successfull as it continues to rebuff Turkey's demands to join the Union making the argument of democratic deficiencies in the political life of the country, of the non respect of human rights, and especially about the way Turkey deals vvith the Kurdish question, and finally the already unsolved problem of Cyprus. Of prior importance is also - besides ali what is left unsaid the dispute with Greece which actually vetoes the admission of Turkey. After a period of euphoria aroused by the conclusion of the Oslo agreements and the prospect of the achievement of a comprehensive peace for the Middle East which was felt as a majr issue for its sucurity and its economic acvity, Turkey, which was actively participating in multilateral meetings devoted to the peace process, faces a degradation of the general situation in the Middle East and of its relations with most of its middle eastern neighbours due, to a great extent, to the consequences of the stalling of the peace process, and also to its dispute with Greece and its tradtionaly tense relations with Syria which brought Ankara and Damas on the verge of a clash. Given their conflictual relations vvith Turkey, Greece and Syria which both supported Kurdish claims - espacially Syria whose support was both of a political and military nature - concluded military agrements in 1995. This event considered by Turkey as a majr threat for its security was, following certain sources, one of the main reasons of the conclusion of its two military agreements vvith Israel in February and August 1996. 609

Other reasons are to be found in security issues as the willingness of the two States to fight terrorism and islamist activities, the possibility for Turkey to benefit from the sophisticated military technology of Israel and the necessity for Turkey to give some insurances to its American partner. Whatever it may be, the military agreements between Israel and turkey were considered, despite the denials of Turkey, by Arab states as an antiArab alliance. This impression was moreover strengthened after the joint manouvres of January 1998 with Israel and the United States. These agreements being concluded with the governement of Netanyahu who is seen by the Arabs as the responsible for the stallin of the peace process, could only lead to a deterioration of Turkey's relations with the Arab and other Mslim States. An indubitable sign of this deterioration was the way Turkey's military agreements with Israel were indirectly criticized at the Islamic summit hold in Teheran in December 1997. These evolutions are fraught with consequences for the stability of the Middle East. The first consequence of this situation leads to a view of international relations based on the balance of forces and the forming of objectively antagonistic alliances of unbalanced military power as is the Turk-Israeli alliance compared to the Cairo-Damas-Riyadh axis, politically of signifcant importance but military weak. in such a situation there is no more room for regional cooperation as a basis of peaceful relations between States of the area. For Turkey, in particular, the conclusion of these military agreements with Israel will inevitably have some negative effects on its econmic relations with the muslim and Arab world. Finally as Turkey seems to give up, in the eyes of the arab countries, its neutral position in the Israel-Arab dispute, it will loose its possibility to be a mediator in the crisis and, as it is involved in a military alliance, to play the role of a stabiliser State in the Middle East. The atmosphere of suspicion and tough rivalry that arise actually in the Middle East favours the outburst of situations of confrontation and the upsurge of terrorism. At the end of this century one was never so far, in the Middle East, from the kemalist vision of a world order based on peace and cooperation betvveen peoples. Conclusion To conclude let us say that Atatrk's device "peace at home, peace in the world" has an universal import and proves valid at ali time and for every state. But if such a general satement can be considered as a global guide line for political action it doesn't provide any solution likely to solve the political problems created by the actual vvorld in transition and the unstable and volatile situations it generates. The attitudes of Atatrk in some critical situations can most certainly be a source of inspiration for contemporary political deciders, but one can hardly consider kemalism as 610

a true theory of international relations even if some of his political decisions could constitute a basis for a political theory of conflict prevention. Such are, among other decisions: his refusals to take at the end of the Lausanne Conference the war indemnities due by Greece, in order to improve greco-turc relations and avoid further conflict inspired by revenge. his neighbourliness and regional cooperation policy between states traditionally opposed in history, of which a concrete example is to be found in the Balkan Pact of 1934 aiming at improving regional stability and security and detering the expansionist impulses of great powers. One can adhere fully to the foreign policy of the various governements vvhich came in power after the death of Atatrk or criticize more or less bitterly the way follovved by some of them but it is obvious that regardless of the changes of governements and of political parties in power, and considering the necessities imposed on foreign policy given the evolution of the international relations system turkish diplomacy is caracterized by a remarkable continuity. This continuity is due to the fact that Turkey's foreign policy rested continuously on the three stable parameters mentionned at the beginning of this article. Regarding neighbourliness, the third parameter, even if it appears as an invariant in the philosphy of foreign policy of proximity, it can also appear as a variable follovving the constraints imposed by the evolution of the international relations. Given this evolution, and also local circumstances, national security concerns can override the importance granted to neighbourliness. Neighbourliness can thus be defined both as a variable and an invariant follovving the needs of the current situation. in fact neighbourliness is essentailly to be considered as an invariant way to realize the first condition of the establishment of an international order likely to promote peace in the vvorld. in this respect the comparision between the foreign policies initiated in the fifties and after 1963 gives clear indications about the various ways a policy of neighbourly terms can be conceived. in the fifties the governements led by Adnan Menderes conceived its relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours in terms of Turkish leadership in the wake of United States' policy. But this appreciation is to be qualified as, from 1946 until 1963, the cold war, in its hard stage, left almost no freedom of movement to the allies of the two superpowers. Conversely, since 1963, the detente allovved Turkey to redifine in a most autonomous way its choices concerning its foreign policy, and specially its foreign policy of proximity with prior regard to its national interests; This 611

position brought Turkish diplomacy to distance itself on several questions from the positions adopted by Turkey's western allies. With the end of the cold war Turkey benefts of a greater autonomy of decision and was able to take several particularly fortunate initiatives. But at the same time, Turkey, in the heart of an area of chronic instability and turmoils, seems inclined to give priority to security matters, rather han to neighbourliness. in fact, Turkey being confronted both to a very awkward international and regional situation, continues to search a political line likely to express the assertion of its identity and its originality on the intemational scene in full accordance with its true national interests. At present, Turkey has a clear understanding of the fact that the middle East market can not be considered as an alternative to the ties with the European Union, but that the Middle East is at the same time an indispensable element for its economic prosperity. in this respect the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, ismail Cem seems to show that Turkey is building up a way of its own when he told an American journalist: "We no longer perceive ourselves as a country on the outer periphery of Europe. Of course we are part of Europe. But now we see ourselves as a pivotal country in the emerging geography of Eurasia."9 Words in the pre tradition of Atatrk's view on Turkey's role in the world.

9.

International Herald Tribne, August 3, 1998.

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THE PLAN OF THE GHAZY MOSTAFA KAMAL PASHA N THE INDEPENDENCE WAR AND THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THIS WAR 1920-1923 According to the Egyptian Archives
Dr. YoussefMouhamed IRAKI* in the first World War, the Ottoman Empire had been defeated, such as many other wassat Countries (Axis). in fact, England and its Allies shackled such defedated countries by hard treaties. For instance Thievert's treaty had been contracted with the Ottoman Empire at the French city, "Thiever", in 1920. Apparently, that treaty's conditions were too oppresive and had strong intrusion upon the Turkish affairs and their freedom which they used to enjoy. Naturally, the Turks disapproved that treaty which enabled Greece to occuply large areas from Anatolia (the minr Asia). it is known that Anatolia was the original home from whcih the ancestors departed to establish the great Ottoman Empire which headed the vvorld and terrified Europe for many centuries. in spite of Great Britain's pretensions to follow an impartial policy, England provided-during that period, the Greeks with the necessary succours against the Turks. On March 16th in 1920, England and the Allies (France & Italy) had announced the occupation of Al-Assetana (Istanboul), i, e Ottoman Empire Capital) martially. On that day, the historical city and its residents had been offensively insulted. Allied armies had attacked the Mslim' houses; arresting the men, disgracing Mslim women and ladies' dignity 1 and violating ali the sacred Islamic traditions . Furthermore, the English autohirites had intended to arrest the Turkish leaders exploiting the bad conditions which the country had suffered during the great war. The English policy- through such aggressive conducts - had exposed neither truth nor justice on which their rulers and thinkers used to pride themselves.
Ain Shams University, Faculty of Arts, History Department, Cairo. Al Levvaa, Al Mesry, 20/9/1921. No.25.

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The Importance of The Independence War "The Greek-Turkish War" This war had attracted People's attention ali ver the world, easterly and vvesterly. Orientals had been preoccupied with it due to the deep religious, social and historical relations which connected them with the Ottoman Empire.'On the other hand, the Europeans were interested in this war, vvherever the historians and authors had profoundly studied it and the military had ciritcally analyzed it. Accordingly, most of them had agreed that the Turks were worthy victory because of many reasns, as follow2. it was known that the Turkish nation was a militant nation, and its history-for five centuries, was evidently full of endless exploits. Undoubtedly, military acumen-according to the Turks was a natural instinct. This quality of the Turks was not easily accompolished for the Greeks - who were dominated by the Turkish Empire for more than five hundred years - to encounter their previous governors face to face (vis - - vis). However, some spiteful people had accused the contemporary Turks that they did not belong to the ancient conquerors' lineage who had founded the broad ottoman Empire until they had reached Vienn3. But this opinion had been criticized by the European thinkers themselves such as Mr. SinoBosk-in his famous book entitled (Turkey & Turks). He could, during his actual participation in that war analyze and disprove such rootless claims and pretensions. For example, El-Dardanelle Campaign which England and France had equipped with enormous navies, armies and developed equipments to attack Al-Assetana had failed before the firmness and resolution of the Turkish troops. Surprisingly, the English officiers as well as the soldiers were astonished by the Turks' marvellous courage. it is fair enough to set El-Dardanelle Campaign - which the Turks rushed into during the great war - as an evidence that the Turkish nation was truely the successors of the anicent conquerors4. Undoubtedly, England and France failure to break into that strait and occupy Al-Assetana during only two weeks ~ as they pretended - was adistinct confession that the Turks were eternally courageous worriors and had high fighting efficieny. Of Course, the Turkish soldier's emotions in the independence war were impassioned because he was defending his homeland and unless he
2. A. Levaa, 28.8.1921, No.6. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.

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triumpled, he would be enslaved by peoples and monarchies vho, nce upon a time, were his own obedient subjects5. it was impossibh for that indomitable nation which had these amazing historical qualifcatitns, morals and situations to be easily dominated as Europe had imagined. The whole world eagerly follovved the Turkish victories in spie of the bad circumstances they faced. Moreover, the Islamic world felt reigious brotherly sympathy with the combatant Turks. The War Lord, Mostafa Kamal Pasha, had virtually proved his gallantry and dexterity at the battle. in addition, his successful tactics revealed that he was an experienced veteran in fghting. The Turkish heroes sacrificed their blood and souls in order to show the whole world that they were worthily the ancient conqueors. They could achieve triumph and dictate their coditions at "Lozan" Conference6. in this context, we cannot ignore Egypt's honourable attitude with the Turks; wherever the Egyptian press was preoccupied with following the latest Independence war news and the Turkish leaders' efforts to liberate the country from the Greeks. in this paper, we try to pinpoint these important developments and their different dimensions depending on many original sources from the Egyptian Archieves. The Plan of The Gahzy Early 1921 The Ghazy drew up his plan not to engage in war with Greeks until; they reached (Kasstamony Ankara) line. This was intended to sap their strength, and to distace them from their military bases7. The Turks stopped the Greeks in the area of (Ashaak an Brossa), and the Greek troops were forced to retreat, meanvvhile, the Allies claimed that the Turks were unable to stop the Greeks from storming (Ankara) vvithin ten days. Nevertheless the Turkish triumphed ver the Greeks at (Askishaher) in early April 1921, where the Greek loss was round 7000 soldiers, according to Reuter. This victory boosted Turkish morals, and thousands of Turks volunteered to serve in the army. it is noteworthy that many women were among the volunteers8.
5. Al-Ahram 27.8.1921. 6. Al-Lewaa 28.8.1921. 7. Al-Moqattam, 9.4.1921, No. 9753. Al-Menbbar, 12.8.1920, No.1845. 8. Al Lewaa, 23.3.1922, No.26. Al Moqattam, 9.4.1921, No.9753. Ibid, 3.4.1921, No.9748. Ibid, 5.4.1921, No.9749.

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One pf the main results of this victory was the Italys' and France's rapprochment to Turkey in the economic domain, a matter which angered Britain. Tie Turks achieved many other success against the Greeks in (Kara hissarand Bolthly), thanks to Essmat pasha's efforts (late August 1921). TheGhazy was now commander - in - Chief (21-8-1921) and he addre*sed his soliders urging them to eliminate the enemy" with the help of Cod"9 The Greeks forces numbered about 170,000 soldiers, and Britain supplied them with light and heavy vveapons. King Konstantin marshed in order to occupy the Turkish first defence line (Askyhahir-KotahiaAffion), constituting two flanks and a heart of his troops. The Ghazy left the Grreks to penetrate into the three cities without resistance until the heart proceeded 100 k.ms, and then the Turks charged upon the Greek Flanks heavily. The Greek defeat was tremendous. The Greek claim, that (Ankara) had fallen into their hand, was a big lie10. The Greeks suffered another defeat in the battle of (Sakkaria). Britain tried to save the Greeks, so Lord (Curzon) advised the Greeks to conclude a truce with the Turks, however, figting continued until fnally on 9 September 1922 the Turks entered (Azmir), and eventually the Greeks were driven out from Anatolia n. The Ghazy and his men restored istanbul, Thrace and (posphor and Dardanelle). Political efforts and negotiations were running high until the agreement of Midania at Oct. 1922 was reached, in preparations were runing high until the agreement of Midania at Oct. 1922 was reached, in preparation for the "Lozan" conference from November 1922 until 1923. Thus the Ghazy and his fellow fighters proved to be the heroes of both war and peace, accomplishing independence for their country and world admiration for their heroic deeds12.
9. Al-Lewaa, 31.8.1921, No.8. Ibid, 29.8.1921, No.7. Ibid, 26.8.1921, No.4. Al Moqattam, 22.6.1921, No. 9816. 10. Al Lewaa, 31.8.1921, No.8. Ibid, 1.9.1921, No.9. 11. Al Moqattam, 28.8.1921, No. 9818. Al Lewaa, 8.9.1921, No.15. Ibid, 10.9.1921, No.17. Ibid 11.9.1921, No.16. 12. Al-Afkaar, 23 23.11.1922, No.843. Al-Lewaa 9.4.1922, No.41. Al-Akhbar 4.10.1922, No.794. Al-Ahram, 4.1.1923, No.13937. Al-Siassa, 5.4.1923, No.136. Al-Akhbar, 10.10.1922, No.799. Ibid, 11.10.1922. Ibid, 14.11.1922. L'express, 27.10.1922, No.36.

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Egypt's attitude tovvards the vvar of Turkey's Independance (1920-1923). in spite of the British occupation of Egypt and the Egyptianquestion. Egypt could not stand a loof from the events in Anatolia. The Times Newspaper (13th March, 1922) confessed that the relations between Egypt and Turkey were as strong as ever, for Egyptians hold good feelings to their co-religionsists the TurksB. These good feelings were shared by ali segments of the Egyptian society. Furthermore, the Egyptians were irritated by the British support of the Greeks against the Turks. in Mid, April 1921, the Egyptian "Express" paper saluted Anatolia for its heroic achievements, "Egypt being the sister-country of ali Oriental countries, greets and lauds the Anatolians with heartfelt emotions."14 This article of the "Express" was representative of feelings of ali the Egyptian people. After the victory of 'The Great Leader", The local Moqattam paper issued the results of that victory in Alexsandria city, as a model for ali other Egyptian big cities. it should be noted, here, that a substantial Greek Community had been living in Alexandria since the early days of Alexander the Great. Both Egyptians and Syrians in Alexandria Celebrated that wonderful Turkish victory ver the Greeks15. it was an pen secret now that Greece was only a tool in the hands of Great Britain. The Greeks in Alexandria were well-aware of the fact that the Greek Government was dragged to war without popular support. The evidence for that is the fact that many Greeks recruits deserted the battle feld, and sought help from the Egyptian authorities16. Moreover, a delegation from the "National Party of Egypt" had travelled to istanbul and Ankara to congratulate the Turkish people on thpeir victories17. The delegation met with Moustafa Kamal himself, who welcomed them warmly and discussed with them many issues, and invited
13. Al-Lewaa, 29.3.1922, No.32. Al-Menbbar, 21.8.1920, No.1852. 14. Al-Moqattam, 14.5.1921, No.9782. Al Lewaa, 6.5.1922, No.63. Al-Akhabar, 3.10.1922, No.793. L'express, 29.9.1922, No.33. 15. Al-Moqattam 14.5.1921. L'express, 29.9.1922, No.31. 16. Al-Lewaa, 28.3.1922, No.31. L"express, 29.9.1922, No.33. 17. Al-Ahram, 3.1.1923, No.13937. Ibid, 8.1.1923, No. 13941. Al-Mahrossa, 27.10.1923,4003.

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them to attend the session of the Turkish "National Assembly", where they met the Turkish parliamentarians. He also presented them with his own signed portrait and a copy of the National Turkish Charter. it is itneresting to mention that the Ghazy was fully informed about the Egyptian affairs under British occupation, a matter which surprised the memers of the Egyptian delegation18. in Egypt, a committee under the name of "Egyptian feelings towards The Caliphate State" was established, in 1923, to collect money to send* gifts to the Ghazy, his men, and the Caliphate State as a whole19. Egyptian nobles as well as ordinary people contributed willingly in that invitation. Many parts in Egypt protested against British exportation of Egyptian resources to the Greeks at that time. Some Egyptians asked their fellow-citizens to boycott the Greeks completely, in support of the Turkish cause. Any Egyptian who did not abide by this cali, was considered a traitor20. in Alexandria and the provinces, great protest took place because some Alexandrian Greeks deceived some Egyptian workers and persuaded them to travel to Syria and Palestine to join the Kamali Army, while in fact they were shipped to Greece instead21. it is essential to pinpoint here, that both Muslims and Copts in Egypt stood firmly together in support of the Turkish cause. There are many examples to testify to this fact, suffice to mention the attitude of the copts and Muslims of the city of Bebla i.e. (province of Gharbiya) against the Greek trick with the fooled Egyptian workers mentioned above, "ali of which is a disgraec to the honour of his Majesty, the King of England!"22.
18. Al-Ahram, 8.1.1923. Ibid, 3.1.1923. Al-Lewaa, 10.5.1922, No.67. 19. Al-Mahrossa, 1.10.1923, No.3979. Al-Afkaar, 2.12.1923, No.581. Ibid, 5.12.1923, No.584. Al, Levvaa, 14.9.1921, No.20. 20. Al-Shaab Al Mesry, 11.6.1923, no.9. Al-Lewaa, 15.9.1921 no.21. Ibid, 11.9.1921, no.16. Ibid, 17.9.1921, no.22. 21. L'express, 30.9.1922, no.34. Al-Lewaa, 17.9.1922, no.22. 22. Al-Mahrossa, 29.11.1923, No.4030. Al-Lewaa, 17.9.1922, no.22. Al-Siassa 13.4.1923, no. 143.

618

One more evidence of the Egyptian attitude is to be found in the position of the Egyptian workers who protested about loading Cargo ships to Greece from Alexandria23. Many doctors and nurses volunteered to go and extend medical aid to the Turkish fghters. Among the volunteers was Doctor Ali Al-Aghizi (a citizen from Tanat) who graduated from England, had declared his willingness to travel to Turkey in Mid-April 1921 for this purpose. Another name is that of Al Sayed Mohamed Khalil, ca citizen from Tanta too, who worked as a nurse for the wounded Turkish soliders in Heliopolis Canip. He was fluent in Turkish as well24. Many Egyptian names are recorded as fighting volunteers with the Turks, such as Mustafa Al-Damassi, who was a simple paper distribtr, together with twenty of his companion from the city of Met-Ghamr25. in April 1921, an organization of the "Egyptian Crescent" was set up to nurse war victimes in Anatolia26. As for financial support, many Egyptian from ali classes donated money for the Turks without hesitation. This was organized by a committee called the "Anatolia Relief Committee" with its headquarters in Cairo, headed by Prince Omar Tousson, and branches ali ver the Country, in 1920. There are many lists to testify to that i.e. List No.7 dated August 1921. The donations amounted to 8,665 (Egyptian Pounds)27. in September 1921, Al-Lewaa Paper reported the amount of donations from Cairo alone at 9431. Alexandria contributed with 2925 in the same month. This shows that donations were doubling year after year28. in Alexandria, a committee headed by Musatafa Maher Pasha, and treasured by Daoud Bey Takla, and membered by Mousa Bey Esmat,
23. Al-Lewaa, 1.4.1922, no.34. Al-Siassa 16.4.1923, No. 145. Al-Lewaa 16.9.1922, no.21. 24. Al-Moqattam, 14.4.1921, No.9760. Ibid, 11.4.1921. Ibid, 4.4.1921. Al-Shaab Al Mesry 4.6.1923, no.3. 25. Al-Moqattam, 17.4.1921. Ibid, 11.4.1921. 26. Al-Mahrossa, 29.11.1923, no.4030. Al-Moqattam, 11.4.1921, no.9754. 27. Al-Lewaa, 13.9.1921, No.19. Ibid 29.8.1921, No.7. 28. Al-Moqatam, 4.4.1921, No.9748. Al-Lewaa, 1.9.1921, No.9. Ibid, 12.9.1921, no. 18.

619

Bushra Bey Hanna, George Bey Wessa, and Mohamed Bey Al-Shareef, was set up to collect donations from Summer visitors in Alexandria, and to send it ali to the headquarters in Ciro29. The evidence is that ali segments of the Egyptian people, rich and poor, Mslim as well as Copt, stood frmly behind the the Turkish war of Independence30. Even Theatre bands and artists contributed part of their fnancial resources for the same purpose. An example of that was the "Abu-Al-Houl" band in the Al-Hambra "Teatro", which appropriated the whole input of Saturday, 24th September 1921, for the Turkish cause. People flocked to the Al-Hambra on that particular occasion31. Even ordinary schoolboys were eager to share in that cause; such as the pupils from Moharem Bey school in Alexandria, who with their teachers, headed to prince Tosson to offer the Second amount of donation for the Turks32. Simple labourers, like poor barbers and hired hands and housekeepers contributed as much as they could afford. in st no. 18 of the donations, the reasurer Hanafy Bey Naji declered the amount of 1258 in donation. Ankara sources estimate Egyptian donations to Anatolia fghters at 18,158, in 28 March 1922.33 in addition to that, relations and contacts with Ankara were maintained, especially with the representatives of the "National Assembly", i.e. the contacs betvveen Galal El-Din Aaref Bey in Rome, who sent a cable to prince Tousson telling him that the "Red Crescent" in Ankara had received the amount of 10,000 Liras, in early April 192234. Aaref Bey was extending thanks to the prince and the Egyptian people for their attitude. Egyptian press was urging ali Egyptians to contrib29. Al-Akhbar, 1.10.1922, No.791. Al-Lewaa, 19.9.1921, no.24. 30. Al-Akhbar, 5.10.1922, no.795. Al-Lewaa, 17.4.1922, no.48. Ibid, 19.9.1921, no.24. 31. Al-Moqattam, 1.4.1921, no.9746. Al-Lewaa, 19.9.1921, no.24. 32. Al-Akhbar, 3.10.1922, no.793. Al-Lewaa, 23.3.1922, no.26. 33. Al-Akhbar, 6.11.1922 no.822. Al-Lewaa, 1.4.1922, no.34. Ibid, 30.3.1922, no.33. 34. Al-Akhbar, 5.12.1922, no.847. Al-Lewaa, 9.4.1922, no.41.

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ute to the cause of Turkey, in order to alleviate the sufferings of the soliders and the Turkish people35. The Egyptians supported with equal warmth the committee for "Orphans vvelfare", which was established in istanbul to look after children who lost their fathers in vvar36. in the holy month of Ramadan (April) 1922, a prominent figre proposed to allot ali "Zakat" of Al-fitr for the welfare of the orphans of Anatolia. This cali was met with great reshonse and enthusiasm37. Egyptian press particular Al-Lewaa paper, kept urging the people to contribute to this noble purpose, who were estimated at 80,000 orphans. A new idea more many for these orphans was the donations of the price of exchanged gift at the Fitr "Eid" (Feast), ali ver Egypt. in June 1922, we fmd the list No.21, at the value of 22382, which is a sign of increasing donations year after year38. To sum up, the two crescents, both Turkish ang Egyptian, were in full contact thoughout the war, side by side with the "Committee of Brotherly co-operatrion", in order to collect money from prayer performers in the mosques, especially on Friday Collective Prayers39. From the a fore-said documents, it is clear beyond doubt, that the Egyptian people, unanimously, stood strongly supporting their Turkish brothers in their Turkish brothers in their cause, until the great leader AlGhazi M.K. achieved his noblest goal of independence and created modern Turkey. We sincerely hope that this brotherly spirit continues as strong as it had been in the days of the Great Attaturk, regardless of any tarnsformations in global affairs.

35. Al-Akhbar, 15.10.1922, no.803. Al-Lewaa, 30.4.1922, no.58. Ibid, 9.4.1922, no.41. 36. Al-Akhbar, 9.10.1922, no.798. Al-Lewaa, 23.3.1922, no.26. 37. Al-Moqattam, 1.4.1921, no.9746. Al-Lewaa, 30.4.1922, no.58. Ibid, 29.4.1922, no.57. 38. Al-Akhbar, 5.10.1922, no.795. Al-Lewaa, 25.5.192, no.80. Ibid, 8.6.1922, No.93. Ibid, 10.6.1922, no.95. 39. Al-Akhbar, 2.10.1922, no.792. Ibid, 6.11.1922, no.822. Al-Lewaa, 27.5.1922, no.82. Ibid, 5.6.1922, no.90.

621

THE LAST PITCHED BATTLE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE TURKISH-SYRIAN BOUNDARY LINE
Dr. Ycel GL* Given the thankless and impossible task of shoring up the Ottoman front in Palestine as the commander of the 7th Army on 16 August 1918, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatrk)1 departed almost immediately to take up his new assignment. He reached Nablus, the headquarters of the 7th Army, on 27 August after an exhausting journey on the railvvay. None of the three so-called armies on the front -4th, 7th and 8th Armies- could muster the strength of a well found division and the troops were in the last extremity of deprivation and despair. British superiority on the front was about two to one, even leaving aside questions of fitness, morale and supplies and there was no reasonable prospect of being able to stop the impending British attack. British forces struck on 19 September, less than a month after Atatrk's arrival, and immediately broke through the 8th Army on Atatrk's right. The Ottoman front crumbled and a large part of the 8th Army was destroyed in the confused fghting of the next three days. Under continual air attack and with majr British forces already completely round his flank and joining from the north in the assaults being made on him from the south, Atatrk nevertheless succeeded in withdrawing most of his 7th Army and the remnants of the 8th to the east of 2 the river Jordan on 24 September . After a few days in the Dera district attempting to reorganize the shattered and badly mixed units which had come from the west of the river Jordan, Atatrk continued the withdrawal north to Damascus on 27 September with the 7th Army, leaving the 4th Army to cover its retreat with what forces could be gathered from the East Bank. Multitudes of
* 1. 2. Embassy of Turkey, Vatican. The brackets denote surnames assumed in accordance with the law of 2 July 1934. Tevfk Byklolu, Trk stiklal Harbi (Turkish War of Independence), Vol. 1, Mondros Mtarekesi ve Tatbikat (Moudros Armistice and its application), Turkish General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Directorate, Ankara, 1962, pp. 17-18. Cyril Falls. Armageddon 1918, London, 1964, pp. 171-172.

623

sick, wounded and hungry soldiers were in disarray as Ottoman armies had collapsed and were in need of reorganization. The army group (known as Lightning Armies) commander German general Otto Liman Von Sanders had an appreciation of Atatrk's strength as a strategist. Another bright spot in the othenvise bleak scene was the presence in Palestine and Syria of his old friends and associates, Ali Fuat Pasha (Cebesoy) and Colonel ismet bey (inn), who were serving as army corps commanders in his own 7th Army3. Damascus had to be abandoned on 30 September and on 2 October Liman Von Sanders ordered Atatrk to withdraw his forces and break contact with the enemy. Atatrk's troops were not pursued by the British and so the next day Von Sanders ordered him and his staff to go farther north to Aleppo and reorganize the 7th Army. A special commission was set up for the purpose and the work of reorganization proceeded apace. it was Von Sanders who issued the final order. But it was in effect Atatrk who from then onwards commanded. On 5 October Atatrk and Cebesoy reached Aleppo, where they set about the task of recreating the 7th Army, incorporating the surviving units of the 4th and 8th Armies in it as they arrived. inn arrived there about the same date, but he had fallen ili and after some days spent semi-conscious in a hospital he was recalled to istanbul to assume the post of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of War\ The 2nd Army guarding the Gulf to iskenderun against possible landing from the sea was also placed under the Lighting Armies Group command and after two weeks Atatrk had succeeded in restoring a front and some order. it was him in person who directed the reorganizational efforts, often on horseback. Two new divisions were gradually assembled, one of them at Katma, commanding the mountain roads to the north and west, leading down to the port of iskenderun. Von Sanders transferred the greater part of his staff beyond the port to Adana and in a little while follovved himself, thus virtually retiring from the scene of the battle5. it appeared that actual fghting against attack was only possible on the mountains above Aleppo. The command of the Group of Lightning Armies realized the difficult situation and sent instructions to the 7th Army saying that, while no ground was going to be yielded without due
3. Falih Rfk Atay, Atatrk'n Hatralar 1914-1919 (Atatrk's Recollections 19141919), Ankara, 1965, pp. 63-81. ismet nn, nn'nn Hatralar (Inn's Recollections), Vol. 1, stanbul, 1969, pp. 192-203. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Milli Mcadele Hatralar (Reminiscences of the National Struggle), stanbul, 1953, pp. 10-12. Hseyin Hsn Emir (Erkilet), Yldrm (Lightning) 1917-1918, stanbul, 1921, pp. 78-91. Otto Liman Von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, Annapolis, 1927, pp. 306320. Franz Von Papen, Der Wahrheit Eine Gasse, Munich, 1952, pp. 109-110. Ibid. Ibid.

4. 5.

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cause, the neighbourhood of Aleppo had to be evacuated in the face of superior enemy forces and the resistance was to be continued on the mountains. in accordance vvith these directions, the 7th Army deployed itself in depth. On 17 October the 20 th Army Corps was stili below Aleppo whilst the 3rd Army Corps was in Mslimiye, a station on the Baghdad railway between Aleppo and the bridge ver the Euphrates at Birecik, where the line from Anatolia branched off to the lines in Syria and Mesopotamia. Mslimiye station served as a junction for the Hijaz and Baghdad railvvays. in this way the 7th Army commanders had gained twelve days in which to create a military force capable of defending the hills north of the city, the gatevvay to Anatolia itself. This front, running parallel to and slightly south of the present Turkish-Syrian border, \vithstood the first probing attacks of the over-extended British forces towards the end of October6. in these days the movements of Allied ships in the Gulf of iskenderun became more active. On 14 October two torpedo boats and a guard ship entered the gulf and bombarded the harbour batteries of iskenderun. Here one of the vessels hoisted a white flag and landed some officers. They conferred with the local Turkish commander and returned to their ships, which then left the gulf. As soon as the army group learned of this, such negotiations were strictly prohibited and headquarters of the 4st Turkish Division, heretofore on the Belen Pass southeast of iskenderun, was transferred to the latter place. in the Gulf of iskenderun, British and French ships were observed on 23 October. in front of Arsuz, southwest of iskenderun, a ship appeared at dusk, bombarded the coast and attempted to land troops. The attempt was repulsed by the detachments of the 4st Division. This ship returned to the hgh sea. Defensive measures therefore had to be taken both in the town and vicinity of iskenderun7. The importance of iskenderun as a nodal point in the Turkish railway system and of its vulnerability to an amphibious assault from the sea was at nce apparent. An Allied thrust inland, either in a northerly direction from iskenderun towards Osmaniye or eastvvards from iskenderun and Antakya against Aleppo, from a firm base secured in the Gulf of iskenderun, vvould have effectively severed Turkish railway and road Communications vvith istanbul. The loss of this vital port-cum-railhead together vvith a thrust tovvards Aleppo vvould have a disastrous effect on the Turkish war effort in general and on the movement of troops and supplies in particular. Major-General H.J. Macandrevv, commander of the British 5th Cavalry Division, appeared before Aleppo on 22 October. This British divi6. 7. Ibid. Sanders (1927), pp. 314-316.

625

sion was the only formation able to make the long march north from Damascus to Aleppo. On 23 October the British 15th Cavalry Brigade, comprising the Jodhpur Lancers, the Mysore Lancers and the st Hyderabad Lancers, established contact with elements of the Turkish 20th Army Corps, 20 kilometers southwest of Aleppo. The newly formed 20th Army Corps, which consisted of the skeletal st and llth Divisions under the command of Cebesoy, was the fruit of the organizing power of Atatrk, who was responsible for the defence of Aleppo and beyond. A demand to surrender Aleppo was rejected and the British emissary, Captain R.H.M. Mclntyre of the 7th Light Car Patrol, was courteously treated by the Turks, but the written message from the chief of staff of the 20th Army Corps, Majr Naci (Tnaz), which he brought back was brief, curt, stiff, laconic and to the point. it ran: "The commander of the Turkish garrison of Aleppo does not fmd it necessary to answer your note." The Turks had about 8,000 troops in the city and was not impressed by Macandrevv's slight column. Macandrew therefore decided to wait for the remainder of his force before attacking and 24 and 25 October passed \vithout activity8. On the afternoon of 25 October Arab bedouin pillagers attacked Aleppo from the east and broke in. Liman Von Sanders describes this as the frst hard fighting since his troops had left Palestine. Von Sanders was at Adana, ver 150 kilometers from the scene, but he describes accurately what follovved and gives the strength of the bedouins at about 1,500, which is correct. They appeared at one moment to have captured the citadel and government building. Then they attacked the headquarters of the 7th Army. After gaining a temporary footing there they were thrown out. Atatrk heard firing in the street outside his headquarters. He went out and sardonically observed that certain inhabitants of Aleppo, whom the Turks aspired to defend, were throwing grenades at them from the rooftops. His men moved swiftly down the streets and dispersed the bedouins. They were driven out of the city and order was soon restored. The commander of the Group of Lightning Armies goes astray at this time about the British. He states that they brought up a strong force of infantry in trucks, whereas what the Turks actually saw was a supply column and the 9 maintenance vehicles of the cars . But the time had come to evacuate Aleppo. Apart from Macandrew's imminent advance there was a danger of a landing in the rear at iskenderun. A disembarkation in the area had previously been discussed among the Allies and the scheme had been very much in the mind of the British military authorities. At midnight on 25 October the Turkish commander
8. 9. Atay (1965), pp. 59-61. Sanders (1927), pp. 317-318. Official History of the Great War, "Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine", Edited by Cyril Falls, London, 1930, Vol. l,p.61O. Ibid.

626

had withdrawn his troops intact from the city. The 7th Army pulled back five kilometers to the north during that night and the army headquarters was transferred to Katma. On the early morning of next day, British forces advanced cautiously to find the Turkish defences evacuated and they moved fonvard to the southern suburbs of Aleppo. There they were to discover from the inhabitants that the Turks had withdrawn. Thus Macandrew was able to enter the city without opposition and practically reached the northern limits of the Arabic-speaking land. The British commander, hovvever, was soon going to experience a disillusion. 12 kilometers northwest of Aleppo a body of about 2,500 strong and well-equipped Turkish infantry, with 150 cavalry and from eight to ten guns took up position astride the Aleppo-Iskenderun road. Here the Turks had organized a new defensive position of strength10. At 10.45 a.m. on 26 October, the British forces made up of the 15th Cavalry Brigade and an armoured car column and accompanied by Arab rebels attacked Turkish positions. British cavalrymen trotted fonvard and, as they topped a slight ridge, came in sight of the little village of Haritan and at the same moment came under machine-gun fire. The commander of the 15th Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier-General C.R. Harbord, ordered the Mysore Lancers to move round the ridge and charge and the remaining squadrons of the Jodhpur Lancers to follow them. While the armoured car column attempted to turn the Turks' right, the cavalry charged in on their left and galloped through the lines. The horsemen in particular suffered severely from intensive and accurate machine-gun fire. They fell back a quarter of a kilometer, dismounted and took up a position straddling the road. The Lancers got no support from the light cars; the 12th Light Armoured Battery, moving ver higher ground, was so hotly engaged by the Turkish machine-guns that it drew back after a number of tyres had burst. Lieutenant-Colonel H.N. Holden, the Senior Special Service Officer with the Jodhpur Lancers was killed under heavy fire and the two leading squadrons retired in confusion. The British forces were thus encountered by a stiff resistance and they were gallantly repelled and speedily repulsed by the toughest defensive fighter in the world, Turks, with big casualties. These fresh and rested Turkish troops fought their last important engagement in war fiercely and the remainder of the Turkish line stood firm". Despite the long and painful retreat to the north the Turks were stili full of fight. in the last tactical action of the war Turkish troops had little difficulty in brushing aside the advancing British 15th Cavalry Brigade. According to a liaison officer of the st Hyderabad Lancers, the Turks stood up to the charge of the Jodhpur and Mysore Lancers unflinchingly
10. Atay (1965), p. 63. Sanders (1927), pp. 318-319. Falls (1930), p. 612. 11. Ibid.

627

and before these over-confident horsemen could recover from the shock of the head-on collision with the Turkish first line, the Turkish infantry, with bayonets gleaming in the sun, were soon bearing down on the dazed British forces, with the aplomb, steadiness and discipline of troops on a ceremonial parade. Little wonder that British veterans of the First World War who participated in the operations in Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, talked with awe and respect of the incredible physical hardiness and raw courage of the Trk. To one and ali he was a brave soldier. Perhaps the Ottoman officers of Arab origin, who fought with the Turks against the British, and later with the Arab rebel forces against the Turks, were the best judge of the relative professional skill and fighting quality of the Ottoman and British armies. These men were unanimous in their view that for sheer fighting ability, raw discipline and the ability to survive and more importantly, fight under the most adverse conditions conceivable, there was no army to equal the Ottoman and no commanders that equalled the Trk in professional competence and personal bravery12. The entrenched Turks, under the resolute and inspiring leadership of Atatrk, proved to be as stubborn and valiant as ever. The Anatolian soldiers fought at Haritan with the dour courage and phlegm characteristic of the Turkish nation - almost immovable and unyielding in the defence and bold and fearless in the attack. They were sound of limb and of heart and as fighting men they proved themselves superior to the polygot British forces arrayed against them. On 26 October the Turkish soldier's morale and fighting spirit was in no way affected by the earlier reverses which would undoubtedly have broken the will and soul of most armies in the world. The battle at Haritan indicated that in case where the Turkish soldier had equality in arms, training, leadership and equipment he was virtually equal to any. He could almost match any other in every military quality. it was undoubtedly due to Atatrk's boundless energy, enthusiasm and determination that the Turks were able to gain such a great achievement. He was a meticulous organizer with great capacity for fitting his plans to his resources. A potent combination of tactical prudence and brazen audacity was the characteristic feature of the Turkish general at the battle of Haritan. He was the most capable field commander the Turks had during the war. By one of those striking ironies of fate, the last triumph of the Ottoman army came on the very plain of Mercidabik where almost exactly four centuries earlier, the troops of Sultan Selim I had won a decisive victory - the victory which made the Ottomans masters of Syria. British military authorities emerged from the war with a healthy respect for the prowess and gallantry displayed by Turks at Haritan, in the
12. Syed Ali El-Edroos, The Hashemite Arab Army: 1908-1979, Amman, 1980, pp. 187-188.

628

very words of Captain Cyril Falls, the writer of the official British war history, "so the last action of the Palestinian campaign of the British ended with a success for the Turks." He also held that "the Arab rebels proved to be little more than a gadfly to a reorganized Turkish army."13 Again according to the same source, for the Turks, one man, and one alone, had gained it. The first reason why the Turks had fought as stoutly as they did and had shaken off their demoralization was to be found in the personality and organizing power of Atatrk. The majority of his forces had gne through the disastrous battles and retreats, but they had recovered a good part of their traditional quality after being rested, re-equipped and inspired afresh. Atatrk did not lead his army from behind. With the unruffled aplomb and total disregard for personal safety, Atatrk was well forward, physically leading his men in the battle. And the rugged and courageous Anatolian soldiers invariably responded favourably to the personal leadership and example set by their commander. Eyevvitnesses later testifed that the Turkish general personally fought among his men in the battle at Haritan. Thus an Ottoman officer of Arab origin who passed during the war into the service of Sherif Hussein of Mecca informed Captain Falls later that he fought a machine-gun in the battle at Haritan and that the fire was controlled and directed by Atatrk in person14. in ali fairness the same could not be said of Atatrk's British counterpart. Major-General Macandrew did not measure up to the professional competence and qualities of battlefield leadership vvitiS which the Turkish commander was endovved. Burdened by the deadvveight of an outdated military tradition, Macandrevv appeared content to remain riveted to the army base at Aleppo while his troops were fghting for their lives on the slopes of Haritan15. in effect, the Turks were now fighting on their own soil, for those hills and mountains behind them formed the natural boundary between Anatolia, the Turkish heartland, and the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The historic land route betvveen Aleppo and Anatolia wound up behind the town of iskenderun to the Belen Pass ver the southern Amanus range. This narrow passage at an altitude of 730 meters was about 15 kilometers southeast of the town and that way was the direct road from Aleppo. The Belen Pass, known as the Syrian Gates in history, had been used from time immemorial as a commercial, administrative and military link of communication between Syria and Cilicia. The passage of the Syrian Gates was singularly adapted by nature for strategic control of the traffic.
13. Falls (1964), pp. 171 and 167. 14. Falls (1930), p. 616. 15. Edroos (1980), p. 36.

629

At nightfall on 26 October the Turks resumed their march to a position in the hills about 30 kilometers northwest of Aleppo on the iskenderun road and they held the southern gatevvay to Anatolia. Beyond this ne, to the north, the Turks organized a formidable position of great strength along the Anatolian frontier under the direct and dynamic control of Atatrk16. The position proved too strong for the single depleted British division and armoured cars. The task of breaking through was beyond the capacity of Major-General Macandrevv. He was obliged to cali up reinforcements from Damascus. Supply and medical services could not keep up with an advance ver devastated and malarial terrain. Disease was now rampant in the British cavalry. Macandrew's division was incapable of further effort and it was decided to await the arrival at Aleppo of the Australian Mounted Division before resuming the offensive. The presence of the 7th Army was enough to prevent any further advance by this one \veakened division. Had the Turks not been about to sign the armistice British 5th Cavalry Division would have been in a perilous position. Despite ali difficulties the 7th Army proved to be a formidable fighting machine, commanded and led by a Turkish general of outstanding ability and of great personal courage. 7th Army, repeatedly attacked but never defeated, was for the first time defending, not Arab territory, but the soil of Anatolia itself, of which this was the natural frontier. Recognizing that not only that Syria was lost but that the Ottoman Empire would have to sue for peace, Atatrk revealed his thoughts to Cebesoy that out of this debacle might come the birth of a new nation comprising those regions of the empire populated by Turks. it was in Asia Minr, behind this range of mountains, that both the past and the future of the Turkish nation lay. He held the idea of defending the independent existence of the Turkish nation from the stronghold of Anatolia and accepting the loss of Turkish rule of Arab lands17. The fighting at Haritan was the final fierce combat betvveen the Ottomans and the British - actually the last pitched battle of the First World War - and it could in addition be considered as the first military operation of the Turkish War of Independence. in fact, several events which later took place proved that the ideas of Atatrk as regards the liberation of the country by an armed national struggle were already definite at the time and it was again at Haritan that he had started to apply them effectively. The conviction was formed and action flowed from it. On 30 October, at 9.40 p.m., negotiations that had begun three days earlier between the representatives of the Ottoman Empire and Britain,
16. Atay (1965), pp. 64-65. 17. Cebesoy (1953), pp. 13-14. Henry Somer Gullett, The Australian Imperial Force in Snai and Palestine: 1914-1918, Sydney, 1984, pp. 778-779.

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the latter acting on behalf of Allied Powers, resulted in the signing of Moudros Armistice on the Aegean island of Limnos. Atatrk, when he received the news of the armistice and the order to cease fire, was stili resisting with his forces to the British advance in the hills northwest of Aleppo. "in the fghting of the last few days," wrote Liman Von Sanders, "the army held high the honour of its arms." in the closing days of the war, Atatrk gave a final display of his exceptional skills. Thus, after four long disastrous years of war, Atatrk emerged from the general carnage as the only Turkish field commander, who had not suffered a single defeat. A recent historian's judgement has him "the greatest Turkish military hero of the war."18 By 30 October the Turks held a position at least 40 kilometers in length bestriding the sharply bending road to iskenderun at two points 20 kilometers northwest of Haritan, with outposts 6 kilometers in advance. The front extended from the slopes of the heights rising there, from Marata to Babulit and Halebli, thence crossing raihvay and road, from Tennib to Tatmarash and Ain Dakni, from there across the Aleppo-Kilis road to the southeast of Djibrin. Turkish ne of defence stretched from the mouth of the Asi river, went south of Antakya, passed eastwards to Tel Rifat and ended upon the Euphrates at Deyrizor. The Turkish position was held by the 24th and 43rd Divisions of the 20th Army Corps, totalling about 8,000 rifles ali under the command of Atatrk, with headquarters at Katma. A few kilometers to the north of Katma the low, grey-ash foothills of the Taurus mountains were clearly visible. The Turks stood at the bottom of the very ramparts of Anatolia. They withdrew to the slopes of the Taurus mountains and solidified their positions in the very drawbridge of the Ottoman Empire formed by the cul-de-sac of the Amanus mountains resting on the triangle formed by iskenderun, islahiye and Antep. Two divisions, 4st and 44th, were deployed in the Gulf of iskenderun, with the 23rd and 47th along the coast in Tarsus19. Here it is both interesting and important to remark that Captain William Yale, the American military observer with General Edmund Allenby's Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Palestine and Syria during the years of 1917 and 1918, maintains the idea that "this strikng force, gathered by Atatrk, might well have driven the British and Arab advanced forces out of northern Syria had it not been for the signing of the Armistice at Moudros on 30 October 1918."20 With the conclusion of the armistice Atatrk was formally appointed Lightning Armies Group Commander in Liman Von Sander's place. Plac18. Ibid. Sanders (1927), p. 319. See also Fahri Belen, Birinci Cihan Harbinde Trk Harbi, 1918 Y Hareketleri (Turkish War in the First World War, Movements of the Year 1918), Vol.5, Turkish General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Directorate, Ankara, 1967, pp. 110-115. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. William Yale, The Near East, Michigan, 1958, p. 249.

631

ing Cebesoy in command of the 7th Army he set off instantly for Adana, where Von Sanders had rejoined the group headquarters, travelling nonstop until he got there and assumed command on 31 October. The armistice, for Atatrk, was not an end. At the farevvell party given for the departure of the German general, Atatrk responded to the former's speech to the effect that for them while the war against the Allies might be ver, the war for Turkish independence was beginning at the very moment. Undefeated in battle he was more than ever undefeated in spirit. There would now be peace of a kind. But he knew that a just peace would have to be fought for and that the struggle would be hard and long. Atatrk endeavoured to reorganize and reinforce against any eventuality the two armies (2nd and 7th) remaining under the commad of Lightning Armies Group and established contact with the 6th Army to his east in Mosul. At the end of four years of war, the fighting morale of the Turkish army was by no means affected as the British, French and Italian occupation forces and the Greeks were to find out to their cost in the immediate postwar years21. But it was only on 3 November, when he was sent the full text of the armistice that he realized what ort of terms the Prime Minister and Defence Minister Ahmet zzet Pasha's (Furga) government had agreed to. The armistice generally demanded the retention of ali forces on both sides behind the line of contact as of noon 31 October. Although this apparently assured the Turkish heartland in Anatolia against an Allied invasion from the south, a number of pretexts for widespread Allied armed presence throughout both Asia Minr and eastern Thrace were suggested by several clauses. Atatrk sensed in these vagaries a deliberate British attempt at deception. As the Turkish leader subsequently observed, it contained clauses which gave Entente Povvers potentially complete control of the country: specifically, the immediate demobilization of the army, the right of the Allies to occupy any strategic point (to be defined by the victors) deemed necessary in the Ottoman Empire and control ver the means of communication22. The first political necessity now became clear: to bring the armistice terms under control by close definition or if necessary revision, and to resist their misinterpretation by the British, by threat of force if need be. He at nce wired back to the Prime Minister requesting clarification of the clauses affecting his army. "The Armistice of Moudros is not intended to secure the safety of the Ottoman Empire. The clauses are not explained clearly. They are vague and have wide meanings. it is necessary to clarify them explicitly or today the Allies will demand the Taurus line and tomorrovv the city of Konya", in a hectic telegraphic correspondence with
21. Kemal Atatrk, Nutuk (The Grand Speech), Vol. 1, istanbul, 1934, p. 257. Cebesoy (1953), pp. 28-30. Byklolu (1962), pp. 20-29. 22. Ibid. See also Ali Fuad Trkgeldi, Mondros ve Mudanya Mtarekelerinin Tarihi (History of the Armistices of Moudros and Moudania), Ankara, 1948, pp. 44-46.

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the Prime Minister ver next week Atatrk, aware now of the former's considerable naivete about Entente intentions towards Turkey, progressed rapidly from lecturing him on the need for firmness, to a refusal to obey military orders, to pen defiance of the personal instructions of the Prime Minister, and within seven days to resignation23. The armistice was in Atatrk's opinion an agreement by the Ottoman Empire to surrender itself unconditionally to the enemy. Not only that, but a promise to aid the enemy in its invasion of the country as well. During the truce negotiations at Moudros the Ottoman delegation had missed the hidden menace of clauses giving the Allies the right of occupying strategic points 'in case of disorder'. He realized that it would have to be resisted eventually and already on the fourth day of the armistice he began to think of ways and means. He was especially concerned about the clause demanding the withdrawal of ali Turkish garrisons from Syria. The exact northern frontier of Syria was unknovvn. Where, by definition, was the frontier of Syria? Did it follow the line of the mountains northwest of Aleppo? Or was it to be prolonged down into the southern Anatolia, to include the district of iskenderun? The British was now claiming that his garrison, the 7th Army, was stationed in Syria, hence liable to surrender. British military authorities were making use of antiquated geographical terms such as Cilicia, instead of the Province of Adana and Sanjak of Mara, which had been put in the Moudros Armistice to occupy larger portions of Turkish territory24. The Prime Minister replied that the armistice did not give the British the right to occupy iskenderun. Since, hovvever, the raihvays to the south, with their bridges, had been destroyed during the Turkish retreat, there was a verbal gentleman's agreement that they should be allovved to use the port and the road to Aleppo for the transport of their wounded and supplies to their forces. But e port and town of iskenderun were to remain under Turkish control. Atatrk was requested to inform the British 25 commander accordingly . in his reply, Atatrk persisted in his objections, arguing that the British armies had access to ample food supplies in Aleppo itself and in the surrounding districts and that their real purpose was to occupy iskenderun and thus cut the retreat of the 7th Army and force it to surrender. On 5 November Atatrk ordered that a British landing at iskenderun be opposed by force. He was convinced that the British request to use the port
23. Atay (1965), pp. 63-64. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. pp. 68-69. The town of iskenderun had great strategic value from both a naval and military standpoint. The port was of vital importance and was generally regarded as being one of the fnest in the eastern Mediterranean. The area possessed a splendid natural naval base. it was connected by rail with Toprakkale and thus with the main lines running west to Ankara and istanbul.

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and the road from there to Aleppo to supply their army in Syria was a mere pretext: the demand for the surrender of the 7th Army in Syria confirmed it. The Prime Minister had seen no harm in granting this "justifiable request"26. On 6 November, in reporting his action to the Prime Minister in a telegram marked "Penalty of death for delay", Atatrk said: "The British request is not justifiable. I assure you that the intention is not to supply the British army at Aleppo, but by occupying iskenderun and moving along the Iskenderun-Knkhan-Katma road to cut the line of retreat of the 7th Army and to place it in a position where it cannot avoid surrender, just as was done to the 6th Army in Mosul. The fact that the British have today put Armenian gangs into action in islahiye lends strength to this suspicion. Therefore I am excused in having been the means of informing the British commander in Syria of the state of affairs. I have ordered that the British are to be opposed by force if they try to land troops at iskenderun under any pretext whatever, and I have ordered the 7th Army to leave a weak outpost organization on the line it occupies today and to move to its main body in the direction Katma-Islahiye and to get within the Cilician border. Since my character is not suited to carrying out these orders and since I would naturally be pen to many accusations if I could not act in accordance with the convictions of the Chief of the General Staff, I most particularly beg that the person whom you will appoint in my place be designated svviftly in order that I may relinquish my command immediately."27 iskenderun had been occupied by two squadrons of British troops on 9 November, the Turkish garrison of the town only withdrawing from it after repeated refusals to do so had been met by a threat that a landing would be made by force if the locality was not instantly evacuated. According to Atatrk, the British troops had no right to advance beyond the line which they actually occupied at midday^on 31 October 1918 and under the terms of the armistice this extension f the British occupation was not in order. During the withdrawal Turkish military authorities left behind large numbers of armed soldiers in the guise of gendarmerie, with the object of embarrassing the Allies and obtaining Turkish control of the iskenderun region. it was mainly his opposition to the orders received from the Sublime Porte for the evacuation of iskenderun that prompted Atatrk to resign his military command and move in on istanbul to tackle the political situation head on28. The victory at Haritan had enabled Atatrk to fix a natural boundary line below the Taurus and Amanus mountain ranges on the southern fron26. Ibid. 27. Les Souvenirs du Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Revue des Etudes Islamiques, I (1927), p. 174. 28. Atatrk (1934), p. 526.

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tier of Asia Minr. The exceptionally able and far-seeing Turkish leader issued an order that the enemy must not be allowed to cross this line and the British never did. The actual military front at that moment ought to set the outside limit for the permanent political frontier of the future Turkish state. The linguistical map of Asia Minr shovved that the Arabs spread some 20 to 50 kilometers south of the Baghdad railway line. Thus the advance of the British army was halted at the approximate linguistical line of demarcation between Turkish and Arab peoples. in the dark and bitter months ahead, when it became necessary to define the national territorial limits of the new Turkey, Atatrk chose this line, traced, as he said, by Turkish bayonets. A common language was not the only possible bond of modern nationality, yet it was the most obvious and prevalent one. There was Turkish linguistic unity north of the line drawn on 26 October and such a delineation of the border conformed, on the whole, to the principle of nationalities. Thus the Mazzinian-Wilsonian ideal of linguistic self-determination came closer to realization in Turkey than elsewhere in the Middle East. in the Erzurum Congress of 13 July - 7 August 1919, held with Atatrk's participation and under his direction, it was particularly stressed that the territories which were controlled by the Turkish armies on 30 October 1918 were a single invisible whole and could not be separated from each other. The acceptance of national boundaries at Erzurum was the first big step on the road to the new national Turkish state. Later the Turkish leader was to remark: "I confess that I, too, tried to define the national border somewhat according to the humanitarian purposes of the American President Woodrow Wilson's principles. On the basis of those humanitarian principles, I defended boundaries which Turkish bayonets had already defended and laid down. Poor Wilson, he did not understand that lines that cannot be defended by the bayonet, by force, by honour and dignity, cannot be defended on any other principle." The judgement of Atatrk was condescending in its phrasing but apt in its substance29. The Sublime Porte, under unrelenting pressure from the British, could not accept Atatrk's defnition of the Syrian frontier as the area being actively defended by Turkish bayonets. Atatrk tried to oppose surrender to foreign occupation of territory he regarded as geographically and linguistically Turkish. He had by this time developed a Western-style national consciousness of a ort not uncommon among educated Turks, many of them from the officer class. His nationalism, so far as it had a theory, derived it from the French revolution. By 1918 nationalism was a doctrine familiar enough and congenial enough to the Turkish intelligentsia who had some contact with Western ideas to enable them to seize on Wilson's principle of the self-determination of peoples as a means of saving the Turkish nucleus of the Ottoman Empire after the defeat. in resisting foreign occupation the Turkish leader thus insisted that the Turks
29. Ibid. p. 83.

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should recognize the rights of Arabs to self-determination, while claiming to be masters themselves in their own Anatolian homeland. As developments later proved, Atatrk's drastic attitude was not a mere bluff but had a very definite bearing on the formation of the Nationalist movement. This nationalistic spirit was irremovably at the bottom of his dealings with other states. Regarding his own immediate plans, he was to state several times during the next few years that it was his armistice experiences at Adana that decided him on the course he followed thence to the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Thus as early as the first week of November 1918, Atatrk was able to predict events in the years to come30. On 3 November, in a circular sent to the military and civil authorities of southern Anatolia commenting on the armistice clauses stipulating the evacuation of Syria, Atatrk considered as the northern boundary of Syria a line which began from Ras-Ibn-Han, on the Mediterranean, at 10 kilometers from the north of Latakia and covered iskenderun, Antakya, and their environs as well as a notable part of the Province of Aleppo. The line between the Turkish and Arabic-speaking populations would very certainly class the region of iskenderun, Antakya and their dependencies with Asia Minr, not with Syria31. in this conjunction it is signifcant that Atatrk's opinion on the determination of the Turkish-Syrian frontier line is confirmed by the British military intelligence sources which indicated that a line dravvn from Birecik on the Euphrates westwards to Sajur and then southvvest to a point on the coast some 16 kilometers north of Latakia would roughly coincide with the Turkish-Arabic linguistic boundary32. On the other hand, the assertions of the Arab nationalists that the northern limits of the Arabic-speaking lands extended up to the Taurus range were unrealistic by ali accounts and definitely did not correspond with the facts. That certainly was not the case. The line laid down by the Franco-Turkish Ankara Agreement of 20 October 1921 as the frontier betvveen Turkey and Syria began at a point south of Pay as, 15 kilometers north of iskenderun, passed eastwards thence to a point on the Baghdad railway some 45 kilometers north of Aleppo and thereafter followed the course of that railway to Nusaybin in such a way as to place the actual railway line in Turkish territory. The stations and sidings of the section betvveen obanbey and Nusaybin belonged to Turkey as forming parts of the track of the railway. From Nusaybin the new frontier turned north-east to the Tigris at Cizre. The Turk30. Trk Harp Tarihi Vesikalar Dergisi (Turkish Review of Documents of War History), 9 (1960), document no: 767. 31. Ibid. 27 (1959), document no: 715. See also Yunus Nadi Abalolu, Our Grand Chief and the National Cause, Cumhuriyet, 5 June 1937. 32. Handbook of Asia Minr, Naval Staff intelligence Department, Vol. IV, Part 2, London, 1919, p. 109.

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ish nationalist demand for the territory north of the 1918 armistice line was mostly accepted in 1921 - with the exception of the district of iskenderun, Antakya and their environs (Hatay) vvhich were later to join the mother country in 1939 - in simple recognition of the fact that the Turks had themselves won back Cilicia (and the cities of Mara, Antep and Urfa further east) from the French who had advanced from Syria. The definitive peace treaty between Turkey and ali the Allied Powers was signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. The frontier fxed in the Ankara Agreement between Turkey and the French mandated territory of Syria was subsequently adopted and confirmed by Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne. Victory ver their enemies gave Turks tremendous confidence in their own strength and ability and raised the morale throughout the whole nation. it would have been easy to adopt a dangerous and ambitious course of aggrandizement and unrealistic expansion. Yet this was not done. Turkey's post-Lausanne policy firmly rejected the pursuit of any irredentist claims. The Hatay affair was only an apparent exception; for the Turkish case rested on a special agreement with France which Turkey insisted on renegotiation at a time when France was ready to relinquish its Syrian mandate. Atatrk, when laying the foundations of the new Turkey, clearly renounced ali desire to incorporate Arab lands vvithin the national state. For he thought that discontented subjects in such territories would weaken rather than strengthen his country. Turkey was to become a compact homogeneous state removed from extraneous elements. it was certain that Turkey would give no trouble to Syria, but would on the contrary seek to remain on the best of terms with it. Although such appraisals are not central to this paper, there was no reason to suspect Turkey of adventurous designs or of any desire to seize Arab territory. The Turks had accepted their existing frontier and the statement that they had no wish to govern non-Turkish territory rang true. Turkey's foreign policy would be based on peace, friendship and trade with ali nations - which called for the use of ali resources for internal development and the betterment of the citizen's life. Turkey's national energies were almost entirely concentrated on reconstruction at home. Abroad its only desire was for the long-term peace which would enable it to pursue its reform program undisturbed. Facts, not fancies, dominated Ankara. Atatrk did not conduct foreign policy from theory, but according to the dictates of geography and the needs of the time. Possibly the most important feature of Atatrk's thinking in matters of foreign policy was to define the national interest strictly in accordance with the country's own need for peace, development, stability and security rather than foreign adventurism. Turkey had no expansionist aims. it did not want to recover the former Arab provinces of the old Ottoman Empire and counted it an asset that these had been struck away. it was a sound and healthy attitude in ali respects.

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BN ABD AL-KARIM'S AND KEMAL'S MOVEMENTS N THE 1920s: WHAT CONNECTIONS?

Prof. Abderrahmane el MOUDDEN* I would like to start this paper with a disclaimer: the scope of this topic as vvell as the material needed to deal with it are much larger than the documentation and the approach used here. Hence, the treatment given here, I am afraid, is rather tentative. My hope is to be able to carry out a more thorough treatment based on substantial data including available archival material, in a more ambitious project. in the early 1920s, following World War I, several national movemets, aroud the Mediterranean, resisted the new colonial deal. Some of them took the form of wars of liberation and soon evolved into nation and state building. Among these, the Kemalist movement in Turkey and the Rifian movement in Morocco, on both the Eastern and the Western sides of the Mediterranean, were the most important. in many ways, both movements held similar characteristics in their early stages, but they were soon to bifurcate in different directions. A comparison of the two experiments leads to a series of questions: What was the reception of the Kemalist movement in other countries South of the Mediterranean? What was the attention given by early Kemalist Turkey to other national movements around the Mediterranean? What were some of the Arab attitudes towards early Kemalism and how did they change? Were there any differences between the Maghrib and teh Mashriq in this respect? These are, among others, the issues I will deal with in this paper, relying on some contemporary reports. The main goals are to find oft if and how these two movements interacted, and to replace them in the intricacies of Arab-Turkish relations.
* Muhammed V University, Rabat.

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it is certainly an easy task to determine reciprocal assistance betvveen movements of liberation and states in the making in terms of material goods or financial helpy. For one it is quantifiable, and usually, it is documented in detail, whenever documents are stili extant. it is much of a harder endeavor to assess mutual assistance when it comes to psychological effects such as the feeling of solidarity for instance. If the former deals with measurable facts, the letter rather tackles feelings and emotions. Their impact on the unfolding historical events, hovvever, may hold the same strength in both cases. By the end of the second decade of the 20th century, Morocco and the remnant parts of the Ottoman Empire were undergoing profound and, to a certain extent, similar transformations. On the left hand of the map, since 1912, the intemational status of Morocco was that of a double-protectorate: the Northern and Southern parts of the country had been given to Spain vvhile the central parts, by far the richest and most populated, had been allotted to France, through a series of intemational agreements betvveen the main colonial povvers on the eve of World War I. The real occupation of ali these parts, hovvever, was to take more than 22 years, as a number of resistance movements broke out ali ver these regions. The most important among these was undoubtedly the Rifan war of liberation vvhich attained its peak in the decisive victory of Anvval in July 1921, under the leadership of Muhammed Bin 'Abd-al Karim al-Khattabi, more frequently knovvn as 'Abd al-Karim.1 He drove the Spanish forces back to the presidios, i.e. the Spanish enclaves on the Moroccan shores of the Mediterranean: Sabta and Malilla. it will take the Spaniards and the French who came to their rescue four years later several years before they could overcome the Rifian resistance, in 1926, thus cutting short a political experiment at state building. On the right hand of the map, the Ottoman Empire went into the vvar to the side of the Central povvers and, in 1918, found itself among the losers. in 1919, with its capital under real if not legal occupation, it looked like bound to a colonial fate and become just one of the other protectorates and mandates that took ver its former possessions. Here again, a new leader, Mustafa Kemal, of the traditional leadership, vvill carry on the resistance to the occupation forces and eventually establish a fully political new regime: the Turkish Republic.
it is, perhaps, worth noticing an interesting parallel: both leaders gained fame under names different from those given to them originally. Abd al-Karim, the name by which the Rifian leader came to be known to many scholars as well as to the public at large, is in fact his father's name. His actual name being Mihammad. See Abd elKrim et la rpublique du Rif, Paris: Franois Maspero, 1976, p. 165. As for Mustafa Kemal, his eventual name, Kamal Atatrk, certainly overshadovved his given name of Mustafa. See Volkan, Vamik and Norman Itzkowitz, The Immortal Atatrk a Psychobiography, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 36-37 and 300-302.

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Strong similarities emerge from a quick glance at both experiments: a catastrophic colonical situation tbreatening of territorial occupation and loos of national sovereignty; humiliated local traditional authorities, either under colonial rule or supervision; new leaders, taking roots in social and geographical peripheries, who prove able to gather national momentum against foreign occupation whom they fght, at least at the first stages of their action, on behalf of the very traditional authority they were soon to replace with new institutions. in this respect hovvever, Turkey presented a much more clear cut picture than the Rf, where some confusion was maintained about whether the new institutions put in place after Anwal were to fully replace the old regime or just to prepare for its renewal. This leads us to point out that the dissimilarities betvveen the two experiments were no less salient. While in Turkey clear choices were made for secularism, a republican regime and wholesale westernization, in Morocco, the nature of the regime established by Bin 'Abd al-Karim, its relationship to the Moroccan monarchy and to the western culture, are ali stili matters widely pen to debate. 1. Moroccan urban elite, poetry and Kemalist movement Like in many other parts of the Mslim and Arab world, the Kemalist movement, at its early phase, held in Morocco the importance of an inspiring model. Among other things that account for the deep interest of Moroccans -especially the urban elite, well avvare of the happenings of international politics- in the new developments of Anatolia, there is the fact that many of a family decided to give the name of Mustafa or Mustafa Kemal at nce to their new born male babies.2 Stili today, people in their sixties recall how their fathers kept in their libraries copies of translated books about the Kemalist epic movement.3 They were 'ulama' (scholars)
2. Bu-Talib, 'Abd al-Hadi, Dhikrayat, sahahadat wa wujuh (Memories, testimonies and fgures), al-Sharika al-Sa'udiya lil-abahath wal-taswiq, 1992: p. 130 "The years 1923-1924 vvitnessed a real competition among fathers to give the name of Mustafa to their boys", and al-Kittani, Ali and Khalid al-Kattani, al-'allama al-mujahid Muhamnad bin ibrahim bin Ahmad al-Kittani hayat 'Hm wa jihad 1325-1411 (The scholar and mujahid Muhammad al-Kittani, a life of cholarship and jihad) Matbaa'at al-najah al-jadida, 1992, p. 237 "On 7 Rebi' al-'awwal 1342 [/1924], a cousin of ibrahim al-Kittani had a new born hoy and gave him the name of Muhammad Mustafa Kemal". The Kittanis belong to a big family of Idrisid sharifs (descendents of the Prophet or alledged to be so), religious scholars and leaders from the spiritual city of Fez. As leaders of the Zawiya (or tariqa, religious order, brotherhood) holding their name, the Kittania, they had a important follovving in large areas in Northern Morocco, both in cities and in the countryside. They played key roles both prior to and after 1912, i. e. the establishment of formal french and Spanish protectorates, either agaist foreing penetration or, later, in support of the French. Oral communication of Prof. Brahim Boutaeb, Rabat, (May 29, 1998).

3.

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and tujjar (merchants) who frequently gathered in clubs (nadi) in important cities like Fez or Rabat, to debate on world affairs. Not only were they familiar with the stili unfolding Bolshevik revolution and Wilson's 14 points message, they above ali showed a passionate interest in the Kemalist movement.4 The novel al-lnqilab al-'uthmani [The Ottoman revolution] by Jorji Zaydan, describing the dark years before the Young Trk revolution and the complexities of the Ottoman years before World War I, was a success of readership among Moroccan urban youth well into the 1930s.5 However, these youth did not have access to only a bookish knowledge of the Middle eastern state of affairs. Some of their elders had had frst hand acquaintance with it through their travels or through pilgrimage. Some of their family members have emigrated to the eastren lands upon the institution of the protectorate, but remained in contact with them in many ways. Among salient figures of this early Moroccan diaspora, one is worth mentionning, as he relates directly to the topic at hand: Muhammad bin Ja'far al-Kittani. The Kittanis belong to a big family of Idrisid sharifs (descendents of the Prophet or alledged to be so), religious scholars and leaders from the spiritual city of Fez. As leaders of the Zawiya (or tariqa, religious order, brotherhood) holding their name, the Kittania, they had an important following in large areas in Northern Morocco, both in cities and in the countryside. They played key roles both prior to and after 1912, (i. e. the establishment of formal French and Spanish protectorates,) either against foreing penetration or, later, in support of the French. Muhammad bin Ja'far al-Kittani, influential member of the Zawiya just mentioned is known for his pamphlet: Nasihat ahi al-Islam (an admonition to Muslims) where he analyzed the different ills from which the people of islam suffered. When the threats of French and Spanish occupation materialized in 1912, he decided to leave Morocco and went to Mecca. During the war, he moved to Damascus. When Mustafa Kemal, soon surnamed "Ghazi" (literally, holy vvarrior), launched his campaign against the Greek occupation of izmir, one of his religious advisers, Ahmad al-Sannusi, convinced him to invite Muhammad al-Kittani to Anatolia to implore God, in his quality as a religious master (shaykh) and saintly man (sharif), to secure victory to Kemalist warriors. Kemal sent
4. Rivet, Daniel, Lyautey et l'institution du protectorat franais au Marov 1912 1925, Paris: Ed. l'Harmattan, 3 t., T 3, p.235: "Moroccan elite paid a passionate attention to the Kemalist movement, the epic territorial restoration of Turkey as well as the first measures of modernization." Bu-Talib, op. cit p. 130: "The youth would borrow it from each other. Its content nurtured the National movement leaders' cali for reform in the secret cells... in the thirties, we used to swallow up its pages and devour its unfolding events... it was at that time one of the best novels and the few great epics."

5.

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envoys to accompany al-Kittani to Anatolia where he performed his religious blessings. We do not know what conversation if any al-Kittani had with Mustafa Kemal. But it is interesting to know that the same Kittani had been a former teacher at al Qarawiyyin, the famous university of Fez, where he had among other disciples, in particular, Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim. His Admonition was read and commented on in popular meetings in the Rif. Further, he kept regular correspondence with the Rifian leader. To what extent was he a bridge between the two movements, at least informing each side of the developments of the other? More reseacrh is certainly in order before tempting a satisfactory answer to such a question. it is however safe to assume that such human links, certainly more frequent than usually admitted, betvveen Morocco and Turkey and the Middle East in general in that period, were undoubtedly propitious to increasing the awareness of and interest in each other's whereabouts, especially among the urban young population.6 it was in this feverish context that a young Moroccan poet from an intellectual club of Rabat, Muhammad al-Jazuli, wrote a series of poems exalting the feats of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal.7 A member of the traditional urban elite, he belonged to the segment who did not totally reject the colonial order, but found ways to compromise with it. The French Protectorate administration under Lyautey made a big deal of preserving the former traditional structure of Moroccan sultanate, the Makhzan (litteraly, the storing room, name traditionally given to the Moroccan precolonial government structure). Although the sultan kept a semblance of traditional structure with a Sadr or grand vizier, and ministers of Justice and hubus (religious endowments), he was actually under close supervision of the French Resident general. Al-Jazuli's life offers an interesting profile. Holding a position in the High Court in Rabat, he must not have refrained from criticizing the colonial order, though more implicitly than overtly. For instance, he was keen on learning and commenting on news from the rest of the Arab and Mslim world. The Sadr who alone received the Famous Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram vvould pass it on to al-Jazuli who would read it with the greatest interest Many like al-Sazuli8 used the debate about international affairs, particullarly those of Kemaliste Turkey, as an inderect way of questionning the state of affairs in Morocco under the double protectorate.9 Some of them even tried their hands at journalism to spread word of their
6. 7. al-Kittani and al-Kittani, op. cit., pp. 284-285. See al-Jazuli, Muhammad, Dhikrayat min rabi' al-hayat (Memories of youthful years), Rabat: Matba'at al-Umniya, [1971], p. 5-16, on vvhich I rely heavily in this section. I vvould like to thank prof. Abd al-Karim Kurayim for dravving my attention to this important source. id. p. 70. Rivet, op. cit., p. 236.

8. 9.

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convictions. One of them, Badr al-din al-Badrawi, from Fez, published a newspaper titled al-Akhbar al-Maghribiya (Moroccan News, March 1921) in which he manifested a clear eagemess to propagate information about the developments of Mustafa Kemal's resistance and reforms.10 Despite the French agreement with the Turkish nationalist authorities about Cilicia, the yougn Moroccan interest in these developments was not without causing serious concern to the French Resident general who sooner than later banned Badrawi's newspaper. in this context, it should not come as a surprise if a poet like al-Jazuli, whose extant poetry about Kemal's early achievements is to date, to my knovvledge, the most substantial in Morocco, was harrassed for his ideas and opinions. Although he does not allow for specifcs on the subject, probably by caution, he nevertheless clearly states that he was dismised from his position." Leaving government office, he vvorked for his own in the private sector, as a farmer first, then as a promoter. He benefited from the prosperity that preceded the 1929 crisis which hit him badly. After ups and downs, during which he put aside his creative activity, he decided to publish his youthful poetry at the age of 70. Poems dealing vvith the Kemalist action constitute an independent unit in the whole volume, and were given the telling general title: "Praise of the Turkish struggle for existence and freedom". Each one of the four poems of the unit, celebrates one of the majr steps of the Turkish war of liberation against the Greeks. The first poem fulminates against the Greek occupation of izmir in 1919, considering it as a British not a Greek occupation. The title: "England and islam" reveals the broad picture into which he puts the struggle: after mentioning the British manipulation and stirring of the ethnic and religious issues in the Ottoman empire to the effect of dismembering it, he goes on to point to the real intentions of the British, and state that they are the real invaders, the Greeks being the obedient instrument for British policies. Enough, enough, sons of the Thames, you exagerated in falshood and accusations AH your covered policies came to light... Be then frank whith the people of islam
10. Baida, Jama "al-Badrawi, Badr al-Din bin al-Fatimi", in Ma'Iamat al-Maghrib alaqsa (Encyclopedia of Morocco), Sale: Matabi' Sala, 1991, vol. 4, P. 1108 a. 11. al-Jazuli, op. cit., p. 76. His prefacer explains though: "He held bold liberal opinions which testifed to his genius and pen mindedness. Despite the harrasment he constently suffered for his opinions, he met the situation with patient endurance until he could not bear it..." p. 1.

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and say that you want to tear them up with sword and pen You want to rvive the crusades war... Ask the troops of the sons of Greece about what they met from lions, the lions of war and confrontation... They trapped themselves obeying your orders May God be with the Turks, what have you left of their land? May God be with Egypt who uprised so many times but her rights are lost since you are the judge and the opposit party...12 The second poem deals with one of the majr defeats of Greek attempts at carving inroads in the Anatolian heartland in March 1921. it is titled "the struggle betvveen justice and injustice". it is a burst of pride and jubilation at the Turkish victory which is felt as a purificatory act avenging not only the Turks but ali dominated peoples. O God, be compationate for the sufferings of the Turks O God, be compationate for the hunger and illness of Anatolia... May God protect you, protectors of the sons of "Uthman, you the spearheads of islam since long ago You embrassed death amongst spears and amongst blazes not frearing any nation You dragged their faces in the dust but out of magnanimity, you did not deign to put your sandals on their cheeks... You pleased God and the homelands which are boasting your deed against ali other nations You saved the homeland of the ancestors from hardship you saved the Turkish reputation from disgrace... No, the Greeks did not fight you alone as wolfs fear lions in the jungle No, their helpers the English assisted them with troops, funds, ammunition and labor When you defeated the Greek forces, you actually defeated the forces of the mighty and determined English13 in addition to the recurrent theme of the Briish deep involvement in the war, there is a sence of pride and satisfaction at the Turkish achievements.
12. al-Jazuli, op. cit, pp 6-7. 13. id. p. 8-10.

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The third poem praises the French attitude after the settlement of the Cilicia question to the beneft of the turkish national authority, by the end of 1921. it bears the seemingly neutral title of "France and the Turks of Anatolia". in fact, the whole poem is a glorification of France for its retreat from the alliance against the nationalists in Anatolia. Hey France, may God reward you for your noble deed... You stood by the Turks supported by your people, well known for his pride... You agreed to peace with the Turks as the Greeks were out of breath due to their defeat You revived the age of Sleyman the Great and Henry the Third who was firm in opinion and decision... This is great America who possesses today the best finances and values it was you who saved her unity... You went to Mexico to save and assist her and it was you who created Greece from nothing... You are the mother of the free men, you help them with sword and pen in every battle You called during the great Revolution for the freedom of ideas, religions, opinions and institutions... You brought dictators down from their thrones when you decided that the peoples had the right to choose their rulers God blees you! If only your system was extended to ali countries includng Arabs and non-arabs May you, France, continue to put yours in the Turks' hands to deter any predator Thus, you will please the whole nation of islam.. . : 4 From these excerpts, it appears clearly how the poet rejoyced at the Turco-French settlement. Praise is due to France, but to a certain France, that of the defense of civil and human rights, and that of the support of freedom cause. This poem was somewhat curious on the tongue of a Moroccan in the 1920s, when France was stili engaged in deadly encounters with Moroccan tribal resistance in many parts of the country. One way to look at it is to grasp through it how, for al-Jazuli, jubilation at one Mslim land's victory may even make him overlook the hardship of the situation of his own mother land. Solidarity would in this interpretation overshadow national feeling. in fact, closer attention to the themes treated by al-Jazuly may suggest a more relevant interpretation of this poem. it is clear that the poet cali upon the French rich heritage in civil rights and
14. IbicLpp. 10-12.

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freedoms. Focusing on this shining side of the French experience was to a certain extent implicitly criticizing the ongoing territorial occupation of Morocco, with its familiar toll of dramas and traumas. Only with this second interpretation can we make sense of the wish expressed by al-Jazuli to see France extend her system to ali countries, as if it was not already in Morocco. As a matter of fact the majrity of Moroccans had not seen yet much of the shinning side of the French heritage.15 The fourth and last poem is devoted to the Turkish victory of izmir and its recorvery against the Greeks in September 1922. it is titled: "Morocco's delight at the victory of the Turks". By far the strongest in tone, it almost asserts the examplarity of the Turkish model for ali the peoples under foreign domination. This must have been the kind of poetry that raised ali the concerns of the French Resident general. After recalling the Anglo-Greek plot against the Turkish independence, he describes how the British satisfed the other colonial powers with small pieces reserving the best parts for thermselves. But when they believed the victim was ready to be slaughtered, she rised up to the deep fear of her enemies. They wondered: "Can the dead rise up out of his shroud? can the Turks' specter become threatening again?" Yes, they saw the lion bringing out his claws and showing his teeth, sharpened like spears... He inserted in the Greeks his tooth and claw... He teared them into two arts, one to his sword and the other was shackled with chains of humiliation... Turks and Greeks defied each other to the battle field And only the sword was to decide... The only speech between the two parties was that of the cannon... Thus the Greek armies melted away as if they were statues of snow ver blazing fire... The Greeks were abandonned, on the day of their disaster, by those who enticed them, after ali what they saw... Like foxes, you, Greeks, retreated to your dens when you found out that the Anatolian land was the lair of lions... O sons of Turks, may your hand never be paralyzed... O sons of Turks, you have defended the sanctuary of the East for long but your deed today earned eternity
15. To the credit of al-Jazuli, we should put emphasis on his familarity with the progressive side of French history and culture, and the accuracy of his statements, which was stili rather uncommon at this early stage of the protectorate.

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O sons of Turks, history books narrate your past glory but you added to it today a book well adorned You removed from islam the sign of humiliation and put on it the gown of your honor you raised its flag high amongst other nations Even from far away, he who identifies to it feels ennobled... O Mustafa [the chosen] from the elite of his people you, the rescuer of homelands from the grip of the enemies O heroe of Turks, savior of their blood by spilling the blood of those who attacked the homeland Be satisfied that you singly beared what the one with the crown could not bear, as he became shackled... From nothing, you raised army and established power... After gruesom days, you gave back a smilling face to the East and made it forget ali the suffering it endured.16 Such were a few examples of the keen attention the young urban elite paid to the unfolding transformation of early Kemalist Turkey. As a matter of fact, these young men often joined in their discussion comments on the two experiments that seemed to be strong enough to stand up to colonial occupation, that is the Rifian and the Kemalist movements. One may wonder what was the reception made to the news of the Kemalist movement in the Rifian region and especially among the leadership of the Rifian republic. For want of archival research, we can only make peripheral inroads in the subject, relying mostly on journalistic and indirect data. But before dealing with how Bin 'Abd al-Karim saw Kemal's experiment, let's try to find out how Turkish opinion, this time, followed Bin 'Abd al-Karim's own struggle for independence. 2. Kish opinion and Bin 'Abd al-Karim' struggle for independence The Turkish interest in Moroccan affairs during the early decades of the XXth century was known to North Africanists through an article by a French scholar, J. Deny, about the memories of some former member of the Turkish military mission in Morocco in 1909.17 These memories were published by the Turkish nevvspaper Vakit, on 8 June 1926. J. Deny's concern was to show how the Ottoman Empire in the Young Turks era endeavored to establish a political infuence in Morocco. But in passing, he mentions that the publication of these memories was part of a press campaign in favor of the Rifian leader Muhammad Bin Abd al-Karim,
16. al-Jazuli, op. cit.pp. 13-16. 17. Deny, Jean, "Instructeursmilitaires turcs au Maroc sous Moulay Hafidh", in Memorial Henri Basset, Paris, 1928, pp. 221-227.

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who had just recently (end of May) surrendered to the French. it was a good guess to try to see further what was the material published by this newspaper in an attempt to determine what information was available in Turkey, at least to the readership of this newspaper about the events of the Rif. This leads us to vvonder what kind of paper Vakit was, and who wrote in it, at least about Morocco. Vakit18 was founded by Ahmet Emin and Mehmet Asim in November 1917. Both men had worked in another nevvspaper, Sabah, as editr in chief and writer, respectively. As such, they were closely acquainted with world affairs in the troubled years of the war and its aftermath. Ahmet Emin went for intance to Germany to cover the war events there. After the occupation of istanbul in November 1918 by the Allies forces in application of Mudros Armistice (30 October), Emin was one of the Turkish elite members who opposed in one way or another, foreign occupation. Military commanders, political leaders, representatives and newspaper writers or editors like Emin were banished by the British to Malta. Vakit continued publicaton under Mehmet Asim's responsibility. The newspaper had already earned a wide popularity by attacking the malversations of some high ranking officials in the Ottoman government of the last months of the war. in the confused months follovving Mudros, Vakit, under the direction of Asim, showed some sympathy to the Anadolu movement and its leader, Mustafa Kemal, whom it stili called Pasha, despite the ruling of Damat Ferit's government to the effect that it was a erime to apply this title to Kemal or his companions. Asim was frequently summoned before authorities and courts, ineluding the martial court. This brought the newspaper eloser to the Kemalist cireles in istanbul, especially to ismet Pasha, later named Inonu, with whom Asim maintained a elose relationship well into the Republic era.19 This short incursion in Turkish press history was necessary to shed some light on the keen interest of Vakit in the Rif events in the mid 1920s. For want of an exaustive consultation of Vakit issues between 1921-1926, I cannot asses the frequency nor the importance of coverage the newspaper devoted to the Rifan movement and political strueture. Nor can I assess the range of interest in other Turkish nevvspapers of the time. Yet, the sustained coverage of the developments of the Rifian war, evolving from a war between the Rif and Spain to one betvveen the Rif
18. I would like to thank both Sleyman Tugral and Abdelhafid Tbaili for their help vvith obtaining copies of some of Vakit articles about the Rif. Tugral further helped with translating some of them into Arabic. 19. For more details about Vakit and its performance both prior to and under the Republic, see Nuri Inugur, Trk Basn Tarihi, istanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, 1992, pp. 32-35.

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and Spain and France together in 1925, demonstrate the depth of concern of Turkish opinion about the case. Obviously, one cannot infer from this data the official position of the authorities of the the young Turkish Republic. Only a thorough use of the archives of that period would allow conclusive ideas about this position and the connections between the two movements, if any. Meanwhile, however, the links we identified between the newspaper and some high ranking officials of the new regime, allow some speculation to the effect that these officials were not only scrutinizing these developments, but they perhaps wanted them to be vvidely publicized among the Turkish public opinion. Much of the data published by Vakit was drawn from what European, basically French news agencies and newspapers made public. Often, pieces of information are merely signed by the Turkish news agency: Anadolu Ajans. However, some articles dealing with developments of special importance were signed by Mehmet Asim himself. Two of these appeared on 11 and 12 July 1925 and seem to cali speciall attention. First, they provide a close shot of the picture of the Rifian question at that crutial juncture, when France decided to support Spain to press the defeat of Bin 'Abdal-Karim, Second, in these articles Asim does not content himself with a descriptive account of the international wires about the question. He also endeavors to provide his readership with a specific analysis of the turn of events, which may cast some light at least on the segment of public opinion familiar with Vakit. On 12 of July, Asim gives an account of the recent victories of Bin 'Abdal-Karim ver the French forces. After having pushed the Spaniiards back to the Mediterranean shore, of Bin 'Abdal-Karim started attacking the French on the southern border of the Rif and achieved sustained success. While detailing military operations, Asim points out to the international diplomatic context. in addition tho the French-Spanish negotiations, there were rumors about contacts between the British and the French in order to compensate each other in the Maghrib and the Middle East, France abandonnig any claim Mosul and Britain leaving the French free in the Rif. Building on that, Asim goes on to suggest that the real goal of French military operations was not to contain Bin 'Abdal-Karim's struggle to the profit of Spain, but to occupy the Rifian region to its sole beneft. To the contrary of ali expectations, the outcome of the French attacks ended in new victories for Bin 'Abdal-Karim. The question of Morroco is reaching a new stage... in fact, the recent victories of 'Abd al-Karim20 are of great importance, as they aimed to take both Fez and Taza. If these cities fail under 'Abd al-Karim's control, France will remain with
20. Asim uses the name most familiar to the French.

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only half of her former possessions in Northen Morocco.. .If will remain with onl half of her former possesssions in northen Morocco...If this happens, this will certainly ruin the French presence in Morocco, which took them ten or twelve years to establish. As the French become convinced that the military means actually available in Morocco now, cannot eradicate 'Abd al-Karim's resistance, they tura their efforts to establishing a firm blockade against the Rifian shores. France assumes that if the assistance that 'Abdal-Karim receives by sea is stopped, his resistance will fade away spontaneously. This is why some measures in this respect were decided by the French and the Spaniards in the Conference of Madrid. However, it is doubtful that either negotiations, decisions or measures can stifle or contain the movement led by 'Abdal-Karim in the Rif.21 A clear effort of restraint emerges from Asim's vvriting although his leaning towards Bin 'Abdal-Karim's cause is doubtless. The article published the following day under his signature is more revealing in this respect. Signifcantly enough, Asim gave to his article the following title: "The independent state of Rif [Mstakili Rifistan]." When we asserted yesterday that the Moroccan question was entering a important phase, we were for from thinking that the events were going to prove us tre with such rapidity. We could not know that in the same time news wires were reporting on the advant of a new independent Mslim state in Morocco, after Turkey. But, from the historical events, it seems that an independent state is about to take form in the Rif region, under the presidency of the mujahid [holy warrior] 'Abdal-Karim... The Franco-Spanish conference in Madrid decided to propose peace through giving independence to 'Abdal-Karim, on the condition that he recognize the sovereignty rights of the Moroccan sultan... in fact, this is not the first time the French and the Spaniards propose peace talks to 'Abdal-Karim.. .but in earlier propositions, the Rif independence was never agreed to. This is why 'AbdalKarim declined it ali. At last, this time, France and Spain agreed to the formation of a new independent Mslim state in the far West of North Africa. One thing calls for coution, though: so far, it is not clear to what extent the French and Spanish decision is a genuine one or not. it is probable that the French and Spanish proposition stems from their desire to stop 'Abdal-Karim's successful attacks by a counter attack from another nature. it is
21. Vakit, HJuly 1925.

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also probable that France and Spain, while proposing peace on the basis of indenpendence to 'Abdal-Karim, will on purpose prolong the time negotiation so that they can prepare themselves militarily and attack him, by surprise, nce again... Anyway, if this proposition is not genuine today, it will be tomorrovv. After Turkey, this is the second nation in the Mslim world to gain its independence from the Western powers though armed struggle and holy war. Turks know more than any other nation what are the risks and problems the independence path is paved of. For this reason, Turks do not believe that the matter will be settled when the French and the Spanish say to mujahid 'AbdalKarim "Let's recognize independence and agree to peace". Nevertheless, they appreciate the importance of the round that the Rifians gained on the path of their independence cause.22 Asim set out to see in the Rifian state in the making a sister experiment of Turkey's. As a matter of fact, the acuracy of Asims information was paralled with relevant foresights. While expressing a jubilant welcome to the new state, he vvarns against the intricacies of Western diplomacy and strategy. History proved many of his foresights to be true. The process led to Bin 'Abd al-Krim's surrender in May 1926. 3. Afiya Bin 'Abd al-Karim and Atatrk (outline) in this section, I will review some of the salaf attitudes toward both Mustafa Kemal and bin 'Abd al-Karim, basically through the material published by al-Manar, the well known salafi periodical appearing in Cairo in the late 1920s and 1930s. Kemal will evolve from a heroe status to a devil status as the his action will progressively put emphasis on secularism after the abolition of the caliphate. Meanwhile Bin 'Abd al-Karim will gain the position of the new heroe of islam, it is in the same periodical that we find some indication about how Bin 'Abd al-Karim was well aware of Kemal's modernization measures, and how he tried to find inspiration in some of them. His eventual failure put on the account of both foreign encirclement and local traditional oppositions, mainly from the tariqas. in conclusion, it is relevant to emphasize the close attention paid by important segments of the Moroccan and Turkish societies to the unfolding events each of them was experiencing. I addition, it is interesting to notice that for many Moroccan intellectuals, the debate about such sensitive issues as the caliphate, was much less heated than in the East although raising much concern as well.
22. Vakit, 12 July 1925.

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STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP N TURKEY AND INDIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Dr. Arshi KHAN* Study of state and society essentially involves study of interaction between different structure and sub-structures of society and the structure of the state. Specially study of relationship between these two - state and society is under the process of revival in the recent decades. it was a majr focus of a philosophical-cum-political discourse in later part of 18th century and at in 19th century. it is again getting a strong ground of academic debate and discussion in order to examine the nature of interaction between the two. The project of modernity and the overarching role of the state have by and large undermined the importance of society. Bipolarity has been created betvveen state at one end and society on the other. There is no mediating space between these two. in real situation bipolarity has been challenged time and again. Indeed it has become an obligation for a democratic state to promote the possibility of coherence and interaction between the state and society. A democratic state exists for society which implies that government rests on the consent of the governed. in other words, consent or dissent of the people shall have outlets for democratic expression on various occasions such as in periodic elections, in conferences, in press, and in public demonstrations. Success of a democratic polity depends upon the nature and \vorking of the government which is the state's machinery having supreme authority to make and enforce laws. One of the emerging tasks of a democratic government is the unavoidable obligation of securing compliance between state and society. Perhaps this was the main reason which motivated public mass against colonial authority, dictators and monarchial rules. it is significant to note that many Afro-Asian countries sought to build democratic polity on the debris of colonialism and imperialism. India is one among them which singled out its objective of building secular, federal-democracy in the country. Whereas Turkey, having a quite distinct experiences from the Western world, dismantled the institutions of Sultanate and Caliphate to introduce republican regime in the country. Unlike
* Hamdard University, New Delhi.

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India's struggle against the British rulers, Turks fought against invading forces of Allied povvers and indigenous institution of power, i.e., Sultan. This is a very historic and ceremonial year ~ 75th year of the Turkish Republic and 5st year of India's independence. Hovvever, both the countries ~ Turkey and India began the political experience of democracy, multiparty politics and free elections in 1950 and 1952 respectively. The only difference is that the Turkish Republic introduced freecompetitive elections after 27 years of its establishment whereas in India competitive elections were held soon after seeking independence in 1947. Hovvever, it is a fact that Turkey and India have established historic precedents to perpetuate democratic institutions and experiences in order to strengthen state-society relationship. Moreover, their commitment to socio-economic development, diversification of economy, expansion of opportunities, improved Communications, increased freedom of expression and opening up of the political system have contributed to the development of a more pluralist society. They have also developed various mechanisms to process smooth relationship betvveen state and society. There are following factors which have been instrumental in the process of state-society building in Turkey and India. Constitution it is a supreme institutional document and a collection of principles according to which the powers of the government, the rights of the governed, and the relations between the two are adjusted. Both Turkey and India have a strong legacy of constitution-making and participatory politics. Supremacy of Constitution is the main attribute of democratic governance in both the countries. Moreover, their Constitutions have evolved through a long process of historical experiences and political-legal necessities. Judiciary has played role of guardian for upholding the Constitution in India and Turkey. Moreover, Turkish armed forces claim to have played the role of guardian too. Turkish Experience During the Ottoman's last phase, constitutional experiments were made in 1876, 1909 and 1921. After defeating the occupying forces of Allied power and the istanbul government of the Ottomans, Turkish nationalist Kemal Atatrk drafted the Turkish constitution in 1924 which established a parliamentary republic with ali povvers concentrated in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The enumeration of individual rights and freedoms were taken from most liberal European constitutions1. in
Walter F., Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961, Washington, The Brookings institution, 1963, p.65.

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the following years, European models were used as the basis for civil, penal commercial and other codes. During these years, significant transformations took place in Turkish polity and society. Military-bureaucrat elites replaced Ottomanism with Turkish nationalism and Kemalism. Despite strong resistance from the traditionalists and the periphery, the Republican People's Party consolidated the Republican ethos in governance. Priority was given to state and its agencies. But the introduction of multiparty politics (in 1945) and victory of the Democrats in 1950 elections heralded a new era of statesociety relationships. For the first time the periphery (non-elites and people at the grass-root level) felt empovvered against political dominance of the bureaucrats, armed forces and RPP leaders who perceived the Democrats and their sympathisers as the emerging group of reactionary elements. in 1960, Democrats were overthrown by armed forces who unveiled their objective to control party politics and to strictly adhere to Kemalism. The 1961 constitution was framed both to perpetuate Kemalism, democracy and the influence of armed forces. Political freedoms were given more permanent legal status. The Republic was proclaimed "nationalistic, democratic, secular and social State" under Article 2 of the Constitution. Scope of judicial review of governmental action and legislations was expanded. A new Constitutional Court was created. A number of changes in the electoral system were affected to provide wider choice of electorates. The introduction of provincial primaries to select the candidates and the accepting of proportional representation as the basis to divide the seats in multi-member electoral districts were notable examples of these election related changes2. However, the main philosophy of this new constitution was to cement Kemalism which under Article 153 was mentioned to "safeguard the Reform Laws". Some of these reform laws have been critically debated by religious nationalist parties which observed these laws as the source of restrictions on freedom of religion and faith. Islamic religious people and groups in Turkey have expressed their resentment ver the laws. Such resentments have culminated into the formation of some political parties opposed to restrictions ver socio cultural rights and values. Following specific reform laws would neither be repealed nor interpreted as unconstitutional: 1. The law on the unification of education, of March 3, 1340 (1925), No. 430. 2. The Hat Law, of November 25, 1341 (1925), No. 671.
2. Ilter Turan, "Stages of Political Development in the Turkish Republic", in Ergun Ozbudun, ed., Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey, Ankara, Sevine Matbassi, 1988, p.84.

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3. The Law on the closing down of dervish convents and mausoleums, and the abolition of the office of keepers of tombs, and the Law on the abolition and prohibition of certain titles, of November30, 1941(1925). 4. The conduct of the act of marriage according to article 110 of the Civil Code of February 17, 1926, No. 743. 5. The Law concerning the adoption of international numberals of May 20, 1928, No. 1288. 6. The Law concerning the adoption and application of the Turkish alphabet, of November 1, 1928, No. 1353. 7. The law on the abolition of titles and appellation such as efendi, bey, of November 26, 1934, No. 2590. 8. The law concerning the prohibition to wear certain garments, of December 3, 1934, No 2596. After the proclamation of the Second Republic, formation of coalition govemments became a permanent feature of Turkish polity. After the frst coalition experiment of coalition government during 1961-65, the Justice Party won parliamentary majority in 1965 and 1969 elections. But by late 1960s political violence and terrorism engulfed Turkey. The armed forces intervened indirectly to maintain law and order and affected constitutional changes to expand povvers of govemments. But political instability remained due to weak coalition govemments. Armed forces again intervened in 1980 to weed out growing political violence and terrorism. Faced with difficult situations and crisis experienced in past, the 1982 Constitution was framed to provide political stability and effective government. Under this Constitution, the fundamental objective and duty of the State is to safeguard the independence and integrity of democratic Turkish nation and to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and society3. Like its predecessor the 1982 Constitution includes a detailed bili of rights covering the social, economic and political rights and liberties of citizens.. So much of involvement and efforts in framing constitutions have certainly contributed to State-society building. it is, however, said that ali such political activism of pro-Kemalism elites (military, bureaucracy, intelligentsia and press) is aimed at strengthening the Kemalist Establishment and to marginalise periphery in govemance. Certainly the Turkish State has given priority to Kemalism. For example, 1924 Constitution assumed that only the nation holds the right to sovereignty. On a political basis, the nation is represented by th TGNA, and the sovereignty of the nation cames from its power of legislation, execution and judgement. Under Article 4 of the 1961 Constitution, sovereignty is vested in the Turkish Nation. The Nation shall exercise its sovereignty through the author3. Paul M. Pitman III, ed., Turkey:A Country Study.

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ized agencies (also mentioned under Article 6 of the 1982 Constitution). Some parts of 1961 Constitution reflected the biases and preferences of the centralist elites. Formation of the National Security Council prepared a concrete ground for the armed forces to interfere in decision-making process. Some of these provisions provided enormous power to the Turkish State vis-a-vis society in order to safeguard national integrity and Kemalist order in order to construct homogenous nation State. But there have also been many provisions in Turkish constitutions to strengthen the process of civil-society building in the country. Like its predecessor, the 1982 Constitution incorporates economic and social provisions as well as fundamental rights and duties. Accordingly ali individuals possess "inherent fundamental rights and freedoms vvhich are inviolable and inalienable". Primary education is no w compulsory and free of charge in State schools. There are many other provisions which provide freedom to individual, associations and political parties to participate in democracy. Turkish Constitutions seem to have been instrumental in sustaining democratic and competitive party politics. Under Article 126 of the 1982 Constitution, central administrative structure is based on provinces lower level of administrative units. Devolution of povvers at the grassroots level and periodic local elections are instrumental in statesociety relationship. Indian Experience After seeking freedom from the British, the Constituent Assembly took more than two years to draft, discuss and debate provisions of the Indian Constitution. The framers of the Indian Constitution prepared a comprehensive document to sustain secularism and federal democracy with fundamental rights and the Directive principles of State Policy. The Indian Constitution is based on the spirit of socio-cultural and religious pluralism. The working of the Constitution has proved productive for Statesociety building in India. A wide netvvork of representation through the two Houses of Parliament, 4000 members of state Legislative Assemblies of 25 states and 7 Union Territories and the 3-tier level of local-self governments (Municipalities/Districts, Blocks and Villages) have provided multi-layered channels of political participation. Thus freedom, participation and social justice (for weaker sections of society) have strengthened state-society relationship in India. However, it is argued that the Indian Constitution is the replica of the Government of India Act, 1935 which resulted into creating a very strong Centre vis-a-vis Indian States/regional/provincial govemments and society. Even today, centralizing tendencies can be perceived in the governance of the country. Some of the constitutional provisions (Article 3, 248, 249, 256, 257, 355, 356, ete.) have given enormous povvers to the central government. Many problems in states ~ Jammu and Kashmir,

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north-eastern states, Assam, are attributed to the mismanagement of the Centre. The Centre or Union Government of India has enacted strict laws to control violence and terrorism. These laws have been criticized on humanitarian ground. But these criticisms cannot be and ought not to be the basis of execuse to deny democratic spirit of the Constitution. Accommodation of diversities is quite evident from constitutional provisions vvhich underline the merits of fundamental rights and rights of religious minorities to maintain their socio-cultural and educational prerogatives. As a result, many minority based educational institutions were established. Minorities are also given freedom to follow up their respective personal laws and religious codes. On the other hand, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who are historically and socially deprived and depressed people, have been provided with their "secured reservations" in educational institutions, employments, promotion and in elected bodies. Similarly debate is going on for reservations for women in elected bodies andjobs. Main purpose has been the empovverment of people and elimination of inequalities. Therefore, there has been a positive trend towards building state-society relationship. Political Parties and Participatory Politics Political parties are unavoidable aspects of democracy. Their institutionalization has facilitated participatory politics. in fact, political parties play important part in bridging gap between elites and masses and in integrating people with the state. Political parties have also been catalysts in the democratization process of Turkey and India. Democracy and political participation is sustained through the involvement of more than one political party in seeking people's mandate. Huntington said, "modern State is distinguished from the traditional State by broadened extent to which people participate in politics ... The most fundamental aspect of political modernization ... is the participation in politics beyond the village or town level by social groups throughout the society and the development of new political institutions, such as political parties, to organize that participation4. Turkey The decision of the ruling Republican People's Party in 1945 to allow opposition party and competitive elections was a majr breakthrough in the history of Turkish democracy. The Democrat Party, established in 1946, took a great lead in the democratization process of electoral politics, government formation and governance. The Democrats emphasized local initiatives and satisfaction of people at the grassroots level. They initiated a strong movement against statists and centrists including military4. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, 1968, p.36.

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bureaucracy elities. The Democrats remained in power for a decade (1950-60) till the military take-over. They went beyond the Constitution of 1924 to moderate State's attitude tovvards islam in Turkey. The Democrats got the support of local notables (earlier an ally of the RPP) and the mass public. Ballot box and voters became the political reality in forming the government. in the words of Ilter Turan, "the most signifcant outcome of the initial multi-party period was the integration of the peasantry and the urban masses to the political nad economic life of the country"5. He further says, "the integration of the mass electorate to national political life produced two consequences. First, government came to effect more intensely the life of very citizen. The distributive and redistribute functions of government received increasing emphasis, while the prevalence of the extractive function began to decline. Second ... the citizens became more interested in national political life and came to identify themselves more closely with national political institutions of which political parties were the main example. in this context, the economic policies of the DP ... were highly instrumental in building the citizen political system linkages, and promoting the integration of masses into national politics"6. Thus mass political participation began as an important political process of Turkish political system. Democrats' victory has been conceptualized as a "ruralizing election"7. it is argued that "the peasantry had assumed new importance, emerging as potentially the country's majr political force", and that "the villager is becoming an integral part of his country's social, political, and economic development."8 The Democrats "had integrated the villager into the national political scene and had placed the govemment's relations with the peasants in a new and much needed perspective. Never before had the villager been courted by ali the political parties; now deputies and politicians visited his village and asked for his vote. This was change of great and fundamental importance9. Similarly "unprecedented growth of the Turkish economy after 1950 has created a very suitable ground for the process of pluralism in Turkish society"10. Even after the closure of the DP in 1960 and military intervention, multiparty politics and participatory politics remained crucial to Turkish polity and society. Thereafter two more military interventions disrupted the process of democratization in 1971 and 1980, but parties continued to
5. Ilter Turan, n.2, p.81. 6. Ibid., p. 82. 7. Samuel P. Huntigton, n.4, p.448,461. 8. Joseph S. Szyliovvicz, Political Change in Rural Turkey, Erdemli, The Hague and Paris, 1966, p.16. 9. Ibid., p.159. 10. Aydin Yalcin, "Social and Economic Foundations of Turkish-Egyptian Conference on Political Development and Democracy", Cairo, 6-7 May 1988.

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represent various interests and constituencies. This is possible only through the emergence of an assertive society which develops its own dynamics of representing its demands. Thus "political pluralism which does not allow any single person or institution to dominate the whole society has been deeply ingrained in Turkish social structure. Even the most powerfull organised social institution such as the armed forces, have not found it impossible to run the country beyond a limited period of time. As a result of social, economic and political developments Turkish society has become complex and pluralistic, and its problems became utterly unsuitable for military solutions."" One of the significant contributions of the Democrats in Turkish polity was the institutionalization of a viable alternative political party or parties in place of dominant single Republican People's Party. Even the military takeover could not overlook the necessity of multiparty politics in Turkey. The two most crucial decades (1960-80) in Turkish politics were dominated by either the centre-right Justice Party or the coalition governments or the minority government. After 1983 elections, again the centre-right Motherland Party and True Path Party headed the government. But since 1991, the dominant phase of coalition politics has begun. Coalition politics certainly creates political instability due to frequent fail of governments and mid-term elections causing high expenditure. But it also provides opportunities to more than one political parties to share power at the Centre. it can promote cooperation among different parties to rule in national interest. India Socio-cultural and regional diversities have alvvays been catalyst in the democratisation process of India. Having a strong historical background of 'unity in diversity' and a successful collective mass movement against British colonialism, the framers of the Indian Constitution and the Indian National Congress envisaged federal-democratic model of governance conducive to pluralist Indian society. However, the Indian National Congress maintained one-party rule both at the Centre and in the states till 1967. The Fourth general election (1967) was a breakthrough in Indian political panorama in vvhich several non-Congress and regional political parties formed their own cabinets and coalition governments in several states. in India, federal polity vvhich subscribes to dual polity at the centre/national and state/regional levels, political parties contest elections to form goverments in centre and states. Earlier, the Indian National Congress was a dominant ruling party ruling at the centre and in majority of the states. This was the period when regional political parties and nonCongress parties began to increase their influence ver Indian electorates who perceived them as an alternative to the Congress government. Reli. Ibid. 660

gional political parties were also perceived as more democratic and representative institutions of political participation. Whereas non-Congress political parties (national parties) came out with more pluralistic and socialist package to show their vitality in Indian national politics. Multiparty politics gave a setback to the dominant Congress Party by forming the Janta Party coalition government at the Centre in 1977 elections. Non-Congress parties (including regional parties) also formed their govemments in Indian states. Similarly the National Front-Left Front coalition government at the Centre (1989-90) was the assertion of the periphery. After 1996 general elections, the United Front (an umbrella organization of 17 political parties, mostly regional parties) minority government remained in power at the Centre for 18 months. The UF was given outside support by the Congress Party. And at present, it is Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led coalition government at the Centre in which many regional parties are sharing power. For the first time in the history of Indian democracy, the BJP, a Hindu (religious) nationalist party, won 182 seats (out of 545) in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) of Parliament. Coalition politcs in India has unique dimensions. Primarily there has been grand coalition of as many as 17 and 18 parties. Next, such coalitions were based on different forces opposed to one another. This has resulted into temporary and long lasting compromise between central and regional parties, between rightist and secular parties and between smallest and biggest parties. This tendency has provided strength to the democratization process. Thus coalition politics has enabled even smaller parties and groups to share power at the Centre and in the states. in this political process, different segments of Indian society have begun to experience democratic rule. Such experiences - coalition govemments, minority govemments (both at the Centre and in the states), consolidation of regional political parties and frequent mid-term elections have resulted into political instability but at the same time such experiments have strengthened the roots of democratic govemance and political participation. This has finally resulted in building state-society relationship. Therefore, coalition politics can also be considered as a very constructive political development in Turkey and India. Coalition of parties has widened the social base of govemance with the attributes of the participation of periphery. Coalition govemments have been the remedy for recurrent demands of different groups and states/provinces. Coalition institutionalizes the norms of democratic govemance and many conflicts and tensions are resolved smoothly within the coalition rim. This ultimately maintains equilibrium between state and society. Democratic Govemance The successful vvorking of democracy and state-society relationship require association of the people at the various levels of administration. 661

Democratic decentralization is basically meant for sharing administration and vvelfare policies at local level. Activation of local institutions of governance in the sprawling rural hinterland and in the expanding urban areas,... is the most necessary input into the process of grassroots democracy12. Decentralization process is becoming universally acceptable principle of governance which get more rooted into the constitutional systems. Decentralization is taken to mean by a central ruling group with other groups, each having authority within a specific area of the state. At te level of 'norms' it indicates the existence of formal political structures, each covering a defined area, representing local interests as well as the interest of allocating power is protected by formal as well as normative rules vvhich are accepted by the centre. At the level of 'collectivities and roles' it means units of local government in vvhich formal decision making is primarily exercised by locally representative councillors or officials13. On the other hand, autonomy of federal units is one of the fundamental principles of federal governance. The Indian Constitution mentions categorically the powers, rights and obligations of two layers of polity - national/central and state/regional in vvhich they operate vvithout any interference or command. Particularly in India, autonomy of federal units has a great relevance to Indian federal democracy. Such arrangements in polity have been very useful for bridging gap betvveen state and society. Both Turkey and India have a substantial experience of local government to facilitate democratic decentralization. Turkey Having its roots in the Ottoman Empire, local elf government was envisaged under the Village Law (1930). Turkey has basically three types of local authorities, namely village administrations, municipal administrations and provincial local administrations. The provincial administration Law is based on a mixed system of shared power structure betvveen the Governor appointed by the Central government, and the Provincial Council elected by local residents in the province. Jurisdiction of municipal administration is limited to urban areas - ali provincial centre tovvns and district tovvns (including villages) vvith a population of more than 2000 inhabitants. Village administrations have jurisdiction vvithin the boundaries of their villages. Municipalities seem to be given more specific and numerous duties than the others. A fourth category of local authority is sometimes mentioned as the urban "precinct" (mahalle) administration similar to those of village administrations. Election of local policymaking organs, i.e., the council of elders, the municipal councils and the general councils of provinces, are ali based on equal and universal suffrage.
12. Rasheeduddin Khan, Federal India : A Designfor Change, Dew Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1992, p. 58. 13. Philip Mawhood, ed., Local Government in the Third World : The Experience of Tropical Africa, Chishester, 1983, p. 4

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Local governments work in harmony with the policies of the central govemment. The centre stili adhered to the notion that the central and local governments together formed a unifed entity. Thus in fnancial matter the local govemment remained totally dependent upon the Central government. Despite the dominance of the central goverment ver local administration, the latter have been able to cater to the needs of people at the grassroots level. People learned the intricate mechanism of engaging in consultation, debate, organization, formulation of policies, fnancial and manpower planning for election campaign, respecting rules of the game of a civilized country, through the process of small town politics. The same process has been maintained on the village level even in a more lively atmosphere.14 India Seventy percent rural areas of India with 646,000 villages are basic realities to recognise the importance of local elf government and democratic governance. Father of Indian nation, Mahatma Gandhi had asked Indian people to go to villages where soul of India lives. Historic 73rd and 74th Amendments, 1992 provided constitutional status and legitimacy to local governing bodies namely Panchayats and Nagarpalikas with a role in plan formulation and development. Local administration in India is the heritage of Indian civilization. Panchayats (village level) have existed since earliest times. The Panchayat Raj system covers the village, the block (Tehsil-Taluk, consisting of 20 to 60 villages) and the district, and the Nagarpalika (district council) serves towns and cities. Under the three-tier system of Panchayat Raj, Village Panchayat is an executive body of the village. The Panchayat has an elected Chairman, known as Sarpanch. The Panchayat is accountable to the general body of the village known as Gram Sabha. Village Panchayat performs functions including settlement of minr disputes. The Block forms the hub of the developmental work. Panchayat Samiti exists at the bloc level, which consists of elected members belonging to the village Panchayats, and different sections of society. The Samiti coordinates the work of the various Panchayats in its jurisdiction. it serves a useful training ground for the political leaders for higher responsibilities at the district and State levels. The highest developmental agency in the state is the Zila Parishad which consists of representatives of the Panchayat Samitis, ali the members of the State Legislature and Parliament representing the district level Officers, representation of women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Parishad coordinates the activities of Panchayat Samitis. Since 1959, "democratic decentralization" has been gradually extended ali ver India for the revitalization of this grass root democratic in14. Aydin Yalcin, n.10.

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stitution. in 1992, the Government of India passed the Panchayat Raj Bili (73rd Amendment) to provide greater constitutional and legal support to PRIs to make them effective local governing agencies. The Act provided reservation of 30% seats for women, inclusion of Gram Sabha concept, reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, option for state to adopt 2 tier or 3 tier Panchayat system, holding of elections to Panchayats, setting up of State Finance Commission, and listing of various socioeconomic programmes. This legal foundation has revitalized the ailing PRIs in the country. The main objective about the programme among rural people, thereby helping in its implementation. The Panchayat Raj Act has assigned a detailed list of functions to three tiers. There are also provisions enabling government to entrust additional functions and responsibilities under any law or laws for the time being and issue necessary orders and directions. in Schedule XI of the Indian Constitution PRIs have been conceived as 'institutions elf government' which will formulate and implement the schemes of economic development and social justice. The Panchayat Raj is useful effort for prompt rural development with the cooperation of local people. However, this system has faced the problem of lack of fund, lack of co-ordination and autonomy. in India, state government is empowered to decide about the functions and responsibilities of these bodies. There are instances of state government exercising administrative control ver the local bodies through guidelines, grants system, confirmation of by laws, approval of schemes, borrovving, audit of accounts statutory consultations, approval of budget, ete. The rural local bodies are also quite effectively controlled by Deputy Commissioners in India who have extensive powers vis-a-vis Panchayats and Panchayat Samitis. Now due to pen participation of political parties in Panchayati Raj Institution, demoeracy is being institutionalized at grassroots level. Panchayat Raj System's success in Indian states like West Bengal, Kerala, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Aldhra Pradesh and greater participation of people in Panchayat elections have ultimately contributed to state-society relationship. There are certain other important areas in which both Turkey and India seem to have progressed to strengthen state - society relationship. An attempt is being made to discuss them briefly. Both Turkish and Indian Constitutions have substantial provisions on rights and duties. Fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey may be restricted by law in national interest. Whereas fundamental rights in India aim at fostering social revolution by creating a society egalitarian to the extent that ali the citizens were equally free from the coercion or restriction of the state and liberty was no longer a privilege of few. Besides, the Directive Principles of State Policy aim at realising the high ideals of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity as outlined in the Preamble to the Constitution. Second, the TGNA is among those southern European legislative systems which may be said to have undergone prolonged periods of insti-

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tutionalization. in the course of its vicissitudinous existence it has survived a rocky transition to multiparty politics and three praetorian interludes since 1946.15 in India, the Federal Legislature, i.e., Parliament has certainly undergone a comparatively smooth phase of institutionalization. Third, Turkey embraced market economy to integrate the Turkish economy into the global economy. Privatization of the State economic enterprises, the devolution of authority and the transfer of funds to the municipalities, and the increasing emphasis on market forces were crucial to strengthen the civil society. Massive industrialization and stress upon market economy and foreign investment are now the philosophy of development in India. Fourth, with the exceptions of military intervention in 1960, 1971 and 1980, there have been peaceful and democratic changes of the governments in Turkey. India has no such exceptions in this context. Lastly, coalition politics, fragmentation of political parties, and minority governments have become political realties in Turkish and Indian politics. India has experienced these realities at two level of governance ~ centre and states. Coalition governments and its survival show the level of adjustment between and among contending parties in national interest. Similarly minority government is the acid test for democracy. Despite resulting into political instability, they contribute to political pluralism in governance. There are certain issues such as military take-over, role of State, nature of socio-cultural diversities and demands groups, localism/ regionalism, treatment of minorities and other issues on vvhich both Turkey and India have different opinions. Some of their policies have been detrimental to state-society relationship. The Turkish paradox is not always an apparent contradiction between poverty and democracy in Turkey, but the far more amazing contradiction betvveen Turkey's military interventions (including their occasional pressure) and its success at sustaining democratic polity. Strong State, centralized authority, vulnerable corporate intermediary structures and \veakness of local governments have been counterproductive to state-society relationship. Historically and culturally state was assigned dominant position in Turkey. There has been an emphasis upon building strong Turkish State and nation in military training, educational institution and mass media. in Turkish folk tradition State is generally referred to as the "father, Devlet baba, the land as the mother, toprak ana, vatan ana, and the people as the 16 children, memleket ocuklar"
15. Ersin Kalayciolu, "The Grand National Assembly of the Post 1983 Multiparty Era", in Ergun zbudun, ed., Perpectives on Democracy in Turkey, Ankara, 1988, p. 154. 16. Engin Deniz Akarli, "The State as socio-cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey", in Engin D. Akarli with Gabriel Ben-Dor, eds., Political Participation in Turkey, Boazii University Publications, 1975, p. 138.

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However, it is argued that State is a socio-cultural phenomenon in Turkey as it constitutes a distinct sector of the society'7. But Turksh State's attitude towards Kurdish problem, ideological groups, particularly religious groups and religious traditions can be understood as either too rigid or uncompromising institution of power. Such a tendency promotes democratic discontent and vvidens gap betvveen the state and effected segments of society. National unity can be better achieved through maximum compliance and acceptability of each other. Closure of the welfare party and restrictions on Kurdish parties are the result of political rigidity enforced by Kemalism. The Turkish state needs to be considerate towards existing social realities for a more harmonious society and polity. Paradoxically the Indian Constitution has enumerated many important provisions to accommodate regional demands/localism and to protect minority rights. Besides giving primacy to national unity and integrity, Indian State has provided autonomy and rights to various demands groups. it is the uniqueness of Indian democracy that has sustained itself in the midst of federal structure, sharp social cleavages and large scale violence. But at the same time the Indian Establishment is accused of playing double standard when it comes to deal with Indian Muslims and other deprived sections of society. it has appeared to be strong enough to deal with terrorism and violence in certain affected areas vvhereas it has been largely soft to the majority community in communal riots and violence against Muslims and caste war against the Scheduled Castes. Role of State in communal conflicts needs to be a neutral order enforcement agency but in India there are instances when State neutrality has been compromised as in the case of Ayodhya dispute. This is evident from Judicial Commissions, Polie Commission's reports, media, civil and human right groups. This lacunae seems to be absent in Turkey. Polie and bureaucracy are being politicized. Marginal proportion of Muslims' representation in education, employment and media has further encouraged bureaucracy, and polie to play a partisan role in maintaining law and order. Moreover, tremendous growth of the Hindu rightist party the BJP, growing political influence of its associated groups and their Hindutva construct of Indian federal nation have posed a serious challenge to the Indian Establishment and society. Thus the rise of the BJP is detrimental to democracy and secularism in India. Hovvever, the Indian spirit of federal nation and democracy is expected to thwart Hindutva. in the words of Myron Weiner, "India in 1947 appeared to be among the least likely country to sustain democratic institutions in the context of four theories (based on political culture, sharp social cleavages, socioeconomic determinants of democratic institutions and Barrington
17. Ibid., p. 134.

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Moore's theory of socio-economic conditions) prescribing conditions for democracy."18 But India succeeded in sustaining democracy. Despite many hurdles and flaws both Turkey and India have succeeded in sustaining some important institutions and processes to promote democratic process of building state-society relationships. in Turkey, it is imperative to strengthen local governments, to promote voluntary association and to chalk out a strategy to moderate statist attitude towards people's demands. There is a need of collective mobilization and democratic protest against the politics of military. Turkish armed forces should cease to act as an interventionist force in domestic politics in the interest of strengthening Turkish democracy. Because military's interference is anti-thesis to the democratization porcess. in case of India, State is required to be assertive against chauvinist forces and to encourage minorities' participation in polity, bureaucracy, polie, education and other areas to build State society relationship. The Central government is also required to discourage the growing tendency of centralization vis-avis Indian States. Thus it seems that building state-society relationships remains a majr task before the state and society which can be accomplished through collective bargaining and mutual co-operation.

18. Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1989, pp. 320323.

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CHINESE VIEWS OF ATATRK AND MODERN TURKEY

Prof. Dr. Zheng-hua DONG* China and Turkey are two countries both with ancient civilizations in the medieval world. in recent centuries they struggled unremittingly for their national rejuvenation, sharing the same kind of historical experiences. Turkey was noticed by the famous Late-Qing Reform leaders Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao and has ever attracted the attention of Chinese elite since then. At the end of World War II, the Turkish people and Turkish Nationalist military forces defended their national independence and then established the Republic of Turkey successfully under the leadershp of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk. These events in modern Turkey evoked strong repercussions in China. Since that time, many Chinese intellectuals have concerned themselves with the rise and development of modern Turkey although there have been troubles in the developing route of these two countries and in the relationship between them. in order to review this research field, the author of this paper collected the literatre on Atatrk and modern Turkey, totally about two hundreds including monographs, academic theses, general comments and introductions, which were published in various periods and in different publications. The vievvpoints of these works are not unanimous, but most of them identical in appraising the valor, wisdom and the great achievements of Atatrk, the Turkish people and the National Army. 1. The Chinese intelligentsia has begun to pay close attention to Turkey since late 1918. 'The Eastern Miscellany' (Dongfang zazhi), a famous magazine published in Shanghai in the years 1904-1948, carried a series of articles from No.8 of Vol. 15 (August 15th, 1918) to No.24 of Vol. 18 (Dec.25th, 1921), ali showed indignation against the imperialist aggressors and hearty sympathy for the invaded Turkish people. The final victory of Turkish independence War in September, 1922 inspired both the radicals and the liberals in China. 'Guide' (Xiangdao), a weekly CommuDeputy Director, Center for Studies of World Modernization Process, Department of History, Beijing University.

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nist magazine, carried several arrticles on Sept. 27th, titled as 'Celebrating the Turkish Nationalist Force's Victory'. in the later issues of 1922, articles such as 'Turkey and the International Imperialists', acclaimed the Turkish People who, led by 'the Great General with courage and insight', set the best example for the oppressed nations ali ver the world'. (Jun Yu: 1922) News comment in 'The Eastern Miscellany' reported nearly every big events which took place in Turkey and the neighbor areas, especially the process of the Conference in Lausanne, with 2 articles on the Peace Treaty praising the peace in the Near East based on maintaining the independence and sovereighty of Turkey as 'the hearld of the world peace'. (You Xiong: 1923) From 1923 to 1947, there had been long articles and short comments on modern Turkey and Atatrk in nearly every issue of 'The Eastern Miscellany'. The contents were various, including reforms, industry and modernization rograms, new economic achievements, new regulations on transportation and duty, changes of the Cabinet, women's progress, new treaty about the Straits, national defense and policies of foreign affairs of the Republic of Turkey. Four articles among them were about Atatrk himself, extolling him as 'the founder of New Turkey' and recalling his contributions as the first president of Turkey after his death in 1938. (Jing Ru:1938; Wu Zeyan:1939). One of the characteristics of Chinese 'new historiography' that emerged in the early 20th century is the avvareness of national progress and modernization. Its first monograph is 'New Turkey', vvhich reviewed the whole process of Turkish transformation from the Ottoman Empire to a modern nation-state, written by Liu Keshu, then a young historian, who believes his book could 'arouse the masses of the Chinese people' to modernize China, it is in this book that the term 'modernization', defined earlier by the famous Turkish nationalist thinker, Ziya Gkalp, and prevailed in the Western literatre several decades later, appeared first in China. in 1935, a new book, 'A History of Turkey', vvritten by Zhao Jingyuan, another historian, was published in Shanghai, then the most developed metropolis in China. Also in 1935, China and Turkey established diplomatic relations at the legation level. The nex year, a monthly magazine published in Beijing (then named 'Beiping'), titled as Foreign Affairs, gave the 'Special Issue for Turkish Studies' which consisted of 6 columns including articles on Turkish history and geography, home politics and foreign affairs, economy and society. Some of these articles were vvritten by scholars, others were by the officials of Chinese legation in Turkey including the minister and the minister-counsellor. The editorial preface of this issue compared the significance of the rejuvenation of Turkey with the rise of Soviet Union, holding Turkey in great esteem as a latent peace defender and the leading country in the Middle East, and as a good example of China in the socio-economic reconstruction. The preface emphasized that the Sino670

Turkish relationship should be friendly and everlasting since these two countries had had no interest conflicts at ali times. (Foreign Affairs: 1935). it should be noticed that the Chinese Communists' attitude towards Atatrk and modern Turkey had changed in this period. Yun Daiying, a famous Communist writer in the period of the 1924-27 Grand Revolution, highly praised Turkish achievements in the peace Conference in Lausanne (Yun Daiying: 1923), yet Cai Heshen, one of the CCP's early leaders who wrote the article congratulating the victory of Turkish Republicans in September, 1922, published 2 articles on Lausanne Conference criticizing Turkey 'forfeit ali that gained in the battle feld but get a new yoke of enslavement.' (He Shen: 1922) Obviously this judgment is incorrect. in 1930s and 1940s the prevailing opinion of the Communists on Atatrk and modern Turkey was influenced by what Stalin gave to Chinese students in Moscow 'Zhongshan University' considering 'the Kemalist anti-imperialist revolution in Turkey came to a prematre end'. (Stalin: 1927) Although Mao Zedong had appraised the Renaissance of Turkey under Atatrk as 'an example for ali Muslims and oppressed nations,' (Mao: 1936) yet in 1940, Mao in a speech refereed to that 'Kemal's Turkey has turned back to semi-colony and a part of imperialist reactionary world' by the Stalinist criterion which dividing 'the heroes of colonies and semicolonies' 'either a part of world revolutionary forces or else a part of world counter- revolutionaries.' (Mao: 1940) it is quite evident that these criterion and evaluation did not conform to reality. Later in 1958 Mao corrected his point of view by admitting that some nationalist countries 'chosen the standpoint of neutrality (between the Eastern socialist vvorld and the West) when talking with some Latin American journalists.' (Mao: 1958).

2.
From 1949 to the end of 1970s, Mao Zedong's inference in 1940 has prevailed in China on Atatrk and modern Turkey. Since 'Chinese bourgeoisie advocated Kemalism after the failure of the First Grand Revolution in 1927' (Mao: 1940), there were few further studies on Kemalism in New China within this long period. So in August, 1979, when two young historians from Beijing University raised the problem 'should we praise Kemalism correctly on its feature of anti-imperialism, progress and revolution' in a workshop of the Association for Modern World History Studies, there was a heated debate. Later these two historians published their paper. They held that Turkish had defended Turkey's independence and sovereignty in Lausanne Conference, emphasized that the choice of the path for development by the Turkish people should be respected, and the significance of 671

the Revolution led by Kemal and its great international influence. By this way they criticized Stalin and Mao's theoretical dogmas on Atatrk and Kemalism. (Lin&Liang:1979). With this paper as the symbol, research works and introductive essays on Atatrk and modern Turkey presented again. Some senior experts on Middle East studies such as He Jingxi, Yang Zhaojun, Peng Shuzhi, Zhu Kerou published their theses or monographs. Scholars from many universities and the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) wrote many papers on this subject. in 1981, the 'Atatrk Year', UNESCO organized a series of commemoration activities, Beijing also held a meeting for the centenary of the birth of Atatrk. The focuses of studies on Atatrk and modern Turkey in China since 1979 are as follovvs: 1). The change of paradigm from 'class struggle' to 'peace and development'. Before 1979, class struggle, or revolution going to socialism, had been the only theme, on 'paradigm' as some scholars argued, of many historical studies in China. it is for this reason fhat many great historical events were written off, or even denied completely, and many research fields became out-of-bounds. Since 1979 this tendency has been changed. This change reflected the new attitude of Chinese intellectuals toward modernization at home and peace and developmend in the whole world. For studies of Atatrk and modern Turkey, there has been a broad range: the growth of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk himself, the wholesale reforms during the 1920s and 1930s in retrospect; the six principles of Kemalism; and so on. Professor Peng Shuzhi described the growth of Atatrk, detailed why Young Kemal decided to be an armyman and his devotion for the reinstatement of the 1876 Constitution when he was studying in college and in the Young Turkish Movement. Kemal's nationalism and consciousness of anti-imperialism during the First World War vvere manifested by his frm stand for a national self-defense and neutrality policy refraining from being sucked into the vortex of war. At the critical moment deciding Turkish survive-and-perish in 1918, he extricated himself from the command of the decadent Sultan regardless of his personal safety and resorted to the Turkish people in Anatolian hinterland. it is this spirit that made him the hero and 'Atatrk' of Turkey. (Peng Shuzhi, 1992: 242-261). The 'Kemalist Reforms" vvere considered an abrupt turn in Turkish history for they made a breakthrough from backvvardness and ushered in a long epoch of sustained political stability and economic development. 'it is Atatrk who led these vvholesale reforms, by his superb skill to have 672

the situation well in hand, by conducting successfully the relation between change and carrying forvvard the good traditions, and by the guidance of the six basic principles- the six arrows.' (Dong Zhenghua, 1993: 357-358). As for the 'six arrows\ the late two, Etatism (devletilik) and Reformism (inkilapcilik), the doctrines drawn from the economic development and reforms and added to Kemalism in the 1930s were underlined as they distinguished the transitional process from traditional society to a modern one in Turkey from the British style liberalist route, and also from the French style revolutionary route. Etatism means not only an economic policy in force from 1932 to 1950 but also a bureaucratic centralized, strong, autonomous and initiative state power in pursuing ali of the national goals and defending the country when the civil society and private sector in economy were quite weak. Reformism summarized the great Atatrk Reforms that were elaborately planned and promoted. The success of Kemalism is the reason why the development of the new Republic of Turkey has ever been generally acknowledged in developing societies as an imitatable model and why the UNESCO held the symposium in 1981 for 'summing-up Ataturk's achievements and thought in order to help the UN member states to bring about the studies on development and modernization processes'. (Dong Zhenghua, 1993: 359-361). Chinese scholars have also studied the relationship betvveen tradition and development in social, economic and cultural spheres in the earlier period of the Republic of Turkey, and changes of Turkish foreign policies and international relations, changes of Turkish Constitution and the real polity. For example, the neutrality policy of Turkey during the Second World War, adhering to principle while flexible in practice, was held to be advantageous to the Allied countries and the world peace, since it defended Africa and the Russian forces disposed then in the southern part of Soviet Union as well as the Allied forces in the Near-East, and afforded valuable experiene for the Third World countries. (Zhang Runmin: 1986) 2). Exploration of the history of Sino-Turkish relations The cultural exchange and firendship between China and Turkey could be retrospective to the ancient time. Although these two countries both became periphery, or semi-colony of the vvestern big powers in the 19th Century, they stili kept in contact with each other. in 1912, Wang Kuan, a famous Chinese Islamite and educator, visited istanbul. He was so deeply impressed by the Young Turkish Reforms that he appealed for diplomatic and commercial exchanges betvveen the new Republic of China and Turkey as soon as he returned to China. Wang Jnigzhai, another Chinese Islamite, visited Ankara, the new capital of Turkey, together with his disciple Ma Hongdao in 1923 and left Ma for years studying in istanbul University. (Yang Zhojun, 1987:526-544) Scholars have also re673

viewed the new events of Sino-Turkish relations in recent decades, such as the activities of the Turkish goodwill mission in China in 1966, the establishment of Sino-Turkish diplomatic relations in 1971, Sino-Turkish Cultural Exchange Program of 1981-82, the Turkish President's visit in China in 1982 and the Chinese President's visit in Turkey in 1984. (Zhang Tiewei: 187). *** To sum up, from the late 1910s till the 1990s, the Chinese political and intellectual elite have ever considered Atatrk and modern Turkey a point of reference in their interpretation of revolution and modernization in China. The main inclination has been appreciation of the achievements of Atatrk and modern Turkey, but the attitude of the theme has changed a lot. This change reflected the change of the analytical paradigm in 20th centruy China in exploring a rapidly changing world.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Chang Zheng, 1986: On the Position and Influence of Kemal in Modern World History, in The Middle East, 1986, No. 2. Dong Zhenghua, 1993: Atatrk Reforms and the Process of Modernization in Turkey, in Luo Rongque ed., Comparative Studies of Modernization Processes, Xi-an: Shanxi People's Pr. Fan Ruolan, 1989: Changes of Women's position in Turkey, in West Asia and Africa, 1989, No. 2. Foreign Affairs, 136: Editorial Preface of the Special Issuefor Turkish Studies, Foreign Affairs, Beiping: Foreign Affairs Publishing House, vol. 8, no. 4, Apr. 1, 1936. He Jingxi, 1981: Atatrk and His Historical Contributions, in WestAsia and Africa, 1981, No 3 He Shen, 1922: Celebrating the Victory of the Turkish Nationalist Party, Guide (xiangdao), No. 3. , 1922: Turkey and the International Imperialists, Guide, Vol. 9.
11922:

Lausanne Conference and Turkey, Guide, Vol. 14 & 15.

Jing Ru, 1938: The President of Turkey Passed Away, in The Eastern Miscellany, Vol. 35, No.24. Jun Yu, 1922: The International Significance of the Turkish Nationalist Victory, Guide, Vol. 3. Lin Beidian & Liang Zhiming, 1979: The revolutionary Role of the National Bourgeoisie in the Nationalist Movement, in Trends of World History Studies, Beijing, 1979, No. 10.

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Liu Keshu, 1926: New Turkey, Shanghai: Commercial Press. Mao Zedong, 1936: An Appeal to the People of Hui Nationality, in Documents of the CCP Central Committee, Zhongyang Dangxiao Press, 1985, Vol. 10, pp. 27-29. , 1940: On New Democracy, in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Beijing: People's Press, 1991, Vol. 2, pp. 680-681. , 1958; Talk with Two Brazilian Joumalists, see Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol.2, p. 710, note 17. Peng Zhuzhi, 1981: On Kemal and Kemalism, World History, Beijing, 1981, No.5.
)

1992: Nationalism in the Eastern World, Xi-an: Nortwest University Press.

1997; Mam and Modernization Process in the Middle East, Xi-an: Northwest ( University Press. Stalin, Joseph V., 1927: Speech to the Chinese Students in Zhongshan University, Collective Works of Stalin, Beijing: People's Press, 1954, Vol.9, pp.217-241. Wei Benli, 1983: On the Change and Characteristic of Turkish Polity, in West Asia and Africa, 1983, No.6. Wu Zeyan, 1939: Kemal-the Former President of Turkey, The Eastern Miscellany, Vol. 36, No.3. Yang Mansu, 1986: Changes of Turkish Agricultural Developmental Policies, in West Asia and Africa, 1986, No.2. Yang Zhaojun, 1983: The Route of Turkish Economic Development, in Data ofSouthwest Asia, 1983, No.3. , 1987: Sino-Turkish Cultural Interchange in Retrospect, in Zhou Yiliang ed. A History of Cultural Interchange Betvveen China and Other Countries, Henan People's Press. , 1992: On the Modernization of islam in Turkey, in Thinking, 1992, No.4. You Xiong, 1923: The Results of Lausanne Conference, in The Eastern Miscellany, Vol.20,No.l2. Yun Daiying, 1923: The Mistakes of Some Expositions, in The Eastern Miscellany, Vol. 20, No.22. Zhang Runmin, 1984: Development and Change of Turkish Constitution, Data ofSouthwestAsia, 1984, No.2. , 1986: The characteristic and Signifcance of Turkish Neutrality Policy During the Second World War, in WestAsia and Africa, 1986, no.6. Zhang Tiewei, 1987: A Brief History of Sino-Turkish Friendship, in West Asia and Africa, 1987, No.6. Zhu Kerou, 1983: Kemal-the Father of Turkey, in Outstanding Personages, 1983, No.5. , 1984: Kemal, in A Brief Biography of Eminent Persons in World History, Chongqing Publishing House, 1984. , 1985: On Turkish Foreign Policies in the 1930s, in World History, 1985, No. 4.

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KORE-TRK LKLERNE GENEL BR BAKI

Prof. Dr. Jaemahn SUH* I. GR Trkler ile Koreliler, ta eskiden beri kltrel bakmdan yakn akrabalk ilikileri iinde olmalarna karn, corafi bakmdan uzakta yerlerini almlardr. Tarihilere gre, Trkler ile Koreliler, M. .'ki zamanlarda Kuzey-dou Asya ktasnda, Hun mparatorluu ile Kocosun1 adlaryla biribiriyle yanyana komu olarak yaamlardr. Fakat tarihin uzun gemesinde, Trkler Asyann bat ucu Anadolu'ya ve Koreliler ise Uzakdou'nun dou ucu Kore yarmadasna g etmilerdir. Bylece iki eski komu lke bugn en uzak mesafede bulunmaktadrlar. Gerekten bu iki lkenin halk, biribirine en yakn dillere (Altay Diller Grubu) sahip olmalar, gemiteki yaknla bir kanttr. Bir Trk atasznde, "Hayvan koklaa koklaa, insan konua konua anlar" denir, Korecede de "Bir szle 1.000 ake bor denir" denir ki, bu benzerlik bize halklarn dile ok deer verme geleneine sahip olduklarm gsterir. ki lkenin dostluklarn ve her trden ilikilerini gelitirmek iin nemli bir e olan yakn dilleri vardr. Ne yazk ki, bu iki lke arasndaki dil dahil yakn kltrel benzerliklere ramen, eski tarihten bu aa kadar pek temas olmamtr. Ancak 1950 ylnda Kore Savann meydana kmas, fizik olarak ok rak kalan bu iki eski komu halklarn yeniden bir kan kardeliine kavuturmutur. Daha II. Dnya Savann bitiinden itibaren, Komnistlerin merkezi Sovyetler Birlii'nin byk tehditlerine ramen Trkiye, Komnist Kuzey Kore'nin Gney Kore'ye saldrs haberini alr almaz hemen, Atatrk'n 'Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh' ilkesi dorultusunda Birlemi Milletler Ordusu'nun bir yesi olarak Kore harbine katlmaya karar vermitir. Savatan bugne Kore'nin gneyinde Pusan'da, sakince yatmakta olan 462 ehit Mehmetik bata olmak zere saysz Trk genlerinin yce fedakarl ite bugnk bayndr Kore'nin olumasna bir
Hankuk University of Foreign Studie, Seul. Korelilerin en eski devleti olarak M. . 2333'te kurulmu olduunda bilinmektedir.

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katkdr. Buna, btn Korelilerin her zaman mteekkir olduuna inanrm. Bylece Trk askerlerinin Kore Sava'na katlmas, yeniden balam olan iki lke arasndaki kardelik ilikilerinin temel ta olmutur. Bu makale ile, iki lkenin 50 yllk ilikileri incelenecektir. Makale 6 blmden ibarettir: Giri Blm'nden sonra 2. Blm'de iki lkenin siyasi ilikileri, 3. Blm'de askeri ilikileri, 4. Blm'de ekonomik ilikileri, 5. Blm'de kltrel ilikiler, 6. Blm'de sonu yer alacaktr. II. SYAS LKLER; II. Dnya Sava sonunda Japon igalinden kurtulan Kore Yarmadas, kuzeyi Rus, gneyi ise ABD kuvvetleri tarafndan igal edilmi, bu iki igal kuvvetlerinin altnda Kore Yarmadas ikiye blnp 38'inci paralelin gneyinde 15 Austos 1948'de Kore Cumhuriyeti (Gney Kore), kuzeyinde ise, 9 Eyll 1948'de Kore Demokratik Halk Cumhuriyeti (Kuzey Kore) kurulmutur.2 te yandan, Dou-Bat Blok arasnda souk savan eiinde Bat Blok'a katlmasyla Komnizme kar bir yer alm olan Trkiye, Uzakdou Asya'ya Komnistlerin el atmasyla ikiye blnm Kore Yarmadas'na dikkat ekmi, ve anti-komnist bir lke olarak yeniden kurulmu olan Kore Cumhuriyetini, kuruluundan 1 sene sonra (11 Austos 1949) dnyada 9. lke olarak tanmtr.3 Bundan sonra Trkiye, hem dorudan doruya hem de dolayl yolla Kore'ye dostluunu her frsatta gstermitir. Trkiye, Ekim 1949'da Birlemi Milletler Kore Komisyonu (United Nations Commission on Korea), Ekim 1950'de B.M. Kore'yi Birletirme ve Kalkndrma Komisyonu (United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea)'nun bir ye lkesi olmu ve Kore'nin birlemesi ile kalknmasyla yakndan ilgilenmi ve izlemitir. Bunun gibi durumlarda 1950 ylnn Haziran aynda Kuzey Kore kuvvetlerinin Gney Kore'ye saldrmas ile patlak veren Kore Savann btn dnyada yaratt gvensizlik havas iinde, bu blgede uluslararas bar ve gvenlii geri getirme amacyla yardmlarda bulunmaya davet edildii srada, Trkiye B.M. Antlamasna sadk kalarak B. M. Ordusu'nun dnya uluslarnn hrriyet ve gvenlii uruna yardm hareketlerine katlmaya karar vermi ve B. M. Ordusunun bir mensubu olarak komnist saldrsndan Kore'yi kurtarmaya almtr. Bylece Trkiye Kore ile daha youn diplomatik ilikiler kurmadan nce, bir kan-karde lke olarak,
2. Kuzey Kore'de 1947 ylnn ubat'nda yaplm olan 'Kuzey Kore Halk Komisyonu' seimi sonucunda 19 ubat 1947'de bu rgtn Kuzey Kore Halk Hkmeti'nin en yksek organ olarak ilan edilmi ve bylece Kuzey Kore Halk Cumhuriyeti fiilen Gney Kore'den daha nce kurulmu oldu (KM, 1993:37-38). T. C. Bakanlar Kurulu, 11 Austos 1949 tarihinde Dileri Bakanlnn nerisine uyarak Kore Cumhuriyeti Hkmeti'ni tanmaya karar vermitir. Bak: Resmi Gazete, 22 Austos 1949.

3.

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uluslararas topluluklarda daima Kore'nin yannda bulunmu ve onu desteklemitir. Kore Sava srasnda (1950-53) Trkiye, 4500 kiilik 1 Tugay sava birlii yollam,4 bu Tugay, 1960 ylna kadar devam etmitir. 1960-1966 aras bir blk, ve 1971'den son kalan eref Mangas da Kore'den tamamen geri ekilmitir. Trk askerlerinin Kore Savana katlmasn anmak zere 1974'de Kore'de Seul banliys Yongin'de bir Trk Ant kurulmutur.5 Trkiye ve Kore ancak 1957'de diplomatik ilikiler kurmu ve Ankara ile Seul'de karlkl Bykelilik am, buna ek olarak 1977'de stanbul'da Kore Konsolosluu alm 1982'de kapanmtr. Ayrca 1975'te stanbul'da Kore Fahri Konsolosluu, ve Pusan'da Trk Fahri Konsolosluu almtr. Bununla birlikte iki lke 1972'de Giri Vizesi Muaf Tutulma Mukavelesi, 1974'de Kltr Andlamas, 1977'de Ticaretin Gelitirilmesi ve Ekonomik-Teknik birlii Andlamas, 1979'da Havaclk birlii Andlamas, 1986'da ift Vergi deme Muaf Andlamas, 1989'da Kltr ve Teknik Mbadele Program gibi ikili andlamalan imzalamtr. 1972'de Ankara ile Seul Belediyesi arasnda karde ehir andlamas imzalanm ve bunun sonucunda 1973 de Trkiye'nin bakenti Ankara'da Kore Park, ve buna karlk olarak Seul'de Trk Park kurulmutur. Ayrca Kore'den, 1977'de Babakan Choi Kyu-hah, 1990'da Babakan Kang Young-hoon, 1996'da Babakan Lee Soo-Sung Trkiye'yi ziyaret etmi; buna karlk 1958'de Babakan Adnan Menderes, 1982'de Cumhurbakan Kenan Evren, 1986'da Babakan Turgut zal, 1991'de Babakan Yldrm Akbulut'un Kore'ye ziyareti bata olmak zere iki lkenin yksek mevkideki personellerin karlkl ziyaretleri ile gitgide dostluu gelitirmitir. Bundan baka iki lkenin parlamentolarnda Trk-Kore, Kore-trk Dostluk Cemiyeti kurulmu ve imdiye dek devam edegelmektedir. Ayrca Trkiye'de 1973'te Kore Gazileri Dernei kurulmu ve bu rgt 1984'de Trkiye Muharip Gaziler Dernei ile birletirilmi ve eski Kore Gazileri Dernei yeleri yine bu yeni Dernein faaliyetlerinde nclk roln stlenmilerdir. Kore Cumhuriyeti ile diplomatik ilikiler kurmu olan Trkiye, Kuzey Kore tarafndan, gerek dorudan doruya gerek dolayl olarak yaplan diplomatik ilikiler kurma tekliflerini reddederek halen Kuzey
4. 5. Sonra 6,086 kiiye oalmtr. Bak: U.N. Yearbook, 1951:249. 25-27 Ocak 1951'de Trk Tugay'nn Kumyangjang-ri (Yongin kasabasndaki bir kyn ad) zaferini anmak zere kurulmutur.

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Kore'yle diplomatik iliki kurmama tavrndadr. Ama Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, siyasi ideoloji ayrm yapmakszn btn dnyaya d kapsn ak tuttuundan, Kuzey Kore, kendisiyle ittifakta bulunan nc lkeler vastasyla iktisadi iliki kurma talebini bahane edip Trkiye'ye yaknlamaya almaktadr. Kuzey Kore'nin Trkiye ile diplomatik iliki kurma abas hala devam etmektedir. 1977'de Trkiye-Kuzey Kore ile Ticari Protokol deiik yasas varken, 1983'te feshedilmitir. Bununla birlikte ok az sayda da olsa bir ka Trk bilim adam ile Kuzey Koreliler, birbirini karlkl olarak ziyaret etmi ve Kuzey Kore bunlar bir nve olarak kullanp Trkiye'de, Kuzey Kore Taraftan Grubu kurma abasndan vazgememitir. m. ASKER LKLER Trkiye ile Kore arasnda ikili ilikiler, dier rneklerinden pek farkldr ve ilk ilikiler askeri ynden balanmtr. Bylece iki lke arasnda daha resmi ikili diplomatik ilikiler kurulmadan evvel asker ibirlii ile dostluun kazanmas dnya tarihinde kolayca rastlanabilecek bir olay deildir. 25 Haziran 1950'de Kuzey Kore'nin Gney Kore'ye saldrsyla patlak veren Kore Sava'na, 28 Haziranda B.M. Gvenlik Konseyi yardm etmeye karar alm ve ye devletlerini yardma davet etmitir. Trkiye, bu yardm arsn Byk Millet Meclisi'nin onayndan evvel,6 18 Temmuz'da Bakanlar Kurulu'nca kabul etmi, ve 25 Temmuz'da Kore'ye asker gnderme kararn B.M.'e bildirmiti (Suh: 1973:104). Bylece, Trkiye B.M.'in yardm arsn kabul eden yedinci lke olmu.7 Bu hareket 'Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh' dorultusunda, dnya barnn korunmas ve btn milletlerin zgrlne ve bamszlna sayg gsterme hususundaki ciddi inancn gstermi oldu. (Suh, 1973:149) Bu inanc, dnya barnn korunmas iin Kore'ye yardmda bulunma ars anlam tamtr ki, Trkiye'den hemen sonra 9 devlet daha Gney Kore'ye asker gnderilmesine katlmt.8
6. 7. 11 Aralk 1950'de 39 red, 1 ekimsere kar 311 oyla T.B.M.M.'ce onaylanmtr (Suh, 1973:108). Daha evvel 3 Temmuz'da in Cumhuriyeti (imdiki Taiwan), 15 Temmuz'da Bolivia da Kore'ye asker birlii gnderme kararn Birlemi Milletleri'ne bildirmise de kabul ertelenmitir, Trkiye'den evvel Avustralya (30 Haziran), Yeni Zelanda (1 Temmuz), Kanada (12 Temmuz), Fransa (19 Temmuz), Tayland (23 Temmuz) da savaa katlma kararlarn bildirmilerdir (U.N. Yearbook, 1951:249-250). Trkiye'nin Kore Sava'na asker gndermesi karan hakknda 28 Haziran 1950'de dzenlenmi olan bir basn toplantsnda Babakan Adnan Menderes, "Hkmetimizin alm olduu karar bir harp karan deildir. Sulh koruma teebbs ve karandr. Kanaatimizce bizim kararmz gibi dier hrriyet sever milletlerin bu yolda alacaklan karardr ki tecavzleri nleyebilir ve dnya sulhu korunabilir." dedi. G.K.H.B.T., S:68

8.

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Trkiye Gney Kore'ye yalnz bir sembolik asker birlii deil, gerekten sava gc ok yksek olan 4500 kiilik 1 Tugay Sava Birlii yollam,9 bu birlik Tugay Komutan Tugeneral Tahsin Yazc bata olmak zere artan sayyla toplam 5.090'a ulamtr. (Suh, 1973:105) Trk Tugay'nn Kore Yarmadas'na ayak basmasndan sonra 27 Temmuz 1953 tarihinde Atekes Mtareke Andlamasnn imzalanmasna kadar 3 yl boyunca "Kunu-ri Zaferi"10 bata olmak zere "Kumyangjangri Muharebesi" gibi 14 baarl muharebe kayt etmiti. Bunlardan zellikle 26 Kasm - 6 Aralk 1950 tarihleri "Kunu-ri Muharebesi", 25-27 Ocak 1951 tarihleri "Kumyangjang-ri Muhrabesi" ve 28-29 Mays tarihleri "38. Paralel Muharebesi" gibi sava durumunu byk lde deitiren dnm noktalar olmutu. "Kunu-ri Muharebesi"nde gstermi olduu Trk Tugaynn baarlarna kar ABD Kongresince 'Mmtaz Birlik Nian ve Berat', Kumyangjang-ri muharebesindeki kahramanlna kar Gney Kore Cumhurbakan adna "Cumhurbakanl Birlik Nian", ve yine 38. Paralel kesimindeki muharebe dolaysyla ABD Cumhurbakan adna "Liyakat Nian" ile dllendirilmiti. Bylece Trk Tugay'nn Kore Sava'ndaki arpmalarda hayretedici kahramanlk ve ok yksek sava gcn gstermesi, daha sonra Trk Ordusunun Bat Savunma sistemi yani NATO'nun iine alnmasna yol amtr (Suh, 1973:111). Gerekten tahmini mmkn olmayan durumlarla karlaarak ve ar artlar altnda kalp da byk baarlaryla dnya apnda n kazanm olmasna ramen 1950-53 muharebeleri sresinde Trk Tugaynn personel kayb da az deil: maalesef 721 kii ehit dahil toplam 3,600 kii dolaynda yaral ve kayp olmutur (Karabiber, 1997:103). Ama atekesten sonra da atmalar olmutur ki 1960'a kadar 10 tugayn toplam ehit says ise 770'e kmtr. Trk Askeri baaryla grevlerini tamamlayarak 1960'a kadar bir tugay birlii ve 1966'a kadar bir blk Kore'de bulunmukin, 1971'de son eref Mangas tamamen Kore'den geri ekilmekle grevine son vermitir. Kore Sava'nda ehit denlerden 462'si Pusan Birlemi Milletler Ant Mezarl'nda dalgalanan Trk Bayra altnda yatmaktadr ve Korelilerin nazarnda unutulmazlardr. Bundan baka iki lke arasndaki askeri ilikilerin temel rnekleri olarak Seul'deki Sava Anlan Mzesi'nde yer alm olan Trk Kesi, Seul banliysndeki Yongin Trk Silahl Kuvvetleri Ant (1973), Ankara'da da Kore'de Savaan Trkler An (1973) bulunmaktadr. Ayrca Trkiye'de 1973'te Kore Gazileri Dernei kurulmu, ancak 1984'te Trkiye Muharip Gazileri Dernei iinde yerlerini al9. Trkiye'nin 1. Tugayi, 25, 26 ve 29 Eyll 1950'de 3 kafile halinde skenderun'dan hareket etmi, 17-20 Ekim 1950'de Pusan'da karaya kmt. 10. Kunu-ri Kuzey Kore'nin bat kesiminde bulunan bir kyn addr.

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msa da eski Kore Gazileri Dernei yeleri yine bu yeni dernein faaliyetlerinde nclk rolnde bulunmaktan geri kalmamtr. Kore Savanda BM Ordusuna katlm olan ve 16 devletin Kore Gazileri Derneklerinden oluturulmu olan Kore Sava Eski Muharipleri Uluslararas Federasyonu'na Trkiye Muharip Gazileri Dernei de bir ye olarak kaydedilmitir. Savan olaanst durumuyla balayan iki lke arasndaki askeri yndeki dostluk ve ibirlii, Haziran 1957 tarihinde bar zaman nizaml askeri ilikilere balanmt. 1957'de diplomatik ilikilerin kurulmasyla birlikte iki lke Bykelilii'nde Askeri Ataelik de kurulmu ve Askeri Ataeleri karlkl deitirilmitir. Bu, iki lke arasnda askeri ilikilerin temeli olmutur. Bundan sonra resmi st mevki personellerin karlkl ziyaretleri devam etmitir: ki lke kara kuvvetleri komutanlarnn teati ziyareti11 bata olmak zere 1985'ten itibaren Harp Okullarn kardelii ve her sene rencilerin karlkl ziyareti, irtibat subaylarn teatisi v.s. ile askeri ynde dostluk ve ibirlii gitgide younlamakta ve oalmaktadr. Ancak savunma sanayii alanndaki ibirlii olanaklarnn byk olmasna ramen onu gerekletirebilecek askeri ibirlii andlamas gibi andlamalar henz mevcut deildir. IV- KTSAD LKLER ki lke arasnda geleneksel dostluk temeli serinde, 1970'li yllardan itibaren Kore'nin hzl ekonomik geliimiyle birlikte iktisadi ilikiler de hem younlamaya hem de artmaya devam edegelmitir. Yukarda bahsedildii gibi iki lke arasnda 5 Mays 1977 tarihinde Ticaretin Gelitirilmesi ve Ekonomik-Teknik birlii Andlamas imzalanmtr. Bu andlamann uygulanmasn kolaylatrmak iin iki lke temsilcilerinden ibaret olan Karma Komitesi, Ankara ve Seul'de srayla toplantlar yapm, en son 6. toplant, 27-28 Ekim 1997'de Seul'de yaplm, bunun gibi toplantlar ticareti ile ekonomik-teknik ibirliinin gelitirilmesi ve artrlmasnda byk rol oynamtr. Ayrca 6 Temmuz 1984 tarihinde Kore ile i yapan Trkler arasnda Trk-Kore Ekonomik birlii Komitesi kurulmu, bu komite 4 Kasm 1989'da Trkiye-Kore Konseyi'ne dnmtr. Buna karlk, Trkiye ile i yapan Koreliler arasnda Kore-Trkiye Konseyi kurulmutur. Bu iki lkenin Konseyleri hem Trkiye'de hem de Kore'de srayla toplanmlardr.
11. Eyll 1995'de Gney Kore Kara Kuvvetleri Komutan Org. Yun Yongham'n, ve Mays 1997'de Trk Kara Kuvvetleri Komutan Org. Hikmet Kksal'n karlkl ziyareti yakn zamann rnekleridir.

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Bunun gibi faaliyetlerin katksyla iki lke arasnda ticari ilikiler gitgide artmaktadr. rnein ticaret hacmi 1990 senesinde 514.5 milyon dolar iken, 1991'de 646.6, 1992'de 709.5, 1993'te 750.8, 1994'te 410, 1995'te 689.7, 1996'da 903 milyon dolar, 1997'de 1,187 milyar dolar, ve 1998'de (7 ay) 682 milyon dolar amtr (bak: Tablo-1). 1996 yl istatistiine baklrsa Trkiye, Kore'nin ihracatnda 31. ve ithalatnda 54. lke olarak yer almtr.
Tablo 1: Kore-TUrkiye D Ticareti Kore'nin hracat Yl Deer (Bin $)/ Miktar (Ton) 349.000/ 320,000/ 399,000/ 610,217/190,538 276,027/ 80,756 574,725/281,075 745,947/331,578 1,121,859/277,064 657,998/261,848 Kore'nin ithalat Deer (Bin $)/ Miktar (Ton) 165,500/ 326,000/ 310,500/ 140,651/453,544 134,064/574,103 115,005/279,109 157,164/490,119 64,818/118,837 24,730/ 43,123 Toplam Deer (Bin $)/ Miktar (Ton) 514.000/ 646600/ 709,500/ 750,868/644,082 410,091/654,859 689,730/560,184 903,111/827,697 1,186,677/395,901 682,728/304,971 Denge (Bin $) Deer (Bin $)/ Miktar (Ton) 183,500/ - 6,600/ 88,500/ 469,566/-263,OO6 141,963/-493,347 459,720/ 1,966 588,783/-158,591 1,057,041/158,227 633,268/218,725

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 (7ay)

1990 yllarna gelince Kore'nin Trkiye'ye sermaye yatrm da salanmtr. 14 Mays 1991'de imzalanm 'Yatrmlarn Karlkl Teviki ve Korunmasna' ilikin Anlama'dan sonra daha Kore'nin ekonomi krizine girmeden 1997 ylnn Haziran ayna kadar 26 Kore firmas tarafndan takriben 182 milyon dolarlk yatrm yaplmtr (Karabiber, 1997:132-3). Bunlarn dnda Ulatrma alannda da byk gelimeler bulunmaktadr. 18 Aralk 1991'de Ankara'da dzenlenmi Beinci Ortak Karma Komite Toplants'nda imzalanm protokol ile iki lke arasndaki deniz ulamnn nemi gz nnde tutularak bir denizcilik andlamas iin aratrmalara karar verilmi, ve 5 Mays 1997'de Ticaretin Gelitirilmesi ve Ekonomik ve Teknik birlii Andlamas'nn imzalanmasyla iki lke arasnda deniz ulatrmas ibirlii salanm oldu. Ama henz ne Kore'de ne de Trkiye'de karlkl olarak deniz nakliyat firmalarnn acentalar bulunmamaktadr. Buna karn, hava ulam alanndaki ibirlii ise daha hzl gelimitir, 17 Haziran 1976 tarihinde Hava Ulam ve Hava Servisleri Andlamas'nn imzalanmas sonunda 1997 ylnn Mays aynda Kore'nin Asyana Havayollar (AAR) yolcu uaklarnn Seulstanbul direkt uu hatt almtr. Bu yeni hattn almas ancak ticari ilikilerin artrlmasyla kalmayp ayn zamanda turizmi de ok etkilemi, 1997'de Trkiye'ye ziyaret edenlerin says takriben 30 bini gemitir. Bunun gibi turistlerin oalmas kltr anlamasna da ok byk yol

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aacaktr. Kasm 1997'de Trk Hava Yollar (THY) da stanbul-Seul seferine balam, ancak iki ay sonra seferleri yanl zaman seme nedeniyle durdurulmutur. V. KLTR LKLER Bilindii gibi, genel olarak kltr ok geni anlam tamaktadr. Daha evvel bahsettiim siyaset, ekonomi alanlar bile kltr kapsam iine alnabilir. Ama burada deinmek istediim taraf ise kltrn temeli ve z olan ilimdir. Balangta da sz ettiim gibi Trkler ile Koreliler ta eskiden beri kltr benzerliklerine sahiptir. Fakat uzun zamandan beri corafi mesafeden dolay gerek kltrel gerek siyasi ynden irtibat kurma frsat salanamamtr. Ancak II. Cihan Harbi 'nden sonra doan yeni dnya politika vaziyetinden dolay bu eski snr komusu ama imdi tam zt blgede yerlemi olan iki lkenin yeniden yaknlama frsat olmutur. imdi yarm asr geriye dnelim. Gerekten, Trkiye'nin uzak bir yerde bulunan Kore'ye kar yakndan ilgilenmesi de, o zaman yrrlkte bulunan Dou-Bat Blok Souk Harbi Politikas, ve Trkiye'nin Bat Blok'a Katlmas, Kore'nin Dou-Bat Souk Harbi erevesinde ikiye blnmesi gibi son derece ac olan Kore Harbi v.s. bir seri halinde ortaya km olan dnya politikasnn olaylarna dayaldr. Her naslsa bu ac tecrbeler erevesinde Trkiye'nin Kore'ye kar yakn ilgileriyle iki lke arasnda uzun zamandan beri dondurulmu kltr ilikileri yeniden canlandrlmaya balanmtr. Kore Sava'na katlm olan Trk Askerleri ancak savamakla kalmayp ayn zamanda Kore'ye Trk kltrn iletmeye de aba gstermitir; daha sava srasnda Korelilere hem slam dinini iletmi hem de Trke'yi retmitir. O zamandan beri Kore'de Mslman says az da olsa oalmaya balam, u anda 5 tane cami ve takriben 35 bin Mslman bulunmaktadr (Lee, 1994:75). Kore Sava srasnda Seul niversitesi, Linguistik (Dilbilim) Blm'nde balam olan Trke kursu, ileride Kore'de Trke ile Altay dilleri aratrmalarnn temeli olmutur. Trkiye 1956'dan ve Kore ise 1982'den itibaren karlkl olarak rencilerine burs balar salam, ve bu vesile ile iki lkenin bilimi de eitim ve aratrmaya balanmtr. Fakat uzun zamandr sadece dilbiliminden baka bilim dallarna uzanlmamtr. Ancak, bu iki lke arasnda kltr ilikileri, 4 Austos 1972 tarihinde Ankara'da imzalanan Kltr Andlamas ile bir temel ta nrei, daha gzenli ekilde kuvvetlendirilmitir. Bu andlama, her iki tarafn kendi kltrnn daha iyi tantlmasn salamak, kltrel ve entellektel dei-

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simi kolaylatrmak ve bunlar tevik etmek amacn gtmektedir. Bu andlamamn gereklemesi iin zaman zaman Kltrel Deiim Programlan da imzalanmtr: Eitim, bilim, kltr, sanat, enformasyon ve spor alanlarnda bilgi ve deneyim deiimi gibi... Ama Kore'de dilbiliminden hari Trk Bilimi (Trk ve Trklk zerine bilimsel aratrmalar) ise, zgr ve mstakil bir bilim dal olarak deil, ancak Ortadou Bilimi ile Yakndou Bilimi veya Tarih, Corafya gibi eitli bilimlerin bir paras olarak tantlm, retilmi ve aratrlmtr. Bununla birlikte Trkiye'de ise yakn zamana kadar eitimde Kore Bilimi hi tantlmamtr. Ancak iki lke arasnda 1972'deki Kltr Andlamasndan sonra Kore'de zgr ve bamsz bir bilim dal olarak Trk Bilimi, 1973'de Hankuk Yabanc Aratrmalar niversitesi' (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)nde Trk Aratrmalar Blm'nn almas ile balanmtr. Bu blme her sene 30 kii dolaynda renci alnr. Mesela Japonya'da 1992'de Tokyo Yabanc Diller Fakltesi'nde bamsz Trke Blm'nn al ylma baklrsa, Kore'de daha erken baland gzlenir. Daha evvel 1966'da Hankuk Yabanc Aratrmalar niversitesi'nde Lisansst 'Master' dzeyde Arap Ortadou Aratrma Blm alm ve sonradan kurulmu olan lisans seviyesindeki Trk Aratrmalar Blm ile birlikte, bu blmn adna yer alan 'arap' kelimesini kaldrp Trkiye'yi de iine kapsayarak Ortadou Aratrma Blm adyla deitirilmi ve Trk Bilimi de dier Ortadou Bilimi ile birlikte ortak aratrma yapmaya balanmtr. Ayrca 1995 Pusan Yabanc Aratrmalar niversitesi'nde, Orta Asya Ettleri Blm alm ve her sene 30 kii dolaynda renci alnmaya balanmtr. Bu blm, Trkiye dahil olmakla beraber btn Orta Asya'daki Trkleri yani Kazakistan, zbekistan, Azerbaycan, Krgzistan, Trkmenistan, Uygurlar da iine alp eitim yapmay amalamaktadr. Ama daha evvel bahsedildii gibi, Kore Sava sralarnda Seul niversitesi'nde Trke dersi almtr. Dilbilimciler arasnda iyi bilindii gibi Korece ile Trke ayn Altay dilleri ailesine mensup olmasndan dolay karlatrmal linguistik aratrmas iin ok nemli bir lisan olarak Trke'yi eitim programna dahil etmitir. imdilik Seul niversitesi Linguistik B lm'nde her yl iki Trke Kursu balatlmakta, bu iki kurs Trke renmek iin yeterli deilse de btn linguistik blmndeki rencilere linguistik asndan Trke'nin yeri ve nemi belirtilmektedir. Bunlardan baka Trkiye'de de 1989 ylnda Ankara niversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Corafya Fakltesi, Dou Dilleri ve Edebiyatlar Blm'nde 685

Kore Dili ve Edebiyat Anabilim Dal kurulmu, her yl 20'er renci alnmaktadr. Ama 1997-98 retim ylnda alnan renci says 10 kiiye indirilmi, nihayet 1998-99 retim ylnda ise renci alnmamtr. Yksek retim Kurulu'nun kararna12 gre 1998-99 bir retim yl deil, ancak mevcut renciler mezun oluncaya kadar renimlerine devam etmeleri artyla 1998-99 retim ylndan itibaren renci alnmayacaktr. Bu da bize gsteriyor ki ileri gitmesi gereken bu durum, geriye evrilmitir. Daha evvel bahsedildii gibi, Kore'de yakn zamana kadar Trkoloji veya Trk Bilimi, Ortadou Bilimi veya dier bilimlerin bir dal olarak aratrmalarda bir yer alrken, Temmuz 1996'da mstakil bir bilim alan olarak, Trk bilimini aratrmak amac ile Kore-Trk Aratrma Demei kurulmutur. Trkiye ve Orta Asya'daki Trkleri, sadece dilbilim deil btn alanlarda aratrmalar yapmak amacndadr. Trk bilimiyle ilgili niversitelerde ders veren ve aratrmalar yapanlar bata olmak zere, eitli ilgili yerlerde alan ve lisansst ihtisas bulunanlardan oluan bu demek, yllk konferanslar dzenlenmekte, 1996 ile 1997'de yllk konferans dzenlenmi ve ilk yllk dergisi 1997 ylnda yaymlanmtr. zellikle, bu demek, Mays 1997'de Marmara niversitesi Trkiyat Enstits ile birlikte Kore ve Trkiye birlii konulu konferans ile, iki lkenin ilim adamlarnn katlmasyle 1. uluslararas ortak konferans dzenlendi, onun raporu da Kore-Trk Aratrma Dernei'nce 1997'de Kore'de yaymland. Bylece iki lke ilim adamlarnn katklaryla kltrel ilikiler git gide ilerlemektedir. Bundan baka, Trk bilimiyle ilgili aratrma yapan rgtler de vardr: rnein, 1985'de dilcilerden ibaret olan Kore Altay Aratrma Demei ki bu demek, bata Korece ve Trke olmak zere btn Altay dilleri zerine karlatrmal linguistik aratrmalar yapmaya amalar, yllk konferans dzenler ve yllk dergi karr. Ayrca 1975'te kurulan ve btn Kore'de Ortadou ile ilgili aratrmalarda bulunan tek enstit, Orta Dou Aratrma Enstits'dr. Bu aratrma enstits, Hankuk Yabanc Ettleri niversitesi'ne baldr ama lkedeki Ortadou ile ilgili btn ilim adamlarnn katlmasn salar. Bununla birlikte Kore Ortadou Aratrma Demei 1979'da kurulmutur. Bu demek, btn Ortadou lkeleri13 ve Ortadou ile snr komusu olan blgeleri iine alan geni apta: Dil, edebiyat, felsefe, din, kltr, sosyal bilimler dahil btn hmaniter bilimleri kapsayan ortak aratrmalar yapar, yeleri de, tm lkenin Ortadou ile ilgili bilginlerden ibarettir. Yukarda bahsedildii zere Kore-Trk Aratrma Demei yelerinin
12. 31 Mart 1998 tarihli Yksek retim Kurulu Yrtme Kurulunun karan. 13. Kore'de Dileri Bakanlnca Trkiye, Avrupa Dairesi'ne balysa da ilim alannda ise tarihi, corafya, kltr v.s. unsurlar bakmndan Trkiye Ortadou'nun bir lkesi olarak kabul edilmektedir.

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ou da bu Ortadou Aratrma Dernei'nin yeleridir. Kore-Trk Aratrma Dernei 'nin kurulmasndan evvel Trk bilimini aratrma grevlerini, Ortadou Aratrma Dernei stlenmitir. Ayrca Ortadou dahil olmak zere btn dnyadaki slam Dini ve slamiyet Kltr'nn incelenmesi ve aratrlmasn hedef alr. Kore slam Aratrma Dernei de 1988'de kurulmutur. Bu dernek de yllk seminer dzenler ve yllk dergi yaynlar. Kore Ticaret-Yatrm Gelitirme Ajans (Korean Trade Promotion Corporation: KOTRA), Koree Maden leri Gelitirme Merkezi (Korean Mining Promotion Corporation), Kore Gelitirme Enstits (Korean Development Institute), Kore hracat-thalat Bankas (The Export-Import Bank of Korea), Kore ktisadi-Teknolojik Enstits (Korean Institute of Economy and Technology), Kore D Yap Cemiyeti (Korean Overseas Construction Association) de ilgili alanlarnda Trkiye hakknda incelemelerde bulunurlar ve yaynlar yaparlar. Bylece Kore'de gerek resmi daireler gerek zel sektrlerde kendi amac ile ilgili alan ve dallarda Trkiye ve Trklere dair incelemeler ve aratrmalarda bulunmu, ve neticede 29 kitap, 9 tercme, 112 makale meydana gelmitir. Bunlara karn Trkiye'de Kore bilimi ile ilgili aratrmalarda bulunanlar ok azdr ve imdiye dek tek bir kitap ve iki makale bulunmaktadr. Hemen hemen yok saylr. Ankara niversitesi, Dil ve TarihCorafya Fakltesi, Dou Dilleri ve Edebiyatlar Blm, Kore Dili ve Edebiyat Anabilim Dal'nda aratrma grevlisi olarak sadece 3 asistan bulunmaktadr. Henz doent ve doent st seviyede elemanlar bulunmaktadr. Ve burada ilave etmek isterim ki 1988'de Trk-Kore Kadnlar Dostluk ve Kltr Dernei kurulmutur. Trkiye'de bulunan Koreli kadnlar, bu dernee katlarak kltrel ibirlii ile birlikte eitli sosyal yardmlarda bulunurlar. VI. SONU Yukarda bahsedildii gibi Koreliler ile Trkler ta eski zamanlarda snr komusu iken, o zamandan beri corafya bakmndan dnyann uzak kesiminde kalmaktan dolay irtibatsz kalmlardr. Ama 1950 ylnda patlak veren Kore Sava'na gerek Kore, gerek dnya barn korumak amacnda ayn kampta bulumu yeniden kankarde olarak balanm ve ilikilerini canlandrmtr. Bylece savatan dolay biribirine irtibat kurmu olan bu iki lke arasnda zamanla siyasi, askeri, iktisadi, kltrel ilikiler gitgide younlam ve bu dostlukta hi bir sorun olmamtr. Bylece iki lke arasnda yeniden canlandrlm olan, btn dost ilikilerin temeli, phesiz Atatrk'n unutulmaz 'Yurtta Bar, Cihanda Bar' grnden kaynaklanmtr, ve onun bar politikasnn uygulanmas ve gerekletirmesi bize antl sonucu vermitir. Atatrk, tarihe mal olmu bir l deil, onun dncesi ile birlikte btn milletlerin ortasnda varolan bir canldr.

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imdi Kore ve Trkiye, sadece Kore Harbindeki kankardelikle kalmamal, yeni dnya politika dzenine uygun bir ekilde ibirliini salamaldr. Bu yeni dnya dzeni, siyasi, ekonomik, kltrel, her ynden snrsz ama bar iinde bir rekabetdir; btn imkanlarla daha youn ibirlii salamak gerekir. Avrupa, Ortadou ve Orta Asya'nn bir balantsnda ok nemli bir yerde bulunan Trkiye ile, in ve Japonya arasnda baka bir nemli balant noktasnda bulunan Kore, siyasi, askeri, iktisadi ve kltrel ibirlii salayabilme aresini bulmak, iki lkenin gelecei iin yeni bir devdir. imdiye dek bu iki lke arasnda siyasi, askeri, iktisadi ilikilere ramen kltrel ve bilimsel etkileim halen ok zayftr. Aslnda lkeler aras ilikilerin temelini salamlatrmak, muntazam ve nizaml halde tesbit ve muhafaza etmek ve daha da artrmak, birbirleriyle olan anlama ve dostluu dzenli bir halde gelitirmek ok nemlidir. Elbette, bu deiim ve ilikiler tek tarafl olmaktan ziyade iki tarafl, yani karlkl ve dengeli olmas daha beklenilir bir konudur. Bilhassa Koreliler, Kore Yarmadas'ndan Anadolu'ya kadar olan geni alanda Altayllarn tarihi ve kltrleri zerine Trklerle ortak inceleme ve aratrma yapmaldrlar. phesiz ki byle bir aratrma iin hem Trke hem de Korece bilen bilginlerin ibirlii gerek; Bu ibirliinden salanacak yarar da ok byktr.
KAYNAKLAR ALKAN, Necmettin, 1960, Sakin Sabahlar Memleketinde Bir Yl, Ankara. ARMAOLU, Fahir, 1988, 20. Yzyl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914-1980, Ankara. CHOE, Sug-Man, 1985, Students and Their Role in Developing Countries: A Historical Study of Brazil and Turkey, Pennsylvania. State Univ. Press. DORA, Celal, 1963, Kore Savanda Trkler, stanbul. EAMNOLU, brahim, 1983, Savala Gelen Umut, Kore'de slamiyet, stanbul. Genel Kurmay Harp Tarihi Bakanl, 1975, Kore Harbinde Trk Silahl Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri (1950-1953), Ankara. GNLBOL, Mehmet, v.s. 1996, Olaylarla Trk D Politikas, 1919-1995, Ankara. KARABBER, Mustafa, 1997, Kore Kalknmasnn Temelleri ve Trk-Kore likileri, Ankara. KM, Hak-joon, 1993, Kore Sava, Seul. KM, Dae-sung, 1996, Kore Blnmesinin Balangc ve Sava kmadan nceki Kore'nin Siyasi Durumu Hakknda Baz Bilgiler, Ankara niversitesi D.T.C.F. Dergisi, Say: 3. LEE, Hee-chul, 1988, Trkiye-Kore likileri 1950:1960, Ankara. 1994, Siyasi, Ekonomik, Askeri ve Kltrel Adan Trkiye-Kore likileri, Ankara. LEE, Hee-soo, 1988, slam ve Trk Kltrnn Uzak-Dou'ya Yaylmas, Ankara. , 1994, 'islam in Korea: Its History and Present Situation', Annal of the Korean Association of Islamic Studies, Vol. 4, Seoul. SUH, Jaemahn, 1973, Kore Sava'nn Trk D Politikasna Etkileri, Ankara. , 1997, 'Turkish Studies in Korea', Cooperation of Turkey and Korea, Seoul. YAZCI, Tahsin, 1963, Kore Birinci Trk Tugaynda Hatralarm, stanbul.

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ATATRK, ANZAC AND AUSTRALIA

Prof. Duncan Bruce WATERSON* The purpose of this paper is to make a few short points on a relationship - short but deep - that is historically significant for both countries. An unusual set of historical conjunctions has occurred between the Republic of Turkey founded in 1923 and the Commonwealth of Avustralia established by a federation of six British settler colonies in 1901. So, vvithin four years both Turkey and Australia have commemorated significant milestones in their emergence as tvventieth-century nation states: Turkey on this year 1998 and Australia on 2001. By then the Commonwealth of Australia may well have become, like Turkey, a republic and, vvhile other political and economic forces have promoted constitutional inertia, a national referendum on the issue has been promised by the federal government. it should also be made clear that vvhile Australia is a federation of six former British colonies, each vvith their own legislatures and with a Commonwealth Parliament in Canberra1, Turkey since 29 October 1923 is a uniform state. Australia, vvhile it does not have the povverful State Councils of Turkey and nothing resembling the povverful stabilizing role of the military that exists in Turkish democracy does, by virtue of its 1901 Constitution, maintain a Governor-General vvith, as vvas demonstrated on 11 November 1975, povverful reserve povvers2. Furthermore, the High Court of Australia is increasingly influencing public policy in matters such as Aboriginal land rights, environmental concerns and antidiscriminatory legislation3. Finally, Australian legal institutions and practices are firmly based on the English Common Lavv vvhile Turkey, as is

Macquarie University, School of History, Philosophy & Politics, Sidney. Howard, Colin, Australia's Constitution, Melbourne, 1985. McMinn, W.G., The Constitutional History of Australia, Sydney, 1979. 2. Browning, H.O., The 1975 Crisis. An Historical View, Sydney, 1985; Dutton, G., Republican Australia?, Melbourne, 1977; Sexton, M., Illusions of Povver. The Fate of Reform Government, Sydney, 1979. 3. Reynolds, H., The Law of the Land, Ringwood, new ed. 1992.

* 1.

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well known, adapted the Continental Swiss legal code. Australia did, however, borrow one Swiss innovation, the desire of a popular referendum as a mechanism to secure constitutional alterations to the body politic. This democratic procedure, which requires that a majority of electors in a majority of the States, as well as a national majority, is necessary for change, has proved to be a difficult hurdle for reformers to surmount, the vast majority of propsals having been rejected by the people. Indeed, only eight of the forty-two propositions have been successful. Of these, the 1946 Commonvvealth Powers referendum and the 1967 Aboriginal Citizenship were the most signifcant. Thus most radical initiatives have failed but, conversely, in rejections difficult for foreigners to understand, Australians rejected conscription for overseas service in 1916 and 1917 (although it was imposed for tropical service in 1943- by a Labor government) and an attempt to ban the Communist Party at the height of the ColdWarinl951. 4 While the success of a promised referendum on a future Australian Republic to be held at the turn of the century remains problematical, Turkey in November 1982, did vote overwhelmingly for a new constitution to replace the 1961 organ, strengthen central civilian and military control, and to allow direct local control by appointed regional and provincial governors responsible to Ankara5. There are other contemporary similarities, but also difficulties, facing both countries. Problems of globalization, place, culture, religion, region and race in many respects deny the validity of past historical experiences. Since 1923 we have both shared, in varying degrees, a hierarchy of values which include many of the tenets of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment Such concepts as toleration, reason, scientific investigation, liberty and progress, were of course notions integral to the central assumptions of the founding father of the Turkish nation, Kemal Atatrk5. So, too, in a British imperial context and with native and nationalist adaptations and improvements, they are part of our Australia's constitutional constructions at the end of the nineteenth century. To quote the words (if I may be pardoned for doing so as one of New Zealand birth) on the New Zealand Memorial on Sari Bair "from the uttermost ends of the earth" now has a deeper meaning than our forefathers on both sides of the globe envisaged. And, as the conference exemplifed, this interweaving of our
4. 5. 6. Mclntyre, S., Reds, A History of the Communist Party of Australia, Melbourne, 1998. Ramazanolu, Hseyin, (ed.), Turkey in the World Capitalist System, Aldershot, 1986. Kinross, Patrick, Atatrk. The Rebirth of a Nation, new ed., London, 1995; Kazancigil, Ali and zbudin, Ergin (eds), Atatrk. Founder of a Modern State, London, new ed., 1997.

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shared histories is now a complex and productive phenomenon that could scarcely have been imagined even thirty years ago. it is in contradistinction to the amoral role of much of the global finance capital which attempts to sweep history, nationality and indeed culture aside vvithout are or responsibility7. But let us return to similarities and differences between the two national experiences, bearing in mind that the population of Turkey is about three times that of Australia; that while Australia is a nation originally populated by one of the oldest coherent peoples on earth, the Aboriginals, it is also a changing home of many diverse peoples which now includes a sizeable and productive Australian - Turkish population mainly in Melbourne and Sydney and which accelerated after the 1967 bilateral agreement. Both countries are undergoing very rapid population conurbation8. Comparisons are often stimulating sometimes irrelevant and occasionally odious. Yet it is instructive to examine some of the basic geographical, demographic and economic indices relating to Turkey and Australia. The latter is an island continent situated to the south-east of Indonesia. With a land area of 7,682,300 square kilometres, most of its inhabitants live around the coastal fringe, in the cities and on the grasslands of the 'fertile crescent' of south-eastern Australia. The population density is only 2.3 persons per square kilometre. The figures compare with Turkey's area of 779,552 square kilometres and a population density of 79.1 per square kilometre, nearly 38 times that of Australia with its 'desert heart". Nevertheless, Australia's population, vvhich now approaches nineteen million, is nearly a third of Turkey's 64 millions in 1998. What is highly significant is that well ver ten million Australians live in the five cities - Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide - the first two amounting to ver 60% of the whole people. in comparison, while istanbul with its seven and a half million souls outnumbers the two Australian leaders Sydney (4.1 millions), Melbourne (3.8 millions), Ankara (2.8 millions) and izmir (2 millions) trail behind the Australian leaders. While far more Turks, both numerically and proportionately, live in the countryside than Australians, both countries have, and are, experiencing a substantial drift of population from rural to urban areas. in Turkey the urban population is 65% of the total, in Australia 85%, reflecting Western European norms9. in Australia the gap between rich and poor is accelerating, foreign multinationals control much of the national economy, banking deregula7. 8. 9. The majr work on contemporary Australian developments is Kelly, Paul, The Age of Uncertainty, Sydney, 1975. Manderson, L., "The Turks", in Jupp, James (ed.), The Australian People, Canberra, 1989. These figures are drawn from current Statistical Yearbooks and OECD figures published in the Turkish Daily News, 29 October 1998.

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tion and the privatization of State assets have bitten deeply into a national consensus that had existed betvveen 1901 and 1984. Unemployment, especially amongst the youth and the unskilled is endemic and immovable, commodity prices are low vis--vis manufactured imports, and Australians, vvith a median income of c. $ US22.500 compared vvith Turkey's $US3,007 maintain their high, if falling, Standard of living through the savings and investments of foreigners. Expenditure per head on education and state services generally is falling as the "dovvnsizing" of the nation state to meet the demands and ideology of global corporate capital proceed apace. Inflation, hovvever, at around 1.8% per annum in 1997 compared to the astronomical rate of c.80% in Turkey in 1998, is minuscule. Although the corruption amongst politicians, erime groups, state officials and businessmen as privatization accelerates has not, unlike the Turkish experience, been a significant phenomenon, the moral debauchery and a erosion of social responsibility has proceeded at a rapid clip in Australia. Both countries, then, are experiencing similar, if somevvhat culturally and historically diverse, responses to international economic forces10. There are further differences. Turkey's birthrate at 4% per vvoman, although slovving, is considerably higher than Australia's at 1.8% per vvoman, her population is considerably younger and Turkey is a country of both high internal and external migration levels. Australia, by contrast, is a nation vvhose population is 24% foreignborn, of many diverse nationalities (although stili basically Anglo-Celtic in origin) and vvith a rising Asian presence. By 2025 7% of ali Australians vvill be Asian-born plus a grovving minority of Australian-born Asians11. These factors have, in combination vvith a revival of rural and vvorking-class populism in northern Australia and in the depressed areas of regional and outer-suburban Australia, produced atavistic and bitter responses vvithin a social democratic process stili vvith strength but leaking political convictions except amongst corporate elites and professional politicians. At the September 1998 Federal eleetions, vvhile it only returned one Senatr and failed to achieve a presence in the House of Representatives, the inchoate, racist, anticosmopolitan and "red-neck" One Nation Party polled 10% of the entire national vote in a country vvhere, since 1924, voting has been compulsory. Turkish social scientists and commentators, too, have increasingly noted the divergence betvveen city and countryside, betvveen the poor and the affluent, the educated elite and the disaffected and alienated Anatolian masses that, in part, has spavvned a revival of religious fundamentalism12.

10. Ibid. 11. Yearbook of Australia, no.80, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, 1998. 12. See: Redmond, John, The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community. Turkey, Cyprus and Malta, Aldershot, 1993.

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Perhaps a few further comparisons between the dual experiences of our two countries may well be useful. Both nations have emerged from vanished Empires, although in a different context. Turkey became a Republic in 1923 - Australia stili has Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain as Queen of Australia although there is a strong republican movement albeit divided on constitutional issues13. Turkey is to ali intents and purposes a unitary state with certain regional problems. Australia is a federation with several tiers of government, an uneven taxation system, a steady erosion of states' powers and with, as noted, growing friction between the metropolis and the countryside. Both countries draw for historical sustenance on the Gallipoli experience. Not only in Turkey's case because of the critical role of Atatrk in saving the day on at least three occasions when the Allied forces were close to breaking the Turkish lines. The great Australian war historian, C.E.W. Bean, had, as early as 1921, paid, in the frst of his monumental volumes, a unique tribute to Atatrk as "a man of fine qualities both of judgement and decision.... Whose svvift determination, and that alone, which had prevented the Australian & New Zealand Army Corps from reaching the all-important height of Chanuk Bair. By his action, the exhausted invader, after an effort almost passing human endurance was completely hemmed in by a formidable force under a formidable leader...14 Three years later, in his second volume on the Gallipoli campaign, Bean reinforced this judgement with comments he seldom made about generals, either friends or foes: ... the advance from Anzac was for a second time barred by the greatest leader on the Eastern front... his determination, his directness and the influence of his single-minded patriotism... had a decisive influence on the campaign ... Australian offcers who faced him aftervvards in Palestine found him a straightfonvrd and honourable opponent15. The British historian of the campaign, C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, was even more laudatory eight years later, praising Atatrk's "outstanding genius for command" and stating that

13. Hirst, John, A Republican Manifesto, Melbourne, 1994; Winterton, George, "Can a Republic Work?"'( Independent Monthly, 1992, pp.8-21. 14. Bean, C.E.W., The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol.l, The Story of Anzac: The First Phase, Sydney, 1921, pp.449,452. 15. BeanlI, Sydney, 1924, p.718.

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Seldom in history can the exertions of a single division commander have exercized, on three separate occasions, so profound an influence not only on the course of a battle, but perhaps on the fate of a campaign and even the destiny of a nation16. The meaning of the Anzac experience to a new fledgling nation a mere thirteen years old is stili a matter of pride, historical analysis, contention and strong debate. The qualities then believed to be required of males from British colonies of settlement - physical strength, adaptability, masculine egalitarianism, democratic politics and environmental superiority - welded war experiences to the bush legends17. Yet the overwhelming impression, and it is an historian's duty to be sceptical of such matters, is of the lack of rancour and hatred that marked the individual soldier's experiences on the Peninsula on both sides of trenches that were often only a few metres apart. After May 1915 mutual respect between the Anzacs and the Mehemets grew and remained. The evidence for this is quite conclusive and has lasted until the present day, although only a tiny handful of Gallipoli veterans from both sides are stili alive. This regard extended from both the highest to the lovvest. For instance, on Anzac Day, 25 April 1934, Kemal Atatrk sent the following message: The landing on Gallipoli on April 25 1915, and the fghting that took place on that peninsula will never be forgotten. They shovved to the world the heroism of ali those who shed their blood there. How heartrending for their nations were the losses that this struggle caused18. Thomas Kelly, a veteran of the Queesland 9th Battalion reciprocated these sentiments in a letter to Atatrk on 6 March 1934 to which the leader cordially replied: At Anzac dinners... The name of "Johnny Trk" is certainly not absent from our talk. He takes an honoured place in our memory, and not a single word is said that might be detrimental to the honour of the Turkish soldier. He is appreciated by the Anzacs as having been a clean, gallant, and generous foe19. These informed the accounts of latter years and that have continued to the present day without apology but, in modern parlance, producing and promoting on several levels a sincere and rather rare form of recon16. Aspinall-Oglander, C.F., Official History of the Great War. Mitary Operations Gallipoli, Vol. II, London 1932, pp.485-486. 17. See: Adam-Smith, Patsy, The Anzacs, London, 1978, McKernan, Michael, The Australian People and the Great War, Melbourne, 1980: Moorehead, Alan, Gallipoli, new ed., London, 1967; Robertson, John, Anzac and Empire, Melbourne, 1990; Serle, G.S., "The Digger Traditions and Australian Nationalism', Meanjin, 2, 1965, pp. 149-58. 18. Sydney Morning Herald, 26 April 1934. 19. Ibid, 5 July 1934. Smith's Weekly, 19 May 1934, p.8. See also Reveille, 1 July 1934, p.9.

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ciliation. The historical record continues to fuel new symbols and initiatives - from memorials in the three countries to the ex-servicemen contacts of the past, to the Republic's generosity so far as the transfer of Anzac Cove (Ari Burni) is concerned, to the dedication of Atatrk Reach, Lake Burley Griffin in Canberra and to the memorial in Anzac Way between the Australian Parliament House and the War Memorial. These ali contribute to the growing mutual interest in various aspects of our shared history. There are other similarities between Canberra and Ankara, the two national capitals. Both are inland, both largely artifcial creations of new national governments symbolizing central authority, a modern reflection of nation-building and the site of Parliament Houses and such national institutions and memorials as the Australian War Memorial Museum and tomb of the recently re-interred Australian Unknown Soldier from the 1916-18 battlefields of France. Ankara has its powerful Atatrk Mausoleum and evocative War of Independence Museum. Canberra and Ankara are both to a greater or lesser extent planned and both have been cordially detested by many diplomats and civil servants compelled to move from the fleshpots and other attractions of istanbul and Sydney/Melbourne to the cold uplands of pastoral plateaus20. in both capitals there are memorials to the Great War and its aftermath. Every Turkish town and school has its bst or statue of Atatrk: every Australian city, town and village has its war memorial ranging from the shrines of the capital cities to the stone diggers of suburb and countryside. Then, too, the British and Empire obelisks on the Gallipoli Peninsula have been recently complemented, nearly seventy years later, by Turkish symbols of their victorious struggle. Until the erection of the great Turkish monument at Morto Bay in 1965 there was only one surviving memorial to the victorious troops, that of Sergeant Mehemet's valiant last stand at The Nek. Now, however, memorials of Atatrk and plinths with his utterances dot the crucial areas, valiant and humane deeds are remembered in sculpture and, most significant and intriguing of ali to an historian, two large memorial gardens with headstones, but no actual graves, at Helles and Anzac commemorate the fallen from every region of modern Turkey in a national attempt to remember both one of the seminal origins of the new Republic, the sacrifces of the martyrs and the ongoing need for modern national unity21. So much for the dead. What of contemporary parallels and difficulties? Both states have problems with minorities. in Australia's case it is
20. Lack, John, (ed.) Anzac Remembered. The Selected Writings of K.S. Inglis, Melbourne, 1998; Inglis K.S., Sacred Places. War Memorials in the Australian Landscape, Melbourne, 1998. 21. Personal observation, Gallipoli Peninsula, 27-29 October 1998.

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the post-1788 consequences of the invasion or settlement of a continent (this is mportant vis--vis Turkey with its landed connections to Europe, the Middle East and West Asia) and the social, economic and political problems resulting from such dysfunctions and accommodations. Of these, Australia, in spite of a populist/anti-Aboriginal rural backlash, is well aware that health, employment, education and erime are amongst the worst in the develope vvorld. Both countries have skeletaons in the eloset which need to be both individually and mutually rattled so that policies can be formulated and solutions, or at least produetive agreements, can be formulated. Betvveen the Chanak crisis of September 1922, hadled with masterly skill by Atatrk, but which also demonstrated Australia's reluetance to embark on another Churchillian adventure, Australian-Turkish contacts remained slender until the 1960s when the bilateral agreements on emigration and, later, trade, stili prevailed in Australia until the fail of Singapore on 6 February 1942 shook the imperial connection with Britain in ali its manifestations to the core22. Australia culturally and socially langished betvveen the Armistice and the outbreak of the Second World War, preferring to attempt to return to Victorian values, Empire attachments and rural produetion rather than to more adventurously revive the concepts of the "New Commonwealth" embraced betvveen 1901 and 1914. Not so in Turkey with Atatrk's rapid and determined construction of a new society and a modern state23. Amid trovving fears that a new World War was probable, Atatrk's death on 10 November 1938 was marked by more than usual attention in Australia. Munich, rearmament, Jewish persecutions in Germany and internal political problems revived interest in his achievements and the future direetion of the fifteen-year-old Republic. Four years earlier, the Professor History at Sydney University, S.H. Roberts, had, in a remarkable article, paid tribute to Atatrk's drive towards national development, his emancipation of vvoraen, and his "wonderful courage and disinterasted patriotism" which has produced Kemalism "which spells peace and prosperity for the whole north-eastern Mediterranean". Roberts' statement that "I know of nothing in modern history to compare with the achieve24 ments of Mustapha Kemal Pash, the Ghazi of Turkey" was, given the confusion of the times, a remarkable one. At Atatrk's funeral the British Empire was represented by Lord Birdvvood "the soul of Anzac" and Commander of the Australian imperial Force, 1915-1918. Australia then
22. Spartalis, P., The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, Sydney 1983, pp.232-248 (Chanak crisis). 23. Williams, J.F., The Quarantined Culture. Australian Reactions to Modernisin, Melbourne, 1995. 24. Sydney Mail, 18 April, 1934, p.8.

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had no foreign overseas representation of its own. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister of Australia, Joseph Lyons, sent Australian condolences and, as a unique mark of respect, the ships of the Royal Australian Navy flew, on the day of the funeral, the Turkish flag at half-mast.25 During the Second World War, Turkey's prudent neutrality reflected Atatrk's previous sophisticated handling of the Western Powers and Lenin's new Soviet Union. This differed from Australia's increasing preoccupation with East Asia arising from the Japanese military onslaught from 7 December 1941 and her rapid economic rise after the Korean War. Yet there is a parallel after 1942. As the ill-fated and misjudged Suez fiasco of 1956 marked Australia's further retreat from the old Empire, Korea, the Malaysian Emergency and Viet Nam demonstrated Australia's growing dependence upon and involvement with the United States or - to use a grovelling Australian Prime Minister's phase - "our great and powerful friend". As one of history's subtle ironies, Turkey, as well as Australia, became part of the American imperium during the Cold War; Turkish soldiers actually serving alongside Australian and New Zealand volunteers in that hard and bitter Korean conflict. Both groups fought hard, suffered considerable casualties-359 Australian dead, 904 Turkish and had a paralel and unprecedented resistance to intimidation and "brainwashing" in prisoner-of-war camps. Both countries' infantry casualties were high in relation to the numbers involved26. Why then the upsurge in interest in both countries? The commemorations of the Anzac experience, particularly on each 25th April, have not, in spite of the fading away of veterans, dwindled away as was anticipated by some in the 1960s. interest in the catastrophe of 1914-18 continues apace, mass tourism has opened "sites of mourning", both ancient and modern, to the many. On 25th April 1998 ver 7,000 Australians and New Zealanders, mostly young, attended services at Ari Burnu. Bus loads of Turkish citizens now visit the old battlegrounds. So, for both Antipodeans and increasingly for Turks, John North's 1936 observation rings true: "Gallipoli is no longer a narrow neck of land set in the blue or grey of the sea. If it is anything at ali, it is a country of the mind."27 Surely, considering the enmities of the past, this phenomenon must be unique. As in Turkey, interest in "national history" proceeds apace although hindered in the academies by the obeisance to corporate fnancial structures, an obsession with vocational training and the consequences of the demolition of the controls of the international economic order established after the Second World War.
25. Sydney Morning Herald, 11 November 1938, p.l 1; 22 November 1938, p.12. 26. Korea. Ministry of National Defence, The History of the U.N. Forces in the Korean War, Vol. VI, Seoul, 1977, pp.9-14, 381-3; O'Neill, Robert, Australia in the Korean War, 1950-1953, Canberra, 1985, esp. 136, 215, 276. 27. North John, Gallipoli. The 'Fading' Vision, London, 1936, p.360.

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Certainly, too in Australia there has been, since the late 1950s, a new confidence in our ability to examine myths and distil realities and a preparedness to disaccord aspects of certain legends that are no longer tenable. White Australia as a restrictive immigration and national icon has been abolished, cultural provincialism is waning, the glorification of imperial sacrifice and notions of racial superiority are under fire, although, as mentioned above, a considerable backlash, resulting largely from economic factors, has recently emerged. Then, too, Turkish immigration as well as other arrivals, and with them the evolution of a New Australia based, hopefully, on the solid foundations of the old but also incorporating cultural and social elements from throughout the world, has transformed Australia. Unlike Turkey, we have not yet had a female Prime Minister of the Commonwealth. Australians are stili confronting problems-cultural, environmental, economic and social as well as the conflict betvveen economic globalization and the national community. Turkey, as well, as we ali know, must also pursue sophisticated policies in a hot of difficult arenas, ranging from religious fundamenetalism, military power, the Cyprus problem, to global pressures and demographic difficulties. I conclude with a few remarks, some historical, some quasi-political and some personal. We are ali agreed that, although the histories of our peoples were quite different and often marked by imperial imperatives, and more often than not by ignorance, they did coincide in a remarkable episode for both countries in 1915. Then again, on a social level, the phenomena that well ver 50,000 Turkish migrants and their families are in Australia has added greatly to our own Australian emerging culture and I hope will continue to do so in levels of society. For instance, we would ali like to see far more Australia/Turkish students at our universities, although I am well aware of the vocational and social mobilty requirements of the first generation of Australian-born children of Turkish migrants and the problems facing the unskilled working class. But what of the second and even the third? There is a challenge to be met on ali sides - a challenge which closer academic ties betvveen our two nations, already inaugurated, will I trust facilitate. So, too, should trade continue to develop - not just wheat and carpets but that whole range of value-added commodities which both countries are attempting to facilitate and exploit. in 1996 Ausralia exported goods worth $ A 384 million to Turkey but only imported A74 million worth in return. Politically, we must, in spite of certain tensions vvithin both societies, build on that mutual respect that Atatrk and his soldiers, the very soul of the new Turkey, enjoyed with the Anzacs now almost ali dead, and the Australian and New Zealand people. That respect and meaning is confirmed by the growing presence, already noted, of young Antipodeans 698

on the Galipoli Peninsula before and after Anzac Day. How encouraging would it be if young male and female Turkish students and workers could, in reasonable numbers, visit Australia and learn something of our problems and that feeling for the country, its ancient and modern past and its complexities that only a favoured few tourists now enjoy? Then, too, although Australia since 1942 has been intimately involved with the United States, the declining mother country Great Britain, and East Asia, we have neglected some of our historical legacies and duties. As a middle power we have tended to adapt short-term fashions and solutions rather than invest in long-term and more complex relationships. Both Turkey and Australia have much to gain from a strengthening of bilateral contacts wich can range from expanded archaeological concerns, shared historical experiences and multi-cultural interfaces. Finally, this visit to Turkey will be the third by a Waterson in 83 years. The first episode, that of my father with the New Zeland Expeditionary Force from 25 April 12 September 1915 was, from the British point of view, a great failure. From the Turkish perspective the episode was a tremendous military triumph and more importantly, began that political and personal transformation which fuelled Kemal Atatrk's rise as one of the greatest and most creative figures of the 20th century. The second sojourn was my own visit to your country in 1989 - an investigation both historically stimulating and emotionally confronting. But I should finish with one of the great panegyrics of the recent past which shows magnanimity, statesmanship and historical perxception rare in this century of much intolerance, greed, irresponsibility and violence. We are ali familiar with those great words of Kemal Atatrk inscribed on twin stele at Ari Burnu: Those heroes who shed their blood and lost their lives, you are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference betvveen the Johnnies and the Mehemets to us where they lie side by side in this country of ours. You, the mothers who sent their sons from far away countries wipe away your tears, your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they become our sons as well. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Ahmad, Feroz, The Making of Modern Turkey, London, 1993; The Turkish Experiment in
Democracy, 1950-75, London, 1977. Akelik, Rahmi, (ed.), Before and After Gallipoli, Melbourne, 1986. Aspinall-Oglander, C.F., Official History of the Great War. Military Operations Gallixpoli. Vol. II, London 1932. Bean, C.E.W., Gallipoli Mission, Sydney, 1990: The Official History of Australia in the War of1914-1918, Vols. I and II, The Story of Anzac, Sydney, 1921, 1924.

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Boyack, N, and Tolerton, Jane, in the Shadow ofWar, Auckland, 1990. Facey, Albert, A Fortunate Life, Fremantle, 1981. Fevvster, K. and Basarin, V. and H., A Turkish View ofGallipoli, Melbourne, 1985. Galloway, Jack, The Last Cali of the Bugle, The Long Road to Kapyong, St Lucia, 1994. Gammage, Bili, The Broken Years, Ringwood, (new ed.), 1980. Inglis, K.S., Sacred Places. War Memorials in the Australian Landscape, Melbourne, 1998. Kazancgil, Ali and zbudun, Ergun (eds), Atatrk: Founder of a Modern State, (new. ed.), London, 1997. Kinross, Patrick, Atatrk. The Rebirth of a Nation, (new ed.), London, 1995. Lack, John (ed). Anzac Remembered. Selected Writings ofK.S. Inglis, Melbourne, 1998. Moorehead, Alan, Gallipoli, 5new ed.), London 1967. O'Neill, Robert, Australia in the Korean War, 1950-1953, Canberra, 1985. North, John, Gallipoli. The Fading Vision, London, 1936. Ramazanolu, Hseyin (ed), Turkey in the World Capitalist System, Aldershot, 1985. Robertson, John, Anzac and Empire, Melbourne, 1990. Sonyel, S.R., Atatrk- the Founder of Modern Turkey, Ankara, 1989. Spartalis, Peter, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, Sydney, 1983. Stephens, Tony, The Last Anzacs. Gallipoli, 1915, Sydney 1996. Thomson A., Anzac Memorial, Living with the Legend, Melbourne, 1994. Articles Encel, Sol, "The Study of Militarism in Australia'", The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 3, 1, 1967, pp.2-18. Gammage, Bili, "Anzac's Influence on Turkey and Australia", Journal of the Australian War Memorial, 18 April 1991, pp 13-19. James, Robert-Rhodes, 'The Mystery ofGallipoli', Quadrant, June 1985, pp. 34-37. Knightley, Philip, "Murdoch's Bloody Lies About Gallipoli', Sydney Morning Herald, 14 April 1990, p.36. Manderson L., "The Turks', in Jupp, James (ed.), The Australian People, Canberra, 1989, pp.818-25. Smart, Judith and Wood, Tony, 'An Anzac Muster, War and Society in Australia and New Zealand', Monash University Publications in History, 14 Melbourne, 1992. Essays by Sinclair, Phillips, Clancy, Smart, King, Blackmore, Gould and Waterson. Newspapers Reveille, 1 July 1934, p.9; 1 April 1938, p.64. Smith's Weekly, 19 May 1934, p.8. Sydney Morning Herald, 18, 26 April, 6 July 1934, 11, 12, 22 November 1938. Turkish Daily News, 29 October 1998, Special Issue.

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THE RELEVANCE OF KEMAL ATATRK N THE TURKEY OF THE FUTURE

Prof. Gerrit OLIVIER* History teaches us the fragility of structures dependent on individuals.(l) Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's living legacy in Turkey defies the wisdom of this general historical phenomenon. Indeed, he was one of the very few 20th century political leaders who left a legacy, which survived and remained relevant long after they had left the scene. Atatrk created a new reality. His legacy to modern Turkey is that of a political and constitutional founding father as it was his single-minded determination, perseverance, fearless leadership, and above ali historical insight and wisdom, that led to the birth and development of a redefned national, political, and cultural identity of the Turkish people. He was simultaneously soldier, statesman and prophet who absorbed himself in both methodology and purpose. These qualities help to explain his uniqueness as a reformer whose success as state- and nation-builder is virtually unparallelled in the 20th century. The fact that some sixty years after his death his political legacy stili remains a dominating force Turkey, shows that he was no dictatorial usurper of power, but a national leader whose vision of the future was in harmony with the deeply felt aspirations of the Turkish people. For these reasons, Kemal Atatrk will be remembered and revered as the founding father of modern Turkey. Of course, change and adaptation to new circumstances are the indispensable ingredients of the political dynamics of any modern state, not only for the sake of survival but also for the sake of a better future. To adapt to new circumstances is, therefore, an imperative prescribed by the national interest, and in the modern democratic state it is almost routine political behaviour to constantly test and revise the relevance of the existing order of things. Turkey is no exception. Its history confirms that it is a rather restless nation, constantly in a state of flux and fermentation. As Turkey stands at the brink of the new millenmum, and with the terrible experience of the Cold War behind us, the relevance and immutability of
* Centre for European Studies in Africa, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg.

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the Kemalist paradigm will be tested further, and perhaps even more severely than in the past. No nation can today escape the fact that the post-Cold War world characterised by the expanding phenomenon of globalisin has brought a vastly different decision-making environment to the doorstep of every state. New choices, new policies, and new strategies will perforce characterise natinoal and international political life in the millenium ahead of us. Some states will have the wisdom and foresight to adapt, in anticipation of these new future challenges, while the laggers will find change being thrusted upon them. The former category will be the vvinning states and the leaders of tomorrovw, while the latter category will become increasingly marginalised in a highly competitive world of the future. in many cases the future of nations will depend on the redefnition of goals, policies and priorities and perhaps also radical re-alignment as far as external cultural affinities and foreign policy are concerned. The basic precepts or roots of the Kemalist paradigm go back to at least the middle of the 19th century. Atatrk articulated and concretized a spirit and a mood which were embryonic, or at least latent, among Turks of some time. in 1865 already, the Association of the New Ottomans set its aims on achieving drastic changes to the political institutions of the Ottoman Empire and to counter European superiority through the adoption of Western technology and science and Western political institutions and values.(2) Although the constitutional reforms which follovved their initiative were short-lived [1876-1878], a favourable climate was gradually created for the emergence of the Young Trk Movement around 1898, the Young Trk Revolution of 1908, the rise of Kemal Atatrk, the creation of the Republican People's Party, and the establishment of a new, modern, secular Turkey. it is a moot question whether history had, in the words of Fukuyama, suddenly "ended" for Turkey when it embraced and canonised Kemalism as a national ideology. If history did in fact end for Turkey, it would be logical to assume that Kemal's basic principles or "six arrovvs", e.g. populism, republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, and reformism, as well as the rest of his political legacy, constitute the final word on the future political and cultural path of Turkey. (3) Sixty years have lapsed since Atatrk left the scene, which in the context of modern politics, is a long time. During this period the Kemalist doctrine was subjected to the general will and acquiescence of the citizenry; it was severely tested, and yet survived. in some way it is quite remarkable that the Atatrk legacy did survive, considering the fact the he presided ver a de facto one-party regime and that pover was concentrated at the top. Normally, this type of govemance provokes resentment and resistance and there is a backlash of one kind or another nce the leader leaves the scene. The opposite seems

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to to have happened in Turkey. Kemal's stature grew to even greater proportions after his death, when Turkey did venture into a multi-party system, and the electorate had the democratic choice to replace his legacy, but refrained from doing so. During the Menderes regime, the Kemalist doctrine was indeed severely tested, but it nevertheless survived. The durability of Kemalism is therefore a povverful manifestation of its relevance and legitimacy in the context of the Turkish political culture. Does this mean that Kemalism is an immutable phenomenon in Turkey's body politics? The answer to this question depends, of course, on how Kemalism is experienced by the masses and interpreted and applied by the key political role players. An orthodox or rigid interpretation and application would make it increasingly difficult for Turkey's authorities to cope with a rapidly changing internal and external environment. An approach is called for which would contribute tovvards a greater sense of national purpose and of the Turkish people. A divided or polarised society, and a "torn" state is a too high and unnecessary price to be paid for a foreign policy which is by no means the only alteraative. Of course, to change the existing order of things, as we learned from Machiavelli, could be a highly risky or even dangerous exercise. But as Atatrk himself has proven when he dismantled the anachronistic Ottoman Empire, vvithout modernisation and revision it is virtually inconceivable that any political doctrine or regime could withstand the test of time. Even hallowed institutions like for example the American and Swiss constitutions, along with various others, have from time to time been changed or amended in order to deal more effectively with the exigencies of contemporary politics. The continued relevance of Atatrk's historical legacy depends, therefore, on its dynamic and modernistic interpretation and implementation. Atatrk himself favoured the dynamic approach, thus he proclaimed "reformism" and "populism", obviously and inherently dynamic in character, as part and parcel of his quiver of "arrovvs" it would, therefore, be logical to conclude that Atatrk himself did not preclude changes h the application of his legacy. Against this background, how shall one then view the future of Turkish domestic and foreign politics? Of course, an objective-scientific analysis of the deeper motives and cultural predilections of the Turkish people, insofar as it affect policy-making, is hardly possible for any outside observer. At best, the outsider can only judge Turkish policies in terms of verifable, objective and concrete results. As C E Black pointed out, "[C] hance may be viewed within the framevvork of the conception that a society evolves with reference to the problems that it faces".(4) This conception, according to Black, is reflected in a particular society's religion, ideology, and value system, permeating ali modes of expression. "A society's understanding of itself and its problems- its sense of identity

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and purpose- is the principal binding force that integrates the members of that society and enables them to act effectively in common to solve their domestic and foreign problems."(5) The relevance and durability of the Kemalist doctrine thus depend on its continued congruence with the deeply felt convictions of the Turkish people. Kemalism survived and remained a relevant force ver the past sixty years despite many upheavals and turbulence in the Turkish body politics because this congruence was correctly perceived and articulated. The survical of Kemalism does, therefore, not require a Turkey in a permanent state of equilibrium. No modern state is ever in a state of permanent equilibrium. "They are constantly in the process of change, and it is the most characteristic feature of the modern era that change has been more rapid and thoroughgoing than in any other period in history."(6) History also telis us that change and modernisation are not necessarily linear and progressive. For instance, particularly in some African states, efforts to modernise have precipitated stagnation and decay. The process of political change and modernisation could, therefore, be creative and progressive or destructive and regressive, depending on how leaders and policy-makers deal with the challenges their countries are faced with. Turkey was very fortunate to have Atatrk as leader, reformer, and later as symbol and lodestar to guide it into the difficult and uncertain future. Even so, wise leadership and strategic excellence will continue be at a premium if Turkey's present generation is to succeed in coping with the rapidly changing circumstances facing it. Sooner or later, situations do arrive in the lives of most states which require a radical redefinition of their raisons d'etre. This could mean ideological renewal, the replacement of socio-political paradigms, change in the form of government, and so on. in his recent book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel P Huntington comments that Turkey could conceivably "do a South Africa". This would entail, according to Huntington: "abandoning secularism as alien to its being as South Africa abandoned apartheid and thereby changing itself from a pariah state in its civilisation to a leading state of that civilization." Huntington continues to state that: "Having experienced the bad and the good of the West in secularism and democracy, Turkey may be equally qualified to lead islam. But to do so it would have to reject Atatrk's legacy more thoroughly than Russia has rejected Lenin's. it would also take a leader of Atatrk's calibre and one who combined religious and political legitimacy to remake Turkey from a torn country into a core state."(7) Two important issues of principle seem to be involved if Turkey were to decide to "do a South Africa". Firstly, there would have to be fundamental redefinition of the Turkish secular cultural identity, and sec704

ondly, a reassessment would be made of Turkey's place and role in the world. What complicates matters further is that these two issues are closely interdependent as a nation's foreign policy is essentially a derivative of its domestic policy and its cultural underpinnings. Obviously other options are available to Turkey beyond renouncing secularism and "doing a South Africa" in order to reach for a better future. The most obvious and immediate area where to look for these options seems to be in the domain of Turkish foreign policy. A more innovative foreign policy, strengthening Turkey's international diplomatic clout and bargaining power, would greatly help to give new purpose and unity to the Turkish nation. By the same token, trying to maintain the foreign policy status quo could conceivably harm or undermine Turkey's Kemalist secular character. On the other hand, prudent strategic adaptations to the existing foreign policy should actually lead to the reinforcement of the Kemalist legacy. As already pointed out, the inclusion of "reformism" and "populism" among the "six arrows" of Kemalism seems to indicate a build-in dynamic or evolutionary element in Atatrk's philosophy. Therefore, a complete volte face in Turkey, in order to reach future national goals, does not seem necessary. in South Africa and Russia changes were of a zero-sum, or paradigmatic(8) nature, in the sense that apartheid and communism, because of their obsolescence, were totally and summarily dispensed with and and replaced by something totally and radically new and different. A change of Turkey's secular character would obviously faal in the zerosum or paradigmatic category because Islamizaton implies a total replacement of the old order in a non-evolutionary manner. This dynamic perspective raises the possibility of incremental or even peace-meal changes in areas not affecting secularism, for instance in the realm of foreign policy. in other words, Kemalism does not preclude Turkey from realigning itself to the realities of the post-Cold War world. Indeed, such foreign policy changes may in time become an important prerequisite for a greater measure of internal unity and national consensus in Turkey. Of immediate concern is Turkey's persistence with an almost evangelistic proWestern stance. The latter disposition seems to be a Cold War relic which has little to do with the survival of Kemalist Turkey. The policy, because of its persistent inability to produce successful results, could very vvell help to galvanise poplist fundamentalist forces' opposition to secularism. An important question is, of course, vvhether Turkey could remain secularised and Westernised, \vithout being ideologically pro-Western, or for that matter, a captive ally of NATO? The answer seems to be "yes". When Atatrk proclaimed the foreign policy dictum of "peace at home and peace abroad", he, according to Lord Kinross, conveyed the nation that: "The Turks were the friends of ali civilised nations. The hatchets of the past, with its lust for conquest, were buried. The Turkish mind harboured no thoughts of reconquest or revision of 705

frontiers." Kinross goes on to state that: "The new sovereign Republic, poised betvveen East and West, was to be a stabilising element. Thus there were to be pacts both with Russia and her neighbours and with the European powers, both with Arab and the Balkan worlds, - Above ali, there was to be loyal and unquestioning co-operation with the League of Nations."9 What is described here is a typically non-aligned foreign policy posture. But developments after World War II [in which Turkey stayed neutral], and particularly Turkey's stronger growing identification with the West and its joining of NATO in 1952, "caused the Turks to be denounced by the non-Western, non-aligned countries at the 1955 Bandung Conference and to be attacked a blasphemous by Islamic countries" (10). The important and rather disturbing reality Turkey has to face up to is that its role and contribution as a loyal Western ally are being taken for granted and beyond a few palliatives, like the new Customs Union, they cannot expect meaningful rewards for their contribution to "VVestern security. it is highly unlikely that the ineluctable logic and laws of politicallife would allow this asymmetrical relationship to continue indefinitely. As Huntington (11) points out, Turkey's NATO membership was a product of the Cold War... "Its end removes the principal reason for that involvement and leads to a weakening and redefinition of that connection. Turkey is no longer useful to the West as a bulwark against the majr threat from the north, but rather, as in the Gulf War, a possible partner in dealing with lesser threats from the south." The crucial help Turkey provided to the anti-Saddam Hussein coalition met with substantial internal criticism, and moreover, it failed to secure a more favourable attitude from the West. Western indifference was particularly exemplified by the fact that Germany, Turkey's traditional friend, refused to view an Iraqi missle attacks on Turkey as an attack on NATO. The same type of scenario now seem to manifest itself in regard to Turkey's highly coveted goal of membership of the European Union, which it applied for already in December 1989. Since then, the EU has approved the applications of Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway in 1993, and in 1997, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were allowed in, while at this point in time the Turkish application is stili being kept in abeyance. in December 1997 the EU "humiliatingly put Turkey into a special sub-category of applicants for membership behind such countries as Bulgaria and Slovakia, meaning, in effect, that it had no change of joining the Eu in the foreseeable future."(12) By way of what could perhaps be called a "second prize", Turkey was given a Custom's Union dispensation with the EU, only after what seemed to be considerable American pressure. The "idea of Turkey", strictly based a Kemalism, is that of a secular, democratic Mslim state with a market economy. Turkey modernised along Western lines, it associated with the West, and has during the long Cold War years stood prepared to come to the defence of the West. But

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from the European perspective, "the idea of Turkey" does not seem to be compatible with the "idea of Europe". Human rights issues, relatively lovvers levels of economic development, the recent banning of the Islamic-minded Welfare Party and persistent Greek animosity, are the "politically correct" or objective reasons for European reticence. Deeper down, however, the European attitude is that culturally, Turkey is not part of Europe. Turkey knows this. President Ozal said in 1992 that Turkey's humah rights record is a "made-up reason why Turkey should not join the EC. The real reason is that we are Mslim, and they are Christian."(13). For the Europeans, Ozal continued, the EU is a "Christian club" entertaining the attitude is that the Turks should be kept at arm's length because for them "Turkey is too poor, too populous, too Mslim, too harsh, too culturally different, too everything".(14) Ostensibly, European decision-makers calculate that the cost of their present Turkish policy would not be unbearably high, bargaining on the possibility that Turkey would not change its secular pro-Western stance out of deference to Kemalism. This assumption seems flovved because, as already pointed out, secularism based on the Western model of modernisation, should not be equated with being pro-Western. it is debatable whether Atatrk intended Turkey's foreign policy to be blindly proWestern. A more Machiavellian type of scenario which one can put foward is that Europe has already decided that in the absence of a threat from the East, it can enter the future vvithout Turkey, who they in any case feel culturally uncomfortable with. The present policy could, therefore, be part of an unfolding grand strategy to wean Turkey systematically away from Europe. This depiction is not ali that far-fetched should one, for instance, contemplate the chauvinistic sentiments recently expressed by Wilfried Martens, a prominent Christian Democrat in the European Parliament, that: "The EU is in the process of building a civilisation in which Turkey has no place."(15) Significantly, German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl [who a prominent Turkish magazine rather poignantly refers to as "Charlekohl", with reference to Charlemagne who tried to convert Europe into a single Christian empire], did not repudiate the Martens statement. A faulty assessment of the importance of Turkey's geo-strategic role in the future regional political configuration which affects Europe, the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and China could end in a costly historical miscalculation for the West. On the other hand, these views fit in rather neatly with the Huntingtonian hypothesis concerning "the clash of civilisations", which he explains as follovvs: "in this New World, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry between superpovvers is replaced by the clash of civilisations. in this New World the most pervasive, important,. and dangerous conflicts will not be betvveen social classes, rich and 707

poor, or other economically defned groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities." (16) The EU countries' rather strict and narrow interpretation of their own national interests is, of course, not only confned to Turkey and seems to be part of a general emerging pattern. Russia, for instance, is going through a similar experience. in spite of its avowing itself part of a "common European home", Russia is pointedly and deliberately being isolated through the extension of NATO to the Visegrad countries. Like Turkey, Russia will probably forever remain outside the inner circle of the Eu family of nations. it is fairly easy to surmise that this "cultural apartheid" on the part of Europe, vvhould stir up anti-European and anti-Western sentiments in Turkey and create a fertile ground for fundamentalist extremism. The 21.5 percent voter support garnered by Mr Erbakan's Islamist "VVelfare Party in the 1995 parliamentary elections should be seen as an early vvarning signal to the West that something is afoot in Turkey which, in the end, could affect their interests even more adversely and permanently than a Turkish membership of the European Union. According to the London Economist: "Two prospects loom, both undesirable. First, many religious-minded Turks will become stili more resentful of their purportedly pro-western leaders... Second, many secular-minded Turks are likely to retreat into even surlier resentment [vis--vis Europe]." (17) The secular heritage of Atatrk is, therefore, under pressure and says the Economist. "at some point, Turkey could be ready to give up its frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar pleading for membership in the West and to resume its much more impressive and elevated historical role as the principal Islamic interlocutor against the West" (18). As we have argued, Kemalism does not presuppose the indefnite maintenance of the status quo concerning Turkey's external relations and foreign policy. An evangelical pro-Western posture is not part of the Kemalist doctrine. Apparently this is not what Western countries believe. Turkey's availability as a strategic partner is almost taken for granted. it is unclear what the level of Turkey's tolerance is, but it cannot be unlimited. Huntington's "do a South Africa"-scenario could indeed develop into a plausible alternative if European cultural chauvinism and sectional interests continue to keep Turkey feel unwanted. Although Turkish tolerance of what amounts to humiliation should be admired, but it would be unwise for the country's policy-makers to sit and wait for the inevitable. The wise and prudent thing to do to is to embark timeously on a process of reconstruction of Turkey's foreign policy architecture. This reconstruction should be based on the realistic assumption that secularism and Westernism are not intertwined like Siamese twins. This may be happening already. Revisionism, albeit in a rather careful and limited way, ah-eady seems to have found its way into Turkey's

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domestic and foreign policies. Examples of this are the Office of Religious Affairs maintained in the 1980's and 1990's, the govemment allowing schoolgirls to wera the traditional headscarf, the promotion and expansion of Turkey's relations with Arab and other Mslim countries in the 1990's, support to the Bosnian Muslims as well as to Azerbaijan, and the Islamicizing of Turkey's foreign policy in its immediate region. The fact that Turgut Ozal, Necmettin Erbakan, and other political leaders have explicitly identified themselves with Mslim symbols and policies, goes beyond mere revisionism of the Kemalist doctrine, and also show up new fissures in Turkish society. Even so, a meaningful majority of Turkey's population rejects Islamism as a national creed, and the great majority stili honour and respect Atatrk as their founding father. But, ver time, existing fissures could grow into canyons if alternative policies with greater national appeal and greater and symbolic advantage are not implemented. One cany only wonder what a contemporary Kemal Atatrk would have been able to achieve, given the range of foreign policy options Turkey has to its disposal. If one looks at the more recent efforts to revise Turkey's foreign policy, there is little ground for optimism that a new paradigm has been found. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey made efforts to break out of the cold-war mould by trying to establish a regional policy based on a vision of community of Turkic people in its "near abroad", stretching "from the Adriatic to the borders of China". Although this policy is congruent with Turkey's cultural identitiy and earlier Ottoman history, it has some immediate drawbacks: firstly, the states in this region are generally poor and underdeveloped and the question is whether Turkey has the resources to meet the demands of such a depleted and dependent community. Secondly, it puts Turkey up against a rather nervous Russia who regards this region as its sphere of influence. Thirdly, even if the coming into being of such a community were theoretically possible, it would, because of Turkey's insuffcient economical and diplomatic clout, lead to over-extension and lack of viability. Fourthly, such a policy may smack of Turkish cultural neoimperialism, a return to Ottomanism, which in turn could provoke or exacerbate ethnic tensions and regional competition. Finally, it is doubtful whether such a policy would in the end stand up to Kemal Atatrk's doctrine of "peace at home and peace abroad", a dictum which today is probably even more relevant than it was sixty years ago. The role of altruistic "developer", e.g. without nationalistic or neoimperialist intentions or overtones, would, of course, give a regional policy a more acceptable countenance, but apart from being too overly Utopian for practical application, Turkey lacks the resources and would probably overstrech itself by trying to follow this route. 709

An alternative route to improving Turkey's international position which seems totally in line with Kemal's "peace at home and peace abroad" doctrine, is that of "bridgebuilder" between nations and cultures. As Blanco Villalta wrote:" At the end of the War of Independence, Atatrk made it an accomplished fact that his country stood equidistant from East and West. He created a Turkey which was free of any bond of any kind, which might tie her to either of these poles of povver... in this aspect the Hero of Sakarya can be seen as a precursor of the Third World" (19). Villalta also made the important point that: "No one knows better than the Turks themselves what dangers arise from the privileged location of their country. it was thanks to that, that the Ottoman Empire achieved the rapid development of its power, but for the same reason it died, and the city which Napoleon said was worth the world to her possessor is a jevvel difficult to keep".(20) Hovvever, there is also the more positive side to the Turkish geopolitical and cultural equation as articulated by the former Turkish Prime Minister Tansu iller, who said in 1993 that Turkey was both a "Western democracy" and "part of the Middle East", and "bridges two civilizations, physically and philosophically". in similar vein, President Sulleyman Demirel referred to Turkey as a "very significant bridge in a region extending from west to east, that is from Europe to China".(21) This type of foreign policy would seem to be acceptable to the majr internal cultural and religious groupings inside Turkey, and also seems compatible with a policy of non-alignment. But to fulfil this role, Turkey will have to restructure the architecture of its foreign policy. Particularly it will have to redefine its position tovvards Europe and the West. This is a difficult but necessary choice. But a change in the direction indicated is better than the status quo. Drastic foreign policy change in democratic countries is rather rare phenomenon because of traditional and almost primordial bipartisan perceptions of the national interest. Such dramatic changes mostly happen only after some majr domestic raptura or external upheaval. As already pointed out, a switch to a policy of non-alignment [or "Turkey frst"] would not violate Atatrk's broad guidelines. Indeed it should be seen as a return to classical Kemalism. The existing policy was manufactured during the post-Ataturk Cold War-period and has not been realigned to the new realities yet. it is important to point out that a policy shift, such as indicated, does not pre-suppose changes in Turkey's secular culture. Moreover, these changes, if they take place, need or ought not to be "antiWest". If carefully planned and orchestrated such a new policy could help Turkey to broaden its range of foreign policy options considerably, including of course, increasing its leverage on Europe. A sensible redefinition of national purpose could help Turkey in a considerable measure to mend fences with the Arab and Mslim worlds and to redefine relations with Russia, China, and India, thus creating a wide array of new opportunities in the economic, security and diplomatic fields. At the same time,

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such a policy would help Turkey to emerge gracefully and with honour from its present status as being a captive ally of the West. To conclude, Kemal Atatrk's legacy remains relevant and its guiding principles will steer the Turkish nation into the next millenium. The Turkish people as a collectivity, are the guardians of this legacy. What they expect from Kemalism is what Atatrk gave to Turkey when he lived. in today's terms this can be summarised as the protection and enhancement of the national pride, maximisation of Turkish national interests, and a foreign and domestic policy aimed at bringing peace and unity to the Turkish nation. Seen in this context, the time has perhaps arrived for the incisive revision of Turkey's strategic role in the region and further afield. Of immediate concern is Turkey's propensity to develop into a torn nation with less and less power to shape its own fiture. Such a scenario would erode and undermine the great legacy of the great Kemal Atatrk. I am sure, hovvever, that prescient decision-making and wise leadership will prevail, and that Turkey's immense intrinsic national potential will assure a great future for a great nation. Abstract The post-Cold War political environment confronts states with new realities and new challenges, as they stand ready to enter the next millenium. Atatrk has left Turkey gudelines as how to interpret its own raison d'etre. and also how to deal with the continuous challenges facing the Turkish state. it is argued that Atatrk intended his legacy, as exemplified by his "six arrows", be interpreted and applied dynamically. The two immediate issues which particularly need to be addressed in the context of the Kemalist paradigm are, firstly, the impact of the so-called "clash of civilizations"- hypothesis on secularism in turkey, and secondly, Turkey's pro-western foreign policy posture. These two issues are not necessarily interdependent, and in the light of the fact that Atatrk's secularism did not prescribe pro-westernism, foreign policy shifts may take place vvithout dishonouring his legacy. Change should be contemplated in view of the prevalence of what seems to be "cultural apartheid" on the part of Europe vis--vis Turkey, particularly in regard to membership of the European Union. Continuation with the existing policy will progressively erode Turkey's ability to maximise its national interests and act in a way commensurable with its regional geo-political position and status. in the new post-Cold War global environment, Atatrk's philosophy of "peace at home and peace abroad" seems to cali for a different foreign policy architecture and posture. The fresh approach should be aimed at uniting the Turkish people behind a single overarching international purpose and serving the national interest by way of making the right choices from among the state's wide array of options abroad. 711

REFERENCES (1) (2) Henry A Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, Three Essays (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1969) p. 47. Arif T Payaslioglo in Robert E Ward & Dankvvart A Rustovv (Eds), Political Modernization in Japan And Turkey (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964), p. 414. Stanford J Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, History Of The Ottoman Empire And Modern Turkey, Vol 11 (Cambridge University Press, London, 1977) pp.375-395. C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, A Study in Comparative History (Harper & Row, New York, 1967) p. 59.

(3) (4)

(5) Ibid., p. 59. (6) Ibid., p. 47. (7) (8) Samuel P Huntington, The Clash Of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order (Simon&Schuster, 1996), p. 179. Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 92. (Kuhn relates paradigms to "scientific revolutions" which he defines as "noncumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one"). Lord Kinross, Atatrk, The Rebirth Of A Nation (Rustem & Brother, Nicosia, 1964) pp. 458-459.

(9)

(10) Huntington, op cit, p.144. (11) Ibid. p. 145. (12) The Economist, January 24, 1998, p. 30. (13) Quoted in Huntington, op. cit., p. 146. (14) Quoted in Ibid, p. 146. (15) The Economist, March, 15, 1997, p. 31. (16) Huntington, op. cit., p. 28. (17) The Economist, January 24, 1998, p.18. (18) Huntington, op. cit, p. 178. (19) Jorge Blanco Villalta, Atatrk, (Trk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi, Ankara, 1982) p. XIII. (20) Ibid, p. 416. (21) Quoted in Huntington, op. cit., p. 149.

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GARCIA GOMEZ, A VALUABLE CLOG N THE MEDITERRANEAN POLICY OF SPAIN N THE MIST OF THE COLD WAR
Prof. Dr. Victor Morales LEZCANO* it won't be hyperbole to start this essay by stating that, in Spain, Histography and some Social Sciences -such as Maghrebology and the study of Political and Social Systems from a historical perspective and in comparative terms, just to mention a couple of examples that I am acquainted with- are progressively conquering new horizons on a wide range of issues and attaining fairly commendable achievements. I have recently struck a comprehensive balance of that conquest and those achievements confining myself to the Spanish bibliographical production dealing with the Maghreb for the last ten years. I believe to have noticed that it has both experienced a remarkable growth as well as developed a more profound sensibility in the experts taking an interest on the past and present of the nations clustered along the southern border of our country1. That is, those who live-and in the sense instilled in the word by Americo Castro, who also "suffer" - in the lands of the Mslim West delimited by Algeria and Mauritania, the two African neighbours of the Moroccan Kingdom and the Western Sahara. Sticking always to the field of the two above-mentioned academic subjects, one has to acknowledge, that the Spanish bibliographic production on the past and present of the societies living in the Eastern Meditteranean basin has dwindled in numbers but not in quality. I beg your pardon for the immodesty, but I also drew attention in 2 due course to the lack of solid and steady researching in our Universities
* 1. Spanish pen University, Madrid. See from the author of these lines, "The development of the studies on the Maghreb in the Spanish bibliography" in Mediterranee, Mer Ouverte, Minutes of the Marseille Debate under the direction of Ch. VILLAIN-GANDOSE, L. DURTESTE AND S. BUSUTTIL, 1997, V.U, p.755-766. in 'The reason of being a book" Spain and the Eastern Question, Madrid, Spanish Diplomatic Library of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992; foreword by Bernard Lewis, p.13-18.

2.

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-and other accredited centers of knowledge- on the sources of the disputes teeming the Balkan peninsula, the Fertile Crescent, the ancient Egypt and century-old Turkey. The opposition of some "heads" of department, to whom the ill-begotten law ot University Reform has entrusted excessive power, coupled by the force of the Hispanic inertia (if not Euro-centrist), can partly account for the production shortage I pointed out before. A shortage which does not overshadow the good intemational journalism of "La Vanguardia de Barcelona" and "EL Pais"; nor the lucid "Revista de Politica Exterior" of Madrid's INCIPE3. If we momentarily confine ourselves to the century-old Turkey which is presently at one of the ciritcal crossroads that this country has always been exposed to due to the internal complexity of its history and the determinant role that its geographical location subjects it to-we can easily notice, without straining much our attention, that Turkish literatre, essays and histography vvhich had some weight and tradition in the Spanish letters, have lately lost significance. From a Journey to Turkey (1557) to the adventures of Domingo Badia -commonly known by the pseudonym of Ali Bey- during the ruling of Clarles IV; from the pages that Blasco lbnez consecrated to the Turkish-Ottoman Empire early in this century to the highly scholarly works of Ambassador Emilio Garrigues first in 1962 (A diplomatic slip of the tongue) and afterwards in 1976 (Second Journey to Turkey), the Spanish tradition of cultivating Turkish matters seems to have paled. Not to mention the Catalan-Aragonese involvement in the development of events in the Mediterranean Levant, as it happened in 1623, when the chronicler and historian Francisco de Moncad gave to the print his famous "Expedition... against Greeks and Turks", or as it was the case with Francesc Cambo, who made public in his Visions d'Orient (1924) the onset of the Kemalist phenomenon in the convulsive political landscape of the period betvveen wars4. The efforts of a few young -and some already matured ones- Spanish scholars are making possible that this Turkish tradition which has survived in Spain somevvhat spontaneously, will remain alive-and make it visible-Spanish book-shops and catalogues5.
3. 4. 5. INCIPE stands for Institute of International Questions and Foreign Policy, vvhich publishes bulletins, papers and monograhies pertaining to the subject it is consecrated to. I refer the reader to the bibliography of Floristn IMIZCOZ, Lily LITVAK and other authors who I relate in pp. 119-124 of my study Spain and the Eastern Questions. I am referring to M.A. de BUNES, researcher of the C.S.I.C. (The image of the Muslims and of Northern Africa in XVI-XVII centuries Spain) and to S. VALLEJO FERNANDEZ-CELA, attached to the "Seminar of the Oral and Graphic Sources" of the UNED (Francsc Camb and the Turkish Republic: a Spanish vision of Kemalism). Also to Carmen URIARTE from the istanbul University (Spanish-Turkish Relations during the Spanish Civil War: 1936-39).

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More often than many people think, this is the way things come about and traditions survive. Without requiring any effort from power, by virtue of vvritten and oral tradition. The pages, that follow, written in a symbolic date for the Spaniards, seek to rekindle the memory of an episode of the cultural policy of Spain which and unfolded in the fifties and sixties of the XX century. I am referring specifically to the promotion of Professor Emilio Garca Gmez (1905-1995) to the rank of cultural supra-Ambassador (such was the ad hoc terminology that Mr. Femando Mara Castiella, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, put into circulation). Ambassador, precisely, in three countries of the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Iraq, in July 1958; Lebanon, in December 1960; and, fnally Turkey, in December 1962. it was, from my point of view, a considerable turningpoint that the political Regime of Spain instilled to the "Mediterranean" orientation of its foreign action. That is, to its attempt to balance the progressive Spanish integration into the international fora during the harshest decades of the so-called Cold War between 1949-1962, and at a time when the Arab and Islamic countries of the Mediterranean basin were in full nationalist swing -from the Maghreb to the Egypt of Nasser, from the Iran ot Dr. Moussadeg to the fledgling belligerent State of Israel. If on the one hand, the egregious professor, and author interrupted for some time his bibliographic "productivity" (to resume it in 1970, by the way), on the other hand -conversely- the general interests of Spain (and those of a cultural nature in particular) were crowned by the foundation of the Spanish-Arab Cultural Institute in 1954, and the proliferation of Cultural Centers of Spain in the emerging Arab World an the Turkish Rebuplic, throughout the two decades the recovery of the past which concerns us here takes roots. On top of this comes the policy of treaties and agreements that Madrid concluded with the bordering countries of Mslim ancestry. The role that Garca Gmez played at this international juncture has not been fully recognised as yet. The posthumous homages paid to him by the Madrid-based Egyptian Institute of Islamic Studies6 and the 7 AWRAQ magazine of the Institute of Cooperation with the Arab World , have stood out the many facets of the well-known Arabist. There are even a recent documentary contribution on the diplomatic duties -in partibus
6. 7. See "Homage Week to the master Mr. Emilio Garcia Gmez", in the Magazine of Egyptian Institute of Islamic Studies, Madrid, v.XXVIII (1996), Arab and Spanish edition. See (Homage to Professor Emilio Garca G6mez" in AWRAZ. Studies on the Arab world and contemporary islam, Madrid, v.XVII (1996), p. 97-158.

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infidelium- which were assigned to Mr. Emilio in the Iraq of the colonels (remember that by a change of destiny, Professor Emilio landed in Baghdad just when Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim had ousted the Hashemi dynasty bringing down on its wake the political cobweb that the senior leader Nuri Said Pasha had so carefully knitted)8. I myself jined later on the homage that the Cairo University paid to Garca Gomez in the opening day of the IV International Congress of Andalusi Civilisation, that took place just a few months ago9. Despite of this, the rescue of this versatile personality is far from being completed. For the time being, I will confine myself to outlining a few ideas -crisscrossed with certain relevant data on the Embassy that Garca Gomez headed in Turkey since late 1962 tl the turn of 1969-. We will go rescuing piecemeal the palimpsest that constitute today the traces of that episode. GARCIA GOMEZ, AMBASSADOR OF SPAIN N TURKEY. N THE EYE OF THU REPUBLICAN WHIRLWIND But, in the face of the situation of generalised "destabilisation" that Garca Gomez met when he undertook his duties as Ambassador of Iraq and Lebanon -with the ramification in Afghanistan in his capacity of non-resident Plenipotentiary Minister- what novelties did Mr. Emilio's landing in the Anatolian peninsula mean for him? in a letter dated 30 November 1962, the Head of the Spanish State addressed a message to the President of the Turkish Republic bearing the follovving heading: "Great and Good Friend: The live desire that moves Me to permanently cultivate and highten, by way of a faithful interpreter of My sentiments, the good relations of friendship that happily exists betvveen Our two Countries, has prompted Me to appoint as Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Spain to Your Excellency's Country, to Mr. Emilio Garca Gomez, Lord of the 10 Great Cross of the Isabel la Catlica Order, ete, ete" .
See R. VILLANUEVA ETCHEVERRIA. The first Embassy of Professor Garca Gomez (seleetion of his dispatehes and Letters to Minister Castiella from 1958 to 1960). Madrid, Spanish Agency for International Cooperation, 1997. 9. This Conference was organised by the Department of Spanish Language and Literatre of Cairo University betvveen 3-5 March 1998. The Minutes recording the papers submitted will be published shortly. 10. See "File of Emilio Garc'a Gmez (File of E.G.G.) in the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid (p. 536, file 359). 8.

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Hardly a month had gne by, the professor and author sent a report by airmail to the "General Directorate of Foreign Policy" in the Madrid Santa Cruz Palace, depicting in detail the presentation of his credential letters to the highest authority of the Turkish Republic, General Cemal Grsel". And thus formally began the diplomatic assignment of Garcia Gmez in Ankara. This time, hovvever, our character could make his own the piece of advise that Minister Castiella gave him when he first entered the foreign policy: "do always behave with confdence, as if you were a member of the Diplomatic Career"12; because the professor had already since 1962- some years of experience in the job. But, taking for granted the fact that Garca Gmez had managed to sidetrack the hazardous macropolitical and procedural situations he had been exposed to during his four years of diplomatic training in the game fields of Baghdad and Beirut, it is worthwile to remind here and now that Mr. Emilio was already well acquainted with the affairs of century-old Turkey at the time of his appointment and accreditation to the Republic which had been delivered during the hazardous years between the two world wars in a painful political childbirth (1923-24). Let grant the word to the Ambassador of Spain, who narrated, in an autobiography, how he had come to know Turkey: " as carly as 1928: as boursee student, as scientist panelist, as member of Spanish Official Missions, as special guest of the Turkish Government, as Ambassador on transit to other countries, as a mere tourist. Also for unforeseeable circumstances and with no connection whatsoever with our later diplomatic adventure, my wife learned good Turkish in Madrid and translated some Turkish works. I want to say that my contacts with Turkey have been ample and at the same the time brief to my liking. But I dare to say that these have hardly yielded any external intellectual fruit"13. in other words, in principle, the professor was not a newcomer -far from it- on Turkish issues. Another matter was, no doubt, that the experience of every day life in the Spanish embassy in the Ankara neighbourhood of ankaya -during the sixties- prompted him to ponder on a perma11. See "Presentation of Credential Letters to H.E. the President of the Republic of Turkey", 27 December 1962, in File of E.G.G., No. 10. 12. N R. VILLANUEVA ETCHEVERRIA, "Profile and diplomatic adventures of Ambassador Emilio Garcia G6mez", in "Homage to Professor Emilio Garcia Gmez" AWRAZ, vol.qu.No 7, p. 144. 13. "Foreword" of E.G.G. to Mr. Emilio GARRIGUES' book, Second Journey to Turkey, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1976, p. IV.

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nently enthralling issue: the insertion of Turkey in the modern vvorld; although contemplated now not in the identical terms Mr. Emilio had ab initio reflected on the signifcance of the historical breakaway that the 1923-24 Kemalist revolution introduced in the course of the Ottoman Empire. I do not resist the temptation to reproduce anew an already classic passage where Garca Gmez depicts the Turkish-national revolution of "the Father of the motherland", by repelling both the Anglo-Greek siege (1920-22) to Anatolia as well as by laying the foundations of the construction of the future Turkish Republic on the principle of secularisation of the national sovereignty, that we have been getting accustomed vvith ver the 75 years of its hazardous existence: "With Atatrk, Turkey made in a single stroke what Spain had done in two phases, with a time-span of almost a century mediating between them: the Independence War and the 98 movement. As a military officer, Atatrk liberated the motherland, almost turning it from vanquished to victor. As a cultural renevver he showed unprecedented and remarkable courage. Turkey, in his hands, ceased to be Asia to become part of Europe and was turned from the site of the Caliphate of islam into a secular republic; cosmopolitanism became Turkism with arguable Hittite roots; the language, swept by a tornado, lost one by one almost every Arab and Persian word, strengthening instead the language's Ural-Altaic roots; the elaborate attires came out of use while European costumes became fashionable (the Pashas swapped their seven-tails gowns for two-piece suits and their turbans for hats or caps); the Arab alphabet; the Aziyades of Loti- were the Aziyades of Loti indeed Aziyades, which seems they were not- got rid of their yeils and started dancing the foxtrot in dancing-halls and delivering speeches in Parliament; every Turkish citizen changed his surname; religious brotherhoods were banned; codes, calendars, measuring systems, law, habits and customs were changed. Everything. Not a single thing was left untouched. I sincerely believe that no nation has ever undergone a modification of such proportions, carried out by a member M of this same nation in the blink of an eye, ever since the vvorld exists" . The final remark to the previous commentary is, conversely, more arguable. The plight of the political and social life of Turkey in the nineties, vvith the upsurge of the fundamentalist movement led by Mehtin Erbakan's Welfare Party, and the uncertainty prevailing ver the precise course to steer a nation so geostrategically complex as Turkey, follovving the dismemberment of the neighbouring Soviet empire, and the onerous march of the Turkish Govemments in the path tovvards the insertion of the Republic in the list of offcial candidates for integration in the Euro14. in the "Forevvord" at supra, p. XV-XVI.

718

pean Union, constitute factors vvhich do not allow us to accept unconditionally -today- this last appraisal of the Ambassador: "And what surprises me the most is that ali this -but-for the final coat of the consciences, where no State reaches is already lasting half a century, thirty fve years after its founder's demie, who died prematurely in 1938. What is essential stili survives. The reforms, which had been adopted ever since by almost ali other Mslim countries vvhich opposed them more fiercely are irreversible. They have also been eventually accepted even by countries vvhich at a certain time rose against vvho, vvithout the genius of Atatrk, tried to impose them upon their people vvith the same haste"15. There exists a debate ver the Kemalist phenomenon in Turkish history, as it is vvell knovvn by professional Turkologists: was it an ex novo revolution, or the culmination of a reformist process vvith Ottoman roots such as the Tanzimat, the constiutionalism of Abdul Hamid II's kingdom and, finally, the movement of the "Young Turks" led by Enver Pasha in 1908?16. I vvill not make the blunder of dvvelling further on an issue so hard to crack and about vvhich I am acquainted just vvith its most naked parts. At any rate, the issue has been brought to the forefront for a detailed explanation by someone vvith a high command on this issue on vvhich I have been requested these pages of remembrance. it is yet to be studied by us, Spaniards, the acquis of dispatches, letters, notes, minutes that Garca Gomez discharge ver his seven-year stay in Turkey. The anuolated edition of this documentary volume vvill provide some joys -because of the articulation of the Ambassador- and surprises -ver the state of the Spanish- Turkish relations in the sixties17. That is, vvhen a more intense exchange betvveen the tvvo countries at both ends of the Mediterranean seemed to begin. it is hovvever neither too difficult nor a daring task to imagine the depiction that Mr. Emilio made of the bubbling political and social scene of that fledgling secular Republic vvhich had been ruled vvith an iron-first by
15. in "Forevvord" ut supra, p. XVII. 16. A rich bibliographic guide on the subject, in Abraham BOUDIRGIL, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk: a Centennial Bibliography, 1984. A recent study, which included the approaches of DUMONT and GEORGEON, DODD and ZURCHER, in Menter AHNLER, Origine, influence et actualite du kemalisme. Paris, Publisud, 1995. 17. As well as the databank in the "Political" Section of the Diplomatic Archive of the Santa Cruz Palace, the databank on Foreign Policy of the General Archive of the Administration in Alcal de Henares y the archive of the former Spanish-Arab Institute of Culture could be rich sources for the researcher.

719

its founder, betvveen 1923-38, as well as by his disciple, ismet Inonu, between 1938-1950. in a letter addressed to Minister Castiella, he wrote a lively description of the latter: "No sight is more interesting than inn. This man who is somewhat the living history of Turkey, because he is contemporary or even older than Atatrk, and who has been in everything a man can aspire to be in Turkey, both as a civilian as well as in the military life, is an extraordinary character. Nobody would believe that an eighty-year old man can encompass such amazing activity and such capacity of maneuvre, giving the stick and the carrot, combining so dextrerously the fox with the lion"18. Do bear in mind that ver the fifties Kemalism had shown unequivocal signs of anachronism. The bronze law inexorably turned out to be true nce again: the social and economic transformations that Turkey witnessed in the postwar, gave the victory to Adnan Menderes' Democratic Party at the general elections of May 1950. Indeed, Menderes and his party tried to put the agricultural and bureaucratic Turkey into the path of a society moving towards a mixed economy -State and private owned means of production-, with the peasantry moving to big cities; and plunge it into the international dynamic of the Cold War, with the integration of Turkey into NATO (1952) and the Baghdad Pact (1954). That is, in what the Pentagon called "the contention dike" against communism along the Soviet territory bordering with Turkey itself, Iran and Pakistan, ali of them gathered under the auspices of Great Britain formerly, and, later onsince 1959- under the umbrella of the United States of America19. When Garca Gmez landed in Turkey and throughout the seven years that he held the ambassadorship of Spain in Turkey, the People's Republic Party of the senile nn -later on replaced by Ecevit-had managed to wrench from the Menderes's hordes the hegemony ver the balloting boxes through not always transparent, much less fair, means. Revenge in the game of political interests, is as the hazardous tricks that History plays with peoples: purely whimsical. in conformity with this law (if it indeed is), Garca Gomez could moreover contemplate how since 1965 a political "wild boar" -as Ortega y Gasset would had put itcame out the winner at the poll. This personality would come down to
18. See VILLANUEVA, work quoted in No. 12. p. 145. 19. I refer the reader, for the complexity of Turkey's foreign relations to a comnilation by Dr. M. AYDIN and Dr. M. N. ALKAN, An Extensive Bibliography of Studies in English, German and French on Turkish Foreign Policy (1923-1997). Ankara, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Center for Strantegic Research. I owe this reference to the courtesy of Mr. Gazne Soysal, Minister Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Madrid.

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history as "Sultan Demirel", heading the Justice Party vvhich was called to win (in the 1965 election, for example, got 53.3% of the Parliamentary seats, while the Kemalist heirs -the Peoples' Republican Party- suffered an electoral reversal plummeting to 28.7% of the seats)20. If, on the one hand, the political plight of the ffties and sixties proved that the game of rotating in power was on the verge of consolidating in Turkey, the social "upheaval" that economic changes were igniting in the well organised trade-unionist vvorking class, in the Islamist resurgence whose numbers were called to grow in importance, in leftist circles (Workers' Party, that is, the communists, of the legendary Mehmet Ali Aybar), could not mislead Garca Gmez. Much less when che elite of the large Turkish army acted as incornptible guardian of the State. Apodictic, but realistic, Mr. Emilio wrote: "the survival or downfall of Turkey will rest on the country's ability to get out from the spell of Atatrk, no matter how, whether moving forvvards or backvvards. it will be a tragedy, but it seems to be fateful." Further dwelling on the ne of thought evolved not from knovvledge but from observation, he broached it by writing that "Modern Turkey is Atatrk and the huge work of Atatrk is a phenomenal drive for the Westernisation of the most elaborately Oriental country (not fully free of a sinister mask). As this enterprise -overcame- is somevvhat beyond the strength of a single man, it is no surprise that many ends were left loose, particularly two fundamental and to some extent interwoven things: the increase of the Turkish Standard of living and getting the Turkish citizen accustomed to democracy. This was the most difficult aspect and the hardest one for Atatrk to tackle, because he was an iron-first dictator, and the people he has reshaped tribal multitude with a strong military sense- got used to the dictatorship. The problem of Atatrk's successors, none of them of his stature, is similarly to many other nations- to seek this "make-believe democracy" which now seems to be a must in order to be accepted in the international fora. More specifically, to fnd a multiparty system where governments 21 rotate in power. And so far, they have failed" . This commentary could well server as a full stop to this outline. Other facets of the embassy of Mr. Emilio in Turkey will have to be revievved in due course, particularly the push he wanted to give to the teaching of Spanish language and culture in the istanbul and Ankara Universities and the teaching of Turkish language and culture in the Madrid Universities vvhich has failed to materialise so far.
20. Electoral data taken from C.H. DODD, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy. The Eothen Press, 1900, second edition, p. 223, appendix I. 21. Apud VILLANUEVA quoted in No. 12, p. 146-47.

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At the end of his stay in Ankara, in December 1960, when he had attained the honourific status of Dean of the Diplomatic Corp accredited in the century-old Turkey, some nevvspapers published articles reviewing his mission in terms of this ort: "Spain, before he came, was for us but a name. Garca Gmez has approached his world to ours". "He did not come to Turkey - a country with a democratic record- to make propaganda of Franco's Spain. He has been on this point wise and thoughtful". How pleasant and enlightening!", ete, ete, ete,22. Mr. Emilio sent to the Santa Cruz Palace his last encoded telegram dated December 23rd: it read: "Completed my mission with gratefulness towards H.E. the Head of the State and to Y.E. I leave today for Madrid acerediting the Secretary Mr. Repatraz as charge d'affairs as instructed" Signed: Garca Gmez23. Thus was how the protracted leave of absence from the academic profession of a seholar in diplomacy ended.

22. Le Journal d'Orient (istanbul), 20 November 1969. 23. InFileofE.G.G.,No. 10.

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THE NORTHERNMOST TRK COMMUNITY-A CASE OF EURO-ISLAM N FINLAND

Prof. Dr. Tapan HARVIA1NEN* At present, the Volga Trk Tatar community in Finland consists of approx. 950 Snni Muslims. During the last three decades other Muslims have also immigrated to Finland from the Arab countries, from Turkey, Iran, Somalia and, to a lesser degree, from south-eastern Asia and subSaharan Africa. in total, the number of Muslims in Finland is betvveen fifteen and twenty thousand. Among the population of Finland, i.e. 5 million, the Mslim minority constitutes 0.4 per cent of the total. 86% of Finns are members of the Lutheran Church, one per cent members of the Orthodox Church. Jews have lived in the country from the middle of the 19th century onvvards; at present they number approx. 1100; and some 10% of Finns remain without religious affliation. These fgures indicate that the population of Finland is stili very homogenous in comparison with the majority of European countries. The Tatar community represents the earliest settlement of Muslims in Finland whither their forefathers came from the guberniyas of Nizhniy Novgorod and Simbirsk, east of Moscow, in the period 1880-1930. This implies that in three or four generations they have adapted to Finnish society in numerous respects, and, as a consequence, their position in the country and their attitudes to daily life in Finland differ remarkably from the approach of their co-religionists who have more recently settled in the country. Two factors have brought Tatars to Finland. in 1809 Finland was separated from Sweden and became a Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire. Troops of the Russian army were stationed in Finland and these included Tatars and other Muslims who served in several garrison towns in the country. in 1858 a Russian military regulation was issued concerning soldiers discharged from the Russian army. According to this ukase, a soldier in possession of a letter of retirement, passport or a travel document had the right to settle down and support himself in Finland. The
* University of Helsinki.

723

same right applied to his family, to his children until their marriage and also to his widow. it is important to note that the regulation did not make any distinction on the basis of the religion of the ex-soldiers. The great majority of the Jewish community in Finland -1100 at present, as mentioned earlier- are descendants of the soldiers discharged from the Russian army. in contrast, very few Mslim ex-soldiers settled in Finland during the Russian period. The stability of family connections between the Mslim soldiers and their home villages may be one explanation for this difference. in fact, the great majority of Tatars came to Finland as pedlars from the Tatar villages of the region between the Volga and Ural from the 1860s on, the first of them via St. Petersburg. Several family traditions of the "discovery" of Finland by Tatars have been preserved. it is told that two young Tatar soap sellers were sailing from St. Petersburg to the fortress island of Kronstadt in the Finnish Gulf; however, they were asleep when the ship continued the voyage from Kronstadt to Finland. in Finland the men were able to engage successfully in business and so they stayed in the country. Another story maintains that in 1868 "the King" (i.e. Queen Victoria)! of the United Kingdom was to visit St. Petersburg, and, in order to "clean" the city, the pedlars were expelled; because of this purge a Tatar small retailer had to travel 100 kilometres to Finland to the city of Viipuri (Vyborg)-which he discovered to be a proper place for his future life. No matter in what way the first Tatars in fact came to Finland, the settlers were soon in correspondence with their relatives left behind in their native villages. The message "come here, here you have an opportunity" was effective. As a result numerous family members and neighbours were attracted to visit Finland as pedlars of textiles and other minr articles in vvinter, when they had spare time from the duties of the agrarian life. Gradually an increasing number of visitors stayed in Finland and then invited their families and fiances to follow them. in this context it is worth mentioning that a railway was opened betvveen St. Petersburg and Helsinki in 1870, and inside Finland numerous cities were connected by other railways at the same time. The great majority of the ancestors of the Tatar community of Finland arrived from a rather limited region in the province of Nizhniy Novgorod, where they had been living south of Sergach, the terminus of the railvvay. The village of Aktuk/Yangapar (Aktukovo) and the district centre of Uraz (Urazovka) with many villages in that area are most frequently referred to as the birthplaces of the immigrants. Linguistically these Tatars represent the so-called Mishr dialect, the westernmost Tatar dialect.

724

Immigration continued until the end of the 1920s, when Finland had been an independent country for more than ten years. At that time they numbered approximately six hundred. in Finland the region of the capital city of Helsinki inclusive of the town of Jrvenp, the industrial city of Tampere 150 kilometres north of Helsinki as well as Viipuri (Vyborg) and Terijoki in the south-eastern part of the country were their principal places of settlement. The first imam (mullah) was appointed by the Russian army in Helsinki in 1836; during the Russian regime the military imams were religious leaders of the Tatar civilians too. Originally the prayer house was located in the residence of the imam. in 1871 a Mslim graveyard donated by the Finnish authorities was officially opened in Helsinsi. Finland gained political independence in 1917. A law ensuring general freedom of religion was promulgated in 1922, and three years later, on April 25, 1925, the Islamic Congregation in Finland was established. For fifty years Finland was the only Western country officially to acknowledge the rights of a Mslim community; in 1974 Belgium was the frst to follow the Finnish example. in 1958-1961 the slam House was built by the Congregation in Helsinki (Fredrikinkatu 33). This centre of the Tatars in Finland houses a mosque, an assembly hail, a kitchen, kindergarten, library, secretariate and several offce rooms. I mentioned the city of Tampere as one of the centres of the Tatar community-150 km north of Helsinki. The follovving description of this community -the northernmost Trk one in the \vorld- is based on a number of articles dealing with the Tatars in Finland written by Mr. Harry Halen and Mr. Antero Leitzinger (see the bibliography) as well as on an interview given to me at the beginning of this year by two leading persons in the Tatar congregation in Tampere, viz. Mr. esad Baibulat and Mr. krm Neuman. Mr. Baibulat has been the Chairman of the Islamic Congregation in Tampere for the last 15 years; before his retirement he was the fnancial manager of a well-known clothing factory in Tampere. Mr. Neuman, a member of the congregation board, served as the sales manager of the leading shoe factory in the same city. Both of them were born in Tampere, in 1925 and 1926, resp. I am very grateful to these gentlemen for their hospitality and the very pleasant hours of conversation with them. From the middle of the last century on, Tampere was a rapidly growing city where the textile industry played an important role; a Russian garrison too was located in city. The first Tatars seem to have settled in Tampere in the 1880s. As in Finland in general, the forefathers of the Tatars of Tampere came from the Aktuk, Uraz and other villages of the Sergach region in the province of Nizhniy Novgorod; some of them had been living earlier in other cities in Finland, while others came directly from Russia.

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Although Tampere was a Tatar centre in Finland, this does not imply that their number has ever been high. in 1910 59 Tatars lived in the city, in 1920 only 31; however, in 1930 their number had increased to 110. The economic state of the Tampere Tatars was on the constant rise in the 1920s and '30s; e.g. they ovvned seven or eight draper's shops in the city. in particular, a number of families originating from Aktuk enjoyed a reputation for great wealth. Beside the trade in textiles and clothes, that in furs was placed third-in this context it is worth noting that stili in 1940 98% of the Tatars in Finland were engaged in commerce. An independent Islamic congregation was established in Tampere in 1943. Financially Mr. Ymr ali, a vvealthy Tatar merchant, rendered the decision possible. in 1948 he donated a building in the city centre to the congregation. At present a small mosque and a community centre are located in the topnost floor of a block in the main street of Tampere (Hmeenkatu 29 A). The congregation consists of a little less than one hundred members; in addition a score and a half of the members of the Helsinki congregation are living in Tampere or its neighbourhood; these often participate in the activities of the Tampere congregation. Since the outset of the Tatar settlement in Tampere, their youth were educated in Finnish in the normal, compulsory school system of the city. Linguistic assimilation had taken place very rapidly-my intervievvees did not remember having had any difficulties at school in this respect. Also in other respects they had no special examples of discrimination to teli as regards school or other aspects of life; in a few cases of employment, prejudices may have been of some importance. Although this sounds even too good to be completely true, it seems to be a fact that only seldom were negative attitudes directed against the Tatars in Finland. in the 1920s-30s Tampere had a population of 40-50.000 Thus it was self-evident that the young knew each other, they went to the same schools, had hobbies in common -several Tatars were well-known icehockey players- and, if not earlier, the boys of Tampere met during military service. These everyday contacts eroded prejudices. One of the supporting factors of adaptation was the outvvard appearance of the Tatars vvhich only in a few cases deviates from that of the rest of the population of Finland. As Mr. Neuman put it: "We carry features of this province of Hme. Another Finn may discern that we come from the city of Tampere but nobody that we might be a kind of foreigners". Without radical difficulties the members of the Tatar community have been able to adapt to Finnish society. Their professional status has also changed: instead of being businessmen as in the '40s, at present Tatars may be met as bank managers, physicians, lawyers, tax officials, photographers, football players ete. in these cases solely their Trk names may arouse the attention of "the ordinary Finn". 726

Nevertheless, the Tatars have not become just "Finns with Trk names". in my opinion, the term 'dual identity' suits their case well. Earlier on I mentioned their complete adaptation to the Finnish educational system. At the same time their own religious, linguistic and cultural education has not lost its value. in Helsinki the curriculum of the Finnish-Turk Primary School included instruction in the Tatar language, the general history of the Trk peoples, the religion of islam and the recitation of the Koran in Arabic. This, in the West, very exceptional school was established in 1948; in 1969, however, it unfortunately closed its doors. in Tampere there has been no Tatar school. However, an imam was invited from the region of Kazan as early as in 1912. This Mr. Alautdin (Alaeddin, Alei Abbas) was follovved by several successors. Beside leading the prayers, one of their principal duties consisted in the instruction of the youth. in this respect Mr. Gibadulla (Gubaidulla) Murtazin (18951968) is remembered by the members of the congregation who studied with him in the 1920s and '30s as "a complete, most modern teacher, not like one of the old mullahs who themselves did not know much". The instruction took place every second evening between 6 and 8 p.m. after the ordinary school day. The Koran, the mother tongue, i.e. the Tatar language, the calligraphy of the Arabic script, the history of the Trk peoples, the religion of islam, songs, music and theatre plays were subjects offered by the evening school. Later similar instruction has been offered on various summer courses which are intended for Tatar youth from ali parts of Finland. Despite fluency in Finnish, at home the Tatar language has retained its position as the natural native language; modern cultural loans from Finnish differentiate the Tatar spoken in Finland from that of Russia, where as a rule parallel expressions have been borrowed from Russian. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between the Tatars in their old and new countries have experienced a renaissance on both the cultural and religious level. Connections with Turkey and the Turkish language have given rise to numerous debates. On the one hand, the rebirth of Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk offered an ideal for ali of the Trk peoples-Turkey was the only independent Trk country. "it (i.e. Turkey) had been able to hold its own and thus it was for us the only direction to turn in", in numerous Tatar homes a photo of Atatrk and the Turkish flag can be seen even today. The linguistic affinity has been well known. On the other hand, however, these connections gave rise to difficulties. The Tatar language is written in the Arabic and Latin characters in Finland. in Tatar, however,

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there is one vovvel phoneme more than in Turkish (/e/ vs. /ad). Due to this fact the Latinized Turkish spelling is not directly suitable for Tatar, for these reasons a number of Tatars in Finland wanted to replace their language with Turkish; they imported text books from Turkey and were inclined to join the political Pan-Turkish movement. This discrepancy was also reflected in the names of the community. 'Turks of Finland' is the designation supported by the last-mentioned group. 'Turkish-Tatars' was quite usual a couple of decades ago; at present the designation 'Tatars' is in fashion again-although it stili demands additional explanations for people less familiar with these matters. An additional name to be mentioned is the 'Volga Turks'. This controversy led to diffculties in the school system too. in Tampere religious activities consist of regular Friday prayers, celebration of religious feasts, especially Ramazan and Korban, feasts of name-giving, weddings and funerals. The High Holidays convene 70-80 people, i.e. in practice the whole congregation. Mr. Baibulat, as suceessor to his father, leads these services; they are conducted in Arabic with various traditional modes of recitation. The imam of Helsinki, Mr. Ahmet Atasever -from Turkey- usually conducts the family feasts. During the Second World War, 156 men of the Tatar community served in the Finnish army in the war against the Soviet Union-where ali of them had relatives. Irrespective of this fact participation in battle did not arouse special questions. Probably Mr. Baibulat expresses the general opinion of his community when he states: "Religion was important for us, and on the other side (i.e. the Soviet Union), there was no religion. A Mslim must act in favour of his religion, and there was no religion on the other side. And our people had been subdued sufficiently ver there; for us there was no difficulty to go to the war". Then Tatars were killed in action, three of them were officers. The Association of War Veterans of the islam Congregation in Finland is an active organization even today. Novvadays in daily life, islam is not considered to be a problem. I quote Mr. Baibulat and Mr. Neuman: "We are pleased that we can observe the religion of islam, and nevertheless, we live in a rather modern way"; "a completely normal life". "When in a country, do quite a lot as the countrymen do". Among the dietary rules, the prohibition of pork is strictly observed. The circumcision of boys has been retained as the normal custpm. "A low profile", i.e. an attempt to take are of internal matters without arousing too much attention among the Finnish majority has been a part and parcel of the Tatar way of life, and this independence is true concerning the finances of the congregations, too. The publishing activity of the small community is worthy of respect. in seventy years (since 1925) two hundred items have appeared in Finland in Tatar-printed partly in the Arabic and partly in the Latin characters, some of them in both. Members of the Tampere congregation have

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made their contribution also in this feld, although the majority of vvriters and translators lived and continue to live in Helsinki. As for the material culture, a number of traditional dishes have defended their position on the tables of Tatar homes. in 1990 a Tatar cookery book called Milli alarbz was published by Mrs. Derya Samaledtin in Helsinki in the Tatar language, of course. I hope that this short description has been suffcient to convince you that the dual identity of the Tatars in Finland is not a legend. At the same time, I believe, it has indicated that, besides being religious congregations, the Islamic Congregation in Finland and its sister in Tampere have esteemed and supported national causes. in recent years this national aspect with a low external profile has surfaced in a new way. As well-rooted citizens of Finland the Tatar Islamic congregations have faced altered circumstances, when Muslims from other countries and with a totally different cultural background have immigrated to Finland. in principle other Muslims are vvelcome to pray in the mosques of Tatars; in practice, hovvever, the immigrants have acquired prayer-houses of their own where they arrange their meetings and can spend time according to their national customs. As for the future of the Tatar community in Tampere, the moving of youth to the region of the capital city seems to constitute the most serious danger: the number of young couples and children is in striking decline. it is normal that Tatar women too have a job outside the home and thus they are not able to teach their children as was the custom earlier; grandparents do not live together with their grandchildren either, and the summer courses are insufficient to transmit the Tatar language and other traditions to the children. At present, approximately every second marriage is a so-called "mixed marriage". The children of these couples can be members of the Islamic congregations-a Tatar woman is legally entitled to make a decision regarding the name and religion of her child. However, the transmission of the Tatar language to a child demands exceptional resolution on the part of the Tatar parent in a "mixed marriage". Despite a number of modern challenges, the Finnish Tatar community, the northernmost Islamic Trk congregation in the world, can be characterized as a successful case of dual identity. it is to be hoped that they will be able to retain this identity in the future.

***
Finally, I should like to draw the attention to the traditional Trk pronunciation and recitation habits of Arabic which have been transmit-

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ted orally in the reading of the Koran and prayers ver a millennium. The phonology of the Trk languages has had an effect on these pronunciations, and from the viewpoint of Arabic these reading traditions appear corrupt. At the moment, the "genuine" Arabic pronunciation can be heard everyvvhere on recordings, cassettes, TV ete, and it enjoys the status of prestige. As a consequence, it is moving the "old-fashioned" Trk traditions into oblivion. As long as there are reliable experts in the traditional recitations, we should record these invaluable testimonies of a long chain of teachers and pupils, publish the most interesting features, study their contacts with the vernaculars and with each other, and in this way save this Trk cultural heritage for future generations.
BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY Aro, Jussi-Halen, Harry: "The Turkic peoples in Finland". in: Margaret Bainbridge (ed.), The Turkic Peoples of the World. London-New York 1993, pp. 119-124. Halen, Harry: "Islaminuskoisista Suomessa" [On the Muslims in Finland]. Teologinen Aikakauskirja 5/84. Helsinki 1984, pp. 341-353. idem: "A bibliographical survey of the publishing activities of the Turkic minority in Finland". Studia Orientalia 51: 11. Helsinki 1979. 26 pp. idem: "Lahjan hedelmat" Katsaus Suomen volganturkkilaisen siirtokunnan julkaisuihin ["The fruits of a gift". A revievv of the publications of the Volga-Turk community in Finland]. Unholan aitta 6. Helsinki 1996. idem: Viaporin/Helsingin ja Viipurin linnoituksen imaamien tataarinkieliset metrikkakirjat 1851-1914 [The metrika books composed in the Tatar language by the Imams of the Fortresses of Viapori/Helsinki and Vyborg in 1851-1914]. 2. lisilty painos. Unholan aitta 7. Helsinki 1997. Leitzinger, Antero: Mishrit-Suomen vanha islamilainen yhteis [Mishars-the old Mslim community in Finland]. Helsinki 1996. Suomen Islam-seurakunta. Sotaveteraanit [islam Congregation in Finland. The War Veterans]. Helsinki 1992.

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ATATRK SEEN FROM BANGLADESH

Arshad-uz ZAMAN* I extend my deepest gratitude for the kind invitation to participate in this Conference to commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic. I bring fraternal greetings and good wishes from Bangladesh and wish the Conference a resounding success. I am pleased to inform this distinguished audience that in Bangladesh we started the celebrations quite early. in fact on 27 April 1998 a Seminar was held at the Nazrul Institute in Dhaka under the title "Kemalism, Instrument of Cultural Link betvveen Turkey and Bangladesh". it was on the insistence of the then Turkish Ambassador in Dhaka H.E.K. zcan Davaz, that the venue of Nazrul Institute was selected. He rightly argued that Bangladesh National Poet Kaz Nazrul islam, was the unperishable spiritual bond between Turkey and Bangladesh and therefore Nazrul Institute would be the appropriate venue. Prof. Dr. Trkkaya Atav, a distinguished professor of the Political Science Faculty of the Ankara University, was a guest speaker on the occasion of celebration of the 75th Anniversary in Dhaka. it was very right and proper that he should be the eminent guest speaker at the Nazrul Institute. Back in 1953 when he was young and I was nearly his age, I was Press Attache of the Pakistan Embassy in istanbul. From our office at the Halaskar Gazi Caddesi (opposite a tiny museum of Atatrk) we used to biring out a fortnightly magazine called Pakistan Postas. Trkkaya Ataov, who was Editr of the magazine published the translation of poet Nazrul islam's poem Kamal Pasha. it is necessary that I dwell on this poem. it was written in 1921, when, I believe, nobody had heard of Mustafa Kemal and surely nobody had dedicated a poem to him. The poem is in the form of a drama and has been sung and played by children of Bengal since time immemorial. in this poem poet Nazrul islam sings the praise of the heroic battle of Inde* Retired Ambassador, Bangladesh.

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pendence of the Turks under the incomparable leadership of Mustafa Kemal. He sings "Kamal tne Kamal Kiya Bhai" (o! brother Kamal, what vvonder you have worked). in the introduction of the poem he writes "An autumn evening. The sky is blood-smeared like the feld of Karbala. The Greek Army has been completely defeated in the fierce battle fought that day. The Commander-in-Chief of Turkish National Armed Forces is triumphantly returning to his camp from war field. He is surrounded by his victorious army Their eyes are full of tears for the victory they have achieved". in this dramatic poem Nazrul islam celebrates Mustafa Kemal's victory in these stirring words "brother Kemal, desperate son of a frenzied mother has gne furious, so the devils are full of hue and cry looking for elf protection everyvvhere Kemal, what a wonder you have vrorked". Our National Poet continues in this vein "well done brother, well done the covvard foes are completely done well done brother, well done teli me now, who is there on earth not afraid of Turkish sword? "Nazrul describes the heoic Turkish soldiers in these vvords" why you look with rapt attention comrades! Ho, Ho, Ho! That's right brother! The evening looks like soldier's bride, a doe! A martyr's bride clad in crimson attire Besmeared with fresh blood of her husband dear!- The dress of sky at our sight Coloured brilliantly with the blood of fght! So beatiful, so great Beat loud and deep the trumpet Whatever it may be, brother, a Karbala Maidan. We sing of truth, its anthem. Hurrah Ho. Hurrah. True fghters have sacrificed their lives, and the fake And the covvard have shown their back. True fghters are indeed, martyrs! Haven't you seen a hero's blood? it's warm and red. You dead-in-life go to hell! And they say, they shall become king. Go to hell conceding the beating. Given by Kamal, a martial King. Nazrul is ecstasic while describing how Mustafa Kemal has snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. He sings; Living means is to live free, nothing more! Ali we want is this much, nothing more! We have done it, brother, done it. The enemies have fled away on their feet. And the fort is freed. Hurrah Ho! Hurrah Ho! We no more want a paradise even now the land is free. Heaven we don't want, we're free." If National Poet Nazrul islam is the eteraal spiritual link between Turkey and Bangladesh, Nazrul was a versatile genius and he passed through the skies of Bengal like a meteor. His most famous poem is entitled "Rebel". He sings the song of rebellion, rebellion against injustice, rebellion against the fact that he belongs to a nation in chains. Nazrul repeatedly revolted against the fact that India was a British colony and he raised his powerful voice for freedom and often landed in British jail. Here we find the same chord of unity that binds Mustafa Kemal's War of Independence and the War of Independence of India. What fred the imagination of the Indians in general and particularly Muslims of Bengal was the gallant fght of Mustafa Kemal against enemy

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attempts to dismember Turkey. The Muslims of Bengal watched with trepidation the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the last bastion of islam and the occupation of Turkey by Christian povvers. it is, therefore, with deep admiration that Muslims of India followed the heroic war of Independence waged under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire a new Turkey was being born. 1923-1938, a brief span of 15 years. Yet within this period Mustafa Kemal Atatrk transformed the Turkish society. His reforms, better to describe it a social revolution are so ali pervading that they have touched nearly ali aspects of the Turkish society. Take education for instance. One of the sweeping changes was the change of alphabet from Arabic to Turkish. Romanized alphabets were introduced and have been totally accepted by the entire population. Indeed there is no sign of any dissent anywhere. Along with spread of universal education, Atatrk took particular are about women's education. in the march for progress. Turkish women had been left far behind. The educational reforms of Atatrk had a deep impact on the education system of Bengal. The Bengali journal Shaugat in a survey published in 1929 analysed the effects of the introduction of the Latin alphabet. The journal described the unbaunded enthusiasm of the population, who came forward, to master the new alphabet. One of the direct results of the introduction of education reforms was the mushrooming of schools bearing the name Atatrk. One such school bearing the name Atatrk is functioning to this day in a lost corner of the Noakhali district of Bangladesh. Atatrk's reforms, which broke the schackles on women, had an electrifying effect on the enlightened Mslim women of Bengal. They took up in right earnest the achievement of their o r a goals of equal education facilities with the menfolk. The name of such a person that comes readily to mind is Rokeyya Begm, who champiuoned the cause of Mslim Bengali women in the last part of the 19th century and the frst quarter of the 20th century. She was undoubtely inspired by the famous Turkish lady Halide Edip Advar. in the early thirties Halide Edip toured throughout India and delivered speeches bringing to the attention of her audience the struggle of Turkish women to gain equal rights with their men. I remember Halide Edip Hanm well. She used to live in the istanbul university area in a tiny flat. She smoke incessantly Bafra cigarattes. She spoke English with a perfect British accent. She was a very strong vvilled person. I am pleased to salute her memory on this occasion. Of ali the majr reforms that Mustafa Kemal Atatrk introduced, the one with which his name has become permanently linked in Secularism. Very simply put it is separation of religion from state affairs. it is confining the role of the religious preachers within religious institutions and not allow them to meddle with state affairs. in the process the very far reaching decision of abolishing the Caliphate was taken. The Sultan seating in istanbul performed the temporal functions of the Head of State and the

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Spiritual function of the protector of the Fatih of islam. More concretely the Sultan was the protector of two Harams-namely Makkah al Mukarramah and Madina al Munavvara. Introduction of Secularism did away with the Spiritual powers flowing out of istanbul. Secularism did not dawn suddenly in Turkey. There is a whole history of interaction with the west as the Ottoman Empire lived side by side with European Empires. Ideas flowed freely. The French Revolution leading to the separation of the Church and the State had a deep impact on the Ottoman Empire. in the early tvventieth century the Young Turks started agaitating for a more pen society. Introduction of secularism was a logical continuation of what had preceded in Turkey. it is interesting that since its introduction the Turks have never looked back. it is undoubted that secularism has transformed Turkish society like no other single event has. it has in a real sense created a chasm in the way of thinking of the Turks and their immediate Arab neighbours. Insisting on the argument that islam is a complete code of life, Arabs have rejected secularism- that is separation of religion from state affairs. in the political arena of Turkey there are signs that the political parties are coming to terms with secularism. Indeed there is no more pen opposition to secularism as was evident until recently. in Bengal although the dominat majority is Mslim, a secular thread has run ali along history. The writings of authors reveal a secularizing trend, in 1926 Kazi Abdul Wadud, a great exponent of free thought and an eminent Bengali Mslim scholar read out an article in a gathering of intellectuals. The article entitled "A few words on Mustafa Kemal" gave pen support to Mustafa Kemal's religious reforms. While congratulating Mustafa Kemal for his liberal outlook, the author expressed that his compatriots would be able to appreciate the reasons behind Atatrk's onslaught against blind fanaticism and traditional superstitions and accept his reforms vvithout any hesitation. An eminent journalist and author Muhammad Nsiruddin, who died recently after completing a hundred years wrote an article on the 14th anniversary of the Turkish Republic. The article entitled "Adhunik Turashka" (Modern Turkey) appeared in 1937, that is a year before the death of Atatrk. He wrote "Turkey has accepted the different aspects of European civilization vvithout surrendering her own cultural identity. Critics who have failed to grasp the true spirit of the new reforms, have expressed the view that the newly-awakened Turkish nation are not follovving strictly the tenets of the religion of islam. This misleading conclusion has been reached through the errors of judgment. it must be emphasised, that is true, that Turkey has eliminated the baneful influence of the bigoted and reactionary mullahs, but it has certainly not renounced the immortal message of islam". 734

The creator of Bangladesh Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Father of the Nation, was largely inspired by Atatrk's secular politics. in his struggle to win equal rights for Bangaless within Pakistan, he carried on a secular campaign. He championed the equal rights of ali citizens irrespective of caste, creed or religion. After the birth of Bangladesh as a sovereign, independent country on 16 December 1971, the Constitution of Bangladesh was adopted in 1972. it had four pillars. The most important state pillar was secularism. it is a matter of deep regret that following the assasination of the Father of the Nation along with his entire family and close political colleagues on 15 August 1975, the military regime did away with secularism from the Constitution. This has left a deep void vvithin the state structure of Bangladesh. I was fortunate to have known and worked for the Government of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Again and again he expressed his unbounded admiration of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk and expressed a desire to moidel the society of Bangladesh after Atatrk. At the end of a long struggle for independence, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman emeged as the sole, undisputed leader of the Bangalees, some prominet Turks paid visits to Bangladesh. They were Ambassador Vahap Asirolu, then Secretary General of the RCD. Also alayangil, the Foreign Minister visited Dhaka and both were received very warmly by Sheikh Mujib. One of the happiest moments of Sheikh Mujib's life was when the Turkish Government announced in 1974 its recognition of the independence of Bangladesh. The influence of the movement of Mustafa Kemal was intelsely felt in Bengal. The nobel laureate of Bengali literatre, the great universal poet Rabindra Nath Tagore, was deeply influenced by the liberal and secular ideas of Mustafa Kemal. Tagore, an ardent nationalist, was a great admirer of Mustafa Kemal and wrote in the journal "The Modern Review. "in October 1932", Just when Turkey was about to collapse there appeared Mustafa Kemal Pasha. it was a fateful moment. Under the guidance of a masterful personality it now became possible to establish securely, on a normal basis and in an efficient modern manner the compact and reduced empire vvithin narrower boundaries." The death of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk on 10 November 1938 stunned the world and in India and particularly the Muslims of Bengal it was felt with profound sentiments of loss of a very near and dear one, one who had galvanized his nation in the field of battle and later covered it with glory through his svveeping reforms of the entire Turkish society. That name had become a household name throughout India and the name was Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, in battle he had fought successfully the combined might of the western powers and throvvn them out of the Turkish soil. it was a successful war of Liberation, it was going to set an example throughout the world and most particularly in India. There were already

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stirrings for freedom throughout India and Atatrk's victories would fire the imagination of Indians. The death of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk was mourned by the Bengali daily Azad with banner headline: "The World's greatest statesman and maker of modern Turkey Gazi Kemal Atatrk passes away". Kamal day was observed on 18th November in Calcutta and different parts of Bengal. The Mourning day was observed by holding condolence meetings and offering Fateha in mosques. The greatest tribute was paid by world poet Rabindra Nath Tagore, who was deeply saddened by his death. in a condolence meeting at his own university Shantiniketon he stated "Turkey was nce called the sick man of Europe until Kemal came and set before us an example of new Asia vvhere living present recalled the glories of a dead past... Kamal Pasha's heroism was not on the battlefeld only, he vvaged a relentless war against the tyranny of bilind superstition which perhaps is the deadliest enemy a people have to contend against. To his own people he was a great deliverer, to us he should remain a great example". Mujibur Rahman Khan, a noted journalist in his article "Kamalbad" (the principles of Kemalism) gave a detailed survey of the far reaching impact of the ideas and reforms of Atatrk. He voiced the sentiments of his countrymen thus: "Today's India divided and plagued by ignorance, prejudice and fanaticism, eagerly awaits the advent of an epoch making leader like Kemal to lead her". Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's attachment to the person of Atatrk can be gauged from the fact that he named his son Kemal. Alas! he too was gunned down on the fateful night of 15 August 1975. As I stand before this distinguished audience I cannot help reflecting that the last 45 years of my life have passed in intimate contact with this great country and its very great people. Let me begin with the beginning. I arrived here in 1953 and on the night of my arrival in istanbul on 26 January, the city was rocked by earthquake. Again in 1953 the mortal remains of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk were transferred with a moving ceremony to its final resting place in ankaya, in the capital, which he created single handed. I have met numerous historical personalities of Turkey. When I started my career as Press Attache of Pakistan Embassy in istanbul in 1953 I met Blent Ecevit, currently Deputy Prime Minister. He used to work for Ulus in Ankara. We have talked often about Tagore and the traditional culture of the Indian subcontinint. After my departure from Turkey in 1958 I sent him a letter in which I expressed my belief that one day I would see him in high places. in 1974 when he bacame Prime Minister I was Bangladesh Ambassador in Algiers. I sent him a message of congratulations to which he responded. I was a regular visitor to Rauf Orbay, who lived in a modest apartment on Atatrk Boulevard in istanbul. He

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was the Prime Minister of Atatrk and served as Turkish Ambassador in London during the Second World War. His exploits as a naval commander with his ship Hamidiye, are in the history books. I used to listen with rapt attention of his memories of the War of Independence and after. There were points of disagreement between him and Atatrk. nce I asked him if I could keep notes. He immediately broke the conversation and said "our nation has united around Atatrk and nothing must be done to upset it". Yahya Kemal lived in the only good hotel of istanbul- Park hotel. (The hotel has been pulled down and due to a dispute with the municipality a half finished ugly structure stands in its place in the heart of the town- Taksim Square). Shortly after my arrival in istanbul Pakistan's Governor General Ghulam Mohammad came on an offcial visit. There was a dinner at the Park Hotel. Ghulam Mohammad, who had difficulty in speaking due to a stroke managed a few jokes on poet Yahya Kemal's Rak. Political relations blossomed between Turkey and Pakistan during my stay here. Numerous visits were exchanged at the highest level. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali, President Iskander Mirza, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, to name only a few came on official visit. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, President Celal Bayar were the highest level visitors to go to Pakistan. Outside of a military pact in 1954 Turkey and Pakistan became members of Baghdad pact, CENTO and later RCD. At the time of the signing of the RCD in 1964,1 was Public Relations Officer of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan, I accompanied President Ayub during his visit to Ankara and sat as interpreter during negotiations with Prime Minister ismet Inonu. ismet Pasha was a historical personality and fought the war of Independence by the side of Atatrk and served as his loyal Prime Minister. Following Atatrk's death he became the President and brought democracy to Turkey by accepting his party's defeat in the elections of 1950. He always more a hearing aid. He was the most meticulous leader I have seen. He understood English but was not fluent. He dictated to his interpreter slowly in Turkish and was alert enough to correct any mistake of the interpreter. I had the high privilege to be present at the ornate Throne Room of the Dolmabahce Palace, where the Treaty of RCD was signed by ismet Pasha, President Ayub Khan and the Shah of Iran. in the spring of 1975 I received a telephone cali from Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, who had left the post of President of Bangladesh and had taken up the post of Permanent Representative at the UN in Geneva. I had friendship with him going back to mey days in New York in the early sixties, a friendship which had much deepened during my days as Chief of Protocol in Dhaka in the early years of our Independence. When he

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was President of Bangladesh Justice Chowdhury had been invited to visit Turkey and the invitation was now renevved. Justice Chowdhury took me as a member of his Delegation and was entertained by the Foreign Minister alayangil. We were received by Prime Minister Sleyman Demirel and had an interesting conversation with him. in 1992 follovving the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Turkic Republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus I accompanied the first Bangladesh Delegation to the newly Independent states. it was a fascinating experience to watch those new Republics waking up from a long period of slumber. Turkey, quite naturally, is daily forging new relations with her kith and kin. in 1992 UNESCO declared Yunus Emre love year. Emre was a poet of the Middle Ages little knovvn outside Turkey. Unlike his comtemporaries like Mevlana Jalaluddin Rumi, who vvrote in Persianm, Emre wrote in pre Anatolian Turkish. I translated into Bangla the book of poems of poet Yunus Emre and the book was published by the Bangla Academy. I thus became the first ever translator of any Turkish literary work into Bangla. in March 1997 President Sleyman Demirel came on an official visit to Bangladesh. On the lavvns of the Turkish Ambassador's Residence, he delivered a speech, where he eulogised my lifetime work in bringing the Bangalee nation and the Turkish nation closer together. He presented me an autographed photograph with the follovving inscription "To Mr. Arshad-uz Zaman in appreciation for his valuable contributions in the promotion of Turkish-Bangladesh relations" 25.3.1997. S. Demirel The most outstanding aspect of the Turkish Revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, is its durability. Mustafa Kemal burst on the political stage of the world in the first quarter of the tvventieth century. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire ran parallel vvith the fail of the Czars next door in Russia. The Marxist-Leninist Revolution has been one of the majr events of our times. This ambitious revolution had as its goal no less than creation of a new MAN. it spread like wild fire throughout the world. The battle cry vvas "proletariat of the vvorld nite. You have nothing to lose but your chains". The Communist party vvorld wide became the vehicle on vvhich rode the Russian revolution. After 70 years the Marxist-Leninist Revolution has come full circle and has been denounced in its birth place-Russia. Lenin has just about managed to survive but his revolution lie in tatters. Other contemporaries of Atatrk like Hitler and Mussolini have been thrown into the dust beans of history. Whether it is Zhivko or Cauceascu, their statues lie on the ground dishonoured.

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it is truly amazing that each passing day appears to strengthen the image of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk. New generations of Turks are growing with ever increasing veneration for Atatrk. He outshines anybody in the firmament of Turkey. One ready answer is Mustafa Kemal's courage in the battlefield. When the nation laid prostrate under the jackboots of the British, the French, the Italian and the Greek, Mustafa Kemal took to the mountains and roused his people to take up arms. He provided brilliant leadership and galvanized his entire nation to unparalleled heroism. The last Greek soldier was thrown into the Aegean sea, the English and the Australian found their graveyard in the Dardanelles. The nation vvhich had never known defeat would not take defeat lying down for long. Out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire rose modern Turkey. Atatrk's new slogan became "Peace at home and Peace in the world". Now was the time for nation building. Now was the time to give the nation permanent orientation. Revolutionary reforms came in quick succession. it was judiciary, it was education, it was the alphabet, it was the wholesale import of vvestern laws, it was the permanent banishment of Shariah laws and most important of ali it was secularism. These revolutionary changes within the Turkish society have found their place in the hearts and minds of people. it is no vvonder that veneration for this great leader does not diminish with passing day s but rather grow. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk is reaching the status of timelessness. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk left his legacy with the youth of Turkey. Like the renewal of earth begins with the advent of spring, the human kind is renevved by the advent of youth. By bequeathing his revolution with the youth, Atatrk has made it sure that it will alvvays remain in safe hands. it has been a fascinating journey through life with Turkey of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk. I am proud to record here that there is an element of timelessness in the relations betvveen Bangladesh and Turkey. Our national poet Kazi Nazrul islam was ecstasic with the victory of Atatrk in 1921, when nobody had heard of Mustafa Kemal, it is this spiritual bond that is going to be everlasting. No power on earth can shake this bond betvveen Turkey and Bangladesh. ends.

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TRKYE'NN TEKNOLOJ TERCHLER: 1923-1998 DORULAR-YANLILAR; MKNLAR-MKNSIZLIKLAR*

Prof. Dr. Ergun TRKCAN** BLDR ZET Trkiye Cumhuriyeti, kurulduu tarihten itibaren, modernlemeyi, adalamay, daha zel bir terimle, batllamay yeni devletin temel hedefi haline getirdii iin sanayilemek, modern bilim ve teknolojiyi zmsemek iin birok politikalar uygulamtr. Eitim ve bilim alanndaki politikalar, bir lde, imkanlara gre kapsaml ve tutarl olmakla birlikte, teknoloji transferleri, eitli iktisadi kararlarn yan rnleri biiminde ve/veya siyasi-askeri kararlarn etkileriyle, ok kere tesadfi (random) bir karakter sergilemitir. Bylece, pek ok uygun ve doru teknoloji seimi yannda byk yanllar da yaplmtr. Bazen stratejik tercihler doru uygulamalar ok yanl, bazen de, stratejik yanln iinde kalnarak ok etkin teknoloji seimleri yaplmtr. Bunlarn bir ksmnda, mali imkanszlklar, kredi artlar veya gnn i ve d siyaset dengeleri rol oynamtr. Bu bildiride, zellikle devletin, kamu yatrmlar, devletilik, Plan kararlaryla ilgili olarak yapt teknoloji tercihlerinin bazlar rnek olarak ele alnm ve daha ok, Trkiye iktisat tarihi asndan, ilerdeki yllarda uygulanabilecek bir aratrma yntemi formle edilmee allmtr. Gncel politika olarak da, artk teknoloji retme aamasna gelmi lkemizin, bu noktada, daha ileri ve "sofistike" teknolojiler transfer etme durumunda bulunduu gz nnde tutularak, arl zel sanayiye kaym olan bu srete, bundan sonra nasl bir stratejik e-gdm gerekletirilebileceinin ipular verilmitir.
* Bu bildiriyi, 7 Kasm 1998 gn aramzdan ayrlan Ticaret Bakanl eski Mstear erafettin Durugnl'e ithaf ediyorum. ** Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi retim yesi.

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GR:
Neo-Klasik iktisat kuramnda, "teknoloji seimi" (choice of technique), sadece bir retim fonksiyonunda retim faktrlerinin bileim oranlarn belirlemek anlamnda kullanlmaktadr. Bu da faktrlerin nisbi fiyatlaryla ilgilidir: Ayn mal retmek iin, e-rn erisi zerinde, farkl (teorik olarak n sayda) emek-sermaye bileimleri mmkndr.' Buradaki varsaymlar, sermayenin biimlendirilebilir (malleable); teknolojinin serbest ve ekonominin dnda retildii; piyasa ve teknik bilgilerin giriimciler asndan tam (perfect) olduudur. Bylece, mikro dzeyde, firmalar, cretler ykselirse daha ok makine kullanmak isteyeceklerdir. (Ricardo, 31. Blm) Makro dzeyde de, ekonomiler, faktr yaplarna (factor endowment) uygun yani emek gc fazlaysa emek-youn, sermaye fazlaysa sermaye-youn toplam retim fonksiyonlar kurarlar veya kurmaldrlar. Bunu tersine bir yol tutulursa uygun bir teknoloji (appropriate technology) seimi yaplmam olur. Ricardo'nun, d ticaret alanna uygulad faktr verimlilii esasndaki "mukayeseli stnlkler" kuramn da Klasik iktisadn teknolojik varsaymlar arasna katmamzda bir saknca yoktur. Bu teoriyi 20. yy.'da Heckser-Ohlin-Samuelson yaklam izleyecektir. Ama hepsi, teorik gzelliine ramen, gerek dnyada yerini bulamad; nl "Leontief Paradoksu" bu gzellii biraz bozdu.2 Teknoloji seimi, sanayilemi lkeler iin, sadece, firma baznda hem mevcut teknolojiler arasnda seim hem de retilecek teknolojilerin faktr younluunu belirlemek asndan bir sorundur; bu lkelerde devletin retimde yer almad varsaylmaktadr. (Sadece, 20. yy.'da, ileri sanayi lkelerinin gizli-ileri teknolojilerin bir ksmn kendi kurumlarnda rettii gerei; retim piyasa iin yaplmadndan, genel kural fazla zorlamyor). Buralarda, firmalarn rasyonel, piyasalarn mkemmel olduu da genel bir varsaymdr; yanl teknoloji tercihleri piyasalar tarafndan cezalandrlr. Teknoloji tercihi, teknoloji retmeyen, bunu, d dnyadan transfer etmek zorunda olan, fakir, gelimekte olan veya sanayileme yolundaki lkeler asndan nemli bir sorun oluturur. Bu lkelerde, devletin rol de, teknoloji seimi ve transferi srelerinde ok nemlidir; hatta, kalknmalarnn ilk aamalarnda, zel sermaye birikimi olmadndan veya yeterli lekte olmadndan devletin dorudan rn ve retim teknolojileri semesi byk bir olaslktr. Bu erevede, gelimi bir piyasa ekonomisinde, firma baznda, rasyonel bir karar sreci olan teknoloji seimi, gelien bir ekonomide, pek ok kst altnda makro (devlet), mezo (sektr) ve mikro (firma) dzeyler1. 2. Neo-Klasik iktisadn bu yaklamn her ders kitabnda bulabiliriz. Bu konuda Oktar Trel'in almas (Trel, 1998) ve benim bunun zerindeki yorumum (Trkcan, 1998) grlebilir.

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de, teknoloji transferiyle i ie girmi karmak bir sretir. Teknoloji seiminin transfer (sat) artlarndan ayrlmas g olduu gibi, bir ok durumda, transfer edilebilme artlan, teknoloji seimine gerek brakmaz; dier koullar yani finansman, siyasi-askeri kstlar, bilgisizlik (enformasyon eksiklii) ve teknolojik cehalet (enformasyonu yeterince deerlendirememek) seilecek teknolojiler setini tek alternatife indirgeyebilir. Bu kstlar, ksaca, yle sralayabiliriz: - Neo-klasik teoriye aykr da olsa, teknoloji, zellikle retim teknolojileri, hibir ekilde serbest mal deildir, niteliine ve yeniliine gre artan fiyatlar vardr. Baz durumlarda, fiyat da yoktur nk, sahibi (firma veya devlet) tarafndan satlmaz ve devredilmez. Genelde, bir teknoloji tekelini ifade eden bu durumda, u veya bu ekilde sat karan verilirse, tekel fyatlamas (monopoly pricing) uygulanr ve "ak artrma" yaanr. - Baz teknolojileri, firmalan satmaya raz da olsa, bulunduu lkeler veya uluslararas anlamalar tarafndan bu satlar nlenir. ABD'de Hkmet (State Department, Pentagon ve Department of Commerce); NATO (COCOM), Souk Sava dneminde, Dou Blouna ve gvenilmez nc lkelere stratejik mal ve teknolojilerin satn nlyordu. B.M.'in Nkleer Yaylmay nleme (Nuclear Non-Proliferation) Anlamas ve Uluslararas Atom Enerjisi Ajans da (IAEA) nkleer teknolojilerin transferini denetlemektedir. Bu nedenle, nkleer santral kurmak iin, yakt tipi ve ona bal bir santral tipini semek, yalnz teknik ve fnans deil, siyasi bir denge sorunudur. - Sanayilemenin ilk aamalarnda, makine ve tehizata "ierilmi" (embodied) teknolojiler, genelde fiziki yatrm sreci ile transfer edilebildii iin, teknoloji vericisinin (donor) ortak veya tek bana dorudan yatnma (foreign direct investment) raz olmas gerekir. nk, alc, tek bana, "ierilmemi" (disembodied) teknolojileri "patent, licence, know-how" anlamalar yoluyla transfer edecek sermaye ve teknik bilgi birikimine, sanayi alt-yapsna sahip deildir. Sanayilemenin belli bir aamasna gelindiinde, rn ve retim teknolojileri, ierilmemi olarak transfer edilebilir. Bu aamadan nce, teknolojinin gelmesi, yabanc sermayenin (yatrmcnn), projeyi, kendi verecei teknoloji ve makine asndan, feasible bulmas gerekir ki, bu da, o lkedeki yabanc sermaye ve vergi mevzuatna bal bir husustur. Bu noktada, teknoloji seimi konusunda, alcnn fazla bir rol olmad anlalr. - Fakir lkeler, genelde, teknoloji transfer eden yatrm projelerini, yabanc devletlerin veya uluslararas kurulularn verdii kredilerle gerekletirirler. Bu kredilere balanan artlar, o lkenin veya

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firmalarnn istedikleri lkeden, istedikleri teknolojileri semelerini kstlar. Az gelimi lkelerin yatrmclar (zel giriimcileri ve yatrm bandaki brokratlar) teknolojik bakmdan ok bilgili ve bilinli olmadklar gibi, zellikle, dk gelirli brokratlar ifsada msaittir. Buralarda iyi bir enformasyon servisi iin alt yap ya yoktur ya da fazla etkin almaz. Bu faktrler de, fnans ve siyasi kst olmasa bile, salkl bir teknoloji seimini engeller; kt, eski (obsolete), ne olduu bile bilinmeyen ve hatta serbest mal niteliindeki teknolojiler, ok yksek fiyata, aleyhte artlarla alnabilir. Bu kategoriye, iyi, uygun bir teknolojinin, yksek fiyatla, kt artlarla alnmasn da ekleyebiliriz. Gelien lkelerde devletin, (siyasi kararlarn) yatrm projelerinde nemli rol oynadn belirtmitik. Genelde piyasalara mdahale edilmesi, gmrk tarifeleriyle sk sk oynamak, korumac eilimler, teorik olarak, kaynak dalmnda optimaliteden uzaklatran faktrler saylsa da, dorudan proje bazndaki mdahaleler de seimleri olumsuz etkiler. Ayrca, bu lkelerde, teknoloji seimlerini, u veya bu ekilde etkileyen bir ok mevzuat bulunabilir. Bazen, bu mevzuat teknolojiyi, batan belirlemektedir. Baka bir adan, kk retici modeline gre hazrlanm (gda, giyecek satn alm, bina inaat vb. iler iin) ihale sistemleri, ileri teknolojileri satn almak iin gerek bir engeldir. Gnmzde teknoloji, deerli bir meta olarak, ayrca retilmekte ve bunun bir pazar olumaktadr. Uruguay Round grmeleri sonucunda ortaya kan Marake Nihai Senedi'ne (15 Nisan 1994) bal, bata "Ticaret Balantl Fikri Mlkiyet Haklan anlamas" TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) olmak zere, yeni kurulan Dnya Ticaret rgt (WTO) ile Avrupa Topluluu denetiminde, teknoloji ticaretini dzenleyen bir ok uluslararas anlama mevcuttur. Artk, teknolojinin retilmesi (srf teknoloji retimine ynelmi aratrma firmalar hzla oalmakta, bunlar, Silicon Valley'de sk grld gibi, sipari zerine, dier firmalar iin A&G yapmaktadrlar); ayr bir ekonomik sektr, ayr bir ura haline gelirken, ticareti yani bunun pazarlanmas ya da teknolojinin aranp, satn alnmas da ayr bir uzmanlk hatta meslek dalna dnmektedir. Oysa, Trkiye'nin ilk sanayileme srecinin yaand yllar, 1920'lerden 1970'lere dein, genelde, ierilmi teknolojilerin bir paket olarak pazarland ve pazarlama-satn alma tekniklerinin fazla gelitirilmedii, hatta hi bilinmedii, teknoloji seim ve

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transferlerinin baka kararlar iinde mevcut olduu bir dnemdir. Teknoloji seiminde sofstikasyon ve/veya sofistike teknolojileri seme, gelimilikle doru orantl olduundan, bu dnemdeki ciddi yatrm kararlarnda, ana (core) teknolojilerle yardmc (peripherials) teknolojiler "teknoloji paketi" iindedir. Aslnda, gelimi sistemler, kendilerine uygun teknolojileri ayr ayr seerek, paket iindeki, serbest, modas gemi, uygun olmayan hatta kendilerinde mevcut teknolojileri transfer etmek durumunda kalmazlar; az gelimiler ise, istenen-istenmeyen, uygun olan-olmayan her teknolojiyi, satclarn belirledii bir fiyattan, paket halinde almak durumunda kalrlar. Teknoloji seimi ve transferi konusunda, gze arpan, balca tarihi gerekler ve teorik argmanlar, ksaca, byle zetlenebilir. Zaten, amacmz, bu alanda bir tebli vermek deildir. Trkiye'nin gnmze gelinceye kadar yapt teknoloji tercihleri/teknoloji transferlerinin bazlar ele alnarak, Cumhuriyet Dneminde, ekonominin hatta toplumun, teknolojik adan nasl ekillenmee baladn, ana hatlaryla gstermee altmz bu bildiride, yukarda sralanan gerekler ve argmanlar nda, gelecee dair ksa bir tahmin yapmak da istiyoruz. OSMANLININ TEKNO-EKONOMK MRASI: Osmanl mparatorluu, ngiliz-Trk Ticaret Anlamas (1838) ve Tanzimat'tan (1839) sonra, gelien Sanayi Devrimi'nin daha fazla etkisine girerek, 19. yy. a damgasn vuran baz sanayi ve ulam-iletiim alan teknolojik yenilikleriyle tant. Burada, teknoloji seimlerini kendisinin yaptn sylemek ok gtr; nk, bunlar tam olarak anlayacak teknik dzeyi olmad gibi, anlasa bile, serbest seim yapacak mali gten yoksundu. Geleneksel el zanaatlar da, kurulan fabrikalarn says nedeniyle deil, Bat'dan ithal edilen sanayi mallan rekabeti yznden hzla kayboluyordu. Osmanl limanlar buharl gemiyle, bu teknelerin ortaya kt yllarda, 1820'lerin sonunda, demiryollar ile 1850'lerin sonunda, IzmirAydn demiryoluyla tant. Anadolu'da, 1913'de, ngiliz, Alman ve Fransz irketlerine ait 3121 km. demiryolu mevcuttu. Buna, Trklerin yapt am-Medine demiryolu ve Anadolu dnda, Suriye, Bulgaristan ve Yunanistan'da kalan hatlar dahil deildir. lk telgraf hatt, Istanbul-Edirne arasnda, Krm Sava srasnda kuruldu. stanbul'un zmir zerinden Avrupa'ya baland tarih 1859'dur; Musul'a ve ran zerinden Hindistan'a ise 1860'lann ortalarnda balanmtr. Osmanl lkesinde 1900'de 50 bin km. uzunluunda telgraf hatt alyordu. Telefon lkeye 1881'de girmitir; 1911'de, bir yabanc konsorsiyuma, stanbul ve civar iin telefon imtiyaz verilmiti. Dzgn posta servisi 1834'de balamt ve 1914'de her bin kiiye 6 postane dyordu. stanbul sokaklarnda otomobile izin verilmemesine ramen, yasak zamanla delinmi, 1914'de, stan-

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bul'da 110, zmir'de 22 ve dier vilayetlerde 55 otomobil bulunuyordu. Elektrikli tramvay zmir'de 1885'de, stanbul'da 1889'da ve Selanik'te 1892'de almaya balamt. (Issawi) Sanayi olarak, 1913'de, bugnk Trkiye snrlar iinde kalan yerlerde, 10 ve daha fazla ii altran 560 iyerinde yaklak 35 bin ii ve bunlarn iinde, o zamana gre, byk fabrika saylabilecek 100 ve daha fazla ii altran 21 devlet, 32 zel 53 tesiste ise 3 binin stnde bir istihdam salanyordu. Bu byk tesisler, un deirmnleri, ttn ilemesi, 3 bira fabrikas, 1300 tezgah ve 122 bin ilik 22 yn ve pamuk dokuma tesisi, 2 imento fabrikas, askeri fabrika ve tersanelerdi. (Tezel, 1995, 1034) Buna bakarak, Trkiye'de ciddi bir sanayi olduu sylenemez; ama yine de, modern teknolojik imkanlarn bilinmesi ve renilmesi bakmndan ok nemli ilevleri olmutur. Sanayi buhar gc demekti. 1913 Sanayi saymna gre, evrim gc hakknda bilgi verilen 245 iletme, 21 bin beygir gcne eit enerji kaynana sahipti. Bunun 3/4 buhar, % 5'den az geleneksel su gc ve gerisi elektrik ve iten patlamal motordur. Byk Savatan nce lkede retilen maden kmr 900 bin tona ykselmiti; 1923 de, sadece bir-iki byk ehirde 45 milyon kws. elektrik retilebiliyordu. Sanayi Devrimi'ne katlmann ya da teknoloji retmenin en byk gstergesi makine yapmaktr. zmir'de kurulan ssigonis ve Rankin makine atlyeleri hakknda O. Kurmu bilgi vermektedir. Her iki fabrika da "Dou'da kurulmu en eski, en byk ve en mkemmel teknik iletme" olup, 400 ii ve 300 beygir gcyle "iki silindirli iten patlamal motorlar, kondansatrl, imbisatl buhar makineleri, elektrik jeneratrleri, demir veya sa depolan, ivi, tel, dikenli tel ve ayrca matbaa hurufat, komple un deirmenleri, rr, ya, helva ve ekerleme fabrikalar" imal ediyorlard. kisi de ngiliz sermayeli irketlerdi. ssigonis, ngiliz uyruuna geerek zmir'e g etmi bir Yunanlyd. (D. ssigonis'in, 1960 larn banda, ngiltere'de, Volkswagen'den sonraki en baarl araba tasarm saylan Austin Mini'lerin tasarmcs, Sir unvan alan ssigonis'in babas olduunu tahmin ediyorum. nk, tm haberlerde, kendisinin, zmir'den ngiltere'ye g etmi bir sanayicinin olu olduu ifade ediliyordu). ssigonis iten patlamal motorlarda, Rankin ise 200 beygirlik buhar makinalar yapmnda n kazanmt. ssigonis, Alman AEG'nin zmir blge datcln; Rankin, ngiliz R. Procter'n acenteliini almt. Rankin, zellikle, Gney Amerika'ya buhar makineleri ihra ediyordu. (Trkiye'nin ilk makine ihracat olarak kayda gemelidir). nce makine tamircilii ile ie balayan bu giriimciler, Aydn demiryolu yapmndan sonra, bu ilerde eitilmi ve sonra isiz kalm teknisyenleri toplayarak kadrolarn salamlatrdlar. (Bylece, belli bir alandaki teknoloji transferinin, baka iler yaratmasnn "spill ver" rnei ortaya kyor). Bu fabrikalara, Savan balangcnda, ingiliz Rice Brothers'a ait bir nc

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atlye daha ilave edildi. Bu tesislere (machine shops) Savata, Osmanl Hkmeti el koymutur. Bu tesisler, 1891-1913 arasnda, 54 fabrika iin 1544 beygir gcnde buhar makinesi imal etmilerdir. Bunlardan 150 beygirlik ikisi Trkiye'de un deirmenlerinde bulunan en gl makinelerdi. Ayrca, un deirmenleri iin 107 eitli makine daha yaplmtr. Tam otomatik ilk helva imali ilk kez zmir'de bu tesislerin yapt bir fabrikada gerekleti. (Trkiye'deki ilk modern retim teknolojisi yenilii saylmaldr.) Rankin ve ssigonis'in yapt buhar makineleri Trkiye'deki toplam buhar makinelerinin rettii gcn % 4.93'n, Bat Anadolu'da ise % 9.64'n temsil ediyordu. (Kurmu, 1974, 156-9). Bu noktada nerebileceimiz bir aratrma plan, Osmanl'nn 19. yy., ve Cumhuriyet'in ilk yllarn kapsayan bir "endstriyel arkeoloji"* grubunun mevcut eski tesisleri ve teknolojileri kataloglayp hzla yok olan az saydaki objeyi Trkiye 'nin sanayi tarihine katmalardr. Tarm teknolojileri konusunda sylenebilecek tek ey, Anadolu'nun, Hititler'den beri ok deimeyen bir ilkel kuru tarm sistemine sahip olduudur. Yabanclarn toprak sahiplii 1869'dan nce mmkn olmadndan (toprakta zel mlkiyeti getiren 1858 Arazi Kanunnamesi'nin 110. Maddesi slam hukukuna gre, yabanc tebaann toprak almasn nlyordu), yabanclarn 1860'lardan itibaren toprak alarak yarattklar fiili durum yeni bir kanunla legalize edilmiti; bir ok yabanc, bata ngilizler olmak zere Bat Anadolu'da, ukurova'da byk topraklar almaa baladlar. (Barkan, 1940, 391) Sadece, ngilizlerin ald topraklarn 2.4 ile 2.8 milyon dnm olduu tahmin edilmektedir. (Kurmu, 1974, 1023) Bu topraklarda, ilk kez, dnya piyasalarna ynelik rnler reten kapitalist iftlikler kurulmu ve o zamann en yeni tarm makine ve teknikleri denenmitir. Ancak, bunlar, kk cepler halinde kalarak, Trk tarmnn yapsn deitirmeye yetmemitir. Buna ramen, 1880'lerden itibaren, Trk iftlik sahipleri de baz yenilikleri benimsemeye, buharl traktr, bierdver, tohum makinesi vb. kullanmaya baladlar; ilk kez, pamuk, haha, zm, ttn gibi sanayi bitkilerine (cash crop) yneldiler. Bilim ve teknolojide, kendini yeniden retme anlamnda, yksek retimin, aratrma faaliyetlerinin dzeyini belirlemek baka bir alan olduundan, burada zerinde durulmamtr. (Trkcan, 1998) CUMHURYET DNEMNDEK TEKNOLOJ TERCHLER VE TEKNOLOJ TRANSFERLER Cumhuriyet'in teknoloji transfer dnemlerini, yeni rejimin iktisat politikalar dnemlerinden ayr biimde ele almak olduka g olmakla bir3. Endstriyel arkeoloji, teknoloji tarihinin zel bir alma alan olarak, nce Sanayi Devrimi'nin yurdu olan ngiltere'de dodu. Bu konuda Bkz. Buchanan. Bu arada Ko'un Halis'te kurduu mzeyi ilk endstriyel arkeoloji kurumu saymamz gerekir.

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likte, srf teknolojik aamalar belirlemek amacyla, bu emalardan bir miktar sapmak gerekebilir. Bu nedenle, kabaca; (1) Kurulu yllarndan (1923) Birinci Sanayi Planna (1934) kadar olan nispeten sanayi politikas olmayan bir dnem; (2) Sanayi Planlarndan kinci Dnya Sava sonu, daha belirgin olarak, 1947 Marshall Plan uygulamalarna kadar youn bir devlet eliyle teknoloji transferi, sanayi alt-yaps kurma almalar; (3) Buradan, 1947'den, Planl ekonomiye kadar sren liberal ve daha sonra, yan-liberal dnem; ayn zamanda modern ulam ve enerji alt-yaps kurtarma almalarnn balatlmas; 1954 tarihli, 6224 sayl "Yabanc Sermayeyi Tevik Kanunu"nun kabul ile zel yabanc sermayeye alma ve yaygn teknoloji transferlerine bu dnemde balamtr. (4) Planl dnemin balangcndan (1963), bu sistemin arka plana itildii 1980'lerin ba arasnda nispeten devlet arlkl, ikili anlamalar ve dier resmi teknik yardm programlaryla ykl Karma Ekonomi Dnemi; (5) Planlarn arln yitirdii aamadan, 1980'lerin bandan gnmze, zel sektrn giderek arlk kazand Yeni Liberal Dnem, Avrupa Gmrk Birliine Giri ile (1996) en st noktasna ular. Bu ayrntlara inmeden de, teknoloji transfer aamalarn, genelde imalat sanayi asndan, 6224 ncesi (1954) ve sonras eklinde ayrmak mmkndr. nk bu kanun yabanc sermaye yatrmlar ile birlikte yabanc ticari teknolojilerin de artan bir hzla lkeye giri kapsn oluturacaktr. Ancak, daha geni bir perspektif kazanmak iin beli periyodizasyonu izlemek uygun olacaktr. Bu makale, Trkiye'deki tm teknoloji transferlerini listeleyen ve snflandran bir 'survey' olmadndan, sadece, bu dnemlerin zelliklerini, stratejik hata ve sevaplarn, baz rnek olaylarla belirlemeyi ve mmknse, Trkiye'nin eyrek yzylda teknoloji tercih ve transferlerindeki genel eilimleri ortaya karmay amalayan bir geni alma program nerisi gibi ele alnmaldr. Ayrca, bu alma bir sanayi tarihi kategorisine de dahil edilmemelidir. 1. Kurulu Yllarndan Birinci Sanayi Planna Kadar Olan Dnem, 1923-1934: Bu dnem, henz yeni rejimin iktisadi hayata, Lozan Anlamas hkmlerine gre gmrklerine hakim olamad, bir tr Osmanl iktisadi

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hayatnn devam niteliinde kabul edilebilir. Buna ramen, 1920-1930 arasnda 201 anonim irket kurulmu olup, bunun 84 tanesi hizmet alannda, gerisi imalatta idi. (kn, 1970b) Milli Mcadele esnasnda, eldeki makine ve tehizatla, bulunabilen usta ve teknisyenlerle, silah ve mhimmat tedarii iin kurulan ve sonra Makine ve Kimya Kurumu'na dnecek "Imalat- Harbiye", Anadolu'daki ilk teknolojik hareket saylabilir; eitli lke yapm her trl silah tamirat ve bunlarn ok eitli cephaneleri en ilkel usullerle yaplmt. Bu dnemdeki imalat irketlerinin ne kadarnn yabanc sermayeli olduu ve getirdikleri teknolojilerin kkenleri konusunda ayrntl bilgilerimiz bulunmuyor; sadece ksmi bilgiler mevcuttur. Elektrik ve havagaz retimi iin kurulan 7 irketin beinin Alman teknolojisi getirdii (AEG, Siemens), zmir telefon irketinin sve Ericson ile ortaklk yaptm biliyoruz. Henz Trkiye, Savataki mttefiklerinden ya da tarafszlardan ayrlp, kar taraf firmalarna yanamak istemiyor. Bu durumu, Cumhuriyet'in ilk byk tesislerinden olan eker fabrikalarnn teknolojilerinde de grebiliriz. Bunlardan ilki, bir grup yerli mstahsil tarafndan Nisan 1923'te kurulan "Uak Terakki-i Ziraat" irketinin gnde 500 ton pancar ileme kapasiteli tesisin ekoslovak Skoda makine fabrikasnn teknolojisiyle 10 ay gibi bir srede kurulmasdr. Ancak iletme suyu yetersizlii nedeniyle fabrika 17.12.1926 tarihinde, yaklak iki yl sonra alabilmitir. Bu ilk denemede, daha da sk tekrarlanacak temel bir planlama hatas yaplmtr. Ancak, Ziraat Bankas ve yeni kurulan Bankas nclndeki "stanbul ve Trakya eker Fabrikalar" irketinin Alpullu tesisi, Uak'tan sonra temeli atld halde, bundan nce iletmeye alnabilmitir. Ayn kapasitede olan Alpullu tesisi, Alman "Machinefabrik Backau R. Wolf' firmas tarafndan kurulmutur. Bylece ilk Trk ekeri, 1926 sonunda iki tesis tarafndan retilmee balanmtr. nc fabrika da, yine Wolf tarafndan 1933'te kurulan ve 1934'de iletmeye alman 1000 ton kapasiteli Turhal'dr. Skoda'nn da Alman teknolojisi olduu dnlrse, yukardaki "silah arkadalnn, sanayide devam ettii tezimizin fazla yanl olmad anlalr. Bu tesis eitli tevsiat ve yenilemelerle gnmzde de almaktadr. Yeni rejim, 1927'de, Savatan nce karlm olan "Tevik-i Sanayi Kanun-u Muvakkati"ni yenileyerek, daha geni kapsaml tevikler getiren bir 'Tevik-i Sanayi Kanunu" kabul etti. Bu kanundan, 189'u Osmanldan devir alman, 281'i yeni, 480 fabrika ya da tesis yararlanmtr. Bu tesislerin teknolojileri hakknda da fazla bilgimiz yoktur. 2. Birinci Sanayi Planndan Marshall Planna Kadar Olan Dnem, 1934-1947: Bu dnem, Trkiye'nin ilk ve kapsaml "devletilik" aamasdr. Trk devletilik uygulamasn, Fransa'nn 17. yy.'da yaad "Colber749

tism" ile veya o dnemde uygulamaya sokulan Sovyet Planlamasyla karlatrmamak gerekir. Fransa, byk g olmak iin alt yap eksikliini devlet eliyle tamamlamaa alrken Sovyetler Birlii snfsz bir toplumun alt yapsn hazrlamak istiyordu. Oysa Trkiye, d dnyadaki olumsuz artlar ve kendi iktisadi bamszl iin bir eyler yapmaa, o zamana kadar byk bir sermaye birikimi yapamam zel sektrn bu an kamu birikimi ile karlamaa almtr. zel sektrn sermaye birikiminin yetersiz olmas bir yana, bu dnemde bir zel sektr giriimci grubundan dahi sz etmek zordur. Devletiliin amalarndan biri de, II. Merutiyet'ten beri, "ktisad- Milli" politikasnn da amac olan, byle bir snfn, Trk Burjuvazisinin domas iin ortam hazrlamakt. Bundan da anlalaca gibi, bu dnemdeki teknoloji seimlerinin tamam devlet tarafndan yaplm ve ynlendirilmitir. Piyasa ekonomileri 1929'da Byk Buhran'a girerken, Sovyetler, Birinci Plan uygulamaya sokuyordu; dnyada yaygn bir korumaclk, daha sonra Keynesci makroiktisat politikalarnn proto-tipleri olan devletlerin iktisat politikalarna mdahalesi, ithal ikamesi dnemin balca zelliklerini oluturur. Trkiye, 1929'da gmrklerine sahip olmu, Merkez Bankas kurulmu ve lk Sanayi Plan hazrlklarna girilmitir. Bu dnemde, ayrca, mevcut demiryollarnn devletletirildii ve yeni demiryollar yapmna baland grlr; ulamdaki stratejik teknoloji seimi, tm ileri lkelerde olduu gibi, demiryoludur. Bu politika 1950'lere kadar srecek, sonra tercih karayollarna kayacaktr. Burada, 1933 ylnda ana hatlar ortaya kan ve 1934'te yrrle giren Birinci Sanayi Plan ile 1936'da hazrlanp, eitli deiiklikler yapldktan sonra 1938'de yrrle giren kinci Sanayi Plan'nm hikayesini anlatmayacaz; bunlar baka yerlerde belgelenmitir. Ancak, Sanayi Planlarnn teknoloji tercih ve transferleri hakknda, bilinebilen, baz rnekleri ile yetineceiz. Birinci Sanayi Plan'nda Sovyet etkisinin ve teknolojisinin rol olduu bilinir, fakat bu fazla abartlmamaldr. Trk ynetimi her zaman, iktisadi tercihlerinde de dengeyi gz nnde tutmutur. smet Paa'nn (nn) 25 Nisan-10 Mays 1932 tarihlerinde kalabalk bir uzman heyetiyle Sovyetler'e seyahatinin hemen arkasndan 22 Mays - 2 Haziran 1932 tarihlerinde talya'y ziyaret etmesi ve her iki lkeden de hem kredi hem de teknoloji tedarik etmesi, Bavekilin iktisat eitimi asndan olduu kadar, yeni teknolojik alt-yapnn kkenleri asndan da belirleyicidir. Bir anlamda "planlama" kavramnn Sovyetler'den transfer edildii, ama ve ieriinin lkede kararlatrld sylenebilir. Teknik olarak, sanayi planlamas, total bir "retim-yatrm-tketim" planlamas, bir byk elektrifikasyon projesi nitelii tamaz. Daha sonra, 1960'larn Kalknma Planlar da Sovyet tipi deildir. Yine de, plan-proje yapm, bugnk terimiyle "feasibility study" ve mhendislik almalar konusunda Sovyet750

ler'den ok ey renildii aktr; Trkler ilk kez, bir yatrmn seyircisi deil sorumlusu durumuna, bu almalar esnasnda ulamlardr. Austos 1932'de gelen Sovyet uzman heyeti, yurdu dolaarak, "Trkiye Pamuk, Keten, Kendir, Kimya, Demir Sanayii Hakknda Rapor" unu hazrlamlar; ilk kez sektr ve blge iktisat raporlar diyebileceimiz almalarn rneklerini vermilerdir. Daha sonra, 1933 Mart'mda, benzer makineleri yerinde grmek, bunlann tetkik ve kabuln yapmak iin Hereke ve Feshane (stanbul) fabrikalar mdrleriyle baz mhendisler Moskova'ya gnderilmi, Temmuz'a kadar orada kalan heyete fabrikalarn teknik projeleri hazrlanarak teslim edilmitir. Projelere gre, makineler Moskova yaknndaki Kari Marx Fabrikas'na smarlanm, Eyll'de gelen 50 kiilik bir kafileye teknik eitim verilmitir. Bylece sadece makine-tehizata deil insana ierilmi bir teknoloji transferi yaplmtr. Sovyet Raporu'nda yaplan pamuklu talep projeksiyonuna gre, Trkiye'nin pamuklu kuma ve iplik ithalatndan kurtulmak iin 170.000 ili, 4000 tezgahl, gnde onar saatten iki vardiya olarak alacak 3 fabrika kurmas gerekiyordu. Bu yaklam, Sovyet teknolojisinin balca zelliklerinden birisi olan "gigatomania", byk-lek dknln de yanstr. Aslnda, byk talep karsnda, maliyetleri dk retim yapmann teknik zm lek ekonomilerinden yararlanmak, yksek kapasite kullanmaktr. ok sayda, kk ve farkl (yl ve orijin) teknolojilerin bir arada bulunmas da bu yaklama aykrdr. Sovyet Raporu, "2 cins pamuktan ve 4 muhtelif numaradan ziyade iplik retimine" kardr. Bu yaklam, 1930'larn Trkiye'si iin geerli miydi? Birinci Sanayi Plan'nda, balca uygulama organ olan Smerbank sorumluluu altndaki 23 proje iinde tekstil arlk tar. zellikle 4 yeni ve bir tevsi projesi ile pamuklu dokumann yeri ayrdr. Trkiye, daha kk lekli tesislerde 118.000 i ve 3.300 dokuma tezgah kurmu, Sovyet tipi "kombinat"a fazla ilgi gstermemitir. Bu fabrikalardan ikisi, Kayseri ve Nazilli, kaba kuma retimi ve basma ve Amerikan bezi retimi iin tahsis edilmi, bunlarn teknolojisi Sovyetler'den alnmtr. Daha ince ve kaliteli dokuma iin Avrupa teknolojisi tercih edilmitir. Sadece fabrika kurmak deil, bunun ham maddesi iin de yeni teknoloji transferi gerektii bilinmekteydi. Amerikan "ekspres" tohumu diye bilinen "Clevland 5" tohumunu yerletirmek iin Adana'daki Pamuk Enstits'nn bir sredir almalar yapt da kaytlara gemitir. Birinci Sanayi Planndaki dier projeler arasnda Bursa Merinos Ynl Dokuma Fabrikas, Gemlik Suni ipek Fabrikas (bu ikisi gnmzde kapanmtr), Beykoz ie ve Cam Fabrikalar, Ergani Bakr, Keiborlu Kkrt tesisleri, Zonguldak Kmr Tesisleri ve En nemlisi Karabk Demir-elik Tesisleridir. Programn uygulanmas srasnda Guleman Krom Yataklar Tesisleri ve Kuvarshan Balar Yata letme Tesisleri de maden grubuna dahil edilmitir. Demir - elik tesisinin kurulu yeri ve teknoloji seimiyle uygulanmas ilgi ekici bir rnek olay oluturur. Birinci Sanayi Plan'nda 100 bin 751

ton/yl kapasiteli (o zamann teknolojisine gre ok kk bir lek) bir tesisin Karadeniz Erelisi mntkasna bal, biraz ierlerde bir yer olarak, fakat kesin bir yer verilmeden kurulmas nerilmiti. Genelde, byle ar girdi-kt tama maliyeti olan tesislerin deniz veya nehir kenarlarnda kurulmas dnlr. Zonguldak ta kmrleriyle alacak bu tesisin ya kmre ya da demir cevherine yakn olmas dnlmeliydi. Ancak, askeri mlahazalar, iktisadi hesaplara galip gelmitir. O zamann ktisat Vekili Celal Bayar, "Snai tesislerde yer intibanda mnhasran iktisadi mlahazalarn hakim olmad... Milli sanayiin, memleketimizde iktisadi ihtiyalara olduu kadar yksek menfaatlerimizin istilzam ettirilebilecei nazik vaziyetlere de cevap verebilmesi... lzumunda tereddt yoktur..." demekteydi. (Tezel, 1995, 303) Sonunda Genel Kurmay, tesisin Karabk'te kurulmasna karar verdi. Zonguldak demiryolunun, pahal da olsa ulam sorununu zecei dnld. Tesislerin ngiliz finansman ve teknolojisi ile yapmna karar verilerek, 1936 ylnda H.A. Brassert irketine ihale edildi. Temeli 3.4.1937 tarihinde atlan tesisin ilk yksek frn 9.9.1938 de iletmeye alnd. Tesisler, 1940 ylnda, 320 bin ton/yl pik demir, 148 bin ton/yl elik ve 70 bin ton/yl hadehane kapasitesi ile tamamland. Amerikal iktisat Max W. Thornburg, Karabk' kt planlamann en gze arpc bir rnei olarak sunuyor: "Ordunun gvenlik nedenleriyle setii 4.000 feet ykseklikte bir yerde denizden ve Zonguldak'dan 45 mil, Divrii'deki demir cevherlerinden 600 mil uzaklkta kurulan tesis, Trkiye'nin ihtiyac olan inaat demiri, ray ve kk ebatta profil retecekken, kaln levhalar, byk ebat profiller ve yarm in ve zerinde apl ubuklar retiyordu... lkede baka demir-elik tesisi olmadndan, sonuta, haddehane tam kapasite alsa, elik frnlar te bir, yksek frnlar altda bir kapasitede almak durumunda kalrd. Trkiye gibi kaynaklar kt bir lkede nasl bir sermaye israf." (Sugar, 1964, 169) Gerekten de, 1940-50 arasndaki ortalama kapasite kullanmlar haddehanede % 71, elikte % 46 ve yksek frnlarda ancak % 26 oldu. (Tezel, 1995, 305) 3. Sava Sonundan Planl Ekonomiye Geie Kadar Olan Dnem, 1947-1963: Kambiyo kontrolleri ile birlikte ithalat tahditlerinin kaldrld, tarm kapitalizminin, uygun dnya tarm fiyatlarnn da rzgaryla (Kore Sava tahl ve pamuk fiyatlarnn artmasna sebep olmutu) gelimee balad bu dnemin ilk yllarndan sonra, 1950'lerin sonuna doru, kapal bir rejim, sk kambiyo ve ithalat kaytlamalar ve dviz tahsisleri dnemi gelmitir. Bu dnemde, Trkiye'nin iktisat politikasnda, d politikasnda ve buna bal olarak, teknolojik alanlarda, etkisini uzun dnemde gsterecek stratejik deiiklikler-seimler yapt kabul edilir. Bu deiikliklerin ni-

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telii, nedenleri yazmzn kapsam dndadr. Ancak, genel hatlar ile ekonomi daha liberal, da ak, zel sektre ve piyasalarn hakim olduu politikalara ynelirken, d politikada, tarafszlktan anti-Sovyet ve proBat kampa kayd. Bu yaklam, Trkiye'nin 1947'de Truman Doktrini erevesine girmesine, Marshall Yardmndan yararlanmasna ve nihai olarak da, 1951'de NATO yesi olmasna yol aacak, i politikada ise tek parti dneminden ok parti dnemine geilecek, 1950'de iktidar Demokrat Parti'ye braklacaktr. Demokrat Parti'nin liberal politikalar, zel sermaye birikimi yeterli olmayan bir lkede, tekrar ve zorunlu olarak, devletilik, kambiyo kontroUar ve iktisadi-siyasi bir krizle gelen 1960 askeri darbesiyle noktalanmtr. Amerikal uzmanlarn tavsiyesiyle 18.1.1954'de kabul edilen 6224 sayl "Yabanc Sermayeyi Tevik Kanunu" ve 18.3.1954'de kabul edilen 6326 sayl "Petrol Kanunu" bu dnemdeki liberal mevzuata rnektir. Stratejik deiikliklere balang noktas olarak Marshall Yardmn almak fazla yanl olmayacaktr. Bu program, genel bir yardm erevesi ortaya koyar. Bu ereve iinde, eitli askeri, iktisadi ve teknik yardm imkanlar, kolay kredi ve hibeler iin anlamalar yaplr. Tabii, Avrupa iin tasarlanm bu yardmn, Trkiye ve Yunanistan temili iin Truman Doktrini'nin ilan beklenmiti. Kamp deiikliinin en nemli sonularndan birisi askeri malzeme silah sistemlerinin, savunma doktrinleriyle birlikte deimesidir. Bilindii gibi, Trkiye ve benzer lkelerdeki tarihsel modernleme hareketlerinin gerekelerinden biri, Bat ordular karsnda stnln kaybedilmesi ve bunu karlamak iin yeni silahlar ve bunlar reten sanayileri (teknolojileri) transfer etmek eklinde bir savunma refleksidir. Bilindii gibi, Osmanl genileme dneminde bile Bat'dan silah teknolojisi transfer etmitir: Fatih'in Macar Urban'a byk apta toplar dktrmesi yannda 18. yy'dan itibaren Fransz ve Prusya subaylarna askeri mhendislik okullar (Mhendishane-i Beni ve Bahri Hmayun) kurdurulmas, yeni talim ve askeri dzenler getirilmesi, bu yzden katlolunan reformcu padiahlar, paalar, yenieriliin tasfiyesi vb. tarihimizin nemli dnemeleridir Birinci Dnya Sava ncesi ve esnasnda Ordu, Alman teknoloji ve doktrinleri etkisine girmi, bu etki, malzeme ve silah arl olarak kinci Dnya Savanda da devam etmitir. Sava srasnda baz mttefik glere (ingiltere ve ABD) ait malzeme ve silah temin edilmise de, bunlar stratejik bir deiiklik yapmamtr. Ancak, 1947'de ABD ile yaplan "Matual Defence Assistance Act" ile Trkiye'ye, NATO'ya girmesinden nce, 1948-1952 arasnda 687 milyon USD askeri yardm salanm, bu da Ordumuzun tamamen ABD, daha sonra NATO standart ve silahlarna almasnn balangc olmutur. Kore Harbi de silah ve yeni sistemlerin Trk askerleri tarafndan renilmesinde nemli bir uygulama alan olacak, bu dnemde, Trk Hava Kuvvetleri, jet sava uaklar (F-84 ve 86 lar) ile tanacaktr. Az ok milliletirilmi Alman doktrinlerinin (tabye)

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braklp ABD sahra talimnamelerinin ve dier metinlerin tercme ve adaptasyonuyla byk bir teknoloji transfer aamasna geilmitir.4 Sivil hayattaki en nemli stratejik deiikliklerden biri, Amerikallarn yardmyla Karayollar Genel Mdrl'nn (TCK) kurulmas ve ulamda, demir yollar yerine karayollarnn arlk kazanmaya balamasdr. Bu ok iyi bilinen bir konudur; taraflar da bellidir. Bu seimde neler rol oynam olabilir? Bir kez savatan km ABD sanayii, tank yerine, i makineleri retmee balamt ve bunu satmak zorundayd. Marshall Yardmnn insani cephesi arkasnda bu iktisadi gerein bulunduu pek saklanmaz. ABD de kendi iinde bir stratejik tercih yapyor, demir yollar yerine hzla karayollar ve hava yollarna geiyordu. (Bombardman uaklar ina kapasitesinin yolcu uaklanna dntrlmesi ok iyi bir teknoloji seimi, neo-klasik iktisadn retim imkanlar erisindeki kaymaya, ders kitab ekliyle, tereya-top arasndaki miktar deiiminin arpc rneiydi.) Otomotiv sanayii (Detroit) ok glendii gibi petrol irketlerinin bu sistemle akrabal ve en byk irketlerin bu gruba tanmas, siyasi etkilerinin de artmasna yol amt; ABD'nin dnya pazarlarna yaylma dnemiydi. Amerikan yardm rgtlerinin (AID) nemli misyonlarndan biri bu olacakt. Bu teknoloji tercihinin ABD den empoze edildii ve yeni Demokrat Parti iktidar tarafndan da kolaylkla benimsendii anlalmaktadr. Trkiye'de teknoloji tercihlerinin siyasi tercihlere paralel bir "kamplama" sistemi iinde daha kolay anlalabileceini dnyorum. Demokrat Parti, CHP'nin devletilik politikalarna olduu kadar demiryolu politikasna kar kmay da bir igd haline getirmiti; Trkiye'yi "Kk Amerika" yapmak gibi bir ideal, Amerika'da olan ve yaplan her ey iyidir, mantn douruyordu. DP hrriyet temasn iledii iin, insanlarn istedii yere gitmesini salayan ferdi tamay, toplu tamaya tercih etmesi doald. Geri, Karayollar CHP zamannda kurulmutu ama benimseyen DP oldu. nk, yol yapmak devletin iiydi ve yapmnda "yol vergisi" ad altnda kylnn altrlmas, CHP'ye kar kullanlan propagandann nemli bir unsuru olmutu. Yollarn emek-youn deil sermaye-youn biimde devlet eliyle yaplmas, hem kyly mutlu klan hem de "modernlik" imajn pekletiren bir husustu. Bu politikalar, Trkiye'de demiryollarnn 1950'lerden sonra yaklak yarm yzyllk ihmalini dourduu gibi, karayollarnn devlet eliyle yapmndan mteahhite verilmesine, oradan yap-ilet-devlet modeliyle yabanc firmalara ana yollar tahsisine ulat.
4. Bu dnemde ocukluunu yaayan benim gibi asker ailesi kkenliler, Alman toverlerinin yerini ciplerin, bize ok byk gelen Cemselerin (GMC) hzla doldurduunu, M-48 ve M-36 tanklarnn, toplarn trenlerle Dou'ya aktn, Amerikan, potin ve palaskalarnn yayldn, ordu kyafetlerinin de (kepler, montgomeriler vb.) yeni dzene uydurulduunu yaamzdr. Bu deneyim, kk lde, bir "Nizam- Cedit" veya "Asakir-i Mansure" havasndayd.

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Trkiye'de ulam politikasndaki stratejik yanllardan ok sz edilir. Bazlar da, bugnk durumumuzu iftihar vesilesi sayar. Kanaatimizce, Trkiye, 1950'den sonraki stratejik tercihlerinde yapt gibi, ularda yaamay sevmekte, dengeyi bulamamaktadr. Kukusuz, byk bir lkede, her tarafa demiryoluyla ulamak pahal ve hatta imkansz bir hedeftir. Ama, yan denizle evrili kk bir "Kta"da yaadmz unutulmadan, denizyollar, demiryollar ve kara yollar arasnda optimal bir denge kurulabilirdi. Avrupa, yk tamasn, deniz ve demiryoluna biralarken, Trkiye, Avrupa'nn en byk tanker, kamyon ve otobs filosuyla petrole dayal ok pahal ve tehlikeli (trafik kazalar) bir tamaclk yapmaktadr. Avrupa, Japonya ve ABD giderek hzl (saatte 300 km. civarnda) trenlerle demiryollarn canlandrrken, biz, Almanlarn yz yl nce yapt (uzun ve gnmze gre standart alt) hatlarda Ankara-lstanbul arasnda seyahat ediyoruz. Tabii ki, bunlarn alternatif zmlerini burada retenleyiz.5 Burada ulam konusunda yarm yzyl nce yaplm stratejik bir deiikliin nedenleri zerinde durduk. Bu devletin, ynetenlerin yapt bir seimdir; dorudur-yanltr; tarih deerlendirir. Bunun stne, 1980'lerde devlet eliyle yol yapm, hatta planlamasnn, tamamen firmalara, uluslararas konsorsiyumlara brakld yeni bir model gelitirildi. Bu da bir teknolojik tercihtir; daha baka yerlerde deerlendirilmelidir. in baka bir yan bu genel tercihin veri olarak alnmas durumunda, uygulama ya da taktik seimlerinin rasyonel ve artlara uygun olup olmad, sistemin kendi "feasibility" sini yapp yapamayacadr. Baka deyile, karayollarnn en ekonomik yntemle ncelii olan gzergahtan geirilmesi, inaatn zamanlamas ve teknik seiminin iyi yaplmas vb. hususlardaki kararlar ne lde "mhendis-teknisyen" kararlaryla alnmaktadr? Bu dnemde ve daha ilerde, iktisadi kararlarda askerlerden ok yeni siyasetiler arlklarn hissettirecektir.6
5. Biz, baka bir yerde, yeni, hzl demiryollar ile Ankara-lstanbul'u birbirine banliy eklinde balayarak, Tokyo-Osaka gibi, gelecekte STANKA diye anlacak bir byk ehir kompleksi ile, iki ehrin de "ufunetini" aradaki bo alanlara yaymay ve bu sisteme, Bursa-Eskiehir eksenini ilave ederek, daha geni bir sanayi-metropol planlamas yapmay nermitik. (Boratav-Trkcan, 1993, 111-2) lgi ekici bir yanllklar setine burada deinmek yerinde olur. Istanbul-Ankara karayolu, harita zerinde de grlecei gibi, Bolu'ya uramadan ve Bolu Dan amadan, daha Gney'den kolay ve ksa bir hat izer. Bolu milletvekillerinin gc, yolu bugnknn yerine, Kuzeye ekmitir. Bu birinci yanl tercihtir. Daha sonra, 1980'lerde, TEM de, buna paralel ve Bolu Da'n geen bir ikinci pahal yol olmutur. Bu ikinci hatadr. Burada yolun ekonomisi zerinde durmuyorum. Bu kararla birlikte, iki byk modern mhendislik hatas yaplmtr: Birincisi, yolun projelendirilmesi, inaat, kontrol mhendislii ve hatta finansman, yapmc firmaya terk edilmitir. Pek tabiidir ki, firmalar, kendileri iin en kolay, en krl projeyi, kendi insaflanyla uygulama durumundadrlar. kincisi, bir projede en zor ksmlar nce balar ve paralar aym zamanda bitirilir ki, zaman faktr ekonomik kullanlm olsun. Bir projede eer Bolu Da varsa, ilk kazma buraya vurulur, nk projenin en g b-

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Tarmdaki byk teknolojik deiimi burada anlatmak ok gtr. Anadolu tarihinde, demografik, sosyal ve ekonomik sonularn hl yaadmz byk deiimin temelinde, tarm teknolojisinin kkten deiimi, "traktr stratejisi" denen (Singer, 1977, 202) mekanizasyon yatmaktadr: Traktr says 1948'de 1.756 iken, 1950'de 16.585, 1952'de 31.415, 1957'de 44.144 olmutur. Buna paralel, o zamana kadar pek bilinmeyen bier dverlerin says 1958'de 6.592'ye ykselmitir. Bu makinelerle, lkemizde tarm topraklan birleerek optimal leklere ulald gibi, ekilebilir topraklar en st dzeye km, sermaye-youn retim, kyden ehre g hzlandrmtr. Tarm kapitalizmini lkeye kim getirdi sorusuna iktisat tarihisine brakarak, gzden kaan bir teknolojik balantya iaret etmekle yetinelim. Mekanize bir ordu, sanayileme, makineye aina insanlar ister. Trkler, ilk kez makine ile bu aamada, kitlesel bir tanklk kazandlar. Kyl, bir traktr, bir kamyon grm olarak, ehirdeki fabrikada, mekanize taburda hayata daha kolay adapte oldu; makine talebi artt. Bu talep, daha sonraki aamada otomotiv sanayiinin ve genelde sanayilemenin ivmesini artracaktr.

Unutulmamaldr ki, bu dnemde, Trkiye, toplu ine ve kurun kalemin ithal edildii, pek az tketim malnn retildii bir aamadan, tedricen, en ileri (high-tech) olmasa da, her maln retildii, monte edildii bir yere doru hareket etmitir.7 Daha nemlisi, ilk yerli zel sanayi sermayesi bu dnemde mayalanr: Ko, Sabanc, Eczacba vb. ticaretten ilk sanayi denemelerine geerler. lkede sanayilemenin ikinci perdesi almtr.
lm burasdr. Bilindii gibi, yolun btn ksmlar iletmeye alndktan sonra, bu blmn inaat balamtr. Firma, buray talyan usul viyadklerle geecekken, 1993 de projelerin balatc saylan zat lp, yerine meslekten, ok deneyimli bir inaat mhendisi devletin bana geti ve ilk kararlarndan biri, sanrm, evre mlahazasyla, Bolu Da'n tnelle gemek oldu. Herkes de bilir ki, Trkiye'nin en zor jeolojik artlarn tayan byle bir yerde, uzun ettler olmadan tnele balanmaz ve belki de, ekonomisi olmadndan yaplamaz. O tarihte tnele girildi ve hl klamyor. Bu arada, Trkiye'nin en ilek yolu Ankara-Sivrihisar ok ge bir tarihte, Karayollar Gen. Mdrl tarafndan yaptrlmaya balandnda, bir banliy hatt olan zmireme yolu, arazi rant kazanmak iin otoyol sistemiyle yaptrld. Dnyada hibir otoyol, kmaz sokak gibi, kk bir tatil kasabasnda sona ermez. Hl, stanbulzmir otoyolunun plan bile mevcut deil. ocukluumuzda, Anadolu'da en nemli aydnlanma arac, elektrik olan ve olmayan yerlerde (elektrikler lokal retildiinden, her zaman almaz, alrsa ok dk voltajda alr, fazla bir yaran olmazd) lks lambas denen, gaz yayla alan ama gl k veren bir aygt bulunurdu. Her evde de olmayan bu 'lks'n ipek veya benzeri bir maddeden yaplm gmlei (flaman) belli bir srede biterdi. Sanrm svelilerle yaplan ilk yabanc sermaye yatrm bu gmlekle ilgiliydi. Zaten ou sve yapm lks kullananlar iin nemli bir gelimeydi. Lks lambas nasl geldi, yanna (yine gazyayla alan ve ok pratik bir bulu saylan) gaz ocan nasl takt, tm bunlar bizim sanayi tarihimizin aratrlmas gereken konulardr.

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4. thal kamesi Arlkl lk 3. Be Yllk Kalknma Plan Dnemi, 1963-1980: Trkiye'nin yaygn ve yine kendi leine gre youn biimde sanayiletii ve doal olarak da en byk, kitlesel teknoloji transferlerini yapt dnemdir. Bu dnemde yerli ve yabanc zel sektrn yan sra KiT'ler de ok nemli teknolojiler transfer etmilerdir. Bu transferlerde ve seimlerde DPT'nin ve eitli yerlere bal alan (bir ara Ticaret Bakanl, sonra DPT ve imdilerde Hazine Mstearl) Yabanc Sermaye Dairesi Bakanl'nn, sektrlere gre, yatrm byklk ve niteliklerine bal olarak, derece derece kontrol ve kriter uygulamalar olmutur.8 Bu dnem, iktisat politikalar asndan "ithal-ikameci" denilen bir aamadr. Kk lekler ve daha geri teknolojiler (kullanlm makine ve tehizat) kapal gmrk duvarlar arkasnda krl alabilir nk, fiyatlar dnya fiyatlar deil, milli pazardaki monopol fiyatlardr. "Bebek sanayiler" uygulamas, kalknmann ilk aamalarnda gerekli midir, deil midir? Bunun tartma yeri buras deildir; ancak, pek ok, eski, kk-lekli, orijin lkesinde krl olmaktan km teknolojinin ve makinelerin lkeye girdiini de inkar edemeyiz; bu da, teknolojiyi siz retmiyorsanz, ok doaldr. KiT'lerin teknoloji transferleri ayrca ele alnmaa deer bir teknoloji transferi rnek olaylar seti oluturur. Sovyetler Birlii ile yaplan paket program (sdemir, Seydiehir Alminyum), Bat kkenli Erdemir, Karadeniz Bakrlar (Finlandiya'nn henz denenmemi yeni bir "smelting" teknolojisi girdi), Kayseri in-Kur, Uluda Volfram gibi metalrji alanndaki kimi baarl, kimi hayli baarsz bir ok seimin devlet kademelerinde nasl yapld aratrlmaldr.9 Ancak, makro seimin nedeni, rnein, Sovyet teknolojisi, 1930'lardaki Birinci Sanayi Plan'nn tercihlerine benzeyen, eitli iktisadi ve siyasi artlar altnda, o zamanki hkmetin siyasi bir karar olmaldr. Bir anlamda kstl bir teknolojik bir seim karardr; Eer serbest piyasadan alminyum teknolojisi almak mmkn olamamsa, mali g yetmezlii veya bu alandaki Bat oligopol Trkiye'nin retici olmasn istememise, Sovyet teknolojisinden baka seenek kalmamtr. Ancak, Sovyetler'de, birden fazla teknoloji ve lek varsa, bu seimi Trk uzmanlar m yapmtr yoksa bir Sovyet Brokrat, "bu sizim iin iyidir" diyerek, bu seimi bizim admza m yapmtr? Bunlar da devlet arivlerinden ve hl yaayan, o zamann politikac ve brokratlarndan renilmelidir.
8. rnein, bir zamanlar ok pahal bir kiralama yntemiyle kullanlan bilgisayarlarn kamu ve zel sektr talepleri, DPT, DE ve Bakanlk uzmanlarndan oluan bir komite tarafndan deerlendirilirdi. O zamanki bilgisayarlarn gc bugnk basit bir PC nin de ok altndayd. Doktora rencim Metalurjist Esin Yrk, Trkiye'nin bu alanda yapt teknoloji transferleri ve seimleriyle ilgili bir doktora tezi hazrlamaktadr.

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5- Yeni Liberal Dnem, 1980 den Gnmze Dein: Trkiye'nin, dnyada esen liberal rzgarlara, biraz ge de olsa, katlmasyla, eklen planl ama bir yerde, ge gelen liberalizmin etkisiyle, kendi leklerinin tesinde bir mali ve ticari serbestlie kavutuunu, bunu iyi ve kt, krizli yanlaryla yaamaa baladn biliyoruz. Doal olarak, kambiyo ve ithalat kontrollarnm, pratikte kaldrld, ihracatn da ar biimde tevik edildii bir ortamda, yabanc sermaye yatrmlar ve teknoloji transferleri, haydi haydi serbest kalmtr. Pek ok byk yatrm ve teknoloji trasferi bu dnemde zel sektr eliyle gerekletirilmi, kamu sektr de, zellikle haberlemede, dijital santrallara geerek teknolojik srama yapmtr. Teknolojilerin byk lde, te ikiye yakn Avrupa Topluluu lkelerinden geldii, ABD'nin bunu drtte biri civarnda bir teknoloji salad grlmektedir. (Tablo 1) Japonya ise bu dnemde, Trkiye'ye tedricen girmektedir. 6224 erevesindeki zel sektrn yapt lisans anlamalarnn imalat sanayiinde younlat aadaki 2. tabloda grlmektedir.
Tablo 1. Trkiye'de 6224 Sayl "Yabanc Sermayeyi Tevik Kanunu"na Gre Yaplm Lisans Anlamalarnn lkelere Gre Dalm, 1980-1996

Yllar 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Toplam

ABD
3 3 2 9 7 1 8 19 15 15 12 19 7 9 6 13 7 155

Avrupa Birlii 6 15 17 32 49 13 54 50 39 43 45 34 28 23 38 38 59 593

Japonya

Dierleri 1 3 4 14 11 17 10 20 17 15 12 3 9 3 6 4 9 148

Toplam 10 21 25 55 69 33 76 94 76 74 70 56 48 36 54 55 78 930

2 2 2 4 5 5 1 1 4 1 4 3 34

Kaynak: Hazine Mstearl, Yabanc Sermaye Bakanl Yaynlan ve Yaynlanma-

758

Tablo 2; Trkiye'de 6224 Sayl "Yabanc Sermayeyi Tevik Kanunu"na Gre Yaplm Lisans Anlamalarnn Sektrlere Gre Dalm, 1980-996

Yllar 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Toplam

Tarm

Maden

malat 10 21 25 54 59 29 68 81 68 56 62 46 42 34 51 45 52 803

Hizmet

Toplam 10 21 25 55 69 33 76 94 76 74 70 56 48 34 54 55 78 930

1 4 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 1

6 5 10 5 15 6 6 3 2 10 26 96

2 2 1

25

Kaynak: Hazine Mstearl, Yabanc Sermaye Bakanl Yaynlan ve Yaynlanma-

Bu tablolardaki veriler sadece 6224'e tabi firmalarn lisans anlamas tescillerini kapsamaktadr. Bunun dnda pek ok lisans anlamas yaplmtr. Ancak bunlarn saylan, dalmlar, deme zellikleri, nitelikleri vb. hakknda hl ciddi verilere sahip deiliz. Trkiye'de teknoloji stokunu ve teknoloji dzeyini belirleyen bu en nemli dsal faktr hakknda kapsaml bilgilerimizin olmamas, bilim ve aratrma politikalanmzn da salkl tasarmn engellemektedir. Bylece acil, hatta gecikmi bir aratrma programnn da erevesi ortaya kmaktadr. KAYNAKLAR
Barkan, .L., "Trk Toprak Hukuku Tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi", MEB, Tanzimat, 1940 iinde. Boratav, K. ve Trkcan, E., (Editr) "Trkiye'de Sanayilemenin Yeni Boyutlar ve KiT'ler", Tarih Vakf Yurt Yaynlan, 1993

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Buchanan, R. A., "IndustrialArchaeology in Britain", Penguin, 1966. in, 1977. DE, "Trkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelimenin 50 Yl", 1973. nan, A., "Devletilik tikesi ve Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin Birinci Sanayi Plan", Trk Tarih Kurumu, 1972. nan, A., "Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin kinci Sanayi Plan", Trk Tarih Kurumu, 1989. Issawi, C, "The Economic History ofTurkey", The University of Chicago Press, 1980. Kepenek, Y. ve Yentrk, N., "Trkiye Ekonomisi", Remzi Kitabevi, 6. Basm, 1994. Keyder, ., "Dnya Ekonomisi inde Trkiye", Tarih Vakf, 1995. Kurmu, O., "Emperyalizmin Trkiye'ye Girii", Bilim Yaynlar, 1974. kn, G., "Osmanl Sanayii: 1913; 1915 Yllar Sanayi statistikleri", ASBF Yayn, 1971. kn, G., "Trkiye ktisat Kongresi 1923", ASBF Yayn, 1968. Ricardo, D., "The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation", Dent, 1962. Singer, M., "The Economic Advance of Turkey, 1938-1960", Turkish Economic Society, 1977. Sugar, P. F., "Economic Modernization in Japan and Turkey", Princeton, 1964 iinde. Tekeli, 1., ye ilkin S., "Uygulamaya Geerken Trkiye'de Devletiliin Oluumu", ODT, 1982. Tezel, Y. S., "Cumhuriyet Dneminin ktisadi Tarihi", Tarih Vakf, 1995. Toprak, Z., "Milli ktisat-Milli Burjuvazi", Yurt Yaynlan, 1995. Trel, O., "Uluslararas Ticaret ve Teknolojik Deime: Teori ve Politika Sorunlar zerinde Bir Deerlendirme", DE, Teknoloji ve stihdam, (Editr: Tuncer Bulutay), 1998, ss. 135-142. Trkcan, E., (Oktar Trel'in almas zerine) "Yorum", DE, Teknoloji ve stihdam, (Editr: Tuncer Bulutay), 1998, ss. 135-142. Trkcan, E., 'Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Bilim ve Teknoloji Politikalar, 1923-1998: Tarihi Bir Perspektif, O.D.T..de yaplan 75. Yl Kongresi'nde sunulan bildiri. (10-12 Aralk 1998).

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TURKISH ECONOMY ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21st CENTURY: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF SOME RECENT INTERNATIONAL APPRAISALS
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. efik Alp BAHADIR* EVTRODUCTION in these days, as we approach the next millennium, the Republic of Trkiye -as it is now offcially known- celebrates its 75th anniversary and, throughout the country, festivities are taking place to mark the event. This is an appropriate occasion to take stock of the achievements of this very young state. This paper is an attempt to undertake such stocktaking in the field of political economy and derives two main results. First, in the 20th century when most countries got "stuck" in a path of insuffcient growth and economic backvvardness, Turkey has revealed a high degree of adapive efficiency with regard to changing global economic trends and external shocks, and this promises to be the most outstanding developmental asset of the country in the next millenium. Second, this high degree of adapive efficiency of the Turkish economy is the outcome of the cultural renevval and the new belief system of the Turkish society which originate in Atatrk's cultural reforms. The first section of the paper gauges the economic significance of culture by exploring the concepts of path dependence and adaptive efficiency. The second section touches on four episodes of successful economic policy changes in the past which display the adaptive efficiency of the economic system in Turkey. The paper concludes with some general observation on the Jurkish economy on the threshold of the 2st century.
Professor Bahadr is holder of the Chair for Contemporary Middle Eastern Research at the Institute of Economics of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. At the present, he is also executive director of the Interdisciplinary Central Institute of Regional Research of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg; Director of the Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Middle East Studies of the Universities of Bamberg and Erlangen-Nuremberg; and Predean of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg.

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The Economic Significance ofCulture in his Alfred Nobel Memorial Lecture of 1993, Douglass C. North raised an issue which turned out, since then, to be the focus of international debates on the theory of economic dynamics, especially in the feld of cliometrics: "Why do economies nce on a path of groyvth or stagnation tend to persist?"1. in two volumes, The Rise of the Western World} and Structure and Change in Economic Historf, North investigated world history in this light. The principle question in these volumes is why Europe failed to grow in a sustained manner from 900 to 1700, yet succeeded thereafter. This ort of question is very common in the field of economic history and it evokes one of the central issues of the history of the Ottoman Empire which is why the Empire failed to grow in a sustainable manner after 16004. The answer of North to this kind of question is, however, a novelty in mainstream economies insofar as he argues that inereases in the conventional factors commonly used to explain economic growth imply that an economy has the capacity to grow. They do not therefore explain why growth is absent in particular countries or at particular times. Saying that countries grow because they inerease their stock of capital is, according to North, like saying that people are rich because they have money. in his view, the rules of economic and social interaction determine economic outeomes more than the stock of resources and the level of technology. North would like to return economic historians to one of their original tasks, that is to the understanding of the "humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction"5, whether they be laws, norms, ideology, government agencies, constitutions, codes of behavior, religion, or conventions. The path of development of any society depends, according to North, crucially on these formal and informal rules and constraints of human interaction and on their evolution through time. With an enabling set of rules and constraints, capital can accumulate, innovation can flourish, and economic growth can be sustained. Without it, nothing. However, the emergence of an enabling set of rules and constraints depends crucially on the kind of learning that the individuals in a society acquired through
1. 2. 3. 4. Douglass C. North, "Economic Performance Through Time", The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (June 1994), pp. 359-368, cit. p. 365. Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. London: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W.W. Northon&Co., 1981. See, in particular, Halil nalck, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700", Archivum Ottomanicum, Vol. 6 (1980), pp. 283-337; and, The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973, by the same author. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 3.

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time. This collective learning "consists of those experiences that have passed the slow test of time and are embodied in our language, institutions, technology, and ways of doing things"6. From this perspective, North asserts his main argument as follows: "it is cluture that provides the key to path dependence-a term used to describe the prowerful influence of the past on the present and future. The current learning of any generation takes place within the context of the perceptions derived from collective learning. Learning then is an incremental process filtered by the culture of a society which determines the perceived payoffs, but there is no guarantee that the cumulative past experience of a society will necessarily fit it to solve new problems. Societies that get 'stuck' embody belief systems and institutions that fail to confront and solve new problems of societal complexity". Accordingly, "incentives embodied in belief systems as expressed in institutions (i.e. formal and informal rules and constraints of human interaction, S.A.B.) determine economic performance through time"7. After founding the eminent impact of culture on the path dependence of an economy, North refuses the conventional concept of allocative efficiency as an appropriate criterion of successful economic growth. in his view, "it is adaptive rather than allocative efficiency which is the key to long-run growth. Successful political/economic systems have evolved flexible institutional structures that can survive the shocks and changes that are part of successful evolution8. But again, it is the culture which brings about the adaptive efficiency of economies and their long-run performance. in the words of North, "these systems have been a product of long gestation. We do not know how to create adaptive efficiency in the short run"9. North's conceptualization of the impact of culture on path dependence and adaptive efficiency of economies may be viewed as a paramount assault on mainstream economic theory since it implies refusal to accept the concept of allocative efficiency as the key instrument of that theory. On the other hand, North has been avvarded the Nobel Prize in Economies "for having renevved research in economic history". Therefore, his work certainly marks the beginning of a cultural turn in the reasoning of mainstream economists, and it has pioneered theoretical and empirical studies in this line which focus on many topics, such as the role of culture in the emergence and perpetuation of distinet institutional and organizational trajectories10, the formal and informal institutional foundations of
6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Douglass C. North, "Economic Performance...", p. 364. Ibid. Ibid., p.367. Ibid. Avner Greif, "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies", Joumal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 2 (October 1994), pp. 912-950.

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the market and informal systems for contract enforcement11, the interrelations among social structures, culture, and economic and political institutions12, the role of various organizations in facilitating cooperation, organizational complementarities, and the institutional foundations of the state13, to name but a few. in spite of this intensive research work, two central issues raised by North have so far not been resolved: Firstly, "Why do economies nce an a path of groyvth or stagnation tend to persist?", and secondly, "how to create adaptive efficiency in the short run" in order to release an economy from the path of stagnation. Concerning the second question, it is generally accepted that emulation is not a panacea. North asserted this by stressing the importance of informal rules and constraints in a society which adopts the institutional structure of a more successful society: "Economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have very diferent performance characteristics than the first economy because of different informal norms and enforcement. The implication is that transferring the formal political and economic rules of successful Western market economies to third-world and Eastern European economies is not a sufficient condition for good economic performance"14. Recently, Victor Nee stressed the same conclusion by comparing the economic performance of transition economies. in these countries, governments "implemented far-reaching transformation of formal rules of the game to institute market economies. (...) But whether rulers followed blueprints of capitalist transition provided by Western economists of pursued a trialand-error evolutionary approach, the behavior of economic actors frequently bears little resemblance to the legitimate courses of action stipulated by the formal rules. Instead, networks based on personal connections serve to organize market-oriented behavior according to informal norms reflecting the private expectations of entrepreneurs and politicians. They act in the shadow of the state, often at odds with the goals formulated by rulers. in China, informal privatization and local arrangements have contributed to a remarkable two decades of sustained economic growth. But in Russia, mafia-like business netvvorks have operated to obstruct Boris Yeltsin's efforts at building a modern market economy. What accounts for the difference in results? One thing is certain: a one-sided fo11. Karen Clay, "Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican Califomia", Journal ofLaw, Economies, and Organization, Vol. 13, No. 1 (April 1997), pp. 202231. 12. Masahiko Aoki, "Tovvard a Comparative institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some Tentative General Insights", Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 (March 1966), pp. 1-19. 13. Randall L. Calvert, "Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions", in: Jack Knight and Itai Sened (eds.), Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, pp. 57-94. 14. Douglass C. North, "Economic Performance Through Time", op.cit., p. 366.

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cuss on formal... constraints would miss the boat in understanding economic behavior in transition economies"15. The next section of this paper briefly describes four episodes of successful economic transition in Turkey which display the remarkable adaptive effciency of the Turkish economic and societal system. The Turkish model comprising a successful combination of appropriate informal rules and constraints of economic behavior which are the outcome of Atatrk's cultural reforms, on the one hand, and of the adoption of modern institutions of prosperous contemporary economies on the other, may help economists to better specify the relationship between these formal and informal norms and institutions, and may deliver some insight to politicians in the transition economies of today thus allowing them to design economic and societal programs vvhich promise an improved economic performance. A majr task of economic historians of Turkey is to integrate the Turkish experience in the ongoing international research on economic change through time. The following remarks represent some preliminary hypotheses down that road. Atatrk's Cultural Reforms and the Adaptive Effciency of the Turkish Economy Chapter 8 of Bernard Lewis Book The Emergence of Modern Turkey starts with the following sentence: "At the end of 1918 it seemed that the Sick Man of Europe was about to die at last"16. This is only a popular expression of the path dependence and failing adaptive effciency of the Ottoman economy and society. Atatrk's uniqueness as a stateman lies in the fact that he detected the crucial sources of the path dependence of the old Empire and identified the necessity of cultural renewal as the key factor in order to enhance the adaptive effciency of Turkish society. The most impressive evidence of these insights are the following passages of his address of 1923 to the assembled delegates of the economic congress in izmir and of his speech of 1927 to the deputies and representatives of the Republican Party in Ankara, in zmir, he exposed one of the crucial factors of the path dependence of the Ottoman Empire as follows: "My friends, those who conquer by the sword are doomed to be overcome by those who conquer with the plough, and finally to give place to them. Thas is what happened to the Ottoman Empire... The arm that vvields the sword grows weary and in the end puts it back in the scabbard, where perhaps it is doomed to rust and moulder; but the arm that holds the plough grows daily stronger, and in growing stronger becomes yet more 17 the master and owner of the soil..." in his speech of 1927, Atatrk dis15. Victor Nee, "Norms and Netvvorks in Economic and Organizational Performance", The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (May 1988), pp.85-89, cit. p.86. 16. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press, (1961), 2nd ed. 1962, p. 134. 17. Kemal Atatrk, Atatrk'n Sylev ve Demeleri, 3 Vols. istanbul 1945-1952, cit. Vol. 2, p. 99.

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played very celarly his deep conviction that cultural beliefs embedded in existing institutions direct the process of organizational innovation and adoption, as well as cultural and social evolution. He asked the delegates of the Republican Party: "Is it possible to cali a group of people a 'Civilised nation' if they let themselves be led by the nose by a herd of eyhs, Dedes, Seyyids, elebis, Babas and Emirs; if they entrust their destiny and their lives to chiromancers, magicians, dice-throwers and amulet sellers? Ought one to conserve in the Turkish State, in the Turkish Republic, elements and institutions such as those vvhich had for centuries given the nation the appearance of being other than it really was? Would one not therevvith have committed the greatest, most irreparable error to the cause of progress and reavvakening?"18. Sweeping away outmoded religious institutions and lavvs was, however, only a first step in the cultural renewal of Turkish society. Atatrk's main achievement was to persuade Turks to accept the new secular values. Atatrk's radical cultural reforms that followed the abolition of the caliphate and their impact on Turkish society have been extensively analysed and evaluated by many historians. it has often been emphasized, that in this cultural transformation "the replacement of old, Islamic conceptions of identity, authority, and loyalty by new conceptions of European origin was of fundamental importance"19. The impact of Atatrk's cultural reforms on the adaptive efficiency of Turkish society and the Turkish economy, in particular, has not yet been the subject of similarly intensive research. in fact, the eminent and long-lasting impact of Atatrk's cultural reforms turns out, in retrospect, to be disruption of the path dependence of the old societal and economic system and boosting of the adaptive efficiency of these systems thus enabling them to cope successfully with the shocks and changes that characterized the decades vvhich have since passed. The frst episode of the economic history of the Turkish Republic vvhich displays a high degree of adaptive efficiency is the introduction and the performance of the economic regime of etatism. World War I and the War of Independence had left the country economically in chaos, and the Treaty of Lausanne constrained economic policy in such a way that the new republic did not gain full autonomy until 1929. The years 1923 through 1929 thus became a period of reconstruction, modernization and institutional change in vvhich the government of Atatrk prepared for a modern development policy with industrialization as its backbone. The Great Depression of 1929 seriously compounded the country's economic problems. Since Turkey vvas an exporter of primary commodities, the global depression caused a sharp deterioration in its external terms of trade.
18. Turkish Republic, Ministry of Education (ed.). A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatrk 1927. stanbul: Ministry of Education Printing Plant, 1963, p. 739. 19. Bernard Lewis, op. cit., p. 479.

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The policy of etatism that emerged after 1929 was one of the first examples among developing countries of an inward-looking, importsubstitution strategy in a mixed economy with a large public enterprise sector and economic planning. As part of this strategy, the First Five Year Industrial Plan went into effect in 1934, which was the first such attempt by a developing country outside the Soviet Union. As many historians pointed out, the new policy was not inspired, however, by any new ideological trends, or due to any external theoretical influences20. it was just the outcome of the successful adaption of the newly created institutional structures to the domestic needs and external constraints of the time in order to set up a new path of economic growth. The results were impressive: Large-scale distribution of public land to landless laborers and smallholders was instrumental in improving equity in land ovvnership and expanding the cultivated area. Conservative fiscal and monetary policies accompanied a remarkable expansion of production throughout the decade of the Great Depression. As a result, Turkey experienced its first high-growth period. From 1927-29 to 1937-39, that is the 1930s as a whole, the GNI grovvth rate was 6.3 percent, with 4.2 percent per capita growth21. During World War II, with military considerations taking the upper hand, civilian development efforts were reduced or brought to a standstill. A second round of institutional change, initiated in 1946, was the reform of the etatist economic policy in the direction of greater reliance on private initiative and agriculture, and playing down the emphasis on public sector industry. The ruling Republican Party offered a new, more liberal defnition of etatism, stili reserving for the public sector such activities as Utilities, railroads, mining, and heavy and military industry, yet visualising a transfer of ali other public enterprises to the private sector. The success of this policy change is again impressive evidence of the adaptive efficiency of the Turkish economy and society which was brought about by the cultural reforms of Atatrk. Estimates of Turkish GNP make it clear that the years from 1944-46 to 1951-53 were a period of rapid recovery of both agricultural and industrial production. During this period, GNP increased at a rate of 8.7 percent, industry by 9.7 percent and agriculture at a rate of 9.4 percent. Economists have often asserted that this rapid economic recovery and grovvth was an impact of the European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan). Indeed, during the period 1948 to 1952, Turkey received a total of $213 Million from the Mashall Plan aid programme. This amount was, hovvever, quite small in comparison to other 15 European recipient
20. Ibid., p. 463. 21. Bent Hansen, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Grovvth. Egypt and Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University Press (published for the World Bank), 1991, p. 319.

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countries; only Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden received less22. The coincidence of aid flows and rapid grovvth in Europe has led many academic observers, politicians and the general public to believe in a casual link. This view has recently been the subject of a lively academic debate. The traditional view that this massive transfer of recources made a considerable contribution to the economic recovery of Western Europe has come under heavy attack23. A comparison of the aid receipts of individual countries (in per cent of their GNP) and their economic performance as measured by the grovvth of GNP and exports reveals no clear picture. A statistical analysis shows only a weak and insignificant positive correlation betvveen aid receipts in per cent of GNP and the grovvth of exports and especially GNP in the 1948-1953 period24. Especially the negative effect of this program on the economic policy of West European countries is emphasized. it is argued that "the Marshall Plan relieved European governments of the need to correct their economic policies in a way which would have made their countries attractive for private capital inflows. Instead, it encouraged the majority of European governments to continue with their internal policies of planifcation, demand expansion and prematre redistribution"25. Accordingly, with regard to recent demands for a new Marshall Plan for eastern Europe, it is cautioned that "The Marshall Plan for Western Europe after World War II provides an example that external fnancing may even retard rather than promote economic reforms"26. in the case of Turkey, however, the Marshall Plan aid had a strong impact on the transition to a liberal economic policy regime. This transition evolved from a mix of domestically derived motivations and goals, and from the need to respond to problems of the world system as a whole. The new economic policy originated out of a successful meshing of Turkish policy makers' concerns about the structural needs of the Turkish economy with their recognition that international aid would be available only with liberalization of the economy and democratization of the country. There thus existed, after the Second World War, a harmony of interests betvveen the donor country, the U.S., and the recipient country, Turkey, on the scope and purposes of the aid. The economic policies of Menderes's Democrat Party, which came to povver after the elec22. W. Kostrzewa, P. Nunnenkamp, H. Schmiedling, "A Marshall Plan for Middle and Eastern Europe?", Kiel Working Papers No. 403, Kiel: The Kiel Institute of World Economics, 1989, p. 8, Table 1. 23. Werner Abelshauser, "Zur Funktion des Marshallplans beim westdeutschen Wideraufbau", Vierteljahreshefte fr Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 37, 1989, No. 1, pp. 85-113. Tyler Cowen, "The Marshall Plan: Myths and Realities", in: Doug Bandow (ed.), U.S. Aid to the Developing World-A Free Market Agenda, Washington, D.C., 1985. Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1984. 24. W. Kostrzevva, P. Nunnekamp, H. Schmieding, "A Marshall Plan for Middle and Eastern Europe?", Kiel Working Papers No. 403, December 1989, p. 8, Table 1. 25. Ibid., p. 10. 26. Ibid., p. 30.

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tions of 1950, aimed at carrying reform even further. Yet considering the very substantial revisions of the ideology of etatism in the second half of 1940s, from a development point of view the change of regime in 1950 stands out as a matter of degree more than of kind. A third round of institutional change, codifed in the new constitution of 1961, was an efficient adaptation of the economic policy in Turkey to changing internal and external requirements of economic growth. From the economic perspective, the constitution was important in attempting to block the inflationary budget fnancing of the late 1950s, requiring comprehensive planning, and making unionization a right of labor for the first time in the Republic. The constitution provided the institutional conditions for continuation of the etatist, inward-looking development policy, which lasted until 1980. Investment volumes and patterns were determined by successive fve-year development plans, investment licensing, credit rationing, and import licensing, and Turkey experienced her second high-growth period. From 1965 to 1980, Turkey achieved with 6.2 percent the highest average annual growth rate of GDP among the OECD countries27. A fourth round of institutional change, triggered by the global debt crisis of late 1970s, began 1980 with a reform program aimed at stabilizing and liberalizing the economy. The program included liberalization of foreign trade and domestic fnancial markets, abolishment of most price controls, and reform of public enterprises and taxation. The inwardlooking import-substitution strategy was partly replaced by an exportpromotion strategy. The result of this "fundamental economic transformation"28, as George Kopits of the IMF called it, was a huge expansion of foreign trade and sustained economic growth. From 1980 to 1990, the export volume of Turkey increased with an average annual rate of 9.1 percent, and Turkey attained the 1 lth rank of export performance among the 120 countries reported by the World Bank29, in this period, Turkey had, again, the highest average annual rate of growth among the 24 OECD countries30. These four episodes of successful economic regime change display very impressively the high degree of adaptive efficiency of the Turkish economy and society. The banal fact that each of these rounds of successful policy change follovved a deep economic crisis led, however, some observers of the Turkish economy to the pessimistic conclusion that Turkish governments were incapable of learning from past experience ex27. World Bank, World Development Report 1992. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press (published for the World Bank), 1992, p. 220, Table 2. 28. George Kopits, Structural Reform, Stabilisation, and Grovvth in Turkey, IMF Occasional Paper 52. Washington, D.C.: IMF, May 1987, p. 9. 29. Ibid., p. 224f., Table 14. 30. OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, Historical Statistics. 1960-1990, Paris: OECD, 1992, p. 48, Table 3.1.

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cept in the midst of the most serious crises. Professor Szyliowicz recently attempted to explain the "stubborn adherence" of political decision makers in Turkey to misguided policies by emphasizing the strength of their belief systems31. in a similar manner, Professor Kedourie recently cautioned on the stability of the political system in Turkey by saying that "the tension betvveen secularism and islam present in Turkish politics from the foundation of the Republic, is ...far from subsiding, let alone disappearing, and in certain circumstances might prove too strong for a stillfragile constitutionalism"32. Unfortunately, virtually none of the whole new body of literatre, that has developed in the last few years dealing precisely with the kinds of issues involved in these case studies, particularly the whole range of questions relating to the process of economic development and relations between the state and other societal actors in that process, is reflected in the works of Professors Szyliowicz and Kedourie. Concerning the casual link between the policy change and economic crisis in the four episodes outlined above, economic historians are often inclined to ignore the fact that the policy change in each of these episodes was not a mere passive reaction of the Turkish decision-makers to the current crises, but a creative and successful act of effcient adaptation of the political and economic system to the domestic and external developments which caused those crises. in each of these cases, the policy change in Turkey was autochtonous and has been emulated by many other countries as a successful model. This applies not only to the introduction of etatism after 1929 which was, as mentioned before, one of the frst examples among developing countries of an inward-looking, importsubstituting strategy with economic planning. The peaceful transition from a one-party to a multi-party system in 1946 and the economic liberalization coupled with this process has been unanimously referred to as a model for the Third World. The liberal and democratic Constitution of 1961 which explicitly dealt with the state's obligations to promote social equity has also often been referred to as a model of institutional foundation of the "social state" in a middle income country. And the Turkish case of coping with the intemational debt crisis by the end of the 1970s was a unique experiment that, as Professor Waterbury put it, "the donor community touted as a model of adjustment, particularly regarding export performance"33.
31. Joseph S. Szyliovvicz, Politics, Technology and Development: Decision-Making in the Turkish Iron and Steel Industry. London: Macmillan Press, 1991. 32. Elie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992, p. 151f. 33. John Waterbury, Exposed To Innumerable Delusions. Public Enterprise and State power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993, p. 79: see also Bela Balassa, "Outward Orientation and Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries: The Turkish Experience", Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1983), pp. 429-447.

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From the perspective of this success story of efficient adaptation of Turkey to new domestic and intemational challanges, it is not easy to understand some of those political scientists who, after the refusal of the Turkish application of 1987 for full membership of the European Community, predicted new alliances for Turkey in order to avoid isolation. Philip Robins of the Royal Institute of International Ajfairs suggested even more than one option: pan-Turkism, that is, leadership of a panTurkic community of states, or pan-Islam, that is a majr role in the Islamic Conference Organization34. Turkey very soon invalidated these predictions by signing the Black Sea Convention of Economic Cooperation, demonstrating that it does not feel confined to those options. Moreover, with the customs union of 1996 with the European Union, Turkey brought to an end ali the pessimistic speculations about its future relations with Europe. Moreover, the World Trade Organisation asserted very recently that Turkey had derived considerable benefits from the farreaching structural economic reforms undertaken to comply with the customs union with the EU33. According to the WTO report, Turkey has adopted to EU's common external tariff on most industrial imports and eliminated ali import surcharges. Furthermore, it has brought a number of laws into line with EU rules in such wide-ranging areas as customs provision, export credits, competition policy, subsidies, intellectual property rights, industrial standards and food hygiene. CONCLUSIONS in one of his highly revealing review articles on Turkish affairs Andrew Mango drew attention to the sudden change in the perception of Turkey by the intemational community. Referring to David Barchard's Book "Turkey and the West"x, published 1985, Mango observed that "Writing before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, David Barchard, an experienced and well-informed Turkey-watcher, vvondered whether Turkey would follow the Iberian, the Korean, the Mexican, the Neo-Ottoman, the Latin American or the Marxist model. That Turkey was about to become itself a model was not foreseen37. Indeed, even after the fail of the Berlin Wall there were observers like Philip Robins who hastely contended that "a rapidly changing intemational order ...is likely to affect Turkey more than most states, almost exclusively in a negative sense"38, in spite of these prematre predictions, the current global financial crisis and the economic turmoil in Russia disclosed the fact that Turkey is virtually the
34. Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middl East (Clatham House Papers, The Royal Institute of intemational Affairs). New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991. 35. Francis Williams, "Trade Liberalisation Pays off for Turkey", Financial Times, 14.10.1998, p. 5. 36. David Barchard, Turkey and the West. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. 37. Andrew Mango, "The Turkish Model", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, (October 1993), pp. 726-757, cit. p. 726. 38. Op. cit.,p. 116.

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last bulwark of economic as well as political stability in the Balkans, in the Black Sea area and in the Middle East region of today39. Despite its successes, Turkey stili has many problems. However, compared with the famous Sick Man of Europe, it may not be an exaggeration to characterize the achievements of the Turkish Republic throughout its 75 years of existence as the Turkish miracle. in these decades, despite a population growth from around 10 to almost 68 million, life exceptancy increased more than 50 percent and educational indicators show strong uniform improvement ever since the foundation of the Republic. An adequate appraisal of the economic performance of Turkey throughout this period, which enabled these and other deep-rooted achievements in many areas of social development, hovvever, cannot be confned to the narrow context of allocative efficiency. Such an assessment deserves the broader perspective as developed in the seminal work of Douglass North by applying the concepts of path dependence and adaptive efficiency. it thus remains a majr task for the economic historians of Turkey to integrate the Turkish experience into ongoing international research on the issues of "why do economies nce on a path of growth or stagnation tend to persist?" and "how to create adaptive efficiency in the short run?". The progress of research on these issues promises not only to assert the extraordinary adaptive efficiency of the Turkish economy and society as the most outstanding developmental asset of the country on the threshold of the 2st century. Future research work in this area will also reveal the eminent value of Atatrk's program of cultural evolution as the main impetus of this adaptive efficiency extending even into the 2st century.

39. See John Barham, "Basking in Asia's Shadow. Emerging Market Turbulence has Placed the Country in a More Positive Light", Financial Times Survey: Turkey, Financial Times, 23.06.1998, p. 14.

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KAMU EKONOMSNDE BR YNETCLK RNENDEN ZLENMLER: SELAHATTN ANBAOLU VE SANAYDE MODERN GRMCLK
Prof. Dr. Bilsay KURU* Size Selahattin anbaolu'nun anlatacam. Ben Selahattin anbaolu'nu tanmak ayrcalna ve onuruna eritim. Trkiye'nin ilk metalrji mhendisidir. 1995'de bir delikanl iken 88 yanda kaybettik; "delikanl iken" diyerek abartmyorum, ilk gnk gibi alyordu. Selahattin Bey metalrji mhendisi olarak Aachen'dan 1932'de mezun olduktan sonra 13 haneli bir ky olan Krkkale'ye gelerek Askeri Fabrikalar, daha sonraki ad ile Makina Kimya'da almaya balam. nce dkmhane mhendisi oluyor, sonra elik Fabrikasnda alyor ve sonunda elik Fabrikasnda teknik mdr ve fabrika mdr oluyor, 1951'e kadar. 1932-1951 arasnda Krkkale'dedir. 1951'de Makina Kimya Endstrisi Genel Mdr Yardmcs oluyor. Bu arada belirteyim ki, Makina Kimya Endstrisi Kurumu' nun adn koyan da Selahattin Bey'dir. Sonra Maden Hurdacl (bir kamu irketi), onun Genel Mdr olarak grev yapyor 1955-1957; yine bir kamu irketi olan Maden Arama ve Etd Anonim irketi, onun Genel Mdrln yapyor, 19571959. 1959-1961'de zmir'de kurulan Meta'n Genel Mdrln yapyor ve 1961-1965 arasnda Makina ve Kimya'nm Genel Mdr oluyor. 1965'de ayrldktan sonra imento Sanayiinde Ynetim Kurulu yelii ve Bakanl yapt, 1978-1979 yllarnda Devlet Planlama Tekilat Mstear Mavirlii yapt, daha sonra 1980'den sonra ema Krehir'de 1986'ya kadar Mavirlik yapt ve sonra da Konya Krom Mangezit'te, ki ok baarl bir teebbstr, orada Ynetim Kurulu yelii ve Bakan Yardmcl yapt, 1994'e kadar. Selahattin Bey'i anlatmaya balarken byk bir parantez aarak Alfred Chandler'a geeyim. Selahattin Bey'i niin anlattma yardmc ola* Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi.

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aktr. Alfred Chandler'n son kitab 1990 tarihli: Scale and Scope, The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism baln tayor. Sanayi kapitalizminin 19. Yzyl sonunda ve 20. Yzyldaki gelimesini anlatyor. Chandler Schumpeter ve Gerschenkron'un bir izleyicisidir. nemli bir iktisat tarihisi, bir iletme tarihisidir. Tezi basite u: modern sanayi kapitalizminin gelimesinde 1870'lerden 1980'lere kadar temel birim, bu kapitalizmin gelimesini aklayabileceimiz en nemli temel birim modern snai teebbsdr. Modern snai teebbse bakacaz bu dnemi anlayabilmek iin. Neden byle? nk, modern snai teebbs ikinci sanayi devriminin ana birimidir. Makinaya, ar kimyaya, otomotive, petrol teknolojisine dayanan ikinci sanayi devrimi 19. Yzyln dnemecinde btn rnleri ile karmza kyor, innovasy on'lanyla karmza kyor. Bu innovasyorilarn, yani teknolojik yeniliklerin retime aktarlabilmesi iin didik didik edilmesini, bu didik didik etme sayesinde teknolojilerin birer rn haline getirilmesini salayan ey modern snai teebbsdr. Burada da Chandler'n "Scale and Scope" dedii, yani bir tesisin leini veya kapsama alann byttnz zaman retilebilecek rnleri, teknolojinin size verdii potansiyeli sonuna kadar kullandnz takdirde neler yapabileceksiniz, bunu bulmay, hayalinizi zorlayarak bu potansiyeli sonuna kadar kullanabilmeyi salayan ey, ite modern snai teebbsdr. Onun iin, yzyllk gelimeyi, kapitalizmin, modern kapitalizmin yzyllk gelimesini ancak bununla anlarz. Bu innovasyon dalgas, bu yenilikler dalgas byk bir dalga. kinci sanayi devrimi denilen gelimeye baktmz zaman unu gryoruz, diyor Chandler: Bu gelimeyi piyasa ile aklayanlayz. Firmalar piyasalarn ajanlar deildir; modern snai teebbs piyasalarn ajan deildir. Hatta tersi daha dorudur: esas olan ey firmadr, piyasay ekillendiren ey esas olarak firmadr, yani modern snai teebbstr. Burada da bir kilit, bir anahtar var: Bu teknolojilerin didik didik edilebilmesini salayan kilit ynetimin veya yneticinin gds, ilham ve akldr. "Ben bu teknolojilerin neresinden girer neresinden karm, bu bulular nasl retime eviririm?" diye dnen yneticinin bu gds ve akldr. Schumpeter'den gelen ey, yani anahtar ise, bu kilidi aacak anahtar ise, hereyden nce sermaye younluu isteyen bu retim tekniklerine yatrm yapmay bilmektir. Demek ki, kilidi aacak anahtar yatrmdr. Onun iin, sermaye youn tekniklere yatrm yapmak, Ergun Trkcan'n bu platformda syledii ekilde teknolojinin embodied olarak kmas, yani yatrma bal olarak teknolojinin bir rn halinde karmza kmas, ite sanayilerin yapsn deitiren ey budur. 20. Yzyl boyunca sanayilerin yapsn deitiren ey, demek ki yatrmn nereye yaplacan bilmek, ne lekte yaplacan bilmek, bu teknolojileri bir anlamda deifre etmek ve rnleri yaratmaktr. Burada tesisin optimal byklkte kurulmas, yani kapsayabilecei lek iinde neler mmknse maliyeti drerek olabildiince retimi artrmas ok kritik bir nokta oluyor.

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kinci sanayi devrimi dnemi yine Ergun Trkcan'n iaret ettii bir baza, bir altyapya oturuyor. O bazda demiryolu var, iletiim var, telgraf var. Bu baza oturduu iin modern snai teebbs bu rnleri ok hzla gelitirebiliyor. Bu rnler petrol rafinerisinde kyor, zellikle demir elikte kyor, makinada, camda, suni elyafta, gbrede, gda ilemeciliinde, bunlarda btn sistemi etkileyecek apta ve kapsamda ortaya kyor. Bu sanayi devriminin retim ve rgtlenme birimi, yeni irketi de holdingdir. Bu sanayi devrimi bir bakma holding sayesinde can bulur ve tarihi grevini yapar ve yatrmc tipi ortaya kar. Buna Chandler "The most effective first mover" diyor; yani, ilk hareketi en anlaml lekte, en byk lekte yapabilen adam. rnein, Andrevv Carnegie, ilk demir elik tesislerini kuran adam, o lekte kuruyor ki birim maliyet hzla dyor. Pittsburgh'da Edward Thompson Works ile kuruyor ve ton bana dolar maliyeti (byk lek ile kurduu ve btn imkanlar sonuna kadar kullanabildii iin) hzla dyor; 188O'de eliin ton maliyeti 67 dolar imi, ondan 18 yl sonra 17 dolara dm. Demek ki, hem maliyeti drmek, hem rnleri eitlendirmek, hem de entegre bir ekilde gitmek, cevherden yararlanmak ve ileri entegrasyon, yani ray yapmak, boru yapmak, elik kablo yapmak eklinde gidiyor. te, bu devrimin kilit grevini, tarihi grevini gren firma farkl bir organizasyondur. Kendi bnyesi iinde piyasalarndaki gibi rekabete dayanan bir ey deildir. Firmann iinde rekabet sz konusu olamaz, firma administrative'dir, hiyerariye dayanarak ilemitir, 20. Yzyl bunu gsteriyor. Firma administrative srelerde alr, hiyerariye dayanr. Firma iinde bunlar piyasa srelerinde gzlenen rekabetiliin nne geerler; her firma iinde adeta emir kumanda zinciri vardr. Bu alglama, yeni devrimin getirdii eyi alglamak kapitalizmi 1870'den 1980'e gelindii zaman mthi farkl bir noktaya getirmi ve kendi iinde bu teknolojiyi sonuna kadar, posasn karana kadar didik didik edebilmek iin, yeni rnler yapabilmek iin belli bir organizasyon gerekmitir. Bizim iin soru udur: Bu organizasyon acaba- Trkiye'nin 1920'lerden sonraki gelimesinde bilinerek mi gidilmi, acaba parmak ucuyla m hissedilmi, yoksa hi mi hissedilmemi? a alglamak ve a yakalamak. Bunu renebilmek iin iki eye muhtacz, birincisi, devlet katnda verilen politika kararlar, bunlara bakabiliriz; ikincisi, belki de daha ilgin olan, daha az bilineni, acaba bu ynetici tipi Trkiye'de var myd? te, bence, an adam (var olanlarn rnei) vard. imdi Chandler'dan Selahattin Bey'e dnyoruz. Selahattin Bey'i renmemizi, O'nun evlatlar olmaya hak kazanan Metalrji Mhendisleri Odas'na borluyuz. Bu Oda'mn yneticileri ve geni bir dost meslekta evresi bir babaya lmnden sonra gsterilebilecek rnek bir vefa ile yldr Selahattin Bey'in kimlii zerinde iz srdler. Bu aba Selahattin Bey'in

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kimliini, dolaysyla Cumhuriyetin a yakalamasn, Cumhuriyetin ada uygarlktan kastettii eyin ne olduunu daha iyi anlamamz salyor. Hangi ortamdan balyor ve o ortamdan a yakalamay nasl biliyor? Amac, ortam ne olursa olsun a yakalamak. Kendi szleri ile, "1932'de Krkkale'de askeri fabrika sahas dnda sadece 13 ev vard. Meyhane, kahvehane ve kasap dkkan ayn yerdi. Yol yoktu, haftada iki tren geerdi, gazete gelmezdi, fabrikaya ya trenle, ya amur tarladan geerek gidilirdi. i tamamen orann kylsyd. ki, saatlik kynden eekle veya yaya gelirdi; fabrikada eeklere ayr yer vard." Dikkat edin, fabrikada park yeri ayorlar eeklere. "elik fabrikasnda 500, 600 kii alrd; ii yani kyl kendi getirdii pekmez ve ayrana band yufka ekmeinden ibaret yemeini yerdi, kendi elbisesiyle alrd. O tarihte Almanya'da da ii alrken tulumunu kendi getirirdi, fabrika iiye i elbisesi vermezdi. Ama Trkiye'de, ilk fabrika yemei ve alma kyafeti Krkkale elik Fabrikas'nda verilmitir. Bunu yapan devlet deildi, kendi aramzda para toplayp balattk ve usul haline getirdik." Tandm en alak gnll insanlarn belki banda gelen Selahattin Bey, bunu sylerken kendine bir vnme pay karmyor. Bu modern fabrika organizasyonu ihtiyacn hissederek balatlan, hemen bununla balayan bir eydir. 1930'dan sonra organizasyon yle gelimitir: Krkkale tm ile harp sanayiine ynelik bir ana fabrika ve yardmc fabrikalar eklinde kurulmutur. nce fiek fabrikas, sonra kuvvet santrali, sonra mermi, pirin, elik, tfek ve barut fabrikalar ortaya kmtr. Hepsi, yani mermi ana maddesi, pirin aksam, barut, kapsl fiek orada yaplmtr Trkiye'de. Ksacas, bu bir minyatr sanayi sitesi modelidir. Krkkale, Trkiye'nin o gnk koullarnda yaplm dier sanayi yatrmlarnn, yani Smerbank'n Kayseri, Nazilli fabrikalarnn tesinde bir minyatr sanayi sitesi modelidir. kinci sanayi devrimi rnlerine ynelmi bir modeldir. "Krkkale'nin esas imal grevi vasfl eliktir ve bunda baarl olmutur." Selahattin Bey'in szleri ile anlatyorum, "1932'de 100 ton elik yapard elik fabrikas. Ama 1935 ve 1950 arasnda 150 eit elik yaplmtr. Bugn Trkiye'de bunlarn drtte biri bile yaplmyor: Uak elii, kalem elii, paslanmaz elik, ata dayankl elik, btn dili elikleri, semantasyon elikleri ve dierleri. Kitaplardan bakarak yaptk" diyor. "Kitaplardan bakarak yaptk," yatrma bal deil, disembodied. "Patent, lisans mevzuu bahis deildi. Kapasite 2 tonluk elektrik ark oca idi. Orada 600, 700 ton kadar elik yapardk. Kendi ihtiyacmz, Devlet Demir yollarnn, Milli Savunmann ihtiyalarn karlardk. Piyasaya vermedik, piyasann pek ihtiyac da yoktu. 193 8'den itibaren nemli bir rn, ileri top namlusu iin krom nikelli elik yaptk. 1939-45 arasnda nce 3.7'lik sonra 5.7'lik tanksavar topu iin, ayda 8 top olmak zere 500 namluluk elik karld. Baka eyler de yapld, Ali etinkaya Bayndrlk Bakan olduktan sonra, 1934'de Devlet Demiryollarn zorluyor. 776

nk, Devlet Demir Yollan Krkkale'ye ray yaptrmak istemiyordu. Fakat nn'nn talimat ile mecburen ray siparilerini Krkkale'ye verdiler. Trkiye'de ilk ray o zaman yapld. Devlet Demir Yollar bu rayn evsafna inanamad. naat Dairesi Fen ubesi Mdr bizim raylar Alman raylar ile mukayese iin svire'ye gnderdi; bizimkiler Alman raylarndan drt kat daha dayankl knca, 1936'da, herkesin sesi kesildi." u noktaya gelelim: Modern sanayi teebbsleri iin sipari ok nemlidir. Ray yaplana kadar Askeri Fabrikalar'in nemli lekte bir faaliyeti yok; kendi kendilerine elik dkyorlar ama kapasite ok dk. lk sipari talya'nn 1930'larn ortalarnda Libya'ya ve Habeistan'a girmesinden sonra, yani Trkiye iin Akdeniz'deki en byk tehdit haline gelmesinden sonra oluyor. Milli Savunmann mhimmat siparii balyor ve Askeri Fabrikalar kendilerine bir eki dzen veriyorlar. Neden nemli? nk, her sipari bir modernizasyon getiriyor. Bundan sonraki byk lekli sipari 1950'lerdedir. Makina Kimya'ya o zaman yaplan iki nemli offshore sipari, Selahattin Bey'in deyiiyle '1952'de Amerikal Albay Grossman, teki 1957'de Almanlarn 750 milyon DM'lk mhimmat ve mermi siparileridir." lkinde, Amerikal "250 bin mermi istiyoruz, yapabilir misin?" sorusu ile gelir. Bu sipari ansn bir nceki Genel Mdr Celal mre ahsi gayreti ile yakalam. Ama grevden alnm, yerine Selahattin Bey bakyor. Amerikalnn teklifi zerine Selahattin Bey Msteara gidiyor. Ama, ald yant "Vallahi bizim size hi bir faydamz olamaz" dr! Teklif 43 dolar, halbuki Makina Kimya'nn maliyet hesab 51 dolardr. Aradaki fark kapatmak iin devlet yardm etmez mi? Devlet "Biz elimizi sremeyiz" diyor. Ynetim Kurulu yeleri "Bu akam randevum var, yarn iim var" eklinde yaklarlar bu ie! Selahattin Bey yapayalnz kalr ve adam mecburen uurlamaya gider Ankara Garna. Ama, akl zm aramaktadr. Gar'da Amerikal "Gidiyorum, evet mi hayr m?" diyor. Selahattin Bey dedi ki, "Gar Lokantasna gtrdm adam. Teklifi orada lokantada imzaladm. Ne olursa olsun diye dndm. Sonra alp 35 dolara malettik ve bununla byk modernizasyon yaptk. Ciddi hamle oldu. Mermi fabrikasnn ilk modernizasyonunu yaptk. Sonra 750 milyon DM'lk Alman siparii geldi: Mhimmat Fabrikasn tamamen yeniledik, Fiek Fabrikasn tamamen yeniledik." Dikkat edersek Selahattin Bey'in karlat retim problemi karsndaki dnce, hesap ve davran biimi Chandler'n modern sanayi teebbsnn dinamizmine ve problem zme gdsne uygundur. Ve bu olay Trkiye'nin snai retim tarihesinde hi zerinde durulmam bir eydir: Bunlar Trkiye'den yaplan ilk ciddi snai mamul ihracatdr ve 1950'lerde yaplmaktadr. Gelelim ikinci noktaya. Daha dorusu, Cumhuriyet dneminde ikinci snai mamul ihracatna. 1925'de Kayseri'de ufak bir uak fabrikas kuruldu, Alman Junkers uaklarn harp uana tadil etmek iin kuruluyor.

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Ama ciddi bir sonu alnamamtr. Yurtlarndan kaan Polonyallar 2. Dnya Sava iin Etimesgut'ta 7,8 kiilik sivil keif uaklar yapyorlar. Sonra bunlar Danimarka'ya satlyor. Fakat en nemlisi udur: Makina Kimya'nn, yani o tarihte Askeri Fabrikalar'in Uur tipi talim ua yapmas. Selahattin Bey'in anlatyla, "Dizayn bize ait, kesik kanatl talim uaklarnn imalat. Bunlarn motoru ngiliz Havilland'dr; motor gvdesi gelir, iftlikteki uak motor fabrikasnda ilenir, uan montaj Etimesgut'ta yaplrd. Uu tecrbeleri iyi sonu verdi. Bu fabrika 1951'de Makina Kimya Endstrisi'ne intikal etti. Orada 54 uak yaptk, motorlarn iledik, bunlardan 4'n trenle Trk pilotlar ile uurarak 1954'de rdn'e gnderdik, gerisini Milli Savunma Bakanlna verdik. Daha sonra Milli Savunma Bakanl artk uaa ihtiyac olmadn, nk bunlar Amerikan Askeri Yardm ile alacan syledikten sonra ayn tesislerde kuluka makinesi yapmaya baladk." Gnmzden, kalite dlleri ile sevindiimiz gnmzden geriye doru baknca grlyor ki, Trkiye'nin 1950'lerin banda kk kapasiteli, ama ciddi ve iddial bir retim, hatta snai ihracat gc olumaktadr. Bunun temeli modern snai teebbs dncesi ile olumutur. Adeta Andrew Carnegie gibi dnenlerin yetimesiyle. Selahattin Bey'in ve ekibinin yeri budur. Burada bir adm daha ileri gitmek gerekiyor. nk, i sipariten de ibaret deildir modern snai teebbs iin. Ciddi bir sanayi kuruluu kendi kendine ok daha deiik ve stn rnler yapma mcadelesine giriyor mu, giremiyor mu? Bunu ortaya koymal. nk sanayide rtn ispatlamann yolu budur. "1946'da kendi giriimimizle tank yaptk. Bunun sadece Ford motoru dardan geldi. Dizayn bizimdir, tipi kendimize mahsustur. Kamil Necati filan yaptlar. Zrh levhas, topu, paleti, aktarma organlar hepsi bizim retimimizdir. Bu tank 1946'da Cumhuriyet bayram treninde geti. Ancak sipari filan gelmedi ve tek tank olarak kald. Amerikan yardm balaynca hazrclk ve kolaya kama balad." Selahattin Bey byle diyor. te bunlar tebliimin balndaki "kamu ekonomisinde bir yneticilik rneinden izlenimler." Bu izlenimler Selahattin Bey'in bizlere kavrama frsatn verdii eylerin ok kk bir ksm oluyor. u grlyor ki, yer seimi dahil tasarlanan ve yaplan rnler dahil olmak zere, mesele a yakalamaktr. Bu bazen maliyet endielerinin tesinde bir eydir. Her eyi sadece maliyetle dnmek mmkn deildir. a zellikle hzla deime ve retimde eitlenme ile yaanan ynyle kavramak ve gnn teknolojilerinin size neyi yapmanz emrettiini anlamak ve bunlar didik didik etmeye girimek maliyet endiesinin tesinde bir eydir. Ve unutmayalm ki, bu 19. Yzyln ortalarndan gelen bir nabz art ile yaanan bir deime ve eitlenmedir. a kavramak iin maliyet endiesini bir yana koymak bazen yaamsal bir zorunluluk halinde ortaya kar. Karabk kurulaca zaman Selahattin Bey orada, tesisin yerini semek iin kurulan komitenin yesinden biridir. Deniz toplarnn menzili

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70 km olduu iin, bildiiniz gibi tesis ieride kurulmutur. Bir demir elik tesisinin mutlaka suyun kenarnda kurulmas lazm. Selahattin Bey'in dedii gibi, 1 ton mamul iin 6 ton hammadde gerekiyor: tamaclk ve maliyetler ok nemli. Yalnz, maliyet endiesi ne olursa olsun mutlaka kurmak sz konusu olduu zaman i deiiktir: Selahattin Bey'in deyiiyle "Viyana'da Prof. Bossart'a tetkik ettirdiler. Adam "cevher olmasa dahi lazmdr" dedi. Ondan sonra ktisat Vekaleti Milli Savunmaya sordu; deniz toplarnn at menzili dnda 70 km ieride Karabk bulundu ve 150 bin ton kapasite ile teklif yapan Brassert'e verildi. Bu, Krupp'un teklifinden daha iyi idi." Ksacas, Selahattin Bey'in iaret ettii sipari ve kendi kendine bir eyler yapma bunlar sanayi devriminin yneticiye meydan okuyan eyleridir. Ama, Trkiye'de bunlar durduran eyler; yok etmese de, bu giriimcilik ruhunun a yakalamasn yok etmese de, ok zayflatan eyler Trkiye'nin handikaplarn bytmtr. rnein, kendi azyla, "demiryolu hareketinin durmas yazk olmutur; nk unutmamak lazm ki sanayileme bir malzeme hareketidir." a ve tarihi alglamak ve buna bal profesyonel sistemleri kurmak politikacya politika dzeyinde, mhendise i dzeyinde den eylerdir. Uygarla mensup olabilmek iin, ksacas var olabilmek iin lazm olan eylerdir. Doru alglamak dediimiz zaman, Selahattin Bey demir elikte hangi zmleri alglam, onlar gstermise, Selahattin bey'in mstesna kiilii bir yana, kendisinin bu alglama ans o dnemin tanmadmz bir ok isimsiz kahramannn da ayn dorultuda ayn eylerle yayor olmalarndandr. Ve onlarn dnyasnda tank yapmak, uak yapmak, bunlar lks iler deildi. Bunlar kendini amak iin, uygarla mensup olmak iin yaplan eylerdi. Alglamann ve bu kavrayn normal sonular idi. Ancak, bu sreklilik isteyen bir abadr. Siz bu sistemi, insanlaryla birlikte ortadan kaldrrsanz, Trkiye iin henz tamamlanmam olan ikinci sanayi devrimi aamasndan bu lke iin daha karmak olan, daha karmak ve stn bilgi isteyen nc teknoloji devrimi denilebilecek bir aamaya nasl geersiniz? in temeli firmada, ama firmann z insandadr, insann doru zmleri bulabilmesindedir, teknoloji dzeyi, bilgisi veya rgt kapasitesi ile o zmleri bulabilmesindedir. Firma ve insan diye sonuca geldiimiz zaman ve sonun sonunda da insan diye geldiimiz zaman, bundan sonra hangi zmlerle, neleri bulma ans ile kar karyayz? Cumhuriyetin ilk kuann, bizi bugne getirenlerin yarna doru bakabilmemiz iin bize hatrlattklar nemli derslerin banda bu geliyor.

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BLMEYEN NE BLSN BZN?

Prof. Geoffrey LEWIS* I expect you ali know where I found the title from one of Yunus Emre's poems: 'Bilmeyen ne selm olsun' - 'What should the ignorant know know, greetings.' (it should be noted that bizin is added an n to bizi for the sake of the rhyme.) of this paper. it comes bilsin bizin? Bilenlere of us? To those who not a misprint; Yunus

For us who know and love Turkey, this is an occasion for rejoicing. But we are here not in a spirit of blind adulation but as scholars, not only to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Republic, but also to examine what the Republic has achieved in its first 75 years. Yet let us never forget what Mustafa Kemal and ali those Turks who had faith in him and follovved him had achieved before the foundation of the Republic, and what Turkey would be now had there been no Mustafa Kemal and no War of Liberation. Rauf Orbay, Prime Minister from July 1922 to August 1923, could not stomach the abolition of the Caliphate; he parted company with Atatrk and they were never reconciled. Shortly after he resigned as Prime Minister, a friend met him in the street and asked if there was any truth in the rumour that he was going to become Prime Minister again. Rauf growled, 'If I had my way I'd become Grand Vizier.' Yet years after Atatrk's death this same Rauf Orbay told a gathering which included three distinguished generals, Refet Bele, Kzm Karabekir and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, 'If none of us had been there, Mustafa Kemal would stili have won the war, but if he had not been there we could never have done it.' To which we might add that if that war had not been won, Turkey would have been reduced to a small principality in Central Anatolia. Her frontiers would have been as specified in the Treaty of Sevres, signed by the Sultan's government on 10 August 1920. Edirne and most of Thrace would lie outside those frontiers, as would zmir and Antalya and their
* St. Antony's College, Oxford.

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hinterlands, and Erzincan, Bitlis, Gaziantep, Mardin, and many another city. Hatay would stili be part of Syria; the Dardanelles were to be under an Allied Commission with one Turkish member, who would have no vote; much of the remainder would have been within the spheres of influence allotted to France and Italy. These two powers and Japan were to decide on a system to replace the Capitulations even in what remained of an independent Turkey, which would be roughly coterminous with the two Ottoman provinces of Ankara and Kastamonu. Merchant ships of 1,600 tons and ver were to be confiscated. The army was to be reduced to little more than a gendarmerie, with no artillery or aircraft; the navy was to consist of thirteen gunboats. Deprived of most of her agricultural land and her mineral wealth, this tiny State in Central Anatolia, which the Treaty of Sevres stili solemnly referred to as the Ottoman Empire, would have had no economic future, perhaps no future at ali. Aside from saving his country from that dismal fate, and his creation of the Republic, there are three things that Atatrk did which must never be forgotten. The first is one of his greatest gifts to his people: the change of alphabet; the second is his part in the language reform. Not a few Turks before him had deplored the Arabic and Persian domination of their language. in 1277, emsddin Mehmed Karamanolu, the chief minister of the ruler of Konya, decreed that no language other than Turkish would be spoken at court or in govemment offices or public places, but the decree had little or no effect because he was killed in battle shortly afterwards. Two hundred years later. Mir Ali ir Neva'i wrote his Muhakamat al-Luateyn to demonstrate that Turkish was in no way inferior to Persian as a literary medium. in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many spoke and wrote on the same theme, and many called for a change to the Latin letters, but it took Atatrk's iron will actually to set the language reform in motion and to introduce the new alphabet. Where else in the vvorld, where else in history, has there been a Head of State who did as Atatrk did to explain a new law and to follow it up? Equipped with a blackboard and easel, he went on a tour round Anatolia, teaching huge crowds of villagers the ne w letters, which they called 'Gazi elifbas' 'The Gazi alphabet'. Some weeks of this practical experience showed him that the rules of spelling laid down by the Alphabet Commission were capable of improvement, and he improved them. The Commission had decided, for example, that a hyphen should be inserted before the interrogative partide - 'Geldi-mi?', 'Deil-mi?' By the time he reached Sinop, he had seen that this was unnecessary, and he telegraphed the Ministry of Education to say that the rule was abrogated. On his return to Ankara, he made a number of other improvements, which everyone who reads and writes Turkish now takes for granted.

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His third never-to-be-forgotten deed was one of the most heroic of an heroic career. Knovving as he must have done that it would shorten his life, in May 1938, when he was seriously ili and in great pain, he chose to make an official visit to south-eastern Anatolia, vvhich succeeded in its purpose of scaring the French into thinking that he was making ready to seize Hatay if they did not agree to give it up. The principal theme of this paper, however, is to consider a strange phenomenon: that the Western press so often ignores or brushes aside Turkey's achievements. A question that has always puzzled me, particularly now since the end of the Cold War, when most Western countries not, I am happy to say, my own country- seem to think that they no longer need Turkey's friendship. Why are Turkey's efforts at publicity not as effective as one would wish? I think the answer is that Turks have the quality which they cali temkin and vvhich the ancient Romans called gravitas. it is the sturdy sense of responsibility born of many centuries of being an imperial power, a built-in avvareness that you must keep your head or the world may fail apart. Turks think it as far beneath their dignity to defend themselves against criticism as to boast of their achievements. One sometimes wishes that Turks would display a little less temkin and make it plain to the world that they do not claim to be better than other people; they only claim to be no worse. A second question is rather more difficult: Why are Western journalists who know little or nothing of Turkey so eager to share their ignorance with a wider public? Why is it that when the Spanish Government finds it necessary to take action against ETA, Western nevvspapers describe them as Basque terrorists, whereas when the Turkish Government finds it necessary to take action against the PKK, Western nevvspapers describe them as Kurdish villagers? How does one account for the man who said in a recent article in the Financial Times that in 1965 a hundred thousand Greeks were evicted from istanbul? I don't see why one should find a excuse for him, but it is possible that he meant 1955, in vvhich year, after anti-Greek rioting, a number of Greeks chose to leave Turkey, though the number was nothing like a hundred thousand and there were no evictions; in fact the government paid compensation to those who had suffered in the riots. You may recall the delightful Ottoman response to multiple mistakes of that kind: 'Question: Who was the Sultan who was pulled out of a river by his sisters? Answer: it vvasn't a Sultan, it was the Prophet Yusuf, it vvasn't a river, it was a well. it vvasn't his sisters, it vvas his brothers. And they didn't pull him out, they pushed him in.' 783

Consider the editorial of 15 November 1997 in The Times, which used to be known as the world's greatest newspaper. it contained this astonishing sentence: 'the same Arab countries that nce mobilized against Saddam - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, even Kuwait - are now isolated from the American Administration.' I wrote a letter to the editr informing him that Turks are not a ort of Arab. My letter was published, though my favourite sentence was omitted: 'Can we expect to see a reference in your nevvspaper one of these days to "Venezuela, Chile, Sweden, and the other Latin American countries"?' And here is an earlier example. On 31 August 1928, The Times devoted a well-informed and sympathetic editorial to the new alphabet: The advantages of the change can scarcely be appreciated by those who have not struggled with the difficulties presented to the student of Turkish by the Arabic letters... No alphabet is less fitted to express the melodious Turkish speech... By this step the Turks, who for centuries were regarded as a strange and isolated people by Europe, have drawn closer than ever to the West. it is a great reform, vvorthy of the remarkable chief to whom the Turkish people has entrusted its destinies. But memories can be short, even the corporate memory of a great nevvspaper. Twenty-one years later, on 10 August 1949, there was an editorial in The Times on the proposed admission of Greece, Turkey, and Iceland to the Council of Europe: To have any chance of success a federal union would have to start vvith nations either adjoining each other or separated by no barrier more formidable than the English Channel... They could not share a common language but at least it vvould be an advantage if the different languages were vvritten in the same script... Mslim in tradition, vvith an Asiatic language in an Arabic script, it is not easy to see how Turkey could take her place easily in a United States of Western Europe. Incidentally, the author of that egregious hovvler could have mentioned that the Greeks have a different script from other Europeans - but he didn't. As we ali know, a favourite theme of the Western press is illtreatment of people held in Turkish police-stations and prisons. I vvouldn't like to fnd myself in any prison. in June of this year, for example, Amnesty International issued a report on Japanese prisons, which painted a horrifying picture. I shall not harry you vvith the details, because Japan is not applying for membership of the European Union, for which

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higher standards are required. Or are they? Again in June of this year, the London Daily Telegraph published a report on the British footballhooligans who had been arrested in Marseilles: Ali will be kept in the Baumettes prison in the city. Conditions there have improved, but it is stili regarded as one of the ghastliest prisons in France and was recently condemned in a report by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture. it said Baumetters "brought shame on France" and described it as "inhumane and degrading". Filthy bedding broken lavatories, rats and lice also await the Englishmen. They can expect to be sharing with thieves and drug-dealers... Some think the reason for the general tone of the foreign press is an atavistic memory of anti-Ottoman polemics during the centuries when the Ottoman Empire was the most powerful State in Europe, or of nineteenthcentury west-European sympathies with the subject-peoples' desire for independence. I don't think that those who vvrite anti-Turkish articles in newspapers know enough history to have any such memory. Ignorance is only partly to blame. Most anti-Turkish journalism, formerly the product of the Soviet campaign to undermine NATO, is novvadays due to the influence of those countries of the European Union who for their own reasons do not want to see Turkey join them as full members. I should like to quote here something I said in a talk I gave some years ago at a European Community conference on Turkey's place in Europe. I do not myself believe in European unity. I am not happy that my own country has let itself be dragged into it. But if my Turkish friends want to be a part of it I am sure that their country's claim is at least as strong as that of -shall we politely say?- certain other countries. And above ali I should like to see them attain full membership because that is what Atatrk would have wanted. it would crown his achievement; it would show that he was not indulging in an idle dream when he set his young Republic's face westward. The constant appearance in the foreign press of ill-informed if not positively hostile reports about Turkey makes great demands on the time of Turkish embassies, but their letters to the editors of offending newspapers do not alvvays have the desired effect, because readers think, 'Well, it's the duty of an embassy to defend its country's reputation, isn't it? What else could they say?' Therefore Turkey's friends abroad regard it as a duty to help to help to answer as many as they can of the pernicious fabrications published in the press, although even when their letters are printed they seldom elicit a retraction or an apology. For example, I nce wrote in answer to a letter from a woman who declared to the London Evening Standard that Kemal Atatrk was responsible for a massacre of 785

Armenians during the First World War. I explained that at the relevant time he was a divisional commander at Gallipoli and, military genius though he was, could scarcely have stopped doing his part in coping with the British landings in order to organize a massacre in south-east Anatolia, ver a thousand miles away. I don't know \vhether I succeeded in convincing her. Another time I challenged a statement in an article in The Times Magazine that Nicole Farhi's [Jewish] parents 'fled from Turkey to France in the early 1920s to escape the persecution of Atatrk.' it was in the early 1920s that Atatrk said in a speech at zmir, 'There are some loyal elements amongst us, in particular the Jews, who have cast in their lot with the Turks... Because they have proved their loyalty to this nation and this country, they have lived tranquil liveshitherto and shall continue to live in tranquillity and wellbeing.' Turkish Jews suffer from no legal disabilities and live as Atatrk promised they would. it was the Turks who gave sancturay to thousands of refugees from Nazi Germany, just as their ancestors had done for the Jews expelled from Spain and Portugal in and after 1492. Could we be told the justification for Ms Lovatt-Smih's extraordinary statement? Needless to say, as usual no justification was forthcoming. I have two consolations. One is that \vhenever one of my letters has been printed in a newspaper, many readers vvrite to me expressing their agreement. The other is that if you talk to ordinary people who do not claim to be experts on Turkey but have taken their family there on holiday, they ali teli you that they came home delighted with their experience of the country and its people and are eager to visit it again. To ali these good souls, selm olsun.

786

ATATRK'N YARATMAK STED BLG TOPLUMU

Adnan BNYAZAR* Kemalizm, bugnk adlandrmayla Atatrklk, dnsel bir dizge olarak, adalkla edeerlidir; deiimi, yenilemeyi, ileri dnceyi gerektirir. Bu balamda, Mustafa Kemal, Anadolu'ya ayak basp Kurtulu Sava'n planlarken, toplumun altyapsn salamlatran "mreffeh" bir Trkiye yaratmay temel ama saymtr. "Mreffeh Trkiye", toplumun adalamas demektir. Atatrk devriminin varmak istedii hedef, siyasal, ekonomik bamszln salam laik ve demokratik bir Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'dir. Atatrk, bu byk devrimi yaratmada inanl ve kesin kararldr. Cumhuriyet'in onuncu ylnda Afet nan'a yazdrdna gre, "Devrim, mevcut kurumlar zorla deitirmek demektir. Trk ulusunu son yllarda geri brakm olan kurumlan ykarak, yerine ulusun medeni gereksinmelere gre ilerlemesini salayacak yeni kurumlar koymu olmaktr." Tanmn yapt bu devrimin kararn, daha eyleme gemeden yllar nce, "bamsz cumhuriyeti kurmann, eriat hukuk dzeninden silmenin, laiklii devletin temel ilkesi yapmann bir d olduu" 1919 yl Temmuz aynn 7'nci gnn 8'ine balayan gecenin ge vaktinde, Mustafa Kemal, Bitlis valisi iken Damat Ferit Paa tarafndan grevinden alnan Mazhar Mfit'i (Kansu) artr ve not defterine unlar yazdrtr: '1) Zaferden sonra hkmet biimi cumhuriyet olacaktr. 2) Padiah ve hanedan iin zaman gelince gereken ilem yaplacaktr. 3) Tesettr kalkacaktr. 4) Fes kalkacak, uygar toplumlar gibi apka giyilecektir. 5) Latin harfleri yrrle girecektir.' Bunlar yazdrdktan sonra, Mazhar Mft'e, "Defterin bu sayfasn kimseye gstermeyeceksin, sonuna dek gizli kalacaktr." der. (lhan Seluk, Cumhuriyet, 25 Temmuz 1998) Anadolu'da o gece Trk aydmlanmaclnn temeli atlmtr. Kurtulu Sava boyunca bir yandan dmanla, te yandan iteki gerici ve ibirliki glerle savalarak, aydnlanma dncesinin ats da atlmtr. Bu, Atatrk'n dledii adalk dr.
* Yazar, Berlin.

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Devrim, devletin btn kurumlarn deitirip yeni bir yap kurmay gerektiriyordu. O gn iin bir "utopia" saylan "ada" Trkiye bu inan ve direngenlikle kurulmutur. Mustafa Kemal, tasarlyor, tasarladn annda uygulamaya geiriyordu. Nitekim, hemen halkn katlmn salayarak TBMM'yi toplam, egemenliin kaytsz artsz ulusta olduunu zellikle vurgulamt. Bu, her eyin ulusun iradesiyle, ulusun gcyle, ulusal birlikle yaplabilecei anlamna geliyordu. lk adm, igale uram yurt topraklarnn kurtarlmasyd. Bunun iin gl bir orduya gerek vard. Toprak bamszlndan yoksun bir halkn eli kolu bal olurdu. Yurdu igalden kurtarmadan devrim yaplamazd. Mustafa Kemal bu gerei stn sezgisiyle kavram; ada dnyayla da ilikilerini srdrerek Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin temellerini barut kokulan ortamnda atmt. Cumhuriyet, en ksa tanmyla, halk ynetimidir. Cumhuriyetle ynetilen lkelerin halk, Ziya Gkalp'in deyimiyle cemm-i gafr (kalabalk) deil, hakkn hukukunu bilen, demokratik anlamda halk (public, bilinli halk topluluu) olmaldr. Tark Zafer Tunaya'nn 'Trk devriminin dili" dedii Atatrklk, byle bir halk yaratma yolunda giriilmi bir uygarlk aray, bir bilgi devrimidir. Atatrk cumhuriyetin temeli kltre dayanmaktadr. Atatrk, toplumsal onurun, ada dnyayla btnlemenin, ulusal kltrle gerekleeceine inanmt. Devrim ilkesi olarak benimsedii, "Dou'nun dinsel, sosyal, siyasal basksndan olduu kadar Bat devletlerinin siyasal ve ekonomik zorbalndan uzak bir devlet kurmak ve toplum yaratmak" kltrel birikimlerle olurdu. Nasl temeli kltre dayanmayan devlet gerek anlamda devlet olmazsa, kltrel temelden yoksun bir cumhuriyet de olamazd. Misak- Milli ile yurdun toprak snrlarn izen Mustafa Kemal, "Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin temeli kltrdr" szyle de Trkiye'nin kltrel snrlarn izmiti. Atatrk kltr devriminin amac, baka kltrlerin boyunduruu altnda ezilerek kimliinden uzaklam bir toplumu yeniden var etmek, birey olarak yzyllarca kltrel smrye uram insanmza gven kazandrmaktr. Cumhuriyet'in ilanndan ok ksa bir sre sonra balatlan, eitimin laikletirilmesi bu amac yrrle koymann ilk admdr. Laik eitimle, dnce de laikletirilmi olacaktr. Bu uygulamayla, bilgi belli kesimlerin tekelinden kurtarlp halk kesimlerine de yaylacaktr. Bylece bilgi zr klnacak, zgr dnl Trk insan, adalk yolunda, elinde "mspet bilimin mealesi" ni tutarak ilerlemeye koyulacaktr. Dnce, ancak bilimin gerek kaynaklarna inilerek zgrletirilebilir. Ulusal bilin, bilgiyle donanm dncenin rndr. Kendi dilini ve dncesini yaratmam hibir ulus gerek anlamda zgr deildir. Mustafa Kemal'in devrim ilkelerinin kaynaklar saylan halklk, ulusalclk,

788

"kltr" kavramyla e tutulmas gereken cumhuriyetilik kavram, gelip bu ulusal bilin gereinde younlayor. Ulusal bilin gibi, ulusal kimliin kayna da bilgidir. Ulusal bilinten yoksun kesimlerin ulusal kimlikten de yoksun olduklar, kendilerine bir kimlik yaktrmak iin Cumhuriyet'in karsna mmeti ve ad bir anlay dikmek istemelerinden bellidir. Ulusal kimlik kazanmam toplumlarn adalndan da sz edilemez. aadaln, kendini tarih iinde bir dil varl olarak kantlam toplumlarn rn olduunu, Avrupa'nn aydnlanma dneminde geirdii deneyimler kantlamaktadr. Kendi dilini, dolaysyla dncesini yaratamam toplumlarn, bakalarnn dlamasna gerek kalmadan, kendilerini alarnn dna frlatp attklar; bilgide, yaayta ad dncelerin kulu olmay yazglar saydklar, gelimi lkelerin alt kltr tketicileri olarak nasl smrldklerini her gn televizyonlarda gryoruz, gazetelerde okuyoruz. Oysa, Atatrk, zgrlk ve insanca yaama haklarn egemen uluslarn denetimine brakmay erdem sayan "kalabalk" toplum anlayn yok edip, halk bilinli toplum olmann erdemine inandrmaya almtr. Bu yntem, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti bilinle, bilgiyle, erdemle var olmu bir aydnlanma devrimi saylmaldr. Tarihi boyunca toprak bamszln salam bir toplumun bireyi olarak, Mustafa Kemal, bu halkn, tilaf devletlerinin Trkiye'yi yok etme plann bozacan bilinle kavrayarak Anadolu'ya gemi, onlarn arasna katlmtr. Bir bakma sivil toplum rgtlenmesi olan Kongrelerden sonra, "Egemenlik kaytsz artsz ulusundur" inancyla geldii Ankara'da Trkiye Millet Meclisi'ni toplamtr. Toplumsal rgtlenmeyi bilinli halklarn baarabileceklerine yrekten inanmaktadr. Mustafa Kemal, Trk halknn tarihten gelen bu gcne dayanarak, zaman yitirmeden, yurt ve bilgi bamszln salayacak savamlara girimitir. Btn yaam boyunca, egemenliin ulusta olduuna inanm, bu halk ve ulusalc anlayn, demokratiklemenin temel ilkesi saymtr, iin ta banda, dinciliin karsna ulusalcln karrken, eitimin laikletirilebileceini dnyordu. nk, "ilerleme ve gelime yolunda, uluslararas ilikilerde Trk toplumunun ada uluslarla yan yana ve bir uyumda yrmekle birlikte kendine zg karakterini ve bamsz kimliini esas tutma" amac, ulusalc bir dnya gryle, laik eitimle gereekletirilebilirdi. Eitimin laikletirilmesi, Mustafa Kemal'in kanlmaz sayd bir devrim ilkesidir, devrimci eyleminin temelidir. Eskinin btn rm kurumlan, ancak laik eitim uygulamalaryla, eitimi iki balktan kurtarmakla yklabilirdi. Mustafa Kemal'in tarih sahnesine kndan bu yana, en ar saldrlarn laik eitim uygulamalarna yaplmas bir rastlant saylmamaldr. Hemen her dnemde, gelimelerin nne engeller karan gericilik, kktendincilerin sna olmutur. Bir ataszmzde dile getirilen, suyun uyuyup dmann uyumad gibi, zaman uyuyor da gericilik uyumuyor! Bilerek ya da, -daha kts-, bilmeyerek, devrim ilkelerinden bir k izgisi kadar dn verildiinde, gericiliin ar bulutlan lkenin ada yzn hep karartmtr. Son zamanlarda ise, "kurtarma" bir yana, 789

Atatrk devrimleriyle yaratlan btn ada kurumlan ykmay hedef gstererek, Cumhuriyet rejimini sarsacak boyutlara varmtr. adalamay Trk devriminin temel hedefi sayan Mustafa Kemal, daha Cumhuriyet ilan edilmeden, Trk halkn ad kalmaktan kurtaracak laik eitimi neden gerekli grdn, 1922 ylnda an defterine yazdklarndan reniyoruz: "Okul, gen dimalarda, insanla saygy, vatana ve ulusa sevgiyi, bamszlk onuruna sevgiyi ve bamszlk tehlikeye decek olduu zaman, onu kurtarmak iin izlenmesi gereken kurtulu yolunu retir. Okul sayesinde, bilim ve fen sayesinde Trk ulusu, Trk sanat, Trk edebiyat btn gzellikleri ile kendini gsterecektir." Dinsel eitim ise bunun tam tersini yapmaktadr. Daha sonra, bunu gerekletirecek olan retmenleri de yle uyarr: "Hibir zaman hatrnzdan kmasn ki, Cumhuriyet sizden fikri hr, vicdan hr, irfan hr kuaklar ister." Eitim izlencesini de, toplumsal yaammzn ve an gereklerine uygun decek biimde dnmtr. Bu tam anlamyla laik eitim izlencesidir. Kurtulu Sava yllarnda, Mustafa Kemal'in "fikri hr, civdan hr, irfan hr" kuaklarn zlemini ekmesinin anlam bugn daha iyi anlalyor. yleyse, Mustafa Kemal'in zlemini duyduu dncesi, vicdan, duyarl, anlay ve kavray zgr; ada Trk insan nasl yetiecekti? Bir topluma ulusal bilin ancak bilgi yoluyla kazandrlabilirdi: Mustafa Kemal'in baard da budur. Halkn adar bir bilgi toplumu yapma yolunda her eyi yerinde ve zamannda planlamay bilmitir. Cumhuriyet'in ilanndan be ay sonra Eitimin Birletirilmesi Yasas kmtr (1924). Bu, eitimi dinsel etkilerden kurtarmann bir balangcdr. nce, ada bir dnyada okuma yazma bilmemenin utanlacak bir ey olduunu belirtmi, bu yasadan sonra byk bir eitim seferberlii balatlmtr. Herkes birbirini etkileyerek, bilen bilmeyene retenrek okuma yazma sorunu zlecektir. Atatrk iin nemli oln, toplum iinde bir dinamizm yaratmakt. Yurdunda kendini bamsz klan bir halk, en ksa srede eitimi de laikletirecekti. Eitimi dinsel basklardan kurtarmay amalayan Eitimin Birletirilmesi Yasas, laik, ada eitimin temellerini de atmtr bylece. Trkiye'nin var olmasnda "Cumhuriyet" ne ise, dnsel bamszlkta da "laiklik" odur. Arap yazsnn, ancak eitim grmlerce zlebilen bir yaz olduu bilinmektedir. Szcklerin kkleri, reme kurallar ve biimleriyle balantl bu karmak yazy zp, okuma yazmay yaygnlatrmak pek yle kolay deildi. Bilgiyi yaygnlatrmak, o bilgili iletecek aralara da baldr. Latin abecesini kabul ettirmeyi Mustafa Kemal baarmtr. Devrim, ok tez davranmay ve gze almay gerektirir. Konuyu aratrp Ata790

trk'e neri getirenlerin be alt ylda gerekletirileceini tasarladktan Latin kkenli yeni Trk harflerini Mustafa Kemal aamal olarak bir iki yl iinde yaygnlatrmtr. Bu abece, Trk toplumunu ada dnyaya yaklatrmtr, toplumlar aras iletiimin yaratlmasnda da etkili olmutur. Bizi eski kltrmzden kopard savyla eletirilen abece devrimi, gerekte, bilgi toplumu olma yolunda Trk aydnlanmasnn nemli bir aamasdr. Ulusal duygu ynnden, bir toplumun tarihsel kkenlerini aratrmas byk nem tar. Ulusal bilincin kayna saylan tarih bilgisinden yoksun toplumlar, kendilerine bakalarnn bitikleri kimlikle yetinmek zorundadrlar. Atatrk devrimi iinde yer alan tarih ve dil almalar bu ynden ulusal dnce devriminin temelidir. Bugn "resmi tarih" diye kmsenmek istenen, bir ynden de abartl bulunan bu ilk almalar olmasayd, acaba, Trk bilimi tarih ynnden bugnk nesnellie ulalabilir miydi? Kukusuz, Trklerin btn uluslarn atas olduuna ynelik bir tarihsel yorumun bugn geerlii kalmamtr. Ancak kendini yeniden var etmi bir toplumun byle destansal bir yaklamdan g alaca da unutulmamaldr. Atatrk'n amac, toplumuna gven vermek, ona uluslar iinde bir varlk olduu bilincini alamakt. Zaman gstermitir ki, gerek ama, slam kimlii iinde eritilmi bir Trk tarihi deil, tam tersine, Trklk bilinci iinde ada bir tarih yaratmakt. Devrimlerin oda ulusal bilin yaratmak olduuna gre, bir toplumun var olu yks de saylan tarih, neden Anadolu gerekleri dnda yorumlansn? Atatrk'n ulusalcl vurgulayan tarih anlayndaki cokuyu o gnn kouUannda deerlendirmek gerekir. Onun kurduu Trk Tarih Kurumu (1931), toplumun, topraklarn varl olduu bilinciyle, zellikle Anadolu tarihine ynelerek, tarihimizi Orta Asya ile snrlayan nyargl deerlendirmeleri ortadan kaldrmtr. Tarih yaratmakla kazanlan ulusal bilincin ne denli nemli olduunu u gzlemlerden karabiliriz: Berlin'de, Kanuni Sleyman adna dzenlenen sergi iin, Ktahya inilerini British Museum'dan dn alnd, Trk Tarihinin nemli kayna "Ouz Kaan" destannn Paris'te Bibliotheque Nationale'de, yine tarihsal neminin yannda Trk anlat ve yk sanatnn baeseri saylan Dede Korkufun Dresden'de Staatsbibliothek'te bulunmas, Bergama'dan gtrlen talarla Berlin'de, neredeyse kk bir kent grnmndeki Pergamon Museum'un kurulmas, tarihsel varlklarmza nasl sahip ktmzn (!) bir lsdr. Ulusal anlamda tarih bilinci kazanm toplumlar, Berlin'de bir mze oluturacak tarihsel deerleri yaplarda temel ta, kap nlerinde binek ta, koyunlara tuz yalama ta, tuvalet aya... olarak kullanmaz. Greme'dek aziz fresklerinin gzlerini oymaz, her biri mzelerin ba eseri olacak heykellerin kollarn, bacaklarn, kafasn, burunlarn... koparmaz. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanolu, tarihi topluma ulusal bilin alamann arac sayan Atatrk'n, tarihe neden nem verdiini yle anlatr: "Atatrk, milli tarihimizin snrlann zenginletirmek hareketiyle hem Kema-

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list devrimin en kapsaml bir izahn yapmak, hem u devrimin kklerini stnde yaadmz topran en derin tabakalarna kadar ulatrmak, hem de Trk ulusunun asaletini phe gtrmez soy ktkleriyle ispat etmek istemitir". Atatrk'n, tarih yazmay tarih yapmak kadar nemli saymasnn temelinde yatan budur. nk tarih yazmak, bir ulusun yaamn belgelemektir. ada dnya, deerlendirmesini bu belgelere dayanarak yapacaktr. Onurlu bir ulus, tarihinin yalnzca bakalar tarafndan yazlasna raz olmaz. Cumhuriyet'e dein, tarih yazm konusunda gelimeler olmam deildir. Ne var ki, aratrmaya, belgelere dayanlarak nesnel tarih yazm Cumhuriyet'le gerekletirilmitir. Tarih, Atatrk iin, toplumun kendi gemiine, varlna, geleceine sahip kmasnn belgesidir; her frsatta Trk varln "barbar" diye niteleyen Bat devletlerinin nyarglarna bir tepkidir. Bugn bile, Avrupa Birlii tartmalarnda, Avrupa lkeleri, Trk tarihini kurcalama gereksinimi duymaktadrlar. Bir toplumda ulusal bilinle kltrel kimlik hem birbirinin iinde, hem birbirinin tamamlaycsdr. Tarih gibi, o toplumun yapp ettiklerinin bir gstergesi olan kltr de o topluma kimlik kazandran temel etkenlerden biridir. Onun iin Atatrk, tarih almalaryla dil almalarn birbirinin btnleyicisi olarak dnmtr. Toplumsal kimlik asndan ikisini birbirinden ayrmann ne denli olanaksz olduunu tarih bilimi gstermektedir. Dil ise, kltrel varl belirleyen en yaratc alandr. Toplumlarn ancak kendi yarattklar z dille gerek kimliini kazand bir gerektir. nk dilini tanyan, duygusunu, dncesini, yaratc gcn, anlatmn, mantn, ada dnyadaki yerini, her eyini tanyacaktr. Dil devrimi, bir toplumun yaratcln ortadan kaldrmaya ynelik basklara bakaldrmadr. Atatrk'e gre, halk, yeniliklerin yaratcs olmal, bu yaratc gcyle ada dnyadaki yerini bulmaldr. Bu balamda Atatrk, dilsel geliimi, ulusal bilin kazanmann kltrel taban saymtr. Diliyle kiiliini bulmam toplumlarn snt duygusu iinde kimlik bunalmlarna girdikleri biliniyor. Atatrk'n her alandaki bamszlk, zgrlk, uygarlk kavramlaryla anlatmak istedii, toplumlarn baka kltrlerle iletiim iinde kendi z dillerini gelitirmesi, karlkl olarak, birbirlerini stn grc ya da alaltc bir duygu yaamamasdr. Trk Dil Kurumu (1932) bu gerekenin rndr. Atatrk'n dile ne denli nem verdiini hemen her vesileyle anlan u szlerinden karabiliriz: "Ulusal duygu ile dil arasndaki ba ok gldr. Dilin ulusal ve zengin olmas ulusluk duygusunun gelimesinde balca etkendir. Trk dili, dillerin en zenginlerindendir; yeter ki bu dil bilinle ilensin" Trk toplumunun bunda byk baar gstereceini belirtmek iin de, kazanlan bamszlk savan anmsatarak, "lkesini, yksek bamszln korumasn bilen Trk ulusu, dilini de yabanc diller boyunduruundan kurtarmaldr." Dilin boyunduruk altnda olmas, dncesinin de bamsz olmad anlamna gelir. Atatrk'n vurgulamak istedii dil bamszl, yalnzca 792

dnceyi zgr klmayacak, yaz dili ile konuma dili arasndaki uurumu da kapatacak, bylece toplumsal iletiim kurulacaktr. Trke, bilim ve kltr dili olma yolunda gelime gstererek bir dnce dili dzeyine ulaacaktr. Bu amacn gerekletirilmesinde de toplumsal bir dayanmaya gidilmitir. Trk Dil Kurumu'nda, derleme, tarama, tretme almalar balatlarak Trk dilinin temellerine inilmeye allmtr. Kurum'un nclnde, ky kent demeden, bata retmenler olmak zere, halk azndan derlemeler yaplmtr. 11. yzylda Kagarl Mahmut'un oba oba gezip halkn dil varln devirmesi gibi, Dil Kurumu da szck (atasz, deyim, mecazl kullanmlar...) derleme iini toplumun her kesimine yaym, halkn azndan halk dilini, "Halk Azndan Dirleme Szl"nde bir araya getirmitir. Atatrk'n doumunun 100. ylnda 13 ciltlik bu yapt, Cumhuriyet dneminin en nemli almas olarak deerlendirilmitir. Dili, zeklar bilgiyle stp donatmann arac sayan Leibniz (16561717), Latince'nin egemenliine karn incil'i Alman halk diline eviren Luther'in baarsn sz konusu ederken, onun, halkn diline bakarak konutuunu belirtir. Gerekten, Luther, kasaplarla, bahvanlarla konumu, Almanca'nn geni anlatm olanaklarn onlarn dilinde bulmutur. Trke'de yaplan da budur. Atatrk, halk kendi varlndan kopararak yaratt kltr birikimlerine nce dille balamtr. Halk azndan derlenen bu szcklerin ounun, yzyllar nce Trke'de canl biimde kullanld grlmtr. Dil devrimiyle, alt yzyllk Arap ve Fars basks ortadan kaldrlarak dilin z kaynaklanna inilmitir. Eskiden olduu gibi, artk Arapa ve Farsa szcklere karlk olabilecek Trke szckler aranmyor, Trke, kaynandan ryor. Dili bamsz klmann en nemli aamas bu derleme almalar olmutur. Bir yandan da, yazma eserlerdeki szckler taranarak, bunlara ne gibi Trke karlklar kullanld saptanmtr. 8 ciltlik 'Tarama Szl" de bu almann rndr. ada gereksinimleri karlama ynnden ise, bu kaynaklara dayanlarak tretme almalar balatlmn". Bugn, z Trke Szlk, neredeyse genel szln oylumuna varacak. Ozanlarn, yazarlarn, evirmenlerin, felsefecilerin, gen bilim adamlarnn diline baktmzda, dilimizin geni anlatm olanaklar kazandn grebiliriz. Trk kltr varln simgeleyen sanatlar, yazarlar, bilim adamlar baka dillerin kltrleriyle deil, kendi z dillerinin birikimiyle dnyorlar, duyuyorlar. Gerek anlamda kltrel ulusallama budur. Bu olumlu gelimelere karn, Cumhuriyet tarihi iinde en ok dil devrimi saldrya urad. Yenilie, adala ayak uyduramayanlar, her frsatta z Trke'ye kar ktlar. Ama bu kltrel akn nn kimse alamad. Ellerine frsat getiinde z Trke'yi yasaklayan, bugn devletin en yksek kademesinde bulunanlar, bugn, yasakladklar szcklerle sesleniyorlar halka, zellikle de genlere... Atatrk'n, Trkiye'nin gele793

ceini gvenle onlara brakt genler ise, Bat dillerine zenip dillerini bozanlarn dnda, analarnn ak st gibi, tertemiz bir Trke'yle konuuyorlar. Halklk, hangi alanda olursa olsun, halk retici duruma getirmek demektir. Atatrk'n halkln bu balamda dnmek gerekir. Merutiyet dneminde, Trkl aratrma amacna ynelik olarak kurulan Trk Ocaklar'nn sonradan Halkevleri'ne (1932) dntrlmesinin znde, halk kendi iinde retici klmak ve kltrel birikimlere onun katlmn salamak amac gdlmtr. Trk Ocaklar'nn halk kesimleriyle balants snrlyd. Daha ok uzmanlk konularnn ele alnd bir yerdi Trk Ocaklar. Halkevleri ise ksa srede yaylm, kendi iinde kltr retirken, bir yandan da retilen kltrn yaycs olmutur. Birok Avrupa lkesinde etkinlik gsteren kltr merkezlerinin yerini Trkiye'de Halkevleri tutuyordu. Acaba, Halkevleri, kurulduu yllardaki retkenliiyle bugnlere ulanlsayd, halk ocuklarndan oluan orkestralar, yarattklar dzeyli sanat rnleriyle Trkiye'nin, ya da Avrupa'nn merkezlerinde konserler vermezler miydi, oyunlar oynamazlar myd, sergiler amazlar myd?... Halkevleri, halk retici klarak, sanatsal ve bilimsel yaratcln kayna olarak dnlmtr. Ksa srede de bu ama gereklemitir. lkenin bakanlar, milletvekilleri daha oturacak masa sandalye bulamazken, Ankara'da Devlet Konservatuvan, Devlet Opera ve Balesi, Devlet Tiyatrosu kurulmu, halk yaratc klan kurumlamaya gitmenin yollar aranmtr. niversitelere salanan bilimsel zerklikle birletirilirse, toplumda dncenin nasl bamsz klnd daha iyi anlalr. Atatrk'n zamannda temeli atlan, lmnden iki yl sonra kurulan Ky Enstitleri ise kentkyl, varsl-yoksul demeden lkenin ocuklarna eitim eitlii salamtr. Bunlar, hep bir bilgi toplumu yaratmann devrimci abalardr. Cumhuriyet'in 10. yl dolaysyla yapt konumada, Atatrk, balatt devrimlerin anlamn bir kez daha dile getirmek gereksinimi duymutur. Yurdu dnyann en gelimi lkeleri dzeyine karmak, mreffeh bir Trkiye yaratmak, ulusal kltr ada uygarlk dzeyinin stne karmak... Trk insannn alkanln, zeksn vurgulayan Atatrk, szlerini "Trkln unutulmu uygar nitelii ve byk yetenei, bundan sonraki gelimesiyle, gelecein uygarlk ufkunda yeni bir gne gibi doacaktr!" diye tamamlamaktadr. Atatrk'n kulland her szck, yaratmak istedii bilgi toplumunun ana stunlarn oluturuyor. Atatrk, Sylev'ine balarken, "manzara-i umumiye" diye izdii o batk lkeden, on drt yl iinde, ada bir Trkiye Cumhuriyeti yaratmtr, smet inn'nn belirttii gibi, vatan, Atatrk'e "minnet" borludur. Trk ulusu byk ounluuyla bu minnet duygusunu, yreinde Atatrk inanca ve cokuya dntrm; O'nun onuruna layk demok-

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rasiyi kurmutur. Trk ulusunu bu yoldan dndrecek, onu Atatrk inancndan saptracak hibir g dnlemez. Ancak, "O'nun, ulusal bilincin ve kltrel varln kanlmaz iki kurumu olarak, kendi kiisel tasarruflaryla destekledii Trk Tarih ve Trk Dil Kurumu'nu, hukuk kurallarn ineyerek kapatanlar, tarihin yzne nasl bakacaklar? # Halkevleri gibi, sanattan, yazndan yoksun braklm halka yaratc gcn yaatma olana salayan kurumlan yok edenlerin devrimi tarihi karsnda alnlar ak olacak m? Gnmzde, ulusal eitimi parallarn tekeline sokanlar, eitim eitliini bilgi toplumunun temel ilkesi sayan Atatrk'e, o bilinle yetimi Atatrk kuaklara nasl yant vereceklerdir? Yzyllarca yoksul braklm bir halkn ocuklarna ilk kez eitim olana salayan Ky Enstitlerini kapatp, o kayna laikliin tam kart dinsel eitime ynelterek ad ve Atatrk dman kuaklar yetitirenler, Atatrk'n zgr klmak istedii vicdanlarnn sesini ne zaman duyacaklardr? Cumhuriyet'in 75. ylnda, yal gen demeden O'nun devrimlerine sahip kmak ve ada uygarlk dzeyine ulamakla kalmayp onun da stne kmay amalamak, btn Cumhuriyet kuyaklarnn namus borcu olmaldr. Trkiye'de neredeyse her kurulu kendi niversitesini ap, kendine gerekli adam yetitirme program uyguluyor. Gittike emberi daralan eitim koullarnn halk ocuklarndan uzak tutulmas, ileride zm zor durumlar yaratacaktr. Atatrkln temel ilkesi, snf ayrm gzetmeden, eitliki eitimi egemen klmakt. Eitimde bu ilkeye uyulmad iin, Atatrk genliinin tm zelliklerini tamas gereken halk ocuklar, onlar aldatanlarn oyununa gelip, Atatrk'e dman kesiliyorlar. Bir kar uruna, kendilerini an nimetlerinden, ulusal ve kltrel bilinten, bilimsel zerklikten, kii olarak dnyadaki varlk nedenlerinden yoksun brakan genler, bir gn, yalnz Trkiye'de deil, btn dnyada da adalk yolundan baka bir yol olmadm, bu yolu da Atatrk'n, ulusu iin ok erken grdn anlayacaklardr. Babalarn, annelerin, retmenlerin, br byklerin genler zerinde etkili olmalar doaldr; gene de hibir gen, bilincini, zerkliini, insan olma hakkn kimsenin karna hizmet edecek yolda kullanmamaldr. Bitki bitkiliiyle, zaman zamanlyla kendi varln yaarken, insanolu nasl olur da birilerinin ynlendirilmesiyle kendini tutucu dncelere kaptrp ad kalmay yeler?

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THE LANGUAGE FACTOR AS THE KEYSTONE OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC'S REFORM PROGRAM
Prof. Dr. Ezel Kural SHAW* in celebrating the 75th anniversary of the Turkish Republic we are in fact engaged in an overvievv of what the twentieth century has meant for the Turkish people. Language is a strong indicator of the pace of change that Turkish society and culture experienced in making the transition from being part of an empire to becoming a nation unified under a republican form of government. in follovving the phases of the Turkish language reform movement, we see how it has been an active agent in the transformation of Turkish identity in the period of the Turkish Republic. Historicism, the desire to explain change in the context of the past touching the present, calls for a wider perspective in viewing the progress of Turkish language reform. Ottoman use of Persian and Arabic vocabulary and idiom had been a carry-over from a pre-nationalist era, the Umma period which assumed the existence of a unifying religious ideology. The Ottoman language was part of a voluntarily shared supra-nationalist civilization. Ottoman became and remained an administrative language, the acquisition of which allovved for upvvard social mobility. Turkish was one of the languages used in the Empire, but it was privileged in that it provided the syntax that ordered and managed Arabic, Persian, and some Turkish terms, thus empovvering the Ottoman construct. Diverse communities in the Empire practiced their religion in their own language. The Ottoman government let the different millets, communities based on religious distinction, conduct their own internal affairs and practice their own religion. Though dominated by Greek-speaking Orthodox clergy into the nineteenth century, communities in the Balkans launched their nationalist movements through initial stages of securing their own language in conducting religious services. The first indications of national awakening were, one might say, marked with the demand the Greek-speaking orthodox clergy appointed by the Patriarchate in istanbul be replaced by clergy appointed by
* California State University, Northridge.

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the Patriarchate in istanbul be replaced by clergy who used the local language Serbian, Bulgarian, Rumanian. Nationalism in the Balkans, ethnicity if we employ a more recent identifier, was frequently inseparably linked with religion and language. Throughout the Empire, the existence of semi-autonomous communities who were free to follow their religion and regulate their own internal affairs was, both in the context of the late Middle Ages and Early Modern Era, unusual but signifcant signs of toleration (hogr) and the Islamic state's staying out of the religious belief systems of subject peoples, a proto-secularist policy. Of the different ethnic groups that made up the human mosaic of the Empire, the Turks were one community vvhere language and religion were seperate: they practiced islam, used Arabic in formal ritual, and spoke Turkish in their daily lives. Turkish was also the language of their bards and poets, and Sufi dervishes like Yunus Emre who spread the heartbeat of mystic islam through saz and sz. The state was distant, its administrative authority, derivative of Islamic political theory, was also distant, exercised through its officials. The Turkish national avvakening came late in comparison to Europe and to the subject ethnic communities within the Ottoman Empire. Turkish language reform supplemented, rather than preceeded the process of becoming an independent nation. Unlike many other national movements (such as in Germany and in the Balkans in the nineteenth century) which promoted a national language as arallying cry for independence, the intense period of change in Turkish took place after the threat of foreign political hegemony was ver and the Republic was established. Turkish national identity, combining language and land, finds expression in the Misak-i Milli, the assertion of convergence of language and boundary as determinants of territory to be claimed for the turkish nation. The Turkish War of Liberation was fought within the framevvork of this commitment. The working out of the details was to follow. How Turkish, the language of the people, would dovetail with the program of the Republic was put on hold until full sovereignty was achieved. A brief look into the Tanzimat period, the later part of the nineteenth century, informs us of the growing Ottoman awareness of the political, economic, diplomatic, and military ascendancy of Europe. The opening of the Translation Office to provide future administrators with knovvledge of French was a first step in the effort to attain parity. Recognition of availability of resources not accessible in Turkish led to translation of instructional manuals in military and veterinary science, engineering, and medicine, vvhile the need to inform the public and obtain its cooperation gave rise to nevvspapers. The initial stages of language simplification are thus connected with a practical approach to translation, eventually ex-

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tending to works of literatre. The flovvery, redundant, elaborate Ottoman style was broken down to accommodate new forms and ideas. One work may serve as an indicator of progress made in the nineteenth century. The first Dictionary of Turkish, Kamus-u Trki (1901, in two volumes) by emsettin Sami (1850-1904) was most likely inspired by the author's earlier work on a French-Ottoman dictionary. He felt the need to explain his use of the word "Turkish" instead of the word "Ottoman" in the title of the work by noting that it was the language used by the Turkish nation. What took place in this process of translation during the Tanzimat is comparable to the experience of the Renaissance period, fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries, when study and translation of classical literatre inspired works on language and grammar. it is also important to signal what did not happen. The wildly held opinion in islam that the Koran cannot be translated, only interpreted, into another language absolved those working on Turkish renditions from aiming at clarity and precision. "Turkish" renditions remained heavy in Arabic vocabulary, offered an inadequate bridge to the religious experience, and did not create canons for aliterary style common to ali. The immediacy of emotional access to religion through the vernacular took place in the Turkish Suf tradition. Turkish and the formal religion were in two different spheres. in a sence, this was a built-in separation of the worldly activities of the believers from their religious performance. The Western encounter with secularism (as conceived during the Enlightenment, in the eighteenth century) does not involve a linguistic break from existing patterns. Translations of the Bible were available before the Reformation of the sixteenth century. After the Lutheran break from the Papacy, in Protestant and Reformed Churches, The Bible, translated into the vernacular of the region, became a tool for the promotion of literacy, a source for shared idiom, and a canon of style for the standardization of language. The King James or Authorized version of the Bible (1611) drew upon earlier translations and became a literary paradigm for the English language. Following the translation activity of the nineteenth century we find the evolution of an argument in favor of simplification of the Turkish language by way of eliminating Persian and Arabic phrases and constructs. The publicists of this movement, mer Seyfettin and Ziya Gkalp, collaborated in the publication of Gen kalemler in Selanik. Gkalp's exposure to Positivism and to the new science of sociology has no direct bearing on translation, but represents an exposure to concepts seminal in his development of ideas on Turkish cultural identity. His recognition of the linguistic factor as a defining feature of cultural nationalism was to find expression in the formulation of the language program of Gen Kalemler, in the arguments penned by mer Seyfettin. Promotion of the istanbul dialect as the model for the literary and general language of the Turkish nation indicates that the advocates had

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not moved beyond the Ottoman centext: the capital set the tone. in explaining his canons of Turkish usage, Seyfettin offered a hierarchy of categroies of people in istanbul, suggesting that social classes have a language, not the people as a whole. Included were groups as diverse as old style poets, experts in Islamic studies (ulema) and students of theology (softa). Teachers who taught old usage, conservative govemment employees who kept the Bab-i Ali style (the bureaucratize?) alive, women who were not well-educated, foreigners and non -Turks- ali had a claim to istanbul Turkish. Nevertheless, the refined istanbul usage had to prevail. mer Seyfettin's prioritizing istanbul puts emphasis on achieving a viable Standard form, but the idea of a Turkish national language had a very narrow foundation from which to grow, if it was to grow at ali. Following the declaration of the Republic, institutional reforms were introduced individually, as the right moment allovved for the move. Specific dates record the changes. The case of language reform presents an extended process. Even as other reforms were ushered, they had to be explained through language. Language reform was interactive with the implementation of other reforms. Curiously, changes in nomenclature skipped the BIG achievement that was already in place by the time other reforms rolled along. What did it mean to have a Republic-a Cumhuriyet? it did not matter that the word was of Arabic origin: it was suffcient that it did not stem from the Ottoman past and it conveyed the sentiment of shared responsibility and freedom. The emotional weight of words is such that nce introduced as CUMHURYET, it is inconceivable that another word can be used in reference to the Turkish Republic. The Republic represented the success of a massive effort against foreign invasion and occupation. it was a secular jihad. The energy it released swept away the debris of traditional institutions and ushered changes in form and content. The new Turkish state shed its Ottoman heritage in stages reinforced by changes in language. The language issue which had been peripheral and auxiliary in the crumbling Ottoman empire became the deep reaching instrument used to chisel and define Turkish identity. Language acquired priority in determining identity only after the shattering of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman linguistic policy towards different ethnic communities, parallel to its religious policy, was, on the whole, one of lack of interference, attributable to, from various perspectives, to practicality, tradition, indifference, or even liberalisin. Communities, ethnic or religious, including Turks and Arabs and Kurds and Jews and Greeks and Armenians and bulgars and serbs and others performed their religious services in a language that might or might not be the vernacular. The construct that we refer to as the Ottoman language was an administrative tool that distinguished civil servants from the masses, but beyond that was not an exclusive definer of identity. Thus the potential separation of the realm of religion from the realm of every800

day linguistic communal interaction was widespread. This I regard as a balancing of the administrative role of the Empire with the spiritual demands of religion. Potentially, the essence of a secular outlook was available in the Ottoman tradition. By the obalition of the Caliphate, the Republic not only took a firm step away from claims of religion ver state policy-hardly effective since the reign of Mahmut II- but it also unbound other Moslem states from a misconstrued notion of institutionalized centrality of religious authority. The Caliphate was no Papacy. it could not make dogmatic statements. But, by analogy, mistakenly, the West confused the role of these two institutions. The abolition of the Caliphate removed the semblance of centrality in Islamic administration. Secularism in Turkey, advanced through the alphabet reform and linguistic reform, achieved what the sixteenth century Reformation had brought to Europe: opportunity to forge ahead, as a nation, with identity linked to land and language. The reforms and institutional innovations that followed the declaration of the Republic came in time of peace and served to create a divide betvveen then and now. The explanation of these changes needed an extended discourse, a discourse that explanation of these changes needed an extended discourse, a discourse that allowed conceptual distancing from what had been unquestioningly practiced in the past. What was visually demonstrated through the adoption of a brimmed hat to replace the fez (which had itself been an innovation in the nineteenth century) was intellectually brought to the realm of language through the adoption of the Latin-European based alphabet, principle of phonetic spelling, encouragement of the vernacular as the ascending literary style, and a vocabularybuilding program that would break away from established conceptual molds of the past. The language program was an acceleration to catch up with fast moving times. it reached out for a past untainted by the Ottoman years of decline, a past that could provide inspiration for a new beginning for the Turkish nation. it was the keystone that strengthened policies of nationalism, secularism, populism, egalitarianism, and promotion of contemporary values and trends including science and creativity. The language issue became one of the most holty debated topics in the decades that saw the rise in Turkey of the multi-party system follovving the Second World War. Why? The answer lies in the contrast between the enegry manifested in the application of the reforms in the Atatrk years, the whirlwind effect, the immediacy of an all-encompassing sense of change and the normative adjustments that are to be expected in a field such as language where the people's response is a indispensable measure of its appropriateness and insurance of longevity. The formation of the TDK (Trk Dil Kurumu, Turkish Linguistic Society) was a milestone in the series of reforms. This deliberate institutional step towards an effective language reform that would eliminate for-

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eign roots and expressions from Turkish usage and encourage the coining of new vvords to meet contemporary needs was taken as the Turkish Republic prepared to celebrate its first decade. President Atatrk and Prime Minister nn both attended to Turkish Language Congress gathered in Dolmabahe Palace in September 1932. The TDK received its mission from the urgent need to develop and effective means of communication that would express the identtiy of the Turkish nation. The purpose behind the institution of TDK was akin to that of the Academie Franaise. it was intended to function as a commitee with a broad base, able to cali on the service of experts in different fields, decide on priorities in carrying out voluminous translation projects, and see to it that these tasks were accomplished. They would also determine rules of grammar, punctuation, and usage. A lexicon of Turkish words and terms that were either obsolete or had been modified in meaning ver time was produced by combing 160 Turkish works produced since the thirteenth century. The first edition was published piecemeal, between 1943 and 1957. each volume contained alphabetically arranged vocabulary from works combed up-to-date. The second edition incorporated 67 additional works. The vocabulary was integrated into an alphabetically arranged presentation of eight volumes, including an index. (TANIKLARIYLE TARAMA SZL. Tarih Kurumu Basmevi, Ankara, 1988). By 1946, the reforms were in place and part of the constitution. The Republic had been tested, and remained sound. Unlike European regimes that had moved towards totalitarianism and then eventually collapsed, the Turkish Cumhuriyet matured. Progressively it became more liberal and pen to a wider spectrum of opinions, ideas, practices. The move to a multi-party system was a sign of confidence in what had been achieved. Democracy was healthy. The assimilation of the reforms into the lifestyle patterns of society, the adjustments, disruptions, ruptures that society experienced in years of turmoil was detached from the comforting, customary labels. Linguistic modes and patterns change at a slow pace. Perception of cultural threat makes each generation adhere to the schooling it received. Though the political and institutional demie of the Ottoman Empire was clearly irriversible, the generation that experienced the transition thought of the past as it had learned about it, in the traditional cultured idiom. There was resistance to abandoning the language that had shaped their cultural identity. Yet that break was essential for the cultural transition to nationalism and modernity that came with the Republic. And those who experienced the rebirth of the Turkish nation saw the need for sustained reform. As Nurullah Ata pointed out, reforms had to be adopted holistically. The issue was not one of esthetic preference but active, deliberate, committed loyalty to innovation, to the reforms. Change in the script- alphabet reform- was not just a sharp break from the shared script of islam, but became an on-going, persistent icon for the accurate and uniform pronunciation of the Turkish language.

802

Women and men, young and old, rich and poor had the oppotunity to become literate. Alphabet reform was the foundation for mass education in the Turkish language. Alphabet reform was also a poplist measure. The change to Latin characters in a way nullified the literacy of ali those who were fluent in the reading and writing of the Arabic script. Except for the few who were already familiar with the Latin script through their knovvledge of a European language such as French or English, change in the script was an instant leveling of literacy: the literate and thus privileged joined the ranks of the illiterate, and had to start from the begining. A similar egalitarian measure dependent on language usage was the abolition of honorific titles and the adoption of two simple gender designating forms, Bay (Mr.) and Bayan (Ms. or Mrs.), comparable to Citizen and Citizeness of the French Revolution. Demotion of the Ottoman language from its position as elitist identifier, the abolition of honorific social titles, the coming of age of Anatolia and Anatolian regional language usage, were part of changes towards a democratic society. Simplification of the language also aimed at eliminating the gap betvveen the urbane educated and the commoner from the countryside. The main characters in the traditional Turkish shadowpuppet theater, Karagz an Hajivat, the icons of the linguistic gap between everyday language and Ottoman, would be blown off the stage not just by the advent of the movies, but the anachronistic nature of their dialogue. Alphabet reform reinforced the secularist program. The difficulty of reading the Koran in Arabic, frequently vvithout understanding what the text said, was compounded by the severing of the familiarity with the script. Turkish language refom emphasized the separation of the realm of religion from the common daily activities of the people. The experiment to render the ezan in Turkish, the words officially adopted in 1932, was abandoned in the fifties, a concession to public sentiment. The ezan, frequently part of setting the stage in a Moslem country in movies and news reports, was too strong an icon to be altered: the domain of language was not to cross ver to alter religious tradition. The initiators of language reform, the first generation actively engaged in making the shift, had to make a deliberate effort to make the new prevail. Authors such as Yakup Kadri Karaosmanolu (1889-1974) whose life span and experience covered a vast range, from the decline and shattering of the Ottoman Empire through the war of Liberation and the establishment of the Republic, revised earlier works to reflect the changing usage, especially in vocabulary. Their exhilaration ver assertion of Turkish independence carried ver to their mission in establishing the connection betvveen language and national identity. Themes went beyond the confnes of istanbul, into Anatolia, where the language was neither that of the older, educated generation in istanbul nor the vocabulary being revamped by the Language Association. Prominent authors who 803

lived through the intensive moments of reform, had greater latitude of choice later, a freedom factor that fanned the debate between conservatives and innovators... Plurality in party programs could be and was matched by plurality in linguistic styles. Turkish was the vvinner in producing poets as distinct in style as Yahya Kemal, Orhan Veli, and Nazm Hikmet. Concepts have a history acquired within the cultures that use them. in translation, a concept can represent only a portion of its connotations. Post-modern textual analysis points to the inadequacy of definitions in establishing meaning. Some of the key ideas in the reform program, when expressed through imported concepts, remained ambiguous, without a backdrop of precedents. Secularism/laicism is one such concept that is difficult to transplant from a different cultural environment because the coordinates and etymological roots of the reference are different. (The same might be said of the word toleration.) These are instances when a translation carries only a portion of the meaning, but severs the idea from its roots. Reforms that seek cooperation from the people need to be explained through words, preferably by choice of vocabulary and experience to which they can relate. Part of the difficult tasks assigned to language is undoing what happened during the building of the Tower of Babel- to make us understand one another in spite of differences in language. Sometimes when lengthy explanations and persuasions are to timeconsuming, it is more effective to have a train of changes that follovv one after another. Reforms introduced under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk stand as an integrated, coordinated program of change when viewed not only in their totality, but also in the complementary relationships that emerge as individual measures fail into place. The new perspective of the place of religion in the life of the Republic was closely linked to the recognition bestowed on the Turkish language. Language was to serve as the new bond between the people and their state. Time marched in determined steps: the status of islam as the religion of the State, stated in the 1924 constitution, was altered gradually. The Common Era calendar adopted on December 26, 1925 was put into effect on January 1,1926. The adoption of western style 24-hour day was later supplemented by a shift of the rest day of the week from Friday to Sunday. in 1926, Arabic and Persian language courses were eliminated from the curriculum of state schools. On April 10, 1928, the alteration of the second article of the Constitution which stated that islam was the religion of the state, and article 26 which recognized the Grand National Assembly as the executive power in charge of the application of the sheri'a indicated the advent of secularism. Preparations form alphabet reform were undenvay in 1927 and the reform was launched in 1928, allovving only for a six-month transition period. Yet there were popular boundaries that set limits to where language reform might prevail: the rendition of the Ezan 804

in Turkish, which was put into effect in 1932 "in urban centers where it could be enforced" was short-lived. The traditional Cali to Prayer was restored af ter the Democrat Party came to power in 1950. From the way people thought about time, the way they arranged their agenda, to the script they used to keep records and to communicate, ali indicators pointed to a different world where they would need a new array of vvords to think new thoughts and achieve new goals. The social and cultural shifts and transitions were daring, immense, comprehensive. it is this momentum that ensured success, vvhile leaving details and adjustments to the future. Laicism and secularism, in the mythical world of the "West" exist in different degrees of recognition, support, and fair application. Separation of Religion and State, as it is explained in Turkish, by using three words from Arabic and one from Turkish (din ve devlet ayrm) was preceded in the Constitution by the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. it is diffcult to miss the connection betvveen alphabet reform (in preparation in 1927, launched in 1928) and the incorporation of secularism into the constitution. The phenomenon of information explosion and dissemination, the emergence of a supranational civilization dependent on new technology, has encouraged the entry of neoglogisms into languages that have otherwise maintained stability that comes with maturity. French fear of Franglais recedes in intensity as the European Common Market extends its grip. Neither Turkey nor Turkish is zenophobic: people and ideas from the outside will continue to be welcome. And some old vvords may revisit. Semiotics treats vvords as signs. Each vvord brings vvith itself a cluster of associations. Some relate to early encounters in texts. Some arise from the sound, melody, beat in the articulation of the vvord. Nevv vvords to match the meaning of an earlier sign only address a portion of the existing spectrum of meaning. Thus, old vvords come back into circulation, not to replace the nevv, but to enrich. Confdence in the success of language reform allovvs a tolerant rather than zealously protective perspective. The nevv generation uses contemporary Turkish, shaped by reform, responding to the current needs. Perhaps this interpretation is also valid for the analysis of secularist reform. Atatrk vvhose leadership provided the Turkish people vvith the liberated land on vvhich they could exercise sovereignty vvas an accomplished master of language. His address (NUTUK) to the Second Congress of the Republican People's Party, is a speech of record length, delivered October 15-20, 1927, ver a period of five days. it is his account of the Turkish War of Liberation. The language of the first edition, based on his MS revised in his own hand, is loaded vvith Arabic and Persian vocabulary, but the prose flovvs vvith povver and grace. The 1981 edition of the NUTUK-SOYLEV published by the Trk Tarih Kurumu provides the text of the 1934 edition on even-numbered pages vvhile old-numbered facing pages present the modernized, revvorded text, privileging Turkish vocabu-

805

lary. The contrast is striking. Equally striking is the parallel syntax of the two texts: the vocabulary change is achieved with minimal disruption of sentence structure. The NUTUK, presented in two versions, is a vivid demonstration of the structural strength of Turkish, its ability to absorb and utilize words from other languages, and its fecundity in generating effective vocabulary to substitute for words of foreign origin. The radical reforms in the first decade of the Turkish Republic can be matched by a similar series introduced in the decade of the French Revolution, 1789-1799. The overthrow of the monarchy, egalitarianism, calendar reform, changes in costume, the altering of the status of the religious institution, standards for weights and measures can be matched with what took place during the French Revolution. What is peculiar to the Turkish experience is the longevity of the reforms and the common thread of continued change that engages the people in the process. Language serves as conveyor and perpetuator of reform even as it itself changes. The language forged in the seventy-five years of the Republic now has reached the point of taking stock of its gains. it needs to go into an editing mode, where instead of worrying about vocabulary, it can survey its practical and esthetic achievement. The keystone is in place, and in its maturity it can continue to maintain the edifice of reforms created by Atatrk. As the third generation of the Republic comes of age, Turkish has the opportunity to continue its communicative and esthetic mission in a multinational modern global setting. A snapshot of writing activity in the Ottoman capital in the early twentieth century reveals a mix of styles, in which the functional communication is just beginnnig to take root, while the hermetic language of the cultivated, the Servet-i Fnun and Fecr-i Ati movements represent the anachronistic, exhausted, Ottoman esthetics and literary style. By the end of the twentieth century, language reform, though subject to adjustments, is irreversible. it has created and continues to create original literatre that is being translated from Turkish into other languages. The challenge the language faces now is the impact of the new shared international vocabulary of technology ("technobabble") and corresponding changes that modify nation and cultural identity. The debate ver the language issue in Turkey, which peaked, one might say, in the middle decades of the tvventieth century, now presents a more relaxed attitude. The syntax continues to accommodate neologisms in transition to established usage; expressions and terms that persist as part of a pool of alternative resource of signifiers; and the inevitable social and technical vocabulary that seeps into the language through closer contact with contemporary culture. nce confident that plurality of choices does not mean betrayal of language reform, but is a factor of enrichment of expression and stylistic enhancement, it is hoped that a maturing taste for language will seek clarity, accuracy, and esthetic structuring in the utilization of Turkish. The efforts of new generations and the test of time will determine what Turkish will be like in the next millenium.

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Language as Keystone to Atatrk's Reform Program

TRADITION

Movementto simplify Ottoman Turkish, Tanzimatb pre World WarOne Era. abolition of the Caliphate

I nter natio na I izatio n

Kor'anl Sharia

Arabic S erip t

Umma: supra-national The Caliphate as Islamic administrative icon Rightof Islamic peoples to natio nal svere ignty

calendar reform Common Era dates solar year change of alphabet to Latin letters

National svere ignty literacy campaign Populism Turkic T.D.K etymo logy

Anno Higri (622 C.E.) lunar year

Language Reform

religious autonomy of / reaya- subjectpopyitfuons. Non-interference iVthe state S uf i si |backdrop to secularism Spiritual unity Mevlana Yunus Emre Universalism andappreciationof OTHER

reform of personal attire Turkish National Identity MODERNITY

folklore

Resi Mence of Turkish bardsand poets

Secularism

Visual and Conceptual resacting of the Turkish Nation: Centrality of Language Reform in shaping cultural identity

807

TRKOLOJNN TRKYE'DE CUMHURYET DNEMNDEK GELMESNN BAZI SORUNLARI STNE

Prof. Gyrgy HAZAI* Avrupa'da Trklere, bu halklarn diline, tarihine ve kltrne kar gsterilen ilginin yzyllara uzanan bir ananesi var. Fakat bu konulan inceleyen bilim dal, yani trkoloji nispeten gen bir bilimsel disiplin olarak bilinmektedir. Douu Avrupa'da 19. yzyla, zellikle bu yzyln ikinci yarsna baldr. Trkiye'de bu sahadaki eitli abalarn 19. yzyln sonunda ve 20. yzyln banda belirlenip kuvvetlenmesine ramen, trkoloji Cumhuriyet'in evlddr. Trkiye'de trkolojinin hem aratrma, hem de retme merkezleri bu dnemde ortaya kmakta, bu sahada alanlarn evresi ve uzmanlarn bilimsel ama ve metotlar ak bir ekilde belirlenmekteydi. Bilimsel aratrmalarn douunu, gelime ynn ve zenginlemesini kukusuz ki yeni devletin, yani Cumhuriyet'in amalan ve ideolojisi byk apta etkilemekteydi. eitli konularda, zellikle milli kken ve kimlik sorunlar ile ilgili ortaya kan dnce ve tezlerde gze arpan farkllklarda aratnclann bu ideolojiden ne kadar yakn ve uzak oluunu grmek mmknd. Ayn zamanda ise bu aratrmalarda Cumhuriyet ideolojisinin bir noktasnda zel bir ortaklk belirleniyordu. Bu noktay benimsemek bilim adamlar iin kendiliinden anlalan bir lk idi. Bilimsel aratrmalann sanki bir ana noktasn oluturan bu e Cumhuriyet'in dier devrimlerinde de temel rol oynayan modernleme, yani batllama dncesi idi. Bu dnce toplumsal bilimler, bata dil ve tarih aratrmalan iin Avrupa'daki bilim dnyasnn o zamana kadar elde ettii sonular, zellikle bilimsel yntemleri benimsemek, btn bunlan Trk halklarnn dil, tarih ve kltrne ait aratrmalara uygulamakt. Bu abalar gerekletirmek yolu da belli idi: Avrupa bilim hayatyla, var olan bilimsel kurumlarla ve nder uzmanlarla sk bir ibirlii kurup Trkiye'yi uluslararas bilim
Macar Bilimler Akademisi, Budapete.

809

dnyasna balamak, Trk bilim adamlarnn oradaki roln ve almalarnn yerini saptamak idi. Bildirimde Trkiye'deki trkoloji aratrmalarnn Cumhuriyet dneminde, zellikle bu dnemin balangcndan 50-60 yllarna kadar yapt gelimesinde Avrupa bilim dnyasyla balantlar zerinde durmak istiyorum. Bu tabloyu izerken kendi sahamla, yani dil bilimiyle ilgili sorunlar zerinde daha etraflca durmamn balanmasn rica ederim. Konumun temel sorunlarna dokunmadan nce uluslararas trkoloji aratrmalarnn o zamanki durumuna ksa bir bak sunmama izin verilsin. Bu dnemin, yani bu yzyln 20-30 yllarnn trkolojisini incelerken, uluslararas demek pek tabii Avrupal demektir. nk trkoloji denizar lkelerde, bilindii gibi, ancak 2. Dnya Sava'ndan sonra kurulup gelimeye balad. Dil biliminin douunun 19. yzyldaki bilimsel aratrmalarnn bir baars olduu iyi biliniyor. Temel sonu diller arasndaki genetik balarn kefedilmesi idi. Bunun sonucunda geni bir yeni aratrma sahas ortaya kmt : Dilleri tarihi karlatrma temelinde aratrmak sahas. Bu sahann iinde Hint-Avrupa dilleri balang noktasn oluturuyordu ve ksa zamanda dier dillere de ayn yaklamn getirilmesine olanak alyordu. Sami, Fin-Ogur ve dier dillerin karlatrmal tarihi analizi onlarn sadece genetik akrabaln ispat etmekle kalmad, bu halklarn gemii hakkndaki aratrmalarn bir ok yeni yn ve soruyla zenginletirdi. Avrupa ve Asya dillerinin aratnlmasndaki bu nemli olaylar Trk dillerinin incelenmesi konusunda da ilgi uyandrd. O zaman, bu sahada, dille ilgili antlar veya ada diller ve leheler sahasnda alan tm bilim adamlar iin, Anadolu'da, Sibirya'da ve Orta Asya'da konuulan bu diller arasnda genetik akrabalk varolduu akt. Fakat, Hint-Avrupa dilleri ile karlatrldnda durumda byk farkllk vard. Hint-Avrupa dilleri bakmndan eski ve l diller, Sanskrit, Klsik Yunanca, Ltince, Eski Kilise Slavcas v.s. bilim adamlarna binlerce yl ncesinin dil durumunu aratrmak iin geni bir tarih zemin sunuyordu. Trk dillerinde bu zemin yoktu ve bilim adamlar tarihi perspektiften yoksun kalyordu. 19. yzyln sonunda ve 20. yzyln balangcnda beklenmeyen baz olaylar bu durumu anden ve tmyle deitirdi. Bugnk Moolistan topraklarnda Orhun Trkleri'nin antlarnn kefedilmesi, bunlarn V.Thomsen'in parlak almas sonucunda ksa zamanda deifre edilmesi, bu olaylarn ilk aamasn oluturdu. Bundan ksa bir sre sonra, Orta Asya'ya giden ngiliz, Fransz, Alman, Japon ve sveli kaz ekipleri ok sayda yazl belge buldular. Bu aratrmalarn Orta Asya'nn gerek kefinin yolunu atn sylemek abartma olmaz. Bylelikle bilinmeyen yazlar ve diller ortaya karld. Bu bulgular, blgenin gemii hakkndaki bilgilerimizi umulmayan geni bir apta zenginletirdi. Trk dilleri konu810

sunda ise bir ok bilimsel sahada tamamen yeni ve uzun vadeli perspektifler ortaya kt. Orta Asya'da bulunan yeni kaynaklarn daha fazla incelenmesinde Alman bilim adamlar nemli rol oynad. Prusya Bilimler Akademisi ve Berlin niversitesi Macar Enstits'nde bu alanda alan parlak bir aratrma grubu ortaya kt. Bu bilim adamlarnn almalar Trk dili tarihi biliminin douuna yol at. ki dnya sava arasnda Berlin gerekten bu almalarn kalbiydi. Bu almalar, trkoloji tarihine altn harflerle kaydedildi. Dier yandan, Osmanl aratrmalar Almanya'da 1. Dnya Sava'ndan nce kurulmutu. Alman niversitelerinin uygulamalarna gre, bu sahalar slm etdleri erevesinde entegre edilmiti. Ayn dnemde, bir dier nemli trkoloji merkezi Macaristan'd. Macar trkoloji etdlerinin ortaya kmas, 19. yzyldaki uzun bir gelimenin sonucuydu. Macarlarn kendi dil ve tarihlerinin Dou ile balantsna duyduklar ilginin artmas bu alanda youn aratrmalara yolat. stn bilim adamlar, Trk dilleri arasndaki genetik balan, gemiin antlarn ve bugnn dilini, lehelerini aratryorlard. Bu aratrmalar sadece Asya'daki Trk dillerini deil, Anadolu ve Rumeli Trklerinin dilini ve kltrn kapsyordu. Daha sonra bu aratrmalarn kapsam dier Orta Asya dillerini kapsayacak ekilde yani Altay etdlerine doru geniletildi. Bunun amac, Trk dil ailesi ile bu blgedeki dier diller, temel olarak Mool ve Manu-Tunguz dilleri arasndaki ilikileri aratrmakt. O dnemde Macaristan'da trkoloji etdleri ile ilgilenen sadece dilciler ve etnograflar deildi. Tarihiler ve arkeologlar da, Macarlarla TrkMool bozkr dnyasndan kan ger halklar arasndaki ilikiler konular zerinde alrken bunu yapyordu. Bu ger halklarn bazlar Pannonia'ya kadar ulatlar, oraya yerletiler, daha sonra Dou'dan gelen dier ger halklar tarafndan asimile edildiler. Onlarn temel olarak yer altndaki izleri, arkeolojik kazlar iin byk olanaklar sunuyordu. Kazlar, bu halklarn kkeni, ilikileri ve medeniyet dzeyi konularnda bir ok yeni veri ortaya koydular. Bu tabloya Macar bilim adamlarnn Osmanl etdlerine gsterdikleri derin ilgiyi eklemeliyiz. Osmanl mparatorluu ile balar bilindii gibi Macar tarihinde 14. yzyldan balayarak anahtar rol oynuyor. Kronolojik yn bir kenara brakarak, Almanya ve Macaristan'da, yirmili ve otuzlu yllarda trkoloji etdleri sahasnda alan bilim adamlarnn isimlerinin kaba bir zetini vereceim. Onlarn bazlar, lisans st eitim iin trkoloji merkezlerine gelen gen Trk rencilerin retmenleri oldular. Almanya'da Eski Trk etdleri sahas byk ncler A. von Le Coq, F.W.K. Mller, W. Bang-Kaup ve onlarn rencisi A. von Gabain tarafndan temsil ediliyordu. Osmanl ve Trk etdleri sahasnda, her ikisi de 811

kendi sahalarnda mkemmel uzmanlar olan C. Brockelmann ve Fr. Giese zikredilebilir. Macaristan'da J. Nemeth ve L. Ligeti, Trk ve Altay etdlerinin bir ok sahasnda nde gelen bilim adamlar olarak tannmtlar. L. Fekete, Osmanl tarihi sahasnda stn bir uzmand. Osmanl paleografi ve diplomasisinin babas olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu dnem Macar trkoloji okulunun ilk rencileri I. Rasonyi, T. Hasi-Kun, Hasan Eren ve J. Eckmann daha sonra Trkiye'nin bilimsel yaamnda nemli rol oynadlar. Bizans uzman olan ve esas ilgi alanm Bizans'la Trk halklar arasndaki ilikileri adayan Gy. Moravcsik'in ismini de burada anmalyz. Avrupa'daki trkolojinin bu ksa tablosunu sergiledikten sonra dikkatimizi Trkiye'ye evirelim. Trkiye'de Cumhuriyetin kurulu dneminde ve sonralarnda toplumsal bilimler sahasnda nder rol oynayan kiilerin almalarnda, onlar bilim sahasna gtren yol, aym zamanda bilgi hazinelerinin kkeni ve yaps, siyasi ve bilimsel lk ve abalan, net bir ekilde belirleniyordu. Bu zellikler somutlatrlarak belki u noktalar etrafnda toplanabilir: Bu kuak bilim uzmanlarnn akademik karakteri, yani nceki aratrma ve yaynlarn trkolojideki yeri, hayat yollarnn Trk dnyasnn hangi blgesine bal oluu, son olarak ise yeni devletin merkezine yakn olup olmaylar. Ancak bu ileri srdmz kriterlerle yetinirsek, Trkiye'de o dnemde bilim sahasnda rol oynayan uzmanlarn bilimsel kiiliini M.F. Kprl'den Z.V. Togan'a kadar - karakterize etmek istersek, pek byk ayrmlar gze arpar. Ayn zamanda ise demin vurguladm gibi phesiz ki almalarnda birbirlerinden ve Avrupa'daki trkologlardan defalarca farkl grler belirten bu bilginleri Trkiye'nin toplumsal bilimler, bylece trkoloji sahasnda da Avrupa'nn bilim dnyasna balanmak lks ve abas birletiriyordu. Yeni devlet de, resmi ideolojisinde bazen Avrupa trkologlar tarafndan kabul edilmeyen grlerin belirlenmesine ramen, bu lk ve abay byk apta destekliyordu. lkden geree gtren yoldaki admlar neydi? Bu yllarda Avrupa'nn nder trkoloji merkezlerinden nl bilim adamlarnn konferans veya ders vermek amacyla Trkiye'ye daveti grlyor. Ayn zamanda Avrupa'daki trkoloji merkezleriyle ba kurmak, orada yrtlen aratrmalar gerekten yakndan takip etmek amacyla Trkiye'den ve Trk dnyasnn dier blgelerinden gen bilim uzmanlar bu lkelere gidiyor. Bu aln Trkiye ve Avrupa arasndaki bilimsel balantlan geni bir temel zerine oturtmak ve devam ettirmek bakmndan ne kadar nemli bir yatrm olduu sonraki yllar boyunca net bir ekilde belirleniyor. Bu ksa tabloyu izerken, balant noktasnn rnei olarak Avrupa'nn bu dnemde nemli rol oynayan ve demin adn andm trkoloji merkezlerinin ancak bazlarn alalm. Kendi lkemin bakentindeki ni812

versitenin, ayn zamanda Avrupanm ilk Trkoloji Enstits'n bata sze getirmem balansn. 20 ve 30 yllarnda bu krsde tahsil gren veya bir yetiim bursuyla Macaristan'a giden Trk bilim uzmanlar arasnda u kiileri buluruz: lk grupta H.Z. Koay, H. Eren, H.N. Orkun, R.H. zdem ve . Batav, ikinci grupta T. Gkbilgin, . Kafesolu ve S.N. zerdim. kinci olarak 20 ve 30 yllarnda uluslararas trkolojide dil tarihi aratrmalar sahasnda nder bir rol oynayan Berlin'de W.Bang'm, sonralar ise A.V. Gabain'in ismine bal ekoln Trkiye'ye verdii uzmanlar arasnda R.R. Arat, S. aatay ve A. Temir vard. Demin adn andm Trk bilim adamlarnn Trkiye'deki bilim hayatnda, yalnz retim ve aratrma sahasnda deil, ayn zamanda bilim rgtlenmesinde, bu sahann kurumlarnda oynadklar rol bu salonda oturanlarn hatrna getirmek gerekli deildir sanrm. Trkiye ve Avrupa arasnda trkoloji sahasnda bu yllar boyunca kurulan ve genileyen balardan bir ka rnek sergiledikten sonra bu tabloya kk, fakat kanmca nemli bir not eklememe izin verin. Trkiye'nin Trk dnyasnn dier blgelerini etkileyen Rus bilim merkezleriyle balantlar Cumhuriyet'in ilk yllarnda pek mit verici bir ekilde gelimeye balad. Sovyetler Birlii'nden W. Barthold ve N.A. Samoylovi gibi nl trkologlarn Trkiye'de ders ve konferanslar, fikir alverilerinin 1926'da Bak'de dzenlenmi 1. Uluslararas Trkoloji Kongresi'nde devam bunu rneklendirmek iin yeterlidir sanrm. Bu olaylar trkologlarda Trkiye'nin Kafkas, Orta Asya ve Volga blgesindeki trkoloji merkezleriyle olumlu ibirliini devam ettirme midini uyandryordu. Ne yazk ki, bu gelimeye Sovyetlerdeki rejimin kanl bir diktatrle ve kendine kapana dnm bu gelimelere birdenbire son verdi, iki lkenin trkologlan arasndaki ibirlii davasna zel nem veren A.N. Samoylovi'in hayatn Stalin'in bir toplama kampnda bitirmesi bu oluumun feci bir sembol olarak grlebilir. Trk dnyasnn bu iki temel blgesinin uzun yllar iin bir birinden ayrlp uzak kalmasnn uluslararas trkolojiyi ne kadar olumsuz bir ekilde etkilemi olmasyla ilgili sorunlar bir konferansn deil, bir konferanslar serisinin konusu olabilir ve olmaldr kansndaym. Bu nottan sonra tarih aratrmalarna bir gz atalm. Tarih aratrmalarnn sahasnda bata M.F. Kprl'nn adn anmamz gerekir. Kendisi toplumsal bilimlerin Avrupa'daki durumunu, eitli ekolleri ve pek tabii var olan trkoloji merkezlerini o dnemin Trkiye'sinde herkesten daha iyi biliyordu. Kprl, bir yandan Avrupa'daki 813

trkoloji etdlerinin durumunu, dier yandan da Avrupa'da varolan merkezler ve Trkiye'de kurulacak e enstitler arasndaki ibirlii olanaklarn anlad. Amac "ulusal disiplinler" sahasnda aratrmalara Avrupa standardnda zemin oluturmakt. Toplumsal bilimler alanndaki temel aratrmann nemini anlyor ve bu lkeyi kabul ettirmeye alyordu. Onun iin bu sadece bir vizyon deil bilimin rgtlenmesi dzeyinde devaml bir grevdi. Onun yaynlan, projeleri ve giriimleri her zaman nemliydi. Trkiye'de toplumsal bilimlerin uygulanmas ve glendirilmesine ok etkili bir ekilde katkda bulunuyordu. Tarih aratrmalarnn geni sahasnda kendisi, sonralar ise onun talebeleri Trkiye ile Avrupa arasndaki balan kuvvetlendirmek davasna pek nemli katkda bulundular. Trkiye ile Fransa arasndaki iyi ilikiler gelenei daha sonra, .L. Barkan ve H. Inalck'n almalar ile daha st dzeyde devam etti. Onlar, yzylmzn en nemli tarih aratrma ekollerinden biri olan F. Braudel okulu ile yakn ve devaml ilikiler kurdular. Braudel kendisi de Osmanl tarihi ile derinden ilgiliydi. 2. Dnya Savandan sonra younlaan bu aratrmalar, Osmanl imparatorluu tarihi sahasnda, Trkiye, Avrupa ve dier lkelerin bilimsel almalar arasndaki en nemli kpr oldu. Bu etdlerin gelimesi zerinde ve uluslararas sahada byk etkileri oldu. Demin adn andm ve Cumhuriyet dneminin ilk kua saylabilen bilim adamlan alma ve abalaryla uluslararas bilim dnyasna sk skya bal idiler, istisna olmadan tm Trkiye'de parlak bilimsel kariyere sahip oldular. Onlarn almalarnn Trkiye ile Avrupa arasnda toplumsal bilimler sahasnda devaml ve dzenli ilikilerin gelimesi iin katks oldu. nemli uluslararas projelere katldlar ve yabanc lkelerdeki yerel ve uluslararas forumlarla balant kurdular. Ayn zamanda bu ilikilerden aldklar ilhamla kendi lkelerinde bir ok giriim ve faydal projeler balattlar. Bir sonraki kuan eitimini stlendiler. Bu bilim uzmanlarnn almalarnn nemini ortaya koymak iin genellikle Avrupa modelini izleyen gerekli altyapy kurma abalarn da hatrlatmamz gerekir. Bu alanda Avrupa kurumlar ile temas kurmu ve gerekli deneyimi elde etmi Trk bilim adamlan zel bir rol oynuyordu. Trkiye'yi toplumsal bilimler sahasnda uluslararas bilim dnyasna balamak isteyen uzmanlarn emeinin sonucunda gerekleen ortak alma, toplant ve yaynlarndan ancak en nemlilerini rnek olarak anmakla yetinelim. Trk dilleri ve edebiyatlan ile Trk halklarnn tarihini inceleme konusundaki uluslararas bir proje olarak bilinen Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta, bir Trk bilim adamnn stanbul'daki Uluslararas Orientalistler Kongresi'nde yapt neri sonucunda gerekleti. ok tannm bir uluslararas yayn olan Handbuch der Orientalistik'in Trk uzmanlarnn nemli katlm ile hazrlanan trkoloji blmn, slam Ansiklopedisi'nin Trke'ye evrilmi ve geniletilmi basksn, trkoloji 814

sahasnda artk klsik saylan bir ok etdlerin Trke'ye evirisi almalarn da buna ekleyebiliriz. Atatrk tarafndan kurulan iki bilimsel kurum, Trk Dil Kurumu ve Trk Tarih Kurumu yabanc bilim adamlarnn kendi kongrelerine katlmnn ayn zamanda eserlerinin Trkiye'de tantlmasnn nemine zel dikkat gsterdiler. Dier yandan, zellikle 2. Dnya Sava'ndan sonra, Trk ve Avrupal bilim adamlar arasndaki devaml ilikiler, Trkiye'de nemli uluslararas kongrelerin ve sempozyumlarn yaplmasna yolat. rnein Uluslararas Orientalistler Kongresi (bugn: International Congress of Asian and Norh African Studies), Permanent International Altaistic Conference ve Comite International des Etudes Ottomanes et Preottomanes'in sempozyumu anlabilir. Son olarak, u noktann altn izmek gerekir. Osmanl imparatorluu sosyal ve ekonomik tarihi uluslararas kongresi Trkiye'de, Hacettepe niversitesi'nde dodu. Bildirimin banda da belirttiim gibi esas lgim Trkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihinin 1950 ylna kadar olan ilk dnemi zerinde younlayor. Avrupa ile sistematik ve yakn balarn kurulmas alannda Trkiye'nin elde ettii baarlar herkes memnuniyetle karlayabilir sanrm. O dnemde bu balantnn Trkiye ile Avrupa arasnda iyi alan bir kpr vazifesi grd bugn, belirli bir perspektiften grnce daha ak bir ekilde belli oluyor. Bu alandaki gelimelerin zel bak amz araclyla detayl bir incelenmesi ok ilgin bir konu olabilir. Ancak bu mtevaz bildirimin grevi olamaz. Bu nedenle bu dnemde ortaya kan sorunlar ve toplumsal bilimlere etkilerini zetleyen ksa bir tablo ile yetinmek zorundaym. Bu sorunlara k tutmak iin temel soruyu daha provokatif bir ekilde ortaya koymama izin verin. Trkiye ile Avrupa arasnda toplumsal bilimler alanndaki balarn ve ilikilerin son yllardaki gelimesini nceki dneme kyasla olumlu olduunu syleyebilir miyiz? Bu alanda varolan durumdan memnun olabilir miyiz? Eer memnun olamyorsak bu deiikliin nedenleri nelerdir? 1950 sonrasndaki dnemde daha nceki gelime eiliminin organik devam bir ok alanda grdmz konusunda kuku yoktur. Ben baz rnekler verdim. Ancak ayn zamanda cidd olumsuz eilimlere de ahit olduk. Kukusuz ki bu sorunlar Trkiye'nin son dnemdeki bilinen ekonomik ve sosyal gelimesinin sorunlarna baldr. Ekonomik gelime toplumdaki tm aktivite alanlarnda eit bir gelime anlamna gelmedi. Kltr, fen ve ilim sahalar bu bakmdan arka plana geti. Ayn zamanda Trkiye'deki byk nfus artna paralel olarak yeni kuaklara renim frsat yaratmak amacyla bir ok yeni niversite kuruldu. Bu noktada kritik bir soruya ulayoruz: Bu niversiteler, bugn stanbul ve Ankara niversitelerinin bilimsel dzeyine yakn m? Ayn altyapya, zellikle ktphanelere ve dokmantasyon olanaklarna sahip 815

midirler? Son olarak, personelinin bilimsel baarlar ve kapasitesi eski kuakla karlatrlabilir mi? Kiisel olarak bu sorulara olumsuz cevap vermem gerektiine inanyorum. Kanmca, toplumsal bilimlerin oluumunda eski vizyon ve cmertlik politikas, ki bu politika Trkiye bilim hayat iin baarya yolat, 1950 ylndan sonra etkili, yani gerek ihtiyalara cevap verecek ekilde devam ettirilmedi. Bana gre bu noktay dorulayan baz somut olgulara deinmek istiyorum. Bugn Trkiye'de gen bilim adanlan iin yurt dnda lisans st eitim ve eitim amal seyahat olanaklar ilk kuak Trk bilim adamlarnn olanaklar ile karlatrlabilir mi? Yine cevabn olumsuz olmas gerekiyor. Son olarak u soruyu ileri srelim: Yeni niversitelerdeki gen kuak Trk bilim adamlar bilim dnyasnda trkoloji alanndaki hzl globallemeyi takip edebilir mi? Bilimlerin temel amacn gz nnde bulundurursak bu sorunlar ben uluslararas bilgi alverii ve ibirlii konusu bakmndan ileri sryorum, nk sahamzda bu konularn btn trkologlar iin ne kadar nemli olduu herkes iin bellidir. Bu grm ancak bir rnekle desteklememe izin verin. Uluslararas bilim alannda trkolojinin sratli ve etkileyici gelimesini ve bunun sonucunda yaynlardaki artan farkllamay gzlemleyerek dostum Profesr Andreas Tietze ve ben 1973 ylnda trkolojinin yllk bir bibliografyasn yaratmaya karar verdik. Toplumsal bilimlerin tm sahalarn kapsayan bu bibliografya her yl dnyada yeni kan 2200-2400 yayn iermektedir. imdi bu serinin 22. cildine ulatk ve bu cilt nmzdeki haftalarda yaynlanacak. Son yirmi yl iinde sahamzda olup bitenlerin gerek bir tablosunu veren bu bibliografya trkologlarn her gn kullandklar bir alma leti haline geldi. 300'n zerindeki abone says bunun kantdr. Trk meslektalarmz bile, bu bibliografyann niversitelerde trkoloji ile ilgilenen blmlerin raflarnda veya en azndan niversitelerin merkez ktphanelerinde bulunmas gerektiini belirtiyorlar. Ayn zamanda Trkiye'de sadece 5 abonemizin olmas ve bunlarn bazlarnn stanbul'daki yabanc aratrma enstitleri olmas pek normal saylamaz sanrm. Trkoloji, Trkiye ile Avrupa arasnda bir ok nemli ve etkili balar kurdu. Cumhuriyet'in ik dneminde bilinli ve dinamik olarak kurulan bu balar, uzun zaman verimli bilgi alveriine ve ilikilerin salamlamasna katkda bulundu. Ancak bugn bu balarn kapasitesinin yeterli olmad grlyor. Gnmzdeki durum, bu ilikilerin gelitirilmesini gerektiriyor. Bu sorunlar incelemek ve gereken lleri bulmak bence bugnn Cumhuriyet'in olumlu ananelerini devam ettirmek isteyen bilim uzmanlarnn nemli bir devidir.

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THE PERCEPTION OF KEMALISM N GERMAN JOURNALISM SNCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Tamer BACINOLU*

For Turkey, the German Federal Republic represents one of the most important countries in Europe. Numerous German tourists, for whom Antalya and istanbul have become long familiar names, the NATO alliance, and an intensive trade relationship bear witness to the special relationship between Germany and Turkey, even if the nature of this relationship is perceived differently in each country. Of great importance to the GermanTurkish relationship is the fact that Germany has become a home for roughly 2.5 million Turks. De facto, Germany has become a country pen to immigration -in particular for the Turks nce considered as 'guest workers' and itinerant laborers- although the German leadership is loath to admit this. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that a great deal of interest is directed at Turkey in German journalism. A cursory glance at book offerings and other journalistic media shows that this interest is. 1) oriented to both domestic and foreign affairs and 2) in most cases is problem-oriented. in light of the fact that the majority of German Turks retain strong ties to their country of origin, the inner-Turkish political discussion attracts great interest in the FRG. Added to this is the fact that radical Turkish movements, officially termed in Germany as 'extremism by foreigners', have formed and flourished in Germany, thanks not least to the extensive infrastructure. There they have a large room for maneuver and have been able to make the country into the center for political agitation. As a result, it is possible, even though with some exaggeration, to speak
University of Tbingen.

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of a homemade form of extremism exercised by foreigners, and mind you, by 'foreigners' born in the FRG. Kemalism also has relevance for domestic politics, since academic circles as well as the media work under the assumption that modern Turkey suffers from a pervasive form of identity crisis1, vvhose symptoms may be found not least in the Turks living in the FRG. Aside from travel reporting, the image of Turkey in German journalism is characterized through its problem-oriented nature. By journalism, I mean not only the media, but also academic circles, which supply* the former with "background information" and expertise. For this reason the Turkey analyses of little knovvn representatives of "ivory tovver disciplines" have decisively influenced the development of the image of Turkey in the FRG, either directly or through their graduates who have assumed positions in journalism. The political situation in Turkey found increasing interest in Germany directly after the end of the Cold War. Whereas ideological determined confrontations, vvhose roots lay not infrequently in the subversive activities of the Eastern Block2, were the dominant theme in the seventies, the human rights discussion became the explosive issue of the eighties. in the era ushered in by the reunification of Germany, the so-called Kurdish Question, which had been relegated to the sidelines in the seventies and eighties, shifted to the center of the journalistic stage. One may say that towards the end of the eighties, human rights issues ceased being viewed in the terms of Enlightenment principles and began to be seen in an ethnic category, regadless of ideological vievvpoint, which then became the basis for the calling into question of the Turkish republic. The choice of the theme of this lecture "The Perception of Kemalism in German Journalism since the End of the Corld War" vvas not the result of academic boredom. The already mentioned "problem-oriented nature" of German Turkey journalism, vvhich vvill be treated later, differs from similar tendencies in other Western nations. German Turkey journalism differs from that of other Western nations not merely because of its historically determined special status. An alarming difference consists of the fact that in its treatment of Turkey German journalism operates with methods that transcend ideology, and shows great uniformity in its opinions. The results of such coverage and analyses are disastrous for two reasons: For one thing, the German public is presented with a distorted pic1. 2. Udo Steinbach: Europas Brcke zur islamischen Welt. Die Trkei auf identitatssuche, Bltter fr deutsche und internationale Politik, 10/1996, p. 1222 ff. Walter Althammer: Die deutsche Trkei-Hilfe. Ihre nohvendigen politischen Rahmenbedingungen, Sdosteuropa-Mitteungen, 3/1981, p. 48 ff. There are scattered references in serious joumalism to the fact that the PKK was founded in 1978 under the patronage of the KGB. "it vvas an instrument for the destabilization of the NATO partner Turkey". (Werner Gumpel: Die Trkei, der Nahe Osten und das Wasser. Verschiebung des Kraftegleichgewichts, Internationale Politik, 1/1988, p. 19.

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tre of Turkey, for another, an attempt is undertaken to influence the inner-Turkish discussion, both argumentatively and terminologically. If one takes into consideration that roughly 2.5 million Turks live in the FRG, most of whom retain ties to Turkey, then one sees that the results of German journalism are not restricted to Germany alone. in the meantime, even the Turkish identity of the Turks living in Germany is being called into question- here I am referring to roughly 500.000 Turkish Kurds living in Germany. Some even give the more precise figre of 480.0003, although it is more than mysterious by just vvhat methods and by vvhat criteria this number has been arrived at. A report of the German Federal Agency for Internal Security in 1982 stated openly: "Until 1980 the Kurds were classified under the category of 'other states.'"4However, this very same agency discovered in the nineties that there were 500.000 Kurds among the German Turks. Building upon this newly discovered Kurdish presence in the FRG, an intensive concern at ali levels arose regarding the 'ethnic distinctiveness' of these Kurds, something underpinned by regional studies. Two things resulted from this: One the one hand, the difficulties in integrating the Turks into German society were presented as being the fault of the Turks. Reference was made to "the potential for conflict imported from Turkey" (even though homemade), vvhich in turn led to more stringent lavvs governing foreigners living in Germany. On the other hand, the ethnification of the conflict served as a lever in foreign policy. Advocates of the thesis of the importation of Turkish domestic conflicts into Germany base their arguments on the (homemade) ethnic polarization inside of the Turkish community in the FRG, with the aim of persuading the Turkish government to undertake a 'political solution of the Kurdish Question". Based on experience, one may assume that in the future a similar function will be fulfilled by the pseudo-religious radicalism that operates in Germany, and that is to a certain extent tolerated there. That German Turkey journalism seeks to throw into question the republican basis of the Turkish state (vvhich thereby burdens not only the German-Turkish and Turkish-European relationship, but also threatens the internal stability of Turkey and makes even more difficult the already problematical German-Turksh coexistence in the FRG) can be seen from the avvarding of a prize to the vvriter Yaar Kemal. Even here, where supposedly tribute was being paid to the literary work of this Turkish novelist, the founding principles of the Turkish Republic were attacked and the right of existence of the Turkish nation was throvvn into question. According to the analysis of German Turkey journalism in the last decade, Turkey is a nation that is the scene of three conflicts, whose causes lie in the very founding principles of the Republic- in other words the
3. 4. Udo Ulfkotte: Verschlufisache BND, p. 288, Koehler & Amelang, 1997. Betrifft: Verfassungsschutz 1981, p. 156, Bonn 1982.

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failure of the Kemalist model has been demonstrated5. One speaks of three social fault lines in Turkey, namely: 1) Conflicts between secularists ("members of the ruling elite "and \Vestemized city-dwellers") and Moslens, 2) Conflicts between Alawites and Sunnites, and 3) Conflicts between Turks and Kurds6. Similarly, three mutually hostile camps have been discovered inside of Turkish islam, which are supposedly engaged in a raging cultural war. These camps are: 'Kemalist islam', 'Sunnite poplist islam', and 'the religious realm of the Alawites'. The Turkish foreign minister is reportedly 'a secular Sunnite'7. A German ethnologist, who worked in the istanbul branch of the Middle East Institute of the German Eastern Society, was even able to detect a Sunnite dominance in a Marxist-Leninist organization, a domination that led to the alienation of the comrades of the Alawite denomination8. Another co-worker of the same institute even made the claim that several members of the "Turkish Sunnite left" had converted to fundamentalism because they were unable to view Sunnite islam as progressive9. These quotes demonstrate that German journalism denies the existence of a Turkish nation and portrays Turkish society as an artificially amalgamation of ethnic and religious groups. it is remarkable that this premise of German journalism is put forward as being liberal. At first sight, it appears somevvhat odd when the proponents of this same ethnicreligious premise criticize the thesis of Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, however this criticism is consistent. For while Huntington sees global cultural fault lines betvveen the great world civilizations10, his German critics see only ethnic fault lines, and find evidence of fragmentation in several nation states because of their ethnic diversity. A particu5. Erhard Franz: TUrkei: Laizismus contra Islamismus in der Gesellschaft und Politik, Sdosteuropa-Mitteilungen, 1/1997, p. 10 ff. 6. U. Steinbach: "Die Trkei in der Staatskrise: Dire Probleme sind der Fundamentalismus, das Verhltnis zu Europa, der Konflikt mit den Krden", Land am Abgrund, Die Zeit, 11/17/1995; Reiner Hermann: Die Drei Versionen des politischen islam in der Trkei, Orient, 1/1996, p. 35. 7. Wolfgang Gnter Lerch: Die drei Kulturen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 1/29/1998. 8. Karin Vorhoff: Alevismus, Perablatter, ed. By the Orient Institut stanbul, p. 19, stanbul, 1995. 9. Gnter Seufer: Cafe stanbul. AUtag, Religion und Politik in der modernen Trkei, p. 75, Verlag C.H. Beck, Munich, 1997. 10. Samuel P. Huntington: The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking ofWorld Order, p. 26-27, Simon & Schuster, 1996.

820

lar instance of this is the treatment given by German joumalism to the Kurdish Question in Turkey". Making reference to Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and the monarchy of the Shah in Iran, the correspondent of a reputable German newspaper wrote: "it is disturbing that ali three countries demonstrate parallels with the Turkish-republic... Ali three states collapsed due to religious or ethnic contradictions. Turkey demonstrates both variants: a politicized islam and the Kurdish rebellion in the southeast region of the country..."12 This image of a Turkey characterized by multiple fault lines, primarily the product of Orientalists and their students who have found positions in the media, has in the meantime become established. Since according to the German Turkey specialists the putative cause of ali of these fault lines is Kemalism, we will subsequently concern ourselves with the German view of Kemalism as well as with the explanatory system that accompanies it. The thesis of three fault lines in Turkish society implies that either the Turkish nation is merely an offcial rhetorical fiction or that it encompasses only those who adhere to the Sunnite confession. As a result, this criticism of Kemalism targets two of the central principles of Kemalism, national unity and secularism, which supposedly lead to polarization and are likewise supposed unable to deal with cultural diversity. Proposals for Solutions extend from "a new interpretation of Kemalism" to the complete renunciation of Turkish Republic (fderalistisches Modeli). The advocates of the fault lines thesis are of the opinion that the Turkish Republic has difficulties both with "the Kurdish national minority" as well as with "Moslems" per se.

n
Although the PKK had already increased the intensity of its terrorist activities at the end of 1984, it took German joumalism a relatively long time before it took up the "Kurdish Question" in Turkey. in the nineteen seventies, the opinion in Germany was actually opposed to a Kurdish state on Iraqi territory, with the justification of opposing Soviet plans for expansion in the Middle East. in addition, today's trendy proposals for an ethnic rearrangement of the maps of the Middle East was then disapproved of as being a remnant of "the political ideas of the twenties". Or as Harald Vocke put it: "The West too has nothing to gain from the establishment of a Kurdish state. For Moscovv, on the other hand, such a state would constitute a land bridge to the most important oil fields of the Persian Gulf'". But after the Soviet threat had subsided, a different assessment was made of Iraq. in 1991, another German foreign policy expert stated:
11. Uwe Simson: der slam Samuel P. Huntington und wir, Orient, 3/1997, p. 519. 12. VVolfgang Koydl: Die Trkei im kritischen Alter, Sddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), 11/19/ 1998. 13. Harald Vocke: Revolution in Kurdistan, FAZ, 8/22/1979.

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"Iraq is a state without naional identity, an artificial construction from the colonial period ...The Kurds are one of the oldest stepchildren of history. For this reason, the West should make every effort to assist the Kurds and the Iraqis infnding a solution. The West cannot escape its responsibility"H. That the West, in particular Germany, did in fact rapidly remember its "responsibility" t the Kurds, is made apparent from the following lines in the same newspaper, which appeared nearly at the same time: Should Turkey be permitted what was denied to Sadam Hussien? Are there good and bad Kurds in the sense of political tactics? The Kurdish question has long since become the equivalent of the Palestinian problem. But no one pays any attention to it"15. However, six day later one read: "Except for Bonn, no one protested when a few days ago the Turkish army bombed Kurdish camps in northern Iraq and penetrated up to forty kilometers into Iraqi territory"16. it may be seen from these quotes that German journalism equates Turkish citizens of Kurdish extraction with the PKK and compares their situation with that of the Iraqi Kurds. However, the Germans are supposedly popular among the Iraqi Kurds and reportedly: "The Kurds kiss the hands of their (German) helpers and have a complete ...hatred of the Turkish soldiers... The German soldiers are also enraged17. The Kurds, whether they live in Iraq or in Turkey, are seen by German journalism as an ethnic unity constituting an 'irksome' 18 and 'unpopular'19 section of the population, against which the 'anti-Kurdish Turkish state'20 wages a war of annihilation21. it is therefore presumably a matter of indifference vvhether "a Kurdish lawyer wishes to flee the dictatorial Iraqi regime oef Saddam, or a Turkish Kurd wishes to flee the army of his country (or) a Coptic Christian wishes to flee from the Islamic fundamentalists of Egypt"22. Accordingly, Turkey is "a torture chamber, in which the Kurds are subject to a collective persecution solely because of their ethnic identity"23. Because of this, "the conflict with the Kurds is a question of human and minority rights and must be treated as such"24. Occasionally, this is expressed by the German foreign minister as "a politi14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. Thomas Ross: Des Exodus und die neue Weltordnung, FAZ, 4/18/1991. Wolfgang Gnter Lerch: Zweierlei Mafl, FAZ, 8/10/1991. Dersi: Saddam ermutigt, FAZ, 8/16/1991. Axel Wermelskirchen: Die Krden kssen die Hande der deutschen Helfer, FAZ, 4/ 19/1991. Udo Ulfkotte: Ablenkungsmanver, FAZ, 1/3/1998. Dilek Zaptcolu: Mut der Venvzeiflung, Tageszeitung, 1/3/1998. Bernhard Hlsenbusch: "Almania " heifit das gelobte Land der Gestrandeten, Stuttgarter Zeitung (StZ), 1/5/1998. Berliner Zeitung, 1/5/1998. Heinz-Joachim Fischer: Mit dem Elend der Menschen wird Schindluder getrieben, FAZ, 1/6/1998. Jochen Buchsteiner: Aus Deutschland in die Folterkammer, Die Zeit, 6/10/1994. Kinkel appelliert wegen Kurdenflucht an die Trkei, StZ, 1/5/1998.

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cal solution"25. it is hardly an exaggeration when we conclude that in German joumalism the PKK is flatly equated with the Kurds and that the stnggle against them is declared to be 'a war of annihilation'. At this juncture German Turkey joumalism takes up the history of the founding of the Turkish Republic, in which it sees the roots of the problem. For: "in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 the community of nations refused the Kurds their own nation... Turkey, in which the majority of Kurds live, denies to this day its status as a multinational state"26. Criticized here is the adherence of the Turkish to the Treaty of Lausanne. Those who seek to solve the 'conflict' solely through economic and political means are supposedly acting in a one-sided manner and the realization of a political solution is hindered not only by the terror of the PKK "but also through the perception that the conflict is inspired by the military and the rational of the state"27. As background information, it may be mentioned that the relationship betvveen the Kurds living in eastern Turkey and the Turkish state was never truly normal: "at the time, already under Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, the young republic had bloodily suppressed the rebellion of Shaykh Said as well as the uprising of Dersim and Ararat"28. Thus the nature of the conflict may be traced to the restructuring ofi the Middle East following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. For: "the Kurds were at the time unable to achieve their aspirations in the face of the opposition of the Turkish nationalists. ...and the national movement of the Kurds has -and this is demonstrated by the realities of the country- failed until this day to find a political habitat that is truly convincing"29. The author considers a public discussion on the 'Kurdish Question' as insufficient and appeals for the acceptance of ethnic oriented parties. These would allow the 'political emancipation of the Kurds'. in this way the author has come to believe that the principal evil is the centralist Turkish nation state and its conception of nationhood. A young Orientalist put it thusly: "According to the rational of Kemal Atatrk's state, Turkey is a monolithic national state in which only Turks live ...ethnic minorities such as the Kurds have a place in this state only if they are willing to deny their distinctiveness. They were flatly declared to be 'Mountain Turks', and the special character of the Kurdish dialects which are in no way related to the Turkish language, was simply ignored. From the very beginning, the Kurds resisted the attempt to be transformed into Turks ...So much resistance severely provoked the Turkish military: "those who oppose our state, our young republic, will be mercilessly
25. Weitere 1300 Krden aufdem Weg nach Westeuropa, FAZ, 1/5/1998. 26. Fred Gsteiger: Schillernder Denker im Kampfanzug, Die Zeit, 4/1/1994. 27. W.G. Lerch: Wer wufite in Ankara vom Exodus der kurdischen "boat people"?, FAZ, 1/6/1998. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid.

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destroyed. Wherever youfind them -athome, in thefields, in the mountains, or in the valleys- the only thought you are permitted to have is: destroy our enemies! The only good Kurd is a dead Kurd"*>. Although this quote originates from a strongly ideologically plagued segment of German journalism, it may be taken a representative- in both senses. Based on the terminology of the Romanticism of Race, the racial distinctiveness of the Kurds is ascertained, with the biological differences deduced from the lingustic. Because the author considers the Kurds to differ linguistically and racially from the Turks, he views the denial of this, in the framework of a secular conception of nationhood, to be the equivalent of a racial erime, it should be noted that here the German concept of nation as a biological community is being transplanted to Turkey, just as words are put in the mouth of the Turkish army that were heretofore associated only with the German holocaust. Every other viewpoint is denigrated as 'a Kemalist interpretation of history'31. For if the Kemalists choose to ignore the 'racial distinctiveness' of the Kurds and speak instead of a unifed Turkish nation, this can be nothing but an 'ethnic lie'. The Turkish nation, vvhich has recently been referenced in quotes in German academic publications, is considered as being a construction of a handful of former members of the Ottoman ruling elite and has nothing in common with the realities of Turkey. According to a German Turkish expert, the Turkish people supposedly did not even willingly participate in the war of liberation: "Atatrk did not draw his support from a popular resistance movement"32. A further idiosyncrasy of the German critique of Turkish minority policies is the emphasis on the 'indo-Germanic' origin of the Kurds. Here 'indo-Germanic' means 'Aryan', a term that has been taboo since Auschwitz. in addition, the term 'culture' is often used in this conneetion in the sense of 'race' 33 . Not only does the use of the fiction that the supposedly oppressed belong to a 'higher' race serve to illuminate the "ethnoobscurantism" of the Kemalist conception of nationhood, but it also is intended to inerease the empathy of the German public for the fate of the Kurds. A crass example was provided by Udo Steinbach, the direetor of
30. Albrecht Metzger: Verfolgung und Genozid, in: Krden, (ed. by A. Metzger), p. 17, Lamuv Verlag, Gttingen 1996. 31. Renate Kreile & Rainer Werle: Renaissance des islam. Das Beispiel Trkei, p. 23, Junius Verlag, Hamburg 1987. 32. "On the contrary, his army consisted of demobilized veterans, wheras the farmers were forced to fight on the front". According to the author, "the great mass of the population only identifled partially with the war of liberation ". Furthermore, she asserted that at the time the people saw no difference between the occupiers and the Turkish offcers (Ibid., p. 23). 33. Michaela von Freyhold: Rassismus I, in: Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon, Vol. 1, p. 1431, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1997.

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the German Orient Institute in Hamburg: "The Kurds are an IndoEuropean people, therefore, as far as their language goes, and as far as their culture goes, they are closer to Germans -to state it flatly- to Europeans than to Turks...34 in his highly praised 'standard work on modern Turkey', Steinbach has defned the Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin as an "ethnically, linguistically, and culturally independent people"35. 'Ethnic' and 'cultural' mean here the putative Aryan origin of the Kurds and constitutes at the same time the German conception of nationhood: "...the German conception of nationhood rests on notions from the Romantic Era, above ali those ideas of the 'Volk' arising from historical and linguistic contemplations as an indigenous 'Volkstum' based on birth that is accountable only to itself'36. Proceeding on the assumption that the same is true of the Turkish nation, one assumes that there is a persecution, or at least a discrimination, of those of different racial lineage. At this point critical German Turkey journalism encounters a difficulty: the 'racial differing' Kurds are not discriminated against, neither legally nor 'collectively'. On the contrary, the Turkish state regards its citizens as Turks, regardless of their origins. This 'problem' is circumvented by defining discrimination as the denial of the 'distinctiveness' of the 'linguistically, ethnically, and culturally independent' Kurds, who cannot therefore belong to the Turkish nation. it is the failure to acknovvledge the racial uniqueness of various elements of the population, in other words the denial of a racial conception of nationhood, which is considered as being discriminatory, yes, even as racist. And so racism is here not to be understood as the conventional ideological-biological discrimination or persecution of an element of the population regarded as 'foreign', but rather as its integration into a secular nation state. Not only is the term 'racism' used here in a perverted sense, but also the ethno-pluralistic model of the new right37 is implicitly extolled. Because the German experts on Turkey project the German concept of a nation grounded on biological descent into a Turkish context, they accuse the Turkish political elite of incorporating the Kurds into Turkish society, "though even as linguistically, historically, and culturally primi38 tive versions of Turks, e.g. as 'Mountain Turks'" . Aside from the fact that the term 'Mountain Trk' is an a nineteenth century neologism of pre German origin, German Turkey journalism is unable to evade acknowledging that the Turkish state grants equal opportunities to ali of its
34. Die Krden, Sat-1, 3/20/1995. 35. Udo Steinbach: Trkei im 20. Jahrhundert. Schwieriger Partner Europas, p. 349, Gustav Lbbe Verlag, Bergisch-Gladbach, 1996 (: Steinbach). 36. Hans Hecker: Nationalstaat, in: Handlexikon zur Politikwissenschaft, Vol. 1, p. 270, Rowob.lt, Munich, 1973. 37. iris Weber: Nation, Staat und Elite, p. 62 ff., PapyRossa Verlag, Cologne, 1997. 38. Ibid.

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citizens regardless of their ethnic origins. But this acknowledgment is relativized in the following manner: "they have been absorbed as Turks, if only as linguistically, socially, and culturally primitive versions of Turks, for instance as "Alpine Turks"39. it is particularly provocative when of ali people a German exercises such a diffuse eriticisin, especially one who finds the 'Aryan' Kurds "eloser to the Germans than to the Turks". Because the.se experts see a contradietion between being a Kurd an being loyal to the Turkish state, they cali Turkish statesmen of Kurdish origin 'traitors' to their race40.

m
it is not only through use of 'ethnic' (i.e. racist) arguments that German journalism throvvs the Kemalist nation state into question. in past years it has been asserted in Germany that the Kemalist state has from the very beginning been the state of Sunnite Turks. For example, Udo Steinbach has claimed that Mustafa Kemal had conceived of a Turkey in which the only genuine citizens were Sunnites of Turkish origin: "The task is to create an arrangement that is consistent with the multi-ethnic and multicultural realities of Turkey. Turkey no longer owes it legitimization as a nation to the 'fact' that it is a state of Sunnite Turks, as was conceived ofby thefounder of the nation and as perpetuated by a generation of 'Kemalists'. An inereasing number of Kurds and Alawites (as the two largest minorities) exhibit a self-conscious independent ethnic (national) and cultural (religious) identity"*1. This thesis has also found a large degree of acceptance in the press. in the vveekly newspaper die Ze, one of most reputable in Germany, a Greek author wrote: "The state of Atatrk rests solely on Sunnite Turks; only they are truly citizens42. A researeher who has vvritten his doctoral thesis on Turkey and who is now working at the German Eastern Institute in istanbul, has spoken of 'a nation founded on belief as constituting the Kemalist model of nationhood. The young seholar claims that, from the outset, the Kemalist state envisioned Sunnite islam as the basis of the nation and uses this as criteria for evaluating the political reliability of its citizens43. Here, the phenomenon of a politicized islam, which has also made itself visible in Tur39. Udo Steinbach: Europas Brcke zur islamischen Welt. Die Trkei auf Identitatssuche, in: Bltter fur deutsche und Internationale Politik, 10/1996, p. 1236. 40. Wolfgang Koydl: Hikmet etin. Neuer trkiseher Parlamentsprasident, SZ, 29.10.1997. 41. Udo Steinbach: Europas Brcke..., loc. cit., p. 1238. 42. Gregor M. Manousakis: Gute Freunde verschliefien die Augen, Die Zeit, 30/05/1997. 43. Gnter Seufert: Cafe stanbul, loc. cit., p. 61.

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key, is interpreted as a symptom of 'the identity crisis of Turkish society' and of 'the failure of Kemalism'. A contradiction here becomes quite visible: religious fundamentalism causes the experts more difficulty than ethno-fundamentalism. Gnter Behrendt, a political scientist who did his doctoral thesis on the Kurdish question44, wrote the following: "Secularism, which had a tradition among the Young Turks, has, despite signs ofweakening since the military coup in 1980, remained an integral part of the official doctrine ofstate. it expresses an implicit contempt for islam. Mustafa Kemal's dictum that there is only one civilization, namely that of the West, and his often repeated condemnation of religion as a form obscurantism that for centuries held the Turkish nation in stultification leave no doubts that his authoritarian modernization, together with the Western model of ali that is modern, led to his rejection of islam as being detrimental to civilization "45. Another Turkey expert sought to show that Mustafa Kemal was an apostate: "Although Atatrk described himself as a Moslem on several occasions, he had not practiced his religion since 1924. He did not regard the caliphate as holy"46. And the director of the German Orient Institute has speculated vvhether Mustafa Kemal intended to "give the deathblow to Islamic religion"47 through the abolition of the caliphate. Since Kemalism has been peremptorily declared to be an anti-Islamic ideology, the Middle East correspondent of a left-liberal newspaper has felt free to write of "the militant atheism of the generals"48. As his reason he gave that the Turkish army found the activities of the radical fundamentalists to be a threat to the republic. in this connection German Turkey journalism even speaks of 'an anti-democratic secularism"49. Naturally, the socalled 'anti-democratic secularism' in Turkey is eagerly attacked by German converts to islam, who sympathize with the Turkish fundamentalists. Muhammad Salim Abdullah, head of the central committee of Moslems in Germany and a self-proclaimed sheik (shaykh al-Islam!) wrote. "Without doubt, Kemalism is not a democratic system. it has totalitarian tendencies and is only to be tolerated by apostates. For Kemalism is itself a pseudo-religious phenomenon, one that is protected by the Turkish constitution as an immutable and
44. Gnter Behrendt: Nationalismus in Kurdistan. Vorgeschichte, Enrstehungsbedingungen und erste Manifestationen bis 1925, Deutsches Orient-Institut, Hamburg, 1993. 45. Gnter Max Behrendt & Serdar Saris: islam und Fundamentalismus-Reizthemen auchfr 'Auslnderfreunde', http: //sunl.rrzn.uni-hannover.de/nhrkbehr/essay.html. 46. Kreile, loc. cit., p. 27. 47. Steinbach, loc. cit., p. 125. 48. Gerd Hhler: Weltfremdes Militar, Frankfurter Rundschau, 30/03/1998. 49. Georg Maier & Lars Peter Schmidt: Die trkischen brgerlichen Parteien und die Wohlfahrtpartei, KAS-Auslandsinformationen, Oktober 1996.

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unassailable heritage, a phenomenon, by the way, that has no parallel in any other constitution in the world. For such a system ali religions are, without distinction, seen as competitors to be combated"50. This self-proclaimed shaykh al-Islam has referred to the Turkish Alawites as "Atatrks secret weapon in his war of annihilation against Sunnite islam", and has made an pen threat against them: The Turkish Alavvites themselves should give deep consideration vvhether a raomentary success will save their future51. These words were written by a man who praticipates "in the organization of the curriculum for the teaching of islam as well as the education of Turkish teachers for classes in islam in the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen52. it may be pointed out that the German political scientist Reiner Albert, who has been praised by sheik Al-Islam, attempted to analyze the 'loss of purpose in Kemalism' in the framework of a seminar held at the University of Mannheim in 1997. By way of summary, one may say that one encounters two theses relating to the Kemalist principle of secularism in German Turkey journalism. The most widespread of these claims that the Turkish version of secularism is anti-Islamic and is therefore unable to integrate 'faithful Moslems' into Turkish society. The second thesis states that the Kemalist model of nationhood is that of 'a nation founded on belief, by which is meant that Mustafa Kemal sought to build his nation on the foundation of Sunnite islam. For this reason, Turkey is considered unable of integrating members of other confessions. What the proponents of both theses have in common is their belief that Turkish secularism is incapable of integrating certain religious groups-on the one hand Sunnites, on the other hand ali non-Sunnites. They also agree that secularism of the Turkish variety has failed, just as the Kemalist model in general has failed. To underpin these theses, they point out that Kemalism was a reform movement 'dictated from above' to vvhich the great mass of the population in Anatolia had no relationship. One of the proponents of the 'dictated from above' thesis claimed that 'the dictatorial regime of Mustafa Kemal' was not able to even significantly influence the structure of the Islamic state53. As a solution he proposed to "find a lasting reconciliation betvveen modern54 ism and islam" . According to the majority of the critics of Turkey, 'the
50. M. Salim Abdullah: Gtterdammerung, Moslemische Revue, July/September 1997, p. 129. 51. Ibid.. 52. M. Salim Abdullah: Dialoge zur Ringparabel, Moslemische Revue, April/June 1997, p. 89. 53. Raif Georges Khoury: Der slam. Religion, Kultur, Geschichte, p. 109, B. I. Taschenbuchverlag, Mannheim 1993. 54. Ibid., p. 93. 55. Gustav Adolf Sonnenhol: Kemal Atatrk heute, in: Sdosteuropa-Mitteilungen, 3/ 1980, p. 12.

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Kemalist pedagogical dictatorship"55 has "through strict govemmental regulations made impossible any public expression of the emotional needs of islam"56. Mustafa Kemal has "underestimated the power of islam", and "Western civilization has been unable in the long term to satisfy the strong metaphysical needs of the people"57. There are three causes underlying this contradictory and supposedly critical analysis of Kemalist principle of secularism. The most important is certainly that the experts philologically trained Orientalists have a static conception of islam. The high islam of the Sharia, whose final theological form was fixed in the tenth century, is confused with islam as a culture. The inflationary and uncritical use of 'islam', 'Islamic', and 'Moslem' reveals this fatal confusion. For example, Udo Steinbach wrote: "islam has no conception of nation. For a Moslem, there is only one nationalitybeing Islamic"58. Such a problematical, and in every aspect, derisive evaluation of islam and Moslems is familiar to us from the pseudo-Islamic discourses of the radicals. The argumentation of the critics of Kemalism and the so-called Islamic fundamentalists with respect to Turkish secularism is so similar as to be interchangeable. This brings us to the second most important cause, namely the adaptation of a fundamentalist worldview, either unconsciously or due to cultural relativism. For both German Orientalists as well as pseudo-Islamic fundamentalists, secularism in an 'Islamic society' is a fundamentally foreign notion. Viewed on the global scale, one may say that secularism plays an insignificant role, and "this is particularly true in the Islamic world, in which the idea of a separation of religion and politics never really took hold"59. Thus is it argued that only the Kemalist ruling elite and the army were truly secular, vvhile the gap between the religious part of the Turkish population and the Kemalist elite has increased60. This view of islam and Moslems dictated by the Sharia has in the meantime become established in German journalism. According to a young German Orientalist, the ban on polygamy in Turkey could not be enforced because it did not correspond to the ideas of "legal conception" prevailing in the more traditionally oriented segments of the population61. Of the veil she wrote: "The veil is a central characteristic of Islamic iden56. Peter Heine: Ethnizitt und Fundamentalismus, in im Namen Allahs (ed. by Banman Nirumand), p. 98, Dreisam-Verlag, Kln 1990. 57. Gustav Adolf Sonnenhol: Die Trkei und Europa, in: Siidosteuropa-Mitteilungen, 4/ 1985, p. 11. 58. Steinbach, p. 66. 59. Wolfgang Gnter Lerch: Die Zeichen der islamischen Republik, FAZ, 25.08.1979. 60. Michael Lders: Die zwei Gesichter des islam, Die Zeit, 8/15/1997. 61. Rita Breuer: Familienleben im islam, p. 41, Herder Spektrum, Freiburg, 1998. 62. Ibid., p. 86.

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tity and clearly distinguishes Moslem women from non-Moslem women62. This writer termed the veil "Islamic dress" and accused Mustafa Kemal of being antagonistic tovvards islam: "Attempts to ban Islamic dress in public, as were undertaken in Atatrk's time, are a serious attack on Moslem self-identity"63. An older colleague of this scholar even went so far as to cali the Moslem headscarf "the symbol of respectable women in islam"64. Although according to the thesis of this writer Turkey is ruled by an anti-Islamic elite, she refers to Turkey as "one of the less stringent Moslem countries". Since 'Islamic' means here "conforming to the Sharia", and since the Turks living in Germany have, through their emigration, "relinquished to a great extent the right of living unhindered under islam and of not having to make concessions to another culture"65, it becomes clear to the reader that what is meant by "another culture" is a secular culture. However, Germany is supposedly more Islamic than Turkey~on this point there is a virtual consensus in Germany. Making reference to the socalled 'opportunities for development' of islamic extremists in the FRG, another Islamic scholar wrote "in no country of the world is there more freedom for ali elements of the population than in Germany"66. A German fundamentalist even ascertained that "Islamic values are realized to a greater extent in the German constitution than in the constitutions of the socalled Islamic states"67. Hseyin Hatemi has also praised the German legal system68. Ignored here is the fact that Germany, in contrast to France, is not a true secular state, that German churches intervene in day-to-day politics as the "conscience of the nation"69, although loyal to the state, and that they do not propagate politics based on the divine order. Also ignored, or more likely gratefully acknowledged, is the fact that the churches concern themselves primarily with foreign policy issues, and increasingly with issues relating to Turkey. That the German churches have an ambivalent relationship to secularism and therefore cultivate sympathy for fundamentalist groups, may be learned not least from theologically trained state bureaucrats responsible for foreigners70. it is however interesting that a well-known political scientist from Berlin has, in the framevvork of a
63. Ibid.. 64. Peter Heine: Konflikt der Kulturen. Feindbild islam, p. 139, Herder Spektrum, Freiburg 1996. 65. Breuer, p. 138. 66. Ursula Spuler-Stegemann: Muslime in Deutschland, p. 15, Herder Spektrum, Freiburg 1998. 67. M. Salim Abdullah, Dialoge zur Ringparabel, loc. cit., p. 85. 68. Kazm Gleyz: eriat ve Demokrasi, p. 69, Yeni Asya Neriyat, stanbul, 1995. 69. Otto Bickel: Laizismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, MIZ, 1/1984. 70. Ralf Geissler: Kirche und islam. Ein Pladoyer fr den notwendigen Dialog, in Begegnung mit dem islam, p. 9-35, Lutherisches Verlagshaus, Hannover, 1997.

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church symposium, recommend to 'Moslems', that they "seek to find a moderate integration of parliamentary democracy and individual human rights into their cultural tradition71. Pseudo-Islamic fundamentalists, exactly those who claim to have 'Islamic' solutions for the problems of everyday life, may be certain of finding sympathy among German Orientalists. Immediately following the Islamic revolution in Iran, one of them spoke in clearly enthusiastic tones: "Different movements and tendencies have arisen, in the most diverse peoples and groups, which seek self-esteem, guiding principles, legitimization, and ways of mobilizing their energies tofind Islamic solutions for their problems and tofurther their interests. For this they deserve the respect and help ofoutsiders"12. After this quote, we will take up the domestic and foreign policy critique of Turkish secularism, which will simultaneously give a portrayal of the semi-official strategy of the FRG tovvards islam. A non political islam, which in addition does not question the fundamental structure of the Turkish republic, is dismissed in the FRG as "the official islam of the Kemalists"73. Accordingly, the authenticity of a socalled Islamic group is gauged by its relationship to the Turkish state. This can take the extreme form of comparing The Turkish Office for Religious Affairs to the Russian Orthodox Church under Soviet rule and to calling it "an office for the suppression of Turkish islam"74. Or that one of the radical groups (Sleymanclar) has had their right to "cali for the preservation of Islamic values" denied because they have "supported the authority of the Turkish state in several critical situations"75. The Moslems who follow the goal of erecting an Islamic state and who, as shown by the example of the 'caliphate state' in Cologne, are able to flourish unhindered in the FRG, are, according to this logic, "living according to a more earnest form of islam than would be possible in Turkey". Annoyed by the statement of the Turkish president that Turkey had been discriminated against at the Luxembourg summit because of religious prejudice, Wolfgang Gnter Lerch wrote:
71. Friedemann Bttner: Islamismus-Fundamentalismus, in: Begegnung mit dem islam, loc. cit., p. 35 ff. 72. Fritz Steppat: Die politische Rolle des islam, in: Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. Supplement V. XXI. Congress of German Qrientalists (Deutscher Orientalistentag) from 24-29 March, 1980 in Berlin, p. 36, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1981. 73. Wolfgang Gnter Lerch: Religion als Tarnung, Umsturz als Ziel, FAZ, 9/11/1997. 74. Augustinus Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, in: Der islam in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 194, Aschendorf-Mnster, 1986. 75. Gabriele Bucher-Dinc: Siileymanci-Bewegung, in: Religion-ein deutsch-trkisches Tabu?, p. 114, Edition Krber-Stiftung, Hamburg, 1997.

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"The liberal constitution of the FRG permits Moslems to live according to a stricter form of islam than would be possible in Turkey, where the public wearing of religious garments has, at least ojfcially, been banned since Atatrk. As long as they do not infringe against the law, i.e. useforce, even Moslem groups in Germany may be active who are illegal in Turkey, and that formerly would have been expelled. The Turkish public prosecutor has moved for the banning of the former ruling party of the Islamist Erbakan. Although his followers are under surveillance by the Federal Agency for Internal Security, no one suppresses them or discriminates against their religious activities"16. Lerch has also criticized what he called "the elite that considers themselves as being Western" and that views "anything that does not sit them as reactionary". Further, he has claimed that these "cultured Moslems arrogantly despise the conventions of their religion and consider this as constituting freedom and enlightenment". The height of his plea was reached with the rhetorical question: "Who is it that actually discriminates against islam, the Germans or the Turks"77? Hovvever, reference to the 'liberal constitution' of Germany is in itself insuffcient for the explanation of the manifold activities of the pseudo-Islamic fanatics in the FRG. For Basque terroists commit a criminal offence even if they do not violate the law and a certain Christian group, who, according to official sources have as yet not violated the law, are monitored with greater stringency than pseudo-Islamic groups such as the Kaplan-Gemeinde, or the Milli Gr, or, for that matter than the terrorist PKK, which has engaged undisturbed in criminal offences78. Two features characterize both groups: For one thing their activities are directed neither against the German people nor the German state. For another, both have a fixation with the Turkish state and further the 'ethnic' and religious polarization of the Turks living in the FRG. The negative effect on the integration of the Turks in German society resulting from this is actually found desirable in certain circles. As a result, it is not only neo-Nazi 79 elements who favor supporting the activities of the fundamentalists , but also leading legal representatives of the German State. The slogan used is 80 "keeping the option of repatriation of Turkish families feasible" . it is likely that the promotion or at least the toleration of pseudo-Islamic elements in Germany has foreign policy significance. Peter Heine, a noted
76. W.G. Lerch: Die Muslime in Deutschland sind selbstbewufit und prasent, FAZ, 12/ 20/1997. 77. W.G. Lerch: Bild der Wirklichkeit, FAZ, 3/13/1998. 78. "Scientology-Geheimdienst beobachtet Gegner und Abtrnnige ", FAZ, 4/11/1998. 79. Moslems und Moscheen in Deutschland, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 1/16/1998. 80. Der islam in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, loc. cit., p. 138.

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critic of Kemalism in Berlin, has called on German statesmen to enter into a dialog with terrorist and fundamentalist organizations: "No great prophetic gift is needed to see that the takeover of political power in Algeria or Egypt by radical Islamic politicians woud, after a phase of turmoil, lead to a realistic judgement of the economic and political situation ...in light of the possibility that radical Islamic groups or parties in various Islamic countries come to power, the attempt should be undertaken now to pen a dialog with representatives ofthese organizations'm. it is part of such a strategy that critics of fundamentalist activities in Germany are gagged with the accusation of furthering the image of 'the Islamic Bogeyman'. Those who in addition defend the self-defensive measures of the Turkish republic taken against a subversive political 'islam' must expect to be accused of serving the official Turkish ideology or of pleading for an anti-democratic form of secularism. Concluding Remarks Since the end of the cold war German journalism has been more concerned with Turkey than ever before. it is largely of the opinion that Turkish society consists of several segments that, while living side by side, are divided along ethnic and confessional lines. One speaks of three social fault lines in Turkey, according to which the Turkish-Kemalistic elite wages an pen war against 'confessional' and 'linguistic' minorities. The Kemalist state has supposedly not succeeded in building a Turkish nation because the Kemalist model has from the beginning only regarded Sunnites as belonging to the nation. Since the state has supposedly also alienated the citizens of the Sunnite confession, one may observe a further tension between this segment of the population and the Kemalist elite. German Turkey journalism holds two principles of Kemalism to be responsible for the "failure to create a nation". The experts believe that the centralist Kemalist state has, through its policy of 'reforms dictated from above' and having an 'authoritarianpedagogical character', hindered the political participation of minorities. Making reference to the ethno-fundamentalism of the PKK and pseudoIslamic radicalism, one seeks to demonstrate the inability of the Turkish Republic to integrate 'Moslems' and 'Kurds' as well as the hostility of the state towards 'islam' and minorities. With reference to the so-called 'Alawite renaissance', critics attempt to show the 'Sunnite' character of the Turkish republic. The most important catchwords used by German Turkey journalism in reference to Kemalism are 'anti-democratic secular81. P. Heine: Konflikt der Kulturen, loc. cit., p. 169.

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ism', an ethnic-oriented concept of citizenship, and last but not least, 'a nation founded on faith'. Nationalism and secularism, the two founding principles of the Turkish republic, are not only attacked from a specifically German perspective and cast into doubt. One observes also that the German critique of Kemalism uses to an increasing degree the arguments of those who are antagonistic to the Turkish republic. Thus, Turkish nationalism is questioned using the same arguments as put forvvard by the Kurdish chauvinists, while the eriticisin of the Kemalist principle of secularism draws its arguments from the polemics of the Islamic fundamentalists. These attacks on the two most important principles of Kemalism, pirinciples to which the Turkish nation owes is existence, are disquieting for two reasons. For one thing, ali aspects of German Turkey journalism whether popular, academic, or clerical- display an alarming uniformity of opinion that condemns every deviation from its preconceived notions as 'unscholarly' or even 'pro-Kemalist'. For another, the anthropological programs of the German research institutes located in Turkey and funded by the German state not only lead to a reinforcing of German prejudices on, but they seek to engage diverse segments of the Turkish population in a discussion of their theses and results Turkey (which is actually acknovvledged in the formulation of their projects)82. The German critique of Kemalism should be vigilantly observed since "by mobilizing previously disunited sources of discontent" (of which there are enough in the young and vital Turkish society) "many a conflict may be stirred to life by using the rod of ethnicity"83.

82. Die Trkei im Spannungsfeld von Nationalismus und europaiseher Integration. A common project of the Orient Institute of the German Western Society (OII) and the Institut Franais d'Etudes Anatoliennes-Georges Dumezil (IFEA), funded by the European Union program MEDA-democracy. 83. Friedrich Heckmann: Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation, p. 33, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, Stuttgart, 1992.

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ATATRK, ONE VIEW OF THE LIFE AND ACHIEVEMENT OF MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATRK AT THE END OF THE 20th CENTURY
Dusan MIHAJLOVIC* Ladies and gentlemen, Dear participants of the Conference, Allow me to frst of ali thank the organizers of this esteemed gathering for the honor and pleasure they have given me by inviting me to take part in this important meeting on the occasion of the 60th commemoration of the demie of the father of modern Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatrk. I owe special thanks to my dear fried H.E. Mr. Alev Kl, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Turkey to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As I do not happen to be a historian or a scientist, I can not speak about Kemal Atatrk and his achievements from those aspects. About the historical and scientific perspective of the place and role of Kemal Atatrk, one of the greatest politicians of the 20th century, a lot of studies have been written also in the country where I come from. The latest contribution to that inexhaustible subject has been made by an expert in the Turkish language and literatre Doc. Dr. Mirjana Teodosijevic in her paper about Atatrk covering ali that has been written in the Serbian language about the "Father of Turks". Her outstanding study entitled "Mustafa Kemal Atatrk in the Yugoslav Public" has been published, in honor of the 75th anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, by the "NEA" publishing house, founded by the New Democracy Party.
* President, New Democracy Party, Belgrade.

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I can also inform the esteemed gathering about the promotion of this book that will take place in Belgrade very soon. Although I am engaged in politics, I shall not speak from that aspect either. I am going to speak simply as a man, a citizen of Serbia and a member of the same civilizational space as Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, born in Thessaloniki, educated in Bitola. About my political beliefs, I shall only say that their basic ideas is the idea of a united Europe. in that united, civil, democratic Europe, that will respect ali the nations, religions, cultures and traditions of its citizens, there is enough room both for Serbs and for Turks. Europe without Serbia and Turkey cannot be whole or maintainable because there is no durable peace, security and stability, economic prosperity, social stability and security, no human rights or political freedoms, simply no human happiness and good life for ali the citizens vvithout the united Europe. Nor is there a real influence of its citizens, nations and states upon the international economic and political developments, nor the necessary authority in passing the most important global economic and political decisions. Such a political credo is also based upon my personal stand that the planet Earth is the common home to ali the people to whom it has been lended and that they must respect it and develop it with due are, for the sake of their own survival and the future of their successors. The contemporary technology, especially computers and informatics has enabled even today tha prophetic visions about this planet as a "global village" to come true. Thanks to the Internet, the whole world is present in every house and we can be present in any part of the world. Ali of my understanding of Atatrk's achievements can be put as one admiration ond one regret. The admiration is for the greatness and power of Mustafa Kemal, a robust boy, a conspirator, commander of units never defeated, a reformist and creator of the "Turkish miracle", who was capable at watersheds of history to turn the course of the ship of the Turkish nation and state to the West, towards the civilization where his people belonged and the space covered by the Turkish state. I personally share the sympathies expressed for the Turks and Atatrk, their father, by Miodrag Mihailovic-Svetovski, a prominent 836

journalist publicist and writer, in his book "Atatrk's Turkey", published in 1938. Analyzing the social and political doctrine of Atatrk in a poetic, but also suggestive manner, he has depicted Atatrk's life, his revolutionary and reformist endeavors, Atatrk as the champion of a civilization renaissance of the country created upon the "ashes of history". The regret is due to the fact that the people I belong to has not had an Atatrk of its own, which is why it even today has problems with its present and future. Indeed, perhaps that role would have been played by King Alexander if his mission had not been so tragically and prematurely disrupted by the assassination in Marseilles. The Turkish press also testifed about the real nature of his Yugoslav idea. And I quote: "...Today, when official representatives of ali the European countries are gathered together around the great King, one can see how Europe is devoted to Yugoslavia and her efforts to maintain peace... Only his remains have been buried, but not his soul and his ideal. His life achievement is going to live in the hearts of ali the peoples guided by the same ideals..." The friendship personally cherished by Atatrk and King Alexander is well-known. Atatrk used to cali King Alexander his brother and the closeness of their ideas led to the signing of the Turkish-Yugoslav pact, a treaty of friendship, on November 27th, 1933 and then, on February 9th, 1934 in Athens, to the signing of the Balkan pact among Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania. Ali that strengthened the ties between the Serbs and the Turkish people, along with the friendly cooperation and agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey. in order to give an even better illustration, let me also ite a speech of Mustafa Kemal about Serbia, delivered in Bursa, recorded and forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the form of a confidental manuscript by the Yugoslav deputy to Constantinople on January 23rd, 1923. I quote: "That Yugoslavia has become a powerful state in the Balkans and the Serbs had every right to create such a state because they have proven it in action. it is known that Austria and Hungary were the ones who attacked Serbia, using against her almost as much troops as the inhabitants she had. This small people took a manly attitude towards those huge armies. it fought and everywhere, at ali the points where it had approximately the same force at disposal, it always defeated its enemies, to their shame. Where it could not resist the enemy campaign, it pulled

837

back foot by foot, and so was forced to leave the whole of its country and leave it to the enemy. This army, consisting of the sons of the Serb people, but also those statesmen and dignitaries who ruled the people's destiny, were by no means discouraged or rendered hopeless by that. So, when not even a foot of land remained in their hands, they said: "We wish to stay an honorable people!" And so they have. There, the result of that determination is that we today see a big Yugoslavia instead of a small Serbia". End of quotation. The above mentioned big Yugoslavia no longer exists because the statesmen and dignitaries who led the Serb people at the end of the past decade did not realize the essence of the historical changes in global relations manifested through the fail of Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the real-socialist establishment in the countries of Eastern Europe. Rather than comprehending the great historical mission of the Serb people, that had started with the creation of Yugoslavia, rather than peacefully, by reforms and in a democratic and political way ushering that Yugoslavia to the European Union, they tried to avoid the inevitable, failing to realize that Yugoslavia was a "transit stop" on the Yugoslav peoples' way to the united Europe. Today's Yugoslavia again has no prospects of being a peaceful and comfortable place for ali her citizens regardless of nation, religion, ideology and culture to vvhich they belong unless she acknowledges the simple truth that she is not merely a geographic part of Europe, but also part of its civilization and that by that very fact she must also be an active and equal participant in the contemporary economic, political, security and military integration. My regret is even greater knowing that our statesmen and dignitaries do not have to confront the burden of backwardness that Atatrk had to face. They need not "take fezzes and scarves off in order to put hats on the heads of the citizens and dress them in the clothes of the civilized people". But, they, too, would have to understand the importance of Atatrk's efforts to feel the pulse of radical changes in the people, among those who were unaware of the point of changes and modernization. A particularly important message he addressed in that historic speech was "not to stay apart from the entire world". it is my special pleasure to quote the following: "The international clothes of the civilized peoples are fully becoming of our nation. We shall wear shoes, trousers, shirts, collars, 838

ties, coats, we shall even wear a hat! By wearing a fez we were staying outside the whole world. Look at the Turkish and Mslim world. You see them suffer because they accept the changes required by the life of the world..." That simple message of his to "accept the changes required by the world life" is valid even today, at the end of the 20th century. it would therefore be logical and beneficial that co-operation between Yugoslavia and Turkey and their citizens should intensify also in these times, so unfortunate for the Serb people and challenging for ali the European peoples. The goal and essence of that cooperation has been determined by Atatrk. The importance of his profound reforms, by which he led his young state into the civilization circle of the Western world, is universal. That is why Atatrk's personality has been so highly esteemed in Yugoslavia. That esteem has been multiple, related both to respect of Atatrk as the leading statesman of a Balkan country close to Yugoslavia and to great sympathies for a great man who brought renaissance upon the Turkish nation and was known and accepted by the public of his time as a devoted friend of Yugoslavia and "blood-brother" of King Alexander. The best evidence of that are numerous texts that appeared in the Yugoslav press upon Atatrk's demie. Atatrk and his legacy are not only an integral part of the Turkish history, but also an organic part of the Turkish people. That giant of the military and political struggle also possessed a genius for education and bequeathed ali his possessions for the studies of the Turkish culture, language and history, knowing that vvithout a national renaissance trough the language and culture neither the military or political successes could be maintained. He was therefore fully right to say in a historic speech on October 29th, 1933 on the occasion of the lOth anniversary of proclamation of the Republic of Turkey the follovving: "One can feel lucky to be able to say-1 am a Trk". I shall end this brief and simple account on Atatrk by appealing to this audience to take it as an expression of my personal respect for Kemal pasha - the gray wolf, as English captain B.C. Armstrong used to cali him, for gazi Mustafa Kemal - pasha, a fighter and a reformist, for Mustafa Kemal Atatrk "the father of ali Turks", whom the world history see among the greatest politicians of the 20th century. I honestly hope that the Serb and Turkish people will again co-operate upon not "staying outside the world", as Atatrk used to say, 839

and that the Serbs, as well as other Yugoslav and Balkan peoples, will have the Turks as their partners and allies on the common path to the united Europe, as Turkey also is a Balkan and South-Eastern European country, whose roads to Europe lead via Serbia. I therefore believe that we shall soon be able to say that it is good to be a Trk and a Serb, for we shall both be full-fledged and equal citizens, peoples and states of the European Union. Thank you for your attention.

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PROGRAM (PROGRAMME)*
22 Ekim 1998, Perembe (October 22,1998, Thursday) 9.30 AILI TREN (OPENING CEREMONY)** Sayg Duruu ve istiklal Mar (Observation of Silence and National Anthem) - Dinleti (Concert), Polifonik Korolar Dernei Dernek Korosu Yneten: Do. Mustafa APAYDIN Al Konumalar (Opening Speeches) - Prof. Dr. Celal GLE Ankara niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi Dekan (Dean, Faculty ofPolitical Sciencce, Ankara University) - Sayn smail CEM Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Dileri Bakan (Foreign Minister ofthe Republic ofTurkey) - Sayn Rauf R. DENKTA Kuzey Kbrs Trk Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbakan (President ofthe Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) - Sayn Sleyman DEMREL Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbakan (President ofthe Republic ofTurkey) [Onurlandrdklar takdirde. IfHis Excellency the President honors.] 11.
*

Kahve kram (Coffee Break)

Trke tebliler ngilizceye, ngilizce ve Franszca tebliler Trkeye ezamanl evrilecektir [Simultaneous translation will be provided (for Turkish presentations into English; for English and French presentations into Turkish)]. ** 1. Salonda yaplacaktr [Will be held in Hail No. 1].

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1 1

2 0

12. 20 12.45

ORTAK OTURUM: KEMALZMN TEMEL ZELLKLER (JOINT SESSION: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF KEMALISM)* Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): - Yekta Gngr ZDEN, (Atatrk Dnce Dern. Bk.) - Dr. Vladimir I. DANILOV (Moskovv) "Atatrk and Political Modernitization ofTurkey" (Atatrk ve Trkiye'nin Siyasal adalamas) - Prof. Dr. zer OZANKAYA (ODT) 'Trk Devriminin Demokrasi Kuramna Katklar" (The Contributions ofthe Turkish Revolution to the Theory of Democracy) - Prof. Dr. Sina AKSN (SBF) "The Nature ofthe Kemalist Revolution" (Kemalist Devrimin Nitelii) Tartma (Discussion) le Yemei (Lunch)

1. Salon (HallNo.l)
14. BRNC OTURUM (FIRST SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Anl EEN (AHF) - Prof. Roberto Gonzalez GOMEZ (Inst. of Int. Rel., Havana) "Kemal Atatrk: The Emer gence of Modern Turkey" (Kemal Atatrk: Modern Trkiye'nin Douu) - Prof. Dr. Llambro FLO (Univ. of Tirana) "Ataturkism-as Initiative for a Modern Political Culture" (Modern Siyasal Kltr Giriimi in Atatrklk) - Nadezda ZIMOVA (Prague) "Atatrk and the Idea of a Republican State" (Atatrk ve Cumhuriyet Devleti Fikri) - Dr. Mohamed NUREDDN (Lbnan Univ., Beyrut) "Avrupallama ve Kemalizmin Karakteri" (The Character of Europeanization and Kemalism)

1. Salonda yaplacaktr [Will be held in Hail No.l].

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15.40 16.00 16.15

- Orhan KOLOLU (stanbul) "Hzl adalama Modeli Olarak Atatrklk" (Ataturkism as a Rapid Modernization Model) Tartma (Discussion) Kahve kram (Coffee Break) KNC OTURUM (SECOND SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Atila ERALP (ODT) - Prof. Dr. Blent DA VER (SBF) "Hmanizma ve Atatrk" (Humanism and Atatrk) Dursun ATILGAN (Alm. Atatrk Dnce Dern. Gen. Bk., Kln) "ada Trkiye'nin Temeli Kemalist lkeler" (The Kemalist Principles as the Foundation of Modern Turkey) - Eric ZRCHER (Rijks Universiteit, Leiden) "Kemalist Vision of Modernity" (Kemalizmin adalk Gr) - Dr. Kamel Abu JABER (President, Inst. of Dip., Amman) "Mustafa Kemal Atatrk" - Prof. Dr. Hasan KON (SBF) "Trkiye'de Modernlemenin nndeki Engeller" (The Barriers of Modernization in Turkey) Tartma (Discussion) 2. Salon (HallNo.2) BRNC OTURUM (FIRST SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Yulu Tekin KURAT (ODT) - Prof. Carter FINDLEY (Ohio State Univ.) "Reflections on the Early Turkish Republic in World Historical Perspective " (Dnya Tarihi Asndan Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin lk Dnemi zerine Dnceler) - Prof. Anna MASALA (Roma) "Mustafa Kemal Trkiyesi ve Avrupa" (Mustafa Kemal 's Turkey and Europe) - Edouard SABLIER (Paris) "De Gaulle's Turkey" (De Gaulle Trkiyesi) - Prof. Dr. Nimetullah HAFIZ (Pritina) "Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Balkanlara Yanklan" (The Reflections ofthe Republic ofTurkey in the Balkans)

17

4o. 8 oo
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15. 40 16.00 16.15

- Yrd. Do. Dr. Mustafa TRKE (ODT) "Atatrk Dneminde Trkiye'nin Blgesel D Politikalar (1923-1938)" (Turkey's Regional Foreign Policies in Atatrk's Period: 1923-1938) Tartma (Discussion) Kahve kram (Coffee Break) KNC OTURUM (SECOND SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Uygur KOCABAOLU (ODT) - Prof. Dr. ibrahim TATARL (Sofya) "Atatrk ve Modern Trkiye'nin Bulgaristan Parlamentosunda Deerlendirilmesi" (The Evaluation of Atatrk and Modern Turkey in the Bulgarian Parliament) - Prof. Dr. Baskn ORAN (SBF) "Kalanlarn yks: 1923 Zorunlu Mbadelesinden karlacak Dersler" (The Story ofThose who Stayed: Lessons to be Drawnfrom the 1923 Compulsory Exchange) - Gazmend SHPUZA (Tirana) "Arnavutluk ile Trkiye Arasnda Diplomatik likilerin Kurulmas (1923-1926)" (The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between Albania and Turkey: 1923-1926) - Prof. Dr. Ljiljana COLIC (Faculty of Philology, Belgrade) "The Reflections of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk's Reforms in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia " (Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n Reformlarnn Yugoslavya Krall'ndaki Yanklar) - Mustafa MEHMET (Bkre) "Atatrk nklaplar ve Romanya Trk Toplumu" (Atatrk's Reforms and the Turkish Community ofRomania) Tartma (Discussion) 3. Salon (Hail No.3)

n.^-18.

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BRNC OTURUM (FIRST SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Nahit TRE (AHF) - Prof. Eugenio Espir CHAHUAN CHAHUAN (Univ. of Chile, Santiago) "Arab-Islamic Culture " (Arap-slam Kltr)

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- Dr. Alexander de GROOT (Leiden Univ.) "Atatrk's Secularizing the Islamic Hierarchy" (Atatrk'n slami Hiyerariyi Laikletirmesi) - David KUSHNER (Univ. of Haifa) "Some Observations on islam andSecularism in Turkey" (Trkiye'de slamiyet ve Laiklik zerine Baz Gzlemler) - Erik CORNELL (Ret. Amb., Bromma) "The Essence of Secularism-Law Builds the Land" (Laikliin z: lkeyi Kuran Hukuk) - Nazl KANER (Karlsruhe) "Atatrkln adalk Gr ile slami Geleneklerin Bir Sentezi Var mdr? Cumhuriyet Trkiyesi'nin Fikir Hayatndaki Gelimeler: Samiha Ayverdi rnei" (Is there a Synthesis of Atatrk's Vision of Modenisation and the Islamic Traditions? Developments in Turkey's Intellectual Life: The Example of Samiha Ayverdi) 15.40 16.00 16.15 Tartma (Discussion) Kahve kram (Coffee Break) KNC OTURUM (SECOND SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Can HAMAMCI (SBF) - Prof. Dr. Eugen BUCHER (Bern) "The Position of Civil Law of Turkey in the Western Civilisation " (Bat Uygarlndaki Trkiye'de Medeni Hukukun Yeri) - Dr. Ali KAZANCIGL (Directeur, UNESCO, Paris) "Turkey's Democratization: An Assessment" (Trkiye'nin Demokratiklemesi: Bir Deerlendirme) - Prof. Dr. Rait KAYA (ODT) "Siyaset, Demokrasi, Medya" (Politics, Democracy and Media) - Prof. Dr. Alpaslan IIKLI (SBF) "Kreselleme ve Kemalizm" (Globalization and Kemalism) - Prof. Dr. Cem EROUL (SBF) "Devletin Yeniden Yaplandrlmas Sylemi ve Trkiye'nin Demokrasi Gereksinimi" (The Rhetoric of Re-construction ofthe State and the Need for Democracy in Turkey) Tartma (Discussion)

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23 Ekim 1998, Cuma (October 23,1998, Friday) 1. Salon (HallNo.l) 9.00 NC OTURUM (THIRD SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Ersin ONULDURAN (SBF) - Vincente G. ARNAUD (Amb., Buenos Aires) "Atatrk and Modern Turkey" (Atatrk ve ada Trkiye) - Bernhard Tjin Liep SHIE (Surinam) "Ataturkism and Modern Turkey: The Early Reforms of Ataturkism and the Perspectives Towards the Development of a Democratic Society, 1923-1950" (Atatrklk ve ada Trkiye; Atatrkln lk Reformlar ve Demokratik Bir Toplumun Gelimesi Ynndeki Dnceler, 1923-1950) - Prof. Djaparidze SHOTA (Shota Rustaveli Univ., Batoum) "Atatrk and the Republic of Turkey on the New Stage of Political Orientation " (Siyasal Ynelimin Yeni Dneminde Atatrk ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti) - Jihad el ZEIN (Beirut) "Elite's View of Atatrk's Reforms" (Atatrk'n Reformlar zerine Sekinlerin Gr) - Dr. Menter AHNLER (Dileri Bakanl) "Atatrklk ile Demokrasinin Trkiye'de ve Mslman lkelerdeki Gelecei" (Ataturkism and the Future ofDemocracy in Turkey and the Islamic Countries) Tartma (Discussion) Kahve kram (Coffee Break) DRDNC OTURUM (FOURTH SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Baskn ORAN (SBF) Jean-Louis BACQUE-GRAMMONT (Directeur, Centre National, Sucy-en-Rie) "Autour de quelques jugements sur Atatrk et son oeuvre dans la presse parisienne a la fin de 1938" (1938 Sonu Paris Basnna Yansd Biimiyle Atatrk ve Eseri zerine Deerlendirmeler) - Gertrude DURUSOY (zmir) "L'impact des initiatives d'Atatrk sur la vie cultuelle en Turauie " (Atatrk'n Giriimlerinin Trkiye'deki Kltr Hayatna Etkileri)

10.40 11. 11 M

846

- Dr. Xavier JACOB (Ambassade de Vatican, Ankara) "Atatrk et la lacite" (Atatrk ve Laiklik) - Prof. Robert MANTRAN (Inst. de France, Aix-en-Provence) "Souvenirs et reflexions sur la periode post-kemalienne de 1945 1954" (Atatrk Sonras Dnem -1945-1954- zerine Anlar ve Dnceler) \2.m 13.
00

Tartma (Discussion) le Yemei (Lunch) BENC OTURUM (FIFTH SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Cem EROUL (SBF) - Prof. Jacques THOBIE (Viry-Chatillon) "La Republiaue de la Turauie: la voie de la puissance regionale " (Trkiye Cumhuriyeti: Blgesel Gcn Sesi) - Prof. Dr. Dan BERINDEI (President, Academie, Rom., Bucrarest) "La communication Nicolae Titulescu et la Turauie d'Atatrk" (Nicolae Titulescu ve Atatrk Trkiye'si) - Dr. Nahas MAHIEDDINE (Algerie) "L'influence des idees de Mustafa Kemal sur i'elite politiaue et culturelle en Algerie" (Mustafa Kemal'in Dncelerinin Cezayir'deki Siyasal ve Kltrel Sekinler zerindeki Etkisi) - Penda M'BOW (Dakar Cheikh Anta Diop Univ.) "La lecture de l'experience la'iaue du Senegal a la lumiere de cette de la Turquie sous Moustapha Kemal Atatrk (1881-1938)" (Mustafa Kemal Atatrk Trkiyesi Inda Senegal'in Laiklik Deneyimi: 1881-1938) - Prof. Rafa Ben ACHOUR (President, Univ. de Tunis) "L'influence d'Atatrk en Tunisie et notamment relativement au statut de laf emme" (Atatrk'n Tunus'daki Etkileri: zellikle Kadnn Stats Asndan)

14.00

15. 40 16.
00

Tartma (Discussion) Kahve kram (Coffee Break)

847

16.15

ALTINCI OTURUM (SIXTH SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. elik ARUOBA (SBF) - Bilal MR, E. Bykeli (Ret. Amb.) "Cumhuriyetin Bakenti" (Capital of Republic) - Dr. Horst UNBEHAUN (Nrnberg niv.) "Milli Mcadelede Sivas Basn" (The Sivas Press in the Turkish National War) - Prof. Dr. Justin McCARTHY (Univ. of Louisville, Kentucky) "Population Change and the Creation of the Turkish Republic " (Nfustaki Deime ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Douu) - Masami ARAI(Tokyo niv.) " Milliyetilik lkesinin Unutulmu Bir ncs: Ahmet Ferit Bey" (A Forgotten Pioneer of the Nationalism Principle: Ahmet Ferit Bey)
Tartma (Discussion)

17.35-17.55

9.

00

2. Salon (Hail No.2) NC OTURUM (THIRD SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Ercan UYGUR (SBF) - Mehmet Ali EKREM (Bkre) "Atatrk Trkiye'si ile Romanya Arasndaki Diplomatik likilere Toplu Bir Bak" (An Appraisal of the Diplomatic Relations Between Atatrk's Turkey and Romania) - Prof. Dr. Yusuf HAMZA (Pedagoji Fakltesi, skp) "Atatrk ve Makedonya Trkl" (Atatrk and the Turks ofMacedonia) - Prof. Petrika THENGJILLI (Tirana Univ.) "Women's Movement in the Kemalist Republic and in Albania" (Kemalist Cumhuriyet ve Arnavutluk'ta Kadn Hareketi) - Prof. Uffe OESTERGAARD (Univ. of Aarhus) "Atatrk and the Common Greek-Turkish-Ottoman Heritage " (Atatrk ve Yunan-Trk-Osmanl Ortak Miras) - Constantine ZEPOS (Amb., Athens) "Greek-Turkish Relations at the Dawn of the Third Millenium " (3. Binyln Eiinde Yunan-Trk likileri)

848

10. 4 0 11. 11. 2 0

Tartma (Discussion) Kahve kram (Coffee Break) DRDNC OTURUM (FOURTH SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Sbidey TOGAN (Bilkent) - Prof. Dr. Elmira MURADALYEVA (Baku) "Azerbaycan Tarihiliinde ve niversite Kurslarnda Atatrklk Kavray" (The Ataturkist Perception in Azerbaijan Historiography and the University Courses) - Prof. Dr. Anvar KASYMOV (Tashkent) "Communication Between Trk Republics" (Trk Cumhuriyetleri Arasnda letiim) - Prof. Dr. Inom A. ASROROV (President, Inst. of World Econ. and Int. Reis., Dushanbe) "Using the Experience ofTurkey in the Economic Reform of the Republic of Tajikistan" (Tacikistan Cumhuriyeti'ndeki ktisadi Reformlarda Trkiye'nin Deneyiminden Yararlanlmas) Tartma (Discussion) le Yemei (Lunch) BENC OTURUM (FIFTH SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. lber ORTAYLI (SBF) - DAN TSCHIRGI (The American Univ., Cairo) "Turkey's Challenges in the Arab World" (Arap Dnyasnda Trkiye'nin klar) - Prof. Dr. Robert ANCIAUX (Univ. Libre de Bruxelles) "From the Pact ofSaadabad to the Peace Process in the Middle East: Seven Decades ofTurkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East" (Sadabad Pakt'ndan Orta Dou Bar Srecine Kadar Trkiye'nin Orta Dou Politikasnn 70 Yl) - Dr. Yusuf IRAK (Ain Shams Univ., Kahire) "Msr Ariv Vesikalar Inda Trk Kurtulu Sava (1920-1923)" (The Turkish National War-1920-1923- in the Light of the Egyptian Archiyes) - Dr. Ycel GL (Embassy ofTurkey, Vatican) "The Last Pitched-Battle of the First World War and the Determination of the Turkish-Syrian Boundary hine" (Birinci Dnya Savann Son Meydan Muharebesi ve Trkiye-Suriye Snrnn Belirlenmesi) 849

12.20 13. 00 14.00

15. 40 16.00 16.15

- Prof. Abderrahmane el MOUDDEN (Rabat) "Abd al-Karim's and Kemal's Movements in the 1920s: What Connections?" (1920'lerde Abdlkerim'in ve Kemal'in Hareketleri Arasndaki likiler) Tartma (Discussion) Kahve kram (Coffee Break) ALTINCI OTURUM (SIXTH SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Yksek Ko YALKIN (SBF) - Dr. Arshi KHAN (Hamdard Univ., New Delhi) "State-Society Relationship in Turkey and India: A Comparative Study" (Trkiye ve Hindistan'da Devlet-Toplum likisi: Karlatrmal Bir nceleme) - Zheng-hua DONG (Beijing Univ.) "Chinese Views of Atatrk and Modern Turkey: A Historiographical Review" (Atatrk ve ada Trkiye zerine in Grleri: Tarihsel Bir Deerlendirme) - Prof. Dr. Jaemahn SUH (Hankuk niv. Seul) "Kore-Trk likilerine Genel Bir Bak" (A General Look Upon Korean-Turkish Relations) - Prof. Duncan Bruce WATERSON (Macquarie Univ., Sydney) "Atatrk and Modern Turkey: Australia, Anzac and the Turkish Republic " (Atatrk ve Modern Trkiye: Avustralya, Anzak ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti) Tartma (Discussion) 3. Salon {Hail No.3)

17.35-17.55

9.

00

NC OTURUM (THIRD SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. senbike TOGAN (ODT) - Prof. Gerrit OLIVIER (Rand Afrikaans Univ., Johannesburg) "The Relevance of Kemal Atatrk in the Turkey of the Future " (Gelecein Trkiye'sinde Kemal Atatrk'n Yeri) - Prof. Dr. Dou ERGL (SBF) "Atatrklk Neden Alamyor: Liderlik Sorunu" (Why Ataturkism Cannot Be Transcended: The Question of Leadership)

850

10.40 11. 11.2

- Prof. Dr. Victor Morales LEZCANO (Spanish pen Univ., Madrid) "Emilio Garda Gomez: An Exceptional Eyewitness ofthe Plight ofthe Republic ofTurkey (1962-69)" (Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 1962-69 Zorlu Dneminin Srad Bir Grg Tan: Emilio Garcia Gomez) - Tapani HARVIAINEN (Univ. of Helsinki) "The Northernmost Turkic Community-a Case of Euro-tslam in Finland" (En Kuzeydeki Trk Toplumu: Finlandiya'daki Avrupa-slam rnei) - Arshad-uz ZAMAN (Ret. Amb., Bangladesh) "Atatrk as seenfrom Bangladesh" (Banglade'ten Atatrk'e Bak) Tartma (Discussion) Kahve kram (Coffee Break) DRDNC OTURUM (FOURTH SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Korkut BORATAV (SBF) - Prof. Dr. Ergun TRKCAN (SBF) "Trkiye'nin Teknoloji Tercihleri: 1923-1998" (Turkey's Technological Preferences: 1923-1998) - Prof. Dr. efik Alp BAHADIR (Univ. of Erlangen-Nuremberg) "Turkish Economy on the Threshold ofthe 21" Century: A Critical Review ofSome Recent International Appraisals" (21. Yzyln Eiinde Trk Ekonomisi: Son Zamanlardaki Baz Uluslararas Deerlendirmelere Eletirel Bir Yaklam) - Prof. Dr. Bilsay KURU (SBF) "Kamu Ekonomisinde Bir Yneticilik rneinden zlenimler" (Impressions of an Example of Administration in Public Economy) Tartma (Discussion) le Yemei (Lunch) BENC OTURUM (FIFTH SESSION) Oturum Bakan (Chairperson): Prof. Dr. Ruen KELE (SBF) - Prof. Geoffrey LEWIS (Oxford Univ.) "Bilmeyen Ne Bilsin Bizin?" (What Should the Ignorant Know of Us?) 851

12.00 13. 00 14.

- Adnan BNYAZAR (Berlin) "Atatrk'n Yaratmak stedii Bilgi Toplumu" (The Information Society Atatrk Aimed to Build) - Prof. Dr. Ezel KURAL-SHAW (California State Univ.) "The Language Factor as the Keystone ofthe Turkish Republic's Reform Program" (Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Reform Programnn Temel Ta Olarak Dil Etkeni) - Prof. Gyrgy HAZAI (Budapete) "Atatrk Dneminde Trkiye'de Trkoloji" (Turkish Studies in Turkey in Atatrk's Period) - Tamer BACINOLU (Tbingen) "Souk Sava Sonras Alman Yaynclnda Kemalizm" (Kemalism in Post-Cold War German Publications) 15.40 16.
00

Tartma (Discussion) Kahve kram (Coffee Break) KAPANI KONUMALARI (CLOSING SPEECHES)* Prof. Dr. Sina AKSN, Dzenleme Kurulu Adna (On Behalf of the Organizing Committee) Katlmclar Adna Bir Konumac (Address on Behalf of the Participants)

18.-18.15

1. Salonda yaplacaktr [Will be held in Hail No. 1 ].

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DZENLEME KURULU (ORGANIZING COMMITTEE):

Prof. Dr. Celal GLE (SBF) Daire Bk. Dr. Menter AHNLER (Dileri Bakanl Temsilcisi) Bakatip Can NDER (Dileri Bakanl Temsilcisi) Prof. Dr. Sina AKSN (SBF) Prof. Dr. Pars ESN (SBF) Prof. Dr. mer KRKOLU (SBF) Yrd. Do. Dr. Berrin C. ATAMAN (SBF) Yrd. Do. Dr. Mustafa AYDIN (SBF) Ar. Gr. ar ERHAN (SBF) Ar. Gr. zlen KNEK (SBF) Ar. Gr. Kudret ZERSAY (SBF) Ar. Gr. Korkut ZKORKUT (SBF) Ar. Gr. Feyzan Hayal EHRAL (SBF) Sema BAKACAK (Aristo Firmas Temsilcisi)

853

ISBN 975-482-481-9

Ankara niversitesi Basmevi 1999