Winter 2013 Journal of Politics & International Affairs

e Journal of Politics and
International Anairs
Volume V, Issue I
Winter 2013
e Journal of Politics
and International Aairs
Volume V, Issue I
Winter 2013
e Ohio State University
Cameron DeHart
Editor-in-Chief
Charles Trefney
Logistics
Professor Paul Beck
Advisor
Joseph Guenther
Managing Editor
Wayne DeYoung
Advisor
JPIA Editorial Sta:
Phillip Allen
Sarah Arnold
Je Carroll
Taylor Humphrey
Chelsea Hagan
Nickole Iula
Todd Ives
Maegan Miller
Ben Presson
Alumni Advisor
Seth Radley
Design
Holly Yanai
Contents
Sparta and Plataea: Target Selection in the Age of
Religiously Motivated Terror 09
David Agranovich
Caring for the Constitution: Madison and Jeersons
Opposition to the Nation Bank of the United States 21
Yana Mereminsky
Preventing the Loss of Life in Syria 63
Alex Polivka
Black Voting Behavior and Californias Proposition 8 79
Christopher Rupp
Prosecute or Pardon: What Impunity in El Salvador Says
About Transnational Justice Everywhere 95
Adam Schaer
Middlebury College
e New Geopolitics of the Artic 111
Alexander ompson - Associate Professor
Volume V Issue I Winter 2013 Online Edition
Journal of Politics and
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International Aairs
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Welcome,
It is my pleasure to present the Winter 2013 edition of e Journal of Politics & International Aairs.
is issue features several exciting and relevant papers that speak to the strength of the undergraduates
at e Ohio State University. Our editorial team has been working diligently over the past several
months to put this project together, and hopefully the end result is both informative and enjoyable.
Loyal readers of JPIA will notice several changes to the layout of the winter issue. In spring 2012, we
bid adieu to several of our graduating editors and welcomed several fresh faced underclassmen to ll
their positions. Over the summer and fall, the upperclassmen have been mentoring the new editors
and this issue has been a truly collaborative eort by the old and new guard.
Our editorial team identied several areas for improvement after our spring issue was released in June.
In this issue, we worked to improve continuity with regards to formatting, citation style, and other
stylistic aspects. Readers will also notice new biographies for our editorial sta.
Sadly, this issue will be my last as editor-in-chief. As I prepare for graduation in the spring and gradu-
ate school in the fall, I am leaving this project in the hands of my capable successor, Chelsea Hagan,
and the new editorial sta. I hope to stay involved in an advisory role, and I look forward to seeing
how the Journal evolves after my departure.
is issue would not have been possible without the support the Political Science department. I
would like to thank you to Dr. Richard Herrmann for his support and condence in our team, Alicia
Anzivine and Wayne DeYoung for their assistance at every stage of this project, Dr. Paul Beck for
his guidance and administrative support, and Ben Presson for his continuing insights as our alumni
adviser.
Lastly, I would like to thank all those who read the Journal. Your feedback and supports keeps this
project going. ank you.
Cameron DeHart
Editor-in-Chief

Editorial Foreword
Cameron Dehart
Editor-in-Chief
Sparta and Plataea: Target Selection in the
Age of Religiously Motivated Terror
David Agranovich
While terrorism has, since its inception, resulted in civilian casualties, the deliberate targeting of civilians
seems to be a new trend. is essay contrast the targeting methodologies of major terrorist organizations as they
evolve over time in order to evaluate the hypothesis that the increase in civilian targeting is the result of the
growth of an international competitive funding market and the ability of terrorist groups to use new ideologies
to rationalize making civilians primary targets. is analysis focused on the actions and ideology of the IRA
during the Troubles to establish a baseline for terrorist targeting in which the primary targets were government
and military, and in which civilian casualties were strongly discouraged. We then contrasted the targeting
methodology used by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula to identify chief dierences that may have contributed
to forming a civilian-centric targeting model.
9
T
he assassination of Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich at the hands of a terrorists bomb
would have been an unmemorable data point in a long history of political violence if it
were not for the incredible caution of his killer. In a country already bathed in blood from
rising civil unrest and widespread famine, it would be an act of mercy, rather than an act of murder,
that would capture the minds of historians for more than a century. e assassin, a member of the
terrorist Socialist Revolutionary Combat Organization named Ivan Kalyayev, was originally slated to
carry out the attack two days earlier but stayed his hand when he saw his victim accompanied by
his wife and young nephews. Loath to take innocent lives, Kalyayev melted back into the crowd, and
nally completed his mission two days later. He hoped to be remembered for inspiring the socialist
revolution of Russia, but instead became the paradoxical picture of a moralistic terrorist.
Nearly a century later, the concerted attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon in Septem-
ber 2001 took many Americans by surprise, and shook Americas sense of security to the core. ough
the rst attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 was not so far in the past, an attack of this mag-
nitude by a foreign entity on American soil had not happened in sixty years. As the towers crashed to
the ground, a nation mourned the deaths of over 3000 citizens, many of whom were civilians. As res
still burned at the Pentagon, the country was still coming to grips with their attacker a group almost
entirely unknown to the average American and the possible justication for targeting thousands of
noncombatants. e attacks of 9/11 only highlighted an apparently new norm in terrorist targeting
practices: one in which civilians are legitimate, and often preferred, targets in terrorist attacks.
ese anecdotes help illustrate emerging trends in terrorist target selection and behavior. Terrorism
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue I Winter 2013
10
Agranovich Sparta and Plataea
11
in the early 19
th
and 20
th
centuries was largely bound by national borders, and often operated against
a single identiable entity with practical policy goals. is analysis is derived from the actions of
major terrorist groups in this period. e Irish Republican Army, though notorious for its wave of
violence against British state agents (police, army) was dened as a group composed of Catholic Irish
separatists allied against the British government, with the stated aim of securing Irish independence
through concerted attacks against symbols of the British state (Coogan 2000, 547) (Irish Republican
Army 2009). e Baader-Meinho gang in Eastern Germany also tended to focus on targets clearly
associated with the State. Even in the era of anti-Tsarist terrorist organizations, attacks focused on
State targets, with every eort made to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties (*See Kalyayev) (Merari
1993, 227-228).
Somehow, the calculus of target selection seems to have changed to emphasize visibility of
the attack over any other consideration a calculus that now places civilians directly in the crosshairs
of terrorist planners. In this essay I will analyze the factors that have contributed to this change by
contrasting al-Qaeda and the IRA in order to evaluate the hypothesis that terrorist targeting is a result
of a combination of the rationalization of civilians as agents of antagonistic powers and the creation
of a competitive funding marketplace.
Literarature Review
e academic study of terrorist targeting methodology has overwhelmingly focused on
Islamist terror groups and the religious reasoning behind target selection. However, Fathali M.
Moghaddams essay e Staircase to Terrorism explores the psychological steps that terrorists take to
select, plan, and execute an attack. He denes terrorism as politically motivated violence, perpetrated
by individuals, groups, or state-sponsored agents, intended to instill feelings of terror and helplessness
in a population in order to inuence decision making and to change behavior (Moghaddam 2005).
His denition highlights the importance of considering terrorism from an objective standpoint in
order to impartially analyze the factors contributing to changes in terrorist behavior (such as the
introduction of religious or philosophical rationalization or belief ). Moghaddam then presents a
six-part stairway a set of six steps that would-be terrorists ascend until ultimately rationalizing
violence and destructive acts. He postulates that every individual begins on the ground oor at
which individuals perceive injustice and fairness and conceive of their own place in their environment
(Moghaddam 2005). He points out that the individuals who rise above the ground oor tend not
to conform to the notions of terrorists as unemployed, uneducated foot soldiers commonly held by
Western media, but rather, in the case of the IRA, there is a stratum of intelligent, astute, and expe-
rienced terrorists who provide the backbone of the organization[that] does not support the view
that they are mindless hooligans drawn from the unemployed and unemployable (Coogan 2000,
485)(Moghaddam 2005). He goes on to point out that more recent organizations, like al-Qaeda and
Bin Laden himself, come from educated and often wealthy backgrounds (Wright 2006). Moghaddam
addresses the concept of moral engagement as a driving force behind the rationalization of violence
against civilians and government targets. He explains that terrorist groups will try to portray their
targets as morally disengaged, while the group itself develops a secondary, parallel morality that
justies the use of violence (Moghaddam 2005). Finally, he identies the fth oor as the condition-
ing necessary to justify the deaths of civilians by sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms (Moghaddam
2005). He states that two important psychological processes are necessary to facilitate the murder of
civilians: the rst involves social categorization of civilians as part of the out-group, and the second
involves psychological distance through exaggerating dierences between the in-group and the out-
group (Moghaddam 2005). Moghaddams nal oor will be an important part of my argument that
the targeting of civilians stems from the rationalization of their complicity in the actions of the enemy.
Ariel Merari, in his essay Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency, explores the application of the
term terrorism as a political tool. He argues that terrorism is too often applied punitively as violence
we nd objectionable (Merari 1993, 213-214). As such, we must be cautious to identify terrorist
groups not only objectively from the standpoint of emotional response, but also from an orientalist
perspective, as Merari notes, Western academic denitions of terrorism often dier signicantly from
those found in Iran, Syria, and many African nations (Merari 1993, 215). Merari argues that terror-
ism can only be perpetrated by citizens, rather than by states, and that the targets of terrorism can
be either states or civilians (Merari 1993, 218). However, he delineates between state-targeted and
civilian-targeted terrorism. According to Merari, terrorists that target states are guerillas, insurgents,
or revolutionaries, whereas those that target civilians are vigilantes and ethnic terrorists (Merari
1993, 218).
While his dichotomy questionably assigns perceived moral value to certain types of terror-
ism, he continues by discussing the practical morality of terrorism as portrayed by Ivan Kalyayev, a
bomber during the anti-Tsarist period in Russia. Kalyayev, who avoided civilian casualties to the point
of abandoning his rst attempted attack, was, in Meraris eyes one of the few terrorists who pass the
litmus test for moral violence. is litmus test, described by Walzer (as quoted by Merari) as a scale
of assasinability, with government ocials being highly assasinable, and civilians being illegitimate
targets (Merari 1993, 228). However, it is Meraris conviction that moral judgments cannot be passed
on terrorist activity because morality is a code of behavior that prevails in a certain society at a certain
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume IV Issue III Fall 2012
12
13
time (Merari 1993, 230) that informs this papers approach to civilian targets not as morally ille-
gitimate targets, but rather as targets systematically rationalized from the moral standpoint of terrorist
organizations themselves.
e Irish Republican Army
Ireland has been the home to a struggle for independence since the 1500s, when King
Henry VIII assumed the title of King of Ireland. His heavy-handed conquest of the island was fol-
lowed in the late 1700s by a unication treaty admittedly bought through bribery and the awarding
of peerages to important representatives (Ward 1994). Ireland then endured the hardship of the Irish
Potato Famine, caused in part by its sudden unication with the UK, which encouraged its agricul-
tural growth in lieu of industrial power (Mokyr 1983). Finally, in response to the frustration felt by
the Irish, the Home Rule Bill was introduced into parliament. However, the advent of WWI caused
its suspension, and provoked a split among Irish nationalists between those that supported the war
eort and those that opposed it. However, the Easter Day Uprising in 1916, and subsequent execu-
tion of fteen of its leaders, turned the tide of public opinion in favor of the separatists, and led to the
beginning of the 1919 civil war.
e Irish Republican Army traces its roots back to the Dil of 1919 and the Irish War of Indepen-
dence from 1919-1921. At the beginning of the conict, the Dil approved the IRA as the ocial
armed forces of the Irish Republic, vesting them with the legitimacy necessary to begin their guerilla
campaign against the British. After the end of the war in 1921, IRA members opposed to the Anglo-
Irish Treaty set about ghting the Irish Civil War against the members of the IRA and Sinn Fein
that had signed the treaty. is group, too, held that their legitimacy stemmed from the 1916 Dil
proclamation. In 1969 the group split again, into the Provisional IRA (pIRA) and the Ocial IRA
(oIRA), the latter of which ceased operation in 1972 after the troubles, and the former of which split
again after the 1997 ceasere (and subsequent 2005 cessation of hostilities) into the Real IRA and the
political wing of the pIRA, the Provisional Sinn Fein. roughout its history, from its founding and
through various splits, the IRA has maintained its legitimacy through the Dils 1916 proclamation
naming it the ocial armed forces of the Republic of Ireland (Coogan 2000), and was ultimately
responsible for over 1700 deaths throughout the conict (Sutton 2006). I will focus on the IRA be-
ginning during the time of the Troubles and continuing through the dissolution of the PIRA.

IRA Methodology
IRA attacks usually took the form of shootings/assassinations of police or military mem-
bers operating in the IRAs home territory or bombings (usually by car bomb) of banks, government
buildings, and government events. While the death toll during the troubles reached over 1700, of
which 621 were civilians (during the most violent time in IRA history). As such, the IRA could be
considered as an organization that avoided the killing of civilians when possible (as dened by their
own logic) and focused attacks on visible members of the state apparatus namely, those high on
Walzers assasinability scale.
IRA tactics emphasized the minimization of collateral damage by openly notifying police
or residents of a target building of the imminent bombing threat, with the hope that the building
would be cleared in time. Oftentimes, this approach was successful, however, during the Troubles
IRA cells, which were by denition very insulated from each other for security purposes (Coogan
2000), often carried out attacks that, either through insucient warning time or a unmanageably
large number of simultaneous attacks, led to civilian casualties and injuries. One such event was the
Bloody Friday bombings on July 21, 1972, in which killed nine people (seven civilians and two
soldiers) and injured 130, most seriously, of which almost all were civilians (McKenna n.d.). e
attack included 19 bombings over a span of 80 minutes in Belfast in major transit centers and busy
street corners (McKenna n.d.). While the IRA provided, in some cases, substantial (30-70 minute)
warnings, the density of the attacks led to victims being evacuated to other bomb sites and two hoax
warnings signicantly delayed emergency response time (McKenna n.d.).
Rationalization of civilian collateral deaths
IRA response to the deaths of Bloody Friday and other civilian casualties during its bomb-
ing campaign was one of dissociation from responsibility for the event, and even in admitting mis-
takes, the group focused on the tactical error of allowing the British to win a public opinion battle
rather than their planning error in causing civilian casualties. In the Green Book, the IRA volunteers
handbook, civilian casualties were explained as regardless of [whether we overestimated the Britishs
ability to respond to our warnings], we made the mistake and the enemy exploited it [by using as
public relations material against the IRA (Coogan 2000, 552). However, the IRA views the exploi-
tation of its mistake by the enemy as a logical response to their attacks, and urges its members to
exploit [their] mistakes by propagating the facts. So it was with their murderous mistakes of the Falls
Road curfew, Bloody Sunday, and internment (Coogan 2000, 552).
Changes in targeting methodology during the ultra-violent Troubles were also explained
away by placing blame on the enemy for forcing the IRA to resort to more brutal tactics. e Green
Book states tactics are dictated by existing conditions and that those conditions were changed not
14
15
by the actions of the IRA, but by actions of the British, such as the Falls curfew after which all
Brits to a people were acceptable targets. e existing conditions had changed (Coogan 2000, 552).
Coogan also points out how the IRA rationalized the execution of its own members or civilians by
associating them with arms of the state. He notes three anecdotes of civilian executions: the murder of
businessman Jeery Agate, conducted because the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was trying
to drum up investment in the country, the murder of Sir Norman Stronge and his son in response to
sectarian killings of Catholics, and the murder of the Carrols to expound on the IRA opposition to
the process of turning volunteers to the Brits (Coogan 2000, 553). In each case, the organization
was capable of rationalizing civilian casualties by arguing each target was helping to service the war
machine of their enemies (Coogan 2000, 553).
Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaedas origins also begin in a conict for sovereignty. e invasion of Afghanistan by
Soviet troops caused a massive inux of ghters from neighboring regions bent on joining the various
coalitions ghting the Soviet army. Dubbed mujahedeen, they hailed from a myriad of countries but
ultimately shared two things: Muslim faith and a conviction that the expulsion of the Soviets was
both a tactical and ideological imperative. Osama bin Laden, a wealthy son of a Saudi (previously
Yemeni) construction mogul, began his armed career as a nancier of the mujahedeen, providing a
series of guesthouses across the Afghan border in Pakistan to assist mujahedeen receiving training and
preparing to head to the front lines (Wright 2006). As the war progressed, bin Laden, hungry for
action, went to the front lines, where he was notably a terrible soldier and suered from a myriad of
health problems that severely handicapped his ability to ght (Wright 2006). However, it was here
that he began gathering a group of elite Egyptian mujahedeen led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. From this
group he culled the most elite and dedicated of ghters, from which the roots of al-Qaeda were born
(Wright 2006). Al-Qaeda initially focused on consolidating its power in Afghanistan by eliminating
the leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud and allying itself with the Taliban.
While al-Qaedas initial attacks focused on government buildings and military resources,
it displayed absolutely no concern about the deaths of civilians. e bombings of the US embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania were timed for the busiest part of the workday, and the truck bombs used
were of such power that they nearly obliterated the entire buildings, including the publicly accessible
facades and killing over 270 people and injuring over 5000 (Wright 2006). ese targets were chosen
not only to make the political statement that American presence overseas was unacceptable, but also
to present al-Qaeda to the world in spectacular fashion (Wright 2006).
Al-Qaeda and Civilian Targets
Al-Qaeda has since its inception made no eort to avoid civilian casualties, often using
large death counts as vehicles for enhancing its visibility. While several arguments rationalizing the
killing of civilians especially the deaths of Muslims exist, the answer can in part be found in the
ideology that gave birth to the organization. e heavy inuence of Egyptians in the initial al-Qaeda
organization is no coincidence. Ayman al-Zawahiri himself spent time in prison with Syyid Qutb,
the Egyptian revolutionary who developed the idea of takr, the process of declaring a Muslim an
apostate, which legitimizes his death. It was through this theological trick that al-Qaeda was able to
rationalize the deaths of hundreds of Muslim civilians in the embassy bombings and the deaths of any
Muslims during the 9/11 attacks. However, the issue of killing civilians in general is more compli-
cated.
e al-Qaeda approach seems to mirror that of the IRA, just with more readiness to declare
civilians as servicing the war machine of the enemy. In his 1996 fatwa, bin Laden argues that all
those who live without Sharia are apostates, and that to use man made law instead of the Sharia and
to support the indels [here, the United States] against the Muslims is one of the ten voiders that
would strip a person from his Islamic status (Bin Laden 1996). With this act, bin Laden not only
validates the killing of Muslims by stripping them of their status as Muslims but also indicates that
complicity with the enemy (much like the IRAs belief that noncombatants were aiding the enemy
by not taking arms against it) was enough to justify being a target. Al-Qaedas call to target civilians
of any religion appears in the 1998 World Islamic Front fatwa, which stated to kill the Americans
and their allies civilians and military is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any
country in which it is possible to do it (World Islamic Front 1998).
Similarities in Rationalization of Civilian Casualties
An analysis of the methods by which the IRA and Al-Qaeda rationalize civilian casualties as
a result of their attacks does turn up some similarities. Much like in cases of domestic violence, both
groups disassociate themselves from the violence, arguing that the death of civilians was somehow
the fault of the enemy themselves. e IRA takes special care to frame such casualties as the intended
action by the enemy, arguing that the unsuccessful evacuation of victims was a ploy by the British
forces to attack the image of the IRA (Coogan 2000). To both groups, the rationalization of civilian
casualties begins with accepting civilians as extensions of the state machine and arguing their actions
somehow contribute to the perceived injustice motivating the terrorist. In this way, these groups can
morph Walzers assassinability index to allow for civilian targets.
16 17
Dierences in Rationalization of Civilian Casualties
However, during the bloodiest period of IRA history, the organization was responsible
for only 621 civilian deaths (Sutton 2006). In contrast, al-Qaedas most high-prole attacks the
embassy bombings, the London transit bombings, and the 9/11 bombings claimed the lives of 3275
civilians (BBC 2005)(PBS Online Newshour n.d.). e chief dierence between these two organi-
zations is the deliberate targeting of civilians undertaken by al-Qaeda, as opposed to the attempts
frequently made by the IRA to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. e language of the 1998 fatwa
is illuminating because it seeks to justify the murder of American civilians precisely because they
are Americans and therefore surrogates of the oppressive state regime the organization is targeting
(World Islamic Front 1998). Here we see the dening deviation between the IRA and al-Qaedas
methodologies: while the IRA saw civilian casualties as a hindrance to accomplishing their goals (a
tool to be used against them), al-Qaeda sees civilian casualties as a visibility maximizer, and actively
sought attacks that would inspire the greatest amount of fear in the general population.
For al-Qaeda, this legitimacy sprung from a perverted understanding of Islam, one in
which an individual without traditional religious training and outside of the ulama could make pro-
nouncements of Islamic law. It was by this process the incorporation of Qutbs teachings on takr
and kar and the Wahhabi concept of individual interpretation of he Quran that Moghaddams
nal step in the staircase was overcome, and an all-out assault on civilians was morally and psychologi-
cally excusable.
e Competitive Funding Marketplace
A phenomenon of the growth of transnational terrorism is the need for terrorist groups to
compete among themselves for the money necessary to remain in the public eye. Katie Benner quotes
an anonymous al-Qaeda operative saying there are two things a brother must always have for jihad,
the self and money (Benner 2011). Islamic terrorism especially feeds o of a system of clandestine
nancial sources. Islamic banking, with its insulation from the international banking system and
informal regulation, allows for easy transmission of cash to militant groups. Wealthy charities active
in the Islamic world have been implicated in funding numerous terrorist organizations (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004). However, the creation of a funding
source network (with nite resources) means that organizations must compete for those resources.
e meticulous nature in which bin Laden himself worried over the branding of al-Qaeda
in his later years lends credence to the importance of having a competitive and visible brand. Wor-
ried his organization was losing funding and relate-ability, he asked tells his deputies the name of an
entity carries its message and represents it. Al-Qaeda describes a military base with ghters without
a reference to our broader mission to unify the nation and charges them to nd a name that would
not be shortened to a word that does not represent us (Bin Laden, SOCOM-2012-0000009-HT
2012).
e need for a strong brand and visible image is a dening reason for the rationalization of
the killing of civilians. By targeting civilians, al-Qaeda managed to shoot to prominence on the world
stage. Its attacks on US embassies sparked immediate attention from the FBI (Wright 2006) and its
destruction of the World Trade Center towers and attack on the Pentagon established it as a global
franchise. ough al-Qaeda found it immensely harder to fundraise after 9/11 (due to vigilance on
the part of the Saudis and the American and British intelligence services), there is strong evidence that
their fundraising abilities were heightened after their initial attacks (Wright 2006) (Roth, Greenburg
and Wille 2004). e intense media attention that spectacular attacks with high civilian casualties
garner is also an integral part to sustained operation as an organization (Richards 2011). ere ap-
pears to be a clear need for visibility in order for terrorist organizations to remain relevant a type of
visibility that is only enhanced by massive attacks on civilian soft targets (Richards 2011).
Concluding remarks
e growth of terrorist attacks targeting civilians can be clearly shown to have two major
sources: the need for funding in a competitive market and the ability for terrorist organizations to
both rationalize, and later prioritize, civilian attacks. e growth of a viable transnational terrorist
funding network created a competitive marketplace in which organizations like al-Qaeda were forced
to act like businesses competing for venture capitalist funding by enhancing the visibility of their
brand and our-competing their competitors. In this sector, the language of the corporate world ap-
plies mergers like the one between Egyptian Islamic Jihad and bin Ladens edgling al-Qaeda were
calculated to form organizations that could appeal to broader funding bases and audiences (Wright
2006), while garnering the funding necessary for large simultaneous attacks.
While terrorism has, since its inception, resulted in civilian casualties, the deliberate target-
ing of civilians seems to be a new trend. e advent of ideological arguments for associating civilians
with the state apparatus and for widening the gap between in- and out-group individuals, such as
Qutbs philosophy of takr and bin Ladens interpretation of qh, has created a system in which civil-
ians are far easier to associate with legitimate targets, and has blurred the lines delineating the steps on
the stairway to terrorist actions.
18
19
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org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html (accessed May 3, 2012).
Wright, Lawrence. e Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. New York: Knopf, 2006.
Caring for the Constitution: Madison and Jeersons
Opposition to the National Bank of the United States
Yana Mereminsky
In the present-day United States, the Constitution is of utmost legal authority. is conception can be traced to
historical events in which constitutional doctrine decided legal questions. e rst event that set a tradition of
constitutional clout was the 1790s National Bank Debate. Alexander Hamilton proposed a National Bank bill to
strengthen the economy and alleviate the Revolutionary war debt. James Madison and omas Jeerson opposed
the bill and appealed to George Washington to impose his Veto against it. Ultimately, Washington signed the bill.
Modern historical thought asserts that Madison and Jeersons greatest criticism of the Bank was its unconstitutional-
ity. is view may be incorrect. e purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that Madison and Jeersons true op-
position lay with political-economic concerns and their constitutional argument was a ploy that they thought would
convince Washington. e studys research method included investigating primary and secondary sources, economic
and legal theories that were inuential in the late eighteenth century, and Madison and Jeersons motivations.
Results indicate evidence that conrms the hypothesis, such as Madison and Jeersons written correspondence, prior
ideologies, and perception of Washingtons priorities. erefore, results show that Madison and Jeersons genuine op-
position to the Bank in the political-economic realm. e implications of the research are important in considering
the symbolism of the Debate. If Madison and Jeerson were insincere in voicing a constitutional opposition against
Hamiltons bill, the American tradition of granting utmost legal authority to the Constitution is based, at least
partly, on a disingenuous source.
21
P
resident Barack Obamas health care reform bill has been both the most distinguishing foot-
print left by his administration and the most disputed. As debates over the bill surged
throughout the nation, many opponents turned to a question of constitutionality to defeat
the plan. ese critics of the bill used the Commerce Clause as their point of attack, while President
Obamas supporters armed the bills absolute compatibility with the clause and the Constitution.
Federal courts were divided over the issue, with four of the major appeals court decisions shedding
little light on the overall judicial position on the law.
1
When the bill nally reached the Supreme
Court, much of the nation and probably all of its politicians tuned in to hear what the Justices had
to say regarding the laws constitutionality. In the end, Chief Justice John Robertss opinion armed
the constitutionality of the bill.
As the battle raged, strikingly few credible government ocials or national leaders would
have even thought to question the relevance of constitutionality in regards to health care reform. In
this context, the debate over health care reform revolved around whether the bill was constitutional
or unconstitutional, not abouAAt whether constitutionality is important. If the Supreme Court had
stricken down the reform as unconstitutional, no one would have dared to say that it should have
been implemented anyway. e treatment of the Constitution as a document of unmatched legal
importance in American politics is a sentiment shared by the overwhelming majority and one that has
been around for hundreds of years. But when was this sentiment born? What created the unshake-
able foundation for constitutional superiority that lives in American politics today?
e rst truly monumental question of legislative constitutionality presented itself in the
22
Mereminsky Caring for the Constitution
23
1791 National Bank debate. e National Bank, as envisioned by Alexander Hamilton, Secretary
of the Treasury at the time, was proposed to the First Congress in 1790. His Second Report on Public
Credit, which contained the Bank proposal, was one of three important works that unveiled Hamil-
tons entire economic policy, along with the 1789 First Report on Public Credit and late 1791 Report on
Manufactures.
2
e First Report had argued that a funded debt (in this context, the American post-
Revolutionary war debt) could be transformed into capital, and the Second Report recommended
that this transformation be performed through a Bank.
3
Ultimately, Hamiltons main objective in
funding the debt through the incorporation of the Bank was to stabilize the new national govern-
ment and establish its credit. In other words, he aimed to ease the investment of private capital.
Hamiltons more specic hopes revolved around ambitious entrepreneurs and their ability to give the
American economy a signicant push. He predicted that the Bank would attract both foreign and
domestic capital into the possession of these entrepreneurs, and the entrepreneurs would, in turn,
invest the capital into the nations economic growth. is sort of wealth concentration was impera-
tive, Hamilton reasoned, in an underdeveloped frontier society like the US where manufactures were
few, capital frequently diused, and thus currency depleted. Helping to eliminate these negative traits
of the American economy, concentration and mobilization of capital would excite the industry and
productivity of the American people. Likewise, it would cure a chronically unfavorable balance of
trade by encouraging export production.
4
Finally, it would act as both a source of emergency loans
and a depository of funds.
5
Hamiltons constitutional justication for the Bank derived from Article 1, Section 8,
which gave Congress the power to borrow Money on the credit of the United States. He reasoned
that the Bank itself would supply these loans. Although no explicit power allowed Congress to es-
tablish such a Bank, Hamilton looked to the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article 1, Section 8 for
constitutional justication: Congress would have the right to make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, which included the aforementioned
power to borrow money.
6

However, the Bank proposal met erce opposition from Secretary of State omas Jeer-
son and Virginia Congressman James Madison. eir criticisms revolved around two major points
of contention: ey viewed the Bank as economically corrupt and unsound, and they viewed it as
unconstitutional in the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Madison found abundant economic aws with the Bank bill. He asserted two particular
disadvantages in his 1791 speeches to Congress: e Bank would abolish precious metals as the basis
for currency by substituting another nancial medium for them, and it would expose the American
people to the risk of a run on the Bank. Moreover, what troubled Madison even more was that these
evils would be unleashed onto the public in the form of an eleven-year Bank charter, which was much
too lengthy for his liking.
7
Yet just like Jeerson, Madison aimed the majority of his publically voiced
opposition to the Bank at its unconstitutionality. He claimed that constitutionally granted Congres-
sional power to borrow did not imply the power to charter a bank to make loans.
8

For Jeerson, the Bank eectively represented the evils that he attributed to all banks of
note issue (rather than gold issue). Instead of helping people succeed, banks preyed on people, put
them into debt, and supported luxury and extravagance.
9
In short, banks did not create capital as
bank proponents claimed, rather they diverted it from virtuous agricultural pursuits
10
Ultimately
however, Jeerson joined Madison in choosing the unconstitutionality of the Bank as his point of at-
tack. Claiming unconstitutionality, Jeerson complained that to treat the establishment of the Bank
as an implied power with regard to the Necessary and Proper Clause was to take possession of a
boundless eld of power, no longer susceptible of any denition or restriction.
11
He would commit
to this argument throughout the National Bank Debate.
Hamiltons response to Jeerson and Madisons criticisms was as convincing as it was elo-
quent. He stressed the idea that granting implicit Congressional powers to create corporations, like
the Bank, would not lead to unlimited Federal powers as Jeerson and Madison feared. He oered
the example that Congress could not incorporate a Philadelphia police department because [it is]
not authorized to regulate the government of localities. However, since Congress is authorized to
regulate trade and collect taxes, it could employ all means which relate to its regulation to best and
greatest advantage. is was a clear distinction of constitutional powers for Hamilton, and incorpo-
rating a National Bank was entirely compatible with this view.
12
Furthermore, legislation based on implied powers was a constitutional norm at the time.
No state Constitution explicitly mentioned bank incorporation, and yet the states had managed to
erect banks without restriction. e national legislature itself had often acted without explicit consti-
tutional authority or ironclad necessity by creating light houses, buoys, beacons, public piers, and
the like. Why should the National Bank be treated any dierently when it came to constitutional
validation? After all, not only states but other nations as well exercised implied powers routinely for
their benecial gains. us, for Hamilton, the reality was that a National Bank would not lead to
unrestricted Federal powers. However, the striking down of the constitutionality of the bill would
indeed suppress the potential of the federal government, and it would also run counter to existing
practices.
13
President George Washington was initially hesitant to sign the Bank bill, and asked his
24
25
cabinet members to submit opinions on the matter. Jeerson wrote a solid opinion but was outdone
by Hamiltons swift 15,000-word response. Washington was convinced. He signed the bill into law
on April 25, 1791, much to the dismay and horror of Madison and Jeerson.
14

Historians and political scholars alike tend to take the same approach toward analyzing
Jeerson and Madisons opposition to the National Bank. is approach asserts that Jeerson and
Madisons strongest and most signicant genuine criticism of the Bank was that they viewed it as un-
constitutional. is idea demonstrates the common historical belief that Madison and Jeerson were
legal supporters of an enumerated powers approach to constitutional interpretation in the National
Bank Debate. Examples of this majority historical opinion can be found in the writings of Merrill
Peterson, Richard Brookhiser, James Roger Sharp, Richard Hofstadter, Gordon Wood, and many of
their esteemed colleagues. Generally, historians group Madison and Jeersons concerns with Ham-
iltons Bank under the umbrella of constitutional criticism. e following are examples of the way in
which scholars characterize Madison and Jeersons opposition:
It was precisely on this ground [constitutionality] that Madison fought the Bank Bill in Congress and that
Jeerson, upon its passage, sought its defeat at the hands of the President.
15
In his report, Madison let all the Republican Partys hobby horses out for a ride. Hamiltons Bank of the
United States and his Report on Manufactures were as unconstitutional as the Alien and Sedition Acts.
16

Jeerson, of course, never gave up his hostility to banks, and he saw in the Bank of the United States, which
he still believed to be unconstitutional, a rival political force of great potentiality.
17
Even when scholars grant the possibility that Madison and Jeerson had other worthy concerns with
the Bank, they typically do so under the assertion that these other concerns were not as signicant:
Both Virginians, although they primarily opposed the Bank on Constitutional grounds, were also
disturbed by what the establishment of the Bank seemed to represent
18

In fact, a quantitative investigation of how much time historians devote to these charac-
terizations paints a telling picture. I have recorded numerous historical accounts of Madison and
Jeersons opposition to the Bank, and it is clear that prominent scholars like Stalo, Brookhiser,
Peterson, and Wood devote much more time to constitutional criticisms made by Madison and Jef-
ferson rather than concerns of any other kind. To illustrate this, I aim to show the contrast between
how many paragraphs these authors allow for describing constitutional criticisms as opposed to other
qualms. If a paragraph includes both constitutional and non-constitutional reasons of opposition,
I did not count it barring one exception: if the author explicitly states that constitutional concerns
were primary. In these cases, I added the paragraph to the count of described constitutional opposi-
tion (i.e. Sharps e major objection he raised, however was a constitutional one p. 39). I did
not nd any examples of an author describing both constitutional and non-constitutional opposi-
tion with an explicit armation that the non-constitutional concern was primary. is quantitative
analysis shows that Stalo devotes 11 paragraphs to Madison and Jeersons constitutional arguments
and only 2 to other concerns. Brookhiser allows 4 paragraphs to the former and only 1 to the lat-
ter. Peterson writes 5 paragraphs about constitutional criticisms and only 2 about other claims, and
Woods score is 4-0 in favor of constitutional arguments as well. erefore, just among this sample of
four highly-esteemed scholars of American history, there are 24 paragraphs describing Madison and
Jeersons opposition to Hamiltons Bank as being primarily constitutional, while only 5 paragraphs
outline other concerns.
19
However, when taking a step back to look at the big analytical picture, this common be-
lief calls many ideas into question. e Constitution was an extremely young document in 1791,
and it would perhaps be hasty to simply assume that Madison, Jeerson (who was not even present
at the Constitutional Convention), and their colleagues were tremendously committed to all of its
various facets as a source of supreme national legal power. is is not to say that they would not be
entirely devoted to its major fundamental freedoms and rights. Yet a total devotion to or a particular
interpretation of something like the Necessary and Proper Clause would not necessarily be a forgone
conclusion, especially for someone like Jeerson who proposed that the Constitution be rewritten
every 20-30 years. If Madison and Jeerson thought the Bank to be corrupt and economically un-
sound, why would they choose to dwell so much on the fact that it was unconstitutional? Would it
not be smarter to point out its economic and philosophical deciencies, which many people would
arguably care more about than the idea that the Bank deed an enumerated powers interpretation of
a yet untested Constitution?
Of course, historians and scholars believe that Madison and Jeerson cared so much about
the Banks unconstitutionality because this is what Madison and Jeerson themselves reiterated so
often in speeches and writings. But any thorough historical analyst knows to look past the surface
of what these political leaders were saying and deep into what their true intentions were. e reality
is that in 1791, Madison and Jeerson had two available paths of opposition against the Bank: the
political-economic path and the legal path. ey chose the legal path, which is surprising given the
strength of the alternative and the potential controversiality of the topic of constitutional legality of
the Bank. Yet many scholars seem to ignore this curious choice and faithfully trust that strict con-
structionism was the core principle of Madison and Jeersons intentions.
A more thorough investigation of the National Bank Debate merits a reconsideration of
26
27
ries, as well as the sectional divides that existed in the United States at the time. In practical terms,
Madison and Jeerson did not just stand on the opposing side of Hamilton in relation to the Bank,
but also to his general economic and legal approaches to running the American republic. It may be
useful to distinguish between the two main areas of disagreement between these men. e rst is the
political-economic realm, where Jeerson and Madison fought tooth and nail for a virtuous America
and against what they viewed as Hamiltons industrial sinkholes of corruption and fraud. Meanwhile,
Hamilton had no qualms about discarding the classical republican concept of virtue in order to
strengthen the American economy in the best way he saw t: manufactures.
e second realm of conict between Hamilton and his two adversaries was the legal arena.
Here, Hamilton called for an implied powers interpretation of the Constitution while Madison and
Jeerson feared that this view would lead to the worst kinds of unlimited Federal power.
Why would Madison and Jeerson use the second realm of legal reasoning to attack Ham-
iltons Bank when the rst political-economic arena would be relevant in a society constantly torn
between the economic virtues of the past and modern commercialism? Were they sincere in making
this choice, or were their legal constitutional criticisms of the Bank a mask for their true political-
economic convictions?
Economic Context e Spectrum
During the National Bank Debate, the political model widely held to be most eective for
a nation of free men, rid of any tyrannical oppression, was republicanism. Many versions of republi-
canism entered political and economic discussion, and men of various beliefs proclaimed themselves
to be republicans. Yet republicanisms common denominator at all stages was the idea that freedom
ultimately meant the lack of arbitrary power. A commitment against arbitrary power was crucial and
could be eectively accomplished through virtuous practices aimed at achieving the public good.
20

is assertion also had implications in the economic realm as well as on the political-economic poli-
cies that Madison, Jeerson, and Hamilton individually supported.
In the ancient world, the word Free, in a republican sense, described a particular social
class men who were not slaves or serfs. e word also referred to the type of virtue and character
these men were supposed to reect. Ultimately, a Free Man was independent and self-sucient.
Ancient Greco-Roman society saw freedom as an extremely exclusive privilege. Subordinate classes of
men (serfs, slaves) supposedly lacked the ability to be virtuous. Moreover, they regularly performed
commercial and menial labor work that killed virtue and corrupted the individual. us, only men
who did not shoulder the burden of this corruptive labor or free men could truly possess the type
the modern historical analysis and, ultimately, a modication. In reality, constitutionality was nei-
ther Madison nor Jeersons greatest qualm about the Bank, nor was it as important to them as their
fears of the Banks corruptive and economically unsound consequences. In fact, they were not legally
committed to the Constitution in the context of the Bank debate nearly to the extent that historians
claim. is is not to say that they were not dedicated to fundamental constitutional principles and
freedoms. is thesis certainly does not make such a bold and exaggerated assertion. However, it
does assert that Madison and Jeerson were not sincere legal proponents of an enumerated powers
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause as it pertained to the Bank bill. In this context, an
enumerated powers approach was rather an instrumental means to an end, not Madison and Jeer-
sons fundamental goal. eir true goal was to build a political-economic framework for their respec-
tive, ideal American republics. Both Madison and Jeersons plans for the future absolutely required
an enumerated powers interpretation, or else this ideal republic would fall apart economically. ey
also needed to convince their audience, President Washington, of the Banks deciencies and probably
thought it more prudent to do so through legal arguments. Consequently, they needed Washington
to ensure that the enumerated powers view in constitutional interpretation emerged victorious in the
National Bank Debate and that a Hamiltonian implied powers view would die with the Bank bill.
erefore, I will argue that Madison and Jeersons claims of unconstitutionality against
the National Bank did not represent their true, signicant, ideological qualms with Hamiltons Bank
bill nor a deep legal commitment to an enumerated powers approach to the Necessary and Proper
Clause; instead they represented Madison and Jeersons knowledge of their audience and their per-
sonal desires to promote the enumerated powers approach as an instrumental policy in light of their
ultimate political and economic goals.
If Madison and Jeersons opposition to the Bank centered on a disingenuous claim for
unconstitutionality, the implications for todays constitutional discussion would be signicant. e
National Bank debate was one of the rst truly noteworthy disputes regarding the constitutionality of
a piece of legislation. As a momentous historical event, it inuenced the amount of weight that the
modern American government places on constitutionality. If Madison and Jeerson were insincere
in their calls for an enumerated powers interpretation, todays strong emphasis on the Constitution as
a legal pinnacle although justied may be based on a false understanding of history.
Context for the Debate and the Oppositions Arguments
In understanding the National Bank Debate and why certain aspects of it were surprising,
one must rst understand its context. is includes the prevalent economic and constitutional theo-
28
29
of virtue that classical republican ideals required.
21

As history wound its way into the eighteenth century, dierent interpretations of repub-
licanism had a massive eect on scholars and politicians perceptions of rapidly commercializing
society. inkers like Rousseau and Jeerson looked to ancient Roman history for guidance on how
to preserve republican liberty and avoid tyranny. Under the right set of conditions for political insti-
tutions, these men believed that the classical republican ideal of a virtuous citizenry working for the
public good was still very much possible even in a society bent on industrialization and manufactures.
Montesquieu, Smith, and Hamilton disagreed with this approach. ey thought that a reliance
on ancient history for lessons on republicanism was useless because modern commercial societies
confronted entirely dierent challenges than those of ancient Greece and Rome. It was in these new
challenges of the eighteenth century that Hamilton, for example, looked for commercial resources
that would enhance a republican character within the US by freeing it from a dependence on foreign
economic powers.
22

For the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to locate Madison, Jeerson, and Hamilton on
a political spectrum of republican thought. Jeerson was a man whom it is best to describe as a tra-
ditional republican one who valued agrarian virtue over commercial industrialization and desired
autonomy and freedom for agricultural producers from the Northern cities of the manufacturers.
ese cities Jeerson saw as corrupt and fraudulent, and their control over agrarian economic virtue
was exactly the type of arbitrary power he wished to avoid. In this sense, Jeerson subscribed to the
classical republicanism of ancient Greece and Rome described above. He also borrowed much of his
ideology from the doctrine of physiocracy, as described by Ronald Meek:
e Physiocrats main aim was to illuminate the operation of the basic causes which determined the general
level of economic activity. For this purpose, they believed that it was useful to conceive economic activity
as taking the form of a sort of circle, or circular ow as we would call it today Within this circle, the
Physiocrats then endeavoured to discover some key variable, movements in which could be regarded as the
basic factor causing an expansion or contraction in the dimensions of the circle, i.e. in the general level of
economic activity. e variable they hit upon was the capacity of agriculture to yield a net product.
23
Agriculture and agriculture alone yielded this net product, was morally and politically superior to
all other forms of economic output, and thus made land the most indispensable commodity in the
physiocratic system.
24
Hamilton stood on the other end of the republican spectrum. He was not concerned with
battling corruption to preserve virtue. To rescue the country from succumbing to arbitrary power in
the form of foreign market control, Hamilton aimed to strengthen the economy through manufac-
tures and an elaborate system of debt relief, which of course included the incorporation of a National
Bank. In many respects, Hamilton was an anomaly he had succeeded in discarding the traditional
republican heritage that had so heavily inuenced the Revolutionary mind.
25
If America could stand
its ground against foreign competitors in international trade as a result of its prosperous economy,
Hamilton did not so much care if this economy was built on a somewhat corrupt foundation. A
focus on agricultural virtue could be enough to sustain an American economy, but Hamilton wanted
economic glory and rm independence from foreign economic inuence, which required a more
industrialized approach. ese were republican goals in themselves, although they lay on a dierent
part of the republican political spectrum than Madison and Jeersons.
Madison fell somewhere in the middle of these two adversaries on the spectrum of re-
publican thought. He certainly embraced economic prosperity in the form of manufactures, but he
dreaded the destruction of agrarian principles. He also battled ambivalence toward the economic
theory that was rising in dominance in America: mercantilism. Although Madison claimed that he
wished to free America from the oppression of mercantilism, he nonetheless espoused a highly mer-
cantilist policy of commercial discrimination in foreign trade. As he tried to reconcile these opposing
motivations, other theorists, too, considered and rejected mercantilist principles.
Economic Context Discourse Leading up to 1791
In the late eighteenth century, mercantilism posed a heavy challenge to traditional agrarian
principles of republicanism. Philipp Wilhelm von Hornick comprehensively summarizes its nine
major tenets:
at every inch of a countrys soil be utilized for agriculture, mining or manufacturing.
at all raw materials found in a country be used in domestic manufacture, since nished goods have a
higher value than raw materials.
at a large, working population be encouraged.
at all export of gold and silver be prohibited and all domestic money be kept in circulation.
at all imports of foreign goods be discouraged as much as possible.
at where certain imports are indispensable they be obtained at rst hand, in exchange for other domestic
goods instead of gold and silver.
at as much as possible, imports be conned to raw materials that can be nished [in the home country].
at opportunities be constantly sought for selling a countrys surplus manufactures to foreigners, so far
as necessary, for gold and silver.
at no importation be allowed if such goods are suciently and suitably supplied at home.
26
To more and more Americans the traditional mercantilist assumption that manufactures were nec-
essary to maintain industry and full employment, heretofore considered relevant only to Europe,
30
31
seemed suddenly and ominously relevant [in America], explains Drew McCoy.
27
In fact, according
to William Appleman Williams, the central characteristic of American history from 1763 to 1828
was the development and maturation of American mercantilism.
28
It is easy to confuse Americas
rebellion against Britain as a rebellion against mercantilism as well, but this would be a mistake. In
truth, post-revolutionary American hopes for empire actually stemmed from mercantilist inclinations
acquired from and maintained after British colonial rule.
29

Mercantilism was a crucial tenet for people like Madison who worked within a nation-
alistic framework to build a balanced, dynamic, agricultural, and commercial economy based on
capitalism. Whether agrarian or urban, mercantilists were essentially nationalists who strove for self-
suciency through increased domestic production and a favorable balance of trade, says Williams.
Self-suciency was another political element that constituted an essential republican goal of freedom
from arbitrary power. Mercantilists concentrated on production along with the regulation of export
markets and sources of raw material. us, their focus shifted from consumption and economic
interdependence, to fears of decits as an indicator of economic crisis. is can be seen in Madisons
commercial discrimination policy that fervently aimed to restore a favorable balance of trade for the
US and to control foreign export markets by opening up more natural channels for American trade.
Export more and import less, mercantilists said, and it seemed as though America listened.
Yet many economists did not listen but rather rebelled against mercantilism and traditional
agrarian-focused republicanism both, and with a vengeance. Philosophers like Adam Smith and
David Hume asserted that the pursuit of individual private interest was the best and most ecient
method of enhancing the public good (instead of the republican pursuit of collective societal virtue).
Hume encouraged the pursuit of luxury, framing it as both an inevitable and rening human action,
rather than as a degrading behavior of selsh men. e desire for luxury was an industrial stimulus,
and it would be futile to try to stamp it out, while properly harnessed, it opposed indolence and
encouraged men to work harder.
30

Meanwhile Smiths challenges to mercantilism were also striking. He explained that the
main benet of foreign trade was not the importation of gold and silver, but the carrying out of
surplus produce for which there is no demand and bringing back something for which there is. He
continued to denounce the mercantilist claim that the importation of gold and silver was necessary
to maintain a strong America. Smith postulated that e nation which, from the annual produce of
its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, labour, and consumable stock,
has wherewithal to purchase those consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign wars
there, and can thus maintain its strength.
31

One of Smiths greatest contributions to economic thought was his emphasis on the Di-
vision of Labor principle: the more specialized the task of each individual laborer, the greater the
economic output. e establishment of this principle with respect to foreign markets directly contra-
dicted the essential mercantilist tenet of favoring exports. Calvin Johnson explains, once free trade
replaced mercantilism as an economic philosophy importing British woolens and other manu-
factured goods came to be seen as a wise decision to buy the highest quality goods at the best price
abroad, rather than wasting resources doing an inferior job more expensively at home.
32
ere existed also a split not simply between theoretical principles but also between geo-
graphical locations. e Northern and Southern sections of the United States were constantly at odds
with each other, and these arguments stemmed from both economic disagreements and a Southern
perception of commercial favoritism by the government toward the North . Jeerson was the voice of
the Southern struggle against a federal government lled with the likes of Hamilton who (in his view)
blatantly favored Northern manufacturers and nanciers over noble Southern agricultural producers
the virtuous yeomen. Factory-run cities and corruption threatened the Southern republican charac-
ter by forcing producers to become dependent on commerce and manufactures in order to participate
in a swiftly industrializing American economy. is dependence led to a loss of autonomy, and the
vicious cycle continued.
Moreover, the South resented the Northern condemnation of slavery. Republicanism and
true civic participation required that menial labor be left to the slaves so that the free Southerners
could perform their political duties unburdened. Here stood the Northerners, with Hamilton as
their face, championing commercial progress and an industrialized society that they wished to impose
on the South. Meanwhile, the Southerners, forced to accept dependence on the North, would even
further have to decrease agricultural productivity and self-suciency by giving up slavery. is was a
set of conditions that the South and Jeerson simply were not willing to accept.
33

e Political-Economic Discourse in 1791
As free trade principles began to overtake mercantilist leanings, and as both challenged the
predominant traditional agrarian republican theories of the past, the Founders tried to balance the
young economy between modernization and a deeply ingrained commitment to virtue.
By the 1791 National Bank Debate, proponents of traditional republicanism confronted
a dicult challenge in the face of new free trade and mercantilist interpretations of republicanism.
ey had to reconcile their support for a theory focused on the virtuous pursuit of the public good
with Smithian endorsements of self-interest economics. As already mentioned, classical republi-
32
33
canism, throughout all of its historical stages and alterations, espoused the freedom from arbitrary
power.
34
How could this republicanism survive in a world where Adam Smiths free market Invisible
Hand was the epitome of an unimpeded, arbitrary power? As Drew McCoy explains, American
revolutionaries enthusiastically embraced the republican spirit of classical antiquity that expressed
virtue in terms of a primitive economy, but they also seemed to realize that this spirit had to be ac-
commodated to their own dynamic world of commercial complexity.
35
In a way, omas Jeerson
became the face of this struggle. He found himself in a political arena that was hurtling through
commercialization while he remained committed to agrarian virtue and anticorruption.
Merrill Peterson explains that there were many aspects of the Hamiltonian policy prefer-
ences that troubled Jeerson, and most troubling at the time were economic factors surrounding the
National Bank. But besides the immoral, corrupting economic whirlwind that would surround the
creation of the Bank, what Jeerson protested against the most was the length of the Bank charter.
e enduring Bank charter would only exacerbate the sectional imbalances that would result from its
policies, and it would do so for a seemingly unending eleven years. For eleven years, this Bank would
serve as a helper to Northern merchant economies and as a detriment to Southern planters, farmers,
and men of agrarian virtue. Jeerson was truly alarmed by these politics of inequity. He had always
been plagued by the favoritism the national system aorded to Northern industry at the expense
of Southern agricultural producers. e Bank would become another tipping point in favor of the
North. When it came to the Bank, Jeerson could not approve of the measure in the abstract or in
the face of the Constitution; even more, he was convinced it was politically unsound, and he would
not take any responsibility for it.
36

What always made it extremely hard for Hamilton to convince Jeerson of the growing
benets for an industrialized America built on manufacturing was that in Hamiltons own words
Jeerson thought, as did many physiocrats of the time, that agriculture [was], not only, the most
productive, but the only productive species of industry.
37
Jeerson viewed land as the only valuable
economic resource, while commerce and manufactures just altered part of this value into other forms.
is transformation, however, added no value of its own. Industries, Jeerson viewed as sinkholes of
vice and corruption. In general, urban industrial development was a blight to be avoided, and if this
was not possible, at least postponed. Instead of setting urban industrial development as a national
objective, the country would fare better by focusing on westward expansion. In order to avoid cor-
ruptive industrial development, Jeerson rst had to defeat the National Bank bill, the most insidi-
ous engine of Hamiltons entire economic system that would surely lead America to its ruin.
38
Hamiltons policies, especially as seen in the Bank bill, completely negated the Jeersonian
vision. ey would enrich northern nanciers and speculators, and therefore the North instead of
the (as Jeerson saw it) virtuous agrarian South would gain disproportionate standing in the nation-
al government; Northern urban development would draw capital away from westward agricultural
expansion through the stimulation of manufactures. e moment when Jeerson realized the scope
of the threat that Hamiltons political economy posed, with the Bank serving as a microcosm of the
general anti-republican character of Hamiltons policies, was the moment when Jeerson abandoned
his usually timid political presence and fully entered the conict against the Bank.
39
Although Madison ultimately took Jeersons side in the National Bank debate, his politi-
cal-economic policy preferences were not as hostile to commercialization and industrialization as were
Jeersons. Yet Madison was in no way a proponent of the type of commercial society Hamilton had
in mind, and in some ways, he tended to revert to the republican virtue that Jeerson so passionately
espoused as well. Madison had a particularly interesting set of ambitions for the young republic,
preferring for America to develop across space rather than time. In other words, he believed the
American economy would prosper more quickly if American producers also occupied western territo-
ries. With more land to work with, the limitations of time would not be so great to a much expanded
American economic potential of output. Madison explained, if America could continue to resort to
virgin lands while opening adequate foreign markets for their produce, the US would remain a nation
of industrious farmers who marketed their surpluses abroad and purchased ner manufactures they
desired in return. Madison wholeheartedly supported this form of social development as did Adam
Smith because this was a policy that agreed with the natural law of the free market. e policy
represented noninterference with the market, and if America could benet economically without
interference, it was taking the right approach. ese Smithian economic principles were both ex-
tremely popular in post-Revolutionary America and compatible with the nations strain of republican
thought. As described by McCoy, Madisons commitment to westward expansion and free trade
put him in the mainstream of republican thought at the end of the war.
40
A key tenet of Madisonian policy was to free America of the chains of British mercantilism.
Yet his somewhat contradictory stance toward mercantilism reared its head when he pushed for a pol-
icy of commercial discrimination arguably a mercantilist policy in itself. In his eyes, British actions
conned American trade to articial channels and denied it full access to natural markets such as
the West Indies. According to Madison, British merchants and capital overwhelmed American trade
and, thus, restricted foreign markets to American exports. is worry would continue to plague him
for many years even beyond the Bank Debate. Now as the productions of the United States, from
their bulky character, employ at least ten times the tonnage which is required for the exports of Great
Britain it follows that an undue advantage accrues to the British navigation, he wrote to Rufus
King in the Department of State, [and] it is equally certain that the regulation actually adopted by
Great Britain must have the eect of monopolizing the transportation of the whole mass of our bulky
articles, whilst the most that can be hoped by the United States will be a monopoly for their vessels
of British articles not amounting to one tenth of that bulk.
41

Moreover, by diverting American trade into the aforementioned articial channels, Brit-
ish actions threatened the honorable, American, republican character. Without natural channels,
America could not function within a free market trade system because, within the articial channels,
producers could not nd enough demand for American products. e solution was a retaliatory and
discriminatory trade policy against Britain. Madison explained that this would greatly hamper Brit-
ish trade prowess since Britain depended so much on American trade itself.
42

In order to preserve a strong republican character, Madison called for a strong Federal
government (which is interesting, in light of his intense opposition to overly centralized Federal
power in the context of the National Bank Debate to be discussed later). is strong federal gov-
ernment would dismantle restrictive mercantilist systems that obstructed the marketing of Ameri-
can agricultural surpluses. e opening of more foreign markets through his policy of commercial
discrimination would further ensure that Americans would not be compelled to pursue occupations
that degraded their republican character out of economic necessity.
43
McCoy emphasizes the core of
the conict between Madison and Hamiltons political-economic mindsets: In one sense Madison
was still caught between the conicting claims of classical republicanism and modern commercial
society, struggling to dene and implement a variable synthesis that was relevant to the American
experience. Hamilton had stepped condently and unequivocally into modernity.
44
Yet this eager-
ness to enter modernity caused many of Hamiltons adversaries, including Madison, to see him as a
conspirator out to corrupt American society and destroy its republican character. Worse, Madison
thought Hamilton would initiate this destruction with his desire to imitate British forms, manners,
and institutions through American economic policies. Appalled republicans compared Hamilton to
Sir Robert Walpole, who, they argued, singlehandedly corrupted British society through regulariza-
tion and consolidation of the nancial system. Madison was outraged by what he envisioned to be
a corrupted legislature, under the control of the avaricious Hamilton, tied to an immoral economic
system and reckless speculation.
Madison also saw the scope of the political ramications that would result from Ham-
iltons specic economic aspirations. Instead of allowing manufactures to grow at their own pace,
34
Hamilton wished to subsidize, what Madison considered to be, articial monopolies that would de-
stroy private, natural producers and create destructive anti-republican inequalities in wealth. us,
privileged workers groups would be utterly reliant on the government for their livelihoods, and this
would enhance Hamiltons corrupt and malicious inuence over the nation. Ultimately, this chain of
events would serve as a threat to republican ideals and a democratic government, because as Madison
explained, stock-jobbers will become the pretorian band of the Government, at once its tool and its
tyrant; bribed by its largesses, and overawing it by clamours and combinations.
45
Hamilton, on the other hand, saw himself as the forward thinking savior of American po-
litical economy. He rapidly developed his economic initiatives for the nation and published them in
his First Report on Public Credit, Second Report on Public Credit (which contained the Bank proposal),
and the Report on Manufactures. e Report on Manufactures eloquently encompassed his major
political-economic goals through a rm defense of manufactures and a detailed prospectus for Ameri-
can industry. It also conrmed the sheer incompatibility of Hamiltonian and Madisonian political-
economic principles.
46
Finally, it demonstrated Hamiltons unwillingness to completely adhere to
Smithian free trade theory.
Hamilton opposed both Madison and Smiths visions for American trade in a free trade
international order. Yes, free trade allowed the United States to import whatever it found necessary,
but the problem lay in demand for American exports. e republic was young and could not ensure
satisfactory demand for its agricultural surpluses. e severely limited nature of American access
to foreign markets, caused by restrictions of the hated European mercantilism, would continue to
exacerbate this problem. Instead of Madisons calls for commercial discrimination against the British
(who Hamilton did not believe were as dependent on American trade as did Madison), Hamilton
proposed a domestic solution. To oset agricultural surpluses, he encouraged domestic manufacture
production. Government assistance would help develop native manufactures and would result in a
more reliable market at home. e economy would become faster stronger, more balanced, [and]
sectionally interdependent. Gradually, American power would become so enhanced that perhaps
someday a Madisonian policy of commercial reciprocity and discrimination would become feasible.
At the moment, however, Hamilton believed Madisonian commercial discrimination would only lead
to a disastrous commercial war with Britain.
47

Hamilton, like Smith, promoted a complex society with an intense division of labor and
ecient public manufacturing, along with diverse productivity and a civilized and rened citizenry.
He agreed with Smith that the division of labor was the essential element of a progressive society.
35
36
37
However, he did not care much for Smiths worries about its dehumanizing aspects. Adam Smith had
published various works about the degrading eects that immensely specialized labor can have on an
individual who performs the same tasks for hours a day:
e man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations generally becomes as stupid
and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. e torpor of his mind renders him, not only
incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble,
or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary
duties of private life.
48
Hamilton did not hold this concern. In his Report on Manufactures, Hamilton spoke much of
augmenting the productive powers of labor through its division, and not once mentioned any dehu-
manizing aspects.
49
In fact, he had little patience for men who shied away from complex, progressive,
economic societies because of a fear of the destruction of the republican character.
is lack of concern with virtue stemmed from his younger, developmental years when
Hamilton became quite receptive to the writings of David Hume both about political economy and
constitutional thought. Based on Humes inuence, Hamilton accepted commercial society as in-
evitable and salutary. Inevitable also was the human disposition away from classical conceptions of
virtue and toward luxury. us, Hamilton ultimately came to the conclusion that classical republican
virtue was hopelessly irrelevant to the American experience. erefore, he subscribed not to the
same republican theories that gloried agrarian virtue as did Jeerson and Madison, but to the writ-
ings of Robert Morris, a nancier and signer of the Declaration of Independence, who had created
a formula that integrated constitutional change with the funding of the Revolutionary debt and a
vigorous program of economic expansion tied to the consolidation and mobilization of mercantile
capital.
50

More importantly, Hamilton did not share Madison and Jeersons sheer contempt for
Great Britain and its economic policies. In fact, Hamilton wished for America to become much
like the British state a powerful economically advanced modern nation. He did not promote a
virtuous agrarian republic in the least. His American republic could stand squarely on the worldly
foundations of corruption, as did Great Britain. erefore, the reality was that Hamiltons political-
economic objectives were not plagued with traditional republican fears that shaped Madison and Jef-
fersons thinking. Hamilton acknowledged and accepted social inequality, propertyless dependence,
and the unimpeded avarice that would emerge in and were necessary for a powerful and prosperous
society.
51

Legal Context- Leading Up to 1791
e National Bank Debate also took place in the midst of a legal arena that pitted two dif-
fering constitutional interpretations against each other. Such were the arguments for an enumerated
powers interpretation versus an implied powers view. e enumerated powers were located in Article
1, Section 8, and explicitly outlined all of the powers the Constitution granted to Congress. How-
ever throughout history, and especially as a result of Federal court decisions, these powers have been
broadened to expand Congressional authority. is broadening has been based on what powers many
judges and scholars believe the Founders had implied to grant to Congress, regardless of whether these
were explicitly enumerated. Enumerated powers proponents, as Madison and Jeerson presented
themselves to be in the Bank Debate, promoted the idea that Congress only had those powers that
were listed in Article 1, Section 8 no more, no less. ose like Hamilton who favored an implied
powers interpretation asserted that the Constitution also implicitly allowed other Congressional pow-
ers, for example, the power of incorporating a Bank without an expressly written power to do so.
e two-sided argument also centered on the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Consti-
tution (e Congress shall have Power - To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Ocer thereof ). Some theorists ex-
plained that a correct interpretation of the clause granted Congress the power to make laws only if the
lack of said laws would deprive it of the ability to carry out its enumerated powers. eir opponents
however claimed that the Necessary and Proper Clause eectively expanded Congressional authority
to include powers tangentially related to the enumerated powers. e distinct interpretations would
clash heatedly in the National Bank Debate.
52

Legal Context in 1791 - Argument Against the Bank
While Hamiltons preferences lay with an implied powers interpretation of the Constitu-
tion one in which implicit justication for unwritten Congressional powers was quite enough
Madison and Jeerson insisted on the enumerated powers approach. ey argued against Hamilton
that to treat the power to establish a bank as an implied power resulting from the constitutional power
to borrow (Necessary and Proper Clause) was to take possession of a boundless eld of power, no
longer susceptible to any denition or restriction.
53
Madisons concerns lay with Hamiltons interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause
38
partly because Hamiltons emphasis of abundant monetary supply as the best means for augmenting
American manufactures gave Congress an almost unlimited power to interpret that clause. In Ham-
iltons own words, it is of necessity left to the discretion of the National legislation to pronounce
upon the objects, which concern the general welfare, and for which under that description, an appro-
priation of money is requisite and proper. is Madison described as entirely incompatible with any
sense of a limited republican government, corrupt, avaricious, and subversive of the public good. He
wrote to Henry Lee of the dangers of such unrestricted power: e federal Govt has been hitherto
limited to the specied powers, by the Greatest Champions for Latitude in expounding those pow-
ersIf not only the means, but the objects are unlimited, the parchment had better be thrown into
the re at once.
54

On the other side of the legal arena, Hamilton viewed the necessity for an implied pow-
ers approach as part of a political responsibility that he prioritized in every way. is responsibility
demanded the belief that, in the context of constitutional powers, ought implied could. If a govern-
ment [was] to be charged with certain tasks and duties, it must be armed with the requisite authority
and resources to discharge those duties. Hamilton was in the business of matching means to ends
and not the other way around. In his own words, every power ought to be commensurate with its
object there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to eect a purpose.
55
Hamilton may have even given credence to Madison and Jeersons concerns about tyran-
nical centralized government. Perhaps he was in no position to rmly disprove the idea that under a
rare and dangerous set of conditions, a tyrant could emerge in America as a consequence of an overly
centralized federal power. But this was unlikely, and while Madison and Jeerson feared hypothetical
dangers, the pragmatic Hamilton worked to improve real and present economic ineciencies: the
practice of mankind ought to have great weight against the theories of individuals. Specically, the
practice of national banks was already a widely accepted engine in the administration of national
nances. ey were also the most eective method of providing loans without interfering with the
states or the people. at is, states could still erect as many banks as they wanted, and any individual
could still participate in banking to any degree that he desired. Whether the fact that a practice was
widely held compensated for it potentially clashing with the Constitution did not worry Hamilton.
His rule was simple: If the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specied powers of the
Constitution in this case, the collection of taxes, regulation of trade, and procurement of credit it
may safely be deemed to come within the compass of national authority.
56

39
e Real National Bank Debate
e reality is that when Madison and Jeerson embarked on the legal constitutional path
to ghting Hamiltons Bank, they also embarked on a path of insincerity and political maneuver-
ing. Evidence indicates that their true objectives in opposing the Bank lay squarely in the political-
economic realm, but their audience lay with President Washington, a man who genuinely cared about
the legal signicance of the Constitution. Madison and Jeerson could put their true concerns with
the Bank on proud display, but the risk of losing the debate was too great if Washington was the
judge. Ironically, they faltered regardless, and their legal ploy to accuse the Bank of being unconsti-
tutional was ineective anyway. Perhaps they would have been better o with the political economy
argument.
Correspondence
Both Madison and Jeersons correspondence with various politicians and with each other
after the passage of the Bank bill is curious in light of their public insistence on its unconstitutional-
ity. After a full year of rousing Congressional speeches and writings about the rampant disregard
for the Constitution by Hamilton and his Bank bill, Madison was mostly quiet on anything but the
Banks economic aws once it had passed. In the immediate decade after the Banks passage, Madison
emphasized the Banks unconstitutionality very infrequently in his signicant reports. Once was in a
February 1791 letter to Edmund Pendleton which simply and quickly summarized the Bills presence
in the hands of Washington and the points Madison made against it in his early February speeches
to Congress. Another instance occurred in the 1799-1800 Report on the Resolutions, in which
Madison amended and assuaged criticisms of the 1798 Virginia Resolutions. Madison raised a point,
made by the Virginia General Assembly, which outlined how the government had forced certain
Constitutional constructions on the American people in order to enlarge its own Federal powers. He
mainly focused on the Alien and Sedition acts but mentioned the Bank as well: Omitting others
which have less occupied public attention, or been less extensively regarded as unconstitutional, the
resolution [made by the General Assembly may] be presumed to refer particularly to the Bank law.
57

us, Madison was convinced that the General Assembly referred to the Bank bill when discuss-
ing constitutional overstepping by the government in the past. What is interesting here is that this
report focused mostly on the Alien and Sedition Acts, was written almost a decade after the Bank
bills passage, and is still one of the only signicant mentions that Madison made about the Banks
unconstitutionality after its passage. e aforementioned references to the Bank by Madison are the
40
only ones that allude to its unconstitutionality out of the total of seventeen Bank references he made
in the decade after it passed in his reports and correspondence. is analysis is based on the compila-
tion of Madisons writings, compiled by Gaillard Hunt in the early 1900s an extensive nine-volume
collection of Madisons writings.
58
Madisons typical correspondence about the Bank in the years after its passage instead
focused on its economic inadequacies, especially in writing to omas Jeerson. In 1793, Madison
wrote to Jeerson about monied interests surrounding the Bank:
It is said, that Marshal who is at the head of the great purchase from Fairfax, has lately obtained pecuniary
aids from the Bank or people connected with it. I think it certain that he must have felt, in the moment of
purchase an absolute dependence on the monied interest, which will explain him to everyone that reects, in
the active character he is assuming.
59
In an earlier letter, dated July 10, 1791, Madison complained of rising Bank shares that benetted
subscribers and nanciers instead of the virtuous republican producers:
e Bank shares have risen as much in the Market here as at Philadelphia. It seems admitted on all hands
now that the plan of the institution gives a moral certainty of gain to the subscribers with scarce a physical
possibility of loss.
60
At times Madison broadened his criticisms by going further than simply criticizing the Banks eco-
nomic consequences and related these consequences to societal corruption that so weighed on his
mind during the Bank debate. ree days after the previous letter, Madison again wrote to Jeerson
and explained the situation in Boston:
We understand here that 800 shares in the Bank, committed by this city to Mr. Constable, have been ex-
cluded by the manner in which the business was conducted, that a considerable number from Boston met with
the same fate, and that Baltimore has been kept out It is all charged on the maneuvres of Philada. which is
said to have secured a majority of the whole to herself. e disappointed individuals are clamorous of course,
and the language of the place marks a general indignation on the subject. If it should turn out that the cards
were packed for the purpose of securing the game to Philada or even that more than half the Institution and of
course the whole direction of it, have fallen into the hands of that City, some who have been loudest in their
plaudits whilst they expected to share in the plunder, will be equally so in sounding the injustice of
monopoly,
and the danger of undue inuence on the Government.
61
Other excerpts from Madisons correspondence to Jeerson include an August 1791 letter
describing the Bank as a certain and gratuitous augmentation of the capitals subscribed,
62
and an
August 1793 letter discussing the scal system, particularly the Bank.
63
Clearly, the majority of
Madisons correspondence about the Bank centered around its economic aspects, which seems rather
41
odd after his boisterous condemnations of it in the constitutional arena right before the Banks pas-
sage. Furthermore, the only three times that Madison touched on the Banks unconstitutionality, as
outlined in the Hunt compilation, were when he wrote to someone other than Jeerson. In all of his
correspondence with Jeerson about the Bank, Madison only mentioned economic factors. It seems
strange that Madison would avoid discussing constitutional factors with the man that was his most
important teammate in the ght to prove the Bank unconstitutional, unless constitutionality was not
the true concern they shared in their opposition.
To be sure, there was no ocial mode of redress at this time for overturning executively ap-
proved laws that some deemed unconstitutional. It may be true that Madison felt it useless to discuss
the constitutional question involving the Bank because he did not know how to challenge Washing-
tons opinion. Yet by including economic factors in his correspondence about the Bank, Madison
demonstrated that he was not above complaining about aspects of a law that had already passed. If
he did not see it as useless to express his economic concerns with the Bank, why would he deem it to
be useless to express constitutional concerns?
Fueling the re of suspicion are Jeersons correspondences, which made zero references
to the Banks unconstitutionality in the years following its passage, based on an extensive 12-volume
compilation of these correspondences by Paul Leicester Ford.
64
e only time Jeerson even came
close to discussing government corruption in the legal realm in such a way as might have encom-
passed the Bank issue appeared in a February 1791 letter to George Mason, just prior to the Banks
passage. Perhaps referring to Hamilton, Jeerson said,
It cannot be denied that we have among us a sect who [wish] to contain whatever is perfect in human insti-
tutions. I still rely that the great mass of our community is untainted with these heresies, as is its head.
Further in the letter, Jeerson bemoaned the eects of this corrupting sect and foresaw the conse-
quences of its actions, which included a rather bleak and resigned prediction for the Bank:
What is said in our country of the scal arrangements now going and I really fear their eect when I consider
the present temper of the Southern states. Whether these measures be right or wrong abstractedly, more at-
tention should be paid to the general opinion. However all will pass the excise will pass the Bank will
pass. e only corrective of what is corrupt in our present form of government will be the augmentation of
the numbers in the lower house, so as to get a more agricultural representation, which may put that interest
above that of the stock-jobbers.
65
Here, Jeerson made two rather striking assertions. First, he stumbled in declaring these measures
(the Bank among others) to be wrong in the abstract, and decided to leave it up to public opinion,
42
43 42
which the government should listen to more. Here is a man who has been shouting about the Banks
unconstitutionality, along with Madison, in the fervent months leading up to the signing of the Bank
bill, and now he claims to be unsure of its abstract legitimacy.
Secondly, Jeerson appeared much more focused not on the Bankss unconstitutionality
and how the passage of an unconstitutional bill would corrupt government, but rather on govern-
ment corruption resulting from a disproportionate North-South economic and representational di-
vide. e Bank was a mere symptom of the favoritism that Northerners enjoyed over Southerners;
it further enriched Northern nanciers at the expense of Southern agricultural producers. To call
it economically unsound would be to call the entire national system economically unsound, which
Jeerson would not shy away from doing. However, this would not go over very well with the North-
erners who benetted from such a system. Although Jeerson may not have held these Northerners
in high esteem, he must have known that Northern opposition to the Bank, in addition to already
established Southern criticisms of the bill, would build a more convincing argument against the Bank
in Washingtons eyes. us, alienating the Northern states by only presenting criticisms about how
the Bank disparaged the Souths economy would not be the best strategy for Jeerson in this sense.
But to take the strategy of calling the Bank unconstitutional was to call it so on a federal level, with-
out state boundaries. Even Northerners could have been expected to look down upon an attack on
the Constitution or to fear an overreaching federal government. us, it is reasonable to infer how
Jeerson may have used the claim of the Banks unconstitutionality as an instrumental means that
would both prevent its passage and eliminate an obstacle to the Souths economy, and it would do so
by drawing in Northern criticisms of the Bank as well.
In a sense, Jeerson very subtly gave himself away in this letter to Mason. On the surface,
his concerns with how the Bank would contribute to North-South inequalities might have seemed
to be secondary concerns, especially when placed in the context of government corruption, which he
outwardly claimed would result particularly from the passage of an unconstitutional bill. Yet this is
an inverted perception of the meaning of Jeersons words. e North-South economic disparities
were Jeersons primary concern (as will be shown below), and the Banks unconstitutionality was
only secondary useful as a criticism in as much as it would relieve economic government favoritism
toward the North at the expense of the South.
Continuing through Jeersons 1791 correspondence, it becomes obvious that his letters to
Madison were just as concerned with economic issues as Madisons were to him. Nowhere in these
letters was the question of constitutionality brought to the forefront of discussion. In July, Jeerson
43
wrote, I inclose you a paper estimating the shares of the Bank, and explained that many persons
[have been] left in the lurch.
66
Later the same month he told Madison of Bank subscriptions from
Virginia, and how the Bank had lled and overowed.
67
In fact, unlike Madison who seemed to
voice economic disapproval of the Bank only in his correspondence with Jeerson, Jeerson shared
economic concerns with other people as well a few months after the bills passage. To James Monroe
he wrote in April,
Now schemes are on foot for bringing more paper to market by encouraging great manufacturing companies
to form, and their actions, or paper-shares, to be transferrable as bank-stock. We are ruined, Sir, if we do not
over rule the principles that the more we owe, the more prosperous we shall be.
68
To Edmund Pendleton, Jeerson wrote in July about a delirium of speculation.
69
He evidently
had mostly economic concerns on his mind regarding the Bank, with literally no mention of its
unconstitutionality.
Of course, none of this is surprising given that Madison and Jeerson always had truly seri-
ous economic concerns with the Bank bill, and they had always voiced these concerns. e peculiar-
ity of the situation involving their correspondence is that they voiced constitutional concerns more
loudly in the criticisms of the Bank that they presented to Washington, for example when he asked for
his cabinet to write opinions on the subject. Suddenly, as soon as the Bill passed, these legal concerns
fell by the wayside, or at least they seemed to judging by the correspondence record. e implication
is that the Banks unconstitutionality was only a legal tool in preventing its passage, and not Madison
and Jeersons major concern with the bill. is concern was economic.
February 8
th
Speech to Congress
Madisons speeches to Congress leading up to the Banks passing oer more evidence of
the fact that his primary concern with the Bank was economic and not constitutional. At rst this
statement appears counterintuitive. After all, he made two speeches to Congress regarding the Na-
tional Bank on February 2
nd
and February 8
th
, and they both heavily focused on the Banks unconsti-
tutionality. e beginning of the Feb. 2
nd
Speech revolved around the economic deciencies of the
Bank bill. is is not surprising even if one is to believe that economic concerns were secondary in
Madisons opposition since he was always vocal about having these concerns in the background of the
constitutional debate. en, most of the Feb. 2
nd
Speech turned to proving that the bill was indeed
unconstitutional, based on the fact that the Constitution did not grant Congress any express power
to incorporate a Bank.
70

44
45 44
e Speech on Feb. 8
th
started in much the same way as the one on Feb. 2
nd
nished, and
Madison once more outlined the unconstitutionality of the Bank bill. Toward the end of the Feb.
8
th
Speech however, Madisons words took an unexpected turn. He turned once more to economic
problems with the Bank. us, Madison began and ended his vocal opposition to the Bank in front
of Congress with economic criticisms. e impression he started with was economic, and the Con-
gressmen would leave the assembly having last heard more economic considerations. Constitutional
arguments, though taking up far more time than economic, were sandwiched between economic
arguments. is was curious to say the least. Why would Madison not prefer that Congress leave
the speech with constitutional concerns freshly in their minds instead of critical economic snippets
thrown into the Speech at the end?
71
However, to say the structure of the Speeches gives weight to the idea that Madisons pri-
mary concerns were economic would be a matter of opinion, however valid. It was an actual passage
he uttered to conclude the Feb. 8
th
Speech, which draws the most suspicion about his emphasis of
constitutional issues. After spending almost 5,000 words documenting the constitutional abuses
perpetrated by the Bank Bill, Madison said the following:
ere are other defects in the bill, which render it proper and necessary, in my opinion, that it should un-
dergo a revision and amendment before it passes into law. e power vested by the bill in the Executive to
borrow of the Bank, he (Madison) thought was objectionable, and the right to establish subordinate banks
ought not be delegated to any set of men under Heaven.
72

is quoted passage is absolutely astounding in light of what came before it in the Speech. If the Bill
was as incontestably unconstitutional as Madison just nished explaining, how in the world could he
imply that a revision or amendment to a few seemingly economic defects would make it passable
into law? It seems as though this quoted set of lines was taken from a completely dierent speech
on a completely dierent subject and glued into the Feb. 8
th
Speech, but indeed it was not. Even
more shocking was that Madison would commit such a mistake for it seems to be a grave error in
judgment to abandon a total opposition to the Bank and turn to compliance with the bill on the
condition that the bills granted executive power to borrow money be removed. e only explanation
for this utterance might just be that Madison could not hold his tongue and leave the oor without
stressing his genuine economic qualms. Maybe he did not feel it as necessary to focus as much on
constitutionality while addressing Congress as he would in addressing Washington, his main audi-
ence. Regardless, the conclusion to the Feb. 8
th
Speech was telling in regards to Madisons opposition.
45
Federalist 44
A glaring indication that Madison demonstrated inconsistencies in his opposition of the
Bank also lies in Federalist 44. During the Bank debate, Madisons arguments certainly made it seem
as if his constitutional criticisms were fundamental legal principles that he held in his heart. However,
as it turns out, these principles were more recent than they were fundamental.
A major justication that Hamilton employed to legitimize the Banks legality was Federal-
ist 44. e paper was very much legal in scope, and its principal part outlined the meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Federalist 44 described the clause as granting the power to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all
other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States or in any department
or ocer thereof. Federalist 44 further absolutely legitimized the clause: Few parts of the Constitu-
tion have been assailed with more intemperance than this; yet on a fair investigation of it, as has been
shown, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. e paper continued, Without the sub-
stance of this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter. ose who object to the article,
therefore, as a part of the Constitution, can only mean that the form of the provision is improper.
us, Federalist 44 explained exactly what the Necessary and Proper Clause entailed and
why it was a legitimate and necessary section of the Constitution. What is most important with re-
spect to the National Bank Debate is how Federalist 44 applied the clause to the actual realities of the
US government. It read, No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wher-
ever the end is required, the means are authorized; whenever a general power to do a thing is given,
every particular power necessary for doing it, is included.
73
It is clear now why Hamilton would use
this assertion as justication for his Bank. If Congress possessed the enumerated power of borrowing
money, and borrowing money was in this case a required end, the means of incorporating a Bank were
authorized, regardless of whether other means to borrow were available. is approval for an implied
powers constitutional outlook certainly pitted the author of Federalist 44 against the enumerated
powers proponents in the two-sided divide over constitutional interpretation. e surprise is that the
author of Federalist 44 was James Madison.
In fact, many did not even know of Madisons authorship during the Bank debate. Rep-
resentative Elias Boudinot quoted Federalist 44 during a Congressional meeting, assuming it was
written by Hamilton himself. How disconcerting it must have been for Madison to hear his own
eloquent words used to justify the Bank that he now so fervently opposed without the need to twist
these words or take them out of context in the least. It seemed almost as though he had written them
46
to apply to situations like the Bank debate in the rst place.
Of course, Madison attempted to defend himself by explaining that Hamilton had
stretched his reasoning and exaggerated his intentions. Madison claimed that he never meant for
Federalist 44 to apply to an endless chain of implied powers that justied any means to achieve a
required end.
74
But in hindsight, this rings like a hollow qualication, raised when it was convenient
for Madison to twist his own words in opposing the Bank bill. Federalist 44 was written with a rm
and assertive tone, and it meticulously navigated through a set of four dierent scenarios to explain
why the Necessary and Proper Clause was worded in the way that it was. ese scenarios showed how
any other method of including the Clause would have been insucient. 1. Prohibiting the exercise
of any Congressional power expressly delegated to it would have been too restrictive. 2. Positive enu-
meration would have been too exhausting as would 3. negative enumeration. 4. Lastly, silence on the
subject of necessary and proper powers on the part of the framers would have given too much author-
ity to the government.
75
Madison thoroughly explained these minute details, and it seems unlikely
that he would not have included the qualications that he later claimed to have intended during the
Bank Debate.
us it seems that Madisons fundamental legal ideas were quite consistent with the incor-
poration of the National Bank, even though he claimed they were not. He must have had other, more
genuine reasons to oppose it.

Scholars Hints
Although most scholarship on the National Bank Debate centers around the claim that
Madison and Jeerson were most concerned with constitutionality, some authors have dropped vari-
ous hints whether conscious or not about the true underlying causes of Madison and Jeersons
opposition. Drew McCoy is one such author. When he describes Madisons perception of a Ham-
iltonian constitutional system of interpretation, he does not represent this system as necessarily in-
compatible with American principles but rather as totally incompatible with Madisonian principles.
rough this characterization of Madisons support for a strong enumerated powers approach, Mc-
Coy places such an approach into a chain of ideas that make up the Madisonian vision. e enu-
merated powers view becomes instrumental a means to Madisons ends rather than his actual ends.
Without it, Madisons vision cannot exist because this vision depends on anticorruption.
Specically McCoy describes Madisons perception of Hamiltons constitutional doctrine
as one that sees the doctrine to be utterly incompatible with limited republican government [a]
47
corrupt, avaricious subversion of the public good. By promoting the Hamiltonian doctrine, a mi-
nority faction in control of the new federal government had arrogated to itself unlimited discretion
in determining the scope of its operations. us the issue of the Bank was only one part of a tre-
mendous Madisonian fear of a corrupt government and an avaricious minority that would grow into
a tyrannical majority. An implied powers doctrine of interpretation would be a major obstacle to the
Madisonian vision for the future for the young republic. erefore, any constitutional opposition
that Madison had to the Bank could be seen as the utilization of the Constitution as an instrumental
means to achieving his overall political ends these ends centering around anticorruption and a lim-
ited government.
At the same time, it is undeniable that even a genuine constitutional concern with the Bank
could also be based on fears of a corrupt central government. After all, it is not enough to say that
Madison encouraged an enumerated powers interpretation to avoid unlimited government power.
is would not make his calls for the Banks unconstitutionality disingenuous even if the Constitu-
tion was only a means to an end for him (an end of limited government). is situation would
prove a legitimate legal concern for Madison. However, what makes Madisons constitutional claims
insincere is that, in this particular context, his primary fears of unlimited government were economic
fears. He was not as worried about federal tyranny as about economic corruption with respect to the
Bank. is is indicated by his writings in Federalist 44. Hamilton found legal justication for the
Bank in Madisons own words in Federalist 44 (whenever the end is required, the means are autho-
rized). If Madison feared that such a corporation would lead to government tyranny, he would not
have provided a legal foundation for such a corporation. Yet when he saw how one such corporation
in particular, the Bank, could pose economic threats to his vision for the country, he suddenly voiced
a strong opposition. e disingenuousness of this opposition lay in Madisons presentation of his
argument. He hid his economic concerns under the guise of a legal argument. He claimed a fear of
unlimited government power when he specically meant economic corruption. When writing Fed-
eralist 44, perhaps he had not imagined how a corporation legally justied by this document could
create economic conditions unfavorable to him. us, he wrote it under a strictly legal mindset since
Federalist 44 was a document about legal issues. Hence, legally he was ne with the Bank, but as he
would discover later, he had economic qualms.
What were these qualms? An implied powers reading of the Bank bill would legalize and
contribute to a corporation in many ways a monopoly that instead of letting manufactures
grow at their own pace, [would] ruin private natural producers and foster dangerous, unrepublican
48
disparities in wealth. Privileged groups would then become totally dependent on the government
for sustenance, and this would increase Hamiltons corrupt inuence while threatening the American
republican government and social structure.
76
Here it is clear that the operations discussed above
that Madison feared the government would determine for itself were economic operations. e cor-
ruption he feared was Hamiltons economic corruption on a government that would become limitless.
erefore, according to this interpretation of McCoy, even if one is to give some credibility to Madi-
sons complaints of the Banks unconstitutionality, these legal constitutional concerns appear as part
of a broader Madisonian political-economic framework that is incompatible with wealth inequalities
and unrepublican ideals. Once more, his primary opposition to the Bank can ultimately be placed in
the political-economic realm.
Brookhiser further echoes McCoy with his analysis of the Madisonian fears that hinged on
the Bank bill. If the government legalized the Bank, federalisms slipshod lawmaking would pave
the way to monarchy. e President might even regulate his successors in oce as he pleased.
77

To some, it may seem here that Madison was making robust exaggerations, but to him, a National
Bank in the Hamiltonian form would bring about such horrors by further solidifying the corrupt,
conspiratorial Hamilton as someone Washington trusted with lawmaking, and an implied powers ap-
proach was the stepping-stone for the entire system of corruption to come into eect. But, again, this
stepping-stone was much smaller in scope than the political-economic system that it would support.
e political-economic system is what would then destroy Madisons ambitions directly. Constitu-
tionalisms eect on Madisons hopes was more indirect in this sense or more secondary.
e same could be said for Jeerson in the sense that any true constitutional concerns he
had with the Bank bill were based on an instrumental utilization of the Constitution to achieve his
ultimate political-economic vision. As Stalo explains this time, In Jeersons new Romantic poli-
tics, principles were not means to ends they were ends in themselves.
78
ese ends were republican
virtue, North-South equality, and anticorruption. Instead, the enumerated powers approach was the
means. In fact, just as Brookhiser did with Madison, Stalo presents a chain of Jeersonian ideas with
an enumerated powers approach as a link in this chain, but not the end goal of it. Jeerson desired
participatory democracy, which Stalo explains to require strict bounds of the power of the central
government. An enumerated powers approach would keep federal power in check and keep the chain
together.
79
But participatory democracy is the end here, not the enumerated powers interpretation
itself.
Finally, Merrill Peterson makes a remarkable hint at Jeersons disingenuous in making
49
constitutional claims about the Bank bill. He writes, Jeerson would almost certainly not have
enunciated such a niggardly view of federal powers had he approved of the Bank as a nancial insti-
tution.
80
Peterson also claims that most alarming for Jeerson was the Banks charter, not its lack
of constitutional legitimacy. us, it is clear that although most scholarship on the National Bank
Debate claims Madison and Jeersons assertions of unconstitutionality to be sincere, some scholars
have stepped outside this analytical box in the past century.
Jeerson and the North-South Divide
It is likely that, in broad terms, Jeersons greatest concern with the Bank was a North-
South ideological and economic divide, as he specied in the correspondence with Mason. is tre-
mendous split between ideologies was in full view during the time of the Bank Debate, and Jeerson
was the leading voice of the Southern Republicans against Northern commercialism. Southerners
rallied around Jeersons economic perspective that the world of the early Republic ought to belong
to people who lived by manual labor and not by their wits (or apparently people who lived by the
manual labor of others, whom they owned as slaves). He asserted that cities were dangerous because
in them, men sought to live by their heads rather than their hands.
81

James Rogers Sharp presents a fantastic description of the tensions that thus arose between
the North and the South Jeersonian Republicans. e overwhelmingly rural and isolated Southern
society, with its plantation economy based on slave labor and its local elite-controlled institutions,
contrasted sharply with New England. erefore, the South did not like the puritan North dictating
what was an acceptable method of economic gain, particularly when the question turned to slavery.
After all, slavery and republicanism were tightly connected in the South. Slavery could elevate
white citizens of the republic to a level where they would be able to be autonomous, independent,
and virtuous, qualities that were essential to preserving the republic. In this sense, the Federalist-
Republican divide that would continue to grow out of this North-South tension into a widely per-
ceived dierence in party ideology (after about the year 1792) was not so much party ideology at all,
but rather a manifestation of sectional strife. Jeerson himself characterized the Souths Republican
interest as primarily sectionally grounded.
82
How did this sectional strife apply to the Bank bill? e corrupt commercialization of
the Bank would destroy the very core of a Southern agrarian republic. Although Jeerson espoused
the virtue of the virtually incorruptible yeomen of the South, he nonetheless feared a National Bank
because it could lead to dependence, - a signicant republican concern. According to Jeerson, de-
50
pendence begets subservience and venality, suocates the germ of virtue, and prepares t tools for the
designs of ambition. Moreover, the debt created by the Bank would compromise personal autonomy
and independence. Meanwhile, the South absolutely had to remain autonomous and independent
to maintain its way of republican life. If a National Bank imposed government dependence on the
Southern part of the Union, Jeerson feared commercialism would sweep away the agrarian Southern
character and leave only corruption and vice.
Consequently, he saw the Bank as sectionally biased. e context surrounding the Bank
was one that indicated that the Federal government had become a sort of court of last resort which
had the nal voice on such legislative issues, including ones that could hamper the economic pro-
ductivity of the South. In this sense, the new political system silenced local voices. A strong Federal
system could work if it acted for the general good of all localities, but was this possible when Virginia
and Massachusetts had strikingly dierent conceptions of what the general good was? Now, Virginia
and the South had to live with a Bank bill that they absolutely did not approve of, and they could not
handle their powerlessness. As Paul Goodman explains, groups used to getting their way at home
were unused to being thwarted in the new arena. Sharp concludes that, it was particularly easy
for the Virginians, as residents of the largest and most powerful state, to conclude [that the general
welfare was being sacriced to faction].
83
And Jeerson spoke for these Virginians. erefore as
a champion for this cause and a fervent supporter of the idea that the South was constantly put at
a disadvantage by federal policies that favored the Northern economy especially in light of the
mentioned reasons to believe Jeersons constitutional claims against the Bank were insincere it is
reasonable to say that Jeersons gravest concern with the Bank was that it further promoted an unfair
North-South divide.

Washington as an Audience
Realistically, it would be much more evident that Madison and Jeerson utilized consti-
tutional arguments against the Bank as a legal ploy, when they had other primary concerns, if there
was a reasonable motive for them to do so. As a matter of fact, there was, and it had to do with their
audience. Although the Bank bill initially lay in the hands of and was then passed by Congress, the
decision ultimately lay in the hands of the President under the power of the Presidential Veto. In call-
ing the Bank bill unconstitutional, Madison and Jeerson would arguably trigger a bigger red ag for
Washington than by simply calling the bill economically unsound. Under this pretext, Washington
faced the threat of not merely signing an unsound bill into law but an illegal one that might reect
51
disastrously on his reputation. Furthermore, Washingtons previous disposition toward Madison and
Hamilton made it likelier that he would trust Madison more with legal concerns and Hamilton more
with economic ideas. Finally, Washington would not be very keen in taking Jeersons concerns with
sectional strife into account.
Elected as President in 1789, George Washington was a man intensely devoted to the
Constitution if for no other reason than to assuage public fears of a monarchical leader much like
the one in Britain that snubbed national law. In one sense, much of the nation already had a favor-
able attitude toward Washington that precluded any suspicions that he would take unlimited control
of the government and turn it into a monarchy. Gordon Wood explains, Washingtons unanimous
election as President was preordained. He was the only person in the country who automatically
commanded the allegiance of all the people. He was probably the only American who possessed
the dignity, patience, restraint, and reputation for republican virtue He had always resisted any
temptation to become a quasi-King or dictator (as some even wished that he might) and, even in his
days of military glory, had always respected civilian superiority over army power. In fact, after rising
to the status of national hero after his gallantry in the Revolutionary War, Washington promised to
forego any share in public business hereafter. Wood describes the groundbreaking signicance of
this promise: is self-conscious retirement from public life had electried the world. All previous
victorious generals in modern times Cromwell, William of Orange, Marlborough had sought po-
litical rewards But not Washington. He seemed to epitomize public virtue and the proper character
of a republican leader.
84

Yet as history holds, Washington did not keep his promise and would become the rst
President of the United States a few years later. ere he found himself in a peculiar and tense posi-
tion. Although the nation held him in high esteem and trusted his disinterest in seizing monarchical
power, they could not have trusted his successors to be as seless. Every day, Washington confronted
public sentiment that wavered between proclaiming him a King, under a dierent name, (as soon
to be Secretary of War, James MacHenry said) and begging him not to be a King so that the next line
of Presidents would not abuse the title. Washington grew extremely eager to cast away any doubt of
his lack of interest in excessive political power. He tried to refuse a Presidential salary and emphasized
his distaste for oce.
85
He also understood that precedent was all-important. Washington asserted,
many things which appear of little importance in themselves and at the beginning, may have great
and durable consequences for their having been established at the commencement of a new general
Government. e position of President had to be thus conned that even men who were not as
52
honorable as Washington would not have the ability to turn it into a dictatorship in the future.
86

us, it would be reasonable for Madison and Jeerson to predict that a constitutional
argument would make Washington much more cautious in considering the Bank bill. e President
would be meticulously aware of the danger in acting contrarily to the Constitution and thereby
exercising excessive executive power in an unrestricted, monarchical fashion. For a man with such a
strong determination to avoid any abuse of political power and to demonstrate the utmost loyalty to
national law and power restrictions, risking an unconstitutional action was equivalent to playing with
re.
For Madison and Jeerson, these expectations of Washingtons political fears and leanings
would have been conrmed with his frequent proclamations of a erce loyalty to the Constitution. In
a way, Washingtons national standing was intimately tied with the Constitution. Sharp explains that
despite the Antifederalists strenuous opposition and deep apprehensions, the Constitution had been
ratied, perhaps in large part due to the popular perception that Washington would consent to be
the rst President.
87
Now that he was indeed President, Washington would not break his allegiance
to the document. e Presidents personal correspondences and Congressional speeches provide evi-
dence of this fact. To Attorney-General Edmund Randolph he wrote in 1790, the Constitution of
the United States and the laws made under it must mark the line of my ocial conduct.
88
In 1791,
just before the signing the Bank bill, Washington asked Hamilton to write a report outlining his argu-
ment for the Banks constitutionality. Clearly, the matter was important to the President: e con-
stitutionality of [the Bank] is objected. It therefore becomes more particularly my duty to examine
the ground on which the objection is built.
89
It was Washingtons duty to evaluate constitutional
objections, and his duty overall to defend the Constitution.
Later in 1791, Washington made a speech to Congress, once more greatly exalting the
qualities of the Constitution. He spoke of the happy eects of that revival of condence, public as
well as private, to which the Constitution and laws of the US have so eminently contributed. He
followed with the following assertion: It is desirable, on all occasions, to unite with a steady and
rm adherence to constitutional and necessary acts of government.
90
Writing to Hamilton again in
September of 1792, Washington remained steadfast in his loyalty to the document: the Constitution
and laws must strictly govern
91
Finally, Washingtons correspondence indicated that he also valued
loyalty to the Constitution from others. In a private letter, he reassured his recipient that he acknowl-
edged this persons constitutional commitment: I did not require the evidence of the extracts, which
you enclosed to me, to convince me of your attachment to the Constitution of the United States, or
53
of your disposition to promote the general welfare of this country.
92
It may be inferred here that
Washington even equates a constitutional loyalty to promoting the general welfare of the US, placing
his opinion of the Constitution on a very high tier of priorities. If Madison and Jeerson knew about
Washingtons strong adherence to and praise for the Constitution and they probably did as they
interacted with the President often they must have felt that a constitutional argument against the
Bank would most catch Washingtons attention and, they must have hoped, his rejection.
Moreover, Washingtons attitude toward Madison and Hamilton respectively, along with
Madisons perception of Washington himself, would have prompted Madisons eagerness to engage
Hamilton in a constitutional battle rather than an economic one. Madison and Washington had
become good friends prior to Washingtons ascension to the Presidency. In 1785, they had grown
very close over the chartering of the Potomac River Company when Washington described Madisons
judgment as the best guide on the matter.
93
As Washington began his Presidency, Madison had the
opportunity to return the favor by praising his new leader and rmly proclaiming his trust in him.
While many feared a monarch in the form of a President, Madison saw Washington as totally faithful
to the law. Wood explains, Trusting Washington as he did, Madison brought the members of the
House around to accepting the idea of a strong and independent President, one who had full respon-
sibility for seeing that the laws were faithfully executed.
94
Approximately two years later, during the
National Bank Debate, Madison still saw Washington as a patriot who adhered to the Constitution
according to his duty. More importantly, Washington now thought the same of Madison, for whom
he had an immense respect. In fact, Washington now regarded Madison as the leading light on
the Constitution.
95
erein lay the key for Madisons strategy in opposing the Bank, for if Madison
was the constitutional expert and claimed the Bank to be unconstitutional, Washington would likely
be swayed by this assertion.
It is worth mentioning that not only was the constitutional argument more promising for
Madison in this regard, but the economic argument was also likely to fail. When Congress had cre-
ated the National Treasury Department, it made no mention of the President regulating the depart-
ments powers. Instead, the Secretary of the Treasury would report directly to Congress. As a result,
wishing to respect the desire of the legislature, Washington typically abstained from interfering with
Hamiltons aairs. He was much less likely to encroach on Hamiltons economic plans than he was
to meddle in the business of his other cabinet members.
96
Madison may not have felt as condent in
asking Washington to oppose Hamiltons economic ideas as in asking Washington to consider Madi-
sons own constitutional concerns. Yet he did not envision that Hamiltons response to Madison and
54
Jeersons opposition to the Bank would be enough to overturn legal criticisms while arming the
economic principles over which Washington gave Hamilton free rein as usual.
Finally, it is likely that Jeerson also felt that his best argument against the Bank with
Washington as his audience was the constitutional one because his greatest economic concern the
Banks contribution to federal favoritism toward the Northern economy over Southern agriculture
would have made little impact on the President. In his inaugural address, Washington pleaded
for unity, beseeching Congress to shed local prejudice or attachments, to hold not separate views,
and to avoid party animosities. With this statement and later assertions, Washington rmly placed
himself above petty personal, local, and sectional interests. In addition to disliking having to deal
with sectional strife, Washington preferred to act as though it did not exist, at least not to the extent
that ruthlessly plagued Jeerson. During a 1791 trip through the South, Washington said, tranquil-
ity reigns among the [Southern] people, with that disposition towards the general government which
is likely to preserve it.
97
is perspective came into sharp contrast with Jeersons perception of a
victimized South, abandoned by the federal government in favor of corrupt Northern nanciers and
manufacturers. Consequently, an argument targeting the sectional disparities that would result from
the National Bank would not seem likely to be eective for Jeerson in presenting his arguments to
Washington. e most promising plan for Madison and Jeerson remained the constitutional argu-
ment even if it was not their most sincere or signicant one.
Conclusion
As debates over legislative constitutionality continue today, we see that the tradition of legal
constitutional supremacy lies in the 1790s National Bank Debate. Madison and Jeerson voiced
a strong opposition against Hamiltons Bank, which the Secretary of the Treasury believed would
strengthen and improve the American economy. Most historians and scholars today attribute Madi-
son and Jeersons criticisms of the bill to their belief that it was unconstitutional. However, this view
is incorrect in light of evidence such as Madison and Jeersons correspondences, economic beliefs,
and previous legal writings. In fact, it is a likelier story that Madison and Jeerson chose the argu-
ment of unconstitutionality as a legal ploy to convince President Washington to veto to the Bank bill.
In the end, however, he sided with Hamilton.
e National Bank Debate thus serves as a symbol of a false tradition. e idea that
government ocials cared passionately and deeply for the Constitution as a supreme source of legal
authority was ingrained in American ideology at least in part because of the constitutional claims
55
Madison and Jeerson made in this debate. If they were insincere, this historical event is just as much
a mark of deception as it is of tradition. Hence it is important for todays American politicians and
citizens to take a more critical look into history and present times alike.
Various political groups throughout the nation currently take a rm stance against judicial
activism, and this was clearly evident in the case against President Obamas national care reform
bill. Many urged the Supreme Court to strike down the bill if it found it unconstitutional even if
the Justices personally supported President Obamas policy. e idea of twisting the meaning of the
Constitution to t ones personal political motivations is certainly frowned upon in American soci-
ety. Meanwhile, politicians and scholars call for meticulous examination of the American Founders
intentions in writing the Constitution in order to ensure that todays leaders will not get away with
misreading the document for their personal gain.
Yet what this study uncovers and solidies is that our Founding Fathers engaged in this
less-than-admirable practice of intentional constitutional misinterpretation themselves. In this sense,
they were not more dishonest than todays politicians, but they also were not the shining beacon of
honesty that many consider them to have been. Judicial activism and intentional constitutional mis-
interpretation may be troubling and legally harmful in themselves. But Americans should start ana-
lyzing such actions on their own terms instead of begrudging the judicial or executive activist because
he/she breaks with the traditions established by the Founders. ese traditions the fundamental
constitutional core of American society were just as swamped in disingenuousness, as exemplied by
Madison and Jeersons opposition to the National Bank in 1791. Let us look to history and not only
learn honesty and working for the collective American good, but also how to avoid political deception
and personal gain, for there was plenty of that during the American founding as well.
Indeed, if we take the National Bank Debate into consideration, we can see that the Con-
stitution was used as a political tool from its very creation. It served as a smokescreen even for the
Founders in their quests to achieve their personal political goals. Americans frequently contrast the
nation today with the US of the late eighteenth century and claim that, as a country, we have forgot-
ten the true meaning of the Constitution that we have disobeyed the authority of the Founders. Yet
this study shows that the Founders were in the business of masking the Constitutions true meaning
themselves, whenever it suited their ambitions. In many cases, these highly respected men had little
authority to interpret the Constitution at all.
56 57
16. Brookhiser 144.
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(Endnotes)
1. omas More Law Center v. Obama (Jun. 29, 2011) Court rules 2-1 in favor to uphold law.
Florida v. United States Department of Health and Human Services (Aug 12, 2011) Court rules 2-1
to strike down the individual mandate as beyond Congresss constitutional authority. Liberty Univer-
sity v. Geithner (Sep. 8, 2011) Court rules 2-1 to defer consideration of law until 2015. Seven-Sky
v. Holder (Nov. 8, 2011) Court rules 2-1 to uphold law as valid Congressional power to regulate
Commerce.
Rice, Lewis. Is the Obama Health Care Reform Constitutional? Fried, Tribe and Barnett debate
the Aordable Care Act. Spotlight at Harvard Law School. Harvard Law School, 28 Mar. 2011. Web.
21 Mar. 2012. <http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/spotlight/constitutional-law/is-obama-health-
care-reform-constitutional.html>.
2. Hamilton, Alexander. Hamiltons Second Report on Public Credit. Select Documents Illustrative
of the History of the United States 1776. By William MacDonald. N.p.: Ayer Publishing, 1969. 61-66.
Google Books. Web. 21 Mar. 2012.
3. Hamilton, Alexander. Hamiltons First Report on Public Credit. MacDonald 46-58.
4. McCoy, Drew R. e Specter of Walpole. e Elusive Republic. Williamsburg: e University of
North Carolina Press, 1980. 147-148. Print.
5. Stalo, Darren. Alexander Hamilton: e Enlightenment Fullled. Hamilton, Adams, Jeerson.
New York: Hill and Wang, 2005. 97. Print.
6. Brookhiser, Richard. e First Political Party. James Madison. New York: Basic Books, 2011. 92.
Print.
7. Madison, James. February 2nd - Bank of the United States. First Congress - ird Session. 2 Feb.
1791. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 21 Mar. 2012.
8. Brookhiser 92.
9. Peterson, Merrill. Secretary of State. omas Jeerson and the New Nation. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970. 435. Print.
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11. Stalo 314.
12. Stalo 118.
13. Stalo 118-119.
14. Peterson 434; Brookhiser 93.
15. Peterson 433.
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Leicester Ford. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012.
66. Jeerson, omas. Letter to James Madison. 6 July 1791. omas Jeerson, e Works. By Paul
67. Jeerson, omas. Letter to George Mason. 10 July 1791. omas Jeerson, e Works. By Paul
68. Jeerson, omas. Letter to James Monroe. 17 Apr. 1791. omas Jeerson, e Works. By Paul
69. Jeerson, omas. Letter to Edmund Pendleton. 24 July. 1791. omas Jeerson, e Works. By
Paul Leicester Ford. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012.
70. Madison, James. Speeches in the First Congress. Congress. 2 Feb. 1791. Online Library of Lib-
erty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012.
71. Madison, James. Speeches in the First Congress. Congress. 8 Feb. 1791. Online Library of Lib-
erty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012.
72. Madison 8 Feb. 1791
73. Madison, James. Federalist 44. 25 Jan. 1788. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 2 Apr. 2012.
74. Brookhiser 92-93.
75. Madison. Federalist 44.
76. McCoy 148-153.
77. Brookhiser 144.
78. Stalo 294.
79. Stalo 310.
39. Stalo 314.
40. McCoy 121-122.
41. Madison, James. Letter to Rufus King. 2 Dec. 1801. James Madison, e Writings. By Gaillard
Hunt. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012.
42. McCoy 125.
43. McCoy 131.
44. McCoy 134.
46. McCoy 148.
47. McCoy 162.
48. Smith, Adam. Institutions for the Education of Youth. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776. Print.
49. Hamilton, Alexander. As to the Division of Labor. Report on the Subject of Manufactures. 1791.
50. McCoy 132-133.
51. Ibid.
52. United States Constitution. 1 USC. Sec. 8. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Mar. 2012.
53. Stalo 314.
54. Madison, James. Letter to Henry Lee. 1 Jan. 1792. James Madison, e Writings. By Gaillard
Hunt. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012.
McCoy 153-155.
55. Stalo 75.
56. Stalo 118-119.
57. Madison, James. Report on the Resolutions. 1799. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 1 Apr.
2012.
58. James Madison, e Writings of James Madison, comprising his Public Papers and his Private
Correspondence, including his numerous letters and documents now for the rst time printed, ed.
Gaillard Hunt (New York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1900). 9 vols.
Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1933 on 2012-04-10
59. Madison, James. Letter to omas Jeerson. 2 Sept. 1793. James Madison, e Writings. By Gail-
60. Madison, James. Letter to omas Jeerson. 10 July 1791. James Madison, e Writings. By Gail-
60 61
80. Peterson 435.
81. Wood, Gordon S. Republican Society. Empire of Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009. 351. Print.
82. Sharp. 23. 158-159.
83. Sharp 38-41.
84. Wood 73.
85. Wood 74-76; Sharp 27.
86. Wood 88.
87. Sharp 27.
88. Washington, George. Letter to Edmund Randolph. 11 Feb. 1790. e Writings of George Wash-
ington. By Worthington Chauncey Ford. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 1 Apr.
2012.
89. Washington, George. Letter to Alexander Hamilton. 16 Feb. 1791. e Writings of George Wash-
ington. By Worthington Chauncey Ford. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 1
Apr. 2012
90. Washington, George. Speeches to Both Houses of Congress. Congress. 25 Oct. 1791. Online
Library of Liberty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012.
91. Washington, George. Letter to Alexander Hamilton. 16 Sept. 1792. e Writings of George Wash-
ington. By Worthington Chauncey Ford. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Online Library of Liberty.Web. 1
Apr. 2012
92. Washington, George. Private Letter. 18 Oct. 1792. e Writings of George Washington. By
Worthington Chauncey Ford. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012
93. Brookhiser 44-45.
94. Wood 87.
95. Stalo 117.
96. Wood 91.
97. Sharp 27, 54.
62 63
Preventing the Loss of Life in Syria:
Policy Recommendations on Averting Further
Causalities in the Syrian Uprising
Alex Polivka
Syria is now caught up in an armed conict between forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and rebel
ghters opposed to his rule. Since major unrest began in March 2011, various reports suggest that between
30,000 and 34,000 Syrians have been killed. U.S. ocials and many analysts believe that President
Bashar al-Assad and his other supporters will ultimately be forced from power, but few oer specic,
sound timetables for a resolution to Syrias ongoing crisis. After a year and a half of violence and civil
unrest, Syrias crisis has been dened by dilemma and ambiguity in regards to policy-making. A few
potential options for both international and American ocials to explore in averting further bloodshed
are weighed and discussed here.
O
n 5 November 2012, a suicide bomber killed at least 50 Syrian soldiers at a checkpoint
in the Hama province of Syria (50 Syrian Soldiers 2012). is is the latest in a
long line of killings which have taken place in Syria since the Syrian uprising began
on March 15, 2011. An estimated 33,000 people have been killed in the past nineteen months
(Statistics 2012). Up to 28,000 of these deaths have been civilian casualties (As Civilians 2012).
Since early autumn 2011, civilians and military defectors began forming ghting units which have
unied under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) as they oppose the Syrian government
under President Bashar al-Assad (Boghani 2012). Foreign nations and organizations have tried
to end the violence through their own means, but the ghting and death still continue regardless.
In order to bring about a successful end to the violence, a plan which eectively incorporates the
fragile domestic situation in Syria with the strategies of outside countries must be prescribed so that
Syria does not relapse into violent conict that continues to kill more innocent people after the plan
is implemented.
Background
Syrias domestic unrest can be traced back to 1963 when the Baath Party rst came into
power through a military coup. Emergency law, which suspended constitutional freedoms from
Syrian citizens and was justied by Syria being in a war with Israel, was established in 1963 and
remained until the uprising began in 2011 (Syria lifts 2012). Emergency law also suspended
multi-party elections within the country which has allowed for the Baath Party to remain the
64 65
our and food, and have sent in the Syrian army to occupy cities (e Syrian 2012).
Problem Identication
Currently, the uprising is classied as being in the early stages of genocide by Genocide
Watch, a group whose purpose it is to predict, prevent, stop, and punish genocide and other forms
of mass murder, because more than 28,000 civilians have been killed in the country in the past
nineteen months of ghting (Genocide 2012; As Civilian 2012). Casualties reached the highest
levels thus far in February of 2012 amid reports that soldiers in the Syrian army who refuse to
re on civilians are executed. e Syrian government has conceded trivial items to the protestors,
but has not attempted to appeal to any of the four main demands. On November 3, 2011, the
government accepted an Arab League plan that aimed to restore peace in the country by promoting
a cease-re with the opposition and allowing neutral observers in to judge the scale of the conict.
However, continued reports of violence from both sides undermined the cease-re and the observer
force was soon reduced from 300 to 50 to being completely withdrawn by the end of January
2012. Since 12 April, both the Syrian government and rebels of the Free Syria Army entered a UN
mediated ceasere period. Despite the initial plans to begin the ceasere on 10 April, the Syrian
Army continued to pound rebel strongholds for two more days in an attempt to gain ground, and
announced full armistice on 12 April. On 23 April, the violence in Syria allegedly spiked again
with as many as 80 people reported to have been killed nationwide. On May 1, Ban Ki-Moon, the
Secretary General of the UN, said it is vital that government and opposition alike cooperate fully
with the UN observer force (UN: 2012). e observer mission came to an end on 19 August
2012 with their main goal of peace left unaccomplished (Monitoring 2012).
International pressure has built on al-Assad, yet no formal, military action has been made
in Syria as it has in other Arab Spring countries, such as Libya. Syria has ignored requests from
the Arab League it helped to co-found to allow large observation missions into the country and the
United States has not yet been able to pass new, decisive sanctions in regards to al-Assads regime.
In addition to the inability to adequately punish the Syrian government, Russia has been selling
a variety of weapons to Syria, such as anti-ship and air defense missiles, armored vehicles, and
aircrafts, which are being used to put down the uprising (Russia 2012). Amidst pressure from the
European Union and the US, Russia has not stopped aiding Syria yet, which only helps to reinforce
al-Assads position within his country. In July of 2012, Russia announced it was halting arms sales
to the Syrian government, though on October 11, the Turkish Premier announced that a recently
only party in the government. e country was politically unstable until 1970 when Defence
Minister Hafez al-Assad took control and declared himself President. Hafezs nearly thirty years
of presidency were marked by his rm adherence to quelling opposition to the Baath party. In
1982, he put down a Sunni Muslim uprising in the town of Hama by massacring tens of thousands
of people. When Hafez was dying in 1999, violent protests and clashes occurred due to the feud
between Hafez and his brother, Rifaat. Eventually, Hafez died in 2000 and his son, Bashar al-
Assad, was appointed President at age 38 even though the Constitution set the presidential age at 40
(Syrias President, 2000). During his reign, Kurdish-Arab riots have caused tension throughout
the country and were fueled by the fact that the al-Assad family comes from the Alawite minority
which numbers 6-12 percent of the Syrian population, but is the most politically powerful religious
sect in Syria(Syria: 2006). Al-Assads, and therefore the Alawites, tight control on Syrias security
groups have caused resentment among the Sunni Muslims which make up 74 percent of the
countrys population (Syria: CIA 2012).
e Arab Spring movement throughout the Middle East played a role in the run-up to
the Syrian Uprising. Years of human rights violations, both before and during Bashar al-Assads
presidency, added to the deterioration of civility within Syria. Protests started on January 26, 2011,
purportedly when a man named Hasan Ali Akleh poured gasoline on himself and set himself on
re (Jobless 2012). Al-Assad declared it was time to make reforms in an interview to the Wall
Street Journal on 31 January 2011, yet no political action was made from within his government
to accommodate the peoples rising political and economic aspirations that he had acknowledged
(Interview 2011). e protests escalated into an uprising on March 15, 2011 when, on a Day
of Rage, simultaneous demonstrations took place across the country resulting in three thousand
arrests and several deaths (Day 2012). e uprising has led to Syrian civilians demanding
specic concessions from the Baath party government. ese demands are that President Al-Assad
step down from his eleven year rule as president, for the Baath party to allow for other parties to
participate in elections, for equal rights to be given to the Kurdish people, and for political freedoms
such as freedom of speech and of the press to be allowed.
Protestors have attempted to achieve these concessions through marches, hunger strikes,
rioting, vandalism of government property, and civil resistance. In the north part of Syria, some
Islamic groups have taken advantage of the chaos to launch actual attacks against the government.
In response to these aggressive protests, the Syrian government has used tanks and snipers to force
people o the streets. ey have also shut down water and electricity to major cities, conscated
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue I Winter 2013 Polivka Preventing the Loss of Life in Syria
66 67
In addressing why the forces ghting in Syria would hold back from stopping the
advancement of an SFOR, several dierent factors about Syrias regime must be addressed. e
introduction of an SFOR in Syria would not attempt to aggressively switch out the regime. For a
man like Al-Assad who wants to keep a strong hold on his power, this option would look more and
more desirable with the less control he has. Second, as shown in Uganda and Rwanda, simply pre-
deploying a force can psychologically aect the entire armys calculation. e Syrian army has no
desire to ght with Turkish forces and the introduction of a force comprised of many international
bodies would absolutely cause Syria to re-evaluate the choices it faces (Jones 2012). Western
powers can help this process along by working with international nancial institutions to instruct
that debt accumulated by al-Assads regime is odious, which is a term used to mean that the debt
would not ever be paid back (Odious 2012). is would cause Al-Assads business partners to
become very uncertain in their support of the regime. A peaceful transition to power has also been
attempted through oering al-Assad safe passage from Syria if he agrees to not be a part of the new
government (Dehghanpisheh 2012).
Turkey as SFOR Leader
Putting Turkey at the head of an SFOR in Syria makes the most sense in terms of
strategy. While Turkey has avoided saying that it would use its army to protect Syrian civilians or
help stabilize the country, it may be more willing to see its army be deployed as a multi-national
peacekeeping force with UN authorization. e risks it faces alone are enormous, but seeing both
the political risk and operational costs being divided amongst other countries would denitely aid
in its nal decision. Gulf States such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia have already signaled their strong
desire to support the Syrian opposition, so Turkey would have nancial partners before it deploy
(Jones 2012).
Turkeys initiative to take the lead in Syria would ultimately help the SFOR pass through
the Security Council. While two resolutions pertaining to Syria and targeting Al-Assad have not
made it through the Security Council due to the veto-wielding members of Russia and China, the
chances of Turkeys proposal making it through are actually not low as one may think. If Turkey
were to arm its help for Syria and make the proposal to the UN Security Council, they could
seek support from its emerging-power allies within the Security Council (India) and outside of it
(Brazil and Indonesia). e emerging powers would be able to draw more attention to using the
Security Council as a tool to avoid more conict. Russia and China would be harder pressed to
downed Syrian jet was carrying Russian munitions (Russian 2012; Barry 2012).
Several policies, which are in eect or have not been implemented, are legitimate ways
of prescribing an end to the violence. A look at each potential plan, with all similar historical
situations considered and all potential outcomes analyzed, will made so that there are no
debilitating factors in mitigating this crisis. e recommendations are in order from what I deem
to be the most promising plan at resolving the killings to least likely/mostly aspiration. It is my
hope that one of these policy recommendations will be put into eect immediately so as to stop the
killing that has ravaged Syria for a full year and a half.
Use of a Multi-country Stabilization Force
A stabilization force (SFOR) can be loosely termed as an international group under
conventional rules of engagement to ensure that all warring factions comply with a prescribed peace
plan. e goal of an SFOR is not to change the regime in power, just to stop violence. As SFORs
have been used in the past, with one occurring as recently as 2006, international organizations do
have modern experience with them which makes it a credible option if one were to be implemented
(Stabilization 2006).
An SFOR is neither an easy option nor a resolute end to violence. e U.S.-led
multinational force in Beirut in 1982 abruptly ended after bombings of the U.S. and French
barracks killed 241 American servicemen and 58 French soldiers. e multinational force deployed
to eastern Congo in 1996 to bring an end to massive violence and displacement occurring in
Rwanda best highlights the strengths and limitations of this approach. at force achieved its goal:
Merely deploying the force in Uganda got Rwanda to withdraw its forces back across its border
-- but it had been too late to stop Rwandas rulers from killing tens of thousands of former rebels.
Regardless, in both eastern Congo and East Timor, multinational forces helped to prevent a far-
worse slaughter.
A stabilization force of the kind seen in Beirut or Rwanda would not be able to ght its
way to Damascus. Syrias landscape, city centers, and populations are much dierent than those of
Beirut and Rwanda. While the Syrian army does not have to formally comply with the SFORs
deployment, it does have to signal that it will not ght it on the way in. In 2006, France, India,
Italy, and other nations sent troops into Lebanon as part of a cease-re agreement to help end
violence in the region. While Hezbollah never agreed to let the force in, it sent political signals to
SFOR leaders that it would not hinder its advancement.
68 69
that (Levs 2012).
In order for diplomacy to have a signicant impact, changing Russias position in the
Syrian conict is of crucial importance. With backing from China, Russia has been able to veto
two UN Security Council motions which would have allowed the UN to take legitimate action in
pressuring al-Assad to step down. Russia also has provided arms to the government for use against
rebels.
To better understand why Russia is allowing for al-Assad to continue his crackdown in
Syria, one must take a brief look at the history of Russias involvement in Syria and the Middle
East. One key component in all of this is that Syria is the last Middle Eastern ally that Russia has
(El-Shamayleh 2012). After years of dwindling inuence following the Soviet period, Moscow is
acting purely on the principle that countries must not support either side in a civil war or exploit an
organization such as the UN to t the goals of particular groups or countries. Promoting this way
of thinking is Moscows way of ghting for its own international stature; it wants other countries to
respect it and not just ask for it because it is a member of the Security Council. Moscows proven
inuence over Damascus could be useful in mitigating the crisis, but it seems that Moscow is
currently building eminence on the world stage at the cost of Syrian lives.
e role of Russia in bringing about peace through diplomacy lies in its power within
Damascus. If Moscow were to be convinced to give up on al-Assad, then al-Assad would have
little time, resources, and allies left in countering the rebels which could lead to a mutual, trusting
understanding between the two sides. If Moscow were to be convinced to try and convince al-
Assad to meet the rebels at the table and discuss a new system of government that pleases all parties
involved, then al-Assad may be more open to hearing that suggestion from its ally rather than from
Western parties.
Overall, diplomacy regarding Syria is not working eectively at the moment because the
international community as a whole is not working together eectively. If all players involved in
the United Nations or Arab League could be convinced to use whatever connections they have to
Damascus and al-Assads government, and even Moscow as well, there would be more of a chance
at peace fostered out of understanding instead of chaos. For instance, if Arab and NATO nations
were to oer Russia cooperation in air lifting and shipping humanitarian and medical relief supplies
to all parts of Syria, Russia would be more willing to nally put its weight behind a UN ceasere
that would legitimately end the conict. Also, if the Arab League, the European Union, the US and
other nations were to eectively impose targeted national and regional sanctions against nancial
argue with emerging powers than they would be with their regular opponents of the US, UK, and
France within the Security Council. Some additional international pressure on Beijing would likely
convince it to stop providing cover for Moscow and Moscows allies in Syria.
In terms of United States policy, allowing Turkey to lead the charge may temporarily
damage President Obamas foreign policy credibility, but that would be short lived with the eventual
success of a Turk-led SFOR. e US would also be able to provide intelligence and tactical support
to an SFOR but without the delicate matter of putting American troops on the ground.
Conclusion to Use of a Multi-country Stabilization Force
e probability of an SFOR following this thread or actually being introduced to the
Security Council is rather unlikely, but it should be noted that plans such as this are gaining
traction with the failure of peace plans such as Ko Annans. While an SFOR would not be able
to be implemented until weeks, if not months, after its acceptance, this option is the smallest of all
evils that the international community faces in mitigating this crisis.
If an SFOR were to enter the country, the problem would then become maintaining the
stabilization of Syria until it is a sure thing that Al-Assads regime would not attempt to crush or
destroy opposing political parties. As stated earlier, past experiences with stabilization forces have
resulted both successfully and tragically. ey will not be a permanent force in the country, but
the use of a SFOR in Syria must have similar results to what was accomplished in Bosnia instead of
what was accomplished in Beirut.
Keep Using Diplomacy and Non-violent Methods
e international stance in regards to the conict in Syria has been to implement ceasere
agreements through the Arab League and the United Nations. Ko Annans six-point peace plan,
started April 12, 2012, was not eective in stopping violence and on April 23 the violence spiked
again with around 80 people being reported killed nationwide (Assads 2012). e UN ended
its observer mission on August 19 after being unable to pass unanimous resolutions regarding Syria
(Egbe 2012). Current diplomacy is not eective in controlling any part of the violence in Syria.
Al-Assad used the time given by Annans peace plan to send a message to the UN that he and his
forces are needed in the streets to prevent chaos. According to Andrew Tabler, a policy expert with
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, al-Assad wants UN blessing to grind down and
destroy the opposition. And the way this is being implemented, hes well on his way to achieving
70 71
people should be killed a day, a number that ranges anywhere from 50 to 100, because he knows
a full scale massacre would trigger intervention (Hashem 2012). Only when the numbers reach
30,000 or more did Hashem believe that the international community would intervene, even
though that marker has come and gone.
With this revelation about al-Assads tactical planning comes the idea that a quick,
forceful military option may be best to ending the crisis as swiftly as possible. ere are several
military options to implement in Syria that were seen in other Arab Spring countries. One
option, also the simplest, would be airstrikes, similar to what the NATO mission against Slobodan
Milosevic was in 1999. Targeting the security headquarters of Syrians intelligence agencies, military
outposts, government infrastructure, and communications systems could be conducted with
minimal casualties on the side of the Western forces.
A second option could be the establishment of a safe zone within Syria in order to
provide safe haven for the Free Syrian Army. is would give the FSA an area to regroup, for
defectors to join, and for international aid organizations to enter. Once the FSA is recharged and
ready to resume ghting, the political and military stability of the opposition would be much more
assured. e Syrian army under al-Assad would be hesitant to attack a rebel safe zone controlled by
foreign forces.
Two more potential military options are still credible, yet less likely to occur than the
other two. A third option could be an all-encompassing no y zone over Syria, which would
prevent al-Assad from using ghter jets against the rebel ground forces. e nal option would be a
campaign similar to what was seen in Libya last spring, with a no-y/no-drive zone extended across
the entire country and constant airstrikes to stop the movement and abilities of the Syrian military.
ese are less likely to occur due to the organization and resources necessary to pull o such an
operation.
Why the United States would not support a military strike
Bashar al-Assad is dierent from most Middle Eastern leaders because of his appreciation
of Western culture. Al-Assad speaks uent English, married a British woman, and is said to have
eclectic tastes in Western pop culture with Western musical groups such as Right Said Fred and
LMFAO appearing on his iTunes account (Willis 2012). With this fondness for Western culture,
however, comes an understanding of other aspects of it too, such as political systems. Al-Assad
knows that in the midst of a United States presidential election, the end of the war in Iraq, and
accounts and businesses owned by top ocials of the Syrian regime and its army, the world would
see an al-Assad government actively looking for a peaceful resolve.
Conclusion to Keep Using Diplomacy and Non-violent Methods
Giving peace a chance is never a waste of time. Automatically resorting to violent means
to end violence would only tear apart the fabric of our civilization instead of xing anything. With
that being said, though, peace is quickly becoming a less and less viable option in Syria with the
UN having pulled out its peacekeeping mission and no replacement plan in place. Al-Assad is using
the time allocated by the cease-re to increase the death toll while preventing other potentially more
viable options from being tested. All scenarios of Annans plan are leading to failure due to the
mockery al-Assad has made of this international peace agreement. My positioning of diplomacy as
the second most viable resort is only because I believe that this is what will continue to be the venue
that the UN and international community choose to take in the upcoming weeks. Diplomacy is
never a waste, but it should also never be the only option to initiate and that is the problem with
the international community right now.
e Use of Force in Syria
e United States, NATO, or the Arab League could potentially enact a full blown
invasion of Syria to overthrow al-Assad and provide the opposition with control of the government.
In this section, I will be analyzing the reasons why the use of force should be considered in Syria,
why the United States would or would not be in favor of this plan, and what scenarios would follow
an invasion that put power in the hands of the opposition.
Reasons for Force
e death toll in Syria has been mounting for months while the international community
has only implemented non-aggressive peace plans to solve the crisis. According to the futile Arab
League observer mission that occurred in December, al-Assad is repeating a practice he has excelled
at thus far: stopping the aggression against peaceful demonstrators when observers are around, and
resuming the killing once they are gone (Ben-Meir 2012). In a country with 23 million people
and hundreds of thousands of square kilometers, this tactic could easily be maintained even if
UN observers increased ten-fold to the 300 observers that France desired (Ben-Meir 2012). In an
interview with former Syrian General Akil Hashem, he stated that al-Assad regulates how many
72 73
e potential likelihood of a military campaign playing out depends on whether or not
al-Assad continues his calculated killing of civilians and opposition per day. If a tragedy occurs and
a massacre happens, military intervention may be a viable option to override diplomacy, as seen in
the massacre at the Bosnian town of Srebrenica in 1995 (Case Study 2002).
Arm the Rebels
In the United States, a call to arm the Free Syrian Army rebellion group has been growing
for months. As the last policy recommendation, I believe that this is the least likely course of action
to occur, with public knowledge that is, due to the potential long-term instability that could arise
from it. is section will address why the United States and the world has been reluctant to arm the
Free Syrian Army and what could potentially happen if the rebels were to be armed.
Current Hesitation in Arming the FSA
As of 9 November 2012, the Obama administration says that it will not arm the Syrian
rebels because little is known about the resistance forces trying to topple al-Assads regime. Jay
Carney, President Obamas press secretary, said e nature and shape of and the membership of
the opposition forces is something that we and our partners are assessing, and that sending more
weapons to this war-torn region could make the situation spin into chaos (ODonnell 2012).
Governments have a hard time supporting the FSA because there is no solid leadership or support
structure within the organization.
Ocially founded on 29 July 2011, the leader of the FSA is a former Syrian colonel
known as Riad al-Asaad. e sole political goal of the FSA, according to Riad, is that Bashar al-
Assads government be removed from Syria (Commander 2011). e FSA also claims that the
conict is not sectarian because they have Alawites in our ranks who oppose the government and
therefore there would not be much religious inghting should the government fall (Syrian 2011).
In the months following their founding, the FSA was able to gain signicant footholds in many
cities and provide itself with more credibility (Ladicicco 2012).
e world hesitates to arm the FSA because not a whole lot is known about the forces
under Riad al-Asaad. e number of opposition members is said to be 40,000 by Riad, but the
real number remains unknown (Ranks 2011). Furthermore, the number of Alawites, Sunnis,
and other specic groups within the FSA is unknown, leaving much doubt that the FSA could
eectively establish a government that accommodates all the delicate aspects of the sectarian
the forthcoming conclusion to the war in Afghanistan, the United States will not risk military
intervention in another Middle East conict unless signicant massacres are committed.
In regards to the United States, al-Assad has been right in guring that the US will
not support a full scale military invasion, which is what will have to be done in order to clear the
ghting from densely populated cities similar to Iraq. Currently the US has active legal framework
for sanctions against Syria meant to cripple the Syrian government (Obama 2012). Presidents
Bush and Obama have renewed the sanctions annually since Syrian repression in Lebanon started in
2004. President Obama states that the rationale for renewal now is that al-Assad is killing civilians
and continuing to support terrorism, meaning that Obama recognizes the dangerous nature
that al-Assad poses to Syria. Republican presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, has also said that
military actions are an option but at the current stage, I am not favoring military involvement by
the United States (Murray 2012). is is a contrast to a growing number of Republicans led by
Arizona Senator John McCain who are advocating the use of air strikes instead of waiting on the
sidelines as the situation in Syria deteriorates (Boles 2012).
As seen in previous humanitarian genocides that took place in Bosnia and Rwanda, the
United States is often late to the game in stopping senseless violence because of political maneuvers
and an unwillingness to do what may be viewed as unpopular. Rwanda and Bosnia did not have
any signicant political or economic benets for the United States in becoming involved with their
internal disputes, and international military action did not come until many thousands had been
killed and the conicts had drawn on for months. Because al-Assad recognizes the limitations and
constraints of an international military intervention and what a sensitive topic it is in American
politics, he is able to conduct aggressive crackdowns which will continue to increase the death toll
in Syria.
Conclusion to Use of Force in Syria
An aggressive military campaign would bring about the automatic dismissal of Bashar
al-Assad from Syrias government. To predict what could happen if a totalitarian regime that
controlled everything suddenly collapsed, one need look no farther than Iraq circa 2003. A quick,
in-and-out military campaign in Syria would open the door to all kinds of problems, even possible
sectarian violence. e opposition forces would need to have enough guidance and direction to
build a stable, national government, but even helping to nurture that could take years, and there are
not many countries that would be willing to deal with that again.
74 75
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undertones that have been relevant thus far.
Conclusion to Arm the Rebels
If the rebels were to be armed, there is no clear indication of how the conict could
evolve. Should the FSA become strong enough to hold its own against al-Assads government,
eectively dispose of it, and then fulll its goal of removing al-Assad, it technically does not have a
plan for a government after Syria. e fear remains that Syria could devolve into a civil war that is
worse than the current uprising at hand, with dierent religious groups, political parties, and even
terrorism organizations such as Al-Qaeda vying for control of the country (Munoz 2012). While
there is optimism that the FSA would open diplomatic channels to strengthen a new government
with international aid, this is currently not a likely scenario due to the Syrian publics lingering
mistrust of Western governments since the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Guofu
2012).
Conclusion:
As with almost all policy solutions, there are idealistic situations that would dramatically
aid in the xing the problem. A policy that takes special note of the sect values within Syria and
helps to prevent a new government from internally collapsing would maximize the benets of this
option. In regards to what the best action plan may be, I believe the single most important course
for the United States and the international community to follow is the implementation of the
multi-national stabilization force led by Turkey which was discussed on page four. is plan would
best utilize the capabilities of global leaders, pass through the Security Council, and not drastically
alter the fragile political landscape of Syria. While political and operational barriers still remain
in allowing such a force to be initiated, an example of said barrier present in the United Nations
Security Council, an SFOR is the best option at a lasting resolution to the ghting and death. It
must have direct objectives to stop the military violence in Syria and impose itself in the country
until the Syrian government incorporates all opposition dialogue into its daily procedures, but it is
still not the most improbable thing that could occur in this conict as the violence increases. As the
world follows a UN peace program that currently allows the Syrian uprising to worsen and more
innocents to die, the international community has nothing to lose in guring out a better way to
end the senseless killings.
76 77
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78 79
Black Voting Behavior and Californias Proposition 8
Christopher Rupp
is paper analyzes black voting behavior in regards to Californias Proposition 8 in 2008, which would
ban same-sex marriage in the state. After the votes had been counted, and Proposition 8 had been passed,
the common media narrative was that it had passed due to high support from the states black voters who
had turned out in large numbers to support then-Senator Barack Obama. If this were true, it would mark
a potentially signicant break between the black voters, who vote with the Democratic Party in greater
numbers than any other demographic, and the rest of the Democratic Partys voting bloc. is paper will
analyze polls conducted before and after Election Day to determine whether or not the medias assertion that
black voters overwhelmingly supported Proposition 8 is true. Additionally, the paper will explore some of
the sociological, historical, and religious reasons that the black community would have to oppose same-sex
marriage in greater numbers than the rest of the country as a whole. is analysis can prove useful when
future elections are concerned, as same-sex marriage ballot measures are only going to increase in number
and frequency in the coming years.
T
he presidential election of 2008 featured a contest between Republican candidate
John McCain, and Democratic candidateand ultimate victorBarack Obama. As
one would expect, this race captured media headlines in the months leading up to
the election. Proposition 8 in California, however, received a great deal of national attention, as
it dealt with a very contentious issue of the 2004 Presidential election, and an issue that many
people on both sides of the political spectrum feel very strongly about: same-sex marriage. e
initiative, which proposed a ban on same-sex marriage in the state of California, passed by a 52.30
to 47.70 percent margin.
1
Media reports following the election frequently referenced the higher-
than-average turnout of black voters due to the presence of Barack Obama, an African-American,
on the presidential ballot as the reason for the initiatives success. ey argued that these voters
overwhelmingly sided with the conservative initiative, even though they also voted overwhelmingly
for Barack Obama, who was the more liberal candidate. e higher turnout displayed by these
minority voters has become accepted by the media and the public as the reason for the passage of
Proposition 8. Are media reports that black voters experienced higher-than-average turnout and
voted overwhelmingly for Proposition 8 true? If so, what factors would contribute to black voters
rejecting the idea of same-sex marriage? is purpose of this paper is to analyze the racial statistics
of the 2008 vote to determine whether the medias assertion that black voters overwhelmingly
supported the initiative is correct. is will be done by comparing data from exit polls showing the
breakdown of the vote by race and comparing the black vote to the California electorate as a whole,
1 (Bowen, 2004)
80 81
of Black Studies, titled Hating the Sin but not the Sinner: A Study About Heterosexism and
Religious Experiences Among Black Men, written by Pamela Valera and Tonya Taylor focuses on
the experiences and feelings among black men who engage in homosexual activity. e study also
focuses on the participants attitudes towards homosexuals and how their community and the Black
Church have shaped them.
Data
Data sources are heavily relied on to discover the answer to the proposed questions. e
vast majority of the data presented in this paper have come from the aforementioned journals.
e main poll analyzed in the paper is the exit poll conducted by the National Election Pool in
California on the day of the election in 2008. e poll was obtained on the Los Angeles Times
website and is the basis for comparison with other polls for the majority of the paper. ere are
several post-election polls and electorate analysis provided by David Binder Research and used for
comparison and analysis in the paper. ese polls were funded by Equality California and were
found in the article written by Egan & Sherrill. A post-election poll provided by Survey USA is also
analyzed. e poll was also obtained from the article written by Egan & Sherrill. In addition the
paper utilizes several pre-election polls conducted by the Los Angeles Times, Survey USA, and the
Public Policy Institute of California that are compared to the exit polls and the post-election polls.
e polls were obtained in the article written by Abrajano. Data is also presented on the topics that
have been calculated by Egan & Sherrill based on other sources. Ocial election results provided by
the California Secretary of State are also examined. ese data are compared and analyzed in order
to either conrm or deny media reports that black voters overwhelmingly supported Proposition 8
and are also used to examine potential reasons black voters may reject same-sex marriage.
Findings
Although not the largest racial minority in the state of California, African-Americans
have received the most attention in the aftermath of the 2008 election. is attention is due to the
signicant increase in turnout among African-Americans in the 2008 election compared to the
2004 election, which can be primarily attributed to a black candidate running on the Democratic
Partys presidential ticket. In a National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll conducted in California after
the 2004 election, it was estimated that African-Americans made up approximately six percent
and then examining the possible reasons that black voters voted the way they did.
Existing Literature
Sources used include a variety of articles published in academic journals written on
the subjects that are discussed. An article published in Political Research Quarterly by Dr. Marisa
Abrajano, titled Are Blacks and Latinos Responsible for the Passage of Proposition 8? Analyzing
Voter Attitudes on Californias Proposal to Ban Same-Sex Marriage in 2008, discusses the eect
that black, Hispanic, and Asian voters had on the Proposition 8 outcome. Dr. Abrajano examines
the breakdown of the Proposition 8 vote by race and attempts to determine through statistics
whether the black and Latino vote swayed the Proposition in favor of passage. An article published
in the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Journal written by Dr. Patrick J. Egan and Dr. Kenneth
Sherrill, titled Californias Proposition 8: What happened, and what does the future hold?
examines the entire vote on Proposition 8 and includes a detailed examination of a variety of
polls and creates calculations based on the data they present. An article published in the American
Behavioral Scientist Journal titled e Bradley Eect: Mediated Reality of Race and Politics in
the 2008 Presidential Election, written by Dr. J. Gregory Payne, discusses the Bradley Eect
and its possible implications in the 2008 election. ough the article specically focuses on how
the Bradley Eect could have inuenced polling done on the presidential election, Dr. Paynes
insights and knowledge on the topic can also enhance the analysis done in regards to Proposition
8. An article published in Public Opinion Quarterly, titled Black-White Dierences in Attitudes
Toward Homosexuality and Gay Rights, written by Dr. Gregory B. Lewis discusses the reasons
why people in the black community may experience higher rates of homophobia than people in
the white community, specically pointing to the inuence of the Black Church on the black
communities views towards homosexuals. An article published in the Culture, Health & Sexuality
Journal, titled Homophobia, Hypermasculinity and the U.S. Black Church, written by Dr. Elijah
G. Ward specically discusses the issue of hypermasculinty in the black community, its roots,
and how it eects black opinion towards gays and lesbians. An article published in e Journal of
Gay and Lesbian Social Services, titled Marginalization by the Marginalized: Race, Homophobia,
Heterosexism, and the Problem of the 21st Century, written by Angelique C. Harris discusses
a range of factors contributing to the black communitys negative view towards homosexuality
and her ndings are used in depth in this paper. Her paper serves as a great resource to anyone
wishing to learn about this issue in an in-depth manner. Finally, a study published in the Journal
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue I Winter 2013 Rupp Black Voting Behavior and Californias Proposition 8
82 83
surveyed approximately 1,000 voters in the election (including 266 African-American, Latino, and
Asian voters in order to represent the demographics of the voters in the election), the results were
far less drastic than the NEP poll (Egan & Sherrill, 2009). Table 2 shows the percentage of African-
Americans who voted in favor of Proposition 8 compared to California as a whole.
Table 2:
Proposition 8 Results by Race
Yes No
Black Voters 58% 42%
All Voters 5 1% 49%
Source: DBR Survey of California Voters for Equality California 11/6-16
e nding shows African-Americans were only six points more likely to vote in favor
of Proposition 8 then was the state of California as a whole - a much less alarming gure than the
National Election Polls 18 point gap. Additionally, polling conducted before the election by the
Los Angeles Times, Survey USA, and the Public Policy Institute of California show similar results to
the DBR poll.
5
Table 3 shows pre-election polling data on support for Proposition 8 by a potential
voters race.
Table 3:
Preelection Polling: Percentage of Likely Voters Supporting Proposition 8 by Race
Los Angeles Times 5/20 Survey USA 10/17 PPIC 10/1
Black 82.20% 58% 52.60%
Latino 60.80% 47% 56.70%
White 49.20% 48% 48%

Source: LA Times, Survey USA, Public Policy Institute of California (Obtained from Marisa
Abrajano)

e pre-election survey data show us a wide variety of results for all the diering
races depicted. Specically for African-Americans, the data from all three polls show support
5 (Abrajano, 2010).
of all voters in the state.
2
In 2008, an exit poll conducted in California by the same organization
estimated that African-Americans comprised ten percent of all voters in the state, a four percent
jump from the previous presidential election.
3
is four-point increase has given rise to the
hypothesis that an increase in turnout among black voters could have potentially swung the vote
in favor of Proposition 8. In order for this to be true, the exit poll data would also have to support
the hypothesis that black voters supported Proposition 8 in greater numbers than the California
electorate as a whole. When looking at the 2008 NEP exit poll, which surveyed over 2,500
California voters at 30 voting precincts on Election Day and over 100 absentee voters, the data
show a remarkable gap between black voters and the electorate as a whole when it comes to support
for Proposition 8.
4
Table 1 shows the percentage of African-Americans voting for Proposition 8
compared to California as a whole.
Table 1:
Yes No
All Voters 52% 48%

Source: National Election Pool Exit Poll 11/4
ese data, which show an 18 point gap in support for Proposition 8 between black
voters and the state as a whole, seem to support the notion that the black vote may have played a
signicant role in the initiatives passage. e NEP poll is funded and conducted by the majority
of major news networks and media sources (ABC, AP, CNN, FOX, and NBC) and is the poll that
would most likely be referenced by these media sources when discussing the breakdown of the vote.
Looking only at this poll, it is easy to conclude that African-Americans could have swung the vote
in favor of Proposition 8. However, jumping to this conclusion based on this poll alone would
prove unwise.
In a poll conducted two days after the election by David Binder Research (DBR), which
2 (Edison & Mitofsky, 2008)
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
84 85
in favor of Proposition 8 two weeks after the election.
Table 4:
Yes No
All Voters 49% 51%

Source: Survey USA Post-election Poll 11/19 (Obtained from Patrick Egan & Kenneth
Sherrill)
Comparing the overall percentages that the three polls give for the passage of Proposition
8 can also show this potential inaccuracy. e NEP poll states that 70 percent of African-American
voters voted for Proposition 8 and predicted it would pass 52 to 48 percent, which was the ocial
gure. e DBR poll states that 58 percent of African-American voters voted for Proposition 8 and
gives it passage at 51 to 49 percent, slightly o of the ocial results. e Survey USA poll states
that only 41 percent of African-Americans voted in favor of Proposition 8 and gives the aggregate
support as 49 percent in favor and 51 percent opposed, meaning the Proposition should have failed.
In both of the polls conducted after the election that showed black voters less likely to be in favor
of the Proposition, the projected results did not match up to the ocial results. e NEP poll,
stating that African-American voters voted overwhelmingly for the Proposition, matches up with
the ocial results perfectly. It is reasonable to believe that the NEP poll may not be completely
accurate, but its assertion that African-American voters voted overwhelmingly for Proposition 8 is
valid.
If partisanship is indeed the single greatest predictor of a persons voting behavior,
why did African-American votersthe Democratic partys most reliable voting blocseemingly
diverge from the party norm on an issue that is considered by many to be divided along partisan
lines? In order for this question to be relevant, it needs to be established that there is a clear divide
between Democrats and Republicans on the issue. Table 5 shows the vote on Proposition 8 by party
aliation.
for the proposition anywhere between 82 and 45 percent, although the mean of the three polls
is 58 percent in favor, which concurs with the data brought forth by DBR. In an analysis of the
Proposition 8 vote by Dr. Patrick Egan and Dr. Kennith Sherrill, the pair reason that surveys
conducted just before and just after Election Day found much smaller dierences in support for
Proposition 8 between African Americans and voters as a whole than did the NEP exit poll. e
NEP result should thus be treated as an outlier that overstates black support for Proposition 8.
6

Egan are Sherrill are correct in saying that, just by looking at the data found in pre-
election polls and in polls conducted just after the election, the NEP poll certainly seems to be
an outlier when it comes to the black vote. However, they do not account for the possible reasons
that post-election surveys may have yielded lower results than the NEP exit poll. A phenomenon
known as the Bradley Eect could have accounted for the decreasing African-American support
found in the two prominent polls taken after the election. e Bradley Eect proposes that voters
will lie to pollsters about who they plan to vote for in order to not seem racist. Its name is derived
from a 1982 gubernatorial election where African-American Tom Bradley was defeated by his
white opponent even though Bradley was far ahead in the polls taken prior to the election. People
reasoned that white voters, in order to not seem racist, falsely told pollsters that they intended to
vote for Bradley and that this is what accounted for his large lead in the polls.
7
e post-election
polls being examined took place a week after the election at the earliest. In this time frameafter
the election and before the pollthe media had time to perpetuate the story that the black vote was
instrumental in the passage of Proposition 8, fueling anger in many of the initiatives opponents.
Many wondered how a minority group who went to the polls in great numbers to elect a member
of their own group to the highest possible political oce, could at the same time allegedly deny
another group its rights. is could have potentially caused a good number of black voters who
did indeed vote for Proposition 8 to report to pollsters that they voted against the proposition in
order to avoid looking like they do not support hay marriage. is would essentially be the same as
white voters attempting not to seem racist by lying in a pre-election poll. In the Survey USA study
published two weeks after the election, a far greater number of African-Americans reported voting
against Proposition 8, possibly showing that as the media had more time to circulate the story of
African-American support for the Proposition, more African-American voters felt uncomfortable
divulging their true vote to pollsters. Table 4 shows the percentage of black voters indicating a vote
6 (Egan & Sherrill, 2009)
7 (Payne, 2010)
86 87
It is also accepted that Black voters are more likely to side with the Democratic Party
while voting than any other group of people for any party. Why then did black voters split so far
away from the Democratic Party on the Proposition 8 vote? Many believe the answer lies in Table 6.
Table 6 shows that as expected, partisanship is the strongest indicator of a voters
preference towards the Proposition, with religion coming in at a fairly close third. e commonly
held belief is that black voters broke away from the partisan norm on this issue because they were
instead guided by their religious values. As shown in Table 7, black voters in California were more
likely than any other race to report going to church frequently.
Table 7:
Frequency of Attendance of Religious Services by Race and Ethnicity
% Attending Services Weekly
Asian 40%
Black 57%
Latino 47%
White 42%
In an article on homophobia in the black community, Elijah Ward states, the black
church in the USA is widely recognized as the central, oldest and most inuential institution in
the black community.
8
He contends that, because the black church is so inuential, its views
on homosexuality, which are more often negative than positive, have spread through the black
community as a whole. e reasons for the black churchs condemnation of homosexuality are
deeply intertwined with slavery, white racism, and the lasting sentiments these two issues have
left with the black community.
9
Due to their reliance on direct scripture during times of slavery,
black churches tend to teach and believe the direct words of the Bible as it has historically oered
comfort and consolation to them in times of despair.
10
Since the Bible speaks out directly against
homosexuality, it is no surprise that anti-gay feelings are so persistent in the black community. It
is also no surprise that homophobia is highest among blacks that say they go to church and pray
8 (Ward, 2005)
9 Ibid
10 Ibid
Table 5:
Proposition 8 Results by Party Aliation
Yes No
Democrat 36% 64%
Republican 82% 18%

Source: National Election Pool Exit Poll 11/4
e data clearly show a large divide between Democratic and Republican voters on the
issue, with Republicans overwhelmingly supporting Proposition 8 and Democrats overwhelmingly
opposing it (albeit by a smaller margin, which could potentially be attributed to the Black vote).
Comparing the gures from the NEP poll and the results by party aliation it shows that African-
American voters voted nearly opposite from aggregate Democrats. e black vote actually resembled
the Republican Partys vote very closely. It is commonly accepted among political scientists that
partisanship is the greatest predictor of voting behavior, and the data from the Proposition 8 vote
supports this. Table 6 shows the greatest inuences on a voters choice in the election.
Table 6:
e Impact of Voter Characteristics on the Proposition 8 Vote
Percent of Votes Aected by Characteristic
PID 15.2
Ideology 14.6
Religiosity 11.8
Age 8.7
Race 5.5
Gender 4.9

Source: Calculations by Egan & Sherrill based on data obtained from the Center of Urban Research at
the Graduate Data Center, CUNY
88 89
adopted by many black men. Homosexual activity is viewed by many, not only in the black
community, but also in the white community, as something that is eeminate or something that is
going against the traditional cultural idea of masculinity. It makes sense then that black men, and
the black community as a whole, who exhibit hypermasculinity, would be more prone than their
white counterparts to be opposed to homosexuality. is cultural tendency to be opposed to that
which is not masculine has ended up inuencing the most important institution in regards to the
black community in the United States: the Black Church.
Being the most inuential institution in the black community in the United States, the
Black Churchs views on homosexuality have shaped the communitys views on the subject. In a
study on straight black men who engaged in homosexual activity, Pamela Valera and Tonya Taylor
concluded that the Black Churchs condemnation of homosexual activity was the major factor
when participants views on homosexuality were concerned.
16
All men who participated in the
study attended church regularly, keeping in line with the idea that the black community in America
is extremely religious, and most men reported that their churches routinely spoke out against
homosexual culture and actions.
17
One participant went so far as to say that he believed that the
church would accept former drug dealers, crack heads, and child molesters with less hesitation than
they would accept a homosexual.
18
Homosexuality is considered by many in the black community
to be a taboo topic that the Church and the community are hesitant to address.
19
It stands to reason
that the sociological, historical, and religious factors that make the black community in America
less open to homosexual culture and practices, can also be attributed the overwhelming support
black voters in the state of California showed for Proposition 8. It is important to note that while
anti-homosexual sentiments are particularly high in the black community, these sentiments are not
unique. White churches and white culture also exhibit frequent condemnations and persecutions
of homosexual culture and practices, and can also explain how the black community has shaped
some of its views. e things discussed in previous paragraphs are factors that enhance anti-gay
sentiments in the black community.
Conclusion
It is apparent that the data provided in this paper support the notion that black voters
16 (Valera & Taylor, 2010)
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
19 (Harris, 2009)
frequently.
11
Reliance on direct scripture however, is not the single reason why the Black Church
preaches against homosexuality.
In addition to religion, there are various sociological and historical factors that may
contribute to the prevalence of homophobia in the black community. After suering centuries
of slavery and racism, in which black males were often humiliated and made to be subservient
to white males, it is now believed that the black community suers from hypermasculinity.
12

In an article exploring the roots of homophobia in the African American community, Angelique
Harris explains this phenomenon in detail. She asserts that today, African American men and
women are held to the white, western, patriarchal, capitalist standards of success as it pertains to
gender roles, even though historically they have been denied the ability to meet these standards.
13

Slavery is at the very root of this. In order to justify slavery and the atrocities that wealthy white
men and women committed against blacks, blacks were portrayed, in the minds of white slave
owners, as purely being property, lacking any semblance of humanity. During the times of slavery,
black men were not permitted to play the traditional white masculine role in the family. e
white slave owner was the breadwinner; he provided food, shelter and protection for the family
of the black male. Additionally, since slaves were viewed as property, their marriages and family
meant nothing to many white owners, who would rape and beat black women while their spouses
could do nothing to protect them. Even after slavery was abolished, black men still had diculty
playing the traditional masculine role in the family. Racist hiring practices and unequal educational
opportunities left most black men with low-paying jobs, requiring their wives and children to enter
the labor force in order for the family to survive economically.
14
is clearly goes against the white,
western standards that the black community was being held to. Black men, having struggled for
centuries in America to live up to the western standards of masculinity, have resorted to proving
their masculinity in ways that they can control such as strength, athleticism, and high rates of sexual
potency.
15
e display of these kinds of masculine characteristics can be categorized as a display
of what Ward calls hypermasculinity. e values and practices of the LGBT community, gay men
in particular, are perceived as being in direct contradiction with the culture of hypermasculinity
11 (Lewis, 2003)
12 (Lewis, 2003)
13 (Harris, 2009)
14 Ibid
15 (Harris, 2009)
90 91
marriage position than existed in California. Black voters, however, were far less enthusiastic
about the measure, with about fty percent of voters opposing. ese results are far less dramatic
than Californias results in 2008, but continue to show the pattern of black voters breaking with
the party they so overwhelmingly identify with on the issue of same-sex marriage. ey do show
however, that attitudes in the black community may be softening on the issue. Seventy percent of
black voters opposed same-sex marriage in California compared to fty percent in Maryland. Going
forward, it will be interesting to look at future ballot measures dealing with same-sex marriage and
see how black voters in states with large urban populations, such as California and Maryland, will
vote on this issue.
in California not only increased their turnout as a percentage of the voting electorate in the 2008
general election, but they also overwhelmingly lent their support to Proposition 8. is support
is unusual because black votersthe most consistent supporters of the Democratic Partybroke
away from their party and essentially split the ticket by voting for both the Democratic candidate
Barack Obama and Proposition 8. It stands to reason that as a result of a cultural background,
including the hardships of slavery and racism, the black community has accepted a culture of
hypermasculinity that perpetuates anti-homosexuality. Furthermore, this homophobia has made
its way into black churches, which were already speaking out against homosexuality due to their
cultural reliance on literal biblical translations. e combination of these two factors, in addition to
the fact the black voters in California attend religious services at a higher rate than any other racial
group, help explain the prevalence of homophobia in the black community, and thus explain the
overwhelming support that black voters in California showed for Proposition 8.
Moving forward, it will be interesting to see where the black community goes in respect
to its attitudes on homosexuality. e Proposition 8 results have brought attention to the prevalence
of homophobia in the black community, and there are signs that feelings are softening on the issue.
Recently, the United States has seen President Barack Obamathe most prominent black leader
in the worldopenly support same-sex marriage and only months ago the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People drafted a resolution to do the same. As the President and
the nation continue to evolve on the issue of same-sex marriage, it will be interesting to see if the
black community will follow suit and overcome the factors contributing to anti-gay sentiments in
their community.
e nation witnessed a landmark election for the gay rights movement during the 2012
election. ree states had measures on their ballots that would permit the legalization of same-
sex marriage in their states and all three measures were passed, the rst time in the history of the
United States that voters have voted for same-sex marriage. e state of Maryland was one of the
states that had such a measure, and is a state that oers an interesting comparison to California in
2008. Maryland, like California, is a traditionally reliable democratic state where President Obama
won by wide margins in 2008 and again in 2012. Maryland, also like California, has a substantial
urban population with large number of black voters in Baltimore and the Washington D.C. area.
According to the Washington Post, using exit poll information gathered by the Associated Press,
about ninety percent of Marylanders who voted for President Obama also voted in favor of same-
sex marriage, showing a stronger correlation between the Democratic Party and a pro same-sex
92 93
Bibliography:
Abrajano, M. (2010). Are blacks and Latinos responsible for the passage of Proposition 8?
Analyzing Voter Attitudes on Californias Proposal to Ban Same-Sex Marriage in 2008
[Electronic version]. Political Research Quarterly, 63, 922-932.
doi:10.1177/1065912910373555
Associated Press (11/6/12). Exit polls: Maryland voters who backed Obama also favored same-sex
marriage. Washington Post. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
exit-polls-backers-of-same-sex-marriage-in-md-support-obama-opponents-back-
romney/2012/11/06/f6135834-288f-11e2-aaa5-ac786110c486_story.html
Brown, D. California Secretary of State (2008). Statement of Vote November 4, 2008, General
Election. N.p. November 2008. Web. <sos.ca.gov>
Edison & Mitofsky (2004). National and California exit poll results. Cable News Network. N.p.
November 2004, Web. <cnn.com
Edison & Mitofsky (2008). National and California exit poll results. Los Angeles Times. N.p.
November 2008. Web. <latimes.com>
Egan, P. J., & Sherrill, K. (2009). Californias Proposition 8: What happened, and what does the
future hold? National Gay and Lesbian Task Force.
Harris, A. (2009). Marginalization by the Marginalized: Race, Homophobia, Heterosexism, and
e Problem of the 21
st
Century [Electronic Version]. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social
Services, 21. 430-448
Lewis, Gregory B. (2003). Black-White dierences in attitudes toward homosexuality and gay
rights [Electronic version]. e Public Opinion Quarterly, 67, 59-78. doi:
10.1086/346009
Payne, J. G. (2010). e Bradley Eect: mediated reality of race and politics in the 2008 U.S.
Presidential Election[electronic version]. American Behavioral Scientist, 54, 417-435.
doi:10.1177/0002764210381713
Valera, P. & Taylor, T. (2010). Hating the Sin but not the Sinner: A study about Heterosexism and
Religious experiences among Black Men [Electronic Version]. Journal of Black Studies, 42.
106-122
Ward, E. G. (2005). Homophobia, hypermasculinity and the U.S. black church [Electronic
Version]. Culture, Health & Sexuality, 7, 493-504. doi: 10.1080/13691050500151248
94 95
Prosecute or Pardon?:
What Impunity in El Salvador Says About
Transitional Justice Everywhere
Adam Schaer
Middlebury College
Successful transitional justice prosecutionsthe human rights trials that follow a states transition from
authoritarianism to democracyhave increased dramatically in recent years. Nonetheless, as many as half
of all transitional countries fail to prosecute their former leaders for crimes committed in oce. Why? After
nding prevailing structural and constructivist explanations incomplete, this article analyzes the continued
impunity in El Salvador in order to test a new, composite theory explaining the success or failure of tran-
sitional justice. Calling the new theory Dynamic Structuralism, the article nds that both traditional
power distributions and civil society activity are relevant in determining the success of transitional justice.
However, the paper also concludes that constructivist advocacy cannot overcome all structural impediments;
the Salvadoran experience shows that unfavorable power distributions and institutional weakness can prove
impenetrable to advocacy eorts. After analyzing the Salvadoran case, the paper concludes with recommen-
dations for advocates of transitional justice.
An Introduction to Transitional Justice
I
n the twentieth century, more people were killed at the hands of their own leaders than in
all interstate combat combined. (Kim and Sikkink 2010) A new form of war took hold in
the second half of the century, and the line between soldier and civilian became increasingly
obscured. Guerrilla attacks replaced the traditional conceptions of warfare, with civilians becoming
viable targets. And while international organizations scrambled to codify irrevocable human rights,
states throughout the world continued to engage in mass repression campaigns against their own
people. Couching their justications in the rhetoric of security and necessity, few leaders were ever
tried for their crimes, and many remain actively involved in their countrys politics to this day.
But not all remained immune. In the decades following the ird Wave of democratization,
post-conict states began to prosecute their former authoritarian leaders in an eort to provide
national healing and prevent resurgent repression. While the change was neither immediate nor
uniform, in hindsight, it was signicant (see Graph 1). Of the 66 democratic transitions since 1974,
48 have included some form of transitional justice prosecutions. Focusing on trials in particular,
Kathryn Sikkink has dubbed this newfound judicialization of human rights abuses a justice cascade,
rightly arguing that it represents an emerging norm of individual criminal accountability for state-
sponsored abuse. e trend eroded the long-standing precedent of sovereign immunity, or the legal
norm that a head of state cannot be tried for crimes committed while in oce.
96 97
Structural Arguments
Structural arguments explain the occurrence of transitional justice trials as a function of
interests, power, and a countrys macro-political conditions. In his seminal work e ird Wave,
Samuel Huntington (1991) argued that post-transition trials were shaped almost exclusively by
politics, political openings and the post-authoritarian power balance. From this perspective, states
pursue transitional justice measures only when structural conditions permit itthat is, when strong
impediments to prosecution, such as the lingering inuence of authoritarian elites or political
instability, are absent. Snyder and Vinjuamuri (2003) echo Huntingtons conclusions, arguing that
trials work best when they are needed least, or, in other words, once levels of abuse have declined
and signicant democratization has already occurred. By contrast, states that retain authoritarian
elements, or which lack guaranteed democratic protections and independent judiciaries, will either
fail to pursue prosecutions or nd their eorts to do so stymied. In general, then, structural arguments
posit that prosecutions are most likely when the power balance favors liberal democratic elements over
authoritarian ones and political opportunities abound, thanks to strong and independent institutions
and a systematic protection of civil liberties.
While structural arguments are a useful starting point, they fail to explain successful
prosecutions in cases in which the structural situation itself was less than optimal. Both Argentina
and Peru, for example, prosecuted their former leaders even though authoritarian elementsthe
military in Argentina and the fujimorista party in Peruretained considerable inuence. Critical in
these successful outcomes was how civil society actors and behavioral norms inuenced the political
context, despite the post-authoritarian distribution of power. ese countries experiences suggest
that post-transition environments are less static and decisive than structural arguments imply;
interested actors, from supranational legal institutions to domestic advocacy groups, can help shape
state interests and behavior. In other words, while the structural situation may provide the broad
rules of the game, actors have signicant leeway to lobby for prosecutions within an environment
that is best described as dynamic, and not tied to any singleor staticstructure.
Constructivist Arguments
Whereas structural arguments stress the importance of interests and power in facilitating
prosecutions, constructivist arguments emphasize the role of behavioral norms. eir chief claim is
that norms of accountability or transitional justiceadvanced by civil society groups, neighboring
transitional justice movements, and international legal precedentscan prompt other states to
Graph 1: e Justice Cascade
Source: Sikkink and Kim (2010)
Despite this recent surge in transitional justice prosecutions, many countries remain
mired in impunity. What explains these divergent outcomes? Why have some post-conict countries
had more success prosecuting their former leaders than others? What are the most salient factors
determining a post-conict countrys transitional justice trajectory? Looking specically at domestic,
high-level prosecutionsi.e., the intellectual authors of abuses, rather than simply those following
ordersthese are the questions this article seeks to answer.
Prevailing Explanations
Although many scholars study the eects of transitional justice prosecutions, few explore
why such prosecutions occur, succeed, or fail (Kim 2012). Of those that do, the arguments they have
produced tend to fall into two camps. e rst cluster of explanations stresses the overarching structural
factors that promote or impede human rights abuse trials, such as the extent of democratization and
the distribution of power. e second cluster adopts a constructivist perspective and stresses the
role that pro-accountability actors and norms of behavior play in inducing transitional justice trials.
Neither approach, however, provides a completely satisfying answer.
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue I Winter 2013 Schaer Prosecute or Pardon?
98 99
In the following section, I will test this framework on a case of failed accountability: El
Salvador. At the time of this writing, ten years have passed since the end of Latin Americas bloodiest
civil war, and while some lower-level and foreign convictions have been handed down, no high-level
Salvadoran ocials have been charged in domestic courts. Using the dynamic structural framework
as a guide and comparing the Salvadoran experience with comparatively more successful cases, I will
show that only this composite theory can fully explain the incidence of transitional justice.
e Salvadoran Civil War
e roots of the Salvadoran civil war stretched back decades into a history dened by
intense racial and socioeconomic stratication. By the late 1970s, those tensions turned violent: leftist
groups, unhappy with the new Junta governments lack of reforms, commenced a guerrilla war. e
Marxist insurgents soon united to form the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN,
and the state quickly responded. e war unocially began with the 1980 assassination of peace
advocate Archbishop Oscar Romero and subsequent massacre days later at his public funeral, where
a barrage of bullets took between 30 and 50 lives. Widely agreed to be the work of Major Roberto
dAubuisson, no successful judicial investigation into the state-sponsored murders was ever completed
(Collins 2012). Ocial state security forces, along with loosely aliated death squads, continued the
ruthless anti-subversive campaign, killing thousands of rebels and civilians caught in the crossre as
torture, assassination, and mass murder became commonplace. After over a decade of violence, in
1992 a lasting peace was nally secured with a United Nations-brokered peace agreement, but not
before 75,000 Salvadorans lost their lives95 percent of whom were killed by the state and state-
sponsored death squads (Howland 2008; see also Popkin 2000 and Stedman et al. 2002).
El Salvador in Perspective
To explain why, despite extensive abuses, no major domestic prosecutions have occurred,
it is helpful to rst look to the rest of Latin America. A brief examination of the region shows that
El Salvadors dearth of prosecutions is somewhat abnormal; over the past three decades, Latin
America has led the global transitional justice movement. e existence of a regional trend is hardly
coincidental either; recent scholarship nds that neighboring states actions are a signicant cause
of transitional justice, as constructivist norms are diused between neighbors (Kim 2012). So one
variablediusionis present in the El Salvador case; yet prosecution still did not occur.
Some have argued that El Salvador lacked the other constructivist variable necessary for
conform and undertake their own prosecutions (Kim 2012). According to Finnemore and Sikkink
(1998), norms help translate peoples ideas about what is good and what should be in the world
[into] political reality. Norms based on moral claims, such as an abhorrence of human rights
violations, can inuence state rulers. is is especially true when they are adopted by neighboring
states, and are thus diused from one regionally proximate or culturally similar state to another, or
are advocated for by civil society groups and transnational networks who employ their agency to
promulgate norms and shame government leaders who fail to abide by them.
Constructivist arguments alone, however, are analytically insucient because they overlook
the inuence that interests and power actually exert. ey cannot entirely explain why countries like
El Salvador failed to bring human rights violators to trial despite international normative pressures to
do so, or why Argentina slipped from accountability to impunity and then returned to accountability
within a matter of years. Moreover, focusing only on domestic or transnational advocates of
accountability norms tends to obscure the limiting environments in which these advocates operate, as
even the strongest accountability movement can be halted by intense state repression.
A Dynamic Structural Approach
Given the strengths and shortcomings of the prevailing perspectives, I propose a dynamic
structural approach to explain the incidence of transitional justice prosecutions. By combining both
constructivist and structural arguments, this blended approach captures the full range of forces that
shape transitional justice trajectories. Put simply, the dynamic structural approach posits that when
structural conditions favor it, and when there is organized and concerted advocacy for it, we can
expect prosecutions. is theory lends the following four variables and hypotheses:
1. Political opportunity structures: Stable, suciently democratized states with independent
institutions will provide political, judicial, and societal openings more conducive to
prosecutions.
2. Power balance: States in which power rests rmly with pro-accountability leaders, and
where the former regime is no longer inuential, will be more successful in pursuing
prosecutions.
3. Actor agency: States that face organized and eective domestic and international lobbying
campaigns will be more likely to pursue prosecutions.
4. Diusion eect: When geographically proximate and culturally similar states have pursued
prosecutions, new transitional states will be more likely to do the same.
100 101
have committed abuses too (Popkin 2000). ough technically expelled from national politics, the
military also retained some political power and kept close ties to the ARENA party (Stedman et al.
2002). rough a strictly power-focused lens, prosecution seemed a near impossibility.
Power considerations aside, political openings for prosecution were equally limited.
Institutional impetus for prosecutionsessential for providing the political opening necessary for
prosecutionfurther discouraged accountability eorts. e Chapultepec reforms failed to end
judicial corruption and depoliticize the courts, robbing transitional justice advocates of even apolitical
allies in the Salvadoran state (Collins 2010). e Salvadoran judiciarys unique structural makeup
further limited political opportunities available to accountability actors. Because the ruling party
appoints the prosecutor who alone decides which cases will be heard, pro-accountability prosecutors
were rarely chosen and human rights cases rarely heard (Collins 2010). Since the accords did nothing
to change this pattern of institutionalized politicization, judicial corruption remains a serious
roadblock for human rights prosecutions of any kind (Bateman 2012). Furthermore, what reforms
did occur failed to change the informal structures of the state. ough on paperand partially in
practice1992 brought changes to the war-torn country, shadows of its authoritarian past lingered
on as the military retained its inuence, impunity for state crimes continued to be the norm, and
authoritarian actors remained within the halls of power (Call 2003).
A relative lack of interest in prosecutions among Salvadorans further limited political
opportunities, as advocacy eorts fell not only on corrupt institutions but also on deaf ears. e
backbone of civil societythe citizens they representwere unmoved by the idea of transitional
justice. More pressing crises, such as the rise in violent crime and the failing economy, overshadowed
calls for accountability. Popular opinion tended to see transitional justice as a distraction from
democratization and growth rather than a vehicle for its realization. is unfavorable structural
foundation will prove a recurrent problem as we explore the subsequent failed attempts at prosecution.

Accountability Eorts Fail
e Jesuit Trial
Eorts at lower-level accountability in the Jesuit case illustrate how structural factors
decisively limited accountability prospects. ough internationally driven, the 1989 brutal
murder of a small group of Jesuits induced one of the few movements for accountability. After a
year of intransigence and government cover-up, the investigation was restarted in 1990 when U.S.
Representative John Joseph Moakley published a report alleging that the killings resulted from major
prosecution: domestic advocacy. Comparing El Salvadors failures to Chiles legal proceedings against
former dictator Augusto Pinochet (who died before facing trial), Cath Collins emphasizes El Salvadors
insucient domestic advocacy. e countrys small and disorganized human rights community, she
argues, did not (or could not) promote accountability as eectively as Chiles. Successes in Argentina,
and most recently Peru, also support this theory. ese countries both presented inuential advocacy
movements to combat authoritarian political parties, resurgent militaries and institutional weakness,
ultimately convicting their former leaders for human rights abuses (Burt 2009; Brysk 1994; Collins
2010). Together, Chile, Peru and Argentina demonstrated that structural factors do notentirely
determine outcomes; civil society, too, can force accountability.
If Collins explanation is correct, then, the inverse must also be true; with a greater
civil society push from below, Salvadoran trials would have occurred. e following analysis will
show, however, that this conclusion is incorrect. While constructivist pressures can indeed help
deliver prosecution, El Salvador demonstrates that at times no amount of advocacy is sucient.
Using counterfactuals, the following analysis will demonstrate that a stronger domestic civil society
would also have failed. us El Salvador demonstrates that Huntingtons structural theory remains
applicable, albeit only in the most extreme of cases.
Peace without Defeat
Although the 1992 peace agreement ultimately brought an end to the violence, it laid
a foundation hostile to transitional justice. On January 16, 1992, peace was nally brought to El
Salvador in the form of the Chapultepec Accord. In addition to securing a lasting peace, it imposed a
cease-re, demobilized both sides, and brought the FMLN fully into the civil (and political) sphere as
a legitimate actor. It also mandated elections and reforms of the police, military and state institutions,
including the judiciary, and provided some plans for socioeconomic reform. However, the Salvadoran
transition is especially interesting because, unlike in Peru, Argentina and Chile, an end to hostilities
did not mean total regime change. Rather, in El Salvador both the government and subversive forces
remained inuential; the former rulers retained control of the government while the guerillas became
an ocial political party. e accords, however, did not mandate a new Salvadoran societyor even
state. e major political forces during the warthe right wing ARENA party, which had ties to
the armed forces, and the leftist FMLNremained legitimate political actors in the post-conict
state. Both were, unsurprisingly, unwilling to explore the abuses committed: President Cristiani
and his military commanders were implicated in numerous murders, and the FMLN was known
102 103
government nally acquiesced, and even then, it was in name only (Popkin 2000). Following the
letter more than the spirit of the report, the military eliminated implicated ocers through retirement
and honorable discharges, never admitting guilt. While the commission realized the tangible goal
of excluding these potentially dangerous elements from the armed forces, it did not achieve the
greater symbolic goal of indicting the military for its role in the Civil Wara move which could have
stimulated prosecution (Collins 2010).
e experience showed that the Salvadoran structural situation was not impenetrable, and
the extreme costs leveraged by the Clinton administration$11 million, equal to roughly one percent
of the Salvadoran governments annual revenue
1
proved too high to continue total impunity. But as
in the Jesuit case, this accountability was rather tepid, and intense lobbying achieved only marginal
steps toward justice. Under strong international pressure, structural impediments were somewhat
malleable but not entirely eliminable; a stronger domestic civil society could not have imposed greater
costs to impunity, and also would have likely failed. If even Clintons $11 million price tag could not
secure a non-judicial acknowledgement of guilt, how could domestic advocacy have secured a judicial
conviction?
Twenty years of Continued Impunity
Since these failed attempts at accountability, little has changed to encourage prosecutions.
Despite the recent emergence of transitional justice norms, El Salvador has yet to experience a
post-transitional justice wave, or the type of prosecutions that Chile and Argentina saw decades
after transition. Structural factors in El Salvador have proven nearly insurmountable since the
transition, and until 2009, the right wing ARENA party controlled the executive. With the power
balance decisively favoring those whom prosecutions might target, transitional justice measures
have unsurprisingly gained little ground. Legalized politicization of the judiciary only augmented
the trend toward impunity, as the executive continued to use its authority to appoint prosecutors
supportive of the status quo (Collins 2010). e countrys broad amnesty law has also proved to be
nearly impenetrable, despite rulings by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
declaring such amnesties unconstitutional (Cavallaro and Brewer 2008).
A movement for accountability has not emerged, either. Over the past two decades,
civilians concerns have focused more on general criminality and violence than transitional justice
(Bateman 2012). While public resistance to reopening the wounds of the past has been a theme
1. According to data from the World Bank.
institutional problems within the armed forces and that the investigation had come to a virtual
standstill (Doggett 1992). Despite drawing intense criticism from Salvadoran political gures,
including President Cristiani, the report forced the government to restart the investigation and trial
proceedings. By October 1991, a Salvadoran court heard and ultimately reached a guilty verdict in
the case.
e trial, though, can hardly be considered a success. It did little to inspire condence
in the existing criminal justice system in El Salvador, as the jury found only one of the defendants
guilty; it did not indict the High Command for a conspiracy to obstruct justice (Doggett 1992); it
failed to secure convictions where there were already confessions; and it did not even fully investigate
the killings. Because progress in the case only came after intense international pressure, most observers
agree that the trial was merely a political move designed to placate U.S. ocials and other external
observers who wanted to see some semblance of justice in this particular case (Collins 2010).
e Jesuit trial demonstrates two key themes in transitional justice. First, even intense
lobbying campaigns can be ineective when confronting a regime entrenched in impunity. If
powerful international actors were unable to secure meaningful accountability it is unlikely that
a larger domestic advocacy movement could have. Second, transitional justice prosecutions are
impossible without the political opportunities secured by an independent and modern judiciary.
While advocacy can lead to some form of prosecution, that advocacy alone does not guarantee that
the trials will be fair. Concerted though advocacy eorts may have been, international actors were
unable to remedy a judicial system incapable of providing a fair prosecution. e Salvadoran political
systems structural failures became only more evident when UN-sponsored commissions sought to
investigate and prosecute higher-level ocials.
Clinton and the Ad Hoc Commission
e September 1992 Ad Hoc Commission, which sought to investigate and expel guilty
military ocials, is further evidence of the imposing structural limitations. Surprising many, the
commission ultimately recommended the ring of 103 ocers, including the Minister of Defense
and most of the militarys High Command (Popkin 2000).
Given El Salvadors post-transition power balance, the government did not easily accept
the commissions report. President Cristiani decried it as an attack on the institution of the armed
forces and refused to implement its recommendations (Golden 1992). It was not until U.S. President
Bill Clinton withheld $11 million in aid pending the purging of guilty members that the Salvadoran
104 105
While a Salvadoran trial is not imminent, nding Vides Casanova guilty in any court (and in
February 2012, deporting him back to El Salvador) is an important step toward accountability. A
more independent judiciary may be emerging, too, as the Salvadoran Supreme court has taken a more
activist and independent role. In June 2012, the future of the court was still unclear as a national
debate raged as to its proper role, and specically, in the appointment of justices. It has not, however,
seriously pursued transitional justice prosecutions, instead looking to check traditional power bases
in both parties.
Explaining Outcomes
While previous analyses of Argentina, Peru, and Chile demonstrated how some structural
impediments could be overcome, this analysis of El Salvador claried that others can prove to be
insurmountable. e case, however, threatens to draw competing conclusions. Structuralists might
argue that continued impunity vindicates Huntingtons original predictions: trials are determined
by power distributions, and civil society is all but irrelevant. With both major political forces in
El Salvadorthe ARENA and FMLN partiesimplicated in past crimes, power rested with those
most opposed to prosecution. Furthermore, the executives inuence over the judiciary created an
unfavorable political opportunity structure, blocking attempts to judicialize past human rights abuses.
Constructivists, on the other hand, may come to the opposite conclusion: Salvadoran impunity results
from decient domestic advocacy. El Salvador did indeed lack a civil societya factor, analyses show,
that facilitated prosecutions in other countries. After being directly targeted throughout the civil war,
Salvadoran civil society was not able to mount an eective advocacy campaign.
How do we reconcile these two theories? Is El Salvadors feeble civil society to blame for
continued impunity, or were traditional power distributions the only relevant factor? Studied together
with other scholarship on transitional justice, the El Salvador case neither vindicates nor disproves
either theory; instead it reveals the strengths and limitations of each. To fully explain the incidence of
high-level transitional justice prosecutions, the two theories must be combined into the theory I term
dynamic structuralism. e preceding analysis of El Salvador demonstrated that structural conditions
do indeed create a clear context within which advocates operate. Whatever faith scholars have in
civil society must be tempered by realpolitik analyses, as quasi-authoritarian states can quash even
concerted advocacy eorts. However, the comparison casesPeru, Chile and Argentinaall showed
that those structural conditions are not the only relevant factors as pure structuralists once had us
believe; rather, activism and norms matter. In short, it seems minimal structural limitations can be
across all three cases, in no case has it been as extreme as in El Salvador (Collins 2010). Lacking even
a vocal victims movement, civil societyoften a driver of public opinion and organizer of broader
discontentdid not emerge to make broad calls for trials. Instead of reemerging, once fear of the past
subsided, El Salvadors civil society has remained extremely sparsely populated. What small human
rights community does exist also lacks the legal expertise necessary to challenge judicial intransigence
(Collins 2010).
Internationally, though, the situation has grown far more favorable to prosecution. Norms
favoring accountabilityincluding Argentina and Chiles groundbreaking post-transitional justice
trialsdid begin to emerge. e concept of transitional justice was gaining ground both in scholarly
research and political practice, and ideas regarding transitional justice spread widely around the
turn of the century (Sikkink 2011). ese inuences, however, failed to translate into Salvadoran
trials. While she acknowledges the importance of power balance, Sikkink (2011) posits that with
time, in many cases momentum for prosecutions increased, [and] it became possible over time to
hold prosecutions even in some of the countries that had negotiated transitions. While Argentine
civil society was able to translate international trends into domestic convictions, in El Salvador, a
complementary domestic pressure for accountability never emerged. e diusion eect, even at
its height in the early 2000s, failed to unite with a domestic movement to challenge Salvadoran
impunity.
International actors also went beyond soft power attempts to secure accountability. Both
Spanish and American courts, for example, have sought to hold ocials accountable for human
rights violations in recent years. In 1999, the US-based Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA)
used the Alien Tort Claims Act to hold defense ministers Jos Guillermo Garca and Carlos Vides
Casanova liable for human rights violations. ough only a civil claim, in 2002 a Florida court found
that because the men held command responsibility, they could be sued for multiple acts of torture
committed throughout the civil war (Romagoza Arce et al. v. Garcia and Vides Casanova 2002).
In 2008, Spanish courts applied universal jurisdiction to convict lower level members of the armed
forces for violations, too. ough it lacked the evidence to convict a high level ocialPresident
Cristiani was exoneratedit still broke ground by assigning criminal responsibility to Salvadoran
actors.
ough these modest steps have yet to produce domestic prosecutions, it would be
premature to say the door has closed on Salvadoran justice. If Chile and Argentina demonstrate
anything, it is that both the structural system and human rights community are incredibly dynamic.
106 107
regional powers to multilateral organizations and international NGOs, can give edgling movements
the credibility they need to garner support and respect.
Sikkink cites norms entrepreneurs as necessary to promulgate and support developing
norms. She is, in fact, an entrepreneur herself, as her researchalong with that of other transitional
justice scholar activistsserves to inform the debate over transitional justice. While academics
should not abandon their responsibility to conduct unbiased research, they also should not be blind
to the potential eects of their studies. Sikkink, for example, directed her research on the benets of
prosecutions to a broader audience with the explicit goal of inuencing practitioners and the broader
public. By stimulating debate in and out of academic circles, scholars can counter the lingering belief
that trials destabilize transitional states. As transitional justice prosecutions become more socially
acceptable, and even expected, steps in the democratization process, states will nd it increasingly
dicult to ignore advocates calls for accountability.
Finally, though structural factors ultimately proved decisive, the El Salvador case should also
not be interpreted as evidence that advocacy eorts are useless in situations of entrenched impunity.
On the contrary, advocacy eorts canand didbring about other reforms. Public condemnation
of past abuses, even if they do not lead to prosecutions, can help to institutionalize a democratic
culture and forestall future regressions to authoritarianism (Sikkink 2011). While leaders may not
stand trial for their crimes, the more they are publically shamed, the more dicult it becomes to
remain politically inuential. Furthermore, advocacyeven while it is ineectivecan help build a
civil society infrastructure ready to act when the macro-political situation improves. is proved key
in Argentina, where civil society emerged from the dirty war ready to advocate for accountability,
even though it was silenced during the conict. In short, transitional justice advocacy need not secure
immediate results to be useful; steps made toward prosecution, either through public awareness or
more tangible truth-seeking, can provide the foundation for success once the structural situation
improves.
overcome, supporting the constructivist portion of the dynamic structuralism theory. However, when
the structural situation is exceedingly unfavorable, such as in El Salvador, civil society will likely fail;
evidence that the structural approach cannot yet be abandoned.
Recommendations for Advocates
What do these conclusions mean for advocates, both inside government and out? First,
power balance remains important. Actors need to formulateand sometimes limittheir actions
based on the post-transition distribution of power. For example, aggressively calling for prosecutions
of a still-powerful military is not necessarily the most ecient or successful approach to accountability.
Rather, the power balance must rst be brought under relative control; truth telling and human rights
education, as well as macro processes of democratization and reform, can all minimize the power of
entrenched authoritarian elements. Decisively defeating the outgoing regime would of course be
ideal, but preparations for prosecutions should not take priority over peace settlements.
Pro-accountability advocates should also focus on broadening political opportunities.
International organizations and foreign states should incentivize states to pursue aggressive
democratization programs, outside of the context of transitional justice. ese powerful entities should
use tangible stick and carrot incentives to secure democratic freedoms and establish independent
institutions, limiting guilty actors ability to disrupt democratization and accountability eorts.
Domestic advocacy groups should contribute as well and advocate not only for prosecutions, but
also for democratic reforms more broadly. Democratization is an essential means to an end, and all
groupsfrom victims groups to multilateral organizationsshould lobby for democratic reforms.
While the structural situation remains important, advocates should also prioritize capacity
building within civil society itself. Activists should coordinate campaigns among domestic and
international actors, creating coalitions to eect change. A cacophony of disparate voices is liable to
be ignored, while a single, unied, thundering voice is less readily dismissed. But the advocacy process
should start before hostilities cease so that a foundation for later justice movements can be laid. From
gathering evidence to alerting the public of crimes committed, advocacyespecially in a countrys
darkest houris essential for later success, and should not be abandoned for fear of short-term
failure. In fact, groups are likely to be ineective until political opportunities improve, but as soon as
they do, a civil society with organizational experience will be better positioned for advocacyas El
Salvadors was not. Also, during and after periods of conict, foreign entities should establish contacts
with human rights movements. Legitimacy is important, and reputable international actors, from
108 109
Howland, Todd. How El Rescate, a Small Nongovernmental Organization, Contributed to the
Transformation of the Human Rights Situation in El Salvador. Human Rights Quarterly 30,
no. 3 (2008): pp. 703757.
Huntington, Samuel P. e ird Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Kim, Hunjoon, and Kathryn Sikkink. Explaining the Deterrence Eect of Human Rights
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries1. International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 4 (2010):
939963.
Popkin, Margaret. Peace Without Justice : Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador.
University Park Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.
Sikkink, Kathryn. e Justice Cascade : How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics.
Vol. 1st ed. Projected Date: 1109. New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2011.
Snyder, Jack, and Leslie Vinjamuri. Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of
International Justice. International Security 28, no. 3 (2003): pp. 544.
Stedman, Stephen John. Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. International Security 22, no. 2
(1997): pp. 553.
Bibliography
Bateman, Joseph, March 14, 2012.
Brysk, Alison. e Politics of Human Rights in Argentina : Protest, Change, and Democratization.
Stanford Calif: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Burt, J. -M J. M. Guilty as Charged: e Trial of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori for
Human Rights Violations. e International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (2009):
384405.
Call, Charles T. Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El
Salvador. Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 4 (2003): pp. 827862.
Cavallaro, James L., and Stephanie Erin Brewer. Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation
in the Twenty-First Century: e Case of the Inter-American Court. e American Journal
of International Law 102, no. 4 (October 1, 2008): 768827.
Collins, Cath. Post-transitional Justice : Human Rights Trials in Chile and El Salvador. University
Park Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.
Doggett, Martha. Death Foretold : the Jesuit Murders in El Salvador. Washington DC: Georgetown
University Press, 1993.
El Salvador. World Bank, n.d. http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.
International Organization 52, no. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and
Contestation in the Study of World Politics (1998): pp. 887917.
Golden, Tim. SALVADORAN HINTS FIGHT OVER PURGE. New York Times, 1992.
110 111
e New Geopolitics of the Arctic
Alexander ompson
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Ohio State University
I
n 2007, a Russian submarine descended 14,000 feet to the ocean oor and planted a titanium
Russian ag in the seabed below the North Pole. Justifying this provocative act, which followed
a Russian claim of a vastly expanded maritime boundary to the north, President Vladimir Putin
stressed the need for Russia to secure its strategic, economic, scientic and defense interests in the
Arctic (BBC News 2007). While Moscow has been the most assertive, there is a noticeable shift
among all Arctic statesRussia, the United States, Canada, Norway and Denmark (representing
Greenland)to take the region more seriously as one of political and security concern. ey are
involved in multiple disputes over territory and boundaries (Byers 2009) and all have enhanced their
diplomatic focus and military capabilities in the area (Huebert 2010). Even China, with no Arctic
territory, is deploying its wealth and diplomatic clout to secure toeholds in the region (Rosenthal
2012).
e Arctic is heating upliterally and politically. Among the most dramatic impacts
of global climate change is the melting of Arctic Sea ice, a process that is occurring at an alarming
rate. In September of 2012, the extent of the ice cap reached a new record low, bottoming out
at half the average minimum for the period 1979-2000 (NSIDC 2012). For years scientists and
environmentalists have warned of the negative consequences of this phenomenon, especially its
connection to rising sea levels and lost habitat for seals, polar bears and other Arctic species. e
geopolitical consequences of a thawing Arctic, in contrast, have received less attention in the public
discourse.
What is at stake in the Arctic? Beyond the ecological impact, physical change in the region
raises important questions of national security and economic competition. First, the Arctic is home
to vast underwater resources, including sh stocks, oil and gas, and deposits of valuable minerals.
With so many shing grounds now depleted around the world, there is a scramble to exploit new
stocks and to do so with increasingly industrialized distant-water shing eets. Under the Arctic
seabed lies perhaps a quarter of the worlds untapped oil and gas reserves, a potential bonanza for
112 113
Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force in 1994, provides a valuable set of rules and mechanisms.
In particular, three vital organizations fall under the auspices of UNCLOS: the Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, which adjudicates claims falling under the treaty; the International Seabed Authority,
which grants access to seabed mining; and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
which assesses claims to extend maritime boundaries beyond 200 miles. Until ten years ago, virtually
the entire high seas portion of the Arctic Oceanbeyond any countrys 200-mile exclusive economic
zonewas frozen year-round and therefore inaccessible, thus there was little need to rely on these
mechanisms. e International Maritime Organization, a UN agency that promotes the safety of
shipping and the prevention of marine pollution, has provided a useful forum for discussing Arctic
issues that go far beyond the ve littoral sates.
ese global institutions are not likely to be sucient in the long run. One problem
with UNCLOS is that the largest Arctic state, the United States, has yet to ratify, despite support
from successive presidents and secretaries of state and from the military and business communities.
e latest eort, in the spring of 2012, was blocked by a small number of conservative senators.
is means that the United States cannot use the standard mechanisms for claiming an extended
continental shelf and seeking seabed mining rights (and cannot respond to claims by other countries
in these forums). Ultimately, successful eorts to govern the Arctic are likely to require a strong
regional component. e Arctic Council, a forum of eight governments (the ve Arctic states
plus Sweden, Iceland Finland) with participation from various indigenous peoples, has been quite
successful as a platform for discussions and the launching of joint initiatives. It is a promising venue
for the negotiation of new agreements. ese agreements should probably address single issues or
a small number of issues at a time. For example, there is currently no agreement governing shing
in the Arctic, as there is in most other high-seas regions with productive sheries. Beginning with a
relatively well-dened issue like this could help build trust among Arctic states as they grapple with
more sensitive issues.
Ultimately, the long-term solution is to tackle the climate change problem itself. Warming
in the Arctic is particularly bad news in this regard. When ice and snow retreat, their highly reective
surfaces are replaced by the darker surfaces of the land and oceans, which store far more solar radiation.
e result is more stored heat and thus even more melting. Change in the Arctic may also aect
ocean temperatures and, in turn, high-altitude wind patterns, which scientists predict will increase
the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events in the Northern Hemisphere (Biello 2012).
Moreover, when permafrost land thaws, it releases carbon dioxide and methane, an especially potent
energy companies. e Arctics mineral deposits include rare earth metals, which face high demand
for their applications in electronics and the defense industry but are notorious for their unreliable
supply (CRS 2012). Melting ice opens the lid to competition over all of these coveted resources.
Second, and related, the expansion of ice-free waters has opened up new shipping
channelsor made them available for longer each yearand allowed for a far greater naval presence
in the region. From the perspective of international commerce, new routes oer the promise of faster
deliveries requiring less fuel. e route from Asia to Europe via the Northeast Passage, for example,
is thousands of miles shorter than the traditional route relying on the Suez Canal. Indeed, there were
47 crossings by ships carrying cargo between Asia and Europe in 2012, more than a ten-fold increased
from just two years earlier (Brooke 2012). Even China, a non-Arctic nation, recently sent a ship
across the Arctic. In some cases, there is disagreement over whether newly navigable waters constitute
international seaways, which would give any country the right to use them, or internal waters, which
would place them under national control. e Northwest Passage through the northern islands
of Canada is a prime example. More generally, all of the involved governments are increasingly
concerned with maintaining the security of these routes and with avoiding environmental accidents,
especially because most of these ships carry petroleum products and the risk posed by icebergs is so
high.
With these new opportunities come new sources of friction and a need for eective
cooperation. Overshing is a major concern. Environmental groups and even some governments,
including the United States and the European Union, favor a ban on commercial shing in these
waters until a management scheme is put in place (Pew Environment Group 2011). Drilling for oil
and natural gas under the ocean carries obvious environmental risks; the 2006 BP oil spill in the Gulf
of Mexico, in much shallower and warmer waters, shows the potential for disasters. Deep seabed
mining is even more untested and could threaten sheries and marine ecosystems, prompting many
environmentalists to call for more research and planning before it is allowed in the Arctic. Perhaps
the most important task is to manage the increased militarization of the Arctic. Russia now has a
eet of 20 icebreakers (7 of which are nuclear powered) and even Denmark has established an Arctic
Command and plans to deploy F-16 ghter jets in Greenland (Huebert 2010, 10). All ve Arctic
nations have increased their patrols, exercises and military infrastructure with an eye toward to the
north.
In the near future, it makes sense to rely on existing institutions to foster cooperation and
resolve conicts in the Arctic (Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009). e UN Convention on the Law of the
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue I Winter 2013 ompson e New Geopolitics of the Artic
114 115
Huebert, Rob. 2010. e Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment. Calgary: Canadian Defense
& Foreign Aairs Institute.
IPCC. 2007. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
NSIDC. 2012. Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum. Arctic Sea Ice News &
Analysis, September 19. http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-
record-seasonal-minimum/.
Pew Environment Group. 2011. Protecting Fisheries in the High Arctic. Fact Sheet, September 30.
Rosenthal, Elisabeth. 2012. Race Is On as Ice Melt Reveals Arctic Treasures. New York Times,
September 18.
greenhouse gas. In other words, climate change in the Arctic triggers a cascade of self-reinforcing
eects, many of which are hard to predict.
Finally, we should not forget that those most directly aected are the Arctics 4 million
or so human residents. Indigenous communities throughout the region are threatened by shifting
patterns of food availability and face challenges related to transportation and local infrastructure as
the ground turns to mud. e combination of thawing permafrost and increased coastal erosion
threatens the very existence of coastal villages. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
observes, e resilience shown historically by Arctic indigenous peoples is now being severely tested
(IPCC 2007, 655). Any plan to address the problem of Arctic warming should include programs to
increase the adaptive capacity of its most vulnerable communities. e Arctic case reminds us that
climate change poses problems of human security alongside the high politics of national security and
global commerce.
References
BBC News. 2007. Russia Plants Flag under North Pole. August 2. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/6927395.stm.
Biello, David. 2012. What Will Ice-Free Arctic Summers Bring? Scientic American, September
24.
Brooke, James. 2012. Climate Change Melts Away Obstacle to Arctic Shipping for China, Russia.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 5. http://www.rferl.org/content/climate-change-melts-
away-obstacle-to-arctic-shipping-for-china-russia/24784828.html.
Byers, Michael. 2009. Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North.
Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre.
Ebinger, Charles K. and Evie Zambetakis. 2009. e Geopolitics of Arctic Melt. International
Aairs 85(6): 1215-32.
Humphries, Marc. 2012. Rare Earth Elements: e Global Supply Chain. Washington: Congressional
Research Service.
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue I Winter 2013 ompson e New Geopolitics of the Artic
116 117
Seth Radley
Seth is a senior studying Political Science and Film Studies. He has been on the editorial sta for the
Journal since January 2011. After graduation, he plans to pursue a career in the lm industry. May
God have mercy on his soul.
Je Carroll
Je Carroll is a senior studying Philosophy and Political Science.He has been involved with the
journal since its resurrection.He has presented his work in political philosophy at conferences held
at Dowling College on Long Island, William and Mary College, and e Ohio State University. Je
plans to pursue graduate work in philosophy with a focus on political legitimacy and its relationship
to public reason justication. In his spare time, he daydreams about why folks heap scorn on
pragmatism when, upon further questioning, they are unable to even articulate what the occupation
of the position entails. He also enjoys golng, drinking scotch he cannot aord, and real country
music.
Phillip Allen
Phillip Burgoyne-Allen is a junior studying Political Science and Arabic. is is his rst year as an
editor with the journal. He is just beginning his honors thesis project on the eects of redistricting
on partisanship in Congress, with Professor Paul Beck. After graduation, Phillip plans to pursue a
career with the Department of State, and in his free time he enjoys watching Jeopardy and playing
basketball.
Nikole Iula
Nikole is an English major, Spanish minor from Independence, Ohio. Her hobbies include skiing,
horseback riding, reading and watching movies. She loves to travel and hopes to go to law school
after taking a year o.
Todd Ives
Todd is a sophomore studying Political Science and International Studies. is is his rst year with
the journal, and he plans to either attend law school or graduate school after graduation. He is also
a member of the sailing team at OSU. When he has free time,he has been known to remodel train
stations, making them more ecient in the area of heat retention.
e Journal of Politics & International Aairs
e Editorial Team
Cameron DeHart
Cameron is a senior studying Political Science and Economics. He has been editor-in-chief since
January 2011 when he re-established the Journal after a brief period of dormancy. In addition to his
courses, Cameron stays busy with research projects and Fed watching. He is a member of Phi Kappa
Phi, Pi Sigma Alpha, and the Collegiate Council on World Aairs. In fall 2013, he will pursue a
PhD in political science. His research interests include economic policymaking institutions, the
politics of central banking, and the history of social science.
Chelsea Hagan
Chelsea Hagan is a sophomore studying Political Science and Strategic Communication. She has
been an editor for JPIA since September 2011. She is also a girls circle facilitator for e Girls Cir-
cle Project, a member of PRSSA, is part of the student run PR rm, the PRactice and also works at
the Orientation Oce. is past summer she interned for Congressman Jim Renacci in his Canton
District oce. In her free time, Chelsea enjoys hanging out with friends and family.
Joseph Guenther
Joe is a senior studying Political Science and Economics, and he has been involved with the Journal
since January 2011. Joe plans to attend law school next fall. Over the past semester Joe has been
involved in research with the political science department focused on the Supreme Court and
to what extent their decisions are or are not logical. In addition to his studies, Joe serves in the
Army National Guard as an aircraft mechanic, and his hobbies include music, sports, reading, and
political activism.Joe graduated from e Ohio State University in December 2012.
Charlie Trefny
Charlie is a senior studying Political Science and Business from Cleveland, Oh. After graduation he
plans to attend law school to gain a more vibrant and candid perspective of the world. In his spare
time, he enjoys reading and watching political documentaries, playing golf, and managing a fantasy
baseball team.
118 119
Maegan Miller
Maegan is a senior studying Geography and Political Science, and after graduation, she plans to
attend graduate school for geography. She has been with the Journal since August 2012. She is
currently working on my honors thesis project with Professor Mathew Coleman in the Geography
Department. e project examines the role of law enforcement ocers in managing issues of
homelessness in Columbus. In her free time, she enjoys reading and writing poetry and thrift-store
shopping.
Taylor Humphrey
Taylor Humphrey is a rst year student pursuing a BA in Strategic Communications with a minor
in Business. is is her rst year being involved with JPIA and she hopes to continue to help the
program grow and succeed throughout her years at Ohio State. Taylor is also a member of the
Public Relations Student Society of America (PRSSA) and e PRactice, Ohio States own student-
run PR rm. Over the next four years, Taylor plans to make the most of her time at Ohio State
and try as many new things as possible. In her free time, she enjoys spending time with friends and
family, listening to music, watching movies, and occasionally indulging in some retail therapy.
Holly Yanai
Holly Yanai is a sophomore at Ohio State University and is studying International Studies and
Political Science. She enjoys riding horses and is a member of the Ohio State Equestrian Team.
After getting her undergraduate degree she hopes to continue her education in Graduate School.
Sarah Arnold
Sarah is a Criminology and Political science double-major with a dance minor. She enjoys being a
member of Kappa Alpha eta, singing, dancing, and painting. Sarah is planning on attending the
Oxford pre-law study abroad program this summer.
120
Submission of Manuscripts
e Journal of Politics & International Aairs (JPIA) welcomes submissions from undergraduates
and graduates of any school, class or major. We seek to publish manuscripts ofthe highest quality,
and papers selected for publication are generally exceptionally written, with well-developed theses,
and exhibit articulate arguments with original analysis. e JPIA also accepts and encourages sub-
missions from professors, Ph.D. candidates, guest lectures, subject matter experts, and distinguished
faculty. Submissions can include opinion pieces, short policy analysis, and book reviews.
Papers are typically 10-20 pages in length, and have been written for an upper-level course. Shorter
argumentative and current events papers will also be considered for publication. Manuscripts for
consideration should include an abstract of approximately 150 words. Citations and references
should follow the American Political Science Association Style Manual for Political Science. All
references must be complete, accurate, and up-to-date for submissions to be considered. References
in manuscripts should be submitted in the form of footnotes.
ose who submit papers may be asked to revise their manuscript before and after it is accepted
for publication. Submissions must be in the form of a Microsoft Word document and should be e-
mailed to journalupso@gmail.com. Please include name, university, a short biography, and contact
details (mailing address, e-mail address, and phone number). Although papers are encouraged and
accepted on a rolling basis, they will only be considered for publication during each publication
cycle. Please visit the Twitter feed (@OSU_JPIA) or nd us on Facebook for additional JPIA and
submission information.

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